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Reconciliation and the Quest for Pākehā Identity in Aotearoa New Zealand

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Abstract

The interdependent but at times fractious relationship between Māori and Pākehā in Aotearoa New Zealand has been indelibly shaped by its complex association with colonization. From the 1970s onwards, a period that marked a political and cultural renaissance amongst Māori, Pākehā began to renegotiate their identity and the way they belonged to this land. Prominent amongst these renegotiations were claims of ‘indigeneity’ and revisionist ideas about the Treaty of Waitangi.

This public theology thesis is framed as a conversation between various dialogical partners in response to these claims and consists of three main sections. It traces the historical trajectory of Pākehā settlement in Aotearoa New Zealand, the cultural and political changes post-1970, and then posits some examples of the ‘Pākehā quest for identity and belonging’ by three prominent New Zealanders: Michael King, Donald Brash and Trevor Mallard. These claims are then analysed via a postcolonial lens and I argue in concert with three New Zealand scholars, Avril Bell, Ani Mikaere and Stephen Turner, that some of the articulations continue to bear traces of colonialism. The resultant ‘offence’ places pressure on the already strained relationship between Māori-Pākehā, yielding a need for reconciliation.

To address this need, I posit a Christian model of reconciliation, an ontological-ethico schema which provides the framework for some reconciliatory ideas that fulfil the Pākehā existential need for identity and also satisfy a postcolonial perspective.

The main reconciliatory idea inspired by this model is that the Treaty of Waitangi, when understood covenantally, is an ontological and ethical structure that provides both an opportunity of reconciliation and a location of ‘identity and belonging for Pākehā’. To clarify the covenantal scope of the Treaty and its meaning for Māori-Pākehā relations, I propose the idea of Hobson’s ‘one-people union’ at Waitangi as analogous to marriage. Understood in this way the Treaty is a locus of reconciliation and identity, and one that continues to provide for the Māori and Pākehā relationship a covenantal security that also yields a concomitant relational ethic.
Acknowledgments

He hōnore, he korōria ki te Atua – Honour and Glory to God

He maungārongo ki te whenua – Peace to the Earth

He whakaaro pai ki ngā tāngata katoa – Goodwill to all humankind!

This thesis is dedicated to the kuia at Parihaka: Aunty Marg, Aunty Ena and Aunty Neta, for it was in your aroha [love] that this reconciling journey began. “Nō reira, e kuia mā: moe mai ra e ngā wahine o te hohou rongo, moe mai, moe mai! Therefore, reconciling women, rest in peace, rest in peace!”

Writing a thesis is a family affair. To my longsuffering and supportive wife, Jeannie – this is a work that belongs to both of us. My daughter Naomi has been a constant support and a bibliographical ‘angel’! Cousin Graeme Carlé, is my hermeneutical ‘plumb line’ and one who helped me arrive at the finish line. To my wider family and friends, and to my reconciling partners in Te Kohinga, thank you for all your encouragement, especially the Elvins, who lent me an office in a season of need.

Liz Ardely has patiently searched out the misplaced commas and apostrophes – but the mistakes are still mine! Andrew Bradstock, my second supervisor made some helpful comments on the Public Theology chapter.

I reserve my final thanks for my main supervisor Neil Darragh, who accompanied me on this journey and who read so many words...Neil thank you for your wise counsel and faithful patience!

Nō reira, kei te tino manawareka te ngakau ki a koutou! Therefore, my heartfelt thanks to you all!
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Chapter One: Introduction

Background

The foundational concern of this thesis is the vexed relationship between Māori and Pākehā New Zealanders and the related impact of colonization.¹ I share Rowan William’s conviction that theologians should be “involved as best they can in those enterprises in their culture that seek to create or recover a sense of shared discourse and common purpose in human society”.² Twenty-first century controversies around the role of the Treaty of Waitangi³, the place of te reo Māori⁴ in school curricula, the ownership of the Foreshore and Seabed and the dispute over government asset sales, are some of the issues that threaten our “shared discourse and common purpose” and serve to highlight the uneasy relationship between Māori and Pākehā. There persists an uneasy relational strain in the land and it is a concern with this tension that provides an important motivation for this research.

I approach the study from a myriad of vantages and assumptions. I am a Christian male of British descent, a settler or post-settler depending upon perspective.⁵ However, I am also a theologian and historian, who attempts to make sense of his context via a faith that believes that the gospel, as revealed in the life, death and resurrection of Jesus Christ, in the canon of Scripture, and in the tradition of the church, has relevance within the public sphere. This is therefore no detached analysis; but in the words of Miroslav Volf, the work is “almost inescapably personal” in that it relates to my own identity on several levels.⁶ As he has stated:

No free-floating and unaffected mind is trying here to resolve an intellectual puzzle! I chose not even to try the impossible. I, a citizen of a world…and a follower of Jesus Christ, could not hang up my commitments, desires…and uncertainties like a coat on

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¹ Māori are the original Polynesian settlers in Aotearoa New Zealand. The word ‘Māori’, literally means, ‘normal’ or ‘ordinary’ and was not initially used as a self-description. For Māori, the main self-identifiers were via genealogical and geographical locators situated in their whanau [family], hapū [sub-tribe] and īwi [tribe]. *The New Zealand Oxford Dictionary* defines Pākehā as, ‘a light-skinned New Zealander especially one of British birth or ancestry’. I shall refer again later to these “problematic” identifiers.
³ The Treaty of Waitangi refers to an ‘accord’ signed between Māori chiefs and the British Crown in 1840. I shall explain more about the detail and significance of the Treaty during the course of the thesis.
⁴ I shall italicize Māori words, except those which are now considered integral to New Zealand English, such as Māori and Pākehā.
⁵ In line with certain postcolonial definitional conventions, I adopt the term ‘settler’ in contrast to ‘post-settler’ to describe New Zealand citizens of European descent.
a coat rack before entering my study, to be taken up and put on when the work of the day was over.\(^7\)

However, while it is “inescapably personal”, it is at the same time a theological reflection within a contested landscape that will posit some constructive ideas into the national conversation.

Specifically, the emphasis within the study is upon reconciliation and the Pākehā quest for identity and belonging. I characterize this quest as the attempt by various New Zealanders of European descent to redefine their identity and the way they ‘belong’ to Aotearoa New Zealand.\(^8\) The thesis will examine this ‘redefining’ via a public theology of reconciliation. According to the prominent New Zealand historian Judith Binney, “[T]here have been two remembered histories of New Zealand since 1840: that of the colonizers, and that of the colonized. Their visions and goals were different, creating memories which have been patterned by varying hopes and experiences”.\(^9\) Like many Pākehā, my ‘remembered history’ was shaped by the mono-lingual and essentially monocultural educational years that reflected the narratives of my peers and forebears. However, this way of remembering was challenged in the 1970s onwards, not only for me, but also nationally by the emergence of another narrative in the land that demanded attention. This account belonged to Māori, whose new found voice at last found a place to reveal, not in fact a “new” story, but an enduring one that had informed their claims of identity and belonging, arguably since their arrival by various waka a millennia ago.

That “voice” was poignantly summarized for me by the then Anglican Māori Bishop of Aotearoa, Whakahuihui Vercoe, who spoke at the sesquicentennial celebrations of the Treaty of Waitangi, February 6\(^{th}\), 1990. Vercoe’s speech was the latest in a long line of

\(^7\) Volf, *Exclusion and Embrace*, p.10.

\(^8\) There are three official names for the political entity of New Zealand: ‘New Zealand’, ‘Aotearoa’ [Land of the Long White Cloud] and a sign language configuration – reflecting the three official languages. However, there are other “colloquial” appellations, such as ‘Aotearoa New Zealand’ – used by those who want to emphasize the country’s bi-cultural heritage and aspirations. Reflecting my own political perspective and ‘bi-cultural preference’ I shall use Aotearoa New Zealand, but at times, for stylistic literary reasons, I shall also use the more common English name of New Zealand. Although the term remains a contested one, during the last three decades, biculturalism has been defined in official government policy as “a fundamental characteristic of New Zealand’s heritage and identity”. http://www.mft.govt.nz/support/kpm/framework.html#Role of Government Policy, accessed 17 March 2011.

prophetic proclamations from Māori, calling for the need to recognize the Treaty and to continue the analogy of conversation, a continuation of a ‘dialogue’ with Pākehā that began with the arrival of Abel Tasman and James Cook in the 17th and 18th centuries. The relationship between Māori and the new settlers was formalized in 1840 when the British Crown, represented by Lt. Gov. Hobson, entered into a bilateral agreement with 512 chiefs from various Māori tribes. This agreement, initially signed at Waitangi, has been variously referred to as a treaty, a contract and a covenant. Despite the assurances given by Hobson at the signing, and the statements in the Treaty guaranteeing the protection of Māori, including their land and taonga [treasures], it is clear their experience since has been otherwise. The Crown’s failure to uphold the Treaty was summarized by Whakahuihui Vercoe in the presence of Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth II, the New Zealand Prime Minister, Geoffrey Palmer, church leaders, foreign dignitaries, and the general public. There he declared:

_I te tahi o nga wahi o Waitangi noho ana tatou i reira. A, e tangi ana tatou ka mahara kia Hiro’._ [By the waters of Waitangi we sat down. We cried when we remembered Zion.]

_Some of us have come here to celebrate, some to commemorate, some to commiserate, but some to remember what happened on this sacred ground. We come to this sacred ground because our tupuna [ancestors] left us this ground. A hundred and fifty years ago a compact was signed, a covenant was made between two people – to this place where a treaty was signed to give birth to a nation – a unique and unusual circumstance. Some of us have come here to remember what our tupuna said on this ground – that the treaty was a compact between two people. But since the signing of that treaty one hundred and fifty years ago I want to remind our partner that you have marginalized us, you have not honoured the treaty, we have not honoured each other in the promises that we made in this sacred ground. Since 1840, the partner that has been marginalized is me, the language of the land is yours, the custom is yours, the media by which we tell the whole world is yours...What I came here for is to re-new ties that made us a nation in 1840. I don’t want to debate the treaty; I don’t want to re-negotiate the treaty. I want the treaty to stand firmly as the unity – the means by which we are one nation...as I remember the songs of our land, as I remember the history of our land; I weep here on the shores of the Bay of Islands. May God give us the courage to be honest with one another, to be sincere with one another and above all to love one another in the strength of God. So I come to the waters of Waitangi to weep for what could have been a unique document in the history of the world of indigenous people against the Pākehā, and I still have the hope that we can do it. Let us sit and listen to one another._

10 Bishop Whakahuihui Vercoe, quoted in Allan K Davidson, _Aotearoa New Zealand_, Geneva: WCC Publications, 1996, p.48. There is no official transcript of this impromptu speech; several unofficial transcriptions are in existence and they display only minor variations. I shall use italics throughout the thesis to delineate speeches from written texts.
Over 10 years later, in 2006, Whakahuihui Vercoe was asked what gains had been made for Māori since his commemoration speech in 1990. His response: “My feelings about that are very similar to what I discovered when I took part in war. And that is, in spite of whatever you do, and whatever you say, nothing changes!” Although some would argue that Vercoe’s summation is an overly pessimistic one, the statements coming as they do from an elder statesman of national standing demonstrate the level of continuing discontentment and discouragement among some Māori with regard to their status in the land. I interpret his call to, “Let us sit and listen to one another” as an implicit plea for a national conversation of reconciliation. It was his ‘call’ that reinforced my earlier resolve to engage with the ‘other narrative’ in the land. It prompted also, a desire to find ways to connect the two dialogical strands, in an at times ‘disconnected’ conversation.

One of the outcomes of this journey was my participation in various education fora, as a historian, theologian and interlocuter, which aimed at bringing particularly Pākehā into the conversation about this country’s colonial history. From these events, it became evident to me, that a piece of the “puzzle” within the wider issue of race relations is the insecurity some Pākehā feel about their identity and right to belong. Ironically, this quest, which has been termed the “Pākehā ontological dilemma” by cultural anthropologist Avril Bell, has often been expressed within the context of a call to recognize the historical and present injustices experienced by Māori. I characterize the response in the following way: Māori seem clear about who they are, but what about us? Who are we, and how do we fit in this land?

This anecdotal perspective is backed by the research of various scholars who have argued that since the 1970s, partly as a result of a cultural and political renaissance within te ao Māori [the Māori world], the relationship between New Zealand’s two demographically dominant ethnic groups, Māori and Pākehā, has undergone a significant change. An indication of this cultural shift is evidenced via various expressions of identity and belonging by Pākehā New Zealanders, who search for new ways to locate themselves within the redefined political and cultural landscape. As representative of these ‘expressions’ I include

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examples from three influential Pākehā whose offerings continue to attract attention, both negative and positive.

The earliest, is that of New Zealand historian and biographer Michael King, particularly his 1985 ethnic autobiography *Being Pakeha* 13; the second example, the “Nationhood” address of the former leader of the National Party, Donald Brash, to the Orewa Rotary on 27th January 200414; and, finally, the speech by the then Race Relations Minister, Trevor Mallard, “We are all New Zealanders Now”, to the Stout Research Centre for New Zealand Studies, Victoria University on 28th July, 2004.15 While there are many Pākehā who participate in the identity debate at many levels, these three have arguably generated the greatest publicity and response – possibly because of Michael King’s standing as an academic, historian and social commentator and because of the political profile of the other two. Their public profile and the widespread response to their respective identity statements is the main reason for their inclusion, and also, although their identity claims share some commonality, their respective political ideologies are diverse and as such they are representative of a wide demographic.

**Theology and Context**

I owe an incalculable gratitude to the person of the Holy Spirit and his “speaking” to me via the Scriptures about a resurrected Christ, an encounter which resulted in an adult conversion to Christianity. This ‘grace-filled’ experience continues to influence a ‘hermeneutic of trust’ towards the biblical canon, a vantage that is not without its intellectual, cultural and not to mention theological challenges in an age of ‘hermeneutical suspicion’. However, despite a tendency towards ‘trust’ and Christian ‘orthodoxy’, my theological influences and ecclesial involvements are an eclectic mix, revealing perhaps, that despite my “conservative” roots, I may also be a “child” of the postmodern turn.

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My central theological foci are social reconciliation, identity and location, both geographical and historical. The politics of identity and place have generated much interest within the wider academic disciplines of the West over the past 50 years, yet it occupies a space in the margins of our European influenced theology. However, the emergence of political and contextual theology within the period covered by this thesis has delivered new themes for consideration by theologians. These theologies, which include feminist theology, liberation theology in Latin America, black theology in the United States and Africa, minjung theology in Korea, and more recently eco-theology, to name a few, have all situated local, political and social concerns within their theological constructs. One impact of these “local” theologies has been the emergence of new theological and hermeneutical models which have given priority to political, geographical and social contexts in the re-setting of the theological agenda. However, an even more recent theological model has emerged which is more broad-based and ‘inclusive’ than these, and one which meets the contextual and ‘conversational’ needs of this study, and that is public or social theology. Public theology, which I shall explore in more depth in the next chapter, by my definition, is a model that deals with a ‘concern’ and a ‘public’ that involves not only the church, but is also ‘extra-ecclesial’ in its subject matter, conversation partners and audience.

Biblical scholars, such as Walter Brueggemann in *Land: Place of Gift, Promise, and Challenge in Biblical Faith* and John Inge in *Christian Theology of Place*, have provided theological impetus to themes of place and belonging. Their perspectives have critiqued or modified other ‘dislocated’ biblical theologies such as existentialism and the ‘salvation-history’ approach. These studies, which locate God’s concern and strategies within specific geographical spheres, rooted in the stories and histories of those localities, have provided theological inspiration. Jürgen Moltmann’s political theology, which places a ‘liberationist’ emphasis upon place and justice, as well as on the certainty of a ‘hope-filled’ horizon on account of a ‘crucified God’, has influenced many theologians – perhaps the most

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prominent of these being his former student, Miroslav Volf. The latter’s exploration of identity, otherness and reconciliation in *Exclusion and Embrace*, set against the background of the Serbian/Croatian conflict is an important development in the field of local identity politics, and one upon which I shall draw at several junctures. Other ‘reconciliation’ studies have emerged out of the conflicts in Northern Ireland, South Africa, South America and the former USSR. As well as offering local practical “solutions”, many traverse complex theoretical themes such as justice, repentance and forgiveness. Notable amongst these are the works of Joseph Liechty and Cecelia Clegg in Ireland, John De Gruchy, Bishop Desmond Tutu and Charles Villa-Vicencio in South Africa, Robert J. Schreiter in the United States and Corneliu Constantineanu in Romania. These ‘reconciliation theologians’ have all drawn upon their respective church traditions and the work of various Old Testament and New Testament scholars in order to construct their various reconciliation models. As well as analyzing some of the issues raised by these theologians and leaning upon their insights, I shall also draw upon the scholarship of various New Testament scholars, including N.T. Wright and Corneliu Constantineau, in order to reconstruct a reconciliation model and practical strategy that respond to the concerns of this thesis.

In New Zealand, Neil Darragh has rightly argued that theology has roughly mirrored the patterns in Europe and the United States.\(^\text{19}\) As well, some contextualized theology has emerged here with an emphasis in the last decade upon Māori theology, ecology and place-based spirituality. However, there have been few academic theological studies dealing explicitly with this country’s colonized present/past through a reconciliatory lens.\(^\text{20}\) This scholastic lacuna in ‘postcolonial reconciliation’ research equates to a need for more theological reflection on this important subject. Therefore, as well as contributing to the growing international literature on reconciliation, this thesis also offers a theological response to the local discourse on colonialism and race relations, and the interrelated search for identity and belonging by Pākehā.

**Methodology**

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\(^{20}\) Exceptions are Otago University theologian, Murray Rae and Auckland contextual theologian, Neil Darragh.
In this section, I shall briefly outline the trajectory and methodology of my thesis argument. As I have indicated, this study is a ‘participation’ in the identity and belonging conversation that has developed in New Zealand since the 1970s.

For the sake of the research, the conversation partners fall into four categories: firstly, those “voices” I have referred to above – Whakahuihui Vercoe, Michael King, Donald Brash and Trevor Mallard – whose offerings represent some of the Māori and Pākehā conversations within the land.

Secondly, I have chosen to engage with three New Zealand postcolonial scholars: Avril Bell and Stephen Turner from The University of Auckland, and the Ngāti Raukawa academic, Ani Mikaere. As well as sharing wider postcolonial concerns, these particular scholars have in various ways responded either specifically or indirectly to the issues raised by King, Brash and Mallard. The choice of these conversation partners highlights my thesis presupposition: that although the encounter history of Māori and Pākehā on many levels has been mutually enhancing, this does not negate the overwhelming adverse social impact upon Māori of the colonizing experience. This is evidenced by their loss of land, loss of language, loss of culture, and their presence at the lower end of the social statistic indicators which report on economics and social well-being. This perspective is reflected by the editors of an influential cultural studies work on New Zealand identity who have said, “[T]he process of colonial settlement transformed Maori into a relatively powerless indigenous minority by virtue of territorial dispossession and the marginalisation of their local economies and socio-political ideas and practices”.21 Hence, a core assumption of this thesis fits within the wider postcolonial paradigm which analyzes the past and present through a critique of colonization and carries within its scholarship, to adapt a phrase from liberation theology, a “preference for the colonized”.

Thirdly, my dialogue partners are fellow academic theologians – systematic, political, and public – who in a variety of ways inform the overall theological tenor of this public theology thesis.

The final group consists of a wider ‘public’: those Pākehā New Zealanders who are involved in the quest for identity and belonging – and ultimately it is to them that the suggested reconciliatory ideas are addressed.

This ‘conversational’ engagement with the New Zealand context lends itself to the recently formulated discipline of public theology, itself a subset within the wider concept of missio Dei. The ‘reconciling agenda’ assumes that there are social implications to God’s reconciling the world in Christ. However, contrary to my original expectations, as a theological ideology the concept is less than self-evident and requires careful consideration in order to formulate a strategy for the New Zealand context. Consequently, I have dedicated two chapters, (chapters 5 and 6), in order to adequately respond to some of the theoretical and practical challenges. This thesis however, has a pragmatic impulse in that the theological impetus is driven by the practical needs of my present reconciliatory work and the wider reconciliatory needs of the land. I say this as a disclaimer because, given the nature of such a public theology offering, which is ‘macro’ in its scope and by necessity interdisciplinary and ‘practical’, some theoretical issues remain outstanding. In short, while there still remains much to be said, especially with regard to the complex intersection between the divine and human reconciling process, I trust that this thesis will make a contribution to the on-going discussion.

In chapter two, I initiate the theological component of the thesis by tracing the development of public theology and conclude with some personal perspectives and a methodological approach. The methodological approach includes the adoption of a three-fold strategy of analysis, interpretation and ‘constructive solutions’. The analytical task is a reiteration of H. Richard Niebuhr’s view that the first task of the theologian is to ask: “What is going on?”22 In doing this, theology interacts with another discipline to discern what is happening in a particular context. Here, I shall engage with historians and sociologists to background the New Zealand context. Their work will contribute insight into the national conversation that has emerged in the past 25 years around identity and belonging. This leads to the analysis in chapter three of the Pākehā identity quest from a historical

perspective followed by an overview of the three representative ‘identity claims’ of King, Brash and Mallard.

This exploration is followed in chapter four by an interpretation of these identity claims in concert with several New Zealand postcolonial scholars. Here I posit some theoretical reflections on the complex relationship between settler identity construction and colonialism. The theory posits that social identities, such as we are dealing with in this thesis, are complex, mutually-constituted realities that are informed by culturally derived narratives, which are neither objective nor value-free. Influenced by this identity-colonial paradigm, I argue, via a critique of the representative identity claims in concert with the three New Zealand postcolonial scholars, that some Pākehā perspectives carry traces of colonizing practice. It is this interpretation that reveals the specific reconciliatory need and provides some of the structural framework for the constructive task of advancing some Christian influenced ‘reconciliatory ideas’ into the New Zealand identity conversation.

This need for ‘reconciliatory ideas’ leads to the exploration in chapters five and six of the concept of Christian reconciliation. Here, I traverse some of the historical background, as well as the theological and practical considerations associated with this substantial biblical theme. Following that, in conjunction with several biblical scholars, I develop a prototype of social reconciliation via the writings of the apostle Paul. This ontological-ethico model presents reconciliation as an analogy of the divine impetus, albeit ‘imperfectly represented’ by human agency. Understood in this way, reconciliation is an ontological reality and ethical variable, framed within covenant; an aspect of the eschatological missio Dei, which requires a Spirit-human cooperation, in order to yield a reconciled outcome for the New Zealand identity and belonging conversation.

In the final sections of this thesis, chapters 7 and 8, the constructive task draws together some of the postcolonial ‘solutions’ and some of the nation’s historical narrative and synthesizes them with my reconciliation model. Here I describe the Treaty of Waitangi as a covenantal structure that provides for Pākehā an ontological or objective ‘reconciliatory place’. Within that ‘location’ Pākehā are provided with a tūrangawaewae or ‘place to stand’, which also provides a foundational narrative from which they are able to receive and construct an identity and place of belonging, one that does not repeat the colonizing
tendencies of other claims. The ‘place of reconciliation’ that the covenant of Waitangi provides is not dependent initially on ethics, but is a ‘structure of grace’, received via an act of reconciliatory hospitality by Māori, and one which carries an associated ethical imperative. In order to understand the nature of the relationship between Māori and Pākehā which the Treaty provides, as well as the ethos of covenantal ethics, I propose the analogy of a marriage. This is a concept which I argue has historical precedence and metaphorical ‘usefulness’. Specifically, I suggest that the kenotic example of Christ, who ‘offers his life for the church’s sake’, provides the key exemplar for Christian marriage and a potential model for political liaisons, such as the Treaty relationship between Māori and Pākehā.

Scope and Definitions

Here I shall attend to some parameters of the thesis, which have to do with scope and definitions. Firstly, the linking of the terms ‘identity’ and ‘belonging’ are deliberate and reflect my assumption that the Pākehā identity claims relate to a need to reinforce their sense of “adequate” belonging to the geopolitical location of Aotearoa New Zealand. This establishes the claims as location specific and differentiates them from other identity categories, such as those characterized by gender, sexual or religious motivations. However, the recent discourse around identity and belonging has raised complex theoretical and political issues that have spawned several academic sub-disciplines within sociology, psychology and politics, all of which have impinged upon the field of identity politics. I shall reflect on these considerations, especially as they impact upon my understanding of Pākehā identity in the first part of chapter four. In that chapter, I shall discuss my use of the terms Māori and Pākehā and some of the problems associated with that usage. Within the reconciliatory conversation these include the problems associated with essentialism, hybridity and the oversimplification of a Māori-Pākehā binarism. However, I conclude that despite the problems, the two categories are still useful, especially in this postcolonial conversation around identity, belonging and reconciliation.²³

²³ Note: Aotearoa New Zealand is referred to as a ‘bicultural’ nation. However, the term is also a contested one. According to New Zealand anthropologist, Senka Božić Vrbančić, “Biculturalism is constructed as recognition of the historical interaction of two peoples, Māori and Pākehā. However...official government policy defines biculturalism as a celebration of cultural diversity. A ‘celebration’ which includes not just the ‘two’ who are being celebrated, but also the ‘many’: we are One nation, two peoples and many cultures”. In
Further research is needed however, especially analyses which include the identity and belonging needs of recent immigrants and those of Asian and Pacific origin who do not consider that they fit within the nomenclatures of Māori and Pākehā. This thesis is not an attempt to provide a reconciliatory metanarrative that covers all relational configurations within the land – the scope is more limited. I am dealing specifically with the relationship between Māori and Pākehā and the issues raised by the latter’s quest for identity and belonging against the backdrop of colonization. Nevertheless, I suggest that the reconciliatory ideas that I propose via a covenantal understanding of the Treaty of Waitangi are also relevant to a wider ethnic grouping than those normally included within the Pākehā identity label. This however, is a consideration for another study.

A concluding word about the ‘reconciliatory limits’ of this study. I acknowledge that the responsibility for reconciliation between the two people groups is not only a Pākehā imperative: fissured relationships usually require the attention of both parties. However, because the present thesis is framed by the Pākehā quest for identity and belonging, my reconciliatory focus will be from that vantage. However, the subject of Māori reconciliation both Māori- Māori and Māori-Pākehā would be a very fruitful area of research and one that would make a considerable contribution to the New Zealand context.

Vrbančić’s view, “this slogan contains a ‘mathematics’ of hybridity which aims to reconcile the violence of colonial history with present day bicultural policy and harmonise tensions in society by celebrating the forgetting of the past. In other words, beyond the One, the Two and the Many, there are numerous complex articulations that mark the repressed histories of colonisation, racial violence, and the traumas of colonial settler society”. In Tarara: Croats and Māori, p.209. See also the government website “explaining” biculturalism, http://www.mft.govt.nz/support/kpm/framework.html#Role of Government Policy.
Chapter Two: Public Theology

According to the Editors of the International Journal of Public Theology, “Public theology is the result of the growing need for theology to interact with public issues of contemporary society. It seeks to engage in dialogue with different academic disciplines such as politics, economics, cultural studies, religious studies, as well as with spirituality, globalization and society in general”.

While this brief explanation by this influential public theology journal gives an introductory overview as to the intent of this discipline, it masks some of the uncertainty that surrounds this relatively new theological endeavor (at least classified in this way). Defining and defending the public role of theological discourse in pluralistic societies is increasingly contentious, which makes some further explanation necessary. Therefore, in this chapter, I shall give some brief background to its emergence as a distinct discipline, examine various perspectives and definitions, and outline my own understandings and methodology through which I shall approach the wider research questions. Finally, I shall provide a further explanation for the choice of postcolonial scholars as my analytical and conversational partners throughout this study.

Historical Background to Public Theology

There is general consensus that the term ‘public theology’ arose in the context of discussions initiated by sociologist Robert Bellah over civil religion and its role in the United States. He defined civil religion in America as a “collection of beliefs, symbols and ritual with respect to sacred things and institutionalized in a collectivity”.

Viewed in this way, civil religion exists alongside, yet as distinct from religious institutions and political ideologies. Sociology of religion scholar Stephen Tipton defines it as a “religion-like dimension of culturally constitutive depth in the public realm of every modern society, no matter how secular it seems”. Further, he suggests that especially in the American context, “public theology, civil religion and political ideology” are interacting via the

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26 See for example, Harold Breitenberg Jr., Max Stackhouse, Nico Koopman and Paul S. Chung.
28 Tipton “Globalizing Civil Religion and Public Theology”, p.50.
“shifting social arrangements of American public institutions”. However, the two terms ‘public theology’ and ‘civil religion’ within that context are not always easy to differentiate, as the following reference by Bellah demonstrates: “By civil religion, I refer to that religious dimension, found I think in the life of every people, through which it interprets its historical experience in the light of transcendent reality.”

It is arguable, that civil religion resides in the New Zealand landscape via various public commemorations of its ‘historical experience’ such as Anzac Day and Waitangi Day – two statutory holidays that involve a synthesis of the sacred and the secular in a public space. Given the presence of these secular-religious commemorations, New Zealand’s policy of separation of church and state, the increasing appearance and reliance upon a ‘Māori spirituality’ in the public sphere, and the need to clarify the difference if any between the two concepts, a brief discussion of civil religion vis a vis public theology is pertinent.

In 1974, American church historian Martin E. Marty introduced the terms ‘public theologian’ and ‘public theology’ in an attempt to differentiate between ‘civil religion’ and the perspectives of other prominent American figures, including Jonathan Edwards, Abraham Lincoln and Reinhold Niebuhr. Mary Doak makes some helpful observations in her attempts to clarify the two concepts by listing several differentiating features. In her view, public theology’s goal is not merely to support society but also to “engage in critical reflection on the nation’s culture, plans, and actions”. She cites Robert McElroy, who argues that a truly public theology involves “acknowledging God’s participation in the life of the nation, while at the same time using religious truth, to critique the policies and direction of the nation”. Secondly, she states that, whereas civil religion consists of the public use of religious beliefs, symbols, and rituals that are acceptable to the majority of the people, a form of religious “least common denominator”, most public theologians, on the other hand, seek to address public issues from resources within their specific religious tradition. For Doak then, public

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29 Tipton, “Globalizing Civil Religion and Public Theology”, p. 49.
31 A public holiday commemorating the contribution of Australian and New Zealand soldiers in various theatres of war in the 19th, 20th and 21st centuries. The day is characterized by large public “religious” gatherings usually officiated over by public officials, the military and clergy.
theology involves the development of particular theologies of common public life that also engage in the critical analyses of a nation’s “spiritual culture” and offer a perspective, not only to their own religious communities but to the entire public. These need to be “contextualized theologies” that provide reformulations of major Christian themes developed through attention to the demands of the social and political context. She cites the examples of Linell Cady who interprets the doctrine of the Trinity in relation to the creation, redemption, and sustenance of the common life; Parker Palmer who understands Christian reconciliation to include the overcoming of social and class divisions; and Max Stackhouse who articulates a political and economic vision of Christian stewardship.34

To summarize Doak’s perspective then, while public theology continues civil religion’s interest in the public presence of religious ideas, its political dimension means that it is committed to providing a reformulation of the beliefs and practices of particular religious traditions developed through critical engagement with the ideas and practices of national public life.35 However, the extent to which context “authorizes” the reformulation of belief is its own study and while Doak’s analysis is helpful in clarifying the differences as understood by some in the United States between public theology and civil religion, the relationship between context and authority remains for many a contested issue, and one to which I shall return later in this chapter.

Public Theologians?

The emergence of public theology as a distinct theological category has not been without controversy. It has been both “praised” for being in keeping with the best of the Christian theological tradition and denounced as an unfaithful distortion of the church’s true calling”.36 Even definitions are disputed, in part because the term, as indicated above, has been developed by those who approach the discipline from related but different fields; these fields include church history, systematic theology and theological ethics. Thus, even if public theology is “legitimate” theology, a view challenged by some, and is related to, but is a different category from civil or public religion, it does not necessarily follow that public theology is a unitary concept, or even that those who are engaged in conversations about it

34 Doak, Reclaiming Narrative, p.6.
35 Ibid., p.5.
36 Breitenberg Jr., “To Tell the Truth”, p.69.
come to public theology with the same assumptions or for the same purpose. Public theologians and their specific approaches and concerns usually reflect the ‘other’ disciplines that have been their formative influences.

Although the term public theology originated in the United States, and that location has also been a rich source of theoretical endeavour, it would be a mistake to label the discipline as ‘new’ or even an American project. Depending on the definitions used, those who would qualify historically as public theologians are many and varied, including Augustine, Thomas Aquinas, Abraham Lincoln, Karl Barth, Abraham Kuyper and even the US Moral Majority founder Jerry Falwell. There are also overlapping or conflicting assumptions within the theological literature as to what equates to a public theology. Max Stackhouse maintained for example, that public theology is “present in various degrees and in the modulating forms of thought of Augustine, Thomas, Calvin, Wesley, Locke, Edwards, Jacques Maritain, John Courtney Murray, the Niebuhrs, Martin Luther King Jnr and others”. 37

In order to differentiate public theology from other practical theological projects, Korean public theologian Sebastian Kim describes it as “an engagement of living religious traditions with their public environment – the economic, political and cultural spheres of common life”. 38 Harold Breitenberg Jr., who has written extensively about the history and categories of public theology, describes this more ‘deliberate’ approach as a type of “constructive public theology”. This type of public theology is described by him as “theologically grounded and informed interpretations of and guidance for institutions, interactions, events, circumstances, policies, and practices, both within and without the church”. 39 According to Breitenberg Jr., practitioners of this type of theology usually address more than one topic and combine interdisciplinary discussions with constructive proposals to address the concerns of society at large. He calls this “a comprehensive public theology” approach, and nominates his fellow Americans Robert Benne, Max Stackhouse, David Tracy and Ronald Thiemann as typical exponents. 40 To these, I would add a further non-exhaustive list: the influential German theologian Jürgen Moltmann, Duncan Forrester from Scotland and a

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39 Breitenberg Jr., “To Tell the Truth”, p.69.
40 Ibid., p.65.
group of South African theologians including John de Gruchy, Nico Koopman\textsuperscript{41} and the Anglican theologian-churchman Desmond Tutu. Closer to home, within the academy, the non-exhaustive list would also include New Zealanders Clive Pearson, Marion Maddox, Neil Darragh and Murray Rae. However, this is not to say that there have not been Christians operating as public theologians in this country for some time. This is particularly true of some 19\textsuperscript{th} and early 20\textsuperscript{th} century Māori Christian leaders such as Wiremu Ratana, Te Whiti o Rongomai and Tohu Kākahi, whose world views resisted the sacred/secular and public/private divide of the Enlightenment-influenced theology common in New Zealand at the time. Further engagement with these indigenous Christian leaders as ‘public theologians’ would be profitable on many levels, as well it would progress our local understanding of the relationship between civil society and the public role of religion.

\textbf{Objections to Public Theology}

This introduction serves to highlight some initial difficulties associated with attempts to characterize public theology. Definitions are always controversial and disputable but perhaps a greater challenge exists for the discipline in the attacks against its “authenticity”, sometimes dismissed as unnecessary, oxymoronic or even a truism. Breitenberg Jr. has summarized four categories of critique. Firstly, what may be termed the ‘Barthian’ objection, which holds that public theology relies upon “alien or corruptive sources of knowledge or insight”\textsuperscript{42}. This objection merges into the second critique which argues that public theology is therefore a “functionalist or instrumentalist undertaking that puts Christianity in the service of institutions, groups, powers, ideologies, or ideals that are themselves outside of, foreign to and often opposed to the Christian tradition”.\textsuperscript{43} According to the South African theologian Dirk J Smit:

\begin{quote}
The ‘Barthian objection’ is that the theory and practice of public theology serve ulterior motives, ulterior to the truth of the gospel and the nature of the church. Not only the history of the Christian involvement in social, public, political, economic and cultural life, but indeed also recent discourses and practices in the name of public theology – and related notions – often only too glaringly and sadly illustrate the
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{41} It was Nico Koopman’s public address at The University of Auckland in 2008 that introduced me to the idea of public theology as a distinct discipline and one appropriate for this study.
\textsuperscript{43} Breitenberg Jr., “To Tell the Truth”, p.68. Footnote 135.
serious nature of this perennial temptation, of making the gospel and the church serve ulterior interests and powers.\textsuperscript{44}

Thirdly, some argue that at best, public theology is a redundant enterprise and at worst a threat to civil society. For example, Evangelical Reformed theologian and ethicist James Gustafson discounts efforts to forge a public theology theory as unnecessary.\textsuperscript{45} Others view theology’s venture into the public sphere as a public threat on non-theological or anti-theological grounds, while others argue against it on epistemological grounds.\textsuperscript{46} A fourth group, Breitenberg Jr. refers to as “sympathetic critics”. These generally agree with public theology’s goals; however, they often disagree with many of its exponents over “the particulars of the analyses, conclusions, and policy proposals most often put forward by those who make constructive public theology proposals”.\textsuperscript{47}

The loudest criticisms of public theology have arguably been raised by those who adhere to the so-called ‘Yale school’ of theology.\textsuperscript{48} In their view, public theology is at times an “unfaithful endeavour”, because in attempts to be ‘relevant’ and ‘contextual’, public theologians have abandoned the particularity of the Christian message.\textsuperscript{49} Their argument is around the use of language and the role of the church within God’s mission. This view is rejected by those within the ‘Chicago school’. In a helpful analysis, South African theologian Nico Koopman describes the ‘Chicago’ perspective in the following way:

The Chicago school, with David Tracy as its most eminent representative, recognizes the fact that the fragmentation of rationality within particular contexts inhibits the possibility of acquiring universal consensus on public issues in a pluralistic context. This school, however, reckons that it is important to explain, justify, and defend theological claims in a ‘public way’ and to seek at least a degree of consensus and universality. In this way public theology reaches its aim of addressing issues that

\begin{multicols}{2}
\textsuperscript{44} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{45} Ibid., Footnote 138.
\textsuperscript{46} Ibid., Footnote 139.
\textsuperscript{47} Ibid., Footnote 140.
\textsuperscript{48} Note: Not all adherents to the theologies characterized by these ‘schools’ are involved in the faculties of Chicago and Yale. The ‘Yale school’ is sometimes categorized as ‘narrative’ or ‘postliberal’ theologians, and their theological influences are Karl Barth and Thomas Aquinas. The ‘Chicago school’ of David Tracy, Martin Marty, and Max L. Stackhouse, has been influenced particularly by the theologies of Paul Tillich and H. Richard Niebuhr.
\textsuperscript{49} Breitenberg Jr., “To Tell The Truth”, p.70.
\end{multicols}
affect society as a whole and of dealing with these issues in a way accessible to everyone in the public sphere.\textsuperscript{50}

In contrast the ‘Yale school’, with representatives such as George Lindbeck, Hans Frei, Ronald Thiemann and Stanley Hauerwas, does not view the task of theology as making faith claims rationally accessible in the public sphere or seeking public consensus. Rather, from their perspective, theology should simply describe the way in which Christian truth claims function within a particular faith community.\textsuperscript{51} Hauerwas, for example, a critic of the public theology model, eschews the practice of providing blueprints for society in the “non-Christian” language often associated with public theological methodologies, labelling them as “faulty” and “deficiently Christian”.\textsuperscript{52}

In contrast, adherents of the ‘Chicago school’ lean to a more ‘secularized’ approach to their theology, one that seeks consensus in a pluralistic society via the use of non-confessional and scientific language. According to South African theologian John de Gruchy, whom I suggest fits more within the Chicago paradigm, “good public theology”, amongst other things, “does not seek to preference Christianity but to witness to values that Christians believe are important for the common good” and that it requires “doing theology in a way that is interdisciplinary in character and uses a methodology in which content and process are intertwined”.\textsuperscript{53} He maintains that in order to do this, public theology needs to use a language that is understandable and accessible to those outside the Christian tradition.\textsuperscript{54} Arguably, the ‘Yale school’ would view this position as ‘accomodationist’ in that it ‘yields’ to secular demands. In contrast, Stanley Hauerwas argues:

As such the church does not have a social ethic; the church is a social ethic....I am in fact challenging the very idea that Christian social ethics is primarily an attempt to make the world more peaceable or just. Put starkly, the first social ethical task of the church is to be the church – the servant community. Such a claim may well sound

\textsuperscript{51} Koopman, “Contemporary Public Theology”, p.212.
\textsuperscript{52} Breitenberg Jr., “To Tell the Truth”, p.65. Footnote 104.
\textsuperscript{53} John de Gruchy in IJPT, 1, 1, 2007, p.39.
\textsuperscript{54} Ibid.
self-serving until we remember that what makes the church the church is its faithful manifestation of the peaceable kingdom in the world.\textsuperscript{55}

In some sense, the ‘Yale’ position repeats Tertullian’s enduring question, “What has Athens to do with Jerusalem, or the Academy with the Church?” whereas, echoes of Anselm’s “faith seeking understanding” can be found in the ‘Chicago’ stance.

Not all are agreed, however, that the two positions are mutually exclusive. South African theologian Ernst Conradie believes that public theology needs both the Chicago and the Yale approach.\textsuperscript{56} Mary Doak also argues that the two positions are compatible and even necessary for a fully-orbed and effective public theology.\textsuperscript{57} The main argument around language seems to hinge on ‘rationality’ and whether Christian narrative is accessible to ‘the world’. Some of the ‘Yale’ theologians argue that the worldviews presented in these narratives are ‘community-specific’ and understood only within those contexts. From this they refute the possibility of a ‘common narratival discourse’ essential to public theology.

I side with Conradie and Doak and propose that even a ‘Christian’ laden narrative is able to find a “home in the world”. I suggest that the Hebrew and Christian experience has demonstrated for several millenia that the ‘message of God’ is ‘understandable to all’. Ultimately, all theology is dependent upon the Holy Spirit’s ‘graceful translation’ of the divine component within the human message. I propose that ‘discerning’ the mind of the Spirit within the context is a key to this dilemma of ‘language’. The church, and by implication its message, is not a hermetically sealed institution but a goal and a vehicle of God reconciling telos. Public theology, then, will assume various ‘languages’ or ‘voices’ as a communicating vehicle for the divine will. Human involvement in the communication of that will into the public sphere will be imperfect and partial as there is no formula. Sometimes, as Hawerwas desires, the church, as a countercultural institution, will be the ‘ethic’or a ‘faithful remnant’ that displays by its lifestyle an ethic that speaks to an alien world. However, in some fora, the church in God’s wide world will be a source of wisdom for Queen of Sheba-like power brokers. There it may involve a complex intersection of social analysis, biblical narrative and cultural concepts, whereby the theologian operates as an

\textsuperscript{57} Doak, \textit{Reclaiming Narrative}, p.2.
interlocuter of a divine wisdom. For example, Desmond Tutu’s “rainbow nation” is a synthesis of the Zulu/Xhosa ubuntu idea with the biblical narrative which was offered to a post-apartheid South Africa as a reconciliatory metaphor. Cultural or secular language is not necessarily antithetical to the biblical narrative, and vice versa, especially if at its core it carries the divine imprimatur of love and truth. However, in other situations, these same ‘wisdom’ interlocuters may also operate as Amos-like prophets, delivering a ‘thus says the Lord’ in a selective kairos moment. In these public contexts, the Martin Luther King Jr.s, the Desmond Tutus, and even the Whakahuihui Vercoes, will “roar” to the world without translating their biblical vision into a secular narrative. Here the ancient biblical narratives become powerful rhetorical tools in the hands of these prophetic public theologians. Ultimately, the Christian message of the public theologian is a gift of grace offered to the public sphere and one that will have various wrappings. As a ‘Christian gift’, however, it will never contradict the person and message of Jesus Christ as demonstrated in his life, death and resurrection.

A Personal View of Public Theology

Against this backdrop, which has highlighted some of the important issues surrounding the discipline, I shall continue to signal my own perspective. As I indicated above, definitions are usually influenced by the experience and theological positions held by the definer. For example, the ‘public theology’ of Jürgen Moltmann and Stanley Hauerwas demonstrates a consistency with their other theological foundations. Moltmann’s description of public theology as a missiological imperative – whereby the eschatological church community cooperates with the Spirit in anticipation of the kingdom of God – reflects the influence of his Evangelical Reformed thinking and his ‘dialogue’ with John Calvin and Marxist philosopher Ernst Bloch. In contrast, Stanley Hauerwas’ opposition to public theology derives at least in part from his roots in the Radical Reformation via his association with John Howard Yoder and the separatist inclinations of Anabaptism.

If theology is formed via experience, conversation partners and the Scriptures, my approach to public theology is formed via my interaction with several partners. An adult conversion experience outside the established church, which to some degree mirrors Paul’s experience
on the Damascus Road, has contributed to an on-going respect for the present activity of the Holy Spirit in the individual, the life of the church and the world. This encounter with the Spirit confronted me with the unique claims of Jesus of Nazareth as revealed in the New Testament and it interrupted a life undergirded by an ‘insecure’ agnosticism. My research, then, attempts to integrate a cultural analysis with an orthodox and confessional theology that is a complex weaving of the objective and the personal.

Therefore, my version of public theology and its subset, social reconciliation, draws upon an eclectic mix of inspirations which include my reconciliatory encounter with Jesus as well as some of the public theologians to whom I have referred above. With regard to tradition, my influences are more Protestant-Reformed than Catholic, but not exclusively so – a social activist background has meant exposure to a broad ecumenism. I need also to mention the inspiration of 19th century Evangelical social reformers, the 20th century Charismatic movement and a 21st century post-denominational ecclesiology to round out the influences.

Context and a ‘Hermeneutic of Trust’

Public theology, like any theological endeavour, is inextricably connected to hermeneutics. Perhaps my ‘link’ to the Evangelical social reformers and the influence of a Christian conversion ‘explains’ a hermeneutical orientation of ‘trust’ towards the Scriptures. From this position, I concur with Richard Bauckham and Trevor Hart’s statement that, “[G]ood Christian theology must be deeply and extensively informed by the Bible and the Christian tradition, and at the same time creatively alert and related to its particular context”. This perspective is not dissimilar to Max Stackhouse’s “quadrilateral touchstones of authority” – Scripture, tradition, reason and experience – which he holds are the foundational wellspring from which any public theology needs to draw. However, added to these, I would want to acknowledge the present ministry of the Holy Spirit as the ‘enabler’ of any constructive public theology. This hermeneutic of trust may be difficult to defend in an age characterized

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58 In this country, I particularly acknowledge the work of Catholic Treaty practitioners, such as Patrick Sneddon in Pakeha and the Treaty, Robert and Joanna Consedine, in Healing our History: The Challenge of the Treaty of Waitangi and the academic contribution of Dominic O’Sullivan, especially his Faith, Politics and Reconciliation: Catholicism and the Politics of Indigenity.

59 Reformers, such as William Wilberforce and other members of the Clapham Sect, who were indirectly involved in the 19th century missionary endeavour to New Zealand, via the Church Missionary Society.

by ‘suspicion,’ especially in a study that has as a central concern the relationship between identity formation and colonization. However, I propose that at its heart the gospel of reconciliation, when handled in a contextually suitable way, is consistent with the postcolonial project of decolonization. The naivety or not of my biblical approach will probably be in the “eye of the beholder”. I acknowledge that a hermeneutic that tends towards trust is problematic but no more so than one characterized by suspicion. However, the substance of that complex and on-going debate lies beyond the scope of this study. Nevertheless, despite my naïve approach, I offer that it is not simplistically uncritical, and to use the words of the Old Testament scholar Walter Brueggemann, “I have not knowingly violated any seriously established critical judgement” in my interaction with the Bible, my conversation partners and the geographical and historical context of Aotearoa New Zealand.61

Further, in this personal reflection on public theology I propose a generic working definition as that discipline which is concerned in theory and praxis with those spheres that are extra-ecclesiam. The locus of public theology is where the church engages beyond its own internal ‘affairs’ with the multiplicity of publics and concerns that exist in God’s creation. These social and political publics include the economic, environmental and ethical spheres, and extend to all the domains of human stewardship. I also construe the discipline to be a constructive involvement in missio Dei – a mission that is essentially relational to its core. This is an interpretation of context in the light of God’s eschatological kingdom – a past, present and future reality. In the words of the missiologist Paul Chung, mission viewed in this way “elaborates on what God has done in Christ through the Holy Spirit...and continues to do in Word and Spirit (God’s on-going creation). This underlines God’s activity in embracing the church and the world”.62 The present study is in some way a ‘renewed’ public theology which eschews a narrow ecclesial view of mission – but is involved in dialogue with the socio-critical attempts of science in order “to retrieve and invigorate the prophetic vocation” of the Christian community.63 This view widens the horizons of ecclesial mission to articulate the work of the Spirit by acknowledging the “prevenient grace of the Spirit in

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63 Ibid., p.22.
the world”, in the sense of *creatio continua*. It is a perspective that assumes that God still continues to speak in some way, both in the church and in the world, via a multiplicity of media.

This “speaking” of God into the various aspects of his creation raises the issue of theology as situational, the hermeneutical challenge of interpreting the biblical narrative in the light of context, and *vice versa*. This process is sometimes referred to as contextual theology, which is often viewed as allied to, or as a forerunner to, public theology. Because of the centrality of context to public theology, and the different ways that theologians interpret that relationship, I shall outline some of the arguments and my own understandings.

According to the Old Testament scholar and missiologist Christopher J.H. Wright, “[T]he rise of contextual theologies and then the recognition that all theology is in fact contextual, including the Western ‘standard’ variety, has coincided with the arrival of postmodernism and its massive impact on hermeneutics”. However, I suggest that contextualized theologies emerged amongst the controversies of the 60s and 70s, not only via the influence of postmodernism, but also as an attempt to distance the Bible from its perceived collaboration with European colonialism.

According to German theologian Gerhard Sauter, “[O]riginally ‘context’ meant the verbalized context of a text or the syntactical relationships of a text.” Therefore, for a period, context was a linguistic and hermeneutical category but later developed “to include the world as a whole”. Sauter holds that ‘context’ can be understood in what he terms a “soft” or a “hard” manner. In his view, “soft” contextual consideration:

> [l]eads to the careful and thorough recognition of the various interrelations of a text by establishing the linguistic shape of its surrounding area....The primary interest applies to the text, that is to what it says....Yet, if your reconstruction of the context defines the function of a theological text as dependent on all situational circumstances that you regard as decisive, the result would be “hard” contextual theology.

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64 Ibid., p.17.  
67 Ibid.  
68 Ibid.
As “hard”, the context becomes a new ‘authority’ or ‘interpreter’ of the text as it is this knowledge that illuminates and determines the function and meaning of the text.

Contextual theology, at whatever end of Sauter’s spectrum, serves to remind us that theology as an activity is to some degree intertwined with context. New Testament scholar Gordon Fee argues that the apostle Paul, from whose reconciliation opus I shall draw extensively, as the archetypal Christian theologian, engaged in a form of contextual theology, which he has termed “task theology”. Thus, Paul’s theology is not systematic in the modern sense, but occasional and responsive to and influenced by historical, social and political context. Using Paul as a model means that our understanding of God does not occur in a vacuum, but is received and interpreted in and via context. The Scriptures, then, are a revelation of ‘God’s story’ in context, and theology is nothing less than a human attempt to relocate this ‘God story’ within a specific time and place. In my view, context is not to be the ‘source’ of theology, but the locus in which and from which God’s wisdom and will are understood. Therefore, I propose that the interpretative task is a ‘two-way’ process that involves both Scripture and context interpreting each other. What develops is a ‘place-based theology’ where the wisdom of a transcendent God is yielded up by appeal to Scripture and the Spirit in interaction with the location that ultimately provides a foundation for praxis. Thus, theology is inspired by and grounded in each particular context.

However, New Zealand contextual theologian Neil Darragh argues that it is misplaced to view either faith or culture as in any way “stable”. He argues that:

Theology has tended to treat inculturation or contextualization as the introduction of a relatively stable Christian faith into the relatively stable social pattern of an existing culture. But the stability of both faith and culture were largely imaginary. Or if not imaginary, such a stability is in any case difficult to sustain in the contemporary world.

In contrast to his view, I contend for the introduction of a ‘relatively stable Christian voice’ whose core beliefs can be traced over two millennia into an arguably unstable contemporary world, one often referred to as “postmodern”, “post-secular”, “post-Christian” and pluralistic. I posit that this ‘instability’ is not a new phenomenon for Christian

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69 Gordon D. Fee and Douglas Stuart, How To Read the Bible for all its Worth, Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1993.
71 Ibid.
mission and that the world has often been ‘unstable’ and at times hostile to a biblical perspective. The pluralistic and at times antagonistic New Testament Graeco-Roman world, in which Jesus and Paul offered their very public ministry, has similarities to our own. Sometimes, the description of our present context as ‘pluralistic’ carries the implication that earlier Christian mission evolved within a homogenous, cultural environment. However, as Christopher Wright points out:

For two thousand years Christian mission, ever since the New Testament church, has wrestled with the problems of multiple cultural contexts. And yet in the midst of them all it has sustained the conviction that there is an objective truth for all in the gospel that addresses and claims people in any context.\(^\text{72}\)

Missiologist Martha Franks, in her analysis of context and mission, holds that Christian mission has long preceded postmodernism in recognizing the validity of multiple contexts as “home” for the “gospel”. While she holds to “a stability of faith”, she argues, like Leslie Newbigin, that “the message of Christ” and context is “compatible”:

Mission work in the world’s plurality is ‘two-way’. Hearing the new understandings of the gospel that arise when the message of Christ is brought to the new context is an important part of understanding the whole meaning of the Lordship of Jesus. This insight from mission work is sympathetic to the similar suggestion of postmodernism with regard to the meaning of the texts – that communication between people, even when it is by book, is always ‘two-way’. Moreover, Newbigin’s understanding of mission points to the fact that Christian missiology has long preceded the postmodern world in recognizing the possible problem of the fact that transplanting language and concepts from one context to another leads to wholly new ways of understanding them.\(^\text{73}\)

I conclude then, that there does exist a ‘compatibility’ between context and Scripture; however, it remains for public theologians to grapple with the complexity of that relationship and in part, it is their task to illuminate that compatibility.

**Public Theology, Social Reconciliation and Mission**

In this section, I shall briefly discuss the link between public theology, mission and social reconciliation. Stephen Martin, of King’s University College, Edmonton, posits “that there is

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a remarkable convergence amongst Ecumenical, Evangelical, and Roman Catholic thinking on reconciliation as the mission of God". 74 Also, Australasian religious studies scholar Marion Maddox believes that “reconciliation is the most helpful ‘gift’ that Christianity can contribute to the public sphere”. 75 According to missiologist Kirsteen Kim, “[R]econciliation has in the past decade emerged as the dominant ecumenical paradigm for mission, eclipsing the paradigm of liberation from the 1960s on”. 76 Further, she proposes that, “[I]n the present context of fragmentation and conflict, the church’s reconciling role has come to the fore”. 77

These theologians are referring to a form of reconciliation which I term ‘social reconciliation’ in order to distinguish it from the wider concept of reconciliation, which from a theological perspective includes all aspects of the God in Christ reconciling endeavour: divine-human, divine-creation, human-human and human-creation relationships. I propose that social reconciliation is a sub-set within the wider missional project of public theology, especially in the way that it engages beyond the “walls” of the church. This vantage assumes that the reconciling work of God in Christ reaches beyond the horizons of individual soteriology. The divine reconciliatory telos extends to the restoration of the cosmos and to all the relationships within it. I shall explore the theological complexities within this understanding in more detail in a later chapter. But suffice for the present to acknowledge that social reconciliation as a theological concept displays many similarities and faces many of the challenges to its theory and praxis as its umbrella discipline of public theology.

Methodology and ‘Postcolonialism’ 78

In the introduction I gave an overview of the argument trajectory and the thesis methodology. To reiterate briefly, my methodology is interdisciplinary in approach and one that integrates the two streams of context and Christian narrative; the purpose being to

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75 Marion Maddox, “Religion, Secularism and the Promise of Public Theology”, in IJPT, 1, 1, 2007, p.94.
78 In this thesis I shall refer to postcolonialism in two separate ways. The apostrophied, ‘post’ colonialism refers to an assumption that the period of colonialism has ended; whereas, ‘postcolonialism’ is non-temporal, but refers to the theoretical and praxis oriented perspective that utilizes ‘post’ as the ethical intention of ‘beyond’.
offer a reconciliatory contribution to the New Zealand conversation around Pākehā identity and belonging. In broad terms, the thesis might be described as a postcolonial reconciliation study, given its commitment to the ‘deconstruction’ of the traces of colonialism within the Pākehā quest. As I have indicated, I shall engage with some postcolonial scholars, not only in the analysis of the Pākehā identity claims, but also as ‘partners’ in the search for reconciliatory ideas. The perspective of British theologian Haddon Willmer’s is relevant here:

   It cannot be assumed that churches have the power to represent a coherent voice in the political realm; at best, a partnership could be developed between theologians, civil society and political leadership, in the sense that the former could become the interpreters of the efforts and achievements of civil society and politicians. 79

The ‘partnership’ in this study, then, is between myself as a public theologian and various New Zealand postcolonial scholars as we ‘combine’ to respond to the representative voices of Māori and Pākehā. This partnership, however, does not mean that our views are always homogenous and compatible at every level, or that these particular postcolonial scholars would even be comfortable in being partnered with this particular theologian. Therefore, given this and the prominence of the postcolonial voice in the study, some further explanation and justification for its inclusion is necessary.

The editors of the New Zealand Journal of History describe a postcolonial approach as one that:

   [i]nvolve[s] a critical engagement with colonization, and taking a perspective that critiques and seeks to undermine the structures, ideologies and institutions that gave (and continue to give) colonization meaning. The use of this term indicates a critical awareness of the excesses of colonization and an acknowledgement of its enduring legacies. 80

The genre, which is an interdisciplinary umbrella one, has played an activist role in the wider identity discourse that has emerged in this country. Again, according to the Journal:

   The basic premise of postcolonialism…is that colonization is an unfinished business. That is, the template of the nineteenth-century colonial project is with us still; it is

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inscribed in our political and cultural institutions, marked on our bodies and woven into the fabric of contemporary society. In early twenty-first-century NZ, the repercussions of colonialism continue to resonate through entrenched social, cultural, political and economic differences, signalled through publications and academic scholarship, and are deeply ingrained in ‘real world’ inequalities which reach far beyond the academy.\textsuperscript{81}

New Zealand literary scholar Sarah Dugdale has noted that postcolonialism in New Zealand, in concert with the Māori voice, has raised “uneasy questions about identity and belonging, key tropes in the discourse of post-colonial literature”, and caused a “re-negotiation of their identity”.\textsuperscript{82}

Like many ‘post’ endeavours, postcolonialism, as is its “cousin” postmodernism, is notoriously difficult to define and isolate. However, while sharing a similar chronological lineage, and in some quarters a similarity in philosophical influences, the two terms are far from one and the same. Mabiala Kenzo, an African postcolonial theologian, holds that “postcolonialism, when conceived of in merely historical terms, has little, if anything to do with postmodernism” [italics original].\textsuperscript{83} He proposes that the key defining characteristic that denotes postcolonialism is as a “discursive practice that takes colonialism and its aftermath as its subject matter”.\textsuperscript{84} Postcolonialism, in this sense, is closely associated with the work of Edward Said and his critics, especially Gayatri Spivak and Homi Bhabha.\textsuperscript{85}

New Zealand cultural studies scholars Chris Prentice and Vijay Devadas reiterate Kenzo’s position. They claim that what makes the scholarship postcolonial is its:

\begin{quote}
[t]heoretical and critical commitment to a politics of decolonisation in all spheres, and much of the contention within the field concerns quite what this would mean....Postcolonial studies is founded on a long tradition of political engagement, scholarship, and cultural activity in the broadest sense; essentially its foundations lie in the responses of colonised peoples around
\end{quote}

\begin{thebibliography}{9}

\bibitem{81} Ibid.
\bibitem{84} Ibid., p.325.
\bibitem{85} Ibid.
\end{thebibliography}
the world to the policies and practices of imperialism and its colonial translations.  

However, within the New Zealand context, postcolonialism has its critics. There are those who oppose its perceived philosophical affinity with postmodernism and ideological affinity to the politics of the ‘left’, amidst accusations of “political correctness” and “historical revisionism”, while others view the term and genre as “inappropriate” and “untimely”. The latter critics include New Zealand indigenous scholars Linda Tuhiwai Smith and Moana Jackson, who argue that their situation is not “post-colonial” but “still colonized”. In their view, the colonizing is now perpetuated by the Pākehā settler majority, including some Pākehā academics, but especially by the state that serves the majority interest. Moana Jackson, for example, argues that “we are not in a post-colonial or neo-colonial period. Instead we are in a new version of the same old song of the dispossession and denial of the rights of the indigenous peoples”. Linda Tuhiwai Smith holds that many Māori scholars are suspicious of the credentials of the discipline as a means to aid Māori. She argues:

[t]hat the fashion of postcolonialism has become a strategy for reinscribing or reauthorizing the privileges of non-indigenous academics because the field of “postcolonial” discourse has been defined in ways which can still leave out indigenous peoples, our ways of knowing and our current concerns.

Further, she adds, “[M]any indigenous intellectuals actively resist participating in any discussion within the discourses of post-coloniality. This is because post-colonialism is viewed as a convenient invention of Western intellectuals which reinscribes their power to define the world”.  

Speaking about scholarship generally in New Zealand, Māori historian Nēpia Mahuika criticizes attempts which he suggests amount to a “redefining of the Māori world” by the dominant settler community. He argues, “[W]e assert the notion that as the indigenous people here we are not ‘other’, and resist those voices, discourses and frameworks that

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88 Ibid.
would either marginalize or subsume us”.

He suggests that, to a large extent, this is what the nationalist focus within New Zealand history has done, and continues to do. He argues, and I quote at length because of the relevance for the wider concerns of the thesis, that:

Becoming more fully aware of the ways in which colonial oppression is still ongoing in NZ historical scholarship is only a small step...closing the gaps requires change on multiple levels and layers, facilitated by the willingness in action of all manuhiri to embrace and empower the tangata whenua, and to essentially throw off the identity of settlers and colonizers, and be clothed again in the garments, language, identities and histories common to the home people. Closing the gaps...challenges those who are committed to belonging and finding their way ‘home’ in Aotearoa to first reassess their position in the historical landscape. Some of our people [researchers] who have grown tired of waiting for our colleagues to reciprocate, are wearisome of the burden of reminding them at every second conference about their ethical obligations as Treaty partners or their vital place in the shaping of a world we can both satisfactorily inherit. Their usefulness is inextricably dependent on how they materialize within the work of those who have sought to ground themselves in the language, Tikanga, and mātauranga of the iwi kainga. Only then can one truly belong.

Mahuika’s critique is important – his warnings against an overly simplistic interpretation and reliance upon postcolonialism, especially if the discipline is ‘disconnected’ from the views of the colonized, needs to be noted. However, while I agree that any comprehensive attempts to ‘decolonize’ the New Zealand landscape will require a multifaceted and multi-ethnic approach, I suggest that while their critiques need to be acknowledged, these particular indigenous perspectives do not disqualify an ‘informed’ postcolonial analytical approach. I offer that a postcolonial analysis of settler-indigenous societies is not necessarily founded on a conviction that colonialism has ceased. Rather, as Prentice and Devadas describe it, postcolonialism is an “analysis of social, political and cultural questions – of relations among indigenous and non-indigenous peoples” which examines the possibilities “for dismantling

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93 Mahuika’s translation – ‘non-Māori’.
94 Mahuika’s translation – ‘Māori, or people of the land’.
95 According to Nēpia Mahuika, in “Closing the Gaps”, “The term ‘iwi kainga’ means ‘home people’, those who have the right and responsibility to welcome and whakatau (seat), feed and house the manuhiri (visitors), who maintain the tikanga and whose responsibility as kaitiaki (guardians) place them in an immediate position of accountability in retaining the the tribes’ local practices, histories, knowledge and identity. The fulfil a vital role for the people, and are the ahi kaa.” p.27, footnote 79.
persistent legacies of colonial power relations, of forging a decolonised society” 97 As such, it is an approach that “requires explicit, critical attention to colonialism and our colonial past itself, and to its continuities in contemporary political, social and cultural life” 98

In this way, the ‘post’ in postcolonialism does not necessarily mean ‘after’, but rather refers to a continuous engagement with the effects of a colonial occupation. My working definition of postcolonialism, then, is that it involves a critical commitment to a “politics of decolonisation in all spheres”. 99 This commitment will involve the interaction of scholars who are members of the ‘colonized’ and the ‘colonizers’. For, while it might be argued that the “vantage of victimhood” provides the best view of colonialism and consequently the most “qualified” to formulate a decolonizing strategy, this is not necessarily so. I offer the view of postcolonial theologian R.S. Sugirtharajah in support of this view:

Colonialism disturbs both the colonized and the colonizer, and as such the decolonizing process involves both. The purpose of postcolonial discourse is not only to investigate how peoples and cultures were violated, but also to investigate the entanglement and entrenchment of European and American powers which sponsored, sanctioned, and sustained such atrocities. While the colonized liberate themselves from the oppressive structures, the colonizer has to confront the very structures which in the first place perpetuated such an unequal system. Since both the colonized and the colonizer have a heavy stake in unravelling past injustices and present imbalances, the postcolonial critical category is serviceable tool for both. 100

In some ways, Sugirtharajah’s argument reflects Mahuika’s perspective above – this suggests that the strategy for ‘deconstruction’ within any colonial society requires action, not only by the colonized but also by the colonizers.

There is a final consideration of postcolonialism as an analytical lens that needs attention – this is its relationship to my theological method. R.S. Sugirtharajah and other postcolonial theologians argue strongly that a hermeneutic of suspicion is the most appropriate method with which to interpret and apply the Bible. This view is predicated not only upon a critical view of what they perceive as the Bible’s own traces of colonial practice, but also reflects a

97 Prentice and Devadas, “Postcolonial Studies”, pp.5-6.
98 Ibid.
99 Ibid.
postmodern rejection of metanarrative.\textsuperscript{101} Their position has gained a following among many contextual theologians and their arguments do not need to be repeated here.\textsuperscript{102} However, given that this study employs a hermeneutic of trust, and is not ‘anti-
metanarrative’ as such, some clarifications are necessary.

I submit that a ‘trusting’ and indeed a ‘hopeful’ attitude to the Scriptures, the theologian’s major resource, is not antithetical to a postcolonial agenda. The arguments in many ways reflect those I submitted above with regard to context and so I shall not reiterate them here. Briefly, however, there is another perspective to this complex discussion. It is, that despite Christianity’s complicated relationship to colonialism, the Bible has often been employed to critique the oppression of the poor, the powerless and the colonized, and not only in the age of postmodernism. In recent centuries, even during the era of colonialism and slavery, the Bible was the inspiration for those who desired to advance the cause of indigenous peoples.\textsuperscript{103} There are more recent examples as well: in the hands of liberation theologians, the admittedly now contested use of the Exodus \textit{motif} became a powerful narratival tool. In the New Zealand context, the Bible was often utilized, especially by Māori, to draw attention to their plight. Nineteenth century chiefs, such as Wiremu Tamihana and Matene Te Whiwhi, drew upon the Bible, both as an inspiration for the establishment of the Māori king and as a critique of government policies. The use by Māori of the 1 Kings 21 Naboth’s vineyard narrative qualifies as a ‘postcolonial’ reading of the Scriptures by my definition. Here, the loss of Māori land was seen as analogous to Naboth’s land being seized by Ahab and Jezebel in Israel in the 9\textsuperscript{th} century BCE. The narrative became an organizing theme for their petitions to Parliament and in letters to the newspapers of the day.\textsuperscript{104} Finally, most of these groups would also have understood these ‘liberation’ narratives as fitting within the divine teleological metanarrative.

While the above is a necessarily brief defence of my hermeneutic of trust as a valid postcolonial approach, I propose that the only ‘non-negotiable’ qualification for a postcolonial theology is that expressed above in the earlier definition – that it be a

\textsuperscript{101} See Sujirtharajah, “Postcolonial Biblical Interpretation”, in \textit{Voices from the Margin}, pp. 64-85.

\textsuperscript{102} These include Naim Ateek and Robert Allen Warrior. See \textit{Voices from the Margin}.

\textsuperscript{103} See for example William Wilberforce and the British Clapham Sect. Cf., \textit{The Aborigines’ Protection Society} founded in 1837, by Sir Thomas Buxton an English Quaker.

“theoretical and critical commitment to a politics of decolonisation in all spheres”. It is on this basis that I argue that my approach is compatible with my analytical ‘partners’. There is no ‘disqualifying contradiction’ between my reconciling public theology, which is committed to just race relations in Aotearoa New Zealand, and the defining principles of postcolonial analysis. Instead, I suggest that a methodological approach which integrates a postcolonial analysis with the biblical narrative continues a public theological tradition, which has been existent in this land for the past 170 years.

105 Prentice and Devadas, “Postcolonial Studies”, pp. 5-6.
Chapter Three: Historical Context and the Pākehā Quest

In this chapter, having dealt with some of the important theoretical considerations vis a vis the study’s location within the broad research rubric of public theology, I shall provide some historical background to the Pākehā quest for identity and belonging. This will include, in the second sector, an overview of the identity claims by my Pākehā conversation partners: Michael King, Donald Brash and Trevor Mallard. The coverage of their representative discourses at this stage is more descriptive than analytical; I shall attend to that task in the next chapter.

Background Pre-1970

Historians and social commentators are agreed that the 1970s in New Zealand heralded a significant shift in the field of cultural politics – this included reworking understandings of identity and belonging by both Māori and Pākehā. According to sociologist Paul Spoonley, it was during this period that the “postcolonial discourse politics” of the country began to take form; however, the construction of a New Zealand identity had been evolving for some time, especially as those of European ancestry sought to define themselves as distinct from their relatives in the “old world”. Concurrently Māori, both on a tribal and national level, also negotiated the changing landscape under the influence of various leaders.

It was the country’s involvement in overseas’ wars that provided the stimulus for ‘identity formation’, and already by the Boer war, at the beginning of the 20th century, a New Zealand national identity, distinct from the British, was being formed. The pursuit of a national identity was further accelerated during the two World Wars, albeit a nationalism that was defined very much in terms of the dominant European demographic – a domination helped in part by various immigration Acts from 1881 to the 1950s. These Acts ensured New Zealand remained one of the most homogenous of settler colonies.

This includes New Zealand historians, Peter Gibbons, James Belich and Michael King; sociologists Paul Spoonley, Avri Bell and Claudia Bell Evans and others.


Note: Given this study is primarily about Pākehā identity and belonging, I shall only make passing references to a Māori response with the understanding that it is not possible to talk about identity politics in New Zealand without some reference to Māori.

Note: Traditionally, colonies are defined within Postcolonial Studies as either ‘settler’ (e.g. Australia, Canada and New Zealand) countries or ‘non-settler’ countries, e.g., India, Jamaica, Nigeria, Senegal, Sri Lanka.)
“white New Zealand policy”, which restricted immigration largely to immigrants of British or white European background, was only lifted, and partially at that, in the early 1950s. In effect, however, many of these restrictive policies were kept in place until the 1980s. This had a side effect of ensuring that Britain remained “home” for many New Zealanders as well as the prime destination for young “kiwis” on their “rite of passage”, known colloquially as their “OE” (overseas experience).\textsuperscript{110} The drive towards New Zealand distinctiveness became even more pronounced after the return of the ANZACs\textsuperscript{111} from World War II. Eminent New Zealand historian Keith Sinclair described the distinctiveness in the following way: “In contradistinction to the metropolitan English, New Zealanders saw themselves as more casual in their attitudes to rank and hierarchy, this was linked to ideologies of egalitarianism, mateship and ideals of a ‘fair go’.”\textsuperscript{112}

The land itself also provided a significant point of difference from Europe. Artists and writers contributed to the formation of a national identity by using the New Zealand landscape as a point of reference. They did this, in the first instance, by invoking the “pristine landscape” as a literal and metaphorical \textit{motif}, one that literally needed taming and colonizing, as well as representing the obstacles faced by the Europeans in their quest for dominion. In later representations, this “unique” landscape was celebrated for what was left of its wilderness. In the view of sociologist Claudia Bell, land ownership also became an important component of Pākehā attempts to “belong” and as a differentiation from their roots in Britain. She says that, “[I]dentification with the environment, gradually became defined not by one’s connections or family location in Britain, but by owning land here”.\textsuperscript{113}

In tracing the development of a ‘post’ colonial discourse\textsuperscript{114}, Paul Spoonley outlines that an emerging cultural nationalism became especially apparent in the field of literature during the 1940s “as Euro-centred notions of New Zealand identity were increasingly being contested.”\textsuperscript{115} This included a self-conscious exploration of local identity, especially around

\textsuperscript{110} Exceptions to this were the Dutch and Yugoslav immigration movements to New Zealand.
\textsuperscript{111} Australian and New Zealand Army Corp.
\textsuperscript{114} ‘Post’ in the chronological sense of the word.
what it meant to be a ‘New Zealander’ as opposed to a transplanted Briton. An example of this identity transition can be seen in the writings of the well-known New Zealand author Alan Mulgan, who in 1927 entitled his description of a journey to Britain as, *Home: A Colonial’s Adventure*, whereas, by 1958 his autobiography was called *The Making of A New Zealander*.116

During this period, in contrast to the prevailing racial harmony and unity myths of the time, some of the social sciences adopted a more critical position, with certain texts highlighting the marginal position of Māori. An example of this is *The Maori People Today*, edited by I. Sutherland in 1940117, which was a highly critical review of the social and economic circumstances of Maori. Another example is the work of the historian J.C. Beaglehole in the 1940s and 50s, which contradicted the “prevailing optimism of most Pakeha who felt that progress and harmony had been achieved for both races”118, and Dick Scott’s *The Parihaka Story* in 1954119, which broke with the almost hagiographical portrayal of the nation’s colonizing past with its critique of the actions of the 19th century government. This local history, with its critical analysis of the impact of colonialism on Maori, was a rare example of self-criticism until the later revisionist works of historians such as James Belich, Claudia Orange and Jock Phillips in the 1980s.120

The formation of a localized identity prior to the 1970s was channelled primarily towards the formation of a national identity. It was one which reflected the assumptions of the majority peoples, a people confident that their worldview would continue to triumph over the landscape and other minority interests, including Māori and diverse non-white immigrants. However, by the latter part of the 20th century this sense of triumphalism was challenged by the emergence of various internal and external factors.

**1970 And Beyond**

According to cultural historian Patrick Evans, “[A]round 1970, living in New Zealand began to feel different from before” and “although few realised at the time, 14 December 1966 was the end of the golden weather”.\(^{121}\) He reiterates economist Brian Easton’s identification of the collapse of overseas wool prices on that day as the start of “extraordinary and rapid economic transformation”.\(^{122}\) This situation was exacerbated by Britain’s entrance into the European Community in 1973, which had the effect of terminating New Zealand’s economic and emotional dependency upon its northern relation.\(^{123}\) This forced a reshaping of the economic and political relationship and created a rethink among many European New Zealanders about who they were, and where they belonged. The sense of “abandonment” by their northern forebears was exacerbated by developments closer to “home” – in particular the burgeoning cultural and political renaissance among Māori.

The emergence of a more “strident” indigenous voice was spearheaded by several new political groups: *Te Hokioi* and the Maori Organisation on Human Rights (*MOOHR*), as well as a group of young university students, most notably *Ngā Tamatoa*. Each of these issued numerous newsletters and pamphlets in order to publicize their cause and they gained a strong following, particularly amongst young urban Māori. According to Ranginui Walker, “while *Te Hokioi* and *MOOHR* were the underground expressions of rising political consciousness among urban Maori, *Ngā Tamatoa* became its public face”.\(^{124}\) This group, inspired by the Black Power movement in the United States, and led by Syd and Hana Jackson and Donna Awatere, initiated the on-going protests at Waitangi each 6\(^{th}\) February in the early 1970s. Ranginui Walker opined, “[I]t is now abundantly clear that the Waitangi celebrations, which the government cranked up into its present form in the seventies, [have] unleashed irreversible social forces which no amount of cant and myth-making can subdue”.\(^{125}\)

The protests, which centred upon the Treaty of Waitangi, were reinforced by the iconic 1975 land march from Hapua to Wellington, led by the respected *kuia* [woman elder] Dame

\(^{122}\) Ibid.
\(^{123}\) Ibid.
Whina Cooper. This large and visible demonstration not only galvanized wide-spread support from Māori, but also signalled to many Pākehā New Zealanders that their relationship with Māori was not what they had imagined it to be. This emblematic protest was followed by the Bastion Point occupation (1977-78), the Raglan Golf Course dispute, and the protest by *He Taua* (an offshoot of Ngā Tamatoa) against the Auckland University’s Engineering Students annual mock *haka*.

These protests all captured the attention of the national press and the European majority, resulting in a re-examination of the post-war myth of “racial harmony”, a theme that had been engrained within the national narrative. The historical strategies of assimilation and integration, the assumptions of a majority culture confident of their place in the world, propagated as late as the 1960s with the government initiated Hunn Report, were questioned by many Pākehā for the first time.\(^{126}\) This questioning ultimately had an impact on government strategy, with monocultural and integrationist policies replaced in the 70s by a form of ‘multiculturalism’. This in turn was superseded, in response to the growing political demands of Māori, by an official policy of ‘biculturalism’, an often controversial and contested (in terms of meaning) policy which apart from anything else acknowledges the “special” place of Māori as indigenous peoples of New Zealand. As well as the ferment of internal cultural politics, New Zealand in the 1960s and 1970s was also impacted by the anti-war (Vietnam) and anti-nuclear sentiments of an educated and politically liberal “baby-boomer” generation. A generation, who like their peers in other Western democracies, were reacting against the status quo and who sought new “meaning” in an era of ‘post’ colonialism via a variety of expressions.

If the 1970s heralded the new era of identity politics, the trend of challenge and change continued into the 1980s. Commentators point to the 1981 tour of New Zealand by the South African rugby team as a pivotal moment in New Zealand’s political history and as a time of “clear bifurcation” between Māori and Pākehā.\(^{127}\) The resultant protests against the tour highlighted the irony of anti-racist opposition by Pākehā towards South Africa in the absence of any similar stand in this country. Challenged by the strident rejection of Pākehā

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\(^{126}\) The Hunn Report: A government inquiry into the Māori Affairs Department which critiqued race relations in New Zealand, but ultimately recommended a policy of assimilation.

in Donna Awatere’s *Maori Sovereignty*, many non-Māori, who previously had articulated “on behalf” of Māori, felt side-lined in the new political environment – one that argued for indigenous solutions without the contribution of non-Māori. This bifurcation and ‘exclusion’ contributed to a new era of critical self-reflection for many New Zealanders, especially those of European ancestry, including explorations of different ways of belonging and new terms of self-identification. For example, ‘being Pākehā’ was defined as a counterpoint to the new politics of Maori identity, while others continued to claim that, “We’re all New Zealanders”. It is from this foment that many of the conversations of identity and belonging have emerged. Ultimately, the themes of New Zealanders at war and the taming of a hostile landscape of the early 20th century have been replaced by questions of: “Who am I?” and “Where do I belong?”. Arguably, it is questions such as these that have provided the impetus for our representative identity claims, to which I shall now turn.

Representative Pākehā Identity Claims

The following presentation of the three representative Pākehā ‘claims’ is not meant as an exhaustive analysis of each position, but serves more as an illustrative template of the Pākehā quest, both as historical phenomenon and as thematic types. In other words, the ideas expressed by King, Brash and Mallard, and some of the critiques which I shall detail in the next chapter, provide the national ‘conversational context’ into which I shall posit my ‘reconciliatory ideas’.

For the late historian and biographer Michael King, the issue of what it meant to be a New Zealander of European descent became a major theme within his historical and biographical opus. His academic and non-academic offerings initiated much of the discussion around Pākehā identity in the post-1970s Aotearoa New Zealand; given this, and given the wide ranging scope of his arguments, the ‘representation’ of his ideas here is more wide ranging than the other two. In contrast to King, Donald Brash’s and Trevor Mallard’s incursions into the identity debate were more spontaneous and occasional and therefore I shall restrict my inclusion of their identity discourses to the two respective speeches, which garnered wide spread national attention.

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Michael King

Michael King wrote and edited three seminal works concerned with identity and belonging in Aotearoa New Zealand in the late 20th century. However, his concern for Pākehā identity was not restricted to these three books and the theme remained present in many of his other biographical and other historical works. The first book, Being Pakeha, was written in part “to make it clear why I [King] believed that Maori had every right to be Maori in their own country and to expect Pakeha to respect and support them in that mission”. He followed this in 1991 with Pakeha: The Quest for Identity in New Zealand, an edited miscellany by various New Zealanders of European origin who articulated what ‘being Pākehā’ in New Zealand meant for them. The final major work was Being Pākehā Now: Reflections and Recollections of a White Native in 1999, in which King revisited his earlier Being Pākehā book and in which he began to explicate in more detail his Pākehā as “indigenous” thesis – an idea that I shall cover in more detail later.

King nominated the “recovery of lost ground by Maori” and the “identity needs” of his fellow Pākehā as reasons for entering the identity debate. He felt that some Pākehā:

[s]eemed to believe that if Maori were gaining ground, it had to be at the expense of Pakeha. And some Pakeha who watched the waxing of the Maori cultural renaissance began to question the basis for their own presence in the country. If Maori were tangata whenua, indigenous people with whom the agencies of the Crown had an obligation to consult, who or what were Pakeha?....Did Pakeha belong in New Zealand, or were they destined to be forever tauiwi or strangers in their country of birth?

Significantly, these issues and questions of identity and belonging also reflect the concern of many Pākehā participants I have encountered at various reconciliation fora. This Pākehā “dilemma” formed the framework for King’s identity thinking, and became a recurring theme throughout much of his writing.

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129 This is not an exhaustive list of King’s ‘identity’ writings. I shall also draw from other examples of his opus, for example, Tread Softly For You Tread On My Life: New and Collected Writings, and The Penguin History of New Zealand.
133 Ibid.
King also pointed to the 1970s as a pivotal period in New Zealand race relations. He claimed that prior to that time the Treaty of Waitangi had not been “observed or honoured”. However, now that this “deficit was being rectified”, he sensed that another “imbalance” was occurring, another injustice was being perpetrated, but this time the injustice was against the European culture.¹³⁴ Reflecting on the new “imbalance”, King said that Pākehā were asking for what he called a “mutuality of respect”.¹³⁵ He felt that in accordance with this “respect” Māori should desist from using terms such as tau iwi [foreigner or alien], to refer to Pākehā.¹³⁶ As another manifestation of this “respect”, Māori ought not to regard Pākehā as “representatives of a colonising power that merely stole material and cultural resources from Maori and gave nothing in return”.¹³⁷

While King rejected tau iwi as an appellation, he embraced the term ‘Pākehā’ and inculcated it with his own meaning. Growing up in New Zealand, influenced, as he describes it, by a blend of Irish-Catholic and Māori spirituality, as well as the local landscape, ‘Pākehā’ provided for him the most suitable self-description and signature of belonging.¹³⁸ He felt it important to choose a New Zealand label to describe this experience, one that has little significance anywhere else in the world.¹³⁹ He said that in using the word, Pākehā:

I refer to those things that relate to New Zealand but which are not specifically Maori or Pacific Island in character. I refer, in other words, to mainstream New Zealand culture – which is not unaffected by “things Maori”; but which is not in itself Maori. And I prefer to use the term Pakeha because it is positive (as opposed to “non-Maori”); because it is an indigenous expression; and because the words “European” or “Caucasian” are no longer accurate or appropriate.¹⁴⁰

He explained the historical antecedents to his arrival and belonging to this land in the following way:

My people, predominantly remnants of the Irish diaspora, came here to the country where the first indigenous people made a treaty with the Crown that authorised colonisation and gave us those two streams of people with rights to be here: tangata

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¹³⁵ Ibid.
¹³⁶ King, Tread Softly, pp.110-111.
¹³⁷ King, Penguin History, p.516.
¹³⁸ King, Tread Softly, p.110.
¹³⁹ Ibid.
¹⁴⁰ Ibid., p.109.
whenua and tangata tiriti. After several generations of my family’s occupation of this land, my own sense of belonging to it – and hence the flavour of my own culture – includes the following ingredients: a strong relationship to the natural world intensified by living by the sea, boating, fishing, tramping and camping; and engagement with the history of the land...a relationship with the literature of this country...and a relationship with Māori people, Māori writing and Māori history, which affects my view of all the preceding elements.¹⁴¹

Overseas travel “confirmed” to King that New Zealand and its experiences and traditions, both Māori and Pākehā, were in his “bones”; it was this country alone that could provide for him a sense of belonging. This ‘belonging’ led King to argue in Being Pakeha Now that he and other Pākehā are “indigenous” to New Zealand. He claimed also that the “emblems” of colonial settlement – the macrocarpa and the wooden church – are also now indigenous. King defined indigeneity in a way that was “unique” at the time. He said that people who live in New Zealand by choice, as distinct from an accident of birth, and who are committed to this land and its people and steeped in their knowledge of both, are no less ‘indigenous’ than Māori”.¹⁴²

This “indigenising” of Pākehā and their culture represents an ‘identity’ movement beyond his earlier expressions in Being Pakeha. A reason for this progression is described in that book’s sequel:

Two decades on, with the Maori renaissance and Waitangi Tribunal process in full flow, that need [the right for Māori to be Māori in their own country] has been met. New Zealand is for the first time making a conscious effort to accommodate Māori grievances and aspirations. What I am conscious of now is a rather different but equally pressing need. It is to explain Pakeha New Zealanders to Māori and to themselves; and to do this in terms of their right to live in this country, practise their values and culture and be themselves.¹⁴³

King “justified” his claim of “Pākehā indigeneity” in several ways. Firstly, he argued that if we adhere to a literalist definition, no New Zealander is really indigenous:

In the beginning we were all immigrants to these islands, our ancestors boat people who arrived by waka, ship or aeroplane. The ingredients for our indigenous cultures, too, were imported: the Polynesian language that became Māori, and English;

¹⁴¹ King, Tread Softly, pp.110-111.
¹⁴² King, Being Pakeha Now, p.235.
¹⁴³ Ibid., p.9.
Papatuanuku and the Bible; Maui and the culture heroes of Western Europe and North America; the kumara and the kiwifruit.\footnote{King, \textit{Pakeha: The Quest for Identity in NZ}, Michael King, (ed), Auckland: Penguin Books, 1991, p.9.}

Secondly, he felt that time spent in New Zealand also justifies the term, stating:

Pakeha culture can no longer be considered an imported culture; it has now been here long enough, in interaction with the land and the tangata whenua, to be considered a \textit{second indigenous culture}. And it has become indigenous in the same way that East Polynesian culture became Māori culture in New Zealand: by turning the attention of migrants away from their land and culture of origin, and focusing their sense of commitment to this land.\footnote{King, \textit{Tread Softly}, p. 112.}

To King, this emerging Pākehā culture, drawing as it does on Māori, European and wider human ingredients, could only accrete in New Zealand – hence it is not something foreign, but is a second indigenous New Zealand culture. He argued that this does not equate to the displacement of Māori culture, but that there exists a form of symbiotic relationship between the two cultures. Neither does this claim for a second indigenous culture, in his view, devalue the status of Māori as \textit{tangata whenua} – the nation’s first people. He maintained that, “[M]aori were, and will remain the tuakana or senior sibling in our whanau relationship with the land, with each other, and with the outside world”.\footnote{Ibid., pp.112-113.} Equally, he argued that the “first people” status of Māori, does not weaken the claim for the “legitimacy of the Pakeha presence in New Zealand”.\footnote{King, \textit{Being Pakeha Now}, p.235.} He declared:

As far as I was and am concerned, my own people, descendants in the main of displaced Irish, had as much moral and legal right to be here as Māori. Like the ancestors of Māori, they came as immigrants; like Māori too, we become indigenous at the point where our focus of identity and commitment shifted to this country and away from our countries and cultures of origin.\footnote{Ibid.}

To him, the uniqueness of being Pākehā is as inimitable as being Māori – with the former being informed as much by its own memories and traditions as Māori are by their past.

For King, the understanding of “Pākehā as indigenous” served several purposes. Firstly, it offers an identity of belonging that he proposed will increasingly “nourish and sustain them” and will yield a “wholeness and security” that will enable Pākehā to feel that they truly
belong in this part of the world. It also serves as a reconciliatory function because the sense of belonging accorded by indigenous status will play a vital role in the process of Māori-Pākehā accommodation. To him, this reconfigured identity will cause Pākehā not to feel threatened by the “enlarging” Māori presence in New Zealand and ultimately this will yield a better outcome for Māori. King felt that those who opposed the greater role being played by Māori in the country were “insecure” within their own identity and that this was demonstrated by many preferring the term ‘New Zealander’ over ‘Pākehā’. He claimed that those “who lay claim to New Zealand-ness in preference to Pakeha identity, by that very fact – are expressing a stronger commitment to their European culture of origin than to the county in which they live”.¹⁴⁹ In contrast, he felt that their “right to be here, to belong, and to carry indigenous status” is a reality that needs to be acknowledged. For him, the acknowledgement and understanding of this status would help his “Pakeha brothers and sisters towards a similar degree of confidence and security in their own identification with this land as Maori have”.¹⁵⁰

To conclude, King also rejected any thoughts that present-day Pākehā are in any way “responsible” for the impact of colonization upon Māori. This view is a rejection of what he termed the “OT notion that the sins of the fathers are to be visited on successive generations”.¹⁵¹ In his opinion, it is this mind-set that has contributed to the ethnic violence in the Balkans and Ireland and led to the 19th century New Zealand musket wars and other local conflicts. A way of thinking, he opined, that would only open the way for further clashes between Māori and Pākehā.¹⁵² To King, the large populace of mixed Māori and Pākehā descent also weakens the “sins of the fathers” argument and to him offers significant peace-making possibilities. He cited the historical use of marriage by Māori to solve conflict as a “way forward out of a culture of revenge”. The resultant children of the “mixed marriage” operate as a “link” between the sides, thus removing the distinction between both races.¹⁵³

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¹⁴⁹ King, Pakeha: The Quest for Identity in NZ, p.20.
¹⁵⁰ King, Tread Softly, p.119.
¹⁵¹ Ibid, p.113.
¹⁵² Ibid.
¹⁵³ Ibid.
In summary, then, King’s views traverse a range of identity perspectives that by his reckoning arise from a concern both for Māori and Pākehā. He claimed his initial foray into the identity debate was motivated by an aim to support the right of Māori “to be Maori in their own country”, a right promised to them by the Treaty of Waitangi. To King, however, there needs to be a concomitant “mutuality of respect” shown by Māori for Pākehā culture. King adopted ‘Pākehā’ as a term of self-description and signature of belonging because, as well as acknowledging the relationship of the later settlers to Māori, he argued that it uniquely described a culture that was neither Māori nor Pacific in character. He also claimed that Pākehā had the right to use the term ‘indigenous’, denying that it was an attempt to replace the unique indigenous status of Māori. In order to differentiate the ‘status’ accorded to the two ‘indigeneities’ he stated that Māori, to borrow their term, are tuakana or the ‘senior sibling’ in “our whanau relationship with the land”.

By implication, Pākehā might be viewed as teina or ‘a younger indigenous sibling’ in their relationship with the land. In King’s view, this right for Pākehā to identity as indigenous would instil in them a “similar degree of confidence and security in their identification with this land as Maori have.”

Donald Brash’s Speech

The next representative example of the Pākehā identity quest is that by the leader of the National Party, Don Brash, at an address to the Orewa Rotary Club on 27 January 2004. This speech, entitled “Nationhood”, outlined something of Brash’s vision for New Zealand and polarized opinion for several months. One political commentator has noted that his speech “was so successful in boosting National’s popularity that the party still had a link to it from its front page more than 18 months after it was delivered”. The speech to the Rotarians in 2004, often referred to as “Brash’s Orewa speech”, has now become part of the New Zealand vernacular, in much the same way as 9/11 is instantly recognizable in the American context.

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154 King, Tread Softly, pp.112-113.
155 Ibid., p.119.
156 Brash, “Nationhood”.
In the speech, Brash outlined five main priorities that were of concern to him as a leader of a major political party in New Zealand. The final priority, which he addressed on that particular occasion, is what he termed “the dangerous drift towards racial separatism in New Zealand, and the development of the now entrenched Treaty grievance industry”. The following are some excerpts from Brash’s speech, and I quote at length in order to give the salient identity comments an appropriate context. The speech revealed some of his notions about New Zealand’s colonial past and his views about New Zealand identities.

The topic I will focus on today, is the dangerous drift towards racial separatism in New Zealand, and the development of the now entrenched Treaty grievance industry. We are one country with many peoples, not simply a society of Pakeha and Maori where the minority has a birthright to the upper hand...today I want to speak about the threat which ‘the Treaty process’ poses to the future of our country....

So let me begin by asking, what sort of a nation do we want to build? Is it to be a modern democratic society, embodying the essential notion of one rule for all in a single nation state? Or is it the racially divided nation, with two sets of laws, and two standards of citizenship, that the present Labour Government is moving us steadily towards?

But the spirit of the Treaty of Waitangi was expressed simply by the then Lt Gov. Hobson in February 1840. In his halting Maori, he said to each chief as he signed: He iwi tahi tatou. We are one people.

A number of issues flow from this. They are complex, highly sensitive, even emotionally charged....

Over the past 20 years, the Treaty has been wrenched out of its 1840 context and become the plaything [sic] of those who would divide New Zealanders from one another, not unite us.

In parallel with the Treaty process and the associated grievance industry, there has been a divisive trend to embody racial distinctions into large parts of our legislation....

Brash continued the speech with his own revisionist view of history, one that denied any “utopian” perspective of the past – especially any thought that Māori were “wise ecologists, mystical sages, gifted artists, heroic navigators and pacifists who wouldn’t hurt a fly”. Brash acknowledged there were “injustices in the past” and that they should be acknowledged by a “gesture of recompense”; but similarly to King, he denied any personal sense of responsibility.
Don Brash then proceeded to outline his view of what he termed “the Treaty process".

We have moved from a badly drafted and ambiguous Treaty document of 1840, through a long period of colonisation to an attempt to live by the principles that seem to underlie that document. In 1975, the Waitangi Tribunal was established to hear Māori grievances about contemporary problems. The powers of the Tribunal were greatly extended in 1985. In a fateful decision, it was given authority to cover claims going back as far as the 1840 Treaty itself. A poorly drafted Act in 1985, coupled with inadequate attention to its implementation allowed a major grievance industry to blossom.

One principle above all others guides my thinking: The Treaty of Waitangi should not be used as the basis for giving greater civil, political or democratic rights to any particular ethnic group.

Following his critique of the “Treaty process”, under the sub heading “A multi-cultural melting pot”, Brash addressed the issue of Māori identity and his multicultural vision.

Let me turn briefly to what we mean by ‘Māori’. The short cut of referring to Māori as one group and Pakeha as another is enormously misleading. There is no homogenous, distinct Māori population – we have been a melting pot since the 19th century – although there is, of course, a highly distinctive Māori culture, which many people see as central to their identity. Our definition of ethnicity is now a matter of subjective self-definition: if you are part Māori and want to identify as Māori you can do so. The Māori ethnic group is a very loose one.

What we are seeing is the emergence of a population in New Zealand of multi-ethnic heritage – a distinct South Seas race of New Zealanders – where more and more of us will have a diverse ancestry. Hopefully, we will get joy and pride from all the different elements that go to make us who we are.

What do I conclude from all this?

First, we need to look at our past honestly, not through a lens which projects current values onto 19th century New Zealand, and not by stripping away the context of the past.

The Treaty contains just three short clauses, and deals with the government of New Zealand, property rights, and citizenship. Those principles must be upheld. Where there has been a clear breach of the Treaty – where land has been stolen, for example – then it is right that attempts to make amends should be made.

But the Treaty is not some magical, mystical, document. Lurking behind its words is not a blueprint for building a modern, prosperous, New Zealand. The Treaty did not create a partnership: fundamentally, it was the launching pad for the creation of one sovereign nation.
We should not use the Treaty as a basis for creating greater civil, political or
democratic rights for Maori than for any other New Zealander. In the 21st century, it
is unconscionable for us to be taking that separatist path....

The National Party has an honourable record of resolving historical Treaty
grievances....The leadership shown by Prime Minister Jim Bolger and Treaty
Negotiations Minister Sir Douglas Graham was crucial in establishing a
national consensus on the need to resolve historical grievances as part of the
process of reconciliation....

It is essential to put this [the past] behind us if all of us – and Maori in
particular – are to stop looking backward and start moving forward into this
new century as a modern, democratic and prosperous nation. We intend to
remove divisive race-based features from legislation. The ‘principles of the
Treaty’ – never clearly defined yet ever expanding – are the thin edge of the
wedge leading to a racially divided state and we want no part of that. There
can be no basis for special privileges for any race....Having done all that, we
really will be one people – as Hobson declared us to be in 1840....

Let me make one final concluding comment. In many ways, I am deeply
saddened to have to make a speech about issues of race. In this country, it
should not matter what colour you are, or what your ethnic origin might be. It
should not matter whether you have migrated to this country and only
recently become a citizen, or whether your ancestors arrived two, five, 10 or
20 generations ago.

The indigenous culture of New Zealand will always have a special place in our
emerging culture, and will be cherished for that reason. But we must build a
modern, prosperous, democratic nation based on one rule for all. We cannot
allow the loose threads of 19th century law and custom to unravel our
attempts at nation-building in the 21st century.158

In summary, then, the former National Party leader argued for a homogenous national
identity that subsumes all ethnicities within the generic appellation of “New Zealanders” – a
‘leap’ he makes by extrapolating from the Hobson “one people” statement. It might be
argued that he was using the Treaty event as a way of framing his homogenous ‘vision of
unity’. Whereas King proposed a specific form of Pākehā identity as indigenous, Brash
adopted a more fluid approach. On one level, he proposed a form of multiculturalism
without specific ethnic demarcation, and incorporated Māori identity within his
“multicultural” vision. Yet, at another level, he recognized the “indigenous culture of New

158 Brash, “Nationhood”.
Zealand... [and its] *special place in our emerging culture*” without explaining what that “special place” might mean. Brash, like King, also acknowledged that “past injustices” perpetrated upon Māori need to be addressed. However, overall, in his speech he argued against ethnicity as an identity marker and was particularly opposed to any special recognition given to Māori via the Treaty of Waitangi – a document that has in his view only historical interest and little modern relevance. Viewed within the organizing theme of ‘Pākehā identity and belonging’, Brash’s quest yields a multicultural “We are all New Zealanders” model – a model which acknowledges the nation’s colonial past but gives no consideration to either present Pākehā implication in that past or to the possibility that that “past” might in fact still be in some way a present reality.

**Trevor Mallard’s Speech**

I shall now turn to the third ‘representative’ identity offering: a speech to the Stout Research Centre for NZ Studies, Victoria University, Wellington by the then Co-ordinating Minister of Race Relations in the Labour Government, the Honourable Trevor Mallard. In order to safeguard against taking his views out of context, I shall again quote extensively from his speech. In this wide ranging discourse, which was his “response” to Donald Brash’s Orewa Speech and National Party policy, Mallard covered issues such as the ‘race relations debate’ and the ‘principles of the Treaty of Waitangi’. It was also a statement about New Zealand nationhood and identity. Here, I cite the salient points:

*Thank you for the invitation to speak to you today. I’d like to briefly outline my role as Coordinating Minister, Race Relations, and then move on to a wider discussion about the context of the current race relations debate and the principles of the Treaty of Waitangi.*

*As Coordinating Minister, Race Relations, one of my first tasks is to provide an assurance that government policy and programmes are targeted on the basis of need, not on the basis of race.*

*I want to make it clear that my role as Coordinating Minister, Race Relations, or for that matter as Minister of State Services, is not to act as a constitutional expert or defining authority on all matters relating to the Treaty or race relations. What I am focused on is getting the facts out into the public domain so that New Zealanders can have a reasoned and balanced debate.*

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159 Mallard, “We Are All New Zealanders Now”.
Any reasoned debate about race relations requires all of us who participate to understand and reflect on our particular histories in the New Zealand context. That involves considering the place of the Treaty, the nature of Treaty settlements in New Zealand and the rights and needs of all New Zealanders as we go forward in the 21st century.

I want to cover some of my initial thinking on these issues and how this will inform my approach to my responsibilities and the outcomes I want to achieve.

Among the key questions we have to ask ourselves is: what defines New Zealand in the 21st century? How do we build the sort of New Zealand that all reasonable people want to be part of? In my view extremists at both ends of the spectrum don’t help us achieve that.

We have processes in place for righting the wrongs of the past. That means sorting things out so we can all move on. As that happens we can build a stronger consensus about what it means to be New Zealanders in what’s going to be our best century yet.

So I see our 21st century as being about perfecting our nationhood, banishing the demons from our past, cheering each other on as New Zealand citizens, and being successful, instead of some people constantly feeling they are always missing out, always left behind....New Zealand also has to get its British imperial past behind it. Maori and Pakeha are both indigenous people to New Zealand now. I regard myself as an indigenous New Zealander – I come from Wainuiomata.

We’ve left behind a British identity. This has meant that we no longer easily understand the people who tried to tear up the Treaty and went to war with Maori in 1863. Once were Warriors. Once were British.

Indigeneity is about the diversity of ways in which we belong and identify with our country. There are Chinese and Indian New Zealanders who have become deeply indigenous too, just like other kiwis whose forbears come from a huge range of other countries.

Michael King was passionate about New Zealand and about the emergence of a unique New Zealand identity. He rightly pointed out that for most New Zealanders, regardless of their ethnicity, home is here, Aotearoa New Zealand.

He [King] argued that just because one group has been here longer than another does not make its members more New Zealand than later arrivals, nor does it give them the right to exclude others from full participation in national life.

Indigeneity is also about respecting the First Nation or Tangata Whenua in this country, Maori, who after all agreed to the introduction of the British law and government to New Zealand under the Treaty of Waitangi.
Without the trust of Maori in the British government back then, New Zealand as we know it today would not have developed.

Let’s get some facts straight about the Treaty. The Treaty is both bigger and smaller than many people think it is.

First, despite the Treaty having no formal legal status, it has been accorded a kind of constitutional status because it gave legitimacy to the British Crown in New Zealand.

Second, the New Zealand Government would be dealing with indigenous law issues whether there was a Treaty of Waitangi or not.

Let’s not blame the Treaty. It is hugely significant but it is not the be-all and end-all, nor the panacea for every challenge we face as a country. We would still have to face the challenges of genuinely redressing Maori grievances, of fully associating Maori with New Zealand nationhood, and of ensuring their fullest participation in our economy and society, regardless of whether we had the Treaty or not.

Third, in many ways the Treaty no longer underwrites what it used to. Maori, when they signed the Treaty, signed up to the British global order which existed at the time. Since then New Zealand has become an independent self-governing country. But the government's duty to look after all its citizens, Maori and Pakeha, equally – as promised by the Treaty – remains.

There are no people on earth who would of their own free will agree to extinguish themselves as an ethnically distinct group and totally surrender control over their communities and culture to others.

That cannot be what New Zealand’s 21st century is about. New Zealanders know that our unity as a nation can only be achieved by respecting and admitting diversity and difference.

So how do we make sense of the Treaty?

The two texts of the Treaty have led to different understandings. Because of the need to apply the Treaty to present-day circumstances and issues, the “principles” of the Treaty have been referred to by the courts and in legislation, rather than the text of the Treaty itself.

Treaty principles interpret the Treaty as a whole; its intention and its spirit. Some commentators argue that it is the spirit of the Treaty that matters most, overriding the differences in the texts.

Lord Woolf, in the Broadcasting Assets case in 1994 described Treaty principles as “the underlying mutual obligations and responsibilities the Treaty places on the parties. They reflect the intention of the Treaty as a whole and include, but are not confined to, the express terms of the Treaty.”
Trevor Mallard then spent some considerable time defining and explaining the principles of the Treaty. These are important considerations, but not immediately relevant to the discussion; however, he concluded the section by declaring:

*There is a myth that the Treaty gave Maori extra rights over and above those of other New Zealanders.*

*Article III makes it clear that Maori were to have the same rights as other British subjects, the same rights as the settlers. Article III was an explicit equaliser and a promise that Maori were not to have race-based legislation passed against them.*

*Maori have no extra rights or privileges under the Treaty or in the policy of the New Zealand government....*

*I think at this point it's also important to dispel some of the myths about the supposed multi-billion dollar Treaty grievance industry....*

*Treaty settlements are an important part of putting the negative aspects of our past behind us and getting on with a brighter future but they shouldn't be over-stated or unnecessarily exaggerated.*

*It's worthwhile considering the spirit of the Treaty then in terms of New Zealand in 2004.*

*The spirit of the Treaty is about a bond between New Zealanders that should transcend disputes over conflicting intentions and linguistic wrangles over different texts.*

*The spirit of the Treaty is no mystery....*

*The Treaty was open-ended, not a straitjacket. It was a preliminary agreement to an on-going relationship under the same law and government. The terms of that relationship have changed over the past 164 years.*

*The Treaty left us considerable freedom to fill in its considerable gaps together. Overall the outcome has been good. What might have happened without it in the world of 1840 is interesting to think about....*

*Living together as citizens in the spirit of the Treaty requires mutual respect....*

*New Zealand has contested history too...Maori are not alone in having ancestors who were victims at one time or other of the British power structures. Power was as unbalanced in the Lancaster mills as it was on the Waikato or the Punjab.*

*Our job in New Zealand is to not perpetuate that bad past in our own land but to leave it all behind, and to get on with it.*
We have to get over this implicit attitude that ‘History’ just happened to Maori, and that Pakeha history is all either offshore, about fighting in two World Wars, or else is “World History” in which we are only a minor player.

The Treaty was signed in 1840, and its intent must be balanced and understood in terms of New Zealand in 2004.

We should behave as citizens in terms of both the spirit of the Treaty and of the spirit of modern New Zealand.

New Zealanders are quite rightly proud of living in one of the world’s oldest, most successful, participatory, and genuinely egalitarian democracies. We have a reputation for giving people a fair go. It pays to trust this democracy first and foremost, and to confide in New Zealanders and trust them to make the right decisions as I know they will.

New Zealanders know that just throwing out the Treaty is impossible and irresponsible, and that this sort of provocation will cost us all. However Pakeha New Zealanders also want to be trusted by their Maori fellow-New Zealanders.

New Zealanders do not want to be condemned and cursed as if they are the British imperialist white ascendency colonialists. We see ourselves as egalitarian, fair-minded people who have little sympathy for elitism.

The Treaty and New Zealand democracy are reconcilable if we talk together as kiwis. They are reconcilable if Maori accept that the best guarantee of minority indigenous rights is the protection and good-will of the majority. Dumping on each other has no role in constructing a New Zealand for Maori and Pakeha citizens....

Cohesion doesn’t mean assimilation of every single one of us into one mold of the identikit New Zealander, as National would want.

It means getting on with each other appreciating and enjoying our differences, and recognizing how those differences add value to our country as a go-ahead, positive, future-looking nation.

I believe the vast majority of New Zealanders want this.

This speech by Trevor Mallard, although a ‘reactive’ political discourse on one level, was also a ‘constructive’ and ‘visionary’ endeavour by one of the country’s senior politicians. His overall ‘pitch’ to the wider voting public was that, “We are all New Zealanders now”. This theme, however, like that of King and Brash before him, was not developed in historical isolation, but drew upon his interpretation of the Treaty of Waitangi as his mediating touchstone.
Whereas Don Brash saw Pākehā as part of a multicultural amalgam, and by implication, a
coterminous identity with Māori and other ethnicities, Mallard, who drew upon the work of
Michael King, made specific claims about Pākehā identity. Like King, he argued that no
longer are Pākehā to be considered as ‘British’ but as ‘indigenous’. His view was that “all”
New Zealanders are now indigenous to New Zealand, “regardless of their ethnicity”.
Colonialism lives in the distant past because appropriate “processes” are in place to “right”
those historical injustices. These “processes”, he reminded his listeners, are not dependent
upon the Treaty, for as in other colonial countries, justice could be argued on the basis of
common law.

In Mallard’s view, ‘being indigenous’ means being from towns like Wainuiomata and
conferring Māori “respect” as tangata whenua or “First Nation” people because they agreed
to the “introduction of the British law”. However, this “respect” does not extend to
according them a ‘special status’, even in light of the Treaty. He argued that the Treaty “no
longer underwrites what it used to”. Like Brash, he claimed that it is a “myth” that the Treaty
accords Maori special rights over and above those of other New Zealanders. Although he
proposed that Treaty settlements are about putting the negative aspects of our past
“behind us” and “getting on with a brighter future“, its role should not be overstated. For
him, it is the “spirit of the Treaty” that is important in the 21st century, not the ‘letter’. This
“spirit” is about a bond between New Zealanders that is greater than arguments over
outcomes and texts.

In an ethical turn, the Minister proposed that citizens, which presumably include both Māori
and Pākehā, need to “behave as citizens” in accordance with both the “spirit of the Treaty
and of the spirit of modern New Zealand”. This ‘behaviour’ includes a King-like “mutuality of
respect” and an acceptance that the Treaty is a permanent reality, a fact attested to by the
inclusion of Treaty principles into New Zealand law. Presumably, in return for Pākehā
“behaving” according to the “spirit of the Treaty”, Pākehā like himself “also want to be
trusted by their Maori fellow-New Zealanders”. They do not want to be treated as if they are
still “the British imperialist white ascendancy colonialists”. The bulwark against any
perpetuation of colonization is the fact that Pākehā in his view are “egalitarian, fair-minded
people who have little sympathy for elitism”.

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Mallard concluded his speech with some ‘reconciling ideas’. The Treaty should not be “undermined”, because it is compatible with democracy if “we walk together as kiwis”. He also proposed that there will be reconciliation, if Māori accept and understand that their rights as a minority are best guaranteed by “the protection and good-will of the majority”. Presumably, this precludes them from “dumping” on Pākehā (and vice versa), for such behaviour is not only ‘counterproductive’ for Māori aspirations, but also in the building of a nation. Mallard’s model is in some sense an extension of Michael King’s indigenous model, but carries more emphasis upon the homogeneity of his “indigenous/kiwi/New Zealander”.

Summary

In this chapter, in order to contextualize the reconciliatory focus of this study, I have outlined some of the historical and political background to the Pākehā quest for identity and belonging. I have represented this quest by a selected overview of the writings and speeches of three prominent New Zealanders: Michael King, Donald Brash and Trevor Mallard, whom I characterize as my ‘Pākehā conversation partners’. Each of the representatives responded to the “new” national environment of the post-1970s in different, but related ways. In the next chapter I shall examine these identity ‘claims’ in conjunction with various postcolonial scholars.
Chapter Four: Identity and Belonging – A Postcolonial Critique

In the previous chapter, I established the context for the Pākehā quest for identity and belonging in Aotearoa New Zealand via an analysis of European settlement. This historical overview traced the trajectory of evolving settler identity formation – constructions motivated by the distance from “home” and the challenges of belonging to an ever changing landscape, both literally and figuratively. I argued, from the 1970s onwards, that Pākehā, an ‘identity’ conferred by the indigenous people of the land, entered an era of ‘displaced uncertainty’ because of both the nation’s forced ‘individuation’ from Europe and, most significantly, because of a burgeoning political and cultural renaissance amongst Māori. This ‘unsettling’ has been termed by one scholar as the “Pākehā ontological dilemma”\(^\text{160}\), a “condition” which has spawned a plethora of reworked identity claims, most of which are constructions formulated in juxtaposition to the renewed claims of Māori as tangata whenua. In order to illustrate these new identity configurations, I posited three representative examples by prominent New Zealanders, Michael King, Donald Brash and Trevor Mallard. This effort to redefine “who they are” in the reconfigured political and cultural landscape of post-1970s has led me to formulate the phrase “the Pākehā quest for identity and belonging” and utilize it as an organising motif for this reconciling public theology study.\(^\text{161}\)

In this chapter, I shall move from a descriptive historical overview to some theoretical considerations of identity. These deliberations will assist in my analysis of the Pākehā quest against the backdrop of colonialism. I shall explore some understandings of identity formation with assistance from some identity theorists from the field of cultural studies, this includes the idea of social identity as a ‘necessary’, ‘natural’, and multifaceted ‘narratival construction’. From there, I shall propose a connection between identity formation and the processes of colonization in settler societies like Aotearoa New Zealand. This theoretical connection between colonization and identity formation suggests that the Pākehā quest of belonging requires an ethical analysis to determine its complicity within the colonizing project. I shall undertake this ethical critique in the second part of the chapter, together with our postcolonial conversation partners.

\(^{160}\) Avril Bell, “Authenticity and the Project of Settler Identity in New Zealand”, p.123.

\(^{161}\) Sometimes for stylistic reasons, I refer to this formulation simply as the ‘Pākehā quest’.
Social Identity

The influential identity scholar Charles Taylor defines identity generically as “a person’s understanding of who they are...their fundamental characteristics as a human being”. 162 This characterization means that individuals can occupy a range of identities: from a simple appellation given at birth to a complex range of interrelated designations. The following self-description by New Zealand sociologist Tracey McIntosh exemplifies this: “[M]y identity as Māori is entangled and bound with other axes of identification, gender, class, sexual orientation, age, familial location, occupation, religious affiliation, political tendencies and intellectual interests”. 163

Further, Charles Taylor also posits that many of the identities that we hold are formed ‘intersubjectively’. 164 He says, “[M]y discovering my own identity doesn’t mean that I work it out in isolation, but that I negotiate it through dialogue, partly overt, partly internal, with others”. 165 In other words, some identities are not self-formulated, but rather are formed through dialogue or interaction with others and are therefore mutually negotiated social constructs. 166 Nigerian-British social theorist Kwame Anthony Appiah speaks of identity formation in the following way:

[n]either the picture in which there is just an authentic nugget of selfhood, the core that is distinctively me, waiting to be dug out, nor the notion that I can simply make up any self I choose, should tempt us. As we saw, we make up selves from a tool kit of options made available by our culture and society. We do make choices, but we don’t individually, determine the options among which we choose. To neglect this fact is to ignore Taylors “web of interlocution”, to recognize the dialogical construction of the self, and thus to commit what Taylor calls the “monological fallacy”. 167

These theories of identity formation are helpful in our exploration of Pākehā identity and belonging. Based upon Taylor’s and Appiah’s understandings, I understand identities as

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164 Taylor, Multiculturalism, p. 25.
165 Ibid.
being formed via an interaction of the ‘internal self’ with external circumstances, which include those amongst whom we live. The idea that our sense of who we are is determined through our interaction with others is termed a ‘dialogical model of self’, in contrast to a totally individualistic or monological model.\footnote{Ibid.} Understood in this way, the type of identities that we are dealing with in this study are not therefore ‘autonomous’ realities, but ‘substances’ that are formed in relationship to people, history and place.

Pākehā identity, as “one” of the identities held by European settlers, is termed a social or ethnic identity, and one that is described by New Zealand social psychologist James Liu as:

> [t]hat aspect of people’s self-image that relates to their membership in groups. Unlike individual aspects of identity, group or social identities are known only in the contexts of relationships with others, particularly other groups. Social identity, involves knowing what groups one belongs to, and this requires an understanding of what groups one does \textit{not} belong to; in other words, every group identity involves a dynamic process of inclusion and exclusion.\footnote{Liu, “History and Identity”, p.69.}

Pākehā, then, describes “a” social identity of European settlers in this land. It is an appellation that only “makes sense” as a category in relation to Māori and the land of Aotearoa New Zealand. In this way, then, Pākehā, as individuals and as an ‘entity’, are ‘defined’ by their relationship to Māori and by their habitation in this country. However, social identities like Pākehā are not static realities; rather, as we have shown in the previous chapter, and as the editors of the seminal 2005 study New Zealand Identities: Departures and Destinations have stated, “[W]hat is clear, is that the process of identity-making here [New Zealand] is dynamic”.\footnote{Ibid., p.11.} As we shall see, one of the influential dynamics for Pākehā is their position in the land as a settler people.

Viewing it from another angle, social geographer Anne Buttimer agrees that ‘location’ is important to identity. She maintains that “people’s sense of both personal and cultural identity is intimately bound up with place…and the loss of home or ‘losing one’s place’ may often trigger an identity crisis”.\footnote{Anne Buttimer, “Home, Reach and the Sense of Place”, in The Human Experience of Space and Place, Anne Buttimer and David Seamon, (eds), London: Croom Helm, 1980, pp.116-7.} Her insights are important, not only in her linking of identity to place, but especially in her observation that a ‘dislocation’, real or imagined, from
these ‘places’ may produce an ‘identity crisis’. In a similar vein, British sociologist Jeffrey
Weeks notes that, “[l]identity is about belonging….At its most basic, it gives you a sense of
personal location, the stable core of your individuality”.\(^{172}\) Thus ‘identity’ is intricately linked
to ‘belonging’ and is understood as being crucial to human well-being, or as Weeks
describes it, to our “social core”.

The above identity conclusions lead me to a foundational assumption about the Pākehā
quest. I propose that their post-1970 identity reconfigurations are not in themselves
misplaced, but are both ‘natural’ and important for their psychological and social well-being.
What is of concern here, is the way in which such socially constructed identities may impact
upon others – for as the Croatian theologian, Miroslav Volf, has articulated it, the “will for
identity” is “universal”, but, in his view, it is also the “fuel” for many of the world’s
conflicts.\(^{173}\) This is a correlation, he says, that “demands…[us]…to place identity and
otherness at the centre of theological reflection on social realities” [emphasis original].\(^{174}\)

A further insight into social identity formation by Tracey McIntosh, reveals that identity
construction is also about creating a “cohesive narrative” about self, and that within
narrative, “there is always ‘claims making’”.\(^{175}\) In other words, these social identities are in
many ways narratival creations which are, in McIntosh’s words, “neither passive nor merely
descriptive, but carry ideological prescriptions”.\(^{176}\) Such ‘narratives’, and by implication their
associated identities, are neither value-free nor exist in a social vacuum; rather, they are
ontological realities that in some contexts may ‘contradict’ or ‘compete’ with the social
narratives/identities held by others. In many ways, it is these ‘narratives’ behind the
identities that need to be understood and analysed to avoid them being, to reiterate Volf’s
words, “fuel for conflict”.

Māori and Pākehā as ‘Identifiers’

Throughout this thesis, I refer to the two ethnic groups within my reconciliatory concern as
‘Māori’ and ‘Pākehā’. However, the use of these generic identifiers is not without its


\(^{174}\) Ibid.

\(^{175}\) Tracey McIntosh, “Introduction”, in *NZ Identities*, p.38.

\(^{176}\) Ibid., p.14.
problems and some explanation is necessary. Some identity theorists have argued against overly simplistic and monolithic understandings of identity and belonging, which these terms reflect. These oppositions have been based particularly around the concepts of essentialism and hybridity. In identity theory, essentialism is the view that for any specific entity, such as a Pākehā or Māori, there exists a set of attributes, all of which are necessary to its identity and function. These may include attributes such as language, skin colour or blood quantum. The opposition to this view hinges on perceptions of fundamentalism and exclusion.

In contrast, hybridity takes many forms, but simply stated carries the idea of ‘mixture’ and, with particular regard to ethnicity, the implicit understanding that few individuals fit within one ethnic description. In some sense, hybridity is at the other end of the continuum to essentialist definitions of ethnic belonging. Concepts of hybridity are important ideas within the New Zealand context, especially given the common occurrence of inter-marriage between Māori and Pākehā and the resultant ‘mixed race’ or hybrid progeny. There is a growing scholarship here that deals with the issue of hybridity, making an important contribution to the wider discourse of identity politics. Any comprehensive research about identity and also reconciliation in this country needs to take into account the complexities of hybrid identity.

However, while I have pointed out that the simple binarisms of ‘Māori’ and ‘Pākehā’ are problematic in that they may underestimate the complex and real challenges of essentialism and hybridity, there is also a case for their use. I propose that, given the precedent of their historical and popular usage, and that this study is an introductory and “broad sweep” exploration around identity and reconciliation in New Zealand, these two identifying terms are still helpful. Further research is needed, however, not only with regard to essentialism and hybridity, but also research that takes note of the identity and belonging needs of recent immigrants; that is, those of Asian and Pacific origin who do not consider that they fit within the nomenclatures of Māori and Pākehā. However, to reiterate, this thesis is not an

177 See H.B. Levine, “Moving Beyond Cultural Essentialism”, in NZ Identities, pp.104-117.
attempt to provide a reconciliatory metanarrative that covers all relational configuration within the land – the scope is more limited.

A final word about the use of the term ‘Pākehā’. James Liu maintains that there are inherent difficulties associated with any term chosen to designate those of European descent. He uses the elongated term ‘Pākehā/New Zealander/ New Zealand European’ to describe the majority group:

This is because our research has shown that there is no consensus among the majority as to what should be the appropriate label for their own group. A plurality (about 40-50 %, depending on the sample) preferred the term New Zealand European, but only because they thought it was ‘the best of a bad lot’; these persons often stated (erroneously) that Pakeha was a derogatory term meaning ‘white rabbit’, or ‘white pig’ (see Bayard, 1995, for a debunking of such myths). A smaller proportion (20 -30%) called themselves Pakeha, claiming that this was an indigenous term emphasizing the historical relationship with Maori. Finally, some (14 -35%) refused any ethnic labels and referred to themselves as ‘New Zealanders’ or ‘just kiwis’. 179

While Liu’s rationale is understandable, I suggest that here it would be linguistically clumsy and therefore not a suitable appellation. Despite the controversies surrounding the word, I chose the term Pākehā for several reasons. Firstly, a pragmatic one – it is concise and is understood by most New Zealanders as a term that refers to settlers of European origin and also, because any term chosen will have deficiencies. Secondly, the term has had long historical usage. It is perhaps in the Māori language Preamble to the Treaty of Waitangi that the terms Māori and Pākehā first entered into official and common parlance. This states: “Na ko te Kuini e hiahia ana kia wakaritea te Kawanatanga kia kaua ai nga kino e puta mai ki te tangata Maori ki te Pakeha e noho ture kore ana.” This has been translated by Sir Hugh Kawharu as, “So the Queen desires to establish a government so that no evil will come to Māori and European living in a state of lawlessness.”180 The historical precedence of the use of ‘Pākehā’, especially as an identity term vis à vis Māori, adds to the pragmatic rationale. While there is still certain suspicion about the term on etymological grounds and a resistance to its use by some of European descent, the term has always been used by Māori and increasingly by those of European descent. Finally, I also suggest that the term ‘Pākehā’

179 James Liu, “History and Identity: A System of Checks and Balances for Aotearoa/New Zealand”, in New Zealand Identities, pp.77-78.
is not a ‘contested’ identity marker but one, that from a Māori perspective at least, is already ‘reconciled’. Also, each of the representative Pākehā conversation partners – King, Mallard and Brash – used the term as a ‘self-identifier’. I propose that from a postcolonial perspective, this provides for them a partially ‘reconciled identity and place of belonging’. It is not a term that is disputed by Māori as it does not carry the ‘traces of colonialism’ that other markers do. I shall return to this theme in a later chapter, but, for now, although the term is still a disputed one, I propose ‘Pākehā’ as the most suitable alternative to describe the descendants of the original British settlers.

**Colonialism and Identity**

The Pākehā quest for identity and belonging takes place within the geo-political location of Aotearoa New Zealand, a place that was firstly occupied by Māori who refer to themselves as ‘the people of the land’ or tangata whenua. Arguably, since the arrival of the Dutch explorer Abel Tasman in 1642, there has been a contest of sorts between Māori and Pākehā, not only for the control of the land and its economic benefits, but also for identifying “naming rights” that signal and, in a subtle but effective way, perpetuate this control.\(^{181}\)

The “progress” of European domination over Māori, which I generically refer to as the process of colonization, is a complex and multi-layered phenomenon. While it may have had reciprocal benefits for both parties, it is generally conceded that the impact has been detrimental to Māori, as sociologist David Pearson outlines: “[T]he process of colonial settlement transformed Maori into a relatively powerless indigenous minority by virtue of territorial dispossession and the marginalisation of their local economies and socio-political ideas and practices”.\(^{182}\)

Although the use of force is fundamental to most colonizing strategies, historians and cultural studies scholars indicate there is a multiplicity of ways that the initial “violence” may be supplemented or superseded by more subtle means. The strategies may either be

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\(^{181}\) It is not known if Māori had a name for the whole country before the arrival of Europeans. Aotearoa originally referred to only the North Island. Abel Tasman originally called it ‘Staten Landt’, believing it to be connected to a landmass of the same name at the southern tip of South America. In 1645, Dutch cartographers remained the land ‘Nove Zeelandia’ after the Dutch province of Zeeland. British explorer James Cook subsequently Anglicised the name. [http://www.teara.govt.nz/en/european-discovery-of-new-zealand/3](http://www.teara.govt.nz/en/european-discovery-of-new-zealand/3), accessed 24 January, 2011.

deliberate or unwitting, but the outcome of colonial domination is the same. It is these “more subtle means” that I suggest have been employed in the New Zealand context, especially since the Land Wars of the 1860s. When viewed in this way, colonization is not only a past reality, but a present one that implicates the Pākehā identity and belonging quest. In the following section, I shall examine in more detail some of these “subtle means”. The purpose of this analysis is to alert us to some of the often overlooked dimensions of the colonizing process and its relationship to the dynamic of identity construction. The following section explains the convergence between the ‘necessary’ human ‘will’ of identity construction and the implications of that drive within a colonial context such as Aotearoa New Zealand.

“Subtle Means”

The New Zealand literary scholar Simon During writes that colonization impacts not only the “colonized”, but also creates a dilemma for the “colonisers”. The crisis of postcolonialism, he argues, is not restricted to “those who bear the burden of imperialism”, but is “also a crisis for those who have been the agents of colonialism and, who, once colonialism has lost its legitimacy, find themselves without strong ethical and ideological support”. This “crisis” has been explained by Victoria University anthropologist Jeffrey Sissons in the following way: “[T]he great-unfinished project of post-settler nationhood is to convert illegitimate possession into legitimate belonging. It is a reversal of earlier colonial or settler projects that converted legitimate indigenous possession into illegitimate indigenous belonging”.

New Zealand cultural historian Peter Gibbons articulates in more detail the settler crisis. In his view, by the very act of migration the settlers left behind much of what gives the world meaning for human beings; for them this included family, community and an accustomed landscape, all of which contributed to a sense of ‘unbelonging’. Because of the ‘foreignness’ of their new world, he posits that the colonists “set out to make this world normal, from their perspective, through the destruction of what they encounter…and the substitution of

184 Ibid., p.370.
congenial European practices, forms, and phenomena”.\textsuperscript{186} However, the situation these earlier settlers found themselves in was unique to their generation. Those that followed faced an entirely different set of circumstances and consequently, in Gibbons view, developed different attitudes to those who preceded them. These children of the early colonists had no direct experience of the “old world”, or very little, and in order to “belong” they became involved in what has become known as the ‘process of indigenization’.\textsuperscript{187} Gibbons explains it in this way:

These locally born settlers, then, live in a culture and environment which incorporates both introduced and indigenous phenomena, and they seek to understand this world, to acquire knowledge of its names and dimensions and rhythms and interrelationships, so that they will be at home in the land where they were born and brought up. For many, this process is unselfconscious; for others, disconcerted by migrant elders’ praise for the introduced and denigration of the indigenous, the matter becomes more urgent: \textbf{in some measure, they want to become “native”, to belong to this place.}\textsuperscript{188} [emphasis mine]

According to Gibbons, these indigenizing efforts can be first observed in the formulation of a ‘national narrative’ and a ‘national identity’.\textsuperscript{189} Although my concern in this thesis is not national identity as such, his comments regarding the use of a narrative to ‘create’ this national identity are pertinent to the parallel Pākehā quest.

Gibbons acknowledges that while there is a geographical entity which is called New Zealand, in almost every other way, he holds that the term is “a discursive construction” as is the related ‘national identity’, or ‘New Zealand identity’.\textsuperscript{190} It is a “discursive construction”, he says, because “the national identity is not a collective sensibility that has evolved naturally”.\textsuperscript{191} In his opinion, this formulation of a New Zealand national identity, by mainly Pākehā, is not a sign that the colonization phase of history is over, but an important part of the on-going processes of colonization by a settler society. In a warning to the academy he counsels:

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\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{186} Peter Gibbons, “Cultural Colonization and National Identity”, in \textit{NZIH}, 36, 1, April, 2002, pp. 5-18, p.8.
\textsuperscript{188} Gibbons, “Cultural Colonization”, p. 8.
\textsuperscript{190} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{191} Ibid.
\end{footnotesize}
\end{flushleft}
Historical writings dealing with cultural matters that do not take postcolonial perspectives and problematize the presence of Pakeha, run the risk of being considered as parts of the colonizing process. Colonization is not just an early morning fog that dissipates mid-morning as the bright sun of national identity comes out.  

What Gibbons and others are saying here fits Tracey McIntosh’s argument regarding narratives and identity construction as “claims making”. Gibbons, Sissons and others’ detailing of the settler dilemma illustrates how their settler narratives and other ideas around identity are not necessarily benign, self-evident realities, but may in fact be ‘creations’ that continue to marginalize Māori. A specific example of this process may be found in what I term the settler strategy of “naming”. This strategy, while again not directly related to Pākehā identity per se, reveals in another way the “subtle” and on-going presence of settler colonizing practice and as such is pertinent to our postcolonial understanding of the Pākehā quest.

“Naming” and Colonization

Australian spatial historian Paul Carter, whose study of nomenclature pioneered a new historiographical analytical methodology, has explored ways in which early explorers “tamed” new frontiers via the activity of naming. He proposes that “by the act of place-naming, space is transformed symbolically into a place, that is, a space with history”.  

Extrapolating this concept into a colonial context he argues that by the act of naming, colonists claimed for themselves the right to describe and define a location in and on their own terms.

New Zealand historian Giselle Byrnes has also pointed to the strategy of such symbolic acts in the local context. She claims that, “[T]he British came to possess NZ, not only by proclamation, purchase, conflict and confiscation, but also by controlling its interpretation”. This “naming and claiming” of the region by the colonists ignored the

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196 Ibid., p. 4.
reality of Aotearoa as an already “named” place. Byrnes’ research centred upon the incursions of the European into the New Zealand regions of the Waikato and Bay of Plenty. She argues that “the textualization of the Waikato was a fundamental part of the larger process by which Europeans re-imagined and constructed the region”. 197 This revisionist interpretation of Waikato and Bay of Plenty history through a spatial lens reveals how colonial power is able to be expressed through means other than military invasion. According to Byrnes, to perceive colonization in the New Zealand context by only focusing on war and confiscation has tended to obscure “the importance of the discursive invasion which both preceded and outlived the military campaign”. 198 In this analysis, “Waikato space” became transformed into Pākehā “place” through a combination of discursive and ideological practices. Thus, not only was the land itself claimed for settler ownership and control:

[b]ut the power to define space, as well as to determine the value, use and organisation of land was appropriated by the invaders.....while at the same time indigenous presence was ignored or even effaced altogether. As a result, widely dispersed people could share a common sense of place and identity, as the Waikato was translated for colonial and imperial audiences. 199

In these locations, British place names, army generals and royal personages became the new geographical identity markers, replacing the “footprint” of local Māori. 200 This “re-naming” of a locality, in Brynes’ view, becomes “a sharp instrument of colonization”. 201 To use our “place to stand” analogy, the Māori tūrangawaewae, via a name change, turns into a settler tūrangawaewae – a place for the new settlers “to stand” which provides for them a ‘place to belong’ as well as a narratival foundation for a “new’,‘colonising’ Pākehā identity.

Summary
In order to inform our thesis concern with the quest for Pākehā identity and belonging, I have built, in concert with identity scholars, a generic picture of social identity. It sees the concept, as a ‘natural’, interactive and mutable construction, which utilizes value-infused narratives as part of its formation. Identity as a dynamic process is formulated in different

197 Ibid.
198 Ibid.
199 Simon Dench, “Invading the Waikato”, p. 47.
200 Hui [meeting] with local Ngāti Ranginui kaumatua, [elders] who said, “We have lost our footprint on our land” – Holy Trinity Church, Reconciliation Meeting, Tauranga, March, 2007.
201 Byrnes, Boundary Markers, p.4.
contexts in different ways. While social identity constructions are deemed to be universal and necessary for ‘well-being’, in a colonial milieu such as Aotearoa New Zealand these narrative/identity formulations may also bear the traces of colonialism.

The historiographical research has alerted us to the possibility that colonialism is not merely an ‘event’ from a disconnected past but an on-going present reality. The colonizing trajectory may move from a ‘simple’ possession of the land to a complex occupation which utilizes “subtle” discursive strategies to complement a control that was first obtained by the use of force, legal or otherwise. This process, which equates to a ‘discursive invasion’, has been described as “the conversion of illegitimate possession into legitimate belonging” or ‘indigenization’. It is here that we see the ‘will’ for identity by ‘dislocated’ settlers as an “ontological dilemma” and one which consequently converges with various colonizing strategies. These ‘indigenizing’ tactics include the fabrication of a national identity and a strategy of “naming”. However, these “subtle” discursive strategies also extend in other directions and particularly, as we shall see, to current Pākehā identity constructions.

Informed by this research, what remains in this chapter is the application of some of these postcolonial understandings in an analysis of the post-1970s quest for Pākehā identity and belonging, particularly, but not exclusively, as enunciated by our representatives, Michael King, Donald Brash and Trevor Mallard. I shall attend to this now in concert with three leading New Zealand postcolonial scholars: Ani Mikaere, Avril Bell and Stephen Turner.

**Postcolonial Critique and Pākehā ‘Claims’**

In the previous chapter, I outlined how in the view of many scholars the decade of the 1970s marked a significant change in the way Pākehā viewed themselves and Aotearoa New Zealand as the place of their belonging. Prior to this period, Pākehā as the dominant settler group “negotiated” an identity with their new land almost “on their own terms” within the largely accepted myth of racial harmony and unity that had become part of the national narrative. However, in the 1970s various forces, some local and some international, combined to produce a seismic change within the New Zealand context. Perhaps the most significant of these changes, for our purposes, was the way that Māori “re-negotiated” their place within the land and particularly their relationship with settler peoples including Pākehā. The prior insecurity that Pākehā had experienced before, because of their distance
from “home” and which in part undergirded their need to “tame” the new landscape, took on a new dimension. Now, their previously “secure” relationship with Māori, and their right to belong to Aotearoa New Zealand in the way that they had “imagined” it, was being challenged. A new insecurity had arisen and for Pākehā this not only meant a “re-imagining” of their relationship with Māori, but also their own identity within the land and how they belonged here. As we shall see, this re-imagining means making “new” claims, which in reality are often reformulations of old colonial tendencies.

In the following analysis of the various representative identity claims, I shall be referring specifically to King’s, Brash’s and Mallard’s particular offerings. However, it is not my intention to methodically critique in detail every aspect of their various articulations. For example, Michael King’s views, which arguably might be considered as ‘prototypical’ and ‘pioneering’ within the Pākehā identity debate, offer, in my view, a much more nuanced and constructive perspective than those offered by Brash and Mallard. His ideas alone warrant more attention than I am able to give in this study. However, my interest is more generic, remembering that the broad concern of this thesis is the Māori-Pākehā relationship in the light of colonization and how the Pākehā quest might impact upon this relationship. In light of this, I am more interested in the positions they hold as Pākehā representatives within the national conversation around identity and belonging. Guided by this methodological approach, then, I shall organize their perspectives into three main themes and examine them accordingly.

Ngāti Raukawa scholar Ani Mikaere has pointed out that while there are differences in the respective positions of King, Brash and Mallard, there is also a commonality. In a paper presented at Auckland University in 2004 she stated:

[I]t may surprise some of you that I speak of Mallard, King and Brash in the same breath: no doubt there will be those among you who cannot see the similarity in their positions. But while there are differences between them, from a Māori point of view they also have much in common.202

Stephen Turner posits that there is a “common ignorance” among settlers in the way they negotiate their belonging in New Zealand, an ignorance that displays a “three-fold deficit”:

• “[a] constitutional deficit, due to an acknowledged but unenforceable nineteenth century Treaty;
• an historiographical deficit, where long history is read in terms of a short history of a nation-state coming to be;
• and an existential deficit, where majority Pakeha act out of dread and, more recently terror, in the face of indigenous claims of independence”.  

I shall adapt his “three-fold deficit” observation as an organizational structure for my analysis of the representative identity claims. In essence, I suggest that this thematic commonality ultimately defines how Pākehā negotiate their relationship with Māori. I shall examine the three “deficits” in the reverse order and begin by proposing that the “existential deficit” is most clearly demonstrated by the various Pākehā claims of indigeneity.

The “Existential Deficit” and “Indigenous Claims”

As we saw in the first part of the chapter, settler indigenization is now understood as a “typical” response to identity needs in a “foreign land”, and Turner’s reference above to an “existential deficit” recalls Bell’s “ontological dilemma”. However in the phrase, “where majority Pakeha act out of dread and, more recently terror, in the face of indigenous claims of independence”, he is making an ironic reference to the so-called “Tuhoe terrorist raids” which took place in the central North Island community of Ruatoki in 2007. Here, the New Zealand armed offenders squad arrested suspected terrorists, accusing them of establishing an independent Tuhoe nation and of plotting armed insurrection against the government. Eventually, after much controversy and an elongated trial, four people were convicted of being in possession of illegal firearms. Turner’s ironic description, “acting out of dread”, is a reference to settler “fear” and “anxiety” caused by Māori assertions of indigenous sovereignty and to him it reveals the “existential deficit” of the majority population, a deficit which he and others also see in the identity claims of our Pākehā representative triad.

204 Although, following Turner, I have delineated three different analytical categories, they are not totally independent but interrelated categories.
205 See http://news.tangatawhenua.com/archives/15975 for more background on this event.
Significantly, Turner’s perhaps hyperbolic use of “dread” to describe the police response to Māori sovereignty claims echoes my basic proposition that the post-1970s Pākehā reconfiguration of their identity and belonging was in a sense “provoked” by the new Māori claims.

In her recent book *Colonising Myths: Māori Realities*, Ani Mikaere introduced a chapter with a quotation from the late political journalist Bruce Jesson who stated:

> Racial conflict was one of the formative experiences of New Zealand society. Pakeha New Zealanders are the products of an invading culture. As individuals we can be magnanimous or guilt-stricken, according to our inclination. But as a society we have this amazing capacity for self-deception. For more than a century we smugly believed that this country was a model of racial harmony, that we were one people. Maori radicalism has put an end to that particular delusion, **and we are now in the process of putting down new layers of hypocrisy**.  

The “new layers of hypocrisy” that Jesson was referring to was Michael King’s recently published work, *Being Pakeha*. This implicit criticism of King by Mikaere was part of her wider dismissal of the Pākehā claim to indigeneity. King’s indigeneity position attracted much support but also wide criticism and not only from our three postcolonial scholars. It was perhaps because of King’s role as a Pākehā “identity pioneer” that he attracted so much academic attention. To reiterate his position, one also held by Trevor Mallard, King argued that:

> [p]eople who live in New Zealand by choice as distinct from an accident of birth, and who are committed to this land and its people and steeped in the knowledge of both, are no less ‘indigenous’ than Maori, being that ‘no-one’ is really indigenous here because all have arrived from ‘somewhere’.

This view of indigeneity suggests that indigenous status is a “choice”, one which comes down to “commitment” and is based on the perception that “no one is really indigenous”. Mikaere opines that, “[F]rom a Māori perspective, there is almost an element of desperation in this quest for indigeneity, calling to mind John Mulgan’s description of Pākehā as being a ‘queer, lost, eccentric, pervading people looking for satisfaction’”.  

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207 Mikaere, *Colonising Myths*, pp. 97-123.  
209 Mikaere, *Colonising Myths*, p.4.
Mikaere is not alone in her rejection of the various indigeneity claims. Avril Bell proposes that there are “traces of history” at work in New Zealand contemporary identity claims which may serve to perpetuate the power imbalances of the country’s colonial history. It is this eye to these ‘power imbalances’ that makes Bell, like Mikaere, critical of what she terms “indigenizing attempts by white New Zealanders”. In a reiteration of During and Sisson’s thesis above, Bell argues that indigenizing constructions, such as King’s and Mallard’s, arise from the fact that Pākehā are a “hybrid settler people” who find the need to negotiate with an indigenous culture and, as the dominant group, assert their distinctive understandings into one of nationhood. However, this is a challenge for a people whose culture is so similar to their cultures of origin. To Bell, this explains why a majority people would “borrow” so many Maori symbols in the various representations of the New Zealand nation, for example, the koru and the haka, symbols, she maintains, that carry greater significance than other local items, such as the jandal, the kiwifruit and the pavlova. Bell contends that “claims of indigeneity”, such as those by King and Mallard, are ultimately problematic because they are in effect a colonizing strategy in that they fall within the “complex dynamics of appropriation” of Māori’s unique identity status. Bell proposes three Pākehā discursive strategies for dealing with Maori claims to a positive and primary indigeneity: the claim that both groups are immigrants, the construction of a visible Pākehā indigeneity and the appropriation of Maori culture as part of national identity.

Bell also points to the irony of “commitment”, one of King’s “qualifiers” of indigeneity. She points out that “this moment of commitment, was also the moment of the alienation of Maori land through war, confiscations, and the Native Land Court system”. As well, she argues that appropriating the word ‘indigenous’ undermines the political value of the status for Māori. It is also a denial of certain international definitions of the term which reserves it for “descendants of the inhabitants of a region at the time of colonisation and, as such, provides political and moral leverage in struggles to redress colonial injustices and to

210 Bell, “Authenticity and the Project of Settler Identity in New Zealand”, p.131.
211 Ibid.
212 Ibid.
213 Ibid.
214 Ibid.
reformulate contemporary social and political settlements”. Thus, she holds, what is appropriated is not the content of the culture itself, but “Maori ontological and moral status as indigenes”. In other words, to solve their own ontological dilemma, Pākehā, by claiming to be indigenous, hybridize their own identity by taking on another’s.

While this appropriation of Māori identity is not the same as earlier colonizing strategies which sought to assimilate or integrate Māori, it has the parallel effect by reducing the differences between the two ethnic groups and mirrors the colonizing settler strategy of “naming” that I highlighted above. Further, the claiming of indigenous status dilutes the political rationale that lies behind the preservation of a Māori distinctiveness. Thus, a kind of slippage occurs within this reconfigured ‘nationalism of unity’, a slippage that not only diminishes Māori difference but also fails to acknowledge that, as indigenes, they were objects of colonization “by” Pākehā. As Bell rightly concludes, this stratagem only serves to perpetuate the injustices of the past via a de facto form of multiculturalism and contributes to a further fissuring of the Māori and Pākehā relationship.

Similarly to Avril Bell, Stephen Turner holds that the Pākehā use of ‘indigenous’ erodes its essential meaning and also reveals another “settler deficit”. He argues:

> If in fact we are all indigenous now, then there is, strictly speaking, no “indigenous” point of view, just different kinds of New Zealanders (people whose differences are equivalent). So the difference of a Maori New Zealander is no different in kind from the difference of a Chinese New Zealander. Needless to say, a rich history is erased along with a non-equivalent difference – that is, a sense that the difference between first and second peoples is a different kind of difference.

Turner touches on a couple of important points here – one relates to the definition of indigenous and the second to the issue of the ‘past’ and how this is treated.

He holds that the ‘indigenizing’ efforts, such as those that King, Brash and Mallard utilize as a means of identity formulation, are based upon a “short” view of history. He sees this vantage drawing its authority from the nation-state, and the constructions of national

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215 Ibid.
216 Ibid.
217 Ibid.
identity and the sense of belonging that this secures. He posits that such identity constructions, which rely on the ‘national identity’ as the basis of belonging, fail to recognize the ‘longer and older’ history of settlement by Māori. However, Turner claims that this Pākehā strategy of “short history” cannot resolve what he terms the “paradox of indigeneity”, which is to do with a status of anteriority or “being-before”. This “being before” of Māori causes the Pākehā identity constructions, which are based upon a “short history”, to appear as “inferior” to the prior claims of Māori, and “hides a longing to belong”, producing what he terms “an understandable but unreflective identity-envy”. Although this may seem counter-intuitive in light of the Pākehā policies of integration and assimilation, which have sought to erase Maori difference, Turner suggests that Maori have always possessed something that Pākehā have increasingly desired, that is: “to belong here and nowhere else”. The Pākehā response to this existential aspiration has been to appropriate “Maoriness”. This tactic erases the distinction between the first and second peoples, so that all belong in the same way. This disregards non-national modes of identity and belonging, so that one is a New Zealander or Kiwi first, and whatever else you take yourself to be is second. He says, “[I]n this way, making a new country, resettling it, involves putting an older, longer history of place away or behind. Settler societies of new countries are oriented toward the future, not to the past of the place in which settlers find themselves”. Thus, in a paradoxical way, in a movement beyond the integration and assimilationist polices of the past, Pākehā no longer claim that being indigenous is unimportant, but rather, in the post-1970s environment, what King, Mallard, Brash and others have done is claim that they, the non-Maori settlers, are indigenous too. To Turner, this makes a mockery of the term ‘indigenous’ and he concludes that “either Maori are indigenous or nobody is”.

Although it is only King and Mallard, from our representative Pākehā triad, that specifically promote a Pākehā indigeneity, Mikaere points to Brash’s implicit utilization of the

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220 Ibid.
221 Ibid.
222 Ibid.
223 Ibid.
indigenous theme and also how Pākehā multicultural proposals actually “disguise” an indigenizing strategy. In her words:

[Brash]...continues to pursue Hobson’s dream that we will all become one people, embracing with enthusiasm the emergence of what he calls “a distinct South Seas race of New Zealanders” and minimalizing the significance of ethnicity altogether by asserting that most people treat their ethnic allegiances fluidly, with matters such as religion, profession, sports club, gender and political allegiance mattering more to them than their ethnicity.  

Ironically, Brash, whose speech generally dismisses the modern relevance of the Treaty of Waitangi, builds an identity narrative that draws upon Lt. Gov. Hobson’s concluding speech at the Waitangi signing. Brash is not alone in his multicultural vision: his political opposition, Trevor Mallard, heralds a similar perspective. However, Mallard’s version is explicitly ‘indigenous’. According to Mallard, “Indigeneity is about the diversity of ways in which we belong, and identify with our country. There are Chinese and Indian New Zealanders who have become deeply indigenous too, just like other Kiwis whose forbears come from a huge range of countries”. The impact of such ‘multicultural visions’ is to effectively eradicate all ethnic difference and ultimately yields an identity that fuses citizenship with indigeneity. In this way, notions of indigeneity become a catchphrase for the multiple ways of belonging to Aotearoa New Zealand and may be subsumed in terms like “kiwi” or phrases like, “We are all New Zealanders”.

The “Deficit” of the Past

In this section, as the second part of my analytical exercise, I shall examine the way that the Pākehā identity claims engage with ‘history’. If, as I have argued above, narratives are integral to social identity constructions, then any analysis needs to give attention to those narratival assumptions within each identity formulation. In simple terms, social narratives are essentially interpretations of the past inculcated into the present. However, how the past is understood is an epistemological complexity, made all the more complicated when seeking consensus within cross-cultural settings. Within a Western framework alone, historiographical theories abound and the topic has produced many well-known literary “one-liners”. For example, the 1953 English novel The Go-Between by L.P. Hartley begins


224 Mikaere, Colonising Myths, p.96.
225 Mallard, “We Are All New Zealanders Now”.

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with the line, “[T]he past is a foreign country: they do things differently there.” This phrase was the inspiration for historian David Lowenthal’s influential treatise *The Past is a Foreign Country*, which signaled some of the complexities of the historiographical exercise. The American writer William Faulkner, in his 1950 novel *Requiem for a Nun*, observed, “[T]he past is never dead. It’s not even past.” If we accept his view, then, this suggests that the ‘traces of history’ are always with us and while I acknowledge the problematic complexity of “looking back”, the comments of Oxford and New Zealand law professor Jeremy Waldron are particularly apposite. He states that, “[T]he determination not to forget is part of the moral respect we owe to human dignity; the task of remembrance is bound up with the very being of community and individuality in the modern world”.226

I shall return to the theme of ‘remembering’ in a later chapter, one that deals with the characteristics of Christian reconciliation, but for now offer that any postcolonial analysis of identity claims needs to take into account how particular constructions acknowledge and operate within their historical context. I submit that this necessarily truncated conclusion is not only consistent with a postcolonial perspective, but also reflects an orthodox Christian view of the past. However, as we shall see, it is an angle that is at odds with some of the narrative/identity perspectives of our representative Pākehā, who as each of our postcolonial analytical partners recognize, display aspects of “forgetting” in their identity claims.

For example, Bell proposes that what is “apparent in Pākehā discourse is an active amnesia about colonisation”227 She posits that Pākehā display a discontinuous view of colonial history which amounts to “a cultural politics of refusal” and one that results in the termination of dialogue with Māori. This is because, within that paradigm, the past is finished – colonization is a relic of another generation and another mind-set. This way of seeing the past, in Bell’s view, is also a convenient denial of guilt which removes the need for any responsibility or acknowledgement of the past.

Here we can reiterate some of the specific statements by King, Brash and Mallard. Brash, for example, stated: “None of us was around at the time of the New Zealand wars. None of us had anything to do with the confiscations [of Māori land]. There is a limit to how much any generation can apologise for the sins of its great grandparents”.\(^{228}\) Or consider Mallard’s: “New Zealand ... has to get its British imperial past behind it”.\(^{229}\) Similarly, Michael King:

What happened in the nineteenth century happened. It is part of human history. The British Empire, the most expansionist imperial power of that period, did irreparable damage to indigenous Pacific people. (But) it was the British who were responsible; the Pakehas assume the mantle of guilt, which is ridiculous, because the Pakeha is not the same as the British of the nineteenth century.\(^{230}\)

The issue of guilt aside for the present, I suggest this relegation of colonialism to the distant past is problematic for several reasons. Firstly, it seems to discount the possibility of this generation of Pākehā being participants in colonizing practice as a present reality. Also, it takes no cognizance of the fact that, even if all colonizing tendencies had ceased, recent settler generations, as Whakahuihui Vercoe said at Waitangi, have “inherited” the economic and cultural advantages provided by their demographically and politically dominant Pākehā ancestors. This equates to Bell’s “cultural politics of refusal” and, as she implies, it is a perspective that ultimately impacts upon the integrity of the relationship between Māori and Pākehā. Mikaere echoes this view:

Brash, for example, looks forward to the day when the categories Māori and Pākehā will be forgotten altogether, as we amalgamate into a single new breed of New Zealander. Like King, he employs the device of false equivalence to gloss over the stark differences in Māori and Pākehā experience over the last two hundred years.\(^{231}\)

Mikaere calls this an approach of “convenient forgetting” and a “strategy of silence”.\(^{232}\)

This “convenient forgetting” extends to the way the Pākehā representatives relate to the issues of “guilt” and “responsibility” for New Zealand as a colonized place. Mikaere, citing

\(^{228}\) Brash, “Nationhood”.
\(^{229}\) Mallard, “We Are All New Zealanders Now”.
\(^{231}\) Mikaere, Colonising Myths, p.105.
\(^{232}\) Ibid.
King’s “Pākehā are seeking a ‘mutuality of respect’”, argues that this is actually a desire not to be viewed as “representatives of a colonising power”. This amounts to a denial which to her reveals:

A sense of underlying unease, of unresolved guilt pervades their words. One barely has to scratch the Pakeha surface to find the guilt lying immediately beneath, guilt which manifests itself as denial, self-justification, defensiveness and, incredibly enough, a sense of victimhood.

For Mikaere, Brash’s mode is to simply “deny personal responsibility for the detrimental impact on Maori of colonization”, whereas Mallard’s response is “to demand that Maori forgive and forget, so that we can all live together as one big, happy amnesic family”. She also proposes that while King’s approach is a more “sophisticated” one, he too participates to some degree in a “politics of refusal”. King’s view that both races have “made mistakes” and that they have “unfairly stereotyped the other” has the effect of mutualizing guilt or fault. To Mikaere, this creates an unjust imbalance which masks the fact that European colonizers initiated the wrongs and were responsible for a far greater level of offence. Similarly, the pleas to “move on” and to “put the past behind us” are dependent upon the past being forgotten or, at very least, not spoken about. Mikaere argues that this “common” Pākehā position disregards basic views of justice and has the effect of reducing the impact of colonization to a “euphemism”. In her words, it also amounts:

[t]o a fundamental disrespect for the memory of those who suffered as a result of resources wrongly taken, of language denied, of spirituality suppressed. It is also to deny the true cause of the disadvantage that so many Maori are faced with today.

I shall conclude this section with the perspective of Stephen Turner whose analysis of Michael King and other Pākehā claims is based upon his wider theoretical approach to colonization. In the previous section on indigeneity, I have already indicated something of Turner’s historiographical approach, one which contrasts the settler “short view” of history to his preferred “long view”. To him, the whole colonial project is linked to a truncated view

234 Ibid.
235 Ibid., p.107.
236 Mikaere, Colonising Myths, p.106.
237 King, Being Pakeha Now, p. 237.
238 Mikaere, Colonising Myths, p.104.
239 Ibid.
of history: settlement “is” forgetting, “it is a mode of being in a place which is discontinuous with its past (the past of place)”.

It is this discontinuity with the colonial past which, via its “broken story of settlement”, provides the narrative for the Pākehā identity claims. In a description of the Pākehā quest, reminiscent of the colonial/identity theories I posited in the previous chapter, Turner proposes that there are a number of contradictory impulses which are involved in the identity endeavor:

The new country is a site of contradictory demands: the need, ultimately, to forget the old country, and the need to ignore people who already inhabit the new country. To resist the indigenous presence the settler must retain some sense of the old-country self to be able to draw on a strong and authoritative identity. But in order to settle in the new country, to find oneself at home, the settler must forget the old country and become acclimatized, that is to discover a new-country identity.

Significantly for Turner, it is this very “forgetting” that is detrimental to the Pākehā existential need to belong. He suggests that while the “illiberal settler” might not be concerned with colonial excesses of the past, “a stronger motive for such recovery is that forgetting settlement is also not to know oneself, not to be fully alive to the experience of place”. For our purposes, the Pākehā “deficit of the past”, as demonstrated by our representatives, amounts to a “re-imagining” not only of the past but also the very foundations of the Māori-Pākehā relationship to such an extent that, to many especially Māori, the past and that relationship are no longer recognizable.

The “Deficit” of Waitangi

The Treaty of Waitangi is the final “deficit” within our analytical model of the Pākehā claims. While the views expressed by King, Brash and Mallard to the Treaty are representative of a wide Pākehā demographic and although there are significant differences in their respective perspectives, there also exists a recognizable commonality. For example, all three acknowledge the Treaty as a foundational document and its symbolic importance for a national narrative. However, the three have different views about the Treaty’s current status and applicability in the 21st century. I suggest that these differences are also

representative of the wider Pākehā view. In order to assist our recall of their Treaty views from the last chapter, I shall briefly reiterate their range of ideas.

King describes the Treaty as the mechanism which “authorised colonisation and gave us those two streams of people with rights to be here: tangata whenua and tangata tiriti”. While King acknowledges that Māori have a “special relationship” to the Treaty and also draws upon the Treaty as a Pākehā identifier, he expresses doubt that the latter are “deserving of” or even “desire” such a relationship. Nevertheless, despite this Pākehā antipathy and unwillingness to see themselves connected to the Treaty in any meaningful way, King acknowledges that it is “unmistakably still there”, with a “significance and relevance” that is ensured by a Māori insistence and a level of acceptance by recent governments. However, King himself has a personal “ambivalence” towards the Treaty, a view that is expressed in an article to the *New Zealand Herald* in 2004, where he argued against February 6th (National Day of commemoration for Waitangi) as a suitable day on which to “base and celebrate the country’s national day”.

Mikaere opposes King’s view that the Treaty authorized “colonization”. She argues that perceptions that Māori released their sovereignty to the British Crown are misplaced and are misconceptions based upon a wrongly held “conviction that Te Tiriti and the Treaty bear some kind of relationship to one another”. She says:

[t]his misguided attempt to reconcile the irreconcilable [between the English and Māori versions] has not only resulted in a mire of muddled thinking, it has also enabled the perpetration of a dangerous “truth” whereby Te Tiriti has been subordinated to the Treaty and one of our most significant historical documents, He Whakaputanga o te Rangatiratanga o Nu Tireni, the 1835 Declaration of Independence has been marginalised.

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245 Ibid.
247 The Treaty of Waitangi refers to the English version of the Treaty and *Te Tiriti o Waitangi* refers to the Māori version. Of the c.512 Māori who signed the treaty, only 39 signed the English version.
249 Ibid.
Despite her opposition to King’s interpretation, Mikaere maintains that while the Treaty is important, as is the previous agreement signed between the British Crown and northern Māori chiefs, “The Declaration of Independence”, neither of these two agreements substantially altered the autonomy of Māori. In her view, these treaties are not the source of rights for Māori as *tangata whenua*. Mikaere cites Te Atiaria Rarere, a Ngāti Kahungunu chief who stated in 1886, “[T]he source of our rights is that, like the kauri, we are grounded here, were nurtured here, we are the people of the land”.\(^{250}\) To Mikaere, then, the “sovereign authority” of Māori in Aotearoa is “sourced in the simple fact of our having been here for over a thousand years, in our having developed an intimate connection with this environment and an intricate web of relationships to regulate our place within it”\(^ {251}\). What the Treaty does in this view is simply “reinforce” Māori self-understanding of their status as *tangata whenua*.

However, the issue of sovereignty and the Treaty are important within conversations around Pākehā identity and belonging. King’s idea that Māori relegated their sovereignty to the British Crown at Waitangi has the potential to relegate them to the status of a purely “ceremonial” partner and become effectively synonymous with Pākehā. With regard to the Pākehā quest, such a move not only redefines Māori but also reconfigures the Pākehā identity and belonging narrative and as such, “frees” them to define themselves without recourse to the Treaty. However, conversely, if we accept Mikaere and Te Atiaria Rarere’s perspective, it is not so much Māori that need the “special relationship” to the land via the Treaty but it is Pākehā, whose legitimate identity and belonging here, I argue is mediated via the Treaty. This is a position that I shall cover in more detail in a later chapter.

Stephen Turner’s characterization of the Treaty of Waitangi as a “constitutional deficit”, and another manifestation of Pākehā “forgetting”, is particularly applicable to the positions of Donald Brash and Trevor Mallard, our two political conversation partners. Perhaps it is the pair’s involvement in Parliament that makes his views particularly pertinent. However, before attending to Turner’s “constitutional” and “forgetting” argument, I shall briefly reiterate Donald Brash’s “Waitangi position”.

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\(^{250}\) Te Ataria Rarere, cited in Mikaere, *Colonising Myths*, p.126.

\(^{251}\) Ani Mikaere, *Colonising Myths*, p.126.
The former leader of the National Party’s interpretation begs comparison with Justice Prendergast’s 1877 ruling that the Treaty is “a simple nullity”.\textsuperscript{252} Despite drawing inspiration from Hobson’s Waitangi, “We are one people” declaration, he believes that from a constitutional perspective, that to give the Treaty any social or political relevance in the 21\textsuperscript{st} century is anachronistic. He allows for Treaty reparations for land “stolen” from Māori, but he refuses to allow the Treaty to guide the relationships between its three constituencies of Māori, settlers and the Crown. To repeat Brash’s Orewa words, “We cannot allow the loose threads of the 19\textsuperscript{th} century law and custom to unravel our attempts at nation-building in the 21\textsuperscript{st} century”.\textsuperscript{253} Further, Brash declared that:

\begin{quote}
[\textit{t}he Treaty is not some magical, mystical, document. Lurking behind its words is not a blueprint for building a modern, prosperous, New Zealand. The Treaty did not create a partnership: fundamentally, it was the launching pad for the creation of one sovereign nation. We should not use the Treaty as a basis for creating greater civil, political or democratic rights for Māori than for any other New Zealander. In the 21\textsuperscript{st} century, it is unconscionable for us to be taking that separatist path.\textsuperscript{254}
\end{quote}

A critique of Brash’s views on the Treaty is largely covered within the reference to “Pākehā forgetting” in the previous section above and therefore does not need repeating here. However, to reformulate a phrase from another context, Brash might be portrayed as a “Treaty denier”. This “denial” demonstrates Stephen Turner’s characterization of the Pākehā treatment of the Treaty as a “constitutional deficit” and is also found in Trevor Mallard’s perspective, which I shall cover shortly. The relevance for our study is that the Treaty “constitutional deficit” is reflected within the wider narrative that contributes to the construction of Pākehā identity.

In essence, Turner argues that the Treaty has been constitutionally “mistreated” by the Pākehā majority because it is only the “principles of the Treaty” that appear in the nation’s

\textsuperscript{252} In 1877, Justice Prendergast, in the landmark “Wi Parata” case, found against the indigenous claimant who brought a case against the Crown on the basis of the Treaty of Waitangi. In short, his ruling was on the basis that the Treaty was a “simple nullity” because Māori lacked sufficient “civilized understanding” to enter into such an accord with the Crown.

\textsuperscript{253} Brash, “Nationhood”.

\textsuperscript{254} Brash, “Nationhood”.

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legislation – the Treaty itself enjoys no real constitutional status. Significantly, these principles may simply be removed by an act of Parliament. He argues that:

With no ordinary constitutional settlement, the basis for the authority of the New Zealand government today is the sheer weight of white settlement. While the Treaty continues to inspire Maori...it is unlikely that Maori will ever be allowed the power commensurate with their claim to be tangata whenua.\(^{255}\)

In other words, while the government, which is the demographically dominant Pākehā constituency who control Parliament, (albeit, one that contains several senior Māori Members of Parliament within its Executive), “acknowledges” the Treaty, it is in reality unwilling to give the Treaty the constitutional or legislative authority that would give to Māori their “appropriate status” as indicated especially in Article Two.\(^{256}\) Ironically, as I will argue in a later chapter, this “constitutional deficit” also denies Pākehā their “appropriate status”, a status that I propose would help satisfy their “ontological dilemma”.

Finally, to conclude this Treaty deficit section, I shall highlight some of Trevor Mallard’s ideas as posited in his speech to the Stout Research Centre. On the one hand, Mallard acknowledges the Treaty, especially what he terms “the Spirit of the Treaty”. On the other, he proposes its relevance has changed significantly since the time of its signing. He claims that the “Treaty no longer underwrites what it used to”\(^{257}\), but is a “preliminary agreement to an on-going relationship”. He argues that the terms of that relationship have changed and that the “Spirit of the Treaty” is now about a bond between New Zealanders that should transcend any disputes over conflicting intentions and linguistic wrangles over different texts. He also proposes, as if the terms were self-evident, that “we should behave as citizens in terms of both the spirit of the Treaty and of the spirit of modern New Zealand” because it would be “irresponsible” to “throw out” the Treaty. While some, including Donald Brash, might view the Treaty and democracy as being irreconcilable, this is not Mallard’s view, especially if the nation “walks together as kiwis”. This “walking together as kiwis” includes Māori accepting that their best guarantee of minority indigenous rights is the protection and good-will of Pākehā. In his view, this includes not “dumping on each other”, for such

\(^{255}\) Turner, “Settlement as Forgetting”, p.34.

\(^{256}\) Waitangi Tribunal, Article Two: “The Queen of England agrees to protect the chiefs, the subtribes and all the people of New Zealand in the unqualified chieftainship over their lands, villages and all their treasures.” Sir Hugh Kawharu’s translation of Te Tiriti o Waitangi, http://www.waitangi-tribunal.govt.nz/treaty/kawharutranslation.asp, accessed 10 February, 2013.

\(^{257}\) Mallard, “We Are All New Zealanders Now”.
behaviour is precluded for “kiwi citizens” and has no role in the construction of “a New Zealand suitable for all”.

Mallard’s prevarication over the Treaty and the transference of “authority” from text to “spirit” is a “clever” hermeneutical strategy. Unlike Brash, who seems to relegate the Treaty to a “museum-like” status, Mallard’s way of dealing with the Treaty as a “negotiable” document echoes the “forgetting” strategy above which dislocates the accord signed in 1840 from its historical context. While he maintains he is “honouring” the Treaty, but simply not as it “was”, this amounts to a repeat of the non-consultative practices of earlier eras that characterized the colonialism of past government agencies. He seems to equate “the spirit of the Treaty” with “the spirit of modern New Zealand”. There is an assumption by Mallard that the “spirit of modern New Zealand” is better equipped to interpret and apply the Treaty than the “spirit of colonial New Zealand”. This is a highly disputable assumption, especially in the light of earlier arguments which outlined the colonizing trajectory of settler nations, a trajectory that has not been disproven with the above analysis of the post-1970s Pākehā identity claims.

Summary
In this section, I have critiqued the specific identity and belonging claims of Michael King, Trevor Mallard and Donald Brash, via an engagement with three New Zealand postcolonial scholars, Avril Bell, Ani Mikaere and Stephen Turner. Our analysis mirrors to some extent, the trajectory of colonialism in settler societies as outlined by postcolonial historiographers in the first part of the chapter. Based around a three-fold model of “Pākehā deficits”, we have argued that the representative offerings of King, Brash and Mallard take insufficient consideration of the Treaty of Waitangi and New Zealand’s colonial history and also that their visions of Pākehā indigeneity and “kiwi” multiculturalism deny Māori their ethnic, cultural and political difference. For our purposes, this analysis reveals that the quest for Pākehā identity and belonging not only perpetuates colonization but also results in a continuing fissure in Māori-Pākehā relations. This conclusion supports a view that as part of the overall effort to improve race relations in Aotearoa New Zealand, there needs to be a “reconciliation” of the Pākehā quest. This need leads to the next part of the study, an examination of a Christian concept of reconciliation from which I draw a template and
inspiration for some reconciliatory ideas – ideas that can contribute to the national conversation around the Pākehā quest for identity and belonging.
Chapter Five: Towards a Model of Reconciliation

To restate the broad aim of the thesis, I should like to contribute to the field of race relations between Māori and Pākehā by offering some reconciliatory ideas to the national conversation around Pākehā identity and belonging. These ideas will draw upon the vocabulary and structure of reconciliation within the biblical narrative and Christian tradition. It is my contention that Christians, despite the church’s complicity with colonization, are able to make a meaningful contribution to this conversation. Also, while the praxis of the church, in many arenas through the centuries, has not always mirrored its confession, reconciliation in some form has been and continues to be a central doctrinal focus. On this point Rowan Williams offers:

The Church is...the trustee of a vision that is radical and universal, the vision of a social order that is without fear, oppression, the violence of exclusion and the search for scapegoats because it is one where each recognizes their dependence on all and each is seen as having an irreplaceable gift for all. The Church cannot begin to claim that it consistently lives by this; its failure is all too visible, century-by-century. But its credibility does not hang on its unbroken success; only on its continued willingness to be judged by what it announces and points to, the non-competitive, non-violent order of God's realm, centred upon Jesus and accessible through commitment to him.  

In this country, the church’s ‘trusteeship’ of that radical vision, particularly in relationship to colonialism, is an uneven one. Since the first Christian sermon was preached in Northland in 1814, there have been many outstanding examples of Christian peace-making endeavour. According to some church historians, it was the presentation of the gospel as a “way of peace” that attracted many Māori to the church’s message. In the 19th century, church reconciliatory and peace-making efforts were concentrated upon Māori inter-tribal warfare and the impact of colonialism. Consequently many representations were made on behalf of Māori to governments, both in Wellington and London, over unjust land dealings and the Crown policy of raupatu [land confiscation]. Also, Treaty of Waitangi historian Claudia Orange has noted that without the mediation of the missionaries, the 1840 compact would...


never have been signed. However, between 1860 and 1960 the church voice was notably silent on issues of colonization as arguably its concern turned from an emphasis upon indigenous mission to a pastoral concern for settlers. Since the 1960s, however, the church’s prophetic “voice” has become more evident, notably in the sphere of race relations and the political and economic plight of Māori. Hopefully, the present reconciliation study might be viewed as a small contribution to and continuation of the interrupted peace-making efforts of both the Protestant and Catholic mission in the land.

I noted above Miroslav Volf’s belief that it is the “will for identity” that “fuels” many of the world’s conflicts, which in turn yields a responsibility for us “to place identity and otherness at the centre of theological reflection on social realities”. As we shall see, this exhortation brings many challenges, not only to our theoretical understandings of social reality, but also to our praxis that issues from this theory. New Zealand cultural anthropologists Toon van Meijl and Michael Goldsmith have stated that “no one solution, is available to address the challenges of contemporary liberal-democratic, multicultural, or bicultural, nation-states to reach justice and to offer each and every one the opportunity to construct a distinct identity at the same time”. In the light of that, I propose that this study yields no “isolated” or “one” solution for the challenge and no “final word”, but is undergirded by the intention to propose some ideas that hopefully will be an impetus for discussion and a contribution to an on-going national dialogue.

The notion of ‘ideas’ hints at the limits of my approach: it is not a comprehensive reconciliatory metanarrative for this land – I have a more narrow aim. One obvious limit is that my approach is only from one side of the relational dynamic. I do not attempt to

262 For example, “The Church Leaders’s Statement for 1990” to mark the sesquicentennial commemoration of the Treaty of Waitangi, and the 1998 “Hikoi of Hope”, a march organized by the Anglican Church of New Zealand as a ‘protest’ on behalf of the ‘poor’.
263 Volf, Exclusion and Embrace, p.17.
suggest an “appropriate” Māori response to the identity challenge, but to provide a way for Pākehā to advance their reconciliatory interaction with Māori. Within this limited method, my proposals will endeavour to clearly reflect a Christian reconciliatory perspective for the local context and it is the exploration of this angle that forms the basis of this chapter.

After detailing some initial background to the concept, which shall give some insight into a ‘public’ understanding of reconciliation, I shall provide a brief overview of its historical trajectory within the church. Given that social reconciliation as a ‘subset’ within the wider biblical concept of reconciliation is a contested idea, and that one objective is to formulate a Christian reconciliatory paradigm for the New Zealand context, I shall explore in some detail the references to that term as found in the Pauline writings.\footnote{I refer to social reconciliation as the restoration of relationships between humans, in contrast to the all-encompassing divine-cosmic reconciliation as effected by God in Christ. Social reconciliation may involve the relationships between individuals, families, ethnic groups or even nations.} A key question that informs the direction of the analysis is in what way and how the understanding of God’s reconciling work in Christ is ‘continued’ or ‘discontinued’ in the restoration of relationships between people/people groups. The idea that there is a clear distinction between the two is often summed up in the terms ‘vertical’ and ‘horizontal’ reconciliation – with the former referring to the divine impetus and the latter to the human application. From this analysis, I shall propose a theoretical approach that will be used to develop a reconciliatory strategy to apply to the quest for Pākehā identity and belonging. The resultant theoretical and praxis model will serve the double purpose of advancing the reconciliatory conversation and contributing to the overall theological scholarship around social reconciliation.

**Background**

The search for a Christian social expression of reconciliation is a complex one despite the “ready to use” terminology which might suggest that definitions and methodologies are readily available to apply into current contexts. However, as Christoph Schwöbel has noted, from a Christian perspective reconciliation reaches much deeper than mere semantics and political theory for, as he states, “[C]oncepts like...reconciliation are a part of a comprehensive view of reality....The dispute over the interpretation of reconciliation is a
dispute about the nature and destiny of the human and, as such, a dispute about the character of reality”. 266

Reconciliation is a much heralded doctrine within Western Christian scholarship – James Denney, an early 20th century Scottish theologian, spoke of the doctrine of reconciliation as “the inspiration and focus of all” doctrines of the Christian faith.267 Reconciliation was also the central theme of one of Protestant’s leading 20th century theologians, Karl Barth, who wrote with reference to our subject, “[W]e enter that sphere of Christian knowledge in which we have to do with the heart of the message received by and laid upon the Christian community, and therefore with the heart of the Church’s dogmatics”.268 However, the concept, especially when extrapolated into the social domain, remains a contested one.

Some criticize the church for not “utilizing” the doctrine within that social sphere269 and others are equally critical of what they see as an overly simplistic application. I shall examine these perspectives in more depth later in the chapter. However, before I attend to the specifics of reconciliation from a Christian perspective, I shall briefly introduce the concept as it is perceived and utilized within the public realm. The purpose of this excursus is twofold: firstly to show the cultural and interdisciplinary pervasiveness of the idea and secondly, to establish a definitional common ground between a ‘public’ view of reconciliation and a Christian perspective.

Towards a ‘Public’ Understanding of Reconciliation

The rhetoric of reconciliation is certainly en vogue at present and has become common within a wide range of public discourses, particularly within those geopolitical areas that fall within the reach of Western philosophical and theological influence. Legal scholars Emilios Christodoulidis and Scott Veitch have noted that “reconciliation has now become a component part of our political vocabulary in a way that was simply not the case twenty

269 For example, Miroslav Volf in Exclusion and Embrace.
However, the term itself is a mercurial one. It is defined by non-technical dictionaries as ‘to restore persons to friendly relations’ or the ‘restoration of friendship or harmony’. Another dictionary defines the verb ‘to reconcile’ as, ‘to bring (a person) again into friendly relations to or with (oneself or another) after an estrangement’; while ‘reconciliation’ is defined as ‘the action of reconciling persons, or the result of this; the fact of being reconciled’. Thus a generic understanding could simply be ‘the restoration of relationship’. A brief glimpse at the concept’s use within a diversity of settings will give some idea as to its pervasive reach and the complexity of its social meaning and structural diversity.

The task to understand societal or cultural concepts of reconciliation as distinct from Christian ones is not clear cut because religious ideas have so permeated the cultural setting, particularly in the West. Moral philosopher, Michael Hardimon, suggests that the idea of reconciliation represents an important concern within the tradition of Western political philosophy. He states that “Rousseau, Kant, Marx, and Rawls all offer visions of reconciliation, broadly understood” and that “reconciliation is the main goal and central organising category of Hegel’s social philosophy”. However, philosophy, political or otherwise, and the perspectives from other disciplines do not necessarily operate in a secular vacuum. While some formulations, such as those proposed by Karl Marx and Freud are in direct ‘opposition’ to any theological underpinnings, others have clearly drawn upon the religious lineage of the concept. Timothy Gorringe points out that “Christian theology constituted the most potent form of ideology in Western society for at least a thousand years, up to the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, and its ideological importance is by no means dead”. From his vantage, the theological influence upon even self-proclaimed secular constructs is evident. Scott Veitch argues that:

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The rise to prominence of reconciliation in political and legal discourse serves, firstly, as a reminder that our key social institutions are themselves deeply rooted in religious lineages; and secondly, as Durkheim and others have argued, that despite a decline in organised religious belief these same institutions retain, in their (and our) inspirations and deepest needs, responses that are in many ways functional equivalents to those once provided by theology.²⁷⁶

However, reconciliation as a concept which refers to the mechanism or goal of restored relationship is not the preserve of Western philosophy, political theory or theology. In this country, Ngāpuhi theologian Henare Tate points out that reconciliation models known as hohou rongo were being outworked in Māori culture prior to the arrival of Europeans and Christianity. He argues that, “[T]he understanding of practice of hohou rongo, tried and tested in many Māori situations from pre-European times to the present, has much to contribute to the wider discussion”.²⁷⁷ Without attending to the details of reconciliation within te ao Māori [the Māori world], there are many accounts of reconciliatory practices via ceremony, exchange of gifts and other means.²⁷⁸ An exploration of this Māori reconciliation model and contrasting it to Christian understandings would be a fruitful research endeavour.

Despite the almost ubiquitous usage of the term, a number of factors complicate the search for a comprehensive ‘public’ definition. Human rights lawyer Lorna McGregor calls the concept an “amorphous” one, and one that “stands at the pinnacle of a pyramid of uncertainty and intangibility”.²⁷⁹ She maintains that its meaning shifts and is therefore a relative term that is dependent upon the context of its usage by a wide range of disciplines, including philosophy, psychology, political science and religion.²⁸⁰ Further complicating a desire for definition is the fact that understandings associated with reconciliation in its cultural usage refer to activities and outcomes across a broad range of spheres, including the interpersonal (e.g. marital, familial) as well as the social and political. Its flexibility of

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²⁷⁶ Christodoulidis and Veitch, Law and the Politics of Reconciliation, p.3.
²⁷⁸ Ibid.
²⁸⁰ Ibid.
meaning is also related to its unique relationship to time, which includes reference to the past, the present and the future. As the Scottish theologian Stuart Noble has noted:

A process of reconciliation may look back to a past relationship and the events that lead to its dissolution while also exploring the present possibilities for restoration. Thus reconciliation is motivated by both the memory of the positive past and promise of restoration in the future.281

There can, then, be an inherent temporal ambiguity with reconciliation being discussed as both a goal and a process. This is demonstrated in the various metaphors often utilized, such as “journey”, “quest”, and “effort”, which illuminate this phenomenon.282 Finally, to add to the definitional complexity, whereas historically, reconciliation in the public sphere has been primarily utilized to describe interpersonal restoration, the term is now being used within ecological circles to describe the restoration of relationship between humanity and creation.283 Despite the difficulties with definition, I suggest that a generic working understanding of reconciliation as the ‘the restoration of relationship’ still seems reasonable, whatever the sphere or discipline. It is this same reconciliatory ‘end goal’ of restored relationships which provides the possibility of a ‘cooperative’ reconciliatory endeavour between non-Christian models and Christian ones.

However, while there is broad Christian/public agreement regarding the definition and intentions of reconciliation, we will see the concept within Christianity has some distinct characteristics which distinguish it from other cultural and ideological representations. But, if arriving at anything other than a broad definitional consensus in the public realm is difficult, it will be seen that within the relative homogeneity of the Christian world a comprehensive consensus is equally elusive.

A Background to Christian Reconciliation

Few theologians would argue with the statement that “restoration of relationship” or reconciliation is a major theme within the Christian tradition. American Biblical studies scholar Barbara Bowe summarizes the point in the following way:

282 Ibid., p.10.
The biblical idea [of reconciliation] assumes that relationships have indeed been broken, as the narrative of Genesis 3 so poignantly relates. In that story, moreover, all relationships of human existence stand in need of reconciliation: relations between creatures and their Creator, gender relationships made hostile by the effects of sin, and the relationships between human creatures and the earth itself which have been marred by the sin of the garden. Therefore, although biblically the specific term ‘reconciliation’ is used infrequently, the idea as understood in our working definition is certainly present throughout the Scriptures. Arguably, in its widest connotations, it establishes or at least informs in a significant way the trajectory for the biblical narrative from Genesis to Revelation. Within the English translations of the Old Testament canon the actual word is absent, and it is not until the Pauline corpus that the English term ‘reconciliation’ is utilized. It is via the Latin Vulgate’s translation of Paul’s use of the Greek term καταλλασσό as reconciliato that it became a part of Western Christian terminology.

As I have noted above, reconciliation as a theological, political and social concept has certainly gained momentum in the past 20 years. The high profile work of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in South Africa and other reconciliatory bodies in both Ireland and Chile, nations with strong Christian heritages, have contributed to an “easy” liaison between political/social reconciliatory rhetoric and traditional Christian terminology. However, the church’s “offering” of its doctrine to this milieu is a relatively recent phenomenon, and is not without its critics. Traditionally, the church has not emphasized the political dimension, preferring to concentrate on the personal ramifications of its reconciliation doctrine. For example, the Canadian Catholic theologian Gregory Baum has noted the reluctance of that Church to connect the theological idea of reconciliation to social responsibility:

[T]he church’s theological tradition offers very little wisdom on the social meaning of reconciliation. It is symptomatic that even in the recent Handbook of Catholic Theology...the long, scholarly article on reconciliation makes no reference whatever to the reconciliation between peoples. The New Dictionary of Catholic

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Social Thought contains no article on reconciliation. Reflection on this topic is only beginning in the church.\textsuperscript{286}

Meanwhile, a perceived absence of reflection on the social meaning of reconciliation has led the Miroslav Volf to declare that there is “a deeply disturbing absence of sustained attempts to relate the core beliefs about reconciliation to the shape of the churches social responsibility”.\textsuperscript{287} He claims that the doctrine of reconciliation has often been reduced to the relationship of the “soul with God” and so “has a theological and personal meaning, but no wider social meaning”.\textsuperscript{288} He suggests that at the other end of the continuum there are those who criticize such withdrawal from society and take up notions of “liberation”, with the pursuit of freedom and justice “as the only appropriate response to social problems”.\textsuperscript{289} These two perspectives illustrate something of the doctrinal diversity associated with the concept. A third opinion suggests that the term is often used in the political and social context as a “catch-all” phrase without any precise meaning at all. This has prompted Rowan Williams to warn that it is in danger of becoming a “seductively comfortable word, fatally close to ‘consensus’”.\textsuperscript{290} Or, in the English theologian Colin Gunton’s view: “[W]e live at a time when the notion of reconciliation has been trivialized, sentimentalized even. The word is either used in too great a variety of (unrecognized) meanings or superficially”.\textsuperscript{291}

Implicit within the observations of Williams and Gunton is the critique that the term, at least from a Christian vantage, needs clarification and better definition.

In response to this, I propose that a Christian understanding of social reconciliation needs a clear theological framework; otherwise, it is in danger of losing its unique character in the midst of a plethora of other proposals. Gunton agrees:

Reconciliation is one of the few words deriving from the Christian tradition to remain in vogue in the secularized vocabulary of modern politics but] it is in theology that it took its rise, and in theology that its prior meaning is centred, not on the relations

\textsuperscript{288} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{289} Ibid., p.9.
\textsuperscript{290} Rowan Williams, On Christian Theology, Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 2000, p.266.
between human beings but on God and the fallen world, especially the human part of it.  

My concern is that the current popularity of reconciliation within the church is in danger of losing its biblical compass and connection with Christian tradition. Given that, I offer that my hermeneutic of trust remains a suitable interpretative lens for the reconciliatory task.

If we accept these views, it is possible to suggest that the church has now moved from Baum’s “unwillingness” to a position where the Western church at least is involved in a multitude of ‘restorative’ settings with various dialogue partners, but with a lack of conceptual clarity. In order to counter this trend, the South African theologian John de Gruchy argues that:

> The relevance of the Christian doctrine of reconciliation is contingent on it retaining its distinct theological meaning even as we engage in exploring and embodying its political significance. The doctrine of reconciliation will be most relevant to social and political life when it is most true to its own distinct character.

In support of de Gruchy’s position and to “rescue” reconciliation, even within a Christian context, from an indistinct vagueness, I suggest that Christian offerings of social reconciliation need to demonstrate not only a sensitivity to the political and social context, but also a fidelity to its sources, particularly the person of Jesus Christ, the Scriptures and tradition – those well attested sources of a Christian worldview. Hence, in this chapter, I shall look within this foundational triad for a reconciliatory framework that might be applicable to the quest for Pākehā identity and belonging in Aotearoa New Zealand. My intention is not to reconstruct in totality the biblical presentation of reconciliation but to draw from the Christian Scriptures and the local context some resources that might further the reconciliatory conversation. In order to achieve this goal, I shall firstly recapitulate some of the historical trajectory of reconciliation within the church and then turn to the letters of the apostle Paul for whom reconciliation was a major theme.

**Historical Trajectory**

Gregory Baum proposes that in contemporary discussion, Protestants and Catholics have emphasized different aspects of biblical reconciliation. He posits that for Protestants, the

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292 Ibid., p.1.
293 de Gruchy, Reconciliation, p.47.
emphasis is on reconciliation as peace with God as the result of Christ’s atoning death and justification by faith, with the classic location for a Protestant theology of reconciliation being Romans 5: 6-11. He maintains this perspective has the advantage of seeing reconciliation in continuity with the saving acts of God through history, especially in a theology of covenant. Baum states that the Catholic emphasis is slightly different, in that it focuses on the love of God poured out upon us as a result of reconciliation God has effected in Christ, with the emphasis now being on the new creation. He holds that the biblical location for this perspective is found in 2 Corinthians 5:17-20.\(^\text{294}\)

Baum’s analysis is useful in identifying some important theological threads of Christian reconciliation – the atonement, which ‘explicates’ reconciliation from a divine justice perspective, and the divine agape present in Christ’s reconciling activity. However, as well as being an oversimplification of reconciliation perspectives, attributing the use of particular verses to specific denominational streams may not be entirely accurate. For example, G.K. Beale is a Protestant theologian who places 2 Corinthians 5 at the centre of his theological treatment of biblical reconciliation.\(^\text{295}\) Also, the theory and praxis of reconciliation within the Christian community has been a fertile area of ecumenical engagement between Protestant and Catholic practitioners, resulting in much doctrinal “cross-pollination”. This finds Protestant theologians framing reconciliation within the love of God (for example, the South African Anglican Desmond Tutu\(^\text{296}\)) and Catholics acknowledging the importance of the atonement within the overall schema.\(^\text{297}\) Stephen Martin, Professor at King’s University College, Edmonton, says that, “[T]here is a remarkable convergence amongst Ecumenical, Evangelical, and Roman Catholic thinking on reconciliation as the mission of God”.\(^\text{298}\) Nevertheless, important questions remain about this reconciliatory missio Dei, such as how it extends into the social realm and the role that humanity plays within the process. These queries require an examination of the concept in more depth.

\(^{297}\) See for example, the Roman Catholic order Fransiscan Friars of the Atonement, dedicated to “reconciliation and healing through atonement — the unity of men and women with God and with one another”. http://www.atonementfriars.org, accessed 30 January, 2012.
Analytical Framework

Where to start then? While an exhaustive examination of all reconciliatory passages within the entire biblical canon would be beneficial, this is not practical here. Within the church, the New Testament is viewed as an authoritative source for Christian doctrine; however, even the New Testament as a whole is outside of our scope. Miroslav Volf has suggested three particular ways to explore the “primacy of reconciliation in the New Testament”. He says the first would be to look at the Gospel accounts of Jesus’ life, which would highlight “grace and forgiveness” as reconciliatory components. The second method would entail an examination of the ethical appropriation of the basic story of Christ – his life, death and resurrection – in the New Testament writings. The third way he suggests would be to concentrate directly on the theology of reconciliation as developed by the apostle Paul. Volf postulates that it is in part because of Paul’s own ‘reconciled’ experience with God that “it is no accident that in the circle around Paul, a grand vision of reconciliation was conceived….the ultimate vision not only for the church but also for the whole of reality”.

Others concur with Volf’s opinion that Paul’s view is pivotal to any Christian understanding of the concept. As I explained above, the specific term ‘reconciliation’ is used infrequently in Scripture and is almost exclusively a Pauline word and, in the view of many theologians, it finds its apex as a theological concept in his writings. For example, de Gruchy states, “Paul is the pivot in the development of this ‘trajectory of reconciliation’ as he relates God’s reconciliation of the world in Christ to a variety of contexts and issues”.

Also, Bowe states, “The Pauline tradition…develops the theme of reconciliation more fully than any other of the biblical texts”.

Although basing a Christian perspective on reconciliation via Paul may seem a somewhat truncated approach, I suggest that this narrowing of focus is legitimate for three reasons: firstly, for the reasons given above and secondly because, as we shall see, Paul’s reconciliatory opus is itself in part a restatement or reinterpretation of a Hebrew prophetic view. In this way, his presentation might be considered a synopsis of the concept as

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300 Ibid.
301 de Gruchy, Reconciliation, p.51.
302 Bowe, Dictionary of the Bible, p.1113.
presented within the Hebrew canon. Thirdly, Paul’s significance within the New Testament canon as well as his impact upon Christian theological reflection through the centuries, and despite his unpopularity in some circles, suggests that his opus is a suitable source.\textsuperscript{303}

Paul and Reconciliation\textsuperscript{304}

The scholarship surrounding Paul’s reconciliatory opus is voluminous and complex and I shall be guided through the main issues by the approach of several scholars who combine biblical erudition with a particular focus on reconciliation. In large part, but not exclusively, I shall rely upon the comprehensive analysis of the Pauline literature by Romanian New Testament scholar Corneliu Constantineau\textsuperscript{305}, who has combined his expertise in New Testament studies with a focus on the application of Pauline reconciliation in post-Communist Romania. Others I draw from are ‘specialists’ in reconciliation, such as John de Gruchy, Robert Schreiter, Miroslav Volf and several other theologians and exegesis, including N.T. Wright.

From a purely linguistic and statistical standpoint, reconciliation terminology is rare in the New Testament and is used almost exclusively in the Pauline letters.\textsuperscript{306} The Greek noun meaning ‘reconciliation’ (\textit{katallagē}) and the cognate verb (\textit{katallassō}) occur nine times in Romans 5:10-11, 11:15, 2 Corinthians 5:18-19 and in 1 Corinthians 7:11 where reconciliation between humans is in view. A compound form for the verb (\textit{apokatallassō}) is found in two other passages: Ephesians 2:16; Colossians 1:20-22.\textsuperscript{307} There are only two other verbs used outside Paul: \textit{dialassō}, in Matthew 5:24, which refers to reconciliation between two believers before an altar offering is made, and \textit{synēllassen}, in Acts 7:26, which refers to the resolution of a dispute between two Christian disciples.\textsuperscript{308} Thus, the basic words are \textit{katallassō} and \textit{dialassō}, both of which are formed from \textit{allassō}. This root has the sense of

\textsuperscript{304} Although there is some dispute about Paul’s authorship of certain epistles attributed to him in the Bible, for example, Ephesians, for the sake of this study I shall refer to all that bear his name as Pauline epistles. The extent of Paul’s involvement in each letter is relatively immaterial to this reconciliation discussion.
\textsuperscript{305} Corneliu Constantineau, \textit{The Social Significance of Reconciliation in Paul’s Theology: Narrative Readings of Reconciliation in Paul’s Theology}, London: T & T Clark, 2010.
\textsuperscript{306} Ibid., p. 25.
\textsuperscript{308} Ibid.
‘change’, ‘exchange’ or ‘make other than it is’ and also carries meanings of ‘otherness’, ‘alienation’ and ‘estrangement’. The compound verb *katallassō*, which is formed from *allassō*, is also often used to mean ‘exchange’. Its noun form, *katallagē*, is used commonly for currency exchange, but could also speak of the reuniting of estranged marriage partners.

With a focus on the language lexicons, it is the *katallassō/katallagē* passages in the Pauline corpus that have captured the attention of much of the exegetical scholarship on the concept of reconciliation. According to Constantineau, within that semantic focus the scholarship has concentrated on three main areas of inquiry. The first group has sought to identify the origin of the concept of reconciliation in Paul, emphasizing either the Hebrew or Graeco-Roman background to the notion. The second group has sought to determine the significance of reconciliation in Paul’s theology as a whole. The third group has endeavoured to define the nature of reconciliation by examining specific reconciliation passages and seeking to identify particular characteristics and structural elements of the doctrine. As well as these groups, some more recent studies have emphasized the rhetorical function of Paul’s use of reconciliation. Of these groups of studies, I shall concentrate on those that look at the origin, characteristics and structural elements of Pauline reconciliation as they are the most salient to our search for reconciliatory ideas.

**Origins in Paul**

In the complex process of discerning meanings within a non-systematic biblical narrative, the assumption is that we can locate some of Paul’s conceptual understandings from those sources that influenced his paradigmatic rendering. As stated above, Paul used the *katallassō/katallagē* word group to encapsulate his ideas. However, scholars are divided about his use of these terms. The discussion centres on whether the words were of purely secular origin or whether there was also a religious connotation. The German scholar of literature and religion Cilliers Breytenbach argues that the origin of reconciliation lay in the

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312 Ibid., p. 24.
Hellenistic diplomatic sphere where it was used for making peace between enemies and that Paul adopted essential elements of his statements about reconciliation from this arena and not from the religious world. 313 Cilliers Breytenbach maintains that “in classical Hellenistic texts, both διαλλάσσω and κάταλλάσσω signify a reconciling action in political, social and family contexts, without any religious or cultic component”. He argues that, “the Pauline κάταλλάσσω concept and the Old Testament ἡμί [atonement] tradition do not have any tradition-historical connection that could form the basis for biblical theological conclusions”.314 According to Breytenbach, the Jewish religious tradition of atonement and the Hellenistic secular notion of reconciliation were different in origin and belonged to two different semantic fields.315

Breytenbach’s connection of Paul’s usage of reconciliation to the Greek social and political world is helpful, where it links Paul’s usage of the term to the social realm. However, I disagree with his assumption that there is no ‘religious’ pedigree to Paul’s use of the term. Some New Testament scholars, including N.T. Wright316 and G.K. Beale,317 have argued for a “non-exclusive” Old Testament matrix for Paul’s development of the reconciliation motif. They offer that Paul, as well as drawing on current Greek terminology and ideas, drew upon his Jewish worldview for inspiration. They assert that there are obvious connections between Pauline ‘reconciliation’ and cultic ‘atonement’ in the Old Testament. Beale, in his extensive treatment of Old Testament themes in the New Testament, maintains that Paul derives the main thrust for his concept of reconciliation from Isaiah’s eschatological vision, specifically from his themes of “peace” and “new creation”.318 His argument is built on the parallelisms between the complex of ideas in 2 Corinthians 5:14-21 and those in Isaiah 40 – 66. His view is that Paul understands both the “new creation” in Christ and “reconciliation” in Christ (2 Cor 5:17-21) as the inaugurated fulfilment of Isaiah’s promise of a new creation in which Israel and ultimately the entire

314 Ibid.
315 Ibid.
cosmos would be restored into a peaceful relationship with God. Reconciliation, then, as Beale interprets Paul, is a continuation of the biblical narrative, especially as presented by the prophet Isaiah, and one which highlights the movement initiated by God to restore and reconcile his people and his creation to himself. Divine reconciliation is an eschatological certainty that ultimately results in the restoration of a state of shalom for the entire cosmos.

In support of Beale’s argument, Wright, in speaking about Paul’s wider theologizing, states that his ideas were not “merely a novum”, or Christian invention, but were a “redefining” of key Jewish doctrines “by means of Christology and pneumatology”. Furthermore, this redefinition “was based on Torah, Prophets and Psalms, read (he would have said) with eyes now unveiled”. Therefore, despite the “newness” of the new covenant, most of his source material lay within the Hebrew canon. With regard to the Pauline treatment of reconciliation then, the concept is, amongst other things, an exposition and expansion of earlier biblical writers’ soteriological themes. Wright’s and Beale’s arguments are persuasive and it seems unlikely that Paul’s treatment of reconciliation is drawn only or even primarily from cultural sources. Paul, more likely, stands in the tradition of the Hebrew prophets and operates as an interlocutor of their ideas within the era of the new covenant as announced and mediated by Jesus Christ.

I suggest also that Paul’s redefining efforts were not restricted to his Jewish world, but extended to the various worlds he encountered. Such was the nature of his monotheistic understanding of the divine reach – all cultures and worldviews were to be ‘understood’ or ‘reinterpreted’ in the light of the Christian gospel. For example, his speech to the Aeropagus in Acts 17, recorded by the historian Luke, where he incorporated the wisdom of the Cretan and Sicilian poets/prophets into his Christian cosmogony, demonstrates something of Paul’s contextual methodology. His theology was not constructed systematically in a religious or philosophical vacuum, but was a reinterpretation of all that he encountered in the light of a newly received revelation on the Damascus Road.

319 Ibid.
321 Ibid., p.262.
The Damascus Road influence upon Paul’s conceptual insights has been highlighted by the Korean biblical scholar Seyoon Kim. He argues that the concept of reconciliation originated for Paul as a result of his personal restorative experience of God’s reconciliation on the Damascus Road. Kim’s exegesis of 2 Cor 5:11-21 points to Paul using his experience of his personal reconciliation as a legitimation of his apostleship, something that was being disputed by some in the church at Corinth. Paul, in his response to his detractors, acknowledges his past hostility to Jesus and his persecution of the church, but declares that he has now been forgiven and is a “new creature”. Kim proposes:

Paul developed his soteriological metaphor “reconciliation”...out of his theological reflection on his personal experience on the Damascus road. In our judgement, it is this supposition rather than anything else that can explain convincingly the fundamental innovation he wrought in the Jewish idea of reconciliation; it is not human beings who reconcile an angry God to themselves through their prayer, repentance or good works; but rather it is God who has reconciled human beings to himself through the atoning death of Jesus Christ. For on the Damascus road, Paul himself experienced God’s reconciling him, a hostile enemy, to himself, forgiving his sins and making him a new creation by his grace. 322

There is yet another dimension of Paul’s cultural use of katallagē as ‘the restoration of relationship’ or ‘reconciliation’ that deserves attention. As well as being used within the Greek world as a term for peace treaties in a politico-military context, The Theological Dictionary of the New Testament (TTDNT) and others have alerted us to the fact that Greek marriage records used katallassō as a legal term to describe the reunion of a husband and wife after a separation or divorce in contrast to its antonym, apallassesthai, that described the state of divorce. 323 Paul uses the term in 1 Corinthians 7 when instructing a Corinthian Christian to “be reconciled” to her husband. I suggest this non-soteriological use of katallassō, a term he has previously used soteriologically, is deliberate and signals a linkage between the theological concept and its sociological implications. It also hints at the connection between covenant, which is implicit within most cultural understandings of marriage, and reconciliation in Paul’s overall schema. But ultimately, it reveals a form of

continuity in Paul’s mind between the divine work in Christ and the human activity of reconciliation at a social level. Although, as we shall see shortly, there exists a discontinuity between divine reconciliation and human reconciliation, Paul’s willingness to use the secular language and institutions of the day in concert with a religious idea suggests something of his holistic approach. Further, I offer that the use of the term within a covenantal marriage context is also deliberate for as we shall see there is a strong correlation between the idea of reconciliation and covenant within Christianity. A final note about the 1 Corinthians 7 example: apart from TTDNT, Bowe, and others pointing to Paul’s use of the term, it appears no one has explored the possibility that the restoration of relationship within the marriage covenant has implications for our understanding of his reconciliation doctrine per se. It is an idea I shall explore further later in the chapter.

**Origin Summary**

What can we conclude then about the origins of the Pauline terms *katallassō/katallagē*? Whereas some biblical scholars have suggested that Paul’s reconciliatory concept was drawn from a single source, either cultural or biblical, I argue that Paul’s theologizing possesses an “agility” that integrates a wide range of influences into a unified complex paradigm. The influences include the political and social Hellenistic world he inhabited, the prophetic vision of his Hebrew predecessors, especially Isaiah, and finally, his own spiritual experience of being reconciled to his Creator.

In summary, the idea of reconciliation as a new covenant concept had its genesis for Paul via his Damascus Road conversion. It was here, through his own reconciliatory experience with the risen Christ, that he began to develop his multifaceted understanding of what ‘God has done in Christ’. This experience enabled him to reinterpret the Isaianic vision of *shalom* as a ‘new cosmological reality’ that was being fulfilled in his own time. The revelation constituted a paradigm-shift for a 1st century Jewish Pharisee. Specifically, he understood the world as God’s creation, in which God is present and active, and within which a divine eschatological *telos* is unfolding, bringing the cosmos towards a reconciled conclusion of *shalom*. 
In order to express his new understandings to his predominantly Greek audience, he used the *kattalagē/kattallassō* reconciliation terminologies from his Hellenistic context. The terms from the *kata* word group, which had been primarily used for interpersonal, marriage or diplomatic relationships in the sociological and political spheres of life, were preserved, reconfigured and enlarged as comprehensive metaphors to communicate Paul’s cosmological reconciliation. From this, we can begin to assume that for Paul, reconciliation is not only a separate soteriological category, but also includes a sociological or wholly human element, which draws its assumptions from his soteriological treatment. This view means that reconciliation for Paul was not a clear binarism of vertical and horizontal spheres. Instead, he presented a cosmic world within which the actions of the divine and human intersect and cooperate within their spheres of responsibility, yielding an eschatologically reconciled cosmos.

**Excursus: ‘Vertical/Horizontal’**

Frequently, as I indicated above, some who have considered the social implications of divine reconciliation have expressed the idea as two distinct planes – the vertical and the horizontal, which represent the agency of God and the agency of humans. These planes could be illustrated by two intersecting lines, one representing the work of God as a vertical movement, reconciling humanity ‘from above’, and the other the ‘horizontal plane’ representing the work of humankind in restoring relationships ‘below’, on the earthly plane. This idea is expressed in Fig. 1 below:

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Although this portrayal has some merit, in that it alerts us to the possibility of social reconciliation being within the divine schema, it fails to adequately represent Christian reconciliation for several reasons. Firstly, when described in this way, it portrays an unhelpful dualism between the work of God in reconciling humans to himself and the work of God in the ‘task’ of reconciling the world ‘to itself’. An appropriate representation of Christian reconciliation needs to reflect something of the interplay between the Trinitarian reconciliatory agency and the human dimension within the *missio Dei*. Haddon Willmer expresses it well. He argues that Paul’s interpretation of the gospel doesn’t support:

> [a] separated verticalism….For Paul, God acts and reveals God in the horizontal, in the Scriptures, in the world, in Jesus Christ, son of David and Son of God. And from Jesus, there emerges Paul’s apostleship to the Gentiles in a world-embracing movement which will in the end bring all back to God. The word Paul shares is God’s; God’s word is not a word that comes vertically down from heaven, but is spoken in a history, works itself out through being incarnated horizontally, without losing its verticality.\(^{327}\)

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\(^{326}\) My thanks to John Stringer for helping with this diagram.

\(^{327}\) Haddon Willmer, “‘Vertical’ and ‘Horizontal’ in Paul’s Theology of Reconciliation in the Letter to the Romans”, in *Transformation* 24, 3 & 4, July & October, 2007, p.154.
Secondly, reconciliation as represented by two intersecting planes does not adequately represent the ‘multi-layered’ and ‘multifaceted’ tension and complexity inherent within Christian reconciliation as an objective reality and its concomitant subjective potential.

As I will establish soon, Paul does not see any discontinuity between the social implications of reconciliation and the divine work in Christ, so such a stark dualism needs to be resisted. His vision of reality has God ‘at work’ in the social sphere so that reconciliation is at one and the same time vertical and horizontal.\(^{328}\) We will see that Paul collapses the difference between God’s work in reconciling the cosmos and the human dimensions of the process. The only lines that are somewhat indistinct or blurred, are in “who does what?” in social reconciliation, because these do not lend themselves to an easy disentanglement. This tension remains with us throughout the study and I shall return in the next chapter to the complex divine/human interplay in a discussion about strategy and social reconciliation as *missio Dei*. Suffice to say for the present, reconciliation becomes a S/spiritual activity, one that is integrally linked to the other two components, structure and ethics.\(^{329}\)

**Characteristics and Elements of Pauline Reconciliation**

Leaving behind the aspect of origins, I shall turn now to some of the defining characteristics of the concept. Constantineau proposes that most studies have focused their attention almost exclusively on four passages where Paul uses the *katallagē/katallassō* terminology: Romans 5: 10-11; 2 Corinthians 5:14-21; Colossians 1:20-21; Ephesians 2:11-22.\(^{330}\)

The exegesis, with insignificant variations, has yielded five major points which reflect reconciliation as a Trinitarian impetus, and one that invites humanity into this reconciliatory work of God, primarily as recipient of the divine work and secondly as co-labourer.\(^{331}\) I summarize their conclusions in the following way: firstly, God is the subject of reconciliation – he reconciles the world to himself and it is not God who is reconciled. Secondly,

\(^{328}\) Constantineau, *Reconciliation*, p.17.

\(^{329}\) I use this “inelegant” term S/spiritual here to emphasize the cooperation between God the Holy Spirit, and humanity as spiritual beings. This is a mix of two words with the captial ‘S’ indicating the Holy Spirit and lower case ‘s’ indicating humanity. This is a convention I have adapted from New Testament scholar Gordon D. Fee, in his *God’s Empowering Presence: The Holy Spirit in the Letters of Paul*, Massachusetts: Hendricksen, 1994, p. 25.

\(^{330}\) Constantineau, p.38.

\(^{331}\) Ibid.
reconciliation has been effected by the atoning death of Christ. On the basis of Christ’s sacrifice, God deals with the offence of sin, which has created a fissuring enmity between God and the created order. For example, drawing on the meaning of *katallagē* as ‘exchange’, J.B. Torrance describes Jesus’ ‘atoning contribution’ in this manner: “Christ has come and taken our enmity, to give us love in exchange; our alienation and hostility, to give us his friendship in exchange; our sin, our condemnation, our death, to give us forgiveness, righteousness and eternal life in exchange”.332 Thirdly, it is the Holy Spirit who ‘renders effective’ this work of Christ. In Christoph Schwöbel’s words, the Paraclete is “the link to the past event of Christ’s death, the medium of our relationship to the living God and the effective anticipation of the perfection of this relationship in the *eschaton*”.333 Fourthly, reconciliation denotes a real change and transformation in the relationship between God and human beings and brings a restoration of fellowship; it also denotes a real change in the relationship between God and the cosmos and between humans. In other words, all of creation lies within the divine reconciliatory sphere. This change is an eschatological one, an inaugurated reality that is yet to be realized in its fullness. Fifthly, there is a ministry of reconciliation, a human service in cooperation with the Spirit, to be carried into the world.334 This is a service, viewed by Paul as a priestly and ambassadorial role, a role which announces the divine accomplishment and seeks to exemplify it in a way that is consistent with the divine ‘reconciling wisdom’. Thus, the human participation within God’s reconciling schema is both as subject and object, and here reflecting our eschatological understandings of reconciliation within God’s teleological framework, we are an imperfect exemplifying reflection in word, expectation and action of this divine model.

Here I have added a “new” category to the historic discussion – that is, the God in Christ reconciliation as a manifestation of the wisdom of God. I use this term deliberately and shall elaborate briefly upon this. The Cambridge theologian David Ford, who has written extensively on the subject of wisdom, maintains that, “Christian theology requires an engagement with scripture [sic]whose primary desire is for the wisdom of God in life

333 Schwöbel, “Reconciliation”, p. 25.
Further, he describes God as “the God of blessing who loves in wisdom”, a descriptive that fits the act of God’s reconciling the cosmos because he loves it so much (John 3:16). The perfect manifestation of this wisdom is the ‘Reconciler’, who is Christ, and the one whom Paul refers to as “the wisdom of God” (1 Cor 1:28). However, Paul also says that now, particularly through the church, the divine intention is for the “manifold wisdom of God to be made known to the rulers and authorities in the heavenly realms, according to his eternal purpose, that he accomplished in Christ Jesus” (Eph 3:10-11). I propose that the ‘wisdom’ of God, as it relates to our present discussion on reconciliation, is the way God dealt with the reconciliatory needs of the estranged cosmos. In this way, God’s reconciling strategy is contextual. I offer that the God in Christ reconciliation is a ‘God’s-wise’ strategy, a precise and considered response to the unique fissured condition of creation. Thus, the divine model is essentially a contextual one and needs to be viewed as such and, flowing from that, the human response to this process should reflect the same ‘wise-consideration’ both of the divine model and the particular reconciliatory needs of their location. I shall continue to acknowledge reconciliation as wisdom, both divine and human, throughout this and the next chapter which looks at ethics and strategy.

Before leaving this section on the characteristics of Christian reconciliation, it is timely to insert a comparative model of reconciliation drawn from a “Hellenistic environment”, one which John Fitzgerald has termed a “standard paradigm of reconciliation”. This will help clarify the way in which Paul contextualized and transformed both the Isaianic and Hellenistic visions of reconciliation. The following ‘common elements of reconciliation’, drawn from Fitzgerald’s schema, outline the most important elements inherent within the presuppositions and logic of the standard Hellenistic paradigm of reconciliation in Paul’s time.

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336 Ibid., p.264.
338 Ibid., pp.228-32.
• Presupposing a wrongdoing of one or more parties which created the conflict, the basic principle in the standard paradigm was that those responsible for the conflict were to take initiative in restoring the relationships and seek reconciliation.
• The guilty party’s initiative in reconciliation took the form of an acknowledgment as a part of a compensatory gesture towards the wronged person.
• Reparations were a necessary component and a standard precondition for reconciliation particularly between warring nations.
• There were both benefits and responsibilities involved: one benefit being the knowledge that one could continue life in the full confidence of a restored relationship; the responsibility implied that the reconciled were to live in light of their renewed accord with an appropriate social ethic.339

Perhaps the most obvious and significant difference between the two paradigms is that in the Christian model, God, the ‘offended’ party, takes the initiative in reconciliation. Thus, while it is possible to understand the death of Christ as the ‘reparations’ payment, (as per the Hellenistic model above), which enabled the reconciliation between God and humanity, the Pauline shift means that it is not necessarily the ‘offender’ who facilitates the process. In an act of Christian grace, this may include the ‘offended’ providing whatever is ‘necessary’ to initiate the reconciliatory process.

Again, the God in Christ reconciling initiative models an ‘offended party’ proactivity, and this is an acknowledged point of difference from the Hellenistic model, and perhaps most ‘standard’ reconciliation models. However, this is not to suggest that, within a Christian paradigm, the antagonist in a relationship breakdown might be prevented from initiating reconciliation; this would clearly run counter to the weight of biblical wisdom that enjoins a guilty party towards repentance and restoration of relationship. For example, the injunction of Jesus in Matthew 5:24 bears this out: “Therefore, if you are offering your gift at the altar and there remember that your brother has something against you, leave your gift there in front of the altar. First go and be reconciled to your brother; then come and offer your gift.” However, the God in Christ model does seem to at least place some responsibility on the offended party and certainly does not remove them from a generic divine reconciliatory

imperative. This Matthew 5 example, where the offender is exhorted to reconcile with the offended against, is a good reminder that a strict and overly literal adherence to what is perceived as the divine model is an too simplistic. I shall return again to this theme in the section that deals with reconciliatory strategy.

The Structure of the Divine Model of Reconciliation

The above sections have provided some background to the origin and characteristics of Pauline reconciliation. In this next section I shall draw attention to what I term the ‘structural elements’ of reconciliation, to contrast to its ethical characteristics. Specifically, the structure I have in mind is the way that Paul presents reconciliation as an ontological reality framed within the mechanism of covenant. In some ways, this relates to the “structural what” of reconciliation as opposed to the “ethical how”.

In many reconciliation models, the social implications of the doctrine, which include the imperative to ‘be reconciled’, are presented solely as an exhortation to an appropriate ethical endeavour. While an inclusion of reconciliation as ethical is crucial to any reconciliatory model, I argue that this concentration on a behavioural approach delivers a truncated understanding. Recourse to an ‘ethical model’ only, will influence the way reconciliation is presented within a social context and will, in my view, inhibit the social possibilities afforded by the divine model. This situation arises because of the tendency to overlook the structural components of divine reconciliation as applicable to the human realm. Many Christian models promote the ethical characteristics of the divine agency, including such important components as self-sacrifice, justice, forgiveness and repentance, to name a few. I contend, however, that not only should we give attention to these important characteristics drawn from the divine example, but we should also draw upon the structure within which that ethic operates. This proposal presupposes that the divine reconciliatory impetus, particularly as enunciated by Paul, not only creates the foundational

340 Ontology generally pertains to the study of ‘being’. The term ontological describes ‘a state of being’ or a ‘category of being’. It is a ‘reality’ that is identifiable as having its own existence. I use the term with regard to reconciliation in order to make a clear distinction between reconciliation as an ‘objective state’ and reconciliation as ‘economy’, or ‘process’. I also use ‘objective’ and ‘ontological’ interchangeably. According to Australian theologian Geoffrey Bingham, “Ontology is the way things really are” or “the way God has created all things to be and to function”, in Geoffrey C. Bingham’s, The Profound Mystery: Marriage, Love, Divine and Human, Blackwood: New Creation, 1995, p.16.


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possibility for interpersonal or social reconciliation, but operates as a model for that enterprise in both its structural and ethical forms. However, before we can attend to that we need more understanding of the divine model.

I was alerted to the idea of structure by the critique of a number of theologians who see certain theological shortcomings within some social reconciliation models. While my conclusions about the analogical usefulness of the divine reconciliation structure for the social sphere do not directly follow from their critique, their concerns are still aposite to the wider discussion. Gunton, referring to the church’s reconciliation efforts, warns “not to succumb to the feeble activism and Pelagianism that pass for a Christian ethic in so many places today”\(^\text{342}\), a caution born from his perception that some practitioners presume that their activities ‘complete’ in a causal way the divine initiative.

Similarly, the English theologian John Webster is critical of what he suggests is the elision in some quarters of the distinction between the “triune life of God” and the ethics of “the moral community of God’s creatures”.\(^\text{343}\) He argues that Paul’s declaration in 2 Corinthians 5:18, “[A]ll this is from God, who through Christ reconciled us to himself and gave us the ministry of reconciliation”, makes it clear that reconciliation is essentially a divine work. He argues that, on the basis of this, “human moral action is subordinate to divine saving action…and therefore the sociology of morals is strictly subservient to moral ontology”.\(^\text{344}\) As Webster describes it, “more than anything else, a Christian depiction of the field in which human acts of reconciliation take place will want to insist on the wholly unique and perfect action of God in Christ”.\(^\text{345}\) According to him, this “definitive and self-contained event”\(^\text{346}\) is not “just an incitement to human moral activity…it is that without which reconciliation is groundless, lacking in any purchase on reality”.\(^\text{347}\)

\(^{342}\) Gunton, Reconciliation, p.169.
\(^{344}\) Ibid., p.113.
\(^{345}\) Ibid.
\(^{346}\) Ibid.
\(^{347}\) Ibid.
Webster also insists that acts of reconciliation are more than attempts to create reality by establishing imagined communities which offer a different sort of social space. He argues that:

Human acts of reconciliation are in accordance with the structure of reality which God in Christ creates and to the existence of which the gospel testifies; and therefore they are acts which tend towards the true end of creation that God establishes once and for all, in Christ’s reconciling person and work.

Webster believes that the church’s ministry of reconciliation is “primarily speech” or a message, which “indicates” as the “first great act of reconciliation” that reconciliation is already realized in Christ and by the Spirit. His emphasis, then, as well as ‘acknowledging’ the pre-eminence of the divine work within reconciliation, is upon reconciliation as an objective or ontological “state”.

Webster’s observations are helpful in drawing our attention to the “sheer gratuity of the divine act of reconciliation” and the ontological reality that results from God’s work. However, this attention to reconciliation as ontological is incomplete if we do not echo that aspect of the divine strategy within the social sphere. I argue that not only should we ‘replicate’ divine ethics within our reconciliatory practice, but divine ‘structures’ as well. In this next section, I shall briefly examine two Pauline passages, which I propose will support this view.

Several Pauline passages support the generic ontology argument as proposed by Webster and others, especially the 2 Corinthians 5:18 narrative I cited above. While an argument based upon these passages might be sufficient to demonstrate my reasoning, in the sense that they reveal God’s reconciling method, it is perhaps more convincing to draw from examples where an ontological structure is reflected within the social sphere. The first relates to the reconciliation between Jew and Gentile in Ephesians 2 and the second is the marriage example of 1 Corinthians 7. I offer that the Ephesians example is primarily

348 Ibid.
349 Ibid.
350 Ibid., p.118.
351 Ibid., p.119.
soteriological with clear sociological implications and the other is sociological with implications for our soteriological understandings.

Firstly, the Pauline letter to the church in Ephesus which deals with the Jew-Gentile relationship:

But now in Christ Jesus you who were once far off have been brought near by the blood of Christ. For he himself is our peace: he has made us both one, and has broken down the intervening wall which formed a barrier between us. In his flesh he has abolished the hostility, the law of commandments, ordinances and all, in order to create of the two in himself one new human being, (thus) making peace, and to reconcile both to God in one body through the cross, having by its means put the hostility to death. Then he came and proclaimed peace to you who were far off as well as peace to those who were near (Eph 2: 13-18).

Here, reconciliation between Jew and Gentile is described by Paul as “making peace”, a state that was achieved by “destroying the barrier” between them, that is, the “dividing wall of hostility”, which effectively for Paul was the Law. The intricacies of the relationship of Jew and Gentile to the Law are not central to my argument, except to acknowledge that the Law represented the reason for the division. The key here for us is that the inclusion of both Jew and Gentile, within a new covenant and as ‘new creations’ with ‘new identities’, was a work of grace based upon the work of Christ and not an achievement via ethical practice. Paul did not exhort Jew and Gentile in the first instance “to get on better with each other” as a means towards reconciliation – he acknowledged God’s structural or objective change facilitated via covenant as one which ‘created’ a new reconciled relationship. His exhortation to Jewish and Gentile Christians to live in peace proceeded out of the possibility that a state of shalom or reconciliation had already been achieved via the structural change wrought through the new covenant.

Writing about the Ephesians example, Jürgen Moltmann has posited that:

through Christ’s giving of himself God has created ‘peace’ between Gentiles and Jews, since he ‘brings the hostility to an end’ through himself, and proclaims peace between Jews and Gentiles, since through Christ, God ‘has reconciled to himself all things, whether on earth or in heaven, making peace by the blood of his cross’ (Col 1:20).

Speidell, “Incarnational Social Ethics”, p.146.
He argues, then, that in the human dimension as well as this cosmic one, it is important to perceive that peace has already been made by God:

[s]o for human beings the one thing necessary is to perceive and accept what is objectively already existent *sub specie aeternitatis*, [from the perspective of the eternal] whether in human conflicts or in the cosmos. ‘God was in Christ and reconciled the cosmos with himself’ (2 Cor 5:19). This is the ‘peace within the strife’. 353

The point that Moltmann is making, by reference to the Pauline passages in Ephesians and Colossians, that is relevant here, is that reconciliatory ethics are ‘secondary’ to the ontological reality that has been already achieved in Christ.

**Marriage and Reconciliation**

Now to the 1 Corinthians 7 marriage example, where Paul uses the Greek term *katallagētō*, a usage which I propose brings further clarity to our discussion on ontology and ethics. This passage, as I have explained above, is the only explicit *katallasō* or reconciliation passage that is apparently ‘non-soteriological’.

To the married I give this command – not I but the Lord – that the wife should not separate from her husband. But if she does, she must remain unmarried or else be reconciled [*katallagētō*] to her husband. And a husband must not divorce his wife (1 Cor 7: 10 -11).

As I indicated previously, Paul employs a term that was used in the Greek marriage records of the time, a quasi-legal designation that described the reunion of a husband and wife after a separation or divorce. The context of Paul’s usage is a passage where he is addressing the issue of marriage and separation in the Corinthian church. Simply put, Paul exhorts wives and husbands not to divorce. However, speaking to the woman, Paul says that if for some reason the need to separate arises they should stay single or otherwise “be reconciled to her husband”. The choice is between separating and remaining single or, if the woman wants to be married, she needs to return to “be reconciled” to her husband. What does this reconciliation consist of? Paul gives no detail of the process. However, this silence together with our understanding of the term as used within Greek marriage records of the time to describe the ‘state’ of a re-united couple as ‘reconciled’, leaves us with the possibility that

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Paul understands that a type of ‘reconciliation’ is achieved by returning to the marriage covenant, a view that is consistent with the Greek cultural usage at the time. In other words, Paul gives no instructions to the wife as to the reconciliatory ‘mechanics’ apart from the injunction, “be reconciled to her husband”. In Paul’s view, reconciliation is achieved by returning to an ontological reality formed via covenant. This is not to suggest that Paul imagines there is no concomitant ethic, reconciliatory or otherwise, within the marriage relationship – that is clear by his treatment of marriage in other contexts. However, it is possible to argue that within Paul’s mind, returning to the covenant of marriage represents what I shall term, a ‘first order objective state of reconciliation’, that is not achieved by ‘ethical behaviour’ but that a ‘second order state of reconciliation’ within marriage is achieved by an appropriate interpersonal ethic. An important thing to note here is that, mirroring the divine model, an ‘objective state’ of reconciliation within marriage is achieved within covenant. Arguably this ‘reconciled state’ is ‘confirmed’ via an embracing of the associated ethic. In other words, reconciliation would not be achieved by simply ‘returning’ – the integrity of the ‘return’ would be signalled by the embracing of the associated marriage ethic. I suggest that this Corinthian marriage example, as I indicated above, is a deliberate mixing by Paul of a theological and sociological category. Finally, what this example does also, is to emphasize the centrality of covenant within the reconciliatory narrative.

To conclude, while it is important to heed the warnings of Gunton and Webster regarding the differences between divine and human reconciliation, it is equally important to acknowledge that the divine model offers some insight as a model for human participation and responsibility in the process. Webster’s and Gunton’s critiques are primarily calls to acknowledge the prevenience of God within reconciliation, which also draws attention to its ontology. However, I have advanced the thought that this ontological perspective has significant implications for any social reconciling strategy. When viewed in this way, God’s reconciling the world functions as both the ground and model for the reconciling life of humans in this world. While many have assumed this twofold perspective, few theologians have acknowledged or applied the structural elements of divine reconciliation into the social sphere, preferring to emphasize the concept’s ethical components.
Two final observations on this point are in order. Firstly, while the ‘ontological arrangement’ is a demonstration of God’s wisdom for the fissured cosmos and although Pauline theology presents it as a generic model for the social realm, I offer that social models need to fit the context. I propose that the cosmic needs were primarily structural or ontological in type and hence God’s-wise ‘ontological response’. Secondly, I acknowledge that there is a certain artificiality in the distinction, as the two are in many ways inseparable, both theoretically and practically. However, I offer that the distinction remains an important one to make, if for no other reason than to draw our attention to reconciliation having two such integral and interdependent components.

I shall return to the contextual challenges of reconciliation in the next chapter, but for now, I shall continue the ontological discussion via an examination of covenant, the ‘mechanism’ by which the ontological reality of reconciliation was established.

**Covenant and Reconciliation**

A number of theologians, including Wright, de Gruchy and Volf, have noted the connection between covenant and the biblical idea of reconciliation. For Karl Barth also, covenant and reconciliation are interrelated. He sees reconciliation as:

[t]he fulfilment of the covenant between God and man. ‘Reconciliation’ is the restitution, the resumption of a fellowship which once existed but was then threatened by dissolution....The fellowship which originally existed between God and man, which was then disturbed and jeopardized, the purpose of which is now fulfilled in Jesus Christ and in the work of reconciliation, we describe as covenant.

The Barthian view is that the covenant that God makes with humanity provides the framework within which reconciliation is to be understood. The covenant “frames” or facilitates God’s decision and purpose to restore relations with humankind as well as the rest of the created order. Nothing remains outside the reconciling purposes of God, for ‘in Christ’, the mediator between God and humanity, and by implication between God and the

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354 Perry Simpson Huesemman considers covenant a “pre-structural framework for societal relations. By pre-structural is meant a giveneness, something that comes before social structures and relations so as to inform them in an ethical way”, in *Covenant as Ethical Commonwealth: Possibilities for Trust in an Age of Western Individualism and Disintegration*, Martesana: IPOC, 2010, p.11.


cosmos, God has renewed his covenant in a new initiative “to reconcile to himself all things” (Col 1:20). This event radically changes human history and echoing the previous section on ontology, provides an objective basis both for the present experience of reconciliation as well as the future for the world.\textsuperscript{357}

de Gruchy holds that covenant needs to inform our discussion of reconciliation “if we are to do justice to the doctrine and to contribute to its critical reconstruction” because he maintains that divine reconciliation “presupposes” a covenantal relationship.\textsuperscript{358} He posits that:

The [biblical] story has its primordial beginnings (Gen 1 –11) in the creation of humankind to be in relation to God as partner in managing the world. This covenantal relationship of trust between God and humanity expressed in faithful stewardship is the first presupposition of the doctrine of reconciliation. Everything else is contingent on the conviction that men and women are created to be in a covenantal relationship of companionship and co-operation with God, with one another, and in harmony with nature.\textsuperscript{359}

For de Gruchy, it is covenant that makes “reconciliation a possibility and reconciliation makes the promise of the covenant a reality”.\textsuperscript{360} In other words, reconciliation as revealed in the Bible would not exist without covenant. Although cautious as to how the understanding of covenant is to be applied in the political arena, “because those involved are not God and humanity”, he maintains there is an “analogous relationship”\textsuperscript{361} and on this basis, he suggests “we should covenant together to restore justice”.\textsuperscript{362}

I believe that de Gruchy’s and others’ claims for the link between covenant and reconciliation have merit, not only within the divine schema, but consequently within the realm of human responsibility also. Given this, some further discussion of the covenantal idea is in order. Although a detailed analysis, either in its ancient, modern or indeed theological form, is outside the scope of this study, I shall endeavour to draw together some of its main themes, particularly as they pertain to reconciliation in the social sphere.

\textsuperscript{357} de Gruchy, Reconciliation, p.70.
\textsuperscript{358} Ibid., p.187.
\textsuperscript{359} Ibid., p.50.
\textsuperscript{360} Ibid., p.187.
\textsuperscript{361} Ibid., p.185.
\textsuperscript{362} Ibid., p.165.
The ubiquity of covenant in ancient societies as a structural mechanism has been noted by many scholars. As well, the more recent association with federalism – sometimes referred to as covenantalism and an influential political idea in modern Western states – has been well documented. William Everett posits that, “[C]ovenantalism was derived from ancient treaty formulae and then given its theological meaning in Hebrew culture”; however, scholars disagree as to the extent of the influence upon the Hebrew vision by other versions. Regardless, the idea of covenant certainly reached a zenith within Israel and became a foundational and formative element in its identity.

The covenants as detailed within the biblical canon are many and varied, being referred to either implicitly or explicitly from Genesis to Revelation, and some posit, as did de Gruchy above, that the conceptual setting for the world of covenant was established in Genesis. Daniel J. Elazar, a recognized authority on covenant and polity, argues that it is here that the “linguistic and conceptual basis within which to understand covenant and covenantal systems” is first presented. In broad terms, it is suggested that God relates to the universe and the creatures within it, including humanity, through a system of covenants. Elazar introduces the biblical concept of covenant in the following way:

While explicitly advocating covenantal ties as the basis for a good life, Bereshith [Genesis] presents those ties in the context of requisite organic connections among families and peoples needed for human society to work properly. The text expresses the interplay of organic and covenantal ties, showing where covenants rest on organic connections and where they are designed to cut or replace such connections. It presents the family of man from a single common ancestor to demonstrate the unity and basic equality of all humanity, the binding of all humans through God’s covenant with Noah, the subsequent separation of humanity first into different groupings and then into nations, the further separation of those nations by the development of separate languages, culminating in the separation of one man, Abraham, from his family to establish a new nation by covenant.
Here, Elazar points to the way in which the Creator has chosen to utilize covenant as a means of structuring or ordering his society, as well as drawing attention to some of the foundational covenants within the biblical narrative. As well as those divine-human covenants that Elazar has noted, such as the Adamic, Noahic and Abrahamic covenants, others followed, including the Mosaic and Davidic compacts. These ultimately coalesced into the new covenant, a ‘reconfigured’ divinely initiated covenant, mediated by Jesus Christ, and the one that forms the basis for the reconciliation between God and the created order. In Wright’s view, it was with this covenant that the covenantal purposes of Israel’s God “reached their climatic moment”. 370

The Scriptures explain that one reason for God’s use of covenant is to provide personal assurance and therefore a form of ‘security’. This is seen in the divine response in Genesis 15: 8 – 20 to Abram’s question, “how can I know that I will gain possession of [the land]? God’s response was to make a covenant with him. 371 However, it is also possible to draw some inferences from the biblical narrative. Before turning to the role of covenant in the social and political sphere, I shall make some brief comments about the divine raison d’etre that may help to illuminate further the link between reconciliation and covenant.

As I have stated above, covenants in some form or other are ubiquitous as societal mechanisms for structuring relationships. To reiterate de Gruchy’s claim: “[E]verything else is contingent on the conviction that men and women are created to be in a covenantal relationship of companionship and co-operation with God, with one another, and in harmony with nature”. 372 In other words, covenants are part of a divine design within the created order; they are intrinsic to the fabric of creation itself. Some have suggested that that this ‘creation characteristic’ is actually synonymous with the Trinity itself and inherent to the divine nature. 373 This understanding is based upon a perception of the Trinity as an ‘entity of three’ that relates to each other in an eternal commitment of love, fellowship and common purpose. This common purpose, by mutual agreement, consists of each fulfilling their commitments to each other and these commitments are seen as a form of covenant.

370 Wright, The Climax of the Covenant, p. xi.
371 See also Hebrews 6:17.
372 de Gruchy, Reconciliation, p.50.
373 See Everett, Religion, p.16.
In turn, the covenantal relationship within the Trinity extends to the covenantal relationship between God and humankind, an extension of God’s own nature to the image-bearer he has created. As Everett explains it, covenant is “not merely a mode of God’s activity. It is essential to who God is. God is a covenanting God”. 374

Besides the key thought here that God’s own triune being has a covenantal quality, is the associated idea that this characteristic is then conveyed to humankind as his image-bearers. The implication is that if God is a ‘covenanting God’, then as imago Dei, humans are a ‘covenanting species’, that is, ‘covenanting’ is intrinsic to their being. Again, to reiterate de Gruchy, we are created to be in covenant with the Creator, with creation and with each other. The divine design then means that covenants are intrinsic to relationality within the human sphere. This perhaps explains the ubiquity of covenants in some form in most societies.

However, while covenant is a divine-human ontological characteristic, it also has an economy of function. The specific functions vary according to the purpose of the compact, but they all share similar features. Functionally, a covenant serves as an ‘ordering’ and ‘defining’ mechanism of mutual trust that is characterized by the key virtue of fidelity. This fidelity, as an aspect of ‘ordering,’ by defining the nature and the conditions of the relationship, not only protects against a relational ‘chaos’ but also configures a ‘reality’ that both provides a place of belonging and a concomitant identity. Covenants can be seen from one perspective as mechanisms that are applied into the social sphere as an acknowledgment of human frailty and our behavioural vicissitudes, a frailty that requires structures to provide locations of security and grace. These covenantal structures operate as a kind of ‘ring-fence’ not only to define and maintain relationships, but to demonstrate that they are not sustained only by ‘performance’: to enter covenant with another human or group is to acknowledge a mutual need of grace. These characteristics are reflected within the various social and political covenants to which I shall now turn.

374 Everett, Religion, p.16.
The Hebrew word for covenant, בֶּרֶיֶך, is used in the Old Testament narrative and is variously translated in different bible versions as ‘treaty’, ‘alliance’ or ‘compact’. These were the primary means of ordering political relationships and were especially utilized to achieve ‘states of shalom’ or reconciliation after times of conflict. For example: Abram makes a covenant or treaty (בֶּרֶיֶך) with two local Amorite clans near Hebron (Gen 14:13). In Genesis 21:22-34, Abraham and Abimilech make בֶּרֶיֶך following a conflict over the use of a well and, as a result of the covenant, agree to live at peace with each other. In Joshua 9, when the Gibeonites trick Israel into making a treaty with them, again the term is בֶּרֶיֶך (cf. 1 Sam 11:1-2; 1 Kings 5:12; 20:34; Isa 33:8; Hos 12:1). בֶּרֶיֶך also describes the alliances that Judah makes with Ephraim and Aram (1 Kings 15:19; 2 Chron 16:3). Daniel 9:27 makes a reference to a בֶּרֶיֶך that some hold constitutes an alliance between reformist Jews and Greeks in the context of the Antiochene crisis, and others, as the new covenant. In contrast to the hierarchical or suzerainty covenants that characterized the divine-human form, most of these social covenants were of an egalitarian nature, that is, the joining together of two equals in a solemn bond.

As well as being prevalent within Hebrew and other ancient Near Eastern societies, covenantal structures also developed within post-feudal Europe, particularly amongst those nations with strong Christian roots. Everett and Huesmann have described how these biblical covenantal understandings have been utilized in modernity and operated as a ‘basis for trust’ in civil society. In Huesmann’s view, “Western culture has revealed varying understandings of covenant...a ‘strong’ form and a ‘weak’ form”. Related to each form is a difference in understanding of the individual with regard to social relations and social theory. It is from the Latin word for covenant (foedus) that the term federal is coined, which in turn yields the political concept known as federalism or covenantalism, which forms the constitutional foundation in many modern states, including Australia, the United States, India and Europe.

This political usage of covenant within the biblical canon and in the post-biblical era is certainly analogous to the divine use of covenant. Particularly within Israel, there was the

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376 Cf. John Calvin.
377 Everett, Religion, p.18.
378 Huesmann, Covenant, p.113.
expectation that society’s structures and ethics reflected the divine pattern. In other words, the way God dealt with humanity created a model and pattern for interpersonal relationships and societal institutions. In a theocracy such as Israel, these institutions were seen as divinely instituted and as such were considered something more than analogous. As the political applications were developed in Western democratic nations, covenantal ideas were reconfigured to merge with the current philosophical or political theories of the day. These applications of covenant as replications of a biblical model within these contexts, to adapt Huesmann’s “weak/strong” description, ranged from “thick to thin”. However, regardless of the extent of the biblical inspiration within particular polities, covenantal influences remain within most Western democracies.

One particular example of ‘relational ordering’ that has strong covenantal associations even in post-Christian Western societies is that of marriage. This form of covenant-making, from a Christian perspective, has its roots in the Genesis narrative. For example, Genesis 1:27 states, “God created man in his own image, in the image of God he created him; male and female he created them.” This concept of imago Dei is extended in the Genesis 2:18-25 passage, where verse 24 reads, “For this reason a man will leave his father and mother and be united to his wife, and they will become one flesh.” This “one-flesh” union between the man and the woman is held by Jesus to be the prototypical form of marriage (Matt 19: 4-6). Many scholars, therefore, maintain that “one flesh” is a reflection of the relational image of the Trinity and reveals marriage as an ‘ontological reality’ shaped by covenant.379 Much more could be said about marriage within the biblical narrative, especially its role as a rhetorical device to portray the relationship between God and Israel and between God and the church. However, suffice for our purposes here, it highlights the societal use of covenant to form relational ontologies.

In this section then, I have drawn attention to a structural aspect of reconciliation known as covenant and have posited that the restoration of relationship between God and humans is facilitated and framed by this relational mechanism. Covenant describes the nature of the agreement that God has entered into with creation. It is this relationship between God and the cosmos that has been restored by Christ in a new covenant and the end result and process has been metaphorically described by Paul as reconciliation. This restoration of

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379 See Geoffrey Bromiley, Geoffrey C. Bingham, Karl Barth and Daniel Hauser.
relationship is an ontological reality that provides a location of trust through fidelity, and is one which defines and identifies the covenantal partners. The concept is associated with the very nature of the Trinity and by extension with humans as *imago Dei* and consequently is a ubiquitous relational construct in a variety of political, cultural and social relational settings. This exploration of the idea of covenant has been by necessity quite brief and the subject, especially as a reconciliatory mechanism, would benefit from further research.

**Summary**

As part of my objective to posit some Christian inspired reconciliatory ideas into the New Zealand context, I have explored in this chapter the biblical idea of reconciliation, especially as it has been presented by the New Testament writer, Paul. I began by looking at some public understandings of reconciliation as well as the historical trajectory of the church’s treatment. However, my analysis has concentrated largely upon the origins of Paul’s reconciliatory ideas, the defining characteristics within his new covenant reconciliation paradigm, the neglected area of structural elements and the notion that social reconciliation is both a direct and indirect outworking of the divine model as the wisdom of God. I proposed that an understanding of these areas is crucial to the formation of a social reconciliation strategy. Further, I have argued that God’s-wise reconciliation strategy for a fissured cosmos is a contextual response that reveals a covenantally configured ontological reality, which is ‘prior’ but interrelated to its ethical properties. In the next chapter, I shall turn to the ethical components of Christian social reconciliation, followed by a section on strategy. These understandings will be influential in the later formation of my reconciliatory ideas for the New Zealand context.
Chapter Six: Reconciliation as Ethical and Strategic

In my search to locate a Christian understanding of social reconciliation, I dealt in the previous chapter with the ideas of origins, characteristics and the structural elements within Pauline reconciliation. I proposed that Paul’s vision, drawn from a mix of prophetic Hebrew and contextual influences, presents the God in Christ reconciliation as an all-encompassing cosmic act which provides both the model and the means for social reconciliation, which is the restoration of human relationships. This perspective holds that humanity lives, from the divine perspective, in an ‘already’ and ‘not yet’ reconciled cosmos, a reality which lays the foundation for humanity’s reconciling activity as a part of the missio Dei. I described the divine model as contextual and as the wisdom of God for a fissured creation, which yields a covenantal ontological reality with a concomitant reconciling ethic. For Christians, this ethic is exemplified in the life and death of Jesus Christ. Seen in this way, the reconciliatory missio Dei is a ‘grace-ful’ and pneumatologically enabled imperative, which involves humans as both subjective and objective ‘participants’. That is, God provides, via the work of Christ and the Spirit, not only the ultimate telos of reconciliation, but an adaptable model structure, which carries an enabling ethic. However, God’s cosmic reconciling is eschatological – it is a past, present and future reality, and one which will not ultimately be fully realized until the eschaton.

In this chapter I shall consider the aspects of reconciliation as ethical and as a strategy. Until now, I have concentrated primarily upon the structure of God’s reconciling wisdom. If we were to extrapolate this model directly into the social realm, we would be giving primacy to ‘social arrangement’ over ‘social agency’ and subordinating ethics to ontology. This is a position I shall adopt for the New Zealand context and shall continue to explicate for the rest of this study; but suffice for the present to say that I believe that the Pākehā identity reconciliatory need can be better served in the first instance via an ontological approach rather than simply a reliance upon ethics. However, before proceeding with the ethical components, I shall make another methodological comment. While I have concluded that social reconciliation is essentially a ‘two dimensional’ construct, comprising an objective

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380 This is in contrast to Volf, who in Exclusion and Embrace forgoes a discussion on “social arrangements” and concentrates upon “social agency” as modelled by Jesus, particularly his death on the cross. However, I shall refer throughout the study to Volf’s cruciform ethic which I propose is not only helpful to a generic understanding of reconciliation but also for the New Zealand context. See Volf, Exclusion and Embrace, p.21.
state and an ethical process, this summary ignores an important dimension of social reconciliation. This is the application of these characteristics into the social or political context – I term this the ‘S/spiritual strategy’ of reconciliation, to indicate the divine-human synergy. This is an important but often underestimated aspect of the reconciliatory task. It is essentially this process that ‘contextualizes’ the divine reconciliatory wisdom for each local requirement. I will concentrate upon this aspect of social reconciliation in the second part of the chapter.

Reconciliation and Ethics

The analysis in the first half of this chapter follows some of the important discussions that have concerned reconciliation theologians over the past two decades. I shall look at some of those characteristics that these scholars have suggested are the ethical necessities for any Christian social reconciliation model. These recent discussions are important considerations as I proceed further into the search for an appropriate methodology for the New Zealand context.

Whereas in the previous chapter I was guided by Paul’s reconciliatory opus and the work of various biblical scholars and systematic theologians whose concerns were primarily theoretical, in this chapter I shall continue to draw on Paul, but also the Gospels and the ideas of some theologians and practitioners whose preoccupation is reconciliation as social praxis. Most of the positions are posited within particular contexts and locations, and the arguments have moved from theoretical considerations to their own local reconciliatory needs. The assumption by these theologians follows my own, that social reconciliation is in some sense analogous to the divine model and that human reconciling efforts are a participation in the divine reconciling process, or as Volf phrases it: “God’s reception of hostile humanity into divine community is a model of how human beings should relate to each other.” In order to describe this reception, Volf uses the metaphor of “embrace” to describe both the “welcome” of God to humanity and the analogous process in the reconciliation between humans.

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381 This chapter is a development of some preliminary ideas I explored in the “Naboth’s Vineyard”, MPhil, University of Cambridge Thesis, 2007, pp. 15-20.
382 Volf, Exclusion and Embrace, p.100.
383 Ibid., p.29.
Since the emergence of such institutions as the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission and other similar agencies, the discussion of what constitutes ‘genuine’ social reconciliation has preoccupied many. This interest has resulted in scholars arguing for the inclusion of various components as being indispensable to any meaningful Christian social reconciliation model, and I shall refer in more depth to these contributions in the next section. The most common within this non-exclusive list include the interrelated and complex concepts of justice, forgiveness, truth, repentance and restitution. They each carry an inherent theological and philosophical complexity, with their meaning and significance being strongly debated; however, given the limits of this study these issues can only be partially covered here. While most would agree that these components are in some way integral to any reconciling model, it is the integration of these components, particularly the temporal sequencing of justice and the relationship of repentance to forgiveness, which arguably has been the most contentious. Given the importance of these categories to our understandings of social reconciliation, I shall outline some of the recent discussion and also offer some observations and personal conclusions.

Reconciliation and Justice

The place of justice within reconciliatory ethics is a highly contested one and often reflects the wider discussion around the topic within the spheres of theology, philosophy and jurisprudence. Traditionally, the theological discussion has centred on the relationship of the atonement to God’s just requirements. Within Western Christianity there are four main theories covering the atonement and divine justice issue. These historical theories include: the 3rd century Origen ransom or the ‘Christus Victor’ theory, popularized in the 19th century by Swedish theologian Aulén; the moral influence theory as developed by Peter Abelard in the 11th century; the satisfaction or scholastic theory of Anselm of Canterbury, also in the 11th century; and the penal substitution theory, essentially a Protestant refinement of Anselm. All of these theories agree that God’s character of justice is somehow ‘satisfied’ within his reconciling strategy, but disagree as to the why and the how. For example, reflecting his reinterpretation of Anselm’s atonement theory, Daniel Bell Jr. posits:

The atonement, the judgment of God, is not about a juristic reckoning stretched to infinity, but ontological union….The atonement is not about meeting the demands of
an implacable justice before which even God must bow, but the forgiveness that enables desire to return to its source. It is about humanity’s being taken up into the divine life of the Trinity through participation in Christ. There is sacrifice involved in this atoning work and there is substitution. But these are no longer positioned as an economy of *suum cuique*, of equity and retribution, but rather find their true meaning in the aeconomic order of divine forgiveness.\textsuperscript{384}

Or as D. Bentley-Hart argues it:

As Christ’s sacrifice belongs not to an economy of credit and exchange, but to the trinitarian motion of love, it is given entirely as gift, and must be seen as such: a gift given when it should not have been needed to be given again, by God, and at a price that we, in our sin, imposed on him. As an entirely divine action, Christ’s sacrifice merely draws creation back into the eternal motion of divine love for which it was fashioned. The violence that befalls Christ belongs to our order of justice, an order overcome by his sacrifice, which is one of peace.\textsuperscript{385}

As can be seen then, arguments on the atonement/justice paradigm are often predicated upon contrasting views of the character of God, such as love and mercy ‘trumping’ the divine characteristic of justice and the consequential ‘requirement’ of judgement. These interpretations extend into quasi-legal arguments over the extent to which divine justice is a form of punishment or a means of ‘payment’ or restitution. Or from another vantage: how does the divine character of mercy and the offer of forgiveness in Christ equate to a just outcome? These questions within theological circles have impacted upon the parallel discussions amongst philosophers and law makers and have led to divergent justice paradigms, including those models known as retributive and restorative justice.\textsuperscript{386}

Scholars, such the Brazilian liberation theologian Luiz Carlos Susin, and others influenced by the South American movement, such as David Tombs and Celia Clegg writing from Northern Ireland, insist on justice as a prerequisite of reconciliation to avoid any sense of a ‘cheap reconciliation’.\textsuperscript{387} Susin, juxtaposing justice and reconciliation claims, “Today we know that the dream of everlasting peace can become a reality only if there is vigilance and a continual

\textsuperscript{384} Daniel Bell Jr., *Liberation Theology After The End of History: the Refusal to Cease Suffering*, London: Routledge, p.147.


\textsuperscript{386} Most reconciliation theologians would arguably positon themselves within a restorative justice paradigm.

\textsuperscript{387} A term borrowed from Dietrich Bonhoeffer’s concept of “cheap grace”.

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effort for peace through justice and reconciliation." The 1985 *Kairos Document*, a prophetic theological proclamation formulated by various South African church leaders, is a recent example of this position. The document argued for ‘justice’ and an end to apartheid – that is, a structural political change. To the *Kairos* signatories these conditions were viewed as preconditions for authentic reconciliation.

Contrary views to the ‘justice as primary’ argument are held today by several theologians, such as Miroslav Volf. Volf’s reconciliation theology was formed while struggling with his own personal issues from the Balkan conflict. He agrees that the pursuit of liberation and the quest for justice are indispensable and integral to Christian reconciliation, but he opposes the ‘justice first’ position on two fronts. Firstly, he claims it is a denial of the divine model of reconciliation whereby God, through the death of Christ, dies, and initiates a reconciliation for the ungodly, that is, the undeserving. This manifestation of grace, Volf posits, needs to be an inherent quality within the human dimensions of reconciliation. He also argues that absolute justice is an unachievable goal and thus if such a justice were pursued, there would be no real progress towards a satisfactory reconciliation. He proposes a relationship between grace and justice, whereby justice “would become subordinate rather than the primary category around which Christian social engagement is organized; or rather, the struggle for justice would be understood as a dimension of reconciliation whose ultimate goal is a community of love”. Volf proposes that the Pauline version, which he argues mirrors Jesus’ teaching and practice, “stands and falls with the idea that grace has priority over justice (grace, again, which does not negate justice but which *affirms* justice in the act of transcending it)”.

There is certainly, as the first group of theologians have argued, a need to avoid a simplistic model of reconciliation; hence, their appeal to justice as a primary condition. However, as Volf and Bell Jr. have demonstrated, there are complicating factors to this position, not the least being the primary difficulty of arriving at definitions of justice. The Scottish public theologian, Duncan Forrester, asserts:

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391 Ibid.
392 Ibid.
Because understandings of justice are so varied, volatile and confusing, administering justice and attempting to frame and apply politics that are just, become perplexing and systematically confusing operations...the problems for people on the ground who feel a calling to act justly and dispense justice are acute. Different and sometimes incompatible ideas of justice are presented...and in a situation where ‘nobody knows what justice is’, often enough it is the self-interest of the powerful that prevails because the trumpet-call for justice makes an uncertain sound....Only very rarely is an account of justice presented as resting on an ontology, or the nature of things, or as being in some sense ‘true’.  

The Scottish philosopher Alasdair MacIntyre echoes Forrester when he asks, “Whose Justice?” – a variation of my earlier point that configurations of social justice are usually reflections of individual world views. Sometimes these views of justice equate to a motivation of revenge, which perpetuates enmity rather than facilitate reconciliation.

Bell Jr. also echoes Forrester’s scepticism and rejection of justice as either an objective or recoverable reality:

Justice is set off on the path to failure from the outset...not simply because humanity cannot be that good but because injustice is irreversible. Once injustice has been committed, no future can ever make good the suffering of the past...justice can re-establish the precarious balance of rights, but even then the offense is not offset.  

According to Bell Jr., “justice ultimately fails” – not because humanity is lacking, but because injustice cannot be undone. In his view, the blood that cries from the ground signals an absence that ‘justice’ cannot overcome.

To rephrase the above argument as represented by Susin on the one hand and Volf on the other, it is not so much that there is a basic disagreement about the importance of justice as there is about the means of dealing with the past. The arguments are mainly theological or philosophical over definition and practical around the temporal sequencing. However, the difficulties around justice as proposed by Forrester and Bell Jr. should not be the final words on the subject. If we are seeking to articulate a Christian vision of reconciliation then some ‘just’ solution needs to be found. If Wright is correct and justice is “shorthand” for the

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395 Bell Jr., Liberation Theology, p.12.
396 Ibid.
“intention of God expressed from Genesis to Revelation”, then this divine characteristic needs to be present in some form.

In my view, Volf’s ‘grace argument’ and the definitional difficulties make a persuasive case for ‘subordinating’ justice within the reconciliation model, as opposed to it being seen as an ontological and therefore, non-negotiable, primary absolute that is positioned as a pre-condition. I suggest that this ‘solution’ of ‘subordinating’ justice is compatible with my proposal of reconciliation as a spiritual strategy, which I shall outline shortly. In this proposal, the requirements of justice are to be considered in each different context. At the very least, it is a discussion that should involve the offended party, but within a Christian paradigm, as Volf has argued, where justice considerations would also be mixed with such virtues as mercy and grace. Justice in the human realm will always be an imperfect reflection of the divine model. However, this does not equate to the concept as being endlessly relative and only contextually driven; the death of Jesus as the ‘just foundation’ for cosmic reconciliation makes this view untenable. The justice discussion vis à vis social reconciliation remains a complex and necessary one, which will continue to benefit from consideration by other theologians, both systematic and public.

Forgiveness and Repentance

The role of forgiveness in reconciliation is often presented in juxtaposition to justice and repentance and as such raises its own issues. For example, to what extent is forgiveness a prerequisite or even a necessary element within reconciliation, especially in the light of an imperfect justice? Further, what is the relationship of forgiveness to the human offering of repentance and restitution? That the notion of forgiveness is in some sense central to Christian understandings of reconciliation finds solid acceptance – even outside the church. For example, Hannah Arendt, the French Jewish political philosopher, claims that:

The discoverer of the role of forgiveness in the realm of human affairs was Jesus of Nazareth. The fact that he made this discovery in a religious context and articulated

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it in religious language is no reason to take it any less seriously in a strictly secular sense. 399

Inspired by the words and acts of Jesus, Arendt offers forgiveness as the “antidote to revenge and vengeance – instincts that ‘enslave us’, which perpetuate an endless spiral of vengeance”. 400

Volf, perhaps with knowledge drawn from his own experience, admits that Arendt’s “spiral” can often find justification from the reasons located within social realities. He cites two examples. The first relates to the quest for justice, whereby the action of one party, who sees him/herself as simply seeking justice, or even settling for less than justice, is interpreted by the other as extracting revenge or perpetuating injustice. This leads to reactions of ‘just’ counter-revenge, but actually results in a spiral of vengeance. Volf refers to this situation as “the predicament of partiality”, due to the inability of the conflicting parties to agree on the moral significance of their actions. 401

Volf’s other reason resides in the temporal sequence in which acts are necessarily embedded. These are what Arendt termed the “predicament of irreversibility”, the inability “to undo what one has done though one did not, or could not, have known what he was doing”. 402 If deeds and their consequences could be undone, revenge would not be necessary, but, as Volf rightly observes, actions are irreversible, even in the hands of God. This leads again to the “urge for vengeance” or, as some might say, a “just vengeance”. In Arendt’s view, the only solution to this predicament of irreversibility is via forgiveness, which to her is “a genuinely free act” [which] “does not merely re-act”. 403

L. Gregory Jones, a theologian who has explored extensively the concept of forgiveness, states, “If Christian life is fundamentally oriented toward the coming fullness of God’s eschatological reign, then so should be our practices and understanding of Christian forgiveness.” 404 Jones, who employs the God in Christ paradigm of reconciliation as a model

400 Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition, cited in Volf, Exclusion and Embrace, p.120.
401 Ibid.
402 Ibid.
403 Ibid.
for the temporal realm, points to the central place of forgiveness within the divine schema. In his view, social reconciliation as restored relationship necessarily assumes the presence of forgiveness flowing between each party. To cite Jones again:

A Christian account of forgiveness ought not simply or even primarily be focused on the absolution of guilt; rather, it ought to be focused on the reconciliation of brokenness, the restoration of communion – with God, with one another, and with the whole of Creation. Indeed, because of the persuasiveness of sin and evil, Christian forgiveness must be at once an expression of a commitment to a way of life, the cruciform life of holiness in which we seek to “unlearn” sin and learn the ways of God, and a means of seeking reconciliation in the midst of particular sins, specific instances of brokenness.  

Here Christ is the exemplary model of forgiveness, not only as the means to restore broken relationships, but also because his cruciform ethics become the basis for a reconciling way of life.

The place of forgiveness as a way of dealing with the past was brought into sharp focus in post-apartheid South Africa. As Desmond Tutu has noted:

[t]here was in fact hardly any controversy about whether we should deal effectively with our past if we were going to be making the transition to a new dispensation. No, the debate was not on whether but on how we might deal with this only too real past [italics original].

Tutu’s view of the reconciliation process in South Africa demonstrates how forgiveness is often portrayed in juxtaposition to justice. The Anglican churchman, whose ‘forgiveness’ position is summarized in the title of his book No Future Without Forgiveness, a chronicle detailing the background and activity of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, posits that South Africa chose a “third way” between the “justice extremes” of Nuremberg and the “justice-less” amnesty granted Pinochet in Chile after their Truth Commission. He says, “[A]nd that third way was granting amnesty to individuals in exchange for a full disclosure relating to the crime for which amnesty was being sought”. For Tutu, then, forgiveness became a central, but conditional component in the reconciliation process. Amnesty, or a “state of forgiveness”, was arrived at only via ‘acts’ of truth-telling and repentance.

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405 Ibid., p.xii.
407 Ibid., p.30.
408 Ibid.
The American Christian ethicist Donald Shriver Jr., concerned with the national politics of apology, supports the idea that repentance is intrinsically linked to forgiveness, “especially if attending to the practical requirements for restoring or effecting new community between offenders and the offended-against”. Arguing from a biblical base, he points to a complex synthesis between the components of justice/forgiveness/truth and repentance, but argues that:

One of the great confusions in popular talk about forgiveness is the suspicion that to forgive is to treat justice casually. Keeping a moral “backbone” of truth in forgiveness seems required in most places in the Bible. There is something very wrong, even absurd in the claim, “I forgive you, even if you don’t think you have done anything to be forgiven for.” [Italics original] 409

Further, he says that such claims bypass the truth about the past and as such treat reconciliation as requiring no change on the side of offenders. To him, this either disregards or minimizes the offense itself as either unreal or unimportant. In order to underline his point, Shriver Jr. cites the poet T.H. Auden, who expressed the parody of forgiveness-without-repentance in the boast: “God likes forgiving my sins, and I like committing them. The world is admirably arranged!” 410 Shriver therefore insists:

Like all steps towards reconciliation, forgiveness and repentance are twin necessities. Without some degree of repentance, forgiveness stalls near the starting gate. The contrary might also be adduced: without the possibility for forgiveness repentance also stalls, at least for the purpose of leading to reconciliation. 411

He also insists that “an equally useless concept of forgiveness in the politics of reconciliation is the attitude of the victims, ‘You can repent all you want to, but you are still my enemy, and I want nothing to do with you.’” [Italics original] 412

As with the issue of justice, for many it is the temporal sequencing of forgiveness within the social reconciliation process that is the key concern. Murray Rae, a New Zealand theologian who writes about the New Zealand colonial experience, claims, in contrast to Shriver and Tutu, that divine forgiveness, is an act of “reconciling hospitality”, which precedes responses

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410 Ibid.
411 Ibid.
412 Ibid.
of repentance. Further, he posits that this same “pattern” presents for Christians in New Zealand “a compelling reason and a particular responsibility to share with Māori in practicing reconciliation, building peace, and providing opportunity for the truth to be told about the injustices of the past”.\(^{413}\) Rae compares the Māori ritual of *powhiri* [welcome] to the Christian Eucharist. He posits:

> There are echoes here, I suggest of God’s gracious hospitality shown toward us, enacted whenever Christians gather at the Lord’s table to receive bread and wine, forgiveness and new life. This too is a ritual of reconciliation. This too is an extension of hospitality requiring that we first make peace with our brothers and sisters. And this too opens up a new future that would otherwise be precluded by our sin.\(^ {414}\)

There are several remarks I can make about Rae’s helpful contextualizing. Firstly, I agree that divine reconciliation might be viewed as a primary act of divine hospitality in the cross which includes both the basis and offer of forgiveness. However, it is perhaps more accurate to talk in terms of ‘potentiated forgiveness’ being offered within that act of hospitality, rather than a unilateral forgiveness which is implied in the above passage. Many Christians agree that God has provided all the ‘means of salvation’ including the gift of faith and repentance. However, it appears that God’s effective ‘grace-gift’ of forgiveness is conditional upon one’s ‘responding’ to the ‘grace-gift’ of repentance. Consider the apostle Peter’s reply to an inquirer’s question. Peter commanded, “Repent and be baptized, every one of you, in the name of Jesus Christ for the forgiveness of your sins. And you will receive the gift of the Holy Spirit” (Acts 2:37-38).

Secondly, the ritual of *powhiri* is essentially a ‘negotiated welcome’. The ultimate reception by the *tangata whenua* or hosts, as indicated by the greeting of a *hongi* [formal Māori greeting] and/or kiss, is conditional upon the visitor’s appropriate response to an intricate ritual of *wero* [challenge], *karanga* [call] and *whaikōrero* [speechmaking]; at any point, if the hosts do not trust the visitors’ intentions, the welcome will be terminated. If the *powhiri* is, as Rae suggests, a redemptive analogy of divine hospitality, it supports a repentance first position rather than the unconditional welcome that he is suggesting.

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\(^ {414}\) Ibid.
Sometimes the parable, commonly referred to as the “Prodigal son”, is offered as an analogical example of unconditional forgiveness by the first person of the Trinity. This argument is an extrapolation from the Lucan text by those who assume that there is no explicit sign of repentance from the estranged, unreconciled son. In the parable, the father runs to his estranged son, and some commentators have argued that the father’s forgiveness and reception of the son is without a reciprocal or previous filial repentance. However, it could equally be extrapolated that if repentance or metanoia means simply to have a ‘change of mind’ or ‘to change direction’, it is seen in the prodigal’s thoughts in the ‘pig pen’ and by his ‘returning’ home. Seen in this way, the father’s reception for the son, which equates to his forgiveness, was only made ‘effective’ by the son’s metanoia, or ‘returning’. Perhaps, to refer back to reconciliation as ontological, there might be a case to say that there was in the father’s heart or mind an ‘ontological reconciled place’ that existed for the son and that was ‘activated’ by the son’s ethical turning or repentance. Perhaps there is even a father-son covenantal connection that also suggests a connection with our ontological-ethico model that could be explored at another time.

Another issue related to forgiveness and repentance has also been covered by Volf who says, “[B]eyond offering forgiveness, Christ’s passion aims at restoring such communion [communion of peace] – even with the enemies who persistently refuse to be reconciled”. What is implied in Volf’s conclusion is that there is within the divine model a ‘limitless forgiveness’, which needs to be translated into the temporal sphere. This ‘limitless forgiveness’ in Volf’s view, is restricted to the present realm, for even he allows for the ultimate “violent retribution of God” as reflected in the apostle John’s apocalyptic vision on the island of Patmos. However, he insists that such violence is the recourse of God alone. Volf and others instead propose Jesus as the exemplar of this kind of magnanimity.

But is this perception borne out by Jesus’ teaching? I propose that a brief analysis of one commonly referred to Matthean passage will cast doubt upon this perspective. The gospel passage in Matthew 18:21-23, recounts Peter asking Jesus how many times he should

415 Murray Rae holds this perspective. Personal communication, 1 November, 2011.
416 See for example, Volf, Exclusion and Embrace, pp. 156-165.
417 Ibid., p.126.
418 Ibid., pp. 275-306. Significantly, even Volf has to allow for the ultimate “violent retribution of God” as reflected in John’s Revelation. However, he insists that such violence is the recourse of God alone.
forgive. He receives the response “seventy seven times”, an allusion to the Cain/Lamech example of vindictiveness in Genesis 4:23-25. Jesus’ response could be interpreted in two different ways: literally or metaphorically. It is unlikely that he meant that we should count the incidents, which leaves the metaphorical interpretation. This perspective yields two further possibilities: firstly, as some argue, it means that we should always forgive. However, a further metaphorical possibility is that we should forgive ‘perfectly’. Within biblical numerology, seven is seen as the number of ‘completeness’ or ‘perfection’. Seventy seven times then is a hyperbolic rhetorical device that emphasizes the need to forgive “perfectly”. Jesus in the gospel narrative is applying a midrashic approach to the Genesis Lamech incident, whereby he juxtaposes forgiveness and vindictiveness. Lamech’s logic demanded a revenge that ‘perfectly compounded’ the initial offence, and called for a death in return for a wounding. This was a ‘perfect’ revenge! Jesus, in heralding a new covenant approach, juxtaposes this ‘perfect revenge’ for a ‘perfect forgiveness’. Therefore, extrapolating from this, Jesus simply means for us to forgive ‘perfectly’. I should add that this ‘formula’ requires cooperation between the offended party and the Holy Spirit: the ‘offended’ forgives ‘perfectly’ as led by the Spirit of Christ. This formulation brings context to the fore. Human forgiveness viewed in this way is not a closed, unconditional concept but a relational and conditional gift of grace which reflects the divine model.

What then are the repercussions for our understanding of forgiveness for social reconciliation? I have concluded via the Pauline analysis that social reconciliation is an imperfect analogical reflection of the divine wisdom. Therefore, similarly to justice, human forgiveness will be an imperfect reflection of its divine counterpart. However, even the divine model of forgiveness which we seek to mirror, ‘on earth as it is in heaven’, is not a ‘universalist’ unconditional offer of forgiveness. In the spirit of Christian reconciliation we need to take note of this primary offer of forgiveness towards one another within any model of social reconciliation – an offer, however, that is for the most part conditional. I suggest that this process of ‘conditional forgiveness’ should be that which is done in partnership with the Spirit, an activity which precludes any sense of vengeance or revenge, but which

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419 Until recently, hebdome kontakis was thought to be 70 x 7; however, it was used in the Septuagint to translate the Hebrew 77 in Genesis 4: 24. I am grateful to Graeme Carle for suggesting this perspective.

will by implication carry the *imprimatur* of the crucified Christ. I shall return to this aspect of the application of forgiveness as an ethical component within the strategy section.

### History, Truth and Repentance

The final reconciliation components in my non-exclusive list are truth and repentance. In Donald Shriver Jr.’s opinion, “[O]nly remembering history morally will protect the future against the repetition of the human atrocities of the past”. However, in an era influenced by postmodern thought, theoretical concepts such as truth and morality have become notoriously difficult to defend and define. Nevertheless, while theoreticians might be weighed down by such epistemological considerations, practitioners often seem less encumbered. For example, Jesus’ statement in the Johannine gospel, “[T]hen you will know the truth and the truth will set you free” (Jn 8:32), became a familiar refrain of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission hearings in South Africa. The goal of ‘freedom’ or ‘liberation’ for the reconciled victim was seen as a direct result of the presence of ‘truth’ in its various guises. This perspective has led some theologians to argue that “reconciliation has to be based upon truth-telling”, an assertion that the way truth is presented is part of the reconciling process. According to Murray Rae:

> It was one of the premises of South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission, founded upon Christian convictions, that in order for the healing of past wounds to take place and in order that a new future of reconciliation be built, **opportunity must be given for the truth to be told**. [emphasis mine]

Truth, as a component of social reconciliation, when viewed in this way, has two distinct constituents: ‘truth-recovery’, an analysis of the past, and ‘truth-telling’, the public confession of that recovery by the perpetrator. Truth-recovery is not only an ‘objective’ inquiry into the past, but I also characterize it as a form of ‘listening’ to the voice of the victim or Other. This listening may involve a ‘face to face’ hearing of their complaint and

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421 Shriver Jr., *An Ethic for Enemies*, p.70.
424 Rae, “A Balm for Our Wounds”. 
equally it may necessitate the analysis of the past by skilled historians, especially in the case of long running historical and political disputes. Both methods equate to a form of ‘listening’ and when accepted or ‘agreed’ to by the offender, may also demonstrate an attitude of repentance.

However, within some political contexts, truth-telling and truth-recovery has been controversial, especially in South Africa, Guatemala, and Rwanda, because of the trauma that victims experience while ‘revisiting’ a violent past or confronting the perpetrators of this violence. This again supports the idea that the reconciliation process is not merely the outworking of a formulaic dogma, but, to reiterate what I suggested above with regard to justice and forgiveness, requires a considered strategy that reflects the local context.

The other major difficulty in reconciliation truth-recovery efforts lies in the difficulty of accurately ‘recreating’ the past. This process presents serious historiographical challenges, challenges that have been acknowledged in this country’s attempts to deal with its colonial past. An example of this is found in the creation of the Waitangi Tribunal as a ‘truth-telling’ vehicle – a New Zealand parallel of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission – which was established by the 1975 New Zealand Labour Government to investigate breaches of the Treaty of Waitangi. According to the Government website, it “recognized that reconciliation of the Crown and Māori was needed to restore good relationships. In 1975, it established the Waitangi Tribunal – a permanent commission of inquiry – to start working through Māori concerns”.

Further, it maintained that:

[t]he settlement of historical claims is not to pay off for the past, even were that possible, but to take those steps necessary to remove outstanding prejudice and prevent similar prejudice from arising; for the only practical settlement between peoples is one that achieves a reconciliation in fact.

In Rae’s view, the Tribunal was established “to hear Māori grievances and to recommend to government a strategy for reparations” and:

Beyond the possibility of reparation, a further benefit of the Tribunal is that it provides a means for the truth of the past to be told....The Waitangi Tribunal

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427 Rae, “A Balm for our Wounds”.

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provides a formal, judicial means for this process that is profoundly important for those involved, but there is more to be done beyond the Tribunal to help white New Zealanders in particular hear the stories of oppression and injustice and face up to the truth that they are beneficiaries of a colonial history for which Māori have paid a heavy price.\textsuperscript{428}

However, the Waitangi Tribunal’s role as a truth-recovery mechanism has been questioned by historians critical of the agency’s interpretation of the past. For example, a senior New Zealand historian, Bill Oliver, criticized the Tribunal’s conclusions as creating a “retrospective utopia”.\textsuperscript{429} Sometimes even the Tribunal itself has been divided on its reading of past events which has led to members disputing the majority conclusions.\textsuperscript{430} The example of the Waitangi Tribunal’s efforts in truth-recovery serves to highlight the difficulty of discovering, to use the Rankean term, “what really happened”. Historian David Lowenthall’s adage that the “past is a foreign country” reinforces our understanding that interpreting history to discover truth is not only a fraught exercise, but also one that complicates the entire social reconciliation venture. Nevertheless, truth-telling about the past, as fraught as it is, remains a crucial component to the reconciliation process. By definition, reconciliation as restoration involves a referral to past realities. Perhaps the way lies somewhere between the Rankean modernistic boast and a postmodern scepticism in the form of ‘humble realism’, which takes into account both the sanctity and the challenges of the task. Volf, I suggest, demonstrates some of the humble realism that is required in the following statement:

\begin{quote}
The first thing we need to remember as we seek to learn anything from Jesus Christ is that we are not Jesus Christ. Applied to the question of truth this means that unlike Jesus Christ, we are not the truth, and we are not self-effacing witnesses to the truth....Our commitment to Jesus Christ who is the truth does not therefore translate into the claim that we possess the absolute truth. If we know the truth, we know it in our human and corrupted way; as the Apostle Paul puts it, we ‘know in part’, we see, ‘in a mirror, dimly (1 Corinthians 13:12f). There is an irremovable opaqueness to our knowledge of the things divine. Equally, there is an irremovable opaqueness to our knowledge of things human.\textsuperscript{431}
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{428} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{431} Volf, \textit{Exclusion and Embrace}, p.271.
Finally, in this section on ethics, I shall return to the role of repentance within a social reconciliation model. Drawing on our earlier understanding of repentance, we can view it as a ‘changed mind-set’ which implies different ways of living, based upon a reconfigured ‘conviction’ of reality. Repentance, then, is not a single action, but describes the processing of ‘turning’. Within a reconciliation conversation or dialogue, it involves a willingness to engage with the offended party, which can lead to a response that was appropriate to that relational encounter.

Within a Christian context, this changed mind-set would ordinarily involve a Godward confession of sin. This equates to a form of apology, as epitomized especially in some penitential Psalms432, which acknowledges that all ‘offences’ are sins against God in the first instance. However, to advance the cause of reconciliation in social or political settings, a personal response to an offended party would normally be in evidence, as proposed by the apostle James (Jas 5:16). In de Gruchy’s view, “both words and deeds are necessary if we are to rescue reconciliation from banality and recover its costly connection with telling the truth and social justice”.433

The deeds that de Gruchy refers to may involve some kind of restitution, as in the gospel example of the repentant Zacchaeus (Lk 19:2), or as variations of the restitution laws in Old Testament Israel (Ex 22; Lev 5). Restitution as a constituent of repentance may to some extent be dependent upon the perpetrator and the victim arriving at some agreement about the past and the impact that this has on the present. This method is one that the New Zealand Government has adopted with many Māori iwi [tribes] via the mediatorial role of the Waitangi Tribunal. In this way, the final shape of repentance is not a formulaic or predetermined condition, but requires an attitude that reflects a Christ-like willingness to be humbled. Of course, restitution is nearly always symbolic, in the sense that in most cases, offences can never be undone or equalled by compensation.

One final comment needs to be made with regard to repentance and forgiveness and historical grievances. I refer to the problematic separation of time and the issue of

432 Cf: Ps 6; Ps 32; Ps 38; Ps 51; Ps 102; Ps 130: Ps 143.
433 de Gruchy, Reconciliation, p.22.
responsibility. For example, in situations where we are talking about political offences perpetrated by previous generations and by governments or military institutions, who is accountable and for how long? I propose that accountability does not necessarily rest on direct involvement. In contrast to Western concepts of autonomous individualism, which I propose are demonstrated in the positions of our Pākehā representatives, King, Brash and Mallard, the Bible speaks of an intergenerational interconnectedness of responsibility (and rights), as in the sin of Adam and, conversely, the ‘representative’ atoning work of Christ. Biblical examples abound of these ‘intergenerational confessions’; the examples include: Daniel (9: 4, 5, 19), Nehemiah (1:6, 7), and Ezra (9:6, 7) as well as the narrative in 2 Samuel 21. I have already referred to the ‘Gibeon deception’ in the previous chapter, but a reiteration is worthwhile here, particularly because of the parallels with the New Zealand context. The 2 Samuel narrative describes the judgement of God upon Israel, because King Saul, and by extension Israel, broke the treaty made 400 years earlier with the Gibeonites under Joshua (Josh 9:16). Israel suffered a three-year famine in the reign of David, Saul’s successor. As a result, David consulted God about the famine and the divine response came: “It is because of Saul and his blood-stained house; it is because he put the Gibeonites to death” (2 Sam 21:1). Thus, the whole nation of Israel and its leaders were held accountable for past actions, in this case even to a treaty that was agreed to in ‘dubious’ circumstances.

How long ‘accountability’ lasts, I suggest, rests in the domain of God and with the offended. It seems situations like these depend upon “God speaking” but, from a purely human perspective, it may be related to corporate memory, which is determined by the length of time the effects of an offence impacts upon the memory or circumstances of a particular people. For example, in the case of ethnic cleansing or genocide, the impact certainly extends beyond a single generation, as indeed does the economic and identity impact of colonialism. Suffice to say here, that the privileges and also the responsibilities of identity are seen as intergenerational, hence the biblical judgement being extended “to the third and fourth generation” (Ex 34:7). A different but related perspective is that concerning the land. If land can be an inheritance, surely the unjust alienation of land, with its inherent consequences, needs to be considered an intergenerational legacy or responsibility. In the
words of the Northern Ireland churchman David Stevens, “[T]here is solidarity in sin which involves the living and the dead”. 434 Alasdair MacIntyre proposes a parallel logic:

I inherit from the past of my family, my city, my tribe, my nation, a variety of debts, inheritances, rightful expectations, and obligations. I am born with a past; and to try to cut myself off from the past is to deform my present relationships. The possession of an historical identity and the possession of a social identity coincide.435

Similarly, the German theologian and political activist, Dietrich Bonhoeffer, speaking about his country’s moral responsibilities after World War I, claimed:

There is not only the culpability of individual Germans and individual Christians, but also the culpability of Germany and the Church. It is not enough for individuals to repent and be justified; Germany and the Church must likewise repent and be justified.436

On the basis of this rationale, Bonhoeffer later ‘identified’ with the sins of the Church in Germany over the rise of Nazism in the 1930s, despite his own personal innocence. 437

Perhaps a local story will also contribute to our understanding of this complex issue. In September 2006, the Anglican representatives of the Waiapu Diocese of New Zealand were moved to apologize to local Māori for encouraging the Government to suppress the Tuhoe prophet Rua Kenana almost 100 years ago. The then Bishop of Waiapu John Bluck acknowledged that the:

Church’s stance contributed to an environment, that in 1915 saw Rua Kenana arrested at Maungapohatu…and face one of the longest trials in New Zealand history….On Sunday, the annual synod of the Diocese of Waiapu in Napier passed a motion apologising for the 1907 decision.438

The Anglican Church here, displayed a biblically-inspired solidarity with their Church predecessors, and contrary to the prevailing Pākehā ethos, felt that the 100 years distance from the event did not cancel the offence. Here ‘time’ had not healed. As a follow-up to this motion, the leaders made a pilgrimage to various significant sites in the area, including Rua’s village of Maungapohatu to carry the apology in person. Reports suggest that the pilgrimage

437 Ibid, p.110.
was well received: one *kuia* [female elder] said at the end of a journey, “The land remembers”; and at Maungapohatu another *kuia* remarked, “The Mountain forgives”. The issues of ‘who’ and ‘how long’ remain difficult questions to respond to with absolute certainty, but the reconciliatory ‘success’ of the Anglican ‘truth-telling/confession’ as indicated by the graceful Tuhoe ‘forgiveness’ suggest an approach that moves the discussion beyond a ‘rigid’ theoretical discourse.

‘Component’ Conclusion

In the previous chapter I characterized reconciliation as a manifestation of the wisdom of God, a wisdom that is formed by love for the world. Any discussion on the ethical dimensions of social reconciliation would be incomplete without an acknowledgement that this metaphor is primarily a description of love in action. This is a love that includes justice, forgiveness and truth. To the Psalmist there was no internal contradiction for as he wrote in Psalm 85:10: “Love and faithfulness meet together; righteousness [justice] and peace kiss each other”. These characteristics are synergistically expressed in the life and death of Jesus the Reconciler. Volf eloquently expresses the essential thought within the reconciliatory ethos, “the will to give ourselves to others and ‘welcome’ them, to readjust our identities to make space for them, is prior to any judgement about others, except that of identifying them in their humanity”.

Further, to adapt a Shakespearean metaphor, this world as we know it is not the final “stage”. As I have noted, the strategy of divine reconciliation will ultimately be fulfilled at the *eschaton*. There are, therefore, at least two things that may be said here. Firstly, if Christianity has anything to offer to the public discourse, the projection of a future hope is certainly at the forefront. The ultimate promise of *shalom* as the fruit of reconciliation will only be fully realized in the next age; the surety of this hope lies in the reality of the resurrection of the Reconciler. Secondly, humans, as de Gruchy reminds us, are not divine; despite our ‘reflection’ of God’s image, and despite our participation in *missio Dei* – we are not God.

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439 Reverend Brian Hamilton, an eye witness at the event, personal communication, 20 October, 2006.

The above suggests the need for what de Gruchy terms a “principled compromise” via the pneumatological participation. It is this “compromise” that I shall cover in the next section in which I adapt the American theologian Robert Schreiter’s idea that “reconciliation is more a spirituality than a strategy”. However, I shall signal that argument now as a means of rounding out this section on ethics.

If we acknowledge, reconciliation as presented by Paul is both ontological and ethical, then I propose that the application of these may be contextually variable – a context which extends to the offended peoples’ needs. Crucially, this context and those needs are understood by the Spirit as the Counsellor and the Comforter. He, in turn, is able to interpret to both parties a unique contextual wisdom, which will not contradict the biblical narrative. It is this wisdom that will yield for each local context a ‘reconciling spiritual strategy’. It is to this aspect, the final part of my theoretical reconstruction of reconciliation, that I shall now turn.

**Strategy as ‘Spirituality’**

In this section, I shall concentrate on reconciliatory praxis as strategy. In essence, I am dealing with the ‘how’ of my ontological-ethico model, and methodologically it operates as a bridge between my theoretical reconstruction of the doctrine of reconciliation and the specific reconciliatory ideas regarding Pākehā identity and belonging.

Robert Schreiter, who has made a significant contribution to the church’s understanding of social reconciliation, posits that for Christians especially, reconciliation begins with a divine impetus. It is an impetus, according to Swöbel, that results in reconciliation being a “gift of the Holy Spirit”. Constantineau, pointing to the central role of the Spirit in Paul’s reconciliation theology, says:

> Another important element of Isaiah’s vision of Israel’s eschatological restoration is the significant role that the Spirit of Yahweh plays in the restoration of Israel and of the entire world. This is illustrated in such texts as Isa.11:2; 32:15; 42:1; 59:21 and 61:1….The work of the Holy Spirit explicated in Romans 5 and 8 may be, again,

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influenced by the Isaianic tradition of the significant role of the Spirit in the eschatological restoration/blessing of God’s people. “Peace” is God’s gift and the kingdom of God is “righteousness and peace and joy in the Holy Spirit” (Rom. 14:7).  

Here, the Spirit is seen as the ‘Restorer’ and the one who ‘establishes’ a state or states of ‘peace’ which is the ultimate telos of reconciliation. ‘Peace’ and ‘restoration’ are all aspects of reconciliation, and, as Constantineau and Swöbel have posited, in Paul’s view are manifestation of the Spirit’s grace. Schreiter, connecting the pneumatalogical dimension with the human sphere, states:

> Discovering that moment of intersection of the divine and the human leads to...a Christian understanding of reconciliation, [that] namely, reconciliation is more a spirituality than a strategy. If reconciliation is principally God’s work, then we are but ‘ambassadors for Christ’ (2 Cor 5:20).  

Further he outlines:

> It is in God working through us that reconciliation is to be found. Reconciliation means in the first instance then, the cultivation of a relationship with God through which reconciliation can happen. That relationship expressed itself in spiritual practices that create space for truth, for justice, for healing, and for new possibilities....Reconciliation as spirituality is absolutely essential.  

Schreiter’s emphasis upon spirituality is not a rejection per se of ‘human strategy’, for as he states, “Reconciliation is also, about strategies.” He suggests that there needs to be a balance between the two approaches, because, “a spirituality that does not lead to strategies does not fulfil its goals”. His reconciliation spirituality includes meditation upon the biblical narrative as a means of gaining insight into the divine wisdom.

While Schreiter’s idea is helpful in that it raises the pneumatic dimensions of social reconciliation, it also runs the risk of perpetuating an unhelpful dualism which categorizes some actions as ‘spiritual’ and by implication others as ‘non-spiritual’. I propose that involvement in social reconciliation is a ‘spiritual activity’, a term which suggests that there is no clear disjunction between different types of activities, such as prayer, meditation and research and when necessary political protest. This is more than a semantic differentiation.

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444 Constantineau, Reconciliation, p.85.
445 Schreiter, The Ministry of Reconciliation, p.16.
446 Ibid.
447 Ibid.
448 Ibid., p.17.
Humans involved in *missio Dei* are by definition involved in activities that are bi-lateral—an interaction with the person of God and the particular missional focus. Mission, including mission of reconciliation, is not an individualistic autonomous human activity, but one that ‘entwines’ the Spirit of God with humanity and the entire sphere of creation. The important task of discerning a strategy for a particular social reconciliatory issue is ‘spiritual’ in that it necessarily engages humanity in interaction with God through prayer, as well as in a reliance upon the Spirit to fulfil the eschatological promise of God’s reconciliatory work in Christ. I offer that, in some cases, this ‘discernment’ might be an explicitly understood ‘prophetic cooperation’ and at other times mere human ‘coincidence’, whereby humans “stumble into”, as a result of their *imago Dei*, the divinely inspired reconciliatory strategy.

Volf, referring to the issue of Spirit/human interaction within the reconciling process describes it in the following way:

I have referred to the Spirit’s re-creative agency in enabling this Christological reconfiguration. For men and women to be thus ‘regrammared’ in relation to one another means allowing the ‘inscriptions of hatred’ to be erased, letting the Spirit reconfigure the partial and corrupt worldviews that shape our perceptions, speech, actions and emotions, in the knowledge that reconciliation with the other will succeed only if the self, guided by the narrative of the triune God, is ready to receive the other into itself and undertake a readjustment of its identity in light of the other’s alterity.  

Volf here describes reconciliation as a willingness to allow the Holy Spirit to do a work of personal ‘reconfiguration’ which will be consistent with the “narrative of the triune God”. Perhaps it is because of the Spirit’s erratic ‘appearance’ in Christian theology as a whole, or perhaps because of the inherent enigmatic characteristics of the Spirit himself, that the role of the Spirit within reconciliation has been relatively overlooked. Jesus even acknowledges something of this enigmatic quality when likening the Paraclete’s activity to the wind. Referring to the Spirit he says, “The wind blows wherever it pleases. You hear its sound, but you cannot tell where it comes from or where it is going” (Jn 3:8). Therefore, in order to aid our understanding of the process of reconciliation, and drawing upon Schreiter’s idea of strategy as spirituality, I shall posit an analogy and compare the human ministry or service of reconciliation to the art of weaving, specifically flax weaving, an esteemed craft amongst Māori in New Zealand. This craft is called, *mahi raranga*.

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Social Reconciliation as ‘Weaving’ or Mahi Raranga.  

This idea of the praxis of social reconciliation as analogous to the art of weaving was inspired by a real life example, and is represented by the photographs below. In order to explicate further I shall recount the story.

![Fig. 2: Māori Flax Weaving or Mahi Raranga](image)

In 2007, I was involved in a meeting at Parikaha Pa [Māori village] discussing a particular national reconciliation project. The group consisted of two Pākehā and five Māori kaumatua and kuia [male and female elders]. One kuia was weaving a kete [basket] during the meeting, and she was having difficulty fitting some of the strands into place. Simultaneously, in our reconciliation discussion, we were struggling over a particular terminology to describe an event we were planning. The discussion was more than a semantic one, because the terms being proposed represented particular perspectives regarding past offences perpetrated by the Crown. After much discussion, a term was agreed upon, one which was able to carry the reality of the pain that was still being felt because of injustice, but which was also able to indicate the peoples’ desire for reconciliation. Significantly, at that precise time, the kuia had a ‘breakthrough’ with her weaving. Almost at the instance of our ‘reconciliation breakthrough’ she was able to make a particular flax frond fit into her overall kete design. The symbolism of the weaving

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450 I am grateful to my supervisor Neil Darragh for the idea of reconciliation as being like a type of generic weaving.
451 Parihaka Pa, Taranaki, New Zealand.
breakthrough was immediately understood and commented upon by the other Māori in the group. In the instance of the kete weaving, the kuia’s struggle with where to place the particular flax fronds symbolized our own reconciliatory struggle. While on one level the kuia’s struggle was a ‘technical challenge’, symbolically, this frond represented the place of ‘truth-telling’ in our overall reconciliation strategy. The frond placed wrongly would result in a misshapen kete. The lack of truth-telling within our reconciliation event would represent a ‘misshapen’ or ‘incomplete’ reconciliation.

In the mahi raranga of my example, the kuia would never claim to be acting ‘alone’, but guided by the ‘voices’ of her tipuna [ancestors] and the presence of the Atua [God], she was utilizing the materials of her craft and, following this ‘pattern’ and narrative, she was able to finally produce a work of art. As a leading Māori weaving exponent, Puketapu-Hetet has said:

Maori weaving is full of symbolism and hidden meanings, embodied with the spiritual values and beliefs of the Maori people. Weaving is more than just a product of manual skills. From the simple rourou [food basket] to the prestigious kahu kiwi [kiwi feather cloak], weaving is endowed with the very essence of the spiritual values of Maori people. The ancient Polynesian belief is that the artist is a vehicle through whom the gods create.

This comment by Puketapu-Hetet that “the artist is a vehicle” suggests that mahi raranga is more a ‘spiritual art’ than a technologically derived science. I offer that the same is true for the ‘art’ of social reconciliation.

Before concluding this section, I shall return again to Paul and explore his ‘cooperative’ strategy – a spiritual strategy that I suggest reflects an approach akin to the art of weaving.

Paul’s S/spiritual Strategy

That Paul understood missional strategy as a bi-lateral spiritual activity is clear from the many statements he made regarding his relational approach to God. For example, in his address to the church in Corinth he warns them that mission is not merely a human activity, rather, to paraphrase 1 Corinthians 3:9, the Corinthians need to take care how they “do

452 The kuia of this example acknowledged this help in a prayer or karakia by giving thanks to God for enabling her to complete the process.
mission”, because, “we are God’s fellow workers”. For Paul, part of the ‘fellowship of mission’ was the activity of prayer. This ‘link’ to the Spirit was an activity which permeated not only his doctrinal formulations, but also his missional lifestyle, and one that he expected all to follow. For example, to the church in Thessalonica he wrote, “Pray without ceasing” (1 Thess 5:17). However, Pope Benedict XVI points out that even prayer is a “co-labouring activity”. The Pontiff offers:

Paul teaches us another important thing: he says that there is no true prayer without the presence of the Spirit within us. He [Paul] wrote: ‘The Spirit helps us in our weakness; for we do not know how to pray as we ought, but the Spirit himself intercedes for us with sighs too deep for words. And he who searches the hearts of men knows what is the mind of the Spirit, because the Spirit intercedes for the saints according to the will of God’ (Rom 8:26-27).

While much has been written generally about Paul and the Spirit and prayer, within the field of social reconciliation it remains a neglected topic. I have pointed above to the contribution that various theologians have made by identifying the role of the Spirit within the God in Christ model. However, none specifically point to prayer as a significant component within a social reconciliation paradigm. One exception to this is Desmond Tutu, a reconciliation practitioner, who acknowledges his dependence upon God for his reconciling practice.

Tutu’s ‘spiritual orientation’ operated as a *de facto* hermeneutical lens in the formation of his reconciling model – a perspective which was particularly evident in his role as Chair of the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission. Of particular interest to us is the relationship between prayer and his ‘imagination’. In a position of contemplation with God, and facing the social and political challenges of South Africa, Tutu fused his Anglican and African worldviews and “received” what he termed God’s reconciling “dream” for creation. For Tutu, then, prayer became both a unifying and critiquing location for his contextual public theology. Thus, while personally spiritual in the traditional pietistic sense, Tutu’s contemplative activities were not motivated for personal growth only, but his source of inspiration to serve the wider community. According to Tutu, “[W]e can hear God’s voice

most clearly when we are quiet, uncluttered and undistracted, when we are still”. \(^{456}\) It is from this ‘location’ that he formed his picture of what “God’s dream is for the world” \(^ {457}\).

Tutu proposed:

Dear Child of God, before we can become God’s partners, we must know what God wants for us. “I have a dream”, God says. “Please help Me to realize it”. It is a dream of a world whose ugliness and squalor and poverty, its war and hostility, its greed and harsh competitiveness, its alienation and disharmony are changed into their glorious counterparts, when there will be more laughter, joy, and peace, where there will be justice and goodness and compassion and love and sharing. I have a dream that swords will be beaten into ploughshares and spears into pruning hooks. \(^ {458}\)

With reference to his spirituality, Tutu stated:

Soon after church and business leaders helped to broker a National Peace Accord in South Africa in 1991, I talked to my fellow bishops about the need for contemplation as well as activism during the transition to democracy. I talked about the importance of the hidden, the inner life, of pouring oil and balm on wounds, of nurturing our people for the tasks of transformation. This was not pietistic. I knew it was important to cultivate an authentic spirituality of transformation in that transition period of much flux…This authentic spirituality of transformation is the basis for any true and lasting transfiguration of our world. *Discovering stillness, hearing God’s voice*, is not, as I have said, a luxury of a few contemplatives. *It is the basis for real peace and justice.* \(^ {459}\) [emphasis mine]

In other words, the activity of communion with God, during which time a person “hears God” and thus hears “God’s dream” for the world, lays the foundation for the consequential activity. Prayer or communion was the inter-dependent attitude with which Paul and Tutu “faced” the world and all its issues, including its need for reconciliation.

**Spiritual Strategy as ‘Weaving’**

How does the above relate to our *mahi raranga* analogy? As in weaving, prayer is the first ‘reconciling’ activity and remains a continuous one throughout the task. This communion is an essential part of the complex weaving or S/spiritualizing which is the integration of all the reconciliatory constituent parts towards the ultimate goal of restored relationships.

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\(^{457}\) Ibid.


If what I have concluded about prayer and the role of the Spirit from the theology of Paul and the practice of Tutu is correct, what happens next? While it is clear that there exists, as we have seen from the previous chapter, clear characteristics within the Christian paradigm of reconciliation, I offer that this is not a “one size fits all” dogma. For, as we have seen, the Pauline theoretical and practical model was shaped by context. Even the presentation of Paul’s ideas was shaped by context. His ideas were much more than an exercise in dogmatic or systematic theology: they were a response to ‘what was happening’. Context, then, along with communion, is paramount within Paul’s articulation of reconciliation. It was context, in the form of what he was experiencing, who he was relating to and what was happening around him, that gave shape to what he did and how he expressed himself. For while his fundamental ideas were predicated upon a conviction of a transcendental divine pre-eminence in the ordering of reality, and as Volf explicates it, “guided by the narrative of the triune God” handed down by his Hebrew predecessors, Paul understood his role as a Spirit-led and inspired interlocutor of the divine will within a local context. This is a will that waits to be ‘translated’ from the realm of transcendence to that of immanence. What has God ‘said’, or is ‘saying’, about the reconciliatory needs of a specific people, time and place? In other words, what and how do the elements or components that reflect the divine wisdom need to be addressed? How and when do the elements such as truth-telling, forgiveness, research, or unique rhetorical devices take their place? A reiteration of some of the reconciliatory issues of Paul’s time and the way he dealt with them will help clarify these questions.

As we have seen, Paul encountered many reconciliatory challenges. These included the enmity between Jews and Gentiles, the strain within his own relationship with the church, the issue of divorce for Christians and internal divisions within the churches. These challenges represent his context. Paul’s response to these needs was an eclectic mix of theoretical theologizing and pragmatic advice from a foundation of prayer. While he presented his understanding of God’s reconciling wisdom for the cosmos, which in itself might be represented as a divine ‘contextual response’, the different reconciliatory needs he confronted required a pragmatic nuancing of this divine model. Absent, then, is a formulaic approach; instead, as we have seen, Paul “weaves” into the “problem” all that he
is and all that he knows of God. In some circumstances he appealed to ontology, because that solution was the most appropriate; in others, he exhorted his hearers towards a cruciform ethical behaviour, which included love, forbearance, or mercy. Significantly, these exhortations were directed to people who were already in what we might term covenantally structured ontological relationships, such as husbands and wives, citizens of Israel, or members of the church. Ultimately, however, this reconciliatory weaving reflects an interaction of human wisdom with the divine wisdom, a wisdom that we can see modelled by the God in Christ’s example.

Paul and Imagination

Before I conclude this chapter, I want to draw attention to one final aspect of Paul’s theological methodology – his use of the imagination. According to James Dunn, the apostle made great use of that faculty, specifically his rhetorical use of metaphor, in order to advance his various causes. Dunn says:

The very different metaphors Paul drew upon were presumably attempts to express as fully as possible a reality which defied simple or uniform or unifaceted description....The vitality of the experience [conversion] made new metaphors necessary if the experience was to be expressed in words (as adequately as possible) and to be communicated to others. In other words, Paul needed to create a linguistic expression not only to represent his experience, but also for the wider soteriological phenomenon that had been wrought in Christ. For example, in order to describe the restoration of relationship between God and the created order, as I have already outlined above, he “borrowed” the Greek metaphor of reconciliation. This metaphor, however, was more than a description of a doctrine – it became a contextual rhetorical device to connect with his mainly Greek audience, synonymous with the process and telos of restored relationship.

As well as using a contextual metaphor to describe the overarching concept of ‘restored relationship’ as reconciliation, Paul also utilized metaphors to describe some of the micro

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460 Cf. Matthew 5:24. Here Jesus instructs his fellow Jews: “If you are offering your gift at the altar and there you remember that your brother or sister has something against you, leave your gift at the altar. First go and be reconciled [dialogêthi] to that person; then come and offer your gift.”

aspects of reconciliation. For example, in Romans 11 he extended the Jewish metaphor (cf. Jer 11:16) of the olive tree by introducing the horticultural practice of ‘grafting’ in order to demonstrate the process of ‘reconciliation’ or ‘unity’ between Jews and Gentiles as a result of the reconciling work of Christ. Paul ‘imagined’ this metaphor, not only to aid his theoretical construction of soteriological reconciliation, but also to address the issue of Jewish-Gentile relations in 1st century Rome. Paul described, in a somewhat counterintuitive process, the grafting of a ‘wild shoot’ onto an existent fruiting variety – a grafting technique that is opposite to that normally employed by horticulturalists, who graft ‘non-wild’ fruiting varieties on to a basic rootstock. This is reminiscent of the counterintuitive example of God in Christ as the offended party ‘initiating’ reconciliation to the offending party. However, Paul’s imaginative rhetoric was not restricted to his Jewish roots, for as we have seen above, he also drew upon the Greek and Roman cultures to explicate and communicate soteriological and sociological ethical ideas.

The key point for our purposes, is to acknowledge the role of the imaginative creative process utilized within Paul’s overall reconciliatory strategy, a strategy that further points to the role of humanity as ‘sub-agent’ within the reconciliation component of missio Dei. I suggest that the use of the imagination in this way, through the symbolic language of metaphor, is reminiscent of Walter Brueggemann’s description of a “prophetic imagination”. He says:

What a commission it is to express a future that none think imaginable! Of course this cannot be done by inventing new symbols, for that is wishful thinking. Rather, it means to move back into the deepest memories of this community and activate those very symbols that have always been the basis for contradicting the regnant consciousness. Therefore the symbols of hope cannot be general and universal but must be those that have been known concretely in this particular history.

What Brueggemann is describing is the symbolic use of language in order to ‘reimagine’ an outcome. Paul’s use of metaphorical language, or, as Brueggemann describes it, symbols that ‘activate the memory’, is widespread and well appreciated by scholars. His use of such terms as the ‘temple’ and ‘marriage’ to imagine, and ‘re-imagine’ the relationship between God and humanity are indeed part of the ‘deep memory’ of his Jewish community, particularly as was the above referred to example of the olive tree.

The use of the imagination as a reconciliatory strategy can also be seen in the work of Desmond Tutu. I explained above something of Tutu’s reliance upon prayer – a practice which I suggest yielded for him some of the metaphorical language that he was able to offer to the South African context. During the post-apartheid era of South Africa under the political leadership of Nelson Mandela, an expression arose – “the rainbow nation” – to describe the new political entity of the post-apartheid era. It is Tutu who is usually credited with this phrase, which has now become a popular metaphor to describe South Africa’s new political reality. As well, he coined the more explicitly theological term the “rainbow people of God”. The rainbow image reflects the Old Testament covenantal promise of God to Noah and carries in the first instance a message of hope, as it also does within Tutu’s Xhosa cosmology. An obvious secondary meaning of the rainbow metaphor in the South African context is its representation of the various cultural, ethnic and racial groups that make up the new political entity in that country. As Gary Baines states:

> The rainbow symbolizes a range of cultural groups represented by discrete colours and hues which blur into one another; none of which is completely distinct but each is essential to the composition of the entire spectrum. The rainbow is incomplete without each of the colours, but none of the colours or strands is dominant over the other. Thus the rainbow implies the co-existence of individual and collective identities; a representation of different cultures and of a shared South Africanness.

Tutu’s utilization of the rainbow metaphor carries within it the DNA of his theological reasoning on the one hand, and operates as a ‘summary’ of it on the other. His ‘identity’ metaphor of hope and inclusion to describe the new South African political unity is not casual in its use or genesis, but rather a deliberate imagery that draws upon his ‘multicultural’ heritage and reflects that heritage back into the new political environment. This reconciling rhetorical device provides for the South African ethnic mix of black, white and coloureds, a symbolic identity and ‘place of belonging’. I propose that this “rainbow nation” concept is a form of prophetic imagining and part of Tutu’s reconciling spiritual strategy, whereby Tutu reached into the history and vocabulary of his context to find a mutually understood metaphor that could be embraced by the various peoples who stood in need of

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464 See, Desmond Tutu, The Rainbow People of God.
465 Baines, The Rainbow Nation?
reconciliation. It is such imaginative strategies that would be useful in the search for reconciliatory ideas for the New Zealand context.

Summary

In this chapter, which has a more practical tenor than the previous one, I have continued to develop my concept of social reconciliation, which, as an ontological-ethico model, reflects God’s-wise contextual response to the reconciliatory needs of a fissured cosmos. Here, I have looked at some of the ethical characteristics and the strategy of social reconciliation. I have argued that the *missio Dei* involves a spiritual strategy, whereby humans are involved in a somewhat complex and ‘mysterious’ cooperative activity with the impetus of God, in the application of the divine wisdom into the social sphere. I have likened this undertaking to the art of Māori flax weaving and offered that the reconciliatory process, like that craft, benefits from its initiation and continuing relationship to prayer in order to find the appropriate reconciling approach for each context.

While the issue of ethics remains a disputed one, especially the temporal sequencing of particular elements such as justice and forgiveness, I have proposed that each reconciliatory context requires a different approach. It is here that the understanding of reconciliation as a S/spiritual strategy is important. For it is the Spirit, “who searches all things, even the deep things of God” (1 Cor 2:10b), who is able to reveal a divine reconciliatory wisdom for each context.

In the next chapter, my public theological ‘S/spiritual strategy’ will be to engage with the postcolonial reconciliatory ideas of Ani Mikaere, Avril Bell and Stephen Turner. I shall then ‘weave’ some of their ideas with my own ontological-ethico model and posit these in the penultimate chapter as a contribution to the national conversation around Pākehā identity and belonging.
Chapter Seven: Reconciliatory Ideas for Aotearoa New Zealand

In the thesis introduction, I stated that my foundational concern is the always complex and at times strained relationship between Māori and Pākehā New Zealanders, and in particular, the national conversation around the Pākehā quest for identity and belonging. The representative conversation partners have included an eclectic mix of Māori and Pākehā, ‘churchmen’, academics, writers and politicians. In this chapter, I shall continue to participate in the conversation by filtering the on-going debate through a Christian reconciliation lens – this is an outworking of the public theological reconciling strategy as outlined in the previous chapters. This participation in the *missio Dei* involves ‘weaving’ together the various strands of theory and context and the contributions of the other conversational partners, in order to further the New Zealand identity and belonging reconciliatory conversation.

As a part of this strategy and in the spirit of conversation, I shall engage specifically with the ‘reconciliation ideas’ of the three New Zealand scholars, Bell, Mikaere and Turner, with whom I have already interacted via their postcolonial analysis of the Pākehā quest. Their positions represent a stream within the national conversation and accordingly, I shall consider their responses to the Pākehā quest, in order to discern possible synergies between their perspectives and my own ontological-ethico model. While none of these three postcolonial scholars explicitly characterize their responses as ‘reconciliatory’, I have taken the liberty of labelling them as such, for each is committed to the restoration or at least the ‘regulation’ of the Māori-Pākehā relationship by a deconstruction of the vestiges of colonialism. However, before turning to their ideas, I shall preface them by reiterating the context of our discussion, which is the historical trajectory of the Māori-Pākehā relationship.

Māori-Pākehā Encounter

I have characterized this study as an involvement in a national conversation, and it is one that takes place within a long historical ‘dialogue’ that began between Māori and Pākehā in the 17th and 18th centuries, with the respective arrivals of Abel Tasman in the South Island
and James Cook near Gisborne in the North. History reveals that the early communications often resulted in misunderstandings and bloody conflict. These early interactions were soon followed by various encounters, between individuals and groups in a multiplicity of settings, both here and abroad. The ensuing relationship between Māori and Pākehā developed from those early encounters – these exchanges were characterized by the competing elements of self-interest, mutual respect, cooperation and conflict. To use an analogy, the relationship became a *de facto* arrangement, or a tumultuous “courtship” which showed signs of early dysfunction, and displayed polarities of dependency and abuse, as the two parties were forced to engage with each other in modernity’s changing world. If 1642 signalled the beginning of a “courtship”, which lead to the “engagement” between disparate groups of settlers and various Māori *whanau* [family] and *hapū* [sub-tribes], then to continue the analogy, it could be said that a “marriage proper” took place in 1840 at Waitangi. This “union” was officiated over by Lt. Governor Hobson, who on behalf of the British Crown entered into a bilateral agreement with 512 *rangatira* [chiefs] from various Māori *iwi* [tribes] – an arrangement that has variously been referred to as a treaty, a compact, a contract and a covenant. While the Treaty is technically a document that defines an arrangement between *rangatira* and the Crown, it is in essence a way of formalizing the previously *ad hoc* relationship between the two people groups, Māori and Pākeha. That the signatories were in reality representative of their respective peoples is clear, at least on the Pākehā side, from Hobson’s now famous declaration at the conclusion of the signing. He stated, “*He iwi tahi tātou*” or “*We are now one people*” – his statement a clear reflection that in his mind, the Treaty signing was more than a constitutional arrangement between ‘representative authorities’ but it signalled a ‘joining’ of the people ‘behind’ the representatives as well. It is arguable, that the intention within the Treaty included within its scope and ethos all the peoples in the land, both Māori and Pākehā.\(^{466}\)

Despite the assurances given by Hobson and the mediating missionaries at the signing, and clear statements in the Treaty itself that Māori land, language, culture and leadership would be protected and honoured, their experience since has been otherwise. To illustrate a ‘Māori perspective’ of this colonizing experience and particularly the failure to uphold the Treaty, I cited the ‘infamous’ sesquicentennial address by the Anglican Māori Bishop of

\(^{466}\) At this stage all settlers were termed Pākehā by Māori.
Aotearoa, the Rt. Reverend Whakahuihui Vercoe at Waitangi February 6th, 1990. In this address, as well as declaring that the Treaty, “stands firmly as the unity – the means by which we are one nation”, he also chronicled aspects of a post-1840 betrayal by Pākehā. His “cry” at Waitangi included a contextual reworking of Psalm 137 – a Hebrew song of exile, which lamented their condition of alienation in a foreign land. At the heart of Vercoe’s call, was an appeal to the Treaty partners to ameliorate the alienation Māori suffered in their own land through the loss of their identity as tangata whenua, and the associated losses of lands, culture and language. He invited the assembled to, “Let us sit and listen to one another” – an invitation into a reconciling conversation that in part has provided the impetus for the present thesis.

Contemporaneously to Vercoe’s prophetic appeal for Pākehā to honour the Treaty and consider the losses and indigenous ‘rights’ of Māori, another “voice” emerged in the land. I have chronicled that alongside Māori appeals for justice, perhaps somewhat ironically, the dominant demographic group, Pākehā, began to assert their “right” to belong here and create their own ‘indigenous identity’. Their reconfigured identity assertions, according to some scholars, were motivated at least in part, by “their own lack of ontological security”, as a result of the Māori cultural and political renaissance.467 I have termed these recent aspirations as the Pākehā quest for identity and belonging. However, based on the research of some postcolonial historians and cultural studies scholars, I have shown that some of these identity claims mirror the trajectory and strategy of settler colonialism and that particularly their claims of indigeneity prolong and repeat the colonizing practices of the past. Thus, the Pākehā quest, when pursued in this way, exacerbates the already unstable relationship with Māori. As I have indicated, the quest for identity and belonging itself is not being contested – what is being challenged here are the identity constructions that do not take into consideration their colonizing potential and the resultant impact that this has on Māori-Pākehā relations. The remaining task of this study then, is to provide some reconciling ideas that will not only further the national conversation, but will also satisfy the Pākehā identity quest and equally a postcolonial critique. It is to this task that I shall now turn.

467 Bell, “Authenticity and the project of settler identity in New Zealand”, p.122.
Postcolonial ‘Reconciliatory Ideas’

As we have seen, social identities, such as Pākehā, are not just “natural givens”, but are ‘mutually’ or ‘inter-subjectively constituted’ constructions that are formulated out of particular social and cultural narratives. In many cases, these amount to particular accounts of history and how the individual or group ‘fits’ within that historical reconstruction. As I have argued, it is the ‘disruption’ of previously accepted narratives in the post-1970s that have led mainly Pākehā to re-arrange their place in the story and led to the Pākehā quest. Avril Bell has termed this pursuit, as represented by King, Brash and Mallard, the “Pākehā ontological dilemma” and one that reveals “their own lack of ontological security”. Stephen Turner describes it as a quest that issues from their “melancholic condition” and a “pathological condition” that result in a form of “historical amnesia”. While Ani Mikaere says that, “[F]rom a Māori perspective, there is almost an element of desperation in this quest for indigeneity, calling to mind John Mulgan’s description of Pākehā as being a ‘queer, lost eccentric, pervading people looking for satisfaction’”. Following these “diagnoses”, the three postcolonial conversation partners have offed a range of solutions. Their proposals share some underlying methodological differences, but also some helpful similarities as they approach the issue from their various vantages.

Each representative solution proposes a form of ‘right remembering’, that ensures that the foundational narratives of Pākehā belonging reflect a postcolonial view of the present/past. Bell, in her search for relational modes that supersede colonial relations, eschews a focus on identity as an ontological category and moves away from epistemological relations generally. Rather, she offers a strategy that preferences ethics over ontology. However, both Mikaere and Turner continue to embrace identity as an ontological category – one that is mediated via the acceptance of a tikanga Māori identity paradigm. Despite these ‘category’ differences, the scholars find agreement in their adoption of an agonistic attitude.

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469 Bell, “Authenticity and the project of settler identity in New Zealand” p.122.
to the Pākehā quest for identity. In summary, Bell proposes a “politics of disappointment” that forgoes any sense of a “utopian vision of unity”; Mikaere counsels Pākehā not to “escape” from their “sense of dislocation as settlers” and to accept a status of “conditional belonging” as proposed within a tikanga Māori paradigm; and Stephen Turner believes Pākehā need to abandon their historiographical version of short history and accept a location of “purgatory” or “local limbo” within a long history perspective.

As I have indicated, each of the responses displays characteristics of a political theory called ‘agonism’ – a theory which emphasises the potentially positive aspects of political tension or conflict. Sometimes, the tradition is referred to as ‘agonistic pluralism’, referring to the theory’s proposal that groups need to co-exist with contrasting or even conflicting political goals. Specifically, Bell’s, Mikaere’s and Turner’s solutions combine around the idea that Pākehā should refrain from attempts at seeking to construct an identity that is ‘post’ colonial in either a temporal or political sense and accept the ‘coloniality’ of their belonging. This position includes accepting their status as ‘colonial settlers’ within ‘who they are’, or as part of their identity – a status or ethical approach that will mean that their relationship with Māori will be characterized by an on-going state of tension. The scholars argue that identity formations that are based upon assumptions of “moving on”, that is, leaving the past behind, are both unrealistic and deceptive. This applies especially to Pākehā indigenous identity claims and the various ‘unifying’ attempts that amalgamate all inhabitants of Aotearoa New Zealand under the inclusive labels of “just New Zealanders” or “kiwis”. They maintain that not only do these strategies ‘marginalize’ and ‘assimilate’ Māori again, but in their view, they equate to a ‘denial’ of who Pākehā ‘really are’, and as such will not satisfy their “existential deficit”. Further, they offer that Pākehā will not find their identity or sense of belonging by ‘forgetting the past’, which includes expunging their memory of their colonial identity, but by a ‘remembering’ that brings them into a complex and contested relationship with Māori. Their agonistic conclusions have been influential within the New

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472 “Agonism is a political theory that emphasizes the potentially positive aspects of certain forms of political conflict. It accepts a permanent place for such conflict, but seeks to show how we might accept and channel this positively. Agonists argue that the first truth of politics is that it is founded not on some set of just principles, but rather on endless struggle and power...[they] see the fundamental political project as the fostering of disagreement, debate and conflict among groups and within them.” Charles Mathewes, A Theology of Public Life, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007, p.266.
473 Turner, “The Indigenous Commons”.
Zealand postcolonial academic community and are summarized here by Victoria University media theorist, Jo Smith:

The properly post-settler project of affirming belonging must register the intra-national and agonistic differences that would underlie any claim to nationhood, and more generally, that of cultural identity. Such approaches would begin from the logic of colonial encounter as a mutually transformative engagement between settler and native where competing juridical, economic, esoteric and epistemological discourses produce a web of shared meanings and misrecognitions that unsettled each socio-cultural collectivity. Within these messy entanglements, particularly within the ambivalent force of settler law, one can find the ‘basis’ (ever so contingent and shifting) of a post-settler project.474 [italics original]

Having traversed the broad ‘reconciliatory’ approach of our representatives, I shall now outline them in more detail, and offer some critique of their individual positions as well as drawing upon some commonalities that will synergize with my own perspective and contribute to my final goal of contributing some reconciliatory ideas into the national conversation.

Bell’s Solutions

As I have indicated in Chapter Four, Avril Bell argues for an “orientation of disappointment” by Pākehā and a renunciation of what she describes as the “utopian hopes” implied within the Pākehā quest for identity and belonging. She also proposes an ethical approach towards Māori – an approach, which amounts to a way of living, that is, to supersede their previous objective for a unique ‘post’ colonial identity and place of belonging. She rejects an ontological identity approach, in favour of a Lévinasian influenced ethico-metaphysical model. In other words, instead of pursuing a strategy that seeks to find non-colonizing identities for Pākehā, she concentrates her approach on ‘ethical ways’ for them to belong. This is a strategy that preferences social agency over social arrangements. Her agonistic ethics argue that because of their colonial history, Pākehā, instead of seeking to give “flesh” to their own identity, need to accept that as settlers they are an “alienated and estranged” people, who will never get to know Māori, because the Other is always “unknowable”. This ‘permanent’ alienation then becomes the basis for Pākehā social and ethical engagement

with Māori. This approach, which directs Pākehā away from attempts at re-negotiating their identity, draws upon Lévinas’ biblically inspired ethic of love. Consequently, Bell posits that the Pākehā ethic needs to be predicated upon an attitude of concern for Māori as the Other, and for her, such concern includes their justice needs and the preservation of their indigenous identity as re-affirmed for them in the Treaty of Waitangi.

Her perspective is built upon a postmodern renunciation of “epistemological certainties” which holds that “knowledge is provisional”, including the “knowing” of the Other. 475 Māori, according to this view, can never be “known” by Pākehā. Her post-structural view of identity yields for Pākehā a scenario, whereby they are to live in a state of “limbo” – an undefined yet ethically-sound relationship with Māori. This means that they are without a clear identity as such, but are in an agonistic relationship of proximity with Māori, “that maintains, rather than assimilates, human multiplicity”. 476 In this way, there is a type of reconciliation, or restored relationship, albeit an “unsettled” one. Bell’s model, instead of seeking to ameliorate the Pākehā alienation via the creation of “new” identities, means that they need in one sense, to accept their identity as settlers and colonizers and all the associated existential challenges that this presents.

This movement beyond identity is to enter into a “journey of disappointment”, and one that is “without end”. In Bell’s view, the adoption of such a stance cuts across the desire, expressed particularly by Brash and Mallard, “to move on”. For Bell, in a sense there is “no moving on” for Pākehā, but simply an orientation of “being in [a] process without seeking to arrive”. 477 The adoption of ‘belonging as process’, as opposed to ‘belonging as identity’, would be outworked, for example, in the Pākehā response to the Treaty of Waitangi. Returning to our Pākehā representatives, they have in various ways expressed their desire for the Treaty settlement process to “finish” and for relations between Māori and Pākehā to be “settled once and for all”. There is implicit in some of these attitudes, the desire for the Treaty itself to be finished, or at least relegated to a symbolic historical status. However,

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476 Ibid., p.230.
477 Ibid., p. 227.
within Bell’s model, which advocates a form of ‘remembering’ over ‘forgetting’, such claims would be avoided. 478 Specifically on the issue of the Treaty she says:

Lévinas...[insists] on the undending nature of our obligation to the other....Such an obligation would not have us abandon the Treaty process, but would have us question the problematic sources for the desire for its final end. It would also result in greater importance being given to the process and to Māori-Pakeha relations generally, as ends in themselves, rather than the current tendency for Pakeha complaints of “Treaty fatigue” and expression of desires for it to be over. 479

Finally, Bell eschews ultimate political solutions and offers that society needs to give up agreement at the level of principle and seek more localized agreements over particular issues. Here, the different groups involved may come to agreement for completely different reasons, but still find agreement nonetheless, on the particular at hand – such ‘particulars’ would involve issues such as the Treaty. 480 Ultimately, Bell’s proposal is a form of ethical co-existence, which regards the Other as a neighbour and treats their ‘concerns’ as their own.

Response to Bell

Bell’s perspectives have much to offer to the Pākehā identity debate. These include her view that the relationship with Māori and the Treaty are not to be determined by chronological considerations. However, it is her emphasis upon an ethical preferencing of Māori by Pākehā over their own particular identity needs that resonates with a Christian view. In this ‘concern’ or ‘preferencing of the other’, there is some echo of the Christian vision of love and preference for one’s neighbour. This is possibly not surprising given the Biblical inspiration within Lévinas’ ethical vision.

In contrast to Bell however, within a Christian vision, the relationship with the Other, is not characterized by ‘unknowability’, or ‘distance’, but rather by an impetus towards intimacy and closeness. The ‘goal’ of the New Covenant is summarized by the writer to the Hebrews, who says, “No longer will a man teach his neighbour, or a man his brother, saying, ‘Know the Lord,’ because they will all know me, from the least of them to the greatest” (Heb 8:11). Even the Creator God, within his infinite ‘unknowability’ can be known. Arguably, within the

478 Ibid., p.229.
479 Ibid., p.228.
480 Ibid., p. 228.
Biblical canon, the emphasis is always upon the ‘knowability’ of others. In one sense this knowledge finds its apex in the sexual union between a man and woman – the sexual act is often referred to in the Hebrew text as an “act of knowing” the other. All this is to say, that a solution which rejects a relational approach with Māori, with an expectation of ‘knowing’, runs counter, not only to a Christian vision of interpersonal encounter, but also seems to ignore the “cry” from Whakahuihui Vercoe which introduced this study. To reiterate, Vercoe stated at the end of his lament, “Let us sit and listen to one another.” Presumably, Vercoe had in his mind the ability of others not only to “hear” him, but also to know his people in some kind of meaningful way.

However, in my view, the major shortcoming of Bell’s ethical approach is that the Pākehā quest for identity and belonging is, to use her own words, a result of the “Pakeha ontological dilemma”. In other words, it relates to the Pākehā ‘state of being’, or ‘who they are’. I believe the problem is an ontological one before it is an ethical one, and will consequently be better “solved”, via an ontological approach, that is, one that provides an identity for Pākehā, as opposed to an ‘ethical way’ – as important as this aspect is to the reconciliation equation. However, ultimately I suggest that Bell’s agonistic and ethical solution would further serve to exacerbate the Pākehā existential dilemma. An emphasis upon ethics without an accompanying structure offers no foundational security to the human need to belong. In Christian terms this is analogous to trying to “earn” favour or salvation with God. It is forever out of reach. Bell’s proposal opens the way for an endless striving by Pākehā in their relationship with Māori – a situation I suggest is made worse within her model by the fact that Māori can never be ‘known’. This form of agonism might only result in a Pākehā uncertainty and frustration that would be ultimately counterproductive to the Māori-Pākehā relationship.

Mikaere’s Solution
Mikaere’s solution to the Pākehā dilemma has parallels to Bell’s, but differs in that she pursues a social arrangement approach as prior, in contrast to the former’s ethically oriented social agency approach. This, in her view, meets the Māori as “first people”

requirement, and yet also satisfies the settler existential need. It is also agonistic in its approach, in that she argues for an acceptance by Pākehā of a “conditional belonging” as a colonial people – one that renounces identity attempts that assign the colonial relationship with Māori to the past. Specifically, Mikaere proposes that Pākehā, instead of seeking ‘identity satisfaction’, via their various strategies, need to accept a conditional belonging, as ‘manuhiri/visitors’ within the ‘host/guest’ paradigm drawn from a traditional tikanga Māori [Māori law, or that ‘which is right’] perspective. This negotiated status places Pākehā in a permanent relationship of dependency upon tangata whenua, and to Mikaere, this type of social arrangement serves as a means of mitigating the on-going Pākehā colonizing tendencies. She posits that their identity hope lies within a “trust” of Māori via the rejection of their own “epistemological control” and an embracing of the identity and ethical protocols offered within te ao Māori [Māori world]. An acceptance of tikanga would provide the appropriate place of belonging for Pākehā, and place them in right relationship to Māori. This would also have the effect of mitigating the settler propensity to “dictate terms” – something she argues is present within current Pākehā identity aspirations. Mikaere maintains that by releasing this epistemological control and taking a “leap of faith” and placing their “trust in Māori” that Pākehā will gain “the sense of belonging they so crave, the sense of identity that until now has proven so elusive”.

At its core tikanga, is about defining identities and the ordering of relationships – to God, to creation and within social settings. In the Māori world, identities are defined via these relationships. In Mikaere’s view, the tikanga model, as well as offering Pākehā a clear ontological identity as manuhiri, an identity which is derived from and negotiated with Māori as tangata whenua, leads into an ethical framework, or ‘way’ of belonging. Here, the indigenous principle of manaakitanga [hospitality] would operate as the controlling force in the dynamic interplay between host and guest. Within this model, Pākehā as settler/visitor would “receive hospitality” and remain permanently defined by Māori in their role as host. For Mikaere, this voluntary subjection to ‘indigenous definition’ would satisfy the Pākehā quest and simultaneously avoid the colonizing tendencies of other identity strategies. Mikaere implies that Pākehā acceptance of the ‘law’ within the tikanga model would serve,

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482 Mikaere, Colonising Myths, p.97.
483 Ibid.
not only as an acknowledgment of the *mana* [honour/authority] of Māori as the prior settlers in Aotearoa New Zealand, but would also be consistent with articles within *Te Tiriti o Waitangi*, especially Article Two which in the Māori language acknowledges *te Tino Rangatiratanga*.484

**Response to Mikaere’s Solutions**

Mikaere’s host/guest paradigm is helpful at many levels. Firstly, it takes away some of the uncertainty around the identity and belonging that lingers within Bell’s ethical model. In the way that Mikaere presents it, Pākehā have an identity status as “permanent guests” of their host, Māori. Her suggestions also have an ethical dimension, in that the host/guest framework as provided for within *tikanga* Māori carries a concomitant behavioural protocol. The appeal of this approach is that all cultures understand that there is an ‘appropriate’ way for a visitor to behave when in someone else’s home or territory – it is not for the visitor to dictate protocol when in that place. Also, Mikaere’s model provides Pākehā a location of belonging that replaces the “usurping” tendencies of autonomously constructed Pākehā identities. Pākehā, in this model, will continue to be “named” by Māori – this continues the “tradition” that began with the appellation of Pākehā; as well it reverses the colonial “naming” strategy that I referred to in an earlier chapter.

Despite these strengths however, even at a logical level the model has weaknesses. By embracing the agonistic-ontological category of “permanent visitor”, Pākehā will never ultimately “belong” here, and as all cultures would probably acknowledge, by staying too long a visitor can outlive his/her welcome – I say this despite the well-known extent of Māori hospitality. Further, within the *tikanga* example, Mikaere points out that although the host/guest relationship is a ‘dynamic’ one, and involves a ‘maintenance’ from both parties, her own reference to the custom within the land/marriage example demonstrates that the guest never achieves a “belonging” status via land ownership. It was for reasons such as these, that King rejected the term *tauiwi*, [foreigner] as a suitable appellation for Pākehā, especially because of the “outsider” connotations. Also, the hierarchical structuring of

484 Defined by Moana Jackson as: “total political authority” in Mikaere’s *Colonising Myths*, p.127.
host/visitor relations has the potential to reverse the ‘dominant’ role and bring Pākehā into a ‘position of subjugation’ to Māori. This would be an ironic reversal of colonizing roles.

A Christian anthropology holds that all societies have the potential for violence and domination and hence the need for appropriate social arrangements to mitigate this de-humanizing propensity. For the host/guest paradigm as enunciated by Mikaere to work, in my view there needs to be a protocol for the Pākehā as visitor/guest to move into some kind of co-equal, if different status to Māori. Otherwise, Pākehā will always be an interloper within the land of Aotearoa New Zealand.

Mikaere has offered *Te Tiriti* as an important constitutional factor in ordering Māori-Pākehā relations and as an affirmation of the ontological status of Māori as “first people”. However, perhaps because her emphasis has been on the role *Te Tiriti* plays in echoing the indigenous autonomy of Māori, she has neglected to extrapolate the potential that it has as an offer of hospitality to Pākehā – an arrangement that in my view, provides more potential than the host/guest paradigm. I propose that the protocol of the Treaty/Tiriti at Waitangi could be interpreted as Māori as the ‘host-people’, welcoming the Pākehā settler into Aotearoa New Zealand. However, rather than ‘welcoming’ them on a permanent basis as ‘guest’, they are welcoming them as ‘co-inhabitants’, with an interdependent status of identity and belonging – a status that has a similar, but different standing than *tangata whenua*.

To conclude this section on Mikaere’s tikanga reconciliatory idea, I should stress that the rejection of the host/guest paradigm is not a rejection of ideas drawn from the Māori world *per se*. On the contrary, I offer that it is quite possibly the Māori world that is able to offer the most meaningful, lasting and satisfying reconciled identities for Pākehā, even if it is not the host/guest model. Indeed, I suggest that the term Pākehā, that we are using in this study to designate the European settlers, is an example of a ‘reconciled’ identifier. It is one that has been ‘created’ and ‘offered’ by Māori, and is one that is now finding greater acceptance among European settlers. There are two other Māori world examples that are worth considering. The first is the idea of Pākehā as *teina* [younger sibling] to Māori, who would then be *tuakana* [older sibling]. This is a concept that King utilized, and although it has hierarchical connotations, is worthy of further consideration. Another idea is drawn
from Rae’s *powhiri* analogy. Within the protocol of *powhiri*, at the end of the welcome, *manuhiri* are then termed *tangata whenua*, for the length of their stay. Although this concept has difficulties because of its parallel to the Pākehā claims for indigeneity, there may be some helpful ideas or rituals within the Māori world that contribute to the process of Pākehā moving from guest to resident. Even a bi-cultural conversation around these possibilities would be useful; for ultimately, in terms of Pākehā identity and belonging, it is not so much the “labels” that are significant, but the narratives that support these labels, and the implications of these. In the light of Mikaere’s suggestions then, further engagement by Pākehā with Māori conceptual understandings of identity and belonging could help progress the conversation and possibly go some way to restoring a relationship of trust.

**Turner’s Solution**

Mikaere’s *tikanga* solution has influenced a range of Pākehā scholars, including our final postcolonial conversation partner, Stephen Turner. As I have indicated previously, Turner implies that the Pākehā identity constructions are part of a “settler ignorance”, which demonstrates multiple deficiencies in several areas.\(^{485}\) To reiterate these, they include a constitutional neglect of the Treaty of Waitangi, a historiographical embrace of a nationalist driven short history and an existential reaction to the recent Māori political and cultural renaissance.\(^{486}\) In his view, each of these deficits accrues from an inattention to a ‘long view’ of history, which equates to a form of ‘forgetting’. His response to this ‘forgetting’ is to propose an “ethical remembering”.

Specifically, Turners ‘forgetting’ argues that Pākehā have an ethnocentric way of constructing their view of the world, and particularly the world of Aotearoa New Zealand. “History”, therefore, begins with their arrival and is based upon the role that their ancestors have played in the world. This results in a centring of Pākehā within the national narrative and a placing of Māori on the margins. However, in an ironic twist, Turner, like Mikaere maintains that the Pākehā reliance upon this short history, as well as being a colonizing strategy, will never satisfy the “melancholic” and “existential” quest to belong. Turner’s

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\(^{485}\) Turner, “The Indigenous Commons”.

\(^{486}\) Ibid.
reconciliatory solution is based upon his conviction that Pākehā need to acknowledge “the long history of Māori inhabitation”. In his view it is this form of ‘remembering’ that will solve the three postcolonial deficiencies.

Turner, with the New Zealand context in mind, proposes that “an ontological substrate of long history, encompassing multiple lands, peoples and histories, asks everybody to consider the grounds on which they stand”. Applying this principle to the Pākehā quest, Turner is asking them to “stand back”, and “look beyond” their own narratival constructions of this land’s past, to a history that was here “before” them. By doing this, they would discover that others “were here before” and that this “beforenness” implies an appropriate ethical response. His critical question: “consider the grounds on which they stand”, is an excellent one. It is one that that Turner proposes for Pākehā to ask in order that they might “rightly” locate themselves as settlers in this new land. In his view, the question will lead to an understanding that the foundations of identity and belonging lie alongside Māori and particularly their rights as indigenous people – these are rights, which he holds are independent of the current nation-state.

In order to facilitate this understanding, Turner recommends Mikaere’s host/visitor paradigm as one that fits his long history solution, but also as a means of Pākehā entering into the Māori world. He posits like Mikaere, that it is here, that Pākehā will satisfy their existential need to belong. However, not only would the Māori world provide for them an identity and location of belonging, but also as Mikaere argues, it offers a ‘right’ or tika protocol to live by. Turner explains that the world of tikanga is one based in “reciprocity rather than rights, relations not entities, and attributes not properties”. To him, it is this ethos that would show Pākehā “the right way to go about place, in terms of which the ordinary people of the place (“Maori” means ordinary) consider they flourish”.

A part of Turner’s reasoning for Pākehā to follow the law of tikanga is that it was here when the settlers arrived – and consequently, following Mikaere terms it the “first law of the

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488 Turner, “The Indigenous Commons”.
489 Ibid.
490 Ibid.
land”. It is on this basis, he offers, that it is qualified to establish the “right” way of belonging in Aotearoa, not only for Māori, but also for Pākehā. A related aspect to his reasoning for the Pākehā acceptance of tikanga, lies not only on his conviction that it is a “worthy” and “previous” law, but he argues also that it is a law that is foundational to the Māori cosmogony and therefore crucial to Māori well-being. He maintains that for Pākehā to flourish in Aotearoa New Zealand, Māori also need to flourish. A flourishing he implies, that is not possible in the absence of a greater acceptance of tikanga. He says that, “A full experience of place for all will ultimately depend on Māori flourishing...[and] it is already here, albeit contained by public memory.”

However, Turner describes the Pākehā experience of fitting into Mikaere’s host/guest model, as entering into a “kind of purgatory – a local limbo – in which one attends to states of anxiety and dread”. He compares this agonistic location to one in which Māori themselves are involved. He offers that it is a “permanent internal exile, a forced arrest and condition of waiting whose Māori counterpart, Ranginui Walker [a prominent Māori academic], calls ka whawhai tonu mātou/ struggle without end”. In Turner’s view:

To consider oblivion bliss and to love limbo – is only apparently negative: it is really a desire for full life, a full experience of place, which settlement denies Pākehā by refusing the long history of Māori inhabitation (a refusal that is “constitutional” in the most embodied sense, connecting who you are and how well you are).

In conclusion, an ethical ‘remembering’ for Turner also means giving the Treaty of Waitangi its ‘rightful place’. As I indicated earlier, for him, the Pākehā “forgetting” has led to a constitutional marginalization of the Treaty. Although legally, Treaty legislation lies within the sphere of governmental agency, to Turner, “the basis for the authority of the New

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492 Turner, “The Indigenous Commons”.
494 Ibid.
496 Ibid.
Zealand government today is the sheer weight of white settlement”. 497 This makes it a Pākehā responsibility. He sees the Treaty as a foundational document and one that amounts to “an expression of a will to identity and place on the part of whites as much as Māori”. 498 In other words, the Treaty represents an ‘identity and place of belonging’ as much for Pākehā as it does for Māori. Here, Turner is correcting assumptions that are often voiced that the Treaty of Waitangi only provides a constitutional basis for Māori and is silent about Pākehā needs. Further he states that, “[A] treaty happily entered into and concluded by both parties must be the basis of the authority of the state (technically the New Zealand Crown-in-Parliament)”. 499 His implication – the Treaty has an integrity and authority which derives from its genesis – a ‘compact’ signed freely and “happily” by two parties. This means that the government has a responsibility to create a constitution that reflects this reality, and by extension this responsibility extends to the Pākehā majority. However, he fears that while the “treaty continues to inspire Māori hope for greater participation in government, it is unlikely that Māori will ever be allowed the power commensurate with their claim to be tangata whenua”. 500 His “hope against hope” though is that the ‘unlikeliness’ of this scenario might be achieved via Pākehā acceptance of a ‘long history’.

Response to Turner’s Solutions

Stephen Turner’s contributions to the New Zealand identity conversation, as the other postcolonial scholars before him, are insightful and helpful. As a generic concept, his idea of ‘long history’ as a historiographical framework for viewing Pākehā aspirations is valuable. A Pākehā-centric ‘short view of history’, often has Able Tasman and James Cook as the “discoverers” of New Zealand, the wars of 1860s as the “Māori wars” and the Treaty as being irrelevant. This short view continues to ask, “How long is the Treaty valid?” And, “How many times do we need to say sorry?” This Enlightenment-influenced view of the past differs from one I proposed in the chapter on Christian reconciliation ethics, and does not reflect that understanding of ‘long history’. The latter understanding includes an intergenerational responsibility for sin and a narrative that links episodes in Genesis to the apocalyptic future in John’s Revelation. However, I suggest that these Christian

498 Ibid.
499 Ibid.
500 Ibid., p.34.
understandings of time, although theologically complex concepts and beyond my scope to explore here, would find some compatibility with Turner’s view of ‘long history’.

Nevertheless, there are some details within his version that I suggest are problematic. As I acknowledged earlier, the outworking of his ‘long history’ ideas owe much to Mikaere’s presentation of tikanga as the ‘first law of the land’. It is to this ‘law’ that Turner suggests Pākehā need to turn in order to satisfy an ethic of justice for Māori, a “turn” that would meet their existential identity and belonging needs. Specifically, he endorses the host/guest paradigm as enunciated by Mikaere, as a desirable relational ordering mechanism for Pākehā as colonial settlers. I have already given some views on that position and what I have explained around Mikaere’s ontology and ethics holds true for Turner. However, I shall signal a concern about tikanga Māori as the “first law” and its “automatic” acceptance as an ethical ordering mechanism for Māori.

In the identity chapter, I explained some of the critique around essentialism, particularly the problems associated with so-called, ‘fundamentalist’ identity constructions. I am not concluding that either Mikaere or Turner hold to ‘fundamentalist’ views of tikanga Māori necessarily, but it is a critique that would need to be considered if their ideas were to be progressed further. Secondly, as many Māori remind us, they are not a homogenous group in every sense – this also extends to their epistemological positions. In the 19th century particularly, Māori embraced many Christian and indeed Western ideas, and some of this meant reconfiguring their own tikanga perspectives. This complicates any exhortation to Pākehā to simply embrace te ao Māori – while generically the idea has much to recommend it, in reality it less straightforward as a reconciliatory solution for the New Zealand context.

I shall conclude this section on Turner’s solution by looking briefly at two further areas. Firstly, I support his perspective along with Bell’s and Mikaere’s, that despite the difficulties with translation the Treaty/Tiriti, is a foundational document for New Zealand. The significance for the Pākehā identity quest is that not only does the Treaty reinforce the indigenous claims of Māori, but also because as Turner explains it, the Treaty also
negotiates “cultural difference as a condition of settlement”. Seen from this perspective the Treaty holds the potential for Pākehā as an ‘identifying and belonging’ mechanism, for not only are Māori explicitly identified by the Treaty, but also implicitly by Pākehā. I shall explore this latter idea in the next chapter.

Finally there are aspects of Turner’s agonism that appeal. Not as an ultimate ‘location’ for Pākehā, but certainly as part of a reconciliatory journey. An attitude of “mourning”, a “weeping for themselves” and an acknowledgment of the “pain of Māori” all resonate with Christian ideas – consider Paul’s proclamation that it is “godly sorrow that brings repentance” (paraphrase of 2 Cor 7:10). Ideas of ‘purgatory’ and ‘limbo’, that are not measured by a ‘chronos time’ perspective, also echo the Christian ethic of repentance. Turner asks Pākehā for a metanoia, or an ‘about-face’ that not only views Māori in an altered way but also views the way they construct their own identity differently. His model suggests a type of ‘abandonment’ by Pākehā, whereby the dominant people group are challenged to forfeit their power and rely upon the merciful hospitality of Māori. This is an attitude of ‘weakness’ which Christian configurations of reconciliation could certainly find attractive.

‘Postcolonial’ Synergies

Having analysed the reconciliatory responses of our three postcolonial interlocutors, it is now time to consider what synergies may exist between the ‘solutions’ they have proposed and my own ontological-ethico reconciliatory model. While I have been critical of some of their respective positions, I have also acknowledged some important points of agreement – these I suggest are areas from which I can draw for my own reconciliatory ideas. This “borrowing” fits with my description of a public reconciliatory praxis, as an interactive and interdisciplinary process that engages on a variety of levels with God, self, people and place. It is the weaving of these ‘strands’ that hopefully will produce some constructive reconciliatory ideas that might satisfy the complex identity demands of Aotearoa New Zealand.

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501 Ibid., p.37.
Perhaps the primary synergy lies in the scholars’ assumption that the Pākehā quest is in itself ‘legitimate’ and ‘natural’, but one that needs to be re-configured ‘in relationship’ with Māori. It is the contrasting view, which holds that identity constructions are the “right” of an ‘autonomous self’ that I propose has exacerbated the already fragile state of Māori-Pākehā relations. I propose then, that this relational view of identity construction is central to any meaningful reconciliatory strategy – significantly, it is one that each academic builds their position around.

The second agreement is an epistemological consensus about the past, or a ‘rightful remembering’ and a ‘long view of history’. Their postcolonial understanding is consistent with my particular Christian perspective, one that holds that the present and the past are inextricably linked. In a practical sense, this ‘long’ view accomplishes several things. Firstly, it rejects the ‘short’ approach to history – a truncated vantage that both denies settler responsibility for colonialism and relegates the relevance of the Treaty to some undefined era of the past. As well, it acknowledges Māori as tangata whenua or ‘first people of the land’ in agreement with International law and the Treaty of Waitangi, and the associated ‘status’ that this acknowledgement implies. This includes the understanding that there are ‘protocols of settlement’ associated with first and second settling – colonization consists in part, as an abuse of such protocols, or to use an English term, ‘etiquette’. Our approach is able to coalesce then around this ‘long’ view perspective and posit that Pākehā attempts at “moving on” without recourse to the past are misplaced and counterproductive and that without a consistent and continuous view of the past, it would be difficult for Pākehā to extricate themselves from the “convenience” that a short history provides.

This convergence over ‘rightful remembering’ leads to our agreement over the Treaty of Waitangi. Each of the scholars sees this accord as being fundamental to the Māori-Pākehā relationship. While we each approach the Treaty from a slightly different perspective, all are agreed that the Treaty is a ‘living treasure’ and relevant to the identity configurations of both Pākehā and Māori. This implies that any reconciling strategy between the two groups needs to be cognizant of the Treaty in some form.

A ‘long’ view perspective, leads into the final area of synergistic consensus; but here, agreement is found with only two of our postcolonial protagonists. In a previous chapter, which explored the theology of social reconciliation, I argued that God’s contextual wisdom for the reconciliatory needs of the cosmos provided an ontological solution via covenant. This solution created a ‘new identity’ for the created order – and was one that prioritized structure or social arrangement over an ethical or social agency approach. I propose that the social reconciliation/identity issue that we are dealing with here, is firstly about ‘who Pākehā are’ in relation to Māori, before it is ‘how they are to live’ in that relationship. Accordingly, I agree with Bell who “diagnosed” the Pākehā dilemma as an ontological one, and posits that similarly to God’s approach to the cosmic needs, an appropriate reconciliatory wisdom for the New Zealand context would be to prioritize a social arrangement over a social agency approach. Ironically, it is only Bell amongst my conversation partners that rejects such a tactic. However, for the reasons that I have just expressed, generically I prefer Mikaere’s and Turner’s ‘structural’ approach, for in principle, as well as providing a ‘reconciled status’ to Pākehā identity, it also provides a ‘location’ of belonging. Their proposals, I suggest, are helpful advances to the national conversation and move the discussion beyond, what in my view, is a preoccupation with ethics.

In the next chapter, I shall build upon these postcolonial ideas by positing a ‘social arrangement’ that also carries a concomitant ethical component. It is the combination of these two, which will provide a reconciled location and identity opportunity for Pākehā that will hopefully satisfy their existential need, as well as sustain the Māori and Pākehā relationship. I suggest that it is a ‘solution’ that also rescues the New Zealand context from the ‘perpetual agonism’ of our representative postcolonial scholars.
Chapter Eight: ‘Christian’ Reconciliatory Ideas for Aotearoa New Zealand

I shall continue here with the theme I began in the previous chapter, that is, reconciliatory ideas for the New Zealand identity conversation. I shall integrate some of those ideas drawn from the postcolonial analysis and my theoretical ontological-ethico reconciliatory paradigm with the Pākehā quest for identity and belonging. The interaction with Bell, Mikaere and Turner delivered a consensus around several key issues: these lay the foundation for my reconciliatory ideas. The areas of agreement are as follows: that the Pākehā quest is primarily an existential ontological dilemma that will be best satisfied by a reconciliatory social arrangement; secondly, that this arrangement, in order to be postcolonial, needs to be configured in relationship to Māori, and specifically, cognisant of their status as tangata whenua; and finally, that Pākehā have an ethical responsibility towards the Treaty of Waitangi, that needs to be reflected in any settler identifier.

In earlier chapters, I have chronicled some of the Pākehā resistance to the present role of the Treaty, much of which derives from their “short view” of history. Ironically, I propose that it is “within” this very Treaty, that the Pākehā identity is best able to find its reconciled status and resolve its “ontological dilemma”. I argue that, especially when understood as a ‘covenant’, the Treaty yields both an ontological reality and ethical norms that satisfy both the Pākehā quest for identity and belonging as well the above postcolonial reconciliatory requirements. I maintain that Pākehā are able to derive significant aspects of their identity and belonging from the Treaty, and here, Judge Edward Durie’s ‘naming’ is helpful. Pākehā are tangata tiriti [people of the Treaty]. The Pākehā question: “Who are we?” becomes: “We are the people of the Treaty, [ngā tangata tiriti], a people who have a place to stand, a tūrangawaewae”. The Treaty is crucial to a Pākehā moral dwelling in the land. They needed the Treaty to confer an integrity to their entrance into Aotearoa New Zealand and also to regulate their continued belonging. Māori as the first people of the land, did not need the Treaty to justify their mana whenua [status in the land], they needed the Treaty to protect their identity as tangata whenua in the new political environment and to formalize a peaceful and reconciled relationship with the new settlers.

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503 In his address at Waitangi, February 6th, 1989, Judge Edward Durie referred to Pākehā as tangata tiriti [people of the Treaty].
Before I proceed further with this covenantal idea of Waitangi as an ‘identifier’ for Pākehā, allow me to restate the function of covenant as a pre-structural ontological mechanism. In my social reconciliation model, following John de Gruchy and Miroslav Volf, I drew attention to the central role of covenant in the God in Christ reconciliation strategy. Here, by a covenant of grace, and to merge Ford’s and Volf’s concepts, via the ‘wise loving embrace’ of God, an eschatological and ontological ‘state’ of reconciliation is achieved for the entire cosmos. This restored relationship is created or established within a new covenant and is ontological in the sense that it enjoys ‘an objective status’, or perhaps, to use a clumsy term, it has an ‘isness’. Reconciliation defined in this way is different from reconciliation as an ‘ethical process’. It is a social arrangement as opposed to a form of social agency. The ‘being in covenant’ with God – this new relational cosmic arrangement – provided a reconciled identity and ‘place of belonging’ for the people of God; however, it also provided a model for the human sphere. The ubiquitous use of covenant as a relational mechanism to order societies has prompted Dirk Smit to label the “notion of covenant as the central metaphor for public life” (italics original).\(^{504}\) Perry Huesmann describes societal covenants in the following way:

Covenant is a structuring of human relationships, rooted in a relational ontology, by means of the promise of free, equal and consenting persons, which establishes a bond of reciprocal respect and loyalty, witnessed by a transcendent or higher authority, for a mutually predetermined common good.\(^{505}\)

These covenantal agreements, which reflect God’s ‘covenanting’ practice, appear as: treaties, legal transactions, international political declarations and most commonly as the societal institution of marriage. Huesmann maintains that this almost universal use of covenant:

[i]mplies that humans are meant for and find their flourishing through human relationality....Covenant also implies that there is a normative side to this relationality, one that leads free humans not to pursue freedom as autonomous subjects merely in search of objects to conquer, consume, or control, but to use freedom responsibly in the form of consent and promise making for a common good greater than self.\(^{506}\)

\(^{504}\) Smit, *Essays in Public Life*, p. 222. However, Smit acknowledges this idea originated with William J Everett.

\(^{505}\) Huesmann, *Covenant*, p.86.

\(^{506}\) Ibid., p.135.
Understood in this way, I suggest that covenant has theological, political and social legitimacy as a pre-structural social arrangement. It is a unique organizing mechanism, that not only establishes an ontological reality, which is not primarily dependent upon the vagaries of human ‘effort’, but also has an ethical dimension, for as Huesmann states above, there is always an implied “normative side” to covenantal relationality.

**Treaty of Waitangi as Covenant**

Drawing upon this societal use of covenant, I propose the Treaty of Waitangi as a reconciliatory covenantal mechanism that provides for the identity needs of Pākehā and satisfies the other ‘fundamentals’ that I outlined above.

I argue, that this means that the Treaty, not only ‘defines’ the Māori-Pākehā relationship, but initially ‘reconciled’ it and is able to continue to provide a reconciling location. Drawing an analogy from the God in Christ model and from the political treaties of the Old Testament and beyond, those who ‘belong’ to the covenant/Treaty, enjoy a ‘Treaty identity’, and a concomitant “union” with the other covenantal partner. In this way, the Treaty not only reinforces the identity of Māori as tangata whenua, but it also provides a ‘location’, or tūrangawaewae, that serves also as identifier for Pākehā. I suggest that this identity, of tangata tiriti, is both autonomous and yet also mutually constituted with Māori who as tangata whenua enjoy their own unique ‘autonomy’ as delineated within Te Tiriti.

Before I consider further the idea of the Treaty as covenantal, I shall make some other comments about the Treaty as a ‘reconciliatory mechanism’. As I indicated above, the Treaty has played a historical reconciliatory role and that as an enduring covenant it continues to offer a reconciled state. I have described the divine model (and by analogy, social reconciliation) as a ‘grace-ful’ ontological reality – whereby God, as the “offended” party has provided for the “offender” an opportunity of reconciliation. My emphasis here is upon reconciliation as a ‘gift’, for as the apostle Paul has described it: “It is by grace you have been saved, through faith, and this not from yourselves, it is the gift of God, it is not by works, so that no one can boast” (Eph 2: 8 – 9). At the heart of divine reconciliation lies the concept of ‘grace’ or ‘gift’ – and the understanding that ultimately reconciliation cannot be earned. It can be ‘received’ via repentance, and ‘honoured’ by an appropriate ethical
behaviour, but that behaviour, from a Christian perspective does not in itself ‘merit’ the reconciliation.

The Treaty of Waitangi can be viewed in a similar way. In the first instance, it was a ‘graceful’ reconciliatory mechanism, offered by Māori to the Crown – and by extension to Pākehā. In the New Zealand context, the European settlers were the “offending interlopers” and yet Māori from a position of strength\(^{507}\) offered to Pākehā, via the Treaty, a ‘place of belonging’ that achieved a ‘state of peace’ or reconciliation. I offer that in this way Māori personified Volf’s metaphor of reconciliation as “embrace”. To reiterate, he described this reconciling embrace as “the will to give ourselves to others and ‘welcome’ them, to readjust our identities to make space for them”.\(^{508}\)

While, in a technical sense, it might be argued that the Treaty articles, which guaranteed certain rights to Māori, including rights of British citizenship, are indications of Crown favour to Māori, and an indication that it was the Crown that “created” the Treaty, I argue that these ‘rights’ were in reality a reciprocation of the prior Māori ‘hospitality’, and even ‘forgiveness’. In essence, the Crown articulated, with the help of the missionaries, in 19\(^{th}\) century European form, a political document that encapsulated the Māori will – a will that included the ‘forgiveness’ of the European intrusion and offered via the Treaty a ‘legitimate’ means for the new settlers to dwell in the land. Pākehā, then, did not ‘earn’ the right to be here, but ‘received’ the right from Māori, via the ‘gift’ of the Treaty. However, to borrow from Bonhoeffer, this gift is not necessarily “cheap”, but deserves an appropriate ‘ethical honouring’ – a type of ‘honouring’ that becomes clearer when the Treaty is understood within a covenantal framework.

Secondly, as I indicated above, the Treaty as it stands now continues to provide a reconciled identity and place of belonging for all settlers. However, like all covenants, the Treaty has been and can continue to be broken. I suggest that the first place that the covenant/Treaty can be broken is in the heart and mind, because the Treaty is primarily a relational covenant, and relationships are firstly broken within – physical betrayal of whatever nature follows that internal decision. My concern in this study is with Pākehā as people and not so

\(^{507}\) Population statistics around 1840 show the Māori population between 70,000 – 120,000 and the European population c.2000.

\(^{508}\) Volf, *Exclusion and Embrace*, p. 29.
much as governments, so I shall not repeat the issues of Crown betrayal, except to repeat Turner’s statement that “the basis for the authority of the New Zealand government today is the sheer weight of white settlement”.\textsuperscript{509} Simply, then, a governmental betrayal is a Pākehā betrayal. However, returning to the Treaty as a Pākehā heart issue – I offer that Pākehā first ‘break the covenant’ when they are ‘unfaithful’ to it in their heart and minds. This manifests in various ways, but ultimately ends in a denial of its covenantal obligations. For Māori, the repercussions of this Pākehā denial have been the loss of their identity, culture, language and lands – a loss which, as I have indicated, has been particularly highlighted since the 1970s. For those who break the covenant/Treaty, by whatever means, if we draw on our Pauline model, reconciliation in the first instance means, simply to ‘return’ to the covenant/Treaty in the mode of the 1 Corinthians 7 marriage example. A rejection by Pākehā of the covenant/Treaty in whatever way, equates to being in a state of ‘non-reconciliation’ with Māori, and without recourse to their foundational source of reconciled identity and belonging.

However, the validity of the above argument rests a great deal on being able to establish that the Treaty of Waitangi is indeed covenantal. My implication here is, that if the Treaty is ‘less’ than covenantal it carries neither the same rights nor responsibilities for Pākehā. If the Treaty was merely a temporary contract then Brash would be right – it would have little current relevancy and accordingly there would be few obligations for Pākehā. However, neither would it play the reconciliatory role that I have proposed for it. In order to do this, the Treaty needs to display genuine covenantal characteristics, and these need to stand the scrutiny not only of theologians, but also the ‘public’ to whom this study is ultimately aimed. It is to that argument that I shall now turn.

The idea of the Treaty as covenant is neither new nor original – as we shall see, even Whakahuihui Vercoe’s use of the term in 1990 is based upon long historical precedent, especially among the Ngāpuhi people of the north. However, although the Treaty\textsuperscript{510} has been referred to as a covenant in various contexts, the question needs to be asked whether the use is merely rhetorical, or if it meets various definitional criteria. I shall respond to

\textsuperscript{509} Turner, “Settlement as Forgetting”, p.17.

\textsuperscript{510} Although, in this thesis I mainly use the the English term ‘Treaty’ when referring to the 1840 document, I acknowledge in line with international legal understandings that if there are discrepancies in interpretation then it is the Māoir version, Te Tiriti, that takes precedence.
these questions in several ways: firstly, by an observation of its historical use by Māori, the Crown and the church; secondly, by a brief consideration of treaties as covenants within the field of jurisprudence and international law; and finally the manner in which the Treaty reflects a biblical or theological use of the term of covenant.\textsuperscript{511}

Following that discussion, I shall explore the idea of covenantal or Treaty ethics, the second component of my ontological-ethico paradigm. In order to this, I shall briefly refer to Volf’s cruciform ethics and from there I shall advance the idea of the Treaty as being analogous to marriage. The point of this analogy is to illustrate an ‘appropriate’ relational ethic for our covenantal understanding of the Treaty, an understanding that might further clarify some of the Pākehā questions, about ‘how long’ ‘and how many times’.

**The Treaty ‘Understood’ as Covenant**

Claudia Orange, one of New Zealand’s foremost Treaty historians, argues that the Treaty was initially accorded sacred status by Māori because of the mediating role of the missionaries, who acted as interlocutors, translators and witnesses. She says at most signing locations, the missionary presence:

\[\text{appears to have added a religious aspect to Maori understanding of the agreement. At Waitangi, Henry Williams was responsible for developing the idea that Maori and Pakeha could be one people in both a spiritual and temporal sense. The treaty could therefore be construed as a covenant between the Maori people and the Queen as head of the English Church and state.}\textsuperscript{512} [emphasis mine]\]

Thus, from its inception, the Treaty was perceived by many to carry a transcendent element that differentiated it from other political arrangements. The following description of the Māori response at the signing bears witness to this:

 Chiefs had indicated that they were disposed to think of the Treaty in spiritual terms; Heke and Patuone had both likened the agreement to the new covenant. The role of the English missionaries in determining Maori understanding, therefore, was crucial

\textsuperscript{511} The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) is a multilateral treaty adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on December 16, 1966, and in force from March 23, 1976. It commits its parties to respect the civil and political rights of individuals, including the right to life, freedom of religion, freedom of speech, freedom of assembly, electoral rights and rights to due process and a fair trial. As of March 2012, the Covenant had 74 signatories and 167 parties. The ICCPR is part of the International Bill of Human Rights, along with the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESR) and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/unpfii/documents/DRIPS_en.pdf, accessed 13 March, 2011.

through the way explanations were given. It determined that Ngapuhi, in particular, would understand the treaty as a special kind of covenant with the Queen, a bond with all the spiritual connotations of the biblical covenants; there would be many tribes, including the British, but all would be equal under God.\[513\] [emphasis mine]

William Colenso, a CMS missionary, printer and eyewitness records:

At this critical juncture, Heke, Nene and Patuone, all long-time associates of the English missionaries, rose to speak...Heke reasoned that...it would be not unlike the benefit brought by the Word of God – Te Kawenata Hou, the New Covenant or Testament.\[514\]

Richard Taylor, a CMS missionary and another eyewitness at Waitangi, interpreted Hone Heke’s perspective in the following way: “[A]s Christ was the New Covenant and as the old Mosaic Law was put aside on conversion to Christianity, so the treaty, with its promise of a new relationship between the Crown and the Maori chiefs, could be likened to the New Covenant”.\[515\] Taylor also recorded the views of another Ngāpuhi chief from Kaitaia, Te Wera, who stated, “if your [British] thoughts are towards Christ as ours are, we shall be one”.\[516\]

These early 1840 covenantal understandings were carried forward into an important 1860 conference convened between the Crown and Māori. According to Claudia Orange, “[T]he conference at Kohimarama near Auckland in July and August 1860 was the most representative gathering ever held under government auspices; 200 chiefs from the North Island were involved, and Taiaora came from the South Island”.\[517\] While the attendees were divided in their opinion on various current issues, such as the King Movement and Taranaki land grievances, they were generally united in their view of the Treaty as a sacred cornerstone of Māori-Crown relations. According to Orange, “[T]he final resolution of the conference, in effect a ratification of the treaty, came to be known as the Kohimarama covenant”.\[518\] She said that particularly Ngāpuhi:

\[513\] Ibid., p.57.
\[515\] Richard Taylor Journal, 28 April 1840, MS 302, AML, cited in Orange, Waitangi, p.90
\[516\] Ibid., The speaker was Wartona Wera.
\[517\] Orange, Waitangi, p.147.
\[518\] Ibid.
[t]ended to refer to the Waitangi agreement as the covenant (te kawenata) rather than the treaty (te tiriti), indicating an understanding that had been evident in their 1840 negotiations. It seems that they had continued to regard the treaty as a sacred compact, in one sense uniting all Maori tribes and, in another, acting as the bond of union between the races.  

The resolution referred to by Orange, which was passed unanimously at the last session stated:

[...]that this Conference takes cognizance of the fact that the several Chiefs, members thereof, are pledged to each other to do nothing inconsistent with their declared recognition of the Queen’s sovereignty, and of the union of the two races, also to discountenance all proceedings tending to a breach of the covenant here solemnly entered into by them.  

However, it was not only Māori that referred to the Treaty as a covenant. Both the Native Secretary Donald McLean and Governor Gore Browne used the term covenant in preference to the term treaty.  

Browne, during his opening address to the Conference, referred in Māori to the Treaty as a kawenata or ‘covenant’. He said, “So the chiefs who signed their names to that document, the Covenant of Waitangi, were intending it as the price for the benefits they received.” In Orange’s view, Browne’s reference to covenant was the final resolution that “represented far more than an extension of Maori commitment to the terms of Waitangi; it reaffirmed the 1840 agreement as a most solemn compact, giving the covenant concept wider currency”.  

Three further tribal gatherings were held in Kohimarama in 1879, 1880 and 1881. The impetus for reconvening the Kohimarama conference came from Ngāti Toa chief Tamihana te Rauparaha of Otaki and Paora Tuhaere of Ngāti Whātua. They both placed the Treaty of Waitangi as a central topic for consideration. To cite Orange again:

For almost half the nine-day conference, Tuhaere kept discussion rigorously centred on the 1840 agreement and its interpretation....Participants noted the conference was the kind of co-operative unified action which would not have been possible for different tribal groups before 1840. For this reason, the treaty was seen as a

519 Ibid., p.148.
523 Claudia Orange, Waitangi, p.149.
covenant of peace and unity, satisfying man’s temporal welfare just as the law of God provided for man’s spiritual well-being. Furthermore, the treaty was considered by the conference to be the essential bond of unity between the races: under the Queen, Maori and Pakeha would stand united in almost every sense.  

As I indicated above, the missionaries played a pivotal role in presenting the Treaty in quasi-religious terms. However, their involvement in the Treaty debate did not cease at the time of signing and despite opposition from some political quarters that clergy should refrain from involvement in ‘political’ matters, many church leaders, including Octavius Hadfield and Henry Williams, participated in the post 1840 Treaty discussions. They claimed a “right of remonstrance” because of their role in the 1840 negotiations. Williams, in a letter he wrote in the 1840s, said: “Feeling as I did, that the terms of the Treaty were a sacred compact between the British Government and the chiefs of New Zealand, I was able to speak with confidence as to the integrity and honour of England.”

Another CMS missionary, George Clarke, who was appointed Chief Protector of Aborigines in 1841, gave this view in his half-yearly report of 30th September 1841:

Amongst the old chiefs...there is a dread of degradation by submission to the Government; but amongst the younger chiefs ...there is an inclination to rely on the integrity of the British Government; they hold inviolate the treaty, saying the words of it cannot be broken.

Finally, Sir William Martin, a CMS advisor and the first Chief Justice of New Zealand, was a strong proponent of the Treaty and appealed for it to be honoured by the Crown, as much upon moral grounds as upon legal grounds. The following quote summarizes some of Martin’s understanding of the place of the Treaty in the New Zealand context; his views combine the ideas of a jurist and a churchman:

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524 Ibid., p.191.
525 Ibid.
We have undertaken to acquire these islands for the Crown and for our race, without violence and without fraud, and so that the Native people, instead of being destroyed, should be protected and civilised. **We have covenanted with these people, and assured to them the full privileges of subjects of the Crown...** The compact is binding irrevocably. We cannot repudiate it so long as we retain the benefit which we obtained by it.  

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**20th Century Covenantal Understandings**

While the European churches were mainly ‘silent’ on the Treaty for over a century, the idea of the Waitangi partnership as covenantal was picked up again in some quarters in the 1980s and 1990s. For example, in 1989, for the occasion of the 150th anniversary of the signing of the Treaty of Waitangi, the New Zealand Catholic Bishops’ Conference issued a statement entitled, “A Commonwealth Year for Aotearoa-New Zealand”. They acknowledged that via the Treaty, “this country was established as a bicultural state”. They further acknowledged that the Treaty was “a covenant and a taonga [sacred treasure]”. And based upon the declaration at the 1995 Catholic Bishops’ statement: “In the Treaty of Waitangi, we find the moral basis for our presence in Aotearoa New Zealand and a vision that sets this country apart”, the Catholic Church in Aotearoa New Zealand declared, “[T]he Treaty of Waitangi is a covenant or agreement between representatives of the British Crown and Maori chiefs”. 

Also on 29 February, 2004, the Anglican and Catholic bishops responded to Donald Brash’s Orewa Waitangi “denial” speech by issuing a joint press release. In it the bishops stated: “[T]he recent debates reveal the volatile state of popular feeling about race and ethnicity. We believe the Treaty covenant provides the best way of addressing that volatility. We call for a Treaty debate rather than a race debate”.

The late Anglican Bishop Manuhuia Bennett, as a member of the Waitangi Tribunal, was unequivocal about the Treaty’s covenantal status and its role in committing Māori and Pākehā within an ethical framework. Outlining the position of the Waitangi Tribunal he said: “The Treaty is a sacred covenant entered into by the Crown and Māori, based on the promises of two people to take the best possible care they can of each other.”

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530 Ibid.
continued, “[B]oth parties have a common moral duty to abide by the Christian and
traditional Māori values it embodies”.

Another leading Anglican and Ngā Puhi leader, Sir James Henare, described the Treaty in
these terms: “The Treaty then was not just a political and legal covenant but also a spiritual one.” In an 1987 affidavit to the Crown he stated:

[S]ome 540 Māori leaders signed the Treaty at 50 different meetings. Over a
collection period of seven months 500 of them signed a Māori language text. Some
signed with a representation of their facial tattoo marks or moko, others with
crosses and other marks, and 72 with their personal signatures. Only 39 Māori,
including five women, signed an English text of which there were possibly six
versions. There are two key ideas which for Māori mark out the Treaty as more than
a legal contract. Firstly, it is a ‘kwenata’, a covenant, or sacred compact with
obligations on both sides. Secondly, because of the ancestral moko markings on the
Māori language version, the Treaty is a ‘taonga tapu’, a sacred treasure.

This, albeit brief, overview shows that since the time of the 1840 signing, the Treaty has
been considered by a wide diversity of people and in a variety of contexts as a covenant.
Apart from anything else, this review suggests that to speak of the Treaty covenantally is
neither an anachronistic exercise nor an arbitrary imposition of an extraneous concept. In
the next section, I shall continue to pursue the idea by referring to the work of some legal
scholars and quasi-legal representatives.

Covenant, Treaty and the Law

In this section, still with an eye to the Treaty as covenant, I shall look at the way the Treaty
has been referred to by jurists and particularly its place within the nation’s *ad hoc*
constitutional understanding. This is necessarily a brief synopsis and has two purposes:
firstly it is an acknowledgment of this influential ‘conversation stream’ within the wider
Treaty ‘talk’ — and it is one that has had and continues to have a great impact on the way
the Treaty is outworked in the lives of both Māori and Pākehā. Cambridge legal scholar Paul

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McHugh acknowledges the pivotal role of the law for Treaty issues: “[T]his is far from saying that the law is the sole agency of Treaty justice and recognition. However, it is central to that goal since the laws of a country reflect its collective sense of social justice and priorities.”  

The second purpose, given the importance of jurisprudence and legislation to the topic, is to explore the possible ‘congruity’ of a covenantal perspective within those fields.

Auckland University Professor of Law and specialist in Treaty of Waitangi matters David Williams has written, “I contemplated the possibility of an acceptance by the legal system that Te Tiriti envisaged a unique relationship between the Crown and tangata whenua which is an enduring and enforceable covenant partnership.” Although this hope was delivered more from a theological than legal standpoint, it at least suggests that understanding the Treaty covenantally is compatible within a legal perspective. Most legal scholars, however, use less explicit language to describe the Treaty, although as shall be seen in the following quotations, covenantal characteristics such as ‘sacred’ and ‘inviolable’ are often employed in reference to the compact.

Since 1840, the Treaty has been compared in some quarters to the 1215 Magna Carta, which in turn has been described by some as the most “significant constitutional document of all human history”. For example, in a letter to Bishop Selwyn, CMS missionary Henry Williams wrote, “[M]y view of the Treaty of Waitangi is, as it ever was, that it was the Magna Charta of the aborigines of New Zealand”. The enduring constitutional significance implied by Williams’ comparison with the Magna Carta is reiterated by Paul McHugh in his influential work The Māori Magna Carta: New Zealand Law and the Treaty of Waitangi. There he writes:

In the important case Campbell v Hall (1774) Lord Mansfield gave an “incontrovertible” proposition. He stated that “the articles of capitulation upon

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537 David Williams, Personal communication at The University of Auckland, 25 October, 2012.
538 Cf. Lord Denning, UK Judge and legal scholar.
which a country is surrendered, and the articles of peace by which it is ceded are sacred and inviolable [sacrosanct] according to their true intent and meaning”.

Drawing on this opinion McHugh states, “The Treaty of Waitangi...was ‘sacred and inviolable’ in legal terms to the extent that it limited or restrained the executive powers of the Crown in the new colony.” He then asks rhetorically:

Does, the Treaty of Waitangi have any legal status in New Zealand law of its own right....The answer is ‘yes’. There is a line of case-law which sees treaties of cession of sovereignty as ‘sacred and inviolable’, binding the Crown in its executive capacity. By this conclusion only clear, unambiguous legislation could override Māori Treaty rights. The Treaty binds and is enforceable against the Crown.

McHugh, while not using ‘covenant’ explicitly to describe the Treaty, ascribes legal obligations to the Crown on the basis of its ‘sacredness’ and ‘inviolability’. In his opinion a legal status is accorded to the Treaty on the basis of its ‘sacred’ standing.

The Human Rights Commission has noted that early case law has given limited weight to the status of the Treaty (cf. Justice Prendergast’s “simple nullity”), but that in recent years it has acquired a greater legal status. This observation is consistent with extra-judicial comments by some New Zealand’s judges, including Sir Robin Cooke, a former President of the Court of Appeal. He referred to the Treaty as New Zealand’s “founding document” and said, “[I]t is simply the most important document in New Zealand’s history”. Similarly in 1994, the Privy Council commented that the Treaty “is of the greatest constitutional importance to New Zealand”. This is a view echoed by Matthew Palmer, Dean of Law at Victoria University, who said, “[E]ven its critics have to accept that it is a foundation document. It is simply the most important document in New Zealand’s history”. In his book The Treaty of Waitangi in New Zealand’s Law and Constitution, Palmer states, “[T]he Treaty of Waitangi is

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540 Mansfield, (1774), 1 Cowp 204 (KB) cited in McHugh, The Māori Magna Carta, p.149.
541 McHugh, p.156.
542 Ibid., p.166.
best understood as representing an explicit commitment to the health of the relationships between the Crown, Māori and other New Zealanders”. Further, Palmer writes:

The influence of the missionaries would also have an effect. Missionaries actively promoted the Treaty of Waitangi, gaining a significant proportion of the signatures. There is evidence that their association with the Treaty, and their portrayal of its nature as a covenant with the Queen, who was head of the Anglican Church, added moral weight and a sacred aspect to its binding character.

In recent times, New Zealand Courts have taken a flexible approach to Treaty principles. Justice Robertson, then of the New Zealand Court of Appeal, wrote:

Whatever legal route is followed, the Treaty must be interpreted according to principles suitable to its particular character. Its history, its form and its place in our social order clearly require a broad interpretation and one which recognises that the Treaty must be capable of adaptation to new and changing circumstances as they arrive.

This ruling by Justice Robertson helps to clarify the relationship between the law and ‘public opinion’. Current legislation reflects where society “is at” in terms of its reflection on different subjects. The law is not a hermetically sealed transcendent reality, but a form of social ordering that reflects the wishes and goals of a particular community. The key point here is that legislation is not the source of societal ethical understanding, but rather it reflects those cultural perspectives. In this way, the above observations of covenental language in jurisprudential Treaty “talk” not only reflect a usage within that community, but by implication, also echo the presence of the concept within the wider New Zealand society as well. The significance of this for our purposes, as I seek to “insert” covenant as a ‘reconciliatory idea’ into the national conversation, is that the concept already resides here, albeit perhaps somewhat latently.

Covenant, Treaty and Theology

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546 Ibid., pp.24-25.
547 Ibid., p.73.
Finally, I shall now consider the idea of the Treaty of Waitangi as covenant from a theological perspective. I have addressed the theological foundations of covenant in chapter five and so shall not cover them again in detail; instead, I shall draw out the central ideas in order to establish the theological link between the idea of covenant and the Treaty of Waitangi. Whereas, in that chapter I concentrated on the concept of covenant within divine reconciliation, here I am more concerned with the way the Bible presents political treaties as covenantal and how this may influence our thinking of the Treaty of Waitangi.

As I have outlined, most scholars agree that covenantal relationships were pervasive in the ancient world, and a generic definition of such bonds might be as follows: “[A] solemn agreement between two or more parties made binding by some sort of oath”. It is the view of many, that it is the use of ‘oaths’ that differentiates covenant from other types of social arrangements, such as contract, and that these ‘oaths’ speak of the presence of some transcendent element, or ‘gods’, and as well indicate the ‘seriousness’ of covenantal commitment. While Hebrew thinking about covenant reflects this generic understanding, there is both a continuity and discontinuity with other treaty/covenantal conventions of the time, but in Israel’s history, theological vision informed sociological organization, rather than the other way.

Daniel J. Elazar distinguishes between ‘divine’ and ‘social’ forms of covenant. According to him, the ‘divine’ form establishes relationships between God and humans, based on morally sustained mutual promises and obligations. In contrast, the social or political form expresses the freedom that exists among individuals to create relationships, polities, and civil societies through morally grounded compacts, thereby establishing enduring partnerships. Elazar’s analysis of covenant and its historical application as a political mechanism yields three ways in which polities come into existence: through conquest, organic development, or covenant. He proposes that covenantal polities are those that seek to emphasize a

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551 Ibid.
553 Daniel Elazar, *Covenant & Polity in Biblical Israel*, pp.35-44.
554 Ibid.
“deliberate coming together of humans as equals to establish a body politic”. In all its forms, he says, the key focus of covenant is on relationships, and covenant is the “constitutionalization” of such bonds. In his view, this gives the relationship an authoritative basis in objective truth, which is an alternative to an authority rooted in one person’s or party’s ability to accumulate and control power between individuals. In *Covenant Tradition in Politics*, Elazar defines political covenant as:

[a] morally informed agreement or pact based on voluntary consent, established by mutual oaths or promises, involving or *witnessed by some transcendental higher authority*, between peoples or parties having independent status, equal in connection with the purposes of the pact, that provides for joint action or obligation to achieve defined ends (limited or comprehensive) under conditions of mutual respect, which protect the individual integrities of all the parties to it.

Drawn from this definition, which is rooted in an analysis of *bēriṯ* in the Jewish experience as recounted in the Hebrew Scriptures, some variable and non-variable elements of covenant emerge. I propose that the most important variable element (emphasized section) for our perspective lies in the nature of the transcendental witness. Elazar’s definition leaves open the question of a religious or nonreligious ‘witness’ to the covenant. Parties can covenant before God as witness, or before another established higher authority. In either case, there remains a ‘third party’ as a type of transcendent element between the covenanting parties.

**Waitangi, Transcendence and Witnesses**

If we consider the Treaty of Waitangi in light of the Elazar’s elements, it is clear that the 1840 compact displays all the characteristics of his model; however, one area of clarification is the issue of a transcendent witness. There might be some who would only accept the Treaty’s covenantal status if it could be shown that there was a divine witness. While a cursory analysis of the Treaty might suggest the lack of a divine transcendent witness, a closer examination reveals that this is not necessarily the case. I propose that there are two possible approaches to this argument – the first approach considers the Treaty as a compact

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555 Huesmann, *Covenant*, p.76.
556 Ibid., p.81.
557 Ibid., p.22.
between the Crown and Māori, and the second as an accord between Māori and Pākehā. I shall deal with the Crown-Māori approach first. The Human Rights Commission has noted that many of the 512 chiefs signed the Māori language text with “a representation of their facial tattoo marks or moko, others with crosses and other marks, and 72 with their personal signatures”. In light of that the Commission suggests that:

[T]here are two key ideas which for Māori mark out the Treaty as more than a legal contract. First, it is a ‘kawenata’, a covenant, or sacred compact with obligations on both sides. Secondly, because of the ancestral moko markings on the Māori language version, the Treaty is a ‘taonga tapu’, a sacred treasure.

The Commission might also have added that the ‘cross’ was also used as a tohu or ‘marking’ by some of the Christian chiefs. These observations, which illustrate the use of ‘sacred markings’, point to the invocation of a ‘divine presence’ as a witness to the signing. Secondly, as I highlighted earlier in the historical analysis, several chiefs likened the Treaty to the ‘word of God’. Hone Heke, the nephew and son-in-law of Hongi Hika, an influential Northern Chief, according to Colenso stated, “[T]his [Treaty] my friends, is a good thing. It is even as the word of God....Remain, remain, sit, sit here; you with the Missionaries all as one”. This interpretation was not contradicted by either the missionaries or the Crown representatives. This implies that they ‘accepted’ the Māori assumption that the Treaty was sacred, and that the accord had its origin ‘in God/atua’ who by extension was a ‘transcendent witness’ to the occasion. With regard to ‘invocation’, I also suggest that given the ‘spirituality’ of Māori it seems very unlikely that at some time during the ceremony, whaikorero [speechmaking] by the various rangatira would not have included karakia [prayer] in some form.

While the above argument is mainly from the Māori “side”, what about the Crown? I offer that given the English constitutional arrangement, whereby Queen Victoria was also the head of the State Church, it is also arguable that from the Crown’s side, the Christian God was a transcendent witness. This perspective can be seen in the various declarations made

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559 Ibid.
by Lt. Gov. Hobson about the Treaty. For example, in an official communication that preceded the Treaty of Waitangi, Governor Hobson signed off his proclamation:

Given under my hand and seal, at Kororareka, this 30th day of January, 1840, and in the third year of Her Majesty’s reign.

William Hobson,
Lieutenant-Governor.

By His Excellency's command.

God save the Queen! [emphasis mine]

Also, in his introductory speech at Waitangi, Hobson declared, “Her Majesty Victoria, Queen of Great Britain and Ireland wishing to do good to the chiefs and people of New Zealand...the people of Great Britain are, thank God! Free, and so long as they do not transgress.” Hence, the name of God was invoked in various ways and at various times by both Māori and Pākehā before and during the signing – implying that God/atua was a transcendent witness.

In conclusion, I have been examining the ‘evidence’ to support my idea of the Treaty of Waitangi as a covenant. To summarize, we are able to conclude several things. Firstly, the English missionaries, as historians have well documented, were the interlocutors or mediators of a political treaty between two signatories: the British Crown and Māori rangatira. Perhaps, not surprisingly, the language of the day was covenantal, and the Treaty was understood and receieved as such by many of the Māori representatives. Further, the document has also continued to be referred to as a ‘covenant’ by Māori, some Pākehā, as well as various Churches over the past 170 years. I have also noted that within the realms of government and jurisprudence, different legal opinions and quasi-constitutional statements continue to use ‘covenant-like’ language when referring to the Treaty. The final consideration with regards to the Treaty’s covenantal status was a theological one and our analysis suggests that the compact bears the hallmarks of similar biblical treaties that are considered by many scholars as covenantal.

561 http://nzetc.victoria.ac.nz/tm/scholarly/tei-Mac01Comp-t1-g1-t5-g1-t2-g1-t11.html, accessed 1 October, 2012.
Ultimately, from a ‘human’ perspective, people will ascribe particular meanings and significances to institutions that fit with their world view, and to unilaterally ‘declare’ the Treaty as covenantal may be counterproductive. However, I suggest that the above analysis at least demonstrates that a covenantal understanding of the Treaty is a reasonable proposition.

Before turning to the ethical dimensions of the Treaty as covenant, there is a remaining issue that requires our attention – the issue of who the Treaty partners are. I have referred in passing to this before, but will turn to it now in more detail.

Covenantal Treaty ‘Partners’.

A narrow or legalistic interpretation of the Treaty reveals an agreement between certain iwi [tribal] leaders and a representative of Queen Victoria, Lt. Gov. Hobson. However, in my view, the scope of the Treaty is wider than this interpretation allows. This perspective is echoed by Dame Mira Szascy, Auckland University’s first Māori woman graduate and the former President of the Māori Women’s Welfare League. She states, “[I]f we continue to assume outstanding Treaty issues are going to be resolved by legal and political machinations alone, we will fail”. 563

The New Zealand Human Rights Commission also considers the Treaty in a more “expansive way”, calling it “a symbol of possibilities” and “a living document”. 564 In the view of the Commission, while the initial parties to the Treaty were the British Crown and Māori leaders, the “precise scope of the Crown is part of the continuing dialogue between Māori and governments”. 565 Successive governments have tended to promote a narrower and more technical understanding of the Crown, and it is often interpreted as only being the executive arm of government. However, even English law experts express uncertainty as to what is meant by ‘the Crown’. For example, British legal historian F. W. Maitland wrote ironically in 1908, “[T]he Crown does nothing but lie in the Tower of London to be gazed at

by sightseers”.\(^{566}\) If identifying the Crown is problematic in a technical sense, the same might be said with regard to Māori representation. Who were the signatories representing – iwi, hapū or whanau? Today, it is clear that there is no one body that speaks on behalf of all Māori. However, what is clear is that both rangatira and Lt. Gov. Hobson were representative and not acting on their own behalf. For me, however, the question extends beyond who they represent, to – who the Treaty represents. I submit that ultimately, the Treaty represents to one degree or another, all the residents of Aotearoa New Zealand.

With regard to this perspective, the Commission holds that the Treaty creates a relationship between Māori and other New Zealanders in their dealings with each other.\(^{567}\) It summarizes their view in the following way:

> The Treaty is important to all peoples who have settled in New Zealand regardless of when they arrived or their country of origin. The benefits of the Treaty for migrants has been described as giving ‘legal status for the Queen’s subjects to share the space of Aotearoa New Zealand with tangata whenua’ and allowing migrants to ‘share the resources of Aotearoa as agreed to between Māori and the Crown’.\(^{568}\)[italics original]

For many, the Treaty has always been seen as a strategy to manage relationships and as such speaks ‘beyond’ its exact words. Understood in this way, the Treaty as indicated by Hobson’s, “We are now one people”, ‘unites’ or ‘reconciles’ all peoples in the land of Aotearoa New Zealand – that is, Māori as the original settlers with all others as subsequent settlers who include Pākehā. I propose then, that the signatories of the Treaty signed as representatives, and not only as individuals. In this way, the Treaty includes all those who are ‘represented’ by those who signed. From a Māori perspective, whanau, hapū and iwi from different regions were included within the 512 signatories. From a settler perspective, all new settlers were included within the signature of Hobson. For as Durie stated at Waitangi in 1989:

> [w]e must also not forget that the Treaty is not just a Bill of Rights for Maori. It is a Bill of Rights for Pakeha too. It is the Treaty that gives Pakeha the right to be here. Without the Treaty there would be no lawful authority for the Pakeha presence in this part of the South Pacific. The Pakeha here are not like the Indians in Fiji, or the


\(^{567}\) Ibid.

\(^{568}\) Chile, “Biculturalism and Multiculturalism: Are they Mutually Exclusive?”.
French in New Caledonia. Our Prime Minister can stand proud in Pacific forums, and in international forums too, not in spite of the Treaty, but because of it. We must remember that if we are the tangata whenua, the original people, then the Pakeha are the Tangata Tiriti, those who belong to the land by right of that Treaty.\textsuperscript{569} [emphasis mine]

At the time of the signing of the Treaty all non-Māori were referred to as Pākehā. As Treaty activist Katherine Peet has stated and others have supported, “We should not forget that the treaty gives everyone a place to belong – it is not just a Maori matter. At the time of signing the treaty, ‘Pakeha’ meant everyone who was not Maori. These days such peoples are being referred to as tangata tiriti”.\textsuperscript{570}

To conclude this section, for Pākehā settlers then, both new and old, the Treaty formalizes their relationship with Māori. It was a historical act of reconciliation, and it remains as such. However, not only does it afford a ‘state’ of reconciliation with Māori, it also provides a location of identity and belonging. In the way that the Treaty affirms the identity and belonging of Māori as tangata whenua, it also, in a sense, initiates the identity and belonging of Pākehā hence: tangata tiriti [people of the Treaty]. This designation stands in juxtaposition to Māori as ‘the first or host people’ and just as that nomenclature helps to define Māori, tangata tiriti helps to define Pākehā, especially as it links them to their tūrangawaewae, or their ‘place of standing’. I propose that the term tangata tiriti is a ‘reconciled’ cognomen, and similarly to Pākehā provides an identity that is derived via a relationship with Māori, but with the advantage that it provides an identity that recognizes their covenantal social arrangement with their Treaty partner.

The Treaty and Ethics

If the Treaty as covenant is a social arrangement that affords a form of reconciliation, what about the issue of covenantal ethics? In other words, what kind of social agency is involved in covenantal Treaty ethics? For, as I have argued, ethics is integral to any reconciling schema. Here, I am particularly interested in how the Treaty partners should relate to each other. These important considerations contain within them some of the queries that we have already mentioned. These include queries such as: “When are we going to get over it


[Treaty issues] and move on”? And, “How long is the Treaty relevant for?” Another associated question is, “How many times do we have to say we are sorry?” Or, “It’s got nothing to do with us, that was an old document signed over 170 years ago!” I have covered some of the questions in the previous chapter in the interaction with the postcolonial scholars, but offer that even more clarity will arise from an understanding of covenantal ethics.

In the present discussion, I am not discussing such ethical characteristics as justice and restitution, which we considered as integral components of a wider reconciliation ethical schema. Locally, these would be the issues which stem from the political understandings that are carried within the Treaty’s wordings, such as kawanatanga [governance] and tino rangatiratanga. While these matters remain outstanding and are important components to the New Zealand reconciliatory conversation, my focus here is a more narrow one and perhaps even more basic. I am concerned with the fundamental relational ethics that order everyday relationships; the type of ethics that Avril Bell posited in her agency approach, an ethic that is grounded in a love and concern for the other. I suggest however, that if Pākehā embrace the Treaty as a covenantal provision, then the specific issues of justice such as rangatiratanga, might be more easily discussed and resolved.

Although, as I have stated, I prefer a different methodological approach to the identity problem to Volf, in particular the positing of a social arrangement before social agency, I believe that his cruciform ethics model has much to recommend it. Therefore, I shall offer some introductory ‘new covenant’ considerations from Volf that will help us reflect not only on the nature of covenant, but by extension on the ethical dimensions of the Treaty of Waitangi. The insertion of this perspective will also serve as an helpful segue into my Treaty as marriage analogy.

Volf maintains that to reflect theologically on the new covenant as a tool for social issues means to “inquire about the relationship between the cross and the covenant”. In his view, taking cognizance of the new covenant would help strengthen and repair fragile and
broken covenants, and also keep existing covenants from being broken. Referring to the cross as a divine exemplar, Volf says that by that means:

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\text{God renews the covenant by making space for humanity in God’s self. The open arms of Christ on the cross are a sign that God does not want to be a God without the other – humanity – and suffers humanity’s violence in order to embrace it.}^{572} \text{ [italics original]}
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What then does this “making space” look like within political or social covenants? Volf argues that unlike contract, which he sees as a “relationship of mutual utility”, albeit with certain moral commitments, covenant implies something deeper.\(^{573}\) He says that “covenental partners are not simply moral agents who have certain duties to one another within the framework of a long-standing relationship”.\(^{574}\) But because covenant is:

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\text{[a]n enduring arrangement the parties are not merely individuals whose identities are external to one another and who are related to one another only by virtue of their moral will and moral practice. Rather, the very identity of each is formed through relation to others; the alterity of the others enters into the very identity of each}.^{575} \text{ [Italics original, emphasis mine]}
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He maintains therefore, that in order to maintain covenant:

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\text{[w]e need to be willing to be re-negotiating our own identity in interaction with the fluid identity of the other. Each party in the covenant must understand its own behaviour and identity as complementary to the behaviour of other parties .... Sustaining and renewing covenants between persons and groups requires the work of mutual “making space for the other in self” and of re-arranging the self in light of the other’s presence.}^{576}
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In short, being ‘in’ covenant is a form of self-denial and self-giving; it is an ethical positioning that is a reflection of Christ’s voluntary surrender to the cross – an exercise in giving one’s life for the Other.

One other characteristic that Volf attributes to the new covenant, and that is pertinent to our discussion, is its ‘eternality’ – a quality which echoes one of Elazar’s defining characteristics. He explains that God’s self-giving is a consequence of the covenant as

\(^{572}\) Ibid.
\(^{573}\) Ibid.
\(^{574}\) Ibid.
\(^{575}\) Ibid.
\(^{576}\) Ibid.
‘eternal’ – and this is a reflection on God’s ‘inability’ to give up the covenant partner who has broken the covenant. God’s commitment to the covenant is irrevocable and also indestructible. In Volf’s view, this type of commitment translates analogously to political covenants, which means for our purposes, the Treaty. He argues that while these arrangements may be dissolved or broken, there is a sense that they cannot be ‘undone’. In other words, people can ‘break’ the covenant, but the covenant as a ‘reality’ still exists. In light of this, breaches of the covenant still take place ‘within’ the covenant and the struggles for justice and truth and other ethical characteristics of reconciliation also take place ‘within’ the covenant. Further, Volf states:

[a] covenantal relationship requires a willingness to see things from the ‘Others’ perspective; a willingness for self-sacrifice in keeping the covenant, and an unconditional commitment to the relationship so that any breakdowns occur within rather than outside the relationship.

To extrapolate from this to our Treaty example, unless it is dissolved, despite the many unresolved issues of ‘justice’, ‘truth’ and ‘restitution’ that remain outstanding between Māori and Pākehā, these ‘issues’ take place, as Volf would phrase it, ‘within’ the covenant. From a reconciliatory perspective, this would mean that within our Christian model, despite this relationship breakdown, the framework of the relationship still exists, and by extension a form of reconciliation.

Treaty as Marriage

In order to provide further clarification around covenantal/Treaty ethics, I shall employ some poetic licence or prophetic imagination. Brueggemann, who coined the phrase, characterized this process as a search for metaphors or symbols that “challenge” and “contradict the regnant consciousness” within a society, and which move us back “into the deepest memories” of the community. Based upon Brueggemann’s concept, I shall explore the concept of the Treaty as “marriage”, a social institution that carries with it a cultural and covenantal familiarity and one that implies a normative ethic. I propose, in line with Brueggemann’s “prophetic criteria”, that the Treaty as marriage analogy “contradicts the regnant consciousness” and also draws upon the “deepest memories of the

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577 Ibid., p.156.
578 Ibid., pp.154-155.
579 Brueggemann, The Prophetic Imagination, p. 66.
community”. I suggest also that the marriage analogy is a pragmatic way of integrating Volf’s cruciform language into an accessible vernacular.

My initial inspiration for this possibly controversial analogy was drawn from Hobson’s well-known and often cited statement at the conclusion of the Treaty signing. There he said, “He iwi tahi tātou – We are now one people”. His epithet evokes the symbolic joining of two peoples – a symbolism reminiscent of a Christian idea of marriage. However, as with the Treaty as covenant idea, my research shows that the Treaty as marriage also has historical precedent.

Before I explore the analogy, I acknowledge that the concept of marriage is itself a contested institution, particularly within Western cultures. Perhaps the most strident critique originates among feminist and gay activists who argue that marriage in its various guises perpetuates a deep social injustice. However, this opposition has been undergoing a transformation in recent years as gender roles have become more “negotiated”; as well, the proposals of same-sex marriage in many Western democracies has seen ‘marriage’ emerge again as a ‘desirable’ institution. However, this in turn has produced another kind of critique, especially from more conservative elements who define marriage as a heterosexual union. This study is not the place to debate these views, except to say that despite these conflicting perspectives, covenantal marriage in some form remains a consistent institution that governs much of social life and is the aspiration of many. Given that and despite the difficulties, I propose it is still a useful analogy.

Before proceeding, I shall begin with a “disclaimer” – an illustration via analogy is not the same as arguing that they are in all ways similar. All analogies have limits. What then makes an analogy a “suitable” choice? Again drawing upon Brueggemann’s definition, I suggest that public metaphors need to have contextual relevance and some resonance for the hearer – the image needs to conjure in the mind, an idea that is accessible, useful and evocative. I submit that this is what Desmond Tutu did with his use of the “rainbow nation” concept in post-apartheid South Africa and similarly Martin Luther King Jr. with his multiracial “dream” of a “Beloved Community” in the United States.
Marriage however, is more than a ‘recognizable’ idea, it is one that has had wide analogical usage, not only to describe social, political and divine-human relationships, but it also has historical precedence vis a vis the Treaty of Waitangi. The final reasons for selecting marriage as analogy are pragmatic and theological. Having argued that via the Treaty, the relationship between Māori and Pākehā is covenantal, there needs to be some kind of conceptual framework that provides the ethical underpinnings for the covenantal relationship. Volf’s reflections are a contribution towards that goal, and the marriage analogy will further explicate those ideas. Given that my reconciliatory ideas are from a Christian perspective, I shall draw again on the apostle Paul’s understandings of marital ethics with the goal of suggesting some practical ideas for Pākehā as they seek to outwork their Treaty relationship with Māori.

Historical Precedence of Marriage Analogy

The idea of Treaty as analogous to the social institution of marriage is not an original one. In 2010, Paul Moon, Professor of History at the Auckland University of Technology, wrote:

However, if we zoom out from narrow academic or constitutional analyses, there is another dimension to the Treaty – one analogous to a marriage – that casts the agreement in a more refreshing light. There is no doubt the relationship 170 years later has evolved almost out of all recognition from its form in 1840 – maybe the same can be said of most decades-long marriages. Would any bride or groom be able to predict, on their wedding day, the character of their relationship in years to come? It is improbable, and yet many stick to their unions, despite occasional harsh words, difficult periods and all other pressures agitating to separate them. Recalling those vows made between chiefs and the Crown at Waitangi and elsewhere 170 years ago is more than just a nostalgic homage or an exercise in faux patriotism. It is a reminder of the terms of a union between two sovereign peoples that is unique in modern history. [emphasis mine]

The idea has also been suggested by the quasi-judicial body, the Waitangi Tribunal. In their view, “it was a basic object of the Treaty that two peoples would live in one country. In doing so they would mutually benefit from their relationship”. In another report, the Tribunal describes the Treaty as being like a “marriage contract”. They also said that “the

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582 Ibid.
success of the ‘vows’ depends on the parties’ commitment to work through the problems in a spirit of goodwill, trust and generosity".  

The idea in some form is also among Māori in the north, as the following advertisement from the Waitangi Marae website implies.

**“Weddings and Waitangi - The Perfect Match**

Waitangi Treaty Grounds is where, in 1840, two peoples forged a relationship that has grown into nationhood. Now this historic place of partnership can be an auspicious inspiring venue for your special day.

Our choice of settings is almost unlimited: magnificent lawns with sweeping vistas of the Bay of Islands, cherished historic buildings, native bush, or Gardens of National Significance.

Anniversaries, recommitments, civil unions and renewal of vows ceremonies are all made more memorable when Waitangi sets the scene. Charges are for venue hire only".

Marriage as a Relational Metaphor

Marriage is used not only as a metaphor to describe the relationships between entities; it has also traditionally been used as a means of bringing peace between warring political groups. However, it is its metaphorical use that interests us here. As I indicated above, marriage has often been used metaphorically to describe a multitude of different relationships. This is particularly true of the Bible, where Old Testament prophetic writers use marriage to describe the relationship between God and Israel, and entire books are constructed around the metaphor – cf. Hosea and Song of Songs. And in a variation on the theme, Jeremiah uses the idea of divorce to describe the breakdown in the relationship between Yahweh and Judah. The New Testament also employs the metaphor to describe the relationship between Christ and the church. There, Paul in particular refers to the church as the “Bride of Christ” and John’s Revelation describes the climax of history as a “wedding feast” between God and his bride, the church. However, it is not only a ‘religious’ metaphor. The analogy is now being utilized in business marketing circles and by political scientists. For example, in his book *Secession: The Morality of Political Divorce*, the American

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583 Ibid.
political philosopher, Allen Buchanan, employs both the analogy of divorce and marriage to talk about the breakup of modern nation states.  

The above examples are just a few of the wide ranging uses of marriage as a helpful metaphor to describe the nature and quality of different kinds of relationships. Given this wide analogical use of marriage in both the political and religious spheres, and its historical precedence in the New Zealand context, it does not seem incongruous to suggest the Treaty as marriage idea.

If the relationships within the Treaty can be compared to a marriage partnership, a key question we need to ask is: what will make this marriage work? How should marriage partners within a covenantal relationship behave towards each other? These questions are posed in order to aid the Pākehā reconciliatory ethic.

The Treaty Relationship ‘as Christ loved the Church’

As I mentioned, Volf’s cruciform social ethic is a useful concept that fits well with our marriage analogy. Significantly, it is a cruciform ethic that informs the apostle Paul’s view of the marriage relationship, and it is to this perspective that I shall now turn. Remember, we are talking about the kind of social agents that Pākehā need to be as covenantal Treaty partners. In Volf’s analysis, the operative covenantal ethic is exemplified in Christ’s self-giving for his bride – a sacrificial act that sets the tone for Christian marriage as articulated by the apostle Paul. The faithfulness of God to covenant is replicated according to many theologians in the biblical vision for marriage in Genesis.  

Marriage as a central theme and ‘teaching’ analogy continues throughout the Old and New Testaments, but arguably the most explicit treatment of Christian marriage is found in Paul’s letter to the church at Ephesus, and it is from his portrayal that I shall draw an ‘ethic’ for our Treaty as marriage analogy. Before turning there, however, to reinforce the link between Volf’s cruciform model and the Ephesians admonition, it would be helpful to recall Paul’s use of the kenotic ‘hymn’ in his letter to the church in Philippi – for it is the ‘sacrificial sentiments’ that are expressed there that undergird the marriage ethics in the later Ephesians letter. The most

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important section of that passage for our purposes is, “And being found in appearance as a human being, he humbled himself by becoming obedient to death – even death upon the cross!” (Phil 2:8).

This verse reveals the covenantal love of God as displayed by Jesus’ relinquishment of personal rights and preference for the Other. It is that example of Jesus’ humility that the writer to the Ephesians exhorts those within a marriage to imitate. He says: “Be imitators of God, therefore...and live a life of love, just as Christ loved us and gave himself up for us as a fragrant offering and sacrifice to God”(Eph 5:1-2 ). Although addressed to Christians, it is reasonable to argue that this ‘sacrificial ethos’ is the ethical template for all humanity as *imago Dei*. It is a theme the writer continues in 5:21: “Submit to one another out of reverence to Christ.”

This theme of sacrificial honouring of the Other is then continued later in same Ephesians passage of 5:21-33 – a section that analogizes marriage as a symbol for the relationship between Christ and the church. Wives are asked to “submit” to their husbands and husbands are told to “sacrifice” their lives for their wives, “just as Christ loved the church and gave himself up for her” (Eph 5:25). Although the passage has ‘hierarchical challenges’ when viewed with a 21st century eye, challenges which are largely outside the scope of this study to explore, the main point for our purposes is that here Paul’s view of the marriage covenant encourages a mutual honouring of the other, which goes beyond concern for self. 587

What is pertinent to our discussion here is the fact that the Christ/church typology presents an extraordinarily high standard for marriage: if marriage truly reflects the love between Christ and the church, then it should be characterized by infinite loyalty and self-sacrificial love, in which the respective partners ‘give’ their lives to each other for the other’s greatest good. 588


588 Ibid.
How then does this theological “marriage language” translate into a conversation about the Treaty and specifically into the way Pākehā “should behave” and “demonstrate” their Treaty identity and belonging?

**Treaty, Marriage and Pākehā**

If the Treaty is a covenant of grace that provides a reconciled place for Pākehā from which to draw their identity and also a place to belong, this does not mean that they ‘occupy’ that space as totally autonomous political constituents. Pākehā, to continue our analogy, are one of the “marriage partners” in a “bicultural marriage”. The key ethic, following Paul and Volf, that needs to be brought to this union is the ethic of love and self-sacrifice, which places the good of the other ‘above’ the rights and needs of self. There is also a related goal of marriage – one of intimacy – whereby the partners sharing together this life of mutual giving and sacrifice ‘know’ each other in a way that can only be realized via a lifelong commitment of trust and honouring.

So, to return to the context of the Treaty, and specifically the Pākehā covenantal responsibility to their ‘partner’ Māori, how should Pākehā relate to them? The following are a few introductory ideas which would benefit from an expansion and further research. There are many academic and popular studies about ‘successful marriage’ – research which extrapolates from these sources into the political realm would be worthwhile. Also, at a flax roots level, by using the analogy of marriage, many involved in enduring unions would be able to bring a helpful wisdom to the issue; however, the following understandings would probably be included.

As a marriage partner, Pākehā need to understand that the covenantal relationship of the Treaty is inviolable – that is, eternal. Some people object to this, saying it is has a finite lifespan (the date of its ‘termination’ is never offered!), but neglect to mention that the Magna Carta, signed in 1215 has been incorporated into our own *ad hoc* constitutional framework. This perspective is also an opinion, I suggest, based more in a contractual understanding of the Treaty, as opposed to a covenantal one.

Secondly, Pākehā need to honour their Treaty partner in two basic ways. Firstly, by following an aspect of Mikaere’s advice, Pākehā need to enter the Māori world and understand that
‘knowing’ them entails much ‘listening’; even as Whakahuihui Vercoe exhorted at Waitangi. A part of this listening will entail, as many who are in long term relationships will understand, saying “sorry”. This is a good way to restart a conversation that has become strained or terminated. Another part of this listening will involve hearing the ‘Māori story’, and seeking ethical ways to combine it with their own, in order to produce, via consultation, an integrated “family” narrative for the land – a narrative that will provide fresh impetus to the dynamic and evolutionary process of identity formation.

Finally, I suggest that Pākehā need to seek identities or ‘names’ that reflect the identity of Māori/Other, their initial host and “new” partner. Here, Durie’s suggestion of Pākehā as tangata tiriti resonates. These and other indigenous nomenclatures will help to build upon their already ‘given-name’ of ‘Pākehā’ – a reconciled identity that already links the settlers, in a unique way to this land.

Summary

In this chapter, I have integrated some of the ideas drawn from the postcolonial analysis and my theoretical ontological-ethico reconciliatory paradigm with the Pākehā quest for identity and belonging. In order to meet the complex and interrelated requirements of these different perspectives I proposed the Treaty of Waitangi as a covenantal social arrangement. I argued that the reaffirmation of the Treaty as covenant, an understanding that has been associated with the document since its signing in 1840, provided for Pākehā an ontological reconciled status and a place of belonging. This locus not only provided for their existential identity needs but also satisfied the fundamental reconciling requirements established in concert with my postcolonial conversation partners.

Further, I posited the ‘imaginative’ idea of the Treaty as marriage, as a means of providing insight into the normative covenantal ethics implied by the agreement. These cruciform/marriage-based ethics derived from the apostle Paul, yielded a Treaty relationship between Māori and Pākehā that has as its goal a kind of ‘intimate knowing’, founded upon a reciprocal attitude of love and self-sacrifice. I conclude that it is from this ‘knowing’ that Pākehā will be able to dynamically reconfigure their identity, in the changing context that is Aotearoa New Zealand.
Chapter Nine: Conclusion

In this public theology thesis, I address three main issues. The first is the foundational concern of the study – the complex and at times strained relationship between Māori and Pākehā New Zealanders against the backdrop of European colonization. The second is the attempts by Pākehā New Zealanders to renegotiate their identity and ways of belonging in the land, and the impact this has on their relationship with Māori. The third is a Christian public theology of social reconciliation and how that might intersect with the first two contextual needs, and yield some postcolonial reconciliatory ideas from this theological and contextual engagement. Allied to these major themes, many other less central, but nevertheless complex and important issues have arisen – these are both theological and non-theological in nature. I shall therefore acknowledge these as I reiterate the logical progression and main points of my argument.

I have also referred throughout the thesis to specific issues that would benefit from further research, and so shall not rehearse them here, apart from mentioning two main areas. The first is the understanding of social reconciliation as a sub-set of missio Dei. As I indicated, the social reconciliation as S/spiritual is an underdeveloped theme and further consideration would especially help practitioners who struggle with complex issues and dangerous situations in various international contexts. Secondly, within the New Zealand context, the issue of hybridity and recent immigrants has largely remained outside my sphere of concern. However, this is an important area in the wider national reconciliation conversation – one that in some ways is more complex than the simple binary of the Māori-Pākehā relationship that I have considered here.

I have described the study as a participation within a national identity conversation. I have chosen this term deliberately to signal the interactive and hopefully constructive ethos that undergirds my approach. The positing of the reconciliatory ideas, if not all the theological machinations behind them, is an attempt to engage in an on-going dialogue, rather than the delivery of a ‘final’ reconciliatory verdict. My conversation partners have been an eclectic mix, beginning with the ‘Māori voice’ of Bishop Whakahuihui Vercoe, whose address at Waitangi in 1990 to a Pākehā constituency, summarized in his cry, “Let us sit and listen to one another”, set the reconciliatory impetus for the rest of the study. At the heart of his
invitation to a bi-cultural conversation was the appeal to the various constituents to acknowledge how Māori had suffered loss in their identity as tangata whenua, as well as their lands, culture and language. The present thesis is in part a response to that invitation.

The next conversation partners are three influential New Zealanders: the late historian and writer Michael King, the former leader of the National Party Donald Brash and the former Labour Minister of Race Relations, Trevor Mallard. I have posited these three as representatives of a Pākehā voice – a voice that is making ‘claims’ about reconfigured Pākehā identities and ways of belonging in the land. I chose these particular three, because of their public standing and the popularity of their various identity positions. Their identity claims have been described by some scholars in quasi-psychological terms as expressions of a Pākehā “ontological dilemma” or an “existential deficit” as a result of the post-1970s cultural and political renaissance among Māori. These diagnoses describe the ‘unsettled’ responses by the descendants of the original European settlers to this transformation of the national political and cultural landscape. The overall impact of the various claims has been one of polarisation, a response that is symptomatic of the polemical nature of these identity claims and also indicative of the fragile nature of the Māori-Pākehā relationship.

I have acknowledged that my interest in this subject is multi-layered. It is personal in the sense that I too am a Pākehā New Zealander who occupies the same geographical, political and cultural context as King, Brash and Mallard, and who has and is traversing his own identity responses to the post-1970s milieu. However, I am also a theologian, historian and reconciliation practitioner who has both an academic and practical interest in the impact of this quest upon the relationship between Māori and Pākehā, particularly in the light of our colonial present/past. It is the combination of these interests that have ultimately led to this study, with a research goal of being able to contribute some Christian inspired reconciliatory ideas into the national identity conversation.

There are some descriptive terms that I have used in the above paragraphs that are significant organisational indicators of the study’s tenor. This non-exclusive list includes: Christian, public theology, postcolonial, national conversation, context, identity, colonization, and reconciliatory ideas. Each of these terms signal in substantial ways
something of the content and methodological approach of the study, and they each have their own internal complexities that needed explanation and analysis.

Firstly, a Christian engagement with the public sphere, and one that was specifically concerned with reconciliation and colonization in New Zealand, needed some justification; especially given the church’s complicity within the European colonizing project over the past 600 years. Consequently, I acknowledged the church’s flawed record both internationally and here in New Zealand. However, to mitigate that, I offered that particularly in the 19th century, within the New Zealand context the church lobbied for a relatively enlightened indigenous policy with the Crown and was also involved in substantial reconciliatory peacemaking efforts. I also pointed to the significant reconciling contribution that the Christian church has made, both conceptually and practically in many parts of the world. This reconciliatory contribution led one theologian to remark, that “reconciliation is the most helpful ‘gift’ that Christianity can contribute to the public sphere”. Given these mitigating circumstances I offered that the church while ‘flawed’ still has a role to play in the much needed realm of peace-making.

The next major challenge lies in the term ‘national conversation’. Theology over the centuries has adopted different attitudes to the ‘public’, with varying understandings as to how the Christian message might be translated or communicated to those “beyond its walls”. In order to facilitate this conversation, I located the study within the recently developed discipline known as public theology. The term has been recently coined to differentiate the church’s critical engagement with society from its close relation, civil religion; the discipline has also amalgamated within its scope, the related theological schools of political and contextual theology. However, the discipline has not been received with universal acceptance amongst theologians, and debates continue over definitions, methodology around language and contextual understandings, and some have even challenged the legitimacy of such a public engagement by the church.

I traversed some of these different discussions in order to understand the different views and ultimately to formulate my methodological approach. In contrast to many public and contextual theologians, influenced by the Reformers and ‘confident’ of the Scriptures

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aptitude to “speak” in and to all cultures via the mediation of the Holy Spirit, I have adopted a somewhat ‘naïve’, yet not uncritical ‘hermeneutic of trust’ towards the canon of Scripture. I argued that this hermeneutical method was not inconsistent with the public theological approach of the biblical narrative and the church through the ages as well as some of the indigenous public theologians of 19th and 20th century New Zealand.

The public theology model provided some of the overall methodological direction to my thesis, particularly its insistence that social theology is not to be an individualistic exercise, but one that requires engagement with other scholars, in order to provide the analytical expertise within the particular fields of research. The specific overall methodological structure for the study involved a three-fold approach of analysis, interpretation and finally the constructive solutions of the reconciliatory ideas. Given that my primary focus is Pākehā identity and this country as a colonial context, I chose to engage with several New Zealand postcolonial scholars. A choice, given postcolonialism’s close association in some spheres with postmodernism and its fundamental ‘critical’ stance, which might seem an ‘unnatural’ fit with a biblical hermeneutic of trust. However, I submitted that a hermeneutics of ‘hopeful trust’ is not antithetical to a postcolonial agenda and argued for a compatibility on several levels. This included a mutual and critical commitment to a “politics of decolonisation in all spheres” – my working definition for postcolonialism – and posited the argument that the Scriptures have often been employed to critique the oppression of the poor, the powerless and the colonized. In the New Zealand context especially, the Bible was often utilized as a teleological metanarrative, especially by Māori, as an instrument of ‘postcolonial liberation’ to draw attention to their plight and as an inspirational and organising narrative for their own internal resistance to colonization. I proposed that the only ‘non-negotiable’ qualification for a postcolonial theology was the above commitment to the critical process of decolonization. I also argued on that basis that there is no ‘disqualifying contradiction’ between my reconciling public theology, which is committed to just race relations in Aotearoa New Zealand, and the defining principles of postcolonial analysis. Instead, I suggested that a methodological approach which integrates a postcolonial analysis with the biblical narrative continues a public theological tradition, which has been existent in this land for the past 170 years. Finally, in order to signal that the

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Prentice and Devadas, “Postcolonial Studies”, pp. 5-6.
project is not merely a human endeavour, I acknowledged my version of public theology as a participation and subset within *missio Dei*, which is essentially an interpretation of context in the light of God’s eschatological kingdom, and a project that assumes a continuing interaction with the reconciling and teleological impetus of the Holy Spirit.

Following the methodology set by my public theological model, I proceeded with a contextual analysis which comprised a description of the historical trajectory of Pākehā settlement, especially their engagement with Māori and the way they configured their relationship to the newly settled land. The analysis showed a significant change in the way that Pākehā viewed their identity and belonging in the period following the 1970s – the causes being both international and national, but primarily because of the new found “voice” of Māori. It is here that I introduced the representative Pākehā voices of King, Brash and Mallard in order to give some specific examples of this post-1970s identity trend among Pākehā and a wider understanding to this Pākehā identity dilemma. While the approach of the three was different in detail, nuance and depth, particularly in Michael King’s case, their motivations and goals were similar, the establishment of Pākehā as “indigenous”, an identity claim that in their view would put them on an ‘equal’ footing with Māori.

Having established the broad context of the study: the cry of Māori as represented by Whakakhuhiui Vercoe at Waitangi, the post-1970s cultural and political change and the representative Pākehā claims of King, Brash and Mallard, in the fourth chapter I engaged and “listened to” various scholars who provided some background understanding of social identity formation. Drawing upon the field of identity theory, particularly within New Zealand cultural studies, I argued that Pākehā identity formulations are social constructions, based upon particular narratives which are not formed in a vacuum but in interaction with others and within a particular historical and political framework. I extrapolated that this means that identity constructs are therefore socially sensitive activities and consequently open to ethical consideration. However, for our purposes, an important conclusion of this consultation with identity theory yielded the understanding that the Pākehā quest is reflective of a generic human need for identity and belonging. My conclusion from this for the purposes of this study is that it is not the Pākehā quest itself that needs critiquing but the assumed and implied narratives that inform that quest.
In order to introduce the interpretative analysis of the Pākehā quest, I turned to some New Zealand historians and cultural theorists who alerted us to the reality that colonialism is not necessarily confined to history, and that the practice of identity formation may either implicitly or explicitly be a form of colonizing practice. These theorists described the possible trajectory of identity formation as a colonial strategy and I drew particular attention to the phenomenon of “naming” as a common colonial strategy employed by settler peoples in their new environments. The implication being that this kind of “naming” could extend to identity naming as well. The ultimate “power” to colonize, however, remains for Pākehā, not only because of their narratives, but because they are still the majority demographic and continue to wield considerable political influence within New Zealand, an ‘influence’ that at times ‘disrupts’ their relationship with Māori as a minority people.

The lingering colonizing potential of identity formation provided a segue into the postcolonial critical analysis of the representative identity claims. In order to facilitate this analysis, I introduced three influential New Zealand scholars, two from The University of Auckland, Avril Bell and Stephen Turner, and the third, the Ngāti Raukawa scholar, Ani Mikaere. Although their analysis of the representative Pākehā voices demonstrated some difference in approach, there was a significant commonality to their conclusions, a commonality that I described via an adaption of Stephen Turner’s “three-fold deficit” diagnosis. Viewed through that lens, they proposed that the Pākehā quest displayed an “existential deficit” demonstrated by their claims of “indigeneity”, a historiographical deficit which manifested in a form of “historical amnesia” based upon a short view of history and a “Waitangi deficit”. The latter, because their re-visioning of the New Zealand identity and belonging landscape did not take into account the Pākehā responsibility to the Treaty of Waitangi. While these scholars also accepted the legitimacy of the Pākehā quest in general, their general consensus was that, overall, the representative Pākehā claims took insufficient consideration of the status of Māori as tangata whenua, and all that that status represents culturally and politically. They were particularly critical of the claims of Pākehā indigeneity by King and Mallard and the multicultural claims of Donald Brash. They argued that this ‘elision of difference’ amounted to a denial of history and responsibility for colonial practice.

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591 Turner, “The Indigenous Commons”. 

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This denial results in an identity and belonging, which perpetuates the injustice of colonialism and contributes to a further deterioration in Māori-Pākehā relations. Hence the need for some reconciliatory ideas that would not only satisfy the Pākehā need but that would also pass the postcolonial “test”.

An underlying assumption of my thesis has been that the Christian gospel has something ‘good’ to share with the world, especially since the Christian idea of social reconciliation is an integral component of that good news. However, an initial analysis of the literature and a brief synopsis of the church’s attitude to the social implications of the gospel demonstrated that my intention to simply apply Christian theoretical assumptions about reconciliation to the New Zealand identity context was a more complex task than I first imagined. Initially I assumed that an understanding of Christian social reconciliation would yield a relatively straightforward working model – this would be one built around the most commonly acknowledged ethical characteristics of justice, repentance, forgiveness and restitution, and that the complexities would only arise around the task of “translating” those elements into the national identity conversation. However this assumption proved naïve.

Because the reconciliatory goals were public in nature there was a need to establish some consensus around definitions, drawing upon some common understandings, I posited a generic working definition of reconciliation as the ‘restoration of relationship’ and one that is characterised by a ‘state of peace’. This led to an examination of the complex field of Christian reconciliation, one of the important soteriological metaphors used in the New Testament to describe the restoration of relationship between God and creation, and also between humans. Faced with the challenge of ‘reconstructing’ a Christian model of social reconciliation, I based my analysis on the apostle Paul, whom I argued was representative of the Christian reconciliatory vision and the New Testament writer from whom most theological understandings of reconciliation have been derived.

Drawing on the expertise of various New Testament scholars, I looked at Pauline reconciliation under the following headings: origins, characteristics, structural elements and component parts. Although within the literature there was general agreement with my generic definition of reconciliation as the ‘restoration of relationship’, it was here that the
consensus ceased. The main areas of contention centred on the place of social reconciliation within the divine schema. Some scholars were critical of what they saw as ‘Pelagian tendencies’ within some social reconciliation models – that is, the assumption that human involvement in the reconciliatory process was a means of completing the divine work. These objecting theologians argued that the God in Christ reconciliation was an ontological or objective reality that had already been completed as opposed to an economic or ethical process. This objective view meant that reconciliation was ‘free’ of any human dependency. The second main discussion point centred on the extent to which the divine model was ‘exemplary’ for the human experience, and where, if at all, the connections between the divine schema and human efforts lay.

My analysis around ‘origins’ showed that Paul’s method of theologizing was contextual, in the sense that he combined common cultural and political ideas, together with his recently ‘acquired’ new covenant worldview, and wove them all into a cosmic reconciliatory vision that he argued represented the divine plan for creation. I concluded also, in contrast to some writers, that Pauline reconciliation, was neither totally ‘cultural’ or ‘religious’ in its source. I posited that Paul’s theology was an ‘agile’ integration of a wide range of influences into a unified complex paradigm. These influences included the political and social Hellenistic world he inhabited, the prophetic vision of his Hebrew predecessors, especially Isaiah, and finally his own spiritual experience of being reconciled to his Creator. This understanding of Paul’s unified and holistic vision also challenged the prevailing terminology used by many reconciliation theologians that Christian reconciliation was first ‘vertical’ and then ‘horizontal’, which I proposed introduced a kind of dualism into the concept that was alien to Paul’s understanding.

In the section on characteristics, I summarized some of the main qualities of ‘God in Christ’ reconciliation. These elements, as proposed by Paul, equate to a paradigm shift for the apostle after his conversion on the Damascus road. In contrast to commonly accepted reconciliation models of the day, Christian reconciliation is not dependent on a primary movement by the antagonist, but given God’s example in Christ, the offended party may become the ‘initiator’ of the reconciling process and ‘provide’ the means for reconciliation.
Under the heading ‘structural elements’, I argued that God’s ‘contextual’ reconciling wisdom for the fissured cosmos delivers an ontological or objective reality before it is an ethical possibility. In other words, God chose to ‘grace-fully’ establish reconciliation as a ‘reality’ that was not ‘dependent’ upon ‘ethical works’; however, this carried with it an implied normative ethical component. Further, I posited that this objective state of reconciliation is configured within covenant.

Within Paul’s vision, which is also a generic New Testament understanding, there is the implication that the God in Christ wisdom provides both the model and the means for social reconciliation. This perspective holds that humanity lives in an ‘already’ and ‘partially’ reconciled cosmos. It is this objective reality which lays the foundation for humanity’s involvement within *missio Dei*. This is a ‘grace-ful’ and pneumatalogically enabled state and imperative, which sees humans as both subjective and objective ‘participants’. In other words, humans, within the divine schema are both ‘reconciled objects’ as part of the already reconciled cosmos, and also ‘subjective agents’ as ambassadors of the reconciling impetus. God provides, via the work of Christ and the Spirit, not only the ultimate *telos* of reconciliation, but an adaptable and ‘wise’ model for the on-going reconciling needs of creation. However, God’s cosmic reconciling is eschatological – it is a past, present and future reality, and one which will not be fully realized until the *eschaton*.

In the next part of the analytical treatment of social reconciliation, I considered the ‘second’ aspect of reconciliation, that is, the component of ethics. In this chapter, following the ‘dominant’ concerns of reconciliation practitioners, I looked at the ethical characteristics, considered by some as ‘indispensable’ to any model of social reconciliation. The most common within this non-exclusive list included the interrelated and complex concepts of: justice, forgiveness, truth, repentance and restitution. It is particularly the temporal sequencing of justice and the relationship of repentance to forgiveness that have generated the most debate. In light of this concern, I discussed each of the components and offered some variations on some common positions, especially with regard to the nature of forgiveness and repentance. Further, I also suggested that the Christian understanding of reconciliation as an inaugurated eschatology was a ‘hopeful’ contribution that the church might contribute to on-going wider conversation.
However, drawing upon John de Gruchy’s suggestion of “principled compromise” and Schreiter’s referral to reconciliation strategy as spiritual, I proposed that applications of reconciliation into the social sphere are ‘pneumatologically dependent’, and that there is no internal contradiction in the Bible between love and justice. In this way, while the God in Christ reconciliation of the cosmos serves as a model, the actual application of this will be contextually driven. Thus, the social reconciliation I proposed is a S/spiritual activity – a terminology that signifies the intrinsic connection between God and humanity and reflects further the concept of social reconciliation as *missio Dei*. This perspective introduces the important component of prayer or communion with God into the process, for it is by that means that humans are able to discern the divine strategy for each locality.

In order to explain this complex interaction, I introduced the analogy of social reconciliation as having similar characteristics to Māori flax-weaving or *mahi raranga*. I posited that this skillful indigenous craft, grounded as it is in prayer, tradition and human dexterity, serves as a helpful model that furthers our understanding of the complex requirements of reconciliation as a S/spiritual strategy. It is the above analysis of Pauline reconciliation which yielded an ontological-ethico model of social reconciliation, upon which I based my reconciliatory ideas for the identity challenge in Aotearoa New Zealand.

Having developed my ontological-ethico model of reconciliation, I then ‘resumed the conversation’ with Bell, Mikaere and Turner. This interaction with my postcolonial partners produced some helpful reconciliatory “fronds” which were able to be “woven” together with my Christian understandings. The analysis of their position revealed several areas of synergy with which we could collaborate. The primary synergy lay in our assumption that the Pākehā quest is in itself ‘legitimate’ and ‘natural’, but one that needs to be re-configured in relationship with Māori. The second agreement lay in an epistemological consensus about the past, or a rightful remembering and a long view of history. Their postcolonial understandings held similarities to my own Christian ‘historiographical’ perspective – wherein the present and the past are inextricably linked. In short, there were three specific areas of agreement: firstly, that the Pākehā quest is primarily an existential “ontological dilemma” that will be best satisfied by a reconciliatory social arrangement (apart from Avril Bell, who preferred an ethical approach); secondly, that this arrangement, in order to be postcolonial, needs to be configured in relationship to Māori; and finally, that Pākehā have...
an ethical responsibility towards the Treaty of Waitangi, which needs to be reflected within any settler identifier. It was these three postcolonial prerequisites that helped frame the reconciliatory ideas that I have proposed will not only satisfy the Pākehā “ontological dilemma” but also contribute to a restored relationship with Māori.

The resultant reconciliation idea, a weaving together of the various conversational and theoretical strands, both from the Christian ‘world’ and the New Zealand context, is my proposal of the Treaty of Waitangi as a covenantal social arrangement. I argued that the reaffirmation of the Treaty as covenant, an understanding that has accompanied the document since its initial signing in 1840, would provide for Pākehā an ontological reconciled status and a place of belonging. This ‘place’ would not only provide for their existential identity needs as tangata tiriti, or people of the Treaty, but would also be for them a tūrangawaewae or place to stand in their post-1970s “new” land. I proposed that the Treaty as covenantal is both an ontological reality, and is also one that carries with it an implied ethic. I also argued that the Treaty was in reality a reconciliatory gift of belonging for Pākehā from Māori – an extension of their hospitality to the welcome/unwelcome interlopers. While it had a reconciliatory function in 1840, it continues to maintain that function now for those Pākehā who are committed to it. I suggested also that for those who had left/denied the Treaty, in an analogous way to the marriage example of 1 Corinthians 7, the first steps of reconciliation were simply to ‘return to the covenant’.

In order to provide further insight into the relational dimensions of the Treaty, both as an ontological reality and an ethical imperative, I posited the ‘imaginative’ idea of the Treaty as marriage. This is a metaphor that has solid contextual meaning but also challenges the ‘regnant consciousness’ within the Pākehā identity formation. I argued that despite the controversies around marriage, it was still a ‘desirable’ institution that reinforces the covenantal ideas of fidelity and loving commitment. In order to further illuminate a covenantal ethic, I drew upon Paul’s cruciform marriage ethics. His view, which was based upon the example of Christ’s loving self-denial, proposed the marriage relationship as a loving, self-denying institution whereby the ‘partners’ honours the other above their own needs. Extrapolating from this marriage analogy, the Treaty relationship between Māori and Pākehā becomes a union of ‘intimacy’, which becomes its own internal satisfaction for Pākehā. But, because it is a reconciled relationship via Waitangi, it would also provide an on-
going source of inspiration for their identity needs in the ever-changing dynamic location that is Aotearoa New Zealand.

This final reconciliatory idea takes me back to the beginning, to the words of Whakahuihui Vercoe, to his, “Let us sit and listen to one another.” Therefore, allow me to address him in person.

_E koro!_ In many ways it is from your weeping at Waitangi that a more honest conversation has been provoked in this land. The above ideas are offered to that conversation, a fraught conversation that marks the nature of our providentially arranged “marriage”. To ‘adjust’ the words of the old Ngāti Maniapoto warrior, it is a conversation that will be without end:  
 _Ka whawhai tonu mātou_ – the struggle is without end.

_“Nō reira, e koru: moe mai ra e te rangatira, moe mai, moe mai i roto i te rangimarie. Therefore, chiefly one, rest in peace, rest in peace!”_
APPENDIX: Don Brash’s and Trevor Mallard’s Speeches.

Nationhood – “Don Brash Speech, Orewa Rotary Club”

Tuesday, 27 January 2004, 8:29 pm
Speech: New Zealand National Party

An address by Don Brash Leader of the National Party
to the Orewa Rotary Club on 27 January 2004

Ladies and gentlemen,

This is the second occasion on which I have addressed your Club on the last Tuesday of
January, and I very much appreciate your invitation.

Soon after becoming leader of the National Party, I outlined my five main priorities.

First, we must, as a country, take vigorous steps to counter the long-standing relative
decline in New Zealand incomes, which sees our per capita incomes now around $180 lower
per week – or about $9,000 per year – than those enjoyed by Australians. The Labour
Government is doing nothing to bridge this gap, but is instead erecting barriers to faster
growth at almost every turn.

Second, we must deal with the fact that too many of our children leave school massively
handicapped by illiteracy and innumeracy. Today’s education system is failing many of our
children, particularly the least privileged. If education is the passport to a better future, too
many of our children currently have no chance of getting there. The Labour Government is
failing to deal with this issue, and has made things worse by removing the elements of
parental choice which the National Governments of the nineties introduced.

Third, we have to face the reality that traditional kiwi values are being destroyed by a
government-funded culture of welfare dependency. National will stop communities wasting
away on welfare. Sitting at home on welfare should never be an option, as the Labour
Government seems to believe.

Fourth, we must deal with the issues of security, and especially the current half-hearted
attitude towards enforcing the law in New Zealand. Under a National Government, when
people step over the line which marks the boundary between honest and criminal activity,
between civilised behaviour and that which preys on the community, they will be punished.
Labour, by contrast, appears to be much more concerned with the rights of the criminal
than with those of the victim.

And fifth, the topic I will focus on today, is the dangerous drift towards racial separatism in
New Zealand, and the development of the now entrenched Treaty grievance industry. We
are one country with many peoples, not simply a society of Pakeha and Maori where the
minority has a birthright to the upper hand, as the Labour Government seems to believe.
Over the next few months, I plan to give a major speech on each of my five main priorities, but today I want to speak about the threat which “the Treaty process” poses to the future of our country. I am focussing on this topic because, just before Christmas, after Parliament had risen for the year, the Government announced its foreshore and seabed policy, a policy with potentially huge significance for the future of our country.

So let me begin by asking, what sort of nation do we want to build?

Is it to be a modern democratic society, embodying the essential notion of one rule for all in a single nation state?

Or is it the racially divided nation, with two sets of laws, and two standards of citizenship, that the present Labour Government is moving us steadily towards?

But the spirit of the Treaty of Waitangi was expressed simply by then Lt-Gov Hobson in February 1840. In his halting Maori, he said to each chief as he signed: He iwi tahi tatou. We are one people.

A number of issues flow from this. They are complex, highly sensitive, even emotionally charged.

But I believe in plain speaking. So let me be blunt.

Over the last 20 years, the Treaty has been wrenched out of its 1840s context and become the plaything of those who would divide New Zealanders from one another, not unite us.

In parallel with the Treaty process and the associated grievance industry, there has been a divisive trend to embody racial distinctions into large parts of our legislation, extending recently to local body politics. In both education and healthcare, government funding is now influenced not just by need – as it should be – but also by the ethnicity of the recipient.

The Nelson-Tasman Primary Health Organisation is a good example: PHOs are explicitly established on a racial basis, and the Nelson-Tasman PHO is required to have half of the community representatives on its board representing local iwi, even though the number of people actually belonging to those local iwi is a tiny fraction of the population covered by that PHO.

Much of the non-Maori tolerance for the Treaty settlement process – where people who weren’t around in the 19th century pay compensation to the part-descendants of those who were – is based on a perception of relative Maori poverty. But in fact Maori income distribution is not very different from Pakeha income distribution, as sociologist Simon Chapple pointed out a couple of years ago in a much publicised piece of research.

Maori-ness explains very little about how well one does in life. Ethnicity does not determine one’s destiny.
It is the bottom 25% of Maori, most of them on welfare, who are conspicuously poor. They are no different to Pacific Islanders or other non-Maori on welfare; it’s just that there is a higher percentage of them in that category.

The myths of our past

Let me now counter some of the myths of our past. Too many of us look back through utopian glasses, imagining the Polynesian past as a genteel world of “wise ecologists, mystical sages, gifted artists, heroic navigators and pacifists who wouldn’t hurt a fly”.

It was nothing like that. Life was hard, brutal and short.

James Belich shows us that, once guns fell into Maori hands in the early years of the 19th century, ancient tribal rivalries saw Maori kill more of their own than the number of all New Zealanders lost in World War I. Probably 20,000 Maori were killed by Maori in the 1820s and 1830s.

Equally, however, the initial Maori contact with Europeans was hardly a contact with the cream of European civilisation. The first Europeans that Maori encountered were explorers, whalers, escaped convicts from Australia, and then settlers hungry for land to build a new life. Many were none-too concerned about the niceties of the Treaty. And none possessed any appreciation of the interpretations of its meaning that some are trying to breathe into the document today.

Any dispassionate look at our history shows that self-interest and greed featured large on both sides. Pakeha tried hard to separate Maori from their lands, and usually succeeded, although at various points the Crown endeavoured to ensure that proper procedures, consistent with the Article 2 guarantee to Maori that they were able to sell freely and fairly, were upheld.

Yet in spite of these problems, and in spite of all the turmoil, the shocks from the collision of two cultures and the chaos of unprecedented social change, the documentary evidence clearly shows that Maori society was immensely adaptable, and very open to new ways. That adaptability and resourcefulness, that openness to opportunity, that entrepreneurial spirit, is something that survived the trauma of colonisation, and is today reflected in a Maori renaissance across a wide range of business, cultural and sporting activity.

We should celebrate the fact that, despite a war between the races in the 1860s and the speed with which Maori were separated from much of their land – partly through settler greed, partly through a couple of generations of deficient leadership by some Maori – our Treaty is probably the only example in the world of any such treaty surviving rifle shots. Those who said a hundred years later that New Zealand possessed good race relations by world standards weren’t wrong. While we try to fix the wrongs of the past, we should celebrate the good things and shared experiences that underpin our nationhood.

All Maori got the right to vote, and had it long before 1900. By the 1930s, they possessed equal rights of access to state assistance, be it pensions or subsidised housing loans or
access to education. One standard of citizenship was gradually working, and the gaps that existed in every other colonial country were closing here as Maori took advantage of full employment.

Although he listed a number of land grievances in his centennial speech at Waitangi on 6 February 1940, Sir Apirana Ngata told those present that in the whole world it was unlikely that any “native” race had been as well treated by settlers as Maori.

Let me be quite clear. Many things happened to the Maori people that should not have happened. There were injustices, and the Treaty process is an attempt to acknowledge that, and to make a gesture at recompense. But it is only that. It can be no more than that.

None of us was around at the time of the New Zealand wars. None of us had anything to do with the confiscations. There is a limit to how much any generation can apologise for the sins of its great grandparents.

There are a few radicals who claim that sovereignty never properly passed from Maori into the hands of the Crown, and thus ultimately into the hands of all New Zealanders, Maori and non-Maori. They are living in a fantasy world. These claims come from the more radical Maori end of the spectrum. They can be seen for what they really are: a negotiating position.

What worries me about the current Treaty debate is that we find ourselves now, at the beginning of the 21st century, still locked into 19th century arguments.

Too many Maori leaders are looking backwards rather than towards the future. Too many have been encouraged by successive governments to adopt grievance mode.

The Treaty process

I want, now, to briefly review the more recent history of the Treaty process.

We have moved from a badly drafted and ambiguous Treaty document of 1840, through a long period of colonisation to an attempt to live by the simple principles that seem to underlie that document.

In 1975, the Waitangi Tribunal was established to hear Maori grievances about contemporary problems. The powers of the Tribunal were greatly extended in 1985. In a fateful decision, it was given authority to cover claims going back as far as the 1840 Treaty itself –this despite the fact that "full and final" settlements had been made with Tainui, Ngai Tahu and others, decades before.

A poorly drafted Act in 1985, coupled with inadequate attention to its implementation, allowed a major grievance industry to blossom.

Only a year later, in the State-Owned Enterprises Act 1986, the Government, not foreseeing the consequences of its decisions, made a last minute amendment to the Act. It read into
the bill under urgency, without any reference back to a Select Committee, a revised section 9, which stated that “Nothing in this Act shall permit the Crown to act in a manner that is inconsistent with the principles of the Treaty of Waitangi”.

Whether intended or not, Parliament had created a new concept – the “principles of the Treaty”. But these principles were never defined – nobody had a clue what they might be. In the end, it was left to un-elected Court of Appeal judges to determine an interpretation of the Treaty’s meaning that the politicians most certainly never intended.

Thus, an accident of litigation, which related to a specific provision in a piece of economic legislation, and the Court’s attempt to make that legislation work without adequate guidance from Parliament, ended up by providing a basis for building an entire constitutional relationship between Crown and Maori.

Since 1987, and especially since 1999 when the current Labour Government took office, governments have included references to the “principles of the Treaty” in legislation, still without defining them. Even the Cabinet Manual now states that Ministers must specify whether proposed bills comply with “the principles of the Treaty”. It doesn’t define those principles either.

In 1988, there was another development of great significance. The Government’s decision to sell off some of the state forests resulted in a judicial ruling that the Crown could not do so until ownership of the land beneath the trees had been determined by the Waitangi Tribunal process. To speed up what was becoming a much more drawn out process than had been envisaged in 1985, ministers came up with the idea of a Crown Forest Rental Trust that would receive the cutting fees as the forests were managed, and use the money to speed the hearing process about the land under the trees.

Far from speeding the process, it quickly slowed down. As one commentator has observed: “A growing number of bees – some busy, others drones – swarmed around this new, lucrative [Crown Forest Rental Trust] honey pot.” The troubles surrounding this particular honey pot continue to this day, and only very belatedly, and after a lot of very adverse publicity, is the current Government moving to clean up the Crown Forest Rental Trust process.

The biggest problem we face with the Treaty process is a lack of leadership. For 20 years now, mischievous minds have been interpreting the document in ways that they envisage will suit their financial purposes. We need proper leadership on the issue, and the next National Government will provide it.

One principle above all others guides my thinking: The Treaty of Waitangi should not be used as the basis for giving greater civil, political or democratic rights to any particular ethnic group.

The direction in which the current Government is heading is fundamentally different and it is wrong. For the sake of our future, it must be changed.
Treaty references in legislation


The only conclusion we can reach is that successive governments have believed that this 19th century treaty has something to say about today’s SOEs and national parks, today’s schools and universities, how we go about approving or declining building permits, what science we should study, what art we should look at, and even how we should regard the new frontier of genetic science!

Well, it doesn’t.

Local government now also has statutory obligations with respect to the undefined principles of the Treaty. The anachronism of the Parliamentary Maori seats (created as a temporary device in 1867 when tribally-organised, rurally-based Maori still formed the bulk of the Maori population) is now being extended by Labour to include local government. Some local authorities are introducing Maori wards without regard to whether the guiding democratic principle of "one person, one vote, one value" is violated.

The Local Government Act also requires local authorities to set up special consultation with Maori, over and above the extensive consultation already required with local communities, as if somehow Maori are not part of local communities. As a result, iwi are developing a central role with respect to local government. They possess the power to veto many development projects, projects which could provide us all with jobs.

Where does this all stop? And what group is driving this process?

As one commentator observed recently, a number of non-Maori radicals, having climbed high into our social hierarchy, wield considerable political, economic and judicial influence, and now”constitute a powerful fifth column in the Maori cause.”

It is bizarre that, in a society where the Prime Minister refuses to allow grace to be said at a state banquet, because, she says, we are an increasingly secular society, we fly Maori elders around the world to lift tapu and expel evil spirits from New Zealand embassies; we allow courts to become entangled in hearings about the risks to taniwha of a new road or building; we refuse to undertake potentially life-saving earthworks on Mount Ruapehu lest we interfere with the spirit of the mountain; and we allow our environment law to be turned into an opportunistic farce by allowing metaphysical and spiritual considerations to be taken into account in the decision process. It is a farce that could all too quickly turn to tragedy.
Spiritual beliefs are important in any society. They should be respected. They should never be mocked. But personal spiritual beliefs should not be allowed to drive our development as a modern society.

I am sure most Maori are as embarrassed by the present situation as most non-Maori are astounded. We are becoming a society that allows people to invent or rediscover beliefs for pecuniary gain. This process is becoming deeply corrupt, with some requirements for consultation resulting in substantial payments in a system that looks like nothing other than stand-over tactics.

These are crucial issues for the future of our nation. Unless they are dealt with properly, they will ultimately undermine the very essence of what it means to be a New Zealander.

Chris Trotter – who writes in the Dominion-Post in Wellington, and The Independent nationally – is not known for his sympathy for the National Party. He writes unashamedly from the political left, but what he writes is intellectually honest and always arresting. He recently asked:

“Shall New Zealand go forward into a new century as a modern, democratic and prosperous nation; or shall it become a culturally divided, economically stagnant and aristocratically misgoverned Pacific backwater, like the Kingdom of Tonga or the Republic of Fiji?”

He asked that question presumably because he thinks, as I do, that under the present Government, the answer is the latter. We’re going downhill.

The foreshore proposals

Now to a current problem that gets to the heart of today’s mismanagement of Treaty relations. Just after the closing of Parliament last year, when MPs couldn’t debate the issue, the Government released its proposals for dealing with the foreshore and seabed following a legal decision that overturned 125 years of settled law.

The simple option was to legislate to establish the Crown ownership that almost everyone believed already existed. Instead, the Government has come up with a convoluted notion called “public domain”. On the face of it, it sounds good. But it leaves room for much more than just limited recognition of “customary rights”, and in fact embodies vast powers, including the right to a Maori veto.

First, Government documents make it clear that the proposed “customary title” will allow the development of commercial activity arising from customary use. This “development right” will mean an expansion of traditional customary rights.

Secondly, along with commercial development, customary title also gives Maori a veto power over anyone else’s development, whether commercial or recreational. As I read the papers released by the Government, anyone wanting to build a small jetty on a coastal property where customary title has been established will need iwi consent. And what we
know from experience is that this is likely to require a substantial payment to smooth the path for consent.

Thirdly, Maori also gain a new role in the management of the entire coastline. Customary title will give commercial development rights, which over time will inevitably erode public access. In addition, 16 newly-created bureaucracies will give Maori a more dominant role than other New Zealanders in the use and development of the coastline, not only where customary title is granted, but elsewhere as well. All these committees will be taxpayer-funded. Maori will gain access to even more taxpayers’ funds for consultants, lawyers and hui to “build capacity” to take part in this process.

It is not hard to envisage what is going to happen.

The additional costs in any development process will make a small number of people much better off, but will make all other New Zealanders, including most Maori, worse off, by slowing, and in many cases blocking entirely, the potential for development of our resources, especially aquaculture.

There are massive conflicts of interest in all of this, and they will inevitably invite corruption. Under the proposals, Maori can now be owners, managers and regulators, all at the same time, thereby ensuring their own developments can succeed. They can block others if they can show to sympathetic authorities that their customary right is adversely affected. It is astonishing that the Government could establish such a conflict-ridden model. It is an absolute recipe for disaster.

A multi-cultural melting pot

Let me turn briefly to what we mean by “Maori”.

The short cut of referring to Maori as one group and Pakeha as another is enormously misleading. There is no homogenous, distinct Maori population – we have been a melting pot since the 19th century – although there is, of course, a highly distinctive Maori culture, which many people see as central to their identity.

Our definition of ethnicity is now a matter of subjective self-definition: if you are part Maori and want to identify as Maori you can do so.

The Maori ethnic group is a very loose one. There has always been considerable intermarriage between Maori and Pakeha. Anthropologists tell us that by 1900 there were no full-blooded Maori left in the South Island. By 2000, the same was true of the North Island. Today, nearly 70% of 24 to 34 year old New Zealanders who identify as Maori are married to someone who does not.

And most of the rest are themselves of multi-ethnic identity, itself a consequence of two centuries of intermarriage. As a consequence, a majority of Maori children grow up today with a non-Maori parent.
Many people feel it is somehow impolite to mention these facts. But by ignoring them we create an oppositional picture of race relations in this country, and we overlook the many powerful forces that can promote social cohesion.

What we are seeing is the emergence of a population in New Zealand of multi-ethnic heritage – a distinct South Seas race of New Zealanders – where more and more of us will have a diverse ancestry. Hopefully, we will get joy and pride from all the different elements that go to make us who we are.

My own family is racially mixed. My 10-year-old gains both from his New Zealand-European and from his Singaporean-Chinese heritage.

There is plenty of evidence that most New Zealanders are happy to see New Zealand develop in this way. In spite of the heightened rhetoric from the publicists of ethnic difference, most people treat their ethnic allegiances fluidly. For many people, aspects other than their ethnicity matter much more to them – their religion, their profession, their sports club, their gender, and their political allegiance.

What do I conclude from all this?

First, we need to look at our past honestly, not through a lens which projects current values onto 19th century New Zealand, and not by stripping away the context of the past.

The Treaty contains just three short clauses, and deals with the government of New Zealand, property rights, and citizenship. Those principles must be upheld. Where there has been a clear breach of the Treaty – where land has been stolen, for example – then it is right that attempts to make amends should be made.

But the Treaty is not some magical, mystical, document. Lurking behind its words is not a blueprint for building a modern, prosperous, New Zealand. The Treaty did not create a partnership: fundamentally, it was the launching pad for the creation of one sovereign nation.

We should not use the Treaty as a basis for creating greater civil, political or democratic rights for Maori than for any other New Zealander. In the 21st century, it is unconscionable for us to be taking that separatist path, and this Labour Government deserves to be defeated on that basis alone.

The National Party has an honourable record of resolving historical Treaty grievances. Virtually all of the major financial settlements achieved to date occurred under National in the 1990s. They included settlements for the Fisheries ($150 million), Tainui ($170 million) and Ngai Tahu ($170 million). The leadership shown by Prime Minister Jim Bolger and Treaty Negotiations Minister Sir Douglas Graham was crucial in establishing a national consensus on the need to resolve historical grievances as part of the process of reconciliation.

The settlement process has slowed considerably since Labour took office, with claims resolution bogged down due to lack of leadership and commitment.
Let me make it quite clear. National is absolutely committed to completing the settlement of historical grievances. We will ensure that the process is accelerated and brought to a conclusion. It must then be wound up. It is essential to put this behind us if all of us – and Maori in particular – are to stop looking backward and start moving forward into this new century as a modern, democratic and prosperous nation.

We intend to remove divisive race-based features from legislation. The “principles of the Treaty” – never clearly defined yet ever expanding – are the thin end of a wedge leading to a racially divided state and we want no part of that. There can be no basis for special privileges for any race, no basis for government funding based on race, no basis for introducing Maori wards in local authority elections, and no obligation for local governments to consult Maori in preference to other New Zealanders.

We will remove the anachronism of the Maori seats in Parliament.

We will deal with the foreshore issue by legislating to return to the previous status quo – the settled legal situation before the Court of Appeal decision. That is a position where for the most part the Crown owned the foreshore. In so far as there was uncertainty about the situation before, we will clarify the position. Public ownership leaves room for recognising limited customary rights, but we will not allow customary title. If this Government issues such title, we will revoke it.

Having done all that, we really will be one people – as Hobson declared us to be in 1840.

I acknowledge that there are problems of Maori socio-economic disparity in some places, mostly rural. We will focus our welfare reform efforts on those areas. We will not have entire townships, and some suburbs, on the dole.

Welfare recipients will be offered retraining, and offered some activity by which they can earn, and be seen to earn, their welfare cheque. Their children will see their parents constructively engaged in the community each day, not marginalised by it. That, more than anything, will restore their dignity.

But these are not Treaty issues: they are social welfare issues, and Maori New Zealanders who are in need are as entitled to assistance as any other New Zealanders who are in need.

Similarly, a National Government will continue to fund Te Kohanga Reo, Kaupapa Maori, Wananga and Maori primary health providers – not because we have been conned into believing that that is somehow a special right enjoyed by Maori under the Treaty, but rather because National believes that all New Zealanders have a right to choice in education and health.

Finally, we ask Maori to take some responsibility themselves for what is happening in their own communities. Citizenship brings obligations as well as rights. The Maori translation of Article 3 was very clear about that. We all have an obligation to make the effort to build a culture of aspiration – as the great Maori leaders of the past, and indeed some of the Maori leaders of the present, have advocated – not a culture of grievance. Like everybody else, Maori must build their own future with their own hands.
Most are doing that already, and it is crucially important that government policy encourages this, not discourages it.

The spirit evident in the Maori response to the new opportunities that emerged in the mid-19th century is alive and well today. It is displayed in the outstanding performance of Maori in fishing and other primary sectors, and in a range of entrepreneurial business, sporting and cultural activities.

Their efforts, their aspirations, and their focus are light-years away from the handout mentality being fostered by this Government.

A culture of dependence and grievance can only be hugely destructive of the Maori people and, if left unchecked, destructive of our ability to build a prosperous nation of one people, living under one set of laws.

Let me make one final concluding comment.

In many ways, I am deeply saddened to have to make a speech about issues of race. In this country, it should not matter what colour you are, or what your ethnic origin might be. It should not matter whether you have migrated to this country and only recently become a citizen, or whether your ancestors arrived two, five, 10 or 20 generations ago.

The indigenous culture of New Zealand will always have a special place in our emerging culture, and will be cherished for that reason.

But we must build a modern, prosperous, democratic nation based on one rule for all. We cannot allow the loose threads of 19th century law and custom to unravel our attempts at nation-building in the 21st century.

Dr Don Brash
Leader of the National Party
27 January 2004
Mallard Speech: “We are all New Zealanders now”

Thursday, 29 July 2004, 3:04 pm
Speech: New Zealand Government

28 July 2004 Speech Notes

Hon Trevor Mallard: Speech to the Stout Research Centre for NZ Studies, Victoria University, Wellington

Thank you for the invitation to speak to you today. I’d like to briefly outline my role as Co-ordinating Minister, Race Relations, and then move on to a wider discussion about the context of the current race relations debate and the principles of the Treaty of Waitangi.

As Co-ordinating Minister, Race Relations, one of my first tasks is to provide an assurance that government policy and programmes are targeted on the basis of need, not on the basis of race.

I want to make it clear that my role as Co-ordinating Minister, Race Relations, or for that matter as Minister of State Services, is not to act as a constitutional expert or defining authority on all matters relating to the Treaty or race relations. What I am focused on is getting the facts out into the public domain so that New Zealanders can have a reasoned and balanced debate.

Any reasoned debate about race relations requires all of us who participate to understand and reflect on our particular histories in the New Zealand context. That involves considering the place of the Treaty, the nature of Treaty settlements in New Zealand and the rights and needs of all New Zealanders as we go forward in the 21st century.

I want to cover some of my initial thinking on these issues and how this will inform my approach to my responsibilities and the outcomes I want to achieve.

Among the key questions we have to ask ourselves is: “what defines New Zealand in the 21st century?”

How do we build the sort of New Zealand that all reasonable people want to be part of? In my view extremists at both ends of the spectrum don’t help us achieve that.

We have processes in place for righting the wrongs of the past. That means sorting things out so we can all move on. As that happens we can build a stronger consensus about what it means to be New Zealanders in what’s going to be our best century yet.

So I see our 21st century as being about perfecting our nationhood, banishing the demons from our past, cheering each other on as New Zealand citizens, and being successful, instead of some people constantly feeling they are always missing out, always left behind.

There has to be frank and open debate on what New Zealand is about, and on the futures we can share together. Partisan and sectional politics on these issues will get us nowhere.
People who sand-bag themselves into die-hard positions will not be part of creative and positive solutions.

The National Party has dug itself into a bunker and thinks there’s a race war going on. National is the North Korea of New Zealand politics. They're spreading fear by threatening to go nuclear on race relations. Such a party cannot create a New Zealand that is unified and at peace with itself.

Meanwhile, other people are sitting down and working through the issues like sensible adults, or at least indicating that that is precisely what they would like to do.

The debate about our future is not well served by those who make dangerous generalisations. It is simply irresponsible to make assertions about Maori constantly skiving off to tangi or Maori doctors being less able than their non-Maori counterparts. I am appalled when people show contempt for the spiritual and cultural beliefs of others or dismissively resort to name-calling. Paranoia politics and playing on prejudice will not advance New Zealand one iota.

Nor will race-based politics and race-based policy-delivery. Services must be on the basis of need and not because of a sense of race-based entitlement.

New Zealand also has to get its British imperial past behind it. Maori and Pakeha are both indigenous people to New Zealand now. I regard myself as an indigenous New Zealander - I come from Wainuiomata.

We've left behind a British identity. This has meant that we no longer easily understand the people who tried to tear up the Treaty and went to war with Maori in 1863. Once were Warriors. Once were British.

Indigeneity is about the diversity of ways in which we belong and identify with our country. There are Chinese and Indian New Zealanders who have become deeply indigenous too, just like other kiwis whose forbears come from a huge range of other countries.

Michael King was passionate about New Zealand and about the emergence of a unique New Zealand identity. He rightly pointed out that for most New Zealanders, regardless of their ethnicity, home is here, Aotearoa New Zealand.

He argued that just because one group has been here longer than another does not make its members more New Zealand than later arrivals, nor does it give them the right to exclude others from full participation in national life.

Indigeneity is also about respecting the First Nation or Tangata Whenua in this country, Maori, who after all agreed to the introduction of the British law and government to New Zealand under the Treaty of Waitangi.

Without the trust of Maori in the British government back then, New Zealand as we know it today would not have developed.
Let's get some facts straight about the Treaty. The Treaty is both bigger and smaller than many people think it is.

First, despite the Treaty having no formal legal status, it has been accorded a kind of constitutional status because it gave legitimacy to the British Crown in New Zealand.

As Professor Philip Joseph has stated, "The disputed status of the Treaty under international law is an historical curiosity that has no bearing upon the Treaty's symbolic importance. Its status under international law counts for little if the promises exchanged in 1840 were the basis on which the British Crown acquired New Zealand." (Constitutional and Administrative Law in New Zealand, p44.).

Second, the New Zealand Government would be dealing with indigenous law issues whether there was a Treaty of Waitangi or not. Australia is proof of that. There were no treaties in Australia, as there were in North America, South Africa and New Zealand, and yet Australians are still facing many of the same debates that we are.

Let's not blame the Treaty. It is hugely significant but it is not the be-all and end-all, nor the panacea for every challenge we face as a country. We would still have to face the challenges of genuinely redressing Maori grievances, of fully associating Maori with New Zealand nationhood, and of ensuring their fullest participation in our economy and society, regardless of whether we had the Treaty or not.

Third, in many ways the Treaty no longer underwrites what it used to. Maori, when they signed the Treaty, signed up to the British global order which existed at the time. Since then New Zealand has become an independent self-governing country. But the government's duty to look after all its citizens, Maori and Pakeha, equally - as promised by the Treaty - remains.

There are no people on earth who would of their own free will agree to extinguish themselves as an ethnically distinct group and totally surrender control over their communities and culture to others.

That cannot be what New Zealand's 21st century is about. New Zealanders know that our unity as a nation can only be achieved by respecting and admitting diversity and difference.

Today's backward-looking National Party, stalled in the 19th, or perhaps the 18th century, are the inheritors of the original assimilation project. It is hard to see what else they can mean. They are the successors of the Victorian colonialists who wreaked havoc in so many countries.

Winston Peters was more correct than he may have intended when he described Don Brash as a colonial tea planter.

So how do we make sense of the Treaty?

The two texts of the Treaty have led to different understandings. Because of the need to apply the Treaty to present-day circumstances and issues, the “principles” of the Treaty
have been referred to by the courts and in legislation, rather than the text of the Treaty itself.

Treaty principles interpret the Treaty as a whole; its intention and its spirit. Some commentators argue that it is the spirit of the Treaty that matters most, overriding the differences in the texts.

Lord Woolf, in the Broadcasting Assets case in 1994 described Treaty principles as “the underlying mutual obligations and responsibilities the Treaty places on the parties. They reflect the intention of the Treaty as a whole and include, but are not confined to, the express terms of the Treaty.”

So what are these principles that we keep referring to?

In order to define the principles of the Treaty we must look primarily to judgments from our courts and to some of the reports of the Waitangi Tribunal, both of which have had to wrestle with these issues.

The Court of Appeal emphasised that there were two core principles. These were “partnership”, in the sense that they referred to a relationship akin to a partnership, and “active protection”. Both the courts and the Waitangi Tribunal have determined that the principle of partnership includes the obligation on both parties to act reasonably, honourably and in good faith.

The principle of active protection has been described as the duty of the Crown to actively protect Maori people in the use of their lands and waters to the fullest extent practicable. This principle arises from the fundamental exchange contained in the Treaty – the cession of sovereignty for the protection of rangatiratanga. This principle is sometimes described as the principle of reciprocity.

A further principle defined by the courts is the principle of redress. It reflects the Crown’s duty to take active and positive steps to redress Treaty breaches. It entails a fair and reasonable recognition and recompense for wrongdoing.

We can also look to the 1989 “Principles for Crown Action on the Treaty of Waitangi”, which define the essential exchange of promises within the Treaty in the form of principles. The first three of those five principles are:

“The Principle of Government/The Kawanatanga Principle” (The government has the right to govern and to make laws); “The Principle of Self-Management/The Rangatiratanga Principle” (The iwi have the right to organise as iwi, and, under the law, to control their resources as their own); and “The Principle of Equality” (All New Zealanders are equal before the law).

These principles reflect the three articles of the Treaty.

The fourth principle is “The Principle of Co-operation”, which encompasses “good faith, consultation, and partnership”.

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It is stated that “The Treaty is regarded by the Crown as establishing a fair basis for two peoples in one country. Duality and unity are both significant. ... Reasonable co-operation can only take place if there is consultation on major issues of common concern and if good faith, balance, and common sense are shown on all sides.”

The final of these five principles is “The Principle of Redress”, whereby the Crown accepts a responsibility to provide a process for the resolution of grievances arising from the Treaty.

There is a myth that the Treaty gave Maori extra rights over and above those of other New Zealanders.

Article III makes it clear that Maori were to have the same rights as other British subjects, the same rights as the settlers. Article III was an explicit equaliser and a promise that Maori were not to have race-based legislation passed against them.

Maori have no extra rights or privileges under the Treaty or in the policy of the New Zealand government.

So why have Maori invoked the Treaty, if they are on a par with other groups for access to resources and funding?

The British world of 1840 was a class and race-based power-system, at home in the United Kingdom and abroad. Segregation formally or informally was a fact of life throughout its colonies. South Africa as we know was the last bastion of that world.

What Article III guaranteed, in the context of that age, was that Maori would be equal to all other British subjects in the eyes of the law and of the state.

It was necessary to expressly state this back in 1840. Non-discrimination or equality could not be taken for granted. The Maori signatories themselves required this assurance, so that they would not descend into a sub-class.

The Victorians understood civil rights, but they were rough and ready and you had to enforce your rights if they were to be upheld, otherwise "tough”.

The Crown Colony government knew perfectly well what Article III meant and how Maori understood it. In an Ordinance of 1850, Governor George Grey insisted that no laws were to apply to Maori that were not to apply to the settlers and to other British subjects.

So when Maori claim resources under Article III they are asking for what they see as their equitable share in relation to other citizens and in proportion to their needs.

Sometimes these claims are upheld, sometimes they are not.

I think at this point it's also important to dispel some of the myths about the supposed multi-billion dollar Treaty grievance industry. Since 1989 the government has paid out around $680 million in Treaty settlements. Putting this into context, last year alone Telecom
made a $709 million profit, the government collected around $850 million in tobacco excise tax, and our total taxation revenue was over $40 billion.

Treaty settlements are an important part of putting the negative aspects of our past behind us and getting on with a brighter future but they shouldn't be over-stated or unnecessarily exaggerated.

It's worthwhile considering the spirit of the Treaty then in terms of New Zealand in 2004.

The spirit of the Treaty is about a bond between New Zealanders that should transcend disputes over conflicting intentions and linguistic wrangles over different texts.

The spirit of the Treaty is no mystery, even though the lawyers can make it out to seem like one.

I've talked about how it promises equality to Maori and non-Maori under the law. On the Crown’s side it also involves recognition of Maori property and customary rights guaranteed under it. On the Maori side it involves acceptance of the new sovereign power in 1840, and in 2004 acceptance of the state system that continues to guarantee their rights.

The Treaty was open-ended, not a straitjacket. It was a preliminary agreement to an ongoing relationship under the same law and government. The terms of that relationship have changed over the past 164 years.

The Treaty left us considerable freedom to fill in its considerable gaps together. Overall the outcome has been good. What might have happened without it in the world of 1840 is interesting to think about.

The partition of New Zealand and of Maori amongst rival colonial powers is one scenario. New Zealand of the 1840s could have divided among British, French, Maori and any number of other countries. For example, New Guinea of the 1880s was divided between Britain, Germany and Holland. Who knows, New Zealand could have been split - like American Samoa and Samoa.

Living together as citizens in the spirit of the Treaty requires mutual respect. The basis for that has been there for a while now. Many New Zealanders enjoy and respond to films like Braveheart. There is as much myth as fact in Braveheart but that doesn’t spoil a good film. What people respond to is the spirit of the film, and that spirit is the defence by people of their liberties and their countries against an invading power.

New Zealand has contested history too, and to most Maori it looks, sounds and feels like Braveheart for the 19th century period at least.

Maori are not alone in having ancestors who were victims at one time or other of the British power structures. Power was as unbalanced in the Lancaster mills as it was on the Waikato or the Punjab.
Our job in New Zealand is to not perpetuate that bad past in our own land but to leave it all behind, and to get on with it.

We have to get over this implicit attitude that“History” just happened to Maori, and that Pakeha history is all either offshore, about fighting in two World Wars, or else is “World History” in which we are only a minor player.

The Treaty was signed in 1840, and its intent must be balanced and understood in terms of New Zealand in 2004.

We should behave as citizens in terms of both the spirit of the Treaty and of the spirit of modern New Zealand.

New Zealanders are quite rightly proud of living in one of the world’s oldest, most successful, participatory, and genuinely egalitarian democracies. We have a reputation for giving people a fair go. It pays to trust this democracy first and foremost, and to confide in New Zealanders and trust them to make the right decisions as I know they will.

New Zealanders know that just throwing out the Treaty is impossible and irresponsible, and that this sort of provocation will cost us all. However Pakeha New Zealanders also want to be trusted by their Maori fellow-New Zealanders.

New Zealanders do not want to be condemned and cursed as if they are the British imperialist white ascendancy colonialists. We see ourselves as egalitarian, fair-minded people who have little sympathy for elitism.

The Treaty and New Zealand democracy are reconcilable if we talk together as kiwis. They are reconcilable if Maori accept that the best guarantee of minority indigenous rights is the protection and good-will of the majority. Dumping on each other has no role in constructing a New Zealand for Maori and Pakeha citizens.

Most importantly, the Treaty and New Zealand democracy are reconcilable if politicians do not irresponsibly undermine the Treaty.

As the Prime Minister said earlier this year at the opening of parliament, "Responsible 21st century governments and societies don’t try to reinvent the economic policies of the 1990s, the society of the 1950s, or the attitude towards indigenous people of the 1830s. New Zealand has moved on".

To conclude, the philosopher John Stuart Mill said the precondition for the political stability of any democracy "is a strong and active principle of cohesion among members of the same community or state".

Cohesion doesn’t mean assimilation of every single one of us into one mould of the identikit New Zealander, as National would want.
It means getting on with each other appreciating and enjoying our differences, and recognising how those differences add value to our country as a go-ahead, positive, future-looking nation.

I believe the vast majority of New Zealanders want this.

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