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**Polybius' Self-constructed  
Image in the *Histories* and its  
Effect on his Historical  
Objectivity**

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A thesis submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree  
of Doctor of Philosophy in Ancient History,  
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## Abstract

Polybius consciously created an image in his *Histories* that fostered a persona of the author primarily as a teacher, but also as an historian, a politician, and, at times, a Greek. Through this self-constructed image as a teacher Polybius provided didactic lessons for his readers throughout the *Histories*, a preoccupation which often overshadowed the need to be acutely accurate in his historical narrative. Although J. Marincola in his *Authority and Tradition in Ancient Historiography* (1997) discussed Polybius' image as a consciously-constructed persona for the reader, this approach has not yet been undertaken by any modern scholar in a specialised study of Polybius. This thesis proposes to fill this gap in Polybian scholarship by first establishing the existence of this self-constructed image, and second demonstrating how it influenced Polybius' historical accuracy. Part I of this thesis focuses on developing the different aspects of this image of Polybius, aiming to provide a holistic picture of the persona Polybius presented to his audience. It discusses personal, historiographical, and political aspects of this image in the *Histories*, and how these factors often affected the way he interpreted and presented historical events. Part II provides three case studies that investigate instances where Polybius interpreted events in a way that cannot be verified by the details of his own historical narrative. It is argued that these instances provided didactic opportunities for Polybius and caused him to design his historical narrative in a way that emphasised his didactic image and lessons over his considerations of historical accuracy. This approach highlights both the importance of recognising that the persona of Polybius we get in the *Histories* was a consciously-designed image of how he wanted to be viewed by his audience, and also that despite his claims to the contrary, historical accuracy was not always Polybius' only, or even primary, concern.

## Dedication

This thesis is dedicated to my mother,

***Teresa Young***

(Jan. 1955 - Oct. 2011)

Thank you for demonstrating the true  
meaning of strength,  
courage, dignity and perseverance.

You are, and always will be, my  
*exemplum.*

And also

to my cousin, James Young (1972-2012) who showed me it is never  
too late to change your path.

## Acknowledgements

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To my friends that have been part of this journey, there is not enough space here to express my gratitude for your support over the years – thank you. Thanks to Folole Asaua, Mele Alatini, Antonina Savelio and Leighton Robb, for being awesome friends and helping out at the last minute. To Alan Ettles, and especially Silua Fifita, for giving up your precious time to help me out – you guys really are great friends. Also to Jacqueline Passi, I can't even tell you how much I appreciate all you have done for me. You have been there every day, through the good and the really, really bad. I hope I am the kind of friend to you, that you are to me. Thanks Fluff for listening to all the rants and telling me to build a bridge!

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And to my mum, to whom this thesis is dedicated. You are the reason I ever thought I could do this. You were always my biggest cheerleader and I could never thank you enough for putting up with having a continual student for a daughter. Even when you were at your worst you were more concerned about me and my PhD. Your strength, courage and positivity were astounding right to the end. Everything I am, is because you were first and taught me how to be. This thesis is a testament to you. Fa’afetai tele lava mo mea uma na e faia mo matou, olo’o misia oe, alofa’aga e le mavae mo oe.

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## Abbreviations

All ancient authors have been referred to in accordance with the abbreviations given in the third edition of the *Oxford Classical Dictionary*.

Otherwise the following abbreviations have been used:

- B-W (1889-1905) T. Büttner-Wobst (ed.). *Polybii Historiae*, 5 vols. Stuttgart.
- DK (1952). H. Diels and W. Kranz. *Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker*, 6<sup>th</sup> Edition, 3 vols. Berlin.
- FGrHist (1923-58 and 1994-). F. Jacoby et al., *Die Fragmente der Griechischen Historiker*. Berlin and Leiden (1923-58); Leiden (1994-).
- IG (1873-) A. Kirchhoff et al. *Inscriptiones Graecae*. Berlin.
- Insch. Olymp.* (1896). W. Dittenberger and K. Purgold (eds.). *Inschriften von Olympia*. Berlin.
- MMR (1951) T.R.S. Broughton. *The Magistrates of the Roman Republic, Vol. I*. New York: American Philological Association.
- Schmitt, SdA (1969) H.H. Schmitt (ed.). *Die Staatsverträge des Altertums 3: Die Verträge der Griechisch-Römischen Welt von 338 bis 200 v. Chr.* Munich.
- Syll<sup>3</sup> (1915-24) W. Dittenberger. *Sylloge Inscriptionum Graecarum*, 3<sup>rd</sup> edn. Leipzig.

There have been two English translations of Polybius used in this thesis, the Paton (1922-1927) and the Shuckburgh (1889). Paton has been the primary translation used, with specific reference to instances where Shuckburgh has been preferred.

In all cases, the Teubner text has been used for quotations of the original language.

# Chapter One: Introduction

This thesis is a study of Polybius' consciously-constructed image in the *Histories*, and how his concern to develop this persona affected his ability to remain impartial in the historical narrative. Polybius created this persona in the *Histories* to promote the image of himself as a teacher to his audience of young, aristocratic, soldier-politicians. The didactic purpose of the *Histories* has long been acknowledged, but Polybius' conception of his own role in the narrative as a teacher, and the formation of his image in this light has not yet been fully explored. Polybius' preoccupation with this image had a significant impact on his historical objectivity, as he focused on establishing his authority in the narrative primarily as a teacher, but also as an historian, a politician, and sometimes, a Greek. Polybius' persona as a teacher meant his primary intention in the *Histories* was to provide lessons and *exempla* of ideal political behaviour in order to educate his readers. This aim both determined, and took precedence over, his concern to be historically accurate.

Polybius' comments throughout the *Histories* on the importance of truth and impartiality have encouraged historians, both ancient and modern, to put faith in his historical accuracy. His ancient audience considered his narrative historically trustworthy, with Livy claiming that Polybius was 'an authority worthy of credence on all matters of Roman history and especially on occurrences in Greece,' while Cicero referred to him as 'one of the very best authorities.'<sup>1</sup> Modern historians have displayed similar confidence in Polybius, earning him a reputation as one of the most reliable of ancient historians.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Livy 33.10.10: '*non incertum auctorem cum omnium Romanarum rerum tum praecipue in Graecia gestarum*'; Cic. *Off.* 3.113: '*bonus auctor in primis*' (Miller trans.); see also Livy 30.45.5; Cic. *Att.* 13.30.3; *Rep.* 2.27; Joseph. *AJ* 12.358-59; *Ap.* 2.84. Throughout this thesis the Loeb Classical Library translations of Livy have been used, unless otherwise stated.

<sup>2</sup> For historians who have portrayed Polybius as particularly reliable in either approach or account see: Toynbee (1965) 2.472 n. 2; Lehmann (1967) *passim*, esp. 349-359; Usher (1970) 105, 123; Marsden (1974) 294-5; Nemirovskii (1976-77) 51-87; Gabba (1981) 50; Harris (1979) 107-117 (specifically on Polybius' theory of Roman expansion); Champion (2004) 22-23.

However, this idea of Polybius as impartial is increasingly losing favour among modern historians, with many embracing the idea of Polybius as subjective in both his historical approach and analysis.<sup>3</sup>

There has recently been an increase in Polybian studies, which has significantly advanced the scholarly discourse on Polybius and his *Histories*.<sup>4</sup> However, the majority of modern historians have failed to separate the idea of Polybius the man from Polybius the consciously-constructed persona that is apparent in the *Histories*. The creation of this image of the historian within the text, by the historian, has been discussed by Marincola:

The historian's character, for better or worse, was on display in his history, he took care to fashion an appropriate persona for himself in the narrative.<sup>5</sup>

However, historians of Polybius do not generally tend to make the distinction between Polybius the man and Polybius the *auctor*, and analyse his *Histories* as if the image that he projects to the audience was a direct and unmediated representation of his character. Throughout the narrative, Polybius was consciously forming his own image in order to preserve his authorial persona in the way he wanted it to be seen by his audience. This consciously-created image fostered the idea of Polybius as a teacher and historian, but also as a politician and a Greek, guiding the reader's view of Polybius as a historical authority.

This introductory chapter will establish the theoretical and historical background to the concept of historical accuracy. The first section will explore the ideas of truth, objectivity, and subjectivity in modern historical theory in order to provide a theoretical base for the use of these terms in this thesis. In

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<sup>3</sup> For historians who question Polybius' reliability see: Brunt (2011) 239; Sacks (1981) 139-144; Davidson (1991) 10-24; Walbank (1994) 28-42. Roveri argued that Polybius' narrative was 'objective', but simultaneously claimed that when analysing characters whose situation offered a useful lesson for the reader, Polybius was more interested in the didactic, which influenced his historical accuracy: (1964) 106-142. Eckstein allowed for some bias in Polybius' *Histories*, but warned not to let this consideration blind the reader to his sincerity: (1995a) 113.

<sup>4</sup> Most significantly, Baronowski's *Polybius and Roman Imperialism* (2011) and C. Smith, L.M Yarrow's (eds.) *Imperialism, Cultural Politics, and Polybius* (2012).

<sup>5</sup> Marincola (1997) 132.

the second section I will explore the use of these terms in ancient historiography, in particular discussing how ancient historians conceptualised the ideas of truth and impartiality. The focus of this section will be the general use of these terms in ancient historiography, so while Polybius will be a focus, other ancient historians will also be considered. The third section will focus on defining how the terms truth, objectivity, subjectivity, impartiality, and historical accuracy will be used in this thesis.<sup>6</sup> It is necessary to define these terms due to their frequency of use; however, there will be no attempt to define them outside of their immediate applications within this thesis. In the fourth and final section of this chapter, I will focus on the methodology used in this thesis. This section will cover my approach to the overall argument, containing a survey of the subsequent chapters and their purpose in assessing Polybius' self-constructed image and how this affected his historical accuracy.

### **1) The ideas of truth, objectivity and subjectivity in historical theory**

The concepts of truth, subjectivity, and objectivity have been traditionally regarded as central to modern historical theory on the nature of history, and have been vehemently debated by historians and theorists from different academic disciplines. However, such terms encourage certain expectations and generalisations of methodology and purpose, so must be analysed independently to avoid misunderstanding.

The historian Elton argued that history by nature is the search for the truth, in this case a truth that is found in the primary sources:

*Ad Fontes* remains the necessary war cry. For the historian the reality – yes, the truth – of the past exists in materials of various kinds, produced by that past at the time that it occurred and left behind by it as testimony. Historical evidence is not created by the historian.. arguments about the study of 'texts' help hardly at

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<sup>6</sup> Prior to this, these terms will be used in the same way they have been discussed by the authors cited.

all in our understanding of the tasks undertaken by most historians.<sup>7</sup>

However, this attitude towards history has been overshadowed by the more realistic proposition that it is impossible to recover true knowledge of what happened in the past.<sup>8</sup> The belief that history is about finding the one true account of events has been supplanted by the realisation that history is instead about *interpretation*.<sup>9</sup> Historiography is populated by historians who look at the same evidence and come up with different interpretations, suggesting that there is no such thing as historical truth. As Jenkins defined it, in theory, history is:

composed of epistemology, methodology and ideology... is basically a contested discourse, an embattled terrain wherein people(s), classes and groups autobiographically construct interpretations of the past literally to please themselves.<sup>10</sup>

Attempts have been made by historians to decrease the influence of the historical writer on the text by using a series of standard categorical methods intended to reduce historical subjectivity, but the sheer range of historical style, purpose, range, and method makes this difficult.<sup>11</sup> In this instance, there is little need to go into the theoretical parameters of the concept of truth independent from historical theory, although Foucault's description of truth as

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<sup>7</sup> Elton (1991) 52-53. Both Jenkins' analysis of Elton and Tholfsen's review of *Return to Essentials: Some reflections on the Present State of Historical Study*, have shown how antiquated Elton's approach to history was, although in Tholfsen's case much of his criticism seemed to concern Elton's method of critique: Jenkins (1995) 65-97; Tholfsen (1994) 685-686.

<sup>8</sup> Jenkins argued that 'real (true) knowledge... is, strictly speaking, unachievable': (1991) 14-20, 28.

<sup>9</sup> This is the Elton-Carr debate, with Carr arguing that history is interpretation and historical fact has no intrinsic value until it is made important through its use by historians, while Elton has argued that history is the search for the truth, although it can never be fully recovered. Jenkins argued that history should move on from this Carr-Elton dichotomy towards the historical theories of Richard Rorty and Hayden White. He also pointed out that Carr, despite his belief that history is interpretation, still thought that truth and objectivity were ultimately attainable: Carr (1987) 12-13; Elton (1969) 70, 112-113; Jenkins (1995) *passim*, esp. 1-13, 23-24, 52-61 (on Carr); (1991) 14-20.

<sup>10</sup> Jenkins (1991) 19.

<sup>11</sup> Marwick advocated this approach, claiming historians needed to form strict methodological rules that reduced moral commentary in order to speak directly to the past through the evidence. Jenkins disagreed, claiming that 'talk of method as the road to truth is misleading.' He also queried the use of another kind of method, that is the standardisation of the 'heartlands of history': time, evidence, empathy, cause and effect, continuity and change, etc: Marwick (1970) 187, 190; Jenkins (1991) 14-15, 16.

a product of accepted cultural discourses, and Jenkins' depiction of truth as 'useful fictions that are in discourse by virtue of power,' have some merit for the study of Roman history.<sup>12</sup>

The belief that objectivity is possible in history is also part of what Jenkins terms 'old certaintist modernisms'.<sup>13</sup> 'Objectivity' can be defined as a judgement that is independent of personal emotions, opinions or prejudices. The question here is whether historical objectivity is possible. One of the reasons why historical theorists have queried historical objectivity is because of the professionalism of history, since career historians make their living from writing history.<sup>14</sup> Jenkins points out that the number of external forces influencing a professional historian in a university is immense; for example, the pressure to publish and the simultaneous need to teach both undergraduates and postgraduates.<sup>15</sup> Because of this, Jenkins claimed historians are personally invested in the success of their histories, concluding that this implies they cannot be historically objective.

Historical theory on truth and the purpose of history means that there is disagreement on the probability and function of objectivity in historical discourse. Objectivity is usually accepted as a standard historical ideal, although White argues that all history is subjective, claiming that history is about story telling rather than an objective search for the truth of what existed in the past.<sup>16</sup> One concept of objectivity conceives it as the equivalent of 'historical truth.' This Reconstructionist theory of history assumes that it is possible to realise what actually happened in the past, and argues that it can be conveyed in an unbiased and historically correct narrative of events based on firm evidence.<sup>17</sup> There are also those who argue that objectivity is a more complicated concept. Constructionist historians argue that the majority of history is subjective, but that there is still an essential part of history that

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<sup>12</sup> Foucault (1981) 131-133; Jenkins (1991) 28-32.

<sup>13</sup> Along with disinterestedness, the 'facts', unbiasedness, and the truth: Jenkins (1995) 7.

<sup>14</sup> Vincent (2005) 77-82.

<sup>15</sup> Jenkins (1991) 20-26.

<sup>16</sup> White (1973) 281-314.

<sup>17</sup> McCullagh (1984) 2; Munslow (2000) 179.



guarantees some element of historical reality and objectivity.<sup>18</sup>

Epistemological historians believe that it is possible to uncover historical truth, although as Munslow admits, most historians are empiricist sceptics and realise that historians see history through the filter of their own contemporary opinions.<sup>19</sup> History as a hermeneutic process is 'subject to the ontological beliefs held about society by historians, and to the ideologies to which they subscribe, and what they anticipate their audience will wish to hear and/or read.'<sup>20</sup> There are limits on the historian's ability to claim historical objectivity and truth, as Munslow has argued, although this does not stop historians from seeking it.

The concept of 'historical subjectivity' is often seen as the opposite of historical objectivity, although not all historians accept this.<sup>21</sup> Subjectivity can be seen as judgment based on personal emotions, opinions, prejudices, social or professional ideology, and is also commonly referred to in historical texts as bias or partiality. White has argued that all history has an ideological element, with most historians embracing the ideologies of anarchism, conservatism, radicalism or liberalism.<sup>22</sup> Toner summarised White's argument well, by explaining:

The historian's ideology will substantially influence, perhaps even dictate, what is to be studied and how those objects will relate to each other. It will also affect how he or she writes about the subject: how the text is structured, how the subject is explained, how the story is told.<sup>23</sup>

The concept of historical subjectivity has often been associated with negative connotations; however, subjectivity in historical texts do not necessarily have to be viewed in this way. Historians can successfully place themselves within

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<sup>18</sup> Appleby et.al. (1994) 241-270.

<sup>19</sup> Munslow (2000) 180; Bevir (1994) 328-344.

<sup>20</sup> Munslow (2000) 181.

<sup>21</sup> For example: Crane (2006) 434.

<sup>22</sup> These ideologies, according to White, motivate historians to favour particular types of story telling: anarchists favour formism and a romantic plot; conservatives favour organicist stories and comedy; radicals favour mechanist stories and tragedy; and liberals favour contextualist stories and satire: (1973) 307-308.

<sup>23</sup> Toner (2002) 25.

their narratives and provide personal interpretations based on their own experiences that are both useful and contribute positively to historical scholarship.<sup>24</sup> However, this is a particular type of history that does not claim to be objective, but instead is uniquely appreciated because it is subjective.

## 2) The ideas of truth, objectivity and subjectivity in Ancient History

The difference between modern and ancient historiography is particularly significant when assessing their diverse approaches to the concepts of truth, objectivity, and subjectivity. The narrative mode of ancient historiography and its use of rhetorical methods may, on the surface, imply some similarities, but there are fundamental differences that must influence the way these sources are analysed. As Finley claimed:

We start from the wrong premise by assuming that Greeks and Romans looked upon the study and writing of history essentially as we do.<sup>25</sup>

Consequently, there is a need to understand how ancient historians intended their claims of truth and impartiality to be received by the reader, and how these concepts affected their historical accuracy.

For many modern historians the stories of Homer are considered epic poems, and therefore distinct from the genre of history. Ancient historians saw the difference between history and poetry, but the lines between the two were often blurred.<sup>26</sup> Polybius defended the reliability of Homer, whom he claimed mixed truth (ἀληθινός) with falsehood (ψεύδω):<sup>27</sup>

But to invent everything neither produces illusion nor is it like Homer; for all consider his poems to be philosophical works, and

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<sup>24</sup> Crane (2006) 440-442.

<sup>25</sup> Finley (1985) 14.

<sup>26</sup> Arist. *Poet.* 8.9.1-3; Thuc. 1.21.1, 22.4; Polyb. 2.56.10-14; 34.2.1-3; Cic. *Leg.* 1.1.5; Livy, *praef.* 6; Lucian, *Hist. Conscr.* 8; see also Finley (1975) 11-33.

<sup>27</sup> Polyb. 34.2.2.

refuse to follow the advice of Eratosthenes who tells us not to judge the poems by their meaning or seek for history in them.<sup>28</sup>

This passage implied both that Polybius believed there was an historical element in Homer, and that this was not an assumed view held by all ancient historians.<sup>29</sup> However, this showed that in the second century B.C.E. the lines between poetry, myth, and history were not yet clearly defined.<sup>30</sup>

There were, however, historians who made such distinctions between myth and history, but then chose to accept aspects of myth in their historical narratives. Momigliano referred to Herodotus as the ‘father of history’ for both modern and ancient historians, but Herodotus also blurred the lines between the mythological and historical.<sup>31</sup> Cicero in the first century recognised the difference between poetry and history, identifying both Herodotus and Theopompus as historians who included mythological tales in their historical accounts. Cicero stated:

For in history the standard by which everything is judged is the truth, while in poetry it is generally the pleasure one gives; however, in the works of Herodotus, the Father of History, and in those of Theopompus, one finds innumerable fabulous tales.<sup>32</sup>

Thucydides, who has often been considered as the first ‘scientific’ historian, contrasted his claims of truth against the unreliability of poetry, but then also accepted the existence of certain mythical Homeric figures, notably Hellen, son of Deucalion, and Achilles.<sup>33</sup> Marincola pointed out that for ancient

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<sup>28</sup> Polyb. 34.4.4: ‘τὸ δὲ πάντα πλάττειν οὐ πιθανὸν οὐδ’ Ὀμηρικόν· τὴν γὰρ ἐκείνου ποιήσιν φιλοσόφημα πάντας νομίζειν, οὐχ ὡς Ἐρατοσθένους φησί, κελεύων μὴ κρίνειν πρὸς τὴν διάνοιαν τὰ ποιήματα μηδ’ ἱστορίαν ἀπ’ αὐτῶν ζητεῖν.’ Throughout this thesis Paton’s translations of Polybius from the Loeb Classical Library Editions have been used, unless otherwise stated.

<sup>29</sup> Notably Eratosthenes and Plato: Polyb. 34.2.2-4.8; Pl. *Resp.* 2.377d. Polybius also trusted in Homer’s geography, as long as the mythical elements were separated: 34.2.9-10, 4.1. It has been argued that the *Iliad* has a very slight amount of historicity: Davis (1984) 87-110.

<sup>30</sup> All dates in this thesis are B.C.E. unless otherwise stated.

<sup>31</sup> Momigliano (1978) 1; Woodman (1988) 1-5. History and tragedy as derived from epic: Walbank (1960) 216-234.

<sup>32</sup> Cic. *Leg.* 1.1.5 (Keyes trans.): ‘*cum in illa ad veritatem.. referantur, in hoc ad delectationem pleraque; quamquam et apud Herodotum, patrem historiae, et apud Theopompum sunt innumerabiles fabulae.*’

<sup>33</sup> Thuc. 1.3.2 (Hellen, son of Deucalion, and Achilles), 21.1, 22.4 (Poetry); Walbank (1960) 221. In Thucydides’ history the distinction was between the fabulous or story telling (τὸ

historians, myth was unsuitable for use in history because it was impossible to verify the evidence and the exaggerated, sensational nature of the material was inappropriate for the use or practicality of history.<sup>34</sup> Polybius illustrated this contrast when he argued that the increased ability to travel and undertake historical inquiry in foreign lands had replaced the early historians' tendency to exaggerate their geographical descriptions, claiming they should be forgiven due to their technological inability.<sup>35</sup> However, despite the awareness of ancient historians of the nature of myth, many continued to use these stories in their histories. As Marincola claimed, for ancient historians 'the charms of myth, like those of the Sirens, were simply too great to resist.'<sup>36</sup>

Despite the blurring of these lines, many ancient historians also defined history as the search for the truth.<sup>37</sup> Walsh dismissed the importance of truth to ancient writers, claiming that Hellenistic writers were concerned more with entertainment than truth, and were focused on narrative in order to 'charm, divert, and edify.'<sup>38</sup> However, Cicero claimed that the aim of history was truth, distinguished from oratory, which potentially required some slight fabrication.<sup>39</sup> Cicero's perception of the historian's job was very similar to that of Polybius: the historian should investigate causes and repercussions of events; the

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μυθῶδες) of past historians, compared to the clarity (τὸ σαφές) of contemporary historians: Gomme (1945) 149; Marincola (1997) 117. Flory argued that τὸ μυθῶδες referred to exaggerated war stories that flattered the patriotism of the readers: (1990) 193-208. Likewise, Woodman argued that τὸ σαφές should not be interpreted as modern historical truth: (1988) 24-28.

<sup>34</sup> Marincola (1997) 117-127, esp. 127. Prior to the second century rhetoricians categorised narratives by their topic: the first was ἱστορία or *historia* classified as that which had actually occurred, the second was πλάσμα or *argumentum* which was things that seemed real, and the third was μῦθος or *fabulae*, which referred to those things that were not true, nor comparable to the truth: Sex. Emp. *Math.* 1.263-4 (citing Asclepiades of Myrleia); Cic. *Rhet. Hen.* 1.8; Quint. *Inst.* 2.4.2-3; Walbank (1960) 233-236; Marincola (1997) 118.

<sup>35</sup> Polyb. 3.58.1-59.8.

<sup>36</sup> Marincola (1997) 127.

<sup>37</sup> For example: Thuc. 1.1.2, 22; Polyb. 1.14.6-9; 2.56.1-13; 3.21.8-10, 58.9; 4.41.6-8; 12.12.1-3; 13.5.4-6; 16.17.9-10; 20.12.8; 34.4.2; Cic. *De or.* 2.36, 62; *Leg.* 1.1.4; *Rep.* 2.10; *Off.* 3.99; *Div.* 2.115; *Fam.* 5.12.3; Sall. *Cat.* 4.2-4; *Hist.* 1.6; Tac. *Hist.* 1.1; *Ann.* 1.1; Lucian, *Hist. Conscr.* 8-9.

<sup>38</sup> Walsh (1961) 27.

<sup>39</sup> Cic. *De or.* 2.36, 62; *Leg.* 1.1.4; *Rep.* 2.18; *Off.* 3.99; *Div.* 2.115 (on truth in history); *Off.* 2.51; *De or.* 1.17, 53, 143; 2.178, 216; *Orat.* 24, 69, 122, 131; *Brut.* 89-90, 199, 276; *Part. or.* 8-11 (on the need to appeal to the emotion of the audience, perhaps through slight fabrication). The particular argument made by Antonius in the *De Oratore* (2.62) was qualified by the consequent sentence that stated there should be no trace of prejudice or bias in writing - which is discussed below.

historian should also analyse the character of the central figures, giving his own opinion on the actions of the individual (although not necessarily moral or either positive or negative); primarily however, history must be accurate and of use to the audience.<sup>40</sup> Yet Cicero did suggest on two occasions to Lucceius and Posidonius that they approach his memoirs without being limited by the exact truth, admitting to Lucceius that this request was in violation of the accepted bounds of historical writing.<sup>41</sup>

The argument that Greek historians were more concerned with artistic considerations rather than historical accuracy is one evident in modern scholarship.<sup>42</sup> The prevalence of dramatic writing in historiography has often been traced to rhetorical theory and claimed to be both derived from Isocrates, and inspired by Theophrastus and the Peripatetics.<sup>43</sup> As Brunt claimed, both Isocrates and Theophrastus influenced historical style, although he admitted that this was all that could be conclusively argued.<sup>44</sup> There were also ancient historians who argued for more than just stylistic considerations in historical narrative, particularly Duris and Polybius.<sup>45</sup> Duris, though, seemed

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<sup>40</sup> Cic. *De or.* 2.62; Brunt (2011) 215 and n. 36. Of course Cicero also prized eloquence in historical writing: *Tusc.* 1.6. He claimed that the orator must use ordinary language in his narrative, implying that the historian's language should be of a higher standard: *Orat.* 124; Brunt (2011) 224. Brunt argued for a parallel between Cicero's requirements for oratory and those for history (correctness, clarity, appropriateness and ornamentation), claiming Cicero would also have expected the same of history because it was similarly intended to be read aloud: Cic. *Off.* 1.3; *De or.* 2.54, 56, 58; 3.181, 195-7; Brunt (2011) 227.

<sup>41</sup> Cic. *Fam.* 5.12.3 (Lucceius); Cic. *Att.* 2.1.2 (Posidonius). Cicero asked Lucceius, with some embarrassment, 'to eulogise my actions with even more warmth than perhaps you feel, and in that respect to disregard the canons of history' (Glynn Williams trans.) – '*ut et ornes ea vehementius etiam quam fortasse sentis, et in eo leges historiae neglegas gratiamque illam.*' Posidonius declined to write Cicero's memoirs, claiming that Cicero's own composition fulfilled all the necessary requirements; however, there is no record of Lucceius' response. Cicero had high expectations of any biographical narrative that detailed his own exploits, shown by his rejection of Atticus' account of his consulship because it was only a commentary: *Att.* 2.1.1-2.

<sup>42</sup> Walsh (1961) 20-45; see also Kennedy (1972) 207, 292-294, 421, 524.

<sup>43</sup> Schwartz (1897) 560-608; (1900) 107-130; (1909) 491; (1943) 123-5; Ullman (1942) 25-53; Giovannini (1943) 301-314; Laistner (1947) 14; Walbank (1960) 216-34; (1972) 34-40; Brunt (2011) 207-240.

<sup>44</sup> Brunt (2011) 238. This rhetorical aspect of history motivated Woodman to argue that ancient historiography should be categorised in modern terms as 'literature instead of history:' (1988) *passim*, esp. 197-212. In opposition to this see Lendon (2009) 41-61.

<sup>45</sup> Interestingly, Dionysius of Halicarnassus criticised both Duris and Polybius for their lack of attention to language and style, which made them impossible to read: *Comp.* 4.

to support a more vividly descriptive type of narrative than Polybius, such as that endorsed by Plutarch who claimed.<sup>46</sup>

Even though artists with colour and design, and writers with words and phrases, represent the same subjects, they differ in the material and the manner of their imitation; and yet the underlying end and aim of both is one and the same; the most effective historian is he who, by a vivid representation of emotions and characters, makes his narration like a painting.<sup>47</sup>

Plutarch here was discussing Thucydides and his aim to create vividness (ἐνάργεια) in his narrative and turn the reader into a spectator (ὀρῶντας). For many ancient historians the ultimate historical model was Thucydides, who was thought to excel in both historical accuracy and rhetorical style, although his style cannot be attributed to the theoretical teachings of his contemporary Isocrates.<sup>48</sup>

Ancient historians were aware of the potential for bias in historical writing, as evidenced by the prevalence of statements claiming the accuracy of their accounts that we get from Polybius and those who came after him.<sup>49</sup> It was predominantly historians who wrote contemporary history that felt the need to explicitly voice their impartiality. Those who wrote on the distant past, such as Livy, Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Diodorus Siculus, and Cassius Dio, did not find the need to make the same types of claims of historical truth.<sup>50</sup> Lucian claimed that readers had confidence in Homer's depiction of Achilles because they saw no reason for fabrication, since Achilles could not have

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<sup>46</sup> Dion. Hal. *Pomp.* 3 (776); *FGrHist* 76 F 1. On Duris see Kebric (1977), although Brunt has argued against the ability to form any conclusive depiction of this author from the remaining fragments: (2011) 234 n. 67.

<sup>47</sup> Plut. *Mor.* 347A (Babbitt trans.): 'εἰ δ' οἱ μὲν χρώμασι καὶ σχήμασιν, οἱ δ' ὀνόμασι καὶ λέξεσι ταῦτ' ἀποδείξουσιν, ὅλη καὶ τρόποις μιμήσεως διαφέρουσι, τέλος δ' ἀμφοτέροις ἐν ὑπόκειται, καὶ τῶν ἱστορικῶν κράτιστος ὁ τὴν διήγησιν ὡσπερ γραφὴν πάθει καὶ προσώποις εἰδωλοσποιήσας.'

<sup>48</sup> For example: Cic. *De or.* 2.56, 93; Dion. Hal. *Thuc.* 2, 15, 23, 27. Brunt argued against the notion that rhetorical influence on historiography caused late republican historians to value style above truth, arguing that if it was a contribution, there were other considerations as well: Brunt (2011) 207-240.

<sup>49</sup> For discussion on Polybius' claims of objectivity see section 2.2.

<sup>50</sup> Luce (2011) 293. Luce argued that Livy's claim to truth in the preface referred to his later books, when he was writing of contemporary events: (2011) 293 n. 5.

influenced the author.<sup>51</sup> In this case, the distance of time between the historical event written about and the time in which the historian was writing contributed to historical impartiality. Consequently, for ancient historians pressures that contributed to historical bias were only relevant for authors of contemporary history. As Wheeldon pointed out, the impression of historical accuracy was seen by the reader to correspond to the connection between the author and the text. Therefore, ancient authors who had literal space of time and the distance of 'disinterestedness' were seen to be the most historically unbiased.<sup>52</sup> Historians who wrote contemporary history were considered more liable to bias since there was clear potential for direct benefit or injury.<sup>53</sup> As Luce claimed:

Naturally, a writer is not without feelings... when he judges the goodness or badness of men, past or present. But when such feelings were independent of personal experience, a balanced assessment, compounded both of intellect and emotion, was thought possible: an unprejudiced, therefore true appraisal was the result.<sup>54</sup>

Polybius was the first extant historian who addressed the issue of truth (ἀληθεία) directly and claimed authorial impartiality in his narrative.<sup>55</sup> The examples of Sallust and Cicero suggest that there was a wider awareness of historical impartiality in the Late Roman Republic. However, by the time of the Empire it seems claims of impartiality had become routine.<sup>56</sup> There is some question, though, of what exactly ancient historians intended by truth and whether it can be reconciled with the concept of truth as conceived by modern historians.

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<sup>51</sup> Lucian, *Hist. Conscr.* 40.

<sup>52</sup> Wheeldon (1989) 48.

<sup>53</sup> Joseph. *AJ* 20.154-155; Lucian, *Hist. Conscr.* 40; Arr. *Anab. praef.* 2-3. Those who wrote contemporary history often delayed publication until the focus of their histories was dead, attempting to avoid any accusations of bias or punishment for unflattering depictions: Amm. Marc. 26.1.1-2; Plin. *HN praef.* 20; Sen. *Controv.* 10 *praef.* 8; Livy, *Per.* 121; Procop. *Arc.* 1.1-2; see also Luce for discussion on this: (2011) 304-307.

<sup>54</sup> Luce (2011) 309.

<sup>55</sup> Polyb. 1.1.3, 14; 8.8.5-9; 10.21.8; 38.4.

<sup>56</sup> Cic. *Fam.* 5.12; Sall. *Cat.* 4.2-4; *Hist.* 1.6; Dion. Hal. *Thuc.* 8; Lucian, *Hist. Conscr.* 38-41; Tac. *Hist.* 1.1; Joseph. *BJ* 1.1-2; *AJ* 20.154-7; *Vit.* 336-9; see also Luce (2011) 291.

There is no indication that ancient historians regarded historical truth as unachievable, nor did they see historical truth exactly as it is considered in the modern world. Instead, it has been argued by Woodman that the distinction between truth and falsehood can be conceived of as equal to that between impartiality and prejudice, seen in Cicero, Sallust, Tacitus, and Livy.<sup>57</sup> Sallust claimed at the beginning of *The Catilinarian Conspiracy* that he was ‘free from hope, and fear and political partisanship’ so he would then give an account of the affair as ‘truthfully as possible.’<sup>58</sup> This idea of truth as impartiality was also repeated in *The Histories*, where Sallust claimed that he was not biased towards any particular political faction in the Civil Wars.<sup>59</sup> Livy in his preface implied he was free from bias, just as Tacitus described impartiality in terms of opposing influences of hate and favouritism.<sup>60</sup> These indicate the accuracy of Woodman’s claim that ancient historians saw the opposite of historical truth as bias, not falsehood.<sup>61</sup>

Ancient historians conceived of impartiality in terms of a few specific influences: hope (ἐλπίς) of benefit and fear (φόβος) of reprisals, as well as favouritism (χάρις) and hatred (ἐπάχθεια).<sup>62</sup> As Luce stated ‘the causes of the emotions, in turn, are benefits one has enjoyed or hopes to enjoy and injuries one has received or fears to receive.’<sup>63</sup> Historians who worked under a king or emperor seemed to have developed the habit of pre-empting accusations of partiality by including a type of disclaimer of bias in connection to the rulers they lived under. For example, Tacitus’ disclaimer stated that he had received no favours from Galba, Otho or Vitellius, so had no cause to be biased in his

<sup>57</sup> Woodman (2011) 244-245. In opposition to Brunt who claimed that ancient truth was similar to modern truth: (2011) 210

<sup>58</sup> Sall. *Cat.* 4.2-3 (Rolfe trans.): ‘spe, metu, partibus rei publicae animus liber erat’ and ‘quam verissime potero.’

<sup>59</sup> Sall. *Hist.* 1.6: ‘neque me diversa pars in civilibus armis mouit a vero.’

<sup>60</sup> Livy, *praef.* 5-7; Tac. *Hist.* 1.1; *Ann.* 1.1. Woodman also claimed that Lucian viewed truth in terms of impartiality, arguing against Brunt’s use of *Hist. Conscr.* 7 to argue Lucian conceived of truth in the modern sense of the word: Brunt (2011) 210; Woodman (2011) 245 n. 7.

<sup>61</sup> Herkommer claimed Polybius conceived of truth (ἀληθεία) in terms of impartiality, claiming that the only ancient historian who conceived of truth more like Thucydides was Ammianus Marcellinus: (1968) 138, 145-146.

<sup>62</sup> Avenarius defined these divisions, while Luce argued that he created a dichotomy through these classifications that was not always proven in the ancient texts: Avenarius (1956) 46-54; Luce (2011) 295 and n. 9.

<sup>63</sup> Luce (2011) 295.



accounts of their reigns. However, he admitted a personal connection to Vespasian, Titus, and Domitian, indicating to his readers that he would be cautious when writing of these men since he had been the recipient of their favours.<sup>64</sup> There was certainly a tendency by ancient historians to criticise other historians for showing undue favouritism or criticism towards certain monarchs and tyrants. This is reflected in Dionysius' criticism of historians that were so influenced by foreign monarchs who 'despised Rome', that they fabricated their histories in order to please these individuals.<sup>65</sup> Luce proposed that the tendency to include this disclaimer was developed in the fourth century under the reigns of the Macedonian monarchs, since there was no similar claim made by either Herodotus or Thucydides.<sup>66</sup> This disclaimer also seemed to refer to a personal bias by the author towards individuals, one that was not necessarily transferred to the institutions associated with them.<sup>67</sup>

A significant bias that was also acknowledged by ancient historians was that of patriotism (φιλόπατρις). Polybius admitted this was an expected bias with historians, and that they should be permitted to show partiality to their own people, although this should not contradict the facts.<sup>68</sup> Dionysius of Halicarnassus heavily criticised Thucydides for failing to show favour to his native Athens, while Plutarch condemned Herodotus for showing preference to 'barbarians' over his own people.<sup>69</sup> Historians such as Livy admitted their patriotic bias at the outset of their histories, showing that such a declaration of bias was expected and accepted by ancient writers.<sup>70</sup> It was also possible that such patriotic convictions influenced the portrayal of enemy countries; for example, Josephus referred to historians who wrote biased accounts of the Jewish war motivated either by loathing of the Jews or in order to earn favour

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<sup>64</sup> Tac. *Hist.* 1.1; see also *Ann.* 1.1.2; Luce (2011) 293-297.

<sup>65</sup> Dion. Hal. *Ant. Rom.* 1.4.3. For examples of historians criticising other historians for bias towards monarchs or tyrants see; Polyb. 8.11.1-4; 12.15.1-10; Strab. 11.7.4; Plut. *Arat.* 38.8; Paus. 1.9.8. Posidonius also accused Polybius of showing the same type of bias towards Tiberius Gracchus: Strab. 3.4.13; see also Walbank (1979a) 270.

<sup>66</sup> Tac. *Hist.* 1.1; *Ann.* 1.1; Fornara (1983) 99-105; Luce (2011) 295-296.

<sup>67</sup> Luce (2011) 296-297 (personal bias); Vogt (1936) 5 (wider bias).

<sup>68</sup> Polyb. 16.14.6; Luce (2011) 297-298. Elsewhere in the *Histories*, Polybius warned against such partiality: 1.14.4-6. As Luce pointed out, this bias was one based on benefit and gratitude: (2011) 298.

<sup>69</sup> Dion. Hal. *Pomp.* 3; Plut. *Mor.* 857A.

<sup>70</sup> Livy, *Praef.* 11. Livy also showed his preference elsewhere in his history: for example, 9.16.11-19.17; 22.54.7-11; 27.8.4-10.

with the Romans.<sup>71</sup> This bias may also be extended to include friends and family.<sup>72</sup>

There was some contradiction between the expectation that ancient historians would remain impartial, while also abiding by the standard historical requirement to provide moral evaluations of good and bad character in order to provide *exempla* for their audience.<sup>73</sup> Here the character of the historian and his ability to make judgments was central to the success of the narrative, with the expectation that historians would provide character assessments on individuals.<sup>74</sup> As Luce claimed:

As the historian is to judge the moral worth of his subjects, so the reader judges the moral worth of the historian. Hence, the historian must be centrally concerned with his own persona: he must endeavour to demonstrate his own ethical sensibility through the judgments he makes on others.<sup>75</sup>

Character assessments were one of the common features of historical narrative and were often designed to emphasise a didactic point for the audience. Polybius was certainly aware of the requirement to provide character evaluations and went to lengths to prove his own credentials in assessing the behaviour of others. He also criticised the historian Phylarchus for failing to do this, and Timaeus for failing to praise the actions of Agathocles.<sup>76</sup> Plutarch emphasised the importance of providing judgments on significant characters in historical narratives and criticised Herodotus heavily for failing to fulfil this historiographical requirement.<sup>77</sup> However, within this

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<sup>71</sup> Joseph. *BJ* 1.1-2.

<sup>72</sup> For example, Polybius included friends in his consideration of patriotic loyalty, and Livy criticised Licinius Macer for exaggerating his family's glory. Josephus included the appreciation of those mentioned in the narrative as one of the four motives for writing history, and Tacitus admitted that harm done to family members could influence historical memory: Polyb. 1.14; Livy 7.9.5; Joseph. *AJ* 1.2; Tac. *Ann.* 16.29. Patriotic or familial bias could conceivably be extended to include a political faction: Sall. *Cat.* 4.

<sup>73</sup> For example see: Cic. *Fam.* 5.12; *De or.* 2.63; Dion. Hal. *Pomp.* 3; see also Sacks (1981) 132-144, 166-170, 190-193; Woodman (1988) 40-44; Marincola (1997) 158-159; Luce (2011) 299-301. Cicero's appeal to Lucceius to exaggerate the truth of his exploits may fall under this category of accepted partiality: *Fam.* 5.12.1-4.

<sup>74</sup> This could be both subtle and overt: Fornara (1983) 105-120.

<sup>75</sup> Luce (2011) 299.

<sup>76</sup> Polyb. 2.61; 12.15.9.

<sup>77</sup> Plut. *Mor.* 855d-e. In opposition see Dionysius: Dion. Hal. *Pomp.* 3.

accepted display of judgement there was also an expectation that the historian's evaluation would be a fair one.<sup>78</sup> In addition, the ancient audience did not perceive these value judgements as clear fabrications, since outright falsehood was still condemned.<sup>79</sup>

Therefore, the concept of partiality in ancient historiography was usually conceived of in certain ways: in order to express hatred or favouritism that could lead to benefit or injury (usually due to a personal relationship with a figure of significance); due to favouritism by means of patriotism or familial loyalty; and in making moral judgements on individual historical characters. The two latter classifications of historical biases seem to have been an expectation of historical writing, and did not detract from the standard authorial claims of impartiality. For ancient historians from Polybius onwards, these claims to be impartial were a way to add to an historian's authority; that was, in order to appear to be impartial, an author had to explicitly claim to be in the narrative.<sup>80</sup> For example, Polybius made sure his readers were aware of his own lack of bias in dealing with the city of Locri, admitting that his previous association with them could have caused him to treat them with favour, but that he chose instead to remain unbiased.<sup>81</sup> In this case, Polybius gave evidence for his own objectivity in order to add to his historical authority in the *Histories*.

Ancient historians were also conscious of the influence of bias on other ancient historians, which was one reason why polemic against other writers was standard in historical narrative. Polemic in ancient historiography was a method of establishing historical credibility through negative comparison with the object of the polemic.<sup>82</sup> Polybius dedicated his twelfth book to criticising the author Timaeus of Tauromenium (c.356 – 260) whom he believed frequently made false historical statements.<sup>83</sup> In one significant section from

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<sup>78</sup> Marincola (1997) 171, 174.

<sup>79</sup> This was an important measure of an historian's character: Plut. *Mor.* 870a; Polyb. 1.14.2; 12.7.6, 11.7; Luce (2011) 299 n. 24.

<sup>80</sup> This was implied in Thucydides: 1.22; Marincola (1997) 164.

<sup>81</sup> Polyb. 12.5.1-5.

<sup>82</sup> Refer to section 4.4 for discussion of polemic in Polybius' *Histories*.

<sup>83</sup> Polyb. 12.25a, 25b.4, 25k.1.

this book, Polybius defended Aristotle's account of the colonisation of Locri against Timaeus' criticism. In assessing the account of Aristotle, Polybius claimed:

We have, then, either to show that Aristotle, in making statements I have just reproduced about Locri, did so for the sake of currying favour or for gain or from some self-interested motive, or if we do not venture to maintain this we must confess that those are wrong and at fault who exhibit to others such animosity and bitterness as Timaeus does to Aristotle.<sup>84</sup>

According to Polybius then, these were recognisable motives for showing subjectivity. Luce argued that if none of these motives were evident, the assumed reason was then a malicious character, just as Polybius claimed of Timaeus.<sup>85</sup> There was certainly an assumption made by Polybius that authorial bias must be motivated by some type of benefit to the author.<sup>86</sup>

Polybius claimed that the primary function of history was usefulness, which seemed to take precedence over historical accuracy when the author considered it necessary.<sup>87</sup> As Woodman pointed out, for ancient historians sometimes the truth simply constituted what was *plausible*.<sup>88</sup> He claimed that in accordance with rhetorical strictures there only needed to be what Woodman referred to as the 'hard core' or an established fact of history,

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<sup>84</sup> Polyb. 12.8.1-2: 'Ἡ δεικτέον οὖν τὸν Ἀριστοτέλην κατὰ τὸν ἄρτι λόγον τὰ περὶ Λοκρῶν εἰρηκότεα χάριτος ἢ κέρδους ἢ διαφορᾶς ἕνεκεν ἢ μηδὲ τολμῶντας τοῦτο λέγειν ὁμολογητέον ἀγνοεῖν καὶ παραπαίειν τοὺς τοιαύτη χρωμένους ἀπεχθεῖα καὶ πικρία κατὰ τῶν πέλας οἷα κέχρηται Τίμαιος κατ' Ἀριστοτέλους.'

<sup>85</sup> Polyb. 12.11.4-5. Plutarch reached the same conclusion on Herodotus: *Mor.* 855; see also Luce (2011) 302-303.

<sup>86</sup> Polyb. 8.11.6.

<sup>87</sup> For usefulness as a primary purpose of history see: Polyb. 1.1.2; 9.2.5; see also: Diod. 1.1.4-5; Dion. Hal. *Pomp.* 6; *Ant. Rom.* 1.1.2; 2.1; Sall. *Jug.* 4.1-2; Livy, *praef.* 10; Strab. *FGHist.* 91 F2; Tac. *Ann.* 4.32.2-33.2. Utility was not usually presented as the main reason for undertaking the writing of history: Marincola (1997) 43 n. 28. Polybius, though, mentioned utility more than any other historian, implying that for him it was significant. For Polybius' claim that reading history was beneficial for the audience see: Sacks (1981) 122-170. For discussion specifically on the link between truth and benefit see the summaries of: Roveri (1964) 106-7; Mohm (1977) 150-1.

<sup>88</sup> Woodman (2011) 273-274.

around which there could be built an *exaedificatio* of elaboration.<sup>89</sup> There has, however, been a significant challenge to such interpretations of ancient historiography. Lendon has argued that generally Latin historians ‘in fact achieved truth, the truth-orientation of their craft controlled or influenced nearly everything they did; that history was in fact a genre of its own, with its own rules.’<sup>90</sup> Much of a modern historians’ ability to reconstruct the past relies on the premise that the principle aim for ancient historians was historical truth. However, for Polybius historical accuracy was not always his primary consideration, principally due to his emphasis on the utility of history and didactic purpose.

There were also other ancient historians who either elaborated the truth or interpreted it to fit the purpose of their histories. This willingness to embellish the truth in order to emphasise utility was given justification in rhetorical teachings. Quintilian stated that:

Critics also charge rhetoric with doing what no art does, namely making use of vices to serve its ends, since it speaks the thing that is not and excites the passions. But there is no disgrace in doing either of these things, as long as the motive be good: consequently there is nothing vicious in such action. Even a philosopher is at times permitted to tell a lie, while the orator must needs excite the passions, if that be the only way by which he can lead the judge to do justice.<sup>91</sup>

The tendency to exaggerate the truth in order to enhance benefit could also be seen in historiography. For example, Livy gave priority to his moral lessons rather than historical accuracy, his purpose being to convey to the reader his

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<sup>89</sup> Woodman (2011) 271. Woodman equated his use of the term ‘hard core’ (to refer to the hard core substructure of fact) with Cicero’s use of ὑπόθεσις in a letter to his brother: Cic. Q Fr. 2.16.4.

<sup>90</sup> Lendon (2009) 43.

<sup>91</sup> Quint. *Inst.* 2.17.26-7 (Butler trans.): ‘*uti etiam vitii rhetorice, quod ars nulla faciat, criminantur, quia et falsum dicat et adfectus moveat. Quorum neutrum est turpe, cum ex bona ratione proficiscitur, ideoque nec vitium. Nam et mendacium dicere etiam sapienti aliquando concessum est, et adfectus, si aliter ad aequitatem perducere iudex non poterit, necessario movebit orator.*’

moral ideals rather than exact historical details.<sup>92</sup> In addition, both Strabo and Diodorus saw moral importance in fictional myths.<sup>93</sup> Similarly, Cicero recognised that the benefit of Xenophon's portrayal of Cyrus was due not to its historical accuracy, but rather because it provided a model of the just ruler.<sup>94</sup> The way Polybius appealed to truth (ἀληθεία) in the *Histories* implied that for him, truth equated to historical impartiality. However, despite Polybius' protests of impartiality, the real 'truth' of his history was his didactic purpose, which took precedence over considerations of historical accuracy.

Historical 'objectivity' was also subject to the author's selectivity of information. The *Histories* contain the events, characters, and discussions that Polybius chose to give the reader about Rome's rise to power in the second century. As Morley argued, what to include in historical narrative was 'a selection, made both unconsciously (according to his own assumptions and preconceptions) and consciously (according to his artistic purposes).'<sup>95</sup> This imported a degree of subjectivity at the most basic level of history, but is a facet of bias that cannot be measured through analysis of the historical narrative. Polybius was by no means the most admired of the ancient authors, but it is significant that Cicero praised him specifically for his historical accuracy. Cicero referred to him as 'one of the very best authorities' (*bonus auctor in primis*) and praised his reliability in dating, even though he was not listed among those Cicero admired for their eloquence.<sup>96</sup>

### 3) Truth, objectivity and subjectivity in this thesis

Morley in *Writing Ancient History* analysed the meaning of 'history' and 'objectivity', writing as follows:

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<sup>92</sup> Walsh (1955) 369-383.

<sup>93</sup> Diod. 1.2.2; Strab. 1.2.8-9.

<sup>94</sup> Cic. *Q Fr.* 1.1.23.

<sup>95</sup> Morley (1999) 64.

<sup>96</sup> Cic. *Offic.* 3.113; *Rep.* 2.27. Cicero praised Thucydides in particular: *De or.* 2.93; *Orat.* 30-32, 39; *Brut.* 27-29, 66. For analysis of Cicero's stylistic opinion of specific historians: Brunt (2011) 217-220. Livy praised Polybius, while Dionysius of Halicarnassus thought his language ugly and hard to read: Livy 33.10.10; Dion. Hal. *Comp.* 4.

Facts are established not through direct sensory experience but through discourse, according to a particular set of rules about how truth is to be determined. Hence, it is not possible to separate 'objective' facts from 'subjective' interpretation: facts are established *through* acts of interpretation. The job of the historian is not simply to uncover and interpret a pre-existing set of facts. It is to determine, through the interpretation of the sources, what things are to be given the status of facts and hence used as the basis for a historical account.<sup>97</sup>

This process seems to adequately capture the method of historiography undertaken in this thesis. It will focus on Polybius' interpretation of historical events through his self-constructed image in the *Histories*. The creation and development of Polybius' persona in the narrative was of primary importance to the author because it represented how he wanted to be viewed by the reader, and determined how he was going to be perceived in posterity. This self-created image was the lens through which Polybius wrote his historical narrative, implying that his persona determined how he interpreted events and framed them for his audience.

The aim of this thesis is not to search for the truth of events in Polybius' *Histories*, but instead to analyse how Polybius' self-constructed image as a teacher may have distorted his claimed impartiality. Polybius referred to the concept of truth frequently in the *Histories*, although his understanding of it was not the same as that of other historians. His use of the concept of truth in the *Histories* indicated that for Polybius, truth meant historical accuracy. The consistent claims in the *Histories* to truth and impartiality were standard in historical writing, but that did not mean that Polybius did not value the concept of historical accuracy. Although many of the claims of veracity throughout

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<sup>97</sup> Morley (1999) 57-8. Morley claimed there was no such thing as a neutral definition of history, since each definition worked to the advantage of its author. He defined history as 'a discourse about the past... distinguished from other discourses about the past by its emphasis on the critical analysis and interpretation of the surviving traces of the past... History is not myth; but that does not mean that it is automatically true. History is not fiction; but that does not mean that the historian's imagination plays no part in the reconstruction of the past. History is not propaganda; but that does not mean that it is therefore invariably neutral and objective': (1999) 51-52.

Polybius' polemic against Timaeus were rhetorical, they still indicated that Polybius put a certain amount of value in historical accuracy. However, the preference he showed in the *Histories* for the formation of his persona as a teacher above historical accuracy was not a contradiction for Polybius, since his didactic purpose took precedence over his historical aims. The political lessons Polybius bestowed on his audience of soldier-politicians were illustrated through the historical narrative, but these lessons were what were primarily of benefit to the reader, not the narrative of historical events. For purposes of clarity in this thesis, unless specifically used by the author under discussion, reference will be made to 'historical accuracy' instead of the more ambiguous term 'truth.'

Likewise, the concept of historical objectivity seems to imply that the intention is historical accuracy but, as already stated, that is not the aim in this thesis. For the purposes of this thesis, 'objectivity' refers to an ability to remain independent from personal emotions, opinions or prejudices. The question of whether objectivity in history is possible is one that cannot be answered here, but like the ancient historians, there should be the assumption that there are certain criteria of bias that will always influence pure objectivity. The word 'impartial', which is a slightly more neutral word than objective, will also be used to describe the concept of independence from personal emotions, opinions and prejudices. These terms overlap in meaning, so will be used as related concepts in this thesis.

The word 'subjectivity' will also be used in this thesis. However, subjectivity is not conceived of as the exact opposite of objectivity, since both definitions are exposed to more areas of grey than either word suggests. 'Subjectivity' will be defined for the purposes of this thesis as personal emotions, opinions or prejudices that influence the author's interpretation of events, ultimately affecting his ability to be historically accurate. The term 'bias' will also be used as a means of describing the types of prejudices that influence objectivity. The concepts of 'partiality' and 'bias' also overlap with the concept of 'subjectivity' in this thesis, so will be used in similar contexts. However, effort will be made to qualify why such partiality existed, whether it



was for example, due to rhetorical exposition or through Polybius' concern to emphasise his didactic purpose. Finally, many of these terms are considered to have negative connotations, but as far as possible, in this thesis such terms have been used neutrally.

Polybius is the ideal subject of this type of study on historical subjectivity simply because he was intimately involved with the historical narrative throughout the *Histories*. As the historical theorist Jenkins stated, 'history is the way people(s) create, in part, their identities.'<sup>98</sup> Although the standards of ancient historiography accepted and encouraged authorial intrusions in the narrative in order to provide moral *exempla*, Polybius went beyond this standard and built up an image of himself as the author within the narrative. This image, as a consciously-constructed portrait, does not reflect Polybius as he was, but as he wanted to be seen. There were two different Polybiuses in the *Histories* - Polybius the historical character and Polybius the consciously-constructed image of the author in the text. Through the narrative, Polybius became idealised as a teacher, almost in the typical model of the Greek teacher of young Roman aristocrats. This was an image designed to emphasise the utility of Polybius' *Histories*, providing a didactic model of behaviour for Greek and Roman aristocrats to emulate. This preoccupation with *use* and the prevalence of Polybius' image in the narrative makes him ideally suited to any discussion on historical impartiality.

#### **4) Methodology**

This thesis is an analysis of Polybius' self-constructed image in the *Histories*, and how this persona influenced the historical accuracy of his narrative. Authorial presence within the narrative was an expected aspect of ancient historiography. However, Polybius' involvement in the text went beyond these expectations. He interrupted the narrative at frequent intervals to make character assessments, insert digressions, and give political or

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<sup>98</sup> Jenkins (1991) 19.

historical instruction. The regularity and depth of these didactic lessons portrayed an author who was not, despite his effort to appear so, detached from the process of writing or his practical didactic purpose. Through these textual insertions, Polybius created his own persona in the narrative of how he wanted to be perceived by the audience. This image established Polybius primarily as a teacher, but also as an historian, a politician, and on occasion, a Greek. This persona in the *Histories* overshadowed his historical aims as he prioritised his didactic lessons over his historical narrative. For this reason the modern reader is advised to suspect Polybius' historical accuracy when reading the *Histories*.

There are two parts to this thesis. Part One focuses on the development of this self-constructed image of Polybius in the *Histories*, while Part Two contains three case studies that illustrate the prioritisation of his authorial persona and its didactic lessons over his concern to be impartial. As is standard in ancient history, all conclusions in this thesis will be based directly on evidence from ancient historians, in particular the extant sections of Polybius' *Histories*.

Part One consists of four chapters that analyse and enquire into different aspects of Polybius' development of his self-constructed image in the *Histories*. Through this depiction of Polybius' persona, it is then possible to see the way in which it influenced the historical accuracy of his narrative. Chapter Two addresses the formation of Polybius' image in the *Histories* and also discusses the function of his claims of impartiality in the narrative. This chapter provides the basis for Polybius' image as a teacher and historian, and is the foundation for the subsequent chapters that further develop the characteristics of this persona.

Chapter Three comprises of four sections, with the first two analysing Polybius' Achaean heritage, education, and literary knowledge. Section Three discusses Polybius' detention in Rome between 167 and 150, while the last section looks at the significance of his account of his own life after his release. Each of these sections focuses on how these personal aspects contributed to

Polybius' consciously-constructed image in the narrative, and how they, therefore, influenced his ability to remain historically impartial.

Chapter Four focuses on historiographical aspects of Polybius' image in the *Histories* through his historical construction, and how these aspects betray his concern to be portrayed as the ideal teacher and historian. There are five sections in this chapter, which subsequently address Polybius' purpose, structure, audience, his use of polemic, and finally, his use of emotion in the narrative. Each of these sections analyse the significance of these historical constructs in the conscious formation of Polybius' image, and how they affected his concern to remain historically accurate in the *Histories*.

The fifth chapter discusses Polybius' political attitudes and how he used them in the narrative to either strengthen the historical authority of his self-constructed image, or reinforce his didactic purpose. There are four sections in this chapter: the first section discusses Polybius' presentation of his early political life prior to his detention at Rome; the second focuses on Polybius' attitude towards the Romans prior to his detention in 167; while the subsequent section then addresses his attitude towards Rome after this point. The final section in this chapter addresses Polybius' attitude in the narrative towards the Greek states, particularly the Achaean League. Each of these sections will add to the overall development of the image Polybius consciously created in the *Histories* as a teacher and historian, and indicate how these aspects of his image influenced his concern to be historically accurate.

These four chapters illustrate the significance of the development of Polybius' image in the *Histories*, and show his clear concern to establish the authority of this persona in the narrative. For Polybius, this image as a teacher and historian, and the didactic lessons this persona illustrated through the narrative were his primary concerns, and took precedence over his aspirations to historical accuracy. The three case studies in Part Two of this thesis test the conclusions reached in Part One concerning Polybius' persona and the prioritisation of this image and his didactic purpose over his historical accuracy. These case studies analyse three different episodes of Greek-

Roman diplomatic interaction where Polybius provided a conclusion for the reader that was not verified by his own narrative. These chapters argue that Polybius did this in order to illustrate a didactic lesson for his audience of soldier-politicians, eclipsing his need to be historically accurate.

Chapter Six focuses on the Second Macedonian War (200-196) and Polybius' claim that the Romans entered this war specifically to free the Greeks from Macedonian oppression. Despite this claim, there is no indication in the *Histories* that this was the Romans' intention. Instead Polybius depicted Roman actions in this way to provide a contrast between the Roman promise of freedom - which they delivered - and previous pledges of freedom by Greek monarchs that were commonly rescinded. This contrast was further enhanced by the association between failed freedom promises and Philip V, whom Polybius demonised as a negative *exemplum* in the narrative. By comparison, the Romans and their position as the saviours of Greece provided an ideal *exemplum* of benevolence and moderation for Polybius' readers.

Chapter Seven focuses on the Aetolian *deditio in fidem* to the Romans in 191 during the war with Antiochus, and Polybius' claim that the Aetolians did not understand the implications of their unconditional surrender. He claimed this was a linguistic misunderstanding between the Romans and the Aetolians, although there is no additional evidence to corroborate this argument in the *Histories*. Polybius portrayed this episode as a linguistic misunderstanding in order to demonstrate to his audience that one of the qualities necessary for the ideal statesman in diplomatic interactions was the ability to understand foreign culture, particularly one that was dominant. In addition, it also demonstrated Polybius' status as a superior statesman due to his ability to stand between the diplomatic cultures of Rome and Greece, which added to the credibility of his image as a teacher and historian in the narrative.

Chapter Eight focuses on the diplomatic embassies the Romans sent to the Achaean League in 147 on the eve of the Achaean War. Polybius claimed that the Romans did not intend to dissolve the League, despite the

instructions delivered by the first embassy in 147, instead arguing the senate intended to scare the Achaean Leaders into obeying. In addition, he blamed the outbreak of war on the corrupt leaders of the Achaean League and their mistaken belief the Romans would let them act in any way they wished, vilifying their actions that led to the defeat of the League and the destruction of Corinth. However, Polybius' own narrative does not support his claim concerning the Roman embassy of 147, or his assignation of blame on the corrupt politicians of the Achaean League. Instead, Polybius depicted the war in this way in order to provide a didactic lesson for his readers on the ideal behaviour of a statesman by providing extreme examples of the opposite. For Polybius, these statesmen doomed the Achaean League through their own irrationality, leading him to gloss over the Roman provocations in order to emphasise his didactic purpose.

The conclusion to this thesis emphasises the need to look at Polybius' image in the *Histories* as a consciously-constructed persona that reflected how he wanted to be seen by his audience. Polybius chose how to present himself, what to emphasise, and what to exclude when he created this persona in the *Histories*. Therefore, how he portrayed himself cannot be taken to be historically accurate. This image of Polybius as a teacher, historian, politician, and Greek was directly connected to his primary purpose of imparting didactic lessons to his audience of soldier-politicians – a purpose that can be shown in the narrative to eclipse his concern for historical accuracy.

There is one further methodological point in this thesis that should be addressed. I have followed the example of Erskine and focused only on those passages of Polybius directly attributed to him.<sup>99</sup> There is little consideration of the passages in Livy identified as derived from Polybius, simply because this transmission is dubious in its details and unreliable for analysing Polybius' own self-portrayal.

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<sup>99</sup> Erskine (2003) 230.

## Part I

### Chapter Two: Historical Bias and Polybius' Self-Constructed Image in the *Histories*

The focus of this chapter is to establish the type of image Polybius aimed to create in the *Histories* - the kind of persona that gave him historical authority and encouraged his readers to have confidence in his narrative. For Polybius, this self-constructed image was primarily as a teacher, but also as the ideal historian. Part of Polybius' attempt to establish his authority as a teacher and historian for his readers, was through his consistent claims of impartiality. Nevertheless, the creation of this self-constructed image in itself implicitly attests to the author's subjectivity. Polybius' claims to historical accuracy and objectivity were made in order to add credibility to this image of himself as a teacher and historian, inspiring confidence from his readers in his narrative interpretations.

The effort made by Polybius to create and maintain this persona of a teacher both conceals and reveals authorial bias. Polybius' main concern was to create this image and convey his didactic lessons to the reader, rather than to be acutely accurate in his historical narrative. The claims of impartiality were consciously made in order to support Polybius' image, as were his claims of rationality. This does not necessarily mean that Polybius did not value historical accuracy, just that it was often eclipsed by his concern to teach his readers the necessary qualities to be a good statesman. This chapter will first look at Polybius' conscious formation of his image as a teacher and an historian in the narrative, which provides a basis for the development of this image in the subsequent chapters. Second, it will address Polybius' claims of impartiality, since it is this aspect of the narrative that often caused his readers to trust in his historical interpretations.

## 1) Polybius' self-constructed image

The function of this section is to analyse Polybius' self-constructed image in the *Histories* and how it influenced his historical objectivity. The significance of Polybius' persona cannot be overstated, since it was the character of the historian himself that was foremost on display for the reader.<sup>1</sup> Polybius' self-characterisation as a teacher was a consciously-constructed ideal by the author in order to increase his own historical authority and significance in the narrative. This coloured his objectivity in the *Histories* and should lead the reader to question Polybius' historical interpretations. This chapter argues that there were two significant aspects of Polybius' authorial persona in the *Histories*, as a teacher and an historian. Polybius also showed a concern in the construction of his image to portray himself as a politician and a Greek, although these aspects were less evident.

For the reader of the *Histories* there were, and are, two different Polybiuses. Polybius the man about whom we are informed in the *Histories*, and more significantly, the image of Polybius the author who can be seen throughout the narrative. There is no way that modern historians can recapture with any accuracy the biographical details of Polybius' life, since most of the information we have is derived from what Polybius the author chose to include in the *Histories*. Instead, when discussing the biographical details of Polybius' life, historians are discussing the historical character Polybius consciously depicted for the audience in the *Histories* - a distinction that is not made often enough. Although it is difficult to imagine that this historical character was the product of any overt fabrications, due to the contemporary nature of the *Histories*, it still remains that the character the reader can see in the narrative was a construction of how the author wanted to be perceived by his audience. The selective nature of this image suggests

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<sup>1</sup> Gray (1987) 473; Marincola (1997) 131-132. Ancient writers did not distinguish between the character of the author in the history and the man himself: Dion. Hal. *Ant. Rom.* 1.1.2, 6.5; Sen. *Ep.* 114.1. However, some modern historians see this separation as significant: Marincola (1997) *passim*, esp. 128-133.

a high degree of self-conscious shaping within Polybius' self-presentation as a historical actor.

The image Polybius created for himself in the *Histories* provides valuable insights into how he wished to be perceived by his audience. More than any other historian of this period, Polybius interposed himself consistently into the narrative of the *Histories*. Polybius' existence in the narrative was not in the form of incidental additions; instead, he was the constant commentator through both the historical narrative and the didactic digressions. Badian and Eckstein both maintain Polybius was a highly intelligent author.<sup>2</sup> He decided himself how he wanted to be viewed by the audience, projecting this narrative persona through the text onto the reader. This created an intimate and immediate relationship between the reader, as the student, and Polybius, as the teacher. Ancient rhetoric and poetry recognised a distinction between the writer/speaker and the way he represented himself in the text or spoken performance, which could apply to Polybius' position in the *Histories*. However, in the case of Polybius, the construction of his image was not necessarily connected to the use of 'I', but more commonly through less specific authorial interventions in the text.<sup>3</sup>

In ancient historiography it was necessary for the historian to shape his own image in the text in order to prove to the audience he was worthy of their trust. This was a conscious effort to determine the audience's reception of his work and shows the importance placed on character in the ancient world.<sup>4</sup> Aristotle referred to the art of persuasion and the importance placed on the speaker to create a character for the audience to trust, a character who was revealed through indirect characterisation rather than explicit claims.<sup>5</sup> The

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<sup>2</sup> Badian (1968) 209; Eckstein (1989) 10. Derow's reference to Polybius as a 'pro' is also notable: (1994) 84.

<sup>3</sup> Calame (2005) 5. Polybius consistently referred to himself in the third person until after book thirty-six when he became a historical component in the narrative, changing to the first person. However, he recognised this change and addressed his method of referring to himself in the *Histories*: 36.12; see also Marincola (1997) 189-191.

<sup>4</sup> Marincola (1997) 128-133.

<sup>5</sup> Arist. *Rh.* 1.2.3-5; 1.8.6. This was based on the orator's ability to create character within a speech (ῥητοποιία), which Kennedy argued may have been modelled on the character creation by ancient poets: (1963) 92.



Romans placed more emphasis on character than the Greeks, reflected in the contrasting ideas of Aristotle and Cicero on the qualities necessary to be persuasive. Aristotle identified them as good sense, virtue, and goodwill, while Cicero claimed that the art of persuasion was the appeasement of the audience through a man's *dignitas*, deeds, and the audience's opinion of his life.<sup>6</sup> Polybius was aware that it was necessary to trust the character of a speaker in order to be persuaded by their claims. He refused to condemn or praise monarchs without cause, and instead claimed an historian should look at their past actions and character in deciding how to portray them.<sup>7</sup> This was illustrated in the *Histories* through his portrayal of the authority of Philopoemen:

So true is it that a single word spoken in season by a man of authority not only deters his hearers from what is worst, but urges them on to what is best. And when the speaker can reinforce his advice by the example of a life which follows it, it is impossible not to give the fullest credit to his words.<sup>8</sup>

An example of such conviction in the *Histories* can be seen in the trust that Publius Scipio encouraged in his army just before their crossing of the Ticinius River in 218.<sup>9</sup> The significance Polybius placed on character can also be seen in his preoccupation with *exempla* in his *Histories*.<sup>10</sup> These character studies provided for the reader examples to model themselves on, with the author implicitly including himself for consideration.

Polybius' image in the *Histories* was primarily that of a teacher. He believed that history was only significant if it was useful to the reader, so he used his history as a means to impart lessons he thought significant to his audience. He stated that the function of history was to be useful (τὸ χρήσιμος) and give pleasure (τερπνὸς) to the audience, and made it clear from the

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<sup>6</sup> Arist. *Rh.* 2.1.5; Cic. *De or.* 2.115, 182.

<sup>7</sup> Polyb. 8.8.7.

<sup>8</sup> Polyb. 11.10.1-2: 'Οὕτως εἰς λόγος εὐκαίρως ῥηθεὶς ὑπ' ἀνδρός ἀξιοπίστου πολλάκις οὐ μόνον ἀποτρέπει τῶν χειρίστων, ἀλλὰ καὶ παρορμᾷ πρὸς τὰ κάλλιστα τοὺς ἀνθρώπους. ὅταν δὲ καὶ τὸν ἴδιον βίον ἀκόλουθον εἰσφέρηται τοῖς εἰρημένοις ὁ παρακαλῶν, ἀνάγκη λαμβάνειν τὴν πρώτην πίστιν τὴν παραίνεσιν.'

<sup>9</sup> Polyb. 3.64.11.

<sup>10</sup> For discussion on Polybius' use of *exempla* see sections 2.1, 3.1 and 4.1.

beginning of his *Histories* that he intended his work to be educational, 'since men have no more ready corrective of conduct than knowledge of the past.'<sup>11</sup> Polybius was explicit at the beginning of the *Histories* that his audience comprised of those who aspired to a life of active politics - something that he assumed was standard in historiography.<sup>12</sup> So for Polybius, the didactic aspect of his narrative was central to his conception of the *Histories*. But Polybius went further than other historians with this didactic element and embraced his role as the teacher of young Greek and Roman aristocrats by emphasising his role as a teacher in the narrative.

Polybius used the first person on occasion in his *Histories*, but more significantly he used the narrative to relate his own political, military, and historical ideals. Through these didactic lessons Polybius created a teacher-student relationship with his reader, reinforcing his own suitability for the job by emphasising the significance of his ideals throughout the *Histories*. Polybius embraced the idea that the young politician received the necessary education by reading history and learning through the *exempla* of past leaders.<sup>13</sup> He expressed this plainly:

And if any man were entirely self-sufficing in every event, I might allow that the accurate knowledge of the past, though a graceful accomplishment, was perhaps not essential: but as long as it is not in mere mortals to say this, either in public or private affairs, - seeing that no man of sense, even if he is prosperous for the moment, will ever reckon with certainty on the future, - then I say that such knowledge is essential, and not merely graceful. For take the three commonest cases. Suppose, first, a statesman to be attacked either in his own person or in that of his country: or, secondly, suppose him to be anxious for a forward policy and to anticipate the attack of an enemy: or, lastly, suppose him to

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<sup>11</sup> Polyb. 1.1.1: 'διὰ τὸ μηδεμίαν ἐτοιμοτέραν εἶναι τοῖς ἀνθρώποις διόρθωσιν τῆς τῶν προγεγενημένων πράξεων ἐπιστήμης'; see also 1.4.11.

<sup>12</sup> Polyb. 1.1.2.

<sup>13</sup> Polybius claimed that he paid special attention to Philopoemen's education in his monograph on him, implying a link between the significance of Philopoemen as an ideal statesman and his education: Polyb. 10.21.5; see also Eckstein (1995a) 148-150.

desire to maintain the status quo. In all these cases it is history alone that can supply him with precedents, and teach him how, in the first case, to find supporters and allies; in the second, to incite co-operation; and in the third, to give vigour to the conservative forces which tend to maintain, as he desires, the existing state of things.<sup>14</sup>

This quote establishes the historian as the teacher of young statesmen and informs us of how Polybius saw his role as an historian. Through the narrative Polybius constructed his own image to coincide with his belief in the benefits of history, enhancing his own significance in the education of young aristocrats. However, Polybius did not consider all literature worthy of study, shown by his polemic against various other historians, and his criticism of those who read aimless philosophical paradoxes instead of political and ethical treatises.<sup>15</sup>

Polybius advocated the necessity of education for young aristocrats throughout the *Histories*, an education that he thought could be achieved through the reading of history.<sup>16</sup> Polybius also criticised historians for failings in their own educational training that made them less worthy to write history, while he had faith that his own education had equipped him with the necessary skills.<sup>17</sup> According to Cicero, Polybius was critical of the lack of formal education for young Roman aristocrats, although he admired traditions

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<sup>14</sup> Polyb. 3.31.2-6 (Shuckburgh trans.): 'ἐγὼ δ', εἰ μὲν τις ὑπέληφε πρὸς πᾶσαν περίστασιν αὐτάρκης ὑπάρχειν, καλὴν μὲν, οὐκ ἀναγκαίαν δ' ἴσως φήσαιμ' ἂν εἶναι τῶν προγεγονότων ἐπιστήμην· εἰ δὲ μηδεὶς ἂν μήτε περὶ τῶν κατ' ἰδίαν μήτε περὶ τῶν κοινῶν τολμήσαι τοῦτ' εἰπεῖν ἄνθρωπος ὢν, διὰ τό, κἂν κατὰ τὸ παρὸν εὐτυχῆ, τὴν γε περὶ τοῦ μέλλοντος ἐλπίδα μηδὲν ἂν ἐκ τῶν νῦν παρόντων εὐλόγως βεβαιώσασθαι μηδένα τῶν νοῦν ἔχόντων, οὐ μόνον καλὴν, ἔτι δὲ μᾶλλον ἀναγκαίαν εἶναι φημι διὰ ταῦτα τὴν τῶν παρεληλυθότων ἐπίγνωσιν. πῶς γὰρ ἂν εἴτ' αὐτὸς ἀδικούμενός τις ἢ τῆς πατρίδος ἀδικουμένης βοηθοὺς εὖροι καὶ συμμάχους, εἴτε κτήσασθαι τι καὶ προκατάοξασθαι σπουδάζων τοὺς συνεργήσοντάς αὐτῷ παρορμήσας πρὸς τὰς ἐπιβολάς; πῶς δ' ἂν εὐδοκούμενος τοῖς ὑποκειμένοις τοὺς βεβαιώσοντάς τὴν αὐτοῦ προαίρεσιν καὶ διαφυλάξοντάς τὴν κατάστασιν παροξύναι δικαίως, εἰ μηδὲν εἰδείη τῆς τῶν προγεγονότων περὶ ἐκάστου ὑπομνήσεως.'

<sup>15</sup> Polyb. 12.26e.2-4. For Polybius' polemic of Timaeus see section 4.4.

<sup>16</sup> Polyb. 1.1.2, 2.8.

<sup>17</sup> Polyb. 12.26.9 (criticising Timaeus' rhetoric); 34.6.8 (criticising Dicaearchus for his geometry); 36.1 (Polybius' confidence at his own skill).

such as the aristocratic funeral for what they taught the youth of Rome.<sup>18</sup> In the period Polybius lived in Rome, aristocratic education was undertaken chiefly through private Greek tutors.<sup>19</sup> The first known private tutor in Rome was Livius Andronicus from the Greek city of Tarentum in Southern Italy in the third century.<sup>20</sup> So there was already a tradition of employing private Greek tutors for young aristocrats when Polybius was detained. Bonner argued that the detention of so many Greeks after the Third Macedonian War was of great significance to Roman education.<sup>21</sup>

The *Histories* provided some evidence that Polybius may have seen himself in the role of teacher with the sons of Aemilius Paullus who, according to Plutarch, was heavily involved in the education of his sons. Plutarch claimed that Paullus surrounded his sons with Greek teachers of every kind, perhaps including Polybius among them.<sup>22</sup> In the *Histories*, Polybius depicted himself as Aemilianus' teacher, presenting himself with the ability to fill the gaps in the young Roman's education. According to Polybius, Aemilianus approached him and spoke depreciatingly about himself, voicing his concern that his character did not possess those qualities required of a Roman. Polybius replied:

I myself would be delighted to do all in my power to help you to speak and act in a way worthy of your ancestors... But as regards what you say now troubles you I don't think you could

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<sup>18</sup> Cic. *Rep.* 4.3. As Corbeill stated, Roman education was 'citizen training': Corbeill (2001) 266. For Polybius' remarks on the Roman funeral see: 6.53-54.

<sup>19</sup> Previously, Roman parents had been primarily responsible for their children's education in basic Latin and mathematics, while tutors were employed for more advanced study: Plut. *Cat. Mai.* 20; *Aem.* 6.5; *Nep. Att.* 1.2; Suet. *Aug.* 64.3; Tac. *Dial.* 28. See also Bonner (1977) 10-19; Corbeill (2001) 261-288.

<sup>20</sup> Cic. *Sen.* 50; Suet. *Gram.* 1; Bonner (1977) 20.

<sup>21</sup> Bonner (1977) 23. There were also an increasing number of Greek philosophers in Rome in the second century who gave public lectures to Roman youth. For example, those whom Cato got expelled from Rome, Diogenes the Stoic Philosopher and Carneades the Academic: Plut. *Cat. Mai.* 22. There was also Panaetius of Rhodes, a friend of both Polybius and Aemilianus: Cic. *Rep.* 1.34; see also Polyb. 31.24.7.

<sup>22</sup> For example Greek grammarians, philosophers, rhetoricians, sculptors, painters, the overseers of horses and dogs, and hunting tutors: Plut. *Aem.* 6.5.

find anyone more efficient than myself to forward your effort and help you.<sup>23</sup>

This passage clearly establishes Polybius as Aemilianus' teacher, but more than that, it also directly links Polybius with the Roman's achievements. This is emphasised in the consequent passages, where Polybius includes his laudatory character sketch of Aemilianus.<sup>24</sup> Polybius' depiction of himself as Aemilianus' teacher added to his image in the *Histories*. He had helped produce one of the best Roman statesmen of his day, so the lessons he gave to the reader were proven to be worthwhile.

As well as his self-portrait as the ideal teacher, Polybius also defined himself as the ideal historian in the *Histories*, through the polemic against other historians but also through constant instruction directed at the audience on the purpose and use of history.<sup>25</sup> For Polybius, the ideal historian was a man-of-action, one who had practical geographical and political knowledge in addition to knowledge gained through the analysis and comparison of memoirs, historical records, and eyewitness accounts.<sup>26</sup> For Polybius, Odysseus was the ideal historian because he was a political man-of-action and a warrior.<sup>27</sup> Polybius displayed his admiration of the Homeric hero Odysseus, stating:

It appears to me that the dignity of history also demands such a man.<sup>28</sup>

In this way, as McGing pointed out, Polybius associated himself with Odysseus, conceiving of himself as the Homeric hero of historical writing.<sup>29</sup>

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<sup>23</sup> Polyb. 31.24.5-9: 'ἐγὼ δὲ κἂν αὐτὸς ἡδέως σοι συνεπιδοίην ἑμαυτὸν καὶ συνεργὸς γενοίμην εἰς τὸ καὶ λέγειν τι καὶ πράττειν ἄξιον τῶν προγόνων... εἰς δὲ τὰ λυποῦντα σε νῦν καὶ <μάλιστα> καθὼς φῆς, δοκῶ μηδένα συναγωνιστὴν καὶ συνεργὸν ἄλλον εὐρεῖν ἂν ἡμῶν ἐπιτηδειότερον.'

<sup>24</sup> Polyb. 31.25-30.

<sup>25</sup> For Polybius' construction of his own image through polemic against other historians see section 4.4.

<sup>26</sup> Polyb. 12.25e.1-2, 27.

<sup>27</sup> Hartog (2001) 164-165.

<sup>28</sup> Polyb. 12.28.1: 'Δοκεῖ δέ μοι καὶ τὸ τῆς ἱστορίας πρόσχημα τοιοῦτον ἄνδρα ζητεῖν.'

Polybius also argued against the cynicism of Eratosthenes who doubted the existence of Odysseus, claiming that Homer mixed truth with falsehoods in the *Odyssey*: Polyb. 34.2.2-4.8; Walbank (1948) 172.

<sup>29</sup> McGing (2010) 129.

The qualities that Polybius admired in the hero Odysseus were not the more light-hearted qualities attributed to him, but rather his qualities as an accomplished general and intelligent, honourable man, who had lived through many hardships and warfare, and had sacrificed for the greater good.<sup>30</sup> The image Polybius depicted of himself as the heroic traveller, just like Odysseus, can be seen elsewhere in the *Histories*:

I underwent the perils of journeys through Africa, Spain, and Gaul, and of voyages on the seas that lie on the farther side of these countries, mostly for this very purpose of correcting the errors of former writers and making those parts of the world also known to the Greeks.<sup>31</sup>

There is also evidence that this image of Polybius as the Odysseus of historiography fostered in the *Histories*, was one that he encouraged in his contemporaries. Cato's mocking comments in 151 and the phrasing of an inscription to Polybius in Megalopolis that echoed Homer's depiction of Odysseus may not just be coincidence, but a significant aspect of Polybius' identification both in his *Histories* and during his lifetime.<sup>32</sup>

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<sup>30</sup> Eckstein (1995a) 281. Eckstein divided these qualities accordingly: accomplished general (Hom. *Il.* 10.251-53; cf. Polyb. 9.16.1); intelligent man of the world (Hom. *Od.* 1.1; cf. Polyb. 12.27.10); hardship for higher goals (Hom. *Od.* 1.4; Polyb. 12.27.11); seasoned by 'tempest and war' (Hom. *Od.* 8.183; cf. Polyb. 12.27.11).

<sup>31</sup> Polyb. 3.59.7-8: ὑπεδεξάμεθα τοὺς κινδύνους [καὶ τὰς κακοπαθείας] τοὺς συμβάντας ἡμῖν ἐν πλάνῃ τῇ κατὰ Λιβύην καὶ κατ' Ἰβηρίαν, ἔτι δὲ Γαλατίαν καὶ τὴν ἔξωθεν ταύταις ταῖς χώραις συγκυροῦσαν θάλατταν, ἵνα διορθωσάμενοι τὴν τῶν προγεγονότων ἄγνοιαν ἐν τούτοις γνώριμα ποιήσωμεν τοῖς Ἕλλησι καὶ ταῦτα τὰ μέρη τῆς οἰκουμένης.' See also Walbank (1948) 172; (1967) 409.

<sup>32</sup> Polyb. 35.6.4; Plut. *Cat. Mai.* 9.3. Polybius and Plutarch both relate the story of Polybius seeking Cato's advice on whether to ask the senate to reinstate the honours the detainees had in Achaëa after they had been granted their freedom. Cato replied that he was like Odysseus intending to re-enter the Cyclop's cave to retrieve his cap and belt. The question of Cato's awareness of Polybius' self-association with Odysseus could have come from reading book twelve, although its publication date is contested by historians. Alternatively, as Eckstein theorised, it may have been something Cato overheard in conversation between Polybius and the Scipionic circle: Walbank (1948) 172 n. 91; (1972) 52; Eckstein (1997) 196-7; McGing (2010) 129-30; On the publication of book twelve see: Walbank (1972) 18-19, 24-25, 48; Eckstein (1997) 197 n. 71. Pausanias described the inscription on the statue of Polybius at Megalopolis: 'Elegiac verses are inscribed upon it saying that he roamed over every land and every sea, and that he became the ally of the Romans and stayed their wrath against the Greek nation' (Jones trans.) – 'γέγραπται δὲ καὶ ἐλεγεία ἐπ' αὐτῷ λέγοντα ὡς ἐπὶ γῆν καὶ θάλασσαν πᾶσαν πλανηθεῖη, καὶ ὅτι σύμμαχος γένοιτο Ῥωμαίων καὶ παύσειεν αὐτοὺς ὀργῆς τῆς ἐς τὸ Ἑλληνικόν': 8.30.8. This echoes Homer's description of Odysseus, also cited in Polybius 12.27.10-11: 'Tell me, oh Muse, the man of many shifts, Who wandered far and wide... And towns of many saw, and learnt their mind, And suffered much in heart by land and sea... Passing through wars of men and grievous waves' (Shuckburgh trans.) - 'ἄνδρα

This was an important image Polybius presented to the reader of himself throughout the *Histories* - as the Homeric hero of historiography. As the ideal man-of-action, Polybius saw himself as the complete historian:

and I would say that it will be well with history either when men-of-action undertake to write history, not as now happens in a perfunctory manner, but when in the belief this is a most necessary and most noble thing they apply themselves all through their life to it with undivided attention, or again when would-be authors regard a training in actual affairs as necessary for writing history.<sup>33</sup>

Through this characterisation as the ideal historian, Polybius inserted himself into the narrative to give advice and make comments on historiography, geography, and various historical events. Polybius' self-definition in the *Histories* as the complete historian also made him appear trustworthy to the reader, even though his preoccupation with his persona in the narrative and concern to impart his didactic lessons compromised his historical objectivity.

This self-portrait of Polybius implies a deeper involvement in the narrative than modern academics usually allow. Polybius defined his own role as the narrator of the *Histories*, characterising himself as a teacher and an historian. The level of authorial intrusion in the narrative speaks to another agenda apart from the historical, with Polybius' concern to convey his lessons to the reader more significant than the events he was narrating. Polybius' history was written in order to provide lessons and examples for his aristocratic readers - a concern that no doubt shaped Polybius' perspective of events and characters throughout the *Histories*. The conventional image of

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μοι ἔννεπε, Μοῦσα, πολύτροπον, ὃς μάλα πολλά πλάγχθη... πολλῶν δ' ἀνθρώπων ἴδεν ἄστεα καὶ νόον ἔγνω, πολλὰ δ' ὄγ' ἐν πόντῳ πάθεν ἄλγεα ὃν κατὰ θυμόν... ἀνδρῶν τε πτολέμους ἀλεγείνά τε κύματα πείρων': Hom. *Od.* 1.1-4; 8.183.

<sup>33</sup> Polyb. 12.28.3-5: 'κάγῳ δ' ἂν εἴποιμι διότι τὰ τῆς ἱστορίας ἔξει τότε καλῶς, ὅταν ἢ οἱ πραγματικοὶ τῶν ἀνδρῶν γράφειν ἐπιχειρήσωσι τὰς ἱστορίας, μὴ καθάπερ νῦν παρέργως, νομίσαντες δὲ καὶ τοῦτ' εἶναι σφίσι τῶν ἀναγκαιοτάτων καὶ καλλίστων, ἀπερίσπαστοι... παράσχονται πρὸς τοῦτο τὸ μέρος κατὰ τὸν βίον, ἢ οἱ γράφειν ἐπιβαλλόμενοι τὴν ἐξ αὐτῶν τῶν πραγμάτων ἔξιν ἀναγκαίαν ἡγήσονται πρὸς τὴν ἱστορίαν.'

Polybius as impartial disregards his creation of this authorial persona in the *Histories*, an aspect of the narrative that can no longer be ignored.

## 2) Polybius' claims to objectivity in the *Histories*

Throughout the *Histories* Polybius emphasised the historical accuracy of his own narrative and the failure of other historians, particularly Timaeus, to accurately narrate events. This allusion to the impartiality of his own historical account added to the image he constructed of himself as a teacher and historian in the *Histories*. As Vercruysse argued, Polybius' primary motive in paying such attention to the concept of historical accuracy was to prove his own historical reliability to his readers and increase his own status as an historian, an agenda that goes beyond pure historical accuracy. Through his claims of impartiality Polybius was appealing to his readers to trust his interpretations - as Vercruysse terms it, the audience were his judges and he had to interest and convince them.<sup>34</sup> Claims to historical impartiality by historians were common in the ancient world, and were part of the construction of the historian's character and appeal to the audience.<sup>35</sup> Polybius' consciously designed image of himself in the *Histories* as a teacher and historian depended on his ability to sell his own historical interpretations over those of his rivals, which he did through claims of accuracy and polemic against his fellow historians.

As has already been addressed in the introduction, ancient objectivity did not necessarily correspond with our modern notions. Instead, ancient historians expected some subjectivity in their narrative, in particular to show favour or dislike, display patriotism or to cast judgment on historical characters.<sup>36</sup> Polybius' *Histories* adhered to this expectation, with Polybius admitting that patriotism in particular was liable to influence his own historical

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<sup>34</sup> Vercruysse (1990) 17-38, esp. 34-35.

<sup>35</sup> For examples of claims of impartiality in the narratives of ancient historians see chapter one: n. 55 and 56. Marincola also listed experience and effort as aspects of an historian's character that were likewise emphasised: (1997) 128-174.

<sup>36</sup> For discussion of these common biases see section 1.2.



objectivity.<sup>37</sup> However, this was Polybius' only concession in his narrative, which to the uncritical reader would appear to be an impartial representation of historical events because of the consistent assertions to his accuracy. Marincola pointed out that it was common for historians to make claims of their own reliability, indicating that such declarations held an important and traditional part in establishing credibility and authority in ancient historiography.<sup>38</sup> It was a rhetorical aspect of ancient historiography that was intended to reinforce the author's literary authority. As Marincola explained, it was the 'means by which the ancient historian claims the competence to narrate and explain the past, and simultaneously constructs a persona that the audience will find persuasive and believable.'<sup>39</sup> For Polybius, that persona was primarily as a teacher, but also as an historian, politician, and a Greek.

Ancient historians claimed their authority differently from their poetic and philosophical counterparts. Homer appealed to the Muses for his authority, while later poets appealed to a combination of the Muses and what could also be considered more historical evidence.<sup>40</sup> Hesiod explicitly claimed his authority from the Muses, but also acknowledged their ability to convey fabrications as well as truth:

And one day they taught Hesiod glorious song  
while he was shepherding his lambs under holy Helicon,  
and this word first the goddesses said to me –  
the Muses of Olympus, daughters of Zeus who holds the aegis:  
“Shepherds of the wilderness, wretched things of shame, mere bellies,  
we know how to speak many false things as though they were true (ἐτύμοισιν);  
but we know, when we will, to utter true (ἀληθέα) things.”<sup>41</sup>

<sup>37</sup> Polyb. 16.14.6; Luce (2011) 297-298.

<sup>38</sup> Marincola (1997) xii.

<sup>39</sup> Marincola (1997) 1.

<sup>40</sup> Hom. *Il.* 1.1-7. This is Marincola's argument, which he claims is simplified from a larger discussion of the inspiration of poets and their claims of truth: (1997) 3 n. 7, 4. For example Theognis appealed to the gods, but also ancestral tradition, while Mimnermus appealed to eyewitnesses and Solon appealed to the Earth as a witness: Thgn. 1.769-772; Mimnermus F 13; Solon F 13.1-2, 36.3-5.

<sup>41</sup> Hes. *Th.* 22-32 (Evelyn-White trans.):

‘αἶ νύ ποθ’ Ἡσίοδον καλὴν ἐδίδαξαν ἀοιδὴν,  
ἄρνας ποιμαίνονθ’ Ἐλικῶνος ὑποζαθέοιο.

Early philosophers also followed this practice of appealing to the Muses for their authority, but soon began to emphasise their knowledge and attack their predecessors in order to affirm their credibility.<sup>42</sup> Historians used the same methods to attest to the accuracy of their claims, commonly asserting they had reached their historical conclusions through their own inquiry and investigation.<sup>43</sup> As Marincola points out, historians had to verify and expand this standard claim in order to be recognised within the growing number of those who wrote history. The authority of the author increasingly depended on how the audience perceived the character of the narrator.<sup>44</sup> According to Marincola:

The proof that things are as the historian says they are depended not a little on the audience's perception of the narrator's character: to believe an historical account, it was necessary to believe the historian himself.<sup>45</sup>

The level of involvement by the narrator varied with each ancient historian, indicating different practices for claiming authority. For example, Herodotus inserted himself throughout the narrative in order to establish his historical authority, while Thucydides established his authority in his preface, through digressions, and with the certainty of his narrative voice.<sup>46</sup> Polybius' approach was a combination of these two methods. He used digressions to discuss a number of issues he viewed as significant, but also had a similar authorial approach to Herodotus shown by his consistent commentary in the narrative.<sup>47</sup> This methodological approach was referred to by Polybius as

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τόνδε δέ με πρώτιστα θεὰὶ πρὸς μῦθον ἔειπον,  
Μοῦσαι Ὀλυμπιάδες κοῦπαι Διὸς αἰγιόχοιο:  
ποιμένες ἄγραυλοι, κάκ' ἐλέγχεα, γαστέρες οἶον,  
ἴδμεν ψεύδεα πολλὰ λέγειν ἐτύμοισιν ὁμοῖα,  
ἴδεμεν δ' , εὐτ' ἐθέλωμεν, ἀληθέα γηρύσασθαι.'

<sup>42</sup> For example Parmenides and Empedocles: *DK* 28 B 1; *DK* 31 B 3, 4.

<sup>43</sup> The earliest example is Hecataeus: *FGrHist* 1 F 1a = Diod. 1.4.1.

<sup>44</sup> Marincola (1997) 5. See Livy for reference to the number of historians in his period: *praef.* 3.

<sup>45</sup> Marincola (1997) 6.

<sup>46</sup> For example: Hdt. 1.1.1, 2.1, 5.4, 15.1, 49.1, 51.3, 75.6, 85.1; Thuc. 1.1-22. Xenophon was even more rigid than Thucydides and virtually disappeared in the narrative: Marincola (1997) 8-10. There is some reason to conclude that a simple style of narrative indicated historical authority: Livy 3.56.3; Cic. *Brut.* 262; Sall. *Jug.* 85.31; Lucian, *Hist. Conscr.* 8, 16; Marincola (1997) 10 n. 42.

<sup>47</sup> Marincola claimed Polybius 'allows nearly nothing to pass without drawing his own moral from it for the benefit of his audience, almost as if he were afraid that they might overlook an

‘apodeictic’ (ἀποδεικτική), and has been interpreted as ‘demonstrative history.’<sup>48</sup> Hence, Polybius imitated the methodological styles of his predecessors, but also went further and ultimately created his own method of authority.<sup>49</sup>

Polybius’ claimed impartiality and the establishment of his authority can be seen in the *Histories* through his declarations of historical accuracy. Therefore, Polybius’ claims to impartiality can, and should, be regarded as attempts to add credibility to his self-constructed image as a teacher and historian. That is not to say that Polybius did not value historical accuracy. According to Polybius, history had to be of benefit (ὠφέλεια) to the reader, and in order to be useful, he claimed it had to be truthful (τὸ ἀληθές), casting significant importance on his concept of historical accuracy.<sup>50</sup> This link between benefit and historical accuracy can be seen in Polybius’ emphasis on the necessity of understanding the treaties between Rome and Carthage prior to the outbreak of the Second Punic War. Polybius stated:

but I think a more particular examination of it will be useful both to practical statesmen, who require to know the exact truth (ἀληθείας) of the matter, in order to avoid mistakes in any critical deliberation; and to historical students, that they may not be led astray by the ignorance or partisan bias of historians; but may have before them a conspectus, acknowledged to be accurate, of the various compacts which have been made between Rome and Carthage from the earliest times to our own day.<sup>51</sup>

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incident’s importance, or draw the wrong lesson or moral from what he has so carefully constructed’: (1997) 11.

<sup>48</sup> Polyb. 2.37.3; 4.40.1; 10.21.8; Walbank (1972) 57 n. 153. For discussion on Polybius’ apodeictic approach see section 4.1.

<sup>49</sup> It was standard in ancient literature to imitate previous writers, to the point that it was an expectation known as *mimesis*. For discussion on *mimesis* as a technical term in Greek historical theory see: Gray (1987) 467-486. For imitation of predecessors by ancient historians see: McKeon (1952) 147-175; Russell (1979) 1-16; Marincola (1997) 12-19; cf. Cameron (1989) 8. But there was also an expectation that writers would add to these traditions: Dion. Hal. *Pomp.* 3; Sen. *Ep.* 79.6; Russell (1979) 5.

<sup>50</sup> Polyb. 2.56.12.

<sup>51</sup> Polyb. 3.21.9-10: ἡμῖν δ’ ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι δοκεῖ τὸ μὴ παραλιπεῖν ἄσκεπτον τοῦτο τὸ μέρος, ἵνα μὴ θ’ οἷς καθήκει καὶ διαφέρει τὸ σαφῶς εἰδέναι τὴν ἐν τούτοις ἀκρίβειαν, παραπαίωσι τῆς ἀληθείας ἐν τοῖς ἀναγκαιοτάτοις διαβουλίαις, μὴ θ’ οἱ φιλομαθοῦντες περὶ τούτων ἀστοχῶσι, συμπλανώμενοι ταῖς ἀγνοίαις καὶ φιλοτιμίαις τῶν συγγραφέων, ἀλλ’ ἢ

The significance of the relationship between utility and impartiality to Polybius implies that he did not fabricate events. However, his primary concern was to portray himself in a certain way, influencing him to interpret events in order to fit his agenda in the *Histories*. In addition, for Polybius the lessons he portrayed through the *Histories* were significantly useful to the audience, so would have dominated his need for accurate reporting.

In the *Histories* Polybius portrayed Truth as a deity, investing her with the power to overcome falsehood.<sup>52</sup> Eckstein argues that Polybius believed that there was an innate human ‘openness to truth,’ and that it was a positive human quality that was evident within the narrative of the *Histories*.<sup>53</sup> But the same could not be said of all historians, since Polybius openly accused others of lying in their narratives. Polybius even made a distinction in the *Histories* between conscious and unconscious fabrication, accusing Timaeus of deliberate falsehood. Polybius claimed that those who made fabrications in their histories due to ignorance should be forgiven, but those who consciously fabricated should be condemned.<sup>54</sup> Such claims drew attention to Polybius’ own approach as an historian and were intended to inspire the reader’s confidence in his historical narrative.

The inclusion of speeches in Polybius’ *Histories* also influences how modern historians view his impartiality.<sup>55</sup> Polybius was aware of the questionable nature of reporting direct speech in history, and reinforced his

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τις ὁμολογουμένη θεωρία τῶν ἀπὸ τῆς ἀρχῆς ὑπαρξάντων δικαίων Ῥωμαίοις καὶ Καρχηδονίοις πρὸς ἀλλήλους ἕως εἰς τοὺς καθ’ ἡμᾶς καιρούς.’

<sup>52</sup> Polyb. 13.5.4-6: ‘In my opinion Nature has proclaimed to men that Truth is the greatest of gods and has invested her with the greatest power’ – ‘καὶ μοι δοκεῖ μεγίστην θεὸν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἢ φύσις ἀποδείξει τὴν ἀλήθειαν καὶ μεγίστην αὐτῇ προσθεῖναι δύναμιν.’

<sup>53</sup> Eckstein (1995a) 241-242. Eckstein claimed this openness to truth could be seen at: 3.12.1, 64.11, 108.2; 11.10.1-6; 12.25h.4; 15.17.1-2.

<sup>54</sup> Polyb. 12.12.4-7. Polybius reinforced the idea throughout the *Histories* that those who make mistakes through ignorance should be pardoned, perhaps showing his concern about potential criticism of his own work: 12.7.6; 16.20.8-9, 14.7-8; 29.12.10-12.

<sup>55</sup> There is a contentious passage (12.25i) on accuracy in speech recording that could be used to give evidence of Polybius’ lack of objectivity. However, the comments are not direct evidence of Polybius consciously advocating selective history writing. See the arguments of: Balsdon (1953) 158 n. 4; Gomme (1956) 522-3; Walbank (1963a) 211-3; (1967) 397; Pédech (1964) 257 n. 6; Sacks (1981) 79-89; McGing (2010) 87-88. McGing’s wider discussion on the historical reliability of Polybius’ speeches is short, but addresses the pertinent questions: (2010) 86-91.

opinion in the *Histories* that speeches should only be included if accurate and of significant importance.<sup>56</sup> The inclusion of speeches by ancient historians was essential to the narrative process, and although he showed a clear awareness of the pitfalls of including speech written without bias, Polybius was no different.<sup>57</sup> This then implied that the speeches Polybius included in his work conformed to his own expectations.<sup>58</sup> Wooten argued that the speeches of Polybius were accurate, not in words but in argument and intent.<sup>59</sup> This was supported in the *Histories* by Polybius' admission that he sometimes used the same language in narratives of speeches, battles, and other sections of his history, implying that a historiographic speech should convey the ideas and arguments of the original, but could be written in the historians' own words.<sup>60</sup>

Wiater has recently argued that Polybius' approach to his speeches (and his narrative) was intended to emphasise the significance of deeds over words, claiming that Polybius believed that their 'factual basis... (was) endangered by the influence of rhetoric.'<sup>61</sup> Speeches may also have been used in the *Histories* to advance Polybius' characterisation of particular individuals, and provide examples of direct speech from those he chose to use as *exempla* of political behaviour.<sup>62</sup> This didactic purpose may have

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<sup>56</sup> Polyb. 36.1; see also 2.56.10; 12.25a.4-5, 25b. Polybius discusses the different types of speeches at: 12.25a.3.

<sup>57</sup> Walbank pointed out that ancient writers conventionally regarded Greek history as actions and speeches: Thuc. 1.22.1-2; Pl. *Ti.* 19c; Ephorus, *FGrHist* 70 F 9; Dion. Hal. *De imit.* 3.3; *Pomp.* 3; *Thuc.* 25.55; Quint. *Inst.* 10.1.101; Walbank (1965b) 1.

<sup>58</sup> For arguments on the accuracy of Polybius' speeches see: Walbank (1957) 13-14; (1963b) 8-11; (1965b) 7-18; (1972) 69; Pédech (1964) 259-276, 295-302; Wooten (1974) 235-238. Significantly, Champion argued against Polybius' historical reliability in speeches, but did so within his own historical restrictions on speech reporting: (1997) 11-117.

<sup>59</sup> Wooten (1974) 236-237. Wooten pointed to the abundance of sources available to Polybius for Greek speeches: he could have witnessed them in his political capacity in Achaea; heard accounts of them from envoys while in Rome; as well as through the memoirs of Aratus and the records of the Achaean League. In addition, Polybius also mentioned that some speeches were published and may have gained access to them through the captured library of Perseus: 30.4.11; Wooten (1974) 235.

<sup>60</sup> Polyb. 29.12.9-12; Walbank (1965b) 8. This may explain the repetition of phrases, similes, common expressions, and historical arguments in some of Polybius' speeches. Walbank argued that such common repetitions did not signify fabrication but perhaps common expressions that were said by those Polybius attributed them to. For example, the common references to *Tyche* in: Polyb. 3.63.2; 15.10.5; cf. 15.9.4; Walbank (1965b) 13-15.

<sup>61</sup> Wiater (2010) 67-107, esp. 103.

<sup>62</sup> Significantly Philopoemen, Scipio Africanus, and in opposition Hannibal: Polyb. 3.111; 15.11.7-12 (Hannibal); 11.9 (Philopoemen); 10.6.1-6; 15.10 (Africanus). The contribution of

influenced Polybius' interpretations of speeches he was reporting, specifically out of concern to reinforce the lessons he wanted to impart on the reader. So while it is doubtful that Polybius' speeches were completely accurate, his claims of reporting his speeches factually were intended to promote confidence from the reader. The possibility of accusations of falsifying speeches motivated Polybius to predict and dispel any wariness the audience may have had about his historical reliability.<sup>63</sup>

Indeed, Polybius seems defensive about accusations of partiality in his *Histories*. In describing Aemilius Paullus' lack of greed he appealed to his Roman audience for the accuracy of his claims, anticipating the disbelief of his Greek audience and reminding them to recall this whenever they doubted his claims about Rome.<sup>64</sup> Polybius also appealed to his readers to criticise him if deliberate falsehoods were ever discovered in his *Histories*:

I too will beg both my contemporaries and future generations in pronouncing on my work, if they ever find me making misstatements or neglecting the truth intentionally to censure me relentlessly, but if I merely err owing to ignorance to pardon me, especially in view of the magnitude of the work and its comprehensive treatment of events.<sup>65</sup>

This invitation of censure by Polybius was likely intended to inspire confidence in his narrative and reinforce his historical authority. There is also an instance in the *Histories* where Polybius showed concern for including obviously fabricated information, but was loathe to omit what he considered such an obvious gap in the narrative. He admitted that to include an account of the private discussion between Perseus and Eumenes would open him to

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Polybius' speeches to his character *exempla* has been briefly touched on by Usher: (2009) 492.

<sup>63</sup> Just as Polybius accused Timaeus of doing: Polyb. 12.25a.3-5.

<sup>64</sup> Polyb. 31.22.8-11.

<sup>65</sup> Polyb. 16.20.8-9: 'ὁ δὲ κἀν ἐγὼ παρακαλέσοιμι περὶ αὐτοῦ <τοῦ> καθ' ἡμᾶς καὶ τοὺς ἐπιγινόμενους, εἴαν μὲν κατὰ πρόθεσιν εὐρισκώμεθα που κατὰ τὴν πραγματείαν διαψευδόμενοι καὶ παρορῶντες τὴν ἀλήθειαν, ἀπαραιτήτως ἐπιτιμᾶν, εἴαν δὲ κατ' ἄγνοιαν, συγγνώμην ἔχειν, καὶ μάλιστα πάντων ἡμῖν διὰ τὸ μέγεθος τῆς συνταξέως καὶ διὰ τὴν καθόλου περιβολὴν τῶν πραγμάτων.' This claim was connected to his lament on the lack of contemporary appreciation for true and useful history, as opposed to pretentious and showy history, obviously placing his own history in the former category: 16.20.3-4. There is a similar appeal for pardon of any geographical errors later in the *Histories*: 29.12.11.

accusations of fabrication and errors in accuracy, but he also believed the significance of the meeting dictated its inclusion. Here Polybius admitted to depicting events in accordance with his own opinion of what happened:

I persuaded myself to state in a summary fashion my own opinion and the indications and probabilities which left me to form this opinion, living as I did at the time and having been more impressed by everything that happened than anyone else.<sup>66</sup>

This episode in the *Histories* clearly betrayed Polybius' occupation with his own impartiality and concern to avoid criticism. By stating such concern he could not be criticised by his audience; however, he also admitted to interpreting events based on his personal beliefs, begging the reader to question his claimed impartiality.

Lastly, Polybius emphasised his own objectivity through his polemic against other historians. More than any other ancient historian, Polybius used polemic in the *Histories* to add to his self-constructed image.<sup>67</sup> In ancient historiography, definition by contrast was common as a means to distinguish your history above those of your predecessors or contemporaries. In addition, Polybius claimed that criticism should be driven by a desire to seek historical accuracy and not for personal satisfaction, as it is with some historians. As evidence of his pure motivation, he mentioned a letter he sent to the historian Zeno notifying him of an error in his topography of Laconia, which was evidently gratefully received.<sup>68</sup> In Polybius' *Histories* his historical nemesis was Timaeus. Marincola pointed out 'as the portrait of Timaeus receives more and more brush strokes, a self-portrait of the artist himself emerges.'<sup>69</sup> According to Polybius, Timaeus claimed that history without truth (ἀλήθεια) could not be called history at all; however, this did not deter Polybius from claiming that Timaeus was not only guilty of fabrication, but more seriously,

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<sup>66</sup> Polyb. 29.5.3: 'μὴν ἀλλὰ κατηνέχθη ἐπὶ τὸ γράφειν κεφαλαιωδῶς τὸ δοκοῦν, καὶ δι' ὧν εἰκότων καὶ σημείων ἐπὶ ταύτης ἐγενόμην τῆς γνώμης, ὑπάρχων κατὰ τοὺς αὐτοὺς καιροὺς καὶ μᾶλλον ἐτέρων ἐκπληττόμενος ἕκαστα τῶν γενομένων.'

<sup>67</sup> Marincola (1997) 229. For discussion on Polybius' use of polemic see section 4.4.

<sup>68</sup> Polyb. 16.20.1-8.

<sup>69</sup> Marincola (1997) 230.

deliberate fabrication.<sup>70</sup> Polybius defined himself through the deprecation of Timaeus and other historians, emphasising what he regarded as their negative historical tendencies in order to underline his positive ones.<sup>71</sup>

In conclusion, this chapter argued that Polybius' didactic purpose and the establishment of his own historical authority were of prime importance, and eclipsed even the need to be accurate in the historical record. Through his image as a teacher and an historian, Polybius defined his authorial presence in the narrative, which indicates how he wanted to be perceived by his audience. This persona then influenced Polybius' historical interpretations, as he was concerned to convey his didactic lesson to his audience above all else. This was the role that he attributed to himself and was the one he was primarily concerned to establish in the *Histories*. Polybius' claims to historical impartiality were intended to lend authority to this authorial persona in the narrative. Such assertions of impartiality reflected a norm of historical writing, and was intended to give credibility to the author's claims. This did not mean that Polybius was not at all concerned with historical accuracy, just that his claims of impartiality also had a rhetorical function in the narrative. This consciously self-constructed image of the author as a teacher and historian was further developed throughout the narrative in certain ways, for example through Polybius' emphasis of certain personal aspects of this character in the *Histories*.

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<sup>70</sup> Polyb. 12.12.1-3, 12.7.

<sup>71</sup> The use of polemic in the *Histories* is returned to in 4.4.



## **Chapter Three: Historical Bias through Personal Aspects of Polybius' Self-Constructed Image**

The purpose of this chapter is to analyse the development of Polybius' self-constructed image through the personal and autobiographical details he chose to include in the *Histories*. These aspects gave Polybius credibility and added to the foundation of this image he chose to create for his audience as a teacher and historian. Almost all of the information we have of Polybius is from what he decided to include in the *Histories*, so he controlled the readers' perception of him through what he chose to emphasise in the narrative. The first section will focus on Polybius' Achaean heritage and how he highlighted his loyalty and patriotism in the narrative. Subsequently, the second section will focus on his education and literary knowledge, discussing how this contributed to his image as a teacher and an historian, as well as his authorial credibility. Polybius' lack of emphasis on his detention in Rome will then be addressed. He rarely mentioned his time as a detainee in Rome, unless it was to relate a story that enhanced his authorial image, which indicates that this was not an experience that he wanted to contribute to his authorial persona. Finally, the last section will address Polybius' life after his release from Rome in 150, and how he emphasised his experiences after this date to show his audience he had the required expertise to be the ideal teacher and historian. All of these aspects served to develop Polybius' image in the *Histories* and, therefore, are cause to question his historical impartiality.

### **1) Polybius' Achaean and familial loyalty**

One aspect of the image that Polybius created for the reader in the *Histories* is of a man loyal to both his homeland and family. Polybius included hints in the narrative that help form a picture of his family, but there is very

little that can be concluded from these brief glimpses. The personal details Polybius chose to include in the narrative that contribute to his image, indicate a desire for the reader to know primarily about his father and his political importance. There was also some indication of an elder brother Thearidas, although there is little else to indicate who Polybius' mother was or whether he had any other close familial ties.

Historians are unsure of Polybius' exact date of birth, but it appears he was born around the year 200 in Megalopolis, the capital city of the Achaean League.<sup>1</sup> His father, Lycortas, was *hipparch* in 192 and *strategos* in both 184 and 182, illustrating the political pedigree of Polybius' family within the League.<sup>2</sup> Lycortas' political stance against Rome allied him with the great Achaean politician Philopoemen, who also urged resistance in allowing the Romans to dictate Achaean actions.<sup>3</sup> Lycortas' speeches in 189 at Rome and in Greece in 185/4 clearly indicated his position on Roman-Achaean affairs, and may have led the Romans to be suspicious of him and, by extension, his son in later years.<sup>4</sup> Polybius himself informed the reader that the Romans, just prior to the Third Macedonian War, were looking for a chance to accuse him, his father, and the politician Archon of disloyalty to Rome, indicating the Roman belief that the son held the same ideals as the father.<sup>5</sup> Polybius' own

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<sup>1</sup> The date of Polybius' birth has been the topic of much debate. The discussion centres on the claim by Ps.-Lucan that Polybius died at the age of 82 when he fell from his horse: Macrob. 23. Mommsen and Pédech argued that he was born as early as 208, based on his presence in Manlius Vulso's expedition to Galatia in 189. Walbank disregarded the evidence for this, claiming that Polybius' account of meeting Chiomara, the Galatian chieftain Ortiagon's wife, was probably at a later date. Likewise, the presence of Polybius in an embassy to Egypt in 180 is dismissed as evidence, since there was nothing to claim that an aristocratic son of Polybius' standing could not have been on such a commission at the age of 20: Polyb. 24.6.5; *Insch. Olymp.* N. 46. Walbank argued that Polybius was still alive in 118 due to his mention of the *Via Domitia* in 3.39.8, suggesting a date of birth around 200: Mommsen (1864-79) 2. 538; Pédech (1961) 145-156; Walbank (1957) 1 n. 1.

<sup>2</sup> Little is known about Lycortas' life, apart from what we are told about his political actions in the *Histories*. He was born in approximately 190 and was the son of Thearidas: *Syll.*<sup>3</sup> 626.

<sup>3</sup> For Philopoemen's policy see: Polyb. 24.15.

<sup>4</sup> For example, in 189: Livy 38.32.5-10; in 184: Livy 39.33.3-8, 39.35.5-37.21; Paus. 7.9.3-5; Polyb. 22.12.9-10; in 182: Polyb. 23.17.5-18.2; in 181: Polyb. 23.17-18; 24.1-2, 8.2-5; Livy 40.20.2; in 170: Polyb. 28.3, 6.

<sup>5</sup> Polybius tells us that the Romans suspected himself, Lycortas, and Archon of treason against Rome and wanted to accuse them but had no evidence: Polyb. 28.3.

account of his political beliefs in this period, though, does not show them as consistently anti-Roman.<sup>6</sup>

There is little other information in the *Histories* about Polybius' family. Polybius had a brother Thearidas who was also politically active in the Achaean League in the middle of the second century, but in the extant narrative Polybius did not make the familial connection obvious whenever he mentioned his older brother. However, we know that Thearidas was a member of two diplomatic missions to Rome in 159/8 and 147/6.<sup>7</sup> The second of these missions to Rome was of great significance to the fate of Achaean League, since it was sent in order to defend the League against the charges of harming or, at the very least, insulting a Roman legate.<sup>8</sup> His presence on this diplomatic mission shows the esteem with which Thearidas was evidently held in Achaean League. Apart from this, there is very little known about Polybius' family, although, as Walbank and Eckstein suggest, there was some indication in the *Histories* that Polybius had a family, even though there is no explicit reference to the possibility in the narrative.<sup>9</sup>

Patriotic bias was one of the ways ancient historians compromised the objectivity of their histories and Polybius was no exception.<sup>10</sup> At the beginning of the *Histories* Polybius criticised the historians Philinus of Agrigentum and Fabius Pictor for being lovers (ἑρῶσι) of their own people, letting this influence their impartiality in their narratives of the First Punic War (264-241).<sup>11</sup> In this instance, Polybius claimed that in order to be an historian you must be able to put all of these considerations aside:

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<sup>6</sup> Polybius tells us he advocated co-operation with Rome in accord with the arguments of Archon. Lycortas advised taking no part at all in the Third Macedonian War: Polyb. 28.6.

<sup>7</sup> Polyb. 32.7.1 (159/8); 38.10.1-3 (147/6); *MRR* 1.464. Otherwise, we know that Thearidas was honoured by Epidaurus, and that he honoured his grandson of the same name: *IG*. 4.1422; *IG*. 5.2.535; see also Walbank (1979a) 525.

<sup>8</sup> This was in response to the insult suffered by L. Aurelius Orestes in 147 at his announcement that the senate had decided to detach Sparta, Corinth, Argos, Arcadian Orchomenus, and Heraclea near Mt. Oeta from the Achaean League: Livy, *Per.* 51-52; Just. *Epit.* 34.1; Cass. Dio, *Fr.* 21.72.1; Paus. 7.14.1-3; cf. Polyb. 38.9.1-3.

<sup>9</sup> See Polyb. 12.25h.6; 36.17.7-10; Walbank (1967) 397; Eckstein (1995a) 157; see also Von Scala (1890) 256.

<sup>10</sup> Luce (2011) 297-298.

<sup>11</sup> Polyb. 1.14.

He who assumes the character as a historian must ignore everything of the sort, and often, if their actions demand this, speak good of his enemies and honour them with the highest praises while criticising and even reproaching roundly his closest friends, should the errors of their conduct impose this duty on him.<sup>12</sup>

Polybius claimed it was up to the reader to look out for favouritism in this manner, and up to the historian to be aware of the danger.<sup>13</sup> However, this was later contradicted when he accepted the prevalence of historical bias in regards to patriotic loyalty, stating:

Now I would admit that authors should have a partiality for their own country but they should not make statements about it that are contrary to facts. Surely the mistakes of which we writers are guilty and which it is difficult for us, being but human, to avoid are quite sufficient; but if we make deliberate misstatements in the interest of our own country or of friends or for favour, what difference is there between us and those who gain their living by their pens?<sup>14</sup>

Walbank described this concession made by Polybius as a 'dangerous qualification' because of the possibility that it made him unaware of the conscious, or unconscious, leeway this concession gave him when writing about the Achaean League.<sup>15</sup> But this was an expected and accepted cause of partiality among ancient historians, as long as it did not contradict the narrative of events. This suggested that Polybius was aware of the potential for bias, but accepted it in his *Histories* as long as it did not lead to fabrication in the narrative.

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<sup>12</sup> Polyb. 1.14.5-6: ὅταν δὲ τὸ τῆς ἱστορίας ἦθος ἀναλαμβάνῃ τις, ἐπιλαθέσθαι χρὴ πάντων τῶν τοιούτων, καὶ πολλάκις μὲν εὐλογεῖν καὶ κοσμεῖν τοῖς μεγίστοις ἐπαίνοις τοὺς ἐχθροὺς, ὅταν αἱ πράξεις ἀπαιτῶσι τοῦτο, πολλάκις δ' ἐλέγγειν καὶ ψέγειν ἐπονειδίστως τοὺς ἀναγκαιοτάτους, ὅταν αἱ τῶν ἐπιτηδευμάτων ἀμαρτίαι τοῦθ' ὑποδεικνύωσιν.'

<sup>13</sup> Polyb. 16.14.10.

<sup>14</sup> Polyb. 16.14.6-9: Ἐγὼ δὲ διότι μὲν δεῖ ῥοπὰς διδόναι ταῖς αὐτῶν πατρίσι τοὺς συγγραφέας, συγχωρήσαιμ' ἂν, οὐ μὴν τὰς ἐναντίας τοῖς συμβεβηκόσιν ἀποφάσεις ποιεῖσθαι περὶ αὐτῶν. ἱκανὰ γὰρ τὰ κατ' ἄγνοιαν γινόμενα τοῖς γράφουσιν, ἃ διαφυγεῖν ἀνθρώπων δυσχερές· ἐὰν δὲ κατὰ προαίρεσιν ψευδογραφῶμεν ἢ πατρίδος ἕνεκεν ἢ φίλων <ἢ> χάριτος, τί διοίσομεν τῶν ἀπὸ τούτου τὸν βίον ποριζομένων;

<sup>15</sup> Walbank (1957) 12-13; (1967) 518-519.

In accordance with this, Polybius showed clear bias when it came to the Achaean League, adding the quality of patriotism to his image in the *Histories*. McGing stated that Polybius' view of the League may have caused him to 'distort his historical judgment' in the significance he gave to the Achaeans in the second book of the *Histories*.<sup>16</sup> Book two contained a large section of background information that centred on the Achaean League, rather than on larger states that held greater potential opposition to Rome's rise to Mediterranean dominance; for example, Macedonia, the Seleucid Empire, and Egypt.<sup>17</sup> Polybius' stated purpose in book two was to provide background information for his Greek audience prior to commencement of the narrative of the Second Punic War, but the focus instead seemed to be to stress for the reader events in Spain and the history of the Achaean League.<sup>18</sup>

Polybius recognised that the patriotic bias expected in historical narrative may be extended to include friends (φίλων), a classification that also conceivably included family members.<sup>19</sup> As Schepens pointed out, there were many individual Achaean Leaders in the *Histories* that received praise from Polybius. For example, his polemic against Phylarchus in the *Histories* was intended to discredit Phylarchus in favour of his contemporary historian Aratus, both of whom wrote competing accounts of the Cleomenean War.<sup>20</sup> Aratus was an Achaean and had been defended elsewhere in the *Histories* for his political actions, but in this case the effort Polybius made to discredit Phylarchus as a 'tragic historian' was motivated by his faith that Aratus was

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<sup>16</sup> McGing (2010) 46.

<sup>17</sup> Polybius claimed that he would cover the necessary Macedonian background narrative but only commented on Macedonian actions within the historical narrative of the Achaean League (2.38-70). He also stated it was unnecessary to cover events prior to the 140<sup>th</sup> Olympiad, since they had been written about comprehensively and were common knowledge: 2.37.6-9.

<sup>18</sup> Polyb. 1.3.7. Walbank argued against the claim by Petzold that the Greek sections in book two were later insertions made in order to contrast a state based on power (Rome) and one based on 'equality and philanthropy' (Achaea), and that these insertions indicated a later conviction Polybius had that ethics were what counted in politics: Petzold (1969) 25-128; Walbank (1970b) 252; (1974a) 29.

<sup>19</sup> Polyb. 16.14.8; Luce (2011) 297-298.

<sup>20</sup> Schepens (2005) 141-164. See also Lehmann (1967) 340-345. For discussion of Polybius' subjective portrayal of Aratus and Phylarchus see Haegemans and Kosmetatou who concluded that the political nature of Aratus' memoirs indicated that they inevitably became a vehicle for determining public opinion: (2005) 123-139.

an accurate historian, implying Phylarchus was the opposite.<sup>21</sup> This then emphasised the historical reliability of Polybius' fellow Achaean Aratus, even though he wrote political memoirs likely to be in defence of his own political actions.<sup>22</sup> Polybius' failure to be impartial towards the Achaean League was constant and obvious when it came to narrative involving significant members of the League. It is also interesting to note that Polybius avoided directly contrasting Rome and Achaea in the *Histories*, supporting Walbank's argument that this may be one reason for the absence of the Achaean constitution in Polybius' assessment of constitutions in book six.<sup>23</sup>

Not only was it deemed standard for ancient historians to show partiality towards their homeland and friends, but they were also expected to hold up moral *exempla* for their readers to emulate.<sup>24</sup> Aratus was not the only Achaean figure that Polybius showed favour for; Aristaenus, Philopoemen, and Lycortas also received favourable descriptions, and even in some cases strident defence of their actions.<sup>25</sup> Polybius, in his characterisation as the teacher, was holding up these politicians as examples of statesmen he thought were worthy of admiration from his readers - leaders who did what they had to in order to preserve the position of Achaea. The significance of these leaders was shown through Polybius' claim that Aratus, Philopoemen, and Lycortas were the leaders that initiated and strengthened the unity of the Achaean League in the Peloponnese.<sup>26</sup> Polybius even criticised historians in his *Histories* who failed to make moral judgments on important characters in

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<sup>21</sup> Polyb. 2.40.4 (Aratus as a truthful historian); 2.49.1-3, 50.5-11 (Polybius' defence of Aratus' decisions as they were for the good of the League); 4.8.1 (Aratus as the τέλειος ἀνὴρ); 4.8 (Aratus' ideal political qualities). Aratus was the *strategos* of the Achaean League almost successively between 245-213 (245-44, 243-42, 241-234, 231-230, 227-226, 225-218, 217-213) and was also one of the first Greeks to write political memoirs, which were entitled the *Hypomnemata*: *FGrHist* 231 T2. There was, however, one point in the *Histories* where Polybius criticised Aratus in his digression on generalship for only using one method of signalling: 9.17.

<sup>22</sup> Haegemans and Kosmetatou (2005) 123-139. Larsen also recognised Polybius' bias in regards to Aratus' narrative of the Cleomenean War: (1966) 43-57.

<sup>23</sup> Walbank (1974a) 29.

<sup>24</sup> Luce (2011) 299-301. See also chapter one: n. 73.

<sup>25</sup> Walbank (1974a) 29-30.

<sup>26</sup> Polyb. 2.40.1-3. At this point Polybius indicated his intention to fully narrate the careers of Lycortas and Philopoemen, but this is not reflected in the extant sections of the *Histories*: 2.40.4-5.

their narratives.<sup>27</sup> For Polybius, the significance of these figures was two-fold - they were Achaean political heroes that added to the esteem of the Achaean League, but they were also models of good political and moral behaviour to be held up as *exempla* for the reader.

Aristaenus, Philopoemen, and Lycortas can all be seen as ideal statesmen for Polybius, since they put the good of the state above their own aspirations. All three men were characterised in this way, showing the importance such behaviour held for Polybius' image as the teacher in the *Histories*. Aristaenus in particular received rigid defence, since his actions could have been considered by some as against the best interests of the Achaean League. In 198, Aristaenus was the Achaean Leader who urged the League to betray their alliance with Philip V in favour of an alliance with the Romans during the Second Macedonian War.<sup>28</sup> Polybius defended the actions of Aristaenus at two separate points in the *Histories*, in one instance claiming that his political policies were geared towards protecting the state, while in the other he claimed:<sup>29</sup>

For if Aristaenus had not then in good time made the Achaeans throw off their alliance with Philip and change it for that with Rome, the whole nation would evidently have suffered utter destruction.<sup>30</sup>

Aristaenus' actions, though, were not universally accepted at the time, and seem to have left a bitter taste for the Achaeans in later years.<sup>31</sup>

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<sup>27</sup> Polybius criticised Phylarchus and Timaeus for their failure to pass moral judgements of good and bad behaviour: Polyb. 2.61; 12.15.9.

<sup>28</sup> Polyb. 18.13.8-11. Polybius' narrative of this event, which fell in book seventeen, is not extant: see Livy 32.19-23.3.

<sup>29</sup> Polyb. 24.11-13.

<sup>30</sup> Polyb. 18.13.8-9: 'εἰ γὰρ μὴ σὺν καιρῷ τότε μετέρριψε τοὺς Ἀχαιοὺς Ἀρισταίνος ἀπὸ τῆς Φιλίππου συμμαχίας πρὸς τὴν Ῥωμαίων, φανερώς ἄρδην ἀπολώλει τὸ ἔθνος.'

<sup>31</sup> Livy claimed the representatives of Dymae, Megalopolis, and some Argives walked out of the meeting where the vote to accept Roman alliance was being made, showing the split in Achaean opinion. According to Livy, a reference to this was made again by Archon just prior to the Third Macedonian War, reflecting the possibility of lingering questions about the legalities of the Achaean decision of 198: Livy 32.22.8-12; 41.24.13-14. Eckstein argued that Polybius' 'On traitors', in which he defended Aristaenus' actions, shows his unease with the Achaean decision in 198: (1987a) 140-162.

Polybius' praise in the *Histories* of both Lycortas and Philopoemen would have been accepted by ancient historians as expected bias. Particularly in the case of Polybius' father Lycortas, the reader cannot help but expect some partiality. But the figures of Philopoemen and Lycortas also added to the historical authority of Polybius' constructed image by association. Keeping company with two such eminent Greek politicians added credence to Polybius' image as a politician and a teacher, and motivated him to depict them both as positive *exempla* in the *Histories*. Lycortas was portrayed for the reader as an example of a good politician who worked for the good of the Achaean League.<sup>32</sup> However, Polybius was by no means excessively positive. The image that Polybius gives the reader of himself seems to be concerned to appear impartial when it came to family members, but while there is no excessive praise, neither is there any negative judgment.

The praise of Philopoemen had a didactic purpose for Polybius as the teacher in the *Histories*. While Polybius' favouritism towards Lycortas was reasonably restrained, there was an effort to depict Philopoemen as a model *exemplum* of political conduct. When narrating the death of Philopoemen while at war with Messene in 183, Polybius stated:

Philopoemen spent forty successive years in the pursuit of glory in a democratic state composed of various elements, and he avoided incurring the ill-will of the people in any way or on any occasion, although in his conduct of affairs he usually did not court favour but spoke his mind: a thing we seldom find.<sup>33</sup>

This seems to indicate Polybius' admiration of Philopoemen's honest political policies, and fits with Polybius' concern to provide ideal models of political behaviour for his readers. Philopoemen was allied politically with Lycortas and advocated similar resistance to Roman political control.<sup>34</sup> Polybius had a significant personal connection to the politician, to the extent that he was

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<sup>32</sup> Polyb. 2.40.2-6; 23.16.1, 17.1; 24.6.4; 29.23-24; 36.13.1-2.

<sup>33</sup> Polyb. 23.12.8-9: 'Ὅτι Φιλοποίμην τετταράκοντ' ἔτη συνεχῶς φιλοδοξήσας ἐν δημοκρατικῷ καὶ πολυειδεῖ πολιτεύματι, πάντη τάντως διέφυγε τὸν τῶν πολλῶν φθόνον, τὸ πλεῖον οὐ πρὸς χάριν, ἀλλὰ μετὰ παρρησίας πολιτευόμενος· ὁ σπανίως ἂν εὖροι τις γεγονός.' See also: Polyb. 39.3.

<sup>34</sup> Polyb. 24.11, 13.



selected to carry Philopoemen's ashes in his funeral procession.<sup>35</sup> Polybius also wrote a biography of the Achaean general, although it is now lost.<sup>36</sup> It is also noteworthy that there are no negative statements about either Lycortas or Philopoemen in the *Histories*. Polybius even appears to counter any potential accusations of bias in his account of Philopoemen by the consciously even-handed treatment he gives the comparison between Aristaenus and Philopoemen's policies towards Rome in book twenty-four.<sup>37</sup> Polybius' emphasis on his Achaean patriotism and utilisation of his Achaean heroes as *exempla* in the *Histories*, added a personal aspect to Polybius' self-constructed image, and clearly suggests caution when dealing with these aspects of the narrative.

## 2) Polybius' education and literary knowledge

Polybius' education was important to the persona he built up in the *Histories*, particularly since the central characteristic of that image was as a teacher. There is a limited amount of explicit information in the extant sections of the *Histories* about Polybius' education, but the narrative provides evidence of his aristocratic schooling. Polybius seemed concerned that his readers recognise the extent of his knowledge of Greek literature, which added to his image as a teacher and historian, adding authority to his own historical narrative. In the *Histories*, Polybius was also critical of the methods and topics of many ancient historians in order to elevate his own image by contrast and give the readers confidence in his historical accuracy.<sup>38</sup> However, apart from the concentrated polemic against Timaeus in book twelve of the *Histories*,

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<sup>35</sup> Plut. *Phil.* 21.3.

<sup>36</sup> Plutarch's *Life of Philopoemen* may have derived much of its information from Polybius' original account of Philopoemen's life. There is debate as to when Polybius wrote his life of Philopoemen, with Pédech arguing it was written in Rome as a sort of didactic work for Aemilianus, although this view is widely disputed by those who argue that it was an earlier work. Walbank's retort that you did not ask a Roman noble to model himself on a Greek brings to light the unlikelihood of Pédech's claims: Pédech (1951) 82-103; Walbank (1967) 221-222; Petzold (1969) 12-13 n. 5; Errington (1969) 232-234. We can make much of Polybius' opinion of Philopoemen in his political comparison with Aristaenus: 24.11-13.

<sup>37</sup> Polybius appeared to logically evaluate the policies of Aristaenus and Philopoemen, finding them both acceptable: 24.11-13.

<sup>38</sup> Polybius was critical of those who had not received an adequate education. For example: 2.17.9-10; 36.15.4.

there are only brief remarks made on other writers and little reference to the early Greek historians Herodotus and Thucydides.

Polybius displayed knowledge in the *Histories* that would have contributed to a typical Greek aristocratic education; for example, knowledge of Greek literature.<sup>39</sup> Within the bounds of this traditional education, Polybius would have been trained in rhetoric, and received military and political training. Polybius' aristocratic education would also have included knowledge of hunting, which was an occupation he claimed devotion to in the *Histories* and also one that allowed him to foster the friendships of both Scipio Aemilianus and Demetrius the son of King Philip of Macedonia.<sup>40</sup> The focus in his history on political and military developments in the Mediterranean suggest that these were primarily where Polybius' interests lay, in addition to his clear attention to the discipline of history.

Polybius' other work also indicated his prime areas of interest, which may have reflected in some part his education. Polybius wrote an independent work entitled *On Tactics*, which would have been a component of his military education.<sup>41</sup> The numerous references to tactics in his *Histories* also illustrate this as a main point of interest for Polybius.<sup>42</sup> He also wrote a geographical monograph entitled 'On the habitability of the equatorial region' and another on the Numantine War.<sup>43</sup> Polybius also made reference to his biography of his political hero Philopoemen in the *Histories*.<sup>44</sup>

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<sup>39</sup> There are no direct references in the *Histories* to Polybius' education, although he displayed knowledge that would have been an important part of a normal aristocratic education: Walbank (1972) 32-33. It is usually assumed that Polybius had the standard aristocratic education, as well as training in practical politics: Eckstein (1995a) 4.

<sup>40</sup> Polyb. 31.14.3, 29.8: 'διὸ καὶ παραγεγόμενος εἰς (Aemilianus) τῆς Ῥώμην καὶ προσλαβὼν τὸν τοῦ Πολυβίου πρὸς τοῦτο τὸ μέρος ἐνθουσιασμόν.'

<sup>41</sup> Polyb. 9.20.4; Arr. *Tact.* 1.1; Ael. *Tact.* 3-4, 19.10

<sup>42</sup> Polyb. 3.81.10, 105; 5.98; 6.19-42; 10.16.1-17.5, 22.4, 32.7-33, 43-7; 11.25.6; 18.28-32.

<sup>43</sup> Geminus. 16.32-38 (On the habitability); Cic. *Fam.* 5.12.2; (Numantine War).

<sup>44</sup> Polyb. 10.21.5-8. Pédech argued that Polybius' *Life of Philopoemen* was composed as part of Aemilianus' education, but Walbank argued against this, claiming that 'one did not ask Roman nobles to model themselves on Greek *condottieri*, however distinguished.' Errington was willing to consider Pédech's argument: Pédech (1951) 82-88; Walbank (1967) 221; (1972) 14-15 n. 72; Errington (1969) 232-234.

Above all, it was his knowledge of Greek literature that Polybius emphasised in the narrative, adding credence to his self-constructed image as a teacher. Polybius was familiar with Homer, commonly citing him or commenting on geographical points he had made.<sup>45</sup> He also cites Pindar and Euripides, and even mentions the dithyrambic poets Timotheus of Miletus and Philoxenus of Cythera in passing.<sup>46</sup> Polybius demonstrated a wide knowledge of both philosophy and history in the *Histories*, illustrating familiarity through the number of references to certain authors or philosophers. In Polybius' historical library, he was obviously familiar with the historian Timaeus, the focus of his polemical book twelve.<sup>47</sup> But he also shows more than a passing familiarity with the histories of Ephorus, Callisthenes, Theopompus, and Aratus.<sup>48</sup> In addition there were unnamed historians in the *Histories* and those Polybius mentioned in passing.<sup>49</sup> Walbank suggested there was no evidence of a profound, scholarly knowledge of Homer or any specialist literary training in Polybius' education, although he certainly was aware of many of his historical predecessors.<sup>50</sup>

Polybius' literary knowledge was also reinforced by his use of quotations in a message he claimed he sent to Demetrius of Macedonia on the eve of his escape from Rome. According to Polybius, a message was conveyed to Demetrius using the words of Euripides and Epicharmus the

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<sup>45</sup> Homer is either mentioned by name, referred to as 'the poet', or quoted at: Polyb. 3.94.4; 5.38.10; 9.16.1, 21; 12.21.3, 24.1-2, 25i.1, 26.3-5, 27.10-11; 15.12.9, 16.3; 34.2.1-3, 2.13, 3.9, 4.4-5, 9.13, 11.20, 14.8; 38.22.2. Eckstein claimed that the heroic tale of individual honour against the fickleness of fortune evident from Homer onwards would have been a big aspect of Polybius' traditional literary education: (1995a) 272.

<sup>46</sup> Pindar: Polyb. 4.31.5; Euripides: Polyb. 1.35.4; 5.106.4; 12.26.5, 31.13.11-14; Timotheus of Miletus and Philoxenus of Cythera: Polyb. 4.20.9.

<sup>47</sup> In addition to book twelve: Polyb. 1.5.1; 2.16.5; 3.32.2; 34.9; 39.8.

<sup>48</sup> Ephorus: Polyb. 4.20.5; 5.33; 6.45.1, 46.10; 9.1.4; 12.4, 22.7, 23.8, 25f.1, 27.7, 28.9-12; 34.1; Callisthenes: Polyb. 4.33.2; 6.45.1; 12.12b.2, 17.2, 18.1-3, 20.3-8, 21, 22.7, 23.3-8; Theopompus: Polyb. 8.9-11; 12.4, 23.8, 25f.6-7, 27.8; 16.12; 30.14; Aratus: Polyb. 1.3.2-3; 2.40.4, 56.1-2; 4.2.1.

<sup>49</sup> Xenophon: Polyb. 3.6.9; 6.45.1; 10.20; Pylarchus: Polyb. 2.56, 58-61; Thucydides: Polyb. 8.11.3; Philinus: Polyb. 1.14.1-3, 15; 3.26.2-5; Fabius Pictor: Polyb. 1.14.1, 58.5; 3.7, 8; Demochares: Polyb. 12.13-14, 15.5, 23.8; Eudoxus: Polyb. 34.1; Chaereas: Polyb. 3.20.5; Sosilus: Polyb. 3.20.5. Polybius failed to mention any contemporary Greek authors: Eckstein (1995a) 4.

<sup>50</sup> The subject of Polybius' literary knowledge is focused on by: Ziegler (1952) 1464-1471; Musti (1965) 392-393; Walbank (1972) 32. For Polybius' references to Greek philosophers see: Polyb. 4.40.3; 6.5.1, 45; 7.13.7; 12.5.4, 6a.1-4, 6b.3, 7.2, 7.4, 11.5, 23.8, 25c.3, 27.1, 28.2; 29.21.1; 36.2.3; see also Walbank (1972) 32-33 n. 3.

Philosopher which led to Demetrius' freedom.<sup>51</sup> In addition to a clear knowledge of Epicharmus, Polybius also reveals extensive knowledge of both Plato and Aristotle, as well as passing familiarity with a number of lesser philosophers.<sup>52</sup> However, Polybius did not show any great appreciation for abstract philosophy, mocking such philosophers in his *Histories*.<sup>53</sup> The extent of Polybius' literary education was further increased by evidence of his knowledge of Isocrates and Hesiod.<sup>54</sup> Significantly, Polybius also demonstrated some knowledge of medicine in his polemic of Timaeus in book twelve, paralleling history and medicine to illustrate his didactic lesson on historiography.<sup>55</sup>

There has been much interest by modern historians on the influence Herodotus and Thucydides had on Polybius. The influence of Herodotus has been debated by modern historians; for example, Walbank and Murray claimed there was no evidence that Polybius was familiar with Herodotus. In opposition, Hornblower argued that 'nobody who had thought hard about how to do history and geography, as Polybius certainly did, could fail to have assimilated Herodotus almost with his mother's milk.'<sup>56</sup> There is no mention of Herodotus in the extant sections of the *Histories*, although recently McGing has argued that Polybius was very familiar with Herodotus' history. McGing claimed that Herodotus presented Polybius with a 'model of historical presentation', particularly in his personalised presentation of the narrative, which he followed in his *Histories*, consciously or not.<sup>57</sup> Although Polybius himself preferred to claim association with Ephorus' universal history, McGing hints of a connection to Herodotus in Polybius' methodology, specifically his

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<sup>51</sup> Polyb. 31.13.11-14.

<sup>52</sup> Plato: Polyb. 6.4, 5.1, 45.1, 47.7; 7.13.7; 12.28.2-3; Aristotle: Polyb. 12.6a, 6b.3, 8, 9, 11.5, 23.8, 24.2; Theophrastus: Polyb. 12.11, 23; Zeno: Polyb. 16.14-20; Antisthenes: Polyb. 16.14-16; Heraclitus: Polyb. 4.40.3; Strato: Polyb. 12.25c.3.

<sup>53</sup> Polyb. 12.26c.2.

<sup>54</sup> Isocrates: Polyb. 31.33; 32.2.3; Hesiod: Polyb. 5.2.6.

<sup>55</sup> Polyb. 12.25d.2-7.

<sup>56</sup> Murray (1972) 211; Walbank (1972) 38 n. 30; Hornblower (2006) 314. This is a step back from Hornblowers' previous conclusion that there was little indication Polybius had considered Herodotus when composing the *Histories*: (1994) 61.

<sup>57</sup> McGing (2012) 33-49, esp. 37.

personal method, highlighting of geography, and visual descriptions of the physical.<sup>58</sup>

Interestingly, the link to Thucydides as Polybius' historiographical ancestor is much clearer than that of Herodotus. Polybius' emphasis on the utility of history, his interest in causality, and overall pragmatism echoed the historical values of Thucydides. Walbank claimed that Polybius represented 'a return to the aims and methods of Thucydides', emphasising 'verbal echoes' that implied such a connection.<sup>59</sup> Even though there is only one remaining explicit reference to Thucydides in the *Histories*, Rood has recently argued that there was a closer relationship here than has often been suspected, with Polybius imitating Thucydides' method of analysis in his narrative.<sup>60</sup> Longley advances this by arguing that Polybius, like Thucydides, was interested in human nature as the main causal factor of all occurrences, claiming that the influence Thucydides had on Polybius was not simply methodological but also conceptual.<sup>61</sup> This evidence of Polybius' literary knowledge provided for his audience verification of his credentials as a teacher, giving authority to his consciously constructed image in the *Histories*.

### 3) Polybius' detention in Rome

The self-portrait Polybius presented to the reader in the *Histories* was not defined by his detention in Rome after the Third Macedonian War. The significance of his extended detention in Rome and the impact this would have had on the life of Polybius the man cannot be underestimated. However, the image Polybius presented of himself in the narrative did not seem to dwell

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<sup>58</sup> Polyb. 5.33.2; McGing (2012) 33-49.

<sup>59</sup> Walbank (1972) 40-43, esp. 40; (1965) 8-11; Ziegler (1952) 1572-1574; Lehmann (1989-90) 72-4; McGing (2010) 58-61. Pédech argued the opposite based on Polybius' single mention of Thucydides: (1969) xli-xlii.

<sup>60</sup> Polyb. 8.11.3; Rood (2012) 50-67.

<sup>61</sup> Longley (2012) 68-84. Longley argued that Polybius believed, like Thucydides, that human nature was moulded by institutions, and that history was the way to identify and find solutions for the flaws in human nature: (2012) 80-84.

on this aspect of his character.<sup>62</sup> If anything, Polybius' detention in Rome is understated in the narrative, perhaps consciously through his aim to be an impartial historian. However, the occasional hints that are evident in the *Histories* in reference to his detention imply a bias against the political tool of hostage-taking, rather than against the Romans under whose direction he was detained.

The deportation of one thousand aristocratic sons from the Achaean League to Rome was designed to both punish the League and make sure that those left in power were pro-Roman.<sup>63</sup> Polybius was ordered to leave Achaea and was then detained in Italy as a reprimand for the Achaean failure to support the Romans adequately during the war with Perseus.<sup>64</sup> The names of those who were sent to Rome, according to Polybius, were drawn up by the

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<sup>62</sup> Polybius never referred to himself and his fellow detainees as 'hostages' (ὄμηρος), but instead referred to them as 'the accused' (οἱ κατηγορούμενοι), 'the summoned' (οἱ ἀνακεκλημένοι), or 'those being detained' (οἱ κατεχομένοι): Erskine (2012) 21. The ambiguity of the status of those detained in Rome often led historians to refer to them in different ways: for example, Gruen used 'hostage' and 'internee,' while Eckstein used 'detainee,' and Champion called them 'political prisoners': Gruen (1984) 518 ('hostage'), 516 ('internee'); Eckstein (1995a) 7; Champion (2004) 18; see also Allen (2006) 204 n. 10; Erskine (2012) 20 n. 9. Even the ancient sources seemed unsure how to refer to them, with Cicero once even referring to Polybius as *noster hospes*: Cic. *Rep.* 4.3.3; see also: Polyb. 30.5-7, 32.1-9; 32.3.14; Livy 45.35.2; Paus. 7.10.10-11. For purposes of clarity and consistency, I will use 'detainees' to refer to those Achaeans deported to Italy in 167 and 'detention' to refer to their period in Italy.

<sup>63</sup> Derow (1989) 317. Many other Greeks were punished severely for their treachery or lack of support for Rome during the war with Perseus. They were punished by both the senate at Rome and the commanders in the field; for example, Paullus and the *decem legati* beheaded both Andronicus the Aetolian and Neon of Thebes for their support of Perseus (Livy 45.31.15), and the senate directed Paullus to destroy seventy towns (seventy-two according to Plin. *HN* 4.17) in Epirus and sell a hundred and fifty thousand men into slavery for their defection. Plutarch claimed that Paullus was reluctant to do this, but Gruen dismissed this claim. According to Larsen, the Romans acted harshly towards the Epirotes because they had interfered with the trading route between Italy and the Balkans, although alternative theories have been proposed: Polyb. 30.15; Livy 45.34.1-6; Plut. *Aem.* 29.1-3; 30.1; Gruen (1984) 516 n. 171; Larsen (1968) 481-482; or alternatively Scullard (1945) 58-64; Cabanes (1976) 304-305. In one curious case, the Aetolian Lyciscus acted to punish those who had showed allegiance to Perseus in Aetolia before the Romans had demanded reparations and led the massacre of five-hundred and fifty of their leading politicians. These acts, and the expulsion of those who had survived, were later ratified by Paullus and the *decem legati*, although the Roman commander Aulus Baebius was reprimanded for allowing the use of Roman soldiers in this massacre - an act Gruen claimed was in order to remove this slaughter from association with Rome: Livy 45.28.6-8, 31.1-2; Just. *Epit.* 33.2.8-34.1.1; cf. Polyb. 30.11.5; Gruen (1984) 515.

<sup>64</sup> Polyb. 30.13.1-11, 32.1-12; Livy 45.31.9; Paus. 7.10.10.

corrupt Achaean politician Callicrates, who was acting in his own interests.<sup>65</sup> There was no trial of guilt, nor was there any display of evidence, those named were simply detained in Italy until the Romans saw fit to release them.<sup>66</sup>

Polybius stated in the *Histories* that the accusations levelled by the Romans against the Achaeans after the Third Macedonian War were false. The Roman legates who delivered the demand for detainees, according to Polybius, were concerned with their lack of evidence, with even the proconsul Aemilius Paullus doubting the validity of the accusations.<sup>67</sup> The fragmentary nature of Polybius' work makes it difficult to understand the sequence of events conclusively, but Polybius later tells us that the Achaeans expected a trial of those accused once they had arrived in Italy. However this did not occur, with the Romans under the assumption that the Achaeans had decided the guilt of those accused simply by sending them to Rome. Polybius claimed:

that the senate were surprised that they should be asked to pronounce judgement on a matter already judged by the Achaeans. Owing to this Eureas and his colleagues appeared on the present occasion to point out that the league had neither heard the defence of the accused nor pronounced any judgement on them, and they now begged the senate to consider the case of these men, and see that they were put on their trial, and not allowed to rot in exile unjudged.<sup>68</sup>

Therefore, according to Polybius, the detainees were both falsely accused and denied a fair trial through what appeared to be a diplomatic

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<sup>65</sup> Polyb. 30.13.9. Polybius' hatred of Callicrates is well documented: Polyb. 24.10.8; 24.8.7-10.14; 30.29. See also: Badian (1958) 89-93; Errington (1969) 202-204; Derow (1970) 12-23; Walbank (1974a) 7-8; Eckstein (1995a) 204-206; (2008) 368-369; Champion (2007) 259.

<sup>66</sup> Both Polybius, and Pausanias following Polybius, assert the innocence of the detainees: Polyb. 30.13.8-11; Paus. 7.10.8-11.

<sup>67</sup> Polyb. 30.13.8-11. Aemilius Paullus could have been justifiably blamed for the Achaean detention in Rome as the commander in Greece. However, Polybius instead placed the blame on the Greek demagogues Lyciscus and Callicrates: Ferrary (1988) 314-315, 551-552; Walbank (1979a) 437; Erskine (2012) 23.

<sup>68</sup> Polyb. 30.32.2-4: 'αὐται δ' ἦσαν διότι θαυμάζουσιν πῶς, ὑπὲρ ὧν αὐτοὶ κεκρίκασι, περὶ τούτων αὐτοὺς παρακαλοῦσιν κρίνειν. διὸ τότε παρήσαν οἱ περὶ τὸν Εὐρέαν, πάλιν ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἐμφανίζοντες διότι τὸ μὲν ἔθνος οὔτε δικαιολογουμένων ἀκήκοε τῶν κατηγιαμένων οὔτε κρίσιν οὐδεμίαν πεποιήται περὶ αὐτῶν, τὴν δὲ σύγκλητον ἀξιοῖ πρόνοιαν ποιήσασθαι τῶν ἀνθρώπων, ἵνα κρίσεως τύχῃσι καὶ μὴ καταφθαρέωσιν ἄκριτοι.'

misunderstanding. However, the Romans did not see it as their place to put them on trial, nor did they want to release the hostages.<sup>69</sup>

Nevertheless, Polybius did not portray the Romans in this case as acting completely in the wrong. Instead the blame was laid on the Achaean demagogues Lyciscus and Callicrates who Polybius claimed nominated the accused, while the Romans were portrayed as cooperating with the charade in order to cement Callicrates' domination of Achaean politics.<sup>70</sup> According to Polybius, the decision not to release the detainees to the Achaeans for trial also appeared to be motivated by the Roman wish to protect their friends (φίλοις) who they thought would be in danger if the detainees were released.<sup>71</sup> The Achaean League repeatedly sent embassies to Rome in attempts to secure the release of the detainees, but the Romans refused until 150 when Aemilianus appealed to Cato for their release on Polybius' behalf.<sup>72</sup> The retention of the detainees for seventeen years was leverage that the Romans held over the Achaean League in order to keep them docile - a tactic that was successful, as evidenced by the lack of retaliation from the League until the release of the detainees in 150.<sup>73</sup>

Polybius' decision not to highlight his detention in Rome in the image that he created of himself in the *Histories* has understandably led some modern historians to idealise his period of detention. Many historians seem to highlight the beneficial aspects of Polybius' detention at the expense of any real consideration of how this experience might have affected the author.<sup>74</sup>

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<sup>69</sup> A reference to Callicrates and the pro-Roman party in Achaea: Polyb. 30.32.8.

<sup>70</sup> Polyb. 30.13.9-10, 11, 32.8.

<sup>71</sup> By φίλοις Polybius means the friends of the Romans in Achaea who protected Roman interests, particularly Callicrates: Polyb. 30.32.6-10. According to Polybius, the detainees' reaction to this senatorial decision in Rome was to fall into 'despondency and helplessness' (ἀθυμία καὶ παράλυσις τῆς ψυχῆς), while in Greece when the news was heard 'the spirits of the people were crushed and something like despair everywhere prevailed' – 'τὰ μὲν πλήθη συνετρίβη ταῖς διανοαῖαις, καὶ τις οἶον ἀπελπισμὸς ὑπέδραμεν τοὺς ἀνθρώπους': 30.32.10, 11.

<sup>72</sup> The Achaeans sent embassies in 166: Polyb. 30.29.1; in 164: Polyb. 30.32; in 159: Polyb. 32.3.14-17; in 155: Polyb. 33.1.3-8; in 153: Polyb. 33.3, 14; and their release in 150: Paus. 7.10.12; Plut. *Cat. Mai.* 9; Polyb. 35.6; Zonar. 9.31.

<sup>73</sup> See Gruen for a detailed discussion on the Roman motivation to retain the detainees for almost twenty years: Gruen (1976) 48-50.

<sup>74</sup> For example: Eckstein (1995a) 7-8; Champion (2004) 17-18; McGing (2010) 14, 139-141. Walbank is more balanced in his treatment of Polybius as a detainee, as is Erskine, while



Polybius was by no means a typical type of political detainee in Rome, and while he did not negatively portray his captors in the *Histories*, he was consistently negative in regards to unjust hostage taking.<sup>75</sup> As Allen argued there were subtle hints of resistance in Polybius' treatment of hostages in his *Histories*, which seem to reflect a historical bias in relation to his personal experience but not towards the Romans.<sup>76</sup> One of the key episodes that illustrated this was Polybius' narrative on the escape of Demetrius, son of Philip V of Macedonia, from Rome in 161. Polybius went to lengths to prove it was he who incited Demetrius to action, ensuring the reader was aware of his active participation in his escape from Rome.<sup>77</sup> Allen argued that Polybius did this in order to show his audience that he had no allegiance to Rome, and made his opinion of Demetrius' detention clear by referring to it as unjust.<sup>78</sup> By doing this, Polybius was able to vent his own frustrations at his personal situation, while also abiding by what seems to be a conscious decision not to emphasise his own detention in his persona as the author of the *Histories*. This may also be reflected in Polybius' emphasis on his involvement in his own release and that of his fellow captives in 150, as well as his violent condemnation of those Greeks who acted as Roman puppets and betrayed their own people, in particular Callicrates.<sup>79</sup> There are also other incidents in

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Allen's look at Polybius specifically as a detainee is particularly useful: Walbank (1972) 8-10, 168; Allen (2006) 201-223; Erskine (2012) 24-32.

<sup>75</sup> Hostage taking was a viable political tool in the ancient world in general as well as for the Romans. This is evident by the presence of Demetrius, the youngest son of Philip V of Macedonia, in Rome when Polybius arrived. For its political legitimacy see: Allen (2006) 8, 141, 146.

<sup>76</sup> Allen (2006) 207.

<sup>77</sup> According to Polybius, he was actively involved in the plot three times: 1) Polybius managed to secure the cooperation of an Egyptian ambassador whom he knew from before his detention in Rome. 2) Polybius was meant to be part of Demetrius' alibi (they were supposed to be hunting in Cerceii) even though he became sick and was unable to participate. 3) He sent a message to Demetrius reminding him to hurry and not drink too much, which apparently arrived just in time, helping Demetrius avoid detection: Polyb. 31.13.7-14; see also Allen (2006) 211-212.

<sup>78</sup> Polyb. 31.11.12; Allen (2006) 211-212. It has been argued that Polybius was acting in this instance at the behest of powerful members of the senate. Pédech suggested Ti. Sempronius Gracchus, although Walbank and Eckstein argued against this. More likely is the claim supported by Walbank, Ziegler, Briscoe and Reiter, that Polybius was acting on behalf of Aemilius Paullus and his supporters in the senate. Although, as Eckstein pointed out, this would imply a serious division within the senate and Polybius suggested that this was not so: 31.2.6-7, 11.10. Gruen argued that Polybius' claim that Demetrius' Greek friends united in order to help him escape is equally as plausible as Polybius acting at senatorial direction: Pédech (1964) 525 n. 59; Eckstein (1995a) 11-12; Walbank (1979a) 478; Ziegler (1952) 1452; Briscoe (1969) 60-61; Reiter (1988) 144-145; Gruen (1984) 664-665.

<sup>79</sup> See n. 65 above.

the *Histories* where Polybius portrayed hostage situations negatively, perhaps demonstrating resistance to Roman domination behind the façade of acceptance.<sup>80</sup>

To some modern scholars Polybius' failure to criticise the Romans is decidedly odd considering his detention in Rome. Erskine argued that Polybius' use of multiple terms instead of 'hostages' (ὄμηρος) to refer to himself and his fellow detainees, made the situation seem unresolved. He claimed this implied a sense of resentment and frustration from Polybius, in regards to his own unjust detention and those of his fellow Achaeans.<sup>81</sup> Shimron claimed that Polybius begrudged the Romans, speculating that the condescension he would have been subjected to influenced his attitude towards Rome.<sup>82</sup> He further claimed this resentment was not openly stated in the *Histories* because of the patronage of Aemilianus. Instead, it was illustrated through judgments disguised in discussions of pros and cons, and sporadic cynical comments.<sup>83</sup> But Polybius did not use his detention in Rome as a centrepiece of his image in the *Histories*, so there is not enough evidence in the narrative to prove any type of resentment against the Romans. According to the narrative, Polybius did not blame the Romans at all for his detention, but instead saw it as the fault of Greek demagogues.

Polybius' detention in Rome is perhaps best known for the relationship he formed with Scipio Aemilianus. The portrayal of their friendship in the *Histories* is depicted independent of Polybius' status as a detainee. His relationship with Aemilianus was never portrayed as one based on subordination, if anything, it was the opposite. The relationship between Aemilianus and Polybius was redefined by the author in what seems to be an

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<sup>80</sup> For example, Polybius' approval of Chiomara's actions in resisting her captor (she beheaded him), highlighted by Polybius' first person insertion in the narrative and his regard for both 'her good sense and intelligence' recorded in Plutarch (τε φρόνημα καὶ τὴν σύνεσιν): Polyb. 21.38; Livy 38.24.2; Plut. *De mul. vir.* 258f. See Allen for more examples: (2006) 212-215.

<sup>81</sup> Polybius referred to them as 'the accused' (οἱ κατηγορημένοι), 'the summoned' (οἱ ἀνακεκλημένοι), or 'those being detained' (οἱ κατεχομένοι): Erskine (2012) 21. Refer also to n. 62 above.

<sup>82</sup> Shimron (1979-80) 96. Here Shimron refers to general taunts of '*graeculus*' as evidence, even though at this point it did not have any contemptuous connotations.

<sup>83</sup> Shimron (1979-80) 99.

attempt to emphasise the teacher-student aspect of their association, rather than that of detainee and Roman. This was the way Polybius chose to depict the dynamics of their relationship in the *Histories*, with Polybius as the teacher and Aemilianus as the student. In the narrative of the first meeting between student and teacher, Aemilianus is cast in the inferior role with Polybius referring to himself like the father (πατρικός), and Aemilianus as close kin (συγγενικός).<sup>84</sup> This picture was also accepted by other ancient historians, with Appian claiming that when Aemilianus was moved by the fall of Carthage, he turned to Polybius as a teacher (διδάσκαλος) to consider the fate of Rome.<sup>85</sup> Whether this was the reality of their relationship or not is not the question here. Instead, this is the image that Polybius wanted to leave the reader of himself in the *Histories* - as a teacher of young Roman aristocrats.

Despite Polybius' choice to understate his status as a Roman detainee in his image as the author in the *Histories*, some modern historians have attempted to see through this image in order to gain some idea of the condition he was in while detained at Rome. Even though we get a picture of Polybius' detention as one that was relatively comfortable and free, that did not mean that his stay in Rome was entirely pleasant. As Erskine pointed out:

For historians too the very idea of being in Rome at such a crucial time is appealing, so many people with so much information, in Rome or visiting it, but of course Polybius did not go to Rome to write a history he went to Rome because he had to.<sup>86</sup>

The uncertainty and potential danger the detainees faced in Rome would have made their journey difficult, exacerbated by the wait for a trial that never eventuated. As Erskine suggests, the complete change in direction his detention represented in Polybius' life is likely to have aided his belief in the power of *tyche*.<sup>87</sup>

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<sup>84</sup> Polyb. 31.25.1. Modern historians dispute the reliability of this passage, claiming it exaggerated Polybius' influence over Aemilianus: Astin (1967) 298; Walbank (1979a) 498-499; Eckstein (1995a) 79-82; Allen (2006) 208-210.

<sup>85</sup> App. *Pun.* 132.

<sup>86</sup> Erskine (2012) 17.

<sup>87</sup> Erskine (2012) 19.

However reasonable such arguments are, there is no hint of this in the picture of his detention Polybius gives us in the *Histories*. Polybius did claim that the sons of Aemilius Paullus requested his detention in Rome, based possibly on a previous association with Paullus.<sup>88</sup> Alternatively, as Roveri suggested, he may have been confined to Rome so that he could be monitored due to his important political status in Achaea - an argument rejected by Walbank who claimed there must have been more influential and potentially recalcitrant politicians among the hostages from Achaea than Polybius.<sup>89</sup> His detention in Rome rather than in a smaller Italian city was a stroke of luck that enabled Polybius access to many influential Romans. Within Rome, Polybius seemed to have enjoyed relative freedom of movement and been able to act as he saw fit. There is even evidence in the *Histories* that he had some kind of political influence in the mid-150s, and was instrumental in helping the people of Locri avoid the naval requirements dictated by their treaty of alliance.<sup>90</sup> He also seemed to have been allowed certain freedom of movement inside Italy, but his movements would certainly have been endorsed by the Romans.<sup>91</sup> However, these positive aspects of Polybius' time in Rome were usually what he emphasised, showing a conscious decision to attach little importance to his detention when developing his image in the *Histories* as a teacher and historian.

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<sup>88</sup> Polybius claimed his association with Aemilianus began over the loan or use of books, presumably from the library of Perseus confiscated after the battle of Pydna: Polyb. 31.23.4-5; Plut. *Aem.* 28.11; Walbank (1972) 8 n. 34.

<sup>89</sup> Roveri (1964) 153; Walbank (1972) 8 n. 35. However, Walbank failed to name any of these influential Achaeans. The only candidate here that we know of could be Stratius of Tritaea, who was present at the discussion held by the party of Lycortas during the Third Macedonian War in 170 and was also accused of treason by Critolaus in 146, but still advocated against war with Rome: Polyb. 28.6; 32.3.14-15; 38.13.4-6, 17.

<sup>90</sup> Polyb. 12.5.2-3. The Locrians approached Polybius twice to help them with this issue, with which he was successful. He was honoured by the people of Locri for his help: Polyb. 12.5.1. De Sanctis connected Polybius' travels to Locri with the Dalmatian Wars of 156-5: (1907-1923) 210.

<sup>91</sup> Polybius travelled to Locri in Southern Italy and potentially to Spain with Aemilianus in 151-150, although this should not be taken as typical throughout his entire detention: Polyb. 3.59.7; Paus. 7.10.12. For Polybius' travels while a detainee see: Walbank (1948) 158-160; (1957) 4-6; (1967) 331-332; Pédech (1964) 523-529.

#### 4) Polybius' life after his release from Rome

The image Polybius presented in the *Histories* to the reader was partially characterised by his increased involvement in the narrative as a character after 150. The difficulty faced by historians to remain neutral when simultaneously a character in their own narrative was recognised by Cicero, who claimed that 'the author is obliged to write about himself with a certain reserve when there is anything to be praised and to pass over what is deserving of censure.'<sup>92</sup> Polybius' experiences would have influenced the way he presented his own image in the *Histories* because the majority of it was written after his release from Rome in 150. Significantly, the events Polybius witnessed after 150 also contributed to his decision to extend his original project by ten books to include the years 167-146. Walbank divided Polybius' life into four chronological periods: his early life in Achaëa, his detention in Rome, the first five years after his release, and the years 145 until his death c.118, of which little is known.<sup>93</sup> This section will focus specifically on the last two periods and how they helped shape Polybius' self-constructed image in the *Histories*.

The initial question then concerns Polybius' time-frame for composing the *Histories*. This is complicated further by the later insertions Polybius made into his earlier books, blurring the question of both the composition dates of the *Histories* and their publication. There is no reliable way to know how much of the *Histories* had been written before the end of his detention, although it is argued that he wrote at least some of the *Histories* while in Rome. Erbse argued that Polybius composed the entire *Histories* after 146.<sup>94</sup> However, this makes the pointed references to the extension of his *Histories* until 146 somewhat redundant, since there seems little point if the composition had not

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<sup>92</sup> Cic. *Fam.* 5.12 (Glynn Williams trans.): 'et verecundius ipsi de sese scribant necesse est, si quid est laudandum, et praetereant, si quid reprehendendum est.'

<sup>93</sup> Walbank (1974a) 2.

<sup>94</sup> Erbse (1951) 157-179; (1957) 269-297. Musti and Walbank disagree with this hypothesis: Musti (1965) 383-384; Walbank (1957) 293; (1963a) 203-208; (1972) 16. This of course rests on the hypothesis usually accepted that Polybius decided to extend his *Histories* after witnessing the events of 146, although he may have previously been considering an extension: Walbank (1972) 17-18.

at least begun. If Walbank's assumption that Polybius would have been nominally occupied between 150 and 146 is accepted, it stands that Polybius must have composed at least some of his *Histories* while a detainee in Rome.<sup>95</sup> In attempting to uncover the stages of composition of the *Histories*, the pivotal date then seems to be 146.

Much of the scholarship on this subject rests on Polybius' tense use when discussing Carthage.<sup>96</sup> From book one to fifteen Polybius referred to Carthage in the present tense, after which he referred to it in the past tense.<sup>97</sup> This has been used by historians to argue that Polybius composed the *Histories* from book fifteen onwards after the destruction of Carthage in 146.<sup>98</sup> There is only one instance after this point where Polybius referred to Carthage in the present tense, although this single instance does not provide solid evidence either way.<sup>99</sup> However, De Sanctis proposed that the present tense was used in this instance during the narrative of the Macedonian Demetrius' escape from Rome, because Polybius had composed the section on it directly after and simply inserted it into the appropriate section of the narrative once he had written the rest.<sup>100</sup> This is accepted as plausible by Walbank, although there is, of course, no way to verify this suggestion.<sup>101</sup> It can be argued then, that books one to fifteen of the *Histories* seem to have been written prior to Polybius' release from Rome in 150, implying that the majority of his work was written after the destruction of Carthage and Corinth in 146.<sup>102</sup>

There are, however, contrary arguments that cannot be ignored. Ziegler argued that Polybius had completed his originally planned books by

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<sup>95</sup> Walbank (1972) 18.

<sup>96</sup> Walbank disagreed with Erbse's argument that Polybius' use of the present tenses were anachronistic: Walbank (1972) 16; Erbse (1951) 157-179; (1957) 269-297.

<sup>97</sup> This excludes the use of the present in Polyb. 31.12.12.

<sup>98</sup> Walbank (1972) 16-19.

<sup>99</sup> This section can also be used to argue that Polybius began his extended section of the *Histories* prior to 146: Polyb. 31.12.12; Walbank (1972) 18.

<sup>100</sup> De Sanctis (1907-1923) 202.

<sup>101</sup> Walbank (1972) 18. Weil's argument that there is nearly nothing that can be known of Polybius' rate of completion or environment at the time is, as Eckstein commented, 'overly pessimistic': Weil (1988) 185-206; Eckstein (1995a) 10 n. 42.

<sup>102</sup> Lehmann argued that Polybius did not begin the extension of the *Histories* until after the death of Scipio Aemilianus in 129, an argument Walbank seems to support while also admitting that it could have been earlier: Lehmann (1974) 192 n. 3; Walbank (1977) 327-329.

150 and had written the extension after that date.<sup>103</sup> Aymard also presented another opinion, arguing that Polybius' account of the original transfer of Achaean allegiance from Philip to Rome in 198, written in book eighteen, could not have been written after the dissolution of the League in 146, based on a reference to Aristaenus' actions in 198 preserving Achaea.<sup>104</sup> However as Walbank stated, it is impossible to know conclusively either way.<sup>105</sup> Nevertheless, historians have attempted to estimate Polybius' rate of completion, with Walbank arguing that Polybius had completed books one to fifteen prior to 146, up until book twenty-nine by 129, and up until book thirty-nine after this date.<sup>106</sup> Baronowski had a more numerical approach to Walbank's content-based analysis, but he reached similar conclusions based on the assumption that Polybius maintained a relatively steady output.<sup>107</sup> Baronowski accepts the claim that Polybius would have written up until book fifteen before he was released from Rome, arguing that it would have taken Polybius 1.13 years to write one book. Accordingly, it can then be calculated that books sixteen to twenty-nine would have taken roughly sixteen years, taking the time-span of Polybius' composition down to 129. The next eleven books would have taken around twelve years, so according to Baronowski, Polybius would have finished the *Histories* around 117.<sup>108</sup>

The publication of the *Histories* is also a consideration when assessing the historical subjectivity of Polybius, specifically whether it was intended for immediate publication or not. Walbank argued that books one through to five had been publicly released by at least 150, perhaps also accompanied by

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<sup>103</sup> Ziegler (1952) 1477.

<sup>104</sup> Walbank disagreed with Aymard's reasoning and interpretation of the Greek on which this argument partially rests. Aymard's argument was founded on his contrast of *νυν δέ* in 13.9 and *τότε* in 13.8, but Walbank claimed that *τότε* instead referred back to 13.7 *ἐξ αὐτῶν τῶν ἐνεστῶτων* and that *νυν δέ* *ισ* instead translated as 'as it was'. He also pointed to another section in the same book that may have indicated book eighteen was written prior to 146, although he believed the section in question was a later addition: Polyb. 18.35.9; Aymard (1940) 356 n. 8; Walbank (1972) 19, 19 n. 89.

<sup>105</sup> Although there were questions about the composition of book twelve, which Walbank believed may have been written after Polybius had travelled to Africa: Walbank (1972) 19, 25.

<sup>106</sup> Walbank (1972) 13-25; (1977) 139-145.

<sup>107</sup> Baronowski (2011) 4.

<sup>108</sup> For further discussion on the date of completion see: Walbank (1977) 140-143.

book six.<sup>109</sup> It can be argued that books one to six were the first published body of work from the *Histories*, prefaced as he himself tells us by a list of contents (προγραφαί).<sup>110</sup> But Walbank did not use the addition of the προγραφαί as conclusive evidence of the initial publication of books one to six as a whole, and instead argued for a more scattered publication.<sup>111</sup> The aim of Polybius' *Histories* as a didactic work that provided lessons in political behaviour for both contemporary and future statesmen, implies there would have been some motivation for immediate publication. So as Walbank argued, there is little reason to believe that Polybius would not have published those books he had completed prior to 150, although there is no evidence to prove this.<sup>112</sup> There is also little indication where Polybius' *Histories* were first published. It stands to reason then that if the first five books were published while Polybius was in Rome, it would have been the most convenient place for publication, although there is no way to make any conclusive comments.

The narrative of the period after Polybius' detention in Rome contributed significantly to the image Polybius presented to the reader in the *Histories*. A great deal of this image as a politician, a teacher, and an historian, was formed through the inclusion of Polybius as a historical character in the narrative of this period. The fragmentary nature of these later books makes it difficult to make any definitive statements, but it seems that Polybius went to lengths in these sections to appear as an objective recorder of events. The escalating deterioration of the relationship between the Achaean League and Rome in 150 implies that Polybius would have been put in a difficult situation upon his release. Anti-Roman sentiment was rife in Achaea in this period, and Walbank claims the radicals who were then in power had no use for a returning exile such as Polybius.<sup>113</sup> The world that he was released into was significantly different to 167, but there is no trace of

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<sup>109</sup> Walbank claimed that there were passages in books three and four that were related to the political situation in Achaea and Rome around 150: (1957) 293-294; (1972) 20.

<sup>110</sup> Polyb. 11.1a.5; for example by De Sanctis (1907-1923) 205.

<sup>111</sup> Holleaux argued that Polybius published book four before writing book five, based on the reference to the Rhodian earthquake of 227. Walbank considered this 'ill-adapted' and argued it would have been included in book four had it not already been published: Holleaux (1968) 445-462; Walbank (1972) 21.

<sup>112</sup> Walbank (1972) 21.

<sup>113</sup> Walbank (1972) 10.



any type of overt difficulty for the image of Polybius in the extant sections of the *Histories*, although he did include the struggles of his fellow hostage Staius.<sup>114</sup> Although his account of the Achaean War contained clear emotion in its narrative, this did not actually indicate any emotion on the part of the author, and was instead a controlled rhetorical device to heighten the didactic lesson Polybius was conveying to his audience.<sup>115</sup>

Polybius clearly informed the reader of his involvement in the Third Punic War. His participation in the narrative in this case added to the image he was creating of himself as a teacher and historian, particularly due to the involvement of Scipio Aemilianus. Even though there would not have been any blatant fabrication in his account of the Third Punic War, given his reputation as an eyewitness and the existence of potential readers who had also been there, his didactic purpose in the *Histories* would have influenced his narrative. The function of Polybius' account of the Third Punic War was to emphasise his own significant role and contribute to the self-portrait he was building in the *Histories*. Importantly, the details of Polybius' involvement in the war added authority to his credentials as a teacher and historian by proving his own military experience.

This aim was likely to have influenced Polybius and his interpretation of events. As he tells it, the request for his presence at Carthage was sent directly to the Achaeans who endorsed it through a vote.<sup>116</sup> It was not by his own choice that he travelled to Carthage, but rather because the Romans had need of him. According to the *Histories*, Polybius' own inclination was to abide by Roman demands:

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<sup>114</sup> Staius was accused of feeding the Romans information by the Achaean leaders who incited revolt against Rome: Polyb. 38.13.4-6.

<sup>115</sup> For example see: Polyb. 38.38-13, 10.8-13, 11.7-11, 13.8-9, 16.11, 18.8-12. For discussion of the Achaean War see section 4.5 and chapter eight.

<sup>116</sup> This was presumably a vote by the magistrates, since this issue was not one to be put in front of the assembly or the council: Polyb. 36.11.1-2; Walbank (1979a) 671.

I, myself, thinking that for many reasons I ought to obey the Romans, put every other consideration aside and set sail early in the summer.<sup>117</sup>

Polybius was summoned by M. Manilius to Lilybaeum on the eve of his crossing to Africa, although he turned back towards Greece once news reached him that a resolution had been concluded. However, peace discussions failed and the war continued, with Polybius arriving at Carthage in 147.<sup>118</sup> Polybius did not explicitly state what he offered the Romans by his presence in Carthage, but it did seem as though the request for his presence was not due simply to his friendship with Aemilianus. Arguably he could have been summoned because of his knowledge of Africa or the crossing, as is asserted by Walbank.<sup>119</sup> However, it was equally possible that Polybius' usefulness to Aemilianus may have been as a military adviser, since he wrote a separate work *On Tactics* prior to his *Histories*, indicating some kind of expert knowledge.<sup>120</sup> McGing argued that Polybius' reputation as a military expert may have been established prior to his detention in Rome, despite his lack of actual battle experience.<sup>121</sup> There is one reference in the *Histories* preserved by Plutarch of Polybius advising Aemilianus on tactics during his siege of Carthage, which indicated an ability to do so, even though his advice was in this instance disregarded.<sup>122</sup> There is even a story told by Ammianus Marcellinus that is evidence of a more practical involvement in the war. He claimed that Polybius joined in an attack against a city gate at the side of Aemilianus during the offensive on Carthage, although the likelihood of this is disputed.<sup>123</sup>

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<sup>117</sup> Polyb. 36.11.2-3: 'ἡμεῖς δὲ νομίζοντες ἑαυτοῖς καθήκειν κατὰ πολλοὺς τρόπους τὸ πειθαρχεῖν Ῥωμαίοις, πάντα τὰλλα τάρεργα <θήμενοι> θερείας ἀρχομένης ἐξεπλεύσαμεν.'

<sup>118</sup> Polyb. 38.21.1-22.3. It is unclear whether the Achaean authorities directed Polybius to Carthage in this case or whether he was there at the request of Scipio.

<sup>119</sup> Polyb. 36.11.1; Walbank (1972) 10.

<sup>120</sup> Polyb. 9.20.4.

<sup>121</sup> McGing (2010) 142.

<sup>122</sup> Polyb. 38.19; Plut. *Regum*. 82.

<sup>123</sup> Amm. Marc. 24.2.14-17. Polybius praised those army commanders who did not needlessly expose themselves to danger, so it seemed unlikely that he would take part in an attack as part of a small party of troops with Aemilianus. Although unlikely, McGing conceded that if true, Polybius may have been motivated by his relative inexperience in battle, since he saw military experience, and significantly risk of life, as important for an historian to experience: Polyb. 10.13.1-5, 32, 33 (on commanders who take part in battle); 12.25h.5 (on the importance of practical battle experience for an historian); McGing (2010) 142. Eckstein

In the remaining fragments of the narrative on the Third Punic War, Polybius seemed to have made a clear effort to present himself as the objective third party observer, adding to his authorial image. In the midst of Carthage's destruction the audience is told of the tears of Aemilianus, but Polybius gives little indication of his own emotional reaction to the events.<sup>124</sup> The image of Polybius as the neutral historian is emphasised in his presentation of four different Greek opinions concerning the Roman destruction of Carthage.<sup>125</sup> He gave the reader two arguments that supported Roman actions, against two arguments that did not. This guides the reader to assume a unbiased approach to assessing blame in this war - an image that Polybius was concerned to portray to his audience, regardless of his actual opinion. This leads historians to form their own opinions; for example, Walbank argued that Polybius supported Roman actions in both Carthage, and more particularly in Corinth in this period, against the erratic policies of those who were opposing her - a question that will be returned to later in this chapter.<sup>126</sup>

Another significant aspect of Polybius' experiences after 150 that added to his image in the *Histories* were his travels. These experiences directly contributed to his repute as an historian, specifically because, according to Polybius, geographical knowledge was one of the key components necessary to being a good historian, along with political

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argued the opposite, and claimed that overall Polybius' attitude to those generals who placed themselves in danger was praising, as well as in accord with his moral lessons on courage in the *Histories*: Eckstein (1995a) 28-40.

<sup>124</sup> Polyb. 38.21.1-22.3; App. *Pun.* 132.

<sup>125</sup> Polyb. 36.9. There were two arguments critical of Rome and two that were not. In brief they were a) that Carthage had been a continual nuisance for Rome and her destruction was a good move in order to secure Roman power, b) that Roman policy had changed and that they were now following the footsteps of both the Athenian and Spartan Empires (in becoming either tyrannical or short-lived), c) that the Romans had acted unjustly and dishonourably towards Carthage, or d) that the Carthaginian *deditio* justified the actions of the Romans, considering they were also in breach of the treaty with Masinissa and the *deditio* obligations: see also Walbank (1974a). For further discussion of these passages and the requirements of a *deditio* see section 5.3 and chapter seven.

<sup>126</sup> Walbank (1974a) 15-16. Polybius' presence in Carthage meant that he missed witnessing the Achaean War and the swift destruction of Corinth. Walbank claimed that the capture of Corinth took place in the mid-summer of 146, while the final destruction of the city took place after the arrival of the commissioners in Greece around October 146: Walbank (1972) 11-12 n. 55; see also De Sanctis (1953-64) 157-160.

experience, and the research of written knowledge.<sup>127</sup> Geographical knowledge was so central to Polybius' concept of the ideal historian that he dedicated an entire book to geographical matters, although it is not extant. He also inserted geographical observations into the already composed sections of the *Histories* whenever he thought it necessary.<sup>128</sup> With the help of Aemilianus, Polybius travelled around Africa, Spain, Gaul, and the Atlantic.<sup>129</sup> He also traversed the Alps in the footsteps of Hannibal, illustrating how important he considered geographical knowledge for an historian.<sup>130</sup> Polybius' ability to draw attention to his own trek along the difficult terrain that Hannibal used to invade Italy added significantly to the self-portrait that he gave the reader - he was a man-of-action, not simply of words. Polybius' pride in his travels is clear in the *Histories*, as he likened himself to the Homeric traveller Odysseus.<sup>131</sup> Walbank believed that these travels influenced Polybius' vision of his *Histories*, and 'convinced (him) that it was his role to interpret the newly opened up west to the peoples of Greece.'<sup>132</sup> The extension of Polybius' *Histories* may support this argument, although there was a clear intention and recognition of geographical importance from the start.<sup>133</sup> Significantly, his travels would have allowed him to see the wider affects of Roman rule in the Mediterranean, which was the given motivation for extending the *Histories*.<sup>134</sup>

Another significant quality Polybius believed was important for an historian was political experience. Polybius was on the way to having what looked to be a significant political career in the Achaean League, but was then taken to Rome, effectively ending any hope Polybius had to reach the highest

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<sup>127</sup> Polyb. 12.25e.1-2; cf. 3.58.1.

<sup>128</sup> For examples of geographical insertions see: Polyb. 3.36-9, 39.8, 57-9, 61.11, 86.2; 4.39-42; 5.21.3-22.4; 10.11.4.

<sup>129</sup> Plin. *HN* 5.9. Polybius also returned to Rome and to Alexandria during the reign of Ptolemy Euergetes II: Polyb. 39.8.1 (Rome); Polyb. 34.14.6 (Alexandria); Strab. 17.797. He may also have travelled to Numantia with Aemilianus, but there is no clear evidence for this and Polybius would have been quite elderly by this point. Polybius wrote an account of the Numantine War which makes his presence possible, as does Aemilianus' summoning of his friends to Numantia: Cic. *Fam.* 5.12.2; App. *Hisp.* 84, 89.

<sup>130</sup> Polyb. 3.48.12. The date of this trek through the Alps is contested, with Walbank dating it to 151/150 after travelling to Spain with Aemilianus: Walbank (1957) 382; (1972) 11.n. 53.

<sup>131</sup> Polyb. 3.59.7-8; 12.28.

<sup>132</sup> Walbank (1972) 11; see also Walbank (1948) 157-158.

<sup>133</sup> For the interdependency of history and geography in Polybius' *Histories* see: Clarke (1999) 77-128; see also Walbank (1948) 155-182.

<sup>134</sup> Polyb. 3.4.

political office in Achaëa.<sup>135</sup> However, after 150 the Romans seem to have offered Polybius an opportunity to become politically involved again, which he included in the *Histories* in order to add to the image he was building of himself. Polybius' exact role while the Roman commissioners were in Achaëa is unclear, although he seems to have been entrusted with travelling the country and addressing any problems the Greeks had after the commissioners had returned to Rome.<sup>136</sup> Polybius' position in Achaëa seems to have been more than simply advisory, with reference to him drawing up laws on public jurisdiction that were evidently confusing the populace.<sup>137</sup> He then claimed:

So we should consider this to be the most brilliant achievement of Polybius among all those I mentioned.<sup>138</sup>

This reveals the significance Polybius placed on his political involvement in Achaëa after the Achaean War, and how important the evidence of his own experience was to the self-portrait he created of himself in the *Histories*.

In conclusion, this chapter analysed the personal aspects of Polybius' persona as a teacher and historian in the narrative. The bias Polybius showed in his *Histories* towards the Achaean League would have been expected by other ancient historians. This subjectivity was reinforced by his idealisation of multiple Achaean leaders whom he held up in the *Histories* as moral *exempla* for future politicians. But the image we get of Polybius in the *Histories* is that of an historian aware and concerned not to be too extravagant in his praise of his native heroes or family. He seemed conscious of this, particularly in his

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<sup>135</sup> For discussion of Polybius' early political career see section 5.1.

<sup>136</sup> Polyb. 39.5 (note the presence of a posthumous editor in these later passages). The commissioners spent six-months in Achaëa and so left around March-April 145: Walbank (1979a) 734. See Pausanias for details of the constitution set down in Achaëa by Mummius: 7.16.9.

<sup>137</sup> Polyb. 39.5.5. Walbank pointed out that these laws were most likely local laws and not federal laws since the Romans still had the Achaean Confederacy suspended at this time: (1979a) 735.

<sup>138</sup> Polyb. 39.5.6: 'διὸ καὶ τοῦτο κάλλιστον Πολυβίῳ πεπραχθαι νομιστέον πάντων τῶν προειρημένων.' Plutarch recognised the significance of Roman support of their friends when it enabled them (their friends) to benefit their homelands. He cited the examples of Polybius and Panaetius: *Mor.* 814c.

praise of Lycortas, although in the case of Philopoemen Polybius did not seem to be able to avoid extolling the virtues of his Achaean hero. This added to his image in the narrative, highlighting the patriotic aspect of his persona. Polybius' education also contributed to this image he created of himself in the *Histories* as a teacher and historian. The displays of his literary knowledge were intended to add to his credibility and give his own history authority. This displayed his suitability as a teacher and an historian for his readers. By contrast, Polybius' status as a detainee in Rome was not a significant component of the image he created of himself in the *Histories*. At every point he downplayed his detention, arguing it was based on falsehoods and unlawful, while simultaneously casting blame on corrupt Achaean politicians rather than the Romans themselves. It seemed as though Polybius made a conscious decision to separate his authorial persona from this experience. However, there was some evident historical bias in the narrative when discussing unjust hostage taking that suggested some sensitivity on the topic. Finally, when Polybius included the events of his own life in the narrative after his release from Rome in 150, he did so with an agenda of self-representation. Those experiences he chose to emphasise, such as his involvement in the Third Punic War, his travels, and his political involvement in Achaea after the Achaean War, added credence to the image he built in the *Histories* of an historian with the required components he himself advocated as necessary to the discipline of history. Although the fragmentary nature of these later books make it impossible to form definitive conclusions, the passages that do survive support the idea of a consciously-constructed self-portrait of the author in the narrative after 150. This image illustrated Polybius' suitability as an historian and, by extension, a teacher, through reinforcing his military, geographical, and political credentials for his audience.

## Chapter Four: Historical Constructs, Bias and Polybius' Self-Constructed Image

This chapter looks at five different aspects in the construction of the narrative that contributed to Polybius' consciously designed persona in the *Histories*. These historiographical factors demonstrated his techniques of self-definition and historical writing, adding credibility to his image as an historian and teacher in the narrative. Polybius used these aspects of his historical construction to reinforce his image and didactic purpose. His preoccupation with these structural aspects and historiographical priorities meant that they often took precedence over his concern to be acutely accurate in the historical narrative.

The first section in this chapter discusses Polybius' purpose. His didactic purpose was at points more significant than his stated historical purpose, reflecting his persona in the *Histories* as a teacher. The structure of the narrative also reflected Polybius' persona, his purpose, and his audience. In particular, the precision of his structure and the digressions throughout the narrative were vehicles for Polybius' conscious construction of his image as a teacher and historian in the narrative. The third section in this chapter addresses Polybius' intended audience, and how this determined the creation of his image in the *Histories*. His didactic purpose and persona were made in correlation to his audience of young soldier-politicians, for whom he wanted to provide lessons on ideal political behaviour. The subsequent section on the use of polemic in the *Histories* discusses the standardised use of polemic against other historians as a means of self-definition by ancient writers. For Polybius, polemic against his historical rival Timaeus highlighted his own credibility as an historian, contributing to his authority in the narrative. Finally, the last section in this chapter discusses Polybius' use of emotion in the *Histories* as a didactic lesson on irrationality for his audience of soldier-

politicians. In addition, it discusses his use of emotion as a rhetorical device to draw the reader's attention to these didactic lessons. These aspects of Polybius' narrative structure contributed to his image in the *Histories*, which in turn influenced his ability to remain historically impartial.

### 1) The purpose of the *Histories*

One of the most important considerations for an historian in composing their work was its overall purpose. Ancient historians usually stated the purpose and significance of their focus from the outset, and Polybius was no exception.<sup>1</sup> For Polybius there was not only one, but multiple purposes in writing the *Histories*. He had his historical purpose in tracing the rise of Rome and constructing a universal history, but also had historiographical aims that were related to the image he had consciously formed in the narrative; in particular, the didactic lessons that encouraged the author's portrait as the ideal teacher.

Polybius claimed the purpose of his *Histories* was to provide a universal history detailing how the Romans came to dominate the Mediterranean world in only fifty-three years (220-167).<sup>2</sup> This purpose was stated at the outset of his work and reinforced throughout.<sup>3</sup> At some point, probably after 146, Polybius decided to extend the time-frame of the *Histories*. This also modified the purpose of the later books, which now aimed to assess how the Romans treated those they conquered, both for contemporaries in deciding whether to support or revolt against Roman rule, and for future generations in deciding whether to praise or blame the Romans and their actions.<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> For example: Thuc. 1.1.

<sup>2</sup> Polyb. 1.1.5; reiterated at 3.1.4-5.

<sup>3</sup> Polyb. 1.1.5-6, 2.7, 4.1; 3.1.4, 1.9, 2.6, 3.9, 4.2, 118.9; 6.2.3; 8.2.3; 39.8.7.

<sup>4</sup> Walbank (1972) 17-18. As Walbank pointed out, this was a practical purpose that added to the obvious benefits attained from studying history: (1972) 28-29.



Polybius' stated purpose when he began writing the *Histories* was to investigate how Rome rose to domination in the Mediterranean in only fifty-three years:

For who is so worthless or indolent as not to wish to know by what means and under what system of polity the Romans in less than fifty-three years have succeeded in subjecting nearly the whole inhabited world to their sole government – a thing unique in history?<sup>5</sup>

The glory of his topic was plainly claimed in the *Histories*, although this was traditional in ancient historiography.<sup>6</sup> Polybius' topic might be considered strange in light of his detention in Rome between 167 and 150, but for Polybius there was no such difficulty. He depicted himself as the ideal historian, and would have seen himself as standing on the outside looking in on Roman success. His own status as a detainee was separate from his identity as an historian, which can be seen by the minimal references to his detention in creating his persona in the *Histories*.<sup>7</sup> For Polybius, the rise of Rome was an admirable achievement that could be held up as an example to others in the Mediterranean world, as called for by his role as a teacher, historian, and politician. That is not to say that he was not influenced by his own situation, just that he saw his historical purpose and the creation of his own image in the *Histories* as more significant.

Polybius' decision to extend his work undoubtedly reflected the realisation of a matter thought to be of paramount importance.<sup>8</sup> He explained that the extension of his *Histories* was motivated by an interest in how the Romans ruled and administered their newly acquired empire, as well as how their authority was regarded by other Mediterranean peoples.<sup>9</sup> As he claimed:

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<sup>5</sup> Polyb. 1.1.5-6: 'τίς γὰρ οὕτως ὑπάρχει φαῦλος ἢ ῥάθυμος ἀνθρώπων ὃς οὐκ ἂν βούλοιτο γνῶναι πῶς καὶ τίνι γένει πολιτείας επικρατηθέντα σχεδὸν ἅπαντα τὰ κατὰ τὴν οἰκουμένην οὐχ ὅλοις τευτήκοντα καὶ τρισὶν ἔτεσιν ὑπὸ μίαν ἀρχὴν ἔπεσε τὴν Ῥωμαίων, ὃ πρότερον οὐχ εὕρισκεται γεγονός.'

<sup>6</sup> Polybius compared the size of the Roman Empire to those of the Persians, Spartans, and Macedonians: 1.2.

<sup>7</sup> Refer to section 3.3.

<sup>8</sup> Polyb. 3.4.13.

<sup>9</sup> Polyb. 3.4.

No man of sound sense goes to war with his neighbours simply for the sake of crushing an adversary, just as no one sails to the open sea just for the sake of crossing it. Indeed no one even takes up the study of arts and crafts merely for the sake of knowledge, but all men do all they do for the resulting pleasure, good, or utility.<sup>10</sup>

Here Polybius claimed the importance of analysing the end result and not simply the path to it, just as he intended to analyse the result of Rome's rise to power and not simply the rise itself. Subsequently, the last ten books of the *Histories* were written with a different premise in mind - not how the Romans amassed their empire, but rather how their rule was perceived once it was fully established.<sup>11</sup> This investigation would then educate contemporaries on how to react to the Romans, while also informing future generations on whether they should praise or blame the Romans. This he believed, would be the most useful outcome of the *Histories*.<sup>12</sup>

Another purpose of Polybius' *Histories* was to establish the importance of the concept of universal history, a genre of history writing Polybius saw as superior to all others.<sup>13</sup> He informed the reader that it was this challenge that motivated him to attempt writing history; that is, the undertaking of writing a history that traced the unification of the known world under Roman rule. Polybius stated:

*Tyche* has guided almost all the affairs of the world in one direction and has forced them to incline towards one and the same end; an historian should likewise bring before his readers

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<sup>10</sup> Polyb. 3.4.10-12: 'οὔτε γὰρ πολεμεῖ τοῖς πέλας οὐδεὶς νοῦν ἔχων ἕνεκεν αὐτοῦ τοῦ καταγωνίσασθαι τοὺς ἀντιπαττομένους, οὔτε πλεῖ τὰ πελάγη χάριν τοῦ περαιωθῆναι μόνον, καὶ μὴ οὐδὲ τὰς ἐμπειρίας καὶ τέχνας αὐτῆς ἕνεκα τῆς ἐπιστήμης ἀναλαμβάνει· πάντες δὲ πράττουσι πάντα χάριν τῶν ἐπιγινομένων τοῖς ἔργοις ἡδέων ἢ καλῶν ἢ συμφερόντων.'

<sup>11</sup> Polyb. 3.4.3-4: 'And, besides, by this time the acknowledgement had been extorted from all that the supremacy of Rome must be accepted, and her commands obeyed' - 'πρὸς δὲ τούτοις ὁμολογούμενον ἐδόκει τοῦτ' ἔναι καὶ κατηναγκασμένον ἅπασιν ὅτι λοιπὸν ἔστι Ῥωμαίων ἀκούειν καὶ τούτοις πειθαρχεῖν ὑπὲρ τῶν παραγγελλομένων.'

<sup>12</sup> Polyb. 3.4.

<sup>13</sup> Polybius was critical of those who were narrow in their historical focus, and followed the examples of historians such as Herodotus, Thucydides, and Theopompus: 1.4; 7.7.8; 31.30.1. For discussion on the development of universal history in ancient historiography see: Alonso-Núñez (1990) 173-192.

under one synoptical view the operations by which she has accomplished her general purpose. Indeed it was this chiefly that invited and encouraged me to undertake my task; and secondarily the fact that none of my contemporaries have undertaken to write a general history, in which case I should have been much less eager to take this in hand.<sup>14</sup>

For Polybius, the genre of universal history echoed the unification of the Mediterranean world under the Romans. This *symploké* of the Mediterranean, a unification of the east and the west, was first recognised by Polybius in the *Histories* at the peace conference between the Aetolians and Philip V in 217.<sup>15</sup> At this conference, the Aetolian Agelaus heralded the coming of a dominant power in the west in the victor of the Second Punic War, likening their rise to power as clouds that would settle on Greece.<sup>16</sup> The notion of a unifying work was not new to the Greeks, although Polybius was one of the first historians to apply this notion to historical writing, an absence in Polybius' contemporary historiography that was part of his motivation.<sup>17</sup> He traced the unification of the known world (*oecumene*), and identified it as a process that was unique and caused by the presence of *tyche*.<sup>18</sup> According to Walbank, the idea of the universal whole in history and the role of *tyche* were imposed by Polybius upon his subject matter. The pattern Polybius traced in this universal history, and the significance of *tyche* were 'both contrived and belong to the artistry of his composition.'<sup>19</sup> Polybius' agenda, to write a universal history that filled a gap in the contemporary historical tradition,

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<sup>14</sup> Polyb. 1.4.1-2: 'καθάπερ ἡ τύχη σχεδὸν ἅπαντα τὰ τῆς οἰκουμένης πράγματα πρὸς ἓν ἔκλινε μέρος καὶ πάντα νεύειν ἠνάγκασε πρὸς ἓνα καὶ τὸν αὐτὸν σκοπὸν, οὕτως καὶ <δεῖ> διὰ τῆς ἱστορίας ὑπὸ μίαν σύνοψιν ἀγαγεῖν τοῖς ἐντυγχάνουσι τὸν χειρισμὸν τῆς τύχης, ὃ κέχρηται πρὸς τὴν τῶν ὄλων πραγμάτων συντέλειαν. καὶ γὰρ τὸ προκαλεσάμενον ἡμᾶς καὶ παρορμησάν πρὸς τὴν ἐπιβολὴν τῆς ἱστορίας μάλιστα τοῦτο γέγονε, σὺν δὲ τούτῳ καὶ τὸ μηδένα τῶν καθ' ἡμᾶς ἐπιβεβλήσθαι τῇ τῶν καθόλου πραγμάτων συνταξίᾳ· πολὺ γὰρ ἂν ἦττον ἔγωγε πρὸς τοῦτο τὸ μέρος ἐφιλοτιμήθην.'

<sup>15</sup> For discussion on the idea of *symploké* in the *Histories* see: Walbank (1975) 197-212.

<sup>16</sup> Polyb. 5.104.10.

<sup>17</sup> Ephorus wrote universal history, but was not a contemporary of Polybius: Polyb. 5.33.2. On this as motivation to write history see: Polyb. 1.4.2-5.

<sup>18</sup> *Tyche* was a common conception throughout the *Histories*, and was often used to explain things that happened beyond the realm of human control. For Polybius, *tyche* was a logical causal determinant, used when things could not be explained by rational thought: Polyb. 36.17; see also Walbank (1972) 58-65; (2007) 349-355.

<sup>19</sup> Walbank (1972) 71. Refer to section 4.5 for a discussion of *tyche* in Polybius.

influenced his perception of both the historical events and how they culminated in Roman rule.

Despite Polybius' own claims to the purpose of his *Histories*, this history was not perhaps what may usually be considered 'universal,' instead his historical structure revolved specifically around events in mainland Greece and Macedonia.<sup>20</sup> This focus supported the argument that Polybius' primary audience were the Greeks, which would have been a decisive factor in his historical presentation of both the Romans and the Greeks. It is difficult to think that a factor as central as the projected audience would not move the author to consider the way he was writing, or how he was presenting what he identified as 'historical fact', so this is a key consideration in assessing Polybius' subjectivity in his *Histories*.<sup>21</sup>

One of the important factors in the extension of the *Histories* was Polybius' own involvement in the episodes he narrated. If he had ended the time-span of his *Histories* in 167 with the defeat of Perseus in the Third Macedonian War, he would have only been a very minor character in the story, which may have figured in his decision to extend the *Histories*.<sup>22</sup> McGing suggested that his 'personal involvement in the action distracted him from the task and led him to place himself at the centre of the story – the historian, not as Homer, but as Homeric hero.'<sup>23</sup> The persona of the author Polybius was established from the beginning of the *Histories*, but the historical character Polybius was not a significant component in the narrative until near the end.

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<sup>20</sup> Walbank (1972) 3.

<sup>21</sup> The question of Polybius' audience is returned to in section 4.3.

<sup>22</sup> Polybius referred to himself both in the first and third person, and explained his decision to do this interchangeably in the *Histories*: 36.12. Thucydides was also a contemporary of the events he described, but scarcely inserted himself into the narrative: Marincola (1997) 8, 173.

<sup>23</sup> McGing (2010) 15. There were some parallels made by Polybius between himself and the famous Homeric traveller Odysseus – the ultimate man-of-action. His home city of Megalopolis honoured him by recording that he 'wandered over sea and land' (ἐπὶ γῆν καὶ θάλασσαν πλανηθείη), and if such a parallel were common knowledge in 150, this may explain Cato's comment that Polybius was acting like Odysseus going back into the Cyclops' cave to get his hat by requesting the restoration of the honours of the returning Achaean detainees in 150: Polyb. 35.6.4; Paus. 8.30.8; Plut. *Cat. Mai.* 9.3; see also Walbank (1972) 52. For further discussion on Polybius' conscious parallel to Odysseus, see section 2.1.

Although those aims already mentioned were significant reasons for Polybius' *Histories*, they were by no means the historian's only considerations when writing his work. In addition, Polybius had historiographical factors that influenced the impartiality of his narrative, which were equally, if not even more, important. His purpose was to educate his readers about the practical applications of history, a factor that casts further doubt on our ability to view Polybius as an historian faultless in his objectivity. Polybius' self-portrait in the *Histories* was developed around this central image of the author as an educator. He wanted to be seen as a Greek teacher to young Roman aristocrats, and emphasised the didactic aspects of his historical narrative in order to reinforce this image. Polybius' subject matter, his presentation, and the insertion of himself into the narrative, all highlight the importance he placed on his work as a didactic tool. The *Histories* taught its audience about politics, morals, war, and culture - all in the effort to impart wisdom and educate his readers on how to become ideal political leaders in accordance with his own political theories. Similarly, as Jacob pointed out, the emphasis on failure, in particular individual military failure, was intended to provide useful lessons to his readers on the consequences of the actions of the political elite.<sup>24</sup>

The didactic purpose of the *Histories* was evident from the beginning of Polybius' narrative. He claimed:

that the soundest education and training for a life of active politics is the study of History, and that the surest and indeed the only method of learning how to bear bravely the vicissitudes of fortune, is to recall the calamities of others.<sup>25</sup>

Polybius' didactic purpose was aimed primarily at his audience of young Greek aristocrats, and attempted to provide practical advice for their interaction with the increasingly dominant Romans.<sup>26</sup> When Polybius began to

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<sup>24</sup> Jacob (2003) 195-196.

<sup>25</sup> Polyb. 1.1.2: 'φάσκοντες ἀληθινωτάτην μὲν εἶναι παιδείαν καὶ γυμνασίαν πρὸς τὰς πολιτικὰς πράξεις τὴν ἐκ τῆς ἱστορίας μάθησιν, ἐναργεστάτην δὲ καὶ μόνην διδάσκαλον τοῦ δύνασθαι τὰς τῆς τύχης μεταβολὰς γενναίως ὑποφέρειν τὴν τῶν ἀλλοτρίων περιπετειῶν ὑπόμνησιν.'

<sup>26</sup> Walbank (1972) 27.

write his *Histories* he would have had hope that the Greeks could co-exist with the rising tide of Roman power; a hope that would have been disappointed after the events of 168, and completely dashed after 146. Part of Polybius' purpose, then, was to show the Greeks how they had ended up in a subordinate position to the Romans. Polybius' didactic purpose was central to the image he presented of himself in the *Histories* as the teacher, but was also central to the type of history he believed he was writing.

Polybius seemed concerned in his *Histories* to distinguish his type of history from others, referring to it as pragmatic (πραγματικός).<sup>27</sup> There has been much debate over the meaning of this term, in reference to its content and whether Polybius used it to refer to a specific period of history. It seems that 'pragmatic' was a reference to the type of historiography Polybius practiced, with no indication that Polybius intended it to refer specifically to a period of time. Meister has argued that 'pragmatic history' was used to refer to the period after the colonisation between the eighth and sixth centuries, excluding expansion into Asia.<sup>28</sup> However, Polybius did not include any chronological markers in his explanation of pragmatic history, instead explaining:

In the same fashion pragmatic history (πραγματικῆς ἱστορίας) too consists of three parts, the first being the industrious study of memoirs and other documents and a comparison of their contents, the second the survey of cities, places, rivers, harbours, and in general all the peculiar features of land and sea and the distances of one place from another, and the third being political activity.<sup>29</sup>

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<sup>27</sup> Polyb. 1.2.8, 35.9; 9.2.4; 12.25e; 36.17.1; 39.1.4; see also 9.1-2 for discussion of other types of history.

<sup>28</sup> Meister (1990) 160.

<sup>29</sup> Polyb. 12.25e.1-2: 'τὸν αὐτὸν δὴ τρόπον καὶ τῆς πραγματικῆς ἱστορίας ὑπαρχούσης τριμεροῦς, τῶν δὲ μερῶν αὐτῆς ἑνὸς μὲν ὄντος τοῦ περὶ τὴν ἐν τοῖς ὑπομνήμασι πολυπραγμοσύνην καὶ τὴν παράθεσιν τῆς ἐκ τούτων ὕλης, ἑτέρου δὲ τοῦ περὶ τὴν θέαν τῶν πόλεων καὶ τῶν τόπων περὶ τε ποταμῶν καὶ λιμένων καὶ καθόλου τῶν κατὰ γῆν καὶ κατὰ θάλατταν ἰδιωμάτων καὶ διαστημάτων, τρίτου δὲ τοῦ περὶ τὰς πράξεις τὰς πολιτικὰς.' See Walbank (1967) 391-392: for notes on the translation.

As pointed out by Beister, there is no qualification of time here, but there is the implication that pragmatic history was one that was useful to both politicians and students of politics.<sup>30</sup> Polybius' *Histories* were pragmatic because they provided examples and lessons on behaviour for Polybius' readers, displaying the usefulness of history to young politicians in particular.<sup>31</sup> Pragmatic history was one that focused on deeds, while providing military and political examples.<sup>32</sup> There appeared to be a link between pragmatic history and lessons that benefited the reader, although this may not have been a standard function of pragmatic history.<sup>33</sup> Sacks argued that, for Polybius, good pragmatic history was of *use* to the reader.<sup>34</sup> This seems to be a key consideration in how Polybius conceived his work and its purpose - to provide examples of behaviour that would be of benefit to his audience of young aristocrats. This contributed to Polybius' image of himself in the *Histories* as a teacher and historian, whose pragmatic and moral teachings were of use to the reader.

Polybius described his history not only as pragmatic, but also as apodeictic history (ἀποδεικτικὴ ἱστορία).<sup>35</sup> Apodeictic history, unlike pragmatic history, seems to be a reference to historiographical method rather

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<sup>30</sup> Beister (1995) 329-349; Walbank also supported the claim that there was no time qualification put on this definition of pragmatic history: (2002) 7.

<sup>31</sup> McGing argued that the notion of 'pragmatic history' must have been used in Polybius' time, as he tells us of other historians who attempted such an approach, but Walbank argued the expression 'pragmatic history' was probably of Polybius' own formulation. This was also touched on by Gelzer and Pédech: Polyb. 3.47; 39.1.4; McGing (2010) 67; Walbank (2002) 6; Gelzer (1964) 160; Pédech (1964) 32.

<sup>32</sup> As Walbank pointed out, there were sections in the *Histories* that did not abide by this military and political focus, for example book six. Walbank also pointed to the moral lessons in the *Histories* as outside the traditional political/military focus; however, Polybius' moral lessons were not necessarily distinct from his political and military points. Meissner argued that pragmatic history must be considered as everything Polybius included in his *Histories*, although, this did not allow for Polybius' own presence in the narrative. Walbank disagreed with this argument, claiming that pragmatic history seemed to include whatever Polybius thought would contribute to his purpose, but not *all* that he included in the *Histories*: Walbank (2002) 7; (1972) 56; Meissner (1986) 313-351. For the significance of moral lessons in the *Histories* see Eckstein (1995a).

<sup>33</sup> Sacks (1981) 182. Petzold and Meissner have argued that there was a didactic component to Polybius' pragmatic history: Petzold (1969) 3-24; Meissner (1986) 313-351. Sacks pointed out Polybius seemed to have an expectation that, to some degree, this would be the outcome: (1981) 178-186.

<sup>34</sup> Polybius criticised Timaeus' attempt at pragmatic history because it lacked ἔμφοσις, which made it useful: 12.25h-i; Sacks (1981) 183.

<sup>35</sup> Polyb. 2.37.3; 4.40.1; 10.21.8.

than content.<sup>36</sup> Walbank interpreted apodeictic history as 'demonstrative history' or one with evidence and argument, while Sacks argued that apodeictic history referred to a history that has a complete narrative, rather than a summary of events.<sup>37</sup> From the extant evidence however, Polybius only referred to his history as apodeictic on a few occasions, and it may be as North claimed that he did not put any special significance on the term.<sup>38</sup> In contrast, Davidson argued that Polybius was concerned primarily with impressions and perceptions, shown through the multiple 'gazes' or perspectives he framed his narrative through.<sup>39</sup>

In comparison, there has been recent discussion by some modern scholars concerning whether Polybius should be considered an 'indirect historian' or a 'subjective historian'.<sup>40</sup> An 'indirect historian' was one who used the narrative to convey his messages to the audience, whereas a 'subjective historian' interrupted the narrative in the first person to impose his own views directly on the audience.<sup>41</sup> Sacks classified Polybius as a 'subjective historian' according to the original guidelines set down by Brun, to such a degree that 'the narrative sometimes seems less important to Polybius than the lessons he hopes to impart to the reader'.<sup>42</sup> In opposition to this, Champion classified Polybius as an 'indirect historian', which seems surprising considering Brun's original classifications. However, Champion adapted the idea of Polybius as an 'indirect historian', since the use of the narrative to convey Polybius'

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<sup>36</sup> Walbank (2002) 7.

<sup>37</sup> Walbank (1972) 57 and n. 153; Sacks (1981) 171-5. Polybius distinguished between the narrative in his first two books that were considered background, and his narrative beginning from book three, which he described as apodeictic. However, as Sacks pointed out, this did not denote a serious division of approach but rather a reference to the depth of investigation: 2.37.3; Sacks (1981) 178.

<sup>38</sup> North (1967) 154.

<sup>39</sup> Davidson (1991) 17.

<sup>40</sup> The most active proponents of these classifications are Sacks (1981) and Champion (1993, 2004). Polybius has also been seen as an objective, scientific historian by Weidemann, and even a 'positivist' historian at the end of the nineteenth century by Pichon (1896) as cited in Champion: Weidemann (1990) 289-300; Champion (2004) 23.

<sup>41</sup> These classifications are derived from those originally established by Ivo Bruns in 1898. Bruns saw Polybius as a 'subjective' historian: Bruns (1898) 8. Sacks adapted these classifications: (1981) 4-9. See also Champion (2004) 24-28.

<sup>42</sup> Sacks (1981) 8.



thoughts are his primary interest.<sup>43</sup> Depending then on the focus of the investigation, Polybius could be both an ‘indirect’ and ‘subjective’ historian, which is the way in which he should be considered in this study. Investigations into Polybius’ subjectivity obviously include his intrusions into the narrative, but he also used the narrative to characterise his image in the *Histories*, so within these historical classifications he can be considered both ‘indirect’ and ‘subjective.’

Polybius’ purpose was not however completely practical as has been argued previously by scholars of ancient history.<sup>44</sup> As Eckstein has convincingly argued, Polybius had a more moral awareness in his work and did not simply judge states and individuals according to whether they succeed or not, which would have influenced his historical objectivity.<sup>45</sup> Polybius’ attitude to failure was not as clear cut, which can be seen both by his praise of Hannibal and his advice to Demetrius, despite the potential for capture and punishment.<sup>46</sup> Although there was undeniably a practical purpose to the *Histories*, this did not exclude any moral lessons the author was concerned to convey to his readers. These ethical examples show Polybius’ aim was not only to educate his readers on how to be good soldier-politicians, but also how to act with nobility, courage, honour, and self-control. The intention to educate his readers on this type of moral behaviour would have encouraged Polybius to highlight, through the lens of morality, these aspects of his

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<sup>43</sup> Champion argued that Polybius was apologising and defending his own politics through his depiction of group characters in books one to five of the *Histories*; a conclusion made not from Polybius’ comments, but inferred through the narrative: Champion (1993) 12.

<sup>44</sup> See Aymard (1940) 19, n. 3; Pédech (1964) 219; Walbank (1965a) 8; (1972) 173. Eckstein also pointed out Walbank’s tendency to emphasise Polybius’ Machiavellianism instead of scrutinising those passages that have moral commentary in his *Historical Commentaries on Polybius*: (1995a) 18-19. See also Eckstein for a breakdown of previous scholarship regarding Polybius’ practical purpose versus his moralising: (1995a) 16-20.

<sup>45</sup> Eckstein (1995a) *passim*.

<sup>46</sup> Polyb. 9.9.1-5; 31.13.8-14. The note Polybius claimed to have sent Demetrius was as follows: ‘The ready hand bears off the sluggard’s prize. Night favours all, but more the daring heart. Be bold: front danger: strike! then lose or win, care not, so you be true unto yourself. Cool head and wise distrust are wisdom’s sinew’ (trans. Shuckburgh) – ‘ὁ δρῶν τὰ τοῦ μέλλοντος οἴχεται φέρων. ἴσον φέρει νύξ, τοῖς δὲ τολμῶσιν πλέον. τόλμα τι, κινδύνευε, πράττ’, ἀποτύγγανε, ἐπίτυχε, πάντα μάλλον ἢ σαυτὸν προοῦ. νᾶφε καὶ μεμνας’ ἀπιστεῖν ἄρθρα ταῦτα τᾶν φρενῶν.’ The second line of this note was from Euripides, while the last line was taken from Epicharmus. These lines were composed in Homeric repetition, in that the first or second word on a line is a repetition of one that appeared near the end of the previous sentence (φέρων....φέρει, τολμῶσιν....τόλμα, ἀποτύγγανε....ἐπίτυχε): Eur. *Phoen.* 76; Polyb. 18.40.4 (Epicharmus reference); Walbank (1979a) 481-482.

historical characters. Additionally, Davidson claimed there were three levels in Polybius' narrative, the most significant of which was the second level, which he termed the 'signifying action.'<sup>47</sup> At this level, actions described by Polybius were significant for what the audience perceived about a character within the narrative. This character was the example to be given to the audience - the character who had an invisible quality that made them superior to others. Polybius' didactic aim was established through his portrayal of characters that personified what he considered to be admirable aristocratic behaviour.

In the *Histories* Polybius' image was that of a teacher who provided instruction and examples on how a good soldier-politician would act, making the picture he built of the ideal statesmen especially significant. His didactic purpose, with both a pragmatic and moral approach, was aimed towards his audience of young aristocrats, both Greek and Roman. Assessment of individual character was expected by an ancient historian in order to create moral *exempla*, with Polybius creating his image of the ideal statesman through both positive and negative character constructions in the *Histories*.<sup>48</sup> He identified this as a significant aim in the writing of history, stating that the particular virtue of history was its 'praise and honourable mention of conduct noteworthy for its excellence.'<sup>49</sup> Polybius clearly saw character assessments in historical narrative as important because of the use they had to the reader:

It is indeed a strange thing that authors should narrate circumstantially the foundations of cities, telling us when, how, and by whom they were founded, and detailing the precise conditions and the difficulties of the undertaking, while they pass

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<sup>47</sup> Davidson (1991) 18-20.

<sup>48</sup> Fornara pointed out that although investigations of character were expected of ancient historians, Polybius was the first to suggest that *exempla* belonged in history to achieve a didactic purpose: (1983) 113. Polybius claimed it was proper for the historian to draw attention to the positive examples in his narrative in order to provide instruction for the reader, but there was no compulsion to do so for bad examples, in this case Agathocles of Egypt: 15.35-36. But Polybius did provide negative examples, although the most notable ones, Hannibal and Philip V, were portrayed as men who had both good and bad qualities (Hannibal), or had gone through a change of character (Philip V): 9.22-26; 11.19 (Hannibal); 4.77.1-4; 7.11; 10.26; 13.3 (Philip V). In opposition to this argument that character studies fulfilled a didactic aim for Polybius, Lehmann defended Polybius' accuracy in describing historical figures: (1967) 156-330.

<sup>49</sup> Polyb. 2.61.6-7: 'τὸν ἔπαινον καὶ τὴν ἐπ' ἀγαθῶ μνήμην τῶν ἀξιολόγων προαιρέσεων.'

over in silence the previous training and the objects of the men who directed the whole matter, though such information is more profitable. For inasmuch as it is more possible to emulate and to imitate living men than lifeless buildings, so much more important for the improvement of a reader is it to learn about the former.<sup>50</sup>

But as Polybius claimed in the *Histories*, the historian had to *understand* the individual he was discussing in order to make any character assessments of use to the reader.<sup>51</sup> He used the idealised *exempla* of his compatriots Aratus, Philopoemen, and Lycortas to illustrate his didactic lessons on ideal aristocratic behaviour, but he also used the idealisation of Scipio Africanus, Scipio Aemilianus, Hiero II of Syracuse, and particularly Philip II of Macedonia.<sup>52</sup> Through the portrayal of these individual leaders, Polybius built up an image of the ideal soldier-politician. Moreover, just as he created positive *exempla*, Polybius also created negative examples of how not to behave; as can be seen through the characterisation of Philip V of Macedonia and occasionally Hannibal, as well as through the group characterisation of the Aetolians.<sup>53</sup>

These negative lessons that Polybius included in his *Histories* were intended to inform the reader of the typical traits of a bad statesman. As Eckstein rightly pointed out, the crux of this bad behaviour for Polybius was an inability to control emotion. The negative examples of Philip V, Hannibal, and the Aetolians were shown at different times in the *Histories* to make important decisions based on emotional reactions, rather than the clear rationality that

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<sup>50</sup> Polyb. 10.21.3-5: 'καὶ γὰρ ἄτοπον τὰς μὲν τῶν πόλεων κτίσεις τοὺς συγγραφεῖας, καὶ πότε καὶ πῶς καὶ διὰ τίνων ἐκτίσθησαν, ἔτι δὲ τὰς διαθέσεις καὶ περιστάσεις μετ' ἀποδείξεως ἐξαγγέλλειν, τὰς δὲ τῶν τὰ ὅλα χειρισάντων ἀνδρῶν ἀγωγὰς καὶ ζήλους παρρασιωπᾶν, καὶ ταῦτα τῆς χρείας μεγάλην ἐχούσης τὴν διαφορὰν· ὅσῳ γὰρ ἂν τις καὶ ζηλώσῃ καὶ μιμήσασθαι δυναθῆῃ μᾶλλον τοὺς ἐμψυχούς ἀνδρας τῶν ἀψύχων κυτασκευασμάτων, τοσοῦτ' αὖ καὶ τὸν περὶ αὐτῶν λόγον διαφέρειν εἰκός <πρὸς> ἐπανόρθωσιν τῶν ἀκούοντων.'

Fornara argued that Polybius was criticising all previous historians here for being able to describe objects but not human behaviour, but Pomeroy disagrees, claiming instead that Polybius was criticising the genre of history that focused on foundations, instead of the founders: Fornara (1983) 114; Pomeroy (1991) 86 n. 3.

<sup>51</sup> Just as Polybius claimed with Scipio Africanus: 10.2.3-8.

<sup>52</sup> Eckstein (1989) 9.

<sup>53</sup> For Polybius' depiction of the Aetolian League see: 3.7.3; 4.15.9; 5.107.7; 18.53.7; 21.26.16. See also section 5.4 and chapter seven.

Polybius advocated.<sup>54</sup> In the *Histories*, Polybius showed a reluctance to do in depth character sketches of bad examples.<sup>55</sup> Pomeroy attributed this to Polybius' concern for propriety and his preoccupation that his subject reflect the dignity of history.<sup>56</sup> Polybius showed this concern in the *Histories*, seen for example in his refusal to include a description of the tragic actors at Lucius Anicius' performance of Greek artists after his victory over Genthius because he considered it inappropriate for his readers.<sup>57</sup> The purpose of history was education, so there was no need for any character assessments that undermined the seriousness of the genre.

However, the deaths of such negative characters did seem to offer lessons for Polybius' readers. According to Polybius, bad deeds often led to bad ends. However, as Pomeroy pointed out this did not necessarily imply some kind of divine fortune, nor were these lessons necessarily moral. Many of those figures who both led a bad life and met a bad death were guilty, according to Polybius, primarily because of their political misconduct, which was only enhanced by their immorality. For example, the fate of Achaeus, who was betrayed by those he trusted when he revolted against Antiochus the Great held two political lessons for Polybius' readers - it counselled against overconfidence in victory and also provided a warning to be wary of betrayal from those close to you.<sup>58</sup> *Tyche* certainly had a role in the fate of such men,

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<sup>54</sup> For example: Polyb. 6.9.11; 12.14.5; 23.11 (general); 5.10.3; 15.4.11 (controlling emotion); 3.3.3, 7.1-2, 9.6, 10.5, 13.1; 5.11.1; 11.7.2; 16.1.2-4 (policy based on emotion). As Eckstein pointed out, Rome should be seen as the exception to the rule since their power is unique according to Polybius, although he also praised those politicians who calmed the anger of Rome: Polyb. 21.31.6; 30.31.2; 38.4.7; Eckstein (1989) 7. In opposition, Champion argued that Polybius saw a degeneration in Roman (and Achaean) politics from book six onwards, and increasingly saw them with barbarian characteristics: (2004) 144-167.

<sup>55</sup> For example Agathocles of Egypt: Polyb. 15.35-36. It should be noted, however, that despite such claims, Polybius had already discussed the character of Agathocles in some detail: 15.25-34.6. See also Polybius' discussion on Heracleides: 13.4. Bollansée argued that Polybius 'had a few axes to grind' in his narrative of Agathocles' downfall, because he was the opposite of the author's ideal statesman: (2005) 250-253.

<sup>56</sup> Pomeroy (1991) 87-88.

<sup>57</sup> Polyb. 30.22; see also 15.35.7.

<sup>58</sup> Polyb. 8.21.10-11. Polybius also provided other examples in this lesson: 8.35-36. See also: Polyb. 4.87 (Apelles); 5.55.3-5, 56.1, 12-13 (Hermeias); 13.2 (Scopas); 15.26a (Deinon); 18.53-54.7 (Scopas the Aetolian); 18.54.8-11 (Dicaearchus the Aetolian); 33.5.2-4 (Archias); Pomeroy (1991) 89-91. There were also certain parallels in the way Polybius presented Achaeus' biographical details and Homer's description of Iphidamas: Polyb. 8.20.9-11; Hom. *Il.* 11.221-31; McGing (2010) 26-27.

but there is no sense here of the irrational.<sup>59</sup> As Pomeroy pointed out, these examples in the *Histories* that pose as warnings for the reader, would only be useful if such political missteps could be avoided.<sup>60</sup>

The most significant negative portrayal in the *Histories* was that of Philip V of Macedonia, who provided an example of a good character that became bad. From the first introduction to Philip in book four, Polybius foreshadowed his positive years with his impending corruption.<sup>61</sup> He portrayed Philip as a lesson to his readers, as his behaviour deteriorated through his destruction of Thermum and changed completely after his attack on Messene.<sup>62</sup> After which, Polybius stated:

as if he had had a taste of human blood and of the slaughter and betrayal of his allies, he did not change from a man into a wolf, as in the Arcadian tale cited by Plato, but he changed from a king into a cruel tyrant.<sup>63</sup>

The didactic aspect of Philip's story in the *Histories* was clear, with Polybius claiming:

For this seems to me a very striking example for such men of action as wish, in however small a measure, to correct their standard of conduct by the study of history. For both owing to the splendour of his position and the brilliancy of his genius the good and evil impulses of this prince were very conspicuous and very widely known throughout Greece; and so were the practical consequences of his good and evil impulses as compared with each other.<sup>64</sup>

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<sup>59</sup> For further discussion on *tyche* see section 4.5.

<sup>60</sup> Pomeroy (1991) 92.

<sup>61</sup> Polyb. 4.77.

<sup>62</sup> Polyb. 5.9-12; 7.11-14. The significance Polybius put on Messene may in part be due to the involvement of Aratus who Polybius claimed was a day late to stop Philip from his first cruel act that led him down the road to tyranny: Polyb. 7.13.5-7.

<sup>63</sup> Polyb. 7.13.7-8: 'καὶ καθάπερ ἂν ἐγγευσάμενος αἵματος ἀνθρωπέου καὶ τοῦ φονεῦν καὶ παρασπονδεῖν τοὺς συμμάχους, οὐ λύκος ἐξ ἀνθρώπου κατὰ τὸν Ἀρκαδικὸν μῦθον, ὡς φησὶν ὁ Πλάτων, ἀλλὰ τύραννος ἐκ βασιλέως ἀπέβη πικρός.'

<sup>64</sup> Polyb. 7.11.2-4: 'δοκεῖ γάρ μοι τοῖς καὶ κατὰ βραχὺ βουλομένοις τῶν πραγματικῶν ἀνδρῶν περιποιεῖσθαι τὴν ἐκ τῆς ἱστορίας διόρθωσιν ἐναργέστατον εἶναι τοῦτο παράδειγμα. καὶ γὰρ διὰ τὸ τῆς ἀρχῆς ἐπιφανὲς καὶ διὰ τὸ τῆς φύσεως λαμπρὸν ἐκφανεστάτας συμβαίνει

According to Polybius, Philip's character was essentially good, but he was corrupted as he grew older.<sup>65</sup> This fitted with Polybius' *anacyclosis* (ἀνακύκλωσις) and saw the deterioration from monarchy into tyranny, with Philip exhibiting many of the characteristic features of a bad king or a tyrant.<sup>66</sup> As Eckstein pointed out, Philip's fall from grace was characterised by his loss of self-control - for Polybius, 'irrationality, loss of self-control and bad policy-making' were intertwined.<sup>67</sup> The vilification of Philip V may be partially due to what Walbank referred to as Polybius' patterning. Philip V was certainly characterised as a typical bad king or tyrant, and as Walbank claimed, was assessed by Polybius 'in the light of the rôles they have been chosen to fill,' with Philip as the king that destroyed Macedonia.<sup>68</sup> By contrast, the positive depiction of Philip II can also be attributed to this patterning, as he was the king who began the golden age of the Macedonian monarchy.<sup>69</sup>

An important example of the bad statesmen in the *Histories* can be seen in the characterisation of Hannibal at New Carthage.<sup>70</sup> As Eckstein pointed out, Hannibal is shown to be driven by emotion in his interview with the Roman ambassadors at New Carthage on the eve of the Second Punic War. This for Polybius was the mark of a bad statesman.<sup>71</sup> He depicted Hannibal in this interview as driven by emotion, so much so that it drove him to misrepresent the accusations he levelled at the Romans:

Being wholly under the influence of unreasoning and violent anger, he did not allege the true reasons, but took refuge in

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καὶ γνωριμωτάτας γεγονέναι πᾶσι τοῖς Ἕλλησι τὰς εἰς ἑκάτερον τὸ μέρος ὁρμᾶς τοῦ βασιλέως τούτου, παραπλησίως δὲ καὶ τὰ συνεξακολουθήσαντα ταῖς ὁρμαῖς ἑκατέραις ἐκ παραθέσεως.' Walbank and Sacks interpreted this lesson as purely political, but Eckstein pointed out the moral significance of Polybius' criticism of Philip: Walbank (1967) 58; Sacks (1981) 135; Eckstein (1995a) 89-90.

<sup>65</sup> Polyb. 10.26.7-9.

<sup>66</sup> *Anacyclosis* was Polybius' term for his cycle of constitutions: Polyb. 6.9.10; see also Walbank (1957) 643-648. For example: Polyb. 3.81.5-6 (drunkenness); 10.26.1-7 (sexual excess); 7.12; 13.3.1-2; 15.20.1-7, 21, 24.1 (treachery); 5.9, 11.4-5, 7; 7.13.3; 16.1.2-7 (religious crimes); 7.11.13, 13.3; 15.22-23 (cruelty).

<sup>67</sup> Polyb. 7.13.3; 15.20; 16.1.2, 10.1; Eckstein (1989) 12.

<sup>68</sup> Walbank (1994) 38-40, 42.

<sup>69</sup> Refer to the predictions of Demetrius of Phalerum: Polyb. 29.21.5-6.

<sup>70</sup> Hannibal is not depicted in this way consistently in the *Histories*, with Polybius admiring him for his rational decision making and good generalship, but also noting his cruelty and avarice: 3.80-85; 9.22-26; 11.19.

<sup>71</sup> Eckstein (1989) 2.

groundless pretexts, as men are wont to do who disregard duty because they are prepossessed by passion.<sup>72</sup>

Polybius blamed this behaviour on Hannibal's youth, his passion for war, hatred of Rome, and his exaggerated confidence from previous victories - qualities Polybius later recycled in the *Histories* to describe Philip V.<sup>73</sup> These qualities led to the formation of irrational policy and motivated Hannibal (and Philip also) to oppose the Romans, irrational impulses Polybius knew were ill-fated.<sup>74</sup> These irrational, emotion-driven actions were seen by Polybius as the behaviour of barbarians, women, the mob, mercenaries, as well as bad generals, bad monarchs, and bad statesmen.<sup>75</sup>

By contrast, *exempla* of good behaviour provided the reader with positive models of conduct. Again, political proficiency seemed to be Polybius' primary concern in assessing behaviour, as he built up the image of the ideal statesman in the *Histories*. Polybius provided both Roman and Greek *exempla*, reflecting the demographics of his audience. However, according to Pomeroy it seemed that Polybius showed more ease in composing character sketches of Greek political leaders rather than Romans. This was particularly evident in his assessments of Greek monarchic rulers, of whom there seemed to have been a standard set of criteria in Greek historiography.<sup>76</sup> This can be seen in Polybius' idealisation of Philip II of Macedonia, as well as Hiero II of Syracuse, Attalus I of Pergamum, Eumenes II of Pergamum, and Masinissa of

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<sup>72</sup> Polyb. 3.15.9: 'καθόλου δ' ἦν πλήρης ἀλογίας καὶ θυμοῦ βιαίου· διὸ καὶ ταῖς μὲν ἀληθιναῖς αἰτίαις οὐκ ἔχρητο, κατέφευγε δ' εἰς προφάσεις ἀλόγους· ἅπερ εἰώθασι ποιεῖν οἱ διὰ τὰς προεγκαθημένας αὐτοῖς ὁρμὰς ὀλιγωροῦντες τοῦ καθήκοντος.' According to Polybius, Hannibal's real motivation for war was the seizure of Sardinia and the extra indemnity added in 238: 3.15.10.

<sup>73</sup> Polyb. 5.102.1.

<sup>74</sup> Eckstein (1989) 11.

<sup>75</sup> For example: Polyb. 2.8.12, 17.4, 21.2, 30.4, 32.2, 35.3; 3.40.8, 78.5; 11.32.6; 12.4b.2-4c.1; 33.10.5 (barbarians); 15.30.1 (women); 6.44.9, 56.11, 57.8; 15.25.23-25, 33.10; 15.27.1; 30.7.5 (the mob); 1.67.5, 67.7, 68.4 (mercenaries); 1.52.9; 3.81.9, 82.2, 82.10; 5.48.3, 110.10 (bad generals); 5.10.3, 11.1; 7.13.3, 16.12; 16.28.8; 22.13.7 (bad monarchs); 3.19.9; 4.34.7, 67.1; 10.26.4; 11.7.3; 15.24.6; 22.16.3; 28.9.4; 29.9.12; 38.20.1 (bad statesmen).

<sup>76</sup> Polyb. 6.6.1-5; see also Weiwei (1963) 123-184; Pomeroy (1991) 99; Eckstein (1985) 266-267. For discussion of the general monarchic attributes praised by Greek historians see: Walbank (1984) 81-84.

Numidia.<sup>77</sup> All of these monarchs were praised in accordance with the Greek criteria of the good ruler, but more significantly all of them, apart from Philip II, based their foreign policies on their alliance with Rome.<sup>78</sup> Polybius also appeared to judge the success of a monarch by the lack of deceitfulness in their companions, shown specifically by a lack of opponents plotting against them.<sup>79</sup> This was a sign that a monarchy had developed into a tyranny, so part of Polybius' gauge of a successful monarch was the absence of sedition in their court.<sup>80</sup> In this way, these monarchic *exempla* gained Polybius' praise and provided instruction on how to interact with a dominant power, in opposition to those Hellenistic monarchs who received the author's condemnation and opposed the dominance of Rome.<sup>81</sup>

However, Polybius' didactic aim was not to educate young monarchs, but instead aristocratic statesmen. Polybius' familiarity due to the Hellenic tradition of monarchic ideals was clear. However, the significant *exempla* he provided for the reader were those of the ideal politician. Polybius illustrated this ideal through his characterisation of certain Greek and Roman leaders. As Eckstein asserted, for Polybius actions and policies that were decided upon emotion were the mark of a bad statesmen. As Von Fritz claimed, Polybius' ideal statesmen was adept at the game of power politics, gifted with diplomatic skill and an ability to manage human beings in general, without having to resort to intimidation and cruelty through brute force.<sup>82</sup> Polybius' ideal statesman used these means to do whatever was necessary to secure

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<sup>77</sup> Polyb. 5.10-12; 8.10-11; 18.14; 22.16 (Philip II); 7.8.1-8 (Hiero); 18.41 (Attalus I of Pergamum); 32.8 (Eumenes II of Pergamum); 36.15 (Masinissa of Numidia). For contrast, see Prusias of Bithynia: 36.15.

<sup>78</sup> Pomeroy casts doubt on Polybius' accuracy in portraying Hellenistic monarchs, claiming that he was more concerned with them fitting the ideal criteria of monarchic rulers, rather than the truth. Pomeroy asserted such character sketches were used more to 'settle old scores' than to teach. Eckstein admitted that the portrayal of Hiero may have been exaggerated, showing Polybius' ideological concern to create a picture of the ideal: Pomeroy (1991) 108; Eckstein (1985) 268. Interestingly, Harris postulated some kind of personal animosity for Polybius in addition to his didactic purpose for the negative portrayals of various enemies of Rome whose anger overcome their rational judgement: Hamilcar Barca, Philip V, and his son Perseus. However, there is little to support for this in the *Histories*: Harris (2001) 240.

<sup>79</sup> Polyb. 7.8.4 (Hiero); 36.16.6 (Masinissa).

<sup>80</sup> Polyb. 6.7.9. As could be seen with Philip V of Macedonia, Attalus I, and Ptolemy IV Philopater: 23.10.13; 11.13.7; 18.41.4; 5.34.4-10.

<sup>81</sup> For example, Hieronymus of Syracuse, Antiochus III of Syria, Philip V of Macedonia, Perseus of Macedonia and the pretender Andriscus.

<sup>82</sup> Von Fritz (1954) 11.



the best possible position for his people, regardless of the personal political consequences.<sup>83</sup> This meant fighting for freedom but also accepting a dominant power if necessary.<sup>84</sup> For Polybius, the practical politician accepted the situation and sought to achieve the best possible result. As Eckstein put it, Polybius' 'unifying theme was the responsible use of power.'<sup>85</sup>

In the *Histories*, Polybius' Achaean heroes came the closest to encapsulating this ideal statesman.<sup>86</sup> But there were also Roman leaders whom Polybius admired, noticeably for their self-restraint. For example, Scipio Africanus' refusal of the title 'king' in Spain during the Second Punic War and Aemilius Paullus' restraint after the defeat of Macedonia.<sup>87</sup> Polybius' discussion in book six of Roman funerary tradition also demonstrated those Roman virtues that Polybius admired in a statesman: honour, courage, and most significantly, patriotism.<sup>88</sup> However, his ideal Roman was Scipio Aemilianus, to whom Polybius himself taught the occupation of politics. Polybius' development of Aemilianus as an ideal political figure in the *Histories* was clear. After Aemilianus' statement of foreboding at the fall of Carthage, Polybius stated his admiration for the wise sentiments of the general:

It would be difficult to mention an utterance more statesmanlike and more profound. For at the moment of our greatest triumph and of disaster to our enemies to reflect on our own situation and on the possible reversal of circumstances, and generally to bear in mind at the season of success the mutability of Fortune,

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<sup>83</sup> However, Polybius was scathing of those who acted in a servile way towards the Romans, and advocated being firm against a dominant ally: 5.106.6-7; 24.8.10; 30.18; 32.4.3-5.2 (servile); 24.82-6, 10.11 (firm).

<sup>84</sup> This was a significant political lesson for Polybius, as can be seen by his praise of Aratus and criticism of Demosthenes: 2.50-51; 18.14. Perhaps this political ideal was unique to Polybius, since Aratus certainly received criticism for his actions: Plut. *Arat.* 38.3-8; *Cleom.* 15-16.

<sup>85</sup> Eckstein (1989) 14.

<sup>86</sup> For discussion of Polybius' use of Achaean *exempla* see section 3.1.

<sup>87</sup> Polyb. 10.40.2-10; 31.22.

<sup>88</sup> Polyb. 6.53-54. Accompanied by the extraordinary *exemplum* of Horatius Cocles: 6.55.

is like a great and perfect man, a man in short worthy to be remembered.<sup>89</sup>

Polybius' praise of Aemilianus also added to the image he projected of himself as a teacher in the *Histories*.<sup>90</sup> Polybius' depiction of Aemilianus as the ideal statesman is a type of résumé for Polybius - he taught the ideal statesman, so the lessons he gave the reader in the *Histories* should not be ignored.

Polybius' use of *exempla* in the *Histories* reinforce his didactic purpose, as well as his consciously-constructed persona as a teacher and historian in the narrative. These aspects were priorities for Polybius, which in turn must lead the reader to question Polybius' concern to be acutely accurate in his historical narrative.

## 2) The structure of the *Histories*

The structure of the *Histories* was a direct reflection of Polybius' aims and audience. The precise structural organisation of the *Histories* betrays a need for order and clarity, adding to the image of Polybius as a meticulous and conscious author who did not do things by accident. According to Walbank, Polybius superimposed on his narrative a structural approach of historical patterning and his *anacyclosis* of constitutions.<sup>91</sup> This highlighted the calculation with which Polybius approached the task of writing history. In particular, Polybius' digressions were the vehicle through which he presented many of his lessons to the audience. This added significantly to the construction of his self-image in the *Histories*, showing Polybius' concern to be perceived in this way; a preoccupation which needs to be taken into account when assessing his objectivity.

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<sup>89</sup> Polyb. 38.21.1-3: 'ταύτης δὲ <δύναμιν> πραγματικωτέραν καὶ νουνεχεστέραν οὐ ῥάδιον εἶπειν· τὸ γὰρ <ἐν> τοῖς μεγίστοις κατορθώμασι καὶ ταῖς τῶν ἐχθρῶν συμφοραῖς ἔννοιαν λαμβάνειν τῶν οἰκείων πραγμάτων καὶ τῆς ἐναντίας περιστάσεως καὶ καθόλου πρόχειρον ἔχειν ἐν ταῖς ἐπιτυχίαις τὴν τῆς τύχης ἐτισφάλειαν ἀνδρός ἐστὶ μεγάλου καὶ τελείου καὶ συλλήβδην ἀξίου μνήμης.'

<sup>90</sup> This is further addressed in section 3.3 and 3.4.

<sup>91</sup> Walbank (1994) 29-31.

The conscious precision with which Polybius approached the *Histories* can be clearly seen in his structure. Polybius' *Histories* were structured on both chronological and geographical lines, determined by both the Olympiad cycle of four yearly blocks and Polybius' own geographical pattern.<sup>92</sup> Timaeus set the historical precedent for structuring histories chronologically according to the four-year Olympic Games cycle, with Polybius beginning his history in the 140<sup>th</sup> Olympiad or the years 220-116.<sup>93</sup> He usually wrote two books per Olympiad, indicating that each book would contain all of the events in a two-year period.<sup>94</sup> However, for clarity Polybius did not divide his Olympiads by the time of year with which the Olympic Games were held, but instead manipulated the standard Olympiad to continue the narrative to the end of the year, usually concluding with the close of the campaigning season and the beginning of winter.<sup>95</sup> So Polybius apparently finished his books where he thought most logical, and was not restricted by this Olympiad structure.

One of Polybius' primary purposes in his approach to structure was to provide a universal history. This concern was the reason Polybius chose to structure the *Histories* based on a geographical pattern, with his historical structure following a repeated pattern throughout: covering Italy, Sicily, Spain, Africa, Greece and Macedonia, Asia and Egypt in sequence. This structure was fundamentally formed through Polybius' belief that universal history was superior to all others, placing the emphasis on geographical considerations

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<sup>92</sup> Since the focus of this work is Polybius' authorial image, comments in this section are restricted to those structural issues that influenced the presentation of this image in the *Histories*, for example Polybius' decision to include the years 167-146. For a complete treatment of Polybius' structure see: Walbank (1972) 97-126.

<sup>93</sup> Polyb. 1.1; 12.11.1; see also Walbank (1972) 100-101, 108-110; McGing (2010) 19. Polybius treated the first Olympiad (220-216) slightly differently by chronologically covering the separate campaigns and history of various cities and countries, since it was not until after the conference at Naupactus in 217 that all the different histories flowed into one universal history: Polyb. 4.28.2-6; 5.105.4-10; see also Walbank (1972) 100, 103, 105-108; Errington (1967) 100-102; McGing (2010) 19.

<sup>94</sup> Polyb. 9.1.1; 14.1a.5. Polybius called this his 'uniform method of composition' (τὸ μονοειδὲς τῆς συντάξεως) and was aware that it was an unadorned style that may only have appealed to the few. He was also aware that his focus on political history would not appeal to a general readership (9.1.2-6), although Walbank pointed out that in this instance the use of φιλήκοος was derogatory towards the casual reader interested more in stories than politics: Walbank (1967) 116.

<sup>95</sup> Ziegler (1952) 1565; De Sanctis (1907-1923) 219-223; Walbank (1957) 35-37; (1972) 101-102; see also the discussion in Pédech (1964) 449-450.

from the beginning.<sup>96</sup> Polybius consciously echoed his geographical structure to reflect a type of journey around the Mediterranean. It was described this way by Jacob, who portrayed Polybius' aim 'to reveal the connections between what appear to be separate events and the consequences of those linkages.'<sup>97</sup> This geographical pattern did provide some potential for confusion in the *Histories*, since events could not be divided as neatly as this system required.<sup>98</sup> However, Polybius was aware of this and often mentioned points where the narratives overlapped, putting the onus on the reader to pull the threads of his narrative together.<sup>99</sup>

The geographical content in the *Histories* was significant as an expected part of historiography, which also added to the self-portrait Polybius created of himself as a good teacher and historian.<sup>100</sup> For Polybius, geography was an integral and incorporated part of his narrative, and not simply confined to his geographical book.<sup>101</sup> As Clarke has claimed, Polybius showed his belief in the interdependency of history and geography throughout his work, giving geography a central place in his historiographical conception.<sup>102</sup> Geography was central to both Polybius' concept of history and his execution of it, as seen by the structure of his narrative. For Polybius, geographical knowledge was part of his universal approach to history.<sup>103</sup> Knowledge of geography was also one of the three parts necessary for an

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<sup>96</sup> Polyb. 1.4; 7.7.8; 31.30.1.

<sup>97</sup> Jacob (2003) 192.

<sup>98</sup> Polybius also included what historians call synchronisms, where the narrative was halted at a particular point to inform the reader of what was happening at the same time elsewhere. They were intended to orientate the reader and allow him or her to follow the yearly narrative: Polyb. 4.27-8, 37, 66-7; 5.1, 29, 105, 108, 109; Walbank (1972) 5-6, 105, 106 n. 55; (1974b) 59-80; McGing (2010) 25-26.

<sup>99</sup> Polyb. 5.31.3-5; 14.12.1-6; 15.24a, 25.19; 28.16.9-11; 32.11.2-4; 38.5-6. See also: Walbank (1972) 111-114. Maas argued that 15.25.19 should be followed chronologically by 15.24a, an argument supported by Walbank: Maas (1949) 443-446; Walbank (1967) 480; Walbank (1972) 111 n. 75.

<sup>100</sup> There was a strong tradition in Greek historiography of geographical emphasis, for example in Herodotus and Poseidonius. See Walbank (1948) 155-157.

<sup>101</sup> Polybius perhaps got the idea for an independent book focused on geographical study from Ephorus: Strab. 8.1.

<sup>102</sup> Clarke (1999) 77-128.

<sup>103</sup> Clarke (1999) 114-128.

historian who wanted to write political/military history. Polybius' emphasis on this aspect of his work added to his qualifications as an historian.<sup>104</sup>

Polybius' self-constructed image as a teacher and historian and his awareness of his audience were reinforced through his geographical patterning. This served to provide change for the reader in order to maintain his or her interest. Polybius claimed that like Nature, the intellect required variety and change in order to maintain interest, thereby revealing how significant this idea was to his structural conception of the *Histories*.<sup>105</sup> This notion appeared to contribute to Polybius' decision to use geography to structure his historical content, since this provided continuous change, yet also offered consistency so a student of history could return easily to points in the previous narrative in order to fill the gaps. The digression, of which there was a long history in Greek literature, also had the same function.<sup>106</sup>

The digression for Polybius provided an opportunity to contribute to the image he built for himself in the *Histories*, emphasising his didactic purpose and qualities as a teacher. Polybius had a few standard types of digressions in his *Histories* that provided variety from the historical narrative and provided instruction for his readers - they were usually explanations of his own historical structure, instructions on the writing of history, character assessments or geographical descriptions.<sup>107</sup> McGing pointed out that these

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<sup>104</sup> Polyb. 12.25e.1. Walbank argued that Polybius' geographical investigations contributed nothing to geographical theory: (1948) 181-182.

<sup>105</sup> Polybius justified his variety of focus at 38.5-6. Appian also mentioned this type of historical approach in his introduction: App. *praef.* 12.

<sup>106</sup> This practice goes back to the histories of Herodotus and Thucydides: Walbank (1972) 46. Polybius' variety of topics geographically changed the traditional function of the digression in order to provide breaks in the narrative. So Polybius instead used them as opportunities to instruct his readers: Walbank (1972) 46.

<sup>107</sup> For example: explanations of his own historical structure: Polyb. 1.1-5.5, 1.13-15; 2.37; 3.1-5, 6-7, 31-32; 4.1-2; 5.31-33; 8.1-2; 11.1a.1-5; 14.1; instructions on the writing of history: 7.7-8; 8.9-11; 9.1-2; 11.19a; 29.12; 36.1, 12; 36.17; 38.5; criticism of other historians: 1.14-15; 3.26.3-4 (Fabius and Philinus); 2.56-63 (Phylarchus); 8.9-11 (Theopompos); 16.14-20 (Zeno and Antisthenes); character assessments: 4.77 (Philip V); 9.12-20 (on generalship); 9.22-26; 23.13 (Hannibal); 10.2-5 (Scipio Africanus); 10.26 (Philip V); 15.35 (Agathocles); 23.5 (Deinocrates of Messene); 23.12 (Philopoemen); 26.1 (Antiochus IV Epiphanes); 36.15 (Prusias II); 36.16 (Masinissa); geographical descriptions: 2.14-17; 3.36-9, 47-8, 57-59; 4.38-46; 5.21-22, 59; 7.6. There were also examples of digressions that discussed irregular topics the author saw as important and stemmed from the narrative: 4.31, 74; 5.9-12; 8.35-6; 18.13-15; 36.17; 38.1-4; as well as the digressory books – 6 (Roman constitution) 12 (Timaeus

digressions were essentially breaks for the reader since Polybius was aware of a person's inability to focus for long periods of time, while Walbank claimed they were intended to provide relaxation.<sup>108</sup> Although the digressions have a historically functional and stylistic purpose, they also reflected Polybius' historical biases through both topic and positioning.<sup>109</sup> The selection of the digressionary topics by Polybius reveal his preoccupation with providing lessons for the reader. However, scholars have tended to view these digressions in different ways; for example, McGing referred to Polybius' interruptions in the narrative as one of the most distinct and exceptional things about the *Histories*, whereas Sacks saw them as 'wearisome.'<sup>110</sup> Regardless, Polybius intended his digressionary lessons to be of use to the reader, emphasising his self-portrait as a teacher.

Polybius was careful to explain the historical structure of his *Histories*, which added to the image of Polybius as the 'objective' historian he projected to his readers since there were no surprises or uncertainties.<sup>111</sup> The original historical span of Polybius' work ran for fifty-three years; from the initiation of the Second Punic War (taken from 219) to the fall of the Macedonian empire and subsequent dominance of the Romans after 168. The first two books of the *Histories* provided background information for Polybius' Greek readers, and were referred to by Polybius as the προκατασκευή.<sup>112</sup> The significance of book three as the beginning of what Polybius considered the main part of his

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and the writing of history) and the geographical book 34 (lost). Walbank does not strictly consider Polybius' character sketches as digressions, but McGing referred to them as 'narrative pauses': Walbank (1972) 47; McGing (2010) 26-38.

<sup>108</sup> Polyb. 38.5-6; McGing (2010) 11; Walbank (1972) 110-11.

<sup>109</sup> For example, Polybius' digression on the difference between a cause and a beginning at the start of book three: 3.6-7. The most appropriate examples would be the digressionary books (6,12,34), in particular book six directly following the Romans' biggest disaster in the Second Punic War, their defeat at Cannae in 216. Polybius' conscious placing of this book reflected his historical structure because of its position and topic. He made this clear when he stated at the beginning of book six: 'this being my settled purpose, I could see no more fitting period than the present for making a pause, and examining the truth of the remark about to be made on this constitution (trans. Shuckburgh)' - 'κεκριμένου δὲ τούτου καιρὸν οὐχ ἑώρων ἐπιτηδειότερον εἰς ἐπίστασιν καὶ δοκιμασίαν τῶν λέγεσθαι μελλόντων ὑπὲρ τῆς πολιτείας τοῦ νῦν ἐνεστῶτος': Polyb. 6.1.4-5.

<sup>110</sup> McGing (2010) 11; Sacks (1981) 8.

<sup>111</sup> Polyb. 3.1-5.

<sup>112</sup> Polyb. 1.3.7. The first two books gave a brief history of the First Punic War (264-241), the Mercenary War in Africa, and the Romans' seizure of Sardinia and Corsica, as well as the introduction to the Achaean League and Macedonian Kingdom.

work was made clear repeatedly in the *Histories*.<sup>113</sup> But when describing his work as a whole, Polybius seemed to include the first two books, so they cannot be considered completely separate.<sup>114</sup> Indeed, as Sacks has argued, there were some sections in the first two books that displayed Polybius' pragmatic and apodeictic approach to history, so they were not a completely different style of narrative.<sup>115</sup>

Polybius began his *Histories* with this structure in mind, although he was motivated to change it to include the events of 146.<sup>116</sup> An alteration from his stated purpose became necessary once Polybius had decided to extend his work, since he could no longer claim to be investigating how the Romans came to power after he considered their power to be absolute.<sup>117</sup> This shift was explained by Polybius in the *Histories*:

But since judgments regarding either the conquerors or the conquered based purely on performance are by no means final – what is thought to be the greatest success having brought the greatest calamities on many, if they do not make proper use of it, and the most dreadful catastrophes often turning out to the advantage of those who support them bravely – I must append to the history of the above period an account of the subsequent policy of the conquerors and their method of universal rule, as well as of the various opinions and appreciations of their rulers entertained by the subjects, and finally I must describe what were the prevailing and dominant tendencies and ambitions of the various peoples in their private and public life.<sup>118</sup>

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<sup>113</sup> Polyb. 1.3.10; 2.37.3; 3.1.3.

<sup>114</sup> Polyb. 1.5.3, 12.6; 2.71.7; 3.3.1; 11.1a.5. Only at 3.1.6 was this different: Sacks (1981) 176-177, 177 n. 11.

<sup>115</sup> Sacks (1981) 176-177. Walbank argued the first two books were cursory and distinct in narrative approach from the rest of the *Histories*: (1972) 57.

<sup>116</sup> Walbank pointed to the end date of this extension as proof of Polybius' decision made after this point, however this is speculation. It is possible that Polybius conceptualised a possible extension before this date, but had not fixed on it precisely. See section 3.4 for discussion on the only evidence that Polybius began the extended section of the *Histories* prior to 146: Polyb. 31.12.12; Walbank (1972) 17.

<sup>117</sup> Polyb. 3.4.2-4.

<sup>118</sup> Polyb. 3.4.4-7: 'ἐπεὶ δ' οὐκ αὐτοτελείς εἰσιν οὔτε περὶ τῶν κρατησάντων <οὔτε περὶ τῶν> ἐλαττωθέντων αἱ ψιλῶς ἐξ αὐτῶν τῶν ἀγωνισμάτων διαλήψεις, διὰ τὸ πολλοῖς μὲν τὰ

This new focus necessitated the addition of another ten books to the original thirty-book plan of the *Histories*, taking the overall span of Polybius' work to forty books. The potential biases in the last ten books of the *Histories* were increased due to Polybius himself featuring in the narrative. On top of this, the structural addition and new focus added another preoccupation for the author, although it is uncertain whether Polybius answered the questions he was seeking to explore in the last ten books.<sup>119</sup> In this way, Polybius' structural concerns in the *Histories* influenced the presentation of his image as a teacher and historian, particularly through the utilisation of his digressions as a didactic tool.

### 3) Polybius' intended audience

Polybius' readers were a significant factor in his composition of the *Histories*, with the creation of Polybius' image as a teacher and historian constructed in direct relation to his anticipated audience. However, Polybius not only created his own image in the *Histories*, he also created an image of his ideal audience.<sup>120</sup> Polybius anticipated the kinds of readers he wanted to have for his *Histories*, and more significantly for his historical and political lessons, catering his own persona and the narrative accordingly. Polybius anticipated two major types of readers in the histories - young aristocratic student soldier-politicians, both Greek and Roman, and future readers.<sup>121</sup>

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μέγιστα δοκοῦντ' εἶναι τῶν κατορθωμάτων, ὅταν μὴ δεόντως αὐτοῖς χρήσωνται, τὰς μέγιστας ἐπενηνοχένας συμφοράς, οὐκ ὀλίγοις δὲ τὰς ἐκπληκτικωτάτας περιπετείας, ὅταν εὐγενῶς αὐτὰς ἀναδέξωνται, πολλάκις εἰς τὴν τοῦ συμφέροντος περιπεπτωκένας μερίδα, προσθετέον ἂν εἴη ταῖς προειρημέναις πράξεσι τὴν τε τῶν κρατούντων αἵρεσιν, ποία τις ἦν μετὰ ταῦτα καὶ πῶς προεστάτει τῶν ὄλων, τὰς τε τῶν ἄλλων ἀποδοχὰς καὶ διαλήψεις, πόσαι καὶ τίνες ὑπῆρχον περὶ τῶν ἡγουμένων, πρὸς δὲ τούτοις τὰς ὁμὰς καὶ τοὺς ζήλους ἐξηγητέον, τίνες παρ' ἐκάστοις ἐπεκράτουν καὶ κατίσχυον περὶ τε τοὺς κατ' ἰδίαν βίους καὶ τὰς κοινὰς πολιτείας.'

<sup>119</sup> This question is looked at in more detail in section 5.3.

<sup>120</sup> Davidson claimed Polybius also provided the reader with an audience to model themselves on: Polyb. 1.57.3; Davidson (1991) 14.

<sup>121</sup> It can be assumed that only educated aristocrats were anticipated readers. Polybius' claims of the usefulness of history may indicate a slightly wider readership, but there is no direct proof of this: for example: Polyb. 9.2.5-6; see also McGing (2010) 67.



It is often argued that Polybius' primary audience were Greek soldier-politicians, due to his historical purpose in the *Histories* to trace the rise of Rome in just fifty-three years. The prevalence of his Greek audience can also be seen through the presence and content of the first two books of his work, which he claimed to be writing in order to educate the Greeks on the history of both the Romans and the Carthaginians.<sup>122</sup> He stated:

Now were we Greeks well acquainted with the two states which disputed the empire of the world, it would not perhaps have been necessary for me to deal at all with their previous history, or to narrate what purpose guided them, and on what sources of strength they relied, in entering upon such a vast undertaking.<sup>123</sup>

This was a clear example of the influence of Polybius' anticipated audience on his conception of the *Histories*. There were also other indications that pointed to Polybius' Greek audience, ranging from small distinctions that he could not expect a Greek audience to know; such as the difference between a dictator and the annual consuls, or the use of the *toga candida* at elections; to large explanations of Roman life, for example, the descriptions in book six of the Roman constitution or the formation of a Roman military camp.<sup>124</sup>

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<sup>122</sup> A large section of book two was dedicated to recounting Greek events, in particular the history of the Achaean League. This did not negate the possibility that the Greeks were Polybius' primary audience, since he was writing a universal history: Polyb. 2.37-70; see also McGing (2010) 67. Interestingly, Golan argues that within the *Histories* Polybius developed a second layer method in his narrative in order to communicate to his Achaean (Greek) readers his real opinions, although this section argues in comparison that he conceived of an audience of soldier-politicians regardless of ethnicity: Golan (1995) *passim*.

<sup>123</sup> Polyb. 1.3.7: 'Εἰ μὲν οὖν ἡμῖν (us Greeks) ἦν συνήθη καὶ γνώριμα τὰ πολιτεύματα τὰ περὶ τῆς τῶν ὅλων ἀρχῆς ἀμφισβητήσαντα, ἴσως οὐδὲν ἂν ἡμᾶς ἔδει περὶ τῶν πρὸ τοῦ γράφειν, ἀπὸ ποίας προθέσεως ἢ δυνάμεως ὀρνηθέντες ἐνεχείρησαν τοῖς τοιοῦτοις καὶ τηλικούτοις ἔργοις': Walbank (1957) 44.

<sup>124</sup> Polyb. 3.87.7 (difference between dictator and consuls); 10.4.9 (the use of the *toga candida* at elections); 6.11-18 (Roman constitution), 27-32 (formation of a Roman camp). Book six itself was a testament to Polybius' Greek audience, although he did apologise to his Roman readers for omitting details they would be familiar with: 6.11.3-8. As Champion argued, book six held appeal for both audiences and showed Polybius' consciousness of the duality of his readership. For example, a Roman audience would be able to read about the Roman constitution within the framework of Greek political terminology, perhaps reflecting its superiority, while also warning them of the potential for degeneration. For his Greek audience, book six provided a didactic model of a successful mixed constitution for their admiration, while also showing the potential for deterioration for those Greeks unhappy with Roman domination: Champion (2004) 96-98. For more examples of references to Greek internal affairs or what Walbank deems 'his asides' see Walbank (1972) 4-5 n. 19.

Alternatively, it could also be argued that Polybius' anticipated readers were the aristocrats of Rome.<sup>125</sup> A reference to his Roman audience in book thirty-one seems to point to this conclusion. Polybius appealed to his Roman audience as proof of the accuracy of his claim that Aemilius Paullus died a poor man, despite ample opportunity for riches:

If this appears incredible to anyone, I beg him to consider that the present writer is perfectly aware that this work will be perused by Romans above all people, containing as it does an account of their most splendid achievements, and that it is impossible either that they should be ignorant of the facts or disposed to pardon any departure from truth.<sup>126</sup>

Walbank claimed this was primarily a reference to the Greeks and the Romans were only mentioned to bear witness to his accuracy. Although there were a number of acknowledgements of Polybius' Roman audience, they were far outweighed by his attention to his fellow Greek readers.<sup>127</sup>

However, the nationality of the reader seemed far less important than the type of reader for Polybius. The *Histories* prove that Polybius anticipated both Greek and Roman readers, so there is little reason to believe he preferred one over the other. There were just as many references simply to his 'reader' in the *Histories* without any qualification of race. It was more likely that Polybius distinguished between the type of reader, as he used various terms to refer to his audience: politician (πραγματικοί), student (φιλομαθοῦντες), and reader (φιλήκοος).<sup>128</sup> Walbank argued Polybius

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<sup>125</sup> By this time the Greek language was so prevalent in Rome, that Polybius could have expected his anticipated audience to be able to read his *Histories* in Greek: Gruen (1984) 250-260.

<sup>126</sup> Polyb. 31.22.8: 'εἰ δ' ἀπίστω τὸ λεγόμενον εἰκέναι δόξει τισίν, ἐκείνο δεῖ λαμβάνειν ἐν νοῶ, διότι σαφῶς ὁ γράφων ἤδει μάλιστα Ῥωμαίους ἀναληψομένους εἰς τὰς χεῖρας τὰ βιβλία ταῦτα διὰ τὸ τὰς ἐπιφανεστάτας καὶ τὰς πλείστας αὐτῶν πράξεις ἐν τούτοις περιέχεσθαι.'

<sup>127</sup> References to Roman readers: Polyb. 3.21.9; 6.11.3; 31.22.8; Walbank (1972) 3-4. References to Greek Readers: 1.3.3-8; 2.35.9; 3.59.8, 72.12, 87.7, 107.10f; 6.3.1-4; 10.4.9, 16-17; 14.3.6; 21.2.2, 13.11; Walbank (1972) 4-5 n. 19. In particular Walbank pointed out the parallel between Polybius' first four synchronisms at the beginning of his third book, which coincide with the yearly rhythm of Achaean and Aetolian generals in spring and autumn; Walbank (1972) 5-6.

<sup>128</sup> For example: (πραγματικοί); Polyb. 1.35.5; 4.1.4; 6.1.5; 7.11.2 (πραγματικοί); 1.4.8, 65.9; 3.118.12; 5.31.3; 6.1.5; 7.7.8; 16.14.4; 38.6.6 (φιλομαθοῦντες); 4.40.1; 7.7.8; 9.1.4; 31.23.1; 38.6.6 (φιλήκοος). Polybius also used other words, for example: ἀκροατής as reader: 9.1.2,

recognised two types of readers, claiming that Polybius intended specific lessons for his students of politics and other lessons, commonly moral, for his wider audience.<sup>129</sup> Although it was not always clear which type of reader Polybius was intending his didactic lessons for, the purpose of his didactic digressions were always in order to benefit the reader, whether it be the general public or the future statesmen of Greece and Rome.<sup>130</sup> Polybius claimed the benefit of history was twofold, suggesting that for the student the benefit was use and for the reader the benefit was pleasure.<sup>131</sup>

Polybius also categorised different types of readers and the kinds of histories they were attracted to in the narrative, explicitly stating which kind of reader he anticipated for the *Histories*:

The genealogical side appeals to those who are fond of a story, and the account of colonies, the foundation of cities, and their ties of kindred, such as we find, for instance, in Ephorus, attracts the curious and lovers of recondite lore, while the student of politics is interested in the doings of nations, cities, and monarchs. As I have confined my attention strictly to these last matters and as my whole work treats of nothing else, it is, as I say, adapted only to one sort of reader, and its perusal will have no attractions for the larger number.<sup>132</sup>

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1.5; 12.25k.9; οἷς καθήκει... τὸ σαφῶς εἰδέναι as statesman: 3.21.9; and ὁ βουλόμενος καταμαθεῖν as one who loves to learn: 10.47.4. Walbank argued that Polybius used πολιτευόμενοι, πρακτικοί for statesman: (1957) 337; Marincola (2001) 116. The use of ἀκροατής indicated Polybius' conception of reading, which was also displayed at 12.27.3. For discussion of ancient concepts of reading refer to Johnson, who argued that ancient literacy must be analysed within its specific cultural contexts: (2000) 593-627.

<sup>129</sup> Walbank (1957) 7.

<sup>130</sup> Polybius emphasised the benefit (ὠφέλεια) and use (τὸ χρήσιμος) of history for his readers throughout the *Histories*: 1.4.11; 2.56.10; 3.1.5; 7.7.7; 12.25f.2; 30.6.2 (τὸ χρήσιμος); 1.4.4, 57.3; 2.56.12; 3.4.8, 31.13, 57.9; 6.2.3; 9.2.5-6, 47.12-13; 11.19a; 12.25b, 25g, 25i.6; 15.36; 31.30.1; 37.5.3; 39.8.7 (ὠφέλεια); Sacks (1981) 122 n. 1.

<sup>131</sup> Polyb. 7.7.8: 'It would have given greater pleasure to readers and more instruction to students' – 'καὶ γὰρ τοῖς φιληκόοις ἡδίων οὗτος καὶ τοῖς φιλομαθοῦσι.'

<sup>132</sup> Polyb. 9.1.4-6, cf. 2.6-7: 'τὸν μὲν γὰρ φιλήκοον ὁ γενεαλογικὸς τρόπος ἐπισπάται, τὸν δὲ πολυπράγμονα καὶ περιττὸν ὁ περὶ τὰς ἀποικίας καὶ κτίσεις καὶ συγγενείας, καθά που καὶ παρ' Ἐφόρω λέγεται, τὸν δὲ πολιτικὸν ὁ περὶ τὰς πράξεις τῶν ἔθνων καὶ πόλεων καὶ δυναστῶν. ἐφ' ὃν ἡμεῖς ψιλῶς κατηντηκότες καὶ περὶ τοῦτον πεποιημένοι τὴν ὅλην τάξιν, πρὸς ἓν μὲν τι γένος, ὡς προεῖπον, οἰκείως ἡρμόσαμεθα, τῷ δὲ πλείονι μέρει τῶν ἀκροατῶν ἀψυχαγωγῆτον παρεσκευάκαμεν τὴν ἀνάγνωσιν.'

Therefore, Polybius' intended audience were the students of politics, the aristocratic soldier-politicians of both Greece and Rome. This was further proven by the prevalence of *exempla* of behaviour Polybius provided for his readers. Polybius claimed that knowledge of history provided a model of conduct for every eventuality:

Those who study history are, we may almost say, provided with a method for dealing with any contingency that may arise.<sup>133</sup>

By taking this stance in the *Histories*, Polybius created a relationship with the audience by placing himself in the position of teacher, with the reader in the corresponding position of student. Polybius' students held a place of honour for the author, so consequently he had an expectation of their ability. For example, Polybius' esteem for his readers can be seen in his refusal to describe the tragic actors in the celebration games of Lucius Anicius, stating 'if I tried to describe them some people would think I was making fun of my readers.'<sup>134</sup> By encouraging this picture of himself as an educator, Polybius created an image of himself as the ideal teacher in the *Histories*, reinforced by his direct relationship with the reader.

It is also worth considering the argument from Von Scala and Pédech that Polybius' decision to extend his *Histories* indicated a change in his primary audience. They claimed that Polybius' intended audience changed with this adjustment of attitude towards the Romans and the Greeks.<sup>135</sup> This argument centred on the opinion that Polybius became increasingly favourable towards the Romans in the later part of his narrative. Von Scala claimed that the Greeks were alienated by the negativity towards them evident in the *Histories* after 167, concluding then that this section of the narrative was written primarily in consideration of his Roman audience, although there is little specific evidence in the *Histories* to warrant this conclusion. Walbank disagreed with this by using Pédech's claim that

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<sup>133</sup> Polyb. 9.2.5-6: 'τῶ τὰς ἐμπειρίας καὶ τέχνας ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον προκοπὴν εἰληφέναι καθ' ἡμᾶς ὥστε πᾶν τὸ παραπίπτον ἐκ τῶν καιρῶν ὡς ἂν εἰ μεθοδικῶς δύνασθαι χειρίζειν τοὺς φιλομαθοῦντας.'

<sup>134</sup> Polyb. 30.22.12: 'ὅτι ἂν ἐπιβάλωμαι λέγειν, δόξω τισὶ διαχλευάζειν.'

<sup>135</sup> Von Scala depicted Polybius as a dark, stern commentator on human affairs: Von Scala (1890) 62, 290; Pédech (1964) 566.

Polybius' inclusion of the geographical description of Sicily in book one was written post 152.<sup>136</sup> He argued that Polybius' primary audience was still the Greeks in 152, despite his harsh commentary at the end of the *Histories* on their leadership.<sup>137</sup> However, if there was a change in the projected audience in the last ten books of the *Histories*, it was neither the Romans nor the Greeks, but instead a greater emphasis on Polybius' future readers. Polybius claimed that in the last ten books there were two types of people who could pass judgment on the Romans - contemporaries (οὐσίῳ) who would decide whether Roman rule was satisfactory, and future generations (ἐπιγενομένοις) who would decide whether the Roman government was worthy of honour or censure. This clearly indicated who Polybius anticipated his readers to be in the last ten books of his *Histories*.<sup>138</sup>

Modern historians have tended to focus on Polybius' contemporary audience rather than those who would read the *Histories* in posterity, but there was clear awareness in the narrative that his work would be read by future generations. Polybius' self-constructed image of the teacher implied that the didactic aspects of the *Histories* would have future relevance, but there also seemed to be the assumption that the *Histories* would continue to be relevant for future political leaders.<sup>139</sup> The concept of use was still primary for Polybius' audience of future generations, and as Walbank claimed, such use did not necessarily exclude the practical.<sup>140</sup> So Polybius' future audience not only derived the usual benefits from the study of history, but it was also anticipated by the author that his didactic lessons could still give them practical advice. Polybius' anticipated audience influenced the construction of his image as a teacher and historian in the *Histories*, with his own persona and didactic purpose designed to foster a connection between him as the teacher and the reader as the student, both present and future.

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<sup>136</sup> Pédech (1964) 565; Walbank (1972) 4 n. 18.

<sup>137</sup> Polybius' opinion of the Romans will be addressed in section 5.2 and 5.3.

<sup>138</sup> Polyb. 3.4.7.

<sup>139</sup> The didactic future use of the *Histories* was expected by Polybius. For example: 2.35.5-6; 2.117.5; 6.12.10; 8.23.10-11; 23.14.12; 30.6.3-5.

<sup>140</sup> Walbank (1972) 28-29.

#### 4) The use of polemic in the *Histories*

Polybius' polemic in the *Histories* directly contributed to the image he created in the narrative as a teacher and historian. The significance of polemic in contributing to the historical authority of the author was extremely important in the ancient world for those who were trying to distinguish themselves from other historians. So polemic was an established and common feature of historical narrative. An ancient historian used polemic to define his own character by negative comparison with the targets of his polemic, emphasising his own positive qualities that made him a more effective historian. Marincola expressed the mindset of the ancient historian well when he claimed that 'nearly every ancient historian seeks to portray himself as a lonely seeker of truth, as the only one who has somehow understood the historian's proper task.'<sup>141</sup> The nature of criticism can make polemic seem emotional, but for Polybius these were calculated attacks on other historians in order to advance his own image as a teacher and historian. Polemic then had a function in the *Histories* that detracted from a concern to be historically accurate; instead, the focus was on establishing historical credibility for his authorial persona.

In Lucian's treatise on historical writing he warned of the pitfalls of polemic:

Eulogy and censure will be careful and considered, free from slander, supported by evidence, cursory, and not inopportune, for those involved are not in court, and you will receive the same censure as Theopompus, who impeached nearly everybody in a quarrelsome spirit and made a business of it, to the extent that he was a prosecutor rather than a recorder of events.<sup>142</sup>

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<sup>141</sup> Marincola (1997) 217.

<sup>142</sup> Lucian, *Hist. Conscr.* 59 (Kilburn trans.): 'ἔπαινοι μὲν γὰρ ἢ ψόγοι πάνυ πεφεισμένοι καὶ περισκεμμένοι καὶ ἀσυκοφάνητοι καὶ μετὰ ἀποδείξεων καὶ ταχεῖς καὶ μὴ ἄκαιροι, ἐπεὶ ἔξω τοῦ δικαστηρίου ἐκεῖνοί εἰσι, καὶ τὴν αὐτὴν Θεοπόμπῳ αἰτίαν ἔξεις φιλαπεχθιμόνως κατηγοροῦντι τῶν πλείστων καὶ διατριβὴν ποιουμένῳ τὸ πρᾶγμα, ὡς κατηγορεῖν μᾶλλον ἢ ἱστορεῖν τὰ πεπραγμένα.'

This indicates that polemic was a common aspect of ancient historiography, and according to Lucian one that had the potential to be extreme. Due to the fragmentary nature of the early Greek historians, it is difficult to make any certain claims concerning the nature of polemic, and therefore Polybius' place within this tradition. There was some polemic evident in the histories of Herodotus and Thucydides, but not in the explicit and elaborate way expressed in Polybius' *Histories*.<sup>143</sup> These early writers showed a reluctance to name the objects of their polemic, although by the time of Polybius this no longer seemed to be a consideration.<sup>144</sup> The development and elaboration of polemical style, according to Marincola, can be traced to rhetorical training, where it was common to directly refute an opponent, and also to the use of imitation in historiography, where students were taught by critiquing previous historians.<sup>145</sup>

Polybius' polemic was different from his predecessors in that he criticised contemporary historians, and also dedicated an entire book in his *Histories* to criticising the historian Timaeus of Tauromenium (c.356 – 260).<sup>146</sup> The function of polemic as a method of self-definition by opposition was particularly significant in Polybius' creation of his image in the *Histories*. To praise yourself excessively in ancient historiography invited others to question your historical reliability, leaving polemic as a way to draw attention to your

<sup>143</sup> For example: Hdt. 2.2.5, 19-34, 42-5, 112-20; Thuc. 1.20.3, 21.2, 97.2.

<sup>144</sup> Later historical writers showed more willingness to name the objects of their criticism, with polemic becoming more intense and directed towards character: Ctesias of Cnidus claimed that both Hellanicus and Herodotus were guilty of fabrication, Ephorus criticised Hellanicus for his errors in attributing the achievements of Lycurgus to others, Agatharchides of Cnidus attacked Ephorus and Theopompus for their description of the Nile, while both these historians again were criticised by Duris of Samos for their methodology. Dionysius of Halicarnassus claimed that both Theopompus and Anaximenes used their prologues to critique those who had come before them, while Theopompus was criticised heavily by Lucian for going too far in his polemic: *FGrHist* 687a T 2 (Ctesias of Cnidus); *FGrHist* 70 F 118 (Ephorus); *FGrHist* 86 F 19 (Agatharchides of Cnidus); *FGrHist* 76 F 1 (Duris of Samos); Dion. Hal. *Ant. Rom.* 1.1.1; Lucian, *Hist. Conscr.* 59; Walbank (1962) 2-4; (2005) 4-5; Schepens (1990) 40-41 n. 3; Marincola (1997) 221.

<sup>145</sup> Marincola (1997) 219-221. For rhetoric: Arist. *Cael.* 294b 6-11; Cic. *Rhet. Hen.* 1.18. For imitation: Quint. *Inst.* 2.5.10-12; Lucian, *Hist. Conscr.* 7-32.

<sup>146</sup> Schepens (1990) 41; Marincola (1997) 223. Polybius also criticised other historians in his *Histories*, although the focus in this section will be Timaeus: Philinus of Agrigentum and Fabius Pictor: Polyb. 1.14-15; 3.8-9.5, 26.3-4; Phylarchus: 2.56-63; Chaereas and Sosylus: 3.20.5; Zeno and Antisthenes: 16.14ff; A. Postumius Albinus: 39.1; Ephorus: 6.45.1, 46.10; Xenophon: 6.45.1; Callisthenes: 6.45.1; 12.17.1-22.7; Theopompus: 8.9.1-11.8; 12.25f.6; 16.12.7.

own positive attributes through the criticism of other historians. Polybius was aware of the potential for criticism in his work, and appeared to pre-empt criticism at places in the *Histories*.<sup>147</sup> He claimed that the good critic was one who commented only on what was in the narrative, not what was absent, and also showed awareness of those who may be motivated to criticise others for personal advancement.<sup>148</sup> According to Polybius, criticism of other authors should be made for 'the general advantage,' not for personal considerations.<sup>149</sup> However, Polybius also recognised that Timaeus' polemic added credence to his claims of historical accuracy.<sup>150</sup> The function of polemic as a way to claim authority, according to Polybius, was a reason why ancient audiences accepted Timaeus' interpretations:

The reason of this is that, as throughout his whole work he is so lavish of fault-finding and abuse, they do not form their estimate of him from his own treatment of history and his own statements, but from the accusations he brings against others, for which kind of thing he seems to me to have possessed remarkable industry and a peculiar talent.<sup>151</sup>

Although this aspect of Timaeus' historiography is criticised by Polybius, this passage proves Polybius was aware of the function of polemic in establishing authority. So it was not the use of polemic to create an impression of reliability in itself that Polybius objected to, but that it was, in Timaeus' case, excessive and unsupported by correct historical methodology.

The relation of book twelve to the rest of the *Histories* is unfortunately lost to us. Its fragmentary nature and the loss of the introductory chapters of this book mean that Polybius' purpose in including a book primarily occupied with criticism of the historian Timaeus is unclear, which allows historians to

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<sup>147</sup> For discussion of Polybius' claims of impartiality see section 2.2.

<sup>148</sup> Polyb. 6.11.7-9; 16.20.6.

<sup>149</sup> Polyb. 16.20.6: 'τῆς κοινῆς ὠφελείας.' Polybius also conceded that it was easier to blame others than it was to recognise faults in yourself, suggesting that those who are the most willing to blame others were the biggest offenders: 12.25c.5.

<sup>150</sup> Polyb. 12.10.4, 25d.1-4; Marincola (1997) 223.

<sup>151</sup> Polyb. 12.25c.2-3: 'τούτου δ' ἐστὶν αἴτιον διότι πλεοναζούσης αὐτῷ κατὰ τὴν πραγματείαν τῆς κατὰ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιτιμήσεως καὶ λοιδορίας οὐκ ἐκ τῆς αὐτοῦ θεωρεῖται πραγματείας οὐδ' ἐκ τῶν ἰδίων ἀποφάσεων, ἀλλ' ἐκ τῆς τῶν πέλας κατηγορίας, πρὸς ὃ γένος καὶ πολυπραγμοσύνην δοκεῖ μοι καὶ φύσιν προσενέγκασθαι διαφέρουσαν.'



theorise on the purpose of book twelve. McGing argued that the primary purpose of book twelve was to form a resolute and prolonged attack on Timaeus, whom he saw as competition for the position of 'prime interpreter of Rome'.<sup>152</sup> Polybius was Timaeus' chronological heir and recognised his appeal for readers, so attacked his validity as an historian in order to ensure his position for posterity.<sup>153</sup> Schepens argued that the foundation of Polybius' polemic of other historians was their breach of his ideals of historical theory.<sup>154</sup> Polybius' attack on Timaeus in book twelve was based on Timaeus' methodological failure, and was accordingly due to defects in his character, as Schepens pointed out.<sup>155</sup>

This attack on Timaeus' character seemed to suggest a type of emotional involvement for Polybius in his criticism. Indeed, Walbank concluded that Polybius' tone in his critique of Timaeus' claims on the origins of Epizephyrian Locri suggested that he had 'intense personal antipathy' for the author.<sup>156</sup> He claimed that Polybius' motives were not those he gave in book twelve, but instead simple jealousy.<sup>157</sup> Sacks claimed the concentration of Polybius' criticisms in book twelve could perhaps be seen as a type of emotional tirade against Timaeus, but argued instead that Polybius was attempting to script a basic handbook on the writing of history in book twelve and was using Timaeus as a type of anti-example with all of the characteristics Polybius wanted to critique.<sup>158</sup> According to Sacks, the object of Polybius' criticism (Timaeus) was less significant than the lessons on

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<sup>152</sup> McGing (2010) 83-4. Walbank also supported this conclusion: (1972) 25.

<sup>153</sup> Despite the polemic in this book, Polybius admitted to being Timaeus' historical successor: 1.5.1; 39.8.

<sup>154</sup> Schepens (1990) 57.

<sup>155</sup> Schepens (1990) 60.

<sup>156</sup> Polyb. 12.5-11; Walbank (1962) 5-7.

<sup>157</sup> Walbank (1962) 10. He concluded Polybius was 'simply jealous of a western Greek who seemed to challenge his own position.' Pédech also attributed Polybius' polemic to jealousy, although he specifically claimed it developed after Polybius' trip to Alexandria when he realised Timaeus' geographical description of the West was preferred. However, Walbank disagreed that Polybius' jealousy was provoked by this trip: Pédech (1961) xxxi-xxxiii; Walbank (1962) 10 n. 27a.

<sup>158</sup> Sacks (1981) 21-22, 74, 78. For a detailed discussion on book twelve see Sacks (1981) 21-95 (66-78 focus solely on Polybius' motivation for writing book twelve). This basic handbook, according to Sacks, emphasised *ethos* over *techne*, so was not based on technical details but rather the 'mental commitment and special way of life required by the historian': 74. See also Isnardi for the association between *ethos* and *techne* in Polybius: (1955) 102-110.

methodology in book twelve, in fact any historian could have been selected, but there had been an established history of polemic against Timaeus.<sup>159</sup> Although there are foundations for all of these arguments in book twelve, its fragmentary nature makes it difficult to argue any of these conclusively.<sup>160</sup>

There is another argument that deserves greater attention, and that is that book twelve did not signify an emotional, jealousy driven attack on Timaeus, but instead represented Polybius' attempt to define his own historical methodology and authority by criticising another historian.<sup>161</sup> As Sacks suggested, the purpose of Polybius' polemic was to establish his own methodological ideas on historiography by criticising another historian. However, Sacks took this further by claiming that Polybius was attempting to create standardised guidelines for historical writing, producing a type of handbook of instruction. Even though Sacks was correct to emphasise calculation over emotion and see book twelve as focused specifically on Polybius' historical ideals, there is little to indicate he intended it as a type of handbook. Instead, Polybius' polemic in book twelve was a calculated attempt to establish his own historical authority by defining his own ideal historical method in opposition to that of Timaeus.

Polybius expended great effort in the *Histories* to establish his image as a teacher by promoting the benefits of his lessons, all of which might have been undermined if he appeared to allow emotion to rule his criticism of

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<sup>159</sup> For example: Joseph. *Ap.* 1.6; Sacks (1981) 70-74.

<sup>160</sup> The fragmentary nature of book twelve has invited many theories on its structure. Pédech was the first to argue that book twelve was at all structured, asserting there were three main sections: the first on the errors and fabrications made by Timaeus, the second on Timaeus' lack of military and political experience, and the third on the reasons for Timaeus' faults which ended in a description of the ideal historian. Sacks added to the scholarship of the structure of book twelve, arguing that there were two major structural divisions: the first on the problems of Timaeus' training and his lack of ἐμφασίς, a discussion that Polybius based on specific historical concepts; and the second on the lack of accuracy in Timaeus. Schepens presented an alternative argument, claiming that the structure of book twelve was fundamentally divided into two distinct points: criticism of Timaeus and criticism of his work: Pédech (1961) xxiii-xxvi; Sacks (1981) 21-66; Schepens (1990) 48, 52-56.

<sup>161</sup> Although there was a historical precedent of polemic against previous writers, it can be argued that Timaeus was the first historian to engage in this excessively, which may have been a motivating factor for Polybius: Polyb. 12.4a.2-6, 13.23-8, 23.8, 28.8-10; *FGrHist* 566 T I, cf. T 16; see also Walbank (1962) 3-4. Van der Stockt pointed out that the tradition of polemic against Timaeus was so prevalent with historians, that by the middle of the second century it was *en vogue* to attack Timaeus: (2005) 271.

Timaeus.<sup>162</sup> Rhetorical theory, though, allowed the speaker, in refutation, to heighten his own emotion in order to encourage the audience to mimic his outrage and trust his authority.<sup>163</sup> Aristotle explained this:

Appropriate style also makes the fact appear credible; for the mind of the hearer is imposed upon under the impression that the speaker is speaking the truth, because, in such circumstances, his feelings are the same, so that he thinks, even if it is not the case as the speaker puts it, that things are as he represents them; and the hearer always sympathises with one who speaks emotionally, even though he really says nothing.<sup>164</sup>

Therefore, the hostile tone of Polybius' polemic can be attributed, at least in part, to rhetorical technique and not necessarily direct emotion. However, Polybius did have to be conscientious that he did not get too excessive with his polemic against Timaeus, just as Timaeus himself did.<sup>165</sup> This aspect of Timaeus' history was emphasised by Polybius, as if, according to Marincola, he was justifying his own polemic by pointing out Timaeus' constant criticism of other historians.<sup>166</sup>

Polybius' calculated approach to chapter twelve is also shown by his admission that he planned in advance to restrict all of his criticism of Timaeus to one section.<sup>167</sup> There were numerous methodological lessons in this book - lessons intended to illustrate the correct historical methodology in opposition to the erroneous technique of Timaeus. It was as if Polybius was establishing *exempla* of the good and the bad historian for the reader, with Timaeus as the bad example and Polybius himself as the ideal. Polybius used *exempla* to establish good and bad behaviour in a number of ways, so there is no reason

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<sup>162</sup> See section 4.5 for discussion of the importance of rationality in Polybius' *Histories*.

<sup>163</sup> Marincola (1997) 221-222; (2001) 134.

<sup>164</sup> Arist. *Rh.* 3.7.4 (Freese trans.): 'πιθανοῖ δὲ τὸ πρᾶγμα καὶ ἡ οἰκεία λέξις: παραλογίζεται τε γὰρ ἡ ψυχὴ ὡς ἀληθῶς λέγοντος, ὅτι ἐπὶ τοῖς τοιούτοις οὕτως ἔχουσιν, ὥστ' οἴονται, εἰ καὶ μὴ οὕτως ἔχει ὡς λέγει ὁ λέγων, τὰ πρᾶγματα οὕτως ἔχειν, καὶ συνομοπαθεῖ ὁ ἀκούων ἀεὶ τῷ παθητικῶς λέγοντι, κἂν μὴθὲν λέγη.'

<sup>165</sup> For example: 12.4a, 8.1-4, 13.1-7, 23.1, 24.1-5. Polybius also claimed that those who found the most fault in others were the biggest wrongdoers: 12.25c.5.

<sup>166</sup> Marincola (1997) 232.

<sup>167</sup> Polyb. 12.11.6-7.

to believe he would not have applied this model when trying to teach the audience about correct historical methodology.<sup>168</sup> This was further reinforced by Polybius' claim that the ideal historian was a man of action, modelled after the Homeric man-of-action Odysseus. As McGing argues, Polybius was paralleling the actions of Odysseus to his own qualities, making himself the ideal historian.<sup>169</sup>

Within the fragments of book twelve, there appear to be various types of criticism against Timaeus: those that attack his character, his impartiality, his experience (and so qualifications for writing history), his method, and the effort he expended on his historical work.<sup>170</sup> These classifications are illuminating in what they tell us about Polybius' methodological idealisations of history writing, and show the reader the aspects of historiography that Polybius valued the most. Timaeus' character was criticised heavily by Polybius, who referred to him as 'childish and entirely deficient in judgement... (with an) utterly depraved mind... quarrelsome, untruthful and headstrong.'<sup>171</sup> Polybius' dislike of Timaeus and his faults was clear, although the points on which Polybius criticised Timaeus seem logically argued with evidence and intended to serve as lessons for the reader on historical writing - not the maddened tirade of a jealous man. Specific criticism of Timaeus on these points established Polybius' authority in historical writing, implying that those qualities Timaeus lacked were those ones that Polybius excelled at. This added to Polybius' self-constructed image in the *Histories* as the ideal historian, which was his primary concern in his use of polemic.

Polybius' portrayal of Timaeus' character was generated by his approach to historical writing. In book twelve of the *Histories*, Polybius accused Timaeus of many atrocities, notably of partiality and blatant lies.

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<sup>168</sup> For discussion of the significance of *exempla* in Polybius' *Histories* see section 3.1 and 4.1.

<sup>169</sup> McGing (2010) 14-15. Polybius' emulation of the Homeric hero Odysseus can be linked to the importance he placed on geographical knowledge, the man-of-action historian and the dangers he undertook to gain the knowledge necessary for writing history: Polyb. 3. 3-8. Refer to section 2.1 for further discussion on Polybius' parallel of himself with Odysseus.

<sup>170</sup> For discussion on Polybius' claims of impartiality see section 2.2.

<sup>171</sup> Polyb. 12.3.2: 'παιδαριώδη καὶ τελέως ἀσυλλόγιστον'; 12.23.2: 'καθόλου διέφθαρται τῆ ψυχῇ'; 12.25.6: 'φιλαπεχθῆς καὶ ψεύστης καὶ τολμηρός'

Polybius claimed that Timaeus made many claims of accuracy in his history, but that he was inaccurate with his accounts of Africa, Italy, Sardinia, and particularly about Locri.<sup>172</sup> However more significantly, according to Polybius, Timaeus made blatant fabrications in his history.<sup>173</sup> One such fabrication concerned the existence of the Phalaris Bull, which was taken from Agrigentum to Carthage. Timaeus claimed that there had never been a bull at Agrigentum, nor was the one at Carthage the one made by Phalaris - both claims that were in opposition to the common tradition told by many poets and authors.<sup>174</sup> Polybius was scathing of Timaeus' falsehood, claiming that he had no evidence for such assertions. Consequently, by highlighting such fabrications by Timaeus, Polybius was reinforcing his own claims of historical accuracy.

Timaeus' inexperience was also an important deficiency in his suitability for writing history. Polybius' views on the necessary experience for historiography were plainly stated in the *Histories*.<sup>175</sup> He referred to Timaeus' lack of experience a number of times in book twelve, claiming:

It is neither possible for a man with no experience of warlike operations to write well about what happens in war, nor one unversed in the practice and circumstances of politics to write well on that subject.<sup>176</sup>

Polybius claimed that Timaeus freely admitted this lack of experience, which implied he did not value the importance of experience to an historian.<sup>177</sup> The issue here for Polybius was his conviction that without authorial experience 'we miss in them the vividness of facts, as this impression could only be produced by the personal experience of the author.'<sup>178</sup> He cited Homer as an

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<sup>172</sup> Polyb. 12. 3-4 (Africa, Sardinia, Italy), 5-11 (Locri); 12.4d.1, 11.8 (Timaeus' on the importance of historical accuracy).

<sup>173</sup> Polyb. 12.25a, 25b.4, 25k.1.

<sup>174</sup> Polyb. 12.25. For further discussion of this episode see: Schepens (1978) 117-148.

<sup>175</sup> Polyb. 12.25e.1-2. See also 12.25g.1-2, 28.6-7.

<sup>176</sup> Polyb. 12.25g.1-2: 'Ὅτι οὔτε περὶ τῶν κατὰ πόλεμον συμβαινόντων δυνατόν ἐστι γράψαι καλῶς τὸν μηδεμίαν ἐμπειρίαν ἔχοντα τῶν πολεμικῶν ἔργων οὔτε περὶ τῶν ἐν ταῖς πολιτείαις τὸν μὴ πεπειραμένον τῶν τοιούτων πράξεων καὶ περιστάσεων.'

<sup>177</sup> Polyb. 12.25h.1-2.

<sup>178</sup> Polyb. 12.25h.2-25i.1: 'ἢ γὰρ ἔμφασις τῶν πραγμάτων αὐτοῖς ἄπεισι διὰ τὸ μόνον ἐκ τῆς αὐτοπαθείας τοῦτο γίνεσθαι τῆς τῶν συγγραφέων.'

example of an historian who had the necessary experience evident by the vividness of his narrative. Timaeus' lack of military experience in particular was emphasised in the remaining fragments of book twelve, particularly due to his inability to accurately describe tactical positions and manoeuvres.<sup>179</sup> Polybius' own military, political, and geographical experience was established in the *Histories*. By highlighting the deficits in Timaeus' character and his unsuitability for historiography, Polybius was instilling in his audience confidence in his own abilities.

Timaeus' methodological errors were the prime focus of Polybius' polemic against him. Timaeus' lack of personal inquiry for Polybius was his greatest crime in that he relied on the authority of books to write his history and did not make any of his own inquiry.<sup>180</sup> An historian had two basic mechanisms of learning, that is hearing and sight, of which sight was the more significant and was wholly neglected by Timaeus. According to Polybius, Timaeus only utilised his ears and specifically in their lesser capacity in reading books.<sup>181</sup> In doing this he neglected the other function of the ears, the interrogation of eyewitnesses, a skill that was emphasised in the *Histories* (and according to Polybius employed by other historians) as vital to the occupation of an historian.<sup>182</sup> This was the basis of Polybius' claim that

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<sup>179</sup> Polyb. 12.17-22.

<sup>180</sup> Polyb. 12.26e.1-2; see also 12.25d.1-2, 25e.4-7, 25g.2-4, 25h. For further discussion of Polybius' approach to history see section 4.1.

<sup>181</sup> Polyb. 12.27. This was a reference to the reading of books aloud as a function of the ears: Walbank (1967) 409.

<sup>182</sup> This was a significant concept to Polybius who chose to write contemporary history because he was a witness to some events, and had the ability to talk to eyewitnesses when he was not: 4.2.2. He claimed that Ephorus and Homer also recognised the importance in eye-witness accounts: 12.27.7-11. Polybius saw personal inquiry as the most important aspect of historical writing, explaining that this involved a) conferring with as many witnesses as possible, b) trusting those accounts that have merit and c) casting a critical eye over the various reports received: 12.4c2-5. Later in book twelve, Polybius also discussed the importance of the interrogation technique used by the historian: 'Indeed, the questioner is as important as the narrator for getting a clear story. For in the case of men who have had experience of real action, memory is a sufficient guide from point to point of a narrative: but a man who has had no such experience can neither put the right questions, nor understand what is happening before his eyes. Though he is on the spot, in fact, he is as good as absent' (Shuckburgh trans.) – 'οὐ γὰρ ἔλαττον ὁ πυνθανόμενος τῶν ἀπαγγελλόντων συμβάλλεται πρὸς τὴν ἐξήγησιν. ἡ γὰρ τῶν παρεπομένων τοῖς πράγμασιν ὑπόμνησις αὐτὴ χειραγωγεῖ τὸν ἐξηγούμενον ἐφ' ἕκαστα τῶν συμβεβηκότων. ὑπὲρ ὧν ὁ μὲν ἄπειρος οὐτ' ἀνακρίναι τοὺς παραγεγονότας ἰκανός ἐστιν οὔτε συμπαρῶν γνῶναι τὸ γινόμενον, ἀλλὰ κἂν παρῆ, τρόπον τινὰ παρῶν <οὐ πάρεστιν>': 12.28a.9-10.

historians needed to be men of action (just like he was), with Timaeus as the antithesis of this model.<sup>183</sup>

Polybius argued Timaeus' misguided approach to history was due to a complete lack of effort. Polybius basically claimed that Timaeus was too lazy to undertake history in the way it should be done. He asserted:

Inquiries from books may be made without any danger or hardship, provided only that one takes care to have access to a town rich in documents or to have a library near at hand...

Personal inquiry, on the contrary, requires severe labour and great expense, but is exceedingly valuable and is the most important part of history.<sup>184</sup>

This statement from Polybius simultaneously made Timaeus appear lazy, while also reinforcing Polybius' own labour. Claims of effort were common in ancient historiography and referred not only to the effort of writing a history, but also to any travel, labour and danger the historian was exposed to - even Timaeus made claim to effort in his history.<sup>185</sup> Polybius made such a statement in reference to his geographical inquiries.<sup>186</sup>

All of these qualities, which were pinpointed by Polybius and used to criticise Timaeus, also functioned to add to Polybius' historical authority. Impartiality, experience, and effort were commonly claimed by historians so as to define their own character within the narrative, and in this instance Polybius used them to add to his image as the ideal historian.<sup>187</sup> The

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<sup>183</sup> Polyb. 12.28.1-4. Polybius claimed that Timaeus' lack of experience and therefore inability to understand the significance of inquiry, were deliberate: 12.28.6-7.

<sup>184</sup> Polyb. 12.27.4-7: 'ὅτι τὰ μὲν ἐκ τῶν βιβλίων δύναται πολυπραγμονεῖσθαι χωρὶς κινδύνου καὶ κακοπαθείας, εἴαν τις αὐτὸ τοῦτο προνοηθῆ ἴσως ὥστε λαβεῖν ἢ πόλιν ἔχουσαν ὑπομνημάτων πλῆθος ἢ βιβλιοθήκην που γειτνιώσαν... ἢ δὲ πολυπραγμοσύνη πολλῆς μὲν προσδεῖται ταλαιπωρίας καὶ δαπάνης, μέγα δὲ τι συμβάλλεται καὶ μέγιστόν ἐστι μέρος τῆς ἱστορίας.'

<sup>185</sup> Marincola (1997) 148-158. For example: Thuc. 1.22.3; Dion. Hal. *Pomp.* 6 (Theopompus); Polyb. 12.28a.3 (Timaeus).

<sup>186</sup> Polyb. 3.59.7.

<sup>187</sup> Marincola (1997) 133-174. An interesting concept not related to this thesis, but extremely interesting, is whether Polybius' polemic against other historians can be proven as accurate. For discussion of Polybius' criticism of Timaeus' account of the Phalaris Bull see Schepens (1978) 117-148. For discussion of Polybius' polemic against Phylarchus in opposition to his praise of Aratus see Kosmetatou and Haegemans (2005) 123-149.

establishment of Polybius' authority was his primary concern in his polemic against Timaeus. Historical accuracy again became a secondary consideration for Polybius, who was instead concerned to use the traditional mechanisms of polemic in order to strengthen his self-created image in the *Histories* as the ideal historian.

## 5) The use of emotion in the *Histories*

In the *Histories* Polybius emphasised the rational over the irrational, and argued that too much emotion affected the dignity of history. There are two concepts here that need to be looked at: first, Polybius' emphasis on rationality and self-control over emotionally driven decision making as a political lesson for his readers, and second, Polybius' opinion on the place of emotion in historiography. Emotion in history writing was not completely condemned by Polybius, but like all aspects of the *Histories*, it had to contribute to his purpose. However, this kind of emotion was still controlled by the author for effect, and was not actually any indication of emotionally driven narrative. This section discusses these aspects of emotion in the *Histories*. In addition, it will also discuss Polybius' use of emotion to enhance and emphasise the significance of his didactic lessons. His image as a teacher and historian was founded partially on the absence of emotion, with Polybius emphasising reason and rationality above all else in his authorial persona.<sup>188</sup> In the later books, Polybius' use of supernatural causation was intended to heighten the emotion and emphasise his chosen didactic lesson for his audience.

One of the most significant political lessons Polybius wanted to impart to the reader was that the best statesmen were rational in their decision-

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<sup>188</sup> It was not that Polybius was not emotional, just that he made sure that the image he created of himself in the *Histories* was of someone logical and rational, in accordance with his political teachings. Emotion in the narrative was consciously done in order to emphasise the didactic purpose and significance of the episode in question. This distinction between Polybius' emotions and his rational authorial image has not always been made by modern historians, for example by Shimron who claimed the events of the Achaean War led Polybius to 'write emotionally, violently, even a little unjustly, and pitilessly': Shimron (1979-80) 107 .



making and not led by emotion.<sup>189</sup> The image Polybius created of himself in the *Histories* as a teacher was given authority by his own political experience, which gave credibility to his lessons on the necessary qualities of the ideal statesman.<sup>190</sup> Self-control was a prized quality in the *Histories* and one that Polybius emphasised in those he characterised as good leaders.<sup>191</sup> For Polybius, self-control and clear intelligent calculation would always win over emotionally driven, irrational decision making.<sup>192</sup> The significance of self-control can best be seen in Polybius' portrayal of those who acted irrationally, commonly in diplomatic interactions or war. This could be seen in the irrational actions of the Roman consul Flaminius, who Polybius claimed was 'full of anger' (θυμοῦ πλήρης) when he prematurely engaged Hannibal at the battle of Lake Trasimene. Polybius clearly indicated the lesson to be had from this Roman loss:

Rashness on the other hand on his part and undue boldness and blind anger, as well as vaingloriousness and conceit, are easy to be taken advantage of by his enemy and are most dangerous to his friends; for such a general is the easy victim of all manner of plots, ambushes, and cheaterly.<sup>193</sup>

The danger of such emotional decision making was evident in the *Histories* and often led to disaster. In Hannibal's meeting with the Roman envoys, just prior to the Second Punic War, he gave way to his 'unreasoning and violent anger' (ἀλογίας καὶ θυμοῦ βιαίου), which according to Polybius, led him to conceal his true grievances against Rome 'as men are wont to do who

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<sup>189</sup> Pédech (1964) 210-229.

<sup>190</sup> See section 5.1 for discussion on how Polybius' political experience added to his historical authority.

<sup>191</sup> For Polybius' characterisation of good and bad statesmen see section 4.1.

<sup>192</sup> For general comments on the need for rationality as opposed to emotional decision making see: Polyb. 2.35.8-9; 6.9.11; 12.14.5; 23.11. For controlling emotion: 5.10.3; 15.4.11; as opposed to policy based on emotion: 3.3.3, 7.1-2, 9.6, 10.5, 13.1; 5.11.1; 11.7.2; 16.1.2-4. Eckstein argues that Rome should be seen as the exception to the rule, since their power was unique according to Polybius, although Champion disagrees and argues that Polybius increasingly depicted the Romans with barbarian characteristics after book six in the *Histories*; Eckstein (1989) 7; Champion (2004) 144-167.

<sup>193</sup> Polyb. 3.81.9: 'προπέτεια γὰρ μὴν καὶ θρασύτης καὶ θυμὸς ἄλογος, ἔτι δὲ κενοδοξία καὶ τῦφος, εὐχείρωτα μὲν τοῖς ἐχθροῖς, ἐπισφαλέςτατα δὲ τοῖς φίλοις. πρὸς γὰρ πᾶσαν ἐπιβουλήν ἐνέδραν, ἀπάτην ἔτοιμος ὁ γὰρ τοιοῦτος.'

disregard duty because they are prepossessed by passion.<sup>194</sup> For Polybius, there were certain types of people who allowed themselves to be moved by emotion instead of rational calculation, acting in ways that were unacceptable for the ideal statesman. The ability to act in rational ways for Polybius was not innate but connected to the institutional factors in which people lived. Those who were often displayed as ruled by emotion reflected this criterion; for example, barbarians, women, the mob, mercenaries, and the Aetolians.<sup>195</sup> A good example of such irrationality was Queen Teuta of Illyria who, according to Polybius, began the First Illyrian War through unreasoned, but characteristic anger.<sup>196</sup>

Polybius also warned of the danger of using excessive emotion in historiography. Harris claimed that Polybius' negative view of emotion in historical writing was caused either by his concern for decorum or historical accuracy.<sup>197</sup> It was evident in the *Histories* that Polybius believed history should have a certain level of dignity, so it was possible that he avoided emotion out of concern for what he considered correct historiographic etiquette.<sup>198</sup> More likely however, Polybius was concerned that the admission of emotion into his narrative would be out of accord with the historical accuracy of the events reported. Polybius was highly critical of historians who used emotion, exaggeration or any type of embellishment in their historical narrative. Greek historiography had an impressive history of writers who were unconcerned by the appearance of emotion in their work, however Polybius was instead focussed on his historical and didactic purpose.<sup>199</sup> He differentiated between the genres of tragedy and history, criticising heavily

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<sup>194</sup> Polyb. 3.15.9: 'ἄπερ εἰώθασι ποιεῖν οἱ διὰ τὰς προεγκαθημένας αὐτοῖς ὀρμὰς ὀλιγωροῦντες τοῦ καθήκοντος.' Philip V was also moved by emotion instead of rationality: Polyb. 5.102.1. See also Eckstein (1989) 1-15.

<sup>195</sup> For discussion of the Hellenic-barbarian bipolarity and the link to institutional causes see: Champion (2004) *passim*, esp. 67-99. For example: 2.8.12, 17.4, 21.2, 30.4, 32.2, 35.3; 3.40.8, 78.5; 11.32.6; 12.4b.2-4c.1; 33.10.5 (barbarians); 15.30.1 (women); 6.44.9, 56.11, 57.8; 15.25.23-25, 33.10; 15.27.1; 30.7.5 (the mob); 1.67.5, 67.7, 68.4 (mercenaries); 3.7.3; 4.15.9; 5.107.7; 18.53.7; 21.26.16 (Aetolian League).

<sup>196</sup> Polyb. 2.8.12.

<sup>197</sup> Harris (2001) 20.

<sup>198</sup> Polyb. 30.22; see also 15.35.7; Pomeroy (1991) 87-88.

<sup>199</sup> The most significant was Herodotus whom Aristotle referred to as a storyteller (μυθολόγος): Arist. *De gen. anim.* 3.75 b 5. Diodorus also similarly referred to Herodotus as creative with his history in order to entertain: Diod. 1.69.7.

those who employed dramatics to make their narratives more enticing.<sup>200</sup> He clearly distinguished between the purpose of both history and tragedy in book two, placing them as opposites in the way they affected their audiences.<sup>201</sup>

Polybius' opinion was made abundantly clear:

A historical author should not try to thrill his readers by such exaggerated pictures, nor should he, like a tragic poet, try to imagine the probable utterances of his characters or reason up all the consequences probably incidental to the occurrences with which he deals, but simply record what really happened and what really was said, however commonplace. For the object of tragedy is not the same as that of history but quite the opposite. The tragic poet should thrill and charm his audience for the moment by the verisimilitude of the words he puts into his characters' mouths, but it is the task of the historian to instruct and convince for all time serious students by the truth of the facts and the speeches he narrates, since in the one case it is the probable that takes precedence, even if it be untrue, the purpose being to create illusion in spectators, in the other it is the truth, the purpose being to confer benefit on learners.<sup>202</sup>

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<sup>200</sup> For example, Polybius refused to mention the mythological tales surrounding the Po Valley since they were inappropriate for the purpose of the *Histories* (2.16.14); he criticised Phylarchus for sensational writing, lack of attention to detail and inaccuracy (2.56-60); he criticised Timaeus for exaggeration (12.24.5, 26b.4-5); he criticised Theopompus for relaying exaggerated legends in his writing (16.12.7-9); he criticised those unnamed writers who sensationalised Hannibal's crossing of the Alps making it so treacherous that only the interference of the divine could have led him to success (3.47.6- 48.12); he criticised those who sensationalised the death of Agathocles (15.34.1-36.11); he criticised those who exaggerated the tyranny of Hieronymus, making him seem more brutal than both Philaris and Apollodorus (7.7); he also criticised those who portrayed the exploits of Scipio Africanus as mythical rather than achieved through calculation (10.2.5-6); as well as any general criticisms of those who sensationalised their writing (3.58.9; 29.12); see also Walbank (1938) 56-8; (1945) 8-10; (1955) 4-14; (1957) 259-60. For discussion of the tragic historians see: Ullman (1942) 25-53.

<sup>201</sup> Georgiadou and Larmour (1994) 1457. For references to tragic history in Polybius see: 2.16.13-15, 56-63; 3.47.6-48.12, 58.9; 7.7; 10.27.8; 12.24.5; 15.34-36.

<sup>202</sup> Polyb. 2.56.10-13: δεῖ τοιγαροῦν οὐκ ἐκπλήττειν τὸν συγγραφέα τερατευόμενον διὰ τῆς ἱστορίας τοὺς ἐντυγχάνοντας οὐδὲ τοὺς ἐνδεχομένους λόγους ζητεῖν καὶ τὰ παρεπόμενα τοῖς ὑποκειμένοις ἐξαριθμεῖσθαι, καθάπερ οἱ τραγωδιογράφοι, τῶν δὲ πραχθέντων καὶ ῥηθέντων κατ' ἀλήθειαν αὐτῶν μνημονεῦειν πάνπαν, κἂν πάνυ μέτρια τυγχάνωσιν ὄντα. τὸ γὰρ τέλος ἱστορίας καὶ τραγωδίας οὐ ταυτόν, ἀλλὰ τούναντίον. ἐκεῖ μὲν γὰρ δεῖ διὰ τῶν πιθανωτάτων λόγων ἐκπλήξαι καὶ ψυχαγωγῆσαι κατὰ τὸ παρὸν τοὺς ἀκούοντας, ἐνθάδε δὲ διὰ τῶν ἀληθινῶν ἔργων καὶ λόγων εἰς τὸν πάντα χρόνον διδάξαι καὶ πείσαι τοὺς φιλομαθοῦντας,

Here he clearly expressed an opinion repeated often in his *Histories*, that emotion and sensationalism had no place in historical writing. As Walbank argued, Polybius may have advocated this because sensationalism distorted the moral objectives of his history.<sup>203</sup>

However, it may not be emotion that Polybius condemned, but rather sensational emotion that led to exaggeration. Polybius regarded attempts to heighten emotion for entertainment value as detrimental to the discipline of history. But he was not averse to emotion if it was appropriate and fulfilled a purpose.<sup>204</sup> Polybius' criticism of the historian Phylarchus showed that for Polybius, emotion and sensationalism in history had to be appropriate to the situation.<sup>205</sup> In response to Phylarchus' attempts to evoke emotion in his readers, Polybius stated:

This sort of thing he keeps up throughout his history, always trying to bring horrors vividly before our eyes. Leaving aside the ignoble and womanish character of such a treatment of his subject, let us consider how far it is proper or serviceable to history.<sup>206</sup>

So emotion was acceptable in history, as long as it added to the benefit of history. This implied that Polybius condoned and would have employed emotion in his narrative, as long as he decided it was beneficial and contributed to his didactic purpose. So while there were some signs of emotion in the *Histories*, for Polybius the inclusion of emotionally enhanced narrative was a controlled narrative technique in order to advance his didactic purpose.

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ἔπειδήπερ ἐν ἐκείνοις μὲν ἡγεῖται τὸ πιθανόν, κἂν ἢ ψεῦδος, διὰ τὴν ἀπάτην τῶν θεωμένων, ἐν δὲ τούτοις τάληθες διὰ τὴν ὠφέλειαν τῶν φιλομαθοῦντων.

<sup>203</sup> Walbank (1938) 58.

<sup>204</sup> The same applied to Polybius' use of violence in historical narrative: it had to be appropriate to the situation: D'Huys (1987) 224-231. However, Polybius admitted there was temporary pleasure to be gained from sensationalised history: Polyb. 15.36.5; see also Walbank (1990) 260-263.

<sup>205</sup> Marincola (2001) 127-128; Schepens (2005) 141-164.

<sup>206</sup> Polyb. 2.56.8-10: 'ποιεῖ δὲ τοῦτο παρ' ὅλην τὴν ἱστορίαν, πειρώμενος <ἐν> ἐκάστοις αἰεὶ πρὸ ὀφθαλμῶν τιθέναι τὰ δεινὰ. τὸ μὲν οὖν ἀγεννὲς καὶ γυναικῶδες τῆς αἰρέσεως αὐτοῦ παρείσθω, τὸ δὲ τῆς ἱστορίας οἰκεῖον ἅμα καὶ χρήσιμον ἐξεταζέσθω.'

An example of this was the tragic tale of King Philip V of Macedonia, whom Polybius used to demonstrate a negative example of kingship and the avenging nature of *tyche*.<sup>207</sup> The story of Philip V had many of the elements of tragedy described by Aristotle; for example, it was a story that had far reaching influence and evoked feelings of fear and pity in the reader, emotions that should be associated with tragedy rather than history.<sup>208</sup> Walbank highlighted Philip's role as the 'tragic hero' for Polybius, a moral *exemplum* of a leader who fell from grace because of the sins of his early years, a man who was at the mercy of *tyche*.<sup>209</sup> For Walbank then, Polybius' depiction of Philip was intended to provide a moral *exemplum*, not evoke emotion in his readers.<sup>210</sup> However, the imagery of Polybius' language in describing the downfall of Philip induced images of the tragic, making it hard

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<sup>207</sup> Ullman proposed that Polybius' monograph of the Numantine War may also have been what could be termed tragic history, since monographs were more liable to be embellished by rhetoric and tragedy than continuous histories. This was even more so in the case of the Numantine War, with Aemilianus as the ideal hero in the story: (1942) 44-53.

<sup>208</sup> Aristotle claimed history did not convey a continuous story with a beginning, middle and end, which was the object of tragedy, but instead covered a period of time with unrelated events – which contradicted Polybius' arguments on universal history: Arist. *Poet.* 6.1449b.27, 1450a; 23.1459a; see also Ullman (1942) 25-27. The key to evoking emotion in the reader was often a universal change of fortune, which evoked fear and pity in the reader but in a pleasurable catharsis rather than simply through sensationalism: Arist. *Poet.* 9.1452a; cf. 24.1460a.12; 14.1453b.9; see also Ullman (1942) 25-27

<sup>209</sup> Aristotle explained the tragic hero as '[This is] the sort of man who is not pre-eminently virtuous and just, and yet it is through no badness or villainy of his own that he falls into the fortune, but rather through some tragic error, he being one of those who are in high station and good fortune, like Oedipus and Thyestes and the famous men of such families as those' (Fyfe trans.) – ἔστι δὲ τοιοῦτος ὁ μήτε ἀρετῇ διαφέρων καὶ δικαιοσύνη μήτε διὰ κακίαν καὶ μοχθηρίαν μεταβάλλον εἰς τὴν δυστυχίαν ἀλλὰ δι' ἁμαρτίαν τινά, τῶν ἐν μεγάλῃ δόξῃ ὄντων καὶ εὐτυχία, οἷον Οἰδίπους καὶ Θυέστης καὶ οἱ ἐκ τῶν τοιούτων γενῶν ἐπιφανεῖς ἄνδρες': Arist. *Poet.* 1453a; see also Walbank (1938) 59-68. Note: in this translation ἁμαρτίαν has been given as 'tragic error' instead of Fyfe's translation of 'flaw.'

<sup>210</sup> According to Polybius, *tyche* dealt Philip three significant blows that led to his downfall and death amid family turmoil and Macedonian upheaval, generated by his ill-fated opposition to Rome. First, he transferred men and their families from the coast to Emathia (formerly Paeonia) and filled these cities with Thracians of whose loyalty he could be assured in the upcoming war with Rome; second, he ordered the children of those he had murdered to be imprisoned so there would be no element of disaffection in Macedonia, stirring the people to pity those imprisoned who were often notable due to the status of their parents; and third, fortune created the dissension between his sons, Perseus and Demetrius, forcing Philip to choose between the two: Polyb. 23.10.4-15. For discussion on the accounts of Polybius and Livy see Walbank (1938) 59-62. *Tyche* visited this destruction on Philip because of his earlier actions: his sacrilege by returning to Thermum and destroying the sacred buildings in 207 that he had spared when he sacked the city originally in 218 (Polyb. 5.9; 11.7; cf. 7.13.3), his vicious actions at Messene in 214 (Polyb. 7.11.13; Plut. *Arat.* 49.2-51), his intrigues in Rhodes in 204 (Polyb. 13.3-5), his brutality at Cius in 202 (Polyb. 15.22-23), his impiety in Pergamum in 202 when he destroyed the religious temples and altars (Polyb. 16.1), and most significantly, his alliance with Antiochus III against the young Ptolemy Epiphanes in 203/2 (Polyb. 15.20): see also Walbank (1938) 63.

to believe that Polybius was not intending to use emotion to emphasise Philip's fate.<sup>211</sup> The supernatural imagery added to the image of Philip's tragic end:

For it was now that Fortune, as if she meant to punish him at one and the same time for all the wicked and criminal acts he had committed in his life, sent to haunt him a host of the furies, tormentors and avenging spirits of his victims, phantoms that never leaving him by day and by night, tortured him so terribly up to the day of his death that men acknowledged that, as the proverb says, 'justice has an eye' and we who are but men should never scorn her.<sup>212</sup>

Polybius' motivation here was didactic, both practical and moral. Philip was the image of the stereotypical tyrant whose fortune had altered when 'he changed from a king into a cruel tyrant' and attacked Messene in 214.<sup>213</sup> Polybius used Philip as an extreme negative *exemplum* in the *Histories*, and wanted the audience to react emotionally to him in order to reinforce the moral warning associated with his behaviour and ultimate fate. It was acceptable for Polybius to use emotion as a device to emphasise didactic lessons, as long as they were appropriate and not overly sensational.

Polybius was not resolute that emotion had no place in history, simply that it had to be reasonably used to emphasise the benefit of historical study. Just prior to the Battle of Zama, Polybius made the assumption that his readers would react emotionally to his narrative of the battle, asking 'is there

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<sup>211</sup> The possibility of Polybius using tragedies or historical novels as sources for the downfall of Philip was raised by Benecke, but argued against by Walbank who claimed the tragic narrative in the *Histories* of Philip's downfall was constructed by Polybius alone in order to illustrate the moral lessons his story provided: Benecke (1930) 254; Walbank (1938) 55-68.

<sup>212</sup> Polyb. 23.10.2-4: 'καθάπερ γὰρ ἂν εἰ δίκην ἢ τύχην βουλομένη λαβεῖν <έν> καιρῶ παρ' αὐτοῦ πάντων τῶν ἀσεβημάτων καὶ παρανομημάτων ὧν εἰργάσατο κατὰ τὸν βίον, τότε παρέστησέ τις ἐρινύς καὶ ποινὰς καὶ προστροπαίους τῶν δι' ἐκείνον ἡτυχηκότων· οἱ συνόντες αὐτῶ καὶ νύκτωρ καὶ μεθ' ἡμέραν τοιαύτας ἔλαβον παρ' αὐτοῦ τιμωρίας, ἕως οὗ τὸ ζῆν ἐξέλιπεν, ὡς καὶ πάντας ἀνθρώπους ὁμολογῆσαι διότι κατὰ τὴν παροιμίαν ἔστι Δίκης ὀφθαλμός, ἧς μηδέποτε δεῖ καταφρονεῖν ἀνθρώπους ὑπάρχοντας.'

<sup>213</sup> Polyb. 7.13.7-8, cf. 7.11: 'τύραννος ἐκ βασιλείως ἀπέβη πικρός.' As Walbank pointed out, Polybius portrayed Philip negatively here after he refused to abide by the advice of Aratus of Sicyon, one of Polybius' Achaean heroes. Prior to this, Philip had accepted the advice of Aratus, so perhaps this contributed to Polybius' depiction of this event as the turning point in Philip's life: Walbank (1974a) 29-30.

anyone who can remain unmoved in reading the narrative of such an encounter?'<sup>214</sup> Walbank argued that Polybius succumbed to emotional writing on occasion in his *Histories*, for example his narratives of the mutiny at Alexandria, Philip V's capture of Abydus, or on the tragic figure of Hasdrubal at the fall of Carthage in 146.<sup>215</sup> However, these episodes were emphasised for moral and didactic purposes, not simply because Polybius wished to try his hand at sensational writing. He consciously emphasised these episodes to provide examples for his readers of the consequences of cowardly, irrational behaviour on the part of Agathocles and Hasdrubal, as well as the opposing example of impressive courage and bravery displayed by the people of Abydus.<sup>216</sup> Emotion was used in these examples to enhance and emphasise Polybius' didactic lessons, indicating that in such cases emotion was beneficial to the writing of history.<sup>217</sup>

These episodes where emotion was used consciously to emphasise the didactic aspects of the narrative, show no irrationality on the part of the author. These instances of emotion contributed to Polybius' image of himself as the teacher and historian in the *Histories*, and were incorporated into the narrative in order to highlight this persona and his didactic purpose. There were also instances in the narrative where Polybius used the supernatural in order to enhance the emotion of the account and reinforce his didactic lessons. The most significant example of this was Polybius' account of the Achaean War. He recognised his own ability to remain unaffected was in jeopardy when he stated:

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<sup>214</sup> Polyb. 15.9.3-4: 'ἐφ' ἃ τίς οὐκ ἂν ἐπιστήσας συμπαθῆς γένοιτο κατὰ τὴν ἐξήγησιν;'

<sup>215</sup> Polyb. 15.25-33 (Alexandria); 16.30-34 (Abydus); see also Sacks (1981) 166-168.

<sup>216</sup> Polybius made the positive and negative aspects of these examples clear: 15.34.6 (Agthocles); 38.20 (Hasdrubal); 16.30.2-5 (the people of Abydus).

<sup>217</sup> Mitsios discussed the gap Polybius created between his characters' expectations and the reality of their experience, claiming Polybius did this to heighten the suspense in the *Histories*. This compelled his audience to continue reading and created a sense of dramatic irony through the vast difference between expectations and reality in the narrative: (2009) 481-506.

It should not surprise anyone if abandoning here the style proper to historical narrative I express myself in a more declamatory and ambitious manner.<sup>218</sup>

Polybius' acknowledged patriotic bias here prepared his readers for the heightened emotional narrative that followed. He was expected to show emotion in his narrative of the Achaean War because of his personal connection, particularly as patriotic partiality was an anticipated part of ancient historiography. This admission effectively provided a disclaimer that pardoned his emotionally driven narrative without contradicting his own strictures on excessive emotion in historical writing. By highlighting his own subjectivity Polybius called attention to the tragedy of this event and heightened the emotional response of the audience, which had already been emphasised by his previous conclusion that this was the biggest disaster to ever occur in Greece.<sup>219</sup>

For Polybius, the Achaean War was greater than both Xerxes' invasion of Greece and the Peloponnesian War.<sup>220</sup> In his introduction to book thirty-eight Polybius used particular words to distinguish between the gravity of the disasters he listed, using *ατυχία* and *συμφορά* to distinguish between the misfortune of Corinth and Carthage.<sup>221</sup> Gruen explained this distinction made by Polybius as the difference between unfortunate disaster and one that was self-inflicted. Polybius used *ατυχία* for misfortune that was created by the foolishness of those who suffered it, whereas *συμφορά* carried no such implication.<sup>222</sup> *Ατυχία* portrayed a sense of guilt and placed responsibility for

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<sup>218</sup> Polyb. 38.4.12: 'Υπὲρ ὧν οὐ δεήσει θαυμάζειν ἔαν παρεκβαίνοντες τὸ τῆς ἱστορικῆς διηγήσεως ἦθος ἐπιδεικτικωτέραν καὶ φιλοτιμοτέραν φαινώμεθα ποιούμενοι περὶ αὐτῶν τὴν ἀπαγγελίαν.'

<sup>219</sup> Polyb. 38.1-3.

<sup>220</sup> Polyb. 38.1-3.

<sup>221</sup> The distinction was also made generally by Polybius 38.3.7: 'For we should consider that all states or individuals who meet with exceptional calamities are unfortunate, but that only those whose own folly brings reproach on them suffer disaster' – ἀκληρεῖν μὲν γὰρ ἅπαντας ἡγητέον καὶ κοινῇ καὶ κατ' ἰδίαν τοὺς παραλόγοις συμφοραῖς περιπίπτοντας, ἀτυχεῖν δὲ μόνους τούτους οἷς διὰ τὴν ἰδίαν ἀβουλίαν ὄνειδος αἱ πράξεις ἐπιφέρουσι.'

<sup>222</sup> Polybius did not use *ατυχία* and *συμφορά* consistently in this way throughout the *Histories*. This was perhaps an indication of Polybius' decision to extend the original parameters of his narrative. Only when he began to write of the destruction of his people was he motivated to make this distinction, which was why it was not evident throughout: Gruen (1976) 47 and n. 11.



the disaster of the Achaean War firmly on the Achaeans who should be pitied for their actions.<sup>223</sup> These distinctions between the two words highlight the fall of Corinth and the Achaean War as events that were self-imposed, enabling Polybius to emphasise his argument that they arose through the fault of a few corrupt leaders.<sup>224</sup>

Polybius justified his claim that the Achaean War was the greatest disaster to ever befall Greece in two ways: because the Achaeans had no plausible pretext for their actions and they had brought it upon themselves.<sup>225</sup> This argument showed the rational approach to war that was typical of Polybius in the *Histories*. However, he also resorted to supernatural explanations of behaviour twice in the last five books, which added to the impression presented to the reader of the irrationality and foolishness of those involved. Polybius claimed that the Achaean people acted irrationally when faced with war against Rome, and that they were visited by an evil spell (παρηλλαγμένης φαρμακείας) which made the people act illogically.<sup>226</sup> This type of explanation from Polybius was unusual, although more common within the final five books of the *Histories*.<sup>227</sup> Prior to this, Polybius emphasised rational causation, as was evidenced by his efforts to ensure that his readers knew that Scipio Africanus' siege of New Carthage in 209 was not due to the gods and chance (θεοὺς καὶ τὴν τύχην), as had been claimed by previous historians, but rather due to Scipio's rational calculation and foresight (λογισμοῦ καὶ προνοίας).<sup>228</sup>

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<sup>223</sup> Walbank (1979a) 685.

<sup>224</sup> See chapter eight on the outbreak of the Achaean War in 146.

<sup>225</sup> Polyb. 38.1.4-9, 3.7-13.

<sup>226</sup> Gruen translated παρηλλαγμένης φαρμακείας as 'evil spell,' while Paton has it as 'mental disturbance.' Gruen's translation of φαρμακείας as spell fits Polybius' context better than Paton's 'mental disturbance' which does not convey the mysticism evident in Polybius' narrative: Gruen (1976) 47. Polybius claimed that this spell caused the people to throw themselves down wells and into precipices: 38.7-8.

<sup>227</sup> Polybius recognised a change in the subject matter from book thirty-five onwards, and referred to the historical period narrated in those books as the disturbed and troubled time (ταραχὴ καὶ κίνησις). Walbank claimed the last five books (35-39) were distinct from the earlier ones, because Polybius had a more personal role in the narrative: Walbank (1972) 29 n. 149.

<sup>228</sup> Polyb. 10.5.8, 9.2-3. This episode in Polybius has been debated by historians who challenge his approach as overly rational: Hoyos (1992) 124-128; Lowe (2000) 39-52.

Polybius' use of the supernatural in the later books of the *Histories* do not indicate that he lost his concern to find rational causation, just that he wanted to emphasise the irrationality of those involved in order to enhance his didactic purpose. Polybius claimed that he was unable to discover a rational explanation for wide-spread Macedonian support for the pretender Andriscus in 148 and so attributed it to the supernatural.<sup>229</sup> In a digressionary passage he explained how to understand an event that had no logical cause. He claimed:

now indeed as regards things the causes of which it is impossible to understand, we may perhaps be justified in getting out of the difficulty by setting them down to the action of a god or of chance.<sup>230</sup>

This seems to be an admission by Polybius that historians could use supernatural causation when they found it difficult to find rational reasons for events. So in the event of the revolt of the Macedonians led by the pretender Andriscus, Polybius admitted:

For here it is most difficult to detect the cause. So that in pronouncing on this and similar phenomena we may well say that the thing was a heaven-sent infatuation (δαιμονοβλάβειαν), and that all the Macedonians were visited by the wrath of God.<sup>231</sup>

Therefore, because Polybius could find no other explanation he considered logical, he attributed the revolt of the Macedonians to δαιμονοβλάβειαν.<sup>232</sup> Supernatural causation highlighted the irrationality of the event, since for Polybius no rational person, in particular an aristocratic politician, would act in

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<sup>229</sup> Polyb. 36.17.1-15.

<sup>230</sup> Polyb. 36.17.2: 'ὡς μὲν νῆ Δί' ἀδύνατον ἢ δυσχερὲς τὰς αἰτίας καταλαβεῖν ἄνθρωπον ὄντα, περὶ τούτων ἴσως ἂν τις ἀπορῶν ἐπὶ τὸν εὖν τὴν ἀναφορὰν ποιῶτο καὶ τὴν τύχην.'

<sup>231</sup> Polyb. 36.17.15: 'τὴν γὰρ αἰτίαν εὐρεῖν τούτων δυσχερὲς. διόπερ ἂν τις ἐπὶ τῶν τοιούτων διαθέσεων δαιμονοβλάβειαν εἶπυε τὸ γεγονός καὶ μῆνιν ἐκ θεῶν ἅπασιν Μακεδόσιν ἀπηντήσθαι.'

<sup>232</sup> Elsewhere in Polybius δαιμονοβλάβειαν seemed to imply a type of bewitchment, which did not mean the same idea evident here of 'heaven sent.' For example, when Polybius used it to refer to Perseus' penny-pinching with Genthius: Polybius 28.9.4; see also Walbank (1979a) 682. Tränkle claimed that Polybius did not distinguish between τὸ δαιμόνιον and τύχη, but there was a clear difference causally in Polybius' analysis of the Achaean War: (1977) 95-98.

such a way. The irrationality also heightened the emotion of the event and enhanced Polybius' didactic lesson. Polybius depicted the decision of the Macedonians to reject the Romans in favour of the pretender Andriscus, who he considered a tyrant, as completely irrational. He claimed that under the Romans the Macedonians were no longer servants and had been freed through their cancellation of aristocratic taxation and establishment of civil accord.<sup>233</sup> According to Polybius, the Macedonians had forfeited a life of freedom and comfort under the Romans for one of violence and danger under Andriscus. This was clearly an irrational act, that was consciously enhanced in the narrative by the addition of supernatural causation. Polybius was providing a didactic lesson for his readers on the dangers of acting irrationally, which always ended in disaster.<sup>234</sup>

Similarly, Polybius depicted the actions of the demagogues responsible for the Achaean War as irrational in order to provide his readers with a didactic lesson on the responsibility of the statesman.<sup>235</sup> He blamed the war on the actions of a few Achaean leaders; however, this causation was not evident in other aspects of the historical narrative, and as Gruen claimed Polybius' analysis was 'tortured and unconvincing.'<sup>236</sup> Polybius considered the Achaean decisions in this war as driven by irrational policy and mistaken convictions, and so attributed it to the fault of the few and claimed that an evil spell (παρηλλαγμένης φαρμακείας) had overcome the Achaeans. His reliance in these two episodes on the supernatural seems unusual considering his concern to assess causation rationally in the rest of the *Histories*, as well as his insistence that other historians should seek logical explanations instead of attributing events to gods and fortune.<sup>237</sup> As Schepens argued, superstition was one of the important accusations levelled against Timaeus.<sup>238</sup> Polybius stated:

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<sup>233</sup> Polyb. 36.17.13.

<sup>234</sup> The main consequence of Andriscus' revolt was taken to be the annexation of Macedonia as a province, but this has been convincingly contested by Gruen: (1984) 433-435.

<sup>235</sup> See chapter eight for elaboration of this argument.

<sup>236</sup> Gruen (1976) 47.

<sup>237</sup> As can be seen in his explanation of Scipio's siege of New Carthage: Polyb. 10.5.8-9.

<sup>238</sup> Schepens (1978) 117-148.

For while he exhibits great severity and audacity in accusing others, his own pronouncements are full of dreams, prodigies, incredible tales, and to put it shortly, craven superstition and womanish love of the marvellous.<sup>239</sup>

For Polybius the use of such superstition by Timaeus displayed a clear lack of knowledge, and was a serious defect in an historian.<sup>240</sup> So the reliance on the supernatural in these episodes suggests that Polybius was doing so in order to create a specific result in his narrative. For Polybius, superstition was used to heighten the emotion and enhance the impression of irrationality in the episode.<sup>241</sup> The didactic purpose of the *Histories* is the key to understanding his use of the supernatural, particularly as for Polybius, superstition symbolised the irrational, while his didactic strictures commonly focused on rational self-control.

However, for Polybius this did not include *tyche*. He portrayed *tyche* in the Achaean War not as the force that caused the Achaean disaster, but instead as the reason why the League avoided complete destruction. For Polybius, *tyche* saved the Achaeans by hastening their defeat at the hands of the Romans, ensuring their continued existence.<sup>242</sup> As Dmitriev claimed, the role of *tyche* in Polybius' *Histories* has not yet been conclusively argued, but her intervention at the end of the Achaean War was clearly different from the evil spell that visited the Achaeans during the war.<sup>243</sup> For Polybius, *tyche* had been a constant causal determinant in the *Histories*, while these insertions of superstition only appeared at the end of the narrative. They were intended to emphasise the heightened emotion and irrationality of these events within

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<sup>239</sup> Polyb.12.24.5-6: 'οὗτος γὰρ ἐν μὲν ταῖς τῶν πέλας κατηγορίαις πολλὴν ἐπιφαίνει δεινότητα καὶ τόλμαν, ἐν δὲ ταῖς ἰδίαις ἀποφάσεσιν ἐνυπνίων καὶ τεράτων καὶ μύθων ἀπιθάνων καὶ συλλήβδην δεισιδαιμονίας ἀγεννοῦς καὶ τερατείας γυναικώδους ἐστὶ πλήρης.'

<sup>240</sup> For analysis on the attitudes of Timaeus and Polybius to these supernatural explanations see: Brown (1958) 102-103, 136.

<sup>241</sup> Walbank claimed 'madness and infatuation were the terms used to describe policies Polybius could neither approve nor understand': (1972) 177.

<sup>242</sup> Polyb. 38.18.8.

<sup>243</sup> Dmitriev followed Tränkle's argument that Polybius did not differentiate between τὸ δαιμόνιον and τύχη, however παρηλλαγμένης φαρμακείας was somewhat different: Dmitriev (2011) 339.

what Polybius referred to as the time of ‘disturbance and trouble’ (ταραχὴ καὶ κίνησις).<sup>244</sup>

For Polybius *tyche* was a logical force in his world, unlike the superstition illustrated in his accounts of the revolt of Andriscus and the Achaean War. However, his use of *tyche* in the *Histories* was varied and complicated, making it difficult to apply any kind of concrete definition to the term. Polybius’ use of *tyche* as a causal determinant in the *Histories* was also contradictory at times; for example, he attributed Rome’s rise to domination in the Mediterranean to *tyche*, and also declared that it was not *tyche*.<sup>245</sup> According to Walbank, *tyche* was sometimes a supernatural force and sometimes chance - simultaneously, she was sometimes random and other times depicted as the avenging goddess.<sup>246</sup> But Polybius also claimed that *tyche* should not be falsely blamed where human action provided a rational cause of events. The only constant characteristic of *tyche* in the *Histories* is unpredictability.<sup>247</sup> Walbank argued that Polybius also used *tyche* as a rhetorical device, referring to her at points as a ‘play-maker’ and ‘umpire.’<sup>248</sup> McGing argued that Polybius used *tyche* as a rhetorical device for ‘dignifying his history and recognising the questions we cannot answer,’ claiming that for Polybius those events attributed to *tyche* were unimportant compared to the explanations that would be found through his pragmatic investigations.<sup>249</sup> The ambiguity of Polybius’ use of *tyche*, may also imply that the use of *tyche* in contemporary Greek literature was common and he could expect a level of comprehension from his audience.<sup>250</sup> But it may also be that Polybius did not

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<sup>244</sup> Polyb. 3.4.13.

<sup>245</sup> Polyb. 1.4.2, 63.9.

<sup>246</sup> Walbank (2007) 353. For example, *tyche* as: a supernatural force (sometimes accompanied by the god/gods): Polyb. 1.1.2; 2.20.7; 4.2.4; 38.7.11, 8.8, 21.3; chance: 1.86.7; 2.4.3; 2.35.5; 3.118.6; 23.10.12; random: 1.1.2; 6.43.5; 10.40.6; 15.6.8; 18.28.5; avenging goddess: 1.86.7; 4.81.5; 15.20.5, 20.7; 20.7.2; 29.27.12. Polybius’ depiction of *tyche* as a supernatural force coincided with that of Demetrius of Phaleron who prophesied the fall of Macedonia: Polyb. 29.21.5-6. See the table of Polybius’ uses of *tyche* throughout the *Histories* in Hau (2011) 200-202.

<sup>247</sup> Should not be falsely blamed: Polyb. 10.5.8-9; 18.28.5; Unpredictable: 29.20.2, 22.2.

<sup>248</sup> Walbank (2007) 353. Seen in Polybius: 3.118.6; 11.5.8; 23.10.26; 27.16.4; 29.19.2.

<sup>249</sup> McGing (2010) 201. Hau claimed Polybius’ use of *tyche* had a dual role in the narrative, one as the ‘rhetorical storyteller’ where he freely attributed large events to *tyche*, and one where he was in his ‘analytical, scientific mode’ whereby he sought human reasons and scorned those who did not: (2011) 186-193.

<sup>250</sup> Walbank (1945) 6.

fully understand the concept of *tyche* himself, and used it as a causal determinant whenever it seemed appropriate to the narrative.<sup>251</sup>

Modern historians often saw *tyche* as Polybius' reason for events when he could not identify a rational cause.<sup>252</sup> Hau argued that Polybius used *tyche* as a device to emphasise an event to his readers and cause them to look at it 'as unexpected, as momentous, as strikingly coincidental, or as juxtaposed to what a given character or state achieved or could achieve by his own efforts.'<sup>253</sup> It seems plausible that *tyche* was used by Polybius to illustrate the unexpected rather than the irrational in the *Histories*. Polybius' use of *tyche* while not wholly rational to modern eyes, was at least logical to the author and contrasted with his use of superstition, which did imply the irrational. In these instances Polybius has supernatural causation as a warning against illogical decision making, with the emotion serving to highlight the significance of the lesson and draw the reader's attention.

In conclusion, this chapter analysed the historical constructs of the *Histories* and how they contributed to Polybius' self-constructed image. There were two central types of purposes in the *Histories*: the historical and the historiographical. Polybius' historical purpose was to trace the rise of Rome and its place in the universal history of the Mediterranean world. Equally significant was his historiographical purpose, which was determined by his consciously-constructed image as a teacher and historian in the narrative. Polybius' didactic lessons were central to this historiographic purpose and often eclipsed his concern to be acutely accurate in his historical accounts. The precise and conscious structure of the *Histories* added to the picture Polybius constructed of himself in the narrative. He used the structure of the *Histories* as a vehicle for his self-definition as a teacher in particular, but also as an historian, while he also created an image of his audience in the

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<sup>251</sup> Polybius' hesitation was evident in places in the *Histories*: 2.38.5; 36.17. See also: Brouwer (2011) 122-25, 126.

<sup>252</sup> For example: Pédech (1964) 331-354; Roveri (1982) 297-326; Brouwer (2011) 111-132.

<sup>253</sup> Hau (2011) 194-204.

narrative. Polybius tailored his *Histories* towards his primary audience of young soldier-politicians, which influenced his historical impartiality. Another aspect of the *Histories* that influenced Polybius' ability to remain impartial, was his polemic against other historians, in particular Timaeus in book twelve. Polemic was part of Polybius' effort to establish his own historical authority by defining himself as the positive *exemplum* against the negative example of Timaeus. This added to the image he created in the *Histories* of himself as a teacher, and as the ideal historian. Significantly, Polybius was not averse to the use of emotion in historical narrative, but insisted that it had to be in accordance with the demands of the situation. There were instances in the *Histories* where he used emotion to heighten the effect of his narrative, but these were rhetorical and controlled by the author. Similarly, Polybius used supernatural causation to heighten the emotion of certain events. In particular, he did this to stress the irrationality of the actions of the historical characters involved and reinforce for his readers the importance of rationality - a key didactic aspect of the *Histories*.

## Chapter Five: Historical Bias through Political Aspects of Polybius' Self-Constructed Image

This chapter addresses the significance of Polybius' political experiences and ideologies in the development of his self-constructed image in the *Histories*. Polybius identified the *Histories* as a work that would primarily appeal to students of politics, so his persona as a teacher was particularly important when providing political lessons for his readers. Polybius' political instruction, specifically on the qualities he saw as necessary for the ideal statesman, was a priority in the narrative as he sought to establish his political ideologies through providing examples of both good and bad political behaviour. His image as the teacher of politics, and also as an experienced politician, influenced both his perception of events and his conception of his purpose.

The didactic aspect of Polybius' image as a teacher and an historian in the *Histories* was in part developed in order to relate his political ideals to his audience of young soldier-politicians. The first section in this chapter looks at Polybius' own political experience and how it contributed to the authority of his image in the narrative. In order for a teacher to teach politics they needed to have knowledge of politics, just as an historian, according to Polybius, had to have political experience. In this way, Polybius emphasised his own political credentials to bolster the image of himself in the *Histories* as a teacher and a politician. Polybius' image as a teacher and his didactic purpose was further enhanced by his attitude towards the Romans in the narrative, both prior to and after 167. His admiration of the Romans was used as a vehicle for his didactic purposes, as he praised or criticised them in relation to the didactic merit of their actions. The Romans were the primary *exemplum* for his audience of soldier-politicians, therefore, his attitude towards them was determined by their didactic potential. Likewise, the Greeks were also utilised



by Polybius as a didactic tool. Often the experiences of individual Greek states were offered as a lesson on the power dynamics between a large and small state, allowing Polybius to present his political beliefs as lessons for his audience. These political aspects enhanced the construction of Polybius' image in the *Histories* and significantly contributed to his didactic purpose. However, this preoccupation with developing his authorial image, while also providing didactic lessons for his audience, often took precedence over his concern to be historically accurate.

### **1) Polybius' early political career**

It is significant that almost all of the information we have concerning Polybius' early political career has been gathered from the narrative of the *Histories*. The autobiographical political experiences that Polybius informed his audience about in the *Histories* were significant in adding credibility to his narrative persona as a teacher and an historian. The inclusion of details about his own political career enhanced his political credibility, ensuring that the audience would put more reliance on his political ideals because of his own experience as a statesman in the Achaean League. The significance of this image and the consciousness with which Polybius created it in the narrative, makes it difficult to reach any conclusions about Polybius' early political convictions. He was careful to appear a certain way in the *Histories*, so it follows that his political ideas would also have been consciously presented to the audience in order to add to this persona. He displayed his own political and military experience for the reader, making him the ultimate 'man-of-action' historian and reinforcing his own significance in the Achaean League, as well as his Greek patriotism prior to his detention in Rome. Moreover, Polybius consistently attempted to present himself as acting in the best interests of the League, a quality of the ideal statesman he emphasised throughout his work.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> For discussion on Polybius' concept of the ideal statesman see section 4.1.

Polybius was on the path to an important political career in the Achaean League before his detention in Rome after the Third Macedonian War, which implied a certain level of involvement within the League. His political lineage was impressive considering the significant positions his father held, with Polybius probably destined for the most eminent station in the League as *strategos*. He was selected for diplomatic duty in 181 to Ptolemy V, and was given this honour prior to the usual legal age of those chosen to represent the League in the international arena.<sup>2</sup> He informs the reader that his selection was due to his father's position as *strategos* when the original alliance with Ptolemy had been decided in 185, although the death of Ptolemy caused the cancellation of this mission.<sup>3</sup> The pinnacle of Polybius' early political career was his position as *hipparch* in 170/69.<sup>4</sup> This was a military appointment as cavalry leader, which was the second most influential position within the League's hierarchical political structure. It was also considered a step towards the position of *strategos*.<sup>5</sup> Polybius' youth (he was only in his early thirties) and political responsibility indicate how he was regarded in Achaea, and also hint at the expectations his political peers had of him.

The second century was a time of tremendous political upheaval for Greece, which directly impacted on Polybius as a statesman of the Achaean League. The Romans were ever encroaching on the internal affairs of the Greek states and had been since the end of the Second Macedonian War, making the issue for many politicians from these states how to react to the steady advance of Roman domination. In a passage from Livy, which according to Walbank was derived from Polybius, he claimed there were three types of politicians positioned in Greece during the Third Macedonian War.<sup>6</sup>

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<sup>2</sup> Polyb. 24.6. Both Lycortas and Polybius seemed to have had a close connection to Ptolemy VI and Ptolemy VIII: Polyb. 29.23.7; cf. 22.3.5-6; 24.6.3-5; Walbank (1979b) 180-181.

<sup>3</sup> Lycortas renewed the Achaean alliance with Ptolemy V in 185, but was criticised publicly along with Philopoemen for his careless diplomacy by Aristaenus who was then *strategos*: Polyb. 22.9. Polybius also served on an Achaean commission to regulate the boundaries between Megalopolis and Messene: Polyb. 24.6.5; *Insch. Olymp.* no. 46.

<sup>4</sup> Polyb. 28.6.9.

<sup>5</sup> Champion (2004) 221.

<sup>6</sup> Livy 42.30.1-7; 45.31.4-5; Walbank (1979a) 315. Livy mentioned this structured division of political beliefs twice in his work. These divisions also illustrate the incomplete nature of Roman power at this time, showing the importance of the Third Macedonian War and the following settlement of Macedonia in deciding Roman domination.

The first political group was made up of those who supported the Romans due either to their admiration of Rome or the potential that their victory would generate. The second political group was made up of those who Livy referred to as 'sycophants and flatterers of the king', who were driven to support Perseus due to debt desperation or because of his popularity. The third political group preferred to maintain an equal balance between Macedonia and Rome so that the smaller states always had a champion to oppose the tyranny of the other. However, if forced to choose, they would elect to support the Romans instead of Perseus. This party was referred to by Livy as the wisest and most respectable of men and was the party that Polybius subscribed to in his early career, following in the footsteps of Philopoemen and his father, Lycortas.

Those statesmen he was politically associated with in his early career enhanced Polybius' political credibility. The admiration he displayed in the *Histories* for his fellow Achaean statesmen added to his own authority as a politician, especially since his praise of them added to their legend. In particular, Polybius was significant in adding to the posthumous political reputation of Philopoemen, through his independent monograph dedicated to his life and his depiction of him in the *Histories*.<sup>7</sup> Polybius' own political career was favoured by their association, emphasising his own political promise prior to his detention in Rome. As already established, Polybius' patriotic depiction of his Achaean idols served as *exempla* of ideal political behaviour to his readers, which idealised Polybius' political authority because it made him appear just like them - an association encouraged by the historian.<sup>8</sup> The significant influence politicians like Philopoemen and Lycortas had on Polybius' image must cause his readers to question the historical accuracy of

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<sup>7</sup> Polybius wrote an account of the life of Philopoemen which is now lost, although Plutarch's *Life of Philopoemen* may have derived much of its information from Polybius' original. There has been debate as to when Polybius wrote his life of Philopoemen, with Pédech arguing it was written in Rome as a sort of didactic work for Aemilianus, although this view has been widely disputed by those who argue that it was an earlier work. Walbank's retort that you did not ask a Roman noble to model himself on a Greek brings to light the unlikelihood of Pédech's claims: Pédech (1951) 82-103; Walbank (1967) 221-2; Petzold (1969) 12-13 n. 5; Errington (1969) 232-4. Polybius' opinion of Philopoemen is evident in his political comparison with Aristaenus in his *Histories*: 24.11-13.

<sup>8</sup> For further discussion see section 3.1.

their depictions, as Polybius had motivation to make them seem as close to the ideal as possible.

Polybius' early political convictions seemed in line with those of his father Lycortas and Philopoemen. There was little evidence in the *Histories* of the type of relationship Polybius had with his father Lycortas, but the episodes of political involvement depicted in the narrative imply that the two of them were politically aligned. Polybius displayed his respect and admiration for his father through his depiction in the *Histories*, particularly of Lycortas' consistent focus on what was best for the League.<sup>9</sup> Philopoemen received the same type of reverence for his efforts to work in the interests of the League, which he believed was Achaean independence from Rome.<sup>10</sup> However, Polybius did not make any clear statements concerning his own political stance. Despite this, there are two episodes reported by Polybius in the *Histories* that indicated his early alliance with the political party of Philopoemen and Lycortas, and therefore with their promotion of Achaean independence.

The first significant indication that Polybius was allied with the political policies of his father, according to his own narrative, is in the Romans' identification of him as an opponent of Rome. In the winter of 170 the proconsul A. Hostilius Mancinus sent G. Popilius and Gn. Octavius to the Peloponnese to promote the war with Perseus and publicise the senate's recent decree to restrict wartime demands from Roman generals on Greek states.<sup>11</sup> One of the embassy's aims was to determine who supported the

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<sup>9</sup> Polyb. 2.40.2-6; 22.10.8-15; 23.16.

<sup>10</sup> Polybius also had a significant personal connection to Philopoemen, to the extent that he was selected to carry Philopoemen's ashes in his funeral procession: Plut. *Phil.* 21.3.

<sup>11</sup> Polybius did not explicitly include this decree in his account but it is alluded to at 28.3.3. Livy has a more detailed reference explaining that these envoys 'first caused to be read at Thebes and then to be carried about to all the cities of the Peloponnese the decree of the senate that no one should contribute anything to Roman officers for the war except what the senate should have voted' - '*senatus consultum Thebis primum recitatum per omnes Peloponnesi urbes circumtulerunt, ne quis ullam rem in bellum magistratibus Romanis conferret, praeterquam quod senatus censuisset*': 43.17.2. Livy claimed the embassy had the primary intention of publicising this decree, although Polybius depicted it more as a tour of Greece in order to gauge Roman support. This decree had been decided on because of previous abuses of power by Roman magistrates in Greece, and perhaps as suggested by Errington, to preserve senatorial control over foreign affairs: Polyb. 28.3.3; Livy 43.17.2; Errington (1969) 174 n. 1; Walbank (1979a) 330.

Romans in the war and who did not, which generated in Greece, according to Polybius, an atmosphere of fear.<sup>12</sup> Polybius claimed:

Gaius and Gnaeus were reported to have resolved, as soon as the Achaean congress was assembled, to accuse Lycortas, Archon, and Polybius, and to point out that they were opposed to the policy of Rome; and were at the present moment refraining from active measures, not because that was their genuine inclination, but because they were watching the turn of events, and waiting their opportunity.<sup>13</sup>

But they failed to do this, explained by Polybius, by their complete lack of any pretext.<sup>14</sup> The question here has to be how Polybius became aware of such accusations. This was phrased as a rumour, so could have been something Polybius heard retrospectively while he was in Rome, although there was no indication in the *Histories* that this was the case.<sup>15</sup> The specific naming of Lycortas, Archon, and Polybius implied this was more than just extrapolation from the rumours concerning the envoys, although Polybius' lack of explanation allows no sure conclusions.<sup>16</sup> However, the inclusion of this story in the *Histories* did indicate how Polybius wanted his early political career to be seen by his readers. This story provided two points for the reader to consider about Polybius' career in the Achaean League: first he was considered to be part of the party who opposed Roman control of the

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<sup>12</sup> Livy's account of this tour around the Peloponnese did not contain any of this detail. According to Livy, the closest Popilius and Octavius came to accusing anyone of disloyalty was the demand for hostages from the Aetolians. Walbank reiterated Polybius' implication that the Roman accusations were designed to polarise Greek opinion, as could be seen by the meeting of Lycortas and his allies discussed below, and likewise Cephalus and his allies in Epirus: Polyb. 27.15.14-16 (Cephalus); 28.3.1-7, 6.1-9 (Lycortas); Livy 43.17; Walbank (1979a) 331.

<sup>13</sup> Polyb. 28.3.7-8 (Shuckburgh trans.): 'οἱ δὲ περὶ τὸν Γάϊον, συναχθείσης τῆς τῶν Ἀχαιῶν ἐκκλησίας, ἐλέγοντο μὲν βεβουλεῦσθαι κατηγορήσειν τῶν περὶ τὸν Λυκόρταν καὶ τὸν Ἀρχωνα καὶ Πολύβιον, καὶ παραδείξειν ἄλλοτρίους ὑπάρχοντας τῆς τῶν Ῥωμαίων αἰρέσεως καὶ τὴν ἡσυχίαν ἄγοντας κατὰ τὸ παρόν, οὐ φύσει τοιούτους ὄντας, ἀλλὰ παρατηρούντας τὰ συμβαίνοντα καὶ τοῖς καιροῖς ἐφεδρεύοντας.'

<sup>14</sup> Polyb. 28.9-10.

<sup>15</sup> 'οἱ δὲ περὶ τὸν Γάϊον' indicated that Polybius heard this as a rumour: Polyb. 28.3.7. Walbank also included 'συναχθείσης τῆς τῶν Ἀχαιῶν ἐκκλησίας' as part of the rumour: (1979a) 331.

<sup>16</sup> The inclusion of this rumour may be a precursor to Polybius' claim that the Romans had no basis behind their accusations against the Achaean League in 168 that led to his detention in Rome. Both Polybius and Pausanias stated that the Romans had no clear evidence against the Achaean League and based their accusations on the word of Callicrates: Paus. 7.10.7-11; Polyb. 30.13.6-11.

Achaean League, and second, he was so significant within League politics, that he was recognised as a threat by the Romans. These points added significantly to Polybius' self-created image in the *Histories* as a teacher and a politician. It provided evidence not only of his political credibility but also of his own political significance, making him qualified to educate young soldier-politicians how to act.

The second significant indication of Polybius' early political alliance with his father Lycortas prior to his detention in Rome was his presence at what seemed to be an intimate meeting of political allies in 170.<sup>17</sup> Polybius informed the reader that the eight Achaean politicians who were present at this meeting were 'those who were in general sympathy of their policy,' meaning those that were allied with Lycortas' policy of political independence for Achaea, recognising Polybius as allied with this stance.<sup>18</sup> This meeting was called to discuss which policy to follow during the Third Macedonian War, with Lycortas advocating complete neutrality in the conflict:

For he held that co-operation with either would be disadvantageous to the Greeks at large, because he foresaw the overwhelming power which the successful nation would possess; while active hostility, he thought, would be dangerous, because they had already in former times been in opposition to many of the most illustrious Romans in their state policy.<sup>19</sup>

Here, according to Polybius, Lycortas seemed wary of Rome and aware that the Achaeans had been fighting to keep control of their internal politics. In this meeting, the Achaeans Stratius and Apollonidas also advised against action against Rome, but wanted to confront those Achaeans who had begun to decide their internal policies out of a desire to gain Roman favour, against the

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<sup>17</sup> Polyb. 28.3.7-10, 6. This meeting was held in anticipation of a visit from Gaius Popilius in 170 in order to discuss Achaea's involvement in the Third Macedonian War and was attended by Arcesilaus and Ariston of Megalopolis, Xenon of Patrae, Apollonidas of Sicyon, Stratius of Tritaea as well as Polybius, his father Lycortas, and Archon who had been *strategos* of the League in 172/1.

<sup>18</sup> Polyb.28.6.2: 'τὴν ἄλλην πολιτείαν ὁμογνωμονοῦντας.'

<sup>19</sup> Polyb. 28.6.4-6 (Shuckburgh trans.): 'τὸ μὲν γὰρ συνεργεῖν ἀλυσίτελές ἐνόμιζε πᾶσιν εἶναι τοῖς Ἕλλησιν, προορώμενος τὸ μέγεθος τῆς ἐσομένης ἐξουσίας περὶ τοὺς κρατήσαντας, τὸ δ' ἀντιπράττειν <Ῥωμαίοις> ἐπισηφαλές διὰ τὸ πολλοῖς καὶ τοῖς ἐπιφανεστάτοις Ῥωμαίων ἀντωφθαλμηκέναι περὶ τῶν κοινῶν πραγμάτων κατὰ τοὺς ἀνώτερον καιροῦς.'

best interests of the Achaean League.<sup>20</sup> Archon, the *strategos* in this year, advocated acting in accordance with circumstances, but to remain wary of the Romans and avoid giving them any possible pretexts for reprisals.<sup>21</sup> The others at this meeting supported this proposal: Polybius, Arcesilaus, Ariston, and Xenon.<sup>22</sup>

While Polybius' presence at this meeting implied that his policies were recognised to be in accordance with those of his father and the other politicians who advocated independence from Rome, his support for Archon proved that he also had his own ideas of what was best for the League.<sup>23</sup> This could be regarded as the point where Polybius' policies broke from those of his father, although this is a difficult conclusion considering we know little of his earlier political convictions.<sup>24</sup> Eckstein argued that Polybius' treatment of Aristaenus and the defence of his actions in 'On Traitors' implied that Polybius 'had to make an intellectual break both with his own father and with his early political idol Philopoemen' and align himself more with the co-operative policies of Aristaenus.<sup>25</sup> However the policy that Polybius voted for in this

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<sup>20</sup> Polyb. 28.6.6.

<sup>21</sup> In this instance, Archon mentioned the need to avoid the fate of Nicander, referring to Nicander of Trichonium who had been deported to Rome after being accused of being the first to retreat in the Battle of Callinus in 171 along with five other Aetolian generals: Livy 42.60.9; Polyb. 27.15.14, 28.4.6, 6.7. Polybius referred to their accusations as slander (*διαβολή*): 27.15.14. Walbank assumes Polybius had some association with him during his detention in Rome: (1979a) 82.

<sup>22</sup> In agreeing with Archon instead of his father, Polybius was making a tactical decision: Deininger (1971) 178-179; Walbank (1979a) 334.

<sup>23</sup> According to Walbank, this was not the first recorded instance of Polybius' policy differing from that of Lycortas. He argued that Polybius' digression condemning those who destroy agriculture upon conquest was a criticism of Lycortas and his decisions as *strategos* when the Achaean League defeated Messenia after the death of Philopoemen: Polyb. 23.15.1-3; 24.2.3, 9.13; Plut. *Phil.* 21.1; Walbank (1979a) 247.

<sup>24</sup> Errington argued that Lycortas had lost influence and Archon was now the leader of the anti-Roman party once led by Philopoemen: (1969) 210-211.

<sup>25</sup> Eckstein (1987a) 149. Polybius also defended Aristaenus elsewhere in the *Histories*, for example: 24.13.7-10. Polybius' passage 'On Traitors' could also be seen as defence of Aristaenus' actions in advocating the League transfer its allegiance from Philip V of Macedonia to the Romans in 198. Eckstein convincingly argued this passage was a response to the behaviour of Aristaenus and the defection of the Achaeans to the Roman campaign against Philip. Walbank argued that 'On Traitors' was not necessarily in response to the Achaean decision of 198 since only a minority was against forming an alliance with Rome, and Polybius did not need to justify Achaean actions. However the ancient sources give ample testimony for the controversy behind the decision to cede to Rome. Even if the vote had been passed by a minority, the negative reactions from other Greek states would have been motivation to give an *apologia*: Eckstein (1987a) 140; Walbank (1957) 12. For

meeting was not co-operation with Rome, but instead to act in accordance with circumstances (καίροίς), so while it was not the strict neutrality advocated by his father, it was still far from swearing allegiance to Rome.<sup>26</sup> It seemed that Polybius here was simply acting as he thought best for the League, in accordance with the political ideals he advocated in the *Histories*.<sup>27</sup> He may have had a harsher line of policy prior to this, but there is no way this could be proven conclusively. Perhaps he was considered part of Lycortas' party because they both advocated Achaean independence, although Polybius realised the threat Rome posed and counselled reason before defiance and believed, as Green put it, they 'should keep their options open.'<sup>28</sup> They were not opposing policies, but instead shades of grey.<sup>29</sup>

Polybius' account of this meeting of elite Achaean statesmen was significant because he chose to include it in the narrative, indicating that he wanted his readers to be aware of his political involvement. This contributed to his authority as a politician and was also proof of his Greek allegiance, reinforcing his loyalties to his fellow Greeks despite being detained in Rome. The inclusion of these stories indicated to Polybius' audience that he was a Greek patriot and had acted in the best interests of the League, even under threat of danger from the Romans. This image of Polybius as an Achaean politician unwilling to anger Rome, but still striving for the best possible position for his people, was reinforced by his conduct during the Third Macedonian War.

Polybius' diplomatic, and almost military, involvement in the Third Macedonian War added to the authority of his self-constructed image in the

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references to the defection in 198 see: Polyb. 18.13; Livy 32.20-23.3; Plut. *Flam.* 5.3; Paus. 7.8.1-2; App. *Mac.* 7; Zonar. 9.16.

<sup>26</sup> Polybius advocated maintaining the balance of power in the Mediterranean, shown by his praise of the efforts of Hiero II of Syracuse in attempting to maintain the balance of power between the Romans and Carthaginians in the First Punic War: Polyb. 1.83.3-4. Eckstein argued that passages in the *Histories* containing this idea of the balance of power, were also a defence of this decision in 171: (1995a) 5-6, 209 n. 258. See section 5.4 for discussion of this policy in Polybius.

<sup>27</sup> Refer to section 4.1 for Polybius' *exempla* of the ideal statesman.

<sup>28</sup> Green (1990) 276.

<sup>29</sup> Modern historians usually hailed this as a big change in Polybius' policy, even though Lycortas and Polybius' central policy, independence from Rome, still coincided. For example: Walbank (1974a) 7; Champion (2004) 221-222.



*Histories* by giving evidence of his political, diplomatic and military experience. In accordance with the decision of the Achaean leadership mentioned above, the Achaeans decided to cooperate with the Romans as the situation necessitated and attempt to avoid any reprisals. This could be seen once the war between Rome and Perseus had approached its decisive stage, when Archon put a proposal to the assembly to raise a force and join the Romans in the war.<sup>30</sup> According to Polybius, Archon chose to do this in order to refute the ‘suspicions and accusations’ (ὑπονοίας καὶ διαβολάς) of the Romans, which he seemed to anticipate at the end of the war.<sup>31</sup> Polybius, presumably as the *hipparch*, was charged with leading the Achaean embassy to the Romans, and seems to have made sure in his narrative to explicitly state that Archon commanded (ἐνετείλαντο) him to find the consul and get permission to join the army, sending word back immediately so the League did not delay in their support of Rome.<sup>32</sup>

Polybius led the embassy to the Roman commander Q. Marcius Philippus in Thessaly to inform him of the vote of the Achaeans and enquire where he would like them to rendezvous with the rest of his army.<sup>33</sup> However, when Polybius and the envoys caught up with the Romans they were in Perrhaebia and Polybius explained they ‘deferred the interview owing to the critical state of affairs, but shared in the danger of the invasion of Macedonia.’<sup>34</sup> The curiosity here is that by this point Philippus had already essentially achieved the invasion of Macedonia, as Polybius himself

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<sup>30</sup> Polyb. 28.12-13.6. Up until this point the only practical aid the Romans had requested from the Achaeans had been for them to furnish one-thousand soldiers to garrison Chalcis until the Romans arrived: Polyb. 27.2.11-12; Livy 42.44.8. As Burton pointed out, according to Livy, there had also been light troops at Tripolis, although it was unclear whether this was due to a requirement of their treaty or not: Livy 42.55.10; Burton (2012) 182.

<sup>31</sup> Polyb. 28.12.1. This was an interesting change of policy by Archon, although it is possible he anticipated this prior to his selection as *strategos*. Polybius’ phrasing of this sentence does imply that a Roman reaction to Achaean non-involvement was likely, although it was unclear whether this was due to the detention of a few of the Aetolian generals, or whether Archon had a clearer indication of the Romans’ displeasure, which may have impelled him to offer aid. See n. 21 above for reference to the Aetolian generals.

<sup>32</sup> Polyb. 28.12.4-5. Dmitriev claimed the offer of help from Achaea was evidence of their pro-Roman stance in this war: (2011) 325.

<sup>33</sup> See Livy for details of the campaign: 44.3.1-5.13.

<sup>34</sup> Polyb. 28.13.1-2: ‘τὴν μὲν ἔντευξιν ὑπερέθεντο διὰ τοὺς περιστώτας καιρούς, τῶν δὲ κατὰ τὴν εἴσοδον τὴν εἰς Μακεδονίαν κινδύνων μετεῖχον.’ It was unclear what kind of danger they faced, whether it was general since they were present at the battle, or particular, implying they were involved.

admitted.<sup>35</sup> So it appears that Polybius and the Achaean envoys accompanied the Roman army, but did not approach the commander to inform him of the decree of the Achaeans until the campaign had been won and the Roman army had reached Heracleium.

Pédech argued this delay in approaching Philippos was due to secret instructions from Archon, although Walbank argued that Polybius' delay to report to the consul was understandable since the army was crossing the slopes of Olympus, which was a dangerous undertaking.<sup>36</sup> In relaying his instructions from the *strategos*, Archon, Polybius implied that Archon had given him a sense of urgency in his mission, but Polybius' actions once he reached the Roman army displayed no urgency. The offer of assistance to the Romans was a genuine offer and would have been acted upon had Philippos accepted, although of course refusal was preferable.<sup>37</sup> For the Achaeans the important point was to appear as though they were supporting the Romans in the war, while the actions of Polybius made it clear they would have preferred not to be involved. The question is then, whether these instructions came from Archon, or whether Polybius took it upon himself to wait until the Romans were in a position favourable to the Achaeans.

The narrative implies that Archon was concerned to offer assistance to the Romans immediately, although he was not on the battlefield and unaware of the logistics of delivering the message to Philippos. This seems to suggest that Polybius undertook the decision not to immediately offer assistance to the Romans and only to do so once he was sure it would be rejected. However, there is no evidence to prove that this had not been the plan of Archon and Polybius all along. Polybius' account of his meeting with Philippos also seemed to be with the aim of avoiding any Roman reprisals, claiming that the Achaean embassy:

when they had an opportunity, presented the decree to Marcius,  
and informed him of the determination of the Achaeans to send

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<sup>35</sup> Polyb. 28.13.3-4.

<sup>36</sup> Pédech (1969) 257; Walbank (1979a) 344-345.

<sup>37</sup> Walbank (1979a) 344-345.

their total force to share with him in the struggles and dangers of the war. In addition they pointed out to him that all communications and commands which had reached the Achaeans from the Romans during the present war had been duly complied with.<sup>38</sup>

The main concern then in the Achaean offer, as shown by the tone of their meeting with the consul, was to avoid Roman accusations of disloyalty. In any case, this episode was evidence of Polybius' diplomatic and military experience and added to his authority in teaching such things to his audience. These accounts also added to his image as a patriotic Greek, since he did what was necessary to appease both the Romans and serve the interests of the Achaean League.<sup>39</sup>

In a perplexing move, Polybius stayed behind after the rest of the envoys returned to Achaea, although he was soon entrusted with instructions from Philippus and sent back to the League.<sup>40</sup> Perhaps Polybius' decision to stay with the Roman army indicated a curiosity, even at this point, about the Roman conquest. McGing pointed to the possibility that Polybius remained as an advisor to the Romans in order to improve his knowledge of the battlefield.<sup>41</sup> Polybius' interest in war and tactics made this a likely motive, particularly since he had limited military experience until this point. It was also

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<sup>38</sup> Polyb. 28.13.4-5: 'τότε λαβόντες καιρὸν τὸ ψήφισμα τῷ Μαρκίῳ προσήνεγκαν καὶ διεσάφουν τὴν τῶν Ἀχαιῶν προαίρεσιν διότι βουλευθεῖεν αὐτῷ πανδημει τῶν αὐτῶν μετασχεῖν ἀγώνων καὶ κινδύνων. καὶ πρὸς τοῦτοις ὑπέδειξαν διότι πᾶν τὸ γραφὲν ἢ παραγγελθὲν τοῖς Ἀχαιοῖς ὑπὸ Ῥωμαίων κατὰ τὸν ἐνεστῶτα πόλεμον ἀναντίρρητον γέγονεν.'

<sup>39</sup> Although, as Polybius' detention showed, the Romans were not appeased.

<sup>40</sup> Philippus sent Polybius back to the League to intercept a request from Appius Cento for five thousand men from the Achaeans to be sent to Epirus. Philippus entrusted Polybius with preventing this from happening. Since Polybius did not want word to spread of this request from Philippus, he ensured the refusal of Cento's request by invoking the senatorial decree stating that only the senate could directly request aid from the allies in Greece. In this way, the refusal was in accordance with the instructions Polybius considered private from Philippus, while also having legal grounds to refuse the request from Cento: Polyb. 28.13.7-14.

<sup>41</sup> Polybius had relatively little wartime experience until this point, and may have taken the opportunity to observe the Romans at war. Assuming he was born c.200, he may have been involved in the war against Messene in 183 when they revolted from the Achaean League, but otherwise we know of no other opportunity for him to have been involved in battle (although we know little about the Achaean League in the 170s): Livy 39.48.5; Polyb. 23.16.1; 24.9.12; see also McGing (2010) 142-3. However, the war with Messene was bitter and hard fought, due to the capture and execution of Philopoemen: Polyb. 23.12.3, 16.

possible that he stayed behind to ensure the consul's goodwill towards the Achaeans. Polybius' image as an historian with military experience was reinforced through his claim of involvement with the Romans in this war. For the reader, Polybius not only proved his knowledge of warfare, but moreover, of Roman warfare, confirming his didactic lessons as derived from experience rather than from theoretical knowledge.

In the *Histories*, Polybius' comparison of the policies of Aristaenus and Philopoemen allowed him to illustrate a didactic lesson on political behaviour. Through the *exempla* of these politicians he demonstrated for the reader good political policy and provided for them a model to follow. Aristaenus and Philopoemen advocated opposing political policies, but Polybius judged them not on which one was right, but rather on the benefit they brought to the Achaean League.<sup>42</sup> Polybius' lesson here was that the ideal statesman acted in the best interests of his people, which was a central philosophy for Polybius and the image he gave of his own political decisions prior to his detention at Rome. The discussion is based around the policies towards the Romans taken by Philopoemen and the politician Aristaenus and is framed in terms of a debate in Achaea.<sup>43</sup> Aristaenus advocated complying with all Roman decrees even when they contradicted Achaean law, and when possible even anticipating Roman demands, since there was no point in opposing the Romans if the Achaean League did not have the military strength to do so.<sup>44</sup> Philopoemen in opposition, advocated compliance with Rome only when Achaean law dictated it officially. In supporting this policy, Philopoemen was attempting to avoid Rome's complete political dominance of Achaea.<sup>45</sup> Polybius made his opinion clear:

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<sup>42</sup> Polyb. 24.11-13; Plut. *Phil.* 17.3; Paus. 8.51.4.

<sup>43</sup> These speeches from Aristaenus and Philopoemen were not taken exactly from speeches given by the two politicians, but rather compiled by Polybius from various defences each had made of his policies that he recalled when writing his *Histories*: Pédech (1964) 417; Walbank (1979a) 265; see also for general discussion of this passage: Errington (1969) 218-220; Aymard (1938) 362-3 n. 23; Badian (1952) 79-80; Petzold (1969) 43-44.

<sup>44</sup> Polyb. 24.11.4-6, 12.

<sup>45</sup> Polyb. 21.11.6-8, 13.1-7.

From what I have said the policy of Philopoemen was honourable, and that of Aristaenus plausible, but that both were safe.<sup>46</sup>

This was an ambiguous conclusion from Polybius, but this section also seemed to serve as defence of both Aristaenus' policies, in particular his advocacy in 198 of changing the League's allegiance to Rome, and also Philopoemen's policy of Achaean independence.<sup>47</sup> He claimed that both of these statesman protected Achaean equally with their policies towards Rome, perhaps in an attempt to deny Philopoemen's anti-Roman reputation.<sup>48</sup>

However, there must be more to this passage than a simple defence of these Achaean politicians, particularly since Polybius seems to reach a slightly contradictory conclusion. Walbank argued that this passage was written while Polybius was under the influence of Lycortas' political convictions; however, this is doubtful since Polybius' assessment of their policies depended primarily on the overall motivations of both Philopoemen and Aristaenus, not on Polybius' opinion of Rome.<sup>49</sup> There are perhaps two potential answers here. First, it is possible this discussion illustrated both Polybius' early political beliefs (those advocated by Philopoemen) and those formed later in life (those advocated by Aristaenus), so within his lifetime he advocated both of these policies independently. However, the more likely possibility is that there was no contradiction here, and Polybius was judging both of these politicians on what he saw as the most important quality in an Achaean politician, that was, the preservation of the Achaean League above all else.<sup>50</sup> This seemed likely, although the distinction of Philopoemen's policy

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<sup>46</sup> Polyb. 24.13.8-9: 'ἐκ τῶν προειρημένων δῆλον ὡς συνέβαινε γίνεσθαι τοῦ μὲν καλῆν, τοῦ δ' εὐσχήμονα τὴν πολιτείαν, ἀμφοτέρως γε μὴν ἀσφαλεῖς.' The Paton translation has been amended here in accordance with those changes suggested by Walbank: (1979a) 266.

<sup>47</sup> Polyb. 18.13-5. Refer to n. 25 above.

<sup>48</sup> Polyb. 24.13.9-10. Polybius also allegedly defended Philopoemen and his conduct in an audience with Lucius Mummius, begging the general to return the statues of the Achaean and claiming him as a friend of the Romans: Polyb. 39.3.3; Plut. *Phil.* 21.

<sup>49</sup> Petzold argued this was a late insertion that reflected the ethical concerns in writing history Polybius supposedly had in his later life. Walbank was unconvinced by this, particularly the claim Polybius only became aware of the ethical aspects of historical writing later in life; Petzold (1969) 49 n. 1; Walbank (1972) 167.

<sup>50</sup> Polybius' digression on the definition of treachery clearly established those statesmen who act in the interest of the state despite personal cost as the most admirable: Polyb. 18.13-15.

as 'honourable' (καλὴν) must elevate his policy above the 'plausible' (εὐσχήμονα) judgement given to Aristaenus'. Perhaps, then, the ideal was independence from Rome, but the more realistic policy - the one Polybius seemed to support in his *Histories* - was cooperation in order to ensure a continued existence.<sup>51</sup> This lesson for future politicians was significant in the *Histories*, and one Polybius tried to show himself as living up to in his own political career. The picture Polybius presented to his audience of his early political experiences added significantly to his image in the narrative as a teacher, historian, politician, and a Greek, by adding to his credentials and giving authority to his didactic lessons. However, this preoccupation must also lead the reader to question Polybius' concern to be acutely accurate in his historical narrative, since it was often eclipsed by his didactic purpose.

## 2) Polybius' attitude towards Rome before 167

The question of Polybius' attitude towards the Romans has been one greatly debated by modern historians. Some have argued that Polybius admired the Romans, while others argued that he regarded them negatively. It has also been argued that Polybius' opinion of the Romans changed over the period of his detention in Rome and release in 150.<sup>52</sup> However, Polybius' development of his own image in the *Histories* was consciously created, so it follows that his stance on Roman power was also a constructed aspect of this image. Polybius' image as a teacher and an historian necessitated a neutral stance in his assessment of Rome, which was why he did not dwell on his own detention.<sup>53</sup> That is not to say that he did not show favour or depict decisions or people positively, just that such portrayals were for the purpose of providing *exempla* or lessons on political/military/moral behaviour for his readers, rather than to vent his own personal opinions. Conversely, he provided negative examples of behaviour in order to educate his audience of soldier-politicians. In many cases the Romans were the main historical

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<sup>51</sup> Baronowski reached a similar conclusion: (2011) 167-168.

<sup>52</sup> This is the object of section 5.3.

<sup>53</sup> Refer to section 3.3 for discussion of Polybius' portrayal of his own detention in Rome.

*exemplum* in the *Histories*, not because Polybius had been assimilated into Roman culture, but because they provided the examples he wanted his audience to emulate and learn from. But this did not mean that he praised them without basis or overlooked bad decisions. Polybius both praised and criticised the Romans in order to fulfil his didactic purpose and contribute to his persona as the ideal teacher in the *Histories*.

All modern historians of second century Rome have a view on Polybius' opinion of Rome and its expansion in the Mediterranean. What we know of Polybius' life has fuelled much discussion and many conclusions on who he was and what he believed, since Polybius' statements in the *Histories* are not conclusive enough to definitively determine what he thought of Roman expansion. A recent book published by Baronowski has attempted to address the question of Polybius' attitude to Roman imperialism, arguing that in general he regarded imperialism favourably. More specifically, he argued that Polybius admired Roman imperialism, although he also counselled weaker states to act in ways that limited the growth of Roman power.<sup>54</sup> But Baronowski also concluded that Polybius was a patriot and wrote about Rome from a certain intellectual distance, specifically highlighting three significant points: first, Polybius' belief that subject states should cooperate with Rome, but actively ensure their own independence and in some cases work to limit the power of the dominant state; second, that this cooperation should be complete; and third, Polybius' realistic treatment of the behaviour of the dominant power during this rise to supremacy.<sup>55</sup>

However, Polybius has not always been so well regarded and the question of his opinion of Roman dominion is one that has been widely disputed. Most modern scholarship on Polybius has argued that he regarded Roman power positively. Baronowski argued that Polybius looked upon Rome favourably, and believed that its rule was consistently moderate and

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<sup>54</sup> Baronowski (2011) 169. The word 'imperialism' here has been used in keeping with Baronowski's use of the word: (2011) 11, 179-180 n. 53.

<sup>55</sup> Baronowski (2011) 166-173.

beneficent.<sup>56</sup> Ferrary also argued Polybius regarded Roman rule as moderate and beneficent, and was predominantly favourable towards their hegemony.<sup>57</sup> Momigliano argued that Polybius saw Roman rule as a natural progression of events and so was not negatively disposed towards Roman expansion.<sup>58</sup> Similarly, Musti argued that Polybius was not disapproving of Roman expansion.<sup>59</sup> Eckstein supported this argument, claiming that while Polybius' support was not absolute and did not overlook actions he regarded as morally reprehensible, he was positive in his overall opinion of Roman power.<sup>60</sup> One of the more outspoken critics of Polybius, De Sanctis argued that Polybius was a supporter and defender of Rome, even though he knew that this meant the domination of his native Greece. According to De Sanctis, Polybius favoured the Romans for their aristocratic favouritism and opposition to democracy.<sup>61</sup> This emphasis on socio-economic factors has been followed by both Fustel de Coulanges and Green who saw the Romans' favouritism of the wealthy aristocracy as motivation for Polybius' support of Rome.<sup>62</sup>

Walbank provided an alternative explanation of Polybius' attitude towards Rome that showed a development of opinion related to his personal situation and events in both Greece and Rome. According to Walbank, Polybius' regard changed from one of careful opposition prior to his detention in Rome, to pessimistic detachment during his detention, to strong support after his release from Rome.<sup>63</sup> Although unusual, there were also scholars who argued that Polybius was negatively disposed towards the Romans. For

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<sup>56</sup> Baronowski (2011) 10. See also Baronowski for an excellent survey of the arguments of modern scholars regarding Polybius' opinion of Rome: (2011) 5-11.

<sup>57</sup> Ferrary (1988) 286-291, 306-348.

<sup>58</sup> Momigliano (1972-3) 697-699; (1975) 29-31, 48-49; (1977) 67-77.

<sup>59</sup> Musti (1978) 50-57, 79-84: claimed that Polybius had mixed feelings about Roman imperialism but was overall positive.

<sup>60</sup> Eckstein (1995a) 100-109, 229-230.

<sup>61</sup> De Sanctis (1935) 625-630.

<sup>62</sup> Fustel de Coulanges (1893) 119-211; Green (1990) 279-283. Labuske also argues from a socio-economic point of view, claiming that Polybius was representative of the Greek upper class and that he recognised in Rome an ability or desire to maintain the existing social order in Greece: (1969) 339-344.

<sup>63</sup> These distinctions were not, however, exclusive: Walbank (1972) 166-183; (1974a) 3-31; (1977) 151-159; (1981-2) 237-256. Notable opposition to Walbank's conclusions are: Eckstein (1985) 265-282; (1995a) 100-109, 197-225, 229-30; Ferrary (1988) 286-291, 306-348; Shimron (1979-80) 104-117: who was unsympathetic in his disagreement with Walbank, stating towards the end of his article 'it would appear that on Walbank's assumptions Polybius suffered from a split personality': 114.



example Shimron argued that Polybius begrudged Roman rule, and Millar believed that Polybius' view of Rome was increasingly unfavourable throughout the *Histories*.<sup>64</sup> In addition, Golan suggested Polybius was not a blind admirer of Rome, hinting that in reality his opinion was instead the opposite.<sup>65</sup>

However, these modern historians have not made the distinction between Polybius' self-constructed image in the text and Polybius the man. It is difficult to recover how Polybius the man regarded Roman power, because the opinion he gave in the *Histories* was calculated and formed in order to fulfil his didactic purpose. The self-constructed image of Polybius that the reader gets in the *Histories* generally seems to have admired the Romans, but moreover he recognised their significance historically and used them and the circumstances of their rise to power to illustrate examples of behaviour and political policy for his audience. His admiration for the Romans, however, did not at all suggest that Polybius had forsaken his allegiance to the Achaean League and the Greeks. Nevertheless, there are many examples in the *Histories* where Polybius praised the achievements of the Romans.<sup>66</sup> His historical purpose betrayed his admiration for the Romans, just as book six highlighted the aspects of Roman society that Polybius believed contributed to their success.<sup>67</sup> This admiration was consistently illustrated in the *Histories*

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<sup>64</sup> Shimron (1979-80) 94-117; Millar (1987) 1-18.

<sup>65</sup> Golan (1995) 7.

<sup>66</sup> For example Polyb. 1.1.5-6, 2.2-7, 3.3-5, 4.1-5; 6.2.3; 8.2.3-4; 31.22.8; 39.8.7. Also refer to section 4.1 and the discussion of Polybius' purpose in writing the *Histories*.

<sup>67</sup> Book six was dedicated to *why* the Romans were able to gain so much power, a feat Polybius attributes to the Roman constitution. This was a topic that he believed was necessary to his *Histories* from the outset, and illustrated his admiration of the Romans: 'τίς γάρ οὕτως ὑπάρχει φαῦλος ἢ ῥάθυμος ἀνθρώπων ὃς οὐκ ἂν βούλοιο γινῶναι πῶς καὶ τίνι γένει πολιτείας ἐπικρατηθέντα σχεδὸν ἅπαντα τὰ κατὰ τὴν οἰκουμένην οὐχ ὅλοις τευτήκοντα καὶ τρισὶν ἔτεσιν ὑπὸ μίαν ἀρχὴν ἔπεσε τὴν Ῥωμαίων, ὃ πρότερον οὐχ εὕρισκεται γεγονός' - 'For who is so worthless or indolent as not to wish to know by what means and under what system of polity the Romans in less than fifty-three years have succeeded in subjecting nearly the whole inhabited world to their sole government – a thing unique in history?': Polyb 1.1.5-6. This was repeated again at the beginning of book six: 'ἐμοὶ δ' ὅτι μὲν ἦν ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἐν τι τῶν ἀναγκαίων καὶ τοῦτο τὸ μέρος τῆς ὅλης προθέσεως, ἐν πολλοῖς οἶμαι δῆλον αὐτὸ πεποιθέναι, μάλιστα δ' ἐν τῇ καταβολῇ καὶ προεκθέσει τῆς ἱστορίας, ἐν ἣ τούτου κάλλιστον ἔφαμεν, ἅμα δ' ὠφελιμώτατον εἶναι τῆς ἡμετέρας ἐπιβολῆς τοῖς ἐντυγχάνουσι τῇ πραγματείᾳ τὸ γινῶναι καὶ μαθεῖν πῶς καὶ τίνι γένει πολιτείας ἐπικρατηθέντα σχεδὸν πάντα τὰ κατὰ τὴν οἰκουμένην ἐν οὐδ' ὅλοις πεντήκοντα καὶ τρισὶν ἔτεσιν ὑπὸ μίαν ἀρχὴν τὴν Ῥωμαίων ἔπεσεν, ὃ πρότερον οὐχ εὕρισκεται γεγονός' - 'Now, that I have always regarded this account as one of the essential parts of my whole design, I have, I am sure, made

through Polybius' portrayal of the Roman constitution, Rome's expansionist aims and the conduct of its leaders.

The aspects of Roman society that Polybius emphasised were those aspects that he wanted his readers to pay the closest attention to. Polybius' didactic purpose would have determined what he chose to praise and also what he chose to ignore in his assessment of Roman success. He was providing *exempla* for his audience of soldier-politicians, illustrating to them why the Romans reached such a high level of success. McGing argued that Polybius' portrayal of the Roman constitution in book six was 'unrealistically rigid; and he may have failed to appreciate the complexities of Roman political life.'<sup>68</sup> Despite this possibility, for Polybius, the focus of book six was to present lessons on what he considered the most successful aspects of the Roman constitution as an example for his readers, not really understanding its complexities.

One of the key features of Roman society that Polybius admired was its constitution.<sup>69</sup> Through his persona as a teacher in the *Histories*, Polybius wanted to emphasise to his reader the importance of the Roman constitution, presenting it as a key reason for Roman success. Book six was Polybius' attempt to understand and explain the Roman constitution through the filter of traditional Greek political theory on the 'nature of states and human societies.'<sup>70</sup> The mixed constitution of the Romans, comprising of democratic (assemblies), aristocratic (senate), and monarchical (the consuls) elements, appeared to Polybius as the ideal constitutional form. Not because as Walbank described it, it was 'like a cake made out of well-mixed ingredients', but because each separate form was a check on the other, ensuring a

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evident in numerous passages and chiefly in the prefatory remarks dealing with the fundamental principles of this history, where I said that the best and most valuable result I aim at is that readers of my work may gain a knowledge how it was and by virtue of what peculiar political institutions that in less than fifty-three years nearly the whole world was overcome and fell under the single dominion of Rome, a thing the like of which had never happened before': Polyb. 6.2.2-4.

<sup>68</sup> McGing (2010) 15.

<sup>69</sup> The fragmentary nature of book six offers some complications in analysis, although Polybius' opinion of the Roman constitution was clearly established.

<sup>70</sup> Walbank (1998) 46-47.

balanced and stable constitution.<sup>71</sup> Rome was also distinct and superior because its development into a mixed constitution occurred naturally and was a culmination of years of political development.<sup>72</sup>

Polybius' confidence in the value of the Roman constitution was evident in his comparison of the constitutions of Sparta, Crete, Mantinea, and Carthage, which were historically considered admirable.<sup>73</sup> In comparison to Rome, these constitutions were dismissed for various reasons; Crete was dismissed for bad customs and laws (ἔθη καὶ νόμοι) which were reflected in the actions of their populace, and Sparta was dismissed for its lack of constitutional mechanisms that allowed it to effectively expand its power both inside and outside the boundaries of the Peloponnese, while also failing to curb such desires in its leaders.<sup>74</sup> However, Polybius' most thorough comparison was between Carthage and Rome, presumably due to this book interrupting the narrative on the Second Punic War. Polybius argued the constitution of Carthage was already in decline, illustrated by the domination of the masses in decision-making.<sup>75</sup> More particularly the Carthaginian constitution was dismissed because of their use of mercenary soldiers compared to the Roman practice of using citizen soldiers and allies.<sup>76</sup>

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<sup>71</sup> Polyb. 6.11-18. The concept of the mixed constitution can be traced back to Thucydides and Aristotle: Thuc. 8.97.2; Arist. *Pol.* 1273b.35-40; Walbank (1998) 51. Nicolet attempted to argue that Polybius' ideal constitution was not mixed, but an aristocracy. However, Walbank convincingly disputed this theory: Nicolet (1983) 25-35; Walbank (1998) 49-51.

<sup>72</sup> Polyb. 6.4.13. According to Walbank's calculations, Rome became a mixed constitution in 449 and had reached the ideal state by the time of the Second Punic War, implying perhaps that it was not at its best when Polybius was detained in Rome: (1972) 148; (1998) 52. For discussion of this natural progression see Walbank (1998) 51-58.

<sup>73</sup> Polybius also briefly compared the constitutions of Athens and Thebes, but discounted them as unsuited to comparison with Rome, concluding that in these 'states in which everything is managed by the uncurbed impulse of a mob in the one case exceptionally headstrong and ill-tempered and in the other bought up in an atmosphere of violence and passion' – ἐν αἷς ὄχλος χειρίζει τὰ ὅλα κατὰ τὴν ἰδίαν ὁρμὴν, ὁ μὲν ὀξύτητι καὶ πικρὰ διαφέρων, ὁ δὲ βίᾳ καὶ θυμῷ συμπεπαιδευμένος': Polyb. 6.44.9. In addition, Polybius considered Plato's Republic, but declared it unfair to compare a theoretical constitution to one that was genuine: Polyb. 6.47.7-10.

<sup>74</sup> Polyb. 6.47.1-6 (Crete), 48-50 (Sparta). Mantinea was ignored completely even though Polybius included it in his list of constitutions usually praised: 6.43.1.

<sup>75</sup> Polyb. 6.51.3-8. In accordance with Polybius' *anacyclosis* discussed at: 6.3-9. For discussion on the *anacyclosis* see: Von Fritz (1954) 60-95; Walbank (1972) 130-150; (1998) 45-59; McGing (2010) 169-194.

<sup>76</sup> Polyb. 6.52.3-8.

For the Romans, fighting as they are for their country and their children, never can abate their fury but continue to throw their whole hearts into the struggle until they get the better of their enemies.<sup>77</sup>

Polybius advanced this idea by commending the Roman navy as superior, even though their naval skills were inferior to the Carthaginians.<sup>78</sup> They were superior due to their courage, with Polybius claiming that ‘not only do Italians in general naturally excel Phoenicians and Africans in bodily strength and personal courage, but by their institutions also they do much to foster a spirit of bravery in the young men.’<sup>79</sup> Polybius used the traditional Roman aristocratic funeral to illustrate this fostering of courage and bravery in the aristocratic youth of Rome. This, according to the author, was one of the institutions in Roman society that compelled aristocrats to aim for glory by encouraging an eagerness to act for the good of Rome and was a tradition completely foreign to the Greeks.<sup>80</sup> Polybius also applauded the Romans’ attitude towards wealth, in that they condemned the acquisition of money made in ways considered unacceptable, a distinction that was not made in Carthage.<sup>81</sup>

However, above these considerations, Polybius argued that the key reason why the Roman constitution was superior to all others was its religious

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<sup>77</sup> Polyb. 6.52.7-8: ‘ἐκεῖνοι γὰρ ὑπὲρ πατρίδος ἀγωνιζόμενοι καὶ τέκνων οὐδέποτε δύνανται λῆξαι τῆς οργῆς, ἀλλὰ μένουσι ψυχομαχοῦντες, ἕως ἂν περιγένωνται τῶν ἐχθρῶν.’

<sup>78</sup> Polyb. 6.52.9-11.

<sup>79</sup> Polyb. 6.52.11: ‘διαφέρουσι μὲν οὖν καὶ φύσει πάντες Ἰταλιῶται Φοινίκων καὶ Αἰβύων τῇ τε σωματικῇ ῥώμῃ καὶ ταῖς ψυχικαῖς τλμαῖς· μεγάλην δὲ καὶ διὰ τῶν ἐθισμῶν πρὸς τοῦτο τὸ μέρος ποιοῦνται τῶν νέων παρὸρμησιν.’

<sup>80</sup> Polyb. 6.53-4. Polybius provided an example here of the type of behaviour the Roman funeral engendered in Roman aristocrats, by recounting the story of Horatius Cocles: Polyb. 6.55; Champion (2004) 94-95. However, Johanson disputed Polybius’ understanding of the Roman funeral, through his choice of Horatius Cocles as an example, pointing out that fighting in single combat and dying was not the way to attain a glorious Roman funeral, which was based on the achievement of magistracies. Notably, Livy’s account of the story of Horatius Cocles did not end in his death, but rather a reward of as much land as he could plough in one day: Livy 2.10.11. Johanson also argued that the most spectacular aspect of the funeral, the funeral games, was neglected entirely by Polybius, a factor that would have increased the grandeur and inspirational nature of the Roman funeral: Johanson (2008) 168-173. However, there is limited evidence of funeral games held in Rome in the historical record, implying that the assumption that these games were common, and of this magnitude, cannot be conclusively made: Val. Max. 2.4.7; Livy 23.30.15; 31.50.4; 39.46.2; 41.28.11; Plin. *HN* 35.52.

<sup>81</sup> Here Polybius specifically mentioned money gained through bribery: 6.56.1-5.

supports.<sup>82</sup> Polybius saw Roman religion as a sort of counter to immoral behaviour, citing in particular financial corruption of government officials.<sup>83</sup> In the Romans' unwillingness to break or depart from their traditional religious customs, Polybius saw a means of control manipulated by the aristocracy to control the masses - a threat against immoral behaviour that kept the Roman people disciplined in their actions.<sup>84</sup> Polybius' interpretation of Roman religion betrayed his Greek origins, since the perception of religion as a means of control had first been expressed by Critias in the fifth century.<sup>85</sup> This religious scepticism was clearly displayed in the *Histories*:

I believe that it is the very thing which among other peoples is an object of reproach, I mean superstition (δεισιδαιμονίαν), which maintains the cohesion of the Roman state. These matters are clothed in such pomp and introduced to such an extent into their public and private life that nothing could exceed it, a fact that will surprise many.<sup>86</sup>

So Polybius was not blind to the significance of Roman religion, yet this was only one of the few references to religion in the *Histories*.<sup>87</sup> Polybius' own view of religion seems to have blinded him to its significance for the Romans, as the only way he could comprehend it was by assuming, and he admitted it

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<sup>82</sup> Polyb. 6.56.6-7.

<sup>83</sup> Polyb. 6. 56.13-15.

<sup>84</sup> Polyb. 6.56.8-13. In this section, Polybius applied an established Greek notion to Roman religion, reflecting the influence his culture had on his interpretation of the Romans. This idea can be traced back to the Critias fragment preserved in Sextus Empiricus, as well as the Pythagoreans : Sex. Emp. *Math.* 9.54 = DK 2.88, B 25 from the *Sisphus*; Isoc. 11. 25; Walbank (1957) 741-742. This idea was also repeated later in the *Histories*: Polyb. 16.12.9-10: 'In cases indeed where such statements contribute to maintain a feeling of piety to the gods among the common people we must excuse certain writers for reporting marvels and tales of the kind, but we should not tolerate what goes too far' – 'ὅσα μὲν οὖν συντείνει πρὸς τὸ διασώζειν τὴν τοῦ πλήθους εὐσεβειαν πρὸς τὸ θεῖον, δοτέον ἐστὶ συγγνώμην ἐνίοις τῶς συγγραφέων τερατευομένοις καὶ λογοποιοῦσι περὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα· τὸ δ' ὑπεραῖρον οὐ συγχωρητέον.'

<sup>85</sup> Sex. Emp. *Math.* 9.54 = DK 2.88, B 25 from the *Sisphus*; Walbank (1957) 741-742.

<sup>86</sup> Polyb. 6.56.7-8: 'καὶ μοι δοκεῖ τὸ παρὰ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἀνθρώποις ὀνειδιζόμενον, τοῦτο συνέχειν τὰ Ῥωμαίων πράγματα, λέγω δὲ τὴν δεισιδαιμονίαν· ἐπὶ τοσούτον γὰρ ἐκτετραγώδηται καὶ παρεισῆκται τοῦτο τὸ μέρος παρ' αὐτοῖς εἰς τε τοὺς κατ' ἰδίαν βίους καὶ τὰ κοινὰ τῆς πόλεως ὥστε μὴ καταλιπεῖν ὑπερβολήν. ὃ καὶ δόξειεν ἂν πολλοῖς εἶναι θαυμάσιον.' As Vaahtera pointed out, Polybius' negative view of superstition was evident through the use of δεισιδαιμονίαν, not a derogatory word in itself, but παρὰ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἀνθρώποις ὀνειδιζόμενον showed Polybius' intention here was not positive: (2000) 252 and n. 9.

<sup>87</sup> For example: Polyb. 3.25.6-8; 12.4b; 21.2.1-3; 13.11; 22.3.4; 32.6.5.

was his own opinion, that the Romans used religion as a means to control the masses.<sup>88</sup> As Vaahtera pointed out, Polybius ‘either misinterpreted what he saw, or intentionally perverted the picture he wished to give to his readers of the Roman *politeia*.’<sup>89</sup> Here Polybius’ didactic purpose overshadowed his claims of truth, as he all but ignored a factor of Roman social and political cohesion that did not coincide with the lessons he wanted to impart to his reader, a factor that he claimed was the most important aspect. This highlighted Polybius’ image as a teacher in the *Histories* and his unwillingness to include something he considered irrational as a lesson for his readers. The inclusion of this religious aspect would have damaged his didactic purpose in the *Histories* and the authorial credibility he had worked so hard to establish.

Polybius’ didactic purpose compelled him to praise the aspects of the Roman constitution he thought would be of benefit to his readers, reinforcing his image as a teacher. The factors that he recognised as admirable and praised most about the Roman constitution were: its laws and customs; its ability to accommodate the Romans’ desire for expansion successfully; the dedication it inspired in its citizen-soldiers; the way it fostered courage in the youth of Rome and taught them to prioritise the good of the state; the negative attitude towards wealth acquired by dishonourable means; and finally its use of religion to discipline the masses. These were the aspects of the Roman constitution he wanted his readers to learn from, even though the fragmentary nature of book six means that there could have been other factors he admired about Rome. There was also a possibility that Polybius may have compared aspects of the Roman constitution unfavourably to other political constitutions,

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<sup>88</sup> Polyb. 6.56.9: ‘My own opinion at least is that they have adopted this course for the sake of the common people’ – ἔμοί γε μὴν δοκοῦσι τοῦ πλήθους χάριν τοῦτο πεποιηκέναι.’ Polybius earlier in book six recognised the significance of religion in Roman society: 6.56.8. Plutarch illustrated the significance of religion at Rome when he claimed, ‘to such a degree did the Romans make everything depend upon the will of the gods, and so intolerant were they of any neglect of omens and ancestral rites, even when attended by the greatest successes, considering it of more importance for the safety of the city that their magistrates should reverence religion than that they should overcome their enemies’ (Perrin trans.) – οὕτω πάντα τὰ πράγματα Ῥωμαίοις εἰς τὸν θεὸν ἀνήγετο, μαντειῶν δὲ καὶ πατρίων ὑπεροψίαν οὐδ’ ἐπὶ ταῖς μεγίσταις εὐπραξίαις ἀπεδέχοντο, μείζον ἠγούμενοι πρὸς σωτηρίαν πόλεως τὸ θαυμάζειν τὰ θεῖα τοὺς ἄρχοντας τὸν κρατεῖν τῶν πολεμίων’: Plut. *Marc.* 4.4.

<sup>89</sup> Vaahtera (2000) 251-264.

although this is only speculation.<sup>90</sup> In addition to this, the natural development of the Roman constitution into a mixed constitution was highlighted by Polybius as unique and admirable, and was evidence of the Roman ability to adapt politically - another aspect of the Roman constitution that Polybius wanted to highlight to his audience as an admirable example of behaviour.<sup>91</sup>

One of the key aspects of the Roman constitution that Polybius emphasised to his audience was its ability to cope with the Roman desire to expand. Baronowski's recent study on Polybius' attitude towards Rome, not only argues that Polybius was favourable towards Rome in particular, but that he also approved of imperialism in general.<sup>92</sup> According to Baronowski, the intellectual community in which Polybius wrote his *Histories* was 'largely favourable towards Rome and strongly inclined to accept imperialism.'<sup>93</sup> Evidence of this was apparent in Polybius' comparison of constitutions in book six, specifically his criticism of Lycurgus' constitution in Sparta as lacking the support necessary for imperial expansion.<sup>94</sup>

But if any one is seeking aggrandisement, and believes that to be a leader and ruler and despot of numerous subjects, and to

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<sup>90</sup> Polybius concluded near the end of book six 'with this description of the formation, growth, zenith, and present state of the Roman polity, and having discussed also its difference, for better (βελτίονος) and worse (χείρονος) from other polities, I will now at length bring my essay on it to an end' – 'Ἡμεῖς δ' ἐπειδὴ τὴν τε σύστασιν καὶ τὴν αὐξήσιν τῆς πολιτείας, ἔτι δὲ τὴν ἀκμὴν καὶ τὴν διάθεσιν, πρὸς δὲ τούτοις τὴν διαφορὰν πρὸς τὰς ἄλλας τοῦ τε χείρονος ἐν αὐτῇ καὶ βελτίονος διεληλύθαμεν, τὸν μὲν περὶ τῆς πολιτείας λόγον ὧδέ πη καταστρέφομεν': Polyb. 6.57.10. We have no extant section in book six that covered these 'worse' comparisons, but this suggested the existence of such a section.

<sup>91</sup> Polyb. 6.4.13.

<sup>92</sup> 'Imperialism' has been used here in keeping with Baronowski's use: see n. 54 above.

<sup>93</sup> Baronowski (2011) 65. Baronowski claims that the majority of historians and poets accepted Roman power, while the philosophers endorsed imperial rule on both moral and pragmatic grounds as part of international politics. Polybius' contemporary Agatharchides was the only historian to portray imperialism negatively, calling it both unjust and excessive, and criticising the imperial powers of Rome and Greece for their expansionist policies: Burstein (1989) 34-35.

<sup>94</sup> Polyb. 6.50. Although he conceded that if the aim of a people was self-defence, then the Spartan system was unparalleled. Baronowski dwells on this point, but emphasises Polybius' opinion of imperialism through using his praise of those men who achieved imperial power, and also of those who attempted to achieve imperial power and failed, as evidence. However, Polybius' praise of individuals who achieved imperialism instead seems to speak to his ideals of statesmanship and doing all for the good of the state, instead of specific favouritism towards imperial expansion. Similar is Baronowski's argument that Polybius praised those who attempted expansion, despite failure. His evidence for this point was Polybius' discussion of Greek disasters in his preface to the Achaean War, which again can be associated with Polybius' ideals of statesmanship. For a different interpretation of this section of Polybius see section 4.5 and chapter eight.

have all looking and turning to him, is a finer thing than that, - in this point of view, we must acknowledge that the Spartan constitution is deficient, and that of Rome superior and better constituted for obtaining power.<sup>95</sup>

Clearly, the ability to expand was significant for Polybius. But even without this evidence, Polybius' own subject matter would be enough to argue his favourable opinion of expansion or what he saw as Rome's path towards a 'better state' ('ἐπὶ τὸ βέλτιον').<sup>96</sup> He wrote the *Histories* in order to display to his audience the qualities it took to be as successful as Rome, providing them as a didactic example of successful expansion for his readers.<sup>97</sup> This clearly shows that the Roman ability to expand effectively was an importance component of Polybius' positive depiction of them.

The significance of Polybius' attitude towards the Romans as a teaching tool is evident by his willingness to criticise the Romans when he thought they were providing a bad example for his readers. His admiration was rational, so his assessments of Roman behaviour were also logical and in accordance with his image as a teacher in the *Histories* and his concern to provide his readers with rational models of behaviour. Sasso pointed out that Polybius' admiration of Rome did not lead to any qualms about criticising them when necessary.<sup>98</sup> Polybius did not shy away from criticising the Romans' conduct towards their detainees, although he did not voice any personal dissatisfaction, due to his concern to maintain the image he had created in the *Histories*.<sup>99</sup> He had no hesitation in referring to Demetrius' continued detention in Rome as unjust, and did all he could to motivate and

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<sup>95</sup> Polyb. 6.50.3-5: 'εἰ δέ τις μειζόνων ἐφίεται, κακείνου κάλλιον καὶ σεμνότερον εἶναι νομίζει τὸ πολλῶν μὲν ἡγεῖσθαι, πολλῶν δ' ἐπικρατεῖν καὶ δεσπόζειν, πάντας δ' εἰς αὐτὸν ἀποβλεπεῖν καὶ νεύειν πρὸς αὐτόν, τῆ δὲ πῆ συγχωρητέον τὸ μὲν, Λακωνικὸν ἐνδεές εἶναι πολίτευμα, τὸ δὲ Ῥωμαμαίων διαφέρειν καὶ δυναμικωτέραν ἔχειν τὴν σύστασιν.'

<sup>96</sup> Polybius 1.12.7; see also Baronowski (2011) 66.

<sup>97</sup> By contrast, Millar argued that Polybius' purpose in analysing Rome's success was neutral and not necessarily an endorsement to follow their example: (1987) 4.

<sup>98</sup> Sasso (1961) 73-76. In addition, Polybius' speeches have been portrayed as a vehicle through which Polybius criticised the Romans: Millar (1987) 15-16; Champion (2000) 425-444.

<sup>99</sup> For further discussion see section 3.3.



help Demetrius to escape his Roman wardens.<sup>100</sup> He did not hesitate in criticising Roman conduct, even in those books he wrote while detained in Rome.<sup>101</sup> The most significant example of this was the Romans' seizure of Sardinia that Polybius referred to as 'contrary to all justice.'<sup>102</sup>

Nor did Polybius portray all imperial expansion as positive, but judged each instance individually in order to demonstrate for the reader positive motivations and methods for growth. Baronowski provided multiple examples of instances in the *Histories* where Polybius criticised those who attempted to expand in ways that he found morally or politically corrupt, but ultimately claimed that this did not contradict Polybius' generally favourable attitude towards imperialism.<sup>103</sup> Polybius particularly criticised the type of imperialism that was motivated by extreme greed or cruelty.<sup>104</sup> As Baronowski pointed out, there were certain types of expansion Polybius considered blameworthy:

the enslavement of Greeks by Greeks, the betrayal of Greeks to barbarians, treachery, hypocrisy, excessive harshness, expansion unjustified by any pretext, and the political subordination of the Achaean League to Macedonia.<sup>105</sup>

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<sup>100</sup> Polyb. 31.11.7. The senate's later support of Alexander Balas against Demetrius was also criticised heavily by Polybius: 33.18.6-14. His relationship with Demetrius cannot be blamed for his criticism of the senate's conduct here, since he also criticised Demetrius: 31.13.9; 32.10.4-8; 33.19; see also Eckstein (1995a) 107.

<sup>101</sup> Books one to fifteen. For discussion see section 3.4.

<sup>102</sup> Polyb. 3.28.2: 'παρὰ πάντα τὰ δίκαια.' For other instances where Polybius criticised Roman policy see: 1.37.7-10; 2.21, 8; 9.10; 31.10.7, 21; 35.4.3.

<sup>103</sup> Baronowski (2011) 67.

<sup>104</sup> Baronowski (2011) 66-67. For example, Polybius condemned the attempts of Philip V and Antiochus III to acquire Egypt, conduct that was both disgraceful and motivated by extreme greed: 15.20. He was also heavily critical of the Spartans at various points in history. He denounced Sparta's part in the King's Peace in 387, which was motivated by Spartan greed for money and power: 6.48.8-49.5. Likewise he censured the seizure of Cadmeia by the Spartan general Phoebidas in 382 and the decision of the Spartans, who relieved him of command, to maintain this new territory even though imperial action had not been sanctioned to begin with: 4.27.3-4; Baronowski also used the example of the Spartans' conquest and expulsion of their allies the Mantineans in 385: Polyb. 4.27.6-7; Baronowski (2011) 66-67. It is curious that the majority of instances pointed out by Baronowski in the *Histories* where Polybius was critical of imperial expansion concerned Spartan expansion or the actions of the monarchies of Macedonia and Syria.

<sup>105</sup> Baronowski (2011) 67.

It is possible, though, that Polybius' censure depended not on the actions themselves, but on those people who were behind them.<sup>106</sup>

The Romans did not receive the same level of censure for similar acts of greed in their imperial dealings in the Mediterranean.<sup>107</sup> They were aggressive in their expansion, although there seemed to be a point for Polybius where aggression became greed - a line the Romans rarely seemed to cross. They quite often realised the potential for expansion in war and actively sought such outcomes, but they were not vilified by Polybius in the *Histories* for this, perhaps due to the Romans' concern to always have justifications for their actions.<sup>108</sup> The attention Polybius paid to justifying expansionist actions offers some kind of explanation for his lack of criticism towards the Romans for actions he condemned in others. For Polybius, justification seemed to be an important factor in going to war, just as he claimed it was for the Romans. He stated:

for the Romans very rightly paid great attention to this matter, since, as Demetrius says, when the inception of war seems just, it makes victory greater and ill-success less perilous, while if it is thought to be dishonourable and wrong it has the opposite effect.<sup>109</sup>

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<sup>106</sup> The negativity with which he portrayed the Spartans throughout the *Histories* could be argued to be more than simply coincidence. The Spartans after all were in conflict with the Achaean League for much of the second century prior to the Achaean War in 146, and Polybius was certainly subjective in his portrayal of the Achaeans or their enemies; for example, the Aetolians: 3.7.3; 4.15.9; 5.107.7; 18.53.7; 21.26.16. That was not to say that the acts of the Spartans or of Philip V and Antiochus III were not morally reprehensible, simply that the object of such derision was more the product of authorial bias than a reflection of their actions.

<sup>107</sup> The most obvious of which was the seizure of Sardinia and Corsica in 237. Polybius called it an act 'contrary to all justice' but there was little beyond this censure: 3.28.2.

<sup>108</sup> For example, against the Gauls in Northern Italy (2.13.5-7; 2.21.7-9; 2.31.7-10) and Antiochus (21.4.4-5); see also Baronowski (2011) 71.

<sup>109</sup> Polyb. 36.2.2-3: 'πολὺ γὰρ δὴ τούτου τοῦ μέρους ἐφρόντιζον Ῥωμαῖοι, καλῶς φρονούντες· ἔνστασις γὰρ πολέμου κατὰ τὸν Δημήτριον δικαία μὲν εἶναι δοκοῦσα καὶ τὰ νικήματα ποιεῖ μείζω καὶ τὰς ἀποτεύξεις ἀσφαλεστέρας, ἀσχήμων δὲ καὶ φαύλη τούναντίον ἀπεργάζεται.' Similar ideas are illustrated in a fragment attributed to Polybius, although it cannot be conclusively claimed to be from the *Histories*: 'For the Romans took no ordinary forethought not to appear to be the initiators of unjust actions and not to appear to be attacking those around them when they took on wars, but always to seem to be acting in self-defence and to enter upon wars out of necessity' - 'οἱ γὰρ Ῥωμαῖοι οὐ τὴν τυχοῦσαν πρόνοιαν ἐποιούντο τοῦ μὴ κατάρχοντες φαίνεσθαι χειρῶν ἀδίκων μηδ' ἀναιρούμενοι τοὺς πολέμους τὰς χεῖρας ἐπιβάλλειν τοῖς πέλας, ἀλλ' αἰεὶ δοκεῖν ἀμυνόμενοι καὶ κατ' ἀνάγκην ἐμβαίνειν εἰς τοὺς

The Romans were always conscious of the need to offer justifications for their actions, a tradition dictated by the fetial laws, and one that Polybius recognised as important.<sup>110</sup> Although few historians would now argue that the fetial law restricted Roman aggression, there was at least an attempt by the Romans to give justifications for their wars. Baronowski concluded:

although a pretext (*prophasis*) is not the true reason for any decision, its function is to establish a veridical appearance of justice. For this reason, it must be a reasonable explanation, an acceptable justification, based on facts. Thus a pretext is an explanation that would in itself justify a decision if it actually were the true reason (*aitia*). It is therefore the duty of every statesman or government preparing to initiate a war to cite decent pretexts.<sup>111</sup>

So for Polybius, the offering of a justification, even if not true, was the most important component.<sup>112</sup> Imperial expansion was only justified if a reason was given for it, while unadulterated and unjustified greed for expansion without any reasonable pretext was to be criticised. As Baronowski pointed out above, the necessity of providing a reasonable pretext for war was a political lesson that Polybius wanted to emphasise to his readers in his image as the teacher in the *Histories*.

Polybius also judged the Romans on their political intervention in foreign affairs as a way to illustrate to his readers correct diplomatic behaviour. He seemed to express his own particular kind of political morality at certain points, criticising the Romans if he deemed their behaviour unjust - a judgement usually based on his concept of the ideal statesman.<sup>113</sup> Nevertheless, as Baronowski pointed out, in instances where Polybius did

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πολέμους: Polyb. F. 99 B-W. Text and translation have been taken from Derow: (1979) 15. As Derow pointed out this passage was Polybian in language and phraseology and was seen to be associated with 36.2, although cannot be conclusively claimed as Polybian: Nissen (1871) 275.

<sup>110</sup> For discussion on the relevance of the fetial laws in Roman war see: Harris (1979) 166-175; Ando (2011) 37-63.

<sup>111</sup> Baronowski (2011) 75.

<sup>112</sup> Baronowski did not link this specifically to those instances where Polybius explicitly criticised imperial behaviour: (2011) 73-77.

<sup>113</sup> For discussion on Polybius' ideal statesman see section 4.1.

show censure towards the political actions of the Romans, the opposing party was always simultaneously attributed some kind of fault. There was no criticism however, when the Romans had been provoked into action, since they were simply responding to the situation and could not be at fault.<sup>114</sup> The dominance of the Romans after 167 led Polybius to argue that smaller states should defer to the Romans when necessary in an attempt to maintain their own autonomy. This put responsibility on the statesmen of the smaller state to act in their best interests, without threatening their ability to remain independent - in accordance with Polybius' theory of the ideal statesman.<sup>115</sup> Polybius was willing to criticise the Romans in diplomatic actions, but quite often the blame went both ways, as the Greeks failed to understand their position and the Romans reacted as they saw fit. Polybius was providing a lesson for his readers in accordance with his image in the *Histories* of the correct way for a small power to interact with a larger, dominant power. In particular, he emphasised the need to survive as a politically independent entity.<sup>116</sup>

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<sup>114</sup> Baronowski (2011) 77-85. Baronowski cited these examples: Polyb. 30.1.1-3.8 (the Romans were provoked, with Polybius by implication blaming both Eumenes and Attalus); 30.19.1-13 (Eumenes provoked the Romans and they refused to meet any Kings in Italy [167/6] in order to place Eumenes in a politically unfavourable position and advance their own interests); 24.8-10 (unprovoked, but essentially the fault of Callicrates, a leader of the Achaean League, who encouraged the Romans to be more active in the affairs of Greece - Polybius did however criticise this new policy of the Romans); 30.18 (Prusias II of Bithynia was criticised for prostrating himself before the Romans, although there was some censure here towards Rome for rewarding such behaviour); 30.20 (Polybius here criticised the Romans for awarding the Athenians territory they were not entitled to, although the Athenians were more at fault for asking for it in the first place); 31.2.1-11; 31.11.4-12 (Polybius here criticised the Romans for their treatment of Demetrius and installation of the boy-king Antiochus V to the Syrian throne in order to weaken the monarchy and further Roman interests, since the political intrigue of the officials running the kingdom for the young monarch could be counted on to further weaken the state); 31.10.1-10 (here Polybius criticised the Romans for unfairly distributing land between Ptolemy VI and Ptolemy Physcon, when their previous agreement had been fair, although Ptolemy Physcon was blamed for asking the Romans to do this); 31.21 (Polybius criticised the Romans for continuously finding in favour of Masinissa on the question of the cities of Emporia, causing the Carthaginians to surrender this territory and pay an indemnity); 32.10 (Polybius criticised the Romans for deciding for Orophernes against Ariarathes, although ultimately laid blame with the envoys of Orophernes for deceiving the Romans); 33.15.1-2; 33.18.5-14 (Polybius criticised the Romans for supporting Alexander Balas in his opposition to Demetrius, but he laid blame with Heracleides who he claimed misinformed the Romans).

<sup>115</sup> This policy was given as that of the Achaean League when Callicrates advised the Romans to start being harsher in their diplomatic interactions, and was also the policy embraced by Aristaeus and Philopoemen - although to differing degrees: Polyb. 24.8-10, 11-13. See also: 27.15.10-13; 28.6.

<sup>116</sup> Eckstein claimed that Polybius' advice here was based on the temporary nature of Roman power and the assumption that in accordance with the nature of constitutions it will eventually

Even though Polybius criticised the Romans in order to educate his readers on good political policy, there may have been some instances where Roman blame was glossed over due to personal loyalties to Aemilianus.<sup>117</sup> The creation of Polybius' image in the *Histories* gave the author an agenda that affected his ability to remain objective.<sup>118</sup> When discussing the importance of historical accuracy, Polybius recognised the difficulty in remaining impartial:

It may be said that it is easy enough to say this but exceedingly difficult to do it, because there are so many and various conditions and circumstances in life, yielding to which men are prevented from uttering or writing their real opinions. Bearing this in mind we must pardon these writers in some cases, but in others we should not.<sup>119</sup>

Polybius recognised the difficulty in remaining objective when dealing with friends, so it was a possibility that he consciously, or unconsciously, adjusted his narrative to reflect favourably on Aemilianus or his family.<sup>120</sup>

Polybius' causal examination of Rome's wars did not initially imply that he considered blame as part of his role as an historian. Derow has convincingly argued that Polybius was interested in his causal examinations in order to pinpoint the factors that led to decisions, that led to war. Guilt and accountability were not the author's primary objectives, but if sought it must be through seeking the primary instigator, which was quite often the

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decay: (2010) 55. Polybius' political lesson gives support to Eckstein's' realist argument that in the anarchic state system the aim of all states was survival, although Eckstein also argued that this instinct perpetuated conflict: (2006) 14-23, 94-104.

<sup>117</sup> Baronowski agreed that Polybius may have been restricted: (2011) 172. However, Eckstein claimed that Polybius was more able to express his own opinions than scholars have previously assumed: (1995a) 10.

<sup>118</sup> For example his patriotism, see section 3.1.

<sup>119</sup> Polyb. 8.8.8-9: 'ἀλλ' ἴσως τοῦτ' εἰπεῖν μὲν εὐμαρές, πράξαι δὲ καὶ λίαν δυσχερές διὰ τὸ πολλὰς καὶ ποικίλας εἶναι διαθέσεις καὶ περιστάσεις, αἷς εἰκόντες ἄνθρωποι κατὰ τὸν βίον οὔτε λέγειν οὔτε γράφειν δύνανται τὸ φαινόμενον. ὧν χάριν τισὶ μὲν αὐτῶν συγγνώμην δοτέον, ἐνίοις γε μὴν οὐ δοτέον.'

<sup>120</sup> Polyb. 16.14.8; Luce (2011) 297-298.

Romans.<sup>121</sup> Polybius made it clear that his primary concern was to distinguish between reasons (αἰτίαι), a beginning (ἀρχή), and a pretext (πρόφασις), although accountability was often a result.<sup>122</sup> In the case of the Second Punic War there was no clear assignation of blame, although it was implied.<sup>123</sup> However, this analysis of causes by Polybius was not used enough in the *Histories* to provide a clear model of causality.<sup>124</sup> Nevertheless, in the case of the Second Punic War, this system of analysis may have allowed Polybius to imply blame, while avoiding any negative impression on the family of Aemilianus.<sup>125</sup>

The relationship between Aemilianus and Polybius has been one questioned by many modern historians.<sup>126</sup> While, as already established, Polybius may have been wary of depicting his friends in a negative light,

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<sup>121</sup> Derow (1979) 13. Walbank argued that Polybius' method of assessing αἰτία, πρόφασις and ἀρχή presupposed a decision to lay blame on one party involved in the conflict. Polybius' use of αἰτία to denote anything that contributed to the decision to go to war meant that he had to decide who made the decisions and therefore who was at fault: Walbank (1972) 159-160.

<sup>122</sup> Polyb. 3.6-7. Thucydides distinguished between causes (αἰτίαι), the beginning (ἀρχή), and the 'truest explanation' (ἀληθεστάτη πρόφασις), but Polybius' perception of these words was slightly different. As Walbank pointed out, for Polybius αἰτία was anything that contributed to the decision to go to war, πρόφασις was the reason given for war, true or false, and ἀρχή was the first action that began the war. Eckstein described αἰτία as 'a human psychological state or an event in the real world insofar as it led to a human psychological state': Thuc. 1.23.6; Walbank (1972) 158; (1965b) 9; Eckstein (1989) 1; see also Pearson: (1952) 215-219.

<sup>123</sup> Polyb. 3.30.4: 'If on the other hand the taking of Sardinia from them, and imposing the heavy money fine which accompanied it, are to be regarded as the causes, we must certainly acknowledge that the Carthaginians had good reason for undertaking the Hannibalic war: for as they had only yielded to the pressure of circumstances, so they seized a favourable turn in those circumstances to revenge themselves on their injurers' (Shuckburgh trans.) – 'εἰ δὲ τὴν Σαρδόνος ἀφαίρεσιν καὶ τὰ σὺν ταύτῃ χρήματα, πάντως ὁμολογητέον εὐλόγως πεπολεμηκέναι τὸν κατ' Ἀνίβαν πόλεμον τοὺς Καρχηδονίους· καιρῶ γὰρ πεισθέντες ἠμύνοντο σὺν καιρῶ τοὺς βλάψαντας.' Polybius had already established that the seizure of Sardinia was the greatest (μέγας) cause of the Second Punic War, implying the Romans were culpable: 3.10.1-5.

<sup>124</sup> Walbank argued prior to Derow's 1979 thesis that this contradiction between Polybius depicting Rome as the aggressor and their supposed blamelessness in his causal assessment of wars may have been due to a) the assumption by those of the time that large powers normally sought to expand their power, and b) Polybius' theory of *tyche* and his portrayal of the calculation of the Romans, led him to 'postulate a development with a logical inevitability, which ignored the detailed analysis of events and the specific motives of those active in them': Walbank (1972) 165-166.

<sup>125</sup> The tension between Polybius' portrayal of the Romans as conscious aggressors and his failure to allocate fault was first argued by Holleaux, although Derow has dispelled the notion of a contradiction here: Holleaux (1921) *passim*; Derow (1979) 1-15; see also Walbank (1963b) 1-13.

<sup>126</sup> Polybius' relationship with Aemilianus has already been addressed in sections 2.1, 3.3 and 4.1.

Scipio's positive portrayal was due to his significance as an *exemplum* of political behaviour for Polybius' readers. Astin referred to Polybius as a 'client and fervent admirer' of Aemilianus, and while there was ample proof in the *Histories* that Polybius depicted Aemilianus as an ideal *exemplum* of behaviour, there was little evidence to claim he was his client.<sup>127</sup> Polybius did not depict their relationship as one of patron-client association.<sup>128</sup> Although his favoured position in Rome was due to Aemilius Paullus and his sons, his presentation of Aemilianus was not that of a client towards a patron, as has been pointed out by Burton.<sup>129</sup> Instead Polybius depicted their relationship as one of a teacher and student. Not only did Polybius establish this dynamic, but it was also encouraged by his overall construction of his image as a teacher in the *Histories*.<sup>130</sup> Aemilianus was evidence of Polybius' authority to teach his readers, so Polybius' positive portrayal of Aemilianus throughout the *Histories* was determined by his position in the narrative as an ideal *exemplum*.

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<sup>127</sup> Polybius' admiration of Aemilianus was clear: 31.23-30; 36.8.6; Astin (1967) 3.

<sup>128</sup> Walbank highlighted the patron-client system as a significant part of Roman culture absent from the *Histories*, using it to argue that Polybius did not really understand the Romans. He argued that 'despite a close personal relationship with Scipio, one can detect in Polybius some degree of failure to sense the nuances of public life at Rome and the values which held the esteem of the Roman aristocracy'; he also talks of the association between Aemilianus and Polybius as both independently a 'friendship' and a 'congenial relationship'. Etlund argued that Polybius did understand the patron-client system but discussed it in the *Histories* using Greek terminology, and that he himself was a Roman client. Shimron called Polybius a 'servant of the Romans' at the 'beck and call of his patron'; however, there is little evidence of this in the *Histories*. More probable is McGing's reference to their relationship using the same terms that Polybius does; as a type of father-son relationship of friendship and guidance: Walbank (1972) 8, 117, 168; Etlund (1977) 129-136; Shimron (1979-80) 96; McGing (2010) x37, 140. For further discussion of the relationship between Polybius and Aemilianus see section 2.1 and 3.2.

<sup>129</sup> Burton (2011) 72. Polybius and Paullus were already associated when he arrived in Rome: 31.23.4-5. Shimron pointed out that Polybius would not have expressed his inferiority, while this was true, there was also no reason to believe he was treated as inferior by Aemilianus: (1979-80) 102 n. 32.

<sup>130</sup> Shimron pointed out a curiosity in Polybius' praise of Aemilianus; he was praised because of his personal qualities, but not as a politician or military general in the extant sections of the *Histories*. This is interesting in that it was usually agreed that Polybius taught Aemilianus practical advice and encouragement, not, as has been argued by Friedländer, philosophy. Polybius himself implied this was not the kind of education he had to offer Aemilianus. It has also been proposed by Astin that Polybius encouraged Aemilianus to court publicity and popularity as a means to a political career, as could be seen by the advice Plutarch claimed Polybius gave Aemilianus never to leave the forum without making a new acquaintance: *Regum* 82.2. Cicero claimed that Polybius and Aemilianus often discussed politics: Polyb. 31.24.6; Cic. *Rep.* 1.34; Friedländer (1945) 337; Astin (1967) 31, 339; Shimron (1979-80) 102-103.

Polybius' admiration for the Romans reflected his didactic purpose, as he held their political decisions and institutions up as *exempla* for his audience of soldier-politicians. The image of a teacher that Polybius fostered in the *Histories* regarded these Roman institutions in this way because it was useful for his readers and fulfilled his didactic purpose, a distinction not usually acknowledged by modern historians. As has already been established in this section, most authors have argued that Polybius regarded Roman power positively. Most recently Baronowski, who argued that Polybius generally saw Roman power as 'moderate and beneficent' and consistently portrayed it this way throughout the period described in the *Histories*.<sup>131</sup> There were two occasions in the narrative where Polybius portrayed the Romans as moderate in their treatment of those who appealed to them for help. Initially Polybius put these sentiments into the mouth of Lycortas, but then he repeated it in his own voice as narrator soon after.<sup>132</sup> According to Polybius, the Romans would do what they could to help those in need, and would even reconsider their decisions if they proved to be unreasonable:

The Romans are men, and with their noble disposition and high principles pity all who are in misfortune and appeal to them; but, when anyone who has remained true to them reminds them of the claims of justice, they usually draw back and correct themselves as far as they can.<sup>133</sup>

Lycortas first adopted this idea when he advised the Achaeans that it was not necessary to comply with requests from the Romans if they considered the requests excessive or unwarranted. Polybius repeated it again later when he criticised the underhanded politics of the Achaean Callicrates, who according to Polybius, instigated the initial decrease of Achaean influence and power in the Mediterranean.<sup>134</sup> This was a clear lesson to his readers to be moderate

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<sup>131</sup> Baronowski (2011) 10.

<sup>132</sup> Polyb. 24.8.2-4, 10.11-12.

<sup>133</sup> Polyb. 24.10.11-12: Ῥωμαῖοι ὄντες ἄνθρωποι καὶ ψυχῇ χρώμενοι λαμπρᾶ καὶ προαιρέσει καλῇ πάντας μὲν ἐλεοῦσι τοὺς ἐπταϊκότας καὶ πᾶσι πειρώνται χαρίζεσθαι τοῖς καταφεύγουσιν ὡς αὐτούς. ὅταν μὲντοι γέ τις ὑπέμνησε τῶν δικαίων, τετηρηκῶς τὴν πίστιν, ἀνατρέχουσι καὶ διορθοῦνται σοφᾶς αὐτοὺς κατὰ δύναμιν ἐν τοῖς πλείστοις.

<sup>134</sup> In neither of these cases were any examples cited, however there must be some precedent that led both Lycortas and Polybius to this conclusion. According to Polybius, Lycortas made such claims in 181, and the actions of the Romans in 183/2 may have led



with those who have less power, clearly reinforcing the connection between Polybius' praise of the Romans and his didactic purpose.

Finally, Champion's influential argument on Polybius' portrayal of the Romans must be considered. Champion argued that his own cultural, political, and educational perspective determined Polybius' communal depictions. Champion claimed that Polybius' communal characterisations were informed by the already established Greek intellectual means of differentiation between peoples, which was composed of three distinct theories: that there may be naturally distinct characteristics for different peoples (*phusis* - nature); they may be influenced by geography and climate factors; and finally the possibility that political and societal factors may help form collective characterisations, in particular the Hellenic concept of *paideia* (traditional education).<sup>135</sup> This certainly helped inform Polybius' perception of people in the narrative, in particular the third theory evident in book six of the *Histories*.<sup>136</sup> According to Champion, Polybius' portrayal of the Romans in his *Histories* was culturally indistinct, motivated by his political circumstances and his culturally diverse audience of both Greeks and Romans.<sup>137</sup> At different times in his work Polybius presented the Romans both in a positive light, where he culturally assimilated them as Hellenes, and in a negative light as barbarians, which

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them both to this conclusion. In 183 the Achaeans had requested that the Romans help them with their effort against Messene, or at least place an embargo on ships carrying supplies from Italy during the war. The Romans had just received the advice of Q. Marcius Philippus urging them to take a harder line with the Greeks, and refused this appeal, informing the Achaeans they were on their own: Polyb. 23.9.11-15; Livy 40.2.6-8. Despite this, when the Achaeans successfully defeated Messene, the Romans acted as if they had not given the previous answer and placed an embargo on goods travelling from Italy to Messene in accordance with the original request from the Achaean League: Polyb. 23.17.3-4. There was also the Achaeans' announcement in 182 concerning the addition of Sparta to the Achaean League, something the Romans had ruled on in 184: Polyb. 23.4; Livy 39.48.2-4; Paus. 7.9; 182: Polyb. 23.17.5-18.2. In addition, the Romans had decreed in 184 that Spartan capital cases had to be heard by a foreign court, while the Achaeans reversed this in 182 without reaction from Rome. So Lycortas' statement in 181 seemed logical in light of these conclusions, although the same conclusions could not be reached for the period after the Third Macedonian War: For discussion on the different trends in the relationship between the Romans and the Achaean League see: Leenen (2011) 1-5.

<sup>135</sup> Champion (2004) 6.

<sup>136</sup> According to Champion this theory determined the structure of the *Histories*, with the first five books describing the Hellenic characteristics of the Romans at their pinnacle (just as the Achaean League was), whereas book seven onwards showed the societal degradation of both the Romans and the Greeks as they began to show barbaric characteristics: (2004) 6-7.

<sup>137</sup> Champion (2004) 4: Champion defined culture as 'the construction and representation of discrete systems of social processes ascribable to human collectivities.'

Champion referred to as cultural alienation.<sup>138</sup> Interestingly, this was not a classification based on ethnicity, but rather for Polybius one based on the success of a people's societal and political structures.

There are many aspects of Champion's argument that are difficult to deny. Polybius' conception of group characterisation seems to have been founded on traditional Greek lines, as was his depiction of Roman success. However, Polybius' decision to portray the Romans in a positive or negative light depended on the *exempla* they presented to the reader at the time, since he was using their success as a means to educate his audience on the behaviour of the ideal statesman. It may be that Polybius' decision to portray the Romans negatively in any instance caused him to depict them in a traditionally un-Greek, barbaric way, but this was not Polybius' motivation for such a depiction. He simply used the cultural terminology that was familiar to him in providing a positive or negative example for his readers, as Champion termed it, the Hellenic/barbarian bipolarity.<sup>139</sup> In accordance with Polybius' self-constructed image in the *Histories* as a teacher, his aim was to use the behaviour and policies of the Romans as teaching tools for his readers to learn from.

### 3) Polybius' attitude towards Rome after 167

Polybius' decision to extend his original plan for the *Histories* was motivated by a concern to provide examples of behaviour for his readers to model their own behaviour on. The original scope of the *Histories* had afforded multiple opportunities for Polybius to establish his authorial image as a teacher and provide didactic instruction for his audience of soldier-politicians, but the period following the Third Macedonian War was rife with opportunities for Polybius to illustrate his political ideology. Polybius

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<sup>138</sup> Champion (2004) 2-3. When the Romans were praised for their actions they were often characterised in Hellenic ways, although when they acted in ways Polybius disapproved of, they were seen as barbarians. For Champion, Polybius' depictions of the Romans as barbarians were subtle examples of resistance to Roman power: (2004) 2.

<sup>139</sup> Champion (2004) 3. Instances where Polybius referred to the Romans as barbarians: 1.11.7, cf. 5.104.1-11; 9.32.3-39.7; 11.4.1-6.8; 12.4b.2-3; 18.22.8.

considered 167 to be the most pivotal year for Roman relations in the Mediterranean, since it was this year when the prophecy of Demetrius of Phalerum came true and the Macedonian Empire fell to the rising power of Rome.<sup>140</sup> The defeat of Perseus at the end of the Third Macedonian War made the supremacy of the Romans inescapable, and for Polybius there was no use from this point onwards in attempting to stem the tide of Roman power. Polybius' agenda as a teacher in his extension of the *Histories*, like the original section, could overshadow his historical objectivity, since his primary concern was to provide lessons that would be of use to his readers. Even though there was a change in historical purpose for Polybius, his didactic aim remained consistent throughout the narrative. This extended period also facilitated the presence of Polybius within the historical narrative, which in terms of establishing historical authority was more significant than fulfilling the purpose of the last ten books.

Polybius explained his decision to expand the *Histories* at the beginning of book three, just prior to his treatment of the Second Punic War. Polybius justified the extension of his original time-frame by claiming it would allow him to analyse the way the Romans governed their subjects, and how the people under Roman dominion regarded their use of power. The overall aim seems to have been in order to assess whether the Romans were deserving of praise or blame in their conduct after the Third Macedonian War, both for contemporaries and people in the future. He stated:

The present generation will learn from this whether they should shun or seek the rule of Rome; and future generations will be taught whether to praise and imitate, or to condemn it.<sup>141</sup>

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<sup>140</sup> Polyb. 39.21.

<sup>141</sup> Polyb. 3.4.7-8 (Shuckburgh trans., although 'condemn' has been used instead of 'decry'): 'δῆλον γὰρ ὡς ἐκ τούτων φανερόν ἐσται τοῖς μὲν νῦν οὖσιν πόττερα φευκτὴν ἢ τούναντίον αἰρετὴν εἶναι συμβαίνει τὴν Ῥωμαίων δυναστείαν, τοῖς δ' ἐπιγενομένοις πότερον ἐπαινετὴν καὶ ζηλωτὴν ἢ ψεκτὴν γεγονέναι νομιστέον τὴν ἀρχὴν αὐτῶν.' This passage implies that Polybius considered resistance to Rome a possible outcome once his readers had finished the *Histories*. As Walbank claimed, this could be seen as Polybius claiming that his history will provide the evidence that will allow his contemporaries to decide whether to accept Roman domination or actively resist it: Walbank (1972) 28.

However, Polybius also acknowledged that his presence in the historical record was part of the motivation for extending his *Histories*:

owing to the importance of the actions and the unexpected character of the events, and chiefly because I not only witnessed most but took part and even directed some, I was induced to write as if starting a fresh work.<sup>142</sup>

Polybius' increased historical role in these last books allowed him to emphasise his own actions in order to contribute to the authority of his image as a teacher and historian.

Books thirty to thirty-nine of the *Histories* covered the period 167-146. Walbank argued that Polybius intended a division within these ten books, claiming it was implied when Polybius stated:

So the final end achieved by this work will be, to gain knowledge of what was the condition of each people after all had been crushed and had come under the dominion of Rome, until the disturbed and troubled time that afterwards ensued.<sup>143</sup>

Walbank concluded that the book to year ratio was heavily in favour of the years 152/1-146/5, which covered the 'disturbed and troubled times' (ταραχῆς καὶ κινήσεως). There were nine books that covered the period 167-146. Of these, the first four (30-33) covered the years 167-152, while the final four (35-39) covered the years 152/1-146. This clearly established the importance that Polybius attributed to what he described as disturbed and troubled times.<sup>144</sup> This argument seems reasonable, considering Polybius placed his geographical book thirty-four between these two sections. However, other modern historians have disputed such a clear division, with McGing stating

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<sup>142</sup> Polyb. 3.4.13: 'ὑπὲρ ἧς διὰ τὸ μέγεθος τῶν ἐν αὐτῇ πράξεων καὶ τὸ παράδοξον τῶν συμβαινόντων, τὸ δὲ μέγιστον διὰ τὸ τῶν πλείστων μὴ μόνον αὐτόπτης, ἀλλ' ὧν μὲν συνεργὸς ὧν δὲ καὶ χειριστὴς γεγονέναι, τροπήχθην οἷον ἀρχὴν ποιησάμενος ἄλλην γράφειν.'

<sup>143</sup> Polyb. 3.4.12-13: 'διὸ καὶ τῆς πραγματείας ταύτης τοῦτ' ἔσται τελεσιουργημα, τὸ γινῶναι τὴν κατάστασιν παρ' ἑκάστοις, ποία τις ἦν μετὰ τὸ καταγωνισθῆναι τὰ ὅλα καὶ πεσεῖν εἰς τὴν τῶν Ῥωμαίων ἐξουσίαν, ἕως τῆς μετὰ ταῦτα πάλιν ἐπιγενομένης ταραχῆς καὶ κινήσεως.'

<sup>144</sup> Walbank (1972) 174; (1977) 150-151. Walbank also claimed that the idea behind the ταραχῆς καὶ κινήσεως was the military procedures that lacked 'clear scope, organisation, and outcome': (1957) 302.

that Polybius perhaps only intended here to refer to a general decline into disarray after 167.<sup>145</sup> There does, however, seem to be a clear shift in Roman behaviour in the Mediterranean in 152/1, as I have argued elsewhere, which may be reflected here in Polybius' implied division.<sup>146</sup>

Many historians argue that Polybius' attitude towards the Romans evolved with this change of purpose. This section will argue that there was no alteration in Polybius' attitude towards the Romans, and that he was still primarily concerned with providing *exempla* for his audience of soldier-politicians to emulate. Polybius' self-constructed image in the *Histories* as a teacher was enhanced in this period by his own presence within the narrative, where the historical significance he claimed amplified his persona within the text. So the change in focus in the last ten books added authority to Polybius' image within the *Histories*, but he still portrayed the Romans in a generally positive way. Moreover, Polybius' concern to reinforce his image as a teacher and historian through his presence in the narrative, further overshadowed his concern to be historically accurate.

Baronowski argued that Polybius was consistently favourable towards Roman domination throughout the *Histories*.<sup>147</sup> He identified two main phases in the development of Roman power, divided (as Polybius did) at 168. Prior to 168, Roman foreign policy was characterised by 'acquisition and expansion' while the period between 168 and 145 was instead focused on preservation.<sup>148</sup> Ferrary argued that Polybius continued to admire the Romans in his narrative of the period after 167, claiming that their actions remained both moderate and beneficent. Eckstein also argues that Polybius was consistent in his attitude towards the Romans and did not at all hesitate to criticise the morality of Roman actions.<sup>149</sup> Millar argued the opposite, that Polybius' opinion of Rome was gradually more distant and negative. He also pointed out that Polybius did not at any point in the extant sections of the

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<sup>145</sup> Walbank (1972) 174; McGing (2010) 24.

<sup>146</sup> Specifically in relation to the Achaean League: Leenen (2011) 1-5.

<sup>147</sup> Baronowski (2011) 10.

<sup>148</sup> Baronowski (2011) 90.

<sup>149</sup> Eckstein (1995a) 108-109.

*Histories* state directly that Roman dominion was good and beneficial for those who were subjected to it.<sup>150</sup> Both Petzold and Gruen argued that Polybius' opinion of the Romans after 167 was hostile.<sup>151</sup> Gruen claimed that Polybius was increasingly cynical and focused on the self-interested actions of the Romans, stating that 'change in time and circumstances altered and clouded the image' of the Rome Polybius had described in book six.<sup>152</sup> As mentioned previously, Walbank argued that Polybius' opinion of Rome changed in accordance with his own circumstances and the context in which he lived. He argued that Polybius' political stance prior to his detention in Rome was one of careful opposition. This then developed, according to Walbank, into an attitude of detachment while he was detained in Rome, and one of strident support upon his release.<sup>153</sup>

The premise of Walbank's argument was based on Polybius' level of criticism of Rome in the *Histories*. Books one to fifteen, which were written while Polybius was detained in Rome, covered the years 264-202 and displayed an attitude of cynical detachment with some criticism of Rome.<sup>154</sup> Those books written after 146, that is books sixteen to thirty-nine, according to Walbank, showed an alignment in identification with Rome, although the characteristics of books one to fifteen still persisted. This was because books sixteen to thirty-three would have been written from Polybius' contemporary notes of events, so they would have shown traces of his attitude while detained in Rome. Books thirty-five to nine, which covered the years 152-146 did not have the same traces of cynicism according to Walbank, and showed Polybius' alignment and support for Roman policy.<sup>155</sup> However, the basis of Walbank's argument is determined by what he perceived as Polybius' attitude towards the Romans, implying that the determining factor in Polybius' portrayal of them was his personal feelings and circumstances. Instead, Polybius' depiction of the Romans was a consciously directed analysis of their political and diplomatic behaviour designed in order to reflect his didactic

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<sup>150</sup> Millar (1987) 4-5.

<sup>151</sup> Petzold (1969) 59-64; Gruen (1984) 346-351.

<sup>152</sup> Gruen (1984) 348.

<sup>153</sup> See section 5.2 for discussion on this argument.

<sup>154</sup> For discussion on Polybius' dates of composition see section 3.4.

<sup>155</sup> Walbank (1972) 166-183; (1974a) 3-31; (1977) 151-159; (1981-2) 237-256.

purpose. In particular, there was no indication in the *Histories* that Polybius identified himself more with the Romans in these later books than with his native Greeks.<sup>156</sup>

Polybius' attitude towards the Romans after 167 was consistent with his attitude towards them prior to this time. He looked upon their achievements with admiration, but used their behaviour as an educational vehicle for his readers, both praising and criticising them for the benefit of the audience. Perhaps the passage most often used to support the argument that Polybius was negative towards the Romans after 167 is his statement that:

For many decisions by the Romans are now of this kind: availing themselves of the mistakes of others they effectively increase and build up their own power, at the same time doing a favour and appearing to confer a benefit on those who have made the mistake.<sup>157</sup>

This statement was made within the context of the senate's decision to side with Ptolemy Physcon against his brother Ptolemy VI, which Polybius admitted was made in the senate's own interest. His dislike of Ptolemy Physcon is clear in the *Histories*, but there is no serious censure of the Romans in this passage.<sup>158</sup> He admitted the Romans were acting in their own interests out of concern for a strong ruler reigning over a consolidated Egypt, but that was what they were supposed to do.<sup>159</sup> There was perhaps some

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<sup>156</sup> This issue is discussed in section 5.4.

<sup>157</sup> Polyb. 31.10.7: 'πολύ γὰρ ἤδη τοῦτο τὸ γένος ἐστὶ τῶν διαβουλίῳν παρὰ Ῥωμαίοις, ἐν οἷς διὰ τῆς τῶν πέλας ἀγνοίας αὐξοῦσι καὶ κατασκευάζονται τὴν ἰδίαν ἀρχὴν πραγματικῶς, ἅμα χαριζόμενοι καὶ δοκοῦντες εὐεργετεῖν τοὺς ἀμαρτάνοντας.' The English translation is primarily taken from the Loeb edition, with τοὺς ἀμαρτάνοντας amended from 'on the offenders' to 'on those who have made the mistake' as argued by Ferrary and agreed upon by Eckstein. Walbank offered another alternative, translating it as 'on the guilty party': Ferrary (1988) 309-310; Eckstein (1995a) 104 n. 69; Walbank (1972) 170.

<sup>158</sup> Polybius claimed that the populace disliked Ptolemy Physcon. Polybius also became friends with Ptolemy VI's envoy Menyllus while he was in Rome. For dislike of Ptolemy Physcon see: Polyb. 31.10.4-5, 18.14-16; friendship with Menyllus: 31.12.8-13; Diod. 31.18.1; opinion of Ptolemy VI: 39.7.5-6; Walbank (1979b) 184; Eckstein (1995a) 103-105.

<sup>159</sup> Polyb. 31.10.6, 10.8-9. There were two other instances after 168/7 that the Romans acted in a devious manner according to Polybius: their arbitration between Carthage and Masinissa in 162/1 where they decided against Carthage and their decision in 153 to support Alexander Balas against Demetrius Soter. Both decisions were made in accordance with what was considered the most beneficial to Rome, although Eckstein used them to illustrate Polybius'

slight moral censure for the deviousness of the episode, but then it was not unusual for Polybius to criticise the Romans when he thought it necessary, so it cannot be claimed to indicate a souring of Polybius' attitude towards the Romans.<sup>160</sup> Baronowski agreed that this passage did not betray any negativity by Polybius towards the Romans, pointing out that any criticism was tempered by his admiration of the Romans' policy and his condemnation of Ptolemy Physcon for seeking Roman intervention on this issue.<sup>161</sup> Polybius' lessons on the ideal statesman for the reader revolved around this idea of putting the state before the individual good, which was the policy embraced here by the Romans. Livy claimed that this *nova sapientia* evident in Roman politics after the Third Macedonian War provoked the reaction of the conservative senators in Rome, but Polybius did not have a feeling of moral outrage here, since the Roman actions fell within his parameters of acceptable political behaviour.<sup>162</sup>

One of the most illuminating passages in the *Histories* is Polybius' survey of four Greek opinions after the destruction of Carthage in book thirty-six. Polybius claimed that a key reason for his extension of the *Histories* was the opportunity to assess the people's opinion of their Roman superiors. In this instance there is a clear attempt to fulfil this aim and assess Greek reactions to Roman actions. For Polybius this provided an opportunity for him in his image as the teacher, to educate his readers on the various opinions in Greece at the time and the repercussions of imperial expansion. He wanted his readers to be able to judge Roman actions and decide if they were to be

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moral censure at the Romans' betrayal of *fides*: Polyb. 31.21; 33.18; Eckstein (1995a) 100-107.

<sup>160</sup> Eckstein argued that this passage was intended to emphasise the immorality of the Romans' decision. Walbank used this passage to argue for Polybius' cynical detachment, admitting that his comments here did not necessarily imply censure of Roman actions. Elsewhere Walbank claimed the self-interested actions of the Romans 'can hardly have been to Polybius' liking': Eckstein (1995a) 103-105; Walbank (1972) 170-171; (1977) 152.

<sup>161</sup> Baronowski (2011) 83-84. Refer to section 5.2 for discussion on Polybius' tendency to criticise both the Romans and those who provoked them.

<sup>162</sup> The older senators rebelled at this deceit, but others praised this new wisdom as having given Rome the advantage in the war: Livy 42.38-8-43.3, 47.1-9. The *nova sapientia* originated with Marcius Philippus' embassy to Perseus in 172/1 just prior to the outbreak of the Third Macedonian War. Philippus managed to delay the war by forming a truce with Perseus over the winter months by giving him the impression that the senate was willing to consider peace, however his actual motivation was the incomplete nature of the Roman preparations for war. For discussion of the timing and logistics of Roman readiness see: Walbank (1941) 82-93. For discussion on Philippus and the divisions in the senate evident from this split in opinion see Briscoe (1954) 66-77.



praised or criticised, so this passage was one of the more overtly didactic in the last ten books.<sup>163</sup> Polybius did not claim any one of these opinions as his own in the narrative, because it was important for him to be perceived as neutral in his image as both a teacher and historian. However, it seems likely that his own opinion fell within the realm of those expressed.

Of the four opinions presented in this passage, two were positive towards the actions of the Romans, while two were critical. The first point of view praised the Romans for their destruction of Carthage, claiming their behaviour was wise and the actions of good statesmen aimed at the protection of Rome. The Romans showed intelligence by eliminating a people who had always been, and remained, a threat to the wellbeing of their empire.<sup>164</sup> The second point of view was negative and claimed the Romans were increasingly driven by a lust for power, becoming like the tyrannical empires of the Athenians and Spartans. Their behaviour against the Carthaginians was unforgivingly severe and completely unprovoked, heralding an extreme change in the way the Romans treated their enemies.<sup>165</sup> The third point of view claimed that the Romans were usually honourable in war, but in this war with Carthage they had acted in a deceptive and deceitful way that had hindered the Carthaginians' ability to form any effective opposition.<sup>166</sup> The fourth point of view directly argued against the third, claiming that the Romans had acted within the acceptable bounds of wartime behaviour because the Carthaginians had willingly surrendered through a *deditio* to the Romans and faced the consequences after they had refused to abide by Roman directives.<sup>167</sup>

This passage forms a unique part of the *Histories*, indicating Polybius' need to illustrate the tensions that split Greece on the question of Rome's conduct in the Mediterranean. There have been many theories from modern historians arguing which, if any, of these opinions was Polybius' own view of

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<sup>163</sup> Polyb. 3.4.

<sup>164</sup> Polyb. 36.9.3-4.

<sup>165</sup> Polyb. 36.9.5-8.

<sup>166</sup> Polyb. 36.9.9-12.

<sup>167</sup> Polyb. 36.9.12-17.

the Roman destruction of Carthage. Petzold argued that Polybius' opinion could be seen through the second and third critical views of Rome, based on similar opinions elsewhere in the *Histories*.<sup>168</sup> In opposition, Walbank argued that the first and last opinions that supported Roman actions were those of Polybius. Walbank argued this based on four reasons. First, he calculated the amount of space attributed to each opinion and concluded that the final opinion was the most serious.<sup>169</sup> Second, Polybius was present at the fall of Carthage and supported Aemilianus, which is difficult to account for if he was adamantly against such an action. Third, was Polybius' heavy criticism of Hasdrubal, the Carthaginian general whom Polybius called an 'empty-headed braggart and very far from being a competent statesmen or general.'<sup>170</sup> And lastly, was the chiasmic arrangement of the four opinions, with the most significant positions being the first and last.<sup>171</sup> Ferrary also argued that the fourth view was most likely that of Polybius, which was understandable considering Polybius demonstrated his understanding of *deditio* multiple times in the *Histories*.<sup>172</sup> Baronowski argued that the first opinion was Polybius', based on his argument that Polybius admired Roman rule and regarded it as moderate and beneficent.<sup>173</sup> Nevertheless, the most convincing arguments were those of Momigliano, Gabba, Musti, Ferrary, and most recently Baronowski, who argued that Polybius agreed with the first and last opinions, but that the second and third opinions expressed some of Polybius' uncertainties about Roman actions.<sup>174</sup>

The first Greek opinion presented by Polybius contained the same political principle of the ideal statesman that Polybius had expressed

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<sup>168</sup> Petzold (1969) 62-63.

<sup>169</sup> The first had eight lines, the second had fifteen lines, the third had fifteen lines, and the fourth had twenty-eight. These calculations were based on the Teubner text: Walbank (1974) 16.

<sup>170</sup> Polyb. 38.7.1: 'κενόδοξος ἦν ἀλαζῶν καὶ πολὺ κευχωρισμένος τῆς πραγματικῆς καὶ στρατηγικῆς δυνάμεως.'

<sup>171</sup> Walbank (1965a) 7-12; (1970a) 296 n. 35; (1972) 173-181; (1974a) 13-18; (1977) 156-159; (1979a) 663-664; (1981-2) 247-256.

<sup>172</sup> Polyb. 20.9-10.12; 36.4.1-3; Ferrary (1988) 327-343.

<sup>173</sup> Baronowski (2011) 103-104.

<sup>174</sup> Momigliano (1972-3) 697-699; (1975) 29-30; Gabba (1977) 71-73; Musti (1978) 54-57; Ferrary (1988) 327-343; Baronowski (2011) 101-106.

throughout the *Histories*.<sup>175</sup> The image of Polybius as a teacher had provided this example of ideal behaviour for his readers, reinforced here through the guise of public opinion in Greece at the destruction of Carthage. This opinion expressed admiration for the Romans, since they were willing to go to great lengths to protect their empire. After 167 Polybius had a tendency to paint the enemies of Rome in a bad light because his idealised statesman would have gone to lengths to preserve the independent autonomy of his state, analogous to this first Greek view praising the Romans.<sup>176</sup> Even though Carthage was not at the height of its power, it was, and had persistently been, a thorn in the side of Rome. The Roman decision to destroy Carthage was in accordance with what was best for Rome, an admirable policy that guaranteed the continued prosperity of the state.

This judgement would have been coupled with the fourth positive Greek opinion presented by Polybius concerning the traditional legalities of the *deditio*. The significance of this view was its acknowledgment that the Roman decision to destroy Carthage was politically sound and legitimate considering the Carthaginians had put themselves in the power of the Romans by offering a *deditio*.<sup>177</sup> Polybius illustrated his understanding of the traditional *deditio* in the *Histories*, so there can be no question here of any technical misunderstanding.<sup>178</sup> Polybius' understanding of *deditio* was also illustrated through the advice of Mago the Bruttian to the Carthaginians after they had surrendered to the Romans. He advised the Carthaginians to face the two choices they had in front of them since they had surrendered to the Romans: accept the complete surrender of the *deditio* and commit to do what

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<sup>175</sup> For discussion on Polybius' portrayal of the ideal statesman see section 3.1 and 4.1.

<sup>176</sup> This was especially true of the Achaeans and the followers of the pretender Andriscus in Macedonia: Achaea: Polyb. 38.3.10-13, 10.8-13; Macedonia: 36.12-15. For Polybius, Roman power was complete after 167, therefore establishing all of those politicians who opposed the Romans after this point as failing in their job to protect their people. As Walbank stated 'the implications of "staving off Roman rule" at this time (after 146) would be so serious that one would certainly hesitate to cast Polybius in the role of its advocate.' Polybius' idea of universal Roman domination after 167 was in terms of influence and deference, rather than modern notions of annexation: Walbank (1977) 148; Derow (1979) 4-6; Eckstein (2008) 359-360; Leenen (2011) 4.

<sup>177</sup> The Carthaginian envoys committed Carthage into the faith of the Romans because they had no other choice. The Romans had already decided on war and the army had been dispatched, while Carthage was unprepared to fight a war: Polyb. 36.3.9.

<sup>178</sup> Polyb. 20.9-10.12; 36.4.1-3. See section 7.2 for further discussion on *deditio*.

the Romans demanded, unless it was utterly oppressive or impossible, or to decide to refuse the Roman demand for hostages and face war.<sup>179</sup> Polybius referred to Mago's advice as manly (ἀνδρώδεις) and pragmatic (πραγματικοίς), illustrating his admiration of the logical advice Mago had given the Carthaginians. Pédech argued that Polybius endorsed the side that urged the Carthaginians to accept the *deditio*, although Eckstein pointed out that Polybius admired Mago's stance because he had advised the Carthaginians to make their decision with full awareness of the consequences before they sent the hostages to Rome.<sup>180</sup> The Carthaginians also seemed to understand the full consequences of the *deditio*, making their actions after this point somewhat irrational.<sup>181</sup> For Polybius the consideration was political legality and, in this instance, the Romans were acting within the bounds of their power in destroying Carthage, with the Carthaginian leadership at fault for acting against the best interests of their state by forfeiting their surrender and fighting a war they could not win.<sup>182</sup> This option provided another political lesson for Polybius' readers and was clearly intended to argue the strict legality of Roman actions to those who criticised the Romans for their destruction of Carthage.

The second and third arguments perhaps express some of Polybius' misgivings about the Roman destruction of Carthage, although they could also have been an attempt by Polybius to appear to be neutral. The second opinion was that the Roman treatment of their enemies had changed and they were now unforgiving in their demands, leading Rome to the same fate as the Athenian and Spartan empires. Polybius did illustrate for his readers a firm

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<sup>179</sup> The Romans had demanded that the Carthaginians surrender three hundred hostages who were sons of senators or members of the Gerousia: Polyb. 36.4.6-7, 5.1-5.

<sup>180</sup> Pédech (1964) 199-200; Eckstein (1995a) 218.

<sup>181</sup> Polyb. 36.3.7-9, 4.4; Eckstein (1995a) 218.

<sup>182</sup> Baronowski (2011) 103. This was similar to the situation in Achaëa in 146 when the leaders of the Achaëan League caused their own defeat by deciding on a war that was against the interests of their state and impossible to win. However, when Polybius compared the two wars he stated 'the Carthaginians at least left to posterity some ground, however slight, for defending their cause, but the Greeks gave no plausible pretext to any one who wishes to support them and acquit them of error' –'οἱ μὲν γὰρ τόπον εσχατον ἀπολογίας γε πρὸς τοὺς ἐπιγινομένους περὶ σφῶν ἀπέλειπον, οὗτοι δ' οὐδ' ἀφορμὴν εὐλόγον ἔδοσαν τοῖς βουλομένοις σφίσι βοηθεῖν ὑπὲρ τῶν ἡμαρτημένων': 38.1.5. This illustrates that Polybius saw Carthage as at fault for this war, although the irrational behaviour of the Carthaginian leaders was not as damaging as that of the Achaëans.

belief that the most successful empires were consistent in their treatment of their subjects, both while expanding and later in administering their empire.<sup>183</sup> Erskine has argued, though, that there was no clear indication in the extant sections of the *Histories* that Polybius saw the beginning of a decline in Roman actions during the time-span he covered.<sup>184</sup> Even though the Roman behaviour towards Carthage could potentially be considered harsh, the justifications offered by the first and fourth opinions heavily counter this criticism of Rome's inconsistent behaviour.

Likewise, the third argument may indicate some of Polybius' unease at Roman trickery, with the opinion that Rome had acted in a deceptive and deceitful way, and had obstructed the ability of the Carthaginians to form an effective defence. Polybius' criticism of those who achieved their means through treachery was rife in the *Histories* and shows his opinion on the importance of good faith in political and military interaction.<sup>185</sup> Eckstein provides ample evidence for the moral preoccupation of Polybius in the *Histories*, key to which is his criticism of actions he considered deceitful.<sup>186</sup> However, there were also examples of deceitful behaviour that Polybius did not censure.<sup>187</sup> This then seems to suggest that there was another criterion for Polybius' criticism. Nevertheless, in this instance it was the Carthaginians who were in the wrong and broke the pledge they had made to the Romans by ignoring the *deditio* they had freely given.<sup>188</sup> They were the party guilty of deceit, not in this instance the Romans. Perhaps then, opinions two and three provided hints of Polybius' potential uncertainties, but there can be little doubt that the first and last opinions coincide with the didactic lessons provided by the persona of Polybius in the *Histories*.

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<sup>183</sup> Polyb. 7.11, 14.5; 9.10.5; 10.36.

<sup>184</sup> Erskine argued that Polybius realised his model of imperial behaviour, used to explain the Carthaginian loss of Spain and the fall of Philip V, did not apply to Rome after Polybius recognised that Rome was still as dominant twenty-five years after the defeat of Perseus: Erskine (2003) 241-243; see also McGing (2010) 157-164.

<sup>185</sup> For example: Polyb. 1.88.8-12 (see also 3.28.1); 4.30.6-7; 5.49.1-50.14; 13.3; 15.24.1-3; 18.33; 27.15.6-9, 16; 30.4; 31.10.6-10; 31.21; 33.18.10-14; see also Eckstein (1995a) 96-107; Baronowski (2011) 104-105.

<sup>186</sup> Eckstein (1995a) 84-117.

<sup>187</sup> Eckstein surveyed instances where Polybius seemed to approve of deceit in political and military situations, arguing against those who claim Polybius was morally detached from his subject: (1995a) 85-96. For example: Polyb. 1.7.2-4; 2.47-52; 14.1-5.15; 18.10-12.

<sup>188</sup> Baronowski (2011) 105-106.

Despite the clearly established purpose of Polybius' extended ten books, modern historians disagree on whether he in fact fulfilled his stated purpose or not.<sup>189</sup> Scholars have argued that Polybius did not actually achieve his objective and instead became focused on his own role within the narrative. He was more concerned with placing himself within the story and becoming part of his *Histories*, or as McGing put it, becoming the 'Homeric Hero.'<sup>190</sup> Walbank suggested Polybius' own conflicting emotions as a reason for his failure to clarify the terms by which the Romans should be judged, and moreover that he may have come to consider his purpose in the last ten books with some embarrassment.<sup>191</sup> In opposition, Ferrary argued that Polybius did attempt to fulfil his purpose in the last ten books and answer the questions given in book three; however, his answers were complex and ambiguous.<sup>192</sup> The survey of Greek opinion in book thirty-six indicates that by this point Polybius was still aware of his purpose and was attempting to achieve it in part by investigating the reactions of the people to Roman rule.<sup>193</sup> However, his own increased historical presence in the narrative does seem to be a primary concern for the author in the last ten books of the *Histories*, rather than his stated aims in book three.

Polybius was particularly conscious of the significance of his own presence in the narrative and what this added to his historical authority. By including his own actions and his connection with significant historical events, he was providing his credentials to his readers and proving his suitability not only to write history, but also to teach his audience of soldier-politicians on the ideal behaviour for a statesman. Experience was a recognised method of providing credentials in the ancient world, an aim that preoccupied Polybius throughout his work.<sup>194</sup> His actions after his release from Rome were far more significant than those prior to his detention, particularly in the Mediterranean

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<sup>189</sup> For Polybius' change in purpose, see 3.4.

<sup>190</sup> Polybius held up the work of Homer and the character of Odysseus as the ideal man of action; a quality needed to write history: 12.27.8-28. 6; McGing (2010) 14-15.

<sup>191</sup> Walbank (1977) 162.

<sup>192</sup> Ferrary (1988) 289-316.

<sup>193</sup> A component of his wider purpose: Polyb. 3.4.6.

<sup>194</sup> Marincola (1997) 133-148; Polyb. 12.25e.1-2, 25g.1-2, 25h.2-25i, 28.6-7.

context, so he seized the opportunity to include them in the *Histories*. In addition, Polybius did not possess all of the requirements he himself declared were necessary for an historian until after his release from Rome in 150, making it necessary that he include the years after 150 so that his exploits could be part of the narrative.<sup>195</sup> In this way, Polybius reinforced his own credentials as a teacher and historian, and further developed the image of himself he had created in the narrative. This preoccupation in the last ten books eclipsed his concern for historical accuracy, as he sought to emphasise his own historical role and enhance the authority of his persona in the *Histories*.

#### 4) Polybius' attitude towards the Greek states

Polybius conveyed his didactic lessons to his readers through direct means in the *Histories* in the form of digressions, but he also provided commentary on political actions in order to provide *exempla* for his students to model their behaviour on. Quite often Roman actions were the vehicle through which he illustrated his didactic lessons, but the experiences of Greek states were also used to this end. Through his depiction of the Achaean League in particular, he provided examples of both good and bad political behaviour for the statesman to learn from, conveying in the process his own political ideals to the audience through his image as a teacher in the narrative. Polybius commonly referred to the Greeks by city-state instead of as a homogeneous whole in the *Histories*.<sup>196</sup> The Achaean League was naturally his focus when characterising the Greek states generally, but he also paid some attention to the opposing Aetolian League. This section will address Polybius' allegiances to the Greek states and whether he identified more with them, or the Romans, in the narrative of the *Histories*. It will also discuss Polybius' ideals of interstate behaviour between a large and small state, a lesson he reinforced to his audience in the *Histories* through the individual experiences of the

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<sup>195</sup> Polyb 12.25e.

<sup>196</sup> For discussion on the concept of a Greek 'nation' see: Walbank (1951) 41-60.

Greek states. Finally, Polybius' general characterisation of the Achaeans, and briefly the Aetolians, will be discussed.

Many modern historians have argued that Polybius was detached in the *Histories*. This argument primarily indicated a belief that Polybius remained separated intellectually and emotionally from the Roman cause, maintaining his cultural ties to his Achaean heritage and allowing the author to remain aloof from his subject matter. Baronowski argued that Polybius was intellectually detached from the policies of Rome and remained primarily aligned to Greece and the Greek aristocracy.<sup>197</sup> Momigliano claimed that Polybius did not in any way become assimilated into Roman culture, while Fustel de Coulanges argued that Polybius remained true to his Greek identity.<sup>198</sup> Shimron claimed that Polybius was always primarily concerned with Greek interests, Sasso argued that Polybius held tight to his Greek ideals, and Millar claimed that Polybius' outlook remained one of a Greek unassimilated into Roman culture.<sup>199</sup> Richardson also claimed that Polybius' analysis of Rome was made from a Greek perspective, shown by his typical Greek tendency to think about Roman power in monarchical terms.<sup>200</sup> Eckstein argued that Polybius was by no means detached, and was quite often emotionally engaged and morally involved in his comments on Roman policy.<sup>201</sup>

The image that Polybius created in the *Histories* as a teacher and historian required a pose of detachment from his subject matter from the beginning. Polybius attempted to approach the *Histories* as a neutral third party because for him, the lessons he had to impart on his readers were his priority. This did not always work, but his utilisation of Roman actions as teaching tools for his audience of soldier-politicians rely upon a degree of

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<sup>197</sup> Baronowski (2011) 11.

<sup>198</sup> Momigliano (1972-3) 697-699; (1975) 29-31; (1977) 67-77; Fustel de Coulanges (1893) 119-211.

<sup>199</sup> Shimron, (1979-80) 94-117; Sasso (1961) 73-76; Millar (1987) 1-18. Also notable was Musti's argument that Polybius remained strongly aligned with Achaean ideals of political behaviour, even though he argued the author wrote the *Histories* from a Roman perspective: (1965) 399-400.

<sup>200</sup> Richardson (1979) 1-11.

<sup>201</sup> Eckstein (1995a) 108.



detachment from the Roman cause, both intellectually and emotionally. Polybius' connection to the Achaeans and the wider Peloponnesian region in the *Histories*, however, was not as detached. Polybius certainly attempted to approach them in a neutral manner, but his patriotism to the Achaean League could not be ignored, just as his animosity towards the Aetolians could not be hidden.<sup>202</sup> Even Walbank, who argued that Polybius supported Roman policy after his release from Rome, conceded that Polybius remained first and foremost an Achaean.<sup>203</sup> Dmitriev even went so far as to claim that Polybius 'obviously spoke on behalf of all of Greece, or in the interests of all the Greeks.'<sup>204</sup> Even though the merits of this particular argument are uncertain, Polybius' Achaean identity cannot be disputed and must imply some sort of distance from Roman ideas and culture.

Cicero in the first century claimed Polybius as one of them (*Polybium nostrum*) in the *de Re Publica*, although the text of the *Histories* does not support any patriotic association with Rome.<sup>205</sup> As Allen stated, 'although he (Polybius) was a student of Rome, he was not necessarily its disciple.'<sup>206</sup> However, modern historians dispute the extent to which Polybius associated himself with the Romans. Polybius has been damned by some historians, who have branded him a traitor to the Achaean League, and more widely, to the Greek states. Most ardent among them was de Sanctis who stated:

not only had he become a gutless admirer of Rome, but, having now defected openly from the national party, he had recognised no less than Callicrates the ineluctability of Roman rule... And his was a conversion so complete that from now on, as is usually the case with apostates, he began to hate the heirs of the policy of Philopoemen and Lycortas, to attribute to them the most shady intentions.<sup>207</sup>

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<sup>202</sup> For patriotic bias as an expected aspect of ancient historiography, see section 1.2 and 3.1.

<sup>203</sup> Walbank (1974a) 29-30.

<sup>204</sup> Dmitriev (2011) 340.

<sup>205</sup> Cic. *Rep.* 2.27.

<sup>206</sup> Allen (2006) 218.

<sup>207</sup> De Sanctis (1953-1964) 4.3.128; translation from Walbank (2002b) 317.

The question of Polybius' attitude towards the Romans and the Greek states is one that historians have frequently debated, with many making comparisons with Josephus, who also faced similar accusations.<sup>208</sup> The historian Gigante argued that Polybius identified himself with the Romans and did not see any role for Hellenism in this new Roman world.<sup>209</sup> Likewise, Dubuisson claimed that Polybius became absorbed into Roman culture, arguing that his language and thought were influenced by his knowledge of Latin. This included adopting Roman attitudes to foreign policy, specifically placing the blame for war upon the enemies of Rome.<sup>210</sup>

Polybius also seemed conscious to define what it meant to be a traitor in the *Histories*.<sup>211</sup> His digression on the definition of a traitor was influenced by his ideals of the statesman - so if a man acted for the good of the state, despite the impression his actions gave, he was not guilty of treason.<sup>212</sup> Polybius provided Aristaenus and his part in advocating the Achaean League's switch in allegiance from Philip to the Romans in 198 as an example for this discussion, claiming Aristaenus' actions saved the League.<sup>213</sup> A traitor was someone who betrayed his city to another, or abolished law and denied the people basic freedoms of speech and action in the aim of advancing his own situation.<sup>214</sup> Eckstein argued that this discussion showed Polybius' unease at the Achaean decision of 198 and his need to defend the decisions of Aristaenus and Achaea.<sup>215</sup> There is no indication in the *Histories* that this digression was motivated by Polybius' anticipation of similar accusations, but it does define Polybius' conception of what it was to be a traitor, one that did not apply to his own situation.

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<sup>208</sup> Shutt (1961) 103-104; Gabba (1974) 32; Goukowsky (1977) 91; Cohen (1982) 366-367; Mendels (1992) 358; Walbank (1995) 273-285. For the influence of Polybius on Josephus' work see: Cohen (1982) 368-369, 379-380; Eckstein (1990) 175-208.

<sup>209</sup> Gigante (1951) 33-53. Walbank also argued that Polybius' sympathies lay more with the Romans after his release, although this has been discussed in section 5.3.

<sup>210</sup> Dubuisson (1985) 273-287; (1990) 233-243.

<sup>211</sup> Polyb. 18.13-15.

<sup>212</sup> Polyb. 18.13.4-8.

<sup>213</sup> Polyb. 18.13.8-11.

<sup>214</sup> Polyb. 18.14.9-10. For Polybius, Callicrates was the ultimate traitor: Polyb. 24.8.7-10.14; 29.24.5-6; 30.13.9-11, 29.32.8-12.

<sup>215</sup> Eckstein (1987a) 140-162.

The argument that Polybius was a traitor to the Achaeans and chose Roman allegiance was based on the assumption that Polybius' ability to admire Roman achievements was mutually exclusive with his allegiance to the Achaean League. Polybius' admiration of the Romans was due to their achievements and political mechanisms, which allowed them to dominate the Mediterranean. He used their success to teach his readers about ideal political behaviour, but this meant that he both praised and criticised the Romans for their actions. In opposition, there were many indications in the *Histories* that Polybius still considered himself an Achaean patriot. The prevalence of the Achaeans in the *Histories* and his utilisation of a few of their key leaders as character sketches to provide *exempla* of ideal political behaviour, point to his continued Achaean allegiance. In addition, Polybius' vilification of those political leaders he believed had damaged the Achaean League through their sycophantic or irrational behaviour displayed his continued attachment to the Achaeans.<sup>216</sup> Even though Polybius admired the Romans, there was no evidence in the *Histories* that he associated himself with them culturally or intellectually.

Polybius' self-constructed image in the *Histories* provided one particular lesson for his readers on the interaction between larger and smaller states that influenced the way he analysed and perceived the interaction between the Greek states and Rome, particularly after 167. In the *Histories*, Polybius emphasised the need to maintain the balance of power between large and small states in the Mediterranean. Through Polybius' image he emphasised this lesson to his readers, warning them of the dangers of misunderstanding the dynamics of this careful balance of power. In the *Histories*, Polybius praised the actions of King Hiero II of Syracuse in the First Punic War for attempting to maintain the balance of power between Rome and Carthage:

in this he reasoned very wisely and sensibly, for such matters should never be neglected, and we should never contribute to

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<sup>216</sup> For example the Achaean Callicrates: for references see n. 214 above.

the attainment by one state of a power so preponderant, that none dare dispute with it even for their acknowledged rights.<sup>217</sup>

The Third Macedonian War brought the balance of power in the Mediterranean to the forefront of the political concerns of the Greek states, as they watched Macedonia and Rome fight for supremacy. Polybius explained that there were three types of anti-Roman statesmen in the Greek states at the time of the war between Rome and Perseus: the first were those who 'did not indeed view with pleasure the final decision of the struggle and the subjection of the whole world by one power,' but left the decision to *tyche*, deciding not to support either party; the second were those who were pleased that things had finally culminated in war and individually supported Perseus, but could not persuade others to follow; while the third managed to persuade their compatriots into an alliance with Perseus.<sup>218</sup> In discussing these three categories of statesmen, Polybius was providing for his reader examples of possible responses in order to illustrate his didactic lesson on ideal political behaviour.<sup>219</sup>

According to Polybius, the best policy (ἀρίστης γνώμης) in this war was similar to the first category given and exemplified in the example of Cephalus from Epirus. Polybius used the example of Cephalus to illustrate the best political policy on the eve of the Third Macedonian War:

for at first he had prayed to Heaven that there should be no war and no such decision of the issues; and now, during the course of the war, he desired to act justly by Rome according to the terms of their alliance, but beyond this neither to fall foul of the

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<sup>217</sup> Polyb. 1.83.3-4: 'πάνυ φρονίμως καὶ νουνεχῶς λογιζόμενος. οὐδέποτε γὰρ χρὴ τὰ τοιαῦτα παροράν οὐδὲ τηλικαύτην οὐδενὶ συγκατασκευάζειν δυναστείαν, πρὸς ἣν οὐδὲ περὶ τῶν ὁμολογουμένων ἐξέσται δικαίων ἀμφισβητεῖν.'

<sup>218</sup> Polyb. 30.6.6: 'τῶν οὐχ ἡδέως μὲν ὁρώντων κρινόμενα τὰ ὅλα καὶ τὴν τῆς οἰκουμένης ἔξουσίαν ὑπὸ μίαν ἀρχὴν πίπτουσιν': cf. 30.6.5-8.

<sup>219</sup> Polyb. 30.8-9. In order to provide a didactic example Polybius vilified two men of the second group, Polyaratus and Deinon of Rhodes, who he claimed were both dishonourable and cowardly. They had been discovered plotting with Perseus but did not take their punishment honourably, as others who had also been accused did: 30.7. Polybius was explicit in the narrative that this story was conveyed so the reader could learn from their negative behaviour and act rationally if ever in a similar situation: 30.6.1-5, 9.20-21.

Romans by any unworthy action nor to be unduly subservient to them.<sup>220</sup>

This was the ideal policy of a smaller state according to Polybius. Eckstein explained Polybius' ideal policy nicely when he stated that 'smaller states should always affirm their rights and legal independence, act only in accord with whatever formal agreement they had with Rome, and attempt to avoid going further along the road of accommodation, while at the same time demonstrating their fundamental loyalty to the Romans.'<sup>221</sup> Interestingly, this policy was similar to that which Polybius claimed he advocated in Achaëa during the same war.<sup>222</sup> Polybius could not claim that his own policy was the best, due to the potential harm of self-praise to historical authority, but by praising it in Cephalus he could highlight the parallel for the reader, reinforcing his own credibility as a teacher of politics.

Polybius' depiction of the Achaëan League in the *Histories* reflected this central idea of the way smaller states should interact with larger, dominant states. This was a significant lesson for Polybius' readers about the behaviour of the ideal statesman, reinforcing Polybius' persona in the *Histories* as a political teacher. Prior to 167, Polybius portrayed the independent policies of the Achaëans towards the Romans as admirable, spearheaded by the influential politicians Philopoemen and Lycortas.<sup>223</sup> However, with the end of the Third Macedonian War the power dynamic changed in the Mediterranean, illustrated by Polybius' opinion that Roman power from this point onwards was absolute. As Eckstein pointed out, when the geopolitical situation changed, as it did with the defeat of Perseus, there were two potential political threats to the stability of the internal politics of a

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<sup>220</sup> Polyb. 27.15.11-12: 'ἀρχόμενος γὰρ ἠΰξατο τοῖς θεοῖς μὴ συστῆναι τὸν πόλεμον μηδὲ κριθῆναι τὰ πράγματα· πραττομένου δὲ τοῦ πολέμου τὰ κατὰ τὴν συμμαχίαν ἐβούλετο δίκαια ποιεῖν Ῥωμαίοις, πέρα δὲ τούτου μήτε προστρέχειν ἀγεννῶς μήθ' ὑπηρετεῖν μηδὲν παρὰ τὸ δέον.'

<sup>221</sup> Eckstein (2010) 55. He also emphasised Polybius' policy of advising small states to remain unattached and mobile because the dominant state could deteriorate and allow more freedom to the smaller states, as had happened with Macedonia and the states of Greece at the end of the fourth and the third centuries.

<sup>222</sup> Polyb. 28.3.6. See section 5.1 for discussion of this episode.

<sup>223</sup> See section 3.1.

small state.<sup>224</sup> The first was the emergence of those statesmen who pandered to the dominant power in order to advance their own interests, those whom Polybius condemned as sycophantic puppets.<sup>225</sup> For Polybius, Callicrates was the worst of this type of politician, a man who was hated by the Achaean League and blamed for instigating their decline of influence.<sup>226</sup> Polybius claimed that Callicrates' advice to the Romans that they should be harsher in their treatment of the Achaeans in 181 instigated the deterioration of their diplomatic relationship. He stated that in 181:

it was still possible for the Achaeans even at this period to deal with Rome on more or less equal terms, as they had remained faithful to her ever since they had taken her part in the most important times – I mean the wars with Philip and Antiochus – but now after the Achaean League had become stronger and more prosperous than at any time in recorded history, this effrontery of Callicrates was the beginning of a change for the worse.<sup>227</sup>

For Polybius, Callicrates and his pandering to the Romans led to the deterioration of the Achaean League, providing here a negative example of the bad statesman for his readers.

The second potential threat, according to Eckstein, was that 'hysterical resisters to the preponderant power arose as the pressures toward

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<sup>224</sup> Eckstein (2010) 53-54.

<sup>225</sup> Callicrates was the most vilified of these men by Polybius, although there were also 'Aristodamus, Agesias and Phillipus from Achaëa, Mnasippus from Boeotia, Chremas from Acarnania, Charops and Nicias from Epirus, and Lyciscus and Tisippus from Aetolia' who flocked to the Romans after the defeat of Perseus: Polyb. 30.13.1-5.

<sup>226</sup> Polybius' condemnation of Callicrates is well documented: 24.10; 30.13, 29, 32; Eckstein (1995a) 204-206. In contrast, Champion argued that Polybius depicted the Achaeans in the first five books of his *Histories* as an ideal of political rationality (Hellenic), but then after book six, traced their societal deterioration (which coincided with that of the Romans) down to complete loss of rational behaviour in 146: (2004) 100-143 (early idealisation), 144-169 (deterioration).

<sup>227</sup> Polyb. 24.10.9-11: 'ἔτι γὰρ τούτοις ἐξῆν καὶ κατ' ἐκείνους τοὺς χρόνους κατὰ ποσὸν ἰσολογίαν ἔχειν πρὸς Ῥωμαίους διὰ το τετηρηκέναι τὴν πίστιν ἐν τοῖς ἐπιφανεστάτοις καιροῖς, ἐξ οὗ τὰ Ῥωμαίων εἶλοντο, λέγω δὲ τοῖς κατὰ φιλιππον καὶ Ἀντίοχον, οὕτω δὲ τοῦ τῶν Ἀχαιῶν ἔθνους ἠύξημένου καὶ προκοπὴν εἰληφότος κατὰ τὸ βέλτιστόν ἀφ' ὧν ἡμεῖς ἱστοροῦμεν χρόνων, αὕτη πάλιν ἀρχὴ τῆς ἐπὶ τὸ χεῖρον ἐγένετο μεταβολῆς, τὸ Καλλικράτους θράσος.'

accommodation and loss of independence tended to increase.<sup>228</sup> The rise of these types of extremist politicians was also partially in response to the rise of the sycophantic politicians who pandered to the larger power. For Polybius, the rise of such politicians also served as a warning against irrationality for his readers. The Achaean politicians Critolaus and Diaeus, who instigated the decision to go to war with Rome in 146, illustrated the danger for Polybius' audience of soldier-politicians.<sup>229</sup> Polybius was extremely critical of their political stance against Rome, quite simply because any opposition to Rome at this point was doomed. Polybius claimed that Critolaus:

having carried through these measures, set himself to intrigue against and attack the Romans, not listening to reason, but forming projects which outraged the laws of god and man.<sup>230</sup>

For Polybius, the ideal statesman fought to preserve what little independence he could in the face of domination from a larger power, he did not act irrationally and challenge them to a war that could not be won.

Polybius' political lessons reinforced his conviction that after 167, small states who were under the dominion of the Romans should do all they could to accommodate Roman demands while simultaneously maintaining as much autonomy as possible. The actions of Greek politicians in the *Histories* were all judged by this benchmark, with Polybius claiming that the good statesman acted always in the best interests of the state. Polybius' attitude towards the Greek states should be viewed with this filter in mind, since it consistently influenced the way he assessed the behaviour of the Achaeans and the rest of the smaller Greek states.

Polybius' treatment of the Aetolians was markedly different. He had continually depicted the Aetolians negatively, showing them to be both irrational and emotional in their political decisions. Polybius' portrayal of the Aetolians in this way provided his readers with a negative example that

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<sup>228</sup> Eckstein (2010) 54.

<sup>229</sup> Polyb. 38.9-13.

<sup>230</sup> Polyb. 38.13.8: 'οὗτος μὲν οὖν ταῦτα διοικησάμενος ἐγένετο περὶ τὸ πραγματοκοπεῖν καὶ Ῥωμαίοις ἐπιβάλλειν τὰς χεῖρας, οὐδενὶ λογῶ τοῦτο πράττων, ἀλλὰ πάντων ἀσεβεστάτοις καὶ παρανομωτάτοις ἐπιβαλλόμενος.'

Polybius reinforced throughout the *Histories*. The animosity between the Achaean and Aetolian Leagues had a long history, with Polybius' negative portrayal demonstrating how pervasive this was in the ancient world. Polybius claimed:

The Aetolians had for long been dissatisfied with peace and with an outlay limited to their own resources, as they had been accustomed to live on their neighbours, and required abundance of funds, owing to that natural covetousness, enslaved by which they always lead a life of greed and aggression, like beasts of prey, with no ties of friendship but regarding everyone as an enemy.<sup>231</sup>

Modern historians have usually argued this negative portrayal was an emotional depiction by Polybius based on the traditional enmity between the Achaean and Aetolian Leagues.<sup>232</sup> However, as Champion has pointed out, Polybius' negative portrayal may be motivated more by rhetorical reasons. Champion claimed that in books one to five, the Aetolian League was used by Polybius as a contrast to the virtues of the Achaean League. However, because the Achaean League began to deteriorate after book six, according to Champion, the Aetolians were no longer needed in the same way.<sup>233</sup> While Champion is correct in attributing a more rhetorical function to Polybius' characterisation of the Aetolians, the contrast with the Achaean League was made primarily in order to provide examples of positive and negative behaviour for Polybius' audience. In Polybius' image as a teacher in the *Histories*, his concern to provide *exempla* for his readers has already been established. But the Aetolians provided for Polybius an opportunity to collectively provide an *exemplum* of irrational, greedy behaviour within the Greek civilised world, one that his readers would be able to relate to.

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<sup>231</sup> Polyb. 4.3.1: 'Αἰτωλοὶ πάλαι μὲν δυσχερῶς ἔφερον τὴν εἰρήνην καὶ τὰς ἀπὸ τῶν ἰδίων ὑπαρχόντων δαπάνας, ὡς ἂν εἰθισμένοι μὲν ζῆν ἀπὸ τῶν πέλας, δεόμενοι δὲ πολλῆς χορηγίας διὰ τὴν ἔμφυτον ἀλαζονείαν, ἢ δουλεύοντες αἰεὶ πλεονεκτικὸν καὶ θηριώδη ζῶσι βίον, οὐδὲν οἰκείον, πάντα δ' ἡγούμενοι πολέμια.'

<sup>232</sup> Mendels (1984-1986) 63-73; Gruen (1984) 456-462. Opposed by Sacks who argued Polybius was not critical of the Aetolians in the second century: (1975) 92-106.

<sup>233</sup> Champion (2007) 359-362.



In conclusion, this chapter analysed the political aspects of Polybius' self-constructed image which contributed significantly to his didactic purpose. Polybius' image in the *Histories* meant that what he included in the narrative concerning his own political career was consciously designed to contribute to his authority and provoke confidence in his political teachings from his audience. Polybius' attitude towards the Romans, both prior to and after 167, was generally positive, but overall determined by his persona in the *Histories* as a teacher and a politician. Polybius used Roman behaviour and policy to teach his readers about ideal political conduct, and both praised and criticised the Romans to this end. For Polybius, conveying his political lessons to the reader took precedence, which can also be seen in his concern to include the last ten books. These, while demonstrating some attempt to fulfil Polybius' stated aim, were undertaken so Polybius could feature in his own narrative. This was not simply to cement his significance in history. Polybius wanted to narrate his actions during and after his detention in Rome in order to prove his credentials for providing political instruction and reinforce his own historical authority. Likewise, Polybius' depiction of the Greek states was utilised to provide political instruction for his readers, particularly in his depiction of his native Achaean League. Polybius' depiction of the Aetolians by contrast, was intended to provide a negative *exemplum* in contrast to the virtues of the Achaeans. Through these political aspects of the *Histories*, Polybius further developed his self-constructed persona as a teacher, historian, politician, and a Greek. The significance of this image and the prevalence of his didactic purpose, particularly on questions of political behaviour, were important to Polybius' formation of the *Histories*, and so cause doubt to be cast on his concern to be acutely accurate in his historical narrative.

## Part II

### Chapter Six: Case Study I - Polybius and the Declaration of Greek Freedom in 196 B.C.E

Polybius' self-created persona and didactic purpose in the *Histories* led him at points to depict events a particular way in order to illustrate a political lesson for his readers. One such instance was Polybius' portrayal of the Romans' motivation to enter the Second Macedonian War, which he claimed was due to their wish to free the Greek states from the oppression of Philip V of Macedonia. Polybius made this claim after his account of the Isthmian declaration in 196 where Flamininus officially decreed the Greeks of Asia and Europe free. However, throughout Polybius' account there is no evidence to suggest that this actually was the motivation of the Romans. When the idea of Greek freedom was introduced to the senate in 198, it was at the instigation of the assembled Greek allies, not the Romans. Polybius depicted Roman motivations this way in order to provide his audience of soldier-politicians with a lesson on the significance of beneficence in international diplomacy and provide an *exemplum* of moderation, kindness and nobility. Polybius admired such qualities in an imperial power, and through his presentation of the Romans entering this war selflessly to free the Greeks, he provided an *exemplum* of such behaviour for his audience.

This chapter will first look at Flamininus' declaration of freedom at the Isthmian Games in 196 and the associated claim by Polybius that the Romans had entered into the Second Macedonian War specifically to free the Greeks. It will then look at the causes of the war presented by the ancient sources, as well as the diplomatic interactions prior to and during the war in order to trace the development of this political policy of Greek freedom and its introduction

into Roman diplomatic rhetoric.<sup>1</sup> The pivotal role of the Roman commander Flamininus and his contribution to the Isthmian declaration will also be considered. Finally, this chapter will look at Polybius' purpose in presenting the Romans in this way and the didactic lesson he was trying to illustrate to his audience. By portraying the Romans as the saviours of the Greeks he was providing an *exemplum* of behaviour to his readers, illustrating the significance of clemency and beneficence in diplomatic interactions. Significantly, Polybius was able to present the Romans as a counter to the faithlessness of Philip V and his promises of freedom.

### 1) The Roman declaration of Greek freedom

The declaration of freedom at the Isthmian Games sent a shock wave of disbelief through the Greek world, and according to Plutarch generated a shout of joy that was so boisterous it reached the sea.<sup>2</sup> It announced that:

The senate of Rome and Titus Quinctius the proconsul having overcome king Philip and the Macedonians, leave the following peoples free, without garrisons and subject to no tribute and governed by their own countries' laws – the Corinthians, Phocians, Locrians, Euboeans, Phthiotic Achaeans, Magnesians, Thessalians, and Perrhaebians.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> For example see: Walbank and McDonald (1937) 203-207; Badian (1958) 69-75; Walbank (1967) 609-620; Dahlheim (1968) 248-249; Seager (1981) 106-112; Gruen (1984) 382-398; Eckstein (1987b) 274-302; Ferrary (1988) 58-63; Carawan (1988) 212-231; Walsh (1996) 344-363; Dmitriev (2011) 151-199. For further references see: Burton (2011) 224 n. 107.

<sup>2</sup> Plut. *Flam.* 10.5.

<sup>3</sup> Polyb. 18.46.5: ἡ σύγκλητος ἡ Ῥωμαίων καὶ τίτος Κοῖντιος στρατηγὸς ὕπατος, καταπολεμήσαντες βασιλέα φίλιππον καὶ Μακεδόνας, ἀφίσαιν ἐλευθέρους, ἀφρουρήτους, ἀφορολογήτους, νόμοις χρωμένους τοῖς πατρίοις, Κορινθίους, Φωκέας, Λοκρούς, Εὐβοεῖς, Ἀχαιοὺς τοὺς Φθιώτας, Μάγνητας, Θετταλοὺς, Περραιβοὺς.' See also Livy 33.32.5-6: '*Senatus Romanus et T. Quinctius imperator Phillippo rege Macedonibusque devictis liberis, immunes, suis legibus esse iubet Corinthios, Phocenses, Locrensesque omnes et insulam Euboeam et Magnetas, Thessalos, Perrhaebos, Achaeos Phthiotas.*' See also: App. *Mac.* 1.4; Plut. *Flam.* 10.4-6. Diodorus Siculus did not include an account of this public declaration at the Isthmian games. Instead, he claimed it was announced by Flamininus in 194 at the conference in Corinth, where he asked that the Greeks seek out and free Italian hostages in return: 28.13.

This decree freed all those people who had been subject to Philip V, but also had wider implications for the Greeks of Europe and Asia. The level of freedom implied by this declaration surpassed that which had been discussed during the war, and seemed in excess of what had been expected. This could be seen by the level of rejoicing reported by the ancient sources.<sup>4</sup> Flamininus was even personally praised by the Greeks for bringing them freedom and was hailed as their saviour.<sup>5</sup> Polybius admitted there had been uncertainty about how the Romans would administer the political state of Greece after the expulsion of Philip, with the Greeks questioning whether they had exchanged one master for another.<sup>6</sup> The Isthmian declaration not only decreed the Greeks free from Philip's influence, but also free from any other external power - they were free to rule themselves, independent from any type of external force, including the Romans. In the ancient world the concept of freedom was particularly potent both in politics and generally in society, so the power of such a promise cannot be underestimated.<sup>7</sup>

Despite this, Polybius claimed that the level of Greek freedom decreed in the Isthmian games from all foreign intervention, was what the Romans had intended from the outset of the war.

For it was a wonderful thing, to begin with, that the Romans and their general Flamininus should entertain this purpose incurring every expense and facing every danger for the freedom of

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<sup>4</sup> Polyb. 18.46.6-13; Livy 33.32.6-33.5; Plut. *Flam.* 10.4-5; App. *Mac.* 1.4.

<sup>5</sup> For example: Polyb. 18.46; Livy 33.32-33, 34.50.9; Val. Max. 4.8.5; Plut. *Flam.* 10.3-11.4; 16.3-17.1; App. *Mac.* 9.4; see also Walbank (1967) 613-614. According to Plutarch, Flamininus claimed the credit for the Isthmian declaration in an inscription he had commissioned at Delphi: Plut. *Flam.* 12.6.

<sup>6</sup> Polyb. 18.46.1-4. Polybius claimed that the Greeks were unsure what the Romans would do. Some claimed that it was impossible for the Romans to leave certain places (perhaps the three fetters), while others thought they would abandon those most well known and keep others that 'would serve their purpose equally well (χρείαν δὲ τὴν αὐτὴν παρέχεσθαι δυναμένων κατέξουσι)'. Livy admitted that 'almost no one was convinced that they would withdraw from all Greece (*vix cuiquam persuadebatur Graecia omni cessuros*)': 33.32.3-4.

<sup>7</sup> Cicero emphasised the significance of freedom: 'hence liberty has no dwelling-place in any state except that in which the people's power is the greatest, and surely nothing can be sweeter than liberty; but if it is not the same for all, it does not deserve the name of liberty' - '*itaque nulla alia in civitate, nisi in qua populi potestas summa est, ullum domicilium libertas habet; qua quidem certe nihil potest esse dulcius, et quae, si aequa non est, ne libertas quidem est*': Cic. *Rep.* 1.31. The ancient concept of freedom did not necessarily coincide with modern ideals: Wirszubski (1950) *passim*. For Greek and Roman concepts of freedom see: Pohlenz (1966); Fears (1981) 869-875; Brunt (1988) 281-350; Raaflaub (2004).

Greece; it was a great thing that they brought into action a force adequate to the execution of their purpose; and the greatest of all was the fact that no mischance of any kind counteracted their design, but everything without exception conduced to this one crowning moment, when by a single proclamation all the Greeks inhabiting Asia and Europe became free, ungarrisoned, subject to no tribute and governed by their own laws.<sup>8</sup>

Polybius' account of the Isthmian proclamation displayed his conviction that the Romans' policy of Greek freedom was not only conceived prior to the outbreak of war, but was also the major motivation for the Romans to become involved. Everything until this moment at the Isthmian games had been engineered towards such a result; the freedom of the Greeks of Europe and Asia. However, while Livy's depiction closely followed that of Polybius, he was not as definite about Roman motivations. Even though Livy's account of the Greek reaction to this declaration glorified Roman actions, there was not the same conviction that they had entered the war specifically to free the Greeks:

there was one people in the world which would fight for others' liberties at its own cost, to its own peril and with its own toil, not limiting its guaranties of freedom to its neighbours, to men of the immediate vicinity, or to countries that lay close at hand, but ready to cross the sea that there might be no unjust empire anywhere and that everywhere justice, right, and law might prevail.<sup>9</sup>

This seems to suggest that the Romans fought for Greek freedom, but given that the purpose of this passage was praise, not historical accuracy, it is difficult to conclude that Livy's account supported Polybius' claim that the

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<sup>8</sup> Polyb. 18.46.14-15: 'θαυμαστὸν γὰρ ἦν καὶ τὸ Ῥωμαίους ἐπὶ ταύτης γενέσθαι τῆς προαιρέσεως καὶ τὸν ἡγούμενον αὐτῶν Τίτον, ὥστε πᾶσαν ὑπομῆναι δαπάνην καὶ πάντα κίνδυνον χάριν τῆς τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἐλευθερίας· μέγα δὲ καὶ τὸ δύναμιν ἀκολουθῶν τῇ προαιρέσει προσενέγκασθαι· τούτων δὲ μέγιστον ἔτι τὸ μηδὲν ἐκ τῆς τύχης ἀντιπαῖσαι πρὸς τὴν ἐπιβολήν, ἀλλ' ἀπλῶς ἅπαντα πρὸς ἓνα καιρὸν ἐκδραμεῖν, ὥστε διὰ κηρύγματος ἑνὸς ἅπαντας καὶ τοὺς τὴν Ἀσίαν κατοικοῦντας Ἕλληνας καὶ τοὺς τὴν Εὐρώπην ἐλευθέρους, ἀφρουρήτους, ἀφορολογήτους γενέσθαι, νόμοις χρωμένους τοῖς ἰδίοις.'

<sup>9</sup> Livy 33.33.5-7: '*esse aliquam in terris gentem quae sua inpensa, suo labore ac periculo bella great pro libertate aliorum nec hoc finitimis aut propinquae vicinitatis hominibus aut terris continentibus iunctis praestet, sed maria traiciat, ne quod toto orbe terrarium iniustum imperium sit, ubique ius, fas, lex potentissima sint.*'

Romans entered the war specifically to free the Greeks. As Walsh claimed, the 'Romans did not initiate the Second Macedonian War with an *eleutheria* program in hand.'<sup>10</sup> There is no indication in the ancient record that the Romans entered this war with the purpose of freeing the Greeks, despite the claims of Polybius.<sup>11</sup>

## 2) Causes of the Second Macedonian War

The causes of the Second Macedonian War have been widely contested by modern historians, predominantly due to controversy over the reliability of the narrative accounts of Polybius and Livy. Polybius' fragmentary account of the outbreak of this war has been preferred by some historians who dispute the reliability of Livy, for example Gruen, who claimed 'the Polybian evidence represents our one firm foundation.'<sup>12</sup> Difficulties in chronology further exacerbated this difficulty in understanding the causes of this war, particularly in regards to the formal declaration of war from the Romans. There is no extant analysis of the causes of this war from Polybius, his claim, noticeably after the fact, was that the Romans had been motivated to join this war in order to free the Greeks from the oppression of Philip V. Therefore, Livy's narrative account provided the only causal analysis of this war, although as Gruen suggested, Livy was not without bias.

Significantly, Livy claimed that the Second Macedonian War was simply a continuation of the first war.<sup>13</sup> He claimed that the first war had been laid aside (*depositum erat*) and taken up again once the Romans were free from their war with Carthage.<sup>14</sup> Livy also claimed the Romans were angry about the 'treacherous (*infidam*) peace' Philip had concluded with the

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<sup>10</sup> Walsh (1996) 345.

<sup>11</sup> See: Badian (1958) 71-72; Walsh (1996) 344-363; Dmitriev (2011) 166-199.

<sup>12</sup> Gruen (1984) 396. See also: Holleaux (1957) 9-28; Luce (1977) 65-66. For scholars who argue for the reliability of Livy see: Dorey (1959) 288-295; Warrior (1996) 9-103.

<sup>13</sup> The First Macedonian War is an example where the Romans were forced into making peace with an enemy, so perhaps they did consider peace a temporary measure. See Ferrary (2005) 54.

<sup>14</sup> Livy 31.1.8-9. Livy claimed that the war with Philip had only been laid aside three years previously, even though the Peace of Phoenice had been made in 205 (Livy 29.12.1) and this war did not begin until 200.

Aetolians in 206 and the agreement of aid he had with Hannibal during the Second Punic War.<sup>15</sup> This, in addition to the appeals of the Athenians, motivated the Romans into renewing (*renovandum*) the war with Macedonia.<sup>16</sup> Therefore, while Livy included three causes for this war, he did not follow Polybius' claim that it was undertaken by the Romans specifically to free the Greeks.

In addition to these causes cited by Livy, the historian Holleaux claimed that Philip's alliance with Antiochus III motivated the Romans to make a pre-emptive strike against him to stop any combined attacks on Italy.<sup>17</sup> However, even though according to Livy fear of invasion was a motive for the war, there is no evidence that this threat was conceived of as specifically from Antiochus.<sup>18</sup> Therefore, while fear of invasion may have influenced the Roman decision, there was no indication in the sources it was from Antiochus directly. Interestingly, the ancient sources also do not consider the aggressiveness of the Romans in this war as a cause, even though their eagerness could be seen by the allocation of Macedonia as a consular province prior to the declaration of war.<sup>19</sup>

Walbank referred to the Roman decision to become involved in this war as 'one of the most amazing reversals of policy known to the history of the

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<sup>15</sup> Livy 31.1.9. For the alliance between Philip and Hannibal see also: Polyb. 7.9; Livy. 23.33.6-12; Zonar. 9.4; Eutr. 3.12.2. For reference to it as a cause of war: Livy 31.11.9; 34.22.8. There is, however, little evidence of a continued alliance between Philip and Hannibal, shown by the absence of Macedonian troops at the Battle of Zama. There may have been Macedonian mercenaries, but they cannot be used as evidence for an alliance between Carthage and Macedonia: Livy 30.42.4; Bickerman (1945) 143 n. 17; Balsdon (1954) 34; Gruen (1984) 385 n. 151. Gruen claimed that the Peace of Phoenice had negated the alliance between Philip and Hannibal in 205. In addition, the one time Hannibal did request aid from Philip in 205 he chose instead to make peace with Rome: Livy 29.4.4; Zonar. 9.11; Gruen (1984) 385.

<sup>16</sup> Livy 31.1.9-10.

<sup>17</sup> Holleaux (1930) 149-165; (1921) 276-331. Further developed by: Griffith (1935) 1-14; Walbank and MacDonald (1937) 180-207; Walbank (1940) 127-128; Albert (1980) 104-106.

<sup>18</sup> However, Livy does mention Antiochus' impending invasion of Europe: 33.13.15. For arguments against Holleaux's theory see: Balsdon (1954) 30-42; Briscoe (1973) 36-47; Rich (1976) 27; Harris (1979) 213;

<sup>19</sup> Dorey has pointed out that Livy included multiple instances in years prior to this war of aristocrats attempting to seize the glory associated with war for themselves: Dorey (1959) 288-289. For example: Livy 30.24.1 (Servius Caepio), 27.1-5 (M. Servilius Geminus and Ti. Claudius). Dorey also highlighted the difficulty in being awarded a triumph in these years as motivation for aristocratic competition, for example: Livy 26.21.4; 31.20, 47-9; 32.7; Dorey (1959) 290; see also Harris (1979) 212-218.

Republic.<sup>20</sup> Up until 201, the Romans had showed little concern over the Greek East, but reports of Philip's actions in Greece brought before the senate by ambassadors from Rhodes and Pergamum, seemed to cause unease in the senate, and the question of a second conflict with Macedonia became a primary concern.<sup>21</sup> The Aetolians had sent ambassadors to Rome in 202, but the Romans had shown no interest in resuming the war, perhaps due to the final stages of their involvement in Carthage.<sup>22</sup> The refusal of the Aetolian appeal implied that the Romans did not intend to return to Greece at this point, since it was unlikely they would want to alienate an ally as powerful as the Aetolians, despite any anger over their peace with Philip in 206.<sup>23</sup> Therefore, there was no interest shown by the Romans in returning to war with Philip until the embassies of Pergamum and Rhodes alerted the senate to Philip's successful and increasing expansion.<sup>24</sup> Dmitriev has argued that the Romans decided to join this war on behalf of the subjugated, just as they had in Italy, Sicily, Illyria, and Spain.<sup>25</sup> However, at this point in the narrative record, there was no indication that the Romans were motivated to go to war with Philip for the sake of freeing the Greeks.

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<sup>20</sup> Walbank (1940) 127.

<sup>21</sup> The Roman intentions towards Greece after the Peace of Phoenice have been widely disputed: Holleaux (1921) *passim*, esp. iii-iv; (1930) 116-137, 138-198; Walbank and McDonald (1937) 180-207; Walbank (1963b) 1-13; *contra* Harris (1979) 212-218; Derow (1979) 1-15.

<sup>22</sup> Historians have disputed the chronology of this embassy. Appian dated this embassy after those of Athens and Rhodes, but before the Roman embassy to Greece: *Mac.* 4.2. However, it has been included here in accordance with Walbank's dating of 202 in response to Philip's capture of Lysimacheia, Chalcedon and Cius, although it cannot be conclusively stated whether this was before or after the Battle of Zama: Walbank (1940) 310-311. De Sanctis argued it was prior to the Battle of Zama, explaining the Roman rebuff of the Aetolian appeal because of the focus on the Second Punic War at Rome: De Sanctis (1907-1923) 3.2. 599-600. See also McDonald and Walbank (1937) 185 n. 39.

<sup>23</sup> Livy 31.29.4; Walbank and McDonald (1937) 185. There was clear animosity from the Romans towards the Aetolians for concluding peace in 206 contrary to the terms of their alliance: Polyb. 18.38.6-9; App. *Mac.* 3.

<sup>24</sup> Eckstein argued that the Romans were anticipating having to deal with both Antiochus and Philip in 200, but that Philip was dealt with first because 'he was nearest, because of his previous bad relations with Rome, and because of the specific complaints that had been made against him, especially by Pergamum: (2008) 277.

<sup>25</sup> Dmitriev (2011) 168; see also: Errington (1972) 141; Gruen (1984) 145-146, 390; Ferrary (1988) 48-49; Eckstein (2008) 290. Eckstein supports this argument, claiming that there was no clear indication that the Romans would have intervened had it not been for the various appeals from Pergamum and the Greeks states. He refers to it as a 'near-run decision', claiming the decision to go to war was primarily taken 'out of fear of the consequences of the systematic crisis now roiling the Greek East': (2009) 75-101, esp. 98.



In addition, there was also no indication that Greek freedom was their primary motivation when the Roman consul asked the *comitia centuriata* to vote for war. The consular elections of 200 reflected the renewed emphasis the Romans put on Philip's activities and the senate's determination to have war, with P. Sulpicius Galba receiving Macedonia as his consular sphere of military operations.<sup>26</sup> According to Livy, Galba appealed to the *comitia centuriata* to vote for war against Philip because of the injuries Philip had committed against allies of the Roman people, primarily King Attalus of Pergamum, Rhodes, and the Athenians.<sup>27</sup> The war weary Romans did not think this was enough reason for another war and the proposal was defeated.<sup>28</sup> Livy claimed that the people were swayed by the oratory of the Tribune of the Plebeians, Quintus Baebius who criticised the bellicose nature of the senate.<sup>29</sup>

Despite this, the senate was determined to wage war with Philip and demanded that the consul re-summon the assembly and 'make it clear what danger and disgrace such postponement of the war would cause.'<sup>30</sup> Galba reconvened the *comitia centuriata* and in a public meeting (*contio*) before the second vote for war reprised the case of the senate. According to Livy, the consul's speech made it clear that the vote was not whether to have war or not, but rather whether it was to be fought in Greece or Italy:

It seems to me, citizens, that you do not realise that the question before you is not whether you will have peace or war – for Philip will not leave that matter open for your decision, seeing that he

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<sup>26</sup> Livy 31.5.1; 6.1.

<sup>27</sup> Livy 31.6.1. Livy repeated this claim that Rome undertook this war in order to defend her allies: 31.3.1, 5.8-9, 9.4, 11.9, 31.2; 34.22.8-9. Livy even reported an earlier embassy to Macedonia in 203 in response to a request for intervention from *sociarum urbium ex Graecia* but this has been dismissed as a fabrication concocted by Roman apologists: Livy 30.2.6.2-4, 42.1-10; Gruen (1984) 383.

<sup>28</sup> Dorey claimed the war-weariness of the people has been overstated since the majority of Italy had been free from war for the past few years and the two loan instalments from 210 had already been repaid: Livy 31.13; Dorey (1959) 292.

<sup>29</sup> Livy 31.6.3-5. Scullard speculated that the rejection of this vote may have been instigated by Scipio Africanus since Baebius' family had been consistent supporters of Scipio: (1951) 86-87.

<sup>30</sup> Livy 31.6.6: '*edoceret quanto damno dedecorique dilatio ea belli futura esset.*' Larsen claimed this determination to have war could be seen in the ultimatums given to Philip, which 'went beyond the treaty (of Phoenice) and were couched in terms that made it impossible for Philip to accept them without complete self-abasement': (1937) 31.

is preparing a mighty war on land and sea – but whether you are to send your legions across to Macedonia or meet the enemy in Italy.<sup>31</sup>

After the ordeal of the Second Punic War and the memory of the invasion of Pyrrhus, this appeal resonated with the Roman people and they voted for war.<sup>32</sup> The siege of Abydus may also have affected the vote of the people, particularly as it echoed the siege of Saguntum at the beginning of the Second Punic War. Walbank argued that the attacks in Attica and Abydus convinced the people to vote for war, rather than, as Livy claimed, the words of the consul.<sup>33</sup> Accordingly, Livy's account of the Roman vote for war did not claim they were motivated by a wish to free the Greeks from Macedonian oppression, but instead by the need to help their allies and pre-empt a possible offensive strike against Rome from Philip V.<sup>34</sup>

Moreover the two ultimatums given to Philip by Roman ambassadors in 200 prior to the outbreak of the war did not contain any demands for Greek freedom.<sup>35</sup> There has been much debate about the chronology of these embassies, enhanced further by Livy's failure to report the first embassy at Athens.<sup>36</sup> Meadows has proposed that the embassy to Ptolemy V Epiphanes

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<sup>31</sup> Livy 31.7.2-3: *'ignorare mihi videmini, Quirites, non utrum bellum an pacem habeatis vos consuli – neque enim liberum id vobis Philippus permittet, qui terra marique ingens bellum molitur – sed utrum in Macedoniam legiones transportetis an hostes in Italiam accipiatis.'*

<sup>32</sup> Livy 31.8.1-2.

<sup>33</sup> Walbank (1967) 134.

<sup>34</sup> Gruen referred to the Roman fear of a naval invasion by Macedonia as 'manifestly absurd,' pointing to Philip's previous naval history and the eastward direction of Philip's aggressions: (1984) 384. For instances of Philip's naval insignificance in 214: Polyb. 5.110; Livy 24.20; Zonar. 9.4; Plut. *Arat.* 51.2; at the battle of Chios in 201: Polyb. 16.7.1-2, 7.5, 8.6. Harris acknowledged that Philip's loss at Chios ended any hope he had of becoming a naval power outside of the Aegean: (1979) 214.

<sup>35</sup> Dmitriev (2011) 166-167.

<sup>36</sup> Livy included the Athenian assembly and vote for war, but did not include the Romans or their meeting with Nicanor included by Polybius: Livy 31.15; Polyb. 16.25-27. There has been some debate over the chronology of this embassy in 201/200. Some scholars argue that it should be placed after the annual consular elections in the late winter 201/200 or spring 200: Walbank (1940) 533-534; McDonald and Walbank (1937) 189; Holleaux (1952) 290-291; Bickerman (1935) 165. Gruen has argued there was no viable reason to believe that the annalists altered the date, despite the assertions of Luce that they were often unsure of the exact dates and randomly placed them in a year. Gruen also claimed that it would have been prior to the consular elections, so prior to March 15 in accordance with the Roman calendar or even earlier in January or February according to the Julian calendar: Gruen (1984) 393; Luce (1977) 53-57. Meadows agreed, placing this embassy in March of 200, giving the

recorded by Livy containing the ambassadors C. Claudius Nero, M. Aemilius Lepidus and P. Sempronius Tuditanus, was not the same one mentioned by Polybius, claiming that this first embassy to Ptolemy had gone to Egypt and returned in time to be sent again (or at least Lepidus was) to Greece.<sup>37</sup> Livy's failure to record this first embassy to Athens was possibly due to its absence in his unnamed Roman source, with Meadows further claiming he became confused when he saw the embassy to Greece mentioned in Polybius.<sup>38</sup> Regardless, the message conveyed to Nicanor at Athens was clear in Polybius' narrative, as was the message delivered to Philip at Abydos; however, neither demanded the freedom of the Greeks.

According to Polybius, the Roman embassy met Philip's general Nicanor in Athens in 200 and demanded that he:

inform Philip that the Romans requested that king to make war on no Grecian state and also to give such compensation to Attalus for the injuries inflicted on him as a fair tribunal should pronounce to be just. If he acted so, they added, he might consider himself at peace with Rome, but if he refused to accede the consequences would be the reverse.<sup>39</sup>

These demands (παρακαλεσαν), while ordering Philip to leave Greece alone, did not demand the freedom of the Greeks to the same level and extent proclaimed at the Isthmian Games. Clearly, the concept of Greek freedom was not yet conceived of as Roman policy and the objective was specifically Philip's immediate withdrawal from Greece. If Meadows' argument that this embassy was separate from the one sent to Egypt in 201 is accepted, then it

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embassy sent to Ptolemy in November/December 201 time to get to Egypt and return before March: Meadows (1993) 40-47.

<sup>37</sup> Livy's account of this embassy implied the Romans were concerned that Egypt may have taken Philip's side in the war, however there was no strong alliance between the two. Polybius claimed that in 205 Philip had been negotiating marriage with Ptolemy Epiphanes and one of his daughters, although this alliance was never cemented due to the delaying tactics of Philip who wished to leave his options open for involvement with Antiochus: Polyb. 15.25.13; see also Walbank (1940) 112.

<sup>38</sup> Meadows (1993) 40-47. In opposition: Walbank and McDonald (1937) 187-192; Walbank (1940) 128-129; Briscoe (1954) 37-41; Briscoe (1973) 56.

<sup>39</sup> Polyb. 16.27.1-3: 'ἀναγγεῖλαι τῷ Φιλίππῳ διότι Ῥωμαῖοι παρακαλοῦσι τὸν βασιλέα τῶν μὲν Ἑλλήνων μηδενὶ πολεμεῖν, τῶν δὲ γεγονότων εἰς Ἄτταλον ἀδικημάτων δίκας ὑπέχειν ἐν ἴσῳ κριτηρίῳ, καὶ διότι πράξαντι μὲν ταῦτα τὴν εἰρήνην ἄγειν ἔξεστι πρὸς Ῥωμαίους, μὴ βουλομένῳ δὲ πείθεσθαι τἀναντία συνεξακολουθήσειν ἔφασαν.'

could be that the envoys left Rome after the official Roman vote for war, making the purpose of this embassy less ambiguous.<sup>40</sup> However, this was only possible if the second vote of the *comitia centuriata* was held soon after the first.<sup>41</sup>

Polybius' account of this embassy claimed that the Romans had not planned to go to Athens at this time, but had been met by Attalus at Piraeus and travelled from there to Athens with the king and the Athenian delegation that accompanied him.<sup>42</sup> Polybius claimed that in the initial meeting with Attalus, the Roman embassy had indicated to the King that they were ready to join the war against Macedonia.<sup>43</sup> Walbank argued that the Romans had realised the usefulness of Attalus and had enlisted him to encourage the Athenians to join the war, however in Polybius' narrative it appeared to be the opposite.<sup>44</sup> In Attalus' written speech asking the Athenians to declare war on Philip, he intimated that they would be joining Pergamum, the Rhodians, and the Romans in the effort against Macedonia, clearly indicating he thought the Roman involvement in the war was certain.<sup>45</sup> This, in addition to the suggestion that this embassy left Rome after the declaration of war, implies that the purpose of this embassy was to present Philip with the traditional

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<sup>40</sup> Appian claimed this embassy was sent to Antiochus warning him against invading Egypt: *Mac.* 4. This is in accord with Polybius' claim that the Roman embassy deferred going to see the other kings in order to meet with Philip at Abydos: 16.34.2. This also seems logical after the senate had been informed of the pact between Philip and Antiochus: Polyb.3.2.8; 15.20.2; 16.1.8; App. *Mac.* 4; Livy 31.14.5; Just. *Epit.* 30.2.8; Porph. *FGrHist* 260 F 44. This pact has been given as motivation for this war by ancient historians (see n. 15 above), although there are also those who have argued it was fabricated: Magie (1939) 32-44. Errington claimed this agreement was a personal one made between Philip and Antiochus' *strategos* Zeuxis, although this has been disputed by Gruen: Errington (1971) 336-354; Gruen (1984) 387 n. 163.

<sup>41</sup> Some modern historians have argued for a gap of a few months between votes: Holleaux (1957) 16 n. 1; Walbank and McDonald (1937) 189-197; Walbank (1940) 314-315. Others have claimed there was a short gap: Balsdon (1954) 37-39; Rich (1976) 79-81.

<sup>42</sup> Polyb. 16.25.2. Attalus had been on his way to Athens to receive honours from the Athenians for his protection of the coast of Attica and the return of their ships, including a new Athenian tribe named Attalus after him: Livy 31.15.5 (capture of the Athenian ships); Polyb. 16.25.1, 25.5-9 (honours for Attalus).

<sup>43</sup> Polyb. 16.25.4-5.

<sup>44</sup> Walbank (1940) 130. Philip had intervened originally in Attica at the request of the Acarnanians, who were at war with Athens due to the death of two of their citizens at Eleusis the previous year: Livy 31.14.6-10.

<sup>45</sup> Polyb. 16.26.6. Dmitriev pointed out that the letter of Attalus, and the speech of the Rhodians to the Athenians that accompanied it, showed that they were fighting specifically for their freedom: (2011) 168. Although there was no explicit claim to this in the narrative, it can be taken as implied.

declaration of war. However, the Roman embassy did not do this immediately and seemed content to travel around Greece publicising their impending conflict with Philip, perhaps in order to elicit support from the Greek states and survey their current allegiances.<sup>46</sup> Eckstein commented that this Roman excursion around Greece was unsurprising since previous visits to Greece had also involved extensive diplomatic activities, and the Romans realised that allies in Greece were both available and useful.<sup>47</sup>

According to Polybius, this same embassy was in Rhodes when they heard about Philip's siege of Abydus, afterwards detouring in order to meet with the king as they had been commanded (ἐντολάς) to do, presumably by the senate. Polybius claimed that M. Aemilius Lepidus was nominated to confront Philip:

Meeting the king near Abydus he informed him that the senate had passed a decree, begging him neither to make war on any of the Greeks, nor to lay hands on any of Ptolemy's possessions. He was also to submit to a tribunal the question of compensation for the damage he had done to Attalus and the Rhodians. If he acted so he would be allowed to remain at

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<sup>46</sup> Polybius claimed that after meeting Nicanor at Athens the Romans saw the Epirots at Phoenice, Amynder at Athamania, the Aetolians at Naupactus and the Achaeans at Aegium, from where they travelled to see Antiochus and Ptolemy: 16.27.4-5. Gruen claimed that this tour of the Roman ambassadors around Greece was in order to build up a large amount of support and intimidate Philip into complying with their demands. He claimed the Romans thought that Philip would back down, and that Philip did not think the Romans would invade Greece, leading Gruen to state that 'miscalculations are no small factors in the creation of war': (1984) 396-397.

<sup>47</sup> Eckstein (2008) 276. For the gap between the departure of the ambassadors in March and this meeting, which took place just prior to the fall of Abydus in September 200, see: Polyb. 6.34.1; Livy 31.16.7-8, 18.1; Walbank and McDonald (1937) 194 n. 92; Walbank (1940) 315-317. If this meeting took place at the end of August, the question then becomes why they took so long to address Philip directly. This delay has been attributed to a large gap between the two votes of the *comitia centuriata*, with scholars arguing that the embassy was travelling through Greece waiting for notification to deliver the official declaration to Philip. However, if this embassy left Rome with the conditional declaration of war in March, there was no need to wait. Eckstein's explanation of the delay as a diplomatic promotional tour around Greece is convincing. However, it may be that the Romans needed that time to rebuild their forces for war after the Second Punic War, and the activities of the embassy in Greece were in order to let the Greeks know they were intending to help, while delaying conflict until they were ready. The departure of Galba to Illyria directly after the ultimatum to Philip could be evidence of this as a delaying tactic like that used in the Third Macedonian War: Livy 42.43.4.

peace, but if he did not at once accept these terms he would find himself at war with Rome.<sup>48</sup>

According to Polybius, Philip was offended by the arrogance of Lepidus and unwilling to bend to the Roman ultimatum.<sup>49</sup> Regardless, this ultimatum issued by Lepidus, under official instruction (according to Polybius), did not contain any demand for complete Greek freedom from all foreign intervention, such as that decreed by the Isthmian declaration. Instead, the focus was only on freedom from Philip through his evacuation of Greece and the demand for reparations.<sup>50</sup> There was no indication here that the Romans conceived of a policy of Greek freedom at this point in their conflict with Philip.<sup>51</sup>

This meeting between Philip and Lepidus was likely to be the official Roman declaration of war.<sup>52</sup> After the formal vote for war was passed in the *comitia centuriata*, Livy claimed that the fetial priests decreed that the declaration of war could either be delivered to Philip in person, or at the first fortified station in his territory.<sup>53</sup> The senate announced that the consul Galba could elect a representative to inform the king, as long as he was not senatorial, which then explained the seemingly unusual choice of Lepidus to deliver the official war declaration.<sup>54</sup> However, this has been widely

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<sup>48</sup> Polyb. 16.34.3-5: ὅς καὶ συμμίξας περὶ τὴν Ἄβυδον διεσάφει τῷ βασιλεῖ διότι δέδοκται τῇ συγκλήτῳ παρακαλεῖν αὐτὸν μῆτε τῶν Ἑλλήνων μηδενὶ πολεμεῖν μῆτε τοῖς Πτολεμαίου πράγμασιν ἐπιβάλλειν τὰς χεῖρας, περὶ δὲ τῶν εἰς Ἄτταλον καὶ Ῥοδίου ἀδικημάτων δίκας ὑποσχέιν, καὶ διότι ταῦτα μὲν οὕτω πράττοντι τὴν εἰρήνην ἄγειν ἐξέσται, μὴ βουλομένῳ δὲ πειθαρχεῖν ἐτοίμως ὑπάρξειν τὸν πρὸς Ῥωμαίους πόλεμον.' Livy did not include this ultimatum, nor mention anything about a senatorial decree. He simply mentioned that Lepidus protested Philip's attacks against Attalus and the Rhodians: 31.18.1-2.

<sup>49</sup> Polybius 16.34.65-7. Philip pardoned Lepidus for his rudeness, attributing it both to his youthful inexperience and beauty, but mainly because he was Roman.

<sup>50</sup> According to Eckstein, this was an example of 'compellence diplomacy' and 'an alternative means of pursuing the agenda of the more powerful': (2008) 12-15, 277-278.

<sup>51</sup> Walsh (1996) 348 n. 18.

<sup>52</sup> Bickerman argued that the vote for war was accepted in the *consilium* after this final ultimatum was refused. However, this implies extremely swift action by all parties and may not necessarily have been the case: (1935) 173-4. McDonald, Walbank and Gruen see this chronology as far too compact: McDonald and Walbank (1937) 194 n. 92; Gruen (1984) 396 n. 213.

<sup>53</sup> Livy 31.7.2-4.

<sup>54</sup> Lepidus had no political experience at this time and was even reported to be part of the embassy because he was sent by the Romans to be a tutor for Ptolemy Epiphanes: Val. Max. 6.6.1; Just. *Epit.* 30.3.4; Tac. *Ann.* 2.67. For a different analysis of Lepidus' significance see Meadows (1993) 56-58. Lepidus was the only named ambassador, but if he was accompanied by the same magistrates who went on the embassy of 201 to Ptolemy, Nero had held the consulship in 207, while Tuditanus had held it in 204: *MRR* 294, 305-306. In

contested.<sup>55</sup> Rich has argued that in this period there were no specific methods for war declarations.<sup>56</sup> He claimed that there was no declaration of war made by this embassy, but instead they were charged with presenting the *senatus consultum* to Philip, which laid out Roman demands. Alternatively, Rich claimed that war was declared by a non-senatorial Roman once Galba had landed in Illyria.<sup>57</sup> But this theory discounts the timing of Galba's crossing to Illyria, mere weeks after the meeting with Philip at Abydos.<sup>58</sup> What Rich dismissed as coincidence, Gruen argued had to be more than accidental.<sup>59</sup>

Galba's crossing over to Illyria after the ultimatum issued to Philip indicates that Lepidus issued the *rerum repetitio* for war, which was then rejected by Philip.<sup>60</sup> As Walbank argued, the traditional fetial procedure had been modified by the end of the third century, with *legati* taking the traditional position of the *fetiales*.<sup>61</sup> He claimed that these senatorial *legati* entered into diplomatic interactions with the potential enemy in possession of a conditional

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opposition, Rich argued that Lepidus was a senator and so did not fulfil the requirements, according to Livy, of the envoy selected to declare war: (1976) 87, 128-137.

<sup>55</sup> For example: Bickerman (1935) 172-174; McDonald and Walbank (1937) 192-197; Bickerman (1945) 139; Walbank (1949) 15-19; Balsdon (1954) 41; see also Gruen (1984) 395.

<sup>56</sup> Rich (1976) *passim*. Rich claimed that the senate was unaware of the actions and situation of the envoys, but this is very hard to accept, as Gruen acknowledged: Rich (1976) 86; Gruen (1984) 396.

<sup>57</sup> Rich (1976) 84-87.

<sup>58</sup> Livy 31.18.

<sup>59</sup> Gruen (1984) 396.

<sup>60</sup> Gruen argued that this was not an ultimatum: (1984) 396. However, the demand issued to Philip certainly posed an either/or qualification, which forms the basis of an ultimatum.

<sup>61</sup> Walbank and McDonald (1937) 180-207; Walbank (1941) 82-93; (1949) 15-19. The traditional practice of the *ius fetiale*, the most fundamental of Roman diplomatic procedures, was evidence against the Romans' ability to negotiate. According to Livy, the formal procedure was established by King Ancus Marcius (640-614). This declaration had three levels; the *rerum repetitio* which involved the *pater patratus* (head fetial priest) travelling to the enemy and publicly announcing the demands of the Roman people, which were witnessed by Jupiter. As Harris argued, the demands issued in ultimatum for war were often completely unfeasible, seemingly reflecting Roman determination for conflict: (1979) 167. After this, the enemy then had thirty-three days to obey these demands (Dion. Hal. *Ant. Rom.* 2.72.8 claimed it was thirty days). If they did not, the fetial would declare the *testio deorum*, which announced before Jupiter that the opposing party was unjust and unwilling to obey the demands. Upon this proclamation, the fetial returned to Rome where a vote for war would be put to the *comitia*. Finally, the *ius fetiale* would be complete with the return of the fetial to the native land of the enemy where he carried the *indictio belli* and completed the declaration for war by hurling a spear into their territory: Livy 1.32. Ager pointed out that this process was empty of any form or opportunity for negotiation. In fact, the Romans were set on a course even before the initial stage of this religious rite; the *rerum repetitio*. Here the crimes committed by the enemy were recounted, but the enemy was given no opportunity to respond. The choice was simple - obey the Roman ultimatum or face war: Ager (2009) 15-44.

declaration of war that had already been approved by the senate and the *comitia centuriata*. Therefore, if the *rerum repetitio* was rejected, war could then be declared immediately. This formula fits with Polybius' account of the meeting with Philip at Abydus, indicating that his rejection of Roman demands led to a *denuntiatio belli*, which was at that point like an *indictio belli*.<sup>62</sup>

While these embassies both gave Philip an ultimatum that forced him to choose between withdrawing from Greece and war with the Romans, neither of them contained a demand for complete Greek freedom such as that given at the Isthmian Games in 196, which freed Greece from all foreign influence. Significantly, not even the Roman declaration of war gave Greek freedom as a pretext for this war. This indicated that Polybius was mistaken in the *Histories* when he claimed that the aim of Rome in entering this war was to free the Greeks from oppression.<sup>63</sup> The Romans were only concerned with stopping Philip at this point. Their demands reflected this narrow focus and showed that there was no intention in 200 of making Greek freedom from foreign intervention, like that given at the Isthmian Games, official Roman policy. In both these meetings, the Romans were only asking Philip to stop his aggressions, there were no demands for Greek freedom.

### 3) Diplomatic interactions during the war

However, Greek freedom was Roman policy in the East by 196 as shown by Flamininus' declaration at the Isthmian Games. It is unclear when this developed into firm Roman policy, since there was no indication of this as a motivation for entering this war. In 198, Titus Quinctius Flamininus took over the command from P. Villius and hastened the war effort against Philip.<sup>64</sup>

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<sup>62</sup> McDonald and Walbank (1937) 192-194; Walbank (1949) 15-19.

<sup>63</sup> Polyb. 18.46.14-15.

<sup>64</sup> Villius arrived in 199 to a revolt of the soldiers. The soldiers claimed they had been forced into service straight from Africa and Sicily, although they were reported as volunteers: Livy 31.8.6, 31.14.2. Villius did not seem to have done anything of importance during his command, although Livy reported that Valerius Antias claimed that he attacked the camp of Philip by the Aous and was victorious. But Livy questioned the validity of this claim because no other writers mentioned any such success, with him claiming instead that Villius handed the war effort over to Flamininus in the same state he had received it: Livy 32.6.5-8.



There were two diplomatic conferences between Philip and Flamininus during the course of the war that show the initial development of Greek freedom as Roman policy, although not yet the type of freedom from all foreign influence, including the Romans, decreed at the Isthmian Games.<sup>65</sup>

The first meeting was organised by the Epirotes at the Aous River in 198. The Aous conference showed a clear development of Roman war aims, since they now required Philip's complete evacuation of Greece:

The king should withdraw his garrisons from the cities; he should restore what property was recoverable to those whose lands and towns he had ravaged; a valuation should be made of the rest by an impartial board.<sup>66</sup>

While these demands were an escalation of those given prior to the war that simply demanded Philip leave the Greeks alone, the demand to withdraw from Greece was still significantly less than a policy centred on the freedom of the Greeks. It demanded a type of freedom, that was freedom from Philip and Macedonia, not the complete freedom from all foreign influence decreed for the Greek world at the Isthmian Games.

Unfortunately, Polybius' account of the Aous conference is not extant. However, it seems likely that if there had been claims of Greek freedom in Polybius' account of the conference, Livy would also have included them since he seems to be following the account of Polybius for much of his narrative of this war. Many of his descriptions are similar, particularly with reports of diplomatic exchanges between Flamininus and Philip.<sup>67</sup> Livy's account of the conference at Nicaea in 197 is too similar to Polybius' to be

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<sup>65</sup> There are many historians who argue that Flamininus was chosen because he was an 'eastern expert': Badian (1970) 35-38; (1971) 110; Briscoe (1972) 42; Armstrong and Walsh (1986) 32-46; Walsh (1996) 344-363. However, apart from Plutarch's description of him as the first philhellene, there is no evidence to support this in the ancient evidence: Plut. *Comp. Phil. Flam.* His election was controversial, though, since he was not yet thirty and had not held the praetorship: Livy 32.7.8-10; Badian (1971) 107-110; Eckstein (1976) 123-124.

<sup>66</sup> Livy 32.10.3-4: '*summa postulatorum consulis erat: praesidia ex civitatibus rex deduceret; iis, quorum agros urbesque populatus esset, redderet res quae comparerent; ceterorum aequo arbitrio aestimatio fieret.*'

<sup>67</sup> This was first realised by Nissen: (1863) 134-136.

coincidence.<sup>68</sup> It therefore seems likely that in Polybius' lost account of the Aous conference there were no demands for Greek autonomy, particularly as there was little reason for Livy to ignore any Roman demands for Greek freedom, since in accordance with his aims, they would cast a positive light on Roman dealings with the Greeks.<sup>69</sup>

In contrast to Livy's account, Plutarch, Appian, and Diodorus Siculus portrayed the Romans as heroes of Greek freedom from this first meeting at the Aous River. Plutarch claimed that Flaminius offered:

him peace and friendship on condition that he allowed the Greeks to be independent and withdraw his garrisons from their cities; but this proffer Philip would not accept. Then at last it became quite clear even to the partisans of Philip that the Romans were come to wage war, not upon the Greeks, but upon the Macedonians in behalf of the Greeks.<sup>70</sup>

Plutarch portrayed the Romans as the saviours of Greece in his account, indicating that the aim for the Romans in this war was autonomy of the Greek states (αὐτονόμους). Similarly, Diodorus Siculus claimed that Flaminius demanded as his first requirement Philip's complete withdrawal from Greece, which should then remain ungarrisoned and autonomous.<sup>71</sup> Diodorus' account also went further, to claim that Flaminius' instructions to liberate Greece came directly from the senate and that they intended freedom for the whole of Greece.<sup>72</sup> Appian championed the Romans, claiming that the Greek cities that had been under Philip's rule should be free (ἐλεύθερος).<sup>73</sup>

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<sup>68</sup> Livy 32.32-36; Polyb. 18.1-10.

<sup>69</sup> Eckstein (1987b) 275.

<sup>70</sup> Plut. Flam. 5.6 (Perrin trans.): 'εἰρήνην καὶ φιλίαν ἐπὶ τῶν τοῦς Ἑλληνας αὐτονόμους ἔαν καὶ τὰς φρουρὰς ἀπαλλάττειν, ὃ δὲ οὐκ ἔδέξατο, παντάπασιν ἤδη τότε καὶ τοῖς, θεραπεύουσι τὰ τοῦ φιλίππου παρέστη Ῥωμαίους πολεμήσοντας ἤκειν οὐχ Ἑλλησιν, ἀλλ' ὑπὲρ Ἑλλήνων Μακεδόσι.'

<sup>71</sup> Diod. 28.11. According to Diodorus, Flaminius also demanded reparations to be made to all of those who had suffered through Philip's faithlessness. Philip responded by offering to return all those lands he had conquered, but not those that were his by ancestral right. The question of damages he preferred to leave to arbitration. Flaminius refused this claim, insisting that there was no need for arbitration and Philip should make amends to those he had damaged.

<sup>72</sup> Diod. 28.11. Diodorus was explicit that this demand for freedom (ἐλεύθερος) was for the whole of Greece, not simply part of it. It has been argued that Diodorus' account of this conference was the closest in resemblance to Polybius': Walsh (1954) 107-108; Carawan

All of these historians had differing interpretations of the terms issued to Philip at the Aous conference. Livy did not mention freedom of any type, but simply ordered the king to withdraw his forces from Greece.<sup>74</sup> Plutarch claimed that Flamininus ordered the Greeks to be autonomous, while Diodorus and Appian claimed that the Romans had demanded Greek freedom. The terms *autonomia* (αὐτονομος) and *eleutheria* (ἐλεύθερος) had different connotations in the ancient world. Bickerman argued that *eleutheria* was complete unrestricted freedom that was independent from any communal alliances. In contrast, *autonomia* denoted a restricted internal independence that indicated a dependent alliance with another foreign power or group of powers who primarily controlled foreign policy and decisions of warfare.<sup>75</sup> While *eleutheria* has usually been accepted to be a comprehensive type of freedom, the implications of *autonomia* have been widely contested. Significantly, in this case, *autonomia* was the kind of freedom given to a smaller power by a larger power who still maintained control of their foreign policy. As Ostwald claimed:

from the view point of the major power, it (the granting of *autonomia*) is simply a declaration of its willingness to refrain from exercising the power it has, a willingness which is in the control of the major power alone and depends on the historical circumstances in which it finds itself at any given time.<sup>76</sup>

However, Raaflaub argued that the terms *autonomia* and *eleutheria* were understood by the Greeks in accordance with the context and circumstances, and so could imply the same thing.<sup>77</sup> The use of these terms by Plutarch,

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(1988) 212-214; Briscoe (1973) 186; *contra* Seager (1981) 108; Eckstein (1987b) 275; Walsh (1996) 347-348.

<sup>73</sup> App. *Mac.* 1.3

<sup>74</sup> As Ferrary pointed out, there was no indication here that the Romans did not intend to occupy these territories themselves, which until this point they usually had to some extent: (1988) 58-61.

<sup>75</sup> Bickerman (1958) 313-344. Bosworth claimed that the term *autonomia* in the fourth century was tainted by its use as an oppressive tool: (1992) 149.

<sup>76</sup> Ostwald (1982) 9.

<sup>77</sup> Raaflaub (2004) 149-157. *Autonomia* seemed to imply internal freedom, while *eleutheria* implied external freedom. Raaflaub argued that the choice to use *eleutheria* or *autonomia* was one of perspective and emphasis. *Eleutheria* was used to describe an outward looking

Diodorus and Appian seems to indicate various interpretations of the level of freedom the Romans were giving the Greeks in the Second Macedonian War. Plutarch conceptualised an independent state under the general dominion of Rome or *autonomia*, while Appian and Diodorus interpreted the demands at the Aous conference to imply *eleutheria*, or complete freedom from foreign control of both internal and external state policy.

In contrast, Livy portrayed the demands at the Aous conference in a similar way to those issued to Philip prior to the war, except they now expected Philip to evacuate Greece completely. Livy acknowledges an escalation of demands, but nowhere near as excessive as those given by Diodorus and Appian, whose accounts both appear to be the product of hindsight.<sup>78</sup> According to Livy, Roman policy now demanded Philip's withdrawal from the cities of Greece, but this specific type of freedom was not yet the freedom from all foreign influence, including the Romans, given to the Greeks at the Isthmian Games. Philip seemed willing to accept Roman demands at the Aous conference, but refused to forfeit his ancestral territory. However, Flamininus first demanded Thessaly from Philip, which was an established Macedonian territory. This seemingly reveals Flamininus' reluctance to end the conflict, and as a result, negotiations soon failed.<sup>79</sup>

Significantly, Diodorus claimed that these new demands came directly from the senate.<sup>80</sup> Badian argued that Flamininus in this first meeting with Philip was the bearer of the senate's new policy to completely expel Philip from Greece, as shown by the mention of Thessaly as the first territory for him to evacuate.<sup>81</sup> He claimed this new senatorial policy was driven by the

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freedom defined by the absence of foreign domination, while *autonomia* was used to describe an inward looking freedom that depended on self-determination: (2004) 154.

<sup>78</sup> Seager (1981) 108. An escalation of demands after a declaration of war was also somewhat standard for the Romans, which may partially explain these demands: Ferrary (1988) 58-61.

<sup>79</sup> Livy 32.10.5-8; Diod. 28.11. Both Livy and Diodorus claim Philip's last words before he left the Aous conference were: 'what heavier command, Titus Quinctius, could you lay upon a beaten foe?' – '*Quid victo gravius imperares, T. Quinti?*' – 'καὶ τί τούτου βαρύτερόν, φησιν, προσετάξατ' ἄν μοι πολέμῳ κρατήσαντες;'

<sup>80</sup> Diod. 28.11.

<sup>81</sup> Badian (1958) 70; see also: Aymard (1938) 2; Walbank (1940) 152 n. 1; Badian (1970) 36-38.

stagnancy of the first few years of the war, not the new appointment of Flamininus to the Roman command.<sup>82</sup> While it was likely Flamininus left Rome with some vague instructions from the senate, Eckstein argued that they were not clearly established.<sup>83</sup> Livy placed some emphasis on Flamininus' decision-making during the war as being influenced by his own career interests.<sup>84</sup> Flamininus had only been in Greece a month and would not have ended his command on anything short of unconditional evacuation.<sup>85</sup> Therefore, while the senate may have sent Flamininus on campaign with vague instructions, they were ambiguous enough to allow Flamininus and his *consilium* to determine the details.<sup>86</sup> These new demands, as Eckstein claimed, may have given Flamininus a general aim of 'freeing Greece', but they still fell short of the comprehensive freedom Polybius claimed was decreed at the Isthmian Games.<sup>87</sup> As Walsh argued, it could be 'that beyond Philip's defeat and humiliation, the senate had no clear notion of what the consequences of his defeat should be.'<sup>88</sup>

The second diplomatic conference at Nicaea at the end of 198 was instigated by Philip but according to Polybius, the Roman ultimatums still fell short of demanding the freedom of the Greeks.<sup>89</sup> Polybius claimed that Flamininus was clear in his demands to Philip:

he demanded that Philip would withdraw from the whole of Greece after giving up to each power the prisoners and

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<sup>82</sup> Badian (1958) 70.

<sup>83</sup> Eckstein (1987b) 275-276.

<sup>84</sup> Livy 32.32.6-9. However, Flamininus was quite inexperienced and it is usually argued he would not have undertaken such an escalation of demands on his own initiative: Badian (1958) 70-71; Walbank (1967) 550-551; Errington (1972) 146; Ferrary (1988) 58-59. In opposition, Walsh argued there was no evidence that Flamininus did not escalate the war demands on his own initiative: (1996) 348.

<sup>85</sup> Plutarch's biography of Flamininus dwelt on his ambition for glory, for example: *Flam.* 1.2.

<sup>86</sup> For Flamininus' *consilium*, see: Livy 32.9.8-11.

<sup>87</sup> Eckstein (1987b) 276-277. Walsh pointed out that the demands at the Aous conference 'lacked the refined use of freedom terminology we find in the Isthmian declaration': (1996) 347.

<sup>88</sup> Walsh (1996) 348.

<sup>89</sup> According to Livy, Flamininus wanted to meet Philip at this point in the conflict because he was unsure if his command would be extended and may have found it necessary to make peace: 32.32.6-8. Philip had also lost his Achaean allies since the Aous conference, which had changed the balance of allies between Rome and Macedonia: App. *Mac.* 7; Livy 32.20-23.3; Plut. *Flam.* 5.3; Polyb. 18.13; Paus. 7.8.1-2, Zonar. 9.16; see also Eckstein (1976) 138-141.

deserters in his hands; that he should surrender to the Romans the district of Illyria that had fallen into his power after the treaty made in Epirus, and likewise restore to Ptolemy all the towns that he had taken from him after the death of Ptolemy Philopater.<sup>90</sup>

Similarly, at this point in the war Roman demands were still for Philip's withdrawal from Greece, so a freedom specifically from Philip rather than the level of freedom decreed at the Isthmian Games. This conference at Nicaea took three days and was attended by Rome's Greek allies.<sup>91</sup> After Flamininus issued his demands to Philip, he requested that those Greeks involved in the war on the Roman side voice their own demands.<sup>92</sup> Each ally voiced its individual demands, but only the Aetolians reiterated Flamininus' demand to evacuate (ἐξίστασθαι/*decederetur*) Greece.<sup>93</sup> Philip conceded to some of the allies' demands, indicating that he was willing to negotiate in order to have peace with Rome.<sup>94</sup> However, Flamininus was curiously silent through much

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<sup>90</sup> Polyb. 18.1.13-14: 'κελεύειν γὰρ αὐτὸν ἐκ μὲν τῆς Ἑλλάδος ἀπάσης ἐκχωρεῖν, ἀποδόντα τοὺς αἰχμαλώτους καὶ τοὺς αὐτομόλους ἐκάστοις οὓς ἔχει, τοὺς δὲ κατὰ τὴν Ἰλλυρίδα τόπους παραδοῦναι Ῥωμαίοις, ὧν γέγονε κύριος μετὰ τὰς ἐν Ἠπειρῶ διαλύσεις· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ Πτολεμαίῳ τὰς πόλεις ἀποκαταστήσαι πάσας, ἃς παρήρηται μετὰ τὸν Πτολεμαίου τοῦ Φιλοπάτορος θάνατον.' See also: Livy 32.33.3-4.

<sup>91</sup> Both Philip and Flamininus travelled to Nicaea accompanied by allies. Livy claimed Philip was accompanied by Macedonian nobles and an exile of Achaea, Cycliades. Polybius provides more detail, naming the Macedonians as his secretaries Apollodorus and Demosthenes, Brachylles from Boeotia, and Cycliades. Flamininus' entourage consisted of King Amyntander, Dionysodorus the representative of King Attalus, Agesimbrotus the commander of the Rhodian fleet, Phaeneas from the Aetolians, and Xenophon and Aristaenus the Achaeans: Polyb. 18.1.1-4; Livy 32.32.10-12.

<sup>92</sup> Interestingly, Livy phrased this request from Flamininus in terms of another condition of peace. After Flamininus' demands were issued Livy stated: 'these were his conditions and those of the Roman people; but the king must hear besides the demands of the allies' – '*suas populique Romani condiciones has esse; ceterum et socium audiri postulara verum esse*': 32.33.4. Note that he did not say Philip had to obey or abide by the demands of the allies, although that must have been the impression he gave them. This could be seen by their reactions when they heard the terms of peace decided by Philip and Flamininus alone. Philip simply had to listen to their demands, but he did not have to obey them in order to reach an agreement with Rome.

<sup>93</sup> Polyb. 18.2.6; Livy 32.33.8. The exchanges between Philip and the Aetolians were particularly malicious: Polyb. 18.3-5; Livy 32.33.9-34.6.

<sup>94</sup> Dionysodorus demanded the return of ships and hostages from the Battle of Chios, and the restoration of the temples of Aphrodite and Nicephorium Philip had destroyed, while Agesimbrotus demanded the evacuation of the Peraea, withdrawal from Iasus, Bargyliae and Euromus, as well as Sestus and Abydus and all the commercial depots and harbours in Asia. He also demanded Philip return Perinthus to the Byzantines: Polyb. 18.2.2-4; Livy 32.33.5-7. Philip reluctantly conceded Peraea to Agesimbrotus, but would not give up Iasus and Bargyliae. He also gave up the ships and hostages to Dionysodorus, and agreed to send gardeners to the temples – a jest that Flamininus smiled at, according to Polybius: Polyb.

of this dialogue between the allies and Philip. He did not repeat his initial demand that Philip withdraw from Greece, and seemed to let the allies determine the tone of the negotiations. According to Polybius, when Philip sought clarification of the extent of the withdrawal the Romans were demanding, asking if he was also expected to withdraw from his ancestral territories in Greece, Flamininus remained silent.<sup>95</sup> As Eckstein claimed, Flamininus' silence would have bolstered Philip's confidence in his ability to make peace with the Romans, shown by his appeal to go straight to the senate and avoid the complaints of the Greek representatives at Nicaea.<sup>96</sup>

Flamininus' silence and his willingness on the third day of deliberations to allow Philip to send his proposed peace terms to the senate, seemed to indicate that he had no concrete guidelines from the senate upon which to make peace.<sup>97</sup> Philip's concessions at Nicaea were far short of those demanded at the Aous conference, while the negative reactions of the allies indicated they were also far below what they had expected from negotiations.<sup>98</sup> In addition, Flamininus did not censure Philip's behaviour in this meeting at Nicaea, despite a large amount of provocation.<sup>99</sup> His

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18.6.3-5, 8.9; Livy 32.34.7-11, 35.11. The Achaeans demanded Corinth and Argos from Philip, who conceded Argos, but stated he had to discuss Corinth with Flamininus – after which he conceded Corinth: Polyb. 18.2.5, 6.5-8, 8.9-10; Livy 32.33.7-8, 34.12-13, 35.11. The Aetolians demanded Philip withdraw from Greece, but more particularly that he restore to them those cities that had formerly been in the Aetolian League: Polyb. 18.2.6; Livy 32.33.8-9. Philip criticised the Aetolians heavily, but significantly, he also questioned how they defined 'Greece.' Ultimately, however, he agreed to give up Pharsalus and Larisa, but not Thebes: Polyb. 18.4-5, 8.9; Livy 32.34.1-6, 35.11. In addition, he agreed to give up Illyria to the Romans: Polyb. 18.8.10; Livy 32.35.9-10.

<sup>95</sup> Polyb. 18.7.1-2; Eckstein (1987b) 280. Livy did not include this in his account of the conference at Nicaea.

<sup>96</sup> Eckstein (1987b) 281; Walbank (1967) 558. Philip's confidence was also shown by the price he paid to have a two month truce in order to send ambassadors to the senate (he had to evacuate Phocis and Locris), implying Flamininus gave him some kind of reassurance at Nicaea: Badian (1970) 41.

<sup>97</sup> Eckstein (1987b) 276. For discussion on the developing aims of the senate in Greece see: Badian (1958) 66-75.

<sup>98</sup> Polyb. 18.9.1, 9.6; Livy. 32.35.12-36.1, 36.5-6.

<sup>99</sup> Philip's behaviour was incredibly presumptuous at this meeting, and it is somewhat surprising that Flamininus did not censure him. On the first day Philip refused to disembark from his ship and negotiated from its prow: Polyb. 18.1.5-10; Livy. 33.32.12-16. Philip then refused to speak first, even though he had asked for the meeting: Polyb. 18.1.11-12; Livy 32.33.1-2. Livy referred to Philip as having a 'satirical nature' (*dicacior natura*), with both Livy and Polybius claiming he was constantly jesting even in serious situations: Polyb. 18.4.4-5; Livy 32.34.3-4. On the second day, Philip did not arrive at the appointed time, and left Flamininus and the assembled Greek representatives waiting for hours, a sure blow to Flamininus' *dignitas*: Polyb. 18.7.8-8.1; Livy 32.35.2-3; Eckstein (1987b) 280. He then asked

demeanour was different to that at the Aous conference and at the discussions of peace after the Battle of Cynoscephalae. Flamininus' change of attitude towards Philip in this conference has often been attributed to his own concern to manipulate the course of the war to benefit his own glory.<sup>100</sup> Livy explicitly claimed that Flamininus' motivation behind his conciliatory attitude towards Philip and the granting of his request to defer to the senate were due to the state of his own command in Greece.<sup>101</sup> Peace with Philip had to be on the cards for Flamininus in case his command was not extended in Greece, although if it was, he wanted to be able to continue hostilities in order to enhance his chances of achieving glory.<sup>102</sup>

The terms agreed at Nicaea that were sent to the Roman senate in 198 did not demand the freedom of the Greeks. There was no mention of Greek autonomy, independence or freedom in the terms discussed at Nicaea, with Flamininus choosing to stay silent instead of repeating his initial demand to evacuate Greece. Many of the Greek ambassadors at Nicaea demanded specific withdrawals, but only the Aetolians reiterated the Roman's original stipulation to evacuate Greece.<sup>103</sup> This clearly showed that there was no Roman policy of Greek freedom at this point, and certainly not to the level of that promoted at the Isthmian Games. This is further enforced by the senate's lack of direction in the following meeting in Rome with the representatives of Philip and the Greeks.

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to speak with Flamininus alone, a request that was surprisingly granted: Polyb. 18.8.4-8; Livy 32.35.5-8. Then on the third and final day, Philip changed his mind about reaching an accord as he had indicated would be his aim on the previous day (Polyb. 18.9.2-3; Livy 32.36.2) and asked to send an embassy to the Roman senate, a request Flamininus had to force on the allies: Polyb. 18.9.6-10.2; Livy 32.36.3-9; see also Eckstein (1987b) 279-280.

<sup>100</sup> Holleaux (1957) 29-79; Badian (1970) 40-48; Eckstein (1987b) 278-283. Balsdon opposed the argument that glory seeking motivated Flamininus at this conference, attacking Polybius' account of this conference and the existence of Flamininus' 'friends' in Rome who would either ensure the continuation of his command or peace with Philip. Despite this, it seems likely that Flamininus would have been concerned by the continuation of his command and taken steps to ensure its renewal: Balsdon (1967) 180-184.

<sup>101</sup> Livy 32.32.5-8; see also Polyb. 18.10.7; Plut. *Flam.* 7.1.

<sup>102</sup> Flamininus was relying on his friends in the senate to get his command prorogued: Polyb. 18.10.7, 11.1-2; Livy 32.32.7; Plut. *Flam.* 7.1. Eckstein claimed that Flamininus would not have allowed Philip to send ambassadors to the senate unless he thought there was a chance of success: (1987b) 283.

<sup>103</sup> Walsh claimed that this conference saw Flamininus unite the Greek ambassadors under his leadership: (1996) 350.



When Philip's representatives and the Greek ambassadors went before the senate, there was no mention of any existing Roman policy that advocated Greek freedom. However, this was the first time that Polybius used the term *eleutheria* to describe the aim of the Romans, although it was framed this way by the Greeks.<sup>104</sup>

Their accusations were in general similar to those they had brought against the king in person, but the point they all took pains to impress upon the senate was that as long as Chalcis, Corinth, and Demetrias remained in Macedonian hands it was impossible for the Greeks to have any thought of liberty (ἐλευθερίας).<sup>105</sup>

In this way, the Greek ambassadors appealed to the senate to free them from Philip's oppression, clinging to the danger posed by Macedonian possession of the three fetters.<sup>106</sup> The ambassadors 'entreated the senate neither to cheat the Greeks out of their hope of liberty nor to deprive themselves of the noblest title of fame.'<sup>107</sup> Polybius clearly indicates here that the concept of freedom in this war was introduced into the diplomatic equation by the Greeks, and adopted later by Flamininus and the Romans.<sup>108</sup> Gruen also recognised that this policy of freedom was suggested to the Romans by the Greeks. Rome had been allied with the Greeks for four years before the Isthmian declaration, which according to Gruen was ample time for the Greeks to counsel the Romans on the proper result.<sup>109</sup> Badian however, argued that the policy was a natural development of strategic and political

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<sup>104</sup> As Walsh argued, prior to leaving Nicaea Flamininus and the allies would have reached an accord on how to approach the question of peace in the senate: (1996) 351.

<sup>105</sup> Polyb. 18.11.3-4: 'τὰ μὲν οὖν ἄλλα παραπλήσια τοῖς καὶ πρὸς αὐτὸν τὸν βασιλέα πρότερον εἰρημένοις ἦν· τοῦτο δ' ἐπιμελῶς ἐντίκτειν ἐπειρῶντο τῇ συγκλήτῳ πάντες, διότι τῆς Χαλκίδος καὶ τοῦ Κορίνθου καὶ τῆς Δημητριάδος ὑπὸ τῷ Μακεδόνι ταπτομένων οὐχ οἶόν τε τοὺς Ἕλληνας ἔννοιαν λαβεῖν ἐλευθερίας.' Livy does not follow Polybius in claiming that the idea of Greek freedom was introduced by the ambassadors from Greece: Livy 32.37.3-4.

<sup>106</sup> Corinth, which enabled free access to the Peloponnesians, Chalcis, which gave admission to the Boeotians, Locrians, Phocians and the rest of Euboea, and Demetrias, which allowed a means of access to the Thessalians and Magnesians: Polyb. 18.11.6-8.

<sup>107</sup> Polyb. 18.11.11: 'παρεκάλουν μῆτε τοὺς Ἕλληνας ψεῦσαι τῶν περὶ τῆς ἐλευθερίας ἐλπίδων μῆθ' ἑαυτοὺς ἀποστερηῖσαι τῆς καλλίστης ἐπιγραφῆς.'

<sup>108</sup> Despite the claim of Dmitriev that 'freedom was not yet on the mind, or tongue, of the Romans': (2011) 169.

<sup>109</sup> Gruen (1984) 145.

experience.<sup>110</sup> He claimed that this policy was Roman, and that the declaration was exactly like the decisions to free Segesta and the Illyrian Coast.<sup>111</sup> However, Polybius' account suggests that the concept first originated with the Greeks.

The focus on the fetters of Greece ensured that the senate would refuse any argument presented by the Macedonian embassy. Eckstein argued that the terms agreed at Nicaea were not contrary to Roman aims, and Flamininus would have been aware of this when he allowed Philip to send his embassy to Rome.<sup>112</sup> However, Badian, by contrast, claimed that Philip could not have had peace on any other terms except Greek freedom from all foreign influence, pointing to the emphasis on the three fetters.<sup>113</sup> Nevertheless, as has already been seen, this was the first point in the war where the Romans had conceived of freedom in itself as an aim - and it was introduced by the Greeks, with reference to the geographical danger posed by the fetters of Greece.

The Greek promotion of the concept of freedom as policy continued after the Macedonian defeat at Cynoscephalae into the peace negotiations at Tempe. According to Polybius, the only mention of Greek freedom at this meeting was from the Aetolians who argued that the only way to guarantee Greek freedom (ἐλευθερίας) and Roman peace, was to depose Philip from the Macedonian throne.<sup>114</sup> Walsh argued that the parallel between Greek freedom and Roman peace was one that Flamininus consciously fostered with the Greek allies, claiming that the narrative confirmed they had a united aim of

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<sup>110</sup> Badian (1958) 74. However Badian also acknowledged Flamininus' influence on the final Isthmian proclamation: (1958) 72-74.

<sup>111</sup> In 229 after the First Illyrian War, the Illyrian coast was left free, without taxes, garrisons or governors. They were classed as *amici* of Rome but were not bound by formal treaty. This included Corcyra, Apollonia, Dyrrachium and Issa, which the Romans had a sort of protectorate over due to their distrust of Queen Teuta: Polyb. 2.2.2; Badian (1958) 45-46. In 263, the Romans had a favourable alliance with Segesta in Sicily on the grounds of their common descent from Troy: Cic. *Verr.* 5.125; Badian (1958) 39.

<sup>112</sup> Eckstein (1987b) 283

<sup>113</sup> Badian (1958) 70.

<sup>114</sup> Polyb. 18.36.6. In Livy's account both Amynder and Flamininus mention freedom: 33.12.2, 12.10.

Greek freedom but disagreed on how that should be achieved.<sup>115</sup> However, according to Polybius, Flamininus made no specific reference to Greek freedom at Tempe, stating only that he ‘will so manage the peace that Philip will not, even if he wishes it, be able to wrong the Greeks.’<sup>116</sup> Instead, this meeting was dominated by the anger and criticism of the Aetolians.<sup>117</sup> In addition, a speech reportedly given by King Amynder at this meeting foreshadowed the evacuation of the Romans from Greece, painting a future Greece free from both the Romans and the Macedonians.<sup>118</sup> Any negotiations by the Greek states were also undercut by Philip’s declaration on the second day of negotiations at Tempe that he would give the Romans and the Greek states all they had demanded and would leave the final terms of peace to be decided by the senate.<sup>119</sup> Claims of Greek freedom did not follow Philip’s announcement at Tempe, as the terms upon which peace would be made were then referred completely to the senate at Rome.<sup>120</sup>

In Rome peace was concluded with Philip, with the passing of a *senatus consultum* and formation of a ten-man commission to help Flamininus organise Greece.<sup>121</sup> Polybius claimed the formation of this commission was also to ‘assure the liberties of the Greeks’, although Livy did not make any similar claims.<sup>122</sup> The *senatus consultum* from the senate according to the

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<sup>115</sup> Walsh (1996) 353-354.

<sup>116</sup> Polyb. 18.37.12: ‘ἐγὼ γὰρ οὕτως χειριῶ τὰς διαλύσεις ὥστε μηδὲ βουλευθέντα τὸν Φίλιππον ἀδικεῖν δύνασθαι τοὺς Ἕλληνας.’ Livy claimed Flamininus stated: ‘the conditions by which the king will be bound will not be such that he will be able to start a war’ – ‘*non iis condicionibus illigabitur rex ut movere bellum possit*’: 33.12.13. According to Polybius and Livy, Flamininus was eager to end this war because of the increasing threat of Antiochus: Polyb. 18.39.3-4, 47.1-4; Livy 33.13.15, 34.2-5. Derow claimed the Romans were determined to make war on Antiochus, despite what seems to be a lack of justification: Livy 36.1.4-5; Derow (2003) 64.

<sup>117</sup> Polyb. 18.36.5-37.12, 38.3-39.3; Livy 33.12.3-13, 13.5-14. See also: Sacks (1975) 92-106; Derow (1979) 1-15; Eckstein (1987b) 286-293; Walsh (1993) 35-46.

<sup>118</sup> Polyb. 18.36.4; Livy 33.12.2; Sacks (1975) 102-103. Eckstein claimed that Flamininus had hinted that he would support a policy of evacuation from Greece through the speech of Amynder: (1987b) 296-297.

<sup>119</sup> Polyb. 18.38.1-2; Livy 33.13.3-5.

<sup>120</sup> Flamininus granted Philip a four-month armistice and took his son Demetrius as hostage along with two hundred talents: Polyb. 18.39.5; Livy 33.13.14-15.

<sup>121</sup> Polyb. 18.42; Livy 33.24.7. Appian claimed that the senate rejected Flamininus’ suggested terms of peace and that these new peace terms came specifically from the senate, although there was no other evidence of this: *Mac.* 9.3; Walsh (1996) 355-356 n. 48.

<sup>122</sup> Polyb. 18.42.5-6: ‘βεβαιώσοντας τοῖς Ἕλλησι τὴν ἐλευθερίαν.’

accounts of Polybius and Livy, was the first time that freedom was declared as an aim in this war directly from the senate.<sup>123</sup> It stated:

All the rest of the Greeks in Asia and Europe were to be free (ἐλευθέρους) and subject to their own laws (νόμοις χρῆσθαι τοῖς ἰδίοις); Philip was to surrender to the Romans before the Isthmian Games those Greeks subject to his rule and the cities in which he had garrisons; he was to leave free (ἐλευθέρας), withdrawing his garrisons from them, the towns of Euromus, Pedasa, Bargylia, and Iasus, as well as Abydus, Thasos, Myrina, and Perinthus.<sup>124</sup>

Despite the explicit claim from the senate that the Greeks were to be free, the consequent boundaries of the declaration did not reinforce this impression.<sup>125</sup> It decreed different territorial gains for each ally, however the three fetters of Greece were not mentioned at all. In addition, Philip's remaining territories in Greece were to be handed over to the Romans, not the Greeks. This *senatus consultum* was not seen universally by the Greeks as a complete declaration of freedom like that given at the Isthmian Games. The Aetolians began to publicly criticise the Romans, asserting that, 'from this (the *senatus consultum*) anyone could easily see that the Romans were taking over from Philip the fetters of Greece, and that what was happening was a readjustment

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<sup>123</sup> Eckstein (2008) 291. Philhellenism had no bearing on Roman politics: Badian (1970) 33-34; Briscoe (1972) 37; Harris (1979) 244; Errington (1972) 223; (1999) 152-154.

<sup>124</sup> In addition, Flamininus was to write to Prusias about restoring Cius' freedom, Philip was ordered to free all prisoners of war and all of his ships apart from five light vessels and his sixteen-banked ship, as well as a payment of one thousand talents, with half immediately and the rest spread over a ten year period: Polyb. 18.44. 'τούς μὲν ἄλλους Ἕλληνας πάντας, τοὺς τε κατὰ τὴν Ἀσίαν καὶ κατὰ τὴν Εὐρώπην, ἐλευθέρους ὑπάρχειν καὶ νόμοις χρῆσθαι τοῖς ἰδίοις· τοὺς δὲ ταπτομένους ὑπὸ Φίλιππον καὶ τὰς πόλεις τὰς ἐμφρούρους παραδοῦναι Φίλιππον Ῥωμαίοις πρὸ τῆς τῶν Ἰσθμίων πανηγύρεως, Εὐρωμον δὲ καὶ Πήδασα καὶ Βαργύλια καὶ τὴν Ἰασέων πόλιν, ὁμίως Ἄβυδον, Θάσαν, Μύριναν, Πέρινθον, ἐλευθέρας ἀφείναι τὰς φρουρὰς ἐξ αὐτῶν μεταστησάμενον': 18.44.2-4. See also Livy 33.30.1-7; App. *Mac.* 9.3; Diod. 28.11. Livy included various stipulations added by other ancient historians: 33.30.7-11. Polybius' stipulations seem to be derived from the *senatus consultum* passed by the senate, while Ferrary and Larsen have argued that Livy's account of the terms were derived from the treaty itself, but this is inconclusive: Larsen (1936) 342-348; Ferrary (1988) 138 n. 23. Bernhardt noted that the addition of the word freedom (ἐλευθέρους) was for the benefit of the Greeks, since the clause that claimed they were free to live under their own laws (*sua leges*) constituted freedom in Roman diplomatic practice: (1975) 412; (1977) 68.

<sup>125</sup> Eckstein emphasised the vagueness of this decree and the apparent uninterest of the senate: (1987b) 295-296.

of masters and not the delivery of Greece out of gratitude.<sup>126</sup> Therefore, while it was clear that the Roman senate recognised the Greek claim to freedom, they were unwilling to actually give them freedom at this point. The Greeks were now free from Philip, but they were not yet free to make their own decisions - particularly with external policy, but even with internal decisions. They had neither *autonomia* nor *eleutheria* after the defeat of Philip, reflected by the consequent two years that the Roman commission spent in Greece organising affairs before the eventual Roman evacuation in 194.

#### 4) Flamininus and the Freedom of the Greeks

According to the narrative of Polybius, the *senatus consultum* did not guarantee the freedom of the Greeks. The ten-man commission and Flamininus were charged with organising the details, in particular the fate of the fetters of Greece. Polybius claimed Flamininus:

was obliged to address his colleagues at length and in somewhat elaborate terms, pointing out to them that if they wished to gain universal renown in Greece and in general convince all that the Romans had originally crossed the sea not in their own interest but in that of the liberty of Greece, they must withdraw from every place and set free all the cities now garrisoned by Philip.<sup>127</sup>

Therefore, while the *senatus consultum* claimed to give the Greeks of Asia and Europe complete freedom to live under their own laws, in actuality it was not so comprehensive. Flamininus must be credited with the final

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<sup>126</sup> Polybius 18.45.6: 'ἐκ δὲ τούτων εὐθεώρητον ὑπάρχειν πᾶσιν ὅτι μεταλαμβάνουσι τὰς Ἑλληνικὰς πέδας παρὰ Φιλίππου Ῥωμαῖοι, καὶ γίνεται μεθάρμοσις δεσποτῶν, οὐκ ἐλευθέρωσις τῶν Ἑλλήνων.' Livy admitted that the Aetolian complaints were not completely baseless, but claimed the Romans wanted to decide what was best for the fetters because of the imminent threat posed by Antiochus: Livy 33.31.4-6.

<sup>127</sup> Polyb. 18.45.8-9: 'πολλοὺς καὶ ποικίλους ἠναγκάζετο ποιεῖσθαι λόγους ὁ Τίτος ἐν τῷ συνεδρίῳ, διδασκῶν ὡς εἶπερ βούλονται καὶ τὴν τῶν Ἑλλήνων εὐκλειαν ὀλόκληρον περιποιήσασθαι, καὶ καθόλου πιστευθῆναι παρὰ πᾶσι διότι καὶ τὴν ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἐποιήσαντο διάβασιν οὐ τοῦ συμφέροντος ἕνεκεν, ἀλλὰ τῆς τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἐλευθερίας, ἐκχωρητέον εἶη πάντων τῶν τόπων καὶ πάσας ἐλευθερωτέον τὰς πόλεις τὰς νῦν ὑπὸ Φιλίππου φρουρουμένας.'

development of the Roman policy of Greek freedom, a concept initially introduced to the senate at the end of 198 by the Greek allies, not before the war as Polybius claimed.<sup>128</sup> Since Greek freedom from external influence was not guaranteed by the *senatus consultum*, Flamininus had to convince the other commissioners of its wisdom. The commission did not feel any obligation to completely evacuate Greece, and were particularly worried about the three fetters and their security against the possible threat of Antiochus the Great.<sup>129</sup> However, Flamininus was concerned to evacuate Greece in order to secure the goodwill of the Greeks, and significantly to prove the Aetolians wrong in their continuous slander of the Romans.<sup>130</sup> He seemed to be concerned that the Aetolians would increase their influence in Greece once Philip was expelled, and deliberately intended to make them look like fools in front of the Mediterranean world.<sup>131</sup> The inequality of expectations between Flamininus and the commissioners could be seen by the necessity of debating the evacuation of the three fetters prior to the Isthmian declaration and his interruption later to stop the commission giving Oreus and Eretria to Eumenes, which would have negated the claim of freedom in the Isthmian declaration.<sup>132</sup> However, Flamininus held the *imperium* in Greece and, so it seems, had the final word.<sup>133</sup>

In light of this, it does seem as though Flamininus was the only Roman in Greece to value the significance of the declaration of Greek freedom at the Isthmian Games.<sup>134</sup> Walsh portrayed Flamininus as a maestro manipulating an orchestra of allies and senators, calculating carefully each decision during

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<sup>128</sup> Eckstein emphasised the significance of Flamininus' political and military decision-making after Cynoscephalae: (1987b) 285-286.

<sup>129</sup> Polyb. 18.45.10-12; Livy 33.31.10-11. Yarrow has argued for the flexible nature of the *decem legati* through this period and into the first century. This could be seen through this commission's concern for more than the immediate situation and flexibility in negotiations with Flamininus: Yarrow (2012) 168-183.

<sup>130</sup> Polyb. 18.45.8-9; Livy 33.31.8-10.

<sup>131</sup> Polyb. 18.34.2; Livy 33.11.9.

<sup>132</sup> In this case, they referred the decision to the senate who supported Flamininus' argument: Polyb. 18.45.8-12, 47.10-11; Livy 33.31.7-11, 34.10; Walsh (1996) 357 n. 53.

<sup>133</sup> Eckstein (1987b) 294-295.

<sup>134</sup> Walsh (1996) 358: 'He was the only Roman bothered by the contrast between its implications and the reality of 196, for only he understood what the Greeks expected of such a declaration.' See also: Dmitriev (2011) 163-165.

and after the war.<sup>135</sup> Likewise, Eckstein also claimed that Flaminius was the architect of the freedom policy after two years of learning Greek politics, and had suggested it through his envoys to the senate at Rome.<sup>136</sup> Walsh argued that Flaminius had been learning about 'freedom rhetoric' in his association with the Greek allies in the war and had consciously developed it into Roman policy. This began with his introduction of the idea of Greek freedom to the senate in 198 through the Greek ambassadors and their provocation concerning the danger of the fetters of Greece.<sup>137</sup> The evidence does suggest that it was the Greeks who introduced the idea of Greek freedom to the senate, although it is unclear whether this was planned initially by Flaminius. Regardless, the final development of the concept of Greek freedom from the *senatus consultum* to that proclaimed at the Isthmian Games has to be attributed to Flaminius, who according to Polybius had to defend it against the senatorial ten-man commission.<sup>138</sup> Interestingly, as Walbank pointed out, there was no administrative need to make such an announcement at the Isthmian Games.<sup>139</sup>

Even the language of the Isthmian declaration reflected the influence of Flaminius.<sup>140</sup> Instead of the vague decree of freedom like that given in the *senatus consultum*, which still implied only freedom from Philip, the Isthmian declaration was clearly freedom from foreign influence on all internal and external policies - no garrisons or tributes and governed by their own laws.<sup>141</sup>

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<sup>135</sup> Walsh (1996) 344-363.

<sup>136</sup> Eckstein (1987b) 297; (2008) 283.

<sup>137</sup> Walsh (1996) 351-353.

<sup>138</sup> The reality of this freedom however, was not full political independence for all. The Achaeans got Corinth, Heraea and Triphylia: Livy 33.32.5, 34.9; cf. Polyb. 18.42.7. The Phocians and Locrians were given to the Aetolian League: Livy 33.32.5. Lynchnus and Partha went to Pleuratus of Illyria: Livy 33.34.10. The Thessalians and Magnesians were allowed to form independent Leagues, with the Phthiotic Achaeans now under the Thessalians: Polyb. 18.47.6-7; Livy 33.32.5, 34.6-7. The Perrhaebians also formed their own League: *JG IX* 1.689. The fate of the three fetters, Oreus and Eretria was the most contested, supposedly due to the threat of Antiochus III, although they were eventually evacuated as part of the full Roman withdrawal in the Spring of 194: Livy 34.51.1-4.

<sup>139</sup> Walbank (1940) 179-181; (1943) 8; (1967) 614. For discussion of the Isthmian declaration as political propaganda see Dmitriev (2011) 158-165.

<sup>140</sup> Alternatively see Dmitriev (2011) 180-181.

<sup>141</sup> Polyb. 18.46.5; Livy 33.32.5; Plut. *Flam.* 10.4; App. *Mac.* 1.4. In opposition, Dmitriev argued that the senate were the ones who formulated this new Roman policy of freedom. In addition, he also argued it was unlikely that the terms of the *senatus consultum* were changed for the signing of the peace treaty: (2011) 157, 175.

The inclusion of the Corinthians, Euboeans and Magnesians was also directly due to Flamininus and his fight with the commission to include the three fetters of Greece. According to Eckstein, the phrasing of the Isthmian proclamation resembled the traditional freedom declarations common in Greek international politics.<sup>142</sup> Potter asserts Flamininus' use of freedom rhetoric 'indicated that it could be used within a Roman context to express aims that were acceptable to Rome.'<sup>143</sup> He claimed that the Isthmian declaration was an example of the Roman ability to use Greek trends to promote Roman aristocratic interests.<sup>144</sup> This indicates Flamininus had learnt from his Greek allies the rhetoric of Greek freedom and had utilised it to his, and Rome's, advantage.

There was an established history of declarations of freedom in Greece that would have educated Flamininus on the potential use of freedom rhetoric. According to Polybius, promises of freedom from kings were standard in Greece.<sup>145</sup> Polybius claimed that despite the frequent use of this type of freedom slogan, there was a lack of faith in Greece that such promises came to fruition. Flamininus would not have been ignorant of Greek history and would have been aware that such promises were commonplace in Greek politics. Seager argued that the Romans would have realised the benefits of *libertas* as a slogan and its administrative advantages before they became involved in Greece.<sup>146</sup> However, there was no indication that the Romans or Flamininus acted on this knowledge until the end of the war when they introduced the concept of Greek freedom into their war rhetoric.

Some modern historians have argued that the Isthmian proclamation did not actually free the Greeks, but instead ensured Roman domination.<sup>147</sup>

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<sup>142</sup> For example see Polyb. 4.25.7. Eckstein (1987b) 300; see also Gruen (1984) 132-142, 145-151. Walsh claimed that Flamininus learnt to use freedom rhetoric from the example of Philip V: (1996) 358-362.

<sup>143</sup> Potter (2012) 143.

<sup>144</sup> Potter parallels this to Ennius' and Plautus' use of Greek literary traditions to attract audiences, claiming 'Roman poets were aware of Greek literary "brands", and were able to exploit that "branding" to attract audiences': (2012) 143-145.

<sup>145</sup> Polyb. 15.24.4.

<sup>146</sup> Seager (1981) 107.

<sup>147</sup> Harris (1979) 142; Ferrary (1988) 86, 93; Mandell (1989) 90; Derow (2003) 62.



However, there is little in the ancient record to support this. Despite Polybius' didactic preoccupation, he still presented the Isthmian declaration as an act by Flamininus and the Romans that freed the Greek world.<sup>148</sup> Potter claims the freedom of the Greeks did not require any effort on the part of Rome, and instead expressed a Roman desire to detach itself from the (weaker) Greek states.<sup>149</sup> Sherwin-White claimed that Rome's other military commitments contributed to the desire to leave Greece.<sup>150</sup> However, the frequency of Greek embassies to Rome, and Rome's consequent involvement in the war with Antiochus show that this was not a reality, even if detachment was their objective. Badian argued that the relationship between the Romans and the Greeks was determined by interstate *clientela*, but the occurrence of *clientela* in foreign relations has been disputed by both Gruen and Burton.<sup>151</sup> Burton has argued that the promise of freedom was made faithfully by the Romans based on their *fides*, and significantly, the Greeks that had been freed were then Roman *amici*.<sup>152</sup> As *amici* they were required to consult the senate on important matters, so there was no Roman desire here to extricate themselves from Greek affairs.<sup>153</sup> There was still a power aspect to this relationship however, based on the Roman expectation of deference in interactions with their lesser allies.<sup>154</sup> Roman power increased in Greece after this war, as was recognised by Eckstein, although there were no remaining informal or formal mechanisms in Greece that officially enforced Roman rule.<sup>155</sup>

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<sup>148</sup> See Eckstein's arguments against those who claimed the Isthmian declaration established Roman domination: (2008) 292-297.

<sup>149</sup> In contrast to Spain: Potter (2012) 151. Eckstein pointed out that the Romans could have treated Greece as they had Spain and turned it into permanent provinces: (2008) 285-286.

<sup>150</sup> The Celtiberians in Spain and Celts in Northern Italy: Sherwin-White (1980) 177-181; (1984) 9-10.

<sup>151</sup> Badian (1958) 74-5; see also: Errington (1972) 154; Mandell (1989) 91; Wallace-Hadrill (1989) 75-76; *contra* Gruen (1984) 158-200; Burton (2003) 333-369; (2011) *passim*, esp. 2-6, 101, 111-113, 115-117, 125, 127, 138, 150-151, 162, 168, 174, 185, 192, 196-199, 208, 213, 215-216; 226, 246, 265-266, 274-275, 287, 308, 354, 355.

<sup>152</sup> Burton claimed 'the true basis of international relationships – with or without a treaty, whether characterised as *societas* or *amicitia* – is, in the final analysis, *amicitia*.' (2011) 81. For the use of *amicitia* in this context see Burton (2011) 79-84.

<sup>153</sup> Burton (2011) 224-227.

<sup>154</sup> Eckstein (2008) 359-360; Leenen (2011) 1-9.

<sup>155</sup> Polyb. 1.3.6; 3.3.2; 24.10.9, 11.3. However, Rome did not form any alliances with individual Greek states: Eckstein (2008) 287.

The Isthmian declaration did not end Roman involvement in Greece, nor was it intended to. The inclusion of the clause in the *senatus consultum* that directed Flamininus to talk to Prusias concerning Cius showed that the Romans were thinking about future involvement with the Greek states and the potential threat of Antiochus.<sup>156</sup> The Isthmian declaration also seems to have been a warning to Antiochus to refrain from harming the Greeks in any way, indicated by its inclusion of the Greeks of Asia. By issuing the Isthmian declaration Flamininus and the Romans declared Greece free from all external constraints, whether it was Antiochus, the Aetolians or the Romans themselves. They announced themselves as protectors of Greek freedom, and the consequent war with Antiochus showed they were prepared to defend their decision by force. Nevertheless, despite Polybius' claim that the Romans entered the war specifically in order to free the Greeks, there is no evidence of this in the ancient record until after the Battle of Cynoscephalae.

## 5) Polybius' didactic purpose

It has already been established that Polybius' claim that the Romans entered the Second Macedonian War specifically to free the Greeks cannot be proven through his own historical narrative or those of other ancient historians. Instead, the degree of freedom granted to the Greeks at the Isthmian Games in 196 was through the instigation of the Roman commander Flamininus, who had to defend its integrity to the ten-man commission who did not consider it binding on Roman actions. It remains then to question why Polybius presented Roman motives for this war in this way.

Polybius' persona in the *Histories* as a teacher, historian, politician, and Greek was the most significant aspect of Polybius' narrative, and frequently determined how he interpreted events. In this instance, Polybius' concern to provide a lesson on ideal international diplomatic behaviour overrode his concern to present complete historical accuracy. His presentation of the

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<sup>156</sup> Polyb. 18.44.5; Livy 33.30.4; Seager (1981) 110.

Romans as entering this war in order to free the Greeks held more didactic potential than presenting them as only deciding to use Greek freedom as a slogan after the war. This allowed Polybius to depict the decision to free Greece as an act of greatness (μεγέθους), both heightening the emotion of the scene and accentuating Rome's actions in the narrative.<sup>157</sup> The didactic example that the Romans presented here for Polybius' readers was one of benevolence and moderation, qualities that Polybius admired in an imperial power.<sup>158</sup> More significantly to this didactic purpose was the comparison between this promise of freedom that was made in good faith, and those made by Greek kings that were commonly broken. In particular, the example of King Philip V made in book fifteen of the *Histories*. Here Polybius idealised the Romans by portraying them as acting specifically for the freedom of the Greeks in order to hold them up to his readers as *exempla* of good behaviour in contrast to the bad faith of those who did not deliver on their promises, specifically Philip.

The Romans were commonly used in the *Histories* to illustrate didactic lessons to Polybius' audience of soldier-politicians. In the Second Macedonian War, they were contrasted by Polybius to Philip V, who was depicted as the oppressor of the Greeks. Philip was portrayed as the flawed king in Polybius' narrative and was the negative example provided in order to teach his audience how not to behave in international relations.<sup>159</sup> In this war, the Romans were depicted in opposition to the flawed king, providing Polybius with a positive example to counter this negative depiction of Philip. The idea that the Romans entered the war specifically to free the Greeks emphasised their opposition to Philip, even though they only conceived of a policy of Greek freedom after the Battle of Cynoscephalae.

For Polybius the most important point of comparison between Philip and the Romans was their approach to diplomatic promises. According to

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<sup>157</sup> Polyb. 18.46.13.

<sup>158</sup> Baronowski's study on Polybius focuses on his depiction of the Romans as beneficent and moderate: (2011) *passim*.

<sup>159</sup> For Philip's depiction as the bad king in the *Histories*, see section 4.1 and 4.5.

Polybius, Greek kings gave pledges of freedom frequently in the ancient world, but rarely followed through on these expectations:

It may be said of all kings that at the beginning of their reigns they talk of freedom as of a gift they offer to all and style all those who are thus loyal adherents friends and allies, but as soon as they have established their authority they at once begin to treat those who placed trust in them not as allies but as servants.<sup>160</sup>

The cause of these comments in book fifteen was the diplomatic treachery of Philip V and his treatment of the cities of Cius and Thasos in 202.

Prior to the outbreak of the Second Macedonian War Philip was attempting to expand into the northern Aegean with the alliance of Prusias of Bithynia, and encroached on cities around the Hellespont and Bosphorus that were allied with the Aetolian League.<sup>161</sup> Polybius claimed that Philip was aiming at world domination, and had been encouraged that way by Demetrius of Pharos when he was young.<sup>162</sup> As has already been discussed, Philip was Polybius' prime example of a flawed monarch. He was a good king who turned into a tyrant by committing atrocities against those he conquered.<sup>163</sup> Philip's true insanity began after 183, but as Walbank claimed 'the reason for his fate is to be sought earlier' to his previous atrocities, of which Cius and Thasos were key examples.<sup>164</sup>

Philip's cruelty and treachery at Cius were enough to earn Polybius' severe criticism, but his diplomatic games with the Rhodian envoys who were

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<sup>160</sup> Polyb. 15.24.4: 'μὲν γὰρ πάντες οἱ βασιλεῖς κατὰ τὰς πρώτας ἀρχὰς πᾶσι προτείνουνσι τὸ τῆς ἐλευθερίας ὄνομα καὶ φίλους προσαγορεύουσι καὶ συμμάχους <τούς> κοινωνήσαντας σφίσι τῶν αὐτῶν ἐλπίδων, καθικόμενοι δὲ τῶν πράξεων παρα πόδας οὐ συμμαχικῶς, ἀλλὰ δεσποτικῶς χρώνται τοῖς πιστεύσασι.'

<sup>161</sup> They were allied by marriage, with Polybius claiming Prusias was τῷ κηδεστῇ, most likely a brother-in-law: Polyb. 15.22.1; Walbank (1967) 475-476.

<sup>162</sup> Polyb. 5.101-2, 104.7, 108.5; 15.24.6; see also Walbank (1993) 1721-1730.

<sup>163</sup> Philip's atrocities began with Thermum during the First Macedonian War: Polyb. 7.11.2-4, 13.6-8; 10.26.7-9.

<sup>164</sup> Walbank (1938) 63; see also chapter four, n. 210.

trying to negotiate a solution to end the siege aggravated his poor repute.<sup>165</sup> Ambassadors from Rhodes had arrived to negotiate with Philip on behalf of Cius, but he had stalled and offered false promises, while simultaneously proceeding with his plans in spite of them.<sup>166</sup> Polybius even claimed that the Rhodian ambassadors were defending Philip in their assembly in Rhodes when news reached them that he had enslaved the entire population of Cius, contrary to his assurances.<sup>167</sup> In discussing Philip's conduct Polybius claimed:

Philip, therefore, who had rather betrayed himself than the people of Cius, had become so wrong-headed or rather so lost to all sense of decency that he gave himself credit and boasted of conduct of which he should have been most deeply ashamed, as though it were a fine deed.<sup>168</sup>

This analysis of Philip's behaviour added to Polybius' demonisation of the king in the *Histories* and his increasing criticism of the deterioration of his behaviour. Polybius also charged Philip with two distinct offences in his treatment of Cius: first, he had acted unjustly by siding with Prusias who was the cause of the problem, and second he acted in a cruel and brutal way towards the people of Cius. Polybius stated:

He did not see that in the first place the brother-in-law who he came to help was not wronged, but was wronging others by his treachery, next that by thus without any justification bringing the greatest of calamities on a Hellenic city he would set the seal on the reputation he enjoyed for cruelty to his friends, and that both these crimes would justly leave him a legacy of infamy

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<sup>165</sup> Cius was divided by political instability. Polybius blamed the greedy demagogues and the people of Cius for its destruction: Polyb. 15.21.

<sup>166</sup> Polyb. 15.22.4-5. There were envoys from other Greek states, but the paragraph where this was stated is lost. Walbank claimed they may have included ambassadors from Athens and Chios who also involved themselves in the First Macedonian War as mediators: Livy 27.30.1-5; 18.7.14; Walbank (1967) 476.

<sup>167</sup> Polyb. 15.23.2-6.

<sup>168</sup> Polyb. 15.23.5-6: 'Φίλιππος μὲν οὖν, παρασπονδήσας οὐχ οὕτως Κιανούς ὡς ἑαυτόν, εἰς τοιαύτην ἄγνοιαν ἢ καὶ παράπτωσιν τοῦ καθήκοντος ἤκεν ὥστ' ἐφ' οἷς ἐχρῆν αἰσχύνεσθαι καθ' ὑπερβολήν, ἐπὶ τούτοις ὡς καλοῖς σεμνύνεσθαι καὶ μεγαλαυχεῖν.' The statement 'who had rather betrayed himself' highlighted the moral aspect of Polybius' condemnation: Eckstein (1995a) 88-89.

throughout the whole of Greece as a violator of all that was sacred.<sup>169</sup>

Polybius' image of Philip is clear in the narrative as he emphasised his role as a failed king in the *Histories*. The enslavement of Cius caused outrage in Greece, with Polybius specifically accusing Philip of cruelty to his friends, which was a significant allegation that attested to his faithlessness.<sup>170</sup> In addition, there was the accusation that he desecrated those things held sacred in Greece, which Walbank claimed was part of the traditional opinion of Philip at this time.<sup>171</sup> Significantly, Philip's cruel treatment of Cius and enslavement of its people was one of the charges levelled at him by the Aetolians at the conference at Nicaea in 198, although he managed to deflect the blame for this onto Prusias.<sup>172</sup> Polybius also pointed out that Philip had only made peace terms with the Aetolians a few years before in 206, so was in breach of this agreement by taking Cius in 202.<sup>173</sup> This image of Philip as the cruel tyrant was increased by his capture of Thasos.<sup>174</sup>

Philip's capture of Thasos was the impetus for Polybius' observations on the commonality of false promises of freedom issued by Greek kings. It was placed immediately subsequent to his narrative on the capture of Cius, and served to increase the negativity of Philip's image by providing a second

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<sup>169</sup> Polyb. 15.22.2-3: 'πρωτον μὲν <ὡς> οὐκ ἀδικουμένω, παρασπονδοῦντι δὲ τῷ κηδεστῇ τοὺς πέλας ἐβοήθει, δεύτερον ὅτι πρὸν Ἑλληνίδα περιβαλὼν τοῖς μεγίστοις ἀτυχήμασιν ἀδίκως ἔμελλε κυρώσειν τὴν περὶ αὐτοῦ διαδεδομένην φήμην ὑπὲρ τῆς εἰς τοὺς φίλους ὠμότητος, ἐξ ἀμφοῖν δὲ δικαίως καὶ κληρονομήσειν παρὰ πᾶσι τοῖς Ἕλλησι τὴν ἐπ' ἀσεβείᾳ δόξαν.' Paton translated τῷ κηδεστῇ as son-in-law, although it should be brother-in-law: Walbank (1967) 475-476.

<sup>170</sup> For cruelty to his friends, see: Flamininus' taunts to Philip: Polyb. 18.7.6; Plut. *Flam.* 17.2; *Mor.* 197A; Paus. 7.7.5; Diod. 28.3; see also Anth. Pal. 9.519; towards Aratus: Polyb. 8.12.2; Paus. 2.9.4; towards Callias and Epicrates: *Anth. Pal.* 11.12; towards Chariteles of Cyprissia: Livy 32.21.23; towards Eurycleides and Micion of Athens: Paus. 2.9.4; towards Cassander of Maronea: Polyb. 22.14.2-6; towards Philopoemen: Plut. *Phil.* 12.2; Just. *Epit.* 29.4.11; and most significantly, towards his son Demetrius: Livy 40.5-16.3, 20.3-24.8, 54-55; Diod. 29.25; Just. *Epit.* 32.2-3; Plut. *Arat.* 54.3; *Aem.* 8.6; Zonar. 9.22; see also Walbank (1943) 4-5; (1967) 88.

<sup>171</sup> Polyb. 18.54.10; Walbank (1967) 476.

<sup>172</sup> Polyb. 18. 3.12, 4.7. Even though he had promised Cius to Prusias as it was: Polyb. 15.23.10.

<sup>173</sup> He also attacked the Aetolian cities of Lysimachia and Chalcedon, and forced them to withdraw from their alliances with the Aetolian League: Polyb. 15.23.8-9.

<sup>174</sup> The significance of Cius and Thasos may be, as Errington claimed, that they were significant trading cities: (1989) 252.

incident that was even more treacherous and faithless.<sup>175</sup> While Cius was an Aetolian city, the island of Thasos was independent but strategically significant in its position off the coast of Macedonia.<sup>176</sup> Polybius claimed that while Philip was returning to Macedonia he committed 'one act of treachery after another,' one of which was the capture and enslavement of Thasos.<sup>177</sup> However, Philip's behaviour at Thasos was far worse than his behaviour at Cius because they had surrendered to him upon his guarantee of benevolence:

The Thasians told Metrodorus, Philip's general, that they would surrender the city if he would let them remain without a garrison, exempt from tribute, with no soldiers quartered on them and governed by their own laws... The reply was that Philip acceded to this request upon which all present applauded and admitted Philip into the city.<sup>178</sup>

The people of Thasos had asked Philip for the types of terms implied by a promise of freedom: no garrison, no tribute and to be governed by their own laws - the same circumstances that were given in Flamininus' Isthmian declaration. However, after he had accepted their conditions, he entered the city and enslaved the population.<sup>179</sup>

The close proximity of this depiction of Philip and Polybius' statement on the fickleness of Greek declarations of freedom was no coincidence. Polybius was a conscientious historian, who created another aspect to Philip's infamy through this narrative. He was treacherous and cruel, as shown by his treachery and enslavement at Cius. However, his deceitfulness was heightened further through the narrative of his treatment of Thasos, which

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<sup>175</sup> Baronowski argued that Polybius was suggesting in his narrative of this episode, that 'the king would have improved his chances of success by avoiding treachery at Thasos': (2011) 128.

<sup>176</sup> Hammond and Walbank (1988) 413.

<sup>177</sup> Polyb. 15.24.1: 'ἕτερον ἐφ' ἑτέρῳ παρασπόνδημα μεταχειριζόμενος.'

<sup>178</sup> Polyb. 15.24.2-3: 'Θάσιοι εἶπον πρὸς Μητρόδωρον τὸν Φιλίππου στρατηγὸν παραδοῦναι τὴν πόλιν εἰ διατηρήσοι αὐτοὺς ἀφρουρήτους, ἀφορολογήτους, ἀνεπισταθμεύτους, νόμοις χρήσθαι τοῖς ἰδίοις... Συγχωρεῖν τὸν βασιλέα Θασίου ἀφρουρήτους, ἀφορολογήτους, ἀνεπισταθμεύτους, νόμοις χρήσθαι τοῖς ἰδίοις. ἐπισημηναμένων δὲ μετὰ κραυγῆς πάντων τὰ ῥηθέντα παρήγαγον τὸν Φίλιππον εἰς τὴν πόλιν.' According to Walbank, the billeting of troops was an aspect of occupation that was widely resented: (1967) 479.

<sup>179</sup> Polyb. 15.24.1.

then allowed Polybius to make the observation for his readers that Greek kings often forfeited on promises of freedom. The Isthmian declaration was a direct contrast to this portrayal of Philip and his fickleness, because the Romans not only acted in order to free the Greeks from Philip, but they also delivered on their promises.

The comparison between representatives of regional power over Greece, specifically Philip V, and the Romans was one consciously made by Polybius. Baronowski claimed Polybius believed that the freedom given to the Greeks by the Romans was at least in part genuine since there was no official institutionalisation of Roman rule.<sup>180</sup> For Polybius the Roman ultimatum given to Antiochus III by Flamininus and the ten-man commission, after the freedom proclamation, confirmed that the pledge from the Romans at the Isthmian Games had been sincere.<sup>181</sup> In addition, the subsequent war with Antiochus was begun by the Aetolian League inviting the king into Greece to ‘free them’ from the Romans. This was a pretext according to Polybius, implying it was unnecessary since Greece did not need liberating.<sup>182</sup>

It is significant that the majority of the Greeks received the *senatus consultum* at the end of the Second Macedonian War without complaint. Polybius claimed that all except the Aetolians were ‘of good heart and overjoyed.’<sup>183</sup> This implied that most of the Greek states involved in the war had trust that the Romans would act within the directives of the *senatus consultum*, which was somewhat surprising, considering Polybius’ claim that freedom was often an empty promise made by Greek kings. As Baronowski pointed out, there was some tension here between Polybius’ apparent belief that the Romans were genuine in their declaration of Greek freedom and his acknowledgment that the Romans had expanded their power through their defeat of Philip.<sup>184</sup> However, as discussed above, Roman power increased unofficially and through the significance of the relationships of *amicitia*

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<sup>180</sup> Baronowski (2011) 92.

<sup>181</sup> The warning to Antiochus from the *decem legati*: Polyb. 18.47.2.

<sup>182</sup> Polyb. 3.7.3; see also Baronowski (2011) 92.

<sup>183</sup> Polyb. 18.45.1: ‘εὐθαρσεῖς ἦσαν καὶ περιχαρεῖς.’

<sup>184</sup> Baronowski (2011) 91-93.



fostered by this war. The Roman expectation of deference from their allies increased their power but did not necessarily negate their grants of freedom.

The comparison between Philip and the Romans, for Polybius, hinged on their attitude towards political promises. Philip did not consider himself bound by such guarantees, while the Romans considered their promises to be bound by *fides* and so did not forsake them lightly.<sup>185</sup> Significantly, part of Philip's characterisation in the *Histories* was through Polybius' highlighting of his early benevolence and faithfulness. He asserted:

one might say most aptly of Philip that he was the darling of the whole of Greece owing to his beneficent policy.<sup>186</sup>

In addition, Polybius claimed Philip's election as the president of the Cretan confederacy was evidence of 'the value of honourable principles and good faith.'<sup>187</sup>

This contrast between the benevolence of Philip in his early years and his later fall into defeat and dishonour served to enhance Polybius' depiction of the king as a tyrant, and through their contrasting positions in the narrative, the beneficence of the Romans. According to Baronowski, Polybius believed a policy that was based on benevolence and moderation led to imperial success, essentially through the unforced cooperation of other states and the fostering of good opinions.<sup>188</sup> Philip's early expansion had been done in this spirit, but his change of approach had doomed his own expansionist aims.<sup>189</sup> In contrast, Rome's actions at the Isthmian Games were benevolent and moderate, and encouraged the support of the Greek world.<sup>190</sup> The treachery of Philip and the benevolence of the Romans functioned for Polybius to further

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<sup>185</sup> See chapter seven for discussion on the concept of *fides*.

<sup>186</sup> Polyb. 7.11.8-9: 'οἰκειότατ' ἂν οἶμαι περὶ Φιλίππου τοῦτο ῥηθῆναι, διότι κοινός τις οἶον ἐρώμενος ἐγένετο τῶν Ἑλλήνων διὰ τὸ τῆς αἰρέσεως εὐεργετικόν.'

<sup>187</sup> Polyb. 7.11.9: 'περὶ τοῦ τί δύναται προαίρεσις καλοκάγαθική καὶ πίστις.' Polybius even praised Philip for keeping his faith to the Messenians, although this was attributed to the positive influence of Aratus: 7.14.2.

<sup>188</sup> Baronowski (2011) 89, 91-95.

<sup>189</sup> Polyb. 7.11.7-8, 14.3-5; Baronowski (2011) 89. This claim was explicit in his treatment of Cius and Thasos: 15.23.5, 24.6.

<sup>190</sup> Interestingly, the clause from the *senatus consultum* to discuss the status of Cius with Prusias may have been an attempt by the Romans to contrast themselves with Philip V, since his atrocity at Cius would have been well known: Polyb. 18.44.5.

contrast the role of Philip as the flawed king, with the Romans now cast in their role as Greek saviours. While Philip provided the bad example of behaviour shown through his treachery and cruelty, Roman actions provided a good example for Polybius' readers.

Polybius' praise of the Romans clearly expressed his opinion of their decision to free the Greeks. He emphasised the greatness of the Isthmian proclamation by heightening the emotion in his narrative, particularly through describing the reactions of the Greeks.<sup>191</sup> The significance of this action was enhanced further by Polybius' claim that they had entered the war in order to have this result, presenting the Romans as the saviours of the Greeks. This was Polybius' purpose in including such a claim despite there being no historical evidence for it. This praise and enhancement in the narrative served to highlight the virtue of this action to his audience, holding the Roman actions in this instance up as political and moral *exempla* for his audience.

In conclusion, this chapter provided the first example of an episode from the *Histories* that illustrated the significance of Polybius' self constructed image and his didactic purpose, which often took precedence over his concern to be historically accurate. His didactic purpose in presenting the Romans as entering the Second Macedonian War with the aim of freeing the Greeks, was in order to enhance their beneficent image. He also did this by contrasting the Romans with Philip V, who was the example of a bad king who broke faith with those to whom he made promises. Polybius' narrative of the atrocities at Cius and Thasos served to highlight the faithlessness of Philip, and allowed the author to comment on the common failure of Greek kings to deliver on their promises of freedom. Polybius intended this as a direct comparison with the Romans and their declaration of Greek freedom at the Isthmian Games. Polybius' depiction of the Romans as the saviours of Greece and his claim that they had always intended to free the Greeks, enhanced this

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<sup>191</sup> Polyb. 18.46.6-13.

image of the Romans as benevolent and moderate in comparison to Philip. Through this comparison, Polybius provided for his readers the positive *exemplum* of the Romans who achieved imperial success through moderation and benevolence. He was providing for his audience of soldier-politicians a lesson on the correct policy for interstate relations in the Mediterranean.

## Chapter Seven: Case Study II - Polybius and the Aetolian *Deditio* of 191 B.C.E.

As argued in earlier chapters, Polybius' role as a teacher in the *Histories* typically took precedence over historical accuracy, as he attempted to provide didactic lessons for his audience of soldier-politicians to model their behaviour from. At points in the narrative, this preoccupation caused him to interpret episodes to fit the didactic lesson he wanted to make, commonly causing him to exaggerate certain aspects of events over others. During his narrative of the war between the Romans and the Aetolians, Polybius interpreted a *deditio* agreed to by the Aetolians to the Roman commander Glabrio as a linguistic misunderstanding. Polybius presented it in this way in order to illustrate the importance of understanding foreign cultural practices in diplomatic interaction; a lesson to his readers of both Roman and Greek nationality. Polybius was pointing out to his audience the significance of understanding the foreign cultural policies and understandings of those involved in inter-state diplomacy, while simultaneously emphasising his own superior insight as a statesman.

This episode also bolstered the writer's own authority in the narrative, presenting him as endowed with the ability to stand between Roman and Greek culture. This added to his credibility as an historian, politician, and significantly, as a teacher. This chapter will first look at the episode in question and the accounts of Livy and Polybius. Subsequently the implications of *deditio* and *fides* will be examined in the light of Polybius' claim that *deditio in fidem* and *deditio in potestatem* were indistinguishable. In order to assess the probability of Polybius' claim that the Aetolians misunderstood the implications of their *deditio* to the Romans, previous Roman-Aetolian interaction concerning *fides* and *deditio* will be discussed, in particular those that involved Phaeneas, the Aetolian *strategos* of 191. This chapter will then

look at the aftermath of the *deditio* and finally assess Polybius' didactic purpose in presenting this episode as a linguistic misunderstanding when there is ample indication that the Aetolians had already been educated on the implications of an unconditional surrender to the Romans.

### 1) The Aetolian *deditio* in 191

The decision to appeal to the Romans for peace in 191 was not taken lightly by the Aetolians. The Romans were besieging the Aetolians at Heraclea, and it appeared that Antiochus had forsaken their cause. An Aetolian delegation led by Phaeneas sought out the Roman commander M'. Acilius Glabrio to seek a resolution to the conflict.<sup>1</sup> However, Glabrio claimed he had more important matters to address, and refused to see the ambassadors.<sup>2</sup> Instead, he granted them a ten-day armistice, instructing them to return to Hypata with the military tribune Lucius Valerius Flaccus and inform him of their requests. They began their appeal to Flaccus by concentrating on the previous help they had given the Romans. However, they were soon interrupted when Flaccus pointed out their subsequent behaviour had nullified any friendly association they had once.<sup>3</sup> According to Polybius, he then recommended that they approach the consul as suppliants and hope for the best result.<sup>4</sup> Because of this, the Aetolians then decided to commit themselves into the *fides* (πίστις) of the Romans.<sup>5</sup>

When Phaeneas and the Aetolians committed themselves to the *fides* of the Romans, Glabrio immediately countered with his demands. He forbade them to cross over into Asia and required them to surrender to the Romans Dicaearchus and Menestratus of Epirus, as well as King Amynder and the

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<sup>1</sup> Polyb. 20.9.1; Livy 36.27.1-2.

<sup>2</sup> Polybius claimed that he was busy distributing the booty from Heraclea. Livy made no such claim, but only asserted that the consul had to attend to matters that were more important: Polyb. 20.9.4-5; Livy 36.27.3.

<sup>3</sup> Polyb. 20.9.7-9; Livy 36.27.5-6.

<sup>4</sup> Polyb. 20.9.9.

<sup>5</sup> Polyb. 20.9.10-12; Livy 36.27.8.

Athamanians who had also aided them against the Romans.<sup>6</sup> At this point Phaeneas interrupted Glabrio, with Polybius claiming he exclaimed:

But what you demand, O General, is neither just nor Greek.<sup>7</sup>

According to Livy, Phaeneas' response was less impulsive:

We have not delivered ourselves into slavery but have entrusted ourselves to your good faith, and I feel sure that you err from ignorance in giving us orders which are inconsistent with the customs of the Greeks.<sup>8</sup>

In response Glabrio asserted he could treat the Greeks as he wished in accordance with their unconditional surrender:

So you still give yourself Grecian airs and speak of what is meet and proper after surrendering unconditionally? I will have you all put in chains if I think fit. Saying this he ordered a chain to be brought and an iron collar to be put round the neck of each.<sup>9</sup>

However, Glabrio was persuaded not to violate the safety of the Aetolian envoys by Flaccus and the other military tribunes who implored him not to treat ambassadors in such a way.<sup>10</sup> Polybius claimed the Aetolians were astounded (ἐκθαμβος) by such treatment, but consented to do whatever Glabrio demanded, although it first had to be ratified by the people. Glabrio

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<sup>6</sup> Polyb. 20.101-6; Livy 36.28.1-2.

<sup>7</sup> Polyb. 20.10.6-7: 'ἀλλ' οὔτε δίκαιον...οὔθ' Ἑλληνικόν ἐστίν, ὡς στραρηγέ, τὸ παρακαλούμενον.'

<sup>8</sup> Livy 36.28.4: '*non in servitute... sed in fidem tuam nos tradidimus, et certum habeo te imprudentia labi, qui nobis imperes, quae moris Graecorum non sint.*' The image of slavery here would have been very powerful, for both the Greeks and the Romans. Slavery was an institution ingrained in the ancient world. Homer stated that to be in servitude meant that a man lost half of his selfhood (*Il.* 6.463). This loss of selfhood was even more severe in Rome, where the slave-owner had the power over life and death with the complete control over a slave's body: *Cod. Iust.* 1.5.4.1; *Gai. Inst.* 1.52.

<sup>9</sup> Polyb. 20.10.7-8: "ἔτι γὰρ ὑμεῖς ἑλληνοκοπεῖτε... καὶ περὶ τοῦ πρέποντος καὶ καθήκοντος ποιείσθε λόγον, δεδωκότες ἑαυτοὺς εἰς τὴν πίστιν; οὐς ἐγὼ δῆσας εἰς τὴν ἄλυσιν ἀπάξω πάντας, ἂν τοῦτ' ἐμοὶ δόξη." ταῦτα λέγων φέρειν ἄλυσιν ἐκέλευσε καὶ σκύλακα σιδηροῦν ἑκάστῳ περιθεῖναι περὶ τὸν τράχηλον.'

<sup>10</sup> Polyb. 20.10.10. This episode has often been used to illustrate the brutality of the Romans in general, and Glabrio in particular, for example: Merton (1965) 6-7; Dahlheim (1968) 35; Errington (1971) 170-173; Walbank (1979a) 80; Briscoe (1981) 259-260; Gruen (1982) 66; Ferrary (1988) 73, 75. Notably, it has also been used to argue for a new ruthless Roman approach to foreign affairs: Piganiol (1950) 347. Although as Eckstein pointed out, the Aetolian ambassadors were not actually put in chains, nor is there even any clear indication that the chains were produced as ordered: (1995b) 272; see also Walbank (1979a) 82.

agreed and gave the Aetolians a ten-day armistice in order to confirm their surrender.<sup>11</sup>

Polybius claimed that the Aetolians did not fully understand the concept of *fides*, and believed that it implied the victor was required to treat the defeated with clemency. He claimed:

The Aetolians, after some further observations about the actual situation, decided to refer the whole matter to Glabrio, committing themselves “to the faith” of the Romans, not knowing the exact meaning of the phrase, but deceived by the word “faith” as if they would thus obtain more complete pardon. But with the Romans to commit oneself to the faith of a victor is equivalent to surrendering at discretion.<sup>12</sup>

However, Livy did not follow Polybius’ interpretation of this as a linguistic misunderstanding.<sup>13</sup> Instead Livy emphasised the deceptiveness of the Aetolians, claiming they surrendered into the *fides* of the Romans so they would be safe from violence and at liberty to accept better offers if they came along.<sup>14</sup> According to Livy, the Aetolians viewed *fides* as a flexible unbinding concept, while according to Polybius this surrender into Roman *fides* (*deditio in fidem*) was an unconditional surrender equivalent to a *deditio in dicionem* or *potestatem*.

## 2) *Fides* and *Deditio*

In Roman tradition *deditio* was a complete surrender of all rights to the victor. It was a form of surrender particular to Roman tradition as the nation

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<sup>11</sup> Polyb. 20.10.11; Livy 36.28.6-8.

<sup>12</sup> Polyb. 20.9.10-12: ‘οἱ δ’ Αἰτωλοὶ καὶ πλείω λόγον ποιησάμενοι περὶ τῶν ὑποπιπτόντων ἔκριναν ἐπιτρέπειν τὰ ὅλα Μανίῳ, δόντες αὐτοὺς εἰς τὴν Ῥωμαίων πίστιν, οὐκ εἰδότες τίνα δύναμιν ἔχει τοῦτο, τῷ δὲ τῆς πίστεως ὀνόματι πλανηθέντες, ὡς ἂν διὰ τοῦτο τελειότερου σφίσιιν ἐλέους ὑπάρξοντος. παρα δὲ Ῥωμαίοις ἰσοδυναμῆι τό τ’ εἰς τὴν πίστιν αὐτὸν ἐγχειρίσαι καὶ τὸ τὴν ἐπιτροπὴν δοῦναι περὶ αὐτοῦ τῷ κρατοῦντι.’

<sup>13</sup> Despite this, Livy’s account is considered to be derived from that of Polybius: Tränkle (1977) 170-178.

<sup>14</sup> Livy 36.27.8.

that offered it fundamentally ceased to exist as a political entity after it had been accepted.<sup>15</sup> It was not a peace treaty that simply benefited the Romans, but rather a forfeiture of complete independence, which had to be specifically accepted by the Romans and ratified by the people.<sup>16</sup>

Ogilvie pointed out that a procedure of surrender had been standard at least since the early second century.<sup>17</sup> Plautus recorded a surrender that resembled a formulaic *deditio*:

The next day the leaders came from the city to our camp, crying, and with covered hands they asked us to forgive them their transgression. They all surrendered themselves, all their sacred and profane possessions, their city and their children, into the power and sway of the Theban people.<sup>18</sup>

Although this passage is from a play set in Greek mythological times, it seems to attest to a complete surrender just like that of a *deditio*.<sup>19</sup> The question and answer format of the procedure is also an attribute of the Roman system of private law, in particular the *stipulatio*.<sup>20</sup>

According to Livy, a *deditio* was a formulaic ritual, as seen by his narrative of a *deditio* from the people of Collatia to the Roman king Tarquinius Priscus. According to Livy's account, there were certain questions asked when surrendering in totality to the Romans:<sup>21</sup>

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<sup>15</sup> Badian (1985) 5.

<sup>16</sup> For an example of acceptance by the general, see: Tac. *Hist.* 1.68. For an example of the people's approval, see: Sall. *Jug.* 29.4-5, 32-34.

<sup>17</sup> Ogilvie (1965) 153-154.

<sup>18</sup> Plaut. *Amph.* 256-259 (De Melo trans.):

*'postridie in castra ex urbe ad nos veniunt flentes principes:  
velatis manibus orant ignoscamus peccatum suum,  
deduntque se, divina humanaque omnia, urbem et liberos  
in dicionem atque in arbitratum cuncti Thebano poplo.'*

<sup>19</sup> Plautus used *deduntque se*, although the formulaic terms of the surrender suggest a surrender like that of a *deditio*.

<sup>20</sup> Ogilvie (1965) 154. The *stipulatio* was a formal contract conducted verbally through question and answer. The verb in both the question and answer had to be consistent, and the responses had to be immediate. This formula could legalise any type of agreement:

Zimmermann (1999) 1444-1445.

<sup>21</sup> Livy 1.38.2.



The surrender of the Collatini took place, I understand, in accordance with this formula: the king asked, 'Are you the legates and spokesmen sent by the People of Collatia to surrender yourselves and the People of Collatia?' 'We are.' 'Is the People of Collatia its own master?' 'We are.' 'Do you surrender yourselves and the people of Collatia, city, lands, water, boundary marks, shrines, utensils, all appurtenances, divine and human, into my power and that of the Roman people?' 'We do.' 'I receive the surrender.'<sup>22</sup>

Here Livy seemed to provide a complete example of the *deditio* ritual, although this example was pre-republic, and therefore it is unclear whether such formal procedure was still customary in the second century. Livy himself admitted to a lack of historical accuracy in his early books, specifically due to the obscure, scanty records of events in distant antiquity.<sup>23</sup> Despite this, it still remains that Livy was aware of the formula of *deditio*, one that may have been in use in some form during his lifetime. In including an account of the *deditio* ritual during this period, he may have been attempting to illustrate the historical origins of this procedure.

Livy provided multiple examples of this type of surrender to the Roman people.<sup>24</sup> For example, in his narrative of the offer of surrender to Scipio Africanus of those Spaniards under the leadership of Indibilis:

The old custom of the Romans in establishing peaceful relations with a people neither on the basis of a treaty nor on equal terms had been this: not to exert its authority over that people, as now pacified, until it had surrendered everything divine and human,

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<sup>22</sup> Livy 1.38.2: '*Deditosque Collatinos ita accipio eamque deditiois formulam esse; rex interrogavit: "Estisne vos legati oratoresque missi a populo Collatino, ut vos populumque Collatinum dederetis?" "Sumus." "Estne populus Collatinus in sua potestate?" "Est." "Deditisne vos populumque Collatinum, urbem, agros, aquam, terminos, delubra, utensilia, divina humanaque omnia in meam populique Romani dicionem?" "Dedimus." "At ego recipio."*

<sup>23</sup> Livy 6.1.1-3. For the authenticity of this question-answer formula see: Ogilvie (1965) 153-154; Eckstein (1995b) 273-274.

<sup>24</sup> Livy included the same elements in a surrender of the Campanians to the Roman people c.343, which was established as protection against the Samnites: 7.31.3-4. The same formula also applied to the surrender of the Capuans, Atellani, Callatini and Sabatini in 210 to the proconsul Quintus Fulvius: 26.33.12-14.

until hostages had been received, arms taken away and garrisons posted in its cities.<sup>25</sup>

So according to Livy, this formula was in use during the Second Punic War, and still determined the treatment of a defeated foe. It also clearly distinguished the rights afforded to the victor once a *deditio* had been accepted.<sup>26</sup>

In his narrative of the Third Punic War, Polybius demonstrated his knowledge of the formulaic nature of a traditional *deditio*. He stated:

Those who thus commit themselves to the faith of Rome surrender in the first place the whole of their territory and the cities in it, next all the inhabitants of the land and the towns, male and female, likewise all rivers, harbours, temples, tombs, so that the result is that the Romans enter into possession of everything and those who surrender remain in possession of absolutely nothing.<sup>27</sup>

So there can be no question that Polybius was unaware of the formula and consequences of a *deditio*. Although Polybius' account of the Aetolian surrender in 191 did not explicitly include reference to this formula, there was a component of question and answer. According to Polybius, Glabrio asked the Aetolians for confirmation after their original offer of surrender, which at this point may be all that was left of the formulaic ritual of *deditio*.<sup>28</sup> Eckstein argued this was a ritual *deditio* despite its incomplete nature.<sup>29</sup> Livy even claimed that Glabrio urged the Aetolians to consider carefully the terms of

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<sup>25</sup> Livy 28.34.7-8: *'mos uetustus erat Romanis, cum quo nec foedere nec aequis legibus iungeretur amicitia, non prius imperio in eum tamquam pacatum uti quam omnia diuina humanaque dedidisset, obsides accepti, arma adempta, praesidia urbibus imposita forent.'*

<sup>26</sup> Interestingly, Velleius Paterculus described the Roman surrender of Mancinus Hostilius (cos. 137) in 136 to the Numantines because the Roman people rejected a treaty that he had negotiated with them as a *deditio*. He was literally handed over to them by the fetial priests, naked and bound: Vell. Pat. 2.2.1.

<sup>27</sup> Polyb. 36.4.2-3: *'οἱ γὰρ δίδοντες αὐτοὺς εἰς τὴν Ῥωμαίων ἐπιτροπὴν δίδοσι πρῶτον μὲν χώραν τὴν ὑπάρχουσαν αὐτοῖς καὶ πόλεις τὰς ἐν ταύτῃ, σὺν δὲ τούτοις ἄνδρας καὶ γυναῖκας τοὺς ὑπάρχοντας ἐν τῇ χώρᾳ καὶ ταῖς πόλεσιν ἅπαντας, ὁμοίως ποταμούς, λιμένας, ἱερά, τάφους, συλλήβδην ὥστε πάντων εἶναι κυρίου Ῥωμαίου, αὐτοὺς δὲ τοὺς δίδοντας ἀπλῶς μηκέτι μηδενός.'*

<sup>28</sup> Polyb. 20.10.2-4.

<sup>29</sup> Eckstein (1995b) 274-275.

their surrender, with the Aetolians providing written confirmation of their decision.<sup>30</sup> Additionally, Glabrio's immediate commands and mention of their unconditional surrender after the Aetolian outburst, all imply that this was a traditional *deditio*.<sup>31</sup> It is clear in the narratives of both Polybius and Livy that the absolute nature of a *deditio* had not altered by the second century.

However, *fides* was a more complicated concept than *deditio*, because ancient historians used it in a number of ways. It has usually been translated as 'good faith' although this is only an abbreviated definition for a wide-ranging concept. Much of Roman foreign relations was built on this central concept of *fides*, as the basis of the way they formed foreign associations. The significance of *fides* to the Romans can be seen by the establishment of its worship in early antiquity. The cult dedicated to the goddess *Fides*, was according to tradition, attributed to Numa Popilius, the second legendary king of Rome (715-673).<sup>32</sup> He regarded *fides* or πίστις, as a necessary requirement for all types of agreements and deemed it worthy of worship:

For he felt that Justice, Themis, Nemesis, and those the Greeks call Erinyes, with other concepts of the kind, had been sufficiently revered and worshipped as gods by the men of former times, but that Faith, than which there is nothing greater nor more sacred among men, was not yet worshipped by states in their public capacity or by private persons.<sup>33</sup>

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<sup>30</sup> Livy 36.28.2-3. Polybius did not mention any written confirmation of the Aetolian surrender, with Eckstein suggesting in was Livy's addition: (1995b) 275.

<sup>31</sup> Polyb. 20.10.4-6, 10.7.

<sup>32</sup> Numa was a king nominated for his piety and has been accredited with many religious innovations at Rome, therefore, it is conceivable he established the worship of *Fides* as a part of ancient Roman religion: Flor. 1.2; Dion. Hal. *Ant. Rom.* 2.66-76; see also Fears (1981) 828-869.

<sup>33</sup> Dion. Hal. *Ant. Rom.* 2.75.2 (Cary trans.): 'δίκην μὲν ψὰρ καὶ Θέμιν καὶ Νέμεσιν καὶ τὰς καλουμένας παρ' Ἑλλήσιν Ἐρινύας καὶ ὅσα τούτοις ὅμοια ὑπὸ τῶν πρότερον ἀποχρώντως ἐκτεθειώσθαι τε καὶ καθωσιώσθαι ἐνόμισε, Πίστιν δέ, ἧς οὔτε μείζον οὔτε ἱερώτερον πάθος ἐν ἀνθρώποις οὐδέν, οὔπω σεβασμῶν τυγχάνειν οὔτ' ἐν τοῖς κοινοῖς τῶν πόλεων πράγμασιν οὔτ' ἐν τοῖς ἰδίοις.' See also Livy 1.21.4; Plut. *Num.* 16.1.

Despite this, the earliest temple to *fides* has been attributed to Aulus Atilius Calatinus around 250.<sup>34</sup> Nevertheless, this illustrates the significance of *fides* in Roman life.

*Fides* had been an important aspect of Roman ideology since early times, but the origin of the concept has been a source of contention for historians. The argument that *fides* was simply a type of contract has been disregarded in favour of those who argue *fides* was a moral obligation, implying that agreements based on *fides* had at the heart of them a moral responsibility from both the superior and inferior partner.<sup>35</sup> This mutual obligation has been seen as a social phenomenon that held the fabric of Roman society together, with a semi-mystical quality that was similar to *imperium*.<sup>36</sup> It has also been postulated that *fides* was used as a tool of manipulation in foreign affairs.<sup>37</sup> There is no one meaning of *fides*, and, as Dmitriev has recently pointed out, its meaning depends both on the context and circumstances in which it is used.<sup>38</sup> As Gruen claimed, the concept of *fides* probably developed over time as well, further obscuring any attempt to find a central core of meaning for this idea.<sup>39</sup>

The use of *fides* by ancient historians, indicates it was not a rigidly applied concept. According to Cicero:

The foundation of justice, moreover, is good faith – that is, truth and fidelity to promises and agreements.<sup>40</sup>

In the *De Amicitia*, Laelius claimed:

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<sup>34</sup> Cic. *Nat. D.* 2.61: 'Faith had previously been deified by Aulus Atilius Calatinus' (Rackham trans.) – '*ante autem ab A. Atilio Calatino erat fides consecrat.*' Cicero did not explicitly state that this was the first establishment of a temple and worship to *Fides*, so it does not necessarily negate the claim it was established under the Roman monarchies. See also Gruen (1982) 59.

<sup>35</sup> For example *fides* as a contract: Fraenkel (1916) 187-199; *fides* as a moral obligation: Heinze (1929) 140-166; Badian (1958) 1-2; further developed by Boyancé (1964) 419-435; see also Gruen (1982) 51; Burton (2011) 40-41.

<sup>36</sup> Hellegouarc'h (1972) 24, 30; Piganiol (1950) 339-347; see also Gruen (1982) 51.

<sup>37</sup> Piganiol (1950) 343-344.

<sup>38</sup> Dmitriev (2011) 439.

<sup>39</sup> Gruen (1982) 51.

<sup>40</sup> Cic. *Off.* 1.23 (Miller trans.): '*Fundamentum autem est iustitiae fides, id est dictorum conventorumque constantia et veritas.*'

Now the support and stay of that unswerving constancy, which we look for in friendship, is loyalty (*fides*).<sup>41</sup>

Here Cicero expressed two aspects of *fides*, that is, the *fides* of friendship and the *fides* of agreements. But there were different levels of *fides*, notably discussed by Aulus Gellius; for example, that between a patron and a client, and that which extended to the international arena.<sup>42</sup> *Fides* constituted an aspect of each of these relationships although, as Burton pointed out not all of them implied mutual obligation. As he claimed, the type of *fides* was determined by the type of relationship, which can be identified by the level of candour shown by both parties involved.<sup>43</sup>

The importance of *fides* can be realised by the censure and punishment of those who disrespected or defiled it. In 173 Marcus Popilius Laenas disregarded the obligations of *fides* to the Statellates, a Ligurian people situated around Massalia, by disarming them, selling their belongings and destroying the town. The senate received news of this and was outraged by the extreme measures taken against a people who had surrendered themselves to the *fides* of the Romans.<sup>44</sup> Another example can be seen in 149 when S. Galba sold some Lusitanians into slavery when they were under the *fides* of the Romans. Charges were brought against him by the tribune of the plebeians L. Scribonius, with the support of Cato.<sup>45</sup> While Galba avoided conviction, this shows the concern of the Romans to act within the bounds of their promises of *fides*.

Those who surrendered into Roman *fides*, then, seem to have been able to expect a level of mercy and protection. This was demonstrated in 203 when Scipio Africanus refused to allow various African cities to surrender into the *fides* of the Romans. He then went on to conquer them, selling the

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<sup>41</sup> Cic. *Amic.* 65 (Falconer trans.): '*firmamentum sutum stabilitatis constantiaeque est eius quam in amicitia quaerimus fides est.*'

<sup>42</sup> Aul. Gell. 5.13.1-2; see also Burton (2011) 40-45; Dmitriev (2011) 438-439.

<sup>43</sup> Burton (2011) 40-45.

<sup>44</sup> Livy 42.8.

<sup>45</sup> Livy, *Per.* 49; Val. Max. 8.2; Cic. *Brut.* 89; Cic. *De or.* 1.227. See also Appian who claimed the Lusitanians were massacred: *Hisp.* 60.

inhabitants into slavery.<sup>46</sup> Scipio had refused to allow them to surrender into Roman *fides* because that would have restricted his behaviour towards them. He would have been governed by the moral implications of *fides*. So it seems that while *fides* was sacred to the Romans, they were not obliged to accept it, and more significantly, like a *deditio*, for a surrender to the *fides* of the Roman people to be applicable, it also had to be formally accepted. As Dmitriev points out, the type of relationship or agreement between the parties involved determined the type of *fides*. So the act of offering to surrender into the *fides* of the Romans was not in itself a binding obligation.<sup>47</sup>

Some modern historians have argued that the Romans were imposing foreign diplomatic conventions upon people who did not understand the difference between surrendering to Roman faith (*in fidem*) and surrendering to Roman power (*in potestatem*).<sup>48</sup> Livy clearly attested to this difference:

Preferring an assured through unattractive peace to the uncertainties of war, they had entrusted themselves to the good faith rather than to the power of the Roman people.<sup>49</sup>

This distinction was also made by Valerius Maximus writing during the first century C.E.<sup>50</sup> It seems to be that *deditio in fidem* was perceived as a voluntary surrender that ensured clemency, while a *deditio in potestatem* was made after a defeat by the Romans and implied they could treat the defeated as they wished. In both cases the *deditio* was unconditional, but the reaction of the Romans was tempered by the inclusion of *fides*. However, Polybius did not see this distinction in his *Histories*, but treated them as identical. Burton argued for the reliability of Polybius, claiming that the Romans of the third and second century did not distinguish any difference between the types of

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<sup>46</sup> Polyb. 15.4.2; Livy 30.7.2.

<sup>47</sup> Dmitriev (2011) 438-439.

<sup>48</sup> For example: Heinze (1929) 159-166; Larsen (1935) 198.

<sup>49</sup> Livy 39.54.7: 'se certam, etsi non speciosam pacem quam incerta belli praeoptantes dedidisse se prius in fidem quam in potestatem populi Romani.'

<sup>50</sup> Val. Max. 6.5.1b: 'the Falisci had committed themselves not to Roman power but to Roman faith' (Shackleton Bailey trans.) – 'doctus est Faliscos non potestati sed fidei se Romanorum commisisse.'

*deditio*.<sup>51</sup> He claims that Livy, and later Valerius Maximus, were confused by the terminology since by their time the generic term *deditio* was used to apply to all types of surrender.<sup>52</sup> A letter sent by the Scipios to Heraclea in 190 may be evidence of the indistinguishable nature of *deditio in fidem* and *deditio in potestatem*, because it referenced surrendering to πίστις and ἐπιτροπή interchangeably.<sup>53</sup> However, it is difficult to entirely disregard the accounts of later Latin historians.

Therefore, while the concept of *fides* did seem to imply clemency and protection, *deditio in fidem* did not guarantee such treatment. *Deditio in fidem* was like *deditio in potestatem* in that both were a complete surrender of all things to the Romans, but the implied difference was in the treatment of those who had surrendered. As Dmitriev claims ‘the act of *deditio in fidem* alone never established the status of the *dediticii*’, which was varied and seemed to depend on the circumstances surrounding the surrender.<sup>54</sup> Eckstein pointed out that the ‘*deditio* ceremony was traditionally performed with a strong aura of *fides* surrounding it’ which implied those who had surrendered, the *dediticii*, were required to act in accordance with their position if they expected to receive favour from the Romans.<sup>55</sup>

### 3) The Aetolians’ experience of *deditio* and *fides*

The possibility that the Aetolians had misunderstood the implications of their *deditio in fidem* to Glabrio, depends on their past diplomatic experience with the Romans and the concepts of *fides* and *deditio*.<sup>56</sup> In particular, the Aetolian *strategos* Phaeneas had been a representative at the discussions between Flamininus and the Greek states after Philip V’s defeat at

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<sup>51</sup> Burton (2009) 243-244. See also: Badian (1958) 5-6; Dahlheim (1968) 13-14, 29-43; Walbank (1979a) 79-81; Gruen (1982) 53-54; Ferrary (1988) 73; Eilers (2002) 33; Dmitriev (2011) 263-279.

<sup>52</sup> Burton (2009) 244 n. 1; Gruen (1982) 56-57.

<sup>53</sup> *Syll.*<sup>3</sup> 618 II.8.11 = Sherk (1969) 35.

<sup>54</sup> Dmitriev (2011) 260.

<sup>55</sup> Eckstein (1995b) 276.

<sup>56</sup> For reference to this episode as a linguistic misunderstanding see: McElduff and Sciarrino (2011) 1.

Cynoscephalae, so had experience dealing with the Romans in matters of peace and war. The Aetolians' understanding of *deditio* and *fides* would have been the result of observation, with the comprehension of this term internationally a direct result of previous Roman usage and behaviour. Therefore, it is necessary to look at the Romans' use of this word in their dealings with the Aetolian League in order to decide whether there could have conceivably been a linguistic misunderstanding in 191 as Polybius claimed.

Significantly, the example set by Flamininus in Greece would have demonstrated the principal understanding of these concepts by the Aetolians. In 197 in a Boeotian assembly, Flamininus spoke of the *fides* of the Romans, not Roman military superiority or resources, in an attempt to persuade the Boeotians to vote for an alliance with the Romans.<sup>57</sup> In 193, Flamininus associated Roman *fides* with the Roman obligation to protect the Greeks, in contrast to the harm the Greeks had been subjected to under the Seleucid dynasty. He claimed:

If Antiochus believes it noble for him that the cities which his great-grandfather held by the law of war, but which his grandfather and his father never treated properly, be reduced to slavery, then the Roman people likewise considers it an obligation, imposed by its loyalty (*fides*) and consistency, not to abandon that championship of the liberty of the Greeks which it has taken upon itself.<sup>58</sup>

In this way, Flamininus' interpretation of *fides* formed the Greek world's understanding of this concept. Both Polybius and Livy also included episodes where the Greeks demonstrated their own understanding of these concepts. According to Livy, in 195 Nabis recognised the significance of *fides* in Roman treaties and pledges.<sup>59</sup> Polybius, in his comparison between Aristaenus and Philopoemen, claimed Philopoemen recognised the significance the Romans

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<sup>57</sup> Livy 33.2.5.

<sup>58</sup> Livy 34.58.10-11: '*si sibi Antiochus pulchrum esse censet, quas urbes proavus belli iure habuerit, avus paterque numquam usurpaverint pro suis, eas repetere in servitatem, et populus Romanus susceptum patrocinium libertatis Graecorum non deserere fidei constantiaeque suae ducit esse.*' See also Livy 34.59.5; 35.49.12.

<sup>59</sup> Livy 34.31.4; see also Gruen (1982) 60.



placed on *fides* in their treatment of their allies.<sup>60</sup> The Romans had demonstrated how this concept was to be interpreted, with Aetolian understanding coming from the example set previously by the Romans in Greece.

There was also a comparable Greek tradition of entering into πίστις, as Gruen has clearly established.<sup>61</sup> Greek interstate relationships were often based on πίστις, which, like *fides*, established a relationship of security between a stronger and a weaker state. This could be seen for example in the defeat of Messene in 182 by the Achaean League. In this instance Messene had no choice in the end but to offer an unconditional surrender (ἐπιτροπή), but Lycortas described it as a reliance on Achaean πίστις and treated the Messenians fairly after the war.<sup>62</sup> The Greeks then had a comparable tradition to that of *fides*.

There is no evidence that specifically indicates the Aetolians did not understand the Roman concept of *fides*. *Fides* was a concept the Romans were proud of, and one that they constantly used in their diplomatic interactions with Greece. However, the Greek experience of *fides* was a favourable one, as shown by the Aetolians' conviction that they would receive a more favourable outcome through surrendering to Romans *fides*.<sup>63</sup> But this treatment by Glabrio did not resemble any of their past experiences of *fides*, indicating the fluid nature of the concept of *deditio*. While Roman commanders usually recognised the benefit in appealing to *fides* in international relations, Glabrio was decidedly different, although he did not act beyond the legal bounds of the *deditio* he was asked to grant.

Another reason to question Polybius' interpretation of this episode as a linguistic misunderstanding, was the experience of the Aetolian *strategos* who

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<sup>60</sup> Polyb. 24.13.3; see also Gruen (1982) 60.

<sup>61</sup> Gruen (1982) 64-66.

<sup>62</sup> Polyb. 23.16.7-11, 17.1. For further examples see: Polyb. 5.50.8; 22.17.1-5; Livy 28.7.12; 32.16.14; 43.22.2; see also Gruen (1982) 64-66.

<sup>63</sup> Polyb. 20.9.11. Livy claimed that the Aetolians were surrendering themselves into Roman *fides* because they knew it would guarantee their safety from Roman reprisals, and it would also leave them available to accept any better offers: 36.27.8.

presented the *deditio* to Glabrio, Phaeneas. He had been an Aetolian representative during the Second Macedonian War, so had been in constant contact with Flamininus. His presence was first recognised at the conference at Nicaea in 197 and also at the peace negotiations at Tempe.<sup>64</sup> During the negotiations at Tempe, Phaeneas received instruction from Flamininus on the Roman practice of *deditio*, so there is little reason to think that he misunderstood it in 191.<sup>65</sup>

During the peace negotiations at Tempe after Philip V's defeat at Cynoscephalae, Phaeneas claimed that the Aetolians should receive Larisa Cremaste, Pharsalus, Phthiotic Thebes and Echinus.<sup>66</sup> Philip gave assent for this, but Flamininus interrupted them, claiming the Aetolians were only entitled to Phthiotic Thebes. The reasoning behind this was that Phthiotic Thebes had refused to surrender to the Romans and so had been taken by force, meaning that Flamininus could decide its fate. However, those cities who had surrendered without conflict to Roman *fides* were not to be treated in such a fashion. When Phaeneas complained and appealed to the terms of their original alliance in 211, Polybius stated:<sup>67</sup>

For the alliance had been dissolved when, deserting the Romans, they made terms with Philip, and even if it still subsisted, they should receive back and occupy not the towns which had surrendered to the Romans of their own free will, as all the Thessalian cities had now done, but any that had fallen by force of arms.<sup>68</sup>

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<sup>64</sup> Polyb. 18.1.4, 3.1, 4.3-4, 7.2, 37.11-12, 38.3-9.

<sup>65</sup> In comparison, Dmitriev argues that this lecture on *fides* was the reason the Aetolians misunderstood it in 191: (2011) 257-258.

<sup>66</sup> Polyb. 18.38.3-9; see also Walsh (1993) 35-46.

<sup>67</sup> This was the first formal treaty between the Romans and an overseas power in 211: Livy 26.24.8-14; *IG IX<sup>2</sup>* 2.241. This treaty was specifically aimed at war with Philip, which the Aetolians immediately embarked upon. The clause in this treaty, mentioned by Phaeneas that determined the division of booty, referred specifically to the cities between the Aetolian border and Corcyra: Livy 26.24.11. Livy referred to this treaty as *foedere primo*, which may imply there was another treaty or agreement between the Aetolians and the Romans: Livy 33.13.10.

<sup>68</sup> Polyb. 18.38.8-9: 'τὴν τε γὰρ συμμαχίαν λελύσθαι, καθ' ὃν καιρὸν τὰς διαλύσεις ἐποίησαντο πρὸς Φίλιππον ἐγκαταλείποντες Ῥωμαίους, εἴ τε καὶ μένειν ἔτι τὴν συμμαχίαν, δεῖν αὐτοὺς κομίζεσθαι καὶ παραλαμβάνειν, οὐκ εἴ τινες ἔθελοντὴν σφᾶς εἰς τὴν Ῥωμαίων

The Aetolians then were not ignorant of the Roman concepts of *fides* and *deditio*.<sup>69</sup> In this instance, Flamininus clearly stated that the Romans protected those who had surrendered into Roman *fides*, and would not even hand them over to those who were considered an ally. This interpretation of *fides* was the one that the Aetolians would have been expecting upon their surrender to Glabrio, not the harsh reality that faced them.

Livy also claimed that Glabrio had attempted to lure the Aetolians into peace negotiations just prior to the battle of Heraclea. According to Livy, Glabrio assured the Aetolians they would be protected if they forfeited their alliance with Antiochus. He claimed the commander stated:

Other states of Greece too in that war, he said, had revolted from the Romans who deserved so well of them, but because, after the flight of the king, from confidence in whom they had thrown off their allegiance, they had not added stubbornness to their fault, they had been received into alliance; the Aetolians also, though they had not summoned the king but had followed him, and had been the leaders in the war and not allies, if they could repent, could likewise be saved.<sup>70</sup>

So Phaeneas and the Aetolians would have been expecting this kind of reaction from Glabrio. However, Livy also clearly stated that Glabrio received no answer from the Aetolians concerning his offer, so they could not have relied upon any concrete expectations.<sup>71</sup>

In addition, Flaccus had already informed the Aetolians of their best course of action prior to their audience with Glabrio:

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πίστιν ἐνεχείρισαν, ὅπερ αἱ κατὰ Θετταλίαν πόλεις ἅπασαι πεποιθήκασιν νῦν, ἀλλ' εἴ τινας κατὰ κράτος ἐάλωθον.

<sup>69</sup> Gruen (1982) 58; Eckstein (1995b) 281 n. 29; Burton (2009) 245.

<sup>70</sup> Livy 36.22.2-3: *'et ceteras Graeciae civitates defecisse eo bello ab optime meritis Romanis; sed quia post fugam regis, cuius fiducia officio decessissent, non addidissent pertinaciam culpaе, in fidem receptas esse; Aetolos quoque, quamquam non secuti sint regem, sed accersierint, et duces belli, non socii duerint, si paenitere possint, posse et incolumis esse.'*

<sup>71</sup> Livy 36.22.4.

he advised them to leave off trying to justify themselves and resort rather to deprecatory language, begging the consul to grant them pardon for their offences.<sup>72</sup>

Gruen argued this indicated Phaeneas understood the implications of *deditio*, and if he had not at this point, he would have asked Flaccus for enlightenment.<sup>73</sup> Therefore, there can be little doubt that the Aetolians understood both the implications of *fides* through Flamininus and the Romans' use of this term in Greece, and the implications of *deditio* through Flamininus' claims at the peace negotiations at Tempe in 197. In contrast, Eckstein argued that a misunderstanding was possible despite Phaeneas' lesson on these concepts at Tempe. He claimed Flamininus had emphasised the positive aspect of *deditio* as protective at Tempe, while Glabrio in 191 focused on the act of surrendering, which had not been discussed by Flamininus.<sup>74</sup>

However, Burton has more recently argued that Polybius' claim was not that the difference between *deditio in fidem* and *deditio in potestatem* had misled the Aetolians, but rather that they were confused by the treatment they received as *dediticii*.<sup>75</sup> According to Polybius, the Aetolians had decided to surrender to the *fides* of the Romans because 'they would thus obtain a more complete pardon.'<sup>76</sup> The implication here is that they realised the potentially benevolent aspect of *fides* and consciously decided to invoke it in their meeting with Glabrio. However, Glabrio interpreted the Aetolian *deditio* in its most rigid sense, regardless of whether it was a *deditio in fidem* or *potestatem*.<sup>77</sup> According to Burton, Polybius' explanation of *deditio* was intended instead for his audience, not a comment on the Aetolians' misunderstanding of the implications of their actions.<sup>78</sup>

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<sup>72</sup> Polyb. 20.9.9: 'ἀφεμένους τοῦ δικαιολογεῖσθαι συνεβούλευε τρέπεσθαι πρὸς τὸν ἀξιωματικὸν λόγον καὶ δεῖσθαι τοῦ στρατηγοῦ συγγνώμης τυχεῖν ἐπὶ τοῖς ἡμαρτημένοις.'

<sup>73</sup> Gruen (1982) 58-59.

<sup>74</sup> Eckstein (1995b) 281 n. 29.

<sup>75</sup> Burton (2009) 245-247.

<sup>76</sup> Polyb. 20.9.11: 'διὰ τοῦτο τελειότερου σφίσιιν ἐλέους ὑπάρξοντος.'

<sup>77</sup> According to Eckstein, a reaction as extreme as Glabrio's to the Aetolian *deditio* needed to be justified. Glabrio would have had such justification from the obstinate behaviour of the Aetolians in this instance: Eckstein (1995b) 277.

<sup>78</sup> Burton (2009) 246.

There is some merit to Burton's argument that Polybius did not claim that the Aetolians misunderstood the difference between *deditio in fidem* and *deditio in potestate*. However, Polybius still explicitly stated that the Aetolians had decided to surrender to the faith of the Romans, 'not knowing the exact meaning of the phrase.'<sup>79</sup> So while it cannot be said that the Aetolians were confused specifically about the type of *deditio* they were agreeing to, Polybius still claimed they were unaware of the implications of what they were doing.<sup>80</sup> The examples set by the Romans in Greece, and more specifically, Phaeneas' experience with Flamininus, indicates that the Aetolians were clear on the implications of their *deditio*. Their appeal to Roman *fides* indicated their attempt to try and manoeuvre the Romans into agreeing to a positive outcome for themselves. This was a demonstration of their hope that the outcome would be favourable for them, in accordance with previous leniency towards those who surrendered into the *fides* of the Romans, but they were not under any misapprehension of the implications of their *deditio*.<sup>81</sup> Nevertheless, they would not have expected the harsh response of Glabrio.

#### 4) The aftermath of the Aetolian *deditio*

The reaction of the Aetolians to the demands of Glabrio seemed to support Polybius' interpretation of this episode as a linguistic misunderstanding, even though the previous interaction between the Romans and the Aetolians implied they understood the implications of these concepts. However, the harsh treatment they were almost subjected to at the hands of Glabrio may also have contributed to a misunderstanding, since it was not what they had expected. This treatment does stand out as unusual, particularly due to the intervention of the other Roman magistrates. It is

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<sup>79</sup> Polyb. 20.9.11: 'οὐκ εἰδότες τίνα δύναμιν ἔχει τοῦτο.'

<sup>80</sup> Notably, when the Aetolians had an audience with the senate after this episode, they requested an indication of what exactly the senate had control over if they submitted themselves to their power. The senate refused to answer. This may be due to the harsh demands of Glabrio, which contrasted with the Aetolians' previously favourable experiences of *deditio*: Polyb. 21.2.4-6.

<sup>81</sup> As Eckstein pointed out, the potential results of a *deditio* were considerable. Often the people who had surrendered became an independent ally of Rome, but there were also cases of total destruction. For example: Sall. *Jug.* 91; see also Eckstein (1995b) 277.

necessary then to analyse the behaviour of Glabrio and the reactions of the Aetolians in order to completely understand Polybius' interpretation of this event.

Glabrio's behaviour was extremely harsh under the circumstances. He was not only belligerent and arrogant towards the Aetolians after their official surrender, but also prior to this, when he claimed to be too busy to give an audience to their embassy.<sup>82</sup> Gruen argued that this episode 'seems a little too theatrical, the events a little too staged.'<sup>83</sup> The preoccupation of Glabrio and referral of the Aetolian ambassadors to Flaccus may perhaps have been prearranged by the Roman commander to ensure that the Aetolians were aware of the situation and the Roman expectations. Polybius claimed that Glabrio's reaction to the Aetolians and threat to put them in chains was not motivated by anger, but in order to intimidate them and force them to realise their situation.<sup>84</sup> This also implied an aspect of performance in Glabrio's actions, although it is difficult to claim that this episode was wholly planned by the Roman commander.

According to Gruen, the impasse in 191 was caused by the incompatible aims of both the Aetolians and Glabrio. The Aetolians had expected to negotiate and be treated with Roman clemency, while Glabrio wanted an unconditional surrender, after which he could dictate the terms of peace to the Aetolians.<sup>85</sup> Glabrio would have begun to anticipate the arrival of his consular replacement if this war went on much longer, hence his concern to end this war swiftly and on terms beneficial to Rome. His own *gloria* would have been enhanced by the extent of the *deditio* he received and the terms he had been able to enforce on the defeated.

Glabrio's reaction to the Aetolian outburst against the restrictions he placed on them following their *deditio*, was extreme. The intervention of Flaccus and the other military tribunes to prevent him from placing the

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<sup>82</sup> Polyb. 20.9.4-5; Livy 36.27.3

<sup>83</sup> Gruen (1982) 67; see also Burton (2009) 247.

<sup>84</sup> Polyb. 20.10.7.

<sup>85</sup> Gruen (1982) 67.

Aetolians in chains shows that this behaviour was excessive.<sup>86</sup> Eckstein argued that these ambassadors ceased to be envoys of a free state once they delivered their *deditio* to Glabrio and so had lost the sacred protection attributed to foreign envoys.<sup>87</sup> Therefore, Glabrio was justified in treating them any way he wished. However, as Burton pointed out, the intervention of Flaccus and the military tribunes indicated that this was not an acceptable act against the Aetolians specifically because they were ambassadors.<sup>88</sup> It is interesting that Livy did not include Polybius' claim that Flaccus intervened on behalf of the Aetolian envoys to stop Glabrio from putting them in chains, claiming only that Flaccus supported their request for a ten-day truce.<sup>89</sup> Livy's account also portrayed the Aetolians as defeated by the severity of Glabrio. He claimed:

Then the haughty spirit of Phaeneas was broken and that of the other Aetolians, and they finally perceived in what condition they were, and Pheaneas said that he and those of the Aetolians who were present knew that they would have to do what was commanded, but to confirm the decree a council of the Aetolians was necessary.<sup>90</sup>

In this way Livy presented the Aetolian envoys as broken by the commands of Glabrio, while Polybius only presented them as shocked, although similarly they requested the need to consult the Aetolian people.<sup>91</sup>

This episode has been used to demonstrate Roman brutality, but as Eckstein pointed out there was no indication that any violence had been done to the envoys, nor if the chains had even been produced.<sup>92</sup> He argued the

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<sup>86</sup> Polyb. 20.10.8-11; Livy 36.28.5-7.

<sup>87</sup> Eckstein (1995b) 278. For the sacrosanctity of envoys see: Val. Max. 6.6.3.

<sup>88</sup> Burton (2009) 247. Flaccus' authority to intervene in this instance may have been because he was a *pontifex*, and had been since 196: Livy 33.42.5; *MRR* 338. As Eckstein pointed out, it was the duty of the *pontifex* to advise the magistrate on religious matters: (1995b) 278 n. 22; see also Szemler (1972) 34-46.

<sup>89</sup> Livy 36.28.8.

<sup>90</sup> Livy 36.28.6-7: '*tum fracta Phaeneae ferocia Aetolisque aliis est, et tandem cuius condicionis essent senserunt, et Phaeneas se quidem et qui adsint Aetolorum scire facienda esse, quae imperentur, dixit, sed ad decernenda ea concilio Aetolorum opus esse.*'

<sup>91</sup> Polyb. 20.10.9-12.

<sup>92</sup> Eckstein (1995b) 272; see n.10 above for modern historians who use this as an example of Roman brutality.

threat towards the envoys was a 'momentary surge of bad temper.'<sup>93</sup> It has also been argued that this diplomatic interaction with the Aetolians marked a change in Glabrio's behaviour, to become much harsher than he previously appears to have been in the historical record.<sup>94</sup> According to Eckstein, though, this behaviour was consistent with Glabrio's previous interactions in this war.<sup>95</sup> Burton claimed this episode 'shows the power of normative international law in the ancient Mediterranean world to discourage brutality towards the vanquished' and show mercy to the conquered.<sup>96</sup> Even though there was no central control on international behaviour, it appears that Roman conventions, like *fides*, worked similarly to those of the Greeks to limit acts of violence driven by self-interested parties.<sup>97</sup> This however, does not imply that the Romans did not act violently towards *dediciti*, just that there were standards of acceptable behaviour that were intended to govern their contact.

According to the ancient record, Glabrio acted in two opposing ways during diplomatic interaction - with instances both of benevolence and of anger and brutality. Livy claimed that Glabrio marched his army past the gates of Boeotia and Phocis without looting, even though the people had rebelled and were expecting such treatment. However, at Coronea he was suddenly enraged by a statue of Antiochus in the temple of Athena Itonia and allowed his soldiers to loot the surrounding area, although he later realised his mistake and ceased the pillaging.<sup>98</sup> Livy even praised Glabrio's constraint with the cities of Euboea, claiming:

a few days later everything was quiet and the army was led back to Thermopylae doing no injury to any city, their moderate conduct after the victory being far more worthy of praise than the actual victory.<sup>99</sup>

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<sup>93</sup> Eckstein (1995b) 278.

<sup>94</sup> Tränkle (1977) 175-176; Briscoe (1981) 260.

<sup>95</sup> Eckstein (1995b) 280.

<sup>96</sup> Burton (2009) 248; see also Burton (2011) 114-122.

<sup>97</sup> Burton (2009) 250-251.

<sup>98</sup> Livy 36.20.1-4. For another example of Glabrio's benevolence see: 36.14.12-14.

<sup>99</sup> Livy 36.21.3: '*post paucosque dies omnibus perpacatis sine ullius noxa urbis exercitus Thermopylas reductus, multo modestia post victoriam quam ipsa victoria laudabilior.*' See also: Plut. *Flam.* 16.2; App. *Syr.* 21.



According to these examples then, Glabrio was not an especially violent commander, although seemingly susceptible to quick bursts of temper, as Eckstein claimed. Livy also included a reprimand issued to Glabrio by Flamininus in 191 at the siege of Naupactus, but according to Livy it was not because of his treatment of the Aetolians, but rather because he had forgotten the Romans' overall intentions in Greece, in particular their aim to make sure Philip V did not grow in influence and distort the balance of power in Greece.<sup>100</sup> Plutarch, however, depicted Glabrio as a violent commander, claiming his anger was tempered towards Naupactus by Flamininus who was moved by the sight of the helpless Aetolians:

Then, when the besieged citizens caught sight of him from their walls and called aloud upon him and stretched out their hands to him imploringly, he turned away, burst into tears, and left the place, without saying anything more at the time; afterwards, however, he had an interview with Manius, put an end to his wrath, and induced him to grant the Aetolians a truce, and time in which to send an embassy to Rome with a pleas for moderate terms.<sup>101</sup>

Plutarch here seems to be casting Glabrio as a contrast to Flamininus' clemency. While it is possible that Glabrio had some anger towards the Aetolians at this stage in the war, Plutarch is the only historian who depicted the siege in this way. Apart from this episode, there was little reason to claim Glabrio was a particularly violent Roman. There is no evidence that he actually intended to harm the Aetolian envoys in 191, and his granting of a ten-day armistice to the Aetolians after their *deditio*, seems to support Livy's depiction of his character.<sup>102</sup>

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<sup>100</sup> Livy 36.34.6-10; see also Eckstein (1995b) 285-287.

<sup>101</sup> Plut. *Flam.* 15-17, esp. 15.5 (Perrin trans.): 'πολιορκουμένων, ὡς εἶδον αὐτὸν, ἀπὸ τοῦ τείχους ἀνακαλούντων καὶ χεῖρας ὀρεγόντων καὶ δεομένων, τότε μὲν οὐδὲν εἰπών, ἀλλὰ στραφεὶς καὶ δακρύσας ἀπῆλθεν, ὕστερον δὲ διαλεχθεὶς τῷ Μανίῳ καὶ καταπαύσας τὸν θυμὸν αὐτοῦ διεπράξατο τοῖς Αἰτωλοῖς ἀνοχὰς δοθῆναι, καὶ χρόνον ἐν ᾧ πρεσβεύσαντες εἰς Ῥώμην μετρίου τινὸς τυχεῖν ἀξιώσουσι.' See also: Plut. *Phil.* 17.4.

<sup>102</sup> Eckstein (1995b) 280.

The ten-day armistice Glabrio allowed the Aetolians in order to consult with their people was another unusual aspect of this diplomatic interaction. As Eckstein pointed out, it was unusual for a commander who had just received a *deditio* to allow such a privilege.<sup>103</sup> Significantly, the claim that the Aetolians needed to seek the permission of their people to ratify their surrender negated the *deditio* they had just offered the Romans, since the first requirement of a *deditio* ritual was that those participating had the authority to act on behalf of their community.<sup>104</sup> This then could imply that the Aetolians did not understand the requirements of a *deditio*, although this was more likely an excuse to reconvene and consider their options. Livy did, after all, claim that the Aetolians were not entirely committed to the success of their surrender.<sup>105</sup>

It is worth noting briefly the intentions of the Aetolians and the Romans in this meeting. Livy claimed the Aetolians were biding their time until a better offer was made. He also refers to an embassy the Aetolians sent to Antiochus just prior to the fall of Heraclea asking for help.<sup>106</sup> In this light, their appeal to Glabrio for time to present the terms to the Aetolian people may have been a ruse or a delay tactic while they awaited word from Antiochus. Even if the Aetolians had initially decided to seek peace terms with the Romans, it is possible that the conduct of Glabrio angered them into defiance. His conduct had been harsh throughout their association, which would have been exemplified because Phaeneas was the Aetolian *strategos* at the time. At points, Glabrio's conduct also seemed to indicate a nonchalant attitude towards the potential continuation of this war. Eckstein claimed Glabrio was genuine in his treatment of the Aetolians.<sup>107</sup> However, it is difficult to explain his granting of the armistice unless he wanted to allow them an opportunity to reconsider their surrender. Even though the impending end of the campaigning year is often seen as motivation to end a war, this episode did not necessarily reflect that desire in Glabrio.<sup>108</sup>

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<sup>103</sup> Eckstein (1995b) 281-283.

<sup>104</sup> Eckstein (1995b) 281.

<sup>105</sup> Livy 36.27.8.

<sup>106</sup> Livy 36.27.1-2, 8. The messenger from Antiochus reached the Aetolians during the ten-day armistice after their *deditio*: Polyb. 20.10.16; Livy 36.29.3-4.

<sup>107</sup> Eckstein (1995b) 280.

<sup>108</sup> Gruen (1982) 67.

## 5) Polybius' didactic purpose

Polybius interpreted this episode as a linguistic misunderstanding in order to provide a lesson of diplomatic conduct for his audience of soldier-politicians. Polybius' self-constructed persona in the *Histories* as a teacher and historian often determined how he interpreted events, with historical accuracy compromised by his aim to provide his readers with beneficial didactic lessons. Apart from Polybius' claim that this was a linguistic misunderstanding, there was little else that pointed to this conclusion. Instead Polybius emphasised this episode in this way in order to draw attention to the erroneous diplomatic practices of the Aetolians and the necessity of understanding the traditional diplomatic institutions of your opponents in the international arena.

For Polybius, this episode provided several didactic opportunities. His interpretation of this episode as a linguistic misunderstanding highlighted the significance of understanding foreign cultural practices in diplomatic interaction for his audience of soldier-politicians.<sup>109</sup> A lesson that, while applicable to both Roman and Greek readers, was particularly a lesson in appreciating the culturally traditional diplomatic mechanisms of the dominant power, in this case, the Romans. In this way, Polybius' claim that the Aetolians did not understand the implications of their *deditio*, emphasised the importance of understanding key diplomatic terms. In recognising this, as well as the demonstration of his own diplomatic expertise, Polybius was giving evidence of his own political credentials. He stood as a diplomat between these two worlds, particularly after his release from Rome in 150, and displayed his ability to understand both cultures to his audience by his commentary on this diplomatic exchange.

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<sup>109</sup> The Romans had learnt from their embarrassment in Tarentum in 281 when they were mocked for their limited ability in the Greek language: Dion. Hal. *Ant. Rom.* 19.5; App. *Sam.* 7.2.

Both Burton and Eckstein have recognised the didactic aspects of this episode in the *Histories*. Burton pointed out that Polybius' explanation of the implications of *deditio* was intended for his audience.<sup>110</sup> Eckstein claimed:

Polybius' purposes in telling the story of Glabrio and the Aetolians were to explain to his readers the meaning of *deditio*, and perhaps to demonstrate how not to act in a crisis, not simply to attack the Aetolians *per se*.<sup>111</sup>

Polybius used this episode to fulfil his didactic purpose, which induced him to claim this episode was a linguistic misunderstanding when there is ample evidence that attests to the Aetolians' prior knowledge of the requirements of *deditio*. In the *Histories*, Polybius commonly used the Aetolian League as a collectively negative *exemplum* of irrational, greedy behaviour to contrast to the positive attributes of the Achaean League, and this instance is no different.<sup>112</sup> Through this depiction of the Aetolian League, Polybius was able to emphasise his didactic lesson for his readers; however, as Eckstein has claimed, this negative portrayal was not simply due to Polybius' recognised animosity.

Through Polybius' persona in the *Histories* as a teacher he presented lessons for his audience of soldier-politicians on the correct behaviour for a statesman in ancient Greece and Rome. Central to this ideology of the model statesman, were Polybius' strictures on the necessity of rational decision making.<sup>113</sup> He attributed the war with Antiochus entirely to the irrational anger of the Aetolians. He claimed:

It is evident that the cause of the war between Antiochus and the Romans was the anger of the Aetolians, who (as I above stated) looking upon themselves as having been slighted in many ways by the Romans as regards their share in bringing the war with Philip to an end, not only invited Antiochus over, but

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<sup>110</sup> Burton (2009) 246.

<sup>111</sup> Eckstein (1995b) 284.

<sup>112</sup> See section 5.4 for further discussion.

<sup>113</sup> For further discussion of these issues see section 4.1 and 4.5.

were ready to do and suffer anything owing to the anger they conceived under the above circumstances.<sup>114</sup>

This irrationality, as Eckstein recognised, was evident in the reaction of the Aetolian populace when they heard of the terms given to Phaeneas after the *deditio*.<sup>115</sup> According to Polybius, the Aetolian populace ‘became so savage’ that there was no consideration of ending the war with the Romans.<sup>116</sup> This irrationality was further evidenced by the joy apparent in the narrative at the vague promise of help from Antiochus they received just after their *deditio*, upon which they resumed the war with Rome.<sup>117</sup> The irrational behaviour of the Aetolians allowed Polybius an opportunity to provide a lesson for his readers on irrational decision making. This entire war was based on irrational anger, which had led to emotionally driven decision making. For Polybius, this represented the worst kind of political behaviour and was destined to lead to destruction. The Aetolians were Polybius’ *exemplum* for his audience on the dangers of irrationality.

By emphasising that this diplomatic failure was due to a linguistic misunderstanding, Polybius highlighted two central points. First, he emphasised the need for diplomats to understand the foreign diplomatic mechanisms of those they had dealings with. Second, he emphasised the nature of the *deditio* ritual to his audience, ensuring they realised its full implications. This was not the only mention in the *Histories* of the terms of a *deditio*, with Polybius providing the *deditio* formula in book thirty-six.<sup>118</sup> He went to lengths to make sure that his audience was clear on the implications of *deditio*, emphasising it at this point and later in his account of Carthage’s unconditional surrender in the Third Punic War. At this part in the narrative

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<sup>114</sup> Polyb. 3.7.1-2: ‘μὴν τοῦ κατ’ Ἀντίοχον καὶ Ῥωμαίους δῆλον ὡς αἰτίαν μὲν τὴν Αἰτωλῶν ὄργην θετέον. ἐκεῖνοι γὰρ δόξαντες ὑπὸ Ῥωμαίων ὀλιγωρῆσθαι κατὰ πολλὰ περὶ τὴν ἐκβασιν τὴν ἐκ τοῦ Φιλίου πολέμου, καθάπερ ἐπάνω προείπον, οὐ μόνον Ἀντίοχον ἐπεσπίασαντο, πᾶν δὲ καὶ πράξαι καὶ παθεῖν ὑπέστησαν διὰ τὴν ἐπιγενομένην ὄργην ἐκ τῶν προειρημένων καιρῶν.’

<sup>115</sup> Eckstein (1995b) 283-284.

<sup>116</sup> Polyb. 20.10.15: ‘ἀπεθηριώθη τὸ πλῆθος.’

<sup>117</sup> Polyb. 20.10.16; Eckstein (1995b) 284. As Eckstein pointed out, this type of irrationality in difficult circumstances was considered by Polybius as a characteristic of ‘the mob.’ For example: Polyb. 33.17; see also Eckstein (1995b) 284.

<sup>118</sup> This has been discussed previously in this chapter, see section 7.2.

Polybius acknowledged he had already explained the meaning of *deditio in fidem* to his audience, but thought it necessary to do it again because of its significance, clearly indicating this as a lesson he wanted to ensure his audience fully appreciated.<sup>119</sup> Flurl pointed out that this reference was not to Polybius' explanation in book twenty, which indicates that in the lost sections of Polybius there was another explanation of *deditio* for his readers.<sup>120</sup> So Polybius mentioned the implications of *deditio* at least three times in his *Histories*, indicating how significant it was to him to ensure his readers understood it clearly.

After the Carthaginian *deditio* in 146, Polybius included the advice Mago the Bruttian offered the Carthaginians on their *deditio* to Rome.<sup>121</sup> This was in response to the anxiety in Carthage about the kinds of demands the Romans may make of them after they had surrendered themselves completely. Polybius claimed Mago spoke in a manly (*ἀνδρώδης*) and practical (*πραγματικός*) fashion, clearly earning the respect of the author. According to Polybius, Mago argued:

For the proper time, surely, to question what the orders of the consuls would be and why the senate made no reference to their city was not the present but the time when they put themselves at the mercy of Rome. Once they had done this they should be clearly aware that they must accept any order unless it were flagrantly oppressive and beyond expectation. In the latter case they must again consider if they should expose their country to war and its terrors, or not daring to face the attack of the enemy, yield unresistingly to every demand.<sup>122</sup>

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<sup>119</sup> Polyb. 36.4.1.

<sup>120</sup> Flurl (1969) 42-42; see also Gruen (1982) 61 n. 52.

<sup>121</sup> For further discussion of this passage see section 5.3.

<sup>122</sup> Polyb. 36.5.3-5: 'δεῖν γὰρ οὐ μὰ Δία νῦν διαπορεῖν τί διὰ τῶν ὑπάτων αὐτοῖς παραγγελθήσεται, καὶ διὰ τί περὶ πόλεως οὐδεμίαν ἐποιήσατο μνηϊαν ἢ σύγκλητος, ἀλλὰ καθ' ὄν καιρὸν ἐδίδοσαν τὴν ἐπιτροπήν· δόντας δὲ σαφῶς γινώσκειν διότι πᾶν τὸ παραγγελλόμενον ἐπιδεκτέον ἐστίν, ἐὰν μὴ τελέως ὑπερήφανον <ἦ> καὶ παρὰ τὴν προσδοκίαν· εἰ δὲ μὴ, τότε πάλιν βουλευέσθαι πότῃρα δεῖ πρασδέχεσθαι τὸν πόλεμον εἰς τὴν χώραν καὶ πάσχειν ὅ, τι ποτ' ἂν οὗτος ἐπιφέρῃ τῶν δεινῶν, ἢ κατορρωδήσαντας τὴν τῶν πολεμίων ἔφοδον ἐθελοντὴν ἀναδέχεσθαι πᾶν τὸ προσταττόμενον.'

This advice seems to echo Polybius' own sentiments on the behaviour of the ideal statesman. This rational approach to the situation of the Carthaginians was in direct contrast to the irrationality of the Aetolians when they were in the same situation. The Aetolian decision to continue the war with Rome led to the end of the Aetolian League as an independent entity, which signified the complete failure of the statesman to preserve the existence of the state above all other considerations. The peace treaty at the end of this war involved the renowned *maiestas* clause which dictated the submissive position of the League by stipulating that 'the people of Aetolia shall preserve without fraud the empire and majesty of the Roman people.'<sup>123</sup> Any attempts the Aetolians made to arrange a diplomatic meeting after this failed encounter were rebuffed by the Romans, adding to the damage this irrationality did to the future of the Aetolian League.<sup>124</sup>

Moreover, Polybius' survey of the various Greek opinions after the destruction of Carthage in 146 reiterated this point further.<sup>125</sup> This section, although couched in terms of an other's opinion, echoes Polybius' interpretation of *deditio* and its implications in the *Histories*. He claimed that one section of Greek society did not see any immorality in the Roman destruction of Carthage because of the *deditio* they had offered:

But if, in fact, after the Carthaginians had of their own accord committed themselves to the faith of the Romans and given

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<sup>123</sup> Polyb. 21.32.2-3: 'ὁ δῆμος ὁ τῶν Αἰτωλῶν τὴν ἀρχὴν καὶ τὴν δυναστείαν τοῦ δήμου τῶν Ῥωμαίων.' There is a lacuna in the text here where Burton suggests ἀνευ τε δόλου τε ἀπάσης after the phrasing of Herodotus: 1.69.2; Burton (2011) 274 n. 49. See also: Walbank (1979a) 131-132; Gruen (1984) 29 n. 85. Badian claimed this clause was a legal restriction based on the Aetolians' position as *clientela*, although Gruen in opposition argued it was a moral stipulation between unequal partners. Alternatively, Burton has recently argued that this *maiestas* clause was the Romans' attempt to define their relationship and obligations as dictated by the *deditio* in familiar Greek terms of kingship. He claims 'in a sense then, *maiestas* acts as a kind of exegesis on or conceptual parallel to the more concrete *imperium*, the term with which *maiestas* is coupled in the treaty's opening clause.' However, the *maiestas* clause may simply have been a moral and legal stipulation included in order to determine the dominance of the Romans and their desire to be deferred to by their lesser allies. The need for such a clause could be seen in the previous difficulty with the Aetolian League and the ongoing issues with the Achaean League in 189: Livy 38.11.2; Badian (1958) 84, 86-87; Gruen (1984) 29-32; Burton (2011) 275. See also: Baronowski (1990) 435-469. On the treaty in 189 see: Walbank (1979a) 131-136; Gruen (1984) 26-32; Sherwin-White (1984) 59; Kallet-Marx (1995) 26; Grainger (2002) 340; Eckstein (2008) 348 and n. 20.

<sup>124</sup> Polyb. 21.2.3-6, 4-5; Livy 37.4.6-8, 6.4-7.7.

<sup>125</sup> For further discussion on this passage see section 5.3.

them liberty to treat them in any way they chose, the Romans, being thus authorised to act as it seemed good to them, gave the orders and imposed the terms on which they had decided, what took place did not bear any resemblance to an act of impiety and scarcely any to an act of treachery; in fact some said it was not even of the nature of an injustice.<sup>126</sup>

The care with which Polybius established the requirements of a *deditio* for his audience of soldier-politicians shows the significance he attributed to it within the diplomatic arena, and his concern that his readers understood its implications clearly. By drawing attention to this episode as a linguistic misunderstanding and the effect this had on the survival of the Aetolian League, Polybius was ensuring that his readers would pay careful attention to his narrative and the lesson it held for them. In this way, his narrative asked to be interpreted in accordance with his didactic lesson.

Polybius' emphasis on the implications of *deditio* added to his own credibility as a politician and a diplomat, contributing to his authority in the *Histories* as a teacher and an historian. Through his presentation of this episode as a linguistic misunderstanding, Polybius portrayed himself as unique because he could stand in both the Greek and Roman worlds. He understood the implications of *deditio* and, by extension, wider Roman traditions, so was qualified to educate his Greek readers on Roman culture. This image of Polybius as standing between these two cultures added to his legitimacy as an historian and suggested he had the ability to stand outside the events and convey an unbiased account. By placing himself outside these events and implying that he understood Roman tradition, he contrasted his ability as a statesman to that of the Aetolian *strategos* Phaeneas, who obviously failed as a statesman due to his irrational decision-making. His ability to comment on Roman diplomatic procedures was enhanced by his own experience in diplomacy, both before and after his detention in Rome. In

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<sup>126</sup> Polyb. 36.9.13: 'εἰ δὲ δόντων αὐτῶν τῶν Καρχηδονίων τὴν ἐπιτροπὴν ὥστε βουλευέσθαι Ῥωμαίους ὃ, τι ποτὲ φαίνοιτο περὶ αὐτῶν, οὕτω <κατὰ> τὴν ἐξουσίαν, ὡς ποτε δοκοῖ σφίσι, τὸ κριθέν ἐπέταττον καὶ παρήγγελον, οὐκέτι τὸ γινόμενον ἀσεβήματι παραπλήσιον εἶναι καὶ <μὴν> οὐδὲ παρασπονδήματι μικροῦ δεινῷ ἐνιοὶ δ' ἔφασαν οὐκ ἀδικήματι τὸ παράπαν.'



this way, Polybius was presenting himself as the ideal statesman for his readers to model themselves on.

In conclusion, this chapter has provided a second example of the significance of Polybius' self-constructed image and his concern to present his didactic lessons in accordance with his persona as a teacher in the *Histories*. His claim that the diplomatic breakdown between the Aetolian League and the Romans in 191 was due to a linguistic misunderstanding is unconvincing in light of their previous diplomatic interaction, in particular the presence of Phaeneas, the *strategos* of 191, at the peace negotiations after the Second Macedonian War. Polybius seems to be correct in claiming there was no difference between *deditio in fidem* and *deditio in potestatem*: in essence they were both unconditionally complete surrenders that implied a complete loss of independence. The difference came in the treatment the defeated received after their surrender, which was wholly dependent on the context and circumstances surrounding the *deditio*. The behaviour of Glabrio towards the Aetolians reflects this conclusion, and does not necessarily imply that he was excessively violent or belligerent. Polybius' interpretation of this episode as a linguistic misunderstanding was intended to highlight for his readers the meaning of *deditio*. He went to lengths to illustrate to his audience of soldier-politicians the implications of *deditio* and the potential outcomes, and so presented this diplomatic breakdown in this way in order to highlight the significance of understanding the culturally specific diplomatic mechanisms of opposing and allied foreign powers. He also characteristically selected the Aetolians as a negative *exemplum* of diplomatic behaviour, highlighting the irrationality of their actions and because of this, their subsequent defeat. Finally, Polybius' interpretation of this as a linguistic misunderstanding allowed him to claim a superior understanding of diplomatic mechanisms to that of the characters in the narrative. In this way, he presented himself as the ideal politician who stood between the Romans and the Greeks, and therefore the most authoritative teacher and historian.

## Chapter Eight: Case Study III - Polybius and the Causes of the Achaean War in 146 B.C.E

Polybius' self-constructed image determined how he interpreted the events that led to the Achaean War, with this as the culmination of his didactic purpose in the *Histories*. There were two claims made by Polybius in his account of the Achaean War that cannot be confirmed by his own historical narrative. First, is Polybius' claim that the Romans did not intend to dissolve the Achaean League in 147, despite his explicit inclusion of such demands. The second, was his claim that this war was caused by the corrupt demagogues of the Achaean League. The disparity between Polybius' claims and his narrative account suggests that he had an agenda in presenting Roman motivations and the war in this way. The Achaean War provided multiple didactic platforms for Polybius, which caused him to prioritise his political lessons to his audience of soldier-politicians, over his concern to be historically accurate.

There was also an emotional element to Polybius' presentation of this war, that served to emphasise the didactic purpose for his readers. This emotion was a consciously used rhetorical device that enhanced the significance of the narrative, particularly as Polybius was expected to show patriotic emotion over this event.<sup>1</sup> The tragedy of the Achaean War was underlined for the audience because of its complete irrationality, an emotion Polybius usually attributed to those he considered as lesser beings, for example, the mob, women, mercenaries, and barbarians.<sup>2</sup> Many of Polybius' didactic lessons on the ideal statesman focused on the importance of rationality, but he portrays the corrupt leaders of the Achaean League as examples of the worst kind of statesmen. Their folly led to the end of Achaean

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<sup>1</sup> For discussion on this, see section 4.5.

<sup>2</sup> For references see chapter four n. 75.

independence and the destruction of Corinth, which according to Polybius' depiction, was the worst disaster to ever occur in Greece.<sup>3</sup>

This third case study will begin by discussing the magnitude Polybius attributed to this war, and how he consciously sought to emphasise the significance of this war, and therefore, the importance of his didactic purpose. The diplomatic relationship between the Romans and the Greeks will then be discussed in order to adequately establish the tone of their relationship at this point, which is significant in assessing the embassies of 147. Subsequently, this chapter will argue that there is no evidence that supports Polybius' first claim that the Romans did not intend to dissolve the Achaean League in 147, and on the contrary, this action seems to have been a culmination of previous diplomatic failures. Lastly, I will look at Polybius' second claim in his narrative of this war and argue that although the Achaean demagogues held some accountability for this war, Polybius exaggerated it in order to emphasise his didactic purpose. This also led him to downplay the role the Romans had in the outbreak of the war.

### **1) The great disaster of the Achaean War**

Polybius went to lengths to stress the Achaean War as the greatest disaster that ever happened to Greece and compared it to many previous calamities he defined as misfortunes, undeserving of the title *ατυχία*.<sup>4</sup> The prominence of Polybius' claim that the Achaean War was a bigger disaster than there had ever been before, was intended to heighten the emotion and importance of this event in order to emphasise his didactic purpose. Polybius spent the first three chapters of book thirty-eight emphasising the tragedy of this war compared to all of those that had come before it, a tactic clearly intended to make this war stand out from the rest. Polybius' emotional narrative also sought to consciously heighten the significance of this episode, although it was in accordance with Polybius' accepted boundaries and

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<sup>3</sup> Polyb. 38.1-3.

<sup>4</sup> See section 4.5 for discussion on the difference between *ατυχία* and *συμφορά*.

expected as part of his patriotic outlook. Polybius' emphasis on this disaster as man-made also made his didactic lesson crucial to his audience of soldier-politicians by using it to provide an example of bad statesmanship and the consequences such folly caused.

As a way of measuring the level of the disaster compared to others, Polybius introduced the concept of blame as a prerequisite for those events that could be considered disasters, but only when those at fault had suffered defeat through their own folly. For example, blame was not placed on the foolishness of the Mantineans when they were forced to evacuate their city, but rather on their Spartan oppressors.<sup>5</sup> Likewise, Polybius used the example of the destruction of a Theban city by Alexander to illustrate the same point.<sup>6</sup> This was seen as undeserved misfortune, which often led to repentance by the dominant power and recovery of the defeated.<sup>7</sup> The emphasis here was unjustifiable action by a dominant power, and so the results were not truly disastrous, only undeserved.<sup>8</sup>

Polybius claimed that self-inflicted disasters were the most tragic:

For we should consider that all states or individuals who meet with exceptional calamities are unfortunate, but that those whose own folly brings reproach on them suffer disaster.<sup>9</sup>

Polybius categorised the Achaean War and the destruction of Corinth as a

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<sup>5</sup> Polybius claimed this was public opinion, but gave no other evidence: 'but every one in this case blamed the Spartans, and not the Mantineans for their un wisdom' – 'ἀλλὰ πάντες ἐπὶ τούτοις οὐ τὴν τῶν Μαντινέων ἀβουλίαν, ἀλλὰ τὴν Λακεδαιμονίων ὠνείδιζον': 38.2.12.

<sup>6</sup> Polyb. 28.2.13-14: 'but then everyone pitied the Thebans for the cruel and unjust treatment they suffered, and no one attempted to justify this act of Alexander' – 'ἀλλὰ τότε πάντες ἠλέουν μὲν τοὺς Θεβαίους ὡς ἄδικα καὶ δεινὰ πεπονθότας, διεδικαίου δὲ τὴν πράξιν ταύτην οὐδεὶς Ἀλεξάνδρου.'

<sup>7</sup> Polybius claimed: 'For the compassion of others is no small help to those who have suffered undeserved misfortune, and we often see that general sympathy is attended by a change of Fortune and that those in power themselves repent of their conduct and repair the calamity that they had unjustifiably inflicted' – 'ὁ γὰρ παρὰ τῶν ἐκτὸς ἔλεος οὐ μικρὸν ἐπίχειρόν ἐστι τοῖς ἀδικῶς ἀκληροῦσιν, εἴ γε πολλακίς ἰδεῖν ἔστιν ἅμα ταῖς τῶν πολλῶν ὀρμαῖς καὶ τὴν τύχην μεταβαλλομένην καὶ τοὺς κρατοῦντας αὐτοὺς μεταμελομένους καὶ διορθουμένους τὰς τῶν παραλόγως ἡτυχηκότων περιπετείας': 38.3.2.

<sup>8</sup> Polybius also mentioned Chalcis and Corinth by name, but generally referred to cities that were oppressed by a larger power and were 'victims of misfortune'. However, these were not enduring disasters, but conditional to time and space: 38.3.3.

<sup>9</sup> Polyb. 38.3.7.

disaster both 'disgraceful (ἐπονείδιστος) and discreditable (αἰσχρός)' and was the result of their 'faithlessness (ἀπιστία) and cowardice (ἀνανδρία).'<sup>10</sup> The loss of honour that resulted from their own folly is the reason Polybius classified this as the greatest disaster to ever befall Greece.<sup>11</sup>

Polybius attributed the blame for this war in part to the Achaean people who were mistaken in their attitude and failed to preserve Achaean honour. However, the real villains were the leaders of the Achaeans whose mistakes, Polybius claimed, were the reason for the disaster of the Achaean War.<sup>12</sup> There was no qualification attached to these mistakes, although the remaining sections of Polybius' narrative indicate that this referred to their anti-Roman policies. He claimed that the Achaean leaders Critolaus and Diaeus misunderstood the intentions of the Romans, and in their arrogance incited the people to revolt against their 'oppressors.'<sup>13</sup> Gruen claimed that Polybius' inability to objectively search for reasons led him to blame personal corruption and what he saw as the only other possible explanation - the insanity of the whole populace.<sup>14</sup> However, these events caused Polybius to extend his *Histories*, so it was doubtful that he would have done so had he been unable to understand the events, and more significantly, if they had not been of any use to his readers.

Polybius was aware that he would receive criticism for the animosity with which he described the Achaean leaders in this episode, particularly from those who thought his priority should have been to gloss over Achaean errors. He claimed:

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<sup>10</sup> Polyb. 38.3.8-9. Polybius listed those who were involved in the war, which included all of the Peloponnese except Laconia. This was a general statement made by Polybius about the 'common misfortune' of the Peloponnese at the time, so the inclusion of Macedonia is identified as a reference to the revolt of Andriscus in 148. The inclusion of Macedonia in this sentence is curious, particularly as all others mentioned were identified as involved directly in the war with the Romans: Polyb. 38.3.10-11. For evidence of their involvement and the fragmented nature of the passage see: Walbank (1979a) 688.

<sup>11</sup> Polyb.38.3.8.

<sup>12</sup> Polyb. 38.3.13.

<sup>13</sup> Polyb. 38.10.8.

<sup>14</sup> Gruen (1976) 48, 53-66; see also Harris (1979) 240-244; Walbank (1979a) 300; Gruen (1984) 520-521.

In times of danger it is true those who are Greek should help the Greeks in every way, by active support, by cloaking faults and by trying to appease the anger of the ruling power; as I myself actually did at the time of the occurrences; but the literary record of the events meant for posterity should be kept free from any taint of falsehood, so that instead of the ears of readers being agreeably tickled for the present, their minds may be reformed in order to avoid their falling more than once into the same errors.<sup>15</sup>

As has already been discussed, patriotic bias was an accepted aspect of ancient historiography.<sup>16</sup> In this instance, Polybius claims that the didactic lesson to be learned from this episode is more important than his patriotic duties, indicating the importance of this episode didactically. For Polybius the most important consideration in this instance is the lesson he has to impart to his audience on the duties of the statesman, with the core of his animosity going towards the Achaeans due to this oversight by its leadership. The Achaean War and the consequent destruction of Corinth was the fault of irrational statesmen who did not realise that their duty was to cooperate with the larger power and demonstrate loyalty to them, while also seeking to preserve as much independence as possible.<sup>17</sup>

However, there is an awkwardness to Polybius' portrayal of the Achaean War and his attempt to place blame on the demagogic leaders who corrupted the whole and incited them into a frenzy of anti-Roman sentiment. Gruen referred to Polybius' allocation of blame as 'tortured and unconvincing', claiming it was a failed attempt to rationalise events.<sup>18</sup> This clumsiness gave

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<sup>15</sup> Polyb. 38.4.7-8: 'κατὰ μὲν γὰρ τοὺς τῶν περιστάσεων καιροὺς καθήκει βοηθεῖν τοὺς Ἕλληνας ὄντας τοῖς Ἕλλησι κατὰ πάντα τρόπον, τὰ μὲν ἀμύνοντας, τὰ δὲ περιστέλλοντας, τὰ δὲ παραιτούμενους τὴν τῶν κρατούντων ὀργήν· ὅπερ ἡμεῖς ἐπ' αὐτῶν τῶν πραγμάτων ἐποιήσαμεν ἀληθινῶς· τὴν <δ> ὑπὲρ τῶν γεγονότων τοῖς ἐπιγινομένοις διὰ τῶν ὑπομημάτων παράδοσιν ἀμιγῆ παντὸς ψεύδους ἀπολείπεσθαι χάριν τοῦ μὴ ταῖς ἀκοαῖς τέρπεσθαι κατὰ τὸ παρὸν τοὺς ἀναγινώσκοντας, ἀλλὰ ταῖς ψυχαῖς διορθοῦσθαι πρὸς τὸ μὴ πλεονακίς ἐν τοῖς αὐτοῖς διασφάλλεσθαι.'

<sup>16</sup> See section 1.2 and 3.1.

<sup>17</sup> For discussion on this didactic lesson see section 5.4. For the destruction of Corinth see: Paus. 7.15.1, 16; Zonar. 9.31; cf. Polyb. 39.2; Cic. *Leg. Man.* 11; *Off.* 1.35; Livy, *Per.* 52; Strab. 8.6.23; Flor. 1.32.4-7; *De Vir. Ill.* 60.1-3; Oros. 5.3.5-7.

<sup>18</sup> Gruen (1976) 47.

the appearance of dishonesty in the narrative, which was further expounded by the absence of any supporting evidence in the *Histories*. In this case, Polybius may have realised his failure to establish a believable cause to this war. Gruen argued that this recognition was the reason for the claim that the Achaeans had been mystically affected, in this case by an evil spell.<sup>19</sup> He claimed that Polybius abandoned his attempts to justify the actions of the Romans, and instead simply sought to explain this war by seeking fault with the corrupt demagogues as an inadequate afterthought.<sup>20</sup> There is no indication of this in the *Histories*, although it may be true that Polybius saw weakness in his causal explanation. However, the aim of this portrayal of the Achaean War was not historical accuracy, but rather the didactic lessons that it illustrated for his readers. This didactic purpose explains Polybius' attempt to blame the Achaean leaders. He portrayed the Achaean leaders as the worst possible kind of statesmen, and blamed them for the war in order to reemphasise for his readers the importance of his didactic lessons.

## 2) The alliance between the Achaean League and Rome

The validity of the demand given by the Romans by the first embassy of 147 can in part be measured by the tone of the previous relationship between the Romans and the Achaean League. In his narrative of the Achaean War, Polybius claimed that the Romans regarded the Achaeans as 'the most loyal of the Greek powers.'<sup>21</sup> This assertion was intended to belie the possibility that the Romans had intended to dissolve the Achaean League through their decree that demanded the separation of the Lacedaemonians,

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<sup>19</sup> Gruen referred here to Polybius 38.16.7: 'πάντα δ' ἦν πλήρη παρηλλαγμένης φαρμακείας.' Gruen paraphrased this as 'the whole country was afflicted by an evil spell,' while Paton translated it as 'the whole country in fact was visited by an unparalleled attack of mental disturbance.' Gruen's translation of φαρμακείας as 'spell' seems to fit Polybius' context better than Paton's 'mental disturbance', which does not convey the mysticism evident in Polybius' narrative: Gruen (1976) 47. For a similar causal explanation see: Polyb. 36.17.1-15.

<sup>20</sup> Gruen (1976) 48.

<sup>21</sup> Polyb. 38.9.8: 'πιστὸν μάλιστα τῶν Ἑλληνικῶν.'

Corinth, Argos, Heracleia by Mount Oeta, and Arcadian Orchomenus.<sup>22</sup> This section will look at the beginning of their association and discuss the date of their official treaty of alliance, with the implications this posed for the demands of 147.

The ambiguity of the relationship between the Romans and the Achaeans is further complicated by the archaic machinery of diplomacy in the ancient world. The Romans had no consistent diplomatic processes such as we do in the modern world, and so had no official mechanism for maintaining peaceful relations or consistent foreign policy. Because such interaction between foreign powers usually only came at the point of impending conflict or dispute, the ensuing diplomacy was often harsh and demanding, exacerbating the tension between the opposing parties.<sup>23</sup> The archaic mechanisms of ancient diplomacy mean it is difficult to decipher the terms of the relationships Rome had with her allies, because they only contacted them when they needed something and otherwise seemed to avoid direct involvement whenever possible.<sup>24</sup> This certainly applied to the Roman embassies to the Achaean League in 147, although the tone of previous interaction between the two does provide some indication of the Roman motives for their demands.

In 198 during the Second Macedonian War the Achaeans deserted their long-standing alliance with Macedonia and joined the Roman cause.<sup>25</sup> Livy gives us the most comprehensive evidence of this in his narrative of the *synkletos* where this decision was reached.<sup>26</sup> If we can rely on the account of

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<sup>22</sup> Paus. 7.14.1-3; Livy, *Per.* 51-52; Flor. 1.32.4-7; Cass. Dio, *Fr.* 21.72.1; Just. *Epit.* 34.1.5; cf. Polyb. 38.9.1-3, 6-8.

<sup>23</sup> Eckstein claimed that the harsh nature of ancient diplomacy was a factor that encouraged continuous warfare in the Mediterranean. The limited and *ad hoc* interaction between states forced the elite of each people to cast the worst possible motives on their competitors within the anarchic system, leading to an atmosphere of uncertainty and competition. His argument that the fragile nature of ancient political systems influenced the forms of interaction between states and the need to constantly focus on self-preservation, also supports the tendency for last minute diplomatic approaches to ancient conflict: (2008) 11-14.

<sup>24</sup> Rome's imperial intentions in Greece have been discussed by many modern authors. For example see Harris (1979); North (1981); Gruen (1984); Badian (1984); Kallet-Marx (1995); Eckstein (2008).

<sup>25</sup> Polyb. 18.13; App. *Mac.* 7; Livy 32.20-23.3; Plut. *Flam.* 5.3; Paus. 7.8.1-2, Zonar. 9.16

<sup>26</sup> A *synkletos* was a special meeting attended by both the Achaean council and assembly.



Livy, the original decision to forsake Macedonia by the Achaeans was motivated by fear.<sup>27</sup> The question of an alliance with Rome was forced upon the Achaeans by the Roman consul Flamininus, who was on the verge of attacking Corinth and decided it was time the Achaeans declared their loyalties openly.<sup>28</sup> The Achaeans had, until this point, been neutral in the Roman war with Philip and had been preoccupied with King Nabis of Sparta, although still firmly on the side of the Macedonians. Burton claims that the Roman instigation of this alliance was motivated by Roman self-interest, and was the basis upon which the Romans had made other alliances in this period.<sup>29</sup>

The speech of Aristaenus in this instance showed that the choice faced by the Achaeans was not one of neutrality or war, but rather which side they stood on in the conflict.<sup>30</sup> The Achaeans would no longer be allowed to continue their war with Nabis independent of the larger war in Greece, but had to state their loyalty either to the Macedonians or the Romans.<sup>31</sup>

Now men have crossed the sea with mighty fleets and armies, to affirm your claims to liberty without trouble or danger on your

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<sup>27</sup> Eckstein argued that the speech from Aristaenus in this *synkletos* found in Livy, which suggested fear as a motivation for their alliance with Rome, was based on the account of Polybius. Eckstein argued this because of the knowledge of Greek affairs demonstrated in this speech, as well as the parallel between the main argument in Aristaenus' speech included in Livy (32.20-21) and the defence of it extant in Polybius (18.13). However, the reliability of Polybius is still questionable, particularly due to the political leanings of Aristaenus: (1987a) 143; see also Burton (2012) 102-103, 174.

<sup>28</sup> Livy 32.19.1-4.

<sup>29</sup> For example with Camertes, the Aetolians, and Syphax, although Burton also claimed in these instances there was a moral appeal to the benefits of *amicitia*. Although this specific form of appeal was absent in the Roman appeal to the Achaeans in 198, moral considerations were present in Livy's account of the meeting, although primarily by members of the League not the Romans: (2012) 88-105.

<sup>30</sup> Eckstein proposed that Aristaenus had unofficial contact with Flamininus prior to this meeting, and encouraged him to put this proposal to the Achaeans. This was based on Livy's claim that Flamininus knew (presumably from previous contact) that Aristaenus looked favourably upon alliance with Rome, possibly in reaction to the threat of surrounding Roman forces: Eckstein (1987a) 142 and n. 20. This is preferable to Aymard's similar argument on the basis of Flamininus' philhellenism, an argument that has been thoroughly refuted by both Eckstein and Gruen: Aymard (1938) 79 n. 48; Eckstein (1976) 119-126; (1987b) 272-274; Gruen (1984) 207-208.

<sup>31</sup> The Achaeans were involved in a war against Nabis of Sparta and had, until this point, dodged Philip's request for military aid: Livy 31.25.4-11; 32.21.10-11.

part. If you reject them as allies, you are scarcely sane; but as either allies or enemies you must have them.<sup>32</sup>

The need for the Achaeans to make a definitive choice must be in response to the Roman demands, since the Macedonian ambassador's only demand according to Livy was that they remain neutral in the war. Although the speech from the Roman ambassador is missing, Aristaenus' speech was obviously in response to their demands. Aristaenus himself admitted this and urged his fellow Achaeans to consider the speeches of the previous day as opinions on the debate rather than attempts at persuasion.<sup>33</sup> He claimed:

The Romans, the Rhodians and Attalus ask for our alliance and friendship, and in the war which they are waging with Philip they think it right that we should assist them.<sup>34</sup>

The alliance proposed appears as one built on equality and mutual need, where they thought it only right that the Achaeans would join their campaign to preserve the rights of Greece.<sup>35</sup> Burton points out there were both moral and practical considerations emphasised in this deliberation, evident in the speech of Aristaenus, but also likely in the speeches of the Athenians and the Roman envoys.<sup>36</sup> Pausanias later claimed that the Achaeans realised that the Romans were motivated by their intentions to impose their rule, not only on the Achaeans, but the rest of Greece; that is, to replace Philip and the

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<sup>32</sup> Livy 32.21.36-7.

<sup>33</sup> Livy 32.21.2-3: '*Orationes legatorum hesterno die ut pro sententiis dictas percenseamus, perinde ac non postulaverint, quae e re sua essent, sed suaserint quae nobis censerent utilia esse.*'

<sup>34</sup> Livy 32.21.4-5. Here *aequum* is translated as 'right' instead of Sage's translation of 'proper.' The connotations of these words in the sentence are different, with 'right' reflecting the implications of justice evident in *aequum*.

<sup>35</sup> Badian argued that Flamininus would not have followed through with this threat and attacked the Achaeans, since this would have made further overtures to them impossible. However, as Eckstein rightly points out, Flamininus was more concerned with being victorious over Philip than diplomacy. Aristaenus may also have realised this when he theorised that Philip would not be able to protect them against both Nabis and the Romans: Livy 32.21.9; see also Briscoe (1973) 206. More importantly, L. Flamininus' siege of Leucas, after he failed to lure the people of Leucas into alliance with Rome, indicated a willingness to attack those who refused Roman diplomatic advances: Livy 33.17.5-14; see also Eckstein (1976) 141. Both Lucius and Titus Flamininus were willing to go to lengths to win the war against Philip, with both of them gaining notoriety for their brutal behaviour in Greece: Paus. 7.8.1; App. *Mac.* 7; see also Badian (1970) 40; Eckstein (1976) 140; (2008) 281.

<sup>36</sup> Burton (2012) 103-105.

Macedonians as the dominant power in Greece.<sup>37</sup> Although, this is clearly a remark that was made in hindsight.

Flamininus dangled to prospect of Corinth in front of the Achaeans as enticement.<sup>38</sup> However, the tension of this difficult political decision was evident in the division of votes by the *damiorgoi* in the *synkletos*.<sup>39</sup> Five voted to propose an alliance with Rome to the assembly for a vote, while the other five argued it was illegal to do so in light of the alliance with Philip V of Macedon.<sup>40</sup> In Livy's account Pisia of Pellene forced his son Memnon who was a *damiorgoi* to change his vote, swearing to kill his son before he would let him endanger the League, winning his son over with this threat of filicide.<sup>41</sup> The vote was put to the assembly, who voted in favour of alliance with the Romans. However, there were still major divisions on this decision, with

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<sup>37</sup> Paus. 7.8.2. As Walbank pointed out, the Achaean League had no hope of opposing Rome militarily: (1967) 158.

<sup>38</sup> Livy 32.19.4-5. However, there is no mention of this inducement to change sides during the speech of Aristaenus or the deliberations at Sicyon. This seems like an oversight, since an acquisition like Corinth was clearly a serious territorial enticement for the League and must have factored into the discussion. The offer from Flamininus on the eve of his attack on Corinth would have given the decision a sense of urgency, and may in part explain why the Achaeans found the alliance with Rome preferable over that with Philip. According to Livy, it was Flamininus' intention from the beginning to offer Corinth as inducement to join the Romans in the war against Philip. Further proof that the Achaeans were promised Corinth in return for their loyalty, is their consistent claim to it in the historical record after this point: at Nicaea: Polyb. 18.2.5; Livy 32.33.7: in Rome: Livy 32.37.3. Flamininus also acknowledged his promise after the war with the *decem legati*: Polyb. 18.45.12. Eckstein argues that the absence of this offer in Livy's account of the speech of Aristaenus was due to Polybius' conscious decision to emphasise Achaean fear as the main motivator to his readers in his account. According to Eckstein, Polybius did this in order to provide a defence of Aristaenus and the League for their decision against those that would criticise them – namely, Philip V and the Aetolians: Eckstein (1987a) 148-49.

<sup>39</sup> Livy 32.22.3. The difficulties of this decision were evidently lasting in the Achaean memory, shown by the mention of these deliberations by Archon the Achaean prior to the Third Macedonian War. In this speech, again included by Livy, Archon denies that fear of the Romans influenced their judgement during deliberations, rather their previous alliance with the Macedonians was the reason for such long deliberations: Livy 41.24.13-15. The phrase '*nihil metus praesens ab Romanis sententias nostras inclinaret*' – 'grant that no immediate fear of the Romans affected our judgment' is meant to be ironic. The rest of the speech implied exactly this: Eckstein (1987a) 146 n. 50.

<sup>40</sup> The Achaean alliance with Macedonia had recently been renewed, and so many of the Achaeans thought it unlawful to consider alliance with the Romans in this assembly. At this point Philip also restored to the Achaeans Orchomenus, Heraea, and Tripylia, and gave Aliphera to Megalopolis in order to strengthen the alliance: Livy 32.5.4-5

<sup>41</sup> Livy 32.22.5-8. The shadow of foreboding evident in this story implied that it was originally from Polybius, although potentially made more emotive by Livy.

Argos, Dyme, and Megalopolis refusing to cast their vote and walking out of the assembly.<sup>42</sup>

In 198 when the Achaeans decided to ally themselves with the Romans, there was no formal agreement made, although the events of the following years make it clear that the Achaean League expected their association to be formalised. Livy claimed the alliance with Rome was postponed until it could be ratified by the Roman people in accordance with Roman tradition.<sup>43</sup> However, the senate continued to show reluctance after the Second Macedonian War ended to formalise their alliance with the Achaeans, and referred it to the post-war commissioners in Greece to consider. According to Polybius, this was the result of territorial disputes between the Achaeans and other Roman allies, but Gruen argued that the Romans had no intention of binding themselves to the Achaeans despite the beliefs of the League.<sup>44</sup>

There is no historical record that reports when the treaty between the Achaean League and the Romans was formalised, although we are informed of its renewal in 183.<sup>45</sup> There is some argument for its formation in 196 when Flamininus decreed the freedom of the Greeks, in effect making the Romans the guardians of Greece. However, the vague reference by Appian to the Greeks becoming allies of the Roman people is not enough evidence to assume that the Achaeans were formally allied to the Romans at this point.<sup>46</sup>

There is no mention of a treaty between the Achaeans and the Romans in Livy's account of the war with Nabis in 195. If a formal treaty had been concluded, it is reasonable to expect Livy to have mentioned it in his account of the war, particularly due to the Achaean involvement in the council

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<sup>42</sup> Livy 32.22.9-12. Argos (the most powerful city in the League) ceded from the League soon after and went over to Philip V: Livy 32.25.1-11.

<sup>43</sup> Livy 32.23.1-3.

<sup>44</sup> Pausanias has a vague claim to the existence of an alliance after the Isthmian proclamation of 196, but as Badian rightly pointed out there is little to indicate this was a formal treaty: Polyb. 18.42.6-8; App. *Mac.* 9.4; Gruen (1984) 443; Badian (1952) 76-77.

<sup>45</sup> Polyb. 23.4.12.

<sup>46</sup> Holleaux championed this date as the beginning of the formal alliance, however Badian has argued convincingly against it: Holleaux (1921) 400; Badian (1952) 76-77.

at Corinth that decided to declare war on Nabis.<sup>47</sup> The discussion whether to go to war was focused on Nabis' capture of Argos, which rightfully belonged to the Achaeans after the Second Macedonian War.<sup>48</sup> This would have provided the Romans with a convenient pretext for war, assuming of course that they were allied with the Achaeans. The failure of both Flamininus and Aristaenus, who were present at the negotiations, to mention a formal treaty must imply that there was not yet a formal tie between Rome and the League.<sup>49</sup> There is again no mention of an alliance when war broke out again with Nabis in 192. As Badian argued, this would have been a logical place for Livy to mention any existing alliance since there would have been a clear reason for war once Nabis entered Achaean territory.<sup>50</sup> The Achaeans do seem somewhat conscious of Roman interest in their affairs at this point and they seek to ascertain Roman opinion before formally declaring war on Nabis; however, the immediate threat on their territory would have induced them to do this anyway.<sup>51</sup>

There is also little evidence that points to a formal treaty between the Achaeans and the Romans during the war with Antiochus in 192. There is, instead, strong evidence for the opposite. At the council in Aegium prior to the war the representative of Antiochus 'demanded nothing of the Achaeans by which their loyalty to the Romans, who had priority as allies and friends, would be diminished.'<sup>52</sup> The mention of the Romans as allies and friends does not signify a formal alliance, but instead points to their informal friendship.<sup>53</sup> This is highlighted again by Antiochus' ambassador when he asks the Achaeans to

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<sup>47</sup> Livy 34.24.

<sup>48</sup> Livy 34.22.6-24.7.

<sup>49</sup> Badian (1952) 77.

<sup>50</sup> Livy 35.25.2; Badian (1952) 77. In this instance, the Achaeans also ignored the advice of the Romans and went to war with Nabis without waiting for the Roman response. Even though the leadership of Philopoemen would have encouraged independence from Rome, disobeying a direct Roman communication does not seem like the action of those who were restricted by a new alliance with the Romans – although, such disobedience by the Achaeans was not unheard of: Leenen (2011) 1-9.

<sup>51</sup> The Achaeans also sent a letter to Flamininus asking advice. He counselled them to await the return of their embassy from Rome: Livy 35.25.2-12.

<sup>52</sup> Livy 35.48.8-9: '*nihil postulare ab Achaëis, in quo fides eorum adversus Romanos, priores socios atque amicos, laedatur.*'

<sup>53</sup> There is contention over whether the Achaean League declared war on Antiochus before or after the Romans became involved: Baronowski (1982) 220-221.

stay neutral in the coming war.<sup>54</sup> The assumption that the Achaeans could stay neutral if they wished implies a lack of a formal alliance with the Romans. If they were at this point formally allied to Rome, their participation in the war would be unquestioned, making the appeal of the Seleucid ambassadors redundant.

Flamininus' speech at this meeting again reiterates that participation in this war for the Achaeans was a choice, although their inclusion on the Roman side is ensured with a threat that they would become the victor's spoils if they remained neutral.<sup>55</sup> There was again no mention of a treaty of alliance during this council, although Holleaux explained this by arguing that the Achaeans were irritable during a crisis and would not have appreciated a reminder of their treaty negotiations.<sup>56</sup> Badian succeeds in discrediting this argument by pointing out that even though one party may be irritated by mention of their treaty obligations, that rarely stops the other party from mentioning them.<sup>57</sup> It seems impossible that the Romans would have failed to mention a treaty obligation if the Achaeans in fact had one. It is interesting however, that despite no formal obligation to do so, the Achaeans undertook the war with Antiochus *because* of the Romans.<sup>58</sup>

The first undisputed evidence of a formal alliance between the Romans and the Achaeans is in 183 when Polybius claimed the Achaeans asked for its renewal during an embassy to Rome.<sup>59</sup> Apart from this claim, we have no clear reference to a formal treaty between the Romans and the Achaeans, an ambiguity that is added to by the interaction between both parties at this time. Prior to this there are two mentions of the treaty in Livy, one in 188 and one in 184. The brief mention by Lycortas to a treaty in 188 is extremely vague,

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<sup>54</sup> Livy 35.48.9-10.

<sup>55</sup> Livy 35.49.13.

<sup>56</sup> Holleaux (1921) 406. Badian argued that the Achaeans did not doubt Roman intentions in this war, so their responsibilities had they been formal allies, would have come into play; Livy 35.50.2: Badian (1952) 77-78.

<sup>57</sup> Badian (1952) 77-78.

<sup>58</sup> The Achaeans, according to Livy, declared war on Antiochus on the grounds that they had the same friends and enemies as the Roman people, acting presumably the way an ally would despite there being no evidence that they were formally allied: Livy 35.49.

<sup>59</sup> Polyb. 23.4.

leading Badian to convincingly argue it offers no clear conclusions about a formal treaty between the Romans and the Achaean League.<sup>60</sup> The second instance in 184 is again put into the mouth of Lycortas when he referred directly to a treaty between the Romans and the Achaeans, also claiming that it was *aequum* although there was no mention of the date such an agreement was made.<sup>61</sup>

From this evidence, the treaty between Achaea and Rome can be estimated to have been formalised between 191 and 184, although following the analysis of Badian, these dates can be narrowed further to between 191 and 188. He pointed to Polybius' discussion of the political merits of Philopoemen and Aristaenus in book twenty-four, and the reference to Philopoemen acting within the terms of the Achaean alliance with Rome. Badian used Polybius' time parameters in the same passage to further define the possible date, stated by Polybius to be between the wars with Philip and Antiochus – so 197 and 191.<sup>62</sup> Philopoemen's absence from Greece until 193 further defines these parameters, so the official treaty between the Romans and the Achaean League was probably signed between 193 and 191.<sup>63</sup>

Badian theorises that the treaty between the Romans and the Achaeans was concluded soon after the Achaeans declared themselves by taking sides with the Romans in the war with Antiochus in November 192. He sees the treaty as a type of reward for loyalty from the Achaeans, and there is no logical reason to disagree with his assertions.<sup>64</sup> Achaean behaviour after late spring 191 was increasingly independent, indicating less concern to be in line with Roman politics, so it could very well indicate a new security in their

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<sup>60</sup> Livy 38.32.8; Badian (1952) 78.

<sup>61</sup> Livy 39.35.5-37.21. Gruen attempted to reconstruct the terms of this treaty: (1984) 34-38. However, the behaviour of the Achaeans implied they were unrestricted in their policies, shown by their embassies to Attalus and Ptolemy VI in 169: Polyb. 28.12.8-9. It seems likely, that the only requirement of this treaty that can be reasonably concluded is that it was *aequum*, evidenced not only by Lycortas' claim, but also the behaviour of the Achaeans. However, it is noticeable that there were limited appeals to the strictures specified by the treaty in Roman-Achaean interaction: Burton (2011) 181-186.

<sup>62</sup> Polyb. 24.13; Badian (1952) 79.

<sup>63</sup> Aymard (1938) 303.

<sup>64</sup> Badian (1952) 79-80. Badian used the debate between Philopoemen and Aristaenus recorded in Polybius as evidence for a treaty formed between November 192 and late spring 191. See also chapter five n. 42 and 43.

relationship with the Romans.<sup>65</sup> This formalised alliance did not seem to restrict Achaean behaviour, with them acting on many occasions as they saw fit, irrespective of Roman wishes.<sup>66</sup> But the Romans also seemed to consider their role in this alliance as at least consultative, with Polybius stating after his account of the Achaean defiance of their war with Messene in 182:

This made it patent to every one that so far from shirking and neglecting less important items of foreign affairs, they were on the contrary displeased if all matters were not submitted to them and if all was not done in accordance with their decision.<sup>67</sup>

The Romans repeatedly reproached the Achaeans for their lack of consultation, perhaps indicating that the expectations of both parties in this alliance were somewhat incompatible.<sup>68</sup> This alliance should be viewed in accordance with Eckstein's argument that the Romans did not need to be intimately involved with their smaller allies, but did require to be deferred to in light of their *dignitas* and *auctoritas*.<sup>69</sup> In addition to this, the Romans claimed they had given freedom to Messene and Sparta, so through these alliances, as Dmitriev claimed 'the Romans had an effective tool for interfering in the affairs of the League, or for provoking it into an open conflict if necessary.'<sup>70</sup>

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<sup>65</sup> See Livy 36.31-2, 35.7-12; Plut. *Flam.* 15-17; *Phil.* 17.4.

<sup>66</sup> For example in 185: Diod. 29.17; Paus. 7.8.6, 9.1-2; Polyb. 22.10.1-14, 12.5-10; in 182 (in defiance of the Roman settlement in 184): Livy 39.48.2-4; Paus. 7.9.5; Polyb. 23.4); Polyb. 23.17.5-18.2; in 181: Livy 40.20.2; Polyb. 24.2.2, 8.1-8; in 150/1: Paus. 7.12.4-5; in 149/8; Paus.7.12.9; and in 148: Paus. 7.13.1-5.

<sup>67</sup> Polyb. 23.17.4: 'ἐξ οὗ καταφανεῖς ἅπασιν ἐγενήθησαν ὅτι τοσοῦτον ἀπέχουσι τοῦ τὰ μὴ λίαν ἀναγκαῖα τῶν ἐκτὸς πραγμάτων ἀποτρίβεσθαι καὶ παροράν, ὡς τούναντίον καὶ δυσχεραίνουσι ἐπὶ τῶ μὴ πάντων τὴν ἀναφορὰν ἐφ' ἑαυτοῦς γίνεσθαι καὶ πάντα πράττεσθαι μετὰ τῆς αὐτῶν γνώμης.' See also: Eckstein (2008) 359.

<sup>68</sup> For examples see: in 191; Livy 36.31.8; Plut. *Flam.* 17.1; in 187: Polyb. 22.3.2-3; see also Polyb. 22.7.5-7; in 185: Diod. 29.17; Paus. 7.8.6, 9.1-2; Polyb. 22.10.1-14, 12.5-10; in 184: Livy 39.33.6-8, 36.3-5; Paus. 7.9.3; Polyb. 22.12.10. The disastrous treaty with the Aetolians in 211 may have made the Romans hesitant to make other treaties in Greece: *IG IX<sup>2</sup>.1.241*; *Schmitt, SdA.* 536. The Romans may also have learnt from the failure of their treaty with the Achaean League to deter defiant behaviour, reflected in the addition of the clause that required the Aetolians to preserve the *maiestas* of the Roman people in their treaty of 189: Livy 38.11.2; Polyb. 21.32.2-3.

<sup>69</sup> Eckstein (2008) 359-360.

<sup>70</sup> Dmitriev (2011) 315. Messene had surrendered to the Romans through a *deditio* in 191, and then been admitted by Flamininus into the Achaean League: Livy 36.31.1-9. For Sparta see: Polyb. 21.1.1; Livy 38.30-31. The status of Messene was unclear after its defeat by the Achaean League, and Spartan status changed a number of times between 200 and 146: for example, Messene: Polyb. 23.17.3-4; cf. 24.1.6-7; Livy 39.50.9; Paus. 8.51.8; Sparta: in 189: Livy 38.31.5-6, 32.5-10; in 185: Polyb. 22.10, 23.4.7; Paus. 7.8.6, 9.1; Diod. 29.17; in 184: Polyb. 23.4; Livy 39.48.2-4; Paus. 7.9; in 182: Polyb. 23.17.5-18.2; in 181: Polyb. 23.17-18; 24.1-2, 24.8-9; Livy 40.20.2; in 149/8: Paus.7.12.8-9, 13.1-5.



Burton argued that the interaction between the Romans and the Achaeans was 'governed by the dynamics of *amicitia* and the language of *fides*,' with the treaty representing only the public aspect of their relationship. In essence the significant factor of their relationship was based on their *amicitia*, which explained the flexible nature of their association.<sup>71</sup>

As I have argued elsewhere, after this formal alliance, there were different trends in the relationship between the Romans and the Achaeans.<sup>72</sup> Achaean behaviour became independent and belligerent in late spring and autumn 191 and, as Badian recognised, the Achaeans began to act as if they were still an independent state.<sup>73</sup> This heralded in a trend of behaviour, that lasted until 167, and was characterised by an effort on the part of the Achaeans to affirm their independence.<sup>74</sup> Gruen claimed the Roman failure to retaliate against Achaean defiance in this period, implied they 'remained aloof, out of cordiality or indifference.'<sup>75</sup> Even though evidence suggested that the Romans did not want to control the Achaeans as a subject state, they did try to enforce their superior role and get the deference they sought.<sup>76</sup> The Romans seemed hesitant in their interactions with the Achaeans, and tried many diplomatic tactics to try and get them to treat them with the respect they

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<sup>71</sup> Burton (2011) 181-186. Burton provides an alternative interpretation of Achaean-Roman interaction based on the flexibility of *amicitia*. He claimed 'the Romans, by virtue of bestowing the unrepayable *beneficium* of freedom on the Greek states, had become the entrenched superior partner in an asymmetrical friendship,' claiming that the Roman expectations of this relationship were 'at most such reciprocal acts as consulting the senate rather than acting unilaterally, not overtly threatening Rome's national security interests, speaking frankly and openly, and treating the Republic's representatives with the respect friends deserve': (2011) 209-217, 226-227.

<sup>72</sup> See Leenen (2011) 1-9. Prior to this alliance, between 197-191, the Achaean behaviour towards the Romans was tentative, although they did act once against direct Roman approval, but this was a clear issue of security: Livy 35.25.2-12.

<sup>73</sup> Badian (1952) 79-80. Eckstein claims the Greek states resumed their 'traditional expansionist policies' after the Roman evacuation in 194: (2008) 323-325.

<sup>74</sup> There are eight examples of Achaean acts of independence that led to Roman reprimands. For example: in 191: Livy 36.31.8; Plut. *Flam.* 17.1; in 187: Diod. 29.17; Polyb. 22.3.2-3; see also Polyb. 22.7.5-7; in 185: Diod. 29.17; Paus. 7.8.6, 9.1; Polyb. 22.10.1-4, 12.5-10; in 185/4: Livy 39.33.6-8; Paus. 7.9.1-2; Pol. 22.12.5-10; in 184: Livy 39.33.6-8, 36.3-5; Paus. 7.9.3; Polyb. 22.12.10; in 183: Livy 40.2.7; Polyb. 23.9.8-14; and twice in 181: Livy 40.20.2; Polyb. 24.2.2, 8.1-8 and Polyb. 24.10.6-8.

<sup>75</sup> Gruen (1976) 50-53.

<sup>76</sup> Eckstein (2008) 359-360. Deference is defined here as the kind of respectful submission given by a client to a patron; particularly in regard to foreign policy and conduct towards the Romans. However, this relationship should not be described as that between a patron and a client.

required, implying that their actions may have been tempered by their treaty terms with the League.<sup>77</sup>

The Romans, however, were becoming frustrated with their Greek allies, which culminated with the taking of Achaean detainees after the Third Macedonian War in 167.<sup>78</sup> This began a new trend of Achaean behaviour, which was characterised by deference, perhaps due to the continued presence of one-thousand of their men as detainees in Italy.<sup>79</sup> According to Pausanias, the Romans even entrusted their envoy in Greece, Gallus, to separate (ἀφείναι) as many states from the League as possible, although this is not corroborated by any other ancient sources.<sup>80</sup> Gruen referred to the Roman retention of the detainees as their 'trump card', while Polybius claimed the Romans retained them in order to force the League to comply with the pro-Roman policies of Callicrates and provide an example for the rest of the Greeks.<sup>81</sup>

This attitude of deference lasted until around 150, when the Achaean League became recognisably belligerent towards the Romans. It is possible that the release of the detainees in Italy around 150 heralded a new attitude towards Rome, since they had been a tangible reminder of the power of Rome, but only Zonaras implied a connection between their release and the Achaean War.<sup>82</sup> In addition, the pro-Roman politician Callicrates died in 149, which, if we believe Polybius' criticism of him, would have lessened the Romans' hold on the League.<sup>83</sup> Pausanias claimed the *strategos* of 150 was Diaeus who Polybius termed one of the corrupt leaders of the League that led them to war with Rome. According to Pausanias, Diaeus began his term as

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<sup>77</sup> For example: in 183 when the Romans took the advice of Q. Marcius Philippus: Polyb. 23.9.4-10, 9.12-14; Livy 40.2.7-8; when the Romans acted on the advice of Callicrates: Polyb. 24.8.7-10.14; 29.24.5-6; 30.13.9-11, 29, 32.8-12; and when they attempted to divide the League by approaching Elis and Messene separately: Livy 42.37.7-9. Ferrary interestingly claimed that in this period the Romans entrusted the responsibility of overlooking the execution of senatorial decrees made in Rome to those who had received it: (2009) 127-134.

<sup>78</sup> Livy 45.31.9-11; Paus. 7.10.7-11; Polyb. 30.13.6-11; Zonar. 9.31.

<sup>79</sup> In opposition to this, Dmitriev claims 'it is hard, however, to see anything new in Roman treatment of the Achaean League either before or after the war': (2011) 324, cf. 327.

<sup>80</sup> Paus. 7.11.1-3.

<sup>81</sup> Polyb. 30.32.8-12; Gruen (1976) 49.

<sup>82</sup> Zonar. 9.31; Polyb. 35.6; Plut. *Cat. Mai.* 9.2-3.

<sup>83</sup> Paus. 7.12.8.

*strategos* by giving way to corruption and bribery, almost immediately defying Roman directions.<sup>84</sup> Therefore, this change in the Achaean's attitude towards Rome seems likely to be due to a combination of these three factors: the release of the hostages in 150, the death of Callicrates, and the rise of corrupt anti-Roman politicians.

After 150, the relationship between the Achaean League and Rome steadily declined. From 150-146 their relationship drastically altered, with the League attempting to assert its autonomy from Rome, particularly on the question of Sparta.<sup>85</sup> But the Achaeans failed to realise that Rome's power had increased drastically after its victory over Perseus, and they were no longer willing to play diplomatic games with the League. Polybius recognised that the Romans were no longer willing to allow the Achaeans such leeway, claiming Diaeus and his colleague Critolaus acted on:

an entire and absolute misconception. For they imagined that the Romans, owing to their campaigns in Africa and Spain, were afraid of war with the Achaeans, and consequently tolerated everything and were ready to say anything.<sup>86</sup>

Polybius portrayed the behaviour of Diaeus, Critolaus and their corrupt political allies as irrational and irresponsible, claiming they did not understand Roman behaviour and provoked Rome into a war with the Achaean League.<sup>87</sup>

This was the political environment in which the Achaean War began, a far cry from the cordial diplomatic interactions of previous years. There is evidence in the *Histories* that the Romans had been tolerant of the Achaeans previous disregard for their authority, but as Polybius recognised, this tolerance had run cold. However, while Polybius claimed Diaeus and Critolaus were mistaken to tempt the Romans in one part of his analysis of this war, he

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<sup>84</sup> Paus. 7.8.5-6.

<sup>85</sup> Paus. 7.12.4-9.

<sup>86</sup> Polyb. 38.10.9-10: 'καθόλου δὲ καὶ συλλήβδην παρέπαιον τοῖς λογισμοῖς. ὑπέλαβον γὰρ τοὺς Ῥωμαίους διὰ τε τὰς ἐν τῇ Λιβύῃ καὶ τὰς κατὰ τὴν Ἰβηρίαν πράξεις δεδιότας τὸν ἀπὸ τῶν Ἀχαιῶν πόλεμον πᾶν ὑπομένειν καὶ πᾶσαν προίεσθαι φωνήν.'

<sup>87</sup> Eckstein (2008) 358. For the irrationality of war with Rome after 167 see: Schepens (1989) 326.

also portrayed the Romans as playing diplomatic games with the Achaeans by trying to scare them into compliance.<sup>88</sup>

### **3) Diplomatic interactions prior to the war: two Roman embassies to the Achaean League in 147**

The key to analysing Polybius' account of the outbreak of this war lies with two conflicting embassies sent by the Romans to the Achaeans in 147. The first embassy was an ultimatum sent by the senate that suggested they wanted to dissolve the Achaean League, but the second directly contradicted this, containing only a mild reprimand for the insubordinate behaviour of the Achaeans and no repetition of the previous demands. The intentions behind these senatorial demands are unfortunately lost, although Polybius did provide an explanation for such contradictions from the senate.<sup>89</sup> However, it seems incredible that the senate would be so inconsistent in their intentions towards the Achaeans that they would send two completely different messages in such close proximity. Nonetheless, according to the ancient sources, this was exactly what happened in 147.

This war seems to have been created out of confusion and irrationality. Gruen argued that it was caused by misunderstanding, with no rational cause or event that instigated the conflict.<sup>90</sup> However, he did not clarify the type of misunderstanding he thought this was, leaving a certain amount of ambiguity in his interpretation. The assumed strength of the alliance between the Romans and the Achaeans further complicates the outbreak of what Gruen termed a 'suicidal and ruinous war,' although the significance of these two senatorial embassies to the Achaean League cannot be underestimated.<sup>91</sup>

Ancient historians were also aware of the difficulty in explaining these two contradictory embassies. According to Polybius, these embassies from

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<sup>88</sup> Polyb. 38.9.6-8, 10.11-11.7.

<sup>89</sup> Polyb. 38.9.6-8.

<sup>90</sup> Gruen (1976) 69.

<sup>91</sup> Gruen (1976) 46.

the senate generated Achaean animosity and opened the way for the demagogues of the League to promote their anti-Roman sentiments. Polybius in particular attempted to justify the opposing nature of these two embassies, although his justification was unconvincing.<sup>92</sup> Polybius' account of the early events that led to the war is unfortunately lost. However, we have his account of the return of the first embassy to Rome, but unfortunately must use Pausanias to fill the narrative gaps.<sup>93</sup> In 149/8 both the Achaeans and the Spartans approached the senate to resolve a long-standing conflict over territorial boundaries.<sup>94</sup> The senate were unwilling to decide the issue immediately and promised to send an embassy to adjudicate on the conflict. However, neither the Spartan Menalcidas, nor the Achaean Diaeus, listened to the senate, both claiming the senate had decided in their favour - Diaeus claimed the Achaeans had complete control over Sparta, while Menalcidas claimed Sparta had been freed of the League.<sup>95</sup> In the summer of 148, the Achaeans went to war against Sparta, although it was only a brief campaign. Metellus sent a message to the Achaeans warning them to wait for the expected Roman embassy, but they ignored this first message, and only obeyed his second message asking them to stop the war because hostilities had already ceased.<sup>96</sup> Dmitriev has argued that the Roman defence of Sparta was the basis of their policy towards the Achaean League.<sup>97</sup> However, while the plight of Sparta was an immediate concern, the Romans also had wider concerns with the Achaean League as evidenced by their retention of the detainees for such an extended period.

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<sup>92</sup> Polyb. 38.9.6-8.

<sup>93</sup> Gruen viewed Pausanias as somewhat simple and muddled, discounting his historical worth. However, increasingly there are those who defend Pausanias' use as an ancient source: Gruen (1976) 46-69; Hutton (2005) 1-29.

<sup>94</sup> Paus. 7.12.4-8, 8-9. Dmitriev suggests the Spartan attempt to secede from the League in 150 was motivated by the publication of Gallus' senatorial directive to separate as many cities from the League as possible: Paus. 7.11.1-3; Dmitriev (2011) 335.

<sup>95</sup> Paus. 7.12.8-9. The senate's ambiguity in their answer to Diaeus and Menalcidas led them both to misunderstand the Roman decision on the status of Sparta. Derow argued they had decided in secret to fracture the League but would send *legati* to do this. Meanwhile, they issued the ambassadors with a reply Derow referred to as 'one of the masterpieces of ambiguity' he argued were characteristic of the senate in this period: Derow (1969) 59.

<sup>96</sup> Paus. 7.13.1-8.

<sup>97</sup> Dmitriev (2011) 336.

In 147 this long awaited embassy arrived and carried the message given to the Achaeans by the Roman ambassador L. Aurelius Orestes who announced to the *strategos* Diaeus and the assembled magistrates of the Achaean League, that the Roman senate had decided that the Lacedaemonians, Corinth, Argos, Heracleia by Mount Oeta, and Arcadian Orchomenus would no longer belong to the Achaean League.<sup>98</sup> The Achaeans reacted with widespread panic at this announcement and violence erupted in the city, aimed at anyone identified as a Spartan.<sup>99</sup> Orestes reported to the senate that he and the other ambassadors had been in mortal danger, which must have provoked outrage in Rome.<sup>100</sup> Harris claimed that the official Roman justification for the destruction of Corinth was this violence towards the envoys.<sup>101</sup>

According to Pausanias, Orestes' decree caused an immediate and violent reaction from the Achaean representatives, who did not even wait for the ambassadors to conclude their speech before rushing out to call an assembly of the Achaeans. Pausanias claimed:

When the Achaeans heard the decision of the Romans, they at once turned against the Spartans who happened to be then residing in Corinth, and arrested every one, not only those whom they knew for certain to be Lacedaemonians, but also all those they suspected to be such from the cut of their hair, or because of their shoes, their clothes or even their names. Some of them, who succeeded in taking refuge in the lodging of Orestes, they actually attempted even from there to drag away by force.<sup>102</sup>

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<sup>98</sup> For references see n. 22 above.

<sup>99</sup> Paus. 7.14.2-3.

<sup>100</sup> Polyb. 38.9.1-3.

<sup>101</sup> Harris (1979) 241 n. 1. He pointed out that not even Cicero believed this war was caused by the violence towards the envoys: Cic. *Off.* 1.35; Harris (1979) 241 n. 1.

<sup>102</sup> Paus. 7.14.2 (Jones trans.): 'οἱ δὲ ὡς τὰ ἐγνωσμένα ἐπύθοντο ὑπὸ Ῥωμαίων, αὐτίκα ἐτρέποντο ἐπὶ τοὺς Σπαρτιάτας οἱ Κορίνθῳ τότε ἔτυχον ἐπιδημοῦντες, συνήρπαζον δὲ πάντα τινὰ καὶ ὃν Λακεδαιμόνιον σαφῶς ὄντα ἠπίσταντο καὶ ὅτῳ κούρας ἢ ὑποδημάτων ἔνεκα ἢ ἐπὶ τῇ ἔσθητι ἢ κατ' ὄνομα προσγενοῖτο ὑπόνοια· τοὺς δὲ αὐτῶν καὶ καταφυγεῖν ἔνθα Ὀρέστης ὤκει φθάνοντας ὅμως καὶ ἐντεῦθεν ἐβιάζοντο ἔλκειν.'

It appears the violence was not directly aimed at the Roman ambassadors, although Pausanias claimed their lodgings were attacked because Spartans had taken refuge inside.<sup>103</sup> However, he was unclear whether the envoys themselves were attacked, but he did mention that Orestes attempted to stop the violence by 'reminding them that they were committing unprovoked acts of criminal insolence against the Romans.'<sup>104</sup> Livy implied that the envoys were physically assaulted at Corinth.<sup>105</sup> Dio went further than this, and claimed that the envoys were nearly slain.<sup>106</sup> Florus was unsure whether there was physical violence, but mentioned with certainty that there were verbal insults to the Roman ambassadors.<sup>107</sup> An Achaean embassy led by Thearidas was sent to Rome after this violence and the departure of the Roman envoys from Achaea, and was intended to offer explanation and apology to the senate. Consequently, there is no attempt here by Polybius to deny there was violence, he just disputed the direction and seriousness.<sup>108</sup>

Polybius claimed Orestes both exaggerated and embellished the amount of danger he and the other Roman envoys had been in, presenting it as a premeditated incident. Polybius claimed that the embassy's exposure to violence had been a matter of misfortune, not a direct affront to the Romans. Therefore, Polybius did not deny that there was violence and even admitted there had been danger to the Roman envoys, although it was only by chance.<sup>109</sup> He admitted that the senate were more irritated (ἠγανάκτησεν) by Orestes' reports of violence than they had ever been before, and immediately

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<sup>103</sup> Paus. 7.14.2.

<sup>104</sup> Paus. 7.14.3 (Jones trans.): 'μεμνησθαι σφῶς ὡς ἀδικημάτων καὶ ὕβρεως ἄρχουσιν ἐς Ῥωμαίους.'

<sup>105</sup> Livy claims that they were struck or beaten (*pulsati sint*) although the extent is unclear: Livy, *Per.* 51; Cass. Dio 21.72.1.

<sup>106</sup> Cassius Dio claimed the Achaean envoys were not intercepted and reached Rome. The Achaeans explained that the attack was not against the Roman envoys but against the Lacedaemonians who had been with them at the time. This must be in reference to the attack on the accommodation of the Roman envoys in Aegium, where some Lacedaemonians took refuge during the violence: Polyb. 38.10.2-3; Cass. Dio 21.72.2; Paus. 7.14.3.

<sup>107</sup> Flor. 1.32.3. Polybius referred to 'foolish insults' (γενομένων ἀλογημάτων) given to Orestes and the envoys: 38.10.2-3.

<sup>108</sup> Polyb. 38.10.1-3. Perhaps Polybius was concerned by the irrationality of such an action, although within the framework of the wider Achaean disaster this seems unnecessary.

<sup>109</sup> Polyb. 38.9.1-3.

despatched Sextus Julius Caesar.<sup>110</sup> The significance of this event has often been overshadowed by the mild reprimand the senate entrusted Sextus Julius Caesar to deliver to the Achaean League. However, this violence made the mildness of the subsequent embassy even more astonishing.

The tone of the second embassy was mild and pacifying, even though it was sent in response to Orestes' claim that he and the other Roman envoys had been the victims of violence in Achaea.<sup>111</sup> On the way to the Peloponnese, the second Roman embassy led by Sextus met with an Achaean embassy who were heading to Rome to apologise to the senate. However, Sextus persuaded them to return to Aegium, in order to hold discussions.<sup>112</sup> There was neither repetition nor retraction of the previous demands in this second embassy, with no mention of the first ultimatum issued by the senate and delivered by Orestes.<sup>113</sup> Instead, they mildly reprimanded the Achaeans for their behaviour, urging them not to provoke any more conflict with either the Romans or the Spartans. According to Polybius, the embassy was under instruction to:

administer a mild censure for what had taken place, and then to beg and instruct the Achaeans not to give heed in future to those who urged them to the worst courses or to incur before they were aware of it the hostility of Rome, but once again to correct their errors and bring the blame home to the real authors of the offence.<sup>114</sup>

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<sup>110</sup> Polyb. 38.9.3-5, 10.1-5; Paus. 7.14.3; Cass. Dio, *Fr.* 72.2. Violence against a Roman envoy had been cause for war in the First Illyrian War: Polyb. 2.8.12-13.

<sup>111</sup> Dmitriev used the silence of the second embassy about the violence suffered by the first embassy, to argue that there had been no mistreatment of the Roman ambassadors: (2011) 336.

<sup>112</sup> Polyb. 38.9.3-10.11; Paus. 7.14.3-5; Cass. Dio, *Fr.* 21.72.2.

<sup>113</sup> Gruen argued that this was 'less than an ultimatum': (1976) 61. However, there is limited justification for this. The identification of the demands given by Orestes as an ultimatum depends on the intentions of the Romans. There is not enough evidence to claim that this message from the senate was not definitive, nor is there enough evidence to suggest the second embassy was intended to counter the demands of the first. It is difficult to claim for certain this was not an ultimatum without first knowing the intentions of the senate.

<sup>114</sup> Polyb. 38.9.4-5: 'δεῖ μετρίως ἐπιτιμήσαντας καὶ μεμψαμένους ἐπὶ τοῖς γεγονόσι τὸ πλεῖον παρακαλεῖν καὶ διδάσκειν τοὺς Ἀχαιοὺς μήτε τοῖς ἐπὶ τὰ χεῖριστα παρακαλοῦσι προσέχειν μήτ' αὐτοὺς λαθεῖν εἰς τὴν πρὸς Ῥωμαίους ἀλλοτριότητα διεμπεσόντας, ἀλλ' ἔτι καὶ νῦν ποιήσασθαί τινα διόρθωσιν τῶν ἡγνοημένων, ἀπερειαμένους τὴν ἄγνοιαν ἐπὶ τοὺς αἰτίους τῆς ἀμαρτίας.'



There are some telling phrases in this section from Polybius. It is impossible to know the source of Polybius' information for these instructions, although it is fair to conclude that the phrasing was of his own design since he did not present it as a quotation. Not only do the tone and phrasing of these instructions resemble Polybius', but the sentiments also echo those earlier expressed.<sup>115</sup> These instructions echo Polybius' accounting for the causes of this war by isolating the authors as a few corrupt leaders. There is no indication in any of the ancient sources that Orestes informed the senate that the violence they suffered should be attributed to only a few leaders of the Achaean League. It seems more likely he would have blamed the Achaeans in general, particularly in reference to the threat of violence, which seems to have been the focus of his report to the senate. There are no accounts of these embassies that claim the leaders of the League had personally threatened the embassy, so it seems unlikely the senate would have placed blame on the few. It is also exceedingly difficult to assume that the senate had already at this point in the conflict reached this conclusion independently. The similarities between this senatorial message and Polybius' own interpretation of events is too close to be ignored. Consequently, there is no premise for Polybius' claim that the senate specifically identified a few Achaean leaders at this point, as at fault for the actions of the whole.

#### **4) Polybius and the embassy of Orestes**

The conciliatory message of the second embassy led Polybius to argue that the Romans had not intended to dissolve the League, despite the claim of Orestes and the first embassy. He claimed:

This made it quite evident that by the instructions they gave to Aurelius they did not wish to dissolve the League, but to alarm the Achaeans and to deter them from acting in a presumptuous

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<sup>115</sup> Where Polybius claimed: 'For I should rather say that the people in general acted mistakenly and failed in their duty, but that the actual authors of the mistakes were the real offenders' – 'ἐγὼ γὰρ ἠγνοηκέναι <μὲν φαίην ἂν τοὺς> πολλοὺς καὶ παραπεπαικέναι <τοῦ καθήκοντος>, ἡμαρτηκέναι δὲ τοὺς αἰτίους γεγονότας τῆς ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον ἀγνοίας': Polyb. 38.3.13.

and hostile manner. Some it is true, thought that the Romans were playing false, as the fate of Carthage was still undecided. This, however, was not fact; but... they thought fit to alarm the Achaeans and curb their undue arrogance, but by no means wished to go to war with them or proceed to an absolute rupture.<sup>116</sup>

This was Polybius' attempt to rationalise the demands from the senate carried by the envoy Orestes, that the League would no longer include the Lacedaemonians, Corinth, Argos, Heracleia by Mount Oeta, and Arcadian Orchomenus.<sup>117</sup> Dmitriev claimed that Polybius 'offered this explanation by way of his retrospective interpretation that the demise of the Achaean League resulted from the recklessness of its leadership.'<sup>118</sup> There is no indication that this analysis of the Roman demands came from either the Romans or the Greeks, indicating that it was Polybius' individual interpretation. Dmitriev rightly linked this excuse given by the Romans to Polybius' overall claim that the fault for this war lay with the demagogic leaders of the League. Polybius obscured the Roman contribution to this war, by way of the demand carried by Orestes, in order to emphasise the culpability of the Achaean Leadership. This provided Polybius with a didactic opportunity at the culmination of his work on the ideal behaviour of the statesman, providing an extreme negative *exemplum* through the figures of Diaeus and Critolaus.

The subsequent Roman embassy led by Sextus was conciliatory, however, more significantly it neither repeated nor retracted the original demands.<sup>119</sup> Surprisingly, there is no clear indication in Polybius' account that the second embassy was sent in regard to the content of the first embassy at all. Polybius claimed that the mild censure issued by the second embassy was in reference 'to what had taken place,' which although ambiguous, likely

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<sup>116</sup> Polyb. 38.9.6-8: 'ἐξ ὧν καὶ λίαν δῆλον ἐγένετο διότι καὶ τοῖς περὶ τὸν Αὐρήλιον ἔδωκε τὰς ἐντολάς οὐ διασπᾶσαι βουλομένη τὸ ἔθνος, ἀλλὰ πτοῆσαι καὶ καταπλήξασθαι [βουλομένη] τὴν αὐθάδειαν καὶ τὴν ἀπέχθειαν τῶν Ἀχαιῶν. τινὲς μὲν οὖν ὑπελάμβανον καθ' ὑπόκρισιν τοὺς Ῥωμαίους... διὰ τὸ μένειν ἀτελῆ τὰ κατὰ Καρχηδόνα· τὸ δ' ἀληθὲς οὐχ οὕτως εἶχεν... ἀνασοβῆσαι μὲν ἔκριναν διὰ τὸ φρονηματίζεσθαι πέρα τοῦ δέοντος, πόλεμον δ' ἀναλαβεῖν ἢ διαφορὰν ὀλοσχερῆ πρὸς τοὺς Ἀχαιοὺς οὐδαμῶς ἐβούλοντο.

<sup>117</sup> For references see n. 22 above.

<sup>118</sup> Dmitriev (2011) 335-336.

<sup>119</sup> Harris (1979) 242.

referred to the violence the embassy of Orestes had suffered, not the previous senatorial demands.<sup>120</sup> This was supported by Polybius' claim that the embassy of Sextus further urged the Achaeans not to be led by the few into hostility against Rome, which contextually does not apply to the first embassy, and instead, seems to refer to the threat of violence towards the envoys.<sup>121</sup> In addition, according to Pausanias, the demand to separate the stated cities from the League was even repeated by Q. Caecilius Metellus on the eve of war.<sup>122</sup> Consequently, there is reason to argue that the second embassy led by Sextus was sent specifically in response to the violence that threatened the first Roman embassy, which is in accordance with the indignant reaction Polybius claimed the senate had upon hearing Orestes' report.<sup>123</sup> Therefore, the conciliatory tone of the second embassy is not evidence that the Romans did not intend to dismantle the League in the message given to the Achaeans by Orestes.

The only obstacle to this interpretation is Polybius' explicit claim that the Romans were issuing an empty threat and had no intention of dissolving the League. Gruen supported Polybius' stance by claiming that the Romans habitually made threats and then rescinded them.<sup>124</sup> The strongest evidence to support Gruen's claim is a speech given by Lycortas in the *Histories* to the Achaean assembly in 181/180. The issue under discussion was how to react to the Roman edict to free twenty-four Spartan exiles. Lycortas advised the Achaeans to do nothing:

While it was true that the Romans were doing their duty in lending an ear to reasonable requests made by persons whom they regarded as bereft of their rights, yet if it were pointed out to them that some of these requests were impossible to grant, and others would entail great injury and disgrace on their

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<sup>120</sup> Polyb. 38.9.4: 'ἐπὶ τοῖς γεγυόοσι.'

<sup>121</sup> Polyb. 38.9.4-5.

<sup>122</sup> Paus. 7.15.2.

<sup>123</sup> Polyb. 38.9.3.

<sup>124</sup> Gruen provided examples that were from a multitude of dates between 186-149, although none were specific to the Achaean League: (1976) 60-61.

friends, it was not their habit in such matters to contend that they were right or enforce compliance.<sup>125</sup>

Polybius echoed this conviction later in the *Histories*, claiming that the Romans did not enforce their decisions on their loyal allies if they were proven unjust. He claimed:

The Romans are men, and with their noble disposition and high principles pity all who are in misfortune and appeal to them; but, when anyone who has remained true to them reminds them of the claims of justice, they usually draw back and correct themselves as far as they can.<sup>126</sup>

Roman behaviour prior to 167 does provide precedent for these claims, for example the Achaean-Roman disagreement concerning Messene in 181.<sup>127</sup> However, the political environment had drastically changed in the Mediterranean after 167, a development that is not acknowledged in Gruen's analysis of the first Roman embassy to Achaea in 147. Roman foreign policy underwent a change, as did the policy of the Achaean League towards Rome. In addition, the Achaeans also had a treaty with the Romans which may have been established on equal terms, so the interaction between the Achaeans and the Romans cannot be analysed in the same way as other Greeks. It cannot then be claimed that the Romans commonly rescinded demands in the period of Achaean-Roman interactions generally after 167, and specifically after 150.

Polybius was alone in his claim that the first embassy, led by Orestes that demanded the separation of the League, was an empty threat. Later narratives of this episode maintain a more ominous image of Roman

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<sup>125</sup> Polyb. 24.8.2-4: 'διότι Ῥωμαῖοι ποιοῦσι μὲν τὸ καθήκον αὐτοῖς, συνυπακούοντες τοῖς ἀκληρεῖν δοκοῦσιν εἰς τὰ μέτρια τῶν ἀξιουμένων· ὅταν μὲντοι γέ διδάξη τις αὐτοὺς ὅτι τῶν παρακαλουμένων τὰ μὲν ἔστιν ἀδύνατα, τὰ δὲ μεγάλην αἰσχύνην ἐπιφέροντα καὶ βλάβην τοῖς φίλοις, οὔτε φιλονικεῖν εἰώθασιν οὔτε παραβιάζεσθαι περὶ τῶν τοιούτων.'

<sup>126</sup> Polyb. 24.10.11-13: 'Ῥωμαῖοι ὄντες ἄνθρωποι καὶ ψυχῇ χρώμενοι λαμπρᾶ καὶ προαιρέσει καλῇ πάντας μὲν ἐλεοῦσι τοὺς ἐπταικότας καὶ πᾶσι πειρῶνται χαρίζεσθαι τοῖς καταφεύγουσιν ὡς αὐτοὺς· ὅταν μὲντοι γέ τις ὑπέμνησε τῶν δικαίων, τετηρκῶς τὴν πίστιν, ἀνατρέχουσι καὶ διορθοῦνται σφᾶς αὐτοὺς κατὰ δύναμιν ἐν τοῖς πλείστοις.'

<sup>127</sup> Compare the original Roman position at: Polyb. 23.9.11-15; Livy 40.2.6-8; with the amended position: Polyb. 23.17.3-4.

intentions, and at the very least a conscious weakening of the Achaean League. Generally, ancient historians, with the exclusion of Polybius, have treated the first ultimatum as a genuine directive from the senate that intended to dismantle the League. Pausanias did not explicitly state a reason for the Roman demands, but gave no indication he believed them to be a farce.<sup>128</sup> Cassius Dio, writing in the mid-second century AD, claimed that the Romans intended to disrupt and weaken the Achaean League with their demands.<sup>129</sup> Justin agreed and alleged the Romans demanded not only the disassociation of these states, but a complete dissolution of the League.<sup>130</sup> The epitomiser of Livy also referred to the separation of these cities from the Achaean League as a genuine demand from the Romans.<sup>131</sup> So Polybius' account is the only one that interpreted the demands given by the first embassy as an empty threat, although, as the eye-witness, Polybius has often be considered the most reliable of ancient historians. These alternative accounts cannot, however, be completely ignored, especially since they were likely to have drawn upon multiple sources for an event this significant in Roman history.

In addition, Pausanias claimed that Metellus sent envoys to repeat these demands while L. Mummius was on route to Greece:

So he despatched envoys to the Achaeans, bidding them release from the League the Lacedaemonians and the other states mentioned in the order of the Romans, promising that the Romans would entirely forgive them for their disobedience on the previous occasion.<sup>132</sup>

The repetition of these demands supports the claim that they were genuine, although Pausanias was the only ancient historian to include this in his account. There is also no indication in any of the ancient historians that the Romans admitted they were attempting to bluff the Achaean League, even

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<sup>128</sup> Paus. 7.14.1-3.

<sup>129</sup> Cass. Dio 21.72.1

<sup>130</sup> Just. *Epit.* 34.1.

<sup>131</sup> Livy, *Per.* 51.

<sup>132</sup> Paus. 7.15.2 (Jones trans.): 'ἀγγέλους οὖν παρὰ τοὺς Ἀχαιοὺς ἀπέστειλεν, ἀφιέναι κελεύων σφᾶς συντελείας Λακεδαιμονίους καὶ πόλεις ἄλλας ὅποσας εἴρητο ὑπὸ Ῥωμαίων, τῆς τε ἐκ τοῦ χρόνου τοῦ προτέρου σφίσιν ἀπειθείας οὐδεμίαν παρὰ Ῥωμαίων ὑπισχνεῖτο ὀργὴν γενήσεσθαι.'

after the embassy of Orestes had returned to Rome. Significantly, Pausanias' narrative also included a Roman embassy to the Achaeans in 164, when, he claimed:

the senate also commissioned Gallus to separate from the Achaean confederacy as many states as he could.<sup>133</sup>

Historians usually question Pausanias' reliability although, as Dmitriev claimed, it would take clear evidence to prove Pausanias was wrong in this instance.<sup>134</sup> The embassy of Gallus and the decision of the senate in this case, showed an awareness of the possibility of breaking up the League prior to 147.<sup>135</sup> Roman appreciation of the cities of the League as separate entities was also shown in 172, when ambassadors sent to Greece to gauge support for the impending war with Perseus approached the cities of Elis and Messene independently.<sup>136</sup> This has been argued as a reflection of the Roman mistrust of the Achaeans, shown by their decision to forgo standard diplomatic policy that dictated approaching the League as one political entity.<sup>137</sup> Larsen claimed that this was another hint of the desirability of the dissolution of the League.<sup>138</sup> Alternatively, this episode should be seen as a final attempt by the Romans to assert their influence over the Achaean League diplomatically. Although Roman frustration was evident after the Third Macedonian War, they were still attempting to use diplomatic means to encourage the Achaeans to treat them with deference, while also perhaps showing the League that they were not unassailable.

The deliberate selection of these cities by the Romans suggests there was some significance to the selection of Sparta, Corinth, Argos, Heracleia by

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<sup>133</sup> Paus. 7.11.1-3 (Jones trans.): 'προσεπεστάλη δὲ ὑπὸ τῆς βουλῆς τῷ Γάλλῳ πόλεις ὅποσας ἔστιν οἷός τε πλείστας ἀφεῖναι συλλόγου τοῦ Ἀχαιῶν.'

<sup>134</sup> Gruen (1976) 50-51, 59; *contra* Dmitriev (2011) 331-332.

<sup>135</sup> This episode was either not mentioned by Polybius, or is lost. But as Dmitriev pointed out, this embassy does not fit into Polybius' argument that the Romans did not want to dissolve the League: (2011) 332.

<sup>136</sup> Polyb. 27.2.11-12; Livy 42.44.8. Dmitriev claimed that this reflected the Roman preference for interaction with individual cities in the Peloponnese: (2011) 325, 329.

<sup>137</sup> Nottmeyer (1995) 62, 161-162.

<sup>138</sup> Larsen (1968) 466. Kallet-Marx argued that the Boeotian League was dissolved because the Romans began to deal with the cities individually, not through an explicit policy of dissolution: (1995) 77-78. This potentially could have been the Romans' plan, although the war with Perseus interrupted any clear Roman agenda.

Mount Oeta, and Arcadian Orchomenus. Pausanias claimed these cities were selected because they were late to the League and not directly related to the Achaeans.<sup>139</sup> Livy and Cassius Dio claimed these five cities were selected because they had once been under the control of Philip V of Macedon, which would seem to complement the claims of Pausanias.<sup>140</sup> However, as Gruen has pointed out, these claims explaining the selection of these cities cannot be verified in the historical record.<sup>141</sup> Yet it cannot be that these cities were selected randomly by the Romans. Each city had significance in the Peloponnese, or outside it in the case of Heracleia by Mount Oeta, which indicates consideration by the Romans of which cities to separate from the League.<sup>142</sup> In addition, the Romans at this point had already established the

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<sup>139</sup> Paus. 7.14.1.

<sup>140</sup> Livy, *Per.* 51; Cass. Dio 21.72.1

<sup>141</sup> Gruen (1976) 57 n. 100.

<sup>142</sup> The choice of Sparta as one of the cities selected was obvious because of its on-going conflict with the Achaeans. Sparta had been trying to defect from the League for over forty years, and would be a clear choice for the Romans: Livy 38.30.6-32.2. However, strategically Sparta also would have given access and control over to the southern Peloponnese. The strategic position of both Corinth and Argos as major cities of the Achaean League, would also have contributed to their selection. To have control of these cities meant control of the Isthmus of Corinth, and a major communications route between northern and southern Greece. It also confined the influence of the Achaeans in the Peloponnese, centred on the capital of Megalopolis, effectively cutting them off from Attica. These cities themselves also had specific tactical importance. The citadel of Acrocorinth was a military stronghold, so detaching it from the League took away perhaps the strongest defensible position in the Peloponnese: Strab. 8.6.21. Corinth also had two harbours, which dealt with sea-trade from both Italy and Asia: Strab. 8.6.20, 22. Argos was also useful as a defensible city, with a well-fortified citadel called Larisa and ample water supply: Strab. 8.6.7. In particular, Corinth had great significance as one of the three fetters of Greece. The selection of Arcadian Orchomenus is less clear, although it was one of the cities given to the Achaean League by Philip in 198 to encourage its loyalty: Livy 28.8.6; Walbank (1967) 148. However, the tactical significance of Orchomenus can be seen by its history. In 229, King Cleomenes of Sparta occupied Orchomenus, although it was soon taken by Antigonos Doson in 222 and became an important centre for establishing Macedonian influence in the northern Peloponnese: Polyb. 2.46.2, 54.11; Walbank (1967) 15. After his defeat of Cleomenes, Antigonos retained control of Corinth and Orchomenus. Polybius claims this was because he not only wanted to control the entrance into the Peloponnese, but also establish a base to secure his inland influence through a garrison at Orchomenus: Polyb. 4.6.5. Philip V seems to have followed this example and consistently had a garrison in Orchomenus: Walbank (1967) 47 n. 2, 73, 142 n. 2. The selection of Orchomenus was not accidental, particularly as it afforded the Romans a way of limiting the influence of the Achaeans in the northern Peloponnese and would have restricted communication and trade routes over land. Importantly, the possession of Corinth, Argos, Sparta, and Orchomenus effectively isolated the central hub of Achaean influence in Megalopolis and encircled their sphere of influence. Heracleia by Mount Oeta, was also a slightly ambiguous choice by the Romans. Although the tactical importance of Heracleia was significant, it was outside the Peloponnese, which perhaps was the aim of its selection. Heracleia was an Aetolian stronghold, and was the site of a Roman siege in 191: Livy 36.27; Polyb. 20.9.1. It was situated on the northern slope of Mount Oeta about eight kilometres from Thermopylae, with a convenient water supply from the Asopus River: Strab. 8.6.24. The situation of the city also seemed difficult to access, with vague reference in

settlement of Macedonia, so would have been concerned for the safety of their new protectorate. The selection of these cities ensured that the Romans could control the Peloponnese if necessary.

The consciousness with which these cities were chosen betrayed the seriousness of the Roman demands, and may explain the Roman delay between embassies. They were strategically significant within the Peloponnese, and were all well fortified situations. Defensive strength was considered a pre-requisite for selecting ancient city sites, so this in itself is unremarkable, however, the selected cities pose strategic placement for administration and military presence in the Peloponnese should it be necessary. Individually the situation of each city is important, but combined they are an effective obstacle to the power of the Achaean League. Although almost any city could have been selected, the dispersion of those selected indicates consideration of strategic importance in proximity to each other and to pre-existing Achaean strongholds such as Megalopolis.

The contradiction between the first and the second embassy remains a problem. There is a possibility that these two very different embassies may have reflected some uncertainty in senatorial decision-making, although it is possible there was a strategic explanation for the Romans' about-face. Many historians argue that the Romans had resolved to disband the Achaean League and that the second embassy was simply a delaying tactic. McDonald has argued that this demand was similar to that given in 171 to the Macedonians to 'surrender ... power and policy' to the Romans.<sup>143</sup> Larsen argued that this decision had been long standing and that the Romans had given indication of this almost forty years earlier in 182. He claimed that

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Pausanias to a narrow path leading by Heracleia up Mount Oeta: Paus. 10.22.1. Its proximity to Thermopylae, which was traditionally a strong military position, may have been a significant factor in the Romans' decision to include it in their ultimatum. Apart from the obvious advantage on the side of a mountain, it could also have been conceived of in conjunction with Orchomenus as a tactically convenient counter to the strength of Achaean Aegium on the Straits of Corinth. Positioning a Roman base outside the immediate Peloponnese offered strategic advantage because of its proximity to the Roman province of Macedonia, and therefore convenient access to supply routes. It could serve as a central point between the Peloponnese and Macedon for any future engagements of the Romans in Greece.

<sup>143</sup> McDonald (1970) 127; Gruen (1976) 58-62.



before sending the embassy of Orestes, the senate had decided to intercede if the Achaeans ignored their ultimatum.<sup>144</sup> Gruen claims it is simplistic to see the embassies as a mechanism for dissolving the League and argued the senate gave no indication of furthering their imperial aims in Greece.<sup>145</sup> Harris argued that this was a genuine demand for the dissolution of the League, and was essentially ‘a natural step’ for the Romans in light of their previous relations.<sup>146</sup> Dmitriev claims that the demand to separate these cities from the Achaean League was in accordance with the Romans’ policy realised in 150 with the senatorial directive to Gallus. However, according to Dmitriev, ‘we can regard even Gallus’ mission as only a continuation of Roman policy toward the Achaean League, which began before the Third Macedonian War and targeted individual members of that League.’<sup>147</sup> Although it is perhaps premature to argue that the senate were intending to dissolve the League this early, there is no reason to believe they had not conceived of this possibility slightly earlier than 147. The retention of the detainees until 150 suggests the Romans were aware of the need to exert authority over the League. It is possible that they recognised the potential problems they could have with the League once they no longer had such leverage with them, and splitting the League into smaller, more controllable, districts seems a logical conclusion. The Romans may simply have been biding their time; an argument that Polybius admitted was prevalent at the time.<sup>148</sup> The Romans had resorted to

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<sup>144</sup> Larsen (1968) 492, 494. Larsen claimed the senate had hinted in 182 that it aimed at the dissolution of the League. This referred to the interaction between Achaea and Rome concerning Messene, where the Romans ‘answered them that not even if the people of Sparta, Corinth or Argos deserted the League should the Achaeans be surprised if the senate did not think it concerned them’ – ‘ἀπεκρίθησαν δὲ διότι οὐδ’ ἂν ὁ Λακεδαιμονίων ἢ Κορινθίων ἢ <των> Ἀργείων ἀφίστηται δῆμος, οὐ δεήσει τοὺς Ἀχαιοὺς θαυμάζειν ἐὰν μὴ πρὸς αὐτοὺς ἤγῳνται’: Polyb. 23.9.13. However, this reply was made on the advice of Q. Marcius Philippus and did not indicate at this stage a desire to break up the League: 23.9.8-10, 9.12-14; Livy 40.2.7-8. It does indicate that the treaty arrangements between the Romans and the Achaeans did not compel the Romans to militarily aid the Achaeans or refrain from helping their enemies. Dmitriev claimed this was intended to undermine the unity of the Greeks: (2011) 319-320.

<sup>145</sup> Gruen (1976) 58.

<sup>146</sup> Harris (1979) 243.

<sup>147</sup> Dmitriev (2011) 334-335. In opposition to those who argue this was a new policy for the Romans: Briscoe (1969) 59; Gwyn Morgan (1969) 435; Nottmeyer (1995) 112, 155; Ager (1996) 408-409.

<sup>148</sup> Polyb. 38.9.7-8. Larsen claimed this was ‘giving the Achaeans another chance’. In addition, Larsen pointed out how late it would have been in the campaigning season once Orestes’ embassy had returned to Rome: (1968) 494.

such tactics of delay in the past, so there was little reason to think they would not repeat them.<sup>149</sup>

The considerable delay between the senate's promise to send an embassy to resolve the issue of Sparta in 149/8 and the arrival of that embassy in 147 is also an important consideration. Gruen used the delay to argue that the senate was inconsistent in its policy on Achaean affairs. Likewise, factional disagreements in the senate may also be blamed for both the messages and the delay.<sup>150</sup> Even though the sources do not include any accounts of factional disagreements in the senate, this does not necessarily imply that there were none. There were certainly powerful politicians of the time who would have had something to contribute to any discussion on Greece, although any attempted reconstruction of senatorial debate would be impossible. The delay was perhaps due to senatorial disagreements, although there are other possibilities such as the continued Roman involvement in Carthage and Macedonia.

Either way, it can be theorised that the considerable delay before sending the embassy in 147 can at the very least indicate discussion, whether the senate was divided or not.<sup>151</sup> In addition the careful selection of the cities selected to secede from the League implied consideration prior to the delivery of this message by Orestes. There is no indication in the historical record of senatorial uncertainty or hesitation in their demands of the Achaeans at this point, and the delay in response does not necessarily have to affect this conclusion. The time it took to issue this ultimatum, and the clearly structured nature of the demands, imply that this was not a knee-jerk reaction by the Romans to the situation in Greece. The senate would not have been ignorant of the actions of the Achaeans and their war against Sparta in spite of Roman demands, so clearly the Romans would have seen the need for some kind of response to such blatant disregard. The relationship between the Achaeans

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<sup>149</sup> For example, when Livy claimed the Romans granted Perseus an armistice in 172 in order to make better preparations for war: Livy 42.43.1-3.

<sup>150</sup> Gruen (1976) 58-59.

<sup>151</sup> Burton claims that the senate commonly acted in a slow and deliberate way with the dissolution of relations with *amici*: (2011) 351.

and the Romans was not like that prior to the Third Macedonian War, nor was it characterised by the deference shown to the Romans by the Achaeans down to 150. Their relationship had changed, and the Romans would have been aware of the need to respond to Achaean actions in the Peloponnese.

Therefore, there is no evidence either in the narrative of Polybius, or those of other ancient historians, that support his claim that the message of the first Roman embassy to the Achaean League was an empty threat. The behaviour of the Achaeans and their conduct towards the Spartans, in addition to the disregard they showed to the demands of the senate and the general Metellus, make the demand issued by Orestes a logical one. Polybius' claim that the Romans were intending to scare the Achaeans has no basis, and instead suggests that Polybius was attempting to downplay Roman involvement. The significance of this war as a didactic lesson for Polybius' audience can be seen as explanation for this denial of Roman intent, because he was concerned to highlight the actions of the Achaeans as the cause of the war. By claiming that the Romans only intended an empty threat and had meant no harm to the League, the corrupt, aggressive actions of the Achaean leadership seem wildly irrational. This provided a final example for Polybius' readers on the danger of irrational policy decisions, which in turn caused the greatest disaster to ever befall Greece.

## **5) Polybius and the demagogic leaders of the Achaean League**

The depiction of this war as the greatest disaster to ever befall Greece and Polybius' effort to depict the first embassy led by Orestes as an empty threat, were both intended to heighten the emotion and enhance his didactic lesson on the ideal behaviour of the statesman. According to Polybius, this war was caused by the corrupt leaders of the Achaean League who led the League to disaster and disgrace through their irrational policies and mistaken belief that they understood the power dynamics of their relationship with Rome. The image Polybius created of himself in the *Histories* as a teacher and a politician led him to undervalue the other factors that led to this war, in

favour of that which would provide the most significant didactic lesson, specifically on his concept of the ideal statesman. This lesson was the pinnacle of his didactic purpose, with Polybius ending his narrative with the most significant demonstration of what happened when irrational, foolish and ill-advised statesman did not put the state above their own political significance. This war served as a warning for Polybius' readers on the fate of those who put their faith in a few corrupt men, and for other politicians on the importance of monitoring their fellow statesmen.

Polybius claimed that the advice of Sextus divided the Achaeans. They had been issued a mild reprimand and directed not to cause any more problems with either the Romans or the Spartans, which Polybius claimed was received by the Achaeans in two ways:<sup>152</sup>

Upon this all the wiser people gladly accepted the advice, conscious as they were of their error and having before their eyes the fate that awaited those who opposed Rome; but the majority, while having nothing to say against the just remarks of Sextus and being obliged to keep silence, yet remained ill-disposed and perverse.<sup>153</sup>

Polybius claimed that the leaders of the Achaeans, Critolaus the *strategos*, and Diaeus specifically, were under the false impression that they could act in any way they wanted without reprisals from the Romans.<sup>154</sup> Polybius referred to them, and their supporters, as the 'worst men, the most god-forsaken and

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<sup>152</sup> Polyb. 38.10.5.

<sup>153</sup> Polyb. 38.10.6-7: 'τὸ μὲν σωφρονοῦν μέρος ἀσμένως ἀτεδέχετο τὰ λεγόμενα καὶ λίαν ἐνετρέπετο, συνειδὸς αὐτῷ τὰ πεπραγμένα καὶ πρὸ ὀφθαλμῶν λαμβάνον τὰ συμβαίνοντα τοῖς πρὸς Ῥωμαίους ἀντιπαττομένοις, τὸ δὲ πλῆθος τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἀντιλέγειν μὲν οὐδὲν εἶχε τοῖς ὑπὸ τῶν περὶ τὸν Σέξτον λεγομένοις δίκαισις, ἀλλ' ἦγε τὴν ἡσυχίαν, ἔμενε δὲ νοσοῦν καὶ διεφθαρμένον.' This translation has been amended in accordance with Walbank's suggestions, replacing 'strictness' with 'remarks' for λεγόμενοις. In addition, νοσοῦν καὶ διεφθαρμένον, translated by Paton as 'ill-conditioned and demoralised' was replaced with 'ill-disposed and perverse,' which fits better with Polybius' Greek and the context of this passage: Walbank (1979a) 701.

<sup>154</sup> The Achaeans here seem to view the Roman demands as empty threats, however this was likely the interpretation of Polybius, since their immediate reaction (i.e. the violence towards Spartans in Argos) did not indicate they regarded it as an empty threat.

the greatest corrupters of the nation,' establishing their culpability from the outset.<sup>155</sup>

According to Polybius, despite the assurances of Sextus, the Achaeans wanted to send Thearidas and the original embassy to the senate at Rome. Critolaus and the other leaders of the League arranged to meet the Roman legates in Tegea in order to attempt to resolve their issues with the Spartans.<sup>156</sup> However, the Achaeans then decided against this, sending only Critolaus who refused to make any concessions, while claiming he was not authorised to make any decisions and would refer them to the next assembly in six months. The Romans soon realised the Achaeans' ruse:

So that Sextus and his colleagues, now recognising that Critolaus was guilty of wilful obstruction, and indignant at his answer, allowed the Lacedaemonians to return home and themselves left for Italy, pronouncing Critolaus to have acted in a wrong-headed way and like a madman.<sup>157</sup>

For Polybius, this was the act that made the war inevitable.<sup>158</sup> He claimed Critolaus then travelled around the Achaean cities in order to inform them of his dealings with the Spartans and the Romans, although Polybius claimed he was really vilifying the Romans.<sup>159</sup> Metellus dispatched an embassy from Macedonia to try and encourage the Achaeans not to act against the Spartans or the Romans, although they were jeered out of the Achaean assembly.<sup>160</sup> In addition, a second embassy sent by Metellus urged the Achaeans to abide by the senatorial directives given by Orestes in 147, although these were issued while Metellus was mobilising for war.<sup>161</sup> Polybius portrayed Critolaus as a

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<sup>155</sup> Polyb. 38.10.8: 'οἱ χεῖριστοι καὶ τοῖς θεοῖς ἐχθροὶ καὶ λυμαινόμενοι τὸ ἔθνος.'

<sup>156</sup> Polyb. 38.10.11-12; Paus. 7.14.4-5.

<sup>157</sup> Polyb. 38.11.6: 'διὸ σαφῶς ἐπιγνόντες οἱ περὶ τὸν Σέξτον ἐθελοκακοῦντα τὸν Κριτόλαον καὶ δυσχεραίνοντες ἐπὶ τοῖς ἀπαντωμένοις τοὺς μὲν Λακεδαιμονίους ἀπέλυσαν εἰς τὴν οἰκίαν, αὐτοὶ δ' ἐπανῆγον εἰς τὴν Ἰταλίαν, κατεγνώκότες ἄγνοιαν καὶ μανίαν τοῦ Κριτολάου.'

<sup>158</sup> Polyb. 38.10.12.

<sup>159</sup> Polyb.38.11.7-11. At this point, Critolaus seemed to be acting as though the war with Rome was certain, shown through his directives to the magistrates not to take payments from debtors or put in prison those who owed debt, and to maintain the 'enforced contributions' until a decision was clear about the war.

<sup>160</sup> Polyb. 38.12.1-4; Paus. 7.15.2.

<sup>161</sup> Paus. 7.15.2.

rabble-rouser inciting the rage of the masses through likening their position to subjects, and that of the Romans to their masters.<sup>162</sup> Through such tactics, Critolaus convinced the Achaeans to vote for war with the Spartans, although Polybius claimed it was primarily against the Romans. Significantly, Critolaus also persuaded the people to pass a law that gave him complete power, which was unconstitutional according to Polybius and gave him the power of a tyrant.<sup>163</sup> After which:

Critolaus then, having carried through these measures, set himself to intrigue against and attack the Romans, not listening to reason, but forming projects which outraged the laws of god and man.<sup>164</sup>

Polybius portrayed the fault for this war through his vilification of Critolaus and Diaeus. While their actions towards the embassy led by Sextus in Tegea could be seen as provocation, the actions of the Romans in sending the first embassy already set the tone for the impending war. Dmitriev claims that the Romans had behaved provocatively towards the Achaeans since the defeat of Antiochus in 189, just as Briscoe suggested that the Romans had actively pursued a policy of encouraging the separation of Greek Leagues after the Third Macedonian War.<sup>165</sup> In contrast, Burton has argued that while this war was caused through disparate expectations of their *amicitia*, the Romans actively attempted to avoid this war and tried to dissuade the Achaeans from acting in a way whereby the Romans had to retaliate.<sup>166</sup> This was based on the message from Sextus' and Metellus' embassy to the Achaean assembly in 147, where the Romans claimed it was acceptable to hate them, but not provoke war through hostile acts.<sup>167</sup> However, this was part of Polybius'

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<sup>162</sup> Polyb. 38.12.7-10. Critolaus even accused Eugoras of Aegium and Stratius of Tritaea of conspiring with the Romans: 38.13.3-6. Polybius portrayed the masses here through 'all of his aristocratic class biases', according to Champion: (2004) 166; see also Fuks (1970) 78-89.

<sup>163</sup> Polyb. 38.13.7.

<sup>164</sup> Polyb. 38.13.8: 'οὗτος μὲν οὖν ταῦτα διοικησάμενος ἐγένετο περὶ τὸ πραγματοκοπεῖν καὶ Ῥωμαίοις ἐπιβάλλειν τὰς χεῖρας, οὐδενὶ λόγῳ τοῦτο πράττων, ἀλλὰ πάντων ἀσεβεστάτοις καὶ παρανομωτάτοις ἐπιβαλλόμενος.'

<sup>165</sup> Dmitriev (2011) 337; Briscoe (1982) 1107, 1119; (1972) 24-25. Dmitriev saw a connection between the Roman treatment of Rhodes and that of the Achaean League: Polyb. 29.29.1-2; 30.31.9, 14; Dmitriev (2011) 337-336.

<sup>166</sup> Burton (2011) 345-351.

<sup>167</sup> Polyb. 18.12.1-3.

attempt to underemphasise the aggressiveness of the Romans in order to highlight Achaean culpability.

Polybius' portrayal of the Achaean League at the outset of this war, as overcome by an evil spell (παρηλλαγμένης φαρμακείας) has already been dealt with elsewhere, but it contributed significantly to Polybius' picture of Achaean irrationality.<sup>168</sup> The figures of Diaeus and Critolaus were depicted as anathema to the ideal Achaean statesmen who tried to defend the League but were overcome by these corrupt politicians and their popular support.<sup>169</sup> Polybius directly contrasted Diaeus to the more traditionally conservative element of Achaean politics, showing him and his supporters opposing those who would propose an end to the war.<sup>170</sup> This negative portrayal of Diaeus and his supporters was enhanced by claims of murder, corruption, and torture.<sup>171</sup> Polybius' opinion of these politicians and how they should have behaved was clear:

They did not in the least think of making any brave sacrifice for the sake of the state, and the safety of the people in general, as was their duty if they were men who valued their reputations and pretended to be the leaders of Greece.<sup>172</sup>

The character of these men reflected their inability to act as a statesman should, instead leading them to form irrational policies. Polybius even likened the irrationality of the Achaeans with that attributed to barbarians.<sup>173</sup> Polybius, in his self-constructed persona as a teacher, made it clear that if these men were true statesmen they would have ended the hostilities by sacrificing themselves for the greater good, which was the cornerstone of his concept of

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<sup>168</sup> Polyb. 38.16.110. For discussion of this passage see section 4.5.

<sup>169</sup> Polyb. 38.13.1-6, 17.1-18.12. See also Baronowski (2011) 120-124.

<sup>170</sup> Critolaus had been lost in the first engagement in Scarpheia, overtaken by the Romans while retreating from Heracleia. Pausanias claimed there was a certain amount of mystery surrounding his death: Polyb. 38.15.1; Paus. 7.15.4-5. Perhaps part of Polybius' lesson here is the necessity of being able to counter irrational policies in your political peers.

<sup>171</sup> Polyb. 38.17-18.

<sup>172</sup> Polyb. 38.17.8-9: 'τὸ δ' ὑπὲρ τῶν πραγμάτων καὶ τῆς τῶν πολλῶν σωτηρίας παθεῖν ὅ, τι δέοι γενναίως οὐδ' ἐν νῶ καθάπαξ ἐλάμβανον· ὅπερ ἦν ἀνδρῶς φιλοδόξων καὶ προστατεῖν φασκόντων τῆς Ἑλλάδος.'

<sup>173</sup> Polyb. 38.18.7; Champion (2004) 166-167.

the ideal statesman. Polybius' aim in presenting the culpability of the Achaean War in this way was to emphasise this didactic purpose.

The actions of the Romans prior to the war, as well as during the war, do not support Polybius' claim that they did not want war with the Achaeans.<sup>174</sup> In addition to the genuine attempt to fracture the League in their first ultimatum delivered by Orestes, they had also mobilised for war before Metellus' embassy was jeered out of the Achaean assembly, showing no hesitation by the Romans.<sup>175</sup> Dmitriev claims that this war was conceived of as a genuine attempt to maintain Greek freedom, shown by the amount of support from other Greek states.<sup>176</sup> Florus claimed that Critolaus 'used against the Romans the liberty which they themselves had granted,' implying that the Romans had already given Greece freedom.<sup>177</sup> According to Dmitriev, the siege of Heracleia was 'an open challenge to Roman control over the Greeks and, therefore, a display of freedom of action, which the Romans could not tolerate.'<sup>178</sup> So in light of the demands of Orestes and the mobilisation for war immediately by Metellus in Macedonia, it seems as though the Romans were not adverse to war with the Achaean League.

In addition, despite Polybius' claim that the Achaeans had voted for war with Sparta, but in reality it had been against Rome, the initial acts of the war do not seem to reflect this.<sup>179</sup> Once the war had begun, Achaean aggressions seems to have been directed towards the Spartans and those who had seceded from the League, not the Romans. It is significant that the first action undertaken at the outset of the war by Critolaus was the siege of Heraclea, a city who had seceded from the League.<sup>180</sup> In addition, Pausanias claimed that once Critolaus had learned about the advance of the Romans during the siege of Heracleia, he had fled in terror (δῆμα) to Scarpheia.<sup>181</sup> The

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<sup>174</sup> Polyb. 38.9.8.

<sup>175</sup> Polyb. 38.12.1-11; Paus. 7.15.1-2; Zonar. 9.31.

<sup>176</sup> From the Boeotians, the Phocians, the Euboeans, the Locrians, Chalcis and various other Greek cities: Paus. 7.14.6, 15.3-4; Livy, *Per.* 52; Oros. 5.3.3; Dmitriev (2011) 346.

<sup>177</sup> Flor. 32.2 (Forster trans.): '*qui libertate a Romanis data adversus ipsos usus est.*'

<sup>178</sup> Dmitriev (2011) 347.

<sup>179</sup> Polyb. 38.13.7.

<sup>180</sup> Paus. 7.15.2-3.

<sup>181</sup> Paus. 7.15.3.



Romans then overtook the retreating army, according to Pausanias, taking about a thousand prisoners and killing numerous Achaeans. This was also emphasised by Pausanias' claim that Metellus' troops overcame the retreating Arcadians who had marched to meet Critolaus, depicting the first engagements in this war as a Roman victory against the retreating armies of the Achaeans and the Arcadians.<sup>182</sup> This then suggests that perhaps the Achaean League did intend to discipline an errant subject state in this war, rather than go against the might of the Roman army.

In conclusion, this chapter provided a third example in Polybius' *Histories* where his didactic purpose overrode his concern to be historically accurate. For Polybius, this war was the pinnacle of the *Histories*, so his didactic lesson was emphasised through his emotive claims that this was the greatest disaster to ever befall the Greeks. He deliberately depicted the war in this way and encouraged the emotion of the episode by admitting his own partiality. The terms of the relationship between the Romans and the Achaeans, from their alliance in 198 until the war in 146, changed many times. The Achaean War, therefore, must be seen in its immediate international context, specifically, that the Romans were no longer willing to allow the Achaeans to act in any way they chose. The Roman demand carried by Orestes in 147 was a consciously calculated directive to break up the power of the Achaean League, not an empty threat as Polybius claimed. Polybius portrayed the senatorial demands in this way in order to emphasise the aggressive irrationality of the Achaeans in contrast to the fair benevolence of the Romans. That is not to say that he viewed the Romans in this way in this instance, but for Polybius the concentration of blame on the irrational policies of the Achaean demagogues provided more didactic directives for his audience. There is little conclusive evidence to claim that this war was completely the fault of the Achaean leadership, but the blame on these leaders allowed Polybius to emphasise the ideal behaviour of the statesman

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<sup>182</sup> Paus. 7.15.4-6.

by providing extreme *exempla* of the opposite. This was the apex of Polybius' *Histories*, where the complete irrationality of bad statesmen led to the greatest disaster to ever befall Greece, which provided a warning to all on the dangers of irrationally driven decision making.

## Chapter Nine: Conclusions

In conclusion, this thesis has argued that there are two Polybiuses that must be recognised as distinct from one another when analysing the *Histories*. There was Polybius the man, of whom we do not know anything definitively, and Polybius the consciously self-constructed image in the narrative. This image was the deliberate creation of the author and portrayed how he wanted to be seen by his audience. Primarily, he presented himself as a teacher, mainly of political conduct and ideology, but also on other matters he considered significant. In addition, Polybius presented himself as an historian, a politician, and a Greek, designing his narrative accordingly in order to emphasise these aspects of his constructed character. Polybius' preoccupation with his image as a teacher and his didactic purpose, caused him at points to prioritise these aspects of his narrative over historical accuracy.

The creation of this image in the *Histories* was of primary significance to Polybius, as he emphasised certain aspects of this character in order to create his authorial credibility and add to his authority in the narrative. The first part of this thesis discussed the development of this authorial image through key components of the *Histories*: the personal aspects he chose to emphasise that added to his self-constructed image; the historical construction of the narrative that demonstrated his preoccupation with his image as a teacher and his didactic purpose; and the political ideologies he emphasised to his audience that helped shape his persona as a teacher, historian, politician and, at times, a Greek.

Polybius included personal and autobiographical elements in the narrative that were intended to form the basis of his image in the *Histories*. His Achaean heritage was a considerable influence on the creation of this authorial image. The Achaean League was a significant focus for Polybius

and reflected his patriotic outlook. Patriotic bias was an acceptable aspect of historiography for ancient historians, with Polybius demonstrating his loyalty through his idealisation of significant Achaean statesmen, in particular Philopoemen. Polybius' education and literary knowledge also contributed to his personal self-characterisation. Although he did not bluntly claim an aristocratic education, there is evidence of it throughout the narrative. His obvious knowledge of Greek literature helped form the image he presented to the audience of a teacher and an historian, and added credibility to his claim to be qualified to educate his audience. It is clear that Polybius was concerned not to highlight his detention at Rome, and thereby did not make it a significant aspect of his persona. He did not emphasise his detention and only briefly referred to the fact that it was unjust, instead expressing clear indignation at the situation of others who were detained. So while he did not ignore his detention, it was not a factor that he wanted to highlight as part of his authorial persona. Finally, Polybius' experiences after he left Rome in 150 were emphasised in the *Histories* and added to his authorial persona. Significantly, these experiences added credibility to his authority by proving he had the necessary qualifications he himself identified as vital to be the ideal historian, and by extension, the ideal teacher. These aspects of Polybius' image created the basis of his self-presentation, adding credibility to his persona in the *Histories*.

Polybius' development of his self-constructed persona in the *Histories* was then further developed in Chapter Four by addressing the structural aspects of the narrative that contributed to the formation of this image and its didactic purpose. The initial discussion of Polybius' purpose identified both his historical purpose and his didactic purpose. Although his historical purpose was significant, it was at times eclipsed by his concern to emphasise his didactic lessons for the audience. The structural precision Polybius showed in the *Histories* also reinforced his priorities in the narrative. In particular, the frequent digressions that allowed him to intrude on the narrative were significant for the development of his historical persona, as well as his didactic purpose. This chapter also discussed Polybius' readers, who were central to his image as a teacher, with his audience of soldier-politicians envisaged as

his students of politics. This correlation heavily influenced the creation of his image in the narrative, while simultaneously leading Polybius to create his image of the ideal audience. The use of polemic as a method of self-definition by opposition was then discussed. Polybius' polemic against Timaeus, in particular, significantly added to his image as an historian and a teacher by presenting himself as a counter to his negative example. In this way, Polybius highlighted what he considered the historiographical faults of Timaeus, consequently presenting himself as the ideal historian. Last, this chapter discussed the use of emotion in the *Histories* as a didactic tool, but also as a rhetorical technique used for emphasis. Polybius used emotive language to call attention to the relevant didactic lesson he was illustrating for the reader, ensuring that the audience paid attention to the point he was emphasising. These aspects of Polybius' historical construction added to the development of his historical persona and his didactic purpose.

The final chapter that traced Polybius' development of his self-constructed image in the *Histories* addressed its political components. The primary focus of Polybius' didactic lessons was political, so this aspect of his persona was particularly significant. Polybius' emphasis on his own political experience in the narrative added credibility to his authorial image and its authority in imparting political advice to the reader. In this way, he was able to present himself as the man-of-action politician that he idealised in the *Histories*, emphasising his own political and historical importance. Polybius' attitude towards the Romans, both prior to and after 167, has been a topic thoroughly discussed by modern historians. While Polybius' attitude towards the Romans was generally positive, his praise or criticism of them was determined in the narrative by the didactic example they set for his audience. For Polybius, the narrative itself was a means to convey his didactic lessons, so Roman success was the vehicle through which he emphasised many of these lessons for his readers. The Romans both in their rise to power in the Mediterranean and after the establishment of their authority, provided Polybius with both positive and negative examples which allowed him to illustrate those points he wanted to make to his audience concerning correct political behaviour. Likewise, Polybius' attitude towards the Greeks depended

on their didactic value. With the Greek states, Polybius commonly provided didactic lessons and examples of the power dynamic between a small and large power, often making comments to his audience on the correct behaviour of small states within this inter-state interaction. This political dimension enhanced Polybius' consciously self-created image as a teacher and historian, while also providing him with didactic *exempla* for his audience of soldier-politicians.

Part I of this thesis argued for the existence of this consciously self-constructed image in the *Histories* and traced its development in the narrative through different personal aspects of character construction, structural features, and finally its political components. Polybius wanted to construct himself as a teacher and historian, and his didactic aims sometimes led him to subvert historical accuracy in order to emphasise his didactic lesson for his audience of soldier-politicians. Part II of the thesis contained three case-studies that investigated separate instances where Polybius interpreted a historical event in a way that was not otherwise reinforced by the historical record. Polybius' didactic purpose led him to misrepresent the historical record in order to reflect better his didactic priorities.

The first case study argued that the Romans did not enter the Second Macedonian War specifically to free the Greeks as Polybius claimed. Instead, the decision to free the Greeks to the extent that was declared at the Isthmian Games was made after the Macedonian defeat at Cynoscephalae, at the instigation of the Roman commander Flamininus. Rome became the faithful, paternal power in contrast to Philip V of Macedon, a fickle tyrant in the Polybian narrative. A positive *exemplum* was contrasted directly with a negative *exemplum*.

The second case study argued that the breakdown in the diplomatic interaction between the Romans and the Aetolians in 191 was not due to a linguistic misunderstanding, as Polybius claimed. The Aetolians provided the negative *exemplum* of international conduct, whereas Polybius stood as the positive *exemplum* of diplomatic/cultural/linguistic expertise. The Romans had

provided ample examples of the meaning of *deditio* in their dealings with the Aetolians, in particular to the Aetolian *strategos* Phaeneas, so there is limited reason to believe the Aetolians were unaware of the implications of their *deditio*. Polybius presented this episode in this way in order to provide an example for his audience of the significance of knowing the culturally distinct diplomatic traditions of those you interacted with in the international arena. The Aetolians provided a negative example of international conduct, enhanced further by their irrational behaviour after this episode. For Polybius' audience this episode also emphasised the significance of understanding the Roman concept of *deditio* for his Greek readers – a lesson that was emphasised repeatedly throughout the *Histories*. Finally this episode allowed Polybius to highlight his own diplomatic expertise, since he could stand astride Greek and Roman culture and recognise a linguistic misunderstanding between them.

The third case study argued that Polybius' presentation of Roman motivation and Achaean culpability in the Achaean War cannot be corroborated through his narrative of the war, or the accounts of other ancient historians. Polybius claimed that an embassy sent to the Achaean League from the Romans in 147 demanding the separation of specific cities from the League, was not a serious demand from the Romans, but instead an empty threat. However, the behaviour of the Romans indicated otherwise. Polybius' claim that the Romans did not want to fracture the League gave credence to his claim that this war was the fault of a few corrupt Achaean leaders, and not the aggressive Romans - another claim by Polybius that cannot be fully verified by his own historical account. This then allowed Polybius to provide his readers with extreme *exempla* of negative statesmanship, allowing him to emphasise his didactic lessons on irrational, emotion-led decision making and how it inevitably led to disaster.

The significance of Polybius' consciously self-constructed image as a teacher and his didactic lessons for his audience can be seen through these three case studies. The depth of the influence of this persona and his didactic preoccupation on the historical narrative itself means that Polybius' historical

impartiality is frequently open to question. There is no claim here that Polybius fabricated his narratives and did not value historical accuracy. Instead, Polybius' didactic purpose overshadowed these concerns, as he consciously constructed the image of himself in the *Histories* as a teacher, historian, politician, and a Greek, and saw it as his duty to impart his didactic lessons through his narrative to his audience of young, aristocratic, soldier-politicians.



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All Journal abbreviations used are in accordance with those from *L'Année Philologique*.

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