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The Politics of Influence

An anthropological analysis of collective political action in contemporary democracy

Kathryn Scott

Abstract

How voluntary associations in New Zealand have acted collectively to influence policy development and implementation is the topic of this anthropological enquiry. The thesis is informed by detailed ethnographic research with two voluntary associations, including interviews, participant observation, a questionnaire, focus groups, and document and media reviews. Besides tracing the genealogy of two voluntary associations engaged in collective action that their members believed had effective influence, I assess the extent to which their actions produced democratic effects and social justice.

‘TIES’, an urban community leadership group, emerged in 2008 to contest and successfully shape important aspects of a local urban renewal process in Tāmaki, Auckland. This influence was fragile and fleeting, but in the process of coming together to act in concert, TIES created alternative visions for local democracy that are more enduring than the group itself. The Haemophilia Foundation of New Zealand successfully negotiated a groundbreaking national governance structure for haemophilia care, resulting in regionally equitable standards of care. Despite running counter to neoliberal preferences for competitive, regionalised health structures, this nationalised structure is now being replicated for other high-cost conditions.

These associations strategically reversed governmental techniques to exert influence, turning the concepts of ‘inclusion’ and ‘participation’ back on the state, and attaching different meanings and practices to these concepts. Rather than as elite interest groups seeking certain concessions or financial resources, the associations acted collectively to change the very architecture of decision making. In this way they successfully contested fundamental elements of neoliberalism such as decentralisation of decision making and the competitive market model. In distinguishing between voluntary associations and interest groups, it is my purpose to highlight that these associations shaped the procedural aspects of democracy. I examine the temporal and spatial elements of their collective action to show how they successfully managed to work “the spaces (and beyond) of neoliberalism” (Larner and Craig 2005:11). This thesis offers insights into how local actors can create innovations in governance that provide new spaces of negotiation in political decision-making.
Key words: voluntary associations, democracy, collective action, neoliberalism, policy, anthropology
Acknowledgements

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The haemophilia study in this thesis began almost two decades ago; the findings are currently being collated into a book. In 1994, I transitioned from a new graduate to a research assistant in the University of Auckland’s Anthropology Department, working on the “Living with Haemophilia in Aotearoa New Zealand” study. Project leader Julie Park provided me with a valuable apprenticeship in ethnographic research, sharing her considerable experience, skill and kindness. I would also like to acknowledge with gratitude other research team members John Benseman, Elizabeth Berry, Deon York, and Mike Carnahan.

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got me writing early in the process (“don’t angst, just write!”). Department illustrator Briar Sefton prepared the Tāmaki map. Thanks to all of you.

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Almost 20 years ago, my father Des Scott and I worked side by side in the final stages of getting my master’s thesis ready for submission. For a short, intense period our world revolved around the thesis – me writing, Dad editing – until it was done. I didn’t realise at the time how precious that time with Dad was. In the last few months, I have thought of you often, Dad. Your grammatical skills were impeccable, your self-deprecating humour infectious, and your love and support still with me today. You always encouraged me to continue with my studies, “See how far you can get” you said, while also cautioning me, in that wonderful kiwi way, not to “get too big for your boots”. I dedicate this thesis to you Dad, with love.
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<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACC</td>
<td>Accident Compensation Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AHB</td>
<td>Auckland Health Board</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHE</td>
<td>Crown Health Authority</td>
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<tr>
<td>CSE</td>
<td>Community Sector Expert</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DHB</td>
<td>District Health Board</td>
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<tr>
<td>EBP</td>
<td>Evidence-Based Practice</td>
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<tr>
<td>HFNZ</td>
<td>Haemophilia Foundation of New Zealand</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ITTB</td>
<td>Interim Tāmaki Transformation Board</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LGA</td>
<td>Local Government Act 2002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MBIE</td>
<td>Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MMP</td>
<td>Mixed Member Proportional Representation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NHMG</td>
<td>National Haemophilia Management Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NZCCSS</td>
<td>New Zealand Council of Christian Social Services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NZHDA</td>
<td>New Zealand Health and Disability Act 2000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NZHS</td>
<td>New Zealand Haemophilia Society</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OCVS</td>
<td>Office for the Community and Voluntary Sector</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PHO</td>
<td>Public Health Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quango</td>
<td>Quasi-Autonomous Non-Governmental Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RHA</td>
<td>Regional Health Authority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TEB</td>
<td>Tāmaki Establishment Board</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TIES</td>
<td>Tāmaki Inclusive Engagement Strategy Team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TRC</td>
<td>Tāmaki Redevelopment Company</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TTP</td>
<td>Tāmaki Transformation Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TTPB</td>
<td>Tāmaki Transformation Programme Board</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WTO</td>
<td>World Trade Organization</td>
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CHAPTER 1: THEORISING DEMOCRACY & COLLECTIVE ACTION

Democracy is the government of the people, by the people, for the people (Abraham Lincoln).

It has been said that democracy is the worst form of government except all the others that have been tried (Winston Churchill).

Beginnings

One of the abiding conundrums of democracy is that while most people accept Churchill’s premise, the concept expresses an ideal, not a method for its attainment (Brown 2009). From an institutional perspective, democracy entails free elections, political parties, and rotating of politicians through political office (Paley 2008b). For many people, it is the democratic effects such institutions are intended to achieve that hold the promise of democracy, namely the ability of all members of a society to influence public policies that affect their lives, to constrain rulers’ abuses of power, and to change conditions of injustice. There is much less agreement about how to achieve such effects, however, and increasing concern that people cannot “really” influence policies, or certainly not those policies that matter. In contemporary “free market democracies” such as New Zealand, inequalities are spiralling and the bulk of the nation’s wealth is held in the hands of an increasingly smaller percentage of the population. Some critics have gone so far as to suggest that in this globalised world where transnational corporations hold such sway in political processes, we are in an era of “post-democracy” (Crouch 2004). However it has occurred, we seem to have lost sight of Lincoln’s ideal of “the people” as the basis for conceiving and promoting collective well-being.

The recently conceived Occupy Movement involves debate, analysis, and re-imagining democracy at a global scale. In a globalised economic climate, collective political action may hold more hope for creating change than casting a single vote at the ballot box. Groups emerging out of such social struggles tend to be deeply rooted in grassroots relationships, with lines of accountability back to the communities they represent rather than to the state (Paley 2008b). Such movements practice consensus decision making rather than majority-rule, and call it “democracy” (Graeber 2004). However, an important question for democracy is whether collective political action increases or diminishes the very connections between rulers and their constituents that democracy is intended to create.
This thesis is an ethnographic study of the ways in which voluntary associations and networks in New Zealand have sought to influence public policies. More specifically, it studies the role voluntary associations can play in promoting democracy in an increasingly neoliberalised society. Through two detailed ethnographic studies I examine how power is produced through voluntary associations and networks and how that power may contribute to, or detract from, democratic ideals and practices.

The thesis aims to contribute to the emergent field of the anthropology of democracy. In *Inclusion and Democracy*, Iris Marion Young (2000) describes democracy as a matter of degree, rather than all-or-nothing. Rather than essentialise democracy as a condition that a nation has (or does not have), scholars such as Young have demonstrated the ambiguity and performative value of the concept, and highlighted historical cultural aspects and current political preferences that shape democracies in unique ways in different parts of the world. Democracy is therefore conceived as a set of processes that are enacted unevenly over time, with “ongoing processes of making or maintaining assertions of normativity amid a field of contestants” (Paley 2008a:5). While being cognisant of global concerns at anti-democratic trends, ethnographic research offers a lens to analyse how democracy is imagined and enacted by contestants in a particular time and space. Ethnography, based on fine-grained analysis, can highlight power relations and the agency of social actors, and trace people, discourses and events beyond national borders.

Political theorist Pierre Rosanvallon (2008), describing democracy as a pluralist process that needs a mix of institutions, identifies three dimensions of democracy: electoral-representative government, counter-democratic activity, and the institution of civil society by the political. Counter-democracy is not the opposite of democracy, but rather the practices that people use to try to impose control over the political processes carried out in their name. Counter-democracy is therefore a democratic form that reinforces and complements other elements of democracy. Rosanvallon observes that while the profound transformations in social and political activism of the recent past have been the focus of many studies, the democratic function of this activism has not. Collective political action by voluntary associations can be seen as part of what Rosanvallon terms

1 In choosing the term “voluntary associations and networks” to denote the groupings I analyse in this thesis, I am seeking a broad, fluid category that includes voluntary, non-profit, independent associations that may provide some professional services. At times I also use the term “grouping” (rather than “group”) to acknowledge the fluidity of cultural differences and commonalities of groups (Calhoun 2003), and to emphasise that my analysis is of processes rather than the groups themselves.
counter-democracy, and, like all parts of democracy, is in need of constant evaluation and revision to ensure procedures that create democratic models of government reach their potential.

My interest in collective political action comes from more than 20 years of being part of voluntary associations and networks personally and while doing participant observation as a researcher or programme evaluator. Drawing inspiration from engaged anthropology and from Graeber’s vision of an “anarchist anthropology” (2004), I aligned with self-organised, voluntary associations that were set on exposing, subverting and undermining structures of domination and injustice. The task is to “look at those who are creating viable alternatives, try to figure out what might be the larger implications of what they are (already) doing, and then offer those ideas back, not as prescriptions, but as contributions, possibilities – as gifts” (Graeber 2004:12). As I have become more comfortable (and useful) in this engaged anthropologist role, my involvement in groups has shifted beyond merely attending meetings to, as appropriate, contributing to or facilitating discussions, chairing meetings, minute-taking or being part of sub-committees to complete specific tasks. My personal and professional lives often overlap as I take up invitations and other opportunities to contribute to and learn from local democracy in action.

I find myself drawn to people who stand up for important issues such as social injustice or environmental protection. I am fascinated by the assemblage of skills, knowledge, networks, and, typically, charisma, that community leaders employ in their endeavours. However, I have noticed that these exceptional individuals usually work as part of a voluntary association or network. What the public see is a vocal leader, but behind the scenes a wider group of people have often been working in multiple ways to build the knowledge, networks and other resources required to have political influence. The public may just see the “main event”, a demonstration or media campaign that appears to tip the scales in terms of exerting influence on public policies. Yet these dramatic displays are often the culmination of years of smaller, seemingly less significant actions and

2 For example, I joined the Haemophilia Society of New Zealand in 1994, and for short periods during the mid-1990s I was a member of the Country Women’s Institute, the Maori Women’s Welfare League and a Farmers’ Discussion Group while undertaking research in rural Northland. Since taking up the role of urban researcher in 2005, I have become part of numerous urban science, policy and practitioner networks, as well as being an active member of a local community garden and on the Board of a community development organisation.
conversations. I wanted to understand how this happens, and what this success meant for democracy.

A New Zealand example comes from a long-term ethnographic research project with the haemophilia population in which I became initially involved in 1994. This research brought me into contact with the highly politicised group of volunteers of their national association. At this time, they were deeply immersed in a fight to extract a settlement from government for members who contracted hepatitis C through blood products. Four years later (1999), I worked on a small update of the research, and found the fight was still very much on, with apparently little progress towards settlement. In the meantime, however, the Haemophilia Foundation (HFNZ) had built extensive networks, knowledge and skills, and a capacity to strategise collectively – to “push the political knobs” as a key player called it – to exert political influence. It was not until 2005, a decade and a half after they started, that a settlement was finally reached.

What came next was what really caught my attention. The HFNZ turned their well-honed lobbying skills to the issue of regional inequities in haemophilia care. In 2006, they successfully negotiated a groundbreaking new national governance structure for haemophilia care that has resulted in regionally equitable standards of care and significant savings on treatment products that have been diverted to specialist care. These volunteers drew on international networks, “best practice” guidelines, specialist knowledge, ongoing input from their broader membership, and relationships with government officials and medical staff. The foundation’s volunteers came together to strategise and work collectively for political purpose, creating power in the process.

Yet an age-old dilemma of democracy is whether such power produces positive or negative effects, and for whom. This issue has been re-ignited in the last 30 years with the political shift towards participatory democracy in many social democracies. Normatively, participatory processes provide space for deliberation about public policies, complementing representational forms of democracy. The aim is therefore to widen the range of citizens involved to create more “inclusive” decision-making processes. Additionally, participatory processes aim to deepen democracy by inviting citizens to participate in political decision-making in a range of ways, moving beyond information sharing and consultation to public deliberation, collective problem-solving and decision-making (Young 2000). According to Appadurai (2002), attempts to deepen democracy are successful when poor communities are able to engage in partnerships with more powerful agencies at multiple scales (urban, regional, national and global).
New Zealand, described as a test tube for neoliberal reforms in the 1980s and 1990s, has embraced this “inclusive liberal turn” (Craig and Porter 2006). With a small population of 4.5 million, and only two main layers of government between state and societal actors, involving local people and all available expertise makes good sense and is quite achievable. A requirement for public participation is evident in key legislation and strategic planning documents. New opportunities or “invited spaces” (Cornwall and Coelho 2007) of participation have been created to allow citizens more direct involvement in political institutions.

Yet despite public participation being institutionalised in contemporary New Zealand politics, many people express frustration at their lack of power to exert political influence. A long line of transnational agreements and consecutive governments committed to market rule have squarely situated New Zealanders as global citizens. Features unique to New Zealand such as the Treaty of Waitangi, a strong sense of wanting “a fair go”, and having a strongly agricultural-oriented economy have helped shape New Zealand imaginaries in relation to public participation (examined in more detail in Chapter 3). As a community leader commented about her experiences of being “engaged” in a government-led urban renewal programme, “it’s like we are talking past each other” and “it seems as if the real meeting takes place after we leave”, reflecting “a major mismatch between the vision and the reality” of the participatory process.

Such concerns are often explained in academic literature as evidence that participatory democracy has been reduced to strategies to get “buy-in” or gain political legitimacy for central government agendas (Daly 2003, Newman et al. 2004, White 1996). Participatory processes can be a mobilising discourse to involve citizens and community organisations in provision of services formerly understood as provided by the state. The community service sector becomes transformed into a form of “grassroots authoritarianism” (Hyatt 2011:118), whereby they induce community members to be responsible for themselves. Decentralisation of costs and responsibilities, rather than devolution of decision-making authority and funding allocation, has been observed within participatory governance contexts (Taylor 2007). This can serve to reinforce existing power relations, rather than devolve power to local actors (Roßteutscher 2005; White 1996). There was little evidence to suggest that people could come together in collective political action to shape improved policies in ways that could be conceived as “positive”.

Rosanvallon (2008) observed that in France and other liberal democracies, political action in the public sphere is more often aimed at “negative democracy”, that is, criticising,
resisting and condemning policy and implementation processes. Rather than create a “great night” of revolution, to be a radical now means “to point the finger of blame every day... to twist the knife in each of society’s wounds” (Rosanvallon 2008:255). This “watchdog” approach to political action, Rosanvallon argues, results in governments being extremely cautious to avoid criticism and less inclined to propose ambitious projects. Rosanvallon noted, however, that many advocacy groups play a dual role – being “pressure groups” and “think tanks”. Rather than being traditional interest groups whose primary purpose is to defend the interests of their members, such groups aim to identify issues and exert pressure on governments:

They see democracy not as a competition for government power but as a composite of two realms – a sphere of electoral representation and a constellation of counter-democracy organizations – in constant tension with each other (Rosanvallon 2008:65).

Despite all my best attempts to discount the influence of the HFNZ based on governmentality and critiques of neoliberalism, I was unable to shake the sense that an important innovation in governance had occurred and deserved further scrutiny.

My sense was that the HFNZ’s actions were an example of “positive democracy”, the voluntary association acting as a pressure group and a think tank. They certainly did not feel co-opted, nor were they an elite interest group who sought to get a bigger slice of the public dollar. They developed shared understandings and priorities for haemophilia care, then worked with government agencies to shape (rather than prevent) particular policies. I had to look hard, but I did find suggestions in the democracy literature that working with the state did not necessarily equate with being co-opted (e.g., Appadurai 2002; Baumgartner and Mahoney 2005). I decided that the HFNZ would be a good ethnographic study to examine how it was able to re-imagine democracy in ways that government officials and politicians were unable to.

This research interest also comes out of my work in urban environmental research where I regularly encounter the view among government and non-government organisations (NGOs) that tapping the energies of voluntary associations is critical to improve social and environmental health and well-being. The government cannot address these issues alone, is the common catch cry. Much effort therefore goes into determining

3 Even in an interest group, people come together to combine their own political demands with the demands of other citizens, so have to learn to collaborate and sideline some of their own interests (Fennema and Tillie 2005).
how government agencies should “engage” with individuals and societal groupings to enable collaborative action.

Principles and best practice models of community engagement now abound. I have been part of these efforts, despite some misgivings about the underlying logic. After all, just like the concept of community, public participation is widely seen as a good thing. No one argues for less public participation. But I found the governmental (and some NGO) rationales for public participation conflicted with those of voluntary associations and networks that I was involved with. While policy-makers saw public participation as a way to “engage the community” in planning processes and create “active citizens”, the community leaders I knew were avidly trying to build the capacity of government officials and politicians to address urgent local (or national) issues. It was not lack of active citizenship but lack of civic trust that undermined participatory democracy (Scott and Liew 2012). Political mistrust is an international problem of democracy, and appears to reflect an increasing distance between civil society and political institutions (Rosanvallon 2008).

The apparent divergence in policy and public discourses and practices of public participation prompted me to consider what voluntary associations and networks would see as “good” public participation. Rather than using a policy lens to ask “What policies create opportunities for involving communities and more active citizenship?” I asked, “How do voluntary associations and networks help create better policies”? I was more interested in how this actually occurred in practice in specific historical conditions, with all the ups and downs of political action, rather than theoretically.

This interest was partly cultivated by Barbara Cruikshank’s (1999) book *The Will to Empower*. Cruikshank, drawing on Foucault’s concept of governmentality, observed that a long-standing concern in contemporary democracies that inequalities persist, despite people being equal at the ballot box, is now attributed to lack of political participation and powerlessness. The solution: democratic participation and self-government. How

4 See Wendy Larner’s insightful reflections on the role of academics and lines of accountability when contributing to “best practice” guides, concluding that “we are part of the assemblage through which objects and subjects of governance come to take specific forms” (2006:64).

5 Governmentality condenses the phrase “governmental rationality”. Foucault defined governmentality as “The ensemble formed by the institutions, procedures, analyses and reflections, the calculations and tactics that allow the exercise of this very specific albeit complex form of power, which has as its target population, as its principal form of knowledge political economy, and as its essential technical means apparatuses of society” (1991a:102).
participation could address poverty and inequitable distribution of resources was not apparent. Cruikshank noted that promotion of citizenship and self-government was about seeking to “mobilize the subject-effects of power rather than mobilize against the relations of rule that produce these effects” (1999:107). The political project is therefore to transform individual subjects into politically active citizens capable of self-government. These observations aligned with some of my own about governmental practices in New Zealand, and provided an entry point into Foucault’s concept of governmentality that shaped my focus on problematising the concept of public participation and making contestations to governmental discourses and practices visible.

While I was in the early stages of formulating my research ideas, I was invited to be part of a community leaders group that was to become known as TIES. TIES was formed in response to frustrations with poor community engagement processes in an urban renewal programme in Tāmaki, Auckland. Rather than continue to work individually, these local activists decided to come together and work collectively to demand more inclusive processes, for example, by involving local people within programme governance and management rather than in a proposed “community reference group”.

I was invited to be part of TIES because Tāmaki was my place of work and I had undertaken long-term ethnographic research in the area related to urban development, and so had local knowledge and good networks. Although I was also part of several other networks and community groups that were engaged in political action, some of which created small shifts in local government policies or programmes, it was the TIES group that caught my attention as a highly effective leadership group. TIES quickly stamped out stigmatised portrayals of Tāmaki in the urban renewal programme planning processes, and created high expectations that the programme should deliver benefits for the existing residents, rather than merely gentrify the area, as local residents feared. TIES also started to shape procedural processes of the programme so that more local people were involved in influencing the programme and were provided with new opportunities for economic development. TIES and some of its individual members gained local, regional and even national acknowledgement for the positive effects they had on the programme. However, even though TIES influenced development discourses and some practices, the final decisions seemed to continue to lie with central government.

I observed that by coming together to deliberate, TIES built relationships and an ability to work together for a common political purpose. This capacity to act in concert to convince government officials and others to act in certain ways was what Arendt (1967
called power. However, this power was fleeting, as Rose (1999) theorised. TIES’ political actions were difficult to describe as either positive or negative democracy. It often seemed a case of one-step-forward-and-two-steps-back. Over time, I recognised that this localised voluntary association would provide a useful counter-point to my study of the national Haemophilia Foundation. It prompted me to see the boundaries between positive and negative democracy as blurred, and the “creative tension” (Brown 2009) between the state and the voluntary associations as integral to democracy. As a participant observer in the TIES process over a 3-year period, I was able to provide a fine-grained account of the groups’ collective action, in contrast to my study of the HFNZ that was relayed to me (and other members of the research team) through interviews, informal discussions, and document reviews.

Because my focus was on a national and a local voluntary association, I regularly had to lift my sights above the ethnographic detail, and beyond the urban development and health consumer advocacy contexts, to consider the voluntary associations’ activities as they related to broader processes of democracy. This was important as there was an abundance of critiques of community engagement as it relates to urban development, as there was of health advocacy and social movements more generally. There is much less analysis of the spatial and temporal elements of how voluntary associations shape public policies, and critical reflection on their democratic effects. If democracy is to fulfil its promise of promoting inclusion and justice, then a more nuanced understanding of the negotiated space between citizens and state is required.

Theoretically, I aimed to draw together literature on participatory democracy, governmentality, and situational analysis. I have attempted to collapse binary oppositions—civil society/the state, power “from above”/“from below”, participatory/representational democracy, individual/collective, truth/ideology—in order to examine how people in voluntary associations understood and enacted concepts of public participation and inclusion for political purpose. I treat these concepts as categories of social and political practice rather than categories of analysis (Brubaker and Cooper 2000). I wanted to understand how the concepts are understood and enacted by social actors, as distinct from wanting to define, categorise and analyse the concepts themselves (Brubaker and Cooper 2000). The concepts can be seen as “essentially contested concepts” (Gallie 1956), meaning the roots, interpretations and uses of the term are multiple and diffuse. My ethnographic lens has been on the experiences and activities of voluntary associations as
they developed, demanded, deployed, and contested participatory processes, looking back at policies and the state.

**Thesis Aims**

This thesis has four main aims. First, I show how two voluntary associations understood public participation in particular historical contexts. I compare these discourses with those of the government agencies they encountered, and show how differences (and similarities) in discourses of public participation shaped practices. My aim in the first instance is to make visible the voluntary associations’ contestations and successes in influencing public policy in ways that promoted social justice.

Second, I describe the political action adopted by two voluntary associations, with a focus on the spatial and temporal elements and how these link to circulating discourses and wider political shifts. I show that at different times, the groups worked with, within or in parallel to government agencies, blurring the boundaries between society and the state for political effect. I argue that these associations strategically reversed governmental techniques to exert influence, turning concepts such as inclusion and participation back on the state but attaching different meanings and practices to these concepts. They were “working the spaces (and beyond?) of neoliberalism” (Larner and Craig 2005:11), creating innovations in governance that provided new spaces of negotiation in political decision-making.

Third, I show how voluntary associations provide forums for imagining and shaping innovations in democratic process and governance in ways that are impossible on the central political stage. I show ethnographically the unpredictable and irreversible effects of collective political action, including ruptures in the way local democracy is imagined. I provide ethnographic examples where voluntary associations developed a capacity to act collectively and demonstrate new ways of working in collaboration with multiple actors, while remaining accountable to their own membership or local residents rather than to the state. I attempt to avoid romanticising the volunteers as a united force, showing the “awkward relations” (Tsing 2005:212) between actors and failed attempts at contestation as well as their successes. I trace the way contestations layered on one another over time. I show that collective action was not a matter of mobilising an existing network, or merely adding more associates, but required them to re-imagine democracy and its related practices (Tsing 2005).
Finally, I describe and analyse these new spaces of governance in relation to democratic process. Following Brown (2009) and Fennema and Tillie (2005), I argue that non-elected entities or voluntary associations can still produce democratic effects. I also show that where business interests dominate (or government attempts to provide conditions for investment by big business), these effects can be fleeting. The new National Haemophilia Management Group oversees all haemophilia care and involves state and societal actors working together to oversee a more equitable system of care nationally. The TIES group was also a non-elected body that came together voluntarily to shape a government-initiated programme, and used “back-stage” deliberations to develop a capacity to act in concert. Their influence was constantly undermined, however, by central government agendas that sought “buy-in” of local residents to an urban renewal programme that would attract business investment, rather than “inclusion” and “participation” in partnership with the state.

Theoretical Background
The ethnographic detail in this thesis is oriented by four main theoretical perspectives. The first is the concept of power as conceived by Hannah Arendt, meaning power created through deliberation and collective action in the public sphere; the second is Foucault’s concepts of power/knowledge and governmentality; 6 third, I use the concept of situational definitions as conceived by Erving Goffman to consider the different fields of interaction voluntary associations employed; and finally, an anthropology of democracy frames my analysis of voluntary associations and grassroots movements as integral to democracy.

This framework draws partly on Jeffrey Goldfarb’s approach to studying transitions to democracy in parts of Eastern Europe in The Politics of Small Things (2006). Goldfarb examines how “small things” such as illicit discussions around a kitchen table or in other private settings can result in the creation of new definitions of the situation, and so create political power. He observes that changes in definitions of self were integral to developing new definitions of reality:

Bonds of trust developed, enabling each individual who took part to forge an identity, a self, that was strikingly different from his or her institutionally defined persona. This was public life hidden in a private space (Goldfarb 2006:15).

6 I also draw on some key theorists who have followed in Foucault’s wake such as Nikolas Rose (1996, 1999), Miller and Rose (2008), Barbara Cruikshank (1999), and Larner and Craig (2005).
He argues that this “power of small things” is greatly underappreciated in everyday life and on the larger political stage, and uses case studies to show how small things contributed to the shift from communism to democracy. Following Hannah Arendt (1959), Goldfarb notes the importance of people coming together freely to talk as equals, discuss ideas, reveal their differences, and develop a capacity to act in concert. Using examples from three Eastern European countries during the late Soviet era, he shows that in the absence of a public sphere, people acted as if there were one, meeting and debating ideas. In the process, they redefined their situation, and forged a new future beyond communism. Goldfarb draws on Foucault to consider how powers operate in mundane activities of everyday life, but on Arendt to argue that the people’s actions were detached from the truth regime of communism. Goldfarb also draws on Goffman to highlight the ways alternative discourses and practices were developed “back-stage” away from the central political stage. He argues that people in Eastern Europe opposed communist authorities’ ideology by interacting within an alternative framework that did not include ideology. These new patterns of presentations of self and teamwork resulted in a redefinition of their situation.

Like Goldfarb, I am examining the potential for political power created in parallel spaces of interaction in free zones in the public sphere. I also contend that such power is underestimated both in the academic literature and in everyday life. In the totalitarian regimes studied by Arendt and the communist regimes studied by Goldfarb, a public sphere did not exist and had to be fought for. My ethnographic studies in New Zealand are at a time when not only are there vibrant public spheres of deliberation, but the concept of participatory democracy is very popular among both policy elites and in wider society. However, diverse and contradictory perceptions of what participatory democracy is, and is for, undermine its value.

Some would argue that the concept of participatory democracy is also highly ideological, although I have not found ideology a useful concept to analyse the working of power in this case. I examine political actions as contestations, rather than resistance, as a way to show the spaces of negotiation within voluntary associations and between state and society.

The danger with throwing out concepts such as ideology and resistance as analytical tools means that I risk blurring the boundaries between state and society to such an extreme that I lose sight of people’s concerns that they are ever-more-distant from centres of power. There is a widespread perception that participatory processes do not shape important policies related to political economy, so counter to what theorists such as
Appadurai (2002) contend, participation does not “deepen democracy”. Fraser (1997) observed that the concept of plural public spheres was valuable in her analysis to “keep in view the distinctions between state apparatus, economic markets, and democratic associations, distinctions that are essential to democratic theory” (1997:70). I attempt to keep the focus on alternative discourses and practices that penetrate policy narratives – however fleeting; given the strong critiques of participatory democracy, such alternatives seem more important than ever.

The concept of democracy is central to my thesis, but I use it as both a category of practice and as a category of analysis. Democracy is a contested concept with multiple definitions and practices, but however impossible to define, it is still important. Nevertheless, it seems that the central values of equality and freedom fail to encapsulate all that people seek in contemporary democracy. People want a sense of fairness, rather than merely equal treatment before the law and equal right to vote. From the perspectives of voluntary associations and networks, I propose that the reason they promote participatory forms of democracy is to achieve improved quality of public participation and policy outcomes, not just greater numbers of people involved. Citizens are said to experience “fair effect” (Callon, Lascoumes, and Barthe 2001) under conditions of high trust in democratic procedures, whereby they trust that what a person or institution says, promises or does without seeking to verify it. Normatively, participatory democracy involves both “fair effect” and equity: a reasonable level of civic trust in the ability of citizens to influence decisions is required before citizens will become involved in deliberation processes (Scott and Park 2008).

Participatory democracy is therefore aimed at more equitable procedures and outcomes, referring to the degree to which they are fair, just, and impartial. This may or may not involve treating people equally. As Young (2000) advocates, minority groups need to be allowed to develop and exercise capabilities and bring their experiences, needs and priorities to decision-making processes. This thesis explores how this can occur through voluntary associations and networks.

Theorising Political Influence

Arendt, Foucault, and Goffman and anthropologists of democracy are not in conversation with one another but each provides an important aspect of my theoretical framework. I present each theorist’s key theoretical perspectives and the ways these theories have
influenced debates about public participation in a participatory governance context, then describe how I bring these together to frame my research.

**Power through collective action: Hannah Arendt**

Hannah Arendt provides valuable insights about how power is produced through collective action and spatial aspects of collective action. Arendt was a political theorist whose particular interest was the importance of a free public realm, explored in detail in *Origins of Totalitarianism* (1967 [1961]). Described as a “strong liberal” (Rosanvallon 2008:181), Arendt follows in the footsteps of Aristotle, Machiavelli, Montesquieu, and de Tocqueville, a tradition that valorises deliberation in the public sphere as a way for citizens to shape their political environment. Arendt contended that one of the factors that enabled a totalitarian regime to dominate a society was the removal of political freedom. This absence of a public sphere enables false ideologies to go uncontested. Under the Nazi regime, for example, anti-Semitism was based on the idea that Jews were by nature inferior to Aryans. This “fact” was used as justification for their extermination. Coupled with fear of imprisonment or death, people did not challenge it: “Systemic lying to the whole world can be safely carried out only under the conditions of totalitarian rule, where the fictitious quality of everyday reality makes propaganda largely superfluous” (Arendt 1967:413 [1961]). For this reason, Arendt was adamant that public space for dialogue and debate was critical to freedom.

Arendt conceived of politics as based on active citizenship; that is, on the importance of people freely meeting and talking to each other as equals, deliberating, and developing a capacity to act in concert. Arendt contended that forming a judgement together creates bonds among individual subjects (1991, cited in Rosanvallon 2008:46). This capacity to act together for public-political purpose was what Arendt called power, which she contrasted with coercion or force. Strength, in her view, comes through a plurality of actors working together for a common political purpose.

Arendt contends that power is a product of speech and action, because it emerges out of people working in concert and relies on persuasion to secure the consent of others through discussion and debate. Rather than reifying power as imposed or static, Arendt contends that:

…power cannot be stored up and kept in reserve for emergencies, like the instrument of violence, but exists only in its actualization. When power is not actualized, it passes away, and history is full of examples that the greatest material riches cannot compensate for this loss. Power is actualized only where word and deed have not parted company, where words are not empty and deeds not brutal,
where words are not used to veil intentions but to disclose realities, and deeds are not used to violate and destroy but to establish relations and create new realities (1959:178-9).

For Arendt, power is always a potential, rather than pre-existent force, and emerges when people act together and vanishes when people disperse. That said, Arendt (1959) also theorised that because political action takes place through a web of human relationships and in the context of plurality, the effects are unpredictable and irreversible. Political action is manifested through freedom to interact and act in the public sphere, so that no actor can control the final outcomes. Each actor enters into a web of actions and relationships, setting off processes with outcomes that cannot be predicted. Effects are irreversible because once the action has occurred, it cannot be taken back, and the chain of actions and reactions cannot be reversed. The unpredictability and irreversibility of political action are its very potential:

These consequences are boundless, because action…acts into a medium where every reaction becomes a chain reaction and where every process is the cause of new processes…the smallest act in the most limited circumstances bears the seed of the same boundlessness, because one deed, and sometimes one word, suffices to change every constellation (1959:169-170).

In The Human Condition, Arendt (1959) identified the distinction between private and public spheres of life as corresponding to the household and the political realms. She stressed the spatial quality of public life, that is, where people can meet, deliberate, and act in concert. Political action is needed to create a common world, or unity and shared understandings. She is concerned with the need for a “space of appearance” (1959:178) to create a common world, or risk situations where people are “deprived of seeing and hearing others, of being seen and being heard by them” (1959:53). Political action, she contends, always establishes relationships and “therefore has an inherent tendency to force open all limitations and cut across all boundaries” (1959:170). Through speech and action, realities can be disclosed, a web of relations developed, and new realities created. She therefore puts considerable faith in the public sphere, where she considers all are equal:

The public realm, as the common world, gathers us together and yet prevents our falling over each other, so to speak. What makes mass society so difficult to bear is not the number of people involved, or at least not primarily, but the fact that the world between them has lost its power to gather them together, to relate and to separate them (1959:48).

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Arendt defines the term “public” as “the world itself, in so far as it is common to all of us and distinguished from our privately owned place in it” (1959:48).
I agree with critics (e.g., Brunkhorst 2000, Canovan 1994) that Arendt is extremely dualistic in her conceptualisation of public and private life, and that she fails to recognise material welfare of the population that can impact on people’s ability to act collectively. Margaret Canovan called Arendt’s analysis of politics elitist, aimed at maintaining and promoting elite ways of acting. However, in line with my own thinking, Canovan also acknowledges Arendt for shining a light on aspects of political action that had been largely ignored up to that point, in particular, the public sphere as a space of appearance in which free political action takes place.

Arendt’s interest was always in comparing America’s public sphere to totalitarian regimes where no such public space existed. Arendt theorised that the ability of people to act in concert in the public sphere is essential to hold rulers to account and to create a free society. What I find useful is Arendt’s insistence that political action in the public sphere is vital to create a sense of a common world, so badly lacking in contemporary society, but also an important focus for theoretical analysis, in contrast to the more common focus on the state. I also find useful her observations about the effects of political action being unpredictable and irreversible, creating potential to “force open all limitations” to create new forms of power and political rule.

Habermas (1989 [1962]), perhaps more well known for his theorisation of the public sphere, drew on Arendt to analyse the intermediary space between political and private spheres. Habermas saw the public sphere as a discursive space that operated effectively in the eighteenth century because it was inclusive, disregarded status, and was focused on issues of common concern. Like Arendt, he has been critiqued for lack of attention to exclusions and inequalities in a universal public sphere, and a problematic definition of issues of “common concern” (Fraser 1997). Following Gramsci, others saw the public sphere as a training ground for bourgeois men to build a power base in preparation to govern (Eley 1992).

Young (2000) observed that norms of deliberation are culturally specific and can operate as forms of power that perpetuate existing inequalities in status. Officials often privilege reasoned argument, resulting in exclusion of those who cannot or will not take up this discursive style. Women, for example, are routinely excluded by the “rational”, “manly” style of public speech and behaviour (Landes 1988). ⁸ In *Women’s Ways of

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⁸ Landes contended: “Surreptitiously, language works to effect a closure, one that dictates women’s absence from political life” (1988:3).
Knowing, for example, Belenky and co-authors (1986) distinguished “separate” and “connected” knowledge used in deliberation. Based on interviews with a group of 135 women of different ages, ethnic and class backgrounds, from rural and urban communities, Belenky et al. argued that women (in the United States) show significant preference for connected knowing, that is, knowledge created by entering into discussion with others, rather than developed at a distance and impartially. This focus on gendered ways of knowing sparked a lively debate about essentialism versus constructivism and critiques of “white” feminist theory (Goldberger 1996). However, it appears that in the United States, at least, reasoned argument is a discourse that serves to exclude. Of particular relevance to participatory democracy, theorists have raised concerns that participatory processes can be dominated by elite interest groups (Fraser 1997; Cornwall and Coelho 2007; Strang 2009).

Despite all these misgivings about the valorisation of the public sphere, interest has re-emerged in the last two or more decades in relation to participatory democracy. The appeal seems to be that participatory processes provide opportunities for citizens to influence how they are governed more regularly than every three years at the ballot box (Young 2000). Additionally, there is widespread recognition that representational democracy routinely excludes minority voices. However, advocates of participatory democracy seldom recognise the genealogy of the theory that underpins this form of governance - of which Arendt’s work in an important part - nor the critiques that the theory has attracted. This means that important lessons from the past are lost and have to be relearned, at times with disastrous consequences.

Fair representation of minorities has been called “one of the thorniest problems for advanced democracies” (Callon, Lascoumes, Barthe 2001:240). Providing opportunities for people to come together openly to debate ideas, develop new understandings and networks, and develop a capacity to act collectively therefore has considerable appeal. This is particularly the case under conditions of great change and uncertainty. Callon and co-authors (2001) observed that in the face of new technologies, for example, it is important to provide opportunities for people to debate ideas in public since individuals do not necessarily know their preferences. Rather than choosing between solutions, participatory forums such as public debates can enable an exchange of information, ideas and priorities, potentially resulting in new ways of thinking, seeing and acting. What we know from Arendt’s work is that such collective action produces power through the emergence of new relationships, shared understandings and ways of working for common political purpose, with unpredictable and irreversible effects. Critiques of this theory remind us that the
public sphere is not political neutral, and that a range of political spaces are needed for the full diversity of societal groupings to exert influence.

Democracy theorists Iris Marion Young and Nancy Fraser have a common interest and faith in participatory democracy for its potential to create greater social justice, but have engaged in an extended debate about the relative importance of recognition of diverse groupings and distributive justice (Young 1990, 1993, 1998, 2000, 2011; Fraser 1997, 1998a, 1998b; Fraser and Honneth 2003). To summarise, both identified the need for recognition of diverse groupings in deliberative processes. However, while Fraser (1997) advocated downplaying cultural differences to enable the creation of a common world, Young (1990) sought to promote a “politics of difference” that enables differentiated groups to take part in coalition politics. Callon and co-authors (2001) also recognised the importance of new identities being formed and existing identities transformed during deliberative processes in the gradual production of a common world.

An issue of perhaps greater importance for my research that emerged out of Young and Fraser’s debate was that of distributive justice. Both theorists observed that strategies to include minority voices in politics such as affirmative action (sometimes known as reverse discrimination) and deliberative processes could correct inequitable outcomes of social arrangements, but failed to disturb the political-economic structures that created the inequalities. Therefore both recognition and redistribution are needed to create social justice. This raises a fundamental problem with participatory democracy that is being debated worldwide. I return to this in the next section as theorists who draw on Foucault critique the issue.

More recently, Fraser (2009) has acknowledged that the recognition/redistribution debate situated justice as a nation-state issue, and argued that this framing was being challenged by some global activists. Activists, for example, identify an urgent need for the global poor to be represented in important decisions that span national boundaries. Fraser identifies these efforts at “globalization from below” as related to representation (as distinct from recognition and redistribution), referring to both democratic voice and to symbolic framing. Attention to framing is what she calls the “how” of policy: how to determine who is affected by a policy and therefore entitled to have an input. Fraser highlights a distinction between trying to influence a policy and trying to influence the processes through which policies are developed that has relevance to my research. While the voluntary associations I study are contesting policy processes at a national scale, not transnational, I find this distinction useful and return to it in the conclusion of this thesis.
As Fraser observes, the ability to be reflexive at a meta-practice level is fundamental to political action, enabling people to question the “rules of the game” rather than merely how the rules are implemented. In contesting procedural issues, TIES and the HFNZ were questioning the rules of the game.

Before turning to Foucault’s contribution to my framework, I reiterate that Arendt has provided some useful insights on the public sphere, in particular highlighting the potential of people coming together to act for public-political purpose and the dangers of sacrificing pluralism in the public sphere. Arendt’s detailed analysis of the origins of totalitarianism sound a warning that despite the contradictions and compromising ethical subjectivities that emerge through collective political action, the ability of citizens to act collectively for political purpose is fundamental to a healthy democracy. Less useful is Arendt’s insistence on a stark separation between public and private spheres. To consider these spheres in a more nuanced way, I now turn to Foucault whose work highlights the spatial complexities and multiple subjectivities involved in political action.

**Power/Knowledge and governmentality: Michel Foucault**

Foucault’s conceptualisation of power, in particular as it relates to governability of populations, is of particular relevance to my research. While my research lens is on the voluntary associations that contest what Foucault described as the “regime of truth” produced and reproduced in everyday life, my research field is replete with issues of governance and power. Additionally, many theorists have built on Foucault’s concepts of power to critique participatory democracy. In this section, I provide an overview of Foucault’s conceptualisation of power/knowledge and governmentality, show how key critics of neoliberal forms of governance have adopted and developed these concepts, and identify the relevance to my own research.

Like Arendt, Foucault saw power as only existing in action, rather than possessed, and he theorised that power was socially produced through tactics of persuasion and only evident by its effects. While Arendt is interested in freedom to act politically, Foucault’s focus is on discipline and governability through the freedom of autonomous agents.

In *Discipline and Punish* (1995[1977]), Foucault analysed the birth of the prison, showing the importance of normalizing behaviour of multiple actors, making the power to punish natural and legitimate, not just for those who disciplined, but also for the prisoners themselves. In other words, he showed how the norm of imprisonment became operable, showing the techniques that made it possible to produce subjected or “docile” bodies (1995[1977]).
Techniques such as documentation and surveillance were aimed at making the prisoner “visible” and therefore governable. Governance was made possible not just through the actions of those who govern, but also by the thoughts and actions of those who are governed, as he explains in the following quote:

He who is subjected to a field of visibility, and who knows it, assumes responsibility for the constraints of power; he makes them play spontaneously upon himself; he inscribes in himself the power relation in which he simultaneously plays both roles; he becomes the principle of his own subjection (1995[1977]:202–3).

Foucault saw the relationship between power and knowledge as two sides of the same coin. In his view, power defines what counts as knowledge. He contends that power is diffused through society through techniques and forms of knowledge. He states that “power produces knowledge...there is no power relation without the correlative constitution of a field of knowledge, nor any knowledge that does not presuppose and constitute at the same time power relations” (1995[1977]:27).

In Power/Knowledge (1980), Foucault likens power to a productive network. He observes that it creates a diverse array of knowledge and discourses:

What makes power hold good, what makes it accepted, is simply the fact that it doesn’t only weigh on us as a force that says no, but that it traverses and produces things, it induces pleasure, forms knowledge, produces discourse. It needs to be considered as a productive network which runs through the whole social body (1980:119).

In light of this analysis of power, participatory democracy has been broadly critiqued as a mobilising discourse to involve citizens in their very subjection (Rose 1996). I return to this shortly, but now turn to some other insights from Foucault that shaped the debate.

In a detailed analysis of discourse, Foucault contended that the study of discourse was useful to show “what one could say correctly at one period...and what is actually said” (1991b:63). Foucault saw discourse as both an instrument and an effect of power, meaning that it transmits and produces power (Foucault 1991b). He was more interested in demonstrating how facts were produced in action than in silently intended meanings. Analysis needs, in his view, to trace the genealogy of different discourses and how these are manifested in action at a certain point (1980, 1991b). In this thesis, and following Foucault, I attempt to trace the genealogy of discourses and practices of public participation in the context of participatory democracy.

In contrast to Arendt’s faith in the public sphere, Foucault warns against the idea of a rational actor with a high degree of freedom to act (Baumgarten and Ullrich 2012).
Foucault sees the analytic task as exploring truth regimes as they produce power and are controlled by truth regimes. This was particularly the case in his earlier writing, such as *Discipline and Punish*, where he says that, in prisons at least, all relations are supervised by authority and arranged according to hierarchy (1995[1977]:239). He seemed to imply that power was enacted in ways that completely tamed or subjected individuals, without the possibility of a domain of freedom (Gordon 1991).

Foucault wrote a short piece entitled “Governmentality” (1991a) that spawned a vibrant literature that examines governmental rationales and techniques. Anthropologist Jonathan Inda (2006) identified three important themes in governmentality analysis. First, political rationalities, including epistemological characteristics and how the “problem” of government is constructed (such as “lack of democracy”). This reflects Foucault’s contention that “regimes of truth” are not merely ideological or super-structural but are produced through scientific discourses and institutions (1980). Second, Inda notes that theorists examine the programmes of government that are aimed at addressing this specific problem to reach certain goals (such as “inclusive decision-making”), including how such programmes seek to shape the environment and circumstances of specific actors to change their behaviour in specific ways. Inda identified a persistent optimism that reality can be managed better through improved programmes of government. As with all belief systems, hope has transformational potential but also has a high tolerance for contradictions (Linkenbach 2009). Third, technologies of government are identified and critiqued, including a range of mechanisms, devices, calculations, professional vocabularies, procedures and so on that make issues and actors “visible” and therefore governable.

Nikolas Rose is one of those who led the development of governmentality studies to critique neoliberal forms of government, or what he called “advanced liberal democracies” (1996). Rose describes governmentality as analysis of the specific ways individuals and populations are governed, and how particular “behaviours” and “performances” are fostered to reproduce, “at a distance”, a society ordered by prevailing political rationalities (1999). Neoliberal rationalities include a new conception of the

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9 The notion of “government at a distance” draws on Latour’s concept of “action at a distance” (Latour 1987:219) and further developed by Callon and Latour in other texts (Callon 1986; Callon and Latour 1981; Latour 1986). Callon and Latour examined how complex mechanisms make it possible to link calculations at one place with action at another, not through direct control by force, but through a fluid assemblage of agents and agencies into a functioning network (Miller and Rose 2008 [1990]).
subjects to be governed: autonomous, responsible individuals, who choose how to behave and act, and “communities” as a central means of government (Miller and Rose 2008).

Governance relates to the act of governing rather than the government itself, evident in the origins of the word governance from the Greek verb κυβερνάω [kubernáo], which means “to steer”. Under neoliberal governance, the state’s role is one of “steering not rowing” (Shore 2011:295), reducing the role of government while maximising the role of the private sector. The field of public policy is recast as “technical” or “organisational”, to be decided on the basis of expertise rather than through public debate (Shore 2011; Callon, Lascoumes, Barthe 2001). The claim to expertise is itself a claim to power (Li 2007). The tendency to devolve decision-making to non-elected experts raises concerns about lack of transparency and accountability as no-one can be held responsible (Davies 2007; Heinrich 2008). As Leitner et al. (2007) contended, agencies and individuals are meant to make themselves accountable but this does not happen for the centres to whom they are accountable.

Market principles of discipline, efficiency and competitiveness are used to induce free individuals to self-manage (Ong 2006). Forms of governance are invoked that encourage institutions and individuals to conform to the norms of the market (Larner 2000a). The aim is therefore to reposition the individual citizen rather than the state (Levers 2005; Saggers 2005).

Government through communities (Miller and Rose 2008[1996]:93), such as by making community organisations responsible for providing social services, is therefore critiqued as a neoliberal approach to creating self-responsibility and self-government:

Strategies of welfare sought to govern through society. Advanced liberal strategies of rule [seek to]... govern through regulated and accountable choices of autonomous agents – citizens, consumers, parents, employees, managers, investors – and to govern through intensifying and acting upon their allegiance to particular ‘communities’ (Miller and Rose 2008[1996]: 216).

The concept of “community” is reconfigured as the “imagined territory” (Anderson 1983) to govern conduct (Miller and Rose 2008 [1996]). Yet neoliberalism is not a monolithic project imposed “from above” (Ong 2006; Larner 2000a). Governmentality theorists recognize this by seeking to reveal plural rationalities, techniques, institutions, calculations and tactics through which subjects become governable. Neoliberalism has interplays of old and new forms of knowledge and practice (Hemment 2012; Peck and Tickell 2007), suggesting analysis of how these forms are layered would be useful. Following Foucault, theorists attempt, or at least recommend, the identification of points of weakness that might
be exploited (Miller and Rose 2008 [1996]), and hence hold potential for moving beyond neoliberalism.

Rose (1996) observed that “advanced liberal” rule extends the boundaries of politics through networks of experts so as to extend its rule over distant events, places and people. The state is degovernmentalised (and depoliticised) by relocating experts within a market governed by rationalities of competition, accountability and consumer demand. This market model creates new relations of power. Responsibilities for the provision of social services, education, health care, prisons, and the like are handed to quasi-autonomous, non-governmental organisations (known as quangos), who are in turn subject to new criteria for audit: efficiency, appropriateness and effectiveness.

Foucault observed that discourses always intersect with, amplify, and resist other discourses, which results in conflicting and complementary ethical positions for subjects, creating the conditions for counter-demands to be made. Foucault calls this “strategic reversibility”, meaning the ways that practices of governmentality can be turned into forms of resistance or counter-demand (Gordon 1991:5). An example would be the surveillance or what Rosanvallon called “the obsessive idealization of the principle of transparency” (2008:288) being turned into surveillance of power by society, including identifying the political side of the economy and how wealth is distributed (Rosanvallon 2008). The way to examine these contradictory and intersecting mechanisms of power and their effects is through genealogical observation, that is, by tracing the “multiple centres of calculation and authority that traverse and link up personal, social and economic life” (Miller and Rose 2008:20).

Leitner et al. (2007), also keen not to reify neoliberalism as the result of hegemonic power, highlight contestations that potentially supplant neoliberalism. Like Rose (1999), Leitner and co-authors (2007) see merit in identifying potential innovations in governance and understanding how these became possible momentarily in specific contexts. If the political subject of neoliberalism is the individual as active citizen (Miller and Rose 2008 [1992]), then the analyst’s task is to identify a social citizen with powers and obligations derived from membership of a collective body. This responds to Foucault contention that the ability to work with government does not imply subjection or global acceptance; in

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10 Foucault describes political power as “a strategic field of power relations in their mobility, transformability, and reversibility” (2005:252).
fact, he suggested, it was critical to the development of a governmental logic-of-the-left (1982a, cited in Gordon 1991:48).

This has particular relevance to my analysis of the role of voluntary associations in public policy; to frame the voluntary associations’ political action as resistance would flatten the analysis (Rose 1999) and portray it as secondary (Leitner et al. 2007). Similarly, to frame participatory processes as “rituals of subordination” as Scott (1990:67) might propose would reify the power of the state. Instead, Leitner and co-authors advocate analysis of contestations that enable assemblages of actors to imagine alternative visions for justice and democracy. Framing voluntary associations’ political actions as contestations rather than resistance serves to decentre neoliberalism and avoids reifying its ubiquity and power. It also follows Foucault’s contention that contestations are part of the politics of the collective and cannot be reduced to problems of citizenship as this would re-invoke a politics of rights of the individual (Burchell 1991). I have chosen to explore contestations as the assemblage of techniques and networks that enabled voluntary associations to shape participatory processes.

Nikolas Rose highlights spatial elements of governmentality that have particular relevance to my research. Rejecting a binary opposition between the state and civil society, Rose identified “cramped spaces” (1999:280) of contestation and negotiation that are filled with multiple actors, “little territories of the everyday, they seek to engender a small reworking of their own spaces of action” (1999:280). Gilles Deleuze called these brief windows of opportunity “space-times”: “They appear for a moment, and it’s that moment that matters, it’s the chance we must seize” (1990:176).

Rose draws on Deleuze’s concept of the “creative stutter” 11 (Deleuze 1997:111) to describe how interruptions in fluency of everyday language and practice occur. Rose hypothesised that cramped spaces of contestation could produce openings for innovative governance approaches. Rose saw the potential of these spaces – however fleeting – for creative forms of citizenship under participatory democracies (Rose 1999). He noted that “the real powers of invention lie in those untimely mobilizations which can introduce new possibilities into our thought” (1999:280).

11 Deleuze contends that language continually “vibrates” or “utters”. “Creative stuttering is what makes language grow from the middle, like grass; it is what makes language a rhizome instead of a tree, what puts language in perpetual disequilibrium” (Deleuze 1997:111).
Closer to home, Larner and Butler (2007) emphasize the “inventiveness” of neoliberalism in New Zealand. They argue that there is evidence of a more collaborative approach emerging in New Zealand in the social sector, showing an example of “communitariarization” of government, made possible through neoliberal governmentalities. This demonstrates that neoliberalism is a situated process, and analysis needs to trace specific political formulations emerging in particular contexts (Larner and Butler 2007). Larner and Craig (2005) examine partnerships between former activists-turned “strategic brokers” and the state. These researchers contend that the emergence of strategic brokers to foster local partnerships has blurred boundaries between state and social sectors and set off processes of collaboration but with contradictory ethical positions for subjects, since “neoliberalisation incorporates, co-opts, constrains and depletes activism” (Larner and Craig 2005:2). They made a plea for more research that examines the contradictory spaces and subjects that emerge in this context, the ways in which people are “working the spaces (and beyond?) of neoliberalism” (2005:11).

Throughout the thesis, I identify examples where the voluntary associations became centres of calculation, using networks that spanned state and society to exert political influence. I agree with Leitner (et al. 2007) that focusing on contestations that may reify but also work to supplant neoliberalism is vital.

I found Larner and Craig’s concept of “working the spaces (and beyond?) of neoliberalism” useful, in particular the focus on spatial elements of political action to explore what is possible in these new spaces of political action. I particularly like the “and beyond?” part, since it alludes to the fact that inventiveness in governance is possible, but questions whether such inventiveness is moving us beyond neoliberalism or merely absorbing new forms of expertise into neoliberal forms of power. However, while Larner and Craig investigated strategic brokers as individuals, my focus is on collective action by volunteers (not paid to do this work, despite being in (other) paid work). Another difference between my use of the concept and theirs is that the volunteers I was studying were not “unwittingly” being compromised as they move between political spaces of influence. As I describe in the TIES section, TIES members continually discussed and debated the contradictions and dilemmas of, for example, becoming the “go-to” group, risking the exclusion of other local people in decision-making processes. Taking up the

12 In Chapter Three I return to examine neoliberal forms of government as they have emerged specifically in New Zealand.
warning from Larner and Craig, and others, I saw part of my role as a TIES member and an engaged anthropologist was to record, describe and contribute to debate about these ethical dilemmas.

Local, national and international networks are an increasingly integral aspect of collective political action. Saskia Sassen (2006) gives an example from India where a network set up to organise slum dwellers to get housing made valuable use of international networks to gain strength in their negotiations with government agencies.

Graefe (2007) provides a Canadian example of a well-networked collective which made small shifts in policies to promote social equity. Graefe examined the Quebec’s women’s movement, which used a concept of “social infrastructures” to encompass their demands for real jobs for women in the caring industry, improved labour standards, employment equity, and access to training, housing, and non-traditional employment. As a collective, they persistently used the concept of “social infrastructures” in any policy forum in which they took part. This created changes in expectations and some small policy shifts, but in Graefe’s view, enabled those in the social service sector to become a central motor of development of public policy.

Based on Foucault’s earlier texts, Goldfarb contends that Foucault does not conceive of power outside the “regime of truth”, and that where counter-politics led to political changes, Foucault would see this as merely one truth regime – that of dissidents – emerging from another. However, in *Power/Knowledge*, Foucault wrote that power circulates, and that individuals are always in the position of undergoing and exercising power, and so they are never “its inert or consenting target” (1980:98). In his 1982 essay, ‘The Subject and Power’, Foucault contends that power is never a fixed or closed regime, but rather it is a “permanent provocation” (1982b:222). This view is further articulated in later lectures on governmentality, where Foucault identified the possibility – and necessity – of fresh acts of inventiveness (Gordon 1991). I would attribute this reification of the truth regime more to Nikolas Rose (1996) who contended that often governance merely redistributes social power to new experts, with new networks of accountability. Following Foucault, Rose highlighted the potential created by contradictory political discourses for strategic reversal of governmental techniques. However, despite Rose’s apparent optimism about the potential of fleeting spaces of contestation for the creation of innovative governance approaches, he did not undertake such analysis himself, merely theorising that the possibility was there. Rose recommends that analysts trace “rough and ready
assemblage\textsuperscript{13} of forces” (1999:280) to explore the creation of innovative governance approaches and so, potentially, enable a broadening of the space of legitimate contestation.

In more typical fashion, Rose also recommends that the analyst be alert to “switch points” (1999:192) when new structures and practices are absorbed back into the realm of governmental expertise. This is an important observation and a counter-weight to the idea of strategic reversal. The acknowledgement of the importance of local-scale decision-making, for example, could be turned into a requirement for communities and individuals to be responsible for their own well-being (and misfortunes). This was closer to Rose’s consistent and over-arching critique of neoliberalism as some kind of inescapable regime of truth. With co-author Peter Miller, Rose contended that the power of expertise was a key resource of advanced liberal governments (Miller and Rose 2008 [1990]), and that experts can generate “enclosures” within which their power and authority is concentrated, intensified, and defended (Miller and Rose 2008 [1992]). This sense of the freedom and subjectivity of citizens as being bound within a “territory of truth” overstates Foucault’s initial conceptualisation of power. However, it does make me alert to enclosures in my ethnographic data. As Aretxaga (2003) observed, practices of order and control are increasingly carried out within the “third sector” and take a multiplicity of forms that still produce state-like effects (Aretxaga 2003). Susan Hyatt called such effects “grassroots authoritarianism” (2011:118), identifying communities and even families as integral to the law-and-order state.

Like Tania Li (2007), I am interested in identifying switch points that go back the other way. That is where contestations puncture expert discourses. Li (2007) gives the example of where people successfully use the state’s diagnoses of what is lacking in the population to create demands “from below”, backed by a sense of entitlement. Li calls this “rendering technical” the issues at hand. The switch point would be when such demands were met or at least brought the demand into public debate.

As Tsing (2005) observed in relation to social movements, successful campaigns are often symbolic, meaning that they create changes in discourses rather than practices over time. However if they “keep alive our sense that the forms of hierarchy and coercion we take most for granted can yet be dislodged” (Tsing 2005:207) and cause people to think

\textsuperscript{13} “Assemblage”, in this context, recognises that elements to be traced are heterogeneous, contingent, unstable, partial, and situated, the elements including practices and things (people, politics, technology). Collier and Ong described an assemblage as “the product of multiple determinations that are not reducible to a single logic” (2005:12).
and raise political expectations, as I propose TIES and the HFNZ did, then it is useful to know how that occurred.

In summary, Foucault’s conceptualisation of power highlights the importance of techniques such as discourses, tactics, surveillance, and audit that produce power. I also find useful his contention that the very freedom that makes populations governable through their own actions also provides the conditions for ruptures in the “truth regime”. What is still missing, however, in terms of how voluntary associations shape democratic processes, is a way to examine how new definitions of reality are created. Arendt’s focus was on the public sphere as a space of appearance where appearances are reality. As examined in the next section, Goffman examines how people maintain appearances in social interactions, and shows that competing definitions of reality are developed through framing.

**Creating alternative frames of reality: Erving Goffman**

Goffman’s concept of situational definitions is useful to consider the spatial aspects of political action at the micro-scale, and I use it to explore the interactions that occur backstage in voluntary association meetings and informal discussions.

In *The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life*, Goffman (1959) uses a dramaturgical metaphor to describe how face-to-face interactions are staged in everyday life to sustain particular definitions of reality. He contended that there are two kinds of communication: expressions given and expressions given off. His interest is in the latter, “the more theatrical and contextual kind, the non-verbal, presumably unintentional kind, whether this communication be purposely engineered or not” (1959:4). Goffman was interested in the way individuals and teams project a definition of a situation when in the presence of others, and how others present effectively project a definition of a situation by virtue of their responses to the individual.

Of particular relevance to my research is Goffman’s analysis of team performances. He defines a team as “a set of individuals whose intimate co-operation is required if a given projected definition of the situation is to be maintained” (1959:104). The aim of a performance is to sustain a particular definition of reality, but with a team performance, that reality “may become reduced to a thin party line” (1959:85). Team members may
jokingly reject the line backstage,\(^{14}\) but loyalty to one’s team and one’s teammates is vital to provide support for the team’s line.

Disruptions in the performance whereby a team member “makes a scene” that is contradictory to that being portrayed by the team as a whole need to be avoided. Goffman contended that the “front” the team presents on stage is therefore often carefully controlled, and disagreements between team members are downplayed in an effort to present the same version of reality. Backstage, team members develop the ability to stage this performance, but when on the front-stage\(^{15}\) portray the idea that all team members are in agreement without first talking to each other before the performance. In this way, they present a definition of reality.

In *Frame Analysis* (1986 [1974]), Goffman used the metaphor of the frame to examine how people structure (frame) the social world (the picture) they are experiencing. This book shifts the focus away from face-to-face interactions to the frames that structure people’s perceptions of the world. Most important for my research, Goffman contends that alternative frames of reality could exist even within total institutions such as mental and penal institutions, where patients and prisoners create free zones for independent action and re-definition of their social reality (Goldfarb 2006). Goffman’s framework is useful for examining how people’s perceptions of reality are framed in certain ways, and can be re-framed to create alternative definitions of social reality. Framing is also useful for considering different narratives of public participation, that is, who and what is in the frame of public participation.

Goffman has been criticised for undue focus on the micro- rather than macro-scale of political action. Gouldner (1970), a strong critic of Goffman, claims that lack of attention to social order and morality portrays social systems as overly fragile and constantly in need of shoring up. Gouldner objects to Goffman’s image of social life as “a loosely stranded, criss-crossing, swaying catwalk along which men dart precariously” (1970:379). Gouldner claims that this portrays individuals “less as products of the system, than as individuals “working the system” for the enhancement of self” (1970:379).

\(^{14}\) Goffman defined backstage as “a place, relative to a given performance, where the impression fostered by the performance is knowingly contradicted as a matter of course” (1959:112).

\(^{15}\) James C. Scott (1990) uses a similar distinction between the “public transcript” and the “hidden transcript”. The public or “official” transcript refers to the open interaction between subordinates and dominators, and the hidden transcript refers to “discourse that takes place “offstage”, beyond direct observation by powerholders” (1990:4).
Interestingly, this critique highlights the very elements of Goffman’s work that I find most useful. I use Goffman’s frameworks to examine the different spaces of interaction that TIES and the HFNZ used to reframe definitions and practices of democracy. I show the ways volunteers “work the stage” but also broaden the frame to show how they move on and off the stage, working just as hard behind the scenes as on stage to develop and perfect the performance. Goffman’s insights help explain how power and hierarchy work in people’s everyday life and on the front-stage of political action (Branaman 2003; Goldfarb 2006).

The Anthropology of Democracy
While the contributions of the three key theorists examined above are important to my analysis, my research questions and contributions are situated within the field of anthropology of democracy. Anthropology treats democracy not as a given, but as a set of processes that are culturally and historically produced and reproduced through collective action. Democracy therefore emerges in particular times and places in response to sets of demands. What is called democracy in different parts of the world functions in diverse ways, involving interplay of old and new institutions, with differing effects (Hemment 2012).

A central issue in the emergent field of anthropology of democracy is how democracies enact forms of power (Paley 2002). The aim is to provide a more nuanced understanding of how democracy is imagined and enacted in different parts of the world, not just by state actors but also by social movements, voluntary associations, NGOs, and individuals. This focus on grassroots activism is consistent with an anthropological tradition of putting the focus on those that are governed rather than those who govern. The study of democracy is “a matter of discerning ways to make the will and well-being of ordinary people more determinative of the very formation of social institutions as well as of specific decisions within them” (Calhoun 2007:160). As Fraser (2009) observed, procedural justice is needed to achieve just outcomes.

Rather than assume that “the local” is more democratic (Paley 2002), or that people mobilise based on pre-formulated, consistent demands, and shared values and beliefs, I focus on the processes of collective action and people’s lived experiences of democracy. I

16 Until recently, much of the anthropological observations on democracy were gleaned from studies in other fields such as citizenship, social movements, NGOs, civil society, bureaucracy, organisations, and the state (Paley 2002).
use ethnographic research to explore how people mobilise to demand and shape democracy through two voluntary associations. This involves an examination of local meanings, circulating discourses, multiple contestations, and changing forms of power linked to policy processes.

I draw from studies of democracy that have adapted a governmentality framework to show how people make counter-demands. The first wave of influence from Foucault was evident in studies of power and resistance (e.g., Scott 1985, 1990; Ong 1987). James C. Scott (1990), for example, contended that resistance to power is a critical but unvalued form of politics. Scott observed that “hidden transcripts” were produced through politics of resistance, meaning discourse that is beyond direct observation by authorities (1990). The analyst’s task therefore is to uncover these hidden transcripts or invisible political discourses and actions of resistance. In a similar way, subaltern studies in India since the 1990s have focused on those who have traditionally been excluded from formal apparatuses of government (Curtis and Spencer 2012).

Chatterjee’s book The Politics of the Governed (2004) is perhaps the most well known from this era. Chatterjee examines how population groupings are devising new ways in which they can participate in deciding how they should be governed. Such participation is therefore about democratic practice from the perspectives of population groupings, rather than a governance category, as participation is often conceived by those who govern. This resembles the distinction that I have heard among participants in my research between “tick the box” consultation and being an integral part of democratic processes. Chatterjee observed that groups such as the People’s Welfare Association in Calcutta were not part of civil society, since they lived in illegal dwellings next to railways tracks. However, they were part of political society, meaning the site of negotiation and contestation between population groups and government agencies administering policies. In order to be an effective part of political society, groupings need to demonstrate “moral solidarity of a community”, as he explains here:

.....the activities of governmental functions produce numerous classes of actual populations that come together to act politically. To effectively make its claim in political society, a population group produced by governmentality must be invested with the moral content of community. This is a major part of the politics of

17 James Ferguson’s The Anti-Politics Machine (1990) is one of the most influential political ethnographies from this period, but it examines a development project in Lesotho and how it expanded the power of the state, rather than how people of Lesotho contested such power.
governmentality. Here there are many imaginative possibilities for transforming an empirically assembled population group into the morally constituted form of a community (Chatterjee 2004:75).

This analysis enriches observations by Nancy Fraser (1997) and Iris Marion Young (2000) that gaining recognition as full citizens is a vital part of participatory democracy (but that redistribution is also critical).

Since the 1990s, anthropological studies of democracy have largely been on transitions to democracy, such as in Eastern Europe and Latin America. Anthropologists have provided ethnographic examples of the “dark side” of democracy, in particular from the perspectives of citizens (e.g., Hyatt 1997; Ferguson 2002; Comaroff and Comaroff 2001; Gregory 2007). There has also been a proliferation of other fields in political anthropology that have relevance to my research, including anthropology of the state (e.g., Aretxaga 2003; Gupta 1995; Nugent 2007, 2008), citizenship (e.g., Ong 1999, 2006; Holston 2008), policy (e.g., Shore and Wright 1997, 2011), and neoliberalism (e.g., Bockman 2012; Hemment 2012; Hoffman, DeHart and Collier 2006; Kalb 2012; Morgen and Maskovsky 2003; Wacquant 2012).

These academic shifts coincided with (and responded to) the rise of policy interest in “good governance” in the 1980s and 1990s and structural adjustments rendered by global institutions, including the IMF and the World Bank (Paley 2008b). There has also been an explosion of associational life, including a proliferation of social movements (Meyer 2005). In contrast to earlier social movements that argued for equal civil rights, new social movements are just as likely to argue for affirmation and acceptance as for equal rights (Young 1993). Feminists, for example, have taken more notice of differences between women, and are increasingly unwilling to merely enter the male domain, instead wanting to influence the structures of society that were created and dominated by male cultural values (Young 1993). Again, the focus is on institutional and procedural issues rather than gaining “recognition”.

The new social movement literature reveals instances of influence on policy amid often relatively chaotic circumstances of multiple opportunities and interdependencies, revealing multiple subjectivities of actors (Fisher 1997). Anthropologists have analysed the micro-politics of civil society groupings including the lived experiences of people involved (Murdock 2003) and the multiple subjectivities of actors (Agrawal 2005), revealing the changing relationships between citizens, associations and the state and the negotiated
quality and rich ideological diversity of associations. Ethnographic studies are useful to identify the fluidity, complexity and interrelated nature of associational life (Fisher 1997).

Some anthropologists have merged concerns with citizenship and spaces of contestation. Caldeira and Holston (2005), for example, analysed “counter-politics of sheer life” that occurred in specific intermediary spaces in urban Brazil to problematise assumptions about present notions of democratic citizenship. Holston (2008) theorised that social movements emerged and subsided out of entanglements between the state and society, rather than as civil society resistance to the state. “Counter-politics” involve people who feel excluded from decision-making processes appropriating the values and discourses of the regime and turning them back on that regime (Caldeira and Holston 2005). Showing Foucault’s influence on their analysis, they observed this as a strategic reversal in the intermediary space of negotiations between the state and society.

Political theorist Nancy Fraser considered “subaltern counterpublics”18 as having emancipatory potential by providing a place for publics to retreat and discuss strategy and generate alternative discourses to promote “participation parity” (1997). Fisher made a similar observation about the transformative potential of the NGO sector, which he suggested “may emerge less from ordered and controlled participation than from relatively chaotic sets of multiple opportunities and interdependencies” (1997:458). The important point from this literature for my research is that while it is useful to “keep in view the distinctions between state apparatus, economic markets, and democratic associations” (Fraser 1997:70) in democratic analysis, it is also important to situate the actors in the same frame (Paley 2008a). Powerful and non-powerful actors are all required in the development of alternative democratic forms.

While ethnographic studies have focused on the micro-politics of particular groupings and their relations with the state, some anthropologists have attended to global processes that intersect with, enhance, or undermine democracy at a national scale. Arjun Appadurai (2002), for example, examined the global reach of social movements that transcend national borders as a critical aspect of contemporary political action. He contends that while democracy is more typically associated with the nation scale, and participation and inclusion are critical to strong democracies, democracy can also be “deepened” when social movements enact global links and coalitions across national

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18 Fraser attributes her use of the term ‘subaltern’ to Gayatri Spivak (1988) in ‘Can the Subaltern Speak?’, meaning those with limited or no access to cultural imperialism. Fraser credits Rita Feliski (1989) for the term ‘counterpublics’ in Beyond Feminist Aesthetics.
boundaries. Such “democracy without borders” (Appadurai 2002:45) enhances the ability of marginalised people to engage with powerful agencies whose explicit purpose is to address issues of poverty. The voluntary associations I examine are local and national groups, but following Appadurai, I am alert to the importance of transnational networks in my study of their collective action.

The recent academic focus on global processes in terms of how they undermine democracy at a national scale is particularly relevant for my thesis. A common concern is that democracy has been replaced as governments increasingly pander to the interests of multinational corporations and supra-national agencies such as the European Union, the World Trade Organisation, and the International Monetary Fund. Colin Crouch captured this issue in the title of his book: *Post-Democracy* (2004). Crouch’s conceptualisation of democracy relates closely to participatory democracy, requiring inclusions and participation in policy decisions:

Democracy thrives when there are major opportunities for the mass of ordinary people actively to participate, through discussion and autonomous organizations, in shaping the agenda of public life, and when they are actively using these opportunities (Crouch 2004:2).

Crouch contends that in contemporary democracies, “public electoral debate is a tightly controlled spectacle” and so “politics is really shaped in private by interaction between elected governments and elites that overwhelmingly represent business interests” (2004:4).

Jeremy Gilbert responded by acknowledging a crisis in democracy, which he summarised as “a chronic inability of our political institutions to give the public any real influence over policy” (2009:4). Like Crouch, Gilbert points to economic globalisation that has undermined government’s ability to control flows of capital, labour, ideas, or people. He also identifies an important question for analysts to help us move beyond “post-democracy”: “What forms of democratic practice could make these antagonisms visible, and so enable democratic contestation to emerge again, in place of the empty theatre of impotence, gesture and resentment which politics has become?” (2009:9).

Wendy Larner (2000a) made a similar point almost a decade earlier, recommending the value of identifying multi-vocal and contradictory phenomenon as a way to make contestations visible. Yet in 2007, with co-authors Le Heron and Lewis, Larner observes that reification continues to dominate the literature:

At present we tell and retell stories of unrelenting doom; of the global hegemony of market logic, the decline of the nation-state, the erosion of democracy, and the dissolution of the social (Larner, Le Heron and Lewis 2007:226-7).
Swyngedouw (2011) examines spaces of participatory governance or what he calls consensual politics, and concludes that such spaces are often more about broadening and deepening consumer choice and the hegemony of the market than broadening and deepening democracy. He cites Kevin Ward (2007), Mike Raco (2012) and others who examine transformations in urban governance through consensual modes of policy making through public-private partnerships. These consensual forms of politics operate within a frame of agreed objectives such as competitiveness, sustainability, participation, responsibility. The implication is that members of the public are constrained to participate only in ways that align with neoliberal agendas. Swyngedouw notes that important decisions about the economy are deemed too complex for citizens, so experts are used to legitimize decisions. This shift towards a managerial state limits the ability of people to debate important issues.

Like Larner and co-authors (2007), Swyngedouw is also interested in how transformations in governance can be achieved. He contends that to challenge post-democratization, the priority is not to stage equality in conventional democratic ways, but to produce egalitarian spaces and new spatial relations. He argues that “emancipatory-democratic politics can be reclaimed around notions of equality, and freedom” (2011:371). The aim is “opening up spaces that permit speech acts that claim a place in the order of things” (Swyngedouw 2011:378). While attention to spatial elements of democratic process is useful, Swyngedouw’s solution sounds remarkably like the “politics of recognition” and “politics of redistribution” that Young and Fraser debated some years ago. However, for the purposes of this thesis, Swyngedouw provides further support for examining spaces of deliberation where diverse groupings are recognised and included in decision-making, while also paying attention to redistribution to address structural inequality.

**Bringing it all together**

My analysis of the political activities of voluntary associations is informed by the work of three key theorists. I frame my analysis in terms of Arendt’s optimism for collective action.

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19 Ward examines two Business Improvement Districts (BIDs) in Milwaukee. Interestingly, the BIDS were initiated by city businesses rather than government agencies, supporting his thesis that such public/private partnerships are “an example of the neoliberalization of the city” (2007:801). Raco (2012) examines English spatial planning through Sustainable Community Planning (SCPs). Housing development through locally governed SCPs has largely stagnated due to an over-reliance on anticipated private sector investment that did not materialise.
in the public sphere while being cautioned by Foucault’s view that such action is fragile, fleeting, and rarely consistent from the outset. While Arendt shows how power is produced through collective action, she does not acknowledge that power is enacted in the interstices of everyday life (rather than merely the public sphere). This is because her interest was in freedom to act in the public sphere. Foucault’s focus was on discipline and the ways truth regimes produce power and shape the order of things, including what can be said, what is said, what is meaningful, and what roles can be adopted. Despite Foucault and governmentality theorists posing that ruptures in the dominant truth regimes were possible, they do not provide a way to explore how these ruptures occur.

My interest here is in what this power at the margins makes possible. For this, I draw from Goffman who provides a useful addition by highlighting the importance of both back- and front-stage aspects of creating new definitions of reality. The micro-politics of voluntary associations and their efforts to produce a fine-tuned performance to re-frame reality can be explored through the face-to-face interactions of actors behind the scenes as well as while on the front stage. Both front and back stage are vital to effective contestation, as Goffman observes, and therefore detailed analysis of these interactions are needed to explain this important aspect of collective political action. My research is situated within an anthropology of democracy, with attention to spatial and temporal elements of democratic contestations by voluntary associations in New Zealand. My aim is to make these contestations visible, highlight where contestations have successfully ruptured neoliberal governance forms, and to explore what such fractures mean for democracy for the twenty-first century.

**Thesis Structure**

This thesis consists of three main sections and a conclusion. Section One includes three chapters (Chapters One, Two, and Three). In this first chapter, I have outlined how political actions of voluntary associations and networks can be examined in relation to democracy. I situate my study within the anthropology of democracy as it relates to ethnographic study of voluntary associations and suggest that spatial and temporal elements of political action are integral to understanding contestations and political shifts. In Chapter Two, I describe the methodological approaches, fieldwork, and the two voluntary associations I have examined in my research. I explain why an ethnographic approach can make valuable contributions to the field of democracy and how I have used it as a basis of an engaged anthropology of democracy. In Chapter Three, I situate my study...
in the New Zealand context. I examine historic relationships between state and citizens, observing where policy and public discourses of participatory democracy align and conflict. This chapter assembles historical, social, cultural, and political lineages of current forms of participatory democracy to reveal it as a result of competing concepts and contestations linked to technologies of community development and neoliberal governmentalities.

Sections Two and Three of the thesis include ethnographic analysis of two voluntary associations – TIES in Section Two and the HFNZ in Section Three. Both sections begin with a short introduction to the significance of the ethnographic study to the wider thesis.

Section Two includes three main chapters (Chapters Four, Five and Six). Chapter Four examines historical layering of contestations and governmental interventions in Tāmaki, detailing different rationales for public participation and how these differences influenced practice. Chapter Five focuses on TIES as a voluntary association that emerged in response to and as part of this layering of contestation to governmental interventions. TIES activities are examined, in particular the spatial and temporal elements of their activities that were critical to their influence. Chapter Six tracks back and forth between the activities of the TIES team and the governmental urban renewal programme TIES sought to influence, highlighting negotiations and innovations that can be described as working beyond neoliberalism. The chapter ends with a postscript to show that TIES’ influence was fragile, fleeting, but still evident in discourse and practice, in Tāmaki at least.

Section Three includes two main chapters (Chapters Seven and Eight). Chapter Seven examines the Haemophilia Society’s contestations (1983–2006) with health policies and institutions in response to viral contamination of the blood supply. I trace the spatial and temporal elements that shaped the HFNZ as a political subject with high expectations that the HFNZ be part of any decisions that affected the haemophilia population. In Chapter Eight, I show how the HFNZ emerged as an “active citizen” willing to work with the state to create a more equitable and efficacious structure of haemophilia care. However, while an active citizen in the neoliberal sense is an individual who energetically pursues personal fulfilment and undertakes incessant calculations to enable this to be achieved (Miller and Rose 2008[1992]:82), the HFNZ’s version of active citizenship was somewhat different. The HFNZ worked collectively as a social citizen with powers and responsibility derived from its membership. They used that political position to turn governmental
strategies of calculation, documentation, and evaluation back on the state to create an equitable system of care for all people with haemophilia.

In the thesis conclusion, Chapter Nine, I draw on the findings of the earlier chapters to reflect on what TIES and the HFNZ’s activities and achievements mean for democracy. I show that public participation, from their perspectives, was integral to democratic decision making, rather than a side-event to the main political stage. Success in exerting influence, from their perspective, meant influencing the processes of decision making, rather than influencing the actual decisions. I identify strategic approaches to exerting political influence that the two voluntary associations had in common, including strategic use of space, co-opting governmental techniques, a discourse of equity, and a politics of persistent hope. I also provide some final reflection on my research approaches, and offer some questions for future research.
CHAPTER 2: ANTHROPOLOGICAL APPROACHES TO DEMOCRACY

As explained in the previous chapter, this thesis describes and analyses collective political action, and theorises the democratic function of voluntary associations in contemporary democracies. The thesis is framed by theories of power and democracy, only some of which are drawn from anthropology. However, as this chapter outlines, research methodology and ethnographic fieldwork with two voluntary associations are strongly grounded in anthropology.

Methodology

Anthropology is comparative, integrative, and contextualising, treats democracy as culturally constituted, shows commitment to identifying the agency of social actors in governance processes (Shore and Wilson 2012), and provides frameworks for dialogue, conflict resolution (Schirmer 2008), and highlighting viable alternative governance approaches (Graeber 2004). In this section, I describe these elements of anthropology and show how each informs my approach to the research for this thesis.

Comparison and Integration

Anthropological comparison is largely qualitative and is based on ethnographic fieldwork and other primary empirical sources. Comparison involves examination of similarities and differences among humans’ interactions with each other and with the world they live in (Gingrich 2012). Cultural comparisons, often between a cultural group and the anthropologist’s own culture or society, are a starting point for “situating of analysis in the joined, divergent, and asymmetrical personal and institutional histories of both anthropologist and informant” (Tsing 1993:297). Comparative ethnography engages with what is unique in a particular ethnographic situation and what of it represents broader national or universal phenomena.

Ethnographic comparisons are also useful to highlight the cultural nature of specific phenomena that are commonly considered “natural". Democracies and neoliberal forms of governance draw on the old and the new, and are richly culturally defined and enacted. Ethnographers in Africa, for example, have studied how formal democratic procedures such as elections have been interpreted and re-appropriated in culturally divergent ways (Paley 2002). Comparative studies show that democracy is not a single trans-historical norm. Such research offers a useful counter to the dominant logic that democracies can be
defined by discrete features such as equal right to vote or being equal before the law (Paley 2002, 2008).

My research seeks to be comparative and integrative by comparing two ethnographic examples of voluntary associations and their influence on public policy. Both are voluntary, non-profit, independent associations that may provide some professional services. Additionally, both were involved in extended periods of collective political action, and are recognised nationally as having some success in influencing public policies and practices. Perhaps more important for my research, both groups see themselves as having successfully influenced policy. A key criterion of comparison is scale, including local (Tamaki) and national scales. I have chosen these voluntary associations because they allow comparison of collective political action across various periods and sites. Gingrich (2012) describes this shifting time/space comparison as “challenging”, and so communicating the results of the comparison, both successes and failures, is important. I return to reflect on this comparative approach in the thesis conclusion. I also show what is unique about New Zealand’s formulations of neoliberalism and participatory governance, and compare my ethnographies with wider general phenomena. This thesis seeks to show how collective political action by voluntary associations is integral to democratic practice, not separate from it. Chapter Three describes New Zealand as a testing ground for neoliberal reforms, while also highlighting the ways that contestations from voluntary associations and other parts of the public sphere have shaped such reforms in specific ways. The ethnographic sections of the thesis provide more detailed examples, including how contestations and collective political action in these contexts have drawn upon, shaped and resisted global discourses and practices of neoliberalism and participatory democracy. Nielson, a scholar in the anthropology of policy, writes about ‘peopling’ policy with multi-dimensional actors whose subjectivities are created in the intersections or assemblages of different rationalities, technologies, norms and values” (2011:69–70). My intention is to “people power” through ethnography, tracing discourses and actions of people in voluntary associations as they intersect with actors and things in different spaces and times.

Context
Ethnography is particularly suited to the exploration of the historically specific ways that civil society groupings operate and other shifts that also occur along the way in terms of subjectivities, norms, and values. Contextualisation of research is critical to show how
people and things are imbedded in historically constituted social relations. Rather than seeking to situate social relations in specific locations, I have attempted to follow Appadurai’s (2002) call for analysing circulations. The object of study becomes the webs of relationships or what Nikolas Rose (1999) conceived of as the genealogy of groupings. I seek to highlight circulations of discourses and practices and how they intersect, merge, and collide in specific times and places.

My decision to focus on collective political action in my doctoral research came in 2007 when I studied the collective political and environmental action of six Auckland environmental restoration groups (Scott 2007). I was intrigued that one group was adept at understanding and integrating the latest research on low impact design, for example, and using it successfully to shape local government practices in relation to urban water. I was also aware of other such groups in the Auckland region, and wanted to know more about how they exerted political influence and how this related to political shifts towards participatory governance. When I started developing my doctoral thesis proposal, I intended studying six to eight voluntary associations involved in collective political action. Fortunately my supervisors quickly advised that “no more than two” was possible, and so the narrowing down process began. I briefly considered selecting urban community groups only, since my research work had been largely in the urban domain for some years, and it would allow me to contextualize the groups within international urban studies. However, I realised that my main criteria was firstly voluntary associations that perceived they had successfully influenced public policy, and secondly, that their influence could not easily be discounted as elite capture of policy processes. I chose two groups that had confronted neoliberal reforms, though at different times, and had responded collectively. One was linked by locality, and the other linked by a health condition. I was interested in their emergent approaches, their actions and discourses that lent weight to their demands of the state, and how their discourses – and their effects on policies – compared and contrasted.

Culture Matters
Culture, broadly conceived as the symbolic and learned ideas and practices of social groupings (Shore and Wilson 2012), is core to anthropology and our ability to document,

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I was part of a multidisciplinary research team at Landcare Research that undertook a 6-year research programme aimed at mainstreaming Low Impact Urban Design and Development, and so provided interested community-based groups with relevant information.
interpret and compare taken-for-granted cultural meanings, values and practices. Ethnographic research typically reveals contradictions and paradoxes (related to public participation, neoliberalism, and democracy in my case) rather than eliminating uncertainty and ambiguity (Perry, Blatter, and Ingram 2001). This can create a more nuanced understanding of the role of voluntary associations and networks to reflect on theories of democracy.

Governance structures are specific culturally defined ways of organising decision-making and implementation processes (Eversole 2005). Ethnography enables analysis of multiple contestations and changing forms of power, making a unique contribution to studies of democracy (Paley 2002). Saskia Sassen (2006) observes that looking at informal, or not yet formalised, institutional arrangements and practices is important to an analysis of change. I describe alternative governance logics and practices that emerged out of interactions between voluntary associations and state actors, some of which are not yet formalised, to make legible elements that are “frequently a feature of major social changes in the making” (Sassen 2006:12).

**Agency of Social Actors**
As noted earlier, much of the academic analysis of participatory governance and neoliberal forms of government amount to fairly deterministic theories that reify the concepts, often portraying social actors as powerless. A hallmark of social anthropology since Malinowski has been to provide phenomenological accounts of social agency, including what people think, how they make sense of the world and their actions, and plan and strategise (Shore and Wilson 2012). One of my main aims in this thesis is to show how volunteers perceived and interpreted their political activities as they intersected with other social actors, and what effective public participation looks like from their perspective. This provides a useful counter-point to the multitude of “best practice” guides on public participation that are driven from a policy perspective and, to date at least, seem to be failing to create greater civic trust. By examining and comparing what people make of their involvement in public policy processes, ethnography provides depth, richness and complexity to our understanding of global categories such as democracy and voluntary association (Ortner 2011).

**Frameworks for Dialogue**
Over some years of working as part of multidisciplinary research teams and trying to facilitate integration across science, policy and practice, I have found that my tendency to
“problematise” rather than identify solutions can frustrate some of my colleagues. However, unpacking assumptions, meanings and symbols is fundamental to the anthropologist’s role as cultural translator (Reyna 2000), and useful to facilitate dialogue. Rather than defining public participation and its practices, my interest is in highlighting divergence and disorder in discourses and practices as symptoms of liminality, which is “the breeding ground for a new and perhaps better order” (Ortner 1984:127).

The theme of democracy, as Julia Paley observes, has acute political salience, and therefore ethnographies of democracy “often exceed the boundaries of writing” (2008:18). Showing the range of understandings and interpretations of social groupings (e.g., ethnic, religious, professional, sectoral) to understand and interpret the world, can facilitate critical dialogue, identification of points of common interest, refinement of research questions, and (admittedly more rarely) innovations in practice. As Paley explains, the goal is “consciously to generate new political possibilities by cultivating an awareness that making purposeful choices about society is possible” (2008a:19).

I drew inspiration from engaged anthropology, a concept that has a long history in anthropology and implies engagement with crucial issues of contemporary society (Baer 2012), usually growing out of a commitment and sense of reciprocity towards informants and communities with whom anthropologists work (Low and Merry 2010). Prior understandings of anthropology as requiring disengaged observation and recording of daily life have largely been replaced with a concern about social justice (Kirsch 2010), and analysis is of both successes and failures in creating social transformation (Susser 2010). Just as the borders of engagement and disengagement are now seen as porous, so too are the range of ways that anthropologists “engage” with enduring dilemmas for the discipline and the anthropologist.

In a fairly extreme example of engaged anthropology, Schirmer (2008) used what she had learnt through ethnographic research to frame and facilitate discussion between “multiple mindsets” of antagonistic parties in the context of armed conflict in Colombia. Like me, Schirmer drew on Hannah Arendt’s contention that dialogue and collective reflection on events that have come to pass builds relationships and can be transformative. Schirmer concluded that dialogue and debate about substantive issues that have significant consequences for all groups in the society resulted in groups that were previously not on speaking terms now being “in deep conversation, creating a space and a model for deliberation about overcoming political differences and economic exclusions, elements necessary for resolving Colombia’s internal conflict” (2008:229).
Schirmer boldly established a new process of engagement and facilitation, which in this highly conflict-ridden situation appears to be a useful contribution. Following Low and Merry’s (2010) recommendation that engaged anthropologists identify their contribution in the research field (rather than assume there is a blueprint for engagement), I aligned with existing processes of debate and collective action. In this way, I supported and learned from those with deep roots in the field, while offering back careful documentation and frameworks for analysis of events, people and things. My research has involved, following Graeber’s vision of an “anarchist’s anthropology” (2004), working alongside social movements and other civil society groupings to interpret and support their efforts, always with a view to identifying “social changes in the making”, to use Sassen’s (2006:12) terminology.

An example of this approach comes from my research in Tāmaki, where I was invited to take part in collective political action by a community leaders group. As discussed in Chapter Five, I was working with a group of highly skilled, knowledgeable, and extensively networked group of community leaders, so when I was invited to take part in the TIES group, I had to find a way to contribute that had worth to them and to me as an anthropologist. I supported their activities by taking minutes for the meetings, promoting the “unpacking” of concepts such as participation and engagement, and contributed insights from international and local literature.

When I facilitated a meeting to provide feedback on my research, I was quite nervous that they may see my research as “too academic” and distanced from their concerns. This was a group that would have no hesitation in saying so, if that was what they felt. Needless to say, I prepared carefully. In a brief presentation, I compared and contrasted the broad aims, practices and dilemmas of representational and participatory democracy. I prepared a visual representation of this typology, which helped people get a clear sense of the issues. I also continually referred to their own activities and discourses as examples of different forms of democracy in action. By framing their activities within the broader context of democracy, I was then able to facilitate a discussion about how the group’s activities and the problems they encountered were situated within a broader context. They were able to see their own dilemmas as indicative of phenomena that people throughout the world were facing, rather than merely failings of themselves or of local state agencies. When I then opened up discussion about what the terms “mandate” and “representation” meant, a vibrant dialogue ensued, with all those present very engaged in the debate. Later comments from participants confirmed that the group really valued the
opportunity to not only learn from me but also to learn with me and with each other. I did not seek to actively lead collective political action, but rather collaborate with them in ways that promoted shared learning, exposed the misuse of concepts within everyday discourse, and identify small ruptures in the dominant political paradigm.

Fieldwork
Ethnographic research, fundamental to anthropology, provides fine-grained detail of collective action and the grounds for analysis and nuanced understanding of the negotiated space between society and the state. The ethnographic fieldwork used in this research employed a range of methods of data collection, including participant observation, interviews, focus groups, a questionnaire, and document and media reviews. All interviews were digitally recorded and transcribed. I used NVivo, a qualitative analysis software package, to analyse transcripts and field notes. Research data were analysed in relation to the research questions identified above, while I was alert to new issues and themes as they arose.

In this section, I describe the research methods of each study separately since each study required a different approach. For the purposes of narrative coherence and theoretical development, the TIES study comes first. The TIES study is informed by my own detailed participant observation of collective action, and is therefore more richly ethnographic. The HFNZ study picks up some of the themes identified in the TIES chapter. However, because the haemophilia study covers a much longer time span it is largely based on a re-examination of existing ethnographic and archival research data. This has led to a more conceptual analysis of political action. The HFNZ section therefore helps lay the foundations for final analysis in the thesis conclusion.

Voluntary Association 1: TIES
My first study is with TIES,\(^{21}\) a group of people who developed and trialled innovative ways to involve residents in the design and implementation of urban development. Tāmaki, which includes the Auckland suburbs of Glen Innes, Point England, and Panmure, is a low socio-economic area relative to the rest of Auckland. Tāmaki has been targeted by local government targeted for housing intensification to accommodate future population growth.

\(^{21}\) The TIES team took its name from the Tāmaki Inclusive Engagement Strategy; the team developed and later expanded into the TIES book (TIES Team 2010). As suggested in the book title, Creating TIES That Strengthen, TIES is used as a name of the team and as a symbol of collaboration, rather than merely an acronym.
An urban renewal process, known as the Tāmaki Transformation Programme (TTP), was initiated in 2008. TIES emerged in response to this government-led development. Nationally, community development organisations, philanthropic and public service agencies have taken an interest in TIES’ approaches and ability to be influential. TIES is recognised as having influenced the TTP during the design process by demanding community involvement in all scales of the programme governance structure and by influencing the way the programme leaders understood and undertook “community engagement”.

The TIES team developed principles, ways of working, and other tools that support what they called Co-design/Co-delivery of urban development. While developing these tools, some TIES members worked with several community-based organisations to trial the tools. The TIES team also worked with the TTP in the development of the programme’s Community Engagement Strategy \(^{22}\) and in many other aspects of the design phase of the programme.

TIES was initiated by community leaders who were engaged in the TTP as “community commentators” and wanted to have a forum where they could support each other, and develop strategic approaches to influence the TTP and to promote improved processes to involve the residents in the TTP and other government-led development processes. Most of TIES members were leaders of local church, marae or community development organisations; ethnically the group included Māori, Pacific (Cook Island, Niuean, Samoan), Pākeha, \(^{23}\) and Chinese.

In my role as social researcher with Manaaki Whenua Landcare Research, I have undertaken extensive ethnographic research in Glen Innes on urban development issues, including residents’ perceptions of intensification (Scott and Shaw 2005; Scott, Shaw, and Bava 2010; Scott 2011), social networking (Scott and Liew 2012), urban renewal (Scott and Park 2008), and evaluation (Scott and Conway 2005; Scott 2010a). When TIES formed, I was invited to attend meetings as a representative of Manaaki Whenua Landcare Research (known as a “local” Tāmaki organisation) and for my ability to offer critical reflection on public participation in urban development processes. I made it clear at TIES meeting that I was there both to contribute to the discussions and as a researcher with a research interest in public participation. This fitted with my role as an engaged


\(^{23}\) New Zealander of European descent.
anthropologist seeking to support and learn from what showed promise of being local democracy in action. Just as I started to recognise the influence this group was having I was also developing ideas for my doctoral research. With the consent of TIES members, I chose to use what I was using with the team in my thesis. It was agreed that I would become the “minute taker” for the group as a way to give back to the group in the meantime.

I continued taking part in TIES activities and ongoing discussion with members of TIES and other Tāmaki community leaders and residents while developing my thesis topic. In some ways, and at some particular times, my involvement was somewhat more “participant” than “observer”. For example, as minute-taker I documented discussion and decisions made at meetings, but this necessarily involved being selective about what was included and how actors and things were described. As a TIES member observed, preparation of meeting minutes is part of the group’s storytelling and development of a collective memory of the group. Another example of participation as a TIES member was being part of a sub-committee that undertook a peer review of the TTP Community Engagement Strategy (September 2008).

I was also nominated by TIES to be part of the Wellington-based TTP evaluation team (led by a research division of Housing New Zealand), a role that I undertook between August 2009 and June 2010 as a paid consultant. This was at a time when the evaluation team was beginning to develop the evaluation framework for the 20-year programme. I signed an agreement with Housing New Zealand that I could use research data collated during this period for study purposes while Housing New Zealand retain the right to review the final draft of the chapters in which the data are used.24

24 In the thesis, I used just one quote from a TIES participant in the development of the TTP evaluation plan. In November 2012, a Housing New Zealand manager reviewed the TIES section of the thesis and had no objections to the text.

The first two months of my role on the evaluation team involved talking with the evaluation team, TIES and other local leaders25 to work out what my contribution to the evaluation design would be. This participatory approach fitted with TIES “ways of working”, and was an attempt to ensure that my line of accountability remained back to Tāmaki people rather than to Housing New Zealand that were paying me for the role. Over time, an agreement was reached between myself, TIES and the evaluation team that my

25 For example, I attended a meeting of Hunga Tiaki, the Māori leaders’ group, to discuss the evaluation and seek their ideas about evaluation design and outcomes measure.
role would be to undertake a literature review on “co-design/co-delivery evaluation” for
the evaluation team (Scott 2010a), and to facilitate sessions with TIES, and Māori and
Pacific groups, to investigate their views of ways that the TTP should be evaluated, and
measures by which it should be evaluated. This was part of the “co/design” process. Ideas
for “co/delivery” included, for example, local people collecting, collating and analysing
evaluation research data, as part of the evaluation process. Based on focus group input
from local residents and community leaders, I contributed to the development of the TTP
Evaluation Plan (November 2009) and TTP Evaluation Outcomes Framework (May 2010).

The evaluation role was a further opportunity for me to examine “participatory
processes” from the perspectives of local people, but also to experience the delights and
difficulties of being a consultant to the government agency that led the TTP. The enjoyable
part was working with an evaluation team of highly-skilled social scientists who, like me,
sought justice for people in Tāmaki. However, at times the role was extremely difficult and
emotionally fraught. My field notes from this period are full of concerns about how to
retain my line of accountability to Tāmaki rather than to the state, and the tensions when
TIES disagreed with the evaluation team processes or timeframes. The entire period I
continually advocated that for a Māori evaluator be appointed to the evaluation team, but
no agency was willing to pay for this role26, even if a “local” Māori evaluator had been
available at the time.

Like a few other TIES members who were paid by government agencies to do
pieces of work at different times, I moved between different spaces of dialogue and action:
as a TIES member, working in parallel to the state and at time working with the state, and
as an evaluator, working within the state. I was acutely aware that I had been appointed by
TIES (not a representative group) and that I was being paid well to do the evaluation role,
while TTP’s expectation was that local people should “participate” for free. There was
widespread support for me to take this role, and no-one else more “suitable” or “local” was
available.

Meanwhile, my doctoral research continued, though much more slowly during the
period I worked on the evaluation team. Once I had developed a full research proposal, I
was given approval for the research by the University of Auckland Human Participants
Ethics Committee. I presented my research proposal at a TIES meeting and requested

26 The Ministry of Pacific Island Affairs appointed a staff member, who had strong
networks in Tāmaki, to the evaluation team.
formal permission to use what I was learning as a member of TIES in my doctoral analysis. TIES gave me their consent to use field notes from participant observation, meeting minutes, and TIES documents as research data. The TIES book (TIES Team 2010) that was being written at that time is acknowledged here as the work of the TIES Book roopu (team) and not my own, forming part of my research data but not my analysis.

Participant observation involved attending and taking part in monthly TIES meetings, taking minutes of these meetings, attending numerous meetings with and forums of the Tāmaki Transformation Programme, attending community meetings, events and celebrations, and many informal interactions with TIES members, other Tāmaki residents, community workers, and Housing New Zealand Corporation and TTP staff.

Between March and May 2011, I undertook one-on-one interviews with 13 TIES members (of a total of 14 members excluding myself). Interviewed members were semi-structured, and audio-recorded with the participants’ agreement. The interviews were held in places of the participant’s choice, including the Glen Innes library, cafes, or in workplace offices. Interviews tended to be fairly free-flowing, with me prompting them on specific issues. I asked TIES members about their involvement with TIES, what they saw as TIES’ current and future roles, and what TIES had achieved (or not) in terms of influencing the TTP.

Interviews were an opportunity to talk to TIES members individually, to explore questions raised during participant observation, and to help me understand the range of perspectives, experiences, and activities of TIES members. What I found surprised me, despite the length of time I had spent in meetings with these people. Most important, it became apparent that the collective activities in which TIES members were engaged were just a part of their efforts to shape policies and practices. They linked with each other and multiple other actors in a wide range of local, regional and national networks and organisations. Most helped initiate or strengthen local networks that trialled alternative ways of addressing deeply entrenched problems related to poverty. Wherever they went, it seems, they took what they were learning and discussing in TIES with them.

As part of my research, I facilitated two feedback sessions with TIES, the first in July 2011 with initial findings from interviews, and the second in October 2012 after TIES members had the opportunity to read drafts of thesis chapters related to TIES. At both

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27 I intended interviewing five people who were not TIES members but were also involved in the TTP, but after completing two of these interviews, I decided to keep my focus on TIES perspectives and experiences. That said, I continued to have informal discussions with other local people and attending local events and public meetings.
these meetings, I presented an overview of findings and then facilitated discussion and debate about key democratic issues. Participants extended overwhelming support for the work, saying they were comfortable with my efforts to keep them anonymous as individuals, and made a few small suggestions for changes. Earlier anxieties that I would be appropriating their work for my own ends, to put it much more bluntly than they did, were gone. TIES members were happy to see their efforts as a team recorded in text, but those who attended the meetings were just as keen to take this opportunity to catch up as a team and to discuss the latest developments in Tāmaki. This was a further sign that while the analysis in the thesis is my own, the work was part of TIES activities, not somehow separate from them. I would not go so far to call it a participatory research project since the topic was not of the team’s choosing, but it did capture key issues with which they were grappling and made a small contribution to their thinking.

**Voluntary Association 2: The Haemophilia Foundation of New Zealand**

My second study in the thesis is with the HFNZ, a national voluntary organisation that provides support to people with haemophilia and their families. Haemophilia is a rare hereditary disorder that impairs the body’s blood clotting ability, the result of a deficiency of either clotting Factor VIII or IX; without adequate treatment, internal bleeds can be life-threatening or can lead to severely damaged joints and bodily organs. Its rarity and the extreme impact it can have on people’s daily lives mean people living with the condition develop considerable expertise about their own condition and how to cope with bleeds and related issues. The New Zealand Haemophilia Society, as it was initially called,28 was established in 1958 to facilitate mutual support between individuals and families. Over the next three decades the HFNZ remained a small voluntary association that provided information and other forms of support through regional branch committees and a national body.

Radical changes in the role of the society occurred in the mid-1980s with the discovery that the blood supply that provided treatment products for people with haemophilia was infected with HIV and AIDS, and in the 1990s with hepatitis C. Voluntary officers found themselves in critical roles of advocating and lobbying on life-and-death issues such as the safety of the national blood supply. The Haemophilia Society negotiated settlements for all 29 people with HIV, but found considerable resistance from

28 The Haemophilia Society was restructured in 1999, and renamed the New Zealand Haemophilia Foundation.
government to a similar settlement for those with hepatitis C. Through high levels of commitment, energy, time, trial and error, and eventually political stealth, the HFNZ eventually negotiated equitable compensation and treatment for hepatitis C, and later regionally equitable and quality standards of care for people with haemophilia.

My research interest in the HFNZ began in 1994 when I worked on a research programme on the social ecology of haemophilia in New Zealand, led by Professor Julie Park. I was part of the original research team in 1994-1995, and also in a research update in 1999. I undertook interviews, participant observation, document and literature reviews, and was an author of the initial report *A Bleeding Nuisance: Living with haemophilia in Aotearoa New Zealand* (Park, Scott, Benseman, and Berry 1995) and three published papers (Howden-Chapman, Park, Scott and Carter 1996; Scott 1997; Park, Scott and Benseman 1999). Julie Park and Deon York updated and extended the research with the haemophilia community in 2005-2006, collated in a monograph entitled *The Social Ecology of New Technologies and Haemophilia in New Zealand: A Bleeding Nuisance revisited* (Park and York 2008). In total, research data for the haemophilia study include approximately 150 interviews, 193 questionnaires (including many notations and comments), field notes, HFNZ’s archival records, and other secondary resources assembled during the research process.

The haemophilia study has spanned a tumultuous period in the history of the haemophilia community (1994–2008), commencing during a period when people with HIV were suffering from ailing health, and the severity of the effects of hepatitis C was just starting to be recognised by some people with the virus, but not by most treating physicians, nor by the Accident Compensation Commission (ACC), the government agency responsible for financial compensation and support for people suffering from accidental injury. As researchers, we witnessed the tireless work and extreme frustrations as the HFNZ fought to negotiate settlement for hepatitis C, and to contribute to the establishment of the National Haemophilia Management Group. With the ability to have ongoing involvement in decisions about the delivery of national standards of care, the space of negotiation between state and civil society has broadened, making it a useful example of innovation in governance approaches.

For the purposes of my doctoral research, I returned to the research data and publications, which by now were integrated into one project on the NVivo software. This software was useful for identifying and exploring themes in the data, and triangulating various demographic and spatial elements. I interspersed my analysis through “nodes” and
themes with reviews of the original interview transcripts so as to “keep close” to the people I was studying. I also re-established research relationships with key people within the HFNZ, and analysed the change processes that occurred within the HFNZ.

**Ethical Considerations**

Anonymity and my position as participant observer are important ethical considerations. I have been guided by traditional ethnographic approaches of being open and honest about my research aims and approaches, maintaining anonymity of participants in the text, and providing opportunities for participants to review drafts of chapters relevant to them. Undertaking ethnographic research “at home” presents some challenges however. TIES members, for example, became, or in some cases already were, part of my personal or professional network. In this sense, I have never “left the field”. To me, TIES members are more than research participants. This is not uncommon for anthropologists. As with the HFNZ, TIES members continue to take an interest in the research and are always keen to read drafts of my work. While the ethos of the group was of equality and shared sense of purpose, I was very aware of the conflicts between TIES members that were at times thinly veiled at meetings. In the ethnographic chapters, I show some of the contradictions, disagreements and paradoxes that emerged for TIES, but I do this carefully. This is partly because the group is small, and people easily identifiable. Equally important is that the TIES story is not over, meaning that these people have to continue to work with one another and with government agencies. Tāmaki continues to be a site of injustice and power imbalances, and I do not wish to provide material for state agencies to use to “divide and conquer”.

Following direction from TIES, I have named the individual team members in the thesis acknowledgements but referred to each as “a TIES member” in the main text. Providing little or no information about participants has contradictory implications in the thesis. On the one hand, obscuring demographic information about participants quoted or cited in the text enables the people to remain anonymous and for me to reflect critically on TIES members’ activities and perspectives. Focus on the collective (rather than the individual) is also in keeping with the TIES spirit of the collective action and shared responsibility. However, I sacrificed analysis of gender and ethnicity, for example, and have necessarily missed portraying some of the rich local flavour in my ethnographic descriptions.
Throughout my research with TIES I had several complementary roles. I was always a researcher and a person who was willing and able to contribute critical reflection on public participation and wider urban renewal issues and processes. I used this knowledge to stimulate and broaden discussion. I took part in TIES as an academic with a long-term research interest in Tāmaki, a “local” in terms of my place of employment, and a director on the board of a local community development organisation. These long-term commitments to Tāmaki were what led to me being invited to take part, but I worked hard to leave these other affiliations at the door, mirroring the behaviour of other TIES members. The group attempted, and sometimes succeeded, in coming together as equals, identifying each others’ strengths and views, and finding points of commonality to enable collective action.

Being paid to undertake research (as a doctoral student and TTP evaluator) put me in a fairly privileged position relative to the average Tāmaki resident. The risk was that my allegiance would have to shift from these people towards the employer, which in the evaluation was a central government agency. In the event, it was not difficult to maintain clarity that my first obligation of reciprocity and responsibility was towards the people of Tāmaki amongst whom I worked. This was because my role was primarily to canvas local people for their views of measures of success and how they could be involved in the design and delivery of the evaluation. An unexpected benefit for me was that because this work involved listening to, recording and translating local people’s aspirations and concerns to the programme, my credibility with some local leaders was enhanced. I did not see my position on the evaluation team as a neutral one, but rather an opportunity to foster community involvement in the evaluation of the programme. This aligned with my desire to be a politically engaged anthropologist.

As a female, Pākehā researcher, I was immersed and very interested in the social relations between the group, and was aware of some conversations and decisions from which I was excluded. My field notes are full of reflections about discussions between TIES members, the odd times when I was upset by direct confrontations to my comments or position within the group, and when my spirits soared after particularly vibrant and productive meetings or an insightful comment during informal discussion. I spent a lot of time working out what was and what was not appropriate for me to contribute to, in conversation with other TIES members and with my main thesis supervisor. I attempted to

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29 New Zealander of European descent.
support TIES activities wherever possible, but because this was extremely time consuming and risked “crowding out” the development or use of existing resources within the group, I eventually settled upon stepping forward for particular tasks when I had the ability, time or resources that others did not have.

Being an engaged anthropologist involved not just participation but also careful observation, recording and reflection on TIES activities, and keeping abreast of urban renewal issues, and comparing the two ethnographic studies I was involved in. My study of the Haemophilia Foundation’s collective political action was mostly undertaken through a re-examination of existing research data. However, key Foundation leaders reviewed my written work as it evolved, and provided valuable feedback. While I was writing the thesis, I continued to be engaged with research participants, which gave me the opportunity to check my early analysis back with them. Two feedback sessions to TIES were more formalised opportunities to test my ideas, and to contribute my analysis towards group thinking.

Before exploring the ethnographic studies in more detail in Sections 2 and 3, in the next chapter I broaden my focus beyond the two voluntary associations to explore collective action as it has historically shaped public policy in New Zealand.
CHAPTER 3: DOING DEMOCRACY IN NEW ZEALAND

In Chapter One, I described democracy as culturally and historically produced and reproduced through collective action. Democracy is therefore not a destination, nor a coherent set of features, but rather a collection of political processes that are fought for historically and on a daily basis. I also identified New Zealand as a testing ground for neoliberal reforms and a place where “public participation” has become a common requirement in policy development. The question for this chapter is how such apparently divergent concepts have emerged alongside each other: neoliberalism aimed at governing “at a distance” (Rose 1999) and public participation aimed at allowing citizens more direct involvement in political institutions (Cornwall and Coelho 2007).

I argue that public participation, like all aspects of democracy, has been sought by multiple actors with diverse rationales. Participation is a technique used to garner support for central government agendas (Daly 2003; Newman et al. 2004; White 1996), and a way to devolve costs and responsibilities but not power to a local scale (Taylor 2007). Participation is also a way to build knowledge and collective capacity to respond to change and contest conditions of injustice (Munford and Walsh-Tapiata 1999; Kretman and McKnight 1993). Like other elements of democratic decision making, participation is a concept that has emerged through collective action.

In this chapter, I set out the distinctive features of neoliberalism in New Zealand, and show it as a hybrid assemblage of different rationales and practices. I also show the contribution of challenges and demands from the public sphere in shaping public policies. I trace the historical layering of contestations and experimentation that shape the present appetite for participation and partnership. A “history of the present” to use Foucault’s (1995[1977]:31) terminology, involves tracing an assemblage of actors and things that have shaped the present.

The history I show here is necessarily brief, selected to show the hybrid nature of democracy and neoliberalism. My aim is to show snapshots of democracy as it has been imagined, fought over, and enacted since early colonial times through to the present. In this history, culture, context, and a commitment to identifying agency in social actors matter (Shore and Wilson 2012) and provide a basis for comparison with other contemporary democracies. I show the present as a mix of old and new forms of governance, layered
upon each other in ways that are specific to New Zealand, with strong correlations – and some important differences – to those governance forms in other contemporary democracies.

The chapter also seeks to make legible the alternative governance logics and practices that have emerged out of interactions between voluntary associations and state actors. I highlight local groups of activists and their demands for participation, inclusion and justice to show changing forms of power in New Zealand and the ways that governance has been shaped by circulating global discourses and practices.

**Biculturalism as contestation**

Indigenous Māori *iwi* (tribal groups) and other groupings, business organisations, and various voluntary and community sectors\(^{30}\) have been part of the formal and informal processes that have shaped governmental policies and processes. So how did New Zealand become a laboratory for neoliberal reforms, and how did actors respond and contribute to current democratic decision-making processes?

Since the signing of the Treaty of Waitangi in 1840, indigenous Māori have consistently sought to retain sovereignty over precious resources and to be active partners with the government, resulting in a distinctive set of discourses, policies, and practices around New Zealand biculturalism. The establishment of four Māori seats in parliament in 1867, and long-standing relationships between Māori and government bring a unique form of representational and participatory democracy to New Zealand.

Biculturalism, as framed by the Treaty of Waitangi, recognises Māori as partners with the government and therefore Māori assert rights to be included in decisions about policies that affect them. Connection to place is fundamental to Māori authority, genealogy, and collective identity (Durie 1998). Māori have therefore always insisted that government consult with *māna whenua*, that is, the local *iwi* and *hāpu* (sub-tribe/s) who have demonstrated authority over a particular region, rather than individuals or a generic Māori group. Such consultations necessarily involve the building of relationships and sometimes lead to the development of strategic alliances between government and māna whenua. This was to have particular relevance in the 1980s and 1990s and to the political appetite for “partnership” and localism.

\(^{30}\) The community sector includes a range of community-based organisations that deliver services related to social health and well-being, and community development.
Let’s get inventing: 1890s – 1935

New Zealand was understood as a “social laboratory” as far back as the late nineteenth century (Lunt, Spoonley and Mataira 2002), long before it became a testing ground for neoliberal reforms of the 1980s. Contestations have played a critical part in this history. The suffrage movement, for example, contributed to New Zealand becoming the first self-governing country in the world to extend voting rights to women (or landed women at least) in 1893. Women’s suffrage also met the needs of specific political actors at the time, but this “first” is an integral part of New Zealand cultural-imaginaries as a world leader in egalitarianism.

The labour movement was also well-established by the end of the nineteenth century. Following a major defeat in the early 1890s, the trade union movement gained momentum. The Liberal Government introduced the industrial conciliation and arbitration system in 1894 to intervene between labour and business (Lunt, Spoonley and Mataira 2002), earning New Zealand a reputation of being a “working man's paradise”. Nevertheless, the 1890s was a decade of parades to demand a statutory requirement for an 8 hour working day. The Liberal Government resisted, instead introducing a statutory public holiday, Labour Day, first celebrated in 1900. Demands for some workers’ rights continued to go unmet, including that of domestic workers, the largest category of paid women workers, who wanted a half day off and a 68-hour week (clearly nineteenth century New Zealand was not a “working woman’s paradise”).

By 1900, the foundations of the welfare state were laid, including an old age pension and the Arbitration Court (Lunt, Spoonley and Mataira 2002). In a climate of labour contestations, the Labour Party was established in 1916 out of a coalition of all labour movements, including those who purportedly led the nation’s first strike at the Blackball mine in 1908. Tracing one of Labour Party’s roots to a very small mining town on the South Island’s West Coast is indicative of the importance of primary industries in New Zealand’s economy.

From the cradle to the grave: 1935–1984

The emergence of the welfare state was created in response to demands from multiple actors over two decades. Expectations of a caring state created during this era continue to

31 http://www.nzhistory.net.nz/politics/labour-day accessed 23/11/12
shape political action today. In this section, I describe some of the highlights of this history to show rationales and discourses that were integral to welfarism as it was implemented in New Zealand between 1935 and 1984.

Following the severe effects of the Great Depression, the first Labour Government of 1935–1949 introduced a Keynesian system of economic management and comprehensive welfare policies, setting the tone for economic and social policy of high levels of state intervention until the 1980s. The 1938 Social Security Act aimed to produce social equality, social integration, and cohesion (Humpage 2008a). What became known as a “cradle to the grave” welfare system was premised on the concept of a “social wage” and the need for the state to mediate between capital and labour to secure social well-being (Shirley 1990). The Act signalled a commitment to free education, salaried medical staff, a free public hospital system, and a community-based preventative health scheme (Shirley 1990). A universal family benefit was introduced in 1946 at a weekly rate of 10 shillings per child (Beaglehole 1993), so providing a woman with two children about the equivalent of what a labourer would earn in 2 days (Child Poverty Action Group 2012 33). These welfare entitlements have shaped cultural expectations of the state and become a measure against which activists judge more recent political shifts.

Economic and social stability in the post-war period made New Zealand one of the most affluent nations in the world. New Zealand ranked third highest based on income per capita in 1953, among the highest life expectancy rates, and historically low levels of crime, suicide, and admissions to psychiatric hospitals (Shirley 1990). In 1956, so the story goes, the total of five unemployment beneficiaries were known by name by politicians (Shirley 1990).

Economic prosperity and high standards of living, relative to the rest of the world, contributed to a strong national discourse of egalitarianism (Shirley 1990). This idea that everyone is the same and has the same rights as everyone else to fair treatment is commonly referred to as the right to a “fair go” (Belich and Wevers 2008:5). There is also a strong collective memory, however true or false, that people came to New Zealand to escape the hierarchical class structure in Britain. National pride in being a “classless” society (Belich and Wevers 2008) shaped demands for political equality throughout New Zealand’s history.

33 This payment was not indexed so declined in value significantly in the coming years.
**Dutiful daughter to outcast**

As a British colony, New Zealand’s economy was largely subservient to Britain, reliant on the export of primary products to the “Mother Country” and the immigration of British subjects. New Zealand was described as Britain’s “most dutiful daughter” (Hancock 1940:148). Despite becoming a dominion in 1907, New Zealand’s colonial relationship to Britain did not change much over the next 50 or more years.

With a small domestic market and preferential access to the British markets, New Zealand’s agricultural exports strengthened under strong protectionist policies throughout the welfare era. Rural New Zealand has traditionally had strong political representation due to the significance of agricultural exports to the national economy. Many New Zealanders still claim strong connections to rural society, even though the population has been mainly concentrated in urban centres since 1900 (Belich and Wevers 2008). Rural discourses of the stoic, self-reliant pioneer with a “can-do” attitude who is adept at creative problem solving, getting by with limited tools or resources, and making do with a piece of number eight wire (hence the discourse of the “number eight wire” or kiwi ingenuity) resonate throughout the population, both rural and urban (Phillips 1987, James and Saville-Smith 1994, Belich and Wevers 2008). The discourse of egalitarianism means that people who stand above the rest, “tall poppies”, are quickly pulled back down to earth (Bönisch-Brednich 2008), unless they have proven themselves to be talented leaders. Even then, humility and a self-deprecating humour are expected.

Community spirit and collective responsibility are other strong cultural discourses (Humpage 2008c) that may have origins in rural New Zealand. A generalised spirit of hopefulness, that things will work out in the future (Bönisch-Brednich 2008) is likely to be linked to the “number eight wire” attitude and a pervasive belief in the collective, in looking out for ones neighbours and mates. New Zealand is very much a face-to-face society where people’s networks overlap, shaping people’s interactions.

Geographically isolated and with a very small domestic market, New Zealand’s economy was reliant on agricultural exports. In 1973, Britain joined the European Economic Community (now the European Union), leading to withdrawal of New Zealand’s preferential access to British markets. This made New Zealand’s economy extremely vulnerable to global economic shifts. Haworth (1994) contends that due to longstanding subservience to Britain, the New Zealand state was underdeveloped.
Language, culture,34 trade relations, and defence remained closely linked to Britain. These factors contributed to the extreme shift to neoliberalism in the 1980s.

**Rights, action**

Larner and Craig (2002) observe that the public sector during the welfare era was strongly hierarchical, based on a principle of the “common good”. Sectoral specialists (such as head teachers, school inspectors) administered their own domains. The public sector was organised in discrete segmented ways, or what would now be called “silos”, facilitating technocratic approaches to social policy. This segmentation of the public sector resulted in little political engagement between the state and society and marginalisation of some social groups, particularly women, Māori, and non-European migrants (Larner and Craig 2002).

Political movements of the 1960s and 1970s largely centred on Māori and women’s rights, foreign policy (such as the Vietnam War), and moral issues (apartheid, abortion), and so tended to celebrate diversity, self-determination and individual responsibility (Shirley 1990). Despite bicultural discourses and a government commitment to enforcing the “principles” of the Treaty of Waitangi from 1975, Māori were often treated more like an interest group than a partner (Mulgan 1989). Groups had emerged, such as the Māori Women’s Welfare League (in 1951) and New Zealand Māori Council (in 196235), taking a moderate but proactive approach to influence policies that impacted on Māori well-being. By contrast, Māori protests during the 1970s and 1980s were much more vocal and oppositional, with strengthening calls for government to “honour the treaty” and for Māori sovereignty (e.g., Awatere 1984). Māori activists used public shaming of politicians effectively to influence political discourses and public policy (Mulgan 1989). As a grouping with little other means to exert influence, the “politics of embarrassment” (Mulgan 1989:147) was used to good effect to call into question the country’s reputation for racial tolerance and justice. For example, the 1975 land march, and disruption of Waitangi celebrations troubled the notion of an egalitarian society.

Labour movement changes were also occurring during this era. The collective approach to secure wage and employment security during the welfarist era started to change in the 1970s. Instead of viewing the state as the mediator between capital and labour, with a responsibility to secure social well-being, the middle class promoted a more

34 With some important exceptions such as the national discourse of egalitarianism and the “number 8 wire” attitude identified above.
35 The NZ Māori Council was created by the Maori Welfare Act 1962.
individualistic liberal philosophy between 1967 and 1984 (Shirley 1990). As a result, the role of the state came into question; different interest groups committed to individual politics rather than to a universal moral code aligned with classical liberalist criticism of a state-controlled economy. This shift was just one of a number of early shifts in political discourses and practices that shaped neoliberalism in New Zealand when it emerged in the 1980s.

The concept of participation is fundamental to community development. Long before proponents of participatory democracy promoted participation to build active citizenship, community development practitioners promoted participation at a local or community scale to foster relationships built on mutual understanding, trust, and respect. By working together, they aimed to build knowledge, and community and individual capacity to respond to change and to address structural inequalities through active citizenship (Munford and Walsh-Tapiata 1999; Kretman and McKnight 1993).

Longstanding contestations to welfarism existed in the discourses of Māori, unions, and social movements, and by 1980 contestations were starting to emerge to the so-called consensual basis of welfarism (Larner and Craig 2002). These groupings demanded social differentiation in recognition and distribution of resources be addressed (e.g., Bedggood 1980; Awatere 1984). Public displays of discontent from urbanised Māori, unions, and social movements (particularly feminist) occurred. These were oppositional discourses, with little evidence of networks and partnerships between the state and societal groupings (Larner and Craig 2002). This suggests that during the late welfare era, demands for recognition of diverse groupings were starting to strengthen.

The danger of the politics of recognition is the loss of a collective public-political discourse (Fraser 2009). In New Zealand, the discourse of individual responsibility was emerging, with profound implications in the coming years. Ian Shirley traces the discourse of individual responsibility to the 1970s and 1980s, as shown in a Treasury briefing to the incoming government:

Families and tribes are not organic entities with mortality, rationality or senses, they cannot feel pleasure and pain. They cannot make decisions and form preferences other than through the actions of their members...If social entities derive their value from the fact that people as individuals derive value from them, then it would seem that the individual person is the logical basis for analysis (New Zealand Treasury 1987:410).

Global economic shifts were also being felt strongly in New Zealand at this time. Oil-price shocks in the 1970s, together with the removal of New Zealand’s preferential access to
British markets led to an impending financial crisis. In response, Prime Minister Robert Muldoon (1975–1984) initiated the now infamous Think Big projects. These projects, aimed at replacing imported oil with locally generated energy, included a mix of solutions such as hydro-generation (Clutha Dam), an oil refinery (Marsden Point), a conversion of natural gas (Motonui), and ethanol (Waitara) (NZ National Party 2012). Increasingly protectionist policies ensued, such as increased subsidies for the agricultural and industrial sectors, wage- and price-freezes, and “car-less” days.

Muldoon faced numerous political challenges to his domineering leadership style and protectionist policies. He also faced strong opposition to his decision to allow the 1981 Springbok rugby tour during the apartheid-era in South Africa. Nationwide, protestors clashed with pro-tour rugby audiences throughout “the tour” (as it was called in the media, protest chants, and even songs). The tour provided the grounds for the merging of diverse oppositional voices, Māori and Pākeha, and bred a whole new generation of opposition to discrimination and state domination. Muldoon survived all these challenges, however, and was re-elected not long after the tour.

The end of what we now call the welfare era was to occur three years later. This came out of another emergent political movement – anti-nuclear – leading to Muldoon’s downfall. Marilyn Waring, a National Party backbencher, threatened to “cross the floor” to vote in support of the Opposition’s bill for a nuclear-free New Zealand, so undermining Muldoon’s ability to rule. Muldoon called a snap election in June 1984. Businessman Bob Jones captured a groundswell of opposition to Muldoon’s leadership when he established the New Zealand Party in 1983 for the sole purpose of ousting Muldoon from office. This bid was successful, drawing sufficient votes away from National, resulting in Labour taking the election, and a major shift in New Zealand politics. The end of the welfare era was therefore brought about by multiple actors, issues and movements, but as is shown in the next section, some important elements of welfarism were retained.

36 Muldoon implemented a policy of car-less days (August 1979–May 1980), whereby every car displayed a sticker with a day of the week when the car would not be driven (http://www.nzhistory.net.nz/carless-days accessed 27/11/12)

37 Early the following year, the USA tested Labour’s nuclear-free policy, leading to the passing of legislation, Nuclear Free Zone, Disarmament, and Arms Control Act in 1987 (http://www.nzhistory.net.nz/politics/nuclear-free-new-zealand/nuclear-free-zone accessed 26/11/12)

38 Jones disbanded the party after the election, having drawn enough of the vote to oust the National party but not enough to get a parliamentary seat.

The election of a Labour government in 1984 denoted a significant shift in the political environment in New Zealand that still resonates today. Government policies from 1984 became known locally as Rogernomics, after Roger Douglas who served as Finance Minister from 1984 to 1988. Unlike Reaganomics and Thatcherism, Rogernomics was implemented by a social-democratic party, the party that had established the welfare state in the first place (Shirley 1990). New Zealand attracted international attention for this experiment (Kelsey 1997) in neoliberalism. Politics Professor John Grey of Oxford University, for example, observed:

The neo-liberal experiment in New Zealand is the most ambitious attempt at constructing the free market as a social institution to be implemented anywhere this century. It is a clearer case of the costs and limits of reinventing the free market than the Thatcherite experiment in Britain (1998:39, quoted in Larner 2000a:15).

New Zealand’s early version of neoliberal reform has been summed up as “reduced state function, free markets, deregulation and privatisation, an ideological commitment to the individual rather than to society, and complementary panoply of values” (Haworth 1994:27). Ian Shirley (1990) describes Rogernomics as emerging out of a split in the Labour Party between liberals wanting to foster broad national consensus for economic policy, and a small group of Libertarian Right with strong links to the New Zealand Treasury. Even when Labour had won the election, debate still continued. However, when Douglas took up the Finance Minister post, he drew on Treasury’s Economic Management text (1984), with strong support from the Business Round Table, the finance sector, right-wing think tanks, and middle-class liberals (Shirley 1990).

On entering office, Roger Douglas acted quickly to introduce radical reforms to the economy, including an immediate 20% devaluation of the New Zealand dollar. Douglas also removed interest rate controls, restrictions on the flow of money in and out of New Zealand, protections on manufacturing and industry, and agricultural subsidies. The removal of controls on foreign investment resulted in New Zealand being reported by the United Nations as the most transnationalized economy in the OECD (United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 2000:25).39 The introduction of a Goods and Services Tax (GST) in 1986 added indirect taxation to income-based taxation, thereby raising the tax burden of the working-class. These changes suggest that business interests, rather than the wider public, were shaping economic policies during the 1980s.

39 This was based on foreign direct investment measures.
Families were also hit by the replacement of the universal family benefit in 1986 by a tax credit for working parents only, based on parental income and number of children (NZCPA Group 2001). In this early phase of reforms, welfarist aspirations were retained based on citizenship principles of solidarity, equality, and collective responsibility (Humpage 2008a). In other words, a contradictory mix of old and new policies were in place at this time, but the speed of change was startling for many New Zealanders.

Douglas described the speed of his reforms as strategically intended to steer off opposition: “Do not try to advance a step at a time. Define your objectives clearly and move towards them in quantum leaps. Otherwise the interest groups will have time to mobilise and drag you down” (1993: 220-1). This statement suggests that Rogernomics was a top-down process of reforms based on abstract economic theory rather than concern for democratic process.

Another feature of this era was major changes to the public sector that were rolled out over several years. The 1986 State Owned Enterprise Act devolved core state functions to nine corporatised bodies (e.g., electricity, coal, and telecommunications). Drawing directly on the Treasury document (1984), day-to-day management became the responsibility of Chief Executives, leaving government ministers responsible only for “purchasing outputs” and “outcomes” (Martin 1994). Agencies responsible for policy advice, such as the Ministry of Defence and Ministry of Research, Science and Technology, were decoupled from those responsible for implementation (the New Zealand Defence Force and Crown Research Institutes) (Martin 1994). These changes reduced public scrutiny and control (Shirley 1990), and are therefore examples of reduced democracy.

Corporatization was a route to privatization of many state-owned assets (Fougere 2001), while others such as Housing New Zealand and Crown Research Institutes have remained in public ownership. Revival of Māori Treaty claims to precious resources converged with the corporatisation process (Kelsey 1993) resulting in the only effective opposition to the sale of state assets (Kelsey 1995). For example, the assets of Forestry Corp and Coalcorp were retained by the Crown and could be returned to iwi if the Waitangi Tribunal so ordered (Kelsey 1993).

The rapid shift from a highly protected economy to one totally exposed to the global economy created shockwaves throughout New Zealand. But during the mid-1980s the stock market was booming, and the Labour government managed to hold enough support to be re-elected in 1987. Shortly afterwards, however, the stock market crashed,
and earlier Labour Party divisions re-emerged in the form of strong opposition to Douglas’
plans to introduce a flat tax rate, abolish the family benefit, introduce part-payments for
healthcare, and make major reductions in state expenditure (Shirley 1990). Unemployment
rates spiralled upwards from just 1% in 1978 to 13.7% in 1988 (Shirley 1990). Prime
Minister David Lange started to express concerns that the pace of change was too fast,
signalling increasing fractures in the party. This did not herald the end of what later
became known as neoliberal reforms, however.

Wendy Larner and various co-authors (Larner 2000a, 2006; Larner and Butler
2007; Larner and Craig 2002, 2005; Larner, Le Heron and Lewis 2007; Larner and Walter
2004) have gone to some lengths to show that the New Zealand Experiment in
neoliberalism was not from the start a coherent project, nor was it an exact replica of
Thatcherism and Reaganomics. Larner (2000a) acknowledges that the Treasury had a pre-
formulated plan for economic and social policy reforms, but shows it was shaped by
contestations from multiple actors and longstanding expectations (such as free health care
and universal superannuation payments) that the government was still unwilling to test
(Larner, Le Heron and Lewis 2007). In a related argument, Ward and England (2007)
argued that New Zealand’s uniquely constituted version of neoliberalism is proof that
neoliberalism did not originate only from the “core” of the United Kingdom and the United
States.

A common critique of shifts to neoliberalism is that they were based on an
imagined “fiscal crisis” (Rose 1996; Miller and Rose 2008 [1992]). In New Zealand, this
fiscal crisis was real. Between 1974 and 1984, New Zealand went from having less than
500 million dollars in external debt to 16 billion dollars40 (Shirley 1990). However, in line
with Miller and Rose’s observations of other parts of the world, the shift to neoliberalism
did not avert an economic crisis. The national debt spiralled to 40 billion dollars by 1989.
Shirley (1990) notes that while Muldoon’s Think Big projects were widely blamed for
New Zealand’s spiralling overseas debt, they did generate employment and provide scarce
foreign exchange, which contributed to turning the economy around in the following
decade.

Many social costs of the reforms were starting to appear. Deregulation of finance
and money markets in 1984 meant that by 1988, the inflation rate had escalated to 9.6%

40 In 1984, New Zealand’s Gross Domestic Product was $21.25 billion, and by 1989, it had
doubled to $42.3 billion (http://www.indexmundi.com/facts/new-zealand/gdp accessed
26/11/12)
and first-home buyers were paying on average 19.33% interest rates (Shirley 1990). Unemployment rates were also spiralling, particularly in industries where Māori and Pacific peoples were highly represented (e.g., manufacturing, forestry, railways, meat processing). A fifth of Māori workers were shed from the workforce in just 2 years (Shirley 1990). Farmers were also highly affected by the removal of subsidies, and plummeting export earnings and farm land values. New Zealand went from being among the countries with the highest standards of living in the 1950s to being ranked the country with the worst employment outlook of all OECD countries in 1989 (Shirley 1990).

The nation’s economy went from being subordinate to an imperial power to being extremely vulnerable to global economic cycles and to decisions of international agencies (including the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank) and multinational corporations (Kelsey 2002). Successive governments since 1984 have sought to leverage a degree of control by being at the forefront of so-called Free Trade Agreements (Maher 2012), with some success, situating New Zealand on the moral high ground by leading the world in removal of trade tariffs. However, this has exacerbated the vulnerability of New Zealand businesses and some anti-competitive institutions (such as the collective dairy industry and Pharmac) that work well in a small economy like New Zealand’s.

Fiscal crisis was therefore not the cause of neoliberalism, but very much the effect, for many New Zealanders at least. Nevertheless, at this time, the discourse of there being “no other option” was strong, as was people’s memories of the highly protectionist Muldoon era. There were other contributing factors to the New Zealand Labour government adopting such extreme neoliberal policies. According to Haworth (1994), a vacuum in economic policy and the internationalisation of the country’s economy created the environment for more severe neo-liberal reforms.41 The state’s focus had been on providing the conditions for agricultural exports to the Mother Country. Ian Shirley (1990) traced neoliberalism back to free market liberalism that had started to take hold in New Zealand’s finance sector from the late ’60s to the early 1980s, embracing both the Left and the Right. The finance sector was increasingly dominated by overseas-owned companies. Rogernomics therefore emerged out of a mix of contestations that promoted individual responsibility and self-determination.

41 Haworth likened this to similar situations in Peru after 1980, in Chile after 1975, and in Argentina in the 1970s, in which dependent economies became increasingly dependent on external funding and intervention.

A National government replaced Labour in 1990, signalling a new era of neoliberalism. This involved radical reforms to industrial relations (Thomas and Memon 2005), extension of market model into new sectors, and more punitive social policy (Larner 2000a).

**Ruthenasia**

In 1991, Finance Minister Ruth Richardson delivered the “mother of all budgets”, as it was reported in the media, earning Richardson’s policies the name of Ruthanasia. The budget reduced family support, unemployment and other benefits (NZCPA Group 2001), and introduced market rents for state houses. Just three years earlier, the culmination of considerable work by Royal Commission on Social Policy was a report (1988) that recommended retention and strengthening of the existing social security system. Nevertheless, overnight Richardson introduced sweeping reforms that not only discounted these recommendations, but also signalled a much more authoritarian version of neoliberalism, and an increasing focus on individual responsibility.

While the 1990s saw more neo-conservative social policies, Larner (2000b) observed that it involved an increased visibility of the state in social policy, rather than a wholesale retreat of the state. For example, the 1998 *Code of Social and Family Responsibility* extended the role of the state to include direct monitoring of families to foster responsible and enterprising subjects. Rather than protecting families, the role of the state had become fostering self-reliant neoliberal subjects.

These changes denoted a significant shift from collective to individual responsibility, particularly targeting those on low incomes. Political discourses shifted away from social equality and collective “rights” towards citizens “obligations” or responsibilities as individual citizens, usually related to an expectation to be in paid work (Humpage 2008a). Individuals were conceptualised as self-actualising, rational actors, and inequality therefore the result of bad choices (Humpage 2008b). Rather than being governed through society, citizens were now to be governed by managing the choices of the individual citizen based on an ethics of self-responsibility (Indra 2006; Miller and Rose 2008 [1990]; Rose 1999). This shift was evident in the Gibbs report (1988) that

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42 This budget signalled harsh financial measures, introduced by Ruth Richardson, New Zealand’s first female finance minister, hence being reported in the press as the “mother of all budgets”.

recommended restructuring of the health sector based on principles of efficiency, choice, and responsiveness to individual and community needs. The ascendency of notions of choice, the customer, and the ideal of the entrepreneurial self were in line with similar shifts in Europe and the USA (Miller and Rose 2008).

The social costs attributed to these reforms were substantial. In 1992, New Zealand’s standard of living had dropped to fifteenth out of eighteen countries (Kelsey 1995). In 1996, a fifth of all New Zealanders (and a third of all children) lived in relative poverty. Inequality was growing at an alarming rate: the richest five percent had increased their share of the national income by 25% since 1984 (Kelsey 2002). Between 1986 and 1998, the Gini coefficient, a measure of economic inequality, increased by 13% (New Zealand Council of Trade Unions 2004). It was increasingly evident that business interests, not the wider public, were the biggest beneficiaries of the reforms.

**Marketisation**

Another important feature of this era was the introduction of a market-model to social realms. Marketisation was extended into areas of social policy, education, and health (Larner and Craig 2005), shifting the focus towards efficiency, accountability, and fiscal responsibility (Thomas and Memon 2005). This shift was designed to address inefficiencies, the lack of accountability and the ability to contain costs that were associated with the highly bureaucratic structures developed during the welfare era. The market model established a purchaser/provider split to address these problems. Boards were established as “purchasers” of services, and services such as education and healthcare were to be delivered by “providers”. Providers needed to demonstrate efficiency and fiscal responsibility, while citizens could choose from a range of providers, making providers more responsive to the needs of their clients.

The health sector, for example, was restructured in 1991 based on the Health Minister Simon Upton’s *Your Health and the Public Health* strategy (Prince, Kearns, and Craig 2006). The National government had already started reforms to the health system in 1983, the first significant restructuring since the 1938 Social Security Act that established the public health system. In 1983, 14 Area Health Boards were established. These democratically elected boards were intended to consolidate a highly fragmented system of hospitals and primary care providers, and national coordination of place-based systems (Prince, Kearns, and Craig 2006). Administrative and implementation problems emerged, leading to the 1991 reforms.
Under the new health structure, locally-elected Area Health Boards were replaced with four non-elected Regional Health Authorities (RHAs). Public hospitals became Crown Health Enterprises (CHEs), to be run on a business model, and were to compete with private hospitals and community-based providers for contracts from their RHA. RHAs were therefore the purchaser of services, CHEs the providers. Government appointed CHEs’ boards of directors, including business and health sector experts (NZ Parliamentary Library 2009). The appointment of “experts” rather than democratically elected representatives on RHAs and CHEs can be seen as part of a wider agenda of neoliberalism that recasts health policy as a technical rather than political issue (Shore 2011; Callon, Lascoumes, Barthe 2001), making them accountable to the state rather than the public (Davies 2007; Heinrich 2008). They operated more like directors of corporations, seeking to generate profit for the benefit of the shareholder (the state), based on principles of competitiveness and consumer demand.

An anomaly emerged under this new structure. Upton’s 1991 document advocated not only efficiency, self-reliance, and choice but also “fairness”. Fairness was of course seen as the result of restructuring the health system based on a market model (Prince, Kearns, and Craig 2006). However, an aspect of the fairer approach was to extend some service provision opportunities to community trusts, thus mobilising the space of “community” to deliver services formerly provided by government agencies (Prince, Kearns, and Craig 2006). Again, this aligned with similar decentralisation and marketisation in other social democracies. However, in New Zealand, it provided a brief but productive merging of neoliberal directions and pre-existing Māori and Pacific aspirations for improved primary health care.

**Innovations in health**

Health reforms of the 1990s introduced a market model to health, yet also provided the environment for some ethnic and community groups to create alternative health services. Some Māori, in particular, were able to put into practice long-held aspirations for *tino rangatiratanga* (self-determination) through targeted health services, thereby paving the ways for other alternative services to emerge.

Tribal affiliation to land and a long history of advocating for Māori at a local scale found some synchronicity with prioritisation of “the local” under neoliberal governmentalities. Rapidly rising inequalities between Māori and non-Māori following the
radical reforms of the 1980s had motivated a demand for more affordable, culturally appropriate primary health care (Crampton et al. 2004; Lunt, Spoonley and Mataira 2002).

In the late 1980s, Māori (and a few Pacific) organisations had begun to establish themselves as social service agencies based on claims for more culturally appropriate services. However, it was the 1990s health reforms, designed to introduce a competitive health market, that created the environment for Māori to demand Māori-led health services (Prince, Kearns and Craig 2006).

The 1991 health reforms required health boards to identify and target services for those in greatest need. Māori and Pacific groupings saw this as an opportunity to create localised, targeted health services. Māori health providers led the way, demanding control over services (Prince, Kearns and Craig 2006). Some advances were also created by health boards, such as North Health which put a particular emphasis on Pacific health, setting up Pacific Island teams (Dunsford et al. 2011).

An example of a place-based collective that successfully created a locally-owned and controlled health service comes from Hokianga, an isolated part of Northland. A group of local activists contested the commercially-driven health structure and pharmacy user charges proposed in 1991 (Kearns 1998). Faced with indifference from the Health Minister, the group threatened to stage a hikoi tapu (sacred walk) from Hokianga to Wellington with the pledged support of Dame Whina Cooper, a nationally-renown kuia (respected female elder). To avoid further national embarrassment on this issue, the government acquiesced and in December 1991, the group established a community-based health service, autonomous of the CHE. A democratically-elected community health trust was formed to provide all health services in Hokianga. Kearns observed: “In the symbolic politics of resistance the struggle to retain health services in Hokianga has centered on an alternative definition of public to that held by the state” (1998:245). This example has echoes of Goffman’s (1986 [1974]) theory that alternative frames of reality can exist outside the dominant discourse, and shows that contestations and counter-discourses were possible and were acted upon at this time. In this case, the alternative was based on a place-based community rather than a specific ethnic or interest group.

A common critique of such initiatives by ethnic or community groups is that they become like other “experts” in a neoliberal environment, accountable to the state rather than to the public (Shore 2011; Callon, Lascoumes, Barthe 2001). Māori demands for

44 Wellington is the nation’s capital.
Māori-controlled health services were partly based on a desire of some Māori to be less dependent on the state and to assert expertise in Māori health care. These demands had some resonance with neoliberal ideas of self-reliance and active citizenship. Larner observes that while discourses of neoliberalism and Māori claims for *tino rangatiratanga* cannot be reduced to each other, bi-culturalism has helped shape reforms to the public sector. To make this point, Larner quotes Māori academic Mason Durie:

> Positive Maori development, with its focus on tribal responsibilities for health, education, welfare, economic progress, and greater autonomy, fitted quite comfortably with the free market philosophy of a minimal state, non-government provision of services, economic self-sufficiency and privatisation (1998:11, quoted in Larner 2000a:18)

These new Māori health services enabled some Māori groupings to concentrate and defend their power and authority, contributing to a growing gap between a new Māori elite and ordinary Māori (Muru-Lanning 2010, Rata 2000). What began as an opportunity for a shift in power relations based on the idea of collective responsibility became a closure for many. But the market model of health was ruptured, paving the ways for more targeted forms of health services.

As a result of a continual process of health reforms and improvisations and opportunism from Māori and others, the New Zealand health system became a new “hybrid” (Fougere 2001). Part of that hybrid mix includes free public hospital-based care (and some auxiliary systems such as pregnancy care), a carry-over from an earlier era. The obvious contrast is the USA, where President Obama is trying to make some headway in introducing an approximation of this system of healthcare in 2012 (see Goldfarb 2012). Expectations formed throughout the welfare period have proved enduring. Any moves to introduce part-payment, such as “user-pays” implemented briefly by Simon Upton in 1991 (Upton 1991:95), are quickly squashed through widespread protests in the health and community sectors. Despite the overwhelming dominance of business interests on economic policy, contestations from *iwi*, community, and voluntary groupings also influenced policies. Having such a small, largely urban population seems to make it easier to pressure politicians, drawing on cultural imperatives for egalitarianism and a “fair go”.

Healthcare was not the only area where Māori demands for self-determination merged with the demands of other actors to create a growing demand for greater political influence. The electoral system that underpins democracy in New Zealand also came into question.
Mixed Member Proportional Representation

In 1993, New Zealand voted in a referendum to change from the traditional First-Past-the-Post method of parliamentary election to Mixed Member Proportional (MMP) representation. Overwhelming support for MMP signalled public discontent with single-party decision-making and a desire for “consensus” democracy through multi-party politics and coalition government (Karp and Bowler 2001). This support was also likely to have been shaped by longstanding discourses of egalitarianism, Māori demands for self-determination, and in reaction to rapidly escalating social and economic inequalities. This was early evidence in the neoliberal era that a majority of New Zealanders wanted greater ability to influence public policies, although at this time the focus was on forms of representation rather than “participation”. Conversely, Martin (1994) theorised that since MMP would force political parties into coalition to form a government, it would also make it even more difficult to locate power and responsibility. This has certainly proved to be accurate. Nevertheless, deliberation at a cross-party scale became necessary under MMP, as anticipated. It may also have contributed to the ascendance of discourses of collaboration and participation.

Inclusivity, Partnership, Community, and Compacts: 1999–2008

A third phase of neoliberal reform was the shift towards prioritisation of inclusion and partnership. With a new Labour-Alliance coalition government elected in November 1999, New Zealand had its first elected female Prime Minister, Helen Clark. While the 1990s had been a period of radical neoliberal reform, an “inclusive liberal turn” (Craig and Porter 2006) occurred in the 2000s towards participatory democracy. The aim was summed up in a Statement of Government Intentions for an Improved Community-Government Relationship (NZ Government 2001). The government intended that the facilitation of collaborative relationships would foster science, economics, culture, and social development. Partnerships at a local-scale were also promoted between central government, local institutions, and community organisations (Larner and Craig 2002). These “partnership” measures were intended to ameliorate the fallout of the previous decade of radical reforms and resultant inequalities (Craig and Porter 2006). As Larner, Le Heron and Lewis (2007) observe, this was a new era of a “partnering” and “facilitative”

state, integrating some aspects of the existing regime and some new priorities. The Clark government created a higher profile for the creative industries, environmental sustainability, the “knowledge society”, and social development (Larner, Le Heron and Lewis 2007). Earlier neoliberal forms of marketisation, contractualism, and competition were not removed, however. In this section, I explore how this apparent contradiction between fostering local partnerships and continued market-driven policies was enacted (and contested) in practice.

The New Zealand Health and Disability Act (2000) (NZHDA) and the Local Government Act (2002) are examined below as examples of this paradigm shift. These acts also provide the context for my ethnographic studies of voluntary associations in health advocacy and urban development.

**More health reforms**

The NZHDA established 21 District Health Boards (DHBs), most of which are still in place in 2013. DHBs are elected at a local scale, and, because they replace the government-appointed RHAs of the former era, could be called a more democratic system. Each DHB manages its own budgets (allocated from central government’s health budget on a population basis) to meet priorities laid out by central government via the Ministry of Health’s strategic documents. DHBs are therefore both funders and providers of services, reversing the strict funder/provider split that existed under the RHA system.

Another move to involve a wider range of people in decision making under the new DHB system is the requirement to develop “accountability mechanisms” including District Strategic and Annual plans to which community members can make submissions. This governance model prioritises the “local” as the site for effective policy delivery, cooperation, and collaboration between agencies, and strengthens local community input into decision making through elected members to DHBs and “involvement” in deliberations of DHB boards.

Primary Health Organisations (PHOs) were also created, funded by DHBs, to manage primary health care services via general practices. PHOs have a responsibility to

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46 Prime Minister Helen Clark took up the role of Minister of Arts, Culture and Heritage during her 9-year rule, stimulating vibrant music, film and fashion industries.

47 In 2001 and 2003, KnowledgeWave Conferences were held. Larner, Le Heron and Lewis (2007) note that the second conference shifted the focus from the “knowledge economy” to the “knowledge society” so as to promote socioeconomic inclusiveness, human capital, and leadership.
improve and maintain health of the enrolled PHO population, and provide services to restore health when needed. PHOs also have a remit to be “inclusive” in their decision making processes, and provide evidence demonstrating the genuine involvement and participation of the community.

Māori have special recognition under the NZHDA, aimed at reducing health disparities between Māori and other populations. This includes minimum Māori membership on DHBs, and requirements for Māori participation and capacity-building in relation to strategic planning. Since 2000, Māori providers have joined the ranks as PHOs, providing services to a specified population, and “networking” intensively with other PHOs and government agencies to meet statutory requirements for “collaboration” at a local scale, while also competing with other providers for funding.

Collectively then, the NZHDA has created a range of opportunities for members of the public to participate in local-scale health care by being elected members of boards, making submissions to policy statements, and holding elected members and health authorities to account for their local responsibilities. However, this “inclusive” participatory approach does not extend to the national health strategy that DHBs are required to deliver, which is determined by central government’s Ministry of Health. The system instead produces experts tasked to deliver the national strategy and get-more-for-less, and providers that continually have to demonstrate “accountability” to the DHBs. The advantage of having national oversight is that it should mean that people throughout the country are able to access equitable standards of treatment. As will be examined in detail in Chapter Eight of this thesis, haemophilia continued to present a major challenge to this expectation however because of its rarity and clustered nature and the high cost of haemophilia treatment. The NZHDA provided the conditions, or at least the discourse of inclusion, that could be subverted by a voluntary association to demand a more equitable system of haemophilia care.

Local government reforms
The Local Government Act 2002 (LGA) is another example of the shift towards a participatory democracy approach that promotes localism, accountability, and public participation, while leaving intact central government’s power to determine the role of local government. Like the NZHDA, the LGA shows the ambiguous, neoliberal tendencies inherent in the apparent shift towards more local participation, while also providing the
conditions for voluntary associations and others to demand and shape participation processes.

The LGA broadened the role of local government to include promoting the social, economic, environmental, and cultural well-being of their communities. The Act also highlighted the accountability of local authorities to their communities. It required local government to develop Long-Term Council Community Plans that identified “community outcomes”. Development and delivery of community outcomes were to be undertaken in localised partnerships between central government, local institutions, and community organisations through various formal and informal arrangements. These partnerships were intended to be multi-sectoral, based on collaborative identification of needs and solutions, as a means of challenging top-down and fragmented “silo” approaches (Craig 2004). However, very little funding was made available for delivering “community outcomes” (Memon and Thomas 2006), and there is little statutory requirement for budget holders within local government to align plans and strategy to Long-Term Council Community Plans outcomes (Craig and Porter 2006).

Local governments have entrusted community partnership departments – the departments with relatively tiny budgets – with the task of building multi-sectoral links in the communities that they serve by facilitating and taking part in formalised place-based social networks (Craig and Porter 2006; Scott and Liew 2012). During my research in Tāmaki, I have seen these networks attract community organisations, residents, iwi, national NGOs, researchers, elected community board members, local and central government officials, with competing priorities, purposes, and practices. Nevertheless, such networks regularly make collective submissions to local government strategic plans and central government policy, extend invitations to local government officials and elected members to attend local forums and deliberations, and support local residents’ involvement in such processes. The expectation is that “everyone” participates, although, as with the NZHDA, the LGA prioritises “local” issues for participation rather than the broader strategic direction of central government.

Thomas and Memon (2007) examined the LGA to consider whether this Act enabled a shift towards empowering communities to participate in decision making, as the government of the time had indicated. Their research identified several key justifications for the LGA, reflecting broader rationalisations for participatory democracy, including, a

48 Relative to, say, storm water infrastructure or waste management.
“joined up” approach, a principle of subsidiarity,⁴⁹ “localness”, recognising diverse communities, and active citizenship. However, while these were the explicit justifications for the Act, Thomas and Memon concluded that it came out of pressure from the New Zealand Business Roundtable and the Local Government Forum (including Federated Farmers and others) to limit local government function and rates. The Act therefore resulted in a shift in power from local to central government, so increasing the distance between state and citizens. The extensions of central government power, as proxies for business interests, while reducing government responsibilities are at the same time enduring elements of consecutive neoliberal reforms.⁵⁰

**Partnership**

As a result of legislation like the NZHDA and the LGA, partnerships have been promoted by government as a way for communities to find “local solutions to local issues” (Larner, Le Heron and Lewis 2007). As hinted in the descriptions above, partnerships can also be seen as a euphemism for conferring responsibility without power on to community actors (Kelsey 2002). By “partnering” with communities, it was possible to make visible inefficiencies, lack of accountability, and social problems, and therefore legitimate social policies. In turn, communities and individuals were expected to be made accountable, and to manage risks, and responsibilities. Hyatt (1997) provides an illustration of this from the United Kingdom involving a shift toward state tenant self-management policies, as proposed by the tenants themselves. However, this proposal came in response to state withdrawal rather than the existence of local expertise to undertake such work, resulting in a shift from government of the poor to government by the (unskilled and under-resourced) poor.

This repositioning of a motivated collective into a position of mediation between the state and social housing tenants highlights the dangers of voluntary associations stepping into the breach left by a reduced state. Partnership with communities can be a way to shape citizens and communities to be more “active” and responsible for their own well-being, thus limiting government responsibilities, and containing costs for social services and programmes (Craig and Porter 2006).

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⁴⁹ Subsidiarity is a principle that activities should be undertaken by the lowest level of government possible.

⁵⁰ The Local Government Act Amendment Act 2010 secured this direction, reducing requirements for determining and reporting on community outcomes.
My research with the Tāmaki community sector over several years suggests that the narrative of partnership has not just come from state attempts to shift costs and responsibilities to the community scale. Voluntary associations and other community organisations and networks commonly seek partnerships with the state to improve social outcomes. Inspiring Communities, for example, is a national organisation that seeks to promote community-led development to involve people from all sectors (residents, business, funders, iwi, local and central government, and schools) “working together in place to create and achieve locally owned visions and goals” (Inspiring Communities 2012). In the community sector, partnership is widely seen as the “common sense” approach.

Larner and Craig (2005) observe that some community activists have taken on new roles as “strategic brokers” to foster collaboration in the New Zealand social sector. They conclude that “strategic brokers are more involved in making up for the shared accountability shortcomings of the Public Finance Act51 than they are in designing its demise”(2005:27). Rather than framing these people as merely co-opted or evidence of a “bottom-up” political response, these scholars identify new subjectivities and governmental spaces that have emerged out of multiple and contested discourses and practices, with varied effects. In a statement that echoes the approach of this thesis, they argue that “explicating further the contradictory spaces and subjects associated with different forms and phases of neoliberalism, both in New Zealand and more generally, would make a major theoretical and empirical contribution to contemporary debates” (Larner and Craig 2005:27-28).

**Governing through community**
From 1999, New Zealand citizens were not only expected to be in paid work, they were given the added responsibility to be “active citizens” by participating in deliberative policy processes. This was closely linked to the concept of social inclusion, as citizens were assumed to be “empowered” by such opportunities (Humpage 2008a) for civic engagement and being part of an “inclusive society” (Kelsey 2002). “Community” is the new unit for governance. Third sector providers continued to work in a competitive funding

51 The Public Finance Act of 1989 is based on “principles of responsible fiscal management”. In August 2012, the government put forward a bill proposing formulating fiscal policy with regard to “efficiency and fairness” and “its likely impact on present and future generation” (New Zealand Government 2012).
environment, but were now also required to work in partnership or collaboration with each other.

**Let’s come to an understanding**
Another technique that became increasingly common at this time was the use of written agreements such as Memoranda of Understanding (MoU), between government and civil society groupings, identifying principles of partnership and inclusion. Following the *Statement of Government Intentions for an Improved Government-Community Relationship* of 2001, the government established the Office for the Community and Voluntary Sector (OCVS) in 2003\(^{52}\) to foster these relationships. Community and voluntary organisations had promoted improved relationships with the state, so this was not entirely a government-led development. The OCVS, with input from the voluntary and community sector, developed written, seminar and web-based resources.\(^{53}\) These resources promoted “best practice” public participation, and reflected the wishes of state and community sectors to foster collaboration and partnership. Community-based actors also used such agreements as a means of recognition of the community sector as “full partners” with government.

Morison (2000) examined government–voluntary sector agreements or what he called “compacts” in the UK. He observed that the compacts are basically best practice guides, and that it is what comes after the compact is signed in terms of shifts in subjectivity that is most telling. Based on four compacts from the late 1990s, he argues that the voluntary sector is treated as “a reserve army of potential” (2000:112) and repositioned through the compacts to be actively engaged with the powers that govern them and to govern themselves. This is an example of what Rose and Miller (2008 [1992]) identified as power that exists beyond the state through networks and alliances that create a chain that translates power from one place to another. In this way, governmental agendas can penetrate new spheres.

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\(^{52}\) OCVS was established in 2003 under the Ministry of Social Development, and was transferred to Department of Internal Affairs in February 2011 (OCVS 2012).


An ethnographic example in Chapter Five of this thesis shows an urban community leaders grouping that developed a MoU with the urban renewal programme they sought to influence. I propose this is an example of counter-conduct or strategic reversal of a governmental technique, but it was more effective in creating symbolic capital than an enduring shift in power towards community actors.

**Non-reforms, Protection, and Standing together: 2008–2012**

At a time when USA and Britain were electing social democratic parties, New Zealand elected a National-led government, heralding in a return to a reduced role of the state, the privatisation of assets, and highly punitive social policy. The concept of sustainability was quickly replaced with a focus on “green growth” (e.g., see Green Growth Advisory Group 2011). The coalition of National and the Māori Party in November 2008 created an interesting mix of neo-conservative and former-oppositional politics. This is perhaps the period where ambiguities and contradictions between neoliberal concepts of a reduced state and “participation” become most apparent.

**Non-reforms**

Despite early signs that the health structure would remain intact, the government quietly went about implementing significant changes to other parts of the public sector. For example, in February 2011, the Ministry of Research, Science and Technology was disestablished, and replaced with the Ministry of Science and Innovation (MSI). In July 2012, just over a year after it was established, MSI was merged with the Department of Building and Housing, the Ministry of Economic Development, and the Department of Labour to form the Ministry of Business, Innovation, and Employment (MBIE). MBIE is based on the idea that “providing joined up policy advice, regulation and services, will help shape and deliver the business growth agenda and build a more competitive and internationally focused economy” (MBIE 2012). The “joined-up” approach of the former government was retained, in text at least, while the “knowledge society” was replaced with demand for an innovative, business-oriented society.

Mergers and disestablishment of government departments have so far resulted in the loss of 3000 public sector jobs, costing the government almost $NZ39 million in redundancies from the public sector alone since 2011 (Public Service Association 2012). In 2012, the unemployment rate was 7.3% (youth and Māori and Pacific unemployment rates are 25% and 15%, respectively), the highest level since 1999 (New Zealand Labour Party 2012). Another important indicator of economic disparities is in wealth and income
inequalities. The wealthiest 10% of the population now own half of the nation’s wealth, while the bottom 50% own just 5% of wealth. The average wage in 2008 was $49,000, but CEOs averaged $690,000, 14 times the average wage (New Zealand Council of Christian Social Services 2012).

Despite these clear indicators of inequalities and poverty, social policy is increasingly authoritarian, putting the blame on individual for their misfortunes. For example, the 2012 Budget introduced increased work requirements for sole parents and financial sanctions for those who do not meet these requirements.54

**Protecting vulnerable children**

More authoritarian social policy is most evident in proposed changes to protect children from abuse and neglect. In July 2011, the government released the Green Paper for Vulnerable Children, with a focus on the need for improved protection measures and services, with a subscript that parenting was the problem. Contestations quickly emerged from the voluntary and community sector, including documents that identify child poverty and increasing inequality as the key issues to be addressed. For example, the New Zealand Council of Christian Social Services (NZCCSS) initiated a Closer Together campaign. This was not aimed at partnership as might be expected by the name of the campaign, but at reducing income inequalities.

Organisations like Inspiring Communities and NZCCSS are very well networked nationally and internationally, and are able to use the internet and digital technology to build voluntary and community sector support for a discourse of equality. This discourse is based on an ethic of collective responsibility, requiring redistribution of resources. Such contestations are a continual irritant, meaning that governments have continually to promote the dominant political discourse of “no other choice” apart from neoliberalism (Kelsey 2002), based on an ethic of individual rights and responsibilities. This reinforces Arendt’s theory that power comes from a plurality of actors working together for a common political purpose, and that power “exists only in its actualization” (1959:178). It

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54 These sanctions are significant. The Child Poverty Action Group obtained figures from Work and Income NZ under the Official Information Act. These figures show that at the end of August 2012, 377 people with dependent children had had benefits reduced by 50%. The majority of those (234) were sole-parents, including 84 cases where the youngest child was younger than five. In 63 cases, the reduction in benefits had lasted over four weeks (Child Poverty Action Group 2012).
also provides hope—however small—that a shift beyond neoliberalism and towards democracy is possible.

Despite welcoming submissions to the Green Paper and overwhelming evidence that poverty is a major contributor to family violence, the Government released the final White Paper for Vulnerable Children (Ministry of Social Development 2012) in October 2012, retaining the focus on protection and support services. A government website introduces the document’s aims:

The White Paper for Vulnerable Children sets out a programme of change that will shine a light on abuse, neglect, and harm by identifying our most vulnerable children and targeting services to them to ensure they get the protection and support they need (Ministry of Social Development 2012).

The latest move is trialling of Vulnerable Children’s teams in Rotorua and Whangarei to “put the child at the centre of all decision making” and “address the root causes of child abuse and neglect” (Bennett 2012). These teams are partnerships between the Department of Child, Youth and Family and iwi, formalised through MoUs. There is widespread public, professional, and political support for strong measures to reduce appalling national child abuse rates. However, it seems unlikely that partnerships can address the problem without also addressing broader inequalities. This is an example where collective action had little or no effect on public policies, to date at least.

Standing together
When the National-led government was elected, it inherited the OCVS. Community feedback on the OCVS’s efforts to foster improved relations between government and the community sector suggested that government engagement practices were still poor. In a move that indicated National’s ongoing commitment to partnering with communities, the government appointed a steering group in 2009 to develop an accord between communities and government. In June 2011, the Kia Tūtahi Standing Together Relationship Accord was signed to promote the vision of communities and government “working together for a fair, inclusive and flourishing society”. As in the late 2000s, governing through communities was the focus, but rather than merely “participating” or being “engaged”, the discourse has shifted towards being in working relationships with government. Interestingly, the concept of fairness emerges again under National leadership. This aligns with approaches promoted by an ever-expanding voluntary and community development sector, and is a tantalizing hint at collective responsibility; in practice, however, it is about an open market place where people can choose products and services that best suit their needs. As Greenhouse
(2008) observed, ambiguity in text enables politicians to talk to a range of audiences and deliver different messages based on the same text.

The discourse of “working together” no longer seems to extend to government departments. For example, Housing New Zealand Corporation, the central government agency responsible for all state housing, received the directive from the Department of Building and Housing in 2011 that they were henceforth responsible only for housing. Facilitating social development by working with other government agencies, a critical success factor in urban renewal projects of the last decade (e.g., Scott, Shaw, and Bava 2010, Housing New Zealand 2006), is no longer their role. This denotes a shift back to government departments working in “silos”, one of the problems partnership and collaborative relationships were designed to address.

A new focus for government in New Zealand, reflecting a similar focus in the UK a decade earlier, is public-private partnerships (e.g., the Tāmaki Redevelopment Company, described in Chapter Six). Central government has changed from the “joined-up inclusive” approach of the 2000s toward providing the conditions for partnerships to thrive. Despite the new Kia Tūtahi Standing Together Relationship Accord, central government has repositioned itself into a facilitation role, and citizens and communities are expected to be actively engaged with the powers that govern them and to govern themselves. This confirms Morison’s (2000) contention that such accords or “compacts” are aimed at shifting subject positions rather than power-sharing. This makes my research task of identifying small shifts in power that were created by voluntary associations all the more important.

**Conclusions**
Partnerships, inclusion, equality, and fairness have long had currency in New Zealand; neoliberal reforms took these in a new direction, but discourses and practices are flavoured by a specific political history. This chapter set out to trace the historical contestations and shifting forms of power that shape the present. For example, the National-led government’s reforms to make a “fairer” system of health care draws on and subverts the “fair go” discourse from colonial times. Community and voluntary sectors have argued that current market-models of health marginalise the poor and therefore increase inequality. The concept of fairness recurs repeatedly in National government policies yet seems to be based on a notion of the “level playing field” in a free market rather than equitable access to resources. With a single chamber system of government, significant policy changes can
be introduced very quickly relative to most democracies, as was shown by the 1984 Labour government.

Nevertheless, some people have been willing and able to create opportunities to advance pre-existing collective and individual interests. Some forms of governance, such as (almost) free schooling, health care for children, and universal superannuation payments, have endured since the welfare era, reflecting a strong cultural imperative for egalitarianism. No fiscal crisis, imagined or otherwise, has been able to shake that. As shown in this chapter, New Zealanders show a strong propensity towards forming associations and collectives as a way to enact and promote highly valued practices of community participation and collective responsibility. Māori and Pākeha share this cultural discourse of community mindedness, as well as valuing stoicism in the face of adversity and getting by on very little. These cultural discourses have merged with neoliberal discourses of individualism and self-reliance to shape neoliberalism, while also promoting innovative collective action against conditions of inequality.

Subjectivities of community actors have been transformed under neoliberalism, mostly in ways not of their choosing. The transformation of some Māori groupings and community development practitioners from activists to being integrated into governmental techniques suggests co-option but has also enabled some innovation and small shifts in power between state and society. Community-mindedness is a cultural discourse that has been put to work in the name of neoliberalism. In this age of consumer choice and free markets, citizens have been increasingly side-lined as the state’s role has turned to providing the conditions for global business interests to thrive. Working-age recipients of welfare benefits are now transformed into “active job seekers”, with stringent requirements attached. In the welfare era, universal family benefit (and universal superannuation payments to this day) was perceived as a “common good”. In stark contrast, welfare payments to active job seekers are now portrayed as somehow shameful and the result of poor choices. Longstanding narratives of stoicism and getting by may have fed into these representations, but as Humpage (2008c) noted, belief in community spirit and collective solutions to social problems continue to resonate strongly despite almost three decades of neoliberal reforms.

Some contestations have resulted in small ruptures in neoliberal discourse and some practices. Māori health providers, for example, emerged to provide for Māori health needs, creating some new Māori elites, but also small shifts towards Māori self-determination. This is an example of the unanticipated and irreversible effects of
contestations in the public sphere (Arendt 1959). I now turn to a detailed analysis of
contestations by two voluntary associations in New Zealand that have also created shifts in
discourses and practices of governance.
SECTION 2

TIES AND LOCAL DEMOCRACY
I’ve got a Fijian friend, wise sort of guy, he says you shouldn’t really criticise things if you’re not prepared to be involved to [make a] change. And I guess, for the community, if you take that advice, you could sit back and complain about the council, you could complain about TTP [Tamaki Transformation Programme] but if you’re not prepared to actually step up and be involved – I guess that’s part of my motive, to be part of the TIES and TTP is that, well, if you don’t, you shut up and walk away and don’t say anything if you’re not prepared to step up and make a contribution. And what’s refreshing, I guess, from TTP is that they actually are asking for [our input], because it’s part of their brief. But what we need to push through is how does that become effective as an agent of change in our community rather than just lip service to a contract requirement....[Plus] you come back to the shark and the mullet, when the faces change and the people aren’t so well meaning to the community people, is it still going to be the same?

The last chapter showed that citizens’ participation in public policy development has become a democratic norm in New Zealand. As the quote above suggests, however, there are often critical differences in rationales for public participation, with implications for practice. There is a tension between the need for people to feel they can influence public policy and the need for state actors to be able to make decisions and take action in a timely way. In Tamaki, the site of my first ethnographic study, there is also a dire need for more equitable and quality outcomes from public policies. It is all too easy to lose sight of that when examining democratic processes.

A political shift towards participatory democracy has provided new spaces of participation. In Tamaki, participatory democracy and community development have converged to produce widespread support for public participation. The person quoted above is one of a group of community leaders who chose to work collectively to create a Tamaki Inclusive Engagement Strategy (TIES) from which the TIES group takes its name. As he explains, TIES wanted to make a contribution to public policy, with the intention of being “an agent of change”, shifting the balance of power towards greater local democracy. These people were invited to participate by state actors who sought support for a 20-year urban renewal programme. The TIES member quoted above recognises that this is a “top-down” process driven by a need to fulfil a “contract requirement” to demonstrate local support for this central government programme. TIES wanted local people not only to become involved in supporting the plan, or even in formulating the plan; they wanted community people to become integral to local governance over time. They were therefore seeking to influence procedural issues, that is, how policies were to be developed and delivered, rather than the substance of the policies themselves.
This section of the thesis draws on ethnographic research with the TIES group to explore concepts raised in the previous section, including participation and contestation. I examine TIES emergent understandings of participation and related discourses of partnership and collaboration and show how TIES worked the spaces of participation to change, for a time at least, the ground rules for participation. Chapter Three examines historical layering of contestations and interventions in Tāmaki, detailing different rationales for public participation and how these differences influenced practice. Chapter Four focuses on TIES as a voluntary association, in particular the spatial and temporal elements of their activities that were critical to their ensuing influence. Chapter Five shows TIES’ innovative ways of working in collaboration with multiple actors. I trace back and forwards between the activities of the TIES team and the TTP to illustrate negotiations and innovations that fractured dominant political discourses and some practices.

Political action in the public sphere is most often based on mistrust of politicians and aimed at overseeing, censuring and preventing particular policy decisions or programmes (Rosanvallon 2008). As a Pacific community leader who was part of TIES commented, it is much easier to mobilise people to contest a government programme than to work together to shape that programme. It is also much easier to identify when success has been reached if the aim is to stop the programme. As the person in the opening quote acknowledges, participatory processes are undermined by power imbalances and different understandings of what “participation” means, with serious implications for implementation. In addition, he recognises that results are fragile, subject to future political and institutional changes. This is not merely a local Tāmaki problem. Pierre Rosanvallon made a similar observation in relation to “positive democracy” in France and other liberal democracies, stating that results were vulnerable to “future imponderables and the vagaries of execution” (Rosanvallon 2008:14).

TIES is an example of a voluntary association that attempted “positive democracy”, with some successes that deserve scrutiny. TIES drew on an assemblage of participatory democracy and community development discourses and practices to contest poor government processes and demand input into the programme from a wider range of residents. TIES also sought to create a “will to justice” (Spivak 2011), that is, to mobilize local residents and community organizations to contest injustices and work collectively at a localized scale to improve social and economic well-being.

In this section, I use Goffman’s (1959) concept of front- and backstage relationships to examine the types of interactions TIES used to exert influence. The idea of
thirdspace, or intermediary spaces between the state and citizens, is another useful lens for understanding how the TIES group negotiated new spaces of contestation.

Critiques of neoliberalism and participatory democracy sound a warning that TIES’ influence could be at the cost of other groupings or could involve these volunteers taking up roles of the state. These issues certainly emerged, and many more besides. Nevertheless, the group was successful, for a time, in “destabilising and denaturalising the present” (Rose 1999:282) and opening “the space within which human beings…can exercise their political responsibilities” (Rose 1999:284). Furthermore, TIES’ worked collectively to shape alternatives in parallel to state activities, re-imagining the future of local democracy. The next chapter traces the historical assemblage of actors, discourses, and actions that shaped the present.
CHAPTER 4: TĀMAKI: A MEETING POINT FOR DIFFERENT RATIONALES

Tāmaki and the wider Auckland region (Tāmaki Makaurau) have a long history of conflict over who should govern the place, and how. Auckland has about 50 volcanic cones, providing ideal sites for early Māori settlers’ elevated, fortified settlements. Auckland is an isthmus; narrow enough for canoe-voyager Māori to literally drag canoes across from the Waitemata harbour on the east coast to Manukau Harbour in the west, and thereby access rivers that traverse the interior of the North Island. Tāmaki Makaurau’s prime locality, rich with seafood and fertile soils, made the area highly prized and fought over by early Māori settlers, who came to see it as whenua-Tāmaki (a contested land). This resulted in the area being likened to a beautiful girl who has a hundred lovers, hence the name Tāmaki Makaurau, meaning Tāmaki (the maiden contended for) by a hundred lovers (Stone 2001:7).

Figure 1: Map situating Tāmaki (Glen Innes, Pt England, Panmure) in Auckland, NZ

The Tāmaki area is situated within the wider Tāmaki Makaurau region, and, for the purposes of this thesis, includes the eastern suburbs of Glen Innes, Point England, and Panmure (Figure 1). As a research participant explained, Tāmaki has always been a site of “alliance and tussling” between Ngai Tai, Ngāti Paoa, and later Ngāti Whātua (since their conquest in Tāmaki Makaurau in the mid-eighteenth century). Alliance or conquest, “that is the way it happens”. Ngāti Whātua’s chief made an alliance with the government and gifted 300 acres, which later became central Auckland. The chief’s son was involved in the signing of the Treaty of Waitangi. When he heard the Treaty was coming their way, he organised a hui (meeting) and discussion was held, so an agreement to sign the Treaty was reached. Face-to-face interaction – kanohi ki tē kanohi – in spaces where deliberation can occur freely is a tried and true practice among Māori.

A strongly fortified pā (settlement) named ‘Taurere’ (Taylor’s Hill) was situated on a multi-peaked scoria cone at the entrance to the Tāmaki River, symbolising the contested nature of the area.

Within 10 years of signing the Treaty of Waitangi in 1840, Ngati Whatua were to lose almost all their lands in the Auckland region to European title. The fertile plains of Tāmaki became a farming area in the mid-nineteenth century, until they were eventually subdivided for urban development in the 1950s. Glen Innes in particular was developed as a state housing area to house people who worked at the meat freezing works and manufacturing industries in the nearby suburbs of Penrose and Mt Wellington. Despite the relative calm at least from the time Tāmaki was transformed into a suburban area, Māori continued to contest the loss of control over significant resources. The area became home to Māori and Pākehā families, groups of Pacific peoples, and more recently an extremely diverse mix of ethnicities.

Tāmaki was particularly affected by the neoliberal economic reforms that began in the 1980s: huge job losses occurred in industry and unemployment soared, particularly among Māori and Pacific people, heavily represented in the manufacturing area. The casualisation of the labour market and unrestricted global capital flows have resulted in very low wages and the displacement of low and semi-skilled jobs. Benefit-dependant families face even greater relative deprivation as welfare is targeted at wage earners (Craig and Porter 2006). Government aims to deregulate labour and capital markets and create self-reliant citizens jar with local residents’ needs for a liveable wage. More recent welfare

56 This is based on the geographical parameters of the Tāmaki Transformation Programme.
reforms have increased requirements for people living on social welfare benefits to undertake paid work, yet few local opportunities for employment exist.

Tāmaki has been the recipient of repeated local and central government interventions. Each of these interventions has overlaid and intersected with each other and with other processes, never quite delivering what was promised, particularly in terms of involving local people in decision-making processes or better health and well-being for local people. Community workers observe that residents are often recipients of pre-planned government interventions, usually short-term and aimed at specific issues identified by agencies (such as the “Mainstreet” and “Healthy Kai” programmes that sought to revitalise the town centre and improve healthy food choices respectively). When government funding inevitably dries up, government agencies blame lack of community capacity rather than lack of programme suitability (Scott and Liew 2012).

State housing still predominates in Glen Innes and Point England, accounting for more than half of all homes in the area. Most are single-storey homes on large sections, with some two- or three-storey multiplexes, many badly in need of renovation or replacement.

As the biggest home owner in Tāmaki, 57 Housing New Zealand, the central government organisation responsible for all state housing, is a significant stakeholder in the area. The major shortfall in availability of social housing or affordable housing in the private rental sector means that Housing New Zealand must prioritise those of “greatest need”. This has contributed to parts of Tāmaki rating in the highest tenth percentile of deprivation in New Zealand (Salmond, Crampton, and Atkinson 2006), which is indicated by factors such as very low household incomes. Glen Innes’ standard of living is especially low compared with adjacent suburbs that include some of the wealthiest in the country.

He tangata! He tangata! He tangata!

Despite the dire statistics, I was often told by residents of Glen Innes, Point England and Panmure that these suburbs were good places to live. What matters most, so the Māori proverb goes, is the people:

He aha te mea nui o te ao?

He tangata! He tangata! He tangata!

57 In Tāmaki, 2,850 (56%) of the total housing stock is owned by Housing New Zealand (TTP Establishment Board 2009a).
What is the most important thing in the world?
It is people! It is people! It is people!

People care about each other around here, I was often told. People pointed with pride to the rich ethnic diversity of the place and strong social networks based on ethnic and church affiliations, while acknowledging that connections between these networks were weak (Scott and Liew 2012).

Glen Innes, where I undertook most of my participant observation, has a shopping centre around an outdoor main square, which some people compared favourably to the large malls and Big Box shopping in other parts of Auckland. A state tenant commented:

Glen Innes has got everything you need, all the shops here, it’s convenient. You can walk to the supermarket, you can buy clothing here, you can buy everything you need…I know people which moved out of the area…and they all complain that everything is just so much more expensive…they just can’t afford a lot of things and especially having big families. Here even second-hand clothing and so on for the little ones [make it affordable]… (Scott, Shaw, and Bava 2010:190).

There’s a definite Pacific feel to the place. Brightly coloured floral shirts and dresses adorn the entrances to clothing stores, lots of taro and yams are stacked outside fresh-produce shops, and wall murals display Pacific-themed art. People mill about the town centre, some warmly greeting old friends and stopping for a chat, others crossing the town centre to get to the train station to the west, or the library, marae or community centre to the east. It is a unique mix of vibrant urban life, every imaginable ethnicity, and unmistakable poverty.

Planning from on high
Up the hill from this town centre is a light industrial area, and besides that, a university campus, my place of work. The campus is known locally as a “pimple on the bum” of Glen Innes (the other pimple being the large police station next to the town centre). I was told by a community worker that this was because they are both big, imposing places that were built by “the government” to provide regional services, not for the benefit of local residents. This image of significant (and costly) public infrastructure being a blight on the local landscape was telling: as I became part of numerous community networks over time, I learned that anything that was considered imposed “from above” was suspect. The expectation in the community sector 58 was that any new programme, service or infrastructure should respond to local needs and aspirations, not to those of government.

58 Community workers, social service providers, voluntary and community organisations.
This distrust and the clash of rationales and related practices were displayed clearly in multiple ways in my ongoing interactions with the community sector over several years.

**Onwards and upwards**

When I started research in Glen Innes in 2003, local government had not long completed consultation on a “liveability” planning process that aimed to make Glen Innes “a safe and attractive place to live, work and invest” (Auckland City 2004:14–5). The Liveability Plan was a requirement to enable rezoning for higher density development in Glen Innes. Local government reasoned that more compact, mixed-use forms of development would create more “liveable communities”, reduce reliance on cars and facilitate improved efficiency and uptake of alternative transport systems (Auckland City 2004).

This plan provoked a major backlash from the residents that the local council was not quite ready for. The “consultative process” took place between 1998 and 2001, and included written submissions, visual displays, design workshops, meetings with community groups, and public meetings. These invited spaces of participation were trumpeted by policy makers as state-of-the-art consultation techniques. However, they left many residents feeling that their concerns were not taken into account in the final decision. There was widespread concern that the plan for higher density development would gentrify this central suburb to help address a regional shortfall in housing, rather than respond to local residents’ needs for affordable, healthy housing, and higher household incomes.

My first introduction to this contestation was through a review of all the consultation documentation during this period (Scott and Shaw 2005). We were studying the range of residents’ perceptions of what would make the place more “liveable”, and how these compared with policy discourses of liveability. This document review and later interviews showed that many residents, particularly state tenants, feared that housing intensification would lead to gentrification, expressing concern that they would be “pushed out to Otara” (Scott, Shaw, and Bava 2010:190). The memory of the gentrification process in the central city suburbs that led to many Pacific families being shifted out to Glen Innes in the 1950s was still fresh. Why bring more people into an area where

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59 At that time, this included Auckland City Council and Auckland Regional Council. In November 2010, both were amalgamated with other city and district councils in the wider Auckland region to form the new Auckland Council.

60 Otara is an equally impoverished area in South Auckland, much further out from the central city suburb of Glen Innes.
services and infrastructure are already stretched to breaking point, they asked. A few local residents, however, expressed support for higher density development as a way to provide more affordable housing, a critical issue for local people:

[Medium density housing’s purpose is] for a great number of people to be housed in the smallest space and low maintenance, and that brings the cost of housing down, and at the same time providing for some accommodation for some people who can’t afford it, including families. Because at the moment we have about 4000 people waiting for housing in Glen Innes alone, and we haven’t got any houses. Something like [medium density housing is], I guess, practical in a sense but it’s a matter of getting used to a new kind of lifestyle to fit in with what’s available, I guess that’s what it is (state tenant and volunteer community worker, Scott, Shaw, and Bava 2010:191).

In stark contrast to views expressed by Glen Innes residents, many residents in surrounding suburbs, including some of the wealthiest in the country, wrote strong submissions stating that housing intensification would lead to “slumification”.

Despite serious concerns from many residents, rezoning went ahead in 2005.

**Housing New Zealand has a go**

Between 2004 and 2007, Housing New Zealand undertook a demonstration project to show what was possible using a range of medium-density housing in Talbot Park, a small neighbourhood within Glen Innes, to improve living environments (Figure 2). Residents recognised this project was a trial of housing intensification, and despite serious public concerns about higher density housing being expressed during the design phase, the revamped Talbot Park proved to be a very popular place to live (Scott 2011). 61

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61 Through participant observation, I observed during the planning stages that many residents expressed serious concerns about plans to redevelop Talbot Park, but during
Nevertheless, Housing New Zealand recognized that they alone were unable to change the socioeconomic circumstances of residents, and determined that collaboration with other government agencies and local residents was essential to get better results for residents. Inter-agency collaboration and community engagement were to be the governmental technologies that would improve Tāmaki the place and the population that lived there.

**Community Ways of Working**

Many of the people in the community sector who responded to these and previous government interventions went on to form the TIES grouping that contested TTP community engagement processes. I describe this background here to show that just as interventions were layered, so too were contestations from community people. Coming together freely to debate ideas created a capacity to act in concert (Arendt 1967 [1961]). These interactions occurred in parallel spaces, or what Goffman (1959) would call backstage to central political activities.

In parallel to government interventions, the community sector was developing some technologies of its own. These included a community-visioning process (Glen Innes Visioning Project Participants et al. 2005), a Random Household Survey (Liew 2011), and the creation of numerous community sector networks. These alternative processes, publications and networks were based on a strong belief in the community sector in participatory processes and “home-grown” solutions. These activities also helped some community people build their skills and credibility in the local community sector (and in policy arenas), creating power, as Arendt (1967 [1961]) theorised.

I took part in an ever-increasing number of networks in Glen Innes as a participant observer over several years, leading up to and during the period of my doctoral research. Contrary to policy discourses that Tāmaki was a problem to be fixed, an increasingly active and well-connected community sector in Tāmaki perceived a need for changes in the way services and programmes were designed and delivered. Community development workers facilitated networks to improve the coordination of services, to build social connectedness and civic participation to fulfil people’s needs for social interaction, and to support and provide opportunities for people to work co-operatively at a local level (Scott and Liew 2012). These forms of relationship building, collective strategizing and action contributed to a much more strongly connected and mobilised community sector in Glen construction they started to “watch with interest”, and on completion, they said “I hope they are going to do this everywhere in Glen Innes”.

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Innes (Liew 2011). “Participation” and “inclusion” were therefore aimed at collective action to challenge existing relations of power, rather than at individualising responsibility for health and well-being.

I was told of many examples where government agencies imposed a programme in Tāmaki. An example comes from my own experience of being asked to evaluate a health project initiated by the local health authority. The project was a 1-year scheme with the stated intention to “reduce hospitalisations for cellulitis” (not change the poor living conditions of residents that were causing cellulitis). I declined the offer, but what stayed with me was my impression of the rushed and ill-conceived way that the project was rolled out.

Similar concerns continued to be raised throughout my time in Tāmaki. As a youth worker explained in an interview in 2011, government agencies come in, “not knowing anything about this community [and say] they’ve got these three or four programmes from out South Auckland that worked really well that we are going to bring into this community”. This was not the “community way of working”. In recognition of this, workers in the community sector continued to work backstage to redefine the issues and solutions.

**What can happen if we all work together…?**

In 2008, I was aware that a large urban renewal programme was being initiated by Housing New Zealand. I was curious to see how the programme would be received by local residents and also whether the lessons learnt at Talbot Park, particularly in relation to sustainable technologies and collaboration, would be taken into account. The following is written from field notes taken at the programme’s first public meeting.

In July 2008, I was one of about 40 people who attended a meeting at the Glen Innes Community Hall to hear about the newly proposed Tāmaki Transformation Programme. We were the “usual suspects” that I had seen at many such public meetings over the years. A local *kaumātua* (Māori male elder) with a young male relative standing attentively at his side; a few older male Pacific church leaders sitting quietly, dressed formally in jackets and dress *lavalava*; several young adult and middle-aged Māori, Pākehā and Pacific people who led community organisations or voluntary associations; a handful of younger Māori dressed in black; and a small group of Chinese sitting quietly waiting for proceedings to start.

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62 Formal Pacific-style rectangular cloth worn as a skirt
I joined in the warm meetings and greetings – firm handshakes, hugs, respectful kiss on the cheek of kaumātua and kuia – amid grumblings about the short notice given for the meeting and jokes about why-are-we-here-this-time. A man I didn’t know stepped up to the front, introduced himself as the facilitator of the meeting, and asked us all to take a seat. Someone whispered to me that he was one of “the Australians” who have been contracted to “do the community engagement” for the programme. I cringed at this, knowing that this would not go down well with locals.

The facilitator then introduced the TTP Chairperson. The Chairperson proceeded to speak in fluent te reo (Māori language), acknowledging mana whenua and their ancestors, and all those present, and formally introducing himself. His competence in the Māori language attracted warm smiles and calls of “kia ora” from the audience in acknowledgement. While this form of introduction was considered a bog-standard format locally, it is seldom seen at government-initiated meetings. As he switched to English, I saw a ripple of movement around the room as people sat up to attention, listening carefully. The Chair spoke respectfully and eloquently, repeating what he started with in te reo. He appeared to be known and highly regarded by many of those present. This is starting to look promising, I thought to myself.

The Chair explained that the TTP was currently led by Housing New Zealand (the Board of which he also chaired), but the aim was for all the government agencies to work together and with the community to transform Tāmaki. The recently completed Talbot Park Community Renewal Programme in Glen Innes was a “toe in the water” for Housing NZ in terms of trialling a mix of medium density housing. Now they wanted to be bolder and link with other stakeholders so that better results for residents could be achieved. Housing New Zealand wanted to see what could happen if they put their resources and infrastructure into a process working with other stakeholders.

The Chair described what the programme had done since the Tāmaki Establishment Board was appointed in June 2007, including the involvement of two “community commentators” on the TTP board, both local residents. Now it was time to involve the community in the process as it was important that there was a common view of what the community outcome would be. “We wish to be in service in the community, not in control”, he said, describing this approach as a “state as servant” model. The Board had recently got the go-ahead from government to develop a Business Case for the programme, which had to be presented to Cabinet by November – before the general election - just four
months away. Hence the short notice for the meeting and the urgency to obtain community input.

The first question from the audience rang out across the room: “Is it just about housing?” Numerous people around the room nodded in agreement that it was not clear. No, we were told, the need for upgraded and new houses was the catalyst, but now we’re moving beyond that to well-being. General confusion ensued as some people tried to work out what the programme was actually about and others raised long-standing grudges. “What is there to stop prices escalating and pushing people out?” asked a resident. “Isn’t this social engineering? There’s talk amongst the people here that it will lead to gentrification”, said a local community leader. The chair responded that the Prime Minister, Helen Clark, didn’t want to see any fewer state houses in Glen Innes. He added that this was the first time Housing New Zealand was doing renewal in a brownfields site, implying that this was a significant shift in urban development.

A government-employed community development worker, never afraid to be controversial, spoke up next. “The Glen Innes Visioning Project really helped GI [Glen Innes] which puts GI ahead of Panmure. So will Panmure keep GI back so Panmure can catch up? We’re GI proud!” Some people in the audience shuffled uncomfortably at this open challenge, but some seemed pleased to hear the GI Visioning Project being raised as an example of “community ways of doing things”. The Chair responded that “We need to lift our game with community engagement, we are looking to design a process for that now”. The community development worker quickly retorted: “We’ve lifted our game in GI, we’re waiting for the government to catch up to us!” This drew cheers and laughter. This person, despite being employed by the government had long-term ties to the area and was seen as “local” in this instance. This was just one of many examples where boundaries between the state and society were blurred for specific effects.

The meeting by now was really starting to hum with passion, and becoming more chaotic by the minute. Someone asked “Why is there such short notice given for this meeting and for the one on Thursday, and why are these meetings always during the day so you miss people who work?” A young Māori woman spoke up with passion about the urgent need for upgrades of existing state houses and acknowledged an elderly relative next to her as an example of someone who lives in a cold, draughty, damp state house.

63 Brownfield is an urban planning term for redevelopment of an existing urban area. This was contrasted to the Greenfield sites of Hobsonville and Papakura where Housing New Zealand was developing rural land into housing.
Some of the TTP personnel attempted to respond to these questions. People shuffled in their seats and turned to each other to ask “What is this about?”

In the final event, it was only the intervention of community commentators that brought the meeting back to a semblance of order. These well-known community leaders spoke about the programme’s potential to improve the lives of people of Tāmaki. They acknowledged the high credibility of the Board chairperson, and the opportunity for residents to be “part of the change”. One pointed out that community engagement was nothing new in Tāmaki. That “most of us have been engaging with each other”, and now we can “show the agencies how it’s done”. These people decided to “work with” the programme, and give credit where it was due, demonstrating a participatory approach that they felt was needed. Their leadership skills, particularly as talented orators whose ability to “paint a picture” encouraged people to give the programme a chance, were clearly on show today. They understood the rhetoric of participatory democracy and were using it to motivate residents to become involved, but most of their efforts were spent on turning the concept back on the state to demand greater inclusion and participation.

When the meeting finally wound up, we were invited to join the Board and TTP personnel for a cuppa and a bite to eat. Most took up this opportunity and several residents continued to harangue Housing New Zealand staff about their concerns such as poor quality housing.

I was acutely aware that what was being presented was very different from what I saw earlier in a parallel presentation about the same project to a research audience. As part of a group of urban researchers at Landcare Research, I saw a presentation by a senior Housing New Zealand official that showed the appalling social and economic statistics of the area, a broad outline of the programme including its aim to intensify and diversify housing and ownership types.

We were told that Tāmaki’s population of 17,000 people in 5000 households was set to rise to approximately 27,000 persons by 2046. Almost 30% of the population were children under the age of 15, and the population is ethnically diverse including 20% Māori,

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64 Sharing a cup of tea or coffee and food following initial formalities of welcoming and introductions is common practice in Tāmaki. This practice draws on Māori protocols of manākitanga, meaning the art of uplifting mana, or more narrowly translated as hospitality.  
65 This was based on Auckland Regional Council’s projections.
39% Pacific, 34% European, and 7% Asian. More than half of homes are state-owned. Worse still, the average annual income was just $17,000, unemployment was 11%, levels of education were low, and there were high rates of crime, avoidable hospitalisations, and dependency on social security. All this in an area just 13 km from the CBD, and bordered by some of the city’s wealthiest suburbs. The implication was that it was ripe for redevelopment.

I understood that TTP’s Community Forum had consciously chosen not to highlight these appalling statistics, based on backstage conversations with the community commentators. TTP was also trying hard to extend a genuine invitation to residents to be involved. It did not want to just “consult” on a pre-formulated plan. But in its efforts to invite the community to be engaged in the programme, it was not providing enough information for residents to get a sense of what the programme actually was. The good news was that the programme had finally taken the advice of the community commentators to hold a public meeting and had also taken on board the advice not to use dire socioeconomic statistics to justify the programme.

**Let’s try that again**

The second public meeting was held two days later, again in Glen Innes but in the early evening, and in the Glen Innes Community Hall. I hadn’t intended going but the first meeting was so fraught, and to be honest quite entertaining, that I found myself irresistibly drawn to it. I was also keen to see whether they would change their approach to the meeting as a result of the chaos in the first meeting. It was about this time that I became aware that I was becoming one of the usual suspects attending such meetings.

This time the programme director gave an overview of the programme and explained that she was responsible for delivering a business plan to Cabinet. The requirement for the business plan by November, just 4 months away, was one of “the givens”. All the agencies working in the TTP would continue with Business As Usual while the TTP was in the planning process. Another “given” was that the government had a commitment to the level of social housing in Tāmaki.

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67 Social security (domestic purposes, emergency, independent youth, invalids, sickness, unemployment and widows benefits) in Tāmaki was $10,345 per household, over three times the national figure of $3,320 (TTP Establishment Board 2009a:12).
Once again, chaos ensued. “What are you talking about? You have a hidden agenda”. Again local residents were highly suspicious of “the government’s” plan. The TTP Chair responded that their aim was to get more private ownership, “like Talbot Park but with some private ownership”. People raised concerns about the fast pace of the programme, the absence of tangata whenua, poor quality of existing housing, and the vulnerability of the programme to government changes.

While the meeting was once again dominated by dissenting voices, it was not unlike many other such public meetings I had attended in Glen Innes. The usual suspects were more than willing to voice their objections and they seemed to be raising issues they had objected to many times before.

Once again it was the community commentators that helped draw people back together. “We’ve been in this room many times, and we’re here because we still care”. The commentators explained that they did not represent anyone, but they could comment based on their experience. This time another community leader spoke up in support of the programme, introducing himself as a local rugby coach. He commented that Housing New Zealand kept talking of a business model, so, conversely, “Let’s get organic. We need to use a farming model, look at the soil, start from the ground up”. He then implored the audience to give the programme a chance: “When a guy like Pat turns up and says what he says, this is a huge, huge opportunity. Let’s look for things that we can agree on”. It was input like this that helped identify this person as a community leader who would be effective to influence the TTP.

However, while a few community leaders publicly stated that the programme was an opportunity for real change, many residents continued to express their suspicions about the motives behind the programme or their confusion about what it was about. In private, the community leaders also shared concerns, but decided to continue to “work with” the programme in the persistent hope that some good could come of it for residents.

So what is this about?

Some residents and community workers saw the TTP as merely the rollout of long-standing plans to intensify housing. Others saw the TTP as just the latest of a long history of planned interventions in Tāmaki, and bound to fail. Despite a high level of distrust in government interventions, however, many were prepared to take part in the “community engagement” processes of the programme because of the potential of a significant

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68 “People of the land”, meaning indigenous Māori with ancestral links to the local area.
investment of public money in the area, together with the high credibility and passion of the TTP Chairperson.

In fact, much work had already occurred behind the scenes before the first public meetings. Earlier in the year, the Minister of Housing had announced the programme in a media statement:

With vision, central and local government could transform the community by working with local people to redevelop state-owned land, increasing the number of affordable homes available for first home buyers and creating more attractive neighbourhoods and open spaces…The Labour-led government wants to increase opportunities for young families to buy their first home. At the same time we want to improve transport, education and healthcare infrastructure and services, stimulating better employment and economic opportunities (Street 2008).

It certainly sounded like a housing programme, but this statement and many more from the TTP that followed also made it clear that it was aimed at improving living conditions for existing (and future) residents – not to move them out.

The programme is a 20-year programme with the following vision: “Tāmaki, where people thrive and prosper for generations, a place with a strong and vibrant community spirit, valued for its natural beauty and history”. In keeping with a “participatory” approach, this vision was developed with input from community leaders at a public meeting in 2008. 69 The programme claimed to be unique in urban renewal “in its commitment to achieve partnerships between the community, central and local government agencies and private investors”.70 Transformation therefore was to be created through new kinds of partnerships, suggesting that the process of cross-agency and community-government working together would result in transformation of the place and its people.

The first 2 years (later extended to 3 years) was the “establishment phase”, when strategic plans were made and approval received from central government to proceed. This also coincided with the period when I was doing field work in Tāmaki. During that time, the Labour-led government that initiated the TTP was replaced by a National government in November 2008. The next stage of the programme is the implementation of a raft of subprojects and plans to “transform” Tāmaki. But as a TIES member later told me in an interview, interagency collaboration was very slow to develop:

69 This input resulted in the “people” element being placed at the beginning rather than the end of the vision.
70 TTP web page. http://www.tamakitransformation.co.nz/ (accessed 22 December 2012). Property developers were not selected during the foundational period of the programme.
I was seduced by a compelling vision of Pat Sneddon [TTP Board Chair]…[but] there is a major mismatch between what Pat describes, supported by [Prime Minister] John Key, and the institutional ways of working that haven’t changed much. The programme doesn’t have any teeth. Those that have the will don’t have the power, others have the power but no interest….People in the TTP describe it as a giant ship that takes a long time to turn around. But this is uninspired. I want to see a different paradigm; lots of new things are possible through interagency collaboration…

As this person’s assertion suggests, community leaders had high expectations of the programme and were willing to hold government officials to account, and challenge them to collaborate with other agencies and the community.

Who is steering the ship?

Programme governance was fairly fixed in its hierarchical structure throughout the establishment phase, and was outside the boundaries of debate, according to the TTP at least. The TTP was headed by the Tāmaki Ministers’ Group,71 and governed by the TTP Establishment Board (“the Board”). This Board was responsible for developing the vision and high-level objectives, and monitoring the progress of the programme. The Board was made up of senior representatives of Housing New Zealand, the Ministry of Social Development, Auckland City Council, Te Puni Kokiri,72 the Ministry of Pacific Island Affairs, Auckland District Health Board, the Ministry of Education, NZ Police, and a property developer. A Steering Group was also appointed to “provide expertise” to the programme, and included a chairperson and one representative of those agencies and partners represented on the Board.

The programme had a small core staff tasked to deliver the vision, including two or three seconded from key government agencies. A programme director, appointed by the Board, oversaw the delivery of the programme via four work streams: Master Planning, Housing, Economic Development, and Service Review. Work stream leaders were then appointed to lead these areas of work.

Input from “key stakeholders” was to occur through a Tāmaki Advisory Forum and a Community Reference Group (Figure 3). In the initial TTP charter on governance, it was clear what the aim of this input was:

71 This group included the government ministers of the following central government ministries: housing, social development and employment, economic development, health, Maori development, Pacific Island affairs, and education.
72 Ministry of Māori Development.
The vast majority of agencies, NGOs, local authorities, and private sector organisations will wish to support the Programme, but will not be in a position to put their resources or decision making processes at the disposal of the Programme. The Tāmaki Programme will continue to seek a formal and respectful relationship with these organisations, in order to secure future opportunities, and to ensure that the Programme builds a broad level of support for the future (TTP 2009b:8).

Figure 3: TTP Proposed Governance Structure 2009

Despite the rhetoric of the programme being participatory and inclusive, the aim of involving local organisations, businesses and residents was to “build support” for this central government-initiated programme. Community engagement was framed as a neutral

73 Sourced from Tamaki Transformation Programme handout: “Requirements for interim community commentators on Review Steering Group: 30/7/09”.

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technology, yet clearly the process was a highly political one aimed at getting “buy-in” to the programme, cultivating subjectivity that aligns with specific government aims. Greenhouse noted that “discursive fracture” (2008:196) between speech and text, between oral rhetoric and strategic documents in this case, is all part of the malleability or lack of coherence that gives leaders the power to act. Different arguments can be made to different audiences: local residents can be assured that they will be included in the programme via a community reference group, while central government can be assured a hierarchical governance structure is in place to design and deliver the programme.

Community leaders acted quickly to contest the proposal for a Community Reference Group as being anti-democratic and exclusionary. As a result of their concerns, the idea was shelved. A challenge from elected Local Board members, that they should fill the role of representatives with the TTP, was also successfully contested, based on the view that these elected members did not “really” represent local residents. Instead, local community leaders informally nominated two local residents to be on the TTP Board. After some deliberation, a mana whenua representative was elected to be on the Board by three iwi that have mana whenua (customary authority) status in the Tāmaki area. The three nominated people on the TTP Board were therefore at the highest level of the governance structure. While recognising that the two nominated residents on the Board did not represent the community, local leaders saw this option as offering greater potential to influence decisions and keep informed of programme activities than if their input was confined to a community reference group that was “off to the side” of the programme. The two residents nominated to the Board were well-known community leaders and very active in local affairs. They chose to be called “community commentators”, recognising that they had expertise, local knowledge and networks but did not represent local residents. One of these people resigned from the role early to take up a part-time position on the TTP Community Engagement team and another resident was appointed.

74 Local Boards are the lowest tier of representation of local government (Auckland Council)
75 Mutual agreement on this appointee between iwi was considered locally a unique and significant achievement in terms of inter-iwi relations, demonstrating one of several examples of unexpected (and potentially irreversible) effects of contestations to the government-led programme.
I realised you guys were talking about where I grew up

If the TTP viewed involvement of community people in the programme as driven by a need to build support for the programme, how did this align with what community people thought they were there for? The community commentators later told me in interviews that they saw their role as providing advice to the TTP Board about useful models that worked in Tāmaki, to challenge stigmatization of Tāmaki communities, and to advocate for involvement of more community leaders in all levels of the governance structure. This was one of many examples of members of the community sector understanding and demanding a participatory approach to ensure that the participation of the wider community would be sought over time.

Stigmatisation and “lack of inclusion” were therefore identified as the problems to be addressed at an early stage. As one of the community commentators later explained, he consciously chose to contest government representations of Tāmaki, with considerable success:

First eight [TTP board] meetings [I attended] I still hadn’t really found my feet and I was just like – what is this all about? Presentations galore happening. A lot of suits, a lot of conversations...it was agencies producing reports and doing presentations around what the Tāmaki community was about ...Education were doing one, Housing NZ were doing one, every single agency was doing a presentation on their perspective about my place – and I sat through every one and it was weird because it was disconnected and we realised at the end of it all, at the end of all these presentations, I said “Man, what a horrible place to live”. And then I said “I realised you guys were talking about where I grew up and where I live now and my family lives and all these things” and I said “I don’t know whose community you just presented but it’s not my community”. And so that started the journey. I guess from there ... we realised what the magnitude of it was and we realised how strategic we had to be in our thinking and our working...

The community commentators were therefore part of early back-stage conversations and able to influence perspectives of Tāmaki. They also continually advocated for the TTP to begin talking to the wider communities of Tāmaki through a range of forums. As one explained:

the first thing I [thought as a community commentator was]...can I open the door to get someone else in here?...it was almost like a Trojan horse in a sense, you know, being in the middle to open the door constantly.

The aim to broaden the level of participation resulted in about a dozen leaders of local churches, urban marae,\(^{76}\) and social service and community development organisations

\(^{76}\) Ruapotaka Marae in Glen Innes is an urban marae (Māori meeting place), meaning it is not tribally-based.
being seconded on to each of the TTP work streams. At the suggestion of the community commentators, these people were called Community Sector Experts or CSEs. As Larner and Walters observed, “[n]aming itself is an act of power” (2004:2). The CSE title was used as a way to get their community-scale expertise acknowledged, which they duly did. As early as October 2008 we were hearing back from TTP staff that the competence of CSEs was starting to be recognised in the programme, heralding a “huge shift” in thinking.

Following Foucault, we can conceptualise this small shift in power as one truth regime emerging from another. However, as Foucault suggests, what is most interesting is how this is manifested in action (1991b). What made the small power shift possible was the blurring of boundaries between the state and the public sphere, and the use of invited spaces of participation to exert influence. This shift was largely enabled by the fact that one of the community commentators was by now on the TTP community engagement team. His input, together with that of the Community Engagement Manager, was aimed at increasing involvement of residents in the design and delivery in all levels of the programme.

Learning to engage

After the difficulties that the TTP experienced in trying to negotiate a starting-point for community engagement at the first public meetings, the community commentators and CSEs used their invited positions and back-stage conversations with the TTP to advocate for broader participation. Even before the TTP held their first meeting in July, the community commentators had already called a public meeting, alerting people to the programme as an opportunity, albeit one that needed widespread community input and surveillance. This was an early indication that they recognised the need to relay information between the programme and residents and to get input from these residents about their needs and aspirations. It also showed the tendency towards parallel processes, rather than all political action occurring on the central stage. The community commentators retained their scepticism about the programme, and created ongoing opportunities for more residents to become informed and involved in decision-making processes.

Public meetings were to become a favoured technology of the TTP, the front stage for community engagement. Another approach was to contract consultants to prepare some of the programme’s strategic plans. Rather ironically, contracting is the very device that
has been widely criticised as a technology aimed at “rolling back the state” (Kelsey 1993) and governing at a distance, yet here it was used to “engage” with communities.

To make matters worse, this contract was given to an Australian consultancy that had no experience of working in Tāmaki. “The Australians” (as the consultants became known) quickly recognised the leadership skills that existed in Tāmaki and so invited community leaders to work with them to develop the strategy. Demonstrating the inventiveness of neoliberalism and the contradictory spaces and subjects that emerge, the Australians employed one of the community commentators (who had himself been unsuccessful in securing the contract).

While the involvement of this skilled community leader gave some credence to the Australians’ claim of a “participatory approach”, it was not enough to influence the methods of the Australians significantly. The actual process they used was arduous, fractious, and in the final event, unproductive – “unless you count the 100 pages of twaddle” (as it became known) which the consultancy produced to conclude their contract. In addition, while the Australians were reportedly paid an “absolutely exorbitant amount” (I was never told how much) for this contract, the communities of Tāmaki were repeatedly told by the TTP that there was “no money for community engagement”, apart from small amounts that were paid to CSEs to attend TTP board or work stream meetings.

I attended countless meetings that were facilitated by the Australians, each 4 hours long and tortuous. These were attended by community leaders, amid constant complaints about short notice given for the meetings and huge frustration at the lack of clarity about how and when the community engagement strategy would be developed. Mostly these grumblings were no more than that; for the most part, the same group of people continued to attend the meetings in the hope that eventually it would all become clear.

However, when the Australians started to plan two “deliberative forums”, frustration turned to open opposition. Each forum was to involve 100 people, one-third randomly selected local residents, one-third community leaders, and one-third government agencies. A flurry of emails ensued as people debated whether they should help organise and facilitate the forums. When attendees asked what exactly was to be deliberated upon we were told the TTP was yet to decide what information would be made available to the public, so could we just get on with planning the deliberative forums, and trust that the TTP will provide the relevant information in a timely fashion. This lack of information, together with serious doubts about the appropriateness of the deliberative forums in this extremely ethnically diverse, impoverished area, led to considerable backlash.
Concerns were raised that the “usual suspects” would speak up at the forums, and already marginalised people, such as Pacific residents, new migrants and refugees, would not get their points across. This, together with my rather bold suggestion that such forums could become “forums for bullying”, was agreed with among the community members, but met with insistence from the consultants that they had had considerable success with deliberative forums in Australia. Of course this raised the ire of Tāmaki people even more. Any attempt to transplant a process or programme from another part of the world, particularly Australia, is routinely scorned in the community sector. It was considered further evidence that the programme was “doing it to us again”. Deliberative forums were widely viewed as a bad idea and were successfully resisted by the community sector by simply refusing to be involved.

Faced with this refusal and still unable to produce an acceptable Community Engagement Strategy, the Australians left.

**We’ll do it ourselves**

After this botched attempt at contracting out the development of the Community Engagement Strategy, the TTP decided to put the job back into the hands of their own community engagement team. During this early period, CSEs were attending not just meetings organized by the consultants but also TTP work stream meetings, often at short notice and always with tight deadlines. A handful of community leaders chose to deal directly with the TTP rather than be part of the more public “community” forums.

I attended many meetings and felt many of the same frustrations as other attendees. I summarise these frustrations here based on my field notes from discussions at many of these meetings: lack of transparency; power imbalances; “tokenistic” community engagement processes; lack of respect for community members; exclusions of some community groupings; gate-keeping between community input and TTP board level; business-as-usual approaches of government agencies; lack of involvement of key government agencies; and lack of funding for dialogue to enable collaboration.

Dissatisfaction with the TTP had reached a critical point, motivating CSEs and some other residents to discuss how it could be done better and to contest, at every

77 Australia and New Zealand have a long-standing relationship that could be described as friendly rivalry. Perhaps because New Zealand is significantly smaller in size and in population, and because Australia is more widely recognized on the world political stage, New Zealanders have traditionally sought to distinguish themselves from Australians, in a similar way to Canadians relative to the USA.
opportunity, the TTP community engagement process. Some Pacific families and church leaders, in particular, felt marginalised by disrespectful and exclusionary practices – in particular the times of day, formats, or language barriers of public meetings.

When challenged, TTP staff invariably agreed that there had been inadequate time taken in the development of the business plan, but said that they themselves were powerless over central-government-imposed deadlines. Frustrations really started to boil over when, after a series of rushed meetings, the TTP would go quiet as they awaited a decision from central government or the Board, and no communication would ensue until the next period of high-pressure planning. The need for a more coordinated challenge to TTP community engagement processes had become a hot topic of conversation in the community sector.

**Safe spaces of deliberation – TIES is born**

On 1 October 2008 I was invited to attend a meeting with all the CSEs and community commentators to “debrief” about their frustrations in dealing with the TTP, and to discuss experiences, exchange information, and get to know each other better. The TTP had brought together three adjacent suburbs under the umbrella of “Tāmaki”, so new alliances between the CSE, community commentators and other community members had to be formed. There was also a very strong sense that they would be more effective if they worked together to influence the TTP.

The meeting was held at the warm, comfortable rooms of Te Waipuna Puawai, a community-development organisation of the Sisters of Mercy. The comfort and hospitality showed recognition of the importance of commensality. It was a welcome relief from the many TTP meetings that we had been attending where, for example, food was provided at the end of the meeting seemingly as a reward for participation rather than as a form of lubricant for good discussion. People found it useful to get together to discuss ideas in a safe space. The potential of this type of environment to develop more strategic approaches to working with the TTP became clearly evident. The group found the meeting so useful that they decided to continue to meet on a monthly basis and develop what was to become known as the Tāmaki Inclusive Engagement Strategy (TIES).

Like the TTP leadership, the people who formed TIES wanted to see better community engagement processes. However, there were stark differences in the way the TTP and community commentators/CSEs framed the problems they were trying to address (and how to solve them). The TTP needed to shore up local support for a programme that
was vulnerable to Cabinet decisions. Without community support it was very unlikely that the programme would be approved. TTP staff certainly understood that local people had much to contribute to the programme, but the timeframes and processes of involvement were driven by central-government demands. In contrast, community leaders had much higher expectations of community engagement processes: they saw interagency and government–community collaboration as critical to enable transformation to occur. These rationales were fluid, however, and as will be shown in the next chapter, TIES found some points of penetration into the ethos of the programme, influencing governmental practices.
CHAPTER 5: TIES: WORKING THE SPACES OF NEOLIBERALISM

I think one of the triggers that led to the formation of TIES was a sense of – outrage, I guess – that a government-led project was going to experts from Australia to inform them about how to engage with this community….So we kind of responded by becoming desirous of having a parallel process…that’s when we formalized TIES as the parallel process around community engagement in this community (TIES member, interview).

Voluntary associations often work collectively to influence public policy. In the last two decades, with a turn towards participatory democracy in New Zealand, there are more spaces of participation available. Some involve giving feedback on a proposed policy, and can be framed as working with the government. There are also opportunities for voluntary associations or their members to work within government, such as part of advisory groups or programmes. These “invited spaces” of participation (Cornwall and Coelho 2007) are taken up by groupings that are typically referred to as interest groups. A common critique is that such spaces are within the parameters of dominant knowledge/power regime, and therefore are very limited in enabling voluntary associations to “really” influence public policy. For example, people can put forward their views on a proposed policy, but cannot influence which plan is proposed. This was aptly captured in a journal article entitled “I plan, you participate” (Lahiri-Dutt 2004).

As the TIES quote above shows, working in parallel to government agencies is another alternative: working collectively in autonomous, parallel spaces created a safe and reflective environment for TIES to develop alternative visions for justice and democracy. I argue that such imaginings have power, since they can enable people to redefine their situation and destabilise existing norms and practices. However “fleeting” such openings are (Rose 1999), working as if they share a common world and destabilising the present have immense importance, and are the focus of this chapter.

Erving Goffman’s concept of situational definitions is useful to highlight the different spaces of interaction that TIES used to reframe definitions and practices of local democracy. Goffman’s dramaturgical metaphor highlights the importance of face-to-face interactions in everyday life in sustaining particular definitions of reality (1959). Goffman contended that the “front” presented on stage is often carefully controlled, and disagreements between team members are downplayed in an effort to present the same version of reality. Backstage, team members develop the ability to stage this performance,
but when on the front stage, portray the idea that all team members are in agreement without actually talking to each other before the performance.

Goffman’s metaphor of the frame is also useful to consider how people’s perceptions of the social world are structured and competing definitions of reality are constituted (1986 [1974]). Goffman contended that alternative frames of reality could exist even within total institutions such as asylums and prisons, where inmates create free zones for independent action and re-definition of their social reality (Goldfarb 2006). People’s perceptions of reality are framed in certain ways, and can therefore be re-framed to create alternative definitions of social reality.

In late 2008 TIES emerged as a formalised group in response to ongoing frustrations with the Tāmaki Transformation Programme (TTP), with a desire to work together to broaden the definition of participation and to embed this in actions. TIES initially worked with the TTP to demand broader participation in this urban regeneration programme. TIES worked the invited spaces of neoliberalism to shift the balance of power to more localised decision-making and implementation of public policy. In the process, TIES identified and forced the creation of new spaces of participation. I call these “elbowed spaces” of participation and negotiation since they enabled participants to push the agenda beyond what programme leaders initially anticipated. TIES shaped how the policies were made, rather than influencing the policies themselves. Some TIES members also worked within the TTP, such as Community Sector Experts (CSEs) on programme work streams or employed on the TTP Community Engagement team.

History had taught TIES that government interventions come and go. As the TTP appeared increasingly vulnerable to shifting central-government politics, TIES gradually turned their attention from working with and within the programme to working in parallel, articulating alternative discourses, strengthening local networks and groupings, and trialling alternative collaborations. Rosanvallon (2008) theorised that the idea of politics was to make people “visible” and create a vibrant political community, which he described metaphorically as “the decision to write a common history” through “collective reflection” (2008:312). TIES decided literally to write a common history of Tāmaki. Based on collective reflection, TIES promoted collective responsibility and collaboration between community organisations, rather than individual responsibility and competition for scarce resources. They were “working the spaces (and beyond?) of neoliberalism”, to use Larner and Craig’s (2005:11) terminology. The collective action that occurred in parallel to the
TTP, or what I call “safe spaces” of deliberation, has lasting effects that deserve critical scrutiny.

This chapter explores TIES’ activities with a focus on spatial and temporal elements that were critical to TIES’ influence. The decision to put the spotlight on TIES’ perspectives and experiences of parallel and negotiated spaces of interaction, rather than those of the government agencies they encountered, is deliberate. This approach follows Leitner et al.’s (2007) contention that contestations by civil society groupings should not be analysed merely as secondary or as resistance to neoliberalism. Rather than reify neoliberalism as the result of hegemonic power, Leitner and co-authors advocate exploring potential innovations in governance to understand how these became possible in specific contexts.

**A Leaderful Community**

When TIES was formed, I was one of about a dozen people who were regularly attending meetings with the TTP by invitation as “interested” local people. Why then would this group of people choose to form a group that would add more meetings to people’s already-packed monthly schedules? TIES meetings felt very different from those held with the TTP: interesting, collegial, and mentally stimulating were my first impression. I enjoyed the vibrant dialogue of this diverse group of people. Most had strong leadership qualities, and all came together of their own free will and so shared a reasonable level of goodwill and camaraderie. The opportunity to strategise together was highly valued by all of us, as despite being committed to work with the TTP – rather than in opposition to it – we all felt a lot of frustration about the programme. In the case of TIES, as with many other voluntary associations, discontent was a great motivator for collective action.

The initial nine TIES members were community commentators and Community Sector Experts (CSEs) who were working with the TTP. They had been selected for these roles because they were leaders of local churches, marae, community development, or social service organisations. Most were in paid full-time positions, mostly working in the community sector. One worked for local government, one worked for the TTP, and two became local representatives on the Community Board while taking part in TIES. The mix of ethnicities and ages (see Table 1, in Appendix 1 for characteristics of TIES members),

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78 I was one of two other people, from the outset, invited to take part in TIES. Over the following year, the group expanded to 15 core members.
79 Ages ranged from 20s to 70s, with a median age of about 50.
and a fairly even gender split made for lively discussions, diverse perspectives, rich experiences, and extensive local networks. A vivacious young community worker who was an active member of TIES offered a more colourful description:

I think they’re all a little bit crazy actually [laughter]…but it’s that craziness that creates that passion….So they’re all leaders in their own areas…they’re all talkers, even the quiet ones are still talkers. They lead from behind and all that. It’s quite cool that all of them are different and the groups of people that they connect with, like we have [name] who is really one of the core leaders of urban Māori in this community. We have [name] who is a core leader for Pacific Island community, and also religious communities. As well as [name] who is definitely out there in the religious area, of course. Then we have the social service sector, which is [name] and she has got strong connections….then we have vibrant [name], which is all about [community] development, which you can’t do without…. same with [name], he is a leader with innovation especially in youth practice. I think that we all have our own strengths in different things. Also having an ear to the ground….like [name] with his café. He had people walking in his door, he had case examples of things that you could take. Almost all of us had those experiences and so that gave us that edge.

As this person explains, TIES members were known locally as articulate leaders, outspoken, educated (about half had tertiary qualifications), with strong professional and community networks. What they all shared, as one person explained, was that they were "passionate about the community”.

**Researcher, Participant, Volunteer**

I attended TIES meetings by invitation for my knowledge and interest in community participation. I was fortunate to be in a research role at Landcare Research, a Crown Research Institute, where researchers were encouraged to support local initiatives, particularly those closely linked to the researcher’s area of expertise. Nevertheless, the sheer number of meetings I attended was somewhat beyond what might be considered “support”. I found the meetings rather compelling though, and enjoyed the discussion and critical analysis that occurred there.

While I entered the field as an “expert”, I quickly recognised that my expertise paled in comparison to that of others present. I was aware that TIES members considered

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80 As part of two large research programmes on urban sustainability at Landcare Research, I had undertaken research with a range of voluntary associations and networks in Glen Innes and the wider Auckland region, and had written and presented a report on engaging community groups in environmental management (Scott 2007), co-written a journal paper and facilitated workshops on urban networking (Scott and Liew 2007, 2012; Scott, Liew and Greenaway 2007), and made a submission on government approaches to community engagement (Scott 2009).
me an academic more than someone with “practical” knowledge, but tolerated me because I “kept coming back”\(^81\) and I made myself useful by contributing to written texts and discussions. I was also a newly appointed director on the board of a local community development organisation, so wore three different guises: the researcher, a TIES member, and a volunteer at a local organisation. I write this based on extensive field notes, interviews, meeting minutes, TIES data (such as “collective strategizing” material shown in Figure 4) and many informal interactions.

![Image](image.png)

Figure 4: TIES collective strategizing

**All the best meetings happen in the car park**

I was interested to know how people in the team understood their collective activities. What did working together make possible that was not achievable as individuals? And if they did exert influence in this way, what did this mean for democratic process?

\(^{81}\) There is a common perception in the Tāmaki community sector that researchers typically did not “bring anything back” to the area. Several people commented that they agreed to my research because they knew me, I was a “critical friend” to TIES, and I “kept coming back”.
It quickly became clear that by working together the TIES team could be much more strategic about how to interact with the TTP and others. The TIES forum created a safe space for dialogue and strategizing before interactions on the front stage of participation. It also provided a stronger basis for individual TIES members to demand changes in the TTP, since it came with the weight of influence from a strong group of community leaders.

The use of parallel spaces of deliberation was based on experiences of working in the community sector, where informal interactions are critical to building and maintaining alliances. As one TIES member who was involved in numerous multiple-sector networks observed, “that’s where all the really good meetings happen, in the car park”. As in a car park, where people often gather informally before or after the “real” meeting, people in TIES gathered voluntarily over a cuppa to talk freely. As one person explained, “it’s one of the safest places to disagree with people, because they have the tikanga, 82 they hang onto a process”. TIES provided an interaction space where a critique of TTP could be articulated and some shared ideas developed. This is Goffman’s backstage, away from the glare of the lights on the central stage, and with people who will “have your back”, as one person explained. Another TIES member described TIES as:

...a good model for developing collective wisdom, so when TIES meets with TTP we have developed some shared and coherent understandings and speak as a group not as individuals.

When TIES members re-entered the invited (and elbowed) spaces of participation in the TTP, they used their positions within particular levels of the programme to exert influence.

Very quickly, TIES meetings became the “real” meeting rather than merely a place to prepare for encounters with the TTP. Looking back now, I see that the decision to formalise TIES as a team was an important switch-point in terms of exerting influence, since government officials had to deal with the team collectively rather than as individuals.

In line with a community development approach, TIES wanted to see TTP and community members working together to identify priorities, existing strengths, and innovative ways of working. Community development approaches had built a much stronger community sector, but TIES members recognised that community action alone could not lead to greatly improved outcomes for residents.

Collaboration between government agencies and between government and communities was considered the solution to address socioeconomic conditions. Working

82 Protocols or ways of doing things.
together implies a collective responsibility for the work, including local residents, community organisations, government agencies, and business entities. This fitted well with the Labour-led government’s promotion of partnership and governing through communities as a way to contain costs, create “active citizens” and “local solutions to local problems” (as examined in Chapter Three). TIES members called local scale collaboration “community ways of working”, which they saw as a response to their distrust of government processes and an opportunity for improved outcomes. They did not feel co-opted to take up this role.

Front stage productions

Like other TIES members, I was closely following TTP developments as they evolved. While TIES’s political action is the focus of my analysis, problems with the TTP were forever crowding out the spaces of dialogue in TIES meetings. The influence of central government politics continually hung over the TTP. From the time the TTP was initiated and the Tāmaki Establishment Board launched by the Labour government in 2007, the programme leadership was under pressure to make considerable progress as quickly as possible. This was based on the view that if the programme could show a good business case and enough progress made, then central government would give the go-ahead – whichever party won the November 2008 general election.

The first Programme Director, responsible for developing a Business Case in 2008, said repeatedly in meetings with TIES and others that her aim was to get “a bucket of money” to spend in Tāmaki. The logic was that with a committed resource, positive change would be possible.

In the lead-up to and following a general election in November 2008, TTP’s progress slowed to a halt. As many anticipated, a more right-leaning National government was brought to office. After months of silence, we were told at a meeting with TTP staff that the aim now was to secure “an envelope of money”, an unfortunate turn of phrase for those with knowledge of Māori political history. The reduction from a bucket to an envelope reflected the new government’s intention to get more for less. In mid-2009, the focus became “demonstrating a difference” with existing resources and “working in partnership”. This reflected the National-led government’s aims to navigate the worsening

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In 1995, a National government proposed the creation of a ‘fiscal envelope’ of $1 billion for the final settlement of all historical claims under the Treaty of Waitangi; this led to a major backlash from Māori, and was subsequently dropped the following year.

In a letter from the TTP Board Chairperson.
economic recession by “standing together” with local communities and by implemented further retrenchments in the public sector (see Chapter Three).

Producing a document in government-speak

It was all about influencing TTP. It was all about a body of work – producing a document in government-speak that would influence their thinking about how things should happen with this community.

With mounting frustration with the lack of progress with the TTP, TIES turned their focus to creating alternative texts, alliances, and collaborative programmes. As the quote above says, the TIES strategy was “about how things should happen with this community”. TIES determined that their contribution was to promote procedural issues of public participation, presented as alternatives rather than in opposition to the TTP.

TIES members developed texts to provide frameworks and tools for future activities. This focus on texts may seem to contradict the “practical” ethos of the group, but in fact layered upon other alternative texts such as the GI Visioning Project document (2005). This was also another example of strategic reversal of government technologies of intervention. Texts called “Protocols for Leadership” and “Tāmaki Ways of Working”, for example, were being developed by some CSEs members when TIES was first formed. This work expanded to include all TIES members. With this input, the documents were further developed into the Tāmaki Indigenous Engagement Strategy (TIES). The word “Indigenous” was intended to imply being locally initiated but this was soon replaced with “Inclusive” as this seems to describe more aptly the intentions of the strategy. The TIES definition of inclusive draws from the Māori translation, apiti hono, which alludes to involvement of many but also connections or bonds between people. My style at meetings, based on years of researching locally, was to ask questions of clarification. In the early meetings, for example, I asked who the audience for Protocols of Leadership and Tāmaki Ways of Working were and what they were intended to achieve. These questions made a small contribution to getting clarity about such matters. Some TIES members

85 The GI Visioning Project was a co-authored community text (Frances Hancock, personal communication, November 2012; Hancock, Chilcott and Epston 2007).
86 A local Māori leader also objected to the title as they felt it implied the group claimed indigenous status. Other words that were discussed as possibilities were ‘innovative’ and ‘inspiring’.
87 Inclusive is one of Cornerstones of Success, and is described as “Encouraging people to participate and stand together on common ground” (TIES Team 2010:116).
88 Apiti – plus, add, ancillary, friend, extra; hono – bond, connect, join, graft, knit; apiti hono – that which is joined remains an unbroken line.
thrived on these discussions about “process” or strategy development. Others, less enthralled with such discussions, called them “higher level stuff”, and contrasted them with “practical”, “on-the-ground” action. Interactions at meetings, explained in more detail in the next section, were critical to developing the fine-tuned performance of a new reality. This is not to say that they were attempting to create a false performance, but that considerable effort went into “getting on the same page”.

At a meeting in February 2009, the name TIES Team was adopted, drawn from the TIES strategy, replacing the CSE title.\textsuperscript{89} Like the decision to write a strategy in parallel with TTP processes, the TIES team chose an identity that was self-defined and not merely linked to TTP concerns.

TIES members were not new to “positive democracy” (Rosanvallon 2008) or to trying to shape public policy from the public sphere, so they perceived that the written word would be more enduring than merely contributing to a government process or document. Preparation of an alternative publication was therefore critical. TIES also created a written agreement between TIES and the TTP Community Engagement team. This agreement, called “He Whakaaturanga Pumahara: A record of what we wish to remember into the future”, was provided by TIES as a template. He Whakaaturanga Pumahara became one of the most popular of TIES’ tools, used by numerous community and government groups and networks when developing protocols for collaborations. As one TIES member commented, such written documents were necessary or else “our words blow in the wind”.

The TIES strategy was values-based, and drew on people’s local experience and expertise of community development and social service delivery in Tāmaki, and involvement in previous government processes. This endeavour was supported by the involvement of a professional researcher/writer. This “community scribe”, as some called this person, had expertise in collaborative writing processes and community development. From the outset, the aim was to build on existing local documents and relationships to leverage a shift in power relations towards “community-owned and driven” ways of working, as shown in an early draft of the strategy:

The strategy aims to promote active community participation in and community ownership of the Tāmaki Transformation Programme. Importantly, TIES builds on

\textsuperscript{89} The two community commentators on the TTP board retained that title in TTP forums, but Community Sector Experts requested to be known as TIES members.
the earlier work of Charette\textsuperscript{90} and the GI Visioning Project, in which many of us were and continue to be actively involved. It also builds on the work of other community-owned and driven initiatives currently underway in Tāmaki (TIES Team 2008:6).

**Working the spaces**

Developing shared understanding took time, and involved ongoing dialogue in TIES meetings and in emails. TIES members exchanged ideas, respectfully giving each other time to put forward their views, and then debating the main options. At these times, a mixture of community development logic, moral discourse, and local stories of collaboration (or lack of it) was used.

Meetings were consciously held in a public space, usually the Glen Innes library, as a way of showing other local people that TIES was working together but not in secret. Meetings were formally structured, with an agenda circulated in advance. At the beginning of a meeting the chairperson\textsuperscript{91} often invited each person to share “what’s on top”, meaning what was preoccupying them at that moment. At one meeting, for example, a Pacific person shared that at an exercise class the night before a person had “just dropped dead” and that she was still reeling from this shocking reminder of the importance of looking after oneself. This opening round helped the group “get present” for their discussions, and was part of a process of transitioning from their daily lives, shedding their individual titles and positions of hierarchy, and coming together as the TIES team. TIES members were therefore coming together as peers. A few individuals told me that they felt that cliques did form within the group at times, but the unwritten rule was that everyone was there as equals.

Time was always made in meetings for CSEs to report back on TTP matters and to debate emergent issues, but time was also dedicated to develop principles, values, and “ways of working”.

The following is a description of some of the discussion at a TIES meeting in April 2009, not long after the group was formed. The dialogue demonstrates that people came with differing perspectives and pieces of information about the TTP, debated ideas freely, found points in common, and then developed an agreement on how to proceed.

An older gentleman initiates a discussion about the ongoing issue of the lack of community participation in the TTP. He explains that currently there are three levels in

\textsuperscript{90} The Charette was part of the GI Liveability planning process, led by local government.

\textsuperscript{91} During the first year, one person facilitated TIES activities, but chairing of meetings was circulated around the team.
the TTP: the Board where he and another TIES member participate; the Steering Group, which has no community participation; and the five workstreams that currently have no community participation.

A TIES member who works part-time on the TTP Community Engagement team responds that there was a “real range of views” within the TTP about community participation and that this is an obstacle to better processes. Someone adds that with no community participation at the Steering Group level, this group “acts as gatekeeper”, as they “filter information between the work stream and Board” levels, or operations and governance levels. Another chimes in that there are actually two local people still involved at the work stream level, but this is hugely inadequate, given that design plans for the work streams are continuing anyway.

The group debates what TIES’ role is in relation to the TTP. Ideas differ on whether TIES should continue to “hold the space” until broader participation can occur. A few are concerned that TIES is acting as a default community reference group. The main ideas that are agreed upon are that TIES’ role is to “influence the different levels of TTP, building knowledge, skills and support throughout the project”92 about effective community engagement.

Someone explains that TIES is a strong linking point for workstreams to the community sector, based on the TIES document. TIES members agree that they were making some progress in building relationships and trust with the TTP Community Engagement team, and that this is a good starting point to get community engagement at the three levels.

Next, someone explains that he has talked to a manager at Housing New Zealand recently about community engagement for the five housing development sites that Housing New Zealand are planning, and it now looks likely that Housing New Zealand are going to “engage community” in these projects. He explains to the group that it is “important to lean on Housing NZ” to ensure this happens. Everyone present agrees. The difference between Housing New Zealand as the key government agency leading the TTP and the TTP itself is quite blurred in local people’s understanding. It doesn’t help that Housing New Zealand continue to plan for five renewal projects in parallel with the TTP, and say that they will continue with these projects whether the TTP goes ahead or not. What exactly the TTP is remains a big question.

A community worker then diverts the conversation to another longstanding irritation. Local people, including the TIES team, were invited to an Economic Development workshop several months ago, but nothing has been heard since. This workshop was led by an academic under instruction from a TTP workstream leader. Another TIES member explains that a report had been completed but that it “just regurgitated everything in the workshop day we had”, with “no acknowledgement of where it came from”. People at the TIES meeting shake their heads at this indignity. This is one of many examples of government officials’ obsession with documenting everything that is said, but failing to come up with anything of worth. The clear inference, to me at least, is that this contrasts to TIES that is all about “taking things to the next level” by coming up with a comprehensive strategy.

The meeting is then steered back to what TIES’ role is in relation to the TTP. A meeting of both the TIES team and Community Engagement team is planned for later that month, mediated by an external facilitator, due to ongoing difficulties between the two teams. The meeting is to “establish protocols and try to create a culture of trust and

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92 Quote from TIES Minutes April 2009
collaboration between the 2 teams”. 93 Discussion then turns to specifics of what they will discuss and advocate for when meeting with the Community Engagement team.

Lack of payment for CSE roles is an ongoing bone of contention, for example. The TTP have not renewed their contracts for the roles. Some TIES members want payment for the CSE role because they have to take time out from work to attend TTP meetings, some want payment to go to a collective TIES fund, while one chooses not to as this person feels that payment leads to a “loss of power” as it seems as if they are being “paid off”. This issue is not resolved at the meeting, but an alternative option of third-party contracts with a local organisation as contract-holder is flagged for future discussion. The group agrees, however, that any new contracts should be negotiated collectively with the TTP to prevent being “picked off one-by-one”. They also agree to seek clarity about exactly what any payment is for, and to contest the “confidentiality agreement” the TTP required them to sign in the initial contract process.

As the meeting winds up, a Pacific leader asserts that “often communities get hollowed out [gentrified] by government renewal projects”, so implores the group to think about “how do we strengthen...the networks and groups that already exist?” A community worker makes a final comment intended to inspire and re-inscribe collective memory: “We have a community development model, we need to keep reminding ourselves of that”.

This discussion shows the emergent understanding that TIES members had about their role in relation to the TTP. A more critical take on this would be that understandings were fuzzy and conflicting. However, TIES was able to continue working collectively because the members agreed that influencing the TTP to ensure broader community participation was crucial. TIES members exchanged ideas and mutual support, and strategically sought points of agreement as a team or, in this case, planned a meeting to identify points in common, before they re-entered the invited spaces of participation.

The discussion also shows the different spaces that TIES members used to exert influence: working collectively and individually with and within the Community Engagement team; working in invited spaces as community commentators and CSEs; and working in the safe space of TIES. The need to exchange information in the TIES forum is also evident, for example, to keep everyone up to date with Housing New Zealand’s plans for development. So many meetings and workshops were occurring during this time that it was impossible to keep up unless they pooled their knowledge.

**Sharing kai, korero and katakata**

TIES meetings were often filled with extended discussion about major issues, particularly what TIES’ role was or whether TIES should seek funding to continue the team’s work. These were fraught issues. TIES reached agreement that the immediate need was to expand the opportunities for local people to be involved in the TTP. However, the team did not

93 Quote from TIES Minutes April 2009
agree how the role of TIES could become formalised over time. TIES members agreed that they could not continue to work voluntarily as a team because of work and family commitments, but to accept funding from the TTP or elsewhere would shift the lines of responsibility towards the funder rather than local people.94

TIES meetings were, however, much more than problem-solving forums. A collection of experienced community leaders with 2 hours to talk made for dynamic discussion and creativity. With strategic thinking and oratory skills honed on marae, in churches, in sports clubs or in other leadership roles, people interwove concerns, local and professional knowledge, parables or storytelling, and visions of better futures for Tāmaki. All expressed a huge sense of responsibility to ensure the TTP rolled out in ways that would be beneficial for local people.

While I usually left TTP meetings feeling unsettled or frustrated, I almost always walked out of TIES meetings invigorated, inspired by stories of hope. Hope was a key sentiment that kept the group coming together to strategise and support each other in their important work, and, most importantly, to keep trying to create opportunities for more local people to be involved in the TTP.

As several TIES members said in interviews, given all the frustrations they encountered in their daily work, it was exciting to work with such a talented and passionate group, despite the challenging nature of the work. A community worker put it this way:

Personally, I was excited that there is this community action. That we are responding to it, that the people in the community are not just taking it, so I’m excited. So it means that the community is ready to respond. And when I say community it’s very loose because it doesn’t really include the people living here, the community of place, we’re talking about the workers, really. Those are the people in TIES. So…I’m really excited because we have this leaderful community, as we say. So they are rising to the challenge.

Humour was central to developing relationships and smoothing the way for deliberation in TIES meetings. A few “inside” jokes emerged, and being able to “take a joke” was all part of being a team member. One person’s determined efforts to have the group sing a song at each meeting, for example, often attracted mild groans, grins of resignation, followed by

94 Concern about lines of accountability linked to funding was also identified by Paley (2008b) in her study of an Ecuadorian indigenous organisation. In that case, the group’s solution was to develop a strategic plan to establish work projects, to which potential funding needed to contribute to. TIES also accepted small amounts of funding for specific tasks (e.g. book publication), but decided not to pursue funding for the role of mediation between local communities and the TTP as TIES did not reach an agreement that the team had the mandate to fulfil that role.
melodious song complete with harmonies. Glen Innes library patrons and staff paid little attention since such vocal performances were a common form of local expression.

In another example of inside jokes, a TIES member often referred mockingly to the presence of candles at an early TIES meeting. This was before TIES was formalised and meetings were held at the offices of Te Waipuna Puawai Mercy Oasis, the community development organisation where I was a board member. Art work on the walls and a central table display incorporated Māori, Sisters of Mercy, and *papatuanuku* design features, but it was the candle in the middle of the table display that was just one step too far for this TIES member. “Where’s the candles?” or “Maybe we could light a candle” therefore became a common jibe. As Goffman contended, such use of humour was “a catharsis for anxieties and a sanction for inducing individuals to be modest in their claims and reasonable in their projected expectations” (1959:14). Earnest debate was fine, but such humour seemed to remind everyone not to take themselves too seriously. TIES were learning to work as a team.

Food and beverages at the beginning of TIES meetings were another discreet but noteworthy element of TIES interactions. A community development worker often provided this hospitality to create a good working environment and conviviality. One person’s standard answer to calls for “coffee – white or black?” was “brown”, perhaps showing a Pacific version of politically correct humour. Whatever, the response always got a laugh, as it was designed to do – all part of team-building.

Amid the warmth, laughter and song, there were many disagreements, particularly about what our role as TIES was or could be. When verbal barbs did shoot across the room, someone was always quick to censor the comment by admonishing them not to “get personal”. “Getting personal” was not okay. However, this was the space to put forward differing viewpoints and concerns. Some of the more experienced community leaders tended to be quite forthright in putting forward their views, which at times intimidated or annoyed other members. A few seemed to take pleasure in putting forward quite controversial challenges to other members, all part of asserting themselves as capable leaders who were not afraid to “put their neck out on the line”. One person contended, for example, that unless TIES could agree on what their role was, the team was “in danger of being a laughing stock”. One person later observed that, like other TIES members, she had

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95 Māori, Mercy, and *Papatuanuku* (the earth) represent the three strands that underpin Te Waipuna Puawai’s approach.
very high expectations of the team as a whole, and that while the team had documented "Tāmaki Ways of Working", TIES members did not always live up to these expectations. In other words, frustrations were just as likely to be with each other as with the TTP. However, these backstage interactions took place in a safe space of deliberation, which was the very point of the TIES meetings – better that disagreements between TIES members were aired in the safety of TIES meetings than on the central political stage.

Another unwritten rule was that they were not to show disrespect to another team member during front stage encounters with the TTP. On the odd occasion where a TIES member issued a verbal taunt or oppositional view in front of TTP staff, this person would invariably be "bailed up" by another TIES member at a later time. This could also result in the person not being trusted sufficiently to "represent" TIES views in outside forums, for example, by doing a presentation about TIES.

Despite these difficulties, the group continued to participate in TIES meetings because they favoured a collective approach, based on their experiences as community leaders. One TIES member described the group as “all socialists, so they think of others not themselves". Several Māori explained collective responsibility as a *whanau* approach, as one person explained:

I just see it like our responsibility to work with whoever, so work and test them as well ...Well, I always take my thinking [from] how we were brought up as a whanau and because we did things collectively… but I think this was a way for us as community, and that’s always been one of my main objectives is as a community that we work more closely together. Growing up as teenagers we had a group of community people that worked together and fought together but we were able to go to that group to say “can you help us?” So back then that was a community responsibility and I suppose now the position that we’re in is that it’s our turn.

Part of the unanticipated effects of TIES’ activities was that over time, each individual member’s strengths and therefore point of contribution to team work became evident and used to good effect. The existence of disagreements between TIES members therefore was of less importance than the ability to deliberate and find points of agreement and collaboration. The anthropologist’s task is not to legitimate any discourse just because it emanates “from below” (Brass 2007). Nor is it to romanticise the local people as a united cultural force (Tsing 2005). Instead, recognising “awkward relations” is useful to “show that the coalition structure of such engagements is not just a matter of adding allies, but

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96 Māori word for the (usually extended) family.
also of remaking ideas, practices, and local, regional, and global histories” (Tsing 2005:212).

These features of humour, “getting present”, respectful and non-hierarchical interactions, open debate, and sharing refreshments were important in ensuring that people maintained a willingness to work together and, in Goffman’s terms, create a new definition of social reality. They were, after all, coming as volunteers during their own time, or during work time but with the knowledge that they would have to complete their paid work after hours. Sharing *kai*, *korero* and *katakata* (food, talk and laughter), as one TIES member commented, was critical to get people working collectively. Working in independent, parallel spaces to the TTP enabled TIES to become a team, build and maintain relationships, and identify openings for local scale governance.

**Whole of Community**

So, what was “the community” that TIES wanted to see involved in the TTP? Following on from the reference to earlier community-owned and driven initiatives, the draft TIES strategy asserts:

TIES re-visions Tāmaki as a collection of different communities working together to achieve a shared vision. It proposes a long-term, collaborative working arrangement between local Communities of Place and Communities of Interest (including government) while planning for and where possible engaging Communities of the Future (TIES Team 2008:6).

This shows that TIES understood community as a spatial and symbolic concept. That did not prevent TIES members from speaking passionately about the need to “engage the community”, meaning local residents and community workers, but conceptually, they were seeking to re-imagine the community and its relationship to the TTP. They were doing this in parallel spaces of interaction and in conversation with a wide range of local people.

In the early stages of the TTP, the community commentators used the invited space of participation to successfully contest TTP plans to have a Community Reference Group as this would be “off to the side” of the programme rather than integral to it. One of the community commentators suggested the concept of “Whole of Community” to describe this form of collaboration (Figure 5). He also used his position as an opening to promote this concept of Whole of Community. This person later explained his rationale in an interview:

> When I heard the rhetoric that was coming out [of the programme], the vision that was cast by people like [TTP Chair] Pat and others, was that, you know, community are an important part of this process. If we could create better outcomes and also how can we take community along the way? So I immediately said, “Hey
here’s our opportunity, here’s the window of opportunity for us, this is where we can go, enter into this conversation or come to this table”.

The Whole of Community framework was a strategic reversal of the Whole of Government discourse that was dominant in policy circles at the time, meaning all scales of government working together. A Whole of Community approach would require recognition of residents as “agents of change”, involving them as equal partners with the TTP, or as one TIES member envisaged, Tāmaki communities and government agencies “working together as a “we””. For TIES, the Whole of Community concept therefore implied that residents were included as equal partners in decision-making, alongside the other actors. Subversion of a government discourse demonstrated the knowledge and ability of local actors and their tendency to “show the difference” by coming up with new ways of working in collaboration rather than discredit existing paradigms. The Whole of Community concept was quickly picked up by TTP staff as it nicely encapsulated the shared sense of responsibility and endeavours that the programme aimed for, with the added virtue being a “local” concept.

By the time TIES was formalised as a team, some members of the TIES team were starting to question the way the concept had been “colonised” (Foucault 1980:99) by the TTP. As TIES became more immersed in TTP processes and started to strategise collectively, some felt that the way the concept of Whole of Community was being used by the TTP failed to address the issue of power relations. In the process of being bureaucratised, the concept had taken on a life of its own and lost the sense of power-sharing that it was originally intended to convey. The concept therefore risked being used to shift responsibilities from government to communities and to depoliticize the process.

The TTP Community Engagement Strategy, for example, drew on the concept to highlight the need for generosity, mutual responsibility and reciprocity (TTP 2009c). A diagram was used to show the concept, with the addition of “opportunities”, “roles” and “responsibilities” in concentric circles (Figure 6).

The TTP strategy made the following claim:

With a ‘whole of community’ perspective the same questions apply to each of us. What are our responsibilities to ourselves and to others, and what activities will we share with one another? Each group or sector in Tāmaki has a role to play; and all hold a unique view of Tāmaki from which to contribute and participate towards a shared vision. Ultimately success relies on us all playing a part in giving, receiving and sharing our skills, knowledge and resources that will help transform Tāmaki.
Figure 5: TIES’ concept of Whole of Community (created by Alfred Ngaro 2008)

**People who live here**
- Mana Whenua, Taurahere Ruapotaka Marae, kohanga, kura kaupapa
- Pacific Island communities
- Asian communities
- Refugee and Migrant communities
- Residents
- Ratepayers
- Local churches
- Sporting clubs
- Early Childhood Education & School communities
- Youth

**Those who have a stake in Tamaki now**
- People living in neighbouring suburbs
- Local and central government
- District Health Board and health providers
- NZ Police
- Not for profit agencies
- Businesses
- Politicians
- University of Auckland

**Future residents and others with a potential stake in the area**
- Potential change in demographics through housing developments
- Business developments and other changes

This conceptual framework of Tamaki Community is © Alfred Ngaro 2008
Figure 6: TTP’s concept of Whole of Community (Tāmaki Transformation Programme 2009c)
The words themselves come close to the sense that TIES members had envisaged, in terms of people working together for a common purpose. However, at times TTP staff used it to put forward their expectations about “community” needing to “step up” and “think about what they can bring to the table”. An opening had become a closure, to use Nikolas Rose’s (1999) terminology. The need to reframe approaches to collaboration became evident.

TTP’s expectations were particularly irritating, given that the TTP was yet to secure funding, its hurry-up-and-wait approach to community engagement was ongoing, and it had failed to produce results or “runs on the board” in the first two years, as promised.

From Strategy to Book

Meanwhile, TIES had moved on. After several iterations of their own strategy, and considerable interest from the TTP, TIES decided to write a book on the Tāmaki Inclusive Engagement Strategy. Again TIES chose to work parallel with the TTP, rather than as part of it, strategically choosing to create a book that was developed and owned by local communities. The book provided a framework and several tools for local communities to work together on any initiative and for government agencies and others to work with local communities. The rationale was that, regardless of whether the TTP went ahead or not, communities would have used the opportunity to build relationships and create a useful resource. Being recognised as a “publishing community” was also an aspiration. This publication was created as an alternative, not oppositional, text that could broaden the definition of “community engagement” and raise people’s expectations. The independent space of TIES enabled it to happen.

A TIES book roopu (group) was formed and acted as a team-within-a-team. Such small working groups were another approach TIES regularly used to get things done (TIES Team 2010). The roopu consisted of four TIES members, including the community scribe. Like me, this researcher/writer had been invited to join the emerging collective.

The writing task included narrative enquiry-based research and translation, and relied on the networks and leadership abilities of all TIES members. Over time, and many conversations with other members of TIES, the writing task evolved into writing a book on TIES. Importantly, the book was produced as a co-authored community text following the example of the earlier GI Visioning Project publication (2005, TIES Team 2010).
The TIES team contracted the researcher/writer to work on the book and other work was carried out voluntarily. The difference between this form of contracting and that used by the TTP was that the community scribe had a long history of working with the community sector in Glen Innes, and the funding for the writing task came from a national non-Governmental organisation (NGO), Inspiring Communities, and another anonymous trust. The publication costs were covered by Australasia’s largest philanthropic organisation, the ASB Community Trust. This meant the person had the will and scope to involve all TIES members in shaping the writing task and the production of a “collaborative text”, as she called it.

As Arendt theorised, when people act together, power is created with irreversible (and unpredictable) outcomes (Arendt 1959). People in Glen Innes frequently referred to the GI Visioning process as ongoing, and said that TIES work built on it. As one person explained, “What we’ve tried to say to TTP, like, this is not a new initiative...this is a new conversation” but rather than calling it GI Ways of Working, “now we’re calling [it] the Tāmaki Ways of Working”.

Such alternative publications may not transform local democratic processes, but they may have an enduring impact. The GI Visioning process was itself undertaken in parallel to an earlier local government intervention. There was an irreversibility about the power generated by the visioning process, as with TIES activities. People drew on it to justify and explain why community development approaches were critical in Tāmaki. The Australian consultants’ attempts to organise deliberative forums and TTP efforts to “engage community” at public meetings were successfully contested with reference to existing documentations of “community ways of working”. This is an example of interactions in the public sphere creating alternative publications and discourses, and, in the process, creating power to act in concert and exert influence.

**Safe spaces of deliberation**

The writing process involved several steps that were interactive with a wide range of local residents. First, the researcher/writer interviewed local people about their stories of successful community engagement. The book *roopu* then facilitated a series of discussions with a wide range of community groupings, each meeting held with groupings separately in a venue of their choosing so that people were in familiar surroundings and with people they knew. These were safe spaces of deliberation. Discussion involved talking to the

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97 This included 20 groups, including 350+ people.
group about TIES, the specific ways they liked to be engaged in broader community issues, and what they wanted from the TTP.

I was not part of the book roopu, but it seems that again, it was a safe space for dialogue and learning together that was crucial. Many of the people the roopu spoke to would never take part in a TTP public forum. Some Pacific groupings would discourage individual members speaking in such forums unless they were a recognised leader. In the small focus group meetings facilitated by the roopu, however, people were able to come together with people they knew and trusted to get more information and to discuss the TTP. Culturally appropriate protocols were adopted in the meetings, symbolising that the participants were accepted on their own terms as full political subjects, rather than requiring them to be “exceptions” in a large public forum. They were able to learn together, share their knowledge and skills, and debate ideas. The book roopu then collated and analysed the views and values put forward in these facilitated discussions, identified points of agreement, and formulated a shared view of how local residents should be involved in local initiatives. The process also built understanding about what TIES was trying to achieve and raised people’s expectations of the TTP.

The book roopu and the facilitated meetings with existing community groupings were safe spaces where ideas could be developed and then brought back to TIES meetings, where again discussions could be held to develop a shared understanding of what effective community engagement would look like. This double layer of backstage interaction took time but was essential to provide safe spaces of deliberation.

TIES members often contrasted this approach with some of the tick-the-box approaches to community engagement that TTP had proposed, such as holding a public meeting or sending out a pamphlet to all households in Tāmaki to inform them of programme progress. In the meantime, however, Housing New Zealand continued to advance their plans for redeveloping five small neighbourhoods within Tāmaki in an effort to get “runs on the board”. Housing New Zealand involved people in the immediate area in designing these redevelopments, but the wider community protested that they were being “kept in the dark” about Housing New Zealand’s intentions.

For a time, the book development became the main event in terms of TIES activities. It was hugely consuming of the roopu’s time and energy. With four of the most active TIES members absorbed with the book, the rest of TIES struggled to keep the team as dynamic and motivated as it had been. There was still a shared sense of the worth of the TIES strategy, as evident in the way one non-roopu person described it: “creating a
framework of engagement...as advocates, from the community residents’ perspective...It was to say this is how we want to work”. I saw this as a sign that TIES members, and now a wide range of community residents, had come together to form the “we”.

Planning the intervention

It seems that government agencies also used front- and backstage tactics. Front-stage was the TTP, trumpeted as a collaboration between government agencies and local communities, with an exhaustive process of community engagement in developing the Business Case, the Values Proposition, and the Community Engagement Strategy, to name just a few of the key documents. Backstage, Housing New Zealand continued with redevelopment plans in Tāmaki in parallel to the TTP but without the same requirements for community participation.

Flyvbjerg (1998), in a critical analysis of an urban renewal process in the Danish city of Aalborg, observed that front-stage we see rationality (such as in the Business Case), while back-stage, power play goes on before it reaches the stage of political consideration. The real power is therefore back-stage where rationalizations are formulated. Flyvbjerg contended that “rational argument is one of the few forms of power that those without much influence still possess” (1998:37). TTP leadership continued to strategise back-stage, identifying “the givens”, as the first Director called the points that were not up for debate. The TTP staff, meanwhile, continued to produce copious amount of text to produce the rationale for the programme, always needing to line up with the rationalisation formulated back-stage. However, the TTP was just one layer of the power in play. Housing New Zealand, as a central government agency, did not have to demonstrate how their activities fitted with the TTP. The TTP was beholden to central government for funding, and so went to great lengths to show the rationale for the budget it sought for the programme.

For the period 1 June 2007 to 1 October 2009, the programme evaluation team collated a list of 56 TTP documents, of which 19 were listed as key documents by the TTP (Housing New Zealand 2010). Such mapping, cataloguing, description, and prioritising for intervention are all part of governmental calculations to diagnose the problem and identify the solution (Miller and Rose 2008 [1990]), even though these calculations are often ignored during implementation anyway (Ferguson 1990). Following

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98 This list also included two TIES documents that I have excluded in the tally.
Flyvbjerg, these texts provided the rationale for the programme, while the central government continued to determine the fate of the programme.

Some glaring inconsistencies were evident. For example, the “nine high-level outcomes areas” that were to contribute to the Programme’s vision included the following: skills, employment and economic development; housing; safety and security; environment and sustainability; education; health; operational excellence; social services; and culture and identity. These priorities certainly reflected the issues of concern to local people. Work streams that were created to deliver these outcomes, however, included urban strategy, housing, economic development, social services and community engagement (Housing New Zealand 2010). It was rather telling that safety and security, education, health, social services, and culture and identity were bundled up into the one social services work stream. This suggested to me that while Cabinet initiated it as “a multi-agency [programme] developed to address social issues and to take advantage of the significant opportunities in Tamaki” (Housing New Zealand 2010:1), in reality it was an urban housing redevelopment programme. The Values Proposition, released in March 2009, just 6 months after the change in government, described the programme as about “new ways of working across all levels of government and with the community” to “pilot ways to increase efficiencies and generate a greater return on government investment” (Tāmaki Transformation Establishment Board 2009a:5). The national significance of the programme was evident in the claim that the TTP “will be a benchmark for the delivery of government services in New Zealand” (Tāmaki Transformation Establishment Board 2009a:5). TIES were aware of this and saw it as both a threat and an opportunity.

The disconnection between high level strategies and implementation was evident in the way that Housing New Zealand and all the other government agencies continued to work backstage on business-as-usual. Like other TIES members, I struggled to explain to people what the TTP was in concrete terms, as the “foundational stage” of strategic planning seemed to stretch on endlessly, while the on-the-ground progress was hard to identify and only loosely linked to the programme as a whole. Nevertheless, TIES were able to point to examples, such as in the text of the Community Engagement Strategy document, where TIES had an influence.

**Influencing decisions versus influencing the process of decision-making**

The issue of what TIES’ role was or could be in relation to the TTP was discussed repeatedly at TIES meetings. TIES members generally agreed that the TIES team’s
purpose was to influence the process of community engagement. To that end, TIES members met monthly with the TTP Community Engagement team throughout 2008 and 2009 to help shape the TTP Community Engagement Strategy. One person worked part-time as a member of this TTP Community Engagement team in 2009 and continued to attend TIES meetings. In July 2009, TIES also peer-reviewed the TTP CE Strategy, negotiating a fee for this service, which went towards the TIES publication. TIES were working with and within the TTP to exert influence on TTP’s processes, based on their expertise in the local community sector. This influence was on the process of community engagement, that is, shaping the strategy for how local people will be involved in the programme over time.

Over the 3 years that TIES met, more local people became involved in designated roles with the TTP to provide a “community voice”. Most of these roles were identified by TIES and the people filling them were also nominated by TIES. Some discomfort was expressed with this degree of influence among some TIES members but there was general agreement that getting more people was more important at this point than waiting for a more democratic process to be implemented.

I was one of these people, nominated to be on the TTP evaluation team. The Wellington-based evaluation team, led by Housing New Zealand, perceived that it was vital to have a “local” on the evaluation team. I got to experience first-hand the uncomfortable position of being nominated by a select group of community leaders based on my local experience and evaluation expertise, trying at every opportunity to promote more “inclusive” processes but continually feeling obliged to put forward my own opinions in the absence of broader engagement. There was certainly no-one beating down the door to take up these tasks, particularly since the task of constructing a process of how to design a strategy or evaluation plan was so nebulous, and the decisions made so vulnerable to future political changes.

TIES members also continued to attend many more TTP meetings in their designated roles at different scales of the TTP governance structure and programme work streams. These people were paid to attend meetings, and in a few instances to produce more documents. A big focus for these people was to identify spaces for more local people to be involved in the programme, and “elbowing” space for such involvement to occur.

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99 This did not include Māori and Pacific representatives, who were nominated by other groupings. This is outside the area of my research.
TIES members were also regularly invited by TTP to attend workshops, planning meetings, and meetings to plan the workshops. This was time-consuming work and was undertaken voluntarily by TIES members. We were told by the TTP that during the Establishment Phase of the programme, it was best if people who were “already up to speed” with the programme were involved in planning workshops. TIES and a handful of other local people were therefore repeatedly asked to provide input. No-one was excluded. TTP personnel had been told, in no uncertain terms, by Pacific people in particular but also the wider community, that they should not come to them until they “knew what they were doing”. TTP’s attempts to involve residents in planning processes were interpreted by Pacific leaders and others as the programme failing to have a clear direction (and source of funding). “What exactly is the TTP?” was a question I heard many times in the community. It seems that the TTP was in a no-win situation with many Pacific and other residents, while also failing to deliver on central government’s expectations for “runs on the board” in the first two years. However, it was not the involvement of local people that was preventing programme progress but rather dedicated resources and collaboration from government agencies.

Most TIES members told me in interviews that TIES had either stepped in or had been drawn in by TTP to fill a vacuum to ensure Tāmaki voices were heard in the TTP design. Some TIES members were concerned that TIES had become the “go-to” group that was influencing decisions rather than just the process of how those decisions were made.

TIES continued to discuss their discomfort at being part of a core group of interested and informed people who provided a convenient and time-efficient way of getting a “community voice”. We were uncomfortably aware that this met central government demands for signs that the local community was “on board” with the programme. But involving a dozen or so “usual suspects” was not “deepening democracy” (Appadurai 2002); rather it was a convenient reason to discount our input since we “weren’t representatives anyway” as the TTP staff at times felt compelled to remind us.

**Hold that space!**

It would be easy to paint a very grim picture of TIES involvement as lacking mandate and accountability, and indeed the team spoke endlessly about these concerns. However, as Brown stated, accepting time constraints in decision-making is “part of what it means to think and act in a distinctly political manner” (2009:210). TIES were effective in creating
space for wider participation, and, in the meantime, settled for “holding the space” until that could be embedded in practice.

As time went on, TIES was told that a few people in the community were grumbling that TIES was actually “taking up space”. In 2010 two local community residents and workers told me that “it may be time” for TIES to step back. A couple of TIES members also harboured a concern that the more efficient TIES became at responding to requests for participation, the more this resulted in the marginalisation of other residents.

In contrast, other TIES members said that they would be glad to step back, except that Housing New Zealand would then be forging ahead (and the TTP continue to plan) without any “community voice” included. A TIES member used his considerable oratory skills to paint a picture. He regaled us with a tale from his youth when “we used to buy one ticket to the movies”, then one person would go in, go straight to the toilets and hand the ticket out the window, then the next person would get in, and so on. TIES’ work, he said, was also about “passing on the movie ticket” to involve more people.

Several TIES members said that “creating space” was TIES’ major achievement, and that this required the deliberation that occurred in TIES meetings. For example, one person explained that space had been created for deeper conversations:

I think it’s been able to create a space of community voice, to create some sensitivity and some care around how the general community would like to be communicated with and integrated into big projects or small projects…it’s created the [Tāmaki] Ways of Working, it’s created a space to have a more intentional, more in-depth conversation….It’s begun to deepen that type of conversation with a lot of great people around the table.

Nevertheless, TIES continued to debate whether to take up endless invitations to TTP events and to strategise about how best to broaden community participation.

**Co-design and Co-delivery**

An important “switch-point” occurred in late 2009. A TIES member, in his capacity as community commentator on the TTP Board, was asked to make a presentation to the Board in October 2009. After his earlier experience of watching “every single agency…doing a presentation on their perspective about my place”, this person was determined to make an impression.

Before he prepared the presentation he attended a TIES meeting to discuss what main messages about community engagement TIES wanted to portray to the Board. TIES members discussed ongoing frustrations with TTP exclusionary processes and the need for
the TTP to be more “innovative” to achieve the transformation that was sought by all actors. This TIES member did not often attend TIES meetings, but in this case it was useful as a leverage point, as he told me later in an interview:

It’s about being strategic...anything that we do needs to be strategic in the thinking...What we’ve become very good at is being part of these clusters and using them when we need to use them...I use [TIES] when I need to leverage something, they use it when they [TTP] need to leverage something, so it becomes more than a mechanism to do best for our community, it becomes a mechanism for how to do best for ourselves at any given moment.

After attending the TIES meeting, this person then went away and prepared a confronting and punchy PowerPoint presentation, which we heard was delivered with passion and precision, making a huge impression on the TTP board. This community commentator used a new framing of collaboration: Co-design/Co-delivery. This term drew from community development and participatory governance discourses. Like the Whole of Community framework promoted by a former community commentator, Co-design/Co-delivery implied that communities needed to be involved as full and equal partners with other actors in the design process of the programme, hence “co-designed”. Furthermore, the programme should not only involve residents in the design but also in implementation over time, hence “co-delivery”. This would involve, for example, training, mentoring, employment, and contracting of local residents in housing construction and renovation.

The responses from TTP and other community commentators to this presentation were overwhelmingly positive, and TTP leaders went away enthused and challenged to make Co-design/Co-delivery happen. As with the Whole of Community concept, this term was quickly absorbed by the TTP, and eventually integrated into the programme’s foundational documents and used by programme personnel. This is another example of TIES’ using parallel spaces to imagine alternative futures and wield an influence on policy discourses.

To review so far, this political action involved: taking up the opportunity to enter an “invited space” of governance so that influence on important public policy was possible; returning to the “safe space” of TIES meetings to debrief and strategise collectively; using leadership skills and *mana* to deliver a persuasive presentation; reframing current themes of inclusion, collaboration, and power-sharing into a new catchphrase that had widespread appeal. Collectively, this demonstrates a strategic reversal of participatory governance discourses and the creation of spaces in the public sphere to
demand influence on policy processes that were not anticipated in the policy arena. It could also be called a “community way of working”.

**Conclusions**

The effectiveness of coming together in parallel, safe spaces of interaction is an example of what Goffman might call backstage interactions, in contrast to the front stage interactions with the TTP. The TIES team came together and shared ideas, identified differences of opinions, and developed enough of a consensus to move forward. The backstage arena was the place to do this as it enabled TIES to appear front stage as a well-coordinated and united force.

TIES members slipped between parallel, invited, and elbowed spaces of participation, blurring the boundaries between the government and the community. The TIES book was still in preparation, but in the meantime TIES worked together in a safe space of interaction for long enough to develop a solidarity of hope. In contrast with the deliberative forums proposed by the Australian consultancy, TIES was a grouping of people who developed relationships that were sustained over time. This meant that people needed to act in ways that were considered appropriate in this setting, and as they met regularly, they were able to work out ways to communicate, develop shared ideas, and, if necessary, hold each other to account.

TIES meetings provided a forum for the team to come together freely to discuss ideas about the TTP before they re-entered invited spaces of participation with the TTP. TIES members volunteered their time. Following Hannah Arendt, the TIES forum might be explained as an example of what is possible when a vibrant public sphere exists where people can come together and learn to act in concert. However, TIES meetings were not open to everyone and so was not a public sphere as such. TIES meetings were rather, a safe forum for dialogue and strategic planning away from the central political stage of interactions with the TTP.

The desire to influence the process of community engagement, rather than exert influence on the programme itself, meant that TIES limited its membership to those with expertise and experience in the community sector in Tāmaki. This distinction between influence on process and influence on programme decisions related to the meta-level of democracy. It was therefore quite abstract and difficult to pin down, creating ongoing debate and some tension within the team.

100 Described in Chapter Four
Following Foucault, TIES activities and influence could be attributed to the emergence of a new group of experts who replaced the existing power/knowledge paradigm. In Tāmaki, this may be true. TIES demanded to influence the spaces of governance themselves, rather than just take up invitations to participate. These elbowed spaces of participation, such as the Steering Group, kept TIES informed and potentially able to exert influence.

However, critical decisions about whether the programme would go ahead and how budgets would be allocated continued to be dominated by central government. This left the TTP in an awkward alliance with TIES and other local groupings, while always having to answer, ultimately, to central government.
CHAPTER 6: TIES: BEYOND NEOLIBERALISM?

Heavy rain lashes the whare\(^{101}\) as the visitors assemble outside and wait to be called in. The visitors are the government officials appointed to the new Interim Board of the Tāmaki Transformation Programme (TTP). The programme is adopting what it describes as a “joined up” approach to urban renewal to transform Tāmaki into a place “where people thrive and prosper for generations, a place with a strong and vibrant community spirit, valued for its natural beauty and history”. Some of the programme staff waiting outside have been welcomed on to the marae before and have worked in the locality for years, and some of the local leaders that are inside have paid positions connected to the programme: today, however, “government” (meaning TTP staff and board members) have to stand out in the rain until called in. With the formation of the new Interim Board, local leaders decided to welcome the board members into Tāmaki and put forward their aspirations and expectations for the programme, rather than waiting to be invited to do so by the programme. The time-honoured way to do that is with a powhiri, a formal welcome on to the marae. I am among the group of about 60 locals who have arrived a little early, slipped in the side doors of the whare, greeted each other warmly, taken a seat, all the while aware of the waiting visitors outside in a blustery storm. Outside: suits, umbrellas, shiny shoes, serious faces. Inside: comfortable clothing, shoeless, familiarity, laughter.

At last the karanga goes up, the visitors are led into the whare – they are now also shoeless, getting comfortable – to take up the seats on the manuhiri side of the whare. Prayers and a welcome in te reo by the local kaumatua are followed by a response on the visitors’ behalf. Next an emergent young Māori leader speaks in te reo, then in English, acknowledging ancestors and all those present and recently past. The speaker becomes choked with emotion as he acknowledges children recently lost to the community, then makes a poignant plea to everyone present to work together, to “strive to thrive, not just survive”, to create transformational change in Tāmaki. It is a moving speech with calls of “kia ora” and “ae” from locals to show agreement and support for this korero. We then all sing a rousing rendition of “Tūtira Mai Nga Iwi”, a well-known song meaning standing or drawing together, which I think seems very fitting. Officials and marae leaders hongi each other, then we all put our shoes back on and move next door for a cup of tea and scones, and to listen to presentations by local leaders about successful collaborations with the programme to date. All very familiar, routine, ordinary to many of us.

I feel a sense of déjà vu about this event and try to remember just how many times in the last 8 years that I’ve been in Tāmaki this same group of people has met a new group of officials assigned to “fix” Tāmaki. Today our numbers have swollen to include more local residents, business owners, community workers and emergent leaders – Māori, Pacific, Pākeha and a large group of new migrants, mostly Chinese.

What is different today is that “locals” have extended the invitation to programme officials, rather than the other way around. “Let’s take the lead, invite them on to our turf, and show them how things are done around here”. That said, some residents are there today to try to find out just what the government is planning for the local area and whether their fears about gentrification will soon be realised.

\(^{101}\) Māori terms in this ethnographic vignette are part of the local lexicon, and include: whare: Māori meeting house; powhiri: formal welcome; karanga: call to approach the marae; manuhiri: visitors; te reo: Māori language; kia ora: be well (signals agreement); ae: yes (signals agreement); korero: dialogue; hongi: formal nose-to-nose Māori greeting.
Local leaders gather in the hope that this time, positive change can happen, that collaboration and partnership can transform Tāmaki so that people could indeed “thrive” and not just “survive”. Community leaders aren’t willing to wait for government agencies to make this happen, though. They are working together to create collaborative programmes that demonstrate “community ways of working”. They are also working together strategically to ensure that local people are involved in the design and delivery of the programme. This powhiri is just a small part of this emergent strategy, so following the presentations today they will soon be scurrying back out into the rain to continue their efforts to deliver social services and support local people and organizations to get connected, up-skilled, uplifted, employed, empowered and involved in local issues.

I leave pondering the locals’ demand that government and community work together – tūtira mai nga iwi – and how closely aligned this demand is to the “joined up” approach sought by government. Was this an example of participatory democracy in action, deliberation in the public sphere leading to an alliance between state and society based on a common vision for “transformation”? Or is it an act of defiance, an example of a “counter-public” emerging in opposition to a neglectful and inept state, adopting the same discourse of “working together” but attaching different meanings and practices to it? And what about the majority of residents who want affordable, healthy housing and a livable wage – do they actually care about participation?

(from field notes July 2011)

The “inclusive liberal turn” (Craig and Porter 2006) in New Zealand in the last two decades has created more opportunities for public participation in policy processes. This shift is often associated with a shift towards participatory governance, which is normatively understood as the direct involvement of all citizens in political decision making. The idea of participatory governance is not to collapse the distinctions between the state and society completely, but to create the conditions for “a creative tension between public participation and state institutions” (Brown 2009:223). Governance refers to forms of actions and power relations that are intended to shape (not force or control) the actions of others (Cruikshank 1999). The state’s role becomes that of “steering not rowing” (Shore 2011:295), that is, creating a regulatory environment that allows the involvement of a wide range of institutions and actors in the design and delivery of public policy.

This shift “from government to governance” has been consistently critiqued as a neoliberal withdrawal of the state. Neoliberalism can be described as the penetration of market principles of discipline, efficiency, and competitiveness to induce free individuals to self-manage (Ong 2006). The aim is to find ways for individuals to be made responsible through individual choices for themselves. There is a tension between this insistence that all aspects of life conform to the norms of the market and the increasing demand for participation and collaboration at the local scale. For community organizations, for
example, the requirement to compete for increasingly scarce resources comes up against contract requirements to collaborate with each other.

Nicholas Rose has led a consistent critique of participatory governance (e.g., Rose 1996, 1999, Miller and Rose 2008). Following Foucault, however, Rose conceives of power as a product of action that is exercised throughout society, not just by “the state”. Rose (1999) argues that contestation and negotiation can occur in “cramped spaces” filled with multiple actors, both state and societal. He notes that while such spaces are fragile, often “fleeting”, they can potentially create innovative governance approaches. Like Rose, Larner and Butler (2007) highlight the “inventiveness” of neoliberalism, suggesting that contradictory spaces and subjects emerge that enable neoliberal practices but at the same time create the potential for practices that may be “beyond” neoliberalism. William Fisher similarly contends that the non-governmental organization (NGO) sector can have transformative potential, emerging “less from ordered and controlled participation than from relatively chaotic sets of multiple opportunities and interdependencies” (Fisher 1997:458). These theorists are attempting to conceive of what could replace neoliberalism.

In the ethnographic vignette, the Tāmaki Inclusive Engagement Strategy (TIES) group and others turned the concept of public participation back on the state, extending the invitation out to state actors. As with all gifted spaces, they can be withdrawn at any time. This was an example of strategic reversal of governmental technologies. Additionally, the determination to drive local initiatives was a sign that these community actors were willing and able to “work beyond” neoliberalism. Rather than promoting individual responsibility for one’s own wellbeing (or misfortune), or adhering to the competitive funding environment to resource new initiatives, these people were looking for ways to subvert neoliberalism. They called this “community ways of working”.

Another key issue that underpins my analysis of how voluntary associations influence public policy is what TIES’ influence means for democratic process. This will be explored more thoroughly in the concluding chapter of this thesis. Democracy, like neoliberalism, can be analysed as an essentially contested concept (Gallie 1956) meaning that the roots and uses of the terms are multiple and diffuse. Put another way, democracy is an ideal, not a method for achieving it (Brown 2009). Deliberation, resemblance, accountability, and full participation are attributes widely associated with representative democracy. Voting is a blunt instrument, but it is based on the idea of equal rights to vote.

A common critique of participatory processes is that while they can enable greater deliberation, they can result in a lack accountability and full participation (Brown 2009).
Nevertheless, Brown (2009), following John Dewey (1991), argues that nondemocratic associations – meaning not democratically elected to represent a population – can have democratic effects. As Flyvbjerg reminds us, democracy is not something a society “gets”, rather “democracy must be fought for each and every day in concrete instances, even long after democracy is first constituted in a society, if citizens do not engage in this fight, there will be no democracy” (1998:5). I agree, and argue that TIES is an example of a non-democratic voluntary association that created opportunities amid the chaos of the TTP for more people to be involved in decision-making (hence how policies were made by whom) and for community ways of workings (hence beyond neoliberalism).

This chapter picks up my story of TIES activities in late 2009 as the group starts to get bolder and more innovative in their approaches to influencing and working with, within, and parallel to the Tāmaki Transformation Programme (TTP). I track back and forward between the activities of the TIES team and the TTP to highlight negotiations and innovations that might be described as working beyond neoliberalism. Before getting to that, however, I once again return to the ever-unfolding story of the TTP. As described in the previous chapter, the TTP was still the “front stage” of political activity, TIES the backstage. In this chapter I show that, for a short time at least, TIES activities became the front stage as the team attempted to demonstrate innovative ways of working together. However fleeting, I suggest these innovations are noteworthy since they suggest ways of working “beyond” neoliberalism.

We’ll plan, you participate, and we’ll all hope for the best

Throughout 2009 and 2010, the TTP continued to extend invitations to the TIES team, and others, to contribute to the design of the programme. Amid the confusion of creating an urban development programme that was visible, participatory, and involved cross-government agency collaboration, the initial timeline for a 2-year Establishment Phase went out the window. Literally dozens of documents had been produced, all with tight time frames, and all needing “community” input. Co-design/Co-delivery had become the new buzz word, used by TTP leaders to demand innovative approaches and reject business-as-usual. Despite the constant tension between TIES and the TTP, TIES members and others such as Māori and Pacific representatives, continued to be asked to provide this community input. This was becoming a rather circuitous (and tortuous) route towards “participatory governance”.
TIES members regularly reminded TTP staff that they were not representative of the community. The TIES roopu continued to work on the TIES book, and the team as a whole continued to debate whether TIES had an ongoing role once the TIES book was published. In the meantime, TIES people told the TTP that they could provide expertise and local knowledge, but wider engagement with residents was needed. However, TTP staff always made clear that each document had a short time frame for completion, and each was critical to ensure that the programme get central government clearance to advance to the next stage. The 20-year programme appeared to be constantly under threat of being terminated, and therefore the opportunity of a major cash injection into the neighbourhoods of Tāmaki could be lost.

The elephant in the room at TTP meetings to develop high level strategies such as the Development Plan was the lack of commitment from any government agency to resource the plan. The approach seemed to be: We’ll plan, you participate, and we’ll all hope for the best.

Going in twos
In the meantime, TIES members continued to get more creative about how to influence TTP processes. TIES members pressured the TTP to include local people on the Steering Group. This demand was initially rejected, since it was a “cost sharing” and “experts” group. A community commentator challenged this by asking whether government agencies had the competency to work collaboratively. When approval was finally granted, TIES demanded not just one but two local people join the Steering Group based on the idea that “going in twos” was vital. Furthermore, TIES insisted that one of them co-chair the meeting. These demands were agreed to. In September 2009, TIES nominated a TIES member and another local person who had not previously been involved in TIES. This was a clear example of not being content with the invited spaces of participation and instead elbowing space for negotiation with the state.

Symbolically getting two positions on the Steering Group and co-chairing was significant as it put local people in a core part of the governance structure. The new person appointed by TIES also “raised the bar” in terms of providing detailed written reports back to TIES about the Steering Group meetings. In practice, however, at Steering Group meetings government agencies continued to determine the agenda of the meetings, and a TIES person commented that “it’s like we are talking past each other and it seems as if the real meeting takes place after we leave”. She was also annoyed that TIES members were
much better prepared for the meetings than the so-called experts. She reflected that there was “a major mismatch between the vision and the reality” of participatory planning processes.

Another example of TIES creativity was the demand for local people to be on the interview panels for key TTP roles. Again, the idea was better than the practice since the entire process was driven by the TTP. TIES members did not get to determine what roles were needed, for example, or what questions should be asked at interviews. Nor did they see the initial applications and CVs of applicants and had to make do with overviews of a small number of preferred candidates. Nevertheless, their participation was recognised as a symbolic “win”, and later the appointments were agreed unanimously.

The people appointed at these interviews were given a warmer reception by TIES than previous managers. The Community Engagement manager, for example, had co-led the GI Visioning process and had long-term relationships with TIES members and many others in the local community and government sectors. This person, unlike her predecessor, was invited to TIES meetings and eventually became a “regular” TIES team member. This further blurred the boundaries between TIES and the TTP, and provided a new entry point to influence the TTP, as well as administrative and financial support for the launch of the TIES book.

**Innovation not Business-as-Usual**

When examining my ethnographic data and reflecting on how TIES framed the issues to be addressed, I was struck by an almost complete absence of reference to poverty and deprivation. As leaders of local church, marae, youth, community development and social service organisations and networks, most TIES members lived in Tāmaki and spent their working life supporting residents with and promoting better approaches to issues of health, housing, employment, education, and social and spiritual well-being. They were therefore closely linked with the realities of daily life in Tāmaki where household incomes are extremely low, and ill-health, low levels of education, domestic and street violence, and abuse of alcohol and other drugs are all too common. When asked by the TTP, TIES members identified significant gaps in services and infrastructure, such as in mental health, affordable and quality housing, and employment. However, they wanted to see new ways to address these issues that would be more effective for local residents. A common refrain was that innovation and transformation – not business-as-usual – was needed. This suggests that TIES members’ tendency to down-play poverty-related problems was
strategic. TIES members adhered to a community-development approach, “strengths-based” and innovative. The logic was that strengths-based approaches to collaboration would be innovative, avert re-stigmatisation, and lead to better outcomes for residents.

Innovation can be defined as a new method, product or idea\textsuperscript{102} and implies a break from the past. Innovation, like “inclusion” and “community”, was always seen in a positive light, and was a mobilising discourse in TIES to contest what they called business-as-usual and government agencies working in “silos”. TTP leaders and staff certainly became hyper-aware that business-as-usual was not acceptable, and they needed to demonstrate innovative practices, although what became increasingly evident was that the TTP looked to TIES and other local leaders to see what that might look like. A confession from a senior government official involved in the TTP was telling: having been challenged so many times by a particular TIES member to be bold and innovative, he now regularly checked himself during TTP decision-making by asking himself “what would [name] think about this course of action?”, “how is this innovative?” Sadly, this person later moved to another job, so this was an important but fleeting effect.

Innovation is a discourse that has migrated from the private to the public sector in recent years, often used as a way to respond to a crisis. The answer to the problem is to innovate. This is a highly mobilising discourse as it implies that new possibilities will be explored. However, as Nyguist (2011) observed, the development programmes that are done under the banner of innovation often repeat what has been done before but at less expense. To be “innovative” therefore means to cut costs. This observation suggests that “innovations in governance” can be a short circuit back to neoliberal styles of governance. TIES sought new ways for agencies and communities to work together and called this innovation. TIES received reports from TTP staff that the concepts of innovation and Co-design/Co-delivery were being used by the leadership to demand proof that proposed plans were innovative, so an opening for new practices was evident. However, TIES also heard that the TTP leadership were using the concept to seek new ways of spending existing budgets and spreading responsibilities for social wellbeing in Tāmaki to a broader range of actors. If a project could be named as lacking innovation, it would be axed, despite its

worth. The discourse of innovation was therefore an opening for improved practices, but
could also be a closure.

Parallel spaces of collective action

Until now I have described many of the activities TIES undertook to influence the TTP.
This description risks portraying TIES members’ activities as being all about the TTP.
They were not. Most TIES members were also working hard to foster alliances and
collaborations between community organisations and networks.

As well as working with the TTP, TIES members also worked in parallel to initiate
new networks (or strengthen existing ones). These networks were aimed at collective
action to address longstanding social issues. For example, they helped create fathering and
parenting networks to link people and build parenting skills and support, using techniques
that were known to involve local people. A community housing trust was established to
investigate approaches to housing people living on very low incomes that could be a viable
alternative or complement the existing state housing model.

Another example was Manaiakalani, an e-learning programme initiated by a local
school principal, Russell Burt, to improve educational performance of children in 10
schools in the area. A TIES member used his influence with the TTP and beyond to
support this programme to expand considerably, to the point where the TTP was proudly
claiming it as one of their key examples of on-the-ground achievements. Furthermore,
when Pat Sneddon stood down from the role of TTP board chairperson, he was quickly
herded towards becoming chair of the Manaiakalani Education Trust, bringing his
considerable leadership skills, networks and passion for the local area to the role. Latest
reports are that the programme has lifted children’s eagerness to learn to such an extent
that a rugby league coach has complained (perhaps slightly tongue-in-cheek) that he cannot
get on with training at lunchtimes because too many of the team are in the library (Booth
2013). A strategic approach of building on what is already working, adept movement of
actors between state and community sectors, and a focus on positive outcomes for those
most in need is improving learning outcomes.

These examples of collective action were initiated and driven by people living and
working in Tāmaki, indicative of “community ways of working” to the TTP and the
potential of the TTP to support and align with the initiatives. These forms of collective
action, though not strictly TIES activities, challenged capitalist enterprise as the only
solution to poverty. The Manaiakalani programme described above shows the way that
TIES members saw the TTP as an opportunity to provide new resources and networks for local initiatives, but not the answer to local issues. More resources alone would not solve socio-economic problems. Nor would competitive access to those resources, as was the case with the competitive funding environment in which local organisations operated. Again, parallel activities were the focus. Often these initiatives moved from being “alternatives” to being absorbed by the TTP, but TIES members generally saw this as a “win” because they were “locally-owned and driven”. TIES and others made sure that the initiative’s lineage was recited at every opportunity to build credibility and support for the initiative, and show what “community ways of working” looked like.

Quick wins

Parallel efforts in TIES meetings had enabled a greater influence on the central political stage with greater ability to foster collaboration. One of the TIES members explained to me that initiatives such as Manaiakalani were all about “quick wins”, that is, demonstrating that a dedicated group of people with local networks and knowledge could design and deliver programmes quickly and effectively. This person gave the example of the Just Dads group designing, planning, and confirming the time and venue for a workshop in just one early-morning meeting. The obvious contrast was the TTP, which had failed to deliver on its promise of getting “runs on the board” in the first 2 years. The idea of quick wins was therefore extremely seductive to the TTP, who quickly aligned with these so-called community-led initiatives by offering administrative and start-up support. These parallel initiatives created opportunities for people to come together, debate ideas and strategies, reveal their differences, learn together, and act in concert. This resulted in the creation of power, and it was through persuasion rather than coercion, as Arendt (1959) would suggest.

Another example was the involvement of local youth in developing the TTP visual “brand” in 2010. Two TIES members led this process, mentoring the youth during and beyond the process. The youth were paid for their efforts and one of them developed a will to continue developing his design skills to become self-employed. This project was a quick win, with lasting results, and was another demonstration of “community ways of working”.

103 A statistic commonly quoted by the TTP and others was that Tāmaki receives twice the national average of public investment in services. The TTP Values Proposition states that the gross spend per household in Tāmaki on health, education, social security, and housing is $30,749 p.a., amounting to 188% of the national average of $16,377 p.a. (Tāmaki Transformation Establishment Board 2009a:12).
A more ambitious but contentious example was initiated by a TIES member while working as part of the TTP Community Engagement team. Local people were invited to apply to undertake leadership training. The aim was that these “community facilitators”, as they were called, would develop leadership skills and networks and build their own understanding and that of other local people about the TTP. They were provided with token payments (such as petrol vouchers) to acknowledge their contributions when asked to facilitate meetings but were not paid based on the rationale that they would be learning to act as community leaders who typically were not paid for such work. The TTP saw the programme as a great success. I was told by two of the community facilitators that they appreciated the skills they learnt but they actually wanted “real” work, meaning paid work. They were living on very low incomes and found the expectations of time commitment and work unreasonable. This is an example where a TIES member’s attempts to work with the TTP and local people had ambivalent results, resulting in some feeling co-opted to do work of the state.

Many other “community-led” networks and programmes were also being initiated by TIES members and others during (and before) my fieldwork to foster economic development, employment, music and arts, self-esteem, healthy relationships and neighbourhood hubs. This signified the convergence of participatory democracy and community development principles to support locally responsive initiatives rather than government-initiated programmes (Scott and Liew 2012). Reflecting the movement in TIES thinking over more than 2 years of debating the issues, a TIES member stated at a public meeting in 2010, “we need to move from community engagement to community ownership”. By the time my field work ended in mid-2011, people were starting to describe some of the local initiatives described above as being “movements” (rather than the more neutral term “networks”), aimed at redefining local realities “from the bottom-up”.

**Strategic alliances**

In the efforts to demonstrate community ways of working, TIES members helped build networks that were valuable as portals to a wide range of residents and community groupings. TIES members also had personal and professional networks that extended out to the city, regional and national scale, which were enhanced through their work with TIES and were in turn linked to international networks. Community development, social service, 

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104 These networks were mostly led by the community sector, including some residents.
church and ethnic networks were tapped for information and influence. For example, TIES linked with Inspiring Communities, a national network of community development organisations and networks that supported the exchange of information and shared learning. It was this relationship with Inspiring Communities that led to the provision of funding for the TIES book. This made it possible to undertake the writing project independently of the TTP.

**Time to celebrate**

In November 2010, the TIES book was launched with great fanfare. My field notes are filled with the excitement of this day. The Glen Innes library was filled to capacity with friends, family, colleagues, local residents, community workers, TTP and local government officials, elected representatives, and a few academics. TIES integrated Māori protocols, wide participation, respect, and focused on the “positives” as a demonstration of “how we do things around here”. The sense of delight and solidarity is evident in the photograph of the TIES team at the launch (Figure 7).

![Figure 7: TIES team at the book launch](image)

The TIES book itself was extremely well received by all concerned. Entitled *Creating TIES that Strengthen*, the book included TIES principles, Ways of Working, and other tools such as integrity questions, cornerstones of success, and templates for written agreements for collaborative work (Figure 8). Throughout the book there were inspiring quotes from TIES members and stories of hope as told through the voices of local community members of their experiences of good community processes. Sheathed in a specially designed case, the book was supplemented with the key TIES tools on cards for clarity and easy access. Removable cards also explained the five Tāmaki Ways of
Working: transforming leadership; focusing on the positives; working and learning together; stepping up and speaking out; and showing respect. The book and the cards were richly adorned with photographs and TIES-specific branding, which had been created by local residents.

The development of the book was enabled by funding from an NGO. The TTP contributed towards the final printing costs. Neither the NGO nor the TTP could claim ownership over the final product; in fact that was the point of developing the book in an autonomous space of a TIES sub-group.

The book and its guidelines and tools were distributed widely and used by numerous organisations and networks in Tāmaki and more widely, with support from TIES members to embed the practice. Here are three examples of many, the first at the local level and two others at regional and national levels.

Two TIES members used the TIES tools to support their local rugby club, which was going through a difficult restructuring process. Having a template, principles, and guidelines for collaboration made the transitions easier.
In another example, two TIES members were instrumental in getting the TIES tools recognised and endorsed by the local Community Board to which they were elected while they were TIES members in November 2010.\textsuperscript{105} I spoke to these Board members in October 2012 when I invited them and other TIES members to read drafts of the TIES section of this thesis and attend a feedback session that I facilitated. They were continuing to champion TIES tools at the Community Board level to ensure that they were embedded in policy and practices. They observed that TIES and Auckland Council conceived community engagement differently: for TIES, ongoing relationships were critical; while for the Council, the focus was on dialogue. They valued having the TIES book to refer to in these challenging circumstances.

A final example comes from a TIES member who became a list MP for the National government in November 2011. At my feedback session in October 2012, he gave examples where he used the TIES book to champion community development approaches successfully, for example, in relation to particular programmes of work of the Ministry of Education.

Arguably, what was learnt and created together in TIES has the most lasting effects through TIES members as they move into other roles, such as in the examples above of becoming elected representatives, or in the case of other TIES members, taking up local, region and national roles in social development sector fora and programmes.

**TIES’ influence: beyond neoliberalism?**

I think we had a large influence on the people that were there. I say it in the past tense. I suppose we still are having an influence, maybe to a lesser extent. Yeah, I think that was one of the purposes of creating the [TIES] book in the first place. So we had a good influence when we were in meetings [with TTP all the] time. We weren’t going away. That consistency made TTP have to stop and listen and made them have to alter the way that they were doing things. So I think we made a difference in that way. I think that we made a difference with those people, the particular people that were working, because they had to change their way of thinking to work with us...because we weren’t going to budge. We kept saying the same things over and over.

Like most of the other TIES people I interviewed, this TIES member felt that TIES had exerted influence but was also concerned that this influence did not seem to be sustained over time. There was no denying that TIES’ influence on the TTP was fleeting, and, following Foucault, it was easily absorbed back into the expert realm and neutralised. This

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\textsuperscript{105} In 2010, three TIES members stood for election on the Community Board (the two Labour candidates were successful) and one on the Auckland Council (unsuccessful).
was evident when the Whole of Community concept was taken up by the TTP and it was also a risk when the Co-design/Co-delivery concept was also absorbed by the TTP. This is what made the parallel work of TIES and others so critical and gives some hope that existing concepts of participation are forever destabilised, even if the practice is not yet embedded in practice.

Unpredictable and irreversible effects also resulted from collective action by TIES, as Arendt theorised. The TTP became a supporter of TIES, rather than vice versa. No-one saw that coming. At times it seemed that TTP staff looked to TIES to say “the hard stuff”, in other words, openly challenge TTP leadership and central government in ways that paid staff were unable to. In fact, concerns that TIES were taking up space could be explained by the team’s skills at painting a picture that could motivate others, the TTP included. The unwritten rule was that TIES members did not promote themselves, but instead promoted the TIES tools. As a Māori member explained to me, “the kumara never says how sweet it is”, meaning that it was not acceptable to be self-promoting. The TIES tools, however, were the product of TIES collective action and had to be championed to embed them in practice. The relevance of Whole of Community, and later the Co-design/Co-delivery concepts, was not immediately self-evident and had to be established step-by-step. Over a 3-year period, TIES used every space available to broaden the definition and expectations of participation. Relationships and face-to-face interaction were critical, as this TIES member explained:

If you boil it all down, if you can create a kind of trusting relationship...you can have great robust discussion....I don’t think we’ve quite got that yet with TTP, because we don’t have dialogue with them often enough and to a deep enough level... We know from TIES that just coming together over time [makes] a huge difference....I think that’s the unique thing about TIES was that collective thing, the desire to come back and thrash things out and take a collective perspective back rather than an individual one. That takes a lot of effort. It’s not easy. Particularly when your collective don’t turn up. So theoretically it’s really good….I really value [the collective] because it’s about a “we” approach, which I think is the secret to some innovative solutions. Rather than the “I” …There are some individuals who have certain capacity, almost entrepreneurial kind of stuff that are part of the solution. And then there are organizations [such as] community development organizations. Without the involvement of TTP, all those government agencies and everything, then you're not going to have social innovation. Because it needs to be that whole systems kind of thinking.

TIES influence was evident in changes of TTP perceptions of Tāmaki and “transformation” more generally. This translated into changes in TTP policies and some ways of working. Ways of thinking about Tāmaki and about transformation, as expressed
in policy, were just the first steps towards creating improved outcomes for Tāmaki residents. These changes denoted a significant shift, but one that was always fragile to future political and TTP personnel changes. Such is the nature of “positive democracy”. If their task was to stop the programme, then success or failure would have been much easier to identify. TIES continued to work in parallel with the TTP to develop alternative discourses, demonstrating alternative ways of working based on narratives of shared responsibility and hope.

In sum, TIES kept alive contestations to anything that looked like “top-down” processes to the point where they punctured expert discourse. Discourses proved much easier to shift than related practices of government agencies.

**Groundhog Day: A brief postscript**

I was intrigued and somewhat disturbed in February 2011 when, despite TIES efforts to get broad community participation, the TTP, with the support of some TIES members, called for a community representative to be elected to the soon-to-be-appointed Interim Tāmaki Transformation Board. This “election” took place at a meeting of about 40 community leaders who were invited to attend. Again, we heard the same excuses about urgency resulting in the meeting taking place at short notice, with little advertising, and with invitations only extended to those community members who were already involved. A TIES member was elected, as might be expected given the skilled leadership that this group had shown.

I agreed with the general consensus that if anyone was going to do a good job of representing community, this person was it. However, I was disturbed by the undemocratic process adopted, which effectively marginalised the “average Jo in the street” who TIES had worked so hard to have included over the previous 3 years. Yet when I raised this concern in the meeting the majority disagreed with me, and the election went ahead. In typical form, the people present fought hard to get two – not just the invited one – community representative positions on the board. After much debate, the suggestion that a second person be appointed in case the first could not be present at board meetings was taken up.\(^{106}\)

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\(^{106}\) This was just as well, since the appointed person soon became a National Party list MP, and so resigned from the position. However, the latest information is that the second person is “Observer at ITTB meetings” (Mathias 2012), meaning unable to vote.
So what does the future hold for Tāmaki? That is still anyone’s guess. In March 2011, central government appointed the new Interim Tāmaki Transformation Board (ITTB). The ITTB was directed to scope out what an Urban Regeneration Entity or URE would look like. This option had been rejected by the earlier Board, presumably because it would be a non-elected body with significant powers at the cost of local government powers. Fortunately, the desperate attempts by a local Māori leader to alert them to the fact that ure in Māori means “penis” were heeded, though not immediately, and the new entity was called the Tāmaki Redevelopment Company Ltd (TRC). A media statement announcing the new company, “jointly-owned by Crown and Auckland Council”, expressed the well-worn commitment “to work on behalf of the community to further develop that vision and to identify the necessary transformational activities” (Tamaki Redevelopment Company press release 2/9/2012). However, the significance of the shift towards a commercial model of regeneration was not lost on local residents. While the eternal optimists (including several TIES members) saw it as an opportunity to establish a “third sector” of social housing and to work towards “putting one of our own people at the top” of the company, many people were concerned that the new company would not prioritise existing residents’ needs and aspirations.

The use of acronyms to refer to the programme and its governance structure had become problematic in more ways than one. The Tāmaki Establishment Board (2007–2009), the Tāmaki Transformation Programme Board (2009–2011), the Interim Tāmaki Transformation Board (Mar 2011–) and now the Tāmaki Redevelopment Company (2012–) – known consecutively as the TEB, the TTPB, the ITTB and the TRC – added to the chaos of a programme (still called the TTP) that was very hard to describe. After 5 years, it was still very much a backstage process of planning. With each new board, a new CEO was appointed, and silences ensued while each new CEO appointed new staff members. However, while the planning continues, some state tenants are being forcibly removed from their houses as Housing New Zealand makes way for the next stage in urban development, divesting itself of some valuable properties and developing others with higher density housing. Public protests have erupted as people picket the houses targeted for removal and attempt to stop the removals. Placards declare “NO MORE EVICTIONS” and “STOP THE INTIMIDATION” – not the type of publicity the programme was after. Here is just one example of the extensive media coverage these protests have attracted: the headline “47 years of memories won’t save house” is followed by a story about the forced
removal of “double amputee...[who] built his own deck at his Glen Innes home by
crawling around on his hands” (**NZ Herald** 25/07/12). And so the chaos continues.

When I receive the “Heads of Agreement” for the new company about the same
time as these headlines, I immediately flick through the entire document to see if anything
that TIES had worked towards was evident. I finally find the Tāmaki Ways of Working
and related concepts such as tikanga,\(^{107}\) co-led initiatives, and innovation, pegged on at the
end. I then start going through the document in more detail and notice that significant local
and central government resources have been committed to the programme.\(^{108}\) I also notice
that the new Company is required to undertake its activities in accordance with principles
such as Tāmaki Ways of Working and “No Surprises”.\(^{109}\) Good news.

So what exactly will be the company’s first activities? Develop a Strategic
Framework and a Business Case. Seriously? In other words, the new company will go
through exactly the same steps already undertaken during the TEB and TTPB phases, with
no forethought about how programme principles can be imposed on programme partners
from the development industry. An opening for innovation and transformation looks likely
to become a closure.

\(^{107}\) Māori protocols or ways of doing things.
\(^{108}\) Crown $5m and Local Council $3.5m
\(^{109}\) While also being required to identify and support a number of catalyst projects
(including any ongoing legacy projects) to maintain Transformation Programme
momentum (including community engagement and overall strategic direction), but the
Company shall not be required to support those catalyst projects financially.
SECTION 3

JOINT ACTION: THE HAEMOPHILIA FOUNDATION OF NEW ZEALAND
The previous section showed the significant but fleeting influence of a voluntary association called TIES in the context of urban development in Tamaki, Auckland. Before moving on to a more detailed analysis of what such influence by a voluntary association means for democratic processes in the next section, it is useful to present an ethnographic study of a second voluntary association: the Haemophilia Foundation of New Zealand (HFNZ\textsuperscript{110}). Rather than being a localised group of community leaders, the HFNZ is a national health advocacy and support group. It is also a voluntary association with a much longer history of interactions with the state, and was able to influence public policy in more lasting ways than TIES. How that happened is the topic of this section.

The HFNZ successfully created and shaped the governance space in which it can have an on-going influence on health policies that affect the lives of people with haemophilia and other bleeding disorders. Often it has been hampered by absence of choice, and has found that the playing field has had a steep incline when it comes to “power to”. Nevertheless, its members had, and continue to have, significant influence on policies that affect their lives. The new governance structure is being replicated for other high-cost conditions, suggesting that the HFNZ have shifted what is considered “normal” in policy practices of participatory governance and regionalised decision-making.

Following Rose and Novas (2005), I propose that there was no single logic to explain how the HFNZ exerted influence on governance structures of haemophilia care and that this specific structure of governance can only be understood as the conjuncture of specific historical, political, ethical and moral forms. Ethnographic research is used here to detail the “rough and ready assemblages of forces” (Rose 1999:280) that contributed to changing governance structures.

This study of the HFNZ differs from the TIES study in terms of my positionality and the period of time in which the collective action and research occurred. In the TIES study, I was intimately involved as participant and observer with the TIES team over a period of 3 years (2008–2011). In contrast, my study of the HFNZ was over three stages of a larger research programme: the first in 1994–1995, the second in 1999, and the third in 2005–2006 (as described in Chapter Two). My analysis of collective action by the HFNZ during the period 1983–2008 is based on community members’ descriptions of events and

\footnote{110 The association was called the New Zealand Haemophilia Society until 1999, when it was renamed the Haemophilia Foundation of New Zealand. In this thesis I refer to the Haemophilia Society (and NZHS/Society) in historical accounts before 1999 and to the HFNZ or Foundation from 1999 onwards.}
experiences relayed to me and others in the research team during interviews, through a
national-wide questionnaire (1995), through participant observation by me and my team
members, and document and media reviews.

I began research with the haemophilia population as a new graduate in 1994 at a
time when the Haemophilia Society, as it was known then, was fighting to get recognition,
diagnosis, treatment and compensation for people infected with hepatitis C through blood
products. This was a time of great crisis for the haemophilia population. Some people with
haemophilia, including a few I interviewed and interacted with regularly at meetings and
family camps, were ill or dying from HIV and AIDS, also contracted through blood
products. Some people I interviewed had both HIV and hepatitis C. Many had hepatitis C.
Parents of young children were grateful for the introduction of recombinant products for
newly diagnosed children, but many were terrified that a new virus might still emerge. In
April 1995, the cover story of the *New Zealand Listener* magazine was of the “Bad Blood”
affair, giving a nationally recognisable name for the debacle.

My memories, almost 20 years on, of people’s fear at “what’s next”, and the hurt
and extreme anger at government for failing to protect them are still very fresh. When I
updated the research on the haemophilia population’s experiences with hepatitis C in 1999,
I found them still battling with government officials and politicians for a fair settlement
and recognition that the virus had serious, even life-threatening, effects on their health. My
shared sense of outrage at the way they were treated by government agencies during this
prolonged period of lobbying and advocacy led me to follow events as they unfolded over
many years. Julie Park, who led the haemophilia study, continued to undertake research
with the haemophilia population, and led a major study update in 2005/2006 (Park and
York 2008). During this time, the HFNZ finally forced a settlement with government for
hepatitis C and were negotiating a landmark agreement to create more equitable and
quality standards of haemophilia care. I was intrigued how this extremely vulnerable but
feisty group of people had achieved this. I should make very clear that the analysis is
based on the views and experiences of the haemophilia population, and the HFNZ more
specifically. During the first two phases of the research, we interviewed haematologists,
and other health professionals. However, government officials and politicians have not
been approached for their responses to this latest research on the HFNZ’s collective action.
The reasons for this will become clear in the following two chapters: this was not part of
New Zealand’s democratic history that either of our two main political parties want
recalled. My interest here is in a critical analysis of the HFNZ’s experiences of contestation and influence on important public policies.

As with the TIES study, my intention here is to keep the collective actions of the voluntary association in the foreground. However, a range of neoliberal forms of government are a constant presence in both studies, with a certain “family resemblance” – whether in urban development or health care – evident in the proliferation of strategies to create and maintain a ‘market’ in all aspects of daily life. Similarly, the strategies of both voluntary associations contested key elements of neoliberalism such as competitive access to resources and individual responsibility for well-being and misfortunes.

The HFNZ story is analysed in two main chapters. Chapter Seven examines the Haemophilia Society’s contestations (1983–2006) with health policies and institutions in response to viral contamination of the blood supply. The chapter traces the spatial and temporal elements that shaped the HFNZ as a political subject with high expectations that the HFNZ be part of any decisions that affected the haemophilia population. In the following chapter, Chapter Eight, I show how the HFNZ emerged as an “active citizen” willing to work with the state to create a more equitable and efficacious structure of haemophilia care. However, while an active citizen in the neoliberal sense is an individual who energetically pursues personal fulfilment and undertakes incessant calculations to enable this to be achieved (Miller and Rose 2008[1992]:82), the HFNZ’s version of active citizenship was somewhat different. The HFNZ worked collectively as a social citizen with powers and responsibility derived from its membership. They used that political position to turn governmental strategies of calculation, documentation and evaluation back on the state to create an equitable system of care for all people with haemophilia.
We sit with Mike and discuss the Bad Blood story, probing him for more insight into this dark part of New Zealand’s recent history. Why did it take so long to negotiate a settlement for people with haemophilia who contracted hepatitis C through blood products? We sip cups of tea, made by Mike’s wife Cheryl, and observe and experience rising emotions as Mike expresses outrage and betrayal in the longwinded battle that so consumed him and other Haemophilia Foundation committee members for 14 years. Cheryl is less emotional, more task oriented. She’s lived and breathed this story too, prepared countless cups of teas and meals, filed endless documents and acted as chief archive historian, nurse, driver and confidant. Taking early retirement in 1994 from a career in the health sector due to physical effects of severe haemophilia, Mike has been able to dedicate himself to the task of advocating on behalf of the haemophilia population for as long as it took - and it took a long time. As we talk, at times Mike clumsily makes his way on crutches to the next room to get a letter from a minister of health or such like to make his point, easily putting his hands on the required file in a full-to-overflowing home office. I switch between frantically taking notes to looking out over their well-tended garden to ponder how and why the haemophilia community got such a raw deal. Mike and Cheryl, like other key players in the story, have seen a series of ministers come and go, endless restructuring of the health system, the rise and fall from grace of blood products, untimely changes to ACC legislation, and the emergence of new viruses, recombinant products, and an increasingly-connected world haemophilia community. Yet as Mike reflects on the huge satisfaction of finally nailing down a settlement for hepatitis C and then how they turned their sights on reshaping the entire national system of haemophilia care, I also come to realise how critical intergenerational knowledge, skills and relationships were in achieving these outcomes. Over many hours of discussion, I am reminded that nothing about this story was predictable or self-evident, and that my task is to unpick the multiple threads that weave this story of hope.

The New Zealand Haemophilia Society was established in 1958 as a voluntary association to provide support and information and to create opportunities for families and individuals with haemophilia to come together for mutual support. The shock discovery of HIV in donated blood in 1983 heralded a new era for the Haemophilia Society: advocating on life-and-death issues of viral contamination of the national blood supply. A decade later, when hepatitis C was identified, the Haemophilia Society once again found itself fighting to secure the safety of the blood supply and then became immersed in a protracted fight for compensation for people infected with hepatitis C through blood products. Following Titmuss (1971), we can examine the “gift relationship” and the way our society handles its blood service to provide valuable insights about the whole health system. In the case of hepatitis C treatment and compensation, the haemophilia community was excluded from compensation by consecutive governments. In
the end, a daring threat to shame a politician just before a general election brought about a resolution. How, through trial and error, this voluntary association transformed and developed power to influence public policy is the story of this chapter. I describe the different political subject positions that the Society adopted, and the assemblage of action, techniques, and strategies that were critical to their success; as with the TIES study, spatial and temporal elements are integral to this assemblage.

This chapter makes three key points. First, I show why the Haemophilia Society had such a strong sense of solidarity and of entitlement to be included in decisions that affected the haemophilia population of New Zealand. I also describe the protracted period of lobbying to show that it was the breeding ground for active citizenship. Finally, I show that the shift in the Haemophilia Foundation’s subjectivity towards an increasingly active citizen raised their capacity and credibility with the state, but in the end tactics of resistance proved more effective than active citizenship in reaching a compensation settlement.

**Intimate reliance: Intimate links**

To examine the story of the Haemophilia Society, it is first necessary to understand the condition of haemophilia itself. Haemophilia is a rare hereditary disorder in which the clotting factors VIII or IX are missing or depleted. This impairs the body’s blood clotting ability; no cure is available. Because defects of the X chromosome are implicated, the great majority of people with haemophilia are male. Severity of the conditions ranges from mild to severe. Without adequate treatment, internal bleeds can be life-threatening or can lead to severely damaged joints and bodily organs. Treatment involves infusion of replacement factor by intravenous injection.

The rarity and hereditary nature of the condition mean that people with haemophilia typically have more expertise about it than the front line medical workers and health officials they deal with. This was an important contributing factor to the voluntary association becoming an “active citizen” with high expectations that they work with government officials to make important decisions that affect their lives.

From the time the Society was established in 1958, it had an all-embracing membership in the knowledge that broad collaboration was needed to improve this life-

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111 The prevalence of haemophilia in industrialised countries is reported as 13–18 per 100,000 males. About a third to one half of all cases are people with no previous family history of the disease (Rosendaal, Smit and Briet, 1991).
threatening condition. Politicians, clinicians, the pharmaceutical industry, and business people were therefore members, along with people with haemophilia and their families. Over the years the Society became a support and advocacy network run by volunteers, providing and coordinating mutual support and information for people with haemophilia and their families and advocating for improved treatment.

A Medical Advisory Committee was also formed to sit alongside the Society to provide medical expertise and support. Long before it was fashionable, clinicians and government officials recognised the Society as a “key stakeholder” in issues related to treatment and any decisions that affected it. This is largely due to the nature of haemophilia. As a rare, life-threatening condition, people with haemophilia and their families have a high level of expertise in their own condition and treatment needs. Nevertheless, they are completely reliant on the health system for access to treatment products and specialist-level care. A man described this sense of reliance on the health service as one thing he resented about having haemophilia, “feeling that I can’t go too far away from a blood supply”. Another interviewee described this fundamental need for treatment products to live a healthy life as an “intimate reliance” that in turn created an intimate reliance on the state:

I mean, you have a small group of New Zealanders who intimately rely on the State for their health care. You can’t get blood anywhere else and it’s an intimate reliance. If you don’t have the blood you will die (1994/5 interviewee, quoted in Howden-Chapman, Park, Scott and Carter 1996:171).

Intimate in this sense seemed to allude to the strong reliance and hence tight interrelationship between the patient and the state at the most biological level of blood that runs through one’s veins. This gift relationship made the haemophilia population extremely vulnerable to inadequacies in the blood service.

The haemophilia population is small and strongly linked through formal and informal ties between families and individuals. People with haemophilia saw this network as biological, mutually supportive and essential to getting by, given the severity of the condition, its rarity and subsequent lack of expertise on haemophilia among most front-line health workers. The intimate links and mutual support between individuals and families were very evident during ethnographic research. My 1994–1995 field notes as I travelled between cities, provincial centres and rural towns are full of references to these
interconnections between interviewees (e.g., John’s\textsuperscript{112} the uncle of young Peter that I interviewed last week; Hamish is one of three brothers with haemophilia, he said I talked to his oldest brother a week ago; before I arrived Lorna (interviewee) had been talking on the phone to Dianne (who I interviewed yesterday) about a problem bleed that her son was having and said to pass on her regards to me).

The NZHS emerged as a grassroots organisation within this inter-connected community, a support and advocacy network run by volunteers. In the Society gatherings I attended during the first phase of the research (1994/5), such as family camps or Annual General Meetings, it was common to see haematologists on warm and friendly terms with whole families including wives, siblings or parents of people with haemophilia, and uncles and cousins whom they may also have treated. Likewise, drug company representatives were on first name basis with many present. Men on crutches, mobility scooters or in wheelchairs were a common sight. Daughters and nieces of some of these men watched attentively as they prepared to make decisions about whether, as obligate carriers,\textsuperscript{113} they would have children. At family camps, parents talked incessantly about their children, like any group of parents when they come together, but here the talk was related to haemophilia: how to detect a joint “bleed”, when to have a daughter tested for her carrier status, how to divert a boy away from rugby, how to respond to judgemental stares at their “bruised banana” of a child while out in public, and the like. For many families, this was their one opportunity a year to be with a group of people who really knew what it was like to live with haemophilia and to have informal chats with haematologists and other specialists, so they made the most of it.

These backstage interactions also helped build relationships and networks that could be brought into use at later times. The strong sense of solidarity between people with haemophilia was to influence the ways that NZHS volunteers operated. The Society also developed effective national and international links to other patient organisations, including the World Federation of Hemophilia which was established in 1963. Despite international communication being limited to the postal service at this time, the Society played an important role in keeping up to date with the latest treatment developments and

\textsuperscript{112}To protect anonymity of research participants, I have used pseudonyms in this paragraph.

\textsuperscript{113}All daughters of men with haemophilia are carriers, meaning their sons will have a 50\% chance of having the condition, and their daughters will have 50\% chance of being carriers.
using this knowledge to talk to clinicians and lobby the Ministry for improved standards of haemophilia care.

Blood products became available in the 1960s, first cryoprecipitate\textsuperscript{114} and later blood concentrates. These advances reduced the frequency of and recovery time from bleeds and gave people with haemophilia their first opportunity to live a close-to-normal life. Involvement in education, employment and recreational activities was greatly improved and the acute pain of bleeds was avoided. However, many older people suffered from long-term effects of inadequate treatment in earlier years, particularly joint damage, and many of their age cohorts died untimely deaths due to the condition. The Haemophilia Society continued to work on behalf of the haemophilia population, including some volunteers keen to contribute but no longer able to do paid work due to joint damage.

As early as 1974, NZHS volunteers were advocating the need for a comprehensive haemophilia treatment centre, thought to be “only a dream” at that time but one that “doctors and the hospital Board” needed to be convinced of, according to John Davy, secretary of the NZHS (John Davy, \textit{Bloodline} March 2001:8). This may have been the first instance of the Society successfully advocating (with its Medical Advisory Council) for improved haemophilia care, as the first such centre was established in Auckland in 1975 (Lauzon 2008).

Less successful at that time was advocacy for a fractionation plant\textsuperscript{115} in New Zealand. The NZHS, with support from the Department of Health and the National Transfusion Advisory Committee, argued that New Zealand needed to be self-sufficient in the production of blood product concentrates. The idea was declined by the government of the time based on the idea that such products would be replaced by bioengineered products within 5 years (Mike Carnahan, personal communication, July 2010). This decision was to have significant implications when viral contaminants were discovered in imported blood products.

Living with a rare, life-threatening, life-long disorder meant that people with haemophilia became adept at managing risk. We also observed that as people learn to deal with haemophilia, they develop dispositions that enable them to be persistent but diplomatic with authority figures (including front line medical staff who have never

\textsuperscript{114} Cryoprecipitate is a frozen blood product prepared from blood plasma.
\textsuperscript{115} Full blood is collected and is put through a fractionation process to produce blood products. New Zealand’s blood products were fractionated in Australia, and as it turns out, blood sourced from New Zealand and Australia was mixed before the fractionation process.
confronted haemophilia before), flexible and stoic in the face of adversity. This cultural capital helped shape (and was in turn shaped by) advocacy processes, in particular, people’s expectations that they be included in decisions that affected their lives. An equally important factor in the willingness of the Society’s volunteers to challenge government policies was a long history of working with the Medical Advisory committee to advocate on behalf of people with haemophilia.

**Gold to gloom**
The golden era of blood-derived concentrates came to an abrupt end in 1983 with the discovery that HIV/AIDS was transmitted through the blood supply. In mid-1983 the Haemophilia Society started to get reports from the United States that linked acquired immune deficiency syndrome (AIDS) and haemophilia. Blood products that had provided such freedom for the haemophilia community were suddenly to be feared.

The remainder of this chapter explores the Haemophilia Society’s activities in terms of collective action related to viral contaminants and shifting subjectivities, as summarised in the diagram below (Figure 9).

![Figure 9: Haemophilia Society’s Changes in Tactics](image)

Discovery of HIV in the blood supply resulted in Haemophilia Society’s volunteers suddenly finding themselves in the unenviable position of advocating on life-and-death issues of safety of the blood supply. The first task, however, was to let the haemophilia community know. In June 1983 the NZHS issued some brief information about AIDS being linked to the haemophilia population. But it was not until December 1984 that
confirmation came through of the news the entire haemophilia community most feared: a batch of prothrombinex, the blood product used to treat factor IX deficiency, was found to contain an AIDS-related antibody and other earlier batches might have been contaminated. This news, released in a special edition of the Society’s newsletter, threw many people with haemophilia into a state of shock and despair that was to pervade their lives for some years. Products that were once life-saving had become life-threatening.

The Haemophilia Society worked with their Medical Advisory Committee to lobby to ensure the blood supply was made safe. As was their usual approach to “working with” government, they wrote to Minister of Health, Michael Bassett. The Ministry quickly moved to implement their recommendations. In this way, the blood supply that provided blood products for conditions such as haemophilia and full blood for transfusions for anyone requiring it, was restored to safety.

The Society was driven by the serious threat to people’s lives, not just its own membership but also all New Zealanders who might need a blood transfusion. The Society recognised that they were in a unique position of having intimate knowledge of treatment and blood bank systems, and extensive networks with Health Department officials, blood banks, medical staff, and international patient organisations. They also had a strong expectation, based on years of advocacy, that they would be listened to by government officials. The Society was acting as an interest group who sought to protect its own membership but also as an active citizen advocating for the health of all New Zealanders.

NZHS volunteers also worked behind the scenes to support the membership in coming to terms with the discovery of HIV and AIDS. Fear and discrimination were rife at this time. The Society challenged the media, particularly the Auckland Star, for their barrage of articles that further enhanced public fears about HIV and AIDS and stigmatised the haemophilia population. The Society also supported people with HIV who were being excluded from school, employment or other daily activities. A 2-month battle to have a Canterbury boy accepted at a local school is just one example of many (Mike Carnahan, personal communication, March 2011).

The NZHS also acted as a staunch advocate at regional and national scales of the blood service, working with government agencies and their officials. Safety of the blood supply required several critical elements. To summarise, the NZHS volunteers lobbied to introduce donor screening, withdrawal of existing products, upskilling of laboratory staff,
computerization of donor records, heat treatment of blood supply (to \(60^{\circ}\)C \(^{116}\)), safety of blood transfusions, and the separation of Australia and New Zealand plasma in processing.

Because the NZHS was resourced by volunteers, it was in a position to criticise and lobby government and drug companies. This was in stark contrast to haemophilia associations in some other parts of the world (excluding Australia) that were closely aligned with pharmaceutical companies and have been widely criticised for not advocating on behalf of people with haemophilia, or worse, recommending people use products that the association knew to be contaminated or refusing to support claims for compensation (Kirp 1999).

Research interviews with around 100 people in 1994–1995 (Park, Scott, Benseman, and Berry 1995) suggested that participants were mostly satisfied that further avoidable infection with HIV was averted by the introduction of the measures that were adopted as a result of NZHS’s and the Medical Advisory Committee’s advocacy. By then hepatitis C had emerged, and in comparison, government agencies were judged to have acted quickly to ensure blood safety in response to HIV and AIDS.

Nevertheless, 28 people with haemophilia became infected with HIV in New Zealand. When I reviewed the Society’s records, it was clear that volunteers spent a tremendous amount of time and effort ensuring appropriate steps were taken to protect the national blood supply, such as gathering the latest information and writing letters to government official and ministers. They were repeatedly faced with institutional inertia and others barriers. For example, the NZHS tried and failed to have random donor cryoprecipitate phased out immediately because of the risk of viral contamination. They also failed to get super-heat treated (to 80\(^\circ\)C) blood products introduced and to get NZHS representation on the Transfusion Advisory Committee.

Success in securing the safety of the national blood supply was hard won, and each issue demanded enormous effort. The responsibility these volunteers shouldered was no doubt well beyond anything they might have anticipated when they were elected to voluntary committee positions on the Haemophilia Society. Only a highly knowledgeable, extremely motivated, and well-networked association of volunteers could have worked on so many fronts at the same time, and to good effect. They had become extremely active citizens making good use of their knowledge and networks to protect the health of all New

\(^{116}\) Heat treatment to 60\(^\circ\)C killed HIV but not, as was discovered later, hepatitis C, which required “super-heat treatment” to 80\(^\circ\)C.
Zealanders. Had they not been so active it is likely the blood supply would have remained unsafe for longer: no other grouping had such a vested interest and capacity to act. This suggests the Society was not merely an interest group that was exerting pressure for its own self-serving ends. Rather, it demonstrates that the Haemophilia Society created new political space to exert influence at critical times. Based on deliberations and strategizing in the safe space as a group of volunteers, the Society was able to influence the blood service.

Even after the safety of the blood supply was secured against HIV, the volunteers’ role was far from over. Volunteers became immersed in supporting families to access compensation from the Accident Compensation Commission (ACC). A national no-fault ACC system had been in place since 1974. This system was very good at dealing with straight-forward accidents like falling off a ladder, but less useful when it came to providing compensation for viral infection through the blood supply. From 1987 the Society fought for equitable and adequate compensation, often on a case-by-case basis, while supporting those individuals in their dealings with ACC. As with securing the safety of the blood supply, achieving equitable compensation involved fighting on several fronts. The volunteers advocated on disputes with ACC over the degree of progression of disease since this influenced the amount of compensation given. The NZHS also funded legal action in some cases, and prepared and presented submissions to government ministries, the NZ Law Commission, and ACC review hearings (Mike Carnahan, personal communication, July 2010). This was exhausting work, but as often is the case in the face of crisis, this voluntary association mobilised collectively to demand justice.

In response to this viral crisis in the haemophilia community, the NZHS attracted funding from a national AIDS taskforce to employ an outreach worker to provide support to people with haemophilia and HIV. This employment of an outreach worker in 1990 denoted a change in the NZHS’s role beyond a solely voluntary association to being an organisation of volunteers and professional staff. Volunteers continued in elected positions of president, secretary, newsletter editor, and regional committee members. The outreach worker took up a large part of the support role for people with HIV in their dealings with ACC and other government agencies. This support proved so valuable that the service was later extended through public funding to all people with haemophilia, and the number of

117 In 1974, as a result of the 1973 Accident Compensation Commission, common law rights to sue for compensation for injury were replaced by fair compensation from ACC, including medical and rehabilitation, earnings-related compensation for income loss, and lump sum payments.
outreach workers increased over the years to four at the time of writing (Dec. 2012). From 1992, the Society also employed an administrator on a part-time basis, funded by the Lotteries Board.

This arrangement of a voluntary association becoming employers of professional health workers was being promoted by a National Government, and was also being trialled with Māori and Pacific “health providers” at this time (see Chapter Three). This approach was a precursor to what was to become a widespread governance model in the health service a decade later. As the employer, the NZHS was directly able to influence priorities and quality of care provided by the outreach workers, much more so than if they were employed by the public health service. The Society’s funding at that time was approximately 20% from the Ministry of Health (for outreach workers), 10% from pharmaceutical companies, 5–10% from members and subscriptions, and the majority (60%) from fundraising and community grants (NZHS president Peta Hardley, interview in Hemophilia Leader, December 1997: 6).

A strong sense of solidarity within the haemophilia population enabled the Society to exert influence on the blood service at a critical time. With a long history of working collectively for the benefit of the haemophilia population, including two and three generations of some families, NZHS volunteers had the trust and respect of the membership that they would work on their behalf.

In our initial research questionnaire in 1995, respondents were very complimentary about the Society (including voluntary and professional services). In fact, of the 148 questionnaire respondents on this topic, 60 made spontaneous positive comments about the NZHS when asked if they were a member of the organisation. NZHS’ volunteers expressed a strong sense of the vulnerability of the haemophilia population and the need to work collectively to support one another. When the HIV crisis had arrived, it was a given that the NZHS would advocate on the haemophilia population’s behalf, as they had done in the past.

**Watchdog tactics in extraordinary times: contestation and lobbying 1990–2003**

Less than 10 years after HIV and AIDS were identified in the blood supply a new virus was found: hepatitis C. NZHS volunteers again worked tirelessly and collaboratively with other actors to ensure safety of the blood supply.

The NZHS provided a parallel space of interaction where volunteers could come together to share information and strategise, as in the case of HIV. Despite attempts to
“work with” government agencies as they had in the past, the NZHS found that this time it was not effective. This was a new era in health care and accident compensation in New Zealand. Volunteers found they had to adopt a watchdog approach, continually challenging delays in introducing super-heat treated (to 80°C) blood products, introduction of screening of blood donors, testing of blood, and in notification of diagnosis.\textsuperscript{118} Minister of Health Helen Clark diverted the responsibility for these actions to the Area Health Boards, despite the fact that the AHBs did not deal with manufacturing standards for blood products. This was at the peak of the political appetite for decentralisation of decision making and resource allocation. It is also a good example of when some degree of centralised decision making could have averted a disaster. Sadly, that was not to be.

The Society’s traditional approach of writing letters to the Ministry was proving ineffective, as was making the issues public. When confronted by media statements about their failures to introduce adequate measures to protect the safety of blood products, government ministers inevitably denied all knowledge of the inadequacies and assured the public that the problem would be investigated and fixed. Even when promises were finally made by the Minister of Health that adequate measures would be instigated, the NZHS learned this did not necessarily mean such promises would be implemented.

All notions of working with the government ceased when it later emerged that senior health managers chose to continue using blood products that were known to be infected with hepatitis C. These people were never prosecuted for their actions. Their decision was based on the belief that the virus was not serious, and, as Principal Medical Advisor Dr Arvind Patel stated on the Tonight television programme, ACC would compensate:

In Australia health authorities had to screen to protect themselves from legal actions. But here…we were protected because ACC would cover those who became contaminated.\textsuperscript{119}

Haemophilia Society volunteers reeled at this admission, but it did help confirm their suspicions that dollars and cents came first for government. Changes to the ACC Act in

\textsuperscript{118} The NZHS wrote to the Minister Clark in September and October 1990 with these demands. With a change in government, from Labour to National, in November 1990, Simon Upton became Minister of Health. Further letters from the Haemophilia Society, their Medical Advisory Committee, and the Regional Blood Transfusion Directors, over more than 2 years, were unsuccessful in getting adequate measures in place to ensure blood safety.

\textsuperscript{119} Dr Arvind Patel, Chief Medical Advisor to Ministry of Health in 1992, speaking to the Tonight programme, 16 November 1992.
1992 prevented this compensation from being awarded, adding to the outrage at this statement and further fuelling the Society’s determination to get justice for those affected.

The existence of “non-A non-B hepatitis” in the blood supply had been known for many years. However, when the virus was isolated and described as hepatitis C in 1988 (Iwarson 1994), and diagnosis and prevention methods became available, people with haemophilia were incensed that government agencies did not act quickly enough to prevent further infection. It is estimated that approximately 70% of people with haemophilia in New Zealand contracted hepatitis C (NZHS 1994:9). Despite the best efforts of the Society to work with government agencies to protect the national blood supply, many people contracted hepatitis C after it could have been avoided. It was February 1993, 5 years later than in the UK, before measures were in place to ensure all blood products were safe, and later still before many people were notified of their HCV diagnosis.

I can still recall, more than 20 years later, interviewing a man who had contracted both HIV and hepatitis C. I was sadly aware that this bright, articulate young man would not live a long life. This was one of those interviews where I nervously checked the recording device to ensure I would not miss a word. He was clear-headed and rational about his fate, but just as willing to share the angst and uncertainty that he experienced. He explained that HIV was probably unpreventable, but added, in his typically understated way, his sense of outrage:

But in New Zealand, five years later, to turn around and have discovered that people were being infected with hep C, after the great example of HIV is just, to me, extraordinary.

Suddenly we were on the outside of the tent
As in the case of HIV, securing the safety of the national blood supply was just the first step. The Haemophilia Society had a much greater fight on their hands – achieving equitable ACC compensation for what the Society referred to as “victims of tainted blood”.

The Society argued strongly, over many years, that the Ministry of Health had failed in its duty of care to protect people with haemophilia from viral contamination in the blood supply and that those infected were therefore entitled to compensation and an apology. However, the introduction of the Accident Compensation and Rehabilitation Act 1992, effective from 1 April 1992, had huge implications for people who had contracted hepatitis C through the blood supply. More restrictive criteria for accessing compensation, the abolition of lump sum payments, and the introduction of tightly-fixed time limits for
making ACC claims led to most people with haemophilia being excluded from compensation.

The Haemophilia Society found that their customary approach of working with government agencies and in a mediation role between its membership and the state was no longer possible, as one participant explained:

We had reasonably close connections with the Ministry of Health, and then suddenly we were on the outside of the tent, because they decided to break it up into all these different categories of where people deal with it... for example, the Infectious Diseases Committee...IV Drug (users) Committee...the blood transfusion people. And cynically I have to say that that was deliberate...the Ministry pushed them apart so they didn’t correlate information or strategies.

Nevertheless, the Haemophilia Society was able to draw on existing alliances with haematologists, the World Federation of Haemophilia and other haemophilia associations, and formed new alliances, such as with the AIDS Foundation, Hepatitis C Support Group, and COMFFORT Coalition (for medically fragile families), all of which were non-governmental organisations that were very involved in lobbying on similar issues to the Haemophilia Society. With the support of these allies, and faced with apparent indifference from the government, the Society adopted a much more militant role, positioning themselves in opposition to government.

*It makes my blood boil: contestation the only option*

The Society felt they had “no option” but to undertake escalating public action aimed at pressuring politicians to resolve the issue, including public protests, making submissions, taking a class action against ACC, and even making a complaint of criminal nuisance against the previous ministers of health, Helen Clark (by now Prime Minister) and Simon Upton. None of these tactics had the desired effect.

At this time when a right-of-centre government was pursuing free market policies and advocating reduced state-reliance and individual responsibility, this “reciprocity principle” (Standing 2010) was turned back on the state by the HFNZ, albeit with limited success at that time. One person identified a mismatch between government discourses and practices of individual rights and responsibilities:

I am offended by the government not accepting its responsibilities…it makes my blood boil…the government tells us that we should row our own boats, take responsibility for ourselves, but the government is not taking responsibility for their own errors and areas of responsibility. I expect at least an apology (Park, 2013: 233-4).

When I went back over our research interviews and reviewed the Haemophilia Society’s newsletter over the 1990s, I found that rights and responsibilities discourses were
dominant. The newsletter’s editor noted that beginning in 1992, the Society asserted rights to recognition for the betrayal of the haemophilia community in knowingly allowing contaminated products to be administered; rights to adequate treatment for hepatitis C; rights to an apology; and rights to fair recompense. This insistence on rights, pursued through a class action being taken on behalf of individuals, reflected a global rights discourse that highlighted an individual’s rights relative to the state.

Following Cowan, Dembour and Wilson (2001) I examine the concept of rights as a cultural construct in order to unsettle taken-for-granted assumptions and to situate the use of the structuring discourse in time and place. The concept of human rights was first institutionalised after World War Two within an international legal framework (Rabinow 2005). The discourse, very fitting for the time, was “never again” to allow such atrocities as happened in the war to occur, based on the idea of “universal enjoyment of human rights”. The rights discourse took on new salience from the 1960s with the emergence of widespread demands for social and political rights, and again from the 1980s as a rights discourse came to be increasingly aligned with neoliberal notions of individual rights and responsibilities.

The concept of duty of care was framed by the Haemophilia Society as a citizenship right and was used to refer to duties on the part of individuals or the state to adhere to a standard of reasonable care while performing any acts that could harm others. All the actors assumed that the state had a duty of care towards people with haemophilia, and citizens had a right to a duty of care by the state and its agents. The battle was over whether the state had failed in its duty of care and if so, whether individuals should be compensated. The “villains” present in this battle were politicians who, as elected representatives, were responsible for health service failures and ACC failures to reach a

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121 This can be compared with situations where the state does not assume a duty of care towards certain individuals. Rabeharisoa (2006), for example, describes political activism initiated in the 1950s in France by a Muscular Dystrophy patient organisation to have the condition acknowledged as a disease, to initiate research to find a cure for the disease, and to ensure that individuals affected by the disease were acknowledged as full citizens and deserving of care.
settlement with people with haemophilia. The villains were not pharmaceutical companies who supplied the blood products.\textsuperscript{122}

Claims about failures in duty of care were closely linked to circulating global discourses of rights, with the focus on rights of individuals. The rise of human rights claims among international aid agencies and other NGOs evident since the 1990s has been critiqued as rhetorical repackaging to divert attention from structural inequalities. As Peter Uvin identified, this amounted to a redefinition of the nature of the problem, a “move from needs to rights, and from charity to duties, also implies an increased focus on accountability” (2010:170), and is therefore closely linked to emergent neoliberal constructs of “good governance”.

During the first phase of our study in the mid-1990s, the shift from charity to duties was particularly relevant to the haemophilia community, as gifted blood products were being gradually replaced by recombinant products. Rather than being recipients of replacement factors produced from gifted blood, many children with haemophilia had become consumers of recombinant products from multinational pharmaceutical companies. Access to safe and secure supply of treatment products was becoming linked to consumer rights, and to responsibilities of citizens to use the products prudently. This shift was significant as it also shifted lines of responsibilities. While the Haemophilia Society claimed bio-political rights to compensation and treatment based on their vulnerability and right to be protected from harm, these rights were not clearly evident in legal terms and therefore claims were not successful.

The period when the Society began its struggle over hepatitis C was an intermediate period when gifted blood was processed, on behalf of the New Zealand public, by an Australian fractionation plant. Young children who had had no exposure to viral contamination were treated with recombinant products that were gifted from drug companies, although these products were not yet part of government purchasing policy. So while parents of young children grappled with their rights and responsibilities as consumers of gifted and highly sought-after recombinant products, most of the adult haemophilia population struggled with the fallout from being recipients of gifted blood.

\textsuperscript{122} Again, this contrasted with other parts of the world where people with haemophilia sought compensation from drug companies, and in some cases were successful (Kirp 1999).
The act of receiving gifted blood brought a measure of symbolic weight into the moral discourses related to the hepatitis C battle. The actions of successive governments indicated that recipients of the life-giving properties of gifted blood were not entitled to compensation, even if in this case these products were also life-taking. This suggests that the health service was based on the principle of “all care, no responsibility” rather than a fundamental duty of care for all citizens. In response to media attention, the Ministry of Health directed attention to advisory committees and the blood transfusion service, and so it was not surprising that an inquiry in 1992 commissioned by the Ministry of Health, failed to clearly locate where responsibility lay for the hepatitis C debacle.

**Will to Justice: mobilising collective action 1990–2003**

The Bad Blood controversy was waged in the public arena for many years. Behind the scenes, the Haemophilia Society was also continuing with their normal activities of providing support, sharing information, organising regular family camps, and providing a national newsletter. This voluntary association used all these avenues to keep alive the issue of hepatitis C, and foster a “will to justice” (Spivak 2011) among the haemophilia community. Some new Society members, particularly those with no previous family history of haemophilia, commented in interviews that they found the focus on hepatitis C frustrating (and fear-provoking) as it did not affect them. One interviewee described the Society as “a bit [too] political” and said she would prefer it to be “a bit more grassroots”. However, such people also recognised the harm caused by the virus and acknowledged the hard work of the Society to reach a resolution.

The Haemophilia Society subcommittee that dealt with hepatitis C provided a safe space for volunteers to come together to share information, learn together, strategise, and determine ways to keep the haemophilia community informed and engaged in the issue as a collective group, rather than as individuals suffering from a new, life-threatening disease. These volunteers were mostly older men who had haemophilia and moderate to severe joint damage, and shared a fighting spirit to get justice. They encouraged all Society members to...

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123 Narrow and fixed time limits for making claims, the definition of “medical misadventure”, and interpretation of ACC and accompanying regulations.

members to support their efforts, using the Society’s newsletter to keep people informed and to circulate pamphlets and sample letters to send to members of parliament.

This will to justice is in stark contrast to the governmental techniques described by Cruikshank (1999) in her book *The Will to Empower*. In participatory democracies, the creation of active citizens is framed as the political project to address the “problem” of powerlessness and lack of political participation (Cruikshank 1999). In other words, the aim is to transform individual subjects into active citizens who are capable of self-government, allowing the state to govern “from a distance” (Miller and Rose 2008 [1990]). In contrast, HFNZ volunteers framed the problem as governmental failures, and they transformed individual subjects into a collective willing to demand a resolution for these injustices. This voluntary association was not encouraging its members to be active citizens or “wise consumers” in a completely depoliticised way, which Hyatt (2011) described as “grassroots authoritarianism”. The NZHS sought to mobilise those members who felt betrayed by government to demand justice.

The sense of betrayal cannot be over-stated. For many years, the Society fought first for recognition of the failure in the state’s duty of care and apology for the betrayal of the haemophilia community in knowingly allowing contaminated products to be administered. Compensation was secondary, although also a strong focus. Public protests were frequent and sustained, aimed at raising the profile of the issue and garnering support. A vigil outside parliament during the lead-up to a general election in 1999 continued for 11 weeks. This vigil was supplemented with careful courting of the media and opposition politicians. Like many of the public protests, we were told that the vigil was personally satisfying but did not achieve the result they sought. However, it was successful in extracting a promise from the Labour Party opposition spokesperson for health that she would resolve the issue if a Labour government was elected, as it duly was in November that year. She held the position of Minister of Health for the next 6 years. However, the promise was not met, or at least not in the timely and proactive manner that had been promised.

**From Society to Foundation**

In 1999 the New Zealand Haemophilia Society was renamed the Haemophilia Foundation of New Zealand (HFNZ). A National Council was established comprising president, vice presidents (2), treasurer, and secretary, and delegates from the four new branches, Northern, Midland, Central, and Southern (Haemophilia Society Newsletter September-
October 1998:4). This structure enabled greater connection between what were more isolated branches, and therefore a greater capacity to work collectively to contest injustices.

In some ways the association remained much the same. The services of the (paid) outreach workers, the provision of newsletters, educational camps and workshops continued to be the most public aspects of the Foundation activities. Its membership continued to be a diverse mix of individuals and families, associates, corporations, friends, patrons and life members. Positions on the National Council and special committees continued to be voluntary, meaning they could continue with lobbying and advocacy while leaving paid staff to undertake the day-to-day support of the membership. The part-time administrator position created in 1992 (Haemophilia Society Newsletter March 1992:2) grew and changed into a Chief Executive position in 2003 (Bloodline, March 2008:9).

The shift towards a more corporate model for the Foundation reflected their increased budget for supporting the membership. Since 1997 fundraising had been done by a fundraising company operated by a man with haemophilia (Lauzon 2008), resulting in the doubling of their annual budget and relieving volunteers from the arduous task of raising money. As a result, the HFNZ was able to offer much greater support to its membership.

The HFNZ appointed several multinational drug companies as sustaining patrons of the Foundation, but any money these companies donated was carefully channelled to specific projects. The only government funding HFNZ received was for the outreach worker to provide support for families and individuals. The Society made a strategic decision that lobbying would take place at a governance (i.e. voluntary) scale rather than a management scale. This enabled paid staff to stay neutral with government because, as one person explained, “they couldn’t afford to get off side with the Ministry of Health”. These tactics suggest part of becoming an active citizen involved being highly strategic. The many years of lobbying had led to a strong sense of solidarity within the haemophilia community. With the new structure of the association, volunteers were able to focus on lobbying government rather than on the routine tasks of providing face-to-face support for its membership.

**An active citizen approach**
In 2003, the HFNZ hepatitis C team shifted tack in their efforts to achieve justice for all people with haemophilia who had been excluded from earlier hepatitis C settlement deals.
Recognising that demanding rights from an oppositional position was not getting the desired results, they now adopted an active citizen persona. This involved a staged, proactive approach to pressuring politicians in the lead-up to the general election in September 2005. The HFNZ retained their watchdog role but, like good active citizens, also sought to work with government officials to reach a resolution. This political subjectivity was not so much aimed at being responsible for their own individual choices in the neoliberal sense (Rose 1996; Cruikshank 1999) but rather to force government to accept responsibility for past choices that had such devastating effects on the haemophilia population.

Mirroring government forms of calculation when preparing an intervention (Miller and Rose 2008 [1990]), the HFNZ gathered detailed information about the membership through a national survey, finding that people had been treated differently by ACC in different regions and by different ACC officers even in the same regions. Following Miller and Rose (2008 [1990]), the survey performed the role of not only making people with haemophilia and hepatitis C “visible” (as the public demonstrations did), but it also made their issues thinkable, calculable and amenable to deliberative initiatives. The HFNZ used the information in their own calculations but also conveyed the general findings of the survey to the Ministry of Health in 2004.125

The hepatitis C subcommittee repositioned itself to become a “negotiating team”. They decided that in their new persona as active citizens they would act professionally, providing officials with correct information, giving credit where credit was due to Ministry officials, and slamming the Ministry on issues seen as grossly inadequate, especially in the area of treatment for hepatitis C.

The negotiating team then began to “render technical” (Li 2007) the issues, drawing on the survey and international “best practice”. These data were used to highlight a discourse of equity: the problem to be addressed was inequitable treatment and compensation for people who had contracted hepatitis C. They distilled the issues into just a few priorities and clear demands of government or what they called “sound bites”. The central themes, continuously repeated, included:

- access to ‘best international practice’ treatment for hepatitis C
- an apology from Government
- lump sum recompense commensurate with ACC compensation
- followed by withdrawal of common law action

For many years, the volunteers had struggled to convey the complexity and urgency of the issues. They found that sound bites were more powerful than detailed information.

Prioritisation of treatment for hepatitis C was in response to a number of members who were starting to feel major effects of the virus on their health. For them, treatment was their most urgent need. However, many still felt deeply aggrieved and expected an apology in recognition of the harm caused, so this was the second priority. In contrast to earlier campaigns, lump sum compensation dropped to third in order of priority.

The HFNZ held a National Hepatitis C Conference in April 2005. This was a significant step as people with hepatitis C came together for the first time and saw the need to respond collectively to treatment and compensation issues. The HFNZ gained a better understanding of the issues facing its membership and got a mandate to advance the issues on their behalf. Another important aspect of the conference was that the HFNZ invited two activists from Ireland so they could learn from the process used in Ireland to achieve results to hepatitis C issues.

Together with knowledge gained from international haemophilia networks, data were collated from the membership to make the domain they wished to influence clearly visible, knowable, and amenable to management. Their backstage interactions enabled them to be strategic which approaching front stage encounters with government officials. Instead of putting forward a “haemophilia community” or interest group perspective, they used the data to profess neutrality and efficacy as they sought to mobilise government officials to address the priorities that the HFNZ had identified. This strategic reversal of governmental techniques and collective action were all part of their plan to create the power to exert influence.

With the issues now documented, ordered, and evaluated, the HFNZ then made each issue technical and the domain of just one spokesperson (“one person one issue”). In keeping with their active citizen persona, each spokesperson became extremely knowledgeable about “their” issue (more knowledgeable than the people they were dealing with) and so provided brief, accurate, and consistent information.

The HFNZ’s strategic approach was multidimensional and comprehensive. For example, they took a proactive approach to courting the media, which included releasing a series of fortnightly “newsletters” to keep the issue alive in the media, and hand-delivering submissions to government to create media opportunities. They changed their long-standing practice of anonymity and agreed to provide “the personal story” to the media, which allowed the public to see the human consequences of bureaucratic bungling. These
staged encounters were all part of their plan to make the issues visible, calculable, and amenable to address. This approach resulted in three opposition political parties committing to active support. The HFNZ also demanded responses to submissions from politicians within a certain time frame. Meanwhile, they created expectations of people affected by hepatitis C in terms of self-care and provision of personal health and treatment information for databases. This suggested that they were a part of governmental attempts to make citizens self-regulating, while at the same time turning such neoliberal devices back on the state.

In early 2005, the Director General of Health, a long-time target of the HFNZ campaign and therefore knowledgeable about the issues, agreed to consider a submission from the HFNZ detailing new information and a possible settlement. This was the first success of the pro-active strategy. However, with the September 2005 general election fast approaching and still no agreement likely the HFNZ again reassessed their strategy, turning their attention to potential coalition parties in the next government.

**Tactics of Resistance: When all else fails… 2005–2006**

Frustrated with the drawn out “negotiations” with the government, a member of the negotiating team pulled a stunt that brought results overnight. With just days until the election, he created a pamphlet for a letterbox drop to all households in the Mt Albert and Rongotai electorates – seats then held by Labour members, Rt Hon Helen Clark the then Prime Minister, and Hon Annette King, the then Minister of Health. The Minister of Health had provided the 1999 promise that she would resolve the issue with urgency if elected. The pamphlet, headed “Labour’s legacy of lies”, showed a copy of King’s written promise and stated:

**Labour breaks election promise.** Its [sic] been six years since people with Haemophilia received a written guarantee that Labour would settle the issue of the infection of people with Haemophilia matter in a speedy and fair manner. 168 out of 171 have received no settlement offer.

The HFNZ had learned through experience and from their Irish counterparts that the threat of public shaming was more effective than the action itself. Earlier actions undertaken to publically shame politicians into settling the matter had been ineffective, contrary to expectations perhaps created during the pre-neoliberal era of activism in New Zealand.

Instead, the HFNZ volunteer merely approached the minister at a public meeting and threatened to deliver the pamphlets, then waited for the response. He did not have to wait long. The next morning the negotiating team received a call from the Ministry of
Health with a request for urgency in resolving the hepatitis C issue. Unbeknown to the HFNZ, the Labour government had received polling information that their level of support had dropped significantly. The threatened political action could not have come at a better time (or worse time for the Labour politicians).

In the words of a key player, “suddenly it was easy”. After 13 years of lobbying, the battle-weary volunteers suddenly managed to negotiate the terms of a settlement within less than 2 weeks. An opportunistic request for resourcing the HFNZ to provide more outreach workers to support people with a bleeding disorder and hepatitis C was also agreed to by the Ministry of Health. Of course the implementation of the settlement took considerably longer, but the haemophilia community celebrated a restored sense of justice and dignity following the agreement being reached.

In December 2006, a Treatment and Welfare package was announced, meeting the HFNZ’s demands. All people who had contracted hepatitis C through blood or blood products were awarded equitable compensation, and provisions were made for treatment for those infected. The Prime Minister, Helen Clark, also issued a statement that acknowledged the harm done, but did not go so far as to admit guilt.

The New Zealand government was not alone in its unwillingness to admit guilt at that time. Reflecting on the HIV scandal related to people with haemophilia in France and the French government’s unwillingness to admit guilt, Paul Ricoeur noted that this was an example of the increasing evidence in civil law of the concept of “responsibility without fault” (2000:25). This concept suggests a shift in focus away from punishing the perpetrators toward compensation for victims. This helps situate HFNZ’s decision to turn their attention to achieving fair compensation and treatment for hepatitis C, rather than punishing those responsible. However, in New Zealand a no-fault system had existed long before this global shift towards compensatory solutions. The ACC had been established to avoid litigation and provide compensation for straightforward accidents. The fact that the HFNZ had spent so many years “battling” was largely due to the inability of the existing (and new) compensation system to deal with viral contamination of the blood supply and lack of political will to address this problem. The HFNZ’s demand for compensation for individuals based on a rights discourse failed, as did “negotiation”. Despite the neoliberal political appetite for rights and responsibilities of individual, this was directed more at citizens than the state.
Conclusions
The HFNZ’s success in relation to hepatitis C was not easily won. In the absence of expert evidence about the progression of hepatitis C, the state prioritised saving money so “used up” blood products known to be contaminated with the virus. The HFNZ prioritised people’s health. Responsibility for this injustice was never taken by consecutive government ministers, resulting in NZHS volunteers fighting for a decade and a half to extract a reasonable settlement package. In the process, the solidarity of the haemophilia population, as expressed through the actions of the Society, was greatly enhanced and became a tool for a unique kind of active citizenship. They stood together – albeit with crutches, canes and able-bodied supporters – to contest injustices and to redefine their social reality: “joint action”, as the title of this section suggests, got results.

Rather than reinscribing their marginal status by asserting their rights as victims of bad blood, as they had done in the past, they adopted an “active citizen” persona. This shift in subjectivity from passive to active citizen who worked for the good of all was critical as it enabled them successfully to negotiate the political field to pressure central government to make good on an earlier promise to reach a just settlement.

This story of collective responses to viral contaminants in the blood supply is very New Zealand-specific, but is one that was linked to similar contestations by haemophilia associations around the world. However, in New Zealand the haemophilia population were careful not to portray themselves as “innocent victims” of Bad Blood as haemophilia associations had done in other countries (Kirp 1999). The HFNZ preferred not to distinguish people with haemophilia from other affected groups such as gay men and IV-drug users in lobbying efforts. The Foundation was a unitary voluntary association, representing a small national membership, devoid of obligations to the business or state sectors for their existence. This was in stark contrast to the United States, for example, where memberships were large but divided between different associations, blood products were locally sourced and produced, and were organised by medics and funded by pharmaceutical companies (Kirp 1999). The single “social contract” arrangement for accident compensation in New Zealand, an anomaly in a country known as a testing ground for neoliberal reforms, meant that politicians were the lobbying target, not drug companies or health providers. The HFNZ constructed a moral discourse of equity that resonated with New Zealanders.

Based on many years of working with government agencies and clinicians, members of the Society had developed a strong sense of entitlement to be involved in
decisions that affected their lives. After years of unsuccessful attempts to bring about a resolution, through a process of trial and error, and public and covert actions they were finally successful. Less hardy souls might have given up. Members of the HFNZ negotiating team eventually got results through political stealth, as an admiring HFNZ member suggested in a newsletter:

I am full of admiration and awe of these two men...I am very proud to call them my friends. They will modestly shrug off any praise or commendation for their efforts, which we all know were long and difficult, but I want as many people as possible to know how these guys have helped all of us who were able to hold out for settlement. Not to mention how they engineered the Government offer of settlement in the first place! (my emphasis, Bloodline, December 2008:1)
CHAPTER 8: THE HAEMOPHILIA FOUNDATION
AND NATIONAL RESTRUCTURING OF HAEMOPHILIA CARE

The New Zealand Haemophilia Society fought for almost 14 years to reach a settlement with government for people with haemophilia who had contracted hepatitis C through the blood supply. As the previous chapter shows, the Society, having staged protests and other forms of contestation for many years, then adopted an increasingly “active citizen” persona in their attempts to extract a settlement. In the end it was back-stage arm-twisting of a politician, together with their preparedness for immediate hardball negotiation, which finally got the result they were looking for.

A settlement for hepatitis C was not the only issue about which the Society was lobbying government. Problems with some of its members getting access to adequate supplies of blood products and to quality haemophilia care were long-standing and had become increasingly evident since the introduction of a regionalised structure of health care. Society volunteers worked with clinicians and government officials to address these concerns. Success finally came in 2006, with the establishment of the National Haemophilia Management Group to oversee all haemophilia care, resulting in improved quality and regionally equitable treatment standards. The Haemophilia Foundation (HFNZ), as the Society was now called, were influential in negotiating this groundbreaking new governance structure for national haemophilia care. Critically, the HFNZ took up a position on the national group and so has ongoing involvement in decisions about the delivery of haemophilia care.

In this chapter I examine how HFNZ volunteers successfully created and shaped the governance space in which the Society could have an ongoing influence. I explore the spatial and temporal elements of their collective actions that brought about these results. Non-state forms of the exercise of power have been posed as one of the defining features of our present and therefore an important analytical focus is how this exercise of power occurred and to what effects (Miller and Rose 2008). HFNZ’s success as a voluntary association that created an innovation in governance deserves analysis.

My study of the HFNZ raises interesting questions about what such influence means in terms of democratic process. Was this influence evidence of “power from below” whereby a voluntary association successfully shifted the relations of power to create a more inclusive and democratic space of negotiation? Was the HFNZ, rather, an elite
interest group that translated neoliberal discourses of active citizenship for its own self-serving ends? Or was it a ‘super-citizen’, captured or co-opted to undertake roles and tasks formerly understood as the responsibility of the state?

I examine the achievements from the perspective of the haemophilia population and in particular the HFNZ. I trace the assemblage of mechanisms and conditions that made it possible for the problem to be framed as regional inequality and for a national structure to be identified as the answer. The HFNZ translated neoliberal techniques, norms and subjectivities to promote their goals of inclusion, equity and quality care. Translation in this context refers to the strategic reversal by a voluntary association of neoliberal discourses and practices of active citizenship, participation and inclusion to influence public policy.

Chronologically, the collective actions explored in this chapter have significant overlap with those examined in the previous chapter. Viral contaminants in the blood supply resulted in the Haemophilia Society being deeply immersed in collective action to influence blood safety and compensation issues, first from 1983 to 1990 with HIV and AIDS, then from 1990 to 2005 in relation to hepatitis C. In this chapter I examine lobbying to overcome regional inequalities in access to blood products that occurred in the mid- to late-1980s and collective action to address regional inequities in access to quality haemophilia care, finally achieved in 2006.

The Haemophilia Society’s strong sense of entitlement to be included in making decisions that affected their lives and their belief in working with government, so sorely challenged during the Bad Blood episode, re-emerged stronger than ever in relation to national equity issues, although configured in different ways. The HFNZ by now had considerable experience in working with the government and working “outside of the tent” from government. I show that shifts in techniques and subject positions adopted by the Society over the entire period of collective action (1983–2006) drew on circulating global discourses and over time became increasingly crafted to subvert neoliberal dogma in relation to a market model of health care. In keeping with governmental techniques, they employed calculative and discursive mechanisms to render the issues technical (to use Li’s (2007) terminology) and therefore amenable to being fixed through specific techniques.

This chapter begins by presenting an overview of structural factors that created problems with access to blood products and examines how the problem was framed as regional inequity and the solution as a nationally coordinated blood service. This is an important precursor to the story of how a similar solution was found to regional inequities
in access to quality haemophilia care. An overview of the issues examined in this chapter is shown in the following diagram (Figure 11):

**Figure 10: Changes in tactics to address quality of care**

**Inadequacies of Regionalised Health Structure**

Regional inequalities in access to blood products and in quality of haemophilia care had been issues of concern for many years. While each issue had some specific peculiarities, both were largely linked to regionalization of health services, which were at their peak when we began our study of haemophilia care in 1994.

In the 1990s, a complicated mosaic of health territories was funded per head of population. The random but clustered nature of haemophilia and the high cost of haemophilia treatment meant that a higher than average number of people with haemophilia in a region could bankrupt a regional health service, whereas the neighbouring region might have had no people with haemophilia within its boundaries. For this reason, regionalised funding for haemophilia care did not work well.

Our 1994–1995 study was during the era (1993–1997) of Regional Health Authorities (RHAs). This structure had replaced the previous Area Health Board (AHB) structure that had existed for just ten years (1983–1993). The change to a RHA structure of governance reflected a more extreme neoliberal shift towards a business model of healthcare. Four RHAs, were the “purchasers” of health services from 23 “providers” called Crown Health Enterprises (CHEs), or what most people still called hospitals. This

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126 See Chapter Three for a more detailed description of changing health structures.
system created a purchaser/provider split based on contracting arrangements. CHEs were
to run as businesses and were incentivised to cut costs. People with haemophilia found that
the business model was increasingly affecting treatment. This suggested that the market
model of health was, as Rose’s (1996) observed in the UK, a new way of
“responsibilising” experts, making cost-cutting a major imperative. It was also part of
creating a more distant relation between expertise and politics, with regulatory power
delimited from “above” and planning and compulsion to “below”.

**Inequitable access to blood products**

In our 1994-1995 study, we found widespread concern among people with haemophilia
and clinicians about regional differences in people’s access to blood products. Two regions
in particular had insufficient blood products for their populations. As one person explained,
this led to constant attempts to limit their access to treatment products:

…Canterbury gets so many bottles and earlier in the year they'd run out – they were
supposed to last until April, well, they ran out in March. So in April they had to
start using June–July supplies…we weren't allowed any [blood products] at
home…because there just wasn't enough…And every time we'd ring [for products],
they'd say, "Oh, you realise there's a shortage?"...Yeah, we're just doing this for
fun, you know, just to get up your nose.

We were told that these shortages had become more acute over the previous two years,
suggesting the shortages were related to the restructuring of the health service in 1993.
Reciprocal arrangements between regions whereby fluctuations and acute high demands
for blood products were met by sharing between regions had until this time served the
population well. One region had a high number of young adults with severe haemophilia,
typically high users of factor VIII. This region had always had to “import” product from
other centres at times of high need. Under the new health structure, such sharing
arrangements were under threat.

We were told that in areas where shortages occurred, there were delays in surgery
and reductions in the amount of blood products some people could take for home
treatment. In certain cases this appeared to be due to the cost cutting measures of some
CHEs. At times a blood service would warn patients to conserve products. As a result,
people tried to treat only when urgent and also limited their activities to reduce the chances
of getting “a bleed”. One family we interviewed, for example, kept their two boys with
severe haemophilia inside for the weekend because the local blood service had run out of
product until the Monday. Had they lived in the adjacent region, this would not have been necessary and the boys would likely have been given regular prophylactic treatment.127

More extreme cases were also evident. For example, a man with haemophilia who was unwell and needed surgery was forced to wait for a week until the CHE got its next month’s allocation of factor VIII. In the meantime, he remained in hospital and was administered full blood, as would have occurred in the “bad old day” before blood concentrates were available. When he finally had surgery he was found to be bleeding internally and by then was in a critical condition. Had this person been in almost any other region, this threat to his life would not have occurred. We were also told of long-term conservative use of product in particular regions that resulted in men having “target” joints (with repeated bleeds) and limps that caused enormous pain and disability.

Demanding Rights and Equity
The 1990s was a time when a discourse of rights was very prevalent. As discussed in Chapter Seven, throughout the 1990s the Haemophilia Society fought for the rights of people with haemophilia to compensation and treatment for hepatitis C. Their claim was that the government had failed in their duty of care: a citizenship right to a standard of reasonable care while state-provided health services performed any acts that could harm them. This claim was not effective in convincing politicians that the haemophilia population deserved a fair settlement. In hindsight, it seems that this assumption of collective societal responsibility towards citizens was counter to neoliberal political philosophies of autonomous individuals who are responsible for their own self-governments.

At the same time as the Haemophilia Society was demanding rights to compensation, they were also lobbying for changes to the blood service. Their demand in this case, however, was for more equitable access to blood products. Equity proved to be a more effective discourse than rights.

Equitable access to blood products
Regional inequalities in access to blood products and inadequacies in government responses to viral contamination of the blood supply led to a growing demand for a

127 Prophylactic treatment involves regular treatment to restore the clotting factor levels to prevent bleeds from occurring rather than waiting until a bleed has occurred before treatment is given. Prophylaxis can prevent bleeds and therefore resultant joint and organ damage and has since become standard practice for all children with severe haemophilia.
national system of blood supply. This pressure came from clinicians, from the Haemophilia Society, and from other consumer groups such as KIDS (Kids with Immune Deficiency) who also relied on blood products. Our research team also supported this demand in a publication with another researcher and a haematologist (Howden-Chapman, Park, Scott and Carter 1996). The claim was that concerns about inequities and safety of blood quality could be overcome if the provision of blood became the responsibility of central government through a national blood transfusion organisation. Blood should continue to be a public ‘gift’ and the cost of processing and supply should be met directly by central government. With a population of just 3.5 million, one centralised body that could oversee the collection of blood, and the manufacturing, distribution and quality of blood products made good sense (Howden-Chapman et al. 1996).

The demand was met in 1998 with the establishment of the national New Zealand Blood Service. This meant that purchase and supply of both the plasma-derived products from the Blood Service and the increasingly used recombinant clotting products purchased by PHARMAC (Pharmaceutical Management Agency), became nationally-based. While a discourse of equity was adopted to make a case for this centralisation of the blood service, the arrangement also had considerable financial advantages. The National Blood Service was able to negotiate better deals than when each regional authority sourced their own products. PHARMAC reportedly negotiated some of the cheapest factor VIII prices in the world (Tony Goodwin, Bloodline, June 2006:6). A national body was also able to provide education about product change and associated equipment needs, and manage stockholding of treatment products, thereby eliminating problems of date-expired stock held at a regional level. Most importantly, the National Blood Service was able to create processes based on a principle of “haemovigilence” in recognition that blood and blood products are biologic in nature and carry inherent risks in respect of infection or reactions in the recipients (New Zealand Blood Service 2008).

The demand for a centralised blood service and the removal of competitive sourcing of product went against fundamental principles of neoliberalism. Despite political appetite for a market model of health care provision and decentralisation, when a more efficient system was identified, the government moved fairly quickly to centralise the

128 Now 4.5 m in 2013
129 New Zealand Blood Service. Accessed 30/12/11
blood service. This was not the only sector where competitive arrangements were deemed detrimental in such a small country. The success of the national dairy industry, for example, has long been linked to it being united under a single company to remove threats of different companies undercutting each other on the international market. As with the dairy industry, financial logic took precedence over the market model for the blood service. This was all great news for the haemophilia population. While the Haemophilia Society was still far from reaching a settlement for hepatitis C at this time, they were satisfied that they had contributed to the design of national systems of blood and pharmaceutical supply. This new structure also informed their thinking on what was needed in haemophilia care.

**Rights to quality haemophilia care**

Regional differences in access to quality care were another long-standing problem for the haemophilia community. An unevenly dispersed haemophilia population meant isolation, and lack of medical expertise was a common problem for people in rural and small provincial towns. One research participant in the 1995 study, for example, noted that on her husband’s recent visit to a local hospital with a mouth bleed, he was asked by the doctor attending him how long he had had haemophilia. This struck alarm bells as it indicated the doctor “had no idea”, as she put it. Fortunately a quick phone call to the outreach worker and subsequently to a haematologist enabled the man to get the treatment he needed.

In the mid-1990s, haematology specialists were based in seven regional centres: Auckland, Hamilton, New Plymouth, Palmerston North, Wellington, Christchurch and Dunedin. Our research at that time showed that even between the seven main haemophilia centres there were varying procedures for accessing treatment, and differential access to physiotherapy, reviews with a haematologist and other specialist services (Park, Scott and Benseman 1999).

One of the most disturbing interviews I undertook during the first phase of the research was with a young man and his family who lived in a small town in an isolated part of the South Island. This teenager already had two severely damaged joints that caused him considerable pain and limited his employment options. Having met many teenagers who had no or very little joint damage I was shocked to see his joints looked much more like those of older men who grew up before the availability of treatment. Much of the reason for this quickly became evident. He and his family spoke about the many hours of his
childhood they had spent waiting in the Accident and Emergency department of the local provincial hospital to get an infusion of blood products. In another area, he would have been whisked straight through to haematology for treatment. The young man and his mother explained that he had had many stays in hospital over his life time, reflected in the volume of his health records:

YM: Well, when you look at my records, they've got to bring out a trolley.
[laughter]
Mother: They do. Oh, that day we went to theatre, and they had them stacked on his bed and two trolleys. High! What are these? Oh, they are his records... I thought they were joking.

They laughed uproariously at the story, clearly not for the first time, reflecting their stoicism and ability to see the funny side of life. I was left, though, feeling disturbed at this stark example of inadequate treatment.

Another case that also showed the lack of standardised practices was observed by co-researcher Julie Park at a haemophilia camp. During a group discussion about treatment options, a parent explained her difficulties in getting their son treatment in a timely manner when he presented with a “bleed” at the local hospital. In response, a haematologist nodded and indicated that they should talk to him afterwards so that a set protocol could be put in place. Without this chance intervention, this young child could have also progressed to debilitating joint problems.

The Haemophilia Society had for many years been concerned about the effects of regionalised health care for people with haemophilia. This was framed in terms of a demand for rights of all individuals to quality care. We were told of many examples, like those described above, where some people in outlying areas experienced extremely inadequate quality of care, while others reported very good care. The rarity of haemophilia meant that specialist care cannot be provided in all areas. However, the Haemophilia Society were starting to develop the view that a nationalised system of care was necessary to ensure everyone had access to quality care, including through collaboration between doctors in isolated areas and the main specialist areas of expertise. As a research participant commented in 1995, personal experiences of regional differences in standards of care helped shape this demand:

I feel quite strongly that I’ve experienced provincial care as well as, you know, the larger metropolitan care, the Auckland care, and they are as different as chalk and cheese...I have a problem with that. So that’s why I believe that since haemophilia seems to be quite a specialist problem or issue and because it needs such a multi-
disciplinary team, that we’ve got to change the way we are organising haemophilia care in New Zealand by having one resource centre nationally…somewhere where the physician in Nelson or Blenheim or Oamaru is on-call, when a haemophiliac presents acutely, can ring Auckland and ask for advice. I think there’s some pro-active things that a resource centre could do as well, and that is issue standards of care, care protocol.

We found that throughout the country, Auckland was widely seen as the “gold standard” in haemophilia care because of its specialist haemophilia centre. As the person quoted above exemplifies, concerns were expressed that the benefits of such a centre should not just be for those who lived in the Auckland region.

**Rendering the Issues Technical**

One of the most interesting aspects of this story from my perspective was the manner in which the Haemophilia Society went about lobbying for an improved system. During the 1990s, the Society was still fighting the hepatitis C issue based on a rights demand for compensation for “victims of bad blood”. The late 1990s saw them lobbying for a more equitable blood service, which required significant restructuring. The fact that the Haemophilia Society was able to be organising protests against the government at the same time as it was working its networks to influence the blood service attests to their competence. From 2003, they shifted their approach, instead adopting an active citizen persona to demand equitable compensation for all people affected by hepatitis C. The same shift in subjectivity and discourses was also evident in the Society’s approaches to get improved quality of care, from rights of the individual to equitable standards of care.

By trying to create a national haemophilia system, the Society’s efforts can be described as an example of “positive democracy” (Rosanvallon 2008). They were not just making objections or being “watchdog” to keep government in check in ways that Rosanvallon (2008) described as “negative democracy”. Nor were they “working with” government in the conventional interest group way of representing their needs and demands of government. Instead they were being proactive. As with their approach to the blood service, they adopted some of the strategies of government to shape the “problem” as inequitable standards of care, and the “solution” as restructuring haemophilia care into a national system.

**National Standards**

The development of national standards for haemophilia care was initiated by the Haemophilia Society. In 1993, one of the Society’s volunteers attended the World Federation of Haemophilia congress in Mexico and came away feeling that New Zealand
was, in his words, “Third World in terms of treatment”. He also learned that national standards of care for serious health conditions were commonplace in the UK and USA at that time. This motivated him to initiate the development of similar national guidelines for New Zealand.

In 1995, the Standards of Care were produced by the Haemophilia Society and the Medical Advisory Council, in collaboration with other interested parties. In keeping with political discourses of the day, these guidelines presented a logical model of long-term financial gains and individuals’ rights to best international practice. As one person explained, the new approach was: "these are the sort of outcomes that we should be looking for in haemophilia care".

The demand for the rights of individuals to “best international practice” was in keeping with a rights discourse, described in Chapter Seven, that promoted the rights of the individual relative to the state. It also reflected a growing global trend towards “best practice” and “evidence-based practice” (EBP) that was becoming increasing evident across all policy areas and is still very popular today. Best practice is based on scientific knowledge and standardized ways of doing things that can be applied in all situations and evaluated to ensure it is being enacted correctly. EBP was taken up by social activists in the 1970s to promote social welfare reforms. They wanted an alternative to mathematical models that were used to evaluate the financial efficiency of social programmes, instead seeking the use of the best scientific knowledge to design and guide their work. This movement successfully replaced the economist approach with an EBP approach, and this became institutionalised by the 1990s (Sandler 2011).

While being a triumph for a more quality-focused approach, this newer form of practice valorises the gold standard of randomised controlled trials and gives much lower value to expertise opinion and experience (Thedvall 2011). In some cases, clinical expertise is subordinated to management policy (Castel 1991). This form of benchmarking has also been critiqued for its failure to be locally or culturally responsive. More importantly for my analysis, Nikolas Rose has critiqued it as a technique of advanced and liberal democracies to “shape, guide, [and] direct the conduct of others” (1999:3), taking the focus away from the responsibilities of the state.

Governmental studies were being undertaken to inform budgeting for future treatment, including “Haemophilia – the supply and future use of Factor VIII”, and “Prophylactic treatment for severe haemophilia A: an assessment of the costs and
benefits”. The Haemophilia Society’s efforts to create national best practice guidelines can be described as a strategic reversal of governmental forms of calculation and notions of active citizenship, aimed at guiding the conduct of front-line medical staff and creating demands of the state for higher quality care. This was based on a well-founded view that such people did not necessarily have the required level of expertise and experience to treat a person with haemophilia adequately.

Regionally equitable standards of care
In the New Zealand health context of the mid-1990s, policy focus had shifted towards the efficiency of the health service. The development of national standards for haemophilia care was viewed by the Haemophilia Society as just the first step towards improved outcomes. Demanding individual’s rights to international best practice may have been a politically popular approach at the time, but as with the Bad Blood issue, a rights discourse had limited impact. Based on experiences of hepatitis C and the blood service, and those of international networks, the Society started to frame their demands in terms of equity: “national equity” in standards of care became the new mantra.

When asked what they meant by national equity, the Society’s president replied that national equity means “ensuring that the same treatment for haemophilia care offered in large cities is offered in all areas of New Zealand” (Peta Hardley, interviewed in Hemophilia Leader, December 1997:4). Equitable, consistent, quality care for all people with haemophilia was the goal. “We do not want people with haemophilia in New Zealand to be penalized for living in areas other than the main cities” (Peta Hardley, interviewed in Hemophilia Leader, December 1997:4). With a small population, New Zealand could not support specialist haemophilia centres in all regions, but with a nationally coordinated system, the Society determined that a much more equitable and higher standard of care could be achieved. The Society also reasoned that financial savings could be achieved through a national system.

There was some overlap between rights and equity discourses. The Society continued to advocate for the rights of people with haemophilia to improved standards of

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care and to educate its membership about their rights as patients. In March 1995, for example, the Society newsletter published an article on the rights of people with haemophilia, drawing on work of the World Federation of Hemophilia. This included the right of people with haemophilia to be informed, full and equal citizenship, diagnosis, assessment and safe treatment and care. These rights informed the National Guidelines document (1994) prepared by the HFNZ. In July 1996, the newsletter published an article entitled “Your rights when receiving a health or disability service”, including respect, fair treatment, dignity and independence, proper standards, communication, information, decision-making, support, and rights related to teaching, research, and complaints. This mix of rights, equity, and financial logic all helped shape the national guidelines.

**Restructuring governance of haemophilia care**

The establishment of national guidelines did not remedy regional inequalities. The main stumbling block was the way that the funding for haemophilia services was still highly regionalised (Park, Scott, and Benseman 1999). As a health worker explained in 1995, a business model of health care affected their ability to provide adequate treatment for patients:

> ...what the pattern of behaviour up to now has all been a highly cooperative, collegial sort of thing, and we would ring [a centre of haemophilia expertise] and they wouldn't charge, and we'd get advice, and it was very relaxed. And now we are cursed with this new system, and everybody is being put on a business footing. So if I ring you up and ask for advice you set your stopwatch going and you charge me by the minute. Which is very inhibiting in communication.

Major restructuring of the health service over the 1980s and 1990s led to increasingly regionalised systems of funding, resulting in regionally inequitable standards of care. Treaters and the Haemophilia Society developed a growing sense that a national system was needed to get higher quality and more equitable standards of care.

At certain points, this was almost achieved or was achieved for a brief time. For example, after a few years under the RHA system, one RHA was designated as the contracting agent for haemophilia services, so acting ‘as-if’ a national service. However, just as this was implemented the RHA system was dismantled in 1998 and the four RHAs were merged into one national entity: the (Transitional) Health Funding Authority. While this new structure boded well for haemophilia care, restructuring inevitably led to government officials changing and their replacements had to be re-educated about the need

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131 This was based on a recommendation of the Cartwright Inquiry (1988) for a Patients’ Rights Code. This information is still available in a pamphlet for patients in 2012.
for a national system of haemophilia care. The Haemophilia Society continued to advocate for this, but their energies were largely taken up with the hepatitis C issue at the time. No sooner had the national system of health funding been introduced, than it was replaced in the next round of restructuring in 2001. Under these reforms, 21 District Health Boards (DHBs) were formed, undermining any movement towards a national system of haemophilia care (Park and York 2008).

In the 2004-2005 study, these concerns about regional inequalities in haemophilia care standards continued to be evident. For example, a parent explained in an interview that a boy attended the local hospital several times before he was permitted to see the paediatrician and start treatment. Had he been in a major centre, he would have immediately been referred to a haematologist, or a paediatric haematologist if in Auckland. The fact that these problems continued to occur, despite greatly improved treatment options and the establishment of national guidelines, suggested that structural changes were needed to ensure greater coordination and connections between regions.

Ongoing inequities prompted the Medical Advisory Council to develop the original Standards of Care document into the National guidelines – Management of Haemophilia Specification and Treatment Protocols in 2005 (Lauzon 2008). The HFNZ determined that problems related to regional inequalities in standards of care would only be overcome in the same way that regionalised blood service issues were overcome – through a nationally coordinated system of care.

It was about this time that a settlement was finally reached for the Bad Blood issue. The Haemophilia Foundation, as it was now known, had built their “active citizen” persona with all the attendant skills, networks and tactics aimed at influencing public policy by “working with” government (but being just as willing to use tactics of resistance when all else failed). With the hepatitis C settlement finally achieved, they turned their full focus to the issue of regional inequalities in haemophilia care. The volunteers worked with the Foundation’s Medical Advisory Committee and government officials, using the national standards document to build consensus about what was needed. They were active citizens but not content to just be recognised and included in decision-making. They wanted a major restructuring of haemophilia care. This type of demand is likely to be well beyond what government officials envisaged when they required local consumer involvement in planning under the New Zealand Health and Disability Act (2000).
National Haemophilia Management Group established

In July 2006, after many years of lobbying and private conversations with government officials by the Haemophilia Foundation, the National Haemophilia Management Group (NHMG) was established. The NHMG includes representatives from the Haemophilia Foundation, haemophilia nurses, three haematologists, and senior officials from the Ministry of Health, the DHB’s Association, and the CEO of the NZ Blood Service. A national system of haemophilia care was finally created that effectively ring-fenced a national budget for haemophilia care. DHBs now provide a population-based fee to the NHMG. The NHMG allocate funding for all haemophilia care, resulting in regional equity. In addition, the NHMG works closely with PHARMAC which tenders for the supply of product on the NHMG’s behalf.

The HFNZ was not content with “working with” government merely to shape the design of the new national structure of haemophilia care; they also wanted to “work within” the new governance structure to influence implementation over time. They were also successful in getting two positions on the NHMG – one official and one informational position. They considered their inclusion at the governance scale critical. The HFNZ have found that because NHMG decisions are made by consensus, they are able to influence decisions at this level.

As a national system, the NHMG has made significant savings on treatment products that have been diverted, on a regionally equitable basis, to fund specialist care such as tolerisation, haemophilia nurses, physiotherapy, and elective surgery (e.g., joint replacements). All of these services make a significant contribution to quality of life and to people’s ability to be involved in education, employment, and recreational activities.

An indicator of the success of the NHMG is that this national structure is being replicated for other high cost health conditions. The National Cardiac Surgery Clinical Network, for example, was established in 2009 to oversee and coordinate all cardiac surgery in New Zealand. Like the NHMG, it was also established to overcome regional inequities (Hamer and Kerr 2012). The Heart Foundation and the Cardiac Society have representation on the network but due to the nature of heart disease, these groupings are essentially professional networks rather than voluntary patient organisations. It is difficult to determine if the idea of a national structure for a costly and complex disease was translated from the haemophilia context to heart disease. Nevertheless, the same solution to regional inequities was implemented for both, thus creating a new norm of equity that went...
counter to neoliberal concepts of individual responsibility and decentralised decision-making.

**National haemophilia care and democracy**

The HFNZ’s influence in the establishment and ongoing governance of the NHMG raises interesting questions for democratic process. As posed at the beginning of this chapter, this influence on a governance body that oversees a significant budget can be seen as a triumph for “counter-politics”, as capture by an elite interest group, or as an example of neoliberal co-option of a voluntary association to undertake state responsibilities so allowing the state to govern “at a distance”, with limited accountability – therefore reducing democracy. I examine each of these possibilities in light of the ethnographic data to show that the categories that underpin these options are somewhat blurred. I then pose a more nuanced conceptualisation of this negotiated space between “the state” and “civil society”.

**Inclusive democracy?**

Based on social movement theories, I could conclude that the HFNZ’s influence was evidence of power “from below” whereby a voluntary association successfully shifted power relations to exert influence. Advocates of participatory governance might contend that the new governance structure was a more inclusive and therefore more democratic process. Iris Marion Young (2000), for example, observed that inclusion is a fundamental condition of democratic legitimacy, meaning that everyone whose interests are affected by public policies should be included in the process of making them. The new governance space could be described as a deliberative forum where a voluntary association can promote their interests, hold government to account, and be involved in collective problem-solving. This participatory governance style could therefore be considered a valuable complement to more representational forms of democratic process.

However, even advocates of participatory democracy caution that more inclusive democratic processes that “widen” and “deepen” participation in public policy processes are not enough to address deeper structural inequalities (Young 2000; Fraser 1997, 1998a, 1998b). The HFNZ was actually influential in creating a significant restructuring of national haemophilia care. They did not achieve this merely by entering “invited spaces” (Cornwall and Coelho 2007) of participation like a good active citizen. Over time they also created new spaces of influence, demanding to be involved into discussions and decision-making forums. Their strategic approaches when taking part in front stage political
activities were developed in parallel spaces of deliberation in the form of the HFNZ sub-committees. Each of these spaces was critical to their ability to exert influence.

Participatory democracy has drawn considerable criticism as a feature of neoliberal forms of governance, as examined in the introduction of this thesis. This leads to the second proposal that this influence was an example of reduced democracy.

**Elite capture?**

A common critique levelled at the “inclusive liberal turn” (Craig and Porter 2006) towards participatory democracy is that participatory processes can easily be dominated by elite interest groups (Fraser 1997; Cornwall and Coelho 2007; Strang 2009). Norms of deliberation are culturally specific and can operate as forms of power that perpetuate existing inequalities in status (Young 2000). Officials often privilege reasoned argument, resulting in exclusion of those who cannot or will not take up this discursive style. Therefore, rather than enabling diverse interests to be recognised and considered in policy decisions, participatory processes can just as easily lead to existing power relations being reinforced (White 1996).

As the previous chapter shows, the HFNZ often functioned as an interest group in the conventional democratic sense of promoting their interests and holding government to account. However, they also worked very hard over many years, to ensure that the national blood supply was safe for all New Zealanders, so they were not merely working for their own selfish ends. They became active citizens although they translated neoliberal tactics and discourses to promote equity, inclusion, and quality, not to increase the total spend on haemophilia but to get greatly improved outcomes from the existing budget.

The establishment of the NHMG could also be discounted as a non-elected “experts” group or Quango (Quasi-autonomous non-governmental organisation) to which decision-making power has been devolved. This enables the state to govern “at a distance”, with limited transparency and accountability, as no one can be held responsible for its actions (Davies 2007; Heinrich 2008). Rose (1996) observed that often governance merely redistributes social powers to new experts. This removes accountability to the public and shifts it towards business interests (Crouch 2004). A vivid example of this comes from the United States where the National Organic Standards Board became dominated by corporate interests, subordinating the interests of the organics movement, whose efforts had established the board in the first place (Ingram and Ingram 2005).
The NHMG does not include any business interests as members, just government officials, clinicians and a voluntary association with a will to justice. So the concern that the group will be dominated by the concerns of business is unfounded. The HFNZ certainly claims a high degree of expertise about haemophilia. Miller and Rose defined expertise as “the social authority ascribed to particular agents and forms of judgement on the basis of their claims to possess specialized truths and rare power” (2008[1990]:26). The concern is that the rise of the “expert” has recast the field of public policy as “technical” or “organisational”, to be decided on the basis of technical expertise rather than through public debate (Shore 2011; Callon, Lascoumes, and Barthe 2001). This is certainly an important concern. However, in terms of haemophilia care, the very small haemophilia population means that central government politics are unlikely to turn on decisions made that affect people with haemophilia.

The HFNZ displayed considerable competence at keeping abreast of international treatment practices and political tactics, maintaining useful networks, and working on behalf of their membership and with government officials. The HFNZ composed a network of forces to influence public policies. This is certainly an example of power operating “beyond the state” (Miller and Rose 2008:9).

However, following Miller and Rose (2008[1992]:82), I suggest that the political subject position the HFNZ adopted was derived from a collective body as a social citizen rather than as an individual “active citizen”. In simple terms, the HFNZ is accountable to its membership rather than to the state or business interests. HFNZ volunteers had widespread respect among the haemophilia population and their elected representatives are trusted to promote the greatest good for the greatest number within the haemophilia population. This line of accountability is a valuable aspect of the HFNZ’s involvement on the national body. Despite concerns that involvement can weaken a voluntary association’s ability to hold politicians to account (Paley 2008b), this seems unlikely, given the HFNZ’s track record. They proved more than able to retain working relationships while at the same time lobbying politicians. It took many years of detailed planning, documenting, and strategizing in parallel spaces of interaction for this voluntary association to create power to exert influence on the central political stage. As Arendt (1959) observed, such power is not pre-existing and is only sustainable through ongoing actions. In other words, power was an effect rather than the cause of the composition of forces (Latour 1986). My study shows that the HFNZ’s power has waxed and waned over time, but it would be inaccurate to call it an elite interest group.
**Pawns of the state?**

Critics of neoliberalism have highlighted many examples where roles and responsibilities that were formerly considered those of the state have been devolved to the “local” scale in the name of participatory democracy. Following Foucault, governmentality theorists have also critiqued participatory governance as being aimed at repositioning the individual citizen rather than the state (Lever 2005; Saggers 2005). Neoliberal governmentality refers to the penetration of market principles of discipline, efficiency and competitiveness used to induce free individuals to manage themselves (Ong 2006). Active citizenship in a neoliberal context frames the subject to be governed as an autonomous, responsible individual who freely chooses how to behave and act (Miller and Rose 2008).

Public participation in public policy processes can therefore be understood as aimed at involving citizens in provision of services formerly provided by the state. Participatory governance may theoretically enable everyone to have input, but only to what is considered “local” enactment of central government policies. This input often creates costs for citizens, so only those with significant resources can participate. Decentralisation can therefore shift the costs and responsibilities but not power, often reinforcing existing power relations (White 1996).

Rather than assuming that the actors do not know what made them act in the way they did, I seek to allow the actors to propose their own theories of action to explain agency (Latour 2005). The HFNZ did not express concerns that they were pawns of the state. Their experience as active citizens had taught them that government officials and politicians could not be trusted to make decisions on their behalf. Rather than building civic trust, as is often contended in relation to active citizenship, it can also lead to a profound mistrust. For this reason, and with the support of its membership, the HFNZ manoeuvred its way in to a stronger position to negotiate. That volunteers were mobilised into action by ineptitude or failures to uphold a duty of care by the state is a fair critique. To say that they have been co-opted would be to denigrate their strategic reversal of governmental tactics and to ignore the HFNZ’s expectation that they be involved.

**Working the spaces (and beyond) of neoliberalism**

The new national body to oversee national haemophilia care is an anomaly within a devolved, business model of health care. I suggest that the HFNZ contributed to this innovation in governance structure through strategic reversal of governmental techniques. They were not merely seeking “small reworking of their own spaces of action” as Rose (1999:280) theorised about those groupings that create “cramped spaces” of negotiation.
They used the participatory democracy predilection for “inclusion” and “participation” to create spaces of negotiation and influence.

Rather than seeking to reduce costs, the HFNZ wanted to show a more innovative and equitable approach to care. Policy makers were receptive to the idea of innovation since it would not cost more and would bring about better results. This looks like a win-win situation, where everyone wants the same thing. As a highly knowledgeable, networked, and skilled voluntary association, the HFNZ had become something of a “super citizen”. They were intimately involved in the design and ongoing implementation of a national structure. Innovation was a “means” to restructure health structures to achieve the “ends” of greater equity and higher standards of care.

The discourse of equity proved to be effective, perhaps since the concept resonates with historical cultural preferences for a “fair go”. Yet the new structure turns its back on decentralisation and competitive funding arrangements that are fundamental to neoliberalism governmentality. I suggest that this new structure is an innovation in governance made possible by collective strategizing and action by a voluntary association. The HFNZ used its knowledge and networks created through a drawn-out period of collective action to re-imagine the way haemophilia care could be governed.

Conclusions

The HFNZ drew on participatory governance discourses of inclusive decision making and participation to address inequities in haemophilia care. Financial logic was also employed. However, contrary to standard critiques of participatory governance, their version of “inclusion” and “participation” was much more than a side-event to the central political stage. They used these discourses and tactics of calculation such as National Guidelines to demand a complete restructuring that addressed fundamental inequities.

As Fraser (1997) contended, injustice is rooted in the political-economic structures of society. Distributive justice requires economic restructuring to alter the inequitable distribution of social benefits and social burdens. Fraser theorised that recognition and representation of diverse interests, and redistribution of resources were all required to achieve social justice. The HFNZ was indeed recognised in the development of the new structure, and restructuring enabled redistribution of resources in a regionally equitable way. The integration of both recognition and redistribution has been called “transformative recognition” (Fraser 1998), “inclusive communicative democracy” (Young 2000) or seen as evident in “hybrid forums” of negotiation (Callon, Lascoumes, and Barthe 2001). The
interesting lesson from the haemophilia example is that this innovation in governance was driven by a voluntary association rather than the state, suggesting that closer attention could be paid to the political activism of voluntary associations and their effects.
CHAPTER 9: CONCLUSIONS

This thesis opened with the observation that democracy expresses an ideal, not a method for achieving it. There is general agreement that democracy is broadly about decision making and the ability of “the people” to shape policies that affect their lives. The question still remains how to involve people in ways that enable timely, but broadly agreed on, decisions. Post-democracy theorist Colin Crouch (2004) contends that in this neoliberal era, politics is largely shaped behind closed doors by politicians and elite business interest groups. Such concerns have sparked timely debates about democracy in a globalised world. However, even if Crouch is right, if citizens cannot influence the most important policies that create the conditions of injustice, this does not prevent “the people” from continually challenging government decisions.

Every day, people gather to debate ideas, call rulers to account, and make demands of government and each other. I studied two such groups, voluntary associations that worked together to influence policies in ways they, at least, perceived as successful. Critics of neoliberalism would contend that even if such groups of people do exert influence, they lack democratic legitimacy: they are voluntary associations and pressure groups that may start out as oppositional groupings, but eventually become self-interested elites or are transformed into service providers and agents of the state.

I was interested in what these voluntary associations themselves consider to be “successful” influence on policies, and what part they play in democracy in practice. I posed the following questions: How is power produced through voluntary associations and networks? Can such power contribute to democracy in positive – and enduring – ways?

My research came out of an interest in groups of people who hold hope that they can create the power to exert political influence. The Haemophilia Foundation of New Zealand (HFNZ) and an urban leaders group called TIES tried to change the very architecture of decision making, rather than demand certain concessions or handouts. In this way, they successfully contested fundamental elements of neoliberalism such as decentralisation of decision making and a competitive market model for everything. I wanted to make their influences visible, to show why and how these people sought to influence procedural democracy, that is, the way people are involved in policy decision-making. As Hannah Arendt (1959) theorised, power is not pre-existent or imposed from above, but is produced through collective action. Would paying attention to the ways
power bubbles up in the interstices of daily life, as Foucault observed, be a useful way to make such fractures in the dominant political paradigm visible and provide hope that change is possible?

In this concluding chapter, I step back from the ethnographic detail of previous chapters to reflect on what the activities and influences of the HFNZ and TIES mean for democracy. I re-examine the concept of democracy to suggest that voluntary associations can be an integral and valuable part of democratic decision making. Most important, the HFNZ and TIES are examples of voluntary associations that successfully changed the processes of decision making, and so changed “the rules of the game” of democracy, even if this was only in small ways. I provide an overview of their approaches, including strategic use of space, co-opting governmental techniques, a discourse of equity, and a politics of persistent hope. Finally, I reflect on my choice of two such diverse associations, and my role as an anthropologist in relation to democracy, and raise some questions for future research.

**Post-democracy or Democracy-in-practice?**

The concept of post-democracy treats democracy as something we have or do not have. In contrast, the emergent field of the anthropology of democracy depicts multiple ways that democracy is culturally and historically produced and reproduced through collective action in different parts of the world (Paley 2008a). Democracy is therefore not a form of government imposed “from above”, nor is it an “all or nothing” condition a nation has (or does not have). Rather, democracy is a set of political processes fought for historically and every day. Fundamental elements of democracy such as free elections, the formation of political parties, women’s and minorities’ rights to vote, old age pensions, and the ability to hold elected representatives to account are all fought for, at different times and places, through collective action.

As Arendt (1959) observes, without the ability of citizens to come together, debate ideas, and make specific demands of elected officials, there can be no democracy. Contestation from the public sphere, therefore, is fundamental to the ideal of democracy being “of the people, by the people, for the people”. Democracy is not a destination, but is about finding ways to shape policies that affect our lives and to contest conditions of injustice. “The people” are never going to agree on what justice is or how it can be achieved, but democracy involves ongoing contestation, through collective action, to achieve that ideal. It is about getting enough of an agreement to proceed. Elections are one
way to achieve that, but people increasingly seek new spaces of negotiation with the state, and new forms of decision making, such as by consensus. This is an example of the ways democracy is continually being produced, debated, manipulated and re-imagined.

The issue for democracy then is not whether or not we “have” democracy, or how to restore democracy, but how to create conditions of justice. Neoliberalism, like democracy, is produced through specific policies, not as an all-or-nothing, as I show in this thesis. In Chapter Three, I described “Rogernomics”, or what we now recognise as an early manifestation of New Zealand neoliberalism, as involving rapid deregulation of the finance sector, and the removal of subsidies and protections on industry. Other elements such as the market-model in the state sector were rolled out over several years, and some ideas such as “user pays” in hospital care were only very briefly implemented, then dropped. While the finance minister had an overall vision of radical reform of the welfare state, some elements such as free hospital care were so closely linked to the nation’s sense of egalitarianism and the concept of everyone deserving a “fair go” that they remained in place.

Rather than post-democracy, perhaps the more important question is what comes after neoliberalism. How are people imagining and achieving alternative forms of governance, step-by-step, fighting every day, based on hope for a better future? My research makes a small contribution, showing, for example, how the HFNZ subverted fundamental elements of neoliberalism to help create the National Haemophilia Management Group.

**Are we allowed to say empowerment or is it still too soon?**

My rather optimistic approach to studying “successful” collective political action came out a sense of despair at theories and endless accounts of unrelenting doom related to “participatory” democracy: unsuccessful collective action, absorption of oppositional narratives into the dominant political discourse, or elite capture of “public participation” processes (e.g., Burchell 1991; Dean 2006; Heinrich 2008; Hyatt 2011; Lahiri-Dutt 2004; Miller and Rose 2008 [1992]; Roßteutscher 2005; Taylor 2007; White 1996;). In a neoliberal context, not only public participation, but democracy itself was deemed to lack efficacy and legitimacy. If that is the case, how can alternatives be envisaged, let alone enacted?

I wanted to see if there was a way of looking at democracy as slightly less dualistic – not something we have or do not have – and slightly, dare I say it, empowering. Leaving
aside for the moment the connotations of the 1970s empowerment movement, people need to feel that they have power to exert influence on decisions that affect them. Can the concept of empowerment be reclaimed to refer to collective political action, or is the empowerment-of-the-individual-to-make-wise-choices discourse still too strong?

What then do people who continue to try to create power to influence policies see as success?

The “how” of the “who”

Nancy Fraser (2009) observed that activists on the global stage are increasingly trying to influence the “how” of policy, as in how to determine who is affected by a specific policy and therefore eligible to influence that policy. The Occupy Movement is an example of a global network of activists that questions the power of supra-national organisations such as the World Trade Organisation (WTO) and the urgent need to attend to the needs of the “99%” rather than just shareholders of transnational corporations. These activists conceive of a transnationalised public sphere rather than a public sphere that is contained within a democratic nation-state. Fraser (2009) contends that this question of framing, that is, determining the who of policy, is the central question of democratic justice in a globalised world.

“It’s all about the process”: The “how” of policy design

Collective political action by TIES and the HFNZ was contained within the nation-state, although, as I have shown, these volunteers were part of global networks that shaped their activities. They were trying to influence the how of policy, meaning not just how to determine who should be involved (as Fraser described of global activism), but additionally how the said people should be involved in policy.

Both my ethnographic examples show that the most successful influences achieved by voluntary associations, from their perspectives, were not on the policy itself, but on the processes of policy-making. As a TIES member told me when asked what TIES was trying to achieve, “It’s all about the process”. This was the “how” of policy design.

The TIES team celebrated the absorption of narratives of Co-design/Co-delivery into the urban renewal programme because this discourse could guide the processes of public participation over time. Co-design/Co-delivery – a concept developed collectively through dialogue over time, and promoted through presentations, texts and demonstration – became the new norm for public participation in Tāmaki. The concept continues to be promoted and demonstrated by an increasing number in community and state sectors. This
is an example of what Sassen (2006) called informal, or not yet formalised, narratives and practices that need to be made visible as potential alternative governance arrangements.

The HFNZ’s success in promoting a formalised national structure through which the HFNZ and key state actors could oversee haemophilia care was again about the processes of decision-making. The establishment of national treatment guidelines were a starting point to shape more equitable health care for people with haemophilia, but the HFNZ understood that what was required was a major restructuring of the way haemophilia care was governed for these treatment protocols to be achieved. The new National Haemophilia Management Group enables enduring influence and more equitable standards of care.

Collaboration and collective responsibility: The “how” of policy delivery

A narrative of collective responsibility shaped the actions of both the HFNZ and TIES. Coming together to debate issues built relationships between people that in turn created power, enabling them to mobilise as a collective voice.

TIES promoted shared responsibility for health and well-being, rather than providing the conditions for individuals to thrive. TIES members subverted the competitive funding environment by initiating and supporting existing networks of local community organisations, other NGOs and government agencies to work collaboratively to address critical local issues in ways that worked. This was not just the “how” of policy development, but also the “how” of policy delivery. TIES repeatedly emphasised the importance, for example, of government officials maintaining relationships with community members throughout design and implementation of a programme. Relationships, not just “dialogue”, were what enabled trust and collaboration to develop.

Many aspects of Co-design/Co-delivery are still being worked out at a local scale, but there is now a widely held expectation in Tāmaki that any agency seeking to work in the local area first needs to engage with local networks and organisations and determine whether their work is needed, and how and with whom that work should proceed; in other words, how to involve local people and how to deliver an effective programme.

Involving local people in the conceptual thinking and delivery of a programme certainly has a 1970s ring of “empowerment” about it. The difference between what TIES was promoting and the empowerment movement of an earlier era was that collective empowerment to confront conditions of injustice was fundamental to TIES activities. TIES were not merely seeking to “empower” individuals. TIES enhanced the ability of
marginalised and impoverished Tāmaki communities to engage in partnerships with more power agencies at multiples scales, and so, following Appadurai (2002), deepened democracy.

Nevertheless, as our government increasingly divests itself of a duty of care toward citizens, and leans toward blaming and punishing the individual for their misfortunes, the danger is that the community organisations will merely step into the breach left by the state. Collective responsibility can, of course, mean that local communities are forced to find “local solutions to local problems” since there are no other options. Co-design/Co-delivery therefore needs to be implemented in ways that identify and contest hierarchies of injustice.

Three TIES members became politicians during the period of my research, two elected to the local board and one a National-party list Member of Parliament. These three local Tāmaki people, two Pacific and one Māori, actively promote Co-design/Co-delivery or Tāmaki “ways of working” in numerous forums, and so help embed these processes in practice. Critics could claim that TIES was a training ground for the middle-class to build their power base in preparation to rule (e.g., Eley 1992). Yet from the perspectives of local Tāmaki people, the elevation of these talented local leaders to elected representative positions is cause for celebration. The only down side is that their contributions are now at broader scales, rather than being focused locally.

From a national health advocacy perspective, a narrative of collective responsibility was more effective than ideas of individual rights and responsibilities, as the HFNZ learnt in trying to extract compensation for hepatitis C and in delivery of haemophilia care. The HFNZ’s position on the National Haemophilia Management Group means that this voluntary association can ensure national standards are implemented equitably throughout the country. Again, working relationships between government and the HFNZ are critical. This is also about the “how” of policy delivery.

**Changing the rules of the game**

Collective political action, and an anarchist’s anthropology of democracy, is not about trying to create a return to democracy but to continue the fight for inclusion, participation and justice. Chapters Three to Eight of this thesis trace the genealogies of the HFNZ and TIES to show the logic, techniques and technologies they employed to make small changes to the “rules of the game”. They saw inclusion and participation as integral to democratic decision-making processes, rather than a minor part of a check list of steps in the political
process. As noted in the introductory chapter, ruptures in dominant forms of power are not merely created by exceptional leaders or at one particular moment, but as a culmination of years of smaller actions and conversations by a range of actors. The key features of these activities are strategic creation and use of interactive political spaces, reversal or co-option of governmental techniques, and narratives of equity and a politics of persistent hope.

**Strategic use of space**

TIES and the HFNZ created spaces of face-to-face interactions where new relationships and ideas could be developed. The voluntary associations themselves became centres of calculation where people come together freely to strategise together, build networks, and develop a capacity to act collectively for public-political purpose. These processes took time. The ethnographic studies have shown that these processes also involved a lot of trial and error, backstage conversations, bickering, collegiality, learning as they went along what others’ strengths and potential contributions could be, who could be trusted, and where/who were the points of penetration into dominant discourses and practices. Backstage negotiations did not enable them to become a highly united group, but rather to develop enough agreement to act collectively. However “thin” the party line, loyalty on the front stage of political action enabled them to demand important changes that would not have been possible had they acted individually.

The voluntary associations were intermediary spaces between state and society, but volunteers moved adeptly between different spaces of influence, sometimes butting against a barrier until they could enter, at other times being slightly surprised or even alarmed at how quickly (and at times, obtusely) their ideas were picked up by government. Whether this meant they were filling a gap left by state ineptitude, or whether government officials were “walking the talk” of partnership and collaboration still remain questions.

Funding from government or business was either refused or strategically diverted to specific roles or activities, suggesting that TIES and the HFNZ were well-versed in the ways of activism in the public sphere. As long as the volunteers remained accountable to their membership (HFNZ) or to the community group (TIES) rather than to the state or corporate sponsors, they were able to retain their integrity and some level of democratic function. Even when the HFNZ did accept corporate or government funding, for example, to employ outreach workers to support people with HIV and AIDS, the association was not automatically transformed from an oppositional group into service providers (contrary to what was observed by Miller and Rose 2008 [1996]). They retained their ability to contest
and shape public policies. At times the HFNZ did advise the membership to take care with the expensive treatment products by not overstocking at home, for example, so that products would not expire and so be wasted. However, this was not in the league of authoritarianism that Hyatt (2011) cautioned could occur when grassroots groups took over service provision. The oversight of the HFNZ of the professional service of outreach workers was an example of devolved service delivery that worked well for people with haemophilia, suggesting this is one practice that emerged from an era of neoliberalism that is worth holding on to.

Like the HFNZ, TIES was a highly capable group of volunteers who strategically demonstrated that they could be responsible, reasonable, and act within time constraints when needed. They created and moved with ease between roles in the state, business, and community sectors, blurring the boundaries of authority to good effect. This suggests they used the tactics of the “shadow elite” described by Janine Wedel (2009), moving in and out of business and government networks, only in this case they were acting for wider public interest. When they thought it was needed, however, they could quickly shift to a highly oppositional stance. Successfully resisting the “expert” consultants’ attempts at deliberative forums is one such example. This was team work, developed strategically over time, through adversity and opposition to injustice.

**Co-opting governmental technologies**

Foucault’s concept of strategic reversibility of governmental technologies has provided a lens to highlight important elements of how the voluntary associations exerted influence. Strategic reversal or counter-conduct is where state diagnosis of what is lacking in the population is used to create demands “from below” (Li 2007). The very idea of “public participation” is largely, in my experience in urban contexts, aimed at creating “active citizens” who can self-manage. In this thesis, I have described many examples of TIES and the HFNZ demonstrating “active citizenship” by using techniques such as documentation, surveys, cataloguing, describing, prioritising, and identifying “best practice”. But they were using these technologies to their advantage, making demands of government for more inclusive or equitable policy processes. Working in partnerships with more powerful agencies at multiple scales enables a “deepening” of democracy (Appadurai 2002). As noted above, they made use of a “revolving doors” approach more often attributed to business/government, moving deftly between state and community sectors, and even co-opting competent government officials, for example, into their programmes. The
appointment of Pat Sneddon, the former chair of the Tāmaki Transformation Programme, to chair the board of the Manaiakalani Education Trust is just one such example.

**Equity**

During the 1990s, at a time when the National-led government was promoting individual responsibility and “fairness” in social policy, the HFNZ repeatedly campaigned to demand the government recognise the rights of individuals to compensation for hepatitis C. They also advocated for individual rights to national standards of care. In both cases, they employed a rights discourse, and in both cases, they were unsuccessful.

Over time, the HFNZ learned that the discourse of equity (rather than individual rights) created effective leverage points. In relation to hepatitis C, a demand for compensation that was fair and equitable (in relation to all people who had contracted the virus through the blood supply) received much greater support than merely a demand for individuals’ rights to compensation. This approach was successful in convincing a senior politician to pledge support. However, when this pledge proved worthless, the HFNZ reverted to tactics of resistance, threatening to question the trustworthiness of senior politicians. They had tried and failed to achieve their ends through protests that publically humiliated the government, but the threat of embarrassment worked. It left some room for the politicians to move without losing face.

Demanding the rights of individuals to particular resources or concessions can be dismissed by politicians as the demands of one among many self-promoting interest groups. In contrast, a demand for equity resonates more strongly with national discourses of egalitarianism and fairness.

The actions of the National-led government during the early 1990s suggested that these politicians were also cognisant of the effectiveness of the discourse of fairness and equity. They employed the concept of “fairness”, but subverted it to promote marketisation in the state sector. The 1991 health reforms, for example, introduced a requirement for fairness, which in this case referred to the ability of health consumers to choose between competitively funded health providers (Prince, Kearns, and Craig 2006). Another twist in this tale was that Māori and other groups strategically reversed the requirement for fairness to demand alternative health care, including the wider Hokianga community who managed to subvert the competitive funding model altogether (Kearns 1998). However, there have been other important instances where the discourses of the “self-reliant” pioneer and *tino rangatiratanga* (self-determination) resonated so strongly with the neoliberal ideas of
individual responsibility that extreme neoliberalism became quickly entrenched in New Zealand as “the only option”.

In the mid-2000s, the HFNZ successfully advocated for the restructure of the governance of haemophilia care to achieve regionally equitable care for people with haemophilia. Equity, in this context, referred to the quality of care, and fairness in being able to access quality care regardless of where a person lived. Furthermore, at a time when the Labour-led government was espousing inclusivity and partnership, the HFNZ effectively made a case for two HFNZ people to be part of the new governance structure. They employed the dominant political discourses of the day to promote a viable governance alternative.

**A politics of persistent hope**

I see the activities of TIES and the HFNZ as driven by narratives of hope, rather than “narratives of struggle” (Feinsilver 1993, in Kearns 1998:229). When people are motivated by a narrative of hope, they mobilise at the level of the collective, and downplay their differences as individuals or their specific group identities. TIES members, for example, were leaders of ethnic, church, marae and community organisations, but in TIES forums they debated the needs and aspirations of the collective rather than their own or those of their different organisations.

When I relayed the narrative of hope idea to TIES members, I got an interesting response. Most nodded, agreeing that hope was indeed an important reason they “kept coming back”. However, one person, an academic and community worker, was uncomfortable with this framing. “Hope”, she said, “sounds too passive”. TIES was more about being assertive, aspirational, and driven by a compulsion to act. Others then started to join in, agreeing that they couldn’t “just sit and let things happen yet again”, and they were “stepping up” in the same way that others before them have done to challenge injustice. I queried whether “persistent hope” was better, and after some discussion, everyone agreed.

Persistent hope is morally constituted, implying a strong sense of entitlement and urgency to exert influence, as both TIES and the HFNZ demonstrated. It also implies persistent optimism that a better world is possible, despite the odds. This aligns with a New Zealand cultural tendency towards hopefulness, or a belief that things will work out in the future (Bönisch-Brednich 2008). Hage proposes that nations can be “mechanisms for the distribution of hope” (2003:3). He contends that a caring state fosters reciprocal caring
amongst citizens and also makes a citizen feel “like a human being” (2003:3) with a disposition of hope. Yet in this thesis, I show that two voluntary associations induced hope in the face of an uncaring state. Some patient organisations have aligned with scientists to shape the research that may create a better future for themselves and others, creating new spaces of hope (and fear) (Rose and Novas 2005; Rabeharisoa 2006). In contrast, TIES and the HFNZ, also invested with hope, aligned with other NGOS, community organisations and government agencies to shape decision making processes. This suggests voluntary associations may also have a role in creating space for the distribution of hope.

Another word for hope or persistent optimism is, of course, “faith”, which allows a high tolerance for contradiction and adversity. My discussion with TIES led me to reassess Arendt’s work on forgiveness and trust that I had initially discounted as relating to religious principles of faith. Arendt (1959) contends that the ability to forgive and to trust each other are critical to collective action in the public sphere. She explains that because political action occurs through webs of relationships and action, the results are unpredictable. The remedy for unpredictability is the faculty to make and keep promises. Additionally, Arendt contends that because collective action involves a chain of actions and reactions that cannot be reversed, people need to be able to forgive each other when things go wrong.

This reminded me of the ways TIES members continued to try, against all odds, to exert influence on those things they thought important. Sometimes working together was fun, time efficient, and inspiring. But when conflict broke out between the group, hope was briefly replaced with anger and frustration. However, as a TIES member reminded me when I was in that very situation myself, “yes, but we are friends, so we forgive each other”. In other words, we did not abandon the “in-between space” (Arendt 2005:193) of collective action at the first sign of dissent.

A politics of hope, therefore, may well require trust and forgiveness, which in my experience are more achievable and enduring in voluntary associations than in relations with the state. I do not deny that conflict and dissent are common in Tāmaki, but groups such as TIES keep alive the idea that injustice can be challenged. Arendt warns that “withering away of everything between us” in the public sphere is like the “spread of the desert”, and observes that only “those who can endure the passion of living under desert conditions can be trusted to summon up in themselves the courage that lies at the root of action, of becoming an active being” (2005:201-202). As the HFNZ and TIES engaged in political action, they recognised and respected regional or ethnic differences, but worked
for the collective at national or local community scales. In Arendt’s terms, they had the courage and passion to look for and support what existed *between* people. An important issue for future research is how gender, ethnicity and class shape narratives of hope, including expectations and experiences of collective action.

**Is this what democracy looks like?**

Representational forms of democracy, or majority rule, are the dominant paradigm of democracy. However, this is being challenged around the globe by groups that have greater faith in consensus decision-making. Despite very pertinent academic concerns about participatory democracy being driven by neoliberal agendas, there are increasing examples of people demanding to participate in ways that allow them to exert influence more often than every three years at the polls. When protestors in Seattle chanted “this is what democracy looks like” to refer to their mass gatherings, they meant it (Graeber 2004:84). The process of dialogue and consensus decision making was what they saw as democracy, not the WTO meetings behind closed doors of elected officials and business interests. Since then, this chant has been picked up and repeated at demonstrations around the world to demonstrate solidarity in the face of domination.

So what does this debate about democracy tell us about the role of voluntary associations in contemporary democracies? Does collective political action increase or diminish the very connections between rulers and their constituents that democracy is intended to create?

My research shows two voluntary associations that adopted a range of negotiating positions between state and society to influence *processes* of decision-making rather than the decisions themselves. As examined in Chapter Eight, this influence helped create the National Haemophilia Management Group, a centralised body to govern all haemophilia care. This body is incongruous with the regionalised, market-model of health care, but as examined in Chapter Three, this is not the first time that advocacy groups have successfully subverted certain neoliberal forms of health governance. Nor is the National Haemophilia Management Group a more “democratic” model of governance, since its members are there by appointment rather than election. However, the group does not include business interests, and decisions are made by consensus rather than vote, enabling the HFNZ to have an intimate and ongoing relationship with the state. From the perspectives of the haemophilia population, this means that they can exert influence in very important ways. Is this what democracy looks like?
The TIES team was also a non-elected group, and, as discussed above, sought to influence processes of decision making. The focus on processes of decision making is an issue of democracy, but this does not necessarily mean TIES’ influence was “democratic”. TIES and the National Haemophilia Management Group are examples of non-democratic entities that Brown (2009) and Fennema and Tillie (2005) argue can produce democratic effects. The HFNZ and TIES team embedded themselves within a political framework that enabled them to be part of the “creative tensions” (Brown 2009) between public participation and state institutions.

**An anarchist anthropology of democracy**

My work was motivated by the idea that collective political action through voluntary associations and networks is a fundamental – but little understood – element of democracy in practice (Rosanvallon 2008). My contributions to anthropological theories of democracy result from a close analysis of collective political action through voluntary associations. I show two voluntary associations that acted collectively to create democratic effects, including more equitable and inclusive decision making processes. This shows that neoliberalism, like democracy, is not a monolithic project but rather a collection of ideas and practices produced, and contested, on a daily basis. I have used ethnographic examples to give a more nuanced account of spatial dimensions of democracy. The parallel nature of voluntary associations in relation to the state enabled these groups of people to re-imagine alternative democracies in profound ways. They strategically captured, subverted and created political spaces of interaction to reframe public participation as a fundamental democratic practice.

Why do such accounts matter? My inspiration came from engaged anthropology and from Graeber’s vision of an “anarchist anthropology” (2004), that seeks to work with and contribute to the societal groupings who are creating viable democratic alternatives. I merged research questions from the emergent field of the anthropology of democracy with an engaged or anarchist anthropology.

This means that my contributions have taken place over time, throughout my research, not just through this thesis. I have engaged in an iterative process of learning and reflecting on the bigger democratic implications of what these groups are doing, and providing back to the groups frameworks for thinking about their activities. I have also sought to document and analyse their actions, and successes, so that they can inform the larger project of moving beyond neoliberalism. Above all, their actions show that
contestations through collective action can puncture expert discourses and practices in ways that promote social justice. How that is done is, and has always been, the task of collective political action.

Some “tipping points” were identified in the ethnographic studies where their collective efforts were effective in shaping policies in the ways they sought. For example, formalising TIES as a collective meant that after that the government had to deal with a united group of leaders. TIES refusal to help facilitate deliberative forums was a turning point in community engagement processes, including affirmation that local solutions needed to be sought. A highly persuasive presentation by a TIES member to the Board of the Tāmaki Transformation Programme built understanding and commitment to a new discourse of Co-design/Co-delivery, effectively reframing public participation as a process that was up for debate, rather than a technical matter to be determined by experts. Perhaps a more important issue in terms of collective action is that these stories of achievement were told and retold. Celebrating success and reciting the lineage of the group and their activities is a useful way to show the links between past and present actors and their aspirations, build a collective memory and keep alive the sense that change is possible.

Graeber (2004) identifies what he calls “fragments” of an anarchist anthropology. From his perspective, fragments are “a series of thoughts, sketches of potential theories, and tiny manifestos” (2004:1). I find this a useful way of thinking about the democratic effects through collective action that I have identified. While no “alternative democracy” is yet visible, I show fragments of alternative visions for democracy and show how these fragments left a powerful impression on many people. I offer them here in the hope that they can motivate others.

I found it useful to follow Goldfarb’s (2006) lead in terms of triangulating theories of three great thinkers from the last century – Arendt, Foucault, and Goffman. Their theories of power through collective action, governmentality, and micro-politics helped explain how and why the voluntary associations acted in the ways they did, and the effects of that action. However, the broader framework of what I am now tentatively calling an anarchist anthropology of democracy enabled me to be at once engaged in debates at a community scale while continually shifting the analytic lens between local and national or global scales.
Joining the dots between urban renewal and national health advocacy

I chose TIES and HFNZ to be the focus of my study because both are associations made up of volunteers who wanted to influence public policies. Both consider they have had some success in shaping policies in ways that promote greater inclusion and social justice, not just for themselves but for the wider membership and the wider community. Unlike some other voluntary associations in which I had been involved (such as a local ratepayers association), these were not interest groups seeking to advance their own causes at the cost of other societal groupings. The HFNZ, for example, used considerable time, effort and expert knowledge to ensure that the blood supply was safe for all New Zealanders, refusing to distance themselves from other stigmatised groups who were also savaged with the HIV and AIDS pandemic. TIES worked voluntarily, over 3 years, to ensure more local people could be involved and benefit from a major urban renewal programme. Their political subject position was therefore derived from the collective body as a social citizen, rather than as individual “active citizens” (Miller and Rose 2008 [1992]).

My selection of two such diverse voluntary associations for my research calls for reflection. A key criterion for selection was that the voluntary associations themselves conceived they had effectively influenced policies. I also identified that these groups had influenced policies in ways that could not easily be explained (or dismissed) by current theories of participatory democracy and governmentality. But the differences between the groups made comparison difficult. One was a localised group seeking to shape urban renewal processes between 2008 and 2011. The other is a national health advocacy group involved in political action over many years, commencing in earnest in the early 1980s in response to HIV and AIDS. Shifting time and scale made the already difficult task of comparative analysis even more difficult (Gingrich 2012). It meant that I needed to present fragments of re-imagined democratic practice without comparing details at the level of urban renewal or health advocacy.

Throughout the research, particularly during the writing process, I was very aware that there were vast and relevant literatures into which I was unable to do more than dip: urban renewal, health advocacy, NGOs, social movements, community development, volunteering, geographies of place, to name just a few. Instead of seeking to compare my studies with others in the urban renewal and health advocacy literature, I aimed to trace circulations of discourses and how they intersect, merge, and transform at specific time and places, while also lifting my sights to look at the big picture of what this means for democracy.
In retrospect, choosing two such dissimilar associations (by scale and sector) made the task somewhat more difficult as I never felt fully informed on issues such as social policy reforms and urban development trends that shaped the worlds in which my research participants lived. Had I aligned my study of collective political action in Tāmaki with the politics of place (Bönisch-Brednich and Trundle 2010), for example, I would have been able to explore how TIES activities fitted with parallel group activities by Māori, Pacific and new migrants and their ideas of place-making, community, and belonging.

This approach would have had the added benefit of sounding more anthropological. An issue I faced while doing my research was that I often had to justify and explain my interest in collective political action and democracy, suggesting that in the broader community, at least, anthropology is still very much conceived as the study of “the Other”. My decision to work “at home” and explore issues that were extremely important to those I interacted with on a daily basis sits well with my aspiration toward an anarchists’ anthropology of democracy. Many other details – such as the apparent divergence between anarchism and democracy – are still to be worked through.

Finally, I would like to reflect on the value of showing collective action and public participation that more or less worked, rather than the more usual approach of analysing failure of effective participation. As I explained in the TIES section of the thesis, I could just as easily have written a very depressing analysis of TIES’ failings to transform into a more representative or “democratic” group, or the continual shifts between government attempts to “engage the community” and the sidelining of local residents while the experts develop the next round of designs or interventions. No doubt influenced by TIES discussions, I was more interested in highlighting the small power shifts TIES managed to create rather than merely contributing another sad story to an already abundant literature of failed public participation. My analytic lens was firmly fixed on the voluntary association, keeping the more powerful actors they sought to influence within the frame of analysis, but always as a backdrop to collective action. As these voluntary associations understood, and as Paley (2008) theorised, all actors are needed to develop alternative forms of democracy.

I have contributed to a greater understanding of what democracy looks like according to the voluntary associations themselves, the ways their narratives and practices conflicted (and aligned) with those of the state, and how they made that work for democratic effect. I show democracy in practice as an ongoing pushing back and forth between and within the state, voluntary associations, and broader society. Contestations layer upon one another and occasionally puncture expert discourses to create alternative
political visions. My thesis makes people power visible, even if it is fleeting and still in fragments. The task for future democracy theorists and activists is to piece together more fragments of successful collective political actions to create a more coherent picture of democracy in practice.
Appendix 1: Some characteristics of TIES members

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<td><strong>Gender</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Ethnicity</strong></td>
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<td>Government</td>
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<td><strong>Residence</strong></td>
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<td>Tāmaki(^{132})</td>
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<tr>
<td>Not Tāmaki</td>
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Table 1: Some characteristics of TIES members

\(^{132}\) Glen Innes, Point England or Panmure
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