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HEIDEGGER'S LOGICAL INVESTIGATIONS:

A CRITIQUE OF HUSSELI, NEO-KANTIANISM, AND PLATO

Jordan Elijah Collins

A thesis submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy in Philosophy

The University of Auckland

2013
Abstract

This dissertation interprets Martin Heidegger's views of logic in his works up to and including *Being and Time*. Through an examination of his historical context, I argue that Heidegger's philosophy of logic plays a pivotal role in his attempts to work out the question of being. I trace the development of Heidegger's views from his earliest writings. Heidegger's first philosophical writings treat widely debated topics in the logic literature of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries in the neo-Kantian tradition. His positive contributions to a robust philosophy of logic are worked out against this background and in tandem with his criticisms of neo-Kantianism and the phenomenology of Edmund Husserl. As such, I start with a presentation of the state of logic in the nineteenth century culminating in an investigation of the main differences in the works of Paul Natorp and Edmund Husserl as a backdrop for the rest of the thesis where I engage directly with Heidegger's views on logic. I argue that Heidegger's early break from his neo-Kantian affiliation does not demonstrate a turning away from logic, but rather a turning toward the origins of the discipline. Heidegger's engagement with his teacher, Heinrich Rickert, sets the scene in the second chapter. As I show, Heidegger's phenomenological initiation contains the first stirrings of his more mature philosophy where questions surrounding the origins of logic provide the impetus behind the central questions which he pursues during his phenomenological decade. In particular, I maintain that Heidegger's *Being and Time* can be fruitfully read as a response to the debate over psychologism. As I demonstrate, his criticisms of both Husserlian phenomenology and neo-Kantianism are rooted in his views on this debate. Finally, I uncover the source of Heidegger's criticism of logic in his reading of Plato. This dissertation demonstrates that Heidegger's interpretation of Plato in his *Sophist* lectures can best be understood in light of his views on logic and, conversely, that Heidegger's interpretation of the *Sophist* informs his philosophy of logic. At the heart of Heidegger's philosophy, I contend, resides a robust philosophy of logic awaiting excavation.
For Rebecca
Acknowledgements

Many thanks, first of all, to my supervisor Dr. Matheson Russell for his unfailing encouragement and critical engagement; his incisive interpretations of Husserl and Heidegger have motivated me to clarify my own. Thanks also to Dr. Glen Pettigrove for his critical eye, for his constructive advice, and for his general encouragement. I would also like to express my gratitude to Prof. Cyril Welch who has acted as my role model of serious intellectual pursuit and has continued to inspire me in the course of my studies, from mathematics to philosophy, from the start.

I would like to thank my family who have supported me in whatever endeavour I choose. Specifically, thanks to my brother Patrick who has had a great influence in my choice of studies and in life itself (and thanks too for the last minute proof reading).

Thanks also to my friends at the University of Auckland: Dr. Dominic Griffiths and his wife Maria for joining me in reading through Plato’s works; Dr. Koji Tanaka and Andrew Withy for their ‘logical’ conversations; Dan Hirst for the engaging discussions over many cups of coffee; Dr. Bronwyn Finnigan and Dr. Indrek Männiste for their friendly support and advice in PhD-related matters.

Part of this dissertation was written while I was on a three month research exchange at McGill University in Montreal. I would like to thank Prof. Phillip Buckley for supporting my application for funding and his generosity during my time at McGill. Thanks also to Melanie Coughlin and Itamar Schmerling for some engaging conversations.

Finally, thanks to my wife Rebecca. The bibliography, footnotes, and overall format owe their present form to her careful attention (any mistakes remain my own, of course). But more importantly, thanks are owed for all of the pleasant distractions which have made this endeavour worthwhile. Rebecca has truly provided the conditions of the possibility for my completion of this dissertation; thanks to her for always keeping a smile on my face.
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**Abbreviations**

**Martin Heidegger**

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<thead>
<tr>
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<th>Title</th>
<th>Years</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BH</td>
<td><em>Becoming Heidegger</em></td>
<td>(1910-1927)</td>
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<td>FS</td>
<td><em>Frühe Schriften</em></td>
<td>(1912-1916)</td>
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<tr>
<td>TDP</td>
<td><em>Towards the Definition of Philosophy</em></td>
<td>(1919)</td>
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<td>PS</td>
<td><em>Plato’s Sophist</em></td>
<td>(1924-1925)</td>
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<tr>
<td>HCT</td>
<td><em>The History of the Concept of Time</em></td>
<td>(1925)</td>
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<td>LQT</td>
<td><em>Logic: The Question of Truth</em></td>
<td>(1925-1926)</td>
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<td>BT</td>
<td><em>Being and Time</em></td>
<td>(1927)</td>
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<tr>
<td>BPP</td>
<td><em>The Basic Problems of Phenomenology</em></td>
<td>(1927)</td>
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**Edmund Husserl**

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<td>LUI</td>
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<td>(1900-1901)</td>
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<td>LUII</td>
<td><em>Logical Investigations (Vol. 2)</em></td>
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**Immanuel Kant**

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<tr>
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<td><em>Lectures on Logic</em></td>
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**Hermann Lotze**

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**Paul Natorp**

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<td>OSK</td>
<td>“On the Objective and Subjective Grounding of Knowledge”</td>
<td>(1887)</td>
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**Heinrich Rickert**

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<td>LCF</td>
<td><em>The Limits of Concept Formation</em></td>
<td>(1896-1902)</td>
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Introduction

This dissertation treats Martin Heidegger’s early (pre-Kehre) views on logic. In his later (post-Kehre) works Heidegger traces the domination of metaphysics from Plato to Nietzsche in the attendant devolution of Western thought. This history goes hand in hand with the transformation of *logos* from ‘gathering together’ to ‘asserted thought’, to the asserted judgement where truth resides. Assertions are always assertions of *something* and so the judgement as asserted comes to dominate questions into the nature of beings and being: Aristotle opens his investigation of how “things are said” with a division into his ten categories (substance, quantity, quality, relation, place, time, position, state, action, or affection).\(^1\) The categories allow for further characterization according to what the category reveals – an essence or a property, a genus or an accident – and then whether what is said holds necessarily, possibly, or factually. In short, the categories are understood as determinations of being according to what is said. Ontology becomes the doctrine of categories, an account of the forms of assertion expressing an underlying thought. As *logos* is transformed from the ‘happening of unconcealment’ to the assertion, to the presentation of *something* – with ‘that about which something is said’ lying at its basis – being comes to be dominated by *noein*, the grasping understanding of what lies at the basis of assertion.\(^2\) Human reason gradually imposes its domination over being. This domination culminates in the ‘science of logic’, itself nothing but a systematization of the laws of thought derived from the laws of correct assertion. However, these laws are restricted by the capacities of human thinking; they thereby limit what can be said about being. Ultimately they cannot capture the original opening up of being presupposed by human thinking.\(^3\) Assertions are about beings, so logic treats beings and can never capture the process of *being*. In logic resides the pretention to propound upon being and to dominate it. Heidegger looks for a more fundamental speaking that, from its own idiosyncrasy, does not allow itself to be captured in any assertion, in logic. He looks for the saying based upon the (propriating) happening [*Ereignis*] which in itself reveals the most proper way of (propriating) happening [*Ereignen*],\(^4\) for a saying of being that will

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allow the happening of being to show itself. This saying comes before all logic. Logic is an entirely derivative discipline, coming after the most genuine task of thinking (philosophy).

The question of Heidegger’s stance on logic at first glance seems to be a simple one. Apart from his early flirtation with the discipline, Heidegger makes increasingly negative comments about logic and its place in philosophy. By the end of the 1920’s he seems to call for the dissolution of logic. In the 1930s he works out the fundamentally derivative nature of logic. His ‘turn to poetry’ in the 1940s and beyond leads to Heidegger’s coupling of logic with merely calculative thinking and, finally, in the 1950s his critique of logic goes hand in hand with his critique of technology. In this dissertation I counter this simplistic reading of Heidegger’s stance on logic, drawing out the complexities of his views on logic in his earliest writings up to and including his monumental *Being and Time*.

Despite the vast body of secondary literature on Heidegger, relatively little of it deals with his views on logic. The prevelance of the above simplistic synoptic overview of Heidegger’s position on logic might account this neglect. However, as I demonstrate throughout this dissertation, Heidegger in fact develops an intricate and insightful view on the nature of logic that touches the core of his philosophy. I limit my focus to Heidegger’s early Freiburg and Marburg period. As such, I treat his works that date prior to his 1929 inaugural lecture at Freiburg, “What is Metaphysics?”. In this lecture Heidegger addresses in concentrated detail themes introduced in *Being and Time*. He considers the way in which science, which is always about something, can address the question of nothing. Unsurprisingly, all that science – which treats beings – can say about nothing is that ‘the nothing is not’. Questioning the nature of this negativity, Heidegger uncovers the primordial belongingness of negativity to being. He calls the basic nature of negativity ‘the nothing’ and places it as the other of being. Logical negation is only possible, Heidegger explains, on the basis of such a metaphysical being-together of ‘the nothing’ and being. Negation (and logic) is thus entirely derivative of metaphysics. Heidegger demonstrates the limitations of any philosophy taking its orientation from logic which rigidifies its conceptual tools (here negation). Such a logical theory can say nothing about being and ‘the nothing’. Logical theory lacks the requisite phenomenal basis, relying on its own set of presuppositions. He concludes: philosophy must ask, without presuppositions, the basic question of metaphysics: ‘why is there something
rather than nothing?’ Philosophy dominated by logic and theory cannot decide on this question, it cannot even approach it. Logic is derivative of metaphysics: ‘the idea of ‘logic’ itself disintegrates in the turbulence of a more original questioning.’

Rudolf Carnap’s response to Heidegger’s talk, published in 1932, in many ways set the tone for interpretations of Heidegger’s work on logic. Carnap cites Heidegger’s remarks about how ‘the nothing nothings’ as a simple logical mistake. Most writings on Heidegger have either taken up Heidegger’s position, maintaining that logic is a derivative discipline founded on metaphysics, or they have sided with Carnap in dismissing Heidegger’s writings as illogical or as endorsing a form of irrationalism. Among Heidegger’s supporters there is a tendency to endorse the view that Heidegger calls for the expulsion of logic from philosophy, arguing that, if one follows Heidegger, one is impelled to this conclusion. However, this either/or between accepting Heidegger’s complete rejection of logic and accepting his opponents’ endorsement of logic (and hence their rejection of Heidegger) rests on a mistake: although Heidegger is not interested in specific questions internal to logic, he does provide a robust philosophy of logic.

This dissertation is an attempt to uncover the most salient features of this philosophy of logic in the years leading up to and including the publication of Heidegger’s Being and Time. I argue that concerns central to his thought can be read in light of debates surrounding the nature and place of logic in the nineteenth century. To this end, Heidegger’s thoughts on logic must be put into their proper historical context. Recently a few penetrating contributions in this area have appeared. This dissertation aims to add to this slowly growing body of work which presents Heidegger’s philosophical views on logic as necessarily understood in their historical milieu. I survey some of these works presently, simply laying bare the general themes as an acknowledgment of the few in-depth works that have been written on Heidegger and logic.

Beginning with his dissertation Truth and Reflection: Transcendental Logic in Lask, Husserl, and Heidegger, Steven Galt Crowell has published a series of papers treating

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7 For a detailed analysis of the unsatisfactory nature of this ‘interpretive scenario’ see the first chapter of Stephan Käufer, “Heidegger’s Philosophy of Logic” (PhD diss., Stanford University, 1998), 8-33.
Heidegger’s philosophy of logic in relation to both his neo-Kantian teachers, most notably Emil Lask, and his mentor in phenomenology, Edmund Husserl. Crowell’s work is historically well-informed and strives to situate Heidegger’s thought in its proper historical context. Crowell’s dissertation investigates the transformation of the concept of truth in the treatments of transcendental logic by Lask, Husserl and Heidegger. Heidegger’s account of truth in Being and Time is shown to emerge from problems in the Kantian tradition of transcendental logic. In Truth and Reflection, as well as the collection Husserl, Heidegger, and the Space of Meaning, Crowell consistently defends the thesis that Heidegger’s transition from his earliest writings to his Being and Time – the transition from an endorsement of Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology to his own radical hermeneutic approach to fundamental ontology – does not represent a radical break with, but a continuous transformation of Husserl’s project. Heidegger’s hermeneutic phenomenology is presented not as a “‘pragmatic’ substitution of the practical for the theoretical” but as a critical transcendental reflection on the nature of subjectivity. Heidegger’s Being and Time is thus read as a response to transcendental logical questions. As will become apparent throughout this thesis, I agree with Crowell’s basic position: Heidegger’s Being and Time represents the culmination of, not a radical break with, the pursuit of a rigorous ‘scientific’ phenomenological philosophy and is best read in the context of its historical influences.

Stephan Käufer has also contributed much to our understanding of Heidegger’s work on logic with an emphasis on its historical contextualization. Käufer’s work focuses on Heidegger’s earliest writings, up to and including “What is Metaphysics?”. Generally Käufer’s articulates Heidegger’s views on logic in light of his interpretation of Immanuel Kant and more broadly in the context of the development and demise of nineteenth century neo-Kantian logic. In his dissertation, Heidegger’s Philosophy of Logic, Käufer reconstructs Heidegger’s philosophy of logic as presented in Being and Time in light of

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9 A number of these papers have been collected in Steven Galt Crowell, Husserl, Heidegger, and the Space of Meaning: Paths toward Transcendental Phenomenology (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 2001).
10 Ibid. 151.
11 Ibid. 195.
12 Greg Shirley’s recent book Heidegger and Logic covers much of the same historical material as Crowell and covers many of Heidegger’s more well-known criticisms of traditional logical notions from the nature of the copula, to propositional truth and the nature of negation in the writings from his Being and Time era. He adds a thorough account of Heidegger’s 1928 lecture course Metaphysical Foundations of Logic. The book finishes with a defense of Heidegger against Carnap by attempting to demonstrate that Heidegger’s argument about the limits of logic are equally applicable to contemporary mathematical logic. Greg Shirley, Heidegger and Logic: The Place of Logos in Being and Time (London: Continuum, 2010).
the logical idealism of the Marburg neo-Kantians. It is skillfully argued that, far from being an ‘irrationalist’, Heidegger helped to usher in the dominance of our contemporary understanding of logic as a purely formal discipline by systematically dismantling the traditional neo-Kantian project. “On Heidegger on Logic” distills this interpretation in order to provide a refutation of Carnap’s claims that Heidegger violates the syntax of logic. In “The Nothing and the Ontological Difference in Heidegger’s What is Metaphysics?” Käufer sets forth his fully developed interpretation of Heidegger’s inaugural lecture at Freiburg, concluding that if the ontological difference makes sense, then we have good reasons for not reading Heidegger as an irrationalist or as a thinker who rejects the principle of non-contradiction. In two more works Käufer develops aspects of Heidegger’s Philosophy of Logic in more detail: in “Systematicity and Temporality in Being and Time” he argues that Being and Time is a systematic work in the technical neo-Kantian sense (with important qualifications), and that the unity of existential temporality – to have been produced in the infamously unwritten third division of Being and Time – marks the ultimate foundation of Heidegger’s system. Finally, “Heidegger’s Interpretation of Kant” displays Käufer’s strongest statement of the importance of reading Heidegger in his historical context. He argues: “Heidegger’s Kant-interpretation is important, and it is so deeply intertwined with the existential phenomenology of Being and Time that it is impossible to understand one without the other.” This double-edged influence is demonstrated against the backdrop of Heidegger’s disagreement with the Marburg neo-Kantian interpretations dominating Kant scholarship at the time.

Although Richard Polt’s dissertation Heidegger and the Place of Logic prescinds from giving a robust account of the historical situation in which Heidegger was writing his work, Polt manages to provide several novel insights into Heidegger’s thoughts on

14 Stephan Käufer, “The Nothing and the Ontological Difference in Heidegger’s What is Metaphysics?,” Inquiry 48 (2005): 482-506. Given the vast amount of work that has gone into legitimating dialetheism as a viable option in logical circles over the past twenty-five years, most notably in the works of Graham Priest, I wonder whether one has to demonstrate that the principle of non-contradiction must belong to one’s set of philosophical beliefs to avoid the charge of irrationalism. Be that as it may, Käufer constructs a solid argument. On dialetheism, see, for instance Graham Priest, In Contradiction (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1987) and his Beyond the Limits of Thought (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002).
logic. This lengthy work canvases Heidegger’s entire oeuvre, culminating in an exploration of the place of modern mathematical logic in philosophy in light of Heidegger’s more well-developed thoughts on the nature of logic (that is, based on his thoughts on traditional, non-mathematical logic). The first half of the thesis treats Heidegger’s writings from the Being and Time era tying in many of Heidegger’s most well-known notions – conscience, temporality, authenticity, etc. – to his views on logic. Polt thereby presents a picture of Heidegger’s work as a primarily logical consideration, despite his argument that Heidegger has no place for ‘logic’ in philosophy. This seeming contradiction is resolved as Polt appropriately qualifies what ‘logic’ it is that Heidegger is rejecting. He thereby leaves a space open for logic as a topic for philosophical reflection in Heidegger’s work.

In this dissertation I avoid as much as possible a retracing of the territory already covered in the above works. There is bound to be some overlap as I read Heidegger’s work holistically as a response to both Husserl’s phenomenology, as well as in light of his early engagement with neo-Kantian thought. I focus my study on Heidegger’s writings up to and including Being and Time: from Heidegger’s earliest ‘student writings’ (1912-1916) to his first breakthrough works in phenomenology (1916-1924) and finally his mature, Being and Time-era writings which contain his robust and unique philosophical stance (1924-1927).

My work is essentially historical. However, I focus the dissertation on those historical aspects that have not, as yet, been given a thorough treatment in the literature. One obvious aporia in the above accounts: no one has yet looked at Heidegger’s important Sophist lectures in light of his views on logic, despite the fact that Heidegger criticizes Plato’s work as the logo-centric work in this lecture course and that he traces the roots of modern conceptions of logic to misinterpretations of Plato’s thought in this work. There are two key specific points that I hope to demonstrate in this thesis: 1) that Heidegger’s Being and Time can be read as a work in the philosophy of logic, specifically

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17 For his justification, see Richard Polt, “Heidegger and the Place of Logic” (PhD diss., University of Chicago, 1991), 21-22.
as a response to the problem of psychologism and 2) that Heidegger’s critique of Plato in his 1924-25 *Sophist* lectures can best be interpreted in light of this robust philosophy of logic. Ultimately I demonstrate that these two points are mutually influential: the roots of Heidegger’s criticism of logic, together with his vision of a proper philosophy of logic, lie in his interpretation of Plato’s thought; and, conversely, Heidegger’s interpretation of Plato’s thought is determined by his criticism of logic together with his vision of the proper place of logic in philosophy. I thereby contribute not only to the literature on Heidegger and logic, but supply a novel interpretation of Heidegger’s *Sophist* lectures in light of my interpretation of Heidegger’s philosophy of logic.

In order to understand Heidegger’s approach to logic, we have to know what Heidegger meant by ‘logic’. One main objective of this dissertation is to show that *Being and Time* presents a response to the debate over psychologism, a problem originating in nineteenth century questions over the status of logic. The first chapter of this thesis thus works out the most salient features of nineteenth century logic to which Heidegger would later respond. This chapter is meant to inform chapters to come. I begin with an overview of Kant’s transcendental logic, tracing a historical line through G.W.F Hegel and Johann Friedrich Herbart to the rise of psychologism and the ‘logic question’ as raised by Friedrich Adolf Trendelenburg in 1840. This historical survey culminates in a consideration of Hermann Lotze’s response to the logic question together with his influence on the Marburg neo-Kantians, Paul Natorp in particular. The chapter ends with a brief account of Edmund Husserl’s *Logical Investigations*; this work is best understood as a response to logical concerns coming out of the Kantian tradition (although equally influenced by developments of mathematics in the nineteenth century) and I present my concise presentation with this in mind.

In the second chapter I look to Heidegger’s earliest philosophical writings (1912-1916), tying these in to the greater context of nineteenth century logic. I argue that Heidegger works out of the dominant Lotzian interpretation of logic, and that he is still mostly caught up with his direct neo-Kantian influences, Heinrich Rickert and Emil Lask. To demonstrate this later point I open the chapter with a reconstruction of the essential elements of Rickert’s thought. This has been a generally neglected area in Heidegger scholarship as most accounts place Heidegger’s early work in the context of the Marburg neo-Kantian school of thought, or in relation to his theological beginnings, or as a response to his early reading of Husserl’s phenomenological works. I do not deny that
Heidegger was working within this intellectual milieu and that these all significantly influenced his earliest thought. However, another side of Heidegger’s early views on logic come to light when viewed next to Rickert’s as I hope to demonstrate. I finish the chapter by considering Heidegger’s ‘breakthrough’ works (1919 lecture courses) to phenomenology wherein he publicly characterizes his philosophy as phenomenological over against his neo-Kantian background. Throughout I emphasize Heidegger’s conception of philosophy as rigorous science.

I devote the third chapter to an analysis of Heidegger’s writings from the *Being and Time*-era. I argue that *Being and Time* can fruitfully be read as providing the answer to the problem surrounding the psychologism debate: namely, the question of the origins of logic. This frames the chapter within the main theme of this thesis which treats the relationship between logic and fundamental ontology in Heidegger’s thought. This relationship is worked out in light of Heidegger’s mature criticism of both the neo-Kantians and Husserl for their equal share in the ‘theoretical prejudice’. I end the chapter by reconnecting Heidegger’s approach to traditional questions of logic (concept, judgement, inference; truth). I conclude by arguing that *Being and Time* does not cobble together disparate remarks on logic but provides a robust philosophy of logic in its own right.

In chapter four I work towards an application of the preceding results, arguing that Heidegger provides novel insights into an understanding of key issues in Plato’s *Sophist*. I aim to demonstrate that these insights are most easily understood in connection with Heidegger’s views on logic and his position on various questions in the philosophy of logic. More than this, I tie his interpretation of the *Sophist* back in to his philosophy of logic, arguing that several key notions can best be understood in light of Heidegger’s critique of Plato.
Chapter 1: The State of Logic in 19th Century Germany – From Kant to Husserl

Introduction

There is a slowly increasing trend in the history of logic scholarship which takes the investigation of the nature of logic in the nineteenth century as a serious and important task. These works respond to the general view – set at least as early as I.M. Bocheński’s and William & Martha Kneale’s ground-breaking works (1956 and 1962, respectively) – which essentially holds that developments in logic between Leibniz’s work around the turn of the eighteenth century and Frege’s work near the end of the nineteenth century show little or no ‘creativity’ or interesting advances – with the possible exception of George Boole’s work in the algebra of logic from the 1840s and 1850s. Not only is there ample proof against the ‘non-creativity’ of logic in the period between Leibniz and Frege (in particular in the nineteenth century) but many important developments to come in the twentieth century have their roots in discussions of the nature and place of logic in the preceding century.\(^1\) From the emergence of psychology as a (strictly) scientific discipline, to the recognition of the philosophy of science as a legitimate sub-discipline, through to the rise of mathematical logic as a discipline independent of its original role as mere symbolizer of traditional logic: these developments can all be traced back to questions surrounding the state of logic in the nineteenth century. In a similar way, Edmund Husserl’s work can be shown to be in direct descent from the rising awareness of the need to question the state of logic in the years leading up to his breakthrough phenomenological work, the *Logical Investigations*. Heidegger’s work on logic in the 1920s, as a response to both Husserl and the neo-Kantian tradition, is also rooted in this same dynamic nineteenth century logic. Since I will be investigating Heidegger’s philosophy of logic throughout this thesis, it is necessary that I first take up a preliminary study of the state of logic in nineteenth century philosophy restricting my focus to German accounts which were most germane to Heidegger’s work. The goal of this chapter is to set forth the background of Heidegger’s intellectual milieu. This requires two main foci: the Marburg neo-Kantians Natorp and Cassirer, and the origins of the phenomenological tradition. These two strands of thought have a common origin in

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\(^1\) For a recent treatment of some important developments and precursors to the Boole/Frege contemporization of logic in the *seventeenth* century see Massimo Mugnai, “Logic and Mathematics in the Seventeenth Century,” *History and Philosophy of Logic* 31 (2010): 297-314.
Immanuel Kant’s work on logic and, as shown below, were both influenced dramatically by Hermann Lotze and the question of psychologism.

This first chapter reconstructs the philosophical treatment of logic in Germany dominant up into the early twentieth century. This chapter is essentially historical; my reconstruction of the history of logic is not intended to be novel but merely to inform the chapters to come. The changing role of logic in the nineteenth century, from a primarily philosophical to a burgeoning mathematical discipline is a long and complicated story.\(^2\)

By the time of Husserl’s first major phenomenological work (1900/01), he was deeply entrenched in both recent mathematical developments as well as the philosophical logic debates. One goal of this opening chapter is to demonstrate the state of logic in philosophy – especially in Germany – in the years most influential to Husserl’s breakthrough work in phenomenology, the *Logical Investigations*.

I focus here on the Kantian and then neo-Kantian conception of logic, especially as put forth by Hermann Lotze in his 1874 *Logic in Three Books: Of Thought, Of Investigation, and of Knowledge*, an expansion of his 1843 *Logic*. In these opening sections I also explore the emergence of the debate over psychologism among post-Kantians, which Husserl’s *Logical Investigations* essentially put to rest in 1900,\(^3\) and the

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\(^2\)Due to limitations of space I cannot address the issue of the dual influence of mathematics and philosophy on the newly emerging modern logic. Although some presentations are now available, Volker Peckhaus’ statement just over ten years ago is still valid: “The standard presentations of the history of logic ignore the relationship between the philosophical and mathematical side of its development; they sometimes even deny that there has been any development of philosophical logic at all.” Volker Peckhaus, “19th Century Logic between Philosophy and Mathematics,” *Bulletin of Symbolic Logic* 5 (1999): 434. More recently, Werner Stelzner has addressed this problem and argues that the German psychologistic logicians, as paradigms of the ‘traditional logic’ in the nineteenth century, deserve greater attention in historical accounts of the history of formal logic. Werner Stelzner, “Psychologism and Non-Classical Approaches in Traditional Logic,” in *Philosophy, Psychology, and Psychologism: Critical and Historical Readings on the Psychological Turn in Philosophy*, ed. Dale Jacquette (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 2003), 81-111. Risto Vilkko has also made significant contributions towards a re-evaluation of the history of logic which accounts for the contributions from (German) philosophers in the nineteenth century. He maintains that “the development of symbolic logic in Germany can only be understood properly by relating its emergence in the 1870s and 1880s to the preceding philosophically-oriented discussion on the reform of logic, i.e., to the so-called logic question. During the 19th Century it was still commonplace to accept the idea that the possible reform of logic must go hand in hand with a corresponding reform of philosophy.” Risto Vilkko, *A Hundred Years of Logical Investigations: Reform Efforts of Logic in Germany 1781-1879* (Paderborn: mentis, 2002), 15; and more recently see Risto Vilkko, “The Logic Question During the First Half of the Nineteenth Century,” in *The Development of Modern Logic*, ed. Leila Haaparanta (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 202-221 and Leila Haaparanta, “The Relations between Logic and Philosophy, 1874-1931,” in *The Development of Modern Logic*, ed. Leila Haaparanta (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 222-262.

\(^3\)Of course Frege also contributed to this downfall. On the reception of Husserl’s arguments against Psychologism in Germany see Martin Kusch, “The Criticisms of Husserl’s Arguments Against Psychologism in German Philosophy 1901-1920,” in *Mind, Meaning and Mathematics*, ed. Leila Haaparanta (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1994), 51-83. In his early survey “Recent Research in Logic,” Heidegger disagrees with Natorp’s famous decree that although they welcome Husserl’s argument against Psychologism, the Marburger neo-Kantians don’t have much to learn from Husserl: “Husserl’s
so-called ‘logic problem’ which determined the work of subsequent logicians, Lotze included. The purpose of the following opening sections is to outline the nature of logic in the dominant Kantian setting of the nineteenth century. I subsequently contrast Husserl’s phenomenology with the neo-Kantian rejection of Kantian intuition, together with the Marburg neo-Kantian subsumption of the Transcendental Aesthetic under the rubric of the Transcendental Logic and their reconception of the nature of logic. The deeper history presented here comes to play a significant role in Heidegger’s contributions to logic as these emerge as a radicalization of and challenge to Husserl’s position which itself is best understood as a response to problems in nineteenth century logic.

1 Kantian Logic

In this first section I trace a line of logical accounts from Kant through the opposing views of G.W.F. Hegel and Johann Friedrich Herbart to Adolf Trendelenburg’s criticism of both these views in the 1840s. This point in 1840 marks the opening of a new era of logic in philosophy where the question of the place and nature of logic was raised anew. Subsequent philosopher-logicians, such as Lotze, responded to Trendelenburg’s ‘logic question’ which dictated the direction of logic research to come. This new development emerged from Kant’s division of logic into its general and transcendental parts. Whereas Kant’s general logic seems paradigmatically ‘traditional,’ his transcendental logic gave rise to a reconsideration of concept-formation, the theory of science, the possibility of psychology as a science, and formal-mathematical logic itself. The following is a brief discussion of the views of logic which Kant himself inherited.

The logic which Kant taught in his lectures at Königsberg represents the traditional classical logic from the Wolffian school which Kant took as “the best we have” (LOL 535/21). The most important contributions of Kant’s logic come from his transcendental

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5 As noted in Gottlob Benjamin Jäsche’s ‘editor’s introduction’ written in 1800: “Since the year 1765, Professor Kant based his lectures on logic, without interruption, on Meier’s textbook as guiding thread (Georg Friedrich Meier’s Excerpts from the Doctrine of Reason [Auszug aus der Vernunftlehre], Halle: Gebauer, 1752)” (LOL 521/3). Terry Boswell notes that this contains a minor inaccuracy: Kant had always used Meier’s book, for the more than forty years in which he lectured on the topic; that is, from 1755 to 1796. Terry Boswell, “On the Textual Authenticity of Kant’s Logic,” History and Philosophy of Logic 9 (1988): 195.
logic, presented most clearly in his *Critique of Pure Reason*. The logic presented in the logic lectures, and the general logic of the *Critique of Pure Reason*, represents that branch of logic which – although drastically different in form and content – would become the predominant formal (mathematical) logic of the twentieth century.

The logic prevailing in Kant’s time is a reformulation of Aristotelian-scholastic logic in which the basic unit is the concept. Judgements represent the unity of given concepts either by subordination or exclusion. Given a subject-term S and a predicate term P, ‘S is subordinated to P’ is written ‘S is P’ (categorically). The basic unit of judgement can be modified in four respects: as to its quantity (the predicate applies to all, some, or particular subjects); quality (the predicate is affirmed or denied of the subject); relation (the judgement is either categorical, hypothetical, or disjunctive); and modality (the judgement is apodictic, problematic, or assertoric). Since S and P are both treated as of the same ‘type’ – they are both treated conceptually – both conversion and contraposition are allowed in all cases and hence the basic question is whether the one concept is contained in the other. Kant’s transcendental logic departs from this basic tenet as he there considers the subject as subject. That is, the transcendental logic upholds a crucial separation between concepts (formed by the faculty of the understanding) and subjects (as given by intuition) as of essentially different kinds. The third part of logic involves a theory of inference wherein judgements are connected; first by syllogistic inferences in the case of categorical judgements, and next through *modus ponens* and *modus tollens* for the hypothetical judgement. Kant’s general logic essentially

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6 Not only does the *Critique of Pure Reason* present Kant’s transcendental logic and its relation to the general logic most clearly, but the reliability of the ‘lecture notes’ has been greatly questioned. Terry Boswell counts at least four possible sources for what is now called ‘The Jäsche Logic’: students’ notes, some of Kant’s own reflections, various editorial touches by Jäsche, and material from Meier’s textbook. Boswell, “On the Textual Authenticity of Kant’s Logic,” 200. Moreover, Cassirer’s quote of Kant’s views of his job as a university lecturer in a letter of October 1759 puts into question how much stock one should take of these lecture notes: “I sit daily...at the anvil of my lectern and keep the heavy hammer of repetitious lectures going in some sort of rhythm. Now and then an impulse of a nobler sort, from out of nowhere, tempts me to break out of this cramping sphere, but ever-present need leaps on me with its blustering voice and perpetually drives me back forthwith to hard labor by its threats – *inteniat angues atque intonat ore* [he threatens serpents and with his mouth thunders forth].” Ernst Cassirer, *Kant’s Life and Thought*, trans. James Haden (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1981), 42.

7 As John van Heijenoort accounts in 1957: “Since Kant, the aim of transcendental logic has been to found categories and forms of intuition as well as axioms and rules of formal logic….Mathematical logic, with its enormous development, now attracts mathematicians, but repels philosophers, and the problems of transcendental logic have receded into the background.” John van Heijenoort, “Review of Max Bense’s *Transzendente und Mathematische Logik*,” *Journal of Symbolic Logic* 22 (1957): 401. (In the past fifty-odd years this repulsion of philosophers seems to have waned considerably.) The inclusion of the founding of forms of intuition under the transcendental logic came to dominate later neo-Kantian interpretations of Kant, especially in the hands of the Marburgers.
encompasses the investigations of the concept-judgement-inference triad. This structure of ‘pure’ logic dominates philosophical treatments throughout most of the nineteenth century, but it is really Kant’s transcendental logic – essentially his entire *Critique of Pure Reason* – which gives rise to a series of questions concerning the place of logic in philosophy and ultimately opens up the possibility for a general reform in logic.

### 1.1 Kant on General versus Transcendental Logic

Kant set the tone for subsequent German philosophers’ views on logic in the preface to the second edition of his *Critique of Pure Reason* of 1787 where he famously writes:

> that Logic has advanced in this sure course, even from the earliest time, is apparent from the fact that, since Aristotle, it has been unable to advance a step, and thus to all appearance has reached its completion… Now logic is enclosed within limits which admit of perfectly clear definition; it is a science which has for its object nothing but the exposition and proof of the formal laws of all thought, whether it be *a priori* or empirical, whatever be its origin or its object, and whatever the difficulties – natural or accidental – which it encounters in the human mind. (*CPR* 11/Bviii)

Kant’s insistence upon the completed nature of formal logic seems to account for his neglect by historians of mathematical logic. ⁸ Although Kant apparently had no direct influence on the developments of formal symbolic logic, his views on logic impacted the development of the discipline and set the standard to which later philosophical treatments of logic respond.

On Kant’s account, knowledge arises only with the union of the faculty of sensibility with the faculty of the understanding, logic being the science of the laws of the latter faculty. Pure *general* logic⁹ abstracts from all content (objects) and deals

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⁸ Jeremy Gray, for instance, finds Kant’s views on logic unimpressive. See Jeremy Gray, *Plato’s Ghost: The Modernist Transformation of Mathematics* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2008), 82. From a contemporary mathematical logic point of view, Kant’s transcendental logic seems to be a set-back in the development of formal logic: “[F]ormal logic on the continent had suffered a serious set-back at the hands of Kantian transcendental logic which…detracted, at least in Germany, interest from formal logic…. [T]he intellectual climate on the continent had indeed become suffocative for symbolic logic by the middle of the 19th century.” Christian Thiel, “From Leibniz to Frege: Mathematical Logic Between 1679 and 1879,” in *Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science VI*, edited by L. Jonathan Cohen et al. (Amsterdam: North-Holland Publishing, 1982), 763. Mary Tiles attempts to overcome this general neglect arguing that although he contributes nothing directly to the development of symbolic techniques in logic, Kant nonetheless is “the architect who provides conceptual design sketches for the new edifice that was to be built on the site once occupied by Aristotelian, syllogistic logic….Frege, Hilbert, Russell, Gödel and others would do the actual technical engineering work necessary to put up the new building.” Mary Tiles, “Kant: From General to Transcendental Logic,” in *Handbook of the History of Logic*, vol. 3, *The Rise of Modern Logic: From Leibnitz to Frege*, ed. Dov M. Gabbay and John Woods (Amsterdam: Elsevier, 2004), 85.

⁹ As opposed to ‘applied general logic’ which is dismissed as “merely a cathartic of the human understanding” (*CPR* 71/A53;B78). “Applied logic really ought not to be called logic” (*LOL* 533/18).
Logic in 19th Century Germany

exclusively with the form of thought – it is demonstrative and completely *a priori* (*CPR* 71/A53;B78) – and as such has nothing at all to do with the origin of knowledge or with the distinction between empirical and rational knowledge. It provides the *necessary* rules for cognition “without which no use of the understanding would be possible at all” (*LOL* 528/12). The proper method (the Analytic part) of this general logic is found in its *analysis* of the forms of understanding and reason; synthetic *a priori* truths (judgements) are not dealt with in the general logic. It is merely the negative test of truth, against which all knowledge must first be tried. The formal aspects of knowledge claims are tested to see whether they formally accord with the logical laws, prior to the investigation of their content and the determination of positive truth with respect to their object (*CPR* 74/A59;B84). As such, this part of general logic is a canon of judgement (*LOL* 528-529/13-14). It “discovers through analysis all the actions of reason that we perform in thinking. It is thus an analytic of the form of the understanding and of reason and is rightly called the logic of truth, because it contains the necessary rules of all (formal) truth, apart from which our cognition is untrue in itself, regardless of its objects” (*LOL* 531/16).10 General logic thus normatively regulates all thought: its most distinctive fundamental principle being the law of non-contradiction.

The real motivating problem for Kant stands right at the beginning of the *Critique*: how is knowledge of *objects* possible? Kant introduces the distinction between analytic and synthetic judgements to help unpack the answer to this problem: it is a question of *transcendental* and not *general* logic and, as such, not a question about how we apply the predicate-concept to the subject-concept. Rather, Kant asks about the relation between our genuine acquaintance with an object through the subject-concept and the predicate-concept. He asks: how do we know that both subject-concept and predicate-concept apply to the same object, and what is the relation between concepts and objects, not between concepts and concepts? Knowledge consists, for Kant, in the relation between a concept and an object: knowledge is ‘knowledge of objects’ *simpliciter*. Analytic judgements relate concepts and are treated in the general logic, while synthetic judgements relate concepts to objects and are treated in the transcendental logic.11

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10 Compare (*CPR* 73-74/A57-A59;B82-B84).
11 This distinction between analytic and synthetic judgements seems to contradict Kant’s ‘clear’ definition of analytic judgements as “those in which the connection of the predicate with the subject is thought through identity,” and synthetic judgements as “those in which this connection is thought without identity” (*CPR* 35/A6;B10). For an analysis of Kant’s distinction which agrees with my own, see Kenneth T. Gallagher, “Kant and Husserl on the Synthetic A Priori,” *Kant-Studien* 63 (1972): 341-352. As Gallagher
In sum, Kant’s general logic (roughly) names the syllogistic logic from Aristotle which applies to all thought and avoids reference to specific concepts, judgements and inferences as it limits itself to the correct use of the understanding and reason in general. The focus is on the study of thought independent of its relation to objects; its truths are thus a priori. It is entirely general with respect to the objects under consideration (limiting itself to the forms of thought alone) and is in this sense formal. It concentrates on concepts as such and their interrelations and its truths are thus not just true a priori but analytically so.

1.2 Transcendental Logic

The transcendental logic, on the other hand, is a special – non-general, particular – logic. Special logics study the rules for the correct thinking about certain special classes of objects (CPR 70/A51;B76); they do not abstract completely from the matter of cognition. They thus presume prior knowledge of the objects belonging to their respective sciences. For example, one special logic would be a logic of physics, another a logic of biology, and so on wherein rules are provided governing the relation between the concepts employed in the knowledge of the objects under investigation. Transcendental logic is one of these special logics, but is peculiar among them in that its underlying ‘science’ is non-empirical: the empirical content of knowledge is bracketed out, with pure contents taking centre-stage (CPR 72/A55;B80). Whereas general logic abstracts from all content to focus on form alone, transcendental logic abstracts merely from the intuition of objects. Generally, the transcendental logic answers the question: “How is nature possible in the formal sense, as the totality of rules under which all appearances must come in order to be thought as connected in an experience? The answer must...be clearly distinguished from an insight into the objects themselves.” Kant attempts to account for the a priori synthetic forms of the understanding in a systematically complete way in his transcendental logic.

argues, “the distinction as he presents it in the Introduction does not actually convey his true mind on this subject.” Gallagher, ‘Kant and Husserl,’ 345.

12 In this way transcendental logic and general logic are both formal but in different ways. Transcendental logic abstracts from the sensuous matter given in an appearance to the ordered relations between appearances/sensations; it concerns the rules of understanding and reason in their a priori relation to objects. General logic abstracts from the content of a cognition to the relations between concepts; it disregards the objects to focus on the laws of thought themselves (CPR 73/A57;B82).

13 Immanuel Kant, Prolegomena to any Future Metaphysics that will be able to come forward as Science, trans. Paul Carus, revised by James W. Ellington (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, 2001), 56 [318].
The transcendental logic thus governs the relations of pure concepts to pure intuitions in the unity of a cognition of a pure object. The transcendental logic provides rules for the possibility that we have non-empty thoughts and non-blind intuitions as in Kant’s famous declaration that “thoughts without content are empty; intuitions without concepts, blind” (CPR 69/A50;B74). As such, the transcendental side of logic is designed precisely to account for the possibility of universal and necessarily valid knowledge as found in the three areas which claim to produce synthetic judgements a priori: namely (pure) mathematics, (pure) natural science, and metaphysics. The three stages of the Critique of Pure Reason build on one another in an attempt to account for the completion of the synthesis of pure reason.

First, prior to the Transcendental Logic proper, the Transcendental Aesthetic yields the forms of space and time as the conditions without which (unconceptualized) sensations could not be given as unified perceptions. Second, from the division of the Transcendental Logic in two – into its Analytic and it Dialectic part – the former yields the concepts of the understanding (the categories) without which the perceptions supplied by sensibility could not be unified in an experience of the natural world. And third, the latter division of the Transcendental Logic yields the general principles (or Ideas) without which judgements of experience could not be unified into metaphysical knowledge; it is here where the limits of pure reason are met. In the third stage Kant establishes the impossibility of pure metaphysical truths – that is, a metaphysics of the transcendent – and yet the necessity of their appearance; the Kantian Ideas are thus merely regulative. Consciousness passively receives only phenomena and actively applies its a priori categories to the given phenomena alone; Ideas for Kant constitute the systematic

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14 Ibid., 21 [280]. There is the further question, of course, which is the general question of the Prolegomena: how is metaphysics as a science possible? Whereas pure mathematics and pure natural science have no need for such an account since they are possible (since they, in fact exist): “both sciences…stood in need of this inquiry, not for themselves, but for the sake of another science, namely, metaphysics.” Ibid., 64 [327]. It is not just that natural science and mathematics in fact exist, but also that they are justified by recourse to pure intuition, and do not thereby rely on reason: “Mathematics and natural science do not need the critique of our reason. Here we do not need to investigate where the limits of these cognitions are, because everything can be set forth through intuition” (LOL 479/744).

15 The Transcendental Aesthetic must precede and not be included in the Transcendental Logic since Kant maintains that “truth or illusory appearance does not reside in the object, in so far as it is intuited, but in the judgment upon the object in so far as it is thought.” As such, the senses do not err since they do not judge at all; truth and error – and illusion, the cause of error – only arise in the judgement, in the application of the understanding to an object. If the laws of the understanding are followed, knowledge free from error follows (CPR 233/A292;B348).

16 “The greatest, and perhaps the only, use of all philosophy of pure reason is, accordingly, of a purely negative character. It is not an organon for the extension, but a discipline for the determination of the limits of its exercise; and without laying claim to the discovery of new truth, it has the modest merit of guarding against error” (CPR 513/A795;B823).
ordering of experience as *a priori* concepts which are neither given to intuition nor formed by the understanding. Each stage thus develops as a new form of synthesis, taking the results of the previous stage as its content.\(^\text{17}\)

In sum, Kant’s transcendental logic “concerns only the laws of understanding and reason, in so far as they relate *a priori* to objects” (*CPR* 73/A57;B82). It is ‘a logic’ in a usual sense in that it is normative: for it assesses empirical judgements as to whether they conform to the rules of transcendental logic with respect to the general features of the object:

[The analytic part of transcendental logic is such that it] treats of the elements of pure knowledge of the understanding, and of the principles without which no object at all can be thought…and at the same time [is] a logic of truth. For no knowledge can contradict it, without losing at the same time all content, that is, losing all reference to an object, and therefore all truth. (*CPR* 75/A61;B86)

Furthermore, it is formal even though it is not completely general; but it is ‘formal’ in its own sense.\(^\text{18}\) Moreover, the roots of later idealism are found in Kant’s transcendental logic as the pure forms of the understanding produce the world of objects, not within the individual empirical consciousness, but at the foundation of this consciousness in the transcendental apperception or consciousness in general. Opposed to the general logic – that ‘dry and completed science’ – the transcendental logic takes pride of place in Kant’s account for it establishes not only the possibility of knowledge but also the limits of pure reason. The categories of the understanding provide rules for bringing together representations which make possible the determination of (empirical) judgements as synthetically true: the objects given through intuition are deemed to require one form of judgement rather than another; the categories are concepts which delineate the objects, they provide the framework in which objects can be given in experience specifying which judgements are appropriate for which objects. The concepts never fully capture the (empirical) object since reason

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\(^{17}\) Windelband, *A History of Philosophy*, 539.

\(^{18}\) In his dissertation John MacFarlane argues that “Kant seems to be the first modern philosopher to demarcate logic (or a significant portion thereof) by its formality.” John MacFarlane, “What Does it Mean to Say that Logic is Formal?” (PhD diss., University of Pittsburgh, 2000), 79. Vilko argues that both the ‘old’ and ‘contemporary’ logics could be seen as formal in the nineteenth century and that this does not suffice for a proper demarcation between the two. Vilko, *A Hundred Years of Logical Investigations*, 24. The question of the meaning of ‘formality’ in logic and elsewhere presents too large a topic for the present dissertation.
can never conceive anything, except in so far as it is determined under given conditions, and since it can therefore neither come to a halt at the conditioned, nor make the unconditioned comprehensible, nothing is left to it, when thirst for knowledge invites it to comprehend the absolute totality of all conditions, but to turn away from the objects to itself, so as to explore and determine, not the ultimate limits of things, but rather the ultimate limits of its own unaided powers.\footnote{19}

Both pure mathematics and the empirical doctrine of nature thus remain forever incomplete as they require pure or empirical data given through intuition and such data (objects) are never exhausted by reason.\footnote{20} As Mary Tiles concludes in her description of Kant’s logic: “The irony is that Kant has been criticized for his claim that we can have a complete knowledge of logic...when in fact the whole underlying theme of his critique of pure reason is to map its structures in such a \textit{sic} way that reason’s incompleteness can be internally acknowledged.”\footnote{21} The possibility of synthetic knowledge is left open by the incompleteness of reason which, however, provides the ideal goals which guide the necessary striving for complete knowledge.

So, for Kant, the initial givenness of the object is the pre-condition for knowledge and experience. Prior to the formation of the object a manifold sensation is given which is organized and synthesized into a unity, a space-time object. These pure forms of sensible intuition – space and time – mediate between the \textit{a priori} logical structures of judgement, which alone cannot provide insight into the object of knowledge, and the unconceptualized manifold of sensation. Regardless, the object for Kant remains that which is over against the cognizing subject: it is the stable centre of that which one encounters which persists over time; it is that which remains if we ‘think away’ all empirical properties; it is that by which we think of it “as substance, or adhering to substance, although our concept of substances is more determined than that of an object” (CPR 32/A5;B6). The project of transcendental logic consists in delineating how we have knowledge of an object, of providing the conditions of the possibility of knowledge where knowledge equates to the knowledge of objects of the natural world; the transcendental aesthetic precedes this as an account of how we have an object in the first place.

\footnote{19} Immanuel Kant, \textit{Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science}, trans. Michael Friedman (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 104. See also: (CPR 315-316/A420-A422;B448-B450).
\footnote{20} Kant, \textit{Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science}, 10.
\footnote{21} Tiles, “Kant: From General to Transcendental Logic,” 128.
Kant therefore envisions an open-ended logical system. There are no absolutely simple concepts which would provide the basis for a complete logical account for our empirical scientific knowledge. Rather, such knowledge remains forever incomplete for Kant. We can know categorically about individual existents, but only in their phenomenal givenness; we can knowingly refer to existing objects but only objects which exist as scientific. His logic provides a regulative framework to which scientific reasoning must cohere. These regulative principles are not given in advance by the world as it is in itself, but result from the logical arrangement of our *reason*. A chasm remains between the logically organized concepts of the understanding and those non-universal objects of intuition. The question that would plague later thinkers, such as Hegel, is how these concepts ever get applied to objects of the intuition at all.

Two important strands emanate from the Kantian conception of logic: one follows the general, and the other the transcendental logic. The former is taken up by Johann Friedrich Herbart while the latter can be further split into the metaphysical and the ‘theory of knowledge’ treatments of logic. Hegel follows the metaphysical approach to logic whereas Friedrich Schleiermacher and later Adolf Trendelenburg take logic to be properly a theory of knowledge. As we will see, Hermann Lotze to some extent straddles the line, although he is usually considered to follow the ‘theory of knowledge’ interpretation; indeed, Herbert Schnädelbach even credits Lotze with “the rejection of Hegel and Absolute Idealism within the bounds of academic philosophy.” In any case, his is the form of logic which most typifies the age of ‘Traditional Logic’ which can roughly be said to extend from somewhere around the time of the second edition of his *Logik* up until the 1920’s. However, as is well known, both these strands of logic, although dominating

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22 Heidegger argues, against the neo-Kantian interpretation, that Kant’s positing of the pure imagination as the common element which connects concepts and intuitions provides the necessary unity which explains how it is possible to actively represent a passively given manifold. For more on Heidegger’s reading, especially in relation to the neo-Kantians, see Stephan Käufer, “Heidegger’s Interpretation of Kant,” in *Interpreting Heidegger: Critical Essays*, ed. Daniel O. Dahlstrom (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 174-196.


26 See the third chapter of Stephan Käufer, “Heidegger’s Philosophy of Logic” (PhD diss., Stanford University, 1998), 62-87.
logical accounts in the nineteenth century, eventually gave way to a fundamentally
different approach to logic which reconceives the very nature of the discipline: the
mathematical. It is the debates spawned by these various receptions of the Kantian logic,
as well as the status of transcendental logic with respect to formal logic, which
contributed to such a reconception.

1.3 Rise of Psychologism after Hegel and Herbart
As outlined above, for Kant the unconceptualized manifold of sensations are passively
received by the faculty of sensation; these sensible intuitions are unified and perceived
through the mediating structures of the pure forms of sensibility, space and time; and,
conversely, the forms of the understanding are governed by the rules of general logic. But
since knowledge only arises in this account from the combination of sensibility and
understanding, that is, through the judgement, if it is to account for the possibility of
knowledge of objects general logic is not sufficient; it requires the supplement of
transcendental logic in order to provide anything like a full theory of knowledge. In this
Kant agreed with Leibniz in stating that synthetic judgements cannot be proven by
scholastic-Aristotelian logic; the transcendental logic was thus the necessary supplement.
So long as one insists upon the separation between the faculty of pure intuition and the
faculty of the understanding, and so long as general logic only governs the latter, it will
seem a logic which is essentially lacking. The question of whether logic is rightly
considered only a canon for judgement and an organon for thought (and hence for the
sciences) or as additionally a critique (in the Kantian sense) of the sciences – and whether
it be a science in its own right – dominated the post-Kantian philosophical discussions on
the nature of logic.

1.3.1 Hegel
Hegel picks up on Kant’s negative views of general (formal) logic and takes the analysis
a step further, saying that “if logic has not undergone any change since Aristotle…then
surely the conclusion which should be drawn is that it is all the more in need of a total
reconstruction.”

28 Stephan Käufer argues that three Hegelian theses about logic all belong together. Namely, that “all
thought is objective; logic is not formal in Kant’s sense; and logic is metaphysics.” Stephan Käufer, “Hegel
conceptual structures which provide the conditions for the possibility of any experience at all, namely the ‘categories,’ he seems to be saying something about ‘things in themselves’ – that is, Kant’s transcendental logic seems to be an ontology. Of course Kant himself avoids any talk of ‘things in themselves’ by separating out the objects of experience from ‘things in themselves’ which are beyond our experience – that is, the phenomenal from the noumenal realm – and in this way avoids the fusion of (transcendental) logic and metaphysics.\(^{29}\) But the phenomenal/noumenal split is precisely what Hegel rejects in Kant’s philosophy;\(^{30}\) with this rejection the equation of logic and metaphysics necessarily follows for Hegel.

For Kant ‘phenomenon’ is a mode of human (transcendental) representation. For Hegel, the phenomenon is given by the Absolute Spirit externalising itself. Thus, the concepts applied to reality are no longer solely categories of the finite subject’s understanding, as they were for Kant, but are categories of reality itself. As Hegel puts it:

because the interest of the Kantian philosophy was directed to the so-called transcendental aspect of the categories, the treatment of the categories themselves yielded a blank result; what they are in themselves without the abstract relation to the ego common to all, what is their specific nature relatively to each other and their relationship to each other, this has not been made an object of consideration.\(^{31}\)

Hegel attempts to correct this omission: for him concepts actually posit the thing to which they apply; they thus are not ‘in the subject’ and subsequently ‘applicable to the object’ but rather reside between subject and object, straddling both. In this sense a study of logic as the study of the forms of thought is equally a study of reality in itself; that is, logic is metaphysics or ontology. Logic in Hegel’s sense is thus not the formal general logic of Kant, but rightly understood it is a transcendental logic, now understood as ontology.\(^{32}\) Hegel argues for the inseparability of thought and content and, as such, for the elimination of Kant’s general logic altogether. As Stephan Käufer has found, “for Hegel, to Frege: Concepts and Conceptual Content in Nineteenth-Century Logic,” *History of Philosophy Quarterly* 22 (2005): 266.

\(^{29}\) That pure reason cannot reach the absolute truth of ‘things-in-themselves’ is a result for Kant which Hegel notes “forms the immediate starting-point in this [Hegel’s] philosophizing, so that the preceding exposition from which that result issued and which is a philosophical cognition, is cut away beforehand.” Hegel, *Science of Logic*, 61-62n1.


\(^{32}\) The question of ‘what is Hegel’s logic’ is not easily answered. My quick gloss is confirmed in Yvon Gauthier “Hegel’s Logic From a Logical Point of View,” in *Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science VI*, ed. L. Jonathan Cohen et al. (Amsterdam: North-Holland Publishing, 1982), 303-310.
logic is general precisely because it is content-bound. Principles of logic govern all thought not by abstracting from content, but by partaking in it.” Since Kant’s transcendental logic shows that content is produced from concepts, he laid the framework for Hegel’s Speculative Idealism. Hegel’s logic amounts to an account of thought thinking its own essence and as such he – along with Fichte and Schelling – emphasizes the role of the subject in the Kantian framework. His grand attempt would soon be taken issue with, of course, especially in light of increasing developments in the empirical sciences, developments which were unaccounted for by Hegel’s speculative methods. As Oswald Külpe so colourfully put it in his survey of German philosophy up until the early twentieth century,

reality showed itself unruly, and philosophy and the special sciences became involved in a violent war with each other. In this struggle, speculative philosophy, relying upon her own peculiar methods, finally succumbed. The sober, cautious, and exact work of the special sciences proved far superior and won a far more universal recognition than the abstract dialectics of the speculative philosophers, and so Hegel’s whole structure, and the foundation upon which it was built, fell; and great was the fall thereof.

However, the focus on the activity of the knowing subject clearly opened the way for the rise of psychology as a legitimate study and eventually to its application to logical foundations.

Nineteenth century philosophy in Germany was dominated by this speculative Idealism up until Hegel’s death in 1830, and thereafter by forms of materialism or positivism showing a reverence for natural scientific achievements and a disdain for speculative metaphysics on the one hand, and a revised Idealism on the other. The response from philosophers to Hegel’s reformation of logic can be split in three groups: 1) those logicians who continue to follow and justify Hegel; 2) those who reject Hegel outright; 3) those who look to retain some link between logic and metaphysics – that is, between the forms of thought and the features of their objects. It is the second and third

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33 Käufer, “Hegel to Frege,” 267.
groups which grew into the dominant accounts of logic in the second half of the
nineteenth century; namely, those given by the positivists and materialists on the one
hand, and those given by the idealists and neo-Kantians on the other.

1.3.2 Herbart

Before considering the logic arising in the aftermath of Hegel’s reign, we will briefly
examine the work of one of his contemporaries: Johann Friedrich Herbart. As noted,
post-Kantian philosophers of logic were divided into two groups: those working in the
Hegelian idealist vein that emphasised the transcendental branch of logic versus the
Herbartian formalists who prioritized the general branch of Kant’s division of logic.
Herbart’s philosophy in general, and his logic in particular, was almost as far opposed to
Hegel’s as possible. Whereas Hegel aimed to combine logic and metaphysics, Herbart
insisted they remain separate. His logic was purely formal and yet his epistemology and
understanding of the sciences – which both come out of the Kantian transcendental
tradition – would be incorporated into mathematical studies to such an extent that logic
itself would eventually be displaced from philosophy to mathematics proper. We see an
odd turn of affairs here: that the aspects of transcendental philosophy developed by a
formal logician would have an influence on mathematicians’ assimilation of formal logic
into their discipline.

Although a Kantian, Herbart differed from Kant in several crucial respects. Firstly,
on the possibility of knowledge of the thing-in-itself which Herbart actually held to be
accessible through appearance: “as the smoke points to the fire, so does appearance to
Reality; it not merely points thereto, but requires us to set about looking where the fire
burns.” Secondly, with the rejection of the ultimate separation of intuition and
understanding (object and concept), Herbart could, without contradiction, eliminate the
transcendental logic from his consideration. However, the main difference which
separates Herbart from Kant is found in their treatment of the concept, which for Herbart
is an ideal. He saw the historical change of scientific concepts as reason to do away with
the Kantian categories and in turn with the pure forms of intuition: space and time. For Herbart, common concepts which organize experience, space in particular, are not \textit{a priori} forms but require construction.\footnote{His insistence that all reference to the \textit{a priori} should be held in suspicion would prove to be influential on future mathematicians. Cf. Gray, \textit{Plato’s Ghost}, 86 and 91-93; Scholz, “Herbart’s Influence on Bernhard Riemann,” 420-422; and Erik C. Banks, “Kant, Herbart and Riemann,” \textit{Kant-Studien} 96 (2005): 227.} In general, Herbart’s logic was merely meant to be a regulative science with regard to the organization of concepts wherein the law of non-contradiction reigns supreme.

Herbart mostly follows Kant in his views on (general) logic and rarely delves into advanced issues in the subject. His logic deals with the classification, division, and combination of concepts as such, the analysis of judgements built out of concepts, and the study of the modes of inference between judgements. His logic thus remains committed to the basic structure of the Aristotelian-Scholastic model. As he states in his ‘Hauptpunkte der Logik’:

\begin{quote}
Logic is concerned with representation. But not with the act of representing: neither with the method and mode by which we come to a representation nor with the state of mind which is therewith given. But only with what becomes represented.\footnote{Herbart, \textit{Hauptpunkte der Metaphysik} (Göttingen: Justus Friedrich Danckerts, 1808), 103.}
\end{quote}

Herbart thereby departs from Hegel fundamentally in his re-separation of logic from metaphysics. His logic is formal since it relies on a strict distinction between thoughts and their object; it explains the pure forms of thought while completely disregarding the content. Herbart’s work on pure logic was essentially uninfluential during Hegel’s lifetime.\footnote{Moritz Wilhelm Drobisch’s fully formal logic – developed most fully in his \textit{Neue Darstellung der Logik nach ihren einfachsten Verhältnissen} (Voss, 1836) – is the exception. For further treatment see Vilkko, \textit{A Hundred Years of Logical Investigations}, 40-46.} The rebirth of interest in formal logic would eventually take place in the hands of the innovators of the algebra of logic. Like Lotze after him, Herbart contributed to the legitimization of psychology as a (strict) science in its own right. But, also like Lotze, Herbart was anti-psychologistic: that is, he maintained a strict separation of logic and psychology. Once psychology was settled as a ‘genuine’ respectable science, however, the way was opened for logicians to look to psychology for a foundation of their discipline.

\subsection*{1.3.3 The Rise of Psychologism}

Psychologism reduces all logical concepts, methods, and justification to a psychological account of thinking. The general argument is relatively straightforward and comprises at
least two lines of thought: 1) Logic deals with thinking, thinking is part of psychic activity, psychology is the science which accounts for psychic activity, and therefore logic must be treated by psychology; 2) Logic deals with ‘laws of thought’; the laws of thought are determined by experimental psychology (as a strict natural science); and this strict natural science provides logic with its subject matter. The subject matter for logic is therefore provided by and grounded in the empirical science that is psychology. On this account, logic is the part of psychology which studies the laws which regulate the processes of thought—but as an empirical study these laws of thought are laws governing facts and they regulate the factual real processes of thought. These are laws in that they universally and necessarily apply to thought based upon the psychological (logical) make-up of the faculty of the understanding.

The rise of psychology as a legitimate scientific, experimental, practice in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century made it possible for psychology to take such a foundational role for logic. In Kant’s thought psychology is not yet a fully scientific discipline since it is non-mathematized and lacks a strictly rational method. However, the reduction of logic to psychology followed shortly upon the legitimization of psychology as that science which accounts for psychic (and thus rational) activity. Indeed, as commonly held, after Hegel’s death and with the rise of the natural sciences to the dominating position in intellectual life, philosophers were forced to account for empirical findings from the natural sciences in a more responsible way: once psychology emerged as a ‘proper’ natural science the need to account for Kantian a priori sources of human understanding empirico-psychologically arose. David E. Leary skilfully demonstrates that, despite Kant’s entirely negative critique of psychology, he ironically influenced its conceptual development from a ‘natural-historical’ to a scientific (mathematical/measurable) discipline. Leary highlights the ‘logic’ of this contribution: “(1) Kant articulated a philosophy of science, (2) which excluded psychology from the domain of true science, (3) thus posing a problem for later Kantian and semi-Kantian psychologists. In brief, Kant’s heritage to psychology was a challenge.”

With the downfall of speculative idealism, the most crushing opposition argued not against any specific doctrine, nor for the replacement of the speculative system by another, but rather against the systematic speculative method as a whole; the only

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43 For a variety of definitions of ‘psychologism’ see Martin Kusch, Psychology: A Case Study in the Sociology of Philosophical Knowledge (London: Routledge, 1995), 4-6.
methods that should be allowed in philosophy, according to the strictest of positivists, are the methods utilised and approved by the special sciences. Herbart’s approach to psychology thus seemed to provide a more fitting alternative in the age of scientism which supplanted the speculative German Idealistic era. That which limits the scientist in his pursuit of knowledge also limits the philosopher on this account. It follows that any strict positivism upholds some sort of restriction of logic to empirical methods. And since psychology is the empirical science which specializes in the study of the activity which logic is meant to govern, psychology could easily become seen by many as a possible foundation for logic itself. Herbart did not share this view, and as we will see below, neither did Lotze. However, the possibility of founding logic on psychology was set by the re-consideration of the nature of logic, together with the focus on the thinking subject and the rise of positive psychology which empirically grounds the investigation of such a subject.

1.4 Trendelenburg and the Reform of Logic

In 1865 Otto Liebmann’s famous *Kant und die Epigonen* (1865) – which ended every chapter with the declaration ‘Also muss auf Kant zurückgegangen werden’ and is thus often seen as the voice of the neo-Kantians – set the tone for philosophy in Germany for the next sixty years. The work not only expressed the general frustration of German philosophers of the time with regard to the Hegelian speculative idealism but also with the extreme empiricism of J. F. Fries and realism of Herbart. Influenced by his teacher Kuno Fischer and Eduard Zellar’s famous speech of 1862, Liebmann declared that the *a priori* conditions of both our experience and natural science are the proper objects of philosophical investigation; transcendental reflection, and not empirical-psychological investigations of contingent facts or speculations on the Absolute, was the proper inquiry for philosophers to follow.

However, thirteen years before Otto Liebmann’s famous work, Adolf Trendelenburg published a paper addressing ‘The Logical Question in Hegel’s System’

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45 See for instance, Andrew Chignell, “Introduction: On Going Back to Kant,” *The Philosophical Forum* 39 (2008): 109 and Köhnke, *The Rise of Neo-Kantianism*, 138-148 who states that although Liebmann captured the general feeling of the need for ‘going back to Kant’ no one person or work could be considered the ‘originator’ of neo-Kantianism, especially Liebmann, the least significant of the neo-Kantian thinkers of his time.


which amounts to the question: “If by scientific procedure we mean one that is essentially necessary and universal, then the question that must arise for decision is simply this: Is Hegel’s dialectic method of pure thinking a scientific procedure?” 48 Here lies the major influence on developments to come: he answers this question in the negative, thereby opening up the discussion of ‘logic reform’ in German philosophical circles. 49 Since this work opened the question about the nature of logic, philosophers began referring to it simply as ‘the logic question.’ 50 The general consensus for non-Hegelians was either that Hegel’s identification of logic with metaphysics must be overcome or that some connection with metaphysics must be maintained, with an improvement of Kant’s separation of pure logical concepts from all content, without reinstating Aristotelian scholasticism. 51 With the questionable status of the ‘thing in itself’ a complete return to Kant was seen as untenable. But the Herbartian equation of logic with the general logic which tacitly assumes a correspondence between thought and being was not the optimal way out in Trendelenburg’s account: a true ‘logic reform’ was required, with a two-fold aim. A foundation of logic was sought together with an account of logical applications, most notably in the guise of scientific (logical) methodology. 52

It was not any of Trendelenburg’s specific thoughts on logic, but simply his raising of the ‘logic question’ together with his development of logic as ‘theory of science’ or as the completion (in comprehension) of the sciences, that proved to be most influential. This included Trendelenburg’s reintroduction of the Leibnizian idea of a pure rational language in which the shape of the sign captures the content of the concept. 53 As Peckhaus rightly notes:

Given Trendelenburg’s special emphasis in presenting the Leibnizian system, his significance for the mathematical reception of Leibniz’s ideas in the context of the emergence of formal mathematics and mathematical logic in the second half of the 19th century is astonishing. Trendelenburg’s paper on

49 See Volker Peckhaus, “Language and Logic in German Post-Hegelian Philosophy,” The Baltic International Yearbook of Cognition, Logic and Communication 4 (2009): 1-17 which presents not only Trendelenburg’s but also Otto Friedrich Gruppe’s and Carl von Prantl’s responses to ‘the logic question.’
51 Vilkko, “The Logic Question During the First Half of the Nineteenth Century,” 205.
52 Peckhaus mentions both of these areas and argues that both reform procedures led to an estrangement of logic from philosophy. Peckhaus, “19th Century Logic between Philosophy and Mathematics,” 439.
Leibniz’s program of a general characteristic became a point of reference for logical pioneers such as Gottlob Frege and Ernst Schröder.\(^{54}\)

Trendelenburg’s concern with the investigations of concept formation (whether metaphysical or psychological) would prove to be another source of inspiration for future logicians. Meanwhile, developments in mathematics in the nineteenth century inaugurated the call for an increased rigor in dealing with the foundations of the discipline. This set the tone for the ideal of scientificity and would usher in the shift of logic from a purely philosophical to a mathematical discipline. Lotze was one of the philosophers in the nineteenth century to take up Trendelenburg’s call for revision, first in his 1843 *Logic* and then later in its much-expanded 1874 form *Logic in Three Books: Of Thought, Of Investigation and Of Knowledge*. Lotze’s influence on both the neo-Kantians and Husserl’s phenomenology sets the necessary background for Heidegger’s later engagement with issues in the philosophy of logic and so I turn to an investigation of the most pertinent aspects of Lotze’s thought which would play a decisive role in Husserl’s philosophically formative years.

### 2 Neo-Kantian Logic

Lotze takes up Trendelenburg’s challenge, treating logic as a purely philosophical discipline, and in fact as *the* first necessary discipline which would precede any metaphysical investigations. He occupies a middle position between the German Idealists and epistemologically oriented philosophers, and yet, ironically, he in many ways ushered in the positivist mode of thought which would displace the Idealists as the dominant force in German philosophical circles. As Heidegger stresses:

> We should note…the peculiar in-between position of Hermann Lotze, who at the same time that he was reinterpreting Plato’s Ideas as values undertook…that *Attempt at an Anthropology* (1856) which still drew sustenance for the nobility and straightforwardness of its mode of thinking from the spirit of German idealism, yet also opened that thinking to positivism.\(^{55}\)

For our purposes here, Lotze’s rejection of psychologism, his introduction of the logical realm of validity based upon his reinterpretation of Plato’s Ideas as values, together with his revisualisation of how concepts are formed proved most influential to subsequent neo-


Kantian and phenomenological thinkers. Lotze represents the common root of these two strands of thought which would dominate in the late nineteenth and early parts of the twentieth century in German philosophy.

2.1 Lotzean Background: Concepts and ‘The Logical Realm’

Lotze insists across all of his work that while science must provide the impetus from which philosophy springs, science itself deals with facts (about what is) and can never reach a comprehensive understanding of the meaning or value or reason behind what is (LB 172-174). In upholding psychology as a strict natural science and retaining a place for logic as a purely philosophical study, Lotze sets forth the paradigmatic anti-psychologistic stance.

Indeed, Lotze was one of the earliest anti-psychologistic thinkers, which is all the more striking as he contributed much to the development of psychology as an empirical science (as opposed to a metaphysics of the soul). By most accounts he was the most influential German logician in the late nineteenth century. As Bruno Bauch said in 1918:

Of all that has followed in the area of logic from Hegel to our time, nothing has surpassed Lotze’s logical achievement in value…. While everything that may claim value in the logic of our time has been influenced by Lotze in some way…. [For example,] the modern war of logic against the illogic of psychologism could not be understood at all without Lotze.

Bauch mentions four aspects of Lotze’s influence: 1) his anti-psychologism; 2) his distinction between the recognition of an object of knowledge and the object of knowledge as such; 3) his account of concepts in terms of functions; and 4) his

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56 Windelband calls Lotze “by far the most important among the epigones of the German Philosophy.” Windelband, A History of Philosophy, 632. Lotze took up Herbart’s chair at Göttingen in 1844 and stayed there until moving to Berlin in 1880. Both Frege and Dedekind (Husserl’s mathematics teacher) studied at Göttingen during this period.


58 A student of Heinrich Rickert, Bauch was a central figure in Southwest neo-Kantian circles who worked alongside Frege in Berlin and had a hand in bringing the latter’s works to his contemporaries’ awareness. On the reciprocal influence between Bauch and Frege within the dominant Lotzean background see Sven Schlotter, “Frege’s Anonymous Opponent in Die Verneinung,” History and Philosophy of Logic 27 (2006): 43-58.

reformulation of a ‘Platonic’ theory of ideas as a theory of objectivity separate from ontology. Finally, 5) Lotze’s separation of ‘value’ from any psychological origins was the discovery which underpins the previous four and would prove to be crucial to the neo-Kantian epistemology to follow.

2.1.1 On Concept Formation

Following Kant, Lotze introduces his *Logic* with an account of how our senses give rise to representations of objects, some of which are coherent and which flow together as a result of the realities which are non-accidentally connected, and others that are coincident and are connected by the “mere simultaneity of otherwise unconnected irritants” (*LA* 1). The former are the basis for knowledge and the latter for error.

Now in this account, what is distinctive about humans is their ability to connect their representational ideas and to *justify* the connection (*LA* 5) – the flow of representations is grounded in reality only with the addition of a subsequent reason-giving thought, which thinking adds as the “accessory notion of a ground for their [the representations’] coherence or non-coherence” (*LA* 6). Only with the addition of accessory thoughts can representations come to be capable of being true or false. The distinctive feature of human thought lies in the production of these justificatory notions which condition the form of apprehension of an object, and not in the mere correspondence of our apprehension with a fact (*LA* 7). And the purpose of thought consists of the addition of a reason for the coherence or non-coherence to the current of ideas; that is, to explain coincidence in terms of coherence and thus to enable the subject to think that which can be true or false. Only in this way can a thing and its properties be represented to the thinking mind. And only with such a representation can it judge about them that ‘S is P’ or ‘S is not P’.

This activity of ‘providing a reason’ yields concepts on Lotze’s account only following two more steps. In the first instance thought forms representations from sensations by distinguishing the act of sensing from what is sensed; the content of the sensation is isolated and marked (via a word naming the content). In the second stage of thought the isolated contents are marked off from one another (positioned) in their distinguished place so they can be compared to others. A network of relations is thereby formed, although not explicitly except within logical analysis. Common characteristics of impressions are linked through the comparison of distinct ideas. Any common element which is recognized by thought in the comparison of simple representations Lotze calls a
‘first universal’ which he distinguishes from universal concepts as different in kind since they express “an inward experience which thought has merely to recognize” (LA 30). First universals are not products of thought but are directly apprehended in the object (LA 31). The first universals are given and thus are ‘pre-logical’: the comparison of ideas as particular instances under a common universal precedes logical investigation (LA 33).

Traditionally it is assumed that thought abstracts a common element from different instances and forms the logical universal (concept) by disregarding what is different and focussing on the sameness. Lotze instead calls these mere ‘second universals’ which require logical effort in ‘working upon’ the first universals which are given directly, while traditional logic is mistaken in calling these concepts-proper (LA 43). He argues that such abstraction does not at all explain the connection of the parts which together make up the ‘concept’ thus formed. The problem is that the abstractionist concept merely captures a list of common elements which might not cohere for any reason: for instance, cherries can be compared with flesh to attain a (seeming) concept ‘red, juicy, edible bodies’ but no rule unites these marks and the knowledge gained from subsuming a particular under it would be negligible (LA 52). This account leaves out the most important function of thought in the formation of concepts, namely, the display of the reasons, the ground, for the connection of coherent ideas (LA157-159).

This flaw in the traditional abstractionist model of concept formation leads Lotze to his unique addition to the field of logic: the function-model of concept formation. The universal becomes a concept rather than just a general image only with the exhibition of a rule of connection displayed by the concept itself. On Lotze’s account, the rule not merely co-ordinates and exhibits the marks in a concept but it mutually determines these marks as well. One reason that Lotze urges a reconsideration of concepts, not as simple sums (lists) of marks, but as complex functions is that not all elements comprising a concept should be of equal value and connected in a universal way to each other and to the concept as a whole. Marks in complex concepts especially are non-reductively interdependent. He thus holds that \( S=a+b+c+d, \) etc. does not capture the structure of a concept. On the other hand, a notion such as \( S=F(a,b,c,d,\ldots) \) would since it indicates that

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60 For example, “the three sides of a triangle are not merely there as well as the three angles; they must form the angles by their intersections; the concept of motion does not merely contain the part-ideas of place, change, direction, and speed; direction and speed are, each in a different sense, determinations of change; place, being that which is left behind, can least of all be called a mark of the concept; it is a point of reference for the idea of change, to which its relation is expressed by that of the genitive to the nominative which governs it” (LA 48).
the value of $S$ can be obtained only from combining its marks – a, b, c, d, … – in a precise manner, particular in each case (LA 48). The true universal allows for the formation of the entire species through application of its rule. While from an object’s falling under an abstractionist-concept such as that formed from ‘red, juicy, edible body’ we can only deduce that the object is a red, juicy, and edible body, the functional model allows for further consequences to be drawn from the concept; as such, there may be equally correct logical concepts of the same object on Lotze’s account (LA 47).

Objects falling under the (functional) concepts each have a distinctive way of exhibiting the marks comprising the concept – with each of these marks retaining their interdependence. As such, these concepts can give rise to new knowledge, since from the ‘value’ of all but one of the marks, and given the ‘rule’ of the function, the value of the outstanding mark can be discovered – unlike an abstractionist-concept, such as ‘red, juicy, X,’ where nothing tells us what the X should look like. The marks act like variables in the function which, when instantiated, gives rise to an ideal world akin to “the vision of Plato” (LA 56).

However, Lotze does not rest content with the impossible task of discovering a complete world of Ideas: this would tell us nothing about reality – the world of change – but would only give an image of a fixed order. In order to step beyond a mere static concatenation of concepts, logical activity advances to the next stage in Lotze’s account: the theory of judgements. And from here it moves on to the theory of inference. Lotze remedies the limitations of the Aristotelian syllogism by including three non-syllogistic forms of inference utilized by mathematicians which require a non-traditional ‘abstractionist’ concept and which non-trivially allow for the extension of knowledge as opposed to the traditional syllogism. The latter relies on a circle whereby the “two premises themselves are only true on the supposition of its [the conclusion’s] truth” (LA 130). While the syllogistic inferences combine only concepts understood as a collection of unordered marks, non-syllogistic inferences can extend our knowledge since they employ “constitutive concepts” which are structured like functions and display the

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61 I leave out an explicit account of Lotze’s ‘variable instantiation’ in his functional-concepts since he himself left open the question of what this would entail. As Jeremy Heis argues, it was not until Frege’s *Begriffsschrift* “with its distinction between constants and variables, functional expressions and singular terms,” that an explicit system would be developed which “shows us how to form new concepts from judgments by replacing constants with variables.” Jeremy Heis, “Frege, Lotze, and Boole,” in *The Historical Turn in Analytic Philosophy*, ed. Erich H. Reck (Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan, 2013, forthcoming), 113-138. Paper available online https://webfiles.uci.edu/jheis/www/Heis,%20Frege%20Lotze%20Boole%20TO%20APPEAR.pdf, 28.
interdependency of the concepts’ marks (LA 154). Only by understanding non-Aristotelian forms of inferences can the logician uncover these complex conceptual forms required by higher level mathematics and modern science. One key aspect of Lotze’s logic is thus to provide an investigation of the basic concepts employed in scientific reasoning, while taking (mathematical) scientific activity as its impetus.

2.1.2 Anti-Psychologism

Lotze thus follows Herbart in his praise of scientific method and yet his logic extends beyond pure formal logic to include, for instance, methodology, which Herbart took as a part of metaphysics. For Lotze, logic must be more than a purely formal discipline as it should provide a robust theory of knowledge, and so a foundation for the sciences (LA 46). In general, Lotze argues that the psychological foundations for logic put forth by his contemporaries – John Stuart Mill in England and F.E. Beneke, J.E. Erdmann and later Theodore Lipps, Christoph Sigwart and Wilhelm Wundt in Germany – is mistaken. Psychology does not have the requisite foundational status.

As we have seen, the psychologism to which Lotze responds can be traced back to Kant.62 The psychologistic accounts that arise from interpretations of Kant take the essence of Kant’s philosophy to be an investigation into the psychological origin of knowledge, and not the transcendental investigation of the logical value of knowledge. Although his transcendental approach eschews any study of empirical thought, Kant’s study of the operation of the thinking subject opened the doors for a philosophical account of actual embodied thinking.

Despite his championing of psychology as a legitimate scientific enterprise, Lotze upholds at least two clear objections against the project of explaining definitions, concepts, judgements, and inference – that is, logic – in terms of psychology. The first is that psychologistic foundations of logic are circular:

We may presuppose the existence of all these things, of perceptions, ideas, and their connexion according to the laws of a psychical mechanism, but logic only begins with the conviction that the matter cannot end here; the conviction, that between the combinations of ideas, however they may have originated, there is a difference of truth and untruth, and that there are forms to which these combinations ought to answer and laws which they ought to

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62 Sluga is of course right to note that “according to Kant, logic must be formal and the forms of human thought are not empirical.” But Sluga is mistaken insofar as he precludes an investigation into Kant’s influence upon later psychologistic thinkers when he says that to argue that “Kant is…one of the sources of psychologism in logic…is a misunderstanding.” Sluga, Gottlob Frege, 53.
obey. It is true that we may attempt by a psychological investigation to explain the origin of this authoritative consciousness itself; but the only standard by which the correctness of our results could be measured would be one set up by the very consciousness to be investigated. (LA 10)

Any materialistic or empirical theory which attempts either to prove or disprove, for example, the principle of identity or the law of excluded middle, requires this very principle and law in every step of the argument (LB 247). Second, logic is concerned with the formal structures of thought, not with their empirico-genetic origins or the “conditions under which thought as a psychical process comes about” (LB 246). To think that logic and psychology are concerned with the same subject matter is absurd (LB 251). For Lotze, logic concerns itself with the value of the elements of thought in working through its intellectual reasoning process, not with the way in which these elements come into existence (LA 34). This separation of logical value from the emergence of thought processes would prove crucial for both the neo-Kantian’s and Husserl’s understanding of logic. In particular, Lotze interprets the Platonic Idea as this logical value, giving rise to the ‘realm of the logical’, a timeless domain of logical entities – valid judgements – which hold universally and obviate any logical question about the origination of these judgements in concrete, temporal thought processes.

2.1.3 Platonism: The Logical Realm of Validity

Lotze agrees with Herbart that logical forms connect to the activity of thought which is one specific mode of mental existence. What Lotze disagrees with is Herbart’s and later psychologistic thinkers’ conclusion that these logical forms only have significance as expressions of the structure of the human psychological make-up. The essence of the activity of thought for Lotze does not lie in the activity of the empirical consciousness. As Adamson says, “it would do injustice to the meaning of the notion [concept], the judgement, the syllogism, if these were regarded simply as ways in which consistent ideas were put together, or inconsistent ideas held asunder.”63 The mechanism by which acts of consciousness are produced does not embody the whole of these acts; it does not unveil their connection to that about which the act is. An account of the origins of a thought is irrelevant to its justification. It is logic’s business to study this justification. Lotze thereby introduces a distinction between an account of the act of consciousness and that of its content, predating Husserl (and Brentano).

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63 Adamson, A Short History of Logic, 195.
Lotze carves out the logical domain as the realm of validity in his reinterpretation of the Platonic idea. He counts four primitives of reality: real *things* have being (*Sein*); real *events* occur; real *relations* obtain; *propositions* are really true when they hold, when they are validities (*Geltung*) (*LB* 208). The logical domain of reality resides entirely separate from the domain of things in the world: whether the content of a proposition can be related to an object in the spatio-temporal world is of no consequence to questions of its validity, its truth. With his distinction between *Sein* and *Geltung* as two entirely separate domains of reality Lotze opens up the possibility of considering a domain accessible to thought alone. He sets the realm of the valid apart from any genetic questions, separate from experience altogether. As they come to us, Ideas possess reality as events – they *occur* – but their content “so far as we regard it in abstraction from the mental activity which we direct to it, can no longer be said to occur, though neither again does it exist as things exist; we can only say that it possesses Validity” (*LB* 209). The space of logic thus exists entirely independent of any human thought, even though actual validities can never claim real existence “except at the moments in which they are thought” (*LB* 283).

Lotze’s realm of Platonic Ideas, the realm of logical truths, of valid propositions, stands in a fixed mode, awaiting our presentification of their subsistence through our pronouncements, our acts of judgement. The contents of the possible ideas stand in fixed, universal, unalterable, timeless relations regardless of what or when we may think of them. The objective and infinitely complex interrelation of the world of ideas remains forever fixed for Lotze and yet it remains at the bottom of all actual acts of thought, the necessary condition for their possibility. The world of experience has “affinities” with the world of ideas which “guarantees us…the security with which thought is able to move within the world of ideas as such, to investigate the systematic and invariable connexions obtaining among the elements of that world” (*LB* 285). Any ‘new’ connections formed by thought inevitably have a place in the world of ideas that were previously not discovered; Lotze presents us with a view of logic that is thoroughly Platonistic. The project of philosophy begins with the discovery of *a priori* truths which hold with absolute and universal validity in similar vein to his student Frege’s Logicist program.64

On Lotze’s interpretation, the Platonic ideas are constant, steady, eternally selfsame and accessible through our experience. They correspond to the objectification of the first

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64 For comparisons with Frege, see David Sullivan, “Hermann Lotze,” in *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Online*, 2010 (plato.stanford.edu/entries/hermann-lotze/) and Heis, “Frege, Lotze, and Boole.”
movements of thought described above in the development of ‘first universals’ on. The Ideas form the ground upon which eternally valid judgements can be made (*LB* 204). Truth for Lotze resides in this eternal, unchanging realm which becomes instantiated in our individual acts of consciousness. However, as Heidegger will later argue, Lotze nowhere explains how this interaction works. Nor does he provide an adequate account of the mode of being of truth, apart to say that it is one of the four irreducible modes of actuality.

**2.2 Marburg Neo-Kantianism: Paul Natorp and the Theory of Science**

Although Lotze’s ideas would be taken up most fully by the Southwest or Baden school of neo-Kantianism, especially in the works of its founder Wilhelm Windelband and Heinrich Rickert, his ideas also influenced the founder of the Marburg school, Hermann Cohen. This latter influence is seen most clearly in the works of Paul Natorp and Ernst Cassirer, in particular in Natorp’s attack on psychologism. In his 1887 “Über objektive und subjektive Begründung der Erkenntnis” Natorp argues that science cannot proceed from anything other than objective (non-subjective) unities; there is no other possible beginning for knowledge. Generally the Marburg neo-Kantians attempt to account for the explosion of developments in mathematics and the physical sciences near the end of the nineteenth century. The proper function of critical philosophy, in their view, is to provide the foundations for the natural sciences. At bottom, philosophy is an epistemology, a theory of knowledge, working to provide the foundations of the highest mode of human knowledge recognized by the neo-Kantians: namely, scientific-mathematical knowing. Philosophy starts with a basic fact, and this fact is the fact of the positive, mathematical sciences.

The aim of the Marburg neo-Kantian transcendental philosophy is therefore to bring unity to the sciences through the investigation into the principles (categories) according to which the natural scientist constructs his objects of study, or produces being. Thought thereby takes pride of place over being: epistemology is more primordial in the philosophical hierarchy than is ontology. As Steven Crowell says, in this conception of the discipline “philosophy has only indirect access to being, mediated by cognitions achieved in first-order scientific theorizing (i.e., ‘the fact of science’). Unable to deduce truth speculatively from its own principle, as Hegel imagined, philosophy is to reflect
upon the principles governing independent sciences." Philosophy and science are of apiece for Natorp: both take the manifoldness of phenomena and reduce it to laws. The difference lies in the fact that the sciences take the manifoldness of nature as their object of study and reduce this manifold to natural laws while philosophy takes the manifold of science itself as its object of study and reduces this manifold to logical laws. The fact of knowledge is left untouched by philosophy which aims to uncover the grounds for knowledge; philosophy is the critical science. According to Natorp, without philosophy science cannot rest assured that its claims to truth are well-founded.

The Marburg neo-Kantian strategy, which departs from Lotze’s more faithful interpretation of Kant, rest on a reinterpretation of the relationship between the Transcendental Aesthetic and the Transcendental Logic. Ultimately, they argue that there is no pre-conceptual object given to thought for, as Kant’s Transcendental Deduction demonstrates, “we cannot know or speak of any object, so not of any (objective) meaning of universal or particular other than that which exists for knowledge” (OSK 260). As Stephan Käufer puts it, for Cohen and Natorp, “thought goes all the way down.” As such there is no pre-conceptual intuitive object. The concern of the Transcendental Aesthetic to show how an object is first given to the senses, formed by space and time, prior to any thought of the object is entirely confused. On this reading of Kant the Transcendental Logic should not be preceded by any account of the pre-conceptual object; the study of the categories of the understanding exhaustively treats how it is that objects are given to us.

To reiterate, there simply is no object to be subsequently represented in our true judgements for there are no entities which exist independent of our judging activity; neither the transcendent object of the metaphysical realist, nor the ‘bare fact’ of the positivists exists prior to determination through the judging activity of human consciousness. All that is for the Marburg neo-Kantians is what is subsumed under a concept, what is judged; the meaning of being for these neo-Kantians is restricted to the copula. The unconceptualized sense-data are organized into an object within the a priori logical structures of the judgement; only after being so formed is there an object for the positivist to study at all.

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66 Käufer, “Heidegger’s Interpretation of Kant,” 183.
67 The *phenomena* which are given only are after being judged to be something – they are given only predicatively.
Natorp champions Plato as having given birth to this idealism with his ‘theory of ideas’ – interpreted by Natorp as universal laws – which was perverted through Aristotle’s interpretive influence. While the question of the relation between the particular and universal has guided philosophical inquiry since Aristotle’s disagreement with Plato, Natorp sees in the widespread reform of the sciences of his day the general acceptance of the idea of the universal as the form of law. As such, the bare sensory thing no longer stands as the primary given; rather, it first of all represents an unknown, it presents itself as a task for the knowing-subject:

As Kant concisely summed up the basic result of modern science since Galileo, things have dissolved into mere ‘relationships’, although among these there are some which are ‘independent and constant’ and which from now on must represent things for us. From now on it is primarily and essentially a matter of the universality of relation (which gives the concept of law). (OSK 258)

Or, as Cassirer would say some years later, “as soon as we take one step beyond the first naïve observation of isolated facts, as soon as we ask about the connection and law of the real, we have transcended the strict limits prescribed by the positivistic demand.” In the activity of modern scientists the ‘reality’ of the elements is left aside for an investigation into the system of universal hypothetical connections of ground and consequence, into the universal laws which govern ‘reality’, which occurs only as determined by these very laws. These laws hold timelessly, they are valid, and specific sensible phenomena appear only as instances of a law.

Thus, for Natorp, the basic fact to be explained by philosophy is that which is made through the act of scientific thinking. The sciences create objects through their theorizing which ultimately explains the world as following universal a priori laws. Although the positivists are correct when they take the particular occurrence of a thing as given to an observer, they ignore the fact that every particular that has been thought objectively has already been taken as part of a universal validity. It remains a particular thing, but always in relationship to the higher universality of the scientific law through which it is

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70 Although Sebastian Luft argues that Natorp in fact goes beyond Cohen by not limiting Erkenntnis to merely scientific cognizing, but looks to ‘knowledge’ in the broader sense of ‘that which is known’ generally. The nuance is inconsequential in the present account. Sebastian Luft, *Subjectivity and Lifeworld in Transcendental Phenomenology* (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 2011), 212.
comprehended as such and such a thing. While the positivists would likely reply that the universal has significance only insofar as it signifies a particular whose universal it is, Natorp maintains that the particular has significance only because of the universal of which it is a particular (OSK 258-259).

Opposed to the positivist doctrine, Natorp’s account of the particular comes from his interpretation of Plato for whom the particular “could only be valid as something actual, or being (whether thing, occurrence or relationship) by virtue of the universal, as a particular instance of the universal, or to put it in modern terms, as an instance of the law” (OSK 260). The particular is nothing but the particular instance of the universal (law); just as the universal is nothing for itself, apart from the particular. What Natorp holds to most clearly is that both universality and particularity occur in knowledge: more precisely, neither of these are ‘things’ which occur, but rather the relation between them takes place in knowledge. But the opposition and reciprocal relation of the universal and particular comes from the prescriptive laws of knowledge itself. Therefore, that relation itself occurs in the object so long as the object exists for knowledge: “for we cannot know or speak of any object, so not of any (objective) meaning of universal or particular other than that which exists for knowledge” (OSK 260).

We get to the heart of Natorp’s position when we see that he does not dismiss the positivist insight altogether. For he maintains that even if the determining or positioning of something as an object is achieved by knowledge first of all, something must be given to be determined. This something is given to the knowing (scientific) consciousness as something to be known objectively. As such, what precedes the achievement of knowledge is the task: in any act of knowledge, “the object is given, namely as an X, something which is yet to be determined, not as a known quantity” (OSK 262). The unknown X is worked upon by knowledge such that the object comes to be constructed. The cognizing construction of reality is called ‘objective’ since it deals with cognizing something according to a law; although subjectively produced, the objectivity – the law – has a universal, fixed character and as such it is lawlike and no longer subjective. The subject for the neo-Kantians is thereby reduced to its objectification of reality. Only in so far as the subject constructs the objects of reality can the subject be discovered. The problem: once we think of the subject we necessarily think of it as an object and thus not
as a subject.\textsuperscript{71} The question then appears: how can we capture the subjectivity of the subject?

The task of philosophy for Natorp is to provide a logical justification, to uncover the logical procedures for, the subjective-cognizing objective construction of reality that occurs most emphatically in scientific activity. While the scientist constructs reality, the philosopher must devote himself to uncovering the a priori conditions which come to play in such a construction. “To authenticate the laws of knowledge we must move in the constructive direction of knowledge, in the direction of objectification, for it is the ultimate objective unities we seek” (OSK 264). The goal of philosophy is to explain the ‘fact of science’ which Crowell calls “the fact of objectification at its most developed stage…. The logic of science is thus transcendental since it concerns conditions under which objects can be known and since logical principles are simultaneously principles of being.”\textsuperscript{72} However, Natorp reserves a place for the transcendental investigation of subjectivity as well in his transcendental psychology. Yet, since all thematization is objectivization, making the subject the theme of inquiry seems to entail an investigation into the subject as an object, as a construction. To inquire after the subject in this manner will require an investigation of the subject according to its laws of constructivity. This is precisely what occurs in psychology as a scientific discipline. In this way, the concrete life of the subject qua subject is necessarily lost. For Natorp there can be no immediate description of the subject as living since by the very act of making the subject into the theme of inquiry the subject becomes objectified. The essence of the subject is ‘killed’ when the facts of subjectivity are uncovered by scientific psychology, in any description of the subject.\textsuperscript{73} The reflecting subject is not the same as the subject reflected upon; the latter is an objectified subject.\textsuperscript{74} However, Natorp introduces a new non-descriptive method which constitutes the foundation of his transcendental psychology and with this aims to uncover pre-reflective subjectivity at the base of all thinking.

Since all applications of concepts and categories to the subject will turn it into an object, and there is no experience prior to such objectification, Natorp proposes that a philosophical account of subjectivity must work back from the achievements of the object-constructing subject to reconstruct the subjectivity at play there:

\textsuperscript{71} Paul Natorp, \textit{Allgemeine Psychologie nach kritischer Methode, Erstes Buch: Objekt und Methode der Psychologie} (Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1912), 31.
\textsuperscript{72} Crowell, \textit{Husserl, Heidegger and the Space of Meaning}, 30.
\textsuperscript{73} Natorp, \textit{Allgemeine Psychologie}, 102-103.
\textsuperscript{74} \textit{Ibid.}, 30.
The constructive objectifying achievement of knowledge always comes first; from it we reconstruct as far as possible the level of original subjectivity which could never be reached by knowledge apart from this reconstruction which proceeds from the already completed objective construction.... Subjectivity is primary, in so far as the task of knowledge is posed before it is solved, but it cannot be called a given in the sense of being a datum of knowledge. (OSK 263)

The subject can never be fully captured, but through reconstruction the lived experiences that are ‘killed-off’ by reflective objectification can be to some extent restored. The subject cannot be examined directly, but only through this reconstructive method which pieces back together as much of the original experience as possible. It is simply a category mistake to approach the subject via the constructive method, to aim for a direct description of the subject qua subject.

By distinguishing between the constructive and reconstructive methods, Natorp draws a distinction between the natural scientific and philosophical approaches to the subject. As we have seen, Marburg neo-Kantian transcendental philosophy becomes a full-fledged epistemology – not in our contemporary sense, but as that foundational science which unifies the other sciences by uncovering the unifying laws which its subject matter, the natural sciences themselves, obey. Transcendental logic for the Marburg neo-Kantians provides the backbone of this endeavour to be the science of science, the theory of theory.

3 Husserl’s Breakthrough to Phenomenology

Just as neo-Kantians took neo-Kantianism itself as the scientific philosophy, so too did the phenomenologists, following Husserl. Crowell finds the difference between the two movements to lie precisely in the purported relation between philosophy and the sciences: “neo-Kantianism differs from phenomenology in maintaining a continuity between positive science and philosophy. As theory of science, neo-Kantian epistemology wants to provide grounds for a principled (‘scientific’) weltanschauung. Phenomenology (here, Husserl and the early Heidegger), on the contrary, establishes the autonomy of philosophy precisely through a discontinuity with positive science and the aims of worldview formation.” The difference between the two modes of philosophy resides here most of all. Both Husserl and the neo-Kantians approach philosophy from a scientistic-

75 Ibid., 192.
epistemological standpoint, thereby focusing on theoretical consciousness as their main subject matter. A crucial difference arises with respect to the approach to subjectivity, which Husserl’s maintains from his days in the school of Franz Brentano. In direct opposition to the neo-Kantian way of thought, consciousness is to be studied directly without thereby turning the subject into an object. In the first edition of his *Logical Investigations* Husserl chastises Natorp’s reliance upon the ‘pure Ego’ arguing that since the centre of all conscious relations cannot be intuitively given, it remains problematic. However, regardless of this problem, we are given the lived intentional experiences of consciousness directly. While Natorp also recognizes this relational character of consciousness, Husserl works to uncover the structures of consciousness as intentional both in its act-character and in its content-character.

Although it is correct to say that “the main features of Husserlian phenomenology are already in place here in the *Philosophy of Arithmetic*” there are many differences that occur between this work and the *Logical Investigations*, most notably Husserl’s distancing from Brentano. In his earliest works Husserl’s analysis remains a description of the constitution of various concepts and he describes this constitution in terms of the modes of psychical acts and states. He ultimately demonstrates that thought does not merely employ concepts that are given to it passively, but that it forms them according to an active interest. The main difference between *Philosophy and Arithmetic* and the *Logical Investigations* lies in how categories or logical forms are arrived at. In the former, the categories are formed through abstraction since concrete intuition is taken to comprise all that is given immediately: reflection upon psychic acts yields an account of concept-formation. Conversely, in the latter, partially through the influence of Lotze, no reflection upon our psychic acts is required to form categories as these are given immediately in an intentional act. Husserl attempts to delineate the *a priori* laws of thought in such a way that the sciences can be understood as part of a grand logical system. Through an investigation of the knowing consciousness Husserl aims to uncover those invariant structures which make logical thought and thereby science possible. In the *Logical Investigations* Husserl attempts to delineate the *a priori* laws of thought in such a way that the sciences can be understood as part of a grand logical system. Through an investigation of the knowing consciousness Husserl aims to uncover those invariant structures which make logical thought and thereby science possible. In the *Logical Investigations*...
Investigations this process works itself out in confrontation with the then prevalent psychologistic approach to the foundations of logic.

3.1 Confrontation with Psychologism

Just like Lotze before him Husserl’s breakthrough to phenomenology emerges in response to Trendelenburg’s logical question. The Logical Investigations is described as a work in the theory of knowledge: logic is to provide the conditions for the possibility of knowledge as such. Husserl’s work thus competes with the neo-Kantians’ dominant epistemological account. Husserl frames his work first of all as a response to the problem of psychologism, devoting the Prolegomena to the Logical Investigations to demonstrating the falsehood of the psychologistic position, and secondly to delineating his conception of logic as the pure theory of theory. 81

Husserl’s criticism of psychologism generally follows Lotze’s although with considerably more detail and with an account of more nuanced positions within the psychologistic position. Ultimately Husserl also argues that psychologism fatally ignores the fundamental difference between the logical and the psychological domains. Logic, like pure mathematics, is a non-empirical science, which abstracts entirely from factual existence (LUI 97/Hua 18, 154-155). Logic studies ideal structures and laws which are certain, timelessly valid, and exact; it is a science of the ideal meaningful essences of the sciences (LUI 224-225/Hua 19, 97-99). Psychology, as an empirical study, investigates factual nature in all its vagueness, temporal variability and probability. Reducing psychology to logic therefore rests on a category mistake. Pure logic limits itself to the a priori, ideal realm of apodictic laws which govern thought. Logic limits itself to the realm of validity such that a judgement’s being-true must be understood, following Lotze, as its being-valid, as the validity of that very judgement which holds timelessly.

Husserl provides many specific arguments against various nuances in the psychologistic position. To keep my account of his well-known criticism short, I present one example (LUI §§25-26/Hua 18): The law of non-contradiction states that two contradictory judgements cannot both be true (at the same time). Proponents of psychologism interpret this as a law regarding psychical acts of judging. On this

interpretation, the law dictates that two psychical states in which contradictory judgements are pronounced cannot exist concomitantly. John Stuart Mill, for one, even takes this to be an inductive generalization of our experience (LUI 56-57/Hua 18, 88-90). Whether or not this law can be proven through induction, Husserl questions the psychologistic interpretation, stating that the law of contradiction does not express the “real incompatibility of the corresponding acts of judgement” (LUI 58/Hua 18, 91) but the impossibility of two contradictory judgements being mutually consistent. Two opposing judgements might factually co-exist, but they cannot both be simultaneously valid. The act of judging is real while the content of the judgement is ideal. These are two clearly distinct forms of reality, one of which is ‘in time’ and the other of which is ‘supratemporal’.

Although Husserl provides a trenchant critique of the attempt to place psychology at the foundations of logic, most of his Logical Investigations, namely the entire second volume, contains a descriptive investigation into the nature of consciousness. Before moving on to his account of the ‘subjective’ side of logic, Husserl proposes his vision of logic as the pure theory of theory which “is a theory on account of the ideal, necessary connection that dominates it, while what is here [in psychology] called a natural theory is a mere course of chance presentations or convictions, not tied together by insight, without binding power” (LUI 133/Hua 18, 212). Pure logic constructs theories about pure concepts and pure propositions, whose meaning is as little connected to the spatio-temporal world of facts as is pure arithmetic. Pure, ideal truths are ‘a priori’ – true in unconditioned necessity and generality: “we hereby apprehend truth as the ideal correlate of the transient subjective act of knowledge, as standing opposed in its unity to the unlimited multitude of possible acts of knowing, and of knowing individuals” (LUI 145/Hua 18, 232). In the Prolegomena truth is represented as eternally and absolutely valid possibility. Whereas psychologism would see, for instance, the laws of gravitation as not true prior to Newton’s discovery, Husserl insists that their unrestricted validity is clearly part of their inherent meaning (LUI 85/Hua 18, 134): the laws become realized in real acts of judging; truth is like a species or an Idea “given in an act of Ideation based upon an intuition” and yet an identical unity subsisting over against the various acts of its

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Mezei and Smith find the foundation for Husserl’s later transcendental turn to reside in this insistence on the purity of his investigations: “By exaggerating the ideal character of his theory or theories, and by overemphasizing the gap between it and the natural sciences, Husserl prepared the way for his later ‘transcendental phenomenological turn’, in which no feature that is appropriate to nature has a place.” Mezei and Smith, The Four Phases of Philosophy, 48.
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cconcrete instantiation (LUI 85-86/Hua 18,135-136). The possibility of uniting these two realms, of accounting for the purely logical activity of consciousness motivated the publication of the Logical Investigations as well as Husserl’s split from his Brentanian predecessors.83

3.2 Intentionality

Beyond the Prolegomena, Husserl’s Logical Investigations present a descriptive analysis of consciousness as intentional. While the Prolegomena treats the ‘object’ side of epistemology, presenting a pure theory of science, Husserl devotes the remainder of the book to a series of investigations into more general epistemological questions pertaining to the nature of knowing in general, culminating in a phenomenological description of consciousness per se. Husserl criticizes psychologism for reducing the ideal logical to real psychical processes, yet he insists that a connection must exist: it is simply that the distinction must be rigorously maintained, even if a connection can be found. To understand the ideal objects of logic, one must study how they are given to consciousness: for this reason Hans-Georg Gadamer characterizes Husserl along with neo-Kantianism as Heidegger’s point of critical engagement.84 Along with the neo-Kantians, Husserl in no way attempts to reduce objects to acts: he looks to understand the object as it is given in relation to the conscious act through an explication of the a priori structure of these acts. Opposed to Natorp he looks, in the final two logical investigations in particular, to give a direct, descriptive account of consciousness, one completely independent from any empirical, factual, inquiry.85

By limiting his account to experiences from a first-person perspective, Husserl works from the intended presuppositionlessness of phenomenology, striving to avoid any metaphysical or scientific presuppositions (or any ‘facts of science’) while describing whatever appears with utmost fidelity. And Husserl insists that when we experience something in a conscious act, we are always conscious of something: for every conscious

85 To put it exactly, the specific investigations of the second volume were concerned with the turning back of intuition upon the logical experiences which take place in us when we think but which we are not able to see, which we do not have in the field of attentive glance when we perform the act of thinking in the naturally original manner.” Edmund Husserl, “The Task and the Significance of the Logical Investigations,” in Readings on Edmund Husserl’s Logical Investigations, trans. J.N. Mohanty (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1977) 197.
act (be it an act of perception, judgement, fantasizing, recollecting, predicting, and so forth) there is an object toward which it is directed; conscious experiences are *intentional*, consciousness is intentional. Intentionality characterizes all acts of consciousness, but he does not thereby subscribe to a view wherein the intended object is ‘contained in’ consciousness (*LUII* 98-100; *Hua* 19, 384-389). Whether it be perceived or, say, imagined, the intended object, *as intended*, is transcendent to consciousness. The difference in this case lies precisely in the fact that the referent of our perceptive act exists, while the referent of our imaginative act does not. The conscious act is directed toward an object whether or not the referent exists, whether or not it is absurd:

The object of the presentation, of the ‘intention’, *is* and *means* what is presented, the intentional object… it makes no difference whether this object exists or is imaginary or absurd. ‘The object is merely intentional’ does not, of course, mean that it exists, but only in an intention, of which it is a real (*reelles*) part, or that some shadow of it exists. It means rather that the intention, the reference to an object so qualified, exists, but not that the object does. If the intentional object exists, the intention, the reference, does not exist alone, but the thing referred to exists also. (*LUII* 127/*Hua* 19, 439)

Intentionality minimalizes the required metaphysical assumptions: there is not consciousness over against an intended entity, both of which are assumed to exist. All that is required is the existence of a conscious experience; its *directedness* belongs to consciousness alone (*LUII* 133/*Hua* 19, 451). Intentionality thus overcomes the traditional epistemological problem of how to span the gap between the subject and object. There simply is no problem in the first place. Lotze’s solution of constructing an intermediary representation of the given object, for one, is entirely unnecessary. The subject, as conscious, is directed *in its very structure* to something other than itself, it *is* self-transcending.

### 3.3 Meaning, Intuition, and Truth as Evidence

The intended object in the above account, whether it exists or not, is what is *meant* in the act. We intend an object precisely when we mean something about it; as such Husserl distinguishes between the meaning and the object itself, and yet they remain tied by the fact that “an expression only refers to an objective correlate *because* it means something… an act of meaning is the determinate manner in which we refer to our object of the moment” (*LUI* 198/*Hua* 19 54-55). The meaning itself may change while the objective referent remains fixed. The meaning of an act gives an act its *directedness*
insofar as it is what the act intends; moreover, it determines that as which the object is understood. Now, the purpose of theoretical scientific activity is to provide systematic, objective theories which unify some given domain; the activity of a theoretical scientist consists of an investigation into the proper ordering not of the understanding but of the concepts “which are for him ideal unities of meaning” along with the ordering of “the truths, which themselves are made up out of such concepts” (LUI 225/Hua 19, 98-99). Husserl thus takes theoretical science to consist homogenously of meanings such that the scientist does not create the objective validities of his inquiry, but rather, he sees or discovers them (LUI 226/Hua 19, 100). Opposed to Natorp, the pure realm of the scientist consists of ideal essences secured by philosophical logic. Logic as the theory of theory then provides the laws of the meaning-forms guiding scientific activity. Whereas philosophy is a science for the neo-Kantians only insofar as it is a critique of the sciences, the facts of which it takes as its ultimate presupposition, for Husserl philosophy works from the presuppositionless starting point of securing a realm of absolute knowledge, of ideal essences, according to which the sciences can be critiqued.

Each intentional act is directed toward an object in a way of intending (perceiving, wishing, judging, etc) and with some meaning – each intentional act has a quality and a matter. It is not that a bare object is given to consciousness, but rather, one always intends an object as something, that is, with a certain meaning. While the act is a real process, the object can be real or ideal, but the meaning is always ideal as it can be repeated and shared with others. And yet each concrete act is meaningful as well. Husserl maintains that the ideal meaning underlies the concrete meaning as its essence: “only as a species can it embrace it in unity…just as Redness in specie is to the slips of paper which lie here, and which all ‘have’ the same redness” (LUI 230/Hua 19, 105-106). We can refer to the same objects in different acts by varying the meaning or quality of the act; but we can also alter the mode of givenness of an object, for instance whether the object is absent or present (LUII 206-207/Hua 19, 566-567). When intending an object in its absence (when judging prior to confirming the judgement, anticipating the unseen side of an object, and so on) an object is meant but not presently given. The intention awaits fulfilment. Now of course the fulfilment can come in varying degrees: in intuitive acts the object is given in its full presence, a fulfilling intention occurs; in signitive acts the object is absent, it is emptily-intended, and to each full, intuitive act a corresponding signitive act can be
formed (\textit{LUII} 311/\textit{Hua} 19, 720-721). What is merely meant, emptily intended, ‘points toward’ its fulfilment, paradigmatically (but not solely) in perception.

Husserl uses this as the basis for his phenomenological description of knowledge: when an object is signified (emptily intended) and then intuited, what was meant in absence coincides with what is given presentively, with no extra act of identification pinned on to the fulfilling intuition: the intuition \textit{fulfils} what was already intended from the start. In particular, when we entertain a judgement, ‘$S$ is $P$’, we intend a state of affairs, it is meaningful insofar as it is possibly true or false. When we acknowledge that, indeed, ‘$S$ is $P$’, evidence of our entertained state of affairs coincides with what was originally intended. Truth falls out as the objective correlate of this coincidence: the meant and the given are in complete agreement (\textit{LUII} 263-264/\textit{Hua} 19, 651-652). Husserl traces three more definitions of truth: from 1) an \textit{ideal} relation – the ‘subjective’ compliment of the first definition – between epistemic acts, to 2) the object as true, as \textit{actual}, to 3) truth as correctness (\textit{LUII} 264/\textit{Hua} 19, 652-654). Husserl seems to controvert his simple equation of logical truth as valid apart from any human discovery; truth now seems to occur only in a synthesis of identification. Yet the fulfilment in question here really only means \textit{possible} and not \textit{actual} fulfilment: any statement will be true so long as it \textit{can} be fulfilled, not whether it actually is. Husserl’s adherence to the ideal realm of meanings, posited as a solution to the problem of psychologism, sets the tone for his breakthrough to phenomenology.

Husserl’s work responds to the two most pressing problems posited by Trendelenburg’s ‘logic reform’: He not only provides for a foundation of logic in the pure theory of manifolds, but more importantly seeks to account for logical applications, most notably by basing his account of pure theoretical science, for which pure logic provides the methodological basis, as the foundation for all other sciences. Husserl thus combines logic, theory, and science by equating science in its most genuine sense as a pure \textit{theoretical} activity, treating concepts, their interactions, and attendant statements of truth; science as theory treats ideal meanings as its objects. Logic stands at the foundation of science as it provides the theory of science; it is the theory of theory, insofar as it clarifies the basic scientific concepts, providing \textit{a priori} laws for universal validity rooted in its survey of conceptual essences (\textit{LUII} 314-316/\textit{Hua} 19, 725-728).

\footnote{Of course, Husserl does not restrict this first definition of truth to judgemental truth, but rather he aims at uncovering the “concept of truth presupposed by logic.” Daniel O. Dahlstrom, \textit{Heidegger’s Concept of Truth} (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 71.}
Husserl radically departs from Kantian thought here, claiming that Kant “lacked the phenomenologically correct concept of the a priori” (*LUII* 319/*Hua* 19, 733). ‘Pure laws’ are not prior to experience, as Kant understood them to be but a priori in the sense of being independent of any need for re-verification – they are apodictic. Husserl maintains that we do have insight into essential connections between subject and predicate, which insight grounds in experience. It is simply a fact that we do grasp, and see the meaning-content and essential connections. For instance, in the judgement that “no dogs are cats” we see that the species dog excludes the species cat. In eidetic intuitions we are conscious of universal objects in a way different from individuals or particulars (*LUII* 318/*Hua* 19, 731). For example, the *eidos* ‘red’ is not reducible to empirical givens, although this latter is a necessary ‘medium’ – i.e. ‘red’ is only ever given as ‘a red object’. By the time of *Ideas I* (1913) this would lead to a consideration of material ontologies, a foundational science based on regions of essences and essential interrelations, grounding the sciences of fact. Husserl thus expands Kant’s notion of the object to include universals, including ‘concepts’ within the totality of all objects of consciousness. We access essences as ideal unities through eidetic intuition as opposed to individuals as real existents which we access by sensorial intuition. Husserl can thereby reject the neo-Kantian notion of ‘fact’ as what is given a posteriori over against the a priori logical realm which orders the facts of science. For Husserl the a priori characterizes our approach to the empirical, rather than standing opposed to it. Husserl’s phenomenology remains a purely descriptive activity opposed to the neo-Kantian understanding of philosophy as the critical, necessarily non-descriptive, science.

**Conclusion: The Idea of Scientific Philosophy**

The goal of this chapter has been to characterize the most pressing problems in nineteenth century logic coming out of the Kantian tradition. Kant sets the stage for the emergence of psychologism as a viable option with the legitimization of psychology as a natural science, setting the challenge to future logicians with his separation of pure general logic from its transcendental counter-point. In response to the dominating Hegelian speculative idealism, Trendelenburg raises ‘the logic question’ which acts as a call to reconsider the very nature of logic itself. Lotze takes up this challenge, placing logic at the foundation of the sciences, introducing the ideal realm of valid meanings as the space where logic

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resides. While Lotze retains an account of the pre-logical givenness of the object to the cognizing subject, the Marburg neo-Kantians represent an extreme Logicist position where not only all of mathematics is thought to reduce to logic, but all spatio-temporal entities and the pure *a priori* forms (space and time) also become logically constituted. This logical idealism entails that the meaningful validity structures of the logical realm grounds all human knowledge: the transcendental logical conditions of meaning thereby become the conditions of knowledge. Transcendental logic in the Marburg account thus covers all aspects of experience and apparently covers over the dichotomy between fact and value, a dichotomy that lies, as we will see, at the heart of the Southwest or Baden School of neo-Kantianism. Since the neo-Kantian and Husserlian positions in the context of nineteenth century German logic need to be properly understood in order to situate Heidegger’s earliest thought as well as his mature contributions to the philosophy of logic this chapter concluded with a brief overview of the most pertinent points in Husserl’s thought. Husserl’s *Logical Investigations*, which set the stage for his lifelong work regardless of its later modifications, comes out of nineteenth century logical concerns. Meanwhile, Husserl expands the Kantian conception of objects to include both sensuous and categorial objects, all of which makes up the things themselves, the very subject matter of phenomenology. Husserl’s logical investigations are, first of all, thus put forth as a rival conception of logic as the pure foundation of scientific activity. As we will see in the following, Heidegger confronts both Husserlian phenomenology and neo-Kantianism for their prioritization of epistemology in philosophy. Throughout his works up to and including *Being and Time* Heidegger continues in the search for a rigorous foundation of the sciences. However, he departs from that scientific attitude which had characterized the work of the most important post-Kantian German philosophers, Husserl included. Heidegger instead aims for a truly *primordially* scientific philosophy founded on lived experience rather than the ‘fact of science’ or on the structures of a pure consciousness. The goal of philosophy as a scientific discipline recurs throughout Heidegger’s writings and changes along with his changing conception of ‘rigorous science’, from a logical to a pre-logical ultimately founding discipline. Heidegger’s views throughout his early career are worked out in direct confrontation with the neo-Kantians and Husserl. As will become apparent, however, his logical investigations – of which *Being and Time* represents the culmination – move beyond a mere critique of his most formative influences.
Chapter 2: The Roots of Philosophy as Primordial Science in the Young Heidegger and his Neo-Kantian Logical Start

At the time when these early, literally help- less attempts took shape in writing, I knew nothing of what was to press upon my thinking later on. Yet they indicate a path, the commencement of which was then still closed off to me: the question of being (in the guise of the problem of categories) and the question about language (in the form of the theory of meaning). That and how these two questions hang together remained in darkness. This darkness was not even intimated by the manner in which they were treated – dependent, as the manner inevitably was, upon the prevailing yardstick for all onto-logic, i.e. the theory of judgement.¹

Introduction

Heidegger’s earliest philosophical writings (1912-1916) reveal his formative influences from the neo-Kantian – specifically Southwestern or Baden – school of thought and demonstrate a definitive grasp of major contemporary issues in logic and epistemology. Indeed, the young Heidegger shows a great enthusiasm for logic as the focus of his work.² He sees his future in academia as unfolding along the path of his earliest research into the traditional neo-Kantian logic program (dominant in the early part of the twentieth century), but by 1915 tempered by ‘modern phenomenology’ and his newfound respect for history. Although aware of developments in modern symbolic logic along the lines of Frege and Russell – at the time often referred to as ‘logistic’ – Heidegger’s efforts all centre on a more traditional logic rooted in nineteenth century concerns. However, by the time of his first lecture course after the First World War, which Theodore Kisiel considers to be Heidegger’s ‘breakthrough’ to the lifelong topic of his thinking,³ Heidegger publicly displays his break with neo-Kantian ways of thought. This 1919 war emergency semester course on the ‘idea of philosophy and the problem of worldview’ demonstrates not only Heidegger’s new affiliation with the Husserlian programmatic phenomenology as expressed in the 1911 essay ‘Philosophy as a Rigorous Science’ but also his interest in the debate surrounding the status of science and worldviews generally. In this chapter I focus

² As he says in his 1915 Curriculum Vitae: “In this new school [directed by Rickert] I learned first and foremost to understand philosophical problems as problems, and I acquired insight into the essence of logic, the philosophical discipline that still interests me the most” (BH 8/GA 16, 38).
on the emergence of his project of philosophy as rigorous, or primordial, science (Urwissenschaft) in his 1919 lectures. This concern later emerges as a central feature of Being and Time.\(^4\)

The genesis of Heidegger’s Being and Time is a hot topic in recent Heidegger studies.\(^5\) Studies of the influence of the neo-Kantians Heinrich Rickert and Emil Lask on his formative years,\(^6\) together with the neo-Aristotelian traces in his works on the mediævals, dominate the literature.\(^7\) We now know that Heidegger’s Denkweg to the Seinsfrage – including the relation between factity, discourse, and language – has its first stirrings more than two decades before his monumental Being and Time.\(^8\) In this


chapter I add to this growing and well-established body of literature by tracing the origin of Heidegger’s concern with the foundations of science to his neo-Kantian beginnings, keeping his submersion in Husserl’s *Logical Investigations* and ‘Philosophy as a Rigorous Science’ in the background.9

More specifically, I highlight Heidegger’s early position within the prevailing paradigm of logic in Germany coming out of the nineteenth century and continuing into the early twentieth century. The logical concerns in his first works are shared by the majority of philosophers in his time and they differ radically from our contemporary picture of logic. In particular, Heidegger focuses in these earliest works on the nature of the judgement and of category-formation, the idea of logic as the ‘theory of theory’, the relation between logic and ontology, and the debate surrounding psychologism. The basic starting point for Heidegger corresponds with that of Rickert, Lask, and even Husserl: they work out of the dominant view of logic inaugurated by Lotze in the 1840’s and updated in the 1870’s wherein logic is relegated to a ‘third realm’ of validity or values apart from the realms of existence and occurrence, all three of which make up the Real. There is a radical difference in interpretation of this third realm, however, which I draw out below. One main overall goal of this chapter is to contextualize Heidegger’s start in logic. This vision of logic, investigated in the previous chapter, is today nearly forgotten. To properly understand Heidegger’s confrontation with logic it is thus essential to

9 The most thorough discussion of Heidegger’s concern with the foundations of science as philosophical responsibility across his entire oeuvre and in close continuity with Husserl’s own thought is R. Philip Buckley, *Husserl, Heidegger and the Crisis of Philosophical Responsibility* (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1992). Ignoring the historical context of Heidegger’s writings on science – both his neo-Kantian as well as Husserlian influences – Albert Borgmann locates two periods in Heidegger’s work on the philosophy of science: up until the late 1930s Heidegger criticizes symbolic logic in its pursuit of a foundation for the sciences, in his endeavour to pursue this same task but in a more rigorous manner; after the late 1930s Heidegger abandons all such endeavours and, according to Borgmann, this coincides precisely with the pivot of Heidegger’s *Kehre*. Borgmann, “Heidegger and Symbolic Logic,” 150-151. I follow van Buren’s approach of emphasizing Husserl’s influence on Heidegger starting around 1919, despite Heidegger’s appropriation of phenomenological terminology as early as 1913: “Husserl's decisive influence should be located not in this first naive and metaphysical appropriation, important as it is, but rather in his very different postmetaphysical reading beginning around 1919, which severely criticized his earlier reception of Neo-Kantianism and phenomenology.” Van Buren, *Young Heidegger*, 61. As made apparent below, Husserl’s influence on Heidegger, demonstrated in the 1919 course, is not a case of a straightforward following: Heidegger appropriates some aspects of Husserl’s thought and makes them his own while critiquing Husserl’s own approach to phenomenology.
understand what he means by ‘logic’ in his intellectual milieu – a difficult task given our distance from this concept.

The specific genetic point I wish to develop in this chapter is that the start of Heidegger’s break with Rickertian neo-Kantians already lie in his earliest position as influenced by his neo-Aristotelian ontological orientation. This opens the way to trace his more considered position concerning philosophy as primordial science from its nascent stages up to 1916, to the full expression in 1919. This later expression sets logic in a unique position and predates his radical founding of logic in the everyday life-world. Heidegger’s position was never anti-logical, even in Being and Time, despite the seemingly overt negative comments regarding logic. For instance, in Being and Time, he looks for an alternative to the traditional reproductive logics which limp behind the ontic sciences, “simply investigating the status of some science as it chances to find it, in order to discover its ‘method’” (BT 30/10). He proposes the introduction of a ‘productive logic’ which lays the foundations and leaps ahead of the concrete work of the positive sciences, actively demarcating regions of investigation. This ‘productive logic’ remains entirely logical despite Heidegger’s criticisms of the tradition. The details of his more mature philosophy of logic are taken up in the next chapter. Here we attend to the historical roots of this foundational position.

The chapter is broken down into two main sections. In the first I argue that the ontological orientation in Heidegger’s early works sows the seeds for a fundamental break with Rickert. The historical analysis covering Heidegger’s works up to his 1915 Habilitationsschrift on Duns Scotus, together with his 1916 supplemental chapter on ‘the problem of categories,’ uncovers some early indications of Heidegger’s impending attentiveness to philosophy as primordial science. In the second main section I devote my attention to the inauguration of Heidegger’s new philosophical program as worked out in his Freiburg lecture courses of 1919 ‘The Idea of Philosophy and the Problem of

11 George Kovaecs treats Heidegger’s early views on philosophy as primordial science in his “Philosophy as Primordial Science (Urwissenschaft) in the Early Heidegger,” Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology 21 (1990): 121-135. However, he focuses almost exclusively on the 1919 lectures and makes no attempt to situate the views therein within their broader historical context.
12 See Stephan Käufer, “On Heidegger on Logic,” Continental Philosophy Review 34 (2001): 455-476. This work presents Heidegger’s criticisms of logic in their historical context. All of Käufer’s works are indispensable for any study on Heidegger’s relation to logic. He has yet to address Heidegger’s specific relation to Rickert, Lask, and especially Husserl in any detail: this chapter and the next to some extent aim to fill this gap.
Worldview’ and ‘Phenomenology and Transcendental Philosophy of Value’. I investigate Heidegger’s earliest search for the rigorous (‘scientific’) method of philosophy and situate this search within the context of his confrontation with neo-Kantianism, his increasing modifying-appropriation of Husserlian phenomenology, and his general views of the role of logic in philosophy as primordial science.13

1 The Young Heidegger’s Philosophy of Logic and Logic of Philosophy (1912-1916)

I devote this section to an analysis of the young Heidegger’s philosophical approaches to logic together with the problem of the logic of philosophy. I open with a presentation of Rickert’s philosophical position – itself set in the context of the debate surrounding the foundations of historicism – and display its significance for Heidegger. The elements of Lask’s thought most crucial to Heidegger’s thinking are outlined, followed by an overview of Heidegger’s views on logic from this period. The goal of the section is fourfold: 1) to demonstrate the fundamental situatedness of Heidegger’s earliest works in their neo-Kantian context; 2) to argue that the germ of his later confrontation with Rickert already reside here; 3) to provide an understanding of Heidegger’s earliest views on logic in their historical setting; 4) to uncover his early inclination to a philosophical concern for the foundations of science within the concerns of the classification of the sciences and the problem of historicism.

1.1 Rickert’s Logical Classification of the Sciences

The fundamental position of Rickert’s philosophy lies in his conviction that Kant’s Copernican Revolution marks a defining event in the history of philosophy. He takes his philosophical task to be the systematic development of Kantian criticism, defining philosophy as the universal science which treats the problem of knowledge of the world as a whole. The ‘world’ is divided into three realms: material (physical and psychical), ideal (mathematical), and values (logical/philosophical). Theoretical knowledge characterizes philosophy as the universal science. Rickert strictly separates philosophical research, with its subject matter of the world as a whole, from the individual sciences.

13 Heidegger still claims in a letter to Bultmann December 31, 1927, retouched and included in the latter’s lexicon article on Heidegger, that his methodology is “guided by the idea of a scientific philosophy as it has been grounded by Husserl, not without the influence of the logical investigations and philosophy of science of H. Rickert and E. Lask” (BH 331). Heidegger’s overtly critical comments to Jaspers regarding Rickert and Husserl should be compared in Walter Biemel and Hans Saner, eds., The Heidegger-Jaspers Correspondence (1920-1963), trans. Gary E. Aylesworth (Amherst, NY: Humanity Books, 2003).
which investigate merely one part of reality. As for Natorp, the epistemological subject lies at the foundation of his philosophy, although

from the methodological point of view it is the objects which are understood that are essential. If the entire world of phenomena directly accessible to the senses is designated as the object of perception, then only nonsensorial meanings or complexes of meaning remain as objects of understanding, if this word is to retain any precise signification. (SH 20)

The knowing subject has direct access only to these complexes of meanings which themselves require separate sciences for their treatment; these are the cultural, or properly historical, sciences. This mode of science is “different in its essential principles from that [science] accorded to the objects of physical and psychical reality or the world of phenomena accessible merely to sensory perception” (SH 20). It begins at the limit of the natural sciences. Rickert demonstrates the limits of concept formation in the natural sciences – implicitly following a general Hegelian concern, but also guided by the then current concern of saving the scientific character of historical science – by indicating that the natural sciences “are oriented to a representation of the general” (LCF 45) and thus overlook what is lost in such generalization: namely, the individual. The logic of concept formation, ‘limping behind’ the sciences, takes scientific representation concerned only with the subsumption of particulars under universals as its model, thus constituting “itself as a one-sided logic of natural science” (LCF 45). However, Rickert maintains that “in classifying the various sciences, we must speak of a distinction between the method of the natural sciences and the method of history” (SH 15). Opposed to the traditional opposition of natural science and history based upon “the opposition between recurrent being and variable becoming,” Rickert’s analysis rests on more “general logical significance”: namely, the difference in concept formation between the two (LCF 60); between the logic of the general versus the logic of the individual. He thereby follows Windelband in opposition to the Marburg neo-Kantians’ exclusive focus on the physico-mathematical sciences. The empirical sciences treat reality by means of their generalizing concepts. The process of concept-formation, the features and

16 Until Sigwart this was the highest consideration in traditional logical investigations. See in particular his Logik of 1873 – translated as Christoph Sigwart, Logie, trans. Helen Dendy (London: Swann Sommenschtein, 1895) – where the nature of judgements takes over as the central concern of logical investigations.
connections between concepts, all mark out the division of the sciences. The process of formation itself relies on the aim of scientific knowledge: a unique principle guides the concept-formation of each science.

1.1.1 Rickert’s Epistemology

The above division of the world, and thus of the various sciences, is **founded upon** Rickert’s epistemology, in particular on his concept of the epistemological subject.17 In particular, the necessity of the distinct logics of concept-formation has epistemological foundations. Philosophy as a critical endeavour has a task prior to the examination of the structure of the world: namely, the examination of the conditions of the possibility of knowledge. Rickert undertakes this examination in *Der Gegenstand der Erkenntnis* (first edition 1892, expanded to the second edition of 1904, massively expanded in the third edition of 1915):

To the concept of knowledge corresponds but one subject, which knows [*erkennt*] and one object, which is known [*erkannt*]. Under ‘object’ one must first understand nothing other than that which is opposed to the knowing subject, and indeed in the sense that the knowledge itself has to conform accordingly, if it wants to achieve its aim. This aim is to be true or ‘objective.’ Our question is: what is the object of knowledge, or through where does the cognition [*Erkennen*] obtain its objectivity? (*GE* 1).

This can be considered the cornerstone of Rickert’s philosophy and much neo-Kantian philosophy in general: objects are only objects *for a knowing subject* whose knowledge itself is determined by the object.

Rickert develops his theory of cognition against the prevailing theory which holds cognition to be a picture or copy of reality. The picture-theory remains plausible so long as one imagines another world beyond that which is accessible through our direct apprehension. If this transcendent world lies behind the world of perception, cognition is left the task of moulding the data given in immediate experience such that a correspondence between the formed ideas or concepts can be successfully set up: “Plato’s theory of knowledge, for example – if I may reduce it here to its briefest form – sees in ‘Ideas’ the truly real reality; and because Ideas are *universal*, in contrast to the world of the senses, which is everywhere particular and individual and, properly speaking, not real

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17 Alfred Denker makes a similar point, but with different justification in his article, “Der Frühe Heidegger”.
18 I use the 1904 edition throughout this chapter. Heidegger analyzes the decisive developments from the first, through the second, to the third edition in his extensive critique in (*TDP* 149-171/177-203).
at all, the only true ideas are not those of individual objects, but representations or copies of the generic, archetypal Ideas” (SH 30-31). Rickert counters this trend with his own theory of knowledge, starting from the duality of subject (consciousness) and object (content of consciousness). When all contents of consciousness are abstracted away, the subject remains.19 This subject is defined solely by its being aware of its content and its being “the only one that can never be an object of consciousness-content” (GE 24). It is thus the pure form of all consciousness-immanent objects (GE 148). Moreover, since “all being is ‘being’ in consciousness” (GE 29) we cannot think of reality independent of consciousness. Thus the picture-theory, which has essential recourse to a realm of being beyond our conscious awareness, cannot be correct. The hope for agreement of representation with transcendental beings independent of consciousness fails since consciousness would be unable to detect an agreement between its representation and that which is not a content of consciousness – by definition it has no access to the latter. The theory of truth as the agreement between representation and beings beyond consciousness, which is founded upon the picture theory of cognition, thus falters as well.20

This argument against the picture-theory of knowledge provides Rickert with the possibility of considering history as a scientific representation of reality distinct from natural scientific representation. His argument against the idea that any knowledge – in particular, natural scientific knowledge – can possibly yield a complete reproduction of empirical reality on general logical considerations exposes the emergence of historical – in contrast to the natural – sciences even more clearly (LCF 43). Indeed, “the limits of concept formation in natural science cannot be fixed by reflection on the substantive properties of the material, properties exhibited only by this or that part of empirical reality” (LCF 33). Reality is given in complete individuality; each experience is utterly unique, reality is heterogeneous, not mathematically homogeneous, a point on which Rickert diverges from his Marburg contemporaries. The goal of natural science, which treats reality as nature, is generalization through the discovery/creation of universal laws of nature. It ultimately depends on a completely rigorous separation of the content of

19 The importance of Rickert’s view of the relation between subject and object is highlighted by Denker in “Der Frühe Heidegger,” 10-12.
20 According to a recent study, Kant abandons his A-edition commitment to a representationalist account of knowledge for his B-edition constructivist account for similar reasons. See Tom Rockmore, Kant and Phenomenology (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 2011), 41ff. Although he never mentions Rickert and rarely any of the other neo-Kantians, Rockmore’s reading of Kant agrees with the Baden school’s interpretation on several points.
concepts and the reality of sense perception. The further a natural-science develops logically, the further removed are the contents of its concepts from the empirical world of sense-experience. The goal of a natural-scientific description of the world is the elimination of difference, in an attempt to explain “everything real” as “fundamentally one and the same” (LCF 37). Thus, since only the “immediacy of life” grants access to the “full content of reality” (LCF 39) – the limit of the concepts of natural science necessarily resides here in unique empirical reality as we experience it in concrete actuality and thus individuality.21

Essentially, knowledge-claims take the form of judgements, but the content of judgements are conceptual and thus cannot stand in the relationship of copy to original with reality. Thus the picture-theory fails on purely epistemological grounds. Knowledge of reality and knowledge of nature (what is given in natural-scientific concepts) are two separate things. The totality of reality cannot itself be pictured as it has no limit – to place limits on reality is to turn it into nature; to conceptualize it, to limit the infinite manifold of the irrational. “The continuum can be conceptually mastered as soon as it is homogenous; and the heterogeneous becomes conceivable when we can make incisions in it, thereby transforming the continuum into a domain of discrete objects” (SH 34). Hence, a natural scientific theory reaches completion the less its concepts contain of the immediately given, continuously heterogeneous, and infinite reality of sense perception. Of course, this does not leave conceptual simplification open to capricious concept-formation: the generality of cognitive content counts as natural-scientific only in the case where it “holds validly for individual reality” (LCF 44). This notion of validity thus falls out as the foundational element of Rickert’s attempt at a logico-epistemological foundation of scientific concept-formation.

1.1.2 Theory of Values

Now, cognition aims at truth and truth for Rickert, something Heidegger will later take issue with, resides in the judgement: to know truly is to judge truly (GE 84). Truths of judgements, codified in sentences, form the content of the third realm: they ‘hold,’ they

21 Interestingly, Bergson makes an almost identical assessment of the opposition of natural-scientific generalization to experiential individuation. For instance, see Henri Bergson, “Introduction to Metaphysics,” in The Creative Mind: An Introduction to Metaphysics, trans. Mabelle L. Andison (New York: Carol Publishing Group, 1992), 159-200. As far as I know, there has been no extensive study on the relationship between Bergson and the Baden neo-Kantians. However, reading their works, there is much to be found which recommends comparison despite the neo-Kantian disavowal of any of the ‘life-philosophies,’ Bergson’s included. Bambach reads Rickert’s transcendental philosophy of value as a response to the ‘prophets of crisis’ in Heidegger, Dilthey, and the Crisis of Historicism, 83-96.
have ‘validity,’ they are the ‘values.’ So philosophy not only acts as the theory of the totality of the world (material and ideal) but also the totality of values. 22 And the cognitive subject is guided by an “absolutely valid value” – where “theoretical value appears as a ‘categorical imperative’” – by which “there is under all circumstances also an objectively valid ‘duty’ that holds for the person whose only aspiration is the truth,” namely one has a duty to will the truth (LCF 230-231). An undercurrent of practical reason, co-existing with theoretical reason, thus appears at the base of Rickert’s position. Rickert thereby follows in the tradition of the transcendental philosophy of value – going back at least to the first edition of Lotze’s Logik (1843), through Windelband’s incorporation in the 1870’s – affirming the primacy of practical over theoretical reason, a thought noticed by Heidegger (TDP 121-124/143-146). The theory of judgement, driven by the Ought, thus becomes the core of the most central part of logic: epistemology. But natural-scientific judgements cannot be true based on their correct depiction or application of concepts to reality; rather, they are true since they represent what holds validly of reality. Natural science thereby need not encompass reality as whole. And, in fact, it does not: what is left over is precisely the individual. The principle guiding the formation of concepts in the historical sciences falls out from the limit of concept-formation in the natural sciences. Although logic has almost entirely been concerned with the generalizing concept formation of the natural sciences, there is in fact another side to logic: the logic of historical concepts which capture the particular as particular, not merely as subsumed under a general concept. The most fundamental problem then arises for Rickert: namely, to give an epistemological reconstruction of the objectivity of generalizing concept formation in terms of validity to ascertain where the individual falls out and to maintain the strict scientific status of his methodology.

Judgements combine representations or ideas and through affirmation/denial they are true/false. The judgement itself is not formed through the parsing and pasting of representations, but rather through recognition of the claim that the relationship is to be affirmed (or denied). The truth of the judgement does not consist in its matching a picture with reality. Rather, one is ‘compelled’ to affirm the truth of the claim proposed in the

22 Although in the former, philosophy must not interfere with the sciences which aim to describe and explain the world: rather, philosophy always takes the ‘fact of science’ as its starting point. This thought has come back into fashion with some contemporary French philosophers. Alain Badiou maintains that any philosophy which interferes with scientific (or political, amorous, or artistic) truth-procedures ultimately ends in disaster, in the dissolution of philosophy itself. For example, see Alain Badiou, Manifesto for Philosophy, trans. Norman Madarasz (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 1999).
judgement. “Only on the Ought [Sollen] and not on the Is [Sein] can the truth of judgement rest” (GE 122). The truth of the judgement cannot rest on being, as we only have objects as representations and the copy-theory of cognition fails. Rather, judgements – and all propositions pertaining to reality – are true insofar as a value is recognized in them. And validity is one of the three fundamental traditional philosophical values along with the Good and the Beautiful. What is ‘real’ is what is recognized by judgements: true judgements are judgements that should be made. The objects of knowledge (judgements) comprise one aspect of the realm of values, a transcendent realm independent of the knowing subject and any entity: “Values are not realities, either physical or psychical. Their nature consists entirely in their acceptance as valid; they have no real being as such or existential actuality in their own right. However, values are connected with real entities” (SH 88). The task of philosophy, then, is to unite the results of the sciences in a unified worldview, while validity undergirds the three value spheres of traditional philosophy on Rickert’s account. By locating the position of the (human) subject at the centre of the world, philosophy becomes a theory of worldview. But Rickert intends to found his view of philosophy as worldview upon a scientific methodology, with a strict logico-epistemological basis, as opposed to those world-view philosophers who have recourse to irrational movements of life or élan vital. The transcendental Ought lies at the basis of Rickert’s philosophy and sets a scientific worldview as the final aim of philosophy, but this worldview lies at the limit of philosophical inquiry which itself proceeds scientifically. The transcendental Ought is the condition of the possibility of being as it is conceptually prior – one must first be able to judge that ‘something is’ before the object is, since all objects are objects only for the knowing, that is judging, subject. But to judge that ‘something is’ is to be compelled to affirm that it is, to follow the Ought in relation to this state of affairs. One judges as one ought to judge. Only after this recognition is the object since objects only are for a cognizing subject. But the Ought is comprised of values, so any comprehensive worldview depends solely on values and the systematic theory of values becomes the most important task for philosophy.

Rickert starkly separates Form – worth, value, validity – and Matter – being – based on his theory of judgement. The fundamental separation of the transcendental realm of

23 And they should be made since they are true. Heidegger notes the existence of this circularity (TDP 158-159/188-189).
value from the realm of being raises the classical problem of interaction (methexis). Rickert answers this problem by posing the categories as the link between the Ought to the Is, from the judgement (the transcendent product of knowledge) to what the judgement is about (immanent objects). The categories are the forms of the judgement-act, they allow the products of cognition to emerge (GE 172-173).

1.1.3 Transcendental Theory of Science
The category of actuality [Gegebenheit] stands as the highest category. We first encounter reality as a multiplicity of multiple ‘diesen’ (GE 179-180). Rickert thus takes the immediately given sense-datum as the starting point of his theory of knowledge. Each of these – this-blue, this-red, and so on – can be related. Thus, it follows that everything which is already stands in categorical order (GE 180). New categories append to the category of actuality, ordering the given manifold into an interconnected world. These are the ‘constitutive categories’. They order the manifold individuals into a unified world of experience: the world as subject-matter of science. The empirical sciences – the sciences of what is, of being – each investigate a separate aspect of the world, employing their own methodological categories/concepts.

Given Rickert’s epistemological foundation of philosophy, and his traditional view of the sciences as ways of knowing, another task of philosophy is to provide a theory of science. Philosophy organizes the sciences systematically, investigating the conditions of their possibility. The empirical sciences treat the material aspects of the world, the ideal sciences (e.g. mathematics) treat the ideal aspects of the world and as such neither can secure their own foundations: the question of the possibility of knowledge – either of nature or of the mathematical – is neither a natural-scientific, nor a mathematical problem. Similarly, while the natural sciences, guided by their fundamental methodological principle based on the constitutive category of causality, aspire to bring the individual under general laws, the historical and cultural sciences follow a different methodological principle, searching not for general laws but to understand the idiosyncrasies of the individual. One of Rickert’s significant contributions to the theory of

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25 Heidegger will later pick up on this problem in his 1919 lecture course on ‘The Idea of Philosophy and the Problem of Worldview’ (TDP 44-49/53-58).
science is his separation of historical/cultural sciences from the natural sciences based on the method by which they access their unique objects:26

only a concept that is likewise logical can constitute the opposite of the logical concept of nature as the existence of things as far as it is determined according to universal laws. But this, I believe, is the concept of history in the broadest formal sense of the word, i.e., the concept of the nonrepeatable event in its particularity and individuality, which stands in formal opposition to the concept of universal law. Hence, in classifying the various sciences, we must speak of a distinction between the method of the natural sciences and the method of history. (SH 14-15)

As noted above, it is not simply the method of the knowing subject which is determinate for the division of the sciences, but the objects as well: the object as formed by appropriate concepts determines the method, but the method constitutes the object through the implementation of concepts. In either case, this division of the sciences, the theory of science, is a task for logic.

The key mistake of previous philosophers, coming out of an Aristotelian position, lies in their taking all of science to be generalizing. The logical – purely formal-conceptual – definition of ‘science as generalization’ or as dealing only with universal essences, has no basis in reality according to Rickert: “for a logic that does not want to legislate for the sciences, but simply to understand them, there can be no doubt that the view of Aristotle – to which almost all modern logic and even some historians subscribe – that the particular and individual is to be excluded from the domain of science is quite mistaken” (SH 55). The essential point for any logical classification of the sciences is to note that history simply does not aim at generalization: the historical and natural sciences thus both aim to explicate the same domain of reality, but each following its own method. Both deal with empirical reality. The former individualizes – by which empirical reality becomes history; the latter generalizes – by which it becomes nature (SH 56-57). While historical concepts transform the heterogeneous continuum that is reality into a heterogeneous discretum, natural-scientific concepts transform the heterogeneous continuum into a homogeneous continuum. Finally, while the natural sciences contain

26 Of course the separation itself follows Windelband’s classification of nomothetic, explanatory natural science versus idiographic, understanding cultural science. However, Rickert’s focus on the methodology as opposed to the sciences per se distinguishes his work from Windelband’s. Rickert aims to provide more than just a simple taxonomy, but rather a strict systematic account of the division.
theoretical values of truth, the cultural-historical sciences are concerned precisely with atheoretical cultural values. Which values are decisive for a given culture and a given time and place comprise the subject-matter of the idiographic sciences: as such ‘culture’ marks that concept which best demarcates the historically essential from the historically inessential; the concept of culture becomes decisive for the possibility of considering history as a science. To avoid arbitrariness in their (necessarily transformative) treatment of reality, the sciences are guided by a principle of selection in their concept formation: the principles of concept formation set the aim of the sciences and they determine which elements of reality are retained and which abandoned in the limitive concepts. The question of absolute validity of these values, that is, questions pertaining to the realm of value as a whole in its timeless validity, transcending all cultures, marks the highest philosophical problem.

As philosophy answers this question of the validity of values it comes to be a philosophy of worldviews – a theory of worldview, but still a science for Rickert, itself void of any worldview. Philosophy aims to provide a comprehensive system of cultural values emanating from the cultural sciences but founded upon strict epistemological considerations. While the nomothetical sciences aim to illustrate reality and the idographical sciences aim to understand particular values, philosophy aims to interpret meaning. While the natural sciences investigate the realm of Being and the cultural sciences the realm of value, philosophy is left with the realm of sense [Sinn]. Each realm is distinct, but the realm of sense binds the realm of value with the realm of Being through the categories which comprise its members. The categories link Is and Ought so that the meaning/sense of being, an understanding of being, can only be reached through a theory of categories. This logic of concept-formation fits into the traditional logic schema of category-judgement-inference set at least as early as Lotze’s 1848 Logik. The concepts produced in logic are meant to not only articulate the ground of all reality, but to also demarcate its disparate regions. Since Rickert founds his analysis on the epistemological subject, since his transcendental philosophy takes off from his theory of knowledge, the foundation of Rickert’s philosophy is the fact of science, every science itself beginning

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27 Despite the confusion of terminology, although natural science is ‘value-free’ according to Rickert – as opposed to the cultural-historical sciences – the methodology and general concept-formation of every science presupposes and is guided by values, natural science included.
28 This distinction is important. One of Rickert’s main opponents is the group of world-view philosophers who take philosophy to be nothing but the integration of everyday human experience into philosophical analyses of prevailing world-views. Rickert aims to provide a rigorous scientific (epistemological) basis for world-views.
with the knowing subject as opposed to the factic, living person. Rickert clearly distances himself from the Marburg neo-Kantians by expanding what counts as ‘science’ as well as Husserlian phenomenology by avoiding recourse to the standpoint of immediacy. What is immediately given for Rickert is the infinite manifold of unintelligible sense-impressions; phenomena only become coherent after their spatio-temporal placement, in their being rendered meaningful according to historical or natural scientific concepts. The meaning-conferring act is thereby postponed from immediate givenness to the employment of mediate concepts. Heidegger will question Rickert’s basic assumption of the fact of science, and questions the relationship between the transcendental and the concrete: something he feels Rickert does not adequately address. But he will reject both alternatives to the locus of the meaning-conferring act: neither phenomenology’s immediate givenness to consciousness nor the constitution of objects through historical or natural scientific concepts will suffice: both retain an equal claim to absolute foundations grounded in the generalized structures of consciousness. However, as we will see, throughout his earliest works Heidegger follows Rickert (along with Husserl and Lotze) in considering logic to be a “theory of science” with the categories as its “ultimate elements” \((BH\ 62/FS\ 416)\) as well as the general Rickertian distinction between historical and natural methodology.

### 1.1.4 Lask and the Logic of Philosophy

Lask, “proceeding from the insights of the *Logical Investigations* went further than Rickert, without, however, taking the step into phenomenology” \((TDP\ 149/177)\). Lask’s main connection with Husserl lies in the separability of meaning from acts of consciousness:

> I believe that my decade-long preoccupation with your major book, by no means yet over, has contributed decisively toward determining all of my views on the subject-object relation and how the subject is directed toward objective meaning.... [But] I substitute the kind of intentionality that you represent for all concepts of a consciousness in general. Because of this, I am accused by my teacher Rickert of abandoning Kant and of a reactionary regression to antiquity.\(^29\)

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However, despite claiming to accept Husserl’s notion of intentionality, he does not follow “the revolutionary critical implications of Husserl’s phenomenology” unlike Heidegger in the upcoming years. Validity remains the defining category of the logical realm – for Lask a realm ultimately untouched by subjectivity. Lask strives to provide an account of the organization of the formation of categories itself, to provide a logic of the logic of concepts or, in other words, a logic of logic – more generally, a logic of philosophy. Before turning to the question of the relation between being, unity, and truth as it occurs in Heidegger’s 1915 *Habilitationsschrift*, I sketch some themes of Lask’s work which influence Heidegger’s later development.

In his logic of philosophy, Lask distinguishes between the (material) constitutive categories – which reflect the matter-differentiated regions of reality – and the (formal) reflexive categories which point to the unification of being as a whole. To each division of the regions of reality corresponds a material logic, while the unification of the regions leads to a formal-general logic of abstract categories. The generation of the reflexive categories as beginning with sheer presence, an indifferent identity, give rise to the categorial pair (identity, difference) which belongs together in the transcendental unum (unity). This is the point where an object becomes an object – only through its identity and differentiation. “To what degree is something a something? Because it is not another. It is a something and in its being-something it is being-not-the-other. ‘Something is, what it is, only in its limitation,’ said Hegel” (*FS* 218). To be an object means to have self-identity and other-differentiation – they are equiprimordially established in the unum, itself equiprimordial to the transcendental ens, being. This involvement of the given

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31 Lask thus follows in the tradition of post-Kantian German logic. Recall that from Kant, the ‘pure logic’ of deduction requires a transcendental foundation. The categories – forms of judgements – comprise the base of pure logic and it is the job of transcendental logic to explicate these basic concepts. Whereas Aristotle’s categories of being provide a realist foundation of the conditions of knowing any sensible being, Kant’s transcendental logic turns the categories into categories detailing the objecthood of the objects of experience. Moreover, the ‘transcendental deduction’ deduces those concepts which pure logic requires – a main task of transcendental logic. Hegel takes Kant’s starting point and provides a more expansive logic of concepts which treats not just a limited number of fundamental concepts – as does Kant in his focus on a handful of concepts of pure logic and metaphysics – but rather all concepts. Hegel organizes the conceptual system of science in his system as a tree of concepts according to form alone. Hegel’s logic appears excessively foreign to us as it is simply not a propositional logic, but rather a pure logic of formal concepts. These are not the first logics of concepts to appear in the history of philosophy: Leibniz, for instance, includes a consideration of the logic of concepts. He introduces two perspectives: the intensional and the extensional. Based on his radical appropriation of Kant, Hegel’s logic offers a third perspective; namely, focus on the structure of concepts. In any case, the focus is not necessarily on the rules required for deductive reasoning in science but rather on the concept formation itself.
object with its state of affairs – here the most basic differentiation from an other – will reappear in *Being and Time* as the total intentional realtionality (*Bewandtnis*) of *Dasein*.\(^{32}\)

Lask, embracing the anti-psychologistic trend of the neo-Kantians, but also the phenomenologists, refuses to situate logic in the psychic processes or in the subject itself. He follows Lotze, as well as his teacher Rickert, in situating logic in the third realm – apart from the realm of material (physical or psychical) or the realm of the metaphysical/ideal – in the non-entitative realm of validity. As we will see, the young Heidegger continues in this general neo-Kantian trend, keeping logic separate from the physical and metaphysical. But Heidegger along with Lask demands that Lotze’s famous ‘It “is” not, but rather it holds’ be interpreted in a non-Platonic – which equates to non-metaphysical – way. Heidegger grapples with the impersonal judgement, and this one in particular, in focussing on the ‘it’ – questioning where is ‘it’ and what is ‘it’?

Although Lask opposes fact and value/validity/sense/meaning, he maintains a connection to the factual in his account of validity: “all sense that as a matter of fact can be found in experience, is tied to *factual* experiencing (III 67 and 80).”\(^{33}\) Rickert had already equated value with validity, as noted above, while Husserl equates meaning (*Bedeutung*) with sense (*Sinn*) as opposed to reference. Binding these four concepts together demonstrates Lask’s commitment to these two influences. Lask takes up the Husserl-inspired distinction between psychic-experience (acts) and that which occurs *in*, or given to, experience (intentional objects). But a central neo-Kantian tenet holds that an object is only an object for a subject – the notion of pure *givenness* is foreign to the neo-Kantian constructivist tendency whereby the transcendental forms (categories) of pure consciousness constitute objects.\(^{34}\) Lask here steps away from his neo-Kantian roots in taking up Husserl’s notion of intentionality in his philosophy. However, as Crowell notes, Lask never fully takes up Husserl’s concept of intentionality: whereas Husserl can trace the active and passive genesis of meaning based on his theory of intentional constitution, “reflectively trac[ing] the origin of logical forms...to those primordial ‘styles’ of our intentional experience,” Lask considers all such investigations of the subjective side of

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\(^{32}\) As demonstrated in Kisiel “Heidegger-Lask-Fichte,” 239-270.


\(^{34}\) The roots of this notion have been traced back to Fichte through to Lask’s reading in his *Fichtes Idealismus* as has general use of the term ‘facticity’ in Kisiel’s “Heidegger-Lask-Fichte”. Heidegger himself traces the roots of the ‘transcendental philosophy of value’ coming from Windelband, heavily influenced by Lotze, to Fichte; he claims “one could almost characterize it as Neo-Fichteanism” (*TDP* 121/142-143).
meaning a matter of psychology. Although he sees the factually given as a ‘something’ lacking form, awaiting articulation by the psychical experience/encounter, Lask does not articulate the primal givenness and thus remains tied to his neo-Kantian roots.

Following his teacher Rickert, Lask holds that apart from the factual, empirical, spatio-temporal realm there resides the non-factual realm of validity (sense, meaning, truth). The two realms are inseparable elements of the one world which is given in experience: the factual realm provides the material while the non-factual provides the form or structure. Any experience involves more than bare facticity since experience is comprised of structured irrational matter. Validity is always ‘validity of...’. However, Lask departs from Rickert in his attempt to articulate the ground of all being, the bare givenness of a something prior to its formation. However, as this articulation remains bound to the ‘material determination of form’ whereby the sense of logical forms come from a specific region of matter, Lask does not account for how the matter is given in the first place.

To the constitutive categories of regions of being – forms for the matter of the sensory (natural scientific), nonsensory (metaphysical), and supersensory (mathematical) realms – Lask adds the reflexive categories which apply to the determination of these constitutive categories themselves: logic becomes truly universal. Reflexive categories do not apply to the form-matter, but to the subject-object pair; the logic which includes a study of both sets of categories comprises the logic of philosophy; the latter are the ‘philosophical categories’ as opposed to the ‘categories of being’. Lask thus follows Rickert in leaving questions of being to the particular sciences and instead questions after sense/meaning. Taking his cue from Lask, Heidegger’s own transcendental logic is ontological-logic, an onto-logic, as he aims to articulate that ground of all reality via the concepts produced in his logic. As Heidegger says in Laskian fashion: “Logic itself requires its own categories. There must be a logic of logic” (FS 288) or, in a Husserlian and Rickertian vein: “Logic is the theory of theory, a study of science” (BH 35/FS 23).

We now turn to a consideration of Heidegger’s earliest logical writings.

1.2 Heidegger’s Earliest Writings

That I was constantly occupied with Duns Scotus and the Middle Ages, then back to Aristotle, is by no means a matter of chance. And one cannot judge the work simply by what was said in the lecture courses or seminar exercises.

I first had to go all out after the factic, pushing it to its extremity, in order to come to facticity at all as a problem. Formal indications, critique of the customary doctrine of the apriori, formalization and the like: all of this is still there for me even if I do not speak of them now. To tell the truth, I am really not interested in my development.\textsuperscript{36}

We know that in the summer of 1911 Heidegger terminated his theological studies and transferred his energies to the study of a plethora of subjects: natural science, mathematics, history, philosophy. And yet Heidegger retains an apologetic streak in his earliest writings – an urge to rationally justify his Catholic worldview.\textsuperscript{37} This urge to rational justification rather than an appeal to revelation in some ways justifies his displaced interest from theology to philosophy. Heidegger’s radically different fundamental orientation – as an Augustinian theologian – already sets the stage for his later break with Rickert’s thought, prior to his thorough engagement with it.\textsuperscript{38}

In the Augustinian worldview, the world as divine creation orders every being in its own level and place; the logos is the unifying, ontological-ordering, and moral principle for human life. The three realms of creation include: 1) the well-ordered nature of God which provides nature with unity and order through causal laws; 2) truth which consists in the discovery of the causal laws of nature by human cognition; 3) freedom and morals. Natural and moral laws are eternal and universal, but human freedom makes possible the transgression of moral law. Being itself is divided into the realms of world, spirit, and freedom – distinct realms which all yet refer to God as first cause and final end of all being. God transcends all realms and guarantees the possibility of relation between all three.\textsuperscript{39} This background orients much of Heidegger’s later thinking, coming back to his more mature thought: \textsuperscript{40} “Without this theological background I should never have come upon the path of thinking. But origin always comes to meet us from the future.” \textsuperscript{41}

\textsuperscript{36} Letter from Martin Heidegger to Karl Löwith, 20 August 1927 (\textit{BH} 302).
\textsuperscript{39} Denker, “Der Frühe Heidegger,” 18.
\textsuperscript{40} The influence of “the Pauline insight into the kairological character of time” on Heidegger’s confrontation with neo-Kantianism has been stressed by some Heidegger scholars. Bambach, \textit{Heidegger, Dilthey, and the Crisis of Historicism}, 224ff.
One can already detect here in his early years the beginning of Heidegger’s concern with foundations: while there is a science for each level of reality, there is no science of the connection between them. Every science is restricted to its own level – physics to inorganic nature, biology to organic – but then no science can secure its own epistemological foundations. Both Rickert and Husserl define philosophy as the theory of theory in some sense, and Lask concerns himself rigorously with the problem of the logic of philosophy. All three employ philosophy in the task of articulating the border-problems between the sciences; philosophy must become the *Urwissenschaft* accounting for not just any region of being, but being in general. Heidegger re-learns from these three that philosophy is concerned with ultimate foundations, but for him *fundamental ontology*, no longer a matter of theology, accounts for these foundations.

An earlier impetus to philosophical concerns with origins comes from Heidegger’s first formative influence: Carl Braig. Braig’s Aristotelian orientation leads him to develop a fundamental ontology as the science of being, hoping to answer the question of what being is in general. He maintains that as there is no concept higher than that of being, and lower concepts cannot present being, “[t]he concept of being is consequently unique; but to be objective content, determinate being is not one- but manifold and indeed *analogical*.” As Denker notes, Heidegger combines Braig’s ontology with Aristotle’s doctrine of being and psychology. The realms of being find their ground in the pure being of God – the condition of the possibility of knowledge of beings and the being of beings. “The logical and metaphysical principles are ground in the ontological-reality of God…the fundamental laws of thinking fall together with the laws of being of the thinking essence.”

Braig holds himself out against the Kantian focus on the ego, the urge to place man at the centre of things, to even judge truth in terms of practical success: “Historical truth, like all truth – and the most brilliantly victorious is mathematical truth, the strictest form of eternal truth – comes before the subjective ego and exists without

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42 Of course, Heidegger’s later position is not completely anticipated here. As John van Buren puts it: “If the later Heidegger is a postmetaphysician flirting with residual forms of metaphysics, the student Heidegger is a metaphysician flirting with the postmetaphysical.” Van Buren, *Young Heidegger*, 51.
43 In his recollective ‘Vita’ of 1957 Heidegger mentions Braig “professor of systematic theology, who was the last in the tradition of the speculative school of Tübingen which gave significance and scope to Catholic theology through its dialogue with Hegel and Schelling,” as one of two “decisive, and therefore ineffable, influence[s] on my own later academic career” (*BH*, 10).
it.... As soon as the ego of reason regards the reasonableness of things, they are not in truth...and no Kant...will change the law that commands man to act in accordance with things.”

Heidegger’s earliest orientation is thus already towards ontology. Whereas Rickert is a true disciple of Kant – founding the condition of the possibility of all knowledge, and thus of every science upon the epistemological subject – the young Heidegger places God as the source and creator of the world and hence as the ultimate condition of the possibility of knowledge and being. From his theological starting point, Heidegger must reject the general neo-Kantian thesis that an object is only an object for a knowing subject – the thesis of the consciousness-immanence of every being – since God as the transcendent would be unattainable for humans. This fundamental ontological orientation becomes, in the Being and Time era, by no means ontology in a pre-Kantian sense.

However, despite these early indications of a break with a Kantian orientation towards epistemology, Heidegger’s earliest works, while at times extended by phenomenology through Husserl or Lask, remain within the neo-Kantian paradigm of the early parts of the twentieth century, especially influenced by Rickert. He writes a ‘transcendental’ investigation of the problematic versions of realism in his 1912 ‘The Problem of Reality in Modern Philosophy’ although he here utilizes the critical realism of Oswald Külpe as a counter-point to the neo-Kantian adherence to Kant’s transcendental idealism. Along with Husserl and Rickert he defends the thesis that in investigating the foundations of scientific activity, philosophy itself should act as a strict science. The guiding question results from an observation of the activity in the sciences: from morphology, anatomy, and biology, to chemistry and astronomy – “these various branches of science are convinced that they are not analyzing mere sense data or working on pure concepts, but rather positing and defining real objects that exist independently of

48 Caputo argues that contrary to Heidegger’s later, now infamous, story about Brentano’s On the Manifold Senses of Being in Aristotle impelling him to his first questioning concerning being, really Braig stands as a clearer influence. Caputo, Heidegger and Aquinas, 45ff.
49 Denker, “Der Frühe Heidegger,” 20. Van Buren holds that Heidegger’s Habilitationsschrift, but especially the appended conclusion, aims “in effect to appropriate the mystical-Scholastic configuration of God/soul/eternity into his own speculative-theological configuration of the absolute/spirit/eternity, which had also been influenced heavily by Braig's speculative theology.” Van Buren, Young Heidegger, 54-55.
them and their scientific research” (BH 22/FS 4-5). And yet two reigning positions in philosophy – ‘conscientialism’ and ‘phenomenalism’ – both maintain that the definition of the real – or that the positing of an external world independent of consciousness – is inadmissible. Indeed, he faults Berkeley with abolishing the “world transcendent to consciousness” with the “esse est percipi, i.e., the identification of being and being-perceived” along with “[h]is successor, Hume” (BH 20/FS 1-2), for they both fail to realize the intentional structure of consciousness, i.e. the fact that consciousness is always directed out toward the world. Heidegger looks to Külpe’s work as a possible resolution of this conflict between philosophic opinion and scientific practice.

Kant’s theory of knowledge maintains that the thing in itself exists independent from us as a necessary supposition, despite our being unable to determine it any further – even though we can only perceive things so far as they are given to us as an appearance. And yet, at least in the A-edition of his Critique of Pure Reason, Kant maintains that the thing in itself directly affects our senses. Külpe argues that this is an unwarranted supposition: in asserting this Kant himself reasons as a dogmatist. We can give no determination of the thing in itself and as such it cannot be posited as a cause of our sensations. Since “Kant ultimately applied his transcendental method only to the formal sciences, it becomes clear that the problem of reality simply has no place in his epistemology” (BH 21/FS 2-3), one needs to go beyond Kant in the attempt to solve the problem of reality. This is precisely what Külpe aims to do with the help of induction. Along with Rickert, Külpe derives the principles of science from its own factual methods, thereby reducing the theory of science to an empirical science (BH 29/FS 15). Although Heidegger cannot agree with his inductive metaphysics, he praises Külpe for bringing epistemology back to its proper path: toward the problem of reality. “The determination of this reality, and not merely of its appearance, is the goal of science” (BH 26/FS 10). But Heidegger conflicts with Külpe (along with Rickert) in maintaining that ontological truth is still the ultimate ground of this reality: “Pure thought is not a competent court for deciding about ideal and real being. Only experience can inform us about whether real objects exist, though not in such a way as to be the sole authority for deciding this question.... It is only where empirical and rational moments work together that our

50 Heidegger gives a lengthier critique of inductive metaphysics as “in no way adequate to the idea of an absolute primordial science.” (TDP, 23/27). For his critique of critical realism from the position of critical transcendentalism, see (TDP, 69-71/82-84) and then his own critique from a phenomenological perspective (TDP, 73ff/ 86ff).
experience ‘rings’ true” (BH 27-28/FS 13). But Heidegger must then still have recourse to
a guarantor that this experience in fact ‘rings true’: the condition for the possibility of the
agreement between thinking and being must here still be God.51 So even in his earliest
philosophical attempts, Heidegger displays the precariousness of the connection with his
teacher Rickert and his neo-Kantian background – a connection which will be publicly
severed by the time of his 1919 lectures. However, despite his emerging differences in
basic philosophic outlook, his orientation toward logical problems remains thoroughly
neo-Kantian (with a touch of phenomenology) in these years as the following
demonstrates.

1.2.1 ‘Neuere Forschungen über Logik’ (1912)
To gain insight into Heidegger’s specific logical orientation during these years, I focus on
his 1912 review article on recent research in logic. In this 1912 logic essay, Heidegger
addresses the ‘general logical’ problem and several ‘specific logical’ problems. The
former essentially marks his position as affiliated with the neo-Kantians. Its task is to set
the proper object of logic based upon considerations of its proper essence – to meditate on
the sense and foundations of logic thereby undermining “the traditional idea of logic as a
finally fixed summary of forms and rules of thought which are not subject to any further
expansion or deepening” (BH 31/FS 17). Essentially this goal of providing a suitable
answer to the question ‘what is logic?’ is suspended “for the future” (BH 32/FS 18)
although he does give some preliminary indications of what he has in mind, as mentioned
briefly below. His more limited task is structured mostly as a response to the – at the time
– most pressing misconception of the essence of philosophy as propounded in
psychologism. Husserl is cited as having “truly broken the psychological spell” along
with Frege’s “logico-mathematical researches” which “are in my opinion not yet
appreciated in their true significance” (BH 33/FS 19-20).52 He ultimately concludes that
logic is the science of the realm of validity, a realm distinct from the realm of
reality/being – but also of the suprasensible realm of metaphysics – and that access to the
valid, that is knowledge of the logical, is transcendental in the neo-Kantian sense. As

52 Heidegger refers to Frege’s “Sense and Meaning” and “Concept and Object,” but not the Begriffsschrift
(1879), Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik (1874), or Grundgesetze der Arithmetik (1893/1903). To what
extent Heidegger was familiar with these works remains an open question. However, they clearly do not
seem to play a central role in his early works on logic. J.N. Mohanty, “Heidegger on Logic,” in Logic, Truth
and the Modalities: From a Phenomenological Perspective (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1999), 84.
repeatedly emphasized thus far in the dissertation, this is a mainstay of German philosophical logic in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.

Heidegger follows Husserl’s argument against psychologism as an internally contradictory position, citing the distinction between psychic act and logical content, real occurrence of thought in time and the ideal extra-temporal identical sense, “in short between what ‘is’ and what ‘holds’ with binding validity” as crucial to this argument (BH 34/FS 22). He follows the trend of his influences, identifying this ‘durable’ sense [Sinn] as the object of logic, stripped of any ties to the empirical while logic as a normative discipline remains merely a derivative discipline; indeed, he deems the ‘laws’ of thought to be misleadingly named for they should be strictly marked “off from the laws of nature even linguistically” (BH 34-35/FS 22-23). Apart from concerning itself with the ‘laws’ of science, Heidegger follows Rickert in taking the sciences as the starting point in epistemological questions surrounding the conditions of knowledge in general.\(^{53}\) He demonstrates his neo-Kantian affiliation, maintaining that psychologism rests upon a mistaken interpretation of Kant – a position first worked out by Cohen, pursued later by Windelband and Rickert (BH 32/FS 19). The fundamental question of logic consists of the question of the conditions of the possibility of knowledge, in general (BH 35/FS 23). But even more to the point, he takes up Husserl’s call for a pure logic as the science of valid meaning-structures.

To provide an indication of the specific logical issues most pressing to Heidegger – and to philosophical logicians generally at the time – I quickly survey several specific problems addressed in this ‘Recent Research in Logic.’ Heidegger first investigates questions concerning the nature of the logical structure of judgement in line with the neo-Kantian goal of providing a more well-founded system than Kant’s ‘table of judgements’ which Kant simply takes as secured (BH 40/FS 30). The distinguishing feature of the judgement resides in taking a stance on the true-untrue disjunction. Since it is the representational content of what we mean – its stable sense – that can be true or untrue, the “judgement is a sense” and not a “process” of representation (BH 40/FS 31). The question of the structure of judgements is a purely logical, not a psychological problem.

Although each judgement has a specific grammatical form, Heidegger insists, in traditional neo-Kantian vein, that the structure of judgements must be analyzed separately

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\(^{53}\) He refers approvingly to Rickert’s *Der Gegenstand der Erkenntnis* as “foundational for the grounding of logic as a science of value” (BH 466n10/FS 34-35n9).
from an analysis of grammar.\textsuperscript{54} Many non-grammatical sentences still manage to express a sense, and hence are true or untrue: “Fire!” – using Heidegger’s example – is cried by someone. This can be true or untrue and hence is a judgement. Yet it displays no (grammatical) subject, predicate, or copula. Impersonal and existential sentences always mark a problem for logic based on grammar. His concern for the separation of grammar from logic recurs in most of his early logical writings. He praises Lask, in particular, for his contribution to this insight: “The wholly alien character of the domains of logic and grammar has been forcefully demonstrated by Lask in his work on the judgement” (BH 41/FS 32).

The question is: how can the relational direction between subject and predicate be secured? The ‘unchanging’ sense constitutes the basis of the judgement; but the question becomes one of securing this basis, articulating its structure. To remain within the region of the logical while reducing the structure of sense to the constitution of objects Heidegger maintains one must take recourse to Kantian-styled logic. In particular, Lask provides this “primal articulation” by designating “the union of categorial form and categorial material as ‘sense’” (BH 41/FS 33). To know is to enclose material with (categorial) form: to judge is to assert a predicate (categorial form) of a subject (alogical matter). Heidegger notes that Lask thereby brings Kant and Aristotle into close proximity: while the former takes judgement to be the subsumption of sensory-material manifold under categorial-concepts of the understanding, the latter takes the categories to be (metalogical) predicates of the ultimate category ‘substance.’ Lask analyses a judgement of the form ‘a is the cause of b’ – not as ‘the predicate cause of b is predicated of the subject a’ – but rather, the materials a and b stand in the category ‘causality’. Similarly impersonals are dealt with by dividing the judgement into material and form: “It’s thundering” becomes: the material ‘thundering’ stands in the category ‘existence.’ So the copula, as relation between the material and formal elements, takes the general character of ‘relatedness’ as in Lask’s account (BH 41-42/FS 33-34).

In this way, everything we experience must already come in categorial form. Thus, we can only experience being as sense. All beings are immanent to reason (logos). Following Lask, Heidegger maintains here that the most important characteristic of the forms is that they point to their matter; the relationship holds and is not a pure addition;

\textsuperscript{54} The theme of the need to separate grammar from logic recurs in Being and Time: “The task of liberating grammar from logic requires beforehand a positive understanding of the basic a priori structure of discourse in general as an existentiale” (BT 209/165). Although here he reverses the priority between the two.
the relationship ‘validity of’ lies at the foundation of the concept of form and ties form to matter which is in itself meaningless. Sensory material stands as the contrary to form: it is an irrational residue limiting the application of logic to reality. That there is sense at all remains ultimately inexplicable. Heidegger praises Lask’s work as “broadening and deepening” Kant’s logic (implicitly, Rickert’s as well) since Lask institutes a double series of categories: the constitutive categories of being of Kant’s transcendental logic, supplemented by the treatment of these categories themselves as matter enclosed by a new form, the reflexive categories. The only way to know in transcendental philosophy is to enclose material with form (category). Hence, logic, which takes categories as its objects, can know these only by surrounding them by new forms (categories). “The philosophical category is therefore the form of form. If being is the ‘regional category’ for sensory-intuitive material, then validating [Gelten] is the constitutive category for non-sensory material” (BH 36/FS 25). Subjectivity itself creates the reflexive sphere and yet this region, once it holds, holds objectively – it persists as validating. How these forms without matter are given to us will later pose a problem for Heidegger. This is precisely where he will leave Rickert and Lask behind and take up Husserl’s notion of categorial intuition. But here Heidegger follows in the neo-Kantian approach to the meaning of being through a logic of the categories of being – the ontologic which would guide his work up until his 1919 breakthrough.

Heidegger follows Lask again in his assessment of negative and hypothetical judgements. Against the common view that negative judgements are more complex than positive judgements (being comprised of a positive judgement plus negation), he holds that in fact they are of equal rank in their logical structure (BH 42-43/FS 35-36). The mistake of the common view again rests on the confusion of the grammatical form of sentences with the analysis of the purely logical form of judgement. Similarly, Heidegger maintains that those theories (such as Meinong’s) which take hypothetical judgements to consist in a relation between assumptions are mistaken: hypothetical judgements have the form of condition and conditioned (they can even be rephrased as ‘a is a condition of b’).

56 He here clearly takes on Lotze’s view: “Nothing is clearer than that the two sentences ‘S is P,’ and ‘S is not P,’ so long as they are supposed to be logically opposed to one another, must express precisely the same connexion between S and P; only that the truth of that connexion is affirmed by the one and denied by the other...this difference does not give rise to two essentially different kinds of judgement as such; validity or invalidity are rather to be considered...as predicates of fact to which the whole content of the judgment forms the subject” (LA 63).
and not the form of an inference at all (FS 36-37). He thus follows Kant’s view that “it remains undecided” whether either of the propositions comprising the hypothetical is true or not: the sense of the hypothetical judgement lies in the “predication of the ground-consequence-relation” (FS 36-37).

Next, he briefly touches upon the “question of the cognitive value [Erkenntniswert] of the syllogism” (FS 37) followed by a consideration of the problem of evidence. The former takes up the traditional logical concern with the theory of inference. In particular, Heidegger considers the question of expanding the theory of syllogisms to include more complicated mathematical and scientific forms of inference. As discussed in connection with Lotze in the first chapter, a significant question for traditional logicians surrounded the worth of syllogisms: many concluded that syllogisms in no way expand our knowledge as they consist solely in the unpacking of concepts; nothing can come from a syllogistic inference that is not already contained in the concepts involved in the major and minor premises. Heidegger refutes this claim by noting that the expanded form of syllogisms used in mathematical deductions and scientific induction result in conclusions containing more than the content of the premises (FS 37-38). Heidegger’s concern with pressing problems of traditional logic after the mid-1800’s call for logic reform remains transparent in all of these discussions. However, his consideration of the problem of evidence involves considerations typically disregarded by antipsychologistic logicians as a concern for psychology, not logic. He follows Husserl in this course: truth is seen as objective correspondence where “the truth-assertion by the I demands a truth-insight. The correspondence must be experienced” (FS 38). But evidence is not an empirical fact, it is rather a feature of judgement and therefore belongs in the study of logic proper. The justification of a judgement resides in the truth of the logical content and not in the veracity of any psychological decision. The problem of evidence remains a substantial problem for logical theory and a source of constant confusion.

Heidegger concludes his survey of recent logical problems with a note on the new direction of logic toward ‘logistic’ or ‘mathematical,’ ‘symbolic’ logic, coming out of Leibniz’s “Characteristica Universalis” (FS 41). Heidegger briefly traces the development of this new treatment through the influence of refinements of mathematical concepts in the late nineteenth century, noting that the overthrow of the classical logic to a universal

57 Apart from the final two paragraphs, all of section III, pages (FS 36-42), are left untranslated in Becoming Heidegger. I rely on my own translation for section III.
logic of relations through algebraic methods subsequently re-shaped mathematics itself. The high-point of this systematization resides in Russell’s *The Principles of Mathematics* (1903) and his collaborative work with Whitehead, *Principia Mathematica* (1910). This new shape of mathematized logic falls under a brief page-long attack to conclude the article: Heidegger claims that symbolic logic has the strength of grounding logic in its entirety in a systematic fashion, using a fixed number of indefinable concepts and basic principles (*FS* 42). Although this symbolic logic has been shown successfully to undergird mathematics, Heidegger maintains that “logistic does not come out of mathematics at all” and that it has nothing at all to say about “authentic logical problems” (*FS* 42). The application of mathematical concepts and symbols will “conceal meanings and the shifts in meaning of judgements,” obscuring deeper problems such as that the calculus of judgements is a mere “calculating with judgements” (*FS* 42). The main problem lies in the fact that the mathematical treatment of logic has nothing to say about the most fundamental problems of the nature of judgements, and certainly has nothing to say about the conditions of the possibility of their concepts and methods (*FS* 42-43). As noted above, the structure of the judgement, according to Heidegger in his neo-Kantian years, can only be explicated within the framework of Kant’s logic: the structure must be traced back to the ‘constitution of objects’ about which symbolic logic remains silent. To what degree these remarks are justified is taken up in the next chapter, together with Heidegger’s later worries about mathematical logic’s being unable to deal with the “living problems of the sense of judgement, its structure and cognitive-meaning” (*FS* 174n8), to the concern announced in *Being and Time* that in ‘logistic’ the judgement becomes dissolved “into a system in which things are ‘co-ordinated’ with one another; it becomes the object of a ‘calculus’; but it does not become a theme for ontological Interpretation” (*BT* 202/159).

Heidegger’s earliest work on logic thus demonstrates his fluency with the logical issues of his day. His approach to logic falls entirely within the psychologism debate and he takes his orientation from the neo-Kantian transcendental tradition. Each of the above problems – with the possible exception of the problem of evidence, a Husserlian concern – is prominent in 1912, especially in the neo-Kantian research program. Demonstrating the context of Heidegger’s work in logic, it becomes apparent that he is well versed in the problems of the day – but also that these problems are radically different from those that we would today consider within the realm of logical consideration. His treatment of the
‘symbolic’ Fregean/Russellian conception of logic is cursory: he thus treats the ‘new’ logic, typically, as one without the importance of mainstream logics in the Kantian tradition.\textsuperscript{58} This view and orientation is carried throughout his earliest works. A survey of the rest of his early works makes this apparent. For the sake of brevity, I keep overlaps with the 1912 treatment of logic to a minimum in what follows. This background proves important in understanding Heidegger’s confrontation with logic – since in order to fully understand this confrontation we have to understand what he meant by logic.

1.2.2 Psychologismus Dissertation (1913)

Heidegger’s PhD dissertation follows the topic of his 1912 logic-survey closely. As he notes retrospectively:

The PhD dissertation \textit{Die Lehre vom Urteil im Psychologismus} of 1913. Here the question concerns \textit{validity}...questions that are determined completely by the viewpoints prevalent at the time. Here, there is a penchant for Lotze that fails to gain clarity about itself. But the thrust is towards the question concerning the truth of the true as a foundational question.\textsuperscript{59}

As the title attests, psychologism and the theory of judgements retain centre-stage in this work. Heidegger devotes the bulk of the dissertation to examining four unique approaches to the theory of judgement – Wundt, Maier, Marty, and Lipps – concluding that they all exhibit a different psychologistic tendency. Each view is considered in action, as it were, being applied to the cases of various judgements: negative, impersonal, hypothetical, and existential. He demonstrates, further upon his 1912 work, a great familiarity with the dominant logical literature of his day. The common problem with the four psychologistic positions examined lies in their confusion of the core of judgements with the judging-activity: judgement must not be grounded in a subjective activity of human being, but rather in what holds/has validity.

He concludes this treatment noting that the separation of the domains of reality cannot “be proven [bewiesen] but only exhibited [aufgewiesen]” (\textit{FS} 165).\textsuperscript{60} The logical realm shows itself in evidence. Since psychologism, as a form of empiricism, only counts

\textsuperscript{58} Although the Marburg neo-Kantians, Cassirer in particular, go to great lengths trying to accommodate the new logic into their Kantian framework. Ernst Cassirer, \textit{Substance and Function and Einstein’s Theory of Relativity}, trans. William C. Swabey and Marie C. Swabey (Chicago: Open Court, 1923).


\textsuperscript{60} This phenomenological insight, that psychologism as such cannot be refuted on \textit{logical grounds}, along with the idea that the judgement alone can be true or false, is thematized in Heidegger’s work through the 1920’s as discussed in the next chapter. Heidegger rightly holds, albeit tacitly, that psychologism is a problem for the philosophy of logic, and not for any particular logical system to decide.
the realm of reality which can be perceived as existing, any application of psychology to logic simply attempts to explain away the logically evident reality. Heidegger devotes the rest of the 1913 dissertation to his own ‘purely logical’ account of the theory of judgement. The logical domain (Gelten) as opposed to the psychical is strictly adhered to in this account – hence the ‘purity’ of his account (FS 165). His onto-logic thus moves within the same sphere of influence, now focussing on the categorial sense of judgements.

His analysis begins not with the judgement as a given, or as the fundamental starting point: “from the judgement of logic we cannot take our point of departure, because we want to find access to it” (FS 166-167). Instead Heidegger starts with examples of judgements which display its structure and provide evidence of the logical realm to which they are beholden: in different times, places, contexts we recognize something as the same. We might utter ‘the cover is yellow’ in innumerable instances. It is evident, but not provable, that something remains the same in all of these instances: namely, ‘the yellowness of the cover’ (FS 168-170). This persistence, the self-sameness, shows itself as independent of any psychic activity – indeed, it seems to be outside of spatio-temporal reality. We are simply struck by this evidence. This character of evidence provides the foundation and starting point for all logical theories. Following Lotze, and the neo-Kantian tradition generally, as well as Husserl, Heidegger maintains that this something remaining across all instances – and accessible only by evidence – is neither physical nor psychical, but valid. It holds, it has validity: “The reality-form of the identical-factor uncovered in the judgement process can only be ‘validity’” (FS 170). Heidegger calls this ‘identical factor’ in the judgement sense. This provides the logical ground without which judgements could not be made about beings: “as what is immanent to the judgement-act, that is the content, [sense] can be called the logical side of the judgement” (FS 172). The neo-Kantian – Lotzean – influence becomes particularly clear in these passages as does the specific Laskian feeling behind these sentiments, especially in the insistence that the unchanging sense underlying judgements constitutes their essential core and that “the question of the sense of sense is not senseless” (FS 171). Meanwhile Rickert’s equation of judgement with sense is also upheld: “The judgement of logic is sense” (FS 172). This atemporal, aspatial, logical sense is precisely what adherents of psychologism overlook in their exclusive focus on the act in avoidance of the content of judgements.
Existence applies to spatio-temporal entities while validity applies to logical entities. A judgement is valid or not: in its ownmost it ‘is not’, rather, it holds. Every true judgement represents knowledge and all of our knowledge is judgemental. Heidegger again analyses the structure of the judgement into its subject-copula-predicate form and notes the directionality of the structure: ‘being-yellow holds of the book-cover’ but ‘being-the-book-cover’ does not hold of ‘being-yellow.’ He thus reaches his goal of analysing the structure of the judgement in a purely logical fashion. The ‘identical factor’ of judgements is sense; this latter is related to the true-untrue dichotomy which applies only to judgements. But nothing else can be posited to explicate the structure of logical sense further: it has an irreducible givenness. Logical sense is approached only through categorial intuition. Sense is thus purely logical and relates solely to judgements; sense is the central notion of logic; hence his criticism of mathematical logic which says nothing about ‘sense’. Mathematical logic deals exclusively with form, but says nothing about this stable content of judgements which comprises their logical core.

He concludes the dissertation with a veiled shift from the Rickertian and Laskian position, to a promotion of the Husserlian phenomenological research program which was determinative of his upcoming philosophical developments until the publication of *Being and Time*:

Especially in these individual problems [of the negative and impersonal judgement] it should be clear that the logician must seek to highlight the distinct sense [Sinn] of sentences and, according to the objective differences of sense, to determine and to bring in a system – according to their simple or complex structure – the forms of judgment. The true groundwork for logic…will not come from psychological studies of the origin and composition of the ideas, but rather through clear rules and clarifications of word meanings. And only when pure logic is developed and expanded on such a basis, will one be able to approach the epistemological problems with greater security and divide the total realm of ‘being’ in its various modes of reality, and to sharply separate [herausheben] the singularity and the nature of their knowledge and similarly to reliably determine their range [Tragweite]. (FS 186-187)

He thus maintains his earlier view that the highest task of logic includes the provision of a fully worked out doctrine of categories which divides the ‘total realm of being in its various modes of reality.’ The object for Rickert and Lask ends up being only a bundle of categories and their materials. But human knowledge, on its own account, directs itself to one determinate object at a time through judgement. The multiple-faceted object is the
object about which judgements are made, but the truth of the judgement must be measured against the ‘genuine object’ which itself is available only through judgement. The account of these underlying objects, given through Lask’s theory of category formation, ultimately ends up simply providing the ontology which the theory of judgement (which is meant to be based on the theory of category formation) requires. Lask’s attempt to provide a pre-judicative basis for judgemental truth fails as it relies on the model of judgement, with recourse to the object of (theoretical) knowledge. In *Being and Time* Heidegger makes this exact point: one ultimately fails to found judgemental, predicative truth on something more primordial than the judging subject if one attempts to do so based on the identification of truth and sense with the (cognitive) object; the structure of judicative knowledge inevitably find its way back in any such attempt. In any case, validity retains a central role in Heidegger’s early logical writings: it is the fundamental meaning or sense of sense, the highest category of all categories of categories.

The final two sections of Heidegger’s dissertation again treat the question of negative and impersonal judgements. These are studied in more detail than the 1912 article, but the essential message remains: negative judgements do not ‘contain more’ than positive judgements, they can be analyzed into a logical validity-relation of the same form as positive judgements. Similarly, ‘problematic’ impersonal judgements (which seem void of meaning-content or an object of the judgement) can be analyzed to have the proper validity-structure: ‘it rains’ states what is happening, that ‘raining is actual’, or ‘of raining momentary actuality holds’ or something to that effect (*FS* 186). Although the problem of impersonals and the status of negation retain a place of interest throughout Heidegger’s career, the problem of the theory of judgement, together with the relation between judgemental truth and a more primordial truth, dominates his more pressing concerns with logic in the *Being and Time* era. The focus on the grounding of the possibility of knowledge in a fully developed doctrine of categories dictates his *modus operandi* throughout his youthful writings. Heidegger’s early ontologic strives toward being a full blown transcendental logic providing an account of the conditions of the possibility of all knowing rooted in a categorial account of the being of beings.

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61 For a more in depth account of ideas in this paragraph, see Steven Galt Crowell, “Truth and Reflection: The Development of Transcendental Logic in Lask, Husserl, and Heidegger” (PhD diss., Yale University, 1981), 80-81.
1.2.3 Die Kategorien- und Bedeutungslehre des Duns Scotus (Habilitationsschrift, 1915)

The three works surrounding Heidegger’s Habilitation: The Habilitationsschrift (1915) with its supplemental concluding chapter (1916) and the Habilitationsvortrag (1915) mark an important turning point in Heidegger’s career. Not yet fully committed to a hermeneutics of factical life – the project inaugurated in his 1919 lectures – there is a definite movement beyond his Scholastic foundations, but also to some extent beyond his neo-Kantian teachers Rickert and Lask. Of course all of these influences remain – including those of Husserl’s Logical Investigations. In Heidegger’s own retrospective assessment:

The qualifying dissertation, Die Kategorien- und Bedeutungslehre des Duns Scotus of 1916. The inquiry here into categories is an attempt to gain a historical access to ontology, and simultaneously to the question concerning language. This inquiry...contrasts with the hitherto interpretation of Scholastics which uses Neo-Scholasticism.... On the whole the attempt failed.... And nevertheless there is at this stage already more behind the unmastered questions, namely the initial attempts at a dissociating exposition of German Idealism (Hegel). However, these attempts were not striving for a Neo-Hegelianism, but for honing the gaze on the triad ‘Hegel – Middle Ages – Aristotle.’

The Habilitation concerns itself with transcendental logic in the line of Lask and Rickert along with Lotze and the neo-Kantian tradition generally; he continues here to unfold his vision of a robust ontologic in greater detail. A new orientation is added in the 1916 supplemental chapter: namely, the need for a translogical grounding in metaphysics. Against the Kantian incorporation of the categories of being into the categories of ‘objecthood’ Heidegger argues that the interpretational context of logic must be translogical. Formal, symbolic and transcendental logic are to be transcended. The theory of categories fulfils the traditional task of differentiating regions of being and relates categories to the judging subject – but it must do more. Already in the 1915 work Heidegger recognizes that the historical meaning undergirding the factic values must be interpreted, and this includes the value of the categories themselves (FS 208f). This clearly is in line with Rickert’s project of providing logico-epistemological foundational justifications for considering history as a science. However, concern with the factic marks

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a clear, early distinction in the early Heidegger’s 1915 work, which is pursued with
greater efficacy by the time of the 1916 supplemental chapter.

Before moving on to a careful study of the crucial supplemental chapter along with
‘The Concept of Time in the Science of History,’ I here present a brief overview of the
key themes of Heidegger’s Duns Scotus book.63 The ‘historical’ approach of the
Habilitationsschrift follows the Windelband-Rickertian theme of approaching the history
of philosophy according to its problems – and philosophy itself as concerned with values
– as opposed to the study of history as a linear progression: “Outsiders and sometimes
also supposed insiders believe one must see in the history of philosophy a progression of
more or less often repeated solutions to ‘mistakes’” (FS 195). Heidegger maintains that as
philosophers have never once seemed to have agreed upon what philosophy is, even
philosophy’s status as a science seems completely questionable. But like any other
science, the worth of philosophy can be established – in this case as a cultural value (FS
195). Along with Windelband and Rickert he maintains that since human nature is
constant, “it becomes understandable, if the philosophical problems repeat themselves in
history. There is not to be discovered so much of a development in sense, that will
steadily advance to new questions on the basis of previous solutions; rather, one finds in
the main issue an always fruitful unwinding and exhaustion of a limited problem domain”
(FS 196). The philosophical investigation of the history of philosophy can make do
without recourse to political or cultural aspects as it focuses on the problems themselves.
This is precisely the guiding method of this youthful work.

The Scotus book is divided in two main parts. The first is entitled “The Theory of
Categories: Systematic Foundations for the Understanding of the Theory of Meaning.’
The goal of the three chapters comprising this part consists of the exposition of (pseudo)
Duns Scotus’ treatment of categories beyond the ten Aristotelian categories which apply
only to physical – spatio-temporal – substances. The first chapter treats the
transcendental One (unum) and the second treats the other most general category
applicable to any object, the True (verum). The highest category, Being (ens), is there in
every object of experience; it constitutes the object-hood of the object. In his investigation

63 More detailed accounts can be found in John D. Caputo “Phenomenology, Mysticism and the
‘Grammatica Speculativa’,” 101-117; Matthew Rampley, “Meaning and Language in Early Heidegger:
From Duns Scotus to Being and Time,” Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology 25 (1994): 209-
228; Stewart, “Signification and Radical Subjectivity,” 360-386; Sean J. McGrath, “The Forgetting of
Haecceitas: Heidegger’s 1915-16 Habilitationsschrift,” in Between the Human and the Divine:
Philosophical and Theological Hermeneutics, ed. Andrezej Wiercinski (Toronto: Hermeneutic Press, 2002),
of the One, Heidegger discovers the Rickertian distinction between ‘one opposed to another’ and ‘the number one’ as worked out in ‘Das Eine, die Einheit und die Eins.’ He begins by showing that certain non-logical realms exist in the transcendental unum: namely the mathematical, empirical, and metaphysical realms. Heidegger repeats his conviction from the 1913 dissertation that the distinction between the ideal (logical-mathematical) and empirical realm cannot be proven, but only shown (FS 213). As various object-domains are separated off – belonging to distinct realms of reality, each of which has a definite structure and constitution – the problem of the ‘theory of categories’ arises in Scotus’ work on Heidegger’s reading (FS 211).

The second chapter interprets the medieval idea that every object is a true object in the Rickertian (neo-Kantian) fashion as meaning that every object is only an object for a knowing subject (FS 268); all knowledge is only of objects; while truth only occurs in judgements. Heidegger reads into Scotus’ work this essential standpoint: knowledge occurs in true judgements and the object as known is a content of judgement. This content is the meaning or sense (an intensional entity) of the judgement and is different from any particular psychic act. The domain of study opened in investigating the transcendental verum is precisely the study of the logical domain, accessed through the judgement – the realm of validity. Heidegger continues his interpretation of the copula not as simple ‘subsumption,’ nor solely as expressing existence, but rather in its relation to a judgements’ ‘holding’ for a subject (FS 270). Indeed, Scotus is here credited with having uncovered the same problem with the copy-theory of cognition as Rickert does: namely the observation that it is impossible to compare the sense of judgement, the intensional entity, to real objects, since real objects themselves are only known through cognition, or judgement. An object not cognized is no object for the one cognizing (FS 272-273). Scotus does not here “‘side with’ ‘Subjectivism, ‘Idealism,’ or any spectre of epistemology” (FS 273), despite his giving up the copy theory for a theory which affirms the immanence of thought. This correctly understood ‘immanence’ – similar to Husserl’s understanding in the Logical Investigations – does not remove reality, and deny the external world, but rather has recourse to the “absolute primacy of valid sense” which underlies all psychological, economic-pragmatic theories and grounds the “absolute validity of truth, proper objectivity” (FS 273). Heidegger here reaffirms the distinction

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made in his dissertation between the ideal logical entities and the real psychological occurrences. The \textit{ens} (being or entity) of which other categories hold, is again the highest and most universal determination; it is the ultimate category of categories (\textit{FS} 214-215).

Thus, although judgements contain a cognition of the \textit{verum}, the \textit{verum} itself is not equated with truth as the validity of judgements, but is a pre-judgemental truth, the truth as meaning or simple apprehension of the object: the object is true insofar as it is intelligible, or cognized. This more rudimentary level of truth, which precedes the truth of the judgement, consists of material givenness upon which the categorial forms of thought depend for the constitution of their meaning. This constitution takes place pretheoretically, where one already lives in the truth.\textsuperscript{65} Matter is embraced by form. But form receives its meaning from matter. Kisiel notes that Form will come to be denoted \textit{Bewandtnis} (signifying that it befits its matter, that it in-volves it) in Heidegger’s work of the 1920s and category (“Form”) comes to be (environing) world for Heidegger.\textsuperscript{66} In \textit{Being and Time} \textit{Bewandtnis} is the being of the tool – it is the prepositional-intentional nexus of ‘with, in, for, in order to, for the sake of’. The question becomes one of how to express that which comes from the pre-cognitive factic realm of lived meaning. Heidegger’s mature answer lies in his ‘formal indication’ which has its origins in his discussion of the medieval transcendental \textit{unum} (the one) and is motivated by Lask’s treatment of the reflexive categories.\textsuperscript{67} However, Heidegger already distinguishes his thought from Lask’s in his \textit{Habilitation} by holding ‘intentionality’ as the fundamental category of the logical realm, as opposed to validity (\textit{FS} 283).\textsuperscript{68}

Heidegger devotes the rest of the \textit{Habilitationsschrift} to the problem of joining together the realms so strictly separated in the first two chapters: the sense of judgements (their intensional content) and what they signify, the ideal-logical and the real-psychological act. The meaning of a judgement is discovered through an analysis of its expressibility. The \textit{senses} underlying judgements are communicated, signified by words. As Stewart notes, “for Heidegger’s interpretation of ‘Scotus,’ this signals a further assimilation of this medieval text to the concepts of Husserlian phenomenology, particularly as found in Husserl’s revived idea of a universal grammar in the \textit{Logische}

\textsuperscript{65} The theme of ‘living in truth’ recurs in \textit{Being and Time} where the analysis extends to include Dasein’s equi-primordial ‘living in untruth.’


\textsuperscript{67} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{68} See Crowell, \textit{Husserl, Heidegger and the Space of Meaning}, 86f for this connection.
Untersuchungen, and in his theory of noetic acts, neumatic-sense and intentional objects, as found in Ideen of 1913.\textsuperscript{69}

Still following Lotze, Heidegger locates the sense of judgement that obtains, and is expressed in sentences as rooted in the domain of meaning, in the realm of values – this ‘sense’ he here calls ‘syntactic value’ (FS 337). Scotus’ Speculative Grammar articulates the idea that the way we express things (the \textit{modus significandi}) is determined by the way we think of things (the \textit{modus intelligendi}) which itself is determined by the way things are (the \textit{modus essendi}). Language thus points to metaphysical as well as logical determinates: “philosophical or speculative grammar is the study of these ultimate structures of language.”\textsuperscript{70} Heidegger’s interest in Scotus’ speculative grammar is mediated by his interest in Husserl’s Logical Investigations. The latter treats the ‘doctrine of meaning’ in the Fourth Logical Investigation: whereas formal logic prohibits formal nonsense, such as contradictions, the ‘doctrine of meaning’ ensures that senselessness is avoided. The possibility of utterances being senseful versus senseless rests on an objective necessity grounded in the meanings underlying the expressions, according to Husserl – on essences in the realm of meaning. Heidegger interprets the account of the \textit{modus significandi} in Scotus as an example of a Husserlian doctrine of meaning. The theory of categories comes before the theory of meaning as it founds the latter.

Being is “the category of categories” (FS 214) that category beyond which one cannot inquire. All other categories – be they the other transcendental categories or those which demarcate the specific regions of being of the various sciences – fall within the embracing horizon of being. On Heidegger’s interpretation, Scotus jointed being into the five specific regions of the physical and the psychical (the real), the supersensible or metaphysical, the mathematical, and the logical. In Scotus’ strict division of the real from the logical realm, Heidegger uncovers the categories which apply to the logical realm alone. As compared to the psychologistic tendencies in modern logic, Heidegger maintains here that “scholastic thought...[has] a maturity of view for the peculiarity and intrinsic-value of the logical domain which is not to be denied or underestimated” (FS 275). Heidegger holds the demarcation of the “sphere of logical sense” from the “heterogeneous continuum of empirical reality and the homogeneous continuum of mathematical reality” to be of the utmost importance (FS 275). As the logical realm is

\textsuperscript{69} Stewart, “Signification and Radical Subjectivity,” 361-362.
\textsuperscript{70} Caputo, “Phenomenology, Mysticism, and the ‘Grammatica Speculativa’,” 102.
distinct from actual reality, as well as metaphysical reality, it is void of actual existence, and thus the category of causality does not apply here (FS 276). And yet the logical stands out among the realms of being as that realm which cuts across all others: in so far as objects of the other realms can all be known, as they can have “judgments made of them, they must enter the world of sense, only in this world are they known and judged. Only insofar as I live in the valid, do I know about existence” (FS 280). The categories of the logical realm cut across all other domains. But the being of the logical for Scotus is a being in the ‘soul’ – not as a psychic reality, but as a logical actuality (FS 277). Namely, it is the “‘noematic sense’, intentionality as correlate of consciousness, inseparable from consciousness, and yet not really contained in it” (FS 277). Heidegger’s reading of Scotus thus demonstrates his radical incorporation of Husserl’s notion of the intentional as the category of the logically real.

Up until but not including 1916 Heidegger maintains that through a completed, systematic study of the categories, theoretical philosophy holds the power to resolve the repeated problems of philosophy which lie at the heart of his logical considerations: the problems of the nature of the judgement, the problem of the connection between the realms of reality, and so on, are all to be decided with a systematic philosophical explication which resides solely in the realm of the valid as opposed to the mathematical, actual, or metaphysical (aka non-logical) realms.

1.2.4 Seeds of Dissatisfaction: Habilitationsvortrag (1915)

Already in Heidegger’s 1915 Habilitationsvortrag, ‘The Concept of Time in the Science of History,’ slight hints of a departure with the Rickertian analysis of historicism appear, despite its overt Rickertian orientation. In the lecture Heidegger contrasts the treatment of the concept of time in the physical sciences with the concept of time in the historical sciences. Pursuing a course in the school of Rickert and Windelband, Heidegger argues that physics aims to reduce all experience to (mathematical) general laws and to discover “the unity of the physical theory of the world” (BH 65/FS 421). Time becomes a “homogenous ordering of points, a scale, a parameter” in this science, used solely as a measure of motion (BH 66/FS 424). Conversely, the science of history takes “human beings, not as biological objects, but insofar as their intellectual and material achievements serve to actualize the idea of culture” as its object (BH 68/FS 426). Historians thus concern themselves with cultural-formations – objectifications of human spirit – of the past in their uniqueness and particularity as they develop, and impact on the
present. The selection of past cultural-formations as objects of historical study is thus guided by present values. But the historical object is always past, it no longer exists. The historian must bridge this temporal divide: each time period is distinguished qualitatively and so the science of history functions with the concept of time in a way altogether different from the homogenizing utilization in the science of physics (BH 71/FS 431). Each historical period is distinct in its structural content. Although they succeed one another, there is no mathematical procession here. Whereas the ‘when’ of physics refers to the number of ticks on the second hand of a clock, the ‘when’ of history, of a historical event [Ereignis], refers to a “place in a qualitative historical context” (BH 71/FS 431-432). As opposed to the arbitrary starting point of counting-time in the natural sciences, the time-reckoning systems of history “always begin with a historically significant event [Ereignis] (the founding of the city of Rome, the birth of Christ, the Hegira)” (BH 72/FS 432). In a final push of the Rickertian position, Heidegger finishes the lecture with the claim that relatedness to values determines all concept-formation in history.

However, Heidegger opens the lecture with a pronouncement directly at odds with Rickert’s emphasis of epistemology: “epistemology will no longer do the job. The emphasis on epistemological problems is born of a legitimate and lively awareness of the need and value of critique, but it does not permit philosophy’s questions about ultimate issues and goals to achieve their intrinsic significance” (BH 61/FS 415). Despite this opening, as noted above, the lecture itself works within the Windelband-Rickert distinction between cultural and natural sciences. The method guiding the research “is determined by the object of the respective science and the viewpoint from which it is examined” (BH 62/FS 416). Again, the theory of science reflects on the logical structure of the concepts with which each science operates, and reflection upon the use of concepts in the theory of science itself brings one to discover the categories, the fundamental units of logic. The lecture thus works out one aspect of the theory of science: it investigates the concept of time in two branches of science, physics and history. Rickert’s standpoint guides the actual work pursued in the lecture: the science of history is taken as a fact, the factual function of time in the science is studied; and only on this basis is the logical structure of the concept determined. Bambach points to Heidegger’s proposal of the concept of time as a principle for distinguishing the natural and historical sciences as an early point of dissent from the neo-Kantian standpoint.  

71 Bambach, Heidegger, Dilthey, and the Crisis of Historicism, 227.
provide a novel examination of this concept, this – together with his dissatisfaction with epistemology – provides just another mere hint at his separation from the neo-Kantians, as it points to his growing accounting with a lived, non-epistemologized, time.

1.2.5 The Clearest Break: ‘The Problem of Categories’ (1916)

Recall that for Rickert (and Windelband) reality confronts us as an irrational, infinite manifold that can only be understood through conceptual simplification. The concepts are utilised for a purpose: they are guided by values. Sciences are characterized by how they organize reality through their concepts, but then they are ultimately guided by values – or simply interests – since their concepts are applied in order to simplify reality to reach understanding. The goal of each type of science, determined by its object of study, yields a selective interpretation of reality. Science never reaches reality as it actually is, and hence Rickert justifies the Kantian focus on epistemology, and the ultimate abandonment of ontology. The sciences become ordered according to formal-logical divisions of theoretical aims and cognitive interests. Neither historical nor natural science will successfully reproduce the heterogeneous continuum that is reality. Values guide the sciences by determining which part of reality should be isolated through the application of their concepts. The value of these values, their ultimately validity, is the fundamental theme of philosophy for Rickert.

A closer look at the 1916 Concluding chapter on ‘The Problem of Categories’ highlights Heidegger’s first rejection of this neo-Kantian approach. In the introduction to the Habilitation, as noted above, Heidegger had characterized the history of philosophy as a repetition of problems – understandable given the constancy of human nature – occurring in temporally disjointed periods. From 1912 through to 1915 Heidegger maintains that a theoretical-epistemologically oriented philosophy will solve these problems. The solution lies in a complete system of categories determined strictly according to the realm of validity, entirely dirempt of recourse to the metaphysical or empirical realms. This basic standpoint is rejected in 1916.

This rejection lies in Heidegger’s recourse to the notion of ‘living spirit’. Although the judgement should solve the “problem of the ‘immanent and transeunt (lying “outside of thinking”’) validity’” it makes no sense to talk of objectivity without a judging subject: there is only objectivity for a judging subject (FS 405). To fully understand validity, one thus must account for this subject. What is required, it seems, is a subjective-logic. Heidegger here disowns the concept of validity which drove all his previous work.
Moreover, the view of logic as requiring a trans-logical foundation controverts his previous insistence that logic is a separate, independent field of inquiry with its own domain, and centred as the fundamental core of philosophy. The previous theoretical divorce from the historical, living spirit, in search of timeless validities is here repudiated as well. Ultimately, Heidegger criticises the neo-Kantian project for its reduction of categories to pure functions of thought. A clef remains between Being and Validity so long as one remains within the pure logical sphere of Validity; so long as one remains tied to a subject-immanent account, only a trans-logical stance, embodied in the living spirit, can hope to span this chasm.

The entire project from 1912 to 1915 is cast off as of secondary importance to the “philosophy of the living spirit...especially a theory of categories that is guided by its basic tendencies” which “faces the major task of a fundamental confrontation [Auseinandersetzung] with that system of a historical worldview that commands the greatest wealth of experience and concept formation...a system that took up into itself [in sich aufgehoben hat] all of the fundamental motives previously operative in philosophical problems – that is, a confrontation with Hegel” (BH 85/FS 410-411). This marks the end of Heidegger’s years as a pure logician. His two formative schools – neo-Kantian and neo-Scholastic – are both considered excessively one-sided; they require a resolution in a higher unity. The systematic ordering of the sciences according to the facts of science will no longer suffice. A complete system of categories determined strictly according to the realm of validity, with no recourse to the living historical spirit or to metaphysical foundations, no longer counts as the final solution to the recurring problems in the history of philosophy. Philosophy remains the strictest science, the Urwissenschaft but now with a further caveat that apart from ordering the regions of objects for scientific study and solving the problem of judgement, history must be included in the underlying theory of categories. Each age experiences being differently. Only an investigation of the historical objectivity of the living spirit can uncover its structure. With Husserl’s arrival as Rickert’s successor in Freiburg in 1916, Heidegger gains the space to radically redefine his philosophical program in terms of facticity, a primordial dimension of consciousness, unreachable by any empirical science: only phenomenology can provide the method of

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72 Jeffrey Barash argues that this reference to ‘life’ or the ‘living spirit’ has closer ties to “the Tübingen Speculative School, which had inspired Heidegger’s mentor, Carl Braig,” then to ideas from Dilthey’s life-philosophy, than is normally acknowledged. Jeffrey Andrew Barash, Martin Heidegger and the Problem of Historical Meaning (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1988), 123.
access. As we will see in what follows, the logic of philosophy as rigorous science is phenomenology by 1919. However, even Husserl’s unpacking of the universal structures of consciousness, although appearing distinct from Rickert’s work, would prove too theoretically-oriented. Heidegger aims in his work announced in 1919 and carried out throughout the 1920s to eke out a method taking its cue from factual-historical experience, separate from a priori universal standards of truth, and structures of consciousness.

2 Philosophy as Urwissenschaft

As we have seen, in his earliest writings Heidegger works under the title of neo-Kantianism and then phenomenology, or at least influenced by it. Philosophy is the strictest science and as such must ground all other sciences by demarcating the regions of being, determining the structure of judgements, and providing a universal theory of categories applied not just to the concepts of any given domain, but to the totality of all domains. By 1916 he calls for the need to include ‘living spirit’ into the fundamental investigation of the categories. This nomenclature soon gives way to a focus on ‘everyday life,’ as opposed to the focus on theoretical knowledge in Husserl’s Logical Investigations, ‘Philosophy as a Rigorous Science,’ and Ideas as well as in the entire neo-Kantian tradition. Heidegger becomes increasingly ‘phenomenological’ in these early years, but with a phenomenology of a different kind; his early lecture courses demonstrate a shift away from equating philosophy as the highest theoretical science in his attempt to found the theoretical itself on pre-theoretical worldly experience. He does not seem to embrace Husserl’s version of the phenomenological reduction, according to Husserl the most appropriate entry-way into phenomenology. By 1919 he realizes that formal logic does not suffice to ground science: apart from its reliance on the theoretical, it has recourse to its own realm of reality, and thus cannot be self-founding. What is required is a science so primordial that it does not presuppose a domain of objects for its study.

Ultimately, the problem with formal logic is that it is not formal enough. It still prejudicially orient itself toward a specific (material) region of being – namely, toward values, validity, sense, or meaning. Philosophy overlooks the problem of ‘authentic logic’ – an oversight Heidegger strives to counter. Against attempts to apply theoretical-knowing to all aspects of experience, Heidegger highlights certain basic, fundamental aspects of life that are not only not-accessible, but actually are destroyed through the theoretical gaze. In 1919 Heidegger still sees his work fundamentally as logic, albeit a
logic which problematizes logic as it has been known in both its formal and its transcendental incarnations. This problematic works its way out over the next several years as Heidegger engages increasingly with the works of Aristotle, and in light of these readings, he reevaluates his relationship with Husserl and reconsiders Plato (albeit through an Aristotelian lens). This period culminates in his Being and Time: a fundamentally logical work, although not explicitly stated as such. Dahlstrom, for one, considers “the logical prejudice” – the presupposition that “truth is one of two (or more) possibilities of a sentence or its equivalent” which presupposition is never measured as to its truth – as a central component of Heidegger’s philosophical logic and at issue in his works up to and including Being and Time. I devote the rest of this chapter to an explication of Heidegger’s first full exposition of philosophy as a rigorous science, taking hermeneutic-phenomenology as its method.

2.1 Search for a Method as the Search for a Definition of Philosophy

Throughout Heidegger’s career he retains a severe consciousness of method. The earliest search for his own method of philosophy, which can secure its foundations, occurs in 1919. This method turns upon Heidegger’s search for the essence of philosophy. He jettisons his prior commitment to philosophy as an essentially theoretical, logico-epistemological study. In his 1919 lectures Heidegger calls for the need to replace logic as the theory of theories with a “genuinely primordial science” which “cannot make [presuppositions]” (TDP 81/96-97). It is not simply that the primordial science does not make presuppositions, but rather, he hopes to articulate a science so fundamental that it precedes any question of presupposition – a science which emerges from our immediate experience in the surrounding world: “the fundamental methodological problem of phenomenology, [is] the question concerning the scientific disclosure of the sphere of lived experience” (TDP 92/109). He thus aims for a pre-theoretical science, and stands against the “absolutizing of logic” found in Natorp and Husserl (TDP 91/108), and the consideration of logic as “theory of value,” found in Rickert (TDP 163/193-194). The guiding theme of the lectures is the search for the definition of philosophy, worked out through a critical engagement with psychologism, neo-Kantianism, world-view philosophy, and phenomenology: essentially all the main philosophical, ideological currents of the time. The lecture-courses in their published form are mostly polemical:

74 Ibid., 9.
Heidegger’s own position is not fully worked out, but glimpses of what he has in mind are put forth near the end of each course. I briefly reconstruct his vision of philosophy as primordial science in the rest of this chapter, highlighting the place of logic therein.

The introductory ruminations of ‘The Idea of Philosophy and the Problem of Worldview,’ on the relation between philosophy and worldview, lead Heidegger to a radically new understanding of this relation. The issue is not the identity or non-identity of philosophy and worldview, but rather their utter incompatibility. The “essence of worldview becomes a problem,” in an entirely new sense which only the idea of philosophy as primordial science can approach (TDP 9-10/11-12). The inauguration of his entirely new idea of philosophy divorces philosophy from the fundamental questions of humanity for the first time in modern philosophy, according to Heidegger. As something totally other, the examination of worldview must turn into an examination of philosophy itself: What is the essence of philosophy? Heidegger posits the answer: philosophy is primordial science. The question thus turns to one of the essence of this primordial science.

Heidegger’s vision of philosophy as primordial science retains the Rickertian separation of philosophy from worldview – despite Rickert’s hope to ground any worldview on a scientific philosophy. Heidegger jettisons this common conception of philosophy, deeming it to be in line with the disparate worldviews of “the peasant in the Black Forest...the factory worker...the so-called educated person...the political parties” (TDP 6/7). Under this naive view, philosophy presents a worldview higher than these other forms, free from dogma: philosophers appear with a great breadth and depth of thought, able to recognize the ultimate causes, the innerworkings of the world – with perhaps contradictory explanations – but all aiming to provide a meaning and purpose to human activity, to culture in general. Philosophers direct their efforts “towards what is in every sense ultimate, universal, and of universal validity...every great philosophy realizes itself in a worldview – every philosophy is...metaphysics” (TDP 7/8). In the end, philosophy and worldview amount to the same on this initial view.

The more considered view takes its stance from Kantian critical philosophy; the impossibility of precritical metaphysics bars philosophy from finding the ultimate causes underlying the realm of experience. Critical epistemology provides the foundations of...
scientific philosophy; ethics, aesthetics, philosophy of religion and even logic lead back through critical reflection “to ultimate values and absolute validities” the totality of which can be systematically ordered (TDP 7-8/9). A critical scientific worldview results from such an ordered system of values. Worldview becomes the limit of philosophy as the strict science of value. Philosophy is no longer equated with worldview, but rather, the latter stands at its limits. Philosophy fulfils its task in supplying a scientific worldview. But, as I demonstrate below, Heidegger explicitly argues against both this teleological, ‘critical’ conception of philosophy as science of value-formation – namely Rickert’s view of philosophy – which posits worldview as the limit of philosophical investigation and the precritical equation of philosophy with worldview.

The identity/non-identity issue surrounding philosophy and worldview itself rests on a prejudice. This either/or does not exhaust the possibilities. Heidegger uncovers an alternative: philosophy and worldview are so radically incompatible that the issue of their identity never arises. This requires an entirely new conception of philosophy. Philosophy becomes entirely dirempt from questions surrounding the ultimate meaning and purpose of humanity. Similarly, this third way abandons philosophy as critical science of values built on the acts and norms of consciousness which tends toward its limit in a (scientific) worldview. Worldview becomes entirely foreign to philosophical investigation. In this way it becomes a genuine problem for philosophy. As the totally other of philosophy, the problem of worldview brings the question of philosophy into sharper focus: Heidegger devotes the remainder of his 1919 War Emergency Semester lecture to addressing this question of the ultimate definition of philosophy as primordial science.

The method of philosophy as primordial science, as that science which grounds all others, cannot proceed based upon the ‘fact of science’ nor even within any theoretical orientation – science itself as ultimate theoretical practice must be grounded in a pre-theoretical discipline:

The awakening and heightening of the life-context of scientific consciousness is not the object of theoretical representation, but of exemplary pre-living [Vorleben] – not the object of practical provision of rules, but the effect of primordially motivated personal and nonpersonal Being. Only in this way are the life-world and life-type of science built up. (TDP 5/5)

To account for the origin of scientific-consciousness, Heidegger looks to the pre-scientific ‘life-context’ out of which such consciousness arises. Much of the ‘Idea of Philosophy and the Problem of Worldview’ thus works its way out of a confrontation with that
philosophic-attitude which takes the fact of science as its starting point while aiming at a strict scientific foundation of all science. The problem with the general neo-Kantian standpoint arises from their taking the theoretical as the most primary foundation. As Heidegger will argue: “The primacy of the theoretical must be broken, but not in order to proclaim the primacy of the practical, and not in order to introduce something that shows the problems from a new side, but because the theoretical itself and as such refers back to something pre-theoretical” (TDP 50/59). He aims at a truly primordial – in the sense of presuppositionless – science which would undergird even the theoretical stance which itself stands as the condition for the possibility of all scientific-knowing. The search for a method for primordial science comes out of his reflections on the limits of the neo-Kantian theoretical orientation, to the critique of which we now turn.

2.2 The Struggle Against the Theoretical Prejudice

As noted above, while Heidegger repeatedly affirms his allegiance to Rickert’s separation of the historical and natural sciences on the basis of their method and concept-employment – in particular, taking the concept of culture as central to history in its provision of the key to the individuating method of history – this starting point of philosophy is precisely what Heidegger disaffirms starting in 1919. Heidegger’s 1919 Summer Semester lecture course provides an explicit phenomenological critique of Windelband and Rickert’s value-philosophy, and already in the 1919 War Emergency Semester course the hermeneutic approach to the problem of values sets him apart from these influences. In particular, Heidegger brings to central focus the immediate environment of experience wherein

the meaningful is primary and immediately given to me without any mental detours across thing-oriented apprehension. Living in an environment, it signifies to me everywhere and always, everything has the character of world. It is everywhere the case that ‘it worlds’ [es weltet], which is something different from ‘it values’ [es wertet]. (TDP 61/72-73)

He here explicitly thematizes the environing world wherein experiences as events are beyond/below the limits of transcendental-epistemologico-logical investigation. Heidegger’s central concern in this early work – one maintained throughout the 1920s –

76 Although ‘presuppositionless’ not in the sense of merely avoiding presuppositions – but even more, presuppositionless in the sense of uncovering the ground for making presuppositions at all. Heidegger argues that the very idea of a ‘presupposition’ is theoretical.
comes to fruition out of his meditations on the primacy of the theoretical in neo-Kantian thought (TDP 71-79/84-94).

Both the objective idealism of the Marburg school and its counterpoise, critical realism, maintain some relation to mathematical natural science in their investigations. While the former presupposes the mathematical sciences of nature as a fact and takes its task to be the elucidation of their logical structure, the latter also takes this science as a fact “but at the same time as the means of explanation and solution of its problem” (TDP 70-71/84). Now, in order for Heidegger to gain access to the pre-theoretical lived experience in a scientific way he assesses these scientific-philosophies as possible solutions. His way into phenomenology in these lectures takes the path beginning with the theoretical “while freeing ourselves more and more from it” (TDP 92-93/110). The problem of determining the primal something as subject-matter scientifically but in a non-objectifying manner arises. It appears to be a question of whether ‘there is’ anything at all. Historically, (critical) realism and (critical) idealism dominate the discussion of the fundamental problem of epistemology, the problem of the reality of the external world, which claims to justify or get behind all presuppositions. But in either case they posit the problem to be investigated as a theoretical one to be itself approached by theoretical means: the question of the reality of the external world drives both these positions, and the theoretical is assumed as the sole mode of access to such questions.

To understand the problem of taking the theoretical as primary, we must begin with the main question motivating Heidegger’s discussion more clearly. By aiming for a science which stands prior to any presuppositions, he comes across our immediate lived experience as a possible source of immediate evidence, unmarred by conceptual distortion. If one could found all knowledge upon this pure, certain, evidence then scientific-knowledge would find its solid foundation. The question thus turns to answering how a science is to be built on this fact of lived experience since the evidence of one’s experiences only have validity for oneself – and thus not universally, the classic measure of whether one has reached the stage of scientificity. Heidegger articulates the problem in a Natorpian way: “Science is knowledge and knowledge has an object. Science determines and fixes objects in an objective manner. A science of experiences would have to objectify experiences and thus strip away their non-objective character as lived experience and event [Ereignis]” (TDP 64/76). Even speaking about one’s experiences, comparing one experience with another and calling them two experiences,
involves objectification: they are isolated, taken out of context, turned into a something that can be counted, quantified.

The question is, then, how to explain the environing world without turning it into that which it is not. Natorp’s specific solution to the problem of investigating lived experiences via the reconstructive method rests upon the general neo-Kantian solution which turns toward the problem of explaining the reality of the external world: this is “the problem of epistemology” (TDP 66/79). If the reality of the external world can be explained, then the nature of our experiences, an understanding of how we can know things given through our senses, will be solved. The critical realist and the objective idealist both argue that one should focus on the sense datum since this is what is immediately given.

But what is first given is not the sense datum, as Heidegger notes phenomenologically, but rather, say, the desk. Everything pertaining to the desk can certainly be ignored until one arrives at the simple sensation of brown, which can be objectified and seen as the primarily given. But, Heidegger questions, what does this ‘givenness’ amount to? Is the ‘brown’ experienced in the same way as the desk, for instance? In all cases, the recourse to sense data as what is immediately given destroys the environment which “surrounds it, in so far as I remove, bracket and disregard my historical ‘I’ and simply practise theory” (TDP 71-72/85). But in explaining the environing world theoretically, the very thing to be explained is destroyed. A position such as critical realism comes with its theory in place, hoping to explain one being based upon another while critical idealism equates ‘nature’ with the objectivity of the natural sciences, thereby losing any connection with reality as such. The former relies upon theory, the latter aims to institute theoretical objectification within the world universally.

That both options – critical realism and idealism – rely upon natural science does not simply belie their tendencies toward naturalism as Husserl thinks in his Logos essay but rather the general “prevalence of the theoretical” (TDP 73/86-87). It appears that Husserl’s theoretically-oriented phenomenology comes under attack here as well. The approach to the problem itself, following the isolation of sense data, already occurs in the theoretical attitude. By uncovering this fundamental point of departure which grounds

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77 In his 1920 course on the ‘Phenomenology of Intuition and Expression’ Heidegger lumps Husserl together with the Marburg school and Rickert as those who strive to explain life under the rubric of “a universal a priori systematics of reason.” Heidegger, Phenomenology of Intuition and Expression, 10 [GA 59, 15].
these polar positions, Heidegger fulfils the task of a phenomenological critique which aims not at “refutation or counter-demonstration. Instead, the proposition to be criticised is understood from its origin, from where its meaning derives. Critique is a positive sounding out of genuine motivations” (TDP 107/126). All explanations of these most prevalent forms of philosophy take their cue from the theoretical attitude. Even Natorp who recognizes the necessarily objectifying nature of thematization is motivated by the theoretical prejudice to such an extent that he simply accepts the inherently obscuring nature of consciousness as unavoidable. Especially in pursuits of an understanding of science and a theory of knowledge, theory – the theoretical – is always taken as the starting point.

But the theoretical is fundamentally limited. Heidegger here cites Emil Lask as the only one to have realized that the question of the nature and scope of application of the theoretical is a problem – although Lask too approached the problem theoretically, clouding his real discovery of the problem (TDP 74/88). In the question ‘How is the desk given to me?’, ‘givenness’ already rests on a theoretical reflection on the environment since it is removed from the historical ‘I’; such questioning bypasses the primacy of the ‘it worlds’ of the experience. This is the initial “objectifying infringement of the environment” (TDP 75/89) and as such pure givenness cannot stand as the essence of the immediate environing world as environmental. Out of the environing world, things are distilled – bare thingliness marks out a sphere ripped out of the environmental. The bare thing is there, it exists, is real. Reality as the totality of things therefore remains distinct from all environmental characteristics; its essence lies in thingliness (TDP 75/89). Reality – that which poses the fundamental problem of epistemology – marks the primary characteristic of theoretical concern. But the environmental, by contrast, is the meaningful. Thus in the theoretical attitude, “the meaningful is de-interpreted into this residue of being real. Experience of the environment is de-vivified into the residue of recognizing something as real.... The historical ‘I’ is de-historicized into the residue of a specific ‘I-ness’ as the correlate of thingliness” (TDP 75/89). We thus see Heidegger’s concern with the epistemological – and thus the reality-oriented, thoroughly theoretical –

78 Even Husserl’s epoche with its ‘suspension of belief’ ends up bracketing out the world even though it suspends judgement as to the existence or non-existence of ‘reality’ – as such Husserl’s method also loses contact with the flow of the historical I.
Primordial Science in the Young Heidegger

...approach of the neo-Kantians, emerge in full light. Reliance on the theoretical excludes lived experience, that which alone is immediate.

The key to Heidegger’s early position lies in understanding it over and against the dominating force of neo-Kantianism. His general worry concerns the absolutization of the theoretical which overlooks its own origins in life: “i.e. without comprehending the process of ever intensifying objectification as a process of de-vivification.... A theoretical question about the existence of my environing world...distorts the meaning of this world...all that is real can ‘world’, but not all that ‘worlds’ need be real” (TDP 76-77/91). The insistence of the epistemological approach upon the priority of questions concerning reality ultimately misconstrues the true problem: namely, the problem not of the reality of the environmental, but rather the self-showing of the environmental itself (upon which any questions of reality must ultimately rest). Thereby, Heidegger reaches the starting point for his primordial science: it must be a science of (from) the environmental. The problem of the reality of the world is solved by noting that the problem itself is an absurdity. Critical realism buries itself as it digs deeper while objective realism, although more difficult to assess as its problem lies in absolutizing the theoretical, at least poses a genuine problem as it sees that there is a motivation in life (and environmental experience) toward the necessary problematizing of reality. In any case, Heidegger’s struggle against the theoretical prejudice boils down to a fight against the objectifying attitude, the insistence that things be taken as static objects available to the gaze of the observer-philosopher – not only with a sensuous seeing, but in any seeing into the essence of the thing which stands before one awaiting (conceptual) dissection.

Heidegger addresses one final nagging objection: namely, that in environmental experience, the reality of the external world is always presupposed. ‘Pre-supposition’ not in a spatial or temporal ordering, but in “a logical ordering, a relation that holds between theoretical propositions, a relation of founding and logical ground-laying: if this is valid, so is that. Instead of this hypothetical grounding, a categorical grounding is also possible: a ‘so it is’” (TDP 79/93). If this is so, then it remains doubtful whether environmental experience presupposes reality. In this experience there is no theoretical positing at all: ‘it worlds’ is not established theoretically – it is experienced as ‘worlding’. But, one might counter, this claim is itself an unproven epistemological presupposition. However, since

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79 Although Heidegger moves toward an endorsement of phenomenology in these lectures, and even though he does not emphasize the fact here, Husserl too falls victim to this argument.
experience of the environment is not a theoretical posit, there can be no presupposition. This experience lies prior to all provability and unprovability; epistemology stands later with respect to environmental experience, as epistemology only has access to, knows, that which is posited by consciousness. Any epistemological treatment of environmental experience necessarily posits that experience as some-thing and thus destroys its meaning, taking it into a theoretical context. The problem with the absolutizing of the theoretical lies in its seeing theorized reality as reality simpliciter; on this view, the environmental can only be comprehended within reality. Theoretical comportment generally overlooks its pre-theoretical, factual, source.

2.2.1 Rickert’s Philosophy of Value
Apart from the critique of the priority given to the theoretical, Heidegger confronts Rickert’s version of the neo-Kantian philosophy of value directly. Rickert’s teleological method is of course full of presuppositions and is itself founded upon theoretical motivations: for this reason alone it cannot stand as primordial science. The most obvious presupposition is “the givenness of the ought, such that the absolute ought becomes primordial objectivity” (TDP 37/44). The ought is assumed to be prior to being, and yet no account is offered as to how an ought can be given at all. Rickert fails to account for the lived-experience involved in ought-giving and ought-taking. Indeed, even the connection between value and ought remains unclear: certainly there are many experiences of value void of connection to any ‘ought.’ But the ideal of truth, the goal of knowledge, on the teleological account is a value. And yet this conception was premised upon the idea that knowledge should correspond to the ideal since the ideal is valuable; it is seen as something one ‘ought’ to pursue. The will to truth for Rickert is guided by an impulsion, an ‘ought’ which makes what is valued a value. But in separating values from the ought Heidegger comes to his own position namely that the “value is something in and for itself, not an ought, but just as little a Being [ein Sein]. The value ‘is’ not, but rather it ‘values’ in an intransitive sense” (TDP 38-39/46) – this ‘it values’ is an immediate experience, prior to any theorizing appropriation. The founding of the values on the announcement of an ‘ought’ represents another presupposition of the teleological method.

But the most pressing issue with this position concerns its inability to appreciate the importance of the ontological sphere, the realm of being, as a fundamental philosophical problem. As noted above, Rickert’s radical separation of the Is from the Ought leads him
to limit philosophical concerns solely to the realm of value. But “proponents of the teleological method...do not notice that they have only theoretically broken the bridges between the two spheres, and now stand helpless on one of the banks” (TDP 46/55).

Rickert regularly speaks of attributing transcendent meaning to beings or existing things but “what the existing thing is, is given by its Being; this is nowhere clarified” (TDP 166-167/198). This method not only leaves the connection between being and value unexamined, but further, the entire truth-value-being relation.

In opposition to the positing of the realm of value or the tacit assumption that the theoretical attitude is inseparable from scientific investigation, Heidegger strives to uncover a foundation for all knowing prior to the theoretical, and thus to any presuppositions. He finds this in environmental experience:

_Environmental experience itself neither makes presuppositions, nor does it let itself be labelled as a presupposition. It is not even presuppositionless, for presupposition and presuppositionlessness have any meaning only in the theoretical. If the theoretical as such becomes problematic, so also does ambiguous talk of presupposition and presuppositionlessness. These belong rather in the most constructive sphere of the theory of objects, a sphere that is the most derivative branch of the genealogy of meaning. (TDP 79/94)_

If Heidegger’s account avoids the theoretical, and all constructed objects, the question remains how this primordial science will in fact work as a foundation for science in general and how pre-theoretical disclosure is at all possible in the first place.

### 2.3 Primordial Science: Pre-Theoretical Investigation

In attempting to found all scientific knowing scientifically, it seems that philosophy must begin methodologically in circularity; primordial science necessarily stands as its own presupposition. But then it must supersede this apparently irremovable circularity which the self-presupposition of primordial science itself posits if it hopes to be genuinely primordial. However, this very charge of ‘circularity’ is theoretical as it is a positing, a presupposition (of a distinct kind). It is a theoretically constructed difficulty. To aim at the ‘primal leap or the origin’ at the edge of presuppositionlessness is to proceed theoretically (TDP 80-81/95). But since the sphere which includes circularity is theoretical and thus de-vivified and derivative, it therefore cannot be the fundamental or primordial sphere after which Heidegger strives.

Can we now truly master this circularity? Can the problem of theoretical knowledge be solved by a theory of knowledge, theory solved by theory? As a
matter of fact, logic has also been described as the theory of theory. Is there such a thing? What if this were a deception? But it must be possible, for otherwise there would be no science of knowledge and of its axioms, no fundamental science of philosophy, no primordial science at all. The circularity cannot be removed as long as primordial science is theoretical. Knowledge cannot get outside itself. (TDP 81/96)

Heidegger here directly confronts the position of his student years: namely, logic and epistemology no longer suffice as the fundamental ground of all knowledge. The critical teleological method of the neo-Kantian philosophy of values simply lacks the rigor Heidegger seeks. But so too does any theoretical (or any speculative) philosophy since they too fail to disclose immediate living experience; the theoretical attitude necessarily deforms this experience. Moreover, any attempt to found theoretical science upon a theoretical science ends in circularity – a major problem within the theoretical sphere. Ultimately, if the nature of the environing world is to be disclosed theoretically, and if the theoretical which is founded upon the environing world is thereby to be successfully grounded, then all pre-suppositions must be avoided according to the requirements of epistemology. But this entire procedure itself rests upon – presupposes – epistemology!

Heidegger thus aims to disclose lived experience within his conception of philosophy as a primordial science not only for its own sake, but also as a possible foundation for scientific-comportment generally. His conception of philosophy as primordial science becomes one of a pre-theoretical, non-epistemological, pre-logical science which phenomenologically describes lived experience in its immediacy through hermeneutic intuition. The cornerstone of the investigation into the conception lies in the search for an appropriate method, a way of knowing and thinking other than the theoretical epistemologico-logical thinking of neo-Kantianism.

In sum, primordial science is meant to be neither the content of knowledge, nor, certainly, a theoretical construction, but rather a way of knowing or appropriating objects (TDP 23/26-28). For Heidegger, philosophy as primordial science is a method that operates prior to theoretical construction and thus prior to questions of presuppositions. He intends to reach the primordial sphere of immediate living experience wherein lived experience is understood “not as process, as thing, as object, but in a quite new way, as an event [Ereignis]” (TDP 63/75). Again, Heidegger details his own position more finely in response to a possible neo-Kantian objection: this time from Natorp’s famous objection
that Husserl’s non-interfering, purely descriptive reflections upon lived experiences will necessarily ‘still the stream’ of experience.\(^{80}\)

2.3.1 Heidegger on Husserl versus Natorp

Although it seems that Heidegger simply appropriates Husserl’s phenomenological method,\(^{81}\) and although he agrees here and throughout the twenties that the genuine theme of phenomenology is the meaningful as such, Heidegger departs from Husserl on the specific mode of access and structure of the meaningful.\(^{82}\) Husserl’s theoretical orientation comes to the fore in his account of the essence of thinking as object-directedness, in the noesis/noema explication of all human comportment. While Husserl attempts to ground our everyday lived (meaningful) experience in the transcendent ego, Heidegger’s concerns about the primacy of the theoretical and the need for a radical approach to the problem of origins – the ‘way’ into phenomenology characterizing all of his earliest lecture-courses – brings this ego-centred phenomenology into question already as early as 1919.\(^{83}\) However, Heidegger’s focus on lived experiences – although taken in a way radically other than Husserl’s – as the subject matter for philosophical reflection, still comes from Husserl.

On Husserl’s account, we come to know the stream of lived experiences by means of reflective-experiencing acts. The lived experience becomes a looked-upon experience through reflection, itself a lived experience capable of becoming looked-upon through further reflection, and so on. Now, the field of experience reflected upon becomes describable and so “the science of experiences is a descriptive one” (TDP 84/100). Its method is descriptive reflection. Natorp worries that reflection transforms the previously unexamined “into something ‘looked at’” (TDP 84/100). In reflection we make it into an object toward which we direct ourselves, an object which stands over against us. “Thus, in reflection we are theoretically oriented” (TDP 84-85/100). And theories de-vivify, so life-experiences become no longer lived, but merely looked-at. Description utilizes


\(^{81}\) Kovacs seems to hold this view in his “Philosophy as Primordial Science,” 125 and 130.


\(^{83}\) The typical accounts of Heidegger’s confrontation with Husserl begin with his Marburg courses *Introduction to Phenomenological Research* (1923/24) and *Prolegomena to the History of the Concept of Time* (1925). An exception is the recent article: Westerlund, “Phenomenology as Understanding of Origin” which brings together Heidegger’s seemingly fragmentary critique of Husserl in his 1919/20 course *Basic Problems of Phenomenology* into a coherent whole.
concepts. It circumscribes experience into generalities; it subsumes, presupposes a form of concept-formation, and thus a theory for application as well. According to Natorp, the Husserlian phenomenological method appears to be guided not by immediate intuitive givenness of phenomena, but through a grasp of a field of laws: “Description is unthinkable without underlying explanation” (TDP 85/101). Ultimately, for the Marburg as well as Baden schools of neo-Kantianism, “If one wishes to makes experience into an object of science, it is impossible to avoid theoretization” (TDP 85-86/101). Natorp’s concerns arise entirely out of the theoretical standpoint – from out of the “absolutization” of the theoretical and the logical (TDP 91/108).

As we have seen, Natorp proposes a method of rational reconstruction opposed to Husserlian reflection. Reflection necessarily distorts the original experience: Natorp’s method aims to trace the lines of distortion in a reversal which reconstructs the original experience as given, resulting in a mediated knowledge of the immediate. That which is given in experience to consciousness first of all, on the standard neo-Kantian account, are objects as objects of knowledge. Natorp holds that objectification is determination and the subject is what determines, what is prior. But this is the only way the subject is given, as the objectifier. Since Natorp reaches the subjective foundation through the reversal from the philosophical sciences of objectivity (logic, ethics, aesthetics, philosophy of religion), “philosophical psychology is therefore not the foundation for logic, ethics…but rather their conclusion and scientific completion” (TDP 88-89/105). For Natorp ‘objectivity’ and ‘subjectivity’ signify two opposing directions along the path of knowledge: “from appearance to object, and from object to appearance” (TDP 89/105). Natorp himself finds this ‘uniting’ in Plato, this “fundamental relation between law, object and consciousness” as the “fundamental equation of consciousness” (TDP 89/106).84

Heidegger ultimately argues that Natorp’s reconstruction in no way captures ‘lived experience’ as it too objectifies. All re-construction is also construction and thus is theoretical, i.e. objective. Although Natorp fully embraces this limitation, the question arises as to where the standard of reconstruction comes from. Since Natorp denies any immediate access prior to analysis, he lacks the measure for determining whether the reconstruction reconstructs what it aims to. In Natorp’s solution all givenness of objects

84 As I show in the final chapter of this thesis, Heidegger’s critique of logic – as drawn out more fully in the next chapter – contains many insights which illuminate his reading of Plato during the 1920’s, especially in light of his reading many neo-Kantian doctrines into Plato’s work.
to the subject is subsumed under concepts imposed by the strictures of a transcendental logic: “genuine psychology becomes logic” (TDP 91/107). This radical absolutization of logic – wherein all that is unmediated is seen as mediated – has not been proclaimed since Hegel. Natorp sees in his systematic univeralization of the logical an agreement with main trends of philosophy. However, as Heidegger observes, Husserl’s formal ontology and the logic as \textit{mathesis universalis} in Leibniz merely look like Natorp’s universal logic of objects: the difference lies in their avoidance of systematic representation (TDP 91/108). Heidegger argues that Natorp misses the environmental in aiming for the ultimate goal of a genuine logical positing of objects (in science): “Natorp’s pan-logical fundamental orientation blocks him from any access to the sphere of lived experience, to consciousness. For him this remains essentially a theoretical consciousness of objects, resolved into the lawfulness of constitution” (TDP 91/108). But the theoretical is not primordial by Heidegger’s above argument. Natorp simply assumes that it is, again evidencing his theoretical prejudice. Heidegger affirms a greater affinity with Hegelian pan-logicism which at least originates from a primordial, non-theoretical source: “Hegel’s so-called pan-logicism has its origin in the historical consciousness and is not a consequence of the simple radical theoretization of the theoretical!” (TDP 115/135)

Recourse to the theoretical mars the neo-Kantian approach through and through. Thus Natorp misses the authentic sphere of problems and this is what is wrong with all criticisms of phenomenology: they miss the fundamental bracketing of all positions and argue from their own standpoint – something they must do, given their pervasiveness of the theoretical attitude.

2.3.2 The Alternative: Pre-Linguistic Intuitive Seeing, the Ground of Description

To the objection that all language, by employing concepts, already objectifies, that the fulfilment of meaning consists \textit{solely} in object-giving, that grasping meaning is always a theoretical endeavour and that generalization of meaning amounts to nothing more than theoretical-conceptual subsumption – Heidegger responds: these are all undemonstrated prejudices (TDP 93-94/111). Heidegger responds to the deeper (theoretically based) objection that phenomenological seeing consists of nothing but description (itself theoretical), insisting that the intuitive-seeing out of which description arises is of a totally different kind (TDP 94/111). Even if description is always theoretical, this says nothing yet about the intuition which founded the description. Indeed, it seems that even taking phenomenological intuition as a “seeing to which the thing to be seen stands
opposed” rests upon a prior theory which divides knowledge and object (TDP 94/111-112).

The phenomenological method – which constitutes philosophy as primordial science for Heidegger – consists in a freeing from the theoretical attitude to immerse oneself in the stream of living experience, the primordial intention of true life prior to all theorizing. The rigor of the phenomenological method evolves from out of itself. As opposed to all derivate sciences, it is the intrinsic disposition of the scientific-attitude relying on no extrinsic measure. The question becomes: how can phenomenology – as a non-theorizing, non-view-taking, non-objectifying attitude – disclose living experience. The answer lies in the “understanding intuition, the hermeneutical intuition” (TDP 99/117). Heidegger only provides the briefest of sketches of a positive characterization of this key methodology which comprises his vision of philosophy as primordial science (phenomenology). This sketch amounts to demonstrating how, in fact, the theoretical arises from the pre-worldly something. The primordial sphere of experience, the sphere of inquiry for primordial science, thereby falls out as the non-theoretical foundation of the theoretical and so science in general.85

At every level of theoreticized, de-vivified reality – from ‘it is a brown desk,’ to ‘it is brown,’ to ‘brown is a colour,’ to ‘colour is an ultimate sense-datum,’ to ‘sense data result from physical-physiological processes,’ to ‘the cause is physical,’ to ‘the physical is comprised of basic constituent elements,’ and so on – the judgement ‘it is something’ holds. And yet each of the other judgements – ‘it is brown,’ for instance – applies only to one level of the theoretical hierarchy. Heidegger calls this limited application “the specific level-boundedness of the steps in the process of de-vivification” (TDP 96/113-114), while the mere ‘it is something’ is a free, unbounded, formal theoretization. Thus, three things become evident: 1) what motivates formal theoretization and regular theoretization is qualitatively different from the theoretical; 2) formal theoretization does not belong in the sequence of de-vivification; 3) formal theoretization is not the high-point of the de-vivification process (TDP 96/114). The ‘formal theoretical’ something is not at all part of the de-vivification process. Heidegger thus separates off two streams of ‘theoretical’ somethings. The formal-theoretical is the bare objective ‘something at all’ while the

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85 By relocating the phenomenological motto ‘back to the things themselves’ in the nontheoretical, Heidegger thereby steps beyond Husserl even while he claims to follow in his mentor’s footsteps. Kisiel, Genesis of Heidegger’s Being and Time, 56-57.
something of the de-vivification process is ‘some object.’ Heidegger now moves to separate off the sphere of non-theoretical somethings which will underpin the theoretical.

Although the formal-theoretical is not bound to any level, it is also not bound to the theoretical-hierarchy in the de-vivification process, to the sphere of objects (of the theoretical sciences, or the simply concept-determined) – it is not bound to anything with objecthood. The formal-objective characterization applies to a greater sphere. For example:

- the environmental is something; what is worth taking is something; the valid is something; everything worldly, be it...aesthetic, religious or social in type, is something. *Anything that can be experienced at all is a possible something, irrespective of its genuine world-character.* The meaning of ‘something’ is just ‘the experienceable as such.’ The indifference of the ‘anything whatsoever’ in regard to every genuine world character and every particular species of object is in no way identical with de-vivification, or even with the latter’s highest level, the most sublime theretization. (*TDP* 97/115)

There is no ‘stilling of the stream,’ no theoretization of what is experienced, with the ‘anything whatsoever.’ This formal-logical something leads back to the experienceable qua experienceable; which experienceable something belongs to a world (of aesthetics, religion, or some other). But prior to the experienceable (of a world) there is given what is ‘not-yet’ experienced, the “not yet broken out into genuine life” the “essentially pre-worldly” (*TDP* 97/115): something experienced as experienceable is possible only on a prior giving, on a ‘something,’ that is ‘not-yet’ differentiated, not-yet a something in the stream of life, the ‘something in general’ which permeates (or is) life itself as primal motivating, as movement “out towards...‘into a (particular) world’” (*TDP* 97/115). The pre-worldly is prior to the worldly. It is the pre-theoretical something of experiencing life which itself is prior to anything theoretical. The sphere of factual life, the sphere of experience which independently subsists, unites the interplay between world-significance and pre-worldly-manifest-experience.

The pre-worldly something marks the non-theoretical (therefore, especially non-physiological, non-genetic) starting point of Heidegger’s phenomenological considerations. Throughout the 1920s he articulates various ways of experiencing this phenomenon, most notably “in moments of especially intensive life” (*TDP* 97/115). Essentially one lives in a familiar world, a context, of meaningful significance. Significances present themselves to an individual as familiar in some way; we are in the world in concernful absorption. Things show up as significant for us in a context of
involvement wherein we identify them as familiar and as belonging to us. This context of significance determines in advance what can show up as significant. We experience life as a particular historical I, which does not exist apart from the factual experiential context. This context marks out the familiar situation which calls upon the historical I to take it on for itself; to enform experience as its own. As we will see in the next chapter, the formal-logical object of knowledge first arises from this context of significance only on the basis of this pre-worldly something of life with its tendency out towards and into a world. As notes from Franz-Josef Brecht clarify – brought out in their significance so skilfully by Kisiel as the key to unlocking the otherwise mysterious passages in Heidegger’s lecture course – the formal-logical ‘something’ of objectivity “is grounded in the universality of the pre-theoretical primal-something [Ur-etwas]” (TDP 186/218). Concepts form only upon the historical self’s entering into the process of de-vivification from out of itself. “The first sphere, as that of life, is absolute, the two others are relative, conditioned” (TDP 98/116). Experience can thereby be understood from its own motivation. It is only if something is de-vivified that it is graspable by concepts: the ‘if’ is object-specific as well as a formal-logical theoretization. The ‘if’ thus provides the link between the two theoretical spheres.

Hermeneutical intuition is the experience of experience. Signification need not ‘still the water’ or objectify or be object-specific but can remain primordially living (pre-worldly or worldly). Language itself need not be theoretical – that words are first of all universal does not mean that their meaning indicates initially a theoretical generalization: rather, “universality of word meanings primarily indicates something originary: worldliness [Welthaftigkeit] of experienced experiencing” (TDP 99/117). One experiences non-theoretically in life, out of which the theoretical emerges, coming out of pre-theoretical experiencing. ‘Something’ is brought along in this stepping-out, which something is non-theoreticized and thus, from the theoretical point of view, is at most the ‘irrational’ moment of life; but in fact it is the primal meaningfulness of pre-theoretical experience. The ‘problem’ of how the material is given is only a problem from within the theoretical attitude. Most importantly, this non-theoretical character of meaningfulness is the condition of the possibility for phenomenology as primordial science which investigates life itself prior to theoretization. How Heidegger retains the difference

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86 Ibid., 50-56.
between primal-life experience and philosophical inquiry into the origins of the theoretical and pre-theoretical life remains an open question at this point.

Conclusion
This chapter has been devoted to an exploration of Heidegger’s earliest writings in their neo-Kantian context. In part 1 I displayed Heidegger’s early position within the prevailing paradigm of logic in Germany coming out of the nineteenth century and continuing into the early twentieth century. In particular I placed his work within its Rickert-influenced context. I then argued that the origins of his break with Rickertian neo-Kantians already lie in his earliest position as influenced by his neo-Aristotelian ontological orientation. In this I uncovered some early indications of Heidegger’s impending attentiveness to philosophy as primordial science. Ultimately, we find here the inauguration of his lifelong questioning after the standard of knowledge: whether science is this standard or whether, more likely, another knowledge stands as the ground and limit of science, that through which its effectiveness is determined. Lotze, more than anyone, forms the deeper background of Heidegger’s work.

Heidegger’s stance seems to have changed in 1916 where he introduces his idea that ‘living spirit’ (lebendiger Geist) lies at the root of any possible confrontation with the explication of the nature of the judgement. He maintains that objectivity makes no sense without talk of subjectivity, and judgement no sense without talk of a judging subject. Thus an understanding of validity itself is not possible without recourse to the subject. But this subject is no longer the bare epistemological subject of the neo-Kantians. This is a subject with a history: the living, changing subject; the ‘living spirit.’ The notion of validity thus loses its status as the fundamental concept upon which to understand all others: it itself lies in need of explication and a deeper foundation. Indeed, as he says in 1916: “[i]n the long run philosophy cannot dispense with its unique optics: metaphysics” which is trans-logical (FS 406).

Thus, Heidegger’s previous insistence that logic comprises a domain of its own which lies at the foundations of philosophy has been denied. His first true recourse to historical thinking makes its appearance here. The ‘living spirit’, which must be understood in order to understand the problems of logic, validity, and so on, is itself a ‘historical spirit’ (FS 407). The theoretical no longer takes precedence over the historical; Rickert’s – and the general neo-Kantian – view is for the first time fully overcome, albeit in only a rudimentary form. The very idea of considering the theoretical separate from
and above historical-situatedness is now considered an aberration. Heidegger gives up the hope that pure logical considerations can solve the fundamental problems of philosophy, insisting that Hegel’s attention to the historical development of all things philosophical can no longer be ignored (FS 411). The project of his early years thus seems to come to an end. And yet Heidegger maintains for philosophy the fundamental science, grounding all other modes of thought. The change announced here, and made rigorous in the 1919 lectures, relates to the proper location of this ground: it shifts from its logico-epistemological place, to a more primordial one which founds even the most basic logical structures of thinking and interacting with beings.

By 1919 Heidegger begins departing not only from the neo-Kantians, but also from Husserl whose phenomenology he has taken over as the mantle under which he works. Heidegger’s conception of philosophy as a primordial science arises out of his consideration of the failures of the theoretical-orientation of the neo-Kantians and he sketches out the possibility of uncovering a pre-worldly, pre-theoretical experiential foundation of the theoretical attitude. Above all, Heidegger undermines the concept of logic as the theory of theory which founds all knowledge-inquiry. Even more than that, he argues, formal logic itself is rooted in the hermeneutic experience of the life-world. The question addressed in the next chapter revolves around whether we can differentiate logic from theoretical cognition generally: both of these trace back to hermeneutic experience, and so it is a pressing issue, in order to save at least some distinct place for logic in Heidegger’s philosophy, to discover a unique origin for the formal-logical in factical life.
Chapter 3: Heidegger’s Philosophy of Logic

Introduction

Traditionally logic purports to be the science of correct thinking. It stands independent from all other philosophical disciplines, providing the norms for how we ought to think. As we have seen, emerging from Kant’s transcendental logic which provides a system of a priori principles governing the limits of human experience – strictly distinguished from general logic – logicians in the nineteenth century took up the debate as to whether the laws of logic are metaphysical (Hegelians), epistemological (neo-Kantians), or psychological (Wundt, Mill, Lipps). Meanwhile, the technical advancements of symbolic logic in mathematics developed concurrently, yet at a distance. Husserl, along with the neo-Kantians, goes so far as to take logic as the theory of theory in general. The nature of logic and its relation to philosophy and the other sciences is therefore a major issue in the philosophy of logic, especially in post-Kantian philosophical circles. Moreover, logic as a discipline itself comes to be structured by traditional logic’s concept-judgement-inference triad. Each element plays a different, but fundamental role. Logic itself is comprised of these three spheres; further philosophical questions around the nature of logic then arise concerning the nature of the concept, judgement, or inference together with an investigation of which element is most basic to logical thought. Essentially, logic coming out of the nineteenth century concerns itself with the origins of thought, the relations between the most general concepts, the organization of the sciences, and so on. As we have seen in the previous chapter, these concerns are precisely Heidegger’s in his earliest work. In this chapter I turn to an investigation of some central aspects of Heidegger’s work during his ‘phenomenological decade’. I argue that Heidegger does in fact provide a rather robust philosophy of logic during this period.

Several studies on the role of logic in Heidegger’s Being and Time era have recently emerged. From these monumental works there is a growing awareness of the important role that logic plays in the heart of Heidegger’s thought. As much as anything these studies provide any reader willing to follow their arguments with the resources to dispel

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Heidegger’s Philosophy of Logic

the myth of ‘Heidegger the irrationalist’. Moreover, it is clear that the key to understanding Heidegger’s thoughts on the nature of logic, and its place in philosophy lies in a historically informed reading of his work. I have followed this path in the previous chapters, building up the context within which Heidegger’s thoughts on logic can be best understood. In this chapter I continue in this vein, adding to the growing body of literature by reconstructing the basic issues in Heidegger’s philosophy of logic against the background of his confrontation with both Husserl and his neo-Kantian predecessors.

In particular, I argue that Heidegger does not ‘abandon’ logic after his early years, but rather becomes increasingly aware of the wider philosophical problems pertaining to the explanation of the structure of experience – logical experience included – as a whole. Overall, I argue that Heidegger was never ‘opposed’ to logic. Rather he was driven by a purely philosophical question about the nature of logic: ultimately he strives to uncover the foundations of logic in ontology. For instance, in §33 of Being and Time Heidegger uncovers a prereflective, hermeneutical relation to entities which lies prior to the apophantic, judgemental thinking about them. Strictly logical thought rests on a prior prereflective interpretation of beings, itself relying on our prior situatedness as open to entities as useful, fitting, and so on. The conclusion: assertion (judgement) is of a derivative nature. Therefore logic is not quite as independent as it is traditionally taken to be: it relies on Dasein’s prior situatedness and openness to beings as being in some way or another. Here we encounter a clear instance of some of Heidegger’s most pressing investigations into the nature of logic, clearly contributing to a well worked out position in the philosophy of logic.

The goal of this chapter is to reconstruct several of the main aspects of Heidegger’s philosophy of logic. Heidegger’s more mature works (covertly) continue in the trend of his earliest works on the nature of the judgement and of category-formation, questions

2 Earlier treatments of Heidegger’s logic which do not focus on the historical context in which they were written tend to place an over-emphasis on Heidegger’s remarks on symbolic (mathematical) logic. Although many of these studies are illuminating in some respects, they remain limited and some end up embracing the idea of Heidegger as an anti-logical philosopher, explaining his irrationalism with appeals to his need to dive beneath the surface of thought. Examples of some of the earliest treatments of Heidegger’s thoughts on logic include Albert Borgmann, “Heidegger and Symbolic Logic,” in Heidegger and the Quest for Truth, ed. Manfred Frings (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1968), 139-162; Werner Bröcker, “Heidegger und die Logik,” in Heidegger: Perspektiven zur Deutung seines Werkes, ed. Otto Pöggeler (Köln: Kiepenhauer und Witsch, 1969), 298-304; Thomas Fay, “Heidegger on Logic: A Genetic Study of his Thought,” Journal of the History of Philosophy 12 (1974): 77-94; Thomas Fay, Heidegger: The Critique of Logic (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1977); David White, Logic and Ontology in Heidegger (Columbus, OH: Ohio State University Press, 1985).

3 Even his later work remains open to a positive investigation of the nature of logic: he is not dismissive of logic in his later works, but rather works to uncover its metaphysical character.
regarding the idea of logic as the ‘theory of theory’, the relation between logic and ontology, and the debate surrounding psychologism. As my interpretation makes clear, Heidegger’s reflections on the nature and place of logic during the Being and Time-era are not merely tangential, to be patched together in a piecemeal fashion. Rather, they form an integrated whole with the issues most pressing in Being and Time. In particular, I demonstrate that Heidegger’s analysis of the place of logic in philosophy plays a pivotal role in his attempts to work out the being question. The specific point that I wish to uncover in my reconstruction of Heidegger’s philosophy of logic is that Heidegger’s division of entities other than Dasein into the ready-to-hand and present-at-hand goes hand in hand with both his ‘critique’ of traditional logic together with his positive account of the foundations of logic in the everydayness of Dasein. This opens the way to trace Heidegger’s various distancings from both his Husserlian and neo-Kantian influences.

I do not spend too much time re-tracing well known territory in Heidegger’s corpus: for instance, his specific demonstration that Dasein’s openness is not only the precondition for judgemental-truth, but also for falsehood (based upon his analysis of the hermeneutic-as) (LQT §13); or his demonstration that the copula ‘is’ does not first arise as a formal feature of judgements, but rather reflects a “structural moment of the state of affairs itself. The state of affairs as a relation of the subject matter [Sachverhalt als Verhalt] has the formal structure S = P” (HCT 54/72); or his argument that the subject-predicate combination arises in a judgement only because the being of the being under investigation is organized by togetherness since it is given as an ‘organized manifoldness’ (BPP 212/301-303). Of course it is necessary to cover some of this terrain. However, I focus in this chapter on broader concepts in Heidegger’s thought, arguing that these determine the nature of his insights into logic: in particular the priority of situatedness and openness together with his reconception of the notion of ‘sight’ and the above-mentioned characterization of the present-at-hand as the object available to intellectual apprehension.

Crowell even argues that the ‘ontological difference’ found in Heidegger’s Being and Time has its origins in Heidegger’s early logic writings, in particular in his early recourse to the realm of valid meaning. Steven Galt Crowell, “Meaning and the Ontological Difference,” Tulane Studies in Philosophy 32 (1984): 37-44.

Herman Philipse already argued that “we need an interpretation of the question of being in order to grasp the precise meaning of Heidegger’s liquidation of logic.” Heidegger’s Philosophy of Being: A Critical Interpretation (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1998), 15. However, the focus on Heidegger’s ‘liquidation of logic’ as found in his 1929 inaugural lecture ‘What is Metaphysics?’ is too limited. I expand such an approach in this chapter by demonstrating that Heidegger’s existential analytic can be read as a robust work in the philosophy of logic. Philipse’s narrow focus leads him to explain Heidegger’s views on logic as an account of the limitations of thought and language. This overlooks the more interesting philosophical points about the foundations of logic in ontology.
In the next chapter I demonstrate just how much the role of these notions in Heidegger’s philosophy of logic contributes to his critique of Plato.

The chapter is broken down in a series of sections. In the first I argue that Heidegger’s work continues to respond to the problem of psychologism in the Being and Time era. In the second I turn to an examination of Heidegger’s general project in his magnum opus, demonstrating that his ontological questions are intimately tied to the question of the place of logic, ending with a discussion of the derivative nature of apophatic judgements. In the third I address Heidegger’s criticisms of neo-Kantianism and Husserlian phenomenology in light of their conceptions of being and their shared theoretical prejudice. I end with a consideration of Heidegger’s general strategy and approach to questions surrounding the nature of logic.

1 The Problem of Psychologism

One of the key aspects of Heidegger’s criticism of traditional accounts of logic arises within the context of the debate over psychologism. The dominant anti-psychologistic stance, dating back to Lotze, rests on a phenomenon of ‘validity,’ a phenomenon which Heidegger shows to possess a “very questionable character” (BT 198/155). Essentially, ‘validity,’ and the ‘realm of the valid,’ are not phenomenologically secured notions: they are not rigorously attained. As I demonstrate presently, Heidegger’s concern with the question of being relates directly to his criticism of the classic anti-psychologistic position which leaves the being of the valid unquestioned. To this end I begin this section by relating Heidegger’s question of the meaning of being to the debate over psychologism, ultimately demonstrating that many of Heidegger’s most basic investigations relate directly to his concern with this debate; Heidegger’s work is in many ways thus a work in the philosophy of logic at its very core – not only in uncovering the existential-ontological foundations of basic logical notions, but as a response to a contemporary debate in the philosophy of logic itself.6

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6 Although it is often assumed that Husserl settled the psychologism debate within the Prolegomena to the Logical Investigations, it was still a live question in many circles throughout the 1920s, arguably put to an end by the work of the logical positivists – most notably Carnap – in the Vienna Circle. The question of psychologism is arising again as a live option in the philosophy of logic and not just as a historical curiosity in some recent debates. See, for instance, Dale Jacquette, “Psychologism Revisited in Logic, Metaphysics, and Epistemology,” Metaphilosophy 32 (2001): 261-278; Dale Jacquette, ed., Philosophy, Psychology, and Psychologism: Critical and Historical Readings on the Psychological Turn in Philosophy (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 2003); Werner Stelzner, “Psychologism, Universality and the Use of Logic,” in Nature’s Principles, ed. J. Faye et al. (Berlin: Springer, 2005), 269-288.
Recall that psychologism, arguably coming out of a particular nineteenth century interpretation of Kant, consists of a certain way of treating whatever type of logic comes under one’s scrutiny. As Thomas Seebohm states, psychologism is a ‘research program’ whose aim “was to solve all questions of epistemology, those referring to logic and mathematics included, with the aid of psychological research.”7 As a question about logic, psychologism and anti-psychologism alike remain positions within the philosophy of logic, external to logic itself; as such, they are positions which remain independent from, although perhaps influenced by, what one takes logic to be.8 Psychologism thus raises more ‘timeless’ questions than is sometimes considered, and these are live questions regardless of advances made in our various logical systems.9

The psychologistic position arises at the same time as psychology comes to be taken as a legitimate science in the nineteenth century. Traditionally logic is seen as providing the laws of thought which guide our reasoning and determine whether it is correct or not. As psychology came to be the legitimate area which studies our concrete thought processes, certain key thinkers made the short leap to insist that the laws of thought must be based on the way we actually think; since psychology is the science of how we actually think, it thereby took a foundational role with respect to logic. The most extreme proponents of psychologism deny logic any independent domain of research, relegating all logical study to a branch of empirical psychology. All theoretical laws of logic, all laws dealing with the timeless universal-ideal Truths of logic, are thus reduced to natural laws, dealing with temporal, particular, empirically real truths.

1.1 Husserl’s Lotzean Critique of Psychologism

The classic refutation of psychologism claims that this reduction of the laws of logic to natural laws rests on a confusion between modes of being, between the real and the ideal. Husserl’s solution in particular, coming from Lotze, notes that the validity of judgements and logical laws has a different mode of actuality from the being of real things.

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8 For more on the status of the problem of psychologism as a problem external to logic-proper, see Vladimir N. Bryushinkin, “Psychologism, Logic, and Phenomenology,” in *Phenomenology on Kant, German Idealism, Hermeneutics and Logic*, ed. O.K. Wiegand et al. (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 2000), 39-52.
9 I hereby circumvent any argument that would maintain that since 1) Heidegger’s thoughts on the philosophy of logic emanate from his considerations of the debate over psychologism and 2) the debate over psychologism is of interest and applicable only to an out-dated idea of logic, therefore 3) Heidegger’s philosophy of logic is outdated. The second premise remains unsubstantiated, and most likely false. Of course, one could still maintain the conclusion, but a separate argument would be in order here.
happening of events, and the obtaining of relations. A judgement’s being-true is to be understood as the validity of the judgement. Whereas psychologism takes laws about judgements to be laws about concrete acts of judging, to be inductively arrived at through a generalization of experience, Husserl notes that the laws are not about psychical acts of judging but about the content of the judgement. In the law of non-contradiction, for instance, two opposing acts of judging might be simultaneously entertained, but they cannot both be valid: the meaning of the law rests in its application to the valid-objects, not the real-processes, of thought; it treats not the impossibility of the co-existing of two opposed acts of judging but the impossibility of the consistency of two mutually contradictory judgements (LUI §25). The classical refutation of psychologism, of which Husserl’s is a prime example, insists that one simply has to maintain this distinction between realms of actuality (modes of being), the distinction between real facts and ideal validities, to show that psychologism is flawed.

As noted, this refutation has its source in Lotze’s categorization of the four irreducible modes of actuality – being (of things), happening (of events), obtaining (of relations), and validity (of propositions). The idea that truth is a property of propositions or judgements and that this “represents a kind of first principle or closure of epistemological or ontological analysis” has been dubbed the ‘logical prejudice’ by Daniel O. Dahlstrom. Truth is a property of propositions which are true in virtue of their validity. As such, “the true is what remains permanent throughout the change of presentations” (LQT 55/65-66). This permanence is the “formal pre-concept of truth” which Heidegger, following Lotze, relates back to the Platonic ideas which exist permanently (the aei on) (LQT 56/66). True propositions are valid, but validity pertains to Platonic ideas which are supratemporal universals as opposed to sensible particulars; and so, valid propositions are ideas and ideal insofar as they are the universal aspect of the particular parts of the proposition (LQT 61/73). But in this way, truth attains the kind of being attributed to validity, so that, as Heidegger says, “being-true as the actuality of true propositions, and being-true as the essence of truth” come to be equated (LQT 62/74).

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10 Of course, Husserl’s contributions to the debate over psychologism and his reconceptualization of truth as evidence is more complicated than this initial sketch indicates; what I briefly discuss here is Husserl’s direct argument against psychologism, as put forth in the Prolegomena to the Logical Investigations. The confusion between real acts of judging and their ideal content (that is, the judgement) trades on an equivocation, as we have seen (LUI 112-113/Hua 18, 178-179).
Lotze equates validity with stable presence, with what holds timelessly with supratemporal validity. But the being of the true proposition is in turn taken as the being of truth generally. Validity thus takes on the same mode of being which the Greeks, on Heidegger’s reading, upheld as the most authentic mode of being: thereness or presence-at-hand “or presence of *physis* in the broadest sense” (LQT 64/77). But this most authentic mode of being for the Greeks belongs to the surrounding world, to the look (*eidos*) of an entity in the world, while Lotze transforms this sense in taking stable presence to be the ontological character of validity which itself determines the authentic mode of being of true propositions. In this way the kind of being – presence – which the Greeks had attributed to the only object of their inquiries into the meaning of being, namely, to worldly beings, comes to characterize truths. Lotze’s mischaracterization of the proper mode of being of the true as identical with being as validity contains the roots of this inappropriate transposition (LQT 65/78). In so far as Husserl is said to follow in Lotze’s footsteps, he too suffers from the logical prejudice: he takes truth in the sense of the valid proposition which refers to the lawful connection between present-at-hand things, universally binding for all subjectivity.

### 1.2 Husserl’s Novel Conception of Truth

Of course, Heidegger also recognizes that Husserl presents a novel conception of truth that does not reside in the proposition, but rather in the intentional character of knowing, that is, in a specific comportment of Dasein. In this alternate sense, truth is understood as a relation of identity where “something is meant just as it is intuited” (LQT 90/109). The meant and the intuited are thereby connected by a recognized identity relation of ‘true-ness’. With this, truth no longer pertains to propositions. As Heidegger says: “Rather, it means what truth itself is: a recognized identity…this is the determination of truth that we have been looking for, namely, the interpretation that Husserl provides through his investigations into knowing as intentional comportment, or more precisely, knowing as intuition” (LQT 90/109). Husserl thus manages to separate truth from the proposition, locating its fulfilment in the intentional character of knowing. As we have seen in the opening chapter of this thesis, ‘knowing’ has a complex structure in which an empty-intention (what is meant) is *identified* with what is given, the intuition.\(^{13}\) The most

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\(^{13}\) A concept of truth that Heidegger relates back to the Ancient Greeks: “This refers to intuition in the very broad sense that coincides with the Greek *noein* and which is also often indicated as *aisthesis*. When we take this second determination of truth also back to a Greek word, we see that now this second and
primary sense of truth for Husserl is the agreement between the intended and the given; propositional truth is derivative since a proposition’s truth rests upon the identity between what the proposition means and what is at the same time intuited.\(^{14}\)

However, Heidegger sees in Husserl’s conception of truth the same reliance upon ideal being that it was meant to avoid.\(^{15}\) Husserl does not explain the relation between the meant/intended and the given/intuited, except to say that the relation \textit{holds} (truth as identity \textit{subsists} or \textit{obtains}), and so Heidegger delves into Husserl’s account questioning the character of this ‘holding’ or ‘subsisting’ in which truth as an identity-relation partakes. Husserl essentially calls this relation between the intended and intuited a relation between ‘contents’ – Heidegger charges that Husserl thereby falls back into treating truth as identity akin to a state of affairs which “has the same kind of being as a proposition or a propositional state of affairs: ideal being” \((LQT 93/113)\). The intended and intuited contents alike are taken to be present-at-hand entities whose properties are on display, determined by a prior interpretation which is left uninvestigated. Even with his reconception of truth, Husserl ultimately takes truth again to be a relation between a thing and its properties which relation holds universally, ideally, and thus has the same type of ideal being as the proposition. Husserl thereby unknowingly reinstates the Lotzean separation between ideal and real being, without questioning the meaning of being in the first place.\(^{16}\)

1.3 The Problem of Methexis

Although Heidegger adhered to this basic Lotzean position in his earliest years, already in 1923 he sets out a lengthy criticism, questioning the purported obviousness of this separation, tracing the severing of the valid from the factual back to “Platonizing philosophy.”\(^{17}\) Admittedly Heidegger is here attacking Husserl’s critique of historicism.

\(^{14}\) “The proposition is true because it is one relational member of the relation of truth” \((LQT 91/111)\).

\(^{15}\) This is ironic since Husserl’s treatment begins from the very opposite situation as Lotze’s. For Lotze: “The proposition is valid, is true, and because the proposition is valid, therefore it is objectively valid of the thing. But in our treatment [coming from Husserl], because the proposition is provable in and by the thing… it subsists and holds” \((LQT 92/111)\).

\(^{16}\) Thus, \textit{pace} Heeffer, Husserl’s avowed adherence to the ideal realm of validity in the \textit{Prolegomena} thereby \textit{does not} conflict with his concept of truth as evidence, as the identity between empty and filled intentions that he works out in the subsequent \textit{Investigations}, on Heidegger’s reading. Paul Heeffer, “Heidegger’s Discussion with Husserl on the Being of Truth in §44 of \textit{Sein und Zeit},” in \textit{Heidegger und Husserl im Vergleich}, ed. Friederike Rese, (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 2010), 187-205.

But the general concern holds equally with respect to Husserl’s critique of psychologism; both critiques rest on the separation of the real from the ideal and correspondingly the separation of the sciences which deal with each distinct realm,\(^{18}\) without investigating not only how the ideal supratemporal validities interact with the temporal acts, but also what it means to be in either of these two modes at all. In particular, the supratemporal meaning of propositions along with their opposed temporal instantiations (in the form of propositional assertions), are taken to reside in two ontological realms separated by a chasm and distinguished precisely by time: and yet “hitherto no one has asked or troubled to investigate how time has come to have this distinctive ontological function, or with what right anything like time functions as such a criterion” (BT 39/18). The nature of the entities in these realms and the ontological status of the connection itself remain questionable yet unquestioned (BT 259/216-217).

Apart from a general negligence as to the ontological status of the entities which they assume, Heidegger provides a more pointed criticism against Husserl’s explanation for how the ideal and the real interact. Husserl’s famously platonic account of this interaction takes the unified valid meaning or ideal logical sense as that which subsumes the multiplicity inherent in real individual acts, as the real act’s whatness: “Multiplication of persons and acts does not multiply propositional meanings; the judgement in the ideal, logical sense remains single” (LUI 229/Hua 19, 105). Of this valid meaning, Husserl insists that it is a ‘strict identity’ and that this insight is “an immediately graspable truth;” and moreover, that this genuine identity is none other than the identity of the species. As a species, and only as a species, can it embrace in unity (zungballein eis hen), and as an ideal unity, the dispersed multiplicity of individual singulars. The manifold of singulars for the ideal unity Meaning are naturally the corresponding-act moments of meaning, the meaning-intentions. Meaning is related to varied acts of meaning – Logical Presentation to presentative acts, Logical Judgement to acts of judging, Logical Syllogism to acts of syllogism – just as Redness in specie is to the slips of paper which live here, and which all ‘have’ the same redness…Meanings constitute, we may say further, a class of concepts in the sense of ‘universal objects’. (LUI 230/Hua 19, 105-106)

\(^{18}\) Like the science of psychical acts, history as an empirical science of facts for Husserl “can speak neither for nor against the validity of ideas.” Ibid., 65 [GA 17, 89].
Heidegger’s Philosophy of Logic

The multiplicity of concrete-individual acts are subsumed under their common meaning which takes the role of species, their universal Ideal; and the work of explaining how the two realms of being interact all rests on the notion of intentionality.

Heidegger objects in his 1925-26 lecture course on logic, given while in the middle of writing *Being and Time*, that Husserl misunderstands the nature of species and the relation between universals and particulars altogether. As Heidegger says:

the universal, as the content and meaning of the judgement, applies only to this and that meaning, but never to the acts [of judgement]. At best, the universal – the idea corresponding to real acts [of judgement] – is the universal essence of ‘act in general,’ but never the content [or meaning] of the act [of judgement]. To say that the content of the judgement is the genos, the universal, the Platonic idea for the acts of (actual or possible) judgement, is as absurd as saying that the genus or concept ‘table in general’ is the genus for a bunch of teacups. Husserl asserted that the content of the judgement was the genus of the acts of judgement by using the content of the judgement, the idea, in equivocal sense, both as non-sensible being and as ‘idea’ in the Platonic sense – and then mixing them together. (*LQT* 51-52/62)

Heidegger here simply, although poignantly, notes that Husserl, and in fact the entire ‘logic of the day,’ makes equivocal use of ‘idea’ as both non-sensible being and Platonic universal. They thereby misconstrue the whatness of real acts of judgements by considering the expressed meaning as the species. However, the what-character, the beingness-of-an-act, or what variable acts have in common is not their content but rather the fact that they are acts: at best the universal ‘act in general.’

Husserl’s conception of intentionality as “the universal structure of reason” (*HCT* 46/62) was meant to clarify how the two realms of being are bridged; but according to Heidegger, intentionality remains unexplained in Husserl’s works, and, moreover, “what the belonging of the *intentum* to the *intentio* implies is obscure” (*HCT* 47/63). Phenomenology has yet to account for the belonging together of temporal human being and supratemporal validity, in Heidegger’s eyes. Indeed, his incisive criticism of Husserl maintains that “in elaborating intentionality as the thematic field of phenomenology, the question of the being of the intentional is left undiscussed” (*HCT* 113/157).

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19 Heidegger continues in the lecture course to demonstrate that the confusion surrounding the nature of validity, taken as the conflation of ‘non-sensible being’ and ‘universal essence’ already lies at the basis of Lotze’s logic, but also that the interpretation of ideal being as validity was not only made popular by Husserl, but “was also subsumed into Windelband’s and Rickert’s value theory, so that in general we can say that logic today is this so-called logic of validity” (*LQT* 52/62).
In particular, Heidegger argues that the two realms – that of the real and the ideal –, which intentionality is meant to bridge, arise artificially: “First you invent these two regions, then you put a gap between them, and then you go looking for the bridge” (LQT 77/92). He goes on to claim that anti-psychologism, which takes itself as eminently ‘philosophical’ in comparison with psychologism, and which sees itself as triumphing over naturalism, itself contains and even more naïve form of naturalism which posits two entirely separate “orders or fields or spheres or regions coming together in unity” despite the fact that no unitary, originary kind of being to unite these realms comes to be investigated.  

His own solution, coming out of this criticism of Husserl (and extreme anti-psychologistic thinkers, and all proponents of a ‘logic of validity’), is thus to uncover this original kind of being that unites the act of judging and what is judged, or, generally, thinking and what is thought or experience and what is experienced. The traditional relation between universal and particular, tracing back to Plato, itself must be explained by this more primordial relation. As shown below, Heidegger’s rejection of the standard anti-psychologistic position has drastic implications for his conception of the place of logic as he insists that the proper account must not leave “the reality of [the] real aspect of acts…undetermined” (HCT 116/160). Logic for Heidegger cannot remain relegated solely to the ideal realm of valid meaning; that “third realm of meaning, an invention that is no less doubtful than medieval speculation about angels” (BPP 215/306).

1.4 Heidegger’s Approach to Questions of Logic

Therefore, although he looks for a radically new foundation for logical thought, Heidegger’s reconception of the place of logic always takes its cue from the traditional; it is not that he jettisons all developments, insights, and approaches of the past. Rather, his ‘destruction’ of logic, as with his destruction of the history of metaphysics generally, is appropriative. The problem remains for Heidegger one of articulating how we relate to beings meaningfully. This requires above all a reconsideration of how we relate to beings

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20 As he goes on to say: “Even contemporary physics does not present the structure of the atom in such a primitively atomistic and mechanistic way” (LQT 77/93).

21 For example, see Heidegger’s appropriative approach to the “philosophical investigation from the beginning of antiquity” with its orientation “toward reason, soul mind, spirit, consciousness, self-consciousness, subjectivity…[as guided by] the admittedly still hidden basic content of the problems of ontology as such” (BPP 312/444). Or see his claim that “in our own interpretation of being we are attempting nothing other than the repetition of the problems of ancient philosophy in order to radicalize them in this repetition by their own selves” (BPP 316/449). My reading thus stands in stark contrast to Richard Wolin’s where Heidegger’s reading of the history of ontology is interpreted entirely negatively. See Richard Wolin, The Politics of Being (New York: Columbia University Press, 1990).
in the first place, together with a novel conception of meaning; as we will see, meaning arises in our significant dealing with things in a particular context; it is the primary way in which we are in the world; the world itself, on Heidegger’s account, is the source of meaning. In this he thus unearths the underlying unity between our cognitive acts and their objects without recourse to the realm of validity. Instead:

our treatment prescinds entirely from validity and non-validity, and aims at determining what knowing is at all.

Knowing, as a phenomenological relation, is intentional. This is part of the definition of its essence. The question is: what does knowing direct itself to, and what property does this self-directing have qua cognitive? (*LQT* 82/99-100)

Since validity does not guarantee the connection between the cognitive and what it directs itself toward, and since ‘intentionality’ names this connection but without explaining it, Husserl fails to rigorously explain the workings of logic. Heidegger must provide an account of this link, an account of the being of human beings (Dasein) and that toward which they are directed together with the more primordial link. Ultimately Heidegger asks how all of these things are – what is the being of intentionality, human beings, non-human beings – in the pursuit of a solution to this basic question of the nature of logic to which psychologism and classical anti-psychologism propose their answer. These central concerns of Heidegger’s thought are thus intimately related to questions from the philosophy of logic, an idea which remains quite foreign to many accounts of Heidegger’s work.

2 Priority of the Ontological

Any summary of *Being and Time* – or any great work for that matter – will ultimately fail in some respect. However, it might be fair to simply say that *Being and Time* aims to uncover an understanding of the meaning of being and that time is uncovered as the horizon for this understanding. The way into an understanding of being proceeds through that being for whom being is an issue (namely human beings, Dasein) whose way of being is formally indicated by ‘existence’. Existence marks the entrance into and condition for the possibility of understanding being. Heidegger thus devotes the first half of *Being and Time* to uncovering, bringing into focus, the predominant way in which
Dasein exists. The second half of *Being and Time* then searches within this predominant way of being for the impetus to bring this initial way into focus as a whole, transcending the context but precisely by uncovering the transcendence already implicit therein. Dasein as existent is seen as finitely transcendent; ultimately this transcendence, or ek-sistence, is rooted in Dasein’s temporality and time itself emerges as the horizon for understanding the meaning of being.

I contend that in its disclosure of those fundamental structures of Dasein, *Being and Time* constitutes a main component of Heidegger’s philosophy of logic. With the disclosure of those primordial structures of Dasein, Heidegger uncovers those features from which logic is derivative. Put succinctly, from the ‘Preparatory Fundamental Analysis of Dasein’, Dasein is disclosed as understanding. This inexplicit understanding becomes explicit to oneself in interpretation. Interpretation becomes explicit to others in discourse. One mode of discourse, derivative of interpretation, is the judgement. But logic deals with judgements (or propositions). Hence logic is a derivative discipline; and Heidegger provides a foundation for it in his fundamental ontology. In fact symbolic logic [logistics] is of an even greater derivative nature: ‘The judgement gets dissolved logistically into a system in which things are ‘co-ordinated’ with one another; it becomes the object of a ‘calculus’; but it does not become a theme for ontological Interpretation” (*BT* 202/159). Without a secure ontological basis for the basic concepts of logic, it remains an unstable discipline: Heidegger does not do away with logic, as many have held over the years, but rather looks for its foundations. His work thus continues the foundationalist path from his earliest writings, aiming to establish philosophy (as phenomenology) as the most rigorous science.

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2.1 Proper Approach to Fundamental Ontology

To understand Heidegger’s philosophy of logic, we thus need to understand his ontological investigations, his questioning after the meaning of being. As we know, the cornerstone of Heidegger’s investigation into the meaning of being, the attempt to gain an understanding of being, rests on the clear demarcation of being from beings – the ‘ontological difference’ first named in his 1927 lecture course *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology* (*BPP* 17/22). The ontological difference is accessible to us only because “the distinction between being and beings is there [ist da], latent in the Dasein and its existence, even if not in explicit awareness…. [It is] pre-ontologically there, without an explicit concept of being” (*BPP* 319/454). Being is neither some being among other beings, nor is it something that lies hidden beneath the surface, waiting to be discovered, lying behind the entities with which we are engaged. Moreover, there are no distinctive properties which could separate out and determine being as distinct from other beings. Being simply is not a being. This observation makes possible Heidegger’s ontological investigations in the first place.

Heidegger’s ontology avoids naïve metaphysical speculation about hidden entities underlying and explaining those which lie apparent and accessible to the senses. He clearly states that being is always the being of a particular being; and yet despite the apparent truth of this division, it seems to leave being itself opaque as ever. We can enumerate countless examples of some being belonging to any desired domain, but not of being itself (*BPP* 13-14/17-19); ‘it’ is not something that can be pictured or imagined or categorized since it is not a thing at all. And yet there is a fundamental tendency to reify being precisely when we try to understand it; we turn it into what it is not whenever we try to explicate being. Despite this difficulty in our cognizing approach, Heidegger insists that we always already live within an understanding of being. Yet every attempt to comprehensively make it explicit in an articulated manner meets an impasse. And since ontology is the science of being – the making explicit of being – our implicit, pervasive understanding of being remains pre-ontological and unquestioned as we are for the most part lost in our dealings with entities. The genuine task of ontology is thus to somehow

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make explicit our implicit understanding of being, while prodding us into seeing that the question of being is a legitimate and rarely asked question.

One main task of ontology is to provide the differentiation of the different modes of being that are mostly overlooked in our everyday understanding of being. And yet, with this questioning after the manifoldness of being, Heidegger insists that the very plural nature of phenomena makes the search for a unified concept of being all the more urgent (BPP 120/170): attunement to the manifold ways of being awakens the more pressing question of what makes them all ways of being at all, the question of the meaning of being. These are the very questions that Heidegger notes in his letter to Richardson were motivated by his reading Brentano’s dissertation on the manifold senses of being in Aristotle and defined his initial impetus toward philosophy. As such, Heidegger begins his discussion of these questions with an eye to the various ways they have been broached throughout the history of philosophy.

2.2 Thatness, Whatness, and Whoness

Heidegger highlights the two basic ways in which being has been delineated throughout the history of ontology, dating back to the ancients but receiving its clearest articulation with the medievals. Namely, he looks to the division between two aspects of being that belong to any being, its existentia and essentia, the thatness and the whatness of a being, a distinction that underlies even Kant’s thinking “as traditional notions to be taken for granted” (BPP 77/108). Simply put, it is taken as self-evident that every being can be said to exist, that it is in a certain way, that it is extant or present-at-hand (vorhanden). Along with this, each entity can be taken as something, it has characteristics that determine what it is, it has a whatness. Of any being, it makes sense to ask both whether the thing is and


26 Of course the reason for his inquiring into the historical approaches to the question of the meaning of being is not mainly biographical but rather rests on his method of destructive retrieval or critical appropriation of the past. On Heidegger’s use of this method in *Being and Time* see Joseph J. Kockelmans, “Destructive Retrieve and Hermeneutic Phenomenology in Being and Time,” *Research in Phenomenology* 7 (1977): 106-137.

27 One of the key contributions of Heidegger’s ontological investigations is his uncovering those modes of existing that differ from the merely extant, objective being which is present-at-hand; this is simply the way of being that “existence” has been tacitly understood throughout the history of Western metaphysics on Heidegger’s reading.
what it is; this dyadic structure becomes “the problem of the basic articulation of being.”

However, as Heidegger demonstrates in Being and Time and various lecture courses throughout the 1920s, this basic articulation of being hits a roadblock when it attempts to understand Dasein in its whatness since the ‘what-character’ of Dasein is exactly “its to-be.’ It is not any specific ‘what’ which in addition would have its mode of being; rather, what the Dasein is is precisely its being” (HCT 236/325). As such, in the face of Dasein, the universal applicability of the ontological thesis taking the essentia and existentia as the irreducible two-fold structure of all beings, fails (BPP 120-121/169-171). Rather than interrogating Dasein as to ‘what it is,’ Heidegger introduces the ‘who-question’: Dasein is not essentially a thing with a whatness that is present-at-hand but rather has its own mode of being characterized by a whoness. Heidegger’s first contribution to the question of being is simply to show that what has been taken to hold universally, namely the categorization of any being by its essentia and existentia, fails in light of that way of being which is closest to us, namely, our own. The distinction between the existence and the essence of some phenomena makes it possible to exclude an examination of the former to focus exclusively on the determination of the latter: the essence of a thing comes to take centre-stage in all philosophical investigations on Heidegger’s account; this contributes to the Seinsvergessenheit apparent throughout the history of Western philosophy.

Thus, Dasein – or human being – marks that being for Heidegger which cannot be understood according to the traditional whatness-thatness duality inherent in philosophical thought since the Ancient Greeks. Whereas the ‘species’ determines the essence of a thing, its whatness, its Idea or categorization, the crucial question about our own being is not what we are as beings, but rather that we are. Simply put: “The ‘essence’ of Dasein lies in its existence” (BT 67/42). While all entities other than Dasein can be divided into various classes insofar as they all share a sameness in their way of being, Dasein stands out from all other beings, since a characterization of Dasein by classes or

29 A recurring strategy in Heidegger’s confrontation with the tradition of philosophy thus amounts to showing in what way the question of being, the most primary philosophical question, has been overlooked. Typically, the reason for this oversight is drawn back to the focus on determining the essence of a thing, with no account of its way of existing; beyond this, Heidegger consistently (although controversially) uncovers one way of existing that is tacitly assumed, working in the background of all past philosophical investigations: namely, objective existence or sheer presence-at-hand.
participation in a species falls short: ultimately, as Heidegger contends rather uncontentiously, for each of us our own existence matters to us, “in each case it [Dasein] has its Being to be, and has it as its own” (*BT* 32-33/12). We are always concerned with our own being, we choose our own way to be, the various possibilities available to us (whether we grasp these possibilities or just go along with them) (*BT* 68/42-43).

As such, *Who we are* matters more in determining each of us, than *What we are*; Dasein always understands itself with respect to the possibilities available to it, in terms of how it can exist. As Heidegger says: “This term ‘existence’ [*Existenz*] formally indicates that Dasein *is* as an understanding potentiality-for-Being, which, in its Being makes an issue of that Being itself” (*BT* 274/231). Thus, Heidegger introduces the ‘existentialia’ to characterize Dasein as distinct from the ‘categories’ used to characterize entities whose mode of being is other than Dasein’s (*BT* 70/44). Existence (*Existenz*) and presence-at-hand (what has traditionally taken to cover all *existentia*) are thus two different ways of being, characterized by *existentialia* and categories respectively. Therefore, any attempt to reduce all meaningful statements to statements of the form dealt with in traditional and modern symbolic logic – the logics of categories which essentially take all statements as determinations of entities to classes – thereby comes under attack. The traditional bifurcation of all entities into their *essentia* and *existentia*, is thus undermined if Heidegger is correct in his understanding of Dasein’s existence (*Existenz*) or whoness as not being accounted for by its whatness, if Heidegger is correct that Dasein is not merely an instance of a specific genus as a ‘matter of indifference’ but that Dasein’s existence is personal – that “Dasein has *in each case mineness*” (*BT* 68/42).

And only because Dasein’s existence belongs to it, only because Dasein is defined as that being whose being is an issue for it, can Dasein recognize that beings *are*. Dasein interacts with beings always prior to any reflection on this interaction, in such a way that the being of the beings themselves makes a difference to Dasein. The question of the meaning of being itself can arise at all only on a prior understanding of being; yet this prior understanding of being is precisely what belongs to Dasein in its everyday interactions. The possibility of an understanding of the meaning of being provides the impetus for the questioning after Dasein: only because Dasein names that entity for whom the question of being can arise in the first place, only because Dasein’s way of being belongs to it, is Dasein that entity to be investigated.
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Heidegger’s concerns about the proper way of approaching the articulation of Dasein’s being, following the guiding question of ‘who’ Dasein is, rather than ‘what’ it is, provides an insight into Heidegger’s general methodology in *Being and Time*. In order to access the nature of a given entity, we first need to determine the mode of being proper to it. Since Dasein’s proper mode of being is grounded in its existence, the being of this entity will only come to the fore if it is questioned existentially; hence the *existential* analytic of Dasein.\(^{30}\)

This method of investigation appears strange at first sight: Dasein’s essence *is its existence*. As such Heidegger does in fact follow the traditional inquiry into the essence, rather than the existence, of this unique kind of entity whose essence is precisely its existence. The seeming circularity of Heidegger’s approach unearths the limitation of the traditional division of essence from existence.\(^{31}\) Any uneasiness expressed with regard to this method itself springs from the traditional assumption that all entities possess the kind of being which belongs to something present-at-hand (*BT* 153/117). Historical approaches to ‘who’ Dasein is – from Descartes’ substantive soul, the *res* behind the *cogitans*, to Kant’s apperceptive unity in the ‘I think’ accompanying all experiences, to Husserl’s ‘ego-pole’ from which consciousness emanates as in a ray – all presuppose, on Heidegger’s account, this perverse assumption that being is presence-at-hand. And yet this assumption rests on an oversight as crucial to the *Seinsvergessenheit*, if not more, than the ignorance of the difference between beings and being.

As Heidegger says regarding this ‘other ontological difference’ – between nature and history as opposed to beings and being – “*Existence* and *extantness* are more disparate than, say, the determinations of God’s being and man’s being in traditional ontology. For these two latter beings are still always conceived as extant” (*BPP* 176/250). What is merely present-at-hand, what is extant, comprises the realm of scientific inquiry: natural science determines ‘nature’ as the realm of static being, that which is determined according to only one dimension of time, the present. Heidegger’s method begins by

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\(^{30}\) In an insightful article Matheson Russell locates two levels of ‘phenomenological reduction’ in Heidegger’s *Being and Time* the first of which (the ‘existential reduction’) occurs in the first half of the book, guided by the formal indication of ‘existence.’ Russell, “Phenomenological Reduction in Heidegger,” 229-248.

\(^{31}\) Granted, of course, that Heidegger’s phenomenological insights into the essence of Dasein remain correct.
considering the being of Dasein as one that falls out of this narrow realm: Dasein is historical.\(^{32}\)

This path of access toward uncovering the being of Dasein holds for other entities as well, and, importantly for our considerations here, it holds for various logical notions which Heidegger considers: to understand the nature of truth, for instance, Heidegger first delineates the mode of being proper to truth;\(^{33}\) those who remain apprehensive about this approach clearly rely on the ‘perverse assumption’ that truth is best understood as either something ‘present-at-hand’ or solely in relation to the present-at-hand. Similarly, ‘possibility’ (*BT* 183/143-144), the ‘copula’ (*BPP* 210ff/300ff),\(^{34}\) ‘assertion or judgement’ (*BT* §33), and so on are all questioned as to their proper mode of being as a necessary precondition for accessing their ‘essence’ or nature.

### 2.3 Dasein’s Basic Structure

Our pre-ontological, unquestioning understanding of being thus marks the starting point for any ontological approach to delineating this understanding itself. Heidegger must therefore investigate the way in which we are first of all in a meaningful world of entities. We first of all encounter beings in a familiar way; we know their place and proper function in the context of our surroundings.\(^{35}\) Even if we become puzzled or if the entity no longer fits the way it is expected, our prior familiarity shows itself insofar as such puzzlement of failed expectation is not possible without our prior understanding of how things should fit together. Precisely in this everyday context our pre-ontological understanding of being shows itself. For instance, “by saying ‘it is’ thus and so, regardless of its specific mode of being…. It is understanding that first of all opens up or, as we say, discloses or reveals something like being” (*BPP* 18/24). Heidegger’s lengthy investigation into Dasein’s fundamental structure thus marks the entry into his ultimate goal of the clarification of the meaning of being.

\(^{32}\) Moreover, in each case Dasein is *mine*: the mineness in general is thus an existential of Dasein (*BT* 68/42).

\(^{33}\) Heidegger begins §44 part a) by questioning the ways the essence of truth has been “traditionally taken” and goes on to show that the mode of being proper to truth has been misconstrued (*BT* 257/214).


\(^{35}\) Indeed, “the place of a piece of equipment within an equipmental contexture is always determined with regard to the handy quality of the handy thing prescribed and required by the functionality totality” (*BPP* 310/440).
To come to grips with what we mean when we say of something that it is, we must gain access to our primary level of experience of beings, making explicit how they are for us through an interpretation or our basic experience. Beings, whether sensible or not, are for us first of all as they appear. Beings are phenomena which appear or are disclosed to us prior to any reflection; beings are first of all encountered or experienced as they are disclosed. The first half of Being and Time wrestles with the explication of the conditions of the possibility of this disclosedness. The conditions of the possibility, or basic structures of disclosure, Heidegger calls ‘existentials’ – and since they underlie disclosure, they account for any meaning of being encountered by Dasein.

Disclosedness constitutes the being of the ‘Da’ – the ‘there’ – of Da-sein and is “constituted by state-of-mind [Befindlichkeit], understanding [Verstehen], and discourse [Rede]” (BT 263/220). Each of these everyday structures of Dasein is given a temporal interpretation in the second half of Being and Time (BT 383-418/334-369). Yet what is most pressing for the considerations in this chapter on Heidegger’s philosophy of logic, and in the next on his interpretation of Plato, are understanding and discourse. We have seen that Heidegger’s most basic question is intimately connected to his views on the place of logic and it arises as a response to the problem of psychologism. This comes out to an even greater extent within his specific analyses of Dasein’s basic structure. Heidegger equates phenomenology with ontology. Onto-logy is a logos of onta. Essentially the understanding is what gives us access to onta which Heidegger equates with phenomena while discourse is logos. The interplay between these two basic components of phenomenology as ontology proves to play a crucial role in understanding Heidegger’s basic thoughts in the philosophy of logic.

2.3.1 (Pre-Ontological) Understanding

Heidegger devotes the first half of Being and Time to uncovering the basic way in which we are, pre-theoretically, in-the-world. The world we inhabit first of all is precisely where-in we deal with things ‘within-the-world.’ Our initial dealing-with things is not one of theoretical, perceptual cognition, not one which takes things in their ‘objective being.’ Rather, we first of all encounter things as we put them to use; and yet, Heidegger claims,

36 Where ‘disclose’ and ‘disclosedness’ mean, respectively “‘to lay open’ and ‘the character of having been laid open” (BT 105/75). Heidegger explicitly contrasts disclosing with ‘drawing inferences’ or making ‘logical conclusions’. Another aspect of his distancing from the tradition lies here where he takes ‘laying open’ as prior to any reasoning process guided by logic – a key point in his critique of Plato as seen in the next chapter.
this manipulation of things prior to thinking-about them “has its own kind of ‘knowledge’” (BT 95/67). In this pre-cognitive world of daily interactions, things already make sense; we know our way around and where things fit, all without stepping outside of, reflecting upon, the interactions and dealings themselves. The world we initially inhabit then is the where-in of our dealings, it is always something with which we are familiar (BT 119/86).

The world is also that from out of which Dasein encounters the beings – in their various ways of being – that belong to its involvements. Dasein initially encounters beings as either ready-to-hand, as those objects that are put to use, or as being-with, namely as other Dasein that are involved in and interact with our basic projects. In working-with other Dasein, working on other beings in a project, Dasein’s understanding is at work. This understanding displays itself insofar as things in the context of involvement hang together; each has its place, as demonstrated by Dasein’s familiarity. Other Dasein and beings which are ready-to-hand arise precisely within this nexus of involvement; they arise for encounter as involved entities. Each element of the involvement fits with the others and in the whole; the activity runs undisrupted while each item in the activity finds its place therein – the activity, which relies on such fittingness, itself comes before, makes possible, any entity which arises in the enterprise: “the understanding lets itself makes assignments both in these relationships themselves and of them” (BT 120/87). Moreover, the ready-to-hand, the way of being of those beings which we encounter, is discovered precisely through their ability to provide a service, to be useful, or to cause harm (BT 184/144), their discovery is thereby grounded precisely in Dasein’s own dealing with them, in Dasein’s understanding. Things are not first encountered as existing ‘out there’ independently of Dasein, but initially in relation to Dasein’s dealings. The relational character which occurs in assigning each thing its place, Heidegger calls a signifying relation; and the totality of such relations receives the name significance. This always already significant totality is precisely the phenomenon of world and the nexus of relations constitutes the structure (worldhood) of the world. Heidegger uncovers our world specifically as structured and structuring.

Thus, along with the way Dasein always already is, a context of ready-to-hand beings (and possibly other Dasein) already shows itself in the most basic ways in which we are. The scientistic (neo-Kantian) view thus falls under attack as Heidegger insists that:
the usual approach in theory of knowledge, according to which a manifold of arbitrarily occurring things or objects is supposed to be homogenously given to us, does not do justice to the primary facts and consequently makes the investigative approach of theory of knowledge artificial from the very start. Original familiarity with beings lies in dealing with them appropriately. (BPP 304/432)

The interaction with entities, Dasein’s familiarity with significance, provides the ontical condition for the possibility of encountering entities which are as ready-to-hand, but also “the ontological which makes it possible for Dasein, as something which understands and interprets, to disclose such things as ‘significations’: upon these, in turn, is founded the Being of words and of language” (BT 121/87). Any attempt at categorization, or conceptualization, itself is thus only possible based on our already being-in-a familiar world of significance. And since entities are first discovered only through their usability, and hence are grounded in Dasein’s primordial understanding, any understanding of something in some fixed concept is preceded by this prior, pre-theoretical understanding as well.

This way in which Dasein first of all finds itself among beings, attuned to them in terms of their possibility, in terms of what they are for, constitutes in its totality the meaningfulness of the surrounding world. This attunement remains inexplicit. And yet, when any entity appears to one, it does so as already understood as something for some use. Apart from accounting for the way we first of all encounter beings in their use, understanding serves another function on Heidegger’s account – one crucial to the discussion of Plato in the next chapter. As Heidegger says: “In its projective character, understanding goes to make up existentially what we call Dasein’ ‘sight’ [Sicht]” (BT 186/146). Sight here refers to the ‘clearing nature’ of Dasein in being-there among beings; it is characteristic of Dasein’s disclosedness, the fact that beings appear to Dasein. It is neither bodily ‘sight’ nor the non-sensorial awareness of some properties of something merely present-at-hand. ‘Sight’ in its existential significance refers to access in general – access to either beings or being (BT 187/147). Prior to our being able to

37 Heidegger adds a crucial note in his own marginalia indicating an important shift in emphasis in Heidegger’s later thought where language itself brings into focus the Da of Dasein.: “Untrue. Language is not built-up, but rather is the primordial essence of truth as the there [Da].” Martin Heidegger, Sein und Zeit (Tübingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag, 2006), 442, marginalia c to page 87.
38 Or, of course, it can also appear in the privative sense of ‘not fitting’, not useful.
39 As I demonstrate below, the privileging of ‘sight’ as the non-sensorial awareness of the properties of something merely present-at-hand is precisely what Heidegger takes issue with in the tendency to over-emphasize Dasein’s theoretical mode of being in traditional philosophy.
observe entities (either bodily or in their properties) we have access to them, we ‘see’ how they fit and how our own dealings fit into the manifold system of ‘in-order-to’ references that make up our world. This ability to adapt to various dealings has the vision of circumspection [Umsicht] (BT 98/69). We see how things fit only because we understand. Since all sight is grounded in understanding, Heidegger thereby undercuts the priority traditionally given to both pure intuition and cognition alike.

2.3.2 Foundation of the Apophantic-as in the Hermeneutic-as
All phenomena appear to Dasein through disclosure, of which understanding is a key structural moment. Rede or discourse is another. Ontologically, Dasein, as disclosive, is constituted by understanding and equiprimordially by discourse. Whereas understanding is, in a pregnant sense, our ability to see, discourse is precisely our ability to speak what we see. This discussion of understanding and discourse differs radically from Kant’s, precisely on the placement of the faculty of ‘seeing.’ For Kant, sight aligns entirely with intuition over against the understanding and discourse. The problem of intellectual intuition, or any ‘seeing of essences,’ thus arises: any such talk simply rests on a mistake of kinds; the understanding or intellect is simply not the kind of things which sees; ‘sight’ only occurs through intuition. Heidegger avoids this problem altogether by founding sight on understanding as contrasted with discourse. The role of discourse in Heidegger’s account proves to play a crucial part in his overall project of founding basic logical concepts in the ontological structures of Dasein. As we will see, judgement – that which traditionally is taken as the most fundamental constituent of logical investigations – ends up grounding in discourse [Rede] which itself is founded upon pre-predicative (and hence pre-logical) interpretation.

Heidegger begins his inquiry into the nature of discourse by tracing the ways in which Aristotle’s insights have been distorted throughout the tradition. Traditional accounts, taking their cue from Aristotle, have systematically misunderstood his original insights into the nature of assertion/judgement as a derived mode of talk. This is so central to Heidegger’s thought in the 1920s that almost every lecture course during the Marburg years unpacks the central idea of Aristotle’s logos apophantikos – strictly speaking, “letting something be seen in itself and indeed – apo – from itself” (HCT 84/115). All discourse makes manifest what one talks about to another party. Discourse

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40 Alan Kim makes a similar point: see Alan Kim, Plato in Germany: Kant-Natorp-Heidegger (Sankt Augustin: Academia Verlag, 2010), 242n58.
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lets what is spoken about be seen. All discourse is an apophantic act; as such, and only as such, does it have the structure of a synthesis, the latter of which allows something to be seen “in its togetherness [Beisammen] with something – letting it be seen as something” (BT 56/33). This is where one use of the copula comes to be utilized: when we say, for instance ‘The house is red’: the apophantic-as is expressed in the judgement which takes S as P, or which states ‘S is P’.

But the apophantic-as structure of discourse is precisely what allows discourse to genuinely show what is spoken about (or not): the discourse succeeds, is true, when it shows that which it is about as it is in itself, and is false when it fails to do so (BT 56-57/33). The truth of discourse thus grounds in the genuine ‘making manifest’ or disclosure of discourse: as such, the truth of judgements grounds in truth as unconcealment (aletheia). Ultimately, Dasein’s unconcealment grounds assertion and, in particular, the existential structure of the hermeneutic ‘as’ is the root of the formal apophantic-as structure of propositions.

The ‘hermeneutic-as structure’ represents Dasein’s pre-predicative interpretive understanding of the entities which arise in its environing world. As we have already seen, Dasein lives in a world among entities whose possibilities it understands: the world is the horizontal totality of possibilities. Dasein’s comportment toward the world in which entities in their possible ways of being are already disclosed is the condition for Dasein’s uncovering what the entities are: there must be some prior understanding of being if any entity is to be encountered in its way of being. Yet this understanding remains inexplicit. While Dasein discovers entities circumspectively in some nexus of meaningful involvements, this understanding-seeing can be made explicit through interpretation (Auslegung) (BT §33). This explication does not amount to some attribution of properties to a present-at-hand entity but rather an explication of the prior understanding wherein something is understood as something. As Heidegger says:

In interpreting, we do not, so to speak, throw a ‘signification’ over some naked thing which is present-at-hand, we do not stick a value on it; but when something within-the-world is encountered as such, the thing in question already has an involvement which is disclosed in our understanding of the world, and this involvement is one which gets laid out by interpretation. (BT 190-191/150)

41 Apart from this, Heidegger notes that not all discourse is apophantic: wishing, willing, questioning and commanding, for instance, are all modes of discourse that do not have the traditional ‘S is P’ structure. Truth cannot reside in its ownmost in discourse since not all discourse is such as can be (apophantically) true or false.
Interpretation is the pre-predicative bringing into view of an entity *as* something. The *as* here – the ‘hermeneutic-as’ – takes its cue from the broader significationalc context that is the world. Only with this prior hermeneutic-as of interpretation by which something is understood *as* something, can the apophantic-as of assertion arise in the first place. And the *meaning*-structure of our world is what first makes possible the hermeneutical-as. As such, primordial meaning lies prior to determination on Heidegger’s account, in direct conflict with the Marburg neo-Kantian account of our initial encounter of objects as determined through scientific concepts.

Indeed, understanding and interpretation occur primordially as pre-predicative for Heidegger. The *as*-structure exemplified through interpretation is pre-linguistic. First of all we are with ready-to-hand entities pre-linguistically, pre-predicatively (and thus, pre-logically). Yet, just as understanding is made explicit to oneself in interpretation, the possibility lies in interpretation itself to be made explicit to others through discourse. The ‘*as*’ of interpretation is thereby set forth in the assertion which expresses the pre-linguistic meaning explicitly grasped in the interpretation. Here lies the derivative nature of the apophantic-as most strongly: the ‘*as*’ of interpretation, the hermeneutic-as, *precedes* any making manifest to others, any pointing out of the thing just as it is in itself; prior to the pointing out, there must be a recognition of the thing *as* that as which it is being pointed out. And since this hermeneutic-as is grounded in Dasein’s inexplicit familiarity with its world, there is no experience at all – whether theoretical, practical, or otherwise – without a prior understanding. All intuitive-seeing is always a seeing *of* something *as* something based on a prior interpretation.

The traditional emphasis on ‘sight’ as the primary way in which we access entities thus becomes radically altered by Heidegger’s reinterpretation. His regrounding of sight in the understanding will prove to have drastic implications for his relationship to both Husserlian and neo-Kantian thought, as we will see. This not only affects the way Heidegger understands the ontological structures of Dasein, but also the mode of being belonging to those things we first encounter. Traditionally ‘presence-at-hand’ – as the way in which things come before the gaze and can be understood objectively as separate

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42 The *as*-structure is pre-linguistic insofar as it does not depend on any explicit statement. Yet discourse is a primordial aspect of the structure of Dasein as much as understanding is; they are equiprimordial: but discourse at this level refers to a non-reflective ability to speak about things in a context of interaction; discourse in a shared project occurs seamlessly without reflection on the activity itself. This ‘first-order’ talk lies prior to any ‘second-order’ reflective talk which thematizes the original activity with its attendant mode of speech.
from any human activity – has dominated the conception of how entities are primordially. In conjunction with his transformation of the notion of ‘sight’, Heidegger turns this view on its head as I explain in the next section.

3 Fundamental Ontology, Phenomenology, and Neo-Kantianism

Before turning to Heidegger’s immanent critique of Husserl and his further distancing from the neo-Kantians the terminological distinction between the ready-to-hand and the present-at-hand must be unpacked. A more careful explanation of how I interpret these terms in Heidegger’s work is in order especially since it will be important for my characterisation of Platonism and Heidegger’s critique of the ‘theoretical prejudice’ in what follows. It is often overlooked that in Being and Time the notion of the present-at-hand characterizes not only objects available to the perceptual gaze but also ideal objects available to intellectual apprehension; I outline this interpretation presently.

3.1 The Ready-to-Hand and Present-at-Hand

Heidegger’s introduction of the distinction between the present-at-hand and ready-to-hand is typically (and rightly) thought of as a criticism of substance-metaphysics.\(^{43}\) In Greek metaphysics the basic understanding of being as substance is modeled after production: starting at least with Aristotle, ousia comes to designate something fabricated, something placed at hand.\(^{44}\) On Heidegger’s account, being is thought in Greek metaphysics as something produced which appears to us through its look, its eidos. The sight through which the eidos of the ousia is grasped is one which looks to the being of the thing addressed such that one looks to see how the thing fits, guided by the thing’s appearance. As Heidegger says, “all shaping and forming has from the first an out-look upon the look (eidos) of that which is to be produced. Here it may already be seen that the phenomenon of sight which pertains to producing comes forward in characterizing the whatness of a thing as eidos” (BPP 109/154). Ousia comes to be understood as what we find before us, not at our disposal for use, but as what we find before us as disposable: the look (eidos), what is present-at-hand.

Aristotle begins his investigation of how “things are said” with a division into his ten categories: substance, quantity, quality, relation, place, time, position, state, action, or

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\(^{44}\) Heidegger relies on the German Herstellen [producing] with its root stellen [to place] to make the connection between producing and placing, eventually connecting the product with what stands on its own, stably accessible to us.
affection. Each of these categories gives rise to further characterizations according to what the category reveals – an essence or a property, a genus or an accident – and then whether what is said holds necessarily, possibly, or factually. These investigations look to uncover what being truly consist in: ultimately for Plato and Aristotle on the traditional reading, the question is, what is the substance (ousia) of the subject-matter. Intellectual work itself is refocused in the modern era to the working of knowing itself, from a focus on things to a focus on our knowing of things: philosophy itself comes to be most centrally epistemological. And the new subject-matter becomes human beings over and against the world ‘out there’. The questions of logic come to focus on what predication can mean at all when the predicating subject is entirely separated from the predicated object: this problem, to which Kant supplies an answer, rests entirely upon the transformation of the ‘subject’ from ‘that which is at issue’ to the ‘subject’ understood as ‘that being for whom something is at issue’, with it attendant creation of the foreign ‘object’ – the present-at-hand entity that becomes the basis of all subsequent ontology; and this ontology is rooted in Greek thought.

Although Heidegger draws this deeper connection as early as 1922, and more penetratingly in 1927 (BPP 106-112/149-158), in Being and Time the explicit target of substance-metaphysics is no longer the Greek understanding of being in terms of what is producible, but rather the Cartesian substance-metaphysics which takes being as pure spatial extension (BT §§19-21). Understanding being in this mode emerges from the ideal of a ‘stand-offish’ perspective of the pure contemplation of nature. Being comes to be what is measurable – what is there no longer in use, but present before the observer ‘objectively’ as what is purely present and yet available. The present-at-hand is what lies before the gaze, available for cognition to penetrate to its essential properties through intellectual apprehension.

In Being and Time Heidegger counters this understanding of ‘things’ by beginning with the Greek word for things, pragmata – that which one has to do with in one’s concernful dealings. As discussed above, these ready-to-hand entities make up our

46 Namely, he says that a judgement is the manner in which givens are brought into an objective-apperceptive unity.
surrounding world of things with which we interact first of all *understandingly* (*BT* 96-97/68). The ready-to-hand is what we deal with concretely while the present-at-hand is an abstraction. As Heidegger says, the present-at-hand is derivative in the sense that “to lay bare what is just present-at-hand and no more, cognition must first penetrate *beyond* what is ready-to-hand in our concern” (*BT* 101/71). The difference between the two ways of encountering entities comes through most decisively in one of Heidegger’s own examples. Heidegger contends that nature itself is disclosed first of all as ready-to-hand. And yet when one looks at ‘Nature’ as present-at-hand through scientific cognition, one encounters the (scientifically determined) properties of nature as dirempt from all pre-theoretical understanding, attunement, feeling, and so on.

As an example he has us consider the difference between a botanist’s account of plants versus the everyday encounter with the flowers of the hedgerow (*BT* 100/70): the experience of the flowers ‘on site’ does not take the flower out of context, thematizing it; rather the flower remains integrated in our overall experience of the hedgerow and the natural surrounds. The botanist, in contrast, isolates the flower to study and classify it according to its properties.48 ‘Nature’ when understood as something present-at-hand is determined by natural science, it is not just the bare perceptual thing but is already an *interpretation* whereby perception is an act of making determinate (*BT* 89/61-62). And yet scientific determination treats not only those objects available to the perceptual gaze but equally, and more often, its own ideal objects which it creates in order to account for ‘nature’. Scientific activity is, for the most part, an insular one. On the neo-Kantian account in particular, scientific activity actively *constructs* its objects and ‘works upon’ these. The ‘seeing’ (of the present-at-hand) available to theoretical comportment is not limited to sensorial seeing, but includes the intuition of essences on Heidegger’s account.49

In Heidegger’s clarification of ‘sight’ in its existential signification he explicitly contrasts two modes of derivative seeing: ‘seeing’ with the bodily eyes versus “pure non-sensory awareness of something present-at-hand in its presence-at-hand” (*BT* 187/147). Access to the present-at-hand *in its presence-at-hand* occurs through non-sensory awareness: it amounts to ‘seeing’ the ‘sense’ of the thing, no longer caught up within,

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48 Even if the flower were studied in its greater environmental context, the ‘flow’ of experience is still interrupted to thematize and bring to cognition what stands there to be investigated.

49 ‘Essences’ here being precisely the ideal objects of scientific activity – as we will see below, Heidegger does not endorse a naïve realist view of scientific activity, but rather takes these ‘essences’ as ultimately replaceable and alterable.
integrated in, the nexus of involvements that makes up our world, but precisely as no longer integrated (*BT* 98/69). In this way the thing can been seen as possessing properties, distinct from its use-involvement. These properties can then become formulated in propositions stating that the property adheres (or not) to the thing. The very source of the theoretical – and the starting point of all traditional logic – thus lies in a seeing of essences accruing to the present-at-hand entity. By uncovering the derivative nature not only of this seeing, but of the present-at-hand itself, Heidegger thereby undercuts a major point of departure for traditional philosophical inquiry.

In particular, the objectified world of natural science falls out as a secondary phenomenon with its point of origin in the lived world. The only reason that theoretical discourse comes to dominate philosophical thought is due to the basic structure of *logos* [primordial discourse]: only because in *logos* something is allowed to be simply *seen* (perceived or apprehended) can *logos* come to be understood as reason (in the sense of intellectual insight). Also, because *logos* comes to mean both ‘speaking’ and ‘what is said’ (*legomenon*) – which latter in turn is nothing other than the *hypokeimenon*, what lies present-at-hand as the basis for each discussion *about* it – can *logos* qua ‘what is said’ come to mean reason in the sense of ground (*BT* 58/34). In taking presence-at-hand as the sole way of being, one is led precisely into the traps which Heidegger sees as paramount in the history of Western philosophy: an understanding of truth as correctness; a privileging of epistemology as the most pressing philosophical endeavour; and ultimately the theoretical prejudice guided by intellectual apprehension and structured by the rules of logic.50 This reading of the present-at-hand as accessible through the *eidos* as revelatory of the essence of an entity proves to provide central insights into Heidegger’s reading of Plato, as argued more fully in the next chapter.

### 3.2 Uncovering the Theoretical Prejudice

Although Heidegger criticizes the over-emphasis on theory in modern philosophy as early as his 1919 lecture courses, it is not until his phenomenological decade, and really until *Being and Time*, that Heidegger’s ‘critique of theory’ – a critique of any position which

50 Heidegger does not simply endorse a pragmatism as the way of understanding our primordial way of being-in-the-world as the first half of *Being and Time* might seem to suggest. In the second half he uncovers the roots of this focus on the present as grounded in Dasein’s temporal structure. Ultimately primordial temporality plays the role of the ultimate condition of the possibility of pragmatic, existential, and cognitive understanding. For an account of this systematic founding function in *Being and Time* see Stephan Käufer, “Systematicity and Temporality in *Being and Time,*” *Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology* 33 (2002): 167-187.
takes the theoretical as independently existing as an ultimate ground – becomes articulated in detail. In this critique Heidegger emphasizes that theoretical discourse, most notably scientific discourse and all of that which logic can capture propositionally, leaves untouched those non-theoretical moments which account for the greatest moments of life: not everything can be captured theoretically. Theory can explain ‘the theoretical realm’ but not the ‘non-theoretical realm’ and no purely theoretical bridge can ever span these two realms. The gap between them itself only ever arises from the theorizing activity – but as an activity of Dasein’s primordial being-in-the-world. Heidegger argues that what underlies the separation of these two realms, what therefore lies prior to any theoretical truth or validity, is Dasein’s very situatedness in the world; not only is propositional truth derivative of the truth of disclosure (i.e. the pre-theoretic situated truth that first makes propositions meaningful at all), but the entire theoretical attitude itself has its precondition in Dasein’s situatedness. An ignorance of the pre-theoretical underpinnings of the theoretical attitude, which takes the theoretical to be a self-enclosed, holistic explanatory mode of thought, I call the ‘theoretical prejudice.’ In this section I treat Heidegger’s account of this prejudice, bringing to the fore the relation between the disengaged (theoretical) and engaged (non-theoretical) attitudes, but also paying service to his positive account of theory generally.

3.2.1 The Pervasiveness of Theory and the Urge to Objectivity

Theory traditionally aims at a non-subjective, ‘distanced’ account of things, an account meant to hold universally and to reach the essential core of the matter under investigation – to hit upon that which remains stable and self-subsistent across varying contexts and over time – striving to be a subject-free discourse, ideally abstracting from any mention of use (either to the user or a particular context of use). The ideal situation for a theoretical discourse, although it might remain a mere ideal to be strived after but never achieved, is one which transcends any particular situated context in favour of ‘objective’ truth.51 ‘Objective truth’ prescinds from any situatedness, and being free from any

confines, it holds absolutely. Traditionally physics, mathematics, and mathematical logic are cited as the prime examples wherein objective truths can rightfully be attained. Heidegger controverts this long-standing opinion, demonstrating the derivative nature of all theoretical activity and the primordial position of situatedness in general: even more controversially, Heidegger uncovers the tendency and desire to attain the theoretical ideal in the inauthentic, fallen nature of Dasein, in *das Man*.

Heidegger’s critique of theory is complicated by the fact that his views are not entirely negative. His critique is one which aims to situate the theoretical as one mode of comportment among others: “Sciences are ways of Being in which Dasein comports itself towards entities which it need not be itself” (*BT* 33/13). At first glance, it appears that Heidegger is working solely against the positivist ideal of science as the treatment of positive facts, guided by a strict hypothetico-deductive method internally structured by logic, but also demarcated externally by logical-epistemological considerations. And this is the main target of his criticisms. The typical positivist stance understands “science in general” to be “defined as the totality established through an interconnection of true propositions” (*BT* 32/11). However, this position is not limited to the positivists, but reaches widespread agreement beyond strict positivism. Husserl’s theory of manifolds, for one, resembles this basic definition, as does the Baden neo-Kantian approach to the organization of the sciences according to their basic concepts, and the Hilbertian project of axiomatization of the strict sciences. Yet, Heidegger insists: “This definition is not complete, nor does it reach the meaning of science. As ways in which man behaves, sciences have the manner of Being which this entity – man himself – possesses” (*BT* 32/11). Again, Heidegger concerns himself with the *way of being* that these other accounts simply overlook: in favour of a focus on the *essentia*, the *whatness*, of science they ignore its *existentia*, the way it is, its *thatness*.

As we have seen, Heidegger himself gave his qualifying lecture at the University of Freiburg (1915) in this tradition, providing an epistemological investigation of the concept of time in the natural and historical sciences, respectively. In this approach the

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theoretical concepts, structures, and methods of science come under logical scrutiny; formal precision takes centre stage, while reality is understood univocally as ‘the objectively real.’ Furthermore, rationality takes its normative standard from the mathematical-deductive sciences as science is considered to be comprised of, and guided by the goal of attaining, logically certain results. Heidegger’s earliest extant (self-)criticism comes in his 1919 lecture where the theoretical approach is chastised for turning the ‘environing world’ into a study of ‘things’ in ‘reality.’ Heidegger argues that this approach fails since:

Reality is…not an environmental characteristic, but lies in the essence of thingliness. It is a specifically theoretical characteristic. The meaningful is de-interpreted into this residue of being real. Experience of the environment is de-vivified into the residue of recognizing something as real. The historical ‘I’ is de-historicized into the residue of a specific ‘I-ness’ as the correlate of thingliness…. Thing-experience [Dingerfahrung] is certainly a lived experience [Erlebnis], but understood vis-à-vis its origin from the environmental experience it is already de-vivification [Ent-lebnis]. (TDP 75/89-90)

Essentially, Heidegger here argues that in the theoretical mode of engagement with the world, we stand aloof from our normal lived involvement in the world and observe; and in this way the world loses its significance as we step back from our nexus of meaningful interactions.

Heidegger maintains that this tendency toward mere observation finds its motivation in Dasein’s very being: as Dasein ‘takes a break’ from the work-world, when things are no longer set upon in concernful dealings – either because the work has finished or because one simply takes a break – one becomes separated from the meaningful world of interactions and thus the possibility arises that one become absorbed “with the possibilities of seeing the ‘world’ merely as it looks…. Dasein lets itself be carried along [mitnehmen] solely by the looks of the world; in this kind of Being, it

concerns itself with becoming rid of itself as Being-in-the-world and rid of its Being alongside that which, in the closest everyday manner, is ready-to-hand” (*BT* 216/172). In this desire to merely see – perceptually *and* intellectually – something and nothing more, one loses touch with the thing as something seen *in order* to be understood: any primary relation with the entity – a ‘being toward’ it – is thereby lost. Dasein’s theoretical comportment is guided first of all by Dasein’s inherent curiosity.

### 3.2.2 Disengaged Theoretical Comportment versus Engaged Non-Theoretical Comportment

In a scattered series of passages in *Being and Time*, Heidegger's basic account of the relation between the disengaged (theoretical) attitude and the involved (non-theoretical) attitude emerges. The more we put things to use, rather than just standing back and looking at them, the more primordial is our encounter. Entities surround us in a meaningful world comprising our equipmental context, for instance. As such, they are unveiled in their being the more we engage with them as equipment. In this way the being of equipment shows itself (although only circumspectively); it shows up as *ready-to-hand*. It is not through attending to the outward appearance of the thing that this basic way of being manifests itself to us, but in our taking it up in use. As Heidegger says: “No matter how sharply we just *look* [Nur-noch-hinsehen] at the ‘outward appearance’ [“Aussehen”] of Things in whatever form this takes, we cannot discover anything ready-to-hand. If we look at Things just ‘theoretically’, we can get along without understanding readiness-to-hand” (*BT* 98/69). The disengaged theoretical attitude, one in which the item comes under one’s gaze, reveals entities in a derivative manner as merely present – there in front of the investigator. No matter how one tries, merely looking at a thing will never bring one to an understanding of what it is in use. Similarly, no conglomeration of predicates – even if it were possible to exhaust all available predicates of a thing – can ever recreate the experience of putting the thing to use. Theorization fails to be universally applicable.

Theoretical knowing determines the nature of the present-at-hand through observation. And yet observation, standing back from our concernful absorption in the

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54 This will mark another ironic turn in Heidegger’s analysis: pure theory typically claims to strive after wisdom, and yet Heidegger uncovers its roots in a lack of wisdom.

55 Of course, Heidegger does acknowledge that even the ready-to-hand can become an object of scientific-theoretical inquiry. And yet it can only be understood in such an inquiry as a *thematized* ready-to-hand entity, never with the primordial understanding of everyday encounter.
world, involves a deficiency in how we take things around us to be. When we step back from producing, handling, manipulating, and so on we limit our ways of being-in to one: “the mode of just tarrying alongside...[das Nur-noch-verweilen bei...]]” (BT 88/61). Through this alteration of our mode of being-in, we make possible the encounter of entities within-the-world no longer in their primordial sense but just in the way they look – in their eidos. In this way we direct ourselves towards something, from some particular view-point, and see it in its presence-at-hand. This looking-at something does not result in the bare perception of a sense datum, but comes to its own when, as Heidegger says, “one addresses oneself to something as something” (BT 89/62). Moreover, in taking something as something through this consummated perception one can discuss the thing together with its various properties so that “perception becomes an act of making determinate” (BT 89/62). Heidegger here reverses the (neo-)Kantian verdict that perception is a passive faculty while the understanding, through the application of concepts, is an act of making determinate, of forming objects. Heidegger uncovers the root of assertions and propositions, of judgements and thus inferences, and so logic itself in perception’s determining act. Theoretical thought, which determines beings deficiently as present-at-hand, arises from Dasein’s mode of just tarrying-alongside, just looking. Moreover, while our circumspective concern with entities, engaged in our projects, reveals our understanding, curiosity which merely looks from one thing to the next does not reach an understanding of anything: rather, “it seeks to see only in order to see and to have seen” (BT 397/346). Theoretical knowledge is made possible by a prior understanding – it does not generate understanding on Heidegger’s account.\(^\text{56}\)

The great achievement of theoretical engagement lies in the ‘objective’ manner in which things are dealt with in a uniform manner. By dimming down the world to what is purely present-at-hand, we can build theories capturing an amazing array of new entities simply by characterizing them theoretically: negative and complex numbers, protons, electrons and neutrons, and so forth all have their own way of being, all as theoretical constructs. This abundance of things arises from our looking at the world theoretically, by taking things uniformly as present-at-hand, taking the world as the same day in and day out. The ready-to-hand, conversely, manifests itself always in a specific worldly way – a world “which is never the same from day to day” (BT 177/138). We always encounter beings within a certain mood: and such moods determine how we actually encounter the

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\(^{56}\) A precursor to Heidegger’s famously controversial statement: “Science does not think.”
ready-to-hand. But also, Heidegger insists, despite the urge to a cool ‘objective’ approach the world, “even the purest theoria has not left all moods behind it; even when we look theoretically at what is just present-at-hand, it does not show itself purely as it looks unless this theoria lets it come towards us in a tranquil tarrying alongside” (*BT* 177/138). Not only our everyday dealings, but any cognitive determination of entities is constituted existential-ontologically in the state-of-mind [*Befindlichkeit*] of being-in-the-world (*BT* 177/138). As is clear from these considerations, Heidegger does not take an entirely negative view toward theoria, as he is often assumed to do, but rather focuses on the various ways in which the theoretical, disengaged attitude arises from Dasein’s existentially equiprimordial structures which comprise the mode of being-in-the-world.

However, the prejudice of the theoretical, just like the logical prejudice, suffers from an insufficient account of its origins: it does not meet the standards of a rigorous phenomenology. There is an overt criticism of neo-Kantian thought here, as well as a latent criticism of Husserl’s failure to remain true to the tenets of phenomenology. But even beyond this, the theoretical prejudice is rampant in modernity.

### 3.2.3 The Theoretical Gaze

These considerations, scattered throughout *Being and Time*, indicate Heidegger’s basic account of the relation between the theoretical – wherein the significance of the world is eliminated by ‘standing-back’ and merely ‘looking-on’ at the ‘outward appearance’ – which reduces the meaning of being to objective being or presence-at-hand and the non-theoretical, involved way we initially are among ready-to-hand entities which populate our immediate context of significance, our world. When we stand back from our involvement with things, when they lose their significance, they become present-at-hand entities to be ‘characterized’ by their properties. The present-at-hand is made determinate by our looking at it, uncovering properties; this determination then comes to be ‘expressed in propositions’ and judged. However, the theoretical attitude lacks ‘significance’: in it we step back from the flow of our usual involvement in the world, instead bringing things before our gaze to be inspected. No longer caught up with things, we take ourselves – and the entities with us – out of the nexus of interconnected meanings in order to see “the ‘world’ merely as it looks” thereby turning otherwise meaningful entities into mere things. This reification eliminates significance: beings are taken out of their interrelations and examined ‘for themselves’ on their own; beings are seen solely as present-at-hand whereas only ready-to-hand entities have significance. As this is stripped
away under the theoretical gaze they become present-at-hand, studied for their properties, not their fittingness.

Heidegger explicitly ties the deficiency of the mere look to the platonic eidos. The theoretical privileges ‘sight’ over all else as its standard; Heidegger insists that this privileging that dates back to Plato misperceives that which is closest to us, namely, the ready-to-hand and overlooks the fact that in order to see one must first understand. In his later thought he alters this account of the Platonic eidos as the form governing intellectual activity – although still in a critical vein.\(^57\)

Regardless of his later dissatisfaction with the tie to Plato, his criticism of the privileging of sight remains. But then it should be clear that this critique extends to the Husserlian privileging of intuition, of ‘seeing’ as the highest mode of access to beings. In demonstrating that sight (and thus theory) grounds in understanding Heidegger not only undercuts a particular positivist view of science, but a more importantly long-standing tradition in philosophy:

we have deprived pure intuition [Anschauen] of its priority, which corresponds noetically to the priority of the present-at-hand in traditional ontology. ‘Intuition’ and ‘thinking’ are both derivatives of understanding, and already rather remote ones. Even the phenomenological ‘intuition of essences’ [“Wesensschau”] is grounded in existential understanding. (BT 187/147)

Theory and assertion rely on the seeing or direct intuition of something as the primary access to things – but seeing and intuition are modes of presencing, whereby something is made present to sensibility, whereby things are allowed to be present (LQT 342-343/414-415). But presencing is only one aspect of temporality. Traditional logic fails to account for the temporal whole as it relies on a traditional ontology which takes the present as the highest way of being.

In theoretical thinking, objects are treated as present-at-hand; as substances to which properties are attributed via predication, captured in the formation of propositions or judgements. Logic as the theory of theory investigates the properties of these property-attributors – propositions. Objectivity stands as the goal of theoretical thought: the goal of

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\(^57\) Heidegger’s later thought revolves around the critique of Plato precisely on the privileging of ‘sight’ as the paradigmatic mode of engagement with entities. Heidegger’s later criticism of the Platonic Idea has its roots already in his early Freiburg and Marburg lectures, as well as in Being and Time. Heidegger adds a crucial marginal note indicating a dissatisfaction with his equation of the modern theoretical reliance on mere observations and the guiding search for the eidos: “Looking-away-from does not give rise to looking-at – this [looking-at] has an origin of its own and has looking-away as a necessary consequence; observation [theorizing, standing at a distance from things, contemplating] has its own origination. The look to eidos requires something else.” Heidegger, Sein und Zeit, 444, marginalia to page 61.
freeing cognition from its historical-subjective bonds. Our everyday experience thereby falls outside of this mode of investigation wherein we strive to become absorbed in present-at-hand beings disinterestedly. Our daily toils occur in a surrounding world, wherein we interact with human and non-human beings; the latter arise for the most part circumspectively as ready-to-hand, directly in our dealings, as non-thematic. As such, disinterested theorizing overlooks our situatedness within the world, taking things as units to be measured in isolation; theoretically the world is thus understood merely as the totality of these units. In particular, space and time lose any contact with our situation and are taken as mathematical continua. But as we have seen, the ‘wholeness’ of the world is not the summation of the parts of the world, but rather, it is an interrelated network which ‘fits-together’ – the world as meaningful context eludes capture by scientific, mathematical imposition.\footnote{Heidegger provides a phenomenological elucidation of the roots of the concern for totality in several places throughout \textit{Being and Time}. For instance, early on he remarks that scientific inquiry takes as its domain of inquiry ‘the totality of entities’ broken up into different regions according to ‘basic concepts’ which arise from our pre-scientific way of experiencing the world (\textit{BT} 29/9), and he considers the tendency to understand the world as the totality of ontic entities (\textit{BT} 64/92-93), and the question from biology, psychology, theology, or theology of death about the meaning of death among the totality of entities (\textit{BT} 292/248). This drive to understanding solely in terms of the totality of entities is overturned as superfluous in the face of Heidegger’s argument that possibilities are only understood as finite, as never capturing the whole of experience (\textit{BT} 308-309/264), and Dasein’s finite existence (\textit{BT} 378/329-330).}

Not only are objects treated as decontextualized units, but the theorizer himself comes to lose any situational bonds in the ideal theoretical investigation: ‘anyone’ should be able to perform and test-out a given experiment; the goal of modern scientific activity to supply repeatable, testable results ultimately removes the scientist as a particular human being from the picture altogether.\footnote{At first glance, the famous ‘uncertainty principle’ of quantum mechanics – simply put, that the greater precision one has in determining the position of a particle, the less precision one will necessarily have in determining its momentum, and vice versa – seems to controvert this claim since the uncertainty appears to be caused by the effect of the scientist-observer necessary in any measurement. However, physicists now generally agree that the uncertainty principle is actually a property inherent to quantum systems themselves. See any comprehensive text on quantum mechanics, for instance, the opening pages of L.D. Landau and E.M. Lifshitz, \textit{Quantum Mechanics: Non-Relativistic Theory, 3rd ed.}, trans. J. B. Sykes and J. S. Bell (Oxford: Elsevier Science, 1977).} Modern investigators, starting with the works of Descartes’ search for a \textit{new method}, aim for knowledge of things dirempt from any particular investigator: the new science of modernity aspires to a form of universalized cognitive achievement that can proceed without any individual investigator; it aims at knowledge that is testable for ‘everyone’ in relation to what everyone working in the field already knows. This new form of knowledge aims at universal agreement among faceless investigators, it aims at ‘knowledge’ which can be passed on directly, that can be
extended by ever new research programs *rather than* referring to a direct engagement by a particular master of a craft with a matter, an engagement that must be relearned from the start by each beginner or apprentice to the craft. The focus comes to lie on following patterns, following the projects that happen to hold sway in one’s time as opposed to following nature herself. Understanding becomes superfluous as we are called increasingly to *comprehend* instead of being called to *understand*. With this privileging of the theoretical, intellectual endeavours aim to articulate a ‘position’ within the academic paradigm; the call is first of all to defend a ‘theory’ within the world of signification. The theory then becomes true if it is successfully defended, false if not. The theories of modern academics refer only to the referential totality defining their discipline.\(^{60}\) Truth as reference is transformed to truth as defensibility. And the question of truth’s relation to a world of meanings, a world of understanding becomes lost along the way.

### 3.2.4 Science and Philosophy

Heidegger’s views on science during his ‘phenomenological decade’ are not entirely negative; what he criticizes is a tendency in philosophy itself to misplace the role of science, and to inadequately situate philosophy as the study of being, over against the ontical sciences of beings.\(^{61}\) “Science is a kind of cognition” (*BPP* 320/455) but also involves a practical know-how, guided by various ‘procedures’ and as such, is guided by an *intuitus*, a kind of ‘seeing’ (*BT* 410/358). As a way of cognizing, science aims at truth. Theory takes ‘intuition’ or ‘sight’ as the model for our access to this truth. And yet there is something more primordial than cognition: moods, for instance, but then also understanding as projective, as that which allows us to encounter beings as beings in the first place. Theory and assertion arise on the basis of our prior ‘seeing’ of something present-at-hand.

One last word on Heidegger’s project of fundamental ontology remains before moving on to an account of his clash with Husserl and the neo-Kantians. Ontology transcendentally provides the temporally unified phenomenon of being-in-the-world as the ground of all meaning. The ontical sciences, on the other hand, have a derivative

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\(^{60}\) For a reading of this shift from the pre-modern to the modern world of investigators now instilled “behind a one-way mirror,” especially in light of Heidegger’s thought, see Cyril Welch, “What’s the Matter with Talking about Heidegger?,” a talk first presented February 2008, http://www.mta.ca/~cwelch/matter.pdf.

\(^{61}\) In several early lecture courses, up to and including *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology*, Heidegger pits the view of philosophy as a science versus philosophy as world-view against each other to elaborate the failures of both, but also to uncover the genuine guiding motivation from the phenomenon itself which they try to capture: namely, the proper relation between the sciences and philosophy.
status. Whereas ontology studies being in general, the ontic sciences each treat some region of being. These sciences articulate the various regions of being that are opened up by a prior understanding of being. Logic is one particular ontical science which treats logical entities. Since ontology studies the being of entities generally, it inquires into the transcendental conditions of any inquiry into specific entities at all, logic included. But it is not the role of ontology to correct the internal logic of the sciences – or to replace logic as the theory of theory – but to show how such scientific comportment is made possible only through Dasein’s acting upon things in the world. As a particular ontical science, logic also stands in this derivative nature to ontology on Heidegger’s account. The point of Heidegger’s critique of logic thus amounts to the demonstration that ontology ‘comes before’ logic: that an understanding of being is the presupposition of all logical assertion; logic has its limits in this necessary presupposition. This is the fundamental point of Heidegger’s philosophy of logic.

And yet, Heidegger thus makes equivocal use of the term ‘logic’ – on the one hand it stands for the object of his critique, namely, logic as the ontical science which studies the region of the logical and, on the other hand, it stands for Heidegger’s positive vision of logic as a properly philosophical discipline which uncovers the ontological presuppositions of the ontical science of logic. This equivocation, although remaining harmless, follows a common pattern found in Heidegger’s writings. Most famously, Heidegger’s account of ‘truth as disclosure’ as the precondition for any ‘truth as correspondence’ makes equivocal use of the term ‘truth’ – both as the (ontological) condition and the (ontical) conditioned. In his well known criticism, Ernst Tugendhat claims that Heidegger’s notion of ‘truth as disclosure’ entirely misses what is normally attributed to the concept of truth. However, I would claim that the ‘equivocation’ at

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62 Husserlian phenomenology, which studies the structures of one being, namely ‘consciousness,’ remains tied to only one region of being and thus overlooks the prior understanding of being which makes possible such a study. As Heidegger says in 1923: “Being in the sense of being a region for science misplaces more than ever the possibility of letting the entity be encountered in its character of being. This tendency (grounded in the dominance of today’s idea of science) must be reversed, insofar as it is necessary to see that this point of departure is not an original one. The concept of consciousness has in fact been simply taken over by Husserl from Cartesian psychology and Kantian epistemology.” Heidegger, *Introduction to Phenomenological Research*, 208 [GA 17, 270-271].

63 For one, Tugendhat claims that Heidegger’s account contains no account of falsity as contrasting with truth. For instance, see Ernst Tugendhat, *Der Wahrheitsbegriff bei Husserl und Heidegger* (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1970), 335. Tugendhat ultimately holds that Heidegger’s notion of truth as uncovering is only a necessary, but not a sufficient, condition for truth as it is normally understood and as such Heidegger’s ‘definition’ is no definition at all. Ernst Tugendhat, “Heidegger’s Idea of Truth,” in *Critical Heidegger*, ed. Christopher E. Macann (London: Routledge, 1996), 227-240.
work here is an essential equivocation and not at all misleading. Similarly, Heidegger’s ‘equivocal’ use of ‘logic’ is not a mere equivocation, but is an ‘essential equivocation,’ an equivocation whereby disparate meanings necessarily revolve around this central keyword due to a primordial relatedness of the phenomena under consideration. I turn now to an investigation of Heidegger’s critique of the theoretical prejudice and the prevalence of understanding logic solely as an ontical science in Husserl and the neo-Kantians’ work.

3.3 Husserlian and Neo-Kantian Assumptions about the Meaning of Being

We have seen in previous chapters that Husserl shares with the neo-Kantians, of both the Marburg and Baden schools, a ‘tendency towards the theoretical or scientific.’ However, there are radical differences which at first sight would appear to especially distinguish the two strands of thought in their basic conceptions of the meaning of being. Whereas Husserl aims for a scientific, a priori (eidetic) account of consciousness in general, the neo-Kantians, especially Natorp and Cassirer, aim for an account of scientific consciousness only. As such, Husserl seems to posit ideal (Platonic) essences as the highest realm of beings while the neo-Kantians take the objects formed in scientific cognition as the sole realm of beings. As I demonstrate presently, despite the difference in scope of investigation, there is a sense in which both Husserl and the neo-Kantians actually agree on the meaning of being as intimately related to consciousness.

The neo-Kantians commonly reject the representationalist account of knowledge whereby true judgements (knowledge) amount to a representation of objects which exist

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66 This is not to say that ‘consciousness’, Husserl’s main object of inquiry, itself belongs to a region of Platonic essences.

67 The following argument is based on my reading of Heidegger’s *History of the Concept of Time* §§12-13 (on Husserl) and *Basic Problems of Phenomenology* §§7-9 (on Kant) together with my reading of the neo-Kantian position. This latter agrees with the standard reading in many respects. See, for instance, Heinrich Rickert, “Zwei Wege der Erkenntnistheorie,” *Kant-Studien* 14 (1909): 169-228; Paul Natorp, “Kant und die Marburger Schule,” *Kant-Studien* 17 (1912): 193-221; and more recently, chapter 3 of Michael Friedman, *A Parting of the Ways: Carnap, Cassirer, and Heidegger* (Chicago: Open Court, 2000); Crowell, *Husserl, Heidegger, and the Space of Meaning*, 23-36; Käufer, “On Heidegger on Logic,” 461-465; and Kim, *Plato in Germany*, 46-87. My account of the relation between the Husserlian and neo-Kantian understanding of being largely agrees with Kim’s, as found in section 5.3 of his book.
independently of our judgements. They thereby reject both the metaphysical realist and extreme empiricist positions. The former takes objects as entirely transcendent to our thought, existing independently ‘above and beyond’ our sense perceptions; and yet we form judgements about these objects, and have knowledge precisely when our judgements match the state of the transcendent objects; that is, when we form true judgements. The neo-Kantians point to the impossibility of attaining the requisite independent access to these objects, by their very nature, by which to compare our judgements to assess whether they really do represent the objects they purport to. In this way the metaphysical realist position falls out as indefensible. Similarly, any extreme empiricist position which has recourse to the pre-conceptual data of sense experience overlooks the fact that any judgement about this unformed sense-data is impossible: these ‘objects’ are ‘infinitely heterogeneous’ and such an unorganized amalgam of sensations simply makes no sense. There is nothing for the judgement to agree with since all the extreme empiricist allows for is a chaotic tangle of meaningless sense data. The extreme empiricist view thus also falls out as indefensible.

For the judgements to be formed in the first place, neo-Kantians hold (following the Kantian Copernican Revolution), the object qua object must be constituted for the subject through the judgement itself:68 there is no ‘being’ of the object outside the being generated by my judging truly that ‘S is P’. The pre-conceptual data given through the senses are organized by the application of a concept – there is no object prior to its organization. Such application accords with the a priori logical structure of the judgement itself. Thereby, the sense-data is categorized for the first time in such a way that it can become the object of empirical ‘object-ivity’. Therefore, ontology for the neo-Kantians becomes the logic of correct judgement. ‘Being’ for them is nothing other than the copula in true predication (which expresses a true judgement). The neo-Kantian account of ‘being’ is thus exclusively focussed on theoretical phenomena and becomes the theory of science which ignores pre-theoretical phenomena altogether (since this is either senseless, or the source of mere opinion, not knowledge). Thus, logic as theory of science, as epistemology, doubles as the science of being, as ontology, for the neo-Kantians; their ontology is limited by their privileging theoretical objects as constructs of theoretical cognition, which covers their sole understanding of being.

68 Of course this is where the neo-Kantians part with Kant as they subsume the faculty of pure intuition under the faculty of the understanding. See Käufer, “On Heidegger on Logic,” 462; Michael Friedman, A Parting of the Ways, 32.
Husserl, on the other hand, strives for an eidetic account of all conscious activity, the theoretical included. It would then seem that his would naturally be a more robust ontology. Simply put, Husserl begins his eidetic investigation with various modes of empirical givenness and reduces them to their essential modes of givenness. In a sense this is where Husserl’s ontological investigations lie: here the being of given beings is meant to be explained. Through a series of phenomenological reductions, Husserl redescribes the ontic given in terms of its eidetic structure – that is, in its eidetic-ontological core. Although his later positing of essences as (self-subsisting) correlates of conscious acts seems to contravene the neo-Kantian focus on acts of consciousness in their generation of the being of beings, there are striking similarities to be found even here.

While the neo-Kantians understand being as the copular constitution of empirical (scientific) predication, being for Husserl is a correlate of consciousness. The intentional structures of consciousness constitute the phenomena. Although Husserl does not fall into the sway of over-epistemologization and an exclusive focus on scientific consciousness, in his reduction of ontology to a theory of the subject in his later works he does resort to an emphasis on subjectivity much the same as the neo-Kantians. By moving toward the study of essences, Husserl takes a step away from the initial impetus of phenomenology. The study of phenomena qua phenomena is replaced by a study of phenomena qua subjective correlate. Ontology for Husserl becomes a study of subjectivity. Although he considers a wider range of subjective acts, Husserl’s ontological commitments are still limited to what appears to the conscious (knowing) subject. Heidegger will aim to reverse Husserl’s move and reinstate the radical rigor of phenomenology by following the spirit of phenomenology with even greater fidelity than the founder of the movement, looking to things as they are given prior to any reflective awareness of their givenness.

3.4 Heidegger versus Husserl

The inquiry into the question of being reveals the core of Heidegger’s reconceptualization of Husserlian phenomenology, as stated clearly in the introduction of Being and Time.

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69 This move toward a study of essences is found most clearly in Husserl’s later idealism as opposed to his earlier ‘pure phenomenology as description’ phase.

70 As we will see, Heidegger argues that in this way the being of the phenomena themselves becomes overlooked.

71 To what extent Heidegger’s fundamental ontology, in particular his reaction to Husserl’s account of intentionality, is tied to Husserlian phenomenology remains a live debate. Most scholars now seem to read Heidegger’s work as a progressive unfolding of Husserl’s phenomenology: see for instance, Dermot
While Husserl turns toward a search for the ‘essences’ by which the ontical sciences are
guided, this ‘ontological investigation’ leaves the very question of the nature of these
‘essences’ themselves unquestioned. On Heidegger’s account, without inquiring into the
meaning of being (here the meaning of ‘essence’ itself) of beings, phenomenology fails to
retain its pledge to be the most rigorous of all the sciences.

Heidegger controverts what he sees as Husserl’s mistake, indicating that the
subject-matter of phenomenology, if it is to remain true to die Sachen (as in the rallying
cry ‘Zu den Sachen selbst’), is being: “phenomenology is the science of the Being of
entities – ontology” (BT 61/37). The traditional division between phenomena –
appearance – and their hidden being – the division between the realm of dynamic
becoming and stable being seems to be thereby ignored. For Kant, for instance,
phenomenology as the ‘science of appearance’ stands in stark contrast to the ‘sciences of
beings.’ This rejection is not a mere denial, however, since Heidegger follows another
path of inquiry. Instead, Heidegger insists that the access to being can only remain
securely founded if it follows our most primordial lived experience as its clue. His project
differs from Husserl, again, by taking a circuitous route through lived experience to gain
an understanding of our basic encounters of beings (and their attendant modes of being).

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Moran’s thesis that Heidegger simply examines the ontological aspects of intentionality (Dermot Moran,
“Heidegger’s Critique of Husserl’s and Brentano’s Accounts of Intentionality,” Inquiry 43 (2000): 39-65); or Burt Hopkins clear statement that “what is at issue for Husserl, with the progressive reflective unfolding
of the constitutional essences of the natural attitude and its correlative thesis of the world, is isomorphic
with Heidegger’s reawakening of the question about the meaning of Being on the basis of the
Seinsverständnis manifested by Dasein’s essential composition as being-in-the-world” (Burt Hopkins,
Intentionality in Husserl and Heidegger: The Problem of the Original Method and Phenomenon of
Phenomenology (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1993), 185); or Robert Dostal’s interpretation of Heidegger’s work as
framed within Husserlian phenomenology, where Being and Time in particular “follows in the footsteps
of Husserl’s project” (Robert Dostal, “Time and Phenomenology in Husserl and Heidegger,” in The
Cambridge Companion to Heidegger, ed. Charles Guignon (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1993), 142); or Steven Galt Crowell’s most influential account of Heidegger’s objection to Husserl’s
transcendental phenomenology as being really a disagreement over the proper interpretation of
transcendental subjectivity itself in Crowell, Husserl, Heidegger, and the Space of Meaning. My work
follows in the tradition established by these scholars as I emphasize disagreements with Husserl as the
impetus for many of Heidegger’s central insights: yet these disagreements result not in a full-scale overturn
of Husserl’s phenomenology, but an inquiry into the origins of the phenomena which Husserl takes as most
basic. Conversely, Taylor Carmen vehemently denies any continuity between Husserl and Heidegger’s
thought: “Heidegger’s fundamental ontology cannot be understood as a mere supplement or continuation,
let alone ‘translation,’ of Husserl’s philosophy. Construed as an account of hermeneutic conditions, the
analytic of Dasein denies any identification of intentionality with transcendental subjectivity or ‘pure’
consciousness…. [T]he hermeneutic phenomenology of Being and Time amounts to a wholesale rejection of
the transcendental and eidetic reductions by means of which Husserl seeks to establish pure consciousness
as the privileged locus of intentional phenomena.” Taylor Carmen, Heidegger’s Analytic: Interpretation,
However, for an account of Heidegger’s ‘own’ phenomenological reductions, different from Husserl’s but in
the same tradition, see Russell, “Phenomenological Reduction in Heidegger,” 229-248.

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72 See Tom Rockmore, Kant and Phenomenology (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 2011), 42.

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instead of looking directly at the phenomenologically reduced structure of the transcendental ego.

Although Heidegger acknowledges that *Being and Time* would not have been possible without Husserl’s work – and he names the *Logical Investigations* in particular as the place where phenomenology first emerged – Heidegger’s Marburg lecture courses are replete with both explicit and veiled criticisms of Husserlian phenomenology. Two examples set the stage for understanding the importance behind some of Heidegger’s key conceptual shifts. First, in his 1928 lectures Heidegger lauds the second volume Husserl’s *Logical Investigations* for preparing a new stage in the investigation of intentionality beyond Brentano “insofar as he shows that intentionality determines the essence of consciousness as such, the essence of reason.” And yet, Heidegger continues, Husserl takes over the Brentanian trend of not inquiring into the nature of the psyche and not asking after the being of the being that is constituted as consciousness. As Heidegger says, “the insight into intentionality does not go far enough to see that grasping this structure as the essential structure of Dasein must revolutionize the whole concept of the human being.” Heidegger introduces his own work precisely as this ‘revolutionary’ account of the human being; Husserl is praised for his insights into intentionality, and yet he is chastised for remaining, ironically, tied to the same traditional unquestioned metaphysics as Brentano, taking the psyche (soul, subjectivity) as an uninvestigated given.

The significance of Heidegger’s work, in his own words, thus lies in its revolutionary character as he takes the necessary leap beyond Husserlian phenomenology into the question of the meaning of being. Whereas Husserl takes the first *Sache* of phenomenology to be an appearance to consciousness, Heidegger looks for the first *Sache* in (pre-reflective) lived experience. Heidegger works out the mode of being of that being which knows on the basis of a prior being-in-the-world: for Heidegger phenomena are not first given as intentional correlates of an intentional act, but as beings (encountered within a world). A pre-reflective relation to beings, and hence to Being, precedes *every* mode of consciousness, the theoretical included.

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75 Heidegger’s ‘revolution’ is of a conservative nature: he looks to reinstate the initial impetus of phenomenology that drove Husserl’s earliest works, namely, phenomenology as *descriptive*. 
Second, and related to the above, Heidegger’s ‘immanent critique’ provided four years earlier in the summer semester of 1925, shows him working in the name of phenomenology, similarly claiming to revolutionize the concept of phenomenology itself, from within. Again, Husserlian phenomenology comes under attack for standing “under the constraints of an old tradition, especially when it comes to the most primordial determination of the theme most proper to it, intentionality” (HCT 128/178). Husserl’s phenomenology, which claims to be ‘presuppositionless,’\(^76\) to be determined solely from the matter itself, thereby contradicts its own basic principle – ‘to things themselves!’ – leading Heidegger to claim that it fails its foremost task of determining its field of investigation. This latter oversight makes Husserlian phenomenology entirely “unphenomenological! – that is to say, purportedly phenomenological!” (HCT 128/178) Again Heidegger transforms the slogan ‘to things themselves’ into the call to focus on the very being of those things, as opposed to the search for a secure method for their access through an investigation of consciousness; in Heidegger’s eyes, Husserl not only left the being of the intentional undetermined, he also unquestioningly takes over the “categorically primal separations in the entity (consciousness and reality)” without any further clarification (HCT 128-129/178).

Conversely, the determination of these ways of being is exactly what guides Heidegger’s work during his phenomenological decade. Heidegger’s radicalization of Husserl’s phenomenology thus amounts to not simply a turning away from phenomenology in Husserl’s sense, but to a turning directly towards it roots, or origins, by determining the various senses of being or ways of being appropriate to each ‘kind’ of entity.\(^77\) While all of modern philosophy, Husserl’s work included, works within the presupposition of the Cartesian distinction between the res cogitans and the res extensa as two different kinds of substance, Heidegger takes his task to be precisely an uncovering

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\(^76\) “An epistemological investigation that can seriously claim to be scientific must…satisfy the principle of freedom from presuppositions. This principle, we think, only seeks to express the strict exclusion of all statements not permitting of a comprehensive phenomenological realization. Every epistemological investigation that we carry out must have its pure foundation in phenomenology” (LUI 177/Hua 19, 24-25).

\(^77\) In a recent article, Ryan Hickerson argues that Husserl himself did not believe that his success or failure turned upon discovering the being of those beings qua entities and that this is a crucial factor in assessing the veracity of Heidegger’s ‘immanent critique.’ Ryan Hickerson, “Neglecting the Question of Being: Heidegger’s Argument Against Husserl,” Inquiry 52 (2009): 574-595. Although an interesting position, and a correct analysis of Husserl’s intentions as an author, Hickerson never argues for why an immanent critique must remain true to the author’s intentions: phenomenology itself urges that one remain true solely to the matters themselves, not to what the author wanted to express.
of the origins of such a presupposition. The theoretical stance, ubiquitous throughout modern philosophy, is precisely what gives rise to such a presupposition. Although Husserl purports to study all modes of consciousness it is precisely through his bracketing of the world, his search after essences, that leads Husserl to just such a theoretical position: for Heidegger any bracketing of the world eliminates the possibility of accessing the very roots of our conscious activities themselves. Husserl’s attempt in the *Logical Investigations* to ground basic logical notions on everyday experience points in the right direction for Heidegger. However, Husserl’s work remains limited by his very starting point. Heidegger’s turn toward more primordial ways we are first in the world, prior to any reflective awareness of our activity, thus also acts as a more rigorous account of the origins of these basic notions of logic.

Despite this radicalization, in one important specific sense Heidegger’s work remains true to Husserl’s insights. Heidegger himself names Husserl’s phenomenology as having discovered the true sense of categorical intuition as demonstrating that “the non-sensory and ideal cannot without further ado be identified with the immanent, conscious, subjective” (*HCT* 58/78-79). With insight into the categorial, experience of non-sensorial meanings is opened up; and even more so, Husserl’s categorial intuition opens the possibility of detaching these meanings from the merely subjective. In particular, the question about the meaning of being can be pursued as neither an empirical fact, nor as an ideal addition to beings supplied by consciousness. Categorial intuition reveals beings themselves, in what they are, to us. As we have seen, Heidegger’s entire existential analytic investigates the essence of Dasein (which is precisely its existence). We can see Heidegger’s greatest distance from Husserl not in a rejection of Husserl’s phenomenology, but rather in a return to the initial impulse of phenomenology itself: to follow the things themselves in order to achieve a philosophy with as rigorous a foundation as possible.

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79 And he deepens this account even further by uncovering Dasein’s temporality as that which underpins our primordial way of being-in-the-world in the second half of *Being and Time*.

80 As Jacques Taminiaux relates, in his last seminar in Zähringen, which Taminiaux attended, Heidegger confessed that “the doctrine of categorial intuition proclaimed by Husserl in the *Logical Investigations* had in effect provided him with the basis for the problematic of *Being and Time*.” Jacques Taminiaux, “The Husserlian Heritage in Heidegger’s Notion of the Self,” trans. François Renaud, in *Reading Heidegger from the Start: Essays in his Earliest Thought*, ed. Theodore Kisiel and John van Buren (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 1994), 269. Yet, as we will see below, with Heidegger’s revolutionary reconception of phenomenology, categorical intuition comes to have a drastically different meaning for him than it held for Husserl. Still, Husserl’s insight supplies Heidegger with this crucial tool, even in its modified form.
3.5 Heidegger versus the Neo-Kantians

Just as Heidegger criticizes Husserl for overlooking lived experience in favour of theoretically laying bare the structures of transcendental consciousness, Heidegger criticizes the neo-Kantians for ignoring facticity to uncover the transcendental conditions of scientific-theoretical experience. As such, both streams of thought ignore the aim of genuine philosophy: namely, rigorous ontology. In their understanding of scientific objects as the paradigmatic beings, the neo-Kantians end up taking beings as a uniform mass: mathematical physics is the highest mode of scientific thought for the Marburg neo-Kantians, and here objects are taken as uniform in their measurability while the Baden neo-Kantians also work from the ‘fact of science’ but with a broadened notion of ‘science’. Taking the facts of science as a starting point, Heidegger argues that the neo-Kantians are left with a very scant set of basic concepts. But these basic concepts are their building blocks for explaining all phenomena: due to the limitation of their starting point, the neo-Kantians will be able to explain only a limited number of phenomena. For Heidegger this limitation cuts off the neo-Kantian approach from attaining the goal of any genuine philosophy of uncovering the meaning of being in general.

The limitation of the meaning of being to the copula might work for the limited domain of science. Yet by attempting to apply this limited meaning generally the neo-Kantians end up reducing the world to what appears within a scientific system, to what can be accounted for within some logically closed set of scientific propositions; the world becomes nothing but the world of science, nothing but the totality of what scientific thought posits. By proceeding through Dasein Heidegger remains true to Husserl’s initial anti-neo-Kantian impulse to account for every mode of experience, not only the scientific. Ultimately, however, Heidegger succeeds both approaches since their interpretations of being – as presence and as copula, respectively – are derivative of the more primordial meaning of being uncovered in the existential analytic: Heidegger’s success can be measured by his being able to account for the roots of both assumptions about the meaning of being within his more robust investigation.

The neo-Kantian priority given to epistemology is thereby also undermined as Heidegger uncovers the roots of questions about the knowing subject in Dasein’s ontological structure: phenomenology as ontology is more fundamental than epistemology. Similarly, the neo-Kantian pan-logicism and systematicity inhibits any
access to lived experience. The purely theoretical stance and absolutization of logic finds its limits here. The neo-Kantians take all categories as arising solely from the spontaneous action of the understanding while Heidegger uncovers their grounds in the pre-logical significations of our primordial being-in-the-world. Therefore, we can conclude, the epistemological approach to transcendental logic is derivative: logical analysis of the categories must be grounded in an analysis of Dasein.

4 Philosophy of Logic

As we have seen, Heidegger’s early account of lived, pre-theoretical, experience as that which falls out as unthematizable by neo-Kantian pan-logicism is worked out more fully throughout the 1920 lecture courses and writings up to and including Being and Time. Whereas Heidegger’s early courses were mostly focussed polemical attacks on the psychologistic, historicist, neo-Kantian, (philosophy as) world-view, but also Husserlian-phenomenological, positions, he expands his polemics throughout the 1920s to increasingly larger areas of traditional philosophy, all the way back to Plato and the Ancient Greeks. In fact, his critique of the tradition pivots around his locating the proper place of logos. This is a question which Heidegger sees as the central concern of philosophy since antiquity, reaching its high-point in post-Kantian thought. The pervasive focus and reliance upon logos cum logic is unable to thematize its own foundations which Heidegger uncovers as early as 1919, albeit only rudimentarily, in everyday lived experience. Beyond the criticisms, a positive account also emerges. However, it should not be overlooked that after his earliest endeavours Heidegger’s work moves increasingly away from an investigation of logic proper; he maintains generally that ontology and logic should be kept separate only to concentrate his gaze on the ‘ontology side’ of this separation. And yet, from this separation itself, Heidegger’s views on the ‘logic side’ can be understood and to some extent reconstructed.

Indeed, Heidegger’s writings of the Being and Time-era manifest his drive to complete his early vision of setting the foundations for a systematic, scientific philosophy in fundamental ontology – albeit now under the heading of hermeneutic phenomenology or “Temporal science” (BPP 324/461). This represents his positive vision of how logic,

81 Although, the story is not quite so simple: Käufer unearths Heidegger’s commitment to systematicity in Being and Time, skillfully arguing that Heidegger provides perhaps “the last effort in the history of transcendental philosophy to construct a system in the traditional mold.” Käufer, “Systematicity and Temporality in Being and Time,” 183. Based on this argument, it must be conceded that Heidegger does not reject systematicity per se in Being and Time, but rather the neo-Kantian approach to philosophy as a system taking its cue from the fact of science.
and philosophy in general, must be definitively grounded in lived experience. The upshot: *primordial temporality* marks the condition of ultimate structural foundation; not only all objectification, but all experience generally is founded upon primordial temporality, as the “original constitution of the Dasein’s being” (*BPP* 16/22). As such, logic and theoretical thought also come to be shown to have their ground in the temporal structure of Dasein.

### 4.1 General Strategy

Heidegger develops a general strategy for demonstrating the derivative nature of traditional logical notions: beginning with various logical concepts he proceeds from there to derive them from the background of pre-thematic engagement in the world, from significant dealings with the world. Certain fundamental logical notions – the copula, specific determination, judgement, inference, assertion, truth, and formalization being the foremost – are found to have their ground in ‘being-in-the-world’ and thus to have prior conditions. By demonstrating that judgements, for instance, have a prior ground, Heidegger controverts a typical assumption of logic – whether ancient or modern – that judgements have ultimate priority as the most basic constituents of thought. Or, by showing how the copula does not first and foremost arise as a component of the proposition, but rather resides within the “truly relevant problems of philosophy as the science of being” (*BPP* 178/253-254), and thus has its ground in temporality, Heidegger decides against the majority of philosophical inquiries which take the copula as an unanalysable basic component of the proposition. In any case, each of these (theoretical, logical) notions is shown to emanate fundamentally from our non-theoretical, pre-logical everyday way of being.

As we have seen, Heidegger shows the scientific-theoretical urge to understand things ‘just as they are,’ according to their true substance apart from our dealings with them, apart from their meaning or significance in any one context – to understand things

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82 Cyril Welch views this general procedure more broadly, arguing that “one of the achievements of Heidegger’s *Being and Time* is that it provides a sustained account of our habitat [world] as syntactical. And that it thereby unearths the very roots of that intellectual discipline we call logic.” The focus on syntax is seen as pervading all modern intellectual endeavours from political science, to physics and musicology. In: Cyril Welch, “Why Heidegger and Logic?” (Sackville, NB: Atcost Press, 2006), 5, http://www.mta.ca/~cwelch/heidegger_and_logic.pdf.

83 This is typically taken to be the case since 1) the judgement forms a unity (although it is comprised of various conceptual elements that can be separated out, these elements on their own do not constitute the whole, only with the judgement are they united); and 2) only the judgement as unity can be true or false (as such it bears the feature which characterizes knowledge *per se*). See: Heidegger, *The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic*, 24 [GA 26, 31].
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as purely present-at-hand (isolated from any context of involvement) – to have its prior roots in Dasein’s everyday world of interaction. As he says elsewhere:

This [scientific] ‘system of Relations’, as something constitutive for worldhood, is so far from volatilizing the Being of the ready-to-hand within-the-world, that the worldhood of the world provides the basis on which such entities can for the first time be discovered as they are ‘substantially’ ‘in themselves’. And only if entities within-the-world can be encountered at all, is it possible, in the field of such entities, to make accessible what is just present-at-hand and no more. By reason of their Being-just-present-at-hand-and-no-more, these latter entities have their ‘properties’ defined mathematically in ‘functional concepts.’ Ontologically, such concepts are possible only in relation to entities whose Being has the character of pure substantiality. Functional concepts are never possible except as formalized substantial concepts. (BT 122/88)

The ‘functional concepts’ here make tacit reference to Cassirer’s attempt to account for reason’s constructive and applicative nature according to the Marburg neo-Kantian way of thought which leaves the fundamental grounds of their investigation unexamined on Heidegger’s interpretation;⁸⁴ their investigations proceed upon the hidden assumption that all beings have the being with ‘the character of pure substantiality.’ Recall that on the Marburg account, reason must reconstruct the functions of thought, the pure concepts, which merely reside in the faculties of the mind; reason must then actively apply these pure concepts, now as categories of the understanding to the intuitive manifold of the sensibly given. The goal of logic is then to work out the relations between the ideal contents of thoughts and the real application of them through which scientific activity comes to be. The functional concepts ‘apply’ to objective, ‘purely substantial’ beings alone.

But, Heidegger maintains, the structure of the world as significant contextual whole itself provides the condition for the possibility of understanding beings as purely substantial in the first place: “it is first a matter of bringing out the temporality of Dasein, not in the sense that is now worked out with any theory.”⁸⁵ Moreover, all logico-theoretical notions founded upon the assumption of beings as just present-at-hand, themselves find their prior ground in our dealings with entities within the meaningful world. However, Heidegger does not in fact simply aim to uncover the conditions for the

⁸⁴ See the first two chapters of Ernst Cassirer, Substance and Function and Einstein’s Theory of Relativity, trans. William C. Swabey and Marie C. Swabey (Chicago: Open Court, 1923).
possibility of these various notions, as Kant would, but rather he aims to take a step further. Heidegger argues that it is not enough to simply uncover the conditions for the possibility of Nature, for instance, but one must uncover why entities other than Dasein are “understood in their Being, if they are disclosed in accordance with the conditions of their possibility” (BT 184/145). Heidegger aims to understand ‘the understanding’ in its most basic structure. However, Heidegger’s point applies more widely than simply to Kantian and neo-Kantian thought. Indeed, the seeds of his critique of classical logical study already lie in the above account. Heidegger opens the path to understanding the basic notions of logic as rooted in our everyday dealings. The rootedness of these basic notions also points, as we will see, ultimately to their limited scope of application.

To this end Heidegger’s work introduces the existentials of Dasein, and in particular the existential ‘discourse,’ together with the consequential structure of Dasein as projecting possibilities. Each of these notions points to the source of the traditional concept-judgement-inference triad. Without an origin these basic constituents of logic risk leading to empty and groundless formulations. As Cyril Welch writes: “In effect, he reintroduces the distinction, familiar since Plato, between discourse leading back to origins and discourse based on origins.” The difference between Heidegger’s return to origins and that found throughout the history of philosophy can be stated succinctly: while previous philosophers point out the inadequacy or dependence of commonly held positions in order to lead one back to the origin of these inherited views, Heidegger focuses attention on the origins themselves, to the possibility of having the origins show themselves; and such research into origins remains impossible “by the means of the ‘abstractions’ of formal logic” (BT 487/437). Heidegger’s overall method deviates from traditional deductive investigation, and instead follows the phenomenological method which strives to form itself always according to the matter under investigation, to that

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86 In this sense Being and Time is a work in transcendental philosophy in the Kantian tradition, but in a more rigorous vein. As Heidegger said retrospectively: “The science of being [Heidegger’s own project] thus constituted we call the science that inquires and interprets in the light of transcendence properly understood: transcendental science. To be sure, this concept of transcendental science does not coincide directly with the Kantian; but we are certainly in a position to explicate by means of the more original concept of transcendence the Kantian idea of the transcendental and of philosophy as transcendental philosophy in their basic tendencies” (BPP 323/460).

87 As we know, he uncovers the nature of Dasein’s understanding as projecting Dasein’s “Being upon possibilities” (BT 188/148) and ultimately as “primarily futural” (BT 387/337) although, like all existentials, determined equiprimordially by the other temporal ekstases as well.

88 Although this is already apparent in the limited ontology which underlies traditional logical discourse, namely, the present-at-hand.

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which it itself discloses (BPP 328/467). Heidegger thereby not only questions but offers an alternative approach to genuinely foundational questions – whether in philosophy, the theory of judgement, or by extension, in mathematics – than that offered by a strictly logistic viewpoint.

Heidegger’s earliest argument – that the neo-Kantian conception of philosophy rests on conditions of a prior givenness which they deny – takes on a sharper form where his research into origins becomes more nuanced. Heidegger’s uncovering of lived experience in his 1919 lecture course thus anticipates his later critique of logic. His goal in the Being and Time era remains true to his project of working out a rigorous philosophic method wherein “the problem of philosophical concept formation is not of a belated nature that pertains to the theory of science; it is the philosophical problem in its origin.” Heidegger insists that “clarity in scientific research is possible only by way of a philosophizing logic” and thus that an understanding of how the sciences hang together can only be “appropriated from out of the pre-understanding of theoretical truth and ultimately truth in general” (LQT 14/17). This ‘philosophizing logic’ contrasts directly with both scholastic logic and logic as the ‘theory of theory’ and instead names Heidegger’s project itself. Heidegger’s goal is not the promotion of an irrationalism, or anti-logical, un-rigorous mode of philosophizing as many have understood him over the years: the goal always remains in these writings to attain the most rigorous foundations for philosophy, foundations which unite the multiplicity inherent in phenomena.

4.2 Judgement

Heidegger’s philosophical investigations into the grounds of logic broadly continue in the Husserlian vein. Husserl’s logical investigations also find grounds for central logical notions – truth, falsehood, judgement, representation, and so on – in ordinary experience.

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90 For a comprehensive study which reconstructs the ‘phenomenological method’ in Being and Time, see Matheson Russell, “Phenomenon and Semblance: A Study of Phenomenological Method in Heidegger’s Being and Time” (PhD diss., University of New South Wales, 2005).
91 Martin Heidegger, Phenomenology of Intuition and Expression: Theory of Philosophical Concept Formation, trans. Tracy Colony (London: Continuum, 2010), 130 [GA 59, 169].
93 The phenomenological investigation of the grounds of traditional logical concepts is brought out fully in Alexander Pfänder’s 1921 work Logik, recently translated as: Alexander Pfänder, Logic, trans. Donald Ferrari (Frankfurt: Ontos Verlag, 2009). Heidegger cites this book approvingly as “a traditional logic, phenomenologically purified” (LQT 23/28).
Heidegger’s Philosophy of Logic

In his 1919 lectures Heidegger applauds Husserl’s approach for accounting for the full range of experience and thus making all aspects of life relevant to philosophy. However, already in those lectures Heidegger doubts Husserl’s approach: ultimately, Husserl too succumbs to the pervasive theoretical approach overlooking lived experience *qua* lived. Heidegger’s is still a phenomenology of logic in this sense of looking to uncover the roots of central logical notions in everyday experience: but with the difference that Heidegger does not follow the method of bracketing the world, but takes Dasein’s being-in-the-world precisely as his point of departure.

Logic requires such a grounding for several reasons. First, and most obviously, many basic logical notions are simply ambiguous. For example, Heidegger uncovers a multitude of understandings of the copula ‘is’ – the ‘is’ of essence, existence, and truth – in logic. And yet, there is no logical investigation into the unity of these disparate notions (*BPP* §17). Heidegger aims to uncover this unity in multiplicity through his existential grounding of logic. Second, logic simply takes its basic terms as undefinable. The most obvious example is the concept of ‘validity’ or the concept of truth. Even where ‘true judgement’ is defined, truth itself remains undefined in so far as its mode of being remains unexplored. So long as they remain unrooted and purportedly ‘indefinable’ such notions remain entirely unphilosophical. As with all of the basic logical terms, Heidegger uncovers the condition of the possibility of judgemental, ontic, truth in Dasein’s understanding of being, namely in Dasein’s transcendence.

In particular, Heidegger argues that whereas traditional logic focuses on the formal structural features of the judgement – its synthetic, diaretic, and apophantic-determining features – arguing for the priority of one over the other, Heidegger urges that these features themselves can only be understood through fundamental ontology. In this case, the existential structure of the hermeneutic-as is the root of the formal structure of the synthetic-diaretic-apophantic features of the judgement: Heidegger thereby aims to uncover the structures at work within the *logos* itself whereas logicians traditionally settle on focussing indirectly on ‘external’, purely ‘syntactical’ structures; in a sense, Heidegger charges traditional logic with an overemphasis of the syntax without any explanation of the semantics of its terms. This narrow focus, for judgements in particular, overlooks the context within which assertions arise in the first place. It ignores where they first make sense. Traditional logic looks only to the formal structures; taking these as exhaustive of
the essence, logicians have closed themselves off from a complete analysis of the proposition and ultimately of an understanding of the nature of truth.

However, Heidegger does not simply stand back and argue that assertions—understood throughout the history of Western philosophy in terms of predicates belonging to subjects either in Aristotelian logic as a reflection of the nature of the subject itself or in post-Kantian logic as the manner in which given cognitions are unified through an apperceptive act—are derivative and involve presuppositions. Rather, he looks directly to how assertions work in action, arguing that they themselves contribute to the forgetting of their source. Assertions are utterances that can be true or false. As such they are open to disputation—they require that one ‘take a stand’ (BT 56/32). Those utterances where something is communicated, and yet where no true/false stand can be taken, do not count as assertions. For instance: “an exclamation, a request, a wish, a prayer” (HCT 85/116). The defining moment of assertions, as modes of discourse, is precisely their ability to be true or false.

The question then arises of how to test whether the assertion is true or false. Heidegger argues that such questioning only makes sense first of all in a context: the assertion itself arises within and has its measure of success only within a given situation. Questioning after an assertion only makes sense in a context within the significational whole of a world. For instance, the assertion ‘S is P’ occurs within some dealing with the world. With such an assertion the dealings within the world are suspended to bring the subject ‘S’ into focus as something requiring attention; a way of interpreting the subject (as P) within the particular context is then asserted: ‘S is P’. This utterance which purports its own kind of understanding is twice removed from the understanding at work initially in the uninterrupted significational whole of one’s dealings. This derivative ‘understanding’ does not accrue directly to the thing itself but arises in separation from one’s response to the thing as it arises for encounter. For the uses required in the given context, belonging to the world as a nexus of meaningful involvements, one can take up this assertion and defend it, insisting that indeed this ‘S’ can be understood as something else, ‘P’. These judgements remain suspended apart from the context, although arising essentially from a particular context.

That which we investigate in this mode of understanding in a stand-offish manner, articulated in assertions, is no longer caught up within, integrated in, the nexus of involvements that makes up our world: it is precisely the present-at-hand. The things of
the world continue to be understood at work, while this one in particular is taken out of work to be examined in an aloof, objective manner. Assertions arise from our own derivative mode of engagement with the world and give rise to a non-involved, distanced understanding of the world. Similarly, assertions give rise to a derived mode of understanding-with other Dasein. When at work in the world primordially, we communicate with one another and notice misunderstandings, all by focussing on ready-to-hand entities that arise for encounter in our shared world. However, when assertions arise, presenting themselves as ways of interpretively-understanding the world, the possibility of their truth or falsity also arises: we investigate and consider what is said as to its truth. We thereby communicate in this mode not as part of our ongoing affairs, but by putting these affairs into relief: we encounter each other in this way in a derived mode of our being. Whereas we share originary understanding with others, addressing each item that occurs as something in the shared dealings, in asserting we relocate attention to the assertion itself: whether or not it holds, while things are addressed not as something in our shared world but as having properties or not.

Since logic traditionally commences from the judgement, it can be said to ground in the ontology of the present-at-hand (BT 209/165). Here the full temporal situatedness of Dasein’s being-in-the-world is overlooked to uncover the formal structures comprising the judgement. What is at work in the stand-offish manner of communicating takes center-stage and becomes the sole object of inquiry for the logician. Yet these formal structures themselves are grounded in the originary significational situation which is Dasein’s world since the ‘S is P’ predicative judgement only arises from the projected possibilities we find in our prior interpretation of the world we are thrown into. Subject and predicate themselves take their meaning from this prior situatedness: this is their

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94 For an in depth analysis of the on-site mode of communication of our ‘mother tongue’ versus the derivative, investigative mode of communication of our ‘father tongue’ see Cyril Welch, *Linguistic Responsibility* (Victoria: Sono Nis, 1988).

95 Heidegger highlights the derivative mode of talk in modern intellectual circles which overlooks the matter itself in deference to what is said in several places. Here he talks not only of the derivative nature of assertion, but of discourse in its fallen mode of idle talk: “Nowadays, one decides about metaphysics or even higher matters at congresses. For everything which must be done nowadays, there is first a conference. One meets and meets, and everyone waits for someone else to tell him, and it doesn't really matter if it isn't said, for one has now indeed spoken one's mind. Even if all the speakers who thus speak their minds have understood little of the matter, one is of the opinion that the culmination of this lack of understanding will nevertheless eventually generate an understanding. There are people nowadays who travel from one conference to another and are convinced in doing so that something is really happening and that they have accomplished something; whereas in reality they have shirked the labour and now seek refuge in idle talk for their helplessness, which they of course do not understand. The characterization of these phenomena should not be interpreted as a moral sermon or the like, which has no place here” (HCT 272-73/376-377).
orgininary meaning. Logic itself only gets off the ground in this derivative situation where the predicate is understood as a mere property which an object can have when we abstract away from the ready-to-hand nexus of meaningful involvement to gaze at the properties of the present-at-hand entities.

4.3 Truth

This move toward a non-situated understanding of judgements, as the relation between present-at-hand entities is mirrored in the general tendency to understand truth as the correspondence between a judgement and the world. Heidegger treats the concept of truth most fully in the infamous §44a)-c) of Being and Time. Over the first two sections, he demonstrates that the traditional propositional truth relation of ‘correspondence’ is founded upon a more primordial ‘uncovering;’ he then extends the narrow focus upon propositional uncovering to any kind of uncovering and ultimately to Dasein’s disclosedness. He devotes the third section to the most pressing issue in the text, namely, to the mode of being of truth and the necessary presupposition of truth for Dasein, the necessary connection of truth and Dasein. Within Heidegger’s framework, if truth is primordially connected with being, then truth as a phenomenon must lie within the scope of fundamental ontology and thus it must show itself in the analytic of Dasein. As opposed to Husserl’s overtly platonistic presentation of truths as ideal, timeless, universal validities in the Prolegomena, for Heidegger truths are essentially tied to Dasein: “There is’ truth only in so far as Dasein is and so long as Dasein is. Entities are uncovered only when Dasein is; and only as long as Dasein is, are they disclosed” (BT 269/226).

Heidegger thereby denies not only the common view that truth first of all resides in the judgement, but also the broader claim that truth is an absolute and timeless validity. Truth for Heidegger is an existential of Dasein; with no Dasein, there is no truth, but even more, in order for Dasein to exist at all, there must be truth.

The traditional concept of truth takes the truth to reside in the judgement, where a judgement is true just when it agrees or corresponds with its object; the essence of ‘truth’ on the traditional conception thus lies in agreement/correspondence. The judgement as an act of consciousness agrees (or not) with the object which it takes as its matter; and the judgement is thereby true (or not). As an agreement between thought and thing, truth is thus a relation. Heidegger aims specifically in section a) of §44 to elucidate the ontological character of the truth-relation. He argues that truth is primordially a fundamental determination of the Dasein of human beings, not of judgements. The
analysis begins with unpacking the terms of the traditional statement of this relation: *adequatio intellectus et rei*; the terms of the *adequatio*, the *intellectus* and the *rei*, are meant to agree. And yet, as Heidegger simply notes, “they are not of the same species” so it would seem they cannot be similar: while the judgement is ideal that which it is about is Real, *present-at-hand* (*BT* 259/216).

Heidegger’s account of truth thus arises in response to the ontologically unclarified separation between the ideal and the real, as well as the general adherence to an ontology of the present-at-hand. The problem for Heidegger is the very approach taken to the question of the meaning (being) of truth: ultimately Heidegger insists (in section c) that prior to addressing the meaning of truth, the mode of being appropriate to truth must be investigated. Heidegger’s basic analysis, which anticipates his inquiry into the proper mode of being of truth, shows that the truth of a judgement does not stem from its being valid but rather its being-uncovering. But this being-uncovering is not possible without an uncoverer: namely, Dasein. Judgements are made by Dasein alone. And yet judgements are founded upon Dasein’s prior disclosure of being; here lie the ontological foundations of judgemental (and thus logical) truth. Any encounter with present-at-hand entities, or ready-to-hand entities for that matter, presupposes Dasein’s situatedness and openness. It is not that Heidegger rejects truth as correspondence as many hold him to do. Rather, Heidegger aims to provide the existential-ontological foundations of propositional truth: he uncovers that without which propositional truth could not be. In a sense Heidegger aims for a completely formal grounding of the concept of truth, disconnected from any determinate region of being: his concept of truth as unconcealment demonstrates just how language and world can correspond in the first place.

The general movement of Heidegger’s investigation of truth traverses a path from judgement through entities, to Dasein and finally to unconcealment. Whereas the tradition takes truth to reside in the judgement, Heidegger maintains that the primary locus of truth is found in entities as they are encountered; as phenomena, entities show-themselves, they are “seen as something unhidden (*alethes*); that is, they must be discovered [entdeckt]” (*BT* 56-57/33). Already with the Greeks, Aristotle in particular for Heidegger, bare sensory perception of something (*aisthesis*) is deemed ‘true’ prior to any speech (*logos*) about the thing under consideration – so much so that perception is always true, where

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96 Mark Wrathall has consistently argued that Heidegger does not reject truth as a property of judgements, but simply that this is the primary mode of truth. See for instance, Mark A. Wrathall, “Heidegger and Truth as Correspondence,” *International Journal of Philosophical Studies* 7 (1999): 69-88.
perception is meant as the most basic uncovering of beings. As we have seen, the priority of seeing remains the foundation of Western philosophy, at least since Parmenides.\(^97\) And yet, as sight comes to focus increasingly not on the *eidos* of the thing, but on the determination of the properties of an object, truth itself becomes altered.

Kant already articulates the traditional assumption that truth is defined by ‘the accordance of concept with its object,’ or of the correspondence between an ‘inner’ thought and an ‘outer’ object in reality (*CPR* 73/B82). Kant answers the question of the nature of truth in both the *Critique of Pure Reason* and his various lectures on logic by distinguishing between a) the general criterion of truth of our knowledge with respect to a given matter and b) the general criterion of truth irrespective of all matter, and thus according to form alone (*CPR* 73-75/A57-A61; B82-B86).\(^98\) The former affords no solution, since truth as the adequation between knowledge and its object must isolate the determinate matter in any given cognitive act, thereby obviating the possibility of a *general* criterion for knowledge of an object – and “such a criterion is self-contradictory” (*CPR* 73/B82). The latter, on the other hand, does have a possible solution: and yet this pure or formal-logical truth is a mere *conditio sine qua non*; in Kant’s general logic truth is an agreement of cognition with the laws of the understanding; the criteria determine to what the *form* alone of a thought must conform according to its own universal laws, that is, to avoid self-contradiction.\(^99\) As such, formal truth is necessary but not sufficient since general logic has nothing to say about the content of thought or judgement. In a very narrow sense, then, Heidegger’s concept of truth as unconcealment – the formal condition for the possibility for truth as correspondence – plays a similar role to Kant’s notion of the general formal-criterion of truth. The difference lies precisely in how they understand the relation between Dasein and the world.

As early as 1924 in his “Being-There and Being-True According to Aristotle,” Heidegger charges that Kant relies upon two assumptions which act as barriers to any appropriation of a genuine conception of truth, namely “the beliefs (a) that knowing, in whatever form, is capable of emerging from or coming out of the subject in which it is

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\(^97\) “Being is that which shows itself in the pure perception which belongs to beholding, and only by such seeing does Being get disclosed. Primordial and genuine truth lies in pure beholding. This thesis has remained the foundation of western philosophy ever since” (*BT* 215/171).

\(^98\) See also the Jäsche Logic’s distinction between ‘universal material’ and ‘universal formal’ criteria of truth (*LOL* 558-560); and the Dohna-Wundlacken Logic on the impossibility of a universal material criterion of truth: if the criterion for the agreement with an object were universal “it would have to occur when I abstract from all matter, - and the agreement of my cognition of the object with my cognition of the object would be a tautological criterion” (*LOL* 455).

\(^99\) For a clear statement, see for instance Kant’s Vienna Logic (*LOL* 281).
somehow encapsulated, and (b) that knowledge is true only insofar as it follows the laws of thinking” (BH 220-221). Although not stated explicitly, Heidegger clearly takes Kant as one main proponent of these beliefs, along with the adherents of realism and idealism. What all of these philosophical positions maintain in common is the presupposition of a subject-object split, whereby the subject can leap from its cage of consciousness out to the object in the world (realism) or it cannot (idealism). Heidegger insists that this Cartesian subjectivism hiding at the core of modern philosophy, and thus all modern accounts of truth, take Aristotle as their common root. But this appropriation of Aristotle is based on a misinterpretation: hence Heidegger’s opposition to the general consensus which considers Aristotle to have initiated the discussion of the concept of truth as residing in the judgement or reason. Heidegger takes issue specifically with the standard attribution to Aristotle of the claim that truth resides in the assertion or judgement (or here the ‘statement-making sentence’): in the passages of Aristotle usually appealed to, “there is no discussion at all about judgement. There term does not even occur there. The passage deals with logos. However, logos does not mean judgement, nor does it mean reason or concept. Rather, it means discursive speech [Rede]” (BH 221). In this way Heidegger finds in Aristotle the roots of his very own philosophy of logic wherein basic logical notions are grounded in the everydayness of Dasein. Dasein as discursive is always already in a meaningfully interpreted world. Dasein’s openness is what makes it possible for some entity to be revealed in the first place: without this prior revelation no judgement and hence no true judgement could arise at all.

4.4 Heidegger’s Alternative: Productive Logic

In this chapter I have focussed on Heidegger’s ontological investigations of the nature of logic as an account of his philosophy of logic. However, he also presents, although only briefly, an alternative conception of logic, especially in relation to the sciences and concept-formation generally. In Section 3 of Being and Time, on the ontological priority of the question of being, Heidegger writes of the contemporary tendency of various

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100 A main contribution of Heidegger’s Being and Time is often taken to be an overcoming of this very Cartesian subjectivism through a retrieval of the more authentic understanding of Aristotelian and Greek thought generally.

101 For instance, in De Interpretatione Aristotle states: “falsity and truth have to do with combination and separation…names and verbs by themselves…are like the thoughts that are without combination and separation; for so far they are neither true nor false.” Or later: “every sentence is significant…but not every sentence is a statement-making sentence, but only those in which there is truth or falsity.” Aristotle, “De Interpretatione,” in The Complete Works of Aristotle, vol. 1, ed. Jonathan Barnes (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984), 25 [1.16a11-16]; 26 [4.17a1-3].
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sciences – mathematics, physics, biology, sciences of history, theology – to question their foundations, or their underlying ontologies, of the need to define anew the kind of being which belongs to their subject-matter. In this regard, he considers the ‘productive logic’ which lays the foundations and leaps ahead of the concrete work of the positive sciences, breaking new ground, as opposed to standard logic “which limps along after, investigating the status of some science as it chances to find it, in order to discover its ‘method’” (BT 30/10).

Heidegger contrasts this new logic of scientific theory – this logic which discloses some area of being for the first time in its ‘constitution of being,’ making available lines of inquiry for the sciences based upon the newly uncovered structures – with the standard reproductive logic. The latter, as typical ‘methodology’ of the sciences, always treats scientific inquiry as a completed task: it comes to its fulfilment just prior to scientific irruptions, always on the verge of obsolescence. These methodologies dictate how sciences should be based on how they have been, not on what they can be. As he writes on the final page of Being and Time: “One can never carry on researches into the source and the possibility of the ‘idea’ of Being in general simply by means of the ‘abstractions’ of formal logic – that is, without any secure horizon for question and answer” (BT 487/437). Moreover, his account of the ontological genesis of the theoretical attitude aims to explicate the conditions of the possibility for Dasein’s way of existing characterized by scientific research:

This formulation of the question is aimed at an existential conception of science. This must be distinguished from the ‘logical’ conception which understands science with regard to its results and defines it as ‘something established on an interconnection of true propositions – that is, propositions counted as valid’. The existential conception understands science as a way of existence and thus as a mode of Being-in-the-world, which discovers or discloses either entities or Being. (BT 408/357)

The standard logical methodologies, or logics of science, treat science as a completed task, hoping to articulate the various chains of deductions and connections among its propositions and fundamental definitions. This standard approach amounts to treating

102 Charles R. Bambach traces these concerns to the general ‘crisis mentality’ pervading German culture generally, and the various sciences in particular, in the years 1880-1930 in his erudite study Heidegger, Dilthey, and the Crisis of Historicism (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1995).
103 Recent discussions on the nature of language tend toward the same levelling effect: they focus on the nature of language in its everyday usage, dictating how it should be viewed based on how it has been, not on what it can be. Heidegger’s later works on the power of poetry counters this trend.
science as a pure logic, as something without genealogical origins which comes fully formed from its inception. The ‘existential conception of science,’ which interests Heidegger, contrasts with this. Here prescientific origins of science are displayed in an ‘existential genealogy.’\textsuperscript{104} Heidegger’s ‘critique’ of science and its attendant logic in the guise of symbolic logic and reproductive methodology has a positive aim of uncovering a deeper, foundational logic.

**Conclusion**

This chapter has unearthed the key ideas behind Heidegger’s phenomenological founding of logic upon ontology. The most basic logical notions rely on an ontology of beings as present-at-hand. The present-at-hand on my interpretation includes entities beyond those accessible to sensorial perception: if not then Heidegger’s argument that all judgements rest on a pre-logical, pre-predicative disclosure appears to be simply false. For certainly judgements about electrons, quarks, and atoms or negative, hyperreal, and p-adic numbers do not rest on a pre-theoretical disclosure of the objects which the judgement is about unless one considers these objects as disclosed through an intellectual apprehension. Within theoretical comportment an enquiry is guided by insight into the network of relationships governing the present-at-hand objects which populate its domain. Guided by a question – for instance, looking for solutions to the equation ‘$x + 1 = 0$’ – possible answers show themselves as appropriate or not; exactly what \emph{counts} as appropriate in the scientific field changes with time, and yet any solution will be guided beforehand by an understanding of what counts – on what it means \emph{to be} – in the discipline. Within a certain judgemental context different entities count as objects – whether available to the perceptual gaze or not – and these entities are taken precisely as present-at-hand. Regardless of the difficulty in conceptualizing certain abstract notions, to see where a prior disclosure would lie (and in the case of abstract entities, most likely this will not lie in some practical engagement with physical tools in the world), it is still a fact that the judgement is guided by a prior disclosure of meaning; that which is taken as ‘already understood’, the basic building blocks which lie latent in theoretical thought, is precisely the ready-to-hand in that world.

\textsuperscript{104} The term ‘existential genealogy’ is taken from John D. Caputo, “Heidegger’s Philosophy of Science: The Two Essences of Science,” in \emph{Rationality, Relativism and the Human Sciences}, ed. J. Margolis, M. Krausz, and R.M. Burian (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1986), 43-60.
Heidegger’s contribution lies in recognizing the efficacy of the disengaged mode of comportment while still accounting for its origins. In many ways, his philosophy of logic provides an account of modern intellectual endeavours generally. With an increasing retreat into the formal way in which things fit together, regardless of meaning, modern institutions point away from an understanding on-site towards a reflective comportment to one’s activity in the world. This reflective comportment has its own powers: Heidegger does not deny that logic works well at this level of abstraction, accounting for how things fit together in abstraction. This logic itself is best suited to the promotion of all intellectual disciplines in their endeavour to understand the structural aspects of their activity. Heidegger’s call is not to supplant this logic entirely, but to reveal this focus on structure all the more: by uncovering the ontological commitments latent in logic (and theoretical practice generally), uncovering the traditional inheritance, accounting for the transformation of not only the discipline of logic but of intellectual endeavours throughout modernity.105 The call is not to ‘get logic right’ (to find ‘the true’ logic) but rather to unconceal, to make transparent what remains covered-over in our intellectual tradition.

As we have seen, logical notions are grounded in ‘making-present’. And as such, they ignore the whole of Dasein’s temporality. For this reason Heidegger charges logic with being “the most imperfect of all philosophical disciplines” (BT 343/415). As a philosophical discipline, logic is most imperfect so long as it does not take Dasein as its guiding theme. As Heidegger says, the only way for logic to become truly philosophical is for it to reflect “on the basic structures of its thematic phenomena, on the primary ontological structures of the logical as a comportment of human existence, and on the temporality of human existence itself” (BT 343/415). This fundamental ontological investigation is precisely what Heidegger provides with his positive contribution to a philosophy of logic.

105 Welch, “Why Heidegger and Logic?”
Chapter 4: Heidegger’s Reading of Plato in Light of his Philosophy of Logic

Introduction

So far I have dealt exclusively with Heidegger’s philosophy of logic in relation to modern philosophers. I now turn to an investigation of his 1924-25 lecture course on Plato’s *Sophist*. Most contemporary classicists would agree with Glen Most when he states: “for the professional classicist, there is almost nothing at all of interest in Heidegger’s work on Greek philosophy and poetry.”¹ I will not attempt to demonstrate in this chapter that Heidegger might say something of interest to the classicists. However, I will attempt to draw out some of Heidegger’s philosophically penetrating points in his early Plato interpretation. As will become apparent, Heidegger provides novel insights into an understanding of key issues in Plato’s *Sophist*. And what I aim to demonstrate is that these insights are most easily understood in connection with Heidegger’s views on logic and his position on various questions in the philosophy of logic, as worked out in the preceding chapter.

I thereby add to the few substantial works on the relation of Heidegger and Plato in general,² and to those works treating Heidegger’s *Sophist* lectures in particular.³ The most important work to date on the relation between Heidegger and Plato is Francisco J. González’s recently published *Plato and Heidegger: A Question of Dialogue*.⁴ González’s primary goal is to bring forth a dialogue between Plato and Heidegger, which Heidegger himself was unwilling or unable to do, uncovering many affinities along the

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⁴ González has written a number of papers on Heidegger’s reading of Plato and the Greeks, several of which are cited in this chapter.
way, but ultimately concluding that an insurmountable abyss separates the two: “While neither Plato nor Heidegger looks for the truth of beings in beings themselves, Plato turns to *logoi* and how the truth of being manifests itself therein, whereas Heidegger insists on attempting to see and say being directly in a way that bypasses both beings and *logoi*.”

While Gonzalez focuses almost entirely on Heidegger’s negative pronouncements on Plato’s *Sophist*, I try to uncover Heidegger’s more nuanced approach, highlighting that many negative comments are indications of the traditional misappropriation of Plato’s thought and not the simple dismissal that Gonzalez sometimes makes them out to be.

Although I agree with most of what Gonzalez says, I ultimately disagree with his conclusion; I leave my criticism for the ‘Concluding Assessment’ where I argue that Gonzalez misconstrues Heidegger’s position in the *Sophist* lectures and thereby fails to rightly assess the relation between Heidegger and Plato’s thought at this stage. Other recent works of note include, firstly, Catherine Zuckert’s unique interpretation of Heidegger’s entire oeuvre which argues that each fundamental change in his thinking corresponds to a radical change in his thoughts on Plato. Secondly, and in this vein, Alan Kim develops a reading of Heidegger’s *Sophist* lectures which argues that the most basic concepts of *Being and Time* are developed by Heidegger through his study of Plato’s *Sophist* and that Heidegger’s reading of Plato, especially of the *Republic*, is best understood in contrast to Natorp’s. Third and finally, Drew Hyland takes Heidegger to task on his conservative reading of Plato which overlooks the dramatic elements of the dialogues and works from the standard ‘developmental thesis’ of Plato, coupled with the assumption that the main interlocutor of any dialogue is simply Plato’s mouthpiece. I agree with Hyland’s criticism wholeheartedly, yet wonder whether, beyond helping one to reconsider how they read the dialogues, it sheds any light on Heidegger’s thought and his relation to Plato in particular. Criticisms aside, none of these scholars have brought Heidegger’s thoughts on logic in the 1920s to bear on his interpretation of Plato, and the *Sophist* in particular. And this is precisely what I present in this chapter, ultimately arguing that many of Heidegger’s greatest insights into Plato’s thought are best understood in relation to his philosophy of logic worked out most fully in *Being and Time*. More than this, it will become clear that Heidegger’s philosophy of logic itself

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7 Kim, *Plato in Germany*, 230-284.
8 Hyland, *Questioning Platonism*, 17-83.
becomes illuminated in light of his engagement with Plato’s thought in his *Sophist* lectures.

Throughout this chapter I develop Heidegger’s reading of Plato’s *Sophist*, arguing that finding the place of the logical is in fact *the* central point guiding his work in this often misunderstood lecture course. To this end, I first look at Heidegger’s approaching Plato through an Aristotelian lens, arguing that Heidegger has good hermeneutic reasons for such a reading, against most interpreters of this work. From here I unearth Heidegger’s core criticism of Plato in this period of his writing, namely that Plato’s philosophy is limited in its strict adherence to, and upholding of, dialectic as the highest mode of philosophical inquiry. As I demonstrate, Heidegger’s argument has its origin in his conception of Greek ontology as limited to the present-at-hand. This sets up my final investigation of Heidegger’s sketch of the source of the modern logical and theoretical prejudices in the Greek concept of ‘the logical’ – something Heidegger takes to be radically different from the transformed sense which this term takes throughout the history of Western philosophy after Aristotle. A short assessment concludes the chapter.

However, before embarking upon an investigation of Heidegger’s *Sophist* lectures I turn now to a short analysis of interpretive strategies that have emerged in Plato-scholarship to set the background for Heidegger’s own approach.

**1 Excursus: On Reading Plato**

The decisive factor for how we read Plato comes from an interpretation of his relationship to poetry. Typically we assume that Plato dismisses poets as utterly harmful. In Books 2 and 3 of the *Republic* Plato has Socrates radically censor the poets and artists in his ideal “city in speech.” Meanwhile, in Book 10 it seems as though the poets are to be banned from the city altogether. Indeed, in that last book Socrates recalls that the war against poetry is not even due solely to the harshness of philosophers (*Republic*, 607b-c) and that unless a non-poetic argument can be brought forth on behalf of the poets, they are to be forever banished from the “city in speech” where the philosophers rule.

But it is normally assumed that Plato not only criticized poetry, but that he disparaged any form of writing: we find Socrates baldly stating this near the end of the *Phaedrus* in the famous Myth of Theuth. As he says shortly thereafter, regarding written words:

> You’d think they were speaking as if they had some understanding, but if you question anything that has been said because you want to learn more, it
continues to signify just that very same thing forever. When it has once been written down, every discourse roams about everywhere, reaching indiscriminately those with understanding no less than those who have no business with it, and it doesn’t know to whom it should speak and to whom it should not. And when it is faulted and attacked unfairly, it always needs its father’s support; alone, it can neither defend itself nor come to its own support. (*Phaedrus*, 275d-e)

The dangers of writing, being available for anyone to be corrupted by them, seem on par with the dangers of poetry. Both are the enemies of the true philosopher who contemplates the forms and loves truth, justice, beauty, and utilizes the systematic reasoning of mathematics. This all seems straightforward and is the general starting point of many investigations into the Platonic dialogues. However, a moment’s reflection brings us face-to-face with some oddities in this simplistic interpretation.

First of all, Plato wrote dialogues, not treatises. Unlike our unquestioning use of the treatise form in modern philosophical writing, Plato thoughtfully chose, out of all those options open in his day—be it the style of the ‘cosmological’ treatise of Anaxagoras, or the philosophical poems of Parmenides—to write in the dialogic form. These dialogues are imitations of (perhaps fictional) conversations. In fact, the *Republic* itself is Plato’s writing of Socrates’ recounting of what happened to him on his way back from the festival at the Piraeus. The work we read (if we read it in the original Greek) is thus an imitation of an imitation of a conversation. As such it is three removes away from reality. But the artists, in Book 10 of the *Republic*, are precisely upbraided for clouding the truth by providing a picture of an artefact which imitates what is truly real: the unchanging Form. Artists thus provide imitations of imitations of originals. Plato’s dialogues generally, and the *Republic* specifically (wherein the charge itself is found) can be charged with the same wrongdoing as the work of artists. Thus it seems a bit too facile to simply speak of ‘Plato’s criticism of writing’. There are many aporias to be found between the content and the form of the dialogues. These have given many pause to consider how we should beset approach Plato’s dialogues, how one should best proceed in their interpretation.

There are essentially two alternatives in the Classical, pre-modern, interpretations of Plato: the dogmatic and the sceptical. The former are best represented by the neo-Platonists (culminating in the work of Plotinus) and are characterized by their zealous drive to construct Platonic doctrines—doctrines available to them through their
preconceived system. Sceptics, on the other hand, best represented by the New Academy – and praised by Cicero and thinkers of his ilk – held that Plato had no doctrines at all: Plato saw that there was no knowledge of absolute truth (if anything more than probable truth even exists) and hence we should not look to construct artificial ‘Platonic’ doctrines. For most of the Medieval period, up until the present, a form of Platonism held sway which followed the neo-Platonist drive to transform Plato’s thought into a metaphysical or theological system. The sceptics acted as a counterweight to this reigning dogmatic Platonism. The two classical positions can be best differentiated by their reaction to the aporias and contradictions found within and between the dialogues: the dogmatic approach essentially ignores these in their reconstruction of ‘Plato’s doctrines’ while the sceptical approach takes them as the core of the Platonic teachings. In either of these extreme cases there is no serious attempt at overcoming these obstacles – in the former the aporias are glossed over as unessential to Platonic Truth and in the latter they are simply embraced as essential to any human endeavour and thus stand as testimony to Plato’s firm belief that only probable truth is possible. Modern approaches to Plato mostly follow one of these two alternatives. However, since the early 19th Century with the work of Schleiermacher an increasing number of scholars have taken the form of Plato’s dialogues as essential to their understanding of the content of his teachings. This has led to a serious confrontation with the aporias outlined above.

There are three ways in which the aporias are confronted in modern Platonic interpretations: first, they are either explained away as the outcome of the primitive state in which Logic finds itself in Plato’s pre-Aristotelian time, or more often they are


10 See Tigerstedt, *Decline and Fall of the Neoplatonic Interpretation of Plato*.

11 “So also will those spectators of the analysis fail altogether to attain to a knowledge of the Philosophy of Plato, for in that, if in anything, form and subject are inseparable, and no proposition is to be rightly understood, except in its own place, and with the combinations and limitation which Plato has assigned to it.” Friedrich Schleiermacher, *Introductions to the Dialogues of Plato*, trans. William Dobson. (London, 1836), 14.

12 See, for example, I.M. Bocheński’s dismissal of Plato’s work as full of fallacies and entirely superseded by Aristotle for “nearly everything in Aristotle’s logic, if we except the analytical syllogism and some doctrines connected with it, is most probably a relaxed elaboration and development of procedures used already, at least in a rudimentary way, by Plato.” I.M. Bocheński, *Ancient Formal Logic* (Amsterdam: North-Holland Publishing, 1951), 17-18. John Ackrill notes in his review that “Bocheński’s dismissal of Plato in two paragraphs is grotesquely cavalier….The passages he refers to are quite inadequate to support such a sweeping stricture, even waiving the fact that in some of them Plato is exposing not committing fallacies.” J.L. Ackrill, “Review of *Ancient Formal Logic*,” *Mind* 62 (1953): 111. Bocheński’s view was not a new one and similar sentiments in various interpretive approaches would have been known to Heidegger.
explained through an appeal to Plato’s developing views throughout his lengthy career, third, some have held that Plato did have a systematic theory, but since it is not presented in the dialogues themselves he must have presented it in his oral lectures – the dialogues are just playful pieces meant to draw students to his lectures or to act as reminders to the members of his academy and the aporias are thus of no consequence or are even evidence that the dialogues should not be taken seriously; fourth and finally, the aporias are seen as an essential part of Plato’s teaching and they are explained as dramatic elements intrinsic to the dialogic character of Plato’s philosophy. The first approach is the dominant view in current philosophical debates across many styles of philosophy. The second and third are propounded by the ‘esotericists’ of the ‘Tübingen School’. The fourth is what I call the ‘dramatic’ approach.

The dramatic, as an alternative to the standard, approach consists in taking the dialogue form seriously. That is, to recognize that by writing dialogues Plato was making a conscious choice and not simply dressing his systematic philosophy in literary dross. There are a growing number of interpreters undertaking work along this track. Some still look for hidden, underlying doctrines, which the ‘dramatic’ approach simply helps to

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14 The ‘unified theorists’ can be lumped together nicely under the first classification since they tend to explain away the inconsistencies in the dialogues, usually as some sort of pedagogic tool – the inconsistencies are presented in one place so that they can be resolved in another. For a typical stance in this school of thought, see the work of Paul Shorey.

15 For instance, Drew Hyland shows in his *Questioning Platonism*, most ‘Continental’ thinkers (with the exception of Hans-Georg Gadamer) have also followed this ‘standard’ approach. He argues that while it might be justifiable for ‘analytic’ philosophers – based on their own avowed style of philosophy – it is entirely uncharacteristic of, and unwarranted for, ‘Continental’ philosophers to read Plato in this way. It is the unspoken mistake of continental philosophy. However, I would argue that the so-called ‘analytic’-continental’ division simply cannot be made based on a categorization of ways in which Plato is read. There is just a general tendency to take Plato at his word in the dialogues across all modes of philosophy: that is, most seem to tacitly assume that what is written in the dialogues is Plato’s ‘personal’ argument, and that Plato’s arguments simply contain many mistakes.

16 Hans Joachim Kraemer, Konrad Gaiser, Giovanni Reale, and Thomas S , to name a few. Tigerstedt’s *Decline and Fall* and *Interpreting Plato* are both reactions to the growing number of ‘esotericists’ in the mid-20th. Tigerstedt’s work. For instance, he no longer insists that the ‘esotericist’ view is the most ancient and longest persisting view which was only overthrown by Schleiermacher in the early 19th century. In fact, he recognizes that the ‘esoteric’ view has its historical roots in Wilhelm Gottlieb Tennemann’s work from the 18th century. He also accounts for the ‘drama’ of the dialogues, but only in order to further his esotericist views. Thomas Reading Plato, trans. Graham Zanker (London: Routledge, 1999). The esotericist view reached its height of popularity sometime around the turn of the twentieth century.
reconstruct. For them, even if they do not state so explicitly, Plato’s philosophy is ultimately systematizable. A few others take the dramatic form slightly more seriously: the form itself represents Plato’s philosophy. These interpreters rightly, in my opinion, contend that modern attempts at ‘systematizing’ Plato are remnants of a post-Hegelian enlightenment view of the nature of philosophy. Moreover, they argue that the dialogic structure of Plato’s works, together with the aporias that result from applying the internal workings of the dialogues to the external form, all point to the inadequacy of assigning a view of philosophy as systematic to Plato in such an anachronistic fashion. The arguments underlying the ‘dramatic approach’ generally rely on what are taken to be obvious ‘facts’ incompatible with any other method of interpretation. Although it could be argued that Heidegger in many ways influenced the shape of this dramatic approach, he mostly reads Plato in the standard, developmental, way equating Plato with the most dominant character of any dialogue. However, Heidegger’s reading, although guided by these tendencies, is slightly more nuanced such that he can uncover some unique features of Plato’s thought.

In the Sophist the Eleatic Stranger holds the dialectical science above all others – it is the science of the structure of being which proceeds through logos and stands higher than dianoia (thought). Heidegger provides a novel interpretation of both ‘dialectic’ as put forth in the Sophist as well as the relation between logos and being. As we will see, this interpretation comes forth most clearly when seen in the light of Heidegger’s critique of logic – and it reciprocally clarifies certain aspects of this critique. The relation between understanding and intuition (nous) and discourse (logos) and the evident prejudice of the theoretical comes to dominate Heidegger’s interpretation.

17 Schleiermacher and his followers are the best representatives of this.
19 I would argue that the justification for this dramatic approach can be found within the dialogues themselves.
2 Why Read Plato through Aristotle: Heidegger’s Destructive Retrieve

Heidegger lays out his interpretation of Plato in his *Sophist* lectures in direct dialogue with his own views, developed fully in *Being and Time*. Unlike many interpreters of Plato, Heidegger goes to great lengths in these lectures to delineate his method of interpretation and the presuppositions guiding his reading of the dialogues.²⁰ He embarks upon the traditional principle of starting with what is most clear to uncover the obscure: Heidegger states that Aristotle understood Plato better than Plato understood himself, that Aristotle presents the same doctrines as Plato but radicalized scientifically and in a clearer manner (*PS* 8/11-12;131-132/189-190); thus Heidegger proceeds through a lengthy discussion of Aristotle – almost one-third of the published lecture notes – before embarking upon his interpretation of being and nonbeing, true and false logos, and the nature of the sophist in Plato’s *Sophist*. Heidegger is typically read here as fully endorsing Aristotle’s ‘scientific’, well-organized philosophy over Plato’s proto-scientific disorganized account.²¹

However, Heidegger’s reading is not so simple, as we will see. His endorsement of Aristotle over Plato, for instance, conflicts directly with his project of destruction which proclaims that nothing is given in a clear manner: everything is obscured by the presuppositions of one’s historical situation.²² The destructing interpreter moves to uncover the presuppositions handed down throughout the tradition towards an increasingly clarified subject matter: a reconstructive repetition of the tradition to which one already belongs or a penetration to the original motivational source of traditional concepts.

Since Heidegger holds to the hermeneutic maxim that every interpretation arises within a specific point of view, determined by the interpreter’s historical situation, the first task of any interpreter thus amounts to gaining the appropriate mode of access to the

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²⁰ Heidegger vehemently opposes the traditional reading of the *Sophist* which divides it into introduction, kernel (the question of the being of non-being) and shell (the question of the nature of the sophist which precedes the kernel and is recommenced following the kernel, thereby enclosing like a shell). According to Heidegger, such a focus on the extrinsic and literary, the “material occurrences and themes of the dialogue,” overlooks what is at issue in the dialogue and gives rise to “pseudo-problems” with a false separation of matter from form (*PS* 160-161/232-233).


text from within this very point of view. Ultimately for Heidegger: Plato must be read through Aristotle, presupposing that “Aristotle understood Plato” (PS 8/11); indeed, “there is no scientific understanding, i.e., historiographical return to Plato, without passage through Aristotle…especially if we consider that Aristotle’s own research is nothing else than a more radical apprehension of the same problems with which Plato and earlier thinkers had grappled” (PS 131-132/189-190). Heidegger’s preference for Aristotle over Plato seems at first sight to rest entirely upon his conception of phenomenology as the highest, most rigorous, science: reading the teacher through his student’s writings will “secure the ground on which Plato moved in his research into the Being of beings as world and into the Being of beings as human Dasein, the Being of philosophically scientific existence. We will be brought into position to participate in the possible ways of Plato’s research into Being” (PS 16/22-23). The Sophist is itself approvingly introduced as one of Plato’s scientific dialogues (PS 131/189), and Plato is praised along with Aristotle for concretely developing the idea of scientific philosophy which Socrates introduced as the mode of genuine existence (PS 160/231). Heidegger here attributes to the Greeks the way of philosophy which he conceives as most genuine: namely, as his own modified (Husserl-inspired) phenomenological inquiry into the meaning of being, taking everyday existence as its initial starting point. Throughout the lecture course Heidegger lauds Plato on occasion, but always only insofar as he meets the standard of Heidegger’s own conception of philosophy. On the other hand, Plato is criticized here – anticipating the more trenchant criticisms of the 1930s – for his understanding of being as presence, his privileging of sight, and thus his theoretical prejudice.23

An investigation of concealment and unconcealment guides Heidegger’s interpretation from start to finish: his famous reading of the Greek experience of truth (aletheia) as an overcoming of concealment to unconcealment dominates the background of this work, and is explicitly worked out in its opening pages. On this reading, the

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23 For this reason Mark Ralkowski is able to uncover Heidegger’s ‘two Plato’s’ – one good and one bad. See chapters 3 and 4 of Ralkowski, Heidegger’s Platonism. Ralkowski fails to note that this dual-reading of Plato follows the logic of Heidegger’s early approach to historical figures and concepts generally: there is the ‘good side’ to be uncovered and the ‘bad side’, handed down by the philosophic tradition as the most genuine, which really covers-over. Only by working through the distorted can the genuine be approached. Ralkowski also fails to connect the ‘good Plato’ with certain aspects of Husserlian phenomenology and the ‘bad Plato’ with Husserl’s eidetics. In Ralkowski’s defense, he focuses on Heidegger’s interpretation of Plato from 1930 on where Husserl’s influence recedes into the background. Alan Kim remedies this defect by connecting Heidegger’s reading of Plato with his confrontation with Husserl. See Kim, Plato in Germany, 230ff.
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Greeks take the world as what is initially experienced as hidden. Knowledge then consists of wrestling what is initially and for the most part not available, making it available. As such, uncoveredness of the world comes about first of all in our everyday concerns according to natural needs (PS 11/16). But what is disclosed through everyday encounters according to natural concerns gets mostly covered up again through speech – “opinions rigidify themselves in concepts and propositions; they become truisms which are repeated over and over” (PS 11/16). From ignorance, to knowledge, to untruth: Greek Dasein lives caught between two modes of concealment. And philosophy’s task thus involves a double movement: to the matters themselves for the first time, together with a constant struggle against sedimentation. Unconcealment and knowledge are modes of being of Dasein and are multiple for the Greeks. The striking resemblance of the five primary modes – techne (know-how in taking care), episteme (knowledge, science), phronesis (circumspective, practical insight), sophia (genuine, pure understanding) and nous (discernment by way of perception, pure apprehension) – to some of Heidegger’s own key terms used in Being and Time is especially noteworthy (PS 15-16/21-22).^24

Heidegger devotes the first third of the lecture course to an interpretation of the intellectual virtues as given to us by Aristotle, followed by a demonstration of how these already occur, albeit less ‘clearly and rigorously’, in Plato’s thought. The five intellectual virtues (episteme, techne, phronesis, sophia, nous), as ways of being of the human being, stand in a relation to beings, disclosive of their being – they are five modes of aletheuein. Despite the fact that techne and phronesis are concerned with things that can be other than what they are, with what ‘comes into being’, they are, nevertheless, both ways of knowing on Heidegger’s interpretation. In fact phronesis and sophia are determined to be the fulfillment of techne, as the highest modes of unconcealment (PS 39-40/56-57). Most important for his interpretation of Plato’s Sophist, dealing with deception and the possibility of falsehood, Heidegger highlights the relationship between nous, as intellectual insight, and logos in Aristotle’s thought: only through the synthetic structure of logos, as the gathering together of that which was separate, does the possibility of falsehood, concealment, arise; apart from nous, the as-structure of logos pervades the other virtues (ways of unconcealing) and so they too are capable of falsity, they too can

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^24 Kim draws out these connections at length in the final chapter of his book. This is for the most part skillfully done. However, he inaccurately equates nous with Heidegger’s Verstehen, despite Heidegger’s clear indication that nous corresponds to perceptual-knowing (perception taken in its broadest sense) and thus to something closer to Husserl’s categorial intuition. See Kim, Plato in Germany, 238-242.
conceal (PS 125-126/182-184). Logos becomes the source of falsity, on Heidegger’s reading of Aristotle in the Sophist lectures. And this general discussion acts as preparation for Heidegger’s interpretation of truth and falsehood, genuine and counterfeit-knowledge, the philosopher and the sophist in Plato’s Sophist.

But why exactly does Heidegger see Aristotle as more clear, more scientific, more rigorous than Plato? He never gives a definitive answer to this although a clue resides in his taking Plato’s Sophist as one of the ‘scientific’ dialogues. In the Sophist we see the Eleatic Stranger employ his method of division and collection, uninterested with the nature, lineage, or individuality of his interlocutor: treating the investigator and investigated matter as equally faceless, homogenized – in direct opposition to Socratic concerns.\(^{25}\) But Heidegger equates Plato with the main interlocutor of any dialogue: here he equates Plato with the Stranger.\(^{26}\) On Heidegger’s reading, Plato becomes this proto-analytic, scientifically oriented philosopher. This is what Heidegger seems to praise: and the Stranger’s method, undoubtedly more than Socrates’, is akin to Aristotle’s own especially since they both provide a strict division of the sciences following the differentiation of being. In this way Heidegger can claim that Aristotle is clear, and Plato is mostly obscure but that the Sophist comes close to Aristotle’s conceptual clarity.

It seems that Heidegger really does endorse this reading, championing Aristotle’s scientificity above Plato’s poetic tendencies.\(^{27}\) And yet, what most if not all readers of Heidegger’s works miss, is that this movement from the clear to the obscure so clearly upheld in these lectures flies in the face of Heidegger’s own basic conception of phenomenology as moving from the obscure to the clear, and his hermeneutic principle of destructive retrieval: that later thinkers do not understand earlier thinkers better than themselves, but that much interpretive work needs to be done to work through various

\(^{25}\) For instance, in Socrates’ opening discussion with Theodorus, Socrates asks about Theaetetus’ name, lineage, place of birth, and so on. And throughout the dialogues we come to know Socrates himself rather personally through his own self-interpretation. Conversely, the Eleatic Stranger remains impartial to Theaetetus’ distinctive characteristics; and, moreover, we are left in the dark concerning any definite traits of the Stranger – we are not even told his name – apart from his place of origin.

\(^{26}\) Heidegger explicitly states ‘Plato = Socrates’ or that the Stranger’s views are Plato’s in a vast number of instances throughout the Sophist lectures. See, for instance, (PS 165/238;188/272;224/324;232/335;235/340;259/375; 377/544). This in only a partial list since almost every time Heidegger mentions the Stranger, he equates the view articulated in the dialogue with Plato’s own. The fact that the Stranger’s views and Socrates’ are presented in direct conflict seems to not bother Heidegger. This is most likely the case because he subscribes to a developmental reading of the Platonic dialogues wherein the ‘mature’ Plato is increasingly uninterested with Socratic ethical concerns and more aligned with the inquiry into ‘higher things’ and with a strict method, as presented by the Eleatic Stranger.

\(^{27}\) However, Heidegger clearly maintains that the traditional, particularly modern, reading of the Sophist as a “purely methodological dialogue” is completely mistaken. (PS 182/263).
levels of prejudice. So, either Heidegger has made a clear mistake, or he has deviated from his otherwise constant approach to the history of philosophy, or perhaps, more charitably, his ‘championing’ of Aristotle in this course has a deeper purpose.

Aristotle is handed down to us through the tradition as having understood Plato. The correct approach to a text involves working on the basis of one’s most inbred presuppositions. It is not enough to pursue the “ideal of an interpretation which simply aims at allowing the dialogue to speak purely for itself” (PS 157/227) since this would be accomplished with utmost fidelity by simply laying out the largest possible amount of text while refraining from any talk of things outside the text. But such an approach would in no way guarantee any access to the text under consideration, any understanding of the matters at issue (PS 157/228). Heidegger himself names the requisite supplement to this mere textual analysis: to follow the guidance of the “innermost tendencies” in their “original elaboration” to reach the ground from which the matters at issue must spring; in short we must think along with the Greeks:

> the past comes alive only if we understand that we ourselves are that past. In the sense of our spiritual existence, we are the philosopher as well as, in general, the scientist we were, and we will be what we receive and appropriate from what we were, and here the most important factor will be *how* we do so. On the basis of these simple temporal relations, the temporal relations of human – and particularly spiritual – existence, we see the proper meaning of actual research to be a confrontation with history, a history which becomes existent only when the research is historical, i.e., when it understands that it is itself history. (PS 158/229)

Thus, more than just thinking along with the Greeks through some mysterious spiritual connection, the interpretation of the matters to which we are to directly address ourselves must work *as embedded* within that very tradition itself. By working through Aristotle, Heidegger works from the widespread view – or the tacit guiding assumption – of his own historical tradition, towards a genuine understanding through a confrontation with this view. This confrontation must work through the presuppositions surrounding the

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28 As Heidegger would say in 1933-34, clearly echoing Nietzsche’s work with which he would increasingly engage, it is not the case that “something like the facts of the matter in themselves could be grasped, purely on their own. Every fact is grasped or graspable by us only if we put it into a *particular perspective*, see it under particular principles. There is no such thing as being able to see things purely, without prejudice. Everything that we experience or interrogate, we see and interrogate in a *particular perspective*. Because this is so, in the unprejudiced inspection of a factual situation we must not only open our eyes, but at the same time we have to know from which perspective I am seeing the object – whether the state of affairs is created by the perspective, whether the understanding corresponds to the object” – the question is whether
text under consideration not to negate them, but to appropriate them afresh through a radical repetition which uncovers the primordial phenomenon underlying that which is taken as given as unquestioned in one’s own tradition. Although it might be overstretching the point, there thus seems to be a clear reason for Heidegger’s reading Plato through Aristotle apart from the typical assumption that Heidegger simply endorses Aristotle’s conception of philosophy over Plato’s.

I do not thereby deny that Heidegger constantly speaks of Aristotle’s work as the radical fulfillment of Plato’s – I am simply arguing that there is another good reason for Heidegger’s reading Plato through Aristotle beyond his endorsement of Aristotle’s philosophy over Plato’s, a reason that is almost entirely overlooked in the literature. The Sophist represents Plato’s most radical confrontation and approach to a genuine scientific philosophy for Heidegger as he confronts Parmenides’ question of the meaning of being for the first time in a robust manner. As we have seen in the last chapter, the scientific ideal of philosophy that Heidegger upholds has nothing to do with the scientific method or following the strict division of labour among the sciences, but rather with the treatment of the most basic subject matter, the question of the meaning of being: and in this dialogue he sees the Stranger (who he equates with Plato) as working in common with Aristotle toward this end.

However, for Heidegger, Plato fails to reach Aristotle’s level of scientificity (essentially, phenomenological-conceptual clarity) for several reasons: 1) Plato remains tied to dialectic which can only ever be on the way to a higher stage of philosophizing

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29 There are too many instances to cite. For a clear statement: “Aristotle did deprive dialectic of its dignity, but not because he did not understand it. On the contrary, it was because he understood it more radically, because he saw Plato himself as being underway toward theorein in his dialectic, because he succeeded in making real what Plato was striving for…Aristotle could do this, of course, only because he understood the function of logos and of dialeugesthai within scientific reflection and within human existence in general” (PS 138/199). Heidegger seems to really endorse this view.

30 Kim provides a different reason: namely, that Aristotle’s works are endoxic – that they, like Heidegger’s own works, begin with widespread or eminent views and work to uncover the inner meaning of these opinions. However, this does not explain why Plato’s works – which also seem to work from prevailing opinions to uncover their inner source – could not be confronted directly by Heidegger. Kim, Plato in Germany, 234-235. Partenie suggests a different reason which, although illuminative of the religious aspects of Being and Time, remains fairly speculative – perhaps since it is only suggested in passing. He argues that the Demiurge of the Timaeus commits Plato to the belief in an all-encompassing, divine, eternal Creator – as opposed to Aristotle – which inhibited Heidegger from siding with Plato in his attempt in Being and Time to make human Dasein the ultimate ground of being. As he says: “The Platonic creationist metaphysics, which revolves around an all-embracing, divine, eternal Creator who has an eternal model and frames a sempiternal universe, could hardly accommodate Heidegger’s self-centered ontology, which at the time gravitated toward temporal, changeable human life rather than toward eternal being.” Partenie, “Imprint: Heidegger’s Interpretation of Platonic Dialectic in the Sophist Lectures,” 67-68.
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(PS 113/165), disclosing negatively the nature of the philosopher and accounting for being by pointing to non-being through an analysis of the sophist. Dialectic remains distinct from sophistry while Aristotle makes a further distinction between the philosopher, the sophist, and the dialectician whose legein remains solely within the mode of *kataphasis* and *apophasis* (affirming and denying). Essentially, Aristotle sees the limitations of human speech while Plato upholds dialectic as the highest activity of the philosopher. 2) Plato approaches the question of the meaning of being but he addresses being as a being, thereby overlooking the ontological difference: Plato’s understanding of being as presence derives from beings, on Heidegger’s account. The same is not true for Aristotle who sees through Plato’s error (PS 59/85). 3) Plato works from universals to particulars rather than the other way around: from the *katholou* to the *kat’hekaston*. Even Aristotle was only partially successful here “within certain limits, and in spite of his tendency to radicality he did not press on into the ultimate originality of the Being of the world” (PS 59/85-86). Heidegger concedes that in the *Sophist* Plato for the first time accounts for the being of particulars, more determinately *material* or *bodily* individuals (*somata*). But here Heidegger attributes this to an influence of the young Aristotle who, throughout all of his works, begins with the perceivable (*aistheta*) as a basis for the discussion of being (but not in such a way that being is determined by these particular beings) (PS 334-336/483-485). 31 4) Finally, Plato takes being to mean entirely *being-present*; even in his taking on the further influence of Aristotle by understanding being as *dynamis*, Plato construes *dynamis* “as the possibility of co-presence with something” or as the “factual occurrence of the possibility of being with one another” (PS 336/485-486). Plato’s *dynamis* remains an ontic category. Aristotle, on the other hand, made a decisive breakthrough, on Heidegger’s account, with his concept of *dynamis* as connected with *energia*, which remains an ontological determination of the structure of being from the

31 Heidegger here agrees with Hermann Siebeck who argues that it can be demonstrated that the young Aristotle must have influenced Plato. Softening Siebeck’s view, Heidegger contends that his is a mere conviction, not a demonstration. See Hermann Siebeck, “Platon als Kritiker aristotelischer Ansichten: III Der *Sophista*,” Zeitschrift für Philosophie und philosophische Kritik, Neue Folge, 108 (1896): 1-18. Siebeck is perhaps best known for his tracing the changes of style in Plato’s dialogues to their psychological roots in Plato’s state of mind. Hermann Siebeck, *Untersuchungen zur Philosophie der Griechen*, 2nd ed. (Halle: J.C.B. Mohr, 1888), 253-266. For an assessment of Heidegger’s reading of Aristotle’s influence on Plato, which concludes that Heidegger’s reading is mistaken through an analysis of various of Plato’s other texts together with the insightful distinction between Plato’s and Aristotle’s use of *dynamis* see Fran O’Rourke, “Plato’s Approach to Being in the *Theaetetus* and *Sophist*, and Heidegger’s Attribution of Aristotelian Influence,” *Diotima: Revue de Recherche Philosophique* 31 (2003): 47-58.
Heidegger attributes the source of their difference to lie in Plato’s negative view of movement and change, still defined in terms of the “common way of speaking about things” and “thus in terms of being and non-being,” versus Aristotle’s positive consideration of the phenomenon of movement (PS 335/484).

What is most at stake in this collection of relations between Plato and Aristotle is the different emphasis that each makes on logos as a means for uncovering ‘that which is’ together with the attendant (tacit) assumption of the presence that underlies all beings. For Heidegger’s Plato logos as dialectic is the highest mode of being for the human being as it provides access to the static core of things, bringing to presence their constitutive eidos, but always in a way that the eidos itself is only ever brought to presence as spoken about.34

3 Logos and Nous: On Plato’s Dialectic

Heidegger argues that Plato writes dialogues not for any trivial reason or on a poetical whim, but from Socrates’ direct philosophical influence.35 Socrates aims at uncovering the matter at issue by speaking with his fellow citizens:

> to pass from logos as prattle, from what is said idly and hastily about all things, through genuine speaking, to a logos which, as logos altethes, actually says something about that of which it speaks. Dialegesthai is a passing ‘through speech,’ departing from what is idly said, with the goal of arriving at a genuine assertion, a logos, about beings themselves. (PS 135/195)

And in the Sophist in particular this becomes a running through what is said precisely to disclose what lies there regarding being. As such, dialegesthai, just like logos, functions as a mode of disclosure, although as discussion. The dialogue-form best captures this mode of discursive disclosure. The starting point is what people say, passing through this

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32 Of course both remain tied to a metaphysics of presence. This is the Greek conception of ontology for Heidegger. It is just that Aristotle problematizes this assumption and brings it to the fore for consideration, and explicitly ties it to an investigation of Dasein (psyche), according to Heidegger.

33 Heidegger, “Being-There and Being-True According to Aristotle” (BH, 224).

34 Gonzalez argues that Heidegger simply privileges Aristotle’s conception of philosophy over Plato’s since Heidegger is guided by the unmediated grasp of things through pure nous, essentially through Husserl’s categorial intuition. I leave my argument against this reading for the ‘Concluding Assessment’.

35 Hyland, for one, overlooks the fact that Heidegger tries to account for Plato’s use of the dialogue form. Of course, for one who reads the dialogues as philosophical dramas Heidegger’s reason is insufficient. However, he does at least acknowledge the centrality of Plato’s chosen medium to Plato’s philosophical position. See the first chapter of Hyland, Questioning Platonism which treats the short-comings of Heidegger’s reading of Plato. For more on Heidegger’s account of Plato’s use of the dialogue form, which remains faithful to Heidegger’s account of Plato’s Phaedrus and Gorgias in his Sophist lectures, see Walter A. Brogan, “Plato’s Dialectical Soul: Heidegger on Plato’s Ambiguous Relationship to Rhetoric,” Research in Phenomenology 27 (1997): 3-15.
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without transcending discussion, to its end in a speaking which genuinely expresses. On Heidegger’s reading, Plato’s philosophy is the paradigm of logo-centric philosophy. _Dialegesthai_, as _logos_, is disclosive: as such _aletheuein_ belongs to _logos_.

But for the Greeks, on Heidegger’s reading, _nous_ is the highest determination of _Dasein_: so much so that _nous_ is our divine end point. Genuine disclosure comes only with pure _nous_. But since pure _nous_ is divine, human comportment is first and foremost not pure _noein_ (direct intellectual insight, pure perceiving) but rather _dianoein_ (thinking-through, or determining); and moreover, for the Greeks, Heidegger maintains, _Dasein_ is _zoon logon echon_ – the being that speaks – and consequently all perceiving is a discussing (PS 123/179). All discerning passes through speech, through _logos_, for that being that is determined in its being as the speaking one: as such all modes of unconcealment, all modes of _aletheuein_ other than _nous_ – _episteme_, _techne_, _phronesis_, and _sophia_ – are modes of speaking for the Greeks according to Heidegger. However, _logos_ as _logos_, as necessarily taking something as something, is not intrinsically directed toward the disclosure of beings: “speaking as such does not primarily have the meaning of _apophainesthai_, letting beings be seen. On the contrary, only a quite specific _logos_ is _logos apophantikos_” (PS 124/180). Rather, _logos_ remains always on the way to truth, a striving after truth and so dialectic remains merely preparatory for Aristotle’s _theorein_ – the highest stage of philosophy (PS 138/199-200). Truth is not an intrinsic feature of discourse – as we have already discovered in the previous chapter – since not all speech points-out, either in disclosing or in distorting. Truth as disclosure can occur in _logos_, but it does not reside there in its ownmost. All _logos_ is meaningful, all speech means something and is thereby comprehensible, but not all speech discloses (PS 124-125/181).

Heidegger here reiterates his well known thought from the 1920s that speech comes in many non-disclosive modes – in wishing, requesting, demanding, and so on – as well as

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36 The idea that Plato’s philosophy remains merely on the way, a striving after but never reaching truth, is buttressed by Socrates’ remarks in the _Theaetetus_ with regard to his midwifery and his general erotic attraction to discussion. Heidegger equates Socrates’ love of speeches with “nothing else than the urge toward Being itself” (PS 219/315). Richard Rojcewicz justifiably finds in this equation an essential aspect of Heidegger’s ‘Platonism’ arguing that ‘Platonic love’ as an urge toward being is the way in which Dasein’s openness to being, the central characteristic of Dasein for Heidegger, can be actualized but that such actualization is necessarily mediated by beings, as it is for Heidegger. Richard Rojcewicz, “Platonic Love: Dasein’s Urge Toward Being,” _Research in Phenomenology_ 27 (1997): 103-120. Oddly, however, Rojcewicz – one of the translators of Heidegger’s _Sophist_ lectures – overlooks, or decides to not mention here, Heidegger’s criticism of Plato’s understanding of being as a being, his non-recognition of the ontological difference.

37 For Heidegger, Aristotle was the first to ‘look beyond’ _logos_ to _nous_, but _nous_ latently guides even Plato’s _dialectic_: another reason for seeing Aristotle’s work as radicalizing what lies latent in Plato’s thought.
in disclosive, assertive-judgemental modes. As such, disclosure is not a necessary feature of speech, of logos.

In the Sophist lectures Heidegger goes to great lengths to show that for the Greeks logos in its apophantic mode, which takes ‘something as something’, is indeed the proper condition of the possibility of falsity (PS 125/182). Since speaking speaks about what is seen (broadly speaking) as something, there is the possibility that this thing spoken about be distorted through the ‘as’. Only if something is taken as something else can that thing be distorted: so long as it is taken as it is in itself, no possibility of distortion or deception arises. But for the Greeks nous (simple disclosing, pure perception) is not mediated by speech, does not address something as something, but rather addresses the thing directly: there is, as such, no possibility of distortion, and thereby no possibility of deception in nous (PS 124-126/181-184).

However, if pure nous is not possible for human beings, if our noein is always a dianoein since we are dominated by logos on the Greek account, the question of the location of truth and access to the being of beings arises. Essentially, translated back into Heidegger’s terminology from Being and Time, since Befindlichkeit (disposition), Verstehen (understanding), and Rede (discourse) are equiprimordially constitutive of Dasein, all pre-predicative simple seeing (understanding) is always already an understanding-interpretation. Pure nous, as intellectual insight, is guided by a prior understanding of the way things are, it is always a dia-noein insofar as it is a working-through, determining what is implicitly known in understanding; this prior understanding, made explicit to oneself in an interpretation, can be made explicit to others through legein, through an explication of this dia-noetic laying out of what has always already been understood thereby bringing the (dia)nnoetic to logical apprehension. Heidegger correctly reads the Sophist, focussing on the possibility of falsehood, and the covering-over of the being of beings through deceptive speech, as leading toward an account of truth as alethes as a possibility for human beings.

To be clear: in Heidegger’s interpretation of these terms logos seems restricted to a speaking-with others (even in an articulation to oneself); noein as direct insight is impossible for that being constituted by logos and as such can only show up in Dasein (the speaking being) as dia-noein, as mediated. Heidegger maintains that for Plato as much as for Aristotle, “no man is alone” – Dasein is a political animal (PS 93/135-136;159/231), and thereby constituted by logos existentially as the one who speaks (PS
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12/17;235/340;405/585). In his excursive analysis of Plato’s *Phaedrus*, Heidegger uncovers the basic way in which humans are in the world as *speaking*. For the most part we speak about things in isolation from them: there is a free-floating *logos* which disseminates “presumed knowledge in a repetition that has no relation to the things spoken of” (*PS* 235/340). This everyday speech, as a mode of access to the world, is one which mostly conceals: it corresponds to Dasein’s “ungenuineness and uprootedness” (*PS* 159/231). Heidegger claims that Plato sees our basic way of being in the world similar to his own account in *Being and Time* of our most basic inauthentic way of being: namely as lost in *das Man*. This speaking which mostly covers-over is the condition for the possibility of the sophist’s persuasiveness as one who is “unconcerned with substantive content” (*PS* 159/230). The sophist, on Heidegger’s reading, takes advantage of the dominance of the spoken word in individuals and their communion with others: the sophist’s lack of concern with substantive content is grounded in the domination of speech; by prescinding from content the sophist draws attention to the form of the speech alone, to the bare formal argument. This inauthentic mode of access to the world which concerns itself only with its own sayings corresponds to ungenuine existence. The sophist represents the extremity of everyday communal existence which, determined by speaking, overlooks the matters themselves. The opposite lies in genuine existence: in the concern with substantive content; “in a concern with disclosing beings and in obtaining a basic understanding of them,” in short, “in the idea of scientific philosophy” (*PS* 159-160/231). Heidegger claims that Plato introduces dialectic as the cure against the inner tendency of speaking to cover-over what is spoken about. Dialectic is the philosopher’s remedy against empty prattle.

Although introduced as a remedy, Heidegger maintains that dialectic ultimately fails since it remains mired in *logos*. Dialectic can succeed in cutting through idle chatter but it fails to disclose the things it approaches, it cannot transcend the linguistic medium.

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38 Heidegger contrasts his reading with the traditional interpretation of sophistry, arguing that the sophists held no definite philosophical positions – they were not skeptics, relativists, or subjectivists – since they had nothing at all substantive to say about scientific questions: they are the complete antithesis of the philosopher; philosophy rose not as a counter-movement but as a radicalized inquiry into the meaning of existence. Heidegger argues that Plato’s portrayal of the sophists has given rise to the view that genuine philosophy arose as a movement against the various sophists’ ‘philosophical systems’ (*PS* 150-151/218-219).

39 Compare the opening lines of the final (81st) meditation in Lao Tzu’s *Tao Te Ching*: “Trustworthy talk is not beautiful, / Beautiful talk is not trustworthy. // He who is competent does not discuss, / He who discusses is not competent.” Cyril Welch, trans., *Lao Tzu’s Tao Te Ching: Way & Power* http://www.mta.ca/~cwelch/Laoctius.pdf.
Although dialectical speaking as *apophanesthai* tends toward seeing, toward disclosing (*PS* 137/197-198), and aims to be a ‘letting-be-seen’ (*PS* 234-235/337-339:394/568-569), it remains a mode of speaking. *Logos* in general fails to cut through to the things themselves insofar as it addresses something as something – since it is thereby unable in principle to grasp that “which by its very sense cannot be addressed as something else but can only be grasped for itself. Here, in this primary and predominating structure, *logos*, as it were, fails” (*PS* 142/206). That is, dialectic *aims* to cut through idle chatter but it remains within the linguistic medium and can thus only point toward, but never achieves, a disclosure of beings in their being (*PS* 136-137/197). Any attempt to reach beings as disclosed must pass through *logos* on the Greek account since Dasein is existentially the speaking-one. Speeches pro and con, in a *dialegesthai* which presses ahead toward what is at issue to ‘let it be seen’, to present things first only spoken of ‘in their immediate outward look’ is the most originary sense of Plato’s dialectic, and thus of his philosophizing, on Heidegger’s reading. However, this philosophizing is guided by the tendency toward seeing, by *noein*: its ultimate *telos* resides in a genuine original intuition taking route through what is merely said (*PS* 137/197-198).

Even more, Heidegger contends that although it aims at the matters themselves, dialectic remains focussed on the sayings themselves. As we saw in the last chapter, Heidegger ultimately traces the theoretical prejudice back to our fallen nature, driven by curiosity. His ultimate criticism of this prejudice lies in its focus on the mere sayings, on arguments devoid of content, in its fundamental unconcern with substantive content. Although Heidegger reads Plato as presenting us with the dialectical philosopher over against the non-dialectical sophist, both remain within the realm incapable of transcending *logos* and thus ultimately only concerned with mere sayings (even if the dialectician *strives* to overcome this limitation). Just as traditional logic remains incapable of quelling this latent and pervasive tendency, so too does Plato’s dialectic: both remain too bound up in the *legein*, even if their ultimate goal is to reach pure *nous*. Both try to capture things ‘just as they are’, abstracting from any context, in their universal static structure. And in fact, what most reader’s of Heidegger’s interpretation of Plato have missed, is precisely that this goal of attaining pure insight, a bare (intellectual) perception of the thing, especially if it is laid out according to genus and species, according to its *eidos* or look, ultimately fails to reach the matters themselves for Heidegger. The reason:
Plato tacitly assumes an ontology of the present-at-hand. This is the crux of the matter in Heidegger’s reading.

4 Plato’s Ontology of Presence

Heidegger argues that both Aristotle’s positing of a noein free of logos, taking sophia (theoria) as the highest mode of being for human being, and Plato’s fundamental tie to logos through dialectic, are based on the pervasive Greek understanding of being as “what is present in the proper sense” (PS 154/222). The theme of Greek ontology remains an investigation into the determinations of beings as they present themselves, in any region of the cosmos. While Greek theology investigates “the highest and most proper presence,” ontology looks to what constitutes presence as such, at all levels of presence, across all regions of beings from the heavenly, to the earthly, to the mathematical (PS 154/222-223). Heidegger maintains that the Greek understanding of being (ousia) as presence rests upon the basic ways in which human beings are in the world, acting and doing, in the most natural way. What is is what lies present in everyday dealings: “Being signifies, in a wholly determinate sense, the presence of definite things in the circuit of everyday use and everyday sight. Ousia means availability for this use” (PS 186/269). In this way, being comes to be that which stands there as brought into being, as produced: being is ‘to be produced’, ‘to stand there as available’. One aspect of our commerce with the world – techne in the mode of production – thus gives rise to the Greek understanding of being as presence. In parallel fashion, on Heidegger’s reading, our working on things in the

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40 Sentiments such as this have caused great confusion among scholars, leading many readers of Heidegger to take him as attempting to simply reinstate the Grecian ontology. However, Heidegger explicitly goes on to say that this is a naïve interpretation of being since this is taken as the sole and absolute meaning of being in toto.

world in the mode of appropriation, the grasping of something and bringing it close, our *techne ktetike* (appropriative know-how) uncovers the fundamental Greek understanding of *logos* (*PS* 188-191/272-276).

To discourse about something – and ultimately to learn and then to know – involves a *disclosive taking* of something already there on hand that does not do anything with the object, but rather lets it stand “just as it is” (*PS* 190/275-276). Against modern epistemology, the object is not transplanted into the subject, or determined by a knowing consciousness. Rather, ‘to know’ and thus ‘to speak about’ it involves moving *oneself* or giving oneself over to the thing: to allow it to *present* itself. Thus Heidegger can say: “What is appropriated in knowledge and speech is the truth of beings, their unconcealedness” (*PS* 191/276). These two modes of *techne*, which give rise to the fundamental characteristics of the Greek understanding of being and *logos*, themselves constitute *techne* as a whole equiprimordially: every appropriation is an appropriation of something produced (be it a human or a divine product) and every production is guided by a prior outlook with regard to what is to be made, a prior appropriation of what is there to be produced. And that which guides the production is precisely this *outlook*, the outward look of the thing, its *eidos*.

Things are thus given most primordially in their outward look, for Heidegger’s Plato, in their *eidos*. Insofar as the sophist is determined as a *producer* of images, skilled in the *mimetic* (presenting) art, the sophist will be precisely that artist who can appropriatively disclose through his *legein* the being of non-being (*PS* 274-275/397-398). According to Heidegger, the most decisive step in Plato’s thinking, articulated in the *Sophist*, comes from the young Aristotle’s influence. Here Plato discovers the possibility (power, force) of the co-presence or possible communion of the greatest kinds. This *dynamis koinonia* is uncovered as the underlying structure of nature which allows what is, in its very being, to stand in relation to what is other than itself. Heidegger understands the Stranger’s account of being as nothing other than being-together – not a simple juxtaposition, but the *possibility* (power) of being-together – as the fundamental disagreements with Heidegger, and the differences between their own accounts, are too broad a topic to broach in this thesis. I prescind from any assessment of the veracity of Heidegger’s understanding of the Greek interpretation of being as constant presence and simply aim to show the role that this plays in his critique of Plato and how this provides the ultimate tie to his critique of logic. Neither Rosen nor Gonzalez attempts to draw out the connection between Heidegger’s readings of Plato’s dialectic as failing on account of his reliance on an ontology of the present-at-hand. For a summary of some of the issues between Heidegger and Rosen, see Andrew Fuyarchuk, *Gadamer’s Path to Plato: A Response to Heidegger and a Rejoinder by Stanley Rosen* (Eugene, OR: Wipf & Stock Publishers, 2010).
ontological concept for Plato. And this provides the starting point of all dialectic: this basic ontological concept acts as Plato’s basic presupposition for the possibility of dialectic (PS 369/533). And crucially, this basic ontological concept comes in response to the question of how being, on, occurs in logos. Heidegger here cautions: “we must be careful not to say, on the basis of this connection, that the Greek theory of Being takes its orientation from logic. Logos in the sense mentioned is still very far removed from what was later called logic” (PS 354/512). Dialectic is precisely the techne designed to research into koinonia (sharing, togetherness) in onta. Dialectic is an inquiry into the koinonia among beings: dialectic, and philosophy itself on Heidegger’s reading of Plato, is possible only on condition of this koinonia.

Dialectic proper is introduced, recall, as the ‘highest science’ which was to account for how we can speak of the holding-together of the disparate aspects comprising the constitution of beings. Heidegger concludes from this that “dialectic has the task of making visible the Being of beings” (PS 362/523). However, on Heidegger’s interpretation this means that the goal of dialectic is to bring forth what stands together already, present within the present thing: to give a genealogy which makes apparent what already lies there statically, persistently, as what makes the being what it is. Dialectic aims at making-visible, making-accessible to (intellectual) intuition, the persistent unchanging core of the entity under investigation. And dialectic fails precisely because as a mode of logos it necessarily cannot show that unchanging core in itself but always only relatively. But it is also only possible based upon this prior understanding of being. The attempt to make the eidos visible only stands as the highest activity of the philosopher for Plato because he considers the eidos – as what is availably present – to be structured in a static dynamis koinonia (possibility of interaction). And because Socrates’ love of discourse guides Plato’s conception of philosophy this activity takes the form of a distinctive discursive-disclosure, namely dialectic. Heidegger concludes that “dialectic in the Platonic sense…[is] the demonstration of the possibilities of co-presence in beings, insofar as beings are encountered in logos” (PS 367/530). No possibility of taking beings kath’ auto exists for Plato, since to be means to be encountered in logos. The pervasiveness of logos marks the limitation of Greek ontology generally for Heidegger at this stage. As he adds in a supplementary note: “Limits of Greek ontology: In logos and its

42 “They are pre-eminently present and in the present, such that nothing else would exist if these structures were not already co-present dia panton” (PS 370/534).
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predominance. Compensated: Insofar as *apophainesthai*. Not ‘logic’” (*PS* 447/641). Although the Greek *logos* remains different from modern ‘logic’, it is precisely the pervasiveness of the former that gives rise to the pervasiveness of the latter on Heidegger’s account.

5 From *Logos* to Logic: The Rise of ‘The Logical’

In a handful of side comments and supplementary notes throughout the *Sophist* lectures, Heidegger draws a distinction between the modern concepts of logic and ‘the logical’ and the Greek concept of logic, not necessarily co-extensive with Plato’s dialectic. The driving question of Greek logic remains constant on Heidegger’s reading: how can we say being, how does *logos* relate to that which is *as* it is. Ultimately Greek logic for Heidegger strives to uncover the meaning of the formal determinations of being, and he applauds Husserl for being the first since the Greeks to rediscover this question with his logic, although only in a preliminary fashion (*PS* 154/223-224). The question of the meaning of being arises as a logical question for the Greeks since *logos* pervades the existential structure of Greek human being; the fundamental science of the Greeks thus takes its initial orientation from *logos*; more precisely, it takes beings as they are spoken about as its theme, and thereby beings as they are for *logos* as its subject matter.

The realm of ‘the logical’ for the Greeks is thus the ontological realm. This gets transformed throughout history so that ‘the logical realm’ comes to be a separate entity, what is studied by logic, over and against what is studied by ontology as we have seen throughout this thesis. But Heidegger reads the Greeks, Plato in particular, as taking ‘the logical’ to be the ways in which *being* is said, regardless of the way of being of the being under consideration (although for the Greeks this ultimately consists of being present). As such, logic – and dialectic – for the Greeks is tied to an ontology of the present-at-hand. In particular, Plato’s dialectic aims to make-present what stands there as unchangeable, the persistent always present structure; dialectic, as the highest mode of *logos*, thus points toward the nineteenth century ‘logical realm’ comprised of universal, timelessly valid judgements. Heidegger goes to great lengths to show that this later development is a perversion. He applauds the Greek connection between logic and the ontological, but sees Greek ontology as fundamentally limited and containing the seeds for its own misappropriation by later thinkers. The Greek ‘logical’ always retains its roots in *logos*, in everyday speech, as opposed to the abstractive notion of modern logic as organizing abstract categorial thought.

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The real source of this perversion comes out of an increasing distancing from Aristotle’s ontological and logical works. Aristotle comes to sharpen the question of the meaning of the various characters of being which universally structure all beings in relation to their individual concrete being. With the introduction of the categories we get a categorial logic, limited to the apophantic mode of \textit{logos}. Through scholasticism the ontological question about the meaning of the universal characters of being in relation to individual concrete beings comes to be expressed as a question about the genus-species-difference character, that is, a question as to how ontological determines beings in their being rather than how universal characters of being issue from concrete individual beings. As Heidegger says, the question is transformed into whether ontology is “in some sense the science of the highest genuses of everything that is, or do these characters of Being have a different structural relation to beings?” (\textit{PS} 154/223)

The guiding problem for the Greeks thereby becomes transformed, covered-over in the tradition. No longer asking about the connection between beings as \textit{uncovered} and the “other characters of being,” the relation between the unconcealedness of beings \textit{to us} and the unconcealedness of beings as “a character of the Being of beings themselves” becomes forgotten (\textit{PS} 128/186-187). And in Heidegger’s account, this spawns the modern epistemological pseudo-problem of how our determination of beings ‘in the mind’ can say anything about beings ‘out there’. While the Aristotelian categories determine the being of beings themselves as beings, \textit{alethes} is a character of the being of beings only insofar as they are “there and present for a grasping” (\textit{PS} 129/187). This gets misinterpreted by, for instance, the anti-psychologistic logicians coming out of the nineteenth century who posit truth not as a character of the being disclosed, but rather as the character of logical being – as the validity or invalidity of a judgement (\textit{PS} 129/187). A false separation is thereby set up which overlooks the inner connection between the being as true and the beings of ontology: both treat the same beings – always the “beings of the world” for the Greeks – but in their different characters (\textit{PS} 129/187).

As Heidegger adds of the Greeks in a supplementary note:

the ‘logical’ is as such onto-logical! Precisely not: thinking and technique of thinking. But instead: that which is accessible in speaking (uncovering) and discourse. The Being of the beings encountered and spoken of in this way, what thus possibly comes to presence, already constituting its presence. (\textit{PS} 439/632)
Hence, as we know from Heidegger, truth finds its home not in *logos* but in the uncoveredness of beings in their being. Greek ‘logic’ concerns the presenting of beings in their being in *logos*. The Greek orientation of ontology toward ‘logic’ – unsurprising given the ubiquity of *logos* in Greek Dasein – thus guides itself toward that which can be made presently available in its immediacy. In speaking of being, *ontos* *logos* as the sole mode of access becomes isolated so that, “that which is asked for is simply the saidness and the sayability” (*PS* 445-446/640) – that is, due to the static conception of being, that which is said about being can come to take the place of any regard for the meaning of being itself. With no regard to what is at issue, so long as something can come to be spoken of, it is taken as being.

Apart from discovering the origins of ‘the logical realm’ in the misappropriation of the Greek separation of the beings of ontology and the beings of truth, and ultimately in their shared ontology of the present-at-hand, Heidegger also more explicitly traces the development of modern propositional logic back to the Greek conception of logic, and ultimately to *logos* as living speech.43 Aristotelian logic is seen as initiating the focus on the *theoretical* in the logic that is handed down to us:

Insofar as the Greeks ultimately developed a doctrine of *logos* in a theoretical direction, they took the primary phenomenon of *logos* to be the proposition, the *theoretical* assertion of something about something. Insofar as *logos* was primarily determined on this basis, the entire subsequent logic, as it developed in the philosophy of the Occident, became propositional logic. Later attempts to reform logic, whatever they might have worked out, have always remained oriented to propositional logic and must be conceived as modifications of it. What we commonly know as logic is merely one particular, determinately worked out, logic, given direction by the research impetus within Greek philosophy, but by no means is it *the* logic; it does not dispose of all the basic questions connected to the phenomenon of *logos*. (*PS* 174-175/252-253)

The focus on the theoretical proposition as *the* object of logic comes to dominate not only logical study itself, but guides all investigations into the nature of language, as though *logos* as a whole were concerned with nothing but the theoretical: “so much so that it seems almost hopeless to try to understand the phenomenon of language freed from this traditional logic” (*PS* 175/253). Heidegger cites Cassirer, for instance, as one major figure who still holds to the idea that speaking first occurs in isolation and that an object then emerges of its own accord, and that the speaking and the object can come into an accord

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43 The “‘logical’ is understood as that which properly concerns *logos*, thus not understood in the sense of formal logic but in the Greek sense” (*PS* 400/578).
or not, guided by no inner necessity (PS 414/598). However, this idea of word-sounds in
the psyche joined to ‘general representations’ by way of association, all working inside
our consciousness overlooks one of Plato’s fundamental insights, rediscovered by Husserl
with his concept of intentionality. Namely, that “logos is logos tinos” that “all discourse,
according to its most proper sense, is a disclosure of something” (PS 414/598) Every
logos has an intrinsic koinonia with on; the as-structure of logos is not restricted to the
theoretical proposition – it is the properly Greek-logical category – since it indicates the
possible communion of logos with being, the possibility of speaking of the eidos of
beings. For all of his severe criticisms of Plato to come later in his career, as setting the
decline of Western philosophy in motion, Heidegger here paints a rather sympathetic
picture of a Plato who sees to the heart of the matter, but is ultimately held from
progressing further due to his inability to break from, or radically thematize, his own
historically imposed limitations.

Concluding Assessment: Being, Logos, and Nous

We have seen Heidegger has good internal reasons for approaching Plato through
Aristotle and that he ultimately unearths the limitations of Plato’s thought as mired in the
linguistic medium: Aristotle saw through this and aimed to overcome dialectic in favour
of pure nous in theoría. Both the prevalence of logos, but especially an emphasis on
theoretical logos, gave rise to a separation of the Greek conception of logic as tied to
ontology. This separation set the stage for the development of the modern logical
prejudice and the transformation of ‘the logical’ as a discipline entirely separate from
questions of ontology. This transformation itself has its roots in the pervasive assumption
of an ontology of presence. However, we seem to have a problem: on the one hand
Heidegger endorses Aristotle’s attempt to move beyond dialectic toward pure nous, and
Plato is praised insofar as he is guided by the ideal of nous beyond dialectic. And yet in
the previous chapter we have seen that Heidegger ties pure intuitive seeing with the
theoretical prejudice which he strives to overcome. Also, although Aristotle is praised for
attempting to get beyond dialectic, ultimately Aristotle too remains caught in logos – for
this is the foundational characteristic of human being for the Greeks on Heidegger’s
reading. This chapter has addressed the relation between Heidegger’s philosophy of logic
and his reading of Plato’s Sophist but has not resolved the problem of Heidegger’s own
position on the relation between nous, logos, and being since I maintain that he does not
simply endorse Aristotle’s view, taking it on as his own. In this concluding assessment I
will briefly address another pressing question, which sets up the possibility of addressing this problem, namely: How are we to assess Heidegger’s writing on Plato and how are we to unearth his own position from his reading of the Greeks?

The simplest and most straightforward way is to attack Heidegger’s method of reading the dialogues. He assumes the dialogues can be read like typical philosophical treatises, that Plato’s views are directly presented in the mouthpiece of the main interlocutor – mostly Socrates, but in the Sophist the proto-analytic Eleatic Stranger – and that Plato’s views develop toward an increasing rationalism that relies more and more on his strict dialectical method. Drew Hyland has spent some time demonstrating the flaws with this reading, and any reading which does not account for the dramatic elements in the Platonic dialogues in his Questioning Platonism. After such an assessment one is left wondering why they should read Heidegger’s writings on Plato at all. It seems that once the truth of the dramatic reading comes to light, reading other approaches, apart from engaging them as mere curiosities, ends up being a fruitless enterprise. Moreover, any insight into Heidegger’s own thought becomes obscured – as Hyland himself writes, it is simply odd that Heidegger reads Plato the way he does. Although I think that Hyland’s assessment is correct, and that the dramatic reading of the dialogues is the most fruitful one, I think that it provides a barrier in judging other approaches to Plato. Nothing distinctive and not much of interest can be seen in Heidegger’s reading if one simply maintains that it – like most readings of Plato – is entirely misguided. Moreover, Heidegger’s own position remains obscure with such an approach.

One could also assess Heidegger’s reading by looking for proof of what he claims in Plato’s works themselves; if proof can be found, then Heidegger is applauded, if not, then he is chastised. Catalin Partenie pursues this strategy in his investigation of Heidegger’s Sophist lectures in his “Imprint: Heidegger’s Interpretation of Platonic Dialectic in the Sophist Lectures (1924-25)”. However, this strategy ignores Heidegger’s pronouncement on how he approaches ancient texts. For instance, in a lecture given just before the course under consideration Heidegger says shortly before his Sophist lectures:

If an examination of Aristotle’s text should show that much of what we say here is not to be found there in the text, that would not be an argument against our interpretation. An interpretation is a genuine interpretation only when, in going through the whole text, it comes upon that which common sense never finds there, but which, although unspoken, nonetheless makes up the ground [Boden] and the genuine foundations of the kind of vision from out of which the text itself came to be. (BH 219)
Partenie, for instance, looks for evidence of several of Heidegger’s theses concerning Plato. He finds definite evidence in the dialogues for the first – that Plato articulates Dasein as *zoon logon echon* – while finding the second and third concerning the concealing tendency of everyday speaking and the goal of dialectic to break through such concealments to have “some” evidence. Finally, the claim which remains “extremely problematic” is the one stating that dialectic remains unable to breakthrough to the things themselves, that dialectic cannot transcend its linguistic medium. Partenie finds no evidence that Plato holds to this doctrine. But Heidegger’s point is not that Plato believed that his dialectic was doomed to fail, that it is intrinsically limited. Rather, this is the result of the unspoken ground which common sense could never find in the text, that Plato himself would be unaware of, namely the assumption of a productive ontology. Moreover, on Heidegger’s reading Plato puts all of his faith in dialectic, so of course there would be no evidence found demonstrating its failure. Any search for accuracy in Heidegger’s interpretations overlooks the fact that he does not strive for a historically accurate reconstruction that remains ‘true’ to the original text, but rather that he aims for a destructive retrieval of the tradition to reappropriate not just the text under consideration, but to break through to the matters themselves. He aims to uncover the guiding assumption of the meaning of being at work under the surface of the text.

It seems then, that the best way of confronting and assessing Heidegger’s work on Plato in this regard involves turning to the matters themselves in each respective thinker’s works. This is precisely what Gonzalez does in his masterful *Plato and Heidegger*. His entire argument in the first chapter on Heidegger’s *Sophist* lectures works toward demonstrating that Heidegger privileges Aristotle’s conception of philosophy over Plato’s

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45 Of course, some will simply respond that since Heidegger does not respect the text under consideration, there is no reason to follow his interpretations. This response remains an option, but seems too simple so long as one takes Heidegger’s work seriously.

46 Heidegger articulates his phenomenological approach (‘genuine research’) in contrast to Husserlian (‘today’s’) phenomenology with just this in mind: “Today phenomenology uses the term ‘phenomenon’ in this sense of *phainetai* [to show itself], *phainomenon*. Phenomenology signifies nothing else than disclosing in speech, exhibiting beings that show themselves, in their way of showing themselves, in the way they are ‘there.’ That is the formal idea of phenomenology, which to be sure includes a richly articulated methodology. This formal idea of phenomenology…is usually confused with the methodology of research, with genuine research and the concrete mode of carrying it out. Phenomenology then seems to be an easy science, where one, as it were, lies on a sofa smoking a pipe and intuiting essences. But things are not so simple; on the contrary, it is a question of *demonstrating* the matters at issue themselves. How the demonstration happens depends on the access, the content, and the ontological constitution of the realm under consideration. Even the Greeks, Plato and Aristotle, use *phainetai* in this sense, although, to be sure, it is often detached from this sense and means simply ‘it seems,’ ‘it merely appears to be so’” (*PS* 406/586-587).
because Aristotle – like Heidegger himself – takes nous, intellectual insight, or categorial intuition, to be the highest mode of access to the being of beings while Plato remains mired in logos, unable to break free of dialectic’s linguistic medium. As such Heidegger’s and Plato’s thought remain forever broken asunder for Heidegger will increasingly look for a mystical insight into being, free from any speech about it, that Plato cannot endorse. On the surface this seems correct – Heidegger repeatedly holds Aristotle above Plato as the proto-phenomenologist. However, what this reading overlooks is the fact 1) that Heidegger maintains that Aristotle too ultimately remains tied to the linguistic medium: for all Greeks, man is zoon logos echon; 2) that this results from the productionist ontology, which can be comprised solely of what is present-at-hand, that is common to Aristotle and Plato alike; 3) that Plato’s dialectic is praised for striving after pure nous only insofar as his aim demonstrates an attempt to follow the things themselves, to allow beings to appear in their being. However, Gonzalez’s criticism brings us to the heart of the matter: if Heidegger is not simply endorsing nous above logos what does he endorse and what is the relationship between nous, logos, and being?

Heidegger’s Sophist lectures are complicated by his apparent indecision on the place of nous as a human possibility, especially in relation to logos. For Aristotle, theoria is the philosopher’s true mode of being since it allows one to uncover the being of beings, while dialectic strives for such an uncovering but never reaches it: only through the pure nous of theoria does one have insight into being as a whole which dialectic, as mired in logos, can never reach. Truth as unconcealment is not achievable without transcending dialectic in an act of intuitive, intellectual, insight. Husserl’s ‘epochal’ discovery of ‘categorial intuition’ also seems to be based on such discernment. But Heidegger does not simply follow in Husserl’s tracks: rather, as we have seen in the previous chapter, Heidegger introduces the existentials of ‘understanding’ and ‘discourse’ precisely to give

47 Gonzalez justifies his reading of Heidegger, following Jacques Taminaux, by arguing that Heidegger’s ‘phenomenological description’ in the Being and Time era is nothing but an updated version of Husserlian eidetic intuition, or pure nous. Gonzalez’s further equation of Heidegger with Aristotle in the Sophist lectures follows immediately from this characterization of Heidegger’s method of phenomenological description.

48 “What is the mode of access to being in ontological questioning? Plato and Aristotle: logos – and indeed with a certain explicitness, but only this far, that logos remains the only one. But that does not mean: ontology is determined by logic – or else one must say what ‘logic’ signifies here. Not: logos – oriented toward logic and thereby still placing at the foundation a modern ontological concept, but instead: logos oriented toward noein – aletheuein – Dasein” (PS 444/638-639).
the grounds for any categorial intuition accompanying sensorial intuition. Husserl provides the breakthrough which Heidegger radically appropriates.

For Husserl intentional acts amount to a constitution of objects in their meaning through a “sense-bestowal” such that categorial intuition provides direct access to this meaning of beings; that is, categorial intuition is essentially what Heidegger takes to be pure nous. But under Heidegger’s appropriation of the term, it is a mistake to think that consciousness actively ‘bestows’ meaning in a creative objectification. Instead, the horizon of meaning precedes and enables such intentional acts in the first place. Meaningful encounters with entities in the world come prior to any co-ordination of sensuous material given to consciousness. Dasein already understands beings pre-theoretically and discovers their meaning – makes this understanding explicit – through interpretive acts. Since intentional acts are interpretive, but pre-linguistic, and categorial intuition derives from this interpretive character, things can never be apprehended entirely apart from some horizon of understanding, given beforehand. As Kisiel has skilfully worked out, only in Being and Time does Heidegger come to the robust concept of understanding as “now a never ceasing, futuristic, finite transcendence. This ex-sisting transcendence might be briefly characterized in two distinct ways, both far removed from the stasis of intuition: as expropriating incessance and as appropriating finitude.” And yet already in these earlier lecture courses Heidegger lays the groundwork for his different interpretation of categorial intuition: whereas for Husserl (and Aristotle with his pure nous) the ‘categorial’ component of any act can be fully and absolutely apprehended in pure intuition (nous), for Heidegger the categorial is always only embedded in a prior horizon of understanding; as such the interpretive act of apprehension might be deficient. Such apprehension is always situated, limited by Dasein’s finitude. It is not that Heidegger strives after this pure nous and that he thereby privileges Aristotle’s thought over Plato’s. Rather, Heidegger acknowledges that Aristotle problematizes being and the way we speak being (dialectic) and for this reason he is praised. But Heidegger himself looks for a different access to being other than through pure nous and logos (and then, even more, other than through modern logic) as I have argued.


50 Husserl, Ideas I, 129 [106].

51 Kisiel, “From Intuition to Understanding,” 47.
The Greeks take *logos* as the starting point, and work out their ontology from this, but always with the tacit assumption that ontology be populated only by the present-at-hand. Heidegger looks at the more primordial question of the relation between *logos* and being in the first place. He looks to give an account of being, not necessarily limited to what can be said about being, but still remaining within a saying. Heidegger searches for a saying that will not limit being to what can be said about it, one which never fully captures being. This culminates in his attempt to overcome the ontology of the present at hand dominant throughout the history of Western metaphysics. His fundamental ontology necessarily works through a hermeneutic, interpretive, approach which always remains only provisional.

Apart from his own views, Heidegger might be misguided in many of the specific points he makes about Plato. However, his uncovering of the roots of the logical and theoretical prejudice, I would argue, provides some deep insight into the nature of Platonic philosophy as it has been passed down in the philosophical tradition. Whether or not Plato believed x or y, whether or not these things can be found in the text, Heidegger uncovers the inner tendency of philosophy in the tradition of Plato, guided by Plato, coming out of Plato, to fall sway to the overwhelming tendency to take things as present-at-hand as all that is, together with the attendant focus on logic as a discipline independent of our being-in-the-world, the purest of pure theoretical activities as the theory of theory. This has culminated in the vision of ‘the logical realm’ as something entirely separate, subsisting in its own realm. Heidegger opposes this movement through his destructive reading of the history of philosophy. His grander scheme is not to uncover some particularity in this or that thinker, to pit Plato against Aristotle, Descartes against Kant, but to uncover the inner tendencies in the tradition: to destroy the inheritance given to us from our tradition, striving after the matters themselves.
Conclusion

To conclude, I shall briefly retrace the argument that has been developed in the main body of the dissertation. The main thesis for which I have argued is that *Being and Time* can consistently be read as presenting a well developed philosophy of logic. As an outcome of my reconstruction of Heidegger’s views on logic, I have argued that his reading of Plato during the era under consideration amounts to an ‘application’ of his philosophy of logic but also that Heidegger’s reading of Plato provides a historical foothold for his most trenchant engagements with the logic of his day. As I have shown, Heidegger works out his philosophy of logic in direct confrontation not only with Plato, but more overtly with both Husserl and his neo-Kantian predecessors.

I devoted chapter one to an articulation of the basic issues in logic in the nineteenth century. The Marburg neo-Kantians and Husserl alike were shown to be products of this intellectual milieu. By outlining the basic positions of the targets of Heidegger’s later criticism, this opening chapter acted as a set-up for the rest of the dissertation. In the second chapter, I supplemented the historical considerations of the first by providing a reconstruction of the most basic tenets of Rickert’s work, arguing that Heidegger’s earliest works in logic show an distancing from Rickert’s thought from the outset. Although every Heidegger scholar is aware of the link, Heidegger’s earliest works have rarely been looked at in detail in the light of Rickert’s work; I hope to have made a first step toward remedying this lack. Throughout the second chapter I also emphasized Heidegger’s changing understanding of the role of philosophy as a rigorous science. Already in his breakthrough works to phenomenology, I argued, Heidegger sets out his conception of rigorous philosophy in contrast to Husserl’s. However, I denied that there is a radical break from transcendental phenomenology in any of Heidegger’s works up to and including *Being and Time*.

The last two chapters contain the heart of the dissertation where I argued for my interpretation of Heidegger’s philosophy of logic from the *Being and Time* era. I set up Heidegger’s logical inquires as a response to the debate over psychologism, a live debate coming out of the nineteenth century call for a reform of logic. In the third chapter I showed that the core of Heidegger’s *Being and Time* can itself be read as contributing to an answer to a question in the philosophy of logic: namely, an answer to the question of the origins of logic. Simply put, Heidegger argues that logic grounds in everyday experience. More than this, I reconstructed Heidegger’s critical engagements with Husserl.
and the neo-Kantians in light of his views on logic. Ultimately I argued that there is a deep connection between this confrontation and his general critique of the privileging of the present-at-hand throughout the history of Western metaphysics. This final observation opened up the possibility of interpreting Heidegger’s reading of Plato in light of his critique of logic. I demonstrated that Heidegger’s lectures on the *Sophist* have often been misunderstood. I aimed to clarify this matter, contending that Heidegger’s *Sophist* lectures present us with a criticism of Plato that ties in to the most intimate aspects of Heidegger’s philosophy of logic in the *Being and Time* era and that Plato provides the source for Heidegger’s most pressing criticisms of the logo-centric tradition that has dominated the history of Western metaphysics.

Although offering a comprehensive picture, my investigation of Heidegger’s philosophy of logic is in no way a completed project. On the contrary, it is open to many possible additions. This dissertation has attempted to add to the several key works in the literature, while pointing out some unseen connections between both Heidegger’s critique of logic, and his positive views on logic, to his reading of Plato in his *Sophist* lectures. The possibilities of unearthing further connections with Heidegger’s earliest works – most notably his notion of formal indication – readily present themselves. Moreover, an esemplastic interpretation of Heidegger’s philosophy of logic across his entire body of writings in light of his changing confrontation with Plato, presents itself as an obvious extension of the work carried out in this dissertation. Heidegger’s engagement with both logic and Plato display an increasingly polemical streak in Heidegger’s later works. A project unearthing a philosophy of logic and interpretation of Plato beyond the mere negative remarks awaits further consideration.
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