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THE NEW CANNIBAL CLUB
DECONSTRUCTING HISTORY IN AOTEAROA NEW ZEALAND

John Bevan-Smith

To

Jodi, Nathan, Heloise, and Sylvie

“l’avenir”
And I would say that deconstruction loses nothing from admitting that it is impossible; and also that those who would rush to delight in that admission lose nothing from having to wait. For a deconstructive operation possibility would rather be the danger, the danger of becoming an available set of rule-governed procedures, methods, accessible approaches. The interest of deconstruction, of such force and desire as it may have, is a certain experience of the impossible.

Jacques Derrida, ‘Force of Law: The “Mystical Foundation of Authority”’

We live in time, it bounds us and defines us, and time is supposed to measure history, isn’t it? But if we can’t understand time, can’t grasp its mysteries of pace and progress, what chance do we have with history – even our own small, personal, largely undocumented piece of it?

Julian Barnes, The Sense of an Ending
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ABSTRACT

The central argument of this thesis is that history is a self-referential discourse, the principal referent of which, the past, exists as an organising device within the discourse itself and not as a material exoteric that can be visited and studied. As a consequence, 'historical discourse is a fake performative discourse' that relies on 'the reality effect' to make the past seem present and accessible in order to achieve its teleological aims. History, therefore, is not axiomatic and has a limited social utility.

The principal purpose of this thesis is to dehegemonize settler historiography in Aotearoa New Zealand in the hope of finding a way to overcome the différend that separates Maori (tangata whenua or people of the land) and Pakeha (tangata tiriti or tauiwi, respectively, people of the Treaty or foreigners) and thereby help to bring about a deep and lasting healing in this place. It thus contends that an alternative to the historico-legal language on which the contemporary dialogue is based must be found.

To these ends, it relies on ideas from linguistic philosophy, particularly those of Roland Barthes, Jacques Derrida, and Jean-François Lyotard, to deconstruct the 'groundless grounds' on which contemporary history writing rests, and deploys these ideas to demonstrate that settler historiography, as a textual site, is central to a discursive system that performs a double function: it affirms the settler's right to belong while displacing the narrative of the indigenous population whose geography the settler has seized by force and other dubious means.

It argues that we should break with the positivist model that informs the modern historiographical project and approach the différend on a philosophico-ethical basis, while learning to live with the aporias and contradictions that inhere within the human condition. Finally, this thesis advocates for an unceasing deconstruction of the hegemonic while seeking the unexpected in Derrida's 'democracy to come'.
PART A

PHILOSOPHICAL PROBLEMATIC
INTRODUCTION
Problematising the past

The central argument of this thesis is that history is a self-referential discourse, the principal referent of which, the past, exists as an organising device within the discourse itself and not as a material exoteric that can be visited and studied. As a consequence, 'historical discourse is a fake performative discourse' that relies on 'the reality effect' to make the past seem present and accessible in order to achieve its teleological aims.¹

That history is not axiomatic and has a limited social utility challenges George Santayana's famous aphorism, first published in 1905: ‘Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it.’² Despite relying on the stigmatising of indigenous people to make its case—'Progress, far from consisting in change, depends on retentiveness . . . and when experience is not retained, as among savages, infancy is perpetual’—this aphorism is still widely used to support the historiographical project.³ Judith Binney, for instance, who wrote acclaimed and award-winning history books based mostly on her extensive work with Maori, the indigenous people of New Zealand, produced, in 1995, her own version of Santayana’s saying: 'If we who live in the present in Aotearoa can discuss our shared history in the 19th and 20th centuries, then we may gain from that past. If we cannot do this, then we will have learnt nothing from the past and we will have exchanged nothing between each other.'⁴

³ Santayana, *The Life of Reason*, 82.
But where is the past? Given that ‘we have not been invaded by hordes of tourists from the future’, as Stephen Hawking has it, and given that no one sells tickets to it as a destination, we can say that the past exists only imaginatively.\(^5\) Furthermore, even if the past were present, which it cannot be and still be the past, remembering all that has happened would be impossible. Thus an aphorism used widely to support the idea and practice of history is a ‘groundless ground’ based on ‘the myth of “race”’, a fashionable anthropological notion for codifying human anatomical differences when Santayana was writing but which has since been discredited by the science of genetics.\(^6\) Hence it could be argued that the opposite of Santayana’s claim might be the case: that it is because we believe what we tell ourselves about the past that we keep on repeating our mistakes. Furthermore, because there is nothing corporeal about history, it is better understood as a belief system we have been socialised into believing in, at least since its invention in its current

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\(^6\) Lee Braver, *Groundless Grounds: A Study of Wittgenstein and Heidegger* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 2012), 11 *passim*. Braver offers the following explanation for the term ‘groundless grounds’: ‘The important point about this phrase is that both terms are in effect: while the grounds of all thinking lack the kind of foundation philosophers have long dreamt of, and thus are groundless, they still function as grounds for finite creatures like us’ (*Groundless Grounds*, 11, see also 194); Ernest Beaglehole, Juan Comas, L. A. Costa Pinto, Franklin Frazier, Morris Ginsberg, Humayun Kabir, Claude Levi-Strauss, and Ashley Montagu, ‘The Race Question’, UNESCO and Its Programme, Volume 3, 1950, 8 §14: [http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0012/001282/128291eo.pdf](http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0012/001282/128291eo.pdf). The authors state: ‘The biological fact of race and the myth of “race” should be extinguished. For all practical social purposes “race” is not so much a biological phenomenon as a social myth. The myth “race” has created an enormous amount of human and social damage. In recent years it has taken a heavy toll in human lives and caused untold suffering. It still prevents the normal development of millions of human beings and deprives civilization of the effective co-operation of productive minds. The biological differences between ethnic groups should be disregarded from the standpoint of social acceptance and social action’ (‘The Race Question’, 8 §14); Naomi Zack, *Philosophy of Science and Race* (New York: Routledge, 2002), xi; The Human Genome Project comments on race as follows: ‘DNA studies do not indicate that separate classifiable subspecies (races) exist within modern humans. While different genes for physical traits such as skin and hair color can be identified between individuals, no consistent patterns of genes across the human genome exist to distinguish one race from another. There also is no genetic basis for divisions of human ethnicity’: [http://www.ornl.gov/sci/techresources/Human_Genome/elsi/minorities.shtml](http://www.ornl.gov/sci/techresources/Human_Genome/elsi/minorities.shtml). See also: Ian Tattersall and Rob DeSalle, *Race?: Debunking a Scientific Myth* (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2011).
formulation in the early nineteenth century.\textsuperscript{7} Indeed, believing in the idea of history is so much a part of our contemporary way of life that the term appears ad nauseam in media headlines: ‘Obama makes history’; ‘Black Sticks aiming at history’; ‘History awaits Ferns’.\textsuperscript{8}

That the past has no material existence but is treated by historians as if it does is the error of praxis that goes to the heart of history writing (historiography). This confusion between the inside and outside of history arises for at least two significant reasons: because history is a discourse, ‘it is impossible to think of history apart from its expression (as history)’; and because time is aporetic, we tend to conceptualise existence beyond the now.\textsuperscript{9} That is, while we locate our being as being in the present of the time series past-present-future, that location, ‘the now’, turns out to be irreducible (inadequate to itself as itself) and dependent on the further conceptualisations of future and past, ‘the not-yet-now’ and ‘the no-longer-now’.\textsuperscript{10} Thus, because ‘the now’ is not present to itself, its self-presence can be achieved only by way of a movement of deferral in which ‘[a]n interval must separate the present from what it is not in order for the present to be itself, but this interval that constitutes it as present must, by the same token, divide the present in and of itself, thereby also dividing, along with the present, everything that is thought on the basis of the present’.\textsuperscript{11}

\begin{itemize}
\item[\textsuperscript{7}] The publication in 1824 of Leopold von Ranke’s first book of history, \textit{History of the Latin and Teutonic Nations: 1494-1514}, is thought to mark the commencement of modern historiography.
\item[\textsuperscript{9}] Alun Munslow, \textit{The Future of History} (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 275.
\end{itemize}
That the past is metaphoric and not empirical has profound implications for history and history writing. To begin with, it means that history is ahistorical because what is being referenced is not real in any tangible sense and always comes after the event. Peter Charles Hoffer describes this paradox as follows: ‘History is impossible. Nothing I have written or could write will change that brute fact. We cannot go back in time. But doing history, studying the past, is not impossible.’

Significantly, however, Hoffer can only ‘reach’ the past by relying on a metaphor offered by *Indiana Jones and the Last Crusade*: ‘a bridge to the other side.’ In other words, because, phenomenologically, there is nothing *there*, text is needed to make the past seem present and accessible, with metaphors often used to heighten that impression. A general lack of acceptance that histories are only texts within the textual site of history, a general unawareness that there is no outside to historical discourse, and a general failure to acknowledge history’s self-referentiality, are among the fatal flaws that beset historiography as we know it. Put alternatively, in its referential function, language does not differentiate between notional and material objects: it simply signifies them. Therefore, unless the user of the sign makes that distinction they may blur the boundaries between the notional and corporeal and thereby perpetuate the error commonly made by historians of treating ideas as having an independent and sometimes material existence outside the discourse. Because the past is an idea and not a place it can be reached only metaphorically and considered only imaginatively, and to not make that clear is tantamount to making a ‘category-mistake’.


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13 Hoffer, *The Historians’ Paradox*, 179.
14 The term ‘category-mistake’ was introduced by Gilbert Ryle in his monograph *The Concept of Mind* (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1963, first published 1949), 17-24, in order to dispel what he believed were the problems inherent in the Cartesian theory of mind.
Palenski’s mistaking of the inside for the outside of historical discourse, his deployment of metaphor to ‘reach’ the past, and his use of history to justify the settler’s right to belong, are found operating in tandem at the beginning of Chapter Three, ‘The Symbols of “Godzone”’:

New Zealand is a small country. Nothing is far away; not even the past. In a country that has had formal government for about 170 years, it is more possible in New Zealand than in longer-established countries to lift the veil from the past to discover, in Leopold von Ranke’s words, *wie es eigentlich gewesen* – what actually happened. . . . While this approach may be regarded as passé in post-modernist theory, it is reasonable to conclude that the facts of history, as far as they can be established, continue to provide the framework to which theory and differing interpretations can later be applied. The progression, historically speaking, of New Zealand in a period of about 50 years from an undeveloped land with a sparse indigenous population to a modern nation-state, one even looked upon as a model of enlightened government by some, has been traced many times.¹⁶

Setting aside such unproblematised matters as ‘the past’s’ distance from ‘the present’, metaphorical veils, national exceptionalism, historical ‘progression’, ‘undeveloped land’, what ‘the facts of history’ might be, and whether only Europeans were capable of modernisation and ‘enlightened government’, Palenski reads the events under description, which he believes confirm his thesis that ‘immigrants in the nineteenth century began to think of themselves as New Zealanders rather than as transplanted Britons . . . earlier than has hitherto been postulated’, as being present to themselves and conflates these events with the moment of writing about them.¹⁷ He is able to do this because of his apparent belief that he can travel back in time: ‘this [thesis] examines the emergence of a New Zealand identity *at the time* it was emerging . . . and not from a viewpoint formed more than a hundred years later’

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Palenski treats his ‘primary sources’ (diaries, images, newspapers, magazines) similarly, mistaking ‘the reality effect’ for the real, and reading these documents as extradiscursive repositories of ‘facts’ and ‘evidence’—‘master words’ of historical discourse that purportedly signify the real—rather than as intradiscursive productions. But this should not surprise, for as early as his abstract we find him mistaking the inside for the outside, his presumed material exoteric being comprised of ‘events of the past’ that even ‘post-modern thinking cannot change’. Thus Palenski’s re-interpretation of the dawning of national consciousness within New Zealand’s settler society is only possible because the fake performativity of historical discourse allows him to make repeated claims about ‘national identity’ with recourse to nothing more than the companionable ideologies of settlerism and nationalism found not in an empirical past but in texts he calls primary and secondary sources. Significantly, in one of those ‘primary sources’, The Story of New Zealand: Past and Present—Savage and Civilised (1859), New Zealand’s first work of historiography, we find its author introducing in the ‘characteristic speech-act’ of the preface the savage/civilised binary opposition that is congenital to European settlerism, and underwrites its ideology as well as acting as its mythopoetic trope:

I have endeavoured to sketch the natural history of the country; to narrate the story of its people, their spiritual conquest, and the dawn of civilisation amongst them; to show how a few Anglo-Saxons planted and managed a colony in the midst of cannibals; and to describe their bygone dangers and difficulties, their present efforts to render a theoretical constitution practically useful, and the progress they have made in developing the resources

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of England’s most distant colony.\textsuperscript{22}

This binary opposition also establishes the settler narrative as being hegemonic and confirms the settler as civilising the savage, one of the justificatory concepts at the heart of settler ideology. And it is here that we also find another aporia: without the idea of the civilised, believed to succeed the savage chronologically, the savage could not be thought. In other words, the predicational basis of both savage and civilised does not preexist their binary relationship: each needs the other to conceive of the other, to give the other life. Maori only receive their savage ‘presence’ by way of their relationship with the civilised European. Put otherwise, neither Maori nor European settler is savage or civilised outside of their binary relationship: as binary signs, ‘savage’ and ‘civilised’ make sense only as ideas in relation to each other; they reference only the other, not material exoterics. Hence it is both ironic and paradoxical that the civilised needs the savage in order to be civilised, but explains, nevertheless, why the savage accompanies the settler on this discursive journey of progress: neither can escape the metaphysical and différential operations of their relationship in which ‘Being as presence’ is both established and maintained.\textsuperscript{23}

Furthermore, because this binary relationship acts as the (non-)centre of settlerism’s signifying system, it requires constant supplementation, as we will see in Part B of this thesis.

Thus we can see how Palenski’s thesis obeys the ‘transcendental teleology’ of settler discourse and its attendant ideology and ethnocentrism, dressing them up as history

\textsuperscript{22} Barthes, \textit{The Rustle of Language}, 130; Arthur S. Thomson, \textit{The Story of New Zealand: Past and Present—Savage and Civilized} (London: John Murray, 1859), opp. title page, iv.\textsuperscript{23} Jacques Derrida, \textit{Writing and Difference}, trans. Alan Bass (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1978), 279. As Derrida puts it in ‘Structure, Sign, and Play’, from where the above ideas are derived, the ‘transcendental signified’ that sits at the centre of any discourse ‘is never absolutely present outside a system of differences’, and is therefore the product of a function, namely ‘an infinite number of sign-substitutions’ that are constantly in play as ‘the movement of supplementarity’ and which substitute for the non-centre of the discourse. This gives rise to ‘the paradox ... that the metaphysical reduction of the sign needs the opposition it is reducing’, an ‘opposition’ that ‘is systematic with the reduction’ (\textit{Writing and Difference}, 280, 289, 281).
as it espouses them. This performance of settlerism in the service of the ‘transcendental community’, the collective subjectivity of the settler state to come, includes the acceptance of history as self-evident, a belief that history is more than text, and what seems to be a glaring inattention to the idea of history as a discursive programming of the nation as a collective good, a common fall-back position of non-indigenous citizens of contemporary settler nation-states. In the case of New Zealand, pre-Treaty Maori is characterised as being marginally human and incapable of progress without having first been colonised by civilised Europeans. As with all settler histories, the teleology of Palenski’s thesis is fatal to the indigenous narrative, violently displacing it. In presenting the settlers’ history as hegemonic and by appropriating from and subsuming Maori within his story, Palenski also denies Maori their ‘long history of place’, as Stephen Turner describes it, and thereby their mana (authority or prestige) as tangata whenua (people of the land/placenta). This is not to deny Palenski a genuineness of intention; rather, it is to suggest that his apparent unawareness of his own socialisation into settlerism and its engineering of his discourse does Maori a disservice, not the favour he appears to think he is bestowing in believing that he is relating ‘what actually happened’. Labouring under this misapprehension, Palenski writes that ‘Maori also contributed in no small measure to the manner in which New Zealand’s national identity developed’, providing ‘a unique dimension and led to a fused national identity between the indigenous and the recent arrivals. Maori in fact provided the lead in the sport that came to be regarded as “the national game,” rugby union’. Confident in his reading of the ‘evidence’, Palenski adds that ‘[i]t was Maori influence that led to the national team being known as the All Blacks and played a large role in solidifying rugby as the national game’, and ‘it was Maori who

24 Derrida, The Other Heading, 33.
25 Derrida, The Other Heading, 33.
were the real progenitors of what the All Blacks came to mean in New Zealand’s national psyche.’

This, Palenski argues, countering national-identity naysayers, confirms that Maori were not excluded from New Zealand’s nascent national identity, and nor, he adds without a hint of irony, were women because they too were spectators at rugby matches, were given the vote in 1893, and homage was paid to a woman, Queen Victoria, throughout this period of national identity formation.

‘The argument that national identity is a flawed or misguided concept is an argument in the abstract’, he writes, without noting that ‘national identity’ is also an abstraction.

That such argumentation is still being made and published within New Zealand’s academy, let alone being acclaimed, begs a wide range of questions, two of which are of particular interest to this thesis: how, in a technical sense, is it able to be made, and why is it still being made? These two questions relate, respectively, to Parts A and B of this thesis. Part A, Philosophical Problematic, examines the fake performativity of historical discourse by deploying certain twentieth-century developments in linguistic philosophy to problematise some of the notional foundations, such as time, origins, and facticity, on which historical discourse rests. Part B, Historiographical Operation, examines selected tropes foundational to settler historiography, and here we find Palenski far from being alone in passing off settler ideology as historical reality: despite there being two competing narratives in Aotearoa New Zealand emanating from its two principal language communities, that of the settler and that of tangata whenua, and despite the latter’s narrative increasingly being heard since 1975 when the Waitangi Tribunal was established to consider claims for breaches or omissions by the Crown in relation to the Treaty of Waitangi, signed by Maori and the British, settler historiography remains resolutely

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hegemonic. Significantly, because the indigenous version of events is markedly divergent from the settler version, the inability of history to deliver definitive answers concerning Treaty claims and therefore social justice becomes increasingly apparent. For instance, conventional Pakeha historiography has it that ‘the chiefs ceded their sovereignty to the Queen’ in the Treaty’s first article, whereas certain iwi (tribes) hold that their tupuna (forebears) ceded no such thing. Indeed, given that ‘significant Maori leaders declared themselves and their people to be a nascent independent state’ in 1835 with their declaration of independence, He Whakaputanga o Te Rangatiratanga o Nu Tireni, and given their numerical (40:1) and military superiority when the Treaty was signed, the proposition that Maori ceded sovereignty in 1840 can be construed as a risible settler construct designed to suit settler ends.

Part A of this thesis is principally concerned with the production of meaning, with a stark choice presenting itself: does the meaning of words inhere in that which they name, thereby capturing the ‘pre-existent’ meaning of their referents or “meaning-objects”, or does it derive from a play of differences within language, the resultant meaning of which is stored in our memories, dictionaries, and socially accepted

32 Waitangi Tribunal Te Ropu Whakamana i Te Tiriti o Waitangi: http://www.waitangi-tribunal.govt.nz/about/established.asp. See also ‘Treaty of Waitangi Settlements Process’, 23 August 2006, 1.: http://www.parliament.nz/NR/rdonlyres/B4CEA237-17B0-42B8-B7BC-20872134CEFA/S0542/0604ToW7.pdf. Treaty of Waitangi claims were made retrospective to 1840 with the passing of The Treaty of Waitangi Amendment Act 1985: http://legislation.knowledge-basket.co.nz/. 33 Keith Sinclair, A History of New Zealand, new edn (Auckland: Penguin Books, 1991, first published 1959), 71; Manuka Arnold Henare, ‘The Changing Images of Nineteenth-century Maori Society – From Tribes to Nation’, PhD thesis (University of Victoria, 2003), Abstract passim. This discrepancy arises because the Maori language version of the Treaty, Te Tiriti o Waitangi, the version debated and signed at Waitangi on 6 February 1840, specifically guarantees Maori ‘te tino rangatiratanga’ (full chieftainship or absolute authority) at Article 2, whereas the English version of the Treaty, which was not debated or signed at Waitangi, has Maori ceding sovereignty at Article 1. 34 Henare, ‘The Changing Images of Nineteenth-century Maori Society’, 19; Ian Pool, Te Iwi Maori: A New Zealand Population Past, Present & Projected (Auckland: Auckland University Press, 1991), 58. This ratio is based on a Pakeha population of 2,000 and Pool’s ‘best estimate’ of 80,000 for the Maori population in 1840 (Te Iwi Maori, 76 Table 5.2). The term ‘Pakeha’, shortened from ‘pakepakeha’, is the Maori word first used, it is thought, to describe James Cook and his crew, or white people. Although it can be used to refer to non-Maori living in New Zealand, its principal contemporary definition is: ‘New Zealander of European descent’: http://www.maoridictionary.co.nz.
usages? The former view, essentialist and positivist, follows the Platonic tradition that has dominated Western thought, and the latter, perspectivalist, follows the sceptical tradition emanating, it is thought, from the Sophists. Uniquely, both sides of the argument can be found in the writings of Ludwig Wittgenstein, the former view in the *Tractatus*, and the latter view in the later *Philosophical Investigations* and its concept of the ‘language-game’ in which the value or meaning of a word may alter according to the role, out of a number of possible roles, it may assume within the game.

The ‘Copernican’ moment in this debate, it could be said, occurred in 1916 with the posthumous publication of *Course in General Linguistics*, in which Ferdinand de Saussure proposed that there are no positive terms in a language, only differences, and therefore no ‘natural’ link or order between words and the objects or ideas to which they refer. However, if language is a signifying system, that raises the question as to whether or not it has a centre. For Jacques Derrida (1930-2004), the French philosopher born in Algeria to a Sephardic Jewish family, there was none, only the endless play of signification he called *différance*, the ‘semantic void at the heart of’ conceptualisation that doubles as a (non-)place or the (non-)centre of language. Hence, without an understanding of *différance*, this thesis argues, it is difficult to appreciate why notions of evidence, facticity, and origins on which


historians depend are inherently unstable. More specifically, without an understanding of how différance accounts for the nothingness of beforeness, historians, like Palenski, will continue to uncritically perpetuate the settler discourse in New Zealand, apparently ignoring Peter Gibbons’s thesis that suggests their writing is part of the ongoing process of ‘cultural colonization’ in this place.\textsuperscript{39} In short, the work of Derrida is privileged in this thesis because différance, arguably his most important contribution to Western philosophy, ultimately determines the entire ensemble and economy of historical discourse. In addition, Derrida’s reading of time in Aristotle and Martin Heidegger and origins in Michel Foucault helps us to understand why these foundational historical concepts are themselves without ground. Likewise, Derrida’s examination of Daniel Defoe’s \textit{Robinson Crusoe} and Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s \textit{Essay On the Origin of Languages} is important in the deconstruction of the cannibal in Part B.\textsuperscript{40} Notwithstanding other titles from Derrida’s voluminous output, as well as a considerable body of instructive secondary literature, three of Derrida’s monographs are of particular importance: \textit{Of Grammatology} (1974), \textit{Writing and Difference} (1978), and \textit{Margins of Philosophy} (1982).\textsuperscript{41}

This thesis is also much indebted to Roland Barthes (1915-1980), who held the Chair of Literary Semiology at the Collège de France at the time of his death, and to two of his essays in particular: ‘The Discourse of History’ (1967) and ‘The Reality Effect’ (1968).\textsuperscript{42} These essays help us understand how ‘the reality effect’ enables historians to neutralise the foundational problem of history: that the past is the


\textsuperscript{42} Barthes, \textit{The Rustle of Language}, 127-148. Barthes was hit by a laundry truck following a lunch with friends, including François Mitterrand, and ‘died a month later from his injuries’ (Robert Wicks, \textit{Modern French Philosophy: From Existentialism to Postmodernism} [Oxford: One Word Publications, 2003], 146).
product of difference and not real in any phenomenological sense. Additionally, ‘the reality effect’ enables historians to make virtually any claim they wish provided those claims are in keeping with the internal logic of their discourse and the expectations of their audience. James Belich, for instance, is able to assert that New Zealand went through an era of “recolonisation” from the 1880s to the 1960s and of ‘decolonisation’ from 1965 to 1988, despite both terms usually being associated with the processes by which indigenous people regain their territories from former colonising powers. Hence Belich’s thesis fits Palenski’s perfectly: ‘Belich . . . offered a fresher view with his concept of “recolonisation” that followed the advent of the trade in frozen farm products in the early 1880s. He defined recolonisation as the tightening of relations between “metropolis” and “periphery” after an era of mass settlement; within that process, national identity became “dominionist” – “a New Zealand identity fitting neatly within a British one.” This tightening, Palenski suggests, as if it exists extradiscursively, ‘was the driving in of another pile supporting New Zealand identity.’ In utilising Belich’s idea, Palenski seems unaware that he is writing within a self-referential discourse that has already predetermined it must displace its rival discourse, the indigenous narrative, by purporting that the colonisers are the colonised. He also appears oblivious to the lack of correspondence in historical discourse between an intradiscursive claim and

43 Barthes, The Rustle of Language, 139, 141-8.
44 Barthes, The Rustle of Language, 139, 141-8.
the purportedly extradiscursive referent about which that claim is being made, and that any correspondence will be between the writer and their audience, as Colin James makes clear: ‘Belich’s contribution to our understanding of ourselves is immense. He is a living national treasure. . . . Few, on reflection, would disagree with his thesis that most of last century was a time of recolonisation.’

Before concluding this initial comment on Barthes, we should note that although he maintains that ‘narrative structure’, commonly utilised by historians, was ‘elaborated in the crucible of fictions (through myths and early epics)’ and ‘becomes both sign and proof of reality’, he was not asserting that history is fiction. Rather, he was proposing that if the concept as expressed by a signified is suppressed in its function through its faux detachment from its signifier this creates the illusion of the signifier directly representing the reality of its referent. This, of course, is the reason historiography insists on the reality of that referent.

Two other ideas privileged in this thesis are from Jean-François Lyotard (1925-1998), the former professor emeritus of Philosophy at the University of Paris-Vincennes who is arguably best remembered for his succinct definition of ‘postmodern as incredulity toward metanarratives’. The two ideas in question are his paradigmatic use of the theatre to analyse representation and critique ‘a certain “realism” in the arts’, and the differend, which, as he defines it in contradistinction to a litigation, ‘would be a case of conflict, between (at least) two parties, that cannot be equitably resolved for lack of a rule of judgement applicable to both arguments’. The former plays an important role in the deconstruction of the settler trope of Gallipoli in Chapter Four, and the latter, the elephant in the room, informs much of

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49 Barthes, The Rustle of Language, 140.
the discussion in Part B. That is, the différend not only points to the difference between the principal language communities and their respective discourses in all settler domains, it also identifies, names and describes the irresolvability that lies at the heart of that difference.\textsuperscript{52} Hence, the principal purpose of this thesis is to dehegemonize settler discourse as a first step towards seeking a philosophico-ethical approach that can begin to address that irresolvability. In other words, unless we begin to deconstruct the retroactive protention on which settler history rests and which enables settler historians to claim all manner of improbabilities as certainties, and unless we begin to deconstruct the doctrine of judicial precedent that does likewise for the law by underwriting its positivist methodology, we may never fully grasp let alone accept how both have extinguished the prior narrative and customary law in settler domains because of our belief in the fantasy that each, history and the law, is present to itself at instituting moments. While this aporia may be unavoidable, understanding it is not. And it is here, in the aporias and textual interstices that ethics can go to work.

Because Part A is concerned with philosophical matters relating to historical discourse, it does not rely to any great extent on that body of literature known as history theory, which is concerned in the main with how history is performed. There are, however, a number of exceptions, most notably Michel de Certeau’s \textit{Heterologies} (1986) and \textit{The Writing of History} (1988), and Gabrielle Spiegel’s ‘Historicism, and the Social Logic of the Text in the Middle Ages’ and ‘The Task of the Historian’.\textsuperscript{53} Also

\textsuperscript{52} In Australia the two competing language communities are comprised of the Aboriginal peoples or First Australians and the European settlers or colonists, the former of whom, through the application of \textit{terra nullius} had their entire island continent stolen by the British government. In New Zealand the two principal language communities are Maori or tangata whenua and Pakeha or European settlers or colonists. In the United States of America, the circumstances are somewhat more complicated with the resettlement and genocide of the indigenous people, or ‘the great American Indian holocaust’ as Stannard describes it (\textit{American Holocaust}, xii), and the subsequent importation of African slaves.\textsuperscript{53} Michel de Certeau, \textit{Heterologies: Discourse on the Other}, trans. Brian Massumi (Minneapolis: The University of Minnesota Press, 1986); Michel de Certeau, \textit{The Writing of History}, trans. Tom Conley (New York: Columbia University Press, 1988); Gabrielle M. Spiegel, ‘Historicism, and the Social Logic of the Text in the Middle Ages’, \textit{Speculum} 65/1 (1990), 59-86; Gabrielle M. Spiegel, ‘The Task of the Historian’, \textit{The American Historical Review}, 114/1 (2009), 1-15.
of significance is the growing body of work from Keith Jenkins and Alun Munslow, as well as the writings of Frank Ankersmit, Hayden White, and Giorgio Agamben.\textsuperscript{54}

In order to demonstrate that historical discourse represents itself and not the past as it purports, Chapter One, Problematising the limit, interrogates two of its foundations, time and multiple singularities, by relying, for the former, on John McTaggart Ellis McTaggart’s essay on time, ‘The Unreality of Time’, with its A, B, and C series, and Derrida’s essay, ‘Ousia and Gramme: Note on a Note from Being and Time’.\textsuperscript{55} In that discussion it follows from McTaggart that time is invalid of reality, and from Derrida that time is metaphorical: ‘The concept of time, in all its aspects, belongs to metaphysics, and it names the domination of presence.’\textsuperscript{56} In regard to problematising multiple singularities, Chapter One relies principally on Bertrand Russell’s discussions of his set theoretical paradox and Alain Badiou’s \textit{Being and Event} (2005).\textsuperscript{57}

\textit{Différance}, Derrida’s neologism, is discussed in Chapter Two, Problematising the outside. Without an understanding of its mechanics and arch-structuring influence, it is difficult to conceive of meaning about the past being produced in any other than


\textsuperscript{56} Derrida, \textit{Margins of Philosophy}, 63.

a conventional historicised manner. As the mechanism by which Derrida deconstructed presence as the basis of Western philosophy, *différance* is also the means by which history may be deconstructed. It makes obvious, for instance, the common error of placing history outside its discursive self as ‘the past’ and conflating it with the belief that knowledge is gathered there instead of being produced within the discourse itself. *Différance* also enables us to consider history as its own signifying system, the transcendental signifier of which, *history*, sits at its centre and controls the extent and play of its domain. This radically alters our understanding of what history is and what its potential utility might be. For if ‘there is no outside-text’ (*il n’y a pas de hors-texte*), history can only ever be intratextual and ultimately undecidable. Our encounter with Spiegel at Chapter Two, in which we see a courageous but ultimately flawed attempt to place texts-objects in their historical setting so that ‘the silences’ of the dead may be heard, is instructive in this regard. Text-objects do not lead to the past, only to more text-objects, often with the help of end- and footnotes in much the same way that signifiers in dictionaries lead only to more signifiers, ‘never any signifieds.’ Just as Chapter One references the delaying movement of *différance* that makes possible the conceptualisation of presence, so Chapter Two references the differing movement of *différance* in the signifying process, where *différance* is productive of meaning even as it remains beyond meaning and has no meaning itself. Other Derridean concepts, such as ‘protowriting’ or ‘arche-writing’, *s’entendre-parler* (hearing/understanding oneself simultaneously) and supplementarity, are also discussed in this chapter and the significance of the latter two, respectively, in terms of the effacement of the signifier by the signified when history is being thought, and making history (seem) possible

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by turning absence into presence through effacement of history’s originary lack. After analysing an important debate on the new novel held at Cerisy-la-Salle, Normandy, in 1963, Chapter Two concludes with a discussion concerning the difficulties of language representing the real and the role of metaphor in that process.

The origin, always already mythical, is discussed in Chapter Three, Problematising the text. In New Zealand settler historiography, the originary beginning in the ‘archaic’ narrative’ is effaced in at least two ways. First, it is subsumed under the settler’s ‘cognitive genre’, in which the former’s hazy origin is displaced by ‘the scholar’s facts’, and second, by the use of first person plural pronouns when positing an even earlier origin than the archaic one commonly found in settler narratives: ‘New Zealand was a land empty of people. But soon our frontier would be crossed. . . . Ancient migrants were carrying their culture into southern seas. Soon they would find our ocean. And our islands would never be the same again.’

Without an understanding of the aporia of time, it may be difficult to appreciate that the empirical beginning of New Zealand, widely taken to be the signing of the Treaty of Waitangi on 6 February 1840, is just as mythical as the archaic myth of origin or the recently invented myth of primordial beginnings, because any foundling moment cannot be present to itself given the irreducibility of the now. It is because of the significance of originary moments to historical discourse in general and settler discourse in particular that Chapter Three also devotes itself to Derrida’s deconstruction of the origin of madness posited by Foucault in The History of

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64 Michel Foucault et al., ‘Débat sur le roman’, *Tel Quel*, 17 (1964), 13-54.
65 Lyotard, *The Differend*, 156 §224.
Madness. As Derrida describes it: 'The concept of origin . . . is the myth of the effacement of the trace, that is to say of an originary differance that is neither absence nor presence, neither negative nor positive.'

Chapter Three also engages with Barthes’ seminal essays mentioned above, ‘The Discourse of History’ and ‘The Reality Effect’, in the former of which we find the signified effaced by the referent when the referent is merged with the signifier when history is being written, just as in Chapter Two we see the signifier effaced by the signified when history is being thought. It is this ‘(illusory) merging of referent and signified’ that results in the ‘referential illusion’ that gives historical discourse its malleability and thereby makes it the ideal cultural instrument with which to underwrite political power systems. That ‘the reality effect’ is disguised as a natural part of narrativity helps to explain why historians may be unaware of their complicity in the formulation and exercise of contemporary political power. Given that history as we know it as an episteme is a relatively recent invention strongly influenced by science and positivism, Chapter Three concludes, with help from Dalia Judovitz, by looking at Discourse on Method (1637), in which René Descartes articulates his famous expression of self-presence, ‘I think, therefore I am’, and The Meditations (1641), in which he provided ‘a philosophical groundwork for the possibility of the sciences’, and which, ironically, doubles as an analogue of history writing.

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68 Derrida, Of Grammatology, 167.
70 Barthes, The Rustle of Language, 139, 148.
71 Barthes, The Rustle of Language, 139.
By the end of Part A, the obvious appears inescapable: that ‘there is no exit’ from language, that there is no outside to discourse, and that history can never escape *différance.*

Part B is concerned primarily with the historiographical operation in the settler domain of New Zealand, and considers some of the ways in which history’s fake performativity is deployed to justify the settler state’s expropriation of the politico-geographical space it now controls. In these examples, not only is the empirical basis of historical writing critiqued, so also is the apparent failure of settler historians to interrogate their own historiographical practices, their idea of history that governs those practices, and the settler logic that drives their discourse and determines their socialisation into settlerism.

Underlying Part B is the understanding, noted above, that in all settler domains there are at least two competing discourses, that of the settler society, intent on justifying its right to belong, and that of tangata whenua, intent on reclaiming its position within that space. In this competitive environment, the settler discourse objectifies the indigenous narrative, subsumes and appropriates it, as well as judging it from within its own discursive structures and by its own discursive rules, which are always to the settler’s advantage. On the other hand, tangata whenua, believing ‘the past’ to be before it and ‘the future’ behind it, ‘speaks’ from within its own narrative, articulating its mana and mana motuhake (autonomy) as being foundational to its collective expression as well as belonging to those no longer living and those yet to come. Manuka Henare encapsulates the heterogeneity of these two discourses in the following:

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74 While ‘tangata whenua’ means, in te reo Maori, ‘the people of the land’, or people born of the placenta or where their placenta is buried, Maori also use the term to refer to other indigenous peoples. See online *Maori Dictionary*: [http://www.maoridictionary.co.nz](http://www.maoridictionary.co.nz).
The alleged dramatic Maori political act of cession in 1840 has dominated New Zealand settler historiography throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. In the settler historical discourse, the certain events before 1840 are not recognised as a narrative of Maori experience of economic, political and religious change and transformation but rather presented as helping prepare the way for Maori acceptance of the Treaty of Waitangi. In my view, the exclusion of mana Maori history is understandable, because in the settler historical discourse Maori are the objects of history and not the subjects. The events when considered are done so only in terms of situting Pakeha into their space and that of New Zealand history, which prior to and during these events was a mana Maori history.

Two themes have been chosen as exemplary of the self-validating rhetoricity of New Zealand’s settler history writing: the ‘savagising’ of indigenous violence and the valorising of settler violence. Both appear in early settler literature and continue to be made over in inventive ways in contemporary historiography. In regard to the former, settler historiography characterises Maori as being so savagely violent that prior to first contact they engaged in the cultural practice of cannibalism, and, on gaining access to European muskets engaged in intertribal warfare of such sustained ferocity that they suffered fatalities of between 20,000 and 80,000. When he realised that 80,000 ‘would have left few Maori alive’, Belich, in 1996, settled on the lower fatalities figure but heightened the spectre of Maori savagism by adding the following rider, now a pronounced trope in this debate: ‘The Musket Wars were the largest conflict ever fought on New Zealand soil. They killed more New Zealanders than World War One – perhaps about 20,000.’ As a consequence, contemporary settler discourse, imbued with Fatal Impact pathos, frames the Musket Wars, discussed in Chapter Four, Problematising the settler domain, as catastrophic for Maori, leaving them with little choice but to sign the Treaty of Waitangi in order to save themselves from themselves and the encroaching outside world. In promoting this view, Michael King wrote that ‘[a]long with effects of

76 Belich, Making Peoples, 157.
77 The term ‘fatal impact’ first appeared in Alan Moorehead, The Fatal Impact: An Account of the Invasion of the South Pacific, 1767-1840 (1966), encapsulating a long-standing notion that, from James Cook’s first voyage of exploration, the indigenous people of the Pacific suffered greatly from their contact with European civilisation. The term is widely used anachronistically.
disease, the most powerful agent of the early transformation of Maori society was the capacity to kill at a distance, which came with the arrival of muskets in the early years of the nineteenth century.’

Three years later he claimed for the Musket Wars that ‘if any chapter in New Zealand history has earned the label “holocaust”, it is this one.’

In his 2000 review of Ron Crosby’s The Musket Wars, Peter Hawes, riffing on the savage/civilised binary, presented Maori as hypersavage and unquestionably better off under British rule:

“The Musket Wars is an account of the Maori utu campaigns between about 1807 and 1840, and depicts a barbarous frenzy of ethnic cleansing on a greater relative scale than anything between Tutsi and Hutu or that [which] occurred last century in Kosovo.

What happened in musket war aftermaths... had been unknown in Europe since the days of Neanderthal Man: kai tangata. “[They] were to eat on the remains until the stench of putrefaction drove them away.” There are about five such cannibal feasts to a chapter, involving a menu of thousands...

It’s a salutary read. Unfortunately, it must be read, for the effects of those dreadful times are, as Mr Crosby proves, with us today, and will be here again tomorrow. ‘Post-colonial traumatic stress disorder’ may yet prove a damn sight more comfortable than ‘pre-colonial traumatic stress disorder’ in olde Aotearoa.

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80 Crosby, The Musket Wars, 17; Peter Hawes, 'Review of The Musket Wars by R. D. Crosby', Massey Extramural Student Review, September 2000: Massey University Extramural Students’ Society Inc.: http://exmss.massey.ac.nz. Hawes’ use of ‘post-colonial stress disorder’ also appears to refer to Turia’s 2000 speech to the New Zealand Psychological Society Conference in which she suggested that “[t]he phenomenon of Post Colonial Traumatic Stress Disorder and its effects ... are now culturally integrated in to the psyche and soul of Maori.’
Rodney Hide, a former member of Parliament and parliamentary party leader, relies on the above figures to argue that the British Crown never considered Maori as co-equal Treaty partners because they had ‘been warring among themselves for more than 30 years’, had ‘killed 20,000 of their own’ and a further ‘40,000’ had been ‘enslaved of displaced’.81

These examples support an important tenet of this thesis discussed above: that claims made by settler historians do not correspond with material or notional referents lying outside their discourse but with the ideology of the discourse in which their claims are made and with the belief of their audience in that ideology. Michel de Certeau articulated this correspondence when he wrote: ‘History would fall to ruins without the key to the vault of its entire architecture: that is, without the connection between the act that it promotes and the society it reflects’.82 In the case of New Zealand, this relationship is reflected, at least in part, in the honours and awards bestowed upon writers of history.83

83 Sir Keith Sinclair, whose best-selling A History of New Zealand was published in 1959 and has sold over 100,000 copies, ‘was knighted in 1985 for his services to literature and history’ (A History of New Zealand, 1); Dame Judith Binney, DNZM, won the F. P. Wilson Prize in 1970 for The Legacy of Guilt: A Life of Thomas Kendal (1968), the Montana Book of the Year in 1996 for Redemption Songs: A Life of Te Kooti Arikirangi Te Turuki (1995), and the New Zealand Post Book of the Year 2010 and the Non Fiction Award for 2010 for Encircled Lands: Te Urewera, 1820-1921 (2009). Binney was made DCNZM (later DNZM) in 2006 for services to historical research; Dame Claudia Orange, DNZM, OBE, author of The Treaty of Waitangi (1987) was made a DNZM for services to historical research; Dame Anne Salmond, DBE, is a Distinguished Professor of Maori Studies and Anthropology at the University of Auckland. Her Two Worlds: First Meetings Between Maori and Europeans 1642-1772 (1991) won the non-fiction section of the National Book Awards in 1991 and the Ernest Scott Prize in 1992, which is awarded annually for ‘the most distinguished contribution to the history of Australia or New Zealand or to the history of colonisation’: http://arts.unimelb.edu.au/scholarships-prizes/current-students/ernest-scott-prize.htm. Her Between Worlds: Early Exchanges Between Maori and Europeans 1773-1815 (1997) won the 1998 Ernest Scott Prize, and The Trial of the Cannibal Dog: Captain Cook in the South Seas (2003) won the Montana Medal for Non Fiction and the History category at the 2004 Montana New Zealand Book Awards. Salmond was made a Dame Commander of the British Empire (DBE) in 1996 for services to New Zealand history; James Belich was made an Officer of the New Zealand Order of Merit in 2006 for services to historical research and was awarded a Prime Minister’s Literary Award in 2011; Michael King won the Montana Medal for Non Fiction at the 2001 New Zealand Post Book Awards for Wrestling With the Angel: A Life of Janet Frame (2000), received the Prime Minister’s Award for literary achievement in 2003, and with The Penguin History of New Zealand, which, by 2011, had sold 250,000 copies, won the Peoples’ Choice Award at
Thus, while the contradictions and inconsistencies of the claims discussed in Part B are a consequence of the philosophico-linguistic matters discussed in Part A, it was also considered necessary to critique some of those claims on their own terms. For instance, by showing arithmetically that the lowest Musket Wars fatalities figure (20,000) relied on by historians most likely did not exceed ten per cent of that figure (2,000), suggests that even the empirical basis of Belich’s alarmist claim is groundless and preempts the possible objections that it is ‘an argument in the abstract’.\(^84\) In other words, the idea that the logocentric logic of empire and therefore of settler discourse requires the dehumanisation of the indigenous population in order to position itself as hegemonic and therefore the rightful repository of the national story is not a product of linguistic idealism but of narrativised ideology.\(^85\) Hence, instead of questioning the empirical basis of their savagism trope, New Zealand’s settler historians use the highly improbable data on which it is based to further enhance this trope, which in turn supports the colonising project and therefore the settler ideology that drives the settler discourse. This, in turn, supports the argumentation made respectively at Chapters Two and Three that historical discourse is a self-referential discourse with no outside and is therefore viciously circular.

The sacralising trope of Gallipoli, discussed in the second part of Chapter Four, is arguably the central sign of settlerism in both Australia and New Zealand and doubles as an expression of (impossible) collective self-presence. There is a

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considerable body of literature devoted to Australia and New Zealand’s involvement, under British command, in the disastrous invasion of the Gallipoli Peninsula in 1915, which is variously described in that literature as ‘a central marker of our nationhood’, where ‘both countries had “come of age”’, and where the ‘Coming Man’ arrived. While Palenski argues that events such as the Boer War and the Gallipoli invasion were ‘affirmations and expressions of an identity already well established’, this thesis, with the help of Lyotard’s ‘theatre of representation’, introduces the idea that the cultural operation of Anzac Day, which annually valorises the violence of Gallipoli, includes not only a display of state power but also doubles as a means of promoting an origin of settler values (self-sacrifice, courage, mateship) as well as a means of forgetting the violence on which the Australasian settler societies are founded.

The deconstruction of the trope of the cannibal in Chapter Five, Problematising the cannibal, references Derrida’s discussion of Defoe’s *Robinson Crusoe* and its hero’s obsession with ‘dying a living death’ at the hands of savage cannibals, before applying Derrida’s reading of Rousseau’s *Essay on the Origin of Languages* to what is thought to be a précis of Christopher Columbus’s logbook made by Bartolomé de Las Casas. Chapter Five notes that 23 November 1492 is the date, as far as we can tell, when the neologism *canibales* first entered a written European text, and concludes that the idea of the cannibal arises out of a particular problematic in language—namely, that the signifier relies on a nonliteral referent as a literal object to which it attaches metaphorical meaning, the fear of being eaten, which makes the affect a

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sign of the sign while remaining as an additional signified attached to the signifier. In this way the inside image of fear, which has been predicated as an idea of its nonliteral referent, is transferred as literal, not as metaphorical, by the signifier to the object, the imaginary (nonliteral) man-eater, as part of the signifier’s denotative function. In other words, the motif of the cannibal is not literal of an extradiscursive object but is created intradiscursively and is metaphorical of the primal human fear of being buried or eaten alive, a fear that is projected as literal onto the unknown Other at the time of early cultural contact when explorers and settlers arguably feel at their most vulnerable and on subsequent occasions of cultural anxiety. We know this is likely the case, at least from the examples examined in this thesis, because there is nothing in the New Zealand archaeological record to support an empirical belief in subsistence cannibalism, and neither Columbus nor James Cook or their travelling companions record witnessing this purported cultural practice. It also appears from Columbus’s logbook and letters that his intention in attaching this stigmatising signifier to the indigenous people of the Caribbean may have been part of a strategy of enslavement for commercial gain. However, while engaging with textual artifacts produced contemporaneously with Columbus’s logbook and correspondence and Cook’s journals may be an interesting exercise, establishing ‘the social logic’ of their texts remains speculative and ultimately an impossible task because there is no outside to the discourse.

That history is a large-scale metaphor answering only to itself is again apparent in Chapter Six, The New Cannibal Club, which examines how two contemporary titles—Anne Salmond’s award-winning The Trial of the Cannibal Dog and Paul Moon’s This Horrid Practice—reframe the cannibal, not as members of London’s

91 Spiegel, ‘Historicism, and the Social Logic of the Text in the Middle Ages’.
Cannibal Club once did, to subvert Victorian pretensions of respectability, but as part of the (unconscious) making over of New Zealand’s settler domain.\textsuperscript{92} Again, this is only possible because both monographs mistake ‘the reality effect’ for the real and the notional cannibal for a corporeal referent with an extradiscursive existence.\textsuperscript{93} While two earlier titles by Salmond, \textit{Two Worlds}—‘a mirror-image ethnography’ in which she ‘tried to respect the perspectives of both sides’, and which, according to the Royal Society of New Zealand, ‘was received as a remarkable piece of scholarship and has made a significant contribution to New Zealand history’—and \textit{Between Worlds}, attempt to redress the imbalance between European and Polynesian points of view concerning the early contact period, \textit{The Trial of the Cannibal Dog}, mostly a narrativised synthesis of various journals covering Cook’s three Pacific voyages, suggests that the paradigmatic preconditions of the disciplines on which it relies—anthropology, ethnography, and history—produce largely predetermined outcomes, the principal value of which is to help update the settler domain.\textsuperscript{94} Indeed, while Thomas Saylor thinks it ‘a well-written account of Cook’s journeys’, he urges caution ‘when considering this book for use in any course.’\textsuperscript{95} This thesis concurs, not least because Salmond’s account offers little more than that which is found in the journals it synthesizes and merely reproduces the cannibal unproblematised, releasing it back into the settler domain where it continues its synecdochic work of denigrating tangata whenua to the advantage of the settler, which, in all likelihood, was never Salmond’s intention. Hence \textit{The Trial of the Cannibal Dog} receives a \textit{différantial} reading that concludes that the organising


\textsuperscript{93} Barthes, \textit{The Rustle of Language}, 139.


\textsuperscript{95} Thomas Saylor, review of ‘The Trial of the Cannibal Dog: The Remarkable Story of Captain Cook’s Encounters in the South Seas by Anne Salmond’, \textit{The History Teacher}, 38/1, (2004), 137.
motif of its title is a fictional invention designed to sensationalize the cannibal motif—a dog, by definition, cannot be a cannibal—and therefore that Salmond was not so much writing history as ‘making history.’ 96 On the other hand, while This Horrid Practice likewise mistakes a notional for a material referent in its deployment of the cannibal, because its author appears to believe that historians perform a miracle whenever they write history—‘historians have a far graver responsibility’ [than those in ‘other areas of academic enquiry’]: to represent the past as it was, and bring it to life for the present age to the greatest extent afforded by the evidence’—because it appears to abandon the scholarly caution generally displayed in The Trial of the Cannibal Dog, and because, according to Rawiri Taonui, it exemplifies “‘poor scholarship’”, a more conventional critique of Moon’s monograph is preferred. 97 That Moon incorrectly attributes the primary title of his book to Cook and that he and his publisher used this elementary error to promote This Horrid Practice supports Barthes’ contention ‘that historical discourse is a fake performative discourse in which the apparent constative (descriptive) is in fact only the signifier of the speech-act as an act of authority.’ 98 Moon’s parallel self-promotion as an intrepid seeker of truth venturing where other New Zealand scholars have feared to tread offers an instructive study of the relationship between writers of settler history and their audience, as do both titles the symbiotic nature of their relationship with that audience. In short, by taking the cannibal to be axiomatic, Salmond and Moon fail to interrogate its role in relation to settler discourse—namely, the possibility that it is a phantasm emanating from the human fear of dying ‘a living death’, and that it has a double function, that of justifying the settlers’ expropriation of the cannibal’s geography while preventing the ipseity and sovereignty of the settler from being swallowed up by its barely human Other. 99

98 Barthes, The Rustle of Language, 139.
In the Conclusion, Problematising the Treaty, the *différantial* reading made of the Treaty of Waitangi, now widely regarded as New Zealand’s ‘founding document’, suggests that its authority rests on little more than ‘a sort of fabulous retroactivity.’\textsuperscript{100} We also see that the act of retroactive protention by which the Treaty’s instituting moment is established *a posteriori* inaugurates a historico-legal discussion in which the meaning of the Treaty metamorphoses from ‘a simple nullity’ in 1878 under the then Chief Justice James Prendergast, to ‘our foundation as a nation’ according to the current Chief Justice, Sian Elias.\textsuperscript{101} Thus, just as settler history takes itself to be *a priori* and violently displaces the indigenous narrative, so does the common law, extinguishing in its hegemonic mindset the existing customary law in all its diversity and complexity. Notwithstanding the problems arising from the use by the translators of the English Treaty text of ‘te Kawanatanga’ (governance) in Article 1 and ‘te tino rangatiratanga’ (full chieftainship) in Article 2 of Te Tiriti, the former commonly taken by Maori commentators to be a delegated and therefore a lesser form of authority than the latter, this thesis concludes, for the theoretical reasons discussed in Part A, that neither language version of the Treaty nor both together can be regarded as the founding text of contemporary New Zealand. In engaging with Bill Oliver’s ‘The Future Behind Us’ and other Treaty-related historiography, it also becomes apparent that the paradoxical character and fake performativity of historical discourse severely limits the general utility of history and its perceived ability to deliver social justice.\textsuperscript{102}

It is for these reasons that this thesis argues for the ‘dehegemonization’ of settler historiography by deconstructive means, and a philosophico-ethical rather than a


historico-legal approach to the *différend* that divides settler domains.\footnote{Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, ‘Subaltern Studies: Deconstructing Historiography’, Ranajit Guha (ed.), *Subaltern Studies IV: Writings on South Asian History and Society* (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1985), 361.} As Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak has it, ‘the greatest gift of deconstruction’ is ‘to question the authority of the investigating subject without paralysing him, persistently transforming conditions of impossibility into possibility.’\footnote{Spivak, ‘Subaltern Studies: Deconstructing Historiography’, 336.} This process could include an interrogation of the injustice and violence of the political sphere through an engagement with such ideas as Derrida’s *democracy to come*, a pre-ethical position of promise that could be said to resemble the ‘proto-linguisticality’ of Derrida’s ‘protowriting’ in regard to ‘the origin of sense’, and Alain Badiou’s ‘evental site’, which attempts to overcome ‘an impasse of an excess of presence’.\footnote{Derrida, *Rogues*, 1 *passim*; Derrida, *Speech and Phenomena*, 85; Leonard Lawlor, ‘Jacques Derrida’, *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2011 Edition)*, Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2011/entries/derrida/; Alain Badiou, *Being and Event*, trans. Oliver Feltham (London: Continuum, 2005), 173-7, 10.} For while settler domains remain trapped within the positivism and self-referentiality of their historico-legal discourses they are more likely than not to repeat the same mistakes, not least because both history and the law are predicated on presence, the irreducibility of time to itself, and are therefore violent in their very expression. Or as Luce Irigaray puts it: ‘If we continue to speak the same language to each other, we will reproduce the same story. Begin the same stories all over again.’\footnote{Luce Irigaray, ‘When Our Lips Speak Together’, trans. Carolyn Burke, *Signs* 6/1 (1980), 69; Elizabeth Deeds Ermarth, *Sequel to History: Postmodernism and the Crisis of Representational Time* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992), 10.} When Derrida says ‘there is a future, l’avenir, which refers to someone who comes whose arrival is totally unexpected’, what would that mean for New Zealand?\footnote{Jacques Derrida, *Derrida* (Jane Doe Films, 2002), Kirby Dick and Amy Ziering Kofman directors.} It could or should mean, to begin with, doing away with historical discourse that seeks to predetermine ‘the future’ by its ordering of ‘the past’, thereby foreclosing on the ‘unexpected’ of Derrida’s *l’avenir*.\footnote{Derrida, *Derrida* (Jane Doe Films, 2002).} That is, because settler historiography is inextricably bound to the settler society it serves, it also predetermines that the New Zealand of the future indicative is always already a modern democratic nation-state,
a singularity that forecloses on the possibility of ‘a re-politicization that does not fall into the same ruts of “dishonest fiction”’ on which ‘the classic concept of nation-state sovereignty’ depends. In short, it forecloses on what might become multiple expressions of mana motuhake and coextensive juridical systems. For until the non-indigenous New Zealander can say, after Mike Grimshaw, that ‘I am a Pakeha because I live in a Maori country’, until Pakeha can acknowledge that the geography seized by its progenitors is not theirs as of right to control, and until those of us who dwell in this archipelago begin to seek a new language that attempts to negotiate the aporia of democracy’s singularity and the universality of Derrida’s ‘democracy to come’, it is doubtful that the différend will ever be overcome or a profound and lasting peace ever secured in Aotearoa.110


CHAPTER ONE
Problematising the limit

Problematising the now

‘In short, it would be hard to overestimate the scope and importance of the convention of historical time and everything it implies about individual subjectivity, collective endeavor, proper uses of language, the nature of power or thought, and, perhaps most of all, the nature and uses of knowledge.’

So wrote Elizabeth Deeds Ermarth in *Sequel to History*, her significant intervention in the discourse of temporality in which she proposes the replacement of historical or representational time with ‘rhythmic time’, the temporality of ‘postmodern narrative’ that ‘either radically modifies or abandons altogether the dialectics, the teleology, the transcendence, and the putative neutrality of historical time’. This replacement is essential for Ermarth because ‘the discourse of historicism and representation’ is ‘fundamentally a religious construction’ that is essentialist and therefore predeterminative of outcomes. Foundational to its creed of objective realism is René Descartes expression of (impossible) self-presence, ‘I think, therefore I am’ (*Cogito, ergo sum*), widely taken to be the model of modern subjectivity, which finds, on Ermarth’s view, ‘the consensus that constructs historical time in the first place and, consequently, is instrumental in maintaining all the other agreements of modernist and empiricist culture.’ Thus, because historical time ‘makes possible those mutually informative measurements between one historical moment and another that support most forms of knowledge current in the West’, and because ‘[h]istory has become a commanding metanarrative, perhaps the

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3 Ermarth, *Sequel to History*, 18, 3.
metanarrative in Western discourse’, history itself needs to be ‘denaturalized’ before any ‘new social construction’ can take place.© Hence Ermarth’s ‘revision of historical temporality necessarily involves, among other things, the replacement of the Cartesian cogito ergo sum with a new formulation, [Julio Cortázar’s] “I swing, therefore I am’”, a ‘nonhistorical’ temporality that ‘is multivalent and nonlinear’.

While Keith Jenkins thinks that Ermarth ‘succeeds brilliantly in her critiques of modernity’s ways of organising temporality’, and while Alun Munslow regards her work ‘on tense and time in history’ as ‘original’ and deserving of greater influence, David Carr holds a somewhat different view.© Describing Sequel to History as ‘ambitious and impressive’, ‘interesting and provocative’, Carr nevertheless questions ‘the very nature and possibility’ of its project because the project itself is dependent on the very convention, historical time, it seeks to undermine, and thus both the project and its language are as historically essentialist as the historical essentialism it challenges.© However, in attempting to explain just how well it exemplifies this aporia, Carr fails to explain that such an aporia inheres within the very nature of time, and that such contradictions are normative of being, even if they remain largely unacknowledged or unrecognised. While this is not lost on Ermarth, she refuses to replace history, even with its ‘radioactive’ language, with another totalizing project, explaining that ‘proposing a solution is less interesting to me than experimenting with new ways of conceiving the problem that extend attention in new directions and exercise attention in new ways.’9 Whether or not Ermarth succeeds in her admirable aims, whether she is offering one form of closure (rhythmic time) in place of another (historical time) as Jenkins suggests, or whether, as Carr has it, her project is impossible because ‘historical time is an a priori notion we cannot dispense with’, the matters of significance that arises for this thesis is ‘the

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5 Ermarth, Sequel to History, 20, 56.
6 Ermarth, Sequel to History, 20-1, 17.
9 Ermarth, Sequel to History, 58.
metaphysical reduction of the passage of time to presence’, its significance for both the conceptualisation and practice of history, and its consequent ‘articulations of justice’ as ‘violent to the experience of time that constitutes the human condition.’

We can locate this problem precisely. Having broached the aporetic nature of time—that time both is and is not; that it is not a movement yet does not exist without change—but before having defined what he thinks time is, Aristotle states:

we apprehend time only when we have marked motion, marking it by ‘before’ and ‘after’; and it is only when we have perceived ‘before’ and ‘after’ in motion that we say that time has elapsed. Now we mark them by judging that A and B are different, and that some third thing is intermediate to them. When we think of the extremes as different from the middle and the mind pronounces that the ‘nows’ are two, one before and one after, it is then that we say that there is time, and this that we say is time. For what is bounded by the ‘now’ is thought to be time—we may assume this.

In other words, the ‘third thing’, the now, that enables the ‘before’ and ‘after’ to be distinguished from each other, is the assumption of it being made present, of it coming into being, by being counted and made analogous with movement:

For time is just this—number of motion in respect of ‘before’ and ‘after’.

Hence time is not movement, but only movement in so far as it admits of enumeration. A proof of this: we discriminate the more or the less by number, but more or less movement by time. Time then is a kind of number . . . both made continuous by the ‘now’ and divided at it. . . Here, too, there is a correspondence with the point; for the point also both connects and terminates the length—it is the beginning of one and the end of another.


12 Aristotle, Physics, Book IV, 292-3 (§291b1-5 and §220a5-6, 9-10).
However, while the now might be distinguishable from that which precedes and succeeds it, it is not present in actuality; it is merely an idea 'that provides for the counting of change by counting nows as different', thereby making change 'ecstatic' and the temporal passage it enables metaphorical.\textsuperscript{13} In other words, Aristotle does not establish the beingness of time. Rather, by establishing the concept of time by association with movement and the nontime of the now by association with 'the already-no-longer and the not yet', he allows us to imagine what time is and where it might be located while leaving its beingness unexplained.\textsuperscript{14} As Jacques Derrida put it: 'Aristotle unites time and movement in \textit{aisthēsis} [sense perception]. And does so such that no sensory exterior content, or objective movement, is necessary.'\textsuperscript{15} Consequently, 'the Aristotelian dyad time-movement is conceived on the basis of \textit{ousia} [being] as presence' and 'the meaning of time is thought on the basis of the present as nontime.'\textsuperscript{16} Nevertheless, despite its metaphysical existence, and despite being irreducible, 'the moving now accounts for the unity of time', divides, connects, and counts time while also having 'the characteristics of both identity and difference'.\textsuperscript{17}

John McTaggart Ellis McTaggart, recently described as 'one of the most important systematic metaphysicians of the early 20\textsuperscript{th} century' and arguably that century's most influential philosopher of time, calls the now that separates the future from the past 'the specious present'.\textsuperscript{18} He does so because his \textit{A} series, 'the distinction of past,

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\textsuperscript{15} Derrida, \textit{Margins of Philosophy}, 49.

\textsuperscript{16} Derrida, \textit{Margins of Philosophy}, 51.

\textsuperscript{17} Protevi, \textit{Time and Exteriority}, 74, 69-70.

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present and future', which he considers unreal but ‘essential to the nature of time’, is dependent on his $B$ series, which, by way of its ‘distinctions of earlier and later’, makes the $A$ series possible—without 'before' and 'after', all conceivable nows would be simultaneous—yet also impossible, because the pure present cannot be present to itself because the now ‘is not a duration but a point’.\textsuperscript{19} To complicate the matter further, the $B$ series also 'depends on the $A$ series', because each 'before' and 'after', which enables time ‘to be’, must necessarily be in the $A$ series.\textsuperscript{20} McTaggart explains the problem thus:

A direct perception is present when I have it, and so is what is simultaneous with it. In the first place this definition involves a circle, for the words ‘when I have it,’ can only mean ‘when it is present’. But if we left out these words, the definition would be false, for I have many direct presentations which are at different times, and which cannot, therefore, all be present, except successively. This, however, is the fundamental contradiction of the $A$ series.\textsuperscript{21}

Furthermore, because a person (A) must be simultaneously present with that which is immediately present in ‘real’ or ‘objective’ time, there is no telling how long that real-time present might last for A, because its duration will depend on the nature (length) of that which is being observed. Likewise, A, who might experience another event simultaneous with but of a different duration from another person (B), will, provided the event they are observing is of a shorter duration than the event being observed by B, experience that event as past while B’s event is still present.\textsuperscript{22} Thus A

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\textsuperscript{19} McTaggart, \textit{The Nature of Existence: Volume II}, 10-11 §306-§308; McTaggart, ‘The Unreality of Time’, 458-59, 472 and Aristotle, \textit{Physics} Book IV, 293 §220a 9-11. Also see Protevi on the problem of the now: 'If the "now is always the same..." that is, if its present-character is not destroyed to make way for another now, then time would also be impossible. Without the destruction of other nows, that is, on the condition of a pure identity of the now, huge simultaneities would result. All nows would be the same now, and, impossibly, things 10,000 years ago would be at the same time with things now' (\textit{Time and Exteriority}, 64).

\textsuperscript{20} McTaggart, \textit{The Nature of Existence: Volume II}, 212 §526.

\textsuperscript{21} McTaggart, ‘The Unreality of Time’, 471.

\textsuperscript{22} McTaggart, ‘The Unreality of Time’, 472.
and B are experiencing two events in their specious presents which are simultaneously present and past.\textsuperscript{23}

The present, therefore, through which events are really to pass, cannot be determined as being simultaneous with a specious present. If it has a duration, it must be a duration which is independently fixed. And it cannot be independently fixed so as to be identical with the duration of all specious presents, since all specious presents have not the same duration. And thus an event may be past or future when I am perceiving it as present, and may be present when I am remembering it as past or anticipating it as future.\textsuperscript{24}

In other words, the objective and specious presents cannot coincide because the former ‘is not a duration but a point’, and the latter, ‘the time in which we perceive’ events, not only ‘has a present of varying finite duration, and, therefore with the future and the past, is divided into three durations’, but also varies from one observer to another.\textsuperscript{25} As a consequence, just as the ‘specious present of our observations . . . cannot correspond to the present of the events observed’, so too ‘the past and future of our observations could not correspond to the past and future of the events observed.’\textsuperscript{26} Thus, since the objective present is a point and all specious presents vary in duration, what is at issue but cannot be located is ‘the presentness of the present’, or, alternatively, ‘the absence within presentness’.\textsuperscript{27}

Earlier in his essay McTaggart had established that the $A$ series was also invalid of time thereby making time invalid of reality. As he puts it: ‘Past, present, and future are incompatible determinations. Every event must be one or the other, but no event can be more than one. This is essential to the meaning of the terms.’\textsuperscript{28}

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\textsuperscript{23} McTaggart, ‘The Unreality of Time’, 472.
\textsuperscript{24} McTaggart, \textit{The Nature of Existence: Volume II}, 28 §344. See also McTaggart, ‘The Unreality of Time’, 472.
\textsuperscript{25} McTaggart, ‘The Unreality of Time’, 472; Aristotle, \textit{Physics} Book IV, 293 §220a 9-11.
\textsuperscript{26} McTaggart, ‘The Unreality of Time’, 473.
\textsuperscript{28} McTaggart, ‘The Unreality of Time’, 468. Also see McTaggart, \textit{The Nature of Existence: Volume II}, 20 §329.
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However, because ‘the only change we can get is from future to present, and from present to past’, if an event ‘is past, it has been present and future’, and ‘if it is future, it will be present and past’, and ‘if it is present, it has been future and will be past’.\footnote{McTaggart, ‘The Unreality of Time’, 468. Also see McTaggart, \textit{The Nature of Existence: Volume II}, 20 §329.} As a result, ‘all the three incompatible terms are prediciable of each event, which is obviously inconsistent with their being incompatible, and inconsistent with their producing change.’\footnote{McTaggart, ‘The Unreality of Time’, 468. Also see McTaggart, \textit{The Nature of Existence: Volume II}, 20 §329: ‘Thus all three characteristics belong to each event. How is this consistent with their being incompatible?’} Furthermore, the \textit{A} series involves a vicious circle: in order for it to exist, time must be presupposed, yet in order for time to exist, the \textit{A} series must be presupposed.\footnote{McTaggart, ‘The Unreality of Time’, 468.}\footnote{McTaggart, \textit{The Nature of Existence: Volume II}, 22 §333. The basis of McTaggart’s position that ‘nothing really changes’ can be found in his disputation with Bertrand Russell over what a poker being hot one day and cold the next represents. This, McTaggart argued, does not represent change to the qualities of the poker as such because ‘there can be no time without an \textit{A} series’, and because the \textit{A} series is itself a contradiction there can be no time. Rather ‘both these qualities are true of [the poker] when it is hot and when it is cold. . . . The fact that it is hot at one point in a series and cold at other points cannot give change, if neither of these facts change—and neither of them does’ (\textit{The Nature of Existence} 14-15 §333).} This leads McTaggart to the following conclusion:

The reality of the \textit{A} series, then, leads to a contradiction, and must be rejected. And, since we have seen that change and time require the \textit{A} series, the reality of change and time must be rejected. And so must the reality of the \textit{B} series, since that requires time. Nothing is really present, past, or future. Nothing is really earlier or later than anything else or temporally simultaneous with it. Nothing really changes. And nothing is really in time. Whenever we perceive anything in time—which is the only way in which, in our present experience, we do perceive things—we are perceiving it more or less as it really is not.\footnote{McTaggart, \textit{The Nature of Existence: Volume II}, 211 §524.}

McTaggart, then, was of the view that our error in believing that time is real arises, on the one hand, from our belief that time is timeless, and, on the other, from misperceiving our perceptions ‘as being in time’, because ‘the original object’ perceived and the act of perception \textit{appear} to hold ‘a time-relation to one another’.\footnote{McTaggart, \textit{The Unreality of Time}, 468.} However, because our specious present is not the same as the present of the \textit{A} series, McTaggart concludes ‘that all perceptions which appear to us as being
perceptions, misperceive their percepta as being in time’, and that ‘all that exists is the erroneous perceptions’ of ‘the percipient’ (the observer) that ‘the perceptum’ (the object being perceived) has its being in the present of a non-existent time-series (past-present-future).\textsuperscript{34}

To summarise, we need McTaggart’s \textit{A} series to represent time and therefore change and his \textit{B} series both to order its events and to separate its nows so as to prevent their compression into absolute simultaneousness. However, time remains unreal because the \textit{A} series represents a temporal impossibility: while an event will be future, become present, then past, it cannot retain the characteristics of all three temporal modes contemporaneously. The most McTaggart will concede, albeit tentatively, is the possibility ‘that the realities which we perceive as events in a time-series do really form a non-temporal series.’\textsuperscript{35} This is his \textit{C} series—‘a series which is not a time-series, but under certain conditions appears to us to be one’—which, importantly, involves order not change yet enables us to \textit{conceptualise} change.\textsuperscript{36} This, as McTaggart suggests, takes a position rather closer to Hegel’s view of ‘the order of the time-series as a reflexion, though a distorted reflexion, of something in the real nature of the timeless reality’, than to Immanuel Kant’s subjective time, or even to Edmund Husserl’s ‘time-consciousness’.\textsuperscript{37}

Objections to McTaggart’s view that time is unreal and his rejection of ‘tensed facts as incoherent’ turn largely on ‘tensed versus tenseless propositions.’\textsuperscript{38} But while tensed accounts give the appearance of causing or reporting change, they do not in

\textsuperscript{34} McTaggart, \textit{The Nature of Existence: Volume II}, 211 §525, 214 §527.
\textsuperscript{35} McTaggart, ‘The Unreality of Time’, 473.
\textsuperscript{36} McTaggart, \textit{The Nature of Existence: Volume II}, 30 §347; McTaggart, ‘The Unreality of Time’, 461-2.
\textsuperscript{37} McTaggart, ‘The Unreality of Time’, 474; Edmund Husserl, \textit{On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time (1893-1917)}, trans. John Barnett Brough (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1991), 3 passim. McTaggart, however, noted that neither Spinoza, Kant nor Hegel, who ‘accepted time as unreal’, would likely have accepted his theory of time as they had not recognised that the error concerning time occurs in cognition (\textit{The Nature of Existence: Volume II}, 214 §527).
fact ‘account for change’, and nor does change cause tense to appear.\textsuperscript{39} ‘Tense’, in other words, ‘is not a perceptible property of the things and events we perceive’, but is required to be \textit{thought} if we are ‘to be capable of timely action.’\textsuperscript{40} Furthermore, the defence to the argument that nothing in reality has tenses ‘is that nothing has incompatible tenses at the same time. Nothing is present \textit{when} it is past, or future when it is present. Things and events only have these properties successively’.\textsuperscript{41} McTaggart’s critics argue that ‘the appearance of contradiction is removed by distinguishing the different times at which events have different tenses’, but this ignores the problem that ‘the tensed means they use to distinguish these times are also subject to the contradiction they are trying to remove.’\textsuperscript{42} Simply put, ‘if the sentence is true (at some present time) it is also false (at some other)’, because McTaggart’s \textit{A}-series contradiction will always apply, and because, while the \textit{B} series makes the \textit{A} series possible, the \textit{B} series also has to have an \textit{A} series location and, therefore likewise will never be valid of time.\textsuperscript{43}

Sandra Rosenthal takes the view that McTaggart ‘offers only a philosophical dead end, around which later \textit{A}-theorists and \textit{B}-theorists attempt to maneuver’, while Derrida ‘explicitly rejects time as a metaphysical concept’ yet structures his position ‘throughout by an implicit acceptance of time as discrete.’\textsuperscript{44} These respective positions, Rosenthal argues, ‘are really opposite sides of the same coin’.\textsuperscript{45} McTaggart rejects time as unreal but acknowledges the real need for time, while Derrida describes time as a metaphor but one which he needs to explain how the present must divide itself in order to \textit{appear} as presence, that is, to be present to itself. As Derrida puts it: ‘The word “time” itself, as it has always been understood in the history of metaphysics, is a metaphor which \textit{at the same time} both indicates and dissimates the “movement” of this self-division, ‘a pure auto-affection in which

\textsuperscript{39} D. H. Mellor, ‘The Unreality of Tense’, Le Poidevin and MacBeath (eds), \textit{The Philosophy of Time}, 49.
\textsuperscript{40} Mellor, \textit{The Unreality of Tense}, 49, 51.
\textsuperscript{41} Mellor, \textit{The Unreality of Tense}, 51.
\textsuperscript{42} Mellor, \textit{The Unreality of Tense}, 53.
\textsuperscript{43} Mellor, \textit{The Unreality of Tense}, 56.
\textsuperscript{44} Rosenthal, \textit{Time, Continuity, and Indeterminacy}, 42, 37.
\textsuperscript{45} Rosenthal, \textit{Time, Continuity, and Indeterminacy}, 41.
the same is the same only in being affected by the other, only by becoming the other of the same’, that is, ‘a non-now, a past now’.46 This ‘self-presence of the living present’ could only be achieved, according to Derrida, by way of deferral, one of two principal operations of his neologism différance—‘spacing, the becoming-space of time or the becoming-time of space (temporization).’47 As the Introduction notes, he describes this process as follows: ‘An interval must separate the present from what it is not in order for the present to be itself, but this interval that constitutes it as present must, by the same token, divide the present in and of itself, thereby also dividing, along with the present, everything that is thought on the basis of the present’.48 This understanding would be crucial for Derrida’s philosophical project, for the spacing of temporization makes possible the deconstructing of presence as presence and the deconstructing of law as time.49 He was also on sure ground. Aristotle’s now, with its threefold activity of linking, limiting and dividing time, needed spacing in order to function, in order to make possible the ‘impossible coexistence’ of a series of temporalised nows, from which it needed to be different but could not be without destroying the earlier now and with it the linear notion of time.50 And the present could hardly be a point if, as Martin Heidegger has it, ‘the present’ was ‘a definite mode of time’ in which ‘Beings are grasped in their being as “presence”’.51 Hence, for Derrida, there could be no temporalization without spatialization, space being the outside of time, but also its inside, as it invades time as trace. As he put it, ‘time is the truth of space . . . . It temporalizes itself, it relates itself to itself and mediates itself as time. Time is spacing.’52

47 Derrida, Speech and Phenomena, 85; Derrida, Margins of Philosophy, 13. The other core movement of différance, the play of differences in text or differing, will be discussed in Chapter Two. Also see Jacques Derrida, Positions, trans. Alan Bass (London: Continuum, 2004, first published 1981), 22–6.
48 Derrida, Margins of Philosophy, 13.
49 Beardsworth, Derrida and the Political, 100.
50 Aristotle, Physics Book IV, 296 §222a 10–16; Derrida, Margins of Philosophy, 55.
52 Derrida, Margins of Philosophy, 42–3. See Alan Bass’s footnote 9 regarding his translation of the essay’s title and the difference between the Greek grammē and the French gramme (Margins of Philosophy, 34). Grammē may also be translated as ‘trace’, as well as line.
When, reminiscent of McTaggart, Derrida wrote in ‘Ousia and Grammē’ ('Presence and Line') that 'if one thinks time on the basis of the now, one must conclude that it is not' because 'the now is given simultaneously as that which is no longer and as that which is not yet', he was responding to 'the first hypothesis' of Aristotle's aporia, which begins 'by paralysing itself in the determination of time as nun [now] and of nun as meros (part).’53 As Aristotle said of time, 'the following considerations would make one suspect that it either does not exist at all or barely, and in an obscure way. One part of it has been and is not, while the other is going to be and is not yet. Yet time—both infinite time and any time you like to take—is made up of these.'54 Derrida’s answer to this aporia was différance—or rather, how différance produces time: ‘Time . . . would be but the name of the limits within which the gramme is thus comprehended, and, along with the gramme, the possibility of the trace in general. Nothing other has even been thought by the name of time. Time is that which is thought on the basis of Being as presence.’55

For McTaggart, as we have seen, time was unreal and, therefore, there could be no change, because, as he rightly pointed out, if time is necessary for change, as is widely held, change cannot occur within time if the distinctions necessary for time (past, present, future) all have incompatible characteristics and stay in the same relation to each other yet inhere within every event which passes through them. From within a different philosophical tradition, Derrida arrived at a similar conclusion, that 'time is a name for this impossible possibility' of the counted nows which go to make it up—'the not-yet-now' or future, 'the no-longer-now' or past, and 'the now' or present, as Simon Critchley described Heidegger's 'vulgar time'—none of which can exist simultaneously, but without which, as McTaggart reasoned, there can be no conception of time.56 As Derrida argued in relation to Aristotle’s first

53 Derrida, Margins of Philosophy, 39, 46.
54 Aristotle, Physics, Book IV, 289 (§217b33-35, §218a1-3).
55 Derrida, Margins of Philosophy, 60.
aporetic, the following ‘three hypotheses make the ousia of time inconceivable’, because ‘time's parts’, its nows, cannot:

(1) either follow each other by immediately destroying one another, for in this case there would be not time; (2) or follow each other by destroying each other in a not immediately consecutive way, for in this case the intervallic nows would be simultaneous, and again there would be no time; (3) or remain (in) the same now, for in this case things that occur at intervals of ten thousand years would be together, at the same time, which is absurd. It is this absurdity, denounced in the self-evidence of the ‘at the same time,’ that constitutes the aporia as aporia.57

Significantly, however, the now—Aristotle's nun, the present of McTaggart’s A series—is non-time in that, while it is the point which separates the future from the past, it cannot be either the future or the past and still be the now, and therefore exists only as a function. Hence, not only is the nun itself not temporal, which means that ‘the meaning of time is thought on the basis of the present as non-time’, but also ‘none of the parts of time is—present—therefore time in its totality is not—which means “is not present,” “does not participate in ousia”’.58 Hence, as we have seen, the now as temporality is nothing less than presence. Derrida explains:

Coexistence has meaning only in the unity of a single, same now. This is meaning, sense itself, in what unites meaning to presence. One cannot even say that the coexistence of two different and equally present nows is impossible or unthinkable: the very signification of coexistence or of presence is constituted by this limit. Not to be able to coexist with an other (the same as itself), with an other now, is not a predicate of the now, but its essence as presence. The now, presence in the act of the present, is constituted as the impossibility of coexisting with an other now, that is, with an other-the-same-as-itself. The now is (in the present indicative) the impossibility of coexistence with itself.59

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57 Derrida, Margins of Philosophy, 56.
58 Derrida, Margins of Philosophy, 40, 51, 53.
59 Derrida, Margins of Philosophy, 54-5.
While Aristotle acknowledged that the now both divides time and makes time continuous and thereby destroys the linearity the nows give to time through their ‘impossible coexistence’—‘For what is “now” is not a part: a part is a measure of the whole, which must be made up of parts. Time, on the other hand, is not held to be made up of “nows”’—he nevertheless resolved this contradiction not by offering incontrovertible support for time’s existence but by using an analogy, the grammē (line) and the point, ‘the space that does not take up space, the place that does not take place’, to support his belief in time’s existence.60 Through this analogy, ‘one could be led to believe’, wrote Derrida, ‘that the now is to time what the point is to line. And that the essence of time can pass, intact and undamaged, into its linear representation, into the continuous, extended unfolding of punctuality.’61 But even ‘if one uses the point and the line to represent movement, one is manipulating a multiplicity of points which are both origin and limit, beginning and end’, a ‘multiplicity of immobilities’ that in itself ‘does not give time’.62

However, as we have seen, Aristotle did not just propose the linearity of time, he also conceived time as being analogous to movement and thereby able to be counted into being. This constitutes the second hypothesis of his aporia—‘time is not movement, but only movement in so far as it admits of enumeration’—which he likewise overcame by way of another appeal to sense, and, by extension, to our desire to believe in that which is not.63 In this case, but again by deploying the now, Aristotle counted time:

It is clear, then, that time is ‘number of movement in respect of the before and after’, and is continuous since it is an attribute of what is continuous. . .

Not only do we measure the movement by the time, but also the time by the movement, because they define each other. The time marks the movement, since it is its number, and the movement the time. We describe the time as much or little, measuring it by the movement, just as we know the number by what is numbered, e.g. the number of the horses by one horse as the unit. For we know how many horses there are by the use of the number; and again by using the one horse as unit we know the number of the horses itself. So it is with the time and the movement; for we measure the movement by the time and vice versa.\(^{64}\)

Significantly, however, the number does not inhere to time as such; it only appears to belong by way of association—that is, by way of an appeal to our inner sense as to what we think time is. As Derrida explained, ‘the number does not belong to the thing numbered. If there are ten horses, the ten is not equine, is not of the essence of the horse, is elsewhere. That is, outside time, foreign to time. But foreign to it as its accident. And this foreignness . . . is comprehended within the system of the founding oppositions of metaphysics: foreignness is thought as accident, virtuality, potentiality, incompletion of the circle, weak presence, etc.’\(^{65}\)

Hence Derrida concluded:

The concept of time, in all its aspects, belongs to metaphysics, and it names the domination of presence. Therefore we can only conclude that the entire system of metaphysical concepts, throughout its history, develops the so-called ‘vulgarity’ of the concept of time . . . but also that an other concept of time cannot be opposed to it, since time in general belongs to metaphysical conceptuality. In attempting to produce this other concept, one rapidly would come to see that it is constructed out of other metaphysical or ontotheological predicates.\(^{66}\)

In other words, while vulgar time as such is not, its apparent being is drawn from the idea of time as ‘a primordial temporality’, around which metaphysics (and therefore history) is organised, meaning that ‘the opposition of the primordial to the


derivative [is] still metaphysical’. Thus because we believe in (Aristotelian) time as both infinite and linear we remain trapped within conceptualisations that do not exist in actuality but from within which we predicate ontotheological and metaphysical meaning. These are the problematical notions of time on which history is based, the beginning at some originary past-point (which does not exist), succeeding through a series of significant now-points (which cannot exist) towards the eternal future end-point, the horizon of completion (which never arrives). And it is these very notions that historical time appears to overcome, while at the same time making possible, as Ermarth points out, that which depends on its invention: ‘the mutually informative measurement between widely separated events that underlies modern empirical science, modern cartography and explorations, certain forms of political and artistic organization such as representational government and tonal music, and certain habitual conceptions of identity’, and the like.

For Derrida, then, time, the now, is irreducible. Time’s outside is its inside, and vulgar or linear time is just as much a product of presence as is primordial time. This irreducibility governs the production of all metaphysical meaning, including historical meaning. Hence we predicate the latter on what are essentially metaphysical beliefs. One such belief is change over time, a belief that undergirds the modern historiographical project. These clichés are often taken to be valid or true because they seem commonsensical, but that is largely because, when it comes to matters historical, we commonly rely on answers to formulate questions, predicates to formulate propositions, effects to predicate causes.

**Problematising the one**

A similar belief-based operation appears to be at work when we assign meaning to singular multiples, such as Americans, Australians, New Zealanders, and savages, as

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67 Derrida, *Margins of Philosophy*, 63. Heidegger’s opposing of primordial and vulgar notions of time is one of Derrida’s critiques of *Being and Time*, because the latter is dependent on the former, and the former on the notion of presence.

set theory suggests. This can be seen in relation to Alain Badiou’s ontology, which ‘employs set theory to help explain how being is essentially multiple and undecidable’ and ‘the one is not’, and Bertrand Russell’s set theoretical paradox—that certain classes cannot be members of themselves.69 As Nicholas Griffin explains the latter: ‘This contradiction . . . arose from the apparently common-sensical assumption that any property whatever can define a class. If we consider the property of being a class which is not a member of itself, it seems to be a property possessed by many classes, e.g. the class of teapots is a class and not a teapot and therefore not a member of the class of teapots. But if we consider whether this property defines a class, the class of classes which are not members of themselves, we arrive at the Russell paradox.’70 The problem arises, in other words, with an expression $f(x)$ if it is ‘considered both a function of the argument $x$ and a function of the argument $f$.’71

69 Antonio Calcagno, Badiou and Derrida: Politics, Events and their Time, (London: Continuum, 2007), 63; Alain Badiou, Being and Event, trans. Oliver Feltham (London: Continuum, 2005), 23. We can also see in Badiou’s attempted working out of the problem of the one, particularly as it relates to classes or sets which are not members of themselves, an equivalence with différance—that is, an aporetic at work in mathematics; Bertrand Russell, My Philosophical Development (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1959), 75-6. Russell discovered his famous paradox in May 1901 while ‘considering Cantor’s proof that there is no greatest cardinal number’, and described it as follows: ‘I thought, in my innocence, that the number of all the things there are in the world must be the greatest possible number, and I applied his proof to this number to see what would happen. This process led me to the consideration of a very peculiar class. Thinking along the lines which had hitherto seemed adequate, it seemed to me that a class sometimes is, and sometimes is not, a member of itself. The class of teaspoons, for example, is not another teaspoon, but the class of things that are not teaspoons, is of one of the things that are not teaspoons. There seemed to be instances which are not negative: for example, the class of all classes is a class. The application of Cantor’s argument led me to consider the classes that are not members of themselves; and these, it seemed, must form a class. I asked myself whether this class is a member of itself or not. If it is a member of itself, it must possess the defining property of the class, which is to be not a member of itself. If it is not a member of itself, it must not possess the defining property of the class, and therefore must be a member of itself. Thus each alternative leads to its opposite and there is a contradiction’ (My Philosophical Development, 75-6). As Russell explained, he thought the Liar’s paradox raised ‘similar problems’, and is ‘seen in its simplest form if a man says, “I am lying”. If he is lying, it is a lie that he is lying, and therefore he is speaking the truth; but if he is speaking the truth, he is lying, for that is what he says he is doing. Contradiction is thus inevitable’ (My Philosophical Development, 77).


Expressed as a ‘predicational paradox’, what this ‘shows’, Russell claimed at the time, ‘is “that not every definable collection of terms forms a class defined by a common predicate” or “A proposition containing one variable may not be equivalent to any proposition asserting that the variable in question belongs to a certain class”’. To use Russell’s example, the statement ““Socrates is mortal””, which attributes a predicate to a named single subject, is of a different order from the propositional statement that ““All Greeks are mortal””, which reads in full, ““For all possible values of x, if x is Greek, x is mortal””, a statement as true for Americans, Australians, New Zealanders and savages as it is for Greeks. That is, because ““All Greeks are mortal””, unlike the statement, ““Socrates is mortal””, names no one and expresses only and solely a connection of predicates [Greek and mortal], it cannot be proved by enumeration’ because ‘the x in question is not confined to the x’s that are Greeks, but extends over the whole universe.’

Thus, if we think of history (the past) as the set (class) and histories (texts about the past) as its subsets or members, we can see that history cannot be a history of histories but the class of all (potential) histories—a class of teaspoons and not a teaspoon, to use Russell’s analogy. As such it is not a member of itself, but in not being a member of itself, the activity that defines it, it is by definition a member of itself. 

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72 It was in May 1901, in a draft of The Principles of Mathematics, that Russell first committed his paradox to paper, expressing it in predicational form rather than as a ‘class paradox’. Having first asserted ‘that “to have a given relation to a given term is a predicate” and that the terms having that relation to that term for a class’, he wrote: ‘We saw that some predicates can be predicated of themselves. Consider now those . . . of which this is not the case. These are the referents (and also the relata) in a certain complex relation, namely the combination of non-predicability with identity. But there is no predicate which attaches to all of them and to no other terms. For this predicate will either be predicable or not predicable of itself. If it is predicable of itself, it is one of those references by relation to which it was defined, and therefore, in virtue of their definition, it is not predicable of itself. Conversely, if it is not predicable of itself, then again it is one of the said referents, of all of which (by hypotheses) it is predicable, and therefore again it is predicable of itself. This is a contradiction, which shows that all the referents considered have no common predicate, and therefore do not form a class’ (Nicholas Griffin, ‘The Prehistory of Russell’s Paradox’, Godehard Link [ed.], One Hundred Years of Russell’s Paradox: Mathematics, Logic, Philosophy [New York: Walter de Gruyter, 2004], 364). This quote is taken from Bertrand Russell, The Collected Papers of Bertrand Russell: Volume 3: Towards the Principle of Mathematics, 1900-02, ed. G. H. Moore (London: Routledge, 1993), 195.

73 Russell, My Philosophical Development, 66.

74 Russell, My Philosophical Development, 67.
itself—which is a contradiction. As Kurt Gödel noted, ‘a thing can certainly not be based on a totality of things to which the thing to be constructed itself belongs.’\textsuperscript{75} Thus, just as there is no greatest cardinal number (for the set of all sets) and just as one can never arrive at a final number for the totality of all the things in the universe, so history cannot be the total of all histories.

Its implications for historiography (history writing) become apparent when a historian adds value to an unenumerated multiple singularity. If, on the one hand, values are not assigned to the individuals making up such a group denoted by a common or proper noun, a metaphorical line cannot be drawn around the group to contain or delimit the values by which it is defined prior to the commencement of predicational activity—or, on the other hand, if values are added to the members subsequent to the set having been defined, the set will take on an altered definition without the change of meaning having been announced (or the set redefined). Put in the contrary, if the values of the set are not contained or delimited in advance of predicational activity pertaining to the set, then its values will remain undefined, in the result that any culturally acceptable value may be assigned to the individuals making up the set, even if, strictly speaking, those values should not be attached to those members. This has the curious effect of the predicate qualifying the set or group (the subject) to which it is attached while giving the impression that the subject and not itself has performed that function because the subject and itself remain in their usual (successive) subject-predicate sequence within the sentence. In effect, the subject, in this case, becomes the subject of the predicate and the predicate the subject of the sentence. Hence, if values pertaining to the individuals making up the set (the subject) have not been assigned in advance of predicational function, a new but untested value may enter the sentence by way of the predicate and be attached via the predicate to the subject (the set) even if, as suggested above, the untested value may not properly belong to the members of the set or group (the subject) to which it has been assigned.

Thus, because categories such as Americans, Australians, New Zealanders, and savages cannot be predicable of themselves, any claims made about them will, in themselves, be meaningless. One such example is Michael King’s truth-claim that ‘most New Zealanders, whatever their cultural backgrounds, are good-hearted, practical, commonsensical and tolerant’, variations of which are a staple for historians of settler societies.\footnote{Michael King, \textit{The Penguin History of New Zealand} (Auckland: Penguin, 2003), 520.} Such a claim, however, is predicated on the doubly false assumption that the person making it, if a member of the group for which the claim is being made, is one of a cloned multiple making up the category which itself cannot be a member of the set for which the claim is being made. The truth-claim made by New Zealand’s former Prime Minister, Helen Clark, that Edmund Hillary ‘was a quintessential kiwi’, is likewise meaningless because the multiple cannot be one.\footnote{Helen Clark, as quoted by staff and agencies, ‘Mount Everest conqueror Edmund Hillary dies’, in \textit{Guardian} (London, 10 January 2008) \url{http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008/jan/10/1}. See also King, \textit{The Penguin History of New Zealand}, 510-11. That is not to say that meaningless statements do not attain to (metaphysical) meaning for those at whom they are aimed.} That is, Clark’s ‘quintessential kiwi’ is an operation not a being. The reason such truth-claims, which amount to category-mistakes, can be readily attached to ‘imagined communities’ is because they are universal propositions that strike a patriotic chord with individual members of the group or set for which the claim is being made and are predicated on assumptions or pre-existing beliefs.\footnote{Benedict Anderson, \textit{Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism: Revised Edition} (London: Verso, 2006, first published 1983); As noted in the Introduction, the term ‘category-mistake’ was introduced by Gilbert Ryle in his monograph \textit{The Concept of Mind} (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1963, first published 1949), 17-24, in order to dispel what he believed were the problems inherent in the Cartesian theory of mind.} Hence Russell’s paradox also makes possible ‘a politics of the “empty set”, a politics of the “supernumerary” element which belongs to the set but has no distinctive place in it.’\footnote{Slavoj Žižek, ‘From Purification to Subtraction: Badiou and the Real’, Peter Hallward (ed.), \textit{Think Again: Alain Badiou and the Future of Philosophy} (London: Continuum, 2004), 165-6.} In a similar vein, when James Cook wrote ‘that the New Zealanders are Canibals’, he was assigning value on the basis of a vicious-circle fallacy.\footnote{James Cook, \textit{The Journals of Captain Cook on His Voyages of Discovery, Volume II: The Voyage of the Resolution and Adventure 1772-1775}, ed. J. C. Beaglehole (Cambridge: published for the Hakluyt Society at the University Press, 1959), 294; Alfred North Whitehead and Bertrand Russell, \textit{Principia Mathematica} (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1962, first published 1910), 37-8.} Cook fell
into this trap for at least four reasons: first, his multiple singular subject, ‘New Zealanders’, was an unenumerated totality; second, he applied a universal value to a group (set) before it could be determined if that value was applicable to each individual member whose values or characteristics (e.g., $x$ and $y$) defined that group; third, he confused his subject group with its individual members; fourth, he used the predicate (‘Canibals’) to define the subject (‘New Zealanders’) while giving the impression that the reverse was the case—that the set or proper noun (the subject of the sentence) had given rise to the predicate through his sentence’s subject-predicate sequence.\footnote{Whitehead and Russell, \textit{Principia Mathematica}, 37; Cook, \textit{The Journals of Captain Cook on His Voyages of Discovery, Volume II}, 294; It could also be argued that ‘New Zealanders’ and ‘Canibals’ are both predicates used interchangeably as subjects.} As a result, Cook produced a statement that could not ‘be proved by enumeration’ because his multiple singularity was an unenumerated totality and the value or characteristic of being a ‘Canibal’ is assignable universally, not just to ‘New Zealanders’ (as is the case with assigning mortality to Greeks).\footnote{Cook, \textit{The Journals of Captain Cook on His Voyages of Discovery, Volume II}, 294; Russell, \textit{My Philosophical Development}, 67.}

We can see from these examples how historiography might fall prey to problems of propositional function, not least because it is the task of historians to disavow the inexistence of time, to make the uncertain certain, the undecidable decidable and to provide ideological comfort for those for whom they are writing. The problem becomes apparent when the function’s scope of application (the domain) is not specified prior to its use, because, with historians commonly treating their absent subjects as present, their propositions often function on the basis of self-assertion while purporting to derive their authority from the objects to which they refer. That authority, however, is generated by the predicational activity itself and not by the artifact or imaginary group under scrutiny, for each artifact or group, which has no meaning in and of itself, only attains to meaning when the historian attaches significance to it within the context of his or her text. The matter may be further complicated if historians confuse ‘objects of cognition’, such as manuscripts or diaries, with their ideas about them, because, as Jean-François Lyotard notes, there
are ‘no procedures, defined by a protocol unanimously approved and renewable on
demand, for establishing in general the reality of the object of an idea.’ Furthermore, because most historiographical propositions are unable to be tested, they are more likely to be poorly conceived than those of disciplines in which propositional domains are well defined in advance, or, alternatively, where it is understood that propositional authority is derived from the author’s imagination.

The inadequation of history and time

Thus, just as Badiou’s count-as-one does not exist but operates, as do multiple singularities that are unenumerated, so Aristotle’s now does not exist but operates. It is for this reason that time can only be a metaphor and will of necessity be the product of a vicious circle: as noted above, just as the time-series past-present-future has to be presupposed in order for us to get time, so time has to be presupposed in order to think the A series which gives us time. Time, then, cannot be real and can only be the product of belief reinforced through iteration. Likewise history, the one of histories, can only be a large-scale metaphor. As with time, it is also the product of a vicious circle—in order for history to exist, histories must be presupposed, and in order for histories to exist, history must be presupposed—and therefore, like time, is the product of presence. History and histories will always be contaminated by this contradiction, for any event will have been future, present and past—that is, it will be ‘present in the present, future in the past, past in the future’, just as a vicious circle will arise, as McTaggart also points out, whenever ‘we endeavour to assign the characteristics of present, future and past by the criterion of the characteristics of present, past and future.’ Furthermore, the contradiction can never be removed from the time-series even if there were multiple time-series—in those circumstances it would become ‘a vicious infinite series’ rather than ‘a vicious

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84 McTaggart, ‘The Unreality of Time’, 469.
circle’—and would also apply if the time-series involved qualities (‘futurity, presentness, and pastness’) rather than relations (future, present, past).\textsuperscript{85}

Thus if the time-series past-present-future is a contradiction, not only is time unreal, so also is the past, and if the past is unreal, then that which we construct to represent it—histories—and that which we believe is its totality—history—cannot be valid of reality either. Even history’s graphic representation is paradoxical, as Michel de Certeau points out: ‘Historiography (that is, “history” and “writing”) bears within its own name the paradox—almost an oxymoron—of a relation established between two antinomic terms, between the real and discourse. Its task is one of connecting them and, at the point where this link cannot be imagined, of working \textit{as if} the two were being joined.’\textsuperscript{86} Hence we might concur with Karl Popper that \textit{“history” in the sense in which most people speak of it simply does not exist’}, and therefore \textit{‘has no meaning’}.\textsuperscript{87} Furthermore, because ‘historical’ or ‘general theories’ are based on ‘severely limited facts . . . and cannot be repeated or implemented at our will’, they are ‘untestable’, are not subject to counterexamples, and can ‘rightly be charged with being circular’, required as they are to ‘fit in with that interpretation which was used in the original selection of facts.’\textsuperscript{88}

We can say, then, that whenever an idea or a concept is self-referentially extant, there is presence, without which the concept could not exist let alone be sustained. In the case of representational time and history, they have become so embedded in our cultural consciousness as integral parts of the functioning world that it seems inconceivable that they might not exist in actuality. As Ermarth has it: “History” as a

\textsuperscript{85} McTaggart, \textit{The Unreality of Time}, 469.
\textsuperscript{87} K. R. Popper, \textit{The Open Society and its Enemies: Volume II: The High Tide of Prophecy: Hegel, Marx, and the Aftermath} (London: Routledge, 1974, first published 1945), 269. Popper defines this commonly understood sense of history as being that which refers to ‘the history of mankind’ and which is acquired at school and university and from the reading of history books (\textit{The Open Society}, 269).
\textsuperscript{88} Popper, \textit{The Open Society and its Enemies: Volume II}, 265-7.
category, like “time” and “space” . . . is an instance of representation that we have almost completely naturalized; it mingles with the air we breathe.”

As a consequence we have in place elaborate structures—call them ‘chronology protection agencies’: history departments in universities and tertiary institutions around the world, government agencies such as the New Zealand government’s History Group—that protect and promote the idea of history and owe their continuing existence to the prevailing belief that their product, historiography, enables us to learn from the past. But that which their work becomes, ‘historical consciousness’, may just be, as Hayden White opines, little more than ‘a specifically Western prejudice by which the presumed superiority of modern, industrial society can be retroactively substantiated.” It is of this, according to Jenkins, that we should be suspicious: ‘For when any kind of thinking establishes itself as the doxa, when it trips rights across a social formation, when its naturalness and its knowledge claims are quite literally taken for granted, are hegemonic, then we can confidently say that we are in the presence of an insidious political ideology.”

How, then, when time is aporetic, metaphysical and irreducible, might we try to think beyond history, ‘the no-longer-now’, and its corollary, representational time, in order to effect profound social change as Ermarth exhorts us? Might the answer lie in Lyotard’s contesting of ‘the totalisations fundamental to most ideas of politics’, in seeking a new language to overcome the différend? Might it lie in the different but not unrelated philosophical approaches of Derrida and Badiou who, as Antonio Calcagno points out, ‘wish to offer a new possibility for thinking politics as political

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89 Ermarth, Sequel to History, 54.
90 The term ‘chronology protection agencies’ is taken from S. W. Hawking, ‘Chronology protection conjecture’, Physical Review D 46/2 (1992), 603: ‘It seems there is a chronology protection agency, which prevents the appearance of closed timelike curves and so makes the universe safe for historians.’
92 Jenkins, At the Limits of History, 170.
93 Critchley, ‘Heidegger’s Being and Time, part 8: Temporality’.
philosophy’ by creating ‘a time-space where a genuine possibility exists for political thinking outside the present-day model of doing politics.’ For Derrida, all events are determined by différance, by ‘the temporizing double bind logic of possibility and impossibility’ and its ultimate refusal to be fixed precisely because ‘the present will never come to presence’ and therefore any event cannot contain all the meaning proper to it. However, it is precisely this undecidability of political events that needs to be acknowledged and engaged with ‘in order to prevent and deconstruct the tradition of metaphysical politics.’ This, for Derrida, is the basis of his ‘democracy to come’, which he variously describes as having ‘the structure of a promise’, of being an ‘interminable political critique’ of any democracy that ‘remains inadequate to the democratic demand’, ‘an extension of the democratic beyond nation-state sovereignty, beyond citizenship’ and being ‘inextricably linked to justice.’ For Badiou, politics is the means by which subjects can ‘subjectivate’ themselves ‘through the decisive intervention that is conceived as time’, that is, subjective time. As Badiou has it, singularities are the evental sites of his four ‘generic procedures’—‘love, art, science and politics’—where ‘the being of a truth’ is able to be thought and ‘an indiscernible of the times’ is able to come to light. For Lyotard, it is ‘the radical singularity of an event’ that ‘invites invention’ as to the meaning it lacks in and of itself. The foregoing also strikes a chord with Richard Beardsworth’s suggestion, that ‘if one cannot not disavow time, one can invent in re-ognizing this disavowal’, for ‘the “now” is not only the very condition of invention; the re-cognition of its disavowal transforms the relations between politics and time’—a matter to which we shall return in the conclusion to this thesis.

95 Calcagno, Badiou and Derrida, 92.
96 Calcagno, Badiou and Derrida, 92, 40.
97 Calcagno, Badiou and Derrida, 40.
99 Calcagno, Badiou and Derrida, 93, 96.
100 Badiou, Being and Event, 16-17.
101 Jenkins, At the Limits of History, 176.
102 Beardsworth, Derrida and the Political, 102.
Might it not be more socio-politically advantageous, then, to learn to live with the aporia of time and the arch-structuring influence and undecidability of Derrida’s *différance*, with the ‘simultaneously indeterminate and complete’ of Badiou’s generic procedures, with the ‘*sui generis* nature’ of Lyotard’s event, instead of riffing on the clichés we circulate about an imaginary discursive exoteric we call the past? Might it not be wiser to acknowledge ‘that epistemologically striving histories were just an enormous philosophical mistake’? For as Giorgio Agamben expresses the inadequation of time and subjectivity:

> The fundamental contradiction of modern man is precisely that he does not yet have an experience of time adequate to his idea of history, and is therefore painfully split between his being-in-time as an elusive flow of instants and his being-in-history, understood as the original dimension of man. The twofold nature of every modern concept of history as *res gestae* and as *historia rerum gestarum*, as diachronic reality and as synchronic structure which can never coincide in time, expresses this impossibility.

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103 Badiou, *Being and Event*, 17; Jenkins, *At the Limits of History*, 176.
104 Jenkins, *At the Limits of History*, 184.
CHAPTER TWO
Problematising the outside

Because the now does not exist but operates we cannot get time, and because the diachronic series, past-present-future, by which we conceptualise time, is itself a contradiction—the future never arrives, the present is not a duration, and the past is incorporeal—we cannot get the past. Likewise, because the one does not exist but operates we cannot get history. That is, history cannot be the one of histories. In short, there are no grounds on which the being of history can be established. Rather, it is ‘writing’ that ‘opens the field of history—of historical becoming’, just as ‘historicity itself is tied to the possibility of writing’.¹ In other words, because history is an idea (historicity) organised around ideas about itself, it can only ever be a metaphysical discourse, despite the widespread belief that the past, in one form or another, is a material exoteric and that our rationalisations about it are as real as the events in ‘the no-longer now’ to which we attach them.² Or, as Keith Jenkins puts it, we confuse ‘examples and schemas with analoga’.³ As a consequence, history quickly comes up against the limit of itself and the limit of the origin, in the result that the various literary devices by which history sustains itself—‘structures, patterns, trends, cause-effect relationships’, ‘the reality effect’—also undermine it, because history as a discourse cannot transcend itself and reach across the abyss, the void, the nothingness, to that which is not there.⁴

History, then, must be a self-referential signifying system without an outside to its discourse. To better understand how the system functions, we now turn to a

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³ Keith Jenkins, At the Limits of History: Essays on Theory and Practice (London: Routledge, 2009), 182.
discussion of Jacques Derrida’s *différance*, the theoretical cornerstone of this thesis. For without a conception of history as the product of *différance*, it may be difficult to understand how history can be deployed for virtually any end, provided it accords with the beliefs and hopes of those for whom it is written and with the etiquette and practices of those who authorise it.

**Différance**

Having seen in Chapter One that “‘time’ is a metaphor for the erasure of time/space’, and ‘can only be thought on the basis of being as presence since the question of the being of time is posed by the evaded question of the unacknowledged temporal predetermination of being’, we now move to that other core function of *différance*: the play of differences within text. Just as *différance*, “that which is related to time, but is not time” is . . . to be thought beyond the determination of being as presence, so *différance* as differing should be thought of as producing meaning while remaining beyond meaning and having no meaning itself.

*Différance*, in this sense, may be defined as the endless play of signification that occurs within language and results in that which can be named—that is, made meaningful. Summarising *différance*, however, is no easy matter, not least because it is a hidden process that even Derrida had difficulty describing succinctly despite inventing the term. As arguably Derrida’s greatest contribution to twentieth-century philosophy, *différance* is an attempt to explain the nothingness of before-ness—that is, to observe, describe and analyse the ‘semantic void at the heart of’ conceptualisation. Derrida’s first public elaboration of his neologism was made in a paper given to the French Society of Philosophy on 27 January 1968:

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'Older' than Being itself, such a différance has no name in our language. But we 'already know' that if it is unnameable, it is not provisionally so, not because our language has not yet found or received this name, or because we would have to seek it in another language, outside the finite system of our own. It is rather because there is no name for it at all, not even the name of essence or of Being, not even that of 'différance,' which is not a name, which is not a pure nominal unity, and unceasingly dislocates itself in a chain of differing and deferring substitutions. . . . This unnameable is not an ineffable Being which no name could approach: God, for example. This unnameable is the play which makes possible nominal effects, the relatively unitary and atomic structures that are called names, the chains of substitutions of names in which, for example, the nominal effect différance is itself enmeshed, carried off, reinscribed, just as a false entry or a false exit is still part of the game, a function of the system.8

The central problem for Derrida was that language has no centre, only the illusion of a centre produced by the endless play of signification. To reach that conclusion Derrida had accepted Ferdinand de Saussure's fundamental premise that 'in a language there are only differences, and no positive terms,' and Saussure's idea of language as a system of linguistic signs (words)—composed of signifier (sound-pattern or word) and signified (the concept or mental image to which the word refers)—that operate arbitrarily and have no meaning in and of themselves.9 Given


9 Derrida, Margins of Philosophy, 10-11; Jacques Derrida, ‘Deconstruction in America: An Interview with Jacques Derrida’, trans. James Creech, Critical Exchange, 17 (1985), 22; Ferdinand de Saussure, Course in General Linguistics, trans. Roy Harris (London: Gerald Duckworth, 1993, first published 1983), 118 [166]. The lectures in which Saussure formulated his revolutionary theories about linguistics were given to his students between 1906 and 1911 and published in 1916, three years after his death at age 55, as Cours de linguistique générale (Course in General Linguistics). Roy Harris described the significance of Saussure’s linguistic theory as follows: ‘The revolution Saussure ushered in has rightly been described as ‘Copernican’. For instead of men’s words being seen as peripheral to men’s understanding of reality, men’s understanding of reality came to be seen as revolving about their social use of verbal signs. . . . Words are not vocal labels which have come to be attached to things and qualities already given in advance by Nature, or to ideas already grasped independently by the human mind. On the contrary languages themselves, collective products of social interaction, supply the essential conceptual frameworks for men’s analysis of reality and, simultaneously, the verbal equipment for their description of it. The concepts we use are creations of
this formulation, we can see that the object or idea to which a sign refers will be another sign and therefore illusory because it is not fully present to itself and will therefore in turn depend on the sign to which it refers, which will itself be illusory, and so on, ad infinitum. Hence, once we accept that linguistic signs function arbitrarily within a system of signs and that their meaning is determined by their differences and not by what they name, it can no longer be held that ‘a given natural order is reflected in the linguistic order’, or that there is a ‘structural congruency between the structure of the world and the structure of language’. That is, for those who embraced Saussure’s basic premises, words were no longer thought to represent ‘the world to us as God himself might know it’, and were no longer ‘felt to link up with their thoughts or objects in essentially right and incontrovertible ways’. While, as John Joseph points out, the Presocratics and Sophists understood that the connection of words to meaning is arbitrary, and that the ‘decoupling of the signified from things in the world goes all the way back to the Stoics and their conception of sēmainomenon [the thing signified] as incorporeal’, Saussure’s view of language nevertheless had the effect of challenging the West’s traditional understanding that a word was a positive entity containing meaning derived from the object or idea to which it referred, and not a sign devoid of meaning. Henceforth, it could be understood, for example, that the meaning of ‘an abstract word like beauty’ was no longer derived ‘from the actual instances of beautiful things.’

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the language we speak’ (Roy Harris, ‘Translator’s Introduction’, Course in General Linguistics, ix). This emphasis on language as a semiotic system—on how meaning is created rather than what meaning is—not only laid the foundations of modern linguistics and semiology, it also contained the seeds for an explosive critique of Western metaphysics that found its voice in the intellectual movements known as structuralism and poststructuralism.

There were, however, a number of contradictions inherent in Saussure’s theory. For instance, the diagram of the linguistic sign presented in *Course in General Linguistics* shows a mutual interdependence between signifier and signified, with the word and its meaning joined by a contiguous horizontal line.\(^{14}\) This apparently indissoluble binding of word and meaning suggests that the latter is pre-set, which is itself a contradiction if signs operate arbitrarily and differentially. ‘The first consequence to be drawn from this’, says Derrida, ‘is that the signified concept is never present in and of itself, in a sufficient presence that would refer only to itself. Essentially and lawfully, every concept is inscribed in a chain or in a system within which it refers to the other, to other concepts, by means of the systematic play of differences. Such a play, *différance*, is thus no longer simply a concept, but rather the possibility of conceptuality, of a conceptual process and system in general.’\(^{15}\) As Terry Eagleton explains it, ‘meaning is not immediately *present* in a sign. Since the meaning of a sign is a matter of what the sign is *not*, its meaning is always in some sense absent from it too. Meaning, if you like, is scattered or dispersed along the whole chain of signifiers: it cannot be easily nailed down, it is never fully present in any one sign alone, but is rather a kind of constant flickering of presence and absence together.’\(^{16}\) Meaning, in other words, is more subjunctive than indicative.

As a consequence, another contradiction arose for Derrida: how could difference be thought of as presence? That is, while we can differentiate between two things, we cannot point to the point of difference between them as a some-thing because if that some-thing were a difference we would need another some-thing to differentiate it from the other some-things to turn it into a presence, and so on, ad infinitum. Hence the apparent appearance of presence requires constant signification in the form of constant substitutions. Thus, not only is meaning always already delayed and differentiated, it is also already always in a state of infinite regress. Put alternatively, the problem is that the sign is always secondary, always standing in the place of

\(^{14}\) Saussure, *Course in General Linguistics*, 67 [99], 113 [159], 115 [162].

\(^{15}\) Derrida, *Margins of Philosophy*, 11.

\(^{16}\) Eagleton, *Literary Theory*, 128.
something else, that something always being absent. Thus while the sign appears to be originary, marking a beginning, it marks the beginning of nothing, because there is nothing there save for signs substituting for other signs—traces of nothing appearing as something. 'Look up the signified of an unknown signifier', writes Geoffrey Bennington, 'and you find more signifiers, never any signifieds.'\textsuperscript{17} And that is because 'the signified always already functions as a signifier. . . . There is not a single signified that escapes, even if recaptured, the play of signifying references that constitute language.'\textsuperscript{18}

Hence we can say that difference is a non-entity and that dif\textipa{\oe}rance, based respectively on the French noun and verb diff\textipa{\oe}rence and diff\textipa{\oe}rer, the latter of which carries two different meanings—to differ (from) and to defer (put off)—suspends itself between the two, between differing and deferring, in that silent non-place in language where, paradoxically, meaning is produced—'a tomb that cannot even be made to resonate', as Derrida describes it.\textsuperscript{19} With no phonetic difference between difference and dif\textipa{\oe}rance, the a of Derrida's portmanteau term marks that silence.\textsuperscript{20} Derrida explained it as follows in an interview with Julia Kristeva:

\begin{quote}
Nothing—no present and in-different being—thus precedes dif\textipa{\oe}rance and spacing. There is no subject who is agent, author, and master of dif\textipa{\oe}rance, who eventually and empirically would be overtaken by dif\textipa{\oe}rance. Subjectivity—like objectivity—is an effect of dif\textipa{\oe}rance, an effect inscribed in a system of dif\textipa{\oe}rance. This is why the a of dif\textipa{\oe}rance also recalls that spacing is temporization, the detour and postponement by means of which intuition, perception, consummation—in a word, the relationship to the present, the reference to a present reality, to a being—are always deferred. Deferred by virtue of the very principle of
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{18} Derrida, \textit{Of Grammatology}, 7.
\textsuperscript{19} Alan Bass, in Derrida, \textit{Margins of Philosophy}, 8 n. 10; Derrida, \textit{Margins of Philosophy}, 4.
\textsuperscript{20} Derrida, \textit{Margins of Philosophy}, 4-5.
difference which holds that an element functions and signifies, takes on or conveys meaning, only by referring to another past or future element in an economy of traces.21

This was a unique formulation. For not only did *différance* represent the contradiction Derrida spent his professional lifetime interrogating through a meticulous reading of texts, it demonstrated that a something was a nothing, acted metaphysically without being metaphysical, and it challenged all authority without being an authority itself. Derrida also cryptically announced, with his reference to the pyramid and the death of the tyrant, the end of stable meaning and its hegemonic thinking, and the closure of Western metaphysics with its reliance on absolute presence.22 In making this sustained challenge, Derrida was describing the intangibility that enables us to differentiate between signs within a system of signs or in perception. That is, while the traces that make up *différance* can never present themselves in the fullness of themselves as presence, they nevertheless play a decisive role in our understanding of ourselves by acting as the link between ontology (our conceptualisations of Being) and phenomenology (the observable here-and-now or Living Present).23 As Derrida wrote of the traces of which *différance* is comprised: ‘Always differing and deferring, the trace is never as it is in the presentation of itself. It erases itself in presenting itself, muffles itself in resonating, like the a writing itself, inscribing its pyramid in *différance*.’24 Thus *différance* not only accounts for the difference between Being and beings and therefore is prior to Being, it also stands for the intangibility of the origin that has always already departed, leaving only traces of its conceptualisation in language and thereby in consciousness.

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Yet another contradiction in Saussure’s theory targeted by Derrida was the arbitrary nature of the linguistic sign, which Saussure described as ‘the organising principle for the whole of linguistics, considered as a science of language structure.’25 As Course in General Linguistics has it: ‘There is no internal connexion, for example, between the idea “sister” and the French sequence of sounds s-ö-r which acts as its signal. The same idea might as well be represented by any other sequence of sounds. This is demonstrated by differences between languages, and even by the existence of different languages.’26 However, in countering the objection that onomatopoeic words cannot be arbitrary with the argument that ‘such words are never organic elements of a linguistic system’ and are ‘already to a certain extent arbitrary’, Saussure, paradoxically, was obliged to make an arbitrary decision about absolute arbitrariness in order to determine what words were or were not onomatopoeic.27 This arbitrariness, Derrida argued, amounts to an institution, one ‘unthinkable before the possibility of writing’, which itself ‘indirectly but irrevocably contests Saussure’s declared proposition’ that privileges the phonic over the graphic, and, as Derrida declaimed, ‘chases writing to the outer darkness of language.’28 For Saussure, however, a ‘language and its written form constitute two separate systems of signs. The sole reason for the existence of the latter is to represent the former. The object of study in linguistics is not a combination of the written word and the spoken word. The spoken world alone constitutes that object. But the written word is so intimately connected with the spoken word it represents that it manages to usurp the principal role.’29

This point of view was neither new nor original. Writing as inferior to speech, as a supplement to speech several times removed from its referent, imitative in function, not as easily corrected, a substitute for memory and therefore subject to distortions, had been maligne in the West since Plato. Writing, wrote Plato, ‘is like a picture,
which can give no answer to a question, and has only a deceitful likeness of a living creature. It has no power of adaptation, but uses the same words for all. It is not a legitimate son of knowledge, but a bastard, and when an attack is made upon this bastard neither parent nor anyone else is there to defend it."30

That writing proceeds from speech would seem to be confirmed by children learning to speak before they can write, the existence of languages without writing, and the pictographic representations (characters) of words spoken in Chinese-derivative languages. But as Derrida points out, although speech appears to function on the basis of signifiers arising spontaneously within us, thereby enabling us to hear and understand ourselves at the same time, a phenomenon he termed *s'entendre-parler*, this, in a sense, is illusory because speech operates in the selfsame manner as writing:

If ‘writing’ signifies inscription and especially the durable institution of a sign (and that is the only irreducible kernel of the concept of writing), writing in general covers the entire field of linguistic signs. In that field a certain sort of instituted signifiers [sic] may then appear, ‘graphic’ in the narrow and derivative sense of the word, ordered by a certain relationship with other instituted—hence ‘written,’ even if they are ‘phonic’—signifiers. The very idea of institution—hence of the arbitrariness of the sign—is unthinkable before the possibility of writing and outside of its horizon.31

In other words, ‘speech is a sequence of signifiers just as writing is’ and likewise ‘works by the differential play of signifiers, though it is precisely this work of difference that the privileging of speech seeks to suppress.’32 To put that otherwise, speech no more has access to pure understanding than writing does because meaning in language is itself the product of play, and the consolidation of meaning into ‘objective truth’ requires its iterative manifestation, whether in phonic or graphic form. Hence Derrida could say: ‘This protowriting is at work in the origin of

31 Derrida, *Of Grammatology*, 98, 44.
sense’ because ‘it is always already engaged in the “movement” of the trace, that is, in the order of “signification.”’ As he adds: ‘One already suspects that if writing is “image” and exterior “figuration,” this representation” is not innocent. The outside bears with the inside a relationship that is, as usual, anything but simple exteriority. The meaning of the outside was always present within the inside, imprisoned outside the outside, and vice versa.’ Thus speech can be viewed as a form of writing because it ‘turns out to depend on those very qualities that have been predicated of writing.’ In other words, ‘writing [is] already at work in the voice’ as ‘a kind of proto-linguisticality.’ Derrida termed this ‘arche-writing’ (archi-écriture), countering the traditional view that writing emanates from speech with the proposition ‘that the “original,” “natural,” etc. language had never existed, never been intact and untouched by writing, that it had itself always been a writing.’ As well, it challenged Saussure’s proposition that linguistics could be made into a science: “This arche-writing, although its concept is invoked by the themes of “the arbitrariness of the sign” and of difference, cannot and can never by recognized as the object of a science. It is that very thing which cannot let itself be reduced to the form of presence’, the latter of which ‘orders all objectivity of the object and all relation of knowledge.’

Derrida also pointed out that the relationship of writing to speech is complicated further by the close association between representation (mimēsis) and memory (mnêmē), the latter being a type of mimēsis. Representation is that process which makes possible the revealing of hidden truth (alētheia) by signifying the presentation of the thing itself, or by setting up a relationship of agreement

34 Derrida, *Of Grammatology*, 35.
37 Derrida, *Of Grammatology*, 56.
38 Derrida, *Of Grammatology*, 57.
between two terms to express the meaning of that relationship.\textsuperscript{40} Representation, therefore, whether phonic or graphic, is essential to meaning production, but like signs substituting for other signs, it leads to representations of representations, ad infinitum, in its own chains of signification. Furthermore, whether performing an essential or inessential function, ‘in each case, \textit{mimēsis} has to follow the process of truth.’\textsuperscript{41}

Truth, however, which is a prime target if not the ultimate goal of philosophical and historical writing, is also an effect of language, not least because graphemes, while purporting to be a part of memory, exist outside of memory as dead not living signs. Derrida puts it like this:

\begin{quote}
The boundary (between inside and outside, living and nonliving) separates not only speech from writing but also memory as an unveiling (re-)producing a presence from re-memoration as the mere repetition of a monument; truth as distinct from its sign, being as distinct from types. The ‘outside’ does not begin at the point where what we now call the psychic and the physical meet, but at the point where the \textit{mnēmē}, instead of being present to itself in its life as a movement of truth, is supplanted by the archive, evicted by a sign of re-memoration or of com-memoration. The space of writing, space as writing, is opened up in the violent movement of this surrogation, in the difference between \textit{mnēmē} and \textit{hypomnēsis}. The outside is already \textit{within} the work of memory. . . . Memory is thus contaminated by its first substitute: \textit{hypomnēsis}.\textsuperscript{42}
\end{quote}

Writing, in other words, is ‘that dangerous supplement’, the doubling of a phonic sign with a graphic one.\textsuperscript{43} Whereas the phonic signifier remains in ‘animate proximity’ to memory (\textit{mnēmē}), the graphic signifier ‘goes one degree further away, falls outside of life, entrains life out of itself and puts it to sleep in the type of its


\textsuperscript{41} Derrida, \textit{Dissemination}, 193.


\textsuperscript{43} As Barbara Johnson notes, “that dangerous supplement,” which Rousseau uses in his \textit{Confessions} to describe masturbation’, is used by Derrida as the title Chapter 2, Part II, in \textit{Of Grammatology} on Rousseau (\textit{Dissemination}, 110 footnote 46).
double’ (hypomnēsis). Writing is also insistent and doubly deceptive in its function as a supplement: by way of its graphic monuments it gives the impression of having recovered memory, yet in supplanting memory it contaminates it, if not in some instances destroying it. As Derrida describes this process, ‘even though writing is external to (internal) memory, even though hypomnesia is not in itself memory, it affects memory and hypnotizes it in its very inside. . . . [It] breaks into the very thing that would have liked to do without it yet lets itself at once be breached, roughed up, fulfilled, and replaced, completed by the very trace through which the present increases itself in the act of disappearing.’ Thus, just as Derrida viewed the opposition between mnēmē and hypomnēsis as determinant of ‘the meaning of writing’ and the ‘boundary line’ where philosophy institutes and maintains itself, so we might view that place between memory (mnēmē) and its first substitution (hypomnēsis) as the site where meaning about the past is produced, and where, as a product of différance, it experiences its own interminable slippages.

As a consequence, while writing appears to be supportive of memory from within and productive of truth, it remains ‘external to memory, productive not of science but of belief, not of truth but of appearances’, producing in that borderland of inscription ‘a play of appearances which enable it to pass for truth’.

**Supplementarity**

Despite Derrida’s assertion that arche-writing always already inhabits speech, writing itself was considered by Derrida to be ‘dangerous from the moment that representation there claims to be presence and the sign of the thing itself.’ As he has it, ‘there is a fatal necessity, inscribed in the very functioning of the sign, that the substitute make[s] one forget the vicariousness of its own function and make[s]

44 Derrida, *Dissemination*, 110.
45 Derrida, *Dissemination*, 110.
46 Derrida, *Dissemination*, 111.
47 Derrida, *Dissemination*, 103.
48 Derrida, *Of Grammatology*, 144.
itself pass for the plenitude of a speech whose deficiency and infirmity it nevertheless only *supplements*.\textsuperscript{49} Just as masturbation diverts thought to sexual intimacy with another, as it did for Jean-Jacques Rousseau and became for him ‘that dangerous supplement’, so writing ‘diverts the immediate presence of thought to speech into representation and the imagination’, and this, wrote Derrida, echoing Rousseau, ‘is not only “bizarre” but dangerous’, because, as an ‘artificial or artful ruse’, writing makes ‘speech present when it is actually absent’, and does so by ‘*procuring* an absent presence through its image’.\textsuperscript{50} That is, writing as a supplement “produces” what it supplements’ relying, in the process, ‘on an unquestioned value: *presence*’—a consequence of our belief that things *are* and of our desire to ‘place a reassuring end to the reference from sign to sign’ through the use of transcendental signifieds or signifiers, as Derrida termed them, words such as God, truth, justice, history.\textsuperscript{51}

To better understand the ambiguous and infinite process of supplementarity, we might, at this point, watch Derrida watching Rousseau who, vicariously in his *Confessions*, is watching *Mamma* while recalling the excitement of living with that ‘beautiful woman, caressing her image in the bottom of my heart, seeing her continually throughout the day, surrounded in the evening by objects which reminded me of her, sleeping in the bed in which I knew she had slept!’\textsuperscript{52} Mischievously, perhaps, Derrida used this onanistic moment to compare writing as a supplement for speech with masturbation as a supplement for copulation, the former, for Rousseau, a dangerous supplement of the latter because it is unnatural, ‘a vice against Nature’, or, more specifically, a sin against the self. Thus, just as writing for Rousseau was a dangerous supplement for masturbation and masturbation for sexual congress, so writing, for Derrida, was a dangerous supplement because ‘the supplement supplements. It adds only to replace. It intervenes or insinuates itself *in-the-place-of* . . . The sign is always the supplement

\textsuperscript{49} Derrida, *Of Grammatology*, 144.
\textsuperscript{50} Derrida, *Of Grammatology*, 144, 155.
\textsuperscript{52} Derrida, *Of Grammatology*, 153.
of the thing itself.’ Thus, even when presence is no longer delivered in the form of
a chimera but arrives in the form of ‘a little intimacy with this excellent girl’,
Thérèse, successor to Mamma (Madam de Warrens) who in turn is successor to
Susanne Bernard, the mother of Rousseau who died bringing him, sickly, into the
world, Derrida is able to opine that ‘through this sequence of supplements a
necessity is announced: that of an infinite chain, ineluctably multiplying the
supplementary mediations that produce the sense of the very thing they defer: the
mirage of the thing itself, of immediate presence, of originary perception.’ In other
words, because ‘supplementation is possible only because of an originary lack’,
because that lack is expressed as desire for presence (truth), and because ‘it is not
possible to desire that with which one coincides’, both can be said to exist
simultaneously and ambivalently within the non-place of différance, ‘which
produces what it forbids, makes possible the very thing that it makes impossible.’
Thus because presence exists perpetually within the ‘breathing-space’ of différance,
the desire for presence ‘carries in itself the destiny of its non-satisfaction.’ Or, as
Barbara Johnson describes this contradiction, it is ‘absence that assures the
presentation of truth, and presence that entails its distortion.’

Supplementarity, in other words, is another way in which Derrida argues that we
never grasp a referent in itself. The word is always already a substitute for the thing
named by the word, a substitute for the referent in its absence. Hence we can never
begin at the beginning because the beginning, already begun, has always already
departed. Therein, perhaps, lies the wider meaning of Derrida’s (in)famous
aphorism, ‘there is no outside-text’, the sentence that causes historians (and others)
much anxiety. That is, because meaning is produced through the infinite play of

53 Derrida, Of Grammatology, 145.
 Books, 1953), 17, 19; Derrida, Of Grammatology, 156-7.
55 Culler, On Deconstruction, 105; Johnson, ‘Translator’s Introduction’, Derrida Dissemination, xi;
Derrida, Of Grammatology, 143.
56 Derrida, Of Grammatology, 143.
58 Bennington and Derrida, Jacques Derrida, 19.
59 Derrida, Of Grammatology, 158.
différence, we can say that everything is text, or, alternatively, that there is nothing beyond it, that text has no outside. Which is not to say that there is no reality beyond language. Rather, it is to suggest that once language is understood ‘as a constant movement of differences in which there is no stable resting point’, an ‘appeal to reality as a refuge independent of language’ is no longer possible.60 We might reasonably assume, therefore, that Derrida italicised ‘il n’y a pas de hors-texte’ in De la grammatologie to remind us of this; that just as Jean-Jacques, Mamma and Thérèse can be accessed only within the text of the Confessions and not outside it, so, too, meaning can be found only within a text’s textuality.61 Derrida puts it like this:

What we have tried to show by following the guiding line of the ‘dangerous supplement,’ is that in what one calls the real life existence ‘of flesh and bone,’ beyond and behind what one believes can be circumscribed as Rousseau’s text, there has never been anything but writing; there have never been anything but supplements, substitutive significations which could only come forth in a chain of differential references, the ‘real’ supervening, and being added only while taking on meaning from a trace and from an invocation of the supplement, etc. And thus to infinity, for we have read, in the text, that the absolute present, Nature, that which words like ‘real mother’ name, have always already escaped, have never existed; that what opens meaning and language is writing as the disappearance of natural presence.62

Which is no doubt why, in bringing his discussion on the supplementarity of writing to a close, Derrida restates ‘Il n’y a pas de hors-texte’ (there is no outside-text) as ‘qu’il n’y a rien hors du texte’ (that there is nothing outside the text).63 It was, he writes, ‘le propos axial de cet essai’—the central proposition of his book.64 It is also no doubt why he could say to New York Times journalist, Dinitia Smith, as he gesticulated at the diners around them in Baltimore’s Polo Grill: ‘Everything is a text; this is a text.’65

63 Derrida, De la grammatologie, 227, 233; Derrida, Of Grammatology, 158, 163.
64 Derrida, De la grammatologie 233; Derrida, Of Grammatology, 163.
Unsurprisingly, then, language for Derrida ‘is originally metaphorical. According to Rousseau, it derives this from its mother, passion’, with ‘metaphor the characteristic that relates language to its origin.’ Rousseau puts it like this: ‘As the first motives that made man speak were the passions, his first expressions were Tropes. Figurative language was the first to arise, proper meaning was found last. Things were not called by their true name until they were seen in their genuine form. At first, only poetry was spoken. Only long afterwards did anyone take it into his head to reason.’ According to Bernard Lamy, on whom Rousseau relied for this view: ‘“Tropes are names that are transferred from the thing of which they are the proper name, to apply them to things which they signify only indirectly: thus, all tropes are metaphors, for the word, which is Greek, means translation.”’ Thus, because, in common usage, a signifier or word comes bearing meaning, language may deceive us into thinking that that meaning is derived from the object of the signification rather than as arising from the play of signs in which meaning is produced, before that meaning stabilises sufficiently to enter the lexical record. ‘Metaphor’, wrote Derrida, ‘must therefore be understood as the process of the idea or meaning (of the signified, if one wishes) before being understood as the play of signifiers.’

What, then, is the significance of différance for history?

**Différance and history**

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67 Jean-Jacques Rousseau, *Essay on the Origin of Languages and Writings Related to Music: The Collected Writings of Rousseau Vol. 7*, trans. John T. Scott ed. (Hanover: University Press of New England, 1998), 294; Derrida, *Of Grammatology*, 271. The translation of Rousseau’s text as it appears in *Of Grammatology* reads as follows: ‘As man’s first motives for speaking were of the passions, his first expressions were tropes. Figurative language was the first to be born. Proper meaning was discovered last. One calls things by their true name only when one sees them in their true form. At first only poetry was spoken; there was no hint of reasoning until much later’ (*Of Grammatology*, 271).
Différance is history in the sense that ‘history’ is both the sign of a discourse and the transcendental signifier or ‘transcendental signified’ that sits at the centre of the signifying system that constitutes history and controls its domain and play.\textsuperscript{70} History does not exist as such. Rather, it is a large-scale metaphor preceded by the idea of itself, the name of which is history. History only appears to exist because of this signifying system, which in turn is a consequence of history’s originary lack. Hence, supplementarity fills in for the very lack that makes history (seem) possible, turning absence into presence through its effacement of that lack. As Gabrielle Spiegel puts it: ‘Historians . . . have no givens — no ready-made chronicle of events or histories — and must construct their narratives on the basis of some degree of positive (if ideologically impressed) visions of the past.’\textsuperscript{71} Thus, history can never escape différance. Just as we never arrive at a signified when we look up a signifier, so historians never arrive at the past when they look up endnotes and footnotes; they only arrive at more text that can never be contextualised—placed in its historical setting—because history is text, not a place. This is problematic for historians given that they commonly promote the past as having an existence beyond their texts, beyond the discourse itself, and meaning created about it as being extracted from that existence. Hence, in order to overcome this deficit and turn originary lack into something to which they can attach their rationalisations, historians deploy a variety of literary devices and techniques. Spiegel’s essay, ‘Historicism, and the Social Logic of the Text in the Middle Ages’, is a courageous if flawed account of this impossibility—for while Spiegel acknowledges ‘that “history” as the object of our knowledge is, inevitably, absent’, she also suggests it can be known once texts have been returned to or ‘located within specific social sites that themselves disclose the political, economic, and social pressures that condition a culture’s discourse at any given moment.’\textsuperscript{72}

\textsuperscript{70} Derrida, Writing and Difference, 280.
\textsuperscript{72} Gabrielle M. Spiegel, ‘Historicism, and the Social Logic of the Text in the Middle Ages’, Speculum 65/1 (1990), 59-86.
As a result of this incessant surrogation—text, in the broadest sense, substituting for absence—we encounter a double bind. First, because meaning can never be fully present to itself, meaning about the past must be continually produced in order to perpetuate the illusion of its presence. Second, because it is always produced after the event, historical meaning is always decontextualized and is therefore always presentist and ahistorical. That is not to say that actual events have not occurred or that what historians write about them is necessarily fictive. Rather, it is to say that historical meaning, like historical realism, can only ever be an effect of signification, of supplementarity, of trace. As Derrida explains:

There is no present text in general, and there is not even a past present text, a text which is past as having been present. The text is not conceivable in an originary or modified form of presence. The unconscious text is already a weave of pure traces, differences in which meaning and force are united—a text nowhere present, consisting of archives which are always already transcriptions. Originary prints. Everything begins with reproduction. Always already: repositories of a meaning which was never present, whose signified presence is always reconstituted by deferral... supplementarily.73

That history is not found in archaeological sites, archives, diaries, digital storage devices, newspapers, parliamentary papers, journals, and the like, but is produced by différance begs the question of origins, that problematic of Western metaphysics concerning ‘the primal materials of the first formation of meaning’, as Edmund Husserl describes it.74 That is, because origins, the equivalent of once upon a time, are a prerequisite for any historical discourse yet are recognisable only within the text that gives them meaning, they presuppose the very history or histories without which they would have no existence. Here we encounter another contradiction: origins cannot exist without the history or the histories they found, and because the originary moment of any historical discourse has always already departed, the historian’s discourse lacks the very foundation on which it purports to rely.

73 Derrida, Writing and Difference, 211.
This calls to mind the paradox encountered with the famous Cartesian Circle in which René Descartes relied on his clear and distinct knowledge of God’s existence to confirm his own self-knowledge and thereby his own existence. That is, just as Descartes relied on knowledge which he posited lay outside him but which actually lay within him, so history resides within textuality and the historian’s mind while being presented as arising outside both. As Rudolf Burnet explains, ‘we can only investigate the a priori of history phenomenologically by taking the historical facts as our point of departure. For their part, however, they can only be recognised as historical facts by virtue of an understanding, implicit at the very least, of the essence of history. Whenever we deal with history we soon discover that we are continually moving in a circle’, a matter disguised in narrative history by the presentation of the past as linear, and, more generally, through the reliance of history on representational time.75 Thus because an origin is never found but presents itself as being a prior-present, the only way it can be recognised as a founding moment is by being constituted as a linguistic object within the signifying process that makes it meaningful. Hence the origin arrives after its originary moment or manifestation, which ‘is not an external fate, but an essential necessity of intentionality.’76 Speech-as-writing/writing-as-speech, is, then, the site where the past is constituted, and from where, delimited, meaning about it is transmitted as knowledge. This ‘transmission is at once preservation and loss, and the return inquiry is at once an exposure and a concealment of the origin.’77

S’entendre-parler

It is not only this transmission but also the effect of s’entendre-parler that appears to guarantee absolute objectivity of the ideality, and which, in turn, transforms the

historian’s inner belief into interpersonal certainty. But *s’entendre-parler* is not only paradoxical—‘without the apparent fall back into language and thereby into history . . . sense would remain an empirical formation imprisoned as fact in a psychological subjectivity’—in its notion of hearing and understanding oneself simultaneously it returns us to the speech/writing dyad and the privileging of the former over the latter.78 That is, in the hearing of their inner voice, the historian may believe that she or he is experiencing a connection to their subject that is more than wholly imaginary.

We can see how this might occur during the historicising process, when imagining becomes ‘perceiving’ as the historian hears the words ‘spoken’ by their inner voice and interprets them as confirmation of the ideas they express, and only later ‘finds’ those ideas somewhere beyond themselves (in other texts, in conversations, etc.). Although we do not learn the extent of the shift from imagining to perceiving until we read or hear the results, it is not hard to see how this shift might occur—when a medievalist, say, breaks the seal of a newly discovered manuscript, and in that moment of awe imagines the wax being poured and stamped. Whatever causes this shift—be it the historian’s training to effectuate the teleologism of their task, the institutional imperative to explain or reconstruct the past in the performance of their employment contract, a splitting of the self during the cognitive process, or a simple forgetting that a manuscript is a cultural artefact and not the past *per se*—the result is still the same: during this process of imaginative engagement absence is turned into presence.

*S’entendre-parler*, then, ‘is the unique experience of the signified producing itself spontaneously, from within the self’.79 Yet it is also much more than this, as Derrida warned. For the thing heard within the self operates as a ‘signified concept’, and it is this ‘effacement of the signifier in the voice’ that ‘is the condition of the very idea of truth’, of ideality and universality, not least because it enhances the belief that

speech delivers pure thought and that there exists somewhere a transcendental
signified that makes ‘the difference between signifier and signified’ absolute and
irreducible.\footnote{Derrida, \textit{Of Grammatology}, 20.} Likewise, when we hear the call of history and enter its discursive
web, we do so accepting or believing (to some extent) in its \textit{a priori} existence, its
signified meanings, its paradigmatic imperatives, its universality and idealities, even
its blind implausibilities—‘the empiricist cult of \textit{fact} and causalist presumption’—for
without doing so we are unable to function with conviction within its signifying
system.\footnote{Derrida, \textit{Edmund Husserl’s Origin of Geometry: An Introduction}, 26.} But it is this that makes history a metaphysical and not a referential
discourse, because ‘the Idea is nothing outside history but the \textit{sense of all history},
[for which] only a historico-transcendental subjectivity can be made responsible’.\footnote{Derrida, \textit{Edmund Husserl’s Origin of Geometry: An Introduction}, 142.}

From this we might conclude that historical cause and effect is a kind of reverse
teleology or reverse protention, the result of discovering the origin after the event
and positing it as the cause of the event, or reformulating the predicate of the
conditional (\textit{If such and such . . .}) as propositional. That is not to say that cause and
effect is an erroneous concept; rather, it is to propose that the effect is not the effect
but the origin of the cause. Friedrich Nietzsche argued that our accepted view of
causation ‘is not something given as such but rather the product of a precise
tropological or rhetorical operation, a \textit{chronologische Umdrehung} or chronological
reversal’, which he explained as follows: “The fragment of the outside world of
which we become conscious comes after the effect that has been produced on us and
is projected \textit{a posteriori} as its ‘cause.’ In the phenomenalism of the ‘inner world’ we
invert the chronology of cause and effect. The basic fact of ‘inner experience’ is that
the cause gets imagined after the effect has occurred”.\footnote{Culler, \textit{On Deconstruction}, 86.} As Jonathan Culler
concludes: ‘If the effect is what causes the cause to become a cause, then the effect,
not the cause, should be treated as the origin. . . . If either cause or effect can occupy
the position of origin, then origin is no longer originary; it loses its metaphysical

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\bibitem{80} Derrida, \textit{Of Grammatology}, 20.
\bibitem{82} Derrida, \textit{Edmund Husserl’s Origin of Geometry: An Introduction}, 142.
\bibitem{83} Culler, \textit{On Deconstruction}, 86.
privilege.' While this logical flaw is emphasised by the empiricism of positivist philosophy—‘the empiricists have taken it for granted that the ideas represented by our linguistic signs already stand in logical relations to one another before we have signs to represent them’—we can also read it as the reason why George Santayana’s famous aphorism—‘Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it’—captures the flawed logic of backwards causation on which history is generally based. Roland Barthes puts it like this in relation to historiography’s mainstay, narration: ‘Everything suggests . . . that the mainspring of narrative is precisely the confusion of consecution and consequence, what comes after being read in narrative as what is caused by; in which case narrative would be a systematic application of the logical fallacy denounced by Scholasticism in the formula post hoc, ergo propter hoc [after this, therefore because of this]. Or as the title of Duncan Watts’s monograph puts it matter-of-factly, ‘everything is obvious once you know the answer.’

In short, because history is a discourse with no outside, we can say that it functions as a ‘meaningful language’ with ‘its own rules and purpose’, expressing ‘meanings in predicative form, i.e., in the form of a possible reference to an object.’ Consequently, all historical meaning can be read as propositional, as founded on nonexistent origins. For, as we have seen, ‘the very idea of an origin that precedes history is itself a product of history, a teleological project that is perpetually deferred.’ Thus, without origins and projected futures history would have no means of conveying meaning, no means of self-differentiation, and would dissolve into transcendence (which, indeed, it does).

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84 Culler, On Deconstruction, 88.
And this, perhaps, is the historian's greatest concern: history stripped of its authority of the referent of the real, that imagined quality with which it has been invested, indeed promoted, for nearly 200 years, and its descent into scepticism and relativism and their darker cousin nihilism. This concern is not unjustified, however. While Eelco Runia takes the view that the past is an ‘ontological twilight state’, concluding that ‘we historians are inclined to combine a half-hearted belief that the past exists with an equally half-hearted belief that the past does not exist—and so we can be said to be doubly wrong’, Jenkins argues the case more radically:

we recognise today that there never has been, and there never will be, any such thing as a past which is expressive of some sort of essence. . . . Consequently, the whole ‘modernist’ History/history ensemble now appears as a self-referential, problematic expression of ‘interests’, an ideological-interpretive discourse without any ‘real’ access to the past as such; unable to engage in any dialogue with ‘reality’. In fact, ‘history’ now appears to be just one more ‘expression’ in a world of postmodern expressions: which of course is what it is.90

History, then, contains within itself the seeds of its own destruction. As a closed-circuit discourse, it exists irrationally while appearing rational, the paradox we saw Peter Charles Hoffer wrestling with in our Introduction:

History is impossible. Nothing I have written or could write will change that brute fact. We cannot go back in time. But doing history, studying the past, is not impossible. If we complete the bridge from present to past, we must confront this final challenge that [Alan] Megill poses[; “The past is a foreign country . . . unvisitatable and unconquerable”]. There is a striking scene near the end of the movie Indiana Jones and the Last Crusade in which Indiana Jones must cross a yawning chasm to reach the cave that houses the Holy Grail. He must have faith in his quest, and that faith requires he take a step into what appears to be empty space. He does, and finds solid ground—a bridge to the other side. What we need to complete our philosophy is a step of faith onto the bridge we have constructed.91

In the conclusion to her inaugural Presidential Address to the American Historical Society, Spiegel, having acknowledged Derrida’s contribution to her praxis, proposed the following solution to history’s originary lack:

Our most fundamental task as historians . . . is to solicit those fragmented inner narratives to emerge from . . . [the] silences [of ‘some invisible other that speaks to us from some deathbed, of which the exact location is unknown’]. In the last analysis, what is the past but a once material existence now silenced, extant only as sign and as sign drawing to itself chains of conflicting interpretations that hover over its absent presence and compete for possession of the relics, seeking to invest traces of significance upon the bodies of the dead.92

The result, as Tom Griffiths expresses it, is the ‘impossible possibility’ of history: ‘Historians move constantly between reading and thinking their way into the lives and minds of the people of the past – giving them back their present with all its future possibilities – and seeing them with perspective, from afar, with a bracing sense of their strangeness.’93

Writing the past, then, is an act of faith, for the only way historians can reach outside their discourse is to construct Hoffer’s ‘bridge to the past’, to view the past through a metaphorical lens or to listen to its ‘silence’—which is to say that historians must remain within their discursive construction while rationalising a link to its absent referent by way of literary and historiographical convention.94 As Michel de Certeau argues: ‘Literature is the theoretic discourse of the historical process. It creates the non-topos where the effective operations of a society attain a formalization. Far from envisaging literature as the expression of a referential, it would be necessary to recognize here the analogue of that which for a long time mathematics has been

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93 Derrida, Margins of Philosophy, 55; Tom Griffiths, ‘History and the creative imagination’, History Australia, 6/3 (2009), 74.12.
for the exact sciences: a “logical” discourse of history, the “fiction” which allows it to be thought.\textsuperscript{95}

But how does the literature of history function as this ‘fiction’? In the first place it does so by assertion; in the manner of scientific discourse, it holds that it can distinguish between what is true from what is not by crediting itself as ‘having a special relationship to the “real” because its contrary is posited as “false.”’\textsuperscript{96} This, effectively, is a ‘double displacement’, in which a concept is rendered ‘plausible or true by pointing to an error and, at the same time, by enforcing belief in something real through a denunciation of the false.’\textsuperscript{97} However, this is only possible, according to Certeau, because modernity has encouraged “écritures” or scientific languages’ to transform their discursive function from that of describing things to that of rendering things possible.\textsuperscript{98} That is, technical languages, one of which history has claimed to be since the nineteenth century, obtain their relevance not from what they describe but from ‘the possibilities they generate for producing or transforming reality.’\textsuperscript{99} That is history’s fictiveness. But its deeper fictiveness, unlike the positive sciences, the model on which it is based, is that it has nothing real to represent. As Frank Ankersmit explains:

[Because] a historical narrative is what its statements determine it to be . . . every statement we make about the past is absorbed into the gravitational field of the narrative substance in question and owes its narrative meaning to it. In the case of the sciences, we are concerned only with the truth or validity of statements; in (historical) representation, the truth of statements about the past is more or less taken for granted—what counts is that one specific

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\textsuperscript{96} Certeau, \textit{Heterologies}, 201.
\textsuperscript{97} Certeau, \textit{Heterologies}, 201.
\textsuperscript{98} Certeau, \textit{Heterologies}, 201.
\textsuperscript{99} Certeau, \textit{Heterologies}, 202. This process is described in greater detail in Chapter Three in connection with the rhetorical nature of modern historiography and its endorsement of the positivist ideologies of modernity.
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set of statements, and not another, has been proposed, and the narrative substance determines the nature of the proposal.\(^{100}\)

In other words, beginning ‘from present determinations’, historians propose postulates and imbed them in narrative, which they also create, in the result that ‘historiography stages the conditions of possibility of production, and it is itself the subject on which it endlessly writes.’\(^{101}\)

**The historian’s defence**

In ‘The Treaty Between Histories’ (2001), the expatriate New Zealand historian and theorist John Pocock advanced the proposition that ‘our language is produced by history, and contains tensions, ambivalences and contradictions deposited in it by processes occurring in the past.’\(^{102}\) That is, for Pocock, whose work has been concerned with analysing ‘the discourse of political thought’, history is nothing less than ‘a ground that determines meaning.’\(^{103}\) However, not even the idea or essence of history, historicity, can be foundational because it is itself the product of différance and therefore does not exist except as a (non-)locus for historical imaginings. As Culler puts it: ‘When Derrida writes that we must attempt to think presence (including meaning as a presence to consciousness) “à partir du temps comme différance” [starting from/in relation to time as difference, differencing, and deferral], he makes clear both the historicity of articulations and the impossibility of making this historicity a ground or a foundation. . . . Time as differencing and deferral undermines presence by making it a construct rather than a given’.\(^{104}\)

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Pocock justified his self-proclaimed ‘anti-postmodernist statement’ by dismissing as ‘an ignoble dream of subjectivity’ the notion ‘that language refers to nothing but itself’, his own straw argument that he ‘countered by the proposition that things have happened in the past, have been experienced and registered in language, and that the historical intelligence can scrutinise language in search of processes and events which have gone towards making it what it is.’

Perez Zagorin advances a similar view:

To say that there is nothing outside the text is synonymous with the anti-realist claim that things exist for us only in language, and that no referential relationship is possible between words and world. It denies that the world and of course the past too have an independent existence external to language to which mind and language give us access. This conception of text, a fallacious consequence of Derrida’s philosophy of language, is a category mistake and deeply misleading. It is one that few historians or philosophers would ever be likely to accept.

At first glance this appears to be a chicken-and-egg argument—what comes first, history or language? For both Pocock and Zagorin the answer is history: each treat the past as an actuality—for Pocock the past just ‘is’, and not just present but also present to itself, while for Zagorin it is an actuality to which we have ‘access’. However, as both are also of the view that we can only reach the past through ‘mind and language’—for Pocock that means ‘historical intelligence’ scrutinising language—they not only subvert their own arguments, it is also clear that they have mistaken the effacement of the signifier in the voice, that is, in their imaginings, for its replacement, the signified concept of history (historicity), treating their unproblematised past as an actuality existing beyond their discourse, which, like history, functions for them as a transcendental signified. However, as we have

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106 Perez Zagorin, ‘Rejoinder to a Postmodernist’, History and Theory, 39/2 (2000), 207. It might be helpful to note at this point that ‘there is nothing outside the text’ does not mean that language has ceased its referential function because nothing real exists beyond it. Rather, it suggests that there is nothing but text in the sense that our lives are mediated in the manner of a text, that our sociality is in essence textual.
seen with Derrida’s engagement with Rousseau’s *Confessions*, Pocock and Zagorin cannot get beyond the (historical) text, let alone gain access to an incorporeal past; the most they can do is access other (historical) texts. That is, they remain within the discourse of history, the outside of which is also its inside. This does not mean that ‘Derrida’s philosophy of language’ has produced ‘a fallacious consequence’ in the form of ‘a category mistake’, as Zagorin argues.108 Rather, it is that Zagorin and Pocock have each mistaken the discourse of history (the signifier) for history itself (the signified—the past-with-meaning). Hence Pocock believes he can distinguish between subjectivity and its binary opposite, objectivity, while both he and Zagorin appear to believe that the teleological task of history, to effectuate its own completeness, is not an impossible one even though history is both preceded and exceeded by its own historicity—that is, preceded by the idea of itself and exceeded by that of itself which is not yet. In short, both historians have accepted history as *a priori* and mistaken their *a posteriori* engagement with its signification as representing the materiality of that which is no longer. Put bluntly, treating an imagined world, the product of *s’entendre-parler*, as real and accessible is the real ‘category-mistake’.109 Furthermore, if they had considered the unreality of time and the impossibility of the originary moment they would or should have concluded that the past cannot be reached precisely because an origin is preceded by the idea of itself expressed in narration and it is therefore axiomatic that history can neither produce language nor exist outside it. As to Zagorin’s objection to *Il n’y a pas de hors-texte*, that was something Derrida had countered some sixteen years earlier in an interview with Richard Kearney:

Every week I receive critical commentaries and studies on deconstruction which operate on the assumption that what they call ‘post-structuralism’ amounts to saying that there is nothing beyond language, that we are submerged in words—and other stupidities of that sort.… The other, which is beyond language and which summons language, is perhaps not a ‘referent’ in the normal sense which linguists have attached to this term. But to distance

108 Zagorin, ‘Rejoinder to a Postmodernist’, 207.
oneself thus from the habitual structure of reference, to challenge or complicate our common assumptions about it, does not amount to saying that there is nothing beyond language.\textsuperscript{110}

We might see in Pocock's reaction to postmodernism and Zagorin's to Derrida's 'There is no outside-text' not only the way history is written—backwards—but also a de facto defence of Western philosophy, which, as Derrida never tired of pointing out, is predicated on a metaphysics of presence.\textsuperscript{111} This should not surprise given that it is Enlightenment thinking, with its desire to know and control the natural world through an emphasis on geometric spatiality, formulations, mathematical progression, logicality, and incessant classification that underwrites the positive sciences, which in turn provide the model for modern historiography.

That historians find it difficult to escape the notion of presence is apparent in their belief that the past is somehow accessible. As has been suggested, this movement from thinking to believing appears to occur when the signifier is effaced by the signified when thinking about history or in the effacement of the signified by the referent when the latter is merged with the signifier when writing history. We can see this shift occur in Richard Evans's \textit{In Defence of History}.\textsuperscript{112} While Evans seems willing to accept that 'the past no longer exists', that 'it is not "real" in the same sense as the world around us in the present is real', eight pages later he has a volte-face: 'Historians know, historians have always known, that we can only see the past "through a glass, darkly."'\textsuperscript{113} He then not only confirms the past's tangibility—'to attempt to read it as a text is to capture only a small part of its reality'—he also explains how, reminiscent of Pocock, it might be accessed: 'It has to be established through a reading of the documentary and other fragments which the real world of

\textsuperscript{111} Derrida, \textit{Of Grammatology}, 158.
\textsuperscript{113} Evans, \textit{In Defence of History}, 96, 104.
the past has left behind’. Thus, whether the metaphor of access is Evans’s “glass, darkly” or his ‘transparent window’, a lens, as in James Belich’s ‘lenses on prehistory’ (‘a septifocal set of distorting spectacles through which new worlds were perceived’), binoculars, as in Paul Moon’s ‘pair of binoculars’ through which a population morphing into New Zealanders is ‘gradually brought into focus’, or ‘the veil’ Ron Palenski lifts to see ‘what actually happened’—at the moment of effacement the idea called the past changes both in quality and in status. The past can now be seen, even if the view is distant, distorted, dimmed or coloured. Not insignificantly, in this process of transmutation the historian experiences an elevation in status: he or she becomes an interpreter of the past, an intermediary between two worlds—between the present and the past and the living and the dead—as well as becoming a custodian of memory, as Inga Clendinnen has it.

Leopold von Ranke, the person considered responsible for placing documentary analysis at the heart of modern historiographical practice, expressed the historian’s role in somewhat grander terms: ‘For our part, let us try to unveil this holy hieroglyph. And so we shall serve God; so are we also priests and teachers.’ It should be noted, however, that for other devout empiricists, such as Geoffrey Elton, there is no real divide, there is no shift in meaning, subtle or otherwise: ‘The past is always with us and we are for ever part of it—and not only yesterday’s past but also that of the retreating millennia. . . . Like it or not, we live in and with history’.

In his Introduction, Evans frames what he takes to be the challenge posed to the discipline history by postmodernists as a challenge to Western civilisation:

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114 Evans, In Defence of History, 110, 112.
Moreover, the questions they raise — about the possibility or impossibility of attaining objective knowledge, the elusive and relative nature of truth, the difficulties involved in distinguishing between fact and fiction — do not merely challenge historians to re-examine the theory and practice of their own discipline, they also have wider implications that go far beyond the boundaries of academic and university life. In this sense, the problem of how historians approach the acquisition of knowledge about the past, and whether they can ever wholly succeed in this enterprise, symbolizes the much bigger problem of how far society can ever attain the kind of objective certainty about the great issues of our time that can serve as a reliable basis for taking vital decisions for our future in the twenty-first century.\textsuperscript{119}

Having explained that the use of original rather than secondary sources was the innovative practice of German scholars that dated the establishment of history as a subject ‘on a professional or scientific basis to the nineteenth century and not before’, Evans then names those he believes provide the most potent critique of its legitimacy: ‘Perhaps the most far-reaching, comprehensive and explicit challenge to history as a discipline . . . has been mounted by the French linguistic theorist Roland Barthes and the philosopher Jacques Derrida.’\textsuperscript{120} Evans, however, makes a number of errors in his counter-offensive. For example, he misinterprets Barthes’s ‘referential illusion’ as a literal challenge to historians instead of explaining that it refers to the historiographical practice whereby ‘the historian claims to let the referent speak for itself’, by suppressing ‘signs of the I in the discourse’ and by effacing the signified through merging the signifier with the referent.\textsuperscript{121} Likewise, he misinterprets “logocentrism”, reading the neologism invented by Derrida to describe and critique the inherent word-centred nature of Western philosophy and its reliance on the ‘ideal of perfect self-presence, of the immediate possession of meaning’, as a critique of historians, whom, he claims on Derrida’s behalf, are ‘stubbornly “logocentric”—that is, they imagined they were rational beings engaged in a process of discovery. But this too was an illusion’, Evans adds, ‘like all forms of

\textsuperscript{119} Evans, \textit{In Defence of History}, 9.
\textsuperscript{120} Evans, \textit{In Defence of History}, 94.
\textsuperscript{121} Barthes, \textit{The Rustle of Language}, 132.
“logocentrism”.'122 In making the claim, he not only fails to explain the term but also fails to make the connection, as Antony Easthope points out, between logocentrism and the problem of ‘absolute origins’, merely asserting that Derrida ‘rejected the search for origins and causes as futile . . . because there is in this view nothing outside the text anyway.’123

Evans’s protestation at the view ‘that the past was only imagined to be out there’, that ‘it was an empty space waiting to be filled by the historian’, brings to mind Runia’s observation about his colleagues: ‘When you address historians they point to what they write about, and when you address what they write about they take it personally.’124 With good grace, however, Evans acknowledged that Easthope, in his review of In Defence of History, had accurately described as ‘a howler’ his definition of a signified as a thing denoted by a signifier (by which he had meant a referent).125 But he refused to accept as another howler his assertion that Derrida claimed ‘Nothing existed outside language.’126 Yet despite Easthope pointing out that Derrida did not write ‘Rien n’existe hors du language’ (Nothing exists outside language), Evans remained of the view that ‘because Derrida argued that “everything was ‘discourse’ or ‘text’ . . . it seems a reasonable conclusion to draw from this that Derrida argues that nothing existed outside language.’127

While Evans appears to be approving of the positivist/postmodern debate and considers that those on both sides have been forced ‘to shift their ground in crucial respects’, his basic errors appear to be not just mistakes with nomenclature and a rejection of what he terms ‘postmodernist theory’, but also parapraxes that suggest an unconscious desire to hypostatize the past, a desire apparently strong enough to

122 Derrida, ‘Deconstruction and the Other’, 115; Evans, In Defence of History, 94.
125 Easthope, review of Richard J. Evans, In Defence of History, 563; Evans, In Defence of History, 95. As Easthope added, while ‘a howler’, it is ‘a common one which gets regularly crossed out in undergraduate essays for courses in theory.’
126 Easthope, review of Evans, In Defence of History, 563; Evans, In Defence of History, 95, 293.
127 Evans, In Defence of History, 293.
override his acknowledgment that ‘the past . . . is no longer with us.’ Thus the deeper issue appears to be that Evans is unwilling or unable to accept that history is nothing other than a discourse or to problematise the past as its faux exoteric. Hence, although apparently conflicted about what the past is, Evans, ultimately, appears to regard it as a form of reality ‘but at a slight remove’ from ‘present reality [that] can be felt and experienced by our senses’—a ‘classic empiricist assumption’, according to Easthope, ‘that would be disputed by almost every major philosopher who has written in this century.’

It is unsurprising, then, that Easthope concludes his review with the following comments: ‘In Defence of History was well received by some London reviewers on grounds that it saw off the invading hordes of postmodernists. It is depressing to think that this uninformed yet totally self-confident work of naïve provincialism should come from close to the heartlands of English culture.’

In his strident attack on postmodernism, Keith Windschuttle, an Australian historian and writer, recycles the old chestnut of linguistic idealism by opining that Certeau, ‘the most radical’ of all French theorists’, subscribes ‘to the thesis that we have access only to our language and not to any real, outside world’, despite Certeau having lived in real cities (Geneva, Paris, Lyon, San Diego) and presumably having slept in real beds rather than on alphabetical ‘H’s. Like others before him, Windschuttle also suggests that Derrida’s ‘famous aphorism’—“There is nothing outside the text”—means that ‘because we are locked within a system of language . . .

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130 Easthope, review of Evans, In Defence of History, 566; Richard Evans, Professor of Modern History at Cambridge, has a general research interest in Germany history since the mid-nineteenth century, including the Third Reich. Evans was an expert witness in the David Irving versus Penguin Books Limited and Deborah Lipstadt trial, which commenced in the High Court of Justice, London, on 11 January 2000.
we have no grounds for knowing anything that exists outside this system. "What one calls real life", according to Derrida, is itself a text. Hence, it follows that all we have access to are texts.'

Lawrence Stone, invoked by Evans, seems to have been similarly mistaken: 'If there is nothing outside of the text . . . then history as we have known it collapses altogether, and fact and fiction become indistinguishable from one another.'

Spiegel, likewise, appears troubled in the quote selected by Evans to support his position: 'If texts — documents, literary works, whatever — do not transparently reflect reality, but only other texts, then historical study can scarcely be distinguished from literary study, and the “past” dissolves into literature.'

Evans, however, fails to inform his readers that this sentence was more a description than a position and was part of Spiegel's broader argument in which she was putting into question the historian's need to rely on the notion of the past as being extra-textual:

If one of the major moves in post-structuralist thought has been to displace the controlling metaphor of historical evidence from one of reflection to one of mediation (that is, has been a shift from the notion that texts and documents transparently reflect past realities, as positivism believed, to one in which the past is captured only in the mediated form preserved for us in language), then we need to think carefully about how we understand meditation and how that understanding affects our practice.

While Stone also holds the view that 'the “linguistic turn” in history has great merits', provided it does not define 'reality . . . purely as language', Elton would have none of it or those who lit 'the beacons along this dangerous road'. In his mind it was a road leading nowhere used by 'theory-mongers', including Saussure, Heidegger, Barthes, Derrida and Foucault. 'German philosophy and French esprit',

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134 Evans, In Defence of History, 96; Spiegel, 'History and Post-Modernism, IV', 197.
136 Stone, 'History and Post-Modernism, III', 190; Elton, Return to Essentials, 28.
137 Elton, Return to Essentials, 41.
he warns, is ‘a dangerous cocktail because while the former may be incomprehensible it looks wise, and the latter demonstrates that the absurd always sounds better in French.’ Elton thought these theorists were adolescent, self-centred, deluded. Their adherence to ‘total relativism’, he lectures, negates ‘one of the possible uses of history’, ‘to assist in that growing-up process, by reminding the individual that he or she is very far from being the centre of the universe. . . . For the historian is in the first place concerned with the people of the past — with their experiences, thoughts and actions — and not with people of the present’. Like Evans, Elton, in these lectures, was fighting for history’s survival. ‘Certainly, we are fighting for the lives of innocent young people beset by devilish tempters who claim to offer higher forms of thought and deeper truths and insights — the intellectual equivalent of crack, in fact.’ What was needed was not a ‘gentle or modest bow’ pointed in the direction of the theorists but ‘a sufficient shield against the cancerous radiation that comes from the forehead of Derrida and Foucault’.

Gordon Wood gives a sense of just how deeply these views about postmodernism remain an integral part of the history community’s defence of its empirical praxis. The ‘new theories’, he writes, which ‘historians in the 1980s began importing into their cultural history . . . especially those of French intellectuals, such as Jacques Derrida and Michel Foucault . . . tended to emphasize the textual construction of reality’. Like Windschuttle, Wood does not explain how reality could be created from text. However, in pointing out the ‘devastating implications for historians’ of such theories, he also made it clear that creating reality out of texts is what certain historians think they do: ‘If historians began doubting that there was an objective past reality that they were trying to recover . . . then they . . . were actually undermining the ground for any sort of historical reconstruction at all.’

138 Elton, Return to Essentials, 28.
139 Elton, Return to Essentials, 43.
140 Elton, Return to Essentials, 41.
141 Elton, Return to Essentials, 41.
143 Wood, The Purpose of the Past, 5.
All of which begs the question as to why historians think that they can access the past, even through documentation, when it is clear that ‘the past does not exist independently of the historian as is proven by the simple fact that the better the work of a historian is, the less it could have been written by another historian’?\(^1\)\(^4\)\(^4\) Indeed, one wonders why there is anxiety about distinguishing fact from fiction when that has been a matter of debate since Aristotle’s *Poetics* (c.350 BCE), and why there is concern about the past dissolving into literature, when, until the nineteenth century, writing the past was considered a purely literary endeavour.

**Débat sur le roman**

The anxiety that undergirds the defence of positive meaning is apparent in Georg Iggers’ discussion, ‘The “Linguistic Turn”: The End of History as a Scholarly Discipline?’\(^1\)\(^4\)\(^5\) As with Evans’s critique of postmodernism, what appears to lie behind Iggers’ targeting of the linguistic turn in general and Michel Foucault in particular is the question of relativism and the possibility of a world in which ethical meaning is indeterminate—behind which again lies the lodestar of the Holocaust, as well, no doubt, as Iggers’ childhood experience of having to flee the Nazis.\(^1\)\(^6\) In essence, Iggers’ principal concern is that we can no longer be sure that the Holocaust occurred if we accept the theories of Barthes, Derrida, and Lyotard,

\(^{144}\) Runia, ‘Spots of Time’, 306.

\(^{145}\) Georg G. Iggers, *Historiography in the Twentieth Century: From Scientific Objectivity to the Postmodern Challenge* (Hanover: Wesleyan University Press, 1997), 118-133. The popularisation, though not invention, of the term ‘the linguistic turn’ is generally accredited to Richard Rorty (ed.), *The Linguistic Turn: Essays in Philosophical Method* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1967), and suggests a turn towards the various modes of thought—structuralism, semiotics, poststructuralism, deconstruction—that were inspired by Saussurean linguistic theory and influenced various academic disciplines around the world from the 1960s onwards. In her 2009 presidential address to the American Historical Society, Gabrielle Spiegel described ‘the “linguistic turn”’ as ‘the belief that language is the constitutive agent of human consciousness and the social production of meaning, and that our apprehension of the world, both past and present, arrives only through the lens of language’s pre-coded perceptions.’ This, she noted, was ‘a significant challenge beginning in the late 1960s and 1970s’ to the ‘traditional understanding of the nature, epistemological grounding, truth-value, and goals of historical research’ that historians could produce ‘some authentic knowledge of the dead “other”’ (Spiegel, ‘The Task of the Historian’, 1).

whom, he claims, have gone beyond ‘Saussurean linguistic theory’ and asserted that ‘the text has no reference to an external reality, but is contained within itself’.147 Or, as he put it eleven years later: ‘The poststructuralist and postmodernist theorists saw in language an autonomous system not dependent on reality but in fact constructing reality.’148 The deeper implication, also echoing Evans’s concern, is that these radical theorists threaten Enlightenment principles that seek to harness science and technology for the betterment of all mankind by framing Enlightenment thinking, with ‘its distorted view of reason’, as having constructed a new myth that science was omnipotent.149 ‘This characterization of the Enlightenment’, writes Iggers, ‘later reiterated by Foucault, Derrida, and Lyotard, in my view represents a gross distortion’, one that could lead to ‘barbarism’.150

However, in order to drive home his argument, Iggers singled out Foucault:

Linguistic analysis has proven to be an important supplementary tool in recent studies of political, social, and cultural history. Yet in general, although the historians with whom we have dealt in this chapter have emphasized the impact of language, rhetoric, and symbolic behavior on political and social consciousness and action, the extreme position that ‘reality does not exist, that only language exists’ (Foucault)52 has been shared by few.151

Endnote 52 in this quote refers the reader to Art Berman’s book, From the New Criticism to Deconstruction, where, at page 183, a fuller version of the offending text, and a note as to where it can be found, appear: ‘In an interview recorded in Tel Quel at about the time when he was writing The Order of Things, Foucault stated, “A number of us, I think, including myself, consider that reality does not exist, that only language exists”’ (qtd. in Cooper 28).152 Sounding rather like Iggers would nine years later, Berman concludes: ‘Because of the prompt availability of his work in

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147 Iggers, Historiography in the Twentieth Century, 126, 121.
149 Iggers, Historiography in the Twentieth Century, 146.
150 Iggers, Historiography in the Twentieth Century, 146-7.
151 Iggers, Historiography in the Twentieth Century, 133.
152 Art Berman, From the New Criticism to Deconstruction: The Reception of Structuralism and Post-Structuralism (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1988), 183.
translation, Foucault’s influence in Anglo-American literary criticism has been to reinforce the early structuralist concepts of language as an autonomous system, of the individual as constituted by language, and of language as severed from any reality beyond that which it itself creates. His writings have also served as a transition to, rather than the source of, the most radical consequences of such beliefs.”

Having been referred to page 28 of Barry Cooper’s *Michel Foucault*, the reader not only finds a fuller version of the quotation—“we live in a world of signs and of language and that, I think, is precisely the problem . . . a number of us, I think, including myself, consider that reality does not exist, that only language exists and what we talk about is language; we talk within language, and so on”—but is referred on yet again, by way of endnote 48, to page 45 of an article in the 17th edition of *Tel Quel*.154 This article, however, turns out not to be an interview of Foucault, as Berman has it, but a panel discussion, ‘Débat sur le roman’ (Debate on the novel), chaired by Foucault that took place at Cerisy-la-Salle, Normandy, in September 1963 as part of a conference organised by *Tel Quel* to discuss the *nouveau roman* (the new novel).155 The panel, which contained a number of prominent *nouveaux romanciers* (new novel authors), was concerned largely with issues raised by the *nouveau roman* itself and particularly with the writerly techniques employed by Alain Robbe-Grillet, its pioneer.156 Had Iggers and Berman engaged with the debate instead of

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153 Berman, *From the New Criticism to Deconstruction*, 185; *Tel Quel* was a literary magazine founded in Paris by a small group of ‘relatively unknown writers in their mid-twenties’, when the Algerian War was at its height. Over the next two decades it gathered ‘under its aegis an impressive constellation of names that stand for what is most noteworthy and provocative in French intellectual thought and writing’ (Danielle Marx-Scouras, ‘Requiem for the Postwar Years: The Rise of *Tel Quel*, *The French Review*, 64/3 [1991], 407-8). *Tel Quel* published a total of 94 issues, at the rate of four per year, until it ceased publication in 1982 (Patrick ffrench and Roland-François Lack, *The Tel Quel Reader* [London: Routledge, 1998], 1).
155 Michel Foucault and others, ‘Débat sur le roman’, *Tel Quel*, 17 (1964) 13-54.
156 The panel was comprised of: Michel Foucault (Chair), Gilbert Amy (composer and conductor), Jean-Louis Baudry (film theorist), Marie-Jeanne Durry (professor of literature), Jean Pierre Faye (*nouveau romancier* and *Tel Quel* co-founder), Maurice de Gandillac (philosopher), Claude Ollier (*nouveau romancier*), Marcellin Pleynet (*nouveau romancier* and co-founder of *Tel Quel*), Maurice Roche (novelist and composer), Edoardo Sanguineti, (poet, critic, essayist, politician, professor of
relying on a quote three times removed from its source to denounce Foucault, they would have encountered a scintillating and comprehensive discussion not about the denial of reality but about the difficulties of representing reality in text and the role of metaphor in that process.

Foucault began the panel discussion by referring to a paper, ‘Logique de la fiction’ (Logic of fiction), Philippe Sollers, one of Tel Quel’s founders, had presented the previous day—a ‘beautiful text’ as Foucault described it. Sollers’ paper had begun with an extract from H. G. Wells’s short story, ‘The Door in the Wall’, which explored the relationship between reality and the imagination, juxtaposing the constraints of the former with the possibilities of the latter. The extract reads: “It was wonderful to me, because the pages of that book were not pictures, you understand, but realities.” Sollers’ paper was concerned particularly with the effects of literature on impressions of reality, not the least of which was the ‘doubling’ effect of texts, or, as Foucault re-stated Sollers’ observation, that ‘all works of art have a double’, which, in the case of a literary work, is the space for thought produced by ‘the positivity of language’. Sollers began his paper as follows:

I am imagining the beginning of a book: the sentences, with an unusual presence, surprising the most mature reader. He was opening this volume with the usual biases, expecting to confirm, here again, his secret prejudices against their author. Yet, he searches not only in vain for the expected quirks of the writer in question, his faults and qualities … but also [for] the reference to a fiction trying to pass itself off as reality (a dubious reality, ambiguous perhaps, but one subjected in the end to the convention of presenting that which is written as being something external [to it].

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158 H. G. Wells, The Door in the Wall and Other Stories (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Library, 1996, first published 1911).
161 Sollers, ‘Logique de la fiction’, 3. The original reads as follows: ‘J’imagine le début d’un livre: les phrases, d’une présence inaccoutumée, surprènnent le lecteur le plus averti. Pourtant, c’est en vain qu’il cherche non seulement les manies attendues de l’écrivain en question, ses défauts et ses qualités … mais
In his introduction to the debate, Foucault compared the surrealists with the members of the *Tel Quel* group, suggesting that the former were more concerned with the unconscious, with psychology, and used language as ‘an instrument of access or surface of reflection for their experiments’, whereas the latter were more interested ‘in the realm of thought’, and that Sollers’ language was ‘the thick space within which and inside which those experiments are conducted.’

It was at this point that Foucault, in reference to Sollers’ work, floated an important question for the panel: ‘isn’t a literary work, a book, that path within language [*cette trajectoire dans le volume du langage*] that both doubles it and gives the appearance within it of a unique space, at once both empty and full, which is that of thought?’ That challenging place, Foucault suggested, was located in exactly the same place as it was for ‘current philosophy’, in what might be termed the ‘intermediary’, in the ‘and, between to think and to speak’.

Of specific issue for the panellists was how realism could be effected *within* the novel. Could it be achieved more successfully with the elaborate use of metaphor in the Proustean-Joycean sense, or through an absence of metaphor in the manner of Roussel and Kafka, and of Robbe-Grillet? For one member of the public audience, the attempts to create realism in the new novel produced an impression of unreality, or, in Robbe-Grillet’s novels, ‘a “flat” impression’ as if ‘everything is on the same level’, because, the speaker suggested, the ‘nouveaux romanciers . . . make us live only in time or only in space.’ This, according to Jean Pierre Faye, was not by accident. In attempting to remove the signified from the novelistic universe, Robbe-Grillet had hoped to neutralise the sign and thereby ‘dehumanise the world of things’, to make it uncomfortable for man. Foucault thought that Robbe-Grillet had not made the

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metaphor ‘totally “taboo”, in the sense that he saw it as a certain link between the writing subject and the world’, whereas the freedom Sollers gave back to the metaphor had led to a rediscovery that ‘figures of speech can only be understood from language and not from the world.’

The Italian, Edoardo Sanguineti, put forward the idea that ‘the metaphor is the only historical aspect of language’, and for him, in the end, ‘metaphor is language.’ He added that ‘language is never innocent’, whether we make choices about what we use, metaphor or allegory, or use what we are given. On his view, Robbe-Grillet produced ‘an allegory of nothing’, something ‘which has no meaning that can be related to the real. Dehumanisation, rejection of metaphor is the rejection of history’, he added. Indeed, for Sanguineti, metaphor had become so dominant that it supported our very idea of history: ‘Beneath the modern conception of history as perpetual flux one finds the great fundamental image of water: everything flows. . . . Reality can always be turned into metaphor.’

It was at this point that Marcelin Pleynet asked Sanguineti three questions: ‘What is this reality? What distinction do you make between this world of signs and language? What is this reality that is not a language?’ In response, Sanguineti attempted to explain what he meant by referring to a metaphor used earlier in the debate: ‘“the head of the train”.’ If it were expurgated from language as was Robbe-Grillet’s wont, then, he intimated, not only might the image be lost but also the social context of which it is a part, ‘the only reality I know’. That, to Pleynet, was incomprehensible once reality had been introduced into language. As he put it: ‘I would indeed like to know how those who ask themselves questions about reality

169 Sanguineti, ‘Débat sur le roman’, 44.
170 Sanguineti, ‘Débat sur le roman’, 42.
171 Sanguineti, ‘Débat sur le roman’, 44.
172 Marcelin Pleynet, ‘Débat sur le roman’, 44.
173 Sanguineti, ‘Débat sur le roman’, 45, 43.
manage to find it elsewhere other than in language. . . . If there is a reality outside of language, I would really like to know where it expresses itself, how it expresses itself and where I will find it."175 Another panellist, Marie-Jeanne Durry, suggested that a deaf and dumb person might have no impression of reality.176 Foucault considered that irrelevant 'because in spite of everything, we live in a world of signs and of language', which, he thought, was 'precisely the problem. Pleynet thinks that, and I think a certain number of us, myself after all, that reality does not exist, that only language exists and that what we are speaking about is language, we are speaking inside language, etc. I think that, for Sanguineti, language is a socio-historical phenomenon, within which individual choices can be made, choices which refer back to a history, a style, etc.'177 This central problem of the metaphor, Foucault thought, was related to the very status given to the language to which it was bound.178 Indeed, he thought that the 'word “reality”', which had been bounced in various directions during the discussion, was perhaps not the one they should have used, for, as he put it rhetorically, 'from the moment someone writes as a writer, is his reality comparable to daily reality, to daily life?'179 This problem of reality, then, Foucault concluded, occurs within 'an aesthetic of perception' and that the problem for those who write for Tel Quel was that 'the aesthetics of language is internal to language.'180

Thus the centrepiece of this discussion was not Foucault's so-called denial of reality, as might be assumed from Iggers and Berman's comments, but the novel, the various forms it had taken, how reality is expressed within it, and, more broadly, the

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175 Pleynet, 'Débat sur le roman', 45.
176 Marie-Jeanne Durry, 'Débat sur le roman', 45.
177 Foucault, 'Débat sur le roman', 45. The original reads as follows: Je crois que l'exemple du sourd-muet n'est tout de même pas pertinent parce que, malgré tout, nous vivons dans un monde de signes et de langage, c'est précisément cela, je crois, le problème. Pleynet considère, et un certain nombre, je crois, d'entre nous, moi même après tout, que la réalité n'existe pas, qu'il n'existe que le langage et ce dont nous parlons c'est du langage, nous parlons à l'intérieur du langage, etc. Je crois que, pour Sanguineti, le langage est un phénomé historique, social, dans lequel les choix individuels peuvent s'opérer, choix qui renvoient à une histoire, choix qui renvoient à un style, etc.)
178 Foucault, 'Débat sur le roman', 48.
179 Foucault, 'Débat sur le roman', 50.
180 Foucault, 'Débat sur le roman', 51.
representation of the real *within* language. At its most animated, the discussion centred on the intersection of the novel and reality, how language expresses the real, and the role of metaphor and analogy when reality and literature interface. It was a matter raised by Faye early in the debate when he quoted from an article, ‘Science and the real outside world’, by the physicist Max Planck, which contains a critique of scientific positivism. “If you limit yourself to the description of actual experiences”, writes Planck, “and furthermore, if you glory in it . . . that is what characterises positivism”: in other words, the world is only my description [of it]. “Thus,” says Planck, “the table is nothing more than the sum of perceptions that we associate with the word *table*. From that point of view, the question of knowing what a table is in reality makes no sense.” And further on, in another passage, he tells us: “Positivism rejects the hypothesis that our perceptions inform us of something else which lies behind and is distinguishable from them.”

This, in the end, turned out to be the central point of the debate: can reality be incorporated figuratively into language, as Sanguineti argued, or is there no reality for the writer beyond language, the position taken by Pleynet, supported by Foucault, because language is that reality? In other words, can there be an outside to a text’s textuality when the text itself is its own self-contained world? At a moment of great political and intellectual upheaval in France, Foucault was chairing a sizeable group of panellists, all eminent in their field, who, with their focus on *le nouveau roman*, were inquiring into the role played by language in understanding not denying the socio-political realities of the day. Indeed, according to Danielle Marx-Scouras, *Tel Quel*’s dedication to extricating ‘literature from both its metaphysical and ideological overtones’ and critically examining ‘its powers, independently of any particular ideology or political context’, would lead to ‘a re-evaluation of the postwar notions of history and man’. As she noted: ‘If history had been a revolutionary concept in the nineteenth century and had become a watchword for an entire generation of writers and intellectuals who came of age in

182 Marx-Scouras, ‘Requiem for the Postwar Years: The Rise of *Tel Quel*’, 410-11.
the 1930s and into prominence in the postwar years, this role was now conferred upon language (Foucault, “Débat sur la poésie” 77).183

Thus Iggers and Berman’s respective suggestions that Foucault was denying reality and severing language from reality appears to exemplify différance as play, where the positive or merely descriptive meaning of the surface text gives little hint of the powerful tidal currents on which it rides and which may eventually capsize it. In this regard, it is interesting to note that in his 2008 discussion of the same question, Iggers replaced the Foucault quote with, as he called it, Derrida’s ‘oft-cited formulation . . . “there is nothing outside the text”’.184

Given the problematic nature of the past with which historians continually grapple—an incorporeal referent lying somewhere beyond but also founding their discourse—Frank Ankersmit’s description of the language/reality divide offers, perhaps, a helpful way of thinking about this fundamental contradiction:

Does not both the language of the novelist and the historian give us the illusion of a reality, either fictitious or genuine? More important still . . . the work of art, that is to say, the language of the artist, is not a mimetic reproduction of reality but a replacement or substitute for it. Language and art are not situated opposite reality but are themselves a pseudo-reality and are therefore situated within reality.185

No matter, then, how we conceptualise the language/reality dichotomy, whether as one divided from the other, or as one situated within the other, it is at the boundary of thought and experience that the two worlds collide, in that ‘distance or gap or non-coincidence between reality and representation’ where a confusion of signs occurs, where slippage in meaning takes place, and where différance is continuously at work.186 It is here that language mediates between consciousness, the material

183 Marx-Scouras, ‘Requiem for the Postwar Years: The Rise of Tel Quel’, 412.
184 Iggers and Wang, A Global History of Modern Historiography, 304.
186 Easthope, review of Richard J. Evans, In Defence of History, 564.
world and our ideas, and where, unavoidably, given the nature of signification, multiple meanings arise and subside, where what is understood is not necessarily what was meant, and where what is meant is not necessarily what will be understood.\textsuperscript{187} The border between these worlds, like any border region, is a place of liminality, instability, and uncertainty, and yet it is also a thinking space, as Foucault suggested, a ‘thick space’ of great imaginative possibility, and, at times, even greater mischief.\textsuperscript{188} ‘The border’, wrote Derrida, is where ‘the most disconcerting problems of topology get posed. . . . It is always risky, particularly for the historian, to assign to whatever happens on the borderline, to whatever happens between sites, the taking-place of a determinable event.’\textsuperscript{189}


\textsuperscript{188} Foucault, ‘Débat sur le roman’, 13.

CHAPTER THREE
Problematising the text

The central problematic for historians is the aporetic nature of the past, which, like time, both is (as a convention) and is not (as a materiality). The desire to resolve this aporia—most notably by positing the past as an accessible exoteric of historical discourse—informs the entire economy of history writing, its theories and conventions, its politics and praxis, and, above all, its fake performativity. That history is text with no outside is perhaps no better illustrated than by the need that arose in 1850 when, after 700 years, history, ‘the subject of the future’, first became an academic discipline at Oxford, charged, as Richard Southern has it, with the ‘task of restoring the University to the nation’ after a decade of ‘endless dogmatic wrangles’. With no ‘“standard author”’ and only a few titles available apart from ancient texts, a body of reference work urgently needed writing, for, without it, the History School had little modern history to teach, to say nothing of its reputation of “an easy School for rich men” to overcome.

This chapter will be concerned primarily with this aporia and its significance for the ontological and epistemological foundations of contemporary historiographical practice. Central to this discussion will be ‘the reality effect’, the principal organising mechanism on which this praxis relies, and which, by domesticating transcendental signifiers or signifieds, appears to overcome the aporia of the past. Also under discussion will be the question of the origin, the Cogito as analogue of history, and the ambiguities of temporality and facticity.

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2 Southern, History and Historians, 91, 93. Southern lists the authors of ‘this ragged, and by 1850, largely antiquated army of texts’, as Smollett, Hume, Robertson, Lingard, Gibbon, Hallam, Guizot and Ranke, with Lingard’s Annals of England being the major text for English History (History and Historians, 93, 92). As Southern explained, the answer to the paucity of texts was found in the study of constitutional history because it was a ‘subject both severe and secular’ and hence soon became ‘firmly established as the central theme of the Oxford History School’ (History and Historians, 94). Modern history here refers to any history from ancient to contemporary history.
Gabrielle Spiegel posed this aporia as follows: ‘No historian, even of a positive stripe, would argue that history is present to us in any but textual form. . . . The problem, of course, is not whether there is a past “out there” . . . but how we reach it and what procedures permit us to do so in ways that respect its integrity.' Her answer is to collapse text and context by placing text-objects (source documents) in their socio-political setting in order to uncover their suppressed meanings and implied purposes, despite, as she acknowledges, a ‘recourse to history as “reality”’ for the purpose of adjudicating meaning looking ‘like an exercise undertaken backwards.’

As Spiegel explains in relation to the *Pseudo-Turpin Chronicle*, ‘the profound transformation in discursive behaviour that it inaugurates can only be understood in the light of a social and political context wholly absent from the body of the text itself, a context which nonetheless determines its significance. It is on the basis of this extratextual history alone that we can begin to appreciate not only the fact of discursive change, but the reasons for it.’ The problem with this proposal, however, is that a ‘text’s social site’ cannot be located ‘within a highly particularized and localized social environment’ because ‘history as “reality”’ is nothing more than texts amassed by historians, as Spiegel herself implies: ‘History as given chronicle or unproblematic “truth” simply does not exist and so cannot serve as a master narrative for criticism into which the enigmatic codes of literary discourse can be transcoded in clear.’

In other words, even though Spiegel acknowledges that there can be no outside to the discourse of history, she still admits an ‘extra-textual reality’ in distinguishing between ‘our access to the past’ (texts) and ‘the past itself’ (the social sites of texts), not only because her relational praxis requires it but also because there can be no history without the past positioned beyond its discourse. Without an exoteric, the consequences, according to Lawrence Stone, are bleak.

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4 Gabrielle M. Spiegel, “Historicism, and the Social Logic of the Text in the Middle Ages”, *Speculum* 65/1 (1990), 76.
indeed: if 'there is nothing besides the text, each one wide open to personal interpretation irrespective of the intentions of the author', then 'texts become a mere hall of mirrors reflecting nothing but each other, and throwing no light upon the “truth”, which does not exist.' Whether or not there is an outside to language is, of course, the problematic posed by Marcelin Pleynet at Cerisy in 1963: is a novel its own reality, or can reality, 'the social context in which I live', as Edoardo Sanguineti described it, be imported into its text by way of metaphor? In 1977, Roland Barthes added a further dimension to the debate when he noted 'that power is the parasite of . . . language', and, 'unfortunately', that 'human language has no exterior: there is no exit.'

For historians, however, there is a further remove: not only is language removed from the real, 'the now' is another remove from 'the no-longer-now'. This double remove is the unavoidable consequence of the idea of history being dependent on the sign's iterability. That is, the totality of history, that which pre-exists its particulars (histories) examined by historians, cannot be conceptualised before the sign is put into play, just as 'the transcendental gesture' made possible by the sign is irreducible 'to that sign at any given manifestation.' This, in relation to the Cogito, is what Jacques Derrida called 'the (mad) project of exceeding the total in order to think it'. Thus, while the past is commonly treated as existing outside the text as an infinite totality fully present to itself, it exists only within the text where its existence—along with its 'aporetic tension: the impossible yet necessary condition of possibility'—is reproduced incessantly by the spinning jenny of signification.

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10 Marcelin Pleynet and Edoardo Sanguineti, Michel Foucault and others, 'Débat sur le roman', Tel Quel, 17 (1964), 45.
15 Jenkins, Why History?, 87.
is this process and this site, as Keith Jenkins has it, that produces ‘the “myth” of the realization of full presence’ and ‘enables us to think the transcendental gesture, yet that gesture is not reducible to that sign at any given manifestation.’

In this context, *history* as a transcendental gesture is only thinkable at the level of the iterability of the sign (*particular* histories) yet it is also irreducible to it in that there will always be an infinite excess, an interminable gap and play between the ideality of history *per se* (the genus) and any specific history (species). In that sense, historical discourse *is* *différance*, at once an idealised gesture *and* iterable, i.e. subject to different inscriptions – forever.

This vicious circle—in which the idea of history produces the discourse it purports to precede but which it cannot do without—returns us to the question of the origin without which there can be no history. However, just as there is no outside to history, origins also have no extratextual existence, and, as with history, are produced contemporaneously ‘with the act of recitation’, not in the space between the material artifact and its immaterial social site, as Spiegel suggests, but in the dreaming space of *s’entendre-parler*, in supplementarity, and in the ‘ephemeral temporality inhabiting the space between the “I have heard” and the “you will hear”’.

**Problematising the origin**

Didier Maleuvre captured the aporetic nature of the origin when he wrote: ‘In the beginning was no beginning, and no end.’ We might amplify Maleuvre by saying that in the beginning is desire in need of a sign, because the beginning has not yet

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begun or has always already departed. Indeed, the beginning cannot begin until the sign stands in its place. Derrida puts it like this:

The concept of origin or nature is nothing but the myth of addition, of supplementarity annulled by being purely additive. It is the myth of the effacement of the trace, that is to say of an originary differance that is neither absence nor presence, neither negative nor positive. Originary differance is supplementarity as structure…

Writing is one of the representatives of the trace in general, it is not the trace itself. The trace itself does not exist.20

While our desire for origins might appear to be excessive, even irrational, without originary meaning historians cannot create history. Put alternatively, just as historicity, the idea of history, is a necessary prerequisite for imagining history itself, so the idea of the origin is a necessary prerequisite for imagining the past, for without origins histories cannot announce their meaning-intention, commence their narrations, or advance their propositions. Origins, in other words, perform a vital discursive function. They clean the slate. They set up paradigmatic limits. They usher in teleologies and new discursive structures in which différance continues its play between presence and absence. Origins ground ideas of historical unity, totality and progression. They prevent a regress of meaning as well as pointing towards the horizon, which doubles as history’s end and new becoming. Yet, as an “idealising” metaphor’, the origin, in its inaugurating function, while appearing to precede and to be superior to the text that describes and explains it, is both subsequent to and dependent upon it.21

Origins, then, like history, are the product of différance, their ‘existence’ opened up as possibility, their ‘presence’ wholly reliant on the sign’s iterability to overcome their absence. Just as an effect may be more accurately described as the origin of the

cause, so the search for origins always begins at the end—at the site of the origin’s becoming: the text. Thus history is always retroactive, the search for its origins always undertaken from the end-point of effect. To initiate this reversal, historians must ‘travel’ backwards in search of origins in order to design their dialectical progressions, to plot their forward trajectories, which lead inexorably back to the moment of composition. ‘The historian is the man who has reversed Time’, wrote Barthes, ‘who turns back to the place of the dead and recommences their life in a clear and useful direction; he is the demiurge who links what was scattered, discontinuous, incomprehensible’ and ‘weaves together the thread of all lives’ which he ‘leads while walking backwards’.22 Hence origins are never originary. Viciously circular, they are the product of a kind of retro-causation or backwards causality in that they are established temporally subsequent to but posited as existing prior to that which temporally and causally follows.23 Origins exist intratextually and function not by authorisation of an extratextual reality but in agreement with ‘the reality effect’.24 That is why they belong more correctly to metaphysical discourse and not to representational discourse.

The following section, an examination of Derrida’s critique of the attempt by Michel Foucault to historicise the moment when, he believed, unreason (madness) was expelled from its dialogic relationship with reason, highlights the problem of the origin—it can never be originary because it is produced by différance—and, by extension, the problem of writing history when history relies on the groundless ground of nonexistent origins.

**The madness of the Cogito**

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In his 1961 Preface to what became known as *History of Madness*, Foucault summarised his project’s aim as follows: ‘To try to recapture, in history, this degree zero of the history of madness, when it was undifferentiated experience, the still undivided experience of the division itself.’

Foundational to this aim was Foucault’s belief that somewhere between Michel de Montaigne (1533-1592) and René Descartes (1596-1650), rationalism so came to dominate Western thought that the undifferentiated dialogue that had existed between reason and unreason, when madness was part of the sceptical tradition, was replaced by the rational language of psychiatry, ‘a monologue by reason about madness’, and driven underground. Hence Foucault’s ‘intention was not to write the history of that language, but rather draw up the archaeology of that silence.’ That appeared possible to Foucault because he believed that he had located the originary moments when reason and unreason, the sane and insane, had undergone, respectively, intellectual and physical separation: the formulation of René Descartes’ Cogito (1637/1641) in *Discourse on Method* and *The Meditations* and the establishment in 1656 by royal decree of the former leprosarium, Hôpital Général, as a place of confinement for the Parisian ‘asocial’—the poor, the criminal, the aged and unemployed—and where, by 1662, approximately 6,000 of Paris’s population of 600,000 were being fed and lodged. By the time the concept of confinement had

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25 Michel Foucault, *History of Madness*, trans. Jonathan Murphy and Jean Khalfa (London: Routledge, 2006), xxvii. *History of Madness* was first published in 1961 as *Folie et Déraison. Histoire de la folie à l’âge classique (Madness and Unreason. History of Madness in the Classical Age)*. This was the Paris publication of Foucault’s Thèse d’État, which, three years later, was abridged and republished in French, with some of the excluded material reintroduced by Foucault for the 1965 English publication, *Madness and Civilization: A History of Insanity in the Age of Reason*. A second French edition was published in 1972, this time with the complete original text and the original subtitle as the main title: *Histoire de la folie à l’âge classique*. For this edition, Foucault replaced the nine-page preface of his 1961 Edition, in which he had outlined his plans to write the history of madness following its separation from reason in the ‘classical age’ (seventeenth century), with a two-and-a-half page preface in which he expressed the hope that his monograph would speak for itself and ‘not be doubled by that first simulacrum of itself which is a preface’ (*History of Madness*, xxxviii).


spread across France, then much of Europe, and, 150 years later, the mad, who ‘had been caught up in this great proscription of idleness’, had replaced the poor in what by then were asylums, the social separation of reason from unreason was complete.\(^{29}\) According to Foucault, it was now considered ‘rational, even necessary that these places be filled with the insane’.\(^ {30}\)

At the beginning of Chapter II of *History of Madness*, ‘The Great Confinement’, in the three pages he wished he had expurgated, Foucault concluded that Descartes, in his journey ‘on the methodical path of doubt’ to his famously certain Cogito—‘I think, therefore I am’ *Cogito, ergo sum* or *Je pense, donc je suis* of ‘Discourse 4’ of *Discourse on Method*, and ‘I am, I exist’ *Ego sum, ego existo* or *Je suis, j’existe* of the ‘Second Meditation’ of *The Meditations*—overcame ‘the possibility of his own madness’ not by using rational thought to explain the errors arising from dreams and illusions, such as conceptual relativity, but by excluding madness from rational thought.\(^ {31}\) It was at that moment, Foucault argued, that madness was ‘banished’ from public view and ‘placed in a zone of exclusion’ where it would no longer be ‘a peril lurking in the domain [of reason] where the thinking subject holds rights over truth.’\(^ {32}\) Whereas up until the sixteenth century reason and unreason had co-existed, with the latter as ‘a sort of open wound’ and reminder that all thought could be ‘haunted by the ghost of unreason’, with the advent of the Cogito a sea change occurred.\(^ {33}\) As Foucault explained it: ‘While *man* can still go mad, *thought*, as the sovereign exercise carried out by a subject seeking truth, can no longer be devoid of reason.’\(^ {34}\)

\(^{29}\) Foucault, *History of Madness*, 71.

\(^{30}\) Foucault, *History of Madness*, 71.

\(^{31}\) Foucault, *History of Madness*, 44-5. Examples of conceptual relativity include large objects appearing to be much smaller at a distance than when they are up close, and an oar appearing to refract at a different angle when it enters the water; Descartes, *Discourse on Method and the Meditations*, 53-4, 103, 105.

\(^{32}\) Foucault, *History of Madness*, 46.

\(^{33}\) Foucault, *History of Madness*, 46.

\(^{34}\) Foucault, *History of Madness*, 47.
The thesis was a compelling one, with its publication happily coinciding with ‘the objectives of the antipsychiatry movement’ whose members, like Foucault, believed that ‘madness had a history because it “was” a history: the history of a voyage, a passage, a situation, and not an illness.’ Among the prominent members of that movement was Ronald Laing, the Scottish psychiatrist and author, who gave *Madness and Civilization* the following commendation in his reader’s report for Tavistock Publications: ‘This is quite an exceptional book of very high calibre – brilliantly written, intellectually rigorous, and with a thesis that thoroughly shakes the assumptions of traditional psychiatry.’

Derrida had a different view. In ‘Cogito and the History of Madness’, ‘his first major paper in Paris’, given on 4 March 1963 to the Collège Philosophique, Derrida, with Foucault, a friend and former teacher in the audience at his invitation, questioned various presuppositions on which Foucault’s thesis relied and highlighted certain of its paradoxes that threatened to undermine both its organising principle and the manner in which Foucault wrote history. Depending on one’s point of view, it was an attack or ‘an elegant bit of deconstruction’ on two fronts: a questioning of Foucault’s methodology and understanding of reason, and a detailed examination of his reading of Descartes. Foucault’s initial response was to thank Derrida—‘You have magisterially showed the right road to take: and you can understand why I owe you a profound debt of gratitude’—and, subsequently, to remove from *Madness and Unreason* his 1961 nine-page preface that contained a number of the targets at which Derrida had taken aim, and to replace it with a two-and-a-half-page preface for his 1972 edition. The latter not only critiqued the concept of a preface both as a tyranny and a doubling of the book itself, but also ‘excised his Utopian aspiration to

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know a higher reason than that which excluded madness’. He also appended to the 1972 edition ‘Mon corps, ce papier, ce feu’ (‘My Body, This Paper, This Fire’), a response to Derrida’s detailed analysis of his reading of Descartes. Containing invective at least five years in the making, ‘Mon corps’ can be read as an attempt to silence Derrida as Foucault had argued reason had silenced madness:

I shall say that what can be seen here so visibly is a historically well determined little pedagogy. A pedagogy that teaches the pupil there is nothing outside the text, but that in it, in its gaps, its blanks and its silences, there reigns the reserve of the origin; that it is therefore unnecessary to search elsewhere, but that here, not in the words, certainly, but in the words under erasure, in their grid, the ‘sense of being’ is said. A pedagogy that gives conversely to the master’s voice the limitless power of sovereignty that allows it to restate the text indefinitely.

While attempting in ‘Mon corps’ to cast Derrida as ‘reason’s lackey’, Foucault, himself disdainful of the limitations he believed philosophy imposed on intellectual endeavour, failed, nevertheless, to address the substantive issues of Derrida’s

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40 Foucault, History of Madness, xxxviii; Roy Boyne, Foucault and Derrida: The Other Side of Reason (London: Routledge, 2001, first published 1990), 76. Foucault would later put it like this: ‘Generally speaking, Madness and Civilization accorded far too great a place, and a very enigmatic one too, to what I called an “experiment”, thus showing to what extent one was still close to admitting an anonymous and general subject of history’ (Michel Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge, trans. A. M. Sheridan Smith [London: Routledge, 1989, first published 1972, first published in French 1969], 16).

41 Michel Foucault, ‘My Body, This Paper, This Fire’, trans. Geoffrey Bennington, Michel Foucault, Essential Works of Foucault 1954-1984, Volume Two, trans. Robert Hurley and others, ed. James Faubion (London: Penguin, 2000), 393-417. The translation of this extraction as it appears in History of Madness reads: ‘I would say that it is a historically well-determined little pedagogy, which manifests itself here in a very visible manner. A pedagogy which teaches the student that there is nothing outside the text, but that in it, in its interstices, in its blanks and silences, the reserve of the origin reigns; that it is never necessary to look beyond it, but that here, not in the words of course, but in words as crossings-out, in their lattice, what is said is “the meaning of being”. A pedagogy that inversely gives to the voice of the masters that unlimited sovereignty that allows it indefinitely to re-say the text’ (History of Madness, xxiv). Such was the nature of the exchange that the ‘two Parisian personalities’ would not have contact for nearly ten years, until they met in January 1982, on Derrida’s return to Paris following his release from prison in Czechoslovakia. See: Geoffrey Bennington, ‘Cogito Incognito’, Oxford Literary Review 4/1, (1979), 8; Jason Powell, Jacques Derrida: A Biography (New York: Continuum, 2006), 151; Jacques Derrida, ”To Do Justice to Freud”: The History of Madness in the Age of Psychoanalysis’, trans. Pascale-Anne Brault and Michael Naas, Arnold I. Davidson (ed.), Foucault and His Interlocutors (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1997), 57; Peeters, Derrida, 240, 340.
critique, most notably that metaphysical notions underwrote his book. As Derrida put it:

The attempt to write the history of the decision, division, difference runs the risk of construing the division as an event or a structure subsequent to the unity of an original presence, thereby confirming metaphysics in its fundamental operation.\textsuperscript{42}

Like all historiographical projects, *History of Madness* relied on a ‘myth of origins’, in this case the myth that underwrites ‘the whole history of philosophy as the story of reason’.

\textsuperscript{43} In doing so it relied on reason as presence. That is, in order for Foucault to postulate a split in the classical age between reason and unreason he had to assume their ‘unity’ prior to their separation.\textsuperscript{44} Without that oneness Foucault had no thesis. Perhaps that is why he failed to problematise his dyadic exoteric—reason/unreason—before embarking on his madness project and why he attacked what he portrayed as Derrida’s reductionism. Foucault also failed to define madness, ‘employing’ instead ‘a popular and equivocal notion of madness, taken from an unverifiable source’ while giving the impression that he knew what madness meant, and that such a definition had already been acquired and was in use.\textsuperscript{45} As Derrida added tellingly, ‘the same kind of questions could be posed concerning the notion of truth that runs throughout the book’.\textsuperscript{46}

Derrida also thought improbable Foucault’s proposition that ‘the Greek Logos had no opposite’ despite the Ancient Greek’s relationship with what they termed ‘hubris’.\textsuperscript{47} On Derrida’s view, the more likely scenario was that ‘the contrary of reason’ had been ‘assimilated and mastered’ by the Socratic dialectic ‘as one of its moments’.\textsuperscript{48} That led him to conclude that either the forerunner of classical reason,

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\item \textsuperscript{42} Derrida, *Writing and Difference*, 40.
\item \textsuperscript{43} Boyne, *Foucault and Derrida*, 63, 62.
\item \textsuperscript{44} Derrida, *Writing and Difference*, 40; Foucault, ‘Preface to the 1961 Edition’, *History and Madness*, xxxii.
\item \textsuperscript{45} Derrida, *Writing and Difference*, 41.
\item \textsuperscript{46} Derrida, *Writing and Difference*, 41.
\item \textsuperscript{47} Foucault, *History of Madness*, xxix; Derrida, *Writing and Difference*, 40.
\item \textsuperscript{48} Derrida, *Writing and Difference*, 40.
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the ‘reassuring dialectics of Socrates’ as Foucault had described it, was not as reassuring as Foucault had suggested (if it had no contrary), or that its contrary (as expressed in the hubris of Thrasy-machus and Callicles) had been suppressed, defeated, exiled, and, therefore, that ‘the structure of exclusion’ Foucault described ‘could not have been born with classical reason.’ Of course, it was in Foucault’s interest that the Ancient Greeks had had no contrary to reason; if they did, his thesis would have had no organising principle and the separation of reason from unreason in the seventeenth century would have appeared, if not redundant, only as ‘a socioeconomic epiphenomenon on the surface of a reason divided against itself since the dawn of its Greek origin.’ Foucault could not have it both ways: reason could not define itself against its other in one era and not in another. Here, then, was the fatal flaw: Foucault could not think inside and outside reason; he was bound within the framework of thought and could not go beyond it.

Another fatal but related issue raised by Derrida to which Foucault failed to respond was the question of historicity—specifically, the proposition floated in the 1961 Preface that ‘the necessity of madness throughout the history of the West is linked . . . to the possibility of history.’ It not only seemed an incoherent claim, that the separation of reason and unreason in the seventeenth century could be ‘the possibility of history itself, the historicity of history’, it was also a contradiction: a history cannot be the basis of its own historicity. Roy Boyne puts it like this: ‘For Derrida, archaeology is just another name for history and, since the historian’s work

49 Foucault, *History of Madness*, xxix; Derrida, *Writing and Difference*, 40. As Roy Boyne points out, neither Foucault nor Derrida mentioned the heresy trials in Athens, when, in reaction to reason’s attempt to rationalise the irrational, ‘it was made a crime to disbelieve in the supernatural.’ That resulted in ‘a series of heresy trials’ that culminated in Socrates’ celebrated sentencing and death by drinking hemlock. In trying to understand this unique event in Athenian life in the context of the Foucault-Derrida debate, Boyne suggests that ‘it is very tempting to say, with Derrida, that reason can only be constituted through exclusion’ (*Foucault and Derrida*, 63-4).

50 Derrida, *Writing and Difference*, 40.

51 Foucault, *History of Madness*, xxxii.

52 Derrida, *Writing and Difference*, 42-43. Foucault appears to have meant by this that the unsaid (unwritten) of history also has a history, but a silent one. Hence, despite being marginalised because ‘historical time imposes silence on a thing we can no longer apprehend’, madness still had a history. Foucault thus concluded: ‘History is only possible against the backdrop of the absence of history, in the midst of the great space of murmurings, that silence watches like its vocation and its truth’ (*History of Madness*, xxxi).
is ordered and rational, history itself is an efflux of reason; reason is the condition and possibility of history. How, then, could there be a history of the conditions of possibility of history?" In other words, Foucault could not 'locate the zero point at which reason would separate itself from madness at a determinate point in history, since any such break would have to be thought of as occurring within history and as the ground of historicity itself.' Derrida made the point as follows:

if the decision through which reason constitutes itself by excluding and objectifying the free subject of madness is indeed the origin of history, if it is historicity itself . . . then the 'classical' moment of this exclusion described by Foucault has neither absolute privilege nor archetypal exemplarity . . .

If there is a historicity proper to reason in general, the history of reason cannot be the history of its origin (which, for a start, demands the historicity of reason in general), but must be that of one of its determined figures.

Foucault's grand Division in the classical age, then, could not be originary. Even if there were a division of some kind, it could only be internal—not external—to reason. It was for this reason that Derrida preferred the word 'dissension' to emphasise that what was in question was 'a self-dividing action, a cleavage and torment interior to meaning in general, interior to logos in general', because: 'As always, the dissension is internal. The exterior (is) the interior'. Put otherwise, because Descartes could 'only evoke madness within thought and thereby reason', the Cartesian 'evocation' on which Foucault's had based his project was not only internal to the discourse—there was nothing behind the concept that could be reached—it was also a 'form of fiction.' Hence, if thinking determines existence, as it does in the first Cogito ('I think, therefore I am'), and if the 'I' of the second Cogito ('I am, I exist') is, as Descartes defined it, a thinking thing (res cogitans), then even if

53 Boyne, Foucault and Derrida, 64-5.
55 Derrida, Writing and Difference, 42-3.
56 Derrida, Writing and Difference, 38-9.
57 Boyne, Foucault and Derrida, 68; Bennington, 'Cogito Incognito', 7.
the 'I' were 'completely mad' the Cogito would still stand, because the 'I' still thinks and therefore exists.\textsuperscript{58} Hence, by retaining madness \textit{within} his methodological scepticism, Descartes had argued his case from \textit{within} reason. Thus, no matter how one might view Derrida and Foucault's different interpretations of the three-step process of doubt (illusions, dreams, and the malicious demon) by which Descartes arrived at his second Cogito, both\textit{Discourse on Method} and \textit{The Meditations} are clearly rational texts.\textsuperscript{59} In other words, the Cogito needs no protection from madness, because, as Derrida put it: 'Whether I am mad or not, Cogito, \textit{sum}. Madness, therefore, in every sense of the word, is only one case of thought (\textit{within} thought).\textsuperscript{60} Indeed, so rational was Descartes about irrationality that he used 'the argument of the evil genius', with its invocation of total madness, 'to frame his ultimate faith in mathematical certitude and the order of reason.'\textsuperscript{61}

In short, Foucault did not write, could not have written, the history of madness as its amanuensis. He could not write its silence. He could not write its absence. Because 'madness is what by essence cannot be said', he could only write its 'history' from within the language of reason he claimed had silenced it.\textsuperscript{62} And in order to write 'a history not of psychiatry, but of madness itself, in all its vivacity, before it is captured by knowledge', Foucault had to avoid using the very 'historical instruments'—the language and concepts of classical reason (i.e., of psychiatry)—by which madness had been captured and expelled from its dialogic relationship with reason, and that, in Derrida's view, was 'the maddest aspect of his project.'\textsuperscript{63}

\textbf{The Cogito and history writing}

\textsuperscript{58} Descartes, \textit{Discourse on Method and the Meditations}, 53–4, 103, 105; Derrida, \textit{Writing and Difference}, 55.
\textsuperscript{59} Descartes, \textit{Discourse on Method and the Meditations}, 103, 105.
\textsuperscript{60} Derrida, \textit{Writing and Difference}, 56.
\textsuperscript{62} Derrida, \textit{Writing and Difference}, 43.
\textsuperscript{63} Foucault, \textit{History of Madness}, xxxii; Derrida, \textit{Writing and Difference}, 34.
We can see in the Cogito not only the famous meditating ‘I’ who, as Elizabeth Deeds Ermath has it, founds ‘the consensus that constructs historical time’, but also, and perhaps less obviously, we can see in Descartes’ Discourse and Meditations an analogue of modern history writing; certainly, both resort to elaborate means to overcome originary lack and disguise their fake performativity.64 Just as we cannot be sure who is the real subject of historical writing—the subject of a title or its author—and just as the originary moment of Foucault’s History of Madness turns out to be an arresting but fictive idea, so the Cogito remains ‘ontologically problematic’ because its ‘ontological provenance’ is never established.65 We cannot be sure, for instance, if the ‘I’ of the Cogito is Descartes, the mediating reader, or a universal subject. Its identity and provenance is further obscured by the manner in which it is constructed. As we have seen, the first Cogito, the ‘I’ of ‘Discourse 4’ (‘I think, therefore I am’), exists because it thinks.66 But as Descartes’ contemporary, Pierre Gassendi, pointed out, any activity would do just as well as thinking for existence to be established. He suggested “I walk, therefore I am.”67 Eric Idle preferred ‘I drink, therefore I am’, Julio Cortázar ‘I swing, therefore I am’, and Descartes himself also used ‘Dubito, ergo sum’ (I doubt, therefore I am).68 As for the Cogito of the ‘Second Meditation’, (‘I am, I exist’), it relies solely on the performativity of language for its authenticity, which, because it is both characterless and applicable to anyone, was redefined by Descartes as ‘A thing that thinks’ thereby making it comparable to the ‘I’ of ‘Discourse 4’ and obviating the possibility that the first Cogito argument was syllogistic—that the ‘I’ already knew it must be existing before it could know it was

67 Judovitz, Subjectivity and Representation in Descartes, 114.
thinking, and therefore existing.\textsuperscript{69} Or as Gassendi put it, “to say \textit{I think, therefore I am}, is not properly to prove existence by thought, since to think and to be thinking is the same thing; and to say, I am thinking, is already to say \textit{I am}.”\textsuperscript{70} Another of Descartes’ contemporaries, Marin Mersenne, expressed a similar view: if someone says ‘\textit{Cogito, ergo sum}’ then they must have prior knowledge of both thinking and existing.\textsuperscript{71} In other words, the Cogito of ‘Discourse 4’ cannot place itself in an alternative position to see itself thinking in order to conclude the logicality of the sentence. Bertrand Russell explained it this way: because a non-entity cannot be the subject of a proposition, “I think, therefore I am” is no more evident than “I am the subject of a proposition, therefore I am,” provided “I am” is taken to assert subsistence or being, not existence.\textsuperscript{72}

The Cogito also turns out to be not just the singular ‘constituting alibi’ of historical (representational) time but a series of characters developed by Descartes over a number of different genres (allegory, fable, fiction, meditation, autobiography) in several different texts using a variety of different devices (metaphor, analogy, rhetoric, hyperbole).\textsuperscript{73} This ‘cast of characters’ culminates in the thinking ‘I’ of the ‘Second Meditation’ where he himself ‘successfully conflates all the positions implicit in representation’, and ‘functions simultaneously as author and actor, spectator and play, thereby confusing the one who represents, the act of representation, with what is being represented’, and, in the process, mediating simultaneously between himself and the author, between himself and the reader, and between his fictional world and the reader’s material world.\textsuperscript{74}

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\textsuperscript{69} Descartes, \textit{Discourse on Method and the Meditations}, 103, 105.
\textsuperscript{70} Judovitz, \textit{Subjectivity and Representation in Descartes}, 114.
\textsuperscript{73} Ermarth, \textit{Sequel to History}, 21; Included in the list of ‘disguises’ used by this protean subject are the ‘masked author/actor of the Praeambula, the author/creator of a fabulistic and axiomatic universe in the Monde and the anonymous first person author/actor/hero in the Discours’, in the latter of which Descartes deployed ‘a collection of heterogeneous literary modes: the autobiographical (Parts 1 and 2), moral (Part 3), metaphysical (Part 4), scientific (Part 5) and elegiac (Part 6) (Judovitz, \textit{Subjectivity and Representation in Descartes}, 98, 138).
\textsuperscript{74} Judovitz, \textit{Subjectivity and Representation in Descartes}, 138, 88.
\end{footnotesize}
While the finer details of this complex legerdemain are beyond the scope of this thesis, we can see in Descartes’ exemplary deployment of the fictional medium of the meditation—a genre with a long Christian tradition—how ‘the meditating “I” in a dressing robe by the fire is also the meditating reader who must use the representation of the meditation, as a way of resolving the question of who he is, as a rational being.’\textsuperscript{75} Thus the meditation becomes a theatre as much for the reader as for the author thereby disguising ‘the difference between the first person of the speaker and the reader by assimilating them to the illusion of the instance of discourse, the moment of speech.’\textsuperscript{76} This mirrors the practice of historians whose texts not only reference a fictive exoteric, the past, but also become theatres of imaginative re-enactment as much for themselves as for their readers.

Furthermore, just as historians purport that the past can be accessed and therefore engaged with rationally and more or less objectively, so Descartes’ writing fosters ‘the illusion that philosophy can exist outside language and independent of it’ even as he denies the ‘literary and rhetorical conventions’ with which he ‘found[s] the fiction of a philosophical system that can define itself autonomously.’\textsuperscript{77} In other words, in order to maintain the appearance of ‘factual objectivity’ on which his philosophy purports to be based, Descartes must at all times abrogate ‘the mediating character of representation’ that has created this illusion.\textsuperscript{78} Descartes accomplished this not only by making his metaphorical subject familiar and therefore accessible to his readers, but also by using as his model of representation ‘an abstract and universal mathematics (\textit{mathesis universalis})’, his universal science embodying ‘a generalized symbolic logic defined by measure, order and enumeration’ derived from commonplace mathematics (arithmetic, geometry, astronomy, mechanics, etc.), the ancient and contemporary forerunners of which he

\textsuperscript{75} Judovitz, \textit{Subjectivity and Representation in Descartes}, 171.
\textsuperscript{76} Judovitz, \textit{Subjectivity and Representation in Descartes}, 171.
\textsuperscript{77} Judovitz, \textit{Subjectivity and Representation in Descartes}, 172, 5.
\textsuperscript{78} Judovitz, \textit{Subjectivity and Representation in Descartes}, 5.
also dissimulated. The following excerpt from the ‘Fifth Meditation’ is exemplary of this practice: ‘when I think about it more attentively, it becomes manifest that existence can no more be separated from the essence of God than the fact that the sum of its three angles is equal to two right-angles can be separated from the essence of a triangle or than the idea of a mountain can be separated from the idea of a valley’. Thus, by conflating a geometrical signifier with a divine referent and the latter with an empirical topography, Descartes was able to establish that his fictional world was a priori and axiomatic, that his metaphorical subject who bestrode it was real yet ahistorical, and that representation and reality were little removed if not one and the same.

We can see this process at work at the beginning of the most commercially successful settler history so far written in New Zealand, where its author, Michael King, describes an imaginary experience of primordiality (the divine referent) in a specific location (the empirical referent established with precision by coordinates) at a precise moment of (historical or representational) time: ‘In Queen Charlotte Sound on 17 January 1770 Joseph Banks, naturalist on James Cook’s first expedition to the South Seas, caught a last vibration of primordial New Zealand’. And just as Descartes invented an exceptional subjectivity as the basis of his new philosophy by way of ‘adequation, not between ideas and the world, but . . . between ideas and the conventions that defines the validity of those ideas’, so King, by the end of Chapter 1, has advanced his originary moment into a statement of national exceptionalism, which accords not with any testable materiality but with the ideology of the settler society for which it was written, and which in turn will validate its truth-claim and reward King for making it: ‘What distinguishes New Zealand’s history from that of other human societies is that these themes have been played out in a more intensive manner, and at a more accelerated pace, than almost anywhere else on Earth. For

79 Judovitz, Subjectivity and Representation in Descartes, 31, 49.
80 Descartes, Discourse on Method and The Meditations, 144-5.
this reason, their course and consequences have interest and relevance for human
history as a whole.”

Thus, just as Descartes’ philosophical system depends on the Cogito who depends
on God, whose existence depends in turn on Descartes’ clear and distinct idea that
He exists, so contemporary historiography relies for its systematisation on the idea
of history and an accessible past lying beyond its discourse. The circular argument
proving God’s existence, known as the ‘Cartesian Circle’, is replicated by the
historian’s ‘epistemological circle’, in which history as a variation of itself is recycled
precisely because there is nothing outside the ‘circle’ from which definitive answers
can be obtained or to which definitive meaning can be attached. Hence we can say
that both the Cogito and modern historiography are self-validating textual
constructs that present accounts of inexistent worlds as being accessible, observable, real, and which are supported by little more than the performativity of
the process that creates them.

Yet another parallel between the Cogito and modern historiography is the
dependence on metaphysical suppositions. Both rely on presence: the Cogito relies
on the ‘I’ being perfectly present to itself—thinking and existing are one and the
same thing for the first Cogito and the second Cogito is a thinking thing (res
cogitans)—and historiography relies on the past being present to itself and
therefore accessible to the historian. These ‘first principles’ are foundational:
without the Cogito the Cartesian edifice would collapse; without the ‘presence’ of
the past history would collapse. Thus, just as Descartes deployed various literary
and rhetorical devices to build and give his fictional world the appearance of being

82 Judovitz, Subjectivity and Representation in Descartes, x; King, The Penguin History of New Zealand,
26; Statements of national exceptionalism, supported by nothing more than the performativity of the
writing that creates them, abound in New Zealand historiography. King’s appears to be of the type
formulated by William Pember Reeves, describing New Zealand at the beginning of his national
general history as ‘one of the parts of the earth best fitted for man’ (William Pember Reeves, The
published 1898), 25.
83 Descartes, Discourse on Method and The Meditations, 53-4, 106.
real, so contemporary historians, in order to access ‘the no-longer-now’, deploy a variety of metaphorical aids, such as bridges, lenses (among the most popular), binoculars, veils, and even by talking to it, as in Georg Iggers’ ‘dialog between the historian and the past’, in order to reconstruct it. Jules Michelet used metaphors of hearing and exhumation: he believed not only that he heard the dead, as he wrote in a _Préface to L’Histoire de France_, but that he also ‘exhumed them for a second life. . . . Now they live with us, and we feel we are their relatives, their friends. Thus is constituted a family, a city shared by the living and the dead.’ Emmanuel Le Roy Ladurie relied on the rhetor: the ‘chief role . . . of the modern historian was to act as mouthpiece for the dead.’ Greg Dening, like Foucault and Spiegel, used the metaphor of silence (as in his ‘life-long commitment to releasing voices from “the silence of aboriginality”’), and also the theatre: ‘history . . . is the theatre in which we experience truth.’

King made contact with the past through a multi-sensory experience:

I lay in the earthworks behind the Pauatahanui Anglican church, which had been built over Rangihaeata’s pa. I cycled up the Horokiri Valley and then climbed Battle Hill to find Rangihaeata’s rifle pits and (at the bottom) the graves of Imperial troops killed fighting there. These experiences did make history live for me. I felt the presence of people who had gone before. I saw them in a kind of Arthurian world that was not Camelot but, literally, on my own doorstep.

The Cogito as analogue of modern historiographical praxis is, of course, ironic given that Descartes rejected history as being counter-productive to scientific knowledge.

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85 Jules Michelet, as quoted in Barthes, _Michelet_, 101-2.
and an encumbrance for his *res cogitans*, whose certainty of existence and direct acquisition of that knowledge made it self-sufficient. As he explains it: ‘I understand history to be all that has been discovered and is found in books. But by science, I mean the ability to resolve all questions and discover by *one’s own means* everything that the human mind can find in science’. In other words, Descartes’ ahistoricism and with it his ‘exclusion . . . of all temporal considerations, other than those of intuition, defined as a pure and unmediated present’, were based on his reformulation of philosophy as epistemology and a corresponding rejection of history’s authorisation of traditional knowledge in favour of scientific knowledge. ‘Epistemology thus tacitly absorbs the historical, since the notion of clear and distinct ideas defines itself by reference to the thinking subject and not to tradition.’ Descartes also held the view that ‘“histories’ describe things that ‘never happened exactly as they describe them, and men who try to model their own acts upon them are prone to the madness of romantic paladins and meditate hyperbolical deeds.”’

Nevertheless, despite Descartes’ ‘radical rejection of history’, it is worth repeating that the Cogito, like history, is inseparable from the ‘literary conventions’ from which it ‘derives its verisimilitude’. Just as ‘the true referent’ of the statement *ego sum, ego existo* ‘is not existence proper, but rather the reality of the discourse’, so ‘the true referent’ of any historical subject is not the past *per se* but the mode of representation by which it is portrayed—an ‘immortal existence’ made possible by ‘the essential iterability of writing [that] carries with it the possibility of a re-contextualization without reference to the signifying intentions of the author, the context of its production, or the event in the experience of a subject from which it

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89 Descartes as quoted in Judovitz, *Subjectivity and Representation in Descartes*, 81.
90 Judovitz, *Subjectivity and Representation in Descartes*, 80-1.
91 Judovitz, *Subjectivity and Representation in Descartes*, 80.
93 Judovitz, *Subjectivity and Representation in Descartes*, 80, 3.
would proceed or to which it would give rise."94 Furthermore, just as history is a
doubling of itself—as self-producing agency and its own object of study authorised
by its own representation—so we see in the Cogito of the Second Meditation ‘an
index of the double meaning of the cogito, as active agency and also as object of its
own rational discourse.’ 95 Descartes’ hidden role thus parallels that of the
historian’s: just as his Cogito ‘hides within its use of the first person its complicity
with language, fiction and representation: it governs the order of representation as
if it resided outside representation’, so historians commonly hide their authorial ‘I’
behind the third person and their present-tense production behind the preterite
(passé simple), thereby disguising that they not so much write about as create the
past.96 This occurs in that liminal border region, a risky place for the historian, as
Derrida reminded us in Chapter Two, where history is made (i.e., written), and
where its making ‘is not subjected to historical scrutiny’ until after its realisation as
history.97

We might also note, in concluding this discussion on the Cogito and historiography,
that in his dependence on God, Descartes bears resemblance to Leopold von Ranke,
the philologist-turned-historian who is ‘widely celebrated as “the father of historical
science”’, and variously described as ‘the pioneer of a critical historical science’, ‘the
master of modern historical scholarship’, “‘the Nestor of Historians’”.98 Although
thought of outside Germany as an empiricist par excellence for his philologist’s
approach to documents, Ranke was, above all, a universalist for whom behind the
life and struggles of nations lay not just ‘the operation of brute force’ but ‘a spiritual

94 Judovitz, Subjectivity and Representation in Descartes, 165; Bernard Flynn, ‘Derrida and Foucault:
1989), 218.
95 Judovitz, Subjectivity and Representation in Descartes, 169.
96 Judovitz, Subjectivity and Representation in Descartes, 139.
97 Jacques Derrida, ““To Do Justice to Freud”: the History of Madness in the Age of Psychoanalysis”,
trans. Pascale-Anne Brault and Michael Naas, Davidson, (ed.), Foucault and His Interlocutors, 63; F. R.
Ankersmit, History and Tropology: The Rise and Fall of Metaphor (Berkeley: University of California
Press, 1994), 149.
98 Ernst Breisach, Historiography: Ancient, Medieval & Modern, 2nd ed., (Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1994), 232-3; Fritz Stern (ed.), The Varieties of History: From Voltaire to the Present (London:
substance, an original genius’, the appearance of which ‘has its grounds in everything’.\footnote{99} Hence, the political state for Ranke was ‘a concrete manifestation that is at the same time the “thought of God”.’\footnote{100} If Descartes’ genius lay in his ability to convince his readers that his fictional philosophical system was founded on a mathematics-based reality, Ranke’s lay in his being able to convince generations of historians that through the scientific investigation of primary sources (textual artifacts) they had access to the past and could tell ‘how it really was’ (wie es eigentlich gewesen), when what they were really describing was ‘how it had become’ (wie es eigentlich geworden).\footnote{101}

‘The reality effect’\footnote{102}

It was this realist representation that Barthes critiqued in his essays ‘Le discours de l’histoire’ (‘The Discourse of History’) (1967) and ‘L’effet de réel’ (‘The Reality Effect’) (1968).\footnote{103} This verisimilitude, ‘realism’, by which is meant ‘any discourse which accepts “speech-acts” justified by their referent alone’, marks a distinct break with its ancient counterpart, which, according to Barthes, held for centuries to ‘the notion that reality could in no way contaminate verisimilitude’ because, for the ancients, verisimilitude was ‘never anything but opinable’, or ‘entirely subject to

102 Barthes, The Rustle of Language, 139, 141-8.
103 Barthes, The Rustle of Language, 127-148. Roland Barthes was born in northwest France in 1915, lived in poverty with his mother following the death of his father, a naval lieutenant, in World War One, but by the time of his death, tragically from a traffic accident at age 65, he had been Professor of Literary Semiology at the Collège de France for four years. From his application of ‘structuralist methods to contemporary cultural phenomena’ in Mythologies (1957), in which he uncovers the cultural illusions of myths created by contemporary society, to his elevation of ‘the neglected and marginalized aspects of discourse – the merely pleasurable, the stylistic, the erotic’ over the scientific in The Pleasure of the Text (1973), Barthes straddled the structural-poststructural divide, reflecting in his influential writing the wider intellectual transition from one school of thought to the other. Arguably most famous for ‘The Death of the Author’ (1968), Barthes, in this essay, proposed that ‘the birth of the reader must be required by the death of the Author’—by which he meant that the author does not have sole authority over textual meaning—because we, writers and readers all, are all multi-dimensional social beings who construct meaning even as we read and write (The Rustle of Language, 55).
(public) opinion.\textsuperscript{104} In other words, modern verisimilitude does what its ancient counterpart did not do—it purports ‘to denote the real directly’, thereby creating the illusion that it is both an accurate and a neutral depiction of that which lies outside the discourse.\textsuperscript{105} This change in understanding of verisimilitude also explains an important difference between old and new ways of writing the past, in that the two writers considered to be the fathers of Western historiography, Herodotus and Thucydides, claim to have written their accounts of the past either from their personal observations and experience or on the basis of eyewitness accounts, whereas, since the nineteenth century, historians, following Ranke, have believed that the verisimilar, notably the text-object or artifact, constitutes the real. Indeed, when writing The Histories, Herodotus did not have the signifier ‘history’ available to him. The word he used, \textit{ίστορεῑν}, means to inquire in person, arising as it does out of its dual meaning ‘to testify and to inquire’, which in turn is derived from a word originally meaning ‘to see’ and ‘eyewitness’, and, subsequently, ‘the one who examines witnesses and obtains truth through inquiry’.\textsuperscript{106} As he wrote at the beginning of Book One: ‘Herodotus of Halicarnassus here displays his inquiry, so that human achievements may not become forgotten in time’.\textsuperscript{107}

According to Barthes, modern verisimilitude is created in ‘a double operation . . . that is extremely complex.’\textsuperscript{108} In the first stage of the operation, the referent is detached from the discourse as ‘the deed’ (\textit{res gestae}) in order to ground or govern the discourse which thus becomes the ‘story’ of that ‘deed’ (\textit{historia rerum gestarum}).\textsuperscript{109} In the second stage, ‘the referent enters into direct relation with the signifier, and the discourse, meant only to express the real, believes it elides the fundamental term of imaginary structure, which is the signified.’\textsuperscript{110} Hence, through

\textsuperscript{104} Barthes, \textit{The Rustle of Language}, 147.
\textsuperscript{105} Barthes, \textit{The Rustle of Language}, 148.
\textsuperscript{106} Hannah Arendt, \textit{Between Past and Future: Six Exercises in Political Thought} (London: Faber and Faber, 1961), 228-9, n. 1.
\textsuperscript{108} Barthes, \textit{The Rustle of Language}, 138.
\textsuperscript{109} Barthes, \textit{The Rustle of Language}, 138.
\textsuperscript{110} Barthes, \textit{The Rustle of Language}, 138-9.
'the direct collusion of a referent and a signifier', 'the signified is expelled from the sign' and 'the very absence of the signified, to the advantage of the referent alone, becomes the very signifier of realism'.\textsuperscript{111} This is 'the reality effect' which, as Barthes has it, is 'the basis of that unavowed verisimilitude which forms the aesthetic of all the standard works of modernity'.\textsuperscript{112} Thus, just as the signifier is effaced by the signified when \textit{thinking} about history, as we saw in Chapter Two, so the signified is effaced by the referent when the referent is merged with the signifier when \textit{writing} history. It is precisely this (illusory) merging of referent and signified', which not only gave rise to 'modern realism' but also 'defines sui-referential discourses (such as performative discourse)', that allowed Barthes to assert 'that historical discourse is a fake performative discourse in which the apparent constative (descriptive) is in fact only the signifier of the speech-act as an act of authority.'\textsuperscript{113} In other words, by merging signifier and referent, historians create what Barthes called 'the referential illusion', in which it appears that the past is being referenced or represented directly but which is just as illusory as it is in 'sui-referential discourse', such as realistic novel writing, because what is being described (the signifier of the speech-act) is based solely on the historian's assertion (the speech-act itself) and nothing external to the text.\textsuperscript{114}

In asserting the fake performativity of historical discourse, Barthes was not saying, as Lubomír Doležel argues, that because 'history appropriates narrative from fiction, where it was developed and cultivated', that 'narrative history is indistinguishable from narrative fiction'—a fallacy of false dilemma commonly offered in defence of history.\textsuperscript{115} This argument, based on the either/or of \textit{tertium non datur} ('the third not

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{111} Barthes, \textit{The Rustle of Language}, 147-8.
  \item \textsuperscript{112} Barthes, \textit{The Rustle of Language}, 148.
  \item \textsuperscript{113} Barthes, \textit{The Rustle of Language}, 147, 139.
  \item \textsuperscript{114} Barthes, \textit{The Rustle of Language}, 148, 139.
  \item \textsuperscript{115} Lubomir Doležel, \textit{Possible Worlds of Fiction and History: The Postmodern Stage} (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2010), 19. This form of argument removes the possibility of other alternatives, of a third way— in this case, for example, as Tom Griffiths suggests, a third alternative might be to view history and fiction as 'a tag team, sometimes taking turns, sometimes working in tandem, to deepen our understanding and imagination', (Griffiths, 'History and the creative imagination', 74.5).
\end{itemize}
given’ or the law of excluded middle)—is history fiction or real?—fails to address either the particular argument Barthes was advancing, namely, that because the signifier does not exist or collude in a direct correspondence with its referent, it cannot and does not represent that to which it refers in a pure or unmediated manner, or Barthes’ broader argument, namely, that because novel writing is a performative discourse, and because the literary techniques used by authors of novels of historical realism are no different from those used by historians writing historical narratives—and all history writing, to a greater or lesser extent, has the quality of narration—but because historians give the appearance that they are referencing the real when they are referencing an effect of the real, their writing, in that sense, is ‘fake’ in its performativity.116 That is not to say that ‘narrative history is indistinguishable from narrative fiction’, by which Doležel means that Barthes’ view of language does not permit us to distinguish between writing based on events that are wholly imaginary and events that have happened, or that ‘language is incapable of referring to anything outside itself (the world, reality, the past)’, the ‘two-step argument’ Doležel says ‘is the crux of the postmodern challenge’ to historiography.117 As we saw in Chapter Two, such a critique of ‘the habitual structure of reference’ is logically inconsistent.118 Self-evidently, language refers to objects and ideas external to itself; if it did not, it would be incomprehensible and cease to exist or not have existed in the first place. Rather, what Barthes was opining is that if the concept as expressed by the signified is suppressed in its function through its faux detachment from the signifier, then that creates the illusion of the signifier directly representing the reality of its referent. This is even more pronounced with history writing because of the double remove it experiences in relation to its referent, and, of course, is the reason modern historiography insists on the reality of that referent. For without the conceit of the past there is nothing to underwrite the principle of wie es eigentlich gewesen and nothing to support the

116 Barthes, The Rustle of Language, 139.
117 Doležel, Possible Worlds of Fiction and History, 19.
‘two basic assumptions of the modern study of history, one ontological, the other epistemological’, advanced in 1962 by François Châtelet, and which, Doležel believes, were ‘undermined’ five years later by Barthes’ ‘The Discourse of History’:

The historical Spirit believes in the reality of the past, and maintains that the past, in its mode of being and, to a certain extent, in its content, is not different in nature from the present. Recognizing what is no longer as having been, he acknowledges that what happened did formerly exist, in a specific time and place, just as what now we see exists. . . . That means, in particular, that it is not in any way acceptable to treat what has happened as fictive, as unreal, and that the nonpresence of the past (and of the future) cannot in any manner be identified with nonreality (p. 11).

It is indispensable that the past, which is held to be real and decisive, be studied rigorously insofar as past times are considered as having a claim on our attention, insofar as a structure is assigned to them, insofar as their traces are visible in the present. It is necessary that every discourse concerning the past be able to clearly show why—on the basis of which documents, and what evidence—it proposes a particular sequence of events, a particular version, rather than another. It is especially important that great care be taken in dating and locating the event, since the latter acquires historical status only to the extent that it is determined in this way. (1:21-22)\textsuperscript{119}

While Doležel correctly reads ‘The Discourse of History’ as a devastating critique of Châtelet’s ‘foundations of modern historiography’, what Barthes highlights by identifying and explicating the way in which historians purport to reach a material exoteric, is not only the efficacy of Derrida’s ‘Il n’y a pas de hors-texte’, but also the aporetic nature of the past and history’s problematic realism in purporting to represent the “concrete reality” of that past.\textsuperscript{120} However, although, on the one hand, the historian’s dependence on ‘the reality effect’ actually confirms the past’s immateriality, on the other hand, as a mechanism that permits great malleability, ‘the reality effect’ allows historical discourse to have a seemingly endless number of


practical applications, from substantiating ‘the presumed superiority’ of the West’s ‘modern, industrial society’ to verifying family genealogies.\textsuperscript{121} Indeed, without ‘the reality effect’ neither history as we know it nor the coextensive belief that the past can be recalled beyond living memory would exist, and neither would historians be able to fulfil their part of the philosophical bargain: to provide assurance that ‘the now’ is based securely on ‘the no-longer-now’ so that ‘the not-yet-now’ will seem less daunting.\textsuperscript{122}

What is most at issue in Doležel’s response to Barthes is whether reality effects are the product of real effects or the product of discourse, a question that bears a striking resemblance to the medieval debate between realists and nominalists over universals, and which in turn harks back to the purported debate between Aristotle and Protagoras as to the nature of knowledge: is it foundational and therefore extractable and certain, or is it perspectival and opinable and in a constant state of flux?\textsuperscript{123} However, because Barthes demonstrates that ‘the reality effect’ links the

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\item In this debate, the realists held that ‘man’, the universal, existed in reality just as much as individual men did, the particulars or singulars of the ‘universal’, whereas the nominalists said ‘universals’ were merely words, conveying only meaning as to the likeness between its particulars, in this case real men. The question was, do categories really exist, as the realists believed, as imprints of reality, as extensions of the named, or are they created rather than perceived, as the nominalists believed, categorised for human convenience rather than being corporeal. Or as Porphyry had posed the problem c.271: “Whether genera or species exist in themselves or reside purely and solely in things understood; whether, if they exist, they are corporeal or incorporeal; and whether they exist apart or within sense objects and in dependence upon them” (Porphyry as quoted in John Deely, \textit{Medieval Philosophy Redefined: The Development of Cenoscopic Science, AD 354 to 1644 (from the birth of Augustine to the death of Poinsot)} [Scranton: University of Scranton Press, 2010], 128). Jean Roscelin (c.1050-1120) was of the view ‘that universal terms such as genus, species, and the like have no proper signification of their own’ and that universals are best described as \textit{flatus vocis}, “a snorting or fart of the voice” — empty air. Only individual beings exist, all else are mere “names”, \textit{nomina} . . . whence “nominalism” (\textit{Medieval Philosophy Redefined}, 130-1). William of Champeaux (c.1070-1121), ‘held polar opposite views . . . holding . . . that the whole of each universal Idea enters into each and every individual. All humanity is in every man (\textit{Medieval Philosophy Redefined}, 132). The answer to the problem offered by Peter Abelard (c.1079-1142), who, it would seem, had been taught by both Roscelin and William, was a middle way, subtly conceptualist—namely, that while universals were merely words, such as common nouns, expressing ideas or naming (inexistent) groups of things, they were necessary, nevertheless, despite their contradictory nature, in order for us to make sense of what they name. As he put it famously: ‘The solution is that we do not want in any way to say that
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discourse of history to a faux exoteric—and we might read the strength of Doležel’s response to Barthes’ critique as being more or less proportionate to the strength of Barthes’ argument—we can say that Châtelet’s past is ‘unreal’ and that historical knowledge is not knowledge recovered from the past but knowledge about the past created in moments contemporaneous with its production. This is a conclusion Doležel might have reached had he noted that Châtelet’s past and present were indeed paradoxical—‘categories that are simultaneously identical and different’, as Le Goff describes them—and had he used the following extraction in between the two paragraphs quoted (above), as had Le Goff, and which confirmed for Le Goff that Châtelet’s past and present were ‘also differentiated and even opposed’:

If the past and the present belong to the sphere of the same, they are also in the sphere of alterity. If it is true that the past event is gone forever and that this dimension constitutes its essence, it is also true that its ‘pastness’ differentiates it from any other event that might resemble it. The idea that there are repetitions in history ... that there is ‘nothing new under the sun,’ and even that we can learn from the past, can be meaningful only for a mentality that is not historical. (1:12)

We might add that the unreality of the past is also apparent from the literary and rhetorical strategies used by historians and the use of technology—photographs,
film, and ‘digital media’—to turn the metaphor of the past into a literal object.\textsuperscript{126} As Television New Zealand described this process in relation to its documentary programme, \textit{Frontier of Dreams}, under the rubric 'Making the past come to life': The producers, in order “to break bread with the dead”, chose different ways of doing this, including using graphics: 'We have returned to original sites when possible, but often they have changed beyond the past’s recognition or no longer exist. That is when the latest generation of computer graphics takes over, recreating ancient landscapes and extinct species like the giant moas.'\textsuperscript{127} Clearly, if the past were present, not absent, there would be no need to deploy these strategies and technologies in historical discourse. This is perhaps no more apparent than with the invention of re-enactment history in which actors act out reconstructed events, a narrator narrates the over-arching storyline, archival footage and photographs are interpolated, old and ancient structures are digitised in seconds, and historians, at strategic points within the narrative, are utilised to explain those events to the viewer and thereby lend their authority to the re-enactment. Hence history is preserved ‘in a unique way’, as New Zealand’s Historical Re-enactment Society puts it.\textsuperscript{128} Thus, digitally stored, the past seems readily and infinitely accessible.

It is, of course, ironic, that this new verisimilitude, created by Descartes, through the effacement of history and therefore tradition, to develop his own epistemology, would become the very basis of history's epistemology. That is, just as Descartes ‘tied the truth of the \textit{cogito} to representation’ while abrogating its representation as the basis of its existence, so historians, by way of ‘the \textit{reality effect}', tie their histories to their representations of the past, while effacing their representations as the means by which they bring the past about.\textsuperscript{129} Without the two Cogitos there may have been no ‘disintegration of the sign’—‘modernity's grand affair', as Barthes describes it—and therefore no radical challenge to ‘the age-old aesthetic of

\textsuperscript{126} Mark Greengrass, 'Chapter 1: Introduction', Mark Greengrass and Lorna Hughes (eds), \textit{The Virtual Representation of the Past} (Farnham: Ashgate Publishing, 2008), 2.
\textsuperscript{128} Historical Re-enactment Society (NZ) Inc.: http://www.hrs.org.nz/. 
\textsuperscript{129} Barthes, \textit{The Rustle of Language}, 139, 141-8; Ankersmit, \textit{History and Tropology}, 145.
“representation”.130 Without Cogito, ergo sum/Ego sum, ego existo there may have been no wie es eigentlich gewesen. In that sense, modern historiography functions as a branch of Cartesian metaphysics, fixated on certainty and buttressed by what we might call post-Cogito hauteur. In other words, just as the ‘Second Meditation’ became ‘the inaugural text of modern metaphysics’, so history became ‘the inaugural text’ of modernity, the modern nation-state and the new inter-national order, precisely because ‘the reality effect’ is able to withhold from consciousness the unreality of time by asserting that ‘the basic factual structure of all historical process’ is ‘chronology’ and by presenting the past as the preface of the present and the present as the preface of the future with nothing more than a shift in tense between them.131

Problematising facticity in history writing

It was in ‘The Discourse of History’ that Barthes also points out that without historians filling in the meaning of the past in discursively particular ways there would be no history: ‘In the historical discourse of our civilization, the process of signification always aims at “filling” the meaning of History: the historian is the one who collects not so much facts as signifiers and relates them, i.e., organizes them in order to establish a positive meaning and to fill the void of pure series.’132 Hence, ‘historical discourse is essentially an ideological elaboration’, or, more specifically, ‘an imaginary elaboration’.133

In support of his conclusion, Barthes appealed to Friedrich Nietzsche: “‘There are no facts as such. We must always begin by introducing a meaning in order for there to be a fact.” Once language intervenes (and when does it not intervene?), a fact can be defined only tautologically: the noted issues from the notable, but the notable is . . .

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130 Barthes, The Rustle of Language, 148.  
131 Barthes, The Rustle of Language, 139, 141-8; Arendt, Between Past and Future, 81.  
only what is worthy of memory, i.e., worthy to be noted.' In other words meaning in historical discourse is not only viciously circular but is also produced by an apparent reversal of the deductive process: historians introduce meaning in order to explain ‘the facts’ (the data) on which their meaning is based, but do so against the flow of linear time purported in their writing. The occlusion of this reversal is made possible by the literary double shuffle of ‘the reality effect’, which in turn enables historians to promote the idea that two of the pillars on which historical discourse rests, facticity and temporality, are real, not illusory, that historical facts produce historical meaning and not historical meaning historical facts, and that history’s temporal movement is from past to present, not from present to past, despite that meaning having been produced in ‘the not-yet-now’ of ‘the no-longer-now’.

If we take the humble fact or ‘res gestae’ (the deed), we can see that, although it is a wholly linguistic entity existing within the discourse, it appears to exist outside it, thereby allowing ‘the “real” and its expression’, through the effacement of the signified, ‘to apparently confront each other’, purporting in the process that the discourse is ‘historia rerum gestarum’ (the story of the deed). In this way facts appear to control the discourse from without, despite their being internal to the discourse and their arrangement with the text, and therefore their meaning, a consequence of the historian’s creation of that text.

Illusion to facticity beyond the text is also provided by end- and footnotes. As well as acting as signs of good scholarly practice, they can also give the impression that what is being referenced has a link to extratextual reality and therefore that the discourse either is connected directly with the past or is the recipient of certain

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135 Critchley, ‘Heidegger’s Being and Time, part 8: Temporality’. An example of what might be termed ‘historiographical retro-causation’ can be found in Fernand Braudel, *A History of Civilizations*, trans. Richard Mayne (New York: Penguin Group, 1995, first published 1993), 469: ‘From the beginning, the United States saw itself as a pioneering nation. The same can be said, in fact, of all nations with a huge territory to take, to tame and to humanize – whether Russia, Brazil or Argentina.’
knowledge relayed from it. This, however, disguises the obscuring role played by these notes, for, in the end, they only point to other texts or to artifacts that have no meaning outside the text. They may also be misleading, as we saw in Chapter Two.

So-called facts are also only signs of meaning. Even a scientific fact is not so much a fact as a discovery, or, more accurately, a hypothesis that has so far not been disproven by the data used to test it. As well, the scientific hypothesis must be capable of being tested in the first place, and the experiment used to test it able to be repeated and the same results achieved. Finally, the fact or discovery must receive validation from the scientific community as a whole.\(^{137}\) Thus, because ‘historical facts’ are themselves always already supplements of supplements within a linguistic construction, and because scientific models for testing facticity are unsuitable for language-based investigations, the community of historians is unlikely to reach unanimous agreement on anything except inconsequential matters, such as dates, and the like. In other words, the data on which historical discourse is based forms only a meaningless series, as is found in chronicles and annals, because it tells us nothing about the numerous activities leading up to historic or notable events or the events themselves. It is because “‘historical facts” cannot be considered entirely independently of language, form, representation and so forth’ that Alun Munslow suggests ‘a fact is better regarded as an event under a description’.\(^{138}\) It is a definition that ‘also has the benefit of emphasising that the history narrative as a whole is a propositional structure for the past.’\(^{139}\)

Furthermore, historical discourse, as we have seen, is, from the outset, ideological in that the historian, as the ‘the shifter of organisation’, must choose that which is ‘notable’ in order to ‘fill’ ‘the subject of the speech-act (a psychological or ideological entity)—to give meaning to the text in production.\(^{140}\) That is why Hayden White

\(^{137}\) Thanks to Dr. A. Marie Phillips, Department of Genetics, Faculty of Science, The University of Melbourne, for her explanation of facticity in science.


\(^{139}\) Munslow, *The Future of History*, 274.

could write that ‘historical narratives’ are ‘verbal fictions, the contents of which are as much *invented as found*, and the forms of which have more in common with their counterparts in literature than they have with those in the sciences.’

The view expressed by Carl Becker in his paper ‘What Are Historical Facts?’ (1926) indicates just how problematic facticity is for the historian. ‘A thousand and one lesser “facts” went to make up the one simple fact that Caesar crossed the Rubicon. The simple historical fact turns out not to be a hard, cold something with clear outline and measurable pressure like a brick. It is, so far as we can know it, only a symbol, a simple statement which is a generalization of a thousand and one simpler facts. . . . This symbol is what the historian deals with . . . and perhaps the safest thing to say about a symbol is not that it is in fact either true or false, but only more or less appropriate.’ As Harry Barnes concluded, ‘the simple historical fact, which has long been the cornerstone of erudite and respectable historiography, proves to be the illusion of the simple-minded and the inadequately informed. . . . It is manifestly impossible to create the past *wie es eigentlich gewesen*.’

Robin Collingwood considered the historian was reduced to ‘re-enact[ing] the past in his mind’ because he ‘has no direct or empirical knowledge of his facts’, making the past ‘mediate or inferential or indirect, never empirical.’ As he wrote: ‘In the phrase “the battle of Hastings was fought in 1066,” the battle of Hastings is a label for something which, no doubt, did happen in that year; but no one knows, no one ever has known, and no one ever will know what exactly it was that happened.’

When Claude Lévi-Strauss asked how an episode in a revolution or a war could constitute a fact when it represents a multitude of individual psychic movements, he

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143 Barnes, *A History of Historical Writing*, 268.
arrived at a similar conclusion: ‘historical facts are no more given than any other. It is the historian, or the agent of history, who constitutes them by abstraction and as though under the threat of an infinite regress.’\textsuperscript{146} Furthermore, the narrative or explanation in which they are imbedded justifies their inclusion by giving them coherence. As White explains: ‘It is not the case that a fact is one thing and its interpretation another. The fact is presented where and how it is in the discourse in order to sanction the interpretation to which it is meant to contribute. And the interpretation derives its force of plausibility from the order and manner in which the facts are presented in the discourse.’\textsuperscript{147} Hence the particular ‘combination of facts and meaning’ not only marks out a piece of historical writing as being ‘one kind of historical consciousness rather than another’, but also acts rhetorically by preparing the reader to accept the meaning the historian has attached to ‘the facts’.\textsuperscript{148}

Facts, then, are not the result of some natural ordering but are arranged according to the needs of the discourse, not least because all occurrences in any one year or month or day cannot be recorded and those that have been recorded have been selected on the basis of their value.

**Problematising temporality in history writing**

The logic that applies to facts also applies to dates, the *sine qua non* of history: dates provide points on the continuum of ‘historical time’ that permit the conceptualisation of ‘before’ and ‘after’, without which history would have no temporal coherence.\textsuperscript{149} As with the idea of history, this illusion of temporality is the product of a vicious circularity: each date has no meaning in and of itself because ‘it has no reference outside itself’; it only attains to meaning when it is placed in

\textsuperscript{147} White, *Tropics of Discourse*, 107.  
\textsuperscript{148} White, *Tropics of Discourse*, 107.  
\textsuperscript{149} Lévi-Strauss, *The Savage Mind*, 258.
relation to other dates. The matter does not end there, however. Because a date’s meaning is modified further by the number of dates within its group of dates, the fewer the dates there are in a historical domain the greater the date’s significance will be, and vice versa. Lévi-Strauss puts it like this: ‘This variable quantity of dates applied to periods of equal duration are a gauge of what might be called the pressure of history: there are “hot” chronologies which are those of periods where in the eyes of the historian numerous events appear as differential elements; others, on the contrary, where for him (although not of course for the men who lived though them) very little or nothing took place.’ Therefore, given that ‘a truly total history would cancel itself out—its product would be nought’, we can say that ‘even “time” as modernity has taught us to assume it, belongs . . . to the game of language’. Or as Bruno Latour has it: ‘The modern passage of time is nothing but a particular form of historicity.’

Time as historicity, as the idea of history, is achieved simply enough, despite time’s unreality and the aporia of the now. By using the preterite, ‘the cornerstone of Narration’, historians not only place the events under discussion in the past but also disguise the time at which they effect this displacement, that moment contemporaneous with their ‘speech-act’. This not only creates the impression that the referent—the immaterial past—is speaking for itself, that history is telling itself, but as Barthes puts it, the part the preterite ‘plays is to reduce reality to a point of time, and to abstract, from the depth of a multiplicity of experiences, a pure verbal act, freed from the existential roots of knowledge, and directed towards a

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152 Lévi-Strauss, *The Savage Mind*, 257; Elizabeth Deeds Ermarth, ‘Agency in the Discursive Condition’, *History and Theory*, 40/4 (2001), 51. This theoretical possibility was noted by Charles-Victor Langlois and Charles Seignobos in their *Introduction aux études historiques* (1898), and quoted by Richard Evans: ‘When all the documents are known, and have gone through the operation which fit them for use, the work of critical scholarship will be finished’ (Richard J. Evans, *In Defence of History* [London: Granta Books, 2000, first published 1997], 21).
logical link with other acts’, thereby making narrative (facticity, temporality, causality, etc.) intelligible.\textsuperscript{155} That is why the preterite ‘is the ideal instrument for every construction of a world; it is the unreal time of cosmogonies, myths, History and Novels’, and why behind it ‘there always lurks a demiuserge, a God or a reciter.’\textsuperscript{156} As Barthes concludes, ‘the preterite is the expression of an order, and consequently of a euphoria’, and ‘the very act by which society affirms its possession of its past and its possibility.’\textsuperscript{157}

The use of the preterite also helps to elide from the discourse the historian’s target audience and thereby helps to disguise both the ideological input of the historian and the historian as the ‘sender’ of the message.\textsuperscript{158} Likewise, just as ‘signs of reception or destination are commonly absent’, so effort is often expended in suppressing the authorial ‘I’ within the text, despite the author’s unavoidable presence, thereby giving the impression that the text is a stand-alone document.\textsuperscript{159}

The preterite is thus part of a wider strategy of effacement: because the meaning being created is produced contemporaneously with the text (the historian’s ‘speech-act’), the use of the preterite hides from the reader that what has been written is from a privileged place of knowing, and not from direct collusion with the persons and events being written about, which, while clearly impossible, is, nevertheless, what is purported.\textsuperscript{160} Hence, historians commonly write in the third person and restrained prose, the intention of which is to make their texts appear objective and dispassionate, which in turn imputes greater certainty to the (absent) past. Indeed, we could say that the level of objectivity purported by the discourse is directly proportionate to the historian’s ability to hide the level of their (performative)

\textsuperscript{155} Barthes, \textit{The Rustle of Language}, 131; Barthes, \textit{Writing Degree Zero & Elements of Semiology}, 30.
\textsuperscript{156} Barthes, \textit{Writing Degree Zero & Elements of Semiology}, 30.
\textsuperscript{157} Barthes, \textit{Writing Degree Zero & Elements of Semiology}, 31, 33.
\textsuperscript{158} Barthes, \textit{The Rustle of Language}, 131.
\textsuperscript{159} Barthes, \textit{The Rustle of Language}, 131.
\textsuperscript{160} Barthes, \textit{The Rustle of Language}, 121 passim.
involvement, for as Barthes points out, ‘we know that the absence of signs has a meaning, too.’\textsuperscript{161}

As ‘the shifters of organisation’, historians not only act as chronology protection agents of historical time, through their control of discursive time they also shape the temporal character of their texts, and, in the process, enhance their authenticity.\textsuperscript{162} For instance, as we saw in Chapter One, when historians talk about change over time they can only be speaking metaphorically, yet because such claims are foundational to the discourse of history and accord with our daily experience of conventional (historical or representational) time, they are likely to be taken at face value and the ideological component of such claims effaced in the process.

There is also the question of the coexistence of two time spans within historical discourse that are necessarily in conflict with each other: ‘the time of the speech-act’, the time in which the historian writes, ‘and the time of the material stated’, when the information being written about is thought to have occurred.\textsuperscript{163} This might also be viewed as a confrontation between ‘history’s chronicle time’ and the ‘paper time’ of the text.\textsuperscript{164} According to Barthes, this conflict gives rise to three discursive phenomena. The first is ‘the acceleration phenomena of history’ in which pages of the ‘the speech-act’ equate to periods of history—that is, pages ‘cover varying lapses of time’ which is ‘the time of the material stated’.\textsuperscript{165} A given number of pages may equate, for example, to a given number of centuries or years. But when these vary—when, as Barthes suggests, a chapter may cover several centuries and another several years—this results in a speeding up of historical time, which generally occurs the closer to the time when the book is being written. Thus, the closer we come to the moment contemporaneous with production, the greater the pressure on the historian’s speech-act, which in turn may affect the development of the text

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item Barthes, \textit{The Rustle of Language}, 132.
\item Barthes, \textit{The Rustle of Language}, 130.
\item Barthes, \textit{The Rustle of Language}, 129.
\item Barthes, \textit{The Rustle of Language}, 130.
\item Barthes, \textit{The Rustle of Language}, 129.
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and/or its overall meaning. This can be a boon for settler historians who use these notions of time to produce situations of equivalence and thereby justify the settler’s right to belong; for instance, they commonly label both Maori and Pakeha as colonisers, who colonise Aotearoa within a short space of time of each other. As James Belich has it: ‘New Zealand’s history to the 1880s is not very long, but it is very fast. In less than one thousand years, a drop in the bucket of time, it formed two new peoples.’

The second phenomenon occurs when the purported linearity of the past (which is the basic structure of narrative history) is interrupted by the introduction of a new story or personage. This necessitates a return to the beginning of the story or chronology in order to place it within the wider historical setting before it returns to the original point of departure in the superior narrative. Barthes called this ‘zigzag history’.

Arguably, the most important of the discursive time phenomena is the third. This concerns the inauguration of the historian’s speech-act, at which point there is an exact coincidence of discursive and historical time—or, as Barthes puts it, ‘where the beginning of the material stated and the exordium of the speech-act are united.’ This enables historians to place their imprimatur on the discourse. For it is precisely at the moment the speech-act begins that the historian enters history, usually with a statement of intent, which not only becomes the template for the discourse or a doubling of that which follows, but also “de-chronologize[s]” the historical “thread”.

On Barthes’ analysis there are two types of inauguration. The first, and least common, is ‘the performative opening’, the model of which is ‘poetic’. In this form, ‘speech is actually a solemn act of foundation’ in which the ‘shifter of organisation’ is able to express his or her subjectivity and themselves as

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167 Barthes, The Rustle of Language, 129.
168 Barthes, The Rustle of Language, 130.
169 Barthes, The Rustle of Language, 130.
170 Barthes, The Rustle of Language, 130.
being part of the historical continuum.\textsuperscript{171} The second and by far the most common is the preface, which has a predictive as well as a doubling function, ‘prospective when it announces discourse to come, or retrospective when it judges that discourse’,\textsuperscript{172} In stopping or splitting historical time, all inaugurations effect a form of nostalgia, the ‘deep space’ of which, as Barthes has it, ‘recalls the mythic time of the ancient cosmogonies’.\textsuperscript{173} In this the historian effectively functions as ‘the agent of a myth’, declaring that he or she ‘knows what has not yet been recounted’.\textsuperscript{174} Thus historians function both as ‘prophets’ and as mediators between the living and the dead—‘the historian-as-priest’, as Barthes describes Jules Michelet, who ‘cannot remain impartial’ in the ‘vast amorous combat between Justice and Grace’.\textsuperscript{175}

Hence, an integral part of history’s illusion is that ‘every historiography puts forward a time of things as the counterpoint and condition of a discursive time’.\textsuperscript{176} As Michel de Certeau explains: ‘By means of this referential time it can condense or stretch its own time, produce effects of meaning, redistribute and codify the uniformity of flowing time’, thereby producing knowledge in “discursive” or “diegetic” time while placing it ‘at a distance from “real” time.’\textsuperscript{177} In other words, ‘history is not an epistemological criticism’ but ‘remains always a narrative. History tells of its own work, and, simultaneously, of the work which can be read in a past time. Besides, history understands the latter only as it elucidates its own productive activity, and reciprocally, it understands its own work through the set of

\textsuperscript{171} Barthes, \textit{The Rustle of Language}, 130.
\textsuperscript{172} Barthes, \textit{The Rustle of Language}, 130.
\textsuperscript{173} Barthes, \textit{The Rustle of Language}, 130.
\textsuperscript{174} Barthes, \textit{The Rustle of Language}, 131.
\textsuperscript{175} Barthes, \textit{The Rustle of Language}, 130; Barthes, \textit{Michelet}, 81.
\textsuperscript{177} Certeau, \textit{The Writing of History}, 88-9.
productions, and the succession of productions, of which this history is itself an effect.’179

Thus, while temporality is foundational to the discourse of history, and while historians confirm its convention at every turn, time for Aristotle, as we saw in Chapter One, was aporetic: it both was and was not. For Derrida, time was a metaphor, a product of presence and therefore irreducible. For John McTaggart Ellis McTaggart time was unreal and ‘all statements’ involving ‘its reality’ were ‘erroneous.’180 Stephen Hawking, in rebutting suggestions among physicists, ‘that we might be able to warp spacetime in such a way as to allow … travel back in time’, reached the conclusion that ‘it seems there is a chronology protection agency, which prevents the appearance of closed timelike curves and so makes the universe safe for historians’, a conjecture for which, he noted wryly, there is ‘strong experimental evidence’: ‘we have not been invaded by hordes of tourists from the future.’181 However, while Hawking believes that this makes the universe safe for historians, the universe, it would seem, is not safe from historians who create and assign meaning to the past retroactively. In other words, historians purport to do what physicists say cannot be done and the majority of physicists say will never be done—using the reality effect as their traversable wormhole, they ‘travel into the past’ in order to observe and explain notable events, which they then arrange and explain on the basis of historical time (not on the basis of Relativity).182

Thus we can see that among the different roles historians play, arguably among their most important is the underwriting of two important cultural fictions: representational (historical) time and the past’s accessibility. As for the former,

179 Certeau, The Writing of History, 43.
while time, standardised from Greenwich, runs our everyday lives—trains, buses, ferries and planes run on it, contracts are dated by it, bills of lading are stamped with it, letters of credit are negotiated within it, and we can change it at will (e.g., daylight saving and ‘Year One’ as proclaimed by the new French Republic’s Convention Nationale on 5 October 1793 in order ‘to scrap the centuries-old Christian calendar and to inaugurate a new world-era’) — and while we can also count, describe, and now measure it down to nanoseconds, we still do not know what time is.\textsuperscript{183} As Ermarth explains: ‘The triumph of historical time is thus an important fictional event in every sense of the word and essentially a triumph of collective awareness, literally collective consciousness that creates and sustains itself. This historical idea is the modern formation par excellence.’\textsuperscript{184} As for the latter, White describes the past as, ‘a place of fantasy. It doesn’t exist anymore. … We can’t repeat it as you can repeat physical events in a laboratory. You can’t replicate—by definition—historical events. They are no longer perceivable. So they can’t be studied empirically.’\textsuperscript{185}

Underlying history, then, is a multi-layered paradox: historical knowledge, which cannot be tested, is extracted from a place we cannot visit, although we are told that we cannot do without what we find there if we wish to remain civilised and avoid a descent into barbarism.\textsuperscript{186}

From the foregoing any number of questions arise, some of which might be:

(1) If time and the past are aporetic and facticity an illusion, if there is no \textit{hors-texte}, no material exoteric to the discourse of history, if its origins are illusory, how is that history attained such a prominence in the West that Robin Collingwood claimed in the 1930s that it ‘occupies in the world of today a position analogous to that occupied by physics in the time of Locke’?\textsuperscript{187} By this Collingwood meant that

\textsuperscript{184} Ermarth, \textit{Sequel to History}, 30.
\textsuperscript{186} Iggers, \textit{Historiography in the Twentieth Century}, 147.
\textsuperscript{187} Collingwood, \textit{The Idea of History}, 209.
the same intellectual movement that produced Descartes’ philosophy had also laid the foundations for ‘the modern conception of history as a study at once critical and constructive, whose field is the human past in its entirety’, which, although ‘not established until the nineteenth’ century, was, by the early twentieth century, ‘recognized as a special and autonomous form of thought’. This was not just an English view. History held ‘a privileged position’ for Foucault in his own inquiry, and he also saw it as both linking and providing ‘each of the sciences of man’ with ‘a homeland’ by determining their ‘chronological and geographical boundaries’. In its broader reach, history, for Foucault, was the milieu that enabled a society’s knowledge to be communicated ‘with other forms of life, other types of societies, other significations’.

(2) How were those who developed history as a scientific genre in the nineteenth century able ‘to institute narration as a privileged signifier of the real’ and convince themselves and their audience that their work was itself evidence of what it expressed? In other words, how could ‘the narrative structure’ of modern historiography, ‘elaborated in the crucible of fictions (through myths and early epics)’, have become ‘both sign and proof of reality’?

(3) How and why was history accepted into universities throughout Europe and beyond during the nineteenth century when it lacked internal cohesion as a discipline as well as a systematic body of reference work?

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190 Foucault, *The Order of Things*, 373.
191 Barthes, *The Rustle of Language*, 140.
192 Barthes, *The Rustle of Language*, 140.
193 Modern History (i.e., history post-Antiquity) was created at Oxford ‘by the examination statutes of 1850 as one of three new degree-granting courses’, making a modest beginning as part of the School of Law and Modern History established in 1853 before becoming its own School in 1872 (Reba Soffer, ‘Nation, Duty, Character and Confidence: History at Oxford, 1850-1914’, *The Historical Journal*, 30/1 [1987], 77). Germany’s first Chair in History was established in 1910 (at the University of Berlin, the chair to which Ranke was appointed in 1925) and in France in 1912 (at the Sorbonne), although history was not professionalised within the French academy until just before and did not flourish until after the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-71. There is some very good literature on the subject, some titles of which are: Southern, *History and Historians*; Stefan Berger, Heiko Feldner, Kevin Passmore (eds), *Writing History: Theory & Practice*, revised edn (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2010); Bonnie G. Smith, *The Gender of History: Men, Women, and Historical Practice* (Cambridge:
(4) How has the self-consciousness of the Western world come to rely so heavily on a literature purporting to be something it is not—a referential rather than a performative discourse—and why has that discourse become what is arguably the West’s metanarrative?\textsuperscript{194}

While space precludes a fulsome answer to each of the above, the answer in every case would return us to ‘the reality effect’.\textsuperscript{195}

As we have noted, it is deeply ironic that historians, in seeking to establish an epistemological basis for their fledgling subject, favoured a scientific model, when Descartes, whose \textit{Meditations} provided ‘a philosophical groundwork for the possibility of the sciences’, radically rejected history on both epistemological and ideological grounds.\textsuperscript{196} Nevertheless, Descartes’ method of representation—in which the fictive passes for the real and the real appears to exist beyond the structures of representation even as those structures are effaced as both creating and authorising the exoteric as real—was an ideal schema on which historians could model their fledgling craft. And in the archival text, Ranke, a philologist before he turned to history, found the ideal substitute for the scientific object of inquiry. It was this that enabled him to famously proclaim, echoing Thucydides’ ‘clear view . . . of the events which have happened’, that his first book of history, and arguably the first in the genre of modern ‘objective history’, \textit{Histories of the Latin and Germanic Nations from 1494-1514}, ‘wants only to show what actually happened (\textit{wie es eigentlich gewesen}).’\textsuperscript{197}

\begin{itemize}
\item Ermarth, \textit{Sequel to History}, 20.
\item Barthes, \textit{The Rustle of Language}, 139, 141-8.
\end{itemize}
In coming down on the side of scientism rather than of literature, Ranke and those who followed him were aligning themselves with Enlightenment thinking and therefore with Aristotle’s view that knowledge is foundational and extractable. This, it would seem, is at the heart of Doležel’s objection to Barthes and the question of whether history is real or fiction. That this form of argument is still being advanced is an indication of just how deeply the river of dissension runs between positive and what we might term perspectival knowledge and just how successfully the Cartesian model has perpetuated the former, based on Aristotelian objectivity and the law of excluded middle, over the sceptical tradition of the Sophists.

Briefly, these two traditions hark back to the purported fifth century BCE debate between Aristotle and Protagoras, in which the former held that true knowledge could only be ‘of what is unchanging, even if it is of what is unchanging in what does change’, a thesis that supported the Greek cosmos (and later the Cartesian universe), and the latter who held that ‘Of all things the measure is Man, of the things that are, that they are, and of the things that are not, that they are not’, a thesis that threatened the underlying order of reality as conceived by Aristotle. Armed with the law of non-contradiction and his conception of reality, Aristotle refuted Protagoras on the basis that knowledge cannot be at the same time of what is unchanging and of what is changing (that is knowledge based on objects of senses, the product of perception, which are indeterminate and ephemeral). As Aristotle put it, ‘contradictories cannot be predicates at the same time’, for ‘if all contradictories are true at the same time about the same thing, clearly all things will be one. For the same thing will be a trireme and a wall and a man, if of anything one may truly

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198 Joseph Margolis, *The Truth About Relativism* (Cambridge: B. Blackwell, 1991), 71, 74, 87. Although Aristotle and Descartes proceeded from opposite directions, the former from reality of the world to knowledge, the latter from knowledge of the self to knowledge of the world through experience (i.e., through science), both were convinced of an invariant order of reality. They did, however, put an invariant reality to different uses: Aristotle deployed it in supporting the Greek cosmic order, Descartes so that his thinking ‘I’ could control the material world. Protagoras’s purported quote, as quoted in Plato, *Theaetetus*, 152a, is also cited by Stanley Fish in his commentary on this debate: Stanley Fish, *Doing What Comes Naturally: Change, Rhetoric, and the Practice of Theory in Literary and Legal Studies* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1989), 480.
affirm or truly deny anything, and this necessarily follows for those who use the argument of Protagoras.'\textsuperscript{199} Expressed otherwise, ‘it is not possible for “to be a man” to have the very same meaning as “not to be a man”, if “a man” not only signifies something predicable of one thing but also has one meaning’.\textsuperscript{200} Hence Aristotle’s conclusion that those persuaded by Protagoras are men only of opinion, not of knowledge, and therefore ‘not healthily disposed towards the truth.’\textsuperscript{201}

The law of non-contradiction, which states that an object cannot be at one and the same time that which it is not—\( P \lor \lnot P \) for any proposition \( P \)—was the firmest of Aristotle’s principles of first philosophy (metaphysics), a principle of scientific inquiry, reasoning and communication that we cannot do without, because, it was argued, if it did not hold, we would be unable to inquire, reason or communicate, and knowledge would be indefinable and indeterminate.\textsuperscript{202} Its apparent logical consistency ‘rests on the presumption that \textit{formal arguments involving noncontradiction and excluded middle hold in the way they do, because that alone would accord with the conditions of knowledge.’}\textsuperscript{203} That is, whether a statement is thought to be logically consistent or not will depend on the type of knowledge used to referee its logicality. Thus we can see that the history or fiction argument advanced by Doležel is based on the Aristotelian notion of positive knowledge—for historians, that the past can be known—\textit{and} on the law of non-contradiction, that the existence of what is known cannot be disputed (although it may be interpreted). In other words, relying on the Aristotelian-cum-Cartesian model, empirical historians believe that the evidence they extract more or less pristinely from the past, is, with a metaphorical spit-and-polish, real (i.e., foundational or positive) knowledge able to be conveyed within a language that reflects without distortion

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{200} Aristotle, \textit{Aristotle’s Metaphysics}, Book Γ, 60 (1006b).
\textsuperscript{201} Aristotle (Apostle), \textit{Aristotle’s Metaphysics}, Book Γ, 64 (1008b).
\textsuperscript{203} Margolis, \textit{The Truth About Relativism}, 72.
\end{flushleft}
that to which it refers. However, for Doležel’s argument to hold, he must demonstrate that the past can be told *wie es eigentlich gewesen*, or, as Châtelet has it, that ‘the past’ is ‘real and decisive’, which, as we have seen, is impossible because the past is immaterial and there is no *hors-texte.*

This debate, writes Stanley Fish, is really ‘the quarrel between philosophy and rhetoric’, one that has continually presented the West with ‘the (skewed) choice between the plain unvarnished truth straightforwardly presented and the powerful but insidious appeal of “fine language,” language that has transgressed the limits of representation and substituted its own forms for the forms of reality.’ In other words, it is a fundamental disagreement over how the world is viewed—in essence, a problematisation of being. Fish describes it thus: ‘To the accusation that rhetoric deals only with the realms of the probable and contingent and forsakes truth, the sophists and their successors respond that truth itself is a contingent affair and assumes a different shape in the light of differing local urgencies and the convictions associated with them.’ On the former view, meaning attains to certainty, truth to a fixity, on the latter, meaning is always shifting and truth always elusive. However, because the debate ‘is itself foundational’ it is also irresolvable and thus constitutes a *différend.* As Thomas Kuhn explains, the incommensurability between different paradigms can never be resolved because no neutral language exists to effect a resolution: ‘the superiority of one theory to another is something that cannot be proved in the debate. Instead . . . each party must try, by persuasion, to convert the other’, not least because ‘part of the difference is prior to the application of the languages in which it is nevertheless reflected.’

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204 Doležel, *Possible Worlds of Fiction and History*, 15.
205 Fish, *Doing What Comes Naturally*, 478.
206 Fish, *Doing What Comes Naturally*, 481.
207 Fish, *Doing What Comes Naturally*, 482; Jean-François Lyotard defines a *différend* as ‘a case of conflict, between (at least) two parties, that cannot be equitably resolved for lack of a rule of judgement applicable to both arguments’ (*The Differend: Phrases in Dispute*, trans. Georges Van Den Abbeele, [Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2007, first published 1988], xi).
To draw this discussion to a close, while this debate keeps erupting in the West, what makes history possible and allows the historian to privately have a foot in both camps while publicly having both in one, is 'the reality effect': it provides the 'exterior' to 'human language' and the means by which we can 'cheat speech'—that is, escape Nietzsche's 'prison-house of language'. It also domesticates not only the real but also transcendental signifieds, thereby giving the impression that origins are originary and constructs like history and the law are pre-existent. For as Barthes put it in his inaugural lecture to the Collège de France when discussing 'the fundamental inadequation of language and the real'.

That the real is not representable, but only demonstrable, can be said in several ways: either we can define it, with Lacan, as the impossible, that which is unattainable and escapes discourse, or in topological terms we observe that a pluri-dimensional order (the real) cannot be made to coincide with a unidimensional order (language). Now, it is precisely this topological impossibility that literature rejects and to which it never submits. . . . I said a moment ago, apropos of knowledge, that literature is categorically realist, in that it never has anything but the real as its object of desire; and I shall say now, without contradicting myself . . . that literature is quite as stubbornly unrealistic; it considers sane its desire for the impossible.210

209 Barthes, The Rustle of Language, 139, 141-8; Barthes, ‘Lecture In Inauguration of the Chair of Literary Semiology, Collège de France, January 7, 1977’, 34; Friedrich Nietzsche as quoted in Fredric Jameson, The Prison-House of Language: A Critical Account of Structuralism and Russian Formalism (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1972), Epigraph. Examples of this debate include that between nominalism and realism, and, currently, between what we might term positivism and poststructuralism. The former produced heated exchanges, particularly in regard to the status of the referent, and none more so than the Trinity, which Roscelin described as 'a flatus vocis', and was offered in return the choice of retraction or excommunication (Deely, Medieval Philosophy Redefined, 133, 131). Examples of the invective on both sides of the recent version of this debate include: the false accusation contained in a letter from 20 academics from ten countries published in the Times (London) on 9 May 1992 objecting to Cambridge University’s offering Derrida an honorary doctorate, that his ‘writings’ contain ‘the puns “logical phallusies”’ – Jacques Derrida, Points…: Interviews, 1974-1994, trans. Michael Israel, ed. Elisabeth Weber, trans. Peggy Kamuf and others (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995), 420. See Points 4 19-21 for the full text of the letter and its signatories; Powell, Jacques Derrida, 187; Peeters, Derrida, 446-8 – Richard Evans’s comment that Keith Jenkins ‘has never had a job in a university himself’ despite his ‘hostility to conventional history as practised in the universities’ (Evans, In Defence of History, 302), and Simon Critchley’s characterisation of further philosophers objecting to Derrida’s honorary doctorate as ‘know-nothings’ (Simon Critchley, ‘Jacques Derrida’, Theory & Event, 8/1 [2005], 8).

It would seem no coincidence, then, that this new form of ‘historical discourse: *historia rerum gestarum*’ or ‘“objective” history’, along with literary realism, emerged more or less contemporaneously with the modern nation-state.\(^{211}\) As a ‘fake performative discourse’ in which ‘the past’ can be imagined as a ‘magisterial space’, which is also ‘fundamentally a religious space’, so-called scientific history proved to be the ideal cultural instrument with which Europe could mediate the new political order that emerged from the Peace of Westphalia (1648), which ended its religious wars and ‘established sovereignty for national states’, and the ashes of the French Revolution (1789).\(^{212}\) As John Bagnell Bury put it in 1902:

> It was a strange and fortunate coincidence that the scientific movement in Germany should have begun simultaneously with another movement which gave a strong impetus to historical studies throughout Europe and enlisted men’s emotions in their favour. . . . When the peoples, inspired by the national idea, were stirred to mould their destinies anew, and, looking back with longing to the more distant past, based upon it their claims for independence or for unity, history was one of the most effective weapons in their armouries; and consequently a powerful motive was supplied for historical investigation.\(^{213}\)

In other words, because modern historiography is a malleable discourse that provides an *imaginative space* in which ideas and beliefs can together be intellectualised and historicised, it was able to underwrite this new model of socio-political organisation and its new ‘religion’, nationalism, which supplanted the once seemingly unshakable system of dynastic realms and its authorising religion,

\(^{211}\) Barthes, *The Rustle of Language*, 146.


\(^{213}\) Bury, ‘History as a science’, Stern (ed.), *Varieties of History*, 213.
Catholicism. Thus, because national historiography, as the doubling of the national dream, is the product of ‘imaginary signification’, it made possible the imagining of these new ‘imagined communities’, as Benedict Anderson famously dubbed nation-states.\(^{214}\) This discursive shift in the West, which seems to reflect a general though not wholesale displacement of faith in Christianity and the Church with a broad-based belief in the nation and nationalism, resulted in national general histories becoming biographies of the former and Bibles of the latter. In the process, the nation became the new religious community, the collective embodiment of the self-sufficient Cogito, providing its members with meaning and security for their lives, and, in its continuation beyond their natural lifespan, offering the prospect of immortality beyond begetting. That, importantly, made possible ‘a secular transformation of fatality into continuity, contingency into meaning’, and a relatively swift transition from one socio-political system to another.\(^{215}\) For the first time, as Hannah Arendt has it, human history became a ‘twofold infinity’, reaching ‘back into an infinite past’ and stretching ‘ahead into an infinite future’, thereby ‘establishing mankind in a potential earthly immortality’, without ‘eschatological expectations’.\(^{216}\) David Lowenthal captured the totalising effect of this transition when he wrote that ‘the past is integral to our sense of identity; ‘the sureness of “I was” is a necessary component of the sureness of “I am”’. . . . Awareness of history likewise enhances communal and national identity, legitimating a people in their own eyes.\(^{217}\)

These, then, are some of the imperatives, personal and political, individual and collective, that urge if not impel us to overcome the aporias of time and the past. While these desires can never be fulfilled, it is ‘the reality effect’—the centrepiece of


\(^{215}\) Anderson, *Imagined Communities*, 11.

\(^{216}\) Arendt, *Between Past and Future*, 68, 75.

history’s mediating function and ‘the organizing principle in all notions of historical representation’— that makes the impossible seem possible, because the credibility it grants the incredible permits historians and their readers to suspend disbelief.\textsuperscript{218}

That the rational milieu of language can so deceive us might seem surprising. But there is yet a further deception: ‘the \textit{referential illusion}’ allows historians to write—literally \textit{invent}—whatever they wish, provided it is commonsensical, in keeping with the ‘cultural grammar’ of the society for which it is written, and conforms to the rules and conventions of the historiographical community to which they belong.\textsuperscript{219}

It is a symbiotic relationship on which the modern historiographical project is utterly dependent, but one that has a fragile existence, as Certeau perceptively explains:

\begin{quote}
History would fall to ruins without the key to the vault of its entire architecture: that is, without the connection between the act that it promotes and the society it reflects; the double status of the object that is a “realistic effect” in the text and the unspoken element implied by the closure of the discourse. If history leaves its proper place—the \textit{limit} that it posits and receives—it is broken asunder, to become nothing more than a fiction (the narrative of what happened) or an epistemological reflection (the elucidation of its own working laws).\textsuperscript{220}
\end{quote}

It is therefore unsurprising that history is the organising idea on which all nation-states depend. And it is the political role of historiography to which we now turn as we consider its operation in settler domains in general and New Zealand’s in particular, where nationalist historians construct and continually make over the settler-state as a collective good while purporting to tell the nation’s story \textit{wie es eigentlich gewesen}.\textsuperscript{221}

\textsuperscript{218} Barthes, \textit{The Rustle of Language}, 139, 141-8; Gourgouris, \textit{Dream Nation}, 263.
\textsuperscript{219} Barthes, \textit{The Rustle of Language}, 148; Dean Hammer, \textit{The Iliad as Politics: The Performance of Political Thought} (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2002), 11-12.
\textsuperscript{220} Certeau, \textit{The Writing of History}, 44.
PART B

HISTORIOGRAPHICAL OPERATION
CHAPTER FOUR
Problematising the settler domain

As we have seen, history, as différance, exists only as a discourse with no outside, and it is this that determines its ensemble and informs its entire economy. As a consequence, historical discourse is not a referential but ‘a fake performative discourse’ predicated on a metaphysics of presence.\(^1\) While, according to Jacques Derrida, ‘it could be shown that the concept of epistēmē has always called forth that of historia’ and that ‘history’, therefore, ‘is always the unity of a becoming’, history as we know it ultimately exists because we want it to exist, because we believe it exists, and in representational (historical) time it appears to have irrefutable confirmation that it does exist.\(^2\) This is possible, as Michel de Certeau explains, because ‘a society furnishes itself with a present time by virtue of historical writing . . . situated in respect of its other, the past.’\(^3\) That is, ‘narrativity, the metaphor of performative discourse, finds its support precisely in what it hides: the dead of which it speaks become the vocabulary of a task to be undertaken. Such is the ambivalence of historiography: it is the condition of a process and the denial of an absence; by turns it acts as the discourse of a law (historical saying opens a present to be made) and as an alibi, a realistic illusion (the realistic effect creates the fiction of another history).’\(^4\) Hence, Bonnie Smith could write:

historians perform a defining function for the nation-state, providing a story of the state’s past that marks off and distinguishes the past as the neutral backdrop to the present state—a backdrop composed of mathematical time. Insofar as nations evolved in the modern period, history fundamentally enabled that evolution by continually creating narrative accounts of what had gone before, in order to give historical universality to a contingent,

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\(^2\) Derrida, Writing and Difference, 291.
highly politicized institution. As each future became a present and then a historical past in
the progressive time of historical science, history ensured ‘depth’ and thus projected the
nation’s ongoing existence.  

Richard Southern understood why. As he has it in one of his presidential addresses
to the Royal Historical Society: ‘The first great lesson that the historians of our
period learnt from the classics was how to turn history into rhetoric. But there was
another lesson which had a still greater future in its influence on western historical
writing – the lesson that the destiny of nations is the noblest of all historical
themes.’

This, as we learned from Southern, placed an urgent obligation on historians to
produce the history they lacked, not only in England, Europe and beyond, but also in
settler domains. In the United States it resulted in a seminal essay of settler
historiography, ‘The Significance of the Frontier in American History’ (1893), in
which Frederick Jackson Turner proffers the organising myth that the westward
moving frontier, until it disappeared in 1880, provided ‘a single line, along which
‘perennial rebirth’ was experienced, ‘with its new opportunities, its continuous
touch with the simplicity of primitive society’, and so served to ‘furnish the forces
dominating American character.’ What this exigency meant for New Zealand
historians is explained by Erik Olssen: ‘There was a sense, being an historian in New
Zealand in the 70s, that we had to work hard to build up a basic body of knowledge.
Sinclair said we needed a generation of pedants. And he was right . . . there was this
powerful sense that we had to build the bricks of our historiography ourselves’.  

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5 Bonnie G. Smith, *The Gender of History: Men, Women, and Historical Practice* (Cambridge: Harvard
1957), 1-3. This paper was first ‘read at the meeting of the American Historical Association in
Chicago, July 12, 1893’ (*The Frontier in American History*, 1).
8 Erik Olssen, ‘Shaping of a Field’, Tony Ballantyne and Brian Moloughney (eds), *Disputed Histories:
Imagining New Zealand’s Past*, (Dunedin: Otago University Press, 2006), 227.
But what were those bricks and what exactly was being built? The former, by and large, were text-objects, known as primary sources, from which ‘evidence’ could be extracted/read into and to which value could be added in the form of meaning. However, without an outside to history, this was problematic, as Certeau points out:

In their devotion to “facts,” erudite scholars gather elements necessary for their research, but these are framed and mobilized with an order of knowledge of which they are unaware and which functions unbeknownst to them. The vindication of facts repeats the forms of their identification. Its implicit corollary is one of the preservation of norms and ideologies which determine the division, classification, and organization depending on the same postulates. ⁹

Hence, while New Zealand’s settler historians believed they were constructing the nation’s story wie es eigentlich gewesen, without problematising ‘the sign of history’ under which they were working, the body of knowledge they were building was inevitably a monument to settler ideology. ¹⁰ In taking history to be axiomatic rather than discursive and their bricks as unproblematised artifacts, they were paying little if any attention to the philosophical and linguistic problems impacting on their praxis. Above all, they were working under the illusion that they were referencing material not notional referents external to the discourse and that theirs, therefore, was a referential project, not a performative one obeying settlerism’s ‘transcendental teleology’. ¹¹ In short, their failure was the failure of all historians operating in the Rankean tradition—treating the past as an extradiscursive referent that can be accessed instead of as an intradiscursive idea that can be reached only metaphorically and considered only imaginatively.

However, as we saw in the Introduction, while the organising principle of settler discourse, the savage/civilised binary opposition, is an intradiscursive dyad

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⁹ Certeau, The Writing of History, 119-120.
congenital to settlerism, it nevertheless establishes the settler narrative as hegemonic in settler domains and confirms the settler in the role of civilising the savage. Yet just as the savage and the civilised need each other to be thought, so this oppositional relationship, as the (non-)centre of settlerism’s signifying system, also requires constant supplementation because the ‘centre’ is always already absent. Hence, Maori, as the settler’s Other, is repeatedly remade (supplemented) in New Zealand settler historiography to prevent the signifying system from collapsing (or becoming another system) and to affirm the hierarchical order in the expropriated geography the settler now controls. Thus, from Arthur Thomson’s introduction of this binary relationship in 1859, to Percy Smith’s nostalgic suggestion in 1898 that ‘the people themselves were dying out before the incoming white man’, to Ron Palenski’s subsuming of Maori in his 2011 thesis—‘Maori . . . contributed in no small measure to the manner in which New Zealand’s national identity developed’—we find this oppositional relationship determining the nature and extent of New Zealand’s settler discourse.12

In the following two examples, we consider, in the first, settler historians engaging with the savage/civilised binary, seemingly unaware of its justificatory role in their discourse as they attempt to quantify Maori savagism in support of the settler’s right to belong. In the second example, we examine a transcendental signifier presented as national theatre in which the target group of the first example, tangata whenua, predicated as savagely violent, is displaced by its successor group, European settlers, the violence of which, at a specific geographical location, ‘Gallipoli’ (the transcendental signifier), is valorized in order to endorse settler values and enable a forgetting of the violence on which its settler society is founded.13 In this example


13 The significance of forgetting is discussed by Stephen Turner in ‘Settlement as forgetting’, Klaus Neumann, Nicholas Thomas and Hilary Ericksen (eds), Quicksands: Foundational Histories in Australia and Aotearoa New Zealand (Sydney: University of New South Wales Press, 1999), 20-38.
we see how transcendental signifiers (or signifieds) substitute for originary lack in historical discourse and control both the extent (domain) and play of signification of both its genus (the idea of history) and its species (histories), respectively, its (impossible) set and sub-sets. We also see how the entire edifice of history would collapse without ‘the reality effect’.  

In considering these examples, it is helpful to bear in mind that in settler domains there are always (at least) two competing narratives, that of the settler, intent on justifying their expropriation of the geo-political space now under their control, and that of the indigenes, intent on reclaiming their position within that space. The former assumes the role of the superior or ‘cognitive genre’ and takes for its object ‘the “savage” narrative genre’, objectified as myth and characterised as “archaic”. In Aotearoa New Zealand, it subsumes and appropriates from the indigenous narrative, as well as judging it from within its own discursive structures and by its own discursive rules, which are always to the settler’s advantage. On the other hand, the indigenous population ‘speaks’ from within its own narrative, articulating its mana (authority) and mana motuhake (autonomy) as being foundational to its collective expression and belonging to those no longer living and those who are yet to come. While the latter was rarely heard in New Zealand prior to the establishment of the Waitangi Tribunal in 1975 to consider claims for breaches or omissions by the Crown in relation to the Treaty of Waitangi, since The Treaty of Waitangi Amendment Act 1985 by which claims were made retrospective to 1840, it has increasingly found a voice in public debate. However, there can be no resolution between these two heterogeneous narrative genres and their respective language communities because no (new) language exists to resolve that difference. Hence the différend—which not only points to the difference between the language

14 Barthes, _The Rustle of Language_, 139, 141-8.
15 Lyotard, _The Differend_, 156 §224.
communities but also identifies, names and describes the irresolvability that lies at the heart of that difference—remains and tangata whenua suffer the consequences.\(^{17}\)

Turning now to the first example, we find New Zealand settler historians broadly framing the so-called Musket Wars (c.1818-1840), a period of intertribal fighting in which European firearms were used for the first time, as catastrophic for Māori society, leaving its chiefs (rangatira) with little choice but to sign the Treaty of Waitangi in order to so save their society from itself and the encroaching outside world, with John Robinson describing it as ‘a collective madness that became a true holocaust.’\(^{18}\) In this historiographical playing out of the savage/civilised dyad, this fighting, with its purported horrendous fatalities figures, reminds the settler society of just how savage pre-Treaty Māori was and just how much it benefited from the intervention of the civilising British. Although these figures originate from within the settler discourse as part of its narrativised ideology and not extradiscursively, an arithmetical deconstruction of them is included in the following discussion in order to demonstrate not only their faux empirical basis but also how the ‘transcendental teleology’ of settlerism depends on settler historians supplementing the savage/civilized binary so that it continues to operate as the (non-)centre of their signifying centre and, in the process, produces the mythopoetic ‘presence’ on which settlerism depends.\(^{19}\) It is also included in order to critically examine Robinson’s numbers-based argument ‘that the Māori population decline of the nineteenth century was’ not ‘a direct consequence of the wrongs of colonisation that followed the signing of the Treaty of Waitangi’, including ‘loss of land’, but was primarily caused by ‘the ravages of the pre-Treaty intertribal wars.’\(^{20}\) That settler historians continue to rely on these improbable and unsupportable figures and build

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\(^{17}\) Lyotard, *The Differend*, xi.


\(^{19}\) Derrida, *The Other Heading*, 33.

\(^{20}\) Robinson, *When Two Cultures Meet*, 50, 61, 51, 3. Robinson is described as having a ‘doctorate in fluid mechanics’ (76), and having applied ‘mathematics to physical problems, before moving to wide-ranging interdisciplinary studies for international organisations’ (3).
on their own hyper-signification to the point of nonsensicality, is also indicative of
the extent to which they are implicated in making over the settler domain, the
undisclosed agenda of which is to displace the indigenous narrative while
promoting the settler nation-state as a collective good, as the ‘transcendental
community’ to come.\textsuperscript{21} Needless to say, the indigenous narrative presents a
markedly divergent view of this period of inter-iwi fighting, a matter that will be
discussed briefly in the Conclusion to this thesis.

\textbf{‘The dementia of enthusiasm’}\textsuperscript{22}

Of the casualties from this warfare, but without explaining the basis of his
computation, Thomson wrote: ‘Twenty thousand lives were sacrificed directly and
indirectly during those twenty years of strife in New Zealand.’\textsuperscript{23}

Thomson’s figure increased by over 300 per cent in 1872 when Locke Travers,
discussing the ‘immense destruction of life amongst the then existing population’,
quoted printer William Colenso: ‘“Blood flowed like water, and there can be no
doubt that the numbers killed during this period of twenty years, including those
who perished in consequence of the wars, far exceeded 60,000.”’\textsuperscript{24}

Hugh Carleton concurred with Travers and Colenso at the end of his first volume of
\textit{The Life of Henry Williams} (1874): ‘The inexorable law of blood for “blood for blood”
keeps on multiplying cause for vengeance, which only extermination can fore-close.
Nevertheless, after a series of wars, which are computed to have cost over sixty
thousand lives, Henry Williams established his name as “the peace-maker” over the
face of the country.’\textsuperscript{25}

\textsuperscript{21} Derrida, \textit{The Other Heading}, 33.
\textsuperscript{22} Lyotard ‘The sign of history’, 174.
\textsuperscript{23} Thomson, \textit{The Story of New Zealand}, 261.
\textsuperscript{24} W. T. L. Travers, \textit{Some Chapters in the Life and Times of Te Rauparaha, Chief of the Ngatitoa}
\textsuperscript{25} Hugh Carleton, \textit{The Life of Henry Williams, Archdeacon of Waimate}, James Elliott ed. (Wellington, A.
H. and A. W. Reed, 1948, first published, 1874), 322.
George Rusden returned the ‘body count’ to Thomson’s original figure in the second volume of his *History of New Zealand* (1883)—‘The musket was supposed to have destroyed 20,000 lives in tribal wars’—as did the Benedictine monk Domenico Felice Vaggioli when he referenced Thomson in his *History of New Zealand and its Inhabitants* (1891): ‘During the twenty years of continuous fighting in New Zealand, from 1821 until 1841, it is estimated that 20,000 natives perished in one way or another.’

‘Probably a fourth of their race perished in this ill-starred epoch’, wrote William Pember Reeves in 1898.

Percy Smith, Surveyor-General, ethnographer, co-founder of the Polynesian Society and inventor of the myth of the Great Fleet theory of Maori migration, increased Thomson’s figure four-fold when he wrote in the concluding chapter of his *Maori Wars of the Nineteenth Century* (1910) that ‘the Missionaries, who had the best means of forming an estimate, calculated that between the years 1800 and 1840, over 80,000 people had been killed or died through causes incidental to the wars.’

Elsdon Best, Smith’s fellow ethnographer and contributor to the *Journal of The Polynesian Society*, supported Smith’s figure when he wrote in his second volume of *Maori* (1924) that the missionaries, who ‘did good work in endeavouring to stay the ferocious contest’ that ‘had continued for twenty years’, ‘estimated that the

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introduction of firearms had caused, directly and indirectly, the destruction of 80,000 natives.’

Without either explanation or reference, Keith Sinclair, ‘the historian’s historian’, as Joseph Romanos described him when placing him at number 87 in *New Zealand's Top 100 History-makers* (2005), halved that figure in the New Edition of his seminal *A History of New Zealand* (1991): ‘In the twenties and early thirties these savage civil wars led to heavy casualties and cannibal feasts unprecedented in pre-European battles fought with stone-age weapons. It is estimated that about forty thousand people were slaughtered. It has taken until the present day for the Maori people to reach anything like their former numbers.’ Sinclair did not include the sentence containing the fatalities figure in his original text published in 1959 but included in that text the term ‘cannibalistic orgies’—thereby deferring to the common trope of sexualised cannibalism—which was redacted for his New Edition and substituted with ‘cannibal feasts’.

According to Harrison Wright, ‘the introduction of European muskets and other weapons provided a means of destruction such as had never before been realized in New Zealand . . . and killed Maoris in the tens of thousands. The explosive and violent nature of these wars resulted from the fact that a warlike people was suddenly given—and seized upon—an improved means of expressing its warlike nature.’

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31 Keith Sinclair, *A History of New Zealand* (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1959), 41. The text in the 1959 edition comparable with that at page 42 of the New Edition reads as follows: ‘In the twenties and early thirties these savage civil wars led to heavy casualties and cannibalistic orgies unprecedented in pre-European battles fought with stone-age weapons. It has taken until the present day for the Maori people to reach anything like their former numbers.’
Bill Oliver, also without explanation, doubled Sinclair’s estimate in *The Story of New Zealand* (1960), returning it to the Smith-Best number: ‘The series of tribal displacements set in train by the musket was of quite fundamental importance for the future of New Zealand. By the middle of the century something like 80,000 Maoris had been killed.’

However, with the publication of *Te Iwi Maori* in 1991, the demographer Ian Pool called these figures into question, proposing instead that ‘tribal warfare’, while a ‘dramatic element of the socio-political life of the period’ in terms of ‘internal migration’, ‘probably would have been a minor direct contributor to mortality in that era.’ Indeed, if Pool is correct and there were barely 100,000 Maori in 1769, the year of James Cook’s first visit, and if we accept his ‘best estimate’ of 80,000 for 1840, the year the Treaty of Waitangi was signed, a population decline of 20,000 over 70 years appears to be more in keeping with a gradual though not insignificant decline in the population resulting from introduced diseases than 20,000 fatalities over a 22-year period from muskets purportedly inaccurate beyond 40-50 metres and relatively scarce until the mid to late 1820s. Of Smith’s 80,000 figure, Pool opined that ‘over 100,000 persons’ would be ‘expected to have died over this 30-

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35 Pool, *Te Iwi Maori*, 57, 53, 58, 238. The population figure of 100,000 accords with the view of George Forster who accompanied Cook on his second voyage: George Forster, *A Voyage Round the World: Volume I*, eds Nicholas Thomas and Oliver Berghof, (Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 1999, first published 1777), 279. While Pool refers to ‘Cook’s estimate’ at pages 42 and 53 of *Te Iwi Maori*, he also notes at page 42 that both the figure and its ‘inflationary tendency’ may be the work of John Reinold Forster who accompanied Cook on his second voyage, and who wrote: ‘therefore allowing 100,000 souls to both islands we rather think our estimate to fall short of the true population’. *Te Ara – The Encyclopedia of New Zealand* has this to say on the subject: ‘The actual size of the pre-European Maori population is uncertain. Captain Cook, whose first visit to New Zealand was in 1769, estimated that there were about 100,000 Maoris, but he did not visit some of the most populous inland centres, and his estimate was almost certainly low. In all likelihood the true figure was at least double this. There seems no doubt that contact with Europeans was speedily followed by a serious decline in Maori numbers.’ See: ‘POPULATION, POPULATION TRENDS, AND THE CENSUS’, from An Encyclopaedia of New Zealand, edited by A. H. McLintock, originally published in 1966. *Te Ara* - the Encyclopedia of New Zealand, updated 22-Apr-09 URL: http://www.TeAra.govt.nz/en/1966/population/1 ; R. D. Crosby, *The Musket Wars: A History of Inter-Iwi Conflict 1806-45*, 2nd edn (Auckland: Reed, 2001, first published 1999), 370; Angela Ballara, *Taua: 'Musket Wars', 'Land Wars' or Tikanga: Warfare in Maori Society in the Early Nineteenth Century* (Auckland: Penguin Books, 2003), 402.
year period in the “normal” course of events, with or without wars’, and ‘over 250,000 for the entire seven decades’ from 1769 to 1840. If Smith, Best and Oliver’s 80,000 is correct, then, according to Pool’s ‘best estimate’ for 1840, Maori would have annihilated its entire population at the rate of 3,636 per annum over the twenty-two year period of the fighting. If Sinclair’s 40,000 is correct, then, on the basis that men did most of the fighting, the male Maori population would have been annihilated in that period, and the population unable to re-generate itself. Even Thomson’s 20,000 may have meant that Maori could not have survived. Furthermore, if we accept Pool’s argument that the 1840 population declined at the rate of -1.6 per cent per annum to 56,000-62,000 by 1858 and suffered an estimated total net loss of 38,000 from 1840 to 1891, at which point it stabilised and began a slow recovery, we can see that Sinclair’s proposition that ‘it has taken until the present day [1959] for the Maori people to reach anything like their former numbers’—that is, numbers immediately prior to the Musket Wars—elides from his narrative the most likely causes of Maori’s demographic decline in the three decades following the signing of the Treaty—namely, ‘the increasing number and density of the Pakeha population’, ‘introduced diseases’, and the dramatic impact of land alienation subsequent to the sustained military assault on Maori by the British Imperial forces in what are known as the New Zealand Wars (1845-1872), described by Sinclair as ‘savage civil wars’ and by James Belich as ‘New Zealand’s great “civil war”’. In short, Pool’s monograph highlights the faux empirical basis of the savagism trope as informed by the Musket Wars fatalities figures: ‘Analysis shows that from 1840 the rate of Maori population decline actually intensified. . . .

36 Pool, Te Iwi Maori, 44.
37 Pool, Te Iwi Maori, 76 Table 5.2.
38 Pool, Te Iwi Maori, 61, 76, 58, 62. Pool’s ‘best’ estimate for the Maori population in 1891, based on census figures, was 41,993 (Te Iwi Maori, 76 Table 5.2); Sinclair, A History of New Zealand, New Edition, 42; Sinclair, A History of New Zealand (1959), 41; James Belich, The New Zealand Wars and the Victorian Interpretation of Racial Conflict (Auckland: Penguin, 1998, first published 1986), 10; James Belich, Introduction, The New Zealand Wars: Nga pakanga nunui o Aotearoa, (Landmark Productions and Television New Zealand, 2004), James Belich, Tainui Stephens, Colin McRea. Belich (writer/narrator): ‘We learned about a sanitised version of the New Zealand Wars. They were New Zealand’s great civil war. We need to see the real history behind the images.’
British colonisation thus did not bring the Maori population a reprieve by producing a calm and stable environment. Instead, it brought the threat of extinction closer.\textsuperscript{39}

Aware of Pool’s work, Belich, in \textit{Making Peoples} (1996), pulled back the figure to Thomson’s still improbable original, conceding that the ‘estimates of up to 80,000 killed’ in the Musket Wars, bequeathed by ‘two unreliable groups: missionaries and Maori victors . . . would have left few Maori alive.’\textsuperscript{40} But in doing so, he added the following rider: ‘The Musket Wars were the largest conflict ever fought on New Zealand soil. They killed more New Zealanders than World War One – perhaps about 20,000.’\textsuperscript{41} Thus, in a single \textit{supplementing} sentence, Belich not only subverted Pool’s commentary on these figures with an anachronism, he also enhanced the savage/civilised motif by transforming musket-toting Maori before they signed the ‘civilising’ Treaty into a more effective killing collective than the Central Powers of World War One with their vastly more sophisticated weaponry, including machine guns.

While Pool’s thesis may have caused a lack of specificity in Ron Crosby’s comments concerning these figures in his Prologue to \textit{The Musket Wars} (1999)—‘probably somewhere between 50,000 and 60,000 had been killed, enslaved or forced to migrate as a result of the wars (working from estimates generated by Ian Pool and others)’—Trevor Bentley, the following year, ran with Belich’s invention, although without acknowledging his source: ‘More New Zealanders probably died during the Musket Wars than in any subsequent conflict in which they took part, whether in New Zealand or overseas. Although exact casualty figures cannot be determined, between 20,000 and 30,000 may have died either in battle or of disease (with one estimate putting the mortality as high as 80,000).’\textsuperscript{42} Despite having the benefit of Pool’s research to call on, Bentley then appropriated Sinclair’s proposition, again

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{39} Pool, \textit{Te Iwi Maori}, 238.
\item \textsuperscript{41} Belich, \textit{Making Peoples}, 157.
\item \textsuperscript{42} Crosby, \textit{The Musket Wars}, 17; Bentley, ‘Musket Wars’, 340.
\end{itemize}
without acknowledgement, that ‘it would be 1960 before . . . [Maori ‘overall numbers’] again reached pre-Musket Wars levels’.43 Bentley also utilised the motif of Maori slaves being used as carriers of provisions and munitions during raids as well as being a food supplement when ‘the provisions were depleted’, a claim found in Crosby’s Prologue: ‘As slaves, they also constituted a food source in themselves, particularly on campaigns—on the war trail they were literally the meat on foot. Kai-tangata (cannibalism [lit. man-food]) became a fixed way of life for the victors, although the European potato was the most important food source for taua (war parties).’44

In The Penguin History of New Zealand (2003), Michael King repeated Belich’s idea, again without acknowledgement, while suggesting an elevated figure: ‘Over a period of 30 years these actions had been responsible for the deaths of at least 20,000 Maori, and possibly many more. Even this figure would make these wars the most costly of any in which New Zealanders previously or subsequently took part.’45

Four years later, Richard Wolf recycled Belich by way of King: ‘The fiercest fighting during the so-called Musket Wars occurred between 1822 and 1836, with activity peaking in in 1832-33. These tribal conflicts still had a few years to run, with the last major outbreaks occurring in 1839-40. However, the three decades dominated by the musket produced a death toll estimated by historian Michael King at in excess of 20,000, making those wars the most costly of any in which New Zealanders have taken part.’46

By the time the History Group, a division of the government’s Ministry for Culture and Heritage/Manatū Taonga, had written the storylines for Frontier of Dreams, a

43 Bentley, ‘Musket Wars’, 344.
television series utilising ‘as many as one thousand people’ and taking nearly five years and $4.5 million to make, as well as publishing a book of the same name, it was clear that these unsubstantiated figures and Belich’s theory formed a recognisable trope in New Zealand historiography. Sensationally re-packaging the Musket Wars fatalities with a metaphor informed by intertextual traces of cannibalism, Gavin McLean, like Bentley and King before him, repeated the Belich theory without referencing its source: ‘The butcher’s bill for these wars is as hazy as many of the events, but even if scholars now discount an earlier estimate of 80,000 deaths from fighting or disease, the lowest recent guesstimate, 20,000 plus, exceeds the New Zealand casualties in either of the two world wars; and if measured in terms of casualties per head of population, they were even worse.’ This extraordinary claim also appeared fourth on a list of twenty trivia questions when Television New Zealand (TVNZ), the state-owned broadcaster, aired Frontier of Dreams on TV One in 2005: ‘Did you know that . . . more Maori were killed in the Musket Wars at the beginning of the 19th Century than all the New Zealanders killed during World War One’?

So finally there existed government endorsement of Belich’s proposition that Maori were so savage that they succeeded in killing more New Zealanders in the Musket Wars than Germany and its allies in either World War I or World War II. Indeed, according to McLean, Maori killed at least (if not more than) 25 per cent of the total population in the Musket Wars (20,000 / 80,000 x 100), compared with Germany and its allies killing 1.75 per cent of the total New Zealand population in World War I (18,500 / 1,058,312 x 100) and 0.73 per cent of the total New Zealand population population

47 The approximate production cost of the television series Frontier of Dreams is taken from Fiona Rae, ‘Digging up the Past’, New Zealand Listener (8 October 2005), 70: http://www.listener.co.nz/search.do?q=Frontier+of+Dreams&x=0&y=0; Frontier of Dreams (Whakapapa Productions, 2005). The historians listed by TVNZ as having worked on the Frontier of Dreams project, and described as ‘many of the best historical minds in New Zealand’, are: Dame Claudia Orange, Jock Phillips, Ranginui Walker, Manuka Henare, Matt McGlone, Geoff Irwin, Janet Davidson, Dame Anne Salmond, Dame Judith Binney, Danny Keenan, Gavin McLean, Erik Olssen, Ian McGibbon, Miles Fairburn, Malcolm McKinnon, Bronwyn Dalley, Charlotte MacDonald.


In World War II (11,928 / 1,637,300 x 100)\(^{50}\). In other words, Belich, King, McLean, Wolf, and the New Zealand government would have their readers believe that Maori, armed with muskets and hand weapons, were 14.29 times (25 / 1.75) or 1,429 per cent (25 / 1.75 x 100) more effective than the Central Powers in World War I and 34.25 times (25 / 0.73) or 3,425 per cent (25 / 0.73 x 100) more effective than the Axis Powers in World War II at killing New Zealanders.\(^{51}\)

In *The Penguin Book of New Zealanders at War* (2009), McLean completed what he had begun in *Frontier of Dreams*, adding to Belich’s hyper-signification by quantifying Maori savagism on the basis of a fatalities-to-total population ratio in the Musket Wars expressed as a fatalities-to-total population in World War I:

> The old estimates ['for the Musket Wars'] of 80,000 deaths from fighting and disease have been lowered to 20,000, still more than five times greater than the death toll of World War I, our costliest overseas war. On a per capita basis that would equate to about 200,000 deaths in World War I instead of the 18,000 lives actually lost.\(^{52}\)

This quantification of Maori’s savagism is, however, fatally flawed. To begin with, and the nub of the problem, is that the Musket Wars fatalities figure has no reliable means of verification, and, as we have seen, fluctuates *within* the historiography from 20,000 to 80,000. As well, there is a level of inadequation between the

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\(^{50}\) The first calculation is based on McLean’s and *New Zealand History online*’s claim of 20,000 and Pool’s median figure of 80,000 for 1840.

\(^{51}\) In the first calculation, the 20,000 is based on McLean’s figure (quoted above) and the *New Zealand History online* website figure (quoted above), and the 80,000 being Pool’s estimate of the median population figure for 1840, there being an additional estimated 2,000 non-Maori in New Zealand in 1840, a figure based on Pool’s estimation that Maori outnumbered Pakeha ‘by perhaps 40:1’ (*Te Iwi Maori*, 61). In the second calculation, the figure of 18,500 New Zealand fatalities in World War I is taken from *New Zealand History online*: [http://www.nzhistory.net.nz/category/tid/215](http://www.nzhistory.net.nz/category/tid/215) with the population figure of 1,058,312 being the New Zealand census figure for 1911: [http://www2.stats.govt.nz/domino/external/pasfull/pasfull.nsf/7cf46ae26dcb6800cc256a62000a2248/4e2567e00247c6acc256b6d00070604?OpenDocument](http://www2.stats.govt.nz/domino/external/pasfull/pasfull.nsf/7cf46ae26dcb6800cc256a62000a2248/4e2567e00247c6acc256b6d00070604?OpenDocument). In the third calculation, the figure of 11,928 New Zealand fatalities in World War II, a War Graves Commission figure, is taken from *New History online*: [http://www.nzhistory.net.nz/war/second-world-war/counting-the-cost](http://www.nzhistory.net.nz/war/second-world-war/counting-the-cost), and the New Zealand population figure in 1940 is a mean estimated figure from Statistics New Zealand: [http://www.stats.govt.nz/tables/historical-population.htm](http://www.stats.govt.nz/tables/historical-population.htm), the last prior census having been taken in 1936, and there being no census in 1941 because of World War II.

circumstances of both wars that makes a statistical comparison such as this misleading.\textsuperscript{53} Nonetheless, this raw extrapolation of data is worth investigating further because it is instructive of how history operates rhetorically in the settler domain.

That McLean's theoretical fatalities figure is an invalid statistic for WWI is apparent for at least three reasons. First, the 200,000 is approximately double the total number of service personnel New Zealand sent overseas in WWI, which, according to the Ministry for Culture and Heritage for whom McLean works as 'Senior Historian', is 103,000.\textsuperscript{54} Second, 200,000 equates to approximately 37.8 per cent of the country's total male population at the time of the 1911 Census, the last census before World War I \(\left(\frac{1,058,312}{2} = 529,156; \frac{200,000}{529,156} = 37.8\right)\).\textsuperscript{55} Third, given that New Zealand's WWI fatalities figure of 18,500 is 17.96 per cent of the 103,000 service personnel sent overseas \(\left(\frac{18,500}{103,000} = 17.96\right)\), based on that percentage, New Zealand needed to have sent 1,113,586 \(\left(\frac{200,000}{17.96} \times 100\right)\) service personnel to WWI, which is 55,274 more than the total number of men, women and children living in New Zealand at time of the 1911 Census \(\left(1,113,586 - 1,058,312\right)\).

Thus, while McLean's extrapolation of 20,000 to 200,000, on the basis that his WWI population is 1 million and his Musket Wars population is 100,000, is arithmetically correct \(\left(\frac{1,000,000}{100,000} = 200,000\right)\), the 200,000 cannot be supported

\textsuperscript{53} For instance, WWI was fought in trenches with mustard gas, machine guns and tanks and the Musket Wars were apparently largely fought by way of bushland skirmishes and inefficient muskets. \textsuperscript{54} New Zealand History online states that 'The total population of New Zealand in 1914 was just over one million' \(\left(1,058,312\right)\), that '103,000' enlisted New Zealanders 'served overseas', and that '18,500 New Zealanders died in or because of the war': 'New Zealand and the First World War', URL: http://www.nzhistory.net.nz/war/ww1-overview, (Ministry for Culture and Heritage), updated 16-May-2011; 'Overview - Musket Wars', URL: http://www.nzhistory.net.nz/war/musket-wars/overview, (Ministry for Culture and Heritage), updated 2-Dec-2011. For Gavin McLean's status as 'Senior Historian Heritage Services Branch', as published by the Editor on 29 August 2011, see: http://www.mch.govt.nz/about-ministry/our-people/our-specialists. \textsuperscript{55} New Zealand census figure for 1911: http://www2.stats.govt.nz/domino/external/pasfull/pasfull.nsf/7cf46ae26dc86800cc256a62000a2248/4c2567ef00247c6acc256b6d00070604?OpenDocument.
either by the total population of New Zealand at the time or the number of service personnel New Zealand sent overseas, and is therefore an invalid statistical comparison. Furthermore, if the fatalities figure of 200,000 is an unsustainable figure for a population of 1 million (in 1914), then the Musket Wars’ fatalities figure of 20,000 is likely to be unsustainable for a population of 100,000 (in 1840). While, to repeat, no valid statistical comparison can be drawn between the two wars, the closest we might venture is to say that if 18,500 WWI fatalities represents 1.75% of the total population at the 1911 Census, and if we accept McLean’s population figure of approximately 100,000 for 1840, then the Musket Wars fatalities figures would be in the order of 1,750 (100,000 x 1.75 / 100). Alternatively, if we say that 9.73 per cent of the population was sent overseas in WWI (103,000 x 100 / 1,058,312) and if 17.9 per cent of that percentage were killed (18,500 x 100 / 103,000), then 9.73 per cent of the 1840 population of 100,000 is 9,730 (100,000 x 9.73 / 100) and 17.96 per cent of 9,730 produces a Musket Wars’ fatalities figure of 1,747 (9,730 x 17.96 / 100). That the fatalities for the Musket Wars is likely to be no more than 2,000, or 10 per cent of the widely accepted 20,000, would seem to be in keeping with Pool’s view ‘that the most severe demographic impact of this new technology was migration rather than direct mortality’, and also in keeping with the fatalities figure of 3,000 for the New Zealand Wars (fought between Maori and British and colonial forces between 1860-1872) posted on New Zealand History online.

What tentative conclusions might we draw from the above?

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56 Based on the 1911 Census figure of 1,058,312 and Pool’s median estimate of 80,000 for the 1840 population, McLean’s 200,000 becomes considerably higher at 264,578 (1,058,312 x 20,000 / 80,000).

57 While McLean does not show his readers how he arrived at his population-adjusted ‘per capita’ figure for World War I of ‘200,000’, because it equates to 18.9 per cent of the 1911 census, the last census before World War I, of 1,058,312 (200,000 / 1,058,312 x 100), his 20,000 must also equate to 18.9 per cent of the total population at some unspecified time during the Musket Wars. (McLean, ‘New Zealand’s Internal Wars – an Overview’, 28.) Thus, his New Zealand Musket Wars’ population figure must be 105,820 (20,000 / 18.9 x 100).

We could say, first of all, that it is the savage/civilised binary that largely controls the Musket Wars discourse rather than the purported 20,000 fatalities, incorrectly taken to be a material referent lying outside the discourse. That is, instead of discarding the 20,000 when its extrapolation to 200,000 showed it to be invalid, McLean appears to have retained it because it signifies a ‘hyper-savagism’ that supports the logocentric logic of the settler discourse even as it enhances the civilising motif of settlerism. It is also part of the process of supplementarity that historians are unavoidably engaged in; without transcendental signifieds acting as centres of discourse, and without their constantly being supplemented, there would be no control over the signifying system constructed around them, and, as noted above, it would morph into another system or eventually collapse. Put alternatively, because the narrative believes it is telling the settler story wie es eigentlich gewesen, it treats Belich’s speech-act—‘The Musket Wars were the largest conflict ever fought on New Zealand soil. They killed more New Zealanders than World War One – perhaps about 20,000’—as supportive information lying outside the discourse, when, as McLean’s extrapolation shows, it is nothing more than settler rhetoric within the discourse itself.59 Furthermore, as the domain’s hegemonic discourse, the settler narrative is answerable to no-one and is likely to remain free from contradiction or censure provided that what it publishes accords with the beliefs and expectations of the audience for which it is written: the settler society. Finally, settler historians, wittingly or not, appear to be complicit in the ideological operation of settler historiography. Indeed so complicit is the Ministry for Culture and Heritage in its ideological construction of the settler domain that it posted McLean’s incoherent claim on New Zealand History online: ‘Between 1818 and the early 1830s an estimated 20,000 Māori were killed in what have been called the Musket Wars. On a per capita basis this is equivalent to around 200,000 deaths in the First World War instead of the 18,500 New Zealand lives actually lost.’60

60 ‘Overview - Musket Wars’, URL: http://www.nzhistory.net.nz/war/musket-wars/overview, (Ministry for Culture and Heritage), updated 2-Dec-2011. This text has subsequently been updated
Thus we can see how ‘the “archaic”’ or ‘the “savage” narrative genre’ becomes the object of ‘the cognitive genre’, substituting for originary lack and perpetuating an inherent double function, which is to privilege and denigrate at the same time, and how, with help from ‘the reality effect’, narration becomes the ‘outside’ to history and confirms, as if it were history itself, that tangata whenua, before the settler arrived, were marginally human.61 By comparison with the 200,000, or even the original 20,000 Musket Wars fatalities, the 3,000 fatalities figure for the New Zealand Wars, effectively wars of dispossession, seems like small change indeed.62 It is also ‘a politics of the “empty set”, exploiting the contradiction exposed by Russell’s set-theoretical paradox that all members of a group correspond with the name of the group (i.e. the class) by which they are described.63 In this way all Maori are made savage, and any doubts that they needed civilising are liable to evaporate under the harsh glare of the Musket Wars figures.

McLean’s ‘butcher’s bill’, then, not only augments the information it presents as factual, information that cannot be tested and for which there is no reliable source,

and now reads as follows: ‘Between 1818 and the early 1830s thousands of Māori were killed in what have been called the Musket Wars. Many more were enslaved or became refugees. Although estimates vary, the deaths caused by these conflicts may have exceeded the 18,500 New Zealand lives lost in the First World War. At a time when the total population was perhaps only 100,000 (compared to around a million in 1914-18), the Musket Wars had a massive impact on these islands’ (‘Overview - Musket Wars’, URL: http://www.nzhistory.net.nz/war/musket-wars/overview, (Ministry for Culture and Heritage), updated 20-Dec-2012). A variant of McLean’s claim can also be found at New Zealand History online under the rubric ‘Writing about New Zealand’s internal wars’: ‘Tens of thousands of Māori died in the intertribal Musket Wars of the opening decades of the 19th century. On a per capita basis the estimated casualty figures for these wars are equivalent to around 200,000 New Zealand deaths in the First World War (in which 18,000 lives were actually lost)’ (‘Writing about New Zealand’s internal wars’, URL: http://www.nzhistory.net.nz/media/photo/writing-about-new-zelands-internal-wars, (Ministry for Culture and Heritage), updated 20-Dec-2012); Simon Critchley, ‘Heidegger’s Being and Time, part 8: Temporality’, The Guardian (27 July 2009, modified 6 August 2009): http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/belief/2009/jul/27/heidegger-being-time-philosophy.

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61 Lyotard, The Differend, 156 §224; Barthes, The Rustle of Language, 139, 141-8.
it also carries a powerful message of negation for the narrative’s referent.\textsuperscript{64} But this should not surprise given the Government’s investment in recent years to making over New Zealand. The Ministry for Culture and Heritage’s History Group, for instance, is purported to be ‘the country’s largest group of New Zealand history specialists’, and its Reference (Te Ara) Group had a combined budget of $2,149,000 for the 2005-2006 financial year; between them they had 27 staff in 2006-7.\textsuperscript{65} In 2008, the then Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Finance, Michael Cullen, a former university history lecturer, made a provision of $754.9 million Budget for ‘the development of New Zealand’s unique national identity’.\textsuperscript{66}

Before concluding this section, we might briefly consider the figures for the 1801-1840 period of intertribal fighting presented by Captain James Rutherford at the Officers’ Club, Auckland, in 1961: 35,400 ‘Probable Killed’ and 8,200 ‘Probable Captured’.\textsuperscript{67} By relabelling the latter as ‘wounded’ and adding the two together, Robinson, in 2012, arrived at a total fatalities figure for Rutherford of ‘43,600’, which he discounted ‘by 0.25% a year (11,365) in order to account for an assumed ability of the population to sustain some losses during a period of war’, thereby

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
    \item \textsuperscript{64} McLean and McGibbon (eds), \textit{The Penguin Book of New Zealanders at War}, 12.
    \item \textsuperscript{65} The staff, budget and salary figures were provided to the author by the then Chief Historian, Bronwyn Dalley, in a letter from the Ministry for Culture and Heritage dated 11 September 2006, in response to an Official Information Act request.
    \item \textsuperscript{66} Michael Cullen, ‘Budget 2008 for the Government of New Zealand’, delivered on 22 May 2008: \url{http://www.treasury.govt.nz/budget/2008/speech/03.htm}.
    \item \textsuperscript{67} J. (James) Rutherford, ‘Some characteristics of Maori warfare’, The Bayly Memorial Lecture, Papers. 1926-1963. MSS & Archive A-42, Box 16, folder 6; J. (James) Rutherford, ‘Note on Maori Casualties in their Tribal Wars 1801-1840’, Papers. 1926-1963. MSS & Archive A-42, Box 16, folder 6. Special Collections, The University of Auckland Library, Table I. between pages 3 and 4. It should be noted that two of the five columns of ‘Table I.’ contain arithmetical errors, and that Rutherford produces an alternative figure, 42,000, for deaths related directly to warfare from the first three figures in a list produced at page 7 of ‘Some characteristics of Maori warfare’, which reads: ‘The loss of 65,000 from 1801 to 1840 could be accounted for somewhat as follows:-

\begin{tabular}{|l|c|}
    \hline
    Killed in battle & say 32,000 \hline
    Died of wounds & 7,000 \hline
    Killed in captivity & 3,000 \hline
    Deaths from hardship etc. during dispersals & 10,000 \hline
    Loss from diseases, and other causes. & 13,000.' \hline
\end{tabular}
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
establishing his own fatalities figure of ‘32,325’.68 These numbers, according to Robinson, explain why, after 1840, there was ‘a fundamental shift of culture – a choice, by the mass of Maori, to change from traditional ways (with bloody feuds, intertribal war, slavery, cannibalism, infanticide) to the new culture that was offered. This was a mass movement, as close to a democratic expression as was possible, and it was overwhelming.’69 As he concludes: ‘Life, free from attacks and slaughter, liberty free from slavery, then the pursuit of happiness became possible for so many. This was a great gift from Western civilisation to so many Maori.’70

While noting that ‘[m]any historians are scarcely numerate’, and that ‘[r]evisionist historians’, such as Belich and King, ‘appear’ to pluck ‘rounded-off numbers . . . out of the air’, Robinson, ‘an applied mathematician’, variously regards Rutherford’s figures as ‘[t]he best available estimates of battles and casualties’, ‘thorough and cautious’, and ‘well-based’, despite Rutherford providing no identifiable sources for his figures and noting that ‘[a]ny calculation of this sort is hazardous, and leaves a big margin of error.’71 Furthermore, while Robinson appears to believe he is referencing extratextual ‘evidence’ by way of Rutherford’s figures, it is apparent that the figures themselves are an intratextual production.72 We know this because Robinson begins by referencing Crosby’s 50,000 to 60,000 figure from The Musket Wars to demonstrate that ‘the period of the intertribal wars (the ‘Musket Wars’ of 1805-40)’ was ‘a time of undoubted savagery’, before turning to Rutherford’s text, which relentlessly constructs Maori as its barely human Other by attaching to them such traits as animality and lack of rationality.73 According to Rutherford, Ngapuhi, ‘the first to obtain muskets’, were ‘man-eating musketeers’, and Maori ‘fighting was

68 Robinson, When Two Cultures Meet, 64, 66-7, 119 (‘43,000’), 196 (‘43,000’). It appears that Robinson has made an error with his figure of 32,325 at page 66, the correct figure presumably being 32,235 (43,600 – 11,365).
69 Robinson, When Two Cultures Meet, 89.
70 Robinson, When Two Cultures Meet, 90.
72 Robinson, When Two Cultures Meet, 8 passim.
73 Robinson, When Two Cultures Meet, 63.
as a rule primitive and savage, treacherous, brutal and merciless’. They went to war, he adds, ‘often for the most trivial reasons’, ‘impregnated’ their ‘fighting . . . with magic and superstition’, and sexualised their warring: ‘There appears to have been a distinct connection between the hot bloodedness of sex and the lust for battle . . . Should the excitement of the occasion cause any warrior to produce the appropriate symptom of his masculine potency, he displayed the gruesome object with pride.’ Rutherford also depicts Maori as engaging in ‘cannibalism’, another cultural practice he associates with warfare—‘On military expeditions, slaves on the hoof were a normal part of the commissariat’—as well as sexualising this purportedly widespread custom: ‘the Maoris had an insatiable craving for human flesh’, an ‘appetite’ indulged ‘on a gargantuan scale’, with ‘[t]he gourmet’ having ‘his favourite tit bits – the breast, the rump, and the fingers and toes were the delicacies, and a prime female rump was highly esteemed.’ Unsurprisingly, echoes of Rutherford’s and other like-minded texts abound in Robinson’s writing: ‘There was frequent cannibalism. Often, during the intertribal wars, whole communities when captured would be slaughtered and eaten’, a truth-claim Robinson supports by quoting yet another text, the Sydney Herald of 10 April 1837: ‘The New Zealanders are inveterate cannibals . . . [and they] describe the breasts as a very tender part . . . It is likely to be many generations before this horrid practice is abolished entirely from among them.’ As Robinson concludes: ‘Traditional pre-contact Maori society was abominable, with no dignity or equality and no respect for human life. The recognition that it was no different from many others, indeed typical of old hunter-gatherer tribal societies, has strengthened my appreciation of the tremendous advances and benefits of European civilisation.’

74 Rutherford, ‘Note on Maori Casualties in their Tribal Wars 1801-1840’, 4; Rutherford, ‘Some characteristics of Maori tribal warfare’, 1.
75 Rutherford, ‘Some characteristics of Maori tribal warfare’, 2, 5.
76 Rutherford, ‘Some characteristics of Maori tribal warfare’, 7.
77 Robinson, When Two Cultures Meet, 30. The introduction and use of the term ‘this horrid practice’ into the discourse of cannibalism is discussed in Chapter Six of this thesis.
78 Robinson, When Two Cultures Meet, 263.
Rutherford’s (modified) numbers, then, provide the foundation for Robinson’s argument against what he calls ‘the modern grievance industry’—that it was the pre-Treaty Musket Wars and not post-Treaty colonisation that caused the dramatic demographic ‘collapse’ of nineteenth-century Maori: ‘The deaths of so many had reduced the population, and it was this, along was a shortage of women and children’, ‘the next generation of breeders’, that ‘largely determined the inevitable population decline from 1840 onwards, and until late in the century.’ Having agreed with Pool that the indigenous population at 1840 was about 80,000, Robinson adds ‘[a]n additional decline of 15,000 . . . due to the disruption of the society and the resultant negative demographic distribution’ to his fatalities figure of 32,325 to establish a population of 127,000 at 1800, ‘which’, he writes, ‘is within the range of most other estimates’, except that of Pool, whose 100,000 for 1769 is the ‘improbable’ but maximum possible figure before the indigenous population ‘suffered the shock of European contact.’ Thus by relying on Rutherford’s unsupported figures, which vary considerably from preparatory notes to final presentation, Robinson is able to postulate a population decline related directly to the pre-Treaty fighting of 47,000 (127,000 – 80,000) or 37 per cent of the population over a 40-year period, a loss he describes as ‘an orgy of killing’ and ‘out-and-out extermination.’ Although Robinson believes his book is ‘is a holistic synthesis of the reports of others, who have been allowed to speak in their own voices’, it is clear that, like Palenski et al., he cannot escape the text or his own socialisation into settlerism.

Robinson’s book, then, not only makes the cardinal error of treating the Musket Wars fatalities figures as extradiscursive ‘evidence’ instead of notional referents

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79 Robinson, When Two Cultures Meet, 10 passim, 50, 62. ‘The modern grievance industry’ is Robinson’s metonymic term for the settlement process that investigates Maori claims to the Waitangi Tribunal for breaches of the Treaty of Waitangi by the Crown through actions and/or omissions.

80 Robinson, When Two Cultures Meet, 54, 59, 66, 65; Pool, Te Iwi Maori, 53, 57.

81 Robinson, When Two Cultures Meet, 46-7.

82 Robinson, When Two Cultures Meet, 263. See David E. Stannard, ‘Recounting the Fables of Savagery: Native Infanticide and the Functions of Political Myth’, Journal of American Studies, 25/3, (1991), 383-5, for a helpful explanation of the cultural thinking that gives rise to arguments such as Robinson’s.
that exist intradiscursively, but also demonstrates a ‘dementia of enthusiasm’ of a type commonly associated with justificatory or exculpatory discourse. As well, it encapsulates the principal tropes of settlerism while reminding us that all historical discourse, whether the product of ‘good’ or ‘bad’ historiography, is fake in its performativity precisely because there is no hors-texte.

With the above in mind, let us turn now to our second example, ‘Gallipoli’, and the play of signification that surrounds it.

**Gallipoli as text**

Every year, the 25th of April is the day in Australia and New Zealand when their ‘fundamental history’ is theatricalised through a nation-wide re-staging of the Gallipoli campaign of 1915, a large-scale military misadventure in which both countries were involved. During this re-staging, broadcast nation-wide on radio and Television from locations around the country, we find it repackaged in heroic and patriotic terms by the nation’s leading ‘actors’ who themselves are surrounded by a large supporting cast of representatives from the armed forces and from central and local government. But what precisely is the purpose of this large-scale production given that all Gallipoli survivors in New Zealand and Australia have now passed on? What does Anzac Day stand for? What does it mean?

Historians in both countries give much the same answer as that provided in 1924 by Australia’s official war correspondent, official war historian, and arguably the creator of the Anzac legend, Charles Bean: ‘In no unreal sense it was on the 25th of 83 Robinson, *When Two Cultures Meet*, 8 passim; Lyotard ‘The sign of history’, 174.


86 ANZAC (also Anzac) is the acronym first given to the Australia and New Zealand Army Corps that took part in the landing at Gallipoli in 1915.
April, 1915, that the consciousness of Australian nationhood was born.'\textsuperscript{87} Bean was much concerned with ‘character’ when editing and helping to write the official history of Australia’s involvement in the Great War. ‘The first question for my fellow-historians and myself clearly was: how did the Australian people – and the Australian character, if there is one – come through the universally recognised test of this, their first great war?’\textsuperscript{88} His answer was straightforward: ‘Actually it was discipline – firmly based on the national habit of facing facts and going straight for the objective – that was responsible for the astonishing success which first gave to other nations confidence in Australia, and to the Australian nation confidence in itself.’\textsuperscript{89}

On a broader view, World War I was, for Bean, about freedom, and more broadly still, about the survival of civilisation itself. As he wrote in ‘The Anzac Legacy’, the chapter concluding his abridged version of the Great War published in 1946: ‘If the cause that led Australians to enlist can be reduced to a single principle, it is the principle of protecting their homes and their freedom by sustaining a system of law and order between nations.’\textsuperscript{90} This, for Bean, was a universal principle, one of the fundamental ‘lessons of history’ upon which civilisation depended:

\begin{quote}
only in conditions ensuring freedom of thought and communication can mankind progress; and that such freedom can be maintained only by the qualities by which from Grecian times it has been won – by such qualities as our own people managed to preserve through the first 126 peaceful years of their existence – the readiness at any time to die for freedom, if
\end{quote}


necessary, and the virility to struggle for it. In facing that necessity we now share with the New Zealanders one condition that was lacking to our young nations in 1915: we have passed through the test which until now, unfortunately, has necessarily been judged by mankind as the supreme one for men fit to be free; and we have emerged from that test with the Anzac tradition.\footnote{Bean, \textit{ANZAC to Amiens}, 538-9: http://www.awm.gov.au/histories/first_world_war/volume.asp?levelID=67901 .}

Similar sentiments had already appeared in New Zealand's media, as Scott Worthy records. \textit{The New Zealand Herald} excerpted the following from the Reverend J. W. Shaw's address at an Auckland Anzac Day ceremony in 1919: 'Four years ago New Zealand had practically no history . . . [and] no great event by which we could be judged, or in which the highest elements of our national character had been fused into one flame. . . . Gallipoli had given us our beacon light by which our national character stood revealed in the white light of a noble purpose, nobly pursued against incredible odds.'\footnote{J. W. Shaw in \textit{The New Zealand Herald} (26 April 1919), 10, as quoted by Scott Worthy, 'Communities of Remembrance: The Memory of the Great War in New Zealand 1915-1939', MA thesis (University of Auckland, 2001), 41.} Similarly, 'the \textit{Auckland Star} argued' in 1922 'that the contribution of the Anzacs to the nation proved three things: 'they established completely the claim of New Zealand to be a nation, they sealed with their blood the solidarity of empire, and they died that the world might be free.'\footnote{Worthy, 'Communities of Remembrance', 40-1.}

The following inscription above the World War I Sanctuary of the Auckland War Memorial Museum, completed in 1929, records those sentiments:

\begin{quote}
THEY WHOM THE INSCRIPTIONS UPON THESE WALLS COMMEMORATE ARE THOSE FROM THE PROVINCIAL DISTRICT OF AUCKLAND WHO AT THE CALL OF KING AND COUNTRY LEFT ALL THAT WAS DEAR TO THEM ENDURED HARDNESS FACED DANGER AND FINALLY PASSED OUT OF THE SIGHT OF MEN BY THE PATH OF DUTY AND SELF SACRIFICE GIVING THEIR LIVES THAT OTHERS MIGHT LIVE IN FREEDOM
\end{quote}
Bean’s account and the Museum’s inscription accords with *Our Nation’s Story*, a 1920s New Zealand primary school textbook that explained to Standard VI pupils that ‘a love of freedom’ ‘has always been a marked characteristic of the British race’, which, with ‘a talent for colonization’, has founded more successful colonies than any other. As the textbook’s authors elaborate:

this love of freedom comes down to us from a very early stage in our nation’s story. The Angles and Saxons were freemen. When they left their homes on the coast of northern Germany to settle in Britain they carried with them the old rights of their fore-fathers, the rights to be free and self-governing . . . . We can understand, therefore, how deeply rooted in our race is this love of freedom, and why it is that, century after century, the British people have fought and struggled to maintain the rights of their Anglo-Saxon forbears.

The view of *New Zealand History online* is in keeping with Bean’s nationhood mythology: ‘It may have led to a military defeat, but for many New Zealanders then and since, the Gallipoli landings meant the beginning of something else – a feeling that New Zealand had a role as a distinct nation, even as it fought on the other side of the world in the name of the British Empire.’ It concludes: ‘For Australians and New Zealanders, the campaign has been seen as a key moment in a growing sense of national identity.’ That explanation is endorsed on the New Zealand Government’s Anzac Day website:

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94 Incription, World War 1 Sanctuary, Auckland War Memorial Museum: https://www.aucklandmuseum.com/site_resources/library/War_Memorial/War_Memorial_Galleries/Sanctuary/Sanctuary4_800.jpg.
Although Anzac Day, the anniversary of the first day of conflict, does not mark a military triumph, it does remind us of a very important episode in New Zealand’s history. Great suffering was caused to a small country by the loss of so many of its young men. But the Gallipoli campaign showcased attitudes and attributes – bravery, tenacity, practicality, ingenuity, loyalty to King and comrades – that helped New Zealand define itself as a nation, even as it fought unquestioningly on the other side of the world in the name of the British Empire. After Gallipoli, New Zealand had a greater confidence in its distinct identity, and a greater pride in the international contribution it could make. And the mutual respect earned during the fighting formed the basis of the close ties with Australia that continue today.99

As the site concludes: ‘Today, at a time when it seems New Zealanders are increasingly keen to assert and celebrate a unique identity, we recognise Anzac Day as a central marker of our nationhood.’100

According to Keith Sinclair, ‘W. P. Morrell, who in 1935 first interpreted the history of New Zealand as the growth of a nation, concluded that New Zealand announced its manhood to the world on the bloody slopes of Gallipoli in 1915.’101 Sinclair himself believed that ‘after the war there was a very general agreement among the New Zealanders that they were a new nation.’102 In citing John Masefield’s description of ‘the Australian and New Zealand Army Corps and the Royal Naval Division’—‘they were . . . the finest body of young men ever brought together in modern times. For physical beauty and nobility of bearing they surpassed any men I have ever seen; they walked and looked like the kings in old poems, and reminded me of the line in Shakespeare: “Baited like eagles having lately bathed”—Sinclair also suggested that ‘the high praise the troops received abroad boosted national pride’.103 Certainly, superiority of the British ‘race’ and the Australasians as a subset was an important theme in post-war literature, as Worthy notes: ‘The war had demonstrated that the future of the British race in the Southern Hemisphere was

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assured; the characteristics of the race – intelligence, physical ability and courage – had survived transplantation.’ On this view, the Coming Man had certainly arrived: those transplanted representatives of the Anglo-Saxon race had not only survived but had excelled in the crucible of war.

Christopher Pugsley’s backwards causality sounds a similar phallogocentric note: ‘Gallipoli was a major step in our recognition of ourselves as New Zealanders. It is a process that continues today. . . . Every man who served on Gallipoli endured, and established a reputation and a sense of identity that is important to us today. Through it we can establish who we are.’ As he concludes: ‘Our society today has been moulded by the Gallipoli experience. This was when we began to think for ourselves and for the first time to put New Zealand’s interests first. We are the sum of what our soldiers did, what they found, and what they lost. It was the loss of innocence.’

Chris Maclean and Jock Phillips also promote New Zealand masculinity as being the basis of national identity in their government-sponsored *The Sorrow & the Pride*: ‘During the war itself many New Zealanders came to believe that the performance of the soldiers on foreign fields had established the country’s “manhood” in the eyes of the world. The war was considered the birth of national identity. At welcome-home receptions, and in Anzac Day speeches, the Kiwi soldier was praised for his physique, his courage, his ingenuity – and the plaudits of foreign observers were endlessly rehearsed.’

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104 Worthy, ‘Communities of Remembrance’, 103.
105 On Richard White’s view, ‘The Coming Man’, that representative “transplanted” by Britain to outlying parts of its empire who would demonstrate whether the Anglo-Saxon race would progress or degenerate, ‘came into his own’ ‘during the Boer War’, and also became “the typical Australian” (Richard White, *Inventing Australia: Images and Identity 1688-1980* [Sydney: George Allen & Unwin, 1981], 67, 79, 83).
107 Pugsley, *Gallipoli*, 357.
After stating that ‘the cost to New Zealand was 2721 dead and 4752 wounded out of a total of 8450 men – a staggering 88 per cent casualty rate’, King added that in Australia and New Zealand ‘the necessary myth evolved quickly in both countries that they had “come of age” on the slopes of Gallipoli. Fred Waite, official historian of the New Zealand contribution, put it this way: “[Before] the war we were an untried and insular people; after ANZAC, we were tried and trusted.”’

‘As one historian noted, the next generation did not need to be told that the angel of death had passed over the land: they had heard the beating of its wings.’ So said Margaret Wilson in her Dawn Service address at ANZAC Cove on 25 April 2006 of the 18,000 New Zealanders killed and more than 41,000 New Zealanders wounded in World War I, before turning her attention to the Gallipoli invasion, which she described, after King, as ‘arguably the most traumatic event in the history of my country. . . . The cost to New Zealand was 2721 dead and 4752 wounded out of a total of 8450 men – a staggering 88 per cent.’

Philippa Mein Smith’s writes that ‘Gallipoli became the defining moment for both New Zealand and Australia in 1915 because Gallipoli was the site where their representatives of the ‘coming man’ were subjected to their first – global – test and proved their manhood. The Anzacs represented the highest form of citizenship: soldiers who passed the test of war. . . . Gallipoli became a sacred site because the men first spilt blood there’, with Anzac Day becoming ‘a full public holiday and ‘holy day’ as if it were a Sunday in 1922’.

Russell Ward ascribed a similar significance to Anzac Day for Australians: ‘Since the slaughter at Gallipoli the anniversary of the Landing has become not only a day of

111 Wilson, ‘Speech to Dawn Service ANZAC Cove Gallipoli Peninsula, Turkey’.
112 Mein Smith, A Concise History of New Zealand, 130-1.
Australian mourning and remembrance for the war dead, but also the Australian national day above all others.113

Kevin Rudd, as Australian Prime Minister, used his 2008 Anzac Day speech to eulogize his fellow Australians:

That we are a good people who want for the good of others. That we stand for a deep sense of liberty which our forebears fought and which should never be surrendered – whatever the cost. That we are a people who by instinct cannot stand idly by and be indifferent to the suffering of others. A people with a sense of a fair go for all carved deep into our national soul. A people also alert to the needs of our friends and allies. These are the values which summoned forth the sons and daughters of ANZAC over the last 100 years from our smallest towns, our greatest cities and our most remote outback.114

On the occasion of the 90th anniversary of the Gallipoli landings, Tim Watkin wrote that, ‘increasingly, young Kiwis are coming to see Gallipoli as the defining moment in New Zealand’s struggle for national identity’, and that ‘most New Zealanders see Gallipoli as a place where our nationhood was forged in the heat of battle.’115 Watkin quoted three students, winners of the government’s Anzac Day essay competition, whose prize was to accompany the Prime Minister Helen Clark to Gallipoli for that anniversary—Guy Williams, Nelson College: “New Zealand gained its national identity at Gallipoli”; Paul Ataahua Smith, Napier Boys’ High School: “the turning point in the development of New Zealand identity was our involvement in a conflict 11,000 miles from home: Gallipoli”; Anna Smith, Waikato Diocesan School: “The events and actions of the New Zealand forces involved in the Gallipoli campaign have transcended through time and inspire the subsequent generations to be

courageous, dedicated and loyal.” Significantly, the topic set by Clark ‘for the nation’s fifth, sixth and seventh-form history students . . . [was] “the importance of Gallipoli on the development of New Zealand’s national identity”, with judging to be left to ‘the Speaker, Jonathan Hunt, a former history scholar, teacher and university tutor.’

‘Young New Zealanders’ go to Gallipoli ‘in their thousands’, wrote Garth George, not only ‘to connect with’ ‘their nation’s fundamental history’ and to fill in the gaps of ‘the laundered history they have been taught’ ‘in their schoolrooms and lecture halls’, but also because ‘they want to know where they come from because that helps them know where they are going.’

Anzac Day as theatre

In New Zealand, the 25th of April 2009 was exemplary of the above. That day there were three principal ‘actors’ representing the government who took to the national stage: the Honourable Sir Anand Satyanand, the Governor-General of New Zealand, the Right Honourable Dame Sian Seerpohi Elias, Administrator of the Government of New Zealand and Chief Justice, and the Right Honourable John Phillip Key, the Prime Minister of New Zealand.

Satyanand travelled to Turkey to attend the Anzac Day Dawn Service at Anzac Cove where he told the 7500 gathered, many of whom were young Australians and New Zealanders, that ‘New Zealanders lost their innocence at Gallipoli but from that loss of innocence, and from deep grief at the loss of so much life, New Zealanders also came to see their nation as more than just an adjunct to Great Britain’. Later in

116 Guy Williams, Paul Smith and Anna Smith as quoted by Watkin, ‘Forever Young’.
the day he delivered his ‘Chunuk Bair Address’. 'This battle', he said, 'has a wider significance for New Zealand and New Zealanders. Like the splitting of the atom and the conquering of Mt Everest, the story of Chunuk Bair has become a legendary part of what it means to be a New Zealander.'\textsuperscript{120} Although Satyanand used the referent Chunuk Bair to anchor his speech, his speech was really about national identity and exceptionalism. We know this because two of the notable events he referenced—Ernest Rutherford's splitting of the atom (1917) and Edmund Hillary and Tensing Norgay's ascent of Everest (1953)—occurred after the battle for Chunuk Bair in August 1915. While these events have no logical connection outside of Satyanand's speech, their connection appears indissoluble because the speech was made while Satyanand was standing ‘on the spot’, a literal merging of signifier and referent at the moment he ascribed meaning to the nominal designator, Chunuk Bair. Even the sense of his statement is dependent not on the existence of the place, Chunuk Bair, which of itself has no meaning, but on Chunuk Bair having been invested with a particular meaning within the ‘Anzac tradition’, initially by Bean.\textsuperscript{121} As Jean-François Lyotard explains: ‘Reality is not what is “given” to this or that “subject,” it is a state of the referent (that about which one speaks) which results from the effectuation of establishment procedures defined by a unanimously agreed-upon protocol, and from the possibility offered to anyone to recommence this effectuation as often as he or she wants.’\textsuperscript{122} For as we saw with the Cogito and other self-referential statements, the meaning they purport is attained not directly from the referent but from the syntagmatic structure in which they are positioned and that from the wider linguistic production of which they are a part. In other words, because meaning is applied to the referent by the author and not delivered to the author by the referent, a referent can have multiple meanings, as does the pronoun to which thinking was attached in the Cogito—‘the sentence ‘I think’ does not entail that I am,


\textsuperscript{122} Lyotard, The Differend: Phrases in Dispute, 4 §3.
but that there has been a sentence’—and as does ‘Chunuk Bair’. This is evident from Satyanand’s statement: there is no connection between the so-called conquering of Mt Everest and Anzac Day save for that which he made; if there were, it follows that Anzac Day would be a part of the public calendar of Nepal, the country of one of the two ‘conquerors’ of Chomolungga (Mount Everest). That which Satyanand signified as ‘subjects, reality, meaning are, then, effects of the concatenation of sentences’ making up his speech, and, indeed, make no sense outside its universe (‘sender, addressee, referent and meaning, and . . . their relationship with each other’), as the non-acknowledgement of Anzac Day in Nepal attests.

Having produced ‘anti-clockwise’ meaning, Satyanand then offered some counterfactual history by claiming that ‘the failure to press home’ the advantage of the winning of Chunuk Bair by the New Zealanders ‘doomed the Gallipoli campaign and led eventually to the evacuation of Allied troops just before Christmas 1915.’ But this was not before the New Zealanders, while briefly in possession of Chunuk Bair, were purportedly shelled by an Allied warship, for which Satyanand relied on British historian Robert Rhodes James quoting Captain Hastings. Cue Satyanand’s

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125 Satyanand, ‘Chunuk Bair Address’.
126 Satyanand, ‘Chunuk Bair Address’. Pugsley offered his version of the story as follows, based on two letters, the first being from Major W. H. Hastings, Indian Army, dated 5 November 1929 (Malone papers) or fourteen years after the “event”: ‘A shell, most probably from the New Zealand 4.5 howitzers firing from within the Anzac perimeter, burst above Malone’s headquarters trench ‘about 5.00 p.m. Swish swish came the shrapnel and all except two in our little trench were killed or wounded. Col. Jordan (Commanding Officer of the 7th Gloucesters) got a bullet through the mouth . . . Col. Malone was killed on the other side of me . . . he collapsed into the Adjutant’s [Harston] or Cunningham’s arms [Wellington Second in Command]’ (*Gallipoli*, 300-1). In Pugsley’s version, it is Captain E. S. Harston, the Adjutant, in a letter dated 5 March 1942 (Malone papers), or twenty-seven years after the “event”, who, as Pugsley recorded it, suggested that a warship was responsible for the shelling: ‘“I have always believed it was the destroyer as I saw her swing broadside on and the puffs of smoke from the gun as she fired”’ (*Gallipoli*, 301). Les Carlyon, without a reference, offered his version as follows: ‘About 5 pm Malone was hit by a misdirected shrapnel burst fired either from an Anzac battery or a warship. According to an officer present, the shrapnel made a swishing noise. ‘Col. M was killed the other side of me . . . he collapsed into the adjutant’s [Harston] or Cunningham’s arms.’ Harston thought the shell came from a destroyer. He had seen the puffs from her guns just before Malone was hit’ (Les Carlyon, *Gallipoli* [Sydney: Macmillan, 2001], 440.
‘incorporated fiction’: ‘In his play, ‘Once on Chunuk Bair’, New Zealand playwright Maurice Shadbolt recounted the taking of the summit. He imagined the following response by New Zealand’s Colonel to a British general’s enquiry about progress: “Tell him some scarecrows called Wellington Infantry have taken Chunuk Bair. No. Tell him, God dammit, that New Zealand has taken Chunuk Bair. Tell him New Zealand is holding Chunuk Bair.”’

Satyanand concluded his Chunuk Bair account by quoting Ormond Burton—‘“When the August fighting died down there was no longer any question but that New Zealanders had commenced to realise themselves as a nation”’—but without also quoting from the appendix of the book from which the quote had been extracted—‘Few serious thinkers to-day would endeavour to justify the World War. It was beyond reasonable doubt the major insanity and the most profoundly immoral act of our time’—or mentioning that Burton became New Zealand’s most prominent conscientious objector of World War II.

In Wellington, in the Cenotaph Chapel of the National War Memorial, Elias gave ‘the oral history reading’—part of an interview in 1982 by Maurice Shadbolt of Dan Curham, the only survivor of sixteen companions who had set out together on the Chunuk Bair offensive: “By some miracle I was the only one who got anywhere near the summit of Chunuk Bair. I never saw or heard of my companions again. I don’t even know what happened to their bodies. I didn’t weep physically. I was not a weeping chap. I wept in my heart. I have felt their loss very deeply for the rest of my life. Talking about Gallipoli, especially about Chunuk Bair, brings sorrow to my heart, even as I talk to you now.”

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Elias’s rendition of sacrifice and stoicism was followed by Key’s Anzac Day address, which included the familiar retroactive claim that ‘both New Zealand and Australia emerged with a new sense of certainty about our place in the world’ from Gallipoli. \(^{130}\) Key continued:

Anzac Day unites generations of Kiwis and binds us to our history as a country. Today we mark our proud history of sacrifice and heroism, we remember those men and women who put their lives on the line for our country, and who fought for a better world. . . . Let us celebrate the Anzac spirit we continue to share with our Australian neighbours. For we who were brothers in arms are brothers still. Finally today let us salute the Anzacs who fought for us . . . to preserve our freedom and humanitarian ideals . . . who rose to heights of sacrifice and, in doing so, preserved the living standards of all of us, for generations to come. They fought for each and every one of us, they fought for New Zealand, and they fought for our world. \(^{131}\)

While this address may have struck a chord with many who heard it, it was, in effect, a violation of chronology. Those in the Gallipoli campaign could not have been fighting for our freedom, because we did not exist, they had no concept of our living standards, and, in any event, were, more likely than not, having an overseas adventure on the politics of empire, fighting not for their country, let alone our world, which did not then exist, but for the British Empire.

We can see, then, a clear correspondence between the rhetoric of the ‘actors’ and the work of historians and the retroactive protention on which their narratives are based. Part of a deceased author’s research material for his 1982 play was rendered as a ‘sacred’ reading in Wellington’s ‘cathedral of death’ on the same day an extract from his play was read at Gallipoli, thereby turning absence into presence by collapsing historical time: a performance by government ‘actors’ in 2009, an interview from 1982, and a military invasion in 1915. Importantly, the extract from


\(^{131}\) Key, ‘Anzac Day Address at National Wreath Laying Ceremony’.
Shadbolt’s play was immediately preceded by the ostensive phrase, ‘once on Chunuk Bair’, the ‘cognitive pretensions’ of which were realised by it being read at the geographical location to which it refers.\textsuperscript{132} In that way the imaginative referent of the phrase and the play (‘Chunuk Bair’) attain the appearance of reality and its attendant meaning is transformed into an apparent reality cognised through Satyanand’s performance. Hence, the meaning attributed to the nominal designator ‘Chunuk Bair’ in Wellington was carried to the place Chunuk Bair by the country’s nominal head where it was delivered to an expectant audience for whom it made sense, despite that same nominal designator having quite different meaning for those who actually live nearby.\textsuperscript{133} Thus because of the rigidity of the nominal designator, which permits the attachment of different meaning in different discourses to its unchanging name, and through the conflation of the ostensive and the cognitive in the narrative, which is history’s stock-in-trade, the unreal attained the status of the real thereby making possible the transformation of the imagined moment of singular death into the imagined moment of collective birth. It is this that feeds the wider signifying system supporting the Anzac settler societies and which seems to become more deeply embedded each year in the national imaginary as a national truth.

However, to put it bluntly, ‘there is no signified . . . only “effects” of them’, only more signifiers, no meaning engraved in marble, only more government representatives circulating a nationalistic theology ‘designed’, as George Orwell put it, ‘to make lies sound truthful and murder respectable, and to give an appearance of solidity to pure wind.’\textsuperscript{134} For while we might set foot on Gallipoli, even stumble across the detritus of war—bullets, shrapnel, human remains—we cannot better the Grandfather Paradox and travel back in time. There is no outside to history. Indeed, all that remains visible at Gallipoli are the names of the missing and the dead, names that

\textsuperscript{132} Lyotard, \textit{The Differend}, 42, §64.
\textsuperscript{133} Lyotard, \textit{The Differend}, 40, §59.
have no meaning, only a function, and to which, as we have seen, can be attached ‘an indefinite number of unpredictable descriptions’.

The meaning of Gallipoli is not extracted from the place called Gallipoli but added to it by way of an elaborate rhetorical operation that supports the idea of Gallipoli as a sacred site for Australians and New Zealanders. At Gallipoli there are only marble inscriptions supported by government officials circulating a nationalist theology within ‘the logocentric circle’.

When Pugsley wrote that ‘on Chunuk Bair we demonstrated our nationhood to the world for the first time in a manner which we in New Zealand have only just begun to appreciate’, he was making a truth-claim based on a retroactive movement of protention just as Satyanand and Key did twenty-five years later.

For there can be no connection between the deaths at Gallipoli and the speculative meaning Pugsley attaches to those deaths, that ‘we are the sum of what our soldiers did’. Indeed, so infested with contradiction is Pugsley’s claim that, like the claims of Satyanand and Key, it retains a tenuous grip on plausibility only from within the safety of his speech-act. For we were not there in 1915, then New Zealand was a dominion, a status it did not renounce until 1947, and it is questionable that the world at large had much interest then, or when Pugsley made the claim, in the event to which he has attached such a high degree of notability.

What, then, lies behind this massive investment in ‘Gallipoli’, and how is it able to succeed as a foundational discourse for two settler societies when it is little more than a totalising fiction?

We can answer the second part of the question easily enough by reminding ourselves that foundations are organising motifs for foundational discourses, ‘useful fictions which just pragmatically allow one to put the world under a description which then acts as if it were real.’

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135 Bennington, Lyotard: Writing the Event, 121.
137 Pugsley, Gallipoli, 314.
138 Pugsley, Gallipoli, 357.
139 Keith Jenkins, Why History?: Ethics and Postmodernity (London: Routledge 1999), 86.
to sciences), ‘only idealities can give a foundation . . . but there is ideality only through and by repetition: this repetition brings with it an alterity that forbids the unity of the foundation that it was supposed to insure.’\textsuperscript{140} Thus, in ascribing his collective ‘I’ (the ‘we’ of New Zealand) with preordained meaning, Pugsley was doing no more than Descartes did with his \textit{res cogitans}, his thinking ‘I’. In other words, when Bean’s notion of nationhood being born at Gallipoli is reiterated, what is being manifested is not a foundational moment but the \textit{desire} for such a moment, an articulation made possible only by the fake performativity of the Anzac discourse, which itself answers to nothing in the world save for meeting the desires it satisfies.

The answer to the first part of the question, however, is not so straightforward, requiring a consideration of the cultural operation performed by Anzac Day, by which, this thesis argues, New Zealand and Australia legitimate their tenuous moral and legal claim to the geography they inhabit through the promotion of an origin of ‘values’ (self-sacrifice, courage and mateship, etc.), the valorisation of which doubles as a means of forgetting the violent and deceptive means by which the tangata whenua of these geographies were dispossessed.\textsuperscript{141} Indeed, such is the level of investment in these values that it may be considered commensurate with the level of brutality and deception with which those expropriations were carried out.

We might begin by recalling that there is no \textit{hors-texte}—that there is no meaning beyond signification—and that history is illusory and paradoxical, both absent and exceeded by that which is to come. We should also keep in mind that the historical narrative is not only the product of self-referential meaning but is also ‘secured by the strength of the narrative mechanism: it encompasses the multiplicity of families of phrases and possible genres of discourse; it envelops every name; it is always actualisable and always has been; both diachronic and parachronic, it secures

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{140} Bennington and Derrida, \textit{Jacques Derrida}, 64.  
\textsuperscript{141} As noted in the Introduction, Maori are also known to use the term ‘tangata whenua’ when speaking of other indigenous peoples.}
mastery over time and therefore over life and death.’ As Lyotard concludes: ‘Narrative is authority itself. It authorises an infrangible we, outside of which there is only they.’ Importantly, narratives, for the ‘child or immigrant’, facilitate entry into a culture ‘through an apprenticeship in proper names. One must learn the names that designate near relations, heroes (in a general sense), places, dates [etc.]... These names are “rigid designators”: they signify nothing or at least can be laden with various and conflicting significations; they can be attached to phrases belonging to altogether heterogenous regimes ... and included in incommensurable genres of discourse’. While these principles of narrativity apply to every non-indigenous generation in New Zealand and, if not more so, in Australia where no treaty exists to ‘legitimate’ the settler society, we can see them strikingly at work every Anzac Day.

The theatricality of Anzac Day, with its eerie mix of faux religious ceremony and military rehearsal, finds a useful metaphor in Lyotard’s ‘theatre of representation’, the paradigm he used to analyse representation and to critique modern historiography. That is, just as a theatrical production is produced within a space containing all the paraphernalia necessary for its production, so the historian takes on the role of a director and does likewise in her or his space, keeping the machinery of production, ‘the underside of politics’, out of sight, while the ‘narrative’ unwinds ‘its drama-tics’ on-stage in an apparent correspondence with the facts ‘external to the theatrical space’. In other words, just as we have asked whether reality effects are the product of real effects or the product of discourse, so Lyotard questions whether ‘the historian “produces” rather than “reflects” a referent’.

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143 Lyotard, The Postmodern Explained to Children, 44. Among the genres of discourse listed by Lyotard are ‘cognitive, persuasive, epideictic, tragic, comic, dithyrambic’, and among the types of phrases also listed are ‘descriptive, interrogative, ostensive, evaluative, prescriptive’ (42).
144 Lyotard, The Postmodern Explained to Children, 42.
145 Bennington, Lyotard, 15.
146 Lyotard as quoted in Bennington, Lyotard, 13, 10.
147 Bennington, Lyotard, 106.
More particularly, Lyotard deploys his metaphor in order to question the production of modern historical meaning through its critical analysis of the ‘raw material’ of its own production, the past ‘facts’, ‘events’ and ‘moments’ transposed into narrative, questioning, at a deeper level, not only ‘the traditional view that the event “comes first” in an unquestionable “real” world’, but also whether ‘the event . . . is purely “produced” by the narrating agency’ and whether the historian can ‘[knock] down the walls of the theatre’ to get at the facts purportedly outside it.\footnote{148} For, as he puts it, ‘It is obvious that the historian is himself no more than another director, his narrative another product, his work another narration . . . [and] whose claim to reach this reference to the thing itself, the fact, to establish it and restore it, is no less crazy, all in all rather crazier, than the power of literary fiction’.\footnote{149}

This metaphor is also apposite, given, on Lyotard’s view, that ‘theatre places us right at the heart of what is religious-political: in the question of absence, in negativity, in nihilism, as Nietzsche would say, and therefore in the question of power’, where multiple acts of replacement take place—‘theatrical signs’ replacing something for someone—and where ‘meaning is itself simply a substitute for displacement’.\footnote{150} That is, because there is no meaning beyond the signifying system, the facts, events and moments of the production must be the product of something else, namely narrative, which fills in for their absence, and which, on Lyotard’s view, is driven by libido—that is, desire. For ‘every narrative’ replaces that which has been lost, ‘reactualises names and the relations between names’, and in its recitation ‘the community reassures itself of the permanence and legitimacy of its world of names through the recurrence of this world in its stories.’\footnote{151} Hence, narrative is readily harnessed for ideological purposes—in this case, for articulating the desire that precedes the event depicted in its diachronic sequence, the process staged on Anzac Day. As a consequence, historians do not break down the walls of their metaphorical theatre to reach a past ‘reality’ but rather heighten the desire of their audience for

\footnote{148} Lyotard as quoted in Bennington, \textit{Lyotard}, 10, 107.  
\footnote{149} Lyotard as quoted in Bennington, \textit{Lyotard}, 10.  
\footnote{150} Lyotard as quoted in Bennington, \textit{Lyotard}, 14.  
\footnote{151} Lyotard, \textit{The Postmodern Explained to Children}, 43.
an experience of the real by placing ‘a population of the dead on stage’.\footnote{Certeau, The Writing of History, 99.} Thus we can say that it is not the events and moments that drive the Gallipoli narrative but an economy of desire that might have several names: ‘the desire for identity’, ‘the desire for immortality’, ‘the desire to forget’. For as Bennington explains:

Theatricality . . . is described by Lyotard as fundamentally religious. What is represented on stage is an absence. The privilege of that absence . . . is ensured by its being placed out of reach, beyond representation as posited within representation. By this transcendence, theatricality enforces its own closure, through the entirely negative excellence it confers on what it situates outside itself. Representation is an enclosure built on the strength of an exclusion; it is a ‘mise en extérieur à l’intérieur’, a placing outside which takes place inside (which constitutes the inside). Whatever name is given to the absence just positioned, it is theological by virtue of that very position.\footnote{Bennington, Lyotard, 13-14.}

By this means the implausibilities of the political ‘actors’ and historians are rendered plausible. Hence those at the centre of this mise en scène, those real-life ‘actors’ who speak on stage amidst the chorus of the dead, are those with the power, the wealth and connections, all of which ‘must be effaced for the political stage to be constituted’, and those who listen, those in the audience, are mostly those who without it.\footnote{Lyotard quoted in Bennington, Lyotard, 13.}

Thus, what takes place each Anzac Day is a quasi-religious act of pure theatre, an elaborately staged production of a national nativity that doubles as a means of forgetting and a reminder of state power. Born of an eschatological ‘moment’—“You will hardly fade away until the sun fades out of the sky and the earth sinks into the universal blackness. For already you form part of that great tradition of the Dardanelles which began with Hector and Achilles. In another few thousand years the two stories will have blended into one”—it gestures, with its dependence on
collective male sacrifice, towards the nation to come, just as Christianity, founded on the notion of Christ’s sacrifice, gestures towards the heaven to come.\footnote{155}

In this new religion, which supplants but not entirely replaces the de facto state religion, Anglicanism, the proper names ‘Australia’ and ‘New Zealand’ substitute for the Supreme Being, ‘God’. Elias’s oral history substitutes for the Gospel reading as does Key’s address for the sermon, both of which tell of past heroic deeds and articulate a creed based on the values inherent in those deeds. Dedicated spaces, such as the altar in the World War I Sanctuary at the Auckland War Memorial Museum and the Cenotaph Chapel, Wellington, substitute for the sacred space of churches. Golgotha, the Biblical site of crucifixion, becomes, for New Zealanders, Chunuk Bair, the elevated site of death. The Bible’s Good Samaritan, for New Zealanders, is found in the medic Richard Henderson and his donkey Roly and for Australians in Simpson and his donkey Murphy. The former were erected, along with their wounded soldier, in a statue alongside the Tomb of the Unknown Warrior, Wellington, on the seventy-fifth anniversary of the Gallipoli landing (after it was decided that the famous painting, \textit{Private Simpson, D.C.M., & his donkey at Anzac}, painted not at Gallipoli but from a photograph by the New Zealand sapper Horace Moore-Jones in Dunedin in 1918, was not, after all, of the ‘Pommy-Australian’ Private James Simpson Kirkpatrick and his donkey).\footnote{156} Christ, who died

\footnote{155} Ian Hamilton, General Commanding the Mediterranean Expeditionary Force, in a preface addressed to the Gallipoli soldiers, as quoted in Alan Moorehead, \textit{Gallipoli} (London: H. Hamilton, 1956), 356.

\footnote{156} Glyn Harper, \textit{The Donkey Man} (Auckland: Reed Publishing, 2004). ‘Henderson’ is cited by Harper as being Soldier 3/258, Richard Alexander Henderson, a teacher from Auckland. See also ‘Simpson and his donkey, Gallipoli painting’: http://www.nzhistory.net.nz/media/photo/simpson-and-his-donkey. John Simpson Kirkpatrick, a.k.a. ‘Simpson’, is described by Peter Cochrane as a ‘Pommy, a ‘new chum’ in Australia’, who ‘was planning to return home before the war broke out and enlisted to get back to England on the cheap, where he hoped to join the English army’ (Peter Cochrane, \textit{Simpson and the Donkey: The Making of a Legend} [Carlton: Melbourne, 1992], 6). According to Cochrane, ‘he was a political radical; he was hardly the willing soldier; and he saved few, if any, lives’ (\textit{Simpson and the Donkey}, 6). He was first compared with the Good Samaritan by Irving Benson in 1965: ‘The setting for Simpson’s fame’, on Cochrane’s view, ‘was not the battlefield but the recruitment crisis on the home front’ (Irving Benson, \textit{The Man with the Donkey: John Simpson Kirkpatrick, the Good Samaritan of Gallipoli} [London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1965], 4), and Simpson’s “deeds” became part of the “spin” around the drive for volunteers. With so little known about him at the time, “Simpson” was effectively a blank canvas on which could be painted the ideological brushstrokes required for the early circumstances of World War I and ‘conservative politics thereafter’ (Benson, \textit{The Man with...}}
'for everyone', is the Unknown Warrior who ‘represents each and every New Zealander who fought and died in war overseas.'\textsuperscript{157} As Benedict Anderson observes: ‘No more arresting emblems of the modern culture of nationalism exist than cenotaphs and tombs of Unknown Soldiers’, precisely because they have ‘no true precedents in earlier times’ and ‘no one knows who lies inside them’.\textsuperscript{158}

Fittingly, it was Silvia Cartwright, as Governor-General, who delivered the eulogy at the internment ceremony of the Tomb of the Unknown Warrior, Wellington—‘He died wearing a New Zealand uniform, and shared with those he had left on the other side of the world his belief that the lives of many might be better, by risking his own’—confirming that the discourse of the dead is a safe one.\textsuperscript{159}

Although much contested during its development, Gallipoli has become virtually unassailable.\textsuperscript{160} ‘Gallipoli’ is now a sacred sign that functions synecdochally: it stands for all our war dead; it stands for us. In this theatre of desire there is no excluded middle: you are either a believer or you are not, either for us or against us, either an apostle (with a voice) or an apostate (unable to speak). With an extensive record of photographs, official despatches, personal letters and journals ‘to signify that the event represented has really taken place’, it not only meets the criteria for

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\textit{the Donkey, 5)}. The illustration by Bruce Potter of Henderson and his donkey in Harper’s \textit{The Donkey Man}, 22, replicates the famous painting, save for the position of the soldier’s head that, in the original by Moore-Jones, is resting without a helmet on “Simpson’s” shoulder. \\
\textsuperscript{158} Anderson, \textit{Imagined Communities}, 9. As to the identity of New Zealand’s Unknown Warrior, the National War Memorial’s ‘Tomb of the Unknown Warrior’ website states: ‘The Unknown Warrior is one of almost 30,000 New Zealanders who perished while serving their country in war, and one of almost 9,000 who have no known grave. A casualty of the First World War, his remains were exhumed from the Caterpillar Valley Cemetery on the Somme in France, a site chosen by the Commonwealth War Graves Commission.’ Under FAQs it states that ‘The Unknown Warrior died sometime between 1916 and 1918 on the Somme battlefield in France.’: \texttt{http://www.unknownwarrior.govt.nz/tomb.html}. \\
\textsuperscript{160} Worthy, ‘Communities of Remembrance’, particularly Chapter Two.
\end{flushright}
being a proper object of historical study, it also satisfies modernity’s taste for the verisimilar and for sacralised relics of war.\textsuperscript{161}

**Waitangi Day as counterpoint**

Unsurprisingly, Waitangi Day—the 6\textsuperscript{th} of February, the day in 1840 when the British Crown and Maori, though not all Maori, signed The Treaty of Waitangi/\textit{Te Tiriti o Waitangi}—provides an interesting counterpoint to Anzac Day, for while the former ‘is recognised as New Zealand’s national day’, it is still too heavily contested to comfortably fulfil that role\textsuperscript{162}. It is a day when Pakeha are too readily reminded of the ‘long history of place’, as Stephen Turner describes it, which precedes their ‘conquest by contract’ and war, by which, for many though not all, their forebears exchanged their status from manuhiri (guests or visitors) to owners and governors\textsuperscript{163}. That is why, concluded and uncontested, Anzac Day, unlike Waitangi Day, provides an occasion during which the large-scale loss of life for no positive outcome can be exchanged for a perceived benefit.

According to Worthy, Waite’s New Zealand Government-sanctioned narrative of the Gallipoli campaign ‘provided this justification of sacrifice with the redemption of New Zealand’s nationhood.’\textsuperscript{164} As has been suggested, this thesis argues rather differently and more narrowly: that the qualities of the soldiers have been converted into values on which the society is believed to be based but which in turn displace those values associated with the violence and expropriation on which it was founded. Thus sense replaces senselessness, the Anzac Day motto, ‘Lest we forget’, replaces ‘Lest we remember’, and Anzac Day becomes the de facto national

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{161} Barthes, \textit{The Rustle of Language}, 139.
\item \textsuperscript{162} ‘Waitangi Day’, URL: http://www.nzhistory.net.nz/politics/treaty/waitangi-day, (Ministry for Culture and Heritage), updated 5-Feb-2011. Waitangi Day has been a public holiday since 1974.
\item \textsuperscript{164} Worthy, ‘Communities of Remembrance’, 113.
\end{itemize}
day. It is also why Waitangi Day cannot fulfil that function—for the perceived benefit under the ‘contract’ has already been realised by Pakeha, a benefit backed by the power of the State, in full dress rehearsal every Anzac Day, and one that Pakeha will not be giving up anytime soon.

Similar comments may be made about the official national day in Australia, Australia Day, the 26th day of January, that marks the arrival in Sydney Harbour in 1788 of the First Fleet of eleven convict ships. As with Maori on Waitangi Day, Australia Day sees significant protests from Aboriginal people (First Australians) and their supporters, most notably the ‘Invasion Day’ protests that began in 1988. This should not surprise. By declaring Australia *terra nullius*, ‘a land owned by no one, and therefore available for the taking’, Britain stole an entire continental land mass inhabited shore-to-shore by ‘more than 250 tribes, each with their own language, laws and territorial boundaries’ who had lived there for what is thought to be about 40,000 years or 1200 human generations, rather longer than the eight generations of European habitation.165 As Marcia Langton points out: ‘If you think about the ancient civilisations that Europeans look to, such as the dynasties of the pharaohs in Egypt, then even they are young compared to the period when humans were coming to Australia.’166 Despite these circumstances, ‘under British colonial law’, according to Stuart Banner, ‘Aboriginal Australians had no property rights in the land, and colonization accordingly vested ownership of the entire continent in the British Government.’167

Thus, through the promotion of Anzac Day, both settler societies propose an ‘origin of values’ for themselves which doubles as an instrument of forgetting the violence

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166 Marcia Langton, ‘Episode 1 “They Have Come to Stay”: Sydney & New South Wales (1788-1824)’, *First Australians*.

on which their societies are founded, a phenomenon identified by Ernest Renan in his 1882 address, ‘What is a nation?’, at the Sorbonne, as being applicable to all modern nation-states: ‘Forgetting, I would even say historical error, is a crucial factor in the creation of a nation.’\(^{168}\) As suggested above, we might think of the investment in those values as being commensurate with the levels of violence and theft with which the dispossession of place was effected by the forebears of many of those for whom Gallipoli now acts as a salve for their consciences. Ani Mikaere puts it like this: ‘One barely has to scratch the Pakeha surface to find the guilt lying immediately beneath, guilt which manifests itself as denial, self-justification, defensiveness and, incredibly enough, a sense of victimhood… . The cost to Pakeha . . . is a burden of shame that they cannot escape.’\(^{169}\) Hence it is never mentioned by the government ‘actors’ on Anzac Day that the violence of empire used against the Turks in 1915 had been used against Maori less than fifty years earlier, ‘when colonists and imperial representatives on both sides of the Tasman united in a resolve to settle New Zealand’s wars’, described, on the one hand, by Tariana Turia as ‘the holocaust suffered by many Maori tribes’, and, on the other, by Jeff Hopkins-Weise as ‘that period in which the “Anzac legend” has its “genesis”, when ‘Australia and New Zealand as ‘blood brothers’ joined in shared military struggles’.\(^{170}\)

Here, then, between these two discursive perspectives, lies an incommensurability that constitutes a \textit{différend} and for which no resolution exists. On the one hand we have an extension of the settler narrative by a settler historian purportedly discovering an originary moment in wars against Maori, just as many before him found originary meaning on the Gallipoli peninsula, and on the other, a leading contemporary political figure of tangata whenua whose oppositional discourse has

\(^{168}\) Ernest Renan, ‘Qu’est-ce qu’une nation?’, Ernest Renan, \textit{Oeuvres Complètes de Ernest Renan: Tome I} (Paris: Calmann-Lévy, 1947), 891. In the original, this sentence reads as follows: ‘L’oubli, et je dirai même l’erreur historique, sont un facteur essentiel de la création d’une nation.’


appropriated from ‘over there’ a term (‘Holocaust’) made ‘sacred’ by Europeans to describe Europe’s genocide against her people ‘over here’. Although the former is a view supported by Damian Skinner—‘the land wars were a testing ground for later conflict, an important step in developing the mettle and heroism of the New Zealand soldiers who fought overseas’—and not withstanding Palenski’s thesis, Hopkins-Weise appears to have gone further than any other settler historian in Australasia by claiming that ‘the New Zealand wars in turn not only provide a point of true genesis where Australia and New Zealand meet militarily, but have significant social and economic ramifications. These conjoined beginnings helped shape the progress and development of the two societies which emerged on either side of the Tasman by the early twentieth century.’171 In other words, what is manifest in Hopkins-Weise’s thesis is an extension of the legitimising grand narratives of nationhood that are always ‘oriented teleologically by some idea or ideal to be attained’—in this case, ‘the realisation of an Idea’ of progress embodied in the Anzac societies of ‘the not-yet now’.172

It is also part of the function of the hegemonic narrative, which presents itself as superior by virtue of the progress it denotes and the good news it purportedly delivers, to attempt to silence any competing narrative, of which the following from Sinclair is exemplary: ‘a minority of Maori radicals, some of whom have only a small proportion of Maori genes, and little Maori language or culture, continue to protest against their ineluctable fate, to share a country whether they feel part of the nation or not.’173 King attempted a silencing of Turia by claiming that ‘if any one chapter in New Zealand history has earned the label “holocaust”, it is’ the Musket Wars.174

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171 Damian Skinner, ‘Lest We Forget: Memory and the Mercer War Memorial’, Art New Zealand (88) 1998, 50; Hopkins-Weise, Blood Brothers, 244.
172 Bennington, Lyotard, 115, 155; Jenkins, Why History?, 87; Critchley, ‘Heidegger’s Being and Time, part 8: Temporality’.
173 Sinclair, A Destiny Apart, 262.
174 King, The Penguin History of New Zealand, 134; Turia, ‘Speech to NZ Psychological Society Conference 2000’; Ian Wishart makes reference to King’s use of the term holocaust in The Great Divide: The Story of New Zealand and its Treaty (Auckland: Howling at the Moon Publishing, 2012) as follows: ‘A “holocaust” it might later have been, as Michael King labelled it, but in terms of
Likewise, Bean, in his claim of ‘126 peaceful years’ of existence in Australia prior to World War I, elides from his narrative the deaths of an estimated 6,000 First Australians from eight nations in Tasmania alone who inconveniently held a prior right to place before the British arrived, and the fate of the remaining 1,000 against whom martial law was declared in 1828, including the placing on their heads of a bounty of ‘£5 for adults and £2 for any child captured alive.’\textsuperscript{175} We might also take it that Rudd’s description of his fellow Australians as wanting for the good of others did not apply to either the Turks in 1915 or has any real compensatory application for Aborigines today, despite his verbal apology, as Prime Minister on 13 February 2008, for the Stolen Generations (Aboriginal children taken from their families between 1910 and 1970), an apology, despite its emotional plea for reconciliation, still firmly imbedded in the progressive narrative of Australia and predicated on, as Rudd put it, ‘a core value of our nation—and that value is a fair go for all.’\textsuperscript{176} Thus, contrary to the widely held view in Australia and New Zealand that both countries were ‘born’ at Gallipoli, and contrary to Hopkins-Weise’s extension of that thesis that ‘the real beginnings’ of ‘the ‘Anzac tradition’ lie ‘in the New Zealand wars’, this thesis argues that while Anzac Day does act as a focus of discussion about identity at transnational, national, local and individual levels, as Worthy suggests, it also operates as a cultural instrument which the questionable values that accompanied colonisation can be replaced by the positive values ‘discovered’ at Gallipoli and for which the non-indigenous inhabitants of both countries would prefer their societies to be known and remembered.\textsuperscript{177} To put that otherwise, in valorising the fiction of an origin of values and the birth of nationhood, both Anzac societies avoid the \textit{différend} that cannot be resolved without their giving up what they believe is theirs, and have constructed as being theirs through their constant making over of their settler domains.

\textsuperscript{175} Bean, \textit{ANZAC to Amiens}, 538; Narrator, ‘Episode 2 “Her Will to Survive”: Tasmania (1803-1880)’, Beck Cole dir., \textit{First Australians}.

\textsuperscript{176} The complete text of the Prime Minister, Kevin Rudd’s apology to the Stolen Generations, ‘Apology to Australia’s Indigenous Peoples’: \url{http://www.pm.gov.au/media/Speech/2008/speech_0073.cfm}.

\textsuperscript{177} Hopkins-Weise, \textit{Blood Brothers}, 242.
The *différend*, however, will not disappear. As Ranginui Walker has it, Maori ‘know the sun has set on the empire that colonised them. They know too it will set on the coloniser even if it takes a thousand years. They will triumph in the end, because they are the tangata whenua.’\(^{178}\) Andrew Sharp is equally forthright: ‘justice will *never* be done . . . in Aotearoa/New Zealand’, and that which is taken for justice ‘is not really justice’ but ‘simply an expression of how a particular political society orders its relations.’\(^{179}\) Belich favours pragmatism: ‘Maori aren’t gonna go away, Pakeha aren’t gonna go away, and we need to get over it and find ways of working together.’\(^{180}\) Even when that which lies behind the *différend* is acknowledged, such as by Banner, Brookfield, Paul McHugh, and Sharp, the cultural logic of settlerism still prevails and the *différend* remains.\(^{181}\) Hence the incommensurability between the two language communities continues to manifest itself in various ways, in the ongoing confrontation between ‘Pakeha sovereignty and te tino rangatiratanga’, in acts of paranoia by the State such as Bastion Point (1978) and the Urewera ‘anti-terror’ raids (2007), in disproportionately high levels of illness, unemployment and imprisonment among Maori, occasionally in the form of a taniwha that disturbs Pakeha’s metaphorical waters, but above all in matters concerning the Treaty of Waitangi.\(^{182}\)

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\(^{182}\) Sharp, ‘Representing *Justice and the Maori*: On Why it ought not to be construed as a postmodernist text’, 37; ‘Bastion Point’ refers to the 506-day occupation by Ngati Whatua, led by Joe Hawke, of the land known as Bastion Point, or Takaparawha, protesting the reduction of their ancestral land by ‘compulsory acquisition’ after the government announced a housing development on former Ngati Whatua reserve land, and the eviction in 1978 of some 300 Ngati Whatua protestors by more than 500 Police and Army personnel who arrived in the morning of 25 May 1978 in a convoy
of Army trucks: http://www.nzhistory.net.nz/media/photo/bastion-point-protest and http://www.teara.govt.nz/en/ngati-whataua/4/4. As Aroha Harris records, the Orakei claim concerning Ngati Whatua’s alienation from their ancestral land as a result of central government’s unilateral action over many years, and subsequently taken to the Waitangi Tribunal by Hawke, was the first of the historical claims the tribunal heard. In its 1987 report the tribunal recommended the return of Bastion Point to its rightful owners. . . . Takaparawha is one of the hallmarks of modern activism’, Harris notes, ‘a hard-fought campaign – long, complex and imbued with a poignancy difficult to express’ (Aroha Harris, Hikoi: Forty Years of Maori Protest [Wellington: Huia Publishers, 2004], 78, 86); New Zealand History online: “Anti-terror” raids in Urewera’, URL: http://www.nzhistory.net.nz/page/so-called-anti-terror-raids-urekares, (Ministry for Culture and Heritage), updated 30-Aug-2012. Taniwha are supernatural figures from Maori tradition. See Basil Keane. ‘Taniwha - Taniwha of the sea’, Te Ara - the Encyclopedia of New Zealand, updated 22-Sep-12 URL: http://www.TeAragovt.nz/en/postage-stamp/10864/araiteuru
CHAPTER FIVE
Problematising the cannibal

Following Jacques Derrida, we have seen that, with no outside or centre, history is always already a metaphysical discourse, and following Jean-François Lyotard, that the language communities to which we belong and the discourses to which they adhere act paradoxically, facilitating, on the one hand, our initiation into those communities, whether by choice or by birth, and, on the other, acting like prisons, separating us from those who are not our fellow members and language-speakers. This gives rise to différends that not only influence the way we organise ourselves socially and politically but also the way we think about ourselves personally and collectively.¹ In New Zealand, for example, a différend exists between Maori and Pakeha, in Australia between First and White Australians, and in the Americas between their indigenous peoples and settler societies, which, as we have discussed, not only points to the difference between the principal language communities and their respective discourses in settler domains, but also identifies, names and describes the irresolvability that lies at the heart of that difference. What, then, are we to make of the cannibal, the subject of this chapter, and the role it plays in helping to formulate difference between these communities?

If we were to historicise the cannibal, we might say, after Catalin Avramescu, that ‘the cannibal is sovereign over a species of freedom. His story is one that casts light on the origins of the modern state and the boundaries of modern civilization, and weighs up their right to existence.’² We might think this renamed ‘Anthropophagi (“man-eater”)’ of Pliny’s ‘monstrous races’ also functions as a marker of cultural progress in that it delimits the primitive from the civilised and positions them at

opposite ends of the spectrum of civility.\textsuperscript{3} We might also think that its attachment to an unidentified ethnic group in the Caribbean led to legalised enslavement of so-called Caribs by the Spanish Crown and a genocide through arms, slavery and introduced diseases that began, according to Bartolomé de Las Casas, with the deaths of some three million indigenes on Española (Spanish island) between 1494 and 1508.\textsuperscript{4} We might even speculate that the discursive cannibal was carried by explorers to the frontiers of empire where it was used to classify owner-occupiers of desirable domains as barely human, a classification that justified the subsequent expropriation of those domains and the exploitation of their resources. We might then conclude that this accounts for the relevance of the cannibal in contemporary

\textsuperscript{3}John Block Friedman, \textit{The Monstrous Races in Medieval Art and Thought} (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 2000, first published 1981), 10, 1 passim.

\textsuperscript{4}Carl Ortwin Sauer, \textit{The Early Spanish Main} (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1966), 155; Bartolomew de Las Casas, \textit{An Account of the First Voyages and Discoveries made by the Spaniards in America Containing the most Exact Relation hitherto publish’d, of their unparallel’d Cruelties on the Indians, in the destruction of above Forty Millions People With the Propositions offer’d to the King of Spain, to prevent the further Ruin of the West-Indies} (London: J. Darby for D. Brown, J. Harris, and Andr. Bell, 1699), 3. Las Casas added that Española’s original population of ‘about three Millions of people, is now reduc’d to less than three hundred’; Kirkpatrick Sale, \textit{The Conquest of Paradise: Christopher Columbus and the Columbian Legacy} (New York: Knopf, (NY), 1990), 161. Although Sale is of the view that the original inhabitants of Haiti were extinct ‘within a decade or two’, he notes that it was claimed in 1989 that some of ‘a thousand people in eastern Cuba’ exhibiting ‘Indian “characteristics”’ claimed ‘to be descendants of the original Taino’ (\textit{The Conquest of Paradise}, 161). Among the diseases introduced by Europeans to the area, Sales lists ‘measles, influenza, typhus, pneumonia, tuberculosis, diphtheria, and pleurisy’ and, from 1518, ‘smallpox’ (\textit{The Conquest of Paradise}, 159). Also see Geoffrey Eatough, ‘Commentary’, in Peter Martyr, \textit{Selections from Peter Martyr: Volume V}, trans. Geoffrey Eatough ed. (Turnhout: Brepols, 1998), 458. An estimate of a population decline of some 3,742,200 between 1496 and 1514 may be made on the basis of the total population estimate of 3,770,000 for 1496, calculated in 1971 by demographers Sherburne Cook and Woodrow Borah on the basis of ‘a partial census’ for 1496 ‘by Bartolomé Columbus’, and a total population figure of 27,800 for 1514 according to the \textit{repartimiento} census of that year. See William Denevan, ‘Reviewed Work: Essays in Population History: Mexico and the Caribbean by Sherburne Cook and Woodrow Borah’, \textit{Journal of Latin American Studies}, 5/2 (1973), 290; Without providing sources for his first two figures, Paolo Taviani relies on quite different numbers: ‘By some estimates about 350,000 Tainos lived on \textit{Hispaniola} when the Spanish arrived. By 1508 there were 60,000, and in 1548 Oviedo estimated that no more than 500 survived on the whole island.’ See Paolo Taviani, ‘Notes’, Columbus, Christopher, \textit{Nuova Raccolta Colombiana: Accounts and Letters of the Second, Third, and Fourth Voyages}, Part 2, trans. Luciano F. Farina and Marc A. Beckwith, ed. Paolo Emilio Taviani (Rome: Istituto poligrafico e Zecca dello Stato, Libreria dello Stato, 1994/1997), 157. David Stannard writes that ‘few informed scholars any longer contend that’ the ‘pre-Columbian hemispheric population’ of the Americas ‘was not at least within the general range of 75 to 100,000,000 persons, with roughly 8,000,000 to 12,000,000 living north of Mexico’, and ‘that population loss among native societies routinely reached and exceeded 95 percent’ (David E. Stannard, \textit{American Holocaust: The Conquest of the New World} [New York: Oxford University Press, 1992], 268).
settler domains, where it continues to roam settler historiography, and, on occasion, causes alarm for settlers by stepping outside their discourse.

It thus seems impossible to depoliticise the cannibal and to think of it as separate from the concept of sovereignty. In his seminars on *Robinson Crusoe*, Derrida notes that James Joyce saw Robinson as ‘the representation of a national type, the national type of a rational animal that an Englishman is’, that Jean-Jacques Rousseau saw him as the embodiment of Adamic sovereignty, and that for Carl Schmitt he would have been a figure of proto- or pre-nation-state sovereignty.\(^5\) Derrida reads Robinson somewhat differently, as the personification of ‘solitary and exceptional sovereignty’, and his obsession with the cannibals as the ‘the fantasy of dying alive’, and therefore ‘of dying without being buried’, or ‘of dying like a beast . . . without a funeral and without mourning.’\(^6\) We might also view him as René Descartes’ *res cogitans*, ‘[a] thing that thinks.’\(^7\) For, as Derrida has it: ‘Everything happens as though, on this fictional island, Robinson Crusoe were reinventing sovereignty, technology, tools, the machine, the becoming-machine of the tool, and prayer, God, true religion.’\(^8\) It is, adds Derrida, ‘an act of sovereignty and a question of life or death when a living being invents all alone, by himself, a technique, a machine designed to ensure his survival, to decide as to his life and his death, to avoid being swallowed alive.’\(^9\) With this reading, and by alternating between *Robinson Crusoe* and Martin Heidegger’s 1929-30 seminar on the animal, Derrida is able to explore the very nature of being, or, as he put it in an earlier seminar, ‘the immense question of the living’.\(^10\) It is within this setting, then, that the cannibal, along with natural

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disasters, represents ways in which ipseity or selfhood may be lost. The cannibal, however, is also the ultimate embodiment of that possibility and therefore of difference, more ‘other’ than other devourers of humans, such as the earth and sea, because in consuming the human Other, the cannibal, who can only be human, consumes all trace of the human, of the human’s humanity, and therefore becomes the ultimate expression of inhumanity, as the victim, phantasmatically, dies ‘a living death’.\footnote{Derrida, The Beast and the Sovereign: Volume II, 117 §176 passim.} It is an aporia. As Derrida explains, ‘the more the other is other, the less it is other. Conversely, the less it is other, the more it is other.’\footnote{Derrida, The Beast and the Sovereign: Volume II, 138 §203.} ‘Only humans are said to be inhuman’, ‘only an anthropoid can be anthropophagic’.\footnote{Derrida, The Beast and the Sovereign: Volume II, 141 §206, 142 §208.} Thus the cannibal’s ‘alterity is the more marked for being less marked.’\footnote{Derrida, The Beast and the Sovereign: Volume II, 139 §§203-4.} Hence death from being eaten by a fellow human being becomes Robinson’s greatest fear: ‘I came to reflect seriously upon the real danger I had been in... [with] nothing but a brow of a hill, a great tree, or the casual approach of night... between me and the worst kind of destruction, \emph{viz.} that of falling into the hands of cannibals’.\footnote{Daniel Defoe (ed. John Richetti), Robinson Crusoe (London: Penguin Books, 2001, first published 1719), 155; Derrida, The Beast and the Sovereign: Volume II, 139 §204.} By extension, then, we might view the cannibal, at moments of early cultural contact, as a cipher, collectively embodying that which threatens to devour and thereby obliterate both the personal sovereignty and the culture of the subject whose imagination projects this fantasy, this ‘psychic repression’, onto its Other.\footnote{Derrida, The Beast and the Sovereign, 155 §225.} As we shall see, the cannibal is a wholly textual construct, a notional referent for which little if any archaeological support exists, but which is written irrationally into existence by its rational Other. Put otherwise, the discourse of the cannibal becomes the textual apparatus by which the potential usurper, exploiter and coloniser constructs the Other in such a way that he or she can not only kill, capture, or enslave it, but, in the process, is also able to preserve his or her ipseity and identity as part of a wider cultural collective. Importantly, however, just as there can be no civilised without its savage opposite,
so 'there is no ipseity without . . . prostheticity in the world', no cannibal without the post-Columbian coloniser. Each exists indissociably with its opposite.

Furthermore, attaching the signifier cannibal to any historical group for taxonomic or empirical purposes will be meaningless in and of itself, in that such a group—Aborigines of Australia, Caribs of the Caribbean, Fijians of Fiji, First Nation peoples of Canada, Maori of New Zealand, Native Americans of the USA, the Tupinambá of Brazil—will either no longer exist or not exist in the same form or composition as when the signifier was first attached to them. As such, each group will be a set whose members are defined by their membership of that set (‘the collection as a whole’) about which ‘no significant statement can be made’ because ‘any set of objects’, such that the set is presumed to have a total of those objects, ‘will contain members which presuppose this total’, in the result that ‘such a set cannot have a total’ and will therefore constitute an illegitimate totality. As a consequence, any value or proposition, such as man-eater, assigned to such a group will be based on a vicious-circle fallacy and therefore invalid as a claim for that group. Alternatively, the amorphous group, in this case the ‘all’ to which the proposition pertains, ‘must be in some way limited before it becomes a legitimate totality, and any limitation which makes it legitimate must make any statement about the totality fall outside the totality.’ Consequently, we can say that any indigenous group to which the signifier cannibal is attached can, like the signifier itself, only have a metaphorical and/or rhetorical function. In other words, as we saw in Chapter One, Badiou’s ‘count-as-one’ does not exist but operates.

Likewise, given that time for McTaggart was not valid of reality and metaphorical for Derrida, as we also saw in Chapter One, and, in Chapter Two, that language, the outside of which is also its inside, was, for Derrida, ‘originarily metaphorical’, so we

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19 Whitehead and Russell, Principia Mathematica, 38.
might expect the discourse of the cannibal to face the same range of problems as the discourse of history. These include its fake performativity as it purports to reach a referent beyond itself but which turns out to be the idea of itself at the centre of its signifying system that determines the extent of its ‘domain and play of signification’. For, as Michel de Certeau notes, ‘the cannibals slip away from the words and discourses that fix their place, just as, at the beginning of Book IV of Herodotus, the Scythians vanish from the successive locations where the Persian army attempts to catch them. They are not to be found where they are sought. They are never there.’ Hence, we should also keep in mind as we consider the textual basis of this discourse, and particularly Christopher Columbus’s logbook and letters, that as with speech and writing ‘the meaning of the outside was always present within the inside, imprisoned outside the outside, and vice versa.’

Significantly, in terms of this discussion, metaphor for Derrida is also more than ‘the idea’ as ‘signified meaning’; it ‘may also indirectly signify an affect or a passion’:

Before it allows itself to be caught by verbal signs, metaphor is the relation between signifier and signified within the order of ideas and things, according to what links the idea with that of which it is the idea, that is to say, of which it is already the representative sign. Then, the literal or proper meaning will be the relationship of the idea to the affect that it expresses. And it is the inadequation of the designation (metaphor) which properly expresses the passion.

Hence, by way of example, Derrida would add:

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22 Michel de Certeau, *Heterologies: Discourse on the Other*, trans. Brian Massumi (Minneapolis: The University of Minnesota Press, 1986), 70. This accords with the article of E. M. Murphy and J. P. Mallory in which they argue that Herodotus merely embellished ‘a genuine funerary ritual into one of our earliest descriptions of cannibalism’ (E. M. Murphy and J. P. Mallory, ‘Herodotus and the cannibals’, *Antiquity* 74 [2000], 394).
If fear makes me see giants where there are only men, the signifier—as the idea of the object—will be metaphoric, but the signifier of my passion will be literal. And if I then say “I see giants,” that false designation will be a literal expression of my fear. . . . [Thus] what we interpret as literal expression in the perception and designation of giants, remains a metaphor that is preceded by nothing either in experience or in language. Since speech does not pass through reference to an object, the fact that “giant” is literal as sign of fear not only does not prevent, but on the contrary implies, that it should be nonliteral or metaphoric as sign of the object. It cannot be the idea-sign of the passion without presenting itself as the idea-sign of the presumed cause of that passion, opening an exchange with the outside. This opening allows the passage to a savage metaphor. No literal meaning precedes it. No rhetor watches over it.

We must therefore come back to the subjective affect, substitute the phenomenological order of passions for the objective order of designations, expression for indication, in order to understand the emergence of metaphor, and the savage possibility of transference.25

To illustrate his point, Derrida relied on the following from Rousseau’s Essay on the Origin of Languages:

Upon meeting others, a savage man will initially be frightened. Because of his fear he sees the others as bigger and stronger than himself. He calls them giants. After many experiences, he recognizes that these so-called giants are neither bigger nor stronger than he. Their stature does not approach the idea he had initially attached to the word giant. So he invents another name common to them and to him, such as the name man, for example, and leaves giant to the false object that had impressed him during his illusion. That is how the figurative word is born before the literal word, when our gaze is held in passionate fascination; and how it is that the first idea it conveys to us is not that of the truth.26

26 Jean-Jacques Rousseau as quoted in Derrida, Of Grammatology, 276. The following is an alternative translation (and extension) of the excerpted text as it appears in Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Essay on the Origin of Languages and Writings Related to Music: The Collected Writings of Rousseau Vol. 7, trans. John T. Scott ed. (Hanover: University Press of New England, 1998), 294-5: ‘Upon encountering others, a savage man will at first be afraid. His fright will make him see those men as taller and stronger than himself. He will give them the name Giants. After many experiences he will recognize that as these supposed Giants are neither taller nor stronger than himself, their stature does not agree with the idea that he had first attached to the word Giant. He will therefore invent another name common to them and to him, such as the name man for example, and will leave that of Giant for
In other words, misleading propositions may arise when metaphorical meaning is predicated as literal of the object. Hence Derrida concludes:

[Rousseau's] Essay thus describes at the same time the advent of the metaphor and its "cold" recapture within rhetoric. One cannot, then, speak of metaphor as a figure of style, as technique or procedure of language, except by a sort of analogy, a sort of return and repetition of the discourse; then one deliberately passes through the initial displacement, that which expressed the passion literally. Or rather the representer of the passion: it is not fear itself that the word giant expresses literally—and a new distinction is necessary which would infiltrate as far as the literalness [propre] of expression—but "the idea that the passion presents to us" [Essay, p. 13]. The idea "giant" is at once the literal sign of the representer of the passion, the metaphoric sign of the object (man) and the metaphoric sign of the affect (fear). That sign is metaphoric because it is false with regard to the object; it is metaphoric because it is indirect with regard to the affect: it is the sign of a sign, it expresses emotion only through another sign, through the representer of fear, namely through the false sign. It represents the affect literally only through representing a false representer.

To put that otherwise, if the ‘anteriorty to language’ is the image on the inside, we can see how, when passion is transferred to an object, that the object in question and not the emotion will be captured by the signifier, in the result that ‘an outside in the image of the inside’ will be established in the form of a signifier, which is not a reflection of the outside on the inside but the emotion arising from the viewing of the object. Hence ‘the inadequation of the designation (metaphor) which properly...

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27 Derrida, Of Grammatology, 277.
expresses the passion’ will apply as much to cannibals as it does to giants, and not least because both come from the same figurative family of ‘monstrous races’.29

Julia Kristeva expressed a similar view when she wrote that ‘the phobic object is a proto-writing and, conversely, any practice of speech, inasmuch as it involves writing, is a language of fear.’30 By which she meant that writing is ‘a language of want as such, the want that positions sign, subject and object. Not a language of the desiring exchange of messages or objects that are transmitted in a social contract of communication and desire beyond want, but a language of want, of the fear that edges up to it and runs along its edges.’31 Hence, in attempting to overcome ‘a terrifying, abject referent . . . the writer is a phobic who succeeds in metaphorizing in order to keep from being frightened to death’.32 As a consequence, ‘phobia does not disappear but slides beneath language’.33

‘The Outside and the Inside’—The Journal and the canibales 34

So far as is known, the ethnographic signifiers, ‘Caniba o Canima’ (Spanish) or ‘Canibas or Canimas’ (English), from which the Spanish signifier ‘caníbales’ and its

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29 Derrida, Of Grammatology, 275; Friedman, The Monstrous Races in Medieval Art and Thought, 1 passim.
30 Kristeva, Powers of Horror, 38.
31 Kristeva, Powers of Horror, 38.
32 Kristeva, Powers of Horror, 38.
33 Kristeva, Powers of Horror, 38.
English equivalent ‘cannibals’ appear to be derived, made their first appearance in a European text on 26 November 1492 as an entry in the logbook of Columbus. Known as The Journal, this document, which covers the period 3 August 1492 to 15 March 1493 and purports to be the record of ‘the first voyage and the routes and courses which the Admiral Don Cristóval Colón used when he discovered the Indies’, is neither a holograph of the admiral’s logbook (‘Diario de a bordo’), nor its first copy, but is, at best, a part-précis, part-transcription of a copy or an edited copy of, with direct quotations from, a copy of the original made by Las Casas while researching his Historia de las Indias (History of the Indies), which, according to Andrée Collard, he began writing in 1527 and which gives ‘a lengthy and well-documented account of the Spanish discovery and conquest of the New World from 1492 to 1520’. Significantly, the whereabouts of his abstract of the logbook remained unknown until 1791 when ‘Martin Fernández de Navarrete discovered . . . and published it in

35 Columbus, The Journal, 124/125-6, 118/119.
36 Columbus, The Journal, 8/9; Anthony Pagden, ‘Introduction’, in Bartolomé de Las Casas, Las Casas on Columbus: Background and the Second and Fourth Voyages: Volume VII, trans. Nigel Griffin ed. (Turnhout: Brepols, 1999), 5; Amerigo Vespucci, Letters from a New World: Amerigo Vespucci’s Discovery of America, trans. Luciano Formisano, ed. David Jacobson (New York: Marsilio, 1992), 125. According to Valerie Flint and Louis Vigneras, both the original of Columbus’s logbook given to King Ferdinand and Queen Isabella and the transcript made of it for Columbus under order from Isabella are lost. Permission was given to Luis Columbus, the admiral’s grandson, to publish the journal in 1554, but the publication did not eventuate. The copy from which Las Casas made his abstract is thought to have been held in the library of Fernando Columbus, the admiral’s son. See L. A. Vigneras, ‘Foreword’, in Christopher Columbus, The Journal of Christopher Columbus, trans. Cecil Jane (London: A. Blond and the Orion Press, 1960), xv-xvi, and Valerie I. J. Flint, The Imaginative Landscape of Christopher Columbus (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992), xv-xvi; Andrée Collard, ‘Chronology’ and ‘Introduction’ in Bartolomé de Las Casas (trans. Andrée Collard ed.), History of the Indies (New York: Harper and Rowe, 1971), xxv, ix-x. A prominent advocate for Caribbean indigenes after being himself a young encomendero (a Spanish colonist to whom ‘Indians’ were allocated or commended by the governor via the repartimiento system to work fields and mines), Las Casas has been accused of intellectual misdemeanours ranging from ‘tampering with the spirit’ of the admiral’s logbook and ‘falsifying its contents’ to mere ‘errors of transcription’, and the “pitiless defamation of the Spanish nation.’” See Vigneras, ‘Foreword’, Columbus, The Journal of Christopher Columbus, xvii-xviii. Las Casas’s written debate in 1552 with Juan Sepúlveda, a leading Spanish humanist, who ‘defended the rights of the Spanish Crown to wage against the Indians on grounds of their supposed barbarism and persistent violation of the laws of nature’, was a cause célèbre. See Pagden, ‘Introduction’, Las Casas, Las Casas on Columbus, 6, and Bill Donovan, ‘Introduction’, in Bartolomé de Las Casas, The Devastation of the Indies: A Brief Account, trans. Herma Briffault (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1992, first published 1974), 8-9; Sale, The Conquest of Paradise, 155-7; Fray Toribio Benavente (Motolinía) as quoted in Collard, ‘Introduction’, Las Casas, History of the Indies, xi-xii.
1825’. Metaphorical, messianic, misinformed, self-serving, The Journal also sounds a warning of genocidal tragedy. For the abstract brings with it not just a ‘merchant-adventurer’s’ ambitions for his family and himself and more than a hint of avarice in his ‘unrelenting search for gold’, it also records the importation of an Old World cosmography into New World waters. Included in the cultural cargo Columbus carried to the Caribbean were ‘five books’ he is known to have ‘owned and annotated’: Pierre d’Ailly’s Imago Mundi (c.1480-1483) that drew ‘upon Ptolemy’s Geography which had been rediscovered in the fifteenth century and ‘made generally available through Jacopo Angelo de Scarperia’s 1409 Latin translation; a 1477 Latin edition of Pius II’s Historia Rerum Ubique Gestarum; Friar Pipino’s 1485-1486 Latin version of Marco Polo’s De Consuetudinibus et Conditionibus Orientalium Regionum; a 1491 publication of a Castilian translation of Plutarch’s Lives; and a 1489 Italian translation by Cristofero Ladino of Pliny the Elder’s Natural History—containing, on Valerie Flint’s calculation, 2,568 postille or marginal notations that demonstrate Columbus’s considerable interest in, among other things, anthropophagi, gold and other precious metals and tradeable commodities. However, as Felipe Fernández-Armesto notes, despite Columbus being devotedly autodidactic, his ‘writings were still full of artifice’ and are therefore ‘better understood as a kind of poetry’ rather than ‘precise logbooks’ that yield ‘exact data.’

The relevant part of Columbus’s logbook entry for 26 November 1492 reads as follows:

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37 Vigneras, ‘Foreword’, Columbus, The Journal of Christopher Columbus, xxi-xxii.
39 Flint, The Imaginative Landscape of Christopher Columbus, 36-7, 44, 44 n. 7 (at which Flint refers to ‘the pioneering study of Columbus’s library and annotated book’ by S. de la Rosa y Lopez published in 1891. Flint’s Chapter 2 is concerned with ‘Columbus’s Known Reading’; see Felipe Fernández-Armesto, Columbus on Himself (London: Folio Society, 1992), between pages 24 and 25 for an example ‘facsimile of a page of Pierre d’Ailly’s Imago Mundi, annotated by Columbus’.
All the people he has discovered so far say that they have the greatest fear of those Canibas or Canimas [Caniba o Canima], who are said to live on the island of Bohío, which must be very large, or so it seems to him. And he believes that the Canibas probably went and took these Indians from their own land and houses because they are so timorous and ignorant of arms. For this reason also he thought that those Indians with him did not normally live on the seacoast because that would make them close to that land. So when they saw he was heading for that land they were speechless with fear of being eaten and could not be calmed. They kept saying that the Canibas had but a single eye and the face of a dog. The Admiral felt that they were lying and thought that their captors must have been subjects of the Great Khan.\(^41\)

As can be seen from this entry, the ethnographic signifier has the metaphorical (false) function of denoting an absent object as literal (extant or present)—although according to the text itself the ‘Canibas or Canimas’ were not there—an idea that is at one and the same time an ‘idea-sign’ metaphoric of the phobics’ fear (because ‘it is indirect with regard to the affect’) but which opens to the outside the signifier’s signified, ‘man-eater’, which is thereby attached to the imaginary (absent) object, the man-eating men, who are presumed to be real.\(^42\) In effect, the signifier has used a nonliteral referent as a literal object to which it has attached its metaphorical meaning, ‘fear of being eaten’, which makes the affect a sign of the sign while remaining as an additional signified attached to the signifier ‘Canibas or Canimas’.\(^43\) In this way the inside image—the ‘fear of being eaten’—which has been predicated as an idea of its nonliteral referent, is transferred as literal, not as metaphorical, by the signifier to the object, the imaginary (nonliteral) man-eater, as part of the signifier’s denotative function.\(^44\) The illusory image offered by the passions being presented first constitutes an incorrect designation in the sense that the signified ‘fear of being eaten’, which appears to derive from the signifier’s object, is, on the contrary, not literal of the object but of ‘they’, the phobics, the collective subject of the sentence, mistakenly made literal of ‘the Canibas’, the object of the sentence.

\(^{41}\) Columbus, *The Journal*, 124/125-6/127 and 118/119 (for ‘*caníbales*’ and ‘*cannibals*’).


\(^{44}\) Columbus, *The Journal*, 124/125-6/127
hidden in its predicate, of which it is metaphorical.\textsuperscript{45} We also know that the signified meaning must be metaphorical and not literal of the absent object because when the object is unveiled as the predicate of the following sentence, it turns out to be the single-eyed dog-faced Canibas, a composite of two Plinian ‘monstrous races’, the ‘\textit{Cyclopes (“round-eye”)}’ and the ‘\textit{Cynocephali (“dog-head”)}’, imaginary figures that had already appeared in \textit{The Journal}, on 4 November 1492.\textsuperscript{46} We also know that the entire passage is either metaphorical and rhetorical or meaningless, because speechless people cannot speak. Nevertheless, by the time the writer has made ‘the Canibas’ part of the predicate of the following and final sentence, they have been normalised as ‘subjects of the Great Khan’, and share the predicate of that sentence with the phobics they have just made ‘speechless with fear.’\textsuperscript{47} This rationalisation of fear—an invocation of ‘the reality effect’ that enables a distancing of the subject’s literal fear and a minimising of its metaphorical impact by attaching its nonliteral object (‘the Canibas’) to another nonliteral object from the journal writer’s cosmological world (‘the Great Khan’)—suggests authorial or editorial intervention given that Columbus also reported hearing about other ‘monstrous people’.\textsuperscript{48} These include people ‘born with tails’ in “Avan” and the warrior women of “Matinino” (Martinique) who copulate but do not live with their man-eating neighbours on “Quaris’, a variant of the story of the ‘\textit{Amazons (“without breast”)}’ found in Herodotus, the warrior women who copulated but did not live with Scythian men, made anthropophagus by Pliny.\textsuperscript{49} For by 13 January 1493, the Canibas had become

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\item\textsuperscript{45} Rousseau, \textit{Essay on the Origin of Languages and Writings Related to Music}, 295; Columbus, \textit{The Journal}, 124/125-6/127.
\item\textsuperscript{46} Friedman, \textit{The Monstrous Races in Medieval Art and Thought}, 1 passim, 13-15 passim. ‘Plinian’ and ‘monstrous races’ are terms taken directly from Friedman and used here as terms of convenience, despite Friedman’s signifier ‘races’ being anachronistic and many other writers, such as Hesiod, Homer, Virgil, Herodotus, the anonymous author(s) of the Alexander legends, the writer of the \textit{Letter of Prester John}, various medieval emissaries, missionaries and merchants, and the bogus armchair traveller Sir John Mandeville, having made reference to monstrous peoples of one kind or another; Columbus, \textit{The Journal}, 92/93: ‘Furthermore, he understood that far from there were men with a single eye and other with dogs’ muzzles who ate men: as soon as they captured one they decapitated him, drank his blood, and cut off his genitals.’
\item\textsuperscript{47} Columbus, \textit{The Journal}, 124/125-126/127.
\item\textsuperscript{48} Barthes, \textit{The Rustle of Language}, 139, 141-8; Columbus, \textit{The Journal}, 124/125-126/127; Friedman, \textit{The Monstrous Races in Medieval Art and Thought}, 146.
\item\textsuperscript{49} Christopher Columbus, ‘Letter of Columbus’, in Christopher Columbus \textit{The Four Voyages of Columbus: A History in Eight Documents, Including Five by Christopher Columbus, in the Original}
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redundant, having morphed into 'the tribe of Caribs, who eat men' as a consequence of Columbus having met that day, according to The Journal, a man on Española whom he judged from his 'most ugly' appearance and very long hair 'tied up in back in a net of parrot feathers' to be a Carib, a judgement on which Las Casas later poured scorn: 'These Indians had to be those called Ciguayos: all of them wore their hair very long'; 'They were not Caribs, nor were they ever on Hispaniola'. Significantly, Columbus’s encounter with his Carib occurred one week after Martín Alonso Pinzón, captain of the Pinta, reported that he had traded 'for a piece of lace...

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Spanish, with English Translations, trans. Cecil Jane ed. (New York: Dover Publications, 1988), 12/13-14/15, 15 n. 6; The men with tails can be found in Pliny living in Callingae, a province of India, and in Marco Polo living on Sumatra. See Pliny the Elder (Pliny the Elder, The Natural History, trans. John Bostock and H. T. Riley (London: Taylor and Francis, 1855), Book VII, Chapter 2; Herodotus, Herodotus The Histories, new edn, trans. Aubrey de Sélincourt (London: Penguin, 1996, first published 1954), 249-50; According to Eatough, Nicolò Scillacio, in De insulis Meridiani atque Indici maris nuper inventis ('Translated into Latin from the report of Guglielmo Coma' and 'first published 1494 [?]') (538), 'makes connections between the unsubdued natives of Tenerife, who are proto-cannibals, Canarians and the city of Cynopolis, that is the city of dogs, in Aethiopia where the dogs are sacred animals. Following Pliny he says that the Canarians have their name because their food is the same as the dogs' ... and that the cannibals themselves eat dogs, when they run short of human flesh' (232). Importantly, Eatough states, after Felipe Fernández-Armesto, Before Columbus: Exploration and Colonisation From the Mediterranean to the Atlantic, 1229-1492 (Basingstoke: Mcmillan Education, 1987), that 'the conquest of Tenerife was not effected until 1496', the Canary Islands being important to Spain, on Eatough's view, because they 'validated the Spaniards' claim to be active in the Atlantic, which could otherwise be seen as a Portuguese province', given Portugal's control of the Azores and Madeira. See Eatough, 'Commentary', in Martyr, Selections from Peter Martyr: Volume V, 538, 232, 220-1, 222. In attempting to explain the women of Matinino, Peter Martyr wrote: 'Those who had been brought to Spain on the first voyage, and those who had been redeemed from the cannibals, asserted that this was called Matinino by its inhabitants the island on which only women live. Rumor about this island had reached the ears of our men on the first expedition. There is a belief that at fixed times of the year the cannibals resort to these women, just as antiquity recounts that the Thracians sailed across to the Amazons of Lesbos, and, in the same way, they too send the sons to their sires when they are weaned, the females however they keep with themselves. They say these women have large underground warrens in which they take refuge if any man comes after them at other than the agreed time. From there they protect themselves with arrows which they are believed to shoot with deadly accuracy, if their pursuers dare to assail the entrance by force or ambush.' See Martyr, Selections from Peter Martyr: Volume V, 52; Fernández-Armesto suggests that the 'topos' of 'the island of women' was 'derived originally from an episode in the tale of Jason and the Golden Fleece; when the Argonauts arrived at Lemnos they found that the women had murdered their menfolk, in revenge for their husbands’ adultery with the women of a neighbouring island. The story blended well with that of the Amazons, who were not generally regarded as island-dwellers in antiquity, but whom Diodorus Siculus, in the first century BC, located on an island. The inference that there was a parallel island of men, with whom the Amazons periodically got together in order to breed, goes back at least to the Muslim geographer, al-Idrisi, who worked in Sicily in the twelfth century. Marco Polo claimed to have heard of such a pair of islands' (Fernández-Armesto, Amerigo, 104-5); Friedman, The Monstrous Races in Medieval Art and Thought, 9.

Friedman, The Monstrous Races in Medieval Art and Thought, 146; Columbus, The Journal, 242/243.
. some fine pieces of gold the size of two fingers, sometimes the size of one’s hand’ and had heard about ‘a large quantity of gold and many mines’ on Española.51

As John Friedman has it: ‘The myths of the monstrous races, though geographically obsolete, were too vital to discard. They provided a ready and familiar way of looking at the native people of the New World.’52 However, as The Journal entry of 13 January 1493 foreshadows, Columbus, in the end, would need only one of Pliny’s ‘monstrous people’, Anthropophagi, to whom The Journal had attached the signifier caníbales fifty-one days earlier, on 23 November 1492.53 For the eating of human flesh not only made Caniba o Canima/caribes/caníbales idolaters, but as ‘an offence against natural law’ also made them, theoretically, liable to enslavement.54

The following is the entry in Columbus’s logbook for 23 November 1492, the date, as far as we can tell, when caníbales first appeared in a European text:

The Admiral sailed all day toward land, to the south, always with little wind, but the current did not permit him to reach it. . . . The breeze, from the east north-east and favourable for sailing south, was light. Beyond this promontory lay another piece of land or promontory, also to the east, that the Indians with him called Bohio. They were saying that it was quite big and that there lived people with a single eye in the middle of their forehead as well as others called cannibals [caníbales], for whom they exhibited great fear. As soon as they saw they were headed for that land, the Admiral says, they stopped talking about it because they feared they would be eaten, and the cannibals were well armed. The Admiral says he felt there was some truth to what they said, but if they were well armed they would have to be reasonable people, and he was of the opinion that they had taken some prisoners, and when the prisoners had not returned home it was said that they had been eaten.55

52 Friedman, The Monstrous Races in Medieval Art and Thought, 207.
53 Friedman, The Monstrous Races in Medieval Art and Thought, 146; Columbus, The Journal, 118/119.
54 Fernández-Armesto, Columbus on Himself, 103.
55 Columbus, The Journal, 118/119; It should be noted that the Spanish ‘canibale’ appears only once in this entry in The Journal, Beckwith and Farina having substituted ‘cannibal’ for ‘porque los comían’. Cecil Jane’s alternative translation for the bolded portion of the entry in The Journal reads as follows: ‘They said that this land was very extensive and that in it were people who had one eye in the forehead, and others whom they called “Cannibals.” Of these last, they showed great fear, and
This entry, in its play of signifiers, its narrative, descriptions and presentation of the rational (European)/irrational (Indians) dichotomy, ‘the cognitive genre and its referent’, seems to foreshadow the entry made three days later in which the signifiers ‘Canibas or Canimas’ first appears.56 Opened to the outside is the same signified—fear of being eaten—the response of the phobics, the subjects of the sentence, to the idea of the nonliteral ‘cannibals’, thoughts which are transferred to, not derived from, the absent object, making the signified meaning metaphoric of the object or referent ‘cannibals’ but literal of the phobics’ passion engendered by the false sign canibales. Like the entry of November 26, the entry of the 23rd appears contrived.57 It is also problematic in that Bohío, which meant ‘house’ according to Las Casas, was, most likely, a geographical area of Española, where, according to The Journal, Columbus was located on the day this entry was made, and where, again on Las Casas’s view, no Caribs lived.58 We might also note that if The Journal were derived from a chronologically composed log-book, then Columbus could not have invented the signifier canibales on that date because he had not yet heard the ethnographic signifier Caniba (‘Canibas’) from which it appears to be derived until three days later. Furthermore, according to Oviedo, caribes (‘Caribs’)—signifier of ‘the inhabitants of Caniba’ that Columbus first heard, according to The Journal, on 26 December 1492—means brave or daring (‘Caribes, que en lengua de los indigos quiere decir bravos e osados’), and not man-eaters.59 As Peter Hulme also points out, ‘the hostile, man-eating, Arawak-hating natives of the Lesser Antilles’, spoke an ‘Arawakan language with a certain number of Carib lexemes’ and not a separate ‘Cariban language’, making it problematic to consider them as Caribs, and that

when they saw that this course was being taken, they were speechless, he says, because those people ate them and because they are very warlike’ (Columbus, The Journal of Christopher Columbus, 68-9).

56 Columbus, The Journal, 118/119.
57 Columbus, The Journal, 118/119.
58 Las Casas, ‘Marginal Notes’, Columbus, 90/91, 242/243.
59 Eatough, ‘Commentary’, Martyr, Selections from Peter Martyr, 232. Eatough refers for this definition to Gonzalo Fernández Oviedo y Valdes, Historia General y Natural de La Indias (Madrid, 1992, first published 1851-1855), vol. 2.323-324; Peter Hulme, Colonial Encounter: Europe and the native Caribbean, 1492-1797 (London: Methuen, 1986), 63, 281 n. 46 (which contains Hulme’s quote from Oviedo Historia general, I, 34, repeated above.)
‘neither Arawak nor Taino were ever, as far as we know, self-ascriptions.’

Taken together, these seems to indicate that the descriptions of a dichotomised population, begun in *The Journal* and perpetuated in subsequent New World texts, were not so much an early form of ethnography as an articulation of grounds for conquest, as had been the case with the Canary Islands when their aboriginal inhabitants, the Guanches, were characterised as idolatrous (‘naked’ and therefore ‘without any religion’) and the most resistant, those on Tenerife, as Cynocephali. We might wonder, too, at the amount and quality of the information contained in *The Journal* entries of 23 and 26 November 1492, given that the expedition’s interpreter, Luís de Torres, had been selected, according to Hulme, for his knowledge of ‘Hebrew, Chaldean, and some Arabic’, and that the parties, by 23 November 1492, had had only forty days in which to learn each other’s languages, notwithstanding that seven local inhabitants from “Guanahani” (San Salvador) had been kidnapped two days after landfall, on 12 October 1492. But that should not surprise given that *The Journal* entry writer of 14 October 1492 was apparently able to understand the local language when the expedition first made contact with the inhabitants: ‘An old man came out to my boat, and others called out in a loud voice to the whole population, men and women, saying, “Come and see the men who came down from heaven; bring them something to eat and drink”.’

Thus, we can see that even if both entries of the 23rd and 26th of November 1492 are faithful renderings by Las Casas, *canibales*, like *Caniba o Canima*, are metaphorical figures signifying fear rather than literal figures purveying it, with their illusory predication apparently already tied to a politics of place.

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60 Hulme, *Colonial Encounters*, 62-3, 61.
62 Hulme, *Colonial Encounters*, 20; Columbus, *The Journal*, 40/41 (for landfall), 48/49 (for kidnapping); Columbus, ‘Letter of Columbus’, *Columbus, The Four Voyages of Columbus*, 10/11; Eatough, ‘Commentary’, Martyr, *Selections from Peter Martyr*, 242. As Eatough notes also at 242, Columbus captured a further fifteen people from Cuba on 15 November 1492 and four from Hispaniola on 15 January 1493, although the total number captured and taken back to Spain remains unknown. As Jane has it, Luis de Torres, thought to have been a *converso*—a convert to Catholicism in the aftermath of the *Reconquista*—was among those left behind in La Navidad at the end of the first voyage but who perished before the second expedition returned to Española (Columbus, *The Journal of Christopher Columbus*, 206 n. 45).
63 Columbus *The Journal*, 46/47-48/49.
In addition to fear of being eaten and man-eater, a third signified, able to be enslaved, had been added on 14 October 1492, according to an entry in The Journal dated 14 October 1492. From this it would seem that Columbus had enslavement in mind just two days after his arrival in the Indies, for, as Paolo Taviani has noted, “Captives” means slaves, though it is only a hint. Referring to the seven prisoners, the diarist wrote:

If Your Highnesses should order either to bring all of them to Castile or to hold them as captivos on their own island it could easily be done, because with about 50 men you could control and subjugate them all, making them do whatever one wished.

Columbus’s formal proposal for enslaving cannibals first appeared towards the end of his first-voyage Letter. Addressed to Luis Santángel, ‘keeper of King Ferdinand’s privy purse, treasurer of the Santa Hermandad, a police force with its own private endowment’ that may have invested in the expedition, the Letter, according to its date, 15 February 1493, was written on the homeward journey. This Letter, ‘basically a publicity brochure to attract further investment’ and likely written by an amanuensis, was printed in Barcelona ‘as early as April 1493’, the following month in Rome in a Latin translation, with editions over ‘the next four years’ appearing ‘in Valladolid, Basle, Antwerp, Paris and Strasbourg, in Spanish, Latin, French and German’, and ‘a rhymed version’ in Italian in Florence. Editorial interventions seem to be apparent in its text, including the signature of ‘El Almirante’ (the Admiral), a title not bestowed on Columbus until after his return to Spain, the Letter

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64 Taviani, ‘Notes’, Columbus, Nuova Raccolta Colombiana, Part 2, 158.
65 Columbus, The Journal, 88/89; Hulme, Colonial Encounters, 48/49. Taviani also noted that Columbus’s thinking on slavery was unexceptional, given the contemporary practice of Christians and Muslims enslaving each other: ‘Indeed, shortly before Columbus left . . . many Moorish prisoners of war from Granada were sold in the slave markets of Seville and other Andalusian cities, while Christian prisoners from the Moroccan wars . . . were sold in the slave markets of Fez, Algiers, Tunis, and Constantinople’ (Taviani, ‘Notes’, Columbus, Nuova Raccolta Colombiana, Part 2, 159).
66 Columbus ‘Letter of Columbus’, Columbus, The Four Voyages of Columbus, 2-19; Delno West, ‘Christopher Columbus and His Enterprise to the Indies: Scholarship of the Last Quarter Century’, The William and Mary Quarterly, 49/2 (1992), xvii.
67 Hulme, Colonial Encounters, 42; Vigneras, ‘Foreword’, Columbus, The Journal of Christopher Columbus, xxi; Fernández-Armesto, Columbus on Himself, 101-2; Sale, The Conquest of Paradise, 124-5.
having been dated when he was ‘off the Canary Islands’, when, according to The Journal, he was ‘near the Azores’ on 15 February 1493, and the claim that “Matinino” (Martinique) was the ‘first island met on the way from Spain to the Indies’, close by to which, as either Dominica or María Galante, lay “Quaris”, home of the man-eating copulating Caribs, something that at the time could not have been known given that Columbus ‘had not sailed within five hundred miles of’ the Lesser Antilles, according to The Journal. The original of the Letter, in which the following passage appears, like that of The Journal, of which the Letter is a discrete summary, is lost, and none of the surviving copies, according to Cecil Jane, ‘can be regarded as an exact copy’:

In these islands I have so far found no human monstrosities, as many expected . . . except in an island ‘Quaris’, the second at the coming into the Indies, which is inhabited by a people who are regarded in all the islands as very fierce and who eat human flesh . . . . These are those who have intercourse with the women of ‘Matinino’ [Martinique], which is the first island met on the way from Spain to the Indies, in which there is not a man. These women engage in no feminine occupation, but use bows and arrows . . . and they arm and protect themselves with plates of copper, of which they have much . . . .

In conclusion . . . their highnesses can see that I will give them as much gold as they may need . . . and slaves, as many as they shall order to be shipped and who will be from the idolaters.

Despite the signified—a savage man able to be enslaved—being attached only to the signifier “Quaris” in this first-voyage Letter, given that caníbales was the first of the interchangeable signifiers to appear in The Journal, it may have been familiar to the Catalan courtiers not long after Columbus returned in March 1493 and soon

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68 Jane, ‘Introduction’, Columbus, The Four Voyages of Columbus, cxli-cxlii; Columbus, The Journal, 278/279; Columbus, ‘Letter of Columbus’, 18/19, 16/17, 15 n. 6, 14/15; Sauer, The Early Spanish Main, 23.
thereafter carried its incendiary meaning beyond the Iberian peninsula.\textsuperscript{70} For, according to Geoffrey Eatough, sections of ‘a manuscript version of Martyr’s first decade’ of his \textit{De Orbe Novo} (1511), had been circulating as early as 1493, Martyr having been ‘at court in Barcelona when Columbus returned from the New World.’\textsuperscript{71} And as Martyr has it in his account of Columbus’s discoveries in ‘The first Ocean Decade’:

They learned by hearsay that not far from those islands are the islands of wild men who feed on human flesh. They mentioned afterwards that this was the reason that they had fled in such panic at our arrival; they thought we were cannibals \textit{[caníbales]}. This, or Caribs \textit{[caribes]}, is the name they give to those savages.\textsuperscript{72}

Thus, on the basis of hearsay, Columbus had made an ethno-cultural group, the existence of which he had not ascertained let alone enumerated, the subject of the signifier \textit{caníbales} and therefore, theoretically, able to be enslaved, a group, furthermore, that had grown numerically, by the time he wrote his second-voyage letter (dated 13 January 1495), from living on one small island to occupying the largest and most populous islands in the region.\textsuperscript{73} As Carl Sauer concludes:

From the beginning Columbus had the slave trade in mind. At the journey’s end he proposed that these should be taken from among the idolaters. By this he meant Caribs, for he had come to the conclusion that the Indians with whom he had been (the Island Arawaks) were

\textsuperscript{70} Vigneras states that ‘this letter was read to a meeting of the Cordoba alderman on March 22\textsuperscript{nd}, Cordoba being the home in Spain of Columbus, ‘his mistress, Beatriz de Arana, and his two sons, Diego and Fernando’ (Vigneras, ‘Foreword’, Columbus, \textit{The Journal of Christopher Columbus}, xxi).


\textsuperscript{72} Martyr (Eatough), \textit{Selections from Peter Martyr}, 46/132 [1.1.8].

\textsuperscript{73} Christopher Columbus, ‘Memorandum of Christopher Columbus, sent to Ferdinand and Isabella, by Antonio de Torres’, Columbus, \textit{The Four Voyages of Columbus}, 88/89. Jane notes at 112, n. 1, that the reason ‘the sovereigns acknowledged the receipt of the letters of Columbus, 13 April 1494’, was because de Torres did not go immediately to the court.
innocent of idolatry and other reprehensible practices. He had never seen a Carib, but what he had heard about them was bad and so it would be proper and profitable to capture them to be shipped to Spain as slaves.\textsuperscript{74}

Motivation for the invention of this stigmatising signifier may be found in Columbus's agreement with Ferdinand and Isabella 'known as the “Capitulations.”'\textsuperscript{75} Dated 17 April 1492, this promissory undertaking by the monarchs included Columbus being created 'Don Christopher Columbus with immediate effect their admiral of all the islands and landmasses that will be discovered or conquered through his efforts and industry throughout the said Ocean Seas', the 'title and office' passing 'on his death to his heirs or successors in perpetuity', being made 'vicerey and governor-general' of all the islands and land he discovered, and to 'keep for himself', tax-free, 'one-tenth part of the net value of all goods . . . acquired within the confines of the said admiralty', including 'precious pearls, gold, or silver, spices or merchandise of any other nature'.\textsuperscript{76} Columbus, however, encountered neither commercial opportunities nor 'established a new trading route to Asia', an issue of some importance for the monarch-sponsored but privately backed expedition if substantial investment were to be raised for a follow-up voyage.\textsuperscript{77} But believing he had arrived at the mainland 'belonging to the Great Khan, where will be great trade and gain', and no doubt wishing to collect on his contract, Columbus arrived home in

\textsuperscript{74} Sauer, \textit{The Early Spanish Main}, 35.
\textsuperscript{75} Las Casas, \textit{Las Casas on Columbus}, 63 [1].
\textsuperscript{76} Las Casas, \textit{Las Casas on Columbus}, 63-4; Sauer, \textit{The Early Spanish Main}, 16.
\textsuperscript{77} West is of the view that 'the budding capitalist economy of the fifteenth century depended on a fast turnover of capital' (West, 'Christopher Columbus and His Enterprise to the Indies', 260, 264). Fernández-Armesto opines that Alonso de Quintanilla, a treasury official who 'seems to have been given responsibility for the organization of the conquest' of the Canaries 'from 1480' was 'himself instrumental in arranging the backing for the “enterprise of the Indies”' (Felipe Fernández-Armesto, \textit{Columbus} [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991], 55). Fernández-Armesto also notes that among Columbus's 'spreading network' of first-voyage supporters were 'the Genoese and Florentine merchants of Seville, the friars of La Rábida and the court, the financiers of the conquest of the Canary Islands, the household of the Prince Don Juan, [and] the treasury of the Crown of Aragon' (\textit{Columbus}, 64); also see West who notes that, in addition to Santángel, other backers included Gianetto Gerardi, the Florentine banker, Francesco Pinelli, 'the other treasurer at Santa Hermandad' and Ferdinand's 'trusted counselor', four Genoese merchants including Gianotto Berardi, 'Christopher Columbus and His Enterprise to the Indies', 260), and Sauer who makes mention of the owners of the three ships making up the first-voyage fleet: Juan de la Cosa (\textit{Santa Maria}), the Pinzón (\textit{Pinta}) and Niño (\textit{Niña}) families (\textit{The Early Spanish Main}, 17-18).
haste, not with holds of gold but with the only readily cashable commodity available: kidnapped Indians who would not only turn a profit when sold as slaves but on account of their docility were potential converts to Catholicism and on their well-formed appearance potentially an important source of labour for the next phase of the enterprise.\footnote{Columbus, 	extit{The Four Voyages of Columbus}, 12/13. According to 	extit{The Journal}, and apart from the ill-fated members left behind at La Navidad, the expedition had been in the Caribbean for only 96 days, having made landfall on 12 October 1492 and having departed on 16 January 1493.} \footnote{Fernández-Armesto, 	extit{Amerigo}, 58. According to Fernández-Armesto, only a few ‘aboriginal Canarians’—which he described as being ‘a very ancient Cro-Magnoid type, comprising elements from Stone-Age North Africa and Europe’, of ‘having a Neolithic culture’, and as being ‘present in the islands perhaps from 2,500 BC’—survived the ordeal of conquest and colonisation and outbreaks of disease, and none is ‘known to have survived beyond the late seventeenth century.’ Apparently in possession of a sophisticated political system, they also were adept at defending themselves despite having vastly inferior weapons. See Felipe Fernández-Armesto, 	extit{The Canary Island after the Conquest: The Making of a Colonial Society in the Early Sixteenth Century} (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982), 5-6, 10-11. Sale also makes the following comment: ‘The Guanches, who once numbered between 80,000 and 100,000, after less than two centuries of conquest and settlement were extinct’ (The Conquest of Paradise, 51).} Whether \textit{Caniba o Canima/Caribes/canibales} even existed before he classified them as able to be enslaved, appears, on the documents, to have been irrelevant to Columbus. What was needed was a signifier imbued with meaning so powerful that it would overcome the objection of canon law that declared slavery to be ‘unnatural’ and the criticisms that had caused Ferdinand and Isabella five years earlier to order hundreds of enslaved Canarians returned to freedom, the right to which, as an observer of canon law knew, could only be ‘forfeited . . . by gross offences against natural law, such as cannibalism or sodomy.’\footnote{Fernández-Rodríguez, 	extit{Atabego Guanches}, 80.}

There was more than a hint that the neologism would become indispensable to the Spanish New World projects when the \textit{Inter caetera}, the Papal Bull of 4 May 1493, in which the Spanish-born Alexander VI, having been advised ‘in great detail’ by Ferdinand and Isabella of Columbus’s discoveries, granted and assigned to them and to their ‘heirs and successors . . . forever . . . all islands and mainlands found and to be found, discovered and to be discovered’ west of a meridian positioned ‘one hundred leagues to the west and the south’ of the Portuguese possessions, the Azores and Cape Verde Islands, provided they not ‘be in the actual possession of any Christian king or prince’, along with the sole and obligatory right to take the
‘Catholic faith’ to the inhabitants of those lands, the ‘very many peoples living in peace, and, as reported, going unclothed, and not eating flesh.’ Thus, although the rights given by the Spanish pope to the Spanish monarchs rested on their evangelisation of ‘the very many peoples’ discovered by ‘our beloved son, Christopher Columbus’, and despite the monarchs being ‘bound by a long canonical tradition, as well as by their own convictions, to permit nothing such as maltreatment or indiscriminate enslavement to interfere with the work of conversion’, it was also ‘quite clear that no natives could in law be enslaved, unless captured in the course of legitimate warfare or clearly placed outside the protection of natural law by such offences against it as cannibalism.’

In Letter I dated 4 March 1493 contained in the *Libro Copiador de Cristóbal Colón* (1989)—a commissioned mid-sixteenth century ‘copy-book of letters’ containing nine letters from Columbus to his Sovereigns, six of which were previously unknown—the author calls the first island *Mateninó* [*Mateninó*] and the second not “Quaris” but *Caribo* [*Caribo*], ‘where live the people feared by all those on the other islands of the Indies’ and who ‘eat human flesh.’ It is from the latter group, ‘who couple with the women of *Mateninó*’, that Columbus proposed sourcing slaves:

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82 Antonio Rumeu de Armas (ed.), *Libro Copiador de Cristóbal Colón*, 2 vols, (Madrid: Testimonio, 1989); Flint, *The Imaginative Landscape of Christopher Columbus*, xiv-xv n. 4; Columbus, *Nuova Raccolta Colombiana*, Part 2, 196/197; Columbus, *The Four Voyages of Columbus*, 14/15; Gil and Varela, ‘Introductory Note’ Columbus, *Nuova Raccolta Colombiana*, Part 1, 163-164. Gil and Varela comment that “the *Libro Copiador* is filled with grave defects and even mistakes, the result of the distraction of the copyist, who did not understand well what he had before his eyes” (164). Varela also notes that two clearly different hands have been used in the copying of the nine letters. Letters 1 to 5 ‘are in an italic hand with the traits characteristic of Castilian scribal schools of the last third of the sixteenth century’ and Letters 6 to 9 are ‘in a round legal hand’ which is ‘also Castilian’ (166). Gil and Varela recount in some detail the story of the manuscript from when it was first offered for sale by a Catalan bookseller in 1985 to its publication in 1989 (163). Barry Ife notes that this letter, Letter I, may be the ‘missing letter to the Monarchs’ (B. W. Ife, ‘Breaking the news: Columbus’s letters of 1493’, *Romance Quarterly*, 40/2 [1993], 69-78). Peter Hulme is of the view in 1993 that while the *Libro Copiador de Cristóbal Colón* ‘may prove to be’ ‘the most important single volume’ produced at the time of the Quincentenary, that ‘its authenticity is still a matter of debate’ (Peter Hulme, ‘Quincentenary Perspectives’, *History Workshop*, 36 [1993], 229).
I believe the great cowardice of the peoples of the other islands, which is without remedy, makes them claim that these Caribs are brave, but I consider them like the others, and when your Highnesses shall order slaves sent I hope to bring or send a greater number of cannibals among them.  

Could it be that the fate of the Caribs—and the subsequent fate of many indigenous people around the world—was sealed when, according to the second-voyage letter of Diego Chanca, the ‘eminent doctor’ made ‘physician’ to Columbus’s seventeen-ship fleet, one of its captains collected from recently abandoned dwellings on Turuqueira ‘four or five bones of the arms and legs of men’, two days after the second expedition made landfall, on 3 November 1493, at Dominica and Ceyre? According to the letter ‘written to the City of Seville’, the bones were interpreted not as signs of funerary or memorial rites but of man-eating practice: ‘As soon as we saw this, we suspected that those islands were the Carib islands which are inhabited by people who eat human flesh’, islands identified as Turuqueira, Ceyre and Ayay, respectively Guadeloupe, Maria Galante (or Quaris) and Santa Cruz. Having reported that the expedition had captured two men and ‘more than twenty women’ and also found ‘a great quantity of men’s bones and skulls hung up about the houses like vessels to hold things’ in coastal dwellings, Chanca’s letter continued: ‘We asked the women, who were captive on this island, what these people were; they replied that they were Caribs. After they understood that we abhorred that race [tal gente] for their evil custom of eating human flesh, they rejoiced greatly’. The letter also reported, again from hearsay, that the Caribs not only castrated young boys in order to fatten them for future feasting, but also kept captured women as lovers and slaves.

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83 Columbus, Nuova Raccolta Colombiana, Part 1, 196/197.
84 Flint, The Imaginative Landscape of Christopher Columbus, 215; Diego Chanca, ‘Letter of Dr Chanca, written to the City of Seville’, Columbus, The Four Voyages of Columbus, 20 n. 1, 22/23 n. 1-3, 26/27.
85 Chanca, ‘Letter of Dr Chanca, written to the City of Seville’, 20/21, 26/27, 30/31-32/33 n. 1.
86 Chanca, ‘Letter of Dr Chanca, written to the City of Seville’, 30/31. For an alternative translation see Diego Chanca, “Letter” to the Mayor of Seville, Diego Chanca and Andrés Bernáldez, Christopher Columbus’s Discoveries in the Testimonials of Diego Álvarez Chanca and Andrés Bernáldez, trans. by Gioacchine Triolo and Luciano F. Farina (Rome: Istituto poligrafico e zecca dello stato, Libreria dello stato, 1992), 20/21: ‘We asked the women kept prisoners there what kind of people the natives were and they answered they were Caribs. Upon realizing we detested such people on account of their bad custom of eating human flesh, they were most glad indeed’.
as well as breeders of fresh meat, an account that was at odds with the suggestion in Columbus’s first-voyage letter of a harmonious relationship between the Matinino warrior women and their man-eating neighbours on “Quaris”:

These people raid the other islands and carry off the women whom they can take, especially the young and handsome. They keep them in service and have them as concubines, and they carry off so many that in fifty houses no males were found, and of the captives more than twenty were girls. These women also say that they are treated with a cruelty which appears to be incredible, for they eat the male children whom they have from them and only rear those whom they have from their own women. As for the men whom they are able to take, they bring such as are alive to their houses to cut up for meat, and those who are dead, they eat at once. They say that the flesh of a man is so good that there is nothing like it in the world. . . . They castrate the boys whom they capture and employ them as servants until they are fully grown, and then when they wish to make a feast, they kill and eat them, for they say that the flesh of boys and of women is not good to eat. Of these boys, three came fleeing to us, and all three had been castrated [todos tres cortados sus miembros].

In Letter II of the Libro Copiador, which amounts to a ‘summary of the logbook of the second voyage’ purportedly written at La Isabella January-February 1494, Columbus (or its author) endorsed these hyper-phobic images soon after the second expedition arrived at Santa María de Guadalupe. That the Caribs ranged widely and menacingly is implied by the purported presence on the island of part of the Santa María that sank on Española, about 530 miles away, on Christmas Day, 1492:

I managed to speak and learned that all these islands were inhabited by cannibals and populated by people who eat others, as Your Highnesses will see and understand from those I am sending you with these ships. The villages of this island were not many, and they were scattered in various locations on the edges of the island. The houses were very comfortable and filled with many provisions. As for people, few were taken and few seen; all of them fled into the countryside, and because the trees were so thick, they could not be captured except for some women, which I am sending to Your Highnesses along with many other fine things

87 Columbus, ‘Letter of Columbus’, 14/15, 15 n. 6; Chanca, ‘Letter of Dr Chanca, written to the City of Seville’, 32/33.
found there. These women told me they had been taken from other islands; in my opinion they were taken as slaves or concubines; they also indicated with words and gestures that their husbands had been eaten and that other women had had their sons and brothers eaten, and they themselves had been forced to eat them. I also found some boys who had been brought there, and each had had his penis cut off [a todos cortado su miembro]: I thought that had been done out of jealousy for their women, but they follow that practice to fatten them up, just like capons in Castile, so they can be eaten for feasts; women they never kill. Everyone will learn about all these things from the people themselves, whom, as I say, I am sending you. In their houses I found baskets and great arches of human bones as well as heads hanging up in every house. Here I found a large piece from the stern of a Spanish ship; I believe it was from the one I left at La Navidad last year.\(^{89}\)

Consistent with the discovery of his Carib on Española in January of that year, one week after Pinzón had traded for gold, Columbus now not only discovered all the islands of the Lesser Antilles to be inhabited by cannibals, he also learned from two captured Caribs ‘the great news that there are islands in which there is much gold’:

One of these cannibals . . . indicated with words and gestures that these islands hold an infinite quantity of gold and . . . also much copper. As I recall, last year an old Indian on this island of La Isabela told me that in this zone of cannibals there was a small island and that three-fourths of it had gold, and this matches that description, because the earth looks like that.\(^{90}\)

According to Letter II, its author even found cannibals on Puerto Rico (‘San Juan Baptist’) in the Greater Antilles: ‘It is populated with people who eat human flesh, but they are enemies of the cannibals and of everyone else on the other islands.’\(^{91}\)

It thus seems, on the basis of Letter II, that the cannibal population spread from the island Quaris/Caribo in more or less direct proportion to the rumours of gold Columbus was encountering on his northward journey, although as Consuelo Varela points out, ‘no other source indicates that the men of Boriquen (Puerto Rico) were

\(^{89}\) Columbus, Nuova Raccolta Colombiana, Part 1, 203-4/205.

\(^{90}\) Columbus, Nuova Raccolta Colombiana, Part 1, 208-9.

\(^{91}\) Columbus, Nuova Raccolta Colombiana, Part 1, 212-13.
cannibals; in absolute contradiction to this document, all stress that they were not man eaters.’92 Consistent, however, with the purported increased size of the population in the cannibal isles and with apparent knowledge of the contemporary trade in slaves from the west coast of Africa, Columbus (or the letter’s author) proposed enslaving large numbers of that population:

When I visited all the cannibal isles and those nearby I took possession of them, destroying and burning houses and canoes. Your Highnesses may decide whether they should be captured, because I believe an infinite number of them and their women could be taken each year. Please believe that one of them would be superior in strength and intelligence to three negroes from Guinea, as you shall see from those I am sending back.93

If they were the co-originators of these images of sexualised cannibalism, Chanca and Columbus had invented a metaphorical monster of extraordinary power that would not only set alight reports from Tierra Firme (mainland) but also burn its way deep into the European imagination. And they had done so, on their own accounts, without having witnessed any of its members eating human flesh, and without having met a so-called Carib save for the male and female captured on Guadeloupe.94 It was also a contradictory designation: the Caribs could not have been as hungry for human flesh as caníbales suggested, for when they first sighted the Spanish on Guadeloupe they purportedly took flight.95 We might also treat sceptically the information that each of the boys ‘had had his penis cut off’ in order to be fattened ‘just like capons in Castile’, given the potential life-threatening loss of blood from such a procedure and that capons are fattened through removal of their testicles.96

92 Varela, ‘Notes’, Columbus, Nuova Raccolta Colombiana, Part 1, 173.
93 Columbus Nuova Raccolta Colombiana, Part 1, 232/233.
94 As David Stannard puts it, ‘there was no real evidence of cannibalism (to say nothing of dog-headed people) anywhere in the Indies, despite widespread popular belief to the contrary that continues to exist today, belief largely based on the fact that Columbus said the alleged man-eaters were called Caribs. . . . The important point . . . is not the spuriousness of the claim that some of the natives ate human flesh, but only that Columbus and those who heard his report readily believed, indeed, needed to believe, that the charge was true’ (Stannard, American Holocaust, 197-8).
95 Columbus, Nuova Raccolta Colombiana, Part 1, 204/205.
96 Columbus, Nuova Raccolta Colombiana, Part 1, 204/205.
There is, however, no mystery in the metaphor. *Canibales* was a cure-all. With no other apparent reason for its invention than to circumvent canon law prohibiting enslavement, and despite the apparent contradiction of exporting the very labour by which the resources of the newly discovered territories might be exploited, the sexualisation of an already highly transgressive practice might be read as a call to arms to conquer the Indies.  

Thus, not yet finished with loading up his neologism, Columbus added further a further layer of meaning when, in a second-voyage letter ‘usually known as the *Torres Memorandum*’, the extant copy of which, like the Chanca letter, lacks an unimpeachable provenance, he not only asserted that ‘of all the islands, those of the cannibals are much the largest and much more fully populated’, but also proposed that his *canibales* become a currency of exchange by which his royal Spanish sponsors could be reimbursed for ‘cattle and other supplies and things for the colonization of the country and the development of the land’:

> Payment for these things could be made to them in slaves, from among these cannibals, a people very savage and suitable for the purpose, and well made and of very good intelligence. We believe that they, having abandoned that inhumanity, will be better than any other slaves, and their inhumanity they will immediately lose when they are out of their own land.

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97 According to Fernández-Armesto, there had been mass enslavement of the indigenous population of the Canaries following Ferdinand and Isabella’s resumption of the conquest of the archipelago in 1478, and particularly as a consequence of the ‘brutal incursions’ on Gomera in 1488 and 1489 (*Columbus, 49*). Furthermore, no-one, on Fernández-Armesto’s view, was more supportive of Columbus than the expatriate Florentine, Gianotto Berardi, who, among other things, was also a slave trader, ‘not just as a buyer and seller but also as an investor in slave raids or acts of piracy at sea, by means of which Castilians captured Portuguese shipments of slaves’ (*Amerigo, 52*). As well, Berardi, along with Pinelli, had guaranteed ‘very large loans’ for the second expedition, and even ‘when Columbus’s hopes of a short route to Asia proved fallacious, Berardi went on investing in the hope of at least acquiring slaves from the venture’ (West, ‘Christopher Columbus and His Enterprise to the Indies: Scholarship of the Last Quarter Century’, 260-11; *Amerigo, 54*).  

98 Flint, *The Imaginative Landscape of Christopher Columbus*, xvii; Jane, ‘Introduction’, *Columbus, The Four Voyages of Columbus*, cxv-cxvi. As Jane comments, ‘only one MS. of the memorial is known to exist’, but it is not the original (cxlv). Furthermore, given its style and given that ‘it cannot be definitely asserted that the original was a holograph of the admiral’, it is more likely than not a copy of memorandum dictated by Columbus to his clerk (cxvii); Columbus, ‘Memorandum of Christopher Columbus, sent to Ferdinand and Isabella, by Antonio de Torres’, *Columbus, The Four Voyages of Columbus*, 88/89, 90/91-2/93.
Despite the monarchs’ initial rejection of his plans for slavery—according to Taviani, ‘the Monarchs made approving notes by the other paragraphs of the letter but expressly forbade the proposed traffic in slaves: “This plan of action is to be set aside”—Columbus nevertheless advised them ‘in October 1948’ ‘that ‘as many slaves as can be sold’ could be dispatched from Hispaniola ‘in the name of the Holy Trinity’, for which he estimated ‘a market for about four thousand of them’, and which ‘would bring in twenty million maravedis “at a modest price”’.\textsuperscript{99} Even when ‘he was stripped of all responsibilities in the lands he had discovered’, Columbus still advocated enslavement in a memorandum to Ferdinand: “The Indians were and are the wealth of the island of Hispaniola because it is they who mine and make the bread and all the rest of the Christians’ food, and extract gold from the mines and perform all other duties and labours of men and of beasts of burden.”\textsuperscript{100}

Chief among the first purveyors of this hyperphobic image was Amerigo Vespucci, the former Medici commission-agent, chandler ‘and jewel dealer with a long-standing interest in pearls’, who worked for Berardi after arriving in Seville from Florence in 1492.\textsuperscript{101} While Fernández-Armesto considers both Columbus and Vespucci to have been ‘pathologically mendacious’ in their writing, he is also of the view that ‘Vespucci’s career generated the most problematic narratives’ of the ‘corrupt genre’ of sixteenth-century travel-writing, much of which ‘concerned entirely fictional voyages.’\textsuperscript{102} Las Casas expressed a similar view when discussing Vespucci’s first voyage account: ‘I doubt that he understood so much in the few days he was there, especially since he admits to not having known the language. . . . Consequently, he is credible when he describes what he saw, such as exterior characteristics—the color of the Indians, their food, their nakedness, their agility as

\textsuperscript{100} Fernández-Armesto, \textit{Columbus}, 139.
\textsuperscript{102} Fernández-Armesto, \textit{Amerigo}, 112.
swimmers; as for the rest, it reads like pure fiction...’

Notwithstanding the disputed provenance of Vespucci’s correspondence, including the *Soderini Letter*—a likely publisher’s hoax purporting that Vespucci had arrived on *Tierra Firme* a year before Columbus, and the text on which the cartographer Martin Waldseemüller relied when in 1507 he mistakenly gave the landmass south of the equator a feminised version of Vespucci’s Latinised name instead of Columbus’s—the *Novus Mundus*, in particular, when it was published ‘at the end of 1502 or the beginning of 1503’, had an ‘enormous impact on the world’ as a result of its name and its claim that Vespucci had ‘discovered a “new”, previously unrecorded continent south of the equator.’

In the first of Vespucci’s letters, addressed to Lorenzo di Pierfrancesco de’ Medici and dated 18 (or 28) July 1500, we find Vespucci in the New World plagiarising Columbus, with whom he was closely acquainted, collecting pearls as gifts, finding a population without any clothing, ‘exactly as they were emerging out of their mothers’ wombs’ and ‘naked as they were born’—much like Columbus had found

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103 Las Casas, *History of the Indies*, 65. According to Collard, *History of the Indies* was completed in the period 1547-65, the year before Las Casas’s death. In accordance with Las Casas’s will it was to ‘be kept from publication for forty years after his death’, but ‘it is known that the manuscript circulated before that date’ (‘Chronology’ and ‘Translator’s Note’, *History of the Indies*, xxvi, vii).

104 Fernández-Armesto, *Amerigo*, 120; Luciano Formisano, ‘Introduction’, Vespucci, *Letters from a New World*, xx-xxi, xxv, xix-xxviii, and Appendix D (‘from Martin Waldseemüller’s Cosmographiae Introduction’) 113. According to Fernández-Armesto, the four voyages which the *Soderini Letter* narrates are composed of two versions of the single voyage Vespucci made with Alonso de Hojeda, the voyage made for the King of Portugal in 1502-1502, and a ‘vaguely narrated fourth voyage and an account of a visit to Sierra Leone’ (*Amerigo*, 126). Waldseemüller apparently came to realise his error in advancing priority of discovery to Vespucci, and, in a map of 1516, ‘named Columbus as the first discoverer’ (*Amerigo*, 190); Columbus claims to have discovered *Tierra Firme* (the Peninsula of Paria, now northern Venezuela) on his third voyage (May-October 1498). See Columbus, ‘Narrative of the voyage which the admiral, Don Christopher Columbus, made the third time that he came to the Indies, when he discovered Tierra Firme, as he sent it to the sovereigns from the island of España’, *The Four Voyages of Columbus*, vii-ix, 2/3, 4/5, and Flint, *The Imaginative Landscape of Christopher Columbus*, 216; Vespucci, ‘Letter V: Mundus Novus’, *Letters from a New World*, 47: ‘Thus, on 7 August 1501, we dropped anchor off the shores of those regions, thanking our God with solemn prayer and the singing of a Mass. There we learned that the land was not an island but a continent.’ The *Soderini Letter* claims Vespucci departed Cadiz on 10 May 1497 and took 37 days to reach the ‘mainland’ from the Canary Islands where eight days had been spent reprovisioning the ships, thus making Vespucci’s ‘discovery’ of *Tierra Firme*, on this account, sometime in June 1497. See ‘Letter VI: To Piero Soderini’, in Vespucci, *Letters from a New World*, 59-60.
his, ‘naked as their mothers bore them’—encountering ‘Cannibals’ who ‘live off human flesh’ save for the females of their enemies whom they ‘keep as slaves’, being confronted by giants, and, in need of turning an expeditionary profit, capturing ‘232 souls by force’, the surviving 200 of whom, according to the letter, were sold in Cadiz to defray the expedition’s expenses, with the minimal profit of ‘five hundred ducats’ from the sale being disbursed among the crew.105 Significantly, none of the letters survive in holograph, were almost certainly written in a hand other than Vespucci’s, and, according to Luciano Formisano, were intended on the basis of their contents (and the mercantile origin of their codices) ‘for a well defined circle of humanist merchants, both in Florence and in the “Florentine colonies” of Seville and Lisbon.’106

In the undated third of Vespucci’s three “familiar” letters, written according to Formisano ‘after 22 July 1501’, we find Vespucci on his second voyage, apparently undertaken for the King of Portugal, perpetuating the rational/irrational dichotomy found in The Journal and adding acts contra naturam to his list—the rational animals’ of the New World ‘have no law or religious faith’ or ‘borders of kingdoms or province’; they prefer the human flesh to the meat of animals; they are polygamous

105 Luciano Formisano, ‘Introduction’, Vespucci, Letters from a New World, xxv-xxvii. Formisano records that this particular letter survives in six manuscripts (‘Introduction’, xxv). Formisano also notes that the alternative date of 28 July 1500 appears in the Vaglenti and Ridolfi codices (Letters from a New World, 176 n. 47); Amerigo, Letters from a New World, 10, 9, 11, 15, 16; Columbus, The Journal, 42/43 (from entry in The Journal dated 11 October 1492). Vespucci (or the author) notes in ‘Letter I’ that they were given ‘some small pearls and eleven large ones’ (Letters from a New World, 10). In Letter IV, the ‘Ridolfi Fragment’, so-called after Roberto Ridolfi the person who discovered and published the codex in 1937 (Formisano ‘Introduction’ xxxiv), the fragment’s author states that on the second voyage they ‘acquired 119 marks of pearls, which were valued in Castile at fifteen thousand ducats’ but which ‘cost the value of ten’ and Vespucci, personally, ‘157 pearls, later valued at a thousand ducats’ for the price of a ‘bell’ which the seller ‘put . . . in his mouth and went off into the forest’, never to be seen again (‘Letter IV: Ridolfi Fragment’, 43); Fernández-Armesto, Amerigo, 115, 170, 172, 191-2, 152. See also Appendix A: ‘Letter from the Admiral Christopher Columbus to his son, referring to Amerigo Vespucci’, Vespucci, Letters from a New World, 101; According to Formisano and Fernández-Armesto, Vespucci made his first voyage to the New World when he joined Alonso de Hojeda and Juan de la Cosa, purportedly as “pilot”, on the royal-sanctioned two-caravel expedition from 18 May 1499 to June 1500, 1499 being the year Ferdinand and Isabella revoked Columbus’s ‘monopoly of transatlantic navigation’ for his alleged mismanagement of Española (Formisano, ‘Introduction’, Letters from a New World, xxv and Fernández-Armesto Amerigo, 63, 66-71); Columbus, The Journal, 42/43. Also see Sauer, The Early Spanish Main, 111-12.

and ‘very procreative’ but ‘have no heirs, since they have no property’; their female children are deflowered ‘by the next closest relative after the father’—but also augmenting the consumption capacity of “cannibals”, presumed to be Tupí-Gurani of Brazil, and elaborating on Chanca’s breeding-babies-for-food topos attributed to the Caribs:

And when they fight, they kill one another most cruelly, and the side that emerges victorious on the field buries all of their own dead, but they dismember and eat their dead enemies; and those they capture they imprison and keep as slaves in their houses: if females, they sleep with them; if males, they marry them to their daughters. And at certain times when a diabolical fury comes over them, they invite their relatives and the people to dinner, and they set them out before them—that is, the mother and all the children they have got from her—and performing certain ceremonies kill them with arrows and eat them; and they do the same to the aforesaid male slaves and the children that have come from them. And this is certain, for in their houses we found human flesh hung up for smoking, and a lot of it, and we bought ten creatures from them, both males and females, who were destined for sacrifice, or, better said, sacrilege; on this we strongly reproached them: I do not know if they will mend their ways.107

As Fernández-Armesto notes, ‘This graphic episode made it into the printed versions and captured engravers’ imaginations’:

[Having] arrived as a merchant, on the lookout for naive traffickers who would sell him cheap pearls . . . by the time he left the New World for good, he had become a writer who needed good copy. Hence his increasing attention to bizarre and sensational tales. Cannibalism sold. It could evoke comfortable horrors in a snug, smug European readership. It was by far the most effective of all Vespucci’s remarks about the narrative, the thing readers noticed and remembered. The woodcuts of early editions of writings by him which all feature scenes of cannibalism with plausible representations of feathered Tupi nonchalantly turning human carcasses into meals.108

Vespucci, however, did not let the matter rest, for in the Mundus Novus he related

how ‘one father was known to have eaten his children and wife’, that he ‘met and spoke with a man who was said to have eaten more than three hundred human bodies’, and that he had ‘also stayed twenty-seven days in a certain city in which’, as he put it, ‘I saw salted human flesh hanging from house-beams, much as we hang up bacon and pork.’

In short, this intricate signifying system, elaborated here in some detail because it exemplifies the play of *différance* and continues to circulate within contemporary settler societies, seems to have known no metaphorical limit, in the sense that its transcendental signified, *canibales*, allowed the imagination to range as freely and widely as the avarice that fuelled it. No doubt as a consequence of this phenomenon, as a result of the circulation of these documents and associated gossip, and along with news of important discoveries on *Tierra Firme*, most notably Juan de la Cosa and Rodrigo de Bastidas’s haul of pearls from the Gulf of Paria and gold from the Gulf Urabá, together with the accompanying stories of resistance, murder and cannibalism, Isabella, on 30 October 1503, issued a royal decree legalising the enslavement of cannibals. ‘After proscribing capture or injury for any Indians, whether living on islands or mainland, it made an exception of “a certain people called Cannibals” who had been asked to mend their ways and to become Christians but who hardened their hearts and continued to eat Indians and kill Christians. For which reason the Queen said’:

“For the present I give licence and power to all and sundry persons who may go by my orders to the Islands and Tierra Firme of the Ocean Sea discovered up to the present, as well as to those who may go to discover other Islands and Tierra Firme, that if said Cannibals continue to resist and do not wish to admit and receive to their lands the Captains and men who may be on such voyages by my orders nor to hear them in order to be taught our Sacred Catholic Faith and to be in my service and obedience, they may be captured and taken to these my Kingdoms and Domains and to other parts and places and be sold.”

110 Sauer, *The Early Spanish Main*, 161-3. According to Sauer stated the document from which he excerpted the quote ‘is Appendix No. 17 in Navarette, II’, 414-16 (162 n. 3).
The same year Isabella also established by royal decree the House of Trade (*Casa de Contratación de las Indias*) in Seville, to oversee, organise and collect taxes from ‘the royal commercial enterprise in the Indies’, both these events having occurred in the year following Nicolás de Ovando’s arrival as Governor at Española with some 2,500 settlers, including a young Las Casas, to re-establish royal authority and to ensure the proper operation of the *encomienda* system. Although the *encomenderos* were instructed by the crown to care for and teach the Indians in return for their labour, as Sauer has it: ‘The political economy was brutally simple. All the natives were given into the charge of individual Spaniards or assigned to the Crown, some for personal service, most to forced labor in field or mine.’ Unsurprisingly, in the year following Isabella’s proclamation legalising enslavement of cannibals, Ovando and his lieutenants completed their brutal submission of Española through liquidating its chiefs, dismantling its indigenous political system, and by way of pre-emptive massacres and systematic slaughter, effecting a depopulation of those *The Journal* had described as ““most meek and timid”, without “knowledge of arms”, who “do not know evil, nor ... kill others nor take prisoners.”

Published accounts of cannibalism grew as the settlers moved inland. Las Casas remained steadfast, however. ‘I do not believe this business of sacrificing and eating human flesh; I’ve never heard of any such practice in Yucatán’, he wrote of reports from *Tierra Firme*. ‘Gómara says this because he heard it from Cortés who was the man who fed him, thus it lacks authority and is said to excuse Cortés’s evil deeds.

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112 Sauer, *The Early Spanish Main*, 150; Las Casas, *The Devastation of the Indies*, 92/93, 100/101. According to Sauer, prior to the arrival of the 2,500, the Spanish population on the island stood at about 300. As a consequence of the influx of people a great strain was placed on the island’s economy. See Sauer, *The Early Spanish Main*, 147-8.

113 Sauer, *The Early Spanish Main*, 147-9; Las Casas, *The Devastation of the Indies*, 32-43; Columbus, *The Journal*, 92/93 and 100/101. According to Sauer, prior to the arrival of the 2,500, the Spanish population on the island stood at about 300. As a consequence of the influx of people a great strain was placed on the island’s economy (*The Early Spanish Main*, 147-8).

Besides, it is typical Spanish talk which Spaniards and those who record their horrible exploits invented to defame these nations universally and excuse the violence, cruelty, plunder and slaughter committed against the Indians every day.\textsuperscript{115}

\textit{‘The Outside Is the Inside’—The Discourse of Race}\textsuperscript{116}

It is hardly surprising, then, that the cannibal became the default Other in the discourse of race as it began emerging with the Spanish ‘blood laws’, the first of which, according to John Edwards, being drawn up ‘in May 1449’, by which Jews and Muslims who converted to Christianity during the Reconquista—collectively conversos—had the integrity of their profession and therefore their right to remain on the Iberian Peninsula tested on the basis of bloodline.\textsuperscript{117} For, as Merrall Llewelyn Price times it, ‘twenty-four hours after the official expulsion of the Jews from Spain’, those ‘who were said to threaten the Eucharist and practice secret and bloody anthropophagous rites’, would, within seventy days, be encountered as ‘another Other’ on the other side of the Ocean Sea ‘practicing the same bloody and abhorrent rituals’, rituals that not only helped ‘to rationalize the development of the Spanish agenda for the New World’ but also set the agenda for the massive ‘experiment in political, economic, and cultural cannibalism’, as Stephen Greenblatt terms it, a project ‘fanatically dedicated to swallowing the whole vast land mass and all of its peoples.’\textsuperscript{118} The discourse of race would include ‘Of National Characters’ (1742), an essay in which David Hume proposed ‘the negroes to be naturally inferior to the whites’ on the basis that ‘there scarcely ever was a civilized nation of that complexion’, and take a scientific turn with Johann Blumenbach’s first anthropological treatise of 1775 in which, according to Thomas Bendyshe’s

\textsuperscript{115} Las Casas, \textit{History of the Indies}, 231.

\textsuperscript{116} Derrida, \textit{Of Grammatology}, 44.


translation, he classified the human species, on the basis of physical characteristics, into ‘varieties’ or ‘races’, a thesis contested by On the Different Races of Men (1775) in which Immanuel Kant proposed ‘a physico-theological order of things.’

This exegetical writing on the savage—‘the science of this fable’, as Certeau has it—became ethnology and more narrowly anthropology as taxonimisation became an obsession in the wake of European discoveries, and Blumenbach, in 1795, on the basis of information he received from Joseph Banks, increased his human ‘varieties’ or ‘races’ to five: Caucasian, Mongolian, Ethiopian, America and Malay. Certeau offered the following explanation of this phenomenon:

The savage becomes a senseless speech ravishing Western discourse, but one which, because of that very fact, generates a productive science of meaning and objects that endlessly writes. The locus of the other that this speech represents is hence doubly fabulous: first by virtue of a metaphorical rupture (fari, the act of speech not having a subject that can be named), and then by virtue of an object that can be understood (a fiction that can be translated into the terms of knowledge). A saying arrests what is said—it is the erasure of writing—and forces it to extend its production; it generates writing.

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119 David Hume, ‘Of National Characters’, in ‘Essays Moral, Political, and Literary’, David Hume, The Complete Works and Correspondence of David Hume (Charlottesville: IntelX Corporation, 1995, first published 1742), 414; Thomas Bendyshe, ‘Editor’s Preface’, Johann Friedrich Blumenbach, The Anthropological Treatises of Johann Friedrich Blumenbach, Late Professor at Göttingen and Court Physician to the King of Great Britain and John Hunter M.D., trans. Thomas Bendyshe ed. (London: Longman, Green, Longman, Roberts, & Green, 1865), x-xi, and Blumenbach, The Anthropological Treatises of Johann Friedrich Blumenbach, 264 passim; Ivan Hannaford, Race: The History of an Idea in the West (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996), 215-16, 218-19. Discussing the etymology of the neologism ‘race’, Charles de Miramon, writes that it ‘does not exist in Greek, nor in classical and medieval Latin’ and ‘has no root in Latin.’ He argues that it ‘was first uttered in France, not Spain or Portugal’, and is derived in relation to hunting dogs and their ennoblement, with its first known appearance ‘found in a little-known poem of Jacques de Brézé, The Hunt’, which describes ‘a deer hunt that took place around 1481’. He adds: ‘The word was not coined to denigrate a despised minority or an alien people with a strange skin colour. It was not invented to justify colonisation or enslavement, but arose out of ‘the discourse on nobility in the late Middle Ages’ in which there is ‘a large conceptual overlap between race and hereditary blood.’ See Charles de Miramon, ‘Noble dogs, noble blood: The invention of the concept of race in the late Middle Ages’, Miriam Eliav-Feldon, Benjamin Isaac, and Joseph Ziegler (eds), The Origins of Racism in the West (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 200-3, 208.


121 Certeau, The Writing of History, 236.
Taking their lead from Blumenbach, anthropological and ethnological societies began springing up in the metropolitan centres of Europe, with counterparts in their colonies, all labouring to turn the metaphor of the savage into the scholarly study of mankind. Europe, however, had not discarded Pliny altogether. The monstrous in the form of the cannibal, the refashioned Anthropophagus, remained an integral part of the discursive productions of these societies, including the influential Anthropological Society of London, co-founded in 1863 by James Hunt and Richard Burton, translator of the *Kama Sutra of Vatsyayana* and the focal figure of the Cannibal Club, the secretive inner sanctum of that Society. Members of this circle, who addressed each other as “brother Cannibal”, included Thomas Bendyshe, translator of Blumenbach’s *Anthropological Treatises*, the solider-diplomat Charles Duncan Cameron, General John Studholme Hodgson, Richard Monckton Milnes (Lord Houghton), ‘politician, poet, and collector of pornography’, Algernon Swinburne, ‘the *enfant terrible* of mid-Victorian letters’ and Sir James Plaisted Wilde (Lord Penzance).122 With a Negro’s head as a gavel, ‘a mace carved to look like an African head gnawing on a bone’, and Swinburne’s ‘The Cannibal Catechism’ as their ‘anthem’, the Club’s members, with their ‘prurient interest in the lives of the colonized’, subverted polite Victorian Society even as they codified difference on the outskirts of Empire.123 In short, members of the London Anthropological Society, as Lisa Sigel has it, ‘saw race and sex as central to understanding the rapidly expanding world.’124 In this it became a de facto discourse factory, producing the latest ‘European ideas about race, culture and society’ for the far-flung colonies, where ‘amateur ethnologists’, such as Percy Smith and Elsdon Best in New Zealand, could apply those ideas ‘to the study of the Maori’, which, as Giselle Byrnes opines, not only ‘validated’ and provided local information for the process of British colonisation, but also gave these enthusiasts, through their own publications,

recognition' both 'as intellectuals' and 'as members of the most civilised race in the world.'

One need only read Hunt's paper, 'On the Negro's Place in Nature', presented to the Anthropological Society of London in 1863, to sense how deeply the idea of race—'the grouping of individual humans by some set of perceived physical characteristics . . . thought to be inherited through some blood-borne factor'—informed early anthropological thinking. In his attempt 'to determine the position which one well-defined race occupies in the genus homo', Hunt, referencing a wide range of 'anatomical peculiarities', physical measurements and learned commentary, claimed 'mental inferiority' of 'the Negro race' based on, among other things, the observation 'that the Negro brain bears a great resemblance to a European female or child's brain, and thus approaches the ape far more than the European, while the Negress approaches the ape still nearer.' Taking the Humean line, Hunt also argued that not 'one instance can be quoted' of 'the name of one pure Negro who has ever distinguished himself as a man of science, as an author, a statesman, a warrior, a poet, an artist', because, as he put it, 'the pure Negro' never 'advances further in intellect than an intelligent European boy of fourteen years of age.' Furthermore, "[t]o attempt civilising such a race before they are humanised", he added, quoting a reputable source, "appears to me to be beginning at the wrong end", given that 'they still cling "to their gris-gris, jujus, fetishism and cannibalism with as much pertinacity as they did many hundred years ago." That, said Hunt, was not surprising: 'We now know it to be a patent fact that there are races existing which have no history, and that the Negro is one of these races. . . . We may be pretty sure that the Negro race has been without a progressive history; and that Negroes have

been for thousands of years the uncivilised race they are at this moment.’\(^{130}\)

Here we find in operation the same savage/civilised binary opposition found in Columbus’s logbook and in the historiographical discourse of settler societies, with the savage, ‘the object of cognition’, held captive by the hegemonic discourse, in this case Anthropology, on which it endlessly writes, offering a tricked-up quasi-science as knowledge, and for similar self-justificatory ends:

There is good reason to believe that, as among all inferior races, there has been little or no migration from Africa since the earliest historical records. The European, for ever restless, has migrated to all parts of the world, and traces of him are to be found in every quarter of the globe. Everywhere we see the European as the conqueror and the dominant race, and no amount of education will ever alter the decrees of Nature’s laws.\(^{131}\)

Hence, we can see, as Byrnes puts it, how ‘the discourse of colonisation and the discourse of anthropology overlap and were interdependent. In the same way that scholarly observation of the Maori relied upon intellectual and social frameworks imported from Europe, anthropology could be used to validate the process of settlement in New Zealand.’\(^{132}\) Thus, as she observes, Elsdon Best’s The Maori as He Was ‘was, in reality, “the Maori as he wished”.’\(^{133}\)

How, then, could the signifier cannibal, metaphorical of its referent, be deployed so effectively that it could underwrite Europe’s colonisation of the indigenous world, and how could ‘the fictitious unity of race created by philologists, anthropologists, historians, and social scientists of the nineteenth century’ develop into the metaphysics of race that continues to inform contemporary thinking and allows a New Zealand historian as eminent as James Belich to go unreproached for claiming

\(^{132}\) Byrnes, ‘Savages and Scholars’, 2-3.
\(^{133}\) Byrnes, ‘Savages and Scholars’, 100; Elsdon Best, The Maori As He Was: A Brief Account of Life as it Was in Pre-European Days, (Wellington: Dominion Museum, 1934).
that Pakeha created a proto-people in 40 years'? How is it that Blumenbach’s races live on in ‘socially constructed’ fantasies of difference when ‘advances in the understanding of human genetics has undermined scholarly belief in the biological foundations of discrete races’?

The answer lies enmeshed in the theoretical issues discussed in Part A of this thesis—most notably that history, the product of différance and a large-scale self-referential signifying system, is unable to overcome the aporias of time and the past without historians invoking ‘the reality effect’, and, therefore, that all things historical are themselves subject to the same problematics and constraints as the cannibal and are likewise ahistorical and illusory. We need to keep in mind as well the role played by transcendental signifieds in not only determining the ‘domain and play of signification’ of their signifying systems but also in preventing the collapse of those systems by halting the regress of meaning. We might also consider how creating a category called the cannibal and presenting it in a nominal sentence gives the appearance of the category existing outside language, but without its extratextual existence ever being established. That is, the non-being of the category is effaced by the mere assertion of its existence, assisted by ‘the law of the supplement of copula’, as Derrida describes it, in which the verb ‘to be’, ‘the verb

135 James, ‘Race’: http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2011/entries/race/. As The Independent put it in ‘Race under fire: Is being white something you can learn?’ (17 May 2010): ‘The $3bn Human Genome Project revealed in 2003 that every human being has a unique DNA sequence which differs from that of any fellow human being by just 0.1 per cent, regardless of ethnic origin. Thus, all humans beings are 99.9 per cent the same and, from a scientific viewpoint, there is no such thing as racial difference.’ http://www.independent.co.uk/news/science/race-under-fire-is-being-white-something-you-can-learn-1974929.html. Also see the Human Genome Project Information, ‘Minorities, Race, and Genomics’ (U.S. Department of Energy Genome Programs, last modified 31 August 2007): ‘DNA studies do not indicate that separate classifiable subspecies (races) exist within modern humans. While different genes for physical traits such as skin and hair color can be identified between individuals, no consistent patterns of genes across the human genome exist to distinguish one race from another. There also is no genetic basis for divisions of human ethnicity.’ http://www.ornl.gov/sci/techresources/Human_Genome/elsi/minorities.shtml.
136 Barthes, The Rustle of Language, 139, 141-8.
of existence, out of all other verbs, has this privilege of being present in an utterance in which it does not appear', yet as copula acts transcendentally by allowing absence to be thought as presence and the distinction between the outside and the inside of language to be imagined.\textsuperscript{138} To put that otherwise, the cannibal appears to have an independent existence outside language precisely because it is signified as being present in its absence by the copula 'to be', which works invisibly within the system of signification that names it.

Categories also carry their own set of problems, in that, strictly speaking, a universal value cannot be attached to a group or set without knowing the particulars of that group, which in the case of the historic cannibal is impossible to establish. Needless to say, it is this universal value or quality, which is used to great effect rhetorically, that allows the cannibal to leap from one language to another, from one discourse to another, even as the signifying systems of 'history', 'cannibal' and 'race', so to speak, feed off and other.

We might also note that the real power behind the cannibal's rhetorical operation is not so much the horror generated by the non-literal object of which it is metaphoric—\textit{man-eater}—but the power of the 'idea-sign' of that of which it is literal: \textit{fear} of the ultimate state of abjection and negation: non-existence through consumption by the human Other.\textsuperscript{139} In this regard it is helpful to recall that following its mysterious appearance in \textit{The Journal} of Columbus the signifier cannibal received four different signifieds. The first, '\textit{fear of being eaten}', literal of the 'idea-sign', opened to the outside its most prominent signified, \textit{man-eater}, the received meaning found in the \textit{Oxford English Dictionary} (OED): 'a man (esp. a savage) who eats human flesh' or 'man-eater'. The third and fourth are not found in the \textit{OED}: \textit{a man (esp. a savage) able to be enslaved}, and \textit{a man (esp. a savage) able to

\textsuperscript{138} Jacques Derrida, \textit{Margins of Philosophy}, trans. Alan Bass (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1984, first published 1982), 202. In his critique of Benveniste in 'The Supplement of Copula: Philosophy before Linguistics', Derrida is careful to note that 'the function of the "copula" or the "grammatical mark of identity" is absolutely distinct from the "full-fledged use of the verb "to be"' \textit{(Margins of Philosophy, 200)}.

\textsuperscript{139} Derrida, \textit{Of Grammatology}, 276.
be traded for a profit. Despite its metaphorical function, the first signified delivered a literal outcome for the second in the sense that once temporal law made it possible to attach the metaphorical man-eater to any corporeal individual or group thought to be resisting Spanish personnel or interests, it was then possible to enslave not only Caribs but indigenous peoples throughout the New World in the encomienda system. In other words, the substitution of the literal (fear of being eaten) for the metaphorical (man-eater) provided moral and legal grounds for the use of arms. Any name would have done, but cannibal it became and remains.

Hence, it seems reasonable to assume that the cannibal’s third and fourth signifieds have been elided from the lexical record because they underwrote a forty-year holocaust in which, on Las Casas’s reckoning, over fifty million people died as well as three hundred and fifty years of Black slave trading and the plundering and expropriating of vast geographies, including Africa, North and South America, Australia, New Zealand, and much of the Pacific. It is also the principal reason, this thesis suggests, why scholarly discussion about the cannibal continues to be far more about indigenous human beings eating each other than Europeans enslaving and slaughtering and continuing to stigmatise indigenous populations from whom they have stolen. In other words, we might think of the cannibal as a rhetorical device that not only acts as a justificatory agent for the existence of settler societies, but also functions as an amnesic agent by which those societies are able to forget the ‘genocidal violence’ on which they are ‘founded’ by positioning the cannibal between their contemporary existence and memory.

140 Las Casas, An Account of the First Voyages and Discoveries made by the Spaniards in America (etc.), 4–5. If Caribs ever existed as an ethnic group, according to Kirkpatrick Sale they ‘were as hard hit by European conquest as the rest of the island populations, so much so that there were only a few deracinated pockets of them left for study by the nineteenth century’ (The Conquest of Paradise, 130). Once the indigenous population of the Caribbean had been decimated by the Spanish, they were replaced by black slaves from Africa, commencing, on Sale’s reckoning ‘around 1505’ (The Conquest of Paradise, 156). Although originally introduced into Europe by the Portuguese, according to Taviani: ‘In 1517 Charles V authorized La Bresa, a Fleming, to furnish 4000 black slaves a year to Hispaniola, Cuba, Jamaica, and Puerto Rica’ (Taviani, ‘Notes’, Columbus, Nuova Raccolta Colombiana, Part 1, 160). Thereafter the slavers trading Africans grew to include not just the Spanish and Portuguese, but also the Dutch, French and English.

141 Hulme, ‘Quincentenary Perspectives’, 231.
An example of this operation may be found in Frank Lestringant’s *Cannibals*.

In support of his claim that ‘the Cannibals really did exist’, Lestringant attempts to literalise the metaphor of the cannibal by providing ‘probable evidence’ of its extratextual existence via Note 19. But this proves to be just another metaphor, which gives rise in turn to the question of ‘the very status one gives to the language that supports it’, the problem Michel Foucault articulated at Cerisy in 1963.

The metaphor in question is contained in a paper in which two physical anthropologists report on the re-examination ‘of a deposit of four fragmented individuals excavated by Walter Hough in 1901 at Canyon Butte 3, northeastern Arizona’, the purpose of which was to test Hough’s claim that ‘the condition of the bones resulted from cannibalism’ and was the ‘first discovery of such in the American Southwest.’ Among the ‘long-term objectives’ the authors set themselves was ‘to attempt to remove the stigma of investigating violence and cannibalism by bringing the topic out into the open so that it can be objectively discussed’, the continued evaluation of their ‘working thesis that Anasazi violence and linked probable cannibalism is a form of social pathology’, and the employment of ‘taphonomic findings and theory on violence and cannibalism to help understand the collapse of the prehistoric Southwest cultural and population systems’. The paper, however, which, unsurprisingly given its paradigmatic constraints, finds for its proposition, qualifies ‘cannibalism’ with adjectives such as ‘probable’, ‘possible’ and ‘likely’, and is itself anachronistic in that cannibalism cannot be ‘pre-historic’ given that the signifier *canibales*, so far as we know, was not used before 23

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143 Lestringant, *Cannibals*, 7, 191 n. 19.
144 Lestringant, *Cannibals*, 7, 191 n. 19; Michel Foucault, ‘Débat sur le roman’, *Tel Quel*, 17 (1964), 48.
November 1492, while Canyon Butte #3 is dated at A.D. 1000-1200.\textsuperscript{147} Consequently, the paper’s authors can only label the former owners of the bones as anthropophagites, thereby invoking the signifieds of Anthropophagi, not those of cannibals. In their conclusion, the authors not only continue to use ‘cannibalism’ anachronistically—‘Hough should be credited as the first archaeologist to recognize on empirical grounds that cannibalism had occurred among the prehistoric peoples of the American Southwest’—they also resort to figurative expression in order to view the past while writing literalised meaning on the bones under investigation: ‘Metaphorically speaking, these traumatized remains serve as ancient windows through which may be glimpsed the value placed on human life by some of the Anasazi.’\textsuperscript{148} In other words, the meaning the authors add retroactively to the human remains is metaphorical of their own beliefs that make a case for the moral and ethical advancement of the American Southwest and synecdochally of the USA: ‘The number of Anasazi multiple burials with extensive perimortem damage indicating violence and possible cannibalism has now grown to the point where serious consideration must be given to assessing the chaotic contribution interpersonal conflict and social pathology had on the collapse of prehistoric population and cultural systems in the Southwest.’\textsuperscript{149} For those writing in this ‘cognitive genre’, the ‘referent’ is always pathological, which confirms in turn that the settler society has rightly replaced the pathological societies preceding it, as comments from Hough’s original report for the Smithsonian Institution attest: ‘Without doubt this ossuary is the record of a cannibal feast, and its discovery is interesting to science as being the first material proof of cannibalism among our North American Indians.’\textsuperscript{150}

In keeping with debates over whether knowledge is foundational or contingent, that which swirled around William Arens’s \textit{The Man-Eating Myth} (1979) has likewise

\textsuperscript{147} Turner II and Turner, ‘The First claim for Cannibalism in the Southwest’, 661 \textit{passim}, 663 \textit{passim}, 664 (for dating of the site); Columbus, \textit{The Journal}, 118/119.


\textsuperscript{149} Turner II and Turner, ‘The First claim for Cannibalism in the Southwest’, 664.

\textsuperscript{150} Lyotard, \textit{The Differend}, 156 § 224; Walter Hough as quoted by Turner II and Turner, ‘The First claim for Cannibalism in the Southwest’, 666.
been acrimonious and laced with *ad hominem* attacks.\textsuperscript{151} Marshall Sahlins, for instance, considers it ‘a scandal’: ‘Professor X puts out some outrageous theory, such as the Nazis really didn’t kill the Jews, human civilization comes from another planet, or there is no such thing as cannibalism.’\textsuperscript{152} Lestringant believes ‘to deny cultural anthropophagy’ is a ‘kind of crazed revisionism’ and Arens ‘more of a sensation-hungry journalist than an exact historian’ who ‘alleges that the Cannibal of the Antilles or Brazil sprang, naked and bloody, from the heads of . . . Europeans greedy for living space and conquest and quick to project their own devouring fantasies on the Other, whom they hated and despised.’\textsuperscript{153} Arens, for his part, eighteen years after the publication of his book, observed that while he has found in the literature different methods of cooking human flesh—‘boiled, broiled, baked, and steamed’—there are no accompanying instructions on how to prepare it.\textsuperscript{154} As he puts it: ‘This lacuna suggests an odd state of affairs. Could it be that cannibals have no recipes? The inability to provide this minor but crucial bit of evidence on the presumed custom of man-eating is probably the best reason to conclude that cannibalism exists more in the limited culinary imagination of the observer than in the native appetite.’\textsuperscript{155} However, while Arens notes that ‘the overall response’ to his book was ‘the admission by anthropology that . . . the general image of rampant anthropophagy by the “natives” might be flawed’, the ‘conclusion did not hold true for Native South or North America, New Guinea, the other islands of the Pacific, Africa, or the Arctic’ because ‘“they” (the “natives”) . . . were no longer cannibals. Thus, the conclusion was difficult to contradict.’\textsuperscript{156}

Given how deeply the cannibal imbedded itself in the European imagination post-Columbus, it is hardly surprising that Joseph Banks and James Cook believed there

\textsuperscript{153} Frank Lestringant, *Cannibals*, 6.
\textsuperscript{154} William Arens, ‘Man is off the menu’, *The Times Higher Education Supplement* (12 December 1997).
\textsuperscript{155} Arens, ‘Man is off the menu’.
\textsuperscript{156} Arens, ‘Man is off the menu’.
were ‘Canibals’ in New Zealand, and that the Marquess of Normanby’s instructions and follow-up letter to New Zealand’s first Governor, Captain William Hobson, just prior to the signing of the Treaty of Waitangi on 6 February 1840, echoed Isabella’s edict of 1503 and indicated just how much a part of Victorian ‘cultural grammar’ cannibalism had become.  

Downing Street, 15th August, 1839.

Sir,—

[...]  

6. It is impossible for me to prescribe the course to be pursued for the prevention of cannibalism, human sacrifices, and warfare among the native tribes; but I have no difficulty in stating that if all the arts of persuasion and kindness should prove unavailing, practices so abhorrent from the first principles of morality and so calamitous to those by whom they are pursued should be repressed by authority, and, if necessary, by actual force, within any part of the Queen’s dominions. I am, however, convinced that habits so repulsive to our common nature as cannibalism and human sacrifice may be checked with little difficulty, because the opposition to them will be seconded by feelings which are too deeply rooted in the minds of all men, the most ignorant or barbarous not excepted, to be eradicated by customs, however inveterate, or by any errors of opinion, however widely diffused. The New Zealanders will probably yield a willing assent to your admonitions when taught to perceive with what abhorrence such usages are regarded by civilized men.  


CHAPTER SIX
The New Cannibal Club

Because the settler domain is an expropriated geography, the settler society must refashion that domain in its own image, thereby reaffirming its right to belong and the ideological basis of that right. There are many ways this refashioning may be done, but none is arguably more important in terms of reach and lasting effect than the writing of the history of that domain. History writing, it could be said, is the axle of nation-formation and everything else its spokes. Thus by deploying the ‘cognitive genre’ of contemporary historiography, the settler society is able to authenticate its narrative as being foundational and therefore authorised to subsume or exile all narratives that challenge its hegemony, including the “‘archaic’ narrative’ of tangata whenua (people of the place). It is able to do this because history, as ‘a fake performative discourse’, has a wide range of devices and procedures at its disposal with which to both recount and update its story in response to the requirements of ‘the now’. Roland Barthes’ ‘the reality effect’ is foundational to this operation, as are originary moments. Most commonly it is the cognising and appropriation of myths belonging to the “‘archaic narrative’, that positions the settler society within the long narrative of place as if it had been there forever. ‘In the beginning Papa and Rangi, the earth and sky, mother and father of the gods, lay close together with their children huddled between them in the darkness’, writes Keith Sinclair at the beginning of A History of New Zealand, while noting fourteen pages later that Maori’s ‘epic lacked a Homer, and though many of their deeds are sketched in chant or song, most are not to be found among the scholar’s facts, however vivid they may be to the

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3 Barthes, The Rustle of Language, 139, 141-8.
historical imagination.’ This instantiating process is managed most effectively in New Zealand by the production of national general histories, of which Sinclair’s provided the template for those that followed. At a recent count, more than thirty have been published since 1840, with twenty of those since 1980 following the emergence of the Maori ‘renaissance’ with its challenge to settler dominance. This writing of national ‘biography’ shows no sign of abating, not least because it is the ‘teleological task’ of history, based as it purportedly is on scientific objectivity, to effectuate its own completeness, and the task of settler historiography, in obedience to its ‘transcendental teleology’, to hold before its audience a vision of the ‘transcendental community’ to come. This, of course, is an impossible task because history is always exceeded by that which has not yet arrived from ‘the not-yet now’.

In this incessant making over of New Zealand’s settler domain, settler historians develop orthodoxies of equivalence and contemporaneousness that become part of settler mythology, the principal aim of which is to invest the settler with the very quality they lack: indigeneity. Examples of this strategy include the characterizing of all people who live in New Zealand as migrants, and the use of the interchangeable signifiers ‘colonist’ and ‘settler’ whereby tangata whenua, the original owner-occupiers of the archipelago, are designated colonists, and the early British colonists are characterised as settlers. In this way Maori is not only subsumed under the settler narrative, but their status as tangata whenua is also undermined and their narrative, or their ‘long history of place’, violently displaced.

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7 Critchley, ‘Heidegger’s Being and Time, part 8: Temporality’.

8 Stephen Turner, ‘The Public Intellectual is a Dog’, Laurence Simmons (ed), *Speaking Truth to Power: Public Intellectuals Rethink New Zealand* (Auckland: Auckland University Press, 2007), 94; See also
Michael King is exemplary in this regard. In his national general history, under the rubric ‘A Land Without People’, by conflating geological and representational time he presents Maori and Pakeha as arriving in New Zealand at the same time: ‘If the country’s geological, natural and human history were represented by an hour on a clock face . . . then humanity itself arrives, Maori and European, within the space of 300ths of a second to one o’clock’ (italics in the original). Under the rubric ‘First Colonisation’, he claims that ‘The Maori colonial era began the moment East Polynesian migrants stepped ashore and continued through the first phase of settlement and adjustment’, despite his use of ‘colonisation’ being anachronistic as well as erroneous because Maori had no metropolis as a base of support. In his Pakeha books, King produced what has become a mantra of Pakeha settlerism: ‘In the beginning we were all immigrants to these islands, our ancestors boat people who arrived by waka, ship or aeroplane.’ Under ‘Allegiance to Origins’, he provided Pakeha with what is effectively their settler creed: ‘People who live in New Zealand by choice as distinct from an accident of birth, and who are committed to this land and its people and steeped in their knowledge of both, are no less “indigenous” than Maori.’ Reworked for the book’s front cover, it reads: ‘Pakeha New Zealanders who are committed to this land and its people are no less “indigenous” than Maori.’ At his untimely death, King was held up as a historian who gave settlers a sense of themselves. According to the then Prime Minister Helen Clark: ““His major contribution to New Zealand was to help us understand ourselves.”” Kerry Howe put it like this: ‘If Maori reidentified themselves in the aftermath of their post-war migration to the towns and cities of New Zealand, King believed that Pakeha needed

12 King, Being Pakeha Now, 235.
13 King, Being Pakeha Now, Front Cover.
14 Helen Clark as quoted by Tim Watkin, The people’s historian’, New Zealand Listener, (10 April 2004), 16: http://www.listener.co.nz/uncategorized/the-peoples-historian/.

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to reidentify and affirm their cultural heritage and values in the face of the new Maori “challenge”.'¹⁵ Hence Howe concluded: ‘He highlights the human capacity in this country for compassion and co-operation, for practical fair-mindedness, for plain decency .... King’s History offers hope for the future.’¹⁶

Despite Pakeha indigeneity and contemporaneous with Maori being indefensible ideas ethically and intellectually, they became orthodoxy after members of the House of Representatives, the settler seat of power, began repeating them. On 28 July 2004, in a speech to the Stout Research Centre for New Zealand Studies at Victoria University, Wellington, the Hon. Trevor Mallard, then Coordinating Minister, Race Relations, said:

Maori and Pakeha are both indigenous people to New Zealand now. I regard myself as an indigenous New Zealander – I come from Wainuiomata .... Michael King was passionate about New Zealand and about the emergence of a unique New Zealand identity. .... He argued that just because one group has been here longer than another does not make its members more New Zealand than later arrivals, nor does it give them the right to exclude others from full participation in national life.¹⁷

As we have seen, the New Zealand Government continues to make a significant investment in the ideological making over of the settler domain through the Ministry for Culture and Heritage. Places of tertiary education also make important contributions to this process with scholarly publications, while all major universities have departments of history that teach and conduct postgraduate research in New Zealand history. As well, trade publishers, without the obligation and constraint of the peer review process, make a significant contribution by

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¹⁶ Howe, ‘The man who put our past in perspective’.
¹⁷ Trevor Mallard, 'We are all New Zealanders now', The official website of the New Zealand Government: http://www.beehive.govt.nz/node/20451
volume to that making-over activity. As Penguin announces on its website: 'Penguin NZ doesn't publish ... scholarly academic works.'

In the Introduction to *Frontier of Dreams*, Bronwyn Dalley observes that ‘New Zealand, it seems, cannot get enough of itself.’ Given the large number of New Zealand anthropological, ethnological and historiographical books that reference cannibalism, including *Frontier of Dreams*, it appears that part of what the settler society cannot get enough of is the idea that Maori once were cannibals, despite the cannibal being a European invention and an anachronism in New Zealand—Maori, on the basis of conventional chronology, had been in the archipelago for several hundred years before the signifier cannibal was probably invented by Christopher Columbus—and there being nothing in the archaeological record to support the idea of cannibalism as a widespread cultural practice. In short, the cannibal is a transcendental signifier that sits at the centre of a signifying system called cannibalism that functions ideologically, metaphorically, politically, and rhetorically. As a foundational trope of settler ideology, the cannibal’s principal role in New Zealand is to mark Maori as marginally human prior to ‘the British Crown’s revolutionary seizure of power in Aotearoa New Zealand’, and, coextensively, to designate the settler domain as having progressed, under settler rule, from a place of untamed savagery to a highly civilized society that functions for the good of all.

Among Maori, as among Pakeha, there is both belief in and skepticism about there having been a such a practice. For some that belief is confirmed by its representation in language. ‘Cannibalism was widespread throughout New Zealand’, Margaret Mutu is reported as saying: “It was definitely there. It’s recorded in all

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sorts of ways in our histories and traditions, a lot of place names refer to it. It was part of our culture.”

On the other hand, ‘a Nga Puhi kaumatua (elder), Eru Garland, says his tribal history largely denies cannibalism’. As Garland puts it himself: ‘I don't believe that Nga Puhi ever ate any one. You know, I think that's the story I think the white people got hold of.’ With Maori holding ‘80% of the North Island’ in 1860, it is perhaps unsurprising that the discursive cannibal saturates early colonial literature, and, with Maori’s growing political and economic profile, that it still lurks in the cultural shadows waiting to pounce. Indeed, the cannibal can burst into conversations when temperatures rise over matters of national identity, Maori protocol, self-determination and sovereignty. Anita McNaught, for instance, only just managed to keep the beast under control during a nationally televised public debate between Maori and Pakeha.

Whatever may be the range of beliefs concerning the cannibal, the best we can say is that caníbales first appeared, so far as we know, in The Journal of Columbus on 23 November 1492, and that while language confirms the cannibal’s corporeal absence, its discursive presence reminds us that the process of ‘cultural colonization’ is an ongoing one in Aotearoa New Zealand.

The trial of ‘a New Zealand Dog’


22 Rod Vaughan, ‘Close to the Bone’, 60 Minutes, TV3 (7 October 2008).

23 Eru Garland, ‘Close to the Bone’.


The two monographs to which we now turn—Anne Salmond’s *The Trial of the Cannibal Dog: Captain Cook in the South Seas* (2003) and Paul Moon’s *This Horrid Practice: The Myth and Reality of Traditional Maori Cannibalism* (2008)—illustrate the central argument of this thesis discussed in Part A: that history is a self-referential discourse and its principal referent, the past, exists as an organising device within the discourse itself and not outside it, and therefore can be studied only as text—that is, imaginatively.\(^\text{28}\) As well, these titles demonstrate, in their different ways, the fake performativity of historical discourse and its rhetorical ability to construct settlerism’s Other as part of making over the settler domain. They also highlight the extent to which many who write settler history have been socialised into settlerism, and their inability to escape its ‘transcendental teleology’ and the savage/civilised binary opposition on which it is based.\(^\text{29}\) In regard to the latter, both Salmond and Moon take the cannibal to be axiomatic, despite its likely invention by Columbus for purposes of enslavement, and Maori to be cannibals, despite James Cook having carried the idea of the cannibal to New Zealand in his ‘cultural cargo’, and despite Columbus’s neologism post-dating by hundreds of years the arrival of ‘the less than 300 Maori of the first canoes’.\(^\text{30}\) Hence, while noting that ‘the *Endeavour* records were shaped by the standards and expectations of the eighteenth-century societies from which they came’, Salmond fails, nevertheless, to examine the cannibal’s etymology or to interrogate the status of its referent.\(^\text{31}\) For both Salmond and Moon, the signifier ‘evidence’, a ‘master word’ of historical discourse, functions metonymically as a sign of the real, which not only allows them to believe that the cannibal has a corporeal and extradiscursive existence rather than a notional and intradiscursive one, it also functions as a ‘transcendental


\(^\text{29}\) Derrida, *The Other Heading*, 33.


signified’ that halts regress of meaning for the cannibal discourse itself.\textsuperscript{32} Hence, when Moon claims that ‘the evidence of Maori cannibalism . . . is comprehensive in its scope, volume and detail’, he can offer only intra- not extradiscursive support for that claim.\textsuperscript{33} For Salmond, the ‘evidence of cannibalism begins to appear’ around AD 1500 as ‘population pressures and a growing competition for resources and prestige’ increased, although, whatever that ‘evidence’ may have been, it could not have been the multivalent cannibalism we saw in Chapter Five, because Cook, the first apparent carrier of the term to New Zealand, did not arrive there until 1769.\textsuperscript{34} Furthermore, if, for Salmond, ‘tribal histories’ are the basis of her ‘evidence’, there is simply no telling how supplementarity has worked to construct that ‘evidence’ in those histories.\textsuperscript{35} It is also the problem confronting Angela Ballara’s claim that ‘evidence of cannibalism’ is found in ‘the placenames and tribal names of New Zealand and its people, many of them ancient and derived from traditions relating to ancestral events.’\textsuperscript{36} For again, not only is that impossible because the term was apparently unknown before 1492, but Ballara, like Salmond, gives no consideration to the supplementarity that produced what is taken to be its equivalent: ‘kaitangta’ (‘or man-eating people’).\textsuperscript{37} It cannot be a material exoteric for the theoretical reasons discussed in Part A, and, within the discourse itself, it may just as well have been a metaphorical or rhetorical device. Furthermore, taking the cannibal to be axiomatic and extradiscursive precludes Salmond and Moon from considering its role as a phantasm derived from the fear of dying ‘a living death’, of circumventing canon law for commercial gain, and from interrogating its double function in settler discourse of justifying the settler’s expropriation of the cannibal’s geography while preventing the settler’s ipseity and sovereignty from being swallowed up by its

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item[33] Moon, \textit{This Horrid Practice}, 221.
\item[34] Salmond, \textit{Two Worlds}, 39.
\item[35] Salmond, \textit{Two Worlds}, 39.
\item[37] Ballara, \textit{Taua}, 137.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
Indeed, because both titles rely on the savage/civilised binary as their organising principle, both also depend on the indissociable relationship of the cannibal and its binary opposite, the post-Columbian coloniser: the savage is only savage in its binary relationship with the civilised and the civilised only civilised in its binary relationship with the savage. Phenomenologically, however, there is nothing there; a product of ‘the syntax of logocentrism’, this binary opposition sets about the task of affirming the civilised European coloniser in the role of civilising the savage indigene. Thus in producing their own metaphors and metonymies, both books play their part in passing off this aspect of settler ideology as being historically real and mythologising Maori in the role of cannibals, who, thus suitably positioned as denigrated human beings, require rescuing by an Enlightenment explorer (Salmond) and enlightened missionaries (Moon). As Moon has it: ‘Missionaries came to New Zealand from the early nineteenth century not to bury Maori but to save them.’

Salmond’s *The Trial of the Cannibal Dog* won the Montana Medal for Non-fiction in 2004 and has ‘sold over 25,000 copies’, according to its publisher, while Moon’s *This Horrid Practice* ‘attracted unprecedented attention from both media and the academic world’, according to *Insight*, the magazine of his employer, Auckland University of Technology (AUT). In addition, Salmond won the Prime Minister’s Award for Literary Achievement for 2004. A Distinguished Professor of Maori Studies and Anthropology at the University of Auckland, Salmond was also ‘made a

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40 Moon, *This Horrid Practice*, 176.
Dame Commander of the British Empire, for services to New Zealand History’ in 1994, and elected Foreign Associate, US National Academy of Science (NAS) in 2009, the latter, according to a *New Zealand Herald* article posted on her website, giving her ‘a place among the world’s elite’, an ‘exalted company’ that includes ‘Albert Einstein, Robert Oppenheimer, Thomas Edison, Orville Wright, and Alexander Graham Bell.’ In 2008, Salmond was elected Corresponding Fellow of the British Academy, the United Kingdom’s national academy for the humanities and social sciences, making her, according to The Royal Society of New Zealand, ‘the only New Zealander known to have achieved this double distinction.’ While Salmond’s earlier monographs, *Two Worlds*—‘a mirror-image ethnography’ in which she ‘tried to respect the perspectives of both sides’, and which, according to the Royal Society of New Zealand, ‘was received as a remarkable piece of scholarship and has made a significant contribution to New Zealand history’—and *Between Worlds*, attempt to redress the imbalance between European and Polynesian points of view in relation to the early contact period, an imbalance heightened by Fatal Impact theory, *The Trial of the Cannibal Dog*, mostly a narrativised synthesis of various journals covering Cook’s three Pacific voyages, not only demonstrates that there is no *horstexte*, but also suggests that the paradigmatic preconditions of the disciplines on which it relies—anthropology, ethnography, and history—produce predetermined outcomes, the principal value of which is to help make over the settler domain.


Salmond's account, although displaying a scholarly caution, offers little more than that which is found in the journals it synthesizes and merely reproduces the cannibal unproblematised, releasing it back into the settler domain where it continues its synecdochic work of denigrating tangata whenua whenua to the advantage of the settler, which, almost certainly, was not Salmond's intention.

It also seems surprising, given her level of national and international recognition, that it took Salmond 430 pages to reach the conclusion that Cook died as much as a consequence of the prevailing circumstances in Hawaii as those on his ships, and that 'Polynesian as well as European thinking is needed again, to illuminate those cross-cultural exchanges.' It is a conclusion that relies on Marshall Sahlins's view that Hawaiians perceived 'Cook as their returning god Lono' and that the unfortunate (mythic) timing of his return and the Hawaiian's savage thinking—'the idea that native people act out their myths' ('mythopraxis')—led to his “ritual murder”, an interpretation of events dismissed by Gananath Obeyesekere on the grounds ‘that the apotheosis of Captain Cook is a European myth of imperialism, civilization, and conquest.’ In other words, beginning with a metaphorical singularity, ‘the trial of the cannibal dog’, Salmond imagines a teleological chain of events in which Cook simultaneously loses the respect of his crew (implicit in the ‘mock court martial’) and the local chief, Kahura, believed to have been responsible

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1767-1840. In coining ‘fatal impact’, and in presenting the Polynesian as a ‘poor benighted savage reeling under Western impact’, as Kerry Howe has it, Moorehead was drawing on a well-established trope. European explorers of the Pacific, including William Bligh, Cook, and George Forster, voiced their concerns about the harmful effects they believed Europeans were having on its inhabitants, while Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s Noble Savage, reports of missionaries, the popular writings of Herman Melville and Robert Louis Stevenson, Social Darwinism, and the work of functional anthropologists such as Bronislaw Malinowski, heightened the expectation that the Savage was no longer Noble but Dying. See K. R. Howe, 'The Fate of the “Savage” in Pacific Historiography', The New Zealand Journal of History (11/2, 1977), 137-47. While contemporary New Zealand historiography still retains traces of Fatal Impact theory, arguably the most eloquent and influential of New Zealand’s Fatal Impact historians has been Harrison Wright, whose New Zealand, 1769-1840 Early Years of Western Contact was published in 1959; Derrida, Of Grammatology, 158.

for the second-voyage cannibalisation of ten Adventure crewmen in December 1773 (implicit in Cook’s failure to take revenge on his third voyage), and thus, ‘while trying to act like an enlightened leader, from a Polynesian point of view he was behaving like a man without mana’. As a consequence of experiencing this perfect storm of cross-cultural encounter, Cook, according to Salmond’s retroactive causality, became increasingly violent towards both his crew and the natives, lost ‘his faith in the power of reason’ and began his long slide down the slippery slope of cynicism and unpredictability to his death and disarticulation. Significantly, the primary title is Salmond’s fictional invention: the teller of the tale, George Home, on whom Salmond relies for the vignette from which her title is derived, recounted that his father, Alexander Home, Master’s mate on the Discovery and ‘claimant to a Scottish earldom’ who ‘had, at least, a story of the voyage [with Cook] for every day in the year’, called the defendant ‘a New Zealand dog’.

Thus it could be said that Salmond, in The Trial of the Cannibal Dog, was not so much writing history as ‘making history.’ This is apparent from her methodology, including, as her book’s organising motif, the use of the ‘New Zealand dog’ tale told in retirement by Home to his ‘admirring’ son and contained in George’s anonymous book ‘suppressed for its libels’. That is, from a questionable source, Salmond takes


50 Salmond, The Trial of the Cannibal Dog, 431.


Beaglehole comments as follows: ‘We may feel we know better Alexander Home of the Discovery if we read the spirited, admiring, libellous and anonymous book by his son, in which he is the conventional sea-dog, retired; jovial, reminiscient, respected; half-blind and growing blinder from his adventures
the tale of an elderly sight-impaired man who would ‘finish his tale of Cook, or
descant upon the swarthy beauties of Tongataboo . . . much at ease, with the tables
and chairs, and sometimes a solitary glass of grog, his sole auditors’, supplies it with
a fictional title, which sensationalises its content, and turns it into the linchpin of
Cook’s life: ‘With its mockery of naval discipline, this prank turned the world upside
. . . and proved to be a key turning-point in his relationships both with his crew, and
with Polynesians.’

To that she adds a little of Greg Dening’s floggings count and
Sahlins’s ‘hotly contested’ views to set up her Homeric ending: Cook’s death ‘was a
tragic event of epic proportions’.

Furthermore, the predication of cannibalism on which Salmond’s vignette relies, is
not literal but metaphorical of its object, as the title of her book suggests, for as was
the case with Columbus and Diego Chanca, neither Cook nor his crew claim to have
witnessed its practice. That Salmond’s cannibal-as-object is a metaphor—a
notional referent made corporeal by way of Salmond’s ‘speech-act’—is corroborated
by the apparent lack of archaeological support at the known occupation sites in
Totaranui (Queen Charlotte Sound), where the vignette purportedly played out,

with powder and shot, his exertions for his country, as he waits on his starveling Berwickshire farm
for triumph in his claim to an earldom’ (‘Introduction’ lxxxii); J. C. Beaglehole, ‘The Ships’ Companies’,
Cook, The Journals of Captain James Cook on His Voyages of Discovery: The Voyage of the Resolution
and Discovery 1776-1780: Volume III, 1473; Bellerophon (Home), Memoirs of an Aristocrat, 271.
Salmond, The Trial of the Cannibal Dog, 390, 416, 431; Greg Dening, Mr Bligh’s Bad Language:
Having counted the recorded floggings on British naval vessels in the Pacific from 1764 to 1795,
Dening concludes that William Bligh, contrary to popular opinion, was less violent than any other
British Naval captains, including Cook, because he issued fewer floggings.

The only exception is the purported but uncorroborated eyewitness account of Richard Pickersgill,
whose ‘use of the plural pronoun’, writes Ian Barber, when his ‘detail was not confirmed by any other
writer’, suggests the possible ‘embellishment’ of an earlier experiment conducted by Banks, as
recorded by Cook on 17 January 1770: ‘M’r Banks got from one of them a bone of the fore arm much in
the same state as the one before mention’d and to shew us that they eat the flesh they bit a[nd] naw’d
the bone and draw’d it thro’ their mouth and this in such a manner as plainly shew’d that the flesh to
them was a dainty bit.’ See Ian Barber, ‘Archaeology, ethnography, and the record of Maori
and James Cook, The Journals of Captain James Cook on His Voyages of Discovery, J. C Beaglehole ed.
(Millwood: Krauss Reprint, 1988), 236-7. The on-board experiment conducted at Totaranui on 23
November 1773, recorded in various journals and discussed later in this chapter, is also discounted
due to its very nature. See Cook, The Journals of Captain Cook on His Voyages of Discovery, Volume II,
292-5.
'where cannibalism was first documented during Cook's visits', where, it seems, cannibalism was uppermost in the minds of those who kept journals on Cook's voyages, and not far from Golden Bay (Taitapu or Murderers' Bay) where, as James Belich would have us believe, 'the first of many European imports consumed in New Zealand was a dead Dutchman.' As Ian Barber reports:

Site survey work was carried out [in Totaranui] in 1979 under the direction of Brailsford (1981:250), concentrating upon the later occupation sites of first contact. During this survey, Brailsford and his team located several of the defended settlements referred to by members of the Cook expeditions, including the "Hippa[h] Island" pa site near the head of the Sound, and several features associated with Grass Cove (Wharehunga Bay) where Furneaux's crew were killed and reportedly eaten. The sites generally contained eroding midden, incorporating molluscan and fish remains, a fur-seal mandible from one site, and dog and bird bone from Hippa[h] Island. No human bone was reported during the survey, and none was found within the eroding middens (Brailsford 1981:20; 25-6 and figs. 15a-d, 33 fig. 19, 35, 38). From other survey work by Trotter (1987:124-8) in Totaranui in 1977 and 1982, there are also no reports of human bone either on site, or within exposed middens. Site survey and excavation work in neighbouring Tasman and Golden Bays, with a particular focus on later Maori occupation, has also failed to locate any indication of cannibalism. In fact, except for the evidence from Rotokura, there is scant evidence of human remains from any of the later, northern South Island coastal midden sites (Barber 1992; Challis 1978).

Hence Barber concludes:

56 Barthes, The Rustle of Language, 128 passim; Barber, 'Archaeology, Ethnography, and the Record of Maori Cannibalism Before 1815', 278; James Belich, Making Peoples: A History of the New Zealanders From Polynesian Settlement to the End of the Nineteenth Century (Auckland: Penguin, 2001, first published 1996), 120. In his journal entry dated 16 January 1770, Cook, on his arrival for the first time at what he would label Queen Charlotte Sound (Totaranui), records that they were ‘at an anchor in 41° 5’ 32”s which is 15’ to the southward of Murderers Bay’, where Tasman had reported, a little over 127 years earlier, that four of his men had been killed. Beaglehole notes, however, that Cook was ‘about 70 miles WNW of where Tasman had anchored, the reason for the miscalculation being that Tasman’s recorded anchorage at 41° 5’s was incorrect because Tasman’s ‘latitudes were consistently 6 ‘too far south (and his longitudes 1½ to 3° too far east).’ See Cook, The Journals of Captain James Cook on His Voyages of Discovery: Volume I: The Voyage of the Endeavour 1768-1771: Part Two, 235, 235 n. 4.

57 Barber, ‘Archaeology, Ethnography, and the Record of Maori Cannibalism Before 1815, 278-9. Ian Barber is currently an Associate Professor in the Department of Anthropology and Archaeology at the University of Otago: http://www.otago.ac.nz/anthropology/arch/people/barber.html.
In spite of an expected emphasis on the physical data from excavations, it would seem that, with respect to cannibalism, many archaeological scenarios have resorted to inference and assumption over reliance on any particular site evidence to a surprising degree. At the level of field interpretation, the general literature lacks consistent and systematic description, as a rule, while workers dealing with fragmentary and burnt human remains have tacitly, if not explicitly, acknowledged significant difficulties in explanation.

For much of the site evidence discussed above, of course, the remains are so modified or few that one could not completely preclude the consumption of human flesh even if all of the relevant site information were available. What can be said is that the assumption of cannibalism on the basis of the site evidence is generally unconvincing and/or unnecessary. In most cases, the data are perfectly consistent with secondary inhumation, cremation, or the raiding of an enemy burial ground instead. . .

Given the general absence of . . . [supporting] evidence and the fact that no more than a few individuals have been reported from any of the midden/occupation sites discussed above (and in some cases no more than one individual), an argument for widespread or subsistence cannibalism cannot be sustained.58

Having subsequently conducted excavations at sites of significant Maori settlement at Tata Beach and Wainui Bay and extensive nearby gardens on the eastern side of Golden Bay, close to where Abel Tasman’s two ship are thought to have anchored on 18-19 December 1642, Barber had the following exchange with Kim Hill on Radio New Zealand in 2010:

58 Barber, ‘Archaeology, Ethnography, and the Record of Maori Cannibalism Before 1815’, 279-80. It should be noted that, despite producing a carefully researched argument to reach the conclusion excerpted above, and while not refuting his findings regarding ‘subsistence cannibalism’, the Conclusion to Barber’s paper is nevertheless conflicted: ‘Given both the circumstantial evidence from Totaranui and the insistence of all recorders, irrespective of philosophical perspective and any initial reluctance to accept the fact, a compelling case emerges for the occasional practice of cannibalism among late 18th-century Maori communities of both the North and South Islands. Against the further weight of Maori oral tradition (Voykovic 1981:47), one would be hard-pressed to argue otherwise’ (Barber, ‘Archaeology, Ethnography, and the Record of Maori Cannibalism Before 1815, 280). In other words, despite his finding no archaeological support to underwrite the belief of Cook et al. in the existence of the cultural practice, Barber accepted ‘the early ethnographic accounts’ as affirmative of that practice, despite his also stating in his conclusion that ‘the absence from later (or earlier) Maori midden sites of large numbers of relatively nonmultitarian [sic] bone is still a telling indictment of any significant subsistence interpretation’, and despite describing the views of [ethnographers Elsdon] Best and [Percy] Smith as ‘racist speculations’ (Barber, ‘Archaeology, Ethnography, and the Record of Maori Cannibalism Before 1815’, 281, 282-3).
Kim Hill: Is there any evidence that Maori ate one of Abel Tasman’s crew? Because that’s been suggested by a number of historians reading the scientific observations.

Ian Barber: Yes, that’s right. The suggestion has been made. After the [cock]boat was rammed, Maori returned to shore. They took the body of one of the Dutch sailors back to shore with them. And indeed as recently as James Belich’s history of New Zealand and Michael King’s very famous Penguin History of New Zealand, both of those authors, King perhaps a little more tentatively, have offered the suggestion that one of those persons was eaten. That’s a suggestion that’s been around for a while, I might add. George Forster, the scientific observer on the second Cook expeditionary voyage, proffered that suggestion as well. So it’s been around for a while. In the first instance, one can’t know for sure why Maori took that body ashore. But the proposition of cannibalism certainly can’t be demonstrated conclusively. What I can tell you is from my work on shore in archaeological middens—as I said before, rubbish heaps, places where people are discarding food remains—I’ve yet to identify any human remains at all. There’s no evidence on shore that these people were cannibals, at least in so far as subsistence cannibalism is concerned. Maori traditions and Maori history would suggest that, at least in pre-contact New Zealand, cannibalism, such as it was, was very much a ritual activity; it had a very specific ritual context. And certainly there is no evidence from the Golden Bay middens that I’ve investigated that cannibalism was at all a matter of course, or even, for that matter, that it existed.\footnote{Ian Barber, ‘First contact and food’, Radio New Zealand Te Reo Irirangi o Aotearoa, Kim Hill interviewer (broadcast 18 September 2010): http://www.radionz.co.nz/national/programmes/saturday/audio/2408273/ian-barber-first-contact-and-food. In this interview, Barber describes these extensive gardens collectively as ‘the food basket of eastern Golden Bay.’}

Nor is Barber’s a lone voice in this regard. As Douglas Sutton commented in 1986, ‘it is important to note that neither the reported scale of early 19th century cannibalism nor the vividness with which it was sometimes reported should be taken as proof that cannibalism was common in the prehistoric period. . . . In the New Zealand context . . . it seem most unlikely indeed that prehistoric cannibalism occurred on the scale necessary to redress late prehistoric dietary inadequacies’.\footnote{Douglas G. Sutton, ‘Maori demographic change, 1769-1840: The inner working of “A picturesque but illogical simile”, The Journal of the Polynesian Society, 95/3 (1986), 313.}
Given that there appears to be no archaeological support for cannibalism as cultural practice in pre-European New Zealand, and given that The Trial of the Cannibal Dog represents little more than a synthesised treatment of journals making up Cook’s ‘three Pacific voyages’, how might we explain the book’s success?\(^61\) Michel de Certeau, in this regard, offers the following helpful commentary concerning historians and history writing:

Thus located in the vicinity of political problems—but not in the place where political power is exercised—historiography is given an ambivalent status which shows forth most visibly in its modern archaeology. It is in a strange situation, at once critical and fictive. The fact is evident with particular clarity in Machiavelli’s Discorsi and Istorie fiorentine. When the historian seeks to establish, for the place of power, the rules of political conduct and the best political institutions, he *plays the role* of the prince that he is not; he analyzes what the prince *ought* to do. Such is the fiction that gives his discourse an access to the space in which it is written. Indeed, a fiction, for it is at once the discourse of the master and that of the servant—it is legitimized through power and drawn from it. . . .

The past is the area of *interest* and *pleasure* that situates beyond the current problems the prince is facing. . . . The gap in respect to present events delimits the space where historiography is manufactured, around the prince and near the public. It plays between what one *does* and what *pleases* the other, yet it can be identified neither with one nor the other. Thus the past is the fiction of the present. The same holds true for all veritable historiographical labors. \(^62\)

Elsewhere Certeau writes: ‘History is probably our myth. It combines what can be thought, the “thinkable,” and the origin, in conformity with the way in which a society can understand its own working.’\(^63\) In short, the literary and popular success of The Trial of the Cannibal Dog may be understood in terms of its symbiotic relationship with the society for which it was written. On the one hand, it appears to play a conciliatory role by treating British and Polynesian cultures even-handedly—

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'On each side, there was savagery and kindness, generosity and greed, intelligent curiosity and stupidity’—while on the other it portrays Maori as cannibals at the time of first contact and therefore in need of civilising.64

We can obtain a sense of The Trial of the Cannibal Dog being ‘nothing more than a fiction (the narrative of what happened) or an epistemological reflection (the elucidation of its own working laws)’ from the construction of its title, which itself is exemplary of how ‘the referential illusion’ is created in ‘sui-referential discourses (such as performative discourse)’, in which, as we have seen, the description ‘is in fact only the signifier of the speech-act as an act of authority.’65 That is, through her deployment of the noun ‘cannibal’ as an adjective, Salmond redefines the (absent) ‘dog’ from being ‘a New Zealand dog’ in the source text to being a ‘cannibal dog’ in her text.66 However, because a dog, by definition, cannot be a cannibal, we can see that her proposition (that the dog is a cannibal) is false and her cannibal dog indeed ‘the signifier of the speech-act as an act of authority.’67 In other words, the now adjectival cannibal, which as a proposition attaches meaning to the dog, is metaphorical of the dog but literal of Salmond’s desire or intention (to create a sensationalised dog). We know this to be the case because the cannibal dog is a paradoxical term meaningless outside of metaphor.68 However, despite it being her literary invention, Salmond deploys it as both existing outside the discourse and causative: ‘As the trial of the cannibal dog at Totara-nui showed, when he acted with calm restraint, he invited humiliation’.69 Put plainly, the cannibal dog is a fictionalised rhetorical device that supports the ideological content of the book it names, which in turn has appeal for the audience at which it is aimed, for it confirms

65 Certeau, The Writing of History, 44; Barthes, The Rustle of Language, 148, 139.
66 Bellephoron (Home), Memoirs of an Aristocrat, 271-2; Salmond, The Trial of the Cannibal Dog, Cover, title page, 1 passim.
67 Derrida, The Beast and the Sovereign: Volume II, 141 §206, 142 §208; Barthes, The Rustle of Language, 139.
68 Salmond, The Trial of the Cannibal Dog, Cover, title page, 1 passim.
69 Salmond, The Trial of the Cannibal Dog, 416.
the justness of the status quo. After all, *The Trial of a New Zealand Dog*, a more accurate title according to the Homes account, would sound more like a book about sheep-dog trials than an ethnographic account of irrational savages lurking in the littoral to capture, cook and eat rational Europeans. Thus, by synecdochally labelling Maori as dogs and putting them on trial through her deployment of the ‘mock court martial’, Salmond finds against Maori as the sailors found against the dog: both are guilty of cannibalism, a verdict of *belief* in a *metaphorical* trial. In short, without any apparent consideration of the cannibal’s etymology or signifieds, Salmond ensnares Maori in perpetuity by making them the subject of the dehumanising signifier cannibal through her deliberate relabelling of the defendant (the dog) and her credulous acceptance of Cook’s statement, also one of *belief*, ‘That the New Zealanders are Canibals’, and despite the basis of that belief being the eating of a piece of flesh from a human skull Cook had ordered cooked and given to an on-board guest.

Salmond also appears not to have problematised one of the disciplines in which she is working: ‘History, for instance, looks at the way the future has been shaped, within and across nations, while the discipline of anthropology has often analysed the customs of indigenous peoples as timeless structures, outside of history.’ Notwithstanding that history cannot *see* unless it is anthropomorphised, ‘the way the future has been shaped’ cannot be studied because the future—the ‘time to come’ or ‘a condition in time to come’ or that which ‘is to be’—has not yet arrived and indeed can never arrive and still be the future. Furthermore, there cannot be an inside and outside to history, for as with any discursive production, as Derrida

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70 Salmond, *The Trial of the Cannibal Dog*, Cover, title page, 1 passim.
reminds us, ‘the meaning of the outside’ is ‘always present within the inside’.\textsuperscript{76} Or to put that in the contrary, if such a thing as history exists as the representation, in whole or part, of ‘all that has gone on before everywhere’, one cannot, by that definition, study people who exist outside it without redefining history as being exclusive of those people.\textsuperscript{77}

As suggested above, Salmond also appears to treat her text-objects as empirical evidence rather than discursive constructions: ‘Unfortunately, since his journal for this visit has not survived, we lack good evidence of his reactions.’\textsuperscript{78} Likewise, when she reads the entry in Cook’s journal dated 21 November 1773—‘Some of our gentlemen having made them a viset at their habitations and got from them some thigh bones the meat of which had been lately picked off, the gentlemen had reason to believe that at this time they had some human flesh by them’—she concludes that this constitutes ‘new evidence of Maori cannibalism’, when her claim is based on belief—‘the gentlemen had reason to believe’—and based on a journal entry that has been substantively altered.\textsuperscript{79} As a result, her predication, while presenting as a literal interpretation of what was, is, more accurately, the product of ‘s’entendre-parler’, revealing more of herself than Cook or her Polynesian subjects, who exist, after all, only as deferred presence in the form of graphic signs.\textsuperscript{80}

This manner of reading sources is perhaps reinforced for Salmond by the discipline of Anthropology, which, as Michael James has it, ‘most prominently disseminated

\textsuperscript{76} Derrida, \textit{Of Grammatology}, 35.
\textsuperscript{78} Salmond, \textit{The Trial of the Cannibal Dog}, 408.
\textsuperscript{79} Salmond, \textit{The Trial of the Cannibal Dog}, 222; Cook, \textit{The Journals of Captain Cook on His Voyages of Discovery, Vol. II}, 291. The whole excerpted quotation Salmond uses at page 222 has been taken from MS 27888 and added to MS 27886 by Beaglehole, on the basis that the ‘differences between the two versions are great, or where’ MS 27888 contains large passages not in MS 27886. See J. C. Beaglehole, ‘Textual Introduction’, in Cook, \textit{The Journals of Captain Cook on His Voyages of Discovery, Volume II}, cxv and cxvii; Alfred North Whitehead, and Bertrand Russell, \textit{Principia Mathematica} (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1962, first published 1910), 37-8.
\textsuperscript{80} Derrida, \textit{Of Grammatology}, 98.
the scientific concept of race’. Furthermore, in making a science of the savage, Anthropology not only relies on the savage/civilised binary opposition but also ‘has consistently operated’ the ‘dichotomization’ of ‘primitive and civilized, non-literate and literate’, which, as Peter Hulme opines, ‘has functioned to divide the world into two, one part (ours) that can be taken at its word, the other (not ours) that needs the interpreting voice of the anthropologist to make it comprehensive (to us)’. As well, in her reliance on mythopraxis in her chapter ‘Killing Kuki’, Salmond continues to promote the perceived superiority of Enlightenment rationality. As Linda Alcoff explains:

“The marginalization of non-European peoples with respect to Europeans,” [Leopoldo] Zea argues, “is related to a Eurocentric view of reason, which leads to the perception that non-Western people are inferior to Europeans in their capacity to reason, hence, in their status of human beings” . . . When the paradigm of reason, construed as culturally neutral, is defined as the scientific practices of European-based countries, the result is a flattering contrast between Europe and its colonies. Reason is counterposed to ignorance, philosophies of mind to folk psychologies, religion to superstition, and history to myth, reproducing a culture hierarchy that vindicates colonialist arrogance.

Thus, in not problematising the twin constructions of race and reason that underwrite her sources, and by treating the cannibal as a corporeal exoteric of her discourse, Salmond, no doubt unwittingly, perpetuates the ideology inherent in those sources—the perceived cultural superiority of Europe that had a devastating effect on the indigenous cultures it encountered on the edges of its empires.

However, having locked Maori in her semantic prison, Salmond also offers them a ‘get-out-of-jail-free’ card in the form of her Enlightenment Ulysses, James Cook,

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82 Peter Hulme, Colonial Encounter: Europe and the native Caribbean, 1492-1797 (London: Methuen, 1986), 56, 278 n. 19.
whom, having endured epic voyages before succumbing to his ‘cross-cultural’ fate, becomes the founding figure of an enlightened country, home to Europeans and Maori, the latter having renounced their savage (unenlightened) ways and accepted those of their enlightened superiors. Cook, then, Salmond’s hero—“I really admire Cook”, she said in her interview with Steve Braunias; ‘She’s unashamedly a fan, an academic groupie’, wrote Jane Phare, who ‘talks about Cook as though she knew him, and writes about him as though it’s a never-ending story’—becomes the Christ-like figure who redeems savage society even as he gives his life for it, and, in that ultimate sacrifice, like Christ, makes possible a harmonious future.\footnote{Steve Braunias, ‘Anne Salmond’, New Zealand Listener (5 July 2003): http://www.listener.co.nz/issue/3295/features/232/anne_salmond.html; Steve Braunias, ‘Anne Salmond’, New Zealand Listener (5 July 2003): http://www.listener.co.nz/issue/3295/features/232/anne_salmond.html; Jane Phare, ‘Cook Scholar takes Heritage Helm’, New Zealand Heritage (Spring 2002): http://www.historic.org.nz/publications/heritagemagazine/heritagenz2002/hnz02-cookscholar.aspx?sc_lang=en; Salmond elevates Cook to hero status and elucidates her admiration of him and his Enlightenment credentials at the beginning of her Preface to The Trial of the Cannibal Dog: ‘Without doubt Captain James Cook was one of the world’s great explorers... [He] has become an icon of imperial history. His voyages epitomise the European conquest of nature, fixing the location of coastlines by the use of instruments and mathematical calculation, classifying and collecting plants, animals, insects and people. As the edges of the known world were pushed out, wild nature – including the ‘savages’ and ‘barbarians’ at the margins of humanity – was brought under the calm, controlling gaze of Enlightenment science, long before colonial domination was attempted’ (The Trial of the Cannibal Dog, xix).} Salmond says as much by quoting from a letter from one Maori leader, Te Rangihiroa (Peter Buck), to another, Apirana Ngata, in which the former refers to Cook as ‘Our Ancestor’, despite the reason for the attribution not being apparent in his letter.\footnote{Salmond, The Trial of the Cannibal Dog, 425; Apirana Ngata, Na To Hoa Aroha: From Your Dear Friend: The Correspondence Between Sir Apirana Ngata and Sir Peter Buck 1925-50: Volume One, ed. M. P. K. Sorrenson (Auckland: Auckland University Press in association with the Alexander Turnbull Library Endowment Trust and the Maori Purposes Fund Board, 1986), 112-13.} In other words, Salmond promotes the idea not only of Maori being savage at the moment of their encounter with Europeans, but also that Maori recognised themselves as such and subsequent to that epiphany were able to incorporate the enlightened founding father of modern-day New Zealand into their ancestry. That is, by signifying Maori as cannibals, by placing Maori on the savage side of the savage/civilised binary, Salmond denies them rationality and civility and all but their savage humanity at the moment of encounter; but by predicating Cook as their ancestor—‘Our Ancestor Captain Cook’ is the title of her conclusion in which she propounds the Eurocentric
view that ‘when the European ships first arrived at the [Polynesian] islands, it made sense to suppose that these marvellous vessels had sailed through the sky from another dimension’—she makes them the inheritors ‘of enlightened reason’, thereby bringing them in from ‘the margins of humanity’ to the very heart of civilisation where European civility and rationality provides them with that which they lacked as savages.\textsuperscript{87} Thus \textit{The Trial of the Cannibal Dog} performs a double movement—it confirms Maori as being formerly savage but subsumes them under the settler’s hegemonic discourse as civilised human beings. Salmond confirms that as a present-day ‘reality’ by concluding \textit{The Trial of the Cannibal Dog} with a chant from her ‘mentor, the Maori tribal expert Eruera Stirling’: ‘Tui, tui, tuituia!’ (‘Bind, join, be one!’)\textsuperscript{88} Dogs no longer, thanks to Cook, but still once were cannibals. It is an insidious ‘cultural grammar’, even if unintentional.\textsuperscript{89}

Finally, we should note that Salmond does not take her readers into Nootka Sound on the Northwest coast of North America with the \textit{Resolution} and \textit{Discovery}, eliding that part of Cook’s third voyage from her narrative with the comment: ‘This is not the place to discuss Cook's contacts with the inhabitants of Nootka and Prince William’s Sound’.\textsuperscript{90} It is a notable omission given that it is in Nootka Sound that the expertise of Cook and his crew as identifiers of cannibals is challenged. As Christon Archer points out, ‘the first Europeans to visit the northwest Coast did not mention the subject of cannibalism’, despite the Spanish, ‘beginning in 1774’, having ‘dispatched three major expeditions’ there ‘to verify the extent of Russian penetration southward’, and despite their reported bloody encounters with some of the indigenous inhabitants.\textsuperscript{91} However, when Cook arrived on 23 March 1778, according to his journal, and three days later began trading ‘Weapons, such as Bows and Arrows, Spears &c\textsuperscript{a} Fish hooks and Instruments of various kinds, pieces of

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\item \textsuperscript{87} Salmond, \textit{The Trial of the Cannibal Dog}, 417-432, 425, 430, xxi.
\item \textsuperscript{88} Salmond, \textit{The Trial of the Cannibal Dog}, 432.
\item \textsuperscript{89} Dean Hammer, \textit{The Iliad as Politics: The Performance of Political Thought} (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2002), 11-12.
\item \textsuperscript{90} Salmond, \textit{The Trial of the Cannibal Dog}, 388.
\item \textsuperscript{91} Christon Archer, ‘Cannibalism in the Early History of the Northwest Coast: Enduring Myths and Neglected Realities’, \textit{Canadian Historical Review}, LXI4, (1980), 456.
\end{itemize}
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carved work and even human sculs and hands’, some members of his crew suspected that ‘the Natives’ were ‘cannibals’. As the astronomer William Bayly noted on 30 March: ‘We bought 3 or 4 Human hands which they brought to sell, they appeared to have been lately cut off as the flesh was not reduced to an horny substance but raw—they made signs that they were good eating, & seemed to sell them us for that purpose or at least all of us understood them in that light.’ Thus, although Cook and his crew could not converse with the inhabitants and stayed in Nootka Sound for only thirty-four days, their published reports were ‘more than sufficient to convince most subsequent explorers and fur traders’ that ‘the Northwest Coast Indians’ were ‘cannibals’. In support of his contention, Archer quotes American fur-trader Joseph Ingraham from 1789: ‘That they were cannibals we had every reason to suppose from Captain Cook’s account of their bringing to him human bones broiled for sale, but we were confirmed in this opinion when they owned, without hesitation, they not only eat their enemies, but bought men for the purpose of eating’, that despite Ingraham’s apparently knowing ‘little of the Nootka language’. As the presence of Europeans in the region increased along with trading activity so did accounts of Indian savagism and cannibalism, incorporating the now familiar tropes of devouring human flesh “with apparent relish”, the eating of children, the fattening of captured boys for consumption and the denigration of tribal reputation through one tribe labelling another as eaters of human flesh. However, even after the Alejandro Malapina’s two-ship ‘scientific expedition’ of 1791 produced ‘an intensive study of Indian culture’ which, among other matters, ‘found that the question of anthropophagy was obscured by an uncritical acceptance of its existence’, that the trade in children for ‘cannibal banquet(s)’ ‘was

nonexistent’, that the local chief Maquinna ‘denied consistently that he ever engaged
in cannibalism’, that ‘many of the stories’ were ‘traced . . . back to Cook and [John] Meares’, and ‘despite an almost unanimous conclusion that the Indian did not eat
human flesh’, according to Archer ‘the myth of cannibalism had taken root’:

Cannibalism sold books, deterred competitors, and for as long as was necessary kept the
Spaniards bottled up in their little post at Nootka Sound. Although the ethnographical
literature points out that some tribes had their own dark myths and cannibal dances, it was
not the mystery and ritual of the shaman that caused the early European observers to draw
their conclusions. With some help from the Indians, the visitors to the Northwest Coast made
and then maintained their own fantasies.97

In conclusion, no matter how well intentioned Salmond may be in wishing to make
her ‘Two Worlds’ one, the discursive self-presence of the genres in which she
works—anthropology, ethnography, history—will not permit it. Each subsumes
under its sign, or any combination thereof, the referents it cognises, the savage
Other in this case, and produces outcomes largely predetermined by the ideologies
with which each is invested and the paradigmatic imperatives that drive their
productions.98 Furthermore, as European inventions, they are deeply complicit in
the power structures of the settler domains they have helped to create. It is for these
reasons that Salmond’s writing perpetuates rather than addresses the différend at
the heart of New Zealand society and why her dream ‘to illuminate the full humanity
of the past’ by working ‘across disciplines’ cannot be realised, not least because ‘the
no-longer-now’ is always already a production of ‘the now’.99 For there is a
fundamental inadequation between what history is commonly taken to be, ‘a

97 Archer, ‘Cannibalism in the Early History of the Northwest Coast’, 474, 471, 473 and 478-9; John
Meares was a British sea captain and fur trader whose four vessels at Nootka Sound were seized by
the Spanish in 1789, an incident which brought England and Spain to the brink of war and challenged
Spain’s claim to possession of the northwest coast of America on the basis of Alexander VI’s Bull of
Encyclopædia Britannica, 20122010. Web.


99 Anne Salmond, Bligh: William Bligh in the South Seas (Auckland: Viking, 2011), 21; Critchley,
‘Heidegger’s Being and Time, part 8: Temporality’. 282
narrative representation of the past’, and what it actually is, ‘an inherently unstable art form’ that cannot be thought ‘apart from its expression (as history).’ As we shall see in the Conclusion, while history’s malleability—‘it can take as many forms as the historian can imagine for it’—makes it the ideal discursive device with which to construct and make over political domains, it is unable to deliver social justice in those domains precisely because it represents not some former reality but the ideology and worldview of those who construct it in the interests of the linguistic communities they serve. To repeat the problematic encountered in Part A: in its referential function, language does not differentiate between notional and material objects: it simply signifies them. Therefore, unless the user of the sign makes that distinction they may blur the boundaries between the notional and material and perpetuate the commonly made error in historiographical praxis of treating ideas as if they have an existence, sometimes corporeal, outside the discourse. For all its fine intentions, Salmond’s ‘full humanity of the past’ is not an exoteric able to be cognised but an idea internal to that discourse, as her deference to the scholars she names makes clear. In short, because ‘the past’ is an idea not a place, Salmond cannot illuminate its ‘full humanity’ except metaphorically. To not make that clear is effectively to make a ‘category-mistake’, yet one that ‘the reality effect’ is able to disguise.

**This horrid praxis**

While arguably an example of “poor scholarship”, as Rawiri Taonui describes it, *This Horrid Practice*, with its unrelenting denigration of tangata whenua and its violent displacement of the cognised indigenous narrative, repeats the error discussed above of treating text-objects as extradiscursive ‘evidence’, that ‘master word’ of historical discourse on which this title clearly relies, as well as promoting

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the savage/civilised binary opposition throughout its 46 chapters as if it were axiomatic instead of a product of ‘the syntax of logocentrism’. That it fails to pay close attention to the referential function of language and therefore takes the past to be extradiscursive and present to itself and the cannibal to be a corporeal exoteric rather than a notional and intradiscursive referent, also accounts for Moon’s reliance on ‘the referential illusion’ to close the distance between his text and its referents. Indeed, it is the extent of Moon’s belief that ‘historians’ can ‘represent the past as it was, and bring it to life for the present age to the greatest extent afforded by the evidence’, that appears to pave the way for his errors of praxis, including the howler of incorrectly attributing the book’s primary title to ‘Captain James Cook’, and his sometimes large-scale truth-claims that rely solely on ‘the speech-act[s]’ of other writers for their ‘authority’. This Horrid Practice, then, in exemplary fashion, highlights the fake performativity of historical discourse, and why the theoretical problematics discussed in Part A of this thesis are needed in order to better understand how a ‘Professor of History at the Faculty of Maori Development at the Auckland Institute of Technology and a Fellow of the Royal Historical Society, University College London’, as This Horrid Practice describes Moon, could make such elementary and substantive errors in a book he ‘spent several years researching’ and to which he applied ‘standard methods of research’. It is to these historiographical errors, therefore, rather than the theoretical reasons for them, and the settler society’s apparent acceptance of the book’s central premise to which we now turn.


106 Moon, This Horrid Practice, Back Cover; Barthes, The Rustle of Language, 139.

107 This Horrid Practice, 1; The Royal Historical Society: http://www.royalhistoricalsociety.org; Tahana, ‘Racism claim over cannibal book’.
It would be fair to say that the publication of This Horrid Practice, which, also according to Taonui, “‘demonises’ pre-European Maori as obsessively violent’, was accompanied by a media feeding frenzy of which most New Zealand authors can only dream.\(^{108}\) If the cannibal had been on sabbatical, it was back with a vengeance in 2008, serving notice on the settlers that their society’s tenure of the expropriated geography was only as good as their ability to keep this ‘man-munching’ monster at bay.\(^{109}\) Although the book’s title signalled the likely outcome if its subject were to run amok, it also carried a reassuring message: thanks to the missionaries, Maori had been saved from being their own main course and that settlers were likewise currently ‘off the menu’:

What... happened to cannibalism in New Zealand at the hands of the missionaries in the beginning of the nineteenth century was one of the most astonishing transformations in the history of Maori society. An entire branch of Maori culture was amputated in around just one generation. And, virtually without exception, no revival of cannibalism was seen sprouting from the stump. Missionaries trumpeted their success in extinguishing the practice, and were right to claim most of the credit.\(^{110}\)

That This Horrid Practice is a blood-splattered metaphor is apparent before we even open it, the publisher having used the schematic engraving by Emile Rouargue (1795-1865), Sauvages de la Nouvelle Zélande (1859), as its front cover illustration, a depiction that cannot be literal of the images it portrays for a number of reasons.\(^{111}\) First, the carving on the beached canoe’s stem appears to be ‘generalised

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\(^{108}\) Taonui as quoted by Tahana, ‘Racism claim over cannibal book’.

\(^{109}\) Hans Staden, Hans Staden’s True History: An Account of Cannibal Activity in Brazil, trans. Neil L. Whitehead and Michael Harbsmeier, eds (Durham: Duke University Press, 2008), 5. The full title of Staden’s 1557 publication is: ‘The true history and description of a country populated by a wild, naked and savage, man-munching people, situated in the New World, America; unknown in Hesse, both before and after the birth of Christ, until two years ago when Hans Staden from Homberg in Hesse came to know of it through his own personal experiences, and now makes it known in print’ (5).

\(^{110}\) William Arens, ‘Man is off the menu’, The Times Higher Education Supplement (12 December 1997); Moon, This Horrid Practice, 182-3.

\(^{111}\) Emile Rouargue, Sauvages de la Nouvelle-Zélande, Alexander Turnbull Library, research library within the National Library of New Zealand, Te Puna Matauranga o Aotearoa, Ref. no. PUBL-0040-01: http://timeframes.natlib.govt.nz/logicrouter/servlet/LogicRouter?PAGE=object&OUTPUTXSL=objec t.xslt&pm_RC=REP002DB&pm_OI=19251&pm_GT=Y&pm_IAC=Y&api_1=GET_OBJECT_XML&num_re sult=0&Object_Layout=about_object.
primitive’ rather than copied ‘from any sort of original source’, and the literal representation of a face at the top of the stem appears to be incongruent with Maori carving tradition.112 Second, the figures purporting to be feasting toa (warriors) do not have facial moko (tattoos) and their features could be said to reference a generalised native physiognomy. Third, the Alexander Turnbull Library is of the view that Rouargue did not accompany Jules Dumont d’Urville on his travels, which included his voyage to New Zealand in 1824-1825, or travelled to New Zealand at any other time.113 It seems most likely, therefore, that the front cover illustration, which first appeared in Dumont d’Urville’s Histoire générale des voyages (1859), is an imaginative one produced as a direct engraving in Paris.114 We might also note that Trevor Bentley, whom we met in Chapter Four perpetuating the Belich myth that ‘more New Zealanders probably died during the Musket Wars than in any subsequent conflict in which they took part’, utilised the generic qualities of Sauvages de la Nouvelle Zélande and the somewhat unusual facial features of its feasting subjects when he wrote the following caption for it in Pakeha Maori (1999): ‘Fully assimilated Pakeha toa participated in the great cannibal feats that followed successful battles and sieges during the intertribal Musket Wars.’115 Ron Crosby offers this caption for the same engraving in The Musket Wars—‘The title of this work by the French artist Émile Rouargue translates as “Savages of New Zealand”. It

113 Minson, in an email to the author dated 19 October 2009.
114 Jules Dumont d’Urville, Histoire générale des voyages . . . Tome 2; voyage autour du monde, Paris, 1859. Minson, in an email to the author dated 19 October 2009. Minson advised that while it seems most likely that the engraving was produced by Emile Rouargue, its authorship remains uncertain, and there is some possibility that it could have even been produced by his younger brother, Adolphe, who ‘was better known for his marine paintings.’ Minson kindly pointed out in the same email that Rouargue was responsible for an engraving showing the death of Captain Cook but of course could not have been present at this incident, since it occurred ‘some sixteen years before he was born.
depicts a scene that must have been commonplace during evenings on a taua’—as does the government’s online Te Ara – the Encyclopedia of New Zealand the following: ‘This engraving by Emile Rouargue illustrated a scene said to have been witnessed on Dumont d’Urville’s voyage of exploration to New Zealand in 1826-27. The scene is of Māori engaging in a cannibal feast with the heads of two enemies on poles to the left. Such images reinforced New Zealand’s reputation in Europe as a dangerous place peopled by bloodthirsty ‘savages’.\textsuperscript{116}

Like Salmond’s title, Moon’s is also paradoxical: if ‘Maori cannibalism’, as Moon describes it, was ‘a socialised, cultural practice’ that disappeared by the middle of the nineteenth century—‘by 1840 Maori cannibalism was indisputably going through its death throes’—the ‘reality of traditional Maori cannibalism’, even for Moon, cannot pertain to the real, only to its intratextual existence.\textsuperscript{117} While Moon has used ‘Maori’ adjectivally to define ‘cannibalism’, the phrase is effectively a subject-predicate proposition, namely, that ‘[all] Maori were/are cannibals’ and on that basis is invalid given that ‘Maori’ represents an unenumerated totality. It also fails to take into account the paradox described by George Forster following the on-board experiment at Totaranui on 23 November 1773, discussed later in this chapter, by which Cooked hoped he would determine whether or not Maori were cannibalistic: ‘But it would be absurd to suppose from such circumstances, that killing men for the sake of feasting upon them, has ever been the spirit of a whole nation; because it is utterly incompatible with the existence of society.’\textsuperscript{118} This echoes the numerical paradox described by Las Casas when discussing the purported encounter of Columbus’s second expedition on 8 November 1493 with those believed to be ‘the Caribs of Guadalupe’:

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\textsuperscript{117} Moon, This Horrid Practice, Front cover and title page, 1 passim, 117, 205.
Columbus went ashore and in a house there saw a lot of cotton both woven and ready to be woven, a new kind of loom, and many shrunken heads and human bones that must have been the natives’ loved ones. It is unlikely that they were remnants of people they had eaten for, if they ate human flesh as much as is said, a house would not accommodate all the bones and heads—which there would be no reason to keep anyway, unless as relics of their most famous enemies, and all of this is pure guesswork.119

If we turn to the rear cover of This Horrid Practice, we notice that the quotation—‘Though stronger evidence of this horrid practice prevailing among the inhabitants of this coast will scarcely be required, we have still stronger to give’—is credited to ‘Captain James Cook’.120 The same quotation appears as the book’s epigraph, again credited to Cook.121 The New Zealand Herald reports that ‘This Horrid Practice is the title borrowed from Captain James Cook’s journal entries on the topic [of ‘cannibalism’] during his expeditions here’, while Insight magazine also reports that ‘its title is borrowed from Captain James Cook’s journal entries on the topic during his expeditions here.’122 Moon himself confirmed the provenance of the title during his interview on the student radio station 95bFM, as he did on TV One’s ‘Breakfast’:

Pippa Wetzel: This horrid practice – James Cook, is that right?
Paul Moon: Yes that’s right. It’s a line Cook used when he described witnessing cannibalism in New Zealand.123

Later that morning Moon provided further details concerning the title to TV One’s ‘Good Morning’:

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120 Moon, This Horrid Practice, Back Cover.
121 Moon, This Horrid Practice, 9.
123 Moon on 95bFM – the Wire (5 August 2008); Paul Moon interviewed by Pippa Wetzel, ‘Breakfast’, Television New Zealand, (3 September 2008).
Steve Gray: And the title, a horrid practice, who first used that?
Paul Moon: It was James Cook’s description. He came across several cases of cannibalism when he arrived in New Zealand and he called it a horrid practice, and that’s where we got the title from.124

‘Good Morning’ then used the title as the device by which viewers could enter its competition to win a copy of Moon’s book:

Gray: Professor Moon, it’s an excellent book. Thank you so much for talking to us today. Now we have three copies of Paul’s books to give away. To enter, just tell us who called cannibalism ‘this horrid practice’. Write to the address on-screen or you can also enter online. Just put ‘this horrid practice giveaway’.125

The quote and attribution to Cook also appears on the websites of Google Books and Penguin New Zealand.126 Finally, along with AUT’s Insight, The New Zealand Herald, 95bFM, TV One, Google and Penguin (the list may not be exhaustive), TV3’s Rod Vaughan reported on ‘60 Minutes’ that, ‘Cannibalised remains do feature in the archaeological record of New Zealand, chilling reminders of perhaps the greatest taboo in our history, what Captain Cook called “a horrid practice”’.127

However, despite Moon’s assurance that his primary title belonged to Cook, thereby lending the explorer’s authority to the claim of ‘Maori cannibalism’ in the secondary title—‘possibly the most able captain of his age’, as Moon describes him—neither the phrase, ‘this horrid practice’, nor the sentence from which it is derived are Cook’s.128 The phrase is the literary invention of John Hawkesworth, commissioned by the British Admiralty to prepare Cook’s first-voyage journal for publication, and is found in Hawkesworth’s sentence linking a descriptive passage based on Banks’s

125 Gray, ‘Good Morning’ (3 September 2008).
127 Rod Vaughan, ‘Close to the Bone’, ‘60 Minutes’, TV 3 (7 October 2008).
128 Moon, This Horrid Practice, 64, Front Cover, 11 passim.
journal but which Hawkesworth purports is based on Cook’s journal, to a passage based on Cook’s journal which continues the description found in Banks’s journal.

The passage in Cook’s journal on which Hawkesworth based his sentence reads as follows:

There was not one of us that had the least doubt but what this *people were Canibals* but the finding this Bone with a *small part of the sinews fresh upon it* was a stronger proof than any we had yet met with, and in order to be fully satisfied of the truth of what they had told us, we told one of them that it was not the bone of a man but that of a Dog but he with great fervency took hold of his fore-arm and told us again that it was that bone and to convince us that they had eat the flesh he took hold of the flesh of his own arm with his teeth and made shew of eating.¹²⁹

The passage in Hawkesworth that Moon attributed to Cook, citing ‘J. Cook in J. Hawkesworth’ in an endnote, reads:

Upon enquiry who the man was whose bones we had found, they told us, that about five days before, a boat belonging to their enemies came into the bay, with many persons on board, and that this man was one of seven whom they had killed. Though stronger evidence of this horrid practice prevailing among the inhabitants of this coast will scarcely be required, we have still stronger to give. One of us asked if they had any human bones with the flesh remaining upon them, and upon their answering us that all had been eaten, we affected to disbelieve that the bones were human, and said that they were the bones of a dog; upon which one of the Indians with some eagerness took hold of his own fore-arm, and thrusting it towards us, said, that the bone which Mr. Banks held in his hand had belonged to that part of a human body; at the same time, to convince us that the flesh had been eaten, he took hold of his own arm with his teeth, and made shew of eating.¹³⁰


¹³⁰ Moon, *This Horrid Practice*, 245 n. 41; John Hawkesworth, *An Account of the Voyages Undertaken by the Order of His Present Majesty for Making Discoveries in the Southern Hemisphere, and Successively Performed by Commodore Byron, Captain Carteret, Captain Wallis, and Captain Cook*, in
Thus, although the phrase and sentence are Hawkesworth’s, because they were attributed to Cook by a Professor of History and embraced enthusiastically by the media, the false ascription took on a life of its own. The subject clearly excited Penguin NZ—’This Horrid Practice promises to be one of the leading works of New Zealand history published in 2008. It is a highly original work that every New Zealand history enthusiast will want to own and read’—just as Hawkesworth deployed it, no doubt, in order to excite his anticipated reading public, for, according to John Beaglehole, having received £6000 from Strahan and Cadell for the copyright and £1000 from Banks—compared ‘with the £3400 which Robertson got for his Charles V a few years before, and the £1940 which Hume received for the first two volumes of his History’—Hawkesworth had a considerable investment riding on his shoulders.

It would seem that Moon made his faux attribution without regard to the comments of William Wharton, editor of the first published literal transcription of Cook’s Endeavour journal:

Dr Hawkesworth, into whose hands the Journals were put, not only interspersed reflections of his own, but managed to impose his own ponderous style upon many of the extracts from the united Journals; and, moreover, as they are all jumbled together, the whole being put into Cook’s mouth, it is impossible to know whether we are reading Cook, Banks, Solander, or Hawkesworth himself.


Moon has the title of ’Professor, Treaty and Economic’ on AUT’s staff website where he is also described as ’Professor of History at the Faculty of Maori Development – Te Ara Poutama’: http://www.aut.ac.nz/profiles/te-ara-poutama/professors/paul-moon.


Moon appears not to have heeded Beaglehole either:

Our literary man was not interested in geography or nautical matters; he was interested in making an impression on a public much wider than geographers and sailors. He thought he would make more, and a more immediate, impression on that public if he wrote always in the first person, as a captain, or at least a participant, not a historian. Nevertheless, being a man with some vague leanings towards philosophy and away from the tenets of the Established Church, and with some smattering of classical scholarship, he thought, and stipulated, that he should be free to insert such moral sentiments and general observations as occurred to him on suitable occasions. He deplored the prospect of ‘a naked narrative’. We can now realize that the two requirements were incompatible: having taken Cook straight, we are a little surprised to find him philosophizing on mortality, and even more surprised to find, when he sighted a party of Maori women collecting shellfish, how instantaneously he was reminded of the chaste Diana and her nymphs. . . . The extent of the Cook account is due not merely to the extent of the voyage, but to the use made of Banks. This is quite easily followed; for Hawkesworth, unlike Cook, relied largely on the ‘slab’ technique, and you can go through him with a pencil and tick off at once the Cook paragraphs and the Banks paragraphs.\(^\text{134}\)

While this appears to be an elementary reading or research error, it demonstrates just how easily faulty predication can enter a society’s ‘cultural grammar’ and spread with the speed of a virus when it is in keeping with the ‘values, beliefs, and social relations’ of that society.\(^\text{135}\) It also represents a failure to distinguish between ‘two different sorts of signification: indication and expression.’\(^\text{136}\) That in turn perpetuates the mistaken belief that historiographical meaning, which is always expressed ‘in predicative form’, is derived indicatively from its object, when not only is there ‘no meaning-content present in indication’, the historical object is always already metaphorical and therefore replete with pre-existent meaning.\(^\text{137}\) Hence, the

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\(^{135}\) Hammer, *The Iliad as Politics*, 11-12.


vicious-circle fallacies on which that meaning is based are merely repeated in modified form.

Faced with an evidential deficit, Moon illustrates this problem with an argument based on the fallacy of false dilemma. As he puts it: ‘writing down a first-hand observation of a teenage girl having her head split open, being butchered, and her body parts then cooked and eaten is not easily subject to cultural (mis)interpretations. The researcher is left with just two options in these cases: either the authors of accounts such as this were liars, or they were correct and their descriptions can be used as part of the general body of evidence on cannibalism.’ The problem with relying on the either/or of _tertium non datur_ is that it forecloses on other possibilities concerning this story, which may be many given that its teller, a fellow trader called Anscow ‘afterwards’ sailed to ‘the Figi group’, where, according to Joel Polack, his ‘fate was equally as unfortunate as that of the poor slave’: he was ‘killed, and his body devoured by the natives, who are the most determined sarcophagi in existence.’ Fortunately for Moon, Polack did not share that fate and thus becomes one of the early New Zealand writers on whom he relies for proof of ‘Maori cannibalism’ and whom he describes in glowing terms: ‘Polack was a dispassionate observer of Maori society, and of all the traders, settlers, missionaries and explorers of his age who wrote about New Zealand, his books on the country are among the most temperate and representative.’ Polack expressed some of those ‘dispassionate’ observations at the beginning of his second volume of _New Zealand_ (1838), just prior to recounting the slave girl story:

The existence of cannibalism among the New Zealanders, few persons will be disposed to doubt at the present day.

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138 Moon, _This Horrid Practice_, 235-6. The story in question is recounted at pages 106-7 of _This Horrid Practice_ and also used in Paul Moon, _Fatal Frontiers: A New History of New Zealand in the Decade before the Treaty_ (Auckland: Penguin, 2006), 21. For the purported hearsay incident see J. S. Polack, _New Zealand: Being a Narrative of Travels and Adventures During a Residence in that Country Between the Years 1831 and 1837 Volume II_ (London: Bentley, 1838), 5-7.
139 Polack, _New Zealand: Volume II_, 7-8.
140 Moon, _This Horrid Practice_, 11 _passim_, 106.
Not a single traveller, however tenacious towards a contrary opinion he might previously have been inclined, ever left the country, without the certain assurance, whether from witnessing the horrid repast, or seeing only vestiges, of the prevalence of these savage enormities so repugnant to the feelings of civilised man.141

_The Athenaeum_, however, would not have shared Moon’s confidence, for when it reviewed _New Zealand_ in 1838 it did not describe it as ‘temperate’ but its ‘language’ as ‘occasionally extremely ambitious’, and Polack as someone who ‘coins words with a boldness which will scare not a few of his readers. He talks of hederaceous, ocrementous, and tophaceous soils; of volitary birds, subsultive fishes,—nay, he rivals the inimitable Mrs. Malaprop herself; and describes a native chief “who squinted with an _obloquy_ of vision, little short of caricature.”142 Furthermore, in _The Athenaeum’s_ review of his _Manners and Customs of the New Zealanders_ (1840), its editor reported as follows:

Now, the reader will be gratified to learn, that we were present when . . . Mr Polack [was ‘pressed’] to state distinctly whether he had ever had ocular testimony of the fact of cannibalism; and . . . protesting his deep conviction of the existence of the usage, was, nevertheless, compelled to acknowledge, that he never saw a human being killed and eaten; that he could say nothing as to the existence of cannibal rites from his own knowledge; and that his belief rested altogether on hearsay evidence and presumptions.143

Despite the scepticism of Polack’s peers and his apparent acknowledgement that his accounts of cannibalism were not based on his personal observations, Moon referenced the Anscow/Polack slave girl story while promoting _Fatal Frontiers_ (2006) on ‘Close Up’, a current affairs programme broadcast by TV One. The

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141 Moon, _This Horrid Practice_, 106; Polack, _New Zealand: Volume II_, 1-2.
142 Moon, _This Horrid Practice_, 106; Editor, ‘_New Zealand. By J. S. Polack, Esq._ 2 vols’, _The Athenaeum_, 564 (18 August 1838), 582.
143 Editor, ‘_Manners and Customs of the New Zealanders. By J. S. Polack, Esq._ 2 vols’, _Athenaeum_, 650 (11 April 1840), 288; J. S. Polack, _Manners and Customs of the New Zealanders: With Notes Corroborative of their Habits, Usages, etc., and Remarks to Intending Emigrants, with Numerous Cuts Drawn on Wood: Volumes I and II_ (London: J. Madden, 1840).
delineation between savage and civilized, marked by the Treaty, could not have been made clearer by the state-owned broadcaster:

Susan Wood (host): Cannibalism, betrayal, torture. No, it is not Hollywood. It is our history laid out in a new book. Dr Paul Moon is a Treaty of Waitangi expert at Auckland University of Technology, and in the book, Fatal Frontiers, he’s laid bare what was going on in New Zealand right before the Treaty was signed. It is a tale of a violent, inhospitable place barely recognisable today, and we do want to warn you that some of the descriptions in this story from Brian Seymour are graphic.

[...]

Brian Seymour: Those who did come here were confronted with a lawless land and 100,000 indigenous Maori, well organised and armed. A trader named Joel Polack described this incident in the Hokianga region with his friend Anscow.

Cut to Moon reading from Fatal Frontiers:

Paul Moon: Anscow had not been long seated, when an interesting slave girl arrived, apparently about fifteen years of age, and remarkably handsome. Her approach was no sooner discovered, than an old decrepid chief woman hobbled forth from her hut, and made use of the most vehement language to the girl, who it appeared had absented herself without leave for two days. After the old crone had vented forth her objurgations, she was unable to continue through exhaustion, she turned to a ferocious looking fellow who was standing by her, and desired him to kill the girl immediately. The ruffian did not wait for a repetition of the request, but ran to the boat, and seizing one of the tomahawks, which had been brought for barter, he struck the miserable girl with a blow to the forehead with the implement that cleft her head in twain.

Seymour (voice over): What happened next is too graphic and gruesome to broadcast [despite the too-graphic-and-gruesome-to-broadcast appearing on-screen as background text].

Moon: And of course the European observer who saw this was shocked. Um... he couldn’t believe that this sort of thing could happen. Um... but for the community itself it was
obviously commonplace. No one made much of a fuss about it. No one really raised an eyebrow. It was just something that they were perhaps used to.

Seymour: If you have never heard a graphic account of cannibalism like this in history class you're not alone.

Moon: Some historians in this country have been fairly, not apologetic, but they've been fairly sensitive to certain issues, and they've tried not to upset people, and they sort of avert their gaze when they come across any accounts of cannibalism. Um . . . I've got no sensitivity whatsoever. So, as far as I'm concerned, if it happened there's an obligation to the reader to explain this, and say this is what happened. Um . . . and if people get upset by it, well then that's something for them to deal with.

[...] Moon: The comment I often get is people tend to say I don't like New Zealand history, it's boring. And I can understand why they say that because there are enough boring books out there to confirm it. But, look, if they read something like this they'll find that it's probably one of the most surprising, shocking histories in the world. And it really does cause you to sit up and pay attention.

Seymour: Do you worry that you'll be accused of sensationalising things that aren't really aren't that prominent or important just to grab your audience?

Moon: Everything is referenced. Everything is fully researched. Everything is presented very professionally. I have other people who go over the manuscripts to confirm things. So there's absolutely no problem with the evidence. Um . . . if people are unhappy about it, they've got to perhaps examine themselves, not me.144

Two years later, while promoting This Horrid Practice on Radio New Zealand and simultaneously presenting himself as an intrepid seeker of truth in an area others have feared to tread, Moon referred to the same purported incident.

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Chris Laidlaw (Interviewer): There seems to have been a mixture of ritualised behaviour around it, and sort of everyday let's just get on with it—make the fire and throw 'em on.

Paul Moon: Yep. The ritualised part of it was fairly slender. I think that after battles people were eaten, they were cooked and eaten fairly hastily. Um . . . but there are a number of episodes again, as you say, fairly casual. There was one case where a girl had walked off from a village for a couple of days, probably thirteen or fourteen years old. She came back. An elderly woman in the community told her off, was very angry at the girl for walking off, then called a man to come over, and the man came over and she gave some instructions to the man. He then hit the girl on the head, cut her head open, and, um, within half an hour they had chopped her up and were preparing to cook her. And this is something that was witnessed by some Europeans.

Laidlaw: Yeah.

Moon: So that's a fairly casual example. Not much ritual involved at all.145

It was during this interview that Moon revealed inadvertently that he might not have been adhering quite as closely as he should to 'a guiding principle' of his book—to emphasise the 'Truth, naked unblushing truth':146

Laidlaw: What was your overall objective in writing this book?

Moon: Well, it initially started because cannibalism has been the one subject in New Zealand history that has been effectively fenced off. It's almost as though there's an unspoken consensus among historians and others that that topic is out of bounds. So I was keen to investigate it, and I was also concerned about the growing importance of the revisionist movement when it comes to looking at issues related to traditional cannibalism.

Laidlaw: Well let's deal with the first one first. I mean, why has it been a taboo? There has been very little written, very little analysis of it. Is it really just squeamishness? Is it a sense of shame that this could have happened in our lovely country? What is it?

146 Moon, This Horrid Practice, 16.
Moon: I don’t think so. There’s any number of books about wars and so forth that have happened, so I don’t think it’ll be squeamishness. I know one fairly prominent academic—and I won’t name him—chatted to me early on in the stages when I was writing the book and he said, look, this is going to ruin your career.

Laidlaw: Really?

Moon: Yes. And I thought that was an odd comment. I didn’t think it was much of a career worth having if you can’t address these things. I think there’s a lot of political sensitivity around the topic.

Laidlaw: Ah-huh.

Moon: And that’s one of the reasons people have chosen not to address it. If you look at Keith Sinclair’s *History of New Zealand*, I think he devoted all of one sentence to cannibalism.

Laidlaw: Yes, yes.

Moon: Michael King of course didn’t even mention it in his history of New Zealand. So it’s slowly being pruned out of our sense of the past.¹⁴⁷

The last is a claim Moon makes in *This Horrid Practice*: ‘Michael King’s single-volume history of New Zealand, along with that of Philippa Mein Smith, adopted an even more dismissive method in which Maori cannibalism – such a pronounced feature of the culture – was circumvented altogether.’¹⁴⁸ Given that Mein Smith refers directly to ‘kai-tangata (cannibalism)’ in *A Concise History of New Zealand*, and King, while not listing cannibalism in his index, refers to it on eight separate occasions in *The Penguin History of New Zealand*, it seems that Moon may have read only the indexes of the New Zealand history books on which he relied to promote his intellectual

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¹⁴⁷ Moon and Laidlaw, ‘Cannibalism – This Horrid Practice’.
¹⁴⁸ Moon, *This Horrid Practice*, 14.
bravery.\textsuperscript{149} That a publisher of Penguin’s reputation failed to find the elementary error when it had published King’s bestseller just five years earlier, may be explained, perhaps, by its significant investment in the promotion and incessant making over of settler New Zealand.

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\textsuperscript{149} Philippa Mein Smith, \textit{A Concise History of New Zealand}, 2\textsuperscript{nd} edn (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012, first published 2005), 35; King, \textit{The Penguin History of New Zealand}, 35, 87, 97, 106, 108, 132, 134-5, 180. The following are the excerpted references to cannibalism:

Page 35: ‘Other oral tradition speak of disagreements and warfare among kin, of sons who failed to inherit land or status, even of cannibalism, propelling island settlers into the role of their forebears, that of island migrants.’

Page 87: ‘As Maori oral tradition recorded, and ancient burials have confirmed, elderly people, women and children, along with defeated male warriors, were periodic subjects for torture, killing and cannibalism.’

Page 97: ‘The body of one dead crewman was taken ashore by Maori, possibly to be cooked and eaten, a ritual means of absorbing the mana of a vanquished foe (‘the first of many European imports consumed in New Zealand was a dead Dutchman’, James Belich would write).’

Page 106: ‘There were misunderstandings, and there were further shootings; and in 1773 ten crew members of the \textit{Adventure}, the vessel accompanying Cook’s ship \textit{Resolution}, were killed and eaten at Grass Cove on Arapawa island in Queen Charlotte Sound. When Cook learned of the episode and returned to the Sound on his third voyage, he did not respond punitively, believing that the cannibalised men may themselves have acted provocatively.’

Page 108: ‘Cook’s view of Maori, in turn, was that they were “of a Brave, Noble, Open and benevolent disposition….” Like his crew, Anne Salmond notes, Cook was affected by his encounters with Maori, “surprised [by their] sexuality, infuriated by their attitudes to property, and shocked by….cannibalism”’.

Page 132: ‘The experience of Ngati Korokoro was probably typical. Not long after the Moremonui action, 300 of them attacked Kai Tutae,* like themselves a hapu of Te Rarawa ki Hokianga.*Footnote: ‘The name means ‘eaters of excrement’. It originated in an assertive chant in which members of the tribe warned their adversaries that when they defeated them they would eat every last morsel of the dead, “including their tutae”. Ritual cannibalism was known as whangai hau – destroying the mana of the victim and thus leaning their kinsfolk without ancestral protection.’

Pages 134-5: ‘Indeed, if any chapter in New Zealand history has earned the label “holocaust”, it is this one [the Musket Wars]…. Some small tribes were all but wiped out. With only one or two families surviving the fighting and its aftermath of executions. Some of these actions involved considerable cruelty. In the wake of battles, for example, the captured killers of warriors might be turned over to the widows of the men they had slain, as happened to Tamiaiharanui of Ngati Tahu. The resulting deaths were prolonged and painful. At Waitangi Beach on Chatham Island, the Ngati Wai hapu of Ngati Mutunga laid Moriori women staked to the ground alongside one another and left them to die slowly. Instances of gratuitous cruelty were certainly not universal. Maori probably had the same percentage of sadists and psychopaths as any other society. The fortunate victims were those who died quickly, even if they were then chosen for the ritual cannibal feasting that was believed to absorb the man of the defeated. To outside witnesses, such as missionaries, these actions were profoundly shocking. To most of the Maori combatants, they were simply the tikanga of customs associated with fighting. Whether you won or lost, you knew what your expected role or fate would be. And you knew the truth of the whakatauki or proverbs that enshrined the values pertaining to war: “Kia mate ururoa, kei mate wheke” (it is better to fight and die like a shark than an octopus), for example. But there are recorded instances of captives committing suicide or killing their loved ones rather than allowing themselves to be subjected to the customs associated with victory.’

Page 180: ‘Maori oratory of those years began to employ proverbs about the power of salt-water to contaminate freshwater (a nice metaphor, this, because Pakeha flesh was reputed to taste more salty than Maori), and the propensity of the kahawai for devouring the mullet.’
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The History Group’s Gavin McLean, whose ‘butcher’s bill’ we discussed in Chapter Four, notes in his review of *This Horrid Practice*, in response to Moon’s charge ‘that cannibalism is often written out of the historical record’, that *Frontier of Dreams*, which he co-edited, ‘makes six references to cannibalism’ in its index whereas ‘Michael King’s *Penguin History of New Zealand* gives it just one-and-a-half lines’, thereby not only indicating inadvertently why his ‘butcher’s bill’ does not add up but also just how closely savagism is tied to settler ideology and motivates settler discourse.\(^{150}\) As well, in the examples that follow, which, it should be said, lack the scrupulousness that marks much scholarly history writing in New Zealand (but which in turn helps to disguise its self-referentiality), both the fake performativity of historical discourse and the author’s inability to reach beyond the text become abundantly apparent.

While accusing New Zealand historians of sins of omission, Moon had apparently been busy adding a few of his own, for we find at Chapter 9, ‘Cook’s First Visit’, that Moon has not just read Cook and Hawkesworth’s versions of the same incident from which he derived the title of his book as two separate incidents, but by including Banks and Parkinson’s versions in his analysis, he appears to have treated the four versions of the one incident as four separate incidents, claiming in the process, that ‘this triumvirate—Cook, Banks and Parkinson—produced the first written records of Maori cannibalism.’\(^{151}\) The strength of this truth-claim should not surprise given that this is arguably Moon’s pivotal chapter in the prosecution of his case against Maori for the crime of cannibalism, a prosecution made evident by his extensive use of legal language: ‘Standards of Evidence’ (Chapter 5 title); ‘oral evidence’; ‘circumstantial evidence’; ‘eye-witness account’; ‘strongest evidence’; ‘mitigation’;

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\(^{151}\) Moon, *This Horrid Practice*, 65.
'grisly proof'; 'forensic evidence'; 'stronger evidence'; 'trail of evidence'; 'testimony and physical evidence'; 'oral testimony'; 'archaeological evidence'; 'monument of evidence'; 'Case Closed' (Chapter 21 title); 'witnessing'; 'The Autopsy' (Chapter 30 title); 'evidence'; 'The Cannibal Conspiracy' (Chapter 42 title); 'Dual Standards of Evidence' (Chapter 45); 'Proof Positive' (Conclusion title).152

Briefly, the three journal entries and Hawkesworth’s account refer to the sighting of a woman’s body floating in the water, and, variously, sightings onshore of ‘many provision baskets’ in one of which two human bones were ‘by accident observd’ (purportedly those of a deceased enemy male), and a demonstration by one of ‘the Indians’, a male, using his own arm, that the flesh off one of the bones had been consumed.153

The first account of the incident Moon presents is that recorded in Cook’s journal for 17 January 1770. Following his partial repeating of this entry, Moon writes: ‘Two days later, Cook noted that the circumstantial evidence was becoming more compelling’: ‘In the PM some of our people found in the skirts of the Wood three hip bones of Men, they lay near to a hole or hoven, that is a place where the natives dress their Victuals, this circumstance trifling as it is, is still a farther prof that this people eat human flesh’.154 However, as Moon also notes: ‘This was still not a direct eye-witness account of Maori eating human flesh.’155

152 Moon, This Horrid Practice, 50 passim, 57 passim, 67, 70, 71, 82, 117 passim, 172 passim, 215, 226, 233 passim.
155 Moon, This Horrid Practice, 67.
The next version of the incident discussed by Moon is Hawkesworth’s. It is shown in the National Library of Australia’s online version as having taken place on 16 January 1770. The earlier date of one day may be accounted for by Cook’s use of ship’s time by which the ship’s day begins at noon (midday) of the day in civil time which in turn has begun twelve hours earlier at midnight, making the afternoon of the 16th for Banks (and Hawkesworth) the morning of the 17th for Cook. This may be confirmed by comparing Cook and Banks’s respective journal entries concerning the woman’s body found floating in the water—Cook’s records it as occurring at the beginning of his entry and the ship’s day for the 17th, which begins at noon or midday and therefore is shown as ‘PM’. This also corresponds with the afternoon and second half of Banks’s entry for the 16th which begins, ‘After dinner we went in the boat towards a cove’; and the occurrences described in Cook’s ‘AM’ of the 17th, which is the period midnight to noon of the 18th of Banks’s civil time, correspond with those described by Banks for his morning of the 17th. However, despite the

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157 Hawkesworth, *An Account of the Voyages Undertaken*, 388-9: http://southseas.nla.gov.au/journals/hv23/388.html and http://southseas.nla.gov.au/journals/hv23/389.html. Cook explained the difference between ship’s time and civil time while at anchor at Georges Island (Tahiti), on 13 April 1769, as follows: ‘The way of reckoning the Day in Sea Journals is from Noon to Noon, but as the Most material transactions at this Island must happen in the Day time this method will be attended with inconveniences in inserting the transactions of each Day; for this reason I shall during our stay at this Island but no longer reckon the day according to the civil account, that is to begin and end at midnight. Cook, *The Journals of Captain James Cook on His Voyages of Discovery: Volume I*, 74: http://southseas.nla.gov.au/journals/cook/17690413.html.
158 Cook, *James Cook’s Journal of Remarkable Occurrences aboard His Majesty’s Bark Endeavour*, 1768-1771: http://southseas.nla.gov.au/journals/cook/17700117.html. See also: Cook, *The Journals of Captain James Cook on His Voyages of Discovery: Volume I*, 235-7; Cook, *Captain Cook’s Journey During His First Voyage Round the World Made in H. M. Bark “Endeavour” 1768-71: A Literal Transcription of the Original Mss., Wharton ed., 183-4; Banks, *The Endeavour Journal of Joseph Banks*, 1768-1771: Volume I, 454: http://southseas.nla.gov.au/journals/banks/17700116.html. Thus, because the Endeavour had by January 1770 ‘passed the 180th meridian of longitude, requiring a customary change in dates’ which Cook did not make until ‘he reached Batavia on 10-11 October 1770’, all of his journal dates between 6 October 1769 and 9 October 1770, entered on the basis of astronomical (ship’s) time, which ‘begins at noon after the midnight when the normal day begins and is therefore a day later than the ship’s day’ or civil time, Cook’s journals ‘are out by one day’ for that period. See Anonymous, *Cook’s Endeavour Journal: The Inside Story* (Canberra: National Library of Australia, 2008), 5.
journal entries made by Cook and Banks describing the same set of events, Moon presents Hawkesworth’s account as another ‘journey Cook took with Banks’, for he describes the Hawkesworth ‘extract’ as representing ‘one of the most compelling examples of the proof of Maori cannibalism obtained during the Endeavour’s journey around New Zealand to this time’, despite the same incident as recited by Cook and repeated in full by Moon immediately beforehand as counting only as ‘circumstantial evidence’ of the purported practice.159 Admittedly, Hawkesworth facilitates misunderstanding by writing—‘After dinner, I went in the pinnace with Mr. Banks, Dr. Solander, Tupia, and some others, into another cove, about two miles distant from that in which the ship lay’—in which the ‘I’ belongs not to Cook but Banks.160 The section of Banks’s journal dated 16 January 1770 on which Hawkesworth based that part of his text begins with the following sentence: ‘After dinner we went in the boat towards a cove about a mile from the ship’, Hawkesworth, therefore, having put Banks’s words into Cook’s mouth.161

After referencing Banks’s ruminations on the topic of cannibalism among ‘the Indians’ from when they first arrived in New Zealand, an extract from Banks’s journal entry of 1 December 1769, Moon then quotes at length from Banks’s journal entry of 16 January 1770, thereby utilising for a third time within four pages the same incident Cook wrote about in his journal entry of 17 January 1770.162 However, although having provided only ‘circumstantial evidence’ for Cook, the same incident transmogrifies for Moon four pages later into ‘grisly proof’, and by the end of the passage, into courtroom evidence: ‘Here, for the first time, forensic

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159 Moon, This Horrid Practice, 67.
160 Hawkesworth, An Account of the Voyages Undertaken, 388: 
161 Banks, The Endeavour Journal of Joseph Banks 1768-1771: Volume I, 454: 
evidence – of a compelling nature – is pointed to as direct confirmation of cannibal activity.’\textsuperscript{163}

Problematically for Moon, however, neither Cook nor Banks, like Columbus and Chanca before them, even claimed to have witnessed the cultural practice of cannibalism. Thus Moon calls his third star witness to the stand, the artist Sydney Parkinson, explaining his significance as follows: ‘Banks was seldom alone when in the field making his observations of Maori society. On one occasion, in February 1770, he was accompanied in a short expedition by Parkinson. The latter also had a keen artist’s eye for detail, and drew his own conclusions about the possibility of Maori being cannibals, based on the discovery of recently cooked human bones and supported by the testimony of local Maori’.\textsuperscript{164} Importantly, Moon’s description of Parkinson’s credentials immediately precedes his verbatim presentation of Parkinson’s textual collage of several interchanges with the ‘CANNIBALS’ over the period 15-31 January 1770.\textsuperscript{165} We also know from Cook and Banks’s description of the same incident with which Parkinson begins his collage, that it occurred on 17 January 1770 according to Cook’s journal and on 16 January 1770 according to Banks’s journal, and therefore could not have occurred ‘in February 1770’ as Moon claims.\textsuperscript{166} Thus, given that Parkinson’s description of the incident corresponds with Cook’s, Banks’s and Hawkesworth’s, given that Parkinson recorded it in his journal in the second half of January 1770 and not in February 1770, given that ‘Parkinson’s final words on the subject’, as Moon describes them—‘These cannibals told us, that the people, who belonged to those they had slain and eaten, were coming to them, over the hills, to kill them the next day, but it proved a false alarm’—occur immediately prior to Parkinson’s entry for the 1\textsuperscript{st} of February 1770, given that Parkinson does not record making ‘a short expedition’ between then and the 7\textsuperscript{th} of

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\footnote{Moon, \textit{This Horrid Practice}, 67,70-1.}
\footnote{Moon, \textit{This Horrid Practice}, 74.}
\footnote{Moon, \textit{This Horrid Practice}, 74.}
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February 1770 when the *Endeavour* departed Queen Charlotte Sound, and given that Banks records making only one trip to shore, on 5 February, with ‘the D’ (Solander), ‘to wind up our bottoms’ (i.e., to conclude business or to “clean up”), it would seem that Moon’s claim of ‘a short expedition’ by Parkinson and Banks in February and his fourth retelling of the singular incident of 17/16 January 1770 as a fourth occurrence, are either elementary errors or an altering of the source-document chronology to support his sensationalist claim that ‘Parkinson happened to be the first person to write down how, in this relentless cycle of revenge, the digestion of enemies was a prominent feature in the menu of terror that one Maori community could inflict on another’.

For not only is Moon’s truth-claim viciously circular, it is also incompatible with a stable population of perhaps 90,000-100,000 and with Moon’s own view that Maori were ‘generally in good health and well nourished’, free from serious disease and therefore ‘physically in even better condition than their European counterparts’ at the time of encounter.

Further errors with or manipulations of what Moon calls ‘the evidence’, are also apparent at Chapter 13, ‘The Experiment’. In this chapter, Moon’s discusses the incident recorded in various journals as occurring at Totaranui on 23 November 1773, in which Richard Pickersgill, formerly Master’s mate on the *Endeavour* then Third lieutenant on the *Resolution*, purchased for one or ‘two nails’ the skull of a deceased ‘youth who had lately been killed’, and from which Charles Clerke, the Second lieutenant, cut a piece of flesh when it was brought on board, which, according to his account, he broiled and gave it to eat to one of the ‘New Zealanders’

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168 Moon, *This Horrid Practice*, 132.

169 Moon, *This Horrid Practice*, 16 passim and 86-8.
who had returned with three or four crewmen to the ship.\footnote{Cook, \textit{The Journals of Captain Cook on His Voyages of Discovery, Volume II}, 292-3, 292 n. 4, 293 n. 2; William Wales, ‘Wales’s Journal’, \textit{Cook, The Journals of Captain Cook on His Voyages of Discovery, Volume II}, 818-9; Richard Pickersgill, \textit{The Journal of Richard Pickersgill}, John Elliott and Richard Pickersgill, \textit{Captain Cook’s Second Voyage: The Journals of Lieutenants Elliott and Pickersgill}, Christine Holmes ed. (Dover: Caliban Books, 1984), 22; Forster, \textit{A Voyage Round the World: Volume I}, 276-82.} Cook, according to his journal, of which, as Beaglehole notes, he was ‘writing . . . more or less simultaneously—three different copies or versions’, asked for the experiment to be repeated when he came onboard a short while later in order to be ‘an eye witness to a fact which many people had their doubts about’.\footnote{James Cook (John Douglas), \textit{A Voyage Towards the South Pole, and Round the World. Performed in His Majesty’s Ships the Resolution and Adventure, in the Years 1772, 1773, 1774, and 1775. Written by James Cook, Commander of the Resolution. In which is included, Captain Furneaux’s Narrative of his Proceedings in the Adventure during the Separation of the Ships. In Two Volumes: Volume I} (London: Printed for W. Strahan and T. Cadell, 1777) (hereinafter called \textit{A Voyage Towards the South Pole, London, 1777}), 243-6; James Cook (John Douglas), \textit{A Voyage Towards the South Pole, and Round the World. Performed in His Majesty’s Ships the Resolution and Adventure, in the Years 1772, 1773, 1774, and 1775. Written by James Cook, Commander of the Resolution. In which is included, Captain Furneaux’s Narrative of his Proceedings in the Adventure during the Separation of the Ships. In Two Volumes: Volume I} (Dublin: Printed for J. Williams, L. White, W. Wilson, C. Jenkin, P. Byrne, and R.} For when we examine Moon’s lengthy quote from \textit{Cook’s A Voyage Towards the South Pole} (1777), which was not written by Cook but by John Douglas, Canon of Windsor and St Paul’s, who, like Hawkesworth before him, had been contracted by the Admiralty to prepare Cook’s journals for publication, and which takes up approximately half of Moon’s Chapter 13, ‘The Experiment’, we find that a large portion of text has been redacted by Moon without an ellipsis.\footnote{Forster, \textit{A Voyage Round the World: Volume I}, 276.} The redacted portion of the text includes the
following two sentences: ‘That the New Zealanders are cannibals, can now no longer
be doubted. The account given of this in my former Voyage, being partly founded on
circumstances, was, as I afterwards understood, discredited by many persons.’

Significantly, Moon, as well as Salmond, expresses reservations about the evidential
value of the “experiment”. Salmond reads it as a case of mutual mocking—
[Clerke’s] parody of a scientific experiment mocked both scientists and cannibals;
while in their finger-licking responses, Maori were mocking both European and
Hitihiti, the young Polynesian—and Moon as an ‘entirely manufactured setting’:
The dubious scientific justification of the ‘experiment’ was appended almost as an
afterthought to add some propriety to an otherwise wholly unacceptable
incident.’ In other words, the experiment on which Cook relied to remove any
doubt that ‘the New Zealanders’ were ‘cannibals’ did not achieve that end, at least
not for Moon and Salmond.

We should not let pass that Beaglehole made the following comment concerning
that section of the quotation which begins in Cook (Douglas) ‘where one of these
cannibals eat it with surprising avidity’ but in Beaglehole’s Cook ‘where one of these
Canibals eat it with a seeming good relish’: ‘The foregoing passage, from “a seeming
good relish”, is one that Cook worked over in B, f. 150, a great deal, presumably to
get the greatest possible dramatic effect. The page is a mass of correction and

Burton, 1777) (hereinafter called A Voyage Towards the South Pole, Dublin 1784), 240-3; Moon, This
Horrid Practice, 87-8. The portion redacted at page 88 after ‘every rational being’ and before ‘If I
remember right’ in Moon, commences in Cook (Douglas), A Voyage Towards the South Pole at 244
with ‘I was not able to find out the reason’ . . . and continues to ‘as they expect to be treated’ at the top
of 246. The four pages of Chapter 13 of This Horrid Practice are comprised of a total of 97 lines, 51 of
which, slightly indented, are from the Cook (Douglas), A Voyage Towards the South Pole, 17 of which
contain other quotations, and 29 of which are of Moon’s own writing.

173 Cook (Douglas), A Voyage Towards the South Pole, London, 1777, 245; Cook (Douglas), A Voyage
Towards the South Pole, Dublin, 1784, 242. The version of this sentence as found in Beaglehole’s
edited version of Cook’s journal reads: ‘That the New Zealanders are Canibals can now no longer be
doubted, the account I gave of it on my former Voyage was partly founded on circumstances and was,
I afterwards found, discredited by many people’ (Cook, The Journals of Captain Cook on His Voyages of
Discovery, Volume II, 294).
174 Salmond, The Trial of the Cannibal Dog, 223; Moon, This Horrid Practice, 87.
175 Salmond, The Trial of the Cannibal Dog, 223; Moon, This Horrid Practice, 88, 87.
176 Cook (Douglas), A Voyage Towards the South Pole, London, 1777, 245; Cook, The Journals of
Captain Cook on His Voyages of Discovery, Volume II, 294.
rewriting, including the final red ink.'177 We should also note that final paragraph of the Cook (Douglas) quote Moon used at Chapter 13 to describe the ‘experiment’ and in which the term ‘this horrid custom’ appears—‘Among many reasons . . . this kind of food’—was not included in Cook’s original journal of his second voyage but was inserted subsequently.178 Beaglehole had this to say about the inserted passage: ‘B f. 151 is a separate slip of paper, which, though it is similar to the paper of the rest of the journal, from the ink and the writing appears to be an afterthought, probably added in England when Cook was preparing the journal for publication.’179 Thus it would seem that although ‘Cook did not think highly of the [Hawkesworth] volumes on any score’, that he and/or Douglas thought well enough of Hawkesworth’s literary invention, ‘this horrid practice’, to use a variation of it, ‘this horrid custom’, in the reworked journal of his second voyage.180

Perhaps the real answer as to why Moon redacted the passage including Cook’s explanation for his ordering of a repeat of the “experiment” can be found in the concluding paragraph to Chapter 13 in which he appears to have misrepresented the chronological order of his source documents again. That paragraph includes an extraction from the Cook/Douglas account that begins with ‘Some of the officers’

178 Moon, This Horrid Practice, 87, 88; Cook (Douglas), A Voyage Towards the South Pole, London, 1777, 246; Cook (Douglas), A Voyage Towards the South Pole, Dublin, 1784, 243.
179 John Beaglehole, in Cook (Beaglehole, ed.), The Journals of Captain Cook on His Voyages of Discovery, Volume II: The Voyage of the Resolution and Adventure 1772-1775, 295, n. 2. The remainder of the footnote states: ‘It is keyed to a red cross at “when Oediddee and several of our people shewed . . . laughed at them”. It runs as follows: “Among many reasons which I have heard assigned for the practice of this horrid custom, the want of animal food has been one; but how far this is deductible from either facts or circumstances, I shall leave those to find out who advanced it, as [in] every part of New Zealand which I have been in, Fish have been found in such plenty that the Natives have generally caught as much as served both themselves and us; they have also plenty of Dogs, nor is there any want of wild fowl, which they know very well how to kill. So that neither this nor the want of food of any kind, can in my opinion, be the reason, but whatever m[a]ly be it, I think it was but too evident that they have a great liking for this kind of food.’
and ends with ‘were the spoils of their enemies.’\textsuperscript{181} This particular passage, however, occurs on the page before the lengthy passage Moon excerpted from the Cook/Douglas account to describe the on-board experiment but which he has placed immediately after it in his final paragraph to Chapter 13, adding that it occurred ‘two days after’ the on-board experiment:

Two days after this event, Cook received a further set of accounts of cannibal activity from a number of his crew. This time, instead of the evidence being examined in an entirely manufactured setting, the sailors came across confirmation that human flesh was being consumed in a Maori settlement. It was hardly a contrived scene, because had it not been for the inquisitiveness of the crew it would never have been discovered. That evening, Cook jotted down what had transpired: ‘Some of the officers visiting them [local Maori] at their habitations, saw, among them, some human thigh-bones, from which the flesh had been but lately picked. This, and other circumstances, led us to believe that the people, whom we took for strangers this morning, were of the same tribe; that they had been out on some war expedition; and that the things they sold us, were the spoils of their enemies.’\textsuperscript{182}

That event, however, began not just two pages earlier in Moon’s cited version of the Cook/Douglas publication but on the previous day, 22 November 1773, according to Cook’s journal, not ‘two days after’ the onboard “experiment” as Moon has it, and therefore could not have been sufficient to convince Cook if he still required convincing the following day.\textsuperscript{183} Furthermore, the occurrence that Moon states

\textsuperscript{181} Cook (Douglas), A Voyage Towards the South Pole, London, 1777, 241-2; Cook (Douglas), A Voyage Towards the South Pole, Dublin, 1784, 238.
\textsuperscript{182} Moon, This Horrid Practice, 88; Cook (Douglas), A Voyage Towards the South Pole, London, 1777, 241-2; Cook (Douglas), A Voyage Towards the South Pole, Dublin, 1784, 238. The original version of the section ‘Some of the officers … their enemies’ excerpted from Cook’s original journal reads as follows, including the footnoted portion in square brackets, which is understood by the author to be an addition from MSS 27888 not in MSS 27886 on which Beaglehole has relied ‘as the main part of the text’: ‘Some of our gentlemen having made them a visit at their habitations and got from them some thigh bones the meat of which had been lately picked off, the gentlemen had reason to believe that at this time they had some human flesh by them. I am of opinion that those men whom we took to be strangers are of the same tribe or family and have been out on some war expedition, [and those things they sold us were the spoils of their Enemies.]’ See Cook, The Journals of Captain Cook on His Voyages of Discovery, Volume II, 291, 291 n. 2 and Beaglehole, ‘Textual Introduction’, Cook, The Journals of Captain Cook on His Voyages of Discovery, Volume II, cxv, cxviii.
\textsuperscript{183} Moon, This Horrid Practice, 88; Cook, The Journals of Captain Cook on His Voyages of Discovery, Volume II, 291; Cook (Douglas), A Voyage Towards the South Pole, London, 177, 241-2; Cook (Douglas), A Voyage Towards the South Pole, Dublin, 1784, 238-9. In the Cook (Douglas) London 1777
occurred ‘two days after’ the onboard “experiment” and which he claims left no
doubt as to ‘the fact of cannibalism taking place’, could not have taken place on 25
November 1773 according to the source he quotes, uncharacteristically without a
page reference number for either of his two endnotes citing his source, because all
three sources—the Cook/Douglas version published in London in 1777 (Moon’s
source), the Cook/Douglas version published in Dublin in 1784, and Beaglehole’s
Cook published in 1959—have Cook weighing anchor and leaving Queen Charlotte
Sound (Totaranui) on the day, 25 November 1773, Moon claims ‘a number of his
crew’ were visiting ‘a Maori settlement’ and finding evidence ‘of cannibalism taking
place.’ In other words, what Moon has done is to redact a large portion of the
Cook (Douglas) entry for 23 November which includes Cook’s comment, on the basis
of the “experiment”, ‘that the New Zealanders are cannibals, can now no longer be
doubted’, and brought forward an occurrence, which clearly had not convinced Cook
of the practice (otherwise he would not have needed convincing the following day),
placing it two days after the “experiment” as if it had convinced Cook.185

While there are other instances of dubious predication to which we could turn,
including Chapter 27, erroneously entitled ‘In the blood’, in which Moon makes the
improbable suggestion that pre-European Maori’s propensity for cannibalism was
transmitted epigenetically—‘Maori society . . . seemed doomed to experience
cannibalism like some genetic curse’—we will conclude with a brief examination of
what is arguably Moon’s largest truth-claim, made in Chapter 28, under the rubric
‘Emotional Insensitivity or Moral Transgression?’: ‘Cannibalism was certainly

184 Moon, This Horrid Practice, 88, 248 n. 89 and n. 88; Cook, A Voyage Towards the South Pole, and
Round the World, London, 1777 247; Cook, A Voyage Towards the South Pole, and Round the World,
Dublin, 1784, 244; Cook, The Journals of Captain Cook on His Voyages of Discovery, Volume II, 295-296.
185 Cook (Douglas), A Voyage Towards the South Pole, London, 177, 245; Cook (Douglas), A Voyage
Towards the South Pole, Dublin, 1784, 242; Moon, This Horrid Practice, 88.
practised in the South Pacific, most probably for thousands of years prior to the Polynesian migration to New Zealand.'\textsuperscript{186} It is a claim he repeated on Radio New Zealand in regard to Maori: 'So here's a practice that goes back potentially thousands of years—it's been imbedded in the culture—and it just collapses in on itself in a period of months.'\textsuperscript{187}

In this example we are confronted at the outset not just with Eurocentrism but also a double error of anachronism: neither ‘cannibalism’, derived from the 1492 neologism \textit{canibale}, nor ‘Polynesian’, derived from a neologism with a mid-eighteenth-century provenance ('Polynesia'), may be applied correctly to anyone before those dates, let alone to an unenumerated totality (South Pacific Polynesians), unless the chronological convention on which history relies is discarded.\textsuperscript{188} In addition, because the dispersal of populations from ‘West Polynesia’ to ‘East Polynesia’ is reckoned at the earliest to have begun around ‘200 B.C.’ and at the latest around ‘800 A.D.’, it is fallacious to claim that ‘cannibalism was certainly practised in the South Pacific, most probably for thousands of years’.\textsuperscript{189} Finally, just as we have seen that end- and footnotes only lead to more text, so endnote 167 at page 157 refers the reader on to two documents on which Moon relies to substantiate his claim that prehistoric cannibalism existed among Southern Polynesians.\textsuperscript{190} That endnote reads: ‘Definitive evidence for this is found in D. DeGusta, ‘Fijian Cannibalism and Mortuary Ritual: Bioarchaeological Evidence from Vunda’, in \textit{International Journal of Osteoarchaeology}, vol. 10, 2000, pp. 76-92; also

\textsuperscript{186} Moon, \textit{This Horrid Practice}, 157, 153.
\textsuperscript{187} Moon, Moon and Laidlaw (interviewer), ‘Cannibalism – This Horrid Practice’.
\textsuperscript{188} Columbus, \textit{The Journal: Account of the First Voyage and Discovery of the Indies}, 118 /119; Charles de Brosses, \textit{Terra Australis Cognita: or, Voyages to the Terra Australis, or Southern Hemisphere, during the Sixteenth, Seventeenth, and Eighteenth Centuries. Containing An Account of the Manners of the People, and the Productions of the Countries, hitherto found in the Southern Latitudes; and Advantages that may result from further Discoveries on this great Continent, and the Methods of establishing Colonies there, to the advantage of Great Britain. With A Preface by the Editor, in which some geographical, nautical, and commercial Questions are discussed.: Vol. I.} (Edinburgh: Printed by A. Donaldson, 1766 Electronic reproduction, Farmington Hill: Thomson Gale, 2003), \textit{v passim}.
\textsuperscript{189} Janet Wilmshurst, Atholl Anderson, Thomas Higham, and Trevor Worthy, ‘Dating the late prehistoric dispersal of Polynesians to New Zealand using the commensal Pacific rat’, \textit{Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America}, 105/22 (2008), 7676; Moon, \textit{This Horrid Practice}, 157; Moon, Moon and Laidlaw (interviewer), ‘Cannibalism – This Horrid Practice’.
\textsuperscript{190} Moon, \textit{This Horrid Practice}, 157.
see K. Lukaschek, *The History of Cannibalism*, chap. 4, for the prehistoric origins of cannibalism.’

However, when we turn to David DeGusta’s article, the first thing we notice is that it concerns an archaeological site in Fiji, which is in Melanesia, not Polynesia. Second, the Vunda site from which the skeletal remains were obtained and which DeGusta ‘interpreted as evidence of cannibalism’, is dated ‘AD 800-1600’, making those remains between approximately 400 and 1,200 years old, therefore falling outside Moon’s claim for the practice existing over ‘thousands of years’. Third, DeGusta is careful to point out that his hypothesis for this site is contested by other archaeologists, adding that he agrees with Arens and others ‘that it is impossible to absolutely prove cannibalism.’ Finally, DeGusta also makes the point that, because his hypothesis relates to just one site in Fiji, ‘it is clearly inappropriate to characterize all, or even most, prehistoric Fijians as “cannibals”’. It is a view with which Moon appears to sympathise, given the paucity of archaeological support for his claim of ‘Maori cannibalism’. As he puts it:

Even if all these archaeological features converged, and the quantity of the unearthed findings was more substantial than it currently is, the evidence for Maori cannibalism from these digs would still be overwhelmingly circumstantial. Without recorded, reliable eyewitness accounts to corroborate the practice, archaeological findings, by themselves, do not meet the threshold of proof that is required to confirm or deny the existence of pre-European Maori cannibalism.

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195 Moon, *This Horrid Practice*, Front Cover, Title Page, 1 passim.
196 Moon, *This Horrid Practice*, 1 passim, 115-16.
When we turn to Karoline Lukaschek’s ‘The History of Cannibalism’, a one-year M. Phil thesis and not a book as the italicisation of its title in Moon’s endnote suggests, the problems intensify.\(^{197}\)

To begin with, it offers no support for Moon’s anachronistic claim of prehistoric cannibalism among South Polynesians because none of the eight archaeological sites Lukaschek reviews at ‘chap. 4’ are from the South Pacific.\(^{198}\) The sites are from Spain (1 site 780,000 years old), Ethiopia (1 site 600,000 years old), Croatia (1 site 130,000 years old), France (2 sites, one 120,000-100,000, the other 6,000 years old), South Africa (1 site 120,000 years old), the United Kingdom (1 site 12,000 years old), and Southwest USA (several sites ‘in the Four Corners area of Colorado, Arizona, Utah and New Mexico’ at 850-900 years old).\(^{199}\) In other words, Lukaschek’s argument for ‘Prehistoric Cannibalism’ has no relevance for Moon’s claim save that it is made for humankind. Indeed, Lukaschek’s brief discussion of ‘the historical record’ for New Zealand contradicts Moon’s claim that the ‘authenticity and significance’ of ‘the evidence amassed during the early decades of European intervention in’ New Zealand ‘are generally beyond serious challenge’:

Eyewitness reports exist of Maori cannibalism, but it is very doubtful how seriously they can be taken.\ldots

Cannibalism among the Maori is said to have disappeared after 1840 when the treaty of Waitangi was thrust upon them. Again, this is not very likely, because if cannibalism was a deep-rooted custom it would not vanish after a short period of European dominance and “culture” and a treaty referring to it.\(^{200}\)

Furthermore, Moon’s reliance on archaeological sites in Europe, Africa, North America, and the United Kingdom is itself paradoxical, in that it suggests that ancestors of those who saved Maori from an autogastronomic fate ‘in around just

\[^{197}\] Lukaschek, ‘The history of Cannibalism’, cover page; Moon, This Horrid Practice, 260 n. 167.
\[^{198}\] Moon, This Horrid Practice, 157; Lukaschek, ‘The history of Cannibalism’, 22-53.
\[^{200}\] Moon, This Horrid Practice, 235; Lukaschek, ‘The history of Cannibalism’, Contents Page, 15-16.
one generation’ may once have been cannibals too—which may account for their zeal and success, but that is not Moon’s argument, although, it seems it may be an emerging conversation in New Zealand.\footnote{Moon, \textit{This Horrid Practice}, 182-3; Tahana, in ‘Racism claim over cannibal book’, reports that Moon’s ‘boss’, Pare Keiha, Dean of Auckland University of Technology’s Te Ara Poutama, as saying that ‘cannibalism was part of every culture at some point’. Likewise, Briar Grace-Smith, writer of \textit{Fresh Meat’s} screenplay, expresses the view that ‘in just about every culture on the planet there is a history of cannibalism.’ See Scott Kara, ‘Temuera Morrison on Fresh Meat: “It’s quite out there”’, \textit{The New Zealand Herald} (18 October 2012): http://www.nzherald.co.nz/entertainment/news/article.cfm?c_id=1501119&objectid=10841122 .} On both counts, then—its lack of archaeological support and its sceptical view of the ethnography—Lukaschek’s thesis offers no support for Moon at all.

Finally, it could be argued that Moon’s failure to problematise the cannibal is his book’s fatal flaw. He simply accepts it as \textit{a priori} and material, as his definition suggests: ‘cannibalism is the act of human beings eating other human beings.’\footnote{Moon, \textit{This Horrid Practice}, 22.} While he admits that ‘there is much more to the meaning of the term than a mere description of the practice’, and engages in a literature review of the cannibal’s appearance in popular books and ethnographical accounts, there is in those discussions no mention of the signifier’s invention and the holocaust it heralded—a human catastrophe far greater numerically, it would seem, than the Holocaust of World War II, as Spain, then other European countries, extirpated entire populations as they stole their geographies and plundered resources, extending that activity around the globe through colonising projects, which, conveniently, the cannibal accompanied.\footnote{Moon, \textit{This Horrid Practice}, 22.}

By reading documents as evidence of the cannibal’s material existence beyond the text instead of discursive productions within the wider denigrating discourse of settlerism, Moon and Salmond create for the settler society an image of the savage Other in its midst that rationalises its violence against tangata whenua, justifies its right to belong, and gives it reason not ‘to look squarely at the genocidal violence’ on
which it is founded.\textsuperscript{204} That \textit{The Trial of the Cannibal Dog} and \textit{This Horrid Practice} received considerable attention is indicative, on the other hand, of just how unsettled this settler domain is, just how much it fears its loss of sovereignty, and just how dependent it is for its constant making over on the spectre of the cannibal. It is no wonder, then, that the cannibal still roams its cultural imaginary and that the Treaty of Waitangi/\textit{Te Tiriti o Waitangi} marks, in a literal sense, the \textit{différend} that divides its two language communities—or, as Donald McKenzie has it, that ‘Pakeha and Maori versions of the past continue to collide.’\textsuperscript{205}

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item \textsuperscript{204} Peter Hulme, ‘Quincentenary Perspectives’, \textit{History Workshop}, 36 (1993), 231.
\item \textsuperscript{205} D. F. McKenzie, \textit{Oral Culture, Literacy and Print in Early New Zealand} (Wellington: Victoria University Press with the Alexander Turnbull Library, 1985), 45.
\end{itemize}
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CONCLUSION
Problematising the Treaty

The central argument of this thesis is that history is a self-referential discourse, the principal referent of which, the past, exists only imaginatively as an organising device within the discourse itself. As a consequence, history is not axiomatic, as the ubiquity of people making history in contemporary media headlines suggests. Rather, history is a large-scale metaphor that functions transcendentally and relies on ‘the reality effect’ to negate the aporia of time and to overcome the intangibility beyond itself.1 Hence, because it purports a material exoteric when none exists, ‘historical discourse is a fake performative discourse in which the apparent constative (descriptive) is in fact only the signifier of the speech-act as an act of authority.’2 Simply put, historians cannot visit and study the past because it does not exist materially; historians therefore do not write history as such but engage in what ‘is tantamount to making history’, which they do by treating text-objects as if they functioned metonymically as pieces of the past.3 This fundamental error of praxis occurs when language is taken to have a natural connection with or to represent directly that which it signifies instead of being a signifying system in which ‘there are only differences . . . and no positive terms.’4 This problem is exacerbated when the language user fails to differentiate between material and notional referents: unless the user of a linguistic sign establishes the status of the object to which they are referring they may incorrectly categorise that referent, misuse it, or blur the boundaries between the notional and corporeal, and thereby perpetuate what amounts to a ‘category-mistake’.5 This is the case with the signifier

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2 Barthes, *The Rustle of Language*, 139.
cannibal: commonly treated as an extradiscursive and historically real object, the cannibal is a wholly textual construct, and, in settler domains, represents both a threat to the settler’s ipseity and the Other of sovereignty, the (barely human) beast that threatens to (culturally) swallow the sovereign (the Crown as embodying the settler state). Hence, because historical discourse is able to purport a referencing of a material past by way of ‘the referential illusion’, history, like the cannibal, is commonly taken to have a material existence, when, on the contrary, it is always a-historical, discursively constructed, incomplete, and answers to a ‘transcendental teleology’ that at one and the same time is certain of its direction and assured in its assertions and iterations yet always interpretative, unstable, and undecidable. Thus we come to believe our own mythologies and often make the same mistakes.

The above has profound consequences for the idea of history and its praxis and our reliance on it as a mythopoetic device to support the idea of the West’s progress in civilisation and the concept of the nation-state, which doubles as a political expression of that progress. In this sense, historical discourse performs a similar function for secular nation-states as the discourse of Christianity once did for dynastic realms: it provides a belief system that confirms them as deriving from ‘an immemorial past’ and therefore as the natural and legitimate expression of political self-fulfilment with the sovereign right to rule. Hence the examples used in Part B of this thesis are intended to make apparent not only the metaphoricity and fake performativity of historical discourse but also and more specifically the agenda embedded in the logocentric syntax of settler historiography, which is to legitimate the illegitimate. That is, settler historians do not relate the (inexistent) past ‘wie es eigentlich gewesen’, as Ron Palenski and the other writers of settler history referenced in this thesis apparently believe; rather, they act as advocates for their

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language communities, communities with a European and positivist heritage, the ‘biographies’ of which depend on their Other, ‘the “savage” narrative genre’, even as those national stories cannibalize useful parts of the latter.9 Thus, in purporting that the community of the latter was once cannibalistic and by treating ‘[t]he “archaic” narrative’ as its referent, ‘the cognitive genre’ of settler historical discourse presents itself as the superior genre and its community as rightfully controlling the geopolitical and cultural space it expropriated from the indigenous community by force and other dubious means.10 The syntax is insidious. It is also inescapable: by purporting to set the past in order, settler historiography determines that New Zealand of the future indicative will remain a settler nation-state that continues to subsume or marginalise those from whom it has stolen, thus foreclosing on a radical rethinking of the ‘to come’ through engaging with such philosophical ideas as Alain Badiou’s theory of the event or Jacques Derrida’s ‘democracy to come’.11

We began Chapter One by considering the views of Elizabeth Deeds Ermarth on the significance of historical time and history, which she describes as ‘a commanding metanarrative, perhaps the metanarrative in Western discourse.’12 While this thesis concurs with those views, it also argues for an amplification of the latter, which

10 Lyotard, The Differend, 156 §224.
might be expressed as follows: *History has become the organising principle of everyday life in the contemporary West by which being is both conceptualised and philosophised.*

We also saw in Chapter One that time is aporetic—‘the aporia cannot be experienced as such’, it is irreducible and time only *appears* to be present to itself by delaying itself to itself, and therefore ‘restricts absolute identity to the order of the phantasmatic’—and metaphoric, both insurmountable issues historians generally fail to problematise but appear to overcome through recourse to ‘the reality effect.’

This fake performativity, however, enables history to transform the internality of its discourse into an object of inquiry, the past, which it presents as lying beyond its discursive borders and on which, as an episteme, it can pronounce authoritatively. It also presents itself in the narrative genre, which, according to Roland Barthes, is not just universal but ‘a prodigious variety of genres’ that cares ‘nothing for the division between good and bad literature’, or, we might add, for good and bad history, but ‘is simply there, like life itself.’

However, as this thesis also argues, history as ‘a narrative representation of the past’ is illusory for the simple reason that ‘the no-longer-now’ no longer is. There is no outside to history, no ‘hors-texte’: all its texts lead to other texts or artifacts that have no meaning outside its discourse.

History, therefore, is better understood as a metaphorical device that enables us to overcome the aporia of time and allows us to think ‘the now’ (in which our being as being is thought but which never comes to presence), as separate and distinct from ‘the no-longer now’ (which no longer is but which we construct in order to understand ‘the now’), so that ‘the not-yet-now’ (which never arrives) might seem

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more, not less, certain. In short, history, the product of *différance*, is nothing more than a large-scale signifying system, the domain and play of which is controlled by its transcendental signifier *history*.

It is with the above in mind that we now turn to the Treaty of Waitangi/Te Tiriti o Waitangi and a recent debate among New Zealand historians about the role history plays in the inquiries made by the Waitangi Tribunal (the Tribunal) into alleged ‘actions or omissions of the Crown, which breach the promises made in the Treaty of Waitangi.’

Briefly, the Treaty of Waitangi/Te Tiriti o Waitangi (the Treaty/Te Tiriti), a treaty of cession according to its English text, was signed at Waitangi, New Zealand, on 6 February 1840 by Captain William Hobson representing Queen Victoria and about 40 rangatira (chiefs). Subsequently about another 500 rangatira, though not all rangatira, added their signatures as the Treaty was transported around the country, with all but 39 Waikato chiefs ‘at Manukau and at Waikato Heads’ signing a Maori language copy, an English-language version, not intended for signing, having been taken to the Waikato region in error, according to Manuka Henare. Problematically, however, the Maori-language version is not a treaty of cession. In the Maori text of Article 1, ‘the chiefs gave the Queen “te Kawanatanga katoa”, the governance or government over the land’, or as Henare translates ‘te Kawanatanga katoa o o ratou wenua’, ‘the Governorship of their country’, and not ““all the rights and powers of sovereignty” over the land and all the peoples in it’ as the English text

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17 Critchley, ‘Heidegger’s Being and Time, part 8: Temporality’.
of Article 1 has it.\(^{21}\) As Hugh Kawharu notes in regard to his translating of kawanatanga as government: 'There could be no possibility of the Maori signatories having any understanding of government in the sense of “sovereignty”: ie, any understanding on the basis of experience or cultural precedent.'\(^{22}\) In Article 2, the Maori text ‘confirmed and guaranteed “te tino rangatiratanga” or the exercise of chieftainship over their lands, whereas the English version ‘confirmed and guaranteed the “exclusive and undisturbed possession of their lands and estates, forests, fisheries and other properties”.'\(^{23}\) Henare translates ‘te tino rangatiratanga o o ratou wenua o ratou kainga me o ratou taonga katoa’ as ‘full (absolute) authority and power (chieftainship) of their lands (pl) (o ratou wenua), their settlements and surrounding environs (kainga), and all their valuables (property) (taonga),’ while Kawharu notes that “‘Unqualified exercise” of the chieftainship – would emphasise to a chief the Queen’s intention to give them complete control according to their customs.’\(^{24}\) Hence, as Paul McHugh has it, ‘the most obvious and fundamental problem relates to the question of what it was that the chiefs were ceding.’\(^{25}\) Unsurprisingly, then, much historiographical debate, particularly since the publication in 1972 of Ruth Ross's ‘seminal essay’, ‘Te Tiriti o Waitangi: Texts and Translations', has focussed on the two language versions and the question of what amounts to two forms of ‘sovereignty’, kawanatanga and rangatiratanga, having a coextensive relationship within the same treaty.\(^{26}\) Or as Keith Sorrenson has it: ‘The


\(^{22}\) Hugh Kawharu, ‘Kawharu Translation of Te Tiriti o Waitangi/The Treaty of Waitangi’, Appendix 4, 2 n. 6.


\(^{25}\) McHugh, *The Maori Magna Carta*, 3.

\(^{26}\) Sorrenson, ‘Towards a Radical Reinterpretation of New Zealand History’, 174; R. M. Ross, ‘Te Tiriti o Waitangi: Texts and Translations’, *The New Zealand Journal of History*, 6/2 (1972), 129-157. As noted in the Introduction, Maori commentators commonly take ‘Kawanatanga’ (governance) to be a delegated and therefore a lesser form of authority than ‘rangatiratanga’ (chieftainship), and, hence, that the equivalent of Maori sovereignty was guaranteed by ‘te tino rangatiratanga’ (lit. the highest chieftainship) in Article 2 of Te Tiriti o Waitangi. While Article 1 of the English language version of the Treaty, which was not debated or signed at Waitangi, purports that Maori ceded sovereignty, had the Crown wished to make that completely clear in Te Tiriti, the version that was debated and signed at Waitangi, alternative te reo Maori words such as ‘mana’, ‘rangatiratanga’, and ‘kingitanga’ could or
fact that there are two histories of the Treaty of Waitangi, stemming from the English and Maori language versions, is a sure reminder that Hobson’s wish that the Treaty would facilitate the formation of one people has not been realized. Because of the determined efforts of Maori people to resist assimilation and preserve their identity, the Treaty has become the basis, rather, for the coexistence of two peoples within one nation.'

Despite all historiographical determinations being always already undecidable, history as a discipline was destined to play a vital role in determining the nature, extent, and significance of the differences between the two language versions when The Treaty of Waitangi Act 1975 established the Waitangi Tribunal ‘as a permanent commission of inquiry’ ‘to inquire into and make recommendations upon . . . any claim submitted to the Tribunal’ by Maori claimants, individuals or groups, for breaches of the Treaty’ since 1975, with the Tribunal, at Section 5(2), given the ‘exclusive authority to determine the meaning and effect of the Treaty as embodied in the 2 texts and to decide issues raised by the differences between them.’

However, this meant, as Sorrenson puts it, that ‘the Tribunal could hardly confine itself to the two texts. It had to examine the contemporary intellectual climate to assess what was in the minds of the men who made, negotiated and signed the Treaty. That in turn required an investigation of the historical traditions of both sides: on the British side some centuries of jurisprudence and colonial policy; on the Maori side orally-recorded tradition of lore and custom.’ In 1985, the Act was amended to extend the Tribunal’s jurisdiction ‘to hear claims dating back to 1840’, should have been used instead of ‘kawanatanga’, in which case it seems unlikely that any rangatira would have signed.


Waitangi Tribunal: Te Ropu Whakamana i te Tiriti o Waitangi: http://www.waitangi-tribunal.govt.nz/about/frequentlyaskedquestions.asp#3; New Zealand Legislation: Treaty of Waitangi Act 1975: http://www.legislation.govt.nz/act/public/1975/0114/latest/DLM435510.html . The paradox that the Tribunal ‘has been set up as part of a legal order which itself rests on breaches of the Treaty’ has been noted by various commentators, including Jock Brookfield (F. M. Brookfield, Waitangi and Indigenous Rights: Revolution, Law and Legitimation [Auckland: Auckland University Press, 1999], 151). That the Tribunal’s terms of reference produces outcomes more or less consistent with those terms—in essence, interpretative predeterminations—is, perhaps, a statement of the obvious, but which, for purposes of the discussion that follows, is worth mentioning.

Sorrenson, ‘Towards a Radical Reinterpretation of New Zealand History’, 176.
signalling an even greater role for history and historians in assisting the Tribunal with its investigations under ‘this greatly enlarged jurisdiction’.30

Although this role entails a metaphysical rather than an empirical operation—as we saw in Chapter Two with our discussion of ‘Historicism, and the Social Logic of the Text’, because texts substitute for the absence of the past they cannot be recontextualized as Sorrenson suggests—as a consequence of history having become ‘perhaps the metanarrative in Western discourse’ and the episteme above all others that underwrites contemporary political power systems, it is foundational to the Crown’s negotiations with the Tribunal, not least because its version of events confirms the contrary of Te Tiriti (used here to mean the Maori language version of the Treaty): that sovereignty was ceded by Maori. 31 Put otherwise, even if sovereignty were not ceded but taken from Maori in a ‘revolutionary seizure of power’ by the British Crown, the ‘transcendental teleology’ of settler history would confirm that the Crown rightfully controls the expropriated space.32 Or as Douglas Graham, the former Minister in Charge of Treaty Negotiations, puts it matter-of-factly: ‘None of these arguments [about Maori sovereignty] has any validity. The simple fact is that the British Crown’s assumption of sovereignty, assisted certainly in part by the Treaty, unquestionably succeeded and it has, as a matter of international law, lasted. In other words, what is, is.’33 Likewise, and in keeping with its statutory obligations, the Tribunal also provides a juridical-cultural space in which the indigenous narrative, or mana Maori history, can be heard in its own right, as it relates to the Treaty. In other words, while the settler state is able to promote to a wide audience through its Ministry for Culture and Heritage and its state-owned television network its own historicised ideas of the existence of an extreme state of

30 Waitangi Tribunal: Te Ropu Whakamana i te Tiriti o Waitangi: http://www.waitangi-tribunal.govt.nz/about/frequentlyaskedquestions.asp#1; Sorrenson, Towards a Radical Reinterpretation of New Zealand History’, 187.
32 Brookfield, Waitangi and Indigenous Rights, 181; Derrida, The Other Heading, 33.
sagery and lawlessness immediately prior to the signing of the civilising Treaty, as we saw in Chapters Four and Six, within the Tribunal process heterodox views, such as those of Henare, ‘that Maori did not intend to cede sovereignty in perpetuity by signing the Maori text of the Treaty of Waitangi’, are able to be considered at length.\textsuperscript{34} As Henare expounds:

The notion that Maori ceded sovereignty is a fundamental belief of generations of Anglo-Celtic and Anglo-European New Zealand settlers who have sustained for themselves the exercise of political, economic and cultural power during most of New Zealand’s short settlement history. That Maori, the indigenous peoples of the islands willingly ceded their collective and national sovereignty in 1840 to the British Crown is largely accepted as a fundamental of New Zealand’s historiography and constitutional history . . . [and] is the great myth of the Treaty of Waitangi. It is a Pakeha and Crown myth.\textsuperscript{35} ‘The ceding of sovereignty idea’, Henare concludes, ‘is only important for the British government and its immigration intentions. To this extent, the ceding of sovereignty is a myth created by British officials missionary witnesses and traders and many others who were a party to this idea that Maori had to cede sovereignty.’\textsuperscript{36} Indeed, it would seem that there was no reason for Maori to cede sovereignty as they were under no duress to do so.\textsuperscript{37} Or as Henare puts it more prosaically: ‘Why take two days to cede sovereignty just after you have spent twenty years engaging in a relationship with Great Britain to maintain mana?’\textsuperscript{38} It can therefore be argued that kawanatanga given in one article and rangatiratanga retained in another is not contradictory but consistent with Maori aspirations, at least as Henare describes them:

\textsuperscript{38} Henare, ‘The Changing Images of Nineteenth-century Maori Society’, 221.
Maori intentions in signing the Treaty of 1840 were to form an enduring relationship with the British Queen and it was to be a mutually beneficial arrangement of a practical kind. It was to be reciprocity on a nation-to-nation basis. Maori expected the relationship to be a protectorate-type one, the notion being well understood by many rangatira and would allow Maori, with British help, to build on the ideas and goals enunciated in the declaration of independence, He W[ā]kaputanga o Te Rangatiratanga o Nu Tīrene. In return, a limit understood at the time, some of the Queen’s people could live in New Zealand in peace.³⁹

On this view, then, ‘Te Tiriti o Waitangi was . . . a treaty between two sovereign states, not between one state and a motley group of autonomous tribes. The subsequent fact of the Crown’s usurpation of cultural and political power does not extinguish the original vision and agenda of Maori.’⁴⁰ Indeed, it could be argued that it is a contradiction of New Zealand settler historiography to suggest that if Maori in the pre-Treaty decades were a more effective killing collective than the Central Powers in World War One that its rangatira would have ceded sovereignty to the British Crown. Hence, the contrary holds just as well: that it is only because Maori had an overwhelming numerical (80,000 to 2,000 or 40:1) and military superiority in 1840s New Zealand that its representatives were prepared to sign Te Tiriti.⁴¹

It is with these heterogeneous perspectives in mind that we now turn to the actual debate in question.

In ‘The Future Behind Us: The Waitangi Tribunal’s Retrospective Utopia’ (2001), Bill Oliver states, as his essay’s ‘central argument’, that the Tribunal ‘is “seeking in chronicle an inverted form of augury”’.⁴² By this he meant that

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the past is used to shape the future, not simply in the form of grievances demanding present remedy, but additionally in the form of real but unrealised ‘possibilities’. A future, already shaped by the prospective reversal of a history of loss, is discovered in the past, not (except by way of its denial) in the past that occurred but in the past that was promised. Both the promised past and the to-be-achieved future are characterised by self-determination, partnership, power-sharing, prosperity and stability, all within the parameters of an enhanced tribal polity. This is the most spectacular way in which the Tribunal has made itself the mouthpiece of the deprived. . .

That programme, so the Tribunal’s chronicle of acts and omissions implies, was the prime duty of government after 1840: to assist in tribal economic development while supporting traditional forms of tribal political authority and promoting European settlement only within that context. Because government policy took precisely the opposite course, the past that has been experienced by Maori becomes a story of deceit, iniquity, deprival and loss punctuated by one lost chance after another. Loss is more than simple deprivation; it is the loss of the self-determined future which was possible in 1840 and is still to be achieved.43

That view is utopic, Oliver argues, because the fledgling colony was not only not equipped administratively or financially for such a partnership, it is also not how

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end- and footnotes, we might note that Oliver’s “‘inverted form of augury’” is borrowed from David Lowenthal’s *The Past is a Foreign Country* (1985), the title of which is taken from the opening sentence of Leslie Hartley’s novel *The Go-Between* (1953)—“The past is a foreign country; they do things differently there”—and the quote itself is from a 1980 book review by Simon Schama of *Faith, Reason and the Plague* by Carlo Cipolla Harvester’. In this review Schama skewers the author for taking a chronicle of events concerning a minor seventeenth-century Tuscan plague story and elongating ‘them into a historical shaggy-dog story’, the dramatic action of which its author ‘stokes up by imaginative use of dramatic hyperbole, generally of the Mills and Boon variety.’ As Schama concludes, echoing the concerns of historians discussed in Chapter Two of this thesis, ‘if the demand for “readable” history becomes a hunt for the scraps and shards, the rags and bones of evidence . . . we shall revert to what we were before Thucydides had grander ideas: bardic tellers of tales, ministering to a culture terrified by the fragility of the contemporary, and seeking in chronicle an inverted form of augury’” (Simon Schama, ‘The Monte Lupo Story’, *London Review of Books*, 2/18 [1980], 22-3. Also see: L. P. Hartley, *The Go-between* (New York: New York Review of Books, 2002, first published, 1953), 17; David Lowenthal, *The Past is a Foreign Country* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003, first published 1985), xvi *passim*;

colonisation worked, and thus to think in this manner is both anachronistic and
millennialist. If Oliver is correct, it also begs the question of the reason(s) for the
Treaty, but that is not Oliver's concern at this point, or ours.

According to Oliver, the Tribunal has arrived at this 'retrospective utopia' because of
the ways it writes history.

(1) It writes presentist history—that is, history constructed out of present needs
and perspectives that it attaches retrospectively to the historical actors and
circumstances.

(2) It writes counterfactual history—that is, history based on 'non-events'.
This is a consequence, at least in part, of statutory constraints 'and the elastic
body of doctrine known as Treaty jurisprudence.' If, for example, a claim
arises out of whenua raupatu ('the confiscation of Maori land carried out
under the New Zealand Settlements Act 1863 during the New Zealand Wars'),
the assessment and quantification of that loss can be assessed only
counterfactually—that is, on the basis of that which did not happen. This is
antithetical to Oliver's positivist history, the 'scholarly history prevalent
since the early nineteenth century'.

(3) It combines two modes of history—(a) 'scholarly history', which, according
to Oliver, it deploys in a cavalier manner—'while it constantly uses past
“facts” for present purposes, it vigorously insists upon their past reality, even
though . . . it takes an inadequate view of what constitutes past reality'—and
(b) oral tribal history, in which time is collapsed so that the 'conventional
categories' of 'past, present and future' becomes 'a seamless history “without
time”'. This absence 'of a sense of historical perspective', writes Oliver, is a
noted characteristic of 'pre-industrial' and 'pre-literate societies. . . . It is said
by Maori that for them the past is not behind but in front of them, that they

45 Oliver, 'The Future Behind Us', 21.
46 Sorrenson, 'Towards a Radical Reinterpretation of New Zealand History', 187; Oliver, 'The Future
Behind Us', 21.
47 Oliver, 'The Future Behind Us', 21, 26
move into the future backwards.'\(^{48}\) The upshot for Oliver is that ‘the non-events which are advanced by the Tribunal as both past and present possibilities . . . are a back-projection of present goals.'\(^{49}\) This has produced the ‘retrospective utopia’ of Oliver’s title, ‘the reverse side of the coin of culpability.’\(^{50}\) Hence the Tribunal’s counterfactualism proposes a past unreality for Oliver: ‘Post-Waitangi New Zealand, had it resembled this model, would not have been a colony in any real sense of the word, and certainly could not have been what it quickly became, a colony of settlement.’\(^{51}\)

Oliver’s views have been outlined in detail here for a number of reasons. First, they illustrate the inherent contradiction of history—the groundlessness of it as an idea and its fake performativity as a practice. Second, they demonstrate the fundamental error of treating the past as a material exoteric instead of as a notional referent that exists intradiscursively as an organising device. Third, they make apparent that history’s authority depends not on telling ‘the past’ \textit{wie es eigentlich gewesen}, as Oliver appears to believe, but on its acceptance by the audience for whom it is written.\(^{52}\) Fourth, despite its ‘impossible possibility’, history, as determined by the Tribunal, authorises what \textit{actually happened} and/or \textit{did not happen}, and therefore has a direct bearing on the outcome of Treaty claims.\(^{53}\)

To begin with, Oliver’s line of thought is inherently paradoxical: if Treaty claims are based on ‘non-events’, and if positivist history is based \textit{on what really happened} and nothing did, then there can be no basis for the grievances and Oliver has no grounds for his empathetic statement that ‘the realities of colonisation . . . had deplorable

\(^{48}\) Oliver, ‘The Future Behind Us’, 23.
\(^{50}\) Oliver, ‘The Future Behind Us’, 9, 13.
\(^{51}\) Oliver, ‘The Future Behind Us’, 16.
consequences for Maori.\textsuperscript{54} In other words, Oliver himself relies on both factual and counterfactual reasoning when he is thinking the past. As Giselle Byrnes explains, Tribunal history, in certain instances, ‘distinguishes between what did come to pass and what might have, but did not. Causation and counterfactuals are’, in the historicising process, ‘two sides of the same coin. Causes connect events in history, while counterfactual conditionals are essential in assigning causality.’\textsuperscript{55}

Second, Oliver’s critique of the timelessness of Maori tribal history and its lack of historical perspective (which bespeaks anachronism), relies on the time-series past-present-future, which, as we saw in Chapter One, is invalid of reality and itself a timeless form of time by virtue of its contradiction. In other words, although it is a very widely used convention, the diachronic series on which ‘scholarly history’ relies is not inherently superior to any other form of culturally constructed time.\textsuperscript{56}

Third, Oliver accuses Tribunal history of inventing ‘non-events’ by way of ‘a back-projection of present goals.’\textsuperscript{57} However, this, as we have seen, is an unavoidable consequence of history being a wholly discursive product that comes into being at the moment of its production, which is always after the event being referenced, which in turn is never present to itself. Furthermore, there is, simply, no ‘“past reality”’ external to historical discourse.\textsuperscript{58} The referent called the past can only be the idea of the past produced within history’s signifying process and projected onto its ‘outside’.

\textsuperscript{54} Oliver, ‘The Future Behind Us’, 26, 18.
\textsuperscript{56} J. Ellis McTaggart, ‘The Unreality of Time’, Mind, New Series, 17/68 (1908), 457-74; Oliver, ‘The Future Behind Us’, 21. Oliver makes a similar comment about the use of time by English common law: ‘Neither tradition is much concerned with the ways in which the past is unlike the present, so that in each past and present can and do merge effortlessly into each other’ (‘The Future Behind Us’, 21-2).
\textsuperscript{57} Oliver, ‘The Future Behind Us’, 26.
\textsuperscript{58} Oliver, ‘The Future Behind Us’, 9, 21.
Hence, if the ‘non-academic’ model of Tribunal history seeks “in chronicle an inverted form of augury” for purposes of ‘the to-be-achieved future’, then that, in essence, is no different from the augurizing of ‘scholarly history’, which, like the law, is built on retroactive movements of protention.\textsuperscript{59} Stephen Turner’s description of history as reenactment suggests as much:

“New Zealand” is the idea of a place that already existed in settlers’ minds, always coming to be as settlers work towards its fulfilment. The title of the first history of New Zealand, \textit{The Story of New Zealand: Past and Present, Savage and Civilized} by Arthur Thomson, suggests that New Zealand is one country, and that its transformation as a result of second settlement is at once inevitable and an indisputable good. . . . The original idea of a country-to-come is now staged as popular national history. A land of promise is realized more fully by the spectacle.\textsuperscript{60}

In other words, the only difference between the augurizing of Tribunal history and Oliver’s own ‘academic history’, which, after all, informs us that the Musket Wars with 80,000 fatalities accounted for what Ian Pool estimates was the entire indigenous population of New Zealand in 1840, is the way it is conceived, perceived and received and the purposes it serves.\textsuperscript{61}

Thus, it could be argued that Oliver’s over-riding concern in ‘The Future Behind Us’ is not so much that ‘scholarly history’ is being challenged by a hybrid form of history, but that the hegemony of the former in the settler domain it helped to construct and continues to make over is now being challenged by the ““archaic” narrative’ it once objectified and controlled.\textsuperscript{62} Furthermore, Treaty settlement outcomes appear to be determined more by \textit{realpolitik} than by even the Tribunal’s form of history. That is, playing by the rules of ‘academic conventions’ in writing the

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\textsuperscript{59} Oliver, ‘The Future Behind Us’, 24-6, 21.
\textsuperscript{61} W. H. Oliver, \textit{The Story of New Zealand} (London: Faber, 1960), 40; Pool, \textit{Te Iwi Maori}, 4-7 (for Pool’s discussion of demographic models), 57, 54-5.
\textsuperscript{62} Lyotard, \textit{The Differend: Phrases in Dispute}, 156 §224.
\end{flushleft}
past may be of little account to the Government, for, it seems, it has come to accept that in order to keep the settler domain secure it would be wise to compensate those from whom it has expropriated the space it now owns and controls. Hugh Fletcher sums up this view as follows: “There is no chance that Maori are going to get a separate parliament that is going to have any authority over New Zealand. . . . It is better to err on the side of generosity so that you increase the certainty of it being a final settlement, than it is to save a hundred million now and, in fact, not settle the matter. Because before long it will be seen to have been an unfair bargain.”

In response to Oliver’s essay, Byrnes suggests that “liberation history” might be a preferable term to “counterfactual utopian history”, which, while being ‘strongly presentist and clearly emancipatory in purpose’, is also ‘positive and constructive’, not least because ‘counterfactual history is a worthy mode of historical enquiry’ in that it destabilises ‘colonial structures and narratives’ and ‘dismantles the inheritance of those structures and narratives.’ On Byrnes’s view:

The Tribunal’s attempt to understand Maori historical actions in terms of a Maori worldview and epistemological context, and arguing that this is not simply part of a Western episteme, but juxtaposed to it, puts Tribunal history at odds with orthodox historicist accounts. . . . Undeniably, the Tribunal’s embracing of both types of history signals a larger political concern—that the recognition of historical injustices demands the recognition not just of different past experiences, but of different histories. It is also an acknowledgement of the limitation of ‘history’ and historicist approaches to the past, most notably that ‘history’ in itself cannot always deliver social justice. ‘History’ is therefore a ‘limited good’ and one among many ways of remembering the past.

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64 Hugh Fletcher as quoted in Archie, Maori Sovereignty, 11, 13-14.
65 Byrnes, The Waitangi Tribunal and New Zealand History, 152.
Jim McAloon disagrees. He responded to Byrnes with a paper, ‘By which standards of the past do we judge these events?’, in which he argues ‘that where the Tribunal finds that the Crown should have acted otherwise than it did, that finding is based upon sources and material that were available at the time in question’, and, furthermore, ‘is not so much imposing present agendas on the past as emphasizing arguments or perspective that were evident in the nineteenth century and which were at the time marginalized. Moreover, the Tribunal’s accounts of historical events and circumstances in many cases do not radically differ from mainstream historiographical treatment’.67

Michael Belgrave takes ‘a middle ground, accepting much of McAloon’s argument, but acknowledging that in key instances the Tribunal has stepped beyond his test of reasonableness’, while also suggesting that ‘it is time to move away from the confines of the current debate and look forward to a broader appraisal of the significance of the Waitangi Tribunal’s now three-decade long reassessment of New Zealand history.’68

While this exercise may be a worthy one for the historiographical community, this thesis argues that because ‘historical discourse is a fake performative discourse’ and therefore incapable of solving the many complex issues found in the claimants’ claims, and because the issues are in essence ethical ones, that an alternative to the current historico-juridical approach is needed.69 In other words, although a range of concepts known as ‘principles of the Treaty’ have evolved in case law, Waitangi Tribunal reports, and Government statements and legislation to overcome the ‘textual differences’ between the two versions of the Treaty, an even more fundamental issue remains: ‘the irreducibility of the aporia of time’.70 That is, because the now cannot be reduced, the Treaty's inception is predicated on ‘the

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69 Barthes, The Rustle of Language, 139.
70 Beardsworth, Derrida and the Political, 150.
ecstatic passage of time’ that can only be conceived of by way of a movement of the future anterior, which is the trace of the aporia; it cannot be experienced in and of itself and therefore is born of an impossible experience.\textsuperscript{71} As Derrida explains it, ‘this founding or revolutionary moment of law is, in law, an instance of non-law . . . [that which] always takes place and never takes place in a presence. It is the moment in which the foundation of law remains suspended in the void or over the abyss, suspended by a pure performative act that would not have to answer to or before anyone.\textsuperscript{72} In ‘this extraordinary paradox’, the law is dependent on the person who institutes it by virtue of their standing before it, ‘the presence’ of which ‘always escapes’ them because, ‘transcendent and theological’, ‘immanent’ and ‘finite’, the law is ‘always to come’ yet ‘already past’.\textsuperscript{73} That which produces ‘après coup’ what it was destined in advance to produce’, is, according to Walter Benjamin, ‘the lawmaking violence’, the ‘founding violence’ of any legislative act, ‘that institutes and positions’ it, as opposed to ‘the law-preserving, administrative violence that serves it.’\textsuperscript{74}

To elaborate, with any instituting act, such as the passing of a law or the signing of a treaty, we find the same aporias at work as we find at work in history: both rely on the temporal delay of \textit{différance} to overcome the aporia of time—the impossibility of the \textit{nun} or now co-existing with itself. That is, because the instituting act cannot be present to itself at the moment of its becoming because the now is irreducible, it requires the rupture of \textit{différantial} spacing in order to be thought and thereby to overcome the fiction that the law or treaty has signed itself into being on the basis of itself, and not on the basis of a pre-existing authority. As a consequence any legislative act disavows time by purporting that the instance of the act is present to

\textsuperscript{71}Beardsworth, \textit{Derrida and the Political}, 100.

\textsuperscript{72}Jacques Derrida, ‘Force of Law: The "Mystical Foundation of Authority”’, Drucilla Cornell, Michel Rosenfeld and David Gray Carlson (eds), \textit{Deconstruction and the Possibility of Justice} (New York: Routledge, 1992), 36.

\textsuperscript{73}Derrida, ‘Force of Law’, 36.

itself (that is, without time). Derrida puts it like this in ‘Declarations of Independence’: ‘By this fabulous event, by this fable which implies the structure of the trace and is only in truth possible thanks to [par] the inadequation to itself of a present, a signature gives itself a name. It opens for itself a line of credit, its own credit, for itself to itself.’\(^75\) Thus the signature invents that which it claims to represent in ‘a movement of the future anterior, which is the trace of the “non-adequation of the present to itself”’.\(^76\) In other words, in order that the founding moment is not seen to be foundationless and the ground of its authority not groundless, all instituting acts depend on the triple fiction of an a priori authority, established a posteriori or after the f/act, the disavowal of time by the act itself, and a ‘performative tautology or a priori synthesis, which structures any foundation of the law upon which one performatively produces the conventions that guarantee the validity of the performative’.\(^77\) Hence, as Richard Beardsworth has it, ‘the unsurpassable violence of law (its aporia) is predicated on the delay of time. An act of legislation always arrives too early and/or too late. The violence of an act of law therefore reveals, in perhaps exemplary manner, that time is the (self)-deferment of time to itself, or différance.’\(^78\)

Thus the Treaty/Te Tiriti both performs and relies on a retroactive movement of protention, which is ‘a sort of fabulous retroactivity.’\(^79\) It is also paradoxical.

- In its instituting moment, the Treaty authorises itself on the basis of that which was not there prior to the instituting moment. That is, the authority the Treaty assigns to itself is anterior to its own existence, making the authority it assumes outside the law, illegitimate, and ‘a violence without ground.’\(^80\)
- Written in the future-anterior, the Treaty nevertheless establishes a past (the

\(^76\) Beardsworth, Derrida and the Political, 100.
\(^77\) Derrida, ‘Force of Law’, 33.
\(^78\) Beardsworth, Derrida and the Political, 100.
\(^79\) Derrida, ‘Declarations of Independence’, 10; for all quotes from the Treaty, see Appendix 4.
Treaty’s ground of authority) and a future (the ‘not-yet now’ it will determine and control).81 However, this impossible backwards-and-forwards operation is only made possible by ‘the ellipsis of law qua time’.82

- The absent ‘Victoria’ (Preamble), will, as ‘the Crown’ and perforce of the signing, play the role of judge (God) and halt any regress of authority and meaning in relation to the Treaty (Preamble). As arbiter, censor, and editor, the Crown will decide what the Treaty’s undecidability ultimately means.

- The Treaty is predicated on an absence of law, which the signature of the Queen’s representative, Captain William Hobson, retroactively makes present, and, protensively, preserves the chief’s ‘chieftainship’ and lands and maintains ‘peace and good order’ (Preamble) ‘for ever’. (Article 1). In this, the Treaty legitimates itself in the future anterior by promising to fill the void, which it asserts on the basis of its own internal logic, not on the basis of the circumstances. It also carries the promise of a retrospective promotion for Hobson from Captain to Lieutenant Governor (Preamble).

- In being performative and descriptive, the Treaty both suggests and is undecidable, but an undecidability that is nevertheless ‘required in order to produce the sought-after effect’: to posit ‘or position’ a right in the face of a fiction.83 (As we shall see, what the Treaty becomes is decided by what the Crown takes it to be, not by what it is.)

- In each of the three Articles, retroactive movements of protention are at work:
  
  (a) In the ‘instant’ of the signing, the chiefs cede ‘sovereignty’ (in the English version) or ‘kawanatanga’ (in the Maori version) ‘for ever’ (Article 1).
  
  (b) While purporting to exchange access to property (Article 2) for protection (Article 3), the Chiefs also engage in an exchange of identities, from being tangata whenua (people of the land) to being English in the future, a paradox of identity that will cause problems for the law (the

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81 Critchley, ‘Heidegger’s Being and Time, part 8: Temporality’.
82 Beardsworth, Derrida and the Political, 100.
That is, in this aspect of the fable, Maori is invited to trade its identity, and, along with it, 'the evil consequences' of living without laws' or 'in a state of lawlessness' (Preamble), for a British identity and future enjoyment of 'all the Rights and Privileges of British Subjects' (Article 3).

The signing of the Treaty/Te Tiriti may be read, then, as the fictional moment when England is transposed to New Zealand and the mythical moment the settler-state begins, both of which occur 'in the simulacrum of the instant.' Hence, as McHugh has it, 'the settler state's authority simply “is” because it is taken by the common law imagination to have always been there.'

The need for a differential reading of the Treaty that acknowledges 'the ellipsis of law qua time' is no more apparent than in the law's oscillation on what it takes the Treaty to be.

Informed by the savage/civilised binary opposition that sits at the heart of settler discourse, the Chief Justice, James Prendergast, in 1877, declared the Treaty inexistent in terms of the law:

The existence of the pact known as the 'Treaty of Waitangi', entered into by Captain Hobson on the part of Her Majesty with certain natives at the Bay of Islands, and adhered to by some other natives of the Northern Island, is perfectly consistent with what has been stated. So far indeed as that instrument purported to cede the

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84 As David Williams points out, a paradox arising out of the Parata decision was 'that Maori were British subjects of the Crown yet foreigners, or non-subjects in a protectorate, at one and the same time' (David V. Williams, *A Simple Nullity?: The Wi Parata Case in New Zealand Law & History* (Auckland: Auckland University Press, 2011), 226-7; James Prendergast, 'Wi Parata v Bishop of Wellington and Attorney-General', G. B. Barton (ed.), *The New Zealand Jurist Reports Comprising Reports of Cases in the Supreme Court of New Zealand and in the Court of Appeal of New Zealand*, Vol. III, (Dunedin: J. Wilkie and Co., 1878), 79: 'the Maori tribes are, ex necessitate rei, exactly on the footing of foreigners secured by treaty stipulations, to which the entire British nation is pledged in the person of its sovereign representative. Transactions with the natives for the cession of their title to the Crown are thus to be regarded as acts of state, and therefore are not examinable by any Court'.

85 Derrida, 'Declarations of Independence', 11.


87 Beardsworth, *Derrida and the Political*, 100.
sovereignty—a matter with which we are not here directly concerned—it must be regarded as a simple nullity. No body politic existed capable of making cession of sovereignty, nor could the thing itself exist. So far as the proprietary rights of the natives are concerned, the so-called treaty merely affirms the rights and obligations which, *jure gentium*, vested in and devolved upon the Crown under the circumstances of the case.88

On McHugh’s view, Prendergast reached this decision on the grounds that a society could only be sovereign and therefore cede that ‘original sovereignty’ if it were civilised, and being civilised meant having ‘a land tenure system and rights to land cognizable in the colonial courts. The Treaty of Waitangi did not effect this’, Prendergast opined, because Maori did not meet the test of being civilised.89 This ‘proposition was wrong’, McHugh argued in the Kaituna River Claim (Wai 4), ‘since it was based on a concept of international law and not on established principles of colonial law’, and therefore ‘[a]ll cases that applied the Prendergast judgement were wrong for the same reason.’90 According to David Williams, ‘the Parata decision stood as good law’ until 1986 when ‘Justice Williamson in the High Court . . . found that an aboriginal right to collect seafood continued to exist’, and when, in 2003, it ‘was finally and comprehensively discredited by the judgments in *Ngati Apa* whereby ‘the Court of Appeal embraced the doctrine of aboriginal title and held that it has been part of New Zealand common law since the original reception of English law.’91

The pendulum of legal opinion swung to the full extent of its amplitude in the opposite direction when, in 2006, the current Chief Justice, Sian Elias, described the

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Treaty as ‘our foundation as a nation’. However, it could also be argued that, no matter how well-intentioned, this was little more than realpolitik, just as Elias’s truth-claim, made on the 170th anniversary of the signing of the Treaty, hides the violence of that instituting moment: “‘No country came together in such beauty, with such hopes.’” It could also be said that reifying a moment such as this is only possible because the force of law relies on the ecstatic passage of time, and because ‘the past is the fiction of the present’ and therefore wholly malleable.

There is one final issue to which we might draw attention in relation to the Treaty: the problem of the one, or singularity, the theoretical basis of which we discussed in Chapter One. What the Treaty does in its assertion of positive law is to effectively elide from consciousness that it is a literary means of asserting dominance. That is, if we are only dealing with the positive assertion of the law and the universalist assertions of the Treaty, we may fail to give proper consideration to the singularities it gives rise to, but which exist and inevitably appear, and, when they do, are taken to be adversarial in relation to the Treaty and its current role. This arises because, as Beardsworth explains, ‘both the fabulous retrospectivity of law and its irreducible force ... necessarily excludes as it includes’, and at ‘the disjuncture between ... law and actuality, between universality and particularity, there emerges what Derrida calls ‘a singularity’ that ‘constitutes the necessary remainder of any attempt to conjoin norm and fact. It marks an essential disjuncture which will return to haunt the law qua those aspects of particularity unmediated by the universality of law.’

In this regard, the law as force was spectacularly on display when, on 15 October 2007, some 300 New Zealand Police, relying on the Terrorism Suppression Act 2002, conducted dawn raids around the country but targeted Tuhoe, the east coast

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94 Beardsworth, Derrida and the Political, 100; Certeau, The Writing of History, 10.
North Island iwi that refused to sign the Treaty and has insisted on its independence since 1840. There could be no mistaking the Crown’s message to Tuhoe as the police in paramilitary gear set up a roadblock in Ruatoki Valley, along part of the line of demarcation where the most fertile of Tuhoe’s land had been divided off and confiscated by the Crown in 1866 on the spurious basis, now acknowledged by the Crown to be without foundation, that Tuhoe had been implicated in the murder of the Anglican missionary Carl Volkner in 1865, and also near where Rua Kenana, a Tuhoe prophet and leader had been arrested in 1916.96 Here, then, at this wider site of indigenous resistance to settler hegemony, the Police, in 2007, forced people onto streets in night attire, searched cars, and boarded school buses. As Moana Jackson puts it: ‘Ruatoki was the only place where people were forced out of their cars at gunpoint and photographed in breach not just of police procedure but basic human rights. Ruatoki was also the only place where mothers, old people and children were searched and held at gunpoint, sometimes for hours, with no pretence at respect and no potential for arrest.’97 Three week later the Solicitor-General refused to authorise Police prosecution under the Terrorism Act, and although the Crown converted its charges to firearms charges under the Arms Act, most of these, by 2011, had also been dropped.98 ‘I can only speak for myself’, said Nikapuru Takuta, ‘but I sort of expected the raids. We all know that there is only one way one culture can maintain power over another one. As far as our ancestors are concerned, it is just another day in the office under colonial rule. . . . The crown will always beat down on us.’99

Thus, the organised violence against Maori, from the New Zealand Wars (c.1843-

99 Nikapuru Takuta as quoted in Morse, The Day the Raids Came, 106.
1872) to Ruatoki 2007, including legislative acts of dispossession, may be reduced to a disavowal of time at the Treaty’s instituting moment, and the ‘savagising’ of Maori on the one hand and the valorising of settler violence on the other may be read as a means of denying the fable of the founding of the New Zealand settler state. Such is the thin thread of metaphor to which settlerism clings.

At the end of 'Declarations of Independence', Derrida poses the following questions: How is a State made or founded, how does a State make or found itself? And an independence? And the autonomy of one which both gives itself, and signs, its own law? Who signs all these authorizations to sign?”

He refrained on that occasion from providing an answer, but did so fifteen years later:

> All Nation-States are born and found themselves in violence. I believe that truth to be irrecusable. Without even exhibiting atrocious spectacles on this subject, it suffices to underline a law of structure: the moment of foundation, the instituting moment, is anterior to the law or legitimacy which it founds. It is thus *outside the law*, and violent by that very fact. But you know that this abstract truth could be illustrated (what a word, here!) by terrifying documents, and from the history of all States, the oldest and the youngest. Before the modern forms of what is called, in the strict sense, 'colonialism', all States (I would dare to say, without playing too much with the word and etymology, all *cultures*) have their origin in an aggression of the *colonial* type. This foundational violence is not only forgotten. The foundation is made in order to hide it; by its essence it tends to organise amnesia, something under the celebration and sublimation of the grand beginnings.

Given history’s ‘impossible possibility’ and the Treaty’s undecidability, this thesis makes the case for thinking about the latter and what it represents—the *différend* at the heart of Aotearoa New Zealand—in radically new ways, not just in conventional historicised ways, but, within the notion of *différance*.

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100 Derrida, ‘Declarations of Independence’, 10.
think ‘the contract-based politics’ of ‘political modernity’ within metaphysics, rather than within the inheritance of post-Enlightenment historico-political thought that delivers results of the type critiqued in this thesis.\textsuperscript{103}

How might we effect this paradigmatic shift in thinking? Given the centrality of \textit{différance} to this thesis, we might begin by considering one of Derrida’s personal observations:

In general, I try to distinguish between what one calls the future and l’avenir. The future is that which—tomorrow, later, next century—will be. There’s a future which is predictable, programmed, scheduled, foreseeable. But there is a future, l’avenir, which refers to someone who comes whose arrival is totally unexpected. For me, that is the real future. That which is totally unpredictable. The Other who comes without my being able to anticipate their arrival. So if there is a real future beyond this other known future, it’s l’avenir in that it’s the coming of the Other when I am completely unable to foresee their arrival.\textsuperscript{104}

This, in essence, is Derrida’s ‘democracy to come’, a way of conceptualising the ‘not-yet-now’, which, as we saw in Chapter One, can never arrive and still be ‘to come’.\textsuperscript{105} It is not ‘a regulative idea in the Kantian sense, but rather something that remains to be thought and to come [à venir]: not something that is certain to happen tomorrow, not the democracy (national or international, state or trans-state) of the future, but a democracy that must have the structure of a promise—\textit{and thus the memory of that which carries the future, the to-come, here and now}.\textsuperscript{106} Among other things, it calls ‘for a militant and interminable political critique’ of any democratic expression anywhere that ‘remains inadequate to the democratic demand’, that ‘remains little more than an obscene alibi so long as it tolerates the terrible plight of so many millions of human beings suffering from malnutrition, disease, and humiliation,

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{103} Beardsworth, ‘In Memorium Jacques Derrida’, §10.
\item \textsuperscript{104} Jacques Derrida, \textit{Derrida} (Jane Doe Films, 2002), Kirby Dick and Amy Ziering Kofman directors.
\item \textsuperscript{105} Derrida, \textit{Rogues}, 1 \textit{passim}, 85-8; Derrida, \textit{Politics of Friendship}, 306; Critchley, ‘Heidegger’s Being and Time, part 8: Temporality’.
\item \textsuperscript{106} Derrida, \textit{The Other Heading}, 78; Derrida, \textit{Rogues}, 85-6.
\end{itemize}
grossly deprived not only of bread and water but of equality or freedom, dispossessed of the rights of all, of everyone, of anyone.'

As Derrida elaborates: 'This naturally presupposes, and that is what is most difficult, most inconceivable, an extension of the democratic beyond nation-state sovereignty, beyond citizenship. This would come about through the creation of an international juridico-political space that, without doing away with every reference to sovereignty, never stops innovating and inventing new distributions and forms of sharing, new divisions of sovereignty.'

Derrida arrived at this point after deconstructing the notion of presence in philosophical thought through the application of différance in his meticulous reading of signature texts, and, later in his career, in relation to the political by deconstructing 'law qua time which institutions attempt to fill in by justifying the violence of the law.' Derrida's différance, therefore, could be an invaluable tool, not only in thinking text in its narrowest terms, but also in its broader scope of interrogating our socio-political world as text. As Beardsworth puts it: 'For Derrida, true political invention lies consequently in experiencing and negotiating the aporias of universality and particularity/singularity as far as possible, all the while aware, precisely, of the impossibility of such a task. The Derridean deconstruction of presence leads therefore to the inseparable but incompatible relation between the ethical or pre-ethical (democracy to come) and the political (this democratic negotiation of singularity here and now).'

Put differently, it is the aporia of time, 'the recurrent impossibility of the now', that creates the promise of 'to come', for it means 'the alterity of any invention or institution is what has always to be negotiated'—which is 'literally the ever-recurrent promise of the non-adequation of the present to itself.'

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107 Derrida, Rogues, 86.
108 Derrida, Rogues, 87.
109 Beardsworth, 'In Memorium Jacques Derrida', §17; Beardsworth, Derrida and the Political, 100.
Thus the question of time and its irreducibility comes back to haunt us. As with the law, so with history: the justification and negation of their undecidability depends on the denial of the relation between time and their existence. That is, the irreducibility of time necessitates that historians rely on ‘the referential illusion’ and retroactive movements of protention to overcome the aporia of time, just as the law relies on ‘the doctrine of precedent’, as if it were present to itself, to do likewise for itself and to underwrite its positivist methodology.\(^{112}\) However, while the irreducibility of time to itself is unavoidable, acknowledging and understanding it is not. And, as suggested in the Introduction, it is here, in the aporias and textual interstices that ethics can go to work.

Hence, it is no longer sufficient, this thesis concludes, to believe in the belief system called history and its accompanying notion of nation-state sovereignty that the spectre of the cannibal suggests settler societies are afraid of losing or sharing. We therefore need to carefully consider Keith Jenkins’s proposition ‘that epistemologically striving histories were just an enormous philosophical mistake’, and thence to a ‘dehegemonization’ of settler historiography so that the process of ‘transforming conditions of impossibility into possibility’ in settler nation-states can commence.\(^{113}\) Reconfiguring ‘scholarly history’ as ‘a fake performative discourse’ predicated on the savage/civilised binary opposition might help Pakeha relinquish the view that their precursors civilised Maori and that their claim to indigeneity as proposed by Michael King—‘Pakeha New Zealanders who are committed to this land and its people are not less “indigenous” than Maori’—is entirely spurious.\(^{114}\) Such a deconstruction would also require acceptance by Pakeha that the domain they now control was expropriated by way of ‘a revolutionary seizure of power’ and

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not handed over in a moment of meek capitulation by a primitive cannibalistic people.\textsuperscript{115} This seismic shift in settler thinking might therefore acknowledge, after Henare, that Maori did not cede sovereignty and that the subsequent settler society trampled on the hospitality extended to it by tangata whenua, a matter of great ethical significance that still needs to be repaired by far more than cash payments that constitute only a tiny fraction of the value of the stolen geography.\textsuperscript{116} Necessarily, that ‘far more’ would involve a reconsideration of the European notion of sovereignty and how the current politico-juridical arrangements might be rethought and redesigned. Part of the critique that must take place, therefore, is that of the widely held view that ‘[t]he Treaty of Waitangi is New Zealand’s founding document’, and Elias’s view that ‘justice’ is ‘one of the underlying notions of the Treaty’.\textsuperscript{117} Given the aporia of time, the document as foundational can only be notional—that is, a metaphor that describes a mystical occurrence—and justice just another transcendental signifier and paradox.\textsuperscript{118} Furthermore, as Tony Ballantyne explains, ‘treaty making was a vital instrument of empire and was absolutely fundamental to the expansion of British territorial interest in North America, South Asia and elsewhere’, including, we might add, the Treaty of Nanking, signed in 1842, by which the British demanded a cash settlement of \$21 million payable over three years from the Chinese government while effectively forcing opium on the Chinese population.\textsuperscript{119} It is the selfsame process perpetuated by the United States government, in which the 371 treaties signed with Native American peoples

\begin{flushleft}
\footnotesize
\textsuperscript{115} Brookfield, \textit{Waitangi and Indigenous Rights}, 181.

\textsuperscript{116} Henare, \textit{The Changing Images of Nineteenth-century Maori Society}, 201.


\textsuperscript{118} As a transcendental signifier, Elias’s ‘justice’ halts any regress of meaning and therefore any inquiry into its paradoxical nature. For ‘justice as law’ is impossible without force, which begs the question of how we are to distinguish between just and unjust force given that the former ‘could not itself have been authorized by any anterior legitimacy’ (Derrida, ‘Force of Law’, 5-6).


\end{flushleft}
‘became the new republic’s legal stepping-stones for building the road to empire in its determined quest to reach the Pacific Ocean.’

Given the classic shape of nation-state sovereignty and the complex set of socio-political circumstances that make up contemporary New Zealand, a shift in settler thinking of this magnitude would require ‘a slow and differentiated deconstruction’ of settler logic, not least because the deconstruction would not just be theoretically posed but would be implemented practically ‘in the world’. As Derrida explains,

even in politics, the choice is not between sovereignty and nonsovereignty, but among several forms of partings, partitions, divisions, conditions that come along to broach a sovereignty that is always supposed to be indivisible and unconditional. Whence the difficulty, awkwardness, aporia even, and the slowness, the always unequal development of such a deconstruction. This is less than ever the equivalent of a deconstruction. But recognizing that sovereignty is divisible, that it divides and partitions, even where there is any sovereignty left, is already to begin to deconstruct a pure concept of sovereignty that presupposes indivisibility.

What, then, might ‘[t]he democracy to come’ mean in the New Zealand context? It should mean, at the least, a radically new way of thinking with a new language to think and express it, one that does away with the cannibalizing of settler discourse and the predeterminations of juridico-historical positivism and begins to negotiate the aporia of democracy’s singularity; a language that remains vigilant to ‘state discourses’, totalizing narratives, and the imposition ‘of discursive norms and models’ no matter whence they arise, including the academy. A new language that deconstructs the law without descending into lawlessness, that takes us ‘beyond the

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120 Paul VanDevelde, Savages and Scoundrels: The Untold Story of America’s Road to Empire Through Indian Territory (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2009), 212.
123 Derrida, Rogues, 1 passim.
124 Derrida, The Other Heading, 54.
homo-fraternal and phallogocentric schema’ that describes Edmund Hillary and Wilson Whineray as ‘models of the national character’, beyond the exceptionalism of nationalism, and the toxicity of commentators such as Rodney Hide who describes the Waitangi Tribunal as ‘our Babylonian priesthood’ and ‘the Maori language [as] being both very limited and obsolete.’

Above all, Derrida’s ‘democracy to come’ might lead to a new way of being that directly addresses the différènd by including multiple expressions of mana motuhake and coextensive juridical systems, and the taking of a ‘new’ name that encapsulates this new way of thinking, this new way of being: Aotearoa.

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126 Derrida, Rogues, 1 passim; Simon During, ‘Postmodernism or post-colonialism today’, Textual Practice, 1/1 (1987), 45; According to the online Maori Dictionary, the term ‘mana motuhake’ means ‘separate identity, autonomy - mana through self-determination and control over one's own destiny’: http://www.maoridictionary.co.nz/.
Speech of the Hon. Tariana Turia to the NZ Psychological Society Conference 2000 at Waikato University on Tuesday, 20 August 2000, as supplied by her office to The New Zealand Herald: 

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Tena tatau e hui nei i tenei ra. Tena koutou nga rangatira o Waikato. Nga mihi ki a koutou a ki Te Ata-i- rangikaahu hoki. Tena tatau katoa.

Thank you for inviting me to speak at this conference. Over the last week or so, such has been the activity over what I have been purported to have said or done, I have at times questioned the nature of truth.

I also questioned hearing, listening and memory.

Indeed I was tempted to seek wise counsel and I did think of this gathering this week and the thought did enter my head, that a psychologist just might come in handy.

I dismissed the thought very quickly!

I realised that the best counsellors for me are the very supportive whanau I am fortunate to have.

A whanau, who in times when my spirit needs nurturing I can always turn to. I am also always able to tap the resource of the memories and guidance of those who have passed on, to give me solace and to uplift me.

It is this whanau of whom I am a member which nurtures and sustains me.

It is this whanau which is also a part of the iwi of Whanganui, Ngati Apa, Nga Rauru and Tuwharetoa who are responsible for my identity, responsible for the security that I have in knowing who I am.

What my whanau are not able to provide I will seek in the hapu and iwi. I have numerous choices.

We all know the social structures of whanau, hapu and iwi are responsible for both cultural reproduction and identity.

All of you here know these same social structures have demonstrated amazing
resilience as sites of resistance to colonisation, but, which as you also know, have been seriously weakened.

Given what I have just said you just might have realised that what I wish to address with you today is the phenomenon of colonisation and some thoughts on what the implications may be for psychology.

I know Tariana Turia and “colonization” always attracts attention.

I seek not personal attention. I just want us to consider our history as a country and consider how this history has affected the indigenous people, how this history has impacted on Maori whanau, hapu and iwi.

I really do believe that mature, intelligent New Zealanders of all races are capable of the analysis of the trauma of one group of people suffering from the behaviour of another.

I can see the connections between 'home invasions' which concern many of us, to the invasion of the 'home lands' of indigenous people by a people from another land.

What I have difficulty in reconciling is how 'home invasions' emits such outpourings of concern for the victims and an intense despising of the invaders while the invasion of the 'home lands' of Maori does not engender the same level of emotion and concern for the Maori victims.

I wonder why that is?

A double standard seems to be working here, you as psychologists I am confident will be able to identify and label the double standard.

With personal identity inextricably tied to whanau, hapu and iwi identity, indigenous people still have to counter the problems of the conspiracy of alienation, assimilation and deculturation launched against them well over a century ago.

I have been accused in Parliament in the past week of indulging in “sociological clap trap” when linking colonisation to family violence.

I can now imagine after this speech that I will be accused of indulging in ‘psychological clap trap’.

I may look to you to defend me against such scurrilous attacks. I suppose I should be grateful the house is not sitting.

What I need to say however that as psychologists you frequently have as your clients, Maori people.

The challenge I put to you is – Do you seriously believe that you, with the training that you get, are able to nurture the Maori psyche, are you able to see in to the soul
of the people and attend to the wounded spirit?

Do you consider for example the effects of the trauma of colonisation? I know that psychology has accepted the relevance of PTSD (Post Traumatic Stress Disorder).

I understand that much of the research done in this area has focussed on the trauma suffered by the Jewish survivors of the holocaust of World War Two. I also understand the same has been done with the Vietnam veterans.

What seems to not have received similar attention is the holocaust suffered by indigenous people including Maori as a result of colonial contact and behaviour.

The Waitangi Tribunal made such a reference in its Taranaki Report of 1996 and I recollect what appeared to be a “but our holocaust was worse than your holocaust” debate. A debate I must add, I do not wish to enter.

Psychologists, Emeritus Professor James and Professor Jane Ritchie likewise link colonisation with violence.

Native American Psychologist Eduardo Duran suggests in referring to Native Americans that the colonial oppression suffered by indigenous people inevitably wounds the soul.

He also says that for any effective therapy to take place the historical context of generations of oppression since colonial contact needs to be articulated, acknowledged and understood.

Professor Mason Durie identifies the onset of colonisation and the subsequent alienation and theft of the land as the beginning of Maori health issues that manifest themselves today. Issues, that have as a result of inter-generational systemic abuse, become culturally endemic.

Since first colonial contact, much effort has been invested in attempts at individualising Maori with the introduction of numerous assimilationist policies and laws to alienate Maori from their social structures which were linked to the guardianship and occupation of land.

A consequence of colonial oppression has been the internalisation by Maori of the images the oppressor has of them. It is for that reason that I found the negative portrayal of Maori whanau last week to be both spiritually and psychologically damaging.

I know the psychological consequences of the internalisation of negative images is for people to take for themselves the illusion of the oppressors’ power while they are in a situation of helplessness and despair, a despair leading to self-hatred and for many, suicide.
The externalisation of the self-hatred on the other hand, is seen with the number of Maori who are convicted of crimes of violence and the very high number of Maori women and children who are the victims of violence.

The film ‘Once Were Warriors’ and the Keri Hulme novel, ‘The Bone People’ bring home all too graphically the extreme levels of violence which for many, is seen as culturally endemic behaviour, behaviour which they and the wider society in which they live, see as ‘normal’.

The phenomenon of Post Colonial Traumatic Stress Disorder and its effects it appears are now culturally integrated in to the psyche and soul of Maori. It never used to be there. Indeed as Professor Anne Salmond has found, children were indulged and records of early contact show that violence towards children was uncommon. More uncommon than it was in Europe at the same period. A golden age for Maori children it would seem.

Maori tribal commentators and Treaty negotiators like Dr Hirini Mead of Te Runanga O Ngati Awa have alluded to the cumulative generational effects of trauma or as he put it ‘damage’ which has been passed down from the period of the Land Wars to current generations.

A question Dr Mead has posed was related to the amount of compensation required to repair the intergenerational damage to the people. Damage, the genesis of which resides in the nineteenth century.

The holocaust suffered by many Maori tribes during the Land Wars needs to be acknowledged. Only then will the healing for Maori occur.

Indeed some of the events surrounding Treaty of Waitangi land settlements have resulted in healing for the whanau of ancestors murdered by the State in State institutions.

The bones of these ancestors have been taken from the gaols and returned to their tribal homes. The return of these physical and spiritual ancestral remains have resulted in the descendants, who generations before, left their tribal lands in shame, also returning ‘home’. For these families, the healing can now begin.

For Maori, indeed for all indigenous people the issue is the identification of the trauma, as Post Colonial Traumatic Stress Disorder in order to site the issue in its proper historical, political and economic context.

This would also encourage considering the continuing oppressive effects of colonisation and the various forms it has taken as Native American academic Ward Churchill says, “since predator came.”

The signs and symptoms of Post Colonial Traumatic Stress Disorder (PCTSD) with Maori, needs analysis and examination.
My challenge would be for the few Maori psychologists amongst you, to lead the discourse on that analysis.

Following are some indicators of the results of post colonial trauma.

* Have a poor self-image.

* Have a tendency to self belittle.

* Tribe deprived of land by government dishonesty and theft.

* Parents/grandparents beaten for speaking their mother tongue.

* Members unable to identify with tribe.

* Identity now based on where they live (urban) and not on genealogy and ancestry.

* Fearful of imprisonment unless cousins are also incarcerated.

* Subjected to personal, institutional and cultural racism.

* Beat up spouse, children and siblings.

While much of my address to you today has focussed on the effects of colonisation and has considered that macro position, at a local and personal level I would like you to also consider the following.

Does your training and education address issues like the nature of the Maori kai tiaki, the spiritual guardian all Maori have? What if I told you I have been visited a number of times by my kai tiaki and had carried out a conversation? What if I said to you that my kai tiaki had cautioned me about a particular action?

What for example is mate Maori? (Maori sickness)

What is makutu?

What is the nature of the rau kotahi; the multiple self?

Finally in terms of our world-views, what is the difference between you saying “I think, therefore I am” and us saying “We are.”

Kia ora tatau.

***
APPENDIX 2.

THE CANNIBAL CATECHISM

Versified from the Writings of a Father of the Church

1

PRESERVE us from our enemies,
Thou who art Lord of suns and skies,
Whose meat and drink is flesh in pies,  
And blood in bowls!
Of Thy sweet mercy, damn their eyes,
And damn their souls!

2

The cannibal of just behaviour
Acknowledges the Lord his saviour,
With gifts of whose especial favour
He hath been crammed,
To whom an offering of sweet savour
Are all the damned.

3

O Lord, Thy people know full well
That all who eat not flesh and fell,
Who cannot rightly speak or spell
Thy various names,

---

1 Algernon Swinburne, ‘The Cannibal Catechism’ (Circa 1853), London, 1913. Supplied by The British Library.
2 A cancel of the first three lines runs thus :-

    Thou who art Lord of suns and skies,
    Whose food is human flesh in pies
    Of sacred make and awful size.
Shall be for ever broiled in hell
Among the flames.

4
Glad tidings of great exultation
Proclaim me to the chosen nation;
To all men else in every station
The joyful story
That they are going to damnation
And me to glory.

5
In pits of sulphur Thou wilt cram them,
In chains of burning brimstone jam them,
Square them like pigs, like wadding ram them,
With flame surround them;
O Lord of love, confound and damn them!
Damn and confound them!

6
Grind them to pieces, small and gritty,
O Thou whose names are Love and Pity!
Roast brown all faces that were pretty,
All black men blacker;
Strip off the trappings of their clay,
Paint, plumes and lacquer.

7
The foes Thy people seek to kill
Even as a devil do thou grill!
O let Thy stormy anger still
    Shake them like jellies!
Give Thou their carcases to fill
    Thy servants' bellies!

8
The heathen, whose ungodly lip
Doth in ungodly pewter dip,
Curse his gin, whisky, rum and flip,
    Strong ale and bumbo!
Scourge him with anger as a whip,
    O Mumbo-Jumbo!
APPENDIX 3.

List of New Zealand national general histories

APPENDIX 4.

THE TREATY OF WAITANGI/TE TIRITI O WAITANGI


English Version of the Treaty of Waitangi

The following version of the Treaty is taken from the first schedule to the Treaty of Waitangi Act 1975.

Preamble
HER MAJESTY VICTORIA Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland regarding with Her Royal Favour the Native Chiefs and Tribes of New Zealand and anxious to protect their just Rights and Property and to secure to them the enjoyment of Peace and Good Order has deemed it necessary in consequence of the great number of Her Majesty's Subjects who have already settled in New Zealand and the rapid extension of Emigration both from Europe and Australia which is still in progress to constitute and appoint a functionary properly authorized to treat with the Aborigines of New Zealand for the recognition of Her Majesty's Sovereign authority over the whole or any part of those islands – Her Majesty therefore being desirous to establish a settled form of Civil Government with a view to avert the evil consequences which must result from the absence of the necessary Laws and Institutions alike to the native population and to Her subjects has been graciously pleased to empower and to authorize me William Hobson a Captain in Her Majesty's Royal Navy Consul and Lieutenant Governor of such parts of New Zealand as may be or hereafter shall be ceded to her Majesty to invite the confederated and independent Chiefs of New Zealand to concur in the following Articles and Conditions.

Article the First
The Chiefs of the Confederation of the United Tribes of New Zealand and the separate and independent Chiefs who have not become members of the Confederation cede to Her Majesty the Queen of England absolutely and without reservation all the rights and powers of Sovereignty which the said Confederation or Individual Chiefs respectively exercise or possess, or may be supposed to exercise or to possess over their respective Territories as the sole Sovereigns thereof.

Article the Second
Her Majesty the Queen of England confirms and guarantees to the Chiefs and Tribes of New Zealand and to the respective families and individuals thereof the full exclusive and undisturbed possession of their Lands and Estates Forests Fisheries and other properties which they may collectively or individually possess so long as it is their wish and desire to retain the same in their possession; but the Chiefs of the
United Tribes and the individual Chiefs yield to Her Majesty the exclusive right of Preemption over such lands as the proprietors thereof may be disposed to alienate at such prices as may be agreed upon between the respective Proprietors and persons appointed by Her Majesty to treat with them in that behalf.

**Article the Third**

In consideration thereof Her Majesty the Queen of England extends to the Natives of New Zealand Her royal protection and imparts to them all the Rights and Privileges of British Subjects.

W HOBSON Lieutenant Governor.

Now therefore We the Chiefs of the Confederation of the United Tribes of New Zealand being assembled in Congress at Victoria in Waitangi and We the Separate and Independent Chiefs of New Zealand claiming authority over the Tribes and Territories which are specified after our respective names, having been made fully to understand the Provisions of the foregoing Treaty, accept and enter into the same in the full spirit and meaning thereof: in witness of which we have attached our signatures or marks at the places and the dates respectively specified.

Done at Waitangi this Sixth day of February in the year of Our Lord One thousand eight hundred and forty.

[Here follow signatures, dates, etc.]

*M*  


**Māori Version of the Treaty of Waitangi**

*The following version of the Treaty is taken from the first schedule to the Treaty of Waitangi Act 1975.*

**Preamble**

Ko Wikitoria, te Kuini o Ingarani, i tana mahara atawai ki nga Rangatira me nga Hapu o Nu Tirani i tana hiahia hoki kia tohungia kia a ratou o ratou rangatiratanga, me to ratou wenua, a kia mau tonu hoki te Rongo ki a ratou me te Atanoho hoki kua wakaaro ia he mea tika kia tukua mai tetahi Rangatira hei kai wakarite ki nga Tangata maori o Nu Tirani-kia wakaaetia e nga Rangatira maori te Kawanatanga o te Kuini ki nga wahihakoatanga te Wenua nei me nga Motu-na te mea hoki he tokomaha ke nga tangata o tona Iwi Kua noho ki tenei wenua, a e haere mai nei.

Na ko te Kuini e hiahia ana kia wakaritea te Kawanatanga kia kaua ai nga kino e puta
mai ki te tangata Maori ki te Pakeha e noho ture kore ana.

Na, kua pai te Kuini kia tukua a hau a Wiremu Hopihona he Kapitana i te Roiara
Nawi hei Kawana mo nga wahi katoa o Nu Tirani e tukua aiiane, amua atu ki te Kuini
e mea atu ana ia ki nga Rangatira o te wakaminenga o nga hapu o Nu Tirani me era
Rangatira atu enei ture ka korerotia nei.

**Ko te Tuatahi**
Ko nga Rangatira o te Wakaminenga me nga Rangatira katoa hoki ki hai i uru ki taua
wakaminenga ka tuku rawa atu ki te Kuini o Ingarani ake tonu atu-te Kawanatanga
katoa o o ratou wenua.

**Ko te Tuarua**
Ko te Kuini o Ingarani ka wakarite ka wakaae ki nga Rangatira ki nga hapu-ki nga
tangata katoa o Nu Tirani te tino rangatiratanga o o ratou wenua o ratou kainga me
o ratou taonga katoa. Otiia ko nga Rangatira o te Wakaminenga me nga Rangatira
katoa atu ka tuku ki te Kuini te hokonga o era wahi wenua e pai ai te tangata nona te
Wenua-ki te ritenga o te utu e wakaritea ai e ratou ko te kai hoko e meatia nei e te
Kuini hei kai hoko mona.

**Ko te Tuatoru**
Hei wakaritenga mai hoki tenei mo te wakaetaanga ki te Kawanatanga o te Kuini-Ka
tiakina e te Kuini o Ingarani nga tangata maori katoa o Nu Tirani ka tukua ki a ratou
nga tikanga katoa rite tahi ki ana mea ki nga tangata o Ingarani.

(Signed) William Hobson, Consul and Lieutenant-Governor.

Na ko matou ko nga Rangatira o te Wakaminenga o nga hapu o Nu Tirani ka huihui
nei ki Waitangi ko matou hoki ko nga Rangatira o Nu Tirani ka kite nei i te ritenga o
enei kupu, ka tangohia ka wakaaetia katoatia e matou, koia ka tohungia ai o matou
ingoa o matou tohu.

Ka meatia tenei ki Waiangi i te ono o nga ra o Pepueri i te tau kotahi mano, e waru
rau e wa te kau o to tatou Ariki.

*Ko nga Rangatira o te wakaminenga.*

*http://www.waitangi-tribunal.govt.nz/treaty/kawharutranslation.asp*

**Kawharu Translation**

*The following translation of the Māori text of the Treaty was done by former Tribunal
member Professor Sir Hugh Kawharu.*

Victoria, the Queen of England, in her concern to protect the chiefs and the subtribes
of New Zealand and in her desire to preserve their chieftainship\(^\text{1}\) and their lands to them and to maintain peace\(^\text{2}\) and good order considers it just to appoint an administrator\(^\text{3}\) one who will negotiate with the people of New Zealand to the end that their chiefs will agree to the Queen’s Government being established over all parts of this land and (adjoining) islands\(^\text{4}\) and also because there are many of her subjects already living on this land and others yet to come. So the Queen desires to establish a government so that no evil will come to Māori and European living in a state of lawlessness. So the Queen has appointed ‘me, William Hobson a Captain’ in the Royal Navy to be Governor for all parts of New Zealand (both those) shortly to be received by the Queen and (those) to be received hereafter and presents\(^\text{5}\) to the chiefs of the Confederation chiefs of the subtribes of New Zealand and other chiefs these laws set out here.

**The first**
The Chiefs of the Confederation and all the Chiefs who have not joined that Confederation give absolutely to the Queen of England for ever the complete government\(^\text{6}\) over their land.

**The second**
The Queen of England agrees to protect the chiefs, the subtribes and all the people of New Zealand in the unqualified exercise\(^\text{7}\) of their chieftainship over their lands, villages and all their treasures.\(^\text{8}\) But on the other hand the Chiefs of the Confederation and all the Chiefs will sell\(^\text{9}\) land to the Queen at a price agreed to by the person owning it and by the person buying it (the latter being) appointed by the Queen as her purchase agent.

**The third**
For this agreed arrangement therefore concerning the Government of the Queen, the Queen of England will protect all the ordinary people of New Zealand and will give them the same rights and duties\(^\text{10}\) of citizenship as the people of England.\(^\text{11}\)

[signed] William Hobson Consul & Lieut Governor

So we, the Chiefs of the Confederation of the subtribes of New Zealand meeting here at Waitangi having seen the shape of these words which we accept and agree to record our names and our marks thus.

Was done at Waitangi on the sixth of February in the year of our Lord 1840.

**Footnotes**
1. ‘Chieftainship’: this concept has to be understood in the context of Māori social and political organisation as at 1840. The accepted approximation today is ‘trusteeship’.\(^\uparrow\)
2. ‘Peace’: Māori ‘Rongo’, seemingly a missionary usage (rongo – to hear: ie, hear the ‘Word’ – the ‘message’ of peace and goodwill, etc).\(^\uparrow\)
3. Literally ‘Chief’ (‘Rangatira’) here is of course ambiguous. Clearly, a European could not be a Māori, but the word could well have implied a trustee-like role rather
than that of a mere ‘functionary’. Māori speeches at Waitangi in 1840 refer to Hobson being or becoming a ‘father’ for the Māori people. Certainly this attitude has been held towards the person of the Crown down to the present day – hence the continued expectations and commitments entailed in the Treaty.↑

4. ‘Islands’: ie, coastal, not of the Pacific.†

5. Literally ‘making’: ie, ‘offering’ or ‘saying’ – but not ‘inviting to concur’.↑

6. ‘Government’: ‘kawanatanga’. There could be no possibility of the Māori signatories having any understanding of government in the sense of ‘sovereignty’: ie, any understanding on the basis of experience or cultural precedent.↑

7. ‘Unqualified exercise’ of the chieftainship – would emphasise to a chief the Queen’s intention to give them complete control according to their customs. ‘Tino’ has the connotation of ‘quintessential’.↑

8. ‘Treasures’: ‘taonga’. As submissions to the Waitangi Tribunal concerning the Māori language have made clear, ‘taonga’ refers to all dimensions of a tribal group’s estate, material and non-material – heirlooms and wahi tapu (sacred places), ancestral lore and whakapapa (genealogies), etc.↑


10. ‘Rights and duties’: Māori at Waitangi in 1840 refer to Hobson being or becoming a ‘father’ for the Māori people. Certainly, this attitude has been held towards the person of the Crown down to the present day – hence the continued expectations and commitments entailed in the Treaty.↑

11. There is, however, a more profound problem about ‘tikanga’. There is a real sense here of the Queen ‘protecting’ (ie, allowing the preservation of) the Māori people’s tikanga (ie, customs) since no Māori could have had any understanding whatever of British tikanga (ie, rights and duties of British subjects). This, then, reinforces the guarantees in article 2.↑
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