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Tiopira McDowell

Abstract

In 1867 the New Zealand Parliament passed legislation to introduce four seats in the House of Representatives for the Māori people, the indigenous tribes of Aotearoa-New Zealand. This thesis investigates the history of how Māori Members of Parliament and Māori political movements have engaged with the Māori seats from 1867 to 2008.

It asks a series of questions on the nature of Māori political engagement with the Māori seats: Why were the Māori seats established and what role did Māori communities play in their establishment? Why did Māori choose to engage with parliament and how did they regard the Māori seats? What types of leaders did Māori political movements send to represent them, according to what criteria were those leaders selected, and how did Māori attitudes towards leadership change over time? What did Māori hope to achieve by sending their leaders to parliament, and what ambitions did those leaders carry with them? What have Māori parliamentarians in the Māori seats achieved and what factors have helped or hindered their efforts? How effective have Māori MPs been in representing their constituents in Parliament and by what criteria should we judge their effectiveness? And how has Māori political engagement with the Māori seats changed over time?

This thesis also looks to the cultural and social implications of political engagement, asking what impact Māori culture, customs, language and social organisation had on Māori political engagement, and in turn what impact did political engagement with the Māori seats have on Māori culture and society?

To answer these questions this thesis discusses the establishment of the Māori seats and the Māori political movements that have engaged with these seats, covering the formation of the seats 1835-1867, the careers of Māori MPs whose efforts and achievements are well established in the existing historical literature 1887-1943, the era of Ngā mātāmua the first wave of Māori MPs 1868-1938, the Rātana-Labour era, 1932-1960, the political career of Matiu Rata 1963-1991, and the formation of the Māori Party 1996-2008. This thesis employs a mix of primary documents, oral interviews and secondary sources to pull together a picture of Māori political engagement with the Māori seats over the past 145 years. It argues that historians have underestimated the role of the Māori MPs and the agency of Māori communities in determining the direction of political engagement. The Māori MPs have been dealt with in a homogenous fashion and written off as ineffective and ill prepared for the rigours of parliament. A closer reading demonstrates that the Māori MPs have made a considerable contribution to New Zealand society in pursuing the ambitions of their constituents, and that the Māori seats play a significant role in the social, cultural and political landscape of the nation.
Dedication

*He tohu maumahara tenei mo Vasudeva Venkataiah:
He tangata pai ia.*
Mihimihi

Ko Motatau te Maunga,
Taikirau te Awa,
Te Manu Koroki te Marae,
Ko Ngāti Hine te hapū,
Ngāpuhi te iwi,
Ko Kawiti te tangata.

He paku mihi tēnei ki tōku whānau me ōku hoa i awhi mai i te tuhinga o tēnei mahi rangahau, aha koa ngā piki me ngā heke o te rori. Kia kore e mutu te mihi ki a koutou mā.

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This thesis is dedicated to my father-in law Vasudeva Venkataiah who passed away in December of 2008 and is greatly missed. Vasudeva encouraged me with great enthusiasm to undertake Doctoral studies. Moe mai matua, moe mai.
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Abbreviations

ACT - Association of Citizens and Taxpayers (Political Party)
AJHR - Appendices to the Journals of the House of Representatives
BBC - British Broadcasting Corporation
DNZB - Dictionary of New Zealand Biography
FPP - First Past the Post (Electoral System)
J Force - Japan Force (New Zealand troops stationed in Japan following the end of World War II)
JHRNZ – Journals of the House of Representatives of New Zealand
JLCNZ – Journals of the Legislative Council of New Zealand
MMP - Mixed Member Proportional Representation (Electoral System)
MP - Member of Parliament
MWEO - Māori War Effort Organisation
NZH - New Zealand Herald
NZJH - New Zealand Journal of History
NZPD - New Zealand Parliamentary Debates
TACSA - Te Aute College Student’s Association
US / USA - United States of America
VAD - Voluntary Aid Detachment
YMP - Young Māori Party
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Glossary

Aotearoa – New Zealand
Ariki – Paramount chief
Haka – War dance
Hākari
Hapū – Sub-tribe
Hauraki-Waikato – Māori Electorate, 2008 - 2012
Hīkoi – Walk, march, protest march
Hui – Assembly, gathering, meeting
Hui o te motu – National assembly, gathering, meeting
Īhoa – Jehovah
Ikaroa-Rāwhiti – Māori Electorate, 1999 - 2012
Iwi – Tribe
Kapa haka – Concert party, action song performance group
Karakia – Prayer, incantation
Kaumātua – Male elder, elders
Kaupapa – Cause, plan, principle
Kawa – Protocol, etiquette
Kāwanatanga – Government, governorship
Kīngitanga – Māori King Movement
Kiwi – Native flightless bird, also a term used to describe New Zealanders
Kōrero – Talk, discussion, speech
Korowai – Ceremonial cloak
Kotahitanga – Unity, unification
Kūpapa – Pro-government tribes
Mana – Status, prestige, authority, power, psychic force
Mana motuhake – Independent / separate / discreet authority
Mana wāhine – Women’s status and rights
Mana whenua – Land ownership, land rights
Māori – Indigenous person / people of Aotearoa-New Zealand
Māoridom – The Māori community
Māoritanga – Māori language, culture, customs and protocol
Marae – Courtyard in front of traditional meetinghouse
Māramatanga – Gospel
Māranga mai – Wake up, rise up
Mātāuranga – Knowledge, learning, education
Maunga - Mountain
Mere pounamu – Club shaped weapon made of New Zealand Jade
Mihi – Welcome, greet, pay tribute
Mihimihi – Welcome, greet
Mōrehu – Survivor, the name given to the followers of T.W. Rātana
Moriori – The Indigenous people of the Chatham Islands
Muriwhenua – The Far North of the North Island of Aotearoa-New Zealand
Ngā koata e whā – The Four Quarters, the name given to the four Māori seats in parliament and the four Rātana MPs who held these seats
Ngā mātāmua – The vanguard, name given to the first wave of Māori MPs to enter Parliament in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century
Pā – Village, fortification, fortified village
Paepae – Orator’s seat on a marae
Pākehā – European
Pepeha – Tribal motto or proverb
Piri Wiri Tua – Name given to T.W. Rātana as a campaigner who would ‘stick fast and bore through to the other side’
Pounamu – Greenstone, New Zealand Jade, highly prized by Māori
Rangatahi – Young person
Rangatira – Chief
Rangatiratanga – Chieftainship, sovereignty
Raupatu – Conquer, confiscation, severe punishment
Rohe – Geographical or tribal region
Rohe pōtae – The regional boundary of the Māori King movement
Rūnanga – Council, assembly
Taiaha – Spear, wooden sword
Taihoa – Wait, wait and see
Take – Issue, concern, claim
Takutai moana – The foreshore and seabed
Tāmaki Makaurau – Auckland City, Māori Electorate, 2002 - 2012
Tā moko – Traditional Māori tattoo / skin art
Tangata reo rua – Bilingual individual
Tangata whenua – People of the land, Indigenous people, local people
Tangi – Māori funeral rites, to cry
Taniwha – Monster, guardian spirit
Taonga – Treasure, prized possession
Tauiwi – Foreigner
Tautohe – Debate
Te Ana o te Raiona – The Lions’ Den, Māori name for Parliament
Te Ariki – Jesus Christ
Te Hoko Whitu a Tū – The Māori Pioneer Battalion who served in WWI
Te kerēme – ‘The Claim’, the name given to the Ngāi Tahu claim for the return of their lands, resources and tribal authority
Te Kotahitanga Mo Te Tiriti o Waitangi – ‘The Union of the Treaty of Waitangi’, one of various titles of the Māori Parliament established in the late nineteenth century
Tekoteko – Carved figure
Te Māngai – The ‘Mouthpiece of Jehovah’, name given to T.W. Rātana
Te Ōmeka – The Rātana Band, identified by their purple uniforms
Te Reo Māori – The Māori language
Te Tai Hauāuru – Western Māori Electorate, 1996 - 2012
Te Taitokerau – Northern Māori Electorate, 1996 - 2012
Te Tai Tonga – Southern Māori Electorate, 1996 - 2012
Te Ture Tangata – The secular mission of T.W. Rātana
Te Ture Wairua – The spiritual mission of T.W. Rātana
Te Wai Pounamu – The South Island of Aotearoa-New Zealand
Te whānau pani – Bereaved family
Tītī – Muttonbird
Tihe mauriora – ‘I sneeze, it is life!’ A positive exclamation
Tikanga – Customs, beliefs, rules
Tino rangatiratanga – Absolute chieftainship, absolute sovereignty, term used in the Māori text of the Treaty of Waitangi
Toa – Warrior, group of warriors
Tohu – Sign, spiritual sign, warning
Tohunga – Reader of spiritual signs, traditional Māori healer and priest
Tupuna – Ancestor
Tūpuna – Ancestors
Tūpuna title – Ancestral title
Wāhi tapu – Sacred place
Waiariki – Eastern Māori Electorate, 1999 - 2012
Waiata – Song
Waka taua – Intricately carved war canoe
Wānanga – Learning, lore, occult knowledge
Whaikōrero – Oratory
Whakaaro – Thought, idea
Whakapapa - Genealogy
Whakataukī – Saying, proverb
Whānau – Family
Whāngai – Māori custom of adoption of a child by a family member
Wharekai – Dining hall
Whare Oranga Ake – Government policy for Māori within the justice system implemented by Dr Pita Sharples and the Māori Party in 2011
Whare wānanga – Traditional house or school of learning
Whetū mārama – Shining Star, the symbol of the Rātana Movement
Introduction: Te Ana o te Raiona – Entering the Lion’s Den

On the fourth of August 1868, Ngāti Kahungunu rangatira Tareha Te Moananui took to his feet and with the aid of an interpreter delivered the first speech made in New Zealand’s House of Representatives by a Māori Member of parliament.¹ Along with a parcel of queries over the administration of Māori affairs by the current government, Te Moananui delivered a broader message to his fellow parliamentarians:

I say to you wise people, work: you the men whose thoughts are wisdom, work: you the people having understanding, do that which is good for the

¹This thesis makes extensive use of te reo Māori, the Māori language. Te reo Māori is an official language of Aotearoa-New Zealand, but in spite of decades of work to bolster the language and encourage its use te reo remains a language in decline. This thesis makes use of a number of key words and phrases in te reo, and includes lengthier quotes and passages with translations provided. The use of te reo in this thesis is part of a wider effort by language speakers to promote the use and retention of the language in every day settings. That said, many of the terms used have no English equivalent, and the lengthier quotations and passages included carry deeper implied meanings and connotations in te reo that cannot easily be translated into English. A glossary has been included to provide translations of the words used.
people, and lay down wise laws…. It has been laid down in the Scripture and also by your own law, that there should be one law for both of us. I urge upon you again to do that which is good, for you will have no cause to be anxious if you do so, and if evil arises, then look at it yourselves, and let me look at it also, and let us work together.²

Over the next 145 years Te Moananui, his contemporaries, and their political descendants would attempt to do just that – to put their wisdom to work, lay down wise laws, and work with their Pākehā colleagues for the betterment of their community and the nation. This thesis tells the stories of the Māori men and women who entered what Māori refer to as Te Ana o te Raiona, the Lions’ den, to carve out a place for their people in a developing settler nation via the Māori seats in parliament. It also tells the stories of the Māori political movements that sent their leaders to parliament, and the hopes, ambitions, trials and visions that inspired their efforts. At its centre is a question: how have Māori MPs and Māori political movements engaged with the Māori seats in parliament over the past 145 years, and what does this engagement tell us about the nature of Māori political engagement? Branching off from this central question is a series of further queries. Why were the Māori seats established in 1867 and what role did Māori play in their formation? Why did Māori choose to engage with the Māori seats in parliament and how did they regard these seats? What types of Māori political movements contested these seats, and what does the emergence of such movements tell us about change and continuity in Māori society over time? What types of leaders did Māori send to represent them in the Māori seats, according to what criteria were those leaders selected, and how did Māori attitudes towards leadership change over time? What did Māori hope to achieve by sending their leaders to parliament, and what ambitions did those leaders carry with them? What have Māori parliamentarians and Māori political movements achieved by engaging with the Māori seats in parliament, and what factors have helped or hindered their efforts? How effective have Māori MPs been in representing their constituents in parliament and by what criteria should we judge their effectiveness? And how has Māori political engagement changed over time?

² New Zealand Parliamentary Debates, 1868, 2, p.270.
This study also asks what influence Māori culture, customs and social norms have had on Māori political engagement. What was unique about a Māori approach to politics, and what differentiated Māori politicians from general seat politicians? How has Māori culture and society influenced the formation of Māori political movements, candidate selection, electoral campaigns and voting patterns in the Māori electorates? In turn, what influence has Māori engagement with the Māori seats had on Māori, and how has Māori culture and society changed as a consequence of political engagement with the Māori seats? Finally, what have Māori achieved over the past 145 years by engaging with parliament and the Māori seats?

Answering these questions requires analysis of the past 145 years of Māori political engagement, from the election of the first Māori MPs to the Māori seats in 1868 through to the signing of the Confidence and Supply Agreement between National and the Māori Party in November 2008. To contain such a lengthy study within the time and word limits of a PhD, this thesis will focus specifically on Māori MPs elected to the Māori seats in parliament via the support of Māori political movements. To define these terms for the purposes of this thesis, a Māori is defined as the descendant of a New Zealand Māori that self-identifies and is identified by his or her whānau, hapū or iwi as Māori. The Māori seats refer to the seats set aside for Māori electorates established under the Māori Representation Act 1867. A Māori political movement is defined as a movement established primarily, though not exclusively, by Māori to represent Māori communities and interests, and run according to tikanga and kaupapa Māori alongside western political conventions. By necessity, this approach excludes a small but significant number of Māori MPs and political strategies employed by Māori to engage with parliament, specifically Māori who held general electorate seats in parliament, Māori MPs who were members of non-Māori political parties but who held Māori seats, and list MPs in non-Māori political parties elected during the Mixed Member Proportional Representation (MMP) era from 1996 to the present day.

Before discussing the MPs and movements that have been included in this research, it is necessary to provide a brief overview of those Māori MPs who have not been included, along with justification for their exclusion. Several influential Māori MPs including Sir James Carroll, Manuera Benjamin Riwai Couch and Winston Peters
have pursued Māori interests via their positions within general electorate seats. Māori MPs have also played significant roles within non-Māori political parties. Carroll rose to the positions of Native Minister, Colonial Secretary and Acting Prime Minister as a member of the Liberal Party; Sir Apirana Ngata was a Cabinet member, Native Minister and Deputy Prime Minister during his lengthy career as a Liberal Party MP; and Sir Māui Pōmare took on roles as a Cabinet member, Minister responsible for the Cook Islands and Minister of Health as a member of the Reform Party. Couch held the Wairarapa seat and served as Minister of Māori Affairs and Minister of Police as a member of the fourth National Government.

In recent years a number of Māori women have entered parliament as members of non-Māori political parties. Sandra Lee-Vercoe took on positions as Minister of Local Government, Minister of Conservation and Associate Minister of Māori Affairs as a member of the Alliance Party between 1999 and 2002. Metiria Turei was elected to Parliament as a list MP in 2002, and has risen within the ranks of the Green Party to being appointed party co-leader in 2009. Georgina Te Heuheu, Paula Bennett and Hekia Parata entered parliament in 1996, 2005 and 2008 respectively as National Party list MPs. All three have taken on ministerial positions as members of the fourth and fifth National Governments: Te Heuheu has since retired and Bennett is now MP for the Waitakere electorate and Minister of Social Welfare.

Of these MPs who were elected to general seats and were members of non-Māori political parties, the Young Māori Party members of Ngata, Pōmare, Buck and their mentor Carroll cast the longest shadow over Māori policy and political engagement. This thesis will focus on the less well known MPs and movements that have contested the Māori electorates: the Young Māori Party and Carroll have come to dominate the existing literature, to the detriment of those other Māori MPs who have been elected to the Māori seats. The careers of these men are, for a topic of Māori history, unusually well researched, widely debated, and critically discussed in the existing literature. This and following chapters will argue that the YMP and Carroll have been well served by historians, and that more focus must be placed on the other Māori MPs, of whom far less is known. That said, their influence is crucial to understanding the history of Māori political engagement, and while this thesis does not include a
separate chapter on these men they will be discussed in some detail throughout the thesis.

The New Zealand First Party and its enigmatic leader Winston Peters have not been discussed substantially in this thesis. New Zealand First has a Māori leader, has had Māori candidates and Māori MPs, held the Māori seats between 1995 and 1999, and has enjoyed support from Māori voters. That said, New Zealand First is not a Māori political party: its manifesto, constitution, values and policies are not substantially informed by tikanga or kaupapa Māori, its candidates are not selected by Māori communities, its Māori MPs serve a national constituency rather than the Māori electorates exclusively, its policies are centrist and populist in outlook, and it conforms to the party structures and processes typical of most western political parties in Westminster-style democracies.

The careers of Māori Labour MPs from the 1970s onward have been largely excluded from this study on similar grounds, most notably that of Koro Wetere, Labour MP for Western Māori from 1969 to 1996. Wetere played a significant role as Minister of Māori Affairs: during the term of the fourth Labour Government (1984-1990) he convened the Hui Taumata (Māori Economic Summit Conference) in 1984, launched a decade of Māori development, instigated the devolution of the Department of Māori Affairs, and attempted to empower iwi to deliver government services under the Runanga Iwi Act 1990. Wetere’s career mirrored those of other Māori MPs who rose to prominence within non-Māori political parties, and he shared many of the frustrations other Māori political movements experienced at the hands of parties unwilling to deliver the results demanded by Māori constituents. To explain the exclusion of these Labour MPs, between the late 1960s and the early 1980s Labour wrestled control of the Māori seats from the Rātana movement. Two Anglican MPs, Dr Bruce Gregory and Sir Peter Tapsell were selected by the Labour Party and elected to parliament in 1980 and 1981 respectively, but the Anglican Church did not attempt to assert the kinds of controls over the seats the Rātana movement were known for. Many of the Māori Labour MPs from the 1970s onwards then were Māori MPs holding Māori seats, but did not represent Māori political movements. Instead, this thesis focuses on the Rātana-Labour alliance, the career of Matiu Rata and the formation of the Mana Motuhake Party, and Tariana Turia’s career as a Labour Party MP and decision to leave Labour and form the Māori Party, as examples of Māori
MPs representing Māori political movements that contested and engaged with the Māori seats.

Māori elected to Parliament as list seat MPs in non-Māori political parties during the post-MMP era have also been excluded from this study for similar reasons. The focus on Māori MPs elected to the Māori seats via Māori political movements has its benefits. It allows us to focus in on the political agendas of Māori MPs, the movements that backed them and the communities they represented. Furthermore, it emphasises Māori agency in engaging with parliament. By removing those Māori MPs who entered parliament to represent their own interests or the interests of non-Māori political parties, we are afforded a narrower but clearer understanding of Māori political engagement. It must be stated at this point that this thesis does not attempt to give a complete picture of Māori political engagement with parliament: more study is required to discuss the roles of all Māori individuals who have entered parliament over the past 145 years.

This lengthy period has been divided up into six chapters covering the establishment of the Māori seats in parliament and the Māori political movements that have contested and engaged with these seats. Chapter one discusses the establishment of the Māori seats from the signing of the Treaty of Waitangi in 1840 through to the passing of the Māori Representation Act 1867, and provides an analysis of the careers of those Māori MPs whose efforts and achievements are well established in the existing historical literature. Chapter two provides an overview of the heyday of Ngā mātāmua, the first wave of Māori parliamentarians elected to the four Māori seats between 1868 and 1938. Chapters three and four engage with the Rātana movement, the Rātana-Labour alliance, and Ngā koata e whā, the Rātana MPs who held the Māori seats in Parliament between 1932 and 1960. Chapter five covers the political career of Matiu Rata from 1963 to 1991, and the formation of the Māori political party Mana Motuhake in 1979. Chapter six provides an in-depth study of the political career of Tariana Turia and the formation of the Māori Party in 2004 to 2005, while the concluding chapter provides an overview of the Māori Party’s experiences in opposition between 2005 to 2008, the coalition agreement signed between National and the Māori Party in 2008, and the fall out over the Marine and Coastal Areas
(Takutai Moana) Act that saw Northern Māori MP Hone Harawira leave the Māori Party to establish the Mana Party in 2011.

To introduce some of the historiographic issues addressed in this thesis, this chapter begins with an overview of representations of Māori political engagement in the existing literature, and the positioning of this research within the contexts of New Zealand history, Māori history, and the wider context of Indigenous political engagement in other settler nations in the nineteenth and twentieth century.

This project began in 2007 as a history of the Māori Party. However, as I prepared the PhD proposal and began studying the literature on Māori political engagement, it became clear that there was a significant gap between how Māori MPs were regarded by their communities and how they were treated in the academic literature. As a descendant of Tau Henare, the MP for Northern Māori from 1914 to 1938, I had heard much about my tupuna and his life’s work. Our oral traditions speak of a diligent, dedicated and able man determined to uplift his people and uphold the Treaty of Waitangi. Similar stories had been passed on through the generations about the work of other Māori MPs, including Sir Apirana Ngata, Sir Peter Buck and Hone Heke Ngapua. Photographs and carvings of these men take pride of place in marae across the country. It came as a surprise to see these esteemed leaders reduced to incompetents and also-rans in the history books.

The existing literature has consistently underestimated the abilities of Māori MPs, downplayed their achievements, and undermined the significant role they have played in New Zealand’s political history. Ngā mātāmua, the 30 Māori MPs who entered parliament between 1868 and 1938, have received the least amount of attention from historians. They have been summarily dismissed as ‘old fashioned’ old-timers,

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hopelessly outnumbered by their Pākehā colleagues, lacking the political sophistication and fluency in Pākehā language and culture necessary to make a significant impact in the House or secure meaningful gains for their people.\textsuperscript{4} According to Paul Moon, Ngā mātāmua were regarded by their Pākehā colleagues as ‘mere pawns, ignorant and easily manipulated by leaders of the parties in the House’.\textsuperscript{5} Alan Ward states they were regarded as being ‘little more than observers with voting rights’, while Ranginui Walker argues that iwi were initially indifferent to the Māori seats, regarded the MPs as ‘tame parrots’, and feared their inclusion in the House of Representatives implied tribal acquiescence to government legislation.\textsuperscript{6}

While substantially more has been written on the Rātana-Labour era of 1932 to 2005, historians have for the most part dismissed the Rātana-Labour MPs as unimpressive and ill prepared for the rigours of modern party politics, and described their influence within the Rātana-Labour Party alliance as inconsequential. In her study of the Rātana-Labour alliance in the 1930s and 1940s, Claudia Orange concluded that ‘one of the ironies of this early period is the apparent failure of the Māori Labour wing to influence policy… [The Rātana MPs] remained peripheral to policy decisions on


Māori matters’. 7 Walker argued that the Rātana-Labour alliance ‘brought no substantial benefits to Māori apart from the general benefits of the welfare state’, while M. Raureti’s appraisal of their achievements was damning, contending that the Rātana-Labour MPs failed to ‘extract in their own interests for their movement or the Māori people any more than would normally have been given by a sympathetic and understanding government’. 8 These works are equally contemptuous of the Rātana-Labour MPs as individuals: Matiu Rātana, Orange wrote, ‘had considerable difficulty with public speaking, because his English was not fluent’; Tiaki Omana ‘was generally silent in public’, and T.P. Paikera ‘was not an aggressive personality’. 9 Sir Eruera Tirikatene was ‘the most experienced and articulate’, but was judged by Peter Fraser ‘to be unreliable, an assessment not entirely without foundation and one which some ten years later [Walter] Nash also held’. 10 Tirikatene also ‘lacked Paikera’s capacity to bring various groups together and did not command the same respect in political circles’. 11 He was unpopular in Cabinet due to his habit of ‘[r]elying too much on stressing a point, he would build up the resistance of the other members of Cabinet against Māori issues’. 12 Keith Sinclair described Tirikatene as being ‘full of tricks’ and unpredictable, and suggested that Nash ‘may also have had reservations about his ability’. 13 Collectively the Rātana-Labour MPs have been described as ‘lacklustre’ by M.P.K Sorrenson. 14 In their biography of the Labour Prime Minister Peter Fraser, Michael Bassett and Michael King alleged that Fraser was so dissatisfied with the Rātana MPs’ calibre, lack of leadership and tendency to miss divisions in parliament, that on several occasions from 1943 onwards he tried, unsuccessfully, to recruit Sir James Henare and Ngata to Labour. 15

15 Michael Bassett and Michael King, Tomorrow Comes the Song: A Life of Peter Fraser, Auckland, 2000, p.334.
Historians have been more forgiving of Matiu Rata, Rātana-Labour MP for Northern Māori from 1963 to 1979 and founder of the independent Māori political party, Mana Motuhake. The existing accounts capture the contradictions and transitions in Rata’s politics: Kayleen Hazlehurst portrayed Rata as ‘the most influential Māori politician of his generation’ and argued his career represented ‘a major philosophical shift in the administration of Māori affairs in New Zealand’ which ‘inaugurated a more tolerant attitude towards Māori social and cultural integrity in Māori affairs policy’.\(^{16}\) Despite his abilities, though, Hazlehurst concluded that Rata was underestimated by his Pākehā colleagues. They regarded him as ‘clumsy, inarticulate…not well read…repetitious…consistently inconsistent’.\(^{17}\) Lindsay Cox reached a similar conclusion: ‘In hindsight, his achievements as Minister are recognised as having had considerable impact at a national level. His contemporaries, however, were slow to accord him his due, the media preferring to portray him as an ill-educated man incapable of finishing a sentence.’\(^{18}\)

King and Walker both identified Rata’s shift from the quiet reformer of the early 1970s to the loud radical of the early 1980s, yet neither sufficiently explained this transformation.\(^{19}\) A closer inspection of Rata’s career and the development of his politics between 1963 and 1979 help to explain both his portrayal as a contradictory figure and his transition from reformer to radical. The main deficiency in the current literature is that so little has been written about one of the most important leaders of his generation.

There are exceptions to the assumption of incompetence. The Young Māori Party MPs Ngata, Buck, Pōmare, and their mentor Carroll, have been the subject of an extensive body of research spanning over six decades. Historians have been far more sympathetic to the YMP than to other Māori politicians, portraying them as complex individuals placed in the unenviable position of having to bridge the cultural gap between Māori and Pākehā at a time when Māori were believed to be a dying race. They are revealed as significant contributors to New Zealand politics and society, and credited with helping revitalise Māori culture and develop Māori land. The political

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\(^{16}\) Hazlehurst, pp.47-49.

\(^{17}\) Hazlehurst, p.45.

\(^{18}\) Lindsay Cox, Kotahitanga: The Search for Māori Political Unity, Auckland, 1993, p.134.

\(^{19}\) Walker, Ka Whawhai Tonu Matou, p.227; King, Whina, Auckland, 1983, pp.210-211.
efforts of turn-of-the-century Northern leader, Ngapua, are praised in Moon’s 2006 biography of him. These small oases in the desert of Māori political history make one more conscious of the deficiencies of the surrounding landscape. In-depth research into the careers of Māori MPs has been patchy, focussing on a few men regarded as particularly, and perhaps peculiarly, capable while neglecting large numbers of other people who tend to be written off as incapable and/or ineffective.

The overriding theme of the existing literature is that, in spite of occasional flashes of brilliance, the Māori MPs have been ill prepared for the rigours of parliament, incompetent in their roles as MPs, and have achieved little. Theirs has been a largely symbolic role: it has been left to well meaning Pākehā politicians and the occasional educated half-caste to provide the substance of Māori policy and political leadership.

These deficiencies in the local literature are not unique. Anglophone settler nations with indigenous minorities, including the United States, Canada and Australia, wrestled with the issue of Indigenous political rights in the nineteenth and twentieth century, and have since grappled with the problems of representing these histories in a manner that mirrors though not necessarily mimics local circumstances. Indeed, efforts to historicize Indigenous political engagement in other settler societies have been even more problematic due to the fact that, unlike Māori, other Indigenous people were usually not offered citizenship and voting rights until as late as the mid-twentieth century, and none were offered separate seats in parliament as were established for Māori in New Zealand in 1867.

In the United States native policy focused on a system whereby individual tribes signed treaties ceding land for settlement, and reservations were set aside on which tribes existed as self-determining nations under federal guardianship but not state

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21 Several non-western nations have granted indigenous and ethnic groups separate representation including Lebanon, Fiji, Zimbabwe, Singapore and India, while the Sami people have their own parliaments in Finland, Norway and Sweden and are campaigning for a parliament in Russia. The United States has granted separate representation in its dependencies of Guam and Puerto Rico, while Hawaiians, Native Americans, Inuit and Pueblo Indians in the states of American have not been offered the same rights. See John Wilson, The Origins of the Māori Seats: Background information briefing service for members of Parliament, Parliamentary Library, Wellington, 2003, p.2.
jurisdiction. As such the political status, citizenship and voting rights of Indians has been ambiguous and contested. Ambiguities in the US Constitution, coupled with the complexities of Indian tribes existing as self-determining nations subject to federal but not state laws, and the fact that it was left to the states to determine the standards of voting eligibility, left ample room within the laws for states to deny Indians voting rights. This has been further complicated by the fact that many tribes regarded and continue to regard citizenship as an unwanted status imposed on them against their will.

By 1924 nearly two thirds of all Indians as individuals and tribes had had citizenship extended to them through a patchwork of laws passed by states and the federal government, and in theory all Indians gained citizenship and voting rights with the passing of the 1924 Indian Citizenship Act. However, individual states, particularly those with large Indian populations, continued to deny Indians voting rights and prevent Indians from voting through a range of strategies. Utah was the last state to allow Indians to vote in 1956, and as Daniel McCool summarised ‘Despite extensive legislation, impediments to Indian voting are still being devised.’

Politicians of Indian descent have been elected to federal and state government in the US, but because Indians did not have separate seats and made up such a small part of the population, those politicians who were elected were not selected or mandated by their communities, and were not elected to represent their people in any meaningful way. The kinds of pan-tribal movements that were able to sweep up all four Māori seats and occasionally general seats to create a ‘Māori mandate’ in New Zealand never eventuated in the states. As Steven Cornell observed: ‘Nationally, nearly three hundred different groups have agendas of their own to pursue. Unity at the polls can be elusive.’

23 For a detailed summary see McCool, pp.106-116; Cornell, p.167; Deloria, Jr. and Lytle, pp.222-226.
24 Cornell, p.167.
26 For a detailed summary see McCool, pp.106-116; Cornell, p.167; Deloria, Jr. and Lytle, pp.222-226.
28 Cornell, p.169.
From the late-twentieth century this began to change, as increased political engagement amongst Indians has led to the election of Indian politicians at a local level in counties with significant populations of Indians. As Cornell commented, with warranted cynicism, ‘A number of Indians have been elected to local offices around the country, and their electoral potential has been enough to inspire efforts to dilute the Indian vote.’

Consequently, the literature on Native American political engagement has tended to focus on court cases defining Indian citizenship and voting rights, and the tactics employed by states to thwart Indian voters. Indian political movements have had to exert influence on native policy from outside the walls of power, and so the literature embodies a division between government policy and Indian political engagement. The effect of this separation is that it has rendered Indian political movements and political leaders invisible, and erased the agency of Indian communities in the process. Leaders, tribal groupings and Indian political movements are discussed in detail in narrower studies, but within wider studies only individuals who pursued voting rights through legal recourse are named, tribes are named only in relation to their dealings with state and federal governments, and political movements are barely mentioned at all.

The denial of citizenship, voting rights, separate seats and a uniform approach to dealing with tribes has also meant that the wealth of written records preserved by parliament on Māori political engagement in New Zealand do not exist in America. The political movements that did emerge from Indian communities existed outside of the state and federal government and were not privy to the same preservation of written records. Detailed records and in-depth research on Indian voting is scant at

29 Cornell, pp.119-120, 167.
30 Cornell, p.168.
31 See for example McCool, pp.106-116; Cornell, p.167; Deloria, Jr. and Lytle, pp.222-226.
32 See for example Cornell, pp.119-120, 167-169. In this influential text Indian political engagement and Indian political rights are dealt with separately: the former discusses Indian political movements, while the later deals with government policy and Indian voting patterns. See also William T. Hagan, *The Indian Rights Association: The Herbert Welsh Years 1882 – 1904*, Tucson, 1985. This source creates a further division, as the Indian Rights Association was a movement dominated by Anglo-Americans, not Indians.
33 See for example Cornell, pp.119-120.
best, and scholars of Indian politics have struggled to piece together even a meagre picture of Indian voter registration and voting habits.34

The paucity of written records on Indian political engagement is reflected in the sources, which again focus on the states, federal government, litigation and legislation. Ironically, the very sources that critique the marginalization of Indians by federal and state governments embody the same marginalization by writing Indians out of their own history and separating Indian political engagement from the machinations of the state and the justice system.

In Canada native policy for Indian tribes, Inuit and Métis has been typified by ambiguity, gradualism and the whim of the Crown. Like America, Canada signed treaties with its First Nation peoples between 1812 and 1921 to gain land for settlement.35 Reservations were set up and tribes were paid annuities and treaty monies for their lands.36 That is, the Crown did recognise indigenous land ownership but its stance on indigenous sovereignty and self-determination was less clear-cut.37 The Royal Proclamation of 1763 recognised indigenous land title and ‘a form of sovereignty’ of ‘the several Nations or Tribes of Indians’ but this was declared as being at the discretion of ‘Royal Will and Pleasure’.38 Indigenous sovereignty was not enshrined and was subject to change at the whim of the Crown. Over a century later the discretion of the Crown was still in place: the Indian Act 1876 described the status of Indians as ‘broad Crown guardianship over aboriginal peoples and their land’ with ‘unfettered Crown discretion’.39

From 1876 tribes were offered a form of limited self-governance similar to the Rūnanga system introduced by Sir George Grey in New Zealand in the 1860s, under which Band Councils were elected every three years and exercised municipal

34 Cornell pp.167-169; McCool, p.116-130. Both texts demonstrate the limited amount of research available on Indian voting trends.
36 McHugh, p.245.
38 Foster, p.355.
39 McHugh, p.256.
powers.\textsuperscript{40} There was little interest in the scheme and it met strong resistance from hereditary chiefs but the system continued on in some areas until at least the 1970s.\textsuperscript{41}

Canada offered citizenship and voting rights to First Nation peoples in the 1850s and 1860s around the same time that Māori leaders and settler politicians were debating the issue in New Zealand, but it came with a catch.\textsuperscript{42} A degree of ‘civilization’ was prerequisite for citizenship under the Gradual Civilization Act 1857, and those that volunteered for citizenship (it was not compulsory) would lose their Indian status, and thus lose their rights to annuities.\textsuperscript{43} The intention of the act was to assimilate mixed race Indians rather than to offer rights to status Indians, and the Gradual Enfranchisement Act 1869 built on this by removing Indian status from any Indian woman (and her children) who had married a non-Indian.\textsuperscript{44}

McHugh described efforts to enfranchise First Nation peoples as a ‘complete failure’.\textsuperscript{45} Between 1857 and 1876 only one Indian, Elias Hill, had been enfranchised.\textsuperscript{46} Between 1867 and 1920 only 102 Indians were enfranchised: by 1950 5,000 had been enfranchised, but this still did not mean voting rights let alone separate seats in parliament.\textsuperscript{47} As was the case in America, many tribes opposed citizenship and preferred to retain their Indian status.\textsuperscript{48}

First Nation peoples began gaining voting rights in significant numbers from the 1920s: as had occurred in America, veterans were given Dominion franchise for serving in World Wars I and II and the Korean War.\textsuperscript{49} In the post-war period of the 1940s and 1950s provinces began lifting voting restrictions, and in 1960 First Nation peoples gained the right to vote in federal elections.\textsuperscript{50} Yet even with citizenship and voting rights some were still unable to vote: the Inuit were granted citizenship in 1947

\textsuperscript{40} Foster, p.360-361; McHugh, p.257-258.
\textsuperscript{41} McHugh, p.257-258.
\textsuperscript{42} McHugh, pp. 245-246, 262-263.
\textsuperscript{43} Foster, p.353; McHugh, p.245.
\textsuperscript{44} McHugh, p. 245.
\textsuperscript{45} McHugh, p. 246.
\textsuperscript{46} McHugh, p. 246.
\textsuperscript{47} McHugh, p. 247.
\textsuperscript{48} Foster, p.361.
\textsuperscript{49} McHugh, p.263.
\textsuperscript{50} McHugh, pp.263-264.
but were unable to vote in Federal Elections until 1962, due to the fact that it was nearly impossible to hold elections in the Canadian Arctic.51

The Canadian situation then shared more in common with the United States than New Zealand. First Nation peoples were bound by the Indian Acts of the nineteenth and twentieth century but retained a degree of self-governance and independence on reservations.52 Canada was slow to grant them citizenship and voting rights, and First Nation peoples were even slower to take them up. Separate seats were never established in Canada, but in recent years some groups have regained other rights: in 1999 the Nunavummiut Inuit of Nanuvat in Canada’s Eastern Arctic gained territorial sovereignty and self-government.53

As a consequence of these histories, the literature on First Nation rights and political engagement often has little to say about First Nation peoples as independent political actors in the non-Indian constitutional institutions. Indigenous leaders, tribes and political movements are rarely named let alone attributed with any agency, although this can be partly attributed to the fact that many showed a marked lack of interest in citizenship, voting rights and political engagement. Instead the literature has tended to focus on federal and provincial policy, the discretion of the Crown, and the influence of gradualist policies and the Indian Act on First Nation peoples.54 More focused regional studies discuss specific tribes, bands and leaders in greater depth, but the wider studies effectively erase them from existence.55 As was the case with America, the fact that First Nation peoples were not offered voting rights or seats in parliament means that the sort of written records associated with Māori political engagement simply do not exist.

52 McHugh, p. 262.
53 Loukacheva, p.29.
54 See for example McHugh, Aboriginal Societies and the Common Law - A History of Sovereignty, Status and Self-determination; Foster, ‘Indian Administration from the Royal Proclamation of 1763 to Constitutionally Entrenched Aboriginal Rights’.
55 See for example Loukacheva, The Arctic Promise – Legal and Political Autonomy of Greenland and Nanuvat; Daniel N. Paul, We Were Not the Savages: Collision between European & Native American Civilizations, Fernwood, 2006.
Though it is an oft-repeated cliché it is no less true, that of the four Indigenous groups discussed here and regularly compared in international case studies, the Aboriginal people of Australia fared worst at the hands of settlers. In the United States, Canada and New Zealand governments dealt rapaciously with indigenous peoples; nonetheless, all three nations recognised native land title and self-determination to a degree, and negotiated with tribes via treaties to access lands for settlement and determine the status and placement of indigenous peoples within the settler nation. This was not to be the case for Aboriginals: Australia was declared ‘terra nullius’, a land without peoples.\textsuperscript{56} Aboriginal laws, land title and sovereignty were deemed nonexistent and no attempt was made to ‘constitute the Aboriginal polity through law’ even for the purposes of land alienation.\textsuperscript{57} To add insult to injury this designation became self-fulfilling in the eyes of settlers, who ‘patronized Aborigines as a very motley and shabby mob, lacking any political coherence whatsoever.’\textsuperscript{58}

Where other indigenous peoples had been forced to choose between assimilation and neglected segregation, many Aboriginals faced either extirpation or extermination: they were either rounded up and herded off land for settlement or simply shot on sight. Aboriginals were driven from coastal locations and inland territories with pastoral potential and pushed into the ‘great continental interiors’ that were not coveted by settlers.\textsuperscript{59} Australia emulated America’s policy of removal and reservations to a degree, setting up reserves and allowing missionaries to set up mission stations, yet their efforts are depicted as being ‘half-hearted’ or ‘half-baked’.\textsuperscript{60} As Paul McHugh has summarised, ‘The expectation was that pure-bred Aborigines would be kept on stations and reserves where they would die out in a short time, whilst ‘half-castes’ would ‘merge’ into the white community.’\textsuperscript{61}

\textsuperscript{57} McHugh, p.277.
\textsuperscript{58} McHugh, p.277.
\textsuperscript{59} McHugh, pp.282, 284.
\textsuperscript{60} McHugh, pp.278, 285.
\textsuperscript{61} McHugh, pp.276, 278.
The citizenship and voting rights of Aboriginals has been grounds for debate.62 Pat Stretton and Christine Finnimore argue that with the discovery of Australia and its designation as ‘terra nullius’ Aboriginals became British citizens.63 In the 1850s New South Wales, Victoria, Tasmania and South Australia became self-governing states in which ‘male Aborigines as British subjects were entitled to vote’ and in 1894 South Australia granted women the vote and extended this right to Aboriginal women.64 Stretton and Finnimore provide anecdotal evidence of this, including reports of Aboriginals voting at Point McLeay in South Australia in 1896 and discussion of Aboriginal voting by parliamentarians during debates over the writing of the Commonwealth Constitution.65 Bain Attwood and Andrew Markus have agreed with this assertion, arguing that prior to federation all the states had granted Aboriginals suffrage, and only Queensland and Western Australia had withdrawn these rights.66 The pair argues that the constitution neither prevented the Commonwealth from passing laws that affected Aboriginals nor prevented them from voting, but that the context within which the constitution was interpreted in the early twentieth century led to the denial of voting rights for Aboriginals.67

Federation contributed to curtail the rights Aboriginals had gained: they were removed from census counts, and Section 41 of the Constitution, intended to guarantee women federal voting rights in South Australia, was manipulated by bureaucrats to gradually remove Aboriginals from state voting rolls and to prevent others from enrolling.68 Australia’s developing ‘whites only’ policy at the turn of the century also played a role in the denial of Aboriginal voting rights: to this end the Commonwealth Constitution contained a clause stating that ‘No aboriginal native of Australia, Asia, Africa or the islands of the Pacific, except New Zealand, shall be entitled to have his name placed on the electoral roll, unless so entitled under Section

64 Stretton and Finnimore, p.522.
65 Stretton and Finnimore, pp.522-523.
67 Attwood and Markus, pp.4-5.
68 Stretton and Finnimore, pp.526-530.
41 of the Constitution.' It is interesting to note here that Māori were the only coloured people in the world offered voting rights in Australia: it is unclear whether this was solely because they had already gained voting rights in New Zealand, or whether Australia also bought into the ideology that Māori were the ‘superior savages’ New Zealanders claimed them to be.

Between 1901 and 1967 states were charged with responsibility for Aboriginals. Most implemented a policy of protectionism first defined by the Victorian Aborigines Protection Act 1869. Aboriginals were removed from their lands and relocated on reserves and stations where they existed in a state of neglected segregation while half-castes were the targets of assimilation and were often dealt with brutally by state bureaucrats. Protectionism did have some benefits: as McHugh argues, removal of Aboriginals from settlers ‘shielded the community from the full brunt of westernization’ and ‘the stations and reserves ensured the survival of some groups, however adulterated by absorption of Christianity and westernization their lifestyle became.’

The push for increased rights began in the 1930s, as activist groups including the Aborigines’ Progressive Association in New South Wales and the Australian Aborigines’ League in Victoria began campaigning to secure equal citizenship, ensure voting rights and for greater government spending to improve the living conditions of their communities. These groups hold an uncomfortable position within Australian history as they advocated a policy of assimilation for ‘civilized’ Aboriginals, and historians have often excluded them due to ‘academic unease in dealing with an Aboriginal political agenda which is difficult to reconcile with more recent demands for indigenous rights’.

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69 Stretton and Finnimore, p.525.
71 McHugh, pp.278-279.
72 McHugh, p.284.
74 McGregor, p.557.
From the 1940s efforts to dismantle Section 41, secure Aboriginals equal citizenship and ensure voting rights received a boost as a number of high profile white Australians including politicians, academics, war heroes and groups like the Aborigines’ Friends’ Association in Adelaide began supporting the efforts of Aboriginal activists and leaders. 75 As a result of their collective efforts, the Commonwealth Electoral Act was amended in 1949, confirming that Aboriginals who were entitled to enrol as an elector in the state they resided in were eligible to vote in state elections. This did not introduce new rights, but confirmed rights already enshrined in the Constitution that had been denied by bureaucratic processes. 76 Aboriginals were extended Commonwealth franchise in 1962, and the states that had denied Aboriginals state voting rights followed suit, with Western Australia and the Northern Territory granting them State votes in 1962, and Queensland in 1965. 77 In 1967 a National Commonwealth Constitution Referendum was held, and the majority of Australians voted to include Aboriginals in the census. 78 From 1967 to the present day 27 Indigenous politicians have been elected to federal, state and territorial parliaments in Australia, beginning with the election of Neville Bonner to the Commonwealth Parliament as Senator for Queensland in 1971.

The historical literature on Aboriginal voting rights and political engagement focuses primarily on state policy, federation, Section 41 of the Commonwealth Constitution and the 1967 referendum. 79 As with previous examples, Aboriginal communities, leaders and agency are undermined in the existing literature: their marginalization is both a reflection of the paucity of written primary sources and secondary literature and a reflection of their marginal place within Australian society. That said, scholars of Aboriginal history make some effort to include Aboriginal peoples within their research: their work compares favourably with Canada and similar to the US, but unfavourably compared to New Zealand. 80

75 Stretton and Finnimore, pp.531-533.
76 Attwood and Markus, p.4.
77 Stretton and Finnimore, p.534.
78 Stretton and Finnimore, p.534.
79 See for example Mc Hugh, pp.276-285; Fletcher, pp.339-367; Stretton and Finnimore, pp.521-535.
80 See McHugh’s attempt to include a balanced view of protectionism and Aboriginal agency, McHugh, pp.283-284. Stretton and Finnimore include discussions of specific Aboriginal communities and individuals, see Stretton and Finnimore, pp.522, 530, 532, 533; McGregor, pp.555-568.
This brief overview of Indigenous political engagement and voting rights in the US, Canada and Australia and their representations in historical texts demonstrates clearly that the deficiencies in the local literature are mirrored in other Western settler nations with indigenous populations. If anything, New Zealand compares favourably to other nations. Historical overviews of Māori political engagement include discussions of Māori tribes, chiefs, leaders and social movements and debate their significance, relevance and agency in far greater detail than seen in the histories produced on other settler nations. The task of New Zealand historians has been aided by the fact that Māori were offered citizenship, voting rights and separate representation in the nineteenth century. As a consequence Māori political movements were able to engage directly with the state, and so their efforts are inseparable from state policy and have been recorded in depth in government-produced written records.

A degree of the enlightenment that saw Māori offered political rights in the nineteenth century can be seen in the treatment of Māori within the local literature: just as Māori were accorded a place in government, they have been accorded a place in the literature. That said, the underlying purpose of including Māori within the settler government was assimilation: Māori were given seats in parliament because settlers believed they were worthy and able of assimilating into settler society. By the same token, we must be wary of the risk that Māori appear in historical literature as assimilated peoples, while those unwilling to assimilate are cast aside. This trend does arise and will be discussed in this thesis.

By closely studying the political careers of the Māori MPs, the movements and communities they represented, their ambitions in entering politics, their efforts in the House, their achievements, and the contributions they made to their people and to society, this study challenges the viewpoint presented in the local literature and mirrored internationally. It attempts to rescue the Māori MPs from historical irrelevancy, and the condescension of posterity. It is not, however, an attempt to heap false praise on Māori leaders simply because they are Māori and have been forgotten. Instead, the research aims to allow a firmer judgement of the significance and contributions of the Māori MPs collectively and as individuals. As the following chapters demonstrate, MPs such as Tirikatene and Rata were adept leaders who made noteworthy political contributions and whose exclusion from the mainstream
historical narrative is questionable. Candidate selection according to genealogy, succession and rushed candidate selections all played a part in determining the effectiveness of an MP. Māori communities were constantly developing and fine-tuning their approach to leadership and politics to match the environs of parliament and the tides of social change. To challenge the static and often homogenous picture presented in the existing literature, this study will address both the subtle nuances of Māori political engagement and the wider picture of change and continuity over time and the overriding themes that emerge when Māori political leaders and movements are dealt with collectively rather than in isolation. The considerable gap between the Māori MPs as, on the one hand, ‘rangatira’ and, on the other, as ‘incompetent’, is not simply a consequence of lack of interest and insufficient research. Moreover it is indicative of the considerable differences between Māori and non-Māori approaches to the writing of history.

The post-colonial priorities of Māori history are in some ways at odds with the post-modern directives of New Zealand history. Māori historians, that is to say historians of Māori descent who research and write about Māori history, readily agree that the task of the Māori historian is to articulate an independent voice for Māori communities and to define and map out a space for Māori within the discipline, combining the tools of history with the tools of mātauranga, tikanga, whakapapa and kaupapa Māori. As Aroha Harris explains:

Māori historians are involved more and more in writing histories that help Māori escape the past into which they have found themselves written, the dominant historical discourse that tends to locate Māori history in the context of British colonialism and expansionism.81

In a similar vein, Linda Smith argues that the discipline of history is a significant site of contestation for indigenous people; Māori have struggled for the inclusion of their stories and their voices within historical narratives:

Every issue has been approached by indigenous people with a view to rewriting and re-eighting our position in history. Indigenous peoples want to tell our own stories, write our own versions, in our own ways, for our own

purposes. It is not simply about giving an oral account or a genealogical
naming of the land and the events which raged over it, but a very powerful
need to give testimony to and restore a spirit, to bring back into existence a
world fragmented and dying.\textsuperscript{82}

In this sense, Māori historians set themselves at odds with the current priorities of
non-Māori historians, by building a bicultural model of New Zealand history that
includes the voices of whānau, hapū, iwi, pan-tribal movements and rangatira while
non-Māori historians question the relevance or even the very existence of the nation,
state and Crown. In theory, efforts to destabilise notions of national identity and
nationhood should suit a post-colonial approach to the writing of New Zealand history.
However, Māori emphasis on the relationship between iwi, settlers and the Crown and
tribal rights enshrined in the Treaty of Waitangi mean these mainstays of New
Zealand history are difficult to abandon for Māori historians.

The irony is that Māori historians are pushing for the inclusion of their voices and
stories within historical narratives which are crumbling apart quicker than they can by
reconstructed, as non-Māori historians deconstruct the colonial narratives and
nationalist themes upon which New Zealand history is built. To give examples of this,
in his article ‘Cultural Colonization and National Identity’ published in the New
Zealand Journal of History in 2003, Peter Gibbons critiqued the way in which the
themes of nationalism and progress have come to dominate New Zealand history, and
argued that such texts should be read as part of an ongoing process of colonization.
Gibbons pointed out that most historians considered colonization to be a series of
events that took place in the mid-nineteenth century, but few consider colonization to
be an ongoing process, enacted and buttressed in part via historical texts.\textsuperscript{83} Gibbons
argued that by proposing nationalism to be a ‘normative narrative’ rather than an
‘ideological construct’ historical narratives themselves become ‘colonizing texts’ and
‘actual sites of (textual) colonization’, in which settlers are presented as ‘legitimate
inheritors’ while Māori are rendered as marginal and problematised as the ‘Other’.\textsuperscript{84}

\textsuperscript{82} Linda Tuhiwai Smith, Decolonizing Methodologies: Research and Indigenous Peoples, Dunedin,
\textsuperscript{84} Gibbons, p.14.
More recently, Jake Pollock has applied Gibbons’ insights to general histories of New Zealand to investigate the ways in which nationalism and colonialism are narrated and enacted via historical texts. Pollock argues that general histories are the most suitable candidates for this type of analysis because their very purpose is to construct and consider the ‘nation’ as an object, and as such are deeply implicated in the construction of nationalism.85 Such texts, Pollock argues, are interested in informing not just the reader’s understanding of national history but more so the reader’s sense of national identity:

the non-historian has a stake in them in the sense that they play a role in the identity formation of the nation, and thus in the identity formation of those individuals who imagine themselves to be a part of that nation … one might read these texts to know what it means to be a ‘New Zealander’.

How then do we reconcile these two competing imperatives and achieve, as Harris describes, ‘a philosophical reconciliation of the intellectual home ground that is history, and the whakapapa of experience from which Māori descend’?87 It is a difficult task to achieve. As Smith posits, ‘Our colonial experience traps us in the project of modernity. There can be no “post modern” for us until we have settled some business of the modern’.88 The circumstances are made all the more difficult by the fact that the writing of Māori history is at the present time connected to the redistribution of power, resources and wealth in society.89 Until Māori voices, Māori stories, Māori ways of viewing the past, and perhaps above all Māori mana have found a meaningful place within historical narratives, and until Māori share equally in the nation’s resources, have attained a degree of tribal authority and a say in the direction of central and local government, and are confident in the status of their language and culture, the task of destabilising the nationalist ambitions inherent in the project of Māori history remains a difficult task to undertake.

86 Pollock, p.8.
87 Harris, ‘Dancing With the State’, p.180.
88 Smith, p.34.
In recognition of these issues, this thesis will not attempt to employ a single grand narrative to encompass the history of Māori political engagement. It will not present Māori history as an ‘ongoing struggle’ or a process of decolonisation; it will not portray Māori history as the search for kotahitanga; it will not take up the Rātana movement’s cause with the Bible in one hand and the treaty in the other; it will not define Māori history according to Rata’s quest for mana motuhake; it will not take up the Māori Party’s search for an ‘independent voice in Parliament’ nor will it employ the term ‘tino rangatiratanga’ to define all Māori interaction with the state. The political movements and leaders discussed in this thesis all worked towards a goal of nationalism, and so this theme is unavoidable in such a study. This thesis will attempt to discuss these goals not as one single movement or intention, but as a set of unique, contrasting and at times conflicting forms of nationalism which differed greatly from year to year, movement to movement, rohe to rohe, iwi to iwi, and leader to leader. Rather than providing one grand narrative, this thesis attempts to understand its historical subjects by the nationalisms they ascribed to, what they tried to achieve according to their own priorities, and what they achieved in relation to these priorities.

The wider themes that emerge from this research do not point to an ongoing narrative of struggle, progress or nationalism. Instead they speak of the shifting strategies Māori employed to gain a voice within the corridors of power according to their social and historical context and era, the paradoxes inherent in Māori political representation, and the active role Māori communities played as agents of change. It is left to the reader to decide whether these over-riding themes arise naturally from the histories discussed, or if they are simply more nationalisms, hidden behind the terms of academic research.

On a personal level, my own subjectivity and involvement in politics has enhanced my understandings and insights into Māori political engagement. As a descendant of Northern MP Taurekareka Henare, having been brought up in a family involved in the Labour Party and the formation of the Alliance Party and New Labour, and having played an active role in the formation and development of the Māori Party in 2004, my experiences, connections and contacts within the world of Māori politics have offered me insights and experiences which could not be gleaned from researching
parliamentary records and undertaking interviews alone. While outsider history may offer the researcher, and in turn the reader, a more objective, disinterested reading of events, insider history cuts straight to the heart of the matter, allowing the researcher access to information and sources not made available to outsiders, and offering insights that cannot be gleaned without being seen from the eyes of someone intimately connected with the events and peoples discussed. Being an insider has allowed me to gather information not available to the public: many of the documents included in chapter six and the conclusion were collected by me between 2002 and 2011, while others were readily offered to me by party members. In terms of the oral interviews used in these chapters, I had proven myself by showing up at hui, washing dishes, digging hangi, cooking BBQs and laying out chairs for years. I gained the trust of members of the community I was conducting research with, and they entrusted me with information and insights that have not been offered to outsiders, in fear that they may be misused or misrepresented.

The position of this research within the wider body of literature known as Māori history is equally as pertinent. Te Ahukaramu Charles Royal has led recent debate over representations of the Māori past, arguing that ‘There is no such thing as Māori history, only tribal history’. Similarly, Joseph Pere has remarked that Pākehā historians have ignored the significance of iwi and instead written ‘so called Māori history which did not … give me or my people any mana or identity’. In Pere’s estimation there is no such thing as ‘iwi histories, only hapū histories’, and only those with whakapapa links should be allowed to write such histories. Other opinions have differed. Danny Keenan has responded that in his view

‘Māori history’ has some value because clearly there are shared histories of Māori people... But, to the extent that such a term aggregates Māori people, and denies complexity and difference, then it must be seen as secondary to those histories that are centred upon the tribe and hapū.

93 Danny Keenan, ‘Predicting the Past: Some Recent Directions in Māori Historiography’, Te Pouhere Kōrero (Hereafter referred to as TPK), 1, 1 (1999), p.31.
Manuka Henare has also argued for the validity of Māori history as an alternative or complement to tribal histories. Henare defines Māori history ‘as a history of the people of that society or ethnic group called Māori of Aotearoa New Zealand’ which ‘involves an interpretation of both Pre-European and Post-European contact periods’. Henare defines Māori history as a history of the people of that society or ethnic group called Māori of Aotearoa New Zealand which involves an interpretation of both Pre-European and Post-European contact periods.

Māori history is not ‘some kind of sum total of tribal ethnographies or histories’ due to the closed nature of these types of histories, rather it is a means with which Māori historians can ‘critique society on behalf of our own people’ in which ‘the explanations and representations have to be in terms of both tribal world views and as a Māori nation of free and independent peoples’. Unlike tribal histories, Māori history is ‘open to wider public scrutiny and interpretation’, and can be done by anyone, accepting that they have the mandate of the Māori institutions or communities relevant to their research. Henare admits that Māori history is ‘not yet fully developed or explained’, and that it is as yet unclear ‘if there are to be new or amended standards of scholarship ethics to be applied to Māori history by Māori historians’.

Royal summed up the debate on behalf of members of Te Pouhere Kōrero, the Māori Historians’ group, identifying two models of representation. The first, which he labelled ‘Māori history’, was written in English, made use of Western calendars and time measurement, allowed for debate in its efforts to articulate a place for Māori narratives within New Zealand history, was primarily written, analysed written representations of the Māori past, and was often but not always university based or located within state institutions. Royal used the term ‘Mātauranga models’ to describe his second model. This model was delivered primarily in te reo Māori, was based upon whakapapa for its explanation of time, space and relationships, was less interested in validating itself to Pākehā and more interested in mātauranga within its own space, was more commonly oral but had begun to make use of writing, and was based within Māori institutions of marae and modern whare wānanga. Royal argued that the two models did not represent two fixed points or camps, but rather a spectrum

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95 Henare, p.25.
96 Henare, p.25.
97 Henare, pp.24-25.
of representation that occurred between the two models which Māori historians adhered to according to their own priorities.99

In undertaking this research, I expected this thesis would sit comfortably within the confines of Māori history. Structurally it fit the criteria outlined by Royal, Henare, Keenan, Harris, Smith and others; a written thesis, using English as its main but not exclusive language of communication, it would seek a place for Māori narratives within New Zealand history, make extensive, though not exclusive, use of written sources, and be based within a university. Furthermore since the focus is the post-contact period and Māori interaction with Pākehā and the state, it could not be regarded as dealing with closed tribal histories.

Perhaps most significantly, the research investigates a number of pan-tribal political movements including the Young Māori Party, the Rātana movement and the Māori Party, all of whom embraced the concept of being ‘Māori’ (that is, being part of the ethnic group known most commonly as ‘Māori’ as opposed to being just whānau, hapū or iwi) as a useful tool to unify iwi and achieve common goals. Indeed, two of these three groups used the word ‘Māori’ in their name, while the third shunned tribalism and encouraged its followers to think of themselves as ‘Māori’ and ‘Mōrehu’ or survivors rather than strictly as members of iwi.

To this end, this thesis does not attempt to engage with tribal oral traditions in a sustained manner. The reasons for this relate to the closed nature of oral traditions, and the issue of mandate. There is a significant disjuncture between the ways in which Māori MPs and Māori political movements have been portrayed in the existing literature and the ways they are remembered by their respective whānau, hapū and iwi. This thesis does not attempt to bridge that gap, and for good reason. Oral traditions are not merely Māori recollections of the past recorded and recited orally. More so, oral traditions are about mana: the mana of ngā Atua, Māori deities, and ngā tūpuna, ancestors, passed down to inform and assert the mana and identity of whānau, hapū and iwi in the present day. Oral traditions do not need the validation or appraisal of historians, nor should an outsider presume to compare, pass judgement or comment in

any way on oral traditions. The purpose of oral traditions is to uphold the mana of whānau, hapū and iwi, not to present an objective or even a subjective account of the past.

The issue of mandate must also be mentioned. As a Māori historian, it would be inappropriate for me to comment extensively on the oral traditions of whānau, hapū and iwi to which I do not belong. To undertake such a task would require organising extensive hui with each of the groups involved, and seeking a mandate from each community to research and publish their oral traditions. The prospect of seeking the mandate of almost every major iwi grouping in the country as a PhD student seemed neither practical nor appropriate. This is further complicated by my whakapapa links to Ngāpuhi, and the animosities directed at northerners by tribes from the Kaipara harbour southward over the actions of northern iwi during the Musket Wars of the 1820s and 1830s. To gain such a mandate, one must be a ‘kanohi kitea’, a seen and known face. I have worked closely with members of the Māori Party, and felt I would have the support from leaders and members to ask for and receive a mandate to research the history of the party and any oral traditions that arose from this study. Therefore the sixth chapter on Turia and the Māori Party includes discussion of the oral traditions related to these particular histories. The other chapters do not include extensive discussions of the oral traditions related to the Māori MPs and political movements discussed, as I deemed this culturally inappropriate.

There was a third reason for not covering oral traditions in this thesis: in writing up the proposal for this thesis it struck me that oral traditions were not the problem. The oral traditions associated with Māori MPs uphold the mana of these ancestors, their contributions to their people, and the mana of their descendents. It is the historical literature that is problematic, in its insistence that the Māori MPs have been largely ineffective. It is for this reason that I chose to focus my attention on the historiography and the primary and secondary written documents, to address this assumption and whether it stood up to scrutiny.

Yet when I came to undertake this research, the findings challenged my understandings of the distinctions between Māori history and tribal history, and my decision to focus on historiography and written records over oral traditions. The
patterns of tribal mana, personality traits associated with specific tupuna and rangatira, styles of leadership, tactics of collaboration and resistance, the place of whakapapa and matakite in leadership selection, and the traditional rivalries and alliances that existed between iwi began to emerge, painting a picture of ‘Māori’ political engagement as a history dominated by tribal ways of knowing, engaging and interacting with the world.

In the Northern electorate, a whakapapa of radical, outspoken and controversial leaders emerged, beginning with H. Taiwhanga and continuing with Ngapua, Paraire Paikea, Rata and Hone Harawira, all of who pursued official recognition of the Treaty of Waitangi with the fiery rhetoric and radical politics characteristic of northern iwi. In the Eastern Māori electorate leaders including Carroll, Ngata and Parekura Horomia embodied the tactic of collaboration with the government, a spirit of tribal enterprise, and a treasuring of Māori culture, art, language, music and performance associated with the iwi of Te Tai Rāwhiti and Te Arawa. The Western electorate proved to be a watershed of pan-tribal social, political and religious movements led by visionary leaders, and was the spawning ground of the Kīngitanga, the Rātana movement and the Māori Party. The Southern electorate provided a long line of very able MPs comfortable with the nuances of Pākehā culture and the priorities of their iwi, from H.K. Taiaroa, Tame Parata and brothers J.H.W and H.W. Uru through to Tirikatene, his daughter Whetū Tirikatene-Sullivan and most recently Rahui Katene. Southern iwi had their own modus operandi which differed from their Northern counterparts: they embraced smart articulate leaders, and instead of competing for the seat they mandated members, and passed the seat on to their descendants so as to maximise the effectiveness of their MPs. In politics, as in many other ways, Southern iwi stood apart from their Northern counterparts.

This sense of tribal mana emerged most strongly from the oral interviews undertaken with members of the Māori Party. As a pan-tribal movement, I expected that the narratives delivered by party members would embrace the pan-tribal, ‘Māori’ ethic the party had embraced from its inception. Instead a strong sense of tribal mana emerged. For example, when I interviewed Ngāhiwi Tomoana at Ruahapia Marae he delivered his kōrero as a whakapapa of movements that had emerged from his iwi and his rohe over the past 120 years. The movements he described were all pan-tribal, and
yet his words carried a deep sense of what it meant for him to be Kahungunu. The mana of his iwi and rohe that guided his people’s efforts were central to his understanding of the pan-tribal Māori Party. The environment in which the interview took place spoke just as strongly of the mana of Kahungunu: we sat at a table in the wharekai, looking at bowls heaped with apples grown in local orchards and surrounded by boxes of dried food Ngāti Kahungunu Incorporated had produced to sell in Asia. To our left, a wharekai full of men prepared a hākari rich with local produce and topped with pots full of tūī from the South Island. The words of Ngāti Kahungunu echoed in my ears as I sat and took in my surroundings: Ko Kahungunu he tangata ahuwhenua: mōhio ki te whakahaere i ngā mahi o uta, me o te tai. Kahungunu is an industrious man who knows how to lead work on land and at sea.100

A similar experience occurred when I travelled to Rotorua to interview Te Ururoa Flavell. As I walked the streets of Rotorua I observed the number of Māori organisations and state agencies dealing with iwi that had made Rotorua the centre for their national and local headquarters, and a strong sense that Rotorua was a central hub within Māoridom began to emerge. As I interviewed Flavell the theme continued, as he described Te Arawa’s efforts in leading opposition to the foreshore and seabed legislation, hosting the foreshore hīkoi in Rotorua, inviting the leaders of the Māori Party to Te Roro o te Rangi marae to encourage the development of the party, contributing to the drafting of the party’s constitution, and providing the party with a wealth of leadership including national secretaries, party presidents and co-presidents, and an MP. When I quizzed Flavell on why Te Arawa had provided such strong leadership and organisation skills to the party he became defensive and recommended I speak to others in the party outside of his rohe, as he was uncomfortable about heaping praise on his own people. When I asked his support staff about why Rotorua was used as headquarters by so many Māori organisations, they commented that it was ‘central to a lot of things’, but seemed equally uncomfortable praising their own rohe. In this case, the environment, the actions of the people and the narratives that emerged spoke of an iwi well equipped to host and with a talent for organisation and logistics, reminding me of their often quoted pepeha, ‘ngā pūmanawa e waru o Te Arawa’, the eight beating hearts of Te Arawa.

In each of these cases, and many others, the interviewees, the narratives they delivered, and the environment the interviews took place in all resonated strongly with the mana and attributes of their iwi, in spite of the fact that the histories discussed were pan-tribal in nature. Tribal traditions, customs and traits were inextricably woven into their narratives and the environments they spoke in, and whether intentionally or unintentionally, each spoke strongly of their iwi, their rangatira, their rohe and their tikanga and kawa.

Historians must tread carefully when engaging with the Māori world and Māori ways of recalling the past. One does not simply gain the right to study Māori culture or oral traditions simply by choosing it as an interesting topic. But even when relying on primary and secondary documents and modern day events not located in the tribal past, historians must be open to the ways in which tribal histories are embedded deeply within Māori communities, they way they express themselves and interact with one another and the world, and the environment they exist within. As a researcher, I have learnt in writing this thesis that oral interviews do not begin when the record button is pushed – they begin the moment you step into that person’s rohe, and the narratives they express may be signified by something as simple as a bowl of fruit or a sign post, or as complex as a carving or a waiata.

To return to the point raised earlier, Royal argues that Māori history and tribal history represent a spectrum which historians adhere to according to their own priorities. Yet the two are both leaves on the same plant, overlapping, rubbing and colliding with the passage of time, the winds of change, and the ever-constant passing of seasons. Tribal traditions are all pervasive; they are inextricably woven into the fabric of Māori historical narratives. In this sense, there can be no Māori history without tribal histories. It is not just the historian’s job to pick and choose their models according to their own priorities: if one works with Māori communities and deals with Māori historical narratives the priorities of tribal history will be ever present, in the written sources, the words of interviewees and the environment they speak in.

To appreciate these expressions of tribal mana and identity, historians must have a strong grasp of tribal customs, traits and traditions, and be able and willing to observe
these as they emerge within the undertaking of historical research. If historians are open to these things and able to express them they will be equipped to give voice to tribal ways of thinking, speaking, acting and knowing the world. Too often these details are lost to the historical record, as many historians have not had the cultural skills to read such nuances in their dealings with Māori communities. It is the duty of historians to produce historical narratives that do justice to the tribal narratives that dominate Māori ways of viewing the past, and Māori historians are well equipped to undertake this work.

To give a brief outline of the chapters of this thesis, chapter one provides a historical overview of the establishment of the Māori seats in parliament in the mid-nineteenth century. The chapter asks: what motivated Pākehā settlers to grant Māori voting rights and separate seats in parliament? What role did Māori themselves play in the establishment of the seats? And how did Māori communities subsequently chose to engage with parliament at the turn of the century? The chapter also offers a critique of the existing literature on Māori political engagement, asking why some individuals and political movements have been the subject of extensive research, while others have been downplayed or even ignored.

Chapter two discusses Ngā mātāmua, the first wave of 30 Māori MPs who entered parliament between 1868 and 1938. The chapter attempts to shine some light on this barely researched yet crucial stage in the evolution of Māori political engagement, asking who these leaders were, what communities and movements they represented, how they spent their time in parliament, what they tell us about the changing face of Māori society at the turn of the century, and why they have been marginalized within the existing literature.

Chapters three and four engage with the Rātana-Labour era from 1932 to 1960 and the political relationship forged between the Rātana movement and Labour Party leaders that would dominate Māori politics from 1932 to 2005. Chapter three investigates the alliance forged between the two groups and the fruits and follies of their relationship, while chapter four engages with the Rātana-Labour MPs and asks why historians have tended to underestimate and undermine their efforts.
The political career of Rātana-Labour MP Matiu Rata is the focus in chapter five. Rata was an effective and influential leader whose efforts have been downplayed by historians. A greater understanding of Rata’s politics and his development as a politician is required to assess his efforts in parliament and understand the twists and turns of his career.

Chapter six discusses the formation of the Māori Party in 2004 and the political career of its founder Tariana Turia between 1996 and 2004. As a study of a modern Māori political movement, this chapter affords a number of important insights into previous movements and the nature of Māori society and political engagement.

To this day, the photographs of the men and women who graced the Māori seats over the past 145 years stare out from the halls of parliament. Their names, their faces and their time in the House are recorded as a testimony to their efforts, but for the most part they remain voiceless, their stories silent in the corridors of parliament. They stand as symbols without substance, stories without words, songs without melody. And yet the same photos take pride of place in marae up and down the country, giving substance to symbol, prompting stories, words, and song from their descendants. The descendants of the Māori MPs take pride in the efforts of their ancestors in Te Ana o te Raiona – the words and deeds of their tūpuna continue to be echoed on marae up and down the country, helping to inform their descendants’ understandings of the present and visions for the future. This thesis seeks to address the discrepancies between the Lion’s den and te marae o Tūmatauenga, and to find a place for these figures in the history books that compliments their place within the oral traditions of their descendants.
Between 1835 and 1867 settler authorities and tribal leaders wrestled with the conundrum of imagining and implementing a form of political representation that would suit the fiercely independent indigenous tribes of Aotearoa-New Zealand. The dramatic increase of European settlers during this 32-year period constantly rewrote the terms of agreement: as settler authority waxed and tribal authority waned, so too British sovereignty increased and the prospects of Māori retaining their chiefly mana dwindled. This chapter provides a historical overview of Māori political engagement and the establishment of the Māori seats in parliament in the late nineteenth and early
twentieth century, covering the journey towards formalising a system of Māori political representation between 1835 and 1867, the establishment of the Māori seats in parliament in 1867, the debate that accompanied this event, and the first 70 years of Māori engagement with parliament and the Māori seats.

Māori men were granted the right to elect representatives to four seats in the Lower House of the New Zealand parliament in 1867, and Māori women in 1893, but the story of Māori political representation began decades earlier with the Declaration of Independence and the Treaty of Waitangi.

The Declaration of Independence was drawn up by British Resident James Busby and signed at Waitangi on 28 October 1835 by 34 northern chiefs. By 1839, under Busby’s direction, 52 chiefs from throughout the country had signed. The document declared New Zealand to be ‘an Independent State, under the designation of The United Tribes of New Zealand’.1 The United Tribes of New Zealand was little more than a title, a product of Busby’s imagination intended to lend legitimacy to the declaration and the Flag of the United Tribes chosen a year earlier. The title obscured from British eyes the reality that tribal groups operated independently and no form of government or pan-tribal organisation resembling government existed in Māori society; no pan-tribal organisation would exist until the late 1850s. That said, it seems Busby intended to transform this medley of chiefs into a legitimate grouping: the chiefs that signed the declaration agreed ‘to meet in Congress at Waitangi in the autumn of each year, for the purpose of framing laws for the dispensation of justice, the preservation of peace and good order, and the regulation of trade’.2 A copy of the declaration was sent to King William IV, thanking him for acknowledging the Flag of the United Tribes chosen in 1834, and entreating the monarch to be ‘the parent of their infant State’ and ‘Protector’ of its independence.3

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2 He Wakaputanga O Te Rangatiratanga O Nu Tirene, The Declaration of Independence of New Zealand.
3 He Wakaputanga O Te Rangatiratanga O Nu Tirene, The Declaration of Independence of New Zealand.
By 1840, though, the Declaration had been rendered redundant. Edward Gibbon Wakefield’s plans for the systematic colonisation of New Zealand along with fears of settler lawlessness effectively twisted the Crown’s arm into taking greater responsibility in the small but rapidly growing colony. The Declaration impeded greater British involvement, and so a new agreement was required to renegotiate terms between Māori chiefs and the Crown.

The new agreement came in the form of the Treaty of Waitangi, signed by Māori chiefs representing the various hapū and iwi of New Zealand and Captain William Hobson on behalf of the Crown. It was first signed at Waitangi in the Bay of Islands on 6 February 1840. The treaty renegotiated the relationship between Māori chiefs, settlers and the Crown, shifting from Busby’s vision of an independent Māori nation protected by Britain to Hobson’s vision of a British settler colony that would protect its native people. However the Declaration retained a symbolic significance for many Māori: it was evoked again and again by successive political movements over the generations as a cornerstone of Māori legislative rights to sovereignty, and continues to be called upon as a symbol of Māori rights to independence in the present day.

The Treaty of Waitangi was a major step in formalising the relationship between Māori and Britain. Under the English language text, the treaty effectively removed Māori rights to self-government and independence, but promised some form of political rights to Māori under the sovereignty of the settler government. The treaty imparted to Māori ‘all Rights and Privileges of British subjects’, which implied citizenship and voting rights, but the reality was more complicated than that. Voting rights were dependent upon land ownership, rental or leasing, and so Māori, along with many Pākehā settlers and all women, were effectively disenfranchised.

The treaty quickly became a point of contention that, along with land loss, settler encroachment on tribal mana, and economic downturn, led to armed conflict in Northland. In part, the problems stemmed from differences between the Māori and

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7 See for example Walker, *Ka Whawhai Tonu Mātou*, pp.165-166; Cox, pp.36-37, 49, 57-59, 67-68.
English language versions of the texts. Both parties signed believing they had gained the upper hand. The Māori belief that substantive indigenous authority had been retained is preserved in the words of chief Nopera Panakareao of Kaitaia. Panakareao, balancing the weight of kāwanatanga (governorship) and rangatiratanga (chieflly authority), the two terms used in the Māori text to describe the powers ceded to the British and those kept by Māori, observed:

Ko te atakau o te whenua i riro i a te Kuīni, ko te tinana o te whenua i waiho ki ngā Māori. (The shadow of the land goes to the Queen, the substance remains with the Māori).8

It is equally clear, though, that the Crown believed it had acquired sovereignty. On 20 May 1840, while signatures to the treaty were still being collected, Hobson declared British control over the North Island on the grounds that sovereignty had been ceded, and over the South Island by virtue of discovery.9

It was not long before chiefs realised the consequences of signing the treaty. Hone Heke, the first chief to sign, signalled his fears in 1844 by smearing a mere pounamu, a weapon of great value and symbolic significance, with human excrement, expressing to his kin and potential allies the great loss of mana the treaty had brought upon them.10 He chose to express his disdain for the Crown by another symbolic gesture, one chosen to resonate in both Māori and Pākehā cultural codes. Between

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8 Orange, *The Treaty of Waitangi*, p.83 (author’s own translation). On the differences between the two texts see Ross, ‘Te Tiriti o Waitangi’. Historians are divided over why the texts diverged so radically. Ross described the Treaty as ‘hastily and inexpertly drawn up, ambiguous and contradictory in content, [and] chaotic in its execution’, p.154, implying that the differences were the result of a poorly managed process rather than dishonesty. Walker, *Ka Whawhai Tonu Mātou*, p.91 sees the differences as the result of deliberate deceit on the part of the missionaries, who aside from their public desire for peace, law and order, privately ‘had a vested interest in ensuring that the Treaty was signed because of their substantial landholding’. Orange, p.41, suggests the mistranslation could have been an act of pragmatic humanitarianism on the missionaries’ behalf; the translator Henry Williams knew Māori would not cede their sovereignty, but realised that without the treaty Māori would suffer at the hands of settlers hungry for land.

9 Hobson’s official proclamations and dispatches indicate that he genuinely believed he had acquired sovereignty despite the fact that the treaty had not yet been circulated around the whole country. For example, in his dispatch to the Secretary of State to the Colonies on May 19th, 1840 Hobson stated that ‘Availing myself of the universal adherence of the Native chiefs to the Treaty of Waitangi… [I] proclaimed sovereignty of Her Majesty over the North Island…..’ and with ‘a perfect knowledge of the uncivilized state of the Natives….. I also proclaimed the authority of Her Majesty over the Southern Islands, on the ground of discovery’, H. Hanson Turton, Preface, *Facsimiles of the Treaty of Waitangi*, Wellington, 1877, republished in *Facsimiles of the Treaty of Waitangi*, Wellington, 1976, n.p.

July 1844 and March 1845 Heke chopped down the flagpole at Kororāreka (then capital of New Zealand), no fewer than three times. On the third occasion, March 11 1845, he and his men felled the flagpole, drove out the town’s inhabitants, sacked the town and burnt it to the ground. War broke out in the North. After an indecisive campaign peace was brokered by kūpapa (meaning pro-government) leader Tamati Waka Nene in 1846 and the bulk of British troops were withdrawn. Heke’s actions at Kororāreka and the ensuing war in the North are not usually remembered as part of the history of Māori political representation. However they are significant in that they foreshadowed the efforts of a long line of fiery and radical Northern leaders, from Hone Taiwhanga and Hone Heke Ngapua to Matiu Rata and today’s incumbent Hone Harawira, who would enter parliament with the treaty in their hands and fire in their bellies.

The 1852 Constitution was the next stepping-stone in the history of Māori parliamentary representation, though like the treaty the promises it made remained unfulfilled. The New Zealand Constitution Act 1852 introduced a two-tier system of government, with six Provincial Councils, and a General Assembly comprising an elected House of Representatives and a nominated Legislative Council. The franchise was open to all males over the age of 21 who owned, leased or rented land or property of a certain value. While Māori men were not officially excluded, the fact that hapū and iwi owned land communally rather than under individual titles effectively meant that most Māori were unable to vote. Māori were not excluded from running for election in the general seats, but the low number of registered voters combined with settler prejudice meant it was unlikely any Māori would win a general seat in parliament: Sir James Carroll was the first to achieve this, winning Waiapu in 1893. Despite the property limits it is noteworthy that Māori men were eligible to vote and run for parliament, a right not granted to all Pākehā men, or any Pākehā women for another 26 years. It was also a right not offered to other indigenous minorities in settler societies until well into the twentieth century. This relatively liberal situation reflected British beliefs that, with time, Māori would be capable and deserving of...
assimilation into Pākehā society. As patronising as this may seem, it does indicate a degree of enlightenment that did not shine elsewhere in the British world.

The Constitution Act made provision for a degree of Māori self-government. Clause 71 of the Act stated that, where it was expedient, the ‘customs and usages’ of the Natives ‘should for the present be maintained for the government of themselves in all their relations to and dealings with each other’ in so far as they were ‘not repugnant to the general principles of humanity’. The Constitution also suggested that ‘particular regions should be set apart within which such laws, customs, or usages should be observed’. Clause 71 seems to have been motivated by expediency: it was accepted that Native laws were in force in areas of high Māori population and that that state of affairs was temporary. No such regions were ever established under the Act, but the clause did not escape the attention of iwi. It was debated vigorously by Māori political movements in the late nineteenth century. For example, it was the third item on the agenda for the first sitting of the Māori Parliament at Waipatu in June 1892, after the Treaty of Waitangi and the Declaration of Independence.

A number of tribal leaders took an immediate interest in the establishment of the settler parliament, seeing it as an avenue for retaining a degree of tribal authority. Indeed, in his first speech in the House of Representatives, Tareha Te Moananui mentioned chiefly interest in parliament: ‘During the administration of former Governors I heard that there was such a thing as an Assembly in Auckland…We Māoris used to take great interest in, and also listened attentively to what took place in the Assembly at Wellington’. Wiremu Tamihana of Ngāti Haua was to play a crucial role in the search for tribal autonomy in the 1850s: in 1855 Tamihana approached the Native Secretary for the Northern province, Major C.L. Nugent, suggesting Māori chiefs be admitted to the House of Representatives, but his advances were ignored. At some time between late 1856 and early 1857 Tamihana visited the Native Office in Auckland to discuss his plans for a rūnanga or council of chiefs to meet in Auckland and fulfil the functions of government. On arrival

14 Cox, p.68. Parliamentary debates are littered with references to the clause by Māori MPs.
15 *New Zealand Parliamentary Debates* (Hereafter referred to as NZPD), 1868, 2, p. 270.
Tamihana was made to wait by staff and ignored while settlers were attended to, an affront to his chiefly mana. He left vowing never again to return: ‘We are treated as dogs – I will not go again’. Instead Tamihana returned to his people and began promoting the concept of a separate Māori parliament.

Having been effectively excluded from the nation’s parliament, chiefs searched for new tactics to retain their tribal mana and chiefly authority. Some created strategic alliances with the Crown as kūpapa or pro-government tribes, including the Te Arawa tribes of Rotorua, Ngāti Porou on the East Coast, Ngāti Kahungunu of the Hawke’s Bay, Te Āti Haunui a Pāpārangi of the Whanganui River, and sections of the Ngāpuhi tribe of Northland. Others chose to remain aloof from government influence and Pākehā society and economics, as was the case with Ngāi Tūhoe of the remote Urewera region. A third strategy, supported by tribes of the central North Island, was Tamihana’s vision of the Kīngitanga, a Māori King movement that united tribes under the mana of a single Māori King. The movement created a rohe pōtae or boundary between British settlements and the ‘King Country’, as it came to be known. Land sales were forbidden, with the collective strength of the movement preventing any further alienation of Māori land. Kingites also created their own parliament, laws and police force. The Kīngitanga was set up as a parallel authority to the settler government, its founders wishing to retain peace as well as chiefly authority. In spite of its professed commitment to co-existence, the government saw the Kīngitanga as a direct threat. The obstacles the movement attempted to erect to the continued acquisition of Māori lands for settlement were an obvious sticking point, but sovereignty and ideology were equally as important as land in the government’s hostile reaction. War broke out in Taranaki in 1860 and spread across the North Island, reaching Waikato, the home of the King movement, in 1863. The fighting spread to the east and west coasts of the North Island between 1864 and 1870. It was

17 Ward, p.98.
19 For more on the Kīngitanga see Walker, Ka Whawhai Tonu Mātou, pp.111-113; Michael King, Te Puea: A Biography, Auckland, 1977, pp.21-34; New Zealand Dictionary of Biography (Hereafter referred to as DNZB), Te Kīngitanga: People of the Māori King Movement: From the Dictionary of New Zealand Biography, Auckland, 1996.
22 Walker, Ka Whawhai Tonu Mātou, pp.113-116.
during this time that the settler government chose to experiment with forms of Māori political representation.

In an attempt to strengthen pro-government support and undermine Māori sympathy for the Kīngitanga, Governor Gore-Browne organised the Kohimarama Conference on the shores of the Waitemata in Auckland in 1860, inviting chiefs from around the country to attend. The event was more than just a meeting: Gore-Brown hoped to formalise the gathering as the first annual conference or parliament of tribal leaders. A number of chiefs in attendance, including Pāora Tūhaere, Ngarongomau and Tamihana Te Rauparaha, called for Māori inclusion in the House of Representatives, local councils and the justice system. Gore Browne was dismissed as Governor before he could implement his plans, but his replacement, Governor George Grey, introduced an equally ambitious plan. The Rūnanga system was established by Grey and supporters Sir William Fox, Henry Sewell and F.D. Fenton in late 1861, and consisted of village rūnanga or councils directed by Resident Magistrates, and District rūnanga directed by Civil Commissioners. The rūnanga were empowered to pass by-laws and enforce the law. By gifting tribes a limited degree of authority in their districts Grey hoped to satisfy tribal desire for autonomy while keeping a tight rein on Māori leadership. The system had some success: it was eagerly adopted amongst pro-government tribes. However anti-government tribes remained aloof from the scheme. An effort was made to include the Kīngitanga in the rūnanga scheme: in 1862 Grey received a dispatch encouraging him to set up a Native Council in the Waikato with the authority to make laws to be assented by the King and the Governor. Grey met with leaders of the Kīngitanga, and Tamihana agreed to the offer but an agreement could not be brokered. As Ward writes: ‘For the first time comprehensive machinery was being set in motion to involve the Māori in a substantial measure of legislative, judicial and administrative authority in their own districts’. The system was a step in the right direction, but failed to deliver the autonomy iwi desired and failed to overcome the suspicions of anti-government tribes.

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23 Ward, pp.116-117.
24 Ward, p.125.
26 Ward, p.126.
The rūnanga system had its critics in the Pākehā world too: J.E. Fitzgerald of Canterbury passed a resolution in the General Assembly in 1864 that the ‘entire amalgamation of all Her Majesty’s subjects in New Zealand into one united people’ should be the goal of law and native policy, and argued that Grey’s system should ‘be scrapped as trivial and unworkable’. The rūnanga were undermined and eventually scuttled between 1865 and 1866, but the search for a workable solution to include Māori within government continued.

In 1863 a select committee recommended that educated Māori should be offered the right to elect two European members to parliament, but nothing came of the suggestion. The Weld government floated a number of other proposals, including appointing chiefs to the Legislative Council and adding Māori to the general roll with land titles from the Native Land Court as property qualifications, but again these suggestions came to nothing.

The following year Fitzgerald, a South Island Member of the House of Representatives who was a passionate advocate for Māori rights and was Native Minister for several months in 1865, moved a series of motions in parliament proposing Māori be given positions in the House of Assembly, Provincial Councils, courts of law and juries. Fitzgerald’s express goal was the legal and political amalgamation of Māori into settler society, but his ambitions proved too revolutionary for his colleagues and the motions were defeated.

The following year MP George Graham of Auckland moved that Māori be represented in the House of Assembly by five Pākehā, and under the Native Commission Bill Premier Frederick Weld suggested establishing a ‘constituent assembly’ of chiefs including Tamihana, the King maker, and Tāwhiao, the second Māori King. The names of a number of kūpapa chiefs were put forward to the Commission but the Weld government crumbled before the group could be assembled. Then in 1865 Fitzgerald introduced the Native Provinces Bill, which

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28 Ward, p.188.
29 Ward, p.188.
31 Ward, p.188.
proposed establishing semi-independent Māori provinces empowered with the finances and authority to enforce law under a resident as opposed to the magistrates of Grey’s scheme.\(^{32}\) Again the fall of the Weld government brought the scheme to a close.

This ten year period, between 1857 and 1867, was marked by a flurry of activity as Pākehā politicians experimented with different means of including Māori within the machinations of parliament, provincial councils, law courts, juries and policing. Their efforts had little to do with enlightenment: a paternalistic desire to assimilate Māori into settler society, a fear that separate institutions and laws for Māori would undermine the project of assimilation, and a wish to undermine or at least pacify the King movement by offering them a limited degree of self-rule, motivated these politicians. Māori leaders, in particular Tamihana and kūpapa chiefs, played significant roles in this decade, campaigning for Māori inclusion in parliament and negotiating with the government. Their efforts should not be underestimated. But Pākehā politicians were always in control of the process, and none of these schemes were implemented to a degree that satisfied Māori desires for independence, inclusion or positions of influence within the state.

It is significant that the legislation that allowed Māori a say in government, the Māori Representation Act 1867, was a wartime measure. The Act was intended as a reward to kūpapa tribes for their loyalty, a peace offering to ‘rebel’ Māori, and as an extension of rights to individuals who held significant amounts of land and contributed to the tax revenue. As a gesture it was at once sincere, pragmatic, cynical and paternalistic. The Act was drafted by Fitzgerald at the behest of Donald MacLean: Fitzgerald had been at the forefront of efforts to include Māori within government and the justice system and amalgamate tribal groups into settler society, while McLean was one of the most powerful figures in Māori-state relations in the 1850s and 1860s and played a leading role in the outbreak of war in 1860.\(^{33}\) According to the Act’s own wording special legislation was necessary because ‘the peculiar nature of the tenure of Māori land’ had excluded Māori from voting and

\(^{32}\) Ward, pp.189-190.

\(^{33}\) Ward, p.208.
participating in government. The measure was a ‘temporary provision’, initially for five years, but was extended indefinitely in 1877. It granted the franchise to any ‘male aboriginal native inhabitant of New Zealand of the age of twenty-one years and upwards’, including half-castes. It was a progressive move at the time, particularly when considered in an international context. As discussed in the introduction, other settler nations refused to extend citizenship and voting rights to Indigenous peoples in the nineteenth century. It is also noteworthy that at the time land title continued to restrict many Pākehā male settlers from voting, and it would be another 26 years before women gained the vote. Previous commentators have tended to dwell on the fact that the number of seats Māori were offered was not in proportion to their percentage of the population. When compared to the rights offered to propertied Pākehā men, Māori political rights seem marginal, yet within the wider national and international context the fact that Māori men were offered four seats in parliament and full enfranchisement before Pākehā men and women is nothing short of astounding. It was without parallel anywhere in the world in the nineteenth century.

The Act established four seats, three in the North Island and one in the ‘Middle Island’ as the South Island was then known. Elected members were to be ‘chosen respectively from amongst and by the votes of the Māoris inhabiting each of the said districts who shall not at any time theretofore have been attained or convicted of any treason felony or infamous offence’. This clause was intended to prevent outsiders and non-Māori from standing and to address fears that Māori might elect ‘improper persons’, namely Pākehā-Māori, a class of people MPs felt had no place in parliament. South Island MPs feared that the North Island MPs would elect Pākehā members in Māori seats in order to swing the balance of power in their favour, so this clause was intended to assuage such misgivings. There were even suggestions in parliament of the establishment of a Māori electoral college ‘composed of the most intelligent men of the race’, though this never eventuated.
The Act included a schedule outlining the four Māori electoral districts, unimaginatively named the Northern, Southern, Eastern and Western Māori Electoral Districts. The proposed districts took some consideration of tribal boundaries, but were equally influenced by geographical boundaries and landmarks. For example the Northern district ended at a line connecting the Tāmaki River and the Manukau Harbour. This division left Ngāti Whātua at the mercy of their Northern foe, much to their chagrin, but at least made a diplomatic division between Ngāpuhi and Waikato, following the tribal pepeha ‘ko Tāmaki te kei o te waka Tainui’.40 However the division of the Western and Eastern districts left a little to be desired: the boundaries cut Lake Taupo in half, despite the fact that Tūwharetoa had more in common with their closer Arawa cousins in the east than they did with the iwi of Waikato, Taranaki and Whanganui in the west and north. Provisions were made to ‘alter and vary’ the boundaries of Māori electoral districts but they were not acted upon for nearly a century. Furthermore, the Māori electorates were significantly larger than those of the general seats, the Southern electorate for instance taking in the entire South Island. Both Māori and Pākehā complained that the electorates were so unwieldy as to be almost unworkable, and similar complaints are still made today by sitting members.41

The debates over the Bill give a clear picture of the ideologies and political manoeuvres at play behind the measure: Pākehā MPs were sure of their dominant place in the scheme of things and were happy to dole out paternalist advice or express raw racial hatred without fear of reprisal or reproach.42 Supporters argued that owing to their population size, the annual tax revenue they contributed and the amount of land they held, Māori deserved the four seats. They also presented voting rights as a peace offering by the government to its Māori allies and ‘rebel Māori’ alike, hoping

40 ‘Tāmaki (Auckland) is the prow of the Tainui canoe’ (authors own translation).
42 For example, Colonel Whitmore paraphrased early explorer and commentator on New Zealand’s flora, fauna and Native peoples Ernst Dieffenbachia during the second reading of the Bill, arguing that ‘when they [Pākehā] arrived the natives were very actively engaged in eating each other so fast that there was no possibility of any being left alive but for the arrival of Europeans’. According to Whitmore Europeans could ‘very justly claim that the Native race really owed its present existence to them’ and pondered how anyone could speak of hardships accrued to Māori by Europeans, and why anyone would suggest ‘special treatment’ considering the special treatment they had already received at the hands of their benevolent Pākehā patrons. NZPD, 1867, 2, p.811.
that ‘the wholesome excitement resulting from freedom of election’ would replace ‘the excitement of war’, ‘a dangerous pastime to which their talents and bravery rendered them too much addicted’. There was a degree of humanitarian concern at play too and a concern for posterity. The Honourable Colonel Kenny praised Māori enfranchisement as ‘founded on the highest principles and on the best intentions’; the seats were ‘an act of justice… prudence and expediency’. Similarly, Colonel Russell described the Bill as ‘a measure which practically gives political freedom to a people’. As Donald McLean, the Bill’s chief proponent claimed, ‘it would be a proud thing to have recorded, by the future historian of New Zealand, that the Anglo-Saxon race in this colony had extended to its aboriginal inhabitants the highest privilege which it could confer, namely, a participation in the Legislature’.

Opponents challenged the Bill on racial and practical grounds. Some feared that Māori were ill equipped to keep up with the complexities of parliament, given the language and customs in the House at times confounded even Pākehā members. There were apprehensions that tribes might send the wrong kinds of people into parliament, notably Pākehā-Māori. South Island MPs opposed the measure on the grounds that it was being introduced to balance up the extra seats offered to gold miners, thus cancelling out any potential South Island advantage from the new Westland seats. Other difficulties discussed included the status of half-castes, the need for unbiased translators who would not mislead Māori MPs, the unworkable size of the electorates, and the expenses that would be incurred conducting elections in Native electorates. Opponents also feared introducing ‘special legislation’ for Māori, due to the workability of making distinctions according to race, and the need to promote equality between races, enforce Pākehā laws in Māori districts, and push forward with the project of assimilation.

Two key themes emerged in these debates, themes which recur again and again through New Zealand’s race relations history: the myth of harmonious race relations, and the two roots from which this tree grows — the supposed superiority of Māori as

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43 NZPD, 1867, 1, p.459; NZPD, 1867, 2, pp.814-815.
44 NZPD, 1867, 2, p.809.
45 NZPD, 1867, 2, pp.809-810.
46 NZPD, 1867, 1, p.459.
47 See NZPD, 1867, 1, pp.336, 457-465, 517-520, and NZPD, 1867, 2, pp.655, 807-816, 975-977, 1312 for readings of the Bill and debates over Māori Representation.
a Native race, and the apparent benevolence and progressive attitude of Pākehā New Zealanders. We also see the emergence of Pākehā opposition to the introduction of ‘special legislation’ for Māori, using terminology and ideologies that would not seem out of place in political debates of the twentieth and twenty first century. Overall, the tone of the debates was paternalist, patronising and self-congratulatory: Māori were depicted as mischievous children to whom benevolent and well-meaning parents were offering a toy to educate the little ones and keep them out of trouble. The question was whether the children deserved the toy, and whether they would appreciate its worth.

Historians offer a variety of reasons for the introduction of this legislation, from the humane to the cynical. Keith Sorrenson argued that the Māori seats were introduced as a ‘quid pro quo’ to offset provisions made for South Island gold miners, and to assuage the fears of the Aborigines Protection Society in Britain, who were highly critical of the New Zealand government’s treatment of Māori. In Sorrenson's estimation ‘no high principle was involved in Māori representation’. Ranginui Walker viewed these events even more cynically, describing the Act as ‘a token measure designed to keep Māori under political subjection’. He pointed out that the number of seats offered to Māori was well below their proportion of the voting population. Further to this he argued that members added a clause that only Māori could be elected to the four seats because they ‘held such a low opinion of Māori that they were prepared to concede their admission to the house because in their view it provided the least disturbance to the status quo’. Walker implied here that Pākehā MPs granted Māori the four seats as they expected Māori MPs would be unable to cope with the rigours of parliament, and therefore would do little to disturb Pākehā hegemony. Alan Ward agreed that the Bill was passed to pacify Māori and gain their support, and also credited the regional dynamics of settler politics with a great deal of influence. The Bill’s form, he contended, was ‘determined largely by the fact that it preserved the distribution of seats between the North and South Islands’. As a result, Ward described Māori representation as having ‘stumbled into being’. Claudia Orange is one of the few historians who has begged to differ, arguing that pressure

49 Walker, pp.144-145.
50 Walker, pp.144-145.
51 Ward, p.209.
from the Aborigines’ Protection Society and ‘embarrassment over censure from abroad’ did not give the government reason enough to grant Māori political representation. For Orange the move represented a ‘thread of idealism’, the same idealism had seen the writing up of the treaty in 1840.\textsuperscript{52}

Critics have reason to be cynical: Māori were set aside four seats when according to their population size they should have been granted 20. Up until the 1890s, seats were apportioned according to property interests and location, yet even under these provisions Māori land owners outnumbered the four seats set aside for them. Furthermore, no provision was made in the Act to revise the system and increase the number of seats if the Māori population increased. Instead the Act was seen as a temporary measure, which would become redundant once Māori either died out or assimilated into Pākehā society. The pressing need to retain a balance between the North and South Island was also hugely significant. Tribal leaders and politicians had spent a good part of a decade debating Māori representation with few results but the need to balance representation from the North and South, while not the only reason parliament introduced the Māori seats, was the tipping point that transformed debate into action. However it must also be acknowledged that a certain measure of idealism was at play, symbolic and tokenistic as it was, and as with all other interest groups in New Zealand, it was left to Māori to make the most of these piecemeal offerings and expand on them in the coming years. The key here is to acknowledge the humanitarian gesture made at this point alongside other pressing priorities, without over-exaggerating its significance.

Twenty-seven years after the treaty had been signed, and after a decade of agitation, false starts, political turmoil and war, Māori had finally gained entrance into the settler parliament. The passing of the Māori Representation Act 1867 was a small, symbolic but nonetheless significant gesture that ushered in a new era of race relations in New Zealand. Māori finally had a position from which to express their grievances and campaign for their rights. It was left to Māori to decide how best to utilise their new position and engage with parliament and Pākehā politics, and over

the next 145 years a plethora of political leaders, tribal and pan-tribal movements would emerge from Māori communities to engage with the state via the Māori seats.

The post-1867 history of Māori political engagement has been divided into five main eras in this thesis: the era of Ngā mātāmua, 1868 – 1938; the YMP era, 1887 – 1943; the Rātana-Labour era, 1932 – 1960; the career of Matiu Rata and the formation of Mana Motuhake 1963 – 1991 and the career of Tariana Turia and the formation of the Māori Party 1996-2008. The rest of this chapter deals exclusively with the first two of these.

Little has been written about the era of Ngā mātāmua. Few authors have much to say about the 30 members who represented iwi in parliament between 1868 and 1938. These men are usually dealt with in a sentence or two. Those sentences generally point out their numerical minority in parliament, lack of fluency in English, their lack of administrative knowledge, and their legal ignorance. The conclusion tends to be that the first Māori men elected to the House were ill prepared for the rigours of parliament and achieved little.53 Pākehā MPs are said to have regarded the Māori MPs as ‘mere pawns, ignorant and easily manipulated by leaders of the parties in the House’, and as being ‘little more than observers with voting rights’.54 According to historians, Māori communities had not asked for political representation, and instead worked towards independent representation via the Kotahitanga and Kīngitanga. Having been granted parliamentary representation they were supposedly indifferent to these first representatives and the Māori elections were disregarded; they were of little consequence.55 Many tribal leaders, we are told, regarded these MPs as ‘tame parrots’, while others feared their presence in the House could be used against Māori to prove the tribes’ support of government policy.56

The first Māori MPs are rarely named in the historiography. Mete Kingi Paetahi, the

56 Walker, The Political Development of the Māori People of New Zealand, p.6.
first member for Western Māori, is occasionally mentioned for taking parliament by surprise and impressing his fellow MPs by asking for an interpreter in the first session of 1868 so that he could speak and take part in debates, but that is as far as the details of his career go.\textsuperscript{57} Wi Pere is the one frequently mentioned by name, but only because he lost his seat to Ngata, ending the benighted early era of Māori politics. Sir Peter Buck’s claim that Pere was an ‘old fashioned’, ‘old timer’ who ‘required an official interpreter to translate English speeches into Māori and his own speeches into English’, is often repeated.\textsuperscript{58} Pere, it seems, is used to stand in for all 30 of these MPs, his apparent incompetence serving as an example of what was expected from the others.

Sorrenson's 1986 overview of Māori representation, though only four and a half pages long, adds some much needed detail to our understanding of this period.\textsuperscript{59} Sorrenson indicated that the first election of 1868 was largely a farce, partly due to Māori misunderstandings and disinterest in the process, and partly because the Native Department and the Resident Magistrates who supervised the elections refused to provide sufficient polling stations. However interest in elections and competition amongst candidates steadily increased from then on. Māori voted tribally in these first elections. As Walker notes, members were elected according to ‘kinship obligations, tribal alliances and Māori values’: by the 1900s the competition for these seats and the mana associated with them signified that tribes had begun ‘incorporating the seats as an integral part of Māoritanga’.\textsuperscript{60} Sorrenson painted a far more active picture of the early-era MPs than other scholars, describing the various bills they introduced to parliament, citing evidence of Māori members holding the balance of power on several occasions, and pointing out that all four members sat on the Native Affairs Committee that dealt with the flood of Māori petitions to parliament. However, on the issues that counted most, namely land loss and the search for self-determination, he, like the other scholars who have written about this period, depicted the Māori MPs as a helpless minority.

\textsuperscript{58} Te Rangihiroa Peter Buck, ‘He Poroporoaki, A Farewell Message’, in The Polynesian Society (various authors), \textit{Sir Apirana Ngata Memorial Tribute}, Wellington, 1951, p.63.
\textsuperscript{59} See Sorrenson, ‘A History of Māori Representation’.
\textsuperscript{60} Walker, \textit{The Political Development of the Māori People of New Zealand}, p.7.
While Sorrenson's account paints in some finer detail, it did not change the bigger picture. The consensus among historians is that though this first wave of MPs made valiant attempts to represent iwi and reverse the many negative effects of colonisation, ultimately they were unprepared for the complexities of parliament. Hopelessly outnumbered, they achieved little beyond symbolic challenges to the Pākehā majority. Yet as the next chapter will show, the first Māori parliamentarians played a significant role representing their peoples, airing tribal grievances, and giving voice to Māori aspirations. They left a legacy that was capitalised on by future generations.

Before turning to the era of Ngā mātāmua, though, it is important to discuss those Māori political leaders who have not been forgotten by the history books. At the turn of the century there emerged a small but influential group of aspiring Māori politicians who have been the subject of the majority of the literature on Māori political engagement. Because of the depth of scholarship on these men, they will not be the subjects of a chapter in this thesis. Instead, this chapter will continue by dealing with those Māori MPs who have been well served by the existing literature.

After what may have seemed a false start, a number of MPs adept in the nuances of the English language and European customs began to be elected in the 1880s. Chief among them was Hone Heke Ngapua. Ngapua entered parliament in 1893, representing the Northern Māori seat as an envoy for the burgeoning Kotahitanga movement. The Kotahitanga movement emerged from a series of intertribal hui in the 1860s, 1870s and 1880s, and took its precedence from other earlier pan-tribal hui of the nineteenth century, notably the first Kohimarama conference. The movement advocated intertribal unity (kotahitanga literally meaning ‘unity’ or ‘oneness’) and the establishment of a separate and independent parliament to govern Māori communities and replace the settler government and the Native Land Court, which had done more harm than good in the eyes of Māori. The first of these large scale intertribal hui was held at Waitangi in 1875, hosted by the Ngāpuhi tribe of the North. The hui celebrated the opening of Te Tiriti o Waitangi marae, erected as a platform from which iwi could discuss treaty grievances with one another and the Crown. Further hui took place at Waiohiki and Pakōwhai on the East Coast in 1876, and again at Ōmāhu in the Hawke’s Bay in 1877. The iwi of Waikato, Whanganui, Te Arawa, and Tūhoe,
amongst many others, organised hui in the 1860s, 1870s and 1880s to debate the merits of pan-hapū and pan-tribal assemblies. In 1879 Pāora Tūhaere and Ngāti Whātua of Auckland hosted a meeting of the Māori Parliament at Kohimarama, linking it symbolically with the Kohimarama conference of 1860.

These hui provided iwi with a forum to discuss the issues that were impacting upon their peoples, in particular land loss, the negative effects of the Native Land Courts, restriction of access to traditional resources such as fishing and shellfish, and the search for self-determination. A series of intertribal hui in 1888 at Waitangi, Waiapu, Ōmāhu, Wairarapa and Whanganui culminated in the decision to form an independent Māori Parliament, and a petition of support known as the Kirihipi was sent out to iwi. It gained nearly 21,000 signatures by 1892. After a second intertribal hui at Te Tiriti o Waitangi Marae, the 96 chiefs in attendance launched Te Kotahitanga Mo Te Tiriti o Waitangi, an independent Māori Parliament. The first meeting of the parliament was held in June 1892, at Waipatu Marae in the Hawke’s Bay. The meeting’s agenda was as ambitious as it was simple: to investigate the Declaration of Independence 1835, the Treaty of Waitangi, section 71 of the New Zealand Constitution Act 1852, and strategies to encourage unity and discourage in-fighting between the various iwi.

Opinions were divided within the movement over the status and utility of the Māori seats. Some argued that the seats should come under the movement’s control; others thought they should be avoided all together, as they implied Māori acquiescence to government policy. Some believed that the number of seats should be increased to better serve Māori interests. No firm decision was made, but the Northern delegates chose to put their support behind a Ngāpuhi member to represent their interests in parliament. The member they chose was Ngapua.

At just 24 years of age, Ngapua seemed a precocious and unlikely choice, but what he lacked in years he made up for in whakapapa, training and verve. Ngapua's whakapapa credentials were impeccable: he claimed descent from some of the most illustrious lines of Ngāpuhi lineage, and was able to call on connections with Waikato

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61 Walker, Ka Whawhai Tonu Mātou, p.165.
62 Cox, p.68.
63 Walker, Ka Whawhai Tonu Mātou, pp.167-168.
and East Coast iwi. His training at St Stephen’s College in Auckland, his employment as a translator for the Native Land Court, and his connection with the Kotahitanga Movement from its inception, not to mention his combative and tenacious personality, set Ngapua apart. He was the perfect choice to represent the Kotahitanga movement in parliament. He commanded all of the attributes of a traditional leader along with the modern skills required to cut it in settler society.\(^{64}\)

Until recently Ngapua has remained an obscure figure in the country’s historiography. Fortunately a biography written by Paul Moon has helped alleviate this situation. Moon depicts Ngapua’s career as demonstrating the difficulties that arise when ‘idealism is met head-on with political practicality’.\(^{65}\) In the early stages of his career, Ngapua took a hard-line approach; he was unwilling to compromise his ideals, and was ready and willing to verbally joust with any critics in the House regardless of race or political affiliation. Ngapua was buoyed up by the tidal wave of support he received outside of parliament from what was at the time one of the largest pan-tribal political movement Māoridom had produced. Moon argues that this support, and his whakapapa and personality, gave Ngapua the conviction to wage a campaign for Māori independence in parliament. This approach garnered support from his electorate and guaranteed his re-election each term, but made him unpopular in the House. Given this, Ngapua was unable to gain support for his policies or wield power in any meaningful way.

Ngapua’s untimely death from tuberculosis in 1909 at the age of 39 was a tragedy for his people in more ways than one. The standard story goes that, out of respect to the grieving family, Carroll and Buck accompanied Ngapua’s body back to his hometown

\(^{64}\) Moon, pp.18-59.

\(^{65}\) Moon, p.96.
of Kaikohe. To repay them for this honour, Ngapua’s mother offered the now vacant Northern Māori seat as payment. In convincingly symbolic language, Buck stated that at the tangi:

Heke’s mother, in an address to the Northern tribes, proposed that their debt of honour for the return of their son’s body should be balanced by marrying their son’s widow to a chief from the south…. And so it came to pass in due course that I was married to Heke’s widow [the Northern seat] and entered Parliament to help Ngata fight the good fight.66

Paul Moon suggests that this scenario was a myth, and that in fact Carroll, with the support of Ngata, had forced Ngapua’s family into supporting the election of a third YMP member, Buck, to the Northern seat, and that under the pressure of these men, the ongoing tangi, and grief over the loss of their son, the family crumbled and acceded to Carroll’s demand.67 It seems that much of this occurred behind the scenes, and Buck was genuinely surprised by the gesture. Thus the men who had campaigned to undermine Ngapua’s life’s work commandeered his legacy both in parliament and in the history books, a tragic end for an admirable leader and intriguing political figure.

In contrast to Ngapua we know considerably more about the other group of Māori politicians who entered Parliament at the turn of the century: like the two great maunga from which they descend, Hikurangi to the east and Taranaki to the west, the Young Māori Party and their mentor Sir James Carroll loom large over the landscape of Māori political history, and indeed New Zealand history. The literature on the Young Māori Party, its members Ngata, Buck, Sir Māui Pōmare and their mentor Carroll, is extensive, ranging from patriotic memorial booklets and patronizing school readers right through to masters and PhD theses and academic publications.68 The

66 Buck, p.63.
67 Moon, p.333.
group’s name was a misnomer: it was not a political party as such, and is better described as a political movement. The movement was made up of a group of ex-students of Te Aute College who studied under the tutelage of the Rev. John Thornton, the school’s head master. After leaving the college the first wave of students formed a group with the unwieldy but indicative name ‘The Society for the Amelioration of the Māori Race’: this was soon shortened to TACSA (The Te Aute College Students’ Association) with the alternate title Te Kotahitanga o Te Aute.

In its early stages the group was influenced by the ‘well meaning but patronizing’ ideologies of its Pākehā patrons, but as Ranginui Walker has argued, the group’s earliest commentary on the state of the Māori race are best seen as juvenilia, and the group’s members, Ngata in particular, soon began to challenge the goals of the association and the ‘assimilationist agendas of its Pākehā patrons’. Richard Hill similarly believes that Pākehā commentators have often misconstrued or even completely misunderstood the group’s political standpoints, arguing that their more controversial actions and statements have routinely been ‘taken out of context’, painting them as poster boys for assimilation and obscuring their true goal, which was to ‘protect their own people and culture from subsumption or annihilation’. Initially, the movement’s work involved touring marae, spreading the gospel of health, hygiene, and abstinence from alcohol to their polite but for the most part un receptive hosts.

Although the movement suffered a slow start and underwent a steep learning curve, the YMP entered the political scene at a crucial moment. Interest in and support for the Kotahitanga movement had begun to wane amongst iwi: by 1898 their chief

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representative in parliament, Ngapua, had twice failed to pass a bill validating the existence of a Māori parliament, and Ngapua had been side lined in the House. The Kotahitanga movement had also begun to crumble under its own weight, as the huge costs of hosting the Māori Parliament began to take its toll on iwi members.

Further to this, the Māori seats had begun to register on the tribal consciousness as a means of gaining and contesting mana. Iwi realised that in order to use these positions effectively they required mandated leaders who were fluent in the English language and European customs. Graeme Butterworth has argued that the appearance of these young educated elite men at such a crucial time was neither good fortune nor a product of Pākehā foresight: in Butterworth’s estimation ‘The appearance of these tangata reo rua and their attainment of positions of influence and responsibility in tribal and national Māori affairs was not fortuitous’ but was the work of tribal elders, who were ‘anxious to produce men with a knowledge of English and of the Pākehā world’.72 Tribal elders and chiefs gifted the land, materials and labour necessary to build Native schools, and sent ‘their brightest children and young chiefs away to learn Pākehā ways’.73 The first wave of graduates from these schools, men like Ngata, Buck and Pōmare, ‘came of age in the 1890s and the elders increasingly came to rely on their advice and even yield the direction of affairs to them’.74 Butterworth thus subtly redirects the agency and creation of these young graduates away from the Pākehā patrons of the association, the church and the state, and back to the iwi from which they came.

The third factor in this equation was Carroll. Carroll had built up a powerful position for himself in parliament as a part of the Liberal government, first as the MP for Eastern Māori, then as the member for the general electorate of Waiapu, and later Gisborne. Carroll achieved a number of firsts in his career: he was the first Māori MP to hold a seat in a general electorate, the first Māori member of the Executive Council and the first Māori Acting-Prime Minister. He saw in the YMP a movement suited to

72 Butterworth, ‘The Politics of Adaptation’, p.6. The term ‘tangata reo rua’ translates as ‘people of two languages’. In a positive sense the term is describes bicultural individuals at ease in Māori and Pākehā culture, though the term could also be used to imply deceitfulness.
his own aspirations and took its members under his wing, acting as a mentor to the group, and elevating the profiles of its members.75

The decline of the Kotahitanga, the emergence of these tangata reo rua created by chiefs and groomed by Pākehā patrons, and Carroll’s rise as a political powerhouse who required able members to enact his goals fused. The YMP members entered parliament at the turn of the twentieth century: Ngata was elected in 1905 and held his seat till 1943 when he was ousted by the Rātana candidate Tiaki Omana. Pōmare served from 1911 until 1931; he fell out of favour with his electorate due to his unpopular enforcement of conscription amongst the iwi of Waikato and Taranaki, but retained his seat because the King movement were unwilling to break the chiefly agreement they had made with him to represent their interests in parliament. Buck held his seat for just one term from 1911: his ‘marriage’ seems to have been an unhappy and unwanted one for the bride, and after unsuccessfully running in the general electorate of the Bay of Islands, Buck joined the Māori Pioneer Battalion and was shipped out to help in the war effort. Carroll held the Eastern Māori seat from 1887 until 1893, after which he successfully contested the European seat of Waiapu and later the Gisborne seat. His parliamentary career finally came to an end in 1919.

This thesis will not attempt an in-depth study of the political careers of the YMP members and Carroll, yet one cannot fully understand the history of the Māori seats without appreciating their achievements. Carroll and Ngata in particular are popularly regarded as the most effective MPs to have held Māori seats, and there is some truth to this - their efforts reached the heights of Māori political achievement and the limits of Pākehā political tolerance. A brief overview of the policies pursued and legislation passed by Carroll and Ngata will be discussed to provide some historical context, and as a means of critically comparing and gauging the effectiveness of the MPs who will be examined in more detail in this thesis.

Carroll entered Parliament in 1887 and, like most Māori MPs, attempted to gain traction on tribal petitions and the issues of the day.76 The trajectory of his career in the following years would take a very different course from those of his

75 Walker, Ka Whawhai Tonu Mātou, pp.172-174; Sorrenson, Na To Hoa Aroha, I, pp.19-21.
76 For examples of Carroll’s early speeches in Parliament see NZPD, 1887, 58, pp.296, 435.
contemporaries. After just three years in parliament Carroll was selected as one of three MPs to head a Royal Commission on Native Land Laws. The Commissions’ report, published in 1891, was highly critical of Crown policy, describing Native land laws as nothing less than ‘legislative robbery’, inducing amongst Māori ‘poverty, demoralisation, concerted perjury, injustice, false claims, uncertainty, and ruinous loss’. The report gives an inkling of the policies Carroll would develop in the years to come. In one section Carroll attempted to conflate the Māori concept of ‘tribe’ with the western concept of a ‘corporation’ as interchangeable terms:

Every tribe was a quasi-corporation… both races are anxious to return as near as possible to the old system. What they require is that the principle of tribal, or corporate, dealing and action shall rule again, but that it shall be regulated and assisted by law.

The argument Carroll presented is highly problematic, yet his goal was to convince his Pākehā colleagues that Māori could comfortably fit into the developing settler economy, as tribal peoples, and that assimilation or extinction need not be the only options open to them. Assimilating Māori into the settler economy and encouraging Māori to settle, develop and farm their own lands with government support, while retaining aspects of their culture and social structures, were the hall marks of Carroll and Ngata’s policies.

What also comes across clearly in the report is that Carroll was a complex bicultural individual. He sympathised with Māori over land alienation, treaty rights, and, to a degree, the desire for self-rule, but he also whole-heartedly believed in the colonial projects of ‘progress’ and ‘spreading civilisation’. Within the report he affirmed that the Crowns’ land policies were ‘evil’, and added the English version of the treaty and sections 71 and 72 of the Constitution Act to affirm Māori positions, yet he also bemoaned the existence of ‘surplus’ or ‘idle’ Māori land ‘while an industrious

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population’ of Pākehā were ‘leaving the colony because they cannot get land to settle on’.  

The solution the commission offered was the setting up of district or tribal committees to manage land blocks on behalf of the wider community. With the benefit of hindsight we see the early germination of Carroll’s land polices in this report that would grow more pronounced in years to come: his critical view of Native policy, his search for a solution to the land issues Māori faced, his view of iwi as potential economic units, his support of land incorporations and his sympathy with Pākehā that Māori land was being underutilised. We also see from this report that, from early in his political career, Carroll’s Pākehā colleagues trusted his opinions on land issues, and entrusted him with positions of power and authority.

The Mangatu No.1 Empowering Act 1893 was a small but significant milestone in Carroll’s career: it represented the official establishment of the first Māori land incorporation and trust board, the building blocks of Carroll and Ngata’s future land policies. Moreover, it proved Carroll’s effectiveness as an MP in his ability to draft, introduce and steer legislation through the house that benefitted Māori communities, and demonstrated that having the support of a Pākehā political party and the government of the day allowed him to pass legislation in a manner that his Māori colleagues simply could not replicate as independent MPs.

The Urewera District Native Reserve Act 1896 was another significant achievement for Carroll. The Bill set aside some 656,000 acres of land in the Urewera district as a reserve for Ngāi Tūhoe, securing for the tribe a degree of local self-rule, the right to establish title to their lands without having to succumb to the divisive and damaging machinations of the Native Land Court, and protecting their lands from private purchasers. Carroll himself was ever cautious over the framing of this Bill, but Seddon described it as ‘preserving a large slice of country, which is essentially a Native country, to the Natives, keeping them clear as far as we possibly can of the
dark side of our civilisation', while Southern MP H.K. Taiaroa dubbed it plainly ‘the first Bill I know of which has been introduced into this Council which carries out the wishes of the Natives.’ The Bill would eventually be unravelled by the Reform Governments’ insatiable hunger for land, but for over two decades it provided Tūhoe some protection from the worse effects of land loss. Carroll’s success in steering a bill that so clearly departed from the norms of Native policy through Parliament was again a testament to his abilities.

In 1900 Carroll passed his most ambitious legislation to date: the Māori Council Act and the Māori Lands Administrations Act. Ngata had drafted the Bills outside of Parliament with the support of his YMP colleagues and the input of Carroll and the Kotahitanga movement—during the first reading Northern MP and Kotahitanga leader Ngapua remarked the bills had been ‘well thought out by the Te Aute College students’. The Māori Council Act set up a series of local elective councils and committees to provide Māori ‘some simple machinery of local self-government’. The Councils were empowered to pass by-laws and ‘frame for themselves such rules and regulations on matters of local concernment or relating to their socials economy as may appear best adapted to their own special wants’. The councils were expected to focus on moral and social issues: passing health by-laws, maintaining cleanliness, managing burial grounds, and improving sanitation were tasks included in the councils’ mandate, while issues of the day such as the ‘suppression of common nuisances’ and regulating the sale of goods ‘by Indians, Assyrian, and other hawkers’ were also mentioned. The Councils were also introduced by Carroll to curb the operations of the Kotahitanga movement. Carroll agreed with a degree of local self-rule for Māori communities, but he strongly opposed separatism. The Māori Councils Bill was drafted with the input of the Kotahitanga movement, on the agreement that the Councils would fulfil the movements’ desire for self-government, and the movement would be disestablished on the passing of the Bill.

83 NZPD, 1896, 96, p.167.
84 NZPD, 1896, 96, p.262.
85 Journals of the House of Representatives of New Zealand (Hereafter referred to as JHRNZ), Wellington, 1900, p.lvi.
86 NZPD, 1900, 114, p.373.
87 NZPD, 1900, 115, p.201.
88 NZPD, 1900, 115, p.201.
89 NZPD, 1900, 115, pp.201-202.
The Māori Lands Administrations Act similarly called for the establishment of voluntary land boards to allow Māori communities to control and limit the sale of tribal lands, and introduced a new category of ‘papatupu’ lands that were set aside as papakainga and could not be alienated by sale.90

Carroll and Ngata’s efforts were impressive: they had drafted Bills that appeared to address two of the most pressing issues Māori faced - land loss and the desire for self-government. They had steered their policies through the dire straits of both the Māori parliament and the settler parliament. Yet the policies did not prove to be the ‘silver bullet’ they had promised to be: by 1904 the Māori Councils were moribund, undermined by a lack of power and finances made available to them, and the land councils, which were established with a majority of Māori members, were soon reconfigured with a majority of Pākehā members, leading to further sales of land.

The final piece of legislation Carroll was involved with has proven in the present day to be his most controversial. The Tohunga Suppression Act 1907 was introduced to outlaw the practices of ‘self-created so called prophets…indulging in the practice known as tohungaism’, whom Carroll felt compelled communities to resist progress, abandon their cultivations, withdraw their children from district schools and abandon ‘themselves entirely to the whim and caprice of any particular tohunga who happened to be predominant at the time in their locality’.91 It seems ironic that 13 years after passing a Bill to protect Tūhoe in the Urewera region Carroll was passing another that specifically targeted Tūhoe prophet leader Rua Kenana and his community of Maunga Pōhatu in the Urewera’s, yet this was all in keeping with Carroll’s politics. Carroll was genuinely concerned for the well-being of his people, but he was convinced that the settler mantras of progress, civilisation and development were the only viable solutions to the problems they faced, and he sympathised with Māori only so far as they pursued these goals. Those who stood in the way of ‘progress’ found Carroll to be a powerful, formidable and at times ruthless opponent. For Carroll and the YMP, Rua represented a step backwards to the superstitions and separatist movements of the past, and they mobilised the might of the state to undermine the prophet and his

90 NZPD, 1900, 115, p.167.
91 JHRNZ, Wellington, 1907, p.liv; NZPD, 1907, 139, p.510.
movement. While Carroll led the passing of the Tohunga Suppression Act he was not solely responsible for the legislation: the Bill strongly reflected the views of Ngata and the other YMP members. It should also be noted that the Act was not an attack on all aspects of traditional Māori leadership or social organisation: the YMP regarded themselves as traditional leaders, though in a new context. Ngata went as far as to say that the legislation was not even an attack on traditional tohunga, as according to Ngata there were no longer any in existence.\(^{92}\) Rua and his ilk were to the YMP, charlatans, and the 1907 Act provided them the means to deal with such individuals accordingly.

Ngata’s political career had begun before he entered parliament: drafting the Māori Council Act and the Māori Lands Administrations Act served as his apprenticeship, and by the time he took the Eastern Māori seat in 1906 he was primed for leadership. In one of his first speeches in parliament Ngata outlined the issues that would dominate his early career, criticising the fact that Native policy focused on acquiring Māori land, and arguing the state needed to set aside sufficient lands for Māori before they pursued more purchasing, asking Parliament:

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\text{Are you to buy land and afterwards think about making adequate reserves for the Natives? I hold that no buying should be carried on in this colony, and no Government should be in a position to say that the Natives have surplus land for sale until this Parliament is assured that adequate and ample provision has been made for the Natives in every part of the North Island. Not until then will you be in a position to say “Here is your surplus land”.}^{93}\]

Ngata would soon be undertaking the task himself: In 1907 he was appointed to the Native Lands and Native-Land Tenure Commission with Sir Robert Stout.\(^{94}\) Between 1907 and 1908 the Commission investigated Māori land ownership in the North Island and produced no less than twenty interim reports, two reports and two further reports in 1908.\(^{95}\) The reports provided a study of every Māori land block in the North Island, providing details on each block, the number of owners, the size, and remarks

\(^{92}\) NZPD, 1907, 139, p.519.
\(^{93}\) NZPD, 1906, 137, p.326.
\(^{94}\) See AJHR, 1908, 4, GI-G1U.
\(^{95}\) AJHR, 1908, 4, GI-G1U.
on the blocks’ current usage or suitability. The reports summarised, for each region of the North Island, the amount of land currently occupied by Māori and required for Māori settlements, the amount of Māori land currently being leased, and the amount of land available for purchase and settlement.

While the commission identified the amount of land available for sale to settlers, Ngata’s purpose in undertaking the exercise was to ensure that sufficient land was set aside for iwi. Ngata and his colleagues realised that land purchasing would continue whether Māori agreed with it or not: their solution was to identify which land could be sold and which should be set aside and reserved as inalienable. A report on the findings of the commission published by the Native Department in 1909 clarifies this point, stating that of the 7,401,825 acres of land remaining in Māori hands 3,407,098 acres were being profitably occupied or leased by papakainga and farms, and 1,706,487 could not be profitably utilised, leaving 2,288,240 acres available for sale and settlement.96 By offering up two million acres for sacrifice, Ngata hoped to save the remaining five million.

Ngata’s efforts in completing a thorough audit of all Māori land blocks in the North Island after just a year in parliament spoke to his abilities and tireless work ethic. His follow up was equally as impressive: In 1909 he assembled a team of the foremost experts on land, including the country’s top draftsmen, Native Land Court Judges, the Presidents of the Native Land Boards, Counsel to the Law Drafting Office and the Solicitor General, and set about redrafting Native land laws.97 The result, the Native Land Act 1909, consolidated some fifty years of Native land legislation and over seventy separate pieces of tangled, conflicting and contradictory legislation.98 It is difficult to view Ngata’s achievement as anything but stunning, the work of an organisational genius and a legal heavy weight. The Attorney General stated as much during the readings of the bill, advising the House that the Bill had been drafted by the country’s foremost land experts, and as such there was no one in parliament qualified to judge it, much less interfere with it.99

97 NZPD, 1909, 148, p.1273.
Taken together, the Native Land Commission 1908 and the Native Land Act 1909 were a stock take of Māori land and Native land laws on a grand scale: The Commission provided a blueprint of the land each tribe should set aside for development, and the Land Act consolidated and ironed out the inconsistencies of Native land laws. Armed with a clear understanding of Māori land and land laws, Ngata was poised to act: instead he would spend the next 16 years in opposition, awaiting the chance to implement his schemes. Ngata’s early career was a revolution suspended, and when he was offered the chance to bring his plans into fruition he leapt at the opportunity.

In 1928 the United party swept into government: Ngata was appointed Minister of Native Affairs and set about implementing the plans he had spent years developing. Ngata introduced a series of Māori land development schemes, enabled via the Native Land Act 1931.  Ngata’s scheme involved consolidating land titles and setting up land incorporations to develop Māori lands for farming.

Like Carroll, Ngata believed Māori would only be allowed to retain their lands if they made productive use of them. His scheme provided the resources, funding and expertise required to set up some 39 tribally based land developments. Ngata used his in-depth knowledge of land blocks to hand pick the best lands available for development and the types of development best suited to each block, but he preferred dairy farming, which he regarded as ‘more congenial to the Māori temperament than sheep-raising’, the incentive for Māori farmers being ‘the quick return in the monthly cheque for butter fat’ which provided a quicker return than sheep grazing and offset ‘the severe discipline and monotonous toil of the dairy-farm’. Ngata’s scheme was a bold attempt to solve the many social issues Māori faced at the time, most pertinently land alienation, lack of access to loans to develop their lands, and the social, moral and health outcomes of unemployment and rural poverty.

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Where Carroll’s policies had seen a place for the retention of elements of Māori culture, Ngata’s scheme delved deep into Māori psychology and social organisation, and sought to harness Māori culture to enhance his schemes. Ngata’s policy saw in a radical shift in Native policy, from focusing on the purchasing of Māori land, to investing hundreds of thousands of dollars into the development of tribally based farming schemes on Māori land and harnessing Māori culture to ensure the developments were a success.

The scheme did not last: civil servants, the opposition and Ngata’s own party colleagues distrusted his policy. A Commission of Inquiry was held in 1934 to investigate allegations of misconduct. Ngata was cleared of all charges but the commission raised serious misgivings over his methods. Ngata's reputation as a Minister was sullied, and he offered his resignation in 1935.

The careers of Carroll and Ngata are essential to understanding the history of Māori politics: the first wave of MPs are written off as ‘ineffective’ and as being replaced by Carroll and the YMP, while future generations have been found lacking in comparison to these two forebears. Carroll and Ngata were certainly effective as politicians: they held positions of power and influence, they drafted, introduced and passed ambitious and often controversial legislation in a manner few Māori MPs have been able to emulate, and they developed and implemented policies that attempted to address the major issues Māori faced. Their successes can be attributed to their intelligence, work ethic and leadership qualities, but of equal importance was their ability to hold positions in Pākehā political parties, gain the support of their Pākehā colleagues, and communicate Māori needs and Māori ways to settlers.

But were Carroll and Ngata effective as Māori MPs? For all their achievements, they were unable to achieve their ultimate goals. They could not completely stem the flow of land alienation, though it had declined substantially by the 1930s as a result of Ngata’s efforts. Their policies of consolidation, incorporation and Trust boards may have staved off alienation but they largely failed to empower Māori land owners,

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stimulate the Māori economy or increase Māori social and economic wellbeing. Ngata’s land developments were a moderate success that were not extended, and both MPs eventually lost the support of their electorates: Carroll chose to stand in the Pākehā electorate of Waipu and Ngata lost to a Rātana candidate in the 1943 election. Ngata and Carroll were successful MPs, but they were not always successful as Māori MPs, and their careers are a testament to the limitations of Māori political engagement.

To judge whether Carroll and Ngata were effective Māori MPs, and how other MPs compare to them, we must define effectiveness. The ability to wield power by holding positions of influence in government and passing legislation is certainly significant, but so too are achieving positive outcomes for Māori, accountability to Māori electorates, and the ability to give expression to Māori viewpoints. This thesis will use the examples of Carroll and Ngata’s careers, and the preceding definition of effectiveness, as a means of gauging the effectiveness of other Māori MPs and explaining the limitations of Māori political engagement with the Māori seats.

The volume of scholarship on the YMP era and the depth of analysis and debate on their significance, ideologies, political strategies and position within New Zealand history demonstrate that the YMP have been well served by the existing literature. Less well served are their predecessors and contemporaries, who, as demonstrated, have largely been written off by historians. But who were these men? How and why were they selected to enter parliament, and what tribal groupings and political movements did they represent? What visions and ambitions did they carry with them into parliament, and what did they achieve? How did their Māori constituents and their Pākehā colleagues perceive them? What impact did they have on parliament and settler politics, and what impact did their engagement with the state have on Māori society? What role did hapū, iwi, and pan-tribal movements play in engaging with parliament and electing members to represent them, and how did Māori attitudes to political engagement and leadership change over time? There are sizable gaps in the historical record that require filling if we are to fully understand the history and development of Māori political engagement. Examining the careers and contributions of Ngā mātāmua allows us to reconsider representations of Māori political engagement, affording an understanding of the ways in which Māori attitudes to
leadership and politics changed and developed at the turn of the century, and the agency and involvement of hapū, iwi and pan-tribal movements in this process. The following chapter investigates the histories of these MPs who have been largely written out of history, to paint a more detailed picture of their careers and bring their stories to life.
Chapter Two: Ngā Mātāmua - The First Wave of Māori MPs, 1868 – 1938.

Figures 3-8: Ngā mātāmua (clockwise from top left) Mete Kingi Paetahi, Karaitiana Takamoana, Wi Pere, Tame Parata, Taurekareka Henare, Hone Heke Ngapua. Figure 3: Daniel Louis Mundy - Portrait of Metekingi Paetahi, PA2-1176, ATL; Figure 4: Karaitiana Takamoana, PA2-2811, ATL; Figure 5: Wi Pere, 1/2-034936-F, P.J. Gordon Collection, Māori portraits, PAColl-4925, ATL; Figure 6: Tame Haereroa Parata, 35mm-00087-d-F, ATL; Figure 7: Taurekareka Henare, 1/2-043304-F, S.P. Andrew Ltd Collection, PA-Group-00572, ATL; Figure 8: Portrait of Hone Heke Ngapua, PAColl-D-0011, Mrs D. Prosser Collection, Photographs of New Zealand Natives Football Team, a painting of Te Pēhi, and horse trainers, PA-Group-00330, ATL.

Ngā mātāmua, meaning the first born child or grandchild who inherits the family mana and the mantle of leadership, or the first warrior to lead a war party into battle, seems an apt term to describe the first wave of Māori MPs elected to parliament to go into battle for their people. Ngā mātāmua entered the House of Representatives with high hopes and a mandate to regain Māori independence, taken from them by the very place they now entered, Te Ana o te Raiona. Their hopes were to be crushed by the
slow, relentless grind of the parliamentary machinery, as months turned into years, and fathers passed onto sons and daughters objectives they were unable to achieve within their own lifetimes. Ngā mātāmua are best represented as transitional figures. Their experiences in parliament mirrored those of wider Māori society, as they went from optimistic hope in the parliamentary system to cynicism and came to doubt the ability of the settler government to protect their rights and independence. They also heralded a shift in Māori attitudes towards leadership, as tribal leaders were gradually replaced in parliament by academics and the leaders of pan-tribal political and religious movements, not to mention a transition from military resistance and collaboration and tribal independence to working within the system. Past historians have painted this transition too simply, portraying it as a case of the old making way for the new, encapsulated in the whakataukī associated with the Young Māori Party, ‘Ka pu te ruha, ka hao te rangatahi’ (the old net is cast aside, the new net goes fishing). Such a description masks the important role Māori communities played in adapting political representation, and fine-tuning it to gain what limited results could be made under such restricted circumstances. More should be made of the significant role Ngā mātāmua played in the development of Māori political engagement, and the active role played by the Māori community in adapting a Pākehā system to suit Māori needs.

From the first elections for the Māori seats in 1868, to Tau Henare’s loss to Rātana candidate Paraire Paikea in 1938, some 36 leaders occupied the four Māori seats. Four of these men — Ngata, Te Rangihīroa Sir Peter Buck, Sir Māui Pōmare and their ally Sir James Carroll — formed a political movement named the Young Māori Party, and two belonged to the incoming Rātana movement. Of the 30 remaining members, far less is known. Ngā mātāmua are discussed sparingly in the literature on Māori political leadership. Some research is available: of the 30, 20 have short entries in the Dictionary of New Zealand Biography.¹ It is perhaps understandable that some members have been excluded. F. Russell and J. Patterson, for instance, the first

members elected to the Northern and Southern Māori seats respectively, seem to have been elected largely because of their dual heritage. Russell was the only candidate put forward in the typically divided Northern seat, and Patterson was one of three candidates, all from Kaiapoi, who put their names forward on the day for Southern Māori. In 1868 enthusiasm for voting was minimal within the Māori electorates, candidate selection processes were practically non-existent, and even if there had been interest there would have been insufficient polling places or returning officers to register Māori votes beyond the handful that were returned in 1868. Russell and Patterson’s electorates were largely disinterested in parliament, both men achieved little during their time in office, and neither was re-elected. Others, however, commanded the respect and mandate of their tribes, and their exclusion is questionable.

Research undertaken by the Waitangi Tribunal has added considerably to our understandings of early Māori MPs, but not without skewing its subjects: the entries for Southern members H.K. Taiaroa and Tame Parata are lengthy and detailed, due in part to the fact their biographers were able to draw on the extensive research undertaken as part of the Ngāi Tahu Report published in 1991. The Tribunal’s decision to focus on te kerēme (the Ngāi Tahu claim) give its reports a certain slant, which offer us a clear picture of Ngāi Tahu and Ngāti Mamoe land claims and grievances at the turn of the century, but tell us less about their social history, or details of the members’ personal lives. As likely source material for the biographies of these two southern members who played instrumental roles in bringing te kerēme to government attention, the perspectives offered by the Tribunal have influenced these biographies produced for the Dictionary of New Zealand Biography.

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The entries for Eastern members Karaitiana Takamoana and Wiremu (‘Wi’) Pere and King movement adviser Henare Kaihau share a similar fate.4 The entries for all three make mention of their questionable land dealings, to the extent that their improprieties threaten to overshadow their careers. The positive contributions they made while MPs receive less attention as a consequence. Nowhere is it explained that this emphasis on land is a product of the biographers drawing on Tribunal reports and a research process interested in untying the knots of nineteenth century land deals.

One member of this group, Hone Heke Ngapua, is the subject of a recent political biography.5 As previously noted, Paul Moon’s Ngapua offers insights into the world of Māori political involvement at the turn of the century, and credibly questions historical assumptions previously accepted as facts. Moon’s work, along with the efforts of the Dictionary of New Zealand Biography, the Waitangi Tribunal, and renewed interest in Māori histories over the past four decades, considerably expand our understandings of Ngā mātāmua, while indicating more could be done to retrieve these histories from irrelevance.6 This chapter consolidates the current research and reconsiders some of the primary sources in an attempt to provide a clearer understanding of the place of these men in our histories.

What types of leaders were Ngā mātāmua? The one fact we know at this stage is that they were all men. Māori women won the right to vote in 1893, along with their Pākehā counterparts, but women were not granted the right to be elected to parliament until 1919, and it would not be until 1949 that Māori would elect their first female member, when Rātana leader Iriaka Rātana filled the seat of her late husband Matiu Rātana after his death in office.7 Many Māori women were politically active, though, engaging with the general parliament and playing significant roles within the Māori

parliaments in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Some of their stories will be told in the next chapter.

Aside from their gender, Ngā mātāmua are difficult to pin down. Several historians have suggested that the first MPs were kūpapa who had been awarded the seats for their loyalty to the Crown.\(^8\) This is true of the first election, in which three of the four were kūpapa, but their domination of the seats gradually declined. Of the 14 members elected in the first four elections, seven were known to have been kūpapa leaders or decedents of kūpapa: Russell, T. Te Moananui, Mete Kingi Paetahi, K. Takamoana, H.M. Tawhai, H. Tomoana and W. Te Wheoro.\(^9\) Of those members whom we can account for, it seems that only eight of the 30 were kūpapa. The last to be elected was Pere in 1884, and along with Te Wheoro his allegiances were to change from collaborator to critic. From then on electorates stopped electing kūpapa leaders, but this was due as much to their age as anything else, as the generals of the 1860s and 1870s began to pass on, and collaborative tactics shifted from the battlefield to the political arena.

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\(^8\) James Belich argues that ‘it was to kūpapa chiefs ... that the first seats went’ and that kūpapa and what he calls ‘insiders’ ‘dominated the four seats for the rest of the century’: James Belich, Making Peoples, A History of the New Zealanders: From Polynesian Settlement to the End of the Nineteenth Century, Auckland, 1996, p.265.

\(^9\) Mete Kingi Paetahi of Whanganui was well known to be a kūpapa, gaining the title ‘General’ Mete Kingi for supporting government forces, see Steveon Oliver, ‘Te Rangi Paetahi, Mete Kingi ?–1883’, DNZB, updated 22 June 2007, [http://www.dnzb.govt.nz/](http://www.dnzb.govt.nz/), accessed on 23/02/2009. Belich identified Te Moananui and F. Russell as being kūpapa, noting that Russell was a descendant of the first great kūpapa general, Tamati Waka Nene, see Belich, Making Peoples, p.265. Karaitiana Takamoana fought Hauhau forces in Napier in 1866, and sent troops to search for Te Kooti in 1869. He was awarded a sword of honour for his efforts, see Angela Ballara, ‘Takamoana, Karaitiana ?–1879’, DNZB, updated 22 June 2007, [http://www.dnzb.govt.nz/](http://www.dnzb.govt.nz/), accessed on 23/02/2009. Henare Tomoana followed the lead of his Kahungunu kinsman, Takamoana; he is believed to have fought against Hauhau forces at Omarunui in 1866, and pursued Te Kooti between 1868 and 1869. Tomoana was commissioned as a Captain of Militia, and was awarded a sword of honour. See Ballara, ‘Tomoana, Henare, ?–1904’, DNZB, updated 22 June 2007, [http://www.dnzb.govt.nz/](http://www.dnzb.govt.nz/), accessed on 23/02/2009. Ward described H. Tawhai as a kūpapa chief and a staunch ally of the government, though no mention is made of Tawhai ever fighting on the side of pro-government forces here or in his DNZB biography, see Ward, A Show of Justice, pp.272, 306. Ward also identified Te Wheoro as an anti-Kingite who was recruited by the government as an officer in the auxiliary forces and fought against his own Waikato kin; see Ward, A Show of Justice, pp. 138, 168. Wi Pere was willing to swap sides as the circumstances demanded. Pere was suspected by Te Kooti of being a pro-government supporter. As a consequence, Pere found it expedient to join Te Kooti’s followers during his raids on Poverty Bay in July of 1868. Pere and his family managed to escape, and aided government forces in their pursuit of Te Kooti through the Urewera. See Ward, ‘Pere, Wiremu 1837–1915’.
One trend is quite clear: of the 30 at least 18 were of chiefly rank, and were chosen, in part, due to their lineage and inherited mana. Chiefly mana was certainly a prerequisite to holding a seat. With 15 of these members, it is possible to trace their chiefly status to their paternal or maternal lines: of these, seven inherited their mana through their fathers’ line, six through their mothers’ line, and at least two inherited mana from both. It would be a little farfetched to suggest that men and women shared equal status and mana during this period. If this were true then at least half the candidates would have been women, though under the laws of the time they would have been barred from entering parliament. The possibility of female candidates was not altogether out of the question; women took part in the Kotahitanga parliaments of the 1890s, and Ngapua was an ardent supporter of female political engagement as rangatira and land owners, a trait his biographer attributes to the influence of his mother Niurangi Pūriri who was an outspoken leader in her own right on the issues of temperance and women’s suffrage in the 1880s and 1890s. However, the majority of Māori MPs, and it would seem the wider community, did not see fit to nominate female candidates for parliament. Considering the Pākehā law barring women from standing for parliament until 1919 was never challenged by the Māori MPs, it seems appropriate here to place the onus on Māori social values and attitudes to leadership than government laws. What we can conclude here is that, while chiefly status was a prerequisite, it mattered little from which side of the family that mana was derived.

Another clear trend is their connections with the church. Of the 19 for whom we have some biographical knowledge, at least 11 had some involvement with the church. This ranged from attending a mission school as a child to being lay readers and donating lands to build churches and missions. In the same vein, 12 of the 19 had some sort of Western schooling, and almost all schools at the time were run by missionaries and local church leaders. It seems most if not all of these men were literate to some extent, but their need for translators and their constant complaints that they could not understand the debates in parliament indicate that most were only

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10 Members who cannot be accounted for include those without biographies or published biographical notes of any kind, and the Uru brothers of Ngāi Tahu, of whom it is not indicated whether they were of chiefly descent or gained their status in the community as Native agents.

11 Moon, pp.31-33.

literate in reading and writing in Māori. It seems that the statements in the literature to the effect that these men were ill-educated and were replaced by an ‘educated elite’ need to be amended slightly. Most had some sort of education via Native schools, but only those who enrolled in post-primary level education like Ngapua, University graduates such as Ngata, Pōmare and Buck, and half-castes raised with their Pākehā parent present, like Carroll or Ngāi Tahu members Tame and Taare Parata, were able to gain the requisite skills in spoken and written English to keep up with parliament. Members were also educated in the tribal wānanga: it is clear that at least six attended the traditional schools of knowledge, though this number is likely much higher.

A quick survey of their occupations indicates that their employment was varied, but a significant number, nine of the 16 whose occupation are known, were farmers and run holders. Several had connections with the Native Land Court: two were assessors and a third was a translator for the courts, while two are listed in their biographies as being ‘oral historians’, a modern way of saying that they were wānanga educated probably from birth and well versed in whakapapa and tribal traditions, and were therefore called on regularly as expert witnesses by the Court. Intimate knowledge of tribal traditions and chiefly mana went hand in hand, so it would be more than likely that members elected for their chiefly mana would also be versed in their traditions. Involvement with the courts also meant familiarity with English and Pākehā customs, which may have convinced supporters that such men would work well within the environs of parliament.

14 See Sorrenson, pp.226, Moon, Ngapua, pp.228-229, Walker, He Tipua: The Life and Times of Sir Apirana Ngata, Auckland, 2001, pp.107-108, and Belich, Making Peoples, p.266. Sir Peter Buck is often quoted as describing the first wave of Māori MPs as ‘old timers’ and ‘old-fashioned’, needing interpreters to translate English speeches into Māori and their own speeches back into English in parliament. Buck was referring to Wi Pere in particular, but his description of Pere as being ‘like the other old timers’ implies that this was the rule for Ngā mātāmua, see Te Rangihāiroa Peter Buck, ‘He Poroporoaki, A Farewell Message’, in The Polynesian Society (various authors), Sir Apirana Ngata Memorial Tribute, p.63. Historians have come to agree with this particular outlook, for example Ward commented in his biography of Pere that ‘he lacked command of legal and administrative detail and political subtlety… The times required trained and subtle minds as well as strong personalities, and the Māori electorate recognised this. Pere was defeated by the young Apirana Ngata in 1905’: See Ward, ‘Pere, Wiremu 1837–1915’.
15 Entries in the DNZB indicate that H. Nahe, W. Pere, H. Kaihau, T. Henare, T. Makitanara and T. Te Tomo were all educated to some extent in tribal wānanga.
16 Entries in the DNZB indicate that M.K. Paetahi, W. Parata, W. Pere, T. Parata, H. Taipua, T. Henare, J.H.W. Uru, H.W. Uru, and T. Makitanara were farmers and run holders.
17 Entries in the DNZB indicate that M.K. Paetahi and H. Tawhai were Native Land Court Assessors. H. Ngapua was hired for a short time as a Native Land Court translator, and H. Nahe and T. Te Tomo are both described in their biographies as oral historians.
Ethnicity and age also varied, though exact details are sketchy due to a lack of birth certificates and recorded details of members’ early years. Out of the 22 members whose ethnicity is known, at least seven were of mixed ethnicity. Neither singular nor dual ethnicity were a requisite for MPs, but those members of mixed descent typically had a better grasp of the English language and Pākehā customs and were thus better prepared for parliament. Age further varied: Ngapua was elected in his 20s, a feat never again achieved in the Māori seats, while his contemporary, kūpapa leader Takamoana was in his 60s or 70s when elected. These were the outliers, the rest ranged in age typically from their 30s to their 60s. Of the 19 whose approximate ages are known, and excluding the outliers, four were in their 30s, six were in their 40s, six were in their 50s, and one was in his 60s. This was fairly typical for Pākehā MPs as well, most of whom were of similar age ranges, but there were other forces at play here which skewed the numbers. Māori society venerated its kaumātua and elders, but this trend would have been balanced up by the earlier death rates experienced by Māori, combined with the fact that, within parliament at least, age was not always a virtue as it was on the marae, and younger leaders were often selected due to their knowledge and experience of English language and Pākehā customs. Ian Pool estimates that by the 1870s Pākehā had a life expectancy of 55 years, with Pākehā women’s mortality rates rising to over 60 by 1901. In comparison Māori life expectancy by the mid-1870s was less than 22 years, rising to 24 in the 1880s and 1890s, and 34 by 1901.¹⁸ Pool points out that it was the considerable gap between the ethnic groups which was startling: Pākehā experienced some of the highest life expectancy rates in the world at the turn of the century, and Māori life expectancy was not exceptionally low compared to other Pacific nations or parts of Europe.¹⁹ Therefore, although the ages of Māori MPs were likely similar to those of Pākehā MPs, they were younger than most rangatira and whānau, hapū and iwi leaders, who were more likely to be older.

Mortality rates should be mentioned here as well: one disturbing trend was the likelihood of Māori members dying in office. We do not have reliable census statistics

¹⁹ Pool, p.77.
to corroborate this in comparison to Pākehā members or other Māori, but it seems startling that out of 21 members who we have information on, seven died in office, and of those five died suddenly and unexpectedly. Three of the 21 died unexpectedly soon after losing their seats, and at least one other was very sickly and died soon after losing his seat. This probably says more about poor Māori health and life expectancy at the time than anything else, but it also indicates that poor health was the norm regardless of economic or social status. Further, the sudden death of these individuals at times played a role in the selection of their successors. The outcome of Ngapua’s untimely death from tuberculosis has been covered previously; proceedings following the death of an MP in office were not usually this dramatic, but it was common for MPs to name their successors, as was the case with Pōmare who named Taite Te Tomo even though the YMP members and Te Puea Herangi of the Kīngitanga had backed Pei Te Hurinui Jones as their candidate. Pōmare had already lost the favour of the King movement, and the burgeoning Rātana movement backed H.T. Rātana. In Southern Māori the seat was passed down to a close relative of the deceased member, to the extent that certain families became hereditary ‘owners’ of the seat. The Parata and Uru whānau held the seat for some 40 years. Taare Parata gained the seat from his father Tame: when Taare died in office J.H.W. Uru won the seat; he in turn died in office leaving the seat to his brother H.W. Uru. This family dynasty was only brought to an end in 1935 by Rātana member Sir Eruera Tirikatene, who in turn left an even longer dynastic legacy of 61 years, with his daughter Whetū Tirikatene-Sullivan holding the seat from his death in 1967 until her retirement in 1996. The dynasties have been revisited in recent years: Hekia Parata entered parliament as a list MP in 2008, and Rino Tirikatene won the Te Tai Tonga seat for the Labour Party in 2011.

Following on from this, another clear trend is that most members were connected to one or several of the political and religious movements of the late nineteenth century.

20 Entries in the DNZB indicate that I. Hakuene, Te P. Te Ao, H. Taiwhanga, H. Heke, T. Parata, K. Takamoana and J.H.W. Uru all died in office, the first five died suddenly and unexpectedly while sitting members. T. Henare, T. Makiranara and T. Te Tomo all died suddenly soon after losing their seats and H. Kahu was ill while a sitting member and died soon after losing his seat.


and were often elected with the mandate of a movement and the support of a block of voters from that movement, along with tribal support. They were also likely to become members of movements or switch allegiances while they were sitting members: political allegiances were far more volatile and fluid in this period than they were to be in the Rātana era, and movements both selected candidates and opposed sitting members, engendering a significant influence on the seats. In the Eastern seat, for example, Takamoana was a kūpapa leader, and some of his strongest competition came from fellow Kahungunu chief Henare Matua, candidate for the Repudiation Movement. His successor, Tomoana, was opposed to the Repudiation Movement, but was to become an ardent supporter of the Kotahitanga movement by the late 1880s. Wi Parata was unaligned, and became the target for criticism from the Repudiation Movement for supporting government policy after his appointment to the Executive Council. Eastern member Pere was elected via Ringatū support, and contested his seat against Carroll, founder of the YMP, to whom Pere eventually lost his seat. By the 1890s Pere had joined the Kotahitanga movement, supporting Ngapua in parliament.

Northern MPs tended to align themselves with the Treaty of Waitangi, though the Māori parliament became popular in the North from the 1880s as well, no doubt due to its connection with the treaty from which it gained the name ‘Te Kotahitanga o te Tiriti o Waitangi’, the Union of the Treaty of Waitangi. Early in his career Northern MP Tawhai felt his allegiance was to the treaty and the tribes of the North and remained aloof from the political movements of the time. However, after parliament ignored his pleas to recognise Māori treaty rights he began supporting various tribal hui in the North, which culminated in the establishment of the Kotahitanga parliaments in the 1890s. Tawhai was to become speaker in the Māori parliament. Similarly, H. Taiwhanga was an advocate of the treaty, organising two deputations to

the Queen in the 1880s by Northern leaders and the King movement respectively. His actions earned him the Northern seat, but by the 1890s he was a confirmed Kotahitanga supporter. Tau Henare was not aligned to any major grouping, and entered parliament once the movements of the nineteenth century had died down: he was however a supporter of the treaty, and perhaps his greatest contribution to the nation was his involvement in organising the centennial celebrations of the Declaration of Independence and the treaty, and the building of the Treaty marae at Waitangi in the 1930s.

The Western seat was contested by the three political powerhouses of Te Tai Hauāuru: Waikato, Raukawa and Whanganui. Maniapoto did not have the numbers to contest the other three alone, but its support and loyalty to the King movement certainly helped elect and unseat members. Initially Raukawa and Whanganui iwi contested the seat: the Kingites remained aloof until 1879, when adviser to the King, Te Wheoro, won the seat with Waikato’s support. Raukawa member Taipua regained the seat in 1886. A decade later the King movement put up another candidate, adviser to the King Kaihau, who held the seat for some 15 years. Kaihau was to be replaced by Pōmare, a YMP member who had the backing of the King movement, but who became unpopular with his constituents for enforcing conscription of Western iwi in World War One. Pōmare nominated Te Tomo as his successor, and Kīngitanga support allowed Te Tomo to beat out Rātana candidate Toko Rātana and YMP protégée Te Hurinui Jones. Te Tomo was a Reform Party member, following in the footsteps of Pōmare. We see here the strength of political pacts made between tribal rangatira – Pōmare was unpopular in his electorate, yet he retained his seat and was allowed to name his successor because the Kīngitanga were unwilling to break the agreement they had made with him. Te Tomo lost office when the Rātana-Labour alliance came into power in the 1935 election.

Almost all then were aligned to one or several political movements, religious groups and causes, and it was not uncommon for allegiances to change over the course of

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31 Butterworth, ‘Pōmare, Maui Wiremu Piti Naera 1875/1876?–1930’.
their careers and even while they were sitting members. Further, each district had its own particular allegiances: the North aligned themselves to the treaty, the South unified around te kerēme, the Eastern seat saw contests between a range of interest groups including kūpapa, repudiationists, Kotahitanga supporters and YMP members. The Western seat was contested by the iwi of Raukawa, Whanganui and Waikato. A generalisation is difficult to make here, but the West was best typified as kūpapa versus Kingitanga. Waikato could call on support from other Western iwi aligned with the King, and secured the seat from 1896 until the rise of the Rātana movement in the 1930s. Tribal rivalry was equally important in the Northern and Eastern seats: Kahungunu, Tūranga iwi Te Aitanga a Mahakia and Rongowhakaata and Ngāti Porou competed for the Eastern seat, while the Eastern and Western sections of Ngāpuhi from Pēwhairangi (the Bay of Islands) and Hokianga respectively competed for the Northern seat with Muriwhenua in the Far North and Ngāti Whātua of Kaipara and North Auckland reserving the right to veto.32

The same kind of competitiveness was not seen in the South Island: a sense of unity was and still is a typical trait for Southern iwi, but this was accompanied by low voter turnout in the region. For the first 70 years Southern votes numbered in the hundreds, while the other seats saw votes in the thousands from at least 1890 onwards. In the 1890 election the Eastern seat received some 3,002 votes, while only 390 were counted in the South.33 The Southern electorate broke through the thousand vote mark for the first time in the 1938 election: in the same election the Northern seat counted 7,583 votes, the Eastern seat 10,324, and the Western seat 10,432.34 The size of the electorate and the difficulty in reaching a polling booth must have played a part but this does not fully explain the low turnout in the Southern seat. Political disengagement does not seem an apt answer either, as Southern Māori were very able and enthusiastic engagers with parliament. Low voting numbers can reflect a number of things: a small voting population, purposeful disengagement, voter apathy, difficulty in reaching voting booths, or a sense that the outcome is already know and

32 For instance, Ngāti Whātua leader Paora Tūhaere refused to recognize the election of Ngāpuhi candidate F.N. Russell in 1868, ‘lest we should twice be put into a false position by that nation the Ngā Puhi’. The 1871 election saw Wi Katene replace the Bay of Islands’ candidate Hone Peti with the support of Hokianga hapū and Te Rarawa of the Far North: Sorrenson, pp.B22–23.
33 Sorrenson, p.B68.
34 Sorrenson, p.B72.
therefore there is little need to vote. Which, if any of these, can account for such low voter turnouts? The Southern seat offers us a number of predicaments that cannot easily be answered.

Voting patterns in the four seats afford us further understandings of the dynamics at play in Māori electorates. Between 1868 and 1886 there was a fair amount of competition between tribal groups and candidates, with few members lasting longer than one term in office. The Northern seat saw the most change; there were eight different members over the first nine elections, a trend that reflected the rivalry and competitiveness commonly attributed to Northland iwi, as remembered in the pepeha ‘Ngāpuhi Kowhau Rau’ (meaning literally ‘Ngāpuhi of a hundred holes’, a commentary on the many divided settlements of this supra-tribe of the North).

Unfortunately there is a lack of written sources on the early Northern members, and only four have entries in the Dictionary of New Zealand Biography; but of the eight at least one was from the Hokianga region, four were from the inland Bay of Islands region (two of them from Kaikohe), and one from Te Aupōuri of the Far North. This reflects the traditional divisions between the Eastern and Western clans of Ngāpuhi and the iwi of Muriwhenua in the Far North. Unrepresented here are the hapū of Ngāti Whātua from Kaipara and the Wai'matua harbours, whom it seems lacked the numbers to compete with their northern neighbours.

The Western seat also experienced considerable division: Western Māori are not usually attributed with the kind of rivalry seen in Northland, though Waikato do have their own answer to Ngāpuhi’s pepeha: ‘Waikato taniwha rau, he piko, he taniwha’ (Meaning literally ‘Waikato of a hundred taniwha, at each bend of the river a taniwha’, a reference to the many different chiefs and settlements along the Waikato River, each as formidable and fearsome as a monster or guardian spirit). The problem

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here was that, rather than inter-hapū rivalry, the Western seat was a creation of bureaucracy rather than tribal boundaries, and was subsequently home to five major iwi groupings: Hauraki, Waikato, Maniapoto, Whanganui and Raukawa, all of whom competed for the seat. H. Taipua, Te P. Te Ao and R. Te Ao held the Western seat for Ngāti Raukawa between 1884 and 1893, beating out Kīngitanga candidate Te Wheoro, but as the King movement opened its borders to outsiders and polling places in the Waikato increased from 1887, the Kīngitanga took control of the seat, holding it successfully from 1896 until the rise of the Rātana movement in 1935.  

The Eastern Māori seat was a little more stable, electing five members in the first nine elections, giving most candidates a second term to prove themselves. The Eastern seat saw early competition between the three powerhouses of Kahungunu of Hawke’s Bay, Te Aitanga a Mahaki and Rongowhakaata of Poverty Bay and Tūranga (Gisborne), and Ngāti Porou of the East Cape. Kahungunu candidates dominated the seat from 1868 until 1884, and briefly again from 1887 to 1893. Pere of Te Aitanga a Mahaki and Rongowhakaata held the seat from 1884 to 1887, and again from 1893 to 1905, when he lost to Ngāti Porou candidate Ngata, who held the seat till 1943.  

Between the elections of 1885 and 1896 competition for the seats settled down, with Heke (Northern Māori), Pere (Eastern Māori), Kāhau (Western Māori) and Parata (Southern Māori) each securing their seats for several consecutive terms. There exists no hard evidence to explain this trend, but a speculative guess would be that this settling down appears to indicate two things. First, as already noted, in this period the various competing groupings within each rohe shored up their voting numbers and ability to control the seats. Second, the electorates may have begun to understand that the typical marae-style competition for mana involved in selecting tribal leaders was not working in parliament, and that electorates needed to elect sitting members over a
number of terms in order to achieve what limited gains they could. Tribal competition and the mana of individual candidates would always be an important factor in Māori political engagement, but from 1885 onwards Māori began voting strategically, mandating a leader with a cause or a movement that backed them, and returning them term after term to achieve their goals. The other significant shift we see here is a transition from traditional tribal leadership to newer modern forms of leadership, as tribal rangatira like Mete Kingi and Takamoana were replaced in parliament by leaders of political movements, such as Ngapua and Taiwhanga, and eventually academics, of whom Ngata was the first. Whakapapa was and still is important, but from the 1880s onwards Māori communities began to favour leaders of pan-tribal political and religious movements, and, as was the case with the YMP, university trained academics. These men were to lose their seats to Rātana members, representing a pan-tribal religious and political movement.

The exception here is the Southern seat where, after a false start with Patterson and a brief flirtation with I. Tainui, Southern Māori settled on a strategy of picking a single member and returning them term after term until their deaths. Again the Southern seat offers us a conundrum: why did Southern Māori settle so quickly into their voting pattern? A firm answer is difficult to establish. A limited voting population must have contributed: the fact that the Southern electorate was redrawn in 1954 to take in sections of the Southern most parts of the North Island to bulk up its numbers confirms this, as does complaints made by then Leader of the Opposition W.F. Massey in 1910 that the Southern seat represented no more than 2,000 Māori people compared with the European seats in the South Island which represented some 12,000 people. The number of polling places in the South Island became progressively lower in the nineteenth century, also indicating a lower voting population than in the other seats. In 1868 Southern Māori were assigned 11 polling places, compared to Northern Māori who were assigned 11, Eastern Māori 12 and Western Māori 14. By 1875 Southern Māori had 14, Northern Māori 13, Eastern Māori 18 and Western Māori 21, and in 1887 the gap had increased to 25 for Southern Māori, 35 for Northern Māori, 61 for Eastern Māori and 86 for Western Māori. A degree of

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38 Sorrenson, p.B37.  
acculturation and close contact with Pākehā perhaps gave Southern Māori a better understanding of how parliament worked and informed their decisions on how to make the most of their seat. Effective leadership, and perhaps a degree of imperialism on the part of Ngāi Tahu and the power houses of Kaikōura, Otago and Riverton / Bluff over their neighbour tribes Ngāti Kuia, Ngāti Toa, Ngāti Mutunga, Waitaha and Ngāti Mamoe also seems likely. Such a speculation is supported by the fact that Ngāi Tahu have continued to lead and dominate the interests of Southern iwi, in their efforts to seek redress for te kerēme in the early and mid-twentieth century and their negotiations with the Waitangi Tribunal in the late-twentieth and early twenty first centuries.

So what specifically did these members do during their time in parliament? What take or concerns did they bring to parliament, and about what issues did they speak?

Land issues were the most pressing concern for iwi in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, and Māori members regularly spoke on the sale of Māori land, the effects of the Native Land Court, the rating of Māori land, the speedy return of lands wrongly taken or sold, and indeed any Bill pertaining to Māori land.

The Native Land Court often came under fire: in the very first speeches delivered in parliament in 1868, Tareha Te Moananui complained about the Court and the actions of other Māori adding their names to land titles to which they were not entitled.41 In his maiden speech Mete Kingi complained of land titles being wrongly attributed to other tribes, and bemoaned that the government had confiscated the lands of loyal kūpapa tribes, in spite of the fact that ‘we were told by the Government that the land of peaceable Natives would be left to them’.42

In a heated debate over Māori representation in 1871, Takamoana argued that Māori did not understand Pākehā language and laws, and that Pākehā were purposefully taking advantage of their confusion to take Māori lands via the Native Land Court, land confiscations and land sales.43 Parata agreed about the impact of the courts on

41 New Zealand Parliamentary Debates (Hereafter referred to as NZPD), 1868, 2, pp.270-271.
42 NZPD, 1869, 2, p.272.
43 NZPD, 1871, 10, p.471.
Māori, and regularly spoke about the Native Land Court and the ringing up of debts by Māori claimants during Court hearings. In 1887 Northern firebrand Taiwhanga delivered a stinging critique of the government, remarking pointedly that it wanted to abolish Māori people but was more than happy to deal with their lands.

The rating of Māori land and the spending of taxes from profits made on Māori land was another cause for concern. Mete Kingi spoke out on behalf of his constituents that taxes were being spent on Pākehā settlements while Māori communities were being ignored. His people had complained to him that ‘[t]hose roads which lead to places inhabited by Europeans are constantly being repaired, but those which lead to places inhabited by Māoris only are not made’.

One hundred and forty years later, Māori Party member for Te Tai Hauāuru, Tariana Turia, was making similar complaints on behalf of her electorate.

In 1881, Tawhai spoke out strongly against the Lands Rating Bill, mixing humour with Biblical allusion:

I should like to see a rope tied around the neck of this Bill and a large millstone placed at the end, and this Bill thrown into the sea, at a distance of not less than a thousand miles from New Zealand, which proceeding will, I hope, prevent its ever returning to meddle with Native lands in the future. And let the Bill, if it attempts to swim at all, swim to England to Her Majesty the Queen.

In debate over the Native Land Bill 1888, which proposed rating Māori lands, Western member Taipua questioned how owners could pay taxes on their lands when no income was being made from the land. Parata’s complaint was not with the rates but how they would be spent: ‘My Native constituents have made representations to

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44 NZPD, 1871, 10, p.474; 1888, 62, p.509.
45 NZPD, 1887, 59, p.352.
46 NZPD, 1868, 2, p.466.
48 NZPD, 1881, 38, p.578.
49 NZPD, 1888, 61, p.690.
this effect: that all the rates collected on their lands should be expended within their
district’.\textsuperscript{50}

In further debate over a proposed Ratings Bill in 1903 Pere argued that the Bill was in
fact a diversionary tactic, and that the government should deal fairly with Māori land:

I know that some Bills are framed merely with a view of keeping the Māoris
in a good humour for the time being until some other question crops up. I say
that the time has come when an end should be put to this continual
humbugging and hoodwinking of the Māori people.\textsuperscript{51}

His allegations are validated by government records: the \textit{Appendices to the Journals of the House of Representatives} are full of petitions and correspondence from chiefs
and tribes complaining of lands lost unfairly through legislation, sale or
confiscation.\textsuperscript{52} Māori were led down a labyrinth of bureaucratic dead ends until they
took the hint: the government was not interested.

Māori representation in parliament was another issue members spoke about regularly.
In 1871, just months into his first term as member for Eastern Māori, Takamoana
introduced three ambitious motions: to appoint Māori members to the Executive
Council as advisers to the Minister of Native Affairs; to allow Māori and Pākehā to
vote for Māori representatives; and to increase the number of Māori seats from four to
twelve. Takamoana was happy with the current districts but felt each should have

\textsuperscript{50} NZPD, 1888, 61, p.691. Parata spoke extensively on this issue during the 1888 session.
\textsuperscript{51} NZPD, 1903, 124, p.80.
\textsuperscript{52} To give just one example from thousands, the \textit{Appendices to the Journals of the House of Representatives} (Hereafter referred to as AJHR) for 1871 contains petitions from rangatira Tamihana Te Rauparaha and Paora Tūhaere, both addressing land lost. See AJHR, 1871, G7-I, pp.11–17. Another pertinent example of this was Southern MP H.K. Taiaroa’s attempts to gain government recognition and redress for te kerēme, the Ngāi Tahu claim. Taiaroa began his campaign in 1871, asking that the Kemp Deeds be laid on the table, and translations made available in English and Māori. While he received some sympathy for his claim, Taiaroa was informed that the government did not wish to translate and reprint deeds that had already been published in English, and on further inquiry was advised that it would take considerable time for the deeds to be compiled, copied and prepared: See NZPD, 1871, 11, pp.735-736 and NZPD, 1872, 12, p.290 for more details. Taiaroa spent the next 14 years trying to access the deeds, asking the government to carry out the promises made in the deeds, and launched a plethora of petitions and motions in parliament to set up a Commission of Inquiry into land sales in the ‘Middle Island’ as it was then called. Taiaroa raised the issue some 59 times in parliament as an MP, and after losing his seat in 1885, spent another 20 years until his death in 1905 pushing for redress as a member of the Legislative Council, to no avail. His claims as an MP are raised in the NZPD from 1871 to 1884, volumes 10-50. See NZPD, 1871, 10, p.457 for his first attempt to address the issue, and NZPD, 1875, 19, pp.265-267 where he delivers an overview of his efforts to date.
three seats instead of one to represent the different iwi factions within each rohe. Takamoana spoke about the many hardships Māori faced at the hands of the government and the Native Land Court, ending his motion with a plea:

You have allowed the Māoris to enter this House. Therefore, I say, let us be equal, let your words be fulfilled, and let us become one people. Do not let us be excluded from any propositions that may be made in this House.

He later added in debate, more pointedly, that Māori had been purposefully excluded from the Legislative Council so as to facilitate the continued alienation of Māori land, taunting parliament that ‘You wish to keep the sources of information to yourselves, - to prevent the Māoris joining. They are not allowed to be in the high places with you’.

Parata, member for Western Māori, supported Takamoana’s motions, making similar complaints about the different laws passed for Māori and Pākehā, and the fact that Māori were not being informed of laws affecting them. Parata felt the four seats were ‘not a just representation of the Māori race in this House’, and supported an increase in Māori members and Māori taking part at all levels of the House. Debating the same issue two years later, Parata argued that the current portioning of seats meant that ‘practically there was no representative for the Tauranga, Hauraki, and Waikato districts’ in his electorate.

Member for Northern Māori at the time, W. Katene, offered his support to the motions, pointing out that other tribes had asked for the same rights in the past, and that agreeing to them would end present day tensions between Māori and the government and promote peace between the races. Katene was concerned that the current four MPs were unable to represent iwi adequately: not all tribes were able to vote in the elections, the districts were too large for a single member to administer, and each tribe elected its own chief to represent their affairs. Asking a chief from

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53 NZPD, 1871, 10, p.471.  
54 NZPD, 1871, 10, p.471.  
55 NZPD, 1871, 10, p.471.  
56 NZPD, 1871, 10, p.474.  
57 NZPD, 1871, 10, p.474.  
58 NZPD, 1873, 15, p.1304.  
59 NZPD, 1871, 10, pp.476-477.
another tribe to represent them was anathema to tribal protocol. Katene clothed his words in metaphor to describe the scant coverage the four members provided, confiding ‘I think that we four Māoris may be likened to a cap which does not hide all the hairs of the head’.

Of Takamoana’s three motions only the first was passed: two Māori members were appointed to the Council the following year. The Legislative Council was an avenue for Māori MPs and tribal leaders to exert some influence on legislation, and is worth discussing briefly. The Legislative Council was established in 1853 via the New Zealand Constitution Act 1852, and was modelled on the British House of Lords. Members were appointed to the Council, and it acted as the Upper House of Parliament until its abolition in 1951. The Constitution Act stipulated that the Council would consist of no less than ten members, and membership fluctuated from between 13 members in 1853 to 53 members in 1885. Up until 1891 members were appointed for life, after which members served seven-year terms, and it earned a sobering reputation as a place MPs went to die.

The first two Māori leaders appointed to the Legislative Council in 1872 were Mokena Kohere, a kūpapa chief of Ngāti Porou, and Wiremu Ngatata of Te Āti Awa. Fourteen Māori leaders served in the Council between 1853 and 1950, including Kohere, Ngatata, Hori Kerei Tairaroa, Ropata Wahawaha, Henare Tomoana, Mahuta Tāwhiao Pōtatau Te Wherowhero, Wi Pere, Tame Parata, Wiremu Kerei Nikora, John Topi Patuki, Te Heuheu Tukino, Sir James Carroll, Wiremu Rikihana, and Rangi Mawhete, an impressive list of some of the movers and shakers of the Māori world. The Constitution Act did not stipulate that the Council required Māori members, but from 1872 onward there was an expectation that there would always be at least one sitting member at any given time. In the 1880s, the

60 NZPD, 1871, 10, pp.476-477. Māori MPs have continued to complain about the unwieldy size of the Māori electorates up to the present day, particularly the Southern seat. In July 2008, Māori Party MP and current member for Te Tai Tonga, Rahui Katene, described the southern seat as ‘the biggest electorate in the country’, the repercussion of this being that ‘it’s more difficult for people to access their MP than anywhere else’: http://www.scoop.co.nz/stories/PO0807/S00318.htm accessed on 15/12/2008.
61 NZPD, 1871, 10, p.477.
62 See Journals of the Legislative Council of New Zealand (Hereafter referred to as JLCNZ), Auckland and Wellington, 1872 – 1950.
1900s and the 1920s there were as many as three Māori members, but in 1917 and again from 1930 to 1935 none were appointed.  

Appointment to the council was at the whim of the government: it was accepted practice that governments would stack the council with supporters, though this was often problematic for incoming governments due to the fact that members had to either die or sit for a term of seven years before they could be replaced. The Māori members were a peculiar mix of kūpapa like Kohere, Wahawaha and Tomoana, tribal ariki of the ilk of King Mahuta and Te Heuheu Tukino, former MPs like Carroll and Pere, Ngāi Tahu MPs pursuing their tribal claim like Taiaroa and Parata, and supporters of non-Māori political parties like Mawhete. Appointment appeared to follow the maxim of keeping one’s friends close and ones enemies closer: the council was a means for the government to pay off kūpapa, buy off so called ‘rebel’ leaders, provide an informal retirement fund for former MPs, and reward loyal party supporters.

The purpose of the council was to hear and report on Bills in parliament between their second and third reading: it was intended as a check on the powers of the House of Representatives to pass legislation, and functioned as a means of tidying up and adding to legislation before the House. In this sense, the council provided an avenue for Māori to have some say over the drafting and passing of legislation. The smaller numbers in the council, combined with the fact that a quorum of only five was required, meant that Māori were not drastically outnumbered within the Upper House as they were in the Lower House. That said, the powers of the council were already limited, and Māori were further limited by being in a minority. Their position was further undermined by attendance: Taiaroa and Pere regularly took leave of absence due to sickness or to attend to private matters, and one sitting member gained notoriety for his non-attendance. Within two months of his appointment in 1903 Mahuta took leave of absence, and was absent twice more within the following two months.

63 JLCNZ, Wellington, 1881 – 1935.
64 See for example JLCNZ 1880 and 1889 for Taiaroa and JLCNZ 1907 and 1910 for Pere.
65 JLCNZ, Wellington, 1903, pp.77, 90, 109.
The Māori MPs complained about Mahuta’s actions in the House of Representatives, claiming he was not attending the Council despite the fact that he was on the government pay roll. \textsuperscript{66} Mahuta was eventually ejected from the council after serving his seven years in 1910; the cause for his vacancy was diplomatically listed as ‘Effluxion of Time’. \textsuperscript{67}

The council provided a forum for Māori leaders to discuss issues of concern to them, and was flexible enough to be able to interact with the House of Representatives and private citizens. Māori MPs could be ordered to attend the Council to be examined before committees, council members could be requested to attend committees in the House of Representatives, and private citizens could attend, as was the case in 1896 when Meiha Keapa Rangihiwinui was granted leave to address the Council at the Bar and provide a written submission on his concerns over the Horowhenua Block.\textsuperscript{68}

The council played a role in hearing issues related to Native Affairs, reporting on Bills affecting Māori, hearing and making recommendations on Māori petitions delivered to Parliament, and examining Native Affairs Committee reports. The council experimented with setting up its own select committee on Native Affairs in 1913 to consider Bills pertaining to Native Affairs and hear petitions from Māori, and was empowered to confer with the Native Affairs Committee in the House of Representatives and to call for persons, papers and records.\textsuperscript{69} The committee was to have 9 members, with as many as three sitting Māori members.\textsuperscript{70} The experiment was sporadic and short lived: the committee was called only on an ad hoc basis, it did not always have Māori members, and the last committee was appointed in 1923.

\textsuperscript{66} See NZPD, 1903, 124, pp.270-271, 580. Taiaroa expressed his resentment at King Mahuta being gazetted as the ‘King of the Māoris’, and that the government were paying his costs in spite of his non-attendance.
\textsuperscript{67} JLCNZ, Wellington, 1910, p.7.
\textsuperscript{68} JLCNZ, Wellington, 1897, p.187.
\textsuperscript{69} JLCNZ, Wellington, 1913, pp.14, 68.
\textsuperscript{70} JLCNZ, Wellington, 1913, p.14.
The Legislative Council provided Māori some influence in the drafting of legislation, and effectively increased the number of Māori with official positions in parliament. That said, Māori members were limited both by their minority within the council and the limited powers of the council to influence legislation. They were unable to either introduce their own bills or prevent bills from being passed, and at times the council acted against the will of Māori communities. To give an example of this, in 1921 the Council attempted to strike out a clause from the Native Land Amendment and Native Land Claims Adjustment Bill that allowed the Native Land Court to vest land in trustees of the Ringatū Church in Ruatoki. The House of Representatives disagreed with the amendment and the Council promptly backed down, stating it did not insist upon the amendment, demonstrating the inability of Māori members to exert their influence over the council, and the inability of the council to challenge the powers of the House of Representatives. The Legislative Council was, for the most part, a toothless organisation: it represents just one of many strategies Māori employed to engage with parliament.

The Māori Representation Bill 1872, which proposed extending the existence of the seats for a further five years, offered another opportunity for Māori members to debate their status in the House and press for more seats: parliament agreed to extend the Act a further five years but refused to meet Māori desires to increase the number of seats from four to five. Māori members continued to push for further representation over the next four years but were unsuccessful: they would have to wait another century and a quarter for the number of seats to increase. In 1872 Taiaroa added to the government’s ‘to do’ list, suggesting that Māori should also be appointed to provincial councils, but nothing eventuated of this and the provinces were abolished in 1876.
A small but important concession these campaigners made was that, once the second term of five years came to an end in 1877, the seats were extended indefinitely, and despite repeated calls from successive government to abolish the seats, none have seen fit to do so up to the present day.76 A more significant concession the Māori MPs gained was the establishment of a select committee to consider Māori affairs. The Native Affairs Committee was established in 1871 to ‘consider all Petitions, Reports, Returns, and other documents relating to affairs specially affecting the Native Race’.77 The committee’s main duties were to hear and report on petitions, read papers, and consider and report on legislation pertaining to Māori put before it by the House. The committee was empowered to call for persons and papers, and regularly called private citizens and public servants to give evidence on matters it was investigating.

An overview of the committee between 1871 and 1910 gives us an idea of how it operated and developed during its first three decades of existence. Membership of the committee typically ranged from 10 to 20 members.78 It was expected that the four Māori members of Parliament would be appointed to the committee but their appointment was not mandatory. From 1871 to 1894 the committee had between one and four Māori members. From 1895 to 1919 Māori membership increased to five, the outcome of Carroll winning a Pākehā electorate seat, and for a brief time in 1909 Māori and Pākehā membership of the committee reached parity, with five Māori members in a committee of 10.79 The number required for a quorum vacillated regularly between three and five.80 A Pākehā MP typically chaired the committee, and the length of chairmanship was not set in stone: most chairs sat for anywhere from one to four years, but R.M. Houston held the position over fourteen years from 1892 to 1905.

77 Journals of the House of Representatives of New Zealand (Hereafter referred to as JHRNZ), 1871, Wellington, 1871, p.XXXXIX.
78 See Appendix to the Journals of the House of Representatives, (Hereafter referred to as AJHR), Wellington, 1871 – 1910.
79 JHRNZ, Wellington, 1909, p.XXXVIII.
80 The Committee continues on in the present day – currently it has 13 members from a range of political parties: Seven are Māori and six are non-Māori. See http://www.parliament.nz/en-NZ/MPP/MPs/MPs/Default.htm?pf=CommitteeShortName&sF=Māori+Affairs&lgc=0 accessed on 29/04/2013.
The main purpose of the committee was to hear and report on Māori petitions, which had grown from a trickle in the 1860s to a deluge by the 1870s. The first Māori petition was delivered to the Crown in 1856, and numbers grew steadily from one petition in 1860, to 12 petitions in 1865, to 18 in 1871, increasing exponentially from then on to reach a peak of 198 petitions in 1891 and 194 petitions in 1908. The committee became inundated and was unable to deal with the sheer number of petitions: Dozens of petitions were regularly held over to be heard the following year, and a subcommittee was set up from 1904 to hear petitions from previous sessions.

This huge number of petitions meant the committee had to meet an excessive number of times to hear all the petitions presented, a difficult task considering the logistics of transport, communication and the short time period parliament was in session each year. By the 1880s and 1890s the committee was holding between 40 and 50 sittings a year and this peaked in 1910, when the main committee met 63 times, while a subcommittee established to hear petitions held over from the previous year sat a further three times.

In contrast, the number of Bills referred to the committee was far lower. Between 1871 and 1910 from as few as zero to as many as nine bills were heard by the committee in a year. The committee spent considerably more time reporting on Bills than it did on petitions: as an example it spent 18 days considering the Native Land Bill in 1909. The committee occasionally read papers pertaining to legislation, land tenure and petitions, and could be asked to read as many as 15 papers during a session.

Māori communities petitioned the government on a gamut of issues, ranging from the sale of alcohol and dog taxes to the status of half-castes and Māori ownership of the foreshore. Predictably, land issues were top of the agenda. Within this wider theme, several sub-themes emerge. The three trouble spots of the South Island, Taranaki and the Waikato tended to dominate the petitions received by the committee. Petitions opposing the Native Land Court and the governments’ land policies were common.
and a large number of petitions called for hearings of Native Land Court cases. Social issues like landlessness and alcohol abuse were common: the first Māori petition to parliament in 1856 from Waikato Māori prayed for ‘the enactment of a law for the prevention of the sale of spirits to the Natives’, and in 1908 alone Māori delivered some 22 petitions signed by nearly 900 individuals calling for the prohibition of alcohol sales in Māori districts.

Māori representation was another significant issue. In 1872 for instance the committee heard a petition from Hone Nahe recommending increased Māori representation in the House of Representatives and the appointment of Māori to Provincial Councils. The following year they heard a petition from Ngāi Te Rangi calling for ‘an additional Māori Member to represent their district’, and another from Wikiriwhi Te Tuahu and others asking ‘that Māoris be admitted to Provincial Councils’.

The interests of kūpapa vied for and often won the attention of the committee, with kūpapa leaders variously requesting payment and pensions for soldiers who had served on the side of the Crown and complaining about the confiscation of their lands despite their loyalty.

The significance of the committee was that it provided a counter-balance to the minority status of Māori MPs in the House of Representatives. Within this forum Māori were no longer an outvoted minority: the requirement of a quorum of three to five including the chair meant that parity between Māori and Pākehā or even a Māori majority was achievable, and Māori attendance of the committee was considerably higher than non-Māori attendance, increasing the chances of parity or a Māori majority. The committee gave Māori MPs something to do in parliament other than just attend debates: they were no longer independent, unaligned MPs without any meaningful role in government or parliament. Moreover, the committee gave Māori

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85 NZVPHR, 1856, pp.1-3.
86 AJHR, Wellington, 1908, pp.16-17.
87 AJHR, Wellington, 1872, p.3.
88 JHRNZ, Wellington, 1873, pp.XV, XXII.
89 See for example AJHR, 1872, p.4; 1880, pp.37-38; 1881, p.27.
90 See for existence AJHR, 1908, p.21.
MPs the opportunity to focus their attention on the issues that mattered the most to them, and a strategic position from which to exert influence on policy and encourage government responsiveness and accountability to their constituents.

It appears the Māori MPs recognized the committee added clout to their position: as mentioned attendance was very high, and a large number of the petitions sent to the committee were written by previous, current and future Māori MPs. While no evidence exists to explain this trend, it seems fair to guess that the Māori MPs recognised petitioning the committee was an effective means of airing their grievances with the state and seeking a resolution.

These were the benefits of the committee – there were many limitations. The committees’ recommendations were unbinding, and could be adopted or rejected by the House. The sheer number of petitions the committee faced actually inhibited their work, and, ironically, prevented them from resolving the pleas of petitioners. Of the hundreds of petitions the committee received each year, most had to be ignored with the glib official response that the committee ‘has no recommendation to make’ or that the petition would be ‘referred to the government for consideration’. Each session the committee had time to make detailed recommendations on a dozen or less petitions, and was usually only able to seriously investigate and take evidence on between one and four cases. The committee admitted as much, stating in 1888 that the hearing of petitions ‘occupies considerable time, and requires evidence not easily obtained by a Committee sitting in Wellington’: It recommended the appointment of a tribunal ‘to deal with such cases as the Government finds, on inquiry, deserve consideration’.91

This was the role the committee was expected to play, but with too many petitions and not enough time or resources to hear them this was simply not possible. During his first year in parliament Ngata recommended to iwi that they stop sending petitions to the government, as their pleas were often ignored by the government and did little more than tie up the time of the committee.92

The other limitation of the committee was its conservative nature: the types of cases it chose to investigate or make recommendations on and those it chose to ignore show

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91 AJHR, Wellington, 1888, p.32.
92 Walker, He Tipua, pp.118–119.
its true colours. The committee preferred to take on cases that involved Pākehā, half-castes or Māori with a Pākehā spouse, such as the petition of Robert Cooper in 1878,\(^93\) or the petition of Mrs Te Korowhitī Tuataka Douglas, the Māori wife of Mr E. Douglas in 1879.\(^94\) Government impropriety was also high on the list, as seen in the investigation of the trustees of Wi Apo in 1880 that involved several Pākehā including MP John Sheehan,\(^95\) the petition of Nepe Te Apatu and others in 1881,\(^96\) and the involvement of Māori MPs Wi Pere and James Carroll in land administration on the East Coast investigated in 1897.\(^97\) The rights of loyal kūpapa tribes were prioritised by the committee,\(^98\) as were any petitions involving the desecration of burial grounds.\(^99\)

In contrast the committee had little time for ‘rebel’ Māori or criticisms of the Crown. One of its strongest worded recommendations was a rebuke of Te Kooti in 1888 that described the hosting of hui in his honour as ‘a deliberate and crafty system of loafing on the resources of the thrifty and well-disposed Natives’.\(^100\) It reprimanded Renata Kawepo and some 790 others in 1877 for making a statement that ‘reflects on the character of a member of this house’,\(^101\) and shunned Heta Hamuera and others in 1881 for threatening violence if their pleas went unheard.\(^102\)

The types of cases the committee chose reflected not just its politics but also the constraints it faced. The committee did not have the time or resources to investigate larger claims: the types of claims it investigated were self-contained or minor issues, typically involving resolving issues around the exclusion of an individual or a single whānau from the title to or payment for a block of land. It made strong recommendations on some controversial cases, such as the Waiohau fraud, which it described as ‘reckless, illegal, and loose’,\(^103\) and the Ngāi Tahu reserves, but was

\(^93\) AJHR, Wellington, 1878, pp.16-17.
\(^94\) AJHR, V.II, I.4, Wellington, 1879, pp.1-27.
\(^95\) AJHR, V.II, I.2-A, Wellington, 1880.
\(^96\) AJHR, V.II, I.2, Wellington, 1881, p.13.
\(^97\) AJHR, V III, I.3-A, Wellington, 1897.
\(^98\) For findings on kūpapa see for example AJHR, 1872, p.4; 1880, pp.37-38; 1881, p.27.
\(^99\) For findings on burial grounds see for example AJHR, Wellington, 1881, p.27; 1882, p.18; 1885, p.8.
\(^100\) AJHR, V.III, I.3, Wellington, 1888, p.9.
\(^102\) AJHR, V.II, I.2, Wellington, 1881, p.4.
\(^103\) AJHR, V.III, I.3, Wellington, 1889, p.5.
unable to fully investigate these cases, and recommended the setting up of tribunals to hear them.\textsuperscript{104}

This was to be one of its most lasting achievements: the committee played an instrumental role in recommending that commissions of inquiry be set up to investigate the ‘top three’ claims of Ngāi Tahu, Taranaki and Waikato. In the case of Ngāi Tahu, in 1874 the committee recommended the immediate settlement of Ngāi Tahu land claims.\textsuperscript{105} In 1878 it recommended that the claim be ‘inquired into exhaustively’ by a tribunal, and it continued to pressure the government to act well into the 20\textsuperscript{th} century.\textsuperscript{106} As a result of its efforts the Smith-Nairn commission 1879-1880, the Mackay Royal Commission 1886-1987, and the Joint Middle Island Native Claims Committee 1888-1890 were all appointed to investigate Ngāi Tahu’s claims at length.\textsuperscript{107} The results of these commissions met neither the desires of the petitioners or the committee, leading to the short-lived South Island Landless Natives Act 1906 and the limited Labour Party negotiated Ngāi Tahu Settlement of 1946.\textsuperscript{108} The committees’ efforts were far from a conclusive victory, and they were just one of a number of groups and individuals pushing for settlements, but their contribution should be recognised. Similar outcomes were reached in Taranaki with the West Coast Commission 1880 and the various reincarnations of the West Coast Settlements Reserves Act, and the committee recommended commissions of inquiry for Waikato, Northland, the Hawke’s Bay, Horowhenua, the East Coast and many other regions.

The committee also allowed Māori MPs an opportunity to consider and report on legislation, though it could only consider Bills sent to it by the House. The committee considered as many as nine bills a session: in most instances it either recommended the bill proceed without amendments, or proceed with amendments made by the committee. It was only on rare occasions that the committee recommended that a Bill should not proceed in the House: Between 1871 and 1910 it did this on just three

\textsuperscript{104} For recommendations on Ngāi Tahu see for example AJHR, I.3, Wellington, 1874, p.1; V.II, I.2, Wellington, 1884, pp.2-3. For suggestions on setting up a tribunal see for example AJHR, I.3, 1878, p.11; V.III. I.3, Wellington, 1888, p.32; V.III, I.3, 1894, p.5.

\textsuperscript{105} AJHR, I.3, Wellington, 1874, p.1.

\textsuperscript{106} AJHR, I.3, Wellington, 1878, p.11.


occasions, and only because either a new bill was being introduced, or it wanted longer to consider the bill. In a similar vein, the committee did not challenge papers forwarded to it for review by the House. In general the committee refrained from challenging the House in any manner, and seemed to regard itself as a safety net for Māori and Pākehā and a moral arbiter within the boundaries of policy and legislation.

The committee passed its own resolutions from time to time. Many of these were expressions of thanks to the current chairman; the remainder were sensible suggestions on improving points of policy that generated significant numbers of complaints from Māori. The committees’ intention in passing such resolutions was to improve government policy and lessen its own workload without overtly challenging the government. In 1884 for example it pointed out that a large proportion of its time was spent on petitions for rehearings of Native Land Court cases, and suggested either the establishment of an appellate court or legislation allowing Māori to have their cases reheard in the Native Land Court or the Court of Appeal. It also called for greater impartiality in the Native Land Court, pointing out that Land Court Judges were unlikely to repeal their own hearings, and that Native Assessors should not have interests in the lands they were adjudicating on. Further resolutions included implementing a policy to grant ‘rebel’ Māori lands on a bond of loyal behaviour, setting up of a commission to investigate land alienation, and an inquiry into Māori ownership of the foreshore and sandbanks.

To summarise, the appointment of the Native Affairs Select Committee represented a significant advancement in Māori political engagement. As independent MPs, for the most unaligned to coalition governments or parties, the Māori MPs were often regarded as little more than ‘observers with voting rights’. The committee gave Māori MPs a role to play in government, and a means of influencing state policy and making the state more accountable to Māori communities. The Māori MPs found the committee a more supportive environment than the debating chamber to air their grievances, and Māori petitioners found a more receptive ear to their pleas. The

112 AJHR, V.II, I.2, Wellington, 1880, p.5; 1887, p.1.
committee faced many limitations: its findings and recommendation were not binding, its time was limited, ironically, by the flood of Māori petitions to parliament, and it was unwilling to overtly challenge the Government.

Within these limitations it achieved some considerable outcomes: it settled a multitude of minor and localised issues, and successfully campaigned for the introduction of commissions of inquiry to investigate the land claims of Ngāi Tahu, Taranaki, Waikato and many other iwi. In a less quantifiable but no less meaningful way, the committee increased the effectiveness of the Māori seats and the Māori MPs in parliament, affording them a strategic position from which to pressure government action and influence policy and legislation.

The pressure for more seats continued into the 1880s, with the Representation Bill 1881 bringing the issue of Māori representation to the fore again. The Bill, covering the rights of Māori and non-Māori, contained no provision to increase the seats, and continued the practice of not allowing Māori to register on the general roll (in some areas Māori could have outvoted their Pākehā counterparts if they had been allowed to vote for general seats). In the debates over the 1881 Bill Māori members took a new, far more critical tack, several launching blistering attacks on the government, its failure to honour the treaty, and the obligation the Crown had to rectify the situation.\textsuperscript{114} This new-found edge was a product of both members and circumstances: the Kotahitanga movement burgeoned in the 1880s, refocusing attention on the treaty and offering an alternative to increased seats in parliament: a Māori Parliament. The members too had changed, if not in person then in attitude. Some older members, like Taiaroa, had already spent a decade in parliament and knew what to expect, while new members such as northern representatives Tawhai, Taiwhanga and Ngapua were elected precisely because of their radical, outspoken personas.\textsuperscript{115}

\textsuperscript{114} See H.M. Tawhai’s speech, NZPD, 1881, 39, p.320, and H.K. Taiaroa’s speech, NZPD, 1881, 40, pp.547-549.

\textsuperscript{115} Both Ward and Sorrenson described Taiwhanga as radical, see Ward, \textit{A Show of Justice}, p.291, Sorrenson, p.B29. Although not singled out in the historiography, Tawhai was equally as radical and outspoken, see for example his speech delivered on Māori representation: NZPD, 1881, 39, pp.547-549. Ngapua was probably the most radical member to have held a Māori seat, and his life’s work has been obscured precisely because of this. As Moon notes, throughout his political career ‘there were forces at play that quietly and often, almost imperceptibly, worked to diminish his influence and importance’ due to his ‘simmering radicalism’ and flair with words: Moon, \textit{Ngapua}, p.8. It is important to note that all three of these men were Northern members, and share much in common with future
Taiaroa launched a scathing attack on the Bill in late 1881, opposing it on the grounds that the Treaty of Waitangi guaranteed Māori ‘the same rights and privileges that other subjects of her majesty do’: instead he claimed ‘During my career in this House I have seen no measure passed which could be pronounced just and satisfactory to the Native people’.\textsuperscript{116} Tawhia made similar statements, arguing Māori rights were guaranteed by the treaty, but that the government set up to protect Māori ‘has travelled in the opposite direction, and has tried as much as possible to oppress us’, contrary to the wishes of the Queen set out in the historical document.\textsuperscript{117} Tawhia saw the moves to deny Māori rights as motivated by a desire to control Māori, quipping ‘I suppose these honourable members who wish to see us out of the House want us to be tethered and then they can lead us whichever way they like’.\textsuperscript{118}

Taiwhanga was equally as cynical, asking of parliament: ‘Here we are four Māori members against ninety-one Englishmen. If ninety-one oxen pull against four oxen, what are the four oxen to do?’\textsuperscript{119} He knew well enough: the Kotahitanga movement was in full swing, and Māori parliaments began meeting in the early 1890s; if the government was not willing to grant more seats Māori would set up their own parliament, and Taiwhanga made no secret of this in the House:

\begin{quote}
I think we are old enough now to look after ourselves independently of the white people ... if they do not want any of us in the House we are quite willing to have a council of our own.\textsuperscript{120}
\end{quote}

Gone here were the polite speeches of the 1860s and 1870s, when elderly tribal leaders orated on the ‘past troubles’ and the need for peace and unity. Early speeches show a certain hope and optimism, with chiefs making pleas that parliament would use its wisdom to make good and just laws, as seen in the words of Te Moananui:

\begin{quote}
Northern members such as Matiu Rata and Hone Harawira, who displayed the same sort of fiery radicalism and flair to capture the imagination of northern voters.
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{116} NZPD, 1881, 40, p.320.
\textsuperscript{117} NZPD, 1881, 39, p.547.
\textsuperscript{118} NZPD, 1887, 59, p.352.
\textsuperscript{119} NZPD, 1881, 39, p.549.
\textsuperscript{120} NZPD, 1887, 59, p.352.
I say to you wise people, work: you the men whose thoughts are wisdom, work: you the people having understanding, do that which is good for the people, and lay down wise laws.\textsuperscript{121}

Such speeches were delivered in much the same way as traditional whaikōrero, calling on old alliances and past promises to deal with the problems of the present day and forge a way forward. These speeches were noble, but they were repetitive, long winded, and were at times misunderstood or ignored by Pākehā parliamentarians.\textsuperscript{122}

Within the space of three years this optimism had turned into realism and eventually cynicism. In 1868 Mete Kingi was asking for debates and laws to be translated so that Māori could see ‘how good’ their words were: just three years later Parata was complaining ‘you alone made the laws, and the evils that have come from them have fallen upon the Māori race’.\textsuperscript{123} The vague orations of the early days quickly turned into sharp, direct, unambiguous accusations. By the 1880s, the Māori MPs readily admitted that the government had failed Māori, and had done nothing to protect their rights and much to abuse them. In Taipua’s words:

Seeing that this House has so often failed in the past, I think the Māoris are justified in asking it to cease making laws for the Native people, and to give us an opportunity of doing so.\textsuperscript{124}

\textsuperscript{121} NZPD, 1868, 2, p.270.
\textsuperscript{122} Such speeches brought the oratory of the marae to parliament, introducing elements of Māori culture into the Pākehā political system. However, their subtle nuances and poignant themes were often too general and wide-ranging for fellow MPs to take in or reply to in full. As an example, Tomoana in an Address and Reply prefaced his speech by stating ‘I have seen in the scriptures that the first sin was committed by Adam and Eve. Following up that, I will say that Sir George Grey was the first man in this island who made laws both for Europeans and Māoris...Who fought against Hone Heke? Who was Waikato’s antagonist? Who took Waikato and placed it in the hands of the Europeans?...Who was Hauhau’s antagonist? Who took Hauhau and placed him in the hands of the Europeans?’ NZPD, 1879, 32, p.147. Mete Kingi’s speeches were similar in construction; he began one by stating ‘The first thing the Europeans taught us in New Zealand was the use of firearms...The next thing they taught us was Christianity...The third thing the Europeans taught us was their appointing Māoris to be magistrates...The forth thing they taught us is their allowing us to enter into this Parliament...’: NZPD, 1869, 6, p.250. In an earlier speech, he gave a brief history of the origins of the New Zealand wars, beginning with the Kohimarama Conference, going on to explain the wars in Taranaki and Waikato, and finishing up with the present day conflicts he was engaged in with Hauhau forces in Whanganui and Taranaki: NZPD, 1868, 2, pp.271-272. These men made their points eloquently, but rarely got a response to the wider issues they raised. Later MPs were to be far more brief and to the point than their predecessors.
\textsuperscript{123} NZPD, 1868, 2, p.466; 1871, 10, p.474.
\textsuperscript{124} NZPD, 1888, 61, p.689.
There was also a growing sense or consensus amongst the MPs that Māori rights were being eroded not by neglect but active intent, and that the government was tricking Māori, using measures such as the seats and promises to address their concerns to divert attention away from their real intention of alienating Māori land. In 1888, Parata claimed of government land legislation that:

It seems to me that all legislation passed by this house affecting Native lands has contained some objectionable provision legalising or in some way dealing with, questionable transactions of the past.\[125\]

He stressed the need for government transparency: ‘I say emphatically, if it is necessary to introduce measures relating to Native lands, let them be above suspicion and white as snow’.\[126\]

Despite their venom, the number of seats was not increased, but limited victories, including the appointment of Māori to the Legislative Council, the establishment of the Native Affairs Select Committee, and the indefinite extension of the seats made small inroads. Māori MPs may have met resistance to their calls for increased representation, but their failures in parliament were balanced by the efforts of Māori parliamentary movements outside of parliament such as the Kotahitanga and Kīngitanga, which rose in popularity in the 1880s.

Accompanying this shift from optimism to cynicism in the 1870s and 1880s, there was a shift in analysis away from the ‘old problems’ and making ‘good laws’ towards a more focused analysis of Māori rights. This new analysis linked Māori rights to the guarantees of the Treaty of Waitangi, called on the Queen and the British Royal family to hold up their side of the bargain and guarantee the rights denied by the settler parliament, and challenged parliament to either protect Māori rights or grant them the right to make their own laws and run their own parliament. Here we see Māori culture at play: the Queen was regarded as an ariki or rangatira rather than just a figure head: Māori at this time felt that the personal mana of the Queen and the Royal family held weight amongst Pākehā, and loyalty to the Queen and the need to uphold her mana would aid their quest to secure treaty rights. From a Pākehā

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125 NZPD, 1888, 61, p.691.
126 NZPD, 1888, 61, p.691.
perspective this was problematic, as parliament was the seat of true power in Britain, not the Crown. However, from a Māori perspective the Queen was a rangatira of great mana, and breaking the agreements made by her would detract from the mana of the Royal family, parliament and Pākehā people in general. This new analysis was tied in with the emergence of the Kotahitanga in the 1880s and its focus on the treaty, and was part of a wider strategy of petitioning the Crown in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century taken up by leaders such as King Tāwhiao, politician Taiwhanga, and religious leader Wiremu Tahupotiki Rātana, all of whom led deputations to Britain to deliver petitions to the Royal family. These strategies rallied iwi around a common cause, promoting pan-tribal unity and providing a measure of hope but they were ultimately ineffective: they were replaced by the strongly delineated separatist agendas of the 1890s and the Kotahitanga, which in turn were eclipsed by the politics of compromise popularised by the YMP from the turn of the century.

A third issue these MPs spoke to regularly were the cultural and language barriers Māori faced in their attempts to engage with the government and other members of the House. They constantly complained that they were unable to follow debates and that all legislation affecting Māori needed to be translated and published so that Māori communities could discuss the issues and advise their representatives how to vote. Mete Kingi admitted that while he may not have been an expert in Pākehā customs, he was well versed in the customs and opinions of his people:

I have not been able to understand what has taken place in this House since I took my seat in it; however I will speak my thoughts to you, and the thoughts of the Māori people, for I am an old man as far as conducting matters with my own people.

In 1879 Te Wheoro suggested all bills be translated and circulated amongst Māori so they could give their opinion before they were debated and passed. Two years later he put a motion ‘That the speeches delivered by the Native members in the House be

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128 See for example NZPD, 1868, 2, p.466; 1872, 12, p.454; 1888, 60, pp.331-332; and 1881, 38, p.289.
129 NZPD, 1868, 2, p.271. Here the term ‘old man’ has probably been used to translate the Māori term ‘kaumatua’ meaning elder, which carries connotations of wisdom and experience.
130 NZPD, 1879, 32, p.125.
translated from *Hansard*, and printed for circulation among the Natives*. Te Wheoro complained that ‘their constituents did not know what they said in Parliament; they were ignorant of what their members did when they were in the House’, and were likened by their people to carved tekoteko (or ‘images of wood and stone’ as it was translated) who simply stood in the house with ‘no voice for their own’.

In 1888, another motion was put by Parata to address the same problem: ‘that all proposed Bills affecting the Native Race should be translated into Māori, and circulated at least one month before the opening of Parliament … whenever practicable’. As with Te Wheoro’s motion seven years earlier, the majority of his parliamentary colleagues did not agree.

As the Māori MPs pointed out, since Māori were unable to read legislation before it was passed, or read parliamentary debates, they often blamed the four members for passing unjust laws. Taiaroa moaned in 1881 that Māori members ‘get the credit of giving our sanction to everything that is passed. The people outside say we consented to pass these things, whatever they may be’. Several also felt that government documents were not being translated on purpose, so as to keep Māori in the dark as to government policy and to minimise the potential for opposition.

There was some truth then in the historical cliché that these early MPs could not speak English and were unprepared for the rigours of parliament. This was particularly true of the first batch of members in the 1860s and 1870s, men like Mete Kingi, Hoani Nahe, Tomoana and Te Wheoro who were senior tribal leaders less well versed in English. Mete Kingi complained in his first speech, and in several subsequent addresses, that he was unable to fully comprehend parliamentary processes. Te Wheoro once asked for a debate to be adjourned as a translation of

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131 NZPD, 1881, 38, p.289.
132 NZPD, 1881, 38, p.289.
133 NZPD 1888, 60, pp.331-332.
134 NZPD 1881, 39, p.590.
135 See Sorrenson, p.B26, Moon, Ngapua, pp.228-229, Walker, He Tipua, pp.107-108, Belich, Making Peoples, p.266, and Buck, ‘He Poroporoaki, A Farewell Message’ for the key works that make this claim, although there are many more.
136 See NZPD, 1868, 2, pp.271, 466.
the Bill had not yet been provided to the Māori members and they were unable to follow debates even with a translator.\textsuperscript{137} However, although these men could not always understand the words of their colleagues they made sure their colleagues understood them, reminding Pākehā of their loyalty to the Crown during the wars, and the provisions of land they had made to establish the settlements and mission stations.\textsuperscript{138}

Others, though, were proficient in English, and revelled in the cut and thrust of debate. Southern MPs Taiaroa and Parata were comfortable with parliamentary parley and made significant contributions to \textit{Hansard}. Parata spoke on a range of issues which had an impact on his constituents, from taxation and rating of Māori land to education, the running of Native schools, the Native Land Court, farming practices, and the numerous petitions sent to parliament. He was also an enthusiastic farmer, and enjoyed speaking on more general issues, particularly the impact of government legislation on farmers.\textsuperscript{139} His ability to word and reword complex motions at the drop of a hat shows he was not fazed at all by the bureaucratic language of parliament. In one debate, Parata described what, in his estimation, were the skills required of Māori MPs:

\begin{quote}
The class of Native who should be called to that position is a man who can look at things from the European standpoint, who knows all about farming operations and stock-raising, and can identify himself with European ideas and
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{137} NZPD, 1879, 34, p.622.
\textsuperscript{138} Mete Kingi for example would deliver reports on the campaigns being waged by kūpapa forces in support of the settler government. His agenda was partly to report back to parliament on their actions, and partly to remind his colleagues of the loyalty and sacrifices made by loyalist tribes, and the pressing need to repay kūpapa tribes for their efforts by addressing their grievances over land loss. See for example two of the speeches he delivered on the subject in 1868: NZPD, 1868, 2, pp.271-272, 465-466.
\textsuperscript{139} Parata began his career in 1886 speaking on a wide range of issues impacting on his constituents, aside from the usual themes of land and Māori representation in parliament. For example in his first two years in parliament he spoke on the issue of Māori education, and the impact dog taxes and proposed seal fisheries would have on Southern Māori: See NZPD, 1886, 54, pp.402, 509; 1887, 58, pp.108-109, 128. His speeches quickly expanded to take in a plethora of social, political and commercial issues which either interested him as a politician or concerned him as a farmer. For example in 1888 he spoke on the impact rail charges had on dairy farmers transporting milk to cheese factories, and the impact wheat tariffs and transport costs would have on wheat farmers. In 1903 he spoke extensively on the rights of barmaids to employment in the face of the Barmaids Abolition Bill: See NZPD, 1888, 60, p.215; 1903, 124, pp.270-271.
habits of thought, and in that way perhaps do some good to both races of the people.140

A degree of Europeanization and acculturation were probably unavoidable for Southern Māori. Parata was returned to parliament as the member for Southern Māori for nearly 30 years, and was later replaced by the Uru brothers, who worked as Native agents and were accustomed to working between Māori and Pākehā communities. North Island tribes soon came to realise that sending elderly chiefs to parliament to remind Pākehā of their promises and debts to tangata whenua was ineffective. So they began electing members more attuned to the settler world, and grooming young leaders to take on these roles. As discussed in the previous chapter, Graham Butterworth identified this process in his biography of Ngata, describing these young leaders as tangata reo rua, ‘new English-speaking leaders, more sophisticated in Pākehā ways than their elders’.141 Thus members like Taiwhanga, Tawhai, Carroll, and Henare who had a better grasp of Pākehā culture and customs were elected, and they were followed by young, articulate and educated members such as Ngapua, Buck, Ngata and Pōmare. The YMP represented the peak of this trend. In 1911 University graduates Buck, Pōmare and Ngata sat alongside Southern member Parata and liberal member Carroll. The argument that the YMP replaced older, ineffectual members hides the steady progression towards more effective members, and the role Māori communities played themselves in selecting and grooming men like Ngapua and Ngata. The process Butterworth describes gives us an insight into the wider process at play, demonstrating the proactive involvement and influence of tribal chiefs, elders and the community in creating and grooming leaders progressively better prepared to serve their people throughout the period.

Taking all this into consideration, let us revisit the central question of this chapter: what roles did these MPs play in the history of Māori political engagement, and how should their place in history be represented? It would be fair to say that they were unable to realise many of their lofty goals; they were however able to make limited

140 NZPD, 1903, 123, p.187.
gains within the constrained circumstances they worked under, and several enjoyed successful political careers and made significant contributions to parliament.

In terms of land, they were unable to pass any major legislation or engender the turnaround in government land policy which they so greatly desired; they did however make some significant contributions as a group and individually. Unable to reverse the trend of land alienation, they at least attempted to limit it by voicing their vehement disagreement in parliament. Their efforts kept Māori land grievances in the spotlight, raised awareness amongst Pākehā, and left a paper trail in the official records for future generations to follow and build upon. Individually some also made limited gains in this area. Southern members Taiaroa and Parata were competent parliamentarians and exemplary spokespersons for their iwi: neither were to see the fruits of their labours in their own lifetimes, but both made huge contributions to the Ngāi Tahu claim by putting their grievances on public record and garnering government awareness of their people’s plight. Their efforts formed the basis of the Ngāi Tahu claim settled by the Waitangi Tribunal in 1997, which included $170 million dollars in land, properties, cash and resources and an apology from the Crown.142

The strongest contribution Ngā mātāmua were able to make was through the Native Affairs Select Committee. The committee afforded these MPs a role in government, gave them some say over the drafting of legislation, allowed them to address the flood of petitions sent to Parliament by Māori leaders and communities, and enabled them to investigate and resolve a number of issues raised by these petitions. The committee’s efforts also saw a series of Royal Commissions into several of the major tribal land grievances: limited settlements were reached at this time and more expansive settlements would be reached by the Labour government in the 1940s as an outcome of their earlier efforts.

If we apply the criteria of effectiveness outlined in chapter one, the effectiveness of Ngā mātāmua varied from individual to individual, but increased over time with the establishment of the Native Affairs Select Committee and to a lesser degree the introduction of Māori members to the Legislative Council. They did not hold positions of power within government, and were unable to pass their own legislation, but their ability to influence policy increased over time. Ngā mātāmua achieved some positive outcomes for Māori, both through the Native Affairs Select Committee and individual effort, but not enough to satisfy their own desires or the needs of their constituents. Their accountability to their communities was limited by their lack of power, but they continued to express Māori concerns and viewpoints. Ngā mātāmua were not as effective as MPs as the YMP members in terms of wielding power, but they were able to exert some influence via the Māori seats, and were not as ineffective as historians have deemed them to be.

Māori MPs were constantly prodding parliament to settle land grievances and answer petitions and letters sent in to them by constituents, like a shepherd prodding and poking a herd of slow sheep along a country road, step by painstaking step. The procession must have been tedious for farmer and sheep alike but at times it gained results. Some achievements were made behind closed doors and likely require further investigation into tribal oral traditions and land titles to clarify. Henare was one such MP who operated in this manner: one story, preserved by oral tradition and published in Michael King’s biography on Whina Cooper, retells how Henare, a snooker hall owner in Motatau and parliamentary snooker champion, convinced Prime Minister Coates to settle Te Arawa's claims to Lake Rotorua by purposefully losing to him in a game of pool at the opening of the Māori Arts and Crafts Centre in Rotorua in 1922. As Cooper recalled:

They had a game of billiards at the hotel where they were staying. Tau was famous in Parliament for being the best billiards player there. He beat everybody. But on this occasion, when Coates asked for a game, Tau let him win. And of course Gordon Coates was overjoyed, he couldn’t get over it, being the first MP to beat Tau Henare. Then Tau said that as soon as the Native Minister stopped laughing, he asked him, “All right, Gordon, what
about settling this business about the lakes once and for all?” And Coates said, “It [sic] that what you want Tau? All right, we’ll settle it”. And so it was settled at once.143

Ngāti Hine oral traditions preserve another similar story of back door negotiations. In 1914 Massey needed a single vote to bring his Reform Party into office; Massey courted Henare, who effectively held the balance of power as an unaligned member. Henare agreed to grant his support if in return Massey settled a dispute over the Ohineriria Block in the Waikino inlet of the Bay of Islands, a wāhi tapu block of 66 acres unfairly taken by the Crown. The land was returned to its rightful owners, the Te Kapotai hapū of Ngāti Hine, and Massey gained the seat he needed to hold power.144 Similar negotiations no doubt took place with other hapū and iwi. These two anecdotes indicate that further investigation into oral traditions would likely show up more instances where similar negotiations occurred.

With regards to Māori representation in parliament some limited gains were made. The Māori members were unable to increase the number of seats, but their pleas for increased representation saw the appointment of chiefs to the Legislative Council in 1871, the establishment of a Native Affairs Committee to hear petitions and address all matters affecting Māori in 1872, and the indefinite extension of the Māori seats in 1877.

In relation to treaty rights, the Māori MPs were unable to make headway with the government in any significant way during this period; what they did do was to preserve a place for the treaty in parliamentary records, and encouraged debate amongst Māori on what the treaty meant to them and their relationships with Pākehā post-1840. Outside of parliament, the building of the Waitangi Marae and the centennial celebrations of the declaration and the treaty were strategies employed to keep the treaty alive. Treaty rights would be bequeathed to future generations to resolve.

144 Te Aroha Henare, Personal Communication, 12 November 2008.
More specifically, Māori MPs were unable to affect in any meaningful way the rights of self-determination promised by the treaty, the declaration, and clause 71 of the constitution. Pressure for a measure of tribal independence by MPs within parliament and movements like the Kotahitanga and Kīngitanga outside of parliament were met by the less substantial but none the less significant Native Committees Act 1883 and the more substantial Māori Councils Act and Māori Lands Act of 1900, drafted and passed by Carroll with the assistance of the YMP members and supporters of the Kotahitanga movement. The Act was perhaps a moral victory, but it was an empty one: the Councils set up by the Act gave no real power to Māori communities, and were redundant by 1904.145 Carroll's efforts helped do away with the Kotahitanga movement, which had already been dying a slow death. Aside from the Kīngitanga, Māori independence movements were the casualties of this era; they largely disappeared from the Māori political scene, and remained a non-issue until the emergence of radical activism in the 1970s.

Another major contribution that these MPs and the movements they represented made was in the sense of hope and focus they gave to their communities. They promoted pan-tribal unity and stimulated debate and social interaction within Māori communities. Iwi hosted major pan-tribal hui and the dust flew as orators stamped and wheeled on marae across Aotearoa and Te Wai Pounamu. Movements like the Kotahitanga, the Kauhanganui (the Kīngitanga Parliament), and the Repudiation movement may not have achieved their ultimate goals, but they were successful in bringing communities together and providing them with direction and hope in hard times.

Ngā mātāmua embodied the transition from armed resistance to political engagement. They were the representatives of Māori communities who experimented with the system, testing its possibilities and limits, and working out the types of leaders best suited to the work. The late 1860s and early 1870s was an experimental phase, as iwi put forward candidates selected largely on tribal affiliations, whakapapa, and personal mana, and measured their success. The period from the mid-1870s to the 1880s saw a verbal assault on government policies. When it was clear that this approach was not

achieving its desired effect, iwi regrouped, forming a series of political movements, each with their own set of agendas and strategies. The members who represented them were more focused, and better prepared for the cut and thrust of parliament. Thus we see a transition from reliance on traditional tribal leadership towards newer modern forms of leadership based around political and religious movements and academic achievement.

Māori communities were quick to realise that members needed to be immersed in Pākehā culture and language to be effective, and needed to be returned to parliament over consecutive terms to achieve their goals. Articulate and outspoken leaders like Ngapua, Taiwhanga, Carroll, Tawhai and Parata were elected to lead Māori into the new century, and worked alongside the members of the YMP who swept into power in the early 1900s.

Historians have chosen to represent Ngā mātāmua as ineffective and anachronistic, old men who were replaced by the younger and more effective YMP. This gradual shift from elderly chiefs to young university graduates is better described as a deliberate, methodical and logical progression, driven not by Pākehā patrons of the church, schools and government, but by tribal elders and community leaders, who over a period of four decades experimented with political engagement as an alternative to disengagement, armed resistance, or military collaboration, and experimented with candidates and approaches so as to identify the most effective means of utilising the seats. Ngā mātāmua were the brave individuals chosen to play this role; each successive wave of members pushed for recognition of Māori rights, and elders and leaders tweaked the system until it began to show results.

These men achieved a number of limited goals. Some have been undervalued when compared to the successes of the YMP, and some have been forgotten or hidden from history completely. They were at the forefront of Māori engagement with the state; they helped iwi in their transition into a new world order that was controlled by Pākehā and the government. Where their efforts met dead ends, they were able to bequeath a wealth of words and wisdom to future generations. They etched out a place for tribal issues in parliament and they raised awareness of Māori culture and
grievances amongst parliamentarians and the public. Ngā mātāmua made a significant contribution to the history of Māori political engagement and to Māori culture and society. Their achievements deserve recognition.

Figure 9: The prophet T.W. Rātana, founder of the Rātana Church. Tahupotiki Wiremu Rātana, PA11-058-04, W.G. Blundell Collection, Lantern slides, PAColl-6600, Views of Rātana Pā, the Bay of Islands, and the South African War, PA11-058, ATL.

Few could have guessed the outcome of the 2008 election. It was expected that Labour would lose, but with five minor parties in the running — New Zealand First, United Future, ACT, the Greens, and the Māori Party — it was unclear as to which parties would be in the next government. The final results surprised many: National swept into power with a majority big enough to rule out the need for coalition partners; New Zealand First was unceremoniously ejected from the political landscape, suspending but not ending the 30-year career of its leader Winston Peters; the Greens faced another term out of government despite the global rise in popularity of eco-politics and the hard won victories of party firebrand Sue Bradford; and the Māori Party and ACT sat teetering above National leader John Keys’ head like some
bizarre, dangerous seesaw. After a week of clandestine meetings behind closed doors the unlikely *ménage à trois* of a National-ACT-Māori Party coalition was announced. The Māori Party’s inclusion in the equation was the most perplexing. Journalists asked why, if they did not need the Māori Party, did National agree to include the party in government? And how could a supposedly pro-Māori movement jump into bed with a party that had not enjoyed any significant Māori support or held a Māori seat since the 1940s?

Every political commentator worth his or her salt aired an opinion, but Chris Trotter’s vitriolic blog posting, unambiguously entitled ‘Kūpapa’, took the cake. Trotter attacked the Māori Party leaders directly for daring to side with National:

> I know whakapapa is everything to you Tariana, so I invite you to consider the whakapapa of Labour’s relationship with Māori.

> I ask you to recall the alliance forged between the prophet Rātana and Michael Joseph Savage.

> I ask you to recall who it was who gave Māori full citizenship – and equal access to the benefits of citizenship. I ask you to recall who established the Waitangi Tribunal. I ask you to recall who extended its remit back to 1840.

> Your people move forward on the road they laid with Labour, Tariana, not with National…

> Your people will not easily forgive this turning away, Tariana. When unemployment and homelessness and poverty bite. When the prisons are full of your rangatahi. When National’s true whakapapa stands revealed.

> They will curse your name.

> Kūpapa! ¹

Trotter’s comments were extreme, but his shock and disbelief that a Māori political movement would dare turn away from the Rātana-Labour alliance spoke volumes

about the common understanding of the nature of Māori political engagement. We need look no further than Labour and the Rātana movement themselves for the sources of this myth. Labour Prime Minister Peter Fraser summed it up best in the lead up to the 1946 election. The night before the Māori election Fraser announced to reporters:

The Māori people have made greater progress under Labour than under any previous Government in social security, education, better health and housing, land development, the settlement of claims and equality of citizenship.²

And yet, bare months later, the Rātana MPs and supporters were meeting at Rātana pā to discuss the possibility of breaking the alliance, and bringing down the government for ignoring the movement and marginalising its MPs.

Understanding the Rātana–Labour era and the alliance forged between Tahupotiki Wiremu Rātana and Michael Joseph Savage, the country’s first Labour Prime Minister, is vital to understanding Māori political engagement in the twentieth and twenty first centuries. Just as the shadow of the Young Māori Party fell over the careers of Ngā mātāmua during the first 70 years of Māori political engagement, the spectre of the Rātana-Labour alliance haunts the histories of the last 70 years of Māori engagement with the state.

This chapter challenges the myths surrounding the Rātana-Labour alliance, so as to provide a clearer understanding of the Rātana-Labour era, the careers and contributions of the Rātana MPs, and the significance of the era within the wider scope of Māori political engagement. It revisits the alliance and the nature of the relationship that developed between the Rātana movement and the Labour Party in the crucial years of 1932 to 1960 and engages with both the popular myth of ‘rosy relations’ between the two groups, and the arguments offered by academics, which have tended to portray Labour’s legacy in a negative light and downplay the involvement and achievements of the Rātana movement.³ Rather than falling on one

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² New Zealand Herald (Hereafter referred to as NZH) (Auckland) 29 November 1946, p.6. Elections to the Māori seats took place the day before the general election up until 1950.
³ The viewpoint offered by historians is quite the opposite: academics have tended to downplay the relationship, arguing that while Labour introduced significant changes for Māori in the 1930s and 1940s, the Rātana MPs themselves were ineffectual, had lacklustre careers in the House, and were
side of the argument or the other, this chapter highlights what the alliance tells us about the nature and development of Māori political engagement, and the factors that helped and hindered Māori MPs in the Lion’s den.

Revisiting the existing literature on the Rātana movement is an important first step in understanding the history of the movement and the ways in which academics have portrayed the nature of its relationship with the Labour Party. If the existing literature on the Young Māori Party (YMP) forms the towering peaks of scholarship on Māori political engagement, then the research on the Rātana movement, its founder T.W. Rātana, and Ngā koata e whā, its elected representatives, comprise an impressive and substantial series of mountain ranges. A number of pervasive themes dominate the...
literature and each of these needs to be dealt with in order to unpack our understandings of the Rātana movement.

Millennial overtones are a common theme that runs throughout the literature: Rātana himself was well versed in millennial politics, and modelled his own self-styled mission on the millennial movements and leaders that emerged from Māoridom in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. J. McLeod Henderson’s foundational texts Rātana published in 1963, and his 1972 refurbishment Rātana: The Man, The Church, The Political Movement, both adopted a millennial approach, painting a pessimistic picture of Māori as a depressed and deprived people, who had been let down by their tribal leaders and the YMP, and had withdrawn into their villages to await ‘the coming of a spiritually endowed leader who would interpret modern life in terms they could accept’.

Subsequent generations of scholars embraced these themes enthusiastically, focusing on the millennial and religious overtones present in Henderson’s seminal works, whilst playing up the oppositional nature of the relationship between the YMP and the Rātana movement. Ranginui Walker, for example, described the YMP as having let Māori down by ‘attempting accommodation with the Pākehā through mainstream politics’. Their inability to solve the issues of poverty, landlessness and the Depression saw Māori turn ‘to charismatic Wiremu Tahupotiki Rātana for salvation’.

The theme of inevitability pervaded Moana Raureti’s work: Raureti argued that ‘Viewed in the light of its forerunners and considered in regard to the deterioration in the circumstances of the Māori people and their still unrequited land claims, emergence of such a personality as Tahupotiki Wiremu Rātana is not surprising’.

According to Michael King, Māori communities were ‘unmoved by and uncomprehending of the kinds of directions offered by the Young Māori Party. They were leaderless, yet seeking leadership, but of a kind that was Māori rather than tribal;
Keith Newman has argued that Rātana does not fit neatly into a ‘socio-physiological or anthropological framework’ and cannot be pinned down with ‘intellectual labels’. Instead, he asserted that:

[T]here was an x factor here beyond human reason…The time and place of his rising, between the two great world wars, among a displaced and broken people, seemed to be an uncanny fulfilment of promises made by a succession of Māori prophets, who forecast a leader would arise basing his message on the dual platform of the Bible and the Treaty of Waitangi.

In Newman’s’ estimation Māori were a ‘broken people who believed they were on the brink of extinction’ and Rātana was ‘responding to the heart cry’ of his people.

There is an unnerving sense of inevitability pervading these texts: Māori are portrayed as a lost people, waiting expectantly for the arrival of a saviour, who was delivered in the form of Rātana. It is clear that Māori communities needed leadership at the time, and they readily supported Rātana, but describing them as waiting sullenly for salvation seems far-fetched. Such an explanation falls too readily for the myths of the ‘dying race’ that were popular at the turn of the century while ignoring the wealth of tribal, pan-tribal, political and religious movements that emerged from the 1870s to the 1920s, of which the Rātana movement and the YMP were just two. Māori were certainly drawn to Rātana's message of hope and faith, and his whakapapa and seeming fulfilment of prophecy cemented his place as a leader for many, but accepting a millennial explanation undermines the agency and proactive nature of Māori communities at the turn of the century and undermines the efforts and abilities of Rātana and his supporters to inspire and uplift the Mōrehu. It is understandable that the works of writers such as Henderson and Newman have been skewed by their close relationship with the church; however academics have too readily adopted this same millennial outlook to explain the emergence of the movement. A more critical approach is required which separates the man from the myth without undermining either Rātana’s spiritual message, Te Ture Wairua, or his political mission, Te Ture Tangata.

11 Newman, Rātana Revisited, p.529.
12 Newman, Rātana Revisited, p.530.
13 Newman, Rātana Revisited, pp.9-10.
Others, notably Lindsay Cox, M.P.K. Sorrenson, and, in his later research, Walker, have eschewed the millennial approach and looked to class politics for answers. Cox argued that Rātana’s popularity stemmed from his common touch, which led ‘inexorably to a firm identification with the Labour movement’.\(^{14}\) According to Cox: ‘The majority of Māori, who had been relegated to the lower rungs of New Zealand’s social hierarchy, had registered a commitment based upon class’: an allegiance to Rātana and an alliance with the Labour Party, ‘the nation’s other champions of the poor’, therefore made perfect sense.\(^{15}\) Sorrenson argued that in the early twentieth century ‘The politics of tribe were giving way to those of class’, and the emergence of the Rātana movement indicated a shift away from conservative tribal leadership, towards a ‘class-based grass roots movement, organised by a network of Rātana branches and in due course firmly aligned to the Labour Party’.\(^{16}\) Walker too shifted towards class as an explanatory factor, stating of the YMP's loss to the Rātana movement: ‘What Ngata did not appear to have realized was the inexorable growth of the brown underclass that Rātana had aligned with the Labour Party.’\(^{17}\) As will be argued in the next chapter, one of the Rātana movement’s lasting contributions to Māori politics was that it heralded a shift away from loyalty to tribal alignments, tribal leaders and the educated elite and towards an alignment with the left-wing and class-based politics.

Criticisms of the Rātana movement and the Rātana-Labour alliance are equally as pervasive throughout the literature. Claudia Orange’s masters thesis offered a critical perspective on the alliance and both parties involved. Orange steered clear of the ‘best race relations in the world’ model offered by her predecessors, instead arguing that government interaction with Māori from 1840 centred primarily around Pākehā land interests, with the desire to assimilate Māori into Pākehā society as a ‘secondary consideration’ which guided government policy. She argued that these trends continued well into the Labour period.\(^{18}\) Orange questioned the myths surrounding the Rātana-Labour alliance, played up by the Labour Party and Rātana MPs, that Labour introduced a raft of sweeping changes to dramatically alter the place of Māori

\(^{14}\) Cox, p.121.  
\(^{15}\) Cox, p.125.  
\(^{17}\) Walker, He Tipua, p.329.  
within society, delivering them some much needed social reforms, equality, access to housing and health and redress for past grievances. Instead she argued that the government had already witnessed a ‘substantial re-direction of policy in the departments most concerned with Māori matters’ thanks to the efforts of Sir Apirana Ngata and the YMP. Labour built on these foundations by introducing a policy of ‘equality’ based around humanitarian and socialist principles, but rather than aiding Māori the policy effectively curtailed their initiatives, as the government pursued its own goals while ignoring the ambitions of its Rātana allies, and marginalising their voices within parliament.

Orange agreed that Labour introduced some important reforms for Māori in the areas of social security, housing, health and education, identifying the Māori War Effort Organisation (MWEO) led by Rātana MP Paraire Paikea as the pinnacle achievement of the Rātana-Labour alliance. That said, she showed that the MWEO was successful precisely because it embraced Māori leadership and initiatives. Labour’s efforts at war’s end to curtail the MWEO and retain the ineffective and inhospitable Māori Affairs Department, despite overwhelming criticism from the people it was supposed to serve, called into question their true loyalties. Their inability to plan ahead and deal with the issues of urbanisation, poor housing and lack of vocational training further showed Labour’s failure to resolve the issues Māori faced during the period.

Orange was equally critical of the Rātana movement, questioning the leadership abilities of Rātana members and their inability to act on the so-called ‘Māori mandate’ and influence the direction of Labour policy. According to Orange: ‘one of the ironies of this early period is the apparent failure of the Māori Labour wing to influence policy… [The Rātana MPs] remained peripheral to policy decisions on Māori matters’.

R.H. Ngatata Love was similarly critical. In contrast to Orange, Love took a closer interest in the Rātana movement and its interaction with the Labour Party and Labour

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leaders. His research paid close attention to the conflicts that developed between the movement and the party, taking in the process of candidate selection and its potential for competition and disagreement between the two movements, the electoral campaigns and their outcomes, the efforts of the Māori Labour Committee and the Māori Advisory Council to influence policy via the Party’s annual conferences and its sitting members, the eventual split that occurred between the Māori caucus of Rātana MPs, the Māori Advisory Council, the Party, and its ministers, and the often strained relationships between the Rātana movement and Labour’s leadership. Love painted a fairly pessimistic picture, attacking the myths surrounding the Rātana-Labour alliance, emphasising the conflicts that arose between the two groups, placing less emphasis than Orange on Labours’ record, and at times questioning the leadership and tactics of the Rātana MPs and Rātana himself.²³

Subsequent scholars have accepted these findings; negative perceptions of the Rātana-Labour alliance, Labour’s record for Māori, and the Rātana movement are common throughout the literature. Walker argued that the Rātana movement achieved little for Māori: ‘The Rātana-Labour alliance brought no substantial benefits to Māori apart from the general benefits of the welfare state’.²⁴ Raureti was damning of their achievements, arguing they failed to ‘extract in their own interests for their movement or the Māori people any more than would normally have been given by a sympathetic and understanding government’.²⁵

Much of the literature has also tended to downplay and question the abilities of the Rātana MPs, their contributions and their impact upon Labour’s polices. Orange has questioned the abilities of the Rātana MPs, stating that Matiu Rātana ‘had considerable difficulty with public speaking, because his English was not fluent’; Tiaki Omana ‘was generally silent in public’; and T.P. Paikea ‘was not an aggressive personality’.²⁶ Raureti has commented similarly on the Rātana movement’s failure to act on its mandate, suggesting that ‘the members elected were not of the calibre and quality to make unwarranted demands of a government, nor did they have sufficient

²³ Love, pp.259-259, 460, 486-487.
²⁴ Walker, Ngā Pepa a Ranginui, p.81.
political acumen to capitalise upon the “opportunity”’. 27 Sorrenson agreed with this estimation, arguing that in the 1950s the Rātana MPs enjoyed increased majorities ‘despite lacklustre performances in the House’. 28

Even Sir Eruera Tirikatene, whom Orange judged to be ‘the most experienced and articulate’ of the Rātana MPs, was held back by the fact that Fraser ‘judged him to be unreliable, an assessment not entirely without foundation and one which some ten years later Nash also held’. 29 Orange suggested that Fraser may have underestimated Tirikatene, pointing to his efforts to salvage the MWEO as evidence, and added that while the Rātana MPs failed to play a decisive role in parliament, they were also prevented from doing so by Labour. 30 In her journal article on the MWEO, Orange added that on taking over the organisation Tirikatene ‘lacked Paikea’s capacity to bring various groups together and did not command the same respect in political circles’. 31 Love also stated that Tirikatene was unpopular in Cabinet due to his habit of ‘Relying too much on stressing a point, he would build up the resistance of the other members of Cabinet against Māori issues’. 32 Love was also critical of the Rātana MPs for failing to seize the moment and walk out on the Labour government in 1947 after Tirikatene was not appointed Minister of Māori Affairs, a decision he described as haunting the Rātana members during both their terms in office. 33 Keith Sinclair described Tirikatene as being ‘full of tricks’ and unpredictable, and suggested that Nash ‘may also have had reservations about his ability’. 34 Michael Bassett and Michael King added to this that Nash’s predecessor Fraser:

...was constantly dissatisfied with the calibre of his Māori MPs, several of whom missed divisions in Parliament and failed to provide resolute leadership for the people they represented. At various stages after 1943 he tried to recruit James Henare and Sir Apirana Ngata to the Labour cause, without success. 35

32 Love, p.478.
33 Love, p.460.
35 Bassett and King, Tomorrow Comes the Song, p.334.
Even Tirikatene himself made similar statements. On welcoming Iriaka Rātana into parliament he commented:

I have listened to quite a number of speeches made by people from the Western Māori District, and I will say that the honourable lady ranks as No.1.

She is a credit to the woman of my race. 36

The statement was as much a compliment to Rātana as it was an insult to her predecessors — her husband and her brother in law.

In contrast Walker placed the blame for the failings of the Rātana MPs at the feet of the government, arguing that: ‘The reason for the poor outcome was the subaltern role of Māori members within the Labour Party and in the overall political structure. They were outvoted within their own party, as well as in Parliament.’ 37

A chorus of voices have thus condemned the Rātana members, questioned their calibre as MPs, their ability to influence policy, and their contributions to their electorates. 38 Few, however, have attempted an in-depth analysis of how these MPs spent their time in the House, the issues they spoke to and campaigned on, their place within the wider scope of Māori engagement with the state, or their contributions as a whole.

37 Walker, Ngā Pepa a Ranginui, p.81.
38 In his biography of Te Puea, King argues that the Kīngitanga leader regarded Rātana as ‘an undistinguished charlatan and usurper of traditional loyalties: she viewed him as a threat to Te Rata’s leadership and told the Maniapoto people sharply that they could not serve two masters’. See King, Te Puea: A Life, 4th ed, Auckland, 2003, p.116. Ngata regarded the movement as bizarre but dangerous, and according to King, used alliances with other tribal leaders such as Te Puea as a buffer against the advances of the Mōrehu. King, Te Puea, p.136. Similarly, Walkers’ biography He Tipua depicts Rātana as Ngata’s ‘nemesis’, stating that ‘he thought that at heart Rātana was anti-Pākehā. Although he could see much to be admired in the Rātana movement, he thought its attitude was insular and its attempt at independence puerile’. Walker, He Tipua, p.266. Walker argued that Ngata underestimated the support Rātana had garnered, and the rise of the movement and his eventual loss to Tiaki Omana in 1943 led to the ‘protracted state of depression’ that marked Ngata’s later career. Walker, He Tipua, pp.328-329. Sorrenson’s Na To Hoa Aroha supported this analysis, highlighting the efforts Ngata and the YMP took to steer support away from the movement, for instance arguing that Ngata’s efforts to set up a Māori Bishopric within the Anglican church were a calculated move to ‘combat the rising tide of the Rātana church’. Sorrenson, ed., Na To Hoa Aroha, I, p.30. The letters themselves show Ngata was dismissive of the movement and underestimated its popularity: in 1928 he wrote to Buck ‘Otira kei te timu te tai o tēnā whakahaere [the tide is turning on that movement]. It was at its height in 1922.’ Sorrenson, Na To Hoa Aroha, I, p.142.
Revisiting the literature on the Rātana movement raises a number of pertinent points that will help shape this and the following chapter. Most authors agree that Rātana provided some much needed leadership, hope and spiritual guidance in the aftermath of World War One, and that his vision of the Bible in one hand and the treaty in the other was far more appealing to Māoridom than the lofty goals of the YMP. In contrast the Rātana movement, the Rātana-Labour alliance, the Rātana MPs and Labours leaders have all faced criticism: authors have argued that Labour failed to live up to its promises of ‘equality with racial individuality’ to Māori, that the Rātana movement failed to influence government policy, and that the Rātana MPs were ineffectual and lacked the abilities required to transform Rātana's vision into concrete change for Māori.³⁹

Further to this, while there is sufficient research on the Rātana Church and Rātana's spiritual mission, Te Ture Wairua, there is a lack of in-depth analysis on Rātana's political mission, Te Ture Tangata. What is needed is an approach that remains open to Rātana’s spiritual message and its impact on Māori, while avoiding the millennial inevitability evident in some publications. More needs to be known about the political efforts of his adherents, the careers of the Rātana MPs, the wider themes that arose from the Rātana-Labour era, and the place of the Rātana-Labour alliance within the wider history of Māori political engagement. This chapter will address these issues by revisiting the history of the Rātana movement, the emergence of Rātana as a leader in the early twentieth century, the movements’ shift into politics, and the outcomes of its alliance with the Labour Party between 1935 and 1960. The chapter engages with the popular belief in cosy relations between the Rātana movement and the Labour Party, and the more critical views offered by academics. Equally important here are the criticisms levelled at the Rātana movement, that it failed to influence government policy and that its MPs were incompetent and lacked the abilities to represent their constituents with conviction.

T.W. Rātana’s transformation from ‘Bill Rātana’, an everyday farmer from the Manawatu-Whanganui region, to ‘Te Māngai’ the ‘mouthpiece of Jehovah’, was a product of whakapapa, circumstance and Divine intervention.⁴⁰ Rātana was marked

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out for greater things from an early age. He received his spiritual teachings from his aunt, Mere Rikiriki, a renowned faith healer who had stayed with Te Whiti and Tohu who led a campaign of passive resistance against the confiscation of Māori land at their community of Parihaka in Taranaki, and formed her own Te Háhi o Te Wairua Tapu (The Church of the Holy Spirit) in 1910. Rikiriki passed on her mantle of leadership to Rātana, predicting his emergence as a great spiritual leader. According to one account she prophesised in 1910 that ‘The time is near when a young man will rise in my place; when he comes there will be weeping and gnashing of teeth’, a prophecy followers understood to be a reference to the influenza epidemic. Another account holds she predicted that ‘In a while it shall be upon a man who will take action directly and strongly (with a great mission) without favouritism (he will be more than a man in his attributes)’.43

Rātana's early years gave little inkling of what was to come: he eked out an existence on the family farm, took an interest in rugby, horse racing and wheat stacking, and was known to drink socially, in excess at times. It was not until 1918 that Rikiriki's prophecies seemed to bear fruit: in the midst of the influenza epidemic Rātana received what he believed to be a series of visions and divine visitations on his home farm, and began to speak in the voices of the Holy Spirit and the Archangels Michael and Gabriel. At first his family believed he had been stricken by madness, however, Rātana began to demonstrate the ability to heal through prayer and faith, healing his son Ōmeka from a needle that had lodged in his knee, and curing the daughter of a local chief who had fallen gravely ill with influenza. These were the first of many visions and miraculous healings performed by Rātana, and his family came to believe that his bizarre behaviour was not a sign of madness, but was divinely inspired. As news spread about his seemingly miraculous abilities visitors from throughout the region and eventually from around the country and the world began arriving on his

41 Ballara, ‘Rātana, Tahupotiki Wiremu, 1873-1939’.
42 Newman, Rātana Revisited, p.42.
43 Rikiriki’s symbolic passing of her mana to Rātana was part of a much longer whakapapa of Māori prophetic leaders stretching back to Papahurihia, Te Ruki Kawiti, Aperahama Taonui, Te Ua Haumene, Tāwhiao, Te Kooti, Te Whiti o Rongomai and Tohu Kakahi, Te Maiharoa, Rua Kenana, and Mere Rikiriki herself. Each claimed the mantle of leadership prophesised by their predecessor and in turn foresaw the emergence of a future leader who would take their place. See Binney, ‘Ancestral Voices: Māori Prophet Leaders’, p.46.
44 Newman, Rātana Revisited, p.46; Ballara, ‘Rātana, Tahupotiki Wiremu, 1873-1939’.
45 Ballara, ‘Rātana, Tahupotiki Wiremu, 1873-1939’.
46 Ballara, ‘Rātana, Tahupotiki Wiremu, 1873-1939’.
doorstep: between 1919 and 1920, 20 to 100 visitors would arrive at Rātana’s farm each day, and by 1921 Rātana indicated that he had received some 70,000 letters from New Zealand and elsewhere requesting his help.\(^{47}\) Between 1920 and 1922 he undertook a series of tours of the North and South Islands as ‘Piri Wiri Tua’, the title he was given as a campaigner who, like a screw, would turn and rotate (‘Piri Wiri’), ‘stick fast and bore through to the other side’.\(^{48}\) Rātana spread his message of faith and hope amongst Māori and encouraged supporters to sign his covenant, pledging that they would unite under Īhoa (Jehovah) and acknowledge his authority, ask forgiveness for their sins, atone for the sins of their ancestors, do away with traditional beliefs in tohungaism and tribalism, forego corruption and the desire for personal gain, and join Rātana in his efforts to spread ‘the Good News of Īhoa’s power, glory and great love’.\(^{49}\) By 1921 Rātana had gained the support of some 19,000 supporters. They had signed his covenant and took on the name of the ‘Mōrehu’ (literally meaning ‘the survivors’).\(^{50}\) By 1924 that number had grown to 34,000, taking in nearly 60% of the Māori population at the time.\(^{51}\)

A bourgeoning and enthusiastic network of followers developed around Rātana: his farm became known as ‘Rātana pā’ as supporters began building makeshift homes and gardens on the settlement.\(^{52}\) The movement gradually coalesced into a formal church, adopting a hierarchy of a president, a synod, secretaries, an executive, committees, Ministers, Apostles and church bands.\(^{53}\) The church was formally founded on 31 May 1925. A list of Ministers was gazetted, and the Creed of the Rātana Church and a Church Constitution were deposited at the office of the Registrar General in Wellington on 21 July 1925.\(^{54}\)

\(^{47}\) Newman, Rātana Revisited, p.85.
\(^{48}\) Newman, Rātana Revisited, p.560.
\(^{49}\) Newman, Rātana Revisited, p.63.
\(^{50}\) Newman, Rātana Revisited, p.106.
\(^{51}\) Newman, Rātana Revisited, p.122
\(^{52}\) Ballara, ‘Rātana, Tahupotiki Wiremu, 1873-1939’.
It was the Kīngitanga leader Tupu Taingakawa who first challenged Rātana to expand his spiritual mission into a political force. Addressing a large scale hui at Rātana pā on Christmas Day, 1920, Taingakawa told Rātana:

Young man, I have come before you not because I am troubled or sick personally but to bring before you the sickness and troubles that have come to bear upon the treasures left us by our ancestors, in particular our lands and our people.

The following year, Rātana announced his dual mission of spiritual salvation and political action in symbolic terms:

Ko te paipera tapu ki taku ringa matau,  
Ko te Tiriti o Waitangi ki taku ringa mauī.

[In my right hand I hold the Holy Bible,  
In my left I hold the Treaty of Waitangi.]

Rātana’s first attempt at ‘going political’ followed the path of previous movements: in 1924 he organised a Royal Deputation to King George V to deliver a petition requesting that the government of England appoint a Royal Commission to investigate Māori land loss, the causes of the New Zealand Wars, the negative impact of government legislation on Māori, and the unfulfilled promises of the Treaty of Waitangi:

If the investigation proves that in accordance with the Treaty of Waitangi the Māoris have been unjustly deprived of their rights, your Petitioners humbly pray that all lands affected by such conclusion be returned to their Māori owners.

Like the northern rangatira in 1882, and King Tāwhiao and the Kīngitanga delegation in 1884, Rātana’s group were denied an audience with the King. Their attempt to
present the petition to the League of Nations in Geneva was also unsuccessful; the League was not sitting at the time.  

The movement’s next step was to turn to the four Māori seats. In April 1922 Rātana had been urged by a meeting of some 3,000 followers to either stand for nomination or nominate candidates to contest the seats. Rātana declined, but put forward his son Haami Tokouru Rātana who stood as an independent in the Western Māori seat. H.T. Rātana failed to wrestle the seat from the incumbent, YMP member Māui Pōmare, but polled impressively in the 1922, 1925 and 1928 elections. With Pōmare’s death in 1930, H.T. Rātana again contested the seat, but was beaten by Reform candidate Taite Te Tomo.

While on a journey to visit the people of Ngāti Maniapoto on 27 June 1928, Rātana announced his entry into the world of politics, stating in metaphorical language typical of his many prophecies and proclamations:

No reira ahau ka whaatu nei ki a koutou, ka wāhia taku tinana kia whā koata, a, māku ano hoki te huanga mai i taku tinana kia kotahi

[Therefore I proclaim here to you all, I will divide my body into four quarters, and, I will unite them back together as one].

His words figuratively announced his desire to take ‘ngā koata e whā’, the four corners of the country: the four Māori seats. Rātana selected his son Haami and three of his most able and dedicated followers to take the roles of Ngā koata e whā: Tirikatene from Ngāi Tahu was to contest the Southern seat; P. Paikea of Te Uri o Hau and Ngāti Whātua was assigned the Northern seat; Pita Te Turuki Moko of Ngāti Whakaue and Te Arawa was to compete with Ngata in the Eastern electorate; and his son Haami was to continue campaigning for the Western electorate. The candidates

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62 Ballara, ‘Rātana, Haami Tokouru, 1894-1944’.
63 Ballara, ‘Rātana, Haami Tokouru, 1894-1944’.
66 Ballara, ‘Rātana, Tahupotiki Wiremu, 1873-1939’.
were made to sign a covenant, stating that they would remain loyal to T.W. Rātana’s authority, and would work to uphold the Treaty of Waitangi, Māori culture and the preservation of the race. The covenant also provided a policy outline for the movement, covering health, education, social security, housing, land development, legislation affecting Māori, the rights of Chatham Island Māori and returned servicemen, the establishment of Māori hostels, and Māori rights under the Treaty of Waitangi. Rātana expected his koata to ‘sew up their pockets’, a figurative way of saying that they should ‘accept no bribes or payment for their work and not be motivated by any thought of personal gain’. Tirikatene followed through with this promise on his election in 1932, paying his entire year’s salary to the church. The following year Rātana allowed him to retain his salary.

*Te Whetū Mārama Ote Kotahitanga*, the official newspaper of the Rātana church, published a simplified version of the movement’s policies in October 1928 stating:

Te Kaupapa  
Ko tōku Kaupapa hei hari ma a koutou tamariki ki roto i te Whare Pāremata, koia tēnei e whai ake nei:  
1 Te Tiriti o Waitangi  
2 Te Mana Motuhake o Te Iwi Māori  
3 Ngā mate o mua atu, me muri mai o Te Tiriti o Waitangi

[The Policy  
My policy is that our children will go to the House of Parliament, to pursue the following goals:  
1) The Treaty of Waitangi  
2) The Independent Authority of the Māori tribes  
3) The grievances that occurred before, and after the Treaty of Waitangi.]

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67 ‘The Qualifications of a Candidate who stands in the interest of the Rātana Policy are as Follows’, in Love, Appendix C1, pp.541-545.
68 ‘The Qualifications of a Candidate who stands in the interest of the Rātana Policy are as Follows’, in Love, Appendix C1, pp.541-545.
71 TWMOTK, 238, 20 October, Whanganui, 1928, p.7.
A later version published in *Te Whetū Mārama Ote Kotahitanga* in the lead up to the 1935 election added a fourth policy identifying a number of the specific tribes that held grievances with the Crown due to land confiscations and land loss in the nineteenth century, a direct appeal by Rātana to those tribes to win their votes.\(^{72}\)

After the movement’s third election loss in 1928, Rātana stepped up his parliamentary efforts, abandoning his neutral stance, demanding that his followers vote for the koata in 1931 and asking them to sign a political covenant accepting him as their ‘Guide and Mentor in matters of politics … that he might revive the Māori Parliament and the Treaty of Waitangi and that he might also resolve matters affecting our lands’.\(^{73}\) Rātana evidentially was frustrated that the nearly 35,000 signatures he had gathered for his covenant had not translated into votes. At a meeting at Rātana pā held on 26 January 1931 and attended by his followers and Labour Party Members of Parliament he questioned the loyalty of his followers and their dedication to the treaty asking:

\[\text{Koia ahaua ka pātai, kei whea koutou e tēnei 35,000…Ko rātou kei te pātai, kei te pewhea to Tiriti o Waitangi, kua mate rānei, kei te ora tonu rānei.}\]

[I ask this question, where are you the 35,000…I ask them, what has happened to your Treaty of Waitangi, has it died, or does it still live?]\(^{74}\)

However the blame did not lie entirely with the Mōrehu. Rātana failed to campaign strongly in the electorates and demanded his koata attend to their duties at the pā rather than take up the campaign trail.\(^{75}\) Some were so busy they even failed to vote. In 1930 Southern koata Tirikatene lost the election on the single vote of the Returning officer: he and his family had spent the day harvesting wheat at the pā and had not voted.\(^{76}\)

The burgeoning Labour Party movement was also competing for votes in the Māori electorates, and although they often polled a distant second to the Rātana candidates their efforts effectively split the vote of working class Māori, delivering the seats to

\(^{72}\) TWMOTK, 596-601, 20 July-3 August, Whanganui, 1935, p.6.


\(^{74}\) TWMOTK, 353, 31 January-7 February, Whanganui, 1931, p.9.

\(^{75}\) ‘Rātana Covenant – Politics’, p.546; Ballara, ‘Rātana, Haami Tokouru, 1894-1944’.

\(^{76}\) Love, pp. 528-529.
the conservative candidates through the 1920s and 1930s. In the 1930 Western Māori by-election, though, H.T. Rātana and right wing YMP candidate Pei Te Hurinui Jones split the vote, delivering the seat to the Reform candidate, Te Tomo.\textsuperscript{77}

The movement’s luck changed in 1932 with the death of United Party MP for southern Māori, Tuiti Makitanara.\textsuperscript{78} Tirikatene stood in the Southern by-election, becoming the first Rātana MP to enter parliament. The win was in some ways a hollow victory: the Labour candidate was deemed ineligible to contest the by-election and Tirikatene won with Labour’s support.\textsuperscript{79} The movement was ecstatic regardless.\textsuperscript{80} Rātana announced enthusiastically:

\begin{quote}
No reira e ngā Mōrehu e hari e koa, otirā e Te Iwi Māori… me koa koutou i roto i tēnei rā ina rā kua uru tēnei tamaiti a koutou, hei hāpai i Te Tiriti o Waitangi.
\end{quote}

[Therefore to the happy and joyous Mōrehu, and to all the Māori people…we celebrate today because your child has been victorious, and in his role will uplift the Treaty of Waitangi.\textsuperscript{81}]

After Tirikatene’s first year in the House Rātana was pleased to announce that thanks to his efforts:

\begin{quote}
te ŌHAKI a ngā kaumātua, ara, TE TIRITI O WAITANGI kei runga nei i ngā ngutu o te iti o te rahi, o te Māori, a, o Tauiwi ano hoki
\end{quote}

[the DYING WISH of our ancestors, that is [the ratification of] THE TREATY OF WAITANGI is on the lips of the few and the many, of the Māori, and of non-Māori also.\textsuperscript{82}]


\textsuperscript{79} Bassett and King, Tomorrow Comes the Song, p.107.

\textsuperscript{80} Bassett and King, Tomorrow Comes the Song, p.107.

\textsuperscript{81} TWMOTK, 388, 29 August-5 September, Whanganui, 1931, p.3.

\textsuperscript{82} TWMOTK, 438-446, 13 August-8 October, Whanganui, 1932, p.2.
Over the following 11 years, the Rātana movement would take each of the four seats in turn, with H.T. Rātana winning the Western seat in 1935, P. Paikea winning the Northern seat in 1938, and Tāiaki Omana (known to Pākehā as ‘Jack Ormand’), who had replaced Moko, wrestling the Eastern seat from Ngata in 1943.83

The Rātana movement was not the only political star on the ascent: as the movement grew in popularity support for the New Zealand Labour Party, which had formed in 1916 and gained their first eight seats in parliament in 1919, was also growing. From the 1920s onwards Labour began to show an interest in Māori votes and Māori issues. Māori Labour supporter and cousin to T.W. Rātana, Rangi Mawhete (known to Pākehā as ‘Rangi Moffatt’) helped to arrange a series of meetings between the Labour Party and Māori leaders in 1924 and 1925 at Parewanui pā, the home of Mere Rikiriki, just west of Rātana pā.84 This was most certainly an overture to the Rātana movement, and Orange indicates that while Rātana did not attend it was possible that he sent an observer.85 Labour leaders also began attending meetings and speaking at Rātana pā: Harry Holland, Fraser, Bob Semple and Ted Howard all visited Rātana pā in 1925, and over the New Year of 1925 ‘the Frasers camped quietly in a corner of Rātana pā while on one of their motoring holidays’.86

In 1925 a Māori Labour committee was formed and invited to the Party’s annual conference.87 The overtures worked: Rātana was interested in the Party’s policies for the working people, and Holland’s ideas about the Treaty of Waitangi and the need to settle land grievances resonated with his beliefs.88 Rātana attended a Labour conference in 1928, and prior to the 1931 election Holland asked to meet with Rātana.89 Although neither was willing to commit to a formal alliance, Rātana agreed that any of the koata who were elected would support Labour.90 Holland in return agreed that while Labour would not officially endorse Rātana candidates, they would refrain from standing Labour candidates in the Māori seats.91

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83 Ballara, ‘Rātana, Tahupotiki Wiremu, 1873-1939’.
85 Orange, ‘A Kind of Equality’, p.34.
86 Bassett and King, Tomorrow Comes the Song, p.107.
As one after another of the Māori seats fell to the Rātana movement it was clear to the Labour leaders that support for the movement was growing. It was also clear to Rātana that the koata would need to form an alliance with one of the main political parties if they were to have any say in government. As Orange has argued, a Rātana-Labour alliance was seen as the best possible scenario. At this stage Labour’s policies and those of the Rātana movement were strikingly similar in format and content. Labour’s Native policy, drafted in 1925 and adopted in 1928, set out the Party’s promises to Māori in four succinct points, mirroring the policies Rātana would publish in *Te Whetū Mārama* in 1928. Labour proposed setting up a Royal Commission to ‘investigate the Native Land Claims arising out of and subsequent to the Treaty’, the setting up of a Native Council ‘to advise it upon all matters relating to Native Affairs’, Māori electoral reform, and an inquiry into the rating of Māori land.

If an alliance had its benefits then a lack of one hurt both parties. In 1938 Labour chose its own candidate, R.T. Kōhere, over the Rātana candidates Omana and M. Rangi. The move effectively split the vote, handing the East Coast seat back to the incumbent Ngata, convincing both parties of the need to work together.

When Tirikatene won the Southern seat in 1932 the Rātana-Labour alliance began to take shape. Tirikatene entered the Labour Caucus on 21 September 1932, and that same week Rātana, Tirikatene and their supporters attended a Labour Party conference, at which Rātana assured the Party of the movement’s support. Several days later Tirikatene was sworn in as a member of the House of Representatives. The following election strengthened the movement’s hand. After H.T. Rātana won the Western seat the two were admitted to the Labour caucus and several days later officially joined the Party, increasing Labour’s numbers in the House from 53 to 55.

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96 Orange, ‘A Kind of Equality’, p.44.
Rātana celebrated the victories of his koata and the achievements of the Labour Party, announcing to his supporters:

Noreira hei mōhiotanga mo tātou ae, i tino kino te hinganga o te Kāwanatanga tawhito. Ka hoki ngā mahara ki ngā kupu whakaari ā kiia “Hara atu ōku hoa he Parikimete, he Hūmeke, he Kamura, ma rātou hei whakatutuki ōku whakaaro” no reira i te rā nei ko te Kāwanatanga hou e tū nei no roto katoa i aua āhua mahi e kōrerotia ake nei e te kupu whakaari nā.

[Therefore it is understood by all, the great defeat of the previous government. Recall the prophetic words that were spoken ‘My friends are the blacksmith, the shoe maker, the carpenter, it is they who will carry out my plan.’ Therefore today the new Government that stands before you do the very same types of work and fulfil the words contained in those prophesies.]99

Rātana called on the prophecy made by King Tāwhiao that his ‘friends’ were the workers of the Pākehā race, the blacksmiths, shoemakers and carpenters. The rise of the Labour Party and the movement’s efforts to work with them was depicted as a fulfilment of this prophecy.

Behind the scenes Mawhete was appointed as a member of the Legislative Council, and a Māori Labour committee and Māori Advisory Council were set up within the Labour Party to strengthen Māori support and advise on Māori policies.100 The Māori Labour committee was particularly successful: under the leadership of Tirikatene as president, Paikea as secretary and H.T. Rātana as member of the executive, the group set up a council consisting of over 160 regional committees from across the North and South Island, brought in 9,000 new members, and added £1000 to Labour’s coffers in their first year of operation, 1936.101

The Labour-Rātana alliance was finally cemented in 1936, in an historic meeting between Rātana and his supporters and Savage. Rātana presented Savage with a series of symbolic objects, explaining the meaning of each. Several accounts of the meeting

99 TWMOTK, 611-5, 2-30 November, Whanganui, 1935, p.3.
exist: the following was published in *Te Whetū Mārama* in 1936. First Rātana presented Savage with a huia feather pushed into a potato, stating:

Te taonga tuatahi, ko ngā Hou Huia e toru, me to rātou waka, (e titi ana ngā hou i runga i te rīwai). Ko ēnei hou, he tohu no te Māoritanga o runga i tēnei motu. Ko tēnei manu ko te Huia, koia nei to manu o tēnei motu, ki te kitea ana e mau ana te tangata i tēnei hou ka mōhio taua tangata he Māori. Waihoki kua mate tēnei manu, no o ngā ngāngara, nā o wītara, i kai, ara ngā ngāngara a te Pākehā. Ko te waka o ngā Hou nei, he rīwai, he kumara, waihoki kua kore o mātou whenua hei touanga i ēnei kai.

[The first gift is three Huia Feathers, and their base, (the feathers are stuck into a potato). These feathers are a symbol of the Māori culture of this country. This bird the Huia, it is indigenous to this country, if you see a person wearing these feathers you will know that person is a Māori. Also these birds have died out, from the pests, from the weasels, they were eaten out, that is by the pests of the Pākehā. The base of the feathers is a potato, a sweet potato, unfortunately we are unable to grow this food on our lands.]¹⁰²

Next he handed Savage a piece of pounamu, stating:

He tohu tēnei mo te Mana Māori, ka tukua atu nei ahau ki a koe. Ko tēnei taonga ko te Pounamu, koia nei te tohu o te mana o te Iwi Māori, heoi i roto i tēnei rā kua ngaro tēnei mana.

[This is a symbol of Māori pride, I hand it on to you. This treasure is made of greenstone, it is the symbol of the pride of the Māori people, however today this pride has been lost.]¹⁰³

Next came a broken watch in a gold case, known to followers as ‘Tewatikoura’ [the gold watch]:

Ko tēnei wati nā tōku Tupuna nā Te Rātana. Ko tērā Kaumatua, he tangata i piri kia Kawana Kerei, a he tangata hoki i piri kia Te Hētana, Pirimia o Niu Tirenī. Ko ahau tēnei ko te uri, kātahi ano ahau ka piri ki Te Kāwanatanga no

¹⁰² Authors own translation: TWMOTK, 633-41, 4-25 April-2-30 May, Whanganui, 1936, pp.7-8.
reira rā, no tōu rā. Waihoki ko tēnei Wati, kahore he karaihe, he kore moni nā taua Kaumatua koia ka kore e oti he karaihe, waihoki kahore aku moni, hei hanga i te karaihe, ka tukua atu nei e āhua ēnei Taonga ki roto i to Ringa.

[This watch belonged to my ancestor Te Rātana. That elder supported Governor Grey, he also supported Seddon, Premier of New Zealand. I am his descendent, and I also wish to join with your Government in this time. Also, this watch has no glass, my ancestor did not have the money to have it fixed, I do not have the money to fix the glass either, I leave this gift in your hands.]104

His final offering was a Rātana church pin, Te Tohu o Te Māramatanga. Rātana told Savage that if he aided the Māori people he would have the right to wear this symbol of Rātana’s impressive body of supporters:

Ko tēnei Pine he tohu o ngā Rātana katoa kei roto i taku whakahaere, ko to rātou tokomaha e 40,000, i tēnei rā ka tukua rātou e ahau ki raro i a koe mau hei tiaki, ko koe hei matua i roto i te Ture Tangata.

No reira e Te Pirimia, ko koe nei Te Minita Māori tena koe, ka tukua atu nei ēnei taonga ki roto i to ringa.

[This Pin is a symbol of all the Mōrehu under my care, they measure 40,000, today I place them under your care, that you may be their father in justice.

Therefore The Premier, as the Minister of Māori Affairs I recognise you, I place these gifts in your hand.]105

His final words to Savage were simple and prophetic: ‘hei mea ano hoki kia kaua koe e wareware ki to Iwi Māori’ [One last thing do not forget your Māori people.]106

According to another account he warned ‘May you never forget your responsibilities

104 Authors own translation: TWMOTK, 633-41, 4-25 April-2-30 May, Whanganui, 1936, p.8. The watch is described in Te Whetū Mārama as ‘Te Wati me te Tini Koura’: it is unclear whether this means ‘the watch and the golden tin’, which would refer to the golden case the watch was held in, or ‘the watch and the golden chain’, which would refer to the chain that fob watches were hung from.
to the Māori people, for when you forget this your Government will fall'. With this, the Rātana-Labour alliance was created. It would last some 45 years.

Little has been made of Tirikatene's first three years in parliament, except that he was a lone but outspoken voice in the political wilderness, and that his early speeches outlined the paths his career would follow. Historians are more interested in the period from 1935 onwards, when the Rātana movement won a second seat and the first Labour government came into power. As Orange and Love have both indicated, the first Labour government’s record for Māori was problematic: they introduced a raft of reforms offering Māori something akin to equality in the areas of social security, by including Māori in the welfare state and straightening out the lower rates of pay imposed upon Māori for unemployment payments and pensions for the elderly, widows and returned servicemen. They attempted to address Māori land grievances, reaching settlements with Ngāi Tahu, Taranaki, and Waikato, and provided more funding for Māori land developments, education, health and housing than previous governments. They also reformed Māori electoral processes, established a Māori electoral roll, introduced the secret ballot, and replaced the word ‘Native’ with the word ‘Māori’ in all official settings. During World War II, Northern Koata P. Paikea was appointed a member of the Executive Council representing the Māori race (1941), and was made Minister in charge of the Māori War Effort in 1942. His work led to the establishment of the highly effective Māori War Effort Organisation (MWEO), the crowning achievement of the Rātana-Labour alliance, though the establishment of the organisation was to be another sore point for Rātana supporters. Fraser had selected Tirikatene to head the MWEO over candidates Mawhete and Paikea, but left the final decision to the Rātana movement. Instead of returning to Rātana pā to discuss the decision Paikea made a detour to Auckland and

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108 There was a brief lapse in the Eastern seat where Rātana’s support had always been lowest, with Mormon candidate P. Watene holding the seat for two sessions from 1963.
114 Love, pp.329-331.
with the backing of Auckland Labour supporters won the appointment as the first Rātana MP to hold ministerial rank in the Labour government.115

The MWEO successfully united all Māori tribal groups and organisations, and for the first time offered Māori a degree of independence and self-governance, under which they thrived.116 Paikea hoped to retain the MWEO in peacetime as a replacement for the inhospitable Department of Māori Affairs, but his untimely death in 1943 meant he was unable to see these ambitions through.117 His place on the Executive Council was taken by Tirikatene, but he, too, was unable to transform Māori wartime efforts into peacetime gains.118 The MWEO was disestablished at war’s end. Tirikatene was made Minister of Printing and Stationary Department in 1947, but the role was a disappointment for the movement and its supporters; Prime Minister Fraser held on to the Māori Affairs portfolio.119

Labour’s record for Māori was considerable, but the Party refused to allow the Rātana movement, the Rātana MPs, or Rātana members within its own Māori Labour Organisation or the Māori Advisory Council any say in the direction of Labour’s Māori polices.120 From as early as 1932 Labour ignored the movement’s attempts to influence Māori policy.121 The same week that Tirikatene entered the Labour caucus in September 1932, a four-day Māori Labour conference was held to discuss Labour’s Māori policy and the establishment of a nation-wide Māori Labour Organisation.122 The meeting was attended by the leaders, MPs and executives of the Labour Party along with Rātana, Tirikatene and their supporters. Rātana promised to co-operate fully with Labour; in return the Labour Party agreed to set up a Māori Advisory Council, but it was not till 1936 that Labour acted on its words and established the council.123

The Māori Labour Organisation suffered similar delays despite its instant success in drawing in memberships and raising Party funds. After nearly a year of inaction the Māori Labour Organisation called its own conference in October 1936: Labour had done nothing in its first year to address the goals of the organisation and despite his promises Savage had been too busy as PM to address Māori concerns in his role as Native Minister. The conference proceeded to draft an ambitious plan to reform the relationship between Māori and the state, calling for a complete reorganisation of the departments that dealt with Māori affairs, the abolishment of the Department of Native Affairs and establishment of a new Native Administration Department, and the appointment of Māori personnel to positions within the resulting departments. The conference’s plans were a major departure from Labour’s original policies: as Orange pointed out, ‘It was obvious that Labour’s original Māori policy had been greatly enlarged upon by the Party’s Māori supporters… A good deal of faith had been placed in the sincerity of Labour’s earlier promises’. The problem was that Labour’s policies had been worked out in the 1920s, when the Party had only an inkling of the depth of Māori grievance, and the Party’s poor showings in the polls meant they could make broad promises without having to implement them. That had all changed by 1936: Labour was now in power, and Māori had not forgotten their earlier promises to ratify the treaty, settle land grievances and offer Māori ‘equality with racial individuality’. The conference called for a greater voice for Māori in government, but Labour had underestimated Māori ambitions and could not risk alienating Pākehā voters: all it could offer was ‘an extension of policies that had been initiated under the previous administration’. The Māori Labour Organisation’s plans were ignored, and the Rātana MPs ‘remained peripheral to policy decisions on Māori matters’.

Furthermore, none of the Rātana MPs, the only Māori MPs in Labour’s caucus, were appointed to the position of Minister of Māori Affairs. After Ngata’s fall from grace as Native Minister and the raft of criticism aimed at the United-Reform government
by the media, public and Labour members, the parliamentary Labour Party feared similar criticisms if it appointed a Rātana MP as Native Minister. Fraser therefore took the portfolio himself. Ironically, Ngata played a part in the decision, requesting Fraser to take the portfolio. As a senior politician and a power player behind the scenes, Ngata’s advice was influential: he likely feared the Rātana movement controlling the Native portfolio, and saw Fraser’s appointment as a workable compromise that would satisfy Māori by placing the portfolio under the mana of the Prime Minister. This would have satisfied Ngata too: it kept the portfolio away from the Rātana MPs and gave him direct access to a more amiable Minister, a strategy he had employed successfully in previous years with Reform member and Minister of Native Affairs, Gordon Coates.\textsuperscript{131}

The Rātana movement also faced distrust from non-Rātana Māori Labour supporters.\textsuperscript{132} Before 1936 the Party had a small but loyal following of Māori supporters.\textsuperscript{133} Some, like Mawhete, saw the strategic sense of linking Labour with Rātana’s expanding band of supporters.\textsuperscript{134} However non-Rātana Māori Labour supporters were incensed at the power and influence lavished on the movement. Rātana members were offered leadership positions within the Labour Party almost immediately after the alliance had been forged, a snub to long term Māori Labour supporters, and although Labour’s leaders reserved the right to make the final decision on candidate selection for the Māori seats the Rātana candidates took priority and were only occasionally challenged.\textsuperscript{135} Resentment grew. In 1938 Labour ignored the Rātana nominees for the Eastern seat, Omana and M. Rangi, choosing instead to back Labour Party member R.T. Kohere.\textsuperscript{136} The move split the Rātana-Labour vote, handing the seat back to the incumbent Ngata.\textsuperscript{137} In the 1946 election non-Rātana Māori Labour supporters stood candidates against the Rātana MPs in the Eastern and Northern seats: A.T. Reedy threatened to stand as an independent Labour candidate in the Eastern seat and H. Toka challenged T.P. Paikea for nomination as candidate for

\textsuperscript{131} Walker, \textit{He Tipua}, p.182.
\textsuperscript{132} Love, p.292.
\textsuperscript{133} Love, p.292.
\textsuperscript{134} Orange, ‘A Kind of Equality’, pp.27, 42.
\textsuperscript{136} Love, pp.309-310.
\textsuperscript{137} Cushla Parekowhai, ‘Omana, Tiaki, 1891-1970’.
the Northern seat. The move had the potential to split the vote and hand the seats to two heavyweight candidates: Ngata in Eastern Māori and Sir James Henare in Northern Māori. According to Love, Prime Minister Fraser was not happy with the performance of the Rātana candidates, and approached both Henare and Ngata to stand for Labour, a bold and divisive intervention that was not appreciated by Rātana supporters. Fraser’s misgivings may have held weight within the Labour movement, but within the Māori electorates support for Rātana held with the Rātana MPs winning all four of the Māori seats.

By 1947 there were serious divisions amongst Māori within the Labour Party: Rātana supporters and Māori Labour supporters clashed over candidate selection and Labour’s Māori Advisory Council was rife with in-fighting between the two factions. The Rātana MPs had split off from the Party and the Advisory Council, and had begun holding their own meetings as a Māori parliamentary caucus, bypassing the Labour Party and attempting to influence the Prime Minister directly. Tirikatene and M. Rātana employed a strategy of being absent from key sessions and votes as a silent protest to the Labour government, but the move had little effect on the stability of the government. Correspondingly, Labour attempted to put the brakes on the movement and limit their impact by appointing non-Rātana members to committees and ensuring non-Rātana members were in the majority on the Māori Advisory Committee. The Rātana MPs were dissatisfied with the alliance; they felt that Labour had failed to meet its obligations to bring full equality to Māori, it had denied them key leadership positions, it had ignored the many policy submissions they had presented in caucus and at the annual Labour Party conferences, and it had replaced the effective MWEO with the lacklustre Māori Social and Economic Advancement Act. The movement met at Rātana pā on several occasions that year to discuss the possibility of severing their link with Labour, and on May 13 complained to caucus of their treatment, asking:

139 Bassett and King, Tomorrow Comes the Song, p.334.
140 Love, p.407.
141 Love, pp.424-425
142 Love, p.424.
143 Love, p.422.
144 Love, p.425.
Have you enquired as to whether you are giving the Māori crumbs from Pākehā’s table, when the Māori is asking for nothing more from your table, but is yearning to get his feet under his own table for a change.146

The alliance could hardly have been more divided. As a sign of this dissention, Māori Advisory Council member Oriwa Haddon left the Labour Party and called for a new independent Māori party to represent Māori in parliament.147 Nothing came of the venture, but it was a symbolic vote of no confidence in the alliance and the infighting between the three factions.

The conflicts carried on in the lead up to the 1949 election, with Labour by-passing the Rātana movement and their own Māori Advisory Council and nominating John Te Herekiekie Grace as the Western Māori candidate over the Rātana selection, Iriaka Rātana.148 Labour backed down on the issue, but this was out of fear of losing to an independent Rātana candidate rather than out of respect to the movement.149 The media were unforgiving in their coverage of the split. Labour was ridiculed for not having announced their official candidate for Western Māori just weeks out from the election. When Labour did finally agree to accept Iriaka Rātana’s candidature they were mocked for having failed ‘to break the shackles of the Rātana church’ and being obliged to ‘accept its candidate the late member’s widow, a lady with heavy family responsibilities and without apparent qualifications as a member of Parliament’.150 Fraser tried to smoothe things over with Western Māori by promising to set up a Royal Commission to investigate claims of Māori ownership of the Whanganui river, and praised Iriaka Rātana’s appointment as ‘a mark of progress among the Māori people in the modern world’.151 The media responded by criticising Fraser for ‘having turned about-face and agreed to reopen the whole matter’, while a Minhinnick cartoon published in the New Zealand Herald on November 18 depicted Fraser as somersaulting into the Whanganui River while four fat sneering Māori men, presumably the four Rātana MPs, watched on in amusement.152

146 Love, pp.420, 423.
147 Love, p.425.
149 Love, p.431.
150 NZH, 15 November 1949, p.6; 17 November 1949, p.7.
151 NZH, 28 November 1949, p.8.
The Rātana movement debated leaving Labour and bringing down the government by removing their so-called ‘mandate’, but ultimately failed to act, believing more could be achieved within government than outside of it, and fearing the possibility that a return to National would mean a return to the inequalities they had experienced before 1935.153

Criticism of the Rātana MPs came from other quarters too: Labour won 53 seats in 1935, giving them a comfortable majority in the House over their United and Reform rivals. This situation changed when the United and Reform parties joined to create the National Party. At the 1946 election National and Labour each gained 48 seats in the House: neither had the numbers to rule since the ruling party needed a majority of at least two, given they had to appoint a speaker to the House. In 1946 the four seats held by the Rātana movement gave Labour the majority, and the Rātana MPs were labelled the ‘Māori Mandate’, with critics arguing that the Rātana MPs provided Labour their majority, and held an unwarranted influence over the Party because of it.154

Criticisms of the so-called ‘Māori Mandate’ in the media were almost immediate: well-known satirist Minhinnick ran the first of several cartoons on the subject on 29 November, just two days after the election.155 The first depicted a tiny man in a business suit walking into Labour’s offices and announcing ‘Morning Boys – I’m the new mandate!’, while the second, published on 9 December depicted the figure shrinking and turning into a Māori, much to the shock of onlookers, with the caption ‘Oo Look! He’s shrinking and turning brown!’156

A third in the series, published just weeks out from the 1949 general election was even less subtle: the first of two images depicted Fraser holding up the tiny figure in triumph in 1946: by 1949 the mandate had become a giant, overweight and sneering Māori, who seemed to be crushing the life out of Nash, much to the surprise of an onlooking journalist.157

Journalists were equally as quick to express their disquiet at the outcomes of the 1946 election: an article published in the Herald on 9 December 1946 warned that ‘for the

153 Love, p.423.
155 NZH, 29 November 1946, p.8.
156 NZH, 29 November 1946, p.8; 9 December 1946, p.8.
157 NZH, 1 December 1949, p.7.
first time in history four Māori members will hold the balance of power’, and mocked the Māori members and Labour’s slim majority in the House, asking ‘Can the Labour Government carry on with a working majority of only four in the House of Representatives particularly when all four are Māori members, some of whom have irregular records of attendance?’

Criticisms and concerns about Labour’s ‘Māori Mandate’ were blamed for Labour’s loss of the 1949 election. At the time Māori voting occurred a day before the general poll, and the Rātana win of all four seats, combined with the years of criticism, seemed to sway voters. The first National government was elected. In the lead up to the 1949 election criticisms in the House about the Labour-Rātana alliance reached fever pitch: the National members ridiculed the Rātana MPs for not gaining the Māori Affairs portfolio, and racial taunts became common. On one occasion T.P. Paikea asked the opposition who had settled the tribal claims, to which he received the retort ‘Who settled the Moriori?’ The Rātana MPs were also put under intense scrutiny: towards the end of the session Tirikatene was attacked for daring to pick up family members and going shopping on the way to official functions in his government car. Iriaka Rātana’s observation on election in 1949 that ‘Māori administration has been the graveyard of reputations’ could not have been more apt.

Labour’s loss was not a heavy blow for the Rātana MPs. Although they lost their place in government their voices had long been ignored by their Labour colleagues. They were diplomatic about Labour’s election defeat: Omana and Tirikatene praised Labour’s record in office and feared what National had in store for them. But newly elected MP Iriaka Rātana welcomed in the National government and the new Minister of Māori Affairs, E.B. Corbett, saying that she was assured ‘the new Government will give my Māori people every consideration’. For the following

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158 NZH, 9 December 1946, p.6.
162 NZPD, 1949, 287, p.2365.
eight years of National’s rule there were no Māori members in government, the first
time this had happened since 1887. The Rātana members were unable to influence
government policy, and lacked the diplomacy and leadership skills to cross party lines
and inform government decisions as Ngata had done in his lengthy stretches out of
power between 1912 and 1928. Instead, the Rātana members continued to meet as a
separate ‘Māori caucus’, and communicated directly with the Rātana movement,
bypassing Labour and its Māori Advisory Council.

If relations between Labour and the Rātana movement had soured during the term of
the first Labour government, it ground to a standstill during the single term of the
second Labour government. Prime Minister Walter Nash had little time for Māori: he
had had limited contact with Māori, and his strong socialist views left no room for
separate Māori rights. On gaining office in 1957 the Rātana movement again held
the balance of power, with National gaining 39 seats and Labour 41. Māori Labour
supporters expected that Tirikatene would be made Minister of Māori Affairs. But
Nash retained the portfolio, making Tirikatene Minister of Forestry, Stationary and
Government Printing. Missing out on the Māori Affairs portfolio was a sore point
for the Rātana MPs and Māori voters: Labour copped flack for the decision, and
Tirikatene was scorned by his own people. He was offered the position of
Associate Minister of Māori Affairs, but was told in no uncertain terms that he had no
powers as Associate Minister, and no authority to hear or act on the concerns of his
constituents. Tirikatene was placed in the embarrassing position of not being able
to speak or act on Māori issues, something he had done his entire career. He also had
to deal with Māori ridiculing him. On visiting the Northern electorate he was told
‘you cannot go through Northland as a Pākehā’, while South Island Māori told him
‘they no longer felt they had an advocate’ or a voice to represent them in
government.

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166 Love, pp.433-5; James Belich, Paradise Reforged: A History of the New Zealanders from the 1880s
168 Love, p.453.
171 Love, p.452.
Tirikatene responded immediately by calling a Māori Policy Committee meeting on 14 December 1957, at which Māori Labour supporters and the Rātana MPs drew up a policy paper entitled ‘Māori Affairs Policy’. They attempted to have the paper added to the agenda at the first cabinet meeting. Nash refused to table the paper, informing Tirikatene that he had no right to concern himself with the portfolio, and furthermore had no legal or moral grounds to interfere as Associate Minister. Nash’s rebuff was an unexpected blow for the Rātana MPs. They met in early 1958 to discuss their concerns, but were unable to make any headway on the issue. Māori Labour supporters took the paper to the 1958 Labour conference where it was officially endorsed, but Labour’s leadership refused to take action, and the Rātana MPs were not even given an opportunity to meet with Nash to discuss their concerns. By 1959 the Rātana MPs were discussing the possibility of leaving Labour and removing their majority to rule, but failed to act. They again demanded adoption of the report at that year’s Labour Party conference, where they received some sympathy, but still nothing was done. The Rātana MPs finally gained an audience with Nash in January 1960. Nash promised to look into the matter, but nothing came of the meeting. In response they tabled a terse motion at the 1960 Labour Party conference:

[T]he frustration of constantly repeating requests for an inquiry into many matters of paramount importance to the Māori race has come to a stage where the practicable effectiveness of this Committee is completely nullified, and to say that its requests have been ignored is putting the matter very bluntly to the organisation which publically states that the Māori adherence will remain loyal to it.

Their pleas were heard by the media, and were an embarrassment for the Party in the lead up to the 1960 election, but by this stage it was all too late. Nash had successfully stalled them for an entire term, they had failed to read the signs and act with

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173 Love, p.450.
174 Love, p.452.
175 Love, p.454-5.
176 Love, pp.466-468, 460, 468-469.
177 Love, p.460.
178 Love, p.475.
179 Love, pp.479-480.
180 Love, p.481.
conviction by walking out on the government, and with Labour’s loss in 1960 they lost their place in government for over a decade, having achieved little.\textsuperscript{181}

Although they had achieved little during Labour’s second term in office, the Rātana MPs had successfully lobbied to have Waitangi Day introduced as a National Holiday. The Waitangi Day Act of 1960 provided for the ‘observance of the 6\textsuperscript{th} of February as a national day of thanksgiving in commemoration of the signing of the Treaty of Waitangi’.\textsuperscript{182} However the Act only allowed provinces to substitute Waitangi Day as a public holiday for their current provincial holiday. It did not introduce a new official public holiday. Instead, the local bodies made the decision.\textsuperscript{183} Despite criticism from National, the Rātana MPs celebrated the victory, and believed the Act was another small step towards recognition of the treaty.\textsuperscript{184}

Labour’s loss in 1960 came almost with a sense of relief and justice for the Rātana MPs.\textsuperscript{185} The movement had achieved little during their term in government, and felt the loss was just deserts for a party that had ignored and marginalised them for the entire term. The Rātana MPs were far less critical of the incoming National government than they had been in 1950: Tirikatene praised the new Minister of Māori Affairs, Ralph Hanan, for his inclusive and respectful treatment of the Rātana MPs, while the more jovial T.P. Paikea quipped ‘I take my hat off to him. He is not a bad little bloke – so far’.

\textsuperscript{186} At the 1961 Labour Party conference they reported with some satisfaction that:

\begin{quote}
A\textsuperscript{n}y organization reaps its just rewards in direct relation to the work effort and real energy put into its work … we stand before you with an indictment that for years the acceptance of the Māori Policy Committee Report has been but empty gestures.\textsuperscript{187}
\end{quote}

The term of the second Labour government was a turning point for the Rātana-Labour alliance and the Rātana movement. The golden years of 1936 to 1949 were a

\textsuperscript{181} Love, pp.486-488.
\textsuperscript{182} NZPD, 1960, 325, p.2952.
\textsuperscript{183} NZPD, 1960, 325, p.2952.
\textsuperscript{184} NZPD, 1960, 325, pp.2960-2966, 71.
\textsuperscript{185} Love, pp.487-488.
\textsuperscript{186} NZPD, 1961, 326, p.310; 1961, 327, p.1675.
\textsuperscript{187} Love, p.487.
cherished but distant memory. After the loss in 1960 the movement would spend the next 12 years out of government. The respite provided the movement time to recuperate, regroup and introduce some new blood. Tirikatene passed away in 1967 and was replaced by his daughter, Whetū Tirikatene-Sullivan. T.P. Paikea died in 1963 and was replaced by Matiu Rata. Omana retired in 1963, and after the Eastern seat had been held by Mormon candidate P. Watene for two terms, was regained by Rātana candidate P.B. Rewiti. Iriaka Rātana chose to retire in 1969, to be replaced by Koro Wētere.

The third Labour government’s single term in office from November 1972 was to be the last time the Rātana MPs held all four koata: Northern koata Matiu Rata left the party in 1979 to form Mana Motuhake, and Labour chose to replace him and his colleague, P.B. Rewiti, with non-Rātana candidates, Dr Bruce Gregory and Peter Tapsell in the Northern and Eastern seats respectively. Rātana MPs retained the Western and Southern seats, and it was not till New Zealand First’s clean sweep of the six Māori seats in 1996 that the Rātana members were completely removed from the House. Rātana members returned to parliament at the next election, though. Mita Ririnui, a Rātana apostle, held the newly formed Waiairiki seat from 1999 until 2005; Mahara Okeroa, also a Rātana apostle, held the Te Tai Tonga seat from 1999 until 2008; and although her candidature came via the Labour Party, Tariana Turia had strong family ties with the Rātana movement and its leaders. She held the Tai Hauāuru seat for Labour between 2002 and 2004, before leaving to form the Māori Party.

To conclude, let us return to the question posed at the beginning of this chapter: Was the Rātana-Labour alliance as rosy, or as bleak, as it has been painted? The answer is complex. There were certainly benefits gained from the alliance. Labour secured four safe seats in parliament from 1936 to 1979. These seats were to be crucial between 1946-1949 and 1957-1960, when the Māori members held the balance of power and gave Labour the majority in the House it needed to secure government. Labour gained more than votes: under the leadership of the Rātana movement the Māori Labour Organisation bolstered the Party’s membership by tens of thousands, and added thousands of pounds to the Party’s coffers.
In turn, the Rātana movement gained a powerful ally within parliament, its leaders were offered key positions within the Party’s hierarchy, P. Paikea and Tirikatene gained ministerial positions, and the movement established and led the short lived but highly successful MWEO.

It must also be said that Māori benefitted from the fruits of the alliance. Labour may not have fulfilled its promise of full equality, and it may not have allowed the Rātana movement a full say in the direction of its Māori policy, but it did more for Māori between 1936 and 1949 than any previous government. Leadership had much to do with this: under Fraser Māori rights surged forward; under Nash they ground to a halt. Without Rātana the Labour Party would have held government for three terms between 1935 and 1959. With Rātana’s support they held government for five terms during the period. Labour’s reforms for Māori were partly driven by sentimentality, and partly by left-wing humanitarian ethics, but the Labour Party were also shrewd and pragmatic: they wanted Māori votes, they needed the Māori seats, and they courted Māori voters and the Rātana movement accordingly. Furthermore, as will be argued in the following chapter, even when the Rātana movement were unable to direct Māori policy their work inside and outside of parliament convinced Labour to develop and implement its own policies for Māori. There were certainly benefits to be gained from the Rātana-Labour alliance, and there is a ring of truth to the myth that Labour delivered reforms that gave Māori ‘something akin to equality’.

However, there is equally some truth in the negative perceptions of the alliance. Labour’s record is considerable, but it fell well short of ‘full equality’. The alliance itself was far from rosy. Labour refused to allow the Rātana MPs a say in the direction of Māori policy. The MWEO proved that Māori thrived under their own leadership, but Labour feared losing control of Māori affairs, and the short-lived experiment was never repeated. The Rātana MPs were offered token positions within the Māori Labour Organisation and gained mediocre positions as Ministers. The real prize, the position of Minister of Māori Affairs was denied them, as Labour feared a repeat of the controversy that surrounded Ngata's brief spell as Native Minister, and were equally as fearful of losing control over Māori policy. Just a year into the alliance the Rātana movement was already dissatisfied with the lack of progress on the polices they had campaigned on: Labour’s decision to ignore the policy draft presented by the
Māori Labour conference in 1937 confirmed their worst fears, and set the tone for future engagements between the Party and the movement. From the 1940s through to the 1960s, tensions built behind the scenes and infighting was rife between the Rātana movement, non-Rātana Māori Labour supporters, the Labour Party and its parliamentary leaders. In 1947, and again in 1957, the Rātana movement seriously debated breaking the alliance and bringing down the government. On both occasions they chose to stay, fearing what would become of Māori under a National government.

The alliance was a mixed blessing: if the Rātana MPs stayed with Labour, Labour would continue to implement its own polices at its own pace. Labour’s polices were appreciated, but the grander schemes Māori envisioned would never eventuate, or would be cut short before they could grow. The Rātana MPs did hold the balance of power during two sessions, but if they dared to flex their newfound muscle they were quickly shut down by Labour’s leaders and the media.

If the Rātana movement ran as independents they could say or do anything they pleased, and could draft any number of radical policy papers, but without a powerful ally in government they had no chance of having their polices implemented. Furthermore, they risked bringing down the Labour Party, and returning to the detrimental polices enacted by right wing parties in the 1920s and 1930s. National’s terms in government in the 1950s and 1960s were never as bad as the Rātana movement feared, but nor did they introduce the kinds of reforms for Māori that Labour offered.

Uniting with National was a possibility, but it was never seriously considered by the Rātana movement: the unequal rates of relief payments meted out to Māori during the Depression, the mistreatment of Māori returned servicemen after World War I, and the continued alienation of Māori land by right-wing parties in the early twentieth century had shifted Māori away from conservative leaders and right wing politics, and even with high profile candidates such as Ngata and Sir James Henare, National barely registered at the polls in the Māori electorates.
The movement’s beliefs also undercut any possibility of leaving Labour. Rātana had his own ‘taihoa’ or ‘wait and see’ policy. We see this in the 1920s and early 1930s, when over three elections Rātana refused to encourage his supporters, the 35,000, to vote for his candidates, and at times even prevented his MPs and close supporters at Rātana pā from voting. Rātana believed that, in time, his prophecies would come to pass. His supporters too believed this: challenging Labour meant challenging the words of the Māngai, and the Rātana MPs were loath to admit their prophet could have been wrong.

The Rātana movement gave up the hope of instant change, and set their sights on a slow grind towards progress and the eventual fulfilment of the Māngai’s prophecies. The best of many examples of this came in 1960, when the Rātana MPs faced damning condemnation for Labour’s failure to make Waitangi Day a national holiday. Tirikatene admitted the movement had loftier ambitions but was pragmatic: ‘We have great visions as to what should be done, but we have to assess what is involved’. He said of Labour ‘I do appreciate all that the Labour Government has been able to do for the Māori people since 1935’. And of the Waitangi Day Act he remarked ‘Thus we were moving along towards a goal as we had been over a period’, ‘It is a step in the right direction’.

The Rātana movement were placed in an unenviable position: if they stayed with Labour they had little say on the direction of Māori policy; if they left they risked bringing down the government and ushering in a government with even less concern for Māori. In the end staying with Labour seemed the lesser of two evils, but the relationship was hardly rosy and was tense at the best of times. Their experience was far from unique; in fact it cuts to the very heart of Māori political engagement and the paradox of Māori representation. If Māori MPs wish to wield power they must be in government; to be in government they must join in coalition with one of the major parties, and they must accept compromise. If they remain loyal to their coalition partner they may eventually gain positions of power, as was the case with Ngata and as will be seen in chapter five with Rata. At worst they may have no say in the way

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188 NZPD, 1960, 325, p.2973.
189 NZPD, 1960, 325, p.2973.
190 NZPD, 1960, 325, pp.2971, 3131.
that power will be wielded, but they may well gain some beneficial concessions for their constituents and token leadership positions. If they wish to retain their independence they will be unable to wield power in any meaningful way. Wielding power while retaining independence was a goal the Rātana movement were unable to achieve during this period. The Rātana movement had failed to learn Ngata’s lesson – to wield power one must compromise, prove loyalty to one’s Pākehā colleagues, and learn to cross party boundaries when required. In many ways their experiences mirror those of previous generations of Māori MPs, who were faced with the same dilemma of having to choose between the compromises of wielding power or the noble futility of retaining independence. The lessons they failed to learn were not lost on future generations. The political movements and leaders that began to emerge from the 1960s onward were well aware of the plight of the Rātana MPs, and worked towards achieving the goals the movement were unable to realise during their time in parliament. Rata in particular would learn the lessons his predecessors had been unable to, and was to be the first Rātana-Labour MP to wield significant power as Minister of Māori Affairs and Minister of Lands.

The existing literature is critical of the Rātana-Labour alliance, Labour’s record, and the abilities and achievements of the Rātana MPs as individuals and as a group. We have sufficient research and evidence to assess these first two issues, but the third is difficult to gauge, as to date there exists no in-depth study of the Rātana MPs and their careers in parliament. The following chapter will rectify this situation by offering a detailed analysis of the political careers of the Rātana MPs, and will engage with the many criticisms of the koata that are peppered throughout the existing literature.
Chapter Four: Ngā Koata e Whā – The Rātana MPs, 1932-1960

Figures 10-15: Six of the seven Rātana-Labour MPs that served between 1932 – 1960. Clockwise from top left: Sir Eruera Tirikatene, Tiaki Omana, Matiu Rātana, Haami Tokouru Rātana, Iriaka Rātana, Tapihana Paikea.¹

If historians have not been kind to the memory of the Rātana-Labour alliance, they have been even less forgiving about the careers of Ngā koata e whā, the seven Rātana members who entered parliament between 1932 and 1960. While there has been lengthy debate over the significance and outcomes of the alliance, research on the koata themselves has been sparse, superficial and uniformly critical, lumping the Rātana MPs together, and collectively labelling them ineffective.² The following

¹ Figure 10: Portrait of Eruera Tihema Tirikatene, 1/1-018923-F, S.P. Andrew Ltd Collection, Portrait Negatives, PA-Group-00572, ATL; Figure 11: Tiaki Omana, PAColl-6303-60, ATL; Figure 12: Matiu Rātana, 1/4-020126-F, S.P. Andrew Ltd Collection, PA-Group-00572, ATL; Figure 13: Haami Tokouru Rātana, Tupu Taingakawa and Te Rewiti, London, PAColl-5671-45, Original Photographic prints and postcards from file print Collection, Box 3, PAColl-5671, ATL; Figure 14: Tahupotiki Wiremu Rātana, Iriaka Te Rio, and Te Urumanaoo Ngapaki, 1/1-016602-F, Tesla Studios Collection, Negatives of Wanganui and district, PA-Group-00410, ATL; Figure 15: Photograph of Tapihana Paraire Paikea, 1/2-056999-F, ATL.

² Criticisms of the Rātana-Labour MPs have been covered in the Introduction and Chapter three of this thesis. For more detail see M. Raureti, ‘The Origins of the Rātana Movement’, in Michael King, ed., Te
chapter will address the inadequacies in the existing literature by in-depth study of the political careers of the koata. It argues that more needs to be known about the Rātana MPs individually and as a group in order to appreciate their contribution to the history of Māori engagement with the state. A lack of detailed research and a tendency to homogenise the Rātana MPs obscured important differences between them: closer study shows that the Rātana MPs varied greatly in their abilities, from competent to mediocre, and that candidate selection played a major role in determining their effectiveness. Furthermore, their experiences offer us insights into the place of Māori within the state, and the paradox of power whereby Māori MPs have had to choose between wielding power or retaining an independent voice in Parliament that has challenged successive generations of leaders seeking to represent their communities in parliament.

The chapter begins with brief political biographies of the seven Rātana MPs: Sir Eruera Tirikatene, Haami Tokouru Rātana, Matiu Rātana, Tiaki Omana, Paraire Paikea, Tapihana Paikea and Iriaka Rātana. These provide some much needed detail on the careers and contributions of the koata as individuals; moreover they allow us to compare and contrast these MPs and their effectiveness in parliament, while highlighting the impact candidate selection had on their careers. The chapter continues with a discussion of the themes that typified the politics of the Rātana MPs and ends with a balancing of the achievements of the movement in parliament and the factors that held it back.

As the first koata to gain a seat in parliament, and as the leader of the political wing of the Rātana movement, Ngāi Tahu’s Tirikatene is a good starting point. Historians have consistently underestimated Tirikatene.3 He was a driven individual and a

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natural leader, and deserves to be regarded as one of Māoridom's significant parliamentarians, alongside Sir James Carroll, Sir Apirana Ngata, and Winston Peters. A man of many talents — good looking, athletic, a skilled musician and a champion rodeo rider — in his early years Tirikatene earned a living as a livestock dealer and a horse-breaker. He joined the Pioneer Battalion in 1914 and was promoted to the rank of sergeant. After his return to New Zealand in 1919 he ran a series of successful commercial ventures, including a dairy farm, a timber-mill, a fishing fleet, and two ferries that ran between Port Levy and Lyttelton. T.W. Rātana recognised Tirikatene’s talents and put his skills to use on the pā, placing him in charge of machinery, food production, harvesting and stock. His leadership abilities, along with the fact that he was one of Rātana's close confidants, made him an appropriate choice for the Southern koata. His stint in the armed services made him a respected speaker on the rights of servicemen and women and an able head of the Māori War Effort Organisation during World War II. His skills as a musician meant he was a suitable commentator on Māori broadcasting and performance and saw him establish the Rātana bands, an important wing of the church and movement. His experience as a miller contributed to his eventual appointment as Minister of Forestry in 1957.

Tirikatene's parliamentary career spanned some 35 years: he entered the House of Representatives in 1932, presenting Rātana’s petition calling for the ratification of the Treaty of Waitangi in November 1932, and spent his first three years in parliament as a lone voice representing the Rātana movement. In the following years Tirikatene headed the political wing of the Rātana movement and led his fellow MPs as the Māori seats fell one after another to Rātana candidates. In parliament he spoke strongly and often on any issues that affected Māori, and campaigned for the ratification of the Treaty of Waitangi as a means of securing and safeguarding Māori rights for nearly four decades. His dignified speeches, his Christian beliefs, and his diplomatic way of appealing to Pākehā values gave him an aura of conservatism. However his underlying politics were pro-Māori and pro-treaty, and called for nothing less than the ratification of the treaty, the return of Māori land, and the securing of mana motuhake, Māori independence.

5 Ballara, ‘Tirikatene, Eruera Tihema Te Aika’.
Tirikatene’s political leadership was recognised by the Labour Party, and according to one source he could have been appointed a Minister during the first term of the first Labour government if it had not been for the intervention of his colleague Paraire Paikea. Tirikatene was understandably disappointed by Paikea's double-dealings, as was T.W. Rātana, but little could be done. On Paikea’s death Tirikatene took over Paikea’s role as Minister in charge of the Māori War effort, and at war’s end he retained his position on the Executive Council as the representative of the Māori race. The movement hoped that with Labour’s re-election in 1945 Tirikatene would be made Minister of Māori Affairs, but was let down when Peter Fraser decided to retain the portfolio. Instead Tirikatene was made Minister of Printing and Stationery, an appointment that belittled his stature as the foremost Māori politician of his time and a popular and respected leader within the Rātana movement. Behind the scenes the movement were unhappy about the appointment, and met at Rātana pā in 1947 to consider leaving the Labour government and removing their slim majority to rule; instead the Mōrehu decided to remain loyal to Labour, fearing what would become of Māori under a National government which by that stage had no elected Māori representatives. Tirikatene toed the line in public: when criticised in parliament by the National opposition for not gaining the Māori Affairs portfolio, he replied that his appointment as Minister of Printing and Stationery ‘exemplifies the fact that the government pays more than lip-service to the principle of equality between the Māori and the pākehā’.

Following the election of the second Labour government Tirikatene was disappointed a third time; Prime Minister Nash retained the Māori Affairs portfolio. Tirikatene was again made Minister of Government Printing and Stationery, and was also made Minister of Forestry, a smart move by Labour that made good use of his previous

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6 As discussed briefly in the previous chapter, in 1940 Prime Minister Peter Fraser decided to appoint a Māori member to the Executive Council to represent the Māori race; Tirikatene, Paraire Paikea and Rangi Mawhete were identified as the three best candidates. Fraser felt Mawhete was unsuitable as he was a member of the Legislative Council, not an elected member, and questioned Paikea's health. He chose Tirikatene as the best candidate but left the final decision to the Rātana movement. Paikea and Tirikatene were called to Rātana Pa to discuss the appointment, but instead Paikea travelled to Auckland to gain the support of Auckland Labour members, and with their support became the first Māori to hold ministerial rank in the Labour government. Love, pp.329-331.

7 Love, pp.421-423.

8 New Zealand Parliamentary Debates (Hereafter referred to as NZPD), 1948, 280, p.717.
experience as a saw miller. He was also made Deputy Minister of Māori Affairs but was told in no uncertain terms by Nash that he had no right to comment or involve himself in Māori issues. Tirikatene was thus placed in the unenviable position of being lambasted by both the National opposition and his own Māori constituents for not having gained the Māori Affairs portfolio. Tirikatene held his seat until 1967, when he passed away in office, and was replaced by his intelligent and able daughter Whetū Tirikatene-Sullivan.

Tirikatene's career was one of quiet frustration: he was a gifted politician who, if given the chances offered to Ngata and Paikea, could have proven his mettle as an effective Minister. Instead he was betrayed by his colleague, and held back by Labour leaders. His leadership of the political wing of the Rātana movement, the Rātana MPs, Labour’s Māori Advisory Council and Māori Policy Committee and the Ngāi Tahu claimants over 35 years, not to mention his popularity amongst voters which allowed him to retain his seat for so long, all point to his abilities as a leader. Instead the history books have questioned his legacy; historians have accepted Labour’s decisions as proof of his incapacity.

Paraire Paikea of Te Uri o Hau and Ngāti Whātua enjoyed a brief but meteoric career in parliament cut short by his sudden death in 1943. Like Tirikatene, Paikea was a close supporter and confident of Rātana and was selected as the Northern koata on the strength of his abilities and his close involvement with the movement. As a Minister of the Methodist church, Paikea’s training was put to good use within the hierarchy of the Rātana movement. In contrast to Tirikatene's practical skills, Paikea's strengths lay in his organisational skills, his abilities to liaison with different groups, his proficient work in committees and his experience as a church minister. He was appointed as chairman and secretary for a plethora of committees and councils within the movement, helped found and conduct the Rātana Brass Band, and organised sporting events at the pā.

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9 Love, p.452.
13 Ballara, ‘Paikea, Paraire Karaka’.
Paikea first contested the Northern Māori seat in 1928, and finally toppled the incumbent, Tau Henare, after a decade of campaigning. In his 1939 maiden speech he expressed heartfelt appreciation for Labour’s reforms, leavening his words with biblical allusions and comparing Labour’s Social Security Act’s ‘applying [of] Christian principle in a practical way’ to the Sermon on the Mount. Paikea was not as an adept speaker as Tirikatene but he was not insignificant. He called his fellow parliamentarians’ attention to issues of health care, Māori broadcasting, education, employment, housing, land development and the settlement of tribal land grievances. In particular, he championed his iwi’s land grievances at Ōrākei on the Waitemata and in the Kaipara region, an issue he would campaign on again and again over the following years. Another key role he played was to follow up tribal petitions and help steer them through committees. After the outbreak of war Paikea's parliamentary demeanour changed considerably; he began to speak regularly and passionately about the Māori war effort. His career stepped up another notch in 1941 when he was appointed Member of the Executive Council representing the Māori race as Minister for the Māori War Effort. Paikea's manoeuvring to secure the position was a serious breach of T.W. Rātana’s trust and his edicts that the koata should forgo corruption, personal avarice and favouritism. Paikea was to be the first of only two Rātana MPs, the second being Matiu Rata, who broke ranks within the strongly loyal and unified Rātana movement. Rātana himself had predicted that Paikea's ambition would lead him to deceive the movement for personal interests,
prophesising that ‘one day he would rise to the heights and then mimi [urinate] on his people’, so the move came as little surprise to some.\textsuperscript{20} Paikea made up for this breach in his work as Minister of the Māori War Effort, establishing and leading the highly successful Māori War Effort Organisation. Paikea was perhaps better suited for the work than Tirikatene: he was popular, an effective organiser, and worked well with others, gaining the respect of his Pākehā colleagues and the iwi he worked with.

His change in fortune was reflected in his speeches. He began delivering lengthy addresses, full of patriotism, pride in the Māori war effort and appreciation of Labour’s reforms. He also spoke frequently and at length about the need to hire Māori civil servants to better serve Māori communities, and the importance of preserving marine resources, in particular shellfish stocks.\textsuperscript{21} His sudden death was a blow to the movement. In the words of the Hon. Mr Wilson:

\begin{quote}
[H]is great deeds were only a prelude to even greater deeds … had he survived for a few years longer he would have equalled the record of any of the great men the Māori race has produced in the past.\textsuperscript{22}
\end{quote}

Though Paikea's political career was short, historians have tended to portray him more favourably than Tirikatene due to his appointment as Minister of the Māori War Effort.

Omana, of Ngāti Kahungunu descent, was born and raised at Māhia in the Hawke’s Bay. He was a regional rugby player of note, making the first fifteen in high school, playing senior rugby with provincial sides, and in 1923 representing New Zealand as an All Black in a test against Wales.\textsuperscript{23} Like Tirikatene, Omana served in the Pioneer Battalion, rising to the position of lieutenant. On his return he became a successful sheep farmer and run holder, and maintained his interest in sport as a rugby administrator and by organising tennis tournaments at his farm.\textsuperscript{24}

\textsuperscript{21} See, for example, NZPD, 1941, 259, pp.635-639; 1941, 260, pp.1196-1197.
\textsuperscript{22} NZPD, 1943, 262, p.506.
\textsuperscript{24} Parekowhai, ‘Omana, Tiaki’.
Unlike Tirikatene and Paikea, Omana's candidature as a koata was not preceded by years of involvement in the Rātana movement. He took an interest in the church in the 1930s, and on a visit by Rātana to the Hawke’s Bay was encouraged to stand for the Eastern seat.\textsuperscript{25} His abrupt selection was the result of a falling out between Rātana and his original candidate for the Eastern seat, Pita Moko, who had been Rātana’s closest confident, secretary and advisor.\textsuperscript{26} The reason for the stoush is not entirely clear, but it seems that Rātana and Moko had begun to disagree over the movement’s shift away from orthodox Christianity. In particular, Rātana’s decision to take on a second wife was a sticking point between the two. Moko also brought the movement into disrepute by failing to pay a Pākehā architect for drawing up designs for the Rātana temple: the mistake led to litigation with the movement made to pay costs.\textsuperscript{27} When Tirikatene won the southern seat in 1932, Paikea and H.T. Rātana were sent to be his parliamentary aides - Pita Moko had been locked out of the movement’s shift into parliament. Church leaders met on 21 October 1933 to discuss the appointment of a new Eastern koata. Left in the lurch in the lead up to the 1935 election, Rātana made a rushed decision to select Omana as the Eastern koata, and he was officially endorsed in 1935.\textsuperscript{28}

Omana’s hasty selection was indicative of the fact that Rātana lacked good contacts in the Eastern Māori electorate. His efforts to gather support on the East coast were hampered by the fact that since 1903 the district had been represented by the highly popular Ngata. Not surprisingly, the Eastern seat was the last to fall, with Omana winning the seat in 1943 after two failed attempts; it was also of little surprise when the Eastern seat was the first the Rātana movement lost control of, with Labour’s Puti Watene (popularly known as Steve) winning the seat in 1963 following Omana’s retirement.

Omana had many fine qualities but he did not possess the charisma or credentials to compete against Ngata. Nor were his personal and political traits on a par with Paikea and Tirikatene. His successful election was probably more indicative of growing

\textsuperscript{25} Parekowhai, ‘Omana, Tiaki’.
\textsuperscript{27} Ballara, ‘Moko, Pita Te Turuki Tamati’.
\textsuperscript{28} Ballara, ‘Moko, Pita Te Turuki Tamati’. 
Omana spoke on a range of issues, including the impact of poor housing on Māori health, the rehabilitation of Māori soldiers, and the importance of using te reo with Māori people in official circumstances. He advocated the utilisation of Māori timber for Māori housing, supported Māori education, the settlement of tribal land grievances, Māori electoral reform, the removal of restrictions on liquor sales to Māori, land development schemes, and protection of Māori fisheries. A good party man, he regularly got to his feet to support Labour’s polices, budgets and election results. In accordance with marae protocol he shied away from interjections during debates, but always had an answer for the opposition’s criticisms.

During the term of the second Labour government, Omana’s criticisms of the National opposition mellowed somewhat, as did those of his colleagues. He remained a strong party man, speaking to Labour’s economic reforms in 1958, justifying the budget and the increases on import taxes. Omana spoke on a wide range of issues including the Treaty of Waitangi, his trips to Western Samoa and Fiji, the risks of hydatids and tapeworms to humans and the meat industry, the need for more Māori housing, land loss, the preservation of the Urewera forest, the unfair treatment of Māori within the justice system, the need for better telephone communication in remote settlements, the
Hunn report, Māori education, and the issue of rural county councils not allowing Māori to build homes on multiply-owned tribal land. Finally, Omana took responsibility for introducing petitions to parliament and steering them through the Māori Affairs Committee. He retired in 1963, ending his valedictory speech and his career with a verse on a harmonica and the song ‘E Noho Rā’. 

Omana was an able politician, yet his career paled in comparison to that of his colleagues and contemporaries. He was never made a minister of the Crown and played a secondary role within the hierarchy of the Rātana movement and the Labour Party. Watene, the Mormon Labour candidate who would replace him in 1963, summed up his career well with the words:

He did not have the brilliance of his predecessor, but his entry into this House was an era notable for the social and economic advancement of the Māori people to equal opportunity.

Omana’s decision to retire seems to have been his own, though it was possibly prompted by the fact that the Rātana movement began introducing new blood into parliament during the 1960s, replacing Tirikatene, Tapihana Paikea, Iriaka Rātana and Omana himself with younger candidates: Rata, Whetū Tirikatene-Sullivan, P.B. Rewiti and Koro Wētere. Notably, Omana was one of the few Māori parliamentarians of his generation who retired rather than dying in office or soon after losing his seat. He lived on for another seven years, passing away in 1970 at the age of 79, a lengthy lifespan compared to many of his colleagues and predecessors.

The four remaining koata – Haami Tokouru Rātana, Matiu Rātana, Iriaka Rātana and Tapihana Paikea, were selected as candidates on the basis of their whakapapa rather than strictly on their skills, abilities and mana as individuals. H.T. Rātana was selected as the candidate for western Māori as the eldest son of T.W. Rātana, while the other three gained their seats through succession. The replacement of an MP by a close relative was not unusual: as discussed in chapter one the practice was common.

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36 See, for example, NZPD, 1958, 316, pp.147, 726-727; 1958, 317, pp.1020, 1059; 1960, 322, pp.372-375.
39 Parekowhai, ‘Omana, Tiaki’.
within the Māori electorates, particularly in the Southern seat, and it was also not unknown in general seats. The tendency of Māori MPs to die in office without identifying a successor, and the will of iwi to honour the passing of an honourable member, often led to the succession of seats to close relatives, more often than not the eldest brother or son of the deceased. Succession did have its benefits: Māori believed that whakapapa was in itself a merit, that certain lines of descent were blessed with natural leadership skills, and that the mana of a leader was bestowed on their descendants and would guide the actions of their descendants for the betterment of the people. Furthermore, succession was a means of honouring the passing of a leader, and ensured the support of voters who believed that the mana of a leader would manifest itself in the actions of that leader’s descendants. Of course there were risks too. Some of the candidates chosen in this manner struggled to fulfil their role as a spokesperson for their people, and were marginalised within the fast-paced, cut-throat world of parliamentary politics.

H.T. Rātana was the eldest son of T.W. Rātana and his first wife Te Urumanaaao: on this basis he was selected as the first koata to stand for election in 1925. He won the Western Māori seat in 1937, and thus became the second Rātana MP. A quiet, humble, retiring man H.T. Rātana possessed neither the outgoing personality nor the oratorical skills required to make his mark in parliament. War service had left him with damaged lungs. Plagued by poor health he was frequently absent from the House and unable to vote on bills or deliver speeches on issues of concern to the movement. He died in office in 1944.

Given Labour’s slim majority, H.T. Rātana’s lengthy absences were a cause for concern for the government whenever it came time to vote on a bill: if it were not for the system of pairing (where members from opposing parties paired off and refrained from voting if their opposite number was not present in the house) his absences could have undermined Labour’s ability to provide effective government.

41 Ballara, ‘Rātana, Haami Tokouru’.
42 Ballara, ‘Rātana, Haami Tokouru’.
H.T. Rātana spoke only four times in parliament, twice in 1937 and twice in 1939. He delivered his maiden speech in October of 1937, commending Labour’s actions in the areas of health, housing, education, social security, and for providing road works for Māori communities. He spoke again briefly in December on the return of confiscated lands in Taranaki and an associated petition put together by Rangi Huna Pire of Hāwera. In 1939 he discussed the Labour government’s achievements for Māori, his dissatisfaction at the descriptions of Māori in the media as ‘cannibals’ and ‘rebels’, and the existence of a colour bar in New Zealand society, and wondered aloud what Māori had to be happy about with the upcoming Centennial celebrations of the Treaty of Waitangi. In a eulogy in October of 1944 Fraser paid tribute to Rātana, explaining that:

He was of a retiring disposition, but when he felt that he had a case to present to the Native Minister or to myself in regards to matters that affected either his people of the Western Māori Electorate or the people of New Zealand generally, he always put it forward quietly but persistently, and very effectively.

The political career of his younger brother, M. Rātana, was equally as short and undistinguished. M. Rātana was one of the younger sons of T.W. Rātana and his senior wife Te Urumanaa. Following the death of his father, M. Rātana married his father’s junior wife Iriaka Rātana, and on the death of H.T. Rātana he was selected to take his brother’s place as the candidate for Western Māori and President of the Rātana church, entering parliament in 1945. M. Rātana made just three speeches in parliament, in 1945, 1946 and again in 1948: all three were startlingly brief. In his maiden speech in 1945 he delivered a very short mihi, congratulating the Prime Minister and the government on the election results, commending them for establishing the Taranaki Trust Board, and speaking proudly of the Māori War effort. His most telling moment as a politician came in 1946, though it was what he

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44 NZPD, 1937, 249, p.1168.
45 NZPD, 1939, 254, pp.759-761.
46 NZPD, 1944, 267, p.244.
47 Ballara, ‘Rātana, Iriaka Matiu, 1905-1981’, DNZB, http://www.dnzb.govt.nz/ accessed on 12/07/2009; ‘Rātana, Haami Tokouru’. As a rangatira, T.W. Rātana reserved the right to take a second wife. He was not the only political figure to have done so: Sir Apirana Ngata was known to have two wives, as were other Māori MPs.
48 NZPD, 1945, 269, p.573.
did not say that spoke loudly to his inabilities as an MP. As member for Western Māori, M. Rātana should have been first in line to pass judgement on the Waikato-Maniapoto Māori Claims Settlement Bill 1946: the Bill offered a limited settlement, but none the less it was a historical moment in relations between the government and the iwi of the Kīngitanga. Instead he delivered a shockingly short speech, offering a one sentence greeting in Māori, mentioning the successes of other Tribal Trust boards set up under Labour, and noting with little sense of occasion that:

The government has fulfilled its promises to the Māori people. Three outstanding claims have been finalised, but there are other affairs…which will need some consideration at some later date.⁴⁹

He delivered a third speech in 1948, but had little to say.⁵⁰ M. Rātana was involved in a car crash and died on 7 October 1949.⁵¹ M. Rātana achieved little during his time in office. Undoubtedly the esteem in which he was held as the eldest son of T.W. Rātana helped the movement win the Western seat, but he lacked the magnetism, speaking abilities and outgoing personality required to represent his constituents satisfactorily, and was a poor choice of candidate.

After two unsuitable candidates the movement’s third candidate in the Western Māori electorate, Iriaka Rātana was a vast improvement on her predecessors. Iriaka Rātana was involved with the Rātana movement from its inception, touring the country and the world as a member of the Rātana Concert Party in the early 1920s. She began living in the Rātana household from 1925 and was encouraged by Te Urumanaao, Rātana’s senior wife, to become a junior wife to Rātana.⁵² After Rātana’s death, Iriaka Rātana married his younger son M. Rātana, and by the 1940s had become a respected and formidable leader within the church. Following M. Rātana’s death in 1949, Iriaka Rātana indicated her desire to replace her husband and contest the Western seat. Her decision attracted controversy, as critics inside and outside the movement doubted her abilities and questioned the suitability of electing a woman to parliament. By this stage only a handful of Pākehā women had entered parliament, and the Māori seats had been held solely by men. Te Puea Herangi of the Kīngitanga

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⁴⁹ NZPD, 1946, 275, p.186.
⁵⁰ NZPD, 1948, 280, p.479.
⁵² Ballara, ‘Rātana, Iriaka Matiu’.
was particularly vocal in her criticisms, stating at a meeting attended by 1500 representatives of Waikato and Maniapoto iwi that ‘she and other leaders strongly objected to a woman aspiring to captain the Tainui Canoe’. Labour also had little faith in a female candidate, putting forward an alternative male nominee, John Te Herekiekie Grace, though they eventually backed down, fearing they would lose the seat if they stood a Māori Labour candidate against an independent Rātana contender.

Iriaka Rātana silenced her critics by winning the seat amongst a field of ten candidates, gaining 9,069 votes, 6,317 votes ahead of her nearest rival. She was sworn into parliament in June 1950 and delivered her maiden speech on 12 July 1950.

Iriaka Rātana’s approach to politics differed considerably from those of her colleagues. She showed little interest in party politics and the banter and baiting that typified parliamentary conduct at the time. Instead she adopted a diplomatic and optimistic approach, speaking to the concerns of the community rather than her political leanings per se, and crossing party lines to work with the National opposition. For example in 1960 after a year away recovering from a car accident she paid tribute to the opposition members from her district who had helped carry out her duties during her illness. Iriaka Rātana placed people above politics, and requested the same of her colleagues on either side of the parliament, pleading in 1960: ‘I would ask them, when considering the welfare of the Māori people, to forget our political feelings. Let us get together and do something to help them out.’

Similarly, her political strategy involved working closely with her community and elders. She regularly attended and organised hui to discuss issues with her electorate and was a mouthpiece for the concerns and opinions of her people. Iriaka Rātana believed in practical solutions, and preferred putting measures in place to solve

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54 Ballara, ‘Rātana, Iriaka Matiu’.
55 Ballara, ‘Rātana, Iriaka Matiu’.
56 NZPD, 1960, 322, pp.380-384. Tirikatene had mentioned during an earlier session that her Pākehā colleague Dame Hilda Ross took a similar approach of working across party lines, noting that Ross would cross the floor to console her female colleagues if they had been frustrated by debating techniques. There may not have been a ‘women’s way’ of working in Parliament, but it could be argued that female Politicians were more likely to cross Party lines than their male counterparts during this era, considering the small number of women who had entered Parliament thus far, and the opposition they often faced for daring to go against the grain and stand for election. NZPD, 1945, 268, p.313.
57 NZPD, 1960, 322, p.381.
problems to launching into diatribes or political flights of fancy. As an example, in 1958 she discussed the need to provide more hostels to house young Māori moving to urban areas.\textsuperscript{58} She found a practical solution to the issue, meeting with the community to discuss the need for a hostel in Whanganui to provide for Māori from the outlying tribes, and arranging for a piece of unused land by the Pūtiki church to be set aside for the purposes of a hostel.\textsuperscript{59}

A mother of seven who was eight months pregnant at the time of her election, a hard-working wife who at times had been left to run the farm and raise her children single-handedly, and the whaaaiti, or ‘little mother’ of the Mōrehu throughout the country, Iriaka Rātana’s concerns were with the family and the home, and the many hardships faced by Māori households.\textsuperscript{60} She spelt this out in her maiden speech: ‘The foundations of Māori well-being are laid in the home, the starting-point of social progress and structure’, and spoke of the need to improve Māori housing conditions.\textsuperscript{61}

Iriaka Rātana gave voice to the experiences of the ‘have not’s’, the poor, the destitute, and the impoverished. She offered parliament and the public an insight into the daily struggles of the Māori underclass. In particular, she became a spokesperson for the growing body of urban Māori who began migrating to the cities from the 1940s, and the difficulties they faced in making the transition from a rural existence to the urban sprawl and adapting to a Pākehā way of life.\textsuperscript{62} She spoke often of the need for acceptance and patience, entreating her listeners in a speech in 1961:

\begin{quote}
I plead with my own people to show even greater willingness to face up to this great challenge of adjustment … to the European, my plea is for tolerance and understanding in my people’s task of adjustment and for willingness to accept the Māori on his merits rather than to judge the many by the failures of the few.\textsuperscript{63}
\end{quote}

Iriaka Rātana could be critical, and became more so from the 1960s onwards. In 1960 she criticized the Department of Māori Affairs, stating: ‘The purpose of the

\textsuperscript{58} NZPD, 1958, 316, pp.176-178.
\textsuperscript{59} NZPD, 1958, 316, pp.176-177.
\textsuperscript{60} NZPD, 1958, 317, pp.848-849.
\textsuperscript{61} NZPD, 1950, 289, p.336.
\textsuperscript{63} NZPD, 1961, 327, p.1703.
Department of Māori Affairs does not mean much today to the Māori people." In 1960 she rebuked the government for telling other countries and ‘coloured peoples’ how to run their affairs, asking:

Is our own House in order? In my view it is not … We should spend more time actively helping to clean up the factors which keep the Māori race in the position it is in today. There is too much talk of the Māori being equal, but we know that if we have two horses working with a plough, one willing but not trained to pull its weight, then that will upset the furrow as the plough advances.

Iriaka Rātana was particularly critical of the Māori Affairs Amendment Bill 1967 and its plans to alienate uneconomic shares in Māori lands to ease the transition of Māori into urban centres and modern lifestyles detached from the responsibilities of the pā, claiming: ‘This Bill is so revolutionary in destroying Māori interests and Māori ideals that no Māori who has the welfare of his race at heart could possibly be in favour of it.’

More generally, Iriaka Rātana spoke in parliament on government budgets for Māori-targeted schemes, the rights of the Māori communities at Ōrākei and on the Chatham Islands, the British Royal family (who were highly regarded by the Rātana movement), the need for preschool education in Māori areas, the Hunn report, the need for Tribal Trust Boards to aid Māori living outside their tribal rohe, and negative portrayals of Māori in the media. Iriaka Rātana's optimistic view of politics could be read as being somewhat naïve, but the issues she spoke to demonstrate an insight into Māori experiences, and the foresight to look ahead and see the problems that would need to be dealt with in the future. The importance of Māori preschool education and the inabilities of Tribal Trust boards to serve urban Māori would dominate Māori political agendas in the coming decades.

Iriaka Rātana was a unique politician, who represented the voices and experiences of real people and real lives. Her career cannot be attributed to any specific acts of 64 NZPD, 1960, 322, p.381.
65 NZPD, 1961, 327, p.1700.
66 Ballara, ‘Rātana, Iriaka Matiu’.
67 See, for example, NZPD, 1950, 292, pp.3615-3616, 3881-3885; 1958, 316, p.178.
government or policy change: instead she believed in working closely with the community to implement practical solutions.

Tapihana Paikea, the son of Paraire Paikea, also won his seat via succession, and held the Northern Māori seat for 20 years, from 1943 until his own death in 1963. Paikea brought a combative, resilient energy to his parliamentary work. He spoke in direct, unambiguous terms about Pākehā racism, voiced his wholehearted support of Labour’s reforms for Māori, and was quick to enter into verbal combat with the opposition. For example, in his maiden speech he confronted the unequal treatment of Māori unemployed during the depression, reminding parliament:

> It has been said that because the Māori can live on pipi and tuna he does not need the same wage as the pākehā. That has been said on the floor of this House. I claim that we are entitled to get what the pākehā gets.

In 1944 he raised the fact that Māori returned servicemen had not received rehabilitation land grants after World War I on the basis of their race, advising that he knew of only one Māori who had received a land grant, and only because his last name was ‘Templeton’ and he had been mistaken for a Pākehā by the authorities.

Following Labour’s defeat in 1949 he was quick to question National’s intentions for Māori, asking:

> Is the Minister of Māori Affairs suggesting that the policy of segregation and degradation that existed prior to the Labour government should not have been scrapped? ... Does he think that the Māori working on a job with a pākehā should receive only half the wages paid to the pākehā? ... Oh, it is a different tale when they become the government; they can do no wrong. Anybody else can do wrong, but not them.

Paikea's behaviour during his early years in parliament shared similarities with those of his colleagues Tirikatene and Omana, and many of his predecessors. On entering

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70 NZPD, 1944, 266, p.162.
parliament Māori MPs often had a militant edge to their politics and conduct which had been sharpened over the years by their experiences and the hardships their people faced. If their careers lasted beyond the first term, this edge was generally worn down by the realities of everyday engagement with Pākehā and the politics of compromise. At best, what they lost in militancy they gained in experience and the know-how and ability to work within the parliamentary system to achieve their goals. At worst, they were worn down, compromised and demoralised by a system that refused to accept accusations of racism or inequality.

Paikea seemed to mellow during his time in the parliament; by the late 1950s his sharp accusations and strongly worded speeches were less common. Instead he embraced the parliamentary practice of peppering debates with frequent interjections. At times his interjections were sharp and witty. During a debate on the Gas Industry Bill in 1958 he quipped that the Bill was ‘Too much ‘gas’ and not enough electricity’. In 1959 he turned the tired old jibe that Māori were cannibals on its head: when the member for Central Otago stated ‘we do not see many Māoris’ in his district Paikea responded ‘you ate them all!’ At worst his interjections achieved little, sometimes showing he had not bothered to prepare a speech and failing to gain him the respect of his colleagues, as can be seen in the following interlude from 1960:

Mr. Carter – We have one loyalty-
Mr. Paikea – Hear, hear!
Mr. Carter – We have one Parliament.
Mr. Paikea – Hear, hear!
Mr. Carter – We have one judicial system.
Mr. Paikea – Hear, hear!
Mr. Carter – We have one noisy Māori member.
Mr. Paikea – Hear, hear! 

Paikea had a number of interests which he regularly aired in parliament and wished to resolve, including the need for Māori electoral reform, the land issues and hardships faced by the people of Ōrākei and Te Hāpuia, the experiences of urban Māori, and the

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74 NZPD, 1960, 323, p.1010.
need to build a carpentry school in the north to teach Māori to build their own homes using their own timbers. His strongest contributions to the parliament centred on his knowledge of Māori fisheries and his interest in policy and legislation. Unfortunately, unlike members such as Ngata, Iriaka Rātana or his own father, Paikea did not pick up the skills of patience, diplomacy and practicality required to turn these dreams into realities, and so his many speeches and constant interjections amounted to little and eventually became tiresome, repetitive and ineffective.

Paikea also took a great interest in government policy and legislation, and the impact it would have on Māori. In 1945 he described the Māori Social and Economic Advancement Act as overthrowing the Māori Councils Act 1900, and believed the new legislation would ‘give us the right of self-government within our powers’ and ‘the opportunity to administer our own affairs in peace-time’, thereby giving back to Māori ‘their pride of race, their mana as we call it’. He also took an interest in the issue of uneconomic land shares in tribal lands, discussing the impact of the Māori Affairs Act 1953, and the suggestions on land ownership and uneconomic shares made by the Hunn Report in 1960.

Tapihana Paikea died in office in 1963, having held the Northern seat for some 20 years. He was replaced by Rātana candidate and Labour and Union supporter Matiu Rata. Paikea's career was lengthy, showing he enjoyed the support of his electorate and the Mōrehu. He was an effective spokesperson on Māori issues in parliament, yet he was not linked with any specific legislation or cause: he was a passionate spokesperson but he lacked the ability to implement his ideas. He did not figure highly within the ranks of the Labour Party or the Rātana movement but was appointed chair of the Māori Affairs Committee from 1957 to 1960. As his biographer summarised: ‘Although Paikea was referred to as “the worthy son of a worthy father”, his parliamentary career never matched that of his father.’

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75 See, for example, NZPD, 1947, 276, pp.468-471; 1958, 316, pp.219-220.  
77 NZPD, 1945, 272, p.474.  
79 Hooker, ‘Paikea, Tapihana Paraire’.  
80 Hooker, ‘Paikea, Tapihana Paraire’.
There is compelling evidence to suggest here that the movement’s decision to select candidates according to their whakapapa alone and to allow the succession of seats to family members was to be one of the movement’s weak points. Those candidates selected according to their skills, abilities and involvement within the church were better suited in their roles. It must be said too, on assessing the careers of Tirikatene and Paraire Paikea, that Pita Moko was probably the better choice for the eastern seat, and his removal was a loss to the movement. Those elected according to their whakapapa alone or who gained their candidature via succession were less effective in parliament and less suited to their roles as MPs. Iriaka Rātana was perhaps an exception here, and it must be noted that the succession of seats to women was more successful for the Rātana movement than succession to men: both Iriaka Rātana and Whetū Tirikatene-Sullivan were impressive MPs and were well suited to their roles.

Poor candidate selection hurt the Rātana movement: those candidates selected according to skills and abilities boosted the position of the Rātana movement in parliament and placed Māori interests on the national agenda. Those candidates who were selected according to whakapapa or succession were less effective, and were viewed as unreliable by the Labour leaders, the National opposition and the press. The evidence suggests that, had the Rātana movement taken the time to select candidates of the calibre of Tirikatene and Paraire Paikea, and done away with the tendency to pass on the seats to their descendants, the movement would have been better represented in parliament, they may have been trusted with more leadership roles by the Labour government, and they may have achieved more during their time in parliament.

Now that we have a better understanding of how these MPs performed as individuals, we need to discuss how they operated collectively as a group. A number of key themes typify the politics of the Rātana movement; the goals they pursued and the strategies they employed to achieve these goals provide us some much needed detail on the efforts and achievements of the Rātana movement, and undermine the commonly held view that they were ineffectual and had little impact on the direction of Māori policy. The Rātana MPs also pursued their goals through the Native Affairs Select Committee, and their engagement with the committee will be discussed in the latter part of this chapter.
The first theme we should address is the development of the Rātana discourse, a constantly evolving set of beliefs and reasoning the Rātana members employed to justify the Rātana-Labour alliance, their place in parliament, and the rights of their constituents.

Tirikatene set the tone for the discourse during his early years in parliament. His maiden speech of 23 September 1932 laid out the themes that would dominate his career: Māori rights under the Treaty of Waitangi; the unequal treatment of Māori unemployed during the depression; the cutting of old age pensions; tribal land grievances; the need for Māori electoral reform; the impact of rates and taxes on Māori lands; and the need to improve Māori health, housing and education.81 In his second speech, delivered two weeks later, he added more issues to the list, discussing the unfair treatment of Māori returned servicemen, the difficulties Māori faced in attending the Native Land Court, and the plight of Māori and Pākehā unemployed.82 The following year he broached the subjects of Māori land loss, protection of Māori fishing rights, and the fact that Māori were denied pensions due to their holdings of tribal land blocks, but were unable to make a living from their holdings because they were worthless, ‘a liability and not worth a button’.83 In 1934 he complained that Māori unemployed were not receiving sufficient relief work, faced difficulties accessing relief funds, and were paid at a different rate to Pākehā despite paying the same levies.84 He also asked why some Māori returned servicemen were not able to access pensions, and asked for parity in the payment of pensions between Māori and Pākehā.85 Finally he spoke regularly on the Ngāi Tahu claim, and suggested that the government settle the grievance so that his people could use the money received to support their own unemployed.86 His queries on relief rates, pensions and tribal grievances were raised again and again until the arrival of the Labour government in 1935.87

81 NZPD, 1932, 233, pp.120-122.
82 NZPD, 1932, 233, pp.359-361.
83 NZPD, 1933, 235, pp.388, 883-884; 1933, 236, p.734.
84 NZPD, 1934, 238, p.711.
85 NZPD, 1934, 238, p.819.
So what impact did Tirikatene's pleas for parity and reparations have on government policy and legislation? The opposition ignored him, but it seems that Labour was listening. On assuming office they set about implementing the very issues he had campaigned on during his first three years in parliament, including Māori in the welfare state, increasing parity in the payments of pensions and social security rates, settling tribal land grievances, and introducing equal treatment of Māori men and women who served in World War II. Notably, the reforms Labour introduced shared more commonalities with Tirikatene’s polices than they did with the parties’ own Māori policy drafted in 1925.  

While there remains little concrete evidence to prove it conclusively, Tirikatene's polices bear a striking resemblance to those subsequently introduced by Labour and his many speeches may have influenced Labour’s reforms.

Labour’s reforms were a vindication of Tirikatene’s lonely years in parliament, and his bearing changed considerably from 1935 onward. From here we see the emergence of a Rātana discourse, shared by the various koata who had joined Tirikatene in parliament. Between 1935 and 1941 the Rātana discourse focused on appreciation for Labour’s efforts and optimism for the future. To give examples of this, in one of his many speeches delivered in 1936, Tirikatene confided that in the past his appeals ‘fell on deaf ears’, but he hoped that with Labour’s help ‘Māori people can again show that dignity which was the characteristic of theirforebears and can live with their pākehā brothers on equal terms.’  

His fellow koata showed the same appreciation of Michael Joseph Savage and his colleagues. In 1939 Paraire Paikea enthused that ‘The Māori have indeed entered upon a new era since the advent of the Labour government’, while H.T. Rātana commented:

I have every confidence in the Prime Minister and his government. I believe that they will do their best to remove any distress, anxiety, humiliation, or hardship that still exists among the Māori people.

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89 NZPD, 1936, 244, p.427.
90 NZPD 1939, 254, p.686.
From 1941 the Rātana discourse began to change: with the onset of war the Rātana MPs and their electorates were swept up in the nationalistic fervour of the war effort. Paikea’s appointment to the Executive and the setting up of the Māori War Effort Organisation gave the Rātana MPs new responsibilities, bringing a new energy and sense of purpose to their political careers. The Rātana members stepped up their efforts in parliament, as Tirikatene and Paraire Paikea began delivering lengthy speeches full of nationalism and pride at the achievements of the Māori war effort. Paikea delivered his lengthiest speech to date in 1941, praising Labour’s reforms and discussing the Māori war effort in great detail, while Tirikatene took the opportunity to deliver the all important ‘Seconding the Motion’ speech during the Address in Reply, making him only the second Māori MP to have delivered such a speech, the first having been made by Carroll in 1888.92

From 1941 the MWEO dominated the Rātana discourse, and was held up as the shining example of the benefits of the Rātana Labour alliance and proof that under their own leadership and direction Māori could make important contributions to the nation. At the slightest sign of any criticism of Māori, the Rātana MPs or the Labour Party, the MWEO would be trotted out and its achievements to date listed in full. In 1943 Tirikatene said of the MWEO ‘This is a new phase of Māori life … under this great machine known as the Māori War Effort Organisation we have every tribe interlocked’.93 Tapihana Paikea agreed that ‘The Māori War Effort Organisation is the best thing my people have ever had since the advent of European government in New Zealand’, while M. Rātana said of the war effort: ‘Never before in the history of New Zealand has the Māori race ever been so united and progressive’.94

At war’s end new issues entered the Rātana discourse. The Rātana MPs pinned their hopes on the Māori Social and Economic Advancement Act, believing the Act would offer Māori ‘the right of self-government within our powers’, ‘the opportunity to administer our own affairs in peace-time’, and would help bring back Māori ‘pride of race, their mana as we call it’.95 Labour’s efforts to rehabilitate Māori servicemen and

92 NZPD, 1941, 259, pp.635-639, 44-49.
93 NZPD, 1943, 262, p.737.
95 NZPD, 1945, 272, p.474.
women was another issue held up by the Rātana MPs, as were the tribal land settlements reached between Labour and the iwi of Ngāi Tahu, Waikato and Taranaki.

With Labour’s election loss in 1949 the Rātana MPs were gracious in defeat and showed a willingness to work with the new National administration. In the Address in Reply to the new government Omana praised Labour’s record and feared that National would return Māori to the conditions they suffered before 1935.\textsuperscript{96} Paikea was at first critical and was equally wary of what was in store for Māori under the new regime. Tirikatene took his cues from the new Prime Minister’s opening address, noting:

\begin{quote}
I find that only about four lines of it refer to the Māori race ... it was very brief, and whether the brevity indicates the attention which the government will pay to the affairs of the Māori race remains to be seen.\textsuperscript{97}
\end{quote}

Iriaka Rātana took a different tack, praising the work of the Labour opposition, expressing her hope that National would continue to aid Māori in their endeavours, and complimenting the appointment of E.B. Corbett as the new Minister of Māori Affairs.\textsuperscript{98}

The Rātana MPs eventually began to thaw: Paikea followed Iriaka Rātana’s lead, expressing his enthusiasm in 1950 for the Electoral Amendment Bill, which reformed Māori voting irregularities, and the Māori Purposes Bill, which sought to reform the detrimental system of succession laws on Māori land ownership.\textsuperscript{99} Tirikatene also began making conciliatory statements, complimenting National’s offers to settle tribal land claims without taking anything away from Labour’s record.\textsuperscript{100} Their optimism and diplomacy was the wisest move to make at the time: National would hold office for the next eight years, and for the first time since the 1880s there were no Māori members in government.\textsuperscript{101}

\textsuperscript{96} NZPD, 1950, 289, pp.420–424.
\textsuperscript{97} NZPD, 1950, 289, p.402.
\textsuperscript{98} NZPD, 1950, 289, p.336.
\textsuperscript{100} NZPD, 1950, 292, p.4728.
\textsuperscript{101} Love, p.435.
With their brief return to power from 1957 to 1960, the Rātana MPs again held the balance of power in parliament, and their political position had developed considerably from the 1930s and 1940s. During this period, Tirikatene's speeches were dominated by his Ministerial duties and party politics: Māori rights took a back seat. He spoke passionately on the need to protect Native forests via strict zoning of forested areas, the introduction of exotic timbers to protect native forests, the controlling of pests including rabbits, possums, wallabies and deer, and the introduction of the highly controversial 1080 poisoning, which was first trialled and introduced during his time as Minister of Forestry to fight pests, soil erosion and the destruction of native flora and fauna.¹⁰²

Omana also displayed changes in his parliamentary manner as he expanded his political viewpoints. He spoke on Labour's policies to put the economy on a sounder footing, the risks of hydatids to humans, and the impact of tapeworms on the meat industry.¹⁰³ He also tackled Māori issues, including the need for more housing to meet the rising Māori population, the risk of land sharks swallowing up uneconomic shares in Māori land, the protection of the Urewera forests and other native forests in New Zealand, the biases against Māori inherent within the justice system, the need for better telephone communications in the isolated Tūhoe settlements, council by-laws preventing Māori from building on tribal lands in rural areas, the Hunn report, and Māori education.¹⁰⁴

Paikea spoke occasionally on party politics during this era, particularly on Labour’s economic reforms and National’s running up of the national debt, but for the most he stuck to bread and butter Māori issues and local concerns.¹⁰⁵ Where Omana and Tirikatene had widened their interests and approach to politics, Paikea's focus had narrowed and his constant interjections in lieu of well-written speeches show his political savvy had actually diminished rather than increased.

¹⁰² See, for example, NZPD, 1958, 316, p.137; 1958, 317, pp.1289-1290; 1959, 320, pp.934-941.
¹⁰³ NZPD, 1958, 316, pp.724-727.
Iriaka Rātana continued to speak on community needs and the hardships her people faced. She engaged critically with issues at times, criticising the Māori Affairs Department and the Māori Affairs Amendment Act 1967, but largely her focus remained on the community.106

To sum this up, the Rātana MPs political behaviour continually evolved, reflecting their beliefs and justifying their relationship with Labour, their place in parliament and the rights of their constituents. During the 1930s and 40s the Rātana discourse displayed a uniformity in theme and content, as the Rātana MPs held up Labour’s reforms and the successes of the MWEO as justifications for the Rātana-Labour alliance, and as an answer to criticisms of the Rātana movement or the Māori people. For the Rātana MPs, the fruits of their alliance with Labour were self-evident and spoke for themselves: they were proof that Māori deserved better than they had received from previous governments, and that their relationship with Labour was unquestionably beneficial.

This was to change with Labour’s election loss in 1949. During their time in opposition from 1949 to 1957 the politics of the Rātana MPs mellowed, reflecting the fact that they were no longer so assured about their alliance with Labour or Labour’s loyalties to the Māori people. Their lengthy spell of eight years in opposition must also have shown them the downside to aligning with Labour: if they were inflexible and unable to cross party lines they would spend many years on the opposition benches, and this they did. During this period they became less critical of National and more willing to sing their praises when needs be. During their second term in office, from 1957 to 1960, members Tirikatene, Omana, Paikea and Iriaka Rātana continued to speak on Māori issues and Labour policy, but they also widened their fields of interest: Tirikatene spoke to his ministerial duties, Omana spoke to party politics and issues affecting the wider populace, Paikea regressed by resorting to interjections, and Iriaka Rātana became more critical of government policies. The Rātana MPs had not given up on their goals of ratification of the Treaty of Waitangi, settlement of tribal grievances, and the attainment of mana motuhake, but they had set their sights on the horizons rather than the near future. Gone were the days of the

106 NZPD, 1960, 322, p.381; Ballara, ‘Rātana, Iriaka Matiu’.
1930s and 40s when Labour had swept into power and brought wave after wave of reforms for Māori. The Rātana MPs had tasted the bitter pill of compromise and felt the cold shoulder of marginalisation. They had seen things grind to a sudden halt with Labour’s election loss and their eight-year spell in opposition, and knew all too well the frustratingly slow pace of bureaucracies. Instead of pushing for immediate change they looked to the future for hope and the fulfilment of Rātana’s prophecies.

The Treaty of Waitangi was the bedrock of Rātana politics, and the changing attitudes of the Rātana MPs to the treaty over these years offer interesting insights into their experiences in parliament. Tirikatene set the tone, promising in his maiden speech ‘to stand for the rights and privileges of the whole Māori race, as embodied in the Treaty of Waitangi’.¹⁰⁷ In his first month in parliament he spoke regularly and eagerly on the treaty, discussing the need to restore to Māori ‘the sacred rights and privileges embodied in that Treaty’.¹⁰⁸ The gifting of the Treaty grounds to the nation by Lord and Lady Bledisloe in 1932 and the passing of the Waitangi National Trust Board Act gave him another opportunity to impress the importance of the treaty on his colleagues. The Treaty, he argued, had been ‘long-misunderstood’.¹⁰⁹ For Tirikatene and the Rātana movement Bledisloe’s gift could not have been better timed: it highlighted the historical and modern day significance of the Treaty and gave the nation time to reflect on the document and its importance. Where Pākehā politicians’ speeches on the topic were nationalistic in tone, Māori MPs Tirikatene and H.T. Rātana reminded Pākehā that the Treaty was a milestone in race relations and guaranteed Māori rights.¹¹⁰

Tirikatene continued to discuss the treaty in parliament between 1932 and 1935, constantly reminding his fellow MPs that the treaty was the founding document of the nation and tying Māori fishing rights, land loss, and rights to equality to the articles of the treaty.¹¹¹

¹⁰⁷ NZPD, 1932, 233, pp.120-122.
¹⁰⁸ NZPD, 1932, 234, p.223.
¹⁰⁹ NZPD, 1932, 234, pp.760-761.
¹¹⁰ NZPD, 1932, 234, pp.760-761.
The issue arose again in 1937 in discussions over the discovery of petroleum in Taranaki, whether Māori should receive royalties or rents from oil mined on their land, and what the Treaty of Waitangi had to say about Māori ownership of such resources. East Coast Māori, predominantly Ngāti Kahungunu and Ngata’s own iwi Ngāti Porou, had been negotiating exploration with oil companies on their lands for some 50 years, and resented the government’s intervention. Labour’s decision to nationalise ownership of petroleum resources was the first major blow to the Rātana-Labour alliance and confidence in Labour as advocates for Māori rights. Ngata and his supporters took the opportunity to attack the alliance, composing a derisive haka and tabling it in parliament. It contained the lines:

Ka horo ra te Tiriti o Waitangi,
Ka Horo, Hei!
A ha ha!
Nā to Kāwana Kaimahi pea?
E rona ra i ngā ture,
E apo ra i ngā moni,
E muru ra i te whenua,
Ka tangi au, au, au e ha!

It has fallen,
It has collapsed
The Treaty of Waitangi!
It is perhaps the work of the Labour government,
Which has altered the laws,
Which has absorbed all the money,
Which is confiscating the lands?
And so I weep
Au! Alas!  

112 NZPD, 1937, 249, pp. 1070-1073; 1938, 250, pp. 77-79.
113 For more detail on this see Waitangi Tribunal, The Petroleum Report, Wellington, 2003.
114 NZPD, 1938, 251, pp.817-818. This is Ngata’s own translation as it appeared in the NZPD. The haka was to have an unintended effect, prompting the Rātana MPs to begin speaking in te reo in the House and providing their own translations, as Ngata had done with the haka.
Tirikatene was quick to defend Labour, stating ‘it was not the Labour Party that shattered the articles of the Treaty of Waitangi … its violation commenced almost from the date when it was signed’ and arguing that Labour’s only sin was to have ‘continued the policy of its predecessors in that the Māori definitely took second place’.

Tirikatene took the opportunity to elaborate on his thoughts on the treaty. In a lengthy address, he outlined the treaty’s provisions, and communications between officials at the time that clarified its intent. He used the highly effective speech-making tool, best employed by Dr Martin Luther King in his ‘I have a dream’ speech later in the century, of tying minority rights to the symbols of the majority, connecting Māori treaty rights to the Magna Carta, their rights as British subjects, their rights according to British laws and standards of justice, and the parables and dictates of the Bible. Tirikatene's ploy was to repudiate the treaty, and thereby Māori rights, by tying them to symbols of British law, rights, justice and morality that appealed to the values of the Pākehā majority. Tirikatene's efforts were not enough to reverse the government’s decision and he received no support from his Rātana colleague H.T. Rātana, but he was pleased that Labour were making changes in other areas, and was satisfied that the issue of petroleum royalties had at least sparked debate on the treaty:

This is the first time I have heard the Treaty of Waitangi discussed so freely and forcibly in this House. I remember that just a few years ago I referred in my speeches to the Treaty of Waitangi, but I received absolutely no support from the present Opposition party.

The Centennial celebrations of the treaty in 1940 and the Centennial Bill of 1938 provided the next platform for debate over the issue. The Rātana MPs differed in their opinions on the proposed celebrations. In line with his previous attempts to connect southern iwi and their land rights to what was at times regarded as a northern treaty, Tirikatene expressed his gratitude that celebrations would be held in Akaroa: ‘this will be the first time in history in which any celebrations expressive of the historic meaning of Waitangi have been allotted to the South Island’. In contrast, H.T. Rātana questioned what Māori had to celebrate, asking ‘What is there to be happy

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115 NZPD, 1938, 252, p.163.
117 NZPD, 1938, 250, p.113.
118 NZPD, 1938, 253, p.461.
Similarly Paikea asked that anomalies between Māori and Pākehā rights be removed so that Māori had something to celebrate in the Centennial year. Here we see a divergence in opinions: Tirikatene was more likely to elevate the status of the treaty and link it to Māori rights, while his colleague felt Māori had little to celebrate with regards to the treaty, and demanded the government recognise their rights.

The treaty largely disappeared from debates for nearly a decade, from 1938 to 1947. The war effort came to dominate Māori interests, and Labour’s reforms and settlement of tribal grievances of the 1930s and 1940s satisfied for the time being Māori ambitions for the ratification of the treaty. The issue arose again in 1947 during opposition-led suggestions to introduce changes to Māori parliamentary representation to undermine the so called ‘Māori mandate’ and restrict Māori MPs from having any influence on government policy or legislation outside of issues that directly concerned their constituents.121 Tirikatene took the opportunity to further expand his ideas on the treaty, arguing that Māori had a ‘constitutional right to express their opinions’ and that their rights stemmed from the Third Article of the treaty, the Magna Carta, the Bill of Rights and the Habeas Corpus Act.122

Despite the occasional mention in debate, the treaty lay dormant for another decade before emerging again at the top of the Rātana members’ agenda. The renewed interest in the treaty came partially from within the Rātana and Labour movements but it was also agitated by interest groups in the Māori community and the National Party. The itching grain that seems to have seeded the growth of this particular pearl came in the form of a petition delivered by Rangi Taurima and his supporters from Ahuriri in 1956 which ‘asked for the revival of the Treaty of Waitangi, and the petitioners felt that the Treaty should be written into the statute books as an Act’.123 Tirikatene’s response was surprising: he expressed sympathy, likening the petition to Rātana’s own petition that he himself had delivered to parliament which had requested ‘that the document be placed in the “Blue Book” of England and the
Constitution of New Zealand’. But he ultimately disagreed with the move: ‘I do not feel that it should be placed under any form of legislation that could be amended’. Instead he put his weight behind the campaign to have Waitangi Day made a national holiday, an idea first suggested by Corbett earlier that year.

Tirikatene’s statements during this period are indicative of that fact that, 25 years after entering parliament, his stance on the treaty had been worn down by the years of compromise, disappointment, and silence in opposition. By this stage he no longer felt Rātana’s goal of ratifying the treaty was realistic, and believed making Waitangi a national holiday was a more realistic goal.

In the lead-up to the 1957 election Tirikatene and Omana campaigned to have Waitangi Day made a national holiday, both to win votes and to ensure Labour would follow through on their promises. The idea had actually originated from the ranks of the National Party, but when it was announced that the annual Labour Party conference had unanimously supported a motion to introduce a national holiday the National Party Prime Minister Keith Holyoake dismissed the idea, stating that he intended to make ‘some formal observance’ but not a national holiday. The issue quickly became a political football that was kicked around for the next three years: Omana declared ‘The Māori people will be very disappointed to learn that the government cannot meet their wishes and make the day a public holiday as well as a national day’, while Tirikatene argued that Holyoake’s decision was a political manoeuvre and reminded his colleagues that the treaty should transcend politics as a symbol of ‘equal respect by one race for the other and equality of opportunity for both peoples’. Tirikatene further compared the sacredness of Waitangi Day to the memorial of the Gallipoli landings commemorated every Anzac Day, playing into Pākehā patriotism.

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125 NZPD, 1956, 309, p.1138.
126 Corbett equivocated about what such a move might mean, noting that he ‘did not share the view of many Māoris that the Treaty of Waitangi should be incorporated in a statute’, but felt ‘the making of the suggested national holiday would go a long way towards meeting the desires of those Māoris and would demonstrate, especially to school children, the equality of the two races’. NZPD, 1956, 310, p.2098.
Resistance would also come from their own side of the House. Labour had campaigned to officially recognise Waitangi, stating in their 1957 election Campaign Manifesto: ‘Labour will commemorate the signing of the Treaty of Waitangi on 6 February 1840 by declaring it a public holiday’.\(^{130}\) On 6 February 1958 Prime Minister Nash had announced that the government would investigate the idea of combining all provincial holidays into one National holiday on Waitangi Day, but by 1959 he warned of the difficulties and costs involved.\(^{131}\) After three years of back-peddling and treading water Labour finally introduced the Waitangi Day Bill 1960: the Bill provided for the observance of 6 February ‘as a national day of thanksgiving in commemoration of the signing of the Treaty of Waitangi’ but did not introduce a national holiday.\(^{132}\) Instead, clause three of the Bill allowed the provinces to substitute their present provincial holidays with Waitangi Day as a public holiday, leaving the decision to the discretion of the Provincial Councils. The PM introduced the Bill stating he did not think it was wise to introduce another national holiday (there were already seven at the time), citing the costs to the country and the impracticalities of trying to incorporate a series of provincial holidays that were all celebrated on different days and in different ways throughout the country.\(^{133}\)

The move saw Labour take back its 1957 election promises. Nash was likely motivated by a number of factors: he feared making an unpopular move which could have angered provinces who did not want to celebrate Waitangi Day and turn away voters, and the Party had sat in opposition for three terms and had a majority of just two in the House and could not afford to lose votes. He had also shown an unmistakeable disinterest in Māori issues, and would not have wanted to appear to be caving in to Māori pressure, the very issue that had lost Labour the election in 1949. His calculated decision not to make Waitangi Day a national holiday and to leave the decision to the provinces was to court criticism from all quarters, as Labour were blasted for going back on their election promises, and the Rātana members were to face what were probably the harshest criticisms ever levelled at the Māori MPs in parliament’s history.

\(^{130}\) NZPD, 1960, 325, p.2953.
\(^{131}\) NZPD, 1960, 325, p.2954.
\(^{132}\) NZPD, 1960, 325, p.2952.
\(^{133}\) NZPD, 1960, 325, p.2954.
Debate over the issue in parliament was heated to say the least. Opposition member D.N. McKay said the Bill ‘adds nothing to what is already happening with regard to the observance of Waitangi Day’, and argued that Labour had ‘done nothing to treat this day as a sacred day, but it used it as a means of buying votes in 1957’. He reserved his harshest criticisms for the Māori MPs, remarking the Māori members would not be happy about the decision and would not be looking forward to facing their electorates during the upcoming election campaign. He challenged Tirikatene to resign and ‘uphold the prestige of a very proud race’ and said of the other Māori MPs in the House:

By their antics in playing party politics the Māori members have not upheld the dignity of their race on this question…nor have they enhanced their mana in this House.

Opposition member P.B. Allen attacked Labour without reserve, describing the act as ‘humbug’, ‘foolery’ and ‘hollow mockery’, and questioning the contradiction that Labour saw Waitangi Day as sacred and akin to Anzac Day, and yet would not follow through with their rhetoric and establish a public holiday. Allen mocked the Rātana MPs for demanding National implement a national holiday in 1957, noting that at that time they spoke as ‘the totaras of the Māori race, the giants of the forest, speaking with the voice of the warrior’, yet now they were in office ‘They speak with the soft voice of the wāhine: they become a bending willow that will bow to any breeze’.

The debate was a bizarre twisting of the natural order of things, as members of the National opposition spoke on the sacredness of Waitangi Day and the mana of the Māori race with the passion and poetics usually associated with the Māori MPs.

The responses of the Rātana members were telling. Omana expressed his sadness that the issue had become a political football, and hoped the Act would be ‘a stepping stone to the ratification of the Treaty of Waitangi by embodying it in the statute

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134 NZPD, 1960, 325, pp.2952-2953.
137 NZPD, 1960, 325, pp.2961-2962.
He felt that ‘unless the Treaty is ratified they [the articles of the treaty] have no legal significance whatever’ and asked the opposition for their support to ratify the treaty. He unconvincingly argued that he would welcome the Bill because it at least made the commemorations official. His argument was contradictory; the Bill was a stepping-stone towards ratification of the treaty that would be appreciated by Māori, but unless the treaty itself was ratified celebrating Waitangi Day was pointless.

Iriaka Rātana made similar comments. She declared that ‘the cause of my election to Parliament is the Treaty of Waitangi’, but she now believed that for Māori ‘the Treaty was not what they thought it was’. Māori, she said, ‘felt it was a piece of paper and not the legal document that they had been led to believe it was’, and she agreed, ‘the Treaty of Waitangi is just a piece of paper, with no worth’. She supported the Bill because it gave official recognition to the treaty, convincing her that the document was no longer worthless.

Tirikatene spoke passionately but unconvincingly about the treaty:

My policy [in 1932] was then and still is to stand for the rights of the whole Māori race, as embodied in the Treaty of Waitangi…From the time I entered this House, I have not lost sight of the Treaty of Waitangi.

He argued the bill indicated that ‘we were moving along towards a goal as we had been over a period’, and that up until then ‘there has been no specific statutory recognition whatsoever of the Treaty’. During the third reading of the bill, Tirikatene was criticised as a minister for granting his staff half a day off on Waitangi Day but not pushing for the rest of the country to receive the same: he reasoned that at the very least the bill was ‘a step in the right direction’.

Over time there was a dramatic change in the attitudes of the Rātana MPs to the treaty. They had entered parliament, as Rātana had figuratively described his own

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139 NZPD, 1960, 325, p.2961.
140 NZPD, 1960, 325, p.2961.
141 NZPD, 1960, 325, p.2965.
142 NZPD, 1960, 325, p.2966.
143 NZPD, 1960, 325, p.2970.
144 NZPD, 1960, 325, pp.2971-2972.
arrival, with the Bible in one hand and the treaty in the other. Over that time Tirikatene developed a complex discourse on the treaty that couched the document within the terms of the foundations of western justice, law and morality, and built upon these familiar foundations a platform for Māori rights to equality, justice, land, and resources. However, after nearly 30 years in parliament, Tirikatene and his colleagues had been worn down and demoralised by a system that had effectively ignored their pleas; they no longer felt that ratification of the treaty was a realistic goal and instead looked to the future and incremental improvements for hope.

The use and significance of te reo Māori was another highlight of the Rātana Labour era: the Rātana MPs spoke on a number of occasions on the importance of language retention, and from 1938 began delivering speeches in te reo in the House. From his earliest years in parliament, Tirikatene took an interest in the retention and protection of Māori language and culture. He strongly supported Māori broadcasting and performance, suggested using gramophone recordings to record and teach te reo, and asked the government on several occasions to set up a school of Māori Arts and Crafts in the South Island (to which he received the response that South Island Māori were the ‘Cinderella’s of the race’).146

The use of te reo Māori in parliament developed significantly during this period. In the nineteenth and early twentieth century the majority of Māori MPs delivered their speeches in te reo: these were then translated by parliamentary translators or, in an emergency, by a Pākehā member who spoke the language, and appeared in the published parliamentary debates in English. If no translator was present the speech was not recorded for later publication. After the defeat of the Liberals in 1911 the provision for interpreters in the House lapsed, and in 1913 the Speaker, Frederic Lang, advised Māori MPs to speak in English if they were able to. 147 Consequently Māori MPs began delivering their speeches in English: this was aided by the fact that knowledge of English had begun to grow in Māori communities, initially amongst

146 NZPD, 1935, 241, p.325; 1937, 248, p.933; 1937, 249, p.730. Tirikatene’s attitudes to Māoritanga were complex: he encouraged Māori to adapt modern technologies and government resources to promote their language and culture, while at the same time speaking positively on Rātana’s efforts to wipe out tohunga, the storehouses of Māori culture and learning. NZPD, 1934, 239, p.1160. 147 John E. Martin, The House: New Zealand’s House of Representatives, 1954-2004, Palmerston North, 2004, p.216.
half-castes, the well educated and school age children.\textsuperscript{148} In 1938 there was a small but significant change: Tirikatene began a short speech that year by asking whether the Speaker would indulge the Māori MPs and relax parliament’s rules by allowing them to speak te reo in the House.\textsuperscript{149} On this occasion Tirikatene avoided the hassle and spoke in English instead. Later the same year, as noted above, Ngata tabled a Ngāti Porou haka deriding the Labour government for disallowing Māori access to royalties from petroleum mining.\textsuperscript{150} Ngata provided his own translation of the haka, breaking the set protocol that Māori could not translate their own speeches into English, or back into Māori, except through a parliamentary translator. His excuse was that the haka contained Māori curse words, but that when translated correctly the English version would be quite ‘Parliamentary’, as he coyly described it.\textsuperscript{151} Immediately after his speech, Tirikatene raised a point of order, stating that Ngata’s translation was correct, but that at a later date he wished ‘to make the same representations with regard to violations of the Treaty of Waitangi’.\textsuperscript{152}

Ngata’s example set a precedent. Labour’s Speakers relaxed the ruling that Māori MPs should speak in English; now Māori members were allowed to speak briefly in te reo provided that they translated their words immediately afterwards. From 1938 on Māori MPs began to make short speeches in te reo in parliament without a translator. In 1951 the National Party Speaker Matthew Oram re-imposed Lang’s earlier ruling, but this was short lived, and Māori MPs continued to speak their language in the House.\textsuperscript{153} The change was an important first step towards te reo Māori being accepted in official settings and becoming recognised as one of the country’s official languages.

With the introduction of broadcasting of parliamentary sessions on radio, the Māori members saw an opportunity to employ te reo, communicate directly to their constituents in their preferred language, and promote the Māori war effort. Māori motives for speaking te reo in parliament were not always about promoting the

\textsuperscript{148} Martin, p.216.
\textsuperscript{149} NZPD, 1938, 251, pp.404-405.
\textsuperscript{150} NZPD, 1938, 251, pp.817-818.
\textsuperscript{151} NZPD, 1938, 251, pp.817-818.
\textsuperscript{152} NZPD, 1938, 251, p.818.
\textsuperscript{153} Martin, p.216.
language: it was discovered that Tapihana Paikea and Tirikatene were using the radio broadcasts on Fridays to let their wives know when they were coming home.\footnote{Martin, p.216.}

During this initial stage the Māori MPs would pepper their speeches with short passages in te reo, taking the form of short mihi and tributes to those who had passed on.\footnote{See, for example NZPD, 1943, 262, p.547.} Omana was the first of the Rātana MPs to deliver part of his maiden speech in te reo Māori in 1944, with the Māori language sections appearing in italics in the published debates.\footnote{NZPD, 1943, 263, pp.316-318.} He ended his speech praising parliament for allowing him to speak in his mother tongue, and its significance to Māori who were listening to the broadcast, with the words:

\begin{quote}
I wish to thank you, Mr Speaker, for the privilege you granted me to speak a few words in the Māori tongue. Many of our elders do not understand the European language, and I am sure they will greatly appreciate the opportunity you have afforded them to hear me in our native tongue.\footnote{NZPD, 1943, 263, p.318.}
\end{quote}

The fact that he had replaced Ngata, one of the great language experts of the time, and that many Māori and Pākehā would be listening keenly to find out more about this relatively unknown Rātana MP who had toppled the giant of the Māori world, must have been playing at the back of his mind. Iriaka Rātana also began her maiden speech in 1950 in te reo with the eloquent words ‘E te mauri o te motu, kīngi Korokī, te ihi, te mana, tēnā koe, tēnā koe, tēnā koe’ – To the leader of the land, King Korokī, the powerful, the highly regarded, greetings to you, greetings to you, greetings to you’.\footnote{NZPD, 1950, 289, p.334.} Over a decade later she expressed the difficulty she found speaking in English in parliament, particularly during her maiden speech, admitting to her colleagues ‘It is not easy to come here with a Māori mind and a Māori understanding, and try to express one’s views, as a Māori, in your language’.\footnote{NZPD, 1961, 326, pp.406-409.}

Tirikatene was the first of the Rātana MPs to deliver an actual speech rather than a mihi or a tribute in te reo in 1944, speaking briefly on the Victory Loans, another
small but significant step forward.\textsuperscript{160} In 1945, Omana spoke on the need to use te reo in official circumstances, stating that balance sheets for properties should be read to Māori in te reo so that they would be better understood.\textsuperscript{161} Omana and Tirikatene made gentle nudges towards greater use of te reo Māori in society in 1945: they campaigned for the word ‘Native’ to be replaced with the word ‘Māori’ in all official usage, and bemoaned the fact their Pākehā colleagues could not understand them, Omana noting he only spoke te reo in the House when the speech was being broadcasted, and Tirikatene mentioning that having to translate their own speeches effectively cut their speaking time in half.\textsuperscript{162} In 1947, the Māori Purposes Bill was passed. It provided for the replacement of the word ‘Native’ with the word ‘Māori’ in all official usage and legislation, another small milestone that nonetheless was greatly appreciated by the Rātana MPs.\textsuperscript{163}

In 1946, Tirikatene spoke at length on the importance of the correct spelling and pronunciation of Māori place names.\textsuperscript{164} The issue was raised by the passing of a Bill to set up the New Zealand Geographic Board as an official authority to advise the government on nomenclature and orthography. Tirikatene advised the board to investigate and correct Māori place names (giving the incorrect spelling of the town of ‘Wanganui’ as an example) to preserve the historical meaning and significance of the names: ‘We Māoris do appreciate hearing our words pronounced correctly, because the historical background of the words possess for us a sentimental and moral significance’.\textsuperscript{165} Paikea also spoke in favour of more Māori programming and more Māori presenters on air, and asked for more haka, chants and action songs and less boogie-woogie.\textsuperscript{166}

By 1948 the Māori members had become comfortable with using te reo in their speeches, and their efforts often sparked comments from their colleagues: some enthusiastically welcomed the use of te reo in the House, while others were unhappy

\textsuperscript{160} NZPD, 1944, 266, p.513.
\textsuperscript{161} NZPD, 1945, 268, p.314.
\textsuperscript{162} NZPD, 1945, 268, pp.314-315,362, 432.
\textsuperscript{163} NZPD, 1947, 279, p.952.
\textsuperscript{164} NZPD, 1946, 273, pp.463-465.
\textsuperscript{165} NZPD, 1946, 273, p.465.
\textsuperscript{166} NZPD, 1946, 275, pp.425-426.
about hearing a language they did not understand.\textsuperscript{167} Either way, the Rātana MPs had begun to reintroduce bilingualism to the halls of power. They were not the only ones to do so, either: National Prime Minister Holyoke was known to throw the occasional word or phrase into debates, usually at the expense of the Māori MPs.\textsuperscript{168} On one occasion he refused to respond to Tapihana Paikea's criticisms of the National Party, confessing: ‘Au mea kāore mōhio ki te kōrero Māori’ (‘The reason I do not respond is that I do not know how to speak the Māori language’).\textsuperscript{169}

In 1950, Tirikatene took the campaign a step further, suggesting that te reo be taught in primary schools so that young people could learn pronunciation and the meanings of different place names.\textsuperscript{170} The next major push came in 1958, when Tapihana Paikea discussed proposals to teach the Māori language in schools. At a recent conference held in Rotorua by the Minister of Education 45 teachers had expressed their interest in teaching te reo in schools.\textsuperscript{171} Paikea discussed his dislike of the mispronunciation of well known Māori place names such as Ōtāhuhu, Paraparaumu and Paekakariki, and felt that recognition of the language was an important part of maintaining peaceful race relations: ‘the only way the Pākehā can reach the Māori is through his stomach and through his language’.\textsuperscript{172} He introduced a full list of the Māori vowels and sounds and their correct pronunciation, which he read out in parliament and tabled for future reference.\textsuperscript{173} Tirikatene voiced similar concerns over the mispronunciation of the Māori language on radio broadcasts, giving the example of a Pākehā announcer on 2ZB calling Paraparaumu ‘Paraparam’, and asked that ‘more consideration should be given to the pronunciation of Māori names’ on air.\textsuperscript{174} The Minister of Broadcasting responded that ‘Particular attention was being paid to Māori pronunciation and a special training course had been established to that end’.\textsuperscript{175} Sadly the opposite was to occur: in 1967 the New Zealand Broadcasting Corporation

\textsuperscript{167} See for example NZPD, 1948, 282, p.2190.
\textsuperscript{168} See for example NZPD, 1949, 288, p.2840.
\textsuperscript{169} NZPD, 1950, 289, p.485.
\textsuperscript{170} NZPD, 1950, 292, p.3183.
\textsuperscript{171} NZPD, 1958, 316, p.220.
\textsuperscript{172} NZPD, 1958, 316, pp.219-220.
\textsuperscript{173} NZPD, 1958, 316, p.220.
\textsuperscript{174} NZPD, 1958, 318, pp.1414-1416.
\textsuperscript{175} NZPD, 1958, 318, p.1416.
decided to ‘adopt Anglicised forms of certain Māori place names on radio and television’, despite the pleas of Māori leaders, MPs and interest groups. 176

For the Rātana MPs the language had come full circle, from being the main language of communication for Māori MPs in parliament to being replaced by English as the main language of communication. Their efforts helped to reintroduce the language in official circumstances, and were a small step towards te reo becoming an official language in 1987.

Equally worthy of discussion are the attitudes of the Rātana MPs to mana wāhine, women’s rights and female leadership. In contrast to the multitude of Māori leaders and political movements that had entered parliament in the nineteenth and early to mid-twentieth centuries, the Rātana MPs took a keen interest in the rights of women and the family, speaking regularly on the issue in the House, and were responsible for electing the first two Māori women to parliament, Iriaka Rātana and Whetū Tirikatene-Sullivan.

Once again it was Tirikatene who set the tone for this: in 1933 he argued in parliament that women should have the right to divorce men who had abandoned them and gone overseas, and argued in 1939 that Māori marriage should be accepted by law and family rates paid to an individual who was not lawfully married. 177 In 1934 he delivered a special mihi to the women and children of Māori families coping with the strains and hardships of the depression. 178 In 1935 he expressed his concerns that Māori women were being forced to work in Chinese market gardens for very low wages. 179 He also spoke on the plight of women whose husbands had abandoned them and were unable to gain an unemployment allowance, reminding parliament of the important role mothers played in raising the citizens of tomorrow. 180 In 1938 he spoke on several occasions on the importance of access to maternity care for Māori,

177 NZPD, 1933, 236, pp.523-524; 1939, 237, p.426.
178 NZPD, 1934, 238, p.711.
supporting Māori women to become midwives, and suggesting the introduction of financial support or scholarships for Māori women wanting to become nurses.\textsuperscript{181}

The Rātana MPs often delivered tributes to women entering parliament. In 1939 Tirikatene delivered a mihi to the newly elected female member for Wellington West, Catherine Stewart, stating that women and children needed to be more fully represented in the House. He later delivered a respectful mihi to Elizabeth McCoombs (the first woman to enter parliament) from Māori women who admired her efforts.\textsuperscript{182} Omana welcomed Hilda Ross to the House in 1945, and Tirikatene paid tribute to her on her death in 1959.\textsuperscript{183} In 1961 Tapihana Paikea and Iriaka Rātana both welcomed the new female member for Gisborne, Esme Tombleson, congratulating her on her maiden speech.\textsuperscript{184} Paikea made special mention of the Speaker’s wife and family noting ‘We are apt to forget that our wives play a prominent part in our lives’.\textsuperscript{185}

Through the war years Paraire Paikea, Tirikatene and Omana were at pains to remind parliament and the nation of the contributions made by women to the war effort. In 1941 Paikea commended the government for the introduction of the Rehabilitation Bill, which would provide for widows, orphans of servicemen and women, and women in active service.\textsuperscript{186} In 1945 Tirikatene delivered a similar speech, commending the introduction of the Social Security Bill and its provisions for widows, orphans and maternal care for Māori women.\textsuperscript{187} Tirikatene explained the terms of the Bill and its provisions for widows in te reo Māori as a means of communicating directly to Māori communities. This was one of the first instances where te reo was used to explain legislation; more usually it was used to convey greetings, tributes, pithy proverbs and other formalised forms of address.\textsuperscript{188}

A variety of other women’s issues also engaged the koata. In his maiden speech in 1944, Omana spoke on the significance of Labour’s social security reforms for Māori

\textsuperscript{181} NZPD, 1938, 251, pp.526-527; 1938, 252, pp.494-495.
\textsuperscript{182} NZPD, 1939, 254, p.375; 1939, 255, p.469.
\textsuperscript{183} NZPD, 1945, 268, p.313; 1959, 319, pp.8-9.
\textsuperscript{184} NZPD, 1961, 326, 406-9, 554.
\textsuperscript{185} NZPD, 1961, 326, pp.406, 554.
\textsuperscript{186} NZPD, 1941, 260, pp.1196-1197.
\textsuperscript{187} NZPD, 1945, 271, pp.204-206.
\textsuperscript{188} NZPD, 1945, 271, pp.204-206.
women and families, asking a critic from the opposition: ‘Does the honourable member know that social security was the means of enabling thousands of Māori women and children to have a piece of bread and butter?’ Omana also paid tribute to the men and women serving in the armed forces, ‘particularly the women’. In 1945 Tapihana Paikea spoke on the war effort, delivering a mihi to the men and women who had served and singling out specifically two VAD (Voluntary Aid Detachment) Nurses who had served with the Māori Battalion, Miss Katene and Miss Kia Rīwai. Similarly, Tirikatene delivered a mihi in 1948 to a Māori woman serving alongside 100 other Māori as part of J Force in Japan. In 1948 Tirikatene delivered a speech on the Liquor Licensing Laws and amendments being made to allow Māori women to enter public house bars, echoing the words of his predecessor in the Southern Māori seat, Tame Parata, who had spoken on the rights of Pākehā women to work as barmaids in the early twentieth century.

During the term of the second Labour government the Māori Women’s Welfare League championed the rights of Māori women children and families: the Rātana MPs regularly commended the efforts of the League and pushed for greater governmental support and funding for its work.

Perhaps the most obvious sign of an inclusive attitude towards women amongst the Rātana MPs and their supporters was the election of Iriaka Rātana in 1949. In her maiden speech she admitted her nervousness at being the first Māori women elected to parliament:

[I]t is precedent to confess my trepidation in this my first address in Parliament, in this gathering of learned representatives of the land, more so, Sir, in my being fully aware of the unseen audience which is all over the country listening with curiosity, praise, criticism, or otherwise, to me, a Māori woman upon whom the choice of the electors of the Western Māori district has fallen to represent them in Parliament.

189 NZPD, 1944, 264, p.316.  
190 NZPD, 1944, 264, p.317.  
191 NZPD, 1945, 268, pp.431-434.  
192 NZPD, 1948, 280, p.718.  
193 NZPD, 1948, 284, pp.4226-4228.  
194 NZPD, 1950, 289, p.335.
She went on to pay tribute to Dame Enid Lyons, who also had a large family and had entered parliament on the death of her husband, winning and continuing to hold the Tasmanian seat in the Australian Parliament: ‘How inspiring was her tenacious and courageous action which justly received the highest tribute’.  

The male koata supported her election. Omana said of her maiden speech ‘This is the first occasion a Māori lady has been elected to this House, and the speech she made the other night was a very worthy one’. Paikea mentioned the resistance she had met and overcome as a female candidate:

As a candidate for that electorate she had to overcome a certain amount of prejudice, but I venture to say that, after hearing her remarks in this House the other evening, the Māori people will accept her with open arms.

Tirikatene also voiced his support, stating Iriaka Rātana was:

the first lady member to enter this House by the will of the Māori people … I have listened to quite a number of speeches made by people from the Western Māori District, and I will say that the honourable lady ranks as No.1. She is a credit to the women of my race.

Over the following years, Iriaka Rātana regularly commented in parliament on her experiences and opinions as a mother of a large family, and spoke on the importance of the home, family life, and the rights of women and children.

The comments made by the Rātana MPs about women were fairly straight forward and simplistic. They did not advocate a succinct plan to advance Māori women’s rights, nor were the speeches complemented by any specific legislation, but it would be too easy to write these comments off as superficial window dressing. What these comments seem to hint at is that the Rātana MPs valued women and felt they deserved praise for their efforts in the home, the war effort and parliament. Their comments may seem rather superficial when compared, for instance, to the rhetoric and campaigning of the first and second wave feminist movements in Aotearoa-New Zealand.

Zealand. However, when compared with the words and actions of their Pākehā colleagues, or indeed when compared to the multitude of Māori MPs and movements that had held the Māori seats in previous years, the Rātana MPs stand out for their positive, inclusive and affirmative attitudes to women, not just as wives and mothers but also as nurses, doctors, school teachers, midwives, service women in the armed forces, politicians and leaders of their people in their own right. It is difficult to pinpoint where this attitude stemmed from, whether the movement as a whole took a progressive attitude towards women, whether Rātana himself had pushed for recognition of women’s rights, or whether it was simply a case of the elected MPs holding these attitudes as individuals. No published source on the Rātana movement or on mana wāhine Māori singles out the Rātana movement as holding inclusive attitudes towards women and female leadership. But it should be noted that from its very inception the Rātana church and movement embraced and included Māori women in leadership roles. Women were included within the formal structure of the church as Awhina and as members of the Rātana Concert Party. Women, notably Rātana’s wives, Te Urumanaao and Iriaka Rātana, were significant leaders within the movement. The case for mana wāhine within the Rātana movement is an intriguing one which deserves more research, but it would seem that, just as the movement, its church and its leader held progressive, inclusive attitudes towards pan-tribalism and youth leadership, it also shared similar attitudes towards mana wāhine and female leadership.

Along with their work in the House, the Rātana MPs were members of the Native Affairs Select Committee, renamed the Māori Affairs Select Committee under their watch in 1945. The koata achieved a number of impressive outcomes from their work within the committee, but their ability to influence legislation and answer the prayers of petitioners waxed and waned according to changes in government and party leadership. On entering Parliament in 1932, Tirikatene was appointed to the Native Affairs Select Committee. The committee had changed little since the era of Ngā mātāmua: it consisted of 14 members including the four Māori MPs, it was chaired by

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199 The one exception to this was Hone Heke Ngapua, the Kotahitanga leader who held similarly progressive attitudes towards women’s rights and female leadership, a trait passed on to him by his mother Niurangi Pūrirī who herself played an active role in politics. Paul Moon, Ngapua: The Political Life of Hone Heke Ngapua, MHR, Auckland, 2006, pp.31-33.

a Pākehā MP, and its role hearing petitions, bills and papers remained.²⁰¹ Petitions still dominated the work of the committee, and iwi continued to petition the government on the same issues. Māori land, government policy, and access to tribal resources ranging from islands and waterways to fishing rights were top of the agenda, while petitions regarding wills had become common by the 1930s.²⁰² Ngāi Tahu were still sending a significant volume of petitions, at this time lamenting the loss of tribal and treaty fishing rights,²⁰³ and each year the committee sent out their reports with the same refrain: either ‘no recommendation’ or ‘referred to the government for consideration’.²⁰⁴

What had changed was the workload: between 1910 and 1932 the number of Māori petitions to the government had declined significantly. In 1932 the committee met just twelve times, well down from the 66 meetings the committee had held in 1910.²⁰⁵ It reported on 46 petitions and 23 were held over till the next session.²⁰⁶ It can only be guessed as to why Māori had stopped petitioning the state in such large numbers, as no evidence exists to authoritatively explain this trend. Yet the fact that Māori had been petitioning the state with little outcome cannot have been lost on tribal leaders and must have played some role in the decline of petition numbers by 75% over 75 years. To add to this, the number of petitions the committee investigated and reported on had declined significantly. The heyday of the committee seemed to be over by the 1930s: it appeared that iwi no longer saw it as a potential avenue for redress, and the committee no longer played as active a role in addressing Māori grievances. In contrast the number of bills and papers considered by the committee had not changed: it reported on two bills and nine papers in 1932.²⁰⁷ When Tirikatene entered parliament the committee was in decline, but as the Rātana movement took over the Māori seats the disempowered status of the committee would, temporarily at least, be shaken from its slumber.

²⁰¹ Journals of the House of Representatives of New Zealand (Hereafter referred to as JHRNZ), Wellington, 1932, p.xxvii.
²⁰² AJHR, 1932, pp.3-15.
²⁰⁴ AJHR, 1932, pp.3-15.
²⁰⁵ AJHR, Wellington, 1910, p.27; 1932, p.16.
²⁰⁶ AJHR, 1932, p.16.
²⁰⁷ AJHR, 1932, p.16.
By 1939 the membership of the committee had been increased to 18 members, and included the three Rātana members, Ngata and the two powerhouses of New Zealand politics, Michael Joseph Savage and Gordon Coates. In this year the committee was dramatically redefined to embody the emerging socialist policies of the Labour party and Rātana ambitions. The subject of the committee was officially changed, for one session, from addressing ‘affairs specially affecting the Native Race’ to considering ‘all matters relating to the economic progress and development, land-settlement, health, housing, and general welfare of the Māori race which may be referred to it by the House or by the Government’, and new rules were instituted, allowing the committee to sit during recesses when the House was not sitting. The number and subject of the petitions and the responses of the committee did not change dramatically, but the number of considered responses and positive reports on petitions increased.

By the early 1940s the transformation of the committee was apparent in membership, in word and in deed. 1943 was to be Ngata's last year in parliament, and with his departure the Rātana movement held the four seats and dominated the committee. In 1945 the committee was renamed the Māori Affairs Select Committee, the name it retains to this day. More substantive changes occurred as well. The Ngāi Tahu Claim Settlement Act 1944, the Taranaki Māori Claims Settlement Act 1944 and the Waikato-Maniapoto Māori Claims Settlement Act 1946 were passed by the Labour government to attempt to address the hundreds of petitions iwi had sent to parliament over the past century. These were not the only issues resolved. In 1943 for example a second ‘Otaki-Porirua and Papawai-Kai Kokirikiri Trusts’ Select Committee was called to consider seven major petitions relating to the misuse of land gifted to the Church of England by iwi for educational purposes. The new committee was akin to a subcommittee of the Native Affairs Committee as it included similar membership and all four Māori MPs and dealt with Māori petitions. The committee produced a thorough report, recommending that a trust representing the Church, Māori and the Education Department administer the lands ‘to carry out as far as is practicable the terms and intentions of the original grant’, and insisted that scholarships, bursaries,

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hostels and teaching resources be provided to Māori students, with an emphasis on the descendants of the hapū who provided the lands in the first place.212 The committee's responses to the other 60 odd petitions were not drastically different from previous years but in amongst the ‘no recommendations’ and ‘considerations’ it recommended changes to policy, legislation, implementation and other approaches iwi could use to resolve the concerns of their petitions.213

Such a change in the direction of Māori policy would not last. By 1949, the end of Labours’ lengthy spell in government, the committee had returned to its former state of inaction, ground down by opposition to the so-called ‘Māori mandate’ and infighting between the Rātana Movement and the Labour Party. In 1949 the committee received just 20 petitions, it reported on 19 of them, and it did not give serious consideration or discussion to a single petition.214

By 1957 the committee had reached its lowest ebb. Membership had reduced back down to ten, Pākehā MPs still held the position of chair, and that year the committee reported on just three petitions and two bills.215 From producing annual reports that would run into the hundreds of pages, the 1957 report was just four pages long, or one page long not including the translations, the cover and table of contents.216

Similarly by 1960 the committee remained muted. In that year it reported on seven petitions and one bill: six of the petitions received a report of no recommendation and the seventh was referred to the government for consideration.217 By this stage the public and private members bills resolving Māori petitions had all but dried up. The only significant change made was that Northern MP Tapihana Paikea was appointed as chairman in 1958: ironically by the time Māori had gained significant control over the committee it was too late. The ebb and flow of the Māori Affairs Committee mirrored the tides of Māori politics: the committee reached its zenith in the 1940s, seeing the first settlements of the issues the committee had been set up to deal with.

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for almost 100 years, but gradually declined thereafter, as Pākehā sympathy for Māori interests waned.

Now that we have a clearer understanding of the careers of the Rātana MPs and the issues they campaigned on, we are better positioned to judge the achievements of the movement and the abilities of the Rātana MPs. So, is the existing literature warranted in its judgement that the Rātana MPs were largely ineffectual and achieved little during their time in office? The answer is complicated: those members picked by Rātana on the basis of their skills, leadership abilities, mana and whakapapa, namely Tirikatene and Paraire Paikea, performed best in parliament. The rushed decision to elect Omana as Eastern koata because of the fall out between Rātana and Moko produced a dependable but not exceptional candidate. If Tirikatene and Paikea’s example were anything to go by, Pita Moko could have made an exceptional MP that elevated the status of the movement within parliament.

Those members who gained their candidature via their familial ties or the succession of a seat to a family member were less effective in their roles. Tapihana Paikea enjoyed a lengthy but lacklustre career in parliament. Iriaka Rātana was a unique, grass-roots parliamentarian, but she did not enjoy a spectacular career and is not credited with any particular policy or legislation. H.T. Rātana and M. Rātana were simply not cut out to be MPs: they achieved little and barely managed to attend to their most basic of duties as parliamentarians.

Suitability for the work certainly impacted upon the careers of the koata, but how do we gauge their efforts according to the criteria of effectiveness outlined in chapter one? In terms of wielding power, the Rātana MPs help positions of power, but they were largely symbolic. Labour retained control of government policy, though the koata had some successes addressing tribal concerns through the Māori Affairs Select Committee. The Rātana-Labour alliance delivered positive outcomes for Māori community well beyond the achievements of the YMP and Carroll, but the koata had little say over their introduction or implementation. The Rātana MPs were very effective in their accountability to their constituents and their ability to express Māori viewpoints, and for this they were returned to parliament, year after year, decade after decade. Judged according to these criteria, the koata were effective as Māori MPs,
certainly more effective than they have been judged by the existing literature, but the catch was that they did not gain control of the Māori Affairs portfolio and had little say over policy and legislation. Treating the Rātana MPs as a homogenous group and writing off their efforts collectively undermines the achievements of those who were effective in their roles as parliamentarians, while obscuring the fact that candidate selection played a major role in determining their effectiveness.

But candidate selection is only part of the story here. The Rātana movement’s decision to pick candidates according to whakapapa and succession was detrimental to the movement’s parliamentary effectiveness, and garnered criticism and mistrust from the Labour Party, the media, the National opposition and the public. We cannot forget Labour’s role in this: Labour chose to marginalise the Rātana movement, appeasing them with policy reforms and symbolic leadership roles, while denying them real leadership and a say in the direction of Māori policy. Even if all the Rātana MPs had been as effective as Tirikatene or Paraire Paikea, they still would have struggled under Labour’s vice like grip on Māori policy. In some respects the ineffectiveness of some of the Rātana MPs actually suited the Labour Party’s aims, it justified their decision to ignore the movement’s path to mana motuhake, and to stay on their own, much longer path to ‘equality with racial individuality’.218

The sad irony here is that the same forces that marginalised the Rātana MPs in parliament have marginalised them within the history books. Historians have largely accepted Labour’s assertion that the Rātana MPs were ineffective, and the historiography reflects this. A comparison between the research on the Rātana MPs and that of the Young Māori Party sheds some light on this trend. Why is it that the YMP members have been canonised within the literature, and the Rātana MPs have been marginalised? Ngata’s land development schemes were impressive, but so too were the reforms introduced by the first Labour government. Many of Labour’s policies, as Orange has noted, were a continuation of Ngata’s polices, but surely the fact that Labour chose to continue and indeed build and improve upon Ngata’s schemes, while adding many more of their own, warrants praise of the Labour Party

If the Rātana-Labour alliance achieved more than Ngata and his YMP colleagues, why is it that historians have championed Ngata, while Tirikatene and Paraire Paikea are at best peripheral? Arguably, Ngata and the YMP have been celebrated popularly and academically because they attained symbols of Pākehā success and distinction, they communicated to Pākehā in their own language and according to their own values, and they expounded the values of western education, science and medicine as the saving graces of the Māori people. The Rātana MPs did not share these same values: they did not have university educations, they were not all eloquent speakers of English, or even of Māori. They were less interested in appealing to Pākehā morals and values and more interested in appealing to the brown proletariat who had put them in power. And, perhaps most importantly, they did not believe that western knowledge and education were the solution to everything, they believed in this mysterious, some even said preposterous figure, the prophet Rātana, and his goals of justice and independence.

What then did the Rātana MPs achieve in parliament? The evidence presented in this chapter, while confirming that some of Labour’s prejudices were justified, would suggest that many of the Rātana MPs were far from ineffective: they were passionate, tireless and vocal spokespeople for their constituents, and session after session, year after year, decade after decade, they struggled and at times succeeded in making sure that Māori voices were heard in the corridors of power. If they did not have direct control over government policy they helped to influence it: Tirikatene’s tireless campaigning in parliament between 1932 and 1935 may have had some impact on Labour’s Māori policy in the 1930s and early 1940s. The movement’s ability to win and hold the Māori seats and deliver them to Labour year after year secured Labour’s reforms for Māori: Labour may have been motivated in part by humanitarian concerns, but they needed Māori votes to secure their majority in parliament, and their reforms were a reward to Māori for their loyalty. The MWEO was the high point of the Rātana-Labour alliance: on this one occasion Labour acceded to Māori wishes for greater control over their own affairs, and the organisation was a tremendous success that other Māori organisations would emulate in the coming years. The MWEO was discontinued not because Labour’s experiment had been unsuccessful: on the contrary

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it had been too successful, and Labour feared losing control of Māori affairs, and perhaps even Māori communities, if they allowed the organisation to go on any longer. When Labour did choose to grant Rātana MPs real leadership roles, as was the case when Paraire Paikea was made Minister of the Māori War Effort and Tirikatene was made Minister of Forestry, they proved to be effective and at times visionary leaders. The Māori Affairs Select Committee provided an avenue for the Rātana MPs to assert some influence on policy, and their efforts contributed to the passing of the Ngāi Tahu Claim Settlement Act 1944, the Taranaki Māori Claims Settlement Act 1944, the Waikato-Maniapoto Māori Claims Settlement Act 1946, the Otaki-Porirua and Papawai-Kai Kokirikiri Trusts Bills of 1943 and a range of other long standing tribal grievances.

The Rātana MPs also gained a number of smaller concessions: they saw the replacement of the word ‘Native’ with the word ‘Māori’ in official circumstances, they campaigned for greater recognition of the Treaty of Waitangi, a wish that was recognised in part but not in full by the introduction of Waitangi Day as a public day of celebration. They helped to reintroduce te reo Māori into parliament, a small but important step towards making the Māori language one of the country’s official languages, and they saw the election of the first two Māori women to parliament, a huge step forward for Māori women’s rights which helped to normalise the place of Māori women as publicly recognised leaders amongst Māori and Pākehā communities.

Perhaps the greatest contribution the Rātana MPs made to their people and to posterity were their words. In their own way, each of the koata were Māngai, they were the mouthpiece of the people. They gave voice to the voiceless. They spoke tirelessly on the hardships and discrimination their people faced. They campaigned for the redress of tribal grievances that were already a century old and unresolved. They campaigned for equal treatment of Māori under the newly founded welfare state, and pushed for special treatment to recognise their status as tangata whenua. They fought for a greater share of the countries’ resources to be spent on Māori communities, and were the first to voice their opposition if Māori were criticised for any reason. They became a sounding board for Māori opinion, and gave their fellow MPs, the media, and the general public, an insight into the Māori world and Māori
opinions. They helped raise awareness of the Treaty of Waitangi, tribal grievances, land loss, the importance of Māori language and culture, the rights of Māori women, and Māori aspirations for independence.

Where they faltered and were unable to push forward in their goals, they set an example and left a legacy that would inspire future generations to follow in their footsteps. As an example, their campaign for greater recognition of the Treaty of Waitangi saw the introduction of Waitangi Day as a public holiday in 1973, and the establishment of the Waitangi Tribunal in 1975 to hear and resolve tribal grievances and land loss. Tirikatene’s endless speeches on the Ngāi Tahu claim and Paraire and Tapihana Paikea’s constant pestering about the communities of the Kaipara, Ōrākei and the Far North must have grown tiresome to deliver and to hear, but they kept tribal claims alive and provided a wealth of recorded material that would one day be called upon as evidence by the Waitangi Tribunal and contribute to the settlement of these long standing grievances.

The Rātana movement also played an important role in the history of Māori engagement with the state and the Māori seats. In some ways they built on the legacy of their predecessors. Like Ngata and the YMP, the Rātana movement felt that alignment with a major political party was the best way of achieving their goals in parliament. Gone were the days of Ngā mātāmua when candidates stood as independents in the Māori seats and cooperation between the Māori members was optional. The movement believed that a unified polity controlling all four Māori seats and aligned with a major party would be the best means of achieving their goals. Unfortunately like Ngata and the YMP, they learnt the hard way that blind loyalty to any political party meant lengthy spells out of government, and did not necessarily mean results or positions of power and influence when their party was in power. They also built on the legacy of the YMP in that they inherited and improved upon Ngata’s land development schemes, and his efforts in the areas of health, education and settling tribal grievances.

If there was a major difference, it was that the Rātana movement saw in a shift away from Māori alignments to conservative, right-wing tribal leaders and the educated elite and towards a loyalty to the political left and the interests of the working class.
This shift paralleled the shift that Ngā mātāmua had introduced, moving Māori away from traditional tribal leaders as MPs and towards leaders of political movements in the nineteenth century.

As much as things changed though they also stayed the same. Just like those that had gone before them, the Rātana MPs struggled to overcome the paradox of Māori representation. By aligning with Labour they gained important concessions for Māori but also lost their right to retain an independent voice, and were unable to control the direction of Māori policy. They debated leaving Labour and breaking the alliance but believed that Māori would fare even worse under a National lead government. When National were in power the Rātana MPs could do nothing but sit back and watch: their alignment with Labour meant they were unable to cross party lines as flexibly as some of their predecessors had. They also experienced many of the same hardships their predecessors had been subjected to. Māori MPs often entered parliament with a hard-edged, uncompromising stance to their people’s rights that had not yet been worn down by the realities of compromise politics. This was the case with many of the Rātana MPs, Tirikatene, Omana and Tapihana Paikea in particular. But the desperately slow movement of bureaucratic wheels, the realities of compromise politics, and the lack of awareness amongst Pākehā of Māori issues all acted to wear down the Māori MPs. At best it taught them that diplomacy, patience and practicality paid off. At worst it left them compromised and demoralised. For the Rātana MPs it meant both: by the 1960s the days of Labour’s quick-fire reforms were long gone and the Rātana MPs had given up on implementing T.W. Rātana’s goals of recognition of the treaty and settlement of tribal grievances. They had not given up all together; they still believed that these goals would be achieved, but they saw gradual progress and incremental steps as the most realistic way of achieving them, not sweeping reforms. Their politics remained intact but they had been ground down almost beyond recognition, and this all came at a cost to the credibility of the movement and the MPs as individuals. Their final indignation has been to suffer at the hands of historians, who have undermined their efforts and belittled their abilities in the nation’s history books.

The lessons of the Rātana movement would not be lost on future generations. Later movements took up their causes of ratification of the Treaty of Waitangi, attainment
of Māori independence, and settlement of tribal grievances. They also learnt from the mistakes of the Rātana movement, that being in power was not a great enough reward to warrant losing one’s independence, and that if Māori wanted to achieve their goals they would have to find a way of being in power while retaining their independence, and remaining flexible enough to cross party lines. Labour would not always be in power. New Zealand romanticises its left-wing governments but it prefers right-wing parties to be in power, and Māori would need strategies, some old and some new, to weather out the lengthy dry spells when Labour was not in office. The Rātana MPs achieved many things during their time in office. What they did not achieve they bequeathed to future generations to follow up. The political movements that followed in the footsteps of Rātana would be guided by their example, and many of the political leaders of the future would have close ties to the movement, but their politics, strategies and loyalties would diverge greatly from those of the Mōrehu.

Figure 16: Matiu Rata (centre) taking tea with gang members at a gang leader summit meeting in 1981. The emergence of urban Māori gangs in the 1970s was to have a profound impact on Rata’s career, contributing to his transformation from conservative reformer to radical. Summit meeting of gang leaders, 35mm-01430-35a 1981, Negatives of the Evening Post Newspaper Collection, PAColl-0614-1, ATL.

On the 29 April 1980, a throng of supporters, family members, Rātana elders and reporters gathered in the corridor outside the office of the Speaker of Parliament, eagerly awaiting the announcement of the resignation of the Northern Māori Member of Parliament, the Honourable Matiu Rata. As Rata emerged his supporters broke into an impromptu haka, and a korowai was placed over his shoulders. Rata announced to the awaiting media ‘I shall return’, quoting the bold words of Douglas McArthur.¹ Instead his words would come to echo the famous last words of the ancestor who had discovered Aotearoa and founded the many tribes of the North whom Rata represented. Ka hoki a Kupe – will Kupe return?

By this stage in his career, Rata had proven himself to be an able and effective Māori MP. He had transcended some of the limitations of Māori political representation that had confounded his predecessors by wielding power in Parliament while retaining a critical voice of his own, and had achieved things his predecessors would not have thought possible. But by the late 1970s Rata had hit the proverbial glass ceiling of Māori political engagement. The National Party held government and were deaf to the pleas of Māori communities, Labour’s leadership had changed with the death of Norman Kirk and were no longer willing to entertain Māori ambitions for reform, and Rata had been demoted within the party’s hierarchy. Challenged with the paradox of Māori political representation, Rata would make the leap of faith that his predecessors had been unwilling to. In resigning from the Labour Party, Rata broke the 43 year long Rātana-Labour alliance, and began the process that would see Labour control of the Māori seats crumble away. Unlike the Rātana-Labour MPs of the 1940s and 50s, Rata was not willing to accept his position and look to the future for hope. Instead he chose to strike out on his own path, and seek out political independence for Māori so they were no longer at the whim and mercy of Pākehā politicians. Rata would not actuate this dream, but others would follow on in his footsteps, in search of the illusive dream of welding power while retaining Māori political independence.

Rata’s career is worthy of closer inspection, as it marks an important phase in the history of Māori engagement with parliament; it tells us much about the nature of Māori political engagement, and was to have a considerable impact on the future of Māori politics. This chapter will begin with a review of the literature on Rata, and the ways historians have depicted his career. It continues with a biographical sketch of Rata’s life before entering parliament, followed by an in-depth analysis of his career, covering the four key periods of his time in opposition between 1963 and 1972, his short stint in office as Minister of Māori Affairs and Lands between 1973 and 1975, the gradual decline of his career in opposition between 1976 and 1979, and his resignation and efforts to found the Mana Motuhake Party between 1979 and 1991.

The existing literature on Rata presents us with two models of the man: Rata as transitional figure, and Rata as a man of contradictions. As a transitional figure we are presented with two figures, the first a snapshot of Rata in 1975 as a well-meaning
Rātana-Labour MP sympathetic to Māori concerns over land loss yet at odds with the ambitions of the Māori land march, summed up in the words of Michael King:

In over two years in Government he [Rata] had worked hard to have Crown Land returned to Māori ownership in cases where it had not been used for the purposes for which it had been taken, and to have land administered by the Department of Māori Affairs returned to the control of Māori owners. He regarded Matakite’s existence as a vote of no confidence in his efforts. He felt undermined and discredited by the suggestion of the march.²

The second snapshot is that of the radical Rata of 1979, who threw in his job and the promise of a government pension to form the Māori political party Mana Motuhake.

The reasons writers offer for this sudden and traumatic change from conservative to radical vary: Ranginui Walker has emphasised that Rata’s transformation was politically driven and was evidence of the radical protest activities of the 1970s spilling into mainstream politics, describing Rata’s resignation as a ‘natural corollary to the rise of Māori assertiveness in the seventies’.³ According to Walker the late 1970s ‘was one of the most volatile times in modern Māori history…. During these traumatic events there was a thunderous silence from the opposition benches’, and Rata’s resignation was ‘the strongest message he could deliver to Labour that the Māori voice should not be taken for granted’.⁴

Kayleen Hazlehurst described Rata’s transformation as driven by a combination of disillusionment in the ability of Pākehā politics to deliver to Māori, and his own personal anger at being demoted within the Labour Party. According to Hazlehurst, he had grown weary of being ‘a victim of constant compromise’, and after years of ‘struggle and introspection, much of which was unknown to the public’ had ‘lost faith in the entire system of Māori political expression through Pākehā organizations.’⁵

² Michael King, Whina, Auckland, 1983, pp.210-211. Aroha Harris has also noted that Rata was a quiet reformer who, unknown to the public, had been working behind the scenes to facilitate the return of Crown lands. See Aroha Harris, Hīkoi: Forty Years of Māori Protest, Wellington, 2004, p.75.
⁵ Hazlehurst, pp. 54, 172.
Hazlehurst’s estimation: ‘For Rata there had been a choice of either a drastic political move or a slow, suffocating death by compromise. Either way, political suicide appeared almost certain.’

The second model we are presented with is Rata as contradiction. Lyndsay Cox has described Rata as an able Minister of Māori Affairs who ‘attempted to restructure the Department and to increase its budget allocation’ in the face of ‘an occasionally less than enthusiastic Party line’. In spite of this, Cox has commented that Rata’s contemporaries underestimated his abilities:

In hindsight, his achievements as Minister are recognized as having had considerable impact at a national level. His contemporaries, however, were slow to accord him his due, the media preferring to portray him as an ill-educated man incapable of finishing a sentence.

In a similar vein Hazlehurst has described Rata’s efforts as representing ‘a major philosophical shift in the administration of Māori affairs in New Zealand’ which ‘inaugurated a more tolerant attitude towards Māori social and cultural integrity in Māori affairs policy’. Rata's policies surrounding Māori land, the Treaty of Waitangi, Māori language and culture and housing were nothing new, but ‘the political climate and the personality of Rata converged to produce a major breakthrough for Māori influence over government policy and legislation.’ Subsequently Rata was to become ‘the most influential Māori politician of his generation’. That said, Hazlehurst has noted that Rata was often underestimated by his colleagues. As Hazlehurst put it, some Pākehā saw him as ‘clumsy, inarticulate…not well read…repetitious…consistently inconsistent’, and his colleague Bob Tizard recalled that Rata spoke in ‘unpunctuated gushes – the words just poured out and the listener usually got lost long before he ran out of breath’.

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6 Hazlehurst, p.59.
8 Cox, p.134.
10 Hazlehurst, p.48.
11 Hazlehurst, p.49.
12 Hazlehurst, p.45.
Both these models have their merits, but they also have their deficiencies. The first fails to account for Rata’s early career between 1963 and 1973, during which time he displayed a radical edge, a flair for the dramatic, and transformed himself from a socialist of the 1960s to the conservative voice of radicalism in the early to mid-1970s. Understanding Rata’s personality and his dynamic politics in these early years is crucial to understanding the dramatic decision he made to leave the Labour Party in 1979.

The second model, Rata as contradictory figure, cuts closer to the heart of Rata’s personality and politics. What is missing here is a clear explanation of why it was that Rata was underestimated by his colleagues, in spite of the fact that he was a highly capable minister. A greater understanding of the historical context, and the trend of politicians, historians and the media consistently undervaluing Māori politicians, helps to explain this conundrum. Moreover, a comparative study of the experiences of Sir Apirana Ngata and the Rātana-Labour MPs in earlier years indicates that party leadership and Rata’s place within the Labour Party were instrumental in allowing him to pursue his goals.

Far more needs to be known about Rata’s politics, personality and career, in order to better understand the twists and turns that came to typify the life of this complex and unpredictable figure. Understanding his career in turn explains much about Māori political engagement, the limitations of Māori parliamentary representation, and the search for Māori political independence.

Rata’s background was to play a significant role in leading him to a career in politics, and is worth exploring briefly. Rata was born on 26 March 1934 in the small Far North town of Te Hāpuia. He was born into the tribes of Ngāti Kurī, Te Aupōuri and Ngāti Whātau, and claimed descent from a Norwegian grandfather. Rata was one of five children: his father, a gum digger and farm labourer, died when he was 10, after which his mother moved to Auckland to work as a Post Office cleaner, taking with

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13 Hazlehurst, p.43.
her four of his siblings.\textsuperscript{15} Rata was left to live with an aunty in Kaitaia, moving to Auckland in 1944 when his mother was offered a state house in Panmure.\textsuperscript{16} Rata’s experiences growing up in a single parent family in urban Auckland and living in a state housing complex with 11 other families fomented his interest in politics from an early age. In his own words:

\begin{quote}
Politics were not academic for us. It was very real. It was on the street. Politics for us represented the means of getting out and into a new opportunity, a new environment, a new home, a new start.\textsuperscript{17}
\end{quote}

Rata left school early: he worked as a farm labourer for a spell in Taupiri, and became a merchant seaman in 1950, travelling the southern trade routes between the islands of the Pacific, Australia, South America and New Zealand.\textsuperscript{18} Rata gained his Able Seaman’s Certificate and joined the Seamen’s Union at this time: he was also involved in the 1951 Waterfront dispute, and joined the Labour Party in that year.\textsuperscript{19} On returning to New Zealand in 1954 Rata worked a variety of jobs. He was an employee of the New Zealand Railways from 1960 to 1963, working as a spray painter and performing other odd jobs at the Ōtāhuhu Railway Workshops, and rose to prominence through his work as a Union organiser for the Railway’s and Seaman’s Union and a member of the executive of the Amalgamated Society of Railways Servants in Ōtāhuhu.\textsuperscript{20} Rata became chairman of his local branch of the Labour Party, and Labour area organiser in Auckland for Northern member Tapihana Paikea.\textsuperscript{21} He married his wife Nellie in 1959 and was the father of three children.\textsuperscript{22}

Rata was also a member of the Rātana church. In 1957 he was chairman of the Auckland branch of the Rātana church, a registered Apostle, and vice-chairman of the Rātana Youth Movement, which numbered some 12,000 members.\textsuperscript{23} Rata was an outspoken and at times controversial leader of the movement, challenging the church

\begin{footnotes}
\textsuperscript{15} ‘Matiu Rata: defector with a mission’.
\textsuperscript{16} ‘Matiu Rata: defector with a mission’.
\textsuperscript{17} ‘Matiu Rata: defector with a mission’.
\textsuperscript{18} Hazlehurst, p.43; ‘Matiu Rata: defector with a mission’.
\textsuperscript{20} Hazlehurst, p.43; ‘Matiu Rata: defector with a mission’; Newman, p.414.
\textsuperscript{21} Hazlehurst, p.44; ‘Matiu Rata: defector with a mission’.
\textsuperscript{22} Hazlehurst, p.44; ‘Matiu Rata: defector with a mission’.
\textsuperscript{23} Newman, p.414.
\end{footnotes}
hierarchy to campaign for the lowering of the voting age to 18, oppose French nuclear testing in the Pacific, and deplore sporting contacts with South Africa.\textsuperscript{24}

Rata’s background would prove to be crucial: his magic combination of a Rātana upbringing, Labour affiliations, strong union support, and close connections with the incumbent Northern member Paikea through whakapapa and his work in the Labour Party would lead him to parliament. With the sudden passing of Paikea in January 1963 Rata’s colleagues from the Amalgamated Society of Railway Servants put him forth as a nominee for the Northern seat.\textsuperscript{25} The candidate selection took place at the Labour Party Office in Queen Street, and Rata was selected from a field of 13 candidates.\textsuperscript{26} He contested and won the ensuing Northern by-election, entering parliament in 1963 at the tender age of 28.\textsuperscript{27} Over the following 17 years Rata would prove to his electorate that he deserved the seat in his own right as an outspoken and highly effective MP; his overestimation of this support, however, would prove to be his downfall.

Rata entered parliament at a time of change. By the 1960s there was a distinct separation between Labour, the Rātana MPs and the Rātana movement, as Labour control over the seats waxed and Rātana control waned. The movement no longer had a strong say in candidate selection and were less involved with the MPs, Labour had begun to monopolise the candidate selection process, and Rata himself was to be the first of many MPs selected by the Labour Party for whom a Rātana affiliation was considered beneficial but entirely optional.

\textsuperscript{24} Newman, p.414.
\textsuperscript{26} ‘The North Rallying To Cause Says Mr Rata’, \textit{New Zealand Herald} (Hereafter referred to as NZH), 12 November 1979, in Walker, \textit{Mana Motuhake: Articles from local newspapers}, p.8; ‘Matiu Rata: defector with a mission’.
\textsuperscript{27} ‘Matiu Rata: defector with a mission’. Rata’s candidature was also significant in that it demonstrated once again that a strong bloc of votes within the Labour Party could be manipulated to impressive gains by aspiring Māori politicians: Paraie Paikea had done the same in 1941, using Auckland Labour supporters to gain his position as the first Rātana MP to enter the Executive Council representing the Māori race. H. Ngatata Love, ‘Policies of Frustration: The Growth of Māori Politics; The Rātana/Labour Era’, PhD thesis, Victoria University of Wellington, 1977, pp.329-331.

Rata and his colleagues inherited a political tradition spanning nearly three decades, encapsulating the Rātana-Labour alliance and a commitment to the issues of the Treaty of Waitangi, Māori land rights, and social and cultural reform. They were the third generation of a genealogy of politicians who had represented their people with eloquence and dignity in parliament, but for whom powerful oratory was not matched by positions of power in government. Rata was to play the leading role in the 1960s and 70s; in many ways he conformed to the political tradition he inherited, yet he also challenged and at times transcended the boundaries of Māori political representation. The following section of this chapter will discuss Rata’s early career in parliament between 1963 and 1972, and the implications these early years would have for the future of his career.

In many ways Rata conformed to the political tradition he inherited and his role as a Māori MP. He spoke regularly and at length on the bread and butter issues of the Treaty of Waitangi, Māori land, education, employment, housing, Māori language and cultural retention, Māori representation in parliament, forestry and fisheries, issues that had become the mainstays of Māori politics.

Following in the footsteps of Sir Eruera Tirikatene, Rata spoke often and at length on the treaty, and led the Māori MPs on the issue. He campaigned for the introduction of Waitangi Day as a national paid holiday in 1963 and 1966 and introduced his own private members bill, the New Zealand Day Bill 1971, which sought to rename the proposed national holiday ‘New Zealand Day’. Rata played a crucial role in elevating the status of the treaty during his career, yet his attitudes towards the treaty differed markedly from those of his predecessors and courted the contempt of a number of his contemporaries. True to his socialist roots, Rata believed class, not race, was the decisive factor in creating the inequalities that existed between Māori and Pākehā; he believed the problems Māori faced were largely social and economic, and could be resolved via socialist reforms. Rata did not regard the Treaty of Waitangi solely as a symbol of Māori grievance or indigenous rights; more so he saw it as a potent symbol of New Zealand nationalism, and a means of fostering positive race relations and celebrating multiculturalism.
As an example, in 1963 he argued the treaty was an agreement between Māori and Pākehā, ‘not something for the Māori people alone’, describing it as bringing about ‘a spirit of complete tolerance and understanding’ and ‘mutual understanding’ between the races.28 In 1966 he supported the introduction of Waitangi Day as a way ‘to instil nationalism and give recognition to it’ at a time ‘when relations with Great Britain appear to be strained’, arguing that celebrating Waitangi would ‘instil confidence in’ and ‘give reality to the principle of a multiracial society’.29 On introducing the New Zealand Day Bill in 1971 Rata summed up his sentiments:

The Treaty of Waitangi is not something that is confined to the Māori race; it is something which all New Zealanders should feel they have a part in. Contrary to the feelings expressed by some, that to set aside Waitangi would simply mean an occasion to celebrate the misdeeds of the past, I think that this would be the first step towards correcting long-standing misdeeds and misgivings.30

Māori land rights were a perennial issue that every generation had to address, and Rata was to be caught up in a maelstrom of activity surrounding Māori land. Rata viewed Māori land issues as a three way equation: a lack of government support for Māori land development led to land loss, land loss led to urbanisation, and urbanisation led to crime, deculturalisation, unemployment and social problems.31 Throughout his time in opposition, Rata urged the government to support land retention by offering greater incentives to Māori farmers, opposing long-term 99 year leases and 25 year leases with perpetual right of renewal, investing in land developments, making finance available to land incorporations and increasing trade training schemes for Māori in farming.32 Rata believed land incorporations were the most effective means of dealing with fragmented land titles, and suggested the establishment of a federation of land incorporations to pool resources as a means of accessing finance and expert advice.33

30 NZPD, 1971, 373, pp.2552-2553.
33 NZPD, 1964, 341, pp.3071-3072, 3671.
Most significantly, Rata led opposition to the infamous Māori Affairs Amendment Bill 1967, dubbed by Māori ‘the last land grab’. He condemned the fact the government were focusing solely on Māori land, noting that four fifths of idle land in Northland was Pākehā owned, yet ‘Too many people make the mistake of thinking that all land with some gorse on it belongs to the Māori’, and wondered aloud ‘Would any European tolerate legislation which made provision that, whether he liked it or not, the status of his property could be altered?’

Rata feared the government was attempting to ‘bulldoze the bill’ through parliament, and asked that they take a ‘taihoa’ policy, so that the bill could be circulated widely, studied closely and debated at length before any decision was made. He condemned the government’s efforts to commandeer unproductive Māori land and uneconomic shares, urging them instead to ‘actively pursue a policy aimed at the development of Māori land for the use, occupation and benefit of Māoris’.

Rata warned the government ‘I do not think this country can afford this short-sighted policy’, and made it clear during the third reading that Māori and opponents of the Bill ‘had no option but to oppose it outright, and it will be reviewed by a future Government at the first opportunity’. His words proved to be prophetic: the Act was the catalyst that sparked the emergence of Māori radical activism in the urban centres of Auckland and Wellington in the late 1960s and early 1970s. His leadership on the issue lead to his appointment as Minister of Māori Affairs and Lands in 1973, and Rata would spend his time as minister repealing the offending clauses of the Act, and introducing new legislation to safeguard Māori land interests.

Housing was another issue high on Rata’s priority list; he campaigned to improve and increase the number of rental properties and hostels available to Māori and Pacific Islanders, indicating that he spent 80% of his time on the weekends ‘trying to find suitable accommodation for Māori and Polynesian families, or trying to renegotiate

34 Harris, p.24; Walker, *Ka Whawhai Tonu Mātou*, pp.139, 207.
their rents’. Rata worried about the increasing numbers of Māori and Pacific Islanders migrating to urban centres: he warned that the new state housing areas being built for them in the inner cities and outlying suburbs were a form of segregation or ‘colour bar’ that would lead to racial tension and increased social problems.

Rata constantly complained about land lords overcrowding rental properties, charging exorbitant rents, and renting out substandard housing including sheds to Māori and Pacific Island tenants, which lead to poor health, the spread of infectious diseases, racial tension and increased anti-social behaviour. He supported reforms of the real-estate industry to ensure equal access to properties regardless of race, and the introduction of stiff fines of up to $500 for real-estate agents and landlords found to be discriminating against potential customers. Rata also campaigned for increased state housing in rural areas as a means of stemming the flow of Māori families to the cities, and deplored the fact that the Town and Country Planning Act prevented Māori from building on tribal lands and marae plots.

Education may not have been a priority for Rata himself, but he regarded it as essential to the futures of young Māori and Pacific Islanders. Rata concerned himself with every level of schooling from preschool to university. As a former labourer he tended to favour trade training over higher education in the nation’s universities, but he appreciated the need for ‘a greater spread of occupational opportunity’. He constantly pestered the government to increase training schemes across a range of trades, and encouraged the government to make courses available to men and women in urban and rural areas. He also had much to say about private Māori schools; Rata protested the government’s decision to integrate Māori schools into the Education Board, noting that Māori schools had consistently produced better students with higher grades who were more likely to go on to further studies at university.
Finally, Rata took much interest in what Māori were being taught. He felt the government was pursuing a policy of ‘deculturalisation rather than one of integration’ by not teaching Māori language and culture in schools, and that loss of culture was leading to an increase in crime, unemployment and ‘unruly elements’ amongst urbanised Māori and Pacific Islanders.49

In many ways Rata conformed to his role as a Rātana-Labour MP, yet he also challenged and confounded the stereotype of the typical Māori MP. If there was one feature of Rata’s early career that set him apart from his Rātana colleagues and predecessors, it was his interest in the politics of class. Rata was the first of the Rātana MPs to wholeheartedly employ the language of the Labour movements, and his socialist beliefs and interest in the rights of workers dominated his speeches during his first five years in parliament, often at the expense of Māori issues.

In line with his views on the treaty, Rata felt the inequalities Māori faced were the product of economics, not racial ideologies, and in turn believed that economic reforms were the best solution to these problems, as he explained in his maiden speech in 1963:

The truth is that only since the advent of the first Labour Government has the Māori been placed on a basis of equality. The improvement of economic conditions brought about by the Savage Labour Government was the greatest step in bringing about equality in New Zealand. Before the Labour Party came into power Māoris lived in remote country areas. They were economically inferior because of wage discrimination and lived almost at subsistence level. With the financial improvements gained by Māoris they at last see daylight and live as humans should.50

Rata spoke often and extensively on labour issues during these early years, campaigning on the need to support rural employment and industrial expansion to meet the needs of an expanding labour force, the rights of workers, the importance of industrial arbitration and conciliation, and the National Party’s failure ‘to maintain

50 NZPD, 1963, 335, p.129.
industrial harmony’ with the unions during its lengthy four terms in parliament from 1960 to 1973.\textsuperscript{51} He blamed increasing unemployment in the late 60s on the National Party’s ‘mismanagement of the economy’, worried that a lack of employment prospects for skilled workers meant that ‘New Zealand had become the greatest exporter of talent’, and described National’s 1972 budget as ‘the biggest fizz in New Zealand’s political history’ for its lack of provisions for workers.\textsuperscript{52}

Rata’s other great passion was, perhaps surprisingly, Pacific Island affairs. For every speech he delivered on Māori issues during his early years in parliament, he delivered three on the affairs of the Pacific. His interest was partly a product of circumstance: in 1968 the Departments of Māori Affairs and Island territories were combined to form the Department of Māori and Island Affairs.\textsuperscript{53} As shadow Minister of Māori and Island Affairs, it was Rata’s job to take an interest in the Pacific and to deal with legislation relating to the region in committee. Rata’s interest in the Pacific was not just a product of circumstances: his compassion for the region indicated a deep affinity with Pacific peoples, far deeper than any other Māori MP had ever displayed. His interest may have been stirred when he travelled the trade routes of the Pacific as a merchant seaman in the 1950s.\textsuperscript{54} Rata repeatedly addressed parliament on a wide range of Pacific issues, discussing the rights and interests of Cook Islanders, Niueans and Tokelauans at home and abroad, the needs of Western Samoa, the strengths of Hawaii’s radio stations, and the exploitation of Nauru’s phosphate deposits by western nations.\textsuperscript{55} Rata was particularly concerned about French nuclear testing in the Pacific, which he claimed in 1972 to be ‘the most crucial issue facing New Zealand and Polynesia at this time’.\textsuperscript{56} He described with obvious horror the thyroid disorders the young people of Bikini Atoll suffered as a result of nuclear fallout, stated in clear unambiguous terms that he would ‘support any move or action undertaken voluntarily and lawfully if it leads to the cessation of nuclear testing in the region’, and suggested sending a taskforce of Pacific nations to Paris to protest France’s actions.\textsuperscript{57}

\textsuperscript{54} Hazlehurst, p.43; ‘Matiu Rata: defector with a mission’.
\textsuperscript{56} NZPD, 1972, 379, p.852.
\textsuperscript{57} NZPD, 1972, 378, pp.102-103, 187.
Rata was equally as passionate about South African apartheid and New Zealand’s sporting ties with the nation. He first took interest in the issue as leader of the Rātana Youth Movement in the 1950s, and during the 1960s and 70s he was one of the few MPs the anti-apartheid movement could call on to voice their dissent in Parliament.\(^{58}\) Rata even threatened to resign over the issue, offering his resignation to Kirk in 1969 in a bid to bring the issue of the 1970 Springbok tour to a head and gauge public opinion in his Northern electorate: ‘I was strongly against the tour. I got nowhere publicly, so I told Kirk that the matter could be brought to a head by a by-election. Kirk said no.’\(^{59}\)

Rata regarded South African apartheid as ‘by far the sharpest and most acute racial problem that the world has to face’.\(^{60}\) He urged the government to take a lead internationally on the issue, arguing that New Zealand’s relatively enlightened views on race relations at home should be applied overseas, while warning that inaction could tarnish the nation’s international reputation: ‘Issues such as immigration and the acceptance of racial restrictions in South Africa could well become the means by which the genuineness of our racial tolerance is judged’.\(^{61}\) He advised that a withdrawal of diplomatic relations, a sporting ban, denial of visas to South African teams, an embargo on the trade of arms with South Africa, and a healthy critique of any political propaganda from South Africa were all solid steps towards showing the nation’s disapproval.\(^{62}\)

Rata was not your typical Māori MP. The issues he campaigned on during his early years in opposition varied greatly from those of his colleagues and predecessors, and he spoke far more often on non-Māori. Rata’s own comments on his dedication to his electorate, his intimate knowledge of and constant referral to the concerns of his constituents in parliament, and the fact that he was re-elected five times unchallenged, all indicate that Northern Māori were satisfied with his performance as an MP. Rata

\(^{58}\) Newman, p.414.
\(^{59}\) ‘Matiu Rata: defector with a mission’.
\(^{60}\) NZPD, 1965, 342, p.700.
did not neglect their needs, but in parliament he spoke more frequently, and often more passionately, on these wider issues.

If Rata’s eyes were turned to the world at large, events closer to home would bring his vision back into focus: the rise of Māori militancy in the form of radical activists and Māori and Pacific Island gangs in New Zealand’s urban centres in the late 1960s and early 1970s was to have a significant impact upon his career. In his maiden speech in Parliament, Rata voiced his concern for the fate of young urbanised Māori, stating that many were ‘not prepared’, ‘unaccustomed’ and ‘not trained’ to their new conditions.63 Two years later he raised alarm bells that a third of Māoridom had urbanised, and wondered how society would cope when two thirds had done the same.64 He warned his colleagues that ‘As more and more move into urban areas, there will be a need to face up to racial issues at an immediate and personal level’.65

By 1968 Rata’s warnings were becoming realities: he cited cases of unofficial unemployment figures collected by Māori welfare officers as high as 80% to 95% in Māori and Pacific Island communities, and feared that rising unemployment coupled with lower skills and qualifications would lead to ‘class attitudes’ and a ‘separation of the races’.66 Rata believed New Zealand had experienced ‘uniquely harmonious race relations’ due to full employment and welfare measures, which he believed had bought ‘dramatic improvements in Māori housing, health, education and incomes’.67 Rising unemployment threatened this relationship, and he was fearful that ‘a minority group could become suspicious and unco-operative’ and express their resentment through violence or dissent.68 Rata was well aware of the rise of radicalism and youth protest movements at home and abroad and called on the government to allow young people a say in the direction of policy:

Young people today are reacting, in some instances violently, in some parts of the world, and we realise they do not like what they are to inherit from their

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63 NZPD, 1963, 335, p.129.
64 NZPD, 1965, 342, p.698.
forebears. In these circumstances this House and this country have much to do for our young people.\textsuperscript{69}

By 1970 Rata’s predictions had come to pass: a new breed of radical and articulate young Māori who had grown up in urban environments and were university educated began to emerge from the urban centres.\textsuperscript{70} He placed the blame for the rise of Māori militants and urban gangs on the government, society, Māori leaders and parents, and he acted as an advocate for these groups, defending their positions and demanding more be done to alleviate the social conditions that had spawned what he regarded as anti-social and militant behaviour.\textsuperscript{71}

In 1970 he delivered a lengthy address in Parliament on ‘The rise in thuggery and plain delinquency among some young people, particularly in new housing areas’, mentioning the emergence of Māori and Pacific Island gangs including the Storm Troopers and Black Power.\textsuperscript{72} Rata viewed their members as ‘socially and racially deprived people’; he urged the government, society and parents to take greater responsibility for their youth by providing more public facilities and social activities in new housing areas.\textsuperscript{73} Rata indicated he had met with gang members, and reminded Parliament that ‘although their hair is longer than is normal and their dress is not all that is desirable or expected, it still has to be remembered that these young people are today’s children’.\textsuperscript{74} In a second address in 1970 Rata mentioned the emergence of ‘young militant Māori groups in the city of Auckland’, which to him demonstrated ‘a failure to give adequate leadership and care for the need and interests of young Māori’.\textsuperscript{75} In 1971 he pleaded society to see the positive work being done by Māori and Pacific Island youth, activists and the gangs, and urged the government to avoid the ‘unnecessary growth of militant protesting’ by calling a conference ‘of those interested in racialism’ to discuss the issues in the nation’s interest.\textsuperscript{76}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{69} NZPD, 1968, 356, pp.1499-1500.
\item \textsuperscript{71} NZPD, 1970, 366, pp.1697-1698.
\item \textsuperscript{72} NZPD, 1970, 366, pp.1697-1698.
\item \textsuperscript{73} NZPD, 1970, 366, pp.1697-1698.
\item \textsuperscript{74} NZPD, 1970, 366, pp.1697-1698.
\item \textsuperscript{75} NZPD, 1970, 368, pp.3068-3070.
\item \textsuperscript{76} NZPD, 1971, 372, pp.819-820; 1971, 374, p.3252.
\end{itemize}
Rata was critical of the government’s reactionary responses to Māori activists and suggested they take time to listen to their grievances: ‘I cannot believe these groups really want to destroy this nation. We should invite them to assist in rebuilding this country, and putting it back on the right road.’\textsuperscript{77} It is clear that by the early 1970s, Rata had grown into his role as a conservative voice of support in parliament for Māori radicals and the gangs. He had spent the early years of his career warning of the consequences of ignoring the rising social problems in new housing areas. When, as he had predicted, the gangs and radical groups did begin to emerge from the streets of Auckland and Wellington, he was quick to hear them out and plead their cases publically. The effects of their efforts were to turn Rata away from the wider issues that had dominated his parliamentary work, and back towards the concerns of his people. In the process they rejuvenated Rata’s career, transforming him from an open-minded socialist of the 1960s to the conservative voice for radicalism of the 1970s.

It is important to understand this transition as it helps to explain the decisions Rata would make later in his career. Rata had always displayed a radical streak, a wider vision of the world, and a passion for certain issues. He also believed strongly in the voice of youth: he had been a leader of the Rātana youth movement and regularly called on the voice of youth groups during his early years in Parliament.\textsuperscript{78} The combination of youth, radicalism, and an internationalist perspective displayed by Māori activists captured Rata’s attention, and although his relationship with the radicals was often turbulent he believed in what they had to say, and supported their right to say it. Māori activists were to be Rata’s ‘Dark Lady’, tormenting but none the less inspiring some of his greatest efforts as a parliamentarian. In understanding this transition we are able to explain the transformations Rata would make later in his career. The existing literature strains to explain how it was that Rata could be at loggerheads with the Māori land march in 1975, only to throw his lot in with the radicals just four years later.\textsuperscript{79} By understanding Rata’s early career, we see continuity is his actions and his politics.

\textsuperscript{77} NZPD, 1972, 378, p.189.
With Labour’s election win in 1972, Rata was primed for action. He had been a virulent critic of National’s policies; much was expected of him, and if he failed to implement the policies he had campaigned on he would have much to answer for to his many critics in opposition. Rata was duly appointed Minister of Lands and Minister of Māori and Pacific Island Affairs, the first Māori to be appointed to the role since Ngata’s short stint from 1928 to 1933. He introduced a raft of new policies reforming Māori land laws, elevating the status of the Treaty of Waitangi and Waitangi Day, addressing tribal grievances, bolstering Māori language and culture, and improving Māori housing and education. This short, sharp flurry of activity led by Rata from 1973 to 1975 represents one of the high points of Māori political engagement, and is worth investigating.

Rata was most active in regards to land legislation. In 1973 he announced Labour’s land policy to be ‘the retention of Māori land in the ownership and the proprietorship of the Māori in every instance’, and promised the government would do everything in its powers to stop land alienation, safeguard ‘the retention of remaining Māori land in the hands of Māori’ and ensure Māori would ‘have the opportunity of properly utilising their land’.80

In 1973 he passed the Māori Purposes Bill (No.1) that repealed sections of the Māori Affairs Amendment Bill 1967, extended the deadline for the payment of estate duties and reached a limited settlement of $20,000 per annum with the Ngāi Tahu Trust Board to settle their historical land claims.81 That same year the Māori Purposes Bill (No.2) repealed further sections of the 1967 Act, increased Māori control of their lands, reduced government control, and removed some of the compulsory clauses of the Act which had been the focus of Māori protest.82 The bill also provided for the return of lands gifted by Māori to the Crown which were not being used for their intended purpose, guaranteed Ngāi Tahu access to the Mutton Birding islands, and made provisions for Māori housing.83

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The Māori Affairs Amendment Bill introduced in 1973 and passed in 1974 was even more extensive. It repealed the most distasteful sections of the 1967 Act, allowed Māori landowners to restore the status of their lands under Māori title, and removed the compulsory acquisition of uneconomic interests in Māori lands. The Act provided for far more besides: it separated the Department of Māori Affairs from Pacific Island Affairs, changed the official definition of what constituted a ‘Māori’ from blood quantum to descent from a Māori ancestor, provided for trade training, improved Māori representation on the Board of Māori Affairs, established Māori land advisory committees, introduced measures to deal with the succession of land and prevent land alienation, and gave official recognition to the Māori language. Rata hoped the Act would repair ‘the invasion of the rights of the Māori people brought about by that legislation of 1967’. He believed the act would go ‘a long way towards meeting the wishes and ambitions of the Māori people’ and would encourage them ‘to utilise their land to best advantage’ and offer them ‘a greater and more personal role in their own affairs’.

The Treaty of Waitangi Bill introduced in 1974 and passed in 1975 was to be Rata’s most ambitious piece of legislation. The Act established the Waitangi Tribunal, enabling tribes to lodge claims over any act or omission of the government that contravened the principles of the Treaty of Waitangi. Initially the tribunal was only empowered to hear modern day claims: Rata had reservations over the fact that the tribunal would not have retrospective powers but saw the Act as ‘a move forward’ and expected the need for retrospective powers ‘could be examined at a future time’. During the second reading of the bill, Rata described it as a landmark victory for Māori:

The Bill is a major document of social and political progress, and I foresee that its enactment will do much to settle the deeply felt and long-standing grievances of the Māori people over the treaty, which they regard as the very foundation of their rights.

84 NZPD, 1974, 391, p.2688.
85 NZPD, 1974, 394, pp.4775-4781.
86 NZPD, 1974, 394, p.4775.
87 NZPD, 1974, 394, pp.4780-4781.
89 NZPD, 1975, 401, p.4343.
With regards to the treaty, Rata also passed the New Zealand Day Act 1973 which named the sixth of February ‘New Zealand Day’ and introduced a paid national holiday to celebrate the signing of the treaty. Rata hoped the legislation would ‘foster a sense of nationhood’ and ‘promote a greater awareness of the meaning of the Treaty of Waitangi as a symbol which embraces all New Zealand citizens and which should strengthen the contract of mutual respect and understanding.’\(^{90}\) Rata wanted to address the growing tensions around Waitangi Day and the demands of Māori activists. Instead his efforts drew immediate criticisms from Māori, particularly activist group Ngā Tamatoa, who deemed the naming of the holiday ‘New Zealand Day’ to be an affront to Māori and an effort to white wash the nation’s colonial past.\(^{91}\)

In response, Rata passed the Waitangi Day Amendment Bill 1975, which renamed the holiday ‘Waitangi Day’. However he remained unapologetic about his stance, stating the name had been ‘designed to foster a multicultural accord’.\(^{92}\)

Housing was another area where Rata was able to make significant ground. After years of complaining about National’s inaction over state housing Rata had no choice but to pursue a course of increased spending in this area. His results were impressive. In his maiden speech as Minister he announced that he had arranged meetings throughout the country with his constituents and other interested parties, and outlined his planned policies that had emerged from the discussions.\(^{93}\) He identified that housing required ‘immediate attention’, and promised that Labour would deal with the lack of housing in urban areas and its resultant social problems by moving 520 families into new homes under the Māori Housing Act that year and 600 more the next.\(^{94}\) He planned a revision of the Town and Country Planning Act that prevented Māori from building around marae or onto existing homes in rural areas, and indicated a need for pensioner homes in and around marae.\(^{95}\)

\(^{90}\) NZPD, 1974, 394, p.5726.
\(^{91}\) NZPD, 1974, 389, p.212.
\(^{92}\) NZPD, 1974, 389, p.213.
\(^{95}\) NZPD, 1973, 382, p.592.
By 1974 he was reporting back on the successes of Labour’s housing schemes, stating that by December 1973, 931 houses had been either purchased or were under construction, estimating that by March 1974 700 houses would be in the process of being made available, and celebrated the progress in building blocks of flats for elderly Māori in Ahipara, Ruātoki and Manutuke, as well as plans for further flats in Te Hāpua, Tokomaru Bay and Ōtaki. The government also reduced the size of the deposit required for rural housing loans, and increased loans for renovations from $2000 to $3000. In 1975 Rata celebrated record levels of spending on Māori and Pacific Island housing, announcing that 772 houses had been built and 351 purchased the previous year, making a considerable dent in the 2032 applications for state housing that had awaited the government in early 1973.

Rata also celebrated victories with regards to Māori culture and language. The Māori Affairs Amendment Act 1974 gave official recognition to the Māori language and provided government ministers the powers to ‘encourage the learning and the use of the Māori language’. Rata helped to introduce the teaching of Māori language in primary schools and the establishment of one year crash courses in Māori language at Teachers Training College to meet the short fall of Māori language teachers available in 1975. The Broadcasting Bill 1973 added to this by providing programming for Māori and Pacific Islanders in their own languages, particularly in Auckland. Rata further recognised marae as significant sites for the retention and protection of Māori language and culture, and regarded urban marae as essential to the livelihood of Māori communities in the cities. He boosted spending on urban marae from $75,000 in 1973 to $100,000 in 1975, and almost doubled subsidies for rural marae from $80,000 in 1973 to $150,000 in 1975.

In just three years Rata had helped to introduce a number of policy reforms, repealing the most offensive clauses of the Māori Affairs Amendment Act, reforming Māori land policies, elevating the status of the Treaty of Waitangi and Waitangi Day,

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97 NZPD, 1974, 391, pp.1894-1895.
99 NZPD, 1974, 391, p.2688.
100 NZPD, 1972, 381, p.3290; McDowell, pp.53-54.
102 NZPD, 1975, 402, p.3408.
increasing government spending on housing and education for Māori and Pacific Islanders, and providing for the protection and official recognition of Māori language and culture. The Waitangi Tribunal he was instrumental in establishing would have to wait another ten years before the fourth Labour government provided the legislative teeth it needed to be effective, but it would be his most lasting and significant contribution to the nation’s political history. Rata’s achievements during the single term of the third Labour government were impressive, marking his time as Minister of Māori Affairs as a high point of Māori political history. These victories were not his alone to celebrate: Labour’s support of policy reforms and the efforts of public servants to aid their Minister in the development, drafting and implementation of these policies were crucial to Rata’s success.

In comparison to his Rātana predecessors, Rata proved to be a highly effective Māori MP. He was able to wield power by holding positions of power and passing legislation in a manner matched only by Ngata and Carroll. He achieved a range of positive outcomes for Māori which compared to those of Sir James Carroll and Ngata and those of the first Labour government. Crucially, Rata was able to develop his own policies and guide them through the House, a feat pulled off by Ngata and Carroll but not the Rātana MPs of the earlier 20th century. Rata was accountable to his electorate and able to express Māori viewpoints, securing his re-election to the Northern seat over four successive elections, but his decision to leave Labour in 1979 would lose him the support of his electorate and the Northern seat.

Two questions remain to be answered here. Firstly, if Rata was so successful in his role as minister, why did his colleagues question his abilities, and why have historians underestimated his achievements? The answer lies partly in the lack of sufficient research: Rata’s career has been studied only as a small part of a wider theme or project, as seen in Walker’s general history Ka Whawhai Tonu Mātou, Cox’s study of pan-tribal unity, Aroha Harris’ research on Māori activism, and King’s biography of Whina Cooper. The one in-depth piece on Rata, Hazlehurst’s Political Expression and Ethnicity, establishes clearly that Rata was an exceptional MP, ‘the most influential Māori politician of his generation’.103 The closer study of his career undertaken here

103 Hazlehurst, p.49.
proves Hazlehurst’s point. The underestimation of Rata is also part of a wider historical trend: Pākehā politicians, historians and the media have consistently undervalued the contributions and questioned the abilities of the Māori MPs, and Rata was no exception. Ngā mātāmua were regarded as ‘old fashioned’ old timers who were unable to follow or contribute to debates without translators, the Rātana koata were ‘not of the calibre and quality to make unwarranted demands of a government, nor did they have sufficient political acumen to capitalise upon the “opportunity”’, and in turn Rata was regarded as ‘clumsy, inarticulate…not well read…repetitious…consistently inconsistent’. 104

If Rata was successful, what factors contributed to his achievements, and why was it that he was able to transcend some of the paradoxes of Māori representation that had frustrated his contemporaries? A brief comparison with the careers of the YMP members and the Rātana-Labour MPs help to answer this question. Part of Rata’s success can be attributed to the fact that he was a member of a Pākehā political party. Rata shared this trait in common with Carroll and Ngata who were members of the Liberal Party (later renamed the United Party), and it is no coincidence that the trio were the only Māori MPs to gain the coveted Māori Affairs portfolio. All three were loyal, outspoken party supporters; in turn all three gained the support of their party and party leaders, and were entrusted with ministerial positions.

Party leadership was equally as important here; when the leadership supported Māori ambitions, reforms were forthcoming, when the Labour Party’s leaders resisted Māori ambitions, reforms ground to a sudden halt. In the 1930s and 40s, Labour leaders Michael Joseph Savage, Peter Fraser and Harry Holland held a sentimentality for Māori and sympathy for their needs, resulting in the social reforms of the first Labour government. When Walter Nash replaced Fraser the reforms were cut short abruptly. Rata’s experiences were similar: under the party leadership of Kirk, Rata was empowered to make reforms to the management of Māori affairs and Māori lands. 105

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With Kirk’s death in 1974 and the appointment of Bill Rowling as party leader, reforms again stalled.

The other striking similarly between the careers of Ngata, the Rātana-Labour MPs and Rata was that all three saw relations sour with the government as they reached the limitations of Māori political representation. Ngata pushed the boundaries of his ministerial position by expanding the budget of the Native Affairs Department and playing a hands on role in the administration of his portfolio. Subsequently Ngata was embroiled in controversy surrounding his land development schemes and offered his resignation as Native Minister. The Rātana-Labour members also saw a decline in their relationship with Labour leaders: their efforts to gain the position of Minister of Māori Affairs and their suggestions regarding the continuation of the Māori War Effort Organisation were ignored, and positive policies for Māori slowed from 1945 onward, grinding to a halt in 1957. The Rātana movement considered breaking their alliance with Labour in 1947 and again in 1959, but chose to stay. Rata too had pushed the limits of his powers as Minister of Māori Affairs and Lands – subsequently his relationship with his Labour colleagues began to decline from 1975 onward. This was the glass ceiling of Māori political representation that every successful Māori MP had to confront.

Rata’s relationship with the Labour Party declined steadily in the wake of the 1978 election, but the seeds of dissension were sown several years earlier. In July 1973, just months into his term as minister Rata suffered from a heart condition and was forced to take leave from parliament for two months. His Labour colleague Arthur Faulkner assumed the Lands portfolio in his absence, and continued to take on the portfolio at different intervals in 1974. According to Rowling, one of Rata’s colleagues, presumably Faulkner, discovered ‘financial irresponsibility evidenced in his handling of his portfolios’, and found ‘Mat’s desk was piled high with unactioned files’. According to Kirk’s secretary, Kirk had misgivings over Rata’s performance, and was faced with the difficult decision of whether or not he should introduce a

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106 Hazlehurst, p.50; ‘Rebel MP Out On His Own’, NZH, 7 November 1979, in Walker, Mana Motuhake: Articles from local newspapers, p.3.
107 See for example NZPD, 1974, 390, p.1193.
108 Hazlehurst, p.51.
ministerial reshuffle and strip his old friend of his duties. Kirk was not forced to make the decision: he died in August of 1974 and was replaced by Rowling. Rowling regarded Rata as incompetent: following Labour’s defeat in the 1978 general election he reduced his status in the shadow ministry, then stripped him of his rank as shadow minister of Māori Affairs, chairman of the Māori Affairs Select Committee and spokesman on Māori affairs, taking the Māori Affairs shadow portfolio himself. Rata retained his position as a Labour frontbencher for the time being, but was limited by the fact that he was no longer spokesperson on Māori affairs. As one supporter commented ‘Mat was moved to the front benches but how could he be effective when he’s not the Māori spokesman?’

Behind the scenes Rowling ignored the growing tension. At the party’s annual conference in 1978 the Māori Policy Committee attempted to address the issue of appointing a Māori Affairs spokesperson. Rowling rejected the request and later wrote to the Māori representatives informing that he wished each of them to be spokespersons for their own area. At the Labour Party conference the following year the Māori Policy Committee served Rowling with an ultimatum to appoint a spokesperson. Rowling attended the conference and spoke briefly, but left before Rata was able to deliver the Māori Policy Committee’s report. When Rata attempted to have sections of the report submitted as a policy to a Commission on the Māori Land Court Rowling vetoed the submission, asking that it be presented as Rata’s private opinion, not the opinion of the committee. According to Rata, Rowling had also planned to rename the Māori Affairs Committee the ‘ethnic relations committee’, undermining the status of Māori as tangata whenua. Rata took serious offence at the suggestion and indicated it was a prominent reason for his

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109 Hazlehurst, p.49.
110 Hazlehurst, p.49.
111 Hazlehurst, p.51.
112 ‘Rowling ‘last straw’ in Rata’s move’, Star, 10 August 1979, in Walker, Mana Motuhake: Articles from local newspapers.
113 ‘Rowling ‘last straw’ in Rata’s move’.
114 ‘Rowling ‘last straw’ in Rata’s move’.
115 ‘Rowling ‘last straw’ in Rata’s move’.
116 ‘Rowling ‘last straw’ in Rata’s move’.
118 ‘Matiu Rata: defector with a mission’.
decision to leave Labour. The final straw came in November 1979, when as part of a party reshuffle Rata was demoted from the front benches and David Lange replaced Tizard as Labour’s deputy leader.

Rata’s efforts in parliament reflected this turmoil. With the resumption of parliament in 1976 Rata was on the offensive, firing barbed criticisms at the government over its stance on apartheid sport, its decision to allow nuclear armed American naval vessels to visit New Zealand, the continuation of the controversial ‘dawn raids’ policy, and its attitude to women’s rights. Rata was also angered that National had placed Māori Affairs on the back burner, reduced the department’s budget, failed to implement new schemes he had introduced during the previous term, and ignored the pleas of activists and the community.

Rata’s speeches and demeanour changed dramatically in other ways too. The most striking change was that he began to do away with the discourse of the labour movement and the socialist rhetoric of equality and unity that he had employed for so many years. Instead his speeches resounded with the type of passionate and ornate language that had echoed in the speeches of his predecessors like Tame Parata, Ngata, Hone Heke Ngapua, Tirikatene and Iriaka Rātana. In short, Rata began to speak with the voice of a Māori parliamentarian. Rata delivered the most powerful example of this in the wake of the forced eviction of occupiers from Bastion Point by the police and army in May 1978. A sense of history and historical significance permeated his speech, as did his disgust for the government’s actions, as seen in the first lines:

I turn now to Bastion Point. The date 25 May 1978 will be remembered as one of the most shameful days in our country’s history. I hope we will all examine now the losses as opposed to the gains made as a result of the action taken.

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119 ‘Matiu Rata: defector with a mission’.
Rata noted this was the third time the National Government had evicted Ngāti Whātua from their lands, and compared the event to the invasion of Parihaka in 1881: ‘The last time the heart of the country bled from internal conflict was in 1881…On that occasion force was used, and, as a result, the nation gained a shameful reputation.’

Rata’s speech echoed those of Ngā mātāmua nearly a century earlier, calling on the lengthy history of state abuse and Māori grievance. He continued with rhetorical questions and historical recriminations, making use of the worn cliché of ‘harmonious race relations’ to appeal to his predominantly Pākehā audience:

When will the Government learn from the mistakes of the past?...In one short period of 3 hours the Government has prejudiced 130 years of progress in the harmonious relationships of our peoples. What price New Zealand’s racial harmony now? What price the understanding we have had in the past of the patient tolerance of the Māori? All for 69 acres!

From mid-1978 onwards Rata’s speeches declined markedly in number, due in part to his demotion within the Labour Party. When he did speak, it was with a sense of foreboding and premonition, as he warned of what was to come if the government continued to ignore the plight of Māori, the increasingly more militant edge of Māori radicalism and the worrying activities of Māori gangs. For example in June of 1978 he painted a bleak outlook of the state of Māori youth in society, pointing to poor performance in education, the low wages and limited industries opened to Māori youth in the economy, and inadequate access to housing and health Māori continued to experience. In a later speech he expressed his fears that social circumstances were leading to increased antisocial behaviour amongst Māori and Pacific Island youth, advising his colleagues that ‘Unless those elements are checked they will be aggravated. Many people have said that the situation could become explosive in future’.

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127 NZPD, 1979, 423, p.1500.
By the first week of November 1979 it had become too much for him to bear. On the second, a Thursday, Labour announced that Lange would be replacing Tizard as deputy leader, and Rata was demoted from the front benches.128 Rata later indicated that he had made the decision to resign the following day.129 On the afternoon of the Sunday he announced his resignation to his colleagues of the Northern electorate committee, though the meeting did not have full attendance due to petrol rationing.130 On Monday morning he informed the general secretary of his decision and handed in his resignation that afternoon.131 By Tuesday (the seventh) the newspapers were filled with news of his resignation and he returned to parliament accompanied by applause from the opposition.132 Between Wednesday the eighth and the following Sunday he held a series of five hui in the northern centres of Auckland, Whangārei, Matawaia, Kaikohe, and Kaitaia to explain his resignation to the electorate.133

Rata delivered his final speech in parliament on the sixth of December, explaining that after being a member of the Labour Party for more than 28 years, of which 16 had been spent in parliament, he had decided to leave the Labour Party to address the more pressing needs of his people:

I have, as a result of a personal decision, set aside my personal ideological convictions for what I regard as the most important need, which is to reassert and re-establish the rights of the Māori and of those I represent in Parliament.134

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128 ‘Rowling ‘last straw’ in Rata’s move’.
129 ‘Rowling ‘last straw’ in Rata’s move’.
130 ‘Rowling ‘last straw’ in Rata’s move’; ‘Doubt Over Who Quit Party In Support of Mr Rata’, NZH, 9 November 1979, in Walker, Mana Motuhake: Articles from local newspapers, p.5.
131 ‘Door Still Ajar For Mr Rata’, NZH, 7 November 1979, in Walker, Mana Motuhake: Articles from local newspapers, p.4.
132 See for example ‘Resigning En Bloc’, NZH, 7 November 1979, in Walker, Mana Motuhake: Articles from local newspapers, p.3; ‘Mr Rata Makes a Gesture; NZH, 7 November 1979, in Walker, Mana Motuhake: Articles from local newspapers, p.3; ‘Rebel MP Out On His Own’; ‘Mr Rata quits’, The Star, 7 November 1979, in Walker, Mana Motuhake: Articles from local newspapers, p.3; ‘Govt Claps Mr Rata’, NZH, 7 November 1979, in Walker, Mana Motuhake: Articles from local newspapers, p.3; ‘Parliamentary Parallels’, NZH, 7 November 1979, in Walker, Mana Motuhake: Articles from local newspapers, p.3; ‘Electorate Tour Arranged’, NZH, 7 November 1979, in Walker, Mana Motuhake: Articles from local newspapers, p.3.
133 ‘Electorate Tour Arranged’.
134 NZPD, 1979, 427, p.4569.
Revisiting the theme that had dominated many of his speeches over the previous 12 months, Rata predicted hard times to follow as social issues and racial tension came to a head:

No one knows better than members of Parliament that over the last few years New Zealand has been sitting on a potential time bomb, and the position has become more precarious each year…The issues of the future will be social ones, and the place of the Māori in New Zealand society will figure very highly.\textsuperscript{135}

The time had come for a degree of Māori independence. Without it, Rata warned, race relations would sour even further:

The Māori looks forward to the day when he can be self-sufficient, meet his own needs, and make his own decisions as a member of the New Zealand community. Unless he believes that he will be able to do that in the reasonably near future, I venture to suggest that the times ahead will be even more difficult than they have been.\textsuperscript{136}

He ended by telling his colleagues that the days of peaceful race relations were over: ‘Once upon a time New Zealand could boast of racial harmony that had a world-wide reputation. I think we will have to earn that reputation again, and earn it with a great deal more vigour and commitment.’\textsuperscript{137}

The speech had an air of dignity, but was perhaps poorly timed and delivered mixed messages: Rata had not yet decided on his future plans and did not as yet have the full support of his electorate, so the speech was speculative, lacked a clear direction, and was full of vague warnings and threats. The speech was not a fitting ending for such a lengthy and significant career, but it was symbolic of the abruptness of his decision to resign and the outcomes of his decision that would unfold in the following years.

Rata’s resignation was the ultimate expression of frustration with the status quo: under the reactionary and conservative leadership of Prime Minister Robert Muldoon

\textsuperscript{135} NZPD, 1979, 427, p.4569.
\textsuperscript{136} NZPD, 1979, 427, p.4569.
\textsuperscript{137} NZPD, 1979, 427, p.4571.
the National government refused to address the social problems working class Māori faced, and ignored the cries of Māori activists. Labour was little better: fearing a Pākehā backlash against the increasingly militant activities of Māori activists Rowling followed suit, placing Māori issues on the backburner and relegating Rata to the back benches. Rata’s response was also about mana: by the late 1970s Rata was a rangatira in his own right, both within his electorate and at a national level. Though he never made the point publically, his demotion was a tramping on his mana, and his response, resigning abruptly and returning to the marae of the North, was apt. Rata had reached the limits of Māori political representation; unlike Ngata or the Rātana-Labour MPs before him, he was unwilling to accept these setbacks and toe the party line in the hope of future gains once his party regained government. Rather than follow in the footsteps of others, Rata chose to chart his own path back into the past, to call upon the separatist movements of the nineteenth century. The vehicle he would use to travel this journey was to be Mana Motuhake.

The day after announcing his resignation Rata embarked on a tour of the Northern electorate to explain his actions to his constituents, soliciting support from voters and Labour electorate committees, and gathering monetary koha for his cause. According to one report he spoke on average three times a day to groups of between 50 and 300 people. By the time a week had passed four branches of the Labour Party had defected and five Mana Motuhake branches had been formed in Te Kao, Mangonui, Kaipara, Whangārei and Hokianga; 200 Labour members had resigned, Rata had raised $1500, and he had received expressions of support from groups and organisations throughout the North.

The call to form an independent Māori political party came almost instantly: at the first hui at Te Unga Waka Marae in Auckland on 7 November young Māori activists in attendance urged Rata to front a new ‘Mana motuhake Māori movement’ and launch the party that evening. Older leaders including Pat Hōhepa advised against

139 ‘Left in Tatters’.
140 ‘Left in Tatters’; Hazlehurst, pp.71, 228.
141 ‘Rata calls Māoris to take control of own destinies’, Star, 11 November 1979, in Walker, Mana Motuhake: Articles from local newspapers, p.2.
the move, suggesting the activists ‘sleep on it first’ and allow the process of discussion and consultation with the rest of the electorate to take place before making such a decision. The formation of a new party was clearly on Rata’s mind. He announced to the meeting that Māori should ‘Strive for the right, the absolute right, to be in command of their own destiny’, a sentiment that was met with enraptured applause, and advised that the movement he intended to build would be ‘more than a political party’ in its scope and objectives.

Events escalated quickly. On 26 March 1980 Rata confirmed that he would be resigning from his seat on the 29th of April, giving the movement just two and a half months to prepare for a looming by-election. The movement kicked into action between April and May 1980, forming a series of sub-committees, producing a logo, letterheads, envelopes, pamphlets and publicity materials, drafting a series of policies, and formalising the party’s structure and administration. The night before his official resignation Rata drove with supporters from Auckland to Wellington. The speaker J.R. Harrison had indicated that he did not wish Rata to use his office to launch his campaign, so supporters and the media waited outside in the corridor. As he emerged his supporters broke into a haka and placed a korowai on his shoulders, and Rata announced to the awaiting media ‘I shall return’.

On Rata’s resignation from his seat in late April Labour began the process of identifying a candidate to challenge the incumbent member: the ensuing candidate selection process and electoral campaign were to be a rich and lively affair, embracing the symbolism of marae politics and the heated debate and verbal jousting of the paepae. Labour’s candidate selection hui was held at Te Kotahitanga Marae in Kaikohe on 3 May and was presided over by elder, Anglican priest and tohunga Māori Marsden, and the Labour Party announced their decision a week later at Tātai.

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142 ‘Rata calls Māoris to take control of own destinies’; Hazlehurst, p.62.
143 ‘Rata calls Māoris to take control of own destinies’.
144 Hazlehurst, p.72.
145 Hazlehurst, pp.72-73. p.76.
146 Hazlehurst, p.81.
Hono Marae at the Holy Sepulchre Church in Auckland.\textsuperscript{149} Just as Rata’s supporters had placed a cloak around him as he announced his resignation, Marsden indicated he would place a sacred cloak of Ngāpuhi over the winner.\textsuperscript{150} The candidates entertained their audience with whaikōrero, waiata and whakapapa recitation. The successful candidate Dr Bruce Gregory, a medical practitioner who was born in Taipa and had worked in Kaitaia for the last 13 years, surprised the audience by claiming a whakapapa link with Labour leader Rowling, and had impressed them by playing an albatross bone flute.\textsuperscript{151}

The electoral campaign was equally as colourful as a war of words was waged between the two parties. During his tour of Northland Rowling had been quoted as saying of Rata ‘When a branch breaks from a tree it will wither and die’, while a freezing worker and Labour supporter from Moerewa had advised Labour that ‘If the jockey falls off the horse during a race you don’t shoot the horse. You get a new jockey.’\textsuperscript{152} At the launch of Rata’s own campaign at Te Unga Waka on 7 May Rata announced to the audience ‘I want it known that the Rata vine has also been known to strangle healthy trees’ to much mirth, and advised Labour supporters ‘I did not shoot the horse. I got off with grace and dignity. You never put an apprentice on a fast gee-gee – you put an expert jockey.’\textsuperscript{153} Later that month Koro Witehira, an elder and leader of Ngāpuhi placed a ‘cloak of belief’ over Rata at a public meeting on behalf of Ngāpuhi supporters from the north: the battle had evidently turned into a cloak and dagger affair.\textsuperscript{154}

The northern by-election was set for 7 June 1980. Rata’s achievements in the seven months between his resignation from Labour and the by-election were impressive. He had built up a political movement from nothing which by June claimed 2,300 members, between 15 and 17 branches, had raised thousands of dollars in koha, and

\textsuperscript{149} ‘How they chose Labour’s ‘jockey’’, source unknown, in Walker, \textit{Mana Motuhake: Articles from local newspapers}, p.21.
\textsuperscript{150} ‘How they chose Labour’s ‘jockey’’.
\textsuperscript{152} ‘Rata Vine Set To Strangle Limbless Labour Tree’, NZH, 8 May 1980, in Walker, \textit{Mana Motuhake: Articles from local newspapers}, p.23; ‘How they chose Labour’s ‘jockey’’.
\textsuperscript{153} ‘Rata Vine Set To Strangle Limbless Labour Tree’.
\textsuperscript{154} ‘Elders Give Mr Rata Kiwi ‘Cloak of Belief’’, NZH, 14 May 1980, in Walker, \textit{Mana Motuhake: Articles from local newspapers}, p.23.
had made significant headway in formalising the structure of the party and drafting policies, a manifesto and a constitution.\textsuperscript{155} On the day of the by-election the movement mobilised some 400 Māori scrutineers, a feat the Labour Party was unable to match.\textsuperscript{156} At the polling booth scrutineers wore black and gold ribbons, which Rata claimed represented ‘the darkness of times past and the golden years to come’.\textsuperscript{157} In spite of the movement’s efforts, the golden years would not arrive in 1980. Rata gained 37.90\% of the vote, just under 15\% behind Gregory, who had gained 52.41\%.\textsuperscript{158} The Social Credit candidate ran a distant third with 8.52\% of the vote, and National had refused to run a candidate.\textsuperscript{159} The real winner on the day was voter apathy: just 6,831 votes were cast excluding special votes, out of a total roll of 16,509.\textsuperscript{160}

Rather than be put off by the result the movement stepped up its efforts. Between August and October Ranginui Walker drew up a draft constitution, which he circulated to branches, though the constitution was only published following the 1981 election.\textsuperscript{161} The party held its first National annual conference in late November, attended by nearly 300 delegates.\textsuperscript{162} The conference formalised the structure of the party, organising a series of councils including an Elder’s council, Women’s council, Youth council and an Industrial Relations council.\textsuperscript{163} Rata was elected Party President, and community leaders and the educated elite held key positions in the party’s executive.\textsuperscript{164} Support for Mana Motuhake grew dramatically in the lead up to the general election. In January of 1981 the party claimed a membership of 7,000 members including children, and had established 59 branches across the country.\textsuperscript{165} In February this had grown to 8,000 members and 66 branches, and by June 10,000

\textsuperscript{155} Walker, ‘Mana Motuhake, Its Origins and Future’, p.4; Hazlehurst, p.94.
\textsuperscript{156} Walker, \textit{Ka Whawhai Tonu Mātou}, p.228.
\textsuperscript{158} ‘Mana Motuhake Happy – What Now?’
\textsuperscript{159} ‘Mana Motuhake Happy – What Now?’; Hazlehurst, p.148.
\textsuperscript{160} ‘Mana Motuhake Happy – What Now?’
\textsuperscript{161} Hazlehurst, p.130.
\textsuperscript{162} Hazlehurst, p.103.
\textsuperscript{163} Hazlehurst, p.104.
\textsuperscript{164} Hazlehurst, p.104.
\textsuperscript{165} Hazlehurst, p.107.
members and 70 branches had joined. In just under a year the party had more than quadrupled its membership and branch numbers.

The movement also made good on Rata’s promise that Mana Motuhake would expand its activities beyond parliamentary politics. With Queen Elizabeth’s scheduled visit to New Zealand in October 1981, Mana Motuhake planned to present a petition to her in person to recognise Māori treaty rights. A Waitangi policy hui was held at Waitangi Marae in late March 1981, at which a petition was drafted calling on the Queen to ratify the treaty, grant a full pardon of all Māori ancestors involved in the New Zealand Wars and labelled as ‘rebels’, and the appointment of a Māori as the next Governor General. The petition was drawn up by Walker on the Treaty grounds near the upper marae at Waitangi, and supporters began to sign immediately. By 30 September Mana Motuhake had collected some 7,000 signatures for the petition, but Prime Minister Muldoon denied the movement an audience with the Queen, claiming that ‘It is not customary for a small political group, without elected representation, to claim the right to speak on behalf of the Māori people.’

Mana Motuhake also expanded their campaign beyond the northern seat. Between May and June of 1981 candidates were selected for the other Māori seats: Eastern Māori was to be contested by Albie Tahana, Southern Māori was to be contested by New Amsterdam (better known as Amster) Reedy, and Eva Rickard, the fiery grandmother and activist who had led the campaign for the return of Raglan Golf Course to Tainui a Whiro, was to contest the Western seat.

The movement’s efforts were rewarded with a groundswell of support in the lead up to the 1981 election. By October they had gained 15,000 members, founded 92 branches, formed four electorate councils to contest the four Māori seats, and had

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166 Hazlehurst, p.120.
168 Hazlehurst, p.126.
170 Hazlehurst, p.131.
secured 7,000 signatures for their petition. ¹⁷² Not all had gone to plan though. Rata had spent too much time launching the party and campaigning in the other three seats. As the face of the movement, Rata’s presence was requested throughout the country as membership grew and new branches opened. Unfortunately he was jeopardizing his own chances of being re-elected, and was furthermore jeopardizing the party’s chances of winning any seats as their strongest candidate. ¹⁷³

Mana Motuhake’s results at the polls in 1981 were disappointing: Rata slipped from 37.90% of the vote to 22.96%, while the party secured only 15.43% of the vote in Eastern Māori, 11.66% in Southern Māori and 12.12% in Western Māori. ¹⁷⁴

In the 1984 general election Mana Motuhake ran eight candidates, four in the Māori seats and four in general seats with high Māori populations in Otara, West Auckland, Porirua and Whangārei. ¹⁷⁵ Their margins slipped even further, with Rata gaining 18.46% of the vote, the eastern candidate Bertram Kairo Te Makarini McLean gaining 3.94% of the vote, the Southern candidate Reedy gaining 8.61% and the western candidate Rickard slipping to 7.27% of the vote. ¹⁷⁶

By 1987 Rata was indicating that he would step aside as the Northern candidate after losing a third general election, but hoped that the ‘Electoral damage inflicted by his party on Labour would see the Government look harder at Mana Motuhake ideas and adopt some of them’. ¹⁷⁷ Once again Rata’s observations proved prescient. In 1985 the fourth Labour government granted the Waitangi Tribunal retrospective powers and increased its funding, support staff and membership. Labour also appointed Sir Paul Reeves as the first Māori Governor General, fulfilling the movement’s wish drawn up in their petition to the Queen.

¹⁷² Hazlehurst, p.141.
¹⁷³ Hazlehurst, p.162.
¹⁷⁶ ‘Māori MPs Establish Records for Margins’, Hazlehurst, p.149.
Future governments would further implement the policies developed by Mana Motuhake in the early 1980s. Their demand for ‘mandatory inclusion of Māori representatives on all statutory and advisory bodies to government to ensure incorporation of Māori values in their policies’ continues to be implemented and debated, most recently with a Royal Commission’s recommendation that Māori seats be included in the planned Auckland ‘Super-city’ Council. Their ‘deliberate policy of the reinstatement of all Māori placenames’ has been adapted by the Waitangi Tribunal and the New Zealand Geographic Board, and has continued to play out in the twenty first century with recent debates over the adding of a silent ‘h’ to the name ‘Wanganui’. Their policy to ‘promote recruitment and quota systems for Māori personnel in all state departments, training for all personnel in Māoritanga, and Māori policies for all government services’ has been implemented voluntarily by some government departments and a number of non-government businesses and organisations. Their emphasis of ‘Equal weighting to criterion of knowledge of Māori language and culture alongside academic criterion’ for state employees has also been adapted to a degree by government and non-government organisations.

After five failed attempts to gain seats in parliament, victory of a sort came to Mana Motuhake in the 1993 general election. In 1990 the movement joined discussions over the forming of a broad coalition of left wing minor parties including the Democratic Party (formerly Social Credit), Jim Anderson’s New Labour formed in 1989, and the newly established Green Party. Mana Motuhake agreed to join the party in December 1990 and the Alliance was launched in 1991. Sandra Lee-Vercoe gained the first Mana Motuhake seat in parliament, winning the Auckland Central seat in 1993; Alamein Kōpū won a list seat in the first MMP election in 1996, but soon left to

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180 ‘Remits Passed at Mana Motuhake Policy Hui, Tirahou Marae, March 29-30, 1980’.

181 ‘Remits Passed at Mana Motuhake Policy Hui, Tirahou Marae, March 29-30, 1980’.

182 Hazlehurst, p.136.

183 ‘Mr Rata May Step Aside’.
form her own Mana Wāhine Te Ira Tangata Party, and Willie Jackson won a list seat in parliament in 1999.184

So why did Rata’s attempt to launch a separatist Māori political party fail? There were many contributing factors; Rata failed to consult his elders before resigning, a move considered disrespectful by many in the North.185 Rata also failed to clarify his reasons for resigning; he cited Labour’s ‘insensitivity to the Māori people generally’, and repeated the same kind of dramatic but vague claims he had made in parliament in the months before his resignation.186 The media picked up on this confusion immediately; an article published the day after his resignation in the Herald appreciated that Rata was making a gesture of defiance but noted ‘The public will find it easier to appreciate his chagrin at being relegated from the Opposition front bench than to understand his complaints about Labour indifference to Māoridom’.187

As noted earlier, Rata failed to delegate responsibility, and expended his efforts launching the party and campaigning in the other electorates at the expense of his own electorate, where the party had its greatest chance of winning.188

The party itself had failed to produce a party manifesto, a constitution or a set of policies to clarify to potential voters the meaning of the movement, had not formulated strategies to combat voter apathy or loyalty to Labour, and had yet to establish a clear and workable party infrastructure. The party had worked tirelessly to produce a set of policies, but they were so wide ranging and all-encompassing that they could not be boiled down to a simple set of points to be presented to voters and used on the campaign trail. Voter apathy was equally to blame: neither loyalty to Labour nor support of Rata’s stand was enough to overcome more than a century of Māori mistrust of the government.

186 ‘Mr Rata quits’; ‘Door Still Ajar For Mr Rata’.
187 ‘Mr Rata Makes a Gesture’.
188 Hazlehurst, p.162.
Perhaps the greatest factor in Rata’s loss was the failure of separatist politics to win support from Māori voters. Many sympathised with Rata’s concerns and admired his stand but their loyalty to Labour, built up over 45 years, not to mention the entrenchment of the two party system as the unwavering foundation of New Zealand politics, proved too much to overcome. Walker admired their efforts but summarised ‘it was not enough to beat the Labour Party machine and the entrenched two-party system of New Zealand.’\textsuperscript{189} As one voter described ‘The people sympathize with him, and love him, but they will probably not vote for him because they are so Labour-minded.’\textsuperscript{190} In Hazlehurst’s estimation ‘As an organising and recruiting principle, the concept of ‘Māoriness’ prove too weak to compete with other contemporary Māori allegiances or to overcome entrenched political indifference.’\textsuperscript{191}

Māori may not have been ready for political independence at this time, but Rata’s actions would inspire future political movements. In 1975 Rata and his Labour colleagues had begun the process of electoral reform: an Electoral Act Committee report had recommended an increase in the Māori seats, and Labour’s election manifesto promised that it would ‘at all times consult the Māori people on all matters affecting their right to parliamentary representation.’\textsuperscript{192} The resulting Electoral Amendment Bill had promised ‘to bestow upon the Māori people the right to be represented in this House on the basis of total population’, but the bill was quickly repealed by the incoming National government in 1976, much to Rata’s disappointment.\textsuperscript{193} The process had begun, and in 1985 the Labour government revisited plans to reform the electoral system for Māori voters and the general public by establishing a Royal Commission on the Electoral system. The Royal Commission reported back in 1986: it recommended the abolition of separate Māori representation but supported the introduction of the Mixed Member Proportion system to increase Māori numbers in parliament and allow minor parties like Mana Motuhake to gain seats.\textsuperscript{194} The Māori Council acted on the recommendations by leading a deputation to Prime Minister Jim Bolger, asking that the Māori seats be retained and increased to

\textsuperscript{189} Walker, \textit{Ka Whawhai Tonu Mātou}, p.228.  
\textsuperscript{190} Levin and Vasil, p.83.  
\textsuperscript{191} Hazlehurst, p.167.  
\textsuperscript{192} NZPD, 1975, 396, p.750.  
represent the Māori proportion of the population.195 Bolger agreed to retain the seats, and introduced the Māori Option in the lead up to the 1996 election, under which the Māori seats would increase or decrease according to the number of Māori enrolled on the Māori role.196 As a consequence of the Māori Option an extra seat was added in the 1996 general election: by 1999 the number of seats had increased to six, and in 2002 the number was increased again to seven.

Mana Motuhake played a part in this breakthrough: the emergence of smaller parties including Social Credit, Mana Motuhake, the Green Party and New Labour contributed to convincing voters of the benefits of electoral reform to expand beyond the two party system. Mana Motuhake had also convinced Māori voters that there may be possibilities beyond the two party system, and that the establishment of an independent Māori political voice was an achievable and credible goal. Māori organisations campaigned strongly for the introduction of MMP, renaming it ‘More Māori in Parliament’, and, tellingly, ‘Mana Motuhake Pūmau’, meaning ‘Hold strong to Māori Independence’.197 In an unbinding Electoral System Referendum in 1992 the nation voted in favour of replacing the First Past the Post electoral system, with 70.3% of voters picking MMP. In a second binding referendum in 1993 53.4% of voters supported the introduction of MMP, and it was introduced in time for the 1996 election. In that election the New Zealand First Party led by Winston Peters won a full sweep of the now five Māori seats, comprehensively breaking Labour’s hold on the Māori seats for the first time in fifty years. The reforms had come a decade too late for Mana Motuhake, but they had played a role in campaigning for change and convincing Māori voters to reconsider their loyalties to Labour. New Zealand First would not last long in the Māori seats, their members courted controversy with the press and neither the incoming Labour government nor Māori voters were willing to stand by them for a second term: Labour regained the six Māori seats in the 1999 election. Nevertheless, the event signalled a significant change in Māori voting patterns.

In 2004, the legacy of Mana Motuhake was to be revisited as history began to repeat. Tariana Turia, the Labour member for Te Tai Hauāuru, resigned from the Party in anger over the government’s reaction to the seabed and foreshore issue. Like Rata before her a political movement, named the Māori Party, began to blossom and develop around Turia, and like Rata she faced the incredible obstacles of having to form a political party from scratch in order to face an impending by-election. Like Mana Motuhake, the Māori Party grew exponentially in members, driven by people power and the passion and loyalty Turia inspired in her supporters. Commentators feared that Turia would lose her seat, pointing to Māori loyalty to Labour, the Rātana-Labour alliance, and Rata’s failure to win his own by-election after resigning in 1979. History did not repeat. Turia won the by-election, and in the upcoming general election the following year the Māori Party secured four of the seven Māori seats in parliament. On election night Turia paid tribute to Rata for having the courage to leave the Labour Party as she had, saying ‘He founded the Mana Motuhake Party, which focused on issues important to Māori, and people like Matiu led the way for people like me.’

Rata may not have achieved his goal of regaining the Northern seat, nor would any of Mana Motuhake’s candidates win seats in Parliament until the movement had joined the Alliance, but their efforts contributed to political reform and opened Māori eyes to the possibility of political independence. As Turia would highlight 26 years later, the Māori Party’s victory at the polls was not just a victory for Turia and her supporters, it was a victory of sorts for Rata and Mana Motuhake, and the challenge they had laid down all those years before.

You will not find Rata’s face on the nation’s currency. There is no Rata Cup in the sporting world, though if there was it would be for horse racing. His name lives on in the history books, but the entries are brief, and the impression given is that Rata was just one of a long line of Northern leaders who agitated for change, with flashes of brilliance and moments of incompetence. And yet he was one of the great Māori politicians and leaders of his times. Rata was a highly effective Māori MP and he was the third Māori to have held the coveted position of Minister of Māori Affairs. The reforms he introduced are comparable to those of Ngata and the first Labour

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government, as they represent such a departure from the norm of detrimental government policy for Māori. The legislation he introduced was perhaps not as drastic a change in direction as those introduced by Ngata but they achieved things Ngata had been unable to implement in his time. His efforts did not impact as directly and immediately as those of the first Labour government, yet they were unique and significant in that they were developed and led by Rata himself. The Waitangi Tribunal was Rata’s most lasting contribution to the nation, and this single piece of legislation has, more than any other before or since, helped to address and resolve historical tribal grievances, and in turn impacted upon the hearts and minds of New Zealanders. His resignation from the Labour Party and decision to form Mana Motuhake brought his career to a close, but opened up new doors and gave a glimpse of new pathways that future generations would follow. Rata is not held in the same regard as luminaries such as Ngata or Carroll. After all he was a state house raised South Auckland spray painter, who rose to the heights of national prominence, only to sink back down into political obscurity. His is not the noblest of tales but it is impressive and important; his name is not mentioned in the same breath as Ngata, Sir Peter Buck, Carroll, or Sir Māui Pōmare, but perhaps it should be.

What this chapter hopes to have shown is that a deeper understanding of Rata’s background, politics and personality is needed to understand the twists and turns of his career, and the dramatic decision he made in 1979 to leave the Labour Party and stake out a place for Māori political independence. A detailed study of his background and his parliamentary career demonstrates that Rata always had a radical streak, a wider view of politics, and a willingness to hear out the voice of the youth. As he demonstrated in 1971 and again in 1979, he was willing to take the leap of faith his predecessors were unable to, threatening to resign from the Labour Party when his demands were not met. Perhaps most importantly, Rata was a dynamic and flexible politician whose views and interests changed with the times. So often in the past, Māori MPs had entered Parliament with a single viewpoint or a single goal. They spent their careers pursuing this viewpoint or goal, and when it was clear that they were not going to achieve what they had set out to, voters would pick a new leader to take their place. Rata differed considerably: he was a man who observed and learnt, and was willing to change his own beliefs if it suited the greater good of his
constituents. By understanding the many facets of the man, we are able to knit back together the two figures we are presented with in the literature, Rata as the well-meaning minister at odds with Māori activists, and the radical Rata who resigned from Labour to form Mana Motuhake.

Rata is worth studying in his own right, but as a part of this thesis his career tells us much about the nature of Māori political engagement. Rata was successful precisely because he was, first and foremost, a member of a Pākehā political party. As such he earned the support and trust of his Labour colleagues, and was rewarded with the position of Minister of Māori Affairs and Lands, and the mandate and power to achieve his goals. Like Ngata before him, Rata was able to transcend the limitations of Māori political representation, for a short time, by working within the system. Having said this, he did eventually hit the proverbial glass ceiling. With Labour’s loss of the 1975 election and a leadership change Rata found himself back at square one, demoted within the Party and unable to influence government policy. Instead of accepting his position and looking to the future for hope, Rata chose to strike out on his own path, and seek out political independence for Māori so they were no longer at the whim and mercy of Pākehā politicians. Māori were not ready for political independence yet, but Rata’s efforts indicated the need for political reform. With the introduction of MMP in 1996, Māori voters demonstrated that they too, finally, had grown weary of their political fate being bound so closely to the fortunes of the Labour Party and the whims of its Pākehā leaders. Māori politics would never be the same again.
On 10 July 2004, Tariana Turia won the Te Tai Hauāuru by-election with one of the largest contested majorities returned in New Zealand’s recent history, securing 92.74% of the vote, a majority of 90.22%. That night and the following day the Māori Party was officially launched at the Memorial Hall in Whanganui. In the space of fewer than eight weeks, Turia and her supporters had launched a political party, signed up 4,000 members, registered the party and the party logo with the Electoral Commission, formed a national steering committee, established party branches throughout the country in all seven of the Māori electorates, fundraised tens of thousands of dollars, learnt how to run an electoral campaign with expert leadership
but little in the way of previous experience, and won their first seat in parliament. Not only had Turia won the Western Māori seat, she had taken the jewel of the Rātana-Labour crown, a seat the Labour Party had first won in 1935 and subsequently lost just once.

Turia’s result was all the more surprising when viewed within the wider historical context: for the first time in 136 years an independent Māori political party not aligned with any other party held a seat in New Zealand’s parliament. She had achieved that which the Young Māori Party had not attempted; she had made the leap of faith that the Rātana-Labour MPs had been unable to make in the 1940s and 1950s; she succeeded where Matiu Rata and Mana Motuhake had strived and failed.

The formation of the Māori Party in 2004 is a significant event in its own right, and is a worthy case study in the history of Māori political engagement. Yet the events that surround the foreshore and seabed issue, the 2004 hīkoi to parliament, Turia’s resignation from parliament, the formation of the Māori Party and the Tai Hauāuru by-election, represent more than that. These events are significant for what they tell us about the nature of Māori society and Māori political engagement. By understanding the circumstances that created the Māori Party we are afforded an insight into the criteria and circumstances that have created Māori political movements in the past and led to the formation of a Māori political party in the early twenty first century. These events tell us something of both the continuity and the changes in Māori society and politics over the past 144 years. Studying the processes that led to the formation of the Māori Party, namely the leadership of tribal and pan-tribal groups, the efforts of activists, academics and tribal leaders, the support of the grassroots community, and the strategies of tribal and pan-tribal activities, legal recourse to the courts and the Waitangi Tribunal, activism, protest, political pressure, political engagement and the use of hui, kōrero and tautohe to discuss problems and find solutions, also affords us an inkling of how past political movements must have operated, and how Māori society has changed in recent decades. The political environment and its impact upon the formation of the Māori Party also speak to the impact of electoral reform and the introduction of MMP on Māori political engagement.
This chapter relies on the testimonies of those who were involved in the formation of the Māori Party, and their voices speak to two key themes in clear, direct and unambiguous terms, namely the search for an independent political voice for Māori in parliament, and the agency of Māori communities in directing political movements and determining their destiny according to their own agendas. In turn the formation of the Māori Party helps us to understand past movements and their struggles to weigh up wielding power with retaining an independent voice.

The focus of this chapter is the formation of the Māori Party between May and July 2004, the factors that led to the establishment of the Party between 1997 and 2004, the party’s first electoral campaign in June 2004 for the Tai Hauāuru electorate, and the Party’s significance within a wider historical context. The chapter begins with a brief biographical outline of the life and political career of Tariana Turia, whose leadership was crucial to the establishment of the Māori Party, before delving into the origins of the Party — the foreshore and seabed issue, the Marlborough Sounds case, the Court of Appeal’s Decision of June 2003, the ensuing controversy that arose surrounding the case and issues of race in 2003 and 2004, the reaction of the Māori community, the media, politicians and the wider public, and the 2004 foreshore and seabed hīkoi. The chapter ends with a detailed account of the formation of the Māori Party, its electoral campaign in the Tai Hauāuru by-election, its significance within the wider context of Māori political history, and what the formation of the Māori Party tells us about the nature of Māori politics and society.

No one could ever have guessed that a grandmother from Whangaehu would, in her 60th year, lead a political revolt in the Māori electorates. Quiet but firmly spoken, unassuming, honest — at times to a fault — comfortable with tikanga and kawa but not a strong speaker of te reo, lacking some of the flair for bold oratory possessed by her colleagues, and with little in the way of a tertiary education, she seems an unlikely leader. And yet in her own calm and dignified way, Tariana Turia did just that, achieving goals that had eluded generations of Māori leaders in Te Ana o te Raiona and reconfiguring New Zealand’s political landscape.

The people of the Whanganui River recite the following pepeha to define themselves and their relationship to the river:
Te Taura Whiri a Hinengākau

_The plaited rope of Hinengākau_

E rere kau mai te awa nui
Mai i te kāhui maunga ki Tangaroa
Ko au te awa, ko te awa ko au

_The great river flows without hindrance_

_From the mountains to the sea_

_I am the river, the river is me_

The first tells us that the Whanganui River is the sum of many tributaries that bind the people together, while the second reminds us that the river winds its way from the mountains to the sea. The story of the Māori Party too is one of many tributaries and many twists and turns, but it begins with the maunga at its headwaters.

Tariana Turia, a descendant of Ngā Wairiki, Ngāti Apa, Whanganui, Ngā Rauru and Ngāti Tūwharetoa, was born in Whanganui in 1944.1 She was raised by her grandmother until the age of five; on her grandmother’s passing she was whangaied by her aunt and uncle.2 At the age of eight her aunt died and she went to live with another aunt and uncle.3 Through her grandfather Turia was raised in an Anglican family and was at one stage an Anglican Sunday School teacher, but her whānau also had strong ties with the Rātana Church.4 Turia’s grandfather was a cousin of T.W. Rātana. She was raised in Whangaehu where the Māngai had lived much of his life, and she counted as uncles and aunties Taruhia (‘Charles’) Manawaroa Te Aweawe, a leading figure in the movement who had accompanied Rātana on his first World tour to England in 1924 along with her grandfather and two of her aunts, and Rātana-Labour MPs Iriaka Rātana and brothers Matiu and Tokouru Rātana. Turia was

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1 ‘I still question myself’, _Mana_, August / September 1999, p.29.
educated at Wanganui Girls’ College; in her early years she worked a range of jobs as a nurse, cleaner, waitress and seamstress, and in later years took on roles in education, youth work, iwi health organisations and social services.5

Turia’s life course took a twist in 1994 when she played a leading role in the occupation of Pakaitore in Whanganui alongside her cousin, the activist Ken Mair, and Niko Tangaroa, a unionist. Her efforts attracted the attention of the Labour Party, and party supporters began approaching Turia at Pakaitore, encouraging her to join Labour and stand for parliament.6 According to some commentators, Turia was handpicked by Helen Clark to stand for Labour.7 Turia is unsure of this, noting that she was never approached by Clark herself but by other party members, the most persistent of whom was Robert Pouwhare who, in her own words ‘approached me and kept at me on behalf of Labour’.8 By her own admission Turia had never been a big supporter of parliamentary politics:

I’ve never been a Labour Party member, I’ve probably been on the fringe of those who say ‘Don’t vote, you only encourage them’, and sort of always been in a way anti-government, mainly because of the history and the impact on our people, I’d been involved in political activity mainly at home.9

Loath as she may have been to enter politics, her whānau encouraged her to stand: ‘At Pakaitore when Labour and others approached me, the families from home said to me, “Well we need to be everywhere, and you should give it a go, you know we’ve got nothing to lose”.’10

It remains unclear whether or not Turia was ushered into Labour at Clark’s behest, but Turia believes that Clark was responsible for her high ranking on the Labour party list going into the 1996 election.11 Her relationship with Labour was difficult from the start, though she credits Clark for supporting her and advancing her career:

6 Interview with Tariana Turia, Wellington, 16 May 2011. All interviews were conducted by the author and are in his possession, unless otherwise noted.
7 Keith Newman described Turia as ‘being groomed by Helen Clark to lead a more pliable block of Māori within the Labour movement to counter the years of Rātana lobbying’: Newman, p.521.
8 Interview with Tariana Turia.
9 Interview with Tariana Turia.
10 Interview with Tariana Turia.
11 Interview with Tariana Turia.
I knew it was always going to be difficult for me, because of my own political thinking. And it was, it was always difficult for me, because when you’re part of the party itself, the machinery of that party, you have your debate in caucus but you cannot speak against them. And that’s what made it difficult, whereas being outside the tent but in a relationship with government, you have your own mana, you’re able to talk about things that mean so much to you, so you’re not suppressed and bound to say things the way they wanted you to give expression to them. I found that really hard, but on the other hand you know Helen made me a Minister, I’d been there for three years, she was very good to me.\textsuperscript{12}

Turia’s entrance into politics came at a time of turmoil in Labour’s relationship with their traditional allies in the Rātana Church. As an activist, a civil servant and, to outward appearances, an Anglican, Turia was part of Labour’s efforts to wrestle the Māori seats from Rātana control. Labour’s move to deregister Rātana supporters from the party in the lead up to the 1999 election is regarded by some to be the decisive blow that cut the ties between Labour and the Mōrehu.\textsuperscript{13} Turia recalls a meeting she attended that symbolised the sorry state of the Rātana-Labour alliance, at which Rātana leaders called on the alliance by asking the whereabouts of the taonga that Rātana had presented to Michael Joseph Savage in 1936:

I recall Rāniera, who was the tumuaki at that time, and Tūmanako Wereta coming to see Helen, because they were concerned that the relationship that they had been led to believe existed in fact had separated, and so Labour weren’t committed to standing Mōrehu, members of the faith, in the four seats. So they were very concerned about that. Rāniera and Tumanako Wereta came to see Helen, I was in the room, to talk about their disappointment, because they felt as if Labour had been moving away from the Rātana movement. I’m not sure whether it was Rāniera or Whetū Tirikatene who first raised where the taonga were.\textsuperscript{14}

\textsuperscript{12} Interview with Tariana Turia.
\textsuperscript{13} Newman, pp.435–436, 521.
\textsuperscript{14} Interview with Tariana Turia.
The Party leadership responded that the taonga had been buried with Michael Joseph Savage, however, according to Turia this may not have been the truth:

A very good friend of mine who was very active in the Labour Party and still is today told me that they had decided to come up with this kōrero that they’d been buried with Michael Joseph Savage, because they didn’t know where they were, cause that was the truth of it. So rather than admit that they in fact hadn’t valued those things, after all it was only a potato, a broken watch and a huia feather, so why would they? That was what some of them were, I think, thinking. But no one will ever know whether they were truly buried with Michael Joseph Savage because apparently that was decided to be the line that they would run.15

Turia’s selection in 1996 raises the question of why Labour would want a list candidate with such strong links to the Rātana Church at a time when it was attempting to distance itself from the movement. When quizzed on this contradiction Turia explained it was an oversight on Labour’s behalf: they did not know her whakapapa, and furthermore did not understanding the nature of Rātana’s teachings:

When the Rātana movement first started it wasn’t a religion, it was the māramatanga, and everybody followed the māramatanga, even my family did too. But when the Rātana faith was formed our family stayed Church of England.16

Strained relations between Labour and the Mōrehu were nothing new, but the state of the Rātana-Labour alliance was indicative of a sea change in Labour’s politics that had taken place over the past two decades. From the late 1970s onwards the Labour party had shifted away from its liberal-socialist roots and its strong connections with unions towards so-called ‘third way’ politics, combining elements of neo-liberalism with the ideologies of Labourites, liberals and social democrats.17 The ‘Rogernomics’ era of 1984 to 1990, during which Labour introduced a series of sweeping free-market

15 Interview with Tariana Turia.
16 Labour’s oversight would come back to haunt them in 2004 when the party attempted to rally Rātana support against Turia, but the irony was not lost on all Labour members. Turia recalls jovially that when the party would discuss Rātana issues in caucus Mita Ririnui would comment ‘well she may not have the wakapono but she’s got the wakapapa’. Interview with Tariana Turia.
reforms, marked the high tide of Labour’s drift towards the right, and signalled a major divorce of Labour from its left-wing roots.\textsuperscript{18} Tangata whenua were hit hardest by the reforms due to the significant numbers of Māori employed by the state, resulting in high Māori unemployment and dissatisfaction with Labour by the end of the 1980s.\textsuperscript{19}

When Labour returned to government in 1999, they found that their reforms, enthusiastically continued by National over three terms, had created an ‘economic middle-ground’ that had ‘moved well toward the liberal end of the socialism-liberalism scale’.\textsuperscript{20} In the 1970s, Māori and unions had been Labour’s strongest supporters; by 1999 they had become just two of a plethora of interest groups vying for attention, alongside women, youth, Pacific Islanders, rural communities, gay lesbian and transgender communities and local government.\textsuperscript{21} In their efforts to widen their appeal to voters, Labour marginalised some of their traditional allies; this would have serious implications for the party in the 1996 and 2005 general elections, as Māori began to opt out of the alliance in search of alternatives.\textsuperscript{22}

Turia’s political career advanced rapidly within government. She entered parliament in 1996 at number 20 on the party list, and was shifted up the rankings to number 16 in the lead-up to the 1999 election, guaranteeing her a place in the House.\textsuperscript{23} With Labour’s electoral victory in 1999 she assumed a number of ministerial roles outside of Cabinet and in May 2003 she was awarded full ministerial rank as Minister for the Community and the Voluntary sector.\textsuperscript{24} Heading into the 2002 election Turia removed herself from Labour’s list and contested the newly formed Te Tai Hauāuru seat, which she won comfortably and has retained since.\textsuperscript{25}

\textsuperscript{18} Aimer, p.356.
\textsuperscript{20} Aimer, p.356.
\textsuperscript{21} Aimer, p.358.
\textsuperscript{22} Sullivan and Margaritis, p.66.
\textsuperscript{23} Interview with Tariana Turia.
\textsuperscript{25} Interview with Tariana Turia.
As a Labour Party MP Turia proved herself to be a staunch and uncompromising advocate for tangata whenua. Her maiden speech was perhaps the hardest hitting ever delivered by a Māori MP: at one stage she managed to fit ‘cultural extermination’ ‘assimilation’ ‘treacherous land-stealing laws’ and ‘tauwi bureaucracies’ into one sentence. Turia pulled no punches when it came to describing the ‘profound’ and ‘traumatic’ impact of colonisation on her people; she fought incessantly for ‘Māori control over Māori destinies’, and spoke at length on the Treaty of Waitangi and its meaning in the present day. Turia bemoaned the failures of successive governments to address the problems Māori faced, and urged government agencies to empower whānau, hapū and iwi to solve the issues they faced. What separated Turia from her colleagues and predecessors was that, rather than calling on ‘expert research’, statistics, or examples from her constituents, Turia drew on personal experience in her speeches, describing in painful detail the impact of colonisation and government neglect on her people.

Turia was a confrontational and uncompromising speaker; the frivolity and flights of fancy of career politicians were indulgences she rarely partook of, a trait she shared with her Aunty Iriaka Rātana. In spite of her confrontational and at times controversial approach to politics Clark and her Labour colleagues continued to support Turia. Her loyalties, however, lay with her people; and between 2003 and 2004, with the introduction of Labour’s foreshore and seabed legislation, those loyalties would lead Turia to sever her ties with Labour.

In 2003 the foreshore and seabed debate exploded across the headlines, yet the slow burning fuse that lit the charge was ignited several years earlier. The issue began in 1997 when Te Tau Ihu o te Waka a Māui, an organisation representing eight iwi from the top of the South Island — Ngāti Apa, Ngāti Koata, Ngāti Kuia, Ngāti Rārua, Ngāti Tama, Ngāti Toa, Rangitāne and Te Āti Awa — raised concerns over the management of marine farming in the Marlborough Sounds. The group was worried about the impact of aquaculture and mussel farming on their customary fishing rights: moreover
they were angered that the Marlborough District Council had refused to grant them a marine farm license, especially given that a two year moratorium on new marine farms prevented them from entering the lucrative industry.31

In 1997 the group applied to the Māori Land Court, claiming customary ownership of the foreshore and seabed in the Marlborough Sounds under the terms of Te Ture Whenua Māori Act 1993.32 The Attorney General objected to the claim on the Crown’s behalf, citing a range of common law cases and statutes relating to customary rights that, in the Crown’s view, extinguished Māori customary rights to the foreshore and seabed.33 Judge Heta Hingston ruled that in lieu of any legislation that clearly extinguished Māori ownership of the land in question customary ownership remained intact, and any attempts to extinguish iwi rights in the present day would amount to ‘a serious infringement of the Treaty of Waitangi’ and a ‘deprivation of rights by a side wind’.34

Hingston’s decision was appealed to the Māori Appellate Court in 1998: that court reserved their decision and, in the interests of time and money, turned to the High Court for leadership.35 Judge Rebecca Ellis heard the case in the High Court in 2002. In its findings the High Court ruled that it could find no precedent for the Māori Land Court declaring the foreshore and seabed to be customary land, and that therefore the case was beyond the jurisdiction of the Māori Land Court.36 The High Court upheld the Crown’s view that, according to common law and legislation, the seabed, that is the land below the low water mark, remained in Crown ownership for the benefit of the public.37 The foreshore, however, that land between the high water mark and the low water mark, was a different matter. As previous cases had proven, sections of the foreshore, riverbeds and lakebeds had been declared Māori customary land, as long as the adjacent dry land remained in customary title. The High Court ruled that while the

34 Walker, p.378.
36 Walker, p.379.
seabed remained in Crown hands, the Māori Land Court had jurisdiction to decide whether the foreshore was Māori customary land.38

Te Tau Ihu appealed the decision and in June 2003 took the case to the Court of Appeal. In this fourth round of litigation, the Court of Appeal took a different tack, rejecting the notion underpinning earlier decisions that on assuming sovereignty the Crown acquired ‘dominium’ over all land in New Zealand, in turn extinguishing Māori customary rights.39 Instead the Court of Appeal argued that on assuming sovereignty the Crown acquired territorial authority or ‘imperium’ over New Zealand, but not ownership, and that Māori customary rights endured until they were expressly extinguished by law.40 The Court of Appeal concluded that the Māori Land Court had jurisdiction to hear the claimant’s case and determine the status of the foreshore and seabed. The ruling came with a warning that the Court’s findings should not be taken as an indication that the entire foreshore and seabed was Māori customary land, that claimants would face a hard task convincing the Māori Land Court that the land was theirs, and Chief Justice Sian Elias stated that she had ‘real reservations about the ability of the appellants to establish that which they claim’.41

Up to this point the foreshore and seabed case had largely managed to fly under the radar of media and political attention, so the Court of Appeal’s sudden revelation that the Crown did not own the foreshore and seabed by right of law and that Māori could possibly still hold customary title over some sections of it was explosive. The Court’s findings were released on 19 June 2003, and reactions were swift.

Māori commentators were the first to pass judgement, expressing a sense of cautious optimism at the Court’s findings. Chief Executive of the Waitangi Fisheries Commission, Robin Hapi, praised the decision as a ‘landmark’ event that proved Māori customary ownership of the foreshore and seabed had never been extinguished.42 Similarly Turia welcomed the decision, suggesting that those who

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41 Walker, p.381.
had opposed the claim should ‘get into discussions with tangata whenua about joint ventures and partnerships, instead of wasting time and energy trying to defeat our people’s legitimate claims’. 43

Others were less optimistic. Members of the opposition sniffed blood in the water, and were quick to capitalise on the public’s fears. National Party MP Nick Smith warned the case would ‘open the floodgates to more Māori claims over beaches, estuaries, harbours and almost any stretch of coastline’, while ACT Party Treaty spokesman Stephen Franks described it as ‘a recipe for endless uncertainty and fresh grievance’, and warned of the adverse legal implications of the case for the government and the marine farms industry. 44 In late June, with the support of National Party MPs, 500 protestors took to the streets in Nelson opposing Māori claims to the foreshore and seabed, waving placards with the words, ‘Whites have rights too’ and ‘When do we stop giving?’. 45 The National Party launched a ‘Beaches for all’ campaign in late July, with an online petition calling on the government to pass legislation confirming Crown ownership of the foreshore and seabed. Within days the petition had gained 10,000 signatures and in a little over a week that number had reached over 40,000. 46

The foreshore and seabed issue touched a raw nerve with many Pākehā, playing into their beliefs in the sanctity of summer holidays at the beach and underlying fears that the so-called ‘grievance industry’ and ‘Māori privilege’ were getting out of hand. Newspapers and magazines took up the issue, publishing a range of editorials exploring the themes of Pākehā identity, treaty claims and a perceived notion that

43 ‘Quick move blocks Māori bid to claim rights over seabed’, NZH, 24 June 2003, [link](http://www.nzherald.co.nz/nz/news/article.cfm?c_id=1&objectid=3509037) accessed on 05/06/2012. The quote came from a statement published the previous week by Turia.
Māori were somehow more privileged than Pākehā, with titles such as ‘What’s eating Pākehā’ and ‘Who are you?’ The National Party saw the potential to win back votes from Labour by preying on Pākehā fears. Party leader Don Brash delivered his infamous ‘Nationhood’ speech at the Orewa Rotary Club on 27 January 2004, attacking what he labelled a ‘dangerous drift towards racial separatism’ and the growth of what he described as the ‘Treaty grievance industry’. Brash’s popularity amongst voters skyrocketed overnight, and National led their 2005 election campaign with the slogan ‘One Law For All’. When Georgina Te Heuheu, the National Party spokesperson on Māori Affairs, refused to toe the party line she was replaced by Gerry Brownlee, who undertook an audit of government departments to sniff out and expose what he called ‘race-based funding’, that is government funding targeted at Māori. National’s stance improved their polling amongst voters, but was insufficient to deliver them victory in the 2005 election. What it did do, though, was expose amongst many Pākehā a deeply held sense of fear and distrust of the growth of Māori nationalism.

Fearing such a backlash from Pākehā voters, the Labour-led government moved to contain the growing unease over the possible outcomes of the foreshore case. Within 24 hours of the court’s decision Prime Minister Helen Clark and Attorney General Margaret Wilson issued a press statement indicating they were considering introducing legislation to vest the foreshore and seabed in Crown ownership, and planned to negotiate directly with iwi to prevent the case and others like it from going to court. That consideration became a plan of action within four days of the Court’s decision: the Prime Minister announced that the government would pass legislation vesting ownership of the foreshore and seabed in the Crown. In an effort to allay Māori fears the Governor General and the Treaty Negotiations Minister both assured

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51 ‘Seabed owned by Crown says PM’.
Iwi that the government would seek to clarify and recognise Māori customary use of the foreshore and seabed and balance the interests of the claimants and the Crown. The media labelled Clark’s efforts a ‘kneejerk reaction’ and ‘ruthless’, a case of ‘act now, talk later’.52

In their efforts to quell a Pākehā backlash, Labour transformed the court case from obscurity to national controversy within days. Pākehā marched on the streets and waved placards on beaches, fearing privatisation of beaches.53 The far-right whipped up resentment of race-based funding and racial separatism, and lambasted Labour for not passing legislation confirming Crown ownership.54 Māori cried foul over the government’s intervention in a court decision, and threatened ‘civil war’, or at least civil unrest. The Labour Party blamed Māori for raising the issue, but they also labelled the Marlborough District Council as ‘racist’ for not dealing with the issue sensibly in the first place.55 Stuck in the midst of this furore were the Māori Labour MPs, torn between their loyalty to their constituents and their political allegiance to Labour.

The initial responses of the nine Māori Labour MPs to the Court of Appeal’s decision varied significantly. As noted, Turia was quick to champion the decision.56 John Tamihere, MP for Tāmaki Makaurau and Associate Minister of Māori Affairs, took a more cautious route through the political minefield, reassuring the public that ‘access was everyone’s birthright’ and that ‘under no circumstances would privately owned land be opened to contest’, while advising that the nature and status of tribal customary rights would ‘need to be worked through with Māori’.57 MP for Te Tai Tokerau Dover Samuels was perhaps less apologetic; he was aware that Māori were ‘absolutely’ concerned about their rights, but was optimistic that the government and claimants were ‘mature enough to know we have got to work through this issue for

53 ‘Protest calls for end of claims to foreshore’.
54 ‘Seabed owned by Crown says PM’; ‘Clark Rejects Claims of kneejerk reaction to Māori rights’; Don Brash, ‘Nationhood’.
56 ‘Quick move blocks Māori bid to claim rights over seabed’.
57 ‘Seabed owned by Crown says PM’.
the benefit of all New Zealanders’. It is clear from their varied responses that the Māori MPs had been caught off guard by the Prime Minister’s announcement.

By 24 June the Māori Labour MPs had discussed the issue and prepared a collective response, issuing a statement signed by Turia, Tamihere, Parekura Horomia, Samuels, Mita Ririnui, Miha Okeroa, Georgina Beyer and Dave Hereora. Nanaia Mahuta of Tainui-Waikato was the only Māori MP not to sign. The statement, written in the unapologetic and confrontational language which had become Turia's trademark, rejected the government’s moves to claim Crown ownership of the foreshore and seabed, asserting that ‘the land wars are over so the consent of tangata whenua is required before customary title can be extinguished’. The statement also warned that any government move to assert Crown ownership would amount to a ‘confiscation’ and would be ‘likely to breach international law’.

Iwi entered the fray by sending out an unambiguous message to their MPs: either oppose the legislation or start looking for future employment. Arapeta Tahana, Chairman of Te Arawa Trust Board, fired a warning shot at the Māori MPs: ‘We're trying to send a message to our MPs and to their Labour Party - be very careful here. You might win this but you'll lose the Māori vote.’ John McEnteer, spokesman for the Hauraki Māori Trust board, warned the Māori MPs that they would ‘suffer the electoral consequences if they don't support us’, and trusted they would either cross the floor to vote against any government legislation undermining Māori rights, or would ‘take appropriate action and review their positions in the Labour Party’.

For two months the Māori Labour MPs sustained intense pressure from their constituents. It was clear that some, such as Turia, had already picked sides, and would vote against any Bill. It was equally clear that others would be standing by the

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58 ‘Clark Rejects Claims of kneejerk reaction to Māori rights’.
60 ‘Labour’s Māori MPs reject new seabed law’.
62 ‘Iwi warning for Māori MPs’.
63 ‘Iwi warning for Māori MPs’.
government come hell or high water, notably Tamihere.\textsuperscript{64} Clarity came on 18 August, when Prime Minister Clark, Deputy Prime Minister Michael Cullen and Minister of Māori Affairs Horomia announced government plans to introduce legislation declaring the foreshore and seabed public domain under government regulation, while allowing Māori to pursue customary rights through the courts. Clark described the plans as a ‘win-win solution’, retaining public access and Crown ownership while allowing the potential for customary rights.\textsuperscript{65} It was a shrewd move from Clark; labelling the land ‘public domain’ took some of the sting out of what many Māori perceived to be Crown confiscation, and if iwi chose to pursue the issue further it effectively set them in opposition to the public rather than the government.

Māori Labour MP Georgina Beyer has offered some insights into the ‘behind closed door’ discussions that took place in the Māori Labour Caucus that saw such a drastic change in direction between June and August of 2003. According to Beyer, Cabinet Ministers Tamihere and Horomia supported the government’s stance and put pressure on their colleagues to follow suit.\textsuperscript{66} Samuels resisted at first but eventually buckled. In Beyer’s words ‘all the men got knocked off one by one, and you were left with the three women—Tariana Turia, myself and Nanaia Mahuta—who were still opposing, particularly the intervention with a judicial process’.\textsuperscript{67} Both Turia and Mahuta threatened to cross the floor if the government attempted to pass legislation. Mahuta eventually traded her loyalty to Labour in exchange for an agreement to settle the Waikato River claim irrespective of any pending legislation renegotiating the status of the foreshore, seabed, riverbeds, lakebeds and harbours.\textsuperscript{68} Beyer strongly opposed the government’s plans, but was torn between her loyalty to her iwi and her responsibilities to her party and her constituents in the largely Pākehā electorate of

\textsuperscript{64} ‘Quick move blocks Māori bid to claim rights over seabed’; ‘Tamihere: Takapuna, Kohi next’, NZH, 11 August 2003, \url{http://www.nzherald.co.nz/nz/news/article.cfm?c_id=1&objectid=3517404} accessed on 05/06/2012.
\textsuperscript{67} Beyer, p.209.
\textsuperscript{68} Mahuta’s loyalties lay with the Kīngitanga, who did not wish to jeopardize their claims over the Waikato River by getting embroiled in the wider issue of Māori customary ownership of the foreshore and seabed, and she was notably the only Māori Labour MP not to have signed Turia’s press release in June.
Her request for permission to abstain from voting ‘was greeted with howls of derision of course in the caucus’. That left just Turia as a lone voice of protest in the Māori Labour caucus.

In the face of mounting resistance the government rolled out plans to pass legislation: the public were given until 3 October 2003 to make submissions, before a report would be drafted to inform the resulting legislation. In late August the government announced plans to host 11 consultation hui with Māori around the country, to be chaired by former head of Te Puni Kōkiri and National Party supporter Wira Gardiner. With the government’s announcement of its plans the battle lines were drawn; iwi mobilised and the consultation hui provided a focus for their protests.

Te Tai Tokerau were the first to respond in the wake of the government’s announced plan. Eleven iwi from the North called a hui at Te Ti Marae, Waitangi, in late August to discuss their position on the foreshore and seabed, Te Tau Ihu’s leadership of the issue, and whether they wished to engage with the government. Opinions were mixed with radical elements calling for protest and conservatives urging for calm. Perhaps the most significant outcome of the hui in the long term was that it gave veteran activist Titewhai Harawira an opportunity to garner support for her calls for a hīkoi of protest.

The first of several national foreshore and seabed hui was launched by the Hauraki Māori Trust Board at Ngāhutoitoi Marae in Paeroa on 12 July, and drew a crowd of around a thousand, including iwi leaders from throughout the country, activists, the Māori Labour MPs and National Māori MP Georgina Te Heuheu. The hui drafted a set of principles known as the Paeroa Declaration, which were delivered to the

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70 In spite of her misgivings Beyer voted in favour of Labour’s legislation. She registered her protest by standing down from the Wairarapa seat in the 2005 general election, but was re-elected via the Party list, Beyer, pp.209–212.
71 ‘Government announces plan for foreshore and seabed’.
74 ‘Hui as seabed anger mounts’
75 ‘Iwi warning for Māori MPs’.
government on behalf of ‘the hapū and iwi of Aotearoa’. The declaration affirmed tribal ownership and control of the foreshore and seabed, directed Māori MPs to oppose any legislation proposing to ‘extinguish or redefine Māori customary title or rights’, supported all hapū and iwi wishing to confirm their rights in court, called for full government disclosure of their plans, argued that any decisions on the land in question should be made by hapū and iwi, and accepted an invitation from Te Tau Ihu to host the following hui.

As iwi prepared for the second national hui a steering group taking the name Te Ope Mana a Tai was formed by Te Tau Ihu and the Waitangi Fisheries Commission to lead Māori opposition. The group was spearheaded by Te Tau Ihu with Matiu Rei of Ngāti Toa appointed as its chairman. It included iwi representatives from throughout the country, and was funded by the Waitangi Fisheries Commission, which had a vested interest in settling Māori customary rights to the foreshore and seabed due to the impact any legislation could have on Māori customary fishing rights. The second hui was hosted at Omaka in Blenheim on 30 August 2003 in preparation for the government’s consultation hui planned for the following week. The hui was attended by around 300, and passed a motion of support for Te Ope Mana a Tai to lead iwi concerns ‘as a mechanism for moving forward in an inclusive and co-operative manner’.

The consultation hui provided iwi and activists with the perfect platform to express their disapproval of the government’s plans. The first, held on 4 September at Whangara Marae north of Gisborne, was attended by around 300, including local iwi, activists and government Ministers Horomia, Tamihhere, Wilson and Trevor Mallard. According to one journalist the hui was ‘relaxed and sometimes

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76 ‘Iwi warning for Māori MPs’.
77 ‘Iwi warning for Māori MPs’.
78 ‘Tamihhere: Takapuna, Kohi next’.
79 ‘Tamihhere: Takapuna, Kohi next’.
humorous’, but sent a clear message that the tangata whenua opposed the government’s plans and would fight to protect their long held control over the coast.83

A hui at Maketū the following day attended by a crowd of 600 saw tense scenes: government ministers were met by a crowd of 50 protestors waiving Māori sovereignty flags and placards, one reading ‘Reject Clown Offer’.84 Activists revisited the drama and theatrics that had typified the Fiscal Envelope hui a decade earlier, with Tame Iti flicking sand from the foreshore on visitors as they entered the marae; government speakers were heckled.85 The hosts began the hui by promptly sacking the government-appointed chair Wira Gardiner and replacing him with Te Arawa Trust Board chairman Arapeta Tahana and paramount chief Tumu Te Heuheu, sending a clear message about who was in charge.86 Speaker after speaker rejected the government’s plans: lawyer and activist Annette Sykes grabbed headlines by pointing out that the government’s four principles for settlement — certainty, regulation, access and protection — ‘actually spell the word crap’.87

The third hui at Te Omaka Marae in Blenheim was the home of Te Tau Ihu and had been the venue for the second national hui on the foreshore and seabed months earlier. Te Ope Mana a Tai chairman Matiu Rei reported later that he sensed a shift in the government’s position at the hui, that they were ‘starting to listen’, and that opponents of the government’s discussion paper would be able to ‘kick that document to touch’.88

The fourth hui, hosted at Mataiwhetū Marae near Thames and attended by 300 guests, was perhaps the most poignant and powerful yet.89 With tears in his eyes, Hauraki Trust Board chairman and respected kaumatua Toko Renata handed back his Queen’s

85 ‘Feelings run high as hui spurns foreshore policy’.
86 ‘Feelings run high as hui spurns foreshore policy’.
87 ‘Feelings run high as hui spurns foreshore policy’.
Service Medal and New Zealand Merit Award to Deputy Prime Minister Cullen, in an emotion filled gesture echoing the symbolic protests of the past.90

The sixth hui scheduled to be held at Terenga Paraoa Marae in Northland was cancelled after kaumātua feared for the cultural and physical safety of their guests.91 Government representatives were met with a far less heated reception at the seventh consultation hui at Rāpaki Marae near Lyttelton in the South Island; there were no protestors in attendance and the services of the plain clothes police officers mingling in the crowd were not required.92 The message, however, remained the same: Ngāi Tahu kaiwhakahaere Mark Solomon stated his iwi opposed the government’s plans outright, describing them as ‘evidence of further unconscionable and repeated breaches of the Treaty of Waitangi’ that had the potential to threaten racial harmony.93

The final consultation hui, planned to be held at Ōrākei in Auckland city, was cancelled by the Ngāti Whātau Trust Board, who advised that they had not yet prepared their position on the foreshore and seabed and feared that relinquishing control of their marae to government officials and the potential for disruption would trample on the mana of the tangata whenua.94 The venue was changed to Ngā Whare Wātea Marae in South Auckland, drawing in speakers from the Waikato to the Far North.95 As with the previous hui, the government’s policies were firmly rejected with a mix of passion, anger and humour. Professor Margaret Mutu continued the symbolism of previous hui by presenting a copy of the government’s proposals marked in red ink with the words ‘Failed’ scrawled across the cover.96

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90 ‘Tears well in emotional protest’.
93 ‘Ngāi Tahu warns of racial tension’.
96 ‘Northland iwi uses last hui to announce its own plans’.
With the consultation hui drawing to a close on the 27th of September and the deadline for public submissions closing on the 3rd of October, the government were to spend October 2003 playing a cat and mouse game with claimants, stalling for more time while claimant lawyers and the Waitangi Tribunal demanded sufficient notice to prepare their responses to the pending policy announcement.97 On 8 December, a week out from the launch of the document, the government announced that they would not be recognising hapū or iwi ownership of the foreshore and seabed in any forthcoming legislation.98 Matiu Rei parried the blow by describing Labour’s efforts as ‘nothing less than a 21st century confiscation’ and warned that protests on the beach over the summer break could not be ruled out.99 Cullen responded angrily that the government was ‘not prepared to sit in the situation where the vast majority of New Zealanders are made to feel as though they are strangers on our own shores’, and advised the public ‘to simply avoid any form of confrontation’.100 Again the government employed the tactic of defining the foreshore and seabed issue as a case of iwi rights versus public rights rather than an argument between Māori and the Crown, currying favour with Pākehā and building resentment and resistance to the calls issuing forth from iwi. The National Party captured the sentiment most succinctly in their 2005 election campaign, erecting billboards with the word ‘Iwi’ on one side and ‘Kiwi’ on the other, under the title ‘Beaches’.

100 ‘NZers will not be made to feel strangers on our shores: Cullen’.
On 17 December 2003 the Labour Government released *Foreshore and Seabed – A Framework*, detailing the outcomes of its consultation process and providing an outline of the key principles that would guide subsequent legislation.\(^{101}\) In spite of the many competing interests and viewpoints presented the overwhelming theme of the report was one of criticism. The government were criticised for their handling of the issue, the consultation process, the discussion document, the timeframe for consultation, for disregarding treaty issues, and for interfering in due process.\(^{102}\) Each of its four principles of access, regulation, protection and certainty were critiqued extensively from every possible position.\(^{103}\) The media were also condemned for their reporting on the issue.\(^{104}\)

After three months of consultation the government’s policy plans had changed very little from those presented in August. The report announced that current provisions in law vesting the foreshore and seabed in the Crown would be repealed and replaced with a ‘public domain’ title, vesting ownership of the land ‘in the people of New Zealand’ in perpetuity.\(^{105}\) Concessions to Māori were minimal: the Māori Land Court would be empowered to award ‘customary title’ to whānau, hapū and iwi, recognising

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\(^{102}\) *Foreshore and Seabed – A Framework*, pp.6-15.

\(^{103}\) *Foreshore and Seabed – A Framework*, pp.18-21, 22-25.

\(^{104}\) *Foreshore and Seabed – A Framework*, pp.7.

their ‘mana and ancestral connection’ to the land and identifying and recognising their ‘specific customary rights’. These customary titles would ‘sit alongside the public domain title’; they would not ‘alter reasonable and appropriate public access’ and could not ‘result in effective ownership of the foreshore and seabed’.

The only major changes between the government’s discussion paper from August and its policy plans of December were in the language used. The policy plans created a new form of title, ‘public domain title’, which was to be vested in ‘the people of New Zealand’. The other major difference presented in the policy plans centred on private ownership: private title would not be affected by forthcoming legislation and private landowners would not be forced to allow public access.

Labour’s policy framework provided opponents and supporters alike with a target to set their sights on, and a range of interest groups across the political spectrum shifted their efforts up a gear in preparation for the next round of lobbying. Understandably the mood was tense at Waitangi commemorations that year, and Brash received a mud pie in the face for his efforts at the gates of Waitangi Marae from protestor Kewana Duncan. Media furore raged over the treatment of the Leader of the Opposition at Waitangi. The following day Far North iwi Te Rarawa hosted ‘Hands Across the Beach’ at Ahipara, a consciousness-raising exercise borrowing its name and some of its sentiment from the ‘Hands Across America’ event hosted in the 1980s. A pouwhenua depicting the ancestor Toroa was unveiled, declaring Te Rarawa’s mana and guardianship of the takutai in that area. A line of hundreds of protestors, including people from a range of ethnic backgrounds, held hands in a sign of unity and mutual respect, spanning two kilometres down Ninety Mile Beach.

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106 Summary of Foreshore and Seabed Framework, p.2.
109 Summary of Foreshore and Seabed Framework, pp.4-5; Foreshore and Seabed – Frequently Asked Questions and Answers, p.2.
111 Aroha Harris, Hīkoi – Forty Years of Māori Protest, Auckland, 2004, pp.147, 154.
112 Harris, p.147.
113 Harris, pp.147, 154.
On 4 March 2004 the Waitangi Tribunal weighed in on the debate, delivering its Report on the Crown’s Foreshore and Seabed Policy.114 The tribunal argued that the government’s plans breached the principles of the Treaty of Waitangi by removing the legal rights, property rights and moral rights of iwi to take their cases to the High Court and the Māori Land Court, that its policy would expropriate Māori property rights without compensation, that it left the claimants in a situation of ‘extreme uncertainty’ about what rights Māori would have under the policy, and cast serious doubt on the government’s promises to deliver any real benefits to Māori by offering ‘enhanced participation of Māori in decision making affecting the coastal marine area’.115 According to the Tribunal, the combined effect of the government’s policy amounted to a modern day breach of the treaty, and also undermined the rule of law and fairness inherent in the ‘wider norms of domestic and international law that underpin good government in a modern, democratic state’.116 Its recommendation was simple, echoing the words of the claimants; the government should ‘go back to the drawing board, and engage with Māori in proper negotiations about the way forward’.117

The tribunal’s findings were nothing new. Indeed such themes had played out time and time again between Māori and the Crown. Yet there was another factor at play here that singled out the foreshore and seabed issue as a significant turning point in Māori-Crown relations and convinced iwi that a new strategy for dealing with the state was required. Clark and the Labour government’s decision to circumvent the Court of Appeal’s ruling on the foreshore and seabed came at the end of an era of nearly 20 years, during which Māori had turned to the Waitangi Tribunal, the Office of Treaty Settlements (OTS) and the judicial system to mediate between the Crown’s sovereign rights and Māori common law and treaty rights. The Tribunal and direct negotiations with the Crown via OTS had acted as a safety valve, cooling off the radical dissent of activists that had begun to erupt into violence in the early 1980s and channelling tribal energies into Tribunal settlements and partnership agreements with the Crown and local government. Clark’s decision was a circuit breaker, reasserting government authority over Māori policy and blocking an avenue of redress that had

reaped modest yet positive outcomes for iwi. Labour’s actions sent a message to Māori that judicial recourse was at the whim of the Crown, and could be withdrawn at a moment’s notice. With the power of the courts and the recommendations of the Tribunal undermined, and a political environment hostile to tribal interests, a new strategy was required to ensure Māori had a say in the direction of policy. There was also the issue of utu to be dealt with.

The other major factor that differentiated the foreshore and seabed issue from the many other issues Māori had faced in the past was the fact that it affected all iwi, all at the same time, all in the same way, and it was to be enacted by the government of the day with one single Act. This shared grievance was to have powerful consequences, uniting Māori across tribal boundaries in their search for justice in a manner that had been seen only once before, in the 1940s, the heyday of the Māori War Effort Organisation. Māori seized the opportunity not just to address the present day issue of customary rights and ownership of the foreshore and seabed, but to address the wider and much longer issue of Māori political representation, and the dream of an independent voice in parliament that had long lain dormant. Te Tai Tonga had planted the seed; its roots would spring up throughout the four corners of the Māori world as a new political consciousness flowered and flourished.

Ngāti Kahungunu of the Heretaunga-Hawke’s Bay region were to play a leading role in this next stage of the journey. Recollecting the role his iwi played in the nineteenth century, Ngāti Kahungunu rangatira Ngāhiwi Tomoana mapped out a pan-tribal whakapapa spanning the landscape of his tribal rohe and connecting the events of the past to the present day in an unbroken line. In an interview conducted at Ruahapia Marae he noted that the whare was named after Karaitiana Takamoana, who entered the House of Representatives as the Member for Eastern Māori in 1871. Two kilometres down the road was Waipatu Marae, the site of the first sitting of the Kotahitanga parliament. Nearby, veteran activist and Ngā Tamatoa founder Sid Jackson was buried. With a gesture he reminded me that Te Aute College, the birthplace of Te Kotahitanga Hau, the Young Māori Party, was also nearby and that
the wharekai in which he sat had long been used for Labour Party meetings and was the birthplace of Derek Fox’s short-lived independent Māori party.\textsuperscript{118}

Tomoana placed Ngāti Kahungunu at the centre of the pan-tribal movements, speaking at length on each of them, their quest for ‘the magic of that first whakaaro’ as he described it: te Kōtahitanga i raro i te maru o te Tīrītī o Waitangi, unity under the cloak of the Treaty of Waitangi, and the inter-tribal rivalries and chiefly jealousies that were to be their downfall.\textsuperscript{119} This lengthy history had been preserved in the tribal memory, passed down from generation to generation, and would guide their actions in the present and their vision for the future. Building on this whakapapa, Ngāti Kahungunu’s response to the foreshore and seabed issue was to formulate a broad action plan, figuratively named ‘The Seven Waves of Takitimu’:

When the foreshore issue came down it provided the perfect opportunity to unite Māori. So at that time we had a strategy in Kahungunu called the seven waves, ‘cause in Kahungunu seven is the number, seven waves of Takitimu, seven migrations, the seven years to do anything, seven generations, so we started the seven waves of Takitimu. When the foreshore and seabed came up we said number one, the first wave is to oppose by any means possible, so that was within the rohe. The second wave was to go to the other iwi to see if there was support to start a national opposition. The third one was to lay the issues at select committee, that’s three. The fourth was to go political and extend a political party. Fifth one was to ask Tariana to cross the floor. Sixth one was to go to the United Nations, and the seventh one was to take it to the media and to start the hīkoi. And so that was our seven strategies of Takitimu, seven waves of Kahungunu. So we went out to the motu with our seven waves, and it just gained traction.\textsuperscript{120}

Key to this strategy was their plan to hold a hīkoi to parliament to protest the government’s pending foreshore and seabed legislation.\textsuperscript{121} Ngāti Kahungunu first

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\item[118] Interview with Ngāhiwi Tomoana, Ruahapia Marae, 16 April 2011.
\item[119] Interview with Ngāhiwi Tomoana.
\item[120] Interview with Ngāhiwi Tomoana.
\item[121] The concept borrowed from the protest marches of the 1970s, the Māori Land March of 1975 and the Hīkoi ki Waitangi in 1984. These in turn were inspired by the American protest marches of the 1960s and 1970s, the Black Civil Rights March on Washington of 1963 and the Native American ‘Trail of Broken Treaties’ March on Washington in 1972: Tiopira McDowell, ‘Riria te Riri, Mahia te Mahi:
raised the idea of a hīkoi in August 2003, echoing similar calls for a hīkoi made by Titewhai Harawira at hui in the north. According to Dr Pita Sharples, their original idea had been to take a bucket of sand each from their rohe and tip it on the steps of parliament.

In March 2004 Kahungunu announced their plans for a hīkoi to parliament to coincide with the first reading of the government’s yet to be unveiled Foreshore and Seabed Bill. Tomoana and activists Mereana Pitman and Moana Jackson co-ordinated the hīkoi and its political strategy; the hīkoi was to leave from Māhia on 1 May and arrive at the steps of parliament four days later. According to Tomoana, Kahungunu had approached tribal leaders from other iwi including Ngāti Porou, Ngāi Tahu, Tainui, Te Āti Awa, Tūwharetoa and Ngāti Toa to discuss their plans but gained little support; however, as the march date drew closer other iwi scrambled to jump on board the kaupapa.

The events of early April convinced others to join the fold. Labour planned to table its Foreshore and Seabed Bill in Parliament on 8 April. Uncertainty remained as to whether Labour had the numbers to pass the Bill, as their success hinged on the support of a group the media labelled ‘the three rebel Māori MPs’, Turia, Mahuta and Beyer. Without their support the government did not have the numbers to pass the legislation.
Just a day out from Labour’s tabling of the Foreshore and Seabed Bill New Zealand First offered Labour the numbers they needed to pass the Bill.\textsuperscript{128} The following day New Zealand First officially pledged their support, removing the last hurdle for the Bill to become law.\textsuperscript{129} The Progressives also offered their two votes in support. At the same time, northern activist Hone Harawira announced his own plans to organise a march from Te Rerenga Wairua in the North to parliament to coincide with the hīkoi being organised by Kahungunu and supported by Te Arawa, to create what he described as ‘The largest mobilisation of Māori people since the Land March’.\textsuperscript{130} Harawira admitted it was unlikely that the hīkoi would stop the legislation, but believed the march would have its own value:

Actions like this have moral and historical value that should not be underestimated, actions like this serve as inspiration for continued struggle. Also, huge public demonstrations of opposition are useful evidence in any international forums or World Courts. The legal strategies have now been exhausted, it’s now time to step up the political pressure.\textsuperscript{131}

Behind the scenes, Harawira scrambled to organise his leg of the hīkoi to coincide with Kahungunu, and leading activists from throughout the country threw in their support.\textsuperscript{132} By 13 April an official press release was sent out under the title ‘We’re Marching’ – the hīkoi would leave Te Rerenga Wairua on 22 April and would arrive on the steps of parliament on 5 May.\textsuperscript{133}

Hīkoi organisers were faced with a formidable challenge: they would have to travel the length of the North Island in two weeks, while gaining publicity, garnering support and raising awareness of their cause. They had just two weeks to prepare, fundraise, and deal with the logistical nightmares involved with a task of this magnitude. Their solution was to divide the North Island up into 10 areas, each with

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  \item \textsuperscript{128} ‘Rebel MPs put off their last stand’, NZH, 7 April 2004, \url{http://www.nzherald.co.nz/nz/news/article.cfm?c_id=1&objectid=3559379} accessed on 05/06/2012;
  \item ‘Helen Clark gives Turia public warning over foreshore vote’, NZH, 8 April 2004, \url{http://www.nzherald.co.nz/nz/news/article.cfm?c_id=1&objectid=3559606} accessed on 05/06/2012.
  \item Hone Harawira, ‘the march’ (Email circulated amongst activist networks signalling Harawira’s plans to launch a hīkoi, Thursday 8 April 2004), personal papers.
  \item Hone Harawira, ‘the march’.
  \item Interview with Ngāhiwi Tomoana.
  \item Hone Harawira, Press Release: ‘We’re Marching’ (Includes hīkoi schedule), 13 April 2004, personal papers.
\end{itemize}
an area leader and organisers responsible for organising and hosting the marchers through their rohe. Marches down the main streets and large-scale rallies were planned for the major urban centres and hui on marae were planned for the smaller but significant tribal areas. At night the marchers would be hosted by local marae, and their arrival and powhiri of welcome at each marae would provide them with a forum to discuss their cause with the hosts.

The Northern hīkoi took its first steps on 22 April, with a group of 250 marchers leaving Te Rerenga Wairua at 8:00am accompanied by a fleet of buses, campervans and cars. Over the following four days the hīkoi wined its way through Northland with a core group of 100–200 supporters, fluctuating as members left to return home while others refreshed the ranks. As the hīkoi reached the larger towns and cities its numbers grew with an influx of locals, and groups of several hundred marched in procession as the hīkoi passed through Ahipara, Kaitaia, Mangamuka, Kawakawa and Whangarei. The hīkoi gathered momentum as it travelled south. By the time it reached Awataha Marae and Hato Petera College on Auckland’s North Shore the marchers had hit their stride – bemused onlookers, frustrated commuters and the awaiting media were met with an impressive sight of between 3,000 and 5,000 marchers travelling over the Auckland Harbour Bridge, signalling to the nation that this peaceful behemoth was proving much bigger than anyone could have guessed.

After regrouping at Takaparawhau, Ngāti Whātua’s famous site of occupation better known as Bastion Point, the hīkoi continued on to the Waikato, spending the night at Wāhi pā in Huntly. Around a thousand left Wāhi pā the following morning stopping for karakia at Taupiri, the sacred burial place of the Kīngitanga, before marching

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134 The list of area leaders reads as a who’s who of Māori activism, including in its ranks (from North to South) Manuera Riwai, Cyril Chapman, Mike Smith, Hinewhare Harawira, Angeline Greensil, Kiri Potaka-Dewes, Ken Mair and Teanau Tuiono, though by 13 April the organisers had still to confirm leaders for the Taupo / Whanganui and Porirua legs of the journey. Hone Harawira, ‘The Foreshore & Seabed Hīkoi’ (Email document outlining march details, route, area organisers and background), nd, personal papers; Hone Harawira, Press Release: ‘We’re Marching’.
through Ngāruawāhia, the capital of the Kīngitanga. By midday the hīkoi had reached Hamilton, and the largest crowd yet, estimated at 5,000, marched down Victoria Street in the city centre and gathered at Garden Place for a rally.

Next the hīkoi moved from Waikato southeast to the Bay of Plenty, arriving in Rotorua that night while a relay team of 10 runners carried a tino rangatiratanga flag from Hamilton to Rotorua overnight as the main body of the hīkoi travelled and slept. Another huge crowd of as many as 4,000 marched through Rotorua the following day, including amongst their ranks entertainer Sir Howard Morrison, actor Cliff Curtis, respected kapahaka tutor Wetini Mitai-Ngātai and local icons Doug and Mike Tāmaki, who led the hīkoi through Rotorua on their Harley Davidson motorcycles. At a fiery rally in the city centre Labour MP Steve Chadwick and National MP Wayne Mapp were both booed from the podium, while Judge Hingston won applause from the crowd, describing the Māori male MPs as ‘traitors in the tribe’ and declaring ‘I don’t think we have had such unity among our people since the Second World War.’ The marchers were further buoyed by Turia’s announcement that she would vote against the Foreshore and Seabed Bill in six days’ time, and would resign from parliament effective from 17 May, forcing a by-election in the Tai Hauāuru electorate. From Rotorua the hīkoi continued its journey on to Taupo, with around 2,500 marching in support through the city centre before moving southwest to Raetihi, a settlement on the outskirts of Whanganui.

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143 ‘Hīkoi marchers buoyed by Tariana Turia’s decision’.
144 ‘Scathing words for Māori male MPs’. 
That same day Ngāti Kahungunu began their own hīkoi, with several hundred gathering for karakia in the darkness before dawn at Māhia, where the sands from Hawaiki were deposited by the Takitimu waka. Mereana Pitman remembers that morning as a moment of beauty and spirituality:

At our karakia before the hīkoi left Māhia I was sitting on the edge of the beach… the galaxy of stars was just beautiful, almost right over the top of our bonfires. Stars fell out of the sky three times. About a hundred yards from where we were, whales (two females and a baby) had been buried the day before. It was very emotional, very beautiful and spiritual. In the dark, just the bonfire, quiet, a couple of hundred people there.145

By this stage the main body of the hīkoi had grown to around a thousand – a second hīkoi from Taranaki marched to meet up with the northern hīkoi, and the two groups met at Moutoa Gardens, the sight of a protest occupation in 1994 where Turia first rose to national prominence and the attention of the Labour Party.146 The media estimated the rally through Whanganui was attended by as many as 4,000, 2,500 of those from out of town, an impressive feat for such a small city.147

In an attempt to undermine the hīkoi and its message Clark described high profile activists involved in the march as ‘haters’ and ‘wreckers’ in a radio interview on Newstalk ZB.148 She complained that those leading the hīkoi and speaking on its behalf were the same old faces seen year in year out at Waitangi protests:

You do see the same old faces who are basically speaking - the sovereignty movement, the wreckers like [Annette] Sykes, [Ken] Mair, the Harawiras - and so on… There are plenty of wreckers out there... but somebody has to stand up for a vision of this country where we live alongside each other and respect each other.149

145 ‘There’s a message here’, p.32.
147 ‘Protest tradition lives on at park’.
149 ‘Turia would like separate Māori house in Parliament’.
Clark followed this up by meeting with Shrek the sheep in her office for publicity photos while refusing to meet with marchers on Wednesday. When asked why she was willing to meet with a very woolly sheep but not the hīkoi she retorted ‘Shrek was good company’. Clark also had to contend with Turia’s public declaration that she would vote against the legislation and would resign from the House. On Friday 30 April the Prime Minister sacked Turia from her ministerial roles, and gave her nine staff members until Monday morning to clear out their offices in parliament.

The next day around 2,000 marched to Rātana pā – Ngāpuhi marcher Rīhare Kake summed up the mood of the hīkoi by challenging the Mōrehu with the words ‘maranga mai’ - ‘wake up’ and ‘rise up’. Even at this early stage it was clear to those involved that support from the Rātana movement would be crucial, being as it was the lynch pin of Māori relationships with the Labour Party. From Rātana pā the hīkoi made for its next stop at Otaki, a small rural centre in population terms but a significant tribal centre as the home of Te Whare Wānanga a Raukawa, a tribal tertiary provider held in high esteem by the wider community.

The hīkoi reached Porirua on the outskirts of Wellington by 4 May, its thirteenth day on the road. The following morning the northern hīkoi assembled outside Te Papa, the national museum, in downtown Wellington: they were joined by the Kahungunu hīkoi, convoys from further north and the South Island, and thousands of locals. Organisers expected a crowd of around 10,000 to march to the steps of parliament, while the police made a more conservative estimate of 5,000. With so many groups converging on the city and joining the ranks of the main march from side streets as it wound through the city it was difficult to gauge the numbers involved, but as many as 20,000 are estimated to have marched through the city streets that day.

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153 ‘Protest tradition lives on at park’.
155 Personal communication, Tony Fala, 14 November 2011. Personal communication, Aroha Harris, 15 November 2011. As a member of the Māori Party I was involved with the Auckland leg of the
The hīkoi was led by Ngāti Kahungunu leader and kapahaka expert Pita Sharples, and fronted by a toa of 50 warriors in full traditional dress and weaponry, bare-chested and resplendent in ta moko, their war cries echoing through the narrow city streets. Protest banners and placards carried the message of the hīkoi, with slogans like ‘Māori Seabed For Shore’ and ‘No Raupatu in our time!’ while marchers chanted ‘Tahi Rua Toru Whā, Helen Clark’s a Hōhā’156 and ‘One two three four, Māori own the foreshore, two four six eight, don't you bloody confiscate’.157 Iwi walked proudly side by side under their tribal banners; the tino rangatiratanga flag flew alongside the flags of Samoa, Aboriginal Australians, veteran activist groups Te Rōpū o te Matakite and the Waitangi Action Committee, and the Whetū Mārama of the Rātana movement.

Whetū Tirikatene-Sullivan, herself a long standing Rātana-Labour MP from the 1960s to the 1990s, and the daughter of Sir Eruera Tirikatene, called the hīkoi onto the forecourt of parliament.158 They were led by Te Ōmeka, the ‘purple’ Rātana Band. That it was the Rātana movement who welcomed the hīkoi onto parliament and led the marchers forward was a huge symbolic statement that was not lost on the marchers.159

Māori Labour MPs Horomia, Tamihere and Samuels fronted to the hīkoi and manned the paepae for the government’s side.160 In his typical avant-garde role as activist

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156 David Gilgen, ‘He Tangata, he tangata, he tangata…’, Tu Mai (Hereafter referred to as TM), June 2004, p.25.
158 Newman, p.496.
159 Newman, p.496.
160 Helen Clark refused to meet the marchers – the fact that she had meet Shrek the sheep earlier that week was a symbolic gesture of gross insult to the tens of thousands who had marched and travelled the length of the country to confront her. However television cameras captured an image of Clark in her office, equally as sheepish as her guest, eyeing the masses of protesters as they assembled on the steps of Parliament. Newman, p.496.
meets performance artist, Tame Iti quite literally expressed his disdain for the Māori male MPs by spitting and expelling the contents of his nostrils at their feet.161

For all its pomp and pageantry, it was a quiet moment of humility that defined the hīkoi. Turia walked to the fence separating the hīkoi leaders and parliamentarians from the main body of marchers and greeted a group of women who held aloft several huge portraits of her which, tellingly, seemed to have been hacked off one of Turia’s Labour Party billboards. Turia embraced the women, weeping openly in their arms. It was a jarring and unfamiliar sight, common in funeral processions and protest rallies in Asia, the Middle East and Africa but seldom seen in 40 years of modern Māori activism, as marchers carried aloft the portrait of their martyr, whose life in politics, it seemed, had been lost battling for her beliefs. Pushing through the crowds to sing a waiata tautoko for her kaumatua Toko Renata, Hiria Pakinga recalled that moment:

Alongside of us I could see all the Labour members, Nanaia, Parekura and all of them, I noticed at the time Tariana saw all her group there, Taranaki I think, and she went to the fence and she went to give them all a awhi and kihikihi [hug and kiss] and all that, that’s when I sort of noticed her, right on that day. And I thought, ‘Well she’d be a very proud lady today!’162

Support was not just limited to the Māori community. Large numbers of Pākehā marched with the hīkoi throughout the country – a photomontage published in Tu Mai magazine showed Pākehā supporters carrying signs with slogans such as ‘Pākehā Oppose Raupatu Too!’ ‘Read the Treaty again Helen’, ‘Foreshore theft’ and ‘Pākehā Support Tino Rangatiratanga!’163 Pacific Islanders also supported the hīkoi, with Samoan activist Tony Fala marching with the hīkoi from Waiomio in the North to Wellington, community worker and activist Betty Sio flying a Western Samoan flag as she crossed the Auckland Harbour Bridge, and Samoan rugby star Michael Jones

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162 Interview with Hiria Pakinga, Paeroa, 23 May 2011.

presenting marae with whole cooked suckling pigs and bags of taro to feed the marchers, a traditional presentation reminiscent of the food presented by the Pacific community to the Māori Land March as they passed through Auckland in 1975.\footnote{Interview with Dr Pita Sharples; ‘Samoan Welcome For Marchers’, NZH, 23 September 1975. Hutchinson papers, MS Papers 4285-3, Alexander Turnbull Library, Wellington; Personal communication with Tony Fala, 16 November 2011.}

None were more proud or surprised at the turn out than Ngāti Kahungunu, whose humble protest march had taken on a life of its own:

> We said it didn’t belong to anyone, not to Hone, not to Tari, not to anyone, there were a million footsteps on that march, it belongs to those million footsteps, and that’s the way we framed it.\footnote{Interview with Ngāhiwi Tomoana.}

The following day the Foreshore and Seabed Bill passed its first reading in parliament with the support of New Zealand First. As both sides had predicted, the hīkoi had not convinced the government to change its course of action, but its consequences would be felt in the very near future. Turia delivered a short, sharp and powerful speech opposing the Bill, her delivery perhaps aided by the fact that she had just five minutes to speak, granted to her by Labour MP Mita Ririnui. She commended the marchers for their efforts, describing the hīkoi as ‘a day in our history that will be etched in our memories for years to come’ that represented ‘a great coming together of our peoples, united in their strength of commitment to ensure that the last part of customary land is not removed from our hands’.\footnote{Turia, Speech, Foreshore and Seabed Bill First Reading, 6 May 2004, http://www.parliament.nz/en-NZ/PB/Debates/Debates/Speeches/2/2/8/47HansS_20040506_00001082-Turia-Tariana-Foreshore-and-Seabed-Bill.htm, accessed on 14/03/2011.}

> Turia bemoaned the fact that a simpler solution could have been found that would have satisfied all New Zealanders and avoided the past 11 months of tension between Māori and non-Māori.\footnote{Turia, Speech, Foreshore and Seabed Bill First Reading.}

In her brief speech Turia also questioned why the Bill dealt only with Māori rights, while allowing the rights of private owners and foreign investors to remain intact, describing the legislation as ‘infused with racist overtones in that it is specifically targeted at ensuring Māori are prevented from claiming their inherent rights to the
foreshore'. Her message to the hīkoi and Māori voters was clear and uncompromising:

What we have heard over the months of discussion on this bill, and resoundingly through yesterday’s hīkoi, is the powerful call to stand up and be counted. We are mana whenua. Our authority comes from our relationship and our access to our lands and the rights of guardianship and protection. We will not be relegated to second-class citizens in our own land. We are tangata whenua, and we are proud of it. It is that pride and determination that will drive us in the next hīkoi to the ballot box. We can determine our own future, and we will.

As the hīkoi had made its way to Wellington, plans were afoot to capitalise on Turia’s stand against the Foreshore and Seabed Bill. To officially register a political party the Electoral Commission required 500 signatures; the hīkoi presented the perfect opportunity to discuss the possibilities of a new independent Māori party, and to sign up the supporters needed to register the party. Donna Hall prepared a form to enrol prospective supporters. With the arrival of the hīkoi at parliament supporters began distributing forms and Turia encouraged the marchers to sign up.

Equally as important, the decision of the male Māori MPs to support Labour’s policy against the will of iwi rūnanga, rangatira, activists, Māori leaders, the Māori media, a plethora of interest groups and the tens of thousands of everyday people marching to Wellington was a rare event in Māori political history. The Foreshore and Seabed Bill was not just a test case for customary rights; it was a test case for Māori political representation. Their decision to support the government signified a failing of Māori

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168 Turia, Speech, Foreshore and Seabed Bill First Reading.
169 Turia, Speech, Foreshore and Seabed Bill First Reading.
170 Interview with Tariana Turia.
171 Te Ururoa Flavell recalls seeing Donna Hall handing out enrolment forms as the hīkoi arrived in Wellington. Activist and student Jesse Butler who had travelled with the hīkoi from Te Rerenga Wairua to Wellington recalls enrolment forms were first handed out on parliament grounds on the 5th of May 2004 ‘from a black bus that had a large platform and a speaker system on its roof’. Turia made the announcement to form a party and called for 500 people to sign up and pay a membership fee of $2. Interview with Te Ururoa Flavell, Rotorua, 26 May 2011; Jesse Waiariki Temanava Butler, ‘The Māori Party: The rise of indigenous liberalism: An evolution of Will Kymlicka’s theory of liberal culturalism in Māori politics’, MA thesis, University of Auckland, 2007, p.3.
172 Individual MPs had made unpopular decisions in the past or fallen out of favour with their electorates: Māui Pōmare's decision to enforce conscription on his electorate, the controversy surrounding Ngata's land development schemes, and Rata’s decision to resign from Labour undermined their positions as MPs in the eyes of their electorates.
political representation. It demonstrated to Māori that the loyalties of their MPs lay with their political party, not just with their constituents; it proved that when it came down to issues of significance the interests of the community were secondary; and it demonstrated to iwi that their MPs could not always be called to account for their actions because they answered to Labour first, and voters second. It also showed up some of the failings of MMP; electoral change had put more Māori in parliament than ever before, but even with 16 Māori MPs, only one of them was willing to risk their career by challenging the government.173

The Foreshore and Seabed Bill afforded a moment of clarity for Māori voters, as the failings of Māori representation in parliament dawned on them. The Bill also offered a window of opportunity. On the back of the momentum of the hīkoi and the support for Turia that transcended tribal borders, it seemed possible to realise the long dormant dream of an independent Māori voice in Parliament. Māori seized the opportunity with both hands. Tomoana summed up the mood of the marchers:

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\text{We saw beyond the hīkoi, beyond the foreshore and seabed. And we said this is the most potent opportunity we’ve ever had to form a Māori party. And in the end we said the foreshore and seabed is the cause, but the Māori Party is the result. In the longer macro analysis of it the foreshore and seabed issue washed up the Māori Party onto the foreshore.}\]

As it became clear that Turia would either resign or be ejected from Labour, a handful of leaders, activists and academics began meeting around the country to discuss the possibilities. Turia credits Donna Hall, Atareta Poananga and Moana Sinclair for their vital roles in transforming this vision from dream to reality:

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\text{As I was going through this thing with Labour, people started talking to me, saying ‘Well it’s one thing for you to leave, but we should fight back, and we should be looking at starting our own political movement’, and people like Donna Hall came to see me, Atareta Poananga, Moana Sinclair. And in fact...}\]


174 Interview with Ngāhiwi Tomoana. A pamphlet produced by northern protest organisation Te Kawariki outlining Māori opposition to the legislation handed out before and during the hīkoi made a similar point, stating under the heading ‘Parliamentary Action’ ‘Now’s as good a time as ever for us to build a National Māori Coalition based on Kaupapa Māori, as an alternative to the pasty Political Parties we currently suffer under’. *The Foreshore and Seabed: Get it while you can – it’s disappearing faster than you think!!!*, Pamphlet produced by Te Kawariki, Kaitaia, 2004, personal papers.
we had dinner together to talk about what it might be, because at the time Donna and them had the Aotearoa Māori Party... And she kind of thought that maybe we could go down that road, and we thought ‘No, we should look for something fresh and new’, we really needed to think, and because people were saying we should start a Māori party, that was the messages we were getting in there, we thought ‘Yeah, why not?’ It was a great brand.175

After speaking with the group, Turia sought the advice of elder and respected leader Whatarangi Winiata. The suggestion of an independent Māori voice in parliament resonated with a concept he himself had been pushing for many years, the idea of a dual parliament or bicameral house, consisting of a treaty house and a general house, based on the model adopted by the Anglican Church.176 Winiata keenly supported the fledgling party and would be appointed as its inaugural president.

The hui continued. On returning to Auckland, Sharples called Turia, promising his support should she choose to launch a new party.177 Turia travelled to Auckland, meeting at the home of June Jackson in Auckland with a small group of supporters including Sharples, Willie Jackson and June Jackson.178 At the meeting the decision was made that Turia, with the support of Sharples and others, would start a new party; Willie Jackson advised Turia to make contact with Matt McCarten to help set up the party and contest her upcoming by-election in Te Tai Hauāuru.179

Hone Harawira led activist involvement in the formation of the party, calling together the organisers of the hīkoi at Whāingaroa to formulate their plans for the future, as recalled by Flavell:

How we all came together was, not long after the hīkoi Hone called us all together, that protest element if you like, to Eva Rickard’s papakainga in Raglan, and he said ‘Well I heard there’s gonna be a teleconference, and Whatarangi Winiata’s on it, Pita Sharples is on it, Tariana Turia is on it, and a couple of others and they’re looking to form a party, I think we need to be

175 Interview with Tariana Turia.
176 Interview with Tariana Turia.
177 Interview with Dr Pita Sharples.
178 Interview with Tariana Turia.
179 Interview with Tariana Turia.
there’. And so somebody contacted Tariana and said ‘Look can we have other people on the call?’ So I was on the call with Hone with a couple of others and we all said basically to Whatarangi ‘We want to be a part of this, if you’re gonna make a political party’.180

With the looming deadlines of Turia’s by-election and the readings of the Foreshore and Seabed Bill, there was a pressing need to formalise the party. Following on from the teleconference, Flavell called a hui at Te Roro o te Rangi in Rotorua to continue discussions around the new party – 20 leaders attended including Sharples, Turia, Winiata and those involved with the hīkoi from Rotorua and around the country.181

With a strong nucleus of supporters acting as a steering committee, fewer than three weeks after the hīkoi had arrived in Wellington the group organised a series of public hui to discuss the idea of an independent Māori party. The first was held at Hoani Waititi Marae on 23 May 2004. The hui was attended by around 200 people: it endorsed the adoption of the name ‘The Māori Party’, Sharples and Turia were nominated as party co-leaders, and Winiata was nominated as party president.182 Sharples recalls that while he had been a very vocal advocate for the cause he had no intention of standing for parliament, having turned down four previous nominations:

  We’d been having hui around the place about what we’re gonna do, ‘Should we have a party?’ and I was very vocal, I was really angry at what they’d done, and this is somebody, that’s me, who has turned down at least four nominations to stand for parliament, cause I had no inclination to go there, really I didn’t wanna go there, I’d rather be out in the community, out on the marae doing stuff and creating opportunities which we can force on the system, and we have done quite a few of those, rather than being inside that House. So in the end I was one of the loudest talkers at a hui at Waititi Marae, they threw me up as a co-leader with Tariana.183

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180 Interview with Te Ururoa Flavell.
181 Interview with Te Ururoa Flavell.
182 Interview with Dr Pita Sharples.
183 Interview with Dr Pita Sharples.
The following day another major hui was held at Turangawaewae Marae in Waikato.\(^{184}\) The hui was attended by around a thousand people and speeches were delivered by Te Ope Mana a Tai, Mahuta, Turia, McCarten and Angeline Greensil amongst others. The hui endorsed the resolutions for the establishment of a Māori party; Turia and Sharples were endorsed as interim co-leaders, and Winiata as interim Party president. The party was not officially named, but was dubbed ‘the Māori party’.\(^{185}\)

At this stage the party name and leadership were regarded as filling the void in the interim, until such time as decisions could be firmed up and more suitable selections made. Yet, with just six weeks to prepare for a by-election, expediency made the decision for them; the interim party leaders were endorsed as its official leaders, and when a young graphic designer Wiremu Barryball designed a logo, as Turia described, ‘it just all fell into place’.\(^{186}\) On 9 June 2004, the Māori Party applied to the Electoral Commission to be officially registered as a political party, and launched its new logo.\(^{187}\)

The idea of launching a political party and contesting a by-election in just six weeks sounds like an impossibility, but as many of its supporters indicated in their interviews, the momentum of the hīkoi and the overwhelming support for Turia and a new party created a huge wave of support, picking up this humble waka and launching it on a sea of hope and goodwill. Donna Gardiner, a founding member of the Māori Party in Tāmaki Makaurau, recalled the ease with which the party was established: ‘we rolled in on the tide of the overwhelming support for the foreshore and seabed hīkoi and Tariana’s stand’.\(^{188}\) Veronica Henare and Martin Cooper, founding members of the party and electorate office support staff for Sharples, made similar comments in a joint interview:

\(^{184}\) The hui was organised by Hori Awa and hosted by Tainui at the capital of the Kīngitanga, and was well timed, falling the day after the annual Koronaihana celebrations when leaders from around the country were already assembled at the pā. ‘Urgent Pānui! RE: Change of Date: Turangawaewae Hui o te Motu’, Hori Awa, 2004, personal papers.

\(^{185}\) Māori magazine *Tu Mai*, based in Hamilton, described the party as ‘temporarily called ‘The Māori Party’, and offered a list of twenty potential names: the name ‘Māori Party’ was not included in its list. ‘Potential Party’, TM, June 2004, n.p.

\(^{186}\) Interview with Tariana Turia.


\(^{188}\) Interview with Donna Gardiner, Auckland, 11 April 2011.
Martin: Everyone was on the move you see? Because it was the hīkoi and then the by-election, everyone was high on emotion. We had so much emotion, and that led right through to the election. We got a huge amount of support, new membership…everyone was on a roll.

Veronica: I tell you…we were just buzzing on it, because everyone was saying ‘Māori Party!’ and honestly you just felt so good. It was just overwhelming. That was the feeling out there, the atmosphere was just alive and it inspired you, the adrenalin was flowing, it was like a drug, it really was… we were, like Martin said, on the wave of the hīkoi.189

Party branches quite literally sprung up overnight throughout the country, as supporters from urban and rural communities banded together, hosted public hui to launch branches, appointed chair people, secretaries, branch representatives and treasurers, and contacted party leadership to confirm their affiliation. In Tāmaki Makaurau Hinewhare Harawira and Titewhai Harawira established Tāmaki ki te Whau, the first Tāmaki Makaurau branch based in Avondale with Titewhai Harawira as its chairperson, and a second was quickly set up by hīkoi marcher and at that time student Jesse Butler for students at the University of Auckland.190 By October 2004 around a dozen branches had formed in the electorate.191 In Te Tai Tokerau the first branch of the Māori Party was formed in Kaitaia by Hone Harawira, who assumed the role as chairperson, and more sprung up throughout Northland in quick succession.192 In Waikato branches were formed at Te Wānanga o Aotearoa and later in Hauraki.193 In Ikaroa-Rāwhiti Gordon Paku formed the first branch in Hastings, and several weeks later a Heretaunga branch was formed in Gisborne: the two branches met up and formed the Ikaroa-Rāwhiti electorate.194 In Waiairiki, hīkoi organisers and members of activist group Ngā Tai o te Reinga established themselves formally as a Rotorua branch – the communities they had visited to discuss the foreshore and seabed issue under the auspices of Ngā Tae o te Reinga in turn formed their own

189 Joint Interview with Martin Cooper and Veronica Henare, Auckland, 8 April 2011.
190 Butler, p.3.
192 Butler, p.3.
193 Interview with Matthew Solomon; Interview with Hiria Pakinga.
194 Interview with Gordon Paku, Ruahapia Marae, 16 April 2011.
branches, with branches forming quickly in Taupo and Murupara, and more followed in succession.\textsuperscript{195} Turia’s upcoming by-election gave the rohe the impetus to combine together as the Waiaariki electorate.\textsuperscript{196} Likewise in Te Tai Hauāuru and Te Tai Tonga, whānau and supporters of the hīkoi organisers and the party’s leadership formed the first branches and more followed in quick succession. As branches spread throughout the country, they linked up to form steering committees in each of the rohe; the structure of the party was formalised after the by-election.\textsuperscript{197}

At this early stage of its development the party had little in the way of formal documentation. The drafting of the party manifesto, constitution and rules had begun at the Rotorua hui at Te Roro o te Rangi – Judge Hingston had provided an outline and lawyer Donna Hall had worked on the early drafts with help from others; Flavell led a working stream refining the constitution in the months ahead.\textsuperscript{198} In the lead up to the first national hui on the 10 and 11 July a draft of the manifesto, constitution and rules of the party were sent out to party members.\textsuperscript{199} No official policy existed at this point either. The main document passed around to potential members was a membership form prepared by Hall.\textsuperscript{200} The lack of documentation perhaps aided the party’s growth – with little in the way of policies to offer potential members the branches took membership forms out to the community, and the membership ballooned exponentially. Between May and July 2004 the Māori Party signed up around 4,000 members. By the time of the November 2005 general election the Party had around 21,000 members. Within the space of 18 month the fledgling party had gone from having the requisite 500 members to having the largest membership of any

\textsuperscript{195} Interview with Te Ururoa Flavell.

\textsuperscript{196} Interview with Te Ururoa Flavell.

\textsuperscript{197} The party at this time was organised according to western structures of committees, with a chairperson, a treasurer, secretaries taking minutes, sub-committees delivering reports and members passing motions. Having said this, the meetings were also run according to tikanga Māori as formal hui, beginning with powhiri and mihimihi and starting and ending with karakia from kaumatua.

\textsuperscript{198} Interview with Te Ururoa Flavell; Interview with Tariana Turia.

\textsuperscript{199} ‘Constitution and rules of the Māori Party’, sent out to Māori Party members from the office of Hon. Tariana Turia MP for Te Tai Hauāuru on behalf of Interim President of the Māori Party, Whatarangi Winiata, personal papers; ‘Minutes of Tāmaki Makaurau Regional Electorate Committee Meeting held Sunday 31 October 2004, Te Ara Poutama, AUT, Wellesley Street, Auckland, Commencing 4:10pm’, personal papers.

\textsuperscript{200} The form was a sparse black on white document entitled ‘Māori Party Membership Form’ with no logo and little more than a space to sign one’s name, address and signature and four bullet points, confirming the signee was enrolled as an elector, had paid their membership fee of $2, authorised the party to record their name as a financial member, and authorised the secretary to release the form to the Electoral Commission. The secretary at this stage was listed as a Ms Naomi Waitai, with a PO Box in Lower Hutt. ‘Māori Party Membership Form, May 2004—May 2007’, personal papers.
political party in the country, a feat which gave supporters and detractors alike an inkling of what was to come.201

Interviews with Māori Party members indicate that involvement in the hīkoi and interest in the foreshore and seabed issue were the most significant factors in influencing individuals to join the party in 2004 and 2005. Yet these were not the only reasons members joined.202 One commonality that Māori Party members shared and cited as their reason for joining was previous involvement with community groups, ranging from political parties and religious affiliations to activist groups and gangs. As members of community groupings that extended beyond their immediate whānau, members knew the importance of tribal and pan-tribal unity, appreciated the support networks offered by group membership, and understood the potential of community groups to undertake fundraising, membership drives and awareness raising initiatives, tasks that individuals would have found too daunting to undertake alone. They also knew how to exist within wider community groups. They understood how roles were apportioned to members and were comfortable with the committee procedures and Māori tikanga associated with these sorts of organisations.

Personal connections with Māori Party leaders played a significant role in convincing supporters to join. For some, whakapapa links were enough of a reason to join the party, while for others past work experiences or support of candidates as community leaders garnered their support.

Another trend that emerged was that a number of Māori Party members had leapt from movement to movement over the years. One kuia described being raised within the Rātana Church and the Kīngitanga, and shifting her allegiance from the Labour Party, to Mana Motuhake, on to New Zealand First, and ending in the present day with the Māori Party.203 Another kaumatua described moving from union work to the Labour Party and on to the Māori Party, while supporting a wide range of movements

202 Interview with Veronica Henare; Interview with Solomon Matthews; Interview with Gordon Paku; Interview with Donna Gardiner; Interview with Hiria Pakinga; Personal communication with Robert Curd, 19 October 2011.
203 Interview with Hiria Pakinga.
and initiatives.\textsuperscript{204} The trend of individuals, whānau, hapū, and iwi shifting allegiances from group to group and movement to movement seen during the era of Ngā mātāmua emerges again here, and should be recognised as a key stratagem of Māori political engagement as communities moved with the times in their search for effective vehicles for Māori independence. The question the party will face in the future is whether it is a new home for Māori votes, or simply another temporary vehicle.

If the Māori Party was a product of a long history of Māori political movements, it was also an immediate response to circumstances. In a sense Labour forced Māori to play their hand, leaving them little option but to form a new political party. All but one of the Māori Labour MPs had been gagged, and all four major parties — Labour, National, New Zealand First and ACT, along with United Future — opposed tribal rights to the foreshore and seabed, leaving Māori with just two options. They could either return, humiliated, to Labour or strike out on their own and build a new independent party. Māori chose both, forming the Māori Party and electing four of its candidates to the seven Māori seats in the 2005 general election while splitting their party vote in favour of Labour, and voting in Labour candidates in three of the Māori seats in 2005.

The Māori Party’s first major test was to contest the Tai Hauāuru by-election, triggered by Turia’s official resignation from parliament on 16 May 2004. The following day Prime Minister Clark announced that a by-election would be held on 10 July.\textsuperscript{205} By 18 May it was confirmed that none of the political parties in parliament would be standing candidates against Turia; many regarded it as waste of money 14 months out from a general election.\textsuperscript{206} However, on 17 May the Aotearoa Legalise Cannabis Party announced their plans to stand a candidate, and Labour Party supporter Peter Wakeman announced he would be standing as an independent ‘to ensure there was a competition’.\textsuperscript{207} Nominations for the by-election closed on 15

\textsuperscript{204} Interview with Gordon Paku.
\textsuperscript{206} If no candidates had stood to contest the by-election, Turia would have been declared the winner, sparing the Party tens of thousands of dollars in campaign costs and saving tax payers around $450,000 to run the by-election. ‘Pro-cannabis party to stand against Turia’; ‘By-election Boost for Turia’, NZH, 4 June 2004, http://www.nzherald.co.nz/nz/news/article.cfm?c_id=1\&objectid=3570557 accessed on 05/06/2012.
\textsuperscript{207} ‘Pro-cannabis party to stand against Turia’.
June, and it was announced that Turia would be standing against five other candidates: veteran activist Dun Mihaka representing Legalise Cannabis, and Tahu Nepia, Peter Wakeman, David Bolton and Rusty Kane, all standing as independents.

In spite of the overwhelming support for Turia and her lacklustre competition for the seat, the party did not regard the by-election as a foregone conclusion. Turia’s success was crucial to the party’s existence at this early stage; without a foothold in parliament and the election funding provided to sitting members, the party would struggle to get off the ground. Turia had been in parliament for eight years by this stage, but she had only held the Tai Hauāuru seat for two years. Though she had run electoral campaigns before, she had done so with the power of the Labour Party machinery behind her, and while she could rely on a large and passionate body of supporters, few had experience in running electoral campaigns. Though they faced no significant competition, interviewees admitted that the by-election would take every ounce of effort the party could muster.

Turia turned to McCarten, formerly of the Alliance Party, to run her campaign. McCarten’s genius was his combination of experience and communication. In a practical sense he knew how to plan and run an electoral campaign, but perhaps even more importantly, he knew how to explain the process to others with no previous experience in a manner that made such a daunting and complex task seem manageable and achievable. McCarten also opened up his considerable contacts to the party, introducing Turia to Gerard Hear, a Pākehā from her electorate with considerable experience in running electoral campaigns that helped organise her campaign on the ground. Within a period of weeks, McCarten and his team inducted their inexperienced but enthusiastic workers into the intricacies of running an electoral campaign, teaching them how to analyse previous poll results, warning them about the voter apathy that distinguished by-elections from general elections and thus the need to mobilise voters on the day, and explaining how to break down electorates into manageable blocks for door knocking campaigns. With McCarten’s help, party members learnt about the numbers of supporters required to door knock and canvas an entire electorate, how many people were required to man polling booths as

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208 Interview with Tariana Turia.
209 Interview with Tariana Turia.
scrutineers, and to provide transport for voters on election day, as well as the costs of a by-election and the fundraising strategies required to cover such costs.\textsuperscript{210} As one of many workers who learnt under his tutelage during the by-election, Veronica Henare praised McCarten for his ability to ‘make it real’:

I know that if it hadn’t have been for Matt we wouldn’t have made it...because he was organised, he really did have the goods in terms of the nous, he’d run elections before, he’d run by-elections, and he made it real. And he knew he had people that were just willing to do the work and to be led, ‘Just tell us how to do it Matt and we’ll do it, and even though we’ve only got twenty people we’re going to do it, we’ll knock on 30,000 doors if that’s what we have to do’, he gave us the process.\textsuperscript{211}

McCarten focused the electorate’s efforts on canvassing voters to find who supported Turia, and providing them with transport and encouragement on the day to go out and vote. Apathy, not policy, party or personality was the greatest challenge Turia faced.

Around the country, the other six electorates rallied to support Turia. Each of the seven rohe were assigned sections of the Tai Hauāuru electorate.\textsuperscript{212} Their job on the day was to man the polling booths as scrutineers, to remind people on the street that the by-election was taking place, and to transport voters to polling booths.\textsuperscript{213}

After a long day’s work, supporters gathered at the Memorial Hall in Whanganui to officially launch the Māori Party and to await the outcomes of the by-election.\textsuperscript{214} Turia’s victory was comprehensive; of the 7,861 votes cast, 7,256 were won by Turia. Her nearest competitor, Dun Mikaha, won just 197 votes, 2.52% of the vote. That night party members and supporters celebrated throughout the country. Some labelled the win a hollow victory, pointing to the fact that none of the major parties had run candidates, yet Turia’s victory still held some significance. The by-election had taught members how to run an election campaign, and supporters returned to their electorates

\textsuperscript{210} Interview with Tariana Turia.
\textsuperscript{211} Interview with Veronica Henare.
\textsuperscript{212} Joint Interview with Martin Cooper and Veronica Henare; ‘Regional Hui Being Organised for Rohe Participation on the 10\textsuperscript{th} and 11\textsuperscript{th} July in Te Tai Hauāuru’.
\textsuperscript{213} Joint Interview with Martin Cooper and Veronica Henare.
\textsuperscript{214} ‘Māori Party Launch, Memorial Hall, Watt Street, Whanganui, Saturday, 10\textsuperscript{th} July 04 & Sunday 11\textsuperscript{th} July 04’, Programme, personal papers.
high on the victory, ready to implement what they had learnt.\textsuperscript{215} The win built on the momentum gathering behind Turia, boosting the confidence of supporters, signalling to Māori voters that a new star was on the rise, and firing a warning shot to the Labour Party that their safest seats were no longer so safe. The by-election also firmed up Turia’s support base of voters, those who would continue to vote for her in the 2005, 2008 and 2011 general elections. When asked about the significance of the by-election and its outcome, Turia pointed to the enthusiasm of her electorate, the need to send a message to Labour, and the support base she secured:

Well Labour refused to participate in the by-election, and I think about four or five people stood against me, I can’t exactly remember how many now, but the electorate was electric! [Laughs] They felt that even though Labour wasn’t standing it was really important to send a message. We got 93% of the vote, and there’s no doubt Labour’s not participating was, I think, an important issue, but the interesting thing is that we’ve always secured at least that same vote, not 93% because once Labour came in they got about 5,000, but we’ve always secured between 11 and 12,000 of the votes, so it was really good to be able to capture that vote at that time and to be able to maintain it.\textsuperscript{216}

The following day the first national hui of the Māori Party was held at the Memorial Hall, attended by about a thousand people. Having won their first seat in parliament, supporters set about confirming drafts of the party’s constitution, rules and manifesto, officially electing a president, co-leaders, treasurers, a general secretary, and approving the reports of the national organising committee.\textsuperscript{217} Their expedience was warranted. In 14 months they would face a general election, in which they would contest all seven Māori seats and 35 general seats.\textsuperscript{218}

So why was it that the Māori Party were able to succeed where previous movements had founded or even failed to envisage? Certainly the foreshore and seabed issue, Turia’s principled stand, and widespread support for the party played a role, but there was another added ingredient that allowed this cake to rise where others had sunk.

\textsuperscript{216} Interview with Tariana Turia.
\textsuperscript{217} ‘Māori Party Launch’.
\textsuperscript{218} \url{http://www.electionresults.govt.nz/electionresults_2005/electorateindex.html} accessed on 17/03/2011.
The introduction of MMP was crucial to the success of the Māori Party in the Tai Hauāuru by-election and the 2005 general election. Māori dissatisfaction with Labour had begun with Rata’s exit from the party in 1979, and was exasperated by the policies of Rogernomics and Labour’s shift away from its traditional alliances with Māori and the unions. Māori were open to considering a new ‘home’ for their votes and the new voting system extended their influence in the political landscape significantly. MMP offered an increase in the Māori seats, a considerable increase in the number of Māori MPs across the political spectrum via party list votes, and the ability to elect a third party that could enter into coalition with one of the two major parties. The formation of an independent Māori party was now a viable option. Subsequently Māori voters elected New Zealand First MP Tau Henare to the Tai Tokerau seat in 1993, and delivered all five Māori seats to New Zealand First in 1996. According to Ann Sullivan, Māori voters saw in New Zealand First ‘an alternative, more assertive agency of Māori political influence’. The experiment did not pay off. New Zealand First performed poorly, courted controversy, and was wracked by factionalism that saw the Māori MPs split into a number of independent political parties. None were re-elected. In 1999, Māori voters returned to Labour ‘not because Māori disillusionment with Labour had been fully resolved, but because the alternative had failed’, and split voting in both the 1996 and 1999 elections indicated that Māori voters were still undecided as to where their alliances lay. The emergence of the Māori Party offered voters another opportunity to break from Labour.

Another significant difference between the Māori Party and its immediate predecessors, Mana Motuhake and New Zealand First, was the involvement of the community in the formation of the party and the accountability of the party to the community. The party was formed at the request of iwi and leaders, not the whim of a single sitting member unhappy with their current political party, as had been the case with Rata and Winston Peters, leader of New Zealand First. Unlike Rata, Turia’s

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219 Sullivan and Margaritis, p.66; Aimer, p.256.
reasons for leaving Labour were clearly understood and she gained widespread sympathy and support for her actions. The structure of the party reflected its ‘commitment to the community’, with the power and drive of the party coming from its branches and electorates, not from the party’s executive.\(^{224}\) The party’s manifesto, constitution, rules and policies were built on Māori tikanga and kaupapa, and were drafted at public meetings with the input of a wide range of members of the community. The Māori Party made a point of hosting hui in small rural settlements that were ignored by the larger parties, which ‘empowered the communities and the grass roots party membership’.\(^{225}\) Finally the party ran a kanohi ki te kanohi or face to face electoral campaign, based upon the less sophisticated but far more appealing techniques of word of mouth, door knocking, visiting market days and hui. Community involvement was built into the party from day one to ensure the Māori Party remained responsive and accountable to its constituents.\(^{226}\)

The formation of the Māori Party was thus both a reaction to immediate circumstances and part of a longer search for an independent voice for Māori in parliament. It was formed as a consequence of Labour’s foreshore and seabed policy, Turia’s resignation from parliament, widespread sympathy for her stance, the momentum of the hīkoi, and the fact that the foreshore and seabed affected all hapū and iwi simultaneously, unifying Māori across tribal and regional boundaries.

The political environment played an equally as important role. The search for a new home for Māori votes, the possibilities offered by MMP, opposition to Māori ownership of the foreshore and seabed by the four major parties, and Labour’s undermining of the justice system as a viable avenue for redress led Māori to form a new political party more responsive to their needs.

The party was also part of a much longer search for an independent voice for Māori in parliament, with Māori dissatisfaction with Labour dating as far back as the 1940s, and receiving a major boost with Rata’s resignation from Labour in the late 1970s and the Rogernomics reforms of the 1980s. The introduction of MMP, the involvement of


\(^{225}\) Smith, p.409.

\(^{226}\) Smith, p.410.
the community in the formation of the party, and the party’s responsiveness and accountability to the community were instrumental in ensuring the Māori Party would succeed where previous movements had failed.

The formation of the Māori Party was an exciting development in the world of politics. However, there have been, and will continue to be, consequences as a result of the formation of the party. Māori politics is fractious and prone to infighting and pluralism. Mana Motuhake imploded, with Alamein Kopu resigning from the Alliance in 1996 and unsuccessfully attempting to form her own political party, Mana Wāhine Te Ira Tangata.227 New Zealand First fell apart in a similar fashion, with its members quitting to form their own parties. New legislation in the form of the Electoral (Integrity) Amendment Act was passed in 2001 to prevent so-called ‘waka jumpers’, as they were labelled by the media.228 Perhaps unsurprisingly, the one time the legislation was invoked was when a Māori MP, former ACT MP Donna Awatere-Huata, was suspended from her party.229 The Māori Party has proved no different. In 2011 Māori Party MP for Te Tai Tokerau Hone Harawira resigned from the party and successfully contested the seat in a by-election and general election, launching his own Mana Party. In the same election, Labour retained their two safe seats, Ikaroa-Rāwhiti and Hauraki-Waikato, and regained Te Tai Tonga from the Māori Party incumbent, Rahui Katene. With three political parties holding Māori electorate seats, Māori political representation has never been more divided.

If history has shown that Māori politics has tended to be fractious, it has also shown that a single, united Māori mandate across the Māori seats has proved far more effective than a series of divided individuals. The greatest challenge the Māori Party faces is not just retaining their seats in the face of stiff competition from Mana and Labour, but in convincing Māori voters of the effectiveness of a unified Māori voice, and that theirs is the party best suited to provide that voice. Likewise, Māori voters will have to decide whether the pluralistic approach delivers results, or whether a return to a single Māori mandate will be more effective.

227 Robie, p.308.
228 Robie, p.308.
229 Robie, p.309.
The formation of the Māori Party also speaks to the longer history of Māori political engagement and the circumstances that create Māori political movements. The party was a product of circumstances which combined to inspire the community and rally support around Turia’s cause. Three criteria — a major issue effecting either an iwi or Māori as a whole, a pervasive sense of dissatisfaction with the status quo, and the emergence of effective leadership — have been present in all the major Māori political movements of the last 170 years. In this regard the Māori Party was no different to Mana Motuhake, Rātana or the Kīngitanga. These three criteria explain some of the mysteries inherent in the formation of these movements: how the Kīngitanga was able to make such a paradigmatic shift in attitudes towards traditional leadership and tribal organisation in such a short time; why the Kotahitanga and the Young Māori Party entrusted leadership in such young leaders; how the Rātana Movement, the Māori War Effort Organisation and Mana Motuhake garnered so much support, raised so much money in fundraising and signed up so many members in such a short time. The Māori Party simply confirmed the trend. The communal ethic, defined as whānaungatanga and manaakitanga or kinship and support in pre-European times and redefined to include the modern concepts of kotahitanga and Māoritanga, pan-tribal unity and Māori nationalism, in the nineteenth and twentieth century are bedrocks of Māori social organisation and culture. The ability of Māori communities to transcend whānau, hapū and iwi boundaries and tribal rivalry to pull together in times of hardship or change is a powerful impulse that has had a significant impact on the direction of Māori political engagement.

The Māori Party also tells us something about the processes inherent in the formation of Māori political movements, and the strategies adopted by Māori to form such movements from the past to the present day. The foreshore and seabed issue began with a group of iwi from one area, the Marlborough Sounds, forming a pan-tribal pressure group to address the issue. Their first recourse was to the legal system. When the legal system failed them other iwi saw the significance of the case. As a result a series of national foreshore and seabed hui were launched to discuss the issue amongst iwi throughout the country, and Te Ope Mana a Tai was established to coordinate Māori responses. Next Māori used political pressure, public hui and the media to put pressure on the government, representing both tribal and pan-tribal groups. At the government consultation hui, Māori used the dramatics of activism and
protest to express their dissent. When the policy paper was published another round of political pressure via the media and hui was launched, and claimants and interest groups turned to the Waitangi Tribunal for support. When all these activities had failed to force the government to change its plans, Māori stepped up the pressure, organising a hīkoi of protest to Wellington with tens of thousands marching in support. Next, Māori leaders, academics, activists and rangatira met in small groups to discuss the way forward. A series of large-scale pan-tribal public hui were hosted, the idea of an independent Māori political party was launched and supported, and the party was formed and won its first seat in parliament.

This process tells us something about how Māori society operates; it demonstrates how tribal groups can operate independently, in conjunction with other tribes as regional groups, and as pan-tribal groupings. It shows the strategies Māori use: legal recourse, political pressure, protest, engagement with the media, and finally the formation of pan-tribal political organisations. The use of the customs of hui, kōrero and tautohe, that is meetings, debate and protest are essential, as time and time again they were employed to discuss issues, form organisations, mount political pressure and express dissent. We also see here the ways in which different types of leadership operate within Māori society – tribal rangatira, academics, politicians, activists, rangatahi, trade unionists and grassroots everyday Māori all played their part, their contributions combining in a synergy that gave birth to a political movement and a political party in the space of eight weeks. By seeing these processes in action in the formation of the Māori Party, we gain an understanding of the processes, the types of leadership, the tribal, regional and pan-tribal configurations, and the customs, both ancient and modern, that have been employed by Māori in the past and present and will undoubtedly continue to do so in the future.

Finally, this chapter speaks to two wider themes: the search for political independence, and the agency of Māori communities in deciding and directing their own destiny. As the testimonies of the interviewees have shown, the formation of a Māori Party was not just about voting against the Foreshore and Seabed Bill, voicing their dissatisfaction with the government of the day, or punishing their Members of Parliament. The foreshore and seabed issue offered a window of opportunity to establish an independent Māori political party, an option that had been considered but
never actuated. Whether it was Tomoana's 'magical thought', Turia’s broken covenant or Winiata's bicameral house, Māori Party supporters had a vision for Māori politics, and saw the party as the means of transforming their dreams into realities.

This chapter also demonstrates clearly the agency of Māori communities, a theme that has been touched on again and again in this thesis. The formation of the Māori Party was not the work of tribal patriarchs and Pākehā patrons. It was the product of the entire community, from academics and activists to lawyers and politicians, from apostles and gang members to rangatira and iwi incorporations. The party was launched on the backs of the tens of thousands who marched on the hīkoi, established branches up and down the country, and walked the streets of cities they had never before visited in Te Tai Hauāuru to win the first of many seats they would come to hold in parliament. Their efforts demonstrate clearly the agency of Māori communities in deciding their own destinies, and give us an inkling of how past movements were established and operated in pursuit of that same goal: mana motuhake, te tino rangatiratanga, ‘the magic of that first whakaaro’, te Kotahitanga i raro i te maru o te Tiriti o Waitangi.
After the highs of her by-election victory, Tariana Turia returned to parliament as a political pariah, ostracised by her former Labour colleagues, New Zealand First and the Progressives who had voted for the Foreshore and Seabed Act, and distrusted by the National Party and ACT who wanted to do away with the Māori seats. Only the Greens were there for occasional moral support. As her party continued to build on its support base in the community, Turia was left with the unenviable task of spending the next 14 months in the House as a lone voice for the Māori Party. Recalling her return to parliament, Turia expressed a profound sense of loneliness:

I was incredibly lonely, I was very isolated, hardly anybody spoke to me, I was terribly lonely if I’m telling the truth. And my husband shifted home too at that time, so I was down here [in Wellington] on my own, then I contacted my daughter, and she came to Wellington to be here with me, she was studying at that time, she gave up her job and decided she would study to be here with me, her and her partner and children. So that was really great for me to have family around me, but yeah, I was pretty lonely.²

Leading into the 2005 general election the Māori Party set about building a political machine based on grassroots support and a sizable contingent of party members on the ground canvassing voters and signing up supporters in the Māori and general electorates. Labour opponent John Tamihere summed up succinctly the momentum of the party, confiding with a party member on the loss of his Tāmaki Makaurau seat: ‘You know the Māori Party had so many people on the ground we didn’t know what to do, there was no way we could compete with that’.³ The party fielded candidates in the seven Māori electorates, ran candidates in 35 general seats, and produced an ambitious party list of 62 members.⁴ Gaylene Nepia of Ngāti Apa was appointed as the party’s national campaign manager; candidates in the general seats were expected to fund and run their own campaigns, while the candidates in the Māori electorates enlisted the support of leaders from the community, a number of whom had never run electoral campaigns before.

The party won four of the seven Māori electorates, with Hone Harawira, Pita Sharples, and Te Ururoa Flavell wrestling Te Tai Tokerau, Tāmaki Makaurau and Waiau respectively from the Labour incumbents, and Turia retaining Te Tai Hauāuru. The party won a total of 75,076 electorate votes (3.4% of all electorate votes), and 48,263 party votes (2.1% of the party votes and below the threshold required to gain list seats in parliament).⁵ The discrepancies between their electorate and party votes, indicating that once again in an MMP election Māori voters had split

² Interview with Tariana Turia, Wellington, 16 May 2011.
³ Interview with Donna Gardiner, Auckland, 11 April 2011.
their vote, led to an overhang in parliament, increasing the number of seats in the House from 120 to 121.6

With the Labour-led government and the National Party running neck-and-neck heading into the 2005 general election, the Māori Party had hoped to hold the balance of power. Prime Minister Helen Clark poured water on the suggestion, advising the party that it would be ‘the last cab off the ranks’ in any coalition talks.7 The Māori Party entered into talks with Labour soon after the election, but it was clear that Labour had the numbers to govern and any chance of a coalition was soon ruled out.8 The party faced the proposition of having to justify its existence over the following three years: it may have wrestled four of the seven Māori seats from Labour, but Labour had gained the majority of the party votes in the Māori electorates. The outcome indicated that Māori voters supported the Māori Party MPs but favoured a Labour-led government. The mixed result in the Māori electorates raised the spectre of the 1999 general election, when after a brief fling with New Zealand First Māori delivered their votes back to Labour. The Māori Party would have to prove its worth, or face possible ejection in three years’ time.

The Māori Party recognised that it had to expand its vision beyond the single issue of the foreshore and seabed – remaining a one-issue party would not allow the party or its support base to grow. The need to broaden the party’s electoral appeal would become even more pressing if the party’s parliamentary leaders were unable to achieve their promise of repealing the foreshore and seabed legislation. Since every issue in parliament affected Māori, the party adopted the strategy of speaking on every bill introduced to the House, a rationale explained by Sharples:

We spoke on every single bill, and sometimes every reading. We wanted to show we weren’t a one-stop shop, we weren’t just there for the foreshore and seabed, we were there for all issues, and we said ‘Rule number one, all issues are Māori issues, number two, therefore we should speak to all bills’. So that was where that idea came from, and I think that did a lot to show that we

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7 One News, Clark conducts first round of talks, 19 September 2005.
weren’t just there to eat our lunch, so I think we did a lot to show that a Māori party can deliver.9

The strategy helped to build the credibility and profile of the party. As Flavell would later summarise:

In reflection, it was about building credibility… because we were new, we had to take time to build up our profile and our position in the political spectrum. They kept talking about us as being either left or right, we said ‘No no, actually we’re Māori’, so we worked on an issue by issue basis…it was all about trying to make sure that we lifted our profile…so we did that through the speeches and the press releases, it was just about keeping our presence out there.10

Between 2005 and 2008 the four Māori Party MPs delivered a staggering number of speeches in parliament, roughly four times more than their Labour counterparts.11 Their ambition to speak on every issue became self-fulfilling: the media began approaching the Māori Party for their commentary on a range of issues affecting Māori and the wider community, and the Māori MPs began appearing on television, radio and in the print media on a weekly and sometimes daily basis.

The Māori Party also worked to change the culture of parliament, beginning on their first day in parliament. On arrival in Wellington their first action was to visit the Green Party for karakia and mihimihi, paying tribute to the passing of Green Party leader Rod Donaldson.12 As the Māori Party MPs prepared to enter parliament they waited for the Greens, escorting them in and out of the House, recognising their status as te whānau pani, the grieving family. Just as the doors to parliament were opened, Harawira broke protocol by delivering an impromptu mihi: for the first time in New Zealand’s history parliament had been opened in te reo Māori.13

9 Interview with Dr Pita Sharples, Auckland, 8 April 2011.
10 Interview with Te Ururoa Flavell, Rotorua, 26 May 2011.
13 Flavell, p.182.
In the weeks ahead the party rejuvenated the use of Māori language in the House. Parliamentary protocol held that speeches in Māori would be translated after they had been delivered, preventing other MPs from commenting or interjecting, a system the Māori Party MPs found insufferable:

The problem was that if the speeches were in ten minute blocks the interjectors would have to wait until the end of the speech to understand what was being said before they could call a point of order, but by that time it was five minutes down the track and therefore the whole point was lost.\(^{14}\)

By making a point of delivering their speeches in Māori, the party forced parliament to introduce instant translation, which members could access via an earpiece. Their efforts encouraged MPs from other parties to respond, interject and ask questions in Māori, and for the first time in parliament’s history debates were held in te reo Māori on a regular basis.\(^{15}\)

The party also worked to change the decorum of parliamentarians while the House was sitting. The disrespectful and often unruly behaviour that had long been accepted as the norm in parliament clashed with the cultural norms of the marae, where speakers could attack a kaupapa but were expected to respect the personal mana of their fellow orators, as Sharples explained:

We made so much difference in terms of the behaviour of people in there, the etiquette, people stopped abusing each other. We protested against that kind of act, there’s a lot of give and take and jokes and stuff, before they used words like ‘pervert’ and stuff like this across the House which is not a good way to behave. We behaved differently, we had a different way of behaving, and that was very noticeable.\(^{16}\)

On 12 June 2007 the party held a press conference with members of the Greens, ACT and United Future to announce it would be signing a voluntary Code of Conduct, and urged MPs from the other parties to follow suit. The code included a clause agreeing

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\(^{14}\) Flavell, p.182.  
\(^{15}\) Interview with Dr Pita Sharples.  
\(^{16}\) Interview with Dr Pita Sharples.
that MPs should show respect to the Speaker of the House and other members, and refrain from personal attacks.\textsuperscript{17}

Māori political commentators were impressed with the party’s performance: reviewing its first year in parliament Rāwiri Taonui praised the party’s ‘measured’ ‘patient and composed’ ability to ‘comment sensibly on issues without surrendering their principles’, singling out their responses to the Report of the UN Special Rapportuer on the Foreshore and Seabed Act, Sharples’s response to discussions over the death of the Kahui twins, and their engagement with the Māori ‘warrior’ gene debate.\textsuperscript{18} Taonui commended the party for ‘placing kaupapa and principles above personalities’ in dealing with the major political parties, running their caucus according to kaupapa Māori, and staying in touch with kaumātua, describing their efforts as giving them ‘maturity beyond the sum total of experience in Parliament’.\textsuperscript{19} Taonui foresaw a ‘robust future’ for the party, and predicted they would continue to take seats from Labour and could possibly hold the balance of power in 2008.\textsuperscript{20}

In December 2006 Kaapua Smith delivered an ‘End of year report card’, commending the party’s impressive ability to deliver speeches and churn out press releases, and appraising their political process of inspecting every piece of legislation, assessing them according to the party's kaupapa, supporting bills at their first reading so the public could have a say at select committee, and their ‘agree to disagree’ policy of allowing their MPs to vote as they saw fit.\textsuperscript{21} The Māori public seemed to agree with these assessments: a Māori digipoll taken in late 2006 indicated 78% of Māori voters were satisfied with the Māori Party’s performance, while 43.7% would vote for them.\textsuperscript{22}

By the end of their first term in parliament the Māori Party had increased their support base;\textsuperscript{23} moreover they had proven to supporters and critics alike that there was a place

\textsuperscript{17} Office of the Speaker, \textit{A Code of Conduct for Members of Parliament – is the time ever right?}, Speech to 38\textsuperscript{th} Presiding Officers and Clerks Conference, Rarotonga, 12 July 2007.
\textsuperscript{18} Rāwiri Taonui, ‘Māori Party on Track’, \textit{Tu Mai}, October 2006, p.32.
\textsuperscript{19} Taonui, p.32.
\textsuperscript{20} Taonui, p.32.
\textsuperscript{22} Smith, p. 43.
\textsuperscript{23} Smith, p. 43; \url{http://www.electionresults.govt.nz/electionresults_2008/partystatus.html} accessed on 15/11/2011.
for an independent Māori party within the nation’s political spectrum, and that they could act as articulate spokespeople and advocates on issues affecting Māori and the wider populace in spite of the fact that they were in opposition. With regards to effectiveness the Māori Party had not been able to wield power during their first term in government: they did not hold positions of power, substantive or symbolic, they were unable to pass or influence legislation that brought positive outcomes for Māori, and they were unable to stall the governments’ seabed and foreshore policy. That said, they met the criteria of accountability and expressing Māori viewpoints, and were rewarded as such by voters in the upcoming election.

In the 2008 general election the party won five of the seven Māori seats, with Rahui Katene taking the Tai Tonga seat from incumbent Mahara Okeroa and Māori Party candidates coming within striking distance of their competitors in the Labour seats of Hauraki-Waikato and Te Tai Rāwhiti. The party increased its party vote from 48,263 to 55,980 votes, but their 2.9% share was still too small to gain a list seat.24 Individually the MPs in the Māori electorates increased their majorities significantly from the previous election, with Sharples nearly tripling his majority over Labour candidate Louisa Wall and Harawira and Flavell more than doubling their majorities. In Hauraki-Waikato Angeline Greensil came within 888 votes of unseating Nanaia Mahuta; Derek Fox edged to within 1645 votes of Parekura Horomia, and Katene defeated Okeroa by 1049 votes.25

While happy to gain another seat, the Māori Party MPs were disappointed with the result. They had campaigned to win all seven of the Māori seats and had hoped to position the party as the ‘king maker’ that would decide who would form the next government.26 Flavell recalled their disappointment on election night, and how quickly the situation was to change:

I was happy for Rahui but disappointed that we’d missed on the other seats, and disappointed that we weren’t in the box seat, cause that’s what we were aiming for. So it wasn’t very pleasant… we were all fairly depressed that we

didn’t win the other seats, we were a little bit tetchy with one another… then we got the phone call that John Key wanted to talk to Tariana, and all of a sudden we recognised, ‘Hey there might be something up here?’ That night we had a meeting off the record with John Tamihere, we pulled him in to give us some advice…and then the next morning Tariana and Pita went down to see John Key…. So from going from an element of almost despair and disappointment that we hadn’t done as well as we were hoping, things turned to, ‘Wow these things could happen’.  

The day after the election the leaders of the Māori Party and National entered into discussions over the possibility of forming a coalition government. The party’s decision would decide their future – on the one hand they had been unable to enter into coalition with Labour under Clark’s leadership, so declining National's offer would effectively mean the Māori Party could not work with either major parties at the present time, and could not wield power in parliament in the foreseeable future, calling into question their effectiveness as an independent voice for Māori. On the other hand, Māori voters had given their party votes to Labour, indicating they wanted a left-led government. The party could not be blamed for ushering in a right wing government as National had the numbers to rule in coalition with ACT and United Future, but the Māori Party MPs risked being branded as ‘traitors’ or ‘sell outs’ for joining a coalition with a party that in the previous election had campaigned to remove the Māori seats and bring an end to ‘Māori privilege’. The decision was left to the party membership: a series of closed hui were organised throughout the country in October 2008, at which party leaders and MPs discussed the proposition with their electorates. Despite some reservations from party members and calls of ‘sell outs’ and ‘kūpapa’ from hard-line Māori activists and leftwing Pākehā, the party accepted the proposition.

27 Interview with Te Ururoa Flavell.
On 16 November the Māori Party signed a Confidence and Supply agreement with National. The text of the agreement called for a relationship of ‘mana enhancement’ ‘good will’ and ‘no surprises’ between the parties. National agreed to consult with the Māori Party on issues of legislation, policy, budgets and government appointments, and promised regular meetings with the Prime Minister and access to government ministers. Both parties agreed to establish a group to investigate constitutional issues including Māori representation, and National agreed not to remove the Māori seats ‘without the consent of the Māori people’. In turn neither would seek to entrench the Māori seats that term and a question on the status of the Māori seats would not be included in National’s planned referendum on MMP scheduled for 2011. With regards to the foreshore and seabed, both parties agreed to review the current legislation by December 2009 to ‘ascertain whether it adequately maintains and enhances mana whenua’, with the possibility of repealing the legislation if necessary. The Māori Party co-leaders were offered ministerial positions outside of Cabinet: Sharples was appointed as Minister of Māori Affairs and Associate Minister of Education and Corrections, while Turia was appointed Minister for the Community and Voluntary Sector, and Associate Minister of Health, Social Development and Employment. Both parties agreed to deal with the disproportionate size of the Māori electorates and several of the general electorates by agreeing to appoint an extra staff member to all MPs with electorates in excess of 20,000 sq km in size. The agreement outlined further clarification of the relationship between the two parties, covering policy priorities, briefings on politically sensitive issues, confidentiality, collective responsibility, procedural motions and select committees.

With the signing of the coalition agreement the Māori Party’s lengthy honeymoon period with Māori voters, the public and the media was well and truly over; the party could now wield power and implement their policies, but they would also face fierce criticism from within and outside the party for daring to work with a right-wing government.

31 Confidence and Supply Agreement between the Māori Party and the National Party.
32 Confidence and Supply Agreement between the Māori Party and the National Party.
The party gained some important concessions during their first term in coalition. Chief amongst them was the implementation of Whānau Ora. Launched on 8 April 2010, with Turia appointed as Minister in charge of the scheme, and $134.3 million set-aside in the budget to fund it, Whānau Ora took a holistic, whānau-orientated approach to social development, encouraging service providers and government agencies to deal with families collectively rather than individually, and to empower families to find their own solutions to the problems they faced.33 Turia had long spoken out on the failure of bureaucracies to protect the welfare of children and the family, and the need of government agencies to empower whānau to solve the issues they faced themselves. The policy represented the culmination of her life’s work in the social development sector.34

Whare Oranga Ake was another significant policy initiative launched by the party, building on Sharples' decades of work in the area of restorative justice and the treatment of Māori within the justice system and the Department of Corrections. The scheme was first announced in the May 2010 budget, and the first facilities or ‘Whare’ were opened in July 2011.35 The scheme introduced correctional facilities for Māori prisoners nearing the end of their sentences. The Whare were run according to tikanga Māori, with the express goal of rehabilitating Māori offenders back into society by reconnecting them with their whānau, culture, identity and community. The first two Whare Oranga Ake reintegration units were launched in Sharples's rohe at Hawke’s Bay Regional Prison and Spring Hill Corrections Facility, with each providing 16 beds for inmates.36 Almost $20 million was provided to launch the scheme over four years, and Sharples hoped the units would ‘help reduce the growth in numbers of prisoners and contribute to savings - not just in Corrections - but in the wider social costs of crime and punishment’ and in the long term would ‘show measurable reductions in rates of re-imprisonment’.37

34 See for example New Zealand Parliamentary Debate (Hereafter referred to as NZPD), 1999, 578, pp.17120-17121.
37 Press Release: Whare Oranga Ake will help cut reoffending.
The most significant and most controversial of the Māori Party’s policies was its introduction of the Marine and Coastal Areas (Takutai Moana) Bill. As part of their Confidence and Supply agreement National and the Māori Party established a Ministerial Review Panel to review Labour’s Foreshore and Seabed Act 2004, and undertook an extensive consultation with the wider community throughout the country in early 2009. The panel found the Act had failed to balance the rights and interests of all New Zealanders and discriminated against iwi. In March 2010 another round of consultation hui was run by the government to discuss their findings and preferred solutions: at the same time Hone Harawira fronted a series of consultation hui on behalf of the Māori Party, encouraging submissions from iwi on the proposed bill. After 18 months of consultation, the Marine and Coastal Areas (Takutai Moana) Bill was introduced and passed its first reading in September 2010. During the following five months a Māori Affairs Select Committee took public submissions and oral hearings on the Bill, the committee reported back on 15 February 2011 and the Bill passed its second reading on 8 March and its third on 24 March 2011.

While responses were mixed, Māori largely opposed the legislation; support from iwi was muted and non-committal, while opposition by activists, iwi leaders and the wider community was strong, dominating debates in the media. A Horizon research poll released two days after the Bill’s second reading, indicated that 41.2% of Māori polled found the Bill to be an ‘unacceptable’ or ‘very unacceptable’ solution, while only 10.9% found the Bill ‘acceptable’ and only 0.4% of those polled found it ‘very acceptable’.

Crucially, Hone Harawira opposed the Bill, citing its failure to establish Māori customary title or ‘tūpuna title’, and protesting the fact that it protected the rights of Pākehā private landowners while placing the ‘burden of proof’ on iwi to go to court to

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establish their rights.40 After such a lengthy battle to oppose Labour’s legislation and establish the Māori Party to introduce new legislation, opponents were understandably disappointed that the new Bill still did not vest the foreshore and seabed in iwi. On 23 February 2011, Harawira resigned from the Māori Party and on 11 May resigned from parliament, forcing a by-election in his Te Tai Tokerau electorate.41 Having left the Māori Party Harawira launched his own political party, named the Mana Party, on 30 April at Mahurehure Marae in Auckland. He went on to win the Tai Tokerau by-election with a majority of 1,117 votes over his nearest rival, Kelvin Davis of the Labour Party.42

Fall out over the Bill and popular sentiments that the Māori Party had sold out and become too comfortable in their relationship with National was to have a considerable impact on the party in the 2011 general election.43 After losing the Tai Tokerau by-election in June the party failed to regain the seat from Harawira in the November general election and lost the Te Tai Tonga seat to Labour candidate Rino Tirikatene. Turia, Sharples and Flavell saw drastic cuts to their majorities and their share of the party vote dropped from 55,980 in 2008 to 38,982 in 2011.44 In terms of the criteria of effectiveness employed in this thesis, the Māori Party had reversed the position they had held in the lead up to the 2008 election. By entering into coalition with National they were able to wield power, holding positions of influence and developing and passing legislation. It is difficult to assess at this early stage whether their policies will deliver positive outcomes to Māori, though they did increase government spending and ring-fence existing spending on Māori. But with the passing of the MACA Act

40 Hone Harawira, Open Letter to the Māori Party Caucus, 23 March 2011, personal papers.
Northern protestors launched a hīkoi to oppose the Bill on 14 March 2011, arriving on the steps of parliament eight days later. The hīkoi was a fraction of the size of the 2004 hīkoi, with a group of 300 marching on parliament, but it indicated that sections of the community vehemently opposed the Bill. http://www.3news.co.nz/Hīkoi-planned-against-Marine-and-Coastal-Bill/tabid/419/articleID/201820/Default.aspx accessed on 16/11/2011; Northern Advocate, ‘Hīkoi marches on Parliament to lay to rest foreshore and seabed legislation’, 22 March 2011, p.1.
the party’s accountability to Māori voters had taken a nose dive, as had their ability to voice a viewpoint supported by the Māori community, and they suffered a significantly reduced vote in the 2011 election. The outcomes of the Māori Party’s coalition with National echoed those of Carroll and the YMP’s alignment with the Liberals and the United Party. They had gained positions of power and passed legislation, and maintained substantial support from their electorates for several decades, but eventually lost the support of the community by aligning themselves with a right wing government whose politics and interests were at odds with those of the majority of Māori voters. With Party co-leaders Sharples and Turia promising to retire before the next election in 2014 and the newly created Mana Party and rejuvenated Labour Party battling for Māori votes to their left, the Māori Party faces an uncertain future.

This thesis began with a central question and a series of queries branching off from it: what is the nature of Māori political engagement, and how have Māori engaged with parliament and the Māori seats over the past 144 years? Having investigated five of the most significant phases of Māori political history we are now better equipped to answer these questions.

The Māori seats were established with a mix of sincerity, pragmatism, cynicism, humanitarianism and paternalism. Pākehā politicians had the final say, and the pressing need to balance the number of North and South Island members in the House provided the tipping point, but Māori agency should not be underestimated. Whether it was the United Tribes of New Zealand in 1835, the rangatira that debated furiously, day and night, over the signing of the Treaty at Waitangi in 1840, the northern tribes that waged war in the 1840s against the Union Jack that flew over Kororāreka, the efforts of Tamihana and the Kingitanga chiefs, first to build a place for Māori within the settler government then to build their own government, or the chiefs that built a new covenant with the government at Kohimarama in 1860, Māori agency and agitation was there at every step of the way.

At first there was little interest in the Māori seats – enthusiasm for voting was minimal and elections were difficult to run due to the lack of polling booths and returning officers. Candidate selection processes were practically non-existent – the
first Māori MPs were either kūpapa leaders or chiefs who had bothered to show up on election day. But interest steadily grew in the late-nineteenth century, corresponding to the emergence of political movements like the Kīngitanga, Kauhanganui, Repudiation movement, the royal deputations of the 1880s and the Kotahitanga movement, who saw the potential to achieve their goals via parliament. Further to this, as Ranginui Walker has argued, members were elected according to ‘kinship obligations, tribal alliances and Māori values’, and by the 1900s increased competition for the seats and the mana associated with them signified that tribes had begun ‘incorporating the seats as an integral part of Māoritanga’.45

With this pattern set, Māori regard for the seats has fluctuated between keen interest and apathy over the past 144 years. During the era of Ngā mātāmua the seats were hotly contested by competing tribal and pan-tribal groupings, and the same can be said of the modern era from 1996 to the present day. During the era of the YMP and the Rātana-Labour period Māori voters were happy to re-elect their MPs regardless of whether they were in government or out of government, making progress or stalling. The pattern that emerges here is that Māori voters prefer to mandate a single group to the seats. If a group, whether it be the YMP or the Rātana-Labour MPs, have the mandate of the Māori electorates there will be less interest and little competition for the seats, regardless of the MPs performance in the House or whether they are in government or opposition. These groups lost their mandates when a new movement was formed, and at these times the Māori seats have been vigorously contested. Ann Sullivan has argued that Māori MPs in the MMP era have been elected according to a mix of three criteria – mana, whakapapa, and being part of the right party.46 This is true of the entire period, though we must add to these the criteria of the mandate, based upon the issues and movements of the day.

In this sense Māori voting patterns differ considerably from the general seats. Māori are less interested in the state of the economy, party politics, party leadership and policy. Māori vote according to mana, whakapapa, party alignment, and having the mandate of the people. If Māori MPs have all or most of these they will retain their

seats regardless of performance or whether they are in government. If they fail to meet these criteria they will lose their seats, even if this means their electorates will lose a place in government. The one consistent trend is that from 1943 to the present day Māori have voted left of centre, and the vote splitting of the MMP elections from 1996 to the present day, whereby Labour have secured the strongest party votes even when they have lost the majority of the Māori seats, indicates this trend will continue on in the twenty first century.

Māori are simultaneously the most conservative, loyal, radical and unpredictable voting population in New Zealand. Political commentators and historians have failed to understand and explain Māori voting patterns and predict the outcomes of elections because they have not understood the criteria that influence Māori voting.

Māori attitudes to leadership and candidate selection went through major changes in the late nineteenth century. Increasingly, MPs were selected because they had the support of a major iwi combined with the mandate of a pan-tribal movement. Education and the ability to speak English were regarded as increasingly more important in the late nineteenth century, peaking during the YMP era. The electorates also began to take a more measured approach to candidate selection from the 1880s, re-electing members over several terms rather than relying on the ever-competing and ever-changing leadership that typified the politics of the marae. In the twentieth century MPs were largely selected by their parties: Māori communities mandated the movements they wished to hold the seats and the movements selected their own candidates. There were occasional exceptions: Puti Watene was elected with Labour support against the will of the Rātana movement in 1963, and Matiu Rata was elected via union support in 1962, though he had the mandate of the Labour Party and the Rātana movement. The three Māori parties, Mana Motuhake, the Māori Party and the Mana Party are also exceptions, as all three allowed wider community involvement in the selection of candidates. Their actions are a nod to more traditional forms of leadership selection, though the selections made by these parties have not always translated into votes. We see a gradual shift here, from marae-style politics and tribal leadership, on to political movements and a more western form of candidate selection, and back to more traditional community-based models in the twenty first century. It could be argued that the recent performance of party-selected MPs from Labour and
New Zealand First and their lack of accountability to their constituents has encouraged Māori communities to take a more active role in candidate selection again. The emergence of Māori political parties built upon tikanga has aided this process. It could, however, be a cycle – if Labour regains the Māori seats in the 2014 election we may see a return to the western model of the party selecting their candidates.

What did Māori hope to achieve by sending their leaders to parliament, and what ambitions did those leaders carry with them? This has varied from movement to movement and era to era. In the late-nineteenth century MPs were sent to parliament to represent their tribes’ interests, and the interests of pan-tribal movements. The YMP were elected with a mandate for modernisation, and their members brought with them plans for Māori cultural retention, government assisted land development schemes and the retention of the tribe as a meaningful expression of social organisation in the modern era. The hopes and ambitions of the Rātana movement had both a spiritual and secular focus, balancing up the Bible and the treaty, including the resolution of tribal grievances, equality of treatment of Māori by the government, and the māramatanga and prophecies of T.W. Rātana. In execution, the MPs varied significantly – Sir Eruera Tirikatene and Rata both had a broad vision for reform across a range of issues, while MPs like Iriaka Rātana and Tapihana Paikea had a much narrower focus of interest. The Māori Party and Mana Party MP Hone Harawira entered parliament with a mandate to reprimand the sitting MPs and repeal the government’s foreshore and seabed legislation; both parties have significantly expanded their focus of interest since entering parliament.

That said, there have been bread and butter issues that Māori MPs have been expected to address, taking in land rights, tribal grievances relating to land and resources, ratification or at least recognition of the Treaty of Waitangi, education, housing, health, equality of rights, the retention of the Māori language and culture, and the rights of women and children.

If these were the hopes and ambitions of Māori MPs and their communities, we must ask whether they have been achieved. Ngā mātāmua made some gains at the turn of the century, extending the existence of the Māori seats indefinitely, raising awareness
of Māori issues, putting tribal grievances on the official record for future generations to act upon, reaching settlements of tribal land grievances via the Native Affairs Select Committee and behind closed doors and giving hope and direction to their people in difficult times. They were hindered by their inability to establish a united Māori voice in parliament and government apathy. Future movements would learn from their lessons, realising that unifying the Māori seats and aligning with Pākehā political parties were more effective means of utilising the seats.

In the twentieth century, the achievements of the Māori MPs were typified by long periods of inaction, interjected with bursts of activity. The YMP made limited gains in the early twentieth century, reforming land policy and reaching limited settlements with several iwi. Sir Apirana Ngata would have to wait some 16 years before his party became government again and he gained the Native Affairs portfolio. His achievements as Native Minister were impressive; there was an about-face in the direction of Native policy and the introduction of schemes that built the Māori economy and bolstered culture, language retention and the mana of the tribe. Ngata gained power by serving as a loyal party member for 23 years, but resigned from his portfolio after five years. Pākehā politicians and the wider public were not yet ready to see a Māori MP wield power autonomously, regardless of his abilities.

As part of the Rātana-Labour alliance, the Rātana koata enjoyed considerable success between 1935 and 1945: Māori were included in the welfare state, received increased assistance in the areas of housing, health, and education, and the government reached limited settlements with tribes over historical grievances and began to address the inequalities Māori faced at the hands of government departments and policy implementation. The high point of the alliance was the Māori War Effort Organisation: for a brief moment iwi were offered the independence they had long campaigned for and they made the most of it. The flip side of this was that the Rātana MPs had little say over the direction of policy, and with changes in Labour’s leadership policies for Māori largely dried up between 1945 and 1973.

During his brief spell as Minister of Māori Affairs and Lands between 1973 and 1975, Matiu Rata made a raft of positive reforms for Māori, including the repeal of the hugely unpopular 1967 Māori Affairs Amendment Act, the establishment of the
Waitangi Tribunal to settle tribal grievances, and increased spending on Māori housing, health and education. With a change in Labour’s leadership and the loss of the 1975 election Rata’s fate changed for the worse – he lost his position as Māori Affairs Minister and spokesman and eventually resigned from Labour to form Mana Motuhake. Rata had reached the heights of achievements but had hit a glass ceiling, as sympathy for Māori needs again ground to a halt.

These three examples were the high points of Māori political engagement, during which time Māori policy surged forward. Patterns emerge from these examples that illuminate the factors that helped and hindered the Māori MPs. Effective representation was essential – MPs who were able to articulate Māori interests, act upon them and keep up with the fast pace of parliament best served their constituents and were rewarded with ministerial positions. For those less suited to the environs of the House, candidate selection played a role. Those selected according to their abilities were more effective; those who gained their seats via succession or whakapapa alone were less effective. The effectiveness of Māori MPs has been assessed in this thesis according to a number of criteria: the ability to wield power by holding positions of influence and passing legislation, achieving positive outcomes for Māori, remaining accountable to Māori electorates and the ability to express a Māori viewpoint. What this study has shown is that holding power in government has not been the be all and end all of Māori politics. The effectiveness of Māori MPs according to these criteria has varied from era to era and movement. The ability to hold positions of influence and pass legislation that benefitted Māori has at times won the support of the Māori electorates, but Māori voters have proved just as supportive of MPs who remain accountable to their people and express their viewpoint, regardless of whether they wield power.

Party loyalty was equally as important: Those Māori MPs who proved their loyalty to Pākehā political parties were rewarded in due course with positions of power, though they would have to wait many years. Ngata waited 23 years for his opportunity to take the Native Affairs portfolio; Rata waited 10.

Pākehā party leaders and prime ministers were also key to the successes of Māori MPs. When party leaders supported Māori interests, Māori policy surged forward, as
was the case with Michael Joseph Savage, Peter Fraser and Norman Kirk. When party leaders had less interest in Māori concerns policy ground to a halt, as was the case with Walter Nash and Bill Rowling. The same is true for the Māori Party; Prime Minister John Key entered into coalition with the Māori Party in 2008 with a set of issues he wanted actioned for Māori. If Don Brash had been elected in 2005 it is unlikely he would have gone into coalition with the Māori Party, and would more than likely have introduced a reversal of Māori policy.

The ability to cross party lines served some MPs well. Māui Pōmare was the first to do it in 1912 when he crossed the floor to join the Reform government. Ngata resented the move but soon followed suit, remaining with the Liberals while working closely with the Reform government during his lengthy years in opposition, and working as an adviser to the Labour Party while the Rātana movement contested and eventually held the Māori seats. Ngata learnt that little could be achieved by Māori MPs if they remained in opposition. The Rātana MPs did not learn this lesson and suffered the consequences for decades at a time, though Iriaka Rātana had little time for party politics and developed strong working relationships with right-wing colleagues in her electorate. The Māori Party have followed in the footsteps of these three, entering into coalition with National in 2008. They have made considerable gains from this relationship, achieving their goal of repealing the foreshore and seabed legislation and introducing a raft of new policy initiatives, but they have suffered considerably at the polls, as their alignment with National has been deemed unpopular by Māori, regardless of its benefits.

There were also many factors that hindered Māori political engagement. Māori MPs could either wield power or retain an independent voice, but being able to attain both simultaneously has proved difficult. If Māori MPs have wished to wield power, they have had to toe the party line, prove loyal and faithful party supporters, and refrain from any overt public criticism of government policy. If they have wished to retain an independent voice for Māori, as was the case for Ngā mātāmua, Rata in his later career, and most recently Hone Harawira, power has eluded them.

Māori MPs have also faced a glass ceiling: they have been tolerated in parliament and by the public and media to a point, that point being where they began to wield
significant power. Party leaders and prime ministers have controlled the height of the ceiling: Savage, Fraser and Kirk set it at the penthouse suite, Nash and Rowling set it on the ground floor. If Māori MPs did not like the restrictions of the ceiling they had to either put up with it or leave. The Rātana koata were not brave enough to make the leap of faith, fearing the prospects Māori would face under a right-wing government. Rata made the leap but did not stick the landing. Turia made the leap and landed on her feet, aided by MMP. Ngata and Rata were the greatest casualties of this glass ceiling.

Thus far the Māori Party have been the only political movement who have managed the task of being in government, holding ministerial portfolios, making significant policy gains, and retaining a degree of independence to speak their mind and act accordingly on government policy, but because they have aligned with National the consequences have been dire in the polls, and they may well be the last movement to transcend the paradox of Māori representation. Their success in this respect is a testament to the party’s founding kaupapa, but is also a reflection of the MMP environment and the space it has made for competing political viewpoints within coalition governments.

This thesis has not just been about political interactions between tangata whenua and the Crown: the changes and continuities in Māori culture and society have emerged as a significant theme in this research. What does this thesis tell us about the influence of Māori culture, customs and social norms on Māori political engagement, and what influence has Māori engagement with the state had on Māori culture and society?

Māori culture has had a significant impact on Māori political engagement; a unique brand of Māori politics has developed over the past 144 years. The customs of karakia, mihimihi, powhiri, hui, kōrero and tautohe have been translated from the marae to parliament. From the era of Ngā mātāmua through to the formation of Mana Motuhake, the Māori Party and the Mana Party these customs have been drawn upon to address concerns, discuss solutions, build movements and implement plans. While the Pākehā customs of the political party, caucus, committees, remits, and motions have been adopted by political movements, the conventions of the marae have been
Mana Māori: The Māori Party in Parliament

Mana and whakapapa are just as relevant today for parliamentary candidates as they were in the nineteenth century, and being a kanohi kitea, a seen and known face, is equally as important. Māori have adapted this system, so that personal mana gained in the arenas of activism, academia, business and sport are recognised as on a par with whakapapa ties, and a kanohi kitea may be seen regularly on the television as well as the marae.

The protection of Māori language and culture has long been a concern for the Māori MPs, and in some senses they have played an instrumental role in preserving these cultural treasures. Ngata’s efforts to revitalise Māori art, craft, language, oral history, music and tribal organisation contributed to the survival of Māori culture at the turn of the century. The Rātana movement helped build the institution of kapa haka in the 1920s, reintroduced the Māori language into parliament, campaigned for decades on the teaching and the correct pronunciation and spelling of the language and place names. Rata introduced courses to teach the language in the 1970s.

In other ways, political engagement has had an influence on Māori culture and society. Pākehā political organisation and the lack of Māori political representation informed and inspired the formation of the first major pan-tribal movement, the Kīngitanga. Subsequent movements interacted with parliament, occasionally winning seats in the House to exert pressure on the government. This saw the development of a tradition in Māori politics, that of the mandate, whereby movements would have to win the mandate of the people to gain seats in parliament, but would thereafter retain those seats even if they were out of government or Māori policy had ground to a halt. In many ways parliament and Pākehā politics has changed Māori society, informing the creation of wider pan-tribal groupings that did not exist in the same fashion before the arrival of Europeans.

All these factors have combined to create a uniquely Māori approach to politics that is dynamic and difficult to predict. At times Māori politics has appeared tame and predictable, at other times it has been radical and ground breaking. With the pluralism
of the Māori seats and the heated competition between Labour, the Māori Party and Mana Party, this trend does not appear likely to change any time soon.

Māori have also had some impact upon parliament. The Māori Affairs Committee room is the strongest symbol of the place the Māori MPs have built for themselves in parliament. Harawira’s efforts to open parliament in 2005 with a mihi in te reo Māori, the introduction of live translations in the House, and the 2007 Code of Conduct all represent efforts by modern MPs to change parliament into an environment that embraces Māori language and culture.

So what have Māori achieved over the past 144 years by engaging with parliament and the Māori seats? What benefits, if any, has political representation garnered for Māori? The Māori seats have never satisfied tribal desires for the ‘tino rangatiratanga’ promised them by the Crown in the Māori text of the Treaty of Waitangi. Four seats were never enough to represent the disparate voices of the many hapū and iwi of Aotearoa, and 144 years seems a long time to wait to see an increase in the seats by just three. Interest in the seats has fluctuated wildly over the years: at times they have represented the vanguard of Māori politics and activism, but they have equally seen decade upon decade of inaction, apathy and low voter turnout in the polls. Māori policy has been at the whim of Pākehā politicians and parties: Māori have only wielded power in parliament with their say so, and incidences of Māori MPs wielding power have been few and fleeting, limited by the media, popular opinion, the paradox of Māori representation and the glass ceiling of parliament.

With these limitations in mind, it must nonetheless be stated that the Māori seats in parliament have been the single greatest concession granted by the government to tangata whenua, a singular, solitary nod to the unfulfilled promises of the Treaty of Waitangi. Many of the greatest advancements Māori have made in the past 172 years have been implemented via the Māori seats in parliament, whether it be Ngata’s economic development plans, inclusion in the welfare state, the Māori War Effort Organisation, the establishment of the Waitangi Tribunal, the settlement of tribal grievances or the instatement of te reo as an official language. These break throughs have not been the initiative of the Māori MPs alone – whānau, hapū, iwi, pan-tribal organisations, religious groups, unions, activists and the whole range of Māori social
groupings have instigated and agitated for change. The seats have provided the entry point for the community to engage in direct discussions with the state, and the MPs have provided a fillip to influence policy and opinion. The MPs themselves have been Māngai, mouthpieces for their constituents, giving voice to the hopes and dreams, the fears and ambitions, the grievances and goals of the community.

The casualty of Māori political representation has been tribal independence. The offer of seats in parliament undermined the search for a Māori parliament in the nineteenth and early twentieth century, and the dream of tino rangatiratanga and mana Māori motuhake were buried for over 70 years, re-emerging in the politics of radical activism in the 1970s. With the capacity building of hapū and iwi and the devolution of state authority and services in recent decades, hapū and iwi must revisit the idea of a Māori parliament, and what that might look like, mean and achieve in the twenty first century.

And what of the future of the Māori seats? Historians are loath to partake of crystal ball gazing, but the lengthy history of Māori political engagement, and recent events, give us an inkling of what may be around the corner. First and foremost, it must be said that the seats have been of considerable benefit to Māori over the past 144 years. They have acted as a safe haven in the Lion’s den, operating as something akin to a marae, where tangata whenua have been able to eyeball manuhiri and speak their mind on the issues of the day, whatever the outcome. They have satisfied, in a very limited sense, Māori desire for a say in the direction of government and the running of their own affairs, and they have operated as a safety valve, letting off steam when race relations have overheated. Pākehā politicians have consistently threatened to remove the seats over the past 144, but none have been brave or foolhardy enough yet to action their plans. Undoubtedly calls for the removal of the seats will continue on well into the future, but the history of the seats, their significance as both a symbol of Māori rights and an avenue for redress, and the fact that previous generations have seen fit to retain them surely prove that the Māori seats have played a hugely significant role in race relations and politics. They are a unique and important part of New Zealand’s social, cultural and political landscape, and should not be done away with until Māori themselves see fit to do so.
In the present day the Māori seats are more relevant than they have ever been, with fierce competition between Labour, the Māori Party and Mana, considerable pluralism, and widespread media and public attention within and outside Māori communities. Māori politics has seen a considerable shift to the left over the past 80 years, but the growth of a Māori middle class could alter this alignment. Māori voters have favoured mandating a single movement in the seats – if the seats are in flux at the present time history shows that they will settle back into a more predictable pattern in the near future, until the next great political movement emerges. The current era of neo-tribalism and the impact of MMP could challenge this pattern, and Māori voters have a considerable question to answer: should they return to a single Māori mandate, and who should control that mandate at the present time? Alternatively, the Māori MPs may become more responsive to their electorates and more effective if they focus on representing their constituents independently rather than as part of a united group. Is a cross-party Māori caucus the answer to the pluralism seen in the seats at the present time? And what of this dream of an independent Māori parliament?

Whatever direction Māori political engagement takes in the future, Māori communities and their MPs will face the very same challenge that Tareha Te Moananui expressed all those years ago:

I say to you wise people, work: you the men whose thoughts are wisdom, work: you the people having understanding, do that which is good for the people, and lay down wise laws…. do that which is good, for you will have no cause to be anxious if you do so, and if evil arises, then look at it yourselves, and let me look at it also, and let us work together.47

47 NZPD, 1868, 2, p.270.
## Appendix: Māori Members of Parliament by Election and Electorate, 1868–2011

### Four Seats Era, 1868–1993

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Election</th>
<th>Northern Māori</th>
<th>Eastern Māori</th>
<th>Western Māori</th>
<th>Southern Māori</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1868</td>
<td>F. Russell</td>
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<td>J. Patterson</td>
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<tr>
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<td>W. Parata</td>
<td>H.K. Taiaroa</td>
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<td>K. Takamoana</td>
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<td>W. Te Wheoro</td>
<td>I. Tainui</td>
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<td>W. Te Wheoro</td>
<td>H.K. Taiaroa</td>
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<td>W. Pere</td>
<td>T.P. Te Ao</td>
<td>H.K. Taiaroa</td>
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<td>1885 By-Election</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Tame Parata</td>
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<td>1886 By-Election</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>H. Taipua</td>
<td>-</td>
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<td>1887 By-Election</td>
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<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
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<td>1887</td>
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<td>H. Taipua</td>
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<td>Tame Parata</td>
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<td>H. Heke</td>
<td>W. Pere</td>
<td>H. Kaihau</td>
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<td>H. Kaihau</td>
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<td>1911</td>
<td>P. Te Rangihīroa</td>
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<td>M. Pōmare</td>
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<tr>
<td>1928</td>
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<td>T. Makitanara</td>
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<tr>
<td>Year</td>
<td>T. Henare</td>
<td>A.T. Ngata</td>
<td>T. Te Tomo</td>
<td>T. Makitanara</td>
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<tr>
<td>--------</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1932</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
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<tr>
<td>1943</td>
<td>T.P. Paikea</td>
<td>T. Omana</td>
<td>H.T. Rātana</td>
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<tr>
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<td>T. Omana</td>
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<td>1954</td>
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<td>T. Omana</td>
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<tr>
<td>1957</td>
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<td>1960</td>
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<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>M. Rata</td>
<td>P. Watene</td>
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<td>M. Rata</td>
<td>P. Watene</td>
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**Post-MMP Elections**

**1996 Election: Māori seats increased to five and renamed**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tai Tokerau</th>
<th>Tai Rāwhiti</th>
<th>Tai Hauāuru</th>
<th>Tai Tonga</th>
<th>Te Puku o Te Ika</th>
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<td>1996</td>
<td>T. Henare</td>
<td>J. Delamere</td>
<td>T. Morgan</td>
<td>T. Wyllie</td>
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327
1999 Election: Māori seats increased to six and renamed

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<th>Hauraki</th>
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<td>1999</td>
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<td>P. Horomia</td>
<td>N. Mahuta</td>
<td>M. Okeroa</td>
<td>M. Ririnui</td>
<td>J. Tamihere</td>
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2002 Election: Māori seats increased to seven and renamed

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<th>Tāmaki</th>
<th>Tainui</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>2002</td>
<td>D. Samuels</td>
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<td>T. Turia</td>
<td>M. Okeroa</td>
<td>M. Ririnui</td>
<td>J. Tamihere</td>
<td>N. Mahuta</td>
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<td>2004</td>
<td></td>
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<td>-</td>
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<tr>
<td>By-Election</td>
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2005 Election: Māori seats renamed

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<th>Tainui</th>
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<td>N. Mahuta</td>
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2008 Election: Māori seats renamed

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