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The Flesh Coloured Bandaid:
Whiteness, dominance and Pākehā cultural normativity in television news

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Abstract

The aim of this project is to draw on global critical theories of Whiteness to determine the extent to which Pākehā perspectives are dominant in New Zealand’s television news. Mainstream and te reo Māori news bulletins are analysed in terms of their varying constructions of Waitangi Day 2012 and surrounding events. In Aotearoa Whiteness appears to take on the specific form of Pākehāness, which is distinct from other White cultures due to the colonial relationship between Pākehā and Māori. Discourses of Pākehāness appear to have influenced both New Zealand’s colonial history and the present moment, and were highly evident in mainstream news constructions of Waitangi Day. Pākehā culture appears to understand itself through a set of ideologies that serve to support and maintain Pākehā dominance, and disadvantage Māori. These ideologies seem to include individualism, future-orientation, meritocracy, majority-rule and privilege. Pākehā cultural ideologies evidently influence mainstream newsmaking processes to create news products on Waitangi Day that seem to inherently disfavour the campaign for Māori rights and calls to respect the contemporary relevance of te Tiriti o Waitangi. In contrast to mainstream news, te reo Māori news bulletins offer some presentations of Waitangi Day grounded in Māori worldviews, which allow a space for Māori voices to be expressed. At the same time there is some indication that Te Kāea may be moving towards the reproduction of mainstream news techniques. Overall however te reo Māori news bulletins offer a challenge to normative Pākehā dominance and privilege as expressed in mainstream television news. By silencing Māori voices, withholding the right to expression and denying a bicultural ideal for New Zealand society, mainstream news constructions of Waitangi Day appear to breach the partnership principle embedded in te Tiriti, fail to protect the taonga of Māori voice and violate Māori Human Rights, Indigenous Rights, and rights as Treaty partners. The normativity of Pākehā cultural common sense at the present moment therefore seems to justify Pākehā privilege, support Pākehā dominance and maintain Pākehā power in New Zealand society whilst disadvantaging Māori health, wellbeing and political aspirations.
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1. Introduction

On the first Waitangi Day of my lifetime, Dr Sue Abel conducted an analysis of the way in which Waitangi Day was constructed by New Zealand’s television news (Shaping the News). I conduct an analysis twenty-three years later and find that, while some important details in news practices have changed, the overarching picture looks very similar to the way it did in 1990. Drawing on the tools of Critical Whiteness Studies I interrogate why this might be and what can be done about it.

I hypothesise that a set of ingrained practices and assumptions in television news institutions operate to present mainstream news analysis from a Pākehā perspective, limiting stories and doing damage to Māori people by perpetuating misunderstandings and negative ideas about Māori culture. I argue that these practices operate to maintain White hegemony by aligning the media’s representation of public opinion with the White dominated status quo.

I test this hypothesis by carrying out an analysis of the television news coverage of Waitangi Day 2012 and its surrounding events on four different channels, examining representational strategies and the framing of events. I find that the news values of Prime News, 3 News and ONE News dictate that these channels present stories in a Pākehā-oriented way to appeal to the dominant viewing audience of Aotearoa. Combined with the commercial need to prioritise visuality, minimise confusion and maintain a fast-paced captivating format, these factors operate to marginalise Māori voices and maintain the normativity of Pākehā perspectives. I argue that these factors combine to do damage to Māori people and culture in a way that violates the Treaty of Waitangi, as well as the Human and Indigenous Rights to voice and expression.

TV ONE’s te reo Māori news programme Te Karere provides the greatest alternative to these mainstream news strategies, representing the principal space for airing Māori perspectives in New Zealand’s television news. It may represent an example of te reo Māori news broadcasting grounded in Māori worldviews. I find that Māori Television’s Te Kāea on the other hand may be undergoing a directional shift towards
a more mainstream commercially oriented broadcasting model. This is evinced in the way that some stories appear to be grounded in Māori worldviews while others appear to be controlled by Pākehā news values. This mixture of approaches however means that Te Kāea broadcasts the diversity of perspectives necessary for the functioning of a healthy democracy. Te Kāea also demonstrates how commercially oriented news values do not necessarily need to disadvantage Māori. Te Kāea perhaps presents a model of how mainstream news could be reimagined to accommodate diverse perspectives and Māori voices.

The objective of this project is to show how Whiteness is normalised as a dominant cultural common sense in New Zealand. I argue that to ensure the bicultural foundations of Aotearoa, all New Zealanders need to have an understanding of Māori perspectives, which necessitates an understanding of te ao Māori. I suggest that this can be achieved by making te reo Māori a compulsory subject in all schools up to Year 11, teaching our children critical awareness of diverse cultural perspectives, and creating a space on all news broadcasters for the accommodation of Māori voices. This research suggests that to some extent this may mean a loosening of commercial pressures on te reo Māori news.

Positionality
Stuart Hall notes that a writer’s background influences their ideas, as “[we] all write and speak from a particular place and time, from a history and a culture which is specific. What we say is always ‘in context’, positioned” (“Cultural identity” 68). It is thus useful to recognise a writer’s particular context. My background as a New Zealander with English, Scottish and Irish heritage positions my writing. I regard an investigation of Whiteness as an exploration of my own ontology as a Pākehā.

Aileen Moreton-Robinson argues that the approach of White researchers can be damaging to non-White peoples, which is something I seek to avoid. Moreton-Robinson contends that White epistemology “provides for a way of knowing and being that is predicated on superiority, which becomes normalised and forms part of one’s taken-for-granted knowledge” (76-77). She posits that this fundamental a priori sense of superiority endows the White subject position with the active capacity of the human ‘knower’, while reducing non-White individuals to the capacity of objects to
be ‘known’. Moreton-Robinson argues that this is evinced in the way that White researchers have tended to racialise the Other while “their way of knowing is never thought to be racialised” (75). The implication is that a White researcher can unintentionally perpetuate the damage of colonialist anthropology by attempting to ‘know’ everything about the ethnic experience of a non-White person before the researcher ‘knows’ everything about themselves. Moreton-Robinson posits that “[the] task today is to name and analyse whiteness in all texts to make it visible in order to disrupt its claims to normativity and universality” (87). Through this research I have come to understand more about myself as a Pākehā. This project hopes to spread that understanding by analysing, naming and disrupting Whiteness in New Zealand.

Focussing on Whiteness in this study of race and the media also avoids the danger of objectifying Māori people through research, however some research into te ao Māori has been necessary. Walker, Eketone and Gibbs feel that only Māori can conduct kaupapa Māori research involving Māori people and culture as only Māori have the ability to “bring a deeper and more comprehensive view because of their positions as insiders” (333). I respect the view that Māori knowledge is best held and shared by Māori people, but I do not believe this means that Pākehā should refrain from learning and understanding more of te ao Māori. In places where I have sought to understand more of te ao Māori I have found studying kaupapa Māori research methods to be extremely beneficial, as this study has helped increase my understanding of tikanga Māori and has helped me approach research with an awareness of what might be appropriate from different cultural perspectives. An approach that maintains an attitude of “generosity, cooperation, and reciprocity… linked to the concept of whanau” (Walker, Eketone and Gibbs 335) seems to be of paramount importance to kaupapa Māori research methods, and I have tried to incorporate this by keeping a broad idea of respect at the forefront of my processes. As such, where I have tried to understand aspects of te ao Māori in this paper, I have attempted to approach the project from a position of learning with and from Māori people, rather than learning ‘about’, and I am extremely grateful to everyone who has helped me with these ideas along the way.
Terms

In this exploration I will be making a series of linguistic choices that reflect the broader ethos or the kaupapa behind this project, which is to contribute to Aotearoa becoming the bicultural nation I believe it is legally meant to be. Linguistic choices are important as the words used have a great effect over the way a topic is structured.

To frame my discussion appropriately I will be using the terms ‘Aotearoa’ and ‘New Zealand’ interchangeably throughout the text. As Jo Smith and Sue Abel note, “‘Aotearoa’ refers to an iwi-based nation and ‘New Zealand’ is that which demarcates the settler nation and those who come after tangata whenua” (9). They note that the juxtaposition of these two signs alludes to the inherent tension and ongoing contrast existent in the settler nation (9). By using these two terms equally I intend to underscore this tension and contrast.

I am using the terms ‘Māori’ and ‘Pākehā’ to refer to the cultural, ethnic and racial conceptual constructions of different groups of people living in New Zealand. I am using ‘culture’ to refer to the ways of doing and thinking in relation to a group (e.g. Spoonley “Constructing Ourselves” 104), ‘ethnicity’ to refer to a person’s self-designated recognition of inherited histories and social and biological traits, and ‘race’ to refer to the systems of power that construct relations between ethnic groups and lead one’s race to be designated by others (e.g. Conley 207). This social constructivist analysis defines race as a biologically irrelevancy but as a necessarily identifiable social fact (e.g. Frankenberg “Local Whiteness” 1-35; Downing and Husband 12; Dolan 11). These categories can overlap and are not singular, for people can identify or be identified with more than one group in a way that impacts upon their existence. The meanings of these categories are also inherently fluid and subject to changing social relations and transforming sociohistorical constructions (e.g. Omi and Winant 71). Therefore I use the terms ‘Māori’ and ‘Pākehā’ to refer only to the conceptual constructions of these groups. I use terms such as ‘Pākehā values’ and ‘Māori perspectives’ in the same way, referring to the concepts rather than assuming they apply to all members of the group.

I will use the term ‘Māori’ to refer broadly to the conceptual construction of the indigenous people of New Zealand. Though I recognise the specificities of iwi within
this group, the nature of the theory in this project makes it useful for me to refer to the collectivity of the indigenous group. I thus use the term ‘Māori’ to refer to the broad commonalities between iwi without being prescriptive. I will use the term ‘Pākehā’ to refer loosely to the conceptual construction of naturalised New Zealanders of European descent. In reality this term is in flux, as until recently it was normatively used to refer to those whose descendants had emigrated from Britain several generations earlier, and who were creating a culture of White Aotearoa. With the increasing multiculturalism of the New Zealand population, as well as the increase of individuals with both Māori and European heritage, anyone of European descent may be ethnically said to be Pākehā, and those who subsume their cultural origins and embrace the dominant culture of White Aotearoa may be said to be culturally Pākehā. The self-designation of the term ‘Pākehā’ can also constitute a political statement in support of Māori tino rangatiratanga (Spoonley “Constructing Ourselves” 105), and some New Zealanders self-designate as Pākehā for this reason.

The fluidity of the term ‘Pākehā’ is demonstrated by its various normative uses. Paul Spoonley uses the term ‘Pākehā’ to refer to “New Zealanders of a European background, whose cultural values and behaviour have been primarily formed from the experience of being a member of the dominant group of New Zealand” (Racism and Ethnicity 63-64), while to Michael King ‘Pākehā’ simply “denotes non-Māori New Zealanders” (12). This shows how the term can slip between referring to White people and referring to all non-Māori people in Aotearoa. Avril Bell identifies the power in such a slippage, noting “Pakeha see their culture as the national culture” (148). This conflation allows Pākehā to be unaware of their cultural specificity as many Pākehā simply feel their culture is ‘normal’ to Aotearoa.

While some White New Zealanders choose to use the term ‘Pākehā’ to variably denote their race, ethnicity, nation or culture, some choose not to use it at all. Many White New Zealanders reject the term as they feel it has pejorative meanings and dislike being marked out ethnically (Bell 145). But Bell notes that “those who reject being called Pakeha are also rejecting a particular form of interdependent relationship to Maori” (145). Spoonley notes that “Pakeha self-identification is essentially a political position” (“Constructing Ourselves” 105) as it demonstrates a level of respect for the Māori tangata whenua of Aotearoa. He feels that the self-identification
of Pākehā denotes “an important fictive ethnicity, or imagined community, which stands in a particular relation to the tangata whenua” (ibid., 110). While recognising the various facets of Pākehā identity and identification, I will use the term to refer to those belonging to the dominant culture of Aotearoa, and to identify White New Zealand culture as a distinctive group, separate from the other specific White cultures around the world and the broader idea of White ‘Western’ culture.

I will use ‘mainstream’ to mean the concept of majority opinion reflected in and reinforced by dominant discourses. In New Zealand this mainstream parallels the concepts of Pākehā cultural identity and Pākehā beliefs, as Pākehā are the dominant majority population. ‘Mainstream news’ is therefore characterised by the English language broadcasts *Prime News*, *3 News* and *ONE News*, as these are highly popular and widely accessible channels that all appear to target this lucrative audience bracket. This is in contrast to te reo Māori broadcast *Te Karere* on TV ONE and *Te Kāea* on Māori Television. These Māori-oriented programmes can be thought of as alternative to the mainstream. I do not use term ‘alternative’ to connote inferiority. Similarly, I do not use the term ‘mainstream’ to imply that it is preferable to be part of the majority, or to imply that the opinions of a group can be homogenous. I use it to refer to the concept of the majority.

I draw on Roland Barthes’ *Mythologies* to view each media product as a ‘text’ that can be ‘read’ in different ways by an active media participant (e.g. Fürsich 240). I will use the term ‘reading’ to describe the experience of interacting with, consuming, experiencing, participating in, perusing, watching and listening to media products. I will use the terms ‘story,’ ‘item’ or ‘segment’ to refer to a singular news item within in a broadcast, and will use ‘broadcast,’ ‘programme’ or ‘bulletin’ to refer to the whole hour or half-hour long news programme on a particular channel on a particular day. I will use ‘news event’ to apply to the event occurring in the social world that is then made into news.

I will use ‘the Treaty of Waitangi’ to refer to the English language version of the text and ‘te Tiriti o Waitangi’ to refer to the version in te reo Māori. I will use the shortened versions ‘the Treaty’ and ‘te Tiriti’ normatively and interchangeably to refer to the overall meanings garnered by a comparison between the two texts.
I will be capitalising ‘White’ when using it to apply to a racial group because I do not use it as an adjective, for no one is actually white like paper or toothpaste. When I use ‘White’ I generally refer to people who appear to be of European descent. I will be using the term non-White to group together every race that is not the White race. Some scholars have a problem with this term as it foregrounds Whiteness. Richard Dyer notes that it is “problematic because of its negativity, as if people who are not white only have identity by virtue of what they are not” (11). I argue that as I am grouping widely disparate associations of people through the only unifying factor, which is that they are not White, there is no other term I can use. In this sense I use it in the same way as Māori and non-Māori, without attaching any designation of inferiority or superiority to the terms.

As a White person I must navigate a ‘they’/‘we’ dilemma of writing about White people. When I say ‘we’, I can be referring to ‘you and I’, or I can be referring to ‘myself and others’. In terms of Whiteness the use of ‘we’ can be interpreted as a form of racial in-grouping and out-grouping. Dyer, for example, notes that his behaviour “is part of the cultural non-consciousness that we all inhabit” (7). Here the ‘we all’ is addressing everyone, though it is only White people that he says are unaware of their own race. This shows that he uses ‘we’ here to mean ‘you and I’ and speaks only to White people as though they are everyone. To avoid this problem I will be using ‘they’ to refer to White people, though I am still included in this group and do not intend to negate my own Whiteness.

Methodology

Overview

I investigate the transmission of Pākehā ideological dominance through the media in New Zealand by critically analysing the textual product of television news. Textual analysis is criticised, however, for focussing too closely on the media text without taking into account factors of production or reception. Greg Philo posits that all three of these stages of media production should be investigated in order to critically analyse a text. Elfriede Fürsich responds however by drawing attention to a range of limitations in Philo’s suggested approach. Fürsich argues that over-determining
production processes can “establish a one-sided causality between production and text” (242), and imply that economic and political factors fully determine the final outcome of the text while disregarding the creative range available within these parameters. On the other hand, over-determining audience responses can give inauthentic results as audiences are rarely studied ethnographically in the instant of their exposure to a text, but are often gathered into focus groups around a text some time after it has been produced. Fürsich argues other limitations are that audience-response analyses can detract from the focus on the text itself as the media product is reduced to a prompt for audience reactions, and audience responses can also be selectively chosen to highlight a researcher’s argument (243). Fürsich supports textual analysis by arguing that it is a necessary method for examining the narrative and communicative role of the media using insights that lie beyond producers’ and audiences’ direct engagements with the text (245). He notes that deeper understandings of a society’s narratives can be gained through perceiving media texts as complex cultural artefacts incorporated within the social practices of discursive relations (247).

Taking these various limitations and strengths into account, Fürsich proposes incorporating a combination of these approaches through the device of textual analysis. He argues that “[a] combination of meticulous reading and contextualized interpretation of text will be able to explain the specific ideological moment” (248), and proposes using the text to analyse conditions of production and the way the audience is positioned. I have therefore framed this research to cover the moments of production, text and reception. I am not interviewing newsmakers or audience members in this research, and am following Fürsich in prioritising the textual moment while incorporating understandings of production and reception. As the task of this analysis is to examine the extent to which texts relay Pākehā ideological dominance I feel this focus is appropriate, however there are clear pathways for further research.

In New Zealand the history of colonialism and the contemporary context of media production are both vitally important factors shaping texts. I begin by discussing the Treaty of Waitangi and the historical, legal and cultural context that has led to a White-dominated New Zealand today. I also look at the concept of voice and Māori
rights to representation. This provides an understanding of the historical context of the production of racial discourses in New Zealand.

In the following section I examine the ideas of Critical Whiteness Studies and apply them to New Zealand, examining the way in which Pākehā perspectives damage non-Pākehā people and reinforce Pākehā dominance. This requires an understanding of key concepts such as power, hegemony, ideology and discourse. I formulate an idea of the cultural ideologies underpinning Pākehā domination and examine these concepts further. This provides an understanding of potential audience responses to media products and to Pākehā discourses.

After gaining this understanding I turn to examine how these concepts apply to media production, investigating the way in which television news is shaped in Aotearoa by political-economic demands and ingrained news practices and assumptions. This enables an analysis of how Pākehā ideologies may be identified in their transmission through the media. In a close analysis of the coverage of Waitangi Day and surrounding events on television I apply the ideas of Critical Discourse Analysis, Whiteness studies, Pākehā ideological discourses and newsmaking techniques to determine where and how Pākehā dominance is transmitted and challenged in the media.

I conclude with the implications of dominant Whiteness in television news, and possibilities for alternative approaches. This research both adds to and extends existing Critical Whiteness Studies research as it applies these theories to a specifically New Zealand context through the medium of television news.

**Close Analysis: Critical Discourse Theory**

In order to conduct a close analysis of news texts I found it necessary to examine the tools of Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) to ensure a thoroughness of discursive investigation. In the same way that Pākehā assumptions about cultural normativity need to be exposed in order to draw attention to the way they may limit Pākehā perceptions of social reality, so too should the assumptions underlying research methodology be interrogated, in order to draw attention to the way methodology may limit research. CDA operates from the principle that language is a social practice
shaping perceptions of reality through such mechanisms as discourse, linguistic choices, inferences, dialogue, inflection and emphasis, as well as through visual language and what is not said. Deconstructing the language of a media text therefore allows one to discern the ways that Pākehā ideological power and dominance may be transmitted through language and discourse. Textual analysis, which I will use to analyse television news coverage of Waitangi Day and surrounding events, is therefore a form of CDA.

One of the benefits of textual analysis is the ability to investigate meanings in the text that go beyond the producers’ and readers’ intentions. Like Fürsich I am interested in these moments “when the text takes on a life of its own (often in ambiguities, unresolved dichotomies or contradictions)” (245). Fürsich argues that it is in these moments that the critic finds crucial insights. I am also interested in these internal contradictions within a text due to the challenges they present to the discursive hegemony of mainstream news, as noted by Stuart Allan (106). In order to analyse the flexibility of discourses it is necessary to approach the text with an openness to the possibility of surprises, contradictions, slips and fissures within the text, rather than with a predetermined agenda.

Textual analysis can be implemented using the tools of CDA. A prominent model in the field is Norman Fairclough’s structure of three embedded layers. Fairclough envisages this theoretical framework as having the text at the core, surrounded by discursive practice, and encased in social practice. The text is scrutinised through linguistic analysis. Discursive practice mediates between the text and the social world, and looks at the processes involved in a text’s production and interpretation. At the level of social practice, the discourses evident in the first two layers are related to prevailing ideologies. This model allows analysis to move both ‘outward’ and ‘inward’ through these layers, investigating the text’s relationship to society and society’s relationship to the text through discursive practice.

The relationship between the text and society can be examined through the different levels of meaning in a text. Stuart Hall (Encoding and Decoding) differentiates between the level of the meanings that are ‘encoded’ into a text and the ‘decoded’ level of meanings that readers derive based on their cultural background. Fairclough
offers nine ways to analyse the meaning embedded in language. These include the following properties for examining a text and the way it constructs social relations and the ‘self’:

- **Interactional control**: turn-taking, who controls the structure of the exchange and therefore holds social power.
- **Modality**: performing varying degrees of commitment to a proposition using subjective modality ‘I think’, ‘probably’, ‘isn’t it’, ‘it may be,’ or authoritative objective modality, ‘It is.’
- **Politeness**: tempering potentially threatening statements, shows a form of social mastery.
- **Ethos**: constructing social identity in conversation, e.g. borrowing academic vocabulary to seem informed, or the body language of youth subcultures to appear more casual.

Fairclough uses these additional properties to analyse the way a text constructs social realities:

- **Connectives and argumentation**: the words used to connect two clauses show the relationship between them and build an argument. In ‘the children were well-fed but sad,’ the use of the word ‘but’ rather than ‘and’ shows that the phrase rests on the assumption that well-fed children should be happy.
- **Transitivity and theme**: words used to show who has agency, or to obscure agency. Also the way information is ordered to convey what is most important in a clause.
- **Word meaning** relates to the unstable potentials for meaning that words have, such as ‘activist’.
- **Wording** relates to the wording used around a topic to create meaning, for example, the selective use of wording in the Foreshore and Seabed scandal, debacle, issue or debate.
- **Metaphor** relates to the way the habitually normalised use of metaphor can create extremely strong links between otherwise separate ideas, for example, the banking concept of education where one deposits knowledge in order to withdraw it later.
Though these components offer ways of analysing a text, Fairclough stresses that every stage of analysis will still involve the subjective interpretation of the researcher (152-199).

While Fairclough concentrates on linguistic features of discourse, James Paul Gee offers five different groups for organising a text. He proposes investigating the way things are said (prosody), the way sentences are connected (cohesion), the way topics are organised to build an argument (discourse organisation), the way speakers negotiate the social situation (contextualisation signals), and the way themes are identified and developed (thematic organisation) (94).

Hilary Janks takes these different approaches and creates a rubric for textual analysis (100-101), which asks questions of a text, adding:

- **Transitivity**: The processes in verbs- are they verbs of material, relational, mental, verbal, behavioural or existential processes?
- **Voice**: Who is the *doer* and who is the *done-to*? A passive voice can delete the agent.
- **Speech**: Who is quoted first/last/most? Who is not quoted or quoted out of context?
- **Turn-taking**: Who is silent, interrupts, is heard? Who controls the topic? Which culture’s rules of turn-taking are followed?
- **Pronouns**: Who is included or excluded? Is the first, second or third person used?
- **Theme**: The first part of the clause can show important or shared information.
- **Rheme**: The second part can give new information. What patterns arise?
- **Conjunctions**: Set up the cause and effect between clauses, e.g. ‘and’, ‘because’, ‘although’, ‘while’. What is suggested?

Drawing on these ideas of linguistic analysis, it appears as though an investigation of visual language and the language of news texts should take into account the way editing decisions contribute to the discourse of a text. For example, images can create a convergence of meanings when a statement is combined with a particular shot. The use of diegetic sound and background noise can make a scene feel busy or peaceful.
The use and length of sound bites and voiceovers gives voice to certain people, but the organisation of these can then detract from this voice e.g. by following a politician’s argument with a citizen’s rejection of it. The size of the shot used to frame a person can influence how the viewer feels about them, as a close-up can create a sense of emotional immediacy and connection while a long-shot can create distance. The rhythm and pacing of cuts between shots can create a sense of urgency. The locations used and the colours in a shot can contribute to the symbolism contained within the frame (the mise-en-scène). Visual and aural markers of gender and ethnicity may impact upon audience interpretations of soundbites. These components may all influence the decoding of the news text.

I apply all the above facets of CDA in my close analysis to gain an understanding of who has voice in the television news coverage of Waitangi Day. CDA highlights the tensions between the different layers of textual negotiation, as it demonstrates the way that the author, the medium, the reader, the discourses, the silent and the social context all struggle with power. What CDA thus brings to the fore is that the text is a site for the transmission of power. The analytical tools of CDA enable the researcher to identify textual features and determine how they transmit power through the text in its interplay with the social world. This highlights the usefulness of CDA as a mechanism for social change.

Selection

I have chosen to look at the only television bulletins to frequently report on New Zealand news. *Prime News*, *ONE News* and *3 News* are broadcast in the English language. *Te Karere* is broadcast in te reo Māori with live English subtitles, while the 5:30pm bulletin of *Te Kāea* is broadcast in te reo Māori, and is repeated at 7:30pm and 11:30pm with English subtitles. As I do not speak te reo Māori I follow the subtitles of the 7:30pm broadcast. The media research group Kupu Taea faced a similar obstacle in their 2007 research, and note that “Ideally news items in te reo Māori would be analysed by a fluent speaker who would appreciate the allusions and nuances in what was said” (17). By only working with the English subtitles, I am conscious of missing out on a lot of the finer detail and of only receiving a condensed version of what is being said, as the subtitles must be shortened to fit into two lines of text readable in a few seconds. This makes my analysis of the English translations
vastly less useful than if I understood te reo Māori, however it is a necessary limitation reflecting my resources.

**Why Television?**

Mass communications media have an unprecedented ability to transmit ideologies and construct public perceptions of social reality in Aotearoa. Kupu Taea note that “[for] many people, media news provides their major source of information about political issues, processes and personalities in the Māori and non-Māori worlds” (7). They point out that many New Zealanders learn more about Māori/Pākehā relations from the media than from direct experience, so “[what] the news media say about Māori/Pākehā relations and the Treaty, therefore, influences the possibilities for Treaty-based social change” (7). Amanda Gregory et al. note that audiences are “active in accepting, critiquing and making meaning from media texts” (53), rather than passive recipients of dominant media messages. However, they point out that “having a critical understanding of media portrayals… does not automatically equate to being immunized against the dominant discourses in media content” (53) as people can hold contradictory understandings simultaneously. Therefore media messages have a strong influence upon public understandings of the social world, particularly where there is little diversity in the ideological messages transmitted across different media sources.

My limited timeframe meant I could only analyse one medium in depth, and I have chosen to focus on television news rather than online, print or radio news, in part because of its popularity and reach. Though the media environment is constantly changing, television remains stable as a widely used mass communications medium. The proliferation of different media platforms has meant that broadcasters, advertisers and readers have diversified, using multi-media approaches that still incorporate traditional mass media. Data from advertising research giant Nielson’s “TV Trends 2011” report shows that 99% of New Zealand households have a television set and over half have more than two, with the average New Zealander spending 23 hours and 34 minutes a week watching television (“The key facts”), an amount that is increasing annually. The limited number of broadly available and highly popular channels in Aotearoa means that a uniformity of transmitted messages can have a powerful impact on New Zealand society, making television a powerfully influential medium
of information in New Zealand. However online news and cross-media analyses are necessary avenues for further research in the area of Critical Whiteness Studies in New Zealand.

My main reason for choosing television news is that it provides a clear contrast between mainstream and te reo Māori media. Timothy McCreanor et al. note that there is an absence of daily te reo Māori national newspapers (244), unlike television. Through comparing te reo Māori and mainstream television, McCreanor et al. propose that te reo Māori television approaches news from a different set of values, including “connection/relationships, time/space/history/context and self-determination/rights—and thereby produces more detailed and nuanced stories grounded in Māori community and experiential contexts” (244). This is also a theme offered by Abel (Shaping the News) and Kupu Taea in their analyses of mainstream and te reo Māori television news coverage of Waitangi Day and surrounding events. The ability to compare this research with these previous studies also enhances the value of focussing on television news.

I look at television news coverage of Waitangi Day and its surrounding events in 2012 because Waitangi Day is a national holiday that commemorates the signing of the Treaty of Waitangi in 1840, a document that symbolises a partnership between Pākehā and Māori, and celebrates its ideals. In 2012 it fell on a Monday, creating a long weekend of events. As some of the Crown’s commitments enshrined in te Tiriti remain unmet, the events at Waitangi tend to be a focal point of protest for those that believe the Government still has a lot of work to do to honour Māori rights. As it brings such issues to the forefront of media attention it is an ideal case study for the examination of how different broadcasts treat stories that involve Māori.

Process
I recorded the entire broadcast of ONE News, 3 News, Prime News, Te Karere and Te Kāea from Friday 3rd of February to Monday 6th of February, which is Waitangi Day. I briefly noted a description of each of the stories that referred to Waitangi Day and surrounding events, and then transcribed in detail the stories from Sunday 5th and Monday 6th of February. I noted a description of each shot on screen and aligned it with the words that were being spoken at the time. I also took note of captions,
descriptors, background noise and other things that added to the overall effect of the story. At the end of each story I collated interviewees and vox pops by gender and ethnicity based on what these appeared or were found to be, operating from the perspective that viewers’ perceptions of these factors may influence their interpretation of words and images. I also recorded my immediate response to and critical interpretation of the stories. I returned to the recorded and transcribed bulletins repeatedly, developing my sense of the inferences and implication of the words and images used in the bulletins, and my impression of the impact these choices might have on viewers.

Hypotheses

Upon embarking on this analysis I predicted that White perspectives would largely dominate mainstream news media, speaking from and to Pākehā common sense worldviews. I predicted this would be made particularly evident through a comparison with te reo Māori news, which I predicted would speak from and to Māori common sense worldviews.
2.

The Treaty of Waitangi and Tino Rangatiratanga

Context: How Pākehā gained power in New Zealand

New Zealand’s history of colonial oppression has led to the privileged position of Pākehā in Aotearoa society today, and the correspondingly disadvantaged position of Māori. Examining the context of colonisation is crucial to understanding Whiteness in New Zealand as this history demonstrates the way Pākehā systems of power have been established and shows the trauma and damage enacted upon Māori in the process. As these systems of power are still in place, the same dominance and trauma continue to manifest themselves today.

New Zealand’s mainstream television news media are examples of Pākehā-dominated institutions that operate to the disadvantage of Māori. The physical processes of power and dominance enacted throughout New Zealand’s history combine with the symbolic and discursive maintenance of Pākehā power in the present to enable Pākehā-oriented media to deny Māori the basic rights ascribed to them in te Tiriti, and further perpetuate the continuing oppression that inhibits Māori potential. Māori-oriented programmes such as TV ONE’s Te Karere and programmes broadcast by the Māori Television Service stand in contrast to this trend. However, by maintaining dominance in almost all other media arenas in New Zealand, Pākehā society limits the ability for Māori to air their voices and to see their presence in this country acknowledged. This may contribute to the tendency for some members of the viewing audience to misunderstand Māori culture and perspectives. Prevailing media institutions therefore appear to extend the colonial trend of denying Māori their entitled resources, which may politically marginalise Māori causes, contradicting the bicultural basis and the principle of partnership on which the New Zealand nation was founded.

These bases were created with the establishment of the Treaty of Waitangi, a document signed between Māori rangatira and the British Crown that established the foundations upon which the New Zealand nation would be built. As the version written in te reo Māori, te Tiriti o Waitangi, guarantees Māori control of their affairs,
properties and taonga, it has been fundamental in the battle to secure Māori rights, and is central to the colonial history of Aotearoa.

**Voice**

The Māori rights that are of the highest importance to this paper are the rights to representation, voice and expression. The right to voice has been intertwined over decades with the battle for the protection of te reo Māori and has led to the development of the Māori Television Service.

In 1986 an alarming decline in language fluency rates led the Waitangi Tribunal to declare te reo Māori to be taonga, entitled to active legal protection under Article II of te Tiriti o Waitangi, which guarantees Māori possession and control of their valuable items. This eventually led to the development of the Māori Television Service as a form of actively supporting the existence and growth of te reo Māori. Six years later Te Kahui o Māhutonga conducted a review of the Māori Television Services Act 2003, and found that “the sole interpretation of te reo as ‘language’ is incomplete and misleading” (3). They declared instead that te reo Māori can be translated as the Māori voice, and that “[the] voice of a people (and that of the individual) implies far more than the fact of their uttered or written or body language. It refers to their need to express themselves and their world-view according to their ability” (12). In this way Māori voice is fundamentally intertwined with Māori language. It is this need for expression that ties Māori rights inexorably to media access. The active obligation on the Government to protect te reo Māori means that the prevalence of Pākehā voices in the mainstream media could be seen to signify a failure on the part of the Crown to actively ensure the survival and flourishing of Māori voices.

Voice is a useful way of conceptualising the dominance and absence of different cultural perspectives, particularly in the context of the media. This conception of voice can be thought of as encompassing the following ideas:

- Who gets to speak (for whom), what is said: *Expression*
- Who and what is heard: *Reception*
- Who and what is understood: *Comprehension*
- Who is addressed: *Interpellation*
This final component that addresses the correlative of voice: silence, is important as it has two facets: whom the power of voice is withheld from, and who finds a form of power by withholding their own voice. White dominance means that White culture controls all five of these areas of voice in mainstream media, as it is largely White voices which are expressed, received, understood and White audiences that are addressed in mainstream television, rendering non-White voices silent. However there is also a subversive power to be found in choosing to stay silent, when individuals and groups abstain from entering into discourses that oppress them.

I believe Māori have a right to all components of voice in the language of their choosing. I believe that in New Zealand this entails the necessity of a space for Māori voices in mainstream media to combat White dominance and its negative consequences for Māori. As Ranginui Walker notes, “Pakeha perceptions of Māori will not change unless there is a radical change in the culture of the mainstream media” (“Māori News” 231). The presence of more Māori voices in mainstream media would also help to inform the populace and secure the widespread diversity of opinion that is necessary for a healthy democracy.

The need for people to be able to broadly express alternative perspectives is of paramount importance, and is recognised in Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights:

Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression… and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers.

It is also recognised in the United Nations Declaration of the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP). Article 8 prohibits the forced assimilation of indigenous cultures, and charges states to prevent and provide redress for anything that deprives an indigenous group of “their integrity as distinct peoples, or of their cultural values or ethnic identities” (2(a)) and anything that contributes to “racial or ethnic discrimination directed against them” (2(e)). Article 13 recognises the mechanisms of

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1 I’d like to thank Charlie Tepana for his insight into this idea in personal communication. 21 Aug. 2012, e-mail.
maintaining a distinctive identity, such as “histories, languages, [and] oral traditions” (1), highlights the importance of being understood, and promotes understanding contexts of reception for indigenous voices. Article 15 connects the act of informing a nation about distinctive indigenous identities to the prevention of discrimination, and Article 16 particularly highlights the importance of the media in affecting indigenous rights, promoting a context where indigenous voices are present in mainstream media:

1. Indigenous peoples have the right to establish their own media in their own languages and to have access to all forms of non-indigenous media without discrimination.
2. States shall take effective measures to ensure that State-owned media duly reflect indigenous cultural diversity. States, without prejudice to ensuring full freedom of expression, should encourage privately owned media to adequately reflect indigenous cultural diversity.

Both these documents are aspirational and have been publicly supported by the New Zealand Government (“New Zealand and the United Nations”). These articles therefore indicate the direction we should be heading in and the aims we should aspire to meet (“National Govt”). This includes promoting the expression of Māori voices in mainstream media, to be understood by all New Zealanders, in order to counter any racism arising from dominant misunderstandings of Māori worldviews.

I will take this opportunity to note that I do not and could not have an opinion on what Māori voices might sound like if this aspiration were to be achieved. I do not have an opinion on what diverse Māori voices might contain or express, or how these voices might be organised to give them air, nor do I believe it is my place to imagine the options here. Rather I posit the need and obligation for the space to be made available for Māori voices on, but not limited to, mainstream television news in New Zealand. I stress that having Māori worldviews contained within commercial Pākehā-oriented formats is ineffective as it limits the forms of expression that different voices can take. It is again not my place to work out how such formats might be reimagined to accommodate Māori perspectives. I merely believe such spaces should be available, and that all New Zealanders should be taught te reo Māori in schools in order to gain some understandings of the worldviews that such perspectives might be coming from. This scenario, I believe, would begin to fulfil the Māori right to all five facets of voice.
and would diversify mainstream media perspectives, providing different discourses that could destabilise the power of Pākehā hegemony, as will be discussed later.

Before the Treaty: Historical Independence

Television in New Zealand exists within the history of colonialism that began prior to the signing of the Treaty of Waitangi. In the 1830s New Zealand was recognised by the British Crown as an independent state capable of partaking in a treaty, giving te Tiriti validity in international law. This was due to a group of around 35 northern rangatira named Te Whakaminenga who, in 1835, signed He Whakaputanga, the Declaration of the Independence of New Zealand as the United Tribes of New Zealand (The Kaipara Report 12.2.1). The Declaration was seen as a statement of sovereignty and was recognised by the Crown. The Waitangi Tribunal’s Kaipara Report notes that in the Māori version of the Declaration, “independence was translated as ‘Rangatiratanga’” (ibid.), an understanding that translators would later omit from te Tiriti o Waitangi.

In 1839 Colonial Secretary Lord Normanby sent instructions to Captain William Hobson to embark on the creation of the Treaty of Waitangi. These instructions frame the Treaty as principally a way of protecting Māori from the unruly settlers, and position the acquisition of New Zealand wealth as a necessary bonus for the British. Normanby affirmed the sovereignty embedded in He Whakaputanga by describing Māori as a people “whose title to the soil and to the Sovereignty of New Zealand is indisputable, and has been solemnly recognised by the British Government” (Orakei Report 11.9.2(4)). Normanby qualified his statement, however, by continuing, “so far at least as it is possible to make that acknowledgement in favour of a people composed of numerous, dispersed, and petty Tribes, who possess few political relations to each other, and are incompetent to act, or even deliberate, in concert” (ibid., 11.9.2(6)). In the eyes of international law, these qualifications effectively discounted Aotearoa as a legal State prior to British government and thus invalidated the Treaty in international law.

International law dictates that a party to a treaty of cession can only be recognised if they are an “international legal personality” (Joseph 54). The status of pre-Treaty New Zealand as an international legal personality is contentious. Philip A. Joseph
notes the orthodox legal view that Māori did not meet the requirements of statehood under customary international law, which stipulates that states must be stable and defined populations ruled by a single government body (ibid.). The orthodox view thus implies that New Zealand was not acquired by the British through treaty, but through occupation and “the assertion of sovereignty by certain acts of state” (ibid., 55). This view of statehood was conveniently suited to the perspective of the Western colonising nations, and would lead to difficulties later in enabling te Tiriti o Waitangi to gain legal respect as an officially recognised international treaty between two nations.

The Treaty of Waitangi- Tino Rangatiratanga and Kāwanatanga

In February 1840 a group of northern rangatira met with Hobson and other British subjects to discuss the Treaty of Waitangi, written in English, and te Tiriti o Waitangi, written in te reo Māori by the Reverend Henry Williams (Orakei Report 10). After debate and reassurances, the Treaty was signed by Crown representatives and te Tiriti was signed by rangatira on the 6th February, now known as Waitangi Day. In the following months, over 500 rangatira around the rest of the country signed te Tiriti, while less than 40 signed the English Treaty (Mutu 19). The purpose of the English Treaty was for Māori to cede sovereignty to the Queen, in exchange for a guarantee that Māori would retain possession of their properties, but that the Crown would gain the exclusive right of pre-emption to these properties if the rangatira were to sell them. The version in te reo Māori did not translate this purpose.

Te Tiriti o Waitangi grants the Queen kāwanatanga in order to control her subjects (Mutu 24), in exchange for a guarantee that Māori will have tino rangatiratanga over their lands, villages and taonga, giving the Queen the right to hokonga parts of land if the owners consent to it (Mutu 25). The English text did not translate the complexity of taonga, involving tangible and intangible treasures, and used ‘hokonga’ for buying and selling though at the time Māori had no concept of the permanent alienation of land (Mutu 29-30). As well as this, the English text used ‘tino rangatiratanga’ and ‘kāwanatanga’ in a way that made the document more appealing to Māori. The English and te reo Māori texts do not replicate each other, a factor which has caused debilitating grievances ever since.
If the English and te reo Māori versions aligned, the tino rangatiratanga that Māori were guaranteed would translate to something approximating ‘full possession,’ ‘control’ or ‘governance of one’s things’. However tino rangatiratanga is much stronger than that. Professor Margaret Mutu notes that tino rangatiratanga is often translated as ‘chieftainship’, based on the assumption “that deriving rangatiratanga from rangatira in Māori produces the same result as deriving chieftainship from chief in English. The assumption is wrong” (29). While chieftainship could approximate governance or control of Māori things, Mutu uses the translation of “paramount authority” (29) to communicate the meaning of tino rangatiratanga. This is close to a notion of Māori sovereignty, but as Mutu describes tino rangatiratanga as “the exercise of paramount and spiritually sanctioned power and authority” (26) this appears to be broader than the English notion of sovereignty. This means that the rangatira who signed te Tiriti believed they were guaranteed paramount authority over their affairs and their things. The Māori aspiration of tino rangatiratanga remains at the forefront of political activism today as the Government has not yet fulfilled this Treaty promise. The differences in opinion over the term’s translation and the sheer breadth of its meaning have led to a range of opinions about how this promise could become fulfilled in contemporary Aotearoa.

The term ‘kāwanatanga’ has been another source of misunderstandings. If the English and te reo Māori versions aligned, then the kāwanatanga that Māori ceded would translate to something close to sovereignty. Kāwanatanga is a word created by missionaries to explain governance in the Bible, “borrowing from the English word ‘governor’ to form the word ‘kāwana’ and then appending to that the derived noun suffix ‘tanga’” (Mutu 22). Mutu argues that the rangatira would have filled this meaning with what they perceived the Queen to want. The Waitangi Tribunal’s Orakei Report notes that kāwanatanga “likely meant to the Maori, the right to make laws for peace and good order and to protect the mana Maori” (11.5.22). This aim is reiterated in the Preamble to the Treaty. It can thus be surmised that the rangatira believed they were ceding far less than absolute sovereignty. This suggests that rather than ceding sovereignty to the Queen in exchange for the guarantee of some form of self-governance, Māori believed they were ceding to the Queen the power to govern her people, in exchange for the guarantee that Māori would have paramount authority over themselves and their things, which constituted almost all of Aotearoa.
These factors combine to show that Māori were signing a very different document to the British. The rangatira were not giving the Queen full authority over Māori. The Orakei Report posits that the concepts of mana and rangatiratanga are inextricably intertwined, so the author of te Tiriti, the Reverend Henry Williams, “was careful to avoid using 'mana' for 'sovereignty' in the Treaty, for due to its spiritual and highly personal connotations, no person of mana could cede it” (Orakei Report 10). This indicates that the English writers and explainers of te Tiriti deliberately utilised the ambiguity in translation of certain words in order to obscure the request for the rangatira to give away authority and land rights. As was noted earlier, ‘rangatiratanga’ was used in the United Tribes’ Declaration to mean ‘independence’. It was deliberately not used in this way in te Tiriti.

The relationship of Māori tino rangatiratanga to the Crown’s kāwanatanga is fundamental to understandings of te Tiriti o Waitangi. The Waitangi Tribunal’s Māori Electoral Option Report states that some believe tino rangatiratanga “was a guarantee of Māori sovereignty; others a right to self-determination; others again a right of self-management” (2.1). They note the adaptability of the term raises difficulties but that it is not unfettered, and must be reconciled with kāwanatanga (2.1). Jacinta Ruru notes that in balancing these two ideas, “the [Waitangi] Tribunal says kāwanatanga is subject to rangatiratanga, whereas the Court of Appeal assumes rangatiratanga is subject to kāwanatanga” (137). However the Waitangi Tribunal’s Muriwhenua Fishing Claim Report suggests that while the concept of a national authority was new to Māori, the Treaty does not describe a relationship between two sovereigns, and declare that the Queen’s promise of protection meant that “the Queen’s authority had to be supreme” (10.3.3(h)). Using the evidence of contemporary testimonies, the Orakei Report states that “Maori accepted the Crown's higher authority and saw themselves as subjects be it with the substantial rights reserved to them under the Treaty” (11.5.22). From this contemporary perspective, therefore, the rangatira who signed te Tiriti allowed the Queen to take sovereign authority on the premise that she would protect their right to tribal self-management.

On the other hand, the Orakei Report suggests that Māori did not understand sovereign power in this way. It notes that “the continued use of’rangatiratanga' to
describe the authority of the Maori in respect of their lands and other interests may perpetuate a Victorian view that Maori society was hierarchical” (11.5.7). The Report states that colonial perceptions grafted “feudal notions of inheritance that restrict land rights to a privileged minority” onto the notion of Māori chieftainship (11.5.8). It cites a discussion between members of the Waitangi Tribunal and Te Rangihau of Tūhoe, who “took the view that there was no such thing as a chief in Maori terms, insofar as the concept of "chief" was an English concept, suggesting the rangatira above and the people below” (11.5.14). Rather, he felt the property of commonality was what distinguished a rangatira, or that “taking the role of rangatira was dependent upon confirmation of such by the people - in his words, "rangatira was people bestowed"” (Orakei Report 11.5.15). The Report notes that Western culture imagines authority “as imposed from 'the top' as from God, Kings and Princes. But there is evidence that in Maori society, authority belongs to the people” (11.5.9). The communal view of authority positions rangatira as leaders rather than rulers. This shows how White perspectives shaped Treaty history, and means that the notion of giving overarching rule to the Queen may have been completely alien to Māori.

Despite the continued differences and translation difficulties between the two texts, the signatures of the rangatira gave the Crown the justification it sought in order to establish a settler government in New Zealand, and begin the process of transferring Māori land to the Crown. Judge Caren Fox notes that while it began with the Treaty, “British control was only legitimised through conquest, seizure or legislation. It required, in other words, a lengthy and protracted process of land reform prior to and following war and conquest to be effective” (49). When Māori began appealing to te Tiriti over the injustices that followed, the Courts used the argument that te Tiriti was not internationally recognisable in order to disregard the rights of Māori, for if Aotearoa in 1840 was not a state, the Treaty could not be seen as a binding agreement between two parties, but more of a unilateral assertion of sovereignty by the British. In Wi Parata v Bishop of Wellington in 1877, Chief Justice Prendergast declared pre-Treaty New Zealand to have been “inhabited only by savages” (78) rather than a governed state, infamously declaring the Treaty a “simple nullity” (78). This effectively silenced Māori voices in the political spectrum and disregarded the rights that Māori had acquired through the Treaty. Te Puni Kōkiri note that the New Zealand Courts have yet to address “the issue of the status of the Treaty at international law,
except to note that it is an important question which has yet to be explicitly addressed in any case” (18). The fundamental issue remains as to whether the Māori rangatira signing te Tiriti were aware they were ceding an English concept of hierarchic sovereignty, and whether the more communal concept of authority suggested by Te Rangi-hau of Tūhoe could provide the basis for an argument of collective statehood that would further justify te Tiriti in international law. However despite the question mark hanging over its international standing, various advancements have increased the recognition of the Treaty in New Zealand law since Prendergast’s declaration.

**Legal Development**

The establishment of the Treaty in New Zealand legislation is important for Māori voice and representation because aside from the aspirational commitments to basic human and indigenous rights, te Tiriti o Waitangi is the only mechanism that obliges the Government to recognise and ensure Māori rights. The more te Tiriti is recognised in legislation, the stronger Māori rights to expression become.

One of the big issues with the Treaty in New Zealand law is that, unlike other countries, the Courts in New Zealand do not have the power to challenge Parliamentary legislation, they may only interpret and apply it. This also means that New Zealand Courts can only apply and appeal to the Treaty if Parliament has written it in to legislation (Joseph 66). Tama W Potaka notes that this practice was non-existent before 1960 (83), meaning that the rights guaranteed to Māori in each version of the Treaty were ignored and rejected for almost a century, within which Māori land, people and culture suffered inestimable damage.

In the decades following Prendergast’s nullification, Māori rights became subsumed beneath waves of colonisation. The increasing numbers of new settlers demanded cultural assimilation and land from Māori. The Crown took its right to pre-emption, or the first offer of sale, further and further through the enactment of various Native Land Acts, including “special legislation to establish a Native Land Court and to translate Māori customary land tenure into titles cognisable in British Law” (*The Kaipara Report* 351). Māori had little to no choice in these acts as they were underrepresented in Parliament and were ineligible to vote, rendering them politically voiceless. Systems that stemmed from the Crown’s purchasing policies and the Native
Land Court led to the division and sale of iwi lands. Fox notes that when iwi retaliated or fought back against these actions, such as through the development of the Kīngitanga movement, “[t]he use of land confiscation legislation… would ensure that all those who supported the Kīngitanga understood the price of resistance to the Crown” (48). Leading into the Land Wars Māori population numbers matched those of Europeans, however the turn of the century saw a flood of European migration while “Maori had been almost decimated by sickness and disease that had been quite outside previous experience” (Te Reo Maori Report 3.4.1). Crown decisions to extend the colony and provide land to migrants led to the devastating loss of extensive areas of Māori land at minimal prices or through punitive appropriation.

The colonial process served to privilege Pākehā and marginalise Māori. Robert Consedine and Joanne Consedine note that these legal actions delegitimised iwi land and kinship systems and “naturally undermined the Maori communal lifestyle and destabilized tribal structures” (204). These blows to traditional Māori life were coupled with the increasing power of the British ruling system, entirely funded by the profits from iwi resources. Māori were expected to renounce their culture and values and adopt Pākehā ways of life. Early twentieth-century assimilationist policies aimed to eradicate Māori spiritual customs, while New Zealand schools adopted a widespread practice of physically punishing Māori children for speaking te reo Māori (Te Reo Maori Report 3.2.8). Ranginui Walker describes this as “[one] of the techniques of cultural invasion practiced by the coloniser” (Ka Whawhai 193), as it highlighted “the role of an education system in cultural reproduction and its power to implement the official policy of assimilation” (ibid.). The Waitangi Tribunal’s Te Reo Maori Claim Report states that “the Maori culture is a part of the heritage of New Zealand and that the Maori language is at the heart of that culture” (1). This means that the erosion of te reo Māori in this period signified an extreme blow to Māori cultural identity, the long-standing repercussions of which are still evident today.

The systematic erosion of traditional Māori life was enhanced by the political disadvantages faced by Māori. Consedine and Consedine point out that Māori were systematically excluded from decision-making, and “were denied ordinary citizenship rights that Pakeha took for granted” (206). An example of this is the way Māori retirees and widows were denied full pensions, receiving 20% to 55% less than
Pākehā until at least 1945 (206). Despite the Crown’s disregard for the Treaty demonstrated through this deliberate process of social, political and economic marginalisation of Māori, Potaka notes that “voluntary military service in all major conflicts during the twentieth century all underscore the ongoing Māori commitment to the Treaty” (86). It was not until the late 1940s after the success of the Māori Battalion in the Second World War that Māori benefit payments began to equal Pakeha, and only after much fighting, protest and struggle. These systems succeeded in orienting New Zealand’s infrastructure to exclude Māori and guarantee Pākehā privilege (Consedine and Consedine 208). Consedine and Consedine note this was enhanced by settler rhetoric which framed Māori as “lazy, immoral, degraded and dirty… This thinking created a rational that made white supremacy inevitable, particularly as British settlers became the majority” (210). Brendan Hokowhitu notes that these attitudes amount to an “othering” of Māori, as Pākehā attributed characteristics to Māori that they did not want to see in themselves. Hokowhitu notes that this process continues unabated today (1).

Economic hardship after the Second World War led to mass migration of Māori into poor urban areas, and the scars of colonisation continued to be perpetuated through the dislocation of urban Māori from their ancestral land, culture and language. These scars can be witnessed today as Māori, like other colonised indigenous peoples, continue to suffer “poorer health, die younger, and maintain lower employment rates and scholastic achievement” (Consedine and Consedine 62) than non-Māori. The cultural worldviews of Māori were overwhelmed by the dominant European culture that disparaged and punished Māori ways of being and promoted European ideals. As the generations went by Māori children were raised to speak English (Te Reo Maori Report 3.2.10), and taught that it was the language of success (Te Reo Maori Report 3.2.11). This was reflected in the monocultural media they were fed and the monolingual school system they were educated under, where Māori voices and perspectives were nowhere to be found.

The fracturing of classical Māori life was mirrored by increased political action, as groups of Māori first banded together to establish a Māori Parliament in 1879 (Fox 50), and then moved into creating Māori political representation in government through various political parties, councils and forums in the twentieth century. The
increasing pressure that Māori organisations put on the Government to respect te Tiriti led to the first Treaty-based pieces of legislation. Ranginui Walker describes the activism of Ngā Tamatoa, “the young warriors [whose] protests instigated the Māori land march of 1975” (“Māori News” 222). This march spanned the entire length of the North Island demonstrating Māori discontent over the Government’s lack of regard for te Tiriti.

The Government responded to this movement with the Treaty of Waitangi Act 1975, which created the Waitangi Tribunal and dictated its purpose and actions. Joseph notes that this Act allowed the Tribunal to investigate the Crown’s actions or omissions in violation of the Treaty from 1975 (82), and give the Crown recommendations as to how it should address Treaty breaches. The Tribunal’s inability to investigate past grievances was a source of contention for Māori rights activists, but this was amended in 1985. The Waitangi Day Act was also passed in 1976, however Joseph notes that “neither statute employs language sufficient to incorporate the Treaty into municipal law” (77). Both Acts alluded to the Treaty, but did not use deliberate language directing the Act to the purpose of incorporation, so the Courts could still not appeal to the Treaty in rulings.

The State Owned Enterprises Act 1986 contained a section “which, for the first time, accorded statutory recognition to the principles of the Treaty” (Joseph 70). This was Section 9, which reads: “Nothing in this Act shall permit the Crown to act in a manner that is inconsistent with the principles of the Treaty of Waitangi” (“Section 9”). This revolutionary legislation allowed the Courts to distil and apply the principles of te Tiriti in judgements. Section 9 led to the landmark Lands case of the NZ Maori Council v Attorney-General in 1987 in which the Court of Appeal decided unanimously that “the principles of the Treaty of Waitangi override everything else in the State-Owned Enterprises Act” (667). Ranginui Walker refers to this decision as “the beginning of decolonisation for New Zealand” (Ka Whawhai 265), stating that “[no] government can ever again rule Maori people while at the same time dishonouring the Treaty, for the honour of the Crown itself is at stake” (ibid.). The case gave the Treaty power in law and allowed the Courts to consider the concept of Treaty principles. It also created Treaty jurisprudence that has since been tested and refined in many other important cases, and ushered in a wave of legislation that
included Treaty clauses. Section 9 of the State Owned Enterprises Act 1986 was therefore of paramount importance in the battle to get the Treaty recognised in law.

The incorporation of Treaty clauses in these Acts signalled a growing public respect for the Treaty of Waitangi, grounded in the nationalist political rhetoric at the time that promoted Aotearoa as a progressive place. This was reflected in the Courts’ wider use of Treaty principles in rulings. Te Puni Kōkiri also note an increasing number of instances wherein “a Court will refer to the Treaty when interpreting legislation even though there is no Treaty reference” (18), using it as an extrinsic aid to interpretation. In addition they note cases where “the Courts have said that the Treaty should have been taken into account by decision-makers as a relevant consideration, even where there is no explicit statutory direction to do so” (18). This shows the ability and willingness of the Courts and Parliament to generally move in the direction of respecting the Treaty in law, which gives the Māori rights to voice and representation a stronger grounding in New Zealand law.

**Te Reo Māori**

The scope of this directional shift is demonstrated in the *Broadcasting Assets* case 1994, where the Māori Council claimed that the Crown’s proposed deregulation of New Zealand’s broadcasting environment would put te reo Māori at risk, thereby desecrating the promise that Māori would retain possession of their taonga. Despite recognising the vulnerable state of the language and the Government’s commitment to protect it, the Court of Appeal rejected the *Broadcasting Assets* case on the basis that te Tiriti did not give Māori rights to Radio New Zealand and Television New Zealand (Joseph 76). The New Zealand Māori Council appealed to the Privy Council, who upheld the Court of Appeal’s decision but warned the Crown that the guarantee declared in the Treaty created a “legitimate expectation” (Joseph 76) that the Crown would actively ensure, rather than passively accept, Māori possession of their properties and taonga. This decision meant the Crown had to take active steps to make sure that te reo Māori survived.

The Privy Council’s recommendations were the catalyst for the creation of a Māori television channel. This project endured a decade of struggle against “bureaucratic impediments and the illwill from a considerable section of the non-Māori public”
(Smith and Abel 3) in order to establish itself. Ranginui Walker details how this included the set-up and closure of the Aotearoa Television Network in the 1990s, which was denied the financial support and governmental commitment it needed to operate successfully (Ka Whawhai 271-272). The subsequent establishment of the Māori Television Service (MTS) in the 2000s was also fraught with roadblocks and “hamstrung from the outset” (Ka Whawhai 372). Smith and Abel note that the mainstream media heightened focus on other managerial setbacks such as the appointment of a CEO with a fraudulent curriculum vitae, “drawing on and furthering a long-established discourse of Māori inability to manage institutions and their finances” (55). This included accusations of lavish overspending, nepotism and wasting taxpayer money that alluded to common Māori stereotypes, while ignoring the fact that “for the first 20 years of New Zealand broadcasting, when Māori were paying taxes, programming content of relevance to Māori was almost non-existent” (Smith and Abel 4). Bureaucratic opposition to the independence of MTS meant it remained (and remains) a statutory corporation dependant on governmental approval and oversight. The resistance of Pākehā politicians, fuelled by racist undertones in the media, delayed the launch of MTS another 18 months with a host of unnecessary impediments that made it difficult for the Service to find a channel to broadcast on (Ka Whawhai 374- 376). However Māori Television Service finally began transmission in March 2004. Te Tiriti’s journey to bring Māori people through voicelessness to voice in all corners of contemporary New Zealand was underway.

Principles

This journey has been made possible through the Courts’ ability to use the Treaty in law. Due to the differences between the two texts of the Treaty, Parliament and the Courts have begun to refer to the principles of the document rather than the actual texts (Te Puni Kōkiri 74) in order to gain greater freedom to apply its tenets. Joseph notes that the Treaty “must be viewed as a living instrument capable of adapting to new and changing circumstances” (72). Parliament’s utilisation of the Treaty’s principles enables the Courts to take meanings from both texts at once, and allows these meanings to evolve through time. The principles that have emerged so far through case law all stem from the overarching idea of partnership (Te Puni Kōkiri 77) arising from two parties signing a document based on mutual compromise and benefit.
However, the Courts and the Waitangi Tribunal view partnership in different ways. The Tribunal view partnership as a reciprocal balance between equal partners, while the Courts view it as more hierarchical as the Government is understood to have more power in the partnership (Te Puni Kōkiri 77-81). Both however agree on the duty to act reasonably, honourably and in good faith. They also both agree on the duty to consult or the Crown’s duty to make informed decisions. The 1997 Rangahaua Whanui National Overview Report by Professor Alan Ward contains an appendix compiled by Dr Janine Hayward that identifies several other principles distilled through the Courts and the Tribunal. Hayward finds that most arose from the Court of Appeal decision in the 1987 Lands case. The principles emerging from the Courts through this case include (477-479):

- The acquisition of sovereignty in exchange for the protection of rangatiratanga
- The freedom of the Crown to govern
- The Crown’s duty of active protection
- The right for Māori to retain rangatiratanga over their resources and taonga and to have all the rights and privileges of citizenship
- The Crown’s duty to remedy past breaches.

The Waitangi Tribunal has developed several principles of its own since the Lands case. Hayward notes that those emerging from reports include (487-493):

- The exchange of the right to make laws for the obligation to protect Māori interests
- The Crown obligation to actively protect Māori Treaty rights
- The need for compromise by Māori and the wider community
- A duty to consult
- The Crown cannot divest itself of its obligations
- The right of development- that te Tiriti can adapt
- The tribal right of self-regulation
- The Crown’s obligation legally to recognise tribal rangatiratanga
- The Crown’s right of pre-emption and its reciprocal duties
- The principle of options - for Māori to be able to choose their cultural base
in the Māori and/or Pākehā world, but not be compelled to make that decision.

Though the two institutions view the Treaty from different perspectives, the principles that have emerged from at least 25 years of publications are similar. The principles still have a level of interpretive flexibility, and cases in future may bring new principles to light. In places where the Treaty has been incorporated into legislation, or in other cases where it might apply, the Courts are now guided by these principles, allowing the Treaty to promote issues of Māori representation and rangatiratanga, and creating the possibility for concepts such as Māori voice to gain force in the Courts.

The Māori right to voice in media representation may also be supported by these principles. If Māori worldviews were expressed, received and understood in mainstream media with equal strength as those of Pākehā, it would give Māori an amount of control over the way they are represented and would reduce the amount of damage done to Māori by the limited perceptions and understandings of most non-Māori New Zealanders. Therefore the Māori right to voice in the media is reinforced by the Crown’s duty of active protection, the right for Māori to retain rangatiratanga over their taonga and to have all the rights and privileges of citizenship such as cultural reflection in the media. It is also supported by the Crown obligation to protect Māori interests and to actively protect Māori Treaty rights, the ability for te Tiriti to adapt, and the right for Māori to be able to choose their cultural base. Finally, allowing Māori and Pākehā cultures equal space on mainstream television would begin to fulfil the notion of partnership embedded in the ideal of a bicultural New Zealand.

Te Tiriti Today

The Courts now have space to consider what the promise of tino rangatiratanga for Māori might look like in Aotearoa today if it were realised. The Orakei Claim Report notes that in interpreting treaties, Courts should be guided by the intentions and purposes of the original document, the way it was understood at the time and, if in doubt, interpret provisions in favour of the party who did not draft the treaty, in this case Māori (11.11.2). Te Puni Kōkiri suggest that because te Tiriti was born from a context where two partners entered into an agreement based on trust and one party
held more power, this could legally raise issues of fiduciary duty that have yet to be fully explored in the Courts. They note that in law, “the party exercising the power often has a fiduciary obligation to act in a way which protects the interests of the affected party” (65). This means that there is still a degree of flexibility in the way the Treaty could be handled by the Courts in future.

However there is still the underlying suggestion that the Treaty needs to be written further into legislature by Parliament so that it can be fully used in Courts. Te Puni Kōkiri argues that “[as] with other core constitutional documents, such as the Magna Carta, the constitutional import of the Treaty does not depend on its formal legal status, but rather derives from the acknowledged importance of the values it represents” (14). However Professor Arohia Durie states that this makes the status of te Tiriti “vulnerable to the whim of consecutive governments” (75). Potaka reiterates that “[this] position exposes the Treaty and its meaning, and can only effectively change if parliamentary sovereignty is modified through (most likely) constitutional rearrangements or (less likely) an exercise of judicial intervention” (92). The idea of ‘constitutional rearrangement’ is based on the fact that at the moment, “New Zealand’s constitution is currently based on various documents, constitutional conventions, attitudes, norms and judicial decisions” (Potaka 93). Many argue that if the Treaty were incorporated into a constitutional document, Māori rights would be ensured protection at the highest level of law.

When the subject of incorporating the Treaty into the Bill of Rights arose in 1985, the reaction from Māori was mixed. Joseph notes that while some Māori rights supporters “advocated making the Treaty paramount over all laws” (79), others felt that “entrenching the Treaty would not be radical enough… and rejected the White Paper bill as an instrument of entrenching monocultural rights” (79). The amount of national disagreement meant the Treaty was therefore not incorporated within the Bill of Rights Act 1990. This constitutional aspiration did not disappear, however. At the time of writing a Constitutional Review is well underway, and due to be completed by 2014 (“Constitutional review”). According to lawyer Steven Price, key issues that will be addressed in the review are whether to replace the Queen as head of state, whether to write the constitution into a single document, whether to give it power over parliament, and to what extent the Treaty of Waitangi and te Tiriti o Waitangi should
be incorporated into the Constitution ("Primer"). An article by Rod Vaughan for the *National Business Review* shows some people fear that incorporating the Treaty into a constitution that has power over Parliament will leave Treaty decisions about legislation to the interpretive abilities of Judges rather than democratically elected Parliamentary representatives ("Why Treaty-based constitution").

These constitutional questions revolve around the form that Māori tino rangatiratanga might take today. However Ani Mikaere warns that “any concessions that are made to Māori aspirations of tino rangatiratanga… are nevertheless envisaged as occurring within the framework of Crown sovereignty. As such they represent the false generosity of the oppressor” (330). This highlights the unsuitable nature of forcing Māori ideas with a Pākehā system, which also raises questions about the efficacy of broadcasting Māori voices and worldviews in mainstream media. However until New Zealand’s dominant framework changes, these appear to be the best options for operating within it. This framework is more likely to adjust if the operation and impacts of Pākehā cultural common sense are widely understood and consequently destabilised through the inclusion of Māori voices in mainstream media.

This brief history of the Treaty of Waitangi and te Tiriti o Waitangi demonstrates how the difference between Māori worldviews and Pākehā worldviews has affected the country. The assimilationist mentality of the European colonisers led to the enactment of laws and procedures that completely ignored Māori perspectives, over-rode Māori cultural practices, took away Māori resources and have left Māori communities scarred to this day. When New Zealand’s mainstream media system seems locked into a pattern of propagating and expounding predominantly White perspectives through the news, it leaves open the gaping question of how much damage this is doing to Māori individuals and Māori culture on a daily basis. The Māori right to voice and representation in mainstream media is supported by the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the UN Declaration of the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, the principles of the Treaty of Waitangi and te Tiriti o Waitangi and the status of te reo Māori as a taonga. The history of the Treaty challenges the dominance of Pākehā perspectives on mainstream news as it demonstrates that the principle of partnership gives Māori a right to have Māori perspectives expressed, received and understood in any sector of New Zealand society. This would be but one small step towards
destabilising the dominance of Pākehā hegemony and eradicating the damage that dominant Pākehā perspectives do to Māori every day.
3. The Processes of Pākehāness: The ways and means by which Pākehā privilege and Māori disadvantage are inculcated in contemporary Aotearoa.

The Treaty of Waitangi operates from a basis of partnership, suggesting the promise of a bicultural paradigm. The ideal of biculturalism, as posited by Sibley, Liu and Khan, would be a political system that recognises Māori and non-Māori “as distinct partners who share guardianship of many of NZ’s resources and ideally should contribute equally to its national identity and culture” (38). Biculturalism means that every New Zealander, regardless of where they are from, should have an equal knowledge of Māori and Pākehā culture, worldviews and perspectives. However, this is not the case. Sibley, Liu and Khan note that Māori are “acutely aware of the failure of Pakeha formulations of biculturalism to live up to their promise” (41). One aspect of this is identified by Smith and Abel, who note that “Māori access to the means of media representation has also been much less than the bicultural balance promised by the Treaty agreement” (2). Instead, Pākehā control most media representation. By speaking mainly from a Pākehā perspective, New Zealand’s mainstream media reinforce Pākehā hegemony, imply Pākehā culture is universal rather than specific and negatively affect Māori and other non-Pākehā New Zealanders. In this process the media render Pākehā culture invisible to Pākehā people, making Pākehā dominance more difficult to challenge. When New Zealand’s institutions operate within a Pākehā worldview to suit Pākehā culture, it is more difficult for non-Pākehā to succeed within them.

In this chapter I investigate how Pākehā achieve and maintain discursive dominance on top of the material dominance they have acquired through the history of colonisation. I argue that the best way to destabilise this dominance is by respecting the Māori right to voice. I believe this right implies a two-fold obligation for New Zealand: firstly, to foster a context of receptive listeners willing and able to understand Māori worldviews by making te reo Māori a compulsory subject in all schools. Secondly, to create a space for Māori voices to be broadcast in mainstream media. I believe that this would go some way towards cultivating the bicultural ideal, and destabilise White hegemony by raising Pākehā awareness of the dominance of
Pākehā culture and the advantages this delivers to Pākehā. Providing different discourses in the media may go some way towards raising the critical awareness of citizens, and enable them to understand the different worldviews and histories surrounding an issue, such as the impact of colonialism, rather than just taking mainstream Pākehā perspectives to be ‘normal’. I think this two-pronged approach would empower marginalised voices and encourage the next generation of media practitioners, educators and law-makers to recognise, understand and transform the cultural specificity of their institutions, perhaps making it less difficult for Māori and other non-Pākehā New Zealanders to succeed within them. I will use ‘White’ to refer to broad transnational theories of White culture and dominance, and use ‘Pākehā’ to refer to the way these specifically relate to the culture of White naturalised New Zealanders.

**Whiteness and Power**

In the expanding field of Critical Whiteness Studies, various researchers have investigated the ways and means by which White culture and people have gained power in the social world (e.g. Dyer; Frankenberg; McIntosh; Shome; Levine; J. Durie; Kimmel). This scholarship suggests that a combination of historical control and present pervasiveness contribute to the power of Whiteness. Applying the questions that arise through Critical Whiteness Studies to New Zealand thus means investigating the discursive and ideological power of ideas supporting and maintaining White dominance in Aotearoa society.

Whiteness gains an invisible sort of power in New Zealand through the way that Pākehā people tend to be unaware of their own cultural perspectives and assumptions. This means they might also be unaware of the way that educational, religious, legal, political, social, media, and cultural institutions may be organised to suit Pākehā perspectives, to the disadvantage of non-Pākehā people. Ruth Frankenberg posits that Whiteness inherently signifies “the production and reproduction of dominance rather than subordination, normativity rather than marginality, and privilege rather than disadvantage” (*White Women* 236-237). This highlights the possibility that there may be an undercurrent to White perspectives that necessitates the subjugation of non-White people.
Power is dispersed across all human relations in Michel Foucault’s conceptualisation. Insofar as it relates to the self, power is what controls a person’s actions, or influences them to control their own. This can inform the way a person controls others, and can also be related to the way that the state controls the individual (“Governmentality” 91). White people thus have power in societies where dominant values encourage people to act and think in a way that supports White authority. In *Discipline and Punish* Foucault describes traditional sovereign societies where the ruler exercised power by governing the people paternally as the head of state. This was the age of torture and punishment, for when a person committed a crime against the body politic, the sovereign sought redemption by extracting it from the body of the criminal, a process described vividly in the ordeal of Damiens the regicide (3-6). The citizens were thus governed through fear and respect of the sovereign power. This external power controlled the actions of the citizens and was enacted on them from above.

This contrasts with the form of power exercised by the governmental model that has come later. This form of power is more internalised, and has been distributed across society in the proliferation of discourses in public culture about self-management. The processes of government now aim at social regulation, so this system signals the age of discipline. Under the model of governmentality, subjects now regulate themselves through their apparent internal motivations, which arise through broader social discourses that influence their thoughts and actions. Though people tend to believe they have power over their lives and social structures, they are continually subjected to the ideas of a society, encouraging them to agree with the way they are ruled. Foucault notes that such power “cannot be localized in a particular type of institution or state apparatus” (*Discipline and Punish* 26), but should instead be conceived as “dispositions, manoeuvres, tactics, techniques, functionings; that one should decipher in it a network of relations, constantly in tension, in activity, rather than a privilege that one might possess” (ibid). Foucault employs the soul, rather than the body, as the site where these complicated mechanisms now enact power. He describes the soul as being born out of punishment, rather than as a precondition of human being. The experiences of supervision and constraint thus teach a person to regulate their behaviour to align with the wishes of authority figures, and power relations become internalised, influencing a person from within.
This social organisation means that any crime in a society is therefore a crime against the system of self-control. Thus Foucault notes that “[the] expiation that once rained down upon the body must be replaced by a punishment that acts in depth on the heart, the thoughts, the will, the inclinations” (ibid., 16). The penalty for crime is now enacted against the soul through a series of psychological investigations, assessments of deviance and restorative prison time. The aim of this may be to contort the soul of the perpetrator to submit to the power of the government. When the perpetrator of a crime feels guilt, asks forgiveness and seeks redemption, this person could be seen to have successfully succumbed to the power of the state systems, internalising the ruling ideologies by regretting their own lack of regulation. As in the formulation of the panopticon (Bentham), the existence and potential presence of authority causes subjects to regulate themselves.

Power, then, may be thought of as the way and means by which dominant ideas regulate people’s actions, or the “multiform instrumentations” (ibid.,26) that encourage an individual to govern and regulate themselves as others want and require of them. Antonio Gramsci uses the term ‘hegemony’ to describe this power when it works in the interests of the “dominant fundamental group” (12). According to Gramsci, this power operates through a balance of the coercion effected through the law-and-order tools of state, and “the ‘spontaneous’ consent given by the great masses of the population to the general direction imposed on social life” (12), or the consent given by people to the way they are ruled. He notes that “the supremacy of a social group manifests itself in two ways, as ‘domination’ and as ‘intellectual and moral leadership’” (57). Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels also describe a concept of the supremacy of the ruling group’s ideas, arguing that the ruling class controls the beliefs of a society in their interest, but will “give its ideas the form of universality, and represent them as the only rational, universally valid ones” (93) making their ruling position appear to be common sense. Though each of these conceptualisations is very distinct from that of Foucault, the generalities coincide to give a picture of the way certain groups gain and maintain power in a society. Implicit White social dominance may thus be maintained through the circulation of common sense notions that encourage citizens to regulate themselves in a way that supports and maintains White hegemony.
The ideas that transmit the power of the ruling system are termed ‘knowledges’ by Foucault. According to this theory, the knowledges a person learns through the information systems of society also constrict their actions because knowledges transmit power by propagating ideologies that suit the ruling order. Foucault posits that power and knowledge correspond, noting that “there is no power relation without the correlative constitution of a field of knowledge, nor any knowledge that does not presuppose and constitute at the same time power relations” (Discipline and Punish 27). This means that the way we learn about a topic may implicitly teach us an ideological value. For example, in Aotearoa, mathematical addition is often taught to children using problems that involve money and the desire to buy things. Where this value supports the ruling social system, the knowledge a person garners about the world can constitute them within its power relations, e.g. as a consumer within a capitalist system.

The power embedded in knowledge highlights the important role of the media in power relations. Hall notes that the media are “part of the dominant means of ideological production” (“The Whites of the Eyes” 11) as their main function is to display representations of the social world in order to help people make sense of it. Hall also notes that “language, broadly conceived, is by definition the principle medium in which we find different ideological discourses elaborated” (ibid., 9), making mass media communication especially important in the production of ideologies. For example, a society’s education curricula may support the idea of individual achievement, and this may be reinforced by television shows that display stories of individuals succeeding proudly on their own. The media thus transmits the knowledge that one should value individualism to make sense of this society. The value of individualism implicitly supports the ruling order as an individualist perspective tends to locate problems on an individual level, as someone’s fault, rather than perceiving the broader social relations that may be contributing to the problems. Individualism can thus obscure structural disadvantage and contradict the values of anyone with a more collectivist cultural orientation. Individualism therefore springs from and constitutes a person within social power relations, shaping and encouraging them to support the dominant system.
When the knowledges transmitted through a society’s information systems all reflect similar hegemonic ideologies, these prevailing ideas can vanish from social consciousness. As Hall notes, “[ideologies] tend to disappear from view into the taken-for-granted ‘naturalised’ world of common sense” (ibid., 9). For example, if individualist values are the dominant common sense, then the absence of curricula and entertainment that prioritise the thriving of the group may go unquestioned. Hall notes that ideologies operate most effectively when people do not realise that their common sense statements are “underpinned by ideological premises; when our formations seem to be simply descriptive statements about how things are (i.e. must be), or of what we can ‘take-for-granted’” (ibid., 9). An example of this is a democratic ideology with utilitarian premises, or the belief that the decision that is good for the greatest number of people is the best decision. In New Zealand this belief can implicitly support the dominance of Pākehā people as they are the majority. This ideology underpins common sense statements such as ‘Let’s vote on it’ or ‘Most people want lunch now, so we’ll eat here’. The way we have learned things presupposes the way we act, so the power invested in ideological knowledges already influences our actions and decisions.

Language and the media communicate ideologies through discourse. Hall describes a discourse as “a group of statements which provide a language for talking about - i.e. a way of representing - a particular kind of knowledge about a topic” (Formations of Modernity 291). Using a discourse can allow one to construct and limit the way a concept is represented. In this way discourses can assign certain meanings to a topic, or create a set of associations that mean a topic is often talked about in the same way. For example, South Auckland is often constructed by those outside the area as a problem, in terms of a discourse of drugs, crime, violence, poverty and unemployment, and what politicians or South Aucklanders need to do about it. Automatic phrases such as ‘get kids off the streets,’ ‘the poverty cycle’, ‘street gangs’ and ‘a culture of violence’ become uncritically associated with the concept of South Auckland and shape the construction of that concept. This construction limits the ability for those outside the area to discuss or even conceive of South Auckland in positive terms of family or community, or in terms of how other suburbs or social sectors in New Zealand could change in order to aid the southern Auckland suburbs. Underpinning this discourse is an ideology of meritocracy, which Sibley, Liu and
Khan describes an ideology “whereby everyone is construed as being equal in terms of opportunity in the here and now, regardless of ethnicity and the historical conditions experienced by one's ethnic group” (40). In other words, this is the belief that anyone can ‘succeed’ in New Zealand if they work hard enough, so those that do not appear to be thriving simply need to work harder, and thus the onus is solely on them to improve their situation.

By associating a discourse with a meaning, knowledge is produced about the topic. Hall posits that this ‘discursive practice’ occurs in all social relations where meaning is produced, entailing that “discourse enters into and influences all social practices” (Formations of Modernity 291). By tying social practices to ideological meanings, discourse and power are fundamentally connected. Hall notes that “discourse is one of the ‘systems’ through which power circulates” (ibid., 293). This power can be exemplified by the way that the ‘South Auckland problem’ discourse produces knowledge in a North Auckland resident that might subsequently affect the way they treat a person from Manukau, i.e. with fear, caution or distrust. In other words, knowledge exercises power, and those who are ‘known’ by a discourse are subjected to it (ibid., 293). In this example, the potential negative treatment of South Auckland residents due to the ‘problem’ discourse stems from the ideology of meritocracy which supports the ruling order of New Zealand by implying that the way we are being governed is fair and is functioning well if anyone can succeed by working hard. The ideology embedded in the discourse thus instils knowledge that transmits power, placing the ‘knower’ in the power structure of the society and encouraging them to agree with the ruling system. The irony of course is that this ideology of ‘fairness’ may subject those within South Auckland to negative treatment and decreased employment and educational possibilities, due to the ‘problems’ that have been associated with their suburbs through dominant discourses. This may make it much more difficult for this person to succeed by working hard, fundamentally contradicting the very ideology they are subjected to.

Exposing the contradictions within the meritocracy ideology in this way may destabilise its discursive power. In this example, the South Auckland resident may find it more difficult to assent to the way they are being ruled if the ideas underpinning the ruling system appear flawed. Hall notes that ideologies are
transformed by “articulating the elements differently, thereby producing a different meaning: breaking the chain in which they are currently fixed… and establishing a new articulation” (‘The Whites of the Eyes” 9). Propagating alternative discourses in the mainstream media may be one way of destabilising the power of dominant ideological discourses. This is important if these dominant discourses prove to discriminate against non-Pākehā peoples in New Zealand, particularly if they discriminate against Māori people in breach of their rights as Treaty partners. Hall draws on Jacques Derrida to argue that ideology necessitates a constant fixing of meaning or a constant articulation of the “chain of equivalences” (“Signification, Representation, Ideology” 93) that build up the logic of an ideological common sense. In this way the spread of alternative discourses, such as those on Māori Television, could contribute to a fissure or slippage of meaning within an ideological chain, thus undermining its discursive authority and destabilising its claim to common sense (Allan 106). Giving alternative perspectives more airtime and broader exposure in the media could highlight the ideologies that have become taken-for-granted in dominant culture and thus expose their internal contradictions. While Hall cautions that “‘breaking and interrupting’ the forms is no guarantee, in itself, that the dominant ideology cannot continue to be reproduced” (“The Whites of the Eyes” 21), exposing people to alternative perspectives might make them more critical and selective of the ideologies they rely upon and the systems of power they implicitly support.

The aim of this project is thus to examine the extent to which Pākehā cultural perspectives shape knowledge to reinforce power structures in this country, to expose the ideologies supporting Pākehā dominance, and to promote alternative discourses.

Pākehā Values
The concept of Whiteness has been broadly theorised internationally as different researchers have investigated the present properties and historical traits of White culture and White people that enable Whiteness to be socially powerful. Scholars such as Dyer and Frankenberg have discussed Whiteness in terms of its values, visibility and invisibility, ideologies and oppression. Within the New Zealand context Pākehaanness is very similar to the concept of trans-national Whiteness, but has its own unique specificities. Pākehā identity diverges from broad theories of White identity due to the relationship of Pākehā with Māori and the colonial history of Aotearoa.
These endow Pākehā identity with a proclivity towards discourses and ideologies that justify Pākehā dominance over Māori in New Zealand. The components of individualism, meritocracy, and majority-rule appear to support the ruling order in New Zealand, as demonstrated in the examples above. These ideologies, along with future-orientation and privilege, seem to be fundamental to Pākehā culture. Pākehā cultural values seem to pervade New Zealand’s “ideological state apparatuses” (Althusser 181) transmitting dominant discourses and knowledges that promote the ruling system of Pākehā dominance, allowing Pākehā to maintain power.

A range of theorists have analysed Pākehā perspectives and come to similar conclusions. King describes Pākehā culture as “the originally Western and European tradition which includes emphasis on literacy, on individual rights, and on material acquisition” (13). Sibley, Liu and Khan posit that New Zealand “holds liberal democratic values anchored in the ideals of Freedom and Equality as central to defining nationhood” (40), though the extent to which they are referring to Pākehā culture as the national culture is unclear. In an international comparison with United States individualism, Oyserman, Coon and Kemmelmeier found that “only one country, New Zealand, fell into the upper left quadrant, being higher in IND [individualism] and lower in COL [collectivism] than the United States” (23) making New Zealand culture the most individualistic in the study of 46 countries. Again one can speculate as to the degree that ‘New Zealand culture’ reflects the dominant Pākehā culture. James Ritchie posits that while Pākehā values are difficult to define, they tend to include “emphasis on individualism, future-orientation, secular materialism and a nexus of political ideas which includes equality, democratic systems and, paradoxically, the power of the majority to over-ride minorities” (81). These studies support the inference that individualism, meritocracy, majority-rule and future-orientation are fundamental Pākehā cultural values.

These values broadly reflect those of White cultures around the world, which also incorporate the centrality of White privilege. Francis Winddance Twine highlights the association of Whiteness with privilege in an American-based study of women with African heritage who acquired White identities as children raised in White suburban communities, before being challenged by African groups at university. Twine found that Whiteness was linked to a middle-class economic position, as many of her
interviewees “argued that they had been white because they had the same material privileges and socioeconomic-economic advantages as their suburban peers” (224). She notes that when her interviewees thought of White people, “they referred exclusively to economically privileged European Americans” (224). This led Twine to view economic privilege as a fundamental part of the construct of White identity. Wander, Martin and Nakayama reinforce this when they discuss “the construction of whiteness” as an elitist category (21) and the challenge to this posed by economically disadvantaged White people. Privilege could also, therefore, be central to Pākehā identity in New Zealand, reflecting the way White identity is imagined, constructed and reinforced around the world.

While it is not altogether useful to categorise cultural values, it seems necessary for the purposes of this study. Ranginui Walker warns that “[paradigms] of this kind are static, and as a consequence are difficult to match with the dynamism of human behaviour” (Ngā Pepa 25). However I feel it is integral to the process of making Whiteness visible in New Zealand, for if we do not mark out present aspects of identity, then it can only be defined in negation. Dyer notes that this is a common way of identifying Whiteness, for “it often seems [to him] that the only way to see the structures, tropes and perceptual habits of whiteness, to see past the illusion of infinite variety, to recognise white qua white, is when non-white (and above all black) people are also represented” (13). Augie Fleras and Paul Spoonely note that New Zealand films have demonstrated the tendency to project White fears and fantasies onto the imaginary Māori ‘Other’ and have used the stereotype of the Māori ‘Other’ to understand Pākehā identities in comparison (71-72). By identifying aspects of Pākehā culture I avoid defining Pākehā culture by what Māori or any other culture is not. King highlights that such categories are merely conceptual, as “there are many Pakeha whose values and lifestyle bear little relation to the Western stereotype, just as there are Maori who have relinquished or not encountered Maori traditions” (13). In this way these facets of Pākehā culture refer to the broad concept of White New Zealand culture but are not prescriptive.

Identifying aspects of Pākehā culture also helps pull it away from the position of exnomination. This term was coined by Roland Barthes to conceptualise the way the bourgeois maintain power by being outside of the realm of identified and named
things. For example, feminism is named and marked out because it is ‘different’ to the status quo. Its opposite, ‘masculinism’, is unnamed because it is just ‘normal’, it holds the power of normality and so becomes invisible. In the same way Pākehā culture has a tendency to become invisible to Pākehā people because it is so dominantly perpetuated through the ideological discourses of the state. Raymond Nairn et al. note that Pākehā “are routinely depicted as ordinary or normal so that the values, beliefs, and practices of the hegemonic culture appear natural, commonplace” (“Mass Media” 169). Fleras and Spoonley note that because the majority group of New Zealand settlers did not believe that they had a culture, “[a] prevailing view, and one that is still widely held, is the belief that majority groups conduct their public and private lives according to universally held and superior systems and values” (81). This invisible exnomination renders Pākehā racially non-specific, and leads many to conflate ethnicity with nationality and claim ‘I’m just a New Zealander’ (Bell). This provides a source of power for Pākehā because, as Dyer notes, “[there] is no more powerful position than that of being ‘just’ human. The claim to power is the claim to speak for the commonality of humanity” (2). By not ‘seeing’ their culture, Pākehā may find it difficult to conceive that there can be multiple cultural worldviews informing different perspectives on an issue, giving Pākehā the power to discredit alternative opinions as ‘abnormal’ and Pākehā perspectives as ‘just common sense’.

In/visibility
While the power of the invisibility of Whiteness has been broadly theorised in this way (e.g. Frankenberg White Women; McIntosh “Unpacking White Privilege”, “White Privilege and Male Privilege”; Shome; Levine; J. Durie; Kimmel “Introduction”), it has also been complicated in recent years (Frankenberg “The Mirage”; Gallagher; Thompson). In a 2011 Doctoral dissertation on Whiteness and the news, Kevin M. Dolan argues that it is particularly hard for a White person to be unaware of their own race, “especially in today’s climate of identity politics and frequent charges of reverse racism” (12). Charles A. Gallagher reinforces this by noting that while invisibility “may have been the case at one time, contemporary racial politics and the effect of the media have made it practically impossible for many whites not to think of themselves as occupying a racial category” (300). In an assessment of White invisibility, Hartmann, Gerteis and Croll surveyed a representative sample of 2081 American respondents, and compared White and non-
White opinions on the significance of White identity, White privilege and colour-blind ideology. They found that while White people “are less likely to see and fully grasp racial inequalities in general and white advantages in particular than people of color… a substantial proportion of whites actually do see the structural ways that they have been advantaged by their race” (419). They argue, in line with Dyer (45) that Whiteness is dialectical and multifaceted, enabling it to be both visible and invisible (Hartmann, Gerteis, Croll 420).

In New Zealand I would argue that while most Pākehā are aware that they are White, many are not aware of the privileges this brings them. The ideological power gained through dominant discourses and the material power gained though the history of colonisation means New Zealand life is likely to be much easier for a Pākehā individual than for a Māori individual. Neville Robertson describes his Pākehā privilege as growing up “on a farm carved out of land taken in a dodgy deal from Ngai Tahu - a farm which gave me a good start in life … [and all] my working life I have been hired by people who look like me” (26). Robert Jensen describes White privilege as attending a school in America “in which I learned that white people like me made this country great. There I also was taught a variety of skills, including how to take standardized tests written by and for white people” (81). Peggy McIntosh describes it as being “taught to recognize racism only in individual acts of meanness by members of my group, never in invisible systems conferring unsought racial dominance on my group from birth” (“White Privilege and Male Privilege” 159). For Conley it is being able to “confidently walk into a hospital without proper identification or into a private party uninvited or sit in a hotel lounge reading the paper without being questioned” (205). Robert Consedine compares his Pākehā experience with that of his Māori friend Irihapeti, and realises “I almost never had to think about ‘being Pakeha’ in the way she had to think about ‘being Maori’… was not singled out as a failure or a success because of my culture; and had always been free to criticize the government of the day without being seen as a demanding Pakeha seeking more benefits for my own people” (199- 200). He notes that he was never burdened with the stereotype “of laziness, violence, trouble-making, poor parenting and living by ‘Maori-time’” (200). Robertson notes that such privilege is not constant, “men tend to have more of it than women. Professional people tend to have more of it than manual or unemployed workers. But as a group, white privilege is something
white folk all share” (27). The normativity of this privilege however means many Pākehā may be initially unaware of it.

Pākehā may also be unconscious of the specificity of their culture and the way it influences social institutions. In relation to news, it seems common for Pākehā to think that other cultures have strange views in comparison with the norm, but not to think that the Pākehā norm is a strange view in comparison with other cultures. Dolan supports this with the assertion that “although whiteness is being marked more in individual and personalized ways, the process of whiteness is still largely invisible in structural and institutional ways” (12). While Hartmann, Gerteis and Croll found many of their respondents were aware of their White advantage, they also found that Whiteness “is a sense of self and subjectivity that is unaware of its own social foundations. As a result, it obscures the broader systemic nature of race that gives it its form” (407). This situation may parallel New Zealand, where Pākehā seem to know their culture is dominant but may not critically analyse this situation because of its normativity. The normativity of Whiteness therefore seems to render it discursively powerful in New Zealand, as it is so normal for social institutions to adhere to Pākehā values that the effect this might have on non-Pākehā people is obscured.

**Ideologies**

Pākehā cultural ideologies are inherently advantageous to Pākehā and can be at odds with and disadvantage Māori cultural worldviews. These ideologies are transmitted in mainstream television news discourse, justifying and protecting Pākehā dominance.

The ideology of individualism fundamentally structures White cultural thinking in a very different way to the thinking of more collectivist cultures. Iris Young argues that White individualist discourses have pervaded scientific theories to the extent that White culture “implicitly conceives the individual as ontologically prior to the collective” (42). This means that White theories of collectivity often conceive of groups based on the similar attributes or associations of individual members. Young posits that this methodologically individualist approach is flawed as it conceives of the self as authentic, unified and autonomous. This ignores the way that “[a] person’s particular sense of history, affinity, and separateness, even the person’s mode of
reasoning, evaluating, and expressing feeling, are constituted partly by her or his group affinities” (42). These factors suggest the individual is formed through interaction with the group, not prior to it.

Conceptualising the self as socially constituted better enables us to understand the ways that social discourses shape a person. If a person were only exposed to ideas that were consistent with ruling ideologies, they would be likely to give unquestioning support to this system. However, if a person were exposed to multiple, diverse discourses that contradicted each other, they would be more able to critically evaluate the discourses constituting them within society’s power relations. Similarly, this would enable democratic citizens to become discerning and aware of the different worldviews informing political issues, and thus better able to vote on such issues. By validating alternative knowledges and discourses such as Māori worldviews in mainstream media, readers would have access to a variety of discursive perspectives. Media readers would thus have more opportunities to realise the different discourses and knowledges that constitute their own selves. Mark Haugaard posits that one can emancipate themselves from dominant discourses by “experimentation with subversive knowledges as new ways of being” (182). By allowing space for multifarious and alternative perspectives in mainstream media, the individual would have a greater ability to resist dominant opinions and make their own decisions on how to view the social world.

However, while New Zealand remains a country where the worldview of one group dominates discourse, many readers will continue to receive an unchallenged individualist conception of self. Young asserts that this conception tends to associate oppression with minority groups, and posit that the solution to oppression is therefore to eliminate or ignore group identifications and treat everyone as individuals (44). This is particularly relevant in a country dominated by naturalised Pākehā perspectives, for it means that many Pākehā conceive of the autonomous individual that is prior to the group as having ‘normal’ Pākehā cultural values. This individualism thus leads implicitly to an oppressive assimilationist ideal of everyone acting and thinking like Pākehā. Young contradicts this by positing that “group differentiation is both an inevitable and a desirable aspect of modern social processes” (44). Her solution is that justice “requires not the melting away of differences, but
institutions that promote reproduction of and respect for group differences without oppression” (44). Enabling the expression of Māori worldviews would constitute such an assertion of group difference.

The Pākehā ideology of meritocracy, or the idea that anyone can succeed if they work hard enough, underpins a similar ‘one people’ idea in New Zealand. That is, that no one should be treated differently as we are all equals, and conversely, that no one should receive ‘special privileges’ because we should all have an equal chance. This is based on a notion of ‘equality’ as giving everyone identical amounts regardless of context, rather than ‘equity’ which ensures everyone can achieve the same outcomes by adjusting amounts according to different needs. The egalitarian idea behind the ‘one people’ discourse obscures the fact that proponents of the ‘one people’ discourse tend to envisage an ideal context in which everyone behaves and treats each other like Pākehā, while ignoring that the advantages denied to non-Pākehā people mean we do not all start out on a ‘level playing field’. Ranginui Walker notes that the ‘one people’ idea functions as a distorted solution to the continuing social problems arising from the history of colonisation, disguising “the relationship of Pakeha dominance and Maori subjection” (Ka Whawhai 186). Denying Māori culture can contribute to damaging acts of overt racism, as the history of assimilation has shown, and Māori today are still recovering from the historical suppression of te reo and tikanga Māori under the wave of the ‘one people’ ideology.

The Pākehā ideology of future-orientation is another that aids Pākehā and is at odds with te ao Māori. It is evinced in the way Pākehā tend to map out the future and leave the past behind them. It underpins notions of ‘progress’ that posit that things must inevitably improve as time passes, as well as consumerist ideas that encourage the purchase of new goods and the disposal of old ones. This fundamentally contradicts te ao Māori understandings of time and the world. As Ranginui Walker explains:

The past was designated mua, and the future termed muri. Both had double meanings. Mua also meant ‘in front of’, or ‘ahead’. This means the past is conceived of as being in front of human consciousness, because only the present and the past are knowable. Muri, designating the future, also means ‘behind’, because the future cannot be seen. Thus, the individual is
conceptualised as travelling backwards into the future, with the present unfolding in front as a continuum into the past.” (Ngā Pepa 13-14)

This is a fundamental difference between Māori and Pākehā culture, as future-orientation allows Pākehā to disconnect themselves from the history of colonisation, forget the past trauma, and focus fixatedly on the present and future. This means that Pākehā are taught to see the world in such a present way as to view poverty as the sole result of a person’s choices within their lifetime, rather than a continuing result of traumatic colonial processes. It also fuels Pākehā discourses that question why Māori ‘continually bring up the past’ and cannot simply ‘get over it’. Again, if Māori voices were present in mainstream television news and te reo Māori were a compulsory subject in all schools, Pākehā might gain a greater understanding of the different worldviews informing Māori culture and thus be more knowledgeable when voting on New Zealand’s political issues.

These ideologies both support Pākehā dominance and disadvantage Māori. In their study of advantages in New Zealand, Belinda A.E. Borell et al. analysed people interested in privilege partaking in a discussion about their understandings of the construction and application of privilege. Of the 19 participants, 14 were Pākehā and 15 were female. Borell et al. found that Pākehā ideological discourses contributed to Pākehā dominance, as many of their participants “felt that Pakeha cultural assumptions around individualism, meritocracy, and democracy (while being the dominant majority) further entrench Pakeha privilege and its invisibility” (45). One privilege identified by participants in the study was that these unquestioned discourses gave the privileged the ability to frequently assume that their experiences were attainable by all (37). The dominance of Pākehā cultural normativity means Pākehā already have an advantage in operating within almost all institutions in New Zealand, as most systems are already unconsciously oriented to suit Pākehā culture (e.g. Consedine and Consedine 200, 218) and to reinforce Pākehā dominance by perpetuating Pākehā cultural ideologies. This means that non-Pākehā people are automatically disadvantaged in Aotearoa, but the inculcation of self-justifying ideological beliefs in well-meaning Pākehā could make Pākehā less inclined to endorse programmes intended to support marginalised peoples. To focus on the Treaty partners, Pākehā cultural normativity means it is already more difficult for
Māori to navigate dominant ideologies and progress through social institutions, both in terms of external obstacles put in their way by dominant cultural resources and beliefs, and in terms of internal obstacles derived from the internalisation of conflicting ideological beliefs. On top of this, programmes designed to aid Māori legal, educational and professional advancement regularly do not receive the necessary support from the Pākehā public in order to gain the resources they need to operate effectively.

**Oppression**

Pākehā ideological dominance thus constitutes a form of oppression against Māori. A definition of oppression is posited by Young, who states that all oppressed people “suffer some inhibition of their ability to develop and exercise their capacities and express their needs, thoughts, and feelings (38). Pākehā dominance and Pākehā cultural normativity inhibit the ability for Māori both individually and collectively to develop their potentials and exercise their voices. Young notes that the causes of oppression are systemic, located “in unquestioned norms, habits, and symbols, in the assumptions underlying institutional rules and the collective consequences of following those rules” (39). This is an apt description of the way Pākehā ideological dominance operates in New Zealand and oppresses Māori.

Many researchers have begun to see the need for examining the full impact of this racial oppression on the health of oppressed groups. Nancy Krieger highlights that this is an under-studied field of scientific discourse, though she notes that she is not the first to point this out (194). Krieger defines racism as “institutional and individual practices that create and reinforce oppressive systems of race relations whereby people and institutions engaging in discrimination adversely restrict, by judgment and action, the lives of those against whom they discriminate” (195). The dominance of Pākehā perspectives could be said to fulfil all these facets as it disadvantages Māori trying to work within the system, discourages cross-cultural empathy and aid, and encourages misunderstandings and Pākehā complacency, both of which can have discriminatory consequences for Māori in New Zealand society. The denial of Māori voice in the media could be seen to constitute a form of racism as Pākehā-oriented media may allow or justify racist perspectives in Pākehā society.
The potential impact of racist oppression on Māori can be seen in the differences between Māori and non-Māori health. Leanne Manson points out several differences between the health of the two groups. She notes that while the gap between Māori and non-Māori health is increasing, “reducing disparities and acknowledging the rights of Māori to equal health under Te Tiriti o Waitangi have disappeared from policy objectives” (30). One indicator of health differences is the presence of rheumatic fever, which is “almost unheard of in other developed countries” (30) as it is associated with impoverished conditions such as overcrowded housing (NZCYES, 23). Manson notes that Māori children are twenty times more likely to be hospitalised with this condition than non-Māori (30). As well as this, the New Zealand Child and Youth Epidemiology Service (NZCYES) finds that the number of hospitalisations for acute and chronic rheumatic disease is growing among young Māori people but not growing for non-Māori, “indicating an increase in inequalities” (17). Māori propensity to be hospitalised for these conditions that are attributable to a low socio-economic position indicates that they may be suffering from more disadvantaged living conditions than Pākehā. The NZCYES note that this correlation “reinforces the continued need to address childhood poverty and ethnic inequalities in unemployment and economic outcomes” (17). For many Māori this low socio-economic position is traceable to the historical processes of colonial marginalisation and to present discrimination, meaning that the oppression of dominant Whiteness in New Zealand could be said to be a key cause of poor Māori health. As the media have a major role in the reproduction and transmission of dominant ideologies, institutions such as television news become important sites for the potential to change this situation.

Institutional racism and colonisation contribute to historical and structural inequalities in New Zealand society that impact negatively upon the health and wellbeing of Māori. This is an unacceptable state of affairs in New Zealand that can and must be altered. Michael Marmot and Richard G. Wilkinson argue that the psychological effects of social factors relating to inequality, such as anxiety, insecurity and depression, are a powerful explanation for population health disparities (1233). Inequality is something that can be improved, and illnesses associated with economic deprivation can be prevented (NZCYES 17). The Commission on Social Determinants of Health, based in Britain, declares that “[where] inequalities in health are avoidable, yet are not avoided, they are inequitable” (1154). They note that “[the]
right to the highest attainable level of health is enshrined in the charter of WHO and many international treaties. This right obliges governments and others to act—to take steps that increase all individuals’ chances of obtaining good health” (1155). It is clear that the New Zealand Government and New Zealand society have not done enough to improve the living conditions and socio-economic status of Māori. This can be attributable in part to the dominant discourses that justify Pākehā privilege in New Zealand. The dominance of Pākehā discourses in the media is a situation that can also be changed in a way that would benefit Māori and improve New Zealand society overall.

Changes
Both the NZCYES report and New Zealand’s “Decades of Disparity” report by Tony Blakely et al. attribute the present level of inequality between Māori and non-Māori health due to the unequal distribution of resources in New Zealand since the neo-liberal economic reforms of the 1980s. These reforms generally cut welfare spending and dissolved protectionist policies to open up New Zealand to the global free market economy. “Decades of Disparity” notes that these reforms increased inequalities between Māori and non-Māori, as “unemployment rates for Maori rose from levels similar to non-Maori in the early 1980s to three times that of non-Maori in the late 1980s” (17). It also notes that “real incomes of Maori households dropped during this period and did not recover” (17). While the gap between Māori and non-Māori life expectancy had been decreasing before these reforms, it began to increase after this period, as Māori life expectancy remained the same but non-Māori life expectancy steadily improved (Blakely 1). Similarly, NZCYES find that New Zealand income inequality has risen since the 1980s (113). The income inequality created by these neo-liberal economic reforms therefore appears to have a significant negative impact on the health of Māori.

Neo-liberalism rests on principles that both feed into and are fed by Pākehā cultural ideologies, the dominance of which has allowed such economic changes to persist, extending the means by which Pākehā are advantaged and Māori disadvantaged. These include the ideology of individualism and its value of individual freedoms, which may endorse a free-market system that is oriented toward consumer desires and the loosening of government restraints. This ideology also supports the idea that the
individual is accountable for his or her own success, encouraging competitiveness and discouraging welfare. The Pākehā ideology of future-orientation also supports and is supported by a neo-liberal economic direction, because it ties into the consumerist idea that the new is always better than the old, encouraging consumers to buy more things. These logical extensions of Pākehā values indicate that presently, Pākehā culture may be inherently directed toward encouraging, and being encouraged by, the extreme extensions of capitalism. According to Marx’ argument that the “ideas of the ruling class are in every epoch the ruling ideas” (92), dominant New Zealand culture will implicitly teach people these common sense ideologies and values because they support a system that ensures the ruling class are sustained. This reveals a parallel whereby the ideological and democratic dominance of Pākehā secures a system that not only oppresses Māori, but also ensures that the largest amount of wealth remains in the hands of very few people.

Today Māori are greatly over-represented in the lower socio-economic bracket of Aotearoa society, demonstrating the continuing impact of the trauma of colonisation. At the same time, the advantage that these processes gave to Pākehā is evinced in the way Pākehā people largely reside in the middle and upper socio-economic brackets. Of course these categories are very loose and the correlations are not fixed. But while Pākehā discourses dominate in most sectors of society because they are perpetuated through media, educational, governmental and other institutions, these discourses also support a system that ensures the very rich stay rich. This includes both those in New Zealand and those overseas who profit off New Zealand’s neo-liberal systems. This market-dominated system could threaten New Zealand ways of being with American cultural imperialism, threaten New Zealand’s natural environment with economic business interests “motivated not by any concern for the public interest or for national identity and culture, but by the imperative to maximise profits in the interests of their shareholders” (Norris 35), and threaten the financial security of non-elite New Zealanders with the increase of low-wage labour and high income tax cuts. If this context were to continue, non-elite Pākehā may risk losing the opportunity for a fair chance at a prosperous, healthy, happy life.

In the present context, Māori seem to lack this opportunity. In order for the chance to be broadly available in Aotearoa, it is imperative that the dominant ideological
discourses in this country are destabilised and their power and internal contradictions revealed. A straightforward way of doing this that would honour some of the promises in te Tiriti, relieve dominant misunderstandings of te ao Māori and strengthen Māori cultural potential, would be to include Māori voices in mainstream media and make te reo Māori a compulsory subject in all schools. Paulo Freire’s *Pedagogy of the Oppressed* posits that a way to end oppression is through an empowering form of pedagogy. Freire’s model for empowering pedagogy involves a context where the subversive knowledges of oppressed people are validated through didactic dialogue with one another, collectively learning and finding ways to turn their knowledge into revolutionary practice in order to end their situation of oppression. This context can be encouraged and facilitated through the media.
4.

News Processes

The production environment of the news shapes its ideological content. The commercial, time-pressured nature of mainstream news means that journalists have limited resources with which to fully investigate a story before its deadline. Journalists therefore often turn to the sources and narratives they are most familiar with in order to explain an event. As around 84% of news workers in New Zealand are Pākehā (Hollings; Hollings et al.), these sources and narratives often reflect their cultural resources and are located within Pākehā worldviews. This process means the context of mainstream news can discriminate against Māori by omitting stories that are important to te ao Māori, by framing stories in ways that disadvantage Māori perspectives, or by misconstruing aspects of these perspectives. In contrast to this, Māori Television’s Te Kāea and TV ONE’s Te Karere are news broadcasts that are outside the mainstream, oriented toward Māori storytelling, and have different pressures on them. In order to bring more balance to mainstream news, the contexts of production and reception would need to adjust, and there would need to be more space created for diverse Māori perspectives dictated by different Māori cultural ideologies.

Context of Production

There are many constraints on the news-making process that influence the outcome of the final news product. Several researchers have defined different sets of factors that impact upon television news construction in New Zealand such as time, budget and regulations (e.g. Abel Shaping the News 6-16, Horrocks 20-21, Atkinson 120). These can be grouped into political, economic and technological constraints. Each channel may be analysed to determine the extent to which these constraints shape news products on each channel and contribute to the transmission of Pākehā cultural ideologies.

The political and economic constraints on TV ONE stem from the fact that New Zealand’s small population size means it has no fully public-funded television broadcaster (Horrocks 21). TV ONE and Māori Television are therefore both partly
funded by the public through governmental institutions. TV ONE is run by TVNZ and has a target demographic of all people aged 25-54 (“About TVNZ”). TVNZ’s TV ONE and TV2 have a combined audience share of 42% in New Zealand, according to SKY (“Company Information”). TVNZ was formerly the BCNZ or NZBC, the body which has managed New Zealand’s state television channels since New Zealand began broadcasting in the 1960s. It was until recently a State-Owned Enterprise (SOE), which meant it had to respect the Section 9 Treaty clause of the State Owned Enterprise Act 1986. In 2011 its status changed to a Crown entity company, which according to the Crown Entities Act 2004 means it is one of the “companies incorporated under the Companies Act 1993 that are wholly owned by the Crown” (7(1)(b)). Neither this Act nor the Television New Zealand Act 2003 refer to the Treaty. However the TVNZ Act states that:

In carrying out its functions, TVNZ must provide high-quality content that-
(a) is relevant to, and enjoyed and valued by, New Zealand audiences; and
(b) encompasses both New Zealand and international content and reflects Māori perspectives. (12(2))

These varying demands of inclusivity were previously reflected in the TVNZ Charter, which contained stipulations that promoted a balance between commercial and public service objectives for the broadcaster. This Charter was however abolished in 2011, allowing commercial imperatives to take over.

TVNZ notes that 90% of its funding comes through commercial activity such as advertising (“About TVNZ”). This effectively means it must prioritise market share over reflecting New Zealand communities and perspectives. The TVNZ Act states that TVNZ must also return a dividend to the Government every financial year (27(1)). The Act also states that its main purpose is now to be “a successful national television and digital media company providing a range of content and services on a choice of delivery platforms and maintaining its commercial performance” (12(1)). Commercial success therefore remains the driving force behind TV ONE and its flagship programme, ONE News. It also, however, broadcasts a half-hour Māori news bulletin called Te Karere on weekdays at 4pm. As this is less commercially viable programming it is placed outside primetime viewing hours and is therefore less convenient for some people to watch. This less commercial time slot however may mean Te Karere is not as influenced by economic pressure as ONE News. As one of
TVNZ’s four shows it identifies as ‘Māori programmes’ (“TVNZ’s Maori Programming”), *Te Karere* could also be seen to fulfil TVNZ’s mandate to ‘reflect Māori perspectives’. These four shows are all placed far outside of primetime viewing hours, keeping the objective of broad audience appeal at the forefront of TVNZ’s operation.

The more recent Māori Television Service (MTS) has very different demands due in part to the historical struggles detailed earlier that led to its establishment. MTS has the status of a statutory corporation, meaning it is supported by and accountable to the Government and is “required to report to the minister on the slightest of deviations in policy and expenditure” (*Ka Whawhai* 372), according to Ranginui Walker. MTS manages both the Māori Television channel and Te Reo channel. As it was born out of the aim of reviving te reo Māori, the main function of MTS, outlined in the Māori Television Service (*Te Aratuku Whakaata Irirangi Māori*) Act 2003, is to “promote te reo Māori me ngā tikanga Māori through the provision of a high quality, cost-effective Māori television service, in both Māori and English, that informs, educates, and entertains a broad viewing audience, and, in doing so, enriches New Zealand’s society, culture, and heritage” (8(1)). The Act also states, however, that MTS must “(A) prudently manage the assets and liabilities of the Service; (B) maintain the long-term financial viability of the Service; (C) cover the annual costs of the Service from the net annual income; (D) act as a successful going concern” (20(f)(iii)). The income of MTS comes mostly from the Minister of Māori Affairs and Te Māngai Pāho, the Māori broadcasting funding agency. Some of its programming is also supported by contestable funding from NZ on Air, in competition with other producers. MTS predicts it will derive only 3.7% of its income in 2012/2013 from advertising (“Pānui Whāinga” 20). This means that in order to fulfil its governmental obligations detailed in the Act, MTS must stay financially viable, yet its financial success is almost wholly contingent on the Government. MTS must therefore promote Māori culture while trying to appeal to a broad viewing audience in order to continue operating.

The success of MTS suggests these values can find harmony, however a push toward a more commercial orientation may cause the demands to conflict. MTS notes that over two-thirds of its audience are non-Māori, attracted in part by its locally produced programming, and that its viewership has increased at a rate of 14% annually since its
launch in 2004 (“Sales”). Smith and Abel suggest that this popularity in New Zealand proves that “there is an eager market for public service television and that tikanga and te reo Māori have a pivotal function to play in not only te ao Māori, but also the nation as a whole” (4). The question remains as to whether the need to remain commercially successful comes at the expense of MTS’s original purpose of promoting tikanga and te reo Māori. In its predicted key outputs for 2012/2013, MTS states that it aims for 51% of the Māori Television channel’s primetime broadcast to be Māori language programming. It notes that this latter figure has dropped from 60% because of the need for language acquisition programming, but also reflecting “a change in strategy to grow audience while improving the quality of programming” (“Pānui Whāinga” 9). As MTS was created out of the struggle to protect te reo Māori, this change in direction towards a potentially more commercial orientation seems concerning. The major risk embedded in this directional shift appears to be that in trying to sequester part of the viewing audience off the mainstream channels, MTS may start using the same production and presentation techniques that mainstream channels use presently, dictated by competition and commercial orientation. As these techniques tend to be rooted in Pākehā cultural ideologies, this may mean that Māori Television loses its alternative appeal and may detract from the purpose of giving voice to te ao Māori.

The other two channels with New Zealand news broadcasts, TV3 and Prime, are privately owned. New Zealand has no limits on foreign private media ownership, so “[every] major media company in the private sector is foreign-owned, a situation without parallel in the Western world” (Norris 36). The Australian company Ironbridge Capital owns TV3 (“About MediaWorks”), and Prime News is owned by Rupert Murdoch’s SKY, New Zealand’s major subscription broadcaster. According to SKY, Prime has a 5.8% audience share, while TV3 and C4 have a combined audience share of 17% (“Company Information”). Paul Norris posits that their popularity is detrimental to New Zealand as foreign companies “have no particular concern for our national identity and culture” (45). He notes that New Zealand has no requirements for channels to screen any local programming, and that private organisations prefer imported programming as it is much cheaper than producing shows in New Zealand (45-46). This suggests that foreign ownership and foreign programming may negatively impact upon the distinctiveness of New Zealand’s various identities and
cultures. The principle objective of both these channels is commercial success, which means appealing to and maintaining broad audiences in order to sell advertising space.

All New Zealand television bulletins therefore seem to be dictated by a substantial amount of commercial pressure to keep audiences interested, except for Te Karere, which has less. Much of the commercial pressure on television news derives from the fact that television programming is very expensive to make compared to radio or newspapers. A television channel’s news programme may be one of its highest rating shows, contributing to the advertising income necessary for the channel to operate. The technological constraints on television news are therefore intertwined with the economic constraints.

The prevailing commercial pressures on mainstream news bulletins can mean that a greater amount of pre-planning is required, and predictable events with strong visuals are preferred. The context of television watching means viewers are easily distracted, so commercial pressure can also result in decreased soundbites and the priority of images in the news in order to maintain the attention of the audience. News delivery and content may become more personalised, framing a story in terms of the effect on one person rather than the social implications. The motive to sensationalise and maximise the drama of an event may be increased and stories may be kept simple and performance-oriented in order to increase their entertainment value. This format may mimic a narrative structure with climaxes and a pleasant resolution to leave the viewer feeling satisfied (Abel *Shaping the News* 11). Story ideas may also be tailored to reflect the common sense of the local culture (Atkinson 121-122), in order to target a broad audience.

**News Values**

Many of the priorities created by these technological, political and economic constraints align with what media scholarship suggests are key news values, or the factors that newsmakers consider important in selecting and constructing news stories. These may reflect Pākehā values, making them useful tools for examining the extent to which Pākehāness is evident in the news. A study conducted by Johan Galtung and
Mari Ruge in 1973 is a seminal text in the area of news values. They posit that the following priorities make a story newsworthy (53-56):

**Frequency:** The timespan of the event, the quicker the better i.e. an assassination is more important than a devastating environmental trend developing over several decades.

**Threshold:** The size of the event, which must be big enough to be newsworthy, and the amount of drama in the event, which will only be continuously reported if the drama increases.

**Unambiguity:** The clarity of the event. A story is more likely to be reported if its meaning is clear, and the range of perspectives on it can be limited to be easily understandable.

**Meaningfulness:** The cultural proximity and relevance to the news workers. If a story is important within the dominant culture it is more likely to be reported on, and stories that are important to minority or foreign cultures are only likely to be reported if they impact upon the dominant culture in some way.

**Consonance:** The predictability of the event. If news workers can see an event is likely to turn violent, they will have their cameras there on time, so the story will probably be reported. If other major things happen at the event, such as mass prayer, song or debate, the story is still likely to be reported within the frame of the expected violence e.g. as things that added to or were affected by the violence.

**Unexpectedness:** Surprising, unexpected and rare events are deemed newsworthy, but this is often within the context of the other news values cited, meaning that surprise events are reported in familiar ways and tend to be recorded if they occur in familiar, accessible contexts.

**Continuity:** A relevant, developing story will run in the news for a long time.

**Composition:** How it fits in to the narrative of the bulletin. Stories that would usually be deemed unimportant may be included in the news if they are relevant to a major story or balance out a pattern in the rest of the broadcast e.g. to leave the viewer feeling satisfied.

Galtung and Ruge present these values as “culture-free in the sense that we do not expect them to vary significantly with variations in human culture” (56).
They also find four news values that are more specific to “the north-western corner of the world” (59), or those societies founded on White European culture. These are (56-57):

**Reference to elite nations:** Events based in politically powerful countries will be more likely to receive coverage, and disasters in White societies are given more importance than those in non-White societies.

**Reference to elite persons:** Celebrities and politicians are more important than everyone else, and can be used for the purposes of broad identification.

**Personalisation:** Events are more likely to be reported in terms of their impact on the individual or a specific person. Therefore a criminal event is more likely to be explained in terms of the actions of ‘a bad person’ on ‘a good person’ rather than as demonstrating the cumulative causes and effects of poverty in society.

**Negativity:** Bad news is more important than good news.

These values have been broadly developed and built upon, but Judy McGregor notes that in the decades since its creation, this theory “has not been critically challenged” (2). She provides an update to these principles to suit the televisual age, proposing the addition of four new values (3):

**Visualness:** The attainment of quality images drives story selection.

**Emotion:** The display of strong, evocative human emotion makes a story more appealing.

**Conflict:** News is driven by a conflict format due to an adversary, dichotomy-based understanding of ‘balance’, wherein every story has two polarised ‘sides’ that must be pitted against each other.

**The “celebrification” of the journalist:** The central mediating personality of the journalist may add to a story’s newsworthiness.

There are several overlaps between the results of commercial pressures and the defining news values, suggesting that the values of television news broadcasting are inherently influenced by profit motives. As noted earlier, the values of extreme capitalism are distinct from, yet entwined with and similar to, the values of Pākehā culture at the present moment. These appear to normatively include individualism,
meritocracy, majority-rule, future-orientation and privilege.

This commonality highlights that the constraints and values influencing news production may be governed by Pākehā cultural ideologies. These ideologies may in turn be detrimental to Māori. McGregor notes that news values and constraints often result in news coverage that has emphasis “on conflict, on the ‘bad news’ and defines Maori people in ‘problem terms’” (6-7). She notes that these trends mirror the news values that Galtung and Ruge declared were particular to Western countries, and concludes that “the news values employed by the New Zealand news media, which follow generally the criteria identified by Galtung and Ruge, are Pakeha values” (7). Galtung and Ruge reinforce this by noting that the prevailing move toward personification in the news “is an outcome of cultural idealism according to which man is the master of his own destiny and events can be seen as the outcome of an act of free will” (57). This fits within the ideology of individualism, which Prasun Sonwalkar notes “lies at the core of the many levels of influences on media content” (264). The pressure of the ‘new’ and the ‘present’ in news construction, shown through the value of ‘frequency’, also reflects Pākehā future-orientation (Kupu Taea 14). Other values such as ‘unambiguity’ and ‘meaningfulness’ will be directed towards Pākehā cultural understandings in New Zealand. Sonwalkar notes that the socio-cultural binary of ‘us’ and ‘them’ that appears often in the media reifies “a deep-rooted and complex structure of values, beliefs, themes and prejudices” (263) prevailing in dominant culture. This is reinforced by the value of ‘Conflict.’ As ‘us’ is invariably aligned with the media’s perception of what the majority of readers believe, this binary reflects the ideology of majority-rule and also supports the way privilege is said to be a fundamental part of White identity construction (Twine 224). Though Galtung and Ruge felt that most of their news values were ‘culture-free’, it appears as though in mainstream New Zealand news, these values dictating the structuring and selection of items all stem from Pākehā cultural ideologies.

By mirroring the values of the dominant culture, news makers construct, limit and frame stories “in order to make the material more compatible with their image of what the readers want” (Galtung and Ruge 56), aligning with dominant ideas of what is ‘fair’, ‘balanced’, ‘accurate’ and ‘true’. As it is advantageous for news corporations to speak from the worldviews of the dominant audience, market constraints on news
may be naturalised by Pākehā common sense discourses so that Pākehā may not notice how news is shaped.

Pākehā cultural ideologies thus influence the selection of mainstream news items and impact upon the way these stories are constructed. The pervasiveness of Pākehā cultural ideologies means they are able to gain the power of common sense in New Zealand, which Chris Weedon defines as “a number of social meanings and particular ways of understanding the world which guarantee them. These meanings which inevitably favour the interests of particular social groups become fixed and widely accepted as true” (77). Timothy McCreanor describes this phenomena as creating a ‘standard story’ (53) in New Zealand based on widely circulated discourses that allow media readers to instantly identify what a story is about by recognising commonly repeated themes. For example, words like ‘nanny state’ ‘welfare mothers’ and ‘benefit dependency’ can instantly tell the reader what angle and discourse a story is utilising to create meaning. The reader can anticipate that the story will be critical of public assistance policy and evoke the ideology of individualism to shift responsibility for public wellbeing from the state onto the individual. Whether they agree with it or not, the ability to identify the ‘standard story’ behind a news item means that the media participant can thus read the story within the frame of its intended discourse to make sense of it quickly and easily.

Viewpoints that are alternative to dominant discourses have much more work to do in order to be efficiently and succinctly understood in the news. McCreanor reinforces this by noting that for alternative discourses, “the work required to produce successful communication is vastly increased and the enterprise prone to failure” (54). Nairn et al. note that those who cannot easily utilise dominant common sense “have to explain their underlying assumptions before they can make their point. Within a 10-second soundbite that necessity places them at a disadvantage” (“Media, Racism” 190). Abel, McCreanor and Barnes note that in news coverage of Waitangi Day 1990, the discourse that challenged the status quo “was associated with those actively protesting, so was only heard in fragments, and viewers were clearly not expected to identify with it” (68). In this instance the inability of the alternative perspective to gain traction in the media decreased the possibilities for mainstream audiences to support it. Abel, McCreanor and Barnes posit that even when a story is reported from
a perspective that challenges mainstream discourses, a lack of background knowledge means it is likely that “many Pakeha readers will ‘decode’ elements of the story… in less sympathetic terms because of the ways that they conflict with hegemonic discourse” (75). The ‘standard story’ of Pākehā common sense thus acts as a powerful mediator in shaping news stories and filtering which perspectives are articulated, heard, received, understood, and addressed in the news, or who has voice and who does not.

Framing Māori

The normativity of Pākehā ideologies in the news thus facilitates the transmission of hegemonic Pākehā worldviews while disadvantaging Māori by making it more difficult for non-mainstream views to be understood by broad audiences. Pākehā ideological dominance and commercial pressures also mean that news practices operate in the interests of Pākehā by reflecting Pākehā common sense and orienting stories toward Pākehā readers. These practices in turn have a detrimental effect on Māori by presenting stories in a way that may conflict with Māori ideologies and by framing news stories that involve Māori in Pākehā terms.

In discussing such stories I will use ‘stories involving Māori’ in preference to ‘Māori news’ or ‘Māori issues’ to refer to news items that involve Māori people, iwi political interests or te ao Māori. Kupu Taea note that they believe “the Treaty and Māori-Pākehā relations are equally relevant to Pākehā New Zealanders” (16). I too believe such stories are equally important to Pākehā, however I will be labelling them ‘stories involving Māori’ in order to differentiate them. The fact that stories involving Māori can be differentiated from ‘the rest’ of mainstream news shows that they are not overly common on mainstream news. This labelling highlights that while terming most news stories ‘Pākehā items’ would seem ludicrous, it is potentially much nearer to the reality than the exnominated idea that these stories are the ‘normal’ selection for ‘everyone’. The limited number of stories involving Māori may skew mainstream perceptions of the relevance of different Māori perspectives to New Zealand life. At the present moment in mainstream news, stories involving Māori are usually limited to Treaty debates, iwi land claims and disparity indicators. In te reo Māori news it is evident that all news stories can involve Māori.
The constraints and values dictated by Pākehā ideologies contribute to the tendency for mainstream news to replicate negative reporting patterns in stories involving Māori. In analysing dominant discourses surrounding Māori in mainstream media, Timothy McCreanor has come up with a set of ‘standard stories’ that are used to frame stories involving Māori to the advantage of Pākehā. These common sense discourses are underpinned by Pākehā ideological values. The prevalence of these monocultural discourses in New Zealand makes Pākehā ideologies powerfully normative, and makes it more difficult for subjects to critically analyse the way they are being constituted within the power relations of society.

McCreanor identifies the following discourses prevalent in mainstream media and Pākehā society:

1. MAORI CULTURE. Maori culture is fundamentally inferior to the mainstream culture of the country…
   Thus Maori culture is of little value and cannot compete in the modern world. It is dependent upon Pakeha for support and survival. To prove the worth of their system, Maori are challenged to live without the advantages of Pakeha culture. They must give up their motorcars, television sets and refrigerators and return to "grass skirts and mud huts".

2. GOOD MAORI/BAD MAORI. Maori fall into two groups, those who fit into Pakeha society and those who do not. Good Maori are often historical figures, living in rural areas as quietly successful farmers or entrepreneurs. They are polite, dignified, passive and contribute unobtrusively to the welfare of their own and the broader society.
   Bad Maori are a contemporary development, arising out of identification with Black militant organisations abroad and the work of local agitators. They are young, demanding and aggressive and disrupt the harmonious relations that otherwise pertain between Maori and Pakeha.
   Alternatively they are disproportionately represented in the casualty areas of society in health, education, welfare and poverty through their own shortcomings and as such are an unwelcome drain upon the taxpayer.
3. MAORI VIOLENCE. Violence is an essential part of the Maori character reflecting this recent emergence from the primitive savage state of their pre-European existence. Maori (men especially) seek and enjoy violence.

4. MAORI INHERITANCE. There are very few "real" Maori left. Most part-Maori are more something else. Many people who identify as Maori do so only in order to claim the unfair privileges which Maori enjoy.

5. PRIVILEGE. Maori have special privileges in our society. They have rights over and above those of the rest of the population. These include the Maori seats in parliament, the Maori Affairs Department, Maori housing loans, Maori sports teams, education allowances, fishing rights and other advantages. All of these are construed as unfair, racist and akin to apartheid.

6. ONE PEOPLE. We are all New Zealanders, Kiwis. Unless we move beyond racial difference and unite under our national identity, the tension will continue to undermine our country. Ideas of biculturalism and multiculturalism must be rejected except as a way of enriching the mainstream culture with a touch of the exotic.

7. STIRRERS. If only the (Maori) agitators would stop stirring up trouble where none actually exists, race relations in New Zealand would be the "best in the world" once more. The activists are presented as malcontents who will never be happy unless they are making trouble. They operate by misleading segments of the Maori community into believing that they are unjustly treated by Pakeha. The activists are vocal, aggressive, separatist and racist; there is a considerable overlap between this group and 'Bad Maori'.

8. RIGHTS. Equal rights for all is a democratic cornerstone of our society. One person's rights end where the next person's begin. Privilege is anathema.

9. SENSITIVITY. Racial tension arises from the over-sensitivity of Maori to the importance of their culture and of their position in the mainstream. A common expression of this idea is that Maori have "lost their sense of humour" in this regard and need to rethink their role in society as equal rather than privileged members.

10. IGNORANCE. Where Pakeha do offend Maori they do so out of ignorance rather than intent. This notion serves to excuse Pakeha transgressions and to shift the blame for such incidents to Maori who have failed to educate Pakeha as to the niceties of the Maori way. (65-67)
These discourses may be widely circulated because of their function in justifying the results of present and historical Pākehā domination in New Zealand. An investigation in the next chapter will examine at the extent to which these are evident in mainstream television news coverage of Waitangi Day.

**Impact on Māori**

The role of Pākehā perspectives in shaping mainstream news can have a detrimental impact upon Māori in violation of their Human Rights, Indigenous Rights and their legal rights as Treaty partners. Abel gives an example of this by noting that telling a news story “without taking the past into account can in itself be seen as a monocultural practice. At the same time, it also produces a version of events which favours Pākehā” (“The Public’s Right to Know” 18). Kupu Taea also note that “[the] absence of links between current issues and their colonial origins supports status quo understandings of Māori/Pākehā relations” (44) which are normatively disadvantageous to Māori.

Mainstream media in Aotearoa has the historic tendency to frame stories involving Māori negatively. Kupu Taea found that the amount of negative news stories involving Māori had decreased between 2004 and 2007, but that mainstream media lacked context on Māori issues, lacked Māori sources and, in print media, only used an average of two Māori words per item. They found that stories involving Māori focussed on conflict and overused words such as “radical” and “activist” to overwhelmingly apply to Māori. In coverage of Waitangi Day 2007 mainstream news emphasised violence and trivialised discussion by focussing on the weather, and implied politics and Treaty remembrances were negative and divisive by creating a dichotomy between the stormy commemorations at Waitangi and the sunny festivities elsewhere, emphasising the theme of unity-without-division (Kupu Taea 23–45). They found these overall trends to be in breach of te Tiriti.

Kelly Barclay and James Liu also found this tendency in their analysis of mainstream news discussions surrounding the 1995 occupation of Pakaitore/ Moutoa gardens in Whanganui by local iwi. They found that “the amount of voice afforded to Maori” (3) was more consistent with the multiculturalist discourse that positions Māori in the
status of a minority, rather than with their legal bicultural status as an equal partner in this country under the Treaty of Waitangi. This was seen in the lesser amounts of discourse giving voice to Māori MPs (Barclay and Liu 7) and the occupiers themselves, and in the use of shorter quotes for these groups that could be taken out of context. The study also found that each Māori voice was consistently matched with a different version of the story, nullifying it in a way that did not happen with other sources (9). The findings of Barclay and Liu indicate that mainstream news practices have a strong tendency to disfavour Māori.

Hodgetts, Masters and Robertson demonstrate the impact that media framing can have on Māori in their study of media responses to the “Decades of Disparity” report in New Zealand. As discussed earlier, this report showed that after the neo-liberal economic reforms of the 1980s, Māori life expectancy plateaued while non-Māori life expectancy began to rapidly rise. Hodgetts, Masters and Robertson note that in the media response to this report “debate was limited by the exercise of symbolic power” (460). Rather than assign communal and structural responsibility for the advantages non-Māori appeared to be gaining at the expense of Māori, the media focussed on “whether Maori neglected their health by adopting unhealthy lifestyles and ‘choosing’ to not access medical services in time” (462). This shifted blame to individual Māori instead of acknowledging the social disadvantages embedded in governmental reforms and Pākehā-oriented institutions. This individual blame-oriented discourse limited the scope of argument so that the evidence “that Māori are more physically active and eat less fast food than Pakeha” (467) was not registered in the media. The media thus utilised dominant Pākehā individualist discourses of Māori fault, rather than acknowledging Pākehā culpability and advocating for the structural changes recommended in the report to aid Māori health.

As media constructions of public opinion affect policymakers, this individualism and the transmission of other Pākehā ideologies in mainstream news reporting may itself have a major effect on ensuring Pākehā advantage and negatively impact upon Māori. In a study of news media agenda-setting and the influence on politics, Diana Mutz and Joe Soss found that a media organisation’s stance on an issue might be somewhat predetermined but may be presented as the dominant opinion. In studying responses to such a stance, they found that the position of a media institution does not change
the opinions of readers about an issue. They found, however, that it does have a
“third-person effect” (435), influencing readers’ perceptions of what the dominant
opinion is on a matter, and creating a tendency for people unaffected by a story “to
infer that other readers or viewers may have been influenced by the tone or perceived
slant” (435). This is particularly troubling when perceptions of public opinion are a
major tool that politicians and advocates use to guide campaigning and policy-making
(Mutz and Soss 447). Media institutions therefore have significant power over the
perception of public opinion, both socially and politically. Even if large numbers of
readers actually disagree with media perspectives, public opinion may be presented to
align with Pākehā ideologies and favour the Pākehā mainstream. In this way
mainstream media institutions can contribute politically to the marginalisation of
Māori.

Mainstream media marginalisation of Māori has numerous consequences. In their
analysis of audience responses to news items involving Māori, Kupu Taea note that
“media representations of Māori were not an abstract issue, but one that could have a
regular negative impact on people’s lives” (43). Their Māori focus group suggested
that “every time news media depict Māori as threatening or privileged, thousands of
Māori may face hostility or prejudice the next day in their interactions with Pākehā”
(43). Kupu Taea find mainstream media representations unbalanced and unjust,
overly extreme and threatening, divisive, superficial, commercial, and lacking
historical and political context (43). As a result, they argue that this damages the
wellbeing of Māori and reinforces negative Pākehā perceptions. Kupu Taea’s research
indicates that “mass media acts as a watchdog for Pākehā interests and is rarely
sceptical of Pākehā initiatives that breach the Treaty. Instead, it is sceptical of Treaty-
based initiatives or points of view” (45). They find this lack of balance stems from the
way mainstream news items are “persistently structured from within a Pākehā cultural
paradigm. When they talked about taxpayers, the public or New Zealanders, they
typically excluded Māori” (5). This reinforces the suggestion that news processes
which disadvantage Māori stem from the normativity of Pākehā cultural dominance.

**Structural Dominance**

By detailing the processes, constraints, values and discourses that impact upon
mainstream news production, we can see that the prejudicial treatment of Māori
representations is not the result of the intentions of overtly racist journalists. Rather, a myriad of institutional factors stemming from Pākehā ideological dominance operate on the news in the interests of Pākehā and to the disadvantage of Māori. Sonwalkar notes that “[journalists] are drawn from the ‘national mainstream’ and circularly cater to this section of society and its value system” (264). Abel points to the Pākehā cultural background of most journalists as a major factor in monocultural news production (Shaping the News 21). Familiarity and the need for efficiency and accessibility can make news events and sources located within Pākehā culture more attractive to Pākehā journalists than news events and sources located within te ao Māori (Shaping the News 21-22). She also finds that the low number of Māori journalists and the lack of journalistic education about racism and te ao Māori are components that hinder the transformation of newsroom processes (194-195). A comparison between an interrogation of the 2006 census (Hollings) and a survey of newsroom composition in 2007 (Hollings et al.) suggests that Māori make up around 5% of newsrooms while around 84% of newsrooms are European. The 2006 population data shows that 67.6% of New Zealanders identify as European while 14.6% identify as Māori (“QuickStats”). 10.3% identified as New Zealander, and around the same amount identified with more than one category. This suggests that newsrooms are disproportionately Pākehā with overly low numbers of Māori, contributing to the dominance of Pākehā ideologies in news processes and influencing news production.

Pākehā ideological dominance in the media allows the transmission of Pākehā power, as the media’s institutional role in the articulation of social meaning can affect the way individuals and groups are constituted within the power relations of New Zealand society. In the same way that this ideological dominance becomes obscured by the pervasive cultural common sense, news processes and limitations are rendered invisible in the construction of the news. Allan points to the role of the media in the replication of hegemony and argues that the ‘naturalness’ of news techniques, “as key terrains of the ongoing political struggle over the right to define the ‘reality’ of public issues” (105), needs to be exposed in order to highlight the voices that are silenced by the media. He also notes, however, that any attempt to do this “should, at the same time, seek to identify the extent to which the same strategies are being challenged, even transgressed, over time” (105). The biggest challenge to hegemonic Pākehā
mainstream news values appears to be issued by te reo Māori news in its use of ‘alternative’, though not necessarily ‘opposite’, strategies for selecting and constructing news stories. In conducting a close analysis of news values in Waitangi Day coverage, this contrast may therefore make it easier to discern whether such challenges are evident within mainstream discourses themselves.

As an example of how te reo Māori news strategies are alternative to and challenge the mainstream, Kupu Taea’s 2007 study of stories involving Māori found that te reo Māori news used a higher proportion of female sources than mainstream news, preferred iwi sources over government sources, and let sources speak for one-and-a-half to three times longer. Te reo Māori news examined the reasons for protest on Waitangi Day 2007 and interviewed Māori political, religious and iwi leaders to discuss historical and political issues. They spoke from discourses situated in Māori worldviews to emphasise “the importance of whānau, global indigenous rights, honouring and promoting te Tiriti, tupuna and tino rangatiratanga, alongside the promotion of goodwill and harmony” (Kupu Taea 36). Te Kāea stood out by utilising a minority of political sources, preferring a diversity of opinion, as opposed to the mainstream news theme of unity-without-division on Waitangi Day. The difference between mainstream and te reo Māori broadcasting shows that te reo Māori broadcasters challenge mainstream news practices and demonstrate how stories involving Māori can be framed in ways that do not impact negatively upon Māori.

In analysing television news coverage of Waitangi Day and surrounding events in 2012, I therefore take into account the constraints and values framing stories involving Māori, as well as the challenge to these practices issued by te reo Māori news and the potential for this challenge to be found within the internal contradictions of mainstream news practices.
Close Analysis: Television news coverage of Waitangi Day 2012 and surrounding events

In order to determine the extent to which Pākehā ideological dominance is present in and transmitted through television news in New Zealand, I will be conducting a close analysis of three mainstream news programmes and two te reo Māori news programmes and their coverage of Waitangi Day and surrounding events in 2012. The focus on Waitangi Day continues a tradition established by Sue Abel in 1990, 1994 and 1995 and Kupu Taea in 2004 and 2007, but shifts the analytical perspective to the lens of Critical Whiteness Studies.

The Immediate Context

In the weeks leading up to Waitangi Day 2012 the National Government of New Zealand announced its intention to carry out a campaign promise to sell off 49% of each of four state-owned power companies to private investors. It declared that in order to do this, new legislation would need to be drawn up in the name of the Mixed Ownership Model Bill, and these power companies would be transferred from the State Owned Enterprises Act 1986 to this new legislation so that they could be sold. One week before Waitangi Day, National announced that Section 9 of the State Owned Enterprises Act would not be included in the new legislation. This Section states, “Nothing in this Act shall permit the Crown to act in a manner that is inconsistent with the principles of the Treaty of Waitangi.” The exclusion of the Treaty clause in the new Mixed Ownership Model legislation meant it appeared to Māori that the Government was lessening its obligations to adhere to the principles of te Tiriti o Waitangi, said to be the founding document of the New Zealand nation, and fundamentally important in the battle to secure Māori rights.

This proposed omission caused a public and parliamentary furore, leading the Māori Party to threaten to walk away from its coalition with the National Government. The Māori Council soon announced that it intended to bring a claim to the Waitangi Tribunal for the rights to Aotearoa’s fresh water. This was designed to obstruct the asset sales process as all the power companies on offer relied on the Waikato River.
The Government responded that it would act within the law, but as the Waitangi Tribunal’s recommendations were not legally binding, this action was unlikely to halt the asset sales.

This contextualises the week leading up to Waitangi Day. Not only is this a national commemoration of the signing of the Treaty and a celebration of its ideals, it is a day that has become an historic focal point for Māori and supporters to voice their concerns to the Government, to protest in opposition to past and present discrimination, and to remind politicians of their obligations to te Tiriti o Waitangi. Many New Zealanders felt outright opposition to the sale of these public assets. Many Māori felt the Māori Party should be doing more to stop the sale and to fight for the inclusion of a Treaty principle. It appeared as though all these factors would culminate on Waitangi Day, and the news media anticipated more of the activism the country had seen in previous years.

Close Analysis
I employ Hilary Janks’ rubric for Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA), discussed earlier, while adding components of unsaid information, visual language and the verbal and non-verbal performance of communication, drawing from Norman Fairclough and James Paul Gee. I use Fairclough’s process of moving from text through discursive practice to social practice, and use these methods to determine who has voice in the news items. Kim Christian Schrøder notes that by intervening in the discursive relations of power, the insights gained through CDA can interrupt and change oppressive practices (116), making it a suitable mechanism for the following analysis.

Sunday 5th February, 2012

Prime News, Prime. 5:30pm- 6:30pm. English.
On Sunday, Prime News presents one item about the protests at Waitangi and their effect on John Key. It is the first item in the Prime News bulletin, indicating that it is the most prominent story of the day or rated most highly according to the values of the news. All the on-screen news workers are Pākehā. To begin the analysis at the level of the text, or of what is said, Alistair Wilkinson on the Prime News desk opens
with the line “Tonight verbal abuse forces the Prime Minister to cut short a Waitangi speech.” The immediate focus is thus on the elite person of John Key. The passive voice used places blame on the ‘verbal abuse’, implicitly giving the activists agency and positioning Key as the victim, his actions merely a response to the protestors’. The rest of the story then focuses on the way the activism impacted upon Key, giving Key a significant amount of voice and is silent about the reasons the protestors had for their actions. Prime News is the only bulletin to refer to him as “Mr Key”, showing him a level of respect. By prioritising Key’s account of events the story aligns with the perspective of governmental authority, reinforcing a status quo understanding of events. This frame is reiterated by Wilkinson when he notes “John Key’s playing down the ugly scenes, calling it a wasted opportunity.” The viewer receives Key’s perspective on the situation but no one else’s. The Pākehā news value of ‘Elite persons’ immediately orients the story to the disadvantage of the activists, who are demonstrating in support of Māori rights.

The news values of ‘Thresholds’ and ‘Conflict’ are reflected as the story emphasises the potential for violence in order to maximise its dramatic capacity at the level of what is communicated and what is understood. Wilkinson crosses to Kevin Baker-Williams, who notes that the protest “was far from peaceful. They tried to charge for [Key].” This is said over panning mid-shots of protestors standing around yelling, followed by a hand-held mid-shot of some people holding a banner and running onto the marae atea, before being held back by security. Baker-Williams describes Key’s welcome as “overpowered by the shouting of the protestors, prepared for violence.” The use of aggressive verbs such as ‘overpowered’ creates the implication of an alarming, dangerous situation, though he is only talking about shouting. The words are said over more hand-held long-shots and mid-shots of protestors in groups getting pushed off the marae atea by Māori Wardens, adding to the language used to suggest the day was filled with significant threats to safety. These groups are clearly part of the same event as the running banner-holders, indicating that the situation may have only lasted a matter of minutes, though the repeated shots imply that the whole day was chaotic and dangerous. There is no evidence that anyone is ‘prepared for violence’, and this claim is left unfounded. Through a careful selection of words and images, the Prime News bulletin manages to construct the day as vastly more
dramatic and dangerous than it actually may have been. These moments combine to suggest that news values can quite heavily skew the representation of events.

The combination of the focus on elites, the deliberate construction of the segment to maximise drama even if it skews the situation, and the lack of voice given to activists, all indicate that in this story Prime News 2012 mimics the state of mainstream news in Abel’s investigation of the coverage of Waitangi Day in 1990. Abel notes that 1990 coverage worked from “the ‘commonsense’ assumption that protest is a problem and the way to contain the problem is through ‘a heavy police presence’” (Shaping the News 85) and that “[this] immediately positions protesters as a potential threat to ‘our’ society” (ibid., 85). She also notes that in 1990 the position of ‘we’ that the news workers spoke from “did not seem to include the protestors” (ibid., 139), excluding them and interpelling news viewers as opposed to protest. This is the same position Prime News takes, presuming to address those who disapprove of the activism. As in 2012, Abel notes the 1990 coverage failed to consider “whether protest actions could have positive effects” (ibid., 97). Discourses that are oppositional to Pākehā values are completely omitted in this style of news work.

By speaking from the Pākehā perspective of the reporters combined with White news values, the bulletin constructs a common sense at the level of discursive practice in which ‘we’, the group that is aligned with Key and the reporters, are reasonable and tolerant while the ‘they’ group, which includes protestors, Māori rights activists, environmental activists and their supporters, are unreasonable and rowdy. This ‘we’ seems closely aligned with a racial coding of Pākehā, while ‘they’ seems to align with the way mainstream news historically codes Waitangi Day activists as Māori. This is because the central focus of Waitangi Day activism tends to be honouring the rights of Māori enshrined in te Tiriti and recognising Māori tino rangatiratanga. By constructing ‘them’ as potentially violent and threatening, this broadcast may draw on McCreanor’s Pākehā discourse of ‘Māori violence’ (66), employing underlying racist stereotypes of Māori as pathologically aggressive and volatile. While this may not be conscious or deliberate, the choices of the news makers stem from their cultural common sense, and operate to alienate and exclude viewers who support Māori rights causes, while failing to provide their perspectives. The text can interact with social practise by having the effect of further entrenching stigmas in viewers who are
uninformed about these causes, which can have very real negative effects for Māori in the social world.

The group of activists actually appears to contain a diverse range of ethnicities and a high proportion of Pākehā. Yet the news operates to disfavour them at Waitangi, showing how Pākehāness in the news can disadvantage Māori. By coding the group as Māori and then continually operating to invalidate their cause, mainstream news processes can be seen to structurally work against the interests of Māori by operating to reject discourses that are oppositional to the status quo. The bulletin overall gives voice to John Key, whose experience is canvassed, communicated and understood within Pākehā discourses. It addresses Pākehā viewers and silences the voices of Māori rights activists.

3 News, TV3. 6:00pm- 7:00pm. English.

3 News begins with two items from Waitangi, the first about politicians and the second about protest. The text opens with the statement, “Tonight on 3 News, Waitangi turns ugly early,” overlaying a medium close-up of activists jostling on the marae, with a caption reading ‘Waitangi Protests’. The closer shot adds to the sense of chaos as the viewer can see a lot of movement but has only a limited perception of what is happening. The words “Waitangi turns ugly early” imply that the event was expected to ‘turn ugly’ at some point. At the level of discursive practice, not only does this frame political activism as ‘ugly’, negative and chaotic, but it operates within McCreanor’s Pākehā discourses of ‘Stirrers’ and ‘Māori violence’ (66) to frame the story as a question of ‘will there be violence/ how much violence?’ Focussing on the drama of the expected protest detracts from the issue of what the activism might be about, so that at the level of social practice it fails to inform viewers about this side of the story.

The underlying logic of this segment seems to be that ‘there will be claims and protest’, rather than a logic of ‘Māori will be unreasonable’ that was evident in previous years. Abel noticed this shift in her comparison between 1990 and 1995 coverage of Waitangi Day, noting that a ‘new common sense’ was evident in “the general acceptance of the idea that Maori had legitimate grievances and had the right to work for their resolution - so long as they worked within the system” (Shaping the
News 162). This shift suggests a growing Pākehā acceptance of the justifiable nature of claims and activism, though at the same time activism has a very low threshold before it exceeds the boundaries of working acceptably within the system. This story does not investigate whether the activism is justified, but instead concentrates on the extent to which the protests ‘disrupted’ the formal proceedings.

3 News continues to vilify political activism as news presenter Simon Shepherd states “angry demonstrations have again marred Waitangi events today.” He ends the statement with a downward inflection, so his prosody seems to suggest that this occurrence is a disappointment. Abel notes that similar rhetoric was used in 1990, revealing “the underlying assumption - that perfection is the absence of dissent, is a feeling of ‘togetherness’” (Shaping the News 48) rather than perfection being the absence of any major reason for dissent. The disadvantage this gives the activists stems from the Pākehā ideology of future-orientation, as this creates a short-term understanding of the importance of time and the past, shaping a shorter narrative of events that tends to omit and silence relevant history. Abel notes that the 1990 coverage of Waitangi Day encouraged “an attitude of looking forward, rather than of looking back over the years since the Treaty was signed” (Shaping the News 46). This future-orientation reflects Galtung and Ruge’s value of ‘Frequency’, or the priority of stories that develop and can be understood within a short time-span. These factors shape the narrative of a story. John Fiske notes that news stories tend to follow a narrative structure modelled by Tsvetan Todorov, in which a story “begins in a state of equilibrium which is disrupted… The narrative charts the course of this disequilibrium and its final resolution in another, preferably enhanced and more stable, equilibrium” (138-9). Fiske notes that the state of equilibrium is not newsworthy and therefore not described (139). Ian Stuart uses this model to chart the difference between Māori and Pākehā narratives. His exposition suggests that a short-term understanding of history means mainstream news frames protest as disrupting the equilibrium of ‘festive harmony’. An alternative and more historical Māori perspective might see past legal injustices as the source of disequilibrium, making protest a response to this injustice and a means of restoring the equilibrium of fairness (51). The quest to restore equilibrium by the end of the news bulletin reflects the commercial pressure to leave viewers feeling satisfied, and appears to be a powerful factor in shaping news stories. The combination of these Pākehā values serves to
disadvantage Māori political grievances in the news, as these often require a long-term perspective of history in order to be understood.

In the next story Patrick Gower states “politics and protest is what Waitangi has become known for.” His prosody suggests this is a regrettable circumstance, while the passive construction of his phrase implies that he is speaking for ‘everyone’, removing the agency of news workers in creating this impression. Gower’s statement demonstrates the way that reporters and newsreaders can appear to have authority in a news text. This impression can be enhanced by the tendency of reporters to set the agenda and control turn-taking in interviews, to paraphrase other people, to use statements instead of suggestions, to use contextualisation signals frequently to refer to occurrences outside the text, and to completely avoid the use of modality. These techniques seem to confer social authority onto on-screen newsworkers and their voices are rendered supremely important in a news piece. This means their position in the text has a major influence on the way it is received and its interaction with society. Gower’s tone and phrasing operate within dominant discourses to imply that everyone feels that the presence of politics at Waitangi is unfortunate, silencing the perspective that it is the reasons behind the politics that are truly regrettable.

Mihingarangi Forbes begins the next story about the protests at Waitangi. She discusses the protestors’ effect on John Key, but also mentions that the “kaikaranga struggled to be heard” and that the “paepae called for calm,” details left out by the other mainstream broadcasts in their focus on the protestors’ potential violence, and on John Key. This suggests a familiarity with Māori custom that other mainstream reporters did not seem to have. It also indicates that Forbes assumes viewers will know what she is talking about, suggesting that she is addressing a wider audience than the other mainstream reporters. The extra complementary information and the added perspectives could perhaps be attributable to her background knowledge of te ao Māori, as Forbes has Māori ethnicity in contrast to the other on-screen newsworkers in the bulletin who are all Pākehā. Forbes also notes that the activists “are using this stage to protest against deep sea oil drilling, poverty and the removal of Section 9, a Treaty clause.” This is the first time the reasons for protest have been mentioned. Forbes gives voice to the protestors’ reasons and the things they are responding to. The description of “using this stage” also suggests that the activists are
guaranteed attention on Waitangi Day, indicating they are vocal because their issues remain unnoticed for the rest of the year. This provides justification for their techniques, rather than just opposing their disruptiveness.

ONE News, TV ONE. 6:00pm- 7:00pm. English.

ONE News has four items about Waitangi events, moving from politics to family festivity, to the history of protest and ending with an interview with Sir Jerry Mateparae. All the on-screen news workers are Pākehā. News presenter Bernadine Oliver-Kirby opens ONE News standing on the Treaty grounds at Waitangi Marae. She states, “ugly protests have marred celebrations and forced the Prime Minister to beat an early retreat,” over scenes of protest and the caption ‘Security Scare.’ This closely replicates the wording that 3 News used to introduce their bulletin. Oliver-Kirby communicates a ‘unity’ discourse that implies that undisrupted sameness is sought, rather than welcome diversity and political expression. Abel notes that in 1990 a similar discourse of unity dominated mainstream media coverage of Waitangi Day, which “referred to the Treaty (if at all) as a symbol of unity, the ‘founding document of our country’. It endorsed the idea of ‘celebration’, saw the celebrations as moving people closer together and spoke of ‘one people’, ‘one nation’” (Shaping the News 39). This discourse saw activism for Māori rights as ‘separatist’. It implicitly supports Pākehā domination and cultural normitivity as it is based on assimilationist assumptions that ‘we are all the same’.

Oliver-Kirby’s use of ‘unity’ reflects McCreanor’s ‘One People’ Pākehā discourse. This discourse operates from the basis that New Zealanders are of a single culture and should all be treated the same, without any extra measures for Māori to right the imbalance caused by historical and continuing discrimination. Angela Moewaka Barnes et al. note that this pattern assumes that “cultural or ethnic differences are divisive, not real, or do not matter, that indigenous status and te Tiriti o Waitangi are irrelevant, and that majority rule is the fairest way to make decisions” (199). By implying it is fairest to treat all people the same, Pākehā culture is allowed to subsume all other cultural differences to an assimilationist mentality that positions Pākehā culture as the one fair culture for everyone. Similarly, contrasting ‘unity’ with Māori rights activism implies that the ‘unity’ sought by mainstream news is a state of affairs where Pākehā domination is unchallenged. This is continually reiterated by the
inferences that families should be able to go on enjoying their weekends without the disruption caused by highlighting historical injustices. As one must occupy a privileged position in order to be able to ignore historical injustices, these families may consequently be imagined as Pākehā. By prioritising the enjoyment of Pākehā families, the ‘unity’ discourse therefore fundamentally aligns mainstream news in the interests of Pākehā domination and against Māori rights activism in its coverage of Waitangi Day. The ‘unity’ discourse sets a framework of discussion around the degree and persistence of unity. This concept of ‘unity’ fails to acknowledge the people negatively affected by breached Treaty promises, and avoids the idea that pride can come from the resolution of mistakes, rather than ignoring them. The editing decision to give a large amount of voice to the Pākehā idea of unity-without-disruption makes it more likely that the item will be decoded in a way that rejects the activists’ perspectives and fails to present the idea that harmony can come from the resolution of injustice. When mainstream news operates within the ‘unity’ discourse it is unable to explore the position of Māori rights activists, as this position is outside the limits of the unity discourse, again disadvantaging Māori rights activism.

Oliver-Kirby crosses to reporter Jessica Mutch who covers the protest story. Mutch describes Key’s speech as competing with the megaphones of protestors. When she states “He was moved forward so he could be heard, it was then the protestors surged,” she indicates that the protestors’ movement may have been a reaction to the movement of the Prime Minister, which could have been taken as a challenge. Mutch’s wording is different to other mainstream news stories where the movement of the protestors was framed as an aggressive surprise, coming out of nowhere. This highlights the way that mainstream news tends to frame activism as irrational and unpredictable, increasing the drama rather than exploring the reasons. Mutch also talks about Wikatana Popata, describing him and his brother as having “made a tradition of protesting Waitangi, they’re upset about deep sea drilling and want a Treaty clause included in the State Assets Law.” This gives voice to some of the reasons for protest. Popata is captioned as ‘Wi Popata: Protestor,’ shortening his full name, possibly to make it more palatable for Pākehā pronunciation. It also instantly labels him as a protestor, positioning him in opposition to the status quo and festive ‘unity’ and thus in opposition to the news’ perspective. Popata is given a short vague soundbite, where he notes that “There’s many issues affecting all of us here in
Aotearoa, our generation would just like to say, no more eh.” While positively including a voice of activism, this soundbite could reflect an editing decision that does not further elucidate or justify the reasons for protest.

Oliver-Kirby’s next introduction changes tack as she focusses on the festivities of the day. She tells us that “While all the noise came from a small number of protestors, it’s a much more reflective time for many of those who have come here to Waitangi.” The contrast between these two clauses suggests that the ‘few’ activists are being pointlessly noisy and are not being reflective, while disrupting the contemplative ‘many’. The bulletin’s position is implicitly aligned with the larger number, ‘we’, and conflicts with the smaller number, ‘they’. However, this is the first acknowledgment in any of the broadcasts of the community spirit of the events. Oliver-Kirby crosses to reporter Steven Smith to continue the story. Smith talks to Charles Kauwhata, an older Māori man. Kauwhata’s perspective on protest is not about how it affected John Key, but how it disrespected kawa, as he notes that “my affiliation’s to this area and people in past years have gone and sort of forgotten that this is a marae, first and foremost it is a marae.” This is the first time on mainstream news that the area has been referred to as a site of great cultural and spiritual importance and intensity, disrupting the dominant narrative that Waitangi is mostly about politicians and drama.

The ONE News bulletin then takes a rare moment to turn and reflect upon history. However, fitting within the identified Pākehā paradigms of the bulletin, the piece is about the history of protest. Rather than looking back in a way that would contribute to an understanding of the protestors’ position, Oliver-Kirby reads a story that focusses solely on violence, with a shot of every major protest incident since 1990, using exaggerated, aggressive words such as “jostled”, “heckled”, “reduced to tears” and “pelted” to describe the actions of the protestors. The group of protestors is again placed in opposition to the “plenty of people here enjoying the festivities.”

At the end of the bulletin ONE News has a story in which reporter Jack Tane interviews Sir Jerry Mateparae, the new Governor General, on the beach at Waitangi. Tane adopts a confrontational style as he asks Mateparae, “Do you get a hard time from people who say that you must be one or the other, who say you must be either a Māori man, or a representative of the Crown?” In a close-up shot of Mateparae’s
surprised face, he responds that “No, that’s never come up. I mean they do ask me where I stand”. Mateparae makes it clear that he feels he represents one of the rangatira who signed the Treaty. The news values of ‘Negativity’ and ‘Conflict’ are evident here as the reporter instantly concentrates on the potentially negative inner conflict of Mateparae’s position. McGregor’s news values of ‘Emotion’ and ‘Celebrification of the Journalist’ are also evident as this attack-style journalism catches Mateparae by surprise. It is interesting to think that if a Pākehā were chosen to be, for example, Minister of Māori Affairs in 2012, their suitability for the role might be questioned but it is highly unlikely that they would be asked to ‘choose’ between their ethnicity and their job. This demonstrates how the persistent marginalisation and common stereotyping of Māori in the discursive practice of a text can limit the possibilities for Māori people, in work and in life.

Overall the text gives voice to a range of politicians, public figures and citizens and even has a soundbite from an activist and explains some reason for protest. However, while these soundbites encapsulate what is said and who speaks, the things that are communicated and understood are more complex as the text silences relevant historical perspectives and discourses that are oppositional to the dominant idea of ‘unity’. At the level of discursive practice ONE News conveys that the protestors are disruptive, unpleasant outsiders whose causes are less important than the enjoyment of the majority.

*Te Kāea*, Māori Television. 7:30pm- 8:00pm (repeat of 5:30pm- 6:00pm broadcast).

*Te reo Māori with English subtitles.*

*Te Kāea* has five different items about Waitangi events, covering politics, protests and including three interviews. The approach that *Te Kāea* takes to the stories is somewhat different to mainstream news. All the on-screen news workers are Māori. News presenter Amomai Pihama speaks from the grounds of Waitangi Marae, opening the first headline “Te Tii Marae elders angry at protestors violating marae protocol and customs.” In contrast to mainstream news, this prioritises the perspective of the marae elders, rather than John Key. *Te Kāea* maintains this position throughout the broadcast, critiquing the activists’ techniques because they showed disrespect to the marae. Wikatana Popata is captioned as ‘Kaiporoteehi,’ a protestor, labelled in the same style as mainstream news, though unlike mainstream news they use his full first
name. *Te Kāea* usually captions speakers with their iwi or hapu affiliations, or their relevant occupations. This indicates that his position as a protestor is considered most important here. As in mainstream news, labelling him as a protestor instantly categorises him as part of the disrespectful group that the item has framed disapprovingly, and thus limits the potential for audiences to understand different aspects of Popata and his activist position in positive ways.

Tina Wickliffe covers *Te Kāea*’s first news item, which focusses on the abusive words that the activists directed at politicians such as Pita Sharples. She begins with a medium close-up shot of Popata on a megaphone calling “sit down John Key’s little niggers.” Wickliffe focusses on this word when she speaks to Popata, asking “is it appropriate?” This closed question seems to mirror mainstream news techniques as it concentrate on the methods of protest, rather than the reasons, and seems to reflect news values such as ‘Conflict’ and ‘Threshold’ that disadvantage alternative discourses that might support Māori rights activism. The question has the potential to lead into a very narrow framework for discussion, however Popata uses it as an opportunity to voice the concerns of protestors, declaring, “That’s how angry we are. They’ve supported oil drilling, and other actions that further place us under hardship, so that’s how angry I am.” Wickliffe elaborates upon these immediate reasons for protest, stating that “anger has been stoked by fears for the Treaty in the new SOE legislation and other issues included opposition to fracking.” In this way *Te Karere* gives voice to the reasons for protest, but as a secondary focus. In this story the deeper and more historical reasons for protest are not covered. The news value of ‘Frequency’ is further evident, as the item presents an understanding of the event that is limited to the one-day timeframe of television news.

The bulletin returns to Pihama in the Treaty Grounds, who interviews National Party MP Hekia Parata, the Minister for Education. This interview tempers some of the sensationalism surrounding activism. Parata notes that she “wasn’t surprised” about the protest, as “Some years there are many protestors, other years there are few, this year I thought there were only a few.” She also nullifies the drama when asked about the use of the racial slur, by declaring that “it’s just what happens with protests.” When Pihama notes that the protests breached marae protocol, Parata responds that it is “an embarrassment for a marae if that happens. But that’s for the marae to discuss,
not us visitors.” In this way Parata positions herself as more respectful of the kaupapa than Pihama’s news making processes that persistently focus on negative aspects of the day. In this way Pihama also seems to adopt a reporting style based on the mainstream news values of ‘Conflict’, ‘Threshold’ and ‘Negativity’, by focussing on the protest and racial slurs but not the education reforms being considered at Waitangi, which Parata would have been in an excellent position to discuss. The interview however is presented in full, uncut, showing a level of respect to Parata and allowing her to speak for herself, in an alternative approach that would be rare to find on mainstream news, perhaps demonstrating kaupapa Māori newsmaking practices (Walker, Eketone and Gibbs).

The next story continues to focus on protest. Pihama introduces it by stating that “elders at Te Tii Marae in Waitangi are livid with the misconduct of protesters today.” She then crosses to reporter Dean Nathan to tell the story. This item begins with three soundbites to demonstrate different thoughts surrounding protest. Each speaker is a prominent Māori man partaking in the events at Waitangi. John Komene from Ngāpuhi states “I’m angered by what’s gone on here… they’ve gone and sullied the whole thing.” Nathan responds that “protestors say there is no better place… to voice their concerns directly to the PM,” followed by a soundbite from Wikatana Popata. While Popata was captioned ‘Kaiporoteehi’ at the beginning of this bulletin, here he is captioned with his affiliation ‘Ngāti Kahu,’ representing him as a person rather than labelling him as ‘protestor’. It is interesting that the stories construct him differently within the same bulletin, showing that Te Kāea does not have a consistent position on activists. The variable approaches provide the viewer with alternative methods for looking at an issue, which can encourage critical thinking as it shows there are different ways of understanding an idea. Popata states “We’re united in bringing about an end to this Govt’s wrongs.” Te Kāea abbreviates ‘Government’ to ‘Govt’ in its subtitles. This statement is followed immediately by Tame Iti of Tūhoe, who asks “if not in this way, what other avenue do we use? What’s the best way to voice our concerns and anger to those we oppose?” This item thus places the soundbite that disapproves of the protest action first, followed by a perspective that supports protest, and then by the reasoned questioning from Iti, a figure often portrayed as ‘radical’ and thus irrational by mainstream media.
This organisation of information frames the protest as unfortunate but necessary, as the supporters of protest are positioned sympathetically, and are given more screen time than Komene. Nathan confirms this position by stating that “Hopefully, their protest won’t fall on deaf ears,” because “if the communal voice of protest isn’t acknowledged, then a change in the near future is unlikely.” This demonstrates a form of support for the protestors and interpellates viewers as feeling the same way. This kind of open advocacy is unseen on mainstream news. The assumption that the reasons for protest need to be resolved before political harmony can ensue demonstrates an oppositional discourse outside the limits of the unity discourse that was discussed earlier. Popata in fact uses the idea of unity in translation to describe the attitude of the activists, completely reframing the concept. This oppositional position continues as Nathan ends his story with a soundbite from Moana Jackson of Ngāti Kahungunu. Jackson declares outright that “the only solution is to have a different way in which the constitution operates that we govern ourselves, and that’s the long term, and the only viable long term solution, I think.” This soundbite strikes directly to the heart of the issues at stake in te Tiriti grievances, reiterating the broader concerns that are informing the protest. The ‘we’ used applies only to Māori people, reversing the implicit in-grouping and out-grouping of much mainstream news coverage of protest.

The juxtaposition of Nathan’s story with Pihama’s and Wickliffe’s shows a sharp contrast between Nathan’s sympathetic, un-sensationalist style and the other reporters’ more dramatic, angled styles. Though many aspects of the construction of a piece are beyond each reporter’s control, Nathan’s story seems to approximate te reo Māori news of the past, shown in the studies by Abel (Shaping the News) and Kupu Taea. Kupu Taea’s “Media and te Tiriti 2007” report describes te reo Māori news as presenting perspectives that were “grounded in Māori world views and recognise the affects [sic] of colonisation” (45). They describe it as assuming “the fight for Māori rights and aspirations is a necessity and is not divisive or unjustified” (45), and as challenging “the familiar separation of us (the viewers) and them (Māori/Other) regularly seen on mass news programmes” (45). Kupu Taea note that interviewee Dun Mihaka was captioned as “Tohunga Porotehi” (skilled protestor)” (36) and feel this helped legitimate the protest. The implication of skill differentiates this caption from the use of “Kaiporoeti” for Popata, as it frames the act of protest positively. Kupu
Taea note that in 2007 *Te Kāea* gave politicians “little airtime” (36), preferring “diverse Māori voices and perspectives” (37) from sources “rarely seen on mass TV news” (45). Māori language news items “almost always provided the iwi affiliations of sources” (Kupu Taea 45) and are described as avoiding a notion of unity that relied on “a homogeneous ‘one people’, preferring to speak of diverse people coming or working together” (37). This type of reporting can be said to be based on kaupapa Māori news practices grounded in Māori worldviews.

The style of the other news workers’ items in this *Te Kaea* bulletin, however, seems to be moving towards Galtung and Ruge’s mass news values: placing the understanding of an event into the timeframe of a day, increasing the dramatic content, focussing on conflict, etc. This suggests a movement of Māori Television’s news away from its foundation in Māori worldviews and towards the more commercial Pākehā values of mainstream television news.

*Te Karere* is broadcast only on weekdays, so has no bulletin for Sunday 5th February and can only be analysed in terms of its Waitangi Day coverage.

**Monday 6th February, 2012: Waitangi Day**

*Prime News, Prime. 5:30pm- 6:30pm. English.*

News presenter Alistair Wilkinson opens *Prime News* on Waitangi Day by describing “more tense scenes… as protestors attempted to fly the Tino Rangatiratanga flag on the Treaty ground,” calling this “an angry moment during an otherwise incident-free day.” He is referring to a hikoi to the iconic flagpole on the Treaty grounds where activists aimed to take down the New Zealand flag and replace it with Tino Rangatiratanga, a flag that symbolises the Māori political aspirations enshrined in te Tiriti o Waitangi. The ‘angry moment’ is again focussed on, framing the story in terms of the expectation of violence, rather than whether negotiations were successful or anyone got their point across or if any progress was made. In the first item on *Prime News*, Kevin Baker-Williams describes the dawn service, emphasising the peace and serenity before comparing it to “yesterday’s scuffles,” quickly turning back to the protest of the previous day with the repeated shots of the activists running with the banner. The jarring aural transition from silence to shouting contributes to the idea
that the protest disrupted the equilibrium. This theme is continued as the story turns to the dispute over the flag “that’s controversial even now. The protest marchers came to it as in other years, and Wardens rushed to protect it.” The words “even now” add to the implication that these disputes should be left in the past and forgotten, perpetuating a more Pākehā perspective of time. A long-shot across the Treaty Grounds shows a small group of protestors and five or six Wardens standing around casually, with no rushing involved. This suggests that the news value of ‘Threshold’ is in operation here, as in order to maximise the dramatic content of the story it appears that word choices are made that do not reflect the actual happenings at the event.

3 News, TV3. 6:00pm- 7:00pm. English.

3 News also has a story about Waitangi Day as its first item. Political reporter Patrick Gower covers the story itself. He begins with the flagpole hikoi, stating that “in a gesture of conciliation protestors were allowed to touch the flagpole.” These words are accompanied by a long-shot of people walking around the flagpole, with one man pulling down the bandana over his face to spit at the base of the pole. The shot conveys an editing decision to include this single negative moment from over an hour of productive negotiations. The deliberate juxtaposition of image and voice-over completely undoes any idea of conciliation, suggesting the activists remain unsatisfied. The scene cuts to a close-up of Levi Bristow, captioned ‘Protestor’, who notes “We came in peace, we had a little bit of a scurfuffle, verbal words, and then we left in peace.” This inclusion of the protestor’s peace-focussed perspective challenges traditional mainstream news techniques, as it frames the intentions of the protestors positively, implying that violence was not the aim or the result of this activism. Accommodating this viewpoint in the news gives the audience the opportunity to understand the perspectives of the protestors and view them sympathetically, rather than excluding them as unsavoury ‘others’.

Gower continues by turning his attention to the experience of the politicians. He notes that “the pressure over [the Government’s] plans to scrap the Treaty clause called Section 9 just continues to rise,” accompanied by a long-shot of canons being fired. Images of the canons smoking, being reloaded and firing again continue as Gower talks about the Māori Party’s move to encourage iwi to take the Government to court.
Gower’s use of metaphor ties the words to the images when he states that the action is “aimed at stopping asset sales.” The combination suggests that the Māori Party’s decision constitutes an act of war. The continual noise of canon-fire adds to the feeling of escalating drama implied by Gower’s reference to ‘rising pressure’. This all contributes to the implication that the situation is just about to erupt, adding to the drama and conflict of the story.

Gower wraps up on a positive note to fit the narrative curve and leave viewers with a sense of resolution. His words are presented as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Words</th>
<th>Images</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>“even though protestors may wish it was,</td>
<td>Wide shot of protest hikoi heading to the flagpole, walking toward the right side of the frame.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Waitangi Day really isn’t all about them, it’s for all New Zealanders”</td>
<td>Long-shot of a group of men performing haka, facing the right side of the frame.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Medium close-up of a happy Māori toddler imitating the haka movements, facing the left side of the frame.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The hikoi protestors are clearly demarcated as “them.” The happy toddler facing the opposite direction represents ‘all New Zealanders’ in opposition to ‘them’, as the toddler is shown at the same time that these words are spoken. The position of the haka performance is ambiguous, but the protestors seem to align with the ‘Bad Māori’ approach in McCreanor’s ‘Good Māori/Bad Māori’ discourse (65-67). This discourse parallels the ‘wild Māori’ versus ‘tame Māori’ dichotomy that Abel identified in the coverage of Waitangi Day 1990. Abel posits that in mainstream news representations, “‘Tame’ Māori might have ‘radical’ views, but they still worked within the system” (Shaping the News 164), while ‘wild’ Māori “preferred confrontation and disruption” (ibid.). Though Kupu Taea found this distinction to be “less prominent” (37) by 2007, the protestors in 2012 seem to be positioned as ‘wild Māori’ in contrast with the non-threatening toddler, who represents ‘tame Māori’ and happy family enjoyment. This
indicates that it is only by being ‘tame’ that the Māori toddler gains access to the category of ‘all New Zealanders’, of ‘us’ and of the ‘we’.

The disapproving stance that the item takes toward ‘Wild Māori’ is unquestioned in the story. The mainstream viewer may not question it because the item relies on several undercurrent Pākehā discourses identified by McCreanor. These include ‘Māori culture’, ‘Good Māori/Bad Māori’ as noted earlier, ‘Māori violence’, ‘Privilege’, ‘One People’, ‘Stirrers’ and ‘Rights’ (65-67). At the level of discursive practice, these themes have all been reinforced throughout the text by the earlier items about the potential violence of Māori protestors and the symbolic warfare of the Māori Party. These discourses all operate to suggest that the activists demonstrate remnants of uncivilised Māori culture and stir up trouble violently and unnecessarily, demanding more and more, wanting unequal privileges, encouraging division and unsettling the family fun of the majority even though ‘we are all New Zealanders now’. In fact, Gower’s statement that Waitangi “isn’t all about them” is contradictory to the news values demonstrated in this item, as his story only focusses on the protestors and politicians, thus making it “all about them”. The form of his statement reinforces this, as the ‘theme’ at the beginning concentrates on the common knowledge about the activists, while the corresponding ‘rheme’ at the end brings in the new information about Waitangi Day being for ‘all New Zealanders.’ However, focussing on the activists does not seem to correspond to giving them voice, for instead they are subjected to the dominant discourses used in the bulletin. Although the piece includes a quote from activist Levi Bristow framing protest positively, his statement is communicated within the story’s frame of activist violence. This means that although he talks about peace, the Pākehā audience who are addressed could understand his quote as an excuse or a defence, and the deeper concerns behind Waitangi Day are thus silenced. By looking at all facets of voice rather than just who gets to speak, it is clear that the Pākehā frame of the bulletin means Māori perspectives are still denied voice.

ONE News, TV ONE. 6:00pm-7:00pm. English.

ONE News has eight different items about Waitangi Day, beginning with politics and moving to various community festivals, and also has an item on the Governor General, a piece about history and a story about Waitangi residents. Bernadine Oliver-
Kirby opens the bulletin standing on the grounds of Waitangi Marae. Her introduction to the day’s Waitangi coverage begins with the statement that “protestors have again made their presence felt, calling for protection of our founding document.” This is a twist to the unity discourse, as the protestors seem to be constructed as working in the interests of ‘us’ New Zealanders. In this way the use of “our” could almost be seen to include the protestors. Framing them as “calling for protection” implies they are partaking in positive action, rather than ‘disrupting the peace’ or ‘causing trouble’. The protest group is also described as participating in “vocal political dissent” rather than threatening violence. By positioning the group as working in the interests of viewers, ONE News extends its presentation of Waitangi Day unity to almost include them. However Jessica Mutch’s following story about the activism reverts back to traditional mainstream methods for framing protest by concentrating on violence and re-establishing the ‘us’ and ‘them’ dichotomy.

After Mutch covers the protestors’ and politicians’ responses to the Section 9 omission, the remainder of ONE News’s Waitangi Day coverage focusses on family fun-days around the country. First, Jack Tame does a soft-news item celebrating the national variety evident on Waitangi Day. He opens with the statement that “On our national day, our national place is a place of contrast.” The theme of contrast is demonstrated through a range of comparisons, including juxtaposing traditional Māori means of transport with traditional European means, and comparing kapa haka to naval brass playing. This idea of contrast seems to involve a spectacle of diversity, demonstrating all the different, strange and interesting groups to the unnamed normal viewer - the Pākehā. The comparisons are loosely based on a dichotomy between Māori and European icons. However the only White people shown in this demonstration of contrast are those in conspicuous positions; the navy in white uniforms, a woman in a full-body Kiwi costume and a man on a penny-farthing bicycle. The rest of the ‘contrast’ is demonstrated by Māori children, singers, Wardens, horseback riders and waka kaihoe, as well as other inconspicuous non-White holiday-makers simply enjoying the day. By using mostly non-White people as the different, strange and interesting spectacles to contrast with each other, the piece positions Pākehā as the implicitly ‘normal’ viewer, placing Pākehā in an exnominated position of power.
After advertisements and other stories the ONE News bulletin returns to Oliver-Kirby at Waitangi. She crosses to reporter Kim Carnell to do a rare Special Report on the history of Waitangi Day, which is described as changing “from a ceremonial occasion to a flashpoint for discontent.” The news item skims over the last century, tracking the rise of “the protest movement” and Treaty grievances, as well as the development of the Waitangi Tribunal. Māori are described positively as having “plenty to fight for” rather than plenty to complain about, while the Foreshore and Seabed scandal is described as “the most recent issue to bind Māori together” rather than the most recent major example of the Government illegally disrespecting Māori rights. In a soundbite, historian Paul Moon states that Waitangi Day “gives the country the opportunity to open the cupboard, take out issues of racism, ethnicity, national identity, and give them a bit of an airing so they can be discussed, people can think about them, and um - then they get put back in the cupboard for another year.” His pause before ‘then they get put back in the cupboard’ and his tone in that statement could suggest that he thinks this tendency is regrettable. The implication of Moon’s comment aligns with Dean Nathan’s statement on Te Kāea’s 6th of February bulletin, when Nathan notes “We mustn’t discuss issues only on this day, but rather, at all times, because Maori will never disappear from this land, and our ancestors agreed for foreign peoples to live together with us in peace.” Moon’s statement highlights that mainstream news practices tend to contrast directly with Nathan’s sentiment. In Moon’s statement “people” presumably refers to Pākehā people who have the luxury of being able to ignore such issues for the rest of the year, rather than non-White people who may have to navigate such things daily. In this way “the country” is referring to White New Zealand, again illuminating the way that dominant discourses in Aotearoa are implicitly oriented to reflect and thus maintain normative Pākehā dominance.

_Te Kāea_, Māori Television. 7:30pm- 8:00pm (repeat of 5:30pm-6:00pm broadcast).

Te reo Māori with English subtitles.

Amomai Pihama opens _Te Kāea_ live from the Treaty grounds. _Te Kāea_ broadcasts nine stories about Waitangi Day. Pihama begins the bulletin by summarising the day, stating that “While most came in peace to this morning’s dawn ceremony, the rumblings of a small group were not able to be suppressed.” This phrasing assumes suppression is desirable, instead of celebrating democratic freedom of speech, or
framing it as “vocal political dissent” as ONE News did. The balance of clauses means the ‘peace’ at the beginning of the statement is contrasted with the ‘small group’ in the second half of the statement, implying that the protestors did not come in peace. This heightens the sense of drama and disequilibrium. The peaceful attendees are placed in the position of preferred equilibrium, contextualising the protest in a short-term understanding of history that parallels Pākehā cultural perspectives of time. As noted earlier, this short-term view of history is common on mainstream news that is Pākehā-oriented, but te reo Māori news might be expected to more closely reflect the long-term view of history modelled in Stuart’s Māori narrative of protest (51), which may take into account historical injustices and position activism as a way of returning to a just equilibrium. The use of a short-term view of history to position the protestors negatively approximates mainstream news techniques and could again be taken to indicate that Te Kāea is moving its approach towards broad audience appeal and away from an approach distinctly grounded in Māori worldviews.

Any suggestion of this directional shift is again balanced out, however, by Dean Nathan’s story about the Dawn Service that follows. He begins by focussing on the “Prayers for peace” and includes a soundbite from Sonny Tau of Ngāpuhi, saying “Our Ancestors were knowledgeable people, and this morning, the ghosts and owls are all here to pray as one with us.” In her research Abel concludes that te reo Māori news in the 1990s demonstrated an inclusion of a Māori worldview by recognising the spiritual aspects embedded in Waitangi Day formalities. This was in contrast to mainstream news where “The importance of these aspects to Maori culture was not signalled” (189). Nathan’s story again therefore approaches the subject from a perspective grounded in a Māori worldview and approximates te reo Māori news techniques of the past.

The interviewees in this piece present positive views of the political situation in contrast to the mainstream focus on dramatic threshold and negativity, with Merimeri Penfold of Ngāti Kuri noting “We are better off now than in the past, because thoughts were divided in those times. Now, foreigners join us in support.” This acknowledges the presence of non-Māori people in the protest group. Penfold notes that “At its inception, Te Tiriti o Waitangi was a sacred thing to enable the indigenous Māori to live as one with foreigners.” The translated use of the word ‘foreigners’
reverses the assumptions of mainstream reporting by directly inferring that Pākehā do not belong and that Māori are the baseline of normality. Nathan closes by noting that “Only when all facets of the treaty are honoured, will it become the guiding document of this nation.” This statement tempers the over-celebratory tone of mainstream reporting on the Treaty. Nathan clearly articulates an approach grounded in a Māori worldview that differs markedly from mainstream news reporting.

Pihama covers the breach of marae protocol, then introduces another story about the protest by stating that “Despite calls for us to celebrate the day the Treaty of Waitangi was signed, for some, this day is to challenge the Govt to honour it. There is no better place than here to voice such concerns.” This frames the story alternatively to show the democratic side of protest, and highlights that the media spotlight on protestors ensures their message gets noticed, revealing the part the media play in news construction. She crosses to Wickliffe, who uses soundbites to convey the various reasons different people have for protesting. Wickliffe also highlights the ambivalent feelings in the hikoi about Māori Wardens being used against Māori rights protestors, as in the past “a heavy police presence” was used. While identifying these various ideas that were absent from mainstream news coverage, Wickliffe still concentrates on the actions of the protestors, reflected in her frequent use of verbs such as “climb”, “lead” and “advance.” Wickliffe notes there was “no ugly incident,” maintaining a framework of ‘how much or how little violence,’ but perhaps referring to violence as ugly rather than protest itself. This approach is interesting as it seems to represent a compromise between Pihama and Nathan. While Wickliffe includes a focus on violence and actions her complementary use of reasons and details significant to te ao Māori seems to implicitly allow support for the causes of protest while framing violent action negatively. Though like mainstream news she concentrates on violence that did not occur and omits any historical grounding, the fact that this was evident in Nathan’s story means that perhaps it is implied or does not need to be repeated in this item.

After covering politics and protest around the country, Pihama turns the bulletin back to the family festive side of Waitangi in the same way ONE News did. Reporter Rewa Harriman of Tamaki Makaurau states “Whether they’re Māori, Pākehā or Indian, they’ve all got an opinion about Waitangi Day,” leading into two vox pops of happy,
non-Māori people. This convergence implies that diversity is a happy, positive thing, while positioning Māori as the implicit ‘normal’ in the same way *ONE News* positioned Pākehā. Harriman states that “for many, Waitangi Day holds more significance than just a public holiday.” The people in the vox pops reinforce this by stating “Our ancestors signed the Tiriti o Waitangi” and “I hope it’s hope for the future.” The concept of te Tiriti is foregrounded while the story focusses on different people coming together, however the connection between these two ideas is not made as the content of the Treaty is not explored. This seems to suggest a superficial acknowledgement of the Treaty, mirroring *ONE News*’ festive piece.

The next story about Waitangi Day at Bluff acknowledges a hui held around New Zealand’s current constitutional review and its implications for Māori. This hui was omitted in the *ONE News* coverage of the event. As it would have been impossible for *ONE News* reporters to miss this when they were there, one might assume that the news values of ‘Unambiguity’ and ‘Meaningfulness’ presided, cutting out stories that were not immediately relevant to the dominant culture to avoid confusion. Aroha Treacher of Murihiku presents the story for *Te Kāea*, reflecting on Sir Tipene O’Reagan’s aim of raising Māori awareness of the review. While not entering into any detail about the constitution or the review process, Treacher notes that “entrenching the Treaty principles is a must.” This story seems to demonstrate an inversion of the mainstream news value of Meaningfulness by including the story as it is meaningful to Māori culture. The value of ‘Unambiguity’ could also be seen to be in operation here, however, as potentially complicated detail about the review process is omitted. Utilising mainstream news values for Māori purposes therefore appears to impact upon this news product beneficially by raising awareness about important political happenings, but also negatively by including a limiting amount of information about the happenings.

*Te Karere*, TV ONE. 4:00pm- 4:30pm. Te reo Māori with English subtitles2. *Te Karere* had nine different stories about Waitangi Day. The opening summary of the bulletin describes Waitangi as “the birthplace of a nation”, and the other

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2 As large amounts of the live broadcast were not subtitled I used the more complete English subtitles that accompanied the bulletin when it was put online later that day at TVNZ Ondemand
celebrations around the country as positive and drama-free. All the on-screen news workers are Māori. Presenter Scotty Morrison speaks from the Treaty grounds, and begins the bulletin by contrasting the bright start to Waitangi celebrations with the protests of the day before - the same device used in every other bulletin to bring up the activism of the previous day. However Morrison refers to the activists as “a handful of rowdy protestors” rather than a great and significant threat as was inferred in mainstream news. The avoidance of overly dramatic descriptors shows a divergence from mainstream news techniques, indicating that the mainstream news values of ‘Conflict’ and ‘Threshold’ are not in operation here as the opportunity to increase the dramatic content is not taken.

Morrison crosses to reporter Jasmyn Pearson to cover the protest story. Pearson too approaches it in a very different way to the other broadcasts. She notes that posturing came from “both politicians and protestors” the day before, framing the protestors’ actions as parallel to the politicians’. She then focusses on the way this ceased on Waitangi Day as “politicians put aside their differences” for the Dawn Service. This inverts the contrast between the two days as every other bulletin began with the Dawn Service in order to launch into negative talk of protest. Pearson however uses the ‘posturing’ to launch into a positive talk about the Dawn Service. She notes that “For Māori families it’s about returning to their roots, and also the faith that all of NZ will benefit from the treaty.” This balances the focus on politicians with the effect on the people, unlike mainstream news. Pearson returns to touch on activism by asking “But will the anger of injustices settle within Maoridom?” over a shot of the ceremonial canonfire. This links anger to the canon’s explosion, a device also used by 3 News. However the actual protestors are unmentioned as the anger demonstrated is linked to all of Māoridom and attributed to past and present injustices.

She refers to the omission of Section 9 from the new state asset sales law, and states “It’s well known people are [not] happy about it.” The wording of this theme indicates that this is shared information or a common truth. ‘People’ here appears to refer to Māori but could also refer broadly to all New Zealanders. This fluidity of signification inverts the common use of ‘people’ by mainstream news when it could refer to Pākehā or to all New Zealanders. This story does not refer to the actual protestors and yet focusses on Māori life, injustices and Section 9, which were the subject of the protests, showing how a rejection of mainstream news values in favour of alternative
perspectives can create a different yet informative news product. The story seems clearly grounded in Māori worldviews and seems to address Māori people.

Morrison then introduces another story about protest, focussing on the breach of marae protocol. Like Te Kāea the perspective is on the way the protest affected the marae rather than John Key, the ‘Elite person’ whose experience was prioritised in mainstream news. Morrison states “some are saying it was a breach of traditional customs.” This is followed by two soundbites from Māori men. Jeremy Tātere MacLeod of Ngāti Kahungunu states “Politicians are well known for giving their opinion, and isn’t that what Waitangi’s about? It’s about having a forum where you can have your say.” In this way MacLeod also frames the protestors’ actions as parallel to the politicians’, questioning why politicians are allowed to be heard but not activists. Matiu Dickson of Ngāi Te Rangi states “If they [politicians] turn up, it’s expected that people will challenge them.” He adds “However, I do feel for the local organisers.” The organisation of soundbites thus positions them to appear as responses to the ‘breach of customs’ claim. This claim is not reinforced with a soundbite, causing the argument to have less force than those that follow, giving an overall impression in support of the activism. These perspectives again minimise the drama of the protest by framing it as an expected part of proceedings. The story gives the effect of justifying the breach of protocol while not alienating the event organisers, who are still offered sympathy. This is a markedly different approach to the mainstream news values of ‘Conflict’, ‘Negativity’ and ‘Unambiguity’ which might shape the story to polarise the different viewpoints and pit them against each other in order to produce a clear meaning.

Morrison then interviews Hone Harawira at Waitangi, discussing marae protocol, asset sales, the Māori Party and Waitangi Day. Harawira frequently reiterates the central importance of te Tiriti. In response to David Shearer’s desire to make Waitangi Day an a-political celebration of ‘New Zealandness’, Harawira states “Waitangi is about what happened at Waitangi… so don’t try to change the true essence of what it meant.” This is said over a long-shot of Shearer at Waitangi, followed by a wide-shot of the flagpole, a long-shot of a man playing bagpipes and a mid-shot of a Māori man blowing a conch shell trumpet. These traditional British and Māori symbols seem to represent the historic pact formed by te Tiriti, reiterating the
The historic significance of Waitangi Day. This is a contrary approach to 3 News as Gower responded to Shearer’s aspirations by stating, “it’s a nice thought but politics and protest is what Waitangi, has become known for.” As the politics and protest at Waitangi are generally around historical Treaty violations and injustices, Gower’s statement and Shearer’s aspiration seem to demonstrate Pākehā future-orientation by implying that Waitangi would be better ‘if we could all just move on, look forward and get over it’. This seems to tap into McCreanor’s Pākehā ‘Stirrers’ and ‘One People’ discourses that assume Māori protestors are just stirring up trouble where none exists, and without it we would all be unified New Zealanders. By reifying the importance of te Tiriti and the significance of historical grievances, Te Karere rejects this Pākehā idea of ‘unity’ and opens up the potential for the Māori rights activism to gain support.

Morrison, who is leading the interview and thus controlling the topic agenda and the turn-taking, mentions “an incident” that seems to refer to the protest, and then states, “On my way here I saw Māori and Pākehā sitting together, eating and discussing issues. Are we losing sight of what it’s [Waitangi Day’s] all about?” Here he seems to imply that focussing on protest detracts from the idea that Waitangi Day is about racial co-harmony and working together, reflecting the principle of partnership embedded in te Tiriti. Harawira reiterates this by stating that “Waitangi is for everyone here in NZ.” In this way the centrality of the Treaty to an alternative concept of unity is conveyed. The productive discussion generated in this interview seems to reflect Morrison’s polite and respectful interviewing style, in contrast to Jack Tane or Amomai Pihama’s examples of confrontational interviewing styles that surprised their interviewees or gathered limited information by asking closed, leading questions. Aside from the overlaying of images mentioned, most of the visuals accompanying the interview are just mid-shots and medium-close ups of the two men speaking at Waitangi. Though the images do not vary widely the interview still manages to remain interesting, contradicting the overwhelming demand for visual variety and impact that seems to dominate mainstream news production. This demand of mainstream news can disadvantage alternative discourses that incorporate the less visual aspects of pre-cinema history or broad social effects, demonstrating again how the different techniques presented on Te Karere allow support for Māori worldviews.
In the next story about the festivities at Manukau, Morrison paraphrases a statement from Pita Sharples that “Waitangi Day is about celebrating not just fighting for Treaty rights. There is a way to put issues across in a peaceful way.” This recognises the political issues present in the festive celebrations, rather than polarising the two phenomena as mutually exclusive as in mainstream news. Reporter Irena Smith notes that the activism raises the question, “why should we celebrate Waitangi?” This relates to the decision Abel notes of 1990 coverage, to frame Waitangi Day as a commemoration rather than a celebration in order to acknowledge the progress that has yet to be made. In a series of vox pops addressing the question of what Waitangi Day is about, a young Māori woman states, “togetherness, we never gave away our lands, this is us sharing our lands.” The same soundbite was used on ONE News, however ONE News omitted the word ‘togetherness’ and positioned the young woman as speaking on behalf of those who felt the Treaty remained at the heart of the day. Removing the word ‘togetherness’ in order to focus on the Treaty may indicate that the mainstream newsmakers working on this story felt the two concepts were incongruous. This could be tied to the Pākehā discourses of “Privilege” and “Stirrers” that associate the Treaty with undesirable division. Te Karere on the other hand gives voice to the perspective that ‘togetherness’, family fun, cultural partnership and the centrality of the Treaty are all corresponding concepts. This idea may be reinforced by the shots of weaving overlaying discussion of how the day should be celebrated, symbolising that the ideal is for all ideas to come together and coexist. This is reinforced in the next story by a soundbite from Alf McCausland of Ngāti Ranginui, who states that he’s just there “to be part of it, and seeing that dream or that, belief, come alive for a, day at least.” His prosody suggests a sadness that the dream is not alive more often. The ideal of Treaty-based racial accord combines aspirations for the future with the importance of the past. McCausland points out that this is evident on Waitangi Day when Māori culture, Treaty grievances and historical injustices become nationally prominent.

Overall the text broadcasts a wide range of diverse Māori voices. At the level of discursive practice, it communicates ideologies and conventions grounded in Māori worldviews to be understood by Māori viewers, who are addressed. Mainstream Pākehā perspectives are silenced, as is the drama of the protest. At the level of social practice the text seems to give support to Māori perspectives and political aspirations.
marginalised by the mainstream. As a Pākehā viewer I found this process was not exclusionary in my social interaction with the discursive practice of the text.

Discussion

Whiteness and Mainstream News

The construction of the protest stories in mainstream news coverage of Waitangi events reflects several of Galtung and Ruge’s news values:

- ‘Frequency’, as the events are understood within the timespan of the day
- ‘Unambiguity’, as the different perspectives on it are polarised
- ‘Meaningfulness’ as stories are selected for their relevance to the dominant Pākehā culture
- ‘Elite Persons’ as the experience of politicians is prioritised
- ‘Consonance’ as protest is predictable at Waitangi
- ‘Thresholds’ and ‘Unexpectedness’ because the focus on maximising drama frames the protests as exceeding expectations
- ‘Negativity’ because the activism is framed as bad news rather than positive democratic involvement.

McGregor’s additional values are also evident:

- ‘Visualness’ as the protestors are a spectacle and the same extreme moments of footage (such as the activists running with the banner) are repeated over and over
- ‘Emotion’ evinced by the concentration on anger
- ‘Conflict’ as the whole story is framed as a conflict between politicians/ marae elders and activists.
- There were also moments of ‘The celebriﬁcation of the journalist’ as reporters took a prominent role in relaying some stories.

These can be seen as Pākehā news values as they reflect the following ideologies:

- Individualism (the effect on individuals is more important than the effect on the group)
• Future-orientation (protest is a negative present phenomenon, historical reasons are unimportant and it will hopefully cease in future)

• Meritocracy (the negative effect of social factors on groups is irrelevant, individuals should just work harder)

• Majority-rule (a small group should not disturb the day for the majority)

• Privilege (what are they even complaining about, New Zealand is a fair and just place).

Constructing the stories in this way also echoes some of McCreanor’s Pākehā discourses as the activists are coded as Māori:

• ‘Māori Culture’ (They are noisy and uncivilised)

• ‘Good Māori/Bad Māori’ (They’re just being rowdy and confrontational, they should get on with life like successful Māori)

• ‘Māori Violence’ (They are volatile and aggressive)

• ‘Privilege’ (The more we give them, the more they want)

• ‘One People’ (They are causing division, they should just enjoy the day because we’re all New Zealanders now)

• ‘Stirrers’ (They are creating trouble where none exists)

• ‘Rights’ (They want more than anyone else).

These factors transmit hegemonic Pākehā ideologies through mainstream news. The normativity of Whiteness in Aotearoa means that the way Pākehā values frame the news may go unnoticed by many Pākehā as the perspectives conveyed just seem ‘normal’. This operates to advantage Pākehā by making Pākehā dominance the pervasive norm, while disadvantaging Māori by constructing Māori worldviews as ‘abnormal’ or irrelevant or omitting them entirely. Pākehā perspectives in mainstream news also operate to delegitimise Māori rights claims by invalidating the importance of history and limiting the potential for alternative discourses to be widely understood.

Te Reo Māori News

Te reo Māori news demonstrated a contrast to these values. Te Karere focussed on the people rather than elites, on political issues rather than sensationalistic moments of
protest, kept the significance of Te Tiriti at the forefront of Waitangi Day discussions, incorporated a long-term view of history and broadcast voices of different Māori people supporting activism, rejecting violence, justifying the breach of marae protocol and disapproving of it. Respect and discussion were prioritised over visual immediacy and confrontational interviews. The underlying aspiration of Treaty-based racial co-harmony was continually reiterated with a focus on progress and moving forward while remembering and incorporating the past. Te Kāea seemed to utilise a mixture of these different approaches.

The soundbites in Te Karere’s coverage overwhelmingly supported the protest activism, though some did not approve of the activists’ techniques. On Te Kāea too Dean Nathan demonstrated open support of the protestors’ cause in his Waitangi Day story. Te reo Māori news could thus be interpreted as presenting a bias towards Māori rights activism. Mainstream news on the other hand gave little voice to protestors and tended to look at their actions rather than their reasons. On Waitangi Day, ONE News and Prime News had no soundbites from protestors while 3 News had one but diminished the power of this voice by contextualising it in a Pākehā framework and surrounding it with the voices of politicians. In this way mainstream news tended to reinforce the status quo of Pākehā domination by minimising the perspectives of activists and focussing more on the experience of the elites. As mainstream news is found to operate extensively in favour of Pākehā and to the disadvantage of Māori, perhaps the voice of Māori rights activism in te reo Māori news programmes such as Te Karere could be seen to balance out the bias inherent in mainstream news.

Due to its mixture of approaches, Te Kāea could be said to be the most balanced of the bulletins studied, as its internal contradictions demonstrated a range of different approaches to newsmaking, providing the viewer with a more complete understanding of how different issues could be approached.

Te Tiriti o Waitangi

Past analyses of media in Aotearoa has found that mainstream news tends to avoid the subject of the Treaty in a way that is detrimental to Māori rights ambitions. Kupu Taea identify several “gaps or silences” (28) in mass media coverage in 2007, noting
that in references to the Treaty of Waitangi, almost all stories “assumed that readers knew what the Treaty said and how Treaty settlements were made” (28) providing “little or no background explanation or context about the Treaty or Māori issues, in contrast to items on *Te Karere* and *Te Kāea*” (6). Abel notes that “consistent patterns of exclusion should be a matter of concern” (*Shaping the News* 189), identifying that “[the] wider issue of tino rangatiratanga, of the transfer of power and resources to Maori people, was conspicuously absent from the news coverage” (ibid.) in the 1990s. Mainstream news seemed to continue this trend in 2012. *Prime News* did not mention te Tiriti and *3 News* only mentioned it in passing references to the location or Section 9. On *ONE News* te Tiriti was mostly mentioned historically in reference to Waitangi Day being the anniversary of its signing. It consistently positioned te Tiriti as a document that was important in the past but did not look at its contemporary position in Aotearoa society. Rather than assuming viewer knowledge of the Treaty’s contents, it seemed to assume a lack of viewer interest in these. Overall mainstream news coverage largely continued the gaps and silences about the Treaty, avoiding any exploration or explanation of the Treaty of Waitangi or issues of tino rangatiratanga.

This contrasts with te reo Māori news. On *Te Kāea*, te Tiriti was positioned as having yet to be fully honoured. It was also represented in soundbites as something threatened and in need of protection. *Te Kāea* reiterated the central importance of te Tiriti to the day and continually looked at its position in the present by restating the need to respect it. On *Te Karere* the importance of te Tiriti was also foregrounded and recognised as requiring present discussion and debate. It was therefore consistently framed as relevant to contemporary Aotearoa life. By repeatedly framing the Treaty in this way, *Te Kāea* and *Te Karere* seemed to assume the viewer was knowledgeable about its contents, insofar as understanding that these contents were not completely and securely honoured. *Te Kāea* also looked into the underlying issue of tino rangatiratanga and repeatedly reminded viewers that this is overarching all other concerns. This seems to reflect te reo Māori broadcasting of the past, grounded in a Māori worldview. On the other hand *Te Kāea* also showed occasional moments of omitting historically relevant detail, referring to the concept of te Tiriti without exploring its content, or mentioning historical details without explaining them further. These were practices also found on mainstream news, indicative of a future-orientation.
Conflict

Conflict, drama and negativity were key factors in mainstream coverage of Waitangi events, and some of Te Kāea’s coverage. However these factors operated in different ways. Mainstream news persistently concentrated on the potentially negative impacts of Māori rights activism, framed protest as a threat and supported negative constructions of Māori. Te Kāea on the other hand utilised conflict, drama and negativity differently. In an interview Amomai Pihama conducted with Nuki Aldridge, for example, she focussed solely on contentious issues such as the lack of time given for consultation over Section 9, the protestors’ breach of protocol and protest getting worse. Though it was all negative, the story did not contribute to an overall negative construction of Māori, because despite the mainstream techniques Te Kāea never seemed to utilise any of McCreanor’s ‘Pākehā Discourses’ with their intrinsic racist assumptions, and never spoke of Māori as ‘they.’ The underlying need to justify and maintain Pākehā power that seemed evident on mainstream news was non-existent on Te Kāea as Te Kāea did not appear to be governed by the ideology of Pākehā privilege. While mainstream techniques served to make the news product more dramatic, Māori were not consequently constructed in a derogatory way. The priorities of conflict and drama may have come at the sacrifice of an informative news product in some instances, but Te Kāea demonstrated that these did not necessarily have to contribute to a detrimental construction of Māori. Framing protest in a negative light in some stories however did limit the opportunities for audiences to understand and support the activists.

Comparing Bulletins

Overall, Prime News seemed to be the mainstream news bulletin that most closely approximated the mainstream coverage of Waitangi Day detailed by Abel in 1990, focussing on elites, ignoring history, context and the voice of protestors, and utilising misleading editing and word choices to create an exaggerated atmosphere of violence and potential threat, while focussing almost exclusively on aspects of conflict. Prime News appeared to be speaking to Pākehā viewers and seemed to racially code protestors as Māori, drawing on and potentially contributing to racist perceptions of Māori as pathologically violent and temperamental. This created an “us” and “them” dichotomy in which viewers were interpellated to disapprove of activism. Protest was
positioned as a disruption to equilibrium, demonstrating a Pākehā perception of historical relevance. By speaking from a Pākehā position to Pākehā viewers, *Prime News* perpetuated negative constructions of Māori that could have very real negative effects for Māori in the social world.

*3 News* seemed to have developed from 1990, though it also appeared to demonstrate a short-term view of historical relevancy, framing protest as disrupting equilibrium and demonstrating an inherent tendency to support the status quo. Violent wording was used to describe non-violent actions and the dramatic content was maximised. However these negative factors were tempered by the story of Mihingarangi Forbes, who included items of interest to a Māori worldview and gave reasons for the protest. Patrick Gower’s stories seemed to deflate some of the sensationalism of the other stories, and he included the voice of a protestor focussed on peace. On the other hand Gower’s stories seemed to deliberately create an escalating sense of drama around the actions of the Māori Party and iwi leaders, and he used the phrase “all New Zealanders” to exclude protestors and position them as antagonistic to the happiness of the family as the founding social unit.

*ONE News* also seemed to have developed in some ways from the style of 1990. Like *Prime News* and *3 News*, the stories of *ONE News* seemed to focus on the anticipation of violence, negativity and conflict, and utilise a Pākehā perspective on time and thus equilibrium, aligning Pākehā viewers with an anti-protest stance. It also seemed to concentrate on the Prime Minister, use violent words to describe protestors and create an “us” and “them” dichotomy. It implied an ideal of family fun without protest, and utilised a ‘one people’ idea of unity to implicitly support the normality of Pākehā domination, presenting ‘diversity’ and ‘contrast’ as ideas applying to non-Pākehā peoples. *ONE News* deliberately excluded hugely important political discussions from its family fun-focussed coverage. While *ONE News* included a soundbite from activist Wikatana Popata it labelled him as ‘Protestor’ first and foremost. However it gave reasons for the activism and included soundbites that referred to marae as sites of cultural and spiritual intensity. On Waitangi Day protestors were framed somewhat positively in an introduction read by Bernadine Oliver-Kirby as ‘calling for protection’ and practicing ‘vocal political dissent.’ Two small pieces of history were included, one of which covered some reasons for the rise of the protest movement.
It appears as though Te Kāea incorporated some of the same news values as the mainstream news channels. This could be due to the commercial pressure put on Māori Television to remain financially viable, as many mainstream news techniques seem commercially oriented to make the news more interesting for dominant Pākehā viewers. Aside from Dean Nathan’s stories, Te Kāea largely seemed to frame the protestors negatively, labelling them and demonstrating a closed focus on the negative aspects of the event such as the shouting of a racial slur and the breach of protocol. This seemed to be in order to maximise the dramatic content, rather than to explore the issues. In some places it described the actions of protestors rather than reasons. At times it seemed to assume the suppression of protest was a desirable state of equilibrium, demonstrating a short-term more Pākehā view of historical relevancy. It implied protest was getting worse, though this was contradicted, and rested on the same underlying assumption of mainstream news, that protest mars an otherwise beautiful day.

In contrast, however, Dean Nathan’s stories on Te Kāea highlighted and reiterated the central importance of tino rangatiratanga and te Tiriti to Waitangi Day. They noted historical patterns and visually reinforced historical aspects of the stories. One story included a soundbite where the translated word “foreigners” positioned Māori as the implicitly normal group, reversing the tendencies of mainstream news. Nathan’s stories presented the protestors sympathetically, giving the movement support. They included spiritual aspects important to a Māori worldview and included optimistic opinions about the political happenings, allaying the negative conflict focus of other items. At the same time it included a soundbite striking directly to the heart of tino rangatiratanga and tempered the celebratory tone of Waitangi Day by noting that some facets of the Treaty have yet to be honoured. Nathan’s experience consistently came through in non-sensationalistic stories that operated by taking into account broad perspectives on the issues, and attempted to make these issues more widely understood. Overall Te Kāea differed from mainstream reporting by having several interviews presented in full and unedited from beginning to end, showing interviewees a level of respect and allowing them to speak for themselves. It included moments of historical context. In a piece about diversity it positioned Māori as the
implicitly normal group, using the same techniques as ONE News but in reverse, promoting the normality of Māori perspectives.

*Te Kāea* seemed to utilise the mainstream news values of ‘Frequency’, ‘Threshold’, ‘Conflict’, ‘Negativity’ and perhaps ‘Consonance’, ‘Visualness’ and ‘Celebrification of the Journalist’. It also used ‘Meaningfulness’ and ‘Reference to Elite Persons’ but inverted mainstream uses of these values by choosing stories that were meaningful and people that were elite to a Māori cultural base. *Te Kāea* utilised none of McCreanor’s identified Pākehā discourses. Of the Pākehā ideologies, it seemed to perhaps incorporate a future-orientation at some points to omit a long-term view of history, but in other points the relevance of the past was stressed, balancing this out.

The use of mainstream news values on *Te Kāea* may suggest that, with the exception of Nathan’s stories, *Te Kāea* is experiencing a paradigm shift towards a more commercial perspective. The contrast between Nathan’s stories and the more mainstream stories on *Te Kāea* suggests that commercial news values are incongruous with effectively transmitting stories based in Māori worldviews. Rather than its past position of offering “a major challenge to the monocultural news values so long espoused as universal by mass TV news programmes” (Kupu Taea 45), *Te Kāea* seems to be moving towards utilising these same news values for Māori purposes. In its coverage of Waitangi events it is evident that these mainstream techniques can come at the cost of a respectful and informative news product, in some instances. On the other hand, though *Te Kaea* appeared to be incorporating more sensationalistic news making techniques perhaps driven by commercial values, it did not use these to implicitly denigrate non-Pākehā peoples or support Pākehā dominance in the way that mainstream news did. This perhaps shows that commercially oriented news values do not automatically need to support White dominance or denigrate non-White peoples. *Te Kāea* perhaps demonstrates how mainstream television news could be reimagined if it were more self-aware of the limitations of White perspectives and the damage they can cause when used exclusively.

*Te Karere* on the other hand seemed to remain grounded in Māori worldviews, express Māori perspectives, utilise kaupapa Māori newsmaking approaches and resemble te reo Māori news of the past, providing a strong contrast to mainstream
newsmaking techniques. This is perhaps possible because it is not as restricted by commercial pressures as mainstream news bulletins and Māori Television. *Te Karere* represents an established challenge to mainstream news techniques. By utilising alternative discourses and providing a different ideological base to Pākehā ideologies, *Te Karere* helps to highlight the flaws and contradictions within dominant discourses and confronts normative Pākehā dominance in Aotearoa, elucidating an alternative approach. This style of newsmaking is vital for Aotearoa's democracy as it provides citizens with different ways of understanding the information framed in mainstream news, enabling and facilitating a diverse range of opinions and stimulating critical debate. It is also an essential component of fulfilling Aotearoa's bicultural obligations as it encourages the inclusion of Māori worldviews in New Zealand and the accommodation of Māori voices in New Zealand's soundscape. By presenting a challenge to Pākehā cultural dominance, the style of newsmaking found in *Te Karere* can help legitimise Māori political ambitions, ensure the longevity of Māori cultural distinctiveness and have real positive effects on the health and daily lives of Māori people in Aotearoa. In short, *Te Karere*’s style of newsmaking fulfills the vision and the legal purposes that Māori Television was created to fulfill.

**Results**

Whiteness was extremely evident in mainstream news. Pākehā ideologies seemed to dominate the construction and selection of news stories. This meant that stories in mainstream news propagated Pākehā ideologies, transmitted Pākehā hegemonic power, were framed to suit Pākehā audiences, and supported normative Pākehā dominance. They also operated to disfavour arguments for Māori political rights and the contemporary relevance of te Tiriti, and drew on underlying racist ideas to contribute to negative constructions of Māori. By contributing to Pākehā misperceptions of te ao Māori, this uniform position of mainstream television news can produce and sustain severe social disadvantages for Māori in New Zealand, resulting in a detrimental impact on the physical and emotional health and wellbeing of Māori.

Te reo Māori news bulletin *Te Kāea* showed a movement in this direction, perhaps in response to the commercial pressures on Māori Television. It used a mixture of mainstream and kaupapa Māori newsmaking approaches that did not correspond to
denigrating Māori or supporting Pākehā cultural dominance, providing a positive example of how mainstream news perhaps should function in a bicultural country to recognise and accommodate Māori voices and minimise the daily disadvantages experienced by Māori in Aotearoa.

*Te Karere* demonstrated an approach grounded in a Māori worldview that challenged normative Pākehā dominance and provided a robust alternative to mainstream news. This perhaps demonstrates how te reo Māori news bulletins can operate to balance out present mainstream news approaches and promote the voices of Māori in Aotearoa. This indicates that in order for *Te Kāea* to fulfill the purposes for which Māori Television was created, a removal of the mandate to maintain a broad audience base and wide commercial viability is necessary. At the time of writing, a Bill is before Parliament which proposes changing ‘broad viewing audience’ to ‘viewers’ in the Māori Television Service Act in order to better reflect the adapted purpose of protecting and promoting te reo Māori me ōna tikanga. However the financial demands in the Act remain the same, so the extent to which the proposed amendments will alter programming is debateable.

The approach of individual reporters seemed to heavily impact upon the construction of news stories, demonstrated by Dean Nathan, Mihingarangi Forbes, Patrick Gower, and Scotty Morrison. This suggests that individual or collective newsworkers can have some degree of control over a news product and are able to work outside of dominant news values and discourses. If more newsworkers become aware of Pākehā ideological dominance, they may therefore be able to take the opportunity to frame stories in a way that is more advantageous to non-Pākehā sections of the public.
Conclusion

In this project I have attempted to identify aspects of Pākehā culture in order to draw it out and name it. I have hoped to show the context that has allowed Pākehā to become powerful in New Zealand and the discursive mechanisms by which that power is maintained. I have attempted to illustrate the operation of Pākehā power through television news discourse and to identify the impact of this on non-Pākehā people, particularly Māori. The aim of this work has been to draw attention to the normativity of Pākehā dominance so that this hegemony may be destabilised and this situation might change. Developing the concept of voice, I have suggested ways that this aim might be achieved to a greater extent in Aotearoa. This research offers a contribution to the field of Critical Whiteness Studies by applying these ideas to a New Zealand context. The primary analysis of news media texts extends previous news analysis in the field of Media Studies as it applies the lens of ‘Pākehāness’ to the production, text and reception of television news in Aotearoa.

Limitations

The limited timeframe and resources of this project imbue the research with a restricted scope on Pākehā ideological dominance in New Zealand. The researcher’s inability to understand te reo Māori, only allowing analysis of the condensed English subtitles of te reo Māori news, was a severe limitation. As well as this, the inferences made in the close analysis were based on one person’s perspective. If the study had a greater scope it could have been enhanced by the incorporation of multiple readings of the bulletins by different people (e.g. Fürsich 249). Ideally future research should approach the idea with a deeper understanding of te ao Māori and te reo Māori, and investigate the responses of Māori, Pākehā and other New Zealanders to Pākehā dominance in the media. A wider examination of different television news stories across a broader timeframe and more channels would also be beneficial, as well as an investigation into Pākehā ideological dominance in non-news programmes. Similarly an examination of the way these ideas apply to different media would produce vital data about Pākehāness in New Zealand. Also further investigation into the Pākehāness of newsroom environments and general media production environments in New
Zealand would be insightful, as well as focussed studies on the impact of Pākehā ideological dominance on the health and wellbeing of Pākehā and non-Pākehā New Zealanders.

Whiteness in New Zealand

The concept of Whiteness has been broadly theorised as different researchers have investigated the history and traits of White culture and people that enable Whiteness to be socially powerful. Scholars such as Richard Dyer and Ruth Frankenberg have discussed Whiteness in terms of its values, visibility and invisibility, ideologies and oppression. In applying these ideas to New Zealand, I found that Pākehāness was very similar to the concept of trans-national Whiteness, but has its own unique specificities. Pākehā identity diverges from broad theories of White identity by virtue of the relationship that Pākehā have with Māori and the colonial history of New Zealand. These two forces seem to endow Pākehā identity with a proclivity towards discourses and ideologies that justify Pākehā dominance over Māori in New Zealand.

Discourses of Whiteness appear to influence both New Zealand’s colonial history and the present moment, and were demonstrated in mainstream news products around Waitangi Day 2012 in which normative Pākehā discourses were highly evident. These ideas serve to justify Pākehā privilege and dominance by locating the source of social problems in individual choices rather than structural factors. These discourses also support Pākehā power by promoting a forward-thinking approach and a short-term view of history that encourages Pākehā to ignore the injustices of the past that contribute to the dominant idea that the country should ‘move on’ rather than reconcile historical grievances. In addition, prevalent messages based on Pākehā cultural norms operate to maintain Pākehā dominance by obscuring Pākehā cultural specificity, promoting the idea that Pākehā culture is just ‘normal,’ that everyone should be able to function equally within it and that other cultural worldviews either do not exist or are only relevant insofar as they aid dominant representations of diversity. This masks the way Pākehā are privileged by a society functioning to suit Pākehā people and ideas, and advances the idea that it is simply ‘normal’ for Pākehā to hold most positions of power in Aotearoa. These discourses were found to be based on ideologies of individualism, future-orientation, meritocracy, majority-rule and privilege, which appear to be specific attributes of Pākehā culture, reflecting broader
White cultures around the world. The ideologies underpinning Pākehā culture at the present moment therefore justify Pākehā privilege, support Pākehā dominance and maintain Pākehā power in New Zealand society.

The Pākehā discourses found in mainstream news operate to disadvantage Māori rights and health by maintaining a situation wherein the majority voting public of New Zealand are not informed about the contemporary relevance of te Tiriti, do not view colonial history as relevant and do not have an understanding of Māori worldviews, or how issues can be seen from different but equally relevant perspectives. The very processes that construct mainstream television news in a visual, fast-paced format are found to work against Māori in these respects. These processes are also underpinned by Pākehā ideologies, further enhancing Pākehā dominance. Mainstream news has been found to draw from racist underlying ideas in presenting concepts of Māori people. Health scholarship indicates that perpetuating racism fuels negative outcomes for Māori in New Zealand society and impacts adversely on Māori health and wellbeing, contributing to social inequalities by feeding an undercurrent of distrust in non-Māori toward Māori people. Overall the monoculturalism of mainstream news helps limit the possibilities for Māori people to have a fair chance at prosperous, happy, healthy lives, in violation of their Human Rights, Indigenous Rights and their rights as Treaty partners.

The News Product

In this study, Māori were found to have a right to voice that was not respected in the mainstream television news sample on Pākehā-oriented channels. It is my contention that if Māori speakers, perspectives, worldviews and stories were more evident in, but not limited to, mainstream media, Pākehā would be more aware of the distinctiveness and prevalence of their culture, destabilising the normativity of Pākehā dominance. The majority voting public would also be better equipped to decide democratically on national questions of Māori and Pākehā rights. An increase of general non-Māori understanding of different Māori perspectives and the continuing effects of colonial trauma would also operate to unsettle racist assumptions about Māori, contributing positively to Māori health and wellbeing.
Te reo Māori channel *Te Kāea* utilised a mixture of approaches in its broadcasts, and could perhaps provide a model for how mainstream news could be reimagined with a balance of Māori voices to fulfil this vision. However, it is not my place to say how Māori voices should, would or could stand in mainstream media, for such a project may involve questions of tino rangatiratanga, regional dialects, conflicting iwi opinions, media resource allocation and format compatibility, among other things. However embracing such complexities would perhaps enhance a final news product.

**Context of Production: Political**

Moving out from the text into the broader level of society, this research indicates that it would be beneficial for the ideal of a bicultural New Zealand if te Tiriti were entrenched at law in the constitutional reform process, particularly the principle of partnership.

This is exemplified by the way the status of TVNZ has recently been changed from a State Owned Enterprise to a Crown entity company. If it were still an SOE it would have to adhere to the State Owned Enterprises Act 1986 and its Treaty clause, Section 9. This may encourage New Zealand’s state broadcaster to incorporate more Māori voices into its programming, particularly from the viewpoint that the Māori voice is taonga protected by Article II of the Treaty. However, TVNZ’s change in status means these strong obligations are no longer present as the Crown Entities Act 2004 does not mention the Treaty and the Television New Zealand Act 2003 refers only to reflecting Māori perspectives as part of presenting New Zealand and international content (12(2)). If te Tiriti were incorporated at law in the Constitution, particularly the principle of partnership, then the state’s obligation to give Māori a fair chance at prosperous, happy, healthy lives would legally pervade through all its processes, including State-supported media institutions, in a way that would appear to be beneficial both for Māori and for Aotearoa.

**Context of Production: Economic**

This study found that neo-liberal economic principles support and are supported by Pākehā ideological dominance in New Zealand. Health scholarship strongly suggests that the consequences of this economic philosophy have negatively impacted upon Māori wellbeing and have increased the disparities between Māori and non-Māori
health. The influence of the market over television organisations has led to a commercialisation of the news product to attract greater numbers of viewers. Commercial news values such as ‘Frequency’, ‘Personalisation’, ‘Threshold’, ‘Conflict’ and ‘Meaningfulness’ are underpinned by Pākehā ideologies. As Pākehā are the dominant group in New Zealand society these measures mean mainstream television is also oriented to suit Pākehā. Mainstream news organisations predominantly hire Pākehā people, are largely funded by advertisers targeting Pākehā consumers and convey Pākehā perceptions of events. Overall the neo-liberal media environment in New Zealand has a negative impact upon Māori. This is particularly concerning as, at the time of writing, measures such as the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement appear poised to increase international market control over New Zealand even further.

Regarding television news, it appears as though a highly commercial environment is not compatible at the present moment with conveying a diverse range of Māori worldviews. This is evinced in the difference between the te reo Māori news of the past and the apparently more commercial Te Kāea today. Having Māori worldviews contained within mainstream commercial formats appears to be ineffective for the expression of Māori voices as it limits the forms of expression that different voices can take. It is again not my place to figure out how such formats might be reimagined to facilitate Māori perspectives.

Monoculturalism

The monoculturalism of mainstream media may be inhibiting citizens from making informed democratic decisions based on an understanding of a range of perspectives. The exposure to alternative discourses would encourage critical thinking and enable Pākehā viewers to break out of the idea that there is only one ‘normal’ way of engaging with the world. This would allow mainstream viewers to become more critical of their ideological engagement and open up the possibility for imagining alternatives to the current system. Broadcasting alternative discourses would also increase the potential for experimentation with such concepts as pan-pacific values, local economies, ideologies of sharing, and alternative solutions to social problems.
such as the national and the Māori suicide rate. Such necessary experimentation is notably absent from New Zealand’s monocultural mainstream, which may be restricting our country’s development.

**Reception**

While the context of production covers who gets to speak, what is said, who is addressed and what is withheld, the other facets of voice depend on the context of reception. This incorporates who and what is heard, and who and what is understood. The promotion of Māori voices in New Zealand’s mainstream necessitates a context of receptive listeners, willing and able to understand Māori worldviews. If te reo Māori were a compulsory subject in all schools, New Zealanders would learn both the Māori language and Māori worldviews, histories, stories and values. This would also promote the bicultural ideal by enabling every New Zealander, no matter where they are from, to have equal knowledge of te ao Māori and te ao Pākehā. It would better prepare citizens for voting on issues involving te ao Māori and te Tiriti. It would also mean the next generation of New Zealanders would be informed and competent in situations such as classrooms where the rights of all New Zealanders need to be respected. Compulsory te reo Māori learning would also better equip the next generation for the legal challenges presented by the concept of tino rangatiratanga, especially as words such as ‘kaitiakitanga’ enter legislation (Resource Management Act 1991), requiring interpretation and application by judges, lawyers and citizens.

**Pākehāness**

The scenario of a more conducive context for the production and transmission of Māori voices, and a more receptive context for understanding these voices, would, I believe, assist in fulfilling the partnership principle embedded in the Treaty, would begin to fulfil the Māori right to all five facets of voice and would diversify mainstream media perspectives, providing different discourses that could destabilise the power of Pākehā hegemony. It would also enable Pākehā to become more aware of their culture, how it is reflected in the structures of social institutions, and its impact on non-Pākehā peoples. The present situation of normative Pākehā dominance is detrimental to Māori and violates the Treaty and many international declarations.
It is possible to think about how we got here and whom we are supporting with our ideas. It is possible to change our ideas and our context. This research suggests pathways for change. These suggestions would go some way towards destabilising Pākehā hegemony, and allow for the imagining of alternative worlds.

To borrow from the wisdom of whakataukī:

**Ko tōu reo, ko tōku reo,**

te tuakiri tangata.

**Tīhei uriuri, tīhei nakonako.**

Your voice and my voice are expressions of identity.

May our descendants live on and our hopes be fulfilled.
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