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China’s Bids for International Events:

A Study of Central - Local Relations

CHU, Pok

A thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy in Political Studies

The University of Auckland

2012
Chinese cities have bid for international events since the 1980s. To increase their odds of success, central and local executive elites as well as central and local Party elites all participate in bids. The central and local executive elites are senior officials of the State Council, ministries and their affiliated units, and local governments. Their duty is to implement official bid tasks on behalf of the Chinese candidate cities. The central and local Party elites are members of the Chinese Communist Party Politburo Standing Committee and chairpersons of the local Party Committees. Their participation is to give support to the Chinese candidate cities. The pattern of division of labour between the central and local executive elites in implementing official bid tasks and the attitudes of both central and local Party elites in giving support are found to vary from case to case.

This thesis intends to understand what factors have significant influence to shape the division of labour between the central and local executive elites in implementing each bid and the attitudes of both central and local Party elites in supporting each bid. Through reviewing Beijing’s bid for the 2008 Olympic Games; Shanghai’s bid for the 2010 World Expo; Guangzhou’s bid for the 2010 Asian Games; and Shenzhen’s bid for the 2011 Summer World University Games, the stipulations of international organisations are confirmed as a factor that has significant influence to shape the pattern of division of labour between the central and local executive elites in implementing each bid, and Factionalism is refuted as a factor that has significant influence to shape the attitudes of both central and local Party elites in supporting each bid.

This thesis hence concluded that (1) China is a rule-abiding and effective international
bidder, and (2) international norms have replaced local factionalism in shaping the behaviour of the Chinese officials in dealing with the duties assigned by international bodies. These findings imply that the Chinese government uses international bids to demonstrate its willingness and competence to bear the responsibility as a member in the international society.
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My tribute is firstly paid to my chief supervisor Professor Gerald Chan. Without his patient supervision in Durham and Auckland, I could not finish this work. I am grateful to my co-supervisor Dr. Yang Jian for offering useful data, and valuable comments on theories and structure of my thesis. I thank Dr. Gordon Cheung for his suggestions at the early stage of my work in Durham, and Associate Professor Raymond Miller for his help during my shift from Durham to Auckland. I also thank Associate Professor Stephen Hoadley for offering constructive advices at the stage of my thesis revision.

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Last, my greatest debt is to my parents and grandparents for their unconditional love and supports. I dedicate this thesis to the memory of my grandparents.
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<tr>
<td>AFC</td>
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<td>Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation</td>
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<td>Asian University Sports Federation</td>
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<td>International Boxing Association</td>
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<td>Badminton World Federation</td>
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<td>OCA</td>
<td>Olympic Committee of Asia</td>
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<td>PLA</td>
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<td>楊志華</td>
<td>Yao Ming</td>
<td>姚明</td>
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<td>ZHOU HAEYING</td>
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<td>周济</td>
<td>ZHOU JI</td>
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<td>Zhou Muyao</td>
<td>周慕尧</td>
<td>ZHOU MUYAO</td>
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<td>周禹鹏</td>
<td>ZHOU YUPENG</td>
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<td>朱寄萍</td>
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<td>朱镕基</td>
<td>ZHU RONGJI</td>
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<tr>
<td>Zhu Xiaoming</td>
<td>朱晓明</td>
<td>ZHU XIAOMING</td>
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

China has been called to shoulder more responsibilities in the international society than it used to since the beginning of this century.\(^1\) This is due to two reasons. First, the high economic growth rate makes the country no longer being considered as a second class middle power.\(^2\) Indeed, the massive growth in China’s global trade and investment demonstrate its hunger to gain control on strategic technologies and assets in the West, as well as natural resources from around the world. It is also predicted to be the only state able to replace the United States and dominate the world marketplace.\(^3\) Second, the political and cultural influence of China in the international society has risen. It is because the Chinese government has become smarter and more mature in exercising soft power worldwide. The ways include setting up Confucius Institutes abroad to promote the Chinese language and traditional culture; giving financial aid to developing countries to build up the image of China’s benignity; sending young talents, like basketball player Yao Ming, overseas to project China’s ambition; initiating security and trade mechanisms within the region to symbolise China’s transformation, and holding international


\(^2\) The second class middle power was coined by Gerald Segal to describe a country which is lack of weight in aspects of the international trade and investment, and has a small and comparatively less significant market. For details, see Gerald Segal, “Does China Matter,” *Foreign Affairs* 78, no.5 (1999): 25.

gatherings to showcase China’s prestige and attraction.  

In response to the call from the international society, the Chinese government has been keen to ratify international treaties; join international organisations; initiate multilateral cooperation forums and participate in the UN peace-keeping missions, and asserts that those actions have been benefiting regional and world peace, development, stability and prosperity. China thus regards itself as a responsible player. However, the Western countries hold a skeptical view. China being questioned as a responsible player is partly due to the Chinese officials’ unwillingness to comply with international laws, and partly because of factionalism existed in the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) that may affect

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the Chinese officials’ effectiveness in dealing with the requests from international bodies.\(^9\)

Through reviewing whether the stipulations of international organisations and factionalism may have significant influence to shape the relations of the central and local officials in China’s bids for international events, this thesis finds that (1) China is a rule-abiding and effective bidder; and (2) the stipulations of international organizations has replaced factionalism in shaping the behaviour of the Chinese officials in dealing with the duties assigned by international bodies. The findings hence imply that bidding for international events is used to demonstrate the Chinese government’s willingness and competence to bear the responsibility as a member in the international society.

This introductory chapter consists of six sections. The first two sections will respectively introduce the characteristics of international bids as well as China’s motives in bidding for international events. The research objectives, scope, and methodology will be elaborated in sections three to five. The last section will outline the structure of this thesis.

1.1. International bids

An “international event” in this thesis refers to a multi-national gathering that is staged at a specified period of time. It can be globally participated in, like the Olympic Games or the World Expo, or only a specified region or a particular group of people may take part,

like the Asian Games and the World University Games. China generally obtains the rights to host international events by the following three channels. In a few instances, like the 1991 Guangdong FIFA (International Federation of Association Football) Women’s World Cup and the 1993 Shanghai East Asian Games, China has been invited to be the host by international organisations. In these cases China directly obtains the rights to host particular international events without going through the assessments of international organisations. Other examples, like Beijing’s 1999 International Horticultural Expo, involve international application, in which only one candidate submits a bid to host a particular international event. In other words, in these cases all Chinese applicants are assessed by international organisations but there are no other bidders and therefore no competition. The main channel through which China obtains the rights to host international events however involves international bids.

An “international bid” in this thesis refers to a zero-sum competition among national candidates vying for the right to host a particular international event. For example, the right to host the 2008 Summer Olympics Games was competed for by ten cities, including Bangkok; Beijing; Cairo; Havana; Istanbul; Kuala Lumpur; Osaka; Paris; Seville and Toronto. The participants in the 2010 World Expo bid were Buenos Aires, Moscow, Queretaro (Mexico), Shanghai, Wroclaw (Poland), and Yeosu (South Korea). The candidates in the 2010 Asian Games bid included Guangzhou (China), Kuala Lumpur,

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11 Yu Ping, “Yi shibohui weiqiji tuidong duiwai kaifang yi guozhanju weiwutai congjin hengping waijiao” (To Use the World Expos to Facilitate the Reform, and to Use BIE to Facilitate the Peaceful Diplomacy), in China Exhibition Almanac 2004 (Beijing: Tongxin Press, 2004), 6-10.
12 “Beijing aoshenwei mishuzhang tan Beijing shenban aoyunhui zhunbei qingkuang” (The Secretary of the Beijing Olympic Games Bid Committee Talked about Preparations in Beijing’s Bid for the Olympic Games), Beijing Daily, 21 June 2000, 4.
13 “Shanghai nuli shenban 2010 nian shibohui” (Shanghai Is Making an Effort to Bid for the 2010 World Expo), Jiefang Daily, 9 November 2001, 1&2.
Amman (Jordan) and Seoul.\(^\text{14}\) The right to host the 2011 Summer World University Games was contested by Edmonton (Canada), Kaohsiung (Taiwan), Kazan (Russia), Murcia (Spain), Poznan (Poland) and Shenzhen (China).\(^\text{15}\)

All international bids have two main characteristics. First, each of them is overseen by the executive body of a particular international organisation. For example, as the Olympic Charter states that the International Olympic Committee (IOC) is the only legal body which has the responsibility of “ensuring the regular celebration the Olympic Games” and that “the Olympic Games are the exclusive properties of IOC”,\(^\text{16}\) the IOC Executive Board is empowered to establish and supervise the procedures of accepting and selecting candidature to organise the Olympic Games.\(^\text{17}\) In other words, the duties of the IOC Executive Board in each Olympic Games bid include determining the contents of a candidature acceptance procedure, deciding which cities will be accepted as candidate cities, appointing a committee to inspect and evaluate all the candidate city for each edition of the Olympic Games, and drawing up the final list of candidate cities for election.\(^\text{18}\)

Since the International Exhibitions Bureau (\textit{Bureau International des Expositions} or BIE) is the sole body “in charge of overseeing the calendar, the bidding, the selection and the organization of World Expo”,\(^\text{19}\) the BIE Executive Committee is empowered to examine all applications to host a World Expo and submit them with advice for the approval of the

\(^{15}\) “Quanli zhengqu shijie dayunhui jubanquan” (Try the Ulmost to Secure the Right to Host the World University Games), \textit{Shenzhen Commercial Daily}, 30 June 2006, A2.
\(^{17}\) Rule 19 paragraph 3.6, in Ibid, 44.
\(^{18}\) Bye-law to rule 34 paragraphs 1.6; 2.2 & 3.1, in Ibid, 73-74.
General Assembly. This means that the Executive Committee organises one or more inquiries to ensure that the proposals of the candidates for holding a particular World Expo are feasible, to review the results of the inquiries, and to forward the matter with advice to the BIE General Assembly.

According to the Olympic Council of Asia (OCA) Constitution and Rules, the OCA is the “representative authority for the Asian Games”. The OCA Executive Board thus is empowered to determine the bidding procedure to be followed until election takes place. Its duties include appointing an Evaluation Committee to visit the bid cities, drafting a detailed report on each bid city, studying the Evaluation Report, determining whether the organisation capacities of the bidding cities qualify them as candidates, authorising the OCA members to organise a separate visit to a candidate city in case of doubt about its organisation capacity, and making a short list of a maximum of three bid cities for selection at the OCA General Assembly.

The International University Sports Federation (FISU) Statutes and Regulations for FISU Events stipulate that the organisation, promotion and supervision of the World University Games should be under the auspices of FISU. The FISU Executive Committee is thus

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23 Article 42 paragraph 3, in Ibid, 62.
24 Article 45 paragraphs 3; 4; 8 & 9, in Ibid, 67.
empowered to negotiate with candidates in each World University Games bid, examine
the answers of each candidate city’s Candidature File, submit the Candidature Files to the
FISU General Assembly, and inspect candidate cities prior to the meeting of the FISU
General Assembly.26

The second main characteristic of international bids is that they are usually zero-sum
games. A zero-sum game is defined as a contest in which the loss of one player is equal to
the gain of the other player.27 Since each international event (the Olympic Games, World
Expo, Asian Games and World University Games) is organised by one country only,28 the
right to host each of them is unlikely to be granted to two or more candidates in a bid.
Hence, a bidder’s win is necessarily the failure of its competitor(s).

International organisations usually decide the host city of a particular international event
by voting. The legislative body of international organisation is empowered to vote for the
host city. According to the Olympic Charter Rule 34 Paragraph 1 and the OCA
Constitution and Rules Article 42 Paragraph 1, the elections of the Olympic and Asian
Games host cities are the prerogatives of the IOC Session and the OCA General
Assembly.29 The BIE Regulation Relating to Procedures and Deadlines for Registration
of an Exhibition Part 1 paragraph 2b states that the winners of World Expo bids are
decided though secret ballots held by the BIE General Assembly.30 The FISU General
Assembly is authorised to choose the World University Games organising countries. The

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26 Article 13, in FISU Statutes, 13; Section D paragraphs 4 & 5, in Regulations for FISU Events, 85.
Oxford University Press, 2003), 582.
28 “The Olympic Games,” International Olympic Committee,
29 Olympic Charter, 72; OCA Constitution and Rules, 62.
30 Regulations Relating to Procedures and Deadlines for Regulation of An Exhibition, 3.
FISU Executive Committee is also able to implement the duty if the General Assembly has delegated the authority.\textsuperscript{31}

Each voting process takes place over successive rounds until one candidate receives a majority vote. If there is no majority in the first round, the city that receives the fewest votes is eliminated, and the international organisation’s members vote again for the remaining candidates. Thus, Beijing became the host city of the 2008 Olympic Games once it received the majority of votes in the second round of voting (see Table 1.1). Shanghai’s bid to be the 2010 World Expo was decided in the final round as it did not receive a majority vote in the prior rounds (see Table 1.2). Occasionally, international organisations give the right to host an international event to a candidate without undertaking voting as a result of that candidate’s rivals withdrawing during their bids. Guangzhou obtained the right to host the 2010 Asian Games from the OCA by this means.\textsuperscript{32}

Table 1.1. The 2008 Summer Olympic Games: host city voting results

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>City candidates</th>
<th>1\textsuperscript{st} round</th>
<th>2\textsuperscript{nd} round</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Beijing</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Toronto</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Istanbul</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paris</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Osaka</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Table 1.2. The 2010 World Expo: host city voting results

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>City candidates</th>
<th>1\textsuperscript{st} round</th>
<th>2\textsuperscript{nd} round</th>
<th>3\textsuperscript{rd} round</th>
<th>4\textsuperscript{th} round</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Shanghai</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yeosu</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moscow</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>12</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Queretaro</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
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<td>Wroclaw</td>
<td>2</td>
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</table>


\textsuperscript{31} Section D paragraph 1, in Regulations for FISU Events, 85.
\textsuperscript{32} “Yayun jubanquan Zhangshengzhong jueding” (The Right to Host the Asian Games Was Decided in the Applause), Guangzhou Daily, 2 July 2004, A3.
1.2. China and international bids

China’s international bids can be traced back to the 1980s. Beijing’s bid for the 1990 Asian Games in 1984 and Shanghai’s bid for the 1993 Summer World University Games in 1988 are two examples. In addition to ongoing attempts to win the rights to host the Asian Games and Summer World University Games, Chinese cities were also ambitious to hold large-scale and internationally renowned events in the 1990s. One prime example is Beijing’s bid for the 2000 Olympic Games. Ever since Beijing and Shanghai were chosen to hold the 2008 Olympic Games and the 2010 World Expo on 13 July 2001 and 3 December 2002 respectively, bidding for international events has been prevalent in China.

The following four factors illustrate how prevalent international bidding has been in China in the 2000s. First, more Chinese cities participated in bidding for international events in the 2000s than in the 1990s. For example, while China’s rate of competing for international multi-sport events was 100 percent higher than its 1980s rate in the 1990s, in the 2000s the rate rocketed to 150 percent higher (see Figure 1.1 and Table 1.3).

Second, international bids are no longer restricted to municipalities (zhixiashi). Sub-provincial cities (fushengjishi) are now also able to participate. For example, Harbin was the only sub-provincial city attempting to bid for international multi-sport event in the 1990s, but five sub-provincial cities bid for seven international multi-sport events in the 2000s (see Table 1.3).

Third, as well as internationally renowned global gatherings, Chinese cities also choose to bid for less popular and small-scale events. Tianjin’s bid for the 2013 East Asian Games in 2007, Harbin’s bid for the 2012 Winter Youth Olympic Games and Nanjing’s bid for the 2014 Summer Youth Olympic Games in 2009 are three examples.\(^{37}\)

Table 1.3. China’s bids for international multi-sport events 1980 - 2010

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year of application</th>
<th>Chinese candidate city</th>
<th>Bidding event</th>
<th>Organisation unit</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>Beijing*</td>
<td>1990 Asian Games</td>
<td>OCA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>Shanghai*</td>
<td>1993 Summer World University Games***</td>
<td>FISU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>Beijing*</td>
<td>2000 Olympic Games***</td>
<td>IOC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>Harbin**</td>
<td>1996 Asian Winter Games</td>
<td>OCA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>Beijing*</td>
<td>2001 Summer World University Games</td>
<td>FISU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>Beijing*</td>
<td>2008 Olympic Games</td>
<td>IOC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>Changchun**</td>
<td>2007 Asian Winter Games</td>
<td>OCA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>Shanghai*</td>
<td>2007 Special Olympics World Summer Games</td>
<td>Special Olympics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>Harbin**</td>
<td>2010 Winter Olympic Games***</td>
<td>IOC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>Beijing*</td>
<td>2006 World Sport For All Congress***</td>
<td>IOC; United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO); World Health Organisation (WHO); General Association of International Sports Federations (GAISF)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>Guangzhou**</td>
<td>2010 Asian Games</td>
<td>OCA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>Harbin**</td>
<td>2009 Winter World University Games</td>
<td>FISU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>Shenzhen**</td>
<td>2011 Summer World University Games</td>
<td>FISU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>Tianjin*</td>
<td>2013 East Asian Games</td>
<td>East Asian Games Association (EAGA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>Harbin**</td>
<td>2012 Winter Youth Olympic Games***</td>
<td>IOC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>Nanjing**</td>
<td>2014 Youth Olympic Games</td>
<td>IOC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>Beijing*</td>
<td>2011 World Sport For All Congress</td>
<td>IOC; UNESCO; WHO; GAISF</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* refers to municipality
** refers to sub-provincial city
*** refers to China’s failed bid
Source: Author’s database

Fourth, two or more Chinese cities began to collaborate on a bid for an international event in the 2000s. The examples include Beijing, Chongqing, Jinan and Chengdu’s bid for the 2004 AFC (Asian Football Confederation) Asian Cup in 2000 and Beijing, Shenyang,

Why is China so actively participating in international bids in the 2000s? According to the official documents, the answer is simply because both central and local Party committees and governments benefit from holding international events. For the CCP Central Committee and the State Council, holding international events is used to publicise the success of their governmental capacity. For example, when Chinese cities participate in international bids, it is interpreted as the CCP Central Committee and the State Council being willing to let international organisations evaluate the Reform and Opening-up (gaige kaifang) policy.  

When Chinese candidates are chosen to hold international events, it reflects well on the Reform and Opening-up policy has been recognised by the international community. When Chinese cities are organising and staging international events, China’s development, harmony and innovation, which are led by the CCP Central Committee and the State Council, are showcased on the global stage.

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38 “Woguo si chengshi shenban yazhoubei” (Four Cities of China Are Bidding for the Asian Cup), China Sports Daily, 15 August 2000, 2; “Si chengshi xiezhu Beijing shenban shijinsai” (Four Cities Are Assisting Beijing to Bid for the FIBA World Championship), China Sports Daily, 20 March 2009, 1.

39 “Zhengcheng de yuanwang zhashi de gongzuo” (A Sincere Wish and a Solid Work), People’s Daily, 9 May 2000, 1; “Wei zhengqu shenao chenggong er nuli” (Make Efforts to Succeed the Bid for the Olympic Games), People’s Daily, 7 September 2000, 5; “Beijing wanquan youmenli bancheng gaoshuiping aoyunhui” (Beijing Is Capable of Holding a High-Standard Olympic Games), People’s Daily, 5 October 2000, 1; “Quanli zhichi shanghai shenban 2010 nian shibohui” (Fully Support Shanghai’s Bid for the 2010 World Expo), People’s Daily, 25 November 2002, 1.

40 “Puxie aoyun shishang zui zhuangli de pianzhang” (Write the Most Glorious Chapter in Olympic History), People’s Daily, 14 July 2001, 1; “Wei shijie zengtian yicai” (Add Colour to the World), People’s Daily, 4 December 2002, 1; “Yingjie xinaoyun jianshe xinbeijing” (Greet the New Olympic Games and Construct a New Beijing), Beijing Daily, 14 July 2001, 1&3; “Huanshijie yige jingcai” (Return Brilliance to the World), Jiefang Daily, 4 December 2002, 2; “Puxie yayun shishang zuizhuangli de pianzhang” (Write the Most Glorious Chapter in the Asian Games History), Guangzhou Daily, 2 July 2004, A2; “Puxie dayunhui lishi xinpianzhang” (Write a New Chapter in the World University Games History), Shenzhen Special Zone Daily, 17 January 2007, A1&A2.

41 “Tong yige shijie tong yige mengxiang” (One World One Dream), People’s Daily, 8 August 2008, 1; “Guangrong shuyu weida de aolinpike” (Glory Belongs to the Olympic), People’s Daily, 25 August 2008, 1; “Rang shijie gengjia meihao” (Make the World a Better Place), People’s Daily, 30 April 2010, 1; “Yongbu luomu de shanghai shibo” (The Shanghai World Expo Never Ends), People’s Daily, 1 November 2010, 1; “Jiqing shenghui hexie yazhou” (Passionate Gathering, Harmonious Asia), People’s Daily, 12 November 2010, 1, “Jiqing shenghui shenteng xiwang” (The Passionate Gathering Raises Hope), People’s Daily, 28
For Chinese local Party committees and governments, holding international events can bring three kinds of benefits. First, when Chinese cities are chosen to hold international events, billions of yuan are injected for urban renovation by which the local economy can be boosted. For example, in order to make the 2008 Olympic Games the most successful event in the IOC history, Mayor Liu Qi announced that the Beijing government will use a total of 235 billion yuan for improving Beijing’s infrastructure and environment between 2001 and 2006. According to Mayor Chen Liangyu’s estimation, nearly 30 billion US dollars was spent in organising the 2010 World Expo. Mayor Zhang Guangning disclosed that the budget of the Guangzhou government for staging the 2010 Asian Games is 220 billion yuan. Before holding the Summer World University Games in 2011, the Shenzhen government decided to spend 43.5 billion yuan on improving the local sports stadiums and public transport.

The second benefit is that the international profiles of Chinese cities can be enhanced through holding international events. When harmony between man and nature and harmony among people were projected throughout the 2008 Olympic Games, Beijing’s unique image of culture, openness, solidarity and development was able to be showcased to the world. Since the 2010 World Expo attempted to harmonise the relationships

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November 2010, 1.
43 “Shanghai juzi dazao shibohui” (Shanghai Will Hold the Word Expo with Huge Amounts of Money), _China Trade News_, 5 December 2002, 1.
47 “Beijing aoshenwei huíhuì kouhao queding” (The Slogan and Emblem of the Beijing Olympic Games
between cities and nature, it facilitated to demonstrate Shanghai’s prestige to the global society. As the 2010 Asian Games aimed to build a harmonious Asia and to promote unity, friendship and further exchanges between different countries and regions, Guangzhou’s international popularity would be escalated to its highest level in history. While the energy, pulse and confidence of young people were being publicized during the 2011 Summer World University Games, it would help Shenzhen to increase its influence in the international community.

The third benefit is that the status of Chinese cities can be raised through holding of international events. As rebuilding Beijing as a modernised international city was the chief objective in the Tenth Five Year Plan (2001–2006) of the municipal government, organising the 2008 Olympic Games would narrow the gap between it and metropolises in developed countries. Since constructing the municipality as one of the economic, financial, trade and logistic centres in the world was the goal of the Shanghai government between 2001 and 2006, the process of preparing for the 2010 World Expo would

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49 “Shenbo: pindao toupiao zuihou yike” (Fighting to the Last Second in the Bid for the World Expo), Jiefang Daily, 11 February 2002, 1&2.
53 Liu Qi, “Beijing shi guanyu guoming jingji he shehui fazhan dishige wunian jiehua de gangyao baogao” (Report on the Outline of the Tenth Five Year Plan (Draft) of Beijing Municipality for National Economic and Social Development), In Beijing Yearbook 2001 (Beijing: Beijing Yearbook Press, 2001), 8-17.
54 Liu Qi’s Speech on the Beijing’s 2008 Olympic Games Celebration Meeting.
55 Huang Ju, “Fenfa youwei yushi jujin ba shanghai gaige kaifang he xiandaihua jianshe tigaodao xinshuiping” (Hardworking and Promising Advance with Time, to Upgrade Shanghai’s Reform and Modernization Construction to a New Level), In Shanghai Almanac 2003 (Shanghai: Shanghai Almanac Press, 2003), 4-11.
expedite the transformation. As the conversion of Guangzhou into one of the most influential cities in Southeast Asia was prioritised in the agenda of the Guangzhou government’s Five Year Plan in 2003, organising the 2010 Asian Games would facilitate the city to complete the task. Since forging Shenzhen as an international metropolis during 2006 to 2011 was in the plan of the Shenzhen government, hosting the 2011 Summer World University Games would speed up the city to achieve the goal.

1.3. Research objective

To increase the odds of Chinese candidates hosting international events, both central and local executive elites and central and local Party elites participate in bids. The central executive elites are the senior officials of the State Council, national ministries and the affiliated units of national ministries. Local executive elites are the senior officials of the local governments. They include the mayor and his subordinates if the bidding city is a municipality. If the bidding city is a sub-provincial city, the local executive elites include the provincial governor, the sub-provincial city mayor and their subordinates. The central Party elites are the members of the CCP Politburo Standing Committee, including the President of China and the Premier of China. The local Party elites are the Party Secretaries of China’s municipalities, provinces and sub-provincial cities.

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56 “Shenbo chenggong qingzhu dahui zaihu juxing” (The Celebration Meeting of Shanghai’s Bid for the World Expo Was Held in Shanghai), Jiefang Daily, 6 December 2002, 1&7.
60 “Gaoqidian gaoshuiping guihua jianshe aotizhongxin” (Plan and Construct the Olympic Sports Centre at High Starting-Point and Standard), Shenzhen Special Zone Daily, 8 December 2005, A1&A2.
All the central and local executive elites are members of bid committees, whose duty is to work together on the management and implementation of official bid tasks on behalf of China’s candidate cities. None of the central and local Party elites are members of bid committees. It means that they do not implement the bid tasks together with the central and local executive elites. The role of the central and local Party elites is to give support to Chinese candidates in China and abroad. In addition, since middle and junior ranking officials who work in central and local governments and Party committees do not work with their superiors on bids, they do not participate in implementing official bid tasks and giving support.

It is important to note that the division of labour between the central and local executive elites in implementing official bid tasks, and the attitudes of both the central and local Party elites in giving support, vary from case to case. When the implementation of the official tasks in bid A is led by the central executive elites and coordinated by the local executive elites, that in bid B is led by the local executive elites and coordinated by the central executive elites. In addition, while both central and local Party elites might be enthusiastic in supporting bid A, their attitudes towards bid B could be inconsistent with each other.

This thesis hence intends to understand what factors have significant influence to shape (1) the division of labour between the central and local executive elites in implementing each bid; and (2) the attitudes of both central and local Party elites in supporting each bid. Two hypotheses are proposed to answer it. Hypothesis I is that the stipulations of international organisations may lead to the pattern of division of labour between the central and local executive elites in implementing each bid. Hypothesis II is that
factionalism may lead to the attitudes of both central and local Party elites in supporting each bid.

1.4. Research scope

According to the Chinese administrative guideline, a Chinese city is only allowed to bid for an international event after it has obtained the permission of the State Council.\textsuperscript{61} Without State Council approval, the central and local political elites are not allowed to implement official bid tasks or support them. In addition, the elites are no longer involved in a bid after the vote of the relevant international organisation. Hence, for the purposes of this research, China’s international bids commence when they have been approved by the State Council and end when the Chinese bidding delegation returns to China after attending the vote. Any interactions between the central and local political elites before and after this timeframe are not included in the testing of the hypotheses of this thesis.

Non-Chinese bids will not be considered, as this research is concerned with identifying the uniqueness of China’s bids and is not a study of the differences between Chinese and non-Chinese bids. However, the latter may be useful topics for the author’s future research if suitable non-Chinese bids are found for comparative analysis. To understand the attitudes of various central and local Party elites towards supporting bids, some of China’s failed bids, including Beijing’s bid for the 2000 Olympic Games and Shanghai’s bid for the 1993 Summer World University Games, will be referred to.

1.5. Methodology and sources

The two hypotheses will be tested in four case studies: Beijing’s bid for the 2008 Summer Olympic Games, Shanghai’s bid for the 2010 World Expo, Guangzhou’s bid for the 2010 Asian Games, and Shenzhen’s bid for the 2011 Summer World University Games. They have been chosen for two reasons. First, the statuses of Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou and Shenzhen are crucial in Chinese politics and economics. For example, Beijing is widely regarded as the political and cultural centre of China as it has served as the national capital since the Yuan Dynasty in 1293. Although the history of Shanghai is shorter than that of Beijing, it is one of China’s first sea ports and foreign trade centres. After nearly 200 years of change, it has become the biggest and most populous city in China, as well as the country’s economic and financial centre. Guangzhou, the capital city of Guangdong province, is the biggest city in South China and its most important trading port. It is also the only sub-provincial city in the list of National Central Cities (the others are the municipalities Beijing, Chongqing, Shanghai and Tianjin). Shenzhen, established in 1980, was the first special economic zone established by China’s Reform and Opening-up policy. Its per capita GDP ranks first among China’s major cities after 30 years of rapid development.

The second reason is that the four chosen case studies obtained the support of both the CCP Central Committee (dangzhongyang) and the State Council (guowuyuan). Most of

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China’s bids for international events since the 1990s, including Harbin’s bids for the 1996 Asian Winter Games and the 2009 Winter World University Games; Changchun’s bid for the 2007 Asian Winter Games; Tianjin’s bid for the 2013 East Asian Games; and Nanjing’s bid for the 2014 Youth Olympic Games, were either supported by the State Council and the local Party committees and governments or the local Party committees and governments only.66 However, the supporters of Beijing’s bid for the 2008 Olympic Games, Shanghai’s bid for the 2010 World Expo, Guangzhou’s bid for the 2010 Asian Games and Shenzhen’s bid for the 2011 Summer World University Games include not only the local Party committees and governments, but also the CCP Central Committee and the State Council.67 It is crucial to point out that not all of these cities’ bids for international events have been supported by the CCP Central Committee and the State Council. For example, Shanghai’s bid for the 2007 Special Olympics World Summer Games only obtained the support of the State Council and the Shanghai government.68 Hence, unlike other Chinese bids, Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou and Shenzhen all received the attention of the central Party committees and government, and enjoyed China’s highest official standard of support when they were bidding for their respective international event.

To examine hypothesis I of this thesis, it is necessary first to review the constitutions, event regulations and other official documents of the IOC, BIE, OCA and FISU for

66 “Suo Changyou shizhang tan shenban chenggong de yuanyin” (Mayor Suo Changyou Talked about the Reasons of Harbin’s Victory), Harbin Daily, 3 December 1993, 1; “Changchun shenban yadonghui daibiaotuan zuori kaixuan” (The Changchun Winter World University Games Bid Delegation Returned in Triumph Yesterday), Jilin Daily, 6 October 2002, 2; “Shizhengfu hedian” (The Harbin Government’s Congratulation Telegram), Harbin Daily, 11 January 2005, 1; “Daibiaotuan zuo zaiyu guijin” (The Bid Delegation Returned Tianjin in Triumph Yesterday), Tianjin Daily, 25 June 2007, 7; “Nanjing wanquan younengli ba qingaohui bancheng qingchun wenhua shenghui” (Nanjing Is Capable of Presenting the Youth Olympic Games as a Youth and Cultural Festival), Nanjing Daily, 12 February 2010, A1&A2.
67 Greet the New Olympic Games and Construct a New Beijing; Return Brilliance to the world; Write the Most Glorious Chapter in the Asian Games History; Write a New Chapter in the World University Games History.
understanding their stipulations regarding the division of labour between the central and local executive units in implementing the official duties of the four bidding cases. The next step is to understand the roles played by the central or local executive elites in implementing their official duties in the four bids. The official duties of each bid include the following six tasks: (1) lobbying international organisation members and executives to support the Chinese candidate cities; (2) publicising the Chinese candidate cities in China and abroad; (3) furnishing the bidding documents of the Chinese candidate cities; (4) entertaining international inspectors when the Chinese candidate cities are being evaluated; (5) giving the presentation to members of the international organisations of behalf of the Chinese candidate cities; and (6) preparing the Chinese candidate cities to hold the international events. The hypothesis will be confirmed if the division of labour between the central and local executive elites in implementing each bid is consistent with the stipulations of the particular international organisation. If the opposite is found, the stipulations of international organisations will be refuted as a factor that has significant influence to shape the division of labour between the central and local executive elites in implementing each bid.

To examine hypothesis II of this thesis, the first step is to understand the supporting attitude of each central or local Party elite in the four bids. A Party elite’s attitude in supporting a bid can be deduced through the approach of comparing all of his actions in supporting a bid with all of the actions of same-ranking officials in supporting China’s previous international bids. The supporting actions generally include writing guarantee letters; meeting with the international organisation’s inspectors and executives; introducing the bid to the foreign guests and asking for their support; giving instructions to their subordinates on the bid; and giving assistance to the executive elites in
implementing official bid tasks. Applying this approach is because both central and local Party elites are usually familiar with same-ranking officials’ actions in supporting previous bids before they decide how to act on the current bid. For instance, after reviewing President Yang Shangkun and Premier Li Peng’s supporting letter for Beijing’s bid for the 2000 Olympic Games, President Jiang Zemin and Premier Zhu Rongji decided to how write their supporting letters for Beijing’s bid for the 2008 Olympic Games. Indeed the contents of Jiang and Zhu’s letters are very similar to those of Yang and Li’s letters.69

Three of the bids chosen for analysis in this thesis, including Beijing’s bid for the 2008 Olympic Games; Guangzhou’s bid for the 2010 Asian Games and Shenzhen’s bid for the 2011 Summer World University Games, have Chinese precedents, either for the same international event, or for events overseen by the same international organisations. Hence, the actions of the central and local Party elites in supporting Beijing’s bid for the 2008 Olympic Games will be compared with those of the central and local Party elites in supporting Beijing’s bid for the 2000 Olympic Games. The actions of the central and local Party elites in supporting Guangzhou’s bid for the 2010 Asian Games will be compared with those of the central and local Party elites in supporting Beijing’s bid for the 1990 Asian Games, Harbin’s bid for the 1996 Asian Winter Games and Changchun’s bid for the 2007 Asian Winter Games. The actions of the central and local Party elites in supporting Shenzhen’s bid for the 2011 Summer World University Games will be compared with those of the central and local Party elites in supporting Shanghai’s bid for the 1993

Summer World University Games, Beijing’s bid for the 2001 Summer World University Games and Harbin’s bid for the 2009 Winter World University Games.

Since Shanghai’s bid for the 2010 World Expo is China’s first attempt to host a BIE international event, the previous bid chosen for comparison should be for an international event overseen by another international organisation. Beijing’s bid for the 2008 Olympic Games was chosen because (1) both Beijing and Shanghai are municipalities; (2) both bids took place in the 21st century; (3) President Jiang Zemin and Premier Zhu Rongji gave their support to both bids; and (4) the CCP Central Committee and the Chinese government both gave equal attention to the 2008 Olympic Games and the 2010 World Expo. For instance, both events were officially regarded as the two engines to carry forward China’s Reform and Opening-up policy in the early 21st century.70

It is important to point out that if any local Party elite is a member of the Bid Committee, his/her actions will not be included in the comparative analysis. This is because the nature of his/her actions is to implement official bid tasks on behalf of the city and not to give support. For example, Changchun Party Secretary Du Xuefang’s duties in Changchun’s bid for the 2007 Asian Winter Games will not be compared with Guangzhou Party Secretary Lin Shusen’s actions in supporting Guangzhou’s bid for the 2010 Asian Games (Du was one of the vice presidents of the Changchun 2007 Asian Winter Games Bid Committee).71

Hypothesis II will be tested after the attitudes of the central and local Party elites in

70 “Quanli zhengqu shenshi chenggong” (Make Every Effort to Secure the Success in the Bid for the World Expo), Jiefang Daily, 22 August 2001, 1&2.
giving support have been deduced. Factionalism will be confirmed as a factor that has significant influence to shape the attitudes of both central and local Party elites in supporting each bid when the following two outcomes are witnessed: (1) if the central and local Party elites come from the same faction, their attitudes in supporting a bid are consistent; and (2) if the central and local Party elites come from different factions, their attitudes in supporting a bid are inconsistent. If the proposed outcomes are refuted, factionalism can be rejected as a factor that has significant influence to shape the attitudes of both central and local Party elites in supporting each bid.

All data analysed in this research were collected from archives in both Chinese and English. The Chinese archives include (1) the official newspapers of the CCP Central Committee, the ministries and the local Party committees; (2) the official websites of Beijing’s bid for the 2008 Summer Olympic Games, Shanghai’s bid for the 2010 World Expo, Guangzhou’s bid for the 2010 Asian Games and Shenzhen’s bid for the 2011 Summer World University Games; (3) the central and local governments’ yearbooks; and (4) the memoirs of the participatory elites. The English archives include the official websites of IOC, BIE, OCA and FISU, and the China Leadership Monitor website of the Hoover Institution.

Most of data consulted in this research are from reports of the Chinese official newspapers published by the CCP Central Committee, the ministries and the local Party committees. This is because they not only document all content of speeches of the central and local Party elites delivered in relation to the bids, but also specifically record the duties of the central and local executive elites assigned to implement the official tasks of each bid. Thus, the People’s Daily (Renmin Ribao) of the CCP Central Committee will be
referred to in all case studies. The investigation of Beijing’s bid for the 2008 Olympic Games will rely on the *Beijing Daily (Beijing Ribao)* of the Beijing Municipal Party Committee and the *China Sports Daily (Zhongguo Tiyubao)* of the CGSA. The analysis of Shanghai’s bid for the 2010 World Expo will be assisted by the *Jiefang Daily (Jiefang Ribao)* of the Shanghai Municipal Party Committee and the *China Trade News (Zhongguo Maoyibao)* of the China Council for the International Trade Promotion.

When researching Guangzhou’s bid for the 2010 Asian Games and Shenzhen’s bid for the 2011 Summer World University Games, the following newspapers were consulted: *China Sports Daily; China Education Daily (Zhongguo Jiaoyubao)* of the Ministry of Education; *Nanfang Daily (Nanfang Ribao)* of the Guangdong Provincial Party Committee; *Guangzhou Daily (Guangzhou Ribao)* of the Guangzhou City Party Committee; *Shenzhen Special Zone Daily (Shenzhen Tequbao)* of the Shenzhen City Party Committee; *Heilongjiang Daily (Heilongjiang Ribao)* of the Heilongjiang Provincial Party Committee; *Harbin Daily (Harbin Ribao)* of the Harbin City Party Committee; *Jilin Daily (Jilin Ribao)* of the Jilin Provincial Party Committee and *Changchun Daily (Changchun Ribao)* of the Changchun City Party Committee.

Occasionally, reports in the broadsheets involving similar authorities as the central and local official newspapers, like *Guangming Daily (Guangming Ribao); Weihui Daily (Weihuibao); South Metropolis Daily (Nafang Dushibao)* and *Shenzhen Commercial Daily (Shenzhen Shangbao)*, will also be quoted. The central and local official English newspapers and magazines, including *China Daily, Beijing Review, Shanghai Daily* and *Shenzhen Daily*, are less cited in this study. This is because their contents are relatively simplistic in comparison with their Chinese versions. Dependence on English primary
sources is likely to lead to the omission of crucial evidence.

Two types of documents in the yearbooks of the central government, the ministries and the local governments (the *People's Republic of China Yearbook* (*Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Nianjian*); *China Sport Yearbook* (*Zhongguo Tiyu Nianjian*); *China Exhibition Almanac* (*Zhongguo Zhanlan Nianjian*); *China Education Yearbook* (*Zhongguo Jiaoyu Nianjian*); *Beijing Yearbook* (*Beijing Nianjian*); *Shanghai Almanac* (*Shanghai Nianjian*); *Guangdong Yearbook* (*Guangdong Nianjian*); *Guangzhou Yearbook* (*Guangzhou Nianjian*); *Shenzhen Yearbook* (*Shenzhen Nianjian*); *Heilongjiang Yearbook* (*Heilongjiang Nianjian*); *Harbin Yearbook* (*Harbin Nianjian*); *Jilin Yearbook* (*Jilin Nianjian*) and *Changchun Yearbook* (*Changchun Nianjian*)) will be referred to. The first type is the annual bid summaries. They are useful to supplement the data collected from the newspapers. The second type of document is the annual work reports of the State Council, the ministries and the local Party committees and governments. The aim of referring to them is to investigate whether the bids are included in them. This not only facilitates our understanding of the supporting attitudes of the local Party elites, but also our understanding of the practices of the central and local governments and Party Committees with regard to bids. In addition, the data in the local statistical yearbooks, including the *Beijing Statistical Yearbook* (*Beijing Tongji Nianjian*); *Shanghai Statistical Yearbook* (*Shanghai Tongji Nianjian*); *Guangzhou Statistical Yearbook* (*Guangzhou Tongji Nianjian*) and *Shenzhen Statistical Yearbook* (*Shenzhen Tongji Nianjian*), will be quoted to flesh out the background of the cities holding the events.

The documents uploaded on the official websites of Beijing’s bid for the 2008 Olympic Games, Shanghai’s bid for the 2010 World Expo, Guangzhou’s bid for the 2010 Asian
Games and Shenzhen’s bid for the 2011 Summer World University Games are analysed because they disclose which party first motivated the cities to hold the events, and the big stages in each bid. They are helpful in providing the backgrounds and processes of the four case studies. To further understand Beijing’s bid for the 2008 Olympic Games and Shanghai’s bid for the 2010 World Expo, some information unveiled in the memoirs of the central and local executive elites are quoted.

The documents referred to on the official websites of IOC, BIE, OCA and FISU are their constitutions and event regulations, including Olympic Charter; IOC Candidature Acceptance Procedure; BIE Convention Relating to International Exhibition; BIE Regulations Relating to the Procedure and Deadlines for Registration of an Exhibition; OCA Constitution and Rules, Regulations for FISU Events, and FISU Statutes. They not only state the roles and duties of the central and local units in the bids, but also the power of the executive bodies of international organisations in penalising candidates which fail to comply with stipulations in the constitutions and event regulations.

The China Leadership Monitor website has also been consulted. This website is sponsored by the Hoover Institution on War, Revolution, and Peace at Stanford University which aims to inform the international community “about current trends in China’s leadership politics and in its foreign and domestic policies”. Some of its articles describe the features and members of the CCP factions during the Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao era. They are helpful in comprehending the factional connections between the central and local Party elites who participated in the four cases.

1.6. Dissertation outline

After this introductory chapter, Chapter 2 is to start with a detail elaboration about who are the central and local Party and executive elites in the international bids, and then explains the theoretical framework behind the two hypotheses of this thesis. The core of Hypothesis I is that each international organisation is empowered to disqualify a candidate city which fails to comply with the pattern of division of labour stipulated in its constitution or event regulations. To avoid disqualification, the pattern of division of labour between the central and local executive elites in implementing all the official tasks of a particular bid needs to be consistent with that stipulated by the international organisation. Hence, the stipulations of international organisations may have significant influence to shape the division of labour between the central and local executive elites in each bid. Hypothesis II is based on the belief that factionalism is a factor that may lead to Party elites’ attitudes in making and implementing policies. Since all the central and local Party elites who participated in the four case studies selected for this research are members of different CCP factions, their attitudes may be influenced by their relations with the various factions.

Chapter 3 reviews Beijing’s bid for the 2008 Olympic Games. To deduce the attitudes of Jiang Zemin, Premier Zhu Rongji and Beijing Party Secretary Jia Qinglin in supporting it, their actions will be compared with those of Presidents Yang Shangkun and Jiang Zemin, Premier Li Peng and Beijing Party Secretary Li Ximing in Beijing’s bid for the 2000 Olympic Games. Since Jia is Jiang’s factional protégé, their attitudes in supporting the bid are assumed to be consistent. Zhu and Jia’s supporting attitudes are assumed to be inconsistent as they come from different factions. The roles of CGSA President Wu
Shaozu and his successor Yuan Weimin, Beijing Mayor Liu Qi and their subordinates in implementing the official tasks of the bid are then investigated. Their division of labour is assumed to be consisted with the stipulations of the IOC: local-led and central-coordinated.

Shanghai’s bid for the 2010 World Expo is analysed in Chapter 4. In the first half of the chapter, the attitudes of President Jiang Zemin, Premier Zhu Rongji and Shanghai Party Secretary Huang Ju’s towards the bid will be deduced by comparing them with the supporting actions of Jiang Zemin, Zhu Rongji and Beijing Party Secretary Jia Qinglin in Beijing’s bid for the 2008 Olympic Games. Since Huang is Jiang’s factional protégé, their attitudes in supporting the bid are assumed to be consistent. However, because Zhu and Huang come from different factions, their attitudes in supporting the bid are assumed to be inconsistent. The duties of State Councillor Wu Yi, Shanghai Mayors Xu Kuangdi and Chen Liangyu and their fellows in implementing the official tasks of the bid will be reviewed in the second half of the chapter. As it is stipulated by the BIE that each World Expo bid must operate as a central-led and local-coordinated project, their division of labour is assumed to be consistent with the stipulations.

Chapter 5 focuses on Guangzhou’s bid for the 2010 Asia Games. The supporting actions of Premier Wen Jiabao, Guangdong Party Secretary Zhang Dejiang and Guangzhou Party Secretary Lin Shusen are compared with those of the central and local Party elites in supporting Beijing’s bid for the 1990 Asian Games, Harbin’s bid for the 1996 Asian Winter Games and Changchun’s bid for the 2007 Asian Winter Games. It is assumed that Wen, Zhang and Lin’s attitudes are inconsistent since they come from different factions. In addition, the roles played by CGSA President Yuan Weimin, Guangdong governor
Huang Huahua, Guangzhou Mayor Zhang Guangning and their colleagues in implementing the official bid tasks are analysed. The division of labour is assumed to be consistent with the stipulations of the OCA: central-coordinated and local-led.

Shenzhen’s bid for the 2011 Summer World University Games is reviewed in Chapter 6. To uncover the attitudes of Premier Wen Jiabao, Guangdong Party Secretary Zhang Dejiang and Shenzhen Party Secretary Li Hongzhong towards the bid, their supporting actions will be compared with the actions of the central and local Party elites in supporting Shanghai’s bid for the 1993 Summer World University Games, Beijing’s bid for the 2001 Summer World University Games and Harbin’s bid for the 2009 Winter World University Games. Their attitudes are assumed to be inconsistent as they come from different factions. In addition, since each World University Games bid is required to operate as a local-led and central-coordinated project, it is assumed that when Guangdong governor Huang Huahua, Shenzhen mayor Xu Zongheng and their subordinates played the leading role in implementing the official bid tasks, the Deputy Education Minister Zhang Xinsheng, the CGSA President Liu Peng and their colleagues acted in a coordinating capacity.

The last chapter, the Conclusion, recaps the findings about the division of labour between the central and local executive elites in implementing, and the attitudes of the central and local Party elites in supporting, the four bids chosen for this thesis, and summarises their implication. Three areas in relation to the implicit political purposes of the Chinese government to bid for international events are suggested for further research at the end. Figure 1.2 shows the structure of this thesis.
Figure 1.2. The structure of the thesis
CHAPTER 2
THEORY AND HYPOTHESES

In order to understand what factors have significant influence to shape the relations of the central and local political elites in China’s international bids, this thesis proposes two hypotheses. The first concerns the division of labour between central and local executive elites in implementing official bid tasks on behalf of the Chinese candidates. The stipulations of international organisations are hypothesised as a determining factor. The second concerns the attitudes of both central and local Party elites in giving support. Factionalism is hypothesised as a determining factor. This chapter aims to elaborate who are the central and local executive and Party elites in China’s international bids, and to explain why the stipulations of international organisations and factionalism are targeted as the factors to shape the relations.

2.1. The central and local executive and Party elites

Chinese officials involved in international bids come from four groups. The first group is the central executive units, including (1) the State Council; (2) the ministries, commissions and organisations; and (3) the affiliated units of the ministries, commissions and organisations. The State Council is the highest state administration organ of the People’s Republic China, which main duty is to lead the ministries, commissions and organisations to deal with China’s internal politics, diplomacy, national defence, finance,
economy, culture, and education.¹

There are 27 ministries and commissions and 16 organisations under the State Council, and each of them is responsible for the administration of a specific area in the PRC.² For instance, the China General Sports Association (CGSA) is the organisation overseeing sports affairs in China.³ Issues relating to education and other student affairs are managed by the Education Ministry (EM).⁴ The unit dealing with Chinese diplomatic affairs is the Foreign Affairs Ministry (FAM).⁵ The duty of organising and publicising China’s exhibitions and trade fairs is the China Council for the International Trade Promotion (CCITP).⁶

The affiliated units of the ministries, commissions and organisations, like the Chinese Olympic Committee (COC) and the Chinese University Sports Federation (CUSF), also take part in China’s international bids. The COC is under the CGSA, which duty is to represent China in handling international affairs related to the International Olympic Committee (IOC), the Olympic Council of Asia (OCA), and other international sports organisations.⁷ The CUSF is under the EM. It is China’s sole body in charge of the affairs related to the International University Sports Federation (FISU) and the Asian

University Sports Federation (AUSF). 8

Those who come from the first group have three characteristics when participating in bids. First, all of them are members of the Bid Committees. The Bid Committee is the official unit to execute bid tasks on behalf of the Chinese city. Thus, the duty of this group of officials is to manage and implement official tasks of a bid. Second, their work in bids is on behalf of the Chinese government or a particular community, like the Chinese sports community, the Chinese business community or the Chinese tertiary education community. Third, all of them are senior officials of the national executive units. For example, State Councillor Wu Yi, Foreign Affairs Minister Tang Jiaxuan, Chairperson of the CCITP Yu Xiaosong, the CGSA Presidents Wu Shaozu, Yuan Weimin and Liu Peng, Education Minister Zhou Ji, the COC Presidents Wu Shaozu and Yuan Weimin, the CUSF President Zhang Xinsheng, and their deputies respectively participated in the bids of Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou and Shenzhen. Since no middle-level and junior officials took part in managing and implementing official bid tasks, this group of officials can be considered the central executive elites.

The second group is the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Politburo Standing Committee. Although the CCP Constitution does not state its status and duty, the Standing Committee is always believed to be the most powerful organ of the CCP and lies at the core of the decision-making process. 9 One of the indicators is its membership. The CCP General Secretary, the Premier, the Chairperson of the National People’s Congress, the President

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of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference are normally part of each Standing Committee. Thus, the members of the Standing Committee involved in the bids can be considered the central Party elites.

However, while the central executive elites are members of the Bid Committees, the central Party elites are not. In addition, the participation of the central executive elites in the bids is to implement official bid tasks on behalf of the Chinese government and/or a particular community in China, whereas the role of the central Party elites in the bids is to give support to the Chinese cities on behalf of the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee and the Chinese government. Furthermore, the members of the Standing Committee involved in the bids vary from case to case. When the CCP General Secretary and the PRC President Jiang Zemin and Premier Zhu Rongji participated in Beijing’s bid for the 2008 Olympic Games and Shanghai’s bid for the 2010 World Expo, only Premier Wen Jiabao took part in both Guangzhou’s bid for the 2010 Asian Games and Shenzhen’s bid for the 2011 Summer World University Games.

The third group is the local governments. According to Article 107 of the Constitution of the PRC, the main duty of the local governments is to *conduct the administrative work concerning the economy, education, science, culture, public health, physical culture, urban and rural development, finance, civil affairs, public security, nationalities affairs, judicial administration, supervision and family planning in their administrative areas.*

It is important to point out that the number of local governments involved in a bid is subject to the administrative status of the city in China. If the bid city is a municipality, like Beijing or Shanghai; only the municipal government would take part. If the bid city is subject to the administrative status of the city in China. If the bid city is a municipality, like Beijing or Shanghai; only the municipal government would take part.

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a sub-provincial city, like Guangzhou or Shenzhen; both provincial and sub-provincial
governments would participate.

Those who come from the second group also carry three characteristics when
participating in China’s international bids. First, all of them are members of the Bid
Committees. It means that their duty is together with the central executive elites to
manage and implement official bid tasks. Second, their participation in bids is to represent
the local governments only. Third, as all of them are senior officials of the local
governments, this group of officials can be called local executive elites. For instance,
while Beijing mayor Liu Qi, Shanghai mayors Xu Kuangdi and Chen Liangyu, and and
their deputies are members of the Beijing 2008 Olympic Games Bid Committee and
Shanghai 2010 World Expo Bid Committee; Guangdong governor Huang Huahua,
Guangzhou mayor Zhang Guangning, Shenzhen mayor Xu Zongheng, and their deputies
are members of the Guangzhou 2010 Asian Games Bid Committee and Shenzhen 2011
World University Games Bid Committee.\textsuperscript{11}

The fourth group is the CCP local committees. The CCP local committees are responsible
for supervising and directing the local governments to make and implement policies.\textsuperscript{12}
Only the leaders of the CCP municipal, provincial and sub-provincial city committees
take part in bids. For instance, while Beijing Party Secretary Jia Qinglin and Shanghai
Party Secretary Huang Ju respectively appeared in bids for the 2008 Olympic Games and
for the 2010 World Expo; Guangdong Party Secretary Zhang Dejiang, Guangzhou Party
Secretary Lin Shusen and Shenzhen Party Secretary Li Hongzhong were involved in the
bids for the 2010 Asian Games and for the 2011 World University Games. Thus, this

\textsuperscript{11} For details, see Tables 3.3, 4.2, 5.2, 6.3.
\textsuperscript{12} James C. F. Wong, \textit{Contemporary Chinese politics, An Introduction}, 7th ed. (Upper Saddle River, N.J:
Prentice Hall, 2002), 81.
group of officials can be called the local Party elites.

Same as the characteristics of the central Party elites in the bids, the duty of the local Party elites is to give support to the Chinese cities. Thus, they are not members of the Bid Committees. However, while the support received from the central Party elites is on behalf of the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee and the Chinese government, those received from the local Party elites is on behalf of the local Party committees and the local governments.

Through reviewing the four groups of officials, it is apparent that there are two types of central and local relations in China’s bids for international events. The first one is between central and local executive elites, and its objective is to implement official bid tasks on behalf of the Chinese cities. The second one is between the central and local Party elites, and its objective is to give support to the Chinese cities.

2.2. Division of labour between the central and local executive elites

Since all the central and local executive elites are members of the Bid Committees, it denotes that the duty of the central and local executive elites on a Bid Committee is to implement six types of official bid tasks for the Chinese candidate city, including (1) lobbying the members and executives of international organisations; (2) publicising the Chinese candidates in China and abroad; (3) furnishing the bidding documents; (4) entertaining the inspectors; (5) giving the presentation; and (6) preparing the Chinese candidate to hold the event.
Lobbying refers to applying to the members and executives of the international organisations to support the Chinese candidate cities. Since the members of the international organisations have voting rights in the bids, the central and local executive elites often spend effort and resources to lobby them. The central and local executive elites also like to meet the executives of international organisations at their headquarters, or to invite them to visit the candidate cities. The reasons for lobbying the executives are twofold. First, they are usually assigned to inspect and evaluate all the candidate cities in the bids. Second, the executives may also have voting rights in the bids for particular events, like the World University Games.

Publicising involves advertising Chinese candidates in China and abroad. The central and local executive elites often organise activities in China, emphasising the importance of holding the events in the Chinese cities and calling on the local residents to coordinate with the Bid Committees to ensure all the bid tasks are completed. In order to draw the attention of the international community to the Chinese candidates, the executive elites frequently go abroad to market the themes of the events and the benefits the Chinese cities can offer the participants. They also give interviews to the local and international media, and hold press conferences to report the progress of the bids on a regular basis.

Each candidate city is required to furnish two bidding documents to the international organisations: an Application Letter and a Candidature File. The Application Letter is an official notice informing the international organisation of the city’s intent to hold the event. The Candidature File is a proposal in which the city must explain its detailed plans for organising the event. The central and local executive elites are in charge of drafting the bidding documents. They also deliver the documents to the headquarters of
international organisations, and then hand them to the relevant executives.

After receiving the Candidature File, the international organisations will send their executives to inspect each candidate city. The executives will give their evaluation of each candidate’s capability to hold the particular event in a report after the inspection. The report will be distributed to all members of the international organisation before the vote. In order to impress the executives of the international organisations, the central and local executive elites need to prepare the Chinese candidate cities before the inspections. They are also in charge of entertaining the executives during the inspections. Entertainment duties include chairing greeting and seeing-off ceremonies, accompanying the executives to inspect the candidate city, and holding a press conference at the end of each inspection.

Each candidate city is required to give at least one presentation to all members of the relevant international organisation during a bid. This usually takes place just before the vote. The presentation is the last chance for the city to impress the voters. The central and local executive elites need to deliver speeches in the presentation. In addition to introducing the city’s advantages, they also give guarantees to the voters.

To strengthen the odds, the central and local executive elites tend to carry out a series of preparations during each bid. They usually include choosing the sites for the venues; improving the city’s environment; re-planning its traffic; formulating a budget for the event and so on. It is important to point out that the preparations for bid A is not exactly the same as those for bid B. They are generally subject to the requirements of the relevant international organisation and the condition of particular city.
It is interesting to note that the division of labour between the central and local executive elites in implementing all the official bid tasks often varies from case to case. When lobbying of the members and executives of the international organisation, advertising the Chinese candidate in China and abroad, furnishing the bidding documents, entertaining the inspectors, giving the presentation(s) and preparing the city to hold the event in bid A are led by the central executive elites and coordinated by the local executive elites, those tasks in bid B are led by the local executive elites and coordinated by the central executive elites. What factors then have significant influence to shape the pattern of division of labour between the central and local executive elites in each international bid?

Some studies have argued that the fiscal element may determine the relations between the central and local governments in China, pointing out that the money allocation between the central and local governments plays a critical role in shaping their power to make and implement policies. By this logic, the local executive elites would play the leading role in implementing all the official tasks of a bid as long as the investment of the local government in a bid is more than that of the central government. If the reverse is true, the central executive elites may play the leading role instead. Therefore, is the fiscal element a possible determining factor in shaping the pattern of the division of labour between the central and local executive elites in each bid?

Shanghai’s bid for the 2010 World Expo seems to reject this argument. Despite the bid being exclusively sponsored by the Shanghai government, State Councillor Wu Yi was the chairperson of the Shanghai 2010 World Expo Bid Committee. The local executive elites, including Shanghai Mayor Xu Kuangdi and his successor Chen Liangyu, played a coordinative role only and the central executive elites were in charge of lobbying the members and executives of the International Exhibitions Bureau (BIE); publicising Shanghai in China and abroad; drafting the Application Letter and the Proposal; submitting the documents to the BIE; entertaining the inspectors at Beijing and Shanghai; and giving guarantees in the presentations.

Does Chinese administrative guideline stipulate the pattern of division of labour between the central and local executive elites in each bid? Chinese rules and regulations do not include instructions regarding bidding for international events. For instance, the Regulation of Application and Approval of Holding International Sports Events only states that how a local government can qualify to apply for holding an international sports event on behalf of China and what it needs to implement after obtaining the right to host an international sports event. It does not stipulate the roles of the Chinese General Sports Administration and local governments in bidding for any international sports event. Thus, Chinese law is not a possible determining factor that shapes the pattern of division of labour between the central and local executive elites in each bid.

\[14\] “Shanghai shenban 2010 nian shibohui” (Shanghai Is Bidding for the 2010 World Expo), People’s Daily East China News, 20 July 2000, 1.
\[16\] For details, see Chapter 4.
With this being the case, it is the stipulations of international organisations that are hypothesised in this thesis as a factor that may have significant influence to shape the pattern of division of labour between the central and local executive elites in implementing each bid. The reason for this is the fact that the constitution and event regulations of international organisations stipulate the pattern of division of labour between the central and local governments in each bid, and require each candidate city to comply strictly with their stipulations. If a city fails to comply with the stipulation, the executive body of international organisation is empowered to issue warnings and even terminate its candidacy. A detailed explanation of this is given in sections 2.1.1 and 2.1.2 below.

2.2.1. The division of labour

The constitutions and/or event regulations of international organisations clearly state the roles of the central and local governments in bids. The roles are generally of two types. The first type is the leading roles in the implementation of bid which involve all of the tasks described in the previous section. The second type is the coordinating roles which involve giving assistance to the executive unit/s who play the leading roles. They include supervision, putting forward candidate cities to international organisations, arranging for the Chinese officials to meet with the executives and members of the international organisations, and giving assistance to all their other duties. Hence, the division of labour between the central and local executive elites in international bids takes one of two forms, either central-led and local-coordinated or local-led and central-coordinated.
According to the Olympic Charter, an Olympic Games bid must be supported by the city and the National Olympic Committee (NOC). The city, as the host unit, needs to play the leading role in implementing all the bid tasks.\(^{18}\) The NOC is required to perform three duties after the city has been approved to bid for a particular Olympic Games.\(^{19}\) First, it needs to hand in the application with the city to the IOC.\(^{20}\) Second, it is required to supervise the city after the IOC has approved the city to bid for the Olympic Games.\(^{21}\) Third, it is required to share the responsibility with the city for the bid.\(^{22}\) Hence, the Olympic Games bids are local-led and central-coordinated projects. The national ministry that manages the NOC must give supervision and assistance when the city government is in charge of implementing official bid tasks.

The stipulations of BIE regarding World Expo bids are different to those of the IOC. The BIE Convention Relating to International Exhibition Article 6 Items 1 and 2 and the BIE Regulations Relating to the Procedure and Deadlines for Registration of an Exhibition Article 1a respectively state that a World Expo application should be pursued by the government of the contracting party.\(^{23}\) Since all BIE contracting parties/members are countries,\(^{24}\) the national government is the host unit for World Expos and must play the leading role in World Expo bids. The duty of the local government is thus to coordinate

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\(^{19}\) By-law to Rule 34 paragraph 1.1, in Ibid, 73.

\(^{20}\) By-law to Rule 34 paragraph 1.2, in Ibid, 73.

\(^{21}\) By-law to Rule 34 paragraph 1.4, in Ibid, 73.

\(^{22}\) Ibid.


\(^{24}\) According to the BIE official definition, the members of BIE are the governments of the contracting party (signed countries to the Convention). Details see: “Organization,” *International Exhibitions Bureau*, http://www.bie-paris.org/site/en/main/organization-m.html; On China is one of the BIE members, see “List of the BIE Member States,” *International Exhibitions Bureau*, http://www.bie-paris.org/site/en/joomla-overview.html (Both accessed 9 November 2010).
the national government in implementing official bid tasks.

According to the OCA Constitution and Rules, both the city and the NOC must execute an Asian Games bid. The city, as the host unit, is required to play the leading role in implementing official bid tasks.\textsuperscript{25} The NOC needs to take charge of two duties in the Bid Committee. First, it is required to give supervision to the city candidate.\textsuperscript{26} Second, it must put forward the candidate city to the OCA.\textsuperscript{27} In other words, the NOC is not only required to submit the candidate city’s Letter of Intent to the OCA, but also to assist the local government in the tasks that involve interactions with OCA members and executives. Hence, the Asian Games bids are intended to be local-led and central-coordinated projects.

The division of labour between the city and the National University Sports Federation (NUSF) in World University Games bids is stipulated in the Regulations of FISU Events. According to Section D Articles 2, 5, 6 and 7, the city candidate is required to take responsibility for furnishing the bidding documents, publicity, financing, receiving the FISU inspectors and signing the attribution contract after it has been selected as host.\textsuperscript{28} The role of the NUSF in the bids, in accordance with Section D Article 3, is to submit the city candidate to the FISU and assist it in its bid.\textsuperscript{29} In other words, all World University Games bids are local-led and central-coordinated projects. While the local government is in charge of implementing official bid tasks, the ministry that manages the NUSF is required to give assistance. Table 2.1 summarises the roles played by the central and local

\textsuperscript{26} Article 45 paragraph 11, in Ibid, 67.
\textsuperscript{27} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{29} Ibid.
executive units in bids for the Olympic Games, World Expos, Asian Games and World University Games.

Table 2.1. Division of labour between the central and local executive units in the four bids

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<tr>
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<th>The role of the central executive elites</th>
<th>The role of the local executive elites</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>The Olympic Games bids</strong></td>
<td>Coordinator</td>
<td>Leader</td>
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<td><strong>The World Expo bids</strong></td>
<td>Leader</td>
<td>Coordinator</td>
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<td><strong>The Asian Games bids</strong></td>
<td>Coordinator</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>The World University Games bids</strong></td>
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2.2.2. The stipulations of international organisations

Each candidate in an international bid is stipulated to strictly comply with the constitutions and event regulations of the relevant international organisations. For instance, in the Olympic Games and Asian Games bids, the national government of each applicant city must sign off a legally binding instrument by which the said government undertakes and guarantees that the country and all public authorities will comply with and respect the Olympic Charter and the OCA Constitution and Rules. The IOC even orders that each applicant city shall comply with the Olympic Charter and the other regulations and requirements issued by its Executive Board, including the Candidature Acceptance Procedure.

The BIE Convention Relating to International Exhibition states that all parties that intend to organise a World Expo must “comply with the provision of the Convention and regulations made for their implementation”. A World Expo is only granted to an applicant

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30 Rule 34 paragraph 3, in Olympic Charter, 72; Article 42 paragraph 5, in OCA Constitution and Rules, 62.
31 Bye-law to Rule 34 paragraphs 1.5 & 1.6, in Olympic Charter, 73.
when “the conditions of the Convention and of the regulation laid down by the BIE are fulfilled”. Since the Regulations of FISU Events constitutes “the law governing legal relations between all parties”, the World University Games bidders have no option but to comply with its stipulations, including the division of labour between the central and local units.

In addition, the executive bodies of international organisations are empowered to give warnings and even terminate candidacy if any candidate city fails to strictly comply with the constitutions and event regulations. For instance, the IOC Executive Board is authorised to withdraw any applicant and candidate city in the case of their violating the Olympic Charter and any other IOC regulations in accordance with the Olympic Charter Rule 23 Item 1.6. The OCA Constitutions and Rules Article 45 Item 12 states that “the OCA Executive Board has the power to withdraw the games from any bidding city, after due warning, if it considers that the preparations are not adequate or are delayed for any reasons whatever”.

The Regulations of FISU Events Section B Items 3.2.2 and 3.2.8 empower the FISU Executive Committee to exercise their right to sanction the application units which violate the Regulations. According to the Convention Relating to International Exhibition Article 30 Items 2b and 2c, the BIE Executive Committee is empowered to discharge the duty of penalising any candidate that fails to comply with the Convention in their World Expo bid after a decision is made by the BIE General Assembly.
In order to win the right to host an international event, each Chinese candidate city must strictly comply with all the stipulations of relevant international organisation, including the pattern of division of labour between the central and local executive elites in implementing official bid tasks. If a Chinese candidate avoids, delays, falsifies, adjusts or resists the stipulations in its executing of the bid tasks, the executive body of international organisation is very likely to terminate its bid and chooses other national candidate to hold the event. Hence, it is reasonable to believe that the stipulations of international organisations may shape the pattern of division of labour between the central and local executive elites in each international bid.

2.3. Supporting attitudes of both central and local Party elites

The central and local Party elites are not assigned to implement official bid tasks with the central and local executive elites since none of them are members of the Bid Committees. The aim of their participation is to give support to the Chinese candidates. The central Party leaders generally pursue the following eight supporting actions:

1. Writing guarantee letters for the candidate cities on behalf of the China government.  
2. Meeting with the inspectors of international organisations when the candidate city is being evaluated.
3. Introducing the bids to the foreign guests and asking for their support.
4. Giving instructions to the local officials on the bids.

The guarantee letters are usually submitted to the international organisations along with the Chinese candidate cities’ Candidature Files.
5. Including the bids in annual work reports of the State Council.

6. Writing personal letters to the chairpersons of the international organisations asking them to express their personal support for the bids.

7. Meeting with the executives of the international organisations in China or abroad.

8. Issuing celebration notifications after being notified a candidate city has been chosen to hold an event.

Not all of the above supporting actions apply to every bid. For instance, Premier Zhu Rongji particularly lobbied the BIE President for Shanghai at the BIE headquarters in Paris, whereas he and Premier Wen Jiabao did not apply to the Presidents of the IOC, OCA and FISU to support Beijing, Guangzhou and Shenzhen at their respective headquarters of those organisations. Moreover, the same supporting actions are pursued by different central Party elites. For example, while Premier Wen Jiabao met with the FISU inspectors on behalf of the Chinese government when Shenzhen was being evaluated, President Jiang Zemin chaired the meeting with the IOC inspectors on behalf of the Chinese government when Beijing was being evaluated. Jiang and Premier Zhu Rongji both met with the BIE inspectors on behalf of the Chinese government when Shanghai was being evaluated, but no central Party elite met with the OCA inspectors on behalf of the Chinese government when Guangzhou was being evaluated. Furthermore, the instructions given by the same central Party elite concerning bids can differ. For instance, Zhu Rongji’s instructions on Beijing’s bid for the 2008

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39 “Zhu Rongji huijian guoji zhanlanju fuzeren” (Zhu Rongji Met with the BIE Leaders), People’s Daily, 28 September 2002, 3.
40 “Wen Jiabao huijian guoji datilian zhuxi” (Wen Jiabao Met with the FISU President), People’s Daily, 15 December 2006, 1.
41 “Jiang Zemin huijian guoji aowei hui pinggutuan chengyuan” (Jiang Zemin Met with the IOC Evaluation Commission), People’s Daily, 22 February 2001, 1.
42 “Jiangzhuxi huijian guoji zhanlanju kaochatuan” (President Jiang Met with the BIE Investigation Delegation), People’s Daily, 12 March 2002, 1; “Zhu Rongji huijian guoji zhanlanju kaochatuan” (Zhu Rongji Met with the BIE Investigation Delegation), People’s Daily, 12 March 2002, 1.
Olympic Games in the 2001 Work Report of the State Council were different to his instructions on the Shanghai bid for the 2010 World Expo in the 2002 Work Report of the State Council. The above findings imply that each central Party elite has his or her own attitude when it comes to supporting a bid. While they give support in both bid A and bid B, their attitude towards bid A might be different to their attitude towards bid B.

The local Party Secretaries generally give support by the following seven types of ways, including (1) leading a think tank to assist the Bid Committee; (2) participating in the activities organised by the Bid Committees; (3) assisting the local executive elites to entertain the inspectors of the international organisations, (4) assisting the local executive elites to oversee venue construction, environmental control and transportation improvement; (5) entering the bids in annual work reports of the local Party Committees; (6) giving instructions or remarks about the bidding projects at the public occasions; and (7) responding the relevant instructions given by the central Party elites.

Not all of the above actions apply to every bid. For instance, Li Hongzhong entertained the FISU Evaluation Commission together with the central and local executive elites, whereas Jia Qinglin, Huang Ju, Zhang Dejiang and Li Shusen did not do so when Beijing, Shanghai and Guangzhou were being inspected. Jia and Li both inserted Beijing’s bid

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44 Shenzhen zhili chengwei hongyang dayun jingshen zuihao chengshi (Shenzhen Try Its Best to Carry forward the Spirit of the World University Games), Shenzhen Special Zone Daily, 12 December 2006, A1&A4; Ju quansheng zhili zhichi Shenzhen shenda (Shenzhen’s Bid for the World University Games Obtained Guangdong’s Support), Shenzhen Special Zone Daily, 13 December 2006, A1&A4; Huanying guoji datilian pingguzu zhananchang wenyi wanhai shengda shangyan (A Verity Show Was Held to Welcome the FISU Evaluation Commission), Shenzhen Special Zone Daily, 13 December 2006, A4; Shenzhen wanquan youshili juban dayunhui (Shenzhen Is Capable of Holding the World University Games), Shenzhen Special Zone Daily, 15 December 2006, A1&A4.
for the 2008 Olympic Games and Shenzhen’s bid for the 2011 Summer World University Games in the 2001 Work Report of the Beijing Party Committee and the 2006 Work Report of the Shenzhen Party Committee, whereas Huang and Lin did not place Shanghai’s bid for the 2010 World Expo and Guangzhou’s bid for the 2010 Asian Games in the 2002 Work Report of the Shanghai Party Committee and the 2004 Work Report of the Guangzhou Party Committee. The above findings imply that each local Party elite has his or her own attitude when supporting a bid. The attitude of the Party Secretary of city A towards city A's bid is different from that of the Party Secretary of city B towards city B’s bid.

The attitude of each central or local Party elite towards a bid can be deduced through comparing all of his/her actions with all of same-ranking officials’ actions in supporting previous Chinese bids. For instance, to comprehend President Jiang Zemin’s attitude towards Beijing’s bid for the 2008 Olympic Games, one needs to compare his actions with those of himself and his predecessor Yang Shangkun’s actions in supporting the 2000 Olympic Games bid. Such a comparison uncovers two kinds of attitudes. First, he/she might be enthusiastic in supporting a bid, suggesting they are acting more in support of the current bid than same-ranking officials did for previous bids. Second, he/she might be indifferent in supporting a bid, suggesting they are acting less in support of the current bid than same-ranking officials did for previous bids.

The above findings imply that each local Party elite has his or her own attitude when supporting a bid. The attitude of the Party Secretary of city A towards city A's bid is different from that of the Party Secretary of city B towards city B’s bid.

It is found that the attitudes of both central and local Party elites in giving support vary from case to case. The central Party elite can enthusiastically support bid A while the supporting attitude of the local Party elite is one of indifference. The central Party elite can indifferently give support in bid B while the local Party elite is enthusiastic. Both of them can be enthusiastic in supporting bid C. So what factors have significant influence to shape the attitudes of both central and local Party elites in supporting each international bid?

The following factors could be involved: (1) the elite’s personality; (2) his/her personal perception of the event; (3) the number of competitors in the bid; (4) the candidate city’s political and economic status in China; (5) the impact of the event in the international community; (6) the political impact and economic benefit of the event for China; and (7) the political impact and economic benefit of the event for the city. However, these factors are unable to shape the attitudes of both the central and the local Party elites in supporting each bid. In addition, neither constitutions and event regulations of the relevant international organisations nor Chinese administrative guidelines stipulate how the central and local Party elites should support bids.

In this thesis factionalism is hypothesised as the key factor that leads to the attitudes of both central and local Party elites in supporting each international bid for two reasons. First, when the Party elites participating in any decision making or policy implementation are factional members, factionalism may shape their attitudes. Party elites from the same faction tend to be consistent in their attitudes while those from different factions tend to be inconsistent. Second, it is confirmed that the central and local Party elites who participated to give support in each of the four bids are all factional members. A
theoretical explanation of the above reasons follows in Sections 2.2.1 and 2.2.2 below.

2.3.1. Factionalism in CCP

Faction, paixī in Chinese, denotes an informal and leader-oriented group that is guided by unwritten rules and is not limited in time. Despite the CCP Constitution requiring its members to oppose factional activities, factions always exist in the CCP. For instance, the downfall of the Northeast Executive Committee Chairman Gao Gang in 1953 was a result of a factional struggle between senior Party elites. The Cultural Revolution, from 1966 to 1976, was totally run by seven CCP factions. Eight factions, including palso-Maoist conservatives, moderates and radical reformers, were active in China’s political sphere in the 1980s. While the Shanghai Clique (Shanghaibang) became the dominant faction in the CCP during the 1990s, the strength of Tuanpai has increased since Hu Jintao assumed leadership of the Party in 2002.

However, although factions still exist in the post-Deng era, some scholars have asserted

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that their influence in Chinese politics is no longer important.\textsuperscript{53} Yet, Victor Shih’s *Factions and Finance in China: Elite Conflict and Inflation*, which is the most recent piece of scholarship in English on the CCP factionalism, serves as a piece of rebuttal. The author contends that the reason why China is able to avoid inflation during the reform era without an independent central bank is due to the conflict between two factions in the economic policy making and implementation, including the generalist group led by Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao; and the technocratic group headed by Zhu Rongji and Wen Jiabao.\textsuperscript{54}

In addition to reviewing strategies of the two factions for controlling inflation, the book also analyses the relations between the Party elites who are from the same faction and those who are from different ones in the post-Deng era. Since each faction has its own interests and beliefs, the attitudes of the Party elites tend to be consistent in making and implementing policies if they come from the same faction. For instance, Shih found that in order to increase the financial discretion of the centre, Premier Zhu Rongji exaggerated the threat posed by the Asian Financial Crisis along with his protégés, the economic technocrats, in the State Council.\textsuperscript{55} By the same token, because factions need to fight for their ideological beliefs, the author confirmed that relations between the Party elites tend to be conflictual if they come from different factions.

In fact, the generalizations of Shih’s book are almost similar with those of the preceding scholarly analyses about the CCP factionalism. Andrew Nathan and Tsou Tang are two of the early scholars in the field. They argued that the relations between the Party elites who

\textsuperscript{53} I am grateful to Associate Professor You Ji for raising this point.


\textsuperscript{55} Ibid, 166.
come from different factions are conflictual, but their focus was on the result of factional conflicts. Nathan contended that the factions represent a balance-of-power situation because each faction has to spend large amounts of resources to maintain its own vertical communication network. Since the cost of taking over the networks of other factions is hugely expensive, no single faction is able to annex all the others.\(^{56}\) In contrast, Tsou argued that that factional struggle in the CCP is a winner-takes-all game. He reasoned that the political reality is that dominant faction enjoys absolute power in making and implementing the policies of the Party.\(^ {57}\)

Lucian Pye’s book, *The Dynamics of Chinese Politics*, analyses the relations of CCP elites who come from the same faction. He argued that “the prime basis for factions among cadres is the search for career security and the protection of power”.\(^{58}\) Indeed, as the power in the Party is entrusted to individuals, the formal institutions are unable to regulate behaviours of the elites. Factional networks are a useful way to strengthen the elites’ position and prevent attacks from their political enemies. In addition, the processes of making and implementing policies in China must involve numerous Party and executive agencies, but there is no effective mechanism to coordinate these.\(^ {59}\) Therefore mistakes inevitably occur in making and implementing policies. Forming factions is thus a useful means of defending against purges from political rivals who use such mistakes as an excuse.


Pye agreed with other sinologists, including James Wong and Richard Baum, that the CCP factions are based on personal relationships and associations. In Chinese, “personal relationship” is guangxi, a concept that is embedded in Confucian thought and becomes part of “the ‘stock knowledge’ of the Chinese adults in their management of everyday life”. As guanxi are easily formed by acquaintanceship and mutual belonging, it is easy for Party elites who share common attributes to form factions. Common attributes might include regional origin (tong xiang); education background (tong xue); industrial experience (tong hang); and organisational experience (tong shi).

For example, Jiang Zemin chose Zeng Qinghong to be one of the core associates in the Shanghai Clique because Zeng was his subordinate in the Shanghai Party Committee and government in the 1980s. President Hu Jintao allied himself with Deputy Premier Li Keqiang because both are of Anhui origin and served in the China Communist Youth League together. Since Zhu was assigned to manage China’s economic affairs after being transferred to the State Council, most of his protégés are the senior officials who served in the economic and financial ministries in the 1990s.

Pye stressed that to consolidate the power of a faction, the relations among its factional

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members need to be mutually dependent. Factional protégés must give support to their patron at any time and any place.\textsuperscript{67} For instance, Li Changchun’s main duty was to move Guangdong into the sphere of influence of his factional patron Jiang Zemin when he chaired the Guangdong Party Committee from 1998 to 2002.\textsuperscript{68} At the same time, a patron must protect, and reward, his protégés.\textsuperscript{69} According to David Lampton’s analysis, one of the reasons why Ji Dengkui was able to become a member of the CCP Politburo during the late Cultural Revolution was his factional patron Mao Zedong’s promotion.\textsuperscript{70} This seems to confirm that in order to retain their political pull in the Party, members of a faction need to be cooperative and supportive of each other.

In \textit{Rebellion and Factionalism in a Chinese Province: Zhejiang 1966–1976}, Keith Forster analysed the pursuit of power among the local Party elites in Zhejiang province during the Cultural Revolution. He argued that all the related struggles were directed by two local factions: the radical rebellion and the establishment. One of the most important contributions of this book is the demonstration that decisions of the local elites are directly influenced by their patrons in Beijing. Members of the radical rebellion and the establishment were not able to act independently in the pursuit of power. The attitudes of senior cadres in the CCP Central Committee played a significant role to master the struggles undertaken by the two factions in Zhejiang.\textsuperscript{71}

Huang Jing’s \textit{Factionalism in Chinese Communist Politics} comprehensively researched

\begin{footnotes}
\item[67] Pye, \textit{The Dynamics of Chinese Politics}, 7.
\item[69] Pye, \textit{The Dynamics of Chinese Politics}, 7.
\end{footnotes}
the conflict between Gao Gang and Liu Shaoqi; the dismissal of Peng Dehuai; the clash between Mao Zedong and Liu Shaoqi; Lin Biao’s rise and fall; and Deng Xiaoping’s dominance after the Cultural Revolution. The author confirmed his hypothesis that all policy differences, institutional interests and power struggles in history of the CCP had been caused by factional struggles, and drew two conclusions from his findings. First, the relations among the CCP factions are competitive. Second, factions in the Party may facilitate the pluralisation of the Chinese political system due to their inharmonious relations.72

According to the above analysis of the relevant literature, it asserts that factions always exist in the CCP and still plays an important role in the Chinese politics in the post-Deng era. In addition, factionalism is highlighted as a key factor to shape the attitudes of the Party elites in decision makings and policy implementations. In order to retain the strength of faction and defend its interests and beliefs, relations between factional members tend to be cooperative and supportive. It leads that if the CCP elites involved in any issue come from one faction only, their attitudes tend to be consistent. Since the relations between factions are competitive and conflictual, it poses that their attitudes tend to be inconsistent if the CCP elites involved in any issue are members of two or more factions.

2.3.2. Factional backgrounds of the central and local Party elites

As long as the central and local Party elites involved in each bid are members of the CCP

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faction/s, factionalism can be assumed as a determining factor in shaping their attitudes about giving support. Thus, the following will investigate the factional backgrounds of the central and local Party elites who supported Beijing’s bid for the 2008 Olympic Games, Shanghai’s bid for the 2010 World Expo, Guangzhou’s bid for the 2010 Asian Games and Shenzhen’s bid for the 2011 Summer World University Games.

President Jiang Zemin and Premier Zhu Rongji were the central Party elites who participated in Beijing’s bid for the 2008 Olympic Games and Shanghai’s bid for the 2010 World Expo. Both of them lead factions in the Party. Jiang’s faction is called the Shanghai Clique because most of its early members were natives of Shanghai, Jiangsu and Zhejiang, and worked with Jiang in the Shanghai Party Committee and government in the 1980s.73 The Shanghai Clique has three characteristics. First, most of Jiang’s protégés are senior cadres in the local Party Committees and governments.74 Second, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is another power base of the Clique.75 Third, the Clique is still powerful in the 16th CCP Politburo Standing Committee and Central Committee despite Jiang stepping down from the Party affairs in 2002.76

After being transferred from Shanghai to the State Council in 1992, Zhu Rongji’s prime duty became pushing China’s economic development forward. It follows that he needed to maintain a close connection with the political elites who worked in the economic and financial circles. Those political elites later became the core members of Zhu’s faction. Yet, whereas most of Jiang’s protégés are marshals and local senior cadres, most of Zhu’s

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74 Shih, *Factions and Finance in China*, 57.
75 Ibid.
associates are the technocrats. While the power base of Jiang’s faction is from the local level and the military, the power base of Zhu’s faction is from the ministries. Jiang’s protégés are still powerful on China’s political stage after his retirement, whereas Zhu’s protégés are less influential after his retreat.\(^77\)

Premier Wen Jiabao is the only central Party elite who participated in Guangzhou’s bid for the 2010 Asian Games and Shenzhen’s bid for the 2011 Summer World University Games. Although he does not have his own faction in the Party, he has a close association with Zhu Rongji and his protégés. Willy Lam argues that Wen would have been unable to prevail in the competition for the Premiership in 2002 without Zhu’s all-out support. Wen has also been fully backed by his predecessor’s protégés, who served in the national economic and financial units, in making and implementing policies since he chaired the State Council in 2003.\(^78\) However, there is no evidence to suggest that Wen maintains close factional connections with senior officials in the local Party Committees and governments, or with marshals in the PLA.

Jia Qinglin headed the Beijing Party Committee when Beijing was bidding for the 2008 Olympic Games bid. He is a protégé of Jiang Zemin, which is proved by his high-profile support of Jiang’s three missile tests in the Taiwan Stair in 1995 and 1996 that were widely opposed by senior officials in the Party and PLA, when he (Jia) was Fujian Party Secretary.\(^79\) And by the fact that, under Jiang’s protection, Jia lives freely despite being suspected of involvement in the Yuanhuaan case of Xianmen, the biggest smuggling and corruption scandal in the history of PRC. Jia eventually was selected as a member of the


\(^78\) Lam, *Chinese Politics in the Hu Jintao Era*, 23.

\(^79\) Lam, *The Era of Jiang Zemin*, 178-179.
16th CCP Politburo Standing Committee in the 16th CCP National Congress in 1992. He also became the new chairperson of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Committee after one year. All of these appointments were manoeuvred by Jiang.80

Huang Ju was the Shanghai Party Secretary when Shanghai was bidding for the 2010 World Expo. He is regarded as a member of Jiang’s Shanghai Clique for two reasons. First, Huang was Shanghai’s Deputy Mayor when Jiang Zemin was chairing the Shanghai Party Committee and government in the 1980s, suggesting Huang had already built up his personal associations with Jiang and his family members in Shanghai.81 Second, Jiang often had Huang’s support after he was transferred to Beijing in 1989. For instance, in order to coordinate with Jiang’s strategy in the power struggle with the then Beijing Party Secretary Chen Xitong in 1995, Huang ordered his subordinates to adopt a low-profile attitude towards the struggle.82 In response to the Jiang’s emphasis on the “interchangeability” between the civility and the military, Huang was the first local Party Secretary to encourage local enterprises to send their staff to the military.83 Hence, by Jiang’s arrangement, Huang became a member of the 16th CCP Politburo Standing Committee in 2002 and the Deputy Premier in 2003.84

Zhang Dejiang successively chaired the Party Committees of Jilin, Zhejiang and Guangdong before joining the State Council in 2008. Although he currently is allied with President Hu Jintao and Premier Wen Jiabao in making and implementing policies,85 he was Jiang Zemin’s protégé when Guangzhou and Shenzhen respectively bid for the 2010

80 Lam, Chinese Politics in the Hu Jintao Era, 17.
82 Ibid, 27.
83 Ibid, 168.
84 Lam, Chinese Politics in the Hu Jintao Era, 17.
85 Ibid.
Asian Games and the 2011 Summer World University Games. He has often stood with Jiang and his protégé Li Changchun on the implementation of provincial economic policies after being appointed to chair the Jilin Party Committee in 1995.86 Despite Zhang being one of the few CCP elites who accept the orthodox graduate training about planned economy abroad, he is no longer a member of the Leftist Camp, which was led by Chen Yun, Li Xiannian and Yao Yilin.87

Lin Shusen and Li Hongzhong respectively chaired the Guangzhou and Shenzhen Party Committees when Guangzhou and Shenzhen were respectively bidding for the 2010 Asian Games and the 2011 Summer World University Games. Before being appointed to chair the Guizhou provincial government in 2006, Lin served in Guangzhou for 30 years, suggesting that he did not have opportunity to build up factional connections with Jiang Zemin, Zhu Rongji or other central Party elites.88 Li’s experience was different however. Before transferring to Huizhou of Guangdong in 1988, he worked under the former State Councillor Li Tieying in the Liaoning government and the Ministry of Electronic Industry for three years. Sinologists have thus asserted that Li is a member of Li Tieying’s faction.89 Li also built up close ties with then Shenzhen Party Secretary Huang Liman, Jiang Zemin’s protégé, after chairing the executive affairs of Shenzhen in 2003,90 but he never joined Jiang’s faction. Table 2.2 shows the factional ties of the central and local Party elites who participated in the four international bids.

88 Li, Think national, blame local, 1-24.
89 Ibid.
90 Nathan and Gilley, China’s New Rulers, 163-164.
Since all the central and local Party elites who participated in the four case studies chosen for this research are members of at least two CCP factions, factionalism may shape their support of the relevant bid. Based upon the theoretical analysis in section 2.2.1, two outcomes are proposed: (1) if the central and local Party elites come from the same faction, their attitudes in supporting a bid will be consistent. It means that if the central patron’s attitude in supporting a bid is enthusiastic, his local protégés will enthusiastically give their support. If the central patron is indifferent when supporting the bid, the attitude of his local protégés will also be one of indifference. (2) If the central and local Party elites come from different factions, their attitudes in supporting a bid will be inconsistent. It means that if the central Party elite is enthusiastic in supporting a bid, the attitude of the local Party elite will be one of indifference, and vice versa.

Table 2.2. Factional ties between the central and local Party elites in the four bids

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Members of the Shanghai Clique</th>
<th>Members of the economic and financial faction</th>
<th>Members of the other factions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Beijing’s bid for the</td>
<td>Jiang Zemin,</td>
<td>Zhu Rongji</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008 Olympic Games</td>
<td>Jia Qinglin</td>
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<tr>
<td>Shanghai’s bid for the</td>
<td>Jiang Zemin,</td>
<td>Zhu Rongji</td>
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<tr>
<td>2010 World Expo</td>
<td>Huang Ju</td>
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<tr>
<td>Guangzhou’s bid for the</td>
<td>Zhang Dejiang</td>
<td>Wen Jiabao</td>
<td>Lin Shusen</td>
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<td>2010 Asian Games</td>
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<tr>
<td>Shenzhen’s bid for the</td>
<td>Zhang Dejiang</td>
<td>Wen Jiabao</td>
<td>Li Hongzhong</td>
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<tr>
<td>2011 Summer World</td>
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<tr>
<td>University Games</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

2.4. Summary

This chapter has presented the theoretical underpinnings for the two hypotheses proposed
in this research. The stipulations of international organisations are hypothesised as a factor that may have significant influence to shape the pattern of division of labour between the central and local executive elites. This is because Chinese candidates are required to comply with the patterns of division of labour stipulated by the constitutions and/or event regulations of international organisations. Otherwise, the candidacies of Chinese cities would very likely to be terminated by the executive bodies of international organisations. In addition, factionalism is hypothesised as a factor that may have significant influence to shape the attitudes of both central and local Party elites in supporting each international bid. This is because factionalism is confirmed as a factor that has significant influence to shape their attitudes if the CCP elites involved in any decision making and policy implementation are factional members, and the central and local Party elites participating to give support in each of the four cases are confirmed as members of the CCP factions.

Two hypotheses will be examined through Beijing’s bid for the 2008 Olympic Games, Shanghai’s bid for the 2010 World Expo, Guangzhou’s bid for the 2010 Asian Games, and Shenzhen’s bid for the 2011 Summer World University Games in Chapter 3 to 6. Bidding for international events can be implied as a means to demonstrate the Chinese government’s willingness and competence to shoulder the responsibility for the international society when the stipulations of international organizations are confirmed as a factor to shape the division of labour between the central and local executive elites in implementing each bid and factionalism is refuted as a factor to shape the attitudes of both central and local Party elites in supporting each bid.
CHAPTER 3

BEIJING’S BID FOR THE 2008 OLYMPIC GAMES

Since the International Olympic Committee (IOC) readmitted China in 1979,\(^1\) the Chinese Olympic Committee (COC) has put forward five Chinese cities as potential hosts for multi-sport IOC events. Nanjing’s bid for the 2014 Summer Youth Olympic Games is the most recent and that was preceded by Harbin’s bids for the 2010 Winter Olympic Games and the 2012 Winter Youth Olympic Games.\(^2\) The other two bids were made by Beijing. After being eliminated in the 2000 Summer Olympic Games bid in 1993, the city targeted the 2008 Summer Olympic Games in 1998.

According to the Olympic Charter, the Summer Olympic Games should be held once during a period of four consecutive calendar years.\(^3\) The aim of the IOC in organising the Games is to advocate “Olympism”, which “places sport at the service of the harmonious development of man, with a view to promoting a peaceful society concerned with the preservation of human dignity”.\(^4\) Each Summer Olympic Games should not exceed 16 days,\(^5\) and must include the following 28 sports: athletics, rowing, badminton, baseball, basketball, boxing, canoeing, cycling, equestrian, fencing, football, gymnastics, weightlifting, handball, hockey, judo, wrestling, aquatics, modern pentathlon, softball,

\(^5\) Bye-law to rule 33, in Ibid, 72.
taekwondo, tennis, table tennis, shooting, archery, triathlon, sailing and volleyball.  

Beijing, the capital of China, was keen to hold multi-sport events. Compared to Shanghai and Guangzhou, it has staged the most national multi-sport events since 1949 (see Table 3.1). Success with its 1990 Asian Games bid saw it become the first Chinese city to host an international multi-sport gathering.  

Beijing was also the first Chinese city that attempted to host the Olympics. In the summer of 1984, the COC Deputy President Lu Jindong first disclosed Beijing’s interest in holding the 2000 Summer Olympic Games.  

Then Chinese paramount leader Deng Xiaoping and President Yang Shangkun expressed their own desires on the matter six years later. Beijing was approved to bid for the games by the State Council and submitted its Application Letter to the IOC in 1991. It was eventually defeated by Australia’s Sydney despite the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Central Committee, the State Council, and all the Chinese people backing the project.  

Beijing did not bid for the 2004 Summer Olympic Games in spite of the fact that the then IOC President Juan Samaranch personally supported it doing so. When a call for applications was issued for the 2008 Olympic Games in late 1997, Beijing did not reply in

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6 Bye-law to Rule 46 paragraph 2, in Ibid, 88-89.  
time. The international media reported that the COC had decided to support Osaka of Japan in the 2008 Olympic race as no Chinese city intended to contest it.\(^{13}\) Beijing’s interest in bidding for the 2008 Olympic Games was first unveiled in September 1998.\(^{14}\) Two months later, Mayor Jia Qinglin handed Beijing’s letter of intent to hold the games to Wu Shaozu, President of the China General Sports Administration (CGSA) and the COC, in the People’s Great Hall.\(^{15}\)

This chapter analyses the central and local relations in Beijing’s bid for the 2008 Olympic Games. After introducing the bid process, the attitudes of the central and local Party elites in supporting the bid are reviewed in section 3.2. To deduce the supporting attitudes of President Jiang Zemin, Premier Zhu Rongji and Beijing Party Secretary Jia Qinglin, their actions in supporting the bid will be compared with those of President Yang Shangkun and his successor Jiang Zemin, Premier Li Peng and Beijing Party Secretary Li Ximing’s in supporting Beijing’s bid for the 2000 Summer Olympic Games. Section 3.3 addresses the division of labour between the central and local executive elites in implementing the official bid tasks. The duties of senior officials of the CGSA, the COC and the Beijing government in lobbying the IOC members and executives, publicising Beijing in China and abroad, furnishing the bidding documents, greeting the inspectors, giving the presentation and preparing Beijing to hold the Olympic Games are reviewed. The last section will summarise whether factionalism and the stipulations of the IOC shaped respectively the supporting attitudes of both the central and local Party elites and the division of labour between the central and local executive elites in the bid.


\(^{15}\) “Beijing zhengshi xuanbu shenban 2008 nian aoyunhui” (Beijing Formally Declared to Bid for the 2008 Olympic Games), Beijing Daily, 26 November 1998, 1.
Table 3.1. National multi-sport events held in Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou and Shenzhen since 1949

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Beijing</strong></th>
<th><strong>Shanghai</strong></th>
<th><strong>Guangzhou</strong></th>
<th><strong>Shenzhen</strong></th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The 3rd National Games (1975)</td>
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<td>The 3rd People’s Liberation Army Games (1975)</td>
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<tr>
<td>The 4th National Games (1979)</td>
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<td>The 4th People’s Liberation Army Games (1979)</td>
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<td>The 1st National University Games (1982)</td>
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<td>The 2nd National Workers’ Games (1985)</td>
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<td>The 1st National Peasants’ Games (1988)</td>
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<td>The 7th National Games (1993)</td>
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<tr>
<td>The 6th National Ethnic Games (1999)</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author’s database

3.1. The process

The bid was composed of three stages. The first stage lasted seven months, until March 1999. In this stage, Beijing was respectively approved to bid for the 2008 Summer
Olympic Games by the State Council, the CCP Central Committee and the COC. In order to draw their subordinates’ attention to the bid, then Beijing Mayor Jia Qinglin and the CGSA and COC President Wu Shaozu both placed it in the 1999 Work Reports of the Beijing government and the CGSA. According to their speeches on official occasions, the CCP Beijing Party Committee, the Beijing government, the COC and all the Beijing people were all supporters of the bid.

The second stage ended when Beijing had been selected as one of the candidates by the IOC in August 2000. During the intervening 16 months, Beijing successively submitted its Application Letter and Application Report to the IOC, and established the Beijing 2008 Olympic Games Bid Committee and Beijing 2008 Olympic Games Bid Work Group. The official bidding theme, “New Beijing, Great Olympics”, and logo were also unveiled. The IOC then decided that Beijing, Istanbul, Osaka, Paris and Toronto were the five candidates for the 2008 Summer Olympic Games. There were two personnel changes in the second stage. First, after Jia Qinglin was transferred to chair the Beijing Party Committee, Liu Qi became the Beijing mayor. Second, Wu Shaozu handed over
his posts in the CGSA, COC and Bid Committee to Yuan Weimin.24

In this stage, the bid was continually included in the 2000 Work Reports of the Beijing government and the CGSA by Liu and Wu.25 Premier Zhu Rongji and the National People’s Congress (NPC) Chairperson Li Peng also mentioned it on official occasions.26 According to the speeches of the central and local political elites, the CCP Central Committee, State Council, CGSA, and all the Chinese people were supporters of the bid.27

The curtain fell on the third stage when Beijing was chosen to hold the Olympic Games by the IOC in July 2001. After becoming one of the five candidates, Beijing submitted its Candidature File, and was successively inspected by the 26 International Sports Federations (IFs) and the IOC Evaluation Commission. Mayer Liu Qi, the CGSA President Yuan Weimin and their colleagues also gave the presentation to the IOC on behalf of the Bid Committee. In this stage, the bid was not only placed in the 2001 Work Reports of the Beijing government and the CGSA,28 but also in the 2001 Work Reports

Beijing), Beijing Daily, 11 February 1999, 1.
24 “Guojia tiyu zongju lingdao banzi tiaozheng” (The CGSA Leadership Changes), China Sports Daily, 19 April 2000, 1; “Yuan Weimin dangxuan zhongguo aoweihui zhuxi” (Yuan Weimin Was Appointed to be the COC President), China Sports Daily, 20 May 2000, 1.
26 “Li Peng canjia Beijing daibiaotuan shenyi” (Li Peng Participated in the Discussion of the Beijing Delegation), People’s Daily, 6 March 2000, 4; “Zhongguo de fazhan libukai shijie, shijie de fanrong ye xuyao zhongguo” (China Cannot Develop without the World, the World also Needs China for Prosperity), People’s Daily, 9 May 2000, 1.
27 “Jia Qinglin huijian xianggang keren” (Jia Qinglin Met with the Hong Kong Guests), Beijing Daily, 23 April 2000, 1; The 2008 Beijing Olympic Games Bid Committee Established; The Slogan and Emblem of the Beijing Olympic Games Bid Committee Were Confirmed.
of the Beijing Party Committee and the State Council. In addition, after President Jiang Zemin called all the Chinese people to back the project, all the CCP Politburo Central Committee and the CCP Central Military Commission members were present to give their support.

3.2. The central and local Party elites

This section tests the second hypothesis of this thesis that factionalism may lead to the attitudes of both central and local Party elites in supporting each international bid. The central and local Party elites who participated in Beijing’s bid for the 2008 Olympic Games, including President Jiang Zemin, Premier Zhu Rongji, and Beijing Party Secretary Jia Qingli, are reviewed. Their supporting attitudes will be deduced through comparing their actions in supporting the bid with those of President Yang Shangkun and his successor Jiang Zemin, Premier Li Peng and Beijing Party Secretary Li Ximing in supporting Beijing’s bid for the 2000 Olympic Games. The section concludes with a summary of its findings.


30 “Zai huijian diershiqijie aoyunhui zhongguo tiyu daibiaotuan shi de jianghua” (The Speech Delivered at the Meeting with the 27th Olympic Games Chinese Delegation), People’s Daily, 4 October 2000, 1.

31 “Jiang Zemin deng canjia shoudu yiwu zhishu huodong” (Jiang Zemin and Others Participated in the Voluntary Tree Planting Activity for the Capital), People’s Daily, 2 April 2001, 1; “Zhang Wannian Chi Haotian Jia Qinglin deng canjia shoudu yiwu zhishu huodong” (Zhang Wannian, Chi Haotian, Jia Qinglin and Others Participated in the Voluntary Tree Planting Activity for the Capital), People’s Daily, 19 March 2001, 4.
3.2.1. Jiang Zemin

President Jiang Zemin, the patron of “Shanghai Clique”,\(^{32}\) participated in supporting the bid a total of five times. He first drafted a personal letter to lobby Juan Samaranch to support Beijing after the final five candidate cities were chosen by the IOC. The President also called on all the Chinese people to support the bid when he was meeting with China’s 2000 Olympic Delegation. After signing a supporting letter for Beijing’s Candidature File, Jiang met with the IOC Evaluation Commission on behalf of the Chinese government. Finally, he congratulated Beijing on behalf of the CCP Central Committee and the Chinese government after Beijing was chosen to hold the 2008 Olympic Games. Compared to President Yang Shangkun actions in supporting Beijing’s 2000 Olympic Games bid, Jiang’s supporting attitude was enthusiastic.

Jiang’s personal letter to the IOC President Samaranch is the first piece of evidence of his enthusiasm. While Jiang lobbied Samaranch to support Beijing during both the 2000 and 2008 Olympic Games bids, but methods were different each time. When the first bid was introduced at a meeting prior to the opening ceremony of the 1993 East Asian Games in Shanghai, Jiang only told the IOC President that Beijing was supported by the Chinese government and all of the Chinese people. He did not mention his personal attitude towards the first bid, nor stress how the IOC could benefit if Beijing was chosen to hold the 2000 Olympics.\(^{33}\) In contrast, Jiang wrote a personal supporting letter to the IOC President for the second bid. He not only stressed his support and that of his colleagues for Beijing, but also promised the 2008 Olympic Games would be staged according to the highest standards and in a way that would significantly develop the Olympic Movement.

\(^{32}\) For details see Chapter 2 Section 2.2.2.

\(^{33}\) “Jiang Zemin zai Shanghai huijian samalanqi” (Jiang Zemin Met With Samaranch at Shanghai), *People’s Daily*, 5 October 1993, 1.
in China and the world.34

The second piece of evidence of the President’s enthusiasm comes from Jiang’s speech at the celebratory meeting for the Chinese 2000 Olympic delegation. Since China’s participation in the 1984 Summer Olympics, every Chinese Olympic delegation has been invited to meet with members of the CCP Politburo Standing Committee at the People’s Hall after the Olympiad. After congratulating the athletes who were awarded medals, the Chinese President delivers a speech on China’s sports development.35 Jiang devoted just one sentence to Beijing’s bid for the 2000 Olympic Games in his speech to the 1992 Olympic delegation, say the “bid should be facilitated in a way that constructs socialism with Chinese characteristics”.36 In contrast, Jiang devoted a whole paragraph to Beijing’s bid for the 2008 Olympic Games in his speech to the 2000 Olympic delegation. In addition to mentioning China’s contributions to promoting the Olympic Movement, he also called for the Chinese government and all the Chinese people to give their all-out support to the bid.37

The third piece of evidence of Jiang’s enthusiasm comes from his supporting letters in

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34 “Jiang Zemin zhuxi zhixin samalanqi” (President Jiang Zemin Sent a Letter to Samaranch), People’s Daily, 4 October 2000, 1.
35 For the 1984 Olympic Games: “Zhao zongli juxing yanhui huanying tiyu tiyudui daibaojuntuan kaixuan” (Premier Zhao Held a Banquet to Celebrate the Triumphant Return of the Sports Delegation), People’s Daily, 19 August 1984, 1; For the 1988 Olympic Games: “Huanying aozhan guilai de aoyunhui jianer” (Welcome the Olympic Delegation Back), People’s Daily, 6 October 1988, 1; For the 1992 Olympic Games: “Dangzhongyang guowuyuan juxing shengda zhaodaohui” (The CCP Central Committee and the State Council Held a Grand Reception), People’s Daily, 17 August 1992, 1; For the 1996 Olympic Games: “Dang he guojia lingdaoren qinqie huijian aoyun jianer” (The Party and State Leaders Met with the Olympic Athletes), People’s Daily, 9 August 1996, 1; For the 2000 Olympic Games: “Dali fayang zhenxing zhonghua weiguo aoyunhui de aoyunhui yingxiang huijian” (Carrying forward the Patriotic Spirit of the Chinese Nation and the Heroism of Striving for Excellence), People’s Daily, 4 October 2000, 1&2; For the 2004 Olympic Games: “Gaodu pingjia tiyu jianer qude de yingxiang jingji” (Highly Praise the Athletes’ Achievements), People’s Daily, 3 September 2004, 1; For the 2008 Olympic Games: “Beijing aoyunhui canaohui zhongguo zhongzhong jingji” (The Beijing Olympic and Para Games Awards Ceremony Was Held), People’s Daily, 30 September 2008, 1&2.
36 “Jiang Zemin tongzhi de jianghua” (Comrade Jiang Zemin’s Speech), People’s Daily, 17 August 1992, 1.
37 The Speech Delivered at the Meeting with the 27th Olympic Games Chinese Delegation.
Beijing’s Candidature File. The candidate file is an essential document used by the IOC Executive Board to evaluate each candidate city, and must be submitted to the IOC before the inspection of the IOC Evaluation Commission. In addition to stating how it would organise the Olympic Games in the file, each candidate city attaches its national leaders’ supporting letters to impress the IOC executives. Although Presidents Yang Shangkun and Jiang Zemin both wrote supporting letters for Beijing’s Candidature File, the contents of them were different. After explaining the significance of holding the Olympic Games in China and introducing the hospitality of the Chinese people, Jiang added that “Beijing will make the 2008 Olympics an extraordinary success with the support of the Chinese government and all the Chinese people”. Yang did not give the same guarantee in his letter, although he did stress the Chinese people’s wish to entertain all participants in the 2000 Olympic Games.

Jiang’s meeting with the IOC Evaluation Commission is the fourth piece evidence of his enthusiasm. An IOC Evaluation Commission is appointed by the IOC President for each edition of Olympic Games, tasked with reporting on all candidates to the IOC Session after reviewing the Candidature Files and inspecting the cities. Their report is one of the most important documents in helping the IOC members to understand the nature of the candidate cities. In addition, Evaluation Commissions are composed of influential figures in the IOC. For instance, the Swede Gunnar Ericsson, chairperson of the IOC Evaluation Commission for the 2000 Summer Olympic Games bid, sat on the IOC

38 Bye-law to rule 34 paragraph 2.3, in Olympic Charter, 74.
41 Bye-law to rule 34 paragraphs 2.2 & 2.3, in Olympic Charter, 74.
Executive Board from 1988 to 1992 and on the Commission of Study and Evaluation for the Preparation of the Olympic Games from 1984 to 1988. Dutchman Hein Verbruggen, who led the Evaluation Commission for the 2008 Summer Olympic Games bid, was a member of the Evaluation Commission for the 2004 Summer Olympic Games and of the Coordination Commission for the 2004 Athens Olympic Games. In order to demonstrate Beijing’s enthusiasm for bidding for the 2000 and 2008 Olympic Games, the central executive elites met with the IOC Evaluation Commissions on behalf of the Chinese government and all the Chinese people. Premier Li Peng chaired the meeting for the first bid, while Jiang did so for the second bid. In the meetings, Li promised the inspectors that Beijing would organise the 2000 Olympic Games well if it won the bid, whereas Jiang gave a more ambitious guarantee that the 2008 Olympic Games would be featuring modern characteristics and Olympic charming if Beijing was chosen to be the host.

The fifth piece of evidence of Jiang’s enthusiasm concerns his high-profile actions after Beijing won the bid. In addition to making an international phone call to congratulate the Bid Committee, Jiang also led all members of the CCP Politburo Standing Committee in the celebration at the China Millennium Monument in front of Beijing residents. In his speech given at the celebration ceremony, he particularly emphasised that organising the 2008 Olympic Games was not just a concern of Beijing people but for people from all

45 “Li Peng huijian guoji aoweihui kaochatuan” (Li Peng Met with the IOC Evaluation Commission), People’s Daily, 8 March 1993, 1.
46 “Jiang Zemin huijian guoji aoweihui pinggutuan chengyuan” (Jiang Zemin Met with the IOC Evaluation Commission), People’s Daily, 22 February 2001, 1.
47 “Jiang Zemin dadianhua relie zhuhe” (Jiang Zemin Gave a Phone Call for Celebration), People’s Daily, 14 July 2001, 2.
over China. Jiang later sent a letter of personal appreciation to the IOC President, in which he once again guaranteed that the Chinese government and all the Chinese people would give their all-out support to the organization of the event. In addition, the President also used the victory to arouse patriotic emotion. When meeting with the staff of the Chinese Embassy in Russia four days after the election, Jiang called on Chinese people to use Beijing’s hosting of the 2008 Olympic Games as an opportunity to better construct the motherland. In contrast, Jiang was silent after Beijing’s failure in the bidding for the 2000 Olympic Games. He did not call to express his sympathy, nor greet the bid delegation after it returned. Instead State Councilor Li Tieying was assigned to take charge of the duties on behalf of the CCP Central Committee and the State Council.

3.2.2. Zhu Rongji

Premier Zhu Rongji, the leader of Economic and Financial Faction, also participated in Beijing’s bid for the 2008 Olympic Games. Like his predecessor, Li Peng, Zhu discussed the bid with foreign guests, gave instructions to the local officials, and signed a supporting letter for Beijing’s Candidature File. However, unlike Li’s actions in supporting Beijing’s bid for the 2000 Olympic Games, Zhu’s did not include writing a supporting letter for Beijing’s Application Letter, nor mention it on voluntary tree

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49 “Jiang Zemin zhixin samalanqi” (Jiang Zemin Sent a Letter to Samaranch), People’s Daily, 14 July 2001, 1.
50 “Liyong shenao chenggong dailai de jiyu baguojia jianshe de gengjia meihao” (To Construct the Country Better by Using the Opportunity from the Victory of the Bid for the Olympic Games), People’s Daily, 16 July 2001, 1.
51 “Li Tieying dianwei Beijing shenban daibiaotuan” (Li Tieying Telegrammed the Beijing Delegation for Comfort), People’s Daily, 24 September 1993, 1; “Relie huanying Beijing shenbantuan fanjing” (Warm Welcome the Return of the Beijing Delegation), People’s Daily, 17 September 1993, 1.
52 For details see Chapter 2 Section 2.2.2.
planting days. His comments on the 2008 Olympic Games bid in the 2001 Work Report of the State Council were more low-profile than those of Li for the 2000 Olympic Games bid in the 1992 and 1993 Work Reports of the State Council. Zhu’s attitude in supporting Beijing’s bid for the 2008 Olympic Games was therefore comparatively one of indifference.

The following three pieces of evidence suggest that Premier Zhu Rongji liked to follow his predecessor Li Peng’s actions with regard to the 2000 Olympic Games bid. First, both Premiers discussed the Beijing’s bids for the 2000 and 2008 Olympics with foreign guests. For instance, at a meeting with Keba Mbaye, President of the then Senegal Constitutional Council, Li highlighted that Beijing’s motive for holding the 2000 Olympics was to strengthen the friendship and exchange between Chinese and international sportspeople. 53 Zhu also underlined that Beijing intended to popularise the Olympic movement via the 2008 Olympic Games at a meeting with the overseas participants of the Third Session of the China (Beijing) International High-tech Industries Week in 2000. 54

Second, to strengthen Beijing’s odds in its two Olympic bids, both Premiers gave instructions to the local political figures. At the 1993 NPC Session, Li emphasised three things to members of the Beijing delegation, including Mayor Li Qiyan. First, holding the 2000 Olympic Games was a common wish of all the Chinese people. It would also assist in removing the national stigma of China being seen as the “sick man of East Asia” (dongya bingfu). Second, Beijing needed to make every effort to improve its environment. Third, the Beijing government must educate local residents in complying with traffic

53 “Li Peng huijian saineijiaer keren” (Li Peng Met with the Senegal Guest), People’s Daily, 22 September 1992, 1.
54 China Cannot Develop without the World, the World Also Needs China for Prosperity.
rules. Zhu called on the local Party and executive elites to attach importance to Beijing’s environmental protection work when he was inspecting the capital on 19 January 2001.

Third, both Premiers wrote supporting letters for the Candidature File. Like President Jiang Zemin and his predecessor Yang Shangkun, Zhu Rongji and Li Peng both drafted letters of support. Both of them stressed that Beijing will be capable of hosting the Olympic Games with the support of the Chinese government and all the Chinese people, and guaranteed that the Chinese government would strictly comply with the Olympic Charter. In addition, their expectations for the two events were also similar. Zhu expressed that organising the 2008 Olympic Games was a desire of both China and Beijing, while Li highlighted that both China and Beijing were looking forward to staging the 2000 Olympic Games for sportspeople and visitors from all over the world.

However, the following three differences between the two Premiers’ actions confirm Zhu’s indifference towards supporting the 2008 Olympic Games bid. First, Zhu did not write a supporting letter for Beijing’s Application Letter. The Application Letter is the official document informing the IOC that a city has decided to bid for a particular Olympic Games. Guarantees signed by the local authorities and the National Olympic Committee (NOC) that the Games “will be organized to the satisfaction of and under the conditions required by the IOC” must be included. In order to impress the IOC

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55 “Li Peng zongli yu Beijing daibiaotuan yiqi shenyi baogao” (Premier Li Peng Discussed the Report together with the Beijing Delegation), People’s Daily, 17 March 1993, 1&3.
56 “Bashoudu jiancheng xiandaihua guoji dadushi” (Construct the Capital a Modernized International Metropolis), People’s Daily, 20 January 2001, 1&4.
59 Bye-law to rule 34 paragraph 1.2, in Olympic Charter, 73.
members, bidders also attach supporting letters from their national leaders. Premier Li wrote one for Beijing’s Application Letter for the 2000 bid. He not only pointed out that the bid was fully backed by the Chinese government and all the Chinese people, but also promised that Beijing would strictly comply with the Olympic Charter to present the Games as an event promoting international peace and friendship. In contrast, Premier Zhu did not do so for the 2008 bid.

Second, Zhu did not mention the 2008 Olympic Games bid during the voluntary tree planting days in Beijing. Since 1984, the first Monday of every April has been set aside as a voluntary tree planting day in Beijing. All members of the CCP Politburo members together with the senior officials of the Beijing Party Committee and the Beijing government plant trees in different parks of the city. In addition to encouraging Chinese people to replant, some central Party leaders take this opportunity to give particular instructions to the local officials. In order to create a beautiful environment for the 2000 Olympic Games, Li stressed to Beijing Mayor Li Qiyan that he should attach great importance to the environment when he took part into the activity on 4 April 1993. However, Zhu did not mention Beijing’s bid for the 2008 Olympic Games, nor give any related instructions to the Beijing officials when he planted trees with other members of the CCP Politburo Standing Committee on 1 April 2001.

Third, Zhu placed Beijing’s bid for the 2008 Olympic Games together with miscellaneous items in the 2001 Work Report of the State Council. The annual work report of the State Council is a document drafted by the Premier and the State Council General Office. It is

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60 “Li Peng zongli zhi guoji aoweihui zhuxi ji quanti weiyuan han” (Premier Li Peng’s Letter to the President and Members of IOC), *Beijing Daily*, 2 December 1991, 4.
62 Jiang Zemin and Others Participated in the Voluntary Tree Planting Activity for the Capital.
usually presented by the Premier at the opening ceremony of each annual NPC session. In addition to summarising the national economic and social affairs of the previous year, it sets out the work plan of the central government with regard to the economy, agriculture, education, sport, national defence and diplomacy for coming year. The Premier then discusses the work report with the NPC members from different provinces, autonomous regions and municipalities. The final version of the work report is released after revisions have been made by the Premier according to the constructive criticism of the local NPC members.

Although both Olympic Games bids were included in the works of the State Council after Beijing had been confirmed as one of the candidate cities by the IOC, Li and Zhu placed them in different parts of the work reports. Li arranged the first bid in the thematic section about the 1992 and 1993 State Council sports plan, whereas Zhu placed the second bid with the miscellaneous items, such as adjusting the economic order of the market; strengthening intellectual and ideological development; and completing the social security management in the second last paragraph of the 2001 Work Report. Moreover, Li highlighted that the State Council would make every effort to help Beijing win the 2000 Olympic bid, whereas Zhu did not.

It is important to note that there were three differences between Beijing’s bids for the 2000 and 2008 Olympic Games that were not indicators of the central Party elites’ attitudes towards the bids. The first difference concerns the meetings with the IOC members. The central Party leaders chose to lobby the IOC members in person in Beijing

when the 2000 Olympic bid was taking place. Jiang held a talk with 11 members, who were invited to attend the opening ceremony of the Seventh National Games, at the People’s Hall on 4 September 2001.\textsuperscript{65} Li was also interviewed by the Mexican IOC member Mario Vazquez Rana in \textit{Zhongnanhai} before the voting.\textsuperscript{66} However, since the IOC did not allow its members to visit any candidate cities during the 2008 Olympic Games bid,\textsuperscript{67} they were unable to come to China after Beijing had submitted its Application Letter. Thus, Jiang and Zhu were unable to lobby the IOC members during the 2008 bid.

The second difference concerned the central leaders’ responses to the anti-Beijing resolutions of the US House of Representatives Committee on Foreign Affairs. After Beijing was selected as one of the candidate cities for the 2000 Olympic Games, the Committee passed a bill that strongly opposed Beijing’s hosting of the Games due to the massive violations of human rights in China. The bill was further debated and gained a huge majority of support in the House of the Representatives.\textsuperscript{68} The IOC members were encouraged to vote for Sydney if Manchester and Berlin were eliminated. In order to relieve the unfavourable mood towards Beijing, Jiang and Li both wrote personal letters to all the IOC members and to the IOC President, reaffirming that the project was backed by the Chinese government and the Chinese people, and stressing the significance of

\textsuperscript{65} “Jiang Zemin huijian guoji aoweihui weiyuan” (Jiang Zemin Met with the IOC members), \textit{People’s Daily}, 5 September 1993, 1.
\textsuperscript{66} “Li Peng tan shenban aoyun ji guoji wenti gaonei xingshi” (Li Peng Talked about the Bid for the Olympic Games, the International Issues and China’s Domestic Situation), \textit{People’s Daily}, 11 September 1993, 1.
holding the event to China, the world and the Olympic Movement.\(^{69}\) However, despite the Committee passing another bill rejecting Beijing’s right to host the 2008 Olympic Games, its impact was not the same as the first one. The House did not put it on file. Most of the IOC members from Western countries also refused to oppose Beijing.\(^{70}\) Hence, there no letters were written by Jiang and Zhu in response to the second bill.

The third difference concerns the Premiers’ decisions to meet (or not) Kim Un Yong. Kim’s affiliation with the IOC began in 1982 when he participated in the Olympic Movement Commission. He was elected as an IOC member in 1986, and joined the Executive Board in 1988. He was appointed IOC Deputy President twice, from 1992 to 1996 and from 2003 to 2004. Kim is also an influential figure in the international taekwondo community. He chaired the World Taekwondo Federation (WTF), one of the 28 IOC IFs, from 1973 to 2004.\(^{71}\) Kim visited Beijing in different capacities when the two bids were taking place. Li Peng met him when he visited China as the IOC Deputy President in August 1992.\(^{72}\) In contrast, Zhu kept a low profile during Kim’s investigation visit on behalf of the WTF in December 2000. The Premier did not attend the greeting party co-organised by the Beijing Party Committee and the Beijing government,\(^{73}\) and did not arrange for either himself or his State Council subordinate to meet with the Korean. Thus, the Chinese premiers’ decisions were determined by Kim’s visiting capacity.

\(^{69}\) “Jiang Zemin zhuxi fenbie zhixin guoji aoweihui gewei weiyuan” (President Jiang Zemin Sent the Letter to Each IOC Member), People’s Daily, 24 June 1993, 1; “Samalanqi huijian Beijing shenbantuan fuzeren” (Samaranch Met with the Leader of the Beijing Delegation), People’s Daily, 20 September 1993, 1.
\(^{70}\) “Gei Beijing yige gongping jihui” (Give Beijing a Fair Chance), Beijing Daily, 29 March 2001, 1.
\(^{72}\) “Li Peng huijian Jin Yunlong” (Li Peng Met with Kim Un Yong), People’s Daily, 30 August 1992, 1.
\(^{73}\) “Jia Qinglin huijian Jin Yunlong” (Jia Qinglin Met with Kim Un Yong), Beijing Daily, 30 December 2000, 1.
Beijing Party Secretary Jia Qinglin, a protégé of President Jiang Zemin’s faction, frequently gave support to the 2008 bid. He reacted quickly to President Jiang Zemin’s supporting actions, and placed the bid in the 2001 Work Report of the Beijing Party Committee. In addition to maintaining a close relationship with the Bid Committee, the Party Secretary also chaired the Bid Work Group which formulated bidding tactics and coordinated the Beijing government and the ministries. Jia also gave instructions to the local officials and discussed the bid to the foreign guests. All the above actions confirm Jia’s enthusiasm in supporting Beijing’s bid for the 2008 Olympic Games, as does a comparison of his actions with those of Li Ximing in supporting Beijing’s bid for the 2000 Olympic Games.

The first piece of evidence of Jia’s enthusiasm is his response to the central Party elites’ supporting actions. Jia reacted quickly to his factional patron Jiang Zemin’s actions during the 2008 Olympic Games bid. For instance, when the President called on the Chinese government and all the Chinese people to give their all-out support towards the bid at the meeting with the 2000 Olympic delegation in the People’s Hall, Jia quoted it at the gathering of the Beijing-trained Olympic athletes on the same day. While Jiang’s personal letter to the IOC President was printed in the People’s Daily on 4 October 2000, Jia immediately stressed that the 2008 Olympic bid was a big event for Beijing, and required all Beijing residents to support the bid with extraordinary effort. In addition,
Jia took part in the same bidding activities as Jiang did. For example, he was one of the attendants in Jiang’s meeting with all the members of the IOC Evaluation Commission.\footnote{Jiang Zemin Met with the IOC Evaluation Commission.} In contrast, former Beijing Party Secretary Li Ximing never responded to the central leaders’ supporting activities during Beijing’s bid for the 2000 Olympic Games.

Jia’s comments on Beijing’s bid for the 2008 Olympic Games in the 2001 Work Report of the Beijing Party Committee is the second piece of evidence of his enthusiasm. The two Olympic Games bids were placed in the 1992 and 2001 Work Reports respectively, but Li and Jia’s requirements regarding them were different. Jia highlighted the second bid as a glorious, influential and significant mission, whereas Li regarded the first bid as a laborious, but glorious, duty. Jia ordered the municipality to complete each task to the highest standard and the best quality, whereas Li merely encouraged Beijing to strive to make the bid success. Jia stressed that the second bid was one of the most important duties of Beijing in 2001,\footnote{Li Ximing, “Jianding buyi de guanche zhixing dangde jiben luxian duoqu shoudu shehui zhuyi xiandaihua jianshe de xinshengli” (Carrying out Party’s Principles Steadily and Striving for New Victories in Capital’s Socialist Construction for Modernization), in \textit{Beijing Yearbook 1993} (Beijing: Beijing Yearbook Press, 1993), 66-78.} but there was no similar instruction in Li’s report.\footnote{Jia, Continue the Triumphant Advance with Firm Determination.}

Jia’s relationship with the Beijing 2008 Olympic Games Bid Committee is the third piece of evidence of his enthusiasm. Since Li Ximing was not a member of the Beijing 2000 Olympic Games Bid Committee, he kept his distance from its activities. For instance, Li did not attend its opening ceremony,\footnote{“Beijing 2000 nian aoyunhui shenbanwei chengli” (The 2000 Beijing Olympic Games Bid Committee Established), \textit{Beijing Daily}, 12 April 1991, 1.} nor sit in any of its meetings. He was also absent from the activities sponsored by the Bid Committee. His only participation was to hear the work report of the Bid Committee, along with the other members of the CCP.
Politburo on 12 July 1992. However, although Jia was not a member of the Beijing 2008 Olympic Bid Committee either, he chose to maintain close ties with it. For example, Jia was one of the guests chairing the opening ceremony of the Bid Committee and present at the unveiling of the official bid motto and logo. He also sat in the general meetings of the Bid Committee to hear the work reports given by Beijing Mayor Liu Qi and the CGSA Presidents Wu Shaozu and Yuan Weimin, and the instructions delivered by Deputy Premier Li Lanqing. He was even present at the Three Tenors concert in Beijing that was sponsored by the Bid Committee.

Jia’s chairing of the Beijing 2008 Olympic Games Bid Work Group is the fourth piece of evidence of Jia’s enthusiasm. The Work Group was another official entity established for Beijing’s 2008 Olympic Games bid. The Bid Committee was chaired by Beijing Mayor Liu Qi, while the Work Group was directed by Jia. The Bid Committee was composed of the senior officials of the Beijing government, CGSA and COC, whereas the Work Group comprised the headpersons and/or deputies of the central Party departments, the national ministries, and the Beijing Party Committee and government (see Table 3.2). The duty of the Bid Committee was to implement Beijing’s official bid tasks, whereas the mission of the Work Group was to analyse the central leaders’ instructions and to oversee coordination between the Bid Committee and the other participating central units.

82 The 2008 Beijing Olympic Games Bid Committee Established; The Slogan and Emblem of the Beijing Olympic Games Bid Committee Were Confirmed.
Ximing did not participate in either entity for Beijing’s 2000 Olympic Games bid. Nor did he work with then Beijing Mayor Chen Xitong, the CGSA President Wu Shaozu and the COC President He Zhenliang to formulate strategies and tactics for the project.

Table 3.2. Members of the 2008 Beijing Olympic Games Bid Work Group

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Post</th>
<th>Official</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>President</td>
<td>Jia Qinglin (Beijing Party Secretary)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deputy President</td>
<td>Liu Qi (Beijing Mayor);</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Wu Shaozu (until April 2000)/Yuan Weimin (since April 2000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(the CGSA President; the COC President)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Member</td>
<td>Yuan Weimin (until April 2000)/Li Zhijian (since April 2000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(the CGSA Deputy President; the COC Deputy President);</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Liu Jingmin (Deputy Beijing Mayor);</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Liu Peng (Deputy Chairperson,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>the CCP Central Committee Propaganda Department);</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Wang Guangya (Deputy Minister, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs);</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Hao Jianxiu (Deputy Chairperson,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>the National Development and Planning Commission);</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Luo Feng (Deputy Minister, the Ministry of Public Security);</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Jin Liqun (Deputy Minister, the Ministry of Finance);</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Yang Zhengquan (Deputy Chairperson, the State Council Information Office)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Zhang Qing, Shenao Jishi (Records of the Olympic Games Bids) (Beijing: China Social Sciences Press, 2008), 129.

The fifth piece of evidence of Jia’s enthusiasm is his keenness to emphasise the importance of Beijing’s bid for the 2008 Olympic Games to the local officials and celebrities. The Beijing Party Secretary often gave speeches at the 2008 Olympic Games mobilisation meetings organised by the Beijing Party Committee and the Beijing government. In addition to underlining the significance of holding the 2008 Olympic

19 May 2000, 1; “Yi zuigao biaozhun zuihao zhiliang yuanman wancheng shenao gexiang renwu” (To Accomplish Every Task in the Bid for the Olympic Games by the Highest Standard and the Best Quality), Beijing Daily, 16 November 2000, 1&2.
Games to Beijing and China, he also pointed out the specific areas that the local Party Committee and government needed to attach importance to.\textsuperscript{86} Jia frequently mentioned the bid when he was investigating the districts of Beijing and chairing the local meetings. He reminded the local officials to get done their environmental protection and social security management duties.\textsuperscript{87} Jia also included the bid in his conversation when he met with the local celebrities. For instance, he discussed the progress of the bid with the senior members of China’s democratic parties at the 2000 Beijing Party Committee Mid-Autumn Festival Gathering and with local lawmakers at the 2001 NPC Session.\textsuperscript{88} Li did not attend the mobilisation meetings for the Beijing’s 2000 Olympic Games bid, nor mention the project on official occasions.

The sixth piece of evidence of Jia’s enthusiasm is his keenness to advertise Beijing’s bid for the 2008 Olympic Games to foreign guests. In addition to emphasising the support of the CCP Party Committee, the State Council and all the Chinese people,\textsuperscript{89} Jia also commented on the progress of the work on improving Beijing’s environment.\textsuperscript{90} In order to draw visitors’ attention to the bid, Jia even identified it as one of the milestones in Beijing’s international exchange.\textsuperscript{91} In contrast, Li never mentioned the 2000 Olympic bid when he was in the same situation. Moreover, no IF inspectors were invited to meet with Li during the 2000 Olympic bid, while FINA President Mustapha Larfaoui and WTF

\textsuperscript{86} “Yi shenao cufazhan” (Let the Bid for the Olympic Games Boost Development), \textit{Beijing Daily}, 18 August 2000, 1&2; “Ju quanshi zhili banshenao dashi” (To Implement the Bid by the Strength of the city), \textit{Beijing Daily}, 2 September 2000, 1&3.
\textsuperscript{87} “Jiaqiang tongchou guihua gaohao huanjing jianshe” (Strengthen the Overall Planning and Get done the Environmental Construction), \textit{Beijing Daily}, 19 December 2000, 1; “Wei shenao tigong lianghao shehui zhian” (Offer a Good Social Security for the Bid for the Olympic Games), \textit{Beijing Daily}, 22 December 2000, 1.
\textsuperscript{88} “Shoudu gejie renshi xiying zhongqiu jiajie” (The Beijing Celebrities Greeted the Mid-Autumn Festival), \textit{Beijing Daily}, 4 September 2000, 1; “Baogao gaozhuan yuanzhu mubiao cuiren fenjin” (The Work Report Shows a Great Foresight and Spurs Us to Work at Our Utmost), \textit{Beijing Daily}, 6 March 2001, 1&4.
\textsuperscript{89} Jia Qinglin Met with the Hong Kong Guests.
\textsuperscript{90} “Jia Qinglin huijian pingshan yufu” (Jia Qinglin Met with Hirayama Ikuo), \textit{Beijing Daily}, 22 February 2000, 2.
\textsuperscript{91} “Shenban de guocheng yeshi duiwai kaifang de guocheng” (The Process of the Bid Is a Process of the Opening-up), \textit{Beijing Daily}, 27 March 2001, 1.
President Kim Un Yong met with Jia when they were inspecting Beijing.92

By comparing the actions of central and local Party elites in supporting Beijing’s two bids for the Summer Olympic Games, the supporting attitudes of President Jiang Zemin, Premier Zhu Rongji and Beijing Party Secretary Jia Qinglin have been deduced. Zhu was indifferent in giving support, whereas both Jiang and his factional protégé Jia were enthusiastic.

3.3. The central and local executive elites

According to the Olympic Charter, an Olympic Games bid must be undertaken by the city and the NOC. The city, as the host unit, needs to play the leading role in implementing official bid tasks.93 The NOC must perform three duties after the city has been approved to bid for a particular Olympic Games.94 First, it needs to hand in the application with the city to the IOC.95 Second, it must supervise the city during the bid process.96 Finally, it must share the responsibility for the bid with the city.97 Olympic Games bids are therefore local-led and central-coordinated projects. The national ministry that manages the NOC must give supervision and assistance when a city government is in charge of implementing official bid tasks.

This section tests the first hypothesis of this thesis in relation to Beijing’s bid for the 2008

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92 “Jia Qinglin huijian guoji yonglian zhuxi” (Jia Qinglin Met with the FINA President), Beijing Daily, 16 December 2000, 1; Jia Qinglin Met with Kim Un Yong.
93 Rule 34, in Olympic Charter, 72.
94 By-law to Rule 34 paragraph 1.1, in Ibid, 73.
95 By-law to Rule 34 paragraph 1.2, in Ibid, 73.
96 By-law to Rule 34 paragraph 1.4, in Ibid, 73.
97 Ibid.
Olympic Games. Did the stipulations of the IOC lead to the division of labour between central and local executive elites? The central and local executive elites in this case are the senior officials of the CGSA, COC and Beijing government who were on the 2008 Beijing Olympic Games Bid Committee (see Table 3.3). The pattern of division of labour will be deduced through reviewing the elites’ duties in lobbying the IOC members and executives, publicising Beijing in China and abroad, furnishing the bidding documents, entertaining the inspectors, giving the presentation, and preparing Beijing to hold the Olympic Games. The section concludes with a summary of its findings.

3.3.1. Lobbying IOC members and executives

After Beijing, Paris, Toronto, Osaka and Istanbul were announced as the candidates for the 2008 Olympic Games bid, the cities were invited to participate in the following eight gatherings organised by the IOC and its affiliated international organisations: (1) the 2000 Summer Olympic Games at Sydney; (2) the 34th Annual Session of the IFs at Monte Carlo; (3) the 17th Conference of the Association of National Olympic Committees of Africa (ANOCA) Secretaries-general at Lome; (4) the 29th Annual Session of the European Olympic Committee at Warsaw; (5) the 20th General Session of the Olympic Committee of Asia at Nagoya; (6) the third East Asian Games at Osaka; (7) the 2001 United Meeting of the IOC Executive Board and the IFs at Lausanne; and (8) the 9th General Session of the ANOCA at Nairobi.
Table 3.3. Members of the 2008 Beijing Olympic Games Bid Committee

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Post</th>
<th>Official</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>President</td>
<td><em>Liu Qi</em> (Beijing Mayor)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>President in Executive</td>
<td><em>Wu Shaozhu</em> (until April 2000)/<em>Yuan Weimin</em> (since April 2000) (the CGSA President; the COC President)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deputy President in Executive</td>
<td><em>Yuan Weimin</em> (until April 2000)/<em>Li Zhijian</em> (since April 2000) (the CGSA Deputy President); <em>Liu Jingmin</em> (Beijing Deputy Mayor)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deputy President</td>
<td><em>Zhang Faqian</em> (the CGSA Deputy President; the COC Deputy President); <em>Yu Zaiqing</em> (the CGSA Deputy President; the COC Deputy President); <em>Li Zhijian</em> (until April 2000)/<em>Long Xinmin</em> (since April 2000) (Beijing Deputy Party Secretary); <em>Lin Wenyi</em> (Beijing Deputy Mayor); <em>Wang Guangtao</em> (Beijing Deputy Mayor); <em>Zhang Mao</em> (Beijing Deputy Mayor); <em>Jiang Xiaoyu</em> (Deputy Head, the CCP Beijing Municipal Committee Propaganda Department)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secretary</td>
<td><em>Tu Mingde</em> (the CGSA Liaison Officer; The COC Secretary); <em>Wang Wei</em> (Deputy Secretary, the Beijing Government)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Since the IOC members were prohibited to visit candidate cities during the bid, the gatherings offered the candidate cities the only opportunities to demonstrate their organising capacities to IOC members face to face. Both central and local executive elites participated in the delegations, but the officials who led the lobbying and managed the Beijing display counters at the gatherings were Mayor Liu Qi, Deputy Mayor Liu Jingmin, Beijing Government Deputy Secretary Wang Wei and Beijing Propaganda Department Deputy President Jiang Xiaoyu.98 In other words, the central executive elites merely

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98 “Jujing huishen zuohao zuihou jieduan shenban” (Attentively Get Done the Work in the Last Stage of the Bid), Beijing Daily, 21 May 2001, 1&3; “Beijing wanquan younengli banhao aoyunhui” (Beijing Is Fully
assisted the local executive elites at the gatherings.

In addition, each candidate city was required to give a ten-minute oral report at IOC headquarters on 11 December 2000. The report had to inform IOC Executive Board about the candidate’s chosen theme for 2008 Olympic Games, and include promises about how participants would be catered for. Mayor Liu Qi, the CGSA President Yuan Weimin and Beijing Government Deputy Secretary Wang Wei delivered speeches as part of the oral report of Beijing. Liu, the first speaker, introduced the theme as “New Beijing, Great Olympics” and promised the IOC on behalf of the Beijing government and the Bid Committee that all participants would enjoy a clean environment, world-class transport, hi-tech services and wonderful Chinese culture if Beijing was chosen. Wang’s duty was to elaborate on the works that Beijing had completed and those it will implement for improving the local environment and traffic and upgrading the local hi-tech services. Yuan did not make any promises, nor elaborate on the preparations. His speech merely informed the IOC Executive Board that the COC fully supported Beijing’s bid to hold the 2008 Olympic Games.99
3.3.2. Publicising Beijing in China and abroad

After Beijing had become one of the five candidates, Mayor Liu Qi respectively was interviewed by the *New York Times* and the *Financial Times* about Beijing’s ambition to hold the 2008 Olympic Games.\(^\text{100}\) Liu also held a meeting with reporters of the *Xinhua News Agency* and the *People’s Daily* before the inspection of the IOC Evaluation Commission, in which the plan for improving Beijing’s transportation, environment and sports facilities was revealed.\(^\text{101}\) Other local officials were keen to boost Beijing’s image in China and abroad. Beijing Deputy Party Secretary Long Xinmin introduced the bid to members of the American Editorial Freelancers Association on behalf of the Bid Committee.\(^\text{102}\) Deputy Mayor Liu Jingmin and Beijing Propaganda Department Deputy President Jiang Xiaoyu both chaired a number of press conferences about the progress of Beijing’s bid.\(^\text{103}\)

The local officials use other approaches to secure local and overseas Chinese support for the bid. To draw Beijing residents’ attention to the bid, Mayor Liu Qi published an article

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\(^{101}\) “Yi shenao cu fazhan yi fazhan cu shenao” (Let the Bid for the Olympic Games Boost the Development and let the Development Stimulate the Bid), *Beijing Daily*, 19 February 2001, 1&2.


in the *Guangming Daily* about the mission of the Bid Committee.\(^{104}\) Liu Qi, Liu Jingmin and Jiang Xiaoyu frequently gave bid updates at gatherings with Chinese notables, including Olympic gold-medal winners, leaders of the Chinese democratic parties, members of the local People’s Congress and People’s Political Consultative Conference, religious figures, scholars and retired Beijing cadres.\(^{105}\) To draw the attention of overseas Chinese, Liu Jingmin invited Chinese and Hong Kong business tycoons and performers to be the consultants and ambassadors of the project.\(^{106}\) The local officials also briefed international personages in politics, business and sport on the project on behalf of the Bid Committee in Beijing and abroad.\(^{107}\)

In addition, major decisions made by the Bid Committee were announced by the local executive elites. For instance, Liu Qingmin announced that a total of 13 billion US dollars

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\(^{104}\) Liu Qi, “Zhashi tuijin Beijing shenao gongzuo” (Steadily Carry forward Beijing’s Bid for Olympic Games), *Guangming Daily*, 19 May 2000, 1.


would be spent on improving Beijing’s environment from 1998 to 2007 at a press conference in Sydney.  
108 The details of the spending were later unveiled by Jiang Xiaoyu during the inspection of the IFs.  
109 To strengthen the support of African voters, Liu Qi promised on behalf of the Bid Committee to use the surplus from the 2008 Olympics to set up a foundation for promoting sports exchange among the athletes of developing counties.  
110 After Liu Jingmin revealed that the Bid Committee intended to build and renovate 37 stadiums in the Beijing Olympic park, the detailed plans were announced by Jiang Xiaoyu at a press conference in November 2000.

The local executive elites also took the responsibility of accepting sponsorship and endowment on behalf of the Bid Committee. In order to express their support for the bid, a number of business enterprises donated money and goods to the Bid Committee after Beijing became one of the five candidate cities.  


109 “Pinggutuan liaojie le zhenshi de Beijing” (The IOC Evaluation Commission Has Realized Beijing), Beijing Daily, 23 February 2001, 1&2.

110 “Beijing jiang jianli aolinpike youyi hezuo jijin” (Beijing Will Set up an Olympic Friendship and Co-operation Foundation), Beijing Daily, 15 June 2001, 1&2.

111 The Beijing Olympic Games Bid Committee Introduced Its Work Progress to the Chinese and Foreign Media in Sydney.

112 “Beijing aoyun changguan jianshe guihua chiding” (The Preliminary Plan of the Beijing Olympics Stadiums Has been Made), Beijing Daily, 29 November 2000, 1&2.

113 “Liang qiye zanzhu Beijing shenao” (Two Enterprises Sponsored the Beijing’s Bid for the Olympic Games), Beijing Daily, 30 April 2000, 2; “Tongyong qiche zhichi Beijing shenao” (General Motors Company Supported Beijing’s Bid for the Olympic Games), Beijing Daily, 13 July 2000, 1; “Si qiye zanzhu Beijing aoshenwei” (Four Enterprises Sponsored the Beijing Olympic Games Bid Committee), Beijing Daily, 6 September 2000, 1; “Dannmai mashiqi jituans zanzhu Beijing aoshenwei” (Maersk Group of Denmark Sponsored the Beijing Olympic Games Bid Committee), Beijing Daily, 20 April 2000, 3; “Zhongguo xinan zanzhu aoshenwei” (China Premier Group Limited Sponsored the Beijing Olympic Games Bid Committee), Beijing Daily, 5 January 2001, 2; “Xili zanzhu Beijing shenao” (Heineken Sponsored the Beijing Olympic Games Bid Committee), Beijing Daily, 27 February 2001, 3; “Nongfu shanquan zhichi Beijing shenao” (Nongfu Spring Company Limited Supported Beijing’s Bid for the Olympic Games), Beijing Daily, 1 March 2001, 10; “Zhongguo dianxin yu Beijing aoshenwei qianshou cheng huoban” (China Telecom Corporation Limited Become a Companion of the Beijing Olympic Games Bid Committee), Beijing Daily, 30 March 2001, 2; “Bajia qiye reqing zhichi Beijing shenao” (Eight Enterprises Are Enthusiastic to Support Beijing’s Bid for the Olympic Games), Beijing Daily, 4 April 2001, 2; “Aodialiya dianxun zanzhu Beijing aoshenwei” (Telstra Corporation Limited Sponsored the Beijing Olympic Games Bid Committee), Beijing Daily, 20 April 2001, 3.

92
donations together with the local governments. For instance, Lhasa Mayor Luosang Jiangcun donated thousands of bottles of Himalayan mineral water to Beijing Government Deputy Secretary Wang Wei on behalf of the Lhasa government and the Tibet Shengdi Company Limited.\textsuperscript{114} Deputy Mayor Liu Jingmin chaired and gave thank-you speeches at all the ceremonies. In addition, despite the Bid Committee discouraging individual donations,\textsuperscript{115} many civilians did so. Accepting endowments was the duty of Beijing Propaganda Department Deputy President Jiang Xiaoyu, Beijing Government Deputy Secretary Wang Wei and Liu Jingmin.\textsuperscript{116} Mayor Liu Qi also gave thanks to donors on behalf of the Bid Committee.\textsuperscript{117}

The central executive elites often worked with the local officials to publicise Beijing. The CGSA President Yuan Weimin and Mayor Liu Qi together informed the attendants about the significance of holding the 2008 Olympic Games for China and the world at both the 2001 Beijing Memorial Ceremony for the Olympic Movement Founder Pierre de Coubertin and a discussion session of the Beijing representatives at the 2001 NPC Session.\textsuperscript{118} The CGSA Deputy President Yu Zaiqing and the CGSA Liaison Officer Tu Mingde discussed the progress of the Bid Committee together with Beijing officials at

\textsuperscript{114} “Beijing aoshenwei huo juanzeng” (The Beijing Olympic Games Bid Committee Received Endowment), \textit{Beijing Daily}, 4 April 2001, 2.
\textsuperscript{115} “Gonggao” (The Announcement), \textit{Beijing Daily}, 14 September 2000, 2.
\textsuperscript{116} “Nongcai hui Beijing” (Beijing Was Painted by Fancy Intense), \textit{Beijing Daily}, 19 February 2001, 1; “Meiji huaren Dong Daiwei xiang aoshenwei juanzeng feiji” (Chinese American David Dong Endowed an Airplane to the Beijing Olympic Games Bid Committee), \textit{Beijing Daily}, 4 April 2001, 2; “Qianming hengfu zuanle pingmian aoshenwei” (A Banner with Signatures Was Send to the Beijing Olympic Games Bid Committee), \textit{Beijing Daily}, 19 April 2001, 1; “Xianggang qiye xi bang Beijing aoshenwei juanzeng” (The Hong Kong Enterprises Endowed to the Beijing Olympic Games Bid Committee), \textit{Beijing Daily}, 19 April 2001, 2; “Zhihua shenren huijia juanhua” (The Painters Endowed Paints to Support the Bid for the Olympic Games), \textit{Beijing Daily}, 19 June 2001, 2; “Aoyunlong yu changcheng gongwu” (The Olympic Dragon Danced with the Great Wall), \textit{Beijing Daily}, 24 June 2001, 2.
\textsuperscript{117} “Liu Qi huijian Wang Qizhi” (Liu Qi Met with Wang Qizhi), \textit{Beijing Daily}, 9 September 2000, 2.
some press conferences. In addition, the CGSA and COC also arranged for the local executive elites to advertise Beijing to the foreign NOC members. For instance, when the representatives of the Cuban Olympic Committee were visiting China in May 2001, Wang Wei was invited to talk about Beijing’s theme for the 2008 Olympics at a dinner party organised by the COC. However, it is rare for the central executive elites to solely publicise Beijing. One instance was during Yuan Weimin’s visit to Pyongyang in December 2000. He introduced the bid in a meeting with Yang Hyong-sop, the President of the North Korean Supreme People’s Assembly.

3.3.3. Furnishing the bidding documents

Each candidate of the 2008 Olympic Games bid was required to prepare three documents: the Application Letter, the Application Report and the Candidature File. The Application Letter informs the IOC that the city has decided to bid for the Olympic Games. After the IOC has confirmed a city as an official applicant, it must submit the Application Report. The objective of the Application Report is to inform the IOC Executive Board about the city’s (1) motive and objectives to host the Olympic Games; (2) government and public support; (3) general infrastructure; (3) sports facilities; (5) backup; (6) organisation experience of large sports events; and (7) financial sources. The Candidature File must

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122 “Yange de ceshi renzhen de dajuan” (A Rigorous Test and the Earnest Answer), *Beijing Daily*, 28 June
be submitted to the IOC after the city had been chosen as one of the five candidates. It must provide information about the candidate city in the following areas: law; immigration; environment; finance; marketing; schedule; spots; the Paralympics Games; heath and medicinal facilities; security; reception and hospitality; transportation; technology; communication and media; Olympic spirit and culture; and guarantees. Both central and local executive elites travelled with the three documents to IOC headquarters in Lausanne, but the representatives who handed them to the IOC were Beijing Mayor Liu Qi and Beijing Government Deputy Secretary Wang Wei.

It is important to point out that the Candidature File was completed with the assistance of the central executive elites. The preliminary draft of the Candidature File was written by a committee that was composed of Deputy Mayor Liu Jingmin and the officials of the Beijing governments over a period of five months from when Beijing was chosen as one of the five candidates in August 2000. Once the preliminary draft had been completed, it passed to He Zhenliang, Lou Dapeng, Wei Jizhong and other CGSA and COC seniors. Their primary role was to suggest revisions of the content according to their experiences in dealing with the international sporting organisations. As all of the seniors are experts in either English or French, the proofreading of the Candidature File was another of their tasks. Thus, the final version of the Candidature File was a collaboration between the central and local executive elites. The local executive elites took responsibility to draft Beijing’s specific arrangements to hold the 2008 Olympic Games, whereas the editing was the duty of the central executive elites.

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2000, 1&4.
125 Beijing Will Submit the Candidature File.
3.3.4. Entertaining the inspectors

After the five candidate cities of the 2008 Olympic Games bid had been chosen, each of them was inspected by the IOC affiliated IFs. According to the Olympic Charter, the IOC recognises 28 IFs, whose chief mission is to “establish and enforce the rules concerning the practice of their respective sports and to ensure their application in the Olympic Movement”. They also play an important role in Olympic Games bids. Each of them is appointed by the IOC Executive Board to evaluate candidate cities after they have been shortlisted in the first round election. Their opinions on “the candidatures of organizing the Olympic Games, in particular as far as technical aspects of venues for their respect sports are concerned” are included in the report of the IOC Evaluation Commission.\(^\text{126}\)

That report is the most important reference for the IOC members during the vote.

Except for the International Weightlifting Federation (IWF) and the International Federation of Association Football (FIFA), Beijing was examined by all the IFs from October 2000 to January 2001. Beijing Deputy Mayors Liu Jingmin and Zhang Mao were appointed to entertain the inspectors of each IF on behalf of the Bid Committee (see Table 3.4). Some of the inspectors, including the ITU President Les McDonald, the FIE President René Roch, the UIPM President Klaus Schormann, the IABA President Khurshid Anwar Chowdhry, the FINA President Mustapha Larfaoui and the WTF President Kim Un Yong, also met with Mayor Liu Qi.\(^\text{127}\)

\(^{126}\) Rule 27 paragraphs 1.1 & 1.4, in Olympic Charter, 57.
\(^{127}\) “Liu Qi huijian guoji tieren sanxiang lianhehui zhuxi” (Liu Qi Met with the ITU President), Beijing Daily, 15 November 2000, 3; “Liu Qi huijian guoji jijian lianhehui zhuxi” (Liu Qi Met with the FIE President), Beijing Daily, 16 November 2000, 2; “Liu Qi huijian guoji xiandai wuxiang lianhehui zhuxi” (Liu Qi Met with the UIPM President), Beijing Daily, 18 November 2000, 2; “Liu Qi huijian guoji yeyu quanlian zhuxi” (Liu Qi Met with the IABA President), Beijing Daily, 27 November 2000, 2; “Liu Qi huijian guoji yonglian zhuxi” (Liu Qi Met with the FINA President), Beijing Daily, 18 December 2000, 2; “Liu Qi huijian shijie taiquandao lianhehui daibiaotuan” (Liu Qi Met with the WTF delegation), Beijing Daily, 29 December 2000, 2.
### Table 3.4. Local executive elites who entertained the inspectors of 26 IFs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date of entertainment</th>
<th>International federation</th>
<th>Local executive elite</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>16 October 2000</td>
<td>The International Table Tennis Federation (ITTF)</td>
<td>Liu Jingmin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18 October 2000</td>
<td>The International Baseball Federation (IBAF)</td>
<td>Liu Jingmin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23 October 2000</td>
<td>The International Sailing Federation (ISAF)</td>
<td>Liu Jingmin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 November 2000</td>
<td>International Volleyball Federation (FIVB)</td>
<td>Liu Jingmin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 November 2000</td>
<td>The International Hockey Federation (FIH)</td>
<td>Liu Jingmin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 November 2000</td>
<td>The Badminton World Federation (BWF)</td>
<td>Liu Jingmin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 November 2000</td>
<td>The International Archery Federation (FITA)</td>
<td>Liu Jingmin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14 November 2000</td>
<td>The International Triathlon Union (ITU); The International Rowing Federation (FISA)</td>
<td>Liu Jingmin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 November 2000</td>
<td>The International Fencing Federation (FIE)</td>
<td>Liu Jingmin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17 November 2000</td>
<td>The International Tennis Federation (ITF); The International Modern Pentathlon Union (UIPM)</td>
<td>Liu Jingmin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 November 2000</td>
<td>International Basketball Federation (FIBA)</td>
<td>Zhang Mao</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25 November 2000</td>
<td>The International Judo Federation (IJF)</td>
<td>Zhang Mao</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27 November 2000</td>
<td>International Softball Federation (ISF); International Boxing Association (AIBA)</td>
<td>Zhang Mao</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28 November 2000</td>
<td>The International Federation of Gymnastics (IFG)</td>
<td>Zhang Mao</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 December 2000</td>
<td>The International Association of Athletics Federations (IAAF)</td>
<td>Zhang Mao</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 December 2000</td>
<td>The International Federation for Equestrian Sports (FEI); The International Federation of Associated Wrestling Styles (FILA)</td>
<td>Zhang Mao</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 December 2000</td>
<td>The International Canoe Federation (ICF)</td>
<td>Zhang Mao</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13 December 2000</td>
<td>The International Handball Federation (IHF); The International Cycling Union (ICU)</td>
<td>Zhang Mao</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 December 2000</td>
<td>The International Aquatic Sports Federation (FINA)</td>
<td>Zhang Mao</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19 December 2000</td>
<td>The International Shooting Sport Federation (ISSF)</td>
<td>Zhang Mao</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29 December 2000</td>
<td>The World Taekwondo Federation (WTF)</td>
<td>Liu Jingmin</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


After hosting the inspectors of the 26 IFs, the local executive elites were in charge of entertaining the IOC Evaluation Commission. In order to best perform the various tasks during the inspection of the IOC executive members in Beijing, the Bid Committee formed a work group, which was directed by Mayor Liu Qi and his subordinates in the Beijing government (see Table 3.5). When the Evaluation Commission Headperson Hein Verbruggen and his colleagues arrived at Beijing International Airport, the greeting ceremonies were chaired by Liu Qi and his subordinate Liu Jingmin in person.128 After attending President Jiang Zemin’s meeting, the mayor gave a welcome speech on behalf of the Bid Committee.129 In addition to accompanying the IOC inspectors throughout the evaluation of the city,130 Liu also welcomed the Commission together with his colleagues

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when the Bid Committee was visited. Deputy Mayor Liu Jingmin and Beijing Propaganda Department Deputy President Jiang Xiaoyu took turns chairing the Bid Committee’s press conferences for reporting the progress of each day of the evaluation. Liu Qi reviewed the whole evaluation trip at the last press conference after farewelling the inspectors.

Table 3.5. Members of the 2008 Beijing Olympic Games Bid Committee Work Group for preparing the inspection of the IOC Evaluation Commission

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Post</th>
<th>Official</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Headperson</td>
<td>Liu Qi (Beijing Mayor)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deputy headperson</td>
<td>Liu Jingmin (Deputy Beijing Mayor)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Captain in presentation</td>
<td>Liu Jingmin (Deputy Beijing Mayor)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deputy captain in presentation</td>
<td>Wang Wei (Deputy Secretary, the Beijing Government)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Captain in entertainment</td>
<td>Zhang Mao (Deputy Beijing Mayor)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deputy captain in entertainment</td>
<td>Zhang Qing (Head, the CGSA Aquatic Sports Department)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Captain in publicity</td>
<td>Long Xinmin (Beijing Deputy Party Secretary)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deputy captain in publicity</td>
<td>Jiang Xiaoyu (Deputy Head, the CCP Beijing Municipal Committee Propaganda Department)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Captain in general affairs</td>
<td>Wang Guangtuo (Deputy Beijing Mayor)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deputy captain in general affairs</td>
<td>Cai Fuchao (Deputy Head, the CCP Beijing Municipal Committee Propaganda Department)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Zhang, Records of the Olympic Games Bids, 156.

The central executive elites assisted the local executive elites in entertaining the inspectors. For instance, during the evaluation of each of the 26 IFs, the Bid Committee

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131 Hearing the First Day Presentation of the Beijing Olympic Games Bid Committee.
132 “Beijing shenao wuda changchu” (The Five Advantages of Beijing’s Bid for Olympic Games), Beijing Daily, 21 February 2001, 1&2; “Beijing youshili younengli” (Beijing Has Strength and Ability), Beijing Daily, 22 February 2001, 1&3; “Rang pinggutuan liaojie zhenshi de Beijing” (Let the IOC Evaluation Commission Realize Beijing), Beijing Daily, 23 February 2001, 1&2; “Beijing jubei juban aoyunhui de shili” (Beijing Has Strength to Hold the Olympic Games), Beijing Daily, 24 February 2001, 1&2; The Beijing Olympic Games Bid Committee Held a Press Conference.
133 “Guoji aoweihui pinggutuan lijing” (The IOC Evaluation Commission Left Beijing), Beijing Daily, 26 February 2001, 1&2; The Beijing Olympic Games Bid Committee Held a Press Conference.
was required to provide a report informing the inspectors about Beijing’s plans for holding specific sports competitions in the 2008 Olympic Games. Lou Dapeng, He Zhenliang, Wei Jizhong and other COC senior officials were appointed to report on Beijing’s sports facility construction together with the Beijing Deputy Secretary Wang Wei and Beijing Propaganda Department Deputy President Jiang Xiaoyu. He Zhenliang and the CGSA Deputy President Yu Zaiqing participated to welcome the IOC inspectors at Beijing International Airport. The CGSA and COC President Yuan Weimin accompanied the inspectors during the 4-day evaluation, and attended the farewell ceremony chaired by the Beijing Mayor.

3.3.5. Giving the presentation

Each candidate city was required to give a presentation to all the IOC members before the vote. This outlines what holding the Olympics would contribute to their own country, the world and the Olympic Movement if the city is chosen. The central and local executive elites, including the CGSA President Yuan Weimin, former COC President He Zhenliang, the COC Senior Lou Dapeng, Beijing Mayor Liu Qi and Beijing Government Deputy Secretary Wang Wei, participated in the presentation. Liu’s duty in the presentation was to make the promises. He guaranteed that the 2008 Beijing Olympic Games Organising Committee would work for (1) China’s social and economic progress; (2) China’s human rights cause development; (3) the exchange between Chinese culture and other cultures; and (4) the spreading of the Olympic Ideals, if Beijing obtained the right to hold the 2008 Olympic Games.

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134 All the IOC Evaluation Commission Members Arrived in Beijing.
135 Hearing the First Day Presentation of the Beijing Olympic Games Bid Committee; The Second Day of the IOC Evaluation Commission at Beijing; The Third Day of the IOC Evaluation Commission at Beijing; The IOC Evaluation Commission Finalised the Inspection at Beijing; The IOC Evaluation Commission Left Beijing.
Olympic Games. Wang elaborated on the works that Beijing had completed, and would implement, to fulfil the promises made.\textsuperscript{136}

Even though the central executive elites participated in the presentation, their speeches did not express what holding the Olympics would contribute to China, the world and the Olympic Movement. For instance, Yuan’s speech, which came after that of Liu, stressed the Chinese sports community’s wish to hold the 2008 Olympic Games. The duties of He Zhenliang and Lou Dapeng were to give the opening and closing speeches and list the works that Beijing had completed, and would complete, on stadium renovations and constructions. Two Chinese athletes who had won gold medals in the Summer Olympic Games, Deng Yaping and Yang Ling, were also invited to deliver speech in the presentation. They highlighted that holding the 2008 Olympics was a common dream of all Chinese sportspeople.\textsuperscript{137}

3.3.6. Preparing Beijing to hold the Olympic Games

In order to show their commitment to holding the 2008 Olympic Games, the Bid Committee started improving the local environment and traffic after Beijing was chosen as one of the five candidates. The local executive elites played the leading role in implementing the improvements. Since Beijing’s environment was the Achilles’ heel of the bid for the 2000 Olympic Games, presenting a “green Olympics” in 2008 became a promise of the Bid Committee. The Beijing government therefore not only invested 12 million US dollars from 1998 to 2007 for green management, but also appointed Beijing

\textsuperscript{137} Ibid.
Government Environmental Bureau Deputy Secretary Yu Xiaoxuan to chair the Environment and Ecology Department of the Bid Committee. The department ensured that the green areas in Beijing increased by 2,556 hectares in 2001.\textsuperscript{138}

The Bid Committee also drafted an action plan aiming to raise and strengthen the long-term awareness of the local residents regarding environmental protection. Around 40 civil groups were invited to collaborate with the local government to achieve this goal. At the signing ceremony, Beijing Government Deputy Secretary Wang Wei and Deputy Mayor Wang Guangtao announced their compliance with the plan on behalf of the Bid Committee.\textsuperscript{139} Deputy Mayor Liu Jingmin later discussed with the 18 district and county governments about the specific implementation.\textsuperscript{140} In addition, to ensure that Beijing’s traffic congestion would be relieved in 2008, the construction of the Beijing Light Rail and 5th Ring Road started under the orders of the Beijing government after the inspection of the IOC Evaluation Commission.\textsuperscript{141}

The central executive elites did not work with the local executive elites to improve Beijing’s environment and traffic. Their role was to give supervision to the Beijing officials at the Bid Committee general meetings. The Bid Committee held general meetings on a regular basis. The central and local executive elites attended all of them. The duty of Mayor Liu Qi and his deputy Liu Jingmin was to recap the works of the previous stage and to give instructions to the members for the next stage. The speeches of

\begin{footnotes}
\item[138] The 29\textsuperscript{th} Olympic Games Organising Committee, “Beijing chenggong shenban 2008 nian di 29 jie aolin pike yundonghui jishi” (The Documentary of Beijing’s Success to Bid for the 29\textsuperscript{th} Olympic Games), in \textit{Beijing Yearbook 2002} (Beijing: Beijing Yearbook Press, 2002), 55-58.
\item[139] “Beijing yaoban lüse aoyun” (Beijing Intends to Present a Green Olympic Games), \textit{Beijing Daily}, 25 August 2000, 1.
\item[140] “Beijing luoshi lüse aoyun xingdong jihua” (Beijing Implements the Green Olympics Action Plan), \textit{Beijing Daily}, 1 September 2000, 1.
\item[141] The Documentary of Beijing’s Success to Bid for the 29\textsuperscript{th} Olympic Games.
\end{footnotes}
Wu Shaozu and his successor Yuan Weimin came at the end of the meetings, which (1) ensured the CGSA and COC staff closely coordinated with the local officials; (2) introduced the work plan of the CGSA and COC for the next stage; and (3) underlined the specific tasks that Beijing needed to attach importance to in the next stage. It is important to point out that the central executive elites never commented on the local executive elites’ work performance at the general meetings, nor did their speeches instruct the local executive elites to do anything for the bid.142

Through reviewing the implementations of bidding works, it is plain to see that the division of labour between the central and local executive elites in Beijing’s bid for the 2008 Olympic Games was consistent with the stipulations of the IOC. Under the supervision of Wu Shaozu, Yuan Weimin and their CGSA and COC subordinates, Mayor Liu Qi and his colleagues were in charge of preparing Beijing to hold the Olympic Games. The central executive elites also gave assistance when the local executive elites were lobbying the IOC members and executives; publicising Beijing in China and abroad; furnishing the bidding documents; giving the presentation and entertaining the IOC inspectors. All the findings confirm that the bid was a local-led and central-coordinated project involving the strict compliance of the CGSA, COC and the Beijing government senior officials with the Olympic Charter.

142 “Beijing aoshenwei zongdongyuan” (The Beijing Olympic Games Bid Committee Made a General Mobilization), *Beijing Daily*, 5 January 2000, 1&4; “Beijing aoshenwei gongzuohui zhaokai” (The Beijing Olympic Games Bid Committee Held a Work Meeting), *Beijing Daily*, 24 March 2000, 1&2; “Beijing aoshenwei juxing dongyuan dahui” (The Beijing Olympic Games Bid Committee Held a Mobilization Meeting), *China Sports Daily*, 7 September 2000, 1; The Beijing Olympic Games Bid Committee Held an Enlarged Meeting.
3.4. Summary

Members of the CCP Central Committee, CGSA, COC, the Beijing Party Committee, and the Beijing government participated in Beijing’s bid for the 2008 Olympic Games from September 1998 to July 2001. The central and local executive elites, including the CGSA and COC President Wu Shaozu and his successor Yuan Weimin, Beijing Mayor Liu Qi and their subordinates, collaborated in the Beijing 2008 Olympic Games Bid Committee to implement the official bid tasks. The central and local Party elites, including President Jiang Zemin, Premier Zhu Rongji and Beijing Party Secretary Jia Qinglin, gave support to the bid in China and abroad. Beijing eventually obtained the right to host the 2008 Summer Olympic Games at the 112th IOC Session in Moscow on 13 July 2001.

To test whether factionalism led to the attitudes of both central and local Party elites in supporting the bid, the actions of President Jiang Zemin, Premier Zhu Rongji and Beijing Party Secretary Jia Qinglin in supporting Beijing’s bid for the 2008 Olympic Games were compared with those of the same-ranking officials in Beijing’s bid for the 2000 Olympic Games. It was found that that both Jiang and Jia were enthusiastic in supporting Beijing, while Zhu was indifferent. Jiang and Jia’s enthusiasm confirms that if the central and local Party elites come from the same faction, their attitudes in supporting a bid tend to be consistent. Zhu’s indifference and Jia’s enthusiasm confirms that attitudes in supporting a bid tend to be inconsistent if the central and local Party elites come from different factions.

To test whether the stipulations of the IOC led to the division of labour between the central and local executive elites in implementing the bid, the actions of senior officials in
the Bid Committee were reviewed. It was found that the executive elites from the CGSA and COC frequently provided supervision and assistance to the Beijing government senior officials who played the leading role in giving the presentations, entertaining the inspectors, furnishing the bidding documents, lobbying IOC members and executives, publicising Beijing in China and abroad, and preparing Beijing to hold the games. Beijing’s bid for the 2008 Olympic Games was operated as a local-led and central-coordinated project involving the strict compliance of the central and local executive elites with the stipulations of the IOC. Hence, the stipulations of the IOC can be confirmed as a factor that may lead to the division of labour between the central and local executive elites.
CHAPTER 4
SHANGHAI’S BID FOR THE 2010 WORLD EXPO

Chinese cities have obtained the rights to host six mega international expositions since the 1990s. Five of these were International Horticultural Exhibitions administrated by the International Association of Horticultural Producers (AIPH). Beijing, Shenyang, Xi’an, Qingdao and Tangshan were chosen to hold 1999, 2006, 2011, 2014 and 2016 Exhibitions respectively.¹ The right to hold the sixth exposition was granted by the International Exhibitions Bureau (BIE). Shanghai, the biggest and most populous city in China, won the 2010 World Expo bid in December 2002. This was the first time the event had ever been held in China.

The aim of the BIE in organising World Expos has three aspects: “(1) to help build trust and connect governments and civil society; (2) to identify the best prospects and the best solution to face the major challenges for humanity; and (3) to contribute to the moral, material and technological progress of humanity.”² At each World Expo, all participant states, international organisations, civil society groups, corporations and citizens may build their own pavilions and educate the public about “the means at man’s disposal for meeting the needs of civilisation; the progress achieved in one or more branches of

¹ “Zhongguo chenggong juban 1999 nian Kunming shijie yuanyi bolanhui” (China Successfully Held the 1999 International Horticultural Exhibition in Kunming), China Trade News, 5 December 2002, 2; “Chenggong shenban 2006 shijie yuanyi bolanhui” (Successfully Bid for the 2006 International Horticultural Exhibition), In Shenyang Yearbook 2005 (Beijing: China Statistic Press, 2005), 29-30; “2011 nian shiyuanhui hualuo Xi’an” (Xi’an Obtained the Right to Host the 2011 International Horticultural Exhibition), Xi’an Daily, 5 September 2007, 1; “2014 nian shijie yuanbohui hualuo Qingdao” (Qingdao Obtained the Right to Host the 2014 International Horticultural Exhibition), Qingdao Daily, 17 September 2009, 1&9; “Tangshan huode 2016 nian shijie yuanyi bolanhui chengbanquan” (Tangshan Obtained the Right to Host the 2016 International Horticultural Exhibition), Tangshan Laodong Daily, 7 October 2010, 1.

human endeavour and prospects for the future”. In addition, the duration of each World Expo may not be less than three weeks nor more than six months, and the interval between two expos shall be at least five years.

The idea of holding a World Expo in Shanghai had been debated before the China government became a member of the BIE in 1993. In the 1980s, Former Shanghai Mayor Wang Daohan intended to bid for both the 1989 and 1993 World Expos. The bids were eventually abandoned however due to the economic situation and political climate at the time.

Since the 1990s, Shanghai has been held up as a symbol of China’s economic growth. In addition to strengthening the build of Pudong New District, the municipality also hosted a number of international economic and political gatherings under the instructions of President Jiang Zemin and Premier Zhu Rongji (see Table 4.1). In order to

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accomplish the tasks necessary to host the gatherings, 257.694 billion yuan was invested in renovating the urban infrastructure of Shanghai between 1998 and 2002. Some of the facilities, including the Shanghai Oriental Pearl International Convention Centre, the Shanghai Science and Technology Museum, and the Shanghai International Media Centre, were highly praised by both Chinese and foreign political economic leaders during the gatherings. In addition, Shanghai was eager to hold international exhibitions in the 1990s. According to official statistics, the numbers of international exhibitions held in Shanghai increased dramatically from 1996 to 2000. The annual rate of increase was 41.9% and 63.8% in 1999 and 2000 respectively (see Figure 4.1). These conditions caused Mayor Xu Kuangdi to rekindle the hope of holding a World Expo in Shanghai.

Table 4.1. International gatherings held in Shanghai under the instructions of Jiang Zemin and Zhu Rongji 1999-2002

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
<th>The Chinese leader instructed and attended</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>17 September 1999</td>
<td>1999 FORTUNE Global Forum</td>
<td>Jiang Zemin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 May 2000</td>
<td>The 11th Annual Corporate Conference of the US Asia Society</td>
<td>Zhu Rongji</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 June 2001</td>
<td>The Summit Meeting of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization</td>
<td>Jiang Zemin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21 October 2001</td>
<td>The 9th Informal Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Leadership Meeting</td>
<td>Jiang Zemin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 May 2002</td>
<td>The 35th Annual Meeting of the Board of Governors of the Asian Development Bank</td>
<td>Jiang Zemin</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


8 “Shanghai jiaotong tongxun sheshi kancheng yilu” (Shanghai’s Transport and Communication Facilities Are Excellent), Jiefang Daily, 28 September 1999, 2; “Digei shijie de xinmingpian” (Hand a New Name Card to the World), Jiefang Daily, 23 October 2001, 1&6; “Jiang Zemin xiang quanti gongzuoren yu guangda Shanghai shimin zhixie” (Jiang Zemin Thanks all the Staff and Shanghai Residents), Jiefang Daily, 23 October 2001, 1&6.
This chapter analyses the central and local relations in Shanghai’s bid for the 2010 World Expo. The attitudes of the central and local Party elites in giving support are reviewed after introducing the process of bid. To deduce the supporting attitudes of President Jiang Zemin, Premier Zhu Rongji and Shanghai Party Secretary Huang Ju, their actions are compared with those of Jiang, Zhu and Beijing Party Secretary Jia Qinglin in supporting Beijing’s bid for the 2008 Olympic Games in section 4.2. The following section discusses the division of labour between the central and local executive elites in implementing the official bid tasks. The duties of senior officials of the State Council, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), the China Council for the International Trade Promotion (CCITP), the Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation Ministry (FTECM) and the Shanghai government in lobbying the BIE members and executives, publicising Shanghai in China and abroad, furnishing the bidding documents, entertaining the BIE inspectors, giving the presentations and preparing Shanghai to hold the World Expo are reviewed. The last section summarises the evidence for whether factionalism and the stipulations of the BIE respectively shape the attitude of both the central and local Party elites in supporting the bid and the division of labour between the central and local executive elites in
implementing the bid.

4.1. The process

The bid can be separated into three stages. The first stage commenced in February 1999 when Shanghai Party Secretary Huang Ju agreed with Mayor Xu Kuangdi’s proposal to hold the 2010 World Expo in Shanghai. The local officials not only submitted the proposal to the State Council for approval, but also initiated communication with BIE executive officials. The State Council approved Shanghai’s request in November, and authorised the CCITP to inform the BIE of Shanghai’s intent. The stage ended after the Chinese representative in the BIE Liu Fugui announced the bid on behalf of the Chinese government at the BIE’s 126th Session in Paris in December 1999. During those 11 months, most of the operation was carried out by the Shanghai government. No central Party and executive elites participated in the project. In addition, the Chinese government and the Shanghai government were the only supporters of the bid.

The curtain fell on the second stage in January 2002. During the previous 25 months, the 2010 Shanghai World Expo Bid Committee and the 2010 Shanghai World Expo Bid Work Group were established, the theme of the exposition “Better City, Better Life” and its

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10 “Shanghai jiangwei shijie geguo tigong wutai” (Shanghai Will Provide a Stage for Countries in the World), Jiefang Daily, 3 November 1999, 1.
12 Shanghai Will Provide a Stage for Countries in the World; Ibid.
13 “Quanli zhichi Shanghai chengban shibohui” (Fully Support Shanghai to Hold the World Expo), Jiefang Daily, 16 May 2000, 1; “Zhizheng zhaoxi zhubei shenban shibohui” (Seize Every Minute to Prepare the Bid for the World Expo), Jiefang Daily, 20 July 2000, 1.
official promotion slogan and poster were unveiled; and Shanghai’s Application Letter and the Proposal were successively submitted to the BIE. Shanghai also gave presentations at the 129th and 130th BIE Sessions in accordance with the requirements of the BIE. There were two personnel changes in this stage. First, Deputy Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation Minister and Deputy Bid Committee President Sun Zhengyu retired. His posts were inherited by Wei Jianguo. Second, Xu Kuangdi was transferred to the Chinese Academy of Engineering. Chen Liangyu became the new Shanghai mayor, the Deputy President of the Bid Committee and the President of the Bid Work Group.

This stage had three differences with the previous one. First, the central executive elites, including State Councillor Wu Yi, Deputy Foreign Minister Wang Guangya and the CCITP President Yu Xiaosong, participated in the implementations of the official bid tasks. Second, President Jiang Zemin and Premier Zhu Rongji both mentioned the bid on official occasions. Third, all the Shanghai people and all the Chinese people were included as the supporters of the bid. However, the bid was not entered in the 2000 and

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14 “Xu Kuangdi huijian waiguo keren” (Xu Kuangdi Met with the Foreign Guests), Jiefang Daily, 26 April 2001, 1&2; “Shibohui shenban hainao kouhao zhuojixiao” (The Poster and Slogan of the bid for the World Expo Were Unveiled Yesterday), Jiefang Daily, 8 September 2001, 5.
16 “Chen Liangyu zai bali guoji zhanlanju chengyuanguo daibiao huiyishang chenshu shenqing” (Chen Liangyu gave a Presentation at the BIE Session in Paris), Jiefang Daily, 8 June 2001, 1&6; “Zhongguo shenbo chongman xinxin” (China Is Confident to Bid for the World Expo), Jiefang Daily, 1 December 2001, 1&2.
18 “Chen Liangyu ren shanghai shi daishizhang” (Chen Liangyu Served as Shanghai Acting Mayor), Jiefang Daily, 8 December 2001, 1.
19 “Zhongde liangguo zongli canguan hannuowei shibohui zhongguoguan” (Chinese Premier and German Chancellor Visited the China Pavilion in the Hannover World Expo), China Trade News, 4 July 2000, 1; “Jiangzhuxi yu kasiteluo zhuxi huitan” (President Jiang Met with President Castro), People’s Daily, 15 April 2001, 1.
20 “Shanghai youtiaojian juxing daxing guoji bolan” (Shanghai Is Qualified to Hold Mega International Exhibition), Jiefang Daily, 22 November 2000, 1; The Chinese Government Submitted the Proposal to the BIE.
2001 Work Reports of the State Council and Shanghai government.\textsuperscript{21}

The third stage ended when Shanghai was chosen to hold the 2010 World Expo in December 2002. During this stage, Shanghai gave presentations at the BIE’s 131\textsuperscript{st} and 132\textsuperscript{nd} Sessions, and was inspected by the BIE Investigation Delegation.\textsuperscript{22} The bid was entered in the 2002 Work Report of the State Council,\textsuperscript{23} but not in the 2002 Work Reports of the Shanghai Party Committee and Shanghai Government.\textsuperscript{24} President Jiang Zemin, Premier Zhu Rongji and Shanghai Party Secretary Huang Ju all gave support in China and abroad while State Councillor Wu Yi, Mayor Chen Liangyu and their colleagues were busy in implementing the official bid tasks. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Central Committee and Shanghai Party Committee were added as supporters of the bid during this stage.\textsuperscript{25}


\textsuperscript{22} “Zhongguo daibiaotuan jiu shenban 2010 nian shibohui chenshu” (The China Delegation Gave a Presentation for the Bid for 2010 World Expo), People’s Daily, 4 July 2002, 1&3; “Silun toupiao Zhongguo Shanghai huode 2010 nian shibohui jubanquan” (Shanghai Obtained the Right to Host the 2010 World Expo through Four Round Votings), Jiefang Daily, 4 December 2002, 1&8.


\textsuperscript{24} Huang Ju, “Fenfa youwei yushi jujin ba shanghai gaige kaifang he xiandaihua jianshe tigao dao xinshuiping” (Hardworking and Promising Advance with Time, to Upgrade the Shanghai’s Reform and Modernization Construction to a New Level), in Shanghai Almanac 2003, 4-11; Chen Liangyu, “Zhengfu gongzuo baogao” (The 2002 Work Report of the Shanghai Government), in Shanghai Almanac 2002, 8-13.

\textsuperscript{25} “Shanghai youxinxin younengli chengban shibohui” (Shanghai Is Confident to Hold the World Expo), Jiefang Daily, 8 February 2002, 1&3; “Shenbo pindao toupiao zuihou yike” (Fighting to the Last Second in the Bid for the World Expo), Jiefang Daily, 11 February 2002, 1&2.
4.2. The central and local Party elites

This section tests the second hypothesis of this thesis that factionalism may lead to the attitudes of both central and local Party elites in supporting each international bid. The supporting attitudes of the central and local Party elites who participated in Shanghai’s bid for the 2010 World Expo – President Jiang Zemin, Premier Zhu Rongji and Shanghai Party Secretary Huang Ju – are deduced through comparing their actions with those of Jiang, Zhu and Beijing Party Secretary Jia Qinglin in supporting Beijing’s bid for the 2008 Olympic Games. The section concludes with a summary of its findings.

4.2.1. Jiang Zemin

President Jiang Zemin, the patron of “Shanghai Clique”, participated in Shanghai’s bid for the 2010 World Expo. Like he did for Beijing’s bid for the 2008 Olympic Games, Jiang wrote a supporting letter for Shanghai’s Proposal and met with the BIE Investigation Delegation. However, he did not write personal letter to lobby the BIE leaders to support Shanghai, nor mention the bid when he was meeting with local officials and foreign guests. Jiang’s performance was low-profile even in celebrating Shanghai’s victory. These differences confirm that Jiang’s attitude in supporting Shanghai was indifferent compared to his supporting actions for Beijing.

The two pieces of evidence suggest Jiang supported Beijing’s bid for the 2008 Olympic Games and Shanghai’s bid for the 2010 World Expo bids in the same way. First, he wrote

26 For details see Chapter 2 Section 2.2.2.
supporting letters for both Beijing’s Candidature File and Shanghai’s Proposal. In the 2010 World Expo bid, each city was required to submit a Proposal to the BIE after it had become one of the six candidates. The Proposal had to cover the concrete information about how the city and national governments would organise the 2010 World Expo.

In order to convey the national government’s ambition to hold the World Expo, national leaders were invited to write a supporting letter for the Proposal of each city. President Jiang Zemin wrote a letter to support Shanghai’s bid on behalf of the Chinese government and its contents were almost the same as the one he wrote for Beijing’s 2008 Olympic Games Bid Candidature File. For instance, Jiang stressed that Beijing is “ready to contribute to the cause of peace, friendship and progress of mankind and to the development of the Olympic Movement by hosting the 2008 Olympic Games”,27 and highlighted that selecting Shanghai would enable the BIE “to expand its influence in China and the world, and to strengthen its cooperation and communication with countries and regions, through holding the 2010 World Expo”.28 Jiang promised “Beijing will make the 2008 Olympic Games an extraordinary success with the support of the Chinese government and all the Chinese people”,29 and later assure the BIE that “the Chinese government and all the Chinese people will back Shanghai to stage a high-standard and admirable World Expo in 2010”.30

Second, Jiang met with both IOC (International Olympic Committee) and BIE inspectors. Both the IOC and BIE appointed a commission/delegation to inspect all the candidate cities in the 2008 Olympic Games bid and the 2010 World Expo bid. Their mission was to

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28 The Chinese Government Submitted the Proposal to the BIE.
29 Letter of Support by President Jiang Zemin.
30 The Chinese Government Submitted the Proposal to the BIE.
evaluate whether the candidate cities were able to fulfil the commitments made in their Candidature Files or Proposals. The inspectors then summarised their evaluations in reports which the organisations’ members read before casting their votes.  

Thus, the functions of the IOC Evaluation Commission and the BIE Investigation Delegation in the 2008 Olympic Games bid and the 2010 World Expo bid were the same.

The inspectors of both international organisations were invited to meet with President Jiang Zemin when they were in Beijing. The speeches Jiang delivered at the meetings were almost the same. They not only gave promises that Chinese government would strictly abide all the commitments made in Beijing’s Candidature File and Shanghai’s Proposal respectively, but also emphasised that both events would be supported by all the Chinese people. In addition, the President assured the IOC Evaluation Commission President Hein Verbruggen that Beijing will host the 2008 Olympic Games featuring modern characteristics and Olympic charming, and then later promised the BIE Investigation Delegation President Carmen Sylvain that Shanghai will hold the most successful, splendid and unforgettable World Expo in 2010.

However, the following three pieces of evidence confirm that Jiang was indifferent in his support of the 2010 World Expo bid. First, Jiang did not send a personal letter to lobby the BIE leaders to support Shanghai. After Beijing was selected as one of the five candidate cities in the 2008 Olympic Games bid, Jiang did write a personal letter to the

33 “Jiangzhuxi huijian guoji zhanlanju kaochatuan” (President Jiang Met with the BIE Investigation Delegation), People’s Daily, 12 March 2002, 1.
IOC President Juan Samaranch. That letter contained the following four points: (1) Jiang and his colleagues fully supported Beijing’s bid to hold the 2008 Olympic Games; (2) it would be significant for the spread of the Olympic Movement in China and the world if Beijing was chosen to hold the Olympic Games; (3) the Chinese government and all the Chinese people would help Beijing stage a high-standard Olympic Games in 2008; and (4) President Samaranch was invited to visit China at his convenience.34 But Jiang did not write personal letter to the BIE President Gilles Noghes or Secretary-General Vicente González Loscertales after Shanghai had became one of the five candidates in the 2010 World Expo bid. Nor did he invite them to visit China in any other communication.

Second, Jiang never mentioned the Shanghai bid when he was meeting with Chinese celebrities and foreign guests, even though that was his normal practice with other bids. For instance, he ordered Beijing’s bid for the 2000 Olympic Games to be achieved and called all the Chinese people to support Beijing’s bid for the 2008 Olympic Games when he was celebrating with the Chinese athletes who had won gold medals in the 1992 and 2000 Olympic Games at the People’s Hall.35 In addition, Jiang also mentioned China’s bids when he met with foreign visitors. One occasion was his welcome for the Three Tenors (Plácido Domingo, José Carreras and Luciano Pavarotti) in Beijing in June 2001. Beijing’s 2008 Olympic Games bid was mentioned then.36 However, Jiang never mentioned Shanghai’s World Expo bid when he met with Chinese celebrities and foreign guests.

34 “Jiang Zemin zhuxi zhixin samalanqi” (President Jiang Zemin Sent a Letter to Samaranch), People’s Daily, 4 October 2000, 1.
35 “Jiang Zemin tongzhi de jianghua” (Comrade Jiang Zemin’s Speech), People’s Daily, 17 August 1992, 1; “Zai huijian diershiqijie aoyunhui zhongguo tiyu daibiaotuan shi de jianghua” (The Speech Delivered at the Meeting with the 27th Olympic Games Chinese Delegation), People’s Daily, 4 October 2000, 1.
36 “Jiang Zemin huijian shijie sanda nangaoyin gechangjia” (Jiang Zemin Met with the Three Tenors), People’s Daily, 26 June 2001, 1.
Third, Jiang was low-key in his celebration of Shanghai’s victory. He expressed his personal congratulations for the success of both the Beijing and Shanghai bids, but through different means. He made an international call to the Beijing delegation, but only sent a telegram to the Shanghai delegation. Moreover, Jiang wrote letters of appreciation to both the IOC and BIE leaders after being notified of the successes of Beijing and Shanghai, but their contents were different. For example, Jiang assured IOC President Juan Samaranch that Beijing’s organisation of the Olympic Games would be supported by the Chinese government and all the Chinese people, but he did not promise BIE President Gilles Noghes and Secretary-General Vicente González Loscertales that the Chinese government and all the Chinese people would back Shanghai’s organisation of the World Expo. Jiang expressed his personal appreciation to Samaranch and all IOC members, but he did not do so to the BIE President, the Secretary-General or the member states. Furthermore, Jiang did not attend any official ceremony for celebrating the success of Shanghai, nor give any instructions for the organisation of the World Expo. In contrast, Jiang called on all the Chinese people to support the hosting of the Olympic Games when he and the other members of the then Politburo Standing Committee were celebrating Beijing’s victory. Lastly, Jiang chose to use the Beijing victory to arouse the patriotic emotions of the Chinese people, but never mentioned Shanghai’s success at any official occasion.

37 “Jiang Zemin dadianhua relie zhuhe” (Jiang Zemin Gave a Phone Call for Celebration), People’s Daily, 14 July 2001, 2.
38 “Jiang Zemin zhi zhongguo shenbo daibiaotuan de hedian” (Jiang Zmin’s Congratulation Telegram to the Chinese Delegation), People’s Daily, 4 December 2002, 1.
40 “Jiang Zemin zhuxi zhidian guoji zhanlanju zhuxi he mishuzhang biaoshi ganxie” (President Jiang Zemin’s Telegram to Thank the BIE President and Secretary-General), China Trade News, 5 December 2002, 1.
42 “Liyou shenao chenggong dailai de jiyu baguojia jianshe de gengjia meihao” (To Construct the Country Better by Using the Opportunity from the Victory of the Bid for the Olympic Games), People’s Daily, 16 July 2001, 1.
4.2.2. Zhu Rongji

Premier Zhu Rongji, the leader of Economic and Financial Faction,\textsuperscript{43} also gave support to the Shanghai bid. Four differences exist between his actions in supporting Shanghai’s bid for the 2010 World Expo and those in supporting Beijing’s bid for the 2008 Olympic Games, First, Zhu did not meet with the IOC Evaluation Commission, but he did with the BIE Investigation Delegation. Second, Zhu did not apply to foreign political figures and IOC executive officials to support Beijing overseas, but he did lobby the foreign political figures and the BIE leaders to support Shanghai when abroad. Third, Zhu’s instructions for Shanghai’s bid for the 2010 World Expo in the 2002 Work Report of the State Council was more high-profile than his instructions for Beijing’s bid for the 2008 Olympic Games in the 2001 Work Report of the State Council. Fourth, Zhu was silent about Beijing’s victory, but he sent a congratulatory telegram to the Chinese officials after being notified that Shanghai had won the right to host the World Expo. All of these differences confirm that Zhu’s attitude in supporting Shanghai was enthusiastic.

Meeting with the BIE inspectors is the first piece of evidence of Zhu’s enthusiasm. He acted differently when the IOC Evaluation Commission and the BIE Investigation Delegation were respectively in Beijing. Zhu did not meet with the IOC inspectors nor participate in the meeting chaired by Jiang, but he did meet with the BIE inspectors at Zhongnanhai. It is important to stress that this was Zhu’s first, and only, meeting with international organisation inspectors for China’s international bids in his tenure as Premier. Zhu gave three guarantees in the meeting. First, the Chinese government and all the Chinese people were competent, and confident, to present the 2010 World Expo as the

\textsuperscript{43} For details see Chapter 2 Section 2.2.2.
most successful event in the BIE history. Second, the Chinese government would strictly abide by all the commitments made in the Proposal and comply with the BIE Convention in holding the 2010 World Expo. Third, the Chinese government would provide financial support and guarantees for the World Expo and take every possible measure to ensure security and other necessities for all participants, especially those from developing countries. In addition, Zhu’s meeting was separated from, and arranged earlier than, the one chaired by Jiang.

Zhu’s lobbying foreign political leaders and the BIE leaders to support Shanghai is the second piece of evidence of his enthusiasm. Zhu mentioned the bid when he was meeting with foreign leaders during official visits. On 2 July 2000, two months after the establishment of the Shanghai 2010 World Expo Bid Committee, Zhu visited the Chinese Pavilion in the 2000 Hanover World Expo together with the then German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder. In addition to wishing for Shanghai’s success in the 2010 World Expo bid during their meeting, the Premier also requested Schröder and the German government to give support to Shanghai’s bid. However, Zhu never mentioned the 2008 Olympic Games bid when he was meeting with the foreign leaders in China and aboard.

In addition, in order to strengthen the odds of Shanghai winning, the Premier met with BIE President Gilles Noghes and Secretary-General Vicente González Loscertales at BIE headquarters during his official visit to France in September 2002. He once again stressed that the Chinese government would fully back the bid and promised that Shanghai was

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44 “Zhu Rongji huijian guoji zhanlanju kaochatuan” (Zhu Rongji Met with the BIE Investigation Delegation), People’s Daily, 12 March 2002, 1.
45 Zhu’s Greeting was held at the afternoon 1st March 2001. Jiang met the BIE inspectors in the evening 1st March 2001.
46 Chinese Premier and German Chancellor Visited the China Pavilion in the Hannover World Expo.
able to meet all the requirements to hold a successful World Expo.\textsuperscript{47} This is the first, and so far only, attempt by a Chinese Premier to lobby international organisation executive officials in support of a Chinese candidate overseas.

Zhu’s instructions for Shanghai’s 2010 World Expo bid in the 2002 Work Report of the State Council are the third piece of evidence of his enthusiasm. Zhu respectively included the Olympic Games bid and World Expo bid in the 2001 and 2002 Work Reports of the State Council, but he placed them in different sections. The Olympic project was mentioned in the second last paragraph, together with miscellaneous items that included adjusting the economic order of the market; strengthening intellectual and ideological development; and completing social security management. In contrast, the World Expo bid was entered in the “Adapting to the New Situation Following China’s Entry into the WTO and Opening Wider to the Outside World” section. It was one of the seven work goals of the State Council in 2002. In addition, the State Council was instructed differently concerning the two bids in the Work Reports. Zhu required the State Council \textit{to support} Beijing’s 2008 Olympic Games bid,\textsuperscript{48} but he required the State Council \textit{to achieve} Shanghai’s 2010 World Expo bid.\textsuperscript{49}

The fourth piece of evidence of Zhu’s enthusiasm is his response to Shanghai’s victory. He responded differently to Beijing’s and Shanghai’s wins. The Premier was silent on Beijing’s victory, but sent a telegram to thank BIE President Gilles Noghes and Secretary-General Vicente González Loscertales after being notified the success of Shanghai. In addition to thanking all the BIE member states, Zhu also gave three

\textsuperscript{47} “Zhu Rongji huijian guoji zhanlanju fuzeren” (Zhu Rongji Met with the BIE Leaders), \textit{People’s Daily}, 28 September 2002, 3.

\textsuperscript{48} The 2001 Work Report of the State Council.

\textsuperscript{49} The 2002 Work Report of the State Council.
high-profile promises to the BIE leaders on behalf of the Chinese government in the telegram. First, Shanghai would abide by all the commitments in its Proposal and offer the best facilities and services to all the participants. Second, all the Chinese people would support the organisation of the 2010 World Expo. Third, Shanghai would present a successful World Expo through which the development of the BIE will be vitalised. It is important to point out that these points did not appear in Jiang’s letter of appreciation to the BIE leaders.

4.2.3. Huang Ju

Shanghai Party Secretary Huang Ju, a protégé of President Jiang Zemin, supported Shanghai’s bid infrequently. He did not attend any meetings of the Bid Committee, nor enter the bid in the 2002 Work Report of the Shanghai Party Committee. Huang never introduced the World Expo bid to foreign guests and gave no instructions to his subordinates about it. His only quick reaction to Jiang’s supporting actions was to celebrate the victory of Shanghai. By comparing his supporting actions with those of Beijing Party Secretary Jia Qinglin in supporting the 2008 Olympic Games bid, it can be shown that Huang’s attitude in supporting the World Expo bid was one of indifference.

The first piece of evidence of Huang’s indifference is his response to President Jiang Zemin’s supporting actions. Although Jia and Huang were both protégés of Jiang’s faction, they acted differently in response to their patron’s supporting actions in Beijing’s 2008 Olympic Games bid and Shanghai’s 2010 World Expo bid respectively. First, Jia promptly

50 “Zhu Rongji zongli zhidian guoji zhanlanju zhuxi he mishuzhang biaoshi ganxie” (Premier Zhu Rongji’s Telegram to Thank the BIE President and Secretary-General), China Trade News, 5 December 2002, 1.
51 For details see Chapter 2 Section 2.2.2.
replied to Jiang’s personal letter to IOC President Juan Samaranch, but Huang never replied to Jiang’s supporting letter for the Proposal. Second, Jia was one of the attendants in Jiang’s meeting with the IOC Evaluation Commission, but Huang was absent from Jiang’s welcome for the BIE Investigation Delegation, even though he attended the 2002 NPC Session in Beijing. Third, Jia frequently quoted Jiang’s speeches about the Olympic Games bid to encourage his subordinates and Beijing residents to get the project done, whereas Huang never mentioned Jiang’s speeches for the World Expo bid at official occasions. Huang’s only quick response came after Shanghai had been chosen to hold the 2010 World Expo. He made a phone call to the bid delegation after Jiang’s congratulatory telegram had been sent.

The second piece of evidence of Huang’s indifference is the 2002 Work Report of the Shanghai Party Committee. Jia placed the 2008 Olympic Games bid in the body of the 2001 Work Report of the Beijing Party Committee. He not only highlighted the bid as a glorious, influential and significant mission, but also stressed it as one of the most important duties of Beijing in 2001. Jia ordered the municipality to complete each bid task to the highest standard on behalf of the Beijing Party Committee. However, Huang did not enter Shanghai’s bid for the 2010 World Expo in the 2002 Work Report of the Shanghai Party Committee. In other words, the bid was not included in the work

52 “Yi Jiang Zemin gei samalanqi de xin weidongli yi feifan de nuli zuohao shenao gexiang gongzuo” (Take Jiang Zemin’s Letter as a Driving Force, to Get Done the Bid for the Olympic Games by Extraordinary Efforts), Beijing Daily, 5 October 2000, 1.
54 “Zhuhe shenbo chenggong” (Congratulate the Success of the World Expo Bid), Jiefang Daily, 4 December 2002, 2.
55 “Tigao tiyu shuiping zhashi tuijin shenao” (Improve the Sports Level and Well Implement the Bid for the Olympic Games), Beijing Daily, 4 October 2000, 1&4.
56 “Zhuhe shenbo chenggong” (Congratulate the Success of the World Expo Bid), Jiefang Daily, 4 December 2002, 2.
agenda of the Shanghai Party Committee in 2002.

Huang’s relationship with the Bid Committee is the third piece of evidence of his indifference. Although Jia and Huang were not members of Beijing 2008 Olympic Games Bid Committee and Shanghai’s 2010 World Expo Bid Committee respectively, they acted differently towards the activities of the Bid Committees. First, Jia unveiled the official bid theme and logo together with the then Deputy NPC Chairperson He Luli, but Huang did not participate in the unveiling of Shanghai’s 2010 World Expo bid theme. Second, Jia was frequently present in the general meetings of Beijing’s 2008 Olympic Games Bid Committee, but Huang never attended any of the general meetings of the Shanghai 2010 World Expo Bid Committee. Third, Jia was one of the guests at the Three Tenors concert in Beijing sponsored by the Beijing Olympic Games Bid Committee, but Huang never attended any activity sponsored by the Shanghai World Expo Bid Committee in Shanghai or abroad. The above three differences are able to confirm that Huang chose to keep his distance from Shanghai’s 2010 World Expo Bid Committee.

The fourth piece of evidence of Huang’s indifference is his unwillingness to mention the World Expo bid to local officials and celebrities. In order to call on all the Beijing and Shanghai officials to support the Olympic Games bid and World Expo bid, both the

59 “Beijing 2008 nian aoshenwei chengli” (The 2008 Beijing Olympic Games Bid Committee Established), Beijing Daily, 7 September 1999, 1&2; “Beijing aoshenwei huihui kouhao queding” (The Slogan and Emblem of the Beijing Olympic Games Bid Committee Were Confirmed), Beijing Daily, 2 February 2000, 1&2.
60 “Shanghai zhengshi shenban shibohui” (Shanghai Formally Bid for the World Expo), Jiefang Daily, 14 September 2001, 1.
61 “Beijing aoshenwei juxing kuoda huiyi” (The Beijing Olympic Games Bid Committee Held an Enlarged Meeting), Beijing Daily, 21 October 2000, 1.
62 “Quanli zhengqu shenshi chenggong” (Make Every Effort to Secure the Success in the Bid for the World Expo), Jiefang Daily, 22 August 2001, 1&2; “Zhongguo shenban shibohui biaozhi jinyibu zouxiang shijie” (The Bid for the World Expo Marks China’s Further Step to the World), Jiefang Daily, 9 November 2001, 1&2.
63 “Shijie sanda nangaoyin fangge wumen” (The Three Tenors Sang at Wumen), Beijing Daily, 4 June 2001, 1.
Beijing and Shanghai governments organised mobilisation meetings. The attitudes of Jia and Huang towards the meetings were different. Jia was keen to participate in, and to give instructions at, the meetings for Beijing’s 2008 Olympic Games bid. In contrast, Huang did not attend the meetings for Shanghai’s 2010 World Expo bid, nor give any instructions. Moreover, Jia often used the Olympics bid to motivate his subordinates in the meetings of the Beijing Party Committee, whereas Huang never mentioned the World Expo bid in the meetings of the Shanghai Party Committee. Jia frequently included Beijing’s 2008 Olympic Games bid in his speeches when he met with Beijing celebrities, whereas Huang never included Shanghai’s 2010 World Expo bid in his speeches when he met with Shanghai notables. Finally, Jia discussed the Olympics bid with the Beijing lawmakers at the 2001 NPC Session, but Huang did not do so at the 2002 NPC Session. He only expressed his wish for Shanghai to hold the 2010 World Expo along with the Shanghai lawmakers.

The fifth piece of evidence of Huang’s indifference is his reluctance to promote the World Expo bid to foreign guests. Jia was eager to introduce Beijing’s 2008 Olympic Games bid in the same situations, but Huang never mentioned Shanghai’s 2010 World Expo bid to foreign guests. Jia was eager to introduce Beijing’s 2008 Olympic Games bid in the same situations, but Huang never mentioned Shanghai’s 2010 World Expo bid to foreign guests. Jia was eager to introduce Beijing’s 2008 Olympic Games bid in the same situations, but Huang never mentioned Shanghai’s 2010 World Expo bid to foreign guests.

64 “Yishenao cufazhan” (Let the Bid for the Olympic Games Facilitate Development), Beijing Daily, 18 August 2000, 1&2; “Juquanshi zhili banshenao dashi” (To Implement the Bid by the Strength of the City), Beijing Daily, 2 September 2000, 1&3.
65 Seize Every Minute to Prepare the Bid for the World Expo; Fighting to the Last Second in the Bid for the World Expo.
66 “Jiaqiang tongchou guihua gaohao huanjing jianshe” (Strengthen the Overall Planning and Get Done the Environmental Construction), Beijing Daily, 19 December 2000, 1; “Wei shenao tigong lianghao shehui zhian” (Offer a Good Social Security for the Bid for the Olympic Games), Beijing Daily, 22 December 2000, 1.
67 “Shoudu gejie renshi xiying zhongqiu jiajie” (The Beijing Celebrities Greeted the Mid-Autumn Festival), Beijing Daily, 4 September 2000, 1.
68 “Zai guoqing zhaodai huishang de zhujiaici” (The Speech Delivered at the National Day Celebration Ceremony), Jiefang Daily, 1 October 2002, 1&3.
69 “Baogao gaozhan yuanzhu mubiao cuiren fenjin” (The Work Report Shows a Great Foresight and Spurs Us to Work at our Utmost), Beijing Daily, 6 March 2001, 1&4.
71 “Jia Qinglin huijian pingshan yufu” (Jia Qinglin Met with Hirayama Ikuo), Beijing Daily, 22 February
foreign visitors. Moreover, some of the headpersons of the IOC International Sports
Federations met with Jia when they were inspecting Beijing, but the BIE President,
Secretary-General and Investigation Delegation were not invited to meet with Huang
when they were visiting, and inspecting, Shanghai.

By comparing the actions of same-ranking central and local Party elites in supporting
Shanghai’s bid for the 2010 World Expo and Beijing’s bid for the 2008 Olympic Games,
the supporting attitudes of President Jiang Zemin, Premier Zhu Rongji and Shanghai
Party Secretary Huang Ju have been deduced. Zhu was enthusiastic in giving support,
whereas both Jiang and his factional protégé Huang were indifferent.

4.3. The central and local executive elites

According to the BIE Convention Relating to International Exhibitions Article 6 Items 1
and 2 and the BIE Regulations Relating to the Procedure and Deadlines for Registration
of an Exhibition Article 1a, the World Expo application should be pursued by the
government of Contracting Party. Since the BIE contracting parties/members are
countries, the national government is the host unit for World Expos and must play the

2000, 2.; “Jia Qinglin huijian xianggang heren” (Jia Qinglin Met with the Hong Kong Guests), Beijing
Daily, 23 April 2000, 1; “Shenban de guocheng yeshi duiwai kaifang de guocheng” (The Process of the Bid
72 “Jia Qinglin huijian guoji yonglian zhuxi” (Jia Qinglin Met with the FINA President), Beijing Daily, 16
December 2000, 1; “Jia Qinglin huijian Jin Yunlong” (Jia Qinglin Met with Kim Un Yong), Beijing Daily,
30 December 2000, 1.
73 Convention Relating to International Exhibition, 9; “Regulations Relating to the Procedure and
Deadlines for Registration of an Exhibition,” International Exhibitions Bureau, 1,
(accessed 14 October 2008).
74 According to the BIE official definition, the members of BIE are the governments of the contracting
party (signed countries to the Convention). Details see: “Organization,” International Exhibitions Bureau,
http://www.bie-paris.org/site/en/main/organization-m.html; On China is one of the BIE members, see “List
leading role in World Expo bids. The duty of the local government hence is to coordinate the national government to implement bidding works.

This section tests the first hypothesis of this thesis in relation to Shanghai’s bid for the 2010 World Expo. Did the stipulations of the BIE lead to the division of labour between central and local executive elites? As listed before, the central and local executive elites are the senior officials of the State Council, the ministries and the Shanghai government who sat on the 2010 Shanghai World Expo Bid Committee (see Table 4.2). The pattern of division of labour will be deduced through reviewing the elites’ duties in lobbying the BIE members and executives, publicising Shanghai in China and abroad, furnishing the bidding documents, entertaining the inspectors, giving the presentations, and preparing Shanghai to hold the World Expo. The section concludes with a summary of its findings.

4.3.1. Lobbying BIE members and executives

To gain the support of the BIE Executive Committee and the BIE member states, the Bid Committee conducted a series of lobbying activities in China and abroad. All of them were led by the central executive elites. Although members of the BIE Executive Committee are not allowed to vote in each World Expo bidding process, most of them, including the President and the Secretary-General, often participate in the Investigation Delegation that inspects each candidate city and later drafts the BIE Evaluation Report. The Report is the authoritative document that informs the BIE member states about the capacity of each candidate city to hold the World Expo.

of the BIE Member States,” *International Exhibitions Bureau*,
Table 4.2. Members of the 2010 Shanghai World Expo Bid Committee

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Post</th>
<th>Official</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>President</td>
<td>Wu Yi (State Councillor)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deputy</td>
<td>Xu Kuangdi (until December 2001) / Chen Liangyu (since December 2001) (Shanghai Mayor);</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>President</td>
<td>Wang Guangya (Deputy Minister, the MFA);</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sun Zhenyu (until January 2001) / Wei Jianguo (since January 2001) (Deputy Minister, the FTECM);</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Yu Xiaosong (the CCITP President,)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Member</td>
<td>Zhang Guobao (Deputy Chairperson, the National Development and Planning Commission);</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Zhang Zhigang (Deputy Chairperson, the National Economy and Trade Commission);</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Deng Nan (Deputy Minister, the Science and Technology Ministry);</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Jin Liqun (Deputy Minister, the Ministry of Finance);</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Yang Zhengquan (Deputy Chairperson, the State Council Information Office);</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Chen Liangyu (until December 2001) / Jiang Yiren (since December 2001) (Deputy Shanghai Mayor);</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ma Yue (the CCITP Deputy President)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The BIE Secretary-General Vincente Gonzalez Loscertales was invited to visit Shanghai by State Councillor Wu Yi after Shanghai had been accepted as a candidate. Wu greeted him at Shanghai in person and informed him about the Chinese government’s commitments to holding the 2010 World Expo. The State Councillor later led the Chinese delegation that met with BIE President Gilles Noghes and the General-Secretary at BIE headquarters in Paris. Wu, on behalf of the Chinese government, guaranteed that Shanghai was able to attract 50 million visitors to the 2010 World Expo.

75 “Zhongguo shenbo shensi shulü” (China Decide to Bid for the World Expo through Careful Consideration), Jiefang Daily, 10 November 2001, 1&2.
76 “Wu Yi huijian guoji zhanlanju zhuxi” (Wu Yi Met with the BIE President), People’s Daily, 2 July 2002, 3.
The local executive elites assisted the Chinese government in the lobbying in Shanghai and abroad. The MFA and CCITP arranged for 610 representatives of the 70 BIE member states to visit Shanghai from 2000 to 2002. Apart from entertaining them, Xu Kuangdi, Chen Liangyu and their colleagues also had the responsibility of lobbying them for Shanghai. Moreover, the Shanghai Deputy Mayors were appointed Chinese special envoys to lobby abroad 18 times. For instance, in order to secure Asian and European countries’ support for Shanghai, Deputy Mayors Jiang Yiren and Yang Xiaodu individually met with the political leaders of Japan, the Philippines, Malaysia and Israel on behalf of the Chinese government before the vote. Deputy Mayors Feng Guoqin and Zhou Muyao respectively attended the 2000 Europe Expo in Staatsburg and the BIE World Expo Bid City Conference in Spain. Their main duty was to promote the commitments of the Chinese government, which included subsidising developing countries to the tune of 100 million US dollars and reducing the participation fee of developed countries.

Furthermore, the representatives of the BIE member states were also targeted by the Bid Committee in the lobby process. Sixty-six of the 89 BIE member states sent representatives in Paris, London and Brussels in 2002. In order to gain their support for Shanghai, Zhou Hanmin, the Deputy Governor of Pudong District, was assigned to lobby them on behalf of the Bid Committee. Under the arrangement of the Chinese Embassies in France, Britain and Belgium, Zhou contacted all the representatives who were based at

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77 Ibid.
78 Ibid.
80 “Shanghai jiang zutuan fu oubohui” (Shanghai Will Send Delegation to the Europe Expo), Jiefang Daily, 16 August 2000, 1&3; “Shibohui geichengshi zengtian huoli” (The World Expo Will Invigorate the City), Jiefang Daily, 24 September 2002, 2.
Paris, London and Brussels. Some of them were canvassed more than 20 times. In addition, the local executive elite sent back more than 370 reports about the positions of the member states. They provided the necessary information for the Bid Committee to prepare the lobby strategy.82

4.3.2. Publicising Shanghai in China and abroad

The Bid Committee organised various publicity campaigns in China to encourage the international community to support Shanghai. All of them were once again led by the central executive elites. For instance, Wu Yi organised a gathering after the establishment of the Bid Committee, to which over 30 foreign diplomats stationed in China was invited. The Chinese government’s decision to bid for the 2010 World Expo was announced.83 The State Council Information Office frequently held press conferences to report on the progress of the Bid Committee in Beijing. At these press conferences, Deputy Foreign Minister Wang Guangya, the CCITP President Yu Xiaosong, the State Council Deputy Secretary Xu Shaoshi, Deputy Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation Minister Wei Jianguo answered the questions of the Chinese and overseas media. They also served as a channel to announce the Chinese government’s subsidies for countries attending a Shanghai World Expo. For instance, the commitment to subsidise attending developing countries to the tune of 100 million US dollars was first disclosed by Xu Shaoshi at one of the press conferences.84 Shanghai Mayors Xu Kuangdi and Chen Liangyu participated too. Their duty was to introduce the achievements of Shanghai’s economic and social

83 Fully Support Shanghai to Hold the World Expo.
development, report on the progress of Shanghai’s preparations, and explain the theme “Better City, Better Life”, after the speeches of the central executive elites.

The central executive elites also played the leading role in publicising Shanghai abroad. For instance, State Councillor Wu Yi highlighted Shanghai’s wish to hold the 2010 World Expo in her speech delivered on the China National Pavilion Day of the 2000 Hanover World Expo.85 In addition, Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan held a meeting with French Prime Minister Jean-Pierre Raffarin in Paris. After reiterating the Chinese government’s ambition to hold the 2010 World Expo, Tang let Mayor Chen Liangyu introduce the Shanghai bid theme to the Prime Minister.86 The CCITP President Yu Xiaosong also advertised Shanghai on behalf of the Chinese government at his meetings with former French Prime Minister Raymond Barre and the corporation members of the Sino-France Committee (le Comité France-Chine). The mayor once again was invited to introduce Shanghai’s economic and social development since the 1980s.87

In order to secure the support of the international community, the Chinese embassy in France organised two large-scale variety shows and two banquets in Paris after Shanghai was inspected by the BIE Investigation Delegation. BIE officials, French politicians and international celebrities were invited to attend. Wu Yi, Tang Jiaxuan, Xu Shaoshi and other central executive elites delivered speeches at the beginning of these occasions. Their speeches informed the visitors about the favourable arrangements the Chinese government would offer to the participants in the 2010 Shanghai World Expo and called

85 “Shijie yu zhongguo zaizheli ronghe” (The World Merges with China Here), China Trade News, 26 September 2000, 1.
87 “Zhichi zhongguo Shanghai shenbo” (Support Shanghai’s Bid for the World Expo), Jiefang Daily, 5 July 2002, 1&5.
on the international community to give Shanghai a chance. Local executive elites, including Mayor Chen Liangyu and Deputy Mayors Jiang Sixian and Yin Yicui also attended the gatherings. However, they did not deliver speeches.

The BIE invited the representatives of the five candidates to participate in a press conference before the vote. The Chinese Ambassador to France Wu Jianmin attended on behalf of the Chinese government. He informed the international media again about the Chinese government’s subsidies for all participating developing countries, including (1) offering free exhibition venue; (2) offering free delivery for their exhibits; and (3) sponsoring the transportation and living costs of their staff. No local executive elites participated in the press conference along with Wu.

4.3.3. Furnishing the bidding documents

Each candidate city in the 2010 World Expo bid was required to submit two documents to the BIE: an Application Letter and a Proposal. The Application Letter informed the BIE that the city had decided to bid. Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan signed the Application Letter of Shanghai on behalf of the Chinese government. Once the Application Letter was delivered to Paris, the person who handed it to the BIE Secretary-General was the Chinese Ambassador to France. Shanghai’s sincerity in wanting to hold the World Expo

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89 “Shanghai rang fazhanzhong fada guoji shuangying” (Shanghai Will Make a Win-Win Situation for Developing and Developed Countries), Jiefang Daily, 28 November 2002, 1&6.
was emphasised by its being the first candidate to submit an Application Letter. The local executive elites were not involved in drafting the Application Letter, nor did they deliver it to Paris.\textsuperscript{90}

The Proposal, which must contain the concrete information about how a city would organise a World Expo, had to be submitted to the BIE before the candidate cities were inspected by the Investigation Delegation in February 2002. The central executive elites not only chaired the work of drafting and editing Shanghai’s Proposal, but also signed five guarantee letters on behalf of the FAM, the Finance Ministry, the Public Security Ministry, the National Customs Administration, and the Quality Supervision and Inspection Administration. The local executive elites only drafted the section about the planning and design of the exhibition halls.\textsuperscript{91} In order to ensure that this duty was performed to the requirements of the BIE, the CCITP officials, including President Yu Xiaosong and his deputy Ma Yue, frequently came to Shanghai to give supervision.\textsuperscript{92} The Chinese Ambassador to France once again handed the Proposal to the BIE Secretary-General on behalf of Chinese government after it was delivered to Paris.\textsuperscript{93}

\textbf{4.3.4. Entertaining the inspectors}

After receiving the Proposals of all the candidate cities, members of the BIE Executive Committee form an Investigation Delegation. This assesses whether the cities are able to fulfil the promises given in their Proposals. According to the 5-day schedule of the

\textsuperscript{90} China Bid for the 2010 World Expo.
\textsuperscript{91} Huang Yaocheng, \textit{Shanghai Expo} (Singapore: Thomson Learning, 2007), 39.
\textsuperscript{92} “Yu Xiaosong tan shenbo” (Yu Xiaosong Talks about the Bid for the World Expo), in \textit{China Exhibition Almanac 2003} (Beijing: Aviation Industry Press, 2003), 1-3.
\textsuperscript{93} China Bid for the 2010 World Expo; The Chinese Government Submitted the Proposal to the BIE.
Investigation Delegation in China, the members visited three cities, with one day spent in Beijing, three days in Shanghai and one day in Hangzhou. In Beijing, the delegation met with the Chinese leaders President Jiang Zemin and Premier Zhu Rongji, and was given a presentation by the Chinese government. The presentation was given by three people. All of them were central executive elites. The first speaker was State Councillor Wu Yi. She delivered the welcome speech and promised the BIE officials that Shanghai would stage the most successful and outstanding World Expo in 2010. Deputy Foreign Minister Wang Guangya and Deputy Financial Minister Jin Liqun later individually addressed the commitments given in the Proposal, including the issuing of visas to the preparatory and exhibition staff of the participants; the issuing of corresponding visas to visitors to Shanghai from all countries during the exposition, and providing full support for the financial expenditures incurred in hosting the exposition.94 The local executive elites, including Mayor Chen Liangyu and his deputy Jiang Yiren, attended the presentation but they did not deliver speeches.

In Shanghai, the delegation inspected the city to see if it was able to fulfil the promises in the Proposal. The local executive elites were required to entertain the inspectors. In order for things to go as successfully as possible, State Councillor Wu Yi, the CCITP President Yu Xiaosong and other central executive elites all gave instructions to the local executive elites before the inspection.95 Mayor Chen Liangyu then held a meeting in which most of the Shanghai government officials participated. After reading the instructions of the central executive elites, he ordered all the attendants to work closely with each other to get the duty done.96 Deputy Mayor Jiang Yiren also discussed with his colleagues the

95 Yu Xiaosong Talks about the Bid for the World Expo.
96 Fighting to the Last Second in the Bid for the World Expo.
specific arrangements for entertaining the inspectors in Shanghai a few days later.97

After hearing the presentation in Beijing, CCITP Deputy President Ma Yue and the Chinese representative in the BIE Liu Fugui together with Deputy Shanghai Mayor Jiang Yiren accompanied the inspectors to Shanghai and attended all the activities during the inspection, including visiting the Shanghai Science and Technology Museum where the 2001 APEC Meeting was held, and the proposed site for the 2010 Shanghai World Expo.98 Mayor Chen estimated that at least 50 million people would visit Shanghai’s 2010 World Expo when he was chairing the welcome ceremony. Under Liu and Jiang’s company, the Investigation Delegation also spent a day in Hangzhou, the capital city of Zhejiang Province. It aimed to let the inspectors see the neighbour city’s support towards Shanghai’s bid for the World Expo.99 Before leaving China, the chairperson of the BIE Executive Committee, Carmen Sylvain, felt that the inspection trip was successful and expressed confidence about Shanghai’s capacity to hold a successful and outstanding World Expo on behalf of the Investigation Delegation.100

97 “Yingjie guoji zhanlanju laihu kaocha” (Greet the BIE Investigation Delegation for Inspecting Shanghai), Jiefang Daily, 18 February 2002, 1.
98 “Chen Liangyu huijian guoji zhanlanju kaochatuan” (Chen Liangyu Met with the BIE Investigation Delegation), Jiefang Daily, 13 March 2002, 1; “Kaochatuan qinshen ganshou Shanghai” (The Investigation Delegation Is Experiencing Shanghai), Jiefang Daily, 14 March 2002, 1; “Zhu Shanghai haoyun” (Wish Shanghai Good Luck), Jiefang Daily, 16 March 2002, 1&5; “Shanghai xiangshijie zhengzhong chengnuo” (Shanghai Solemnly Promised to the World), Jiefang Daily, 13 March 2002, 1; “Shenbo huode jiji pingjia” (The Shanghai’s Bid for the World Expo Received Positive Comments), Jiefang Daily, 15 March 2002, 1.
99 “Guoji zhanlanju kaochatuan laihang kaocha” (The BIE Investigation Delegation Came to Hangzhou for Inspection), Hangzhou Daily, 16 March 2002, 1.
100 “Shanghai wanquan younengli ban shibohui” (Shanghai Is Capable of Holding the World Expo), Jiefang Daily, 17 March 2002, 1&5; “Gengchuse de zuohao shenbo gongzuo” (Get the Bid for the World Expo Done), Jiefang Daily, 17 March 2002, 1&5.
4.3.5. Giving the presentations

Each candidate city in the 2010 World Expo bid was required to give four presentations to all the BIE member states. These had to include the city’s theme for the 2010 World Expo, the progress of the city’s preparations and, most importantly, the guarantees the city will make if it was chosen to hold event. The first two presentations were respectively held at the 129th and 130th BIE Sessions on 6 July 2001 and 30 November 2001. In Deputy Mayor Chen Liangyu’s speech at the 129th Session, he informed the representatives of the member states that Shanghai had decided on “Better City, Better Life” as its theme. In the next session, Mayor Xu Kuangdi explained why the theme was chosen and disclosed Shanghai’s preliminary construction plan for the exhibition halls. China’s Ambassador to France delivered the opening and closing speeches in both presentations, introducing Chen and Xu to the representatives of the member states and promising the BIE that the theme would be effective on behalf of the Chinese government.

The third and fourth presentations were held at the 131st and 132nd BIE Sessions on 2 July 2002 and 3 December 2002 respectively. Totally six central and local executive elites, including Ambassador Wu Jianmin, State Councillor Wu Yi, Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan, The CCITP President Yu Xiaosong and Shanghai Mayor Chen Liangyu, participated in the third presentation. Wu Yi was the first speaker after the ambassador’s opening speech. She emphasised that Chinese government will fully back Shanghai to hold the 2010 World Expo. Tang then gave the representatives of the member states a detail report about the guarantees offered by the Chinese government, including

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101 Chen Liangyu Gave a Presentation at the BIE Session in Paris.
102 China Is Confident to Bid for the World Expo.
103 Ibid, Chen Liangyu Gave a Presentation at the BIE Session in Paris.
104 The China Delegation Gave a Presentation for the Bid for 2010 World Expo.
(1) offering full financial support to Shanghai; (2) sponsoring 100 million US dollars to the developing counties which participate in the exposition; and (3) providing necessary convenience to the staff of the participants. Chen was assigned to introduce the theme and the advantages of holding the World Expo in Shanghai in his speech. In order to secure voters’ confidence in Shanghai, Deputy Premier Li Lanqing participated in the fourth presentation along with Wu Yi and Chen Liangyu. The central executive elites stressed on behalf of the Chinese government that all the promises and guarantees to make Shanghai’s World Expo successful, outstanding and unforgettable would be fulfilled, before Chen presented the details of each of them.

4.3.6. Preparing Shanghai to hold the World Expo

The central and local executive elites were also responsible for deciding the theme and the size of the 2010 Shanghai World Expo. In order to get the tasks done, State Councillor Wu Yi frequently met with Mayors Xu Kuangdi and Chen Liangyu at Beijing and Shanghai after the establishment of the Bid Committee. She instructed the local executive elites that the theme must be reflect China’s ambition to work with the world in solving the living problems of human beings. The size of the event had to reflect the achievement of China’s rise and facilitate exchange between the BIE and its member states.

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105 Shanghai Obtained the Right to Host the 2010 World Expo through Four Round Votings.
106 “Li Lanqing zai guoji zhanlanju di 123 ci daibiao huiyi shangde chenshu” (Li Langqing’s Speech Delivered at the BIE 132 Session), China Trade News, 5 December 2002, 1; “Wu Yi zai guoji zhanlanju di 123 ci daibiao huiyi shangde chenshu” (Wu Yi’s Speech Delivered at the BIE 132 Session), China Trade News, 5 December 2002, 1; “Chen Liangyu zai guoji zhanlanju di 123 ci daibiao huiyi shangde chenshu” (Chen Liangyu’s Speech Delivered at the BIE 132 Session), China Trade News, 5 December 2002, 1.
107 Fully Support Shanghai to Hold the World Expo.
108 The Bid for the World Expo Marks China’s Further Step to the World.
The local executive elites formed the Shanghai World Expo Bid Work Group to implement Wu’s instructions. Mayors Xu Kuangdi and Chen Liangyu together with more than 30 Shanghai government officials, scholars and professionals participated in the selection of the theme and the decision on the size of the event (see Table 4.4). “Better City, Better Life” was finally chosen as the theme by the Bid Work Group for two reasons. First, it referred to the wish of the Chinese government and Chinese people for better living in the urban environment. Second, it showed that Shanghai, the biggest and most populous city in China, shared the same concerns as the international community on urban strategies and sustainable development.

Table 4.3. Members of the Shanghai World Expo Bid Work Group

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Post</th>
<th>Official</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Director</td>
<td><em>Xu Kuangdi</em> (until December 2001) / <em>Chen Liangyu</em> (since December 2001); (Shanghai Mayor)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Executive Deputy Director</td>
<td><em>Chen Liangyu</em> (until December 2001) / <em>Jiang Yiren</em> (since December 2001); (Shanghai Deputy Mayor)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deputy Director</td>
<td><em>Jiang Yiren</em> (until December 2001);</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><em>Zhou Yupeng</em> (Shanghai Deputy Mayor);</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><em>Zhou Mayao</em> (Shanghai Deputy Mayor);</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><em>Jiang Sixian</em> (Shanghai Deputy Mayor)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secretary-Chief</td>
<td><em>Zhu Xiaoming</em> (Secretary, the Shanghai Government)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Member</td>
<td><em>Shen Ximing</em> (Deputy Secretary, the Shanghai Government);</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><em>Li Liangyuan</em> (Director, the Shanghai Development and Planning Commission);</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><em>Zhang Huimin</em> (Director, the Shanghai Construction Commission);</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><em>Jiang Shangzhou</em> (Deputy Director, the Shanghai Economic and Trade Commission);</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><em>Zhu Jiping</em> (Director, the Shanghai Science and Technology Commission);</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><em>Wang Junyi</em> (Deputy Director, the Shanghai Foreign Trade and Economic Commission);</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td><em>Yao Mingbao</em> (Director, the Shanghai Tourism Commission);</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><em>Jiao Yang</em> (Deputy Director, the Shanghai Government Information Office);</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
In order to ensure that the World Expo was able to reflect the achievement of China’s rise and facilitate exchange between the BIE and its member states, the Bid Work Group decided on 400-hectare site in downtown Shanghai, including 260 hectares in Pudong and 140 in Puxi. The site was the biggest the event had seen since the 1980s (see Table 4.5). 3 billion US dollars was budgeted for the construction of the site.109

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>World Expo</th>
<th>Total areas (ha)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1982 Amsterdam World Expo</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983 Munich World Expo</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984 Liverpool World Expo</td>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988 Brisbane World Expo</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990 Osaka World Expo</td>
<td>140</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991 Milan World Expo</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992 Seville World Expo</td>
<td>215</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993 Stuttgart World Expo</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993 Taejon World Expo</td>
<td>90.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998 Lisbon World Expo</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999 Kunming World Expo</td>
<td>210</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000 Hanover World Expo</td>
<td>160</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002 Haarlemmermeer World Expo</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005 Aichi World Expo</td>
<td>173</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008 Zaragoza World Expo</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010 Shanghai World Expo</td>
<td>400</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


By reviewing the implementation of the official bid tasks, it is plain to see that the division of labour between the central and local executive elites in Shanghai’s bid for the 2010 World Expo corresponded with the stipulations of the BIE. Shanghai Mayors Xu Kuangdi and Chen Liangyu and their deputies gave assistance when State Councillor Wu Yi and the ministerial officials were lobbying the BIE executive and its members; publicising Shanghai in China and abroad; furnishing the bidding documents; giving the presentations; and entertaining the inspectors at Beijing. The local executive elites also followed the instructions of the central executive elites when deciding the size of site, selecting the theme of the Shanghai 2010 World Expo, and entertaining the BIE
Investigation Delegation at Shanghai. All the above findings confirm that the bid was a central-led and local-coordinated project, with the State Council, the ministries and Shanghai government senior officials acting in strict compliance with the BIE Convention Relating to International Exhibitions.

4.4. Summary

The members of the CCP Politburo Standing Committee, the State Council, the ministries, the Shanghai Party Committee, and the Shanghai government participated in Shanghai’s bid for the 2010 World Expo from 1999 to 2002. The central and local executive elites, including State Councillor Wu Yi, Deputy Foreign Minister Wang Guangya, Deputy Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation Minister Sun Zhengyu and his successor Wei Jianguo, the CCITP President Yu Xiaosong, and Shanghai Mayor Xu Kuangdi and his successor Chen Liangyu, collaborated in the Shanghai 2010 World Expo Bid Committee to implement the official bid tasks. The central and local Party elites, including President Jiang Zemin, Premier Zhu Rongji and Shanghai Party Secretary Huang Ju, respectively gave their support to the bid in China and abroad. Shanghai eventually obtained the right to host the 2010 World Expo at the 124th BIE Session in Monaco on 3 December 2002.

To test whether factionalism led to the attitudes of both central and local Party elites in supporting Shanghai’s bid for the 2010 World Expo, the actions of President Jiang Zemin, Premier Zhu Rongji and Shanghai Party Secretary Huang Ju in supporting the bid were compared with those of the same-ranking officials in supporting Beijing’s bid for the 2008 Olympic Games. It was found that both Jiang and his protégé Huang were
indifferent in supporting Shanghai, whereas Zhu was enthusiastic. Jiang and Huang’s indifference confirms that attitudes in supporting a bid tend to be consistent if the central and local Party elites come from the same faction. Zhu’s enthusiasm and Huang’s indifference confirms that if the central and local Party elites come from different factions, their attitudes in supporting a bid tend to be inconsistent.

To test whether the stipulations of the BIE caused the division of labour between the central and local executive elites in implementing the official bid tasks, their respective duties on the Bid Committee were reviewed. The Shanghai government officials gave assistance when the State Councillor Wu Yi and the ministerial senior officials were in charge of lobbying the BIE executive and members, publicising Shanghai in China and abroad, furnishing the bidding documents, entertaining the inspectors in Beijing and giving the presentations. The local executive elites also strictly conformed to the instructions of the central executive elites when they were entertaining the BIE inspectors in Shanghai and were preparing Shanghai to hold the exposition. In conclusion, Shanghai’s bid for the 2010 World Expo was operated as a central-led and local-coordinated project, with the central and local executive elites’ acting in strict compliance with the stipulations of the BIE. Hence, the stipulations of the BIE can be confirmed as a factor that may lead to the division of labour between the central and local executive elites.
Chinese cities have bid for the Asian Games and Asian Winter Games four times since the Chinese Olympic Committee (COC) became a member of the Olympic Committee of Asia (OCA) in 1973. The first bid was for the 1990 Asian Games. Beijing obtained the right to host it by defeating Hiroshima. Harbin was approved by the State Council to vie for the 1996 Asian Winter Games in 1992 and eventually beat out Seoul. After the right to host the 2007 Asian Winter Games was given to Changchun, Guangzhou began to target the 2010 Asian Games.

The intention of the OCA in holding the Asian Games is to educate Asian youth about the “moral and physical qualities that come from fair competition in sports, and to promote international respect, friendship, goodwill and peace”. An Asian Games must take place during an even year between the years of the Olympic Games, and shall last for not less than 12 days or more than 16. The 28 Olympic sports and 7 of the following 10 non-Olympic sports: golf, rugby, cricket, squash, kabaddi, soft tennis, karate, pencat silat, sepaktakraw and wushu, are required to include in each of the Asian Games.

2 “Dishiyijie yayunhui jiangzai Beijing juxing” (Beijing Will be Holding the 11th Asian Games), Beijing Daily, 29 September 1984, 1.
3 “Harbin huo disanjie dongyahui jubanquan” (Harbin Obtained the Right to Host the 3rd Asian Winter Games), Harbin Daily, 2 December 1993, 1.
4 “Woshi huode 2007 nian yadonghui jubanquan” (Changchun Obtained the Right to host the 2007 Asian Winter Games), Changchun Daily, 6 October 2002, 1.
6 Article 41 paragraphs 1&3, in Ibid, 62.
7 Article 68, in Ibid, 92-93.
Guangzhou’s desire to hold the Asian Games dated back to November 1987 when its organising of the 6th National Games of China (liuyunhui) was highly praised by the then Premier Zhao Ziyang and the International Olympic Committee (IOC) President Juan Samaranch. However, according to the custom of OCA, the interval between two cities of the same country holding the Asian Games must be at least 16 years (see Table 5.1). Guangzhou was therefore unable to hold the event in the 1990s and 2000s because Beijing had hosted the 1990 Asian Games.

Table 5.1. Interval between the Asian Games hosted by cities of the same country

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>First Asian Games hosted</th>
<th>Second Asian Games hosted</th>
<th>Interval</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>1951 New Delhi Asian Games</td>
<td>1982 New Delhi Asian Games</td>
<td>31 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>1958 Tokyo Asian Games</td>
<td>1994 Hiroshima Asian Games</td>
<td>36 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>1978 Bangkok Asian Games</td>
<td>1998 Bangkok Asian Games</td>
<td>20 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korea</td>
<td>1986 Seoul Asian Games</td>
<td>2002 Pusan Asian Games</td>
<td>16 years</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Guangzhou decided to bid for the 2010 Asian Games for two reasons. First, a Chinese candidate had chance to be successful after the failure of Hong Kong in the bid for the 2006 Asian Games in December 2000. Second, Guangzhou’s performance in organising the 9th National Games of China (jiuyunhui) in November 2001 was outstanding. The 9th National Games was a 9-day gathering in which 8,606 athletes and around 12,000 coaches, judges, guests and journalists participated. Despite the official organiser of games being the Guangdong government, the Guangzhou government was extraordinarily

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8 “Liuyunhui zai Guangzhou longzhong kaimu” (The 6th National Games of China Opened at Guangzhou), People’s Daily, 21 November 1987, 1; “Samalanqi canguan tianhe tiyu zhongxin” (Samaranch Visited the Tianhe Sports Centre), Guangzhou Daily, 21 November 1987, 3; “Samalanqi zai Guangzhou juxing zhongwai jizhe zhaodaishui” (Samaranch Held a Press Conference at Guangzhou), People’s Daily, 23 November 1987, 4.
9 Hong Kong 2000 (Hong Kong: Information Services Department of Hong Kong SAR Government, 2001), vii.
enthusiastic in preparing for them. In addition to spending 59 billion yuan on urban planning from 1998 to 2001,\textsuperscript{11} it also spent 1.8 billion yuan on sporting venue construction and renovation. The latter amount was 11 million yuan more than the Guangdong government spent in the same area.\textsuperscript{12} The large investment meant that Guangzhou possessed world-class sporting venues in the early 2000s. For instance, the Guangdong Olympic Stadium, which has a capacity of 80,000, was the largest stadium in China at the time. The Guangzhou Gymnasium was also the first, and only, venue in China that is qualified to hold the IAAF (The International Association of Athletics Federations) World Indoor Athletics Championships. Former COC President He Zhenliang was therefore able to comment that Guangzhou was competent to hold the Asian Games when he was visiting the sporting venues together with the IOC President Jacques Rogge and his colleagues.\textsuperscript{13}

This chapter analyses the central and local relations in Guangzhou’s bid for the 2010 Asian Games. The attitudes of the central and local Party elites in supporting the bid are reviewed in section 5.2. To deduce the supporting attitudes of Premier Wen Jiabao, Guangdong Party Secretary Zhang Dejiang and Guangzhou Party Secretary Lin Shusen, their actions are compared with those of the central and local Party elites in supporting Beijing’s bid for the 1990 Asian Games, Harbin’s bid for the 1996 Asian Winter Games and Changchun’s bid for the 2007 Asian Winter Games. Section 5.3 outlines the division of labour between the central and local executive elites in implementing the official bid

\textsuperscript{11} “40 yi jian changguan 3.4 yi ban shenghui” (4 Billion Yuan for Building Stadiums, 340 Million Yuan for Holding the National Games), \textit{Guangzhou Daily}, 26 November 2001, A3.

\textsuperscript{12} “Guangzhou saiqu xian yiliu” (Guangzhou Division Shows Excellent), \textit{Guangzhou Daily}, 26 November 2001, A24; Ibid.

tasks. The duties of the senior officials of the Chinese General Sports Administration (CGSA), the COC, the Guangdong government and the Guangzhou government in lobbying the OCA members and executives, publicising Guangzhou in China and abroad, furnishing the bidding documents, entertaining the OCA inspectors, giving the presentation and preparing Guangzhou to hold the Asian Games are then reviewed. The last section summarises whether factionalism and the stipulations of the OCA respectively shaped the supporting attitudes of both the central and local Party elites and the division of labour between the central and local executive elites in the bid.

5.1. The process

The bid can be separated into three stages. The first stage started in August 2002 when the Guangzhou and Guangdong governments implemented the motion discussed in the Eleventh Municipal People’s Congress Fifth Session about holding the 2010 Asian Games. In the following 16 months, Guangzhou’s intention not only obtained the consent of the CGSA and COC, but also the support of the OCA president Sheikh Ahmad Al-Fahad Al-Sabah. Hong Kong deciding to hold the 2009 East Asian Games also assisted Guangzhou in becoming the Chinese representative in the 2010 Asian Games bid. Guangzhou was eventually approved to bid for the 2010 Asian Games by

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14 “Guangzhou shenban yayun ciqi shiye” (This Is Guangzhou’s Right Moment to Bid for the Asian Games), Guangzhou Daily, 3 September 2002, A20; Guangzhou Yearbook 2003 (Guangzhou: Guangzhou Yearbook Press, 2003), 394.
16 “Shenglingdao wu yaoo zhuxi” (The Provincial Leaders Met with the OCA President), Guangzhou Daily, 26 October 2003, A2.
17 being eliminated in the 2006 Asian Games bid, Hong Kong originally planned to bid for the 2010 Asian Games
the State Council in December 2003. The two main characteristics of the first stage were: (1) the headpersons of the CGSA, the COC, and the Guangdong and Guangzhou Party Committees and governments did not participate in implementing the official bid tasks or give support. Second, the Guangdong and Guangzhou governments were the only supporters of the bid.

The second stage ended in March 2004. During a period of three months, Guangzhou completed two requirements of the OCA: (1) it submitted its Letter of Intent and Candidature File to the OCA before the deadlines; and (2) unveiled its theme for the 2010 Asian Games as “Invigorate Asia, Spark the World” and logo. Moreover, the bid was placed in the respective 2004 Work Reports of the Guangdong and Guangzhou governments and the CGSA. In order to complete preparations before the inspection of the OCA Evaluation Committee, the Guangzhou government established the Guangzhou 2010 Asian Games Bid City Work Committee. In addition, Premier Wen Jiabao, the CGSA President Yuan Weimin, and Guangzhou Mayor Zhang Guangning all participated

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18 “Guangzhou huozhun shenban 2010 yayunhui” (Guangzhou Was Approved to Bid for the 2010 Asian Games), Nanfang Daily, 17 December 2003, A01.
19 The Provincial Leaders Met with the OCA President.
20 “Zhongguo aoweihui yizhengshi dijiao shenbanshu” (The COC Confirmed that the Letter of Intent Had Been Submitted), China Sports Daily, 23 December 2003, 2; “Guangzhou zuori dijiao shenya baogaoshu” (Guangzhou’s Candidature File Was Submitted Yesterday), Guangzhou Daily, 1 April 2004, A1.
22 “Shenya chengshi gongzuo weiyuanhui chengli” (The Asian Games Bid City Work Committee Established), Guangzhou Daily, 30 March 2004, 1.
in the official bid tasks and gave support. The Chinese government, CGSA, COC, Guangdong and Guangzhou Party Committees, and all the people in Guangdong and Guangzhou were also included as the supporters of the bid. The second stage ended when the withdrawal of Seoul was confirmed on 24 March.

The curtain fell on the third stage closed in July 2004. In the previous four months the Guangzhou 2010 Asian Games Bid Committee was established and Guangzhou was inspected by the OCA Evaluation Committee. After Kuala Lumpur and Amman withdrew, Guangzhou became the only candidate in the bid and the OCA gave the right to host the 16th Asian Games to Guangzhou on 1 July 2004. The third stage differed in two ways from the second stage. First, Guangdong Party Secretary Zhang Dejiang, Guangdong Governor Huang Huahua and Guangzhou Party Secretary Lin Shusen participated in the official bid tasks and gave support. Second, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Central Committee became one of the supporters.

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26 “Guangzhou youshili banhao yayunhui” (Guangzhou Has Strength to Get Done the Asian Games), Guangzhou Daily, 26 February 2004, A4; “Guoji quanlian zhuxi biaoshi jiang jinli tigong zhichi” (The IABA President Expressed to Try His Hardest to Give Support), Nanfang Daily, 21 March 2004, 01; “Dongya diqu aoweihui luntan zai Beijing juxing” (The East Asian Olympic Association Forum Was Held at Beijing), Nanfang Daily, 26 March 2004, A02.
28 “Guangzhou shenya weiyuanhui jintian chengli” (Guangzhou Asian Games Bid Committee Will Establish Today), Guangzhou Daily, 8 April 2004, A1; “Yao kaopingtuan jintian disui kaocha” (The OCA Evaluation Committee Will Arrive in Guangzhou Today for Inspection), Nanfang Daily, 14 April 2004, A01.
29 “Guangzhou cheng weiyi shenban chengshi” (Guangzhou Became the Only City in the Bid), Nanfang Daily, 15 April 2004, A01.
5.2. The central and local Party elites

This section tests the second hypothesis of this thesis that factionalism leads to the attitudes of both central and local Party elites in supporting each international bid. The supporting actions of the central and local Party elites who participated in Guangzhou’s bid for the 2010 Asian Games – Premier Wen Jiabao, Guangdong Party Secretary Zhang Dejiang, and Guangzhou Party Secretary Lin Shusen – are reviewed. Their supporting attitudes will be deduced through comparing their actions in supporting the bid with the actions of the central and local Party elites in supporting Beijing’s bid for the 1990 Asian Games, Harbin’s bid for the 1996 Asian Winter Games and Changchun’s bid for the 2007 Asian Winter Games. The section concludes with a summary of its findings.

5.2.1. Wen Jiabao

Unlike his predecessor’s actions in supporting Beijing’s bid for the 2008 Olympic Games and Shanghai’s bid for the 2010 World Expo, Premier Wen Jiabao, who is a member of the economic and financial faction, did not enter Guangzhou’s bid for the 2010 Asian Games in the 2004 Work Report of the State Council, nor meet with the OCA Evaluation Committee when Guangzhou was being inspected. After the city had been chosen to host the event, the congratulatory note of the State Council was drafted by State Councillor Chen Zhili rather than the Premier. Wen’s only supporting action was to

32 For details see Chapter 2 Section 2.2.2.
34 “Ba yayunhui bancheng jingcai yuanman de shenghui” (Present the Asian Games as a Wonderful and Consummated Celebration), People’s Daily, 2 July 2004, 12.
write a letter of guarantee for Guangzhou’s Candidature File.\textsuperscript{35} In comparison with Beijing’s bid for the 1990 Asian Games, Harbin’s bid for the 1996 Asian Winter Games and Changchun’s bid for the 2007 Asian Winter Games, there were two distinguishing characteristics which confirm the Premier’s enthusiasm in supporting Guangzhou’s bid for the 2010 Asian Games.

The first distinguishing characteristic is that this was the first letter of guarantee written by Premier in the history of China’s bids for the Asian Games and Asian Winter Games. According to the OCA Rules and Constitution, the national government of each application city for the Asian Games or Asian Winter Games is required to “submit a legally binding instrument by which said government undertakes and guarantees that the country and its public authorities will comply with and respect the OCA Constitution”.\textsuperscript{36} However, there is no stipulation concerning who must write the document. Former Premiers Zhao Ziyang, Li Peng and Zhu Rongji did not write guarantees for Beijing, Harbin and Changchun when the 1990 Asian Games bid, the 1996 Asian Winter Games bid and the 2007 Asian Winter Games bids were respectively taking place. The duty was delegated to then Foreign Minister Wu Xueqian and COC Presidents He Zhenliang and Yuan Weimin.\textsuperscript{37}

The second distinguishing characteristic is that this letter was the first supporting action given by Chinese Premier in the history of China’s bids for the Asian Games and Asian Winter Games. Despite Beijing’s bid for the 1990 Asian Games representing China’s first

\textsuperscript{35}“Guangzhou: shiqinian menxiang chengzhen” (Guangzhou’s Dream Comes True after Seventeen Years), \textit{People’s Daily}, 2 July 2004, 12.
\textsuperscript{36}Article 42 paragraph 5, in OCA Constitution and Rules, 62.
\textsuperscript{37}“Shenqing zai Beijing juban 1990 nian yayunhui” (Apply to Hold the 1990 Asian Games in Beijing), \textit{Beijing Daily}, 13 March 1984, 4; “Harbin shi juban disanjie dongji yayunhui de shenqingxin” (Harbin’s Application Letter for the 3rd Asian Winter Games), \textit{Harbin Daily}, 3 December 1993, 2.
attempt to bid for an international multi-sport event, Premier Zhao Ziyang did not require the State Council to support it, nor publicise it at official occasions. The only supporting action given by the central Party elite in the bid was then President Li Xiannian’s meeting with the OCA President Sheikh Fahad Al-Ahmad Al-Sabah during the inspection trip of the OCA Evaluation Committee. Like Zhao, Premier Li Peng did not say any words about Harbin’s bid for the 1996 Asian Winter Games in 1993. The highest ranking central official who gave support was the then Deputy Premier Tian Jiyun. He expressed his personal support for the bid when he visited the Harbin Ice and Snow Festival in January 1993. Premier Zhu Rongji did not enter Changchun’s bid for the 2007 Asian Winter Games in the 2002 State Council Work Report, nor did he express support during his visit in Jilin province in July 2002.

5.2.2. Zhang Dejiang

Guangdong Party Secretary Zhang Dejiang, a protégé of Jiang Zemin, gave support to Guangzhou’s bid for the 2010 Asian Games infrequently. He did not participate in any activities of the Bid Committee, nor publicise the bid at official occasions. Guangzhou’s bid for the 2010 Asian Games was not entered in the 2004 Work Report of the Guangdong

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40 “Li Xiannian huijian yazhou aolihui zhuxi fahe” (Li Xiannian Met with the OCA President Sheikh Fahad Al-Sabah), *People’s Daily*, 18 June 1984, 1.
44 For details see Chapter 2 Section 2.2.2.
Party Committee. The Party Secretary only indicated his support twice after Guangzhou’s bid was approved by the State Council in November 2003. Once when he held a meeting with CGSA President Yuan Weimin and his deputy Yu Zaiqing while Guangzhou was being inspected by the CGSA delegation, and once when he attended the celebratory ceremony after being notified that Guangzhou had obtained the right to host the event.

Zhang’s level of enthusiasm in supporting Guangzhou’s bid can be deduced by comparing his actions in supporting the bid with the actions of Heilongjiang Party Secretary Sun Weiben and Jilin Party Secretary Wang Yunkun in respectively supporting Harbin’s bid for the 1996 Asian Winter Games and Changchun’s bid for the 2007 Asian Winter Games. Like Zhang, Sun did not enter the bid in the 1993 Work Report of the Heilongjiang Party Committee, and indicated his support only twice. His first supporting action was to accompany Heilongjiang Governor Shao Qihui and Harbin Mayor Suo Changyou to greet members of the OCA Evaluation Committee at a dinner party in Beijing. His second was to participate in the ceremony, chaired by Shao Qihui, for celebrating the return of Harbin’s delegation after the victory. It is important to stress that Sun did not make promises or deliver speeches at the two occasions. At the same time however, Zhang Dejiang’s supporting actions were different to those of Sun. When Zhang was meeting

45 “Shengwei jiujie sici quanhui zaisui juxing” (The Fourth Plenary Session of the Ninth CCP Guangdong Provincial Congress Was Held in Guangzhou), Nanfang Daily, 20 December 2003, A01&A03.
46 Zhang Dejiang and Huang Huahua Met with Yuan Weimin.
47 “Feiteng yangcheng jinshu yuanneng xiyou” (Guangzhou Is Excited about the Victory), Nanfang Daily, 2 July 2004, A01; “Wanzhong huantengye haifukong zhibo” (Broadcast the Live Fiasco through Various Locations), Guangzhou Daily, 2 July 2004, A5.
49 “Shenglinagdao zaijing huijian kaochatuan” (The Provincial Leaders Met with the Evaluation Committee at Beijing), Heilongjiang Daily, 29 March 1993, 1.
50 “Ha shehantuan zaiyu guilai” (The Harbin Delegation Returns with honour), Heilongjiang Daily, 9 December 1993, 1.
with Yuan Weimin and Yu Zaiqing, he gave a high-profile promise that the entire
Guangdong province would fully support Guangzhou’s bid for the 2010 Asian Games. In the celebration ceremony, Zhang also waved the national flag of China to express his desire for Guangzhou’s success. In addition, after Changchun obtained the State Council’s approval to bid for the 2002 Asian Winter Games on 19 June 2001, Wang did not require the Jilin Party Committee to give support in 2001 and 2002, nor did he pass on his congratulations after the victory.

5.2.3. Lin Shusen

Guangzhou Party Secretary Lin Shusen, who does not have a factional connection with Wen Jiabao and Zhang Dejiang, did not assist the central and local executive elites in entertaining the OCA Evaluation Committee, nor did he participate in any of the activities organised by the Bid Committee. He gave support only three times: (1) by publicising the bid on behalf of the Guangzhou Party Committee in interviews; (2) by accompanying CGSA President Yuan Wemin and his deputy Yu Zaiqing to visit the Guangzhou Metro

51 Zhang Dejiang and Huang Huahua Met with Yuan Weimin.
52 Guangzhou Is Excited about the Victory; Broadcast the Live Fiasco through Various Locations.
56 For details see Chapter 2 Section 2.2.2.
and New Airport; and (3) by chairing a celebration party after Guangzhou obtained the right to host the 2010 Asian Games. In comparison to the actions of Harbin Party Secretary Tian Fengshan in supporting the bid for the 1996 Asian Winter Games, Lin’s attitude in supporting Guangzhou’s bid was enthusiastic.

Like Lin Shusen, Tian Fengshan did not assist the central and local executive elites in entertaining the OCA Evaluation Committee at Beijing and Harbin, nor did he participate in activities organised by the Harbin 1996 Asian Winter Games Bid Committee. He also gave his support on three occasions: (1) by participating in a signature campaign together with other local senior officials in Harbin; (2) by entering the bid in the 1993 Work Report of the Harbin Party Committee; and (3) by chairing a symposium to discuss the implications of holding the 1996 Asian Winter Games for Harbin and Heilongjiang after being notified of the victory. It is important to point out that Tian never made an open declaration in support of the bid on behalf of the Harbin Party Committee before the OCA vote. He did not deliver a speech during the signature campaign, and although the bid entered in the 1993 Work Report of the Harbin Party Committee, he stressed only its implications for escalating Harbin’s international reputation and stimulating its international trade, and did not require his subordinates to achieve the task. While Lin Shusen did not place Guangzhou’s bid for the 2010 Asian Games in the 2004 Work

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58 I Assure Guangzhou’s Bid for the Asian Games.
59 Broadcast the Live Fiasco through Various Locations.
60 “Shenban dongyayunhui qianming huodong quanmian zhankai” (A Signature Campaign for the Asian Winter Games Bid Started), Harbin Daily, 13 January 1993, 1.
62 “Shengshi kai qingzhu harbin shenban disanjie dongyahui chenggong zuotanhui” (Heilongjiang and Harbin Held a Symposium to Celebrate Harbin’s Success in the 1996 Asian Winter Games Bid), Harbin Daily, 4 December 1993, 1.
63 Tian, Grab Opportunity.
Report of the Guangzhou Party Committee,\textsuperscript{64} he did however repeatedly declare his support for it on behalf of the Guangzhou Party Committee and government, and introduced the benefits of holding the event for Guangzhou and Guangdong before chairing the celebration party.\textsuperscript{65}

Through comparing the actions of the central and local Party elites in supporting Guangzhou’s bid for the 2010 Asian Games with those of same-ranking officials in supporting Beijing’s bid for the 1990 Asian Games; Harbin’s bid for the 1996 Asian Winter Games; and Changchun’s bid for the 2007 Asian Winter Games, the supporting attitudes of Premier Wen Jiabao, Guangdong Party Secretary Zhang Dejiang and Guangzhou Party Secretary Lin Shusen have been deduced. All of them were enthusiastic in giving support. This finding shows that even when central and local Party elites come from different factions, their attitudes in supporting a particular bid can be consistent.

\textbf{5.3. The central and local executive elites}

According to the OCA Constitution and Rules, both the candidate city and the country’s National Olympic Committee (NOC) must execute the Asian Games bid. The city, as the host unit, is required to play the leading role in lobbying and the other bid operations.\textsuperscript{66} The NOC must take charge of two duties in the Bid Committee. First, it is required to give supervision to the city candidate.\textsuperscript{67} Second, it must put forward the candidate city to

\textsuperscript{64} Lin Shusen, “Zai Guangzhou shiwei bajie erci huiyi shangde jianghua” (The Speech Delivered at the Second Session of the Eighth CCP Guangzhou City Congress), in Guangzhou Yearbook 2004, 470-476.

\textsuperscript{65} Lin Shusen Was Interviewed at Beijing; Showcase the Image of International Metropolis to the World.

\textsuperscript{66} Article 45 paragraph 6, in OCA Constitution and Rules, 63.

\textsuperscript{67} Article 45 paragraph 11, in Ibid, 67.
the OCA.\textsuperscript{68} In other words, the NOC is not only required to submit the candidate city’s Letter of Intent to the OCA, but also to assist the local government in implementing official bid tasks. Hence, the Asian Games and Asian Winter Games bids are supposed to be local-led and central-coordinated projects.

This section analyses whether the stipulations of the OCA led to the division of labour between central and local executive elites in Guangzhou’s bid for the 2010 Asian Games. The central and local executive elites involved were the senior officials of the CGSA, COC, and the Guangdong and Guangzhou governments who participated in the 2010 Guangzhou Asian Games Bid Committee (see Table 5.2). The pattern of division of labour will be deduced by reviewing the elites’ duties in lobbying the OCA members and executives, publicising Guangzhou in China and abroad, furnishing the bidding documents, entertaining the inspectors, giving the presentation, and preparing Guangzhou to hold the Asian Games. The section concludes with a summary of its findings.

\textit{5.3.1. Lobbying OCA members and executives}

In order to gain the support of the OCA members, the local executive elites carried out a number of lobbies in China and abroad. The local executive elites played the leading role in all of them. For instance, Deputy Governor Xu Deli met with Lao National Sports Minister and Olympic Committee President Dr Phouthone Seung-Akhom on behalf of the Bid Committee when the Lao sports delegation was visiting Guangzhou in May 2004. He was informed that the Lao Government and Olympic Committee would support

\textsuperscript{68} Ibid.
Guangzhou in the 2010 Asian Games bid.69

Table 5.2. Members of the 2010 Guangzhou Asian Games Bid Committee

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Post</th>
<th>Officials</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>President</td>
<td>Yuan Weimin (the CGSA President; the COC President),</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Huang Huahua (Guangdong Governor),</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Executive President</td>
<td>Yu Zaiqing (the CGSA Deputy President; the COC Deputy President),</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Xu Deli (Guangdong Deputy Governor),</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Zhang Guangning (Guangzhou Mayor)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deputy President</td>
<td>Xiao Tian (the CGSA President Assistant and Athletic Officer;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>the COC Deputy President),</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Gu Yaoming (the CGSA Liaison Officer, the COC Secretary),</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Cheng Liangzhou (Deputy Secretary, the Guangdong Government),</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Li Zhuobin (Guangzhou Deputy Mayor),</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Yang Naijun (President, the Guangdong General Sports Administration)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secretary</td>
<td>Gu Yaoming, Yang Naijun</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deputy Executive Secretary</td>
<td>Chen Yaoguang (Secretary, the Guangzhou Government),</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Liu Jiangnan (President, the Guangzhou General Sports Administration)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Moreover, Xu and Guangzhou Deputy Mayor Li Zhuobin led the Guangzhou delegation in attending the wine party of the 2004 East Asian Olympic Association Forum at Beijing. The occasion enabled the local executive elites to lobby the representatives of the Olympic Committees of Chinese Taipei, Hong Kong, Japan, Macau, Mongolia and South Korea face to face. All the representatives decided to back Guangzhou after Xu discussed Guangzhou’s performance in economic development and sports affairs and highlighted

69 “Xu Deli huijian laowo tiyu daibiaotuan” (Xu Deli Met with the Lao Delegation), Nanfang Daily, 29 May 2004, 03.
that staging the Asian Games was the wish of all the Guangdong people.70

Furthermore, Xu and Li visited ten countries, including Malaysia, Indonesia, India, the Philippines, Bangladesh, the Maldives, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Pakistan before the inspection of the OCA Evaluation Committee. In addition to visiting the opening ceremonies of the 1st Afro-Asian Games at Hyderabad and the 9th South Asian Games at Islamabad where he met with the Asian NOC presidents, they also applied to the NOC representatives of Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Malaysia, the Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, the Philippines and Sri Lanka about their support to Guangzhou.71

Apart from the OCA members, the local executive elites also chose to lobby the OCA executive officials, including OCA President Sheikh Ahmad Al-Fahad Al-Sabah. According to the OCA Constitution and Rules, the President is empowered to appoint the members of the Evaluation Committee for each Asian Games bid, and is allowed to attend the OCA General Assembly meetings at which the host city for each Asian Games is elected.72 Despite the President not having the right to vote, he can “establish the regulations for all elections and determined any matter concerning the General Assembly and votes that are not covered in the OCA Constitution and Rules”.73 Deputy Governor Xu Deli and Deputy Governor Li Zhuobin met with the President once after the Letter of Intent had been submitted to the OCA. They discussed the progress of Guangzhou’s bid and emphasised its ambition to hold the 2010 Asian Games. Ahmad gave his personal

70 The East Asian Olympic Association Forum was Held at Beijing.
72 Article 18 paragraph 3 & article 19 paragraph 6, in OCA Constitution and Rules, 23; 28 & 29.
73 Article 18 paragraph 2 & bye-law to article 18 paragraph 3, in Ibid, 23; 25 & 26.
support for Guangzhou’s intent.74

The OCA Deputy President Celso Dayrit was also lobbied in Manila. Dayrit was one of the most influential sports figures in the Philippines and Asia. After retiring from the national fencing team in 1969, he served successively on the executive boards of the Philippines Amateur Fencers Association, the Fencing Confederation of Asia and the International Fencing Federation. Dayrit also holds senior executive posts in national and regional Olympic bodies. He was elected to chair the Philippine Olympic Committee (POC) in 1992 and was appointed as Deputy President of the OCA in 2002.75

Dayrit was one of the key OCA executive officials in the 2010 Asian Games bid. Although he did not have the right to vote, he was appointed to chair the Evaluation Committee and to draft the report about the hosting capacity of each candidate city. In order to impress Dayrit, the CGSA arranged a meeting in Manila before his inspection trip. Deputy Governor Xu Deli and Deputy Mayor Li Zhuobin introduced Guangzhou’s social and economic development and performance in organising large-scale multi-sport events. Dayrit was also invited to visit Guangzhou at his convenience.76

The lobbies were coordinated by the central executive elites. All the meetings with the OCA members and executive officials in China and abroad were arranged by the CGSA and COC. In order to promote Guangzhou’s bid, senior officials of the CGSA and the COC, including Yuan Weimin, Yu Zaiqing, Gu Yaoming, Wei Jizhong and their colleagues, often attended and gave the opening speeches at the meetings. It is important

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74 The OCA President Supports Guangzhou’s Bid for Asian Games.
76 The Guangzhou Delegation Visited the Philippines.
to point out that the central executive elites never lobbied directly for Guangzhou in their opening speeches, nor did they discuss Guangzhou’s social and economic development with the local executive elites. In addition, the wine party held to lobby the East Asian OCA members during the 2004 East Asian Olympic Association Forum was co-sponsored by the COC and the Guangdong government.

5.3.2. Publicising Guangzhou in China and abroad

The local executive elites were in charge of publicising Guangzhou’s bid for the 2010 Asian Games to the foreign diplomats and politicians in China and abroad. For instance, Mayor Zhang Guangning particularly emphasised the six advantages of Guangzhou as a host of the event when he met with the then Australian Ambassador to China Alan Thomas in Guangzhou. These were: (1) Guangzhou is a historic city and the local people have a strong sense of international awareness; (2) Guangzhou is one of the Chinese cities with excellent economic and social development; (3) Guangzhou is competent to entertain foreign visitors; (4) Guangzhou has experience in holding large-scale multi-sport events; (5) the local people are enthusiastic about sport; and (6) Guangzhou has impressive medical and health care.77 Deputy Mayor Wang Xiaoling also informed Prime Minister Abdul Qadir Bajamal about Guangzhou’s bid progress when she visited Yemen. The Prime Minister promised to support Guangzhou on behalf of the Yemen government.78

The local executive elite also publicised Guangzhou among influential figures in the

77 Guangzhou’s Asian Games Bid Has Six Advantages.
78 “Yemen zhichi Guangzhou shenya” (Yemen Supports Guangzhou’s Bid for Asian Games), Nanfang Daily, 3 June 2004, A12.
international sports community. For instance, Deputy Governor Xu Deli and Deputy Mayor Li Zhuobin together introduced the bid to Professor Khurshid Anwar Chowdhry in Guangzhou. Professor Chowdhry was born in Pakistan and is famous in the international sports community. In addition to chairing the International Boxing Association (AIBA), one of the 28 International Sports Federations (IFs) associated with the IOC, since 1986, he has also had a close affiliation with many of the world’s leading sports organisations, including the OCA.  

Chowdhry even maintains a good relationship with Chinese sports development. For instance, he was one of the few IF representatives lobbied by Mayor Liu Qi when he was inspecting Beijing on behalf of the AIBA during the 2008 Olympic Games bid. After Xu highlighted that the Guangzhou’s bid for the 2010 Asian Games was fully supported by the Chinese government, CGSA, and COC, Chowdhry pledged to try his hardest to help Guangzhou’s cause.

Another example was in the meetings with Sandy Holloway at Guangzhou. Holloway is an Australian diplomat who participated in Sydney’s bid for the 2000 Olympic Games. After winning the bid, he was appointed to chair the Sydney 2000 Olympic Games Organising Committee. As a result of their achievements, the 2000 Olympic Games was described as the most successful games ever by the former IOC President Juan Samaranch. His experience of managing the 2000 Olympics saw Holloway become involved in a number of international multi-sport events. In addition to supervising the 2006 Doha Asian Games, he was also hired as a senior adviser by the 2008 Beijing Olympic Games Organising Committee.

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80 “Liu Qi huijian guoji yeyu quanlian zhuxi” (Liu Qi Met with the IABA President), Beijing Daily, 27 November 2000, 2.
81 The IABA President Expressed to Try His Hardest to Give Support.
82 “Sandy Holloway’s Biography,” ICMI Speakers Bureau,
Deputy Governor Xu Deli held a meeting on behalf of the Guangdong government when Holloway arrived in Guangzhou on 24 February 2004. He was keen to secure the Australian’s help for Guangzhou’s bid. Deputy Mayor Li Zhuobin met with Holloway on behalf of the Guangzhou Government one day after. He introduced Guangzhou’s contributions to Chinese sports development and pointed out its competence to hold a successful Asian Games in 2010. Holloway expressed his optimism about Guangzhou’s bid and promised he and his Australian colleagues would give assistance if necessary.

In addition to promoting Guangzhou to foreign political and sports figures, the local executive elites were also in charge of informing Guangzhou residents about the significance of holding the 2010 Asian Games. For instance, at a press conference in the 2nd Session of the 12th Guangzhou People’s Congress, Mayor Zhang Guangning stressed that the 2010 Asian Games would not only benefit the development of Guangzhou’s tourism and other tertiary industry sectors, but also improve the standards of its urban management and construction. Deputy Mayor Li Zhuobin highlighted that holding the 2010 Asian Games would accelerate Guangzhou’s pace of internationalisation in his speech delivered at the opening ceremony of the 5th Guangzhou Social Sciences Conference.

The central executive elites assisted on a number of occasions in publicising Guangzhou. At the 2004 COC General Meeting, President Yuan Weimin emphasised the significance

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83 “Xu Deli huijian sangdi hewei” (Xu Deli Met with Sandy Holloway), Nanfang Daily, 25 February 2004, A03.
84 “Guangzhou Has Strength to Get Done the Asian Games.”
85 “Guangzhou shenya youshi wuyu lunbi” (Guangzhou’s Advantages in the Asian Games Bid Are Unmatched), Nanfang Daily, 25 February 2004, A03.
87 “Women shengquan zaiwo” (We Sure Win), Nanfang Daily, 25 February 2004, A03.
of holding the 2010 Asian Games for China and required his colleagues to coordinate with the Guangdong and Guangzhou governments in implementing bid tasks. In addition, Xu Deli and Li Zhuobin’s meeting with Professor Chowdhry were specially arranged by Chang Jianping, Director of the CGSA Boxing and Taekwondo Sports Management Centre, during the 2004 Olympic Games Asian boxing qualifiers in Guangzhou.

5.3.3. Furnishing the bidding documents

Each candidate for the 2010 Asian Games was required to submit two documents to the OCA: a Letter of Intent and a Candidature File. The Letter of Intent informs the OCA that the city has decided to bid for the Asian Games. In order to comply with the requirements of the OCA outlined the beginning of section 5.3, Guangzhou’s Letter of Intent was drafted, and handed to the OCA, by the COC officials.

The Candidature File must be submitted after the city had been approved as one of the candidates. It must contain concrete information about the following 24 subjects: (1) the nation and its international relations, (2) candidature city, (3) immigration, (4) climate, (5) environment, (6) security, (7) finance, (8) heath and medicinal facilities, (9) accommodation, (10) reception and hospitality, (11) transportation, (12) schedule, (13) spots, (14) art exhibition, (15) the OCA General Assembly session, (16) ceremony, (17) media, (18) communication, (19) internet, (20) marketing, (21) schedule, (22) law, (23)...

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88 The COC Fully Support Guangzhou’s Bid for the Asian Games.
89 The IABA President Expressed to Try His Hardest to Give Support.
90 The COC Confirmed that the Letter of Intent Had Been Submitted.
experience of organising multi-sport events, and (24) ticket sales. The Candidature File was delivered to Kuwait City by the central and local executive elites, but the person who handed it to the OCA President was Deputy Governor Xu Deli.

It is important to point out that the Candidature File was completed with the assistance of the central executive elites. The Candidature File was completed in the four months after the Letter of Intent was submitted to the OCA. Once the preliminary draft was completed by the officials and professionals of Guangdong and Guangzhou, it was passed to Wei Jizhong and his colleagues in the CGSA and COC. Their main role was to suggest revisions to the local officials based on their experience in dealing with international sporting organisations, and to proofread the English. The final version of the Candidature File hence was a collaborative document written by the central and local executive elites.

5.3.4. Entertaining the inspectors

After submitting the Candidature File, all the candidature cities in the 2010 Asian Games bid were inspected by the OCA Evaluation Committee. The Evaluation Committee was composed of six OCA executive officials. Its main duty was to evaluate whether the candidature cities were competent to fulfil their intention of holding the Asian Games over the course of a two-day inspection and then write a report. Their report is the most

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91 “Guangzhou shenya baogao shenmi chulong” (The Candidature File of Guangzhou Mysteriously Came out), Nanfang Daily, 26 March 2004, A02.
92 Guangzhou’s Candidature File Was Submitted Yesterday.
93 “Shenya baogao yingyuban chutai neimu” (The Inside Story of Writing up the English-Version Candidature File), Guangzhou, Daily, 30 March 2004, A28; “Guangzhou shenya baogao kaoti jiedu” (Interpret the Questions in Guangzhou’s Candidature File), Guangzhou Daily, 1 April 2004, A28.
important reference for the OCA members during the vote. Before inspecting Guangzhou, the Guangzhou government officials formed the Guangzhou Asian Games Bid City Work Committee. Under the leadership of Mayor Zhang Guangning, its duty was to prepare Guangzhou for inspection in accordance with the instructions of the Bid Committee (see Table 5.3).

Table 5.3. Members of the Guangzhou Asian Games Bid City Work Committee

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Post</th>
<th>Official</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Director</td>
<td>Zhang Guangning (Guangzhou Mayor)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Executive Director</td>
<td>Li Zhuobin (Guangzhou Deputy Mayor)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deputy Director</td>
<td>Chen Yaoguang (Secretary, the Guangzhou Government), Chang Min (Deputy Secretary, the Guangzhou Government), Gu Shiyang (Deputy Secretary, the Guangzhou Government), Liu Jiangnan (President, the Guangzhou General Sports Administration)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secretary</td>
<td>Chen Yaoguang</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deputy Secretary</td>
<td>Gu Shiyang, Liu Jiangnan</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: The Asian Games Bid City Work Committee Established.

In order to motivate Guangzhou officials and residents to complete the preparations for the entertaining of the Evaluation Committee, the City Work Committee organised two activities. The first was a mobilisation meeting. Around 200 middle-level officials from the Guangzhou district governments attended it. In addition to introducing the significance of holding the 2010 Asian Games to Guangzhou, Deputy Mayors Shen Bonian and Li Zhuobin instructed the officials to devote their best efforts to presenting a civilised and harmonious Guangzhou during the inspection of the OCA Evaluation Committee. Later, the City Work Committee organised a long-distance running

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94 Article 45 paragraph 3,4&8, in OCA Constitution and Rules, 67.
95 “Guangzhou shenya zuo shizhan yanlian” (Guangzhou Made a Rehearsal Yesterday), *Guangzhou Daily*,
competition. Around 12,000 Guangzhou residents, including the senior officials of the provincial and city Party committees and governments and the Guangdong-trained Olympic medallists, participated in it. Besides running, all the participants were invited to sign a 100 meter long “I Support Guangzhou to Hold the 2010 Asian Games” banner. The banner was later displayed in front of the OCA inspectors.  

As well as preparing Guangzhou, the city officials were also in charge of entertaining the OCA Evaluation Committee, together with the provincial officials. When the OCA Deputy President Celso Dayrit and his colleagues arrived at Guangzhou International Airport, the welcome ceremony was chaired by Mayor Zhang Guangning and his deputy Li Zhuobin. They farewelled the inspectors from there as well. Governor Huang Huahua and Zhang each had dinners with the inspectors on behalf of the Guangdong and Guangzhou governments after the Evaluation Committee had finished their day’s work. Deputy Governor Xu Deli and Zhang held a press conference after accompanying the OCA executives on the inspection. In response to the Evaluation Committee’s praise regarding Guangzhou’s performance, Xu promised on behalf of the Bid Committee that Guangzhou would stage the 2010 Asian Games as the most outstanding event in the history of the OCA.

97 “Huacheng shengqing yingjie yanyun kaoguan” (Guangzhou Is Passionate to Greet the OCA Inspectors), Guangzhou Daily, 15 April 2004, A1&A5.
99 Guangzhou Is Passionate to Greet the OCA Inspectors; “Shenya nengfou chenggong haikan 7 yue 1 ri” (Whether Guangzhou Holding the Asian Games Will Determine on 1st July), Guangzhou Daily, 16 April 2004, A1&A5.
100 “Guangzhou wanquan youshili juban yanyunhui” (Guangzhou Is Capable of Holding the Asian Games), Nanfang Daily, 16 April 2004, A01; “Guangzhou yao zhengban yijie zuichuse yanyunhui” (Guangzhou Intends to Hold the Most Outstanding Asian Games), Nanfang Daily, 16 April 2004, A03.
In addition, the OCA Evaluation Committee was given a group presentation during the inspection. The presentation was to inform the inspectors about the advantages of Guangzhou for holding the 2010 Asian Games. After Mayor Zhang Guangning delivered a welcome speech, Guangzhou’s urban planning, sports history and tradition, immigration and transportation, reception, medical and health, security, media and telecommunications, and marketing were respectively introduced by eight people. Four of them were senior officials of the Guangdong and Guangzhou governments. The others were celebrities of Guangzhou (see Table 5.4). It is important to stress that all the presenters was exclusively selected by the City Work Group. All the inspectors were satisfied with the presentation content and the presenters’ performance.101

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Presenter</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Urban planning</td>
<td>Li Yongning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Professor, the Guangzhou Academy of Social Sciences)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sports history and tradition</td>
<td>Liu Jiangnan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(President, the Guangzhou General Sports Administration)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immigration and transportation</td>
<td>Qian Hongjie</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Deputy Officer, the Guangdong Government External Affairs Office)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reception</td>
<td>Zhou Haiying</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Liaison officer, the Guangzhou Asian Games Bid Committee)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health and medical facilities</td>
<td>Xiao Haipeng</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Professor, Sun Yat-Sen University)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security</td>
<td>Zhang Zhengui</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Deputy Head, the Guangzhou Dongshan District Police Station)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Media and communication</td>
<td>Yin Jie</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Deputy Head, the Guangzhou Television Station News Department)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finance and marketing</td>
<td>Sun Lei</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Deputy President, the Guangzhou Economic Development Bureau )</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: “Guangzhou shenban 2010 nian yanyunhui chenshu baogaohui zuo juxing” (The Presentation Meeting of Guangzhou’s bid for the 2010 Asian Games Was Held Yesterday), Guangzhou Daily, 16 April 2004, A2.

101 The Presentation Meeting of Guangzhou’s Bid for the 2010 Asian Games Was Held Yesterday.
The central executive elites supervised Guangzhou’s preparations. Before the inspection of the OCA Evaluation Committee, officials of the CGSA and COC examined Guangzhou three times. The first examination was led by President Yuan Weimin and his deputy Yu Zaiqing. They focused on the local transport facilities, including the airport, exhibition centre and underground rail. They passed on their suggestions to Governor Huang Huahua at the Bid Committee’s first general meeting. The COC Deputy President Tu Mingde and the CGSA Aquatic Sports Department Headperson Zhang Qing chaired the second examination. This was to double-check the venues Yuan and Yu had inspected in the first examination. Tu and Zhang were also arranged to watch a presentation rehearsal together with Deputy Mayor Li Zhuobin. The central executive elites commented on the presentation content and the presenters’ performance. Wei Jizhong directed the last examination, making a final check of all the places the inspectors would visit.

The central executive elites assisted the local executive elites in entertaining the inspectors. For instance, the CCSA President Yuan Weimin and his deputy Yang Shu’an invited all the Evaluation Committee members to have lunch at the Mingquanju Hotel in Guangzhou on the second day of the inspection. In addition to introducing Guangzhou’s advantages, Yuan also promised the inspectors that the CGSA and COC would give their all-out support to Guangzhou to hold the event. It is necessary to point out that the CGSA President entertaining the OCA Evaluation Committee is not a common event in the history of China’s bids for the Asian Games and Asian Winter Games. The last time

104 “Guangzhou shenyawei zuo zuihou yici jiancha ge kaochadian” (The Guangzhou Asian Games Bid Committee Pursued the Final Inspection Yesterday), Guangzhou Daily, 14 April 2004, A1.
105 Whether Guangzhou Holding the Asian Games Will Determine on 1st July.
this happened was in 1984, when President Li Menghua did so for Beijing’s bid for the 1990 Asian Games.\textsuperscript{106} In addition, Wei Jizhong, Yang Shu’an, Gu Yaoming and other senior officials of the CGSA and the COC accompanied Governor Huang Huahua and Mayor Zhang Guangnin when they dined with the OCA inspectors.\textsuperscript{107}

5.3.5. Giving the presentation

Each candidate city was required to give a presentation to all the OCA members before the vote. The presentation must cover two parts: (1) the city’s promise to comply with the OCA regulations; and (2) its detailed arrangements for holding the 2010 Asian Games. The presentation was given by both central and local executive elites, and the local executive elites were in charge of making the promise and explaining the detailed arrangements. After Guangdong Governor Huang Huahua assured the audience that the Guangdong government would ensure that the 2010 Asian Games would be the most outstanding event in the history of the OCA, Mayor Zhang Guangnin promised that Guangzhou would strictly comply with the OCA Rules and Constitution and provide excellent conditions for all the participants.\textsuperscript{108} In the second part, Guangzhou’s venue arrangements for the 2010 Asian Games were explained by two local officials, the Guangdong Government External Affairs Deputy Officer Qian Hongjie and the Guangzhou Government Deputy Secretary Gu Shiyang.\textsuperscript{109}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{106} “Li Menghua zai diaoyutai wei keren sheyan xichen” (Li Menghua Held a Banquet at Diaoyutai Hotel for the foreign Guests), \textit{China Sports Daily}, 15 June 1984, 1.
\item \textsuperscript{107} Guangzhou Is Passionate to Greet the OCA Inspectors; Whether Guangzhou Holding the Asian Games Will Determine on 1\textsuperscript{st} July.
\item \textsuperscript{108} “Guangzhou shenya daibiaotuan daibiao zhichu” (The Speech of the Representatives of the Guangzhou Delegation), \textit{Guangzhou Daily}, 1 July 2004, A2.
\item \textsuperscript{109} “Chenshu neirong xuanleng” (The Selected Content of the Presentation), \textit{Guangzhou Daily}, 2 July 2004, A3.
\end{itemize}
The opening speech was delivered by the CGSA and COC President Yuan Weimin. It had only one sentence that he supported Guangzhou’s bid to hold the 2010 Asian Games on behalf of the COC. There was no other senior official of the CGSA or the COC appointed to assist the local executive elites in giving the promise and explaining the arrangement. Nor were the Chinese athletes who had won gold medals in the Asian Games assigned to deliver speeches.\textsuperscript{110}

\textit{5.3.6. Preparing Guangzhou to hold the Asian Games}

In order to achieve the goal of staging the most outstanding Asian Games in the history of the OCA, Mayor Zhang Guangnin announced that the Guangzhou government had decided to spend 220 billion yuan on resident-oriented renovations of the city. Of this sum, 9 billion yuan would be spent on the construction of the sports facilities, with the rest assigned to the expansions of the highways, airport, underground railway, train stations, wharfs, facilities for civil education, and sewage works. Guangzhou would have a 240 km underground railway network connecting the entire region’s cities and townships. The mayor would lead his colleagues in securing finance for the event in China and abroad. However, Zhang did not mention that the national government would invest in the Asian Games, nor participate in financing Guangzhou’s preparations.\textsuperscript{111}

To assist the local executive elites to prepare for the Asian Games, the CGSA organised a seminar at Guangzhou after the Letter of Intent had been submitted. Members of the Beijing 2008 Olympic Games and Changchun 2007 Asian Winter Games Organising

\textsuperscript{110} The Speech of the Representatives of the Guangzhou Delegation.
\textsuperscript{111} “Guangzhou 2200 yi yingyayun cuchengjian” (Guangzhou Will Spend 220 Billion Yuan for the Asian Games and Urban Infrastructure), \textit{Guangzhou Daily}, 29 June 2004, A1-A5.
Committees and representatives of the CGSA Liaison Office and the COC were invited to participate in it. Under the auspices of CGSA Deputy President Yu Zaiqing, the visitors not only shared their experiences in collaborating with the central executive elites in their bids, but also introduced their budgets for the 2008 Olympic Games and 2007 Asian Games. Deputy Governor Xu Deli, Deputy Guangdong Government Secretary Cheng Liangzhou and Guangzhou Deputy Mayor Li Zhuobin participated in the discussions. However, the CGSA and the COC did not participate in the budgeting for the 2010 Asian Games with the Guangzhou government afterwards.¹¹²

Through reviewing the implementations of the official bid tasks, it is plain to see that division of labour between the central and local executive elites in Guangzhou’s bid for the 2010 Asian Games was consistent with the stipulations of the OCA. After submitting the Letter of Intent, the central executive elites often gave assistance and supervision when the local executive elites were in charge of publicising Guangzhou, budgeting the Asian Games, entertaining the inspectors, and furnishing the Candidature File. Yuan Weimin and his colleagues in the CGSA and COC put forward Guangzhou’s application when Governor Huang Huahua, Mayor Zhang Guangning and their subordinates were lobbying the OCA executives and members and giving the presentation at Kuwait City. All the above findings confirm that the bid was a local-led and central-coordinated project, with the CGSA, the COC and the Guangdong and Guangzhou government senior officials acting in strict compliance with the OCA Rules and Constitution.

5.4. Summary

Members of the CCP Central Committee, CGSA, COC, the Guangdong and Guangzhou Party Committees, and the Guangdong and Guangzhou governments participated in Guangzhou’s bid for the 2010 Asian Games from November 2003 to July 2004. The central and local executive elites, including the CGSA and COC President Yuan Weimin, Guangdong Governor Huang Huahua, Guangzhou Mayor Zhang Guangning and their subordinates, collaborated in the Guangzhou 2010 Asian Games Bid Committee to implement the official bid tasks. The central and local Party elites, including Premier Wen Jiabao, Guangdong Party Secretary Zhang Dejiang and Guangzhou Party Secretary Lin Shusen, all gave support to the bid in China. Guangzhou eventually obtained the right to host the 2010 Asian Games in Kuwait City on 1 July 2004.

To test whether factionalism led to the attitudes of both central and local Party elites in supporting Guangzhou’s bid for the 2010 Asian Games, the actions of Premier Wen Jiabao, Guangdong Party Secretary Zhang Dejiang and Guangzhou Party Secretary Lin Shusen were compared with those of the same-ranking officials in supporting Beijing’s bid for the 1990 Asian Games, Harbin’s bid for the 1996 Asian Winter Games and Changchun’s bid for the 2007 Asian Winter Games. It was found that Wen, a member of the economic and financial faction; Zhang, a protégé of Jiang Zemin; and Lin, who had no factional connection with Wen or Zhang, were enthusiastic in supporting Guangzhou. This case study thus refutes the hypothesis II of this thesis that the attitudes of the central and local Party elites in supporting a bid tend to be inconsistent if they come from different factions.
To test whether the stipulations of the OCA led to the division of labour between the central and local executive elites in implementing the bid, the actions of senior officials of the CGSA, the COC, and the Guangdong and Guangzhou governments were reviewed. After submitting the Letter of Intent, the central executive elites frequently gave assistance and supervision when the local executive elites were in charge of publicising Guangzhou in China and abroad, budgeting the Asian Games, entertaining the OCA inspectors, and furnishing the Candidature File. Yuan Weimin and his CGSA and COC colleagues also promoted Guangzhou’s application when Governor Huang Huahua, Mayor Zhang Guangning and their subordinates were lobbying the OCA executives and members and giving the presentation in Kuwait City. The findings of this chapter show that Guangzhou’s bid for the 2010 Asian Games was operated as a local-led and central-coordinated project, with the central and local executive elites acting in strict compliance with the stipulations of the OCA. Hence, the stipulations of the OCA can be confirmed as a factor that may lead to the division of labour between the central and local executive elites.
CHAPTER 6

SHENZHEN’S BID FOR THE 2011 SUMMER
WORLD UNIVERSITY GAMES

Chinese cities have bid for the Summer and Winter World University Games four times since the China University Sports Federation (CUSF) became a member of the International University Sports Federation (FISU) in 1975.\(^1\) The first bid was for the 1993 Summer World University Games.\(^2\) Since Shanghai’s competence was widely questioned at the time, the US city of Buffalo won the hosting rights.\(^3\) Beijing was approved by the State Council to bid for the 2001 Summer World University Games in 1998 and became the first Chinese city to hold an FISU multi-sport event.\(^4\) The third bid was for the 2009 Winter World University Games, and Harbin was chosen over the Turkish city of Erzurum.\(^5\) Shenzhen has made the most recent bid, for the 2011 Summer World University Games.

The aim of the FISU to celebrate the Summer World University Games is to “encourage friendship, fraternity, fair-play, perseverance, integrity, co-operation and application amongst students who will one day hold responsible and even key positions in politics,

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3 “Shanghai gaibugai shenban shijie daxuesheng yundonghui” (Should Shanghai Bid for the World University Games), *Jiefang Daily*, 2 May 1989, 4.
the economy, culture and industry”.Each Summer World University Games is required to include the following ten compulsory sports: athletics, basketball, fencing, football, gymnastics, aquatics, tennis, volleyball, judo and table tennis, and a maximum of three optional sports proposed by the organising country. In addition, the FISU stipulates that the Summer World University Games must be organised every two odd years and last for 11 days.

Shenzhen decided to bid for the 2011 Summer World University Games for the three reasons. First, the World University Games is a gathering for young people, in which participants must be aged in between 17 to 28. Shenzhen is also a young Chinese city as it was formed in 1980. It is therefore well suited to host an international gathering of young people. Second, Shenzhen is located close to Hong Kong, Macau and Guangzhou. Around one million students from over 60 universities live there, which is also an advantage for the city. Third, as Beijing, Shanghai and Guangzhou all obtained the rights to host various international events in the 2000s, Shenzhen, as one of the most economically dynamic and well-managed cities in China (see Tables 6.1 and 6.2), wanted to move with the times.

This chapter analyses the central and local relations in Shenzhen’s bid for the 2011 Summer World University Games. The attitudes of the central and local Party elites in giving support are reviewed in section 6.2. To deduce the supporting attitudes of Premier

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8 Section B Paragraphs 1.2 & 2.1, in Ibid, 9&14.
9 Section A Paragraph 1.6, in Ibid, 4.
10 “Gang sui shen baiwan daxuesheng wei Shenzhen jiayou” (One Million University Students Who Live in Hong Kong, Guangzhou and Shenzhen Cheer Shenzhen), Shenzhen Special Zone Daily, 12 December 2006, A1&A4.
Wen Jiabao, Guangdong Party Secretary Zhang Dejiang and Shenzhen Party Secretary Li Hongzhong, their actions are compared with those of the central and local Party elites in supporting Shanghai’s bid for the 1993 Summer World University Games, Beijing’s bid for the 2001 Summer World University Games, and Harbin’s bid for the 2009 Winter World University Games. Section 6.3 outlines the division of labour between the central and local executive elites in implementing the official bid tasks. The duties of senior officials of the Ministry of Education (EM), the CUSF, the China General Sports Administration (CGSA), the Guangdong government and the Shenzhen government in lobbying the FISU members and executives, publicising Shenzhen in China and abroad, furnishing the bidding documents, entertaining the FISU inspectors, giving the presentation and preparing Shenzhen to hold the Summer World University Games are reviewed. The last section summarises whether factionalism and the stipulations of the FISU respectively shaped the supporting attitudes of both the central and local Party elites and the division of labour between the central and local executive elites in the bid.

Table 6.1. Permanent population, GDP and GDP per capita of Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou and Shenzhen in 2000 and 2006

<table>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Beijing</td>
<td>1,363.6</td>
<td>1,581</td>
<td>15.94</td>
<td>316.1</td>
<td>787.0</td>
<td>148.97</td>
<td>24,122</td>
<td>50,467</td>
<td>109.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shanghai</td>
<td>1,608</td>
<td>1,815.08</td>
<td>12.88</td>
<td>477.1</td>
<td>1,036.6</td>
<td>117.27</td>
<td>36,217</td>
<td>75,990</td>
<td>109.82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guangzhou</td>
<td>561.51</td>
<td>623.12</td>
<td>10.97</td>
<td>249.3</td>
<td>607.4</td>
<td>143.64</td>
<td>25,626</td>
<td>63,100</td>
<td>146.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shenzhen</td>
<td>701.24</td>
<td>846.43</td>
<td>20.70</td>
<td>218.7</td>
<td>581.4</td>
<td>165.84</td>
<td>32,800</td>
<td>69,450</td>
<td>111.74</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6.2. Shenzhen’s national and international honours 1990 - 2006

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Awarded year</th>
<th>Title of honour</th>
<th>Awarding Unit</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>National Health City Scroll of Honour</td>
<td>The Ministry of Health UN Human Settlement Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>National Garden City</td>
<td>The Ministry of Housing and Urban-Rural Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>National Environmental Protection Model City</td>
<td>The Ministry of Environmental Protection</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>Top Tourist City of China</td>
<td>The National Tourism Administration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>The International Garden City (Nations in Bloom); Sir Patrick Abercrombie Prize</td>
<td>The International Association of Gardens and Recreational Facilities The International Union of Architects</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>The Residential Environment Prize of China</td>
<td>The Ministry of Housing and Urban-Rural Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>Global Top 500 Laureate Roll of Honor</td>
<td>UN Environmental Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>National Greenery Model City</td>
<td>The State Forestry Administration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>National Civilised City; The Special Gold Prize, The China Ozone Layer Protection Contribution Prize</td>
<td>The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Central Construction and Instruction Committee of Spiritual Civilisation The Ministry of Environmental Protection</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>National Eco-Garden City</td>
<td>The Ministry of Housing and Urban-Rural Development</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author’s database.

6.1. The process

The bid can be separated into three stages. The first stage began when the Shenzhen government decided that it would bid for the 2011 Summer World University Games in June 2004. In the following six months, the decision not only obtained the consents of the Guangdong government, the CGSA, the EM and its affiliated unit the CUSF, but also the
personal support of FISU President George Killian.\textsuperscript{11} Shenzhen was eventually approved to bid for the 2011 Summer World University Games by the State Council on 17 December 2004.\textsuperscript{12} The first stage has two main characteristics. First, the headpersons of the EM, CUSF, CGSA, the Guangdong and Shenzhen Party Committees, and the Guangdong and Shenzhen Governments did not participate in implementing the official bid tasks or give support.\textsuperscript{13} Second, the Guangdong and Shenzhen governments were the only supporters of the bid.\textsuperscript{14}

The curtain fell on the second stage in July 2006. During the previous 19 months, Shenzhen had completed the two requirements of the FISU. It submitted its Application Letter and the Candidature File before the deadlines,\textsuperscript{15} and unveiled its official bid logo and slogan: “Shenzhen Embraces the World”.\textsuperscript{16} The Shenzhen 2011 Summer World University Games Bid Committee and the Shenzhen 2011 Summer World University Games Bid Executive Committee were also set up.\textsuperscript{17} There were two personnel changes in this stage. First, Li Hongzhong became the Party Secretary of Shenzhen in March 2005 and Xu Zongheng was transferred to chair the Shenzhen government.\textsuperscript{18} Second, Deputy

\textsuperscript{11} “Shenzhen shenban 2011 nian dayunhui” (Shenzhen Is Bidding for the 2011 World University Games), \textit{Nanfang Daily}, 18 November 2004, A01.


\textsuperscript{13} \textit{Shenzhen Yearbook 2006} (Shenzhen: Shenzhen Yearbook Press, 2006), 531.

\textsuperscript{14} Ibid.


\textsuperscript{17} “Shenzhen daibiao zhongguo shenban ershihuitie shijie dayunhui” (Shenzhen Is Bidding for the 26th World University Games on behalf of China), \textit{Shenzhen Special Zone Daily}, 13 July 2005, A1&A6; “Dayunhui shenban weiyuanhui buri chengli” (The World University Games Bid Committee Will Establish within the Next Few Days), \textit{Nanfang Dushi Daily}, 10 November 2005, A37.

\textsuperscript{18} “Li Hongzhong tongzhi ren Shenzhen shiwei zhuji” (Li Hongzhong Was Appointed to be the Shenzhen Party Secretary), \textit{Shenzhen Special Zone Daily}, 18 March 2005, A1&A2.
Guangdong Governor Xu Deli became the Deputy President of the Guangdong Political Consultative Conference in February 2006.  

The second stage was different in three ways to the first. First, Deputy Education Minister and the CUSF President Zhang Xinsheng, CGSA President Liu Peng, Guangdong Governor Huang Huahua, Shenzhen Mayor Xu Zongheng, and Shenzhen Party Secretary Li Hongzhong all participated in implementing the official bid tasks and giving support.  

Second, the EM, the GSAC, the Guangdong and Shenzhen Party Committees, and all the people in Guangdong and Shenzhen were added as supporting parties. Third, the bid was included in the 2005 and 2006 Work Reports of the Shenzhen Party Committee and the Shenzhen Government. However, it was not entered in the 2005 and 2006 Work Reports of the EM, the CGSA, the Guangdong Party Committee and the Guangdong government.

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19 “Xu Deli Ke Xiaogang dangxuan shengzhengxie fuzhuxi” (Xu Deli and Ke Xiaogang Were Elected as Guangdong Political Consultative Conference Deputy Presidents), Nanfang Daily, 26 February 2006, 01; “Jieshou Lu Zhiguang Xu Deli You Ningfeng cizhi qingqiu” (The Resignation Requests of Lu Zhiguang, Xu Deli and You Ningfeng Were Accepted), Nanfang Daily, 26 February 2006, 01.  

20 “Shenzhen huozhun shenban shijie dayunhui” (Shenzhen Has Approved to Bid for the World University Games), Shenzhen Special Zone Daily, 30 December 2004, A1; “Quanli zhichi Shenzhen shenban di 26 jie dayunhui” (Fully Support Shenzhen’s Bid for the 26th World University Games), Shenzhen Special Zone Daily, 30 September 2005, A2; “Gaoqidian gaoshuiping guihua jianshe aotizhun xin” (Plan and Construct the Olympic Sports Centre at High Starting-Point and Standard), Shenzhen Special Zone Daily, 8 December 2005, A1&A2; “Shengwei shengzhenfuzhichi zhichi Shenzhen shenban shijie dayunhui” (The Provincial Party Committee and Government Fully Support Shenzhen’s Bid for the World University Games), Shenzhen Special Zone Daily, 2 November 2005, A1; Shenzhen Is Bidding for the 26th World University Games on behalf of China.  

21 “Shenban xiaoaoyun yao zhizai bide” (Shenzhen Is Determined to Win the Bid for the Small Olympics), Shenzhen Special Zone Daily, 17 June 2005, A2; The Provincial Party Committee and Government Fully Support Shenzhen’s Bid for the World University Games.  


23 Zhou Ji, “Zai jiaoyubu 2005 niandu gongzuo huiyuan shangde jianghua” (Speech Delivered at the Annual Conference on Education Work for 2005), in China Education Yearbook 2005 (Beijing: People’s Education
The third stage of the bid lasted seven months and ended when Shenzhen was chosen to hold the 2011 Summer World University Games in Turin on 16 January 2007. After the FISU President George Killian was invited to visit Guangdong in September 2006, Shenzhen was inspected by the FISU Evaluation Commission. In order to strengthen the city’s odds, more changes occurred in the third stage. First, Premier Wen Jiabao, Education Minister Zhou Ji and Guangdong Party Secretary Zhang Dejiang both participated in implementing the official bid tasks and giving support. Second, the CCP Central Committee and all the Chinese young people were added as supporters of the bid.

6.2. The central and local Party elites

This section tests the second hypothesis of this thesis that factionalism leads to the...
attitudes of both central and local Party elites in supporting each international bid. The supporting actions of the central and local Party elites who participated in Shenzhen’s bid for the 2011 Summer World University Games – Premier Wen Jiabao, Guangdong Party Secretary Zhang Dejiang, and Shenzhen Party Secretary Li Hongzhong – are reviewed. Their supporting attitudes will be deduced through comparing their actions in supporting the bid with the actions of the central and local Party elites in supporting Shanghai’s bid for the 1993 Summer World University Games, Beijing’s bid for the 2001 Summer World University Games, and Harbin’s bid for the 2009 Winter World University Games. The section concludes with a summary of its findings.

6.2.1 Wen Jiabao

Premier Wen Jiabao, who is a member of economic and financial faction, did not enter Shenzhen’s bid for the Summer World University Games in the 2005 and 2006 Work Reports of the State Council, nor did he write a letter of guarantee for the Candidature File. After Shenzhen had been chosen to hold the 2011 Summer World University Games, the congratulatory note of the State Council was signed by State Councillor Chen

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28 For details see Chapter 2 Section 2.2.1.
Zhili rather than the Premier.\textsuperscript{31} Wen’s only action in supporting the bid was to meet with the FISU President George Killian and his colleges in Zhongnanhai.\textsuperscript{32} In addition to stressing the support of the Chinese government, he also promised that Shenzhen would present a better Summer World University Games than that held in Beijing in 2001, which was described as the biggest and most successful gathering in history of the FISU.\textsuperscript{33} In comparison with Shanghai’s bid for the 1993 Summer World University Games, Beijing’s bid for the 2001 Summer World University Games, and Harbin’s bid for the 2009 Winter World University Games, there were two distinguishing characteristics which confirm the Premier’s enthusiasm in supporting Shenzhen’s bid for the 2011 Summer World University Games.

The first distinguishing characteristic is that Wen was the first Chinese Premier to meet with the FISU inspectors in the history of China’s bids for the Summer and Winter World University Games. According to the Regulations of FISU Events, the FISU Executive Committee is empowered to send an Evaluation Commission to inspect the candidates if necessary prior to the vote of the General Assembly.\textsuperscript{34} The State Council usually sends a representative to meet with the members of the FISU Evaluation Commissions when the Chinese candidate cities are being inspected. However, the official who is appointed to chair the meeting varies from case to case. For instance, Deputy Premier Li Lanqing was arranged to meet with the inspectors when Beijing was bidding for the 2001 Summer

\textsuperscript{31} “Shenzhen yingde diershiuljue dayunhui jubanquan” (Shenzhen Win the Right to Host the 26\textsuperscript{th} World University Games), \textit{People’s Daily}, 18 January 2007, 2.

\textsuperscript{32} Wen Jiabao Met with the FISU President.


\textsuperscript{34} Section D paragraph 5, in Regulations for FISU events, 85.
World University Games, whereas State Councillor Tang Jiaxuan was assigned to do so when Harbin was bidding for the 2009 Winter World University Games. Premier Wen was the representative of the State Council for Shenzhen’s bid for the 2011 Summer World University Games.

The second distinguishing characteristic is that this meeting was the first supporting action given by Chinese Premier in the history of China’s bids for the Summer and Winter World University Games. Despite the bid for the 1993 Summer World University Games being Shanghai’s first attempt to hold an international multi-sport event in the Reform Era, Premier Li Peng did not require the State Council to support it in the 1989 Work Report of the State Council, nor publicise it on official occasions. Interestingly, some of Li’s supporters even questioned Shanghai’s ability to hold the games during the bid, and suggested Beijing should host it. Like Li, Premiers Zhu Rongji and Wen Jiabao did not give support to Beijing and Harbin when the 2001 Summer World University Games bid and the 2009 Winter World University Games were taking place. In other words, Deputy Premier Li Lanqing and State Councillor Tang Jiaxuan were the highest ranking Chinese officials who gave support to Beijing’s bid for the 2001 Summer World University Games and Harbin’s bid for the 2009 Winter World University Games respectively.

35 “Li Lanqing huijian guoji daxuesheng tilian daibiaotuan” (Li Lanqing Met with the FISU Delegation), People’s Daily, 8 July 1998, 1.
37 “Shanghai younengli juban 1993 nian shidahui” (Shanghai Is Capable of Holding the World University Games), China Sports Daily, 4 April 1989, 1.
6.2.2. Zhang Dejiang

Guangdong Party Secretary Zhang Dejiang, a protégé of Jiang Zemin,\(^{40}\) supported the bid infrequently. He did not participate in any activities of the Bid Committee, nor did he attend the congratulation ceremony after Shenzhen won the hosting rights.\(^{41}\) Shenzhen’s bid for the 2011 Summer World University Games was not placed in his 2005 and 2006 Work Reports of the Guangdong Party Committee.\(^{42}\) The Party Secretary only gave support once after the bid was approved by the State Council in December 2004. It was the meeting with the FISU President in Guangzhou on 1 September 2006.\(^{43}\)

Zhang’s level of enthusiasm can be deduced by comparing his action in supporting the bid with Heilongjiang Party Secretary Song Fatang’s action in supporting Harbin’s bid for the 2009 Winter World University Games. Like Zhang, Song did not give assistance to the Harbin 2009 Winter World University Games Bid Committee, nor did he enter the bid in the 2004-2005 Work Report of the Heilongjiang Party Committee.\(^{44}\) His only supporting action was to meet with the FISU President when the FISU Evaluation Commission inspected Harbin on 17 November 2004. Both Zhang’s and Song’s speeches discussed the tertiary education sport in Guangdong and Heilongjiang, and trusted that holding the two World University Games would facilitate the development of local sport. However, at the end of the meetings, Song promised to support the bid on behalf of the Heilongjiang

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\(^{40}\) For details see Chapter 2 Section 2.2.1.

\(^{41}\) “Shenzhen jiangbuhui gufu guoji datilian de xuanze” (Shenzhen Will not Let the FISU down), *Shenzhen Special Zone Daily*, 17 January 2007, A1.

\(^{42}\) The Six Plenary Session of the Ninth CCP Guangdong Provincial Congress Was Held in Guangzhou; The Eighth Plenary Session of the Ninth CCP Guangdong Provincial Congress Was Held in Guangzhou.

\(^{43}\) Zhang Dejiang and Huang Huahua Respectively Met with the FISU President Killian.

government only, whereas Zhang stressed that Shenzhen’s bid for the 2011 Summer World University Games was a big event of the entire Guangdong province. The bid was not only supported by the Guangdong Party Committee and government, but by all Guangdong residents.

6.2.3. Li Hongzhong

Shenzhen Party Secretary Li Hongzhong, a protégé of Li Tieying, frequently gave support for Shenzhen’s bid. He maintained close relation with the local executive elites and participated in the entertaining of the FISU inspectors. Shenzhen’s bid was placed in the 2006 Work Report of the Shenzhen Party Committee. He even offered high-profile support after being notified of Shenzhen’s victory. By comparing Li’s actions with those of Du Yuxin in supporting Harbin’s bid for the 2009 Winter World University Games, it is clear that Li’s attitude in supporting Shenzhen’s bid was enthusiastic.

Li’s close relationship with the local executive elites is the first piece of evidence of his enthusiasm. When Harbin was bidding for the 2009 Winter World University Games, Harbin Party Secretary Du Yuxin did not attend any activities of the 2009 Harbin Winter World University Games Bid Committee, nor did he give instructions at its meetings. He never worked with the local executive elites to prepare Harbin to hold the event. Li’s performance was very different. He attended the opening ceremony of the 2011 Shenzhen

45 “Song Fatang huijian guoji datilian kaocha pinggutuan” (Song Fatang Met with the FISU Evaluation Commission), Harbin Daily, 18 November 2004, 1.
46 Zhang Dejiang and Huang Huahua Respectively Met with the FISU President Killian.
47 For details see Chapter 2 Section 2.2.1.
48 “Dadonghui shenbanwei bushu xiajieduan gongzuo” (The World University Games Bid Committee Planned the Works for the Next Stage), Heilongjiang Daily, 24 November 2004, 10.
Summer World University Games Bid Executive Committee\(^{49}\) and gave instructions at its meetings.\(^{50}\) Li also worked with the local executive elites and experts on the construction of the Shenzhen Olympic Sports Centre.\(^{51}\)

Li’s participation in the entertaining of the FISU inspectors is the second piece of evidence of his enthusiasm. Harbin Party Secretary Du Yuxin only held a meeting with the FISU President and his colleagues when Harbin was inspected.\(^{52}\) He did not attend the meetings chaired by Heilongjiang Party Secretary Song Fatang, Heilongjiang Governor Zhang Zuoji and Harbin Mayor Shi Zhongxin,\(^{53}\) nor did he accompany the inspectors on their evaluation of the city.\(^{54}\) However, after greeting the inspectors together with Mayor Xu Zongheng on behalf of the Shenzhen Party Committee and government,\(^{55}\) Li attended Guangdong Governor Huang Huahua’s meeting and participated in all other welcome ceremonies.\(^{56}\) He also accompanied the inspectors

\(^{49}\) Shenzhen Is Bidding for the 26\(^{th}\) World University Games on behalf of China.


\(^{51}\) Plan and Construct the Olympic Sports Centre at High Starting-Point and Standard.

\(^{52}\) “Du Yuxin huijian guoji datilian kaocha pinggutuan” (Du Yuxin Met with the FISU Evaluation Commission), *Harbin Daily*, 18 November 2004, 1.


\(^{55}\) “Shenzhen zhili chengwei hongyang dayun jingshen zuihao chengshi” (Shenzhen Try Its Best to Carry forward the Spirit of the World University Games), *Shenzhen Special Zone Daily*, 12 December 2006, A1&A4.

when they met with Premier Wen Jiabao, Education Minister Zhou Ji and the CGSA Deputy President Hu Jiayan in Beijing together with Deputy Governor Xu Deli, Mayor Xu Zongheng and other local executive elites.57

Li’s placing of Shenzhen’s bid for the 2011 Summer World University Games in the 2006 Work Report of the Shenzhen Party Committee is the third piece of evidence of his enthusiasm. He required the Party Committee to make an all-out effort for the bid and to complete the construction of the Shenzhen Olympic Sports Centre, which was later renamed as the Shenzhen World University Games Sports Centre.58 Party Secretary Du Yuxin however did not enter Harbin’s bid for the 2009 Winter World University Games in the 2004 Work Report of the Harbin Party Committee.59

Li’s response towards Shenzhen’s victory is the fourth piece of evidence of his enthusiasm. Except for the celebration party, Du did not participate in any activities after Harbin obtained the right to hold the 2009 Winter World University Games.60 However, Li’s actions after being notified of Shenzhen’s victory were high profile. In addition to celebrating along with his colleagues after the vote,61 he also congratulated Governor Huang Huahua and other local executive elites in person;62 and delivered a speech at the victory meeting. He instructed the Shenzhen Party Committee and government to

57 Shenzhen Is Capable of Holding the World University Games.
58 The Proposal of the Shenzhen Party Committee regarding Shenzhen’s Economy and Social Development in the Eleventh Five-Year Plan.
60 “Shengshi lingdao chuxi qingzhu Harbin dadonghui shenbantuan kaixuan” (The Provincial and City Leaders Attended the Verity Show to Celebrate Harbin’s Victory in the Winter World University Games Bid), Harbin Daily, 12 January 2005, 1; “Dadonghui shenbantuan kaixuan” (The Winter World University Games Bid Delegation Returned in Triumph), Harbin Daily, 20 January 2005, 1.
61 Shenzhen Will not Let the FISU down.
improve the city’s construction, environmental protection and public security, and to make the 2011 Summer World University Games as the most successful gathering in the FISU history.  

Through comparing their actions in supporting Shenzhen’s bid for the 2011 Summer World University Games with those of the central and local Party elites in supporting Shanghai’s bid for the 1993 Summer World University Games; Beijing’s bid for the 2001 Summer World University Games; and Harbin’s bid for the 2009 Winter World University Games, the attitudes of Premier Wen Jiabao, Guangdong Party Secretary Zhang Dejiang and Shenzhen Party Secretary Li Hongzhong in supporting the bid have been deduced. All of them were enthusiastic in giving support. These findings suggest that even when central and local Party elites come from different factions, their attitudes in supporting a particular bid can be consistent.

6.3. The central and local executive elites

The division of labour between the city and the National University Sports Federation (NUSF) in World University Games bids is stipulated in the Regulations of FISU Events. According to Section D Articles 2, 5, 6 and 7, the city candidate is responsible for furnishing the bidding documents, publicity, financing the games, receiving the FISU inspectors and signing the attribution contract if it is chosen. The roles of the NUSF in the bids, in accordance with Section D Article 3, are to (1) submit the city candidate to the

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64 Regulations for FISU Events, 85.
FISU and (2) assist it. In other words, all World University Games bids are local-led and central-coordinated projects. While the local government is in charge of implementing official bid tasks, the ministry that manages the NUSF gives assistance.

This section analyses whether the stipulations of the FISU led to the division of labour between central and local executive elites in Shenzhen’s bid for the 2011 Summer World University Games. The central and local executive elites involved were the senior officials of the EM, CGSA, CUSF, and the Guangdong and Guangzhou governments who participated in the 2011 Shenzhen Summer World University Games Bid Committee (see Table 6.3). The pattern of division of labour will be deduced through reviewing the elites’ duties in lobbying the FISU members and executives, publicising Shenzhen in China and abroad, furnishing the bidding documents, entertaining the FISU inspectors, giving the presentation, and preparing Shenzhen to hold the Summer World University Games. The section concludes with a summary of its findings.

6.3.1. Lobbying FISU members and executives

Lobbying the FISU members began after Shenzhen’s bid was approved by the State Council. The local executive elites were in charge of this. For instance, Deputy Governor Xu Deli and Deputy Mayor Liang Daoxing widely introduced Shenzhen’s economic development and, most importantly, its ambition to hold the 2011 Summer World University Games to FISU members when they observed the 22nd Winter World University Games at Innsbruck in January 2005 and the 23rd Summer World University Games.

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65 Ibid.
Games at Izmir in August 2005. The local executive elites also came to the headquarters of the national university sports federations to seek support. For example, Xu and Liang lobbied the headperson of the Malaysia University Sports Federation in Kuala Lumpur before the vote.

Table 6.3. Members of the 2011 Shenzhen Summer World University Games Bid Committee

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Post</th>
<th>Official</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>President</td>
<td>Huang Huahua (Guangdong Governor)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Members</td>
<td>Zhang Xinsheng (Deputy Education Minister; the CUSF President)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Liu Peng (the CGSA President, the COC Chairperson)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Yang Liguo (the CUSF General-Secretary)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Xu Deli (Guangdong Deputy Governor (until 25 February 2006) /Guangdong Political Consultative Conference Deputy President (since 26 February 2006) )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Xu Zongheng (Shenzhen Mayor)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Li Yizhen (Shenzhen Deputy Party Secretary)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Liang Daoxing (Shenzhen Deputy Mayor)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Yan Xiaopei (Shenzhen Deputy Mayor)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Tang Jie (Secretary, the Shenzhen Government)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Zhang Baoquan (Chairperson, the Shenzhen Education Bureau)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Qiao Jiahua (Chairperson, the Shenzhen Financial Bureau)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Yu Weiliang (Party Secretary, the Shenzhen Longgang District)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Cai Mingyuan (President, the Shenzhen General Sports Administration)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: The World University Games Bid Committee Will Establish within the Next Few Days.

Apart from the FISU members, the local executive elites also frequently lobbied the FISU President George Killian and other executives. Killian started his affiliation with the FISU

66 “Shenzhen wanquan jubei shenban dayunhui zige he tiaojian” (Shenzhen Is Qualified to Hold the World University Games), Shenzhen Special Zone Daily, 14 January 2005, A2; “Aiqinhaipan kexia Shenzhen yinji” (The Image of Shenzhen Was Carved at the Side of the Aegean Sea), Shenzhen Special Zone Daily, 24 August 2005, A7.
67 “Shenban shidayunhui, Shenzhen pan dama zhichi” (Shenzhen Wishes Malaysia to Support Its Bid for the World University Games), Nanyang Commercial Daily, 13 January 2006.
in 1975 and was appointed president in 1999. He is one of the key figures who determine the host city of each Summer and Winter World University Games bid for two reasons. First, according to the Regulations of FISU Events, the Executive Committee has right to choose host city as long as the FISU General Assembly delegates this authority. Killian is very likely to participate in giving vote. Second, Killian has been keen to inspect candidate cities in person since he became the FISU Deputy President in 1995. For instance, he chaired the FISU Evaluation Commissions that inspected Beijing for the 2001 Summer World University Games in July 1998 and Harbin for the 2009 Winter World University Games in November 2004. He later also participated in drafting the candidate city evaluation reports of each bid.

Deputy Governor Xu Deli and Deputy Mayor Liang Daoxing lobbied the President four times before Shenzhen’s Candidature File was submitted to the FISU: at the 28th Summer Olympic Games in Athens in August 2004; the 22nd Winter World University Games at Innsbruck in January 2005; the 23rd Summer World University Games at Izmir in August 2005; and during the inspection of the FISU Evaluation Commission at Harbin in November 2004. In addition, Killian was invited to visit Guangdong after the Candidature File was submitted to the FISU. Governor Huang Huahua and Mayor Xu Zongheng outlined Shenzhen’s advantages for holding the 2011 Summer World University Games.

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69 Section D paragraph 1, in Regulations for FISU Events, 85.
70 “Jia Qinglin fenwu guoji datilian daibiaotuan he danmai xinjiapo keren” (Jia Qinglin Respectively Met with the Guests from the FISU, Denmark and Singapore), Beijing Daily, 8 July 1998, 3; “Guoji datilian kaocha pinggutuan xingye diha” (The FISU Evaluation Commission Arrived in Harbin Last Night), Harbin Daily, 17 November 2004, 1.
71 Shenzhen Is Bidding for the 2011 World University Games.
72 Shenzhen Is Qualified to Hold the World University Games.
73 The Image of Shenzhen Was Carved at the Side of the Aegean Sea.
74 Shenzhen Is Bidding for the 2011 World University Games.
University Games in meetings with him.\textsuperscript{75}

The central executive elites often gave assistance to the local executive elites in the lobbying process. All the meetings with the FISU members and President abroad were arranged by CUSF President Zhang Xinheng and his colleagues in advance. Zhang also personally invited Killian to visit Guangdong after the Candidature File was submitted to the FISU.\textsuperscript{76} It is necessary point out that Killian and his predecessor Primo Nebiolo were not invited to visit China by Zhang and his predecessors He Dongchang and Lü Fuyuan when Shanghai, Beijing and Harbin respectively bid for the 1993 Summer World University Games, 2001 Summer World University Games and 2009 Winter World University Games. Zhang even outlined Shenzhen’s advantages for holding the 2011 Summer World University Games together with Mayor Xu Zongheng in the meeting with Killian.\textsuperscript{77} The CUSF Secretary-General Yang Liguo and his deputy Yan Guohua also frequently attended the meetings in China and abroad.\textsuperscript{78}

6.3.2. Publicising Shenzhen in China and abroad

In order to motivate national officials and local residents to support Shenzhen’s bid for the 2011 Summer World University Games, the local executive elites launched a series of publicity events at official occasions. For instance, Governor Huang Huahua expressly instructed the Guangdong government to achieve the bid when he celebrated with the

\textsuperscript{75} “Li Hongzhong Xu Zongheng fenbie huijian guoji datilian zhuxi jilian” (Li Hongzhong and Xu Zongheng Receptively Met with the FISU President Killian), \textit{Shenzhen Special Zone Daily}, 1 September 2006, A1&A3; Zhang Dejiang and Huang Huahua Respectively Met with the FISU President Killian.

\textsuperscript{76} The FISU President Killian Arrived in Shenzhen.

\textsuperscript{77} Li Hongzhong and Xu Zongheng Receptively Met with the FISU President Killian.

\textsuperscript{78} Zhang Dejiang and Huang Huahua Respectively Met with the FISU President Killian; Ibid.
Guangdong-trained athletes who had won medals in the 10th National Games at
Guangzhou. Mayor Xu Zongheng stressed the importance of holding the 2011 Summer
World University Games at a recital by the pianist Lang Lang, and at a meeting with the
Shenzhen-trained athletes who had won gold medals in the 12th Guangdong Games.
Deputy Mayor Liang Daoxing also outlined the progress of Shenzhen’s bid when he met
with the 37 Chinese ambassadors at Shenzhen. Shenzhen Deputy Education Officer Li
Changgong even held explanatory press conferences after Shenzhen’s official bidding
logo and slogan were unveiled.

The local executive elites were also in charge of encouraging publicity events organised
by Shenzhen residents. Lin Mingwei, a teacher who worked in a secondary school in
Shenzhen’s Baoan district, completed two cycling trips together with his friends during
the bid. The first lasted for 25 days in Australia. The second went for 45 days through
11 European and Asian countries including Turkey, Greece, Italy, Portugal, Spain, France,
the United Kingdom, Belgium, the Netherlands, Germany and Sweden. Their aim was
to promote Shenzhen’s bid for the Summer World University Games abroad and gain the
support of the international community. Deputy Mayor Liang Daoxing met with Lin
before the second trip. He not only gave his best wishes to all the cyclists, but also paid
tribute to their perseverance on behalf of the Shenzhen government and the Bid

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79 The provincial Party Committee and Government Fully Support Shenzhen’s Bid for the World
University Games.
80 “Wei Shenzhen hecai zhu Shenzhen chengong” (Cheer for Shenzhen and Wish It Success), Shenzhen
(Shenzhen Commended the Athletes Who Won the Medals in the Guangdong Games), Shenzhen Special
81 “Woguo zhu 37 guo dashi canzan kaochatuan fangshen” (Chinese Ambassadors and Counselors to 37
Countries Visited Shenzhen), Shenzhen Special Zone Daily, 28 October 2005, A4.
82 The Application Letter Was Firstly Submitted to the FISU; Try the Ulmost to Secure the Right to Host
the World University Games.
83 “Qianli danqi xuanchuan dayunhui” (Travel Thousand Miles alone to Publicise the World University
Games), Nanfang Daily, 6 September 2005, B04.
84 Baoan minjian zixingche dui jiang chuanxing ouya 11 guo (Baoan’s Civil Cycling Team Will Cross 11
European and Asian Countries), Shenzhen Special Zone Daily, 12 July 2006, A11.
The central executive elites often gave assistance in the publicising of the bid. For instance, the CUSF Secretary-General Yang Liguo attended Lang Lang’s recital in Shenzhen. He and his colleagues also arranged for Lin Mingwei and his teammates to meet with the FISU Secretary-General and the representatives of 11 European NUSFs before the cycling trip. Hence, Lin was able to successfully express the city’s desire to hold the 2011 Summer World University Games to the FISU Secretary-General and the 11 NUSF representatives on behalf of Shenzhen people.

6.3.3. Furnishing the bidding documents

Each candidate for the 2011 Summer World University Games was required to submit two documents to the FISU: an Application Letter and a Candidature File. The Application Letter was to inform the FISU Executive Board that the city had decided to bid for the World University Games. The Candidature File had to be submitted after the city had been approved as one of the candidates. This document is the city’s official proposal for how it will organise the Games, and must be written in English, French and Spanish and cover the following four areas: (1) the schedule; (2) city infrastructure; (3) social services and (4) cultural activities. Shenzhen’s Application Letter and Candidature File were delivered to Brussels by both central and local executive elites, but the person

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85 “Xiang quanshijie zhanshi Shenzhen jingshen” (Showcase the Shenzhen Spirit to the World), Shenzhen Special Zone Daily, 14 July 2006, A5.
86 “Cheer for Shenzhen and Wish It Success.”
87 “Guoji datilian mishuzhang chengzan Shenzhen qingnian” (The FISU Secretary-General Praised the Shenzhen Young People), Shenzhen Special Zone Daily, 29 July 2006, A1; “Wei shenban dayunhui erxing de guangrong shizhe” (The Honor Envoy for the World University Games Bid), Guangming Daily, 15 September 2006, 9.
who handed them to the FISU Secretary-General was Deputy Governor Xu Deli. 88

It is important to point out that the Candidature File was completed with the assistance of the central executive elites. The Candidature File was started in September 2005 and took ten months to complete. Once the first draft was finished by the officials of the Shenzhen government and the scholars of the Shenzhen Academy of Social Sciences, it was passed to senior officials of the EM, CUSF, CGSA and the Chinese Olympic Committee (COC). Their main role was to suggest revisions based on their experience in dealing with the FISU and other international sporting organisations, and to proofread the English, French and Spanish. 89 Thus, the final version of the Candidature File was a collaborative document written by the central and local executive elites. When the local executive elites took responsibility for drafting Shenzhen’s specific arrangements for holding the 2011 Summer World University Games, the editing was the duty of the central executive elites.

6.3.4. Entertaining the inspectors

After submitting the Candidature File, each candidature city in the 2011 Summer World University Games bid had to be inspected by the FISU Evaluation Commission. The Evaluation Commission is composed of six officials of the FISU Executive Board, including the President and the Secretary-General. Its main duty is to evaluate whether the candidature cities are competent to fulfil their plans for holding the World University Games by means of a 4-day inspection. The evaluation results are written up in a report,

88 The Application Letter Was Firstly Submitted to the FISU; Try the Utmost to Secure the Right to Host the World University Games.
89 “Woshi zhengshi tichu shenban di 26 jie dayunhui” (Shenzhen Formally Applied to Bid for the 26th Summer World University Games), Shenzhen Special Zone Daily, 27 October 2005, A2; Try the Utmost to Secure the Right to Host the World University Games.
which is one of the most important documents consulted by FISU members before the vote. The Evaluation Commission was scheduled to visit two cities during their China trip. After a 3-day inspection in Shenzhen, the Evaluation Commission was invited to meet with Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao and other central executive elites in Beijing on the last day.

In order to make sure the Shenzhen officials entertained the Evaluation Commission as well as possible, the Shenzhen executive elites held three meetings. Deputy Mayor Liang Daoxing and Deputy Party Secretary Li Yizhen chaired the first two. They aimed to arrange and coordinate the division of labour among the government units in the preparations.90 Mayor Xu Zongheng participated in the last meeting together with the Shenzhen Party Committee and government officials. In addition to underlining the significance of holding the Summer World University Games to Shenzhen, Guangdong and China, he also instructed all the local Party and government units to strengthen communication with each other before and during the inspection of the Evaluation Committee.91 It is important to note that the central and provincial executive elites did not attend the meetings, nor give any instruction for the preparations.

Both Guangdong and Shenzhen executive elites were in charge of entertaining the FISU inspectors. After meeting with the members of the Evaluation Commission on behalf of the Guangdong and Shenzhen governments respectively,92 Governor Huang Huahua and

91 The Shenzhen Party Committee and Government Held a Mobilization Meeting for the Entertainment of the FISU Evaluation Commission.
92 Shenzhen Try Its Best to Carry forward the Spirit of the World University Games; Shenzhen’s Bid for the World University Games Obtained Guangdong’s Support.
Mayor Xu Zongheng together organised a welcome performance on the second day of the inspection.\footnote{A Verity Show Was Held to Welcome the FISU Evaluation Commission.} In order to inform the inspectors about Shenzhen’s advantages for holding the 2011 Summer World University Games, the mayor and Deputy Governor Xu Deli gave a presentation during the inspection. They also held a press conference and a wine party at the end.\footnote{“Women Shenzhen zhixing feichang chenggong” (We Had a Wonderful Journey in Shenzhen), \textit{Shenzhen Special Zone Daily}, 14 December 2006, A1&A2; “Shiwei shizhengfu juxing juhui huansong guoji datilian pingguzu guibing” (The Shenzhen Party Committee and Government Held a Wine Party to See off the FISU Evaluation Commission), \textit{Shenzhen Special Zone Daily}, 14 December 2006, A1.} In addition, Xu Deli and Deputy Mayor Liang Daoxing accompanied the Evaluation Commission in the entire trip, including inspecting Shenzhen’s sport, telecommunications and transport facilities and meeting with Premier Wen Jiabao, Education Minister Zhou Ji and the CGSA Deputy President Hu Jiayan in Beijing.\footnote{“Guoji atilian pingguzu zaishen kaocha shou shengda huanying” (The FISU Evaluation Commission Was Greeted in Shenzhen), \textit{Shenzhen Special Zone Daily}, 13 December 2006, A2; “Guoji datilian pingguzu kaocha Shenzhen daxue he Shenzhen daxuecheng” (The FISU Evaluation Commission Inspected the Shenzhen University Town), \textit{Shenzhen Special Zone Daily}, 14 December 2006, A2; “Shenzhen younengli rang quanshijie kandao dayunhui shengkuang” (Shenzhen Is Capable of Broadcasting the World University Games to the Whole World), \textit{Shenzhen Special Zone Daily}, 14 December 2006, A2; Shenzhen Is Capable of Holding the World University Games.} They also farewelled the inspectors at Shenzhen.\footnote{“Guoji datilian pingguzu zuori lishen” (The FISU Evaluation Commission Left Shenzhen Yesterday), \textit{Shenzhen Special Zone Daily}, 16 December 2006, A1.}

The central executive elites assisted the local executive elites to entertain the FISU Evaluation Commission. For instance, excepting the farewell ceremony, Deputy Education Minister and the CUSF President Zhang Xinsheng participated in all the meetings and activities in Shenzhen and Beijing. In the presentation, together with the CUSF Deputy Liaison Officer Shen Zhen, he promised the inspectors that the FISU’s prestige would be increased by Shenzhen holding the 2011 Summer World University Games.
It is interesting to find that Zhang Xinsheng delivered his speech in the presentation in two capacities: (1) as the Deputy Education Minister and the CUSF President; and (2) as the FISU Deputy President. Zhang is one of the few Chinese officials who have worked on the executive committees of different international organisations. After being appointed Deputy President of the FISU in 2003, he later chaired the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) Executive Board from 2005 to 2007. It is very rare for a Chinese official to give a presentation together with the local executive elites to his colleagues in an international organisation executive who are inspecting a Chinese candidate city. For instance, Zhang did not participate in Heilongjiang Deputy Governor Cheng Youdong’s presentation when the FISU evaluated Harbin for holding the 2009 Winter World University Games. Nor did Yu Zaiqing, who was appointed one of the six OCA Deputy Presidents in 2002, participate in the presentation when the OCA Evaluation Committee inspected Guangzhou during the bid to hold the 2010 Asian Games. A precedent for Zhang’s involvement can be found in Beijing’s bid for the 2008 Summer Olympic Games. Then IAAF (International Association of Athletics Federations) Deputy President Lou Dapeng gave a presentation

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97 “Xuanze Shenzhen women jianghuan shijie yige qiji” (Choose Shenzhen We Will Get back a Miracle to the World), *Shenzhen Special Zone Daily*, 13 December 2006, A1&A4.
98 “Shenzhen keshi guoji datilian shixian sige zengzhì” (Shenzhen Can Add Values to the FISU), *Shenzhen Special Zone Daily*, 13 December 2006, A4.
99 “Zhang Xinsheng dangxuan shijie datilian fuzhuxi” (Zhang Xinsheng Was Elected the FISU Deputy President), *China Education Daily*, 20 August 2003, 1.
100 “Zhang Xinsheng dangxuan lianheguo jiaokewen zhuzhi zhixing zhuxi” (Zhang Xinsheng Was Elected the President of the UNESCO Executive Board), *China Education Daily*, 28 October 2005, 1.
101 Harbin Gave an Oral Report for the Winter World University Games Bid.
together with Beijing Government Deputy Secretary Wang Wei to his colleagues when Beijing’s track and field facilities were rated.103

6.3.5. Giving the presentation

Each candidate city in the 2011 Summer World University Games bid was required to give a presentation to all the FISU members before the vote. The presentation had to cover three areas: (1) the city’s advantages for holding the games; (2) its promise to fulfil all the commitments given in the Candidature File; and (3) its detailed arrangements for holding the Games. While the presentation was given by both central and local executive elites, the local executive elites were in charge of introducing Shenzhen’s advantages and making the promise. For instance, after China’s ambassador to Italy Dong Jinyi declared support for Shenzhen’s bid on behalf of the Chinese government, Guangdong Governor Huang Huahua made the first promise. He stressed that the Guangdong government will do its best to support Shenzhen in fulfilling its commitments listed in the Candidature File. Mayor Xu Zongheng then introduced Shenzhen’s advantages for holding the Games, and promised that the Shenzhen government was financially ready to fulfil each commitment in the Candidature File and to stage the 2011 Summer World University Games as the most successful event in the FISU history. It is necessary to point out that no central executive elite introduced Shenzhen and made a promise together with Huang and Xu. The CUSF Deputy Liaison Officer Shen Zhen was the only central executive elite who delivered a speech in the presentation. He collaborated with Shenzhen Deputy Mayor Yan Xiaopei to explain Shenzhen’s detailed arrangements for holding the 2011 Summer World

University Games. They did not give promises on behalf of the EM, CUSF and the Shenzhen government, nor did they list Shenzhen’s advantages.104

6.3.6. Preparing Shenzhen to hold the Summer World University Games

As Shenzhen did not have any experience of holding large-scale multi-sport events before the bid, all the existing sports venues did not meet the requirements of the FISU. It was therefore necessary to construct a range of new sports venues. After the bid was approved by the State Council, the Shenzhen government formed the Shenzhen 2011 Summer World University Games Bid Executive Committee. Under the leadership of Mayor Xu Zongheng (see Table 6.4), its main duty was to budget and manage the construction of the sports venues. The Shenzhen government invested 3 billion yuan in the construction of a 14.7 square kilometre Olympic Sports Centre at Longgang district. The Sports Centre contains a main stadium, an accommodation centre and other sporting facilities.105 In order to demonstrate Shenzhen’s sincerity in wanting to host the event, the Olympic Sports Centre was renamed as the World University Games Sports Centre before the Candidature File was submitted to the FISU.106 The government also spent 1 billion yuan on resettling the residents who were moved for the construction of sports centre in 2006.107 The foundation-stone laying ceremony for the Shenzhen World University

104 “Shenzhen shi 2011 dayunhui zuijia shenban chengshi” (Shenzhen Is the Best City to Host the 2011 World University Games), Shenzhen Special Zone Daily, 17 January 2007, A2.
105 “Aoti xincheng kaishi zhaobiao” (The Bidding for the Olympic Sports Centre Started), Shenzhen Special Zone Daily, 28 June 2005, A2; Shenzhen Is Bidding for the 26th World University Games on behalf of China; Plan and Construct the Olympic Sports Centre at High Starting-Point and Standard.
106 “Shenzhen shenban dayunhui jinru chongci jieduan” (Shenzhen’s Bid for the World University Games Entered the Final Stage), Shenzhen Special Zone Daily, 21 July 2006, A3; “Longgang tiyu xincheng qianqi jianshe gongcheng maichu shizhixing bufa” (The Pre-Construction Work of the Sports Centre at Longgang Made a Substantive Progress), Shenzhen Special Zone Daily, 17 August 2006, A2.
107 “Aoyun zhongxin gengmingwei dayun zhongxin” (The Olympic Sports Centre Was Renamed as the World University Games Sports Centre), Shenzhen Special Zone Daily, 3 June 2006, A1&A2.
Games Sporting Centre took place during the inspection of the FISU Evaluation Commission.  

Table 6.4. Members of the 2011 Shenzhen Summer World University Games Bid Executive Committee

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Post</th>
<th>Officials</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>President</td>
<td>Xu Zongheng (Shenzhen Mayor)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Executive President</td>
<td>Li Yizhen (Deputy Shenzhen Party Secretary)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deputy President</td>
<td>Liang Daoxing (Shenzhen Deputy Mayor), Yan Xiaopei (Shenzhen Deputy Mayor)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secretary</td>
<td>Tang Jie (Secretary, the Shenzhen Government)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deputy Secretary</td>
<td>Luo Li (Deputy Secretary, the CCP Shenzhen Committee; Director, Shenzhen Government Reception Office), Huang Guoqiang (Deputy Secretary, the Shenzhen Government), Zhang Qiwen (Deputy Secretary, the Shenzhen Government), Xuan Zhuxi (Deputy Director, the Shenzhen Publicity Department), Zhang Baoquan (Party Secretary, the Shenzhen Education Bureau), Cai Mingyuan (Director, the Shenzhen General Sports Administration), Mao Xiaopei (Director, the Shenzhen Government Foreign Affairs Office), Qiao Jiahua (Party Secretary, the Shenzhen Financial Bureau), Jiang Jianjun (Chairperson, the Shenzhen Architecture and Engineering Department)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Executive Deputy Secretary</td>
<td>Li Changgong (Deputy Director, the Shenzhen Education Bureau), Ke Gangming (Deputy President, the Shenzhen General Sports Administration)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: “Shenzhen diershiliu jie shijie daxuesheng yundonghui shenban zhixing weiyuanhui mingdan” (The Members of the Shenzhen 26th World University Games Bid Executive Committee), Shenzhen Special Zone Daily, 13 July 2005, A2.

The central executive elites did not participate in the budgeting and managing of the construction of the sports venues, but they did hold a number of meetings at Beijing and

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Shenzhen to supervise the local executive elites. For instance, Deputy Education Minister Zhang Xinsheng advised Deputy Mayor Yan Xiaopei and his colleagues about the location selection, size of the sports centre and other related matters in Shenzhen after the bid had been approved by the State Council.109 Deputy Governor Xu Deli and Deputy Mayor Liang Daoxing were invited to meet with the CGSA President Liu Peng at Beijing. Liu and his colleagues not only analysed Shenzhen’s progress in the bid, but also gave their opinions on the construction of the Shenzhen Olympic Sports Centre.110

By reviewing the implementations of the official bid tasks, it is plain to see that the division of labour between the central and local executive elites in Shenzhen’s bid for the 2011 Summer World University Games was consistent with the stipulations of the FISU. Under the supervision of Deputy Education Minister Zhang Xinsheng and the CGSA President Liu Peng, Mayor Xu Zongheng and his colleagues budgeted for and planned the construction of the sports venues. The central executive elites also gave assistance when the local executive elites were lobbying the FISU members and president, publicising Shenzhen in China and abroad, furnishing the bidding documents, entertaining the inspectors and giving the presentation. Hence, all the findings of this chapter confirm that the bid was a local-led and central-coordinated project, with the EM, CUSF, CGSA, and the Guangdong and Guangzhou government senior officials acting in strict compliance with the Regulations of FISU Events.

109 Shenzhen Has Approved to Bid for the World University Games.
110 Fully Support Shenzhen’s Bid for the 26th World University Games.
6.4. Summary

The members of the CCP Politburo Standing Committee, EM, CGSA, the Guangdong Party Committee and government, and the Shenzhen Party Committee and government participated in Shenzhen’s bid for the 2011 Summer World University Games from December 2004 to January 2007. The central and local executive elites, including Deputy Education Minister Zhang Xinsheng, the CGSA President Liu Peng, Guangdong Governor Huang Huahua, and Shenzhen Mayor Xu Zongheng, collaborated in the Shenzhen 2011 Summer World University Games Bid Committee to implement the official bid tasks. The central and local Party elites, including Premier Wen Jiabao, Guangdong Party Secretary Zhang Dejiang and Shenzhen Party Secretary Li Hongzhong, gave their support to the project at Beijing, Guangzhou and Shenzhen respectively. Shenzhen eventually obtained the right to host the 2011 Summer World University Games in Torino on 12 January 2007.

To test whether factionalism led to the attitudes of both central and local Party elites in supporting the Shenzhen’s bid for the 2011 Summer World University Games, the actions of Premier Wen Jiabao, Guangdong Party Secretary Zhang Dejiang and Shenzhen Party Secretary Li Hongzhong in supporting the bid were compared with those of the same-ranking officials in Shanghai’s bid for the 1993 Summer World University Games, Beijing’s bid for the 2001 Summer World University Games, and Harbin’s bid for the 2009 Winter World University Games. It is found that Wen, who has a factional connection with Zhu Rongji; Zhang, a Jiang Zemin’s protégé; and Li, a member of Li Tieying’s faction, were all enthusiastic in supporting Shenzhen. This finding thus refutes hypothesis II of this thesis that attitudes in supporting a bid may be inconsistent if the
central and local Party elites come from different factions.

To test whether the stipulations of the FISU led to the division of labour between the central and local executive elites in implementing the bid, the actions of senior officials of the EM, CGSA, and the Guangdong and Shenzhen governments were reviewed. Under the supervision of Deputy Education Minister Zhang Xinsheng and the CGSA President Liu Peng, Mayor Xu Zongheng and his colleagues were in charge of preparing Shenzhen to budget and construct the sports venues. The central executive elites also gave assistance when the local executive elites were lobbying the FISU members and president, publicising Shenzhen in China and abroad, furnishing the bidding documents, entertaining the FISU inspectors, and giving the presentation. The findings of this chapter confirm that Shenzhen’s bid for the 2011 Summer World University Games was operated as a local-led and central-coordinated project, with the central and local executive elites acting in strict compliance with the stipulations of the FISU. Hence, the stipulations of the FISU can be confirmed as a factor that may lead to the division of labour between the central and local executive elites.
CHAPTER 7
CONCLUSION

Although the Chinese government has been eager to participate in international affairs since the 1990s, the West are still firm on their attitude towards China’s incompetence to bear the responsibility as a member in the international society, due to Chinese officials’ behaviour in dealing with the stipulations of international bodies. The Chinese officials not only have been accused of selectively complying with the rules and regulations of international organisations on a frequent basis, but also have been viewed as being uncooperative with respect to the central government’s requirements to conform to international laws. One reason for this is that carrying out the requirements of international bodies would clash with the interests of the Chinese officials. They are hence unwilling to strictly comply with international rules and regulations, despite the fact that the Chinese government required them to do so. Another reason is about factionalism in the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). As the relations among different Chinese political factions are conflictual, those who come from different factions tend to be uncooperative in implementing the duties assigned by international bodies.

Through examining the two hypotheses in Beijing’s bid for the 2008 Olympic Games, Shanghai’s bid for the 2010 World Expo, Guangzhou’s bid for the 2010 Asian Games, and Shenzhen’s bid for the 2011 World University Games, this thesis confirmed the stipulations of international organisations as a determining factor in the division of labour between the central and local executive elites in implementing each of those bids; and refuted factionalism as a determining factor in the attitudes of both central and local Party
elites in supporting each of those bids. Whether the result enables the Chinese government to change the skeptical view of the Western countries?

This concluding chapter consists of two sections. After recapping the findings about the relations between the central and local Party and executive elites in the four case studies, the implication of this thesis is summarised in the last paragraph of the first section. The second section suggests three areas in relation to the Chinese government’s political purposes behind the bids for further studies.

7.1. Findings

There are three major findings in this thesis. First, China is a rule-abiding candidate in international bids. This is derived from reviewing the leading and coordinating roles played by senior officials of the central and local governments in lobbying the executives and members of IOC, BIE, OCA and FISU; publicising Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou and Shenzhen in China and abroad; furnishing the bidding documents; entertaining the inspectors; giving the presentations; and preparing the cities to hold the Olympic Games, World Expo, Asian Games and World University Games. In fact, they were completely consistent to those required in the constitutions and/or event regulations of the four international organisations. Table 7.1 summarises the details.

The second finding is that China is an effective candidate in international bids. This is supported by two pieces of evidence. The first evidence is that the relations between the central and local executive elites in implementing all the official tasks of the four bids are
synergistic. It denotes that in spite of their different positions and rankings in the
government, the Chinese officials are willing and competent to complete the duties
assigned by international organisations in a cooperative way. This finding is in contrast
with previous researches arguing an inharmonic cooperation between China’s central and
local executives in complying with the stipulations of international bodies: the central
executives are eager to comply, whereas the local executives are reluctant or even
resistant to do so.¹

Table 7.1. Division of labour between the central and local executive elites in the four bids

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>The role of the central executive elites</th>
<th>The role of the local Executive elites</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Beijing’s bid for the 2008 Olympic Games</td>
<td>Coordinator</td>
<td>Leader</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shanghai’s bid for the 2010 World Expo</td>
<td>Leader</td>
<td>Coordinator</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guangzhou’s bid for the 2010 Asian Games</td>
<td>Coordinator</td>
<td>Leader</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shenzhen’s bid for the 2011 Summer World University Games</td>
<td>Coordinator</td>
<td>Leader</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The second piece of evidence is derived from the attitude of the central and local Party
elites in supporting Guangzhou’s bid for the 2010 Asian Games and Shenzhen’s bid for
the 2011 Summer World University Games. They were all enthusiastic to give support
despite the different factional backgrounds of Premier Wen Jiabao, Guangdong Party
Secretary Zhang Dejiang, Guangzhou Party Secretary Lin Shusen and Shenzhen Party
Secretary Li Hongzhong. Such attitude is different from the inconsistent attitude of Wen’s
predecessor Zhu Rongji and Jiang Zemin’s protégés Beijing Party Secretary Jia Qinglin
and Shanghai Party Secretary Huang Ju in supporting Beijing’s bid for the 2008 Olympic

Games and Shanghai’s bid for the 2010 World Expo. Table 7.2 summarises the details.

The difference denotes that both members of the CCP Politburo Standing Committee and secretaries of the local Party Committees are willing to maintain a harmonious tie in dealing with the tasks assigned by international bodies in the post-Jiang Zemin era.

Table 7.2. Attitudes of the central and local Party elites in supporting the four bids

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The central and local party elites who were enthusiastic in giving support</th>
<th>The central and local party elites who were indifferent in giving support</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Beijing’s bid for the 2008 Olympic Games</td>
<td>Zhu Rongji**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beijing’s bid for the 2008 Olympic Games</td>
<td>Jia Qinglin*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shanghai’s bid for the 2010 World Expo</td>
<td>Jiang Zemin*,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shanghai’s bid for the 2010 World Expo</td>
<td>Zhu Rongji**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guangzhou’s bid for the 2010 Asian Games</td>
<td>Wen Jiabao**,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guangzhou’s bid for the 2010 Asian Games</td>
<td>Zhang Dejiang*,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guangzhou’s bid for the 2010 Asian Games</td>
<td>Lin Shusen***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shenzhen’s bid for the 2011 Summer World University Games</td>
<td>Wen Jiabao**,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shenzhen’s bid for the 2011 Summer World University Games</td>
<td>Zhang Dejiang*,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shenzhen’s bid for the 2011 Summer World University Games</td>
<td>Li Hongzhong***</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*member of the Shanghai Clique;
**member of the economic and financial faction;
***member of other factions

The third finding is that the stipulations of international organizations have replaced factionalism in shaping the behaviour of the Chinese officials in dealing with the duties assigned by the international bodies. As mentioned in Chapter 2, scholars have argued that because the relations between CCP factions are conflictual, officials who come from different factions are necessarily uncooperative in decision-makings and policy implementations. However, this assumption is refuted by the officials’ behavior in Shanghai’s bid for the 2010 World Expo since factionalism did not affect the cooperation between the central and local officials in implementing the official bid tasks. Despite the
different supporting attitudes of President Jiang Zemin and Premier Zhu Rongji, their protégés State Councillor Wu Yi and Shanghai Mayor Chen Liangyu strictly complied with the stipulations of the BIE in the bid. Chen was under Wu’s leadership and instructions with regard to lobbying the executive and members of the BIE, publicising Shanghai in Germany and France, entertaining the BIE inspectors in Beijing and Shanghai, giving the presentations at the BIE sessions, and preparing Shanghai to hold the exposition right from the establishment of the Shanghai 2010 World Expo Bid Committee in March 2000. This suggests that even if the central and local officials come from different factions and have different factional patrons’ attitudes in supporting a bid, they can still closely and effectively work with each other under the guidelines of international organisations until the completion of the projects.

When both central and local political elites are willing and competent to synergistically implement official bid tasks under the stipulations of international organizations and to enthusiastically give support, this thesis confirms that China is a rule-abiding and effective bidder, and that those stipulations have replaced factionalism to shape the behaviour of the Chinese officials in dealing with the duties assigned by international bodies. They hence imply that joining international organizations is a means for the Chinese government to demonstrate its willingness and competence to bear the responsibility as a member in the international society, and could be a strong reference to change the skeptical view of the Western countries vis-à-vis China.

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7.2. Suggestions

As mentioned in Chapter 1, the official reasons for the Chinese government to join international bids are that holding international events facilitates (1) to publicise the success of its governmental capacity, (2) to boost the local economy, (3) to enhance the international profile of the Chinese cities, and (4) to transform them into the international metropolises. However, through reviewing the relations of the central and local political elites, this thesis confirmed joining international bids as a means of the Chinese government to demonstrate China’s willingness and competence to shoulder the responsibility for the international society. It is hence reasonable to cross-examine that whether bidding for international events has been used by the Chinese government for any other implicit political purposes.

The following three areas are suggested for further studies. The first one is whether the Chinese government intends to penetrate China’s influence into the legislative and executive bodies of international organizations through international bids. The reason for raising this area is that some of the Chinese executive elites involved in implementing the official tasks of the four bids became the chairpersons or senior executive officials of the international organisations after the Chinese cities obtained the rights to host the international events. They include (1) former China General Sport Administration (CGSA) deputy president Yu Zaiqing, who was elected as a member of the IOC Executive Board in August 2004; (2) former Chinese ambassador to France Wu Jianmin, who succeeded in the BIE presidential election in December 2003; and (3) former Deputy Education

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3 “Yu Zaiqing: dangxuan zhiwei shi guojia de xuyao” (Yu Zaiqing: Being Elected a Member of the IOC Executive Board Is a Need of China), *China Sports Daily*, 12 August 2004, 1.
Minister Zhang Xinsheng, who was re-elected as the FISU vice president in August 2007.5

The success of the Chinese officials in the above elections hence can be assumed that their styles and characters in implementing China’s bids were strongly impressed by the members and executives of the OCA, BIE and FISU. If this is confirmed, bidding for international events are used by the Chinese government not only to showcase the Chinese senior officials’ professionalism and wisdom in handling the duties assigned by international bodies, but also to penetrate China’s influence in the legislative and executive bodies of international organizations.

The second suggested area for further studies is whether international bids are used for defending China’s territorial integrity. It aims to review the Chinese government’s response to the bids in which both Chinese and Taiwanese candidates participate. Just like China, Taiwan is also keen to hold international events to demonstrate its national image in the international community. Table 7.3 shows that four of the five Taiwanese municipalities, including Taipei, Tainan, Taichung and Kaohsiung, have bid for international multi-sport events since the 1990s. Taipei was elected to hold the 2009 Summer Deaflympics by the International Committee of Sports for the Deaf (ICSD) in 2001, and Kaohsiung was elected to hold the 2009 World Games by the International World Games Association (IWGA) in 2003.6

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5 “Jilianan Zhang Xinsheng lianren guoji datilian fuzhuxi” (George Killian and Zhang Xinsheng Respectively Renewed the FISU President and Deputy President), *China Education Daily*, 6 August 2007, 1.
Table 7.3. Taiwan’s bids for international multi-sport events 1990-2011

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year of application</th>
<th>Candidate city</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>Taipei</td>
<td>1998 Asian Games</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>Kaohsiung</td>
<td>2001 Summer World University Games</td>
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<td>Kaohsiung</td>
<td>2002 Asian Games</td>
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<td>2001</td>
<td>Kaohsiung &amp; Tainan</td>
<td>2007 Summer World University Games</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>Taipei</td>
<td>2009 Summer Deaflympics</td>
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<td>2003</td>
<td>Taipei</td>
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<td>2011</td>
<td>Taipei</td>
<td>2017 Summer World University Games</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author’s database

Since territorial integrity is the No. 1 priority in the China foreign policy in sport vis-à-vis Taiwan, any Chinese candidate must shoulder the responsibility of defeating a Taiwanese rival when both are simultaneously bidding for an international event. It hence can assume that the Chinese government is keener to give all-out support to the bids, in which both Chinese and Taiwanese candidates participate, than the bids, in which no Taiwanese candidates participate.

The third area is whether international bids have been used to evaluate the ability of local officials by the Party and executive units who take charge of senior personnel arrangements. It is interesting to find that some of the local Party and executive elites involved in the four bids were promoted or transferred after the Chinese cities were elected to hold the international events. They included (1) former Beijing Party Secretary

Jia Qinglin, who was appointed to be a member of the CCP Politburo Standing Committee in November 2002 and was elected as the chairperson of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference in March 2003;\(^8\) (2) former Beijing Mayor Liu Qi, who was appointed to be a member of the CCP Politburo in November 2002 and the Beijing Party Secretary in 2003;\(^9\) (3) former Guangdong Party Secretary Zhang Dejiang, who was promoted to be Vice Premier of China in March 2008;\(^10\) (4) former Guangzhou Party Secretary Lin Shusen, who was transferred to be the Deputy Party Secretary of Guizhou Province in June 2007 and then chair the Guizhou Government in August 2007;\(^11\) (6) former Shenzhen Party Secretary Li Hongzhong, who was transferred to be Deputy Party Secretary of Hubei Province in November 2007 and was appointed to be Hubei Governor in January 2008.\(^12\)

If the relationship between international bids and the above personnel arrangements could be confirmed, it will denote that the ability of handling the duties assigned by international organisations has been included in the cadre evaluation system of the Chinese government that determines personnel promotions, transfers and appointments of local senior officials.

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