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KOREAN CHINESE IN MULTICULTURAL SOUTH KOREA:
IDENTITY CHALLENGES AND KOREAN NATION-BUILDING

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A thesis submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for
the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Asian Studies,
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ABSTRACT

In this thesis on national membership and identity, I examine Korean Chinese perceptions of South Korea’s commitment to multiculturalism and the consequent social and ideological changes that Korean Chinese experienced in South Korea, in terms of their migration and settlement. I analyse South Korea’s concept and practice of citizenship in this transitional era and I delineate the influence of the changing ideas and practice of citizenship on Korean Chinese in terms of their ethno-national and cultural consciousness. Korean Chinese perceptions are important because they are the largest “co-ethnic”, migrant and “naturalised citizen” group in South Korea. Their being influenced by a variety of types of nationalism and multiculturalism in South Korea and China also adds to the significance of their perspectives as they provide alternative points of view by revealing the complicated internal and external complexities that South Korea currently faces.

My analysis is based on data from interviews with and participant observation of 60 Korean Chinese in South Korea and China in 2010; email interviews in 2011 with 60 Korean Chinese dispersed worldwide; and my review of existing research and government policy documents. The introduction of email interviews gave me some specific insights that I would not have been able to obtain if I confined my study geographically to South Korea and China. My thematic and comparative analysis of data draws from theories of nation and nationalism, multiculturalism, migration and identity constructions, and is grounded in the data itself.

My research is an early attempt to study Korean Chinese in South Korea’s multicultural context and in the wider context of the competing notions of Korean nationalism and Chinese nationalism. By including people who have not been a focus previously, and by examining leading contradictions that have received little attention before, my research better reflects the Korean Chinese community, and creates a more complete picture of Korean Chinese transnational migration. I found that the identities of Korean Chinese, which have already been complicated because of the competing forces of South Korea and China, have become increasingly diversified in the face of recent changes in South Korea. The perceived discriminative nationhood of South Korea and its social transition brought a sharp division of opinions amongst Korean Chinese in terms of their understanding of ethnic and cultural homogeneity. Multiple and flexible identities were highlighted from the frequent discordance between their self-identification during interviews and the identities revealed from their
remarks to the interview questions. A transnational identity was indicated from people inclined to readjust their national identities in the host society. I also found that Korean Chinese have flexible understandings of citizenship, which contradicts their relatively firm understanding of ethnicity and nationality. This is because of their understandings that ethnicity and nationality were transmitted by birth or through inheritance from their parents, while citizenship was achieved when they were accepted into a country’s political framework through legal processes.

My study contributes to the scholarly discussions on national membership, and deepens the understanding of Korean national identity. Reconsidering national membership is important given that the claim that South Korea is homogeneous has been officially abandoned; and that the national boundary has been blurred by the increasing outflow of South Koreans and the influx of migrants. I found that multiculturalism has broadened the idea of Korean national membership, but only to limited extent, and the ethnicity-based concept of membership still thrives in South Korea, as was revealed from South Korea’s request of proof of the blood ties for the Korean diaspora to gain South Korean citizenship, also from the hierarchal orders between South Koreans by birth and by naturalisation. Naturalised citizens often have difficulty in obtaining national inclusion in South Korea. This highlighted different dimensions of citizenship. A contradiction to the ethnicity-based concept of nationhood was that it was not wide enough to easily embrace co-ethnics if they do not meet the requirement of naturalisation or even if they do, in some cases. My findings suggest that hierarchical orders exist in South Korea between different migrant groups or different co-ethnic groups, based on their country of origin, occupations and the capital they brought to South Korea. Hierarchical orders even exist within a migrant group or a co-ethnic group. Korean Chinese resented being put low in the hierarchy. Ironically, they often facilitated the formation of the hierarchy, with their strong sense of entitlement.

Key words:
South Korea, Multiculturalism, Korean Chinese, Ethnic Return Migration, Citizenship, Ethno-national Consciousness, Ethnic Nationalism, Membership, Co-ethnic Preference.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

“…I was humiliated, abused and defrauded by South Koreans, and eventually forced to leave South Korea. It was my fault that I became an illegal migrant. However, if the South Korean government allowed easy access to South Korea, I would not have become an illegal migrant. South Koreans who treated us so badly are now trying to support foreigners with multiculturalism. It is ridiculous. Why do they not help co-ethnics first? …”

—An extract taken from the interviews of Mr. SZ Xu, a 57-year-old farmer in Yanbian¹, China (Interview Date: 15 October 2010)

“…Multiculturalism will cause pure Korean blood to be mixed with other blood. Hearing people of different looks and colours claim they are Koreans makes me shudder…I cannot understand why South Koreans want to start down this risky road of multiculturalism with the current tiny foreign population. The two percent of foreign population is like drops of ink in the sea…”

—An extract taken from the interviews of Mr. JG Yeo, a 30-year-old student in Daejeon, South Korea (Interview Date: 16 August 2010)

Introduction
This chapter introduces my research aims and the major themes of this thesis. After an overview of the thesis’ organisation, my theoretical framework is presented and followed by an introduction to the research background. The theoretical framework is derived from a critique of established research on ethnicity, nation, nationalism, nation-state building, migration and multiculturalism. The introduction to the research background includes

¹ Yanbian is a Korean Autonomous Prefecture in southeastern Jilin Province, China, just north of the border with North Korea.
accounts of South Korea’s social and ideological transition and of Korean Chinese\(^2\), including their history, culture, ethnic return migration and ethno-national identities. My research contributes to the field of ethnic return migration, identity constructions, nationalism, nation-building, the concept of citizenship and South Korean multiculturalism.

1.1 Research Aims and Major Themes

My aim is to contribute to the scholarly debates on nation, nationalism, ethnicity and multiculturalism by examining: South Korea’s concept and practice of ethno-national membership after the adoption of multiculturalism and transition to a multicultural society; and the influences of the changing ideas and practice of South Korea’s membership on Korean Chinese, especially in terms of their ethno-national identities. Korean Chinese make a good case study because they are: (1) the largest migrant, co-ethnic, and “naturalised citizen” group in South Korea. They are also a unique group that has been influenced by a variety of types of nationalism and multiculturalism in South Korea and China.

To understand the ethno-national membership of South Koreans in this transnational era, I explore two main issues. The first issue consists of changes in South Korea’s laws and policies related to naturalisation and citizenship after 2006, taking into consideration the close link between the extended range of citizenship and creating a multicultural society. The second issue consists of changes in South Korea’s laws and policies towards overseas Koreans and co-ethnic migrants in South Korea, considering these changes indicates the social and ideological transition in South Korea. To understand the influence of South Korea’s concept and practice of ethno-national membership on Korean Chinese, I explore five main questions: (1) how the primordial and/or modernist understandings of Korean Chinese on ethnicity and nationality have affected their understandings of South Korean multiculturalism; (2) how their different understandings of South Korean multiculturalism have affected themselves and the Korean Chinese communities; (3) how Korean Chinese perceive the South Korean government policies towards Korean Chinese; (4) how the

\(^2\) The reason I chose to use the term ‘Korean Chinese’, rather than ‘Chosŏnjok’, which has become more widely used in scholarship in English, is that my informants felt uncomfortable with the term ‘Chosŏnjok’, being aware of its negative nuance among many South Koreans. In addition, my informants understood and used the term ‘Chosŏnjok’ in many different ways, as will be discussed in Chapter 6.
changes in South Korea’s laws and policies have affected Korean Chinese in terms of their migration and settlement in South Korea; and (5) how the different migration experiences of Korean Chinese have influenced their ethno-national consciousness.

1.2 Outline of the Thesis

This thesis is composed of seven chapters including this introduction. In the next Chapter, Chapter 2, I provide detailed information about the research design and methodology, starting with a discussion of the preliminary stage of the research, which included consultation with experts, a pilot study and preparation for fieldwork. Then the variety of data collection methods is detailed, including participant observation, focus group discussions, in-depth interviews, internet-based research and a review of existing research and government documents. Next I explain the different types of analyses used in this study that include thematic and comparative analysis. Lastly, the reliability of this research is briefly discussed with reference to the role of the researcher, who might be considered an insider at times.

Chapter 3 provides an overview of the diverse responses of Korean Chinese towards South Korea’s social and ideological transition in order to provide the context and reference for the main analysis chapters. First, a full description of the demographic, socio-economic and cultural environmental backgrounds of the participants is provided to clarify the factors influencing the responses. Then, reasons mentioned by participants for their responses are analysed in association with their different commitment to ethnic nationalism and their different understandings of the term ‘multiculturalism’. Lastly, the significance of the wide range of responses is analysed to pave the way for the three analysis chapters that follow.

Chapters 4 to 6 are the main body of this thesis in which various themes extracted from the responses of the participants are analysed in detail. Direct quotations of some representative responses are incorporated into these chapters to lead and support arguments, and add colour and vividness. My thematic and comparative analysis of data primarily drew from theories of nationalism, multiculturalism and ethno-national identity transformations. Chapter 4 examines the practices of ethno-national membership in South Korea, focusing on its policies towards Korean Chinese. I delineate how such practices have influenced Korean Chinese in terms of their migration and settlement in South Korea, and further, their ethno-national consciousness. This chapter starts by documenting the confusion of many Korean Chinese as to whether or not the South Korean government has incorporated them into multiculturalism.
policy. This is followed by a full description of the South Korean policies towards Korean Chinese. Then, the understandings of Korean Chinese that South Korea’s policies towards them denied the membership of Korean Chinese in the Korean nation are analysed. Lastly I examine South Korea’s definition of the ‘Korean nation’ in multicultural South Korea.

In Chapter 5 I analyse the formation of hierarchical nationhood in contemporary multicultural South Korea; how such hierarchical nationhood has put Korean Chinese low in South Korean society with migrants who have no Korean heritage; how Korean Chinese perceive such practices as disregarding the Korean ethnicity of Korean Chinese; and how such understandings by Korean Chinese influenced their ethno-national consciousness. This chapter begins with an analysis of the strong commitment of many participants to Korean ethnic homogeneity and their hopes of national belonging in their ancestral homeland. Then I discuss hierarchical nationhood in South Korea, which often repositions immigrants (including co-ethnic migrants) according to the economic power of their country of origin and by the individual’s qualification or profession. Lastly, an in-depth analysis follows of how Korean Chinese have been situated low in South Korean society; and how this positioning has frustrated their hopes of belonging to the Korean nation and influenced their ethno-national consciousness in subtle and comprehensive ways.

Chapter 6 analyses many South Koreans’ consistent reluctance to embrace Korean Chinese as members of the Korean nation even after the government’s advocacy to include people of non-Korean heritage; and the influence of this on the ethno-national and cultural consciousness of Korean Chinese in the context of the Chinese government’s policy of active engagement with Korean Chinese. This chapter begins with the deep concern of many participants that South Korea is losing its homogeneous Korean culture in its pursuit of a multicultural society, especially given the ambition of Chinese to subject the culture of Korean Chinese to Chinese culture. Next, the policies of the Chinese government towards Korean Chinese are analysed along with many participants’ differing responses. Lastly I

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3 Although this is generally the case, the realities of South Korea’s policy are more complicated. For instance, the South Korean government offers automatic citizenship to North Koreans, and citizenship and residence to ethnic Koreans from Sakhalin. These policies will also be analysed in Chapter 5.
summarise the identities of Korean Chinese, who have been baffled by the divergence between Korean nationalism and Chinese nationalism.

The main conclusions arising from this thesis are in Chapter 7. This final chapter comprises two parts: a summary of major themes and empirical findings; and a discussion of the significance of this research. First, I revisit the major topics and findings of this thesis. Next, the academic significance and social and political implications with which these findings can be integrated are suggested, along with methodological considerations.

1.3 Theoretical Overview: Nations, Nationalism and Nation-State Building
This section explores prominent academic views of nations, nationalism and nation-state building. The collection of work under “The Nationalism Project” (Zuelow 2009) has been particularly valuable to me in this study. Definitions of ‘nation’ and ‘nationalism’ have been debated along with their origins and developments (e.g. how and when nations first appeared) among a wide range of theorists of nation and nationalism (e.g. primordialists, nationalists, perennialists and modernists). This section begins with the discussion of the origins, basis and definitions of nation and nationalism, based on primordialist and modernist perspectives, which are the major bodies of thought in this field. This is followed by a brief comparison of ‘nation’ and ‘state’. Then an introduction of the two major contrastive forms of nationalism follows, in association with an overview of nation-state building process. This section ends with a discussion of ethnicity, ethnic boundary, the relationship of ethnic groups and ethnic identities, based on Barth’s ([1969]1998) theoretical framework. These ideas will become the theoretical framework of this study to analyse the understandings of Korean Chinese on the formation of Korean nation and Chinese nation, Korean nationalism and Chinese nationalism.

1.3.1 Origins, Basis and Definitions of Nation and Nationalism
The origins, basis and definitions of nation and nationalism have been disputed and have attracted a wide range of explanations. I will introduce some of the theories, upon which I will develop my own arguments. Primordialist and modernist perspectives are the two most predominant perspectives in this field. Primordialists underline the function of shared ethnicity and kinship as being a fundamental part of nation-building (Shils 1972; Smith 1986; Berghe 1981). Primordialists perceive nations as natural groups based on ethnicity, and nationalism as “a reflection of the ancient and perceived evolutionary tendency of humans to
organise into distinct groupings based on an affinity of birth” (Encyclopedia of Nationalism 2001, 251).

Primordialist understandings underlie the significance of ethnicity and cultural bonds in the formation of the Korean nation. South Korea adhered to characteristics of a primordialist nation until recently, and South Koreans recognise the roots of the Korean nation as stemming from a pre-modern tradition. However, the primordial Korean nation can also be analysed in modernist terms (e.g. claims of ethnic homogeneity as a nation-building strategy) due to the distinction between scholarly work with these assumption and what nations themselves adhere to. Primordialist ideas are also critical in explaining the large number of participants with a bond with the members of the Korean nation, in which they include all ethnic Koreans, in and out of the Korean peninsula. For them, ethnicity is the major argument mobilised in creating Korean identity, as will be elaborated in later chapters.

In contrast, modernist understandings are essential in explaining the perceptions of Korean Chinese on the origin and basis of the Chinese nation and the Chinese nationalism, and in explaining how Korean Chinese imagine bond with Chinese. According to modernist understanding, nationalism emerged and spread in modern societies accompanying an industrial economy, a centralised power that enables the maintenance of authority and unity, and a unified language that leads to easy communication among people (Anderson 1983). Anderson, with European models of nation in mind, defines a nation as an imagined political community constructed as a required element of industrialism. He sees nation as imagined because its members never know most other members, no matter how small the nation is. This idea of nation as an imagined community will be used in explaining the perceptions of Korean Chinese of their being members of the Korean nation and of the Chinese nation. Anderson also sees nation as limited because a nation has a restricted boundary no matter how large the nation is. Handler (1988), like Anderson (1983), sees nation as restricted in space, but he also sees the nation as restricted in time. This idea of nation as restricted in space will be used in explaining many participants’ exclusive commitment to the inviolability of the borders of the Korean nation.

Anderson (1983) puts print capitalism at the core of his theory. He claims that capitalist entrepreneurs printed books and other media in the vernacular to maximise circulation, and such printed material enabled readers who spoke different local dialects to understand each
other and also enabled national cultures to be uniquely constructed. Anderson claims that print enabled national consciousness to transcend geographical boundaries of interaction, which allowed people to feel a sense of allegiance and unity. In contemporary Korean Chinese community, TV and the Internet are more relevant to their Korean nation building and Chinese nation building. I will use this idea of the significance of the media of social communication (e.g. press, TV and Internet) in solidifying feelings of national identity among members of the ‘imagined community’ to analyse the sense of homogeneity Korean Chinese felt with members of the Korean nation and of the Chinese nation.

Hastings (1997), like Anderson, explains the importance of an expansively consumed vernacular literature for the formation of a nation-state, particularly one which is composed of many ethnic groups. Hechter (2000) argues that a conscious attempt to assimilate culturally distinctive territories in a state is part of a state-nation building process, and this process often creates state-building nationalism, which is culturally inclusive, contrasting with unifying a nation-state through excluding cultural aliens. The Chinese Communist Party leaders tried to simplify classic Chinese and to spread the education of ‘standard Chinese’, and to assimilate ethnic minorities within the mainstream culture, in order to build linguistic and cultural ties. Hroch (1996) postulates that building linguistic and cultural ties is vital for building a nation-state. In fact, many countries have been through similar processes of achieving homogeneity. A recall of shared history and a notion of the equivalence of social associates are also crucial for the nation-state building, Hroch suggests.

I also borrow the notion of nation as a social entity, based on the individuals’ sacrifice and willingness to compromise their private interest for the sake of the national will, in order to explain the understanding of Korean Chinese of the Korean nation as being built on Koreans’ sacrifice for the nation through a long and complicated process of historical development in general, but particularly in the face of foreign threats and domestic turmoil. The notion of nation as a social entity is frequently debated. Renan ([1882] 1996) sees solidarity as a hallmark of a nation, and considers that the sacrifices that the members of a nation have made and will make in the future constitutes large-scale solidarity. Greenfeld (1995) sees that a nation exists because its members do not intend to separate national interests from their private interests.
Some theorists talk about nationalism as a political theory and practice. Gellner (1983) argues that nationalism invents nations, and defines nationalism as fundamental to the consistency of the political and national unit. Breuilly (1985) sees nationalism as political movements pursuing state power and justifying such actions with nationalist arguments. Similarly, Hastings (1997) sees nationalism as a political theory and practice aiming to provide a nation with a state or to promote the benefits of the nation-state. Hastings also notices nationalism’s authorising the members of a nation-state. Likewise, Greenfeld (1992) notes nationalism made the members of a nation-state liberated and equal. I will explain the understandings of Korean Chinese concerning Chinese nationalism and their political Chinese identities in terms of the views of nationalism as a political theory and a practice of pursuing state power and national interest as well as of empowering the members of the nation.

The terms ‘Korean nation’ (‘chaoxian minzu’/‘chosŏn minjok’\(^4\)) and ‘Chinese nation’ (‘zhonghua minzu’/‘chunghwa minjok’\(^5\)) are frequently mentioned by most participants. Their understandings of the word ‘nation’ (‘minzu’/‘minjok’\(^6\)) in ‘Korean nation’ and ‘Chinese nation’ are often different from each other in these two contexts. Possession of the ‘same racial characteristics’\(^7\) was stressed when they mentioned ‘Korean nation’, whilst possession of the same national characteristics was stressed when they mentioned ‘Chinese nation’. My informants did not use the term ‘state’ much, and when they did, their original word for ‘state’ is ‘guojia’/‘kukka’\(^8\), which is easily distinguishable from ‘minzu’/‘minjok’. However, many participants often identified ‘Korean nation’ with ‘Korean state’. Such understandings of ‘Korean nation’ and ‘South Korean state’ without distinction led to their easy assumption that Korean Chinese were denied as members of the Korean nation, which in fact was the South Korean state. Using the work of Handler (1988) and Gellner (1983), I maintain that nation and state are different. Handler concludes, nation and state both are well-organised and accurately defined social entities; but a nation is commonly understood as a less calculating and more sentimental aspect of collective reality, whilst a state is commonly understood as a more rational and power-concentrating political organisation. Gellner argues

\(^4\) 朝鲜民族/조선민족
\(^5\) 中华民族/중화민족
\(^6\) 民族/민족
\(^7\) 同族性/동족성
\(^8\) 国家/국가
that nation and state are destined for each other, but their emergence is independent and contingent, thus, not every nation controls its state nor does state correspond to nation.

1.3.2 Ethnic Nationalism and Civic Nationalism
Korean Chinese have been influenced by two types of nationalism from their ethnic homeland and natal homeland. The type of nationalism from their ethnic homeland has the characteristics of ethnic nationalism. The notion of ethnic nationalism is based on common descent, language and culture (Muller 2008). Ethnic nationalists believe that ethnicity remains the same, and the pre-existing ethnic characteristics are what hold people together (Muller 2008). Hence, nation-states with strong traditions of ethnic nationalism (e.g. South Korea) define political membership or citizenship by *jus sanguinis*, the law of blood.

Ethnic nationalism, as a non-geopolitically bound concept (Smith 1994), is often used widely in diaspora studies to explain a collective of dispersed ethnics (Safran 2008). Many countries’ immigration policies seem to propagate ethnic nationalism, as they allow automatic or rapid citizenship to diasporas (Muller 2008). This is illustrated by the facts that Greek nationality law allows Greeks born abroad to transmit citizenship to their children indefinitely (Hadary 1999); and South Korean nationality law grants citizenship to ethnic Koreans from Sakhalin9. The South Korean government also grants automatic citizenship to North Korean defectors. However, rather than being granted merely on the *jus sanguinis* principle, the citizenship of North Korean defectors is based on South Korea’s constitution, which defines the political community of ‘Korea’ as being the whole Korean peninsula. This explains why the South Korean government is more reluctant in ‘accepting’ Korean Chinese despite their shared Korean ethnicity. Unfortunately, many Korean Chinese regard themselves as belonging to the Korean nation. The conflict of understandings (and expectations) of the Korean nation between Korean Chinese and the South Korean state will be analysed in the main chapters.

The type of nationalism of People’s Republic of China has the characteristics of civic nationalism. Civic nationalism defines a nation by common citizenship or political membership regardless of ethnicity, language and culture (Renan [1882] 1996; Nash 2001). Renan sees a nation as an everyday process of the members continuing to live together. He

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9 Sakhalin is Russia’s island, being just off the east coast of Russia and north of Japan.
considers membership of a civic nation as each person’s obligation to obey laws and thereby receive legal privileges. Nash (2001, 391) has a more fixed idea, defining a civic nation as “an association of people who identify themselves as belonging to the nation, who have equal and shared political rights and allegiance to similar political procedures.” Tamir (1993) and Greenfeld (1995) talk about the values of civic nationalism. Tamir sees civic nationalism as having liberal values of freedom, tolerance and equality; and a civic nation as a community of equal, rights-bearing citizens, united in patriotic attachment to a shared set of political practices and values. Greenfeld sees a civic nation as democratic because it recognises the freedom of all citizens, vests sovereignty in all citizens, and claims self-governing rights and rights for all citizens.

1.3.3 Ethnicity, Ethnic Boundary, Relationship of Ethnic Groups and Ethnic Identities

Barth’s ([1969]1998) theoretical framework provides a way into my analysis of ethnicity, ethnic boundary, the relationship of ethnic groups and ethnic identities. Barth suggests an approach that focuses on the continuing negotiations of boundaries between ethnic groups, stressing interdependency and interaction as the key feature of ethnic groups. Korean Chinese have mingled with different ethnic groups, but overwhelmingly Han Chinese, in China. As Barth suggests, ethnic groups are not intermittent cultural isolates, but have a continuous interface. Being bilingual and bicultural, most Korean Chinese are able to do a relatively high level of social communication in China.

After their migration to South Korea, Korean Chinese have encountered local Koreans, with whom they share ethnicity. However, despite the shared ethnicity and the firm belief of most Korean Chinese in their shared culture with South Koreans, the two groups of Koreans soon discovered differences in many ways, and such differences have separated the two groups and affected their relationship (Song 2007, 2009; Lee 2005a, 2005b; Seol 2006; Hong, Song, and Park 2013). Borrowing Barth’s theoretical framework on ethnicity from within and outside an ethnic group, the interdependency and interaction of Korean Chinese with local South Koreans and the mainstream Han Chinese will be analysed in the main chapters.

Furthermore, the interconnectedness of ethnic identities proposed by Barth ([1969]1998) is highly relevant in learning about the identities (and the identity constructions) of Korean Chinese, both in China and in South Korea. Barth understands ethnic identities as the product of constant ascriptions and self-ascriptions; and sees ethnic identities come into being, and be
maintained, through relational procedures of inclusion and exclusion. Barth (9) writes, ethnic
distinctions “entail social processes of exclusion and incorporation whereby discrete
categories are maintained despite changing participation and membership in the course of
individual life histories.”

1.4 South Korea’s Transition from a Homogeneous to a Multicultural Society
South Korea used to be regarded as one of the most homogeneous nation-states in the world,
with a shared ancestral lineage and common culture (Shin 2006). Recently, however, South
Korea has been engaged in a swift process of transition to a multicultural society. The influx
of foreign capital and labour resources, which were encouraged by the South Korean
government to boost the national economy, has reshaped South Korea as multicultural.
Following the announcement of the South Korean government entering a multicultural
society in 2006 (H. Lee 2009), a tremendous change has occurred in South Korea, most
noticeably, in ideology and government policies, which will be outlined in more detail below.
But first I explain in some detail the demographic changes, which are closely entailed in these
policy changes. An increase of foreign population and the consequent cultural diversity is an
important index of a multicultural society. Oh (2007) argues that South Korea can be said to
be switching to a multicultural society since its population composition became diverse and
the culture subsequently became diverse.

1.4.1 Demographic Change: From Homogeneity to Multi-ethnicity
South Korea maintained an ideology of ethnic homogeneity until the early 1980s (Shin 2006)
despite a continuous inflow of a range of people from outside the Korean peninsula
throughout the centuries. It was possible to maintain that ideology because most Koreans
believed that only a few migrants remained in the Korean peninsula permanently, a view that
historians (e.g. Duncan 2000) would strongly dispute. The number of people of foreign origin,
which used to be believed to be small enough to neglect, suddenly increased in the late 1980s
with South Korea’s emergence as an economic powerhouse. The idea of a multicultural South
Korea seemed increasingly credible with the mounting number of migrant communities
appearing nationwide. This is particularly apparent in metropolitan and industrial cities, to
which migrants flocked in large numbers in the midst of South Korea’s economic growth.

Figure 1.1 shows the increase of foreign entries (including crews and tourists) between 1985
(769,000) and 2011 (9,765,902) (Korea Immigration Service 2011a, 2012). The year 1995
was a turning point, after which there was a sharp increase in the number of foreign entries for seven years in a row. Since reaching 5,028,000 in 2001 from approximately 1,446,000 in 1995, the number of foreign entries shows a stable rate of increase, except for a sudden and brief decrease in 2003 (4,658,000) due to the aftermath of the financial crisis which struck Asian countries. The Ministry of Justice of South Korea sees the continuous increase of foreign entries as the result of the ‘Korean wave’\textsuperscript{10}, a high-quality immigration service, the simplification of visa issuing for Chinese and citizens of Southwest Asian countries, and government support for foreign tourism (Korea Immigration Service 2012).

![Foreign Entries](image)

Figure 1.1: Foreign Entries (including crews and tourists)
Source: Korea Immigration Service 2011a, 2012

Foreign sojourners are defined as foreign nationals who stay in South Korea for more than 90 days. Figure 1.2 shows the number of foreign sojourners between 2001 and 2011. The number of foreign sojourners passed a million for the first time in history in 2007, and stood at 1,395,077 in December 2011 (Korea Immigration Service 2012). This increase is a result of the expansion of the number of migrants due to the labour shortage in small and medium-sized firms, and, more recently, the expansion of the Overseas Koreans visa (F-4) and Permanent Resident visa (F-5) to co-ethnics (Korea Immigration Service 2012).

\textsuperscript{10} The ‘Korean wave’ refers to a surge in the visibility and popularity of South Korean culture, beginning in the late 1990s in Asia and soon expanding to other parts of the world (Ravina 2009).
In contrast to the rapid growth of the population of migrants in South Korea at the turn of the twenty-first century, the local South Korean population recorded a stable increase (e.g. 49,268,928 in 2007; 49,540,367 in 2008; 49,773,145 in 2009; 50,515,666 in 2010; and 50,734,284 in 2011) (Korea Immigration Service 2012). Accordingly, the percentage of the migrant population in the total South Korean population increased steadily, as Figure 1.3 shows, reaching 2.75% in 2011 (Korea Immigration Service 2012). The percentage of the migrant population in the South Korean population will increase further, considering the low birth rate of South Korea, which barely reached 1.06% (Y. Kim 2010). Y. Kim suggested that a birth rate of at least 2.1% is required in order to maintain South Korea’s present population.

Not only is the rapid growth of migrants noteworthy, but so too is the diversity of their origins. Foreigner in South Korea were from 137 countries, with Chinese the largest group (48.6%, n=677,954) (Korea Immigration Service 2012). The next largest group of migrants came from the United States, numbering 132,133 (9.5%), which includes the 30,000 US military personnel stationed in South Korea; followed by Vietnam (8.3%, n=116,219), Japan
(4.2%, n=58,169), the Philippines (3.4%, n=47,542) and Thailand (3.3%, n=45,634) (Korea Immigration Service 2012). Figure 1.4 shows the percentage of migrants by nationality.

![Figure 1.4: Foreign Migrants by Nationality](source)

Source: Korea Immigration Service 2012

The most important source of ethnic diversity in South Korea comes from international marriages, which produces a large population of non-Korean decent citizens. International marriages in South Korea were initially limited to rural men who had difficulty in finding local brides, but soon expanded to bachelors in urban areas and so now the phenomenon is visible nationwide. With South Korean government support (e.g. subsidising some or all of the expenses for marriage for rural men), the number of international marriages increased rapidly, passing 145,000 in December 2011, accounting for 16.7% of the total number of marriages in South Korea (Korea Immigration Service 2012). The rising proportion of international marriage counters the country’s historic construction of ethnic homogeneity.

Figure 1.5 shows the number of marriage migrants by gender and by nationality based on the *First Quarter Korea Immigration Service Statistics of 2011* (Korea Immigration Service 2011b). Marriage migrants were originally from more than 100 countries but mostly from developing countries, generally poorer than South Korea. Among the 143,004 marriage migrants as of March 2011, Chinese are the largest group (with half of this group being Korean Chinese), accounting for 46.6% of the entire marriage migrant population, followed by Vietnamese (25.1%), Japanese (7.4%) and the Philippines (5.4%).
By gender, as seen from Figure 1.5, the majority of marriage migrants in South Korea are female, accounting for 86.8% in the first quarter of 2011 (Korea Immigration Service 2011b). This means that international marriages in South Korea were predominantly between South Korean men and foreign women. Cambodian and Vietnamese marriage migrants had the most uneven sex ratio: female marriage migrants accounted for 99.87% and 99.53% respectively. On the other hand, Korean Chinese have the highest proportion of males to females: male marriage migrants accounted for 24.4% of the entire Korean Chinese marriage migrant population (31,370) in March 2011 (Korea Immigration Service 2011b). This unusual statistical phenomenon, in my view, is partly the result of many Korean Chinese males marrying Korean Chinese females who have obtained South Korean citizenship.

Another group that has significantly contributed to speeding up the ethnic diversity in South Korea is migrant workers. The massive influx of migrant workers started in the late 1980s after South Korea’s successful hosting of the 1988 Summer Olympic Games in Seoul, which effectively advertised South Korea as a promising labour-importing country. South Korea’s labour importation has been caused by its labour shortage, particularly in non-professional areas (e.g. manufacturing, construction and domestic service sectors). By December 2011, the number of foreigners who entered with non-professional employment visas (E-9) passed 234,000, with the majority being hired to provide cheap labour for positions that are normally shunned by local South Koreans (Korea Immigration Service 2012).

Ethnic-Korean migrants, who ‘returned’ generations after their ancestors left the Korean peninsula, are another increasingly important source for speeding up cultural diversity in South Korean society. By the end of 2011, the number of such “ethnic return migrants”
(Tsuda 2003; Song 2009) in South Korea reached 550,931 (Korea Immigration Service 2012). By nationality, the largest group came from China (86.6%, n=477,163), followed by the United States (7.4%, n=40,786) and Canada (2.1%, n=11,351) (Korea Immigration Service 2012). These migrants often formed distinctive cultural communities in South Korea as a result of their long absence from South Korea.

Nevertheless, none of these groups is a match for North Korean defectors in causing diversity and even social division due to the unique social and cultural environment of North Korea and the complicated inter-Korea relationship. The number of North Korean defectors in South Korea, reaching 24,934 by March 2013 (Ministry of Unification 2013b), is insignificant considering the number of other groups such as Korean Chinese and Korean Americans at the corresponding time. Despite being such a numerical minority, the influx of North Korean defectors to South Korea sent a shockwave through South Korean society. The challenging conditions that North Korean defectors experienced in North Korea have caused them to be maladjusted to the highly competitive market economy and democracy of South Korean society, which has made them of little value economically compared to other co-ethnic groups (Seol and Skrentny 2009), and caused their low social standing in South Korea (J Lee 2002a; Yoo 2010). Moreover, South Koreans have negative perceptions towards North Korean defectors (Chung 2007), and their sense of distance from North Koreans acts as a mechanism to marginalise North Koreans (S. Hong 2009).

1.4.2 Change in Ideology: From Korean Ethnic Nationalism to Multiculturalism

Ethnic Nationalism

The force of Korean notions of nationalism has been overwhelming over the last century in South Korea. Koreans’ nationalism is connected with their belief in a common origin, which produces a collective sense of oneness (Schmid 1997). Ethnic nationalism in Korea has undergone changes in form and content many times over its history, but its role as a principle power to gain independence and national development has not changed much (K. Kim 2006). In the pre-modern era, Korean notions of nationalism were quite weak. Instead, the conception of China as the centre of (Confucian) civilisation was overwhelming. A hint of

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11 By visa type, Working Visit visa (55.1%, n=303,368) is predominant among ethnic-Korean migrants, followed by Overseas Koreans visa (24.8%, n=136,702) and Permanent Residency (6.6%, n=36,162).
ethnic nationalism appeared during the Choson Dynasty (1392-1910) (Palais 1998). In the late nineteenth century, a collective idea concerned with the defence of sovereignty and cultural values was shaped in the face of foreign threat (Pai, Tangherlini, and Palais 1998); and in the early twentieth century, a unified ethno-national identity of Koreans developed in reaction to imperial colonialism (K. Kim 2006).

National division, which divided the Korean peninsula into the Republic of Korea and Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, intensified Koreans’ efforts to defend themselves against foreign threat (K. Kim 2006). Both Koreas have actively promoted nationalism and defined citizenship by *jus sanguinis*. South Korea’s development of nationalism was relatively slow and chaotic, and failed to remove collaborators with the Japanese from the high ranks; whilst North Korea’s development of nationalism was comparatively swift, and succeeded in expelling foreign influences, but led to a dictatorial political system whereby absolute power is held by one person/family (Palais 1998; Cumings 2005).

Ethnic nationalism has been an important influence on Korean society for many years, and is as strong as ever in South Korea, as revealed by, among many others, the Overseas Koreans Act, which gives preference to overseas Koreans in many regards (J. Lee 2002a, 2010; Seol and Skrentny 2004). As Myers (2010) argues, few South Koreans dispute the ethnic homogeneity of the Korean nation; instead, they have a firm faith that Koreans are descended from a sole bloodline in spite of the proof of the varied composition of the population of the Korean peninsula. Furthermore, as Lim (2009) argues, the Korean identity, to which South Korean society is intimately tied, is still based on a rigid ethnic-cultural definition.

Unfortunately, South Koreans’ emphasis on homogeneity in both ethnicity and culture often led to severe discrimination towards people without the required characteristics. Lim (2009) argues that people who lack a pure blood relationship with South Koreans have been rejected as outsiders, no matter how adapted they become to South Korean society; and ethnic-Korean migrants have experienced discrimination in South Korea due to a demand for shared culture that is just as strict as the demand for shared ethnicity. Undoubtedly, such a strong emphasis on homogeneity caused social tension, which became even more significant in the face of the increasing number of migrants, which brought dramatic changes to South Korean society in terms of its demographic, cultural and social composition.
The emerging diversity brought to South Korean society a sudden interest in multiculturalism around the year 2000, and that interest reached its peak in 2006, when the South Korean government launched policies based on multiculturalism (Kim et al. 2012). This was indicated in the increasing frequency of the appearance of the term ‘multiculturalism’ in news articles: from 235 news articles in the ten years between 1990 and 1999, to 469 in the single year 2006 (H. Kim 2012). Acknowledging that the trend towards a multicultural society was uncontrollable and that ethnic nationalism worked against such a trend, the South Korean government announced that it had decided to adopt multiculturalism as the basis of national policy in 2006. In the following section, I will discuss the meteoric rise of multiculturalism in South Korea, and the policies of the South Korean government based on multiculturalism.

South Korean Multiculturalism and Policies based on Multiculturalism

In 2006, under the Presidency of Roh Moo-Hyun, the South Korean government declared South Korea’s transition to a multicultural society, and announced a “Grand Plan” aimed to push South Korean society towards an integrated society inclusive of foreign migrants and part-Koreans (Oh 2007; J. Lee 2010). The Presidential Committee on Social Inclusion adopted the Act on Social Integration of Mixed-race Koreans and Migrants and the Act on Social Integration of Marriage Immigrants in 2006. The National Assembly passed these two Acts in 2007: the 2007 Basic Policy Orientation for People of Mixed Culture and Foreign Migrants and the 2007 Social Integration Policy for Marriage Migrants (see Table 1.1).

Starting with these two polices, which were a symbolic event that opened up a multicultural era in South Korea, acts and policies based on the idea of multiculturalism have continually been reaffirmed. For instance, the Basic Act on the Treatment of Foreigners (hereafter Basic Act) was passed by the National Assembly in May 2007 (see Table 1.1). The Basic Act was different from former legislation that concentrated on immigration and border control; the Act tried to establish a framework to incorporate migrants and to promote social integration (Kim et al. 2012). The First Basic Plan for Immigration Policy (2008-2012) (hereafter First Basic Plan) was implemented to answer the call of the Basic Act (Kim et al. 2012).

Table 1.1: South Korean Policies based on Multiculturalism
Female marriage migrants and their children are central to the goal of the South Korean government in realising social integration (Kim et al. 2012). The basic frame of support for female marriage migrants was established by the Committee of Low-birth and Old-ageing Society. Female marriage migrants are supposed to be provided with government support (e.g. free education, counselling, medical support and visiting nurses during pregnancy) under the Social Integration Policy for Marriage Immigrants (2007), the Basic Act (2007), National Minimum Living Standard Security Act and Maternity Protection Act (2007). The greatest of the benefits that female marriage migrants can get is naturalisation through a simplified process. Unfortunately, the South Korean government’s assistance for female marriage migrants is often criticised for being a mere countermeasure to a decreasing population (e.g. by focusing on the maintenance of the family and child-upbringing) while ignoring the goal of pursuing social integration (Oh 2007). Additionally, it is also criticised for discriminating against migrant families that do not include a Korean national as a member (J. Lee 2010).

For children born of marriage migrants and South Koreans, the focus of assistance is to help them survive in South Korean society. For these children, the South Korean government designed the ‘multicultural textbook’, trained teachers in public schools to assist these children to adapt to school, provided free private tutors for after-class study, and most important of all, introduced legal measures to ban racial discrimination.

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12 The term ‘female marriage migrants’ has been used in the official documents in South Korea since 2005 to distinguish marriage-based female migrants from the labour-based female migrants. Before then, the term ‘female foreign workers’ was used indiscriminately for all female migrants in South Korea.
Migrant workers, too, benefit from the policies based on multiculturalism, although they did not get as much attention as did marriage migrants. Migrant workers often fell into a dead zone in terms of government support, being exposed to exploitation and to violation of their rights and being ineligible for medical welfare (e.g. medical insurance and medical care). However, this does not mean that the South Korean government did not make any efforts to resolve these continuing issues related to migrant workers. In fact, the South Korean government, even before the policy of multiculturalism was adopted, occasionally offered free medical check-ups and medication to migrant workers. For instance, the Ministry of Health and Welfare provided medical support for migrant workers, including illegal migrants who used to be ineligible for medical welfare, and such medical support soon began to expand in size and range. This welfare originated from general humanitarian and practical concerns, and is different from multiculturalism policies.

Underage children of illegal migrants also benefit from welfare for migrant workers. The population of these children was tiny because children of migrant workers were not allowed to follow their parent(s) to South Korea, under the Employment Permit System. Even when they were born in South Korea, it was difficult for them to get legal status and so they became illegal residents in South Korea. Because of their (or their parent’s) undocumented legal status, these children used to have difficulty in getting a proper education in South Korea. Since 2010, however, they have had access to school education once their residence in South Korea is proved, after the revision of the Enforcement Ordinance.

**Naturalisation and Permanent Settlement of Migrants**

The multicultural nature of South Korea is most noticeable in its rising rates of naturalisation and permanent settlement of migrants. The accumulated number of naturalised citizens since the establishment of the Republic of Korea passed 100,000 in January 2011 and reached 128,276 at the end of the same year (Korea Immigration Service 2012). The number of naturalised citizens in South Korea is not that impressive, considering the South Korean

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13 In 2009, the Ministry of Health and Welfare provided a 4,600 million won (4.26 million USD) fund for free medical treatment for migrant workers. Each migrant worker can be funded up to 5 million won. The amended Foreigner Free Medical Treatment Manual in 2010 increased the medical treatment fee, such that one migrant worker patient can be reimbursed up to the amount of 10 million won (Korea Immigration Service 2011a).
population, which passed 50 million on 23 June, 2012 (Korean Statistical Information Service 2012). Nevertheless, this is a significant phenomenon, given that 98.8% of naturalisations happened in a mere 11 years between 2000 and 2011 (see Figure 1.6).

![Accumulated Number of Naturalised Citizens](image)

**Figure 1.6: Accumulated Number of Naturalised Citizens in South Korea**  
**Source:** Korea Immigration Service 2012

Since the first naturalisation in 1957\(^4\), only 214 cases of naturalisation occurred before 1990. This was mainly the result of the strict eligibility criteria and a complicated procedure for naturalisation. Applicants used to be required to submit extensive documentation and to pass examinations and interviews after passing through document screening. As a result, naturalisation in South Korea had been insignificant until the year 2000 (see Figure 1.6), and fewer than 1,500 cases of naturalisation occurred in South Korea between 1948 and 2000, with the majority happening in a short period between 1991 and 2000.

Entering the twenty-first century, the number of naturalised citizens increased at an unprecedented pace. The average annual increase between 2001 and 2011 was 12,678, which was a sharp contrast to the average annual increase of the previous decade (34). In the single year 2009, 26,756 people succeeded in naturalisation (Korea Immigration Service 2012). By previous nationality of naturalised citizens, Chinese were the largest group (63.1%, \(n=11,599\)), of which the majority were Korean Chinese; and Vietnamese (17.8%, \(n=3,269\)) and Filipinos (2.8%, \(n=517\)) were the second and third largest group respectively, with the majority being female marriage migrants (Korea Immigration Service 2012).

\(^{14}\) The new citizen was Ilsung Son, who was of Taiwanese nationality.
The increase in naturalisation is inseparable from the increasing desire of migrants for permanent settlement in South Korea. Requests from migrants for South Korean citizenship before 2000 were insignificant in number, as can be seen from Figure 1.7. Only 781 applications were made in 1993, and the number went up by less than double in the following seven years, reaching 1,268 in 2000. In contrast, requests for South Korean citizenship increased at an astonishing rate since 2000 – more than 20 times in the following six years – and reached 27,077 in 2006. Following the peak in 2006, the number of applications for naturalisation has remained stable, fluctuating between 23,505 (2007) and 25,350 (2010).

Many factors contributed to the increase of successful applications of naturalisation, including the simplified naturalisation procedure, the efficient running of the foreigner-friendly e-government website, and the efforts of government-sponsored organisations and pro-migrant NGOs to assist migrants in the process of naturalisation (e.g. helping with applications and providing preparatory exam courses). Most important of all, however, are the revisions made to the Nationality Law that eased regulations for naturalisation and granted dual citizenship. The revision to the Nationality Law in 1997 addressed the gender discriminatory aspect of the law, granting South Korean citizenship to people who were not entitled to get South Korean citizenship due to the patriarchal ideas embedded in the Korean Family Registration System (Kim et al. 2012). These people included children of international marriages between a foreign father and a South Korean mother.

The Nationality Law was revised again in 2004 to encourage the naturalisation of marriage migrants. Since then, foreign spouses of South Korean nationals, regardless of their gender, can obtain South Korean nationality after two consecutive years of marriage and residence in South Korea; alternatively, after three consecutive years of marriage and one year of residence in South Korea (Korea Immigration Service 2012). Earlier application is allowed in

Figure 1.7: Number of Annual Applications for Naturalisation
Source: Korea Immigration Service 2011
exceptional situations (e.g. Korean spouse’s death). Additionally, the revision in 2004 relaxed permanent residency requirements, allowing marriage migrants to apply for permanent residency since 2005. Permanent residency was expanded in 2008 to include foreign investors who make large investments and overseas Koreans who have been in South Korea for two years on F-4 visas and qualify for South Korean citizenship (Kim et al. 2012).

Granting dual citizenship (although to a limited category of people) is a major revision to the Nationality Law, and it has significantly increased the number of naturalisation in South Korea. In October 2007, the possibility of granting dual citizenship to specific categories of people was discussed and agreed in a Special Committee for Foreigner Policy. In 2010, the National Assembly passed a dual nationality bill, which grants dual citizenship to people (1) who are outstandingly talented in science, economics, culture and sports; (2) who are ethnic Koreans over the age of 65, or who lost Korean nationality as minors or through marriage; and (3) who married South Korean nationals (Korea Immigration Service 2012). The revised Nationality Law took effect on 1 January 2011 and caused a sudden increase in applications for naturalisation, especially in the category of the ‘citizenship reinstatement’. Applications for ‘citizenship reinstatement’ in 2011 (n=2,265) were more than double the applications in the previous year (n=1,011). This is because co-ethnics overseas who were eligible for dual citizenship applied for naturalisation (Korea Immigration Service 2012).

Public Debate on South Korean Multiculturalism
The advantages and disadvantages of multiculturalism have been debated worldwide in the last several decades. The public debate about South Korean multiculturalism appeared full-blown around 2006, when national assembly meetings were frequently held to discuss policies based on multiculturalism. With the enforcement of policies based on multiculturalism, particularly with the increasing amount of money spent on supporting foreign migrants, discontent of locals towards multiculturalism was stirred up, typical criticisms being that too much money was used for the needs of foreigners while the needs of underprivileged South Koreans were ignored (Oh 2007). Such criticism reached its peak when the budget for the four million domestic disadvantaged people was cut in 2009 whilst the budget for migrants was increased and passed one trillion won (S. Kim 2009).

In academia, South Korean multiculturalism is criticised for the confusion of the concept and the absence of public consent, despite the fact that multiculturalism has been pervasive in
South Korean society. This phenomenon was the result of the hasty declaration of the South Korean government about the country’s transition to multiculturalism without a thorough review of multiculturalism (e.g. its definition, status and the best way to pursue it) in the various legal and political frameworks (Eom 2008; Koo 2003; Won 2008; Kim et al. 2012). This unclear conceptual framework was often regarded as the main cause of the confusion in South Korea between the ideology of multiculturalism and a multicultural society, and between multicultural policies and assimilation policies (Eom 2008; Koo 2003; Won 2008; Han and Han 2007; H. Kim 2008; Kim 2007; S. Lee 2007; Oh 2007; J. Lee 2010; Kim et al. 2012). These scholars argue that South Korean multiculturalism is not based on the ideology of multiculturalism, or has little relationship to multiculturalism.

South Korean multiculturalism bears resemblance to the immigration policies (specifically, the Differential Exclusionary Model and Assimilationist Model) of traditional countries of immigration, as J. Lee (2010) has argued. Assuming multiculturalism should promote an acceptance of migrants, J. Lee argues that the discriminatory and exclusive nature of South Korean multiculturalism is revealed from its selective application to a small population of migrants whilst forcing the majority to leave South Korea after their visas expire; and its assimilationist nature is indicated by the forceful integration programmes which were rooted in the acquisition of Korean culture. However, I argue that most countries that adopt multiculturalism have a selective immigration policy, though with differences.

In stark contrast to the international popularity of multiculturalism among migrants (Kymlicka 2007; Koopmans and Statham 2003), multiculturalism in South Korea is rather unpopular, not only among locals but also among migrants (Oh 2007; Lee 2007; H. Kim 2012). As seen from these studies, migrant workers are often indifferent to, or even critical of, the multicultural boom in South Korea. The reluctance of migrants to embrace multiculturalism is puzzling considering the encouraging context of multiculturalism. For instance, multiculturalism can replace the ethnicity-based concept of Korean nationhood, which is the fundamental source of South Koreans’ discriminatory treatment of migrants. H. Kim describes this phenomenon as paradoxical, and clarifies that this paradox is caused by many factors (e.g. the failure of migrants to benefit from multiculturalism).

**Perspective of Korean Chinese**
Chapter 1

The perspectives of Korean Chinese on the emerging diversity in South Korea and the social transition are important, considering that Korean Chinese are a unique group that has been influenced by both ethnic nationalism and multiculturalism due to their identity as both co-ethnics and migrants in South Korea. The overwhelming presence of Korean Chinese adds to the significance of studying their perspectives. Nevertheless, studies on the perspectives of Korean Chinese are rare. In the preparation stage for this research, I carried out an extensive internet search to find out comments made by Korean Chinese on South Korea’s social and ideological transition. A number of blog entries of Korean Chinese were detected, with the majority decrying South Korean multiculturalism as trampling the effort of generations of Korean Chinese to preserve Korean culture and lowering the position of Korean Chinese in South Korea by removing privileges that South Korea used to offer to co-ethnic migrants.

In contrast to this wealth of data about individual opinions, documented or official evidence of the collected opinions of Korean Chinese was scarce. A few articles related to South Korean multiculturalism were found in the widely read Korean Chinese newspapers in China (e.g. Jilin Newspaper, Heilongjiang Newspaper and Yanbian Daily). Nevertheless, most of these articles consisted merely of quotations from South Korean newspapers, without adding their own comment or perspectives of Korean Chinese. This might have resulted from the cautious attitudes of Korean Chinese to protect them from falling into disgrace with the Chinese government by showing too much interest in their ethnic homeland.

1.5 Korean Chinese – An Unusual Group Influenced by Both Korean Ethnic Nationalism and Multiculturalism

Korean Chinese are the descendants of Koreans who migrated to Manchuria (today’s north-eastern China) from the Korean peninsula between the 1860s and the early 1940s. Korean Chinese obtained Chinese citizenship, and were given full acceptance as members of the Chinese nation. Korean Chinese have maintained what they firmly believe is Korean culture, and most of all, Korean identity, even after generations of settlement in China. Despite a decrease in number after the beginning of the twenty-first century, Korean Chinese are still thought to number two million, and so are regarded, together with Korean Americans, who have an equivalent population, as the largest segment of the Korean diaspora. The active

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15 The Korean Chinese population reached 1,830,929 in 2010 (Yanbian State Government 2012).
ethnic return migration of Korean Chinese that started in the early 1990s made Korean Chinese the largest co-ethnic group and the largest migrant group in South Korea. In this section, I will discuss the history, migration and identity transformations of Korean Chinese.

1.5.1 Migration from the Korean Peninsula to Manchuria

There were three waves of migration of Koreans to Manchuria: the first wave was between the 1860s and 1910 and was made up of peasants from the northern parts of the Korean peninsula who crossed the Tumen River to search for arable lands; the second wave was after 1910 and was made up of a small number of politicians and soldiers who went to Manchuria to continue the independence movement; and the third wave was between 1932 and 1945 and was made up of peasants from the southern parts of the Korean peninsula who were semi-forced to migrate to build a supply base for the Japanese invasion of China (Kwon 1996; C. Lee 1986; J. Lee 2002b; Piao 1990; H. Park 2005). Peasants from the northern parts of the peninsula settled in areas which belong to today’s Jilin Province (see Map 1.1), while peasants from the southern peninsula settled in areas which belong to Liaoning Province and Heilongjiang Province. The number of Koreans in Manchuria reached 34,000 in 1894, 109,500 in 1910, and then rapidly increased to 600,000 in 1931, and to 1.2 million in 1945 (Kwon 1996).

Map 1.1: Three Northeastern Provinces of China and Korean Peninsula
Source: Meijin International Travel Web 2008

After Korea were liberated from Japanese rule in 1945, about 600,000 Koreans in Manchuria returned to Korea, with a similar number remaining in China (Kim 2003). One of the many reasons that so many Koreans decided to remain in China was either their fear of moving to their hometown in what was to become a new state or the disapproval of the new state of their return. People originally from the northern peninsula were free to return, but many of them
were scared of returning to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea; whilst those from the southern peninsula were restricted to returning to their hometown, as neither the Republic of Korea nor China wanted their return due to political reasons (J. Lee 2002b).

Meanwhile, the Chinese Communist party promised ethnic equality to Korean Chinese from 1945 (Piao 1990), and accepted them as legal Chinese citizens after the establishment of the People’s Republic of China. About 20% of the Koreans who remained in Manchuria obtained Chinese citizenship in 1949, with the remaining population obtaining it by 1952 (Kim 2003). The Korean Chinese population was recorded as 1.11 million in the first National Census in 1953, accounting for 0.19% of the Chinese population of 578 million (Yanbian State Government 2012), with the majority remaining in the areas of their original settlement (Seol 1999). Korean Chinese Autonomous Prefecture was established in 1952 as a result of the enactment of the regional autonomy policy of the Chinese government for ethnic minority groups. This has greatly strengthened the status of Korean Chinese as Chinese citizens.

Yanbian, which is located in the east of Jilin Province, became a Korean Chinese Autonomous Prefecture due to the large population of Korean Chinese in that area. However, the population of Korean Chinese in Yanbian has been declining since 1996 after reaching its peak in 1995 (859,956), and was 801,088 in 2010 (Yang 2012). The decrease of the population is the result of their active out-migration and a low birth rate, which has decreased noticeably since 1990, from 1.48% to 0.5% in 2010 (Yang 2012). The decrease of the population caused a drop in the percentage of Korean Chinese in the population in Yanbian: from 62.01% in 1952 to 50.04% in 1962, and from 40.05% in 1992 to 36.57% in 2010 (Yang 2012). The drop in the percentage of population does not bode well for the Korean Chinese community, and it threatens the existence of the Korean Chinese Autonomous Prefecture.

1.5.2 Transnational Migration of Korean Chinese
The migration of Korean Chinese from Korea to China ended in the mid-1940s. However, this was not the end of the migration journey of Korean Chinese. Chinese economic reform\textsuperscript{16}, which started in 1978, revived the migration of Korean Chinese in the 1980s. The economic

\textsuperscript{16} Chinese economic reform refers to the reform begun by pragmatists within the Chinese Communist Party to create excess value to fund the modernisation of the national economy.
Chapter 1

reform brought a general improvement of the quality of life for Korean Chinese, but it also brought a rapidly increasing income gap between the southeast coastal regions and the rest of China, particularly the northeast periphery where Korean Chinese are concentrated (Y. Hong 2009). This income gap made Korean Chinese feel a sense of relative decline in their socio-economic status and prompted them to leave their hometowns (Song 2007; Y. Hong 2009).

Thus, Korean Chinese began to migrate from villages to neighbouring cities and from the under-developed northeast to the developed coastal southeast. Over 400,000 Korean Chinese have engaged in domestic migration since the 1980s (G. Park 2008). Soon Korean Chinese widened their destinations to not just within China but eventually to overseas countries. Domestic migration soon proved to be no match for transnational migration. Since its start in the 1990s to the year 2008, more than 500,000 Korean Chinese have engaged in transnational migration to 90 different countries (G. Park 2008). The purposes of their transnational migration are quite varied: to work, to marry, to visit relatives, to study, and to travel. However, most of them go overseas to work and earn money, and even those who went overseas with student visas tend to do more work than study (G. Park 2008).

Korean Chinese transnational migrants, like other transnational migrants who generally do not break ties with their societies of origin but maintain simultaneous relations with both societies of origin and settlement (Baia 1999), tend to move back and forth between China and South Korea to maximise the benefits of migration and the chances of the family’s survival (Hong, Song, and Park 2013). Levitt (2001) argues that transnational migration spreads through interpersonal ties, which create a transnational space between people who have left and those who remain. Korean Chinese transnational migration is, too, propelled by social and family networks which allow them to function in both spheres.

1.5.3 Ethnic Return Migration of Korean Chinese

Ethnic return migration, which refers to the migration of second or later generation descendants back to their ancestors’ homelands, has emerged as a global trend in transnational migration over the last quarter century, and it has been particularly noteworthy since the early 1990s (Tsuda 2003, 2009). For example, millions of Germans, Poles and Jews returned to their ancestral homeland (Germany, Poland and Israel respectively) after collapse of the communist regimes in Eastern Europe. Ethnic return migrants are often regarded as having deep ties of integration with their natal country where they have settled down as legal
members over generations, and are also often thought to hold an idealised image of their ancestral homeland (Cohen 1997; Tsuda 2003, 2009; Song 2009).

Korean ethnic return migration is complex because the Korean nation is divided, with two ideologically opposed and hostile states — the Republic of Korea and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (Seol and Skrentny 2009). North Korea had been an ally of China, while South Korea had long been an enemy. Accordingly, South Korea had been an inaccessible ethnic homeland for Korean Chinese for generations until the 1980s, when the relationship between China and South Korea improved with the reduction of Cold War tension. With the efforts of the two nations to reduce the historic enmity between them, Korean Chinese were able to visit South Korea in the late 1980s to be reunited with their separated families, with whom they had lost contact since the 1940s. However, the number of these early visitors was tiny.

The full-scale migration of Korean Chinese to South Korea began only after China and South Korea established a diplomatic relationship in 1992. China-South Korea ties have developed solidly over the past two decades, and have grown dramatically especially in economic cooperation and human exchanges. The main reason that Korean Chinese head to South Korea is the prospect of an improved economic status. This was the time when Korean Chinese felt a sense of relative decline in their socio-economic status in China (Song 2009). When they came to recognise the economic prosperity of South Korea, which could offer them better employment opportunities with wages substantially higher than that they could earn in China, hopes began to run high (Song 2009; Hong, Song, and Park 2013).

Proficiency in Korean language and culture enabled Korean Chinese to function easily in South Korea. In the early stage of their migration, Korean Chinese made money as street peddlers of herbal medicines that they had brought from China. Soon their business activities expanded to various work sectors, which were mostly dirty, difficult and dangerous. With the rapid growth of Korean Chinese migrants and their illegal residence in South Korea, the South Korean government increased entry restrictions on unskilled Korean Chinese throughout the 1990s. Facing difficulties in obtaining or extending visas, a considerable number of Korean Chinese chose illegal migration to South Korea, and even those who entered South Korea legally became illegal migrants by not leaving South Korea after their visas expired (Song 2009).
Korean Chinese became the largest migrant group in South Korea, and formed Korean Chinese communities in industrial and metropolitan cities in South Korea. In December 2011, the population of Korean Chinese in South Korea was recorded as 470,570\(^{17}\), which was 33.7% of foreign residents in South Korea at that point of time (Korea Immigration Service 2012). This is almost half of the entire Korean Chinese workforce (Yanbian State Government 2012). Unlike many other migrant groups, which have unbalanced sex ratios\(^{18}\) (Korea Immigration Service 2012), Korean Chinese migrants have a balanced sex ratio: male migrants accounting for 51.9% (244,397) and female migrants accounting for 48.1% (226,173).

One major source of Korean Chinese return migration is marriage migration, which emerged as an easy option compared with unskilled labour migration (Hong, Song, and Park 2013). Unlike migrant workers, who suffered stringent quotas that restricted their entry to South Korea and who were denied the right to long-term settlement in South Korea, migrant brides could have easy access to South Korea and South Korean citizenship. This was because in the 1990s marriage between Korean Chinese women and South Korean rural men was promoted by the South Korean government, which believed the importing of non-ethnic Korean brides (e.g. Vietnamese and Filipinas) threatened Korean national identity through racial mixing (Freeman 2011; Hong, Song, and Park 2013). In order to maintain ‘racial purity’ without inviting a flood of non-Koreans, the South Korean government created bureaucratic barriers to the influx of brides. Freeman argues that the South Korean government’s efforts often led to fake claims of kinship and other attempts to game the system.

The first marriage between Korean Chinese and South Koreans dates back to December 1990, when a Korean Chinese woman from Yanji, Jilin Province of China, married a South Korean man in Paju, Gyeonggi Province of South Korea (Jeong 1990). The title of Jeong’s article,

\(^{17}\) This statistic does not include the children of migrants who were born in South Korea.

\(^{18}\) Nationality

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Vietnam</th>
<th>Japan</th>
<th>Thailand</th>
<th>Indonesia</th>
<th>Uzbekistan</th>
<th>Cambodia</th>
<th>Sri Lanka</th>
<th>Nepal</th>
<th>Bangladesh</th>
<th>Pakistan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>62,631</td>
<td>20,032</td>
<td>26,133</td>
<td>31,540</td>
<td>25,806</td>
<td>16,506</td>
<td>21,667</td>
<td>16,574</td>
<td>13,054</td>
<td>9,203</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>57,623</td>
<td>37,142</td>
<td>19,812</td>
<td>6,478</td>
<td>8,882</td>
<td>8,104</td>
<td>687</td>
<td>2,334</td>
<td>530</td>
<td>824</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M/Total</td>
<td>52%</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>56.8%</td>
<td>82.9%</td>
<td>74.3%</td>
<td>67%</td>
<td>96.9%</td>
<td>87.6%</td>
<td>96%</td>
<td>91.7%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
which contains key words like “connect blood vessel to recover severed relations”, clearly indicates the public sentiment at that time. Since then, the number of Korean Chinese marriage migrants in South Korea has increased rapidly. Many Korean Chinese were willing to arrange paper marriages and to leave behind spouses and children in China if necessary in order to pass over the border of South Korea (Freeman 2011). Freeman describes this phenomenon as a ‘Korean wind’ that swept among Korean Chinese women in China in the late 1990s as they sought to marry rural bachelors in South Korea.

With the increase of the number of Korean Chinese marriage migrants in South Korea, the domestic troubles of families involved with Korean Chinese came to the fore. With an increase in the number of stories with sad endings, South Koreans’ assumption that Korean Chinese, due to their shared Korean ethnicity and shared culture with South Koreans, would easily assimilate to South Korean society without disrupting the country’s homogeneity was seen to be unfounded (Seol, Lee, and Cho 2006; Hong, Song, and Park 2013). Accordingly, the popularity of Korean Chinese women as suitable brides has declined. However, they are still the largest group of migrant brides in South Korea, numbering 21,626 in total by 2011 (Korea Immigration Service 2012). Marriages between Korean Chinese and South Koreans include marriages between Korean Chinese men and South Korean women. By the end of 2011, 7,558 Korean Chinese men had married South Korean women. The number of Korean Chinese marriage migrants rocketed to 29,184, accounting for 20.1% of all marriage migrants (144,681) in South Korea (Korea Immigration Service 2012).

Although economic factors are the most fundamental reason for most migrants to return to their ancestral homeland, a sense of ethnic affinity to their ancestral homelands also plays an important role in determining the direction of migrant flow (Tsuda 2009). Like many other ethnic return migrants, Korean Chinese were motivated by their nostalgic affiliation to South Korea when they chose to migrate to South Korea instead of heading for other countries (Song 2009). Unfortunately, their expectations of being warmly accepted as co-ethnics were not met; instead, they have often been alienated, and viewed as poor, untrustworthy and opportunistic Chinese in South Korea (Song 2009; Hong, Song, and Park 2013). They have been subject to economic marginalisation, being confined to low-status jobs, and have suffered exploitation in the workplace, which usually went unreported for fear of deportation. Furthermore, Korean Chinese have encountered significant cultural barriers (Song 2009) despite the fact that they are the most culturally similar of all migrants in South Korea.
The economic activities of Korean Chinese took place in both of their ethnic homelands; and much earlier in North Korea than in South Korea. Thus far, however, the importance of commerce by Korean Chinese in North Korea has received limited attention in comparison to that in South Korea. It could be argued that the economic activities of Korean Chinese in North Korea was of great significance as the experience and capital that Korean Chinese earned from the activities formed the foundation of their later pioneering forays to other foreign countries, including South Korea. In the late 1980s, when I was a child, all my relatives and neighbours that I can remember went to North Korea from Yanbian to carry out a short-term period of trade with locals. They were not professional businessmen, and their ‘business’ was funded with little capital and often took the form of exchange and barter, mostly of household items made in China and North Korean dried seafood. Most Korean Chinese visitors stayed at their North Korean relative’s place, and traded with the people in nearby regions. Although the scale of trade was small, due to the strict customs limitations, this economic activity brought in a good income, and thus was popular among Korean Chinese, particularly in Yanbian. Even people with well-paid jobs joined this economic activity during their periods of leave. My parents, who were a journalist and a high-school teacher by then, visited North Korea more than seven times. I joined them three times, and I remember things we took to North Korea, e.g. electronic watches, different sizes of batteries, sportswear and bags of saccharin and MSG. My parents bartered them for bags of dried pollack, octopus, seaweed and pine nuts. Economic activities of Korean Chinese in North Korea reached their peak in the late 1980s and ceased in the early 1990s, when the interest of Korean Chinese suddenly turned to visiting South Korea, which promised greater income. Different from visits to North Korea, visits to South Korea required a fortune. Many people I know had to empty their pockets to buy airplane tickets to South Korea, and the income they made from their trade with North Koreans, more or less became their seed money. In the case of my parents, they used up ten years’ savings to buy two round-trip tickets to South Korea.

**1.5.4 Identity Formations and Transformations of Korean Chinese**

Due to their Korean ethnicity and Chinese nationality, Korean Chinese have been described as having a dual or hybrid identity that combines both Korean and Chinese aspects (Ko 2003; Lee 2005; Song 2007; Kang 2008). The basis on which Korean Chinese have formed and transformed their ethno-national identities can be analysed with the dichotomy of the primordialist and modernist local models of identity. Korean Chinese share both the
primordialist and the modernist notions of identity and nationalism. Primordialists understand ethnic identities to be shaped on the basis of a combination of fixed elements and to be inherited through the generations (Shils 1972; Smith 1994); whilst modernists understand all forms of identity as “effects of power mechanisms and products of a relation power exercises over bodies, multiplicities, movements, desires and forces” (Billig 1995, 93).

Korean Chinese have continued to preserve Korean language, culture and traditions, and most important of all, their sense of identity as ethnic Koreans, in spite of their generations of separation from the ethnic homeland (Piao 1990; Song 2007). Meanwhile, the Chinese identity of Korean Chinese in terms of their national and political identity can be approached from modernist understandings. Korean Chinese have strengthened their identity as Chinese and their loyalty to China through their participation in China’s nation-building process (e.g. anti-Japanese struggles and pro-Chinese Communist Party activities), acquisition of Chinese citizenship after the establishment of the People’s Republic of China, and generations of living in China with the majority Han Chinese (Song 2007).

The intense assimilation policy of the Chinese government towards ethnic minorities throughout the years, but particularly during the Cultural Revolution of the 1960s and the 1970s also significantly affected the identity of Korean Chinese. Nevertheless, it is hard to say if the forced assimilation policy has strengthened the Chinese identity of Korean Chinese or not. Their Korean identity and culture survived the years when they were forbidden to maintain their ethnic culture and their relationship with their ethnic homeland; and they revived in the 1990s, when they were able to visit their prosperous ethnic homeland (Song 2007; 2009). Regarding the influence of the Chinese government towards the identity constructions of Korean Chinese, many scholars argue that the autonomy of Korean Chinese, coupled with China’s restrictions on people’s movement within the country, have allowed Korean Chinese to maintain the Korean culture and identity (Cheng and Selden 1994).

With their ethnic return migration to South Korea, Korean Chinese have experienced identity transformation yet again (Seol and Skrentny 2004; Lee 2005a; Song 2007, 2009; Y. Hong 2009). Due to the fact that many in South Korean society still equates ethnicity with nationality, Korean Chinese, who have a discord between their ethnicity and their nationality, fail to be included as Koreans in South Korea (Lee 2005a). The identities of Korean Chinese also faced disruption and renegotiation because of the economic marginalisation and social
discrimination they suffered in South Korea (Seol and Skrentny 2004; Song 2007, 2009). Feelings of frustration and even betrayal by their ethnic homeland have made many Korean Chinese reflect on what being Korean meant. Some have come to realise they are more Chinese than Korean; and others have had their Chinese identity reinforced (Song 2009; Y. Hong 2009). Seol and Skrentny argue that the identity of Korean Chinese is a feeling of marginality and of being foreign in both their natal and ancestral homelands.

Korean Chinese initially settled only in northeast China, but they have migrated to other regions of China and beyond. As a result, lifestyles of Korean Chinese have changed greatly: from peripheral, agricultural and homogeneous lifestyles to urban, industrial and transnational lifestyles. Correspondingly, their ethno-national identities are becoming varied: from a dual identity to pluralistic, fluid, flexible and transnational identity (G. Park 2008; Y. Hong 2009). In this research, I approach the identity constructions of Korean Chinese from a multi-level perspective, stressing the reflectivity and fluidity of such processes.

**Conclusion**

In this Chapter, I introduced the research aims and major questions of this thesis; outlined the thesis organisation; and presented the theoretical framework and research background. The theoretical framework of this study is based on contrasting primordialist and modernist perspectives of nationalism and nation-state building process; concepts of ethnic and civic nationalism; ethnic boundary and ethnic identities. I examined South Korea’s recent transition from homogeneity to multiculturalism, focusing on changes in demographics, culture, ideology and government policies; and important aspects of the Korean Chinese, focusing on their history, migration and identity constructions. The experience and perspectives of Korean Chinese are a productive topic of study because they problematise concepts and processes of ethnicity and multiculturalism in South Korea and create interesting questions about these concepts and practices. My study has the potential to contribute to the scholarship on different types of nationalism, nation-building, relationship between ethnic homeland and co-ethnic migrants. It also has practical and political advantages in refining and reflecting on policy. How I carried out this research is the subject of my next chapter, in which I discuss the research design and methodology of this research, focusing on methodological advantages: a large number of participants; diverse sources of data collection over an extensive period; multi-level interpretative analysis; and internet-based research and ethnographic methods that allowed a global study.
CHAPTER 2: RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY

Introduction
In the previous chapter I introduced my research aims, the major themes of this research, the theoretical framework and the research background. Chapter 2 provides comprehensive information about the design and methodology of this research, which unavoidably influences the research result in a significant way. This chapter opens with the preparatory stage of this study, which includes consultation with experts, a pilot study and preparation for fieldwork (see Figure 2.1). This is followed by an outline of the data collection methods, including participant observation, focus group discussions, interviews, internet-based research, and a review of existing research and government documents. Next is an explanation of Grounded Theory (Strauss and Corbin 1994) and the thematic and comparative analyses that were used. My analysis of data drew from theories of nationalism, multiculturalism, ethnic return migration and identity constructions, as well as being grounded in the data itself. Finally, the reliability of this research is discussed along with reference to the role of the researcher.

Figure 2.1: Research Process

2.1 Early Stage of Research and Preparation for Fieldwork
2.1.1 Consultation
For the first step in exploring the research topic, I consulted six professionals with a strong interest in and knowledge of both Korean Chinese and South Korean multicultural issues. Of the six professionals, two were South Korean scholars researching Korean Chinese issues, two were South Korean social activists working for the Korean Chinese community in South Korea, one was a former South Korean official who had worked in the Korea Immigration Service, and the last was a Korean Chinese journalist working at the Yanbian Broadcast Company in China. I met them individually during my visit to Seoul in February 2009.
Chapter 2

The primary topics we discussed included South Korea’s transition from a homogeneous society to a multicultural society; influences of South Korea’s promotion of multiculturalism on Korean Chinese, both individuals and communities, in terms of migration, settlement and identity transformations; and the matters to be settled urgently for Korean Chinese in South Korea during its multicultural transition. The six professionals provided me with a wide spectrum of views, including what would happen to the hundreds of thousands of Korean Chinese with Working Visit visas when the permitted duration of the visas expired. I used the expertise of these professionals as a sounding board for my initial ideas on this research topic.

2.1.2 Pilot Study

A pilot study is a “feasibility study” to prepare for major study (Polit, Beck, and Hungler 2001, 467). The advantage of conducting a pilot study is that it gives advance warning about where the main research project can fail, where research protocols may not be followed, and whether proposed methods or instruments are inappropriate (Teijlingen van et al. 2001). I undertook the pilot study in March 2010, two months before leaving for fieldwork, via the video-chat function of MSN Messenger, an instant messaging service launched by the Microsoft Network. Interviews were carried out to establish issues to be addressed in the main study. Topics covered included participants’ opinions of the shift to multiculturalism in South Korean society; understandings of South Korea’s policies towards Korean Chinese throughout history but particularly after South Korea chose to become a multicultural society; and participants’ ethno-national identities and perceptions of ethnic nationalism.

Five Korean Chinese, who were recruited through my personal networks, participated in this pilot study. They were from various strata of society and were located in different places at the time of the study: a businessperson in Shanghai, a farmer in Yanbian, a postgraduate student in Seoul, a temporary construction worker in Seoul, and a retired Chinese government official residing in Pusan after obtaining South Korean citizenship. They were forthcoming about their experiences and opinions, which made the time consumed on the pilot study quite rewarding. The wide range of responses, along with the interaction process with the participants, enabled me to refine the research aim and to detail interview questions. For instance, I adjusted the research arguments to best reflect the participants’ priorities instead of my priorities. This adjustment balanced my research interest and the major concerns of the participants. Despite my assumption prior to the pilot study that the topic of South Korea’s
shift to multiculturalism was of primary importance among Korean Chinese, the five participants apparently had priorities other than South Korean multiculturalism.

Participants with different backgrounds have different priorities: for the participant who was an international student, the biggest concern was graduation and employment; for the participant who was a migrant worker, the major concern was a wage increase; for the participant who was a farmer in Yanbian, the biggest worry was the depreciation of the South Korean currency, as his wife and two grown-up children work in South Korea; whilst the participant who obtained South Korean citizenship placed the highest priority on inviting his family members to South Korea. Although a direct connection was often difficult to see at first, my interest and those of the participants were not necessarily mutually exclusive. For example, their major concerns (e.g. inviting family members to South Korea) are closely related to South Korean immigration policies, which have changed substantially following the country’s adoption of multiculturalism as national policy.

2.1.3 Preparation of Interview Guide and Record Form
This study aims to examine the practice of ethno-national membership in South Korea in the multicultural context; and how such practice has affected the ethno-national identities of Korean Chinese. Sub-themes were chosen carefully, including: (1) how has ethnic nationalism influenced South Korean nationhood? (2) how has the ethnicity-based concept of nationhood changed in a multicultural South Korea? (3) how do Korean Chinese understand ethnic homogeneity and nationalism? (4) how do Korean Chinese perceive South Korea’s transition to multiculturalism? and (5) how has South Korean multiculturalism influenced Korean Chinese in terms of their identity and commitment to Korean nationalism?

An Interview Guide and Record Form was designed (see Appendix 1). The Form is divided into five parts: (1) participants’ demographic and socio-economic backgrounds; (2) migration experiences; (3) perceptions of South Korea’s multiculturalism; (4) opinions concerning South Korean policies on Korean Chinese; and (5) understandings of ethnicity and nationality focusing on changes before and after South Korea’s adoption of multiculturalism. Each part has sub-categories with questions designed to assist participants to understand questions.

Additionally, a Summary Form (see appendix 2) was made for use in interviews to record a summary of each interview (e.g. themes that arose in the interview). The form also records
comments about the research methods (e.g. did the interview schedule work well?). The Summary Form was also used to take notes of facts the interviewer should remember, including promises made to research participants to send them the results of the research. The Form proved useful as it provided, among many other things, a diagram of where participants were seated. I also added a brief description of each participant and comments on their interaction during group discussion (e.g. did participants work well as a group?).

2.1.4 Recruitment of Participants for Fieldwork Research
This section outlines the process of recruitment of participants for fieldwork research. I employed a snowball method – a non-probability sampling technique where potential participants are approached by an existing participant (Goodman 1961). As a Korean Chinese myself, I have many acquaintances in the Korean Chinese community both in China and South Korea, and so it was not difficult to expand the pool of research participant in a relatively short period of time. However, due to ethical considerations I excluded family members and close friends from the research. Classmates from university became the initial participants, and with the help of the initial contacts, I recruited 40 participants who would have been otherwise totally beyond my reach. Additionally, the extensive community participation that I engaged in also provided me with a pool of people willing to participate in my research. For instance, 20 people I met at routine activities of the Korean Chinese International Student Network (KCN) were willing to participate in my research.

After recruiting 60 candidates, I deliberately selected 40 participants from that number to ensure I obtained an adequate cross-section of participants. Korean Chinese community is becoming heterogeneous in social makeup and in the range of viewpoints, beliefs and values held by its members. It was critical to reflect the diversity. The 40 participants were of varying ages, had achieved a range of educational attainment and had differing migration experiences. After conducting a preliminary analysis of the interviews with the group of 40 participants, I recruited another 20 participants, ten of whom were from the remainder of the initial 60 candidates, while the other ten were newly recruited through a snowball method. One participant had to leave the group just before the end of my fieldwork. I had to carry out another interview to make sure the initially planned 60 cases were achieved.

2.2 Data Collection
2.2.1 Participant Observation
This study is a work of qualitative research, which gathered data through the process of corroborating information with different sources over a lengthy period. Participant observation examines a real and living picture of a community from inside (Quirk and Lelliott 2002). I carried out participant observation in South Korea and in China between June and December 2010. Participant observation, being a strategy of reflexive learning of a culture’s practices, motivations and emotions (Lindlof and Taylor 2002), allows me closer insight into the communities that I assumed to be quite familiar to me. Figure 2.2 gives a visual guideline of locations where I carried out participant observation in South Korea.

![Locations/Sites for Participant Observation in South Korea](image)

Figure 2.2: Locations/Sites for Participant Observation in South Korea

I started my participant observation in Karibong-dong and Kuro-dong in Seoul, which were nicknamed ‘Yanbian District’ due to the overwhelming proportion of Korean Chinese, mostly from Yanbian, living there. Easy access to public transportation and cheap housing made this area, along with neighbouring Daerim-dong, the largest Korean Chinese community in South Korea (Kim et al. 2012). I have a certain amount of familiarity with the Korean Chinese culture, and thus could gain easy access to ‘Yanbian District’ and potential participants. Korean Chinese were easily locatable in public places due to their ‘Yanbian dialect’.

‘Yanbian Street’ of the ‘Yanbian District’ (see Photograph 2.1), a 500-metre-long street near Karibong Market, was a place I visited frequently during my fieldwork in South Korea, not only for research but also to eat and to purchase necessaries of life. This area is both residential and commercial and has more than 30 stores run by Korean Chinese. I stayed at a boarding house located in the heart of the ‘Yanbian District’ to facilitate my engagement in the daily life of the potential participants. The place that became my nest throughout my fieldwork was run by Korean Chinese and full of Korean Chinese customers. I established close relationships with other customers by participating in what they did (e.g. watching TV in hall), and it was helpful to generate understanding of their real-life situations.
The Kuro Korean Chinese Church served as one major research base (see Photograph 2.2). Hundreds of Korean Chinese gather at this church every Sunday. Even on weekdays, the congregation paid regular visits. At any visit to the Church on weekdays, I could find tens of Korean Chinese men gathered in the front of the church building and spending time in chatting, with the majority being retirees. Young men were visible, and they were usually those temporarily out of work. They came to church to relax and also to get job information. Women were also visible, mostly in the Ladies’ Dormitory, which was located on the ground level of the church building.

I went to this Church at least once a week over the period during which fieldwork was conducted, conversed with the people I encountered, and ultimately engaged in discussions regarding my research. Male elders I met there served as a valuable resource for my research. That was unexpected, as I had assumed I would be able to obtain only limited information from them due to their retired and secluded life. However, their retired status allowed them to talk at length without time pressure, and their age enabled them to be generously open to a stranger with ease. Thanks to them, I gained a good deal of information concerning their own migration experiences and those of their grown-up children. Furthermore, these elders, due to
their migration experiences to South Korea in the 1990s, had memories of South Korea during an earlier period when there were few migrant workers and migrant brides, and most importantly of all, no multiculturalism.

Another important research site was the Korean Chinese International Student Network (KCN). KCN, which was established to strengthen the networks among Korean Chinese students in South Korea, has thousands of registered members, the majority being university students and a minority being recent graduates. Most of those graduates had professional occupations including, but not limited to, employment as lawyers, medical doctors, IT specialists and executives of well-known companies. Contacts with KCN members provided me with perspectives of young Korean Chinese with high qualifications or professional jobs, and it supplemented the data I gathered from participants from the working class.

The Immigration Office was another place in which I carried out participant observation in an efficient way. Although I often visited the Immigration Office in Seoul, I paid a greater number of visits to the Immigration Office in Incheon (see Photograph 2.3), where three of my participants had obtained an Aliens Registration Card, changed visa status and applied for naturalisation, respectively. During these visits, I changed my visa type from Temporary Visit visa (C-3) to Overseas Koreans visa (F-4) in order to obtain a more flexible research schedule. The C-3 visa I previously held strictly restricted the length of stay in each visit to 30 days, although it allowed multiple visits. The whole process of changing visa type gave me a good opportunity for both participation and observation.

Photograph 2.3: Incheon Immigration Office in December 2010

Incheon Immigration Office accommodates Chinese residents, allocating half of the service desks to Chinese. Nevertheless, the waiting area reserved exclusively for Chinese was densely packed on my every visit, and around three-quarters of the people waiting were
Korean Chinese. This was because of the large percentage of Korean Chinese among the Chinese migrants in South Korea and their high demands on immigration services. During the hours of waiting time, people were happy to have conversations, and such conversations allowed me an insight regarding various life situations of Korean Chinese and their opinions concerning South Korea’s transition to multiculturalism.

Additionally, I visited dozens of organisations run by/for Korean Chinese in South Korea. They included employment agencies, immigration agencies, education centres for migrants and newspaper companies. I was fortunate to attend events and activities run by these institutes that included the fourth Overseas Korean Festival, which took place in Seoul in October 2010; the first-anniversary seminar of the Foreign Policy Institute in September 2010; and monthly meetings of the KCN from July 2010 to the end of that year.

Participant observation in China was conducted between October and December 2010 in Yanbian (see Photograph 2.4) located in the eastern part of Jilin Province. Yanbian has a territory of 42,700 km² and a population of 2,186,000, of whom 36.57% (n=798,000) are Korean Chinese (Yanbian State Government 2012). I started my research in Yiyuan Residential District and Xinfeng Village. The two sites have different backgrounds in terms of resident composition. Yiyuan (see Photograph 2.5) is one of the richest areas in Yanbian. Being a residential district constructed for government officials, most of its residents were officials and businessmen who had bought apartments from the officials.19

Photograph 2.4: Yanbian Korean Chinese Autonomous Prefecture in October 2010

19 Government institutions offer heavily subsidised apartments to their officials. As government institutions build apartments every few years, many officials have more than one apartment, and so try to sell the spare apartments. The public like to buy these apartments because they are often well located and of good quality.
In contrast, the residents of Xinfeng (see Photograph 2.6) were mostly farmers. They used to be poor but recently have improved their financial status due to their family members’ migration to foreign countries and the Chinese government’s compensation for purchasing their farmland for city planning. Xinfeng, 25 km from the central business district of Yanji, the capital city of Yanbian, used to have 100 households, which were exclusively Korean Chinese families. Since the 1990s more than 80% of the original villagers have left for South Korea and other wealthy countries. The people who left sold their farmland to Han Chinese from other areas. The construction of Yanji International Airport and a highway nearby brought more Han Chinese to Xinfeng. As a result, 95% of the current population in Xinfeng (approximately 2,000) is Han Chinese, and they occupy 99% of the farmland.

I also carried out observation at Yanji International Airport (see Photograph 2.7), from which people leave for overseas and through which they return, and where family members see them off or wait for them. It was difficult to chat with those who were leaving for overseas or with those who were seeing their family members off, as they were not in the mood to talk. However, those waiting for family members returning from overseas were more than happy to chat with me in order to kill boring waiting time. Although it was a casual airport waiting
room conversation, useful information was gathered. I disclosed my identity to them and requested their permission to record my observations. This observation at the airport also acquainted me with a substantial number of possible interviewees.

Photograph 2.7: Yanji International Airport in November 2010

Participant observation is a demanding and time-consuming process as it demands not only participation and observation over a long-term period, but also careful record keeping. I made copious notes from observations, special encounters, practical details and methodological comments. Keeping notes was particularly laborious at the outset of participant observation when it was difficult to judge what was important and what was not. Nevertheless, participant observation was rewarding. It provided first-hand knowledge of the actual life situations of Korean Chinese and the influence of South Korean multiculturalism on their daily life. Moreover, the conversations I had with people during participant observation acted as informal interviews, and provided additional sets of data that were hard to obtain under formal interview conditions. This was because people’s responses were often different in different contexts. Next, I will set out another data collection method used in this study.

2.2.2 Focus Group Discussions

Group discussion is a useful way to add insights to the interpretation of a social event (Frey and Fontana 1991). It can be formal with a structured purpose, or informal with a researcher’s stimulation with a topical question (Frey and Fontana 1991). I conducted group discussions five times in total with five focus groups. I adopted a semi-formal style, conducting group discussions with a specific purpose, but in a relaxed environment. The size of each group varied from seven to 12 participants; each group was relatively homogeneous in terms of educational and socio-economic characteristics.
Three topics were raised during group discussions: (1) how do Korean Chinese perceive South Korea’s policies towards overseas Koreans in general, and Korean Chinese in particular? (2) how do Korean Chinese perceive South Korea’s accommodating multiculturalism and its influence on South Korean society in general, and on Korean Chinese in particular? and (3) how do Korean Chinese perceive ethnic nationalism? Each group had different concerns, showed a different level of interest in the research topics, and had different group interactions. Frey and Fontana (1991) suggest that the characteristics of a group significantly influence the interaction and response patterns within the group.

The first group discussion was held in South Korea with eight members of the steering committee of KCN. Participants in this group were the most cooperative, with spontaneous debates full of energy and enthusiasm. It seemed that my frequent attendance at their regular meetings made them feel obligated to help me. Of all groups, this group had the most balanced understanding of the influences of South Korean multiculturalism on Korean Chinese and South Koreans. In addition to active discussion of the research topics, other issues of concern were also discussed at their initiative (e.g. how to improve the image of Korean Chinese in South Korea). They talked openly from various angles, giving examples drawn from among themselves and their acquaintances. Their excellent cooperation gave me deep insight into both the collective ideas and individual perspectives of young Korean Chinese in South Korea. Detailed information is to be discussed in the analysis chapters.

I conducted the second group discussion on 15 August 2010 at a restaurant near Korea University Station in Seoul, with 12 PhD students from China who had joined a one-year exchange programme. Considering the fact that they had arrived in South Korea one month prior to the interview, I started discussion on the issues of the Korean Chinese community in China rather than South Korean multiculturalism. The participants showed full commitment to the Korean Chinese community, and expressed a collective anxiety over the loss of Korean Chinese population, the collapse of Korean Chinese schools in China, and the assimilation of Korean Chinese to the mainstream Chinese culture. These participants had a strong Korean identity, and spent the longest period of time sharing their feelings on being a Korean Chinese. Their short time in South Korea made them highly sensitive to the new environment, and enthusiastic about sharing their discoveries with others (e.g. differences of perceptions of South Korea before and after their arrival). It was an informative and entertaining experience watching them engaging in discussion and agreeing or challenging each other.
In China, I conducted group discussions three times altogether with three focus groups: one in Beijing and two in Yanbian. The one in Beijing was conducted on 15 September 2010, with seven office workers aged between 30 years and 33 years. These participants had a common social circle and background. They were born in Yanbian, had been classmates for ten years, and currently were working in Beijing. They also shared experience of graduate studies in western countries, where they obtained the first-hand experience of multiculturalism. Among all focus groups, the Beijing group had the most positive understanding of South Korea’s shift to multiculturalism, and had the most relaxed and pleasant discussion, full of laughter and jokes among old friends.

The second group discussion in China was conducted in Yanbian on 10 October 2010, with nine farmers from Xinfeng. They were the original villagers but they currently owned no farmland as they had sold their land to fund their (or their family members’) migration. Knowing only farming but owning no farmland, they had to depend on remittances from family members who worked overseas.20 They shared experiences of being illegal migrants in South Korea between 1995 and 2003. Considering the period was before South Korea began to promote multiculturalism, I started the discussion with their migration experiences in South Korea. I also adjusted the wording of questions to a simple and direct style to meet their request for simple questions. They shared their stories of illegal migration, including the embarrassing moments of their forced deportation to China. Their straightforward chats gave me an insight into the early migration of Korean Chinese, and first-hand information about South Korea’s policies towards Korean Chinese before adopting multiculturalism. Being encouraged by a smooth start, I expanded questions to their identities, understandings of South Korean multiculturalism and its perceived influences on Korean Chinese. Although they took a longer time than other groups, the Xinfeng group covered all the topics raised.

20 Their status in the family had improved since they were granted compensation from the Chinese government. In September 2011, I heard from Mr. SZ Xu that each original villager of Xinfeng was granted 500,000 yuan (80,000 USD). Mr. Xu, whose voice was louder than before due to such an unexpected fortune, told me that he and his younger son were granted 1,000,000 yuan altogether while his wife and elder son could not get any compensation due to losing their original inhabitant status. His wife lost her status when she obtained South Korean citizenship in 2008; and their elder son lost his status when he enrolled a university in a different city in 2002. The compensation was a big money, much more than the amount of money his wife had saved from her years’ work in South Korea. Mr. Xu said that he could feel his wife treated him differently after the incident.
The last group discussion was carried out on 15 October in Yanbian with 12 members of the professional elite (aged between 45 years and 61 years), who were regarded by most Korean Chinese as the intellectuals representing the Korean Chinese community. They had privileged status both in China and in South Korea. The gap in status between members of this group and members of Xinfeng group was particularly apparent. Members of this group showed an astonishing enthusiasm in discussing the prospects of the Korean Chinese community. Their discussions went far beyond talking about the challenges of Korean Chinese facing South Korea’s multiculturalism. They put the issues of Korean Chinese in both South Korean and Chinese contexts, and spared no pains in discussing the latest changes of Chinese policy towards Korean Chinese. They were anxious about the frequent disclosure by Korean Chinese of their Korean identity, and had a heated debate on what were the desirable viewpoints for Korean Chinese. The weakness of this group was a lack of willingness to reveal individual experiences and reflections, due to the participants’ reluctance to expose personal facts in order to maintain their professional relationship with others.

In general, group discussions enabled me to gain multiple perspectives and rich information within a short time – usually four hours for one group. Ideas arose spontaneously during group discussions due to the intense interactions, and offered me an insight into collective responses that was difficult to catch in individual interviews. Some individuals acted as spontaneous leaders of the discussion, and inspired the rest to become involved in the discussion. Such individuals facilitated the smooth process of discussion. However, they often caused a collective response that was not an opinion shared by other members to the same degree, due to their excessive influence on the group mood. I had to discourage some vociferous individuals from dominating the entire discussion. However, it was still difficult to hear from all individuals because many participants were nervous about contributing to a group setting, worried that their revelation of personal information could harm them.

When I conducted individual interviews, I recruited 26 participants from participants in the group discussions to let them expound the points they had made during group discussion or after discussion, when they came to me to talk on an individual basis.  

21 Conducting

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21 I recruited eight participants from the KCN group; three participants from the PhD group; three participants from the Beijing group; two participants from the Xinfeng group; and ten participants from the Elite group.
individual interviews after group discussions was advantageous as it put participants at ease with me. People who kept silent throughout group discussions became active during individual interviews, and felt more comfortable in discussing personal issues. This was because an individual interview can help to overcome the constraints of public accounts (Buston et al. 1998). Discordance was discovered concerning the information provided by a participant in group discussions and in individual interviews, and I paid special attention to the differences.

2.2.3 Face-to-Face, Individual Interviews

Face-to-face interviews, with their direct and personal communication (Jorgenson 1989), allowed me to gather rich information on participants’ diverse ideas, private feelings and even subtle emotions. Using a semi-structured format, I covered the four main topics prepared in advance (see Appendix 1), whilst encouraging participants to explore issues important to them. As a supplement, a life story approach, which focuses on sequences of events influencing the entire life of a person (Atkinson 1998), was utilised with some participants to obtain in-depth narratives of their life patterns. To help participants to understand the interview questions, I made questions clear, with a narrow focus and simple wording. Questions with abstract terms had explanatory information included with them.

Interviews usually lasted three hours in diverse settings, predominantly in cafés near the interviewee’s residence or workplace, depending on the comfort level of participants. Before embarking on interviews, I offered a light meal or drink as a token of appreciation for their help with my research, and endeavoured to establish a rapport with participants to facilitate their opening up to me. When possible, a second interview was held to follow up on issues that had been omitted or briefly covered in the first interview. I met 15 participants twice, and met most of them at their home in the second meeting, in an effort to gain more understanding of their daily life. Meeting at their home often involved their family members sitting in on the interviews. In five cases family members participated in the conversation, which proved beneficial as it provided additional perspectives on the topics at hand.

I vividly remember the occasion I visited Mr. NX Che, a 49-year-old factory worker residing in Seoul. At his home, I met his brother-in-law, Mr. DMC Ann. To my pleasant surprise, Mr. Ann showed great enthusiasm for engaging in the interview. Having arrived in South Korea a week prior to the interview, he stayed at Mr. Che’s apartment, which was 20m² big and
already over-crowded with three adults (Mr. Che, his wife and a grown-up daughter). Mr. Ann did not hesitate to share his experience of being nearly swindled out of his money to get a visa to South Korea. He spent USD 7,000 in buying a Temporary Visit visa from a broker who promised him to arrange a Working Visit visa after his arrival in South Korea. From Mr. Ann, I confirmed that many Korean Chinese in China still buy South Korean visas from brokers as they have little chance of obtaining South Korean visas by legal means (see Chapter 5 for regulations for visa applications).

2.2.4 Email Interviews

Internet research has become a viable tool for qualitative research as it generates high quality data in a convenient and efficient way (Meho 2006). MSN talks, online discussions, and email interviews were used in this research to meet the need to conduct research in transnational space. Here I focus on email interviews. I conducted email interviews between March and July 2011, upon my return to New Zealand from fieldwork in South Korea and China. Email interviews were conducted efficiently, considering the number of people (210) and emails (600) involved, the quantity and quality of data gathered, and the amount of work carried out in each step. This was possible because email interviews eliminate the need for synchronous interview time (Meho 2006).

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22 I had been involved in online discussions that focused on topics related to South Korea’s increasing diversity in my PhD provisional year, to increase my understanding of the points of view represented in a group of people.
according to the alumni record updated in January 2009, to invite them to take part in my research. Sending a personalised email was intended to make potential participants feel valued, and thereby encourage them to participate in my research. To avoid having the invitation email being mistaken for a spam email and therefore possibly being deleted even before being read, I completed the subject line with my name, the name of my alma mater university and my student ID.

Among the 210 email addresses to which I sent invitations, 10 were invalid addresses. I received 70 responses with completed answers and positive statements that the respondent would participate in my research. Feeling satisfied with the result, I did not send reminders to those who did not reply to the invitations. At the second stage ten participants dropped out. This was natural because as Meho (2006) suggests, the possibility of participants dropping out will arise when online research is stretched over a long period. Fortunately, there was no further participant attrition until the end. Five participants ‘disappeared’ for a long period in the third stage without notice, but they returned eventually.

Every step of the research was on an individual basis. Responses from each individual underwent a succession of processes of collecting data, updating personal charts, summarising and analysing, designing follow-up questions, keeping track of missed questions, and encouraging participants to complete missed questions through sending them follow-up emails. Deciding when to move to the next stage was challenging, as the time required to collect responses varied from one participant to another, from a few hours to several weeks. Once I got a response in the seventh week from Mr. NJ Park, who happened to find my email in his spam mailbox. I never pressed participants to respond promptly as it was more vital to answer the questions fully. It simplified matters if participants provided all required information in one email. However, in most cases follow-up exchanges were needed to finish data collection. I tried not to irritate participants when I reminded them to complete missed questions, as I did not know if the questions were left unanswered through a participant’s carelessness or because they had been avoided on purpose. The contribution of follow-up emails was particularly visible when there was a need for explanation or elaboration. In rare cases, however, I could not get a satisfactory result even after sending several follow-up emails, and I stopped waiting in the fifth week and moved to the next stage.

Stage I
In the first email, I provided a self-introduction and explained how I had obtained the addressee’s email address, hoping to reassure them I was contacting them on legitimate business and my honesty and upfront approach would elicit a similar response. I outlined my research topics, specified the interview procedure, and listed possible risks participation would entail. My intention was to give the potential participants a general idea of what would be involved in the research before they decided whether they would participate. Research questions were embedded in the email message rather than in an attached document, as I was concerned that attached questions would be an obstacle to participation.

Questions were composed of two parts: a theme question and supplementary questions. From the theme question, which I purposely made general, I expected to see new ideas that I had never thought of. The supplementary questions, on the other hand, performed the function of eliminating the chances of participants misinterpreting the theme question. This process was necessary because misinterpretation is not rare in email interviews due to lack of real-time interaction (Meho 2006). I controlled the number of questions, concerned that too many questions would detract from the focus and increase participants’ reluctance to answer. In addition, being concerned that the supplementary questions were too demanding, I explained that it was not compulsory to complete supplementary questions.

**Stage I:**

**Theme Question:**
What is your opinion concerning South Korea’s transition to multiculturalism?

**Supplementary Questions:**

1. How do you see the increasing number of multicultural families in South Korea?
2. Do you welcome South Korea’s shift to a multicultural society? Why?
3. Do you welcome South Korea’s adoption of multiculturalism? Why?
4. Why, do you think, has the South Korean government adopted multiculturalism?
5. Is the multicultural policy beneficial for South Korean society?
6. What are the dilemmas related to South Korea accommodating multiculturalism and what are this policy’s prospects of success?
7. Does multiculturalism act as an opportunity or as a challenge to Korean Chinese?
8. Do South Korea’s multiculturalism policies benefit Korean Chinese?
9. Should South Korea’s multiculturalism policies include Korean Chinese as beneficiaries?
Responses tried to answer all the questions raised, and, most important of all, represented a range of ideas and so were very informative. Responses to the theme question were particularly diverse due to the general nature of the question. A follow-up email was sent to respondents to ask for personal background information (e.g. age, gender and occupation). This follow-up email also contained a summary of the different opinions of participants on certain questions that provoked divided responses, and encouraged participants to further justify their opinions on those questions. For instance, the question, “Should South Korea’s multiculturalism policies include Korean Chinese as beneficiaries” led to contrasting responses, including, Korean Chinese should not be included in South Korean multiculturalism policy as they are not foreigners; and, Korean Chinese should be included in multiculturalism as they are foreigners in South Korea. Such process of questioning disputable opinions in follow-up emails helped elicit additional information to clarify the initial findings. Analysis of data from email interviews is contained in the later chapters.

Stage II
Two theme questions were designed to test themes that arose from the preliminary analysis of the data from the fieldwork: “Is the commitment of Korean Chinese to Korean nationalism the factor to determine their negative perception towards South Korea’s adoption of multiculturalism?” and “Has South Korean multiculturalism negatively influence the identities of Korean Chinese?” These questions were followed by supplementary questions, which were not identical for each participant as they were custom-designed based on the previous responses and the background of the participants. Usually, the supplementary questions of this stage were as follows.

<table>
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<th>Stage II</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Do you consider Korea (both South and North) as your ethnic homeland?</td>
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<td>2. Should the South Korean government treat Korean Chinese better than other migrants?</td>
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<td>3. Is it an advantage or disadvantage to live in South Korea as a Korean Chinese?</td>
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<td>4. In South Korea, do you think you are a Korean or a foreigner?</td>
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<tr>
<td>5. How does South Korean multiculturalism affect your daily life?</td>
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<td>6. Has multiculturalism weakened your Korean identity and your beliefs in homogeneity?</td>
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<td>7. How has South Korean multiculturalism influenced the Korean Chinese communities?</td>
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<td>8. Are you concerned multiculturalism harms the ethnic consciousness of Korean</td>
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Chapter 2

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<th>Chinese?</th>
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<tr>
<td>9. Are you concerned South Korean multiculturalism hinders Korean unification?</td>
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</table>

**Stage III**

The majority of the participants confirmed their identification as ‘ethnic Korean’. That identification inspired me to investigate to what extent their ethnic consciousness mirrored or differed from that of South Koreans. Therefore the theme question in this stage was, “Is the ethno-national consciousness of Korean Chinese the same as that of South Koreans?” This question was then followed by indicative questions to explore the practice of South Korean nationhood in the multicultural context.

**Stage III**

1. What does being a Korean Chinese mean to you?
3. What does the ‘Korean nation’ mean to you?
4. Who are members of the Korean nation?
5. Are Korean Chinese as much the Korean nation as people in the Korean peninsula?
6. Do you feel emotional attachment with other overseas Koreans?
7. Does Korean unification mean a lot to you?

Most participants were cooperative, with some being more obliging than others. Mr. DW Kim, Mr. DH So and Ms. HYZ Kim were those who showed most commitment to participation. They were in their early 30s, have study experience in the United States and an ambition to become political leaders of the Korean Chinese community in China. Mr. So and Ms. Kim did their postgraduate study in America, and became government officials back in China after passing the civil-service examination. Mr. Kim went the opposite route: he resigned from his position as a government official to go to America for study. Intensive contact with them gave me rich information about the varied lives and views of young ambitious Korean Chinese, along with information of the local government they served.

23 To protect the identity of participants each participant is identified by a pseudonym.

24 In order to protect the identity of participants, I used age range instead of precise age.
In general, email interviews provided me with easy access to participants who were geographically far away from me, and by doing so, gave me some specific insights that I would not have been able to obtain if I confined my study to South Korea and China. By allowing participants enough time to respond (Meho 2006), email interviews provided me with compact and reflectively dense responses. Proceeding by email also gave me time to construct well-thought-out follow-up questions. An added benefit of conducting email interviews was that it removed the need for transcribing before they were processed for analysis, as data were generated in electronic format. I also found that email interviews were less intrusive than face-to-face interviews as the researcher cannot give advice to participants during interviews (Jorgenson 1989), and so unexpected answers often resulted. This did not mean that the quality of face-to-face interviews was lower than that of email interviews.

2.3 Data Analysis
Analysis is a process of “searching for patterns in data and for ideas that help explain the patterns that exist” (Russell 1994, 360). Two types of qualitative analysis were used: thematic analysis and comparative analysis. Thematic analysis refers to analysing data by themes, while comparative analysis refers to analysing data by comparing data from different groups and research methods (Dawson 2002). The analysis was generally based on Grounded Theory, in which the concept and themes are grounded in the data and the researchers extract the emerging concept and themes (Buston et al. 1998).

2.3.1 Thematic Analysis
In thematic analysis, themes emerge from a conversation between the researcher and the data instead of being imposed upon it by researchers (Dawson 2002). In this research, themes first emerged during the immediate and on-the-spot analysis during data collection (see Chapter 3). For instance, the Beijing focus group raised the possibility of South Korea achieving a co-existence of nationalism and multiculturalism by studying China’s example. When new themes emerged during data collection, I reorganised the research and refined questions to include the emergent themes in the approaching interviews. The process of transcribing also enabled a range of themes to emerge. Once a transcript was completed, I began to familiarise myself with the material through several close readings of it. I read transcripts of group discussions as public stories of peers and transcripts of individual interviews as private life...
stories. The process of reading each transcript as a whole narrative allowed me easy access into the complexity of the lives of participants.

The process of translation also enabled me to note more themes and questions. Meticulous translation was needed as this research was conducted in Korean and Chinese. All the required translation to English was carried out by me, and analysis began in that process. Language is related to interpretative validity (Johnson 1997). I attempted to treat meanings of text as social and cultural constructs; to focus on the participants’ choice of words and style (Lupton 1992); and to find metaphors they have used. This thesis contains large amounts of translated transcripts to illustrate the arguments I have made and to reveal the hidden motivations of text I have discovered (Dawson 2002). The issues surrounding language during translation will be demonstrated in the analysis chapters.

Producing data in a format that can be easily analysed is essential (Dawson 2002) in a successful thematic analysis. I kept notes about the practical details of interviews and details about emerging themes in a Summary Form (see Appendix 2) soon after each interview. I categorised findings under different headings, and such categorisation assisted me in organising my material more efficiently, despite the categories constantly changing with the progress of the analysis. This process was helpful in focusing my mind on significant points which came from the data. I made sure I incorporated most of the issues arising from the research, as researchers have an ethical obligation to make the best use of their research (Crosswaite and Curtice 1994). Disconfirming cases were also included, as analysing deviant cases is helpful in explaining the majority of the cases under scrutiny (Mays and Pope 2000).

Background reading is also part of thematic analysis, especially if it helps to explain the emerging themes (Dawson 2002). I conducted an extensive literature review throughout the research to see if the existing research would give me further insight into what was arising from my data. My literature review drew on a wide range of theoretical materials, addressing key issues such as nation-state building, ethnic nationalism, multiculturalism, citizenship, ethnic return migration and identity constructions. Furthermore, statistical data, law and policy of the South Korean government (e.g. the Nationality Law (2010)) were analysed to serve as background information. I visited South Korean government websites (e.g. Hi Korea) regularly to get the most up-to-date information on statistics and policy.
2.3.2 Comparative Analysis

Comparative analysis is connected to thematic analysis (Dawson 2002). Using comparative analysis, I moved backwards and forwards between field notes and transcripts, and compared data from different people, groups and research methods (Dawson 2002). Through comparing and contrasting the data from each transcript, I found common threads among participants of similar backgrounds and interests. For instance, participants in Western countries were most likely to welcome South Korea’s multiculturalism. I developed a sliding scale, placed each participant on the scale, and then went back to the transcripts again to test my findings. Comparative analysis made the personal and group differences more visible.

Comparative analysis also made the influence of research methods more evident. For instance, participants in face-to-face interviews and email interviews often had different approaches to the interview questions. When asked about their attitudes towards South Korea’s adoption of multiculturalism, few participants in email interviews spontaneously linked South Korean multiculturalism with Korean Chinese, regarding it as an issue separate from issues related to Korean Chinese. Rather, they focused on discussing the need for South Korea to promote multiculturalism. In contrast, participants in face-to-face interviews were likely to weigh the gains and the losses of promoting multiculturalism from the perspective of being Korean Chinese, and their discussions often started with the hardship they had experienced in South Korea and ended with an expression of dissatisfaction with the South Korean government.

After completing analysis and developing my Grounded Theory, I conducted a final investigation of the data to search specifically for instances in which I might have unduly influenced participants without being aware of it. My intention was to conduct an investigation of the data as thoroughly as my toughest critic would. I read through each transcript in reverse chronological order. I collected evidence from the transcripts that indicated that I might have influenced participants in any significant ways. To be concrete, I searched for occasions in which: a participant inquired in any way about what I wanted; a participant expressed uncertainty about something I said; and the participant-researcher interactions deviated considerably from the research protocol.

2.4 Trustworthiness of Research and Researcher’s Role

2.4.1 Quality of a Qualitative Research
The requirement for trustworthiness is under discussion in the field of qualitative research, as the issue of trustworthiness cannot be avoided whatever the research approach is (Gibbs 2002). Lincoln and Guba (1985) argue that the aim of trustworthiness in qualitative research is to support the findings that are worth paying attention to; and triangulation can improve trustworthiness as it ensures comprehensiveness and a more reflexive analysis of data. In a similar context, this research utilised multiple sources of data collection and analysis to improve the quality of the research. Such multiple sources gave me rich information from multiple angles and reduced the likelihood that I would miss important issues, through compensating for the weakness in one method by the strength of another method (Mays and Pope 2000). For instance, participant observation gave me access to the real-life situations of participants (Buston et al. 1998); individual interviews allowed private and in-depth responses that I could hardly gather from group discussions; and email interviews allowed access to participants who were geographically far away. Additionally, different research methods allowed me to contact with people from diverse backgrounds. For instance, the age range of participants in the email interviews was narrow (between 25 years and 35 years); whilst the age range of the fieldwork research was wide, ranging from 23 years to 87 years.

The trustworthiness of this research was also improved through respondent validation, which Mays and Pope (2000) see as part of an error reduction process. Respondent validation includes comparing the researcher’s and participants’ accounts and incorporating participants’ reactions to the analysis into the research result (Lincoln and Guba 1985). I asked three participants to review a summary of the analysis and outcome and to offer comments. They commented that the data was interpreted in a manner congruent with their own experiences.

2.4.2 Position of an Insider Researcher

The role of researchers is huge because they influence every stage of the research (Hay 2005). Thus, to enhance the credibility of the findings the role of researchers should be considered (McDowell 1992). As an insider researcher acting out multiple roles (e.g. observer, translator, recorder, note keeper and analyst), my reflections on the research should be addressed in a more critical way. I shared key characteristics with my participants (e.g. ethnicity, language and culture). Feelings of intimacy and familiarity were notably present and this facilitated my easy acceptance by and engagement with the participants. However, I still needed to make an effort to establish the trust necessary for discussing sensitive issues (e.g. illegal migration and disguised marriage). My insider position was particularly useful in email interviews, in which
suspicion often exists due to the anonymity of the internet. My school ties with participants eliminated the suspicion that might exist between a stranger researcher and participants, eased frequent communication and eventually ensured the collection of high-quality data.

My fieldwork in Yanbian can be regarded as anthropology at home. However, due to my absence from Yanbian since 2002, which was the time of the most abrupt changes, it was more like an ‘anthropology at returned home’. There were moments when I felt a stranger and detected the unfamiliar within the familiar, as Cerroni-Long (1995) describes. After being confronted with a few moments when an unexpected outcome eventuated, I found myself to have been too optimistic prior to the fieldwork, assuming that I knew the community very well. My conducting research in South Korea also can be regarded as conducting research ‘at home’, due to my Korean origin and years of living in South Korea.

Patton (1990) argues that it is possible that a prolonged period of participation can make the researcher a native and thus bias the data. In order to minimise my having an undue influence on the research, I got into a consistent professional frame of mind before each interaction during data collection. I adhered to the interview procedure, asking questions in the same order with the same cues; explaining research aims in the same manner; ensuring each question was understood in the same way; and writing down the answers in a standardised form. In spite of efforts to minimise the imposition of my values on the participants, the “value-free interpretive research” is hard to achieve, as Denzin (1989, 23) argues.

To avoid losing my objectivity due to an overly intimate relationship with participants, I excluded family members from the list of participants and tried to maintain a professional distance from the participants. However, it was not easy to ensure my feelings were always excluded, even though I knew well the importance of engaging with issues of reflection. The following memo from my field notes describes how I could not exclude compassion towards my potential participants – homeless Korean Chinese women in South Korea – during my first encounter with them. This memo also shows the effects of the personal characteristics of the researcher on the research. My identity was of great interest to the people I met, and it came to affect the way we communicated, in my case, in a positive way.

17 June, 2010
I visited Seoul Korean Chinese Church in Kuro-dong. Due to the scorching heat, no one was in the resting place in front of the church building. This was unusual. I went to the Women’s Dormitory located on the ground floor of the church building. It was an open space without any furniture. Twenty Korean Chinese women were lying or sitting on the bare floor when I entered. They were currently out of work and had no place to stay. The church offered them cheap accommodation and food. Some people looked sick and were put on intravenous drips. Wheeled suitcases were near to their pillows. They look miserable. I feel sad. I began to chat with an old woman sitting near the entrance door. I was soon introduced to others in the room. People began to show interest in me, but most of them seemed nervous about talking. I introduced myself as a Korean Chinese studying in New Zealand. Invariably the first question asked by them was “How could you go to New Zealand?” They showed great interest in my migration journey. They also asked me where I was originally from. Once I told them I was from Yanbian, some people who were also from Yanbian seemed excited and gave me a big hello. They called me ‘Kohyang Cheonyeo’ (young woman from the same hometown), and asked me about my family background. The initial suspicion about me seemed to disappear suddenly when they heard my mother’s name. It seemed that they had read my mother’s books and loved them. Many women in the room kindly offered to help me.

Encouraged by the amicable mood present between the women and myself, I assumed that interviewing them would not be difficult. However, the fact was that they were too reserved to talk about themselves. They refused me, saying, “How can I have an interview about such a dreadful life.” With my frequent visits, some women began to feel comfortable talking with me, and eventually, five of them participated in my research. In contrast to the difficulties in persuading them to be interviewed, it was easy to have an active engagement once they had agreed to take part in the research. They were open even about the most miserable part of their life, which they previously described as too dreadful to mention.

2.4.3 Ethical Considerations

As this study involved interactions within an ethnic community, ethical issues needed to be acknowledged. I obtained ethics approval (Ref. 2010/058) from the University of Auckland in March 2010. In accordance with the ethical approval for this study, I always disclosed my identity as researcher to those with whom I had discussions at the outset of the interviews. I
provided participants with a Participant Information Sheet (see Appendix 3) and Consent Form (see Appendix 4), which briefly explained the research aims, possible risks for participants, and the right of participants to withdraw. To help participants’ understanding, the two forms were translated into both Korean and Chinese.

Considering that the population of Korean Chinese numbers two million, keeping confidentiality and anonymity did not pose a major issue. However, I used pseudonyms for participants and modified details which could make an individual identifiable, in order to protect the identity of participants25. Some cases required more protection of the identities of the people involved, due to the sensitivity of the issues and of the comments made by them. For these cases, even less information about the participants was revealed in order to make them untraceable. Thus, age range is used instead of precise age, and general terms for occupations are used instead of exact names. For instance, ‘early middle age’ is used instead of ‘34 years old’, and ‘creative worker’ is used instead of ‘novelist’.

Of utmost concern to me was to protect interests of the participants. An ethical principle I have continuously held throughout the research is not to be a mere extractor of information. I often heard people expressing annoyance at being studied by researchers who extracted information from them without any contribution. Listening to them speak in such a manner strengthened my will to conduct research which would be beneficial to the participants. I found that I could help the participants even before finishing the research. I helped them find jobs, using my personal contacts in South Korea; I put them in touch with public services, which were unknown to many people; and I helped them to deliver gifts for their family when I travelled between China and South Korea. As my involvement with the community expanded, I was invited to various occasions, including birthday parties, wedding ceremonies

25 Pseudonyms were used also to maintain the dignity of the participants. Each pseudonym was composed of one family name and two randomly selected letters that symbolise given names. I chose family names, which were similar to the actual name of the participants. For example, I selected ‘Bang’ for the person whose name is ‘Ban’. This process sometimes produced names that sounded like solely Han family names. When their family names are common, I used the real name, as there is no need to worry about the exposure of their identity. I spell their family names differently, following their preference. Some people signed the consent form in Chinese, and others in Korean. For those who signed the form in Chinese, I used the Chinese pinyin version; and for the others, I followed the Korean-style spelling. That’s why both ‘Kim’ and ‘Jin’, or ‘Park’ and ‘Piao’ appeared.
and even funerals. I became known to the community, and several times people I met for the first time cried out, “I know you, the student from New Zealand.”

On reflection, the intensive community participation proved to be an instrumental precursor for subsequent research. I remember the surprise I had on my first visit to Ms. ZE Ming’s shift-house built on the roof of a building. It was a humble abode, smaller than $15m^2$, but carefully decorated. The space outside her house resembled a small orchard, with a wide selection of fruit trees, which were planted in huge boxes filled with soil. The labour involved in creating the yard and in making a houseful of jars of home-made pickles showed her strong attachment to life in South Korea, and made me realise I was wrong to assume that most non-professional Korean Chinese migrants, being situated at the bottom of South Korean society, view their stay in South Korea as temporary. Neither did she feel as miserable as I assumed, but led a fulfilling life in South Korea despite her plan to return to China some day.

After leaving the community on good terms, as Jorgenson (1989) suggests, I kept contact with my participants through casual greeting calls around holidays and for certain specific events. It was helpful to stay in touch with participants (Jorgenson 1989), as it allowed me to gain updated information from participants, particularly those who had on-going issues at the time of my fieldwork. For instance, one participant who prepared to migrate to New Zealand had changed his destination to Australia; and one participant whose Application Form for South Korean citizenship I helped to fill in had passed the required document screen.

**Conclusion**

This chapter has outlined both the practical and logistical aspects of this research. A ten-month period of data collection, which was based on a multi-level interpretive model from a pilot study, participant observation, focus group discussions and in-depth interviews, provided me with substantial information on the research questions. One hundred and twenty people were interviewed and closely observed for the research, while I interacted with more people during my extensive community involvements. Although laborious, it was a rewarding opportunity to learn more about the people and eventually unearth important findings. Thematic analysis and comparative analysis were used in multi-level and multi-dimensional ways in order to ensure comprehensive research findings. The following chapter will present an overview of the data collected.
CHAPTER 3: OVERVIEW OF THE DIVERSE RESPONSES OF KOREAN CHINESE TOWARDS SOUTH KOREA’S SOCIAL AND IDEOLOGICAL TRANSITION

Introduction
In the previous chapter I outlined the design and methodology of this research. This chapter demonstrates the diverse attitudes and perceptions of Korean Chinese concerning South Korea’s increasingly multicultural nature, its social transition (from a homogeneous society to an officially multicultural society) and its ideological transition (from ethnic nationalism to multiculturalism). This chapter also analyses the determining factors of participants’ responses towards South Korea’s social and ideological transition.

3.1 Factors Influencing Responses
The attitudes of participants varied according to their demographic characteristics (age, gender and ancestral origin); socio-economic background (e.g. educational and occupational status); domestic/transnational migration experiences and legal status in receiving countries; different understandings of the term ‘multiculturalism’; different understandings of ethnicity and nationality; and experiences in China as ethnic minorities and understandings of Chinese nationalism and policies towards ethnic minority groups.

3.1.1 Demographic Characteristics
One hundred and twenty participants with varied demographic profiles were interviewed in the course of this study. Participants were carefully selected on the basis of being proportionately representative of the wider Korean Chinese population in South Korea and in China as a whole. They were 60 male and 60 females aged between 21 years and 82 years at the time of the research (see Table 3.1). Older participants tended to see multicultural changes in South Korea somewhat more negatively than did younger participants. This is mainly a result of their different identities: the older participants had a stronger Korean self-consciousness and a stronger commitment to Korean nationalism than did the younger participants, who tended to have a strong Chinese self-consciousness and a stronger commitment to Chinese nationalism (see Chapter 7). As Table 3.1 shows, this research includes a large number of participants who were aged in their 30s and 40s. The high percentage of this particular age group raised a minor concern that it might have reflected more favourable attitudes to multiculturalism than exist in the Korean Chinese population at
large. Consequently, a larger number of cross section samples will be required in later research.

Table 3.1: Participants by Gender and Age

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age Range</th>
<th>20+</th>
<th>30+</th>
<th>40+</th>
<th>50+</th>
<th>60+</th>
<th>70+</th>
<th>80+</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Gender was found to have discernible but weak correlations with participants’ attitudes. In general, female participants were more generous to migrants, and were more ready to agree with the idea of protecting the human rights of migrants. In contrast, male participants were more likely to insist on Koreans’ maintenance of ethnic homogeneity and cultural heritage. This finding of the relationship between gender and attitudes towards multiculturalism is consistent with the research findings of Ang et al. (2002) and Betts (2005) who found that women tended to more easily accept immigration, multiculturalism and cultural diversity. However, Van de Vijver et al. (2008) observed that gender differences are rather inconsistent and insignificant in previous studies on attitudes towards multiculturalism. Considering this, a critical approach is needed regarding gender influences on the attitudes of Korean Chinese towards South Korean multiculturalism.

On the other hand, no direct relationships were detected between the ancestral origin of participants from the Korean peninsula and their attitudes towards South Korea’s social and ideological transition. An overwhelming number (70%) of the participants in this study were descendants of Koreans originally from the northern part of the Korean peninsula (today’s North Korea). No major difference was found between these participants and others with ancestors from the south of the Korean peninsula (today’s South Korea). This was quite an unexpected finding, considering that ancestor’s origin led to differences among Korean Chinese in terms of accent, culture and emotional attachment to the two Korean states.

I argue that the influence of ancestral origin of participants in their responses was undeniable, though it was unclear outwardly, as different migration experiences (which were often led to by the ancestral origin of participants) have been highly influential on their attitudes towards South Korean multiculturalism. Ancestor’s origin is closely related to the migration experiences of Korean Chinese, not only during the early migration from the Korean
peninsula to Manchuria but also during the recent return migration to South Korea. Korean Chinese whose ancestors were originally from the southern Korean peninsula settled down in Liaoning and Heilongjiang Provinces, and their descendants started the return migration to South Korea due to the existence of family ties with South Koreans. In contrast, those whose ancestors were from the northern Korean peninsula settled down in Jilin Province, and their descendants have gone through a different path of return migration to that of their counterparts in the other two provinces due to the lack of family ties with South Koreans. They had fewer opportunities to visit South Korea during the early stage of their migration, when family reunion was the major route, but soon exceeded their counterparts in number of migrants through various means of migration. For instance, a large number of Korean Chinese women from Yanbian, Jilin Province, married South Koreans, and such marriages created familial ties to South Korean citizens (Freeman 2011), and these familial ties enabled the migration of many Korean Chinese in Yanbian who used to lack family ties.

3.1.2 Socio-economic Background
The difference in attitudes caused by educational level was noticeable. Participants’ educational levels are relatively high: nine participants have a postgraduate degree; 60 have a bachelor’s degree; a further four are current postgraduate students; two are engaged in undergraduate study; 21 have technical college education; and 24 have high school education. By and large, participants with higher educational attainment were more supportive of multiculturalism, and less likely to agree with giving or receiving preference for any reason, in comparison with those with less education.

Participants’ employment conditions, which placed people in different life situations and classes, were correlated with their attitudes towards South Korean multiculturalism. The majority of the participants were currently employed. Their occupations vary, ranging from temporary, non-professional work (e.g. manual workers, maids and waitresses) to professional work (e.g. doctors, lawyers and university lecturers). The influence of employment conditions on participants’ attitudes was particularly significant for participants

26 Sixteen participants were retired; one participant was unemployed; and 15 participants were self-employed as businesspersons, freelance translators and farmers.
in South Korea. Participants with non-professional jobs were found to be less in favour of the South Korean government’s immigration policy, had low wages and suffered greater discrimination in South Korea than did their counterparts with professional jobs. They complained multiculturalism and the subsequent increase in migrant intake increased competition for employment and reduced the social welfare available to them, and thus they were ready to rate multiculturalism as a threat to Korean Chinese. In contrast, participants with professional jobs felt little discrimination against them in South Korea, and were satisfied with their lives, regarding themselves to be in the middle or upper class in South Korea. This finding goes against the findings of Esses et al. (2001) that lower social dominance orientation (of women) resulted in (their) more favourable attitudes towards migrants and multiculturalism. This gap was the result of the special status of Korean Chinese in South Korea as co-ethnic migrants and of their anticipation they would be given a warm reception and good treatment in South Korea, as befitted their co-ethnic status.

Different employment conditions of participants also influenced their input during the research. Several participants were involved in occupations related to my research: one participant worked at the Korea Immigration Service as a monitoring volunteer; two participants worked at institutions promoting multiculturalism in South Korea; two participants worked at public health centres in South Korea; and two participants were writing up their theses on topics related to Korean Chinese migrants in South Korea. They offered me useful information based on their first-hand experience. Some of them even sent me statistics and articles relevant to my research.

3.1.3 Migration Experience and Status in Host Countries
Migration experiences of participants have been highly influential in regard to participants’ attitudes towards South Korea’s transition to multiculturalism. By migration experiences and current location, participants of this research could be classified into people involved in transnational migration that includes ethnic return migration; people involved in domestic migration; and people remaining in their original place in north-eastern China. Most participants were in South Korea (63) and China (48), with the remaining nine participants being spread out in other four countries (see Table 3.2). Among those in South Korea, 45 lived in Seoul and 18 lived in other cities; among those in China, 35 lived in Yanbian and 13 lived in metropolitan cities. Such distribution is roughly reflective of the overall statistics of
Korean Chinese: South Korea is the major destination for Korean Chinese migrants (G. Park 2008); 46% of Korean Chinese in South Korea reside in Seoul (Korea Immigration Service 2012); and 44% of those in China reside in Yanbian (Yanbian State Government 2012; Yang 2012).

Table 3.2: Participants by Location

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Korea</th>
<th>China</th>
<th>USA</th>
<th>New Zealand</th>
<th>Australia</th>
<th>Japan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>63</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Participants who had migrated to Western countries which promote multiculturalism were most likely to see the benefits of multiculturalism and considered it as an inevitable tendency of social development in South Korea. They set out the importance of adopting multiculturalism by comparing their experiences (either direct or indirect) in South Korea and in the multicultural countries they had settled down in. They felt that Korean Chinese were unwelcome in South Korea despite sharing the ethnicity and culture of South Koreans; whilst they did not feel particular hostility towards Korean Chinese in Western countries, but rather they felt a sense of belonging to the host society, with which they had shared nothing before their migration. They expected South Koreans’ exclusive attitudes towards migrants (even to co-ethnics) to be improved through their adoption of multiculturalism. Those with citizenship of the host country had the greatest appreciation of the idea of multiculturalism, believing it granted them the right to be accepted as members of the host society. Due to the active transnational migration activities of Korean Chinese and their successful settlement in host countries, it was common to meet Korean Chinese who had obtained citizenship or permanent residency of the country in which they reside (see Table 3.3).

Table 3.3: Participants by Citizenship/Permanent Residency

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chinese Citizenship</th>
<th>South Korean Citizenship</th>
<th>South Korean Permanent Residency</th>
<th>Australian Citizenship</th>
<th>Japanese Citizenship</th>
<th>New Zealand Permanent Residency</th>
<th>USA Permanent Residency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>100</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In contrast, participants in Yanbian felt the changes in South Korean society most negatively. They resented multiculturalism for harming the interests of Korean Chinese by reducing privileges for co-ethnics; by causing difficulty in their migration to South Korea through a decrease in the quota for Korean Chinese migrants; and by increasing competition for Korean Chinese in the South Korean labour market through importing a large number of cheap
labourers from Southeast Asian countries. They were likely to ask for preferential treatment for Korean Chinese, particularly in obtaining South Korean Work visas. This was chiefly because of their lack of family ties with South Koreans. A family registration record in South Korea could be an alternative to invitation letters from South Korean relatives. However, most Korean Chinese in Yanbian do not have a family registration record in South Korea, because their ancestors were originally from the northern Korean peninsula. Neither do Korean Chinese whose ancestors were from the southern Korean peninsula have family registration records in South Korea, because their ancestors left the Korean peninsula prior to 1948, when the Republic of Korea was established.

Participants from non-Yanbian areas of Northeast China did not show a clear regional characteristic, as participants in Yanbian did. They were from small Korean Chinese villages in Heilongjiang and Liaoning Provinces. These participants, in contrast to the participants in Yanbian, did not regard multiculturalism as reducing the migration opportunities of Korean Chinese nor as stealing the attention of the South Korean government from Korean Chinese. This was a result of their better access to South Korea than Korean Chinese in Yanbian, due to their family ties with South Koreans.

Participants who had migrated to metropolitan cities in China were more likely to accept multiculturalism than were those in Yanbian. This was because they, being migrants themselves, had no localism or regional centeredness, as participants in Yanbian did, and understood the difficulties of migrants and the need to help them. This was also a result of their perception of the term ‘multiculturalism’ as the social equality of migrants and locals. Moreover, the participants in metropolitan cities in China felt changes in South Korea as less closely connected to them. This was mostly due to their having no (or little) intention to migrate to South Korea, as they consider they have better chances to succeed in China, which they proudly felt is a country with world-class economic potential. Relatively easier access to South Korea in comparison with Korean Chinese in Yanbian also allowed participants in metropolitan cities to have relaxed attitudes towards multiculturalism. Hence, they did not feel South Korean multiculturalism is as harmful as participants in Yanbian did.

The easier access to South Korea of participants in Chinese metropolitan cities was not due to regional discrimination by the South Korean government, but due to their young age and high
educational attainment. Most participants in metropolitan cities settled down in those cities after their graduation from universities, and participated in professional or white-collar jobs. Thus, they could obtain the Overseas Koreans visa (F-4), the most privileged visa for Korean Chinese, without any difficulty. However, most of them did not apply for this visa, feeling no need to do so. The small number of participants who were ineligible for an F-4 visa due to the lack of a university diploma could apply for the Working Visit visa (H-2), and had a better chance of obtaining this visa in comparison with many other participants in Yanbian. This was possible due to their young age and to the process for granting visas: applicants for an H-2 visa are selected in a randomised draw after they pass a Korean proficiency test, and applicants in metropolitan cities have a greater likelihood of being selected from the pool due to the small number of Korean Chinese applicants in those regions.

Participants who migrated to South Korea felt the shift in South Korean society at first hand, and thus took the greatest interest in my research topic and provided the most diverse opinions. A strong link between South Korean citizenship/permanent residency and participants’ attitudes towards South Korean multiculturalism was revealed. The nine participants who have obtained South Korean citizenship and the six participants who have obtained South Korean permanent residency were more ready to dislike multiculturalism than were the greater number of participants who were Chinese passport holders, feeling South Korean citizenship made them become members of the Korean nation both in name and reality, and granted them a right to voice their opinion as citizens of the state. They demanded the abolition of multiculturalism, which, in their view, harms the interests of underprivileged South Koreans, including themselves. This finding is consistent with the argument of Ward and Masgoret (2008) that “dominant group members” show less support for multiculturalism than do non-dominant group members. However, the cases of Korean Chinese were much more complicated than those of others studied by Ward and Masgoret. The resentment of participants with South Korean citizenship towards multiculturalism did not result from their “dominant status” in South Korea: rather, it arose from the alienated status they suffered even after they had obtained South Korean citizenship. Some of them felt they were treated worse after acquiring South Korean citizenship as they lost the support they used to enjoy as co-ethnics or as migrants and yet were not offered the benefits available to locals. They were outraged by such a situation, which they described as being in a dead zone, and thus voiced a demand for a customised policy for naturalised Korean Chinese.
The cases of Korean Chinese were complicated also because many participants’ feelings of resentment towards multiculturalism did not depend on whether they had acquired South Korean citizenship, as was shown by the number of participants with Chinese citizenship who regarded multiculturalism as a betrayal of the Korean nation. Clearly, the primordialist understandings of ethnicity and nationality were an important factor in the formation of that perception of betrayal. Additionally, negative migration experience of many participants in South Korea and their failure to be accepted by South Koreans as brothers amplified their animosity towards South Korean multiculturalism. Of course, that does not imply that people who are influenced by primordialist understandings of ethnicity and nationality are found primarily among those who have the least satisfactory migration experiences. Primordialist understandings are widespread among Korean Chinese, as will be illustrated in later chapters.

The visa type held by participants also influences their attitudes towards South Korea’s social and ideological transition. This is because different visa types ascribe different legal rights, which often directly connect to the holders’ economic activities and social mobility, and so eventually lead to different migration experiences and social status for the holders in the receiving country. Most of the participants in South Korea have had more than one type of visa due to changes in their situation or status, for instance, from Student visa to Overseas Koreans visa after their graduation. In total, 15 types of visas have been held by participants. The Working Visit visa (H-2) and Overseas Koreans visa (F-4) were the predominant types.27

The H-2 visa restricts its holders to finding jobs in a limited number of non-professional sectors, which more easily leads to discrimination by locals. Participants with an H-2 visa felt they were treated as nothing more than migrants in South Korea, and more readily became angry with South Korea’s multiculturalism, which, they believed, stole the benefits that should be allocated to co-ethnics, thus causing reverse discrimination against Korean Chinese. The tougher their life in South Korea was, the more readily participants resented multiculturalism. In contrast, participants with F-4 visas, who were professional and privileged, had fewer complaints than did their counterparts. This is because of their

27 Visa types held by participants in the fieldwork research were diverse, whilst those held by participants in the internet research were primarily the F-4 visa and C-3 (Temporary Visit) visa.
successful lives and the relatively good treatment they received from locals. However, the majority of both groups felt there has been little improvement in the status of Korean Chinese in South Korea after the implementation of multiculturalism policies.

For participants living in South Korea, length of residence also influenced participants’ approaches towards South Korea’s multicultural change. The majority of participants had been to South Korea or were currently in South Korea, with different lengths of stay ranging from several days to 20 years (see Figure 3.1). In general, participants who had been temporary visitors, or who had no intention of settling down in South Korea showed less interest in South Korea’s multiculturalism than those who had spent years in South Korea or who wanted to settle permanently in South Korea. Participants who spent more than ten years tended to consider themselves as half South Koreans, regardless of their Chinese citizenship. These participants often tried to approach the issues related to South Korean multiculturalism from the perspectives of South Koreans, excluding the interest of Korean Chinese.

![Figure 3.1: Participants by Length of Stay in South Korea](image)

Participants who had left their homeland (e.g. Yanbian, Shangzhi, Tieling and Mudanjiang) were more inclined to embrace the idea of multiculturalism than participants who had never left their homeland. However, regardless of how much they agreed with multiculturalism, most of them felt it was important for South Koreans to retain Korean identity and culture. It seems that the further participants were from their homeland, the stronger the idea of maintaining the culture of their homeland became. For instance, participants in Chinese metropolitan cities (e.g. Beijing, Shanghai and Changchun) expressed

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28 Shangzhi is a county-level city located in the southeast of Heilongjiang Province of China.
29 Tieling is a prefecture-level city located in the northeast of Liaoning Province of China.
30 Mudanjiang is an important industrial city located in the southeast of Heilongjiang Province.
more concern about losing the Korean language and culture, particularly for their children, than did participants in Yanbian.

Furthermore, the way many participants viewed their ‘homeland’ varied with the change in distance from their homeland. They used different terms for ‘homeland’, such as ‘guxiang’/‘kohyang’\textsuperscript{31}, ‘muguo’/‘moguk’\textsuperscript{32}, and ‘zuguo’/‘choguk’\textsuperscript{33}. The further they were from their homeland, the more inclusively they regarded the term ‘homeland’. For example, for participants in Beijing ‘homeland’ (‘guxiang’/‘kohyang’) is the place they were born and lived in before their migration to Beijing; whilst for participants in countries beyond China’s borders ‘homeland’ (‘zuguo’/‘choguk’; ‘muguo’/‘moguk’) is China or Korean peninsula. Accordingly, the further they were from their natal homeland, the more inclusively they regarded the language and culture of the ‘homeland’. For example, for participants in Shanghai the language of the ‘homeland’ (‘guxiang’/‘kohyang’) is ‘Yanbian Korean’ or ‘Shangzhi Korean’; whilst for participants involved in transnational migration the language of the ‘homeland’ (‘choguk’/‘zuguo’; ‘guxiang’/‘kohyang’) is Korean and Chinese. The implications in the way participants have used ‘homeland’ was often not clear. It begs the question of the relation between primordialist and modernist understandings. Considering that there could be problems with the formulation of ‘homeland’, depending on what ‘homeland’ meant, an in-depth analysis will follow in later chapters.

3.1.4 Different Understandings of Multiculturalism

Understandings of the term ‘multiculturalism’ also influence participants’ attitudes towards South Korea’s transition to multiculturalism. Multiculturalism exhibits a number of different aspects (e.g. policy, moral position and coexistence of cultures) (Turner 2006). Participants in this research conceived multiculturalism in a number of ways: as immigration and social welfare policies; as the ultimate accommodation of ethnic and cultural diversity; as a philosophy of pursing an equitable status for members of society of different backgrounds; and as the opposite of ethnic nationalism or as the ‘mixing of blood’.

\textsuperscript{31}故乡/고향
\textsuperscript{32}母国/모국
\textsuperscript{33}祖国/조국
Participants who viewed multiculturalism as a philosophy of developing a society of locals and migrants with equal relationships and mutual understanding welcomed multiculturalism in the belief that multiculturalism constituted a win-win situation for all involved. However, these participants admitted the difficulties in realising the ideal of multiculturalism in South Korea, where prejudice against migrants was still alive despite the South Korean government pouring billions of dollars into promoting multiculturalism.

Participants who understood multiculturalism as being the result of either an immigration policy to fill a domestic labour shortage or a social integration and welfare policy for migrants readily welcomed South Korea’s promotion of multiculturalism. However, half of these participants criticised these policies for focusing on economic necessity while ignoring the protection of the human rights of migrants and for focusing on cultural aspects blindly believing that all the problems can be fixed automatically once cultural differences are overcome. They pointed out that policies related to migrants should pay more attention to unsolved matters of labour exploitation and an unfair socio-economic structure for migrants, and concluded that South Korea could not become a multicultural society if discrimination against migrants could not be eliminated. In later chapters I will analyse how migrants, including Korean Chinese migrants, are treated unfairly within South Korean society and how different migrant groups are unequally positioned.

Participants who understood multiculturalism as the opposite of ethnic nationalism or as ‘mixing blood’ were least likely to welcome multiculturalism, and did not hesitate to reveal their dislike of multiculturalism. They perceived multiculturalism as detrimental to ethnic nationalism, which they saw as a source of strength for the Korean nation, and thus as essential to retain. The stronger their ethnic nationalism was, the more critical they were of multiculturalism. For instance, Mr. BH Hoo, a 64-year-old retired Chinese government official, was very forthcoming with his hatred of multiculturalism, which he understood as “no more than a scam to hide the artificial process of racial mixture.”

In general, older participants had a stronger commitment to ethnic nationalism than did younger participants. However, cases such as that of Mr. JG Yeo showed that a strong commitment to ethnic nationalism was not limited only to the older generations of Korean Chinese. Mr. Yeo, a 30-year-old international student in Daejeon, was concerned that South
Korean multiculturalism would cause pure Korean blood to be mixed with other blood. Mr. Yeo commented, “Hearing people of different blood and looks claim they are Koreans makes me shudder.” In contrast, a small number of participants who understood that the Korean nation comprises various ethnicities found multiculturalism less threatening. These participants felt that since the Korean nation was not homogeneous from the beginning then there was nothing to worry about in terms of ‘racial mixing’.

Participants who considered multiculturalism was the recognition of cultural diversity or as the co-existence of diverse cultures did not resent South Korean multiculturalism as much as their counterparts who saw multiculturalism as being in opposition to ethnic nationalism. The understanding of these participants of ‘multiculturalism’ as the recognition of cultural diversity or as the co-existence of diverse cultures often came from the Korean term for multiculturalism – ‘tamunhwa’34, which is composed of the elements ‘multi’ (ta) and ‘culture’ (munhwa). These participants felt that co-existence of diverse cultures was a desirable social phenomenon but that recognising all cultures as equal was logically impossible to achieve. Such an understanding was clear from these remarks: “Every culture is valuable, but attributing equal value to all cultures is nonsense, and will destroy the notion of value” (from Ms. KO Park, a 29-year-old volunteer worker at a migrant shelter in Seoul); “It is not right for mainstream culture and sub cultures to be treated equally, because nothing is of value if everything is of the same value” (from Mr. RC Ling, a 41-year-old pharmacist in Shanghai); and “Public affirmation of equal recognition cannot be made available to all cultures simultaneously, and no people naively believe that all cultures can be on equal terms” (from Mr. EM Park, a 41-year-old dentist in Beijing).

Many participants thought tolerance of other cultures was what multiculturalism can do best. Ms. HJ Cha, a 35-year-old employee of the Samsung Company in South Korea, was one of the participants who believed that multiculturalism does not mean all cultures are treated on equal terms. Ms. Cha felt that recognising the existence of subcultures and respecting the differences is all a multicultural society needs to do. Accordingly, these participants did not criticise South Korean culture’s domination of the cultures of migrants in South Korea. At the same time, however, they were wary of the locals’ excessive imposition of their culture and

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34 多文化/다문화
value on migrants. Additionally, a minority of the participants emphasised a reciprocal recognition: not only do South Koreans, who are the majority of South Korean society, need to recognise migrants, but the minority also need to recognise the majority. Many participants’ considering co-existence of cultures as a desirable goal but unwilling to accept the equality of cultures related to very specific Korean and Chinese ideologies that come from cultural upbringing. For instance, their desire for the co-existence of cultures showed the Confucian virtues of harmony and mutual respect. The assumption of a clearly hierarchical rather than a culturally relativist position indicated their Confucian idea of complete respect for and submission to authority. Their understanding that cultures struggle for survival and the weak one invariably becomes the prey of the strong one is related to the Social Darwinism (Leonard 2009), which applies biological concepts of natural selection and survival of the fittest to sociology and politics.

3.1.5 Different Understandings of Nationality and Ethnicity

Different understandings of nationality and ethnicity led to different attitudes among participants to multiculturalism. Primordialist and modernist perspectives were the most predominant perspectives of ethnicity and nationality among participants. The majority of the participants have been influenced by both primordialist and modernist ideas, or have a primordialist understanding of the formation of the Korean nation and a modernist understanding of the Chinese nation. Some participants tried to emphasise their having been influenced solely by a primordialist understanding or a modernist understanding. However, as their complicated responses to the questions about identities indicated, almost no participants have been influenced solely by a primordialist or modernist understanding.

Generally, the large number of participants influenced by primordialist understandings of ethnicity and nationality tended to be easily baffled by South Korean multiculturalism. They considered South Korea’s shift to multiculturalism as a betrayal of the Korean nation. This was because they perceived the Korean nation to be based on an affinity of birth and cultural bonds. With a belief in the homogeneity of the Korean nation, these participants had a Korean identity and felt bonds with other members of the Korean nation, which, in their belief, includes all ethnic Koreans in and out of the Korean peninsula. A Korean identity made participants feel more involved in South Korea’s transition.
In contrast, participants with modernist understandings or those who have been influenced more by modernist ideas, felt multiculturalism as less threatening. This was a result of their understanding that Korean Chinese are members of the Chinese nation, a nation which was based on social and political situations instead of shared ethnicity and culture. Having Chinese identity, these participants felt that they had no right to argue the rights and wrongs of the South Korean policies and of South Korean society. Nevertheless they considered South Korean policies were inconsistent that Korean Chinese migrants could not benefit from South Korea’s multiculturalism, in the way that persons of other migrant nationalities could benefit from their foreign birth. These participants felt Korean Chinese have a full right to benefit from multiculturalism due to their Chinese nationality.

The distinguishing attribute of participants with modernist ideas was their relatively young age. I found that gaps of ideas and identities exist between generations. Young participants, particularly those in Chinese metropolitan cities, show a higher level of assimilation to the mainstream Chinese culture and more easily have modernist ideas about ethnicity and nationality, in comparison with those who are older and who reside in rural areas. Participants with modernist ideas felt that ethnic nationalism and the notion of *Jus sanguinis* of South Korean nationality was inconsistent with the current reality of contemporary South Korea, with hundreds of thousands of people with foreign origins becoming an important part of society. Mr. LW No, a 37-year-old skilled migrant worker at an electronics company in Incheon, felt South Koreans would lose out if South Korea were to persist with ethnic nationalism and the notion of *Jus sanguinis*. Mr. No commented:

> At present there are hundreds of thousands of aliens living alongside South Koreans as members of South Korean society. With the ease of regulation of naturalisation, the number of South Korean citizens of non-Korean descent is increasing, and it is expected to increase in the future. The scope of international exchange of South Koreans is growing too, in comparison to the past. There is a huge demand for reassessing the idea of citizenship, which is still determined by Korean ethnicity. If South Korea persists with mono-ethnic ideologies, then it will become a straggler in this era of globalisation.
If Mr. No raised the urgent need of reassessing the notion of *Jus sanguinis* of South Korean nationality, participants like Ms. JO Bae showed the direction. The responses they made showed a clear characteristic of civic nationalism, which Renan ([1882]1996) and Nash (2001) argue defines a nation in terms of common citizenship or political membership regardless of ethnicity and culture. These participants argued that people who have a will to become South Korean and to respect the value of South Korean society can be accepted as South Koreans regardless of their ethnicity. Such ideas accord with Renan’s argument that membership of a civic nation is each person’s obligation to obey laws and social norms of the society. Ms. Bae, a 38-year-old teacher in an elementary school in Yanbian, commented:

> If South Koreans want to keep their history whilst pioneering into a new future, they must demonstrate open mindedness in accepting foreigners. Despite having a different genealogy, less fluent Korean language ability, or a different skin colour, if they have the will to become Korean and share the same community spirit then they should be accepted as Koreans. Children from multicultural families and their non-Korean parents are undeniably Koreans. They have the right to be treated equally, just as any other Koreans.

### 3.1.6 Different Commitment to Ethnic Nationalism

The most significant factor in the participants’ responses to South Korean multiculturalism is their beliefs in ethnic nationalism and commitment to maintain what they characterise as the homogeneity of the Korean nation are. Sixty-three participants were committed to ethnic nationalism. They opposed multiculturalism, perceiving it as a challenge to the Korean nation, likely, in their own words, to “kill the pure Korean nation”. They felt their Korean ethnicity is endowed by birth, and is inherited from their parents. Such understanding accords with Billig (1995), who argues that ethnic nationalism sees nationality as a matter independent of the individual’s wish, being neither acquired nor lost.

Like most South Koreans who consider their national strength lies in ethnic homogeneity (Kuhn 2008), most participants regarded ethnic nationalism as a source of strength for Koreans, and were proud of being members of a homogeneous Korean nation. They felt it was the cultural root of nationalism that caused Koreans to make colossal sacrifices for their.
nation and people throughout history. Such an understanding is in line with Anderson (1983), who argues that nationalism makes it possible for millions of people willingly to die in the name of the nation. Many participants did not see the negative aspect of nationalism, such as blind loyalty and the deaths of people for the nation.

The commitment of many participants to ethnic nationalism resulted in their desire for Korean unification. Many participants with strong ethnic nationalism considered Korean unification to be of the utmost importance, and opposed multiculturalism on the grounds that it would hinder Korean unification by dissolving the justification for it, which they considered to be ethnic nationalism. Their understanding of ethnic nationalism as the justification for Korean unification accords, to some extent, with Muller’s (2008) argument that pre-existing ethnic characteristics hold together people of common descent, language and culture. Although the desire for Korean unification was propelled by ethnic nationalism, many participants who were not committed to ethnic nationalism also placed great value on Korean unification, and thus responded that South Koreans should make Korean unification a priority greater than the promotion of multiculturalism.

In contrast, a small number of participants regarded ethnic nationalism as being too exclusive and discriminatory. They felt that ethnic nationalism was the source of discrimination against migrants and South Korean nationals of non-Korean heritage, and that persisting with ethnic nationalism would eventually lead to the division of South Korean society. These participants were more likely to welcome multiculturalism in the belief that multiculturalism would encourage the acceptance of differences in South Korea; offer an opportunity for South Koreans to construct an inclusive notion of national identity; bring a foreigner-friendly atmosphere and thus reduce South Koreans’ discrimination against Korean Chinese. This implied they identified themselves as foreigners in the eyes of South Koreans. Most of these participants had Chinese identities, and focused on their ‘migrant’ identity in South Korea rather than a ‘compatriot’ or ‘co-ethnic’ identity.

Criticism of South Korean multiculturalism for being incomplete, with components remaining from ethnic nationalism, was frequent among those participants who had as strong resentment of ethnic nationalism. Some of them doubted if ethnic nationalism could be eroded by multiculturalism given the strong ethnic nationalism of South Koreans. Mr. ES Bang, a
42-year-old librarian who currently worked in Seoul, was one of these participants who pointed out that the general atmosphere in South Korea still emphasises ethnic nationalism and school education still teaches ethnic nationalism. He felt ethnic nationalism would survive at least for a while in South Korea, due to South Koreans’ strong national consciousness and sense of superiority and pride in their homogeneity. Mr. Bang commented:

I do not worry about South Koreans losing ethnic nationalism. No matter how much multiculturalism is implemented, ethnic nationalism will be around for a long time to come at least, considering the strong commitment of South Koreans to ethnic nationalism.

Some participants had a practical view, in other words, a modernist view, of ethnic nationalism. They viewed ethnic nationalism as nothing more than the result of a demand of South Korean society in a particular period. Accordingly, they felt giving up ethnic nationalism was not a serious matter. In particular, those who considered multiculturalism to be the best counterproposal to ethnic nationalism in an epoch of transnationalism and globalisation accused people who opposed South Korean multiculturalism of being foolish and stubborn. Ms. SU Woo was one of these participants with a practical view of ethnic nationalism and multiculturalism. She was a 47-year-old government official in Yanbian. She put more significance on pursuing practical interest than what she described as “getting unnecessarily sentimental”. Ms. Woo commented:

Ideologies are invented to best serve the interest of the nation and society. Different societies need different ideologies, and even a society needs different ideologies at different times. Nineteenth-century Korea needed ethnic nationalism. That was the reason elites at that time tried to advocate ethnic nationalism. Twenty-first century South Korea needs multiculturalism. This is the reason the South Korean government recently has adopted multiculturalism. I think multiculturalism is much needed in South Korea. Considering the abandonment of ethnic nationalism as an apocalypse is exaggeration.
Chapter 3

The rest of the participants who saw both positive and negative sides to ethnic nationalism argued that ethnic nationalism provided Koreans with an identity to unify around and brought independence but meanwhile it brought a cost in terms of discrimination and social division when taken to an extreme. Such ideas were in accordance with Palais (1998), who asserted that nationalism can be both blessing and a curse.

3.1.7 Different Experiences in China As Members of an Ethnic Minority Group

The upbringing and education of Korean Chinese in China has an important effect on their understandings of a variety of types of nationalism and multiculturalism in South Korea and China. For instance, the Chinese government’s ideologies around ethnic minorities made Korean Chinese have unique ethno-national consciousness (see Chapter 6), and made Korean Chinese consider ethnic issues to be of the utmost concern to many multi-ethnic societies; and socialist education made some people regard South Korea’s multiculturalism as a euphemism for the creation of a reservoir of foreign slaves for capitalists in South Korea.

Most participants’ responses to South Korea’s multicultural transition varied depending on their understandings of China’s approach to multiculturalism, and varying degrees of satisfaction with China’s policies towards ethnic minority groups. Participants’ socio-economic and cultural environmental backgrounds came through in their understandings of China’s multicultural status and policies towards ethnic minority groups. Generally, people who regarded China as a multicultural society and considered the prosperity of China came from multiculturalism, and who were satisfied with China’s policy towards ethnic minority groups, were more likely to support South Korea’s multicultural transition than were others.

It was fascinating to look at how participants comprehended the multicultural status of China differently from each other, and tried to discuss South Korea’s multiculturalism on the basis of their understandings. Most participants had no objection to the fact that China is a multi-ethnic country, but expressed considerable disagreement whether China is a multicultural country, considering its assimilation of ethnic minority groups. Mr. XT Oh, a 29-year-old obstetrician working in a university hospital in Changchun\(^{35}\), was one of these participants who pointed to China’s assimilation policy towards ethnic minorities as proof. Mr. Oh felt that the 55 cultures of the ethnic minority groups in China do not have a position equal to that

\(^{35}\) Changchun is the capital and largest city of Jilin Province.
of the dominant Han Chinese culture but they have experienced forceful assimilation throughout history.

However, no one showed a strong objection to China’s assimilation of ethnic minority groups. They agreed that the Chinese government is doing OK with ethnic minority groups, and that the prosperity of China came from the social harmony of different ethnic groups. Nevertheless, only a minority of people felt China respects the idea of multiculturalism. These participants who felt China is multicultural cited the monument\textsuperscript{36} to multiculturalism in Changchun as one proof. They were strongly convinced that the prosperity of China came from multiculturalism, and thus felt it was right for South Korea to promote multiculturalism to achieve wealth and strength, just as China does. These participants believed that nationalism was not a contrasting element to multiculturalism; and that South Korea could achieve a smooth transition between, or a co-existence of, nationalism and multiculturalism by learning from China’s experience. Their use of the metaphor of ‘good cat’, which was raised by the pragmatists within the Chinese Communist Party in 1978, at the beginning of the period of reform in the Chinese economy, was very impressive. For instance, Ms. WJ Park, a 53-year-old politician in Seoul, stated:

Mr. Xiaoping Deng said, no matter whether it is a black cat or a white cat, the one that catches more mice is a good cat. That idea brought socialism with Chinese characteristics, which brought about the rapid economic development of China. I am sure that South Korea can develop multiculturalism with South Korean characteristics to pursue the best interest of the country.

Most participants perceived Chinese nation building positively. Chinese nationalism incorporates two different principles, of ‘blood’ and ‘soil’, granting citizenship to ethnic minorities in its territory and meanwhile giving special rights to overseas Chinese. My informants considered Chinese nationalism to be helpful in achieving a harmonious

\textsuperscript{36} This monument to multiculturalism was created by Francesco Pirelli. Four identical sculptures are located in Changchun (China), Buffalo City (South Africa), Sarajevo (Bosnia) and Sydney (Australia).
superpower. However, none of them agreed that they were descendants of the Yellow Emperor, from whom Chinese nationalism claims all ‘Chinese’ originated. ‘Chinese’ here include all ethnic Han Chinese in and out of Chinese territory and the ethnic minorities who became Chinese citizens. Most informants shared the same opinion as other Chinese on the matter of Taiwan and Hong Kong. They felt Taiwan and Hong Kong are Chinese land; and unification is a national goal of Chinese. They believed that unification would benefit both mainland Chinese and Taiwanese. Their desire for Chinese unification was not as strong as their desire for Korean unification. They maintained lukewarm attitudes towards Chinese unification. They felt Chinese unification is easier to achieve than Korean unification, considering the difference in power between Taiwan and PRC, and the PRC government’s strong will to achieve it. The ways in which Korean Chinese feel themselves to be ‘Chinese’ are complicated, and it will be explored in later chapters, mostly in Chapter 6 and Chapter 7.

The following sections demonstrate the diverse attitudes of Korean Chinese concerning South Korea’s multicultural transition. Greater opposition than support for multiculturalism was indicated, with a substantial proportion of participants showing ambivalent attitudes. Unfavourable attitudes are mainly caused by the participants’ commitment to ethnic nationalism and understanding of multiculturalism as being in opposition to ethnic nationalism; and other perceived problems of multiculturalism, both in the concept and in practice. Favourable attitudes were caused by the perceived merits of multiculturalism (e.g. benefit to the national economy); whilst ambivalent attitudes were mostly caused by the unclear position of Korean Chinese in the South Korean multicultural context, and the multiple identities of Korean Chinese. Regardless of the sharply divided responses, the majority of the participants recognised the significance of this transition in South Korea.

3.2 Unfavourable Attitudes
Participants’ unfavourable attitudes towards South Korea’s transition to multiculturalism related to the perceived negative consequences of multiculturalism, which include multiculturalism’s challenging of ethnic nationalism and Korean identity; causing the loss of traditional Korean culture; and increasing internal discord and threatening social security. Scepticism about multiculturalism in general also leads to unfavourable attitudes. Not only the concept of multiculturalism, but also its concrete practice in South Korea was seen as problematic.
3.2.1 Damage to Ethnic Nationalism
Damage to ethnic nationalism is a prominent theme related to the negative impact of multiculturalism that was discovered in this research. Sixty-three participants perceived the consequences of South Korean multiculturalism as being threatening, seeing it as challenging ethnic nationalism, weakening Korean identity, destroying the homogeneity of the Korean nation, and destroying their ethnic homeland. These participants were committed to ethnic nationalism, and believed homogeneity is the most important characteristic of the Korean nation. The stronger the ethnic nationalism, the more critical they were of multiculturalism. They believed that ethnic nationalism should continue to be upheld as it strengthens unity and devotion among Koreans. They insisted the South Korean government should be more concerned with overseas Koreans than with migrants.

3.2.2 Rising Internal Division
There was criticism from many participants of multiculturalism for its detrimental effect on social solidarity. They perceived multiculturalism as causing social division, threatening social security, and weakening the sense of solidarity of Koreans. Such perception was based on their belief that solidarity was provided by a shared ethnicity and culture. Migrants’ tendency to stick to their own groups and isolate themselves from locals was also perceived to lead to internal division. These participants pointed out that migrant groups did not like to mingle with the dominant group nor with peer migrant groups, and interpreted this phenomenon as the result of the unwillingness of South Koreans to embrace migrants.

Some participants indicated that the unbalanced support of the South Korean government for different groups of migrants has intensified social divisions. They pointed out that when different groups were treated differently, some groups took on a low status whilst some groups received preferential treatment, and this would cause people to feel relative deprivation and eventually spark strong internal conflict. Mr. ES Bang, a 42-year-old migrant worker in South Korea, was one of these participants who hesitated to welcome multiculturalism, fearing it would lead to the disunity of South Korean society through unbalanced support for different groups. Mr. Bang felt that South Korea’s multicultural policies focused exclusively on migrant brides while ignoring other underprivileged groups. As a former librarian in Yanbian, Mr. Bang led a relatively stable life until he came to South
Korea. Mr. Bang commented that the South Korean government should be careful in supporting different groups of migrants, as unbalanced support for different groups possibly tears away the seams of social cohesion.

An increase in the number of crimes committed by foreign residents in South Korea was perceived by some participants as a potential cause for social disunity. Cases of crimes committed by foreigners increased by 30% on average each year between 2004 and 2009, and hit 38,986 cases in the single year 2009 (Supreme Prosecutors’ Office 2012). However, this was the result of a rapid increase in the foreign population. The rate of crimes committed by foreign residents proportionate to population was considerably lower than that of locals (Supreme Prosecutors’ Office 2012). Nonetheless, the overall surge in reported crime has spread horror amongst locals. A few participants viewed migrants as potential criminals. They considered themselves to be Koreans rather than migrants. Unfortunately for them who put themselves in the Koreans’ position, most South Koreans view Korean Chinese as the main perpetrators of crimes committed by foreigners (R. Kim 2012). This is because crimes committed by Korean Chinese accounted for half of the total cases of crimes by foreigners (Supreme Prosecutors’ Office 2012). Korean Chinese have become the target of the anger of locals, and greater hostility towards them emerged following the gruesome murder of a young South Korean woman by a Korean Chinese man in 2012 (R. Kim 2012).

Being aware of South Koreans’ hostility towards Korean Chinese, many participants responded that South Koreans should not regard an individual’s crime as the whole group’s problem but take the large population of Korean Chinese migrants into consideration. These participants took their collective image as Korean Chinese seriously, and tried to dispel the negative images given to them. They resented that the image of Korean Chinese was distorted and exaggerated by the sensationalist South Korean media, and felt such biased reporting increased locals’ hostile feelings against Korean Chinese, particularly those who were not employed as professionals. Some of them pointed out that migrants’ being cut off from social welfare and their unfamiliarity with South Korean social systems could be factors in their criminal offending.

3.2.3 ‘Problematic’ Practice of Multiculturalism Policy in South Korea
Chapter 3

Not only the concept of multiculturalism, but also its practice in South Korea was seen as problematic by many participants. ‘Problems’ mentioned included the lack of a consistent definition of multiculturalism and the examination of the ramifications of multiculturalism; the excessive speed at which multicultural practice has expanded; the negative representation of migrants and the subsequent stigmatisation of the beneficiaries of multiculturalism policy; the socio-economic marginalisation and self-segregation of migrants; the exclusion of the voice of migrants and failing to reflect the reality of migrants; the unbalanced support between migrants and local underprivileged people; and a lack of public support.

‘Excessive’ Speed of the Expansion of Multiculturalism

Some participants indicated concern about the pace at which South Korea was embracing multiculturalism. They felt that multiculturalism has spread in South Korea like a fever, ignoring public opposition to multiculturalism. They recommended a national agreement on multiculturalism and a level-headed rate at which to promote multiculturalism, being concerned that rushing to accept multiculturalism without a national consensus would cause a sudden collapse of multiculturalism and leave South Korean society in chaos. They suggested the South Korean government and public be prudent when accepting an unfamiliar idea as a dominant discourse, especially when the new idea seems to be in conflict with the old discourse, which South Koreans had cherished until recently.

The remarks of Ms. XB Hu, a 60-year-old journalist in China, clearly indicated the concern of these participants at the speed at which multiculturalism has spread in South Korea. Ms. Hu regarded the fast speed involved as the biggest problem with South Korean multiculturalism. She commented that she could not understand why South Korea is gambling against the odds by pursuing multiculturalism at such an alarming pace, and that she shuddered at the thought that multiculturalism would disappear as quickly as it had arisen. Clarifying that what she feared to see was not the disappearance of multiculturalism but the turmoil that could be stirred up as a result, Ms. Hu recommended caution and a controlled pace for embracing multiculturalism. She commented, “Embracing new ideals is like to take a bite out of a mysterious fruit. Better to eat it cautiously, little by little. Even if multiculturalism is assumed to be perfect, a level-headed rate is needed, otherwise tremendous side effects will follow.”
A Lack of Examination of the Controversial Concept of Multiculturalism

Some participants had a common understanding that multiculturalism was a controversial concept and by no means a master key to solve all social problems; and that it had not received critical examination in South Korea. Having seen the struggles that were realities in countries that had adopted multiculturalism previously as official national policy, these participants wished the public to give serious consideration to the negative effects of multiculturalism; and the South Korean government to fully study foreign examples to reduce unnecessary trial and error in the process. Many of these participants knew well that some countries have already announced the failure of multiculturalism, and have even returned to monoculturalism. They felt South Korea should pay attention to failed experiences of other countries and their thought-provoking reversal.

Mr. KX Kim, a 62-year-old professor at a university in China, was one of these participants who considered multiculturalism to be controversial. Mr. Kim did not deny multiculturalism was ethical and progressive in terms of its protection of the rights of minorities. However, he emphasised that South Korea should be cautious to take board multiculturalism, considering the controversial nature of multiculturalism had already become problematic in several multicultural nations. Mr. Kim commented that it is understandable that South Korea tries, through multiculturalism, to solve its dilemma concerning the increase of its foreign population, but a critical attitude is required in approaching multiculturalism because multiculturalism is neither a universal value nor the panacea to cure all problems in South Korean society. Considering that Mr. Kim was influential in academic and social spheres of the Korean Chinese community, it is highly possible that his view on South Korean multiculturalism will soon become the dominant view of the Korean Chinese community towards South Korean multiculturalism.

Inefficient Practice of Multiculturalism in South Korea

Many participants perceived that South Korean multiculturalism has failed to bring all the benefits it claimed to do because of the inefficient implementation of multicultural policies. Most of these participants were migrant workers involved in nonprofessional occupations. They felt that they had received few benefit from multiculturalism despite the significant budget that the South Korean government has allocated to enact multiculturalism, and wanted to see a correspondingly large benefit for the large money spent. Mr. JP Kim, a 45-year-old
construction worker in Seoul, was one of those participants who felt the budget is used inefficiently. He expressed his doubt concerning how much benefit South Korean multiculturalism actually brought to migrant workers like himself. Mr. Kim felt multiculturalism in South Korea was perfunctory and the South Korean government is pouring water into a broken pot, given the still poor working environment for migrants. Mr. Kim commented that few migrants around him had seen the virtues of multicultural policies; instead, they were still poorly paid, and discrimination against foreigners still exists in South Korean society.

**Marginalisation and Segregation of the Migrants**

Many participants who currently in South Korea raised the risk of multiculturalism marginalising migrants or creating conditions that might encourage segregation of migrants, due to a lack of autonomy of migrants in the process of the practice of multiculturalism policy in South Korea. Such an argument corresponds with the research findings of Lee (2007) and H. Kim (2012) that multiculturalism has often reinforced negative images of migrants who are mobilised to participate in government-organised multicultural events without autonomy and self-motivation. Participants answered that they had never been asked to express their opinions on South Korean multiculturalism, nor given an opportunity to represent themselves or to initiate multicultural events of their own; instead they had reluctantly joined multicultural events arranged by South Koreans. They felt that Korean Chinese had been forced to accept negative representations of them by locals, even in multicultural context; and the negative representation has further marginalised Korean Chinese who have already been disadvantaged in South Korean society.

**Ignorance of the Different Needs of Different Groups**

Some participants, most of whom were from professional and high-income brackets, perceived South Korea’s multicultural policies to ignore the different needs of different migrant groups. They felt that differences among migrants of a given nationality should be taken into consideration as much as the differences among migrants of different nationality, and complained that South Korea’s multiculturalism policies focused on marriage migrants and non-professional migrants while ignoring professional migrants. They claimed that migrants who worked as professionals, if they could not benefit from multiculturalism,
should at least be treated in a way that corresponded to the amount of tax they paid, which they thought was more than that paid by the average local.

Customised support for Korean Chinese of different backgrounds was frequently brought up. Participants who were working mothers with under-school-age children wished they could have support with their children’s schooling, considering the difficulty in entering public kindergartens in South Korea. Ms. YX Lu, a 35-year-old doctor who came to South Korea in 2010 with her PhD-candidate husband, had to stay at home for more than one year to look after her two pre-school children who could not enter public kindergarten until the year after their arrival in South Korea. She felt that support with kindergarten enrolment would be a great help for migrant families without extended family members to look after their children. Ms. SH Lai, a 36-year-old lawyer working in Seoul, had similar experience to that of Ms. Lu. She stressed the necessity to support migrant families in the pre-school education of their children, believing it benefits both migrants and South Koreans. These participants believed that their demand for reflection of the perspectives of Korean Chinese in South Korean policy-making is not excessive, even leaving aside their Korean ethnicity, due to the number of Korean Chinese in South Korea and their contribution to South Korean society.

**Lack of Public Support for Multiculturalism**

A large number of participants felt that South Korean multiculturalism lacks public support among migrants, who were supposed to be the targeted beneficiaries, and so were concerned that South Korea’s pursuit of its multicultural project would lead to a costly failure. Lee (2007) and H. Kim (2012) proved that migrants in South Korea are indifferent to the multicultural boom. Several reasons for the indifference of Korean Chinese to multiculturalism have been pointed out in this study from the perspective of Korean Chinese. The failure of multiculturalism to bring actual benefit to migrants was perceived by many participants to be arguably the most important reason. Additionally, a large number of participants were indifferent to multiculturalism, perceiving it as being for marriage migrants and their families only and thus unrelated to migrant workers like themselves. Ms. MS Lee, a 39-year-old realtor in Seoul, was one of these participants who felt South Korean multiculturalism has little to do with the everyday life of migrant workers. She felt that South Korea should make migrants more enthusiastic about its multiculturalism policy in order to
succeed in its multicultural transition; and that in order to attract migrants multiculturalism policies should bring real help to migrants.

Some participants considered the stigmatisation associated with beneficiaries of multiculturalism in South Korea results in multiculturalism being unpopular. They regarded the term ‘multiculturalism’ as being closely linked to negative images of helpless migrants from poor countries desperately needing help, and thus have tried to keep their distance from the multicultural boom in South Korea. Mr. WY Song, a 39-year-old migrant in Pusan, was one of these participants who felt that multicultural policies supposed to support underprivileged migrants often backfired by creating stigma. Having earned an annual average of USD 120,000 by selling brand-name bags he imported from China, he showed his displeasure that migrants collectively were depicted in South Korea as being poor and incapacitated. Such a sentiment is in line with H. Kim’s (2012) argument that the negative way in which marriage migrants are presented is important in understanding why they are indifferent to multiculturalism.

**Not Yet a Multicultural Society**

Many participants did not see South Korea as a multicultural society for different reasons. Thirty-five participants commented that they could see little sign of South Korean society becoming multicultural because Korean culture was still overwhelmingly predominant, with migrants’ cultures being insignificantly visible; differences were not tolerated and respected; and discrimination against migrants were still pervasive in South Korean society. “Even the multicultural programmes promote South Korean culture and values as central”, Mr. CP Seo, a 35-year-old migrant worker at a small-sized enterprise in Incheon, commented.

The severance of migrants from mainstream society and the infrequency of interaction between migrant groups were also pointed out by some participants as the reason they saw South Korea as not yet being multicultural. These participants felt that migrant groups in South Korea form their own communities and their encounters with other migrant groups and with locals are limited; and the communication between migrants and locals was dominated by the mainstream culture. They considered that this phenomenon was caused by the fundamental principle of South Korean multiculturalism, which they perceived as assimilation.
Criticism of South Korean multiculturalism for focusing on assimilation was frequent among participants who felt that multiculturalism should be ethnic and cultural diversity and recognition of disparate cultures. Participants who were marriage migrants, particularly female marriage migrants, criticised the limitations of ‘multicultural education’ programmes that were limited to teaching marriage migrants Korean language, culture and social values.

South Korean multiculturalism was also seen as being thick with debate at the opposite extremes either in agreement or in opposition. Mr. DT Po, a 36-year-old businessman in Shanghai, commented that multiculturalism attracted both support and opposition in South Korea, with little effort being made to find agreement in the middle ground. These participants also point out that supporters of multiculturalism were often the least tolerant towards differences; and no voices against multiculturalism were allowed in South Korea. Mr. JE Kang, a 42-year-old lawyer in Yanbian, felt that supporters of multiculturalism should acknowledge ethnic nationalism, given that multiculturalism is supposed to acknowledge different or even contradicting opinions. Mr. Kang argued:

> It seems that multiculturalists regard ethnic nationalism as something to be disposed of like an antiquated custom. The problem lies in the attitudes of multiculturalists towards those who oppose multiculturalism. Multiculturalists see anti-multiculturalists as racists, inhumane and heartless people; and do not accept any voices that oppose multiculturalism. It’s ironic that multiculturalists, who claim diversity, tolerance and rationality, disregard the values of opposing concepts and want to impose the value they like on everyone.

Some participants felt that South Korea, which was supposed to be multicultural due to the input of significant efforts to promote multiculturalism, was close to the opposite, that is, was moving from an extreme of emphasis on a culture of its own to an obsession with multiculturalism. These participants criticised South Koreans for showing disrespect for their own culture, and for trying to shape South Korean society to be like Western countries by accepting Western values, political systems and even language. They pointed out that
multiculturalism that sacrifices the culture of the dominant people was not a real multiculturalism.

Mr. BV Feng, a 37-year-old employee of the LG Company in Seoul, was one of these participants who insisted South Koreans to respect what they have owned before respecting the traditions of others. He referred to the situation in April 2010 when a famous designer of traditional Korean costume (Hanbok) was denied entry to a hotel in South Korea because she was wearing Hanbok. Mr. Feng felt shocked when he first saw the news from a foreign press source, where it was classified as ‘odd’ news. He asked, “How can Koreans be rejected entering Korean hotels because they are wearing Korean costume? How can people respect other cultures if they ignore their own? Isn’t the first step for South Koreans to achieve multiculturalism is to cherish what they have?”

3.3 Ambivalent Attitudes

Given Koreans’ long-held attitude of being proudly mono-cultural (Shin 2006), the current development of multiculturalism is startling. However, the first reaction of a considerable number of participants to the question regarding their attitudes to South Korea’s multicultural boom is ambivalence. Uncertainty over what multiculturalism is was a bit of a surprise, considering the South Korean media coverage regarding the explosion of multiculturalism in South Korea. Many participants were also not certain about who South Korean multiculturalism aimed to benefit. Kim (2007) argues that South Korea’s multiculturalism targets female marriage migrants from Southeast Asian countries, while excluding migrant workers even within migrant-targeted programmes. A large number of participants were not sure whether South Korean multiculturalism aimed to benefit only members of the ‘multicultural family’, which is composed of a South Korean husband and a foreign wife and their children, or whether it catered to ordinary migrant workers as well. The remarks of Mr. CH Park, a 61-year-old businessman whom I met in Yanbian, clearly indicated such confusion. Mr. Park noted:

Multiculturalism is the trend of South Korean society today. The words ‘multiculturalism’ and ‘multicultural family’ are dominant on TV and everywhere. You cannot avoid hearing them every day. However, if you ask me what South Korean multiculturalism is, I
won’t be able to answer. What is multiculturalism? What does South Korea aim to achieve? Who are the targets of multiculturalism policies? I hardly know myself. I am wondering if South Koreans have a clear answer. Probably the policy makers themselves have disputes.

The deepest concern of most participants, however, was how South Korea’s multiculturalism policy relates to Korean Chinese: whether or not it has incorporated Korean Chinese; and whether or not it should incorporate Korean Chinese. The first source of confusion stemmed from participants’ understanding that multiculturalism is relevant to foreigners only and their perception that South Korea’s stance towards Korean Chinese is unclear, with inconsistent and discriminatory policies. Most participants felt that Korean Chinese were awkwardly placed between foreigners and compatriots, without a clear definition of their position in the multicultural context. Although they focused on the low social standing of Korean Chinese themselves, they understood the plight of North Korean defectors and Soviet Koreans. Some participants felt that Korean Chinese have been excluded from being targets of South Korea’s multiculturalism; whilst others felt that Korean Chinese have been incorporated in, and thereby benefit from, the policy of multiculturalism. Whether or not they are included in the policy of multiculturalism is important to them, as they consider inclusion or exclusion signifies South Korea’s stance towards Korean Chinese, seeing them either as foreigners and disregarding their shared descent with South Koreans or seeing them as compatriots and emphasising their shared descent.

The second source of confusion revolved around two factors: how participants themselves identified Korean Chinese; and how they expected the South Korean government to identify Korean Chinese. Participants’ evaluation of South Korean multiculturalism differed, depending on the identity they had. Forty participants emphasised their blood relationship with South Koreans, claimed they should be treated as compatriots, and resented being incorporated into multicultural policies. In contrast, some participants who considered themselves to be foreigners in South Korea felt they were nothing special in South Korea and thus had no right to ask for privileged treatment but should be treated as were other migrant groups, which meant Korean Chinese should be included as beneficiaries of multiculturalism. A few participants had a different approach, feeling that Korean Chinese were qualified to
benefit from South Korea’s multiculturalism policy no matter who they were, either Korean or Chinese, due to their cultural difference from South Koreans.

Only after spending time in defending their opinions about why (or why not) multiculturalism should be related to Korean Chinese did participants begin to give detailed responses to other questions. Their heated debates with each other showed that most Korean Chinese cared about South Korea’s transition to multiculturalism, which they often cynically described as a ‘multicultural explosion’. The confusion of participants in regard to South Korean multiculturalism was particularly visible during group discussions, in which participants spent a considerable amount of time debating without being able to reach consensus; instead, debate often led to further disagreement and conflicts.

While some may suppose confusion over South Korean multiculturalism emerges from a poor education or inability to comprehend complex ideas, this was not the case. Most participants in this category had enough intelligence and work experience to understand the situation of South Korea: 70 participants had a college education at least; 20 of them had work experience in academic, media and political spheres; three had been involved with a study on migrants in South Korea; five had been engaged in running organisations to promote the rights of Korean Chinese migrants; and three were working at associations to promote multiculturalism in South Korea. These participants blamed South Korean policy makers for exacerbating public confusion with unclear policies.

There was also significant confusion amongst participants as to whether multiculturalism has become the dominant ideology of South Korea. Many participants argued that multiculturalism has become the national ideology of South Korea since 2006; whilst a small number of participants argued that polices issued under the name of multiculturalism did not necessarily mean that the South Korean government had changed its national ideology to multiculturalism. A large number of participants preferred multiculturalism to remain at the level of migration policy or social integration policy rather than being promoted to state policy or the national ideology, in the belief that South Korea has not met the historical, political and socio-economic condition on which the national ideology is premised. Ms. XY Zhou, a 46-year-old clerk at a trading company in Seoul, answered that it was too much for
her to see ethnic nationalism replaced by multiculturalism, although she supported an idea of multiculturalism that includes the building of an equal society. She noted:

I don’t mind seeing South Korean society become multicultural and pursue multiculturalism as a social value, but I have reservations about whether South Korea needs to give up ethnic nationalism. It is unwise to accept multiculturalism as a state policy. South Korea needs ethnic nationalism. It has not yet satisfied the conditions required to replace ethnic nationalism with multiculturalism.

Although it was not common, a few participants were uninterested in South Korea’s social transition. They were ignorant of pertinent social issues in South Korea and the significance of South Korean social changes to Korean Chinese. Ms. MM Hwang, a 37-year-old accountant in Australia asked in return if I cared about what happened in South Africa. She said that her Korean identity has weakened after years of living outside of Yanbian.

3.4 Favourable Attitudes
Favourable attitudes of many participants towards South Korea’s transition to multiculturalism resulted from the perceived benefits of multiculturalism. Included in the positive influences of multiculturalism they pointed out were the reinforcement of social harmony through encouraging locals to reduce discrimination against migrants and to accept and integrate migrants; the strengthening of the national economy by filling the on-going labour shortage and also through enhancing the contributions of migrants by improving their status in South Korean society; the enrichment of Korean culture by encouraging South Koreans to recognise and accept the diverse cultures of migrants; and the effects of making South Koreans cosmopolitan even without leaving their country.

3.4.1 Enhancement of Social Integration
Some participants highly valued multiculturalism, believing it can enhance social integration. Such belief was from their understanding that multiculturalism can acknowledge and respect differences, reduce tensions between migrants and locals, increase mutual understanding between different groups, and thus eventually create a foreigner-friendly society. They felt it important to establish a foreigner-friendly society and for migrants to become integrated,
considering the prevalent hostility against migrants in South Korea and also considering the possibility of South Korea suffering disruption to its social stability if discrimination against migrants continued.

The understanding that South Korea is a foreigner-hostile society came from participants’ negative migration experiences in South Korea, such as being culturally excluded and economically marginalised. These participants felt that Korean Chinese were treated badly in South Korea despite their shared ethnicity and their contributions to South Korean society; and that it was easy to recognise the difficult circumstances of migrants in South Korea when the situation of Korean Chinese was considered. Because of this feeling that ‘misery loves company’, these participants supported South Korea’s adoption of multiculturalism in order to alleviate the hostile atmosphere towards migrants. They felt that South Koreans should treat migrants as allies, considering migrants’ contribution to South Korean society. The necessity of creating a foreigner-friendly environment using the idea of multiculturalism was clear from the comments of Ms. UI Park, a 55-year-old chef in Ulsan. She noted:

> Considering how badly Korean Chinese have been treated in South Korea despite shared descent and language, it is not difficult to imagine how much worse other migrants have been treated with their different ethnicity, culture and looks compared with South Koreans. Migrants are an asset to South Korea. They help to sustain South Korea’s development. They deserve better treatment. I expect multiculturalism to teach South Koreans the values of tolerance and generosity and thus end discrimination against migrants. If South Korea fails to integrate migrants, serious social unrest is inescapable, as seen from plenty of Western experiences.

Some participants retorted to the argument that multiculturalism would pose a threat to social integration and national unity and lead to the decline of that society. They resented that it was ethnic nationalism that caused the failure of South Korea by dividing Korean nationals by descent. These participants had faith in a multicultural society as a tolerant society, where

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37 Ulsan is South Korea’s industrial powerhouse and the seventh largest metropolis.
different ethnicities and cultures could freely express themselves and co-exist in a far stronger way than in a homogeneous society in terms of achieving social harmony, adapting to social changes and overcoming national crises. Ms. BY Kim, a 45-year-old lawyer in Beijing, was one of these participants who felt that adopting a generous standard in defining the Korean nation would strengthen South Korea. Considering a multicultural society would be more powerful and vital, she suggested South Koreans welcome the multicultural boom and adapt to the changes instead of being scared of them:

I think South Koreans feel a multicultural society is complicated and confusing, considering too many cooks would spoil the broth. This is wildly inaccurate. South Koreans do not need to worry about that. I see a multicultural society as having greater vitality and strength. The abilities of multiculturalism for crisis management surpass those of mono-culturalism, as Chinese people like to say, “The combined wisdom of three shoe cleaners exceeds that of the wise man”, and “Among three men who pass me by, one of them could be my teacher”. I think multiculturalism is the correct path for South Korea.

3.4.2 Benefit to the National Economy
Multiculturalism was perceived to boost the national economy of South Korea through filling the workforce shortage. Thirty-two participants considered the labour shortage as the most significant factor determining South Korea’s urgent need to adopt multiculturalism. Based on the assumption that South Korea’s labour shortage would intensify, given South Korea’s rapidly ageing population, and that South Korea’s dependence on a foreign workforce would consequently increase in order to maintain its economic progress, these participants considered South Korea’s acceptance of multiculturalism to be inevitable. Most of them felt that whether or not multiculturalism should be adopted was decided the moment South Korea conceived the ambition to become an economic super power.

Participants who believed that multiculturalism was needed in South Korea held a range of views, illustrated by the following comments: “South Korea, being incapable of self-sufficiency in labour, has to import foreigners, and multiculturalism is the best strategy to attract foreigners to come” (from Mr. DH So, a 34-year-old government
official); “A country like South Korea, with a small land area and limited natural resources, has no choice but to adopt multiculturalism and to live with others” (from Mr. EH Kim, a 45-year-old employee of a livestock processing plant in Daejeon); and “If South Korea doesn’t import migrants, the development of South Korean society will cease” (from Ms. CS Wang, a 47-year-old home-health care worker in Incheon).

Many participants felt that multiculturalism boosts the national economy by enhancing social dynamics through bringing in a new population with diverse skills and resources, and by increasing the economic productivity of migrants. They considered the economic productivity of migrants could be improved by constructing a society in which foreigners are respected, have equal opportunities to display their talents, and receive full recognition of their contributions. These participants felt promoting multiculturalism is mutually beneficial, but more beneficial for South Koreans than for migrants. Ms. MH Koo, a 27-year-old PhD student and a volunteer after-class teacher of children from international marriages in South Korea, is one of those participants who believed multiculturalism would benefit South Korea immeasurably. She noted:

Multiculturalism benefits South Koreans most. It helps South Koreans to gain more talent from around the world, increase the number of loyal citizens, and so will make the Korean nation stronger. South Korea should fully utilise the talents of migrants, without prejudice. Full recognition of their contributions and warm treatment befitting their efforts will maximise their contributions to South Korean society.

3.4.3 A Broader Perspective
Some participants viewed multiculturalism as an opportunity for South Koreans to widen their minds, which they perceived as being narrow and blindly occupied with the idea that “ours is the best”. They considered multiculturalism created an opportunity for South Koreans to become cosmopolitan by deepening their knowledge of both others and themselves. Some of them made sarcastic comments about South Koreans’ constant talking about how good their domestic products were and how bad Chinese products were. Mr. EB Liu, a 38-year-old office worker in Yanbian, was angry with South Koreans’ harsh criticism of Chinese products. He took it personally, and felt humiliated and offended. His comment
was more extreme and aggressive than those of most others, whose comments stopped at the level of complaining. Mr. Liu’s undisguised strong emotion clearly indicated his identification with China or close feelings of attachment to China. He commented:

South Koreans think whatever they have is the best, whilst whatever is made or produced in China is bad, unsanitary and even poisonous. South Koreans should thank Chinese for providing them with cheap products. Without Chinese products, I wonder if South Koreans could lead their daily life. They should blame themselves for being unable to afford expensive products. Usually the losers in South Korean society are bold in word, and more critical of Chinese products and people. I think it’s the expression of their inferiority complex. They have no place to get rid of their inferiority complex.

In general, the participants with favourable attitudes towards multiculturalism felt multiculturalism was a natural phenomenon and an unstoppable trend that came with globalisation. Though admitting that the transition from a homogeneous society to a multicultural society is often accompanied by side effects (e.g. cultural collision and social confusion), they asserted that the multicultural debate South Koreans should have at this point is about what kind of multiculturalism is wanted and how it will be achieved, rather than whether multiculturalism should be promoted. In this regard, they shared opinions with Castles (2007) and Oh (2007). Nineteen of them emphasised that cultural exchange and acceptance of exotic cultures existed in the past, when migration was limited, and expressed puzzlement as to why multiculturalism created such a negative sensation in South Korea. Mr. Park’s comment clearly shows such understandings. Mr. Park, a 41-year-old dentist, noted:

The level of migration activity today was not possible in the past, but even back then, cultural exchange occurred. Today, exchange between cultures is occurring extensively and intensively. Mentalities of exclusiveness and isolation are undesirable. I am a conservative person. But even to me the change from homogeneous to multicultural seems necessary. I feel the image of people of diverse backgrounds coexisting together is better than that of Koreans existing exclusively
on their own. Problems will emerge in the process of transition, but multiculturalism cannot be stopped, and South Korea has to embrace multiculturalism, because that is what it needs. I cannot understand why so many South Koreans dislike multiculturalism so much.

Conclusion
In this chapter I have discussed a wide range of attitudes of participants towards South Korea’s transition to multiculturalism and analysed the factors influencing participants to adopt different attitudes. This transition was perceived more negatively than positively, with a considerable attitudinal ambivalence. In general, participants who were younger, female, more educated and with higher socio-economic status and more migration experiences have more favourable attitudes towards South Korea’s adoption of multiculturalism than did older, male, less educated participants with lower socio-economic status and few migration experiences. The most significant factor in the participants’ responses, however, is their beliefs in ethnic nationalism. The following chapters extend my analysis of the participants’ responses by analysing the important themes arising: South Korea’s exclusion of Korean Chinese due to its ambiguous boundary between ethnicity and nationality; South Korea’s hierarchical nationhood and its consequences of Korean Chinese; and the awkward position of Korean Chinese between South Korea and China.
CHAPTER 4: SOUTH KOREA’S ‘DOUBLE EXCLUSION’ OF KOREAN CHINESE: ETHNICITY OR NATIONALITY?

Introduction
This chapter, focusing on the contested understandings of Korean Chinese of South Korea’s policies towards Korean Chinese, explores: (1) how Korean Chinese have perceived South Korea’s policies towards them, particularly the changes before and after South Korea’s adopting multiculturalism; and (2) how the South Korean government’s policies towards Korean Chinese have affected Korean Chinese in terms of their migration and settlement in South Korea, and most important of all, for the purpose of this research, their ethno-national identities. This chapter starts by documenting the confusion of some Korean Chinese as to whether or not the South Korean government has incorporated Korean Chinese into multiculturalism policy.

4.1 Exclusion from Multiculturalism Policy
One element of resentment of many participants over South Korea’s adoption of multiculturalism came from an understanding that South Korean multiculturalism excluded Korean Chinese from its list of beneficiaries. In contrast to these participants’ understanding, the South Korean government does not officially exclude Korean Chinese from the beneficiaries of its multiculturalism policy; but neither does it specify that Korean Chinese are included. For instance, a Korean Chinese family composed of a partner with Chinese citizenship and a partner with South Korean citizenship was not regarded as being a multicultural family until 2011; a family composed of two Korean Chinese with South Korean citizenship or one partner with South Korean citizenship was eligible to be supported as a multicultural family only after October 2011; and a family composed of two Korean Chinese was still not eligible for support (An 2011). Yet there was no clear policy regarding Korean Chinese workers, who were the majority of Korean Chinese migrants in South Korea.

Feelings of resentment over being omitted from South Korea’s multiculturalism policy were especially strong among participants who felt their lives in South Korea were tough, full of

38 A ‘multicultural family’ used to include families with a partner being South Korean by birth and a partner being a foreigner or a naturalised South Korean. The range of multicultural families expanded to families composed of a partner being naturalised citizen, and families composed of two naturalised citizens.
discrimination by and alienation from South Koreans. They felt that if South Korea needed to embrace migrants, the first group to be considered should be Korean Chinese, who were, leaving aside the question of their Korean ethnicity, a numerical majority of migrants in South Korea with the longest history of migration but had experienced discrimination so far.

Ms. YJ Xin, a 70-year-old retiree in Yanbian, was one of these participants who were furious about the South Korean government supporting foreigners after ignoring Korean Chinese for decades. She first visited South Korea in 2002, and revisited in 2008 after she obtained South Korean citizenship. She commented that she could not understand why, after being treated as foreign workers for so many years, Korean Chinese were disqualified from benefiting from multiculturalism policies, which she understood aim to help migrants. She felt that the South Korean government should help co-ethnics first, or, at least give as much attention to Korean Chinese as it gave to other migrant groups. Ms. Xin remarked:

I cannot think of a time when I was not treated as a foreigner in South Korea. I cannot understand why Korean Chinese are left out of discussions about multiculturalism in South Korea. Isn’t multiculturalism for migrants? If South Koreans are so generous that they are willing to embrace foreigners, why do they not sympathise with co-ethnics who share the same blood. It is impressive that South Koreans help underprivileged foreigners, but I would be more grateful if they helped compatriots first.

Ms. YN Cho’s comment indicated the feelings of Korean Chinese at being treated worse than other migrant groups. Ms. Cho, a 55-year-old businesswoman, had been involved with movements for the rights of Korean Chinese migrants for a long time. She often spent her own money to help Korean Chinese in need of urgent help. As a result, she was called a ‘reliable worker for Korean Chinese’ and highly respected; and was recommended as a leader of several Korean Chinese associations in South Korea. She talked about her own experience of being treated as insignificant by South Korean authorities at a government-sponsored festival for migrants in 2009. Although she talked in a quiet tone from start to finish, the disappointment that she felt towards the South Korean government could still be detected. Initially, the host of the festival did not invite Korean Chinese to the event. Ms. Cho felt
happy with not being invited, as she understood it as a sign the organisers regarded Korean Chinese as compatriots rather than migrants. On the day of the event, quite a small number of migrants arrived, and when the organisers realised that they did not have enough guests to run the event, they contacted the leaders of Korean Chinese organisations to bring Korean Chinese to the event. Ms. Cho recalled that she felt upset and even disgusted when she heard Korean Chinese were belatedly invited to the event only to fill the empty hall. She noted:

I am wondering who South Korean multiculturalists think we (Korean Chinese) are? We would be happier if we were invited from the outset or were not invited at all. If they had invited us from the beginning, we would have thought South Koreans include us in multiculturalism, and thus the beneficial policies based on multiculturalism relate to us. If they had not invited us, I would have thought South Koreans treat us as their compatriots. Unfortunately, they treat us as nothing. We were treated even worse than other migrant groups. It upset me a lot.

Many participants remembered the ‘notorious’ festival. Some of them took part in the festival themselves, whilst others heard about the festival from their acquaintances. Most of them, regardless of how they knew about what happened during the festival, considered the organisers’ belated invitation was insulting and felt disgruntled. Mr. GP Lim’s comment was full of self-deprecation. Mr. Lim, a 54-year-old editor of a Chinese newspaper company in Yanbian, felt that Korean Chinese could not become a major target of South Korea’s multiculturalism because Korean Chinese are poor; and that there was nothing Korean Chinese could do to make South Koreans treat them well. Mr. Lim commented:

The South Korean government did not give a crap about Korean Chinese when it began to design its multiculturalism policy. However, what can we do? We are insignificant, working at the bottom of South Korean society. The South Korean government was holding a sword by the hilt. It can follow its own whim. What Korean Chinese can do is to ask for favours of the South Korean government and enjoy the benefits it occasionally threw to us.
Nineteen participants, who were marriage migrants themselves or had family members who were marriage migrants, commented that neither Korean Chinese migrant workers nor marriage migrants were incorporated in South Korean multiculturalism. They accepted the exclusion of Korean Chinese marriage migrants from government support negatively and emotionally, considering that Korean Chinese marriage migrants are not only the largest group of marriage migrant in South Korea but also the pioneers of trans-border marriages for South Korean men. Mr. SJ Kwon, a 33-year-old office worker in Japan, had two cousins who married South Koreans. He came to a cynical conclusion as to why South Korea’s multiculturalism policy did not include Korean Chinese. He felt that Korean Chinese were taking a back seat in South Korea’s multiculturalism policy because South Korean multiculturalism cared only for migrants who looked like foreigners.

Ms. MH Park, a 37-year-old migrant in Pusan, married her South Korean husband in 2002. She felt South Korean multiculturalism was hypocritical in excluding Korean Chinese families, like hers, from the ‘multicultural family’. Such understanding stemmed from an unpleasant memory of once reading a piece of news about a multicultural event organised by the South Korean government, which invited brides of all different nationality to the event, but not Korean Chinese. Ms. Park commented that she was upset not because Korean Chinese missed a party in the President’s residence, but because that represented the alienated status of Korean Chinese in South Korea.

The President Lee once invited foreign brides to his residence. When I saw pictures of the event, I tried to find Korean Chinese brides. It was not difficult to identify the origins of brides as they put on traditional costumes of their country. I couldn’t find trace of Korean Chinese, who would have put on Korean costume if they were there. Later I heard that Korean Chinese were not invited. What a shame! Korean Chinese are the largest group of marriage migrants in South Korea. I guess they were not invited because they resemble South Koreans too closely, especially when they are wearing Korean costume. That’s why I say South Korean multiculturalism is showy.
This ‘exclusion’ mentioned by Ms. Park is not limited to Korean Chinese, but applies to most members of the Korean diaspora. Even privileged group have suffered an awkward position in South Korea as being between compatriots and foreigners. Some participants worried that the exclusion of Korean Chinese international marriage families from South Korea’s multiculturalism policy would lead to further exclusion of this group from other benefits the South Korean government might offer. However, most of those who were marriage migrants did not like being called members of a ‘multicultural family’, nor did they like getting together with other migrant brides. This was because they knew well, from their direct or indirect experiences, that ‘multicultural families’ were seen negatively by locals. They commented that South Koreans saw multicultural families as more problematic than domestic families, and looked down upon members of multicultural families. Such perception that people involved in international marriages were often stigmatised is in accordance with many scholars’ arguments (Abelmann and Kim 2005; Freeman 2005, 2011; H. Kim 2012; Hong, Song, and Park 2013) that migrant brides were often depicted as people ready to enter into fake marriages to obtain entry into South Korea; and South Korean husbands were labelled as losers who could not find a South Korean spouse.

Ms. SH Lee, a 47-year-old employee at a supermarket in Seoul, was one of those participants who felt happy to be separated from multiculturalism policies to avoid being stigmatised. She married a South Korean man in 2000 and obtained South Korean citizenship in 2005. She felt disappointed that the South Korean government paid less attention to the families in which one spouse is Korean Chinese and the other one is South Korean. She worried that the lack of government support would cause these families to fall behind. She noted:

It seems that the South Korean government doesn’t remember the existence of families like mine. My family has never been supported systematically under a certain policy. I am concerned we will fall behind if we cannot get support like others. But I dislike to be called a member of a ‘multicultural family’. When Korean Chinese women were the only migrant brides in South Korea, there was no term ‘multicultural family’. I think a policy that considered the distinct characteristics of the Korean Chinese families is needed.
Not all participants felt the same way about the exclusion of Korean Chinese from South Korean multiculturalism, and the crux of their different opinion was how they felt about the South Korean government’s identification of Korean Chinese, either as foreigners or as compatriots. Forty participants felt happy at being excluded from South Korean multiculturalism, seeing it as a sign South Korea treated Korean Chinese as Koreans, or as co-ethnics. They thought the South Korean government should not apply multiculturalism policies to Korean Chinese, because multiculturalism policy was for foreigners and Korean Chinese were Koreans due to their Korean descent. On the other hand, 29 participants tried to distance themselves from South Korean multiculturalism because of the negative images that affect the beneficiaries of multiculturalism policy.

Meanwhile, a smaller number of participants felt it acceptable for Korean Chinese migrant workers not to be incorporated in South Korea’s multiculturalism policy because the policy targets migrant brides and their families only. They felt that Korean Chinese need not be included even if the targets were broadened to encompass migrant workers, because South Korea’s multiculturalism policy was limited to helping migrants to overcome the language and cultural difficulties they experience in South Korea. These participants felt that Korean Chinese have high proficiency in Korean language and culture, thus any help they need does not include help in improving their Korean language skill and cultural proficiency.

Regardless of different attitudes concerning whether South Korean multiculturalism excludes Korean Chinese or not, most participants were very interested in their position in South Korean multicultural context. This phenomenon was shown from the number of participants (82 out of 120) whose first reaction to the interview question, “What do you think about South Korea’s adoption of multiculturalism?” was ambiguous, in terms of whether or not South Korea’s multiculturalism incorporated Korean Chinese. Ms. HY Lee’s experience also indicated the interest of many Korean Chinese about their position in the South Korean multicultural context. Ms. Lee, a 37-year-old lecturer at a university in South Korea, was often invited to seminars related to the issues of Korean Chinese migrants, due to her research interest in the wellbeing of migrants in South Korea. She commented that the questions most frequently asked by her Korean Chinese audience during the seminars were why Korean Chinese do not attend multicultural events, why there was no mention of support for Korean
Chinese in multiculturalism, and was it right that Korean Chinese were the last group the South Korean government would consider in its multiculturalism policy.

4.2 South Korean Government’s Policies towards Korean Chinese

Many participants perceived South Korean policies towards Korean Chinese as inconsistent and discriminatory. They were not the first people to have such a perception, as Song and Hwang’s (2008) study has shown. I will analyse how and on what basis the South Korean government has changed its policies towards Korean Chinese; and how the South Korean government’s policies have affected Korean Chinese. Analysis will be carried out of participants’ perception of South Korean policies and their experiences in South Korea as co-ethnic migrants.

The South Korean government allowed Korean Chinese to visit South Korea in the late 1980s, which was prior to the formalisation of Chinese-South Korean diplomatic relations. In 1987, Roh Taewoo’s government allowed Korean Chinese legal entry with a travel certificate, and granted South Korean citizenship to a small number of Korean Chinese who could trace their lineage to former anti-Japanese activists (Seol 1999). Seol argues that such a policy stemmed from the Roh administration’s view that Korean Chinese were Koreans. Unfortunately for Korean Chinese, Roh’s friendly stance towards them did not last long, because of the uncompromising standpoint of the Chinese government on the issue of Korean Chinese (Seol 1999). The Chinese government opposed South Korea’s wielding influence over Korean Chinese, not to mention South Korea’s granting citizenship to Korean Chinese (Seol 1999).

Faced with the ensuing diplomatic pressure, the South Korean government suddenly changed its stance towards Korean Chinese in 1990, which was two years prior to the establishment of the diplomatic ties between South Korea and China. The South Korean government reclassified Korean Chinese as foreigners in 1990; and has put age restrictions on the short-term Visit visas of Korean Chinese since 1992 (Seol and Skrentny 2004). The rigid age limit, which allowed only people aged sixty or older in 1992 to get a short-term visa, resulted in great difficulty in the migration of Korean Chinese.

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39 The age limit was reduced being motivated by the demand for labour: from 55 in 1995 to 50 in 1999; to 40 in 2002, to 30 in 2003; and to 25 in 2004 (Seol 2004, 20).
With all the privileges in immigration and settlement as co-ethnics gone with the South Korean government’s reclassification of Korean Chinese as Chinese (H. Lee 2010), Korean Chinese had to join the Industrial Technical Training programme to work in South Korea. This was a work permit programme, which defined all its participants as foreigners (Seol and Skrentny 2004). The South Korean government started this programme in 1991 in order to import cheap labourers for domestic manufacturing sectors, which suffered from labour shortage. People who entered South Korea on an industrial trainee visa were on a low wage, and were not allowed to leave their assigned companies during the three years that the visa allowed them to live in South Korea. Seol and Skrentny argue that low income and extensive unfair treatment made industrial trainees run away from their assigned companies. The situation of Korean Chinese trainees was much the same, so that many of them ran away from their assigned companies without approval, and became illegal migrants (Song 2009).

The cohort of the 15 participants who first entered South Korea in the early or mid-1990s, either on short-term Visit visas (eight participants) or on Industrial Trainee visas (seven participants), ended up as illegal migrants by overstaying their visas. They reported that they had undergone various kinds of hardship (e.g. verbal and physical abuse from their South Korean employers) and feared being deported. The difficulty of getting into South Korea and the aspiration to earn more money were the main motivations for them to become illegal migrants. They commented that they had to take the risk, knowing well there was a low possibility of re-entry. Mr. MC Park’s comments explained the compelling circumstances of many Korean Chinese that forced them to become illegal migrants. Mr. Park, a 49-year-old worker, came to South Korea in 1993 on an Industrial Trainee visa, and overstayed his visa after it expired in 1996. Mr. Park remarked:

I knew overstaying was illegal, and that it was attended by the danger of being arrested. But I had to overstay my visa. For my family, I would do even worse things. I borrowed USD 10,000 to pay brokers to visit South Korea. I must earn the money to pay back the debt. I had to earn money to buy a house for my family. My two kids need money for school. My parents also need money for their medical treatment.
Eight participants were forced to return to China, with half of them doing so in their first year in South Korea. They had paid huge money to brokers to make their trip to South Korea. A forced deportation in the first year meant they could not earn back the money they had paid to brokers. As the money was usually borrowed, their trip to South Korea left them debt-ridden. Those who had experienced forced deportation felt they had barely been treated as humans in South Korea. They were the people who resented South Korean multiculturalism the most. They felt that it was wrong for South Korea to ignore the socio-economically marginalised Korean Chinese while at the same time helping migrants of non-Korean descent.

Mr. SZ Xu, a 57-year-old farmer in Yanbian, had been forcibly deported. He obtained an Industrial Trainee visa in 1994. He ran away from the designated company in his eleventh month, and was arrested three months later following a tip-off by his then current employer, who did not want to pay him the three-month’s delayed income. The deportation was so quick, only days after the arrest, that he did not even have the opportunity to attempt to make his employer pay him his overdue salary. His unexpected deportation, which he described as “damn unlucky”, left his family debt-saddled and it led to his wife’s disguised marriage (marriage only on paper) with a South Korean man later. He commented that he disliked even the term ‘multiculturalism’ after having experienced contempt in South Korea. Mr. Xu noted:

It was my fault that I ran away from the assigned company and became an illegal migrant. I ran away because the company paid less wages than in the contract. South Koreans treated me like a shit. The boss of my last company reported me to the Immigration Office in order not to pay me my overdue salary. It would be better to take a candy from a child. South Koreans, who treated us so badly, are trying to support foreigners with multiculturalism, going on and on about human rights. Why do they not help co-ethnics first? If the South Korean government allowed Korean Chinese easy access to South Korea, I would not have become an illegal migrant.

Seven participants survived the tight immigration control, and managed to work in South Korea and remit money to their families in China. This money then became the seed money for their family members to migrate to South Korea, and they too became illegal migrants.
These participants voiced their constant fear of being deported, and their frustration at being treated as cheap foreign labourers instead of as co-ethnics. Mr. WB Ku, a 52-year-old employee of an NGO that supports Korean Chinese migrants, had been an illegal migrant for eight years since his arrival in South Korea in 1996. His South Korean bosses took advantage of his status as an illegal migrant, and threw him out without paying for months. In 2001, he fell from a third-storey apartment at a construction site, and was fired because of the accident, without being paid any compensation. Mr. Ku recalled that time:

My boss kicked me off without any compensation because he knew well I could not report him. Many South Koreans tried to take advantage of me when they knew I was an illegal migrant. I shudder just to think of what they did to me. I had no money, no job, and no place to go. Only a disabled body left. I would have killed myself more than a hundred times if there had been no family. I didn’t tell my family about the accident, being afraid they might be worried. My family needed money, and I was so desperate at that time I even considered selling my kidney.

After working in South Korea for almost a decade under a great deal of tension, five participants were granted the right of re-entry to South Korea in 2005 on the condition that they agreed to be voluntarily repatriated and stay abroad for one year. This repatriation programme, implemented in 2005 and 2006, can be interpreted as a compromise by the South Korean government in response to the demands of Korean Chinese for easy access to South Korean citizenship in 2004, when they faced forced deportation (H. Lee 2010). Mr. MC Park, a 49-year-old worker in Pusan, described the circumstances at that time:

The proposal to forgive illegal migrants and to grant the right of re-entry was too good to believe. Who knew what secret plot the South Korean government had in mind? Most Korean Chinese around me felt suspicious about the proposal. We suspected it was a sweet lie to expel all hidden illegal migrants. People tended to watch the situation and watch the door of each other’s lips.
Though having doubts about the repatriation programme, Mr. Park decided to trust the South Korean government, and returned to China in 2005. Regarding the reason he trusted the South Korean government, he explained, “The South Korean government could not be too mean to Korean Chinese because, after all, Korean Chinese share their descent with South Koreans.” Different responses were evoked from other participants whose status had improved from illegal to legal. They felt their status in South Korea still lingered at the level of miserable migrants engaged in poorly paid manual work with a poor living standard.

Despite South Korea’s control of immigration, the number of Korean Chinese migrants increased rapidly. Korean Chinese were the majority of migrants to South Korea during its transition from a labour-exporting country to a labour-importing country in the 1980s (Seol 2004). The increase of Korean Chinese in the 1990s was more dramatic than it had been in the previous decade. Facing an unexpected surge of Korean Chinese migrants, the South Korean government enforced a closed-door policy for unskilled Korean Chinese migration in the late 1990s (H. Lee 2010). Meanwhile, the South Korean government promoted the importing of Korean Chinese brides, believing that Korean national identity would not be threatened as much as it would be by importing non-ethnic Korean brides (e.g. Vietnamese) (H. Lee 2010; Freeman 2011; Hong, Song, and Park 2013). Most participants who were marriage migrants married their South Korean husband in the late 1990s.

The stance of the South Korean government towards Korean Chinese entered a new phase in the 2000s. An Employment Management system was started in 2002 in order to allow overseas Koreans to plug the labour shortage. Although this programme was open to all overseas Koreans, no Koreans from the West joined this programme because they were eligible for a preferential programme. This programme grants a two-year work visa to co-ethnics, but only to those who have family ties with South Koreans and who are over the age of forty. Due to the need for family ties and the age restriction, the number of co-ethnics who took advantage of this programme was much lower than the government expectation of 50,000 (Seol and Skrentny 2004). This programme also limited the participants to working in certain types of labour-starved, non-professional industries such as agriculture and fisheries. The programme also controls the number of foreign employees (including co-ethnics) that South Korean employers can hire, with the number depending on the size of the company.
One recent labour-importing policy towards Korean Chinese is the Working Visit programme (2007), which grants a multiple entry visa and a maximum of three years in employment during a five-year period to co-ethnics (Korea Immigration Service 2011). The Working Visit visa (H-2) is the most common visa type among Korean Chinese. As of the end of 2011, 293,132 Korean Chinese (159,262 male and 133,870 females) were in South Korea with H-2 visas (Korea Immigration Service 2012). The Working Visit programme has been evaluated as having an apparent trend to favour co-ethnics (N. Kim 2008; J. Kim 2009; C. Lee 2009, 2010). However, it still fails to grant the full range of benefits that co-ethnics expect. For instance, the South Korean government applies different procedures for co-ethnics who have family ties with South Koreans and those who have not, and restricts the number of Korean Chinese who lack family ties who can enter South Korea (Korea Immigration Service 2011). Korean Chinese who lack family ties have to pass a Korean proficiency test and must be selected in a randomised draw in order to obtain an H-2 visa. As Table 4.1 indicates, not everyone who passed the Korean proficiency test were selected in the draw.

Table 4.1: Applicants who Passed Korean Test and Success Rate of Being Selected in a Draw

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Passed Korean Test</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>2007</th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>2009</th>
<th>2010</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Success Rate of Being Selected</td>
<td>164,456</td>
<td>25,140</td>
<td>75,803</td>
<td>54,969</td>
<td>8,544</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Passed Korean Test | 42.5% | 100% | 49% | 21% | 0% |
| Success Rate of Being Selected | 100% | 49% | 21% | 0% |

Source: Ministry of Justice, Quoted from Gwak et al. 2011

Several participants, particularly those who failed to be selected in the randomised draw, resented the Working Visit programme. Ms. TE Zu, a 31-year-old nurse in a private dental clinic in Yanbian, passed the Korean language test in 2008 but had not been selected in the draw until 2010. She had the test again in 2010 in order to increase the possibility of her being selected. Having failed to get a visa for several years, Ms. Zu was quite disappointed with the South Korean policies towards Korean Chinese. She felt that the South Korean government should give more chances to Korean Chinese, considering that there are still many Korean Chinese who have no chance to visit South Korea.

The Working Visit programme also forbids visa holders from bringing their families to South Korea; and restricts the working areas of the visa holders to certain sectors (Korea Immigration Service 2011). That is why the programme often faces criticism for containing
aspects of the old Immigration Control Law (H. Lee 2010). Korean Chinese involved in this programme have been placed low in South Korean labour market on low incomes. Furthermore, when job vacancies in South Korea were reduced, Korean Chinese became the first group to be restricted in terms of immigration and employment (Gwak et al. 2011). The Working Visit programme was severely affected in 2008 because of the contraction in the South Korean labour market due to the global economic recession (Gwak et al. 2011; Shin 2013). Korean Chinese suddenly became unnecessary and were criticised by locals for stealing their jobs (Gwak et al. 2011).

In 2008, shortly after the Ministry of Employment and Labour estimated the number of migrants in the construction business accounted for 9.3% of the entire workforce, the Ministry of Justice, feeling the number was too high and that it threatened domestic workers, changed the conditions of the Working Visit programme. Korean Chinese, who accounted for 98% of the beneficiaries of this programme, were the major target of this reform. The Ministry of Justice limited to three the number of Korean Chinese relatives that one South Korean national can invite to South Korea; and reduced the number of foreign employees that one South Korean company could hire. The reform also eliminated a special entry category for Korean Chinese born prior to October 1949. In 2009, the Ministry of Justice reduced the number of co-ethnics obtaining H-2 visas, from 60,000 in 2008 to 17,000 in 2009 (Gwak et al. 2011). In 2010 and 2011, the entire quota for foreign labour, 34,000 and 48,000 respectively, was assigned to the Non-professional Employment (E-9) category (Gwak et al. 2011). The Ministry of Justice explained that the reform was necessary to stabilise the domestic job market and to adequately utilise foreign labour, considering that the programme had caused a drastic increase in the population of Korean Chinese and their subsequent ‘illegal employment’ and ‘illegal sojourn’ (Gwak et al. 2011).

Nineteen participants were displeased with this change in the Working Visit programme, feeling that it was nothing more than a plan to abandon Korean Chinese after many years of exploitation. They described Korean Chinese as the poor hounds that were faithful to their owner but were killed for meat after all the cunning hares were caught. Mr. NX Che, a 49-year old worker in Seoul, had worked in several different fields, including farming, fishery, manufacturing and the construction industry. In his words, he did not take one day off work, and worked like a dog. Having witnessed cases of rough treatment of Korean Chinese in
South Korea during his volunteer work at a Human Rights Centre, Mr. Che felt infuriated with the South Korean government which threw out Korean Chinese when it had no further need for them. His comments also indicated the understanding that South Korea’s policy towards Korean Chinese was inconsistent. He noted:

> It seems that the South Korean government makes its policies towards us (Korean Chinese) based on rule-of-the-thumb forecasts. It brings in us when South Korea needs cheap labourer, and tries to make full use of us. It kicks out us as if we are rubbish when domestic unemployment issues become tense.

The changes made to the Working Visit programme came under fire from scholars. Gwak et al. (2011) criticised the restriction of the quota for Korean Chinese Working Visit migrants as being based on an uninformed guess that they steal domestic job vacancies and cause unemployment issues for domestic workers. Gwak et al. showed that the Working Visit programme, by restricting the quota for Korean Chinese, lost its basic purpose of embracing co-ethnics, and degenerated into a policy with characteristics of labour migration.

The Employment Management system changed in 2009 to require migrants, particularly those who want to be employed on a construction site, to undergo months of education, at their own expense, in order to be permitted to work (Ministry of Employment and Labour 2009). This permit to work has a fixed period of validity, often from six months to one year, which means migrants have to extend their work permit at least once a year. The reform led to resentment among Korean Chinese. Thirteen participants felt it was ludicrous to force Korean Chinese, who have years of work experience in South Korea, to quit their jobs and go back to months of training to obtain work permits. Mr. DM Ann, a 41-year-old construction worker, was one of them who felt annoyed by having to make time during a busy work schedule to get an education. He felt such education was a waste of time, money and energy for both Korean Chinese and the educational organisation. Mr. Ann noted:

> I have worked in South Korea for three years without causing any trouble. Now I have to quit my job to receive training. I cannot understand why I need it at this stage. If I need any training to get a
work permit, that should have been carried out three years ago. The South Korean government should map out a specific plan for different groups of migrants, considering their actual conditions, and stop Monday-morning quarterbacking\textsuperscript{40}.

The changes of South Korean policy that disappointed Korean Chinese most was the one made to the rules concerning the eligibility of migrants to change their visa status from Working Visit (H-2) to Overseas Koreans (F-4). Korean Chinese with an H-2 visa could obtain an F-4 visa after they had worked at a work place for one year before August 2011 (Ministry of Justice 2011a). Given the increased opportunity to obtain F-4 visa, Korean Chinese expected that the South Korean government would soon apply the Overseas Koreans Act (2004) to all Korean Chinese (Park 2011). Most participants with H-2 visas expected to obtain the privileged F-4 visas. Unfortunately for these expectant Korean Chinese, the Ministry of Justice made new regulations such that, from 1 August 2011 only people who had worked for two years in the local manufacturing industry, or agriculture and the stockbreeding field, or the fishing industry could change their visa status to F-4 (Ministry of Justice 2011b). This change was regarded as an effort by the South Korean government to reduce the opportunity for Korean Chinese to change their visa status and to steal the job opportunities of South Koreans (Park 2011; Gwak et al. 2011).

The Ministry of Justice required Korean Chinese whose H-2 visa had expired to leave South Korea. Such a measure was disappointing to Korean Chinese who expected to get F-4 visas after their H-2 visas expired (Park 2011). Concerned that many Korean Chinese would become illegal migrants if they were not given the opportunity of re-entry, the Ministry of Justice allowed those who left South Korea on time to re-enter South Korea: either six months later (for those who worked in the primary industries) or one year later (for those who worked in other industries such as service industries), on a new H-2 visa (Ministry of Justice 2011a). However, the Ministry of Justice blocked the possibility of employment for migrants aged 55 years at the time they left South Korea, by granting them a Temporary Visit visa (C-3), which restricts the length of each visit to 90 days.

\textsuperscript{40} “뒷북치지 말아야 한다” was used for this expression.
On 23 August 2010, 10,000 Korean Chinese protested in solidarity to the South Korean government against the Immigration Act and subordinate statutes, which restricted the rights of Korean Chinese in respect of the Overseas Koreans status. On the same day, 400 Korean Chinese filed a constitutional appeal with the Constitutional Court (M. Kim 2011). These people encouraged the South Korean government to apply the Overseas Koreans Act (2004) to all Korean Chinese, and to guarantee Korean Chinese free visits and freedom of sojourn, as applied to overseas Koreans from Western countries (see Photograph 4.1). The Ministry of Justice argued that granting visas to Korean Chinese was an act of state, which is related to diplomacy, and thus cannot be the subject of a constitutional appeal (Park 2011).

Photograph 4.1: Korean Chinese Filed a Constitutional Appeal to the Constitutional Court
Source: Park 2011

4.3 Denial or Acceptance of Korean Chinese as Members of the Korean Nation
Some participants felt that the membership of Korean Chinese in the Korean nation has been acknowledged in South Korea, given South Korea’s inclusion of Korean Chinese into the Overseas Koreans Act (2004) and the provision of preferential policies for Korean Chinese. They commented that South Korea tried hard to help Korean Chinese, although the effort that it made often did not meet the expectation of Korean Chinese; and that their becoming wealthy was largely to the credit of South Korea. Mr. NJ Chae, a 66-year-old factory worker, felt grateful to the South Korean government for many reasons. He was one of the early migrants who became illegal migrants and were pardoned by the South Korean government in 2005. He described his life when he was an illegal migrant as being full of anxiety about being deported to China. His current life in South Korea was stable and full of positive energy, as can be seen from his work as a community volunteer. Mr. Chae remarked:
I lived in hiding when I was an illegal migrant to avoid being arrested. Deep in my mind, though, I knew the South Korean government would not do terrible things to Korean Chinese. After all, we are co-ethnics. If the South Korean government wanted to expel all illegal Korean Chinese from South Korea, no single Korean Chinese could escape from forced deportation. Although our life in South Korea was not that smooth, the South Korean government provided us with benefits. Even if it did not give us special treatment, South Korea has put Korean Chinese in the way of earning our bread. If no South Korea, Korean Chinese would still be poor, like many ethnic minority groups in China. The reason that Chinese don’t look down upon Korean Chinese is that we have a prosperous motherland backing us.

In contrast, some participants felt that their membership in the Korean nation was rejected. This feeling derived from their understandings of being treated worse than other migrant groups and other co-ethnic groups. The Overseas Koreans Act (1999), which excluded Korean Chinese was the crux of the feelings Korean Chinese had of being shunned by South Korea. The Act (1999) did not explicitly make geographical or social distinctions, but the change it made to the definition of an ‘overseas Korean with a foreign nationality’ enabled South Korea’s exclusion of co-ethnics from China and the former Soviet Union, who emigrated before 1948 (H. Lee 2010; J. Lee 2002b). The definition of an overseas Korean was changed from a person with lineal descent from a Korean to a person who had lost his/her Korean nationality before obtaining a foreign nationality by emigrating abroad before the foundation of the Republic of Korea and the lineal descendants of such a person (H. Lee 2010). 41

The pressure from China and CIS countries in favour of this exclusion cannot be ignored. However, the main reason of this exclusion was that the Act (1999) was enacted as part of the South Korean government’s efforts to increase the engagement of overseas Koreans to overcome the financial crisis (H. Lee 2010) that struck South Korea in 1997 and 1998. Poor

41 In 1997, the Overseas Koreans Foundation Act defined South Koreans as either “overseas Koreans with South Korean nationality” or “overseas Koreans with foreign nationality” (J. Lee 2010).
co-ethnics from China and the former Soviet Union were of no account at all, and the unequal treatment by the South Korean government of co-ethnics from different countries started at the very beginning of its attempts to make policies that related to co-ethnics (H. Lee 2010).

The Overseas Koreans Act (1999) granted privileges to co-ethnics who were included in the category of Overseas Koreans. The privileges included a special visa status, economic rights and social benefits. J. Lee (2002b) and Shin (2013) argue that these privileges did not confer citizenship but came close to doing so through the rights conferred. These privileges were not accorded to the three million co-ethnics excluded from the category of the Overseas Koreans. It was ironic that Overseas Koreans Act (1999), which was promoted as protecting the legal status and rights of Overseas Koreans, applied different rules to different groups of co-ethnics. Being outraged by their exclusion from the Act, three Korean Chinese petitioned the Constitutional Court to review the Act, which then triggered the protest of angered Korean Chinese (Rui 2009). In November 2001, the Constitutional Court ruled in favour of Korean Chinese, declaring that the Act was unconstitutional, and ordered the National Assembly to revise the Act by 2003 (Ginsburg 2003). The Constitutional Court’s decree led to a revision of the Act on 1 February 2004, and the National Assembly passed the revised bill on 9 February 2004. The new Act included co-ethnics who emigrated abroad before 1948, and abolished the provisions that discriminated against Korean Chinese and Koreans from the former Soviet Union. This victory served to raise ethnic consciousness within the Korean Chinese community (Rui 2009; H. Lee 2010).

Korean Chinese still could not enjoy fully the benefits that Koreans from the West enjoyed. This was because the South Korean government applied stringent eligibility criteria to Korean Chinese, and provided Overseas Koreans visas (F-4) only to the elite class involved in professional jobs. When Korean Chinese applied for F-4 visas, they had to submit

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42 The current Overseas Koreans Act grants overseas Koreans many rights, including voting rights to South Korean nationals abroad, which is an important extension of rights that have been granted to overseas Koreans.

43 Co-ethnics from developing countries should meet one of the following requirements to apply for an F-4 visa: be a member of the board of directors or an executive official of a multinational corporation or a press company; a permanent resident of an OECD country; a CEO or a registered director of a corporation; a journalist; a lawyer; a university professor; a certified accountant; a holder of doctorate; a holder of a bachelor’s degree; or a person who has stayed in South Korea for six months or more as a professional worker (Ministry of Justice 2013).
documents to prove their educational level, professional occupation and financial status, and make a statement that they would not work in non-professional job sectors in South Korea. The strict eligibility criteria made most Korean Chinese ineligible to obtain F-4 visas. Applicants from the West did not need to submit the documents that Korean Chinese were required to submit (Ministry of Justice 2011b). This is why C. Lee (2012) argues that an elite background and professional qualifications are more important than ethnicity in facilitating an applicant’s admission into South Korea.

The distinction between professional and non-professional applies only to co-ethnics from China and the former Soviet Union. This separation of co-ethnics based on their qualifications often resulted in differing identification of members of the same family. For instance, parents who were farmers with limited education were not granted F-4 visas, whilst their children who were involved in professional jobs could. Most participants felt such treatment ridiculous. They felt that F-4 visa is different from the permanent residency visa or other types of migrant visas, which they felt OK to be selective; and that the Overseas Korean visa should be provided to all ethnic Korean diasporas, without discrimination, as it is based on Korean ethnicity. Mr. WH Lee, a 29-year-old graduate student in Seoul, obtained an F-4 visa after he obtained a Bachelor’s degree. He felt unfair for Korean Chinese to be treated differently from Korean Americans.

Korean Americans can obtain an F-4 visa even if they are unemployed or homeless. But we (Korean Chinese) can only become Overseas Koreans if we have a good education, a professional job and money. It’s unfair. Both Korean Chinese and Korean Americans are co-ethnics. Why has the South Korean government treated co-ethnics differently? I am given Overseas Korean status, but my parents are not. How could non-Korean parents have a Korean kid?

For the co-ethnics who were not allowed to obtain F-4 visas, the South Korean government put in place the Working Visit programme, and controlled the economic activities of these

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44 The Overseas Koreans Act (2004) separates co-ethnics between the older generation and the younger generation by limiting the status of Overseas Koreans to the third-generation emigrants (C. Lee 2012).
co-ethnic migrants. Such restrictions to the visits and economic activity were in contrast to the free visits and sojourn that co-ethnics from the West could enjoy. Most participants with Working Visit visas (H-2) felt their status as Overseas Koreans was nominal. They felt that they have been channelled into the foreigner category with their H-2 visas.

Meanwhile, participants with F-4 visas reported that they felt there was not much improvement in how South Koreans looked at them after they were granted the title of “Overseas Koreans”. They felt that they were still treated as undesirable foreigners rather than compatriots, let alone as Koreans, by many South Koreans. Their experiences indicated the gap between their legal status and the social status they experienced. Ms. YH Ho’s experience of being treated as a foreigner, even with an F-4 visa, is a good example to show the ambiguous status of Korean Chinese in South Korea. Ms. Ho, a 30-year-old lawyer in Beijing, undertook her undergraduate study in South Korea, and obtained an F-4 visa after she finished university. She felt that Korean ethnicity was a burden in terms of living in South Korea, as it made her experience many embarrassing moments. She elaborated:

I’ve always been treated as Chinese in South Korea. I extended my visa every semester over the years. The regular visit to the Immigration Office reminded me that I am not a Korean. Nothing much has changed after I obtained an F-4 visa. I’m still seen as a foreigner rather than a compatriot. It is fine. But what I can’t stand is South Korean’s prejudice against Korean Chinese. I cannot forget being humiliated at the Customs by being refused to use the Domestic Entry. I didn’t want to use Domestic Entry, as I knew how South Koreans would react to that. I was told by a member of staff from Customs to use Domestic Entry, as there was no queue. Embarrassingly, I was stopped by an official at Domestic Entry. The official said Korean Chinese cannot pass through Domestic Entry, regardless of whether they have an F-4 visa or not, because the F-4 visa means nothing, and Korean Chinese are still what they used to be. He added he was always puzzled why Korean Chinese think they are Koreans. I’ve never thought of claiming to be a South Korean national. I wish I was not Korean Chinese.
As seen from Ms. Ho’s experience, the Overseas Koreans Act (2004) can make the access of Korean Chinese to South Korea easier than before, but it does not fundamentally improve their status in South Korea, nor can it guarantee a change of mind by locals. Shin (2013) argues that most Korean Chinese and Koreans from the former Soviet Union still live an awkward existence in South Korea between kinship and legal citizenship, neither as an insider nor as an outsider. Shin sees this as the reason that most overseas Koreans from developing countries want to return to their natal country.

The policies of the South Korean government towards Korean Chinese revealed South Koreans’ ambiguous attitudes towards this group of co-ethnics. It also showed that definitions of national belonging of Koreans were complex, despite the well-known *jus sanguinis* definition of South Korean nationality (Seol and Skrentny 2004). According to the *jus sanguinis* definition of nationality, ethnicity has been the basis of national belonging. However, co-ethnics from developing countries have trouble in being recognised as members of the Korean nation, as can be seen from the South Korean government’s unwillingness to grant Overseas Koreans visas to them (H. Lee 2010). The reverse seems to be true of co-ethnics from Western countries. The South Korean government has been keen to encourage ties with co-ethnics from the West, going so far as to grant them extended rights.

Such contrary approaches to co-ethnics from developing countries and from developed countries also indicate the ambiguous role of Korean ethnicity when claiming membership of the nation. Scholars argue that the arrival of the co-ethnics from developing countries triggered a challenge to South Korean national identity and forced South Koreans to confront the issue of nationhood (Seol and Skrentny 2004; C. Lee 2012). C. Lee argues that this was the first time South Korea’s long-held belief that the state was an exteriorisation of the nation seemed inadequate. Seol and Skrentny argue that South Korea’s denial of national membership of co-ethnics from developing countries indicates how narrowly the South Korean government defines the nation.

### 4.4 ‘Double Discrimination’ in the South Korean Multicultural Context

What 42 participants took most seriously was the ‘double discrimination’ they had suffered in South Korea after its full-scale enactment of multiculturalism. They felt that Korean Chinese
were discriminated against in the South Korean multicultural context: neither benefit from the multiculturalism policy as much as could other migrant groups; nor benefit from the Overseas Koreans Act (1999, 2004) as much as other co-ethnic groups from the West could. Many participants felt it was unfair for Korean Chinese to be cut off from benefits from both sides. Such feelings of ‘double discrimination’ are in line with H. Lee (2010) and Shin (2013), who argue that Korean Chinese have been excluded from gaining ‘insider’ status and from multiculturalism policy. H. Lee argues that the double marginalisation of Korean Chinese happened because their struggle to be included in the overseas Korean category made them invisible in the multicultural environment.

Many participants tended to feel that foreigners took all the attention of the South Korean government, and thus co-ethnics have been treated in an inferior way to other migrant groups. Some of them pointed out that the South Korean government put more restrictions on the immigration of Korean Chinese in order to encourage the migration of other groups; some discussed that no budget was allocated to support co-ethnic migrants in 2011 whilst a huge budget was allocated for other migrants; and some reported that Korean Chinese organisations were forced to shut their doors due to financial difficulties caused by the government support being cut off. Such feelings of ‘reverse discrimination’ sparked opposition among many participants to South Korean multiculturalism. Ms. HO Kwon, a 28-year-old co-manager at a Japanese restaurant in Incheon, was critical about the South Korean government’s attention shifting from co-ethnics to foreign migrants. She worried that the South Korean government’s preference to foreigners in the multicultural context would turn Korean Chinese against South Korea. Ms. Kwon commented:

Since the South Korean government adopted multiculturalism every migrant group is treated better than is Korean Chinese group. Even

45 The South Korean government allocated 1,747 billion won for migrants in 2011 (Oh 2011). Although the fund did not exclude co-ethnic migrants from being beneficiaries, most participants who knew about this felt the South Korean government should allocate funds to support co-ethnic migrants specifically.

46 The Returned Compatriot Association, which aims to assist Korean Chinese to settle down in South Korea, was one of the associations forced to close. The president of this association stated in a news interview that financial difficulties rendered the association incapable of functioning, and that significant problems might arise if this maltreatment of compatriots continued (Oh 2011).
Han Chinese are treated as being more important than the Korean Chinese. I should have been born Han Chinese to be treated better in my ethnic homeland. If the South Korean government doesn’t want to give privileges to co-ethnics, it, at the least, should not disadvantage co-ethnics. If this situation lasts long, resentment of Korean Chinese will become widespread. Does the South Korean government want to turn all poor co-ethnics against their ethnic homeland?

Ms. WJ Park, a 53-year-old district MP candidate in Seoul, expressed her shock when she first heard that there was no funding budgeted for assisting Korean Chinese in 2011, despite the huge number of Korean Chinese migrants. She has been working at a compatriot support centre for 11 years, and was scouted by a party in 2009 to run for a district election. Although she failed in the first election, Ms. Park was determined to become a politician and to work for the interests of the Korean Chinese community in South Korea. She felt that the South Korean government should pay more attention to Korean Chinese, and that just a little more support for co-ethnics would go a long way.

Some participants felt that marginalisation applied not only to individual migrants but also to family-unit migrants. They felt that the status of Korean Chinese families was lower than that of multicultural families and even that of migrant families, because these families were supported by South Korea’s multiculturalism policy while Korean Chinese families were not. Ms. SH Lai, a 36-year-old lawyer in Seoul, talked about the marginalisation of Korean Chinese families, who fell between multicultural families and migrant families. Ms. Lai and her husband earned their PhD degrees in 2010 at a famous law school in South Korea. She gave birth to her daughter while studying for her PhD, but could not get support from the South Korean government because her family, being composed of two Korean Chinese with Chinese citizenship, was not a ‘multicultural family’. Her mother and mother-in-law came to South Korea to look after her daughter, taking five-month turns, and then the ten-month-old baby went to China. Ms. Lai could not see her daughter until she had submitted her PhD theses, which took another full year. Such experience led her to believe in the importance of the South Korean government supporting all migrant families, without discrimination, in order to create the maximum synergy effect with its migrants. She noted:
I know it is impudent to ask for childcare support for Korean Chinese. After all, I am not a South Korean national, nor married to a South Korean national. But as the South Korean government advocates supporting migrants, why not incorporate Korean Chinese? We are related, isn’t that so? If we are supported, we can work better, and it is beneficial to South Korean society.

In fact, most participants understood that neither two Korean Chinese with Chinese citizenship nor two Korean Americans with US citizenship can get support in this situation. They also understood that few countries in the world support two non-nationals in the situation described. They strongly asked for privileges for Korean Chinese migrant families in South Korea, from the perspective of ethnic ties. Most participants emphasised their rights as co-ethnics, and wished the South Korean government to consider the seriousness of the situation of Korean Chinese facing double discrimination. Such a demand for special treatment is related to their strong sense of entitlement, which often appears unreasonable and unrealistic. Their belief in ethnic nationalism and emphasis on ethnic ties with South Koreans resulted in their strong sense of entitlement of South Korean national membership. Their less desirable life with little capital meant that they desperately sought for benefits of extra belonging.

The fear of losing privileges as co-ethnics following the South Korean government’s adoption of multiculturalism was felt; and such concern led them to become reluctant to accept multiculturalism. They commented that co-ethnics would no longer be privileged as multiculturalism tried to eliminate ethnic nationalism, and that they already could feel a drastic change in circumstances in South Korea, accompanied by unprecedentedly heated discussion about multiculturalism. This feeling of further alienation is in line with J. Lee’s (2012) argument that discussion on issues related to overseas Koreans was replaced by discussions on multiculturalism, and overseas Koreans were no longer the centre of the South Korean government’s attention. Some participants suggested that the South Korean government move in the direction of balancing support for overseas Koreans and foreigners, and balancing the emphasis on ethnic nationalism and on multiculturalism. Although they emphasised “differentiated policy” rather than “discriminated policy”, a feeling of superiority over other migrant groups was evident. Mr. YT Kim’s comment represented what many
Korean Chinese liked and what they disliked. Mr. Kim, a 45-year-old engineer in a railroad company in Yanbian, answered that Korean Chinese do not like to be treated in the same breath as foreign migrants, nor treated different from other co-ethnics from the West; and that Korean Chinese want a differentiated treatment that considers their special situation.

4.5 Exclusion of Naturalised Korean Chinese: Neither Ethnic nor National Citizenship

Seven participants who have given up their Chinese citizenship and obtained South Korean citizenship keenly felt the exclusion from the support of the South Korean government after their naturalisation. They felt a sudden severance of the privileges of co-ethnics which, though limited and thus unsatisfactory, they had enjoyed before their naturalisation; and thus they were located in a dead corner of social welfare after obtaining South Korean citizenship. The alienation they felt they had suffered after naturalisation was clear from Mr. OP Choi’s remarks. Mr. Choi, a 79-year-old retiree, responded that the South Korean government should pay more attention to the new citizens, who were alienated. He noted:

I was able to get support from the South Korean government due to my status as a co-ethnic migrant. However, that support stopped after I became a South Korean citizen. I have not yet had full access to the welfare that a South Korean citizen is entitled to. Maybe it is a short-term problem and soon this situation can be changed. However, I am afraid I cannot see good days coming in my life.

Photograph 4.2: Korean Chinese in A Demonstration

Source: Go 2012

The alienation of naturalised Korean Chinese is an on-going problem. On 6 April 2012 Korean Chinese gathered together to voice the right of first-generation Korean Chinese who
have been naturalised as South Korean nationals (see Photograph 4.2). They asked for the improvement of treatment for the naturalised Korean Chinese, and urged the 19th National Assembly to make a special Act to support these people (Go 2012). Such alienation is a result of the deficiency of systematic political measures for new citizens, particularly those with Korean ethnicity. Although Korean Chinese did not enjoy as much benefit as co-ethnics from Western countries, some who were eligible could enjoy certain benefits from the Overseas Koreans Act (2004), which protects the immigration, economic activities and preferential status of overseas co-ethnics. Co-ethnic preferential treatment applies until the process of obtaining South Korean citizenship is completed. This was why Mr. WB Ku felt that he became an international orphan after he obtained South Korean citizenship. Mr. Ku, a 52-year-old employee of an NGO that supports Korean Chinese migrants, commented:

> Just at the moment I recovered my relationship with my ethnic homeland, I was abandoned, and became an international orphan. It’s an irony that we are ignored more after we become South Korean nationals. Systematic measures need to be taken by the South Korean government for us.

The public’s prejudice against new citizens is also responsible for the alienation of new citizens. Seven naturalised participants felt they were not accepted as South Koreans by the majority of South Koreans, even after their naturalisation. They felt that they were still seen as Korean Chinese, of whom they were well aware South Koreans held negative images. Being annoyed by their alienated status in South Korea, most of them regretted their naturalisation. The cases of naturalised participants proved the importance of impartial representation in national inclusion. Negative representation of Korean Chinese hindered their inclusion as part of the Korean nation. The circumstances of these naturalised participants also led to the conclusion that access to citizenship did not guarantee full membership of the nation or full acceptance by locals, and raised the importance of national inclusion as being of as much importance as access to citizenship. H. Kim (2012) argues that granting citizenship should be addressed in combination with the offer of impartial representation, because what qualifies an individual as a legitimate member of a nation often depends on symbolic representation.
In spite of the predicament of the naturalised participants, some participants still wanted to obtain South Korean citizenship. Unfortunately, most of them did not qualify for ‘special naturalisation’\textsuperscript{47} or ‘simplified naturalisation’\textsuperscript{48}, due to their lack of family ties with South Koreans, not having ancestors involved in the fighting for independence against Japanese, and being born after 1949 to parents who did not reinstate South Korean citizenship.\textsuperscript{49} This means that they cannot enjoy benefits as co-ethnics during the process of naturalisation but are treated in the same way as other foreign applicants. Most of these participants did not qualify for ‘general naturalisation’\textsuperscript{50} either, as they did not meet the minimum requirements of five years’ residence and proof of livelihood in South Korea, with their non-professional employment status and low savings at South Korean banks (Ministry of Justice 2008).

It was not clear whether the motivation of Korean Chinese for obtaining South Korean citizenship is related to their Korean identity.\textsuperscript{51} As I shall analyse in Chapter 7, Korean Chinese have a practical and flexible concept of citizenship. In the cases of the participants who wanted South Korean citizenship, their main purpose of naturalisation was to increase their chance of succeeding in South Korea through convenient economic activities, and to ease their family’s migration to South Korea. Although their motivation for naturalisation

\textsuperscript{47} To be eligible for ‘special naturalisation’, an applicant must have at least one parent of South Korean nationality, except foster children adopted after they became adults (Ministry of Justice 2010b).

\textsuperscript{48} To be eligible for ‘simplified naturalisation’, an applicant must have at least one parent who has been a South Korean national in the past, but has since abandoned South Korean nationality for a foreign nationality; must be born in South Korea and have at least one parent born in South Korea; and must have maintained a domiciliary address in South Korea for the past three consecutive years (Ministry of Justice 2010a).

\textsuperscript{49} Korean Chinese born after 1 October 1949 are eligible for limitless reinstatement of their South Korean nationality through special naturalisation if: either parent has reinstated his/her South Korean nationality; or either parent has applied for restoration of their South Korean nationality (Ministry of Justice 2010b).

\textsuperscript{50} To be eligible for ‘general naturalisation’ an applicant must have had a domiciliary address in South Korea for more than five consecutive years; must have the ability to maintain living on his/her own assets or skills; and must have basic knowledge befitting a Korean national (Ministry of Justice 2008).

\textsuperscript{51} Mr. DC Lee obtained South Korean citizenship in his 80s, in order to invite members of his family to South Korea in order to work. Unfortunately, before he could invite a single family member, the number of family members that a naturalised citizen could invite was reduced, and only one person in every two years is now eligible to enter South Korea (Ministry of Justice 2010a). Mr. Lee, who was 87 years old in 2010, would have to wait 22 years for his three children and their spouses and his five grandchildren to join him in South Korea.
was not related purely to Korean identity, they had no hesitation in criticising the South Korean government for not considering the blood relationship but seeing only how much capital the applicants will bring to the country, in the process of proving naturalisation of co-ethnics.

Some participants expected multiculturalism to increase their chance of getting South Korean citizenship. However, they knew that South Korean multiculturalism did not aid non-professional migrants to obtain South Korean citizenship. They felt that a multiculturalism based merely on the economic needs of the host country could not help migrants but was a euphemism to create a reservoir of foreign slaves for capitalists. Such an understanding accords with Kymlicka’s (2002) argument that multiculturalism without the offer of citizenship is useless and guarantees further exclusion of migrants. Kymlicka argues that formal citizenship is a prerequisite for addressing the rights and the identity aspect of citizenship, thus only after citizenship is granted to migrants can multiculturalism help migrants address economic and cultural inequalities.

Many participants’ criticism about the deficiencies of citizenship in South Korean multiculturalism came from the consideration of their own interest, and their request for citizenship was based on blood ties. For instance, Mr. SM Ban, a 39-year-old worker in a chair factory in Seoul, felt the South Korean government should allow citizenship at least to co-ethnic migrants, even if it does not want to expand citizenship to all migrants. However, their criticism carried an important meaning, as it indicated the importance of the host country providing citizenship to migrants. A few participants felt there was a dilemma for South Koreans in their need of migrants for labour, as against their wish that migrants should not become South Korean citizens. These participants felt that the South Korean government should give migrants rights corresponding to their contribution to South Korean society, instead of kicking out them after exploiting them for several years. Mr. JK Son, a 42-year-old electrician in Incheon, was one of these participants who felt that South Koreans do not want to give migrants citizenship. He commented that robots, which never claim any rights, might be the best choice for South Koreans, considering their wanting cheap labourers but not wanting them to settle down in South Korea.

4.6 Ethnicity-based Concept of Defining ‘Nation’ in Multicultural South Korea
A large number of participants objected to multiculturalism for its potential damage to ethnic nationalism. They worried that ethnic nationalism cannot survive in a multicultural society. It is undeniable that multiculturalism has weakened South Koreans’ deep-rooted sense of being an ethnically homogeneous nation by incorporating migrants and non-ethnic-Korean new nationals (H. Kim 2012). My findings, which are from the responses of the participants, suggest that multiculturalism has broadened the idea of national membership in South Korea. However, the ethnicity-based concept of national membership is still alive in South Korea, despite the significant effort and financial resources that the South Korean government has put into promoting multiculturalism, as was revealed from the request of proof of blood ties for ethnic Korean diasporas to obtain South Korean citizenship, and from the hierarchical orders between South Koreans by birth and by naturalisation.

A phenomenon of ethnic nationalism ‘damaging’ multiculturalism is indicated. Many participants felt that South Korea continued embracing ethnic nationalism even after it announced the promotion of multiculturalism, and pointed out the recent extensions of rights that have been granted to overseas Koreans as proof. However, only a small number of participants criticised South Korea for “walking a tightrope between ethnic nationalism and multiculturalism” or South Korean multiculturalism for being nationalistic. Even among those who described South Korean multiculturalism as ‘incomplete’, with characteristics of ethnic nationalism, most of them did not mean to criticise the ‘incompleteness’, but actually encouraged it, expecting more benefit for co-ethnics. Some participants welcomed more vagueness in multiculturalism if it can benefit the Korean nation. In addition, some participants felt that it was not contradictory to continue co-ethnic preferential policies and to promote multiculturalism. Such opinion is quite different from many South Korean scholars who criticise South Korean multiculturalism for protecting privileged rights for co-ethnics (e.g. N. Kim 2008; Y. Choi 2011), for being exclusive and nationalistic (e.g. H. Kim 2009).

52 It was safer to say that the extensions of rights for overseas Koreans were the result of the efforts of the South Korean government to extend a national consciousness to its overseas populations and to promote the loyalties of overseas Koreans towards the Korean nation. Song (2007, 83) argues that South Korea needed to promote de-territorial and long-distance nationalism among overseas Koreans because it was facing a continuous emigration of middle-class families and a rapidly declining domestic population.
and for being incomplete, with prevalent vestiges of discrimination based on nationality (e.g. H. Lee 2010).

The enduring power of ethnic nationalism, even in a multicultural South Korean society, is seen in the importance of blood ties in claims to membership of the Korean nation, which C. Lee (2012) defines as the bio-politics of Korean national membership. Blood ties are a fundamental condition for Koreans in the diaspora to be recognised as overseas Koreans and to recover South Korean citizenship. Overseas Koreans are required to submit genealogical records or DNA test results, in order to prove their claim of ethnic origin or of previously being a Korean national. Family connections with South Koreans are accepted as proof of ethnic origin, up to second cousins in an applicant’s case, and up to first cousins in an applicant’s parent’s case. A family registration record is the best proof of ethnic origin, and can be substituted for by a residential alien card, or a birth certificate issued by the state of which the applicant is a citizen 53 (Ministry of Justice 2008).

Special categories of naturalisation also indicate the importance of blood ties to membership of the Korean nation. An applicant is eligible for ‘special naturalisation’ or ‘simplified naturalisation’ if either parent was a South Korean national at the time of his/her death, or if either parent was a South Korean national in the past but abandoned South Korean nationality for a foreign nationality (Ministry of Justice 2010a; Ministry of Justice 2010b). These two categories of naturalisation are subject to lower thresholds than is ‘general naturalisation.

The South Korean citizenship regulations for Korean Chinese were relaxed in 2004 (Ministry of Justice 2008). The previous request for proof of residency in Korea before 1948, which had been the main obstruction to the naturalisation of Korean Chinese, was revoked, as it was realised that it was impossible for Korean Chinese to obtain such proof. Since 2006, Korean Chinese who were born before 1 October 1949 were eligible to apply for ‘citizenship reinstatement’. The term ‘citizenship reinstatement’ came from the South Korean government’s ruling that Korean Chinese born before the establishment of the People’s

53 Korean Chinese can prove their ethnic origin thanks to the Family Registration policy of the Chinese government that records individuals’ ethnic origin. Koreans in the former Soviet Union countries can prove their ethnic origin too because of the countries’ ethnic catalogue policy.
Republic of China had had South Korean citizenship. Korean Chinese born after 1 October 1949 are eligible for ‘special naturalisation’ when either parent has reinstated their South Korean nationality or has applied for restoration of their South Korean nationality (Ministry of Justice 2010a). Korean Chinese who can prove their relationship with South Koreans with a notarised document, and whose ancestors fought the Japanese occupation, down to the fourth generation, are also eligible for ‘special naturalisation’. As Seol and Skrentny (2004) conclude, this is a significant move towards inclusion of Korean Chinese in the Korean nation. However, only a few Korean Chinese can take advantage of this relaxation in naturalisation as most of them are not eligible.

Family ties are also important in obtaining visas. The South Korean government divided co-ethnics from China and the former Soviet Union into two groups: ‘related co-ethnics’ and ‘unrelated co-ethnics’. ‘Related co-ethnics’ are those who can submit an invitation from a relative who is a South Korean national or a copy of a family register in South Korea; whilst ‘unrelated co-ethnics’ are those who do not have South Korean relatives or a family register in South Korea. ‘Related co-ethnics’ can visit South Korea relatively easily, while ‘unrelated co-ethnics’ have a much lower chance of entering South Korea.

The importance of the South Korean government’s protection of privileged rights for overseas Koreans in strengthening the connections between South Korea and overseas Koreans cannot be denied. Song (2007) argues that these policies helped foster a sense of ethnic allegiance among overseas Koreans. However, scholars like N. Kim (2008) criticise these policies for being ethno-nationalistic and causing tension with transnational human rights. H. Lee (2010) contradicts this criticism, arguing that the preference for co-ethnics cannot be seen as a form of ethnic nationalism because the policy was intended to compensate for the unjust effects of forced migration. She rightly points out that South Korea’s efforts to retain links with South Koreans abroad and to protect overseas Koreans is legitimate. C. Lee (2009) even suggests that the principle that benefits co-ethnics should be extended, arguing that it does not go far enough yet. Based on Joppke’s (2005) argument that a co-ethnic dilemma is natural because a state is an entity based on both territory and membership, I argue that an immigration policy which recognises family ties is legitimate, unless it violates human rights.
Yet, it is debatable whether ethnicity played a major role for the preferential treatment of the South Korean government towards co-ethnics. For instance, the Industrial Technical Training programme was regarded as special treatment towards Korean Chinese due to its larger quota and higher wages for Korean Chinese than other groups. Lim (2002) argues that this preference was due to South Koreans’ belief that Korean Chinese were less threatening to the tight-knit, homogeneous South Korean society. However, other scholars (e.g. Seol and Skrentny 2004) argue that this preference was in fact due to business ties and politics rather than ethnic ties, and the programme actually made Korean Chinese end up as foreigners. Seol and Skrentny assert that Korean Chinese were advantaged in the programme only because there was a large number of them already in South Korea.\(^{54}\) No matter what the real motivation of the South Korean government was for their preferential policy for Korean Chinese, it remains clear that Korean Chinese did not feel they were properly treated, let alone privileged as co-ethnics. That is why Seol and Skrentny argue that cases of ethnic return migrants from developing countries showed that South Korea’s ethnic nationalism policies had limited success.

**Conclusion**

In this chapter I have discussed the practices of membership in South Korea focusing on South Korea’s policies towards Korean Chinese, and how such practices of membership have influenced Korean Chinese through decades of interface with South Koreans. The South Korean government has differing preferences towards different co-ethnic groups. Its policies towards Korean Chinese indicate South Korea’s ambiguous notion of national membership, which results from the blurred border between ethnicity and nationality. Korean Chinese migrants, an aggregate of diverse background, interest and agendas, are a useful example to give an insight into all these complexities. Many participants’ differing reactions to South Korea’s policies indicated the contested ethno-national consciousness of Korean Chinese, taken as a whole. The contribution of this chapter to the understanding of citizenship in a multicultural context will be discussed in Chapter 7. Next I will discuss how a hierarchical nation emerged in South Korea, and how this hierarchy influenced Korean Chinese.

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\(^{54}\) There is an element of truth but also a space for debate in relation to this argument, considering that Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan were not added to the programme until 1994, despite a number of them were already in South Korea.
CHAPTER 5: SOUTH KOREA’S HIERARCHICAL NATIONHOOD AND ITS CONSEQUENCES OF KOREAN CHINESE BELONGING

Introduction
Previously I examined the practices of membership in South Korea, and how such practices of membership have influenced Korean Chinese in terms of migration, settlement and identity. In this chapter I analyse the formation of hierarchical nationhood in multicultural South Korea; how such hierarchical nationhood has put Korean Chinese at the bottom of the hierarchy; and how Korean Chinese perceive such practices as disregarding their Korean ethnicity, and how such understandings have frustrated their hopes of belonging to the Korean nation. This chapter begins with an analysis of the Korean national belonging of many participants.

5.1 Korean National Belonging of Korean Chinese
A large number of participants thought of themselves as members of the Korean nation, and expressed hopes for national inclusion in their ancestral homeland. Such desire is rooted in their belief of themselves being descendants of Tangun—the primordial ancestor of the Korean nation. Their sense of Korean national belonging was discerned from their commitment to maintaining 'pure Korean blood' (in their terms), concern about the destiny of the Korean nation, and their sense of duty to accomplish Korean unification.

5.1.1 Strong Commitment to Ethnic Homogeneity
A commitment to the ethnic homogeneity of Korea is the direct reason that many participants were against South Korea advocating multiculturalism, regarding it as the country’s renunciation of ethnic homogeneity. They understood ethnic homogeneity as the symbol of the Korean nation, and credited ethnic homogeneity as the source of the strength through which the nation had survived and thrived despite its painful history of external threats. On the other hand, they regarded multiculturalism as a weapon to extinguish ethnic homogeneity and thus to annihilate the Korean nation in the future. Such adherence to ethnic nationalism and resentment of multiculturalism was clear from the remarks of Mr. LQ Ming, an 81-year-old retiree. He felt ethnic nationalism gave Korean Chinese a sense of belonging to the ancestral homeland and strength to unite when life was tough. He noted:
Multiculturalism will destroy our nation’s source of the spirit of unity. Life in a place far away from home was full of tears and sweat. We could not survive if there was no ethnic homeland. No matter whether it was colonised or divided, the existence of a homeland gave us strength to comfort our tired souls. It must be same for other overseas Koreans. If South Korea becomes full of migrants it can no longer be recognised as the homeland for overseas Koreans.

The reason these participants perceived the acceptance of multiculturalism as a sign of giving up ethnic homogeneity is that, the definition of the Korean nation was changed from the homogeneous nation to that of a multi-ethnic nation, after South Korean government announced it would adopt multiculturalism. A large-scale revision to history books followed soon to remove terms related to ethnic homogeneity and ethnic nationalism (e.g. white-clad nation). Many participants, who regarded Korean history and the Korean nation to be mutually defined, felt such changes were unforgivable, because the changes denied the roots of the Korean nation. They felt that Korean history was a history of a homogeneous Korean nation, and so if Korean history dismissed homogeneity, it was no longer a history of the Korean nation and it left the Korean nation unsubstantial. The anxiety over losing Korean history and thus, subsequently, the Korean nation was clear from the remarks of Mr. OP Choi. Mr. Choi, a 79-year-old retired engineer with South Korean citizenship, commented:

South Korea is changing oddly. The government denied the homogeneity of the Korean nation, and distorted its history in order to accept multiculturalism. How can a nation be created like this by government propaganda? Do South Koreans want to be like the Chinese, claiming they have ethnic minority groups? Does it make sense to you that people of all different origins suddenly become Koreans? Korea is nothing without ethnic homogeneity.

A large number of participants felt betrayed by South Korea’s adoption of multiculturalism, feeling their sustained efforts to maintain a homogeneous Korean ethnicity and culture had become meaningless in a multicultural South Korean society. Most participants thought highly of the efforts Korean Chinese made to remain their Korean identity, despite living outside the Korean peninsula for generations. Ms. KL Lee’s remarks clearly conveyed a
sense of betrayal by South Korea as she believes that it no longer values ethnic homogeneity. Ms. Lee, a 59-year-old housemaid in Seoul, came to South Korea in 2008 after she retired from her job at the age of 55 years. Ms. Lee responded that she could not understand why South Korea wanted to give up ethnic homogeneity when even Korean Chinese have tried to maintain ethnic homogeneity at their peril. Ms. Lee commented:

Our ancestors have undergone all sorts of hardship in Manchuria. However, they have never forgotten they were Koreans, and never neglected to teach their children they were Koreans. They thought it their duty. Thanks to their efforts, Korean Chinese still consider themselves Koreans. I cannot comprehend why South Koreans want to abandon homogeneity. They are destroying the Korean nation.

Commitment to ethnic nationalism was widespread among many participants regardless of their occupations or social status. However, some participants’ revelation of their commitment to ethnic nationalism was still surprising considering their special position in China. For instance, a few participants who were currently, or who used to be, Chinese government officials revealed their ethnic nationalism, which was ‘hidden’ deep in their mind. Ms. BR Kim, a 72-year-old retiree, objected to multiculturalism, considering it would erode ethnic nationalism and shake the fundamental beliefs of Koreans. She felt it was stupid for South Koreans to abandon ethnic nationalism in favour of multiculturalism.

The reason to say the ethnic nationalism of these participants was ‘hidden’ and that it was surprising to find them is that Korean Chinese government officials were regarded by many participants as lacking ethnic consciousness. For instance, Ms. XHP Liu, a 41-year-old columnist, felt Korean Chinese officials were unmindful of their duty as leaders of the Korean Chinese community and were busy ingratiating themselves with the central Chinese government. She felt Korean Chinese officials acted as if they were more Chinese than Han Chinese officials in order to survive in the Chinese political arena. Ms. HA Park, an 81-year-old retiree, regarded current Korean Chinese government officials as different from the first generation of Korean Chinese leaders, whom she considered to put the interest of the Korean Chinese community in the first place. Ms. Park commented:
The leaders like Mr. Dehai Zhu\textsuperscript{55} really worked for Korean Chinese. They were real leaders of us. The leaders these days act like spokespersons of the central government. They are so occupied with reading the face of the central government that the interest of the Korean Chinese community has been pushed aside. No one wants to bother to stand up to speak for the Korean Chinese community, being afraid of ruining their career.

I asked those participants who were government officials if they noticed the public’s negative criticism of them. Their responses revealed the awkward and often helpless position of Korean Chinese politicians in China. Mr. KN Kim’s comment well indicated the dilemma faced by many Korean Chinese government officials between, on the one hand, pursuing the interest of the Korean Chinese community to the full and, on the other hand, following the central government’s instructions, even when they hurt the interests of Korean Chinese, to pursue the national interest. Mr. Kim, a 57-year-old high-ranking official, commented:

It is not true that Korean Chinese government officials do not care for the interest of the Korean Chinese community. In the Chinese political reality, even Chinese officials sometimes cannot express what they want to do. As a politician of a minority group, I have to be more careful. I tried not to reveal too much of my ethnic identity. That is why I prefer not to use Korean in public while my Chinese colleagues like displaying their Korean skills whenever possible. The ethnic minority issue is of the utmost concern to the Chinese government. I hope people understand that too much emphasis on ethnic identity could bring more harm than benefit to a minority community.

No matter whether it is true that the Korean identity of these officials is intentionally hidden for a good purpose, or whether it is revived after their retirement from the Chinese government, their responses (e.g. it was stupid for South Koreans to challenge ethnic nationalism on account of an untested ideology of multiculturalism) revealed their Korean

\textsuperscript{55} Mr. Dehai Zhu (1911-1972) was the first leader of the Yanbian Korean Chinese Autonomous Prefecture.
identity. Ms. HR Chang, an 81-year-old retiree, regarded multiculturalism as trash that many countries have already dumped after trial and error. She worried that multiculturalism would shake the roots of the Korean nation and leave South Korean society in chaos.

As befits their occupation, many of these officials saw multiculturalism as a policy that the South Korean government has adopted to solve current issues, and considered the policy of multiculturalism a bad choice that would cause more problems than solve. They also felt the policy was unnecessary considering the small number of foreigners in South Korea. They tried to give advice to the South Korean government for alternative options, which indicated their inclination towards ethnic nationalism. Ms. HYZ Kim, a 33-year-old government official, suggested that South Korean government should activate a policy that gave preference to co-ethnics instead of multiculturalism, considering that most migrants in South Korea were ethnic Koreans. Mr. BH Hoo, a 64-year-old retiree, regarded multiculturalism as a short-term solution with a significant long-term loss, and suggested that the South Korean government solve labour shortages by encouraging the ethnic return migration instead of by importing foreigners. Likewise, Mr. DH So, a 34-year-old government official, commented that the South Korean government should pay more attention to Korean unification than to multiculturalism, and that Korean unification would solve labour shortages in South Korea.

These officials currently in office were prudent during interviews, and paid careful attention to their choice of words, being worried any mistakes they made could cause unnecessary trouble. They worried about not only themselves but also the Korean Chinese community. I could sense their caution. They emphasised their Chinese identity so frequently that it seemed likely that they did so to guard against getting into trouble. Remarks expressing their patriotism to China include: “The natal homeland outweighs the ethnic homeland. China is the country where we were born and will be buried” (from Ms. MO Cho, a 45-year-old government official); “My identity as a Chinese national always comes first. I thank China for nurturing us” (from Mr. DH So, a 34-year-old government official); and “Although it is believed that blood is thicker than water, I feel the affection involved in fostering is stronger than that in giving birth.” (from Ms. HYZ Kim, a 33-year-old government official).

Fifty participants felt that the Korean nation was built on individual Koreans’ sacrifice of their private interests or even lives for the sake of the national will through a process of development in general, but particularly in the face of turmoil. This understanding showed
the notion of nation as a social entity based on the members’ sacrifice. Renan ([1882] 1996)
considers that the sacrifices that the members of a nation have made and will make
constitutes large-scale solidarity, which he sees as a hallmark of a nation. It is surprising to
find that many young participants were willing to sacrifice themselves for both Korean and
Chinese nations and that they felt it was the right and honourable thing to do.

Obsession with the maintenance of ethnic homogeneity turned 20 participants into what
could be termed racists. They felt foreign migrants were unreliable, and could become a
threat to South Korean society. Only three of these participants have South Korean
citizenship. However, it was clear that most of them saw themselves as Koreans instead
of migrants. Such attitudes indicated, once again, that the Korean identity of Korean
Chinese is independent from their Korean citizenship. It also begs the question of how
South Koreans, who do not like to consider Korean Chinese as being Koreans, would feel
if they heard the ‘racist’ Korean Chinese criticise foreigners with the exact words that
some South Koreans use to criticise Korean Chinese. Ms. SL Lee, a 50-year-old
pharmacist in Seoul, had ‘racial’ attitudes towards migrants, although she was a migrant
herself. Ms. Lee maintained:

The effect of ethnic diversity is worse than has been imagined.
Migrants threaten the social harmony of the host country. There will
be less mutual trust among people in a society with a large population
of migrants. As the media reports, more crimes will be carried out.
When the number is large, the result is destructive.

If Ms. Lee’s negative attitude towards foreigners stemmed from a vague fear that was
aggravated by the media, that of Ms. MH Park was the result of her own experience with
her foreign neighbours. Ms. Park, a 37-year-old marriage migrant who obtained South
Korean citizenship in 2007, might be in a stronger position to identify herself as a Korean
than might Ms. Lee. Ms. Park worked at a South Korean textile company in Qingdao,
Shandong Province before she married a South Korean man she met at work. Ms. Park
was living in a residential area in Pusan densely populated by foreigners. She commented:

My Korean neighbours hate having foreigners as neighbours. They
worried the prices of our apartments are decreasing due to there being
so many foreign residents. They also complain that the existence of foreign residents is disruptive to their children’s education. I myself dislike foreigners to be neighbours. My foreign neighbours have never followed the rubbish separating system for recycling, are reluctant to clean even their doorway, and often put bags of smelly rubbish in front of their door near to staircases, which is public place. They often come and go in packs, especially late at night. It is scary.

These participants’ exclusive commitment to the inviolability of the borders of the Korean nation showed the idea of nation is limited. Anderson (1983) and Handler (1988) suggest that nation is limited in space because a nation has a restricted boundary no matter how large the nation is. Some ‘racial’ participants were even more hostile to ‘half-blood’ Koreans (in their term) than to migrants, because they felt ‘half-blood’ Koreans were more harmful to the maintenance of ethnic homogeneity than were migrants, who will eventually leave the country. Consequently, they objected to international marriages, which were the main source of ‘half-blood’ Koreans. Their feelings of resentment towards members of international families carried over into resentment of the South Korean government, which has encouraged the international marriage of South Korean men. Older participants had more exclusive attitudes towards international marriages than did younger participants. Ms. LS Hong, a 71-year-old retired teacher in Yanbian, commented, “How come the South Korean government encourages international marriages? It is speeding up the nation’s racial mixture.” However, many young participants, too, resented international marriages. Ms. GI Han, a 33-year-old migrant in Sydney, felt Koreans should marry Koreans in order to keep pure Korean descent. Her attitude was unexpected, considering her background of completing undergraduate and postgraduate study in Australia and working at an international firm since her graduation. She felt herself lucky to find a Korean Chinese boy. Ms. Han commented:

Korean Chinese have avoided marrying people of non-Korean ethnicity, despite mingling with different ethnic groups for generations. Neither inter-ethnic nor international marriages are encouraged. With the migration of Korean Chinese both nationwide and worldwide, marriages with outsiders became apparent. However, people still take this amiss, and speak ill of such marriages. Parents disagree with their children marrying outsiders. They feel ashamed to
tell others their children-in-law are non-Korean Chinese. In South Korea, however, the government encourages international marriages. I know it is the last resort of South Koreans, but still cannot think of it positively. International marriages will make the pure Korean nation disappear. I dare say Korean Chinese will have purer Korean blood than South Koreans in one generation.

Most participants were not so racial. Nor were they anti-racial. Only eight participants expressed a desire to root out racism in South Korea, regarding it as an obstacle to social cohesion. They criticised South Korean multiculturalism for paying too little attention to tackling racism, and South Koreans for blindly trusting that intermittent festivals would lead to a multicultural society. They asked for substantial changes to combat racism both at an individual level and a government level. Their request for direct anti-racist efforts in a multicultural society is related to the argument of Berman and Paradies (2010), who argue that discussion regarding multiculturalism should refer to its anti-racist potential, otherwise multiculturalism will be limited to a mere complaint mechanism, without having actual effect.

Nevertheless, these ‘anti-racists’ have not yet completely broken away from the nationalist ideas that cause discrimination in South Korea. Their failure to move away from nationalist ideas was captured from their efforts to persuade the ‘racists’ to accept people of other ethnicities. They emphasised that there was no need to fear ‘outsiders’ because Koreans were never homogeneous. Mr. RT Jeong, a 31-year-old historian in Seoul, commented, “Why do you care about mixing the blood of Koreans if they are already multi-ethnic?” Ms. NB Zhang, a 35-year-old neurosurgeon in Shenyang, remarked, “Even when all Koreans cry out that they are people of a single race, they are not homogeneous.”

In addition to the ‘anti-racists’, a further ten participants challenged the foundation myth of the Korean nation, which symbolises its ethnic homogeneity. They argued that the significance of the myth was that Tangun founded a nation in the Korean peninsula, but not that he was everyone’s ancestor. Mr. YX Wang, a 37-year-old nurse at a public health centre in Seoul, felt it was time for a reinterpretation of the Tangun myth. He argued that the

56 Shenyang is the capital and the largest city of Liaoning Province.
emphasis on the Tangun myth was a recent development and that scholars of the Choson period did not claim that all Koreans were the descendants of Tangun. Mr. NJ Park, a 36-year-old businessman in the United States, felt it was anti-progressive to be bound to the Tangun myth even if the myth was true. He countered the symbol of ethnic homogeneity of the Tangun myth with a scientific basis:

Genetic studies have revealed Koreans are not homogeneous, but have affinities with Chinese, Mongolians, Manchurians, and even with Vietnamese. There is no need to worry about having foreign brides from these related countries.

The minority participants who challenged the ethnic homogeneity of Koreans welcomed multiculturalism with the conviction that it would encourage South Koreans to embrace other ethnicities, expand the values of tolerance and equality, and thus facilitate extending the scope of the Korean nation. They felt that same vision and community spirit are more important than bloodline; that people born within the integral territory of South Korea should be granted South Korean citizenship, regardless of their ethnic origin; and that people with South Korean citizenship should be treated equally. Such an idea is congruent with the notion of *jus soli*. It also accords with the value of civic nationalism: which defines a nation as an organisation of people who have shared political rights and allegiance to similar political procedures (Nash 2001), or as a community of equal, rights-bearing citizens, united in patriotic attachment to shared political practices and values (Tamir 1993).

5.1.2 Mindset of ‘Koreans First’ and Supremacy over ‘Others’

A mindset of ‘Koreans first’ and a solid supremacy over migrants without Korean ethnicity was predominant in 42 participants. They believed that it was right to put Koreans first, when the South Korean government distributes resources. Mr. DM Ann, a 41-year-old construction worker in Seoul, commented, “Isn’t it natural to help family first, neighbour next? The South Korean government should first help the underprivileged co-ethnic migrants who desperately need help.” Reagan (2005) argues that nationalism does not automatically imply a belief in the superiority of one ethnicity over others, but irrefutably some nationalists support ethnocentric supremacy. In the case of the participants whose views are discussed here, it is apparent that their commitment to ethnic nationalism led to ‘ethnocentrism’, which Reagan argues is a more accurate and meaningful term than ‘ethnocentric supremacy’.
These participants had a clear idea about ‘us’ and ‘others’. Their understanding of ‘us’ was based on the primordial ideas of ethnicity and nationality. It includes not only Korean Chinese themselves but also the other overseas Koreans and the Koreans in the Korean peninsula. Many participants felt they were the same as other overseas Koreans, whom they had hardly encountered. Ms. JS Oh, a 45-year-old fashion blogger, considered her marriage with a South Korean man as a marriage between Koreans, in her own words, “a marriage reunited Koreans in different regions”, instead of an international marriage. Such feelings indicated a notion of the nation as an imagined community (Anderson 1983). Of course, the ‘nation’ in the mind of Anderson was based on European models of nation, which were constructed as a required element of industrialism, so different from the ‘Korean nation’, which was not yet industrialised at the time Korean Chinese left the Korean peninsula.

Participants’ perception of ‘us’ was indicated by their criticism of South Korean multiculturalism for providing unnecessarily many favours to foreigners; increasing the burden on the South Korean economy; catering only to foreigners while ignoring the demands of co-ethnics; reducing benefits for underprivileged South Koreans; and putting foreigners in a more favourable position than North Korean defectors, whom South Koreans should embrace and stand together with.

Many participants tended to be stricken with a victim mentality of being discriminated against and spurned in their ethnic homeland. They commented that the indifference of the South Korean government towards co-ethnics caused them to feel that they were treated inferior to migrants from the South East Asia. J. Lee (2012) lends support to the argument made by these participants that the focus of the South Korean government on co-ethnics has diminished and has become almost extinct with the rise of multiculturalism in South Korea. J. Lee’s argument that understanding foreigners and building a multicultural society should start from loving compatriots who have blood ties, emotional affinity and cultural similarity has some thread of connection to the ‘Koreans first’ mindset of the participants. That victim mentality was particularly rampant among participants who were unskilled migrants. Mr. YX Gao, a 40-year-old employee at a fish factory, felt the position of Korean Chinese in South Korea has been weakened since South Korea adopted multiculturalism. He commented that it was nonsensical that the South Korean government loves foreigners more than compatriots:
I feel Korean Chinese have been ignored in South Korea due to South Koreans’ obsession with multiculturalism. I am wondering why the South Korean government does not show co-ethnics even half the sympathy they show to complete foreigners. It should help people close to them first, and it at least should not let co-ethnics feel that their position in their ethnic homeland is lower than that of foreigners.

It is natural that participants objected to multiculturalism, seeing it as contrary to their personal interest. Unexpectedly, the objection of some participants to multiculturalism stemmed from seeing multiculturalism as being against the public interest of South Koreans, especially the disadvantaged. Thirty-two participants felt that it was unfair to ignore the neglected locals while helping foreigners with the tax that locals paid. Such an understanding stemmed from the cut in the government budget for 2010 for underprivileged South Koreans. Such feelings of grievance about a perceived rough deal for needy locals were discerned from the remarks of Mr. SY Go, a 33-year-old self-employee in Seoul. He noted:

The South Korean government feeds foreigners with the tax that its nationals have paid, while letting its nationals starve and suffer. It’s not true that only foreigners have human rights. The rights of locals need to be protected first.

A few participants blamed multiculturalism policies for making the employment and wages of local workers become more sensitive to economic changes. They felt that migrants were stealing the jobs of locals and worsening the working conditions of locals because employers preferred to hire migrants who have fewer demands (e.g. permanent employment status, wage increases, welfare and insurance). Such an understanding was captured from an interview with Ms. SA Yoon, a 41-year-old marriage migrant in Japan. Ms. Yoon commented:

The Ministry for Health, Welfare and Family Affairs cut the 260 billion won budget (USD 0.23 billion) of the Emergency Welfare Fund, and eliminated the 4,181 billion won budget (USD 3.7 billion) of the Limited Living Aid Fund for 2010. These funds aimed to support four million non-beneficiaries, whose income does not cover minimal living expenses but were not designated as people in absolute poverty (S. Kim 2009).
South Korean multiculturalism is the major companies’ conspiracy to hire cheap labourers. It produces a large population of non-permanent employees and an unemployment crisis among the locals. Given that one million young South Koreans cannot find jobs, the South Korean government should do something to protect local workers.

In contrast to the participants who openly showed a mindset of ‘Koreans first’, a few participants tried to show their impartiality and rationality. They made it clear that they did not object to the South Korean government’s support for foreigners; and that what they wanted was balanced support for all the unprivileged in order to avoid internal division and the sparks of mass revolt. Despite their efforts to be neutral, it was not difficult to see that they, too, displayed co-ethnic preferences. That was clear from the remarks of Mr. JX Koo, a 49-year-old businessman with the Treaty Investment (D-8) visa. Mr. Koo commented:

I’m not saying that helping foreigners is not important. As a migrant myself, I understand how deeply migrants suffer discrimination in South Korea. I feel sorry for them and feel multiculturalism is needed to improve the situation of foreigners. I just want to say there are more urgent issues waiting for the South Korean government to deal with, such as embracing overseas Koreans and integrating ethnic returnees. At least, it should show equal sympathy for co-ethnic migrants.

It is fascinating to find the understanding of unrivalled status of North Korean defectors among the majority participants. These participants were well informed about the privileges that North Korean defectors can get in South Korea.⁵⁸ Korean Chinese are not eligible for any of the privileges that North Koreans can enjoy. However, no participants complained about the discrepancies in the treatment of the South Korean government of North Koreans and Korean Chinese. Instead, they took it for granted that North Korean

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⁵⁸ The benefits include South Korean citizenship immediately upon arrival; settlement aid valued at 24.4 million Korean won (USD 21,400) for each household; a one-off subsistence allowance of 6 million Korean won (USD 5,260); housing subsidies; support for employment; and support for children’s education (Yoo 2010).
defectors get more help than Korean Chinese, because they felt North Koreans were more ‘genuine’ Koreans\textsuperscript{59} than were Korean Chinese. When questioned why this was so, most participants replied that it was because North Koreans had never left the Korean peninsula, whilst Korean Chinese had mingled with other ethnicities and, more importantly, had become Chinese nationals.

It was then pointed out to them that they had previously asserted that Korean Chinese had maintained ethnic homogeneity and therefore they should be seen on a par with North Koreans as they were both of ‘pure blood’. Most participants talked with an absolutely unanimous voice, as if they had pre-arranged the answer together. They responded that it was unquestionable that Korean Chinese have pure Korean blood, but they are politically and culturally Sinicised. Regarding the ‘Sinicisation’ of Korean Chinese, their Chinese way of thinking (e.g. socialist and collectivist views, ideals of egalitarianism) and political standing within China, and cultural and linguistic assimilation were mentioned most frequently.

The understanding of ‘Sinicised Korean Chinese’ made certain participants display a timid attitude in South Korea, being concerned that South Koreans would deem Korean Chinese to be presumptuous if they demanded special treatment as Koreans. They felt that the Sinicised aspect of Korean Chinese is a factor contributing to South Koreans’ discrimination against Korean Chinese. The idea of Korean Chinese being biologically Korean and politically/culturally Chinese was expressed in a rather interesting way by Mr. GH Jeon, a 40-year-old businessman in Beijing. Mr. Jeon noted:

\begin{quote}
Our (Korean Chinese) blood is pure, but our mind is not. We have assimilated to Chinese culture. We are loyal to China. We are not as pure Korean as North Koreans. Their blood is pure, and their culture is pure. They are the purest Koreans among all Koreans.
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{59} “진짜 조선사람” and “순수한 조선인” were used.
Many participants were upset with the plight of North Koreans, criticising the North Korean government for being the main instigator of its people’s fall into misfortune. Many participants discussed that North Koreans deserve more support than Korean Chinese because they have no country to go back to, while Korean Chinese have China. Additionally, some pointed out that North Koreans need more help than Korean Chinese because they have difficulty in adjusting into the competitive South Korean society, whilst Korean Chinese adjust into South Korean society well due to their having been exposed to a liberal economy since the Chinese reform in 1978. Often one participant put forward more than one reason, as can be seen from Mr. LC Jin’s comments. Mr. Jin, a 34-year-old physician in Yanbian, commented:

North Koreans risk their lives to escape from North Korea. They have nowhere to return. Their situation is more desperate than any other refugees in the world. Besides, they are Korean. They deserve support from South Koreans. Who shall South Koreans help if they don’t support their brothers! It is crucial to guide North Korean defectors to understand the dynamic capitalist principles and to adjust to South Korean society through tailored education.

A few participants raised concerns that privileges for North Korean defectors might discourage them from working diligently to achieve economic self-sufficiency. They worried that North Koreans might feel little need to work hard because they could easily settle for welfare. Such opinions accorded with the argument of S. Hong (2009) that the South Korean government’s immoderate generosity and paternalism to North Korean defectors stands in the way of their becoming economically active and independent. These participants also emphasised the importance of supporting North Koreans to stand on their own feet instead of relying on aid and becoming a permanent underprivileged class in South Korea. Ms. EX Hwang, a 65-year-old retired policewoman in Yanbian, used the proverb, “Give a man a fish, and he will eat for a day; teach a man to fish and he

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60 By contrast, many South Koreans felt that they had nothing to do with North Koreans, with some people even feeling hostile to North Koreans due to their traumatic memories of the Korean War (Shin 2007; S. Hong 2009).
will eat for a lifetime” to show that South Koreans should teach North Koreans skills necessary to survive in South Korea.

5.1.3 Longing for the Unification of the Korean Nation
A large number of participants considered Korean unification to be the ultimate and uncompromised goal of Koreans, in the belief that North and South Korea are one, despite the current hostile relationship. In this respect, the ethnic nationalism of most Korean Chinese has the feature of unification nationalism, which Hechter (2000) argues involves the merger of a politically divided but culturally homogeneous territory into one state. Korean unification was referred to the unification of two Koreas under a single government, by majority of the participants. However, a few of them felt that a unification of ethnic Koreans scattered in and out of the Korean peninsula was more important than a political unification of the two Koreas. In this regard, the ethnic nationalism of some Korean Chinese has the characteristics of pan-Korean nationalism, which J. Kim (2005) argues has gained momentum in South Korea.

Most participants considered their desire for a unified Korea to be unconditional, and responded that such a desire was determined by their destiny of having been born as members of the diaspora of a divided nation. The aspiration of these participants for Korean unification was straightforward, being based on primordial ideas of ethnicity and nationality, as can be seen from the following remarks: “Koreans are one nation of the same blood. Unification will make the Korean nation stronger” (from Mr. DW Kim, a 33-year-old student in the United States); “Unification is compulsory because Koreans have always been one, from Prehistory and Gojoseon to the Great Korean Empire” (from Mr. PQ Min, a 35-year-old consultant at a multicultural centre in Seoul); “Leaving a divided country is an unpardonable sin to posterity. We shouldn’t be so passive” (from Ms. XT Yoo, a 61-year-old farmer in Yanbian); and “Korean unification is desperately needed because only unification can save North Koreans from a miserable life and open North Korea to the outside world” (from Ms. JH Park, a 64-year-old retired customs official in Yanbian). The desire of some participants for unification has reached a realm of believing it to be worthwhile even at a terrible cost. Mr. YO Zu, a 30-year-old office worker in Beijing, felt even warfare was acceptable if it was the only way to save North Koreans from starving to death. For some participants, the perceived exclusion of South Koreans’ of Korean Chinese as members of the Korean nation, was a leading factor
motivating them to desire Korean unification. They felt they would have better position in a unified Korea than in South Korea, and would no more suffer discrimination from locals.

Many participants disapproved of multiculturalism, in the belief that multiculturalism would hinder unification by weakening its justification, which they believed was ethnic nationalism. Widespread concern over multiculturalism hindering Korean unification is seen from these comments: “Where should we find the justification of Korean unification if Koreans think of themselves as multi-ethnic people?” (from Ms. XH Liu, a 23-year-old student in Seoul); “With more residents of non-Korean ethnicity in South Korea, less attention will be paid to unification” (from Ms. JS Oh, a 45-year-old marriage migrant in Daejeon); and “If only one-tenth of the enthusiasm of the South Korean government for multiculturalism is put towards unification, big progress can be made” (from Mr. KN Kim, a 57-year-old government official in Yanbian).

The desire for unification made many participants become engaged with South Korean politics, despite their lack of political rights (e.g. right to vote in national elections) due to their Chinese citizenship. Most participants have a deep understanding of South Korean policies and have political opinions of their own. To sum up, many participants felt that Lee Myung-bak’s administration was not active with regards to unification, and had worse policies on North Korea than his two predecessors; some responded that Korean unification could be achieved through South Koreans’ improving the inter-Korean relationship; some felt that South Koreans should prepare in advance for unification and earn the trusts of North Koreans; some responded that a cool-headed and systematic approach to North Korea should be carried out consistently; and a few felt that intense discussions should be embarked on to establish a nationwide agreed vision and measures for unification.

The following quotes from some participants exemplify their high interest in Korean unification and South Korean politics. “Lee’s administration has worsened the inter-Korea relationship. The North’s sinking of the Navy corvette Cheonan in 2010 was the way North Koreans show their discontent with Lee’s administration. I preferred the policies of the

61 Lee Myung-bak was the tenth President of the Republic of Korea (2008–2013).
administrations of Kim Dae-jung⁶² and Roh Moo-hyun⁶³” (from Ms. SM Kwan, a 42-year-old teacher in Seoul); “Lee’s administration lacks the commitment to consider the unification issue as a historically important task. It had produced dubious proposals for unification that include a unification tax⁶⁴, which lacks the potential to be realised” (from Ms. XHP Liu, a 41-year-old newspaper columnist in Yanbian); “It’s important to prepare to seize the chance of a peaceful unification” (from Ms. XT Song, a 72-year-old retired researcher in Yanbian); and, “Nobody can say when unification will occur, but being well-prepared could expedite the arrival of unification” (from Ms. LW Ann, a 43-year-old editor of a Korean Chinese newspaper company in Seoul).

The negative attitude of these participants towards the North Korean policies of Lee’s government stemmed from its dumping of the Sunshine Policy⁶⁵, which these participants favoured highly. They felt the Sunshine Policy of peaceful engagement between South and North made the cooperative relationship between two Koreas reach new heights and increased the possibility of unification. Many South Koreans were not satisfied with Lee’s approach towards North Korea either, as a poll by the Institute for Peace and Unification Studies of Seoul National University in 2009 indicates: 60% of the surveyed South Koreans were dissatisfied with the Lee administration’s approach to unification (Yoo 2010).

Interest in South Korean politics was widespread among participants regardless of age. Ms. HA Park, an 81-year-old retired history teacher in Yanbian, had a sharp political consciousness. Her comment indicated an earnest longing of Korean Chinese for political

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⁶² Kim Dae-jung was the eighth President of the Republic of Korea (1998–2003).  
⁶³ Roh Moo-hyun was the ninth President of the Republic of Korea (2003–2008).  
⁶⁴ President Lee Myung-bak proposed a unification tax at his Liberation Day address in 2010.  
⁶⁵ The Sunshine Policy (1998-2008) was initiated by Kim Dae-jung and maintained by his successor Roh Moo-hyun, based on the hope of one day achieving a peaceful unification by promoting the inter-Korea relationship through supporting the North Korean economy and inducing changes in North Korean society. Lee’s administration judged the Sunshine Policy to be a failure, and declared an end to the Sunshine Policy in 2010. Lee’s administration implemented a new policy, which asks North Korea to give up its pursuit of nuclear weapons and open doors to the world, and, in return, offers support (Ministry of Unification 2010). The fundamental basis of Lee’s approach to the North is reconciliation (Ministry of Unification 2010), but North-South relations have cooled under President Lee (Voice of America 2010; Yoo 2010).
rights in South Korea. Interestingly, she had not connected the political rights with South Korean citizenship, as can be seen from the fact that she did not apply for South Korean citizenship even though she could do so easily.\textsuperscript{66} When she was asked about the reason she did not apply for South Korean citizenship, she answered that she did not feel any need for it, firstly because her children can visit South Korea freely, and secondly because she was too old to visit South Korea in the remainder of her life. When I told her she could have the right to vote for the South Korean president if she obtained South Korean citizenship, she responded that she was too old to put her idea into practice, and was just satisfied with having ideas. Ms. Park has never visited South Korea. Her understandings of South Korean culture and politics came from her watching South Korean TV programmes. Ms. Park discussed her opinions on Korean unification:

The North-South relationship is complicated. What I want to see is coexistence and co-prosperity rather than confrontation and stalemate. North Korea will suffer after Kim Jong-il\textsuperscript{67} dies. It’s only a matter of time before North Korea collapses once the people taste democracy and the bounty in neighbouring countries. If South Koreans prepare well, they will achieve unification. I might not be able to see the unified Korea, but my grandsons can. They might even see a president originally from North Korea, similar to Germany with its president (sic)\textsuperscript{68} originally from East Germany. If I have voting rights for the South Korean president, I will vote for the candidate who takes the unification issue most seriously. Democratic Party is most active in unification issues. I might vote a candidate from the Party.

Many participants’ keen interest in South Korean politics and concern over the shape of the Korean nation showed their conviction they were, or their imagination of themselves as being, members of the Korean nation. Regardless of their lack of political rights in South Korea, a large number of participants felt they were more interested in, and familiar with, South

\textsuperscript{66} Being born in 1929, Ms. Park could apply for ‘citizenship reinstatement’ of South Korean citizenship.

\textsuperscript{67} Kim Jong-il died of a suspected heart attack in 2011 while travelling to an area outside Pyongyang.

\textsuperscript{68} Angela Merkel is actually Chancellor, not President. Ms. Park made a small mistake.
Korean politics than Chinese politics. Most of them could not correctly name the five most influential Chinese politicians in the correct order, whilst a similar number knew much more about South Korean politicians. When asked whether this was because they cared more about South Korea than China, they disagreed, saying that the reason was complicated. Many participants explained that they felt hardly connected with Chinese politics because it was too macroscopic; some explained that Chinese politics was not fun because it was one-sided, whereas South Korean politics allow the freedom to voice opinions and so was more exciting; and some replied that they were more exposed to South Korean politics, and felt it related more to them. When reminded that they do not have political rights in South Korea, some participants responded that they did not feel they had political rights in China either and that they felt vicarious satisfaction through commenting on South Korean politics, while some responded that their lack of political rights in South Korea made them to be intimidated in South Korea. Mr. Park, a 32-year-old manager in a supermarket in Pusan, explained this was the reason he favoured South Korean politics. Mr. Park noted:

> It is my daily routine to read the South Korean political news online. The best part is to read comments people leave under the news. It’s so much fun. South Koreans write anything they want. They can even criticise their current president. This is impossible in China. You cannot write terrible comments about the Chinese government. If your comment is serious, you might be arrested. I feel Korean politics are closer to me. I have my favourite politician. I would be honoured to join her\(^ {69} \) election camp if she runs for president in the next elections.

South Koreans have lukewarm attitudes towards Korean unification, according to a survey held by Seoul National University in 2011 (KBS World Radio 2011). Among the 1,200 South Koreans surveyed, 53% agreed with the necessity of Korean unification; eight percent expressed no interest in Korean unification; 21% felt Korean unification was impossible.\(^ {70} \) This survey showed a trend of declining interest of South Koreans in Korean unification in comparison with the previous year, when 59% of the surveyed agreed with the necessity of

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\(^ {69} \) The participant is referring to Park Geun-hye, the eleventh president of the Republic of Korea.

\(^ {70} \) This survey has a 95% confidence level with plus or minus 2.8% error.
Korean unification and seven percent expressed no interest in Korean unification in 2010 in a survey conducted by the same Institute.

Another two survey results from trustworthy institutions proved that South Koreans have the least interest in Korean unification among different groups of ethnic Koreans. A survey carried out by Konkuk University\(^{71}\) showed that only 30.1% of the surveyed South Koreans answered that Korean unification has a promising future; whilst 62.4% of North Korean defectors, 59.5% of Korean Russians, 48.5% of Korean Chinese and 30.6% of Korean Japanese surveyed answered that the prospect of Korean unification is bright (Newswire 2012). North Korean defectors have the greatest interest in Korean unification, with 90% of the people in the survey, conducted by Seoul National University in 2012, believed that Korean unification is necessary (Yoon 2012).

Considering the fear of South Koreans that unification will cause a decline in the economy as an obstacle to unification, 50 participants emphasised the permanent benefits brought by unification: expanded territory, abundant natural resources and a wide-open gateway to China, Russia and further to Europe. They felt Korean unification would solve South Korea’s problem of a labour shortage and would lead to a decline in South Korea’s heavy reliance on a foreign workforce, through providing a plentiful cheap, hardworking and well-disciplined North Korean workforce. They also felt that Korean unification would lessen military tensions on the Korean peninsula and in surrounding countries. A few participants even believed that Korean unification would make South Korea a population power. Ms. HO Kwon, a 28-year-old co-manager at a Japanese restaurant in Incheon, responded:

South Korea is the 26th largest country in the world in terms of population. If combined with the 25 million North Koreans, the population would soar to 75 million, which means a unified Korea would have the world’s 18th largest population. There would be no more labour shortage. That’s why I think Korean unification is a good

\(^{71}\) Unification for Humanity Research Institute of Konkuk University carried out a survey between March 2011 and September 2012 to find the values, sentiments and culture of different groups of Koreans.
option for South Korea. Korean unification does not conflict with multiculturalism and globalisation.

A few participants reported that they have heard a few South Koreans argue that Korean Chinese are enthusiastic about Korean unification only because their position as bystanders saves them from being subject to any associated economic burden or risk of war. Mr. GP Park, a 39-year-old accessory designer in Incheon, commented that he had heard South Koreans saying that Korean Chinese can be patriotic and nationalistic as much as they want because Korean Chinese can hide in their country when a Korean war \(^{72}\) breaks out on the Korean peninsula. He retorted:

Korean Chinese support Korean unification because we love our nation. If bystanders like Americans and Russians support Korean unification, we would have had a unified Korea 60 years ago. South Koreans should blame themselves for lacking determination and strength to achieve Korean unification.

It would be easy to form a hasty conclusion that Korean Chinese who were originally from the northern part of the Korean peninsula were more compassionate to North Koreans and more pro-unification than were those who originated from the southern part of the Korean peninsula. Eighty-one participants stressed that their wish for Korean unification and their compassion for North Koreans was independent of their ancestral origins on the Korean peninsula, and was unrelated to other demographic characteristics. They considered the entire Korean peninsula to be their ancestral homeland, and both North and South Koreans as compatriots. The hostile relations between South Korea and China before the normalisation of diplomatic ties in 1992 was hardly mentioned, nor the part of history when Korean Chinese fought on the side of North Korea against South Korea. Only a few people mentioned the Korean War. They regarded the Korean War as a national humiliation and

\(^{72}\) The Korean War (1950-1953) was a war between South Korea, supported by the United Nations, and North Korea, supported by the People’s Republic of China and the Soviet Union. This term is mostly used by Westerners and in international context. For Korean Chinese and Chinese perspective, it has been “War to Resist US Aggression and Aid Korea”.
tragedy for the Korean nation, and understood that North Korea initiated the Korean War. They also tried to explain that Korean Chinese had no choice but to follow the orders of the Chinese government during the Korean War, which was a war to resist US aggression and to aid Korea, from the Chinese perspective. When asked if they purposely avoid talking about the Korean War, most people replied that they felt uncomfortable talking about the Korean War, feeling guilty about their killing many South Koreans. Regarding the reason that they hardly mentioned the hostile relationship between China and South Korea before 1992, they replied that they felt the present was more important than the past, and that Koreans should let go the past, which was riddled with the scars of fratricidal war, and focus on reconciliation in the future.

Ms. XH Liu, whose ancestral origin was in the south of the Korean peninsula, was one of the committed pro-unification participants. Ms. Liu, a 23-year-old international student, had put her longing for Korean unification into practice. She had joined a Pro-Unification South Korean civic organisation, regularly carried out voluntary service to help North Koreans, and twice visited (at her own expense) one of the historical sites of the Balhae Kingdom. This site is racked with controversy because it is located within Chinese territory and was claimed by the Chinese government as an ancient provincial government founded by Chinese minorities. Ms. Liu’s visits to this site were with nationalist South Koreans who went there to protest to recover former Korean territory. Ms. Liu asked not to quote her opinion on the Chinese government’s claiming the Balhae Kingdom as a Chinese local minority government, as she was worried it would cause harm to her. She expressed her compassion for North Koreans both in and outside the national territory of North Korea. Her remarks on North Korean defectors’ criticising North Korea were unique. She commented:

North Korean defectors are sisters and brothers to me. I like working for them. But I don’t like their excessive hurling of abuse at North Korea, especially in front of South Koreans. Chickens come home to

73 Balhae Kingdom was established in 698 in Manchuria by Dae Joyeong, a general of the collapsed Goguryeo Kingdom. Balhae declared itself the successor to Goguryeo, soon regained control of most of the former Goguryeo territory, and ruled the area of today’s northern Korean peninsula and northeast China. Balhae was defeated by Khitans in 926, and the territory was split (Doosandonga 1999).
roost. North Korea is their motherland. Criticising is ungrateful, solving nothing but aggravating the hostile sentiment South Koreans feel towards North Koreans. It is bad for unification. If North Korean defectors consider this is their way to help people remaining in North Korea, I have to say they are wrong.

Mr. BD Kim, a 70-year-old freelancer translator, was another passionate pro-unification and pro-North Korean participant, regardless of his ancestral origin in South. He used to be a Chinese teacher in Yanbian, and came to South Korea in 2006 after he obtained South Korean citizenship. He commented that he cared for North Koreans, although he did not have any relatives in North Korea; and welcomed everything that could stop North Koreans from being treated inhumanely. In contrast to his love towards co-ethnics in North Korea, he had never contacted his South Korean relatives. Mr. Kim explained:

My ancestors were from the South. But I feel close to the people in the North. I do not feel attached to my South Korean relatives, though. I’ve never visited them because I am afraid of being shunned by them. My sister once visited them to deliver gifts from my father. Unfortunately, she was repudiated. They thought she was up to something. Since then, she has never visited them again. I don’t blame them. After so many years we have become total strangers, although we are first cousins.

5.2 Korean Chinese Perspectives on the Formation of a Hierarchical Nationhood
An intensifying hierarchical national order in South Korea was revealed, from many participants who felt that South Koreans ranked migrants by the economic power of their country of origin, professions and the capital they brought with them to South Korea, putting rich and professional migrants from wealthy western countries in a higher position than poor and non-professional migrants from developing countries, with no exception for co-ethnic groups. Some participants demonstrated how they perceived the hierarchy between migrants in South Korea. Ms. CY Ming, a 37-year-old skilled migrant in Incheon, felt South Koreans do not dislike all foreigners but only poor foreigners without professional qualifications. She responded, “You don’t know how much South Koreans are soft on foreigners from wealthy western countries, especially English speaking countries. South Koreans treat them even
softer than co-ethnics.” Ms. MP Ko, a 52-year-old nurse in Shanghai, pointed out the preference granted to professional migrants over non-professional migrants. She explained that the increase of foreigners caused social tension in South Korea not because the number is huge but because most of the foreigners are poor and do not hold professional jobs. She responded that South Korea would not need multiculturalism if all foreigners were rich and professionals:

South Koreans needs cheap foreign labourers to sustain and boost its national economy, but they look down upon migrants. Herein lies the problem, and South Korea has to promote multiculturalism to solve the problem. If the majority of migrants are high calibre people, it would not be a problem but a welcome addition to South Koreans, because South Koreans welcome migrants who are professionals.

A large number of participants positioned themselves above non-ethnic-Korean migrants, and felt that they should be welcomed in South Korea more than other migrants are welcomed. They viewed the Korean nation as a space structured around a Korean culture, where non-Korean ethnics are objects to be moved according to a Korean national will. In this context, they shared a hierarchical view with South Koreans. They defined the Korean community in ethnic, linguistic, cultural and historic terms; deemed themselves as being a part of the Korean community; and sought to exclude people who did not belong to the community. By doing so, they strengthened the national hierarchy created by South Koreans, and formed a sub-hierarchy within that national hierarchy.

The feelings of many participants that Korean Chinese were discriminated against in comparison with co-ethnics from the West are not unwarranted. Seol and Skrentny (2009) argue that South Koreans ranked co-ethnics differently according to the potential contribution they can make to South Korean economic growth and geopolitical stability, ranking Koreans from Western countries higher in the conviction that they were more useful, whilst ranking Koreans from developing countries lower in the belief that they were less useful. According to Seol and Skrentny, Korean Americans can claim almost the same rights and benefits as South Koreans, whilst Korean Chinese encountered South Koreans’ unwillingness to accept them as members of the Korean nation. Freeman (2011) pointed out the discriminatory
treatment of South Koreans towards Korean Chinese, with numerous examples of Korean Chinese suffering artificially suppressed wages and the criminalisation of runaway brides.

Various legal procedures have institutionalised the distinctions between different co-ethnic groups. Discrimination is particularly conspicuous in the different migration policies that the South Korean government has implemented for co-ethnics from wealthy western countries and co-ethnics from developing countries. For instance, Korean Americans can enjoy free entry whilst Korean Chinese need a visa to visit. The Overseas Koreans Act (1999) was the abridged edition of the South Korean government’s legal distinctions towards different co-ethnic groups. The Act (1999) sealed the hierarchy among co-ethnics by excluding Koreans from China and the former Soviet Union from the category of Overseas Koreans. The amended Act (2004) included the two previously excluded groups, but still discriminated against them who were belatedly and narrowly included (C. Lee 2012).

The Ministry of Justice began to issue Overseas Koreans visas (F-4) to members of the two co-ethnic groups in 2008. However, discriminatory treatment remained, as in the granting of F-4 visas to co-ethnics from the West unconditionally, whilst requiring high education or professional qualifications for Korean Chinese to obtain F-4 visas. Only 4,800 Korean Chinese entered South Korea on F-4 visas in 2009, while 32,000 Korean Americans entered South Korea on F-4 visas; there were 32,222 Korean Chinese in 2010, which was a sharp increase but still fewer than the number of Korean Americans (35,645) (Korea Immigration Service 2011). The number of Korean Chinese in South Korea with F-4 visas reached 74,014 at the end of 2011, which surpassed the number of Korean Americans who had entered South Korea on F-4 visas (40,567) (Korea Immigration Service 2012). However, Korean Chinese with F-4 visas accounted for only 15% of Korean Chinese migrants in the same period (470,57074), whilst Korean Americans with F-4 visas accounted for 99% of Korean Americans in the same period (40,786). The number of Koreans from the former Soviet Union countries who entered South Korea on an F-4 visa is insignificant: with 1,458 from the Republic of Uzbekistan, 45 from Kyrgyzstan and 482 from the Republic of Kazakhstan with F-4 visas (Korea Immigration Service 2012).

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74 The 2011 KIS Annual Statistics records two different figures for the population of Korean Chinese migrants in South Korea: 470,570 on page 264 and 477,163 on page 614 (Korea Immigration Service 2012).
Chapter 5

The internal hierarchy among Koreans was indicated from the concern of many participants about the segregation of Korean Chinese communities from the wider South Korean community. They felt this phenomenon was a result of South Koreans feeling a sense of incompatibility towards the expanding Korean Chinese community; and of Korean Chinese being reluctant to have relations with the surrounding South Koreans in the conviction that South Koreans do not like them. Participants who reside on ‘Yanbian Street’ reported few South Koreans visit Korean Chinese areas, particularly at night, as they feel unsafe, and restaurants in those areas often refuse to serve South Koreans, particularly those drunk or disorderly, in order to avoid fights with Korean Chinese customers, both of whom are hostile towards each other. Kim et al. (2012) proved that the Korean Chinese community is largely isolated from the neighbouring South Korean society, despite it is not physically closed off nor is there a language barrier.

The hierarchy amongst different groups of Koreans has become even more complex with the growing influx of North Korean defectors75, whose numbers reached 20,000 in November 2010.76 Differently from Korean Chinese, North Koreans are granted South Korean citizenship as soon as they arrive in South Korea, because they are in principle considered to be South Korean nationals, and their rights as South Korean citizens with full equality are protected by the Constitution. Nevertheless, North Korean defectors were not able to move into the innermost zone of South Korean society (Seol and Skrentny 2009). Instead, they were put low in South Korean society; leading a life reliant on government support, forming their own community and being invisible to most South Koreans (J. Lee 2002a; Chung 2007; Seol and Skrentny 2009; Yoo 2010; S. Hong 2009).

75 In 2005, the South Korean government created a new term to refer to North Korean defectors, understanding the previous terms (e.g. refuges and escapees) have negative meanings. The new term ‘Saeteomin’, which means “a resident in a new place”, emphasises North Koreans’ determination to sow roots in South Korea. S. Hong (2009) shows that most North Koreans felt this effort did not improve their situation much.

76 The number of North Koreans in South Korea has increased since the first person arrived in 1948, and it is expected to increase if the famine and violations of human rights do not stop in North Korea. The following table shows the annual entry numbers of North Korean defectors (Ministry of Unification 2012b).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>2001</th>
<th>2002</th>
<th>2003</th>
<th>2004</th>
<th>2005</th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>2007</th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>2009</th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>2011</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1048</td>
<td>1141</td>
<td>1284</td>
<td>1382</td>
<td>1392</td>
<td>2398</td>
<td>1262</td>
<td>2028</td>
<td>2556</td>
<td>2805</td>
<td>2919</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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Opinion is divided among scholars concerning why North Korean defectors are ranked at the bottom in terms of social class in South Korea. Chung (2007) argues that this is a result of shrinking aid from the South Korean government and the negative perceptions by South Koreans. S. Hong (2009) agrees with Chung, and adds that South Koreans’ sense of distance from North Koreans acts as a mechanism to marginalise North Koreans. Seol and Skrentny (2009) argue that North Koreans’ low social standing is due to their having little value economically, and due to the policy change of the South Korean government from welcoming North Korean defectors to discouraging them, when it realised North Korean defectors’ incapacity to function well in South Korean society. In contrast, J Lee (2002a) and Yoo (2010) argue that it is due to North Koreans’ maladjustment to the competitive market economy of South Korean society, due to the challenging conditions that they experienced in North Korea.

North Korean defectors keenly felt South Koreans’ prejudices against them, which Lankov (2006) concluded include perceiving them to be dishonest, selfish and rude. Forty-one percent of the North Koreans surveyed in 2004 by the Korea Institute of Labour responded that they have experienced discrimination in South Korea (Sun et al. 2005). Another survey conducted by the Graduate School of Practical Theology, showed that 80% of the surveyed North Koreans felt life in South Korea is difficult; 20% felt life was better in North Korea; and 44.4% felt foreign to South Koreans (E. Park 2008). The case of North Korean defectors shows that South Korean citizenship does not guarantee full membership of South Korean society. This might be due to North Koreans’ lack of economic and cultural resources, which Moon (2012) argues are needed for citizens to demand an equal membership in society.

If the return migration of overseas Koreans triggered the formation of a hierarchical nationhood in South Korea, as Seol and Skrentny (2009) argue, multicultural development has complicated the hierarchical classification due to the large influx of non-ethnic-Koreans and, more importantly, their intention to live permanently in South Korea as South Korean nationals. Oh (2007) and H. Kim (2012) argue that South Korean multiculturalism forces boundaries between different groups of people, and thus increases racial and cultural separation. A large number of participants felt that multiculturalism plays a part in producing social hierarchy through negative representation of migrants and through unbalanced support for different groups. They felt that institutes promoting multiculturalism often caused hierarchical national order through their exercise of power to represent migrants; and that the
plight of migrants did not change much after South Koreans adopted multiculturalism. Such opinions agree with H. Kim’s (2012) argument that South Korean institutional agencies supporting the rights of migrants ironically form a hierarchy between locals and migrants through strengthening the public’s stereotypes of migrants, and create the idea of privilege that they initially set out to overcome.

An internal hierarchy amongst Korean Chinese themselves was highlighted. The hierarchy based on individuals’ different educational level, occupation, qualifications and wealth were pervasive. The hierarchy caused by different visa types is also significant, considering the degree of diversity of South Korean visas, which reached 28 types in 2011 (Korea Immigration Service 2012) (see Table 5.1). The hierarchy caused by different citizenship will be intensified, considering the increasing number of Korean Chinese who have obtained South Korean citizenship. In 2011 alone, 8,556 Korean Chinese obtained South Korean citizenship (Korea Immigration Service 2012). A huge gap exists between documented migrants and undocumented migrants, particularly in terms of the social welfare they are able to receive.77 However, this research does not include currently undocumented migrants, so I will not discuss the hierarchy caused by their legal or illegal status. The hierarchy between male migrants and female migrants, in other words, gender discrimination, which Oh (2007) mentioned exists among migrants in South Korea, was not raised by my participants.

Table 5.1: Major Visa Types of Korean Chinese Migrants

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Working Visit (H-2)</th>
<th>Overseas Koreans (F-4)</th>
<th>Permanent Residency (F-5)</th>
<th>Residency (F-2)</th>
<th>Visit &amp; Stay with Family (F-1)</th>
<th>General Training (D-4)</th>
<th>Non-Professional Employment (E-9)</th>
<th>Temporary Visiting (C-3)</th>
<th>Study (D-2)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>293,132</td>
<td>74,014</td>
<td>32,186</td>
<td>31,005</td>
<td>14,729</td>
<td>12,244</td>
<td>4,618</td>
<td>2,565</td>
<td>1988</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Korea Immigration Service 2012

In-group hierarchy was often ignored, or did not get as much attention as did the hierarchy between different groups, though it creates intense internal divisions, as can be seen by the considerable gap in social standing between participants with F-4 visas and those with H-2 visas. Due to the strict eligibility criteria of the F-4 visas for Korean Chinese, only a minority

77 As of the end of 2011, there were 17,284 known Korean Chinese illegal migrants in South Korea (Korea Immigration Service 2012).
of them could get F-4 visas, whilst the majority were granted the less desirable H-2 visas. C. Lee (2012) argues that an F-4 visa is equivalent to first-class ethnic citizenship, whilst an H-2 visa is equivalent to second-class ethnic citizenship. Korean Chinese with F-4 visas could enjoy benefits tantamount to those of co-ethnics from the West, whilst those with H-2 visas had an underprivileged status that was similar to that of migrants without Korean heritage. In this context, the Overseas Koreans Act (2004) settled the hierarchy of the co-ethnics. The two types of visa, which symbolise a different status from the beginning, caused a further class differentiation due to the restrictions on the economic activities of the visa holders. For instance, restricting H-2 visa holders to work in the areas of employment that characterised the lowest strata caused the impoverishment of these people, and increased their inequality with people in a better position.

With rich co-ethnics being advantaged and poor co-ethnics being disadvantaged, many participants, who were in the disadvantaged group, responded that the rich simply got richer while the poor got poorer, and that they experienced feelings of relative deprivation when they compared their position with that of their counterparts in the advantaged group. They felt the hierarchical order that South Koreans set for Korean Chinese according to their qualification was immoral, as Korean Chinese, regardless of their qualification, made contributions to South Korean society by working jobs that South Koreans avoided but that had to be done by someone. The widening gap intensified internal conflict. Mr. QU Park, a 29-year-old worker at a shipyard in Ulsan, stated that he could feel an intangible hierarchy between Korean Chinese, and the South Korean government should be held responsible for this hierarchy, which sometimes formed among members of a family. Mr. Park commented:

Intentionally or not, the South Korean government is contributing to the formation of a hierarchy among co-ethnics. My wife is a researcher, and she has an F-4 visa. She is treated well at work, but I am not. I am a manual worker, with an H-2 visa. I often suffer abuse at work, and I receive less income than my Korean colleagues although I carry out the same work. I feel my wife is a first-class co-ethnic, and I am a second-class. It is miserable to see class divisions among the same Korean Chinese. How can the South Korean government build a discrimination-free society when it even cannot stop discrimination against co-ethnics?
Mr. Park’s comment indicated the existence of an occupational hierarchy among Korean Chinese. The occupational hierarchy among different groups of migrants often coincides with their national origin. It is clear from the comparison of the top three employment visa categories for Korean Chinese and Americans\(^78\) in South Korea. As Table 5.2 shows, the three major employment visa categories for Korean Chinese are non-professional categories, whilst those for Americans are professional categories. Ten participants responded that many South Koreans regarded unskilled migrants in the same light as illegal migrants. This response indicates the complication and significance of occupational hierarchy.

Table 5.2: Top Three Employment Visa Categories

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Korean Chinese</th>
<th>Americans</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Working Visit (H-2)</td>
<td>Agreements (A-3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>293,132</td>
<td>43,459</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General Training (D-4)</td>
<td>Foreign Language Teaching (E-2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12,244</td>
<td>11,570</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-professional Employment (E-9)</td>
<td>Professor (E-1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4,618</td>
<td>812</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Korea Immigration Service 2012

Some participants pointed out that unfair treatment happened not only to non-professionals but also to professionals. Ms. CM Park, a 37-year-old doctoral degree holder who found a teaching position at a national university in Incheon, felt professional migrants also did jobs that the locals avoid. She offered the example that in many research centres, foreigners perform the tasks that locals avoid doing (e.g. overtime experiments at night) without being acknowledged for their effort. She pointed out that South Koreans’ hostility towards Korean Chinese would turn many intelligent Korean Chinese to other countries than South Korea, and it would be bad for the national interest of South Korea, let alone for solidarity among Koreans. Ms. Park commented:

Korean Chinese are the unsung heroes who are ensuring the development of South Korean society by doing jobs locals avoid, in

\(^78\) Differently from the treatment of Korean Chinese, the Korea Immigration Service did not make an individual category for Korean Americans. I compared the Korean Chinese migrants and the American migrants.
both professional and non-professional fields. Their contributions to South Korean society should be recognised, even if their ethnicity is not. However, their contribution was not appreciated by locals. Unfair treatment towards migrants will make this country lose brains. Who wants to remain here receiving tough treatment if they have the ability to fly further? My smartest friends all went to countries other than South Korea. They think even Japan is better than South Korea in terms of treatment of migrants. South Korea is losing the battle.

A small number of participants had different ideas regarding the reasons that South Koreans drew lines between locals and migrants. They felt it was South Koreans’ nature to enjoy conflict and division, and that made them categorise people and discriminate against those who were different from them. Ms. SP Park, a 45-year-old accountant in Changchun, commented, “There is deep-rooted mistrust and resentment even among South Koreans themselves over those from different provinces. Considering their hostility even against fellow Koreans, it is not surprising that South Koreans give the cold shoulder to Korean Chinese, who are from even further away.”

C. Lee (2012) rightly concludes that the Korean nation is not a collective of equals, but rather a nation spreading out like a circle with differing zones, with resident citizens in the centre, and co-ethnic migrants from the former communist countries at the margins. However, his argument that co-ethnics at the margins need to get South Korean citizenship in order to move to the innermost zone of the circle proves inadequate, as in the cases of the nine participants with South Korean citizenship. These participants evidenced that citizenship was not enough for outsiders to move to the centre of South Korean society, but merely a prerequisite. They considered South Koreans’ discrimination against ‘others’ to be the main obstacle hindering migrants from entering mainstream society, even with South Korean citizenship. Discrimination refers to unequal treatment based on group membership (Williams, Neighbours, and Jackson 2003), and it affects the living conditions and even life chances of the group discriminated against. It appears that eliminating discrimination against migrants is just as important as granting citizenship to them.

Four female migrants who married South Koreans felt that they lacked capital and social connections to compete with locals, and that these deficiencies would not only degrade them
to second class members of South Korean society but they would be passed down to their children. They suggested that the South Korean government carry out prompt measures to help families like theirs to have the strength to compete with local families, and that the support not be confined to language and cultural education, but should include addressing the socio-economic disadvantages that these people suffer. Such concern for marriage migrants’ families exiting as an underclass was clear from Ms. HM Ann’s comment. Ms. Ann, a 39-year-old self-employee, married her South Korean husband in 2004 and obtained South Korean citizenship in 2008. Ms. Ann noted:

Language education for marriage migrants is not enough. Look at Korean Chinese, who can speak good Korean but cannot enter mainstream South Korean society. A gap between locals and us remains visible no matter we finish our cultural education at the multicultural centre. Lacking competence is not a personal issue. Invisible lines block migrant families from moving forward. We cannot compete with locals without systematic and advanced support from the government. Otherwise we will become the losers, and our children will also become bottom-class citizens.

South Korea’s drawing lines between people of the same ethnicity, and treating them discriminatively constitutes a severe challenge to the previous ethnicity-based concept of nation building and nation defining. Freeman (2011) concludes South Korea’s transnational kin-making project that aimed to connect the geopolitical divide of Korean kinship has failed, and the myth of ethnic homogeneity has become tarnished. I will analyse how hierarchical positioning has frustrated the hopes of Korean Chinese to belong to the Korean nation, and influenced their identities in a comprehensive way, closely based on the responses of participants.

5.3 Influence of a Hierarchical Korean Nationhood on the Identity of Korean Chinese

Many participants felt they were members of the Korean nation, regardless of their Chinese political and cultural identity, because they were originally from the Korean peninsula. Unfortunately, the sense of Korean national belonging they treasured despite generations of separation from the ‘kin state’, and which they had taken for granted, was damaged as soon as they arrived in South Korea, which ranked not only different ethnic groups but also people
of the same ethnic groups. Korean Chinese are put low in South Korean society, and have suffered marginalisation from many South Koreans. Thus, the ideal of Korean Chinese being at ‘home’\(^79\) again in their ‘unforgettable ancestral homeland’\(^80\) has failed to live up to expectations.

Many participants shared a sense of betrayal by the hierarchical nationhood in South Korea. The more they wanted to be accepted as members of the Korean nation, the more they felt upset. Most of them felt South Koreans’ re-positioning of co-ethnics, both between different groups and in the same groups, was a division of the Korean nation, which they felt was worse than the physical division of the territory. Mr. OP Cha, a 71-year-old, president of the Korean Chinese Elder’s Home in Seoul, deplored South Korea’s discriminative treatment towards co-ethnics as brutally dividing the Korean nation. He was one of the ten participants who took part in the Korean Chinese hunger strike\(^81\) in 2003 that involved approximately 5,500 Korean Chinese asking for their rights to return ‘home’ and for the ‘reinstatement’ of their South Korean citizenship. Mr. Cha obtained South Korean citizenship in 2007. He held fast to his own views that the South Korean government should give Korean Chinese the right to return to their homeland, and grant them South Korean citizenship if they required. He commented:

> What did we ask for risking our lives in the hunger strike that lasted for sixteen days! It is the right to be back in our homeland. We dare not expect hospitality, but definitely do not deserve such mistreatment. Why deport Korean Chinese? Our ancestors were forced to leave homeland. Some people who petitioned the Constitutional Court and applied for South Korean citizenship were caught by the Chinese authorities as soon as they were expelled from South Korea. The South Korean government should treat us well. Are only wealthy

\(^79\) 家/집

\(^80\) 難忘的故国/잊을수없는 고향

\(^81\) The hunger strike was launched on 13 November 2003. Illegal Korean Chinese who were facing forced deportation submitted their application for South Korean citizenship. The next day, they petitioned the Constitutional Court to change the Nationality Law, which they claimed was against the Constitution. The strike ended after the president, Roh Moo-hyun, visited one site of the strike on November 29.
Koreans co-ethnics? Are poor ethnic Koreans no use? South Koreans are dividing our nation. However, they cannot change the fact that Korean Chinese belong to this land (the Korean peninsula).

Some participants emphasised that South Koreans made them feel ashamed of being ethnic Koreans, and they do their best to conceal they are Korean Chinese in South Korea where they think they should be given an unconditional welcome due to their shared ancestral ties or be given credit for their effort to maintain homogeneous Korean genetic lines. Such injured feelings of Korean Chinese were well indicated from the remarks of Mr. SF Han, a 35 year-old public prosecutor in Yanbian. He commented that South Koreans made Korean Chinese feel embarrassed to be a Korean Chinese, by looking down upon Korean Chinese, and by considering every Korean Chinese to be poor, non-professional and illegal in South Korea. Mr. Han answered that he tried to be quiet in South Korea, telling no people about his Korean Chinese identity.

Often, some participants have a self-absorbed view of their position within the diaspora. Their strong sense of entitlement in South Korea made them take a gloomy view of their situation. Ms. JO Bae, a 38-year-old elementary school teacher in Yanbian, was another participant who felt distressed by South Koreans’ looking down upon Korean Chinese. She responded that only in South Korea has being a Korean Chinese become a reason to be judged and humiliated. She visited South Korea only once, in 2008, for a Christmas holiday, and spent three days shopping at department stores in the most prosperous areas of Seoul for designer clothes and jewellery. She commented that in only three days she felt the prejudice of South Koreans towards Korean Chinese, as being poor people. Ms. Bae noted:

Shop assistants are quick-witted. They soon discovered I am Korean Chinese from my accent. When I wanted to try expensive items, they told me that the items were expensive and hesitate to let me try them on. When I purchased the items that they thought too expensive for me, they asked me, “Are you going back to China? How many years have you been South Korea? You must have made a fortune here.” It seems that they cannot believe Korean Chinese can afford costly clothes if they don’t work in South Korea.
Admittedly, Mr. Han and Ms. Bae were luckier than many other participants. They had options to choose which other countries to visit to other than South Korea, they could lead a successful life in China, and they were eligible to obtain the privileged F-4 visas. Their self-pride, to some extent, increased their intolerance of South Koreans’ contempt for Korean Chinese. However, such negative experiences did not make them lose their identities as ethnic Koreans. Mr. Han insisted, “I am Korean Chinese, and Korean Chinese belong to the Korean nation. No one can change it.” Ms. SX Liu’s experience illustrates how Korean Chinese react to South Koreans’ negative feelings towards them. Ms. Liu, a 42-year-old nail artist in the United States, used to be a technician in the fermentation department at a brewery in Yanbian. She chose to migrate to the United States despite her poor English, which was almost non-existent, being tired of South Koreans’ seeing Korean Chinese as inferior. She commented:

I’ve never been embarrassed about being Korean Chinese. Instead, there are advantages to being bilingual and bicultural. I have never had difficulty in finding a job. I like telling people I am Korean Chinese when they ask me how I am able to speak both Korean and Chinese. But in South Korea, even in the shortest of times such as during transit in an airport, I could feel South Koreans’ glares on my back. That’s why I don’t like visiting South Korea.

Ms. Liu has a South Korean boyfriend, whom she responded she would never have dated if they had met in South Korea. She explained that she could not bear South Koreans to think she was an inferior Korean Chinese who married up. Her boyfriend had proposed marriage, but she refused, because she knew his parents would not like their son to marry a Korean Chinese. Ms. Liu decided to marry her boyfriend on the condition that they would not return to South Korea. When she was asked how such negative experiences have changed her identity, she responded that nothing could change her identity as Korean Chinese:

My boyfriend’s parents think it is a disgrace for their son, who will carry on his family line, to end up with a Korean Chinese. When they look at me, they see nothing but my Korean Chinese identity. I have a degree in biotechnology. I am running my shop in the States, earning more money than their son. But they feel their son is losing dignity by
marrying me. I don’t like South Koreans. But it doesn’t mean that I hate being an ethnic Korean.

In contrast to these ‘lucky’ participants, the majority of participants did not have many options other than to lead a tough migrant’s life in South Korea. Worse, some were not able to obtain their visas. They could not be granted an F-4 visa because they were unable to meet the stringent requirement. Obtaining an H-2 visa was also not easy, as the South Korean government grants the visa to only a limited number of people whom it chooses at random from the list of people who have passed a Korean proficiency test. Due to the slim chance of getting an H-2 visa, a few participants tried first to enter South Korea with short term visas and then to change their visa status to an H-2 visa or an F-4 visa. None of them have succeeded in their plan. Perhaps a change from a short-term visa to a long-term one is nonsense from the beginning for them, who have difficulty in obtaining even a single-visit visa, considering the requirement for visa change (e.g. applicants of F-4 visa should have entered South Korea with a short-term visa over 10 times during the last two years).

Fifteen participants who failed to obtain a South Korean visa were resentful of the multicultural boom in South Korea, which they felt ignited competition with other migrants. Ms. ZJ Li, a 38-year-old kitchen porter, came to South Korea in 2010 with an H-2 visa. She was the only person to obtain this visa among 13 of her relatives who have passed the Korean test. She commented that the South Korean government should open its doors wider to Korean Chinese, considering that there are still lots of Korean Chinese desperately waiting to come to South Korea. Understanding that the chances of Korean Chinese of getting H-2 visas were reduced due to the South Korean government’s focus moving to foreigners, Ms. Li responded, “We are treated even worse than strangers. How can I feel close to such an ethnic homeland? It was difficult not to have a cold heart towards the South Korean government.”

However, when asked how such unfriendly attitudes of South Koreans towards Korean Chinese have influenced their identities, most participants, who reported that they felt betrayed by their ancestral homeland, responded that they felt no much change in their understanding of themselves. Ms. HY Kim, a 34-year-old financial manager in Seoul, commented, “I try to not reveal I am a Korean Chinese in South Korea. But it doesn’t mean I hate being Korean Chinese. It’s just too much of a bother to live in South Korea as Korean Chinese.” The Korean identity of many participants and their feelings of belonging to the
Korean nation did not decrease, as will be seen from their viewpoints on the conflict of interest between China and South Korea over Korean Chinese (see Chapter 6).

**Conclusion**

In this chapter I have analysed how a hierarchical national order was formed in South Korea; and how this has assigned Korean Chinese to a low status, and has influenced them in terms of their ethno-national consciousness. The hierarchical order, which contradicts the objective of the South Korean government policies, was a result of South Koreans’ preference for professional and wealthy migrants (including co-ethnic returnees) over non-professional and poor migrants. The perceived low social stratum occupied by Korean Chinese challenged their hopes for Korean national belonging, and made them feel betrayed and hurt. However, their commitment to the Korean nation did not decrease, nor did their interest in South Korea. In next chapter I will analyse the identities of Korean Chinese in the context of South Korea’s multiculturalism policy and China’s engagement policy towards Korean Chinese.
CHAPTER 6: THE AWKWARD POSITION OF KOREAN CHINESE BETWEEN SOUTH KOREA AND CHINA

Introduction
The previous chapter analysed how hierarchical nationhood in South Korea has prevented Korean Chinese from attaining a sense of belonging to the Korean nation. Even after South Korea announced it would embrace migrants to South Korea in a new policy of multiculturalism, South Korea, from the perspectives of many Korean Chinese, has continued a process of the exclusion of Korean Chinese. This chapter discusses how many South Koreans’ consistent reluctance to embrace Korean Chinese as members of the Korean nation has influenced the Korean Chinese understandings of ethnic culture and identities, in the context of the Chinese government’s policy of engagement with Korean Chinese. Being influenced by the PRC’s ideologies concerning ethnic minorities, Korean Chinese tended to have extreme essentialising thinking about ethnic Korean culture. Their being cut off from their ethnic homeland for several generations also made them hold on to an especially romantic notion of what Korean community and Korean culture meant. The discussion commences with the cultural approaches of many participants to South Korean multiculturalism, and their concerns that South Korea risks the loss of what they perceive as homogeneous Korean culture in its pursuit of a multicultural society.

6.1 Participants’ Cultural Approaches towards South Korean Multiculturalism
6.1.1 Concerns Regarding the Loss of a Homogeneous Korean Culture
Essentialising thinking about “Korean culture” appears to be persistent for Korean Chinese, due to the emphasis of the Chinese government on the 56 different ethnicities in China and the lack of direct interaction of Korean Chinese with other ethnic minorities in China. Korean Chinese do not have many opportunities to be exposed to people of other ethnic minority groups in China, either those in the farther West and South, or even those in the near Northeast. Therefore, they did not have a deep understanding of ‘others’. They vaguely understood that every ethnic group in China has a distinct culture, and put emphasis on maintaining the perceived differences. A large number of participants believed Korean culture to be world’s most homogeneous and distinctive culture. They had a strong attachment to the shared cultural heritage of the Korean peninsula, and prided themselves on having preserved the traditional Korean arts and lifestyle in spite of generations of isolation from the Korean peninsula. Most participants insistently repeat “Korean culture” as though
this is a self-evident term, which is quite problematic. If Korean culture is as homogeneous as these people perceived, the Korean nation would not have experienced a bitter civil war fought over 60 years and that has persisted in an increasingly ossified division. The division further resulted in a number of cultural differences between South and North Korea. In this regard, multiculturalism can hardly be the greatest threat to the perceived homogeneous Korean culture.

However, a large number of participants regarded South Korean multiculturalism as a great threat to the homogeneity and authenticity of Korean culture. They expressed deep concern that multiculturalism would cause Korean cultural homogeneity to be destroyed, thereby challenging the cultural security of Koreans. They felt that multiculturalism, seen as a ‘flood’ of multiculturalism in their terminology, could not enrich Korean culture as much as the South Korean government advocates; instead would cause a decline in the dominance of the Korean culture in South Korean society and would make the homogeneous Korean culture lose its uniqueness. Mr. LY Im, a 57-year-old businessman in Dandong, which is the largest Chinese border city with North Korea, felt that the multicultural idea of co-existing cultures sounded good in theory but it would kill the “native culture” in reality. He was concerned that “the unique Korean culture” would lose its authenticity once it was mixed with other cultures, and once Korean culture lost its uniqueness, it would lose its values. “How long can Korean culture remain distinct and sustainable with the flood of foreign culture? With all these foreigners around, Korean culture will soon end up in smoke,” Mr. Im averred.

The reasons these participants felt multiculturalism could not enrich South Korean culture were that: locals will not fully recognise and accept migrants’ cultures; migrants cannot understand “Korean culture”, regardless of how many years they have lived in South Korea; and non-ethnic Koreans do not feel as much obligation as do ethnic Koreans to maintain “Korean culture”. They responded that the low proficiency in Korean language and culture of marriage migrants was a particular concern because it might influence the proficiency in Korean language and culture of their children. Ms. SS Choi, a 37-year-old employee of a travel agency in Seoul, saw the future of the Korean culture as bleak due to international marriages. She noted:

Between their parents’ different mother tongues, a child will learn their mothers’ mother tongue first. Due to their mothers’ low
proficiency in Korean language, it is likely that children born from a non-Korean mother cannot attain as high a proficiency in Korean language as children both of whose parents are Korean. Early education from their mothers will influence them throughout their lives, being more familiar with their mother’s language. They will not develop a strong attachment towards Korean culture and preserve the homogeneity of it with all their strength.

What some participants worried about most, in terms of the loss of traditional “Korean culture”, was the potential damage to Korean identity. They felt that Korean identity, values and beliefs are neither secure nor valued in a multicultural community. Ms. SZ Xu, a 44-year-old restaurant waitress in Seoul, responded that it would be only a matter of time before South Koreans started to lose their national identity after they had lost their culture. She commented, “Multiculturalism will lead to an erosion of the native culture, and ultimately to the loss of Korean identity.” In contrast, a few participants felt that the influence of South Korean multiculturalism was not yet significant enough to swallow “Korean culture”; instead, it was much more likely that Korean culture would absorb foreign cultures to itself. The remarks of Mr. XT Oh, a 29-year old obstetrician in Changchun, well indicated the idea that South Korean multiculturalism makes migrants become assimilated into mainstream Korean society, though it might aim to help migrants to maintain their identity and culture.

Many participants believed that cultural homogeneity must be maintained because it is contributing to Korean unification. They considered the collective memory of shared ancestry and the ethnic and cultural homogeneity before the division as the most powerful link to connect people in a divided Korea, particularly given the conflicting political ideologies and government characteristics of the two Koreas. Hence, they responded that South Koreans should reinforce cultural homogeneity for the sake of Korean national integration and the eventual unification of the nation.

Damage to cultural homogeneity has always been of concern for many participants: not only damage to cultural homogeneity in South Korea but also that in the Korean Chinese community. Forty participants highlighted the overwhelming influence of Chinese culture on Korean Chinese culture. Transnational migration of Korean Chinese was also mentioned as a factor adversely affecting their culture by subverting such migrants with the exotic cultures of
a wider social environment. However, the influence of migration and the subsequent metropolitan life patterns was considered as a welcome development for Korean Chinese who used to be concentrated in the ‘backward’ area of China.

6.1.2 Expectations of Enriching Korean Culture

Many participants understood multiculturalism as celebrating cultural diversity, and thus they expected South Korean multiculturalism to enrich Korean culture by acknowledging the existing minority cultures within South Korean society. They also felt that multiculturalism would help South Koreans to increase understanding of their own culture through comparison with other cultures. Such perceptions were clear from the following remarks: “Opening up towards cultures of migrants and accommodating the exotic cultures is good for South Korea” (Mr. HJ Park, a 30-year-old factory worker in Pusan); and “The diverse cultures caused by the 1.5 million migrants from 150 countries need recognition and respect. It is advisable to accept other cultures to add vitality to Korean culture” (from Mr. UH Pong, a 38-year-old realtor in Seoul).

These participants felt it was not necessary to be wary of damaging the homogeneity of Korean culture by accepting other cultures because Korean culture has never been a pure monoculture. They had a common understanding that cultures are the products of continuous competition and negotiation; therefore there was no such thing as a homogeneous culture. They pointed out numerous cultural similarities in East Asian countries caused by historical subservience to China (e.g. the Sino-writing system). From the points of view of them, at the early period of interaction among people who lived in and around the Korean peninsula, languages, customs and indigenous religions were quite multicultural, but they melded into a relatively homogeneous culture as time passed.

Their own experience of enriching culture through comparison with other cultures was often used to illustrate how multiculturalism can enrich Korean culture by making South Koreans more aware of their own culture when confronted with different cultures. Some participants responded that South Koreans could come to a deeper understanding of their culture in a multicultural South Korean society, just as Korean Chinese came to know their own culture better through mingling with other cultures. Ms. YM Huang, a 45-year-old traditional Korean musician, showed how she came to realise the uniqueness of Korean Chinese culture through comparison with South Korean culture. She responded that she always thought Korean
Chinese culture was the same as both North and South Korean culture, and that it was not until her first visit to South Korea that her eyes were opened to real Korean traditional music. She remarked:

Only after I visited South Korea did I come to acknowledge the big differences between our culture and their culture. I cannot explain the deep gratitude I felt when I first visited the National Music Institute for a traditional performance. I was shocked to discover that the music I had considered as traditional Korean was so different from South Korean’s. I guess that was the real start of my life as a traditional Korean musician.

6.2 South Korea’s Cultural Exclusion of Korean Chinese and Participants’ Reactions

Many participants talked about cultural exclusion that Korean Chinese have suffered in South Korea. The ‘cultural exclusion’ that they felt included discrimination against Korean Chinese due to the cultural difference between Korean Chinese and South Koreans; and South Korea’s exclusion of Korean Chinese culture from the multicultural discussion aimed at embracing the cultures of migrants. Most of these participants considered their culture to be essentially Korean culture with a minor Chinese influence that could be overlooked, and thus felt Korean Chinese culture might be easiest for South Koreans to embrace amongst all the other migrant cultures in South Korea. Unfortunately for these participants, South Koreans discovered cultural differences in many ways, and such differences have affected the relationship between Korean Chinese and South Koreans (Song 2007, 2009; Lee 2005a, 2005b; Seol, Lee, and Cho 2006).

Some participants felt that South Koreans’ discrimination against Korean Chinese due to cultural difference was caused by the discriminatory nature of South Koreans who, they felt, emphasised differences over similarities and perceived differences negatively. They expressed their doubts that South Korean multiculturalism could embrace the cultures of migrants as it sets out to do, given that South Koreans could not even tolerate Korean Chinese culture, which most resembles South Korean culture. Such a perception was clear from Ms. EW Jeon’s comments. Ms. Jeon, a 27-year-old student in Seoul, felt such a bold vision of multiculturalism embracing migrants’ cultures was unattainable given the discrimination Korean Chinese suffered due to their cultural difference from South Koreans. She noted:
Among the migrants in South Korea, we have the most similar culture to that of South Koreans. If South Koreans cannot even tolerate our culture, which migrants’ culture can they embrace? Given that even co-ethnics are discriminated against in South Korea due to cultural differences, it is not difficult to imagine the superficiality of South Korean multiculturalism.

Most participants felt that South Korea’s exclusion of Korean Chinese from its multicultural discussion can be understood in the same vein as the invisible status of Korean Chinese in multicultural discussions in South Korea; neither welcomed as Korean culture nor respected as a foreign culture of the kind that the South Korean government had announced to embrace. A few participants ruefully commented that Korean Chinese culture was not treated well in South Korea because it resembles South Korean culture too much, and that South Koreans only love to embrace foreign cultures. Some participants shared an understanding that no matter what Korean Chinese culture is, either Korean culture or a foreign culture, it should be valued as it is if South Korea truly respects recognition of and equal relationships between different cultures. They felt that South Koreans should give Korean Chinese culture at least the same amount of respect they show to the cultures of other migrant groups. Ms. JG Cha, a 35-year-old employee of Samsung Company, felt that if South Koreans did not wish to accept Korean Chinese culture as Korean culture, then it should be treated as a foreign culture. She commented, “If South Koreans feel our culture is different from their culture and the difference is sufficient to be the cause of discrimination, treat our culture as a foreign culture.”

Many South Koreans’ disdain of Korean Chinese culture and ignorance of the concerted efforts of Korean Chinese to maintain Korean culture challenged the commitment of Korean Chinese to maintaining Korean culture. Many participants responded that they felt hurt by cultural discrimination from South Koreans. In particular, such a feeling was strong among participants who had considered Korean Chinese culture to be Korean culture and prided themselves on maintaining it. Some participants raised the concern that many Korean Chinese do not value Korean Chinese culture, being influenced by South Koreans who consider Korean Chinese culture to be rootless and inauthentic. They felt that respectful treatment befitting the efforts of co-ethnics to maintain traditional Korean culture is more
effective than distributing material aid intermittently to encourage co-ethnics to maintain their Korean culture and identity.

Ms. OZ Choi’s narration showed two very specific examples of ways in which South Koreans saw Korean Chinese culture as an inferior or unauthentic version of South Korean culture. Ms. Choi, a 68-year-old retiree and member of the Sijo (traditional three-verse Korean poem) Association in Yanbian, has pride in maintaining Korean culture in China. Ms. Choi’s narration also showed two examples of ways in which Korean Chinese feel ashamed of their own culture and feel little motivation to maintain Korean culture and identity, as the result of many South Koreans’ ignorance of Korean Chinese culture. She pointed out that South Koreans have made Korean Chinese feel their efforts to maintain Korean culture have been in vain. She noted that South Korea should pay more attention to the protection of the cultures of overseas Koreans, if it is considerate enough to care for the protection of the cultures of migrants.

In China, we are proud of being Koreans. However, in South Korea, we feel embarrassed and try to hide that we are Korean Chinese. I dare say South Koreans’ negative attitudes towards us made us feel uncomfortable about exposing our origin. I know many Korean Chinese who use the Seoul accent even when they talk with themselves, in order to avoid South Koreans near them being able to identify them as Korean Chinese. This was because they know a Yanbian accent triggered discrimination. We didn’t maintain the Korean language to be looked down on by South Koreans. More Korean Chinese have enrolled their children at Chinese schools and lost heart about maintaining Korean culture. I heard many South Koreans saying that Korean Chinese destroyed Korean traditions. The traditions we have maintained are substantially the same as those of South Koreans have maintained. Once at a gathering of South Korean and Korean Chinese poets, I poured out a glass of wine for each of the South Korean guests to thank them for coming to Yanbian to encourage us to make further efforts in developing traditional Korean poetry. Later I heard some South Koreans who attended the party talking behind my back. They said I acted like an old barmaid by
poured wine for men. I didn’t know that in South Korea women do not pour wine for men. Cultural differences do not deserve such severe criticism.

In stark contrast, China has adopted active engagement policies towards Korean Chinese and endeavoured to categorise Korean Chinese culture as part of Chinese culture. With the political ideal of a unified multi-ethnic country, the Chinese government has intensively promoted the intangible cultural heritage of the ethnic minority groups in its territory, and claims the ethnic minority cultures belong to Chinese culture. Participants’ understandings of Korean Chinese culture and their responses to the engagement policy of the Chinese government, particularly the attempt to categorise Korean Chinese culture as a Chinese culture, indicated the awkward position of Korean Chinese between their ethnic homeland and natal homeland.

6.3 Korean Chinese between the Pushing and Pulling Forces of South Korea and China

6.3.1 Anxiety about losing Korean Chinese Culture

A large number of participants were well informed about the Chinese government’s efforts to list the intangible cultural heritage of Korean Chinese as Chinese assets, and further to register them with UNESCO as Chinese assets. Some of them saw the Chinese government’s such practice negatively, but stopped short of direct criticism of the Chinese government, worrying it will put the Korean Chinese community in danger. Their responses were cautious and hesitant and feelings of unease could be discerned. They felt that the Chinese government has recently adopted a conciliatory policy towards Korean Chinese to strengthen effective government over them, as the government is alarmed by the changes happening to Korean Chinese. The ‘changes’ that they thought annoyed the Chinese government included the active migration of Korean Chinese to South Korea; a rapid increase

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82 Intangible culture cannot be touched and interacted with, without a vehicle for the culture, who is called a ‘Human Treasure’. Intangible cultural heritage is promoted by the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (Source: UNESCO Official Website).

83 Between 2006 and 2011, 16 items of Korean Chinese culture have been designated as Chinese national-level intangible cultural heritage, with one item, Nong’akmu (traditional Korean music and dance performed by farmers) being registered with UNESCO in 2009. Nong’akmu is the single dance item registered by UNESCO as Chinese cultural heritage among the 36 items so far registered by UNESCO as Chinese heritage (Xu 2012).
of the number of Korean Chinese renouncing Chinese citizenship; South Koreans’ interest in the ancient ruins of the Goguryeo kingdom in Chinese territory and the frequent visits of South Koreans to north-east China; and the increasing number of North Korean defectors in China and the involvement of some Korean Chinese in helping them to move to South Korea.

A few participants felt the Chinese government was strengthening control over Korean Chinese to prepare for unexpected changes in the future (e.g. territorial disputes in the Manchuria region with the unified Korea). They offered as evidence of the Chinese government’s close attention to Korean Chinese the fact that the first gallery to showcase the intangible cultural heritage of ethnic minorities had been for Korean Chinese culture. The Korean Chinese Intangible Cultural Heritage Gallery opened on 23 July 2010 in Tumen, Yanbian (Jilin Province Government 2011). Some participants were sensitive to the selection of Tumen as the location of the gallery. This sensitivity was based on their strong attachment to the Tumen River, considering it as a symbol of the Korean Chinese. Ms. YM Yuan, a 33-year-old staff member at a university in New Zealand, commented, “When I first saw a restaurant in Auckland named Tumen River, I knew instantly it was a Korean Chinese restaurant, and I was right.”

In contrast, the very sensitive political consciousness was demonstrated by the emphasis that a few participants placed on the political overtones in the location of the Gallery. They felt the selection of Tumen was a well-calculated measure by the Chinese government, which wanted to intercept beforehand all possible disputes with North Korea in the future, by conveying a message that the territory north of Tumen River and the people who live in the territory belong to China. Such an opinion was based on their understanding that the Tumen River could become a focal point of territorial disputes between China and Korea because ancient Korean kingdoms expanded their territories north of the Tumen River at their peak. Ms. OJ Zhang, a retiree in Yanbian, was one of the participants who thought the Chinese government selected Tumen intentionally in order to assert to whom the territory and people belong, and imprint it in the understanding of Korean Chinese. Ms. Zhang remarked:

China is acting high-handedly with its rising power. Selecting Tumen to build a Korean cultural heritage gallery reflects underlying political calculation. The Chinese government is announcing, not only to Korean Chinese but also to Koreans on the other side of the River, that
the territory where Korean Chinese live belong to China. China is preparing for the day Koreans demand the land back.

In contrast to most participants’ restrained criticism of the central Chinese government, there was intense criticism of the Yanbian Korean Chinese Autonomous Prefectural government. Some participants blamed the Yanbian government for failing to fulfil its role of maintaining the identity of Korean Chinese and protecting the interests of the Korean Chinese community. In addition, some participants criticised individual Korean Chinese who had applied for Korean Chinese culture to be registered as Chinese culture and for themselves to become the ‘human treasure’ or master of the particularly culture. Some of these participants were overtly critical, denouncing the applicants as betrayers of the community who were blinded by a love of money and honour. Such criticism was based on their understanding that the process of registering aspects of Korean Chinese culture as Chinese assets was impossible if there were no people applying for such aspects to be registered, or if the Yanbian government did not carry out document screening of the applications or did not elevate the applications to the relevant higher office. At first glance, their understanding seems to agree with the facts. The process of registering Korean Chinese culture as Chinese assets starts with a Korean Chinese individual’s application to become a master of the particular culture. The Yanbian government then investigates applications. Since 2005, 69 items of Korean Chinese culture were announced by the Yanbian government to be prefecture-level intangible cultural heritage (Gao and Zong 2012).

What outraged many participants about such practice was its negative influence on the Korean Chinese community in terms of maintaining a homogeneous culture. Some participants argued that it was easy to think the Chinese government seeks to encourage Korean Chinese to inherit and develop cultural traditions and that thus Korean Chinese culture will flourish; but in reality such a policy will make unique Korean Chinese culture disappear in the long term. A few of them even felt the recent Chinese policy of embracing the cultures of ethnic minorities was a metamorphosis of the cultural assimilation policy. They worried that Korean Chinese cannot survive the current policy, although they had

84 The Jilin provincial government then selects items of provincial-level cultural heritage. So far, 64 items of Korean Chinese culture have been elevated to provincial-level status.
survived the harsh assimilation policy, and had managed to pass down a Korean cultural legacy from generation to generation.

Mr. HG Kim, a middle-aged creative worker, regarded the current policy as a sugar-coated policy, which would make Korean Chinese voluntarily offer Korean culture to the Chinese and would eventually risk the existence of the unique Korean Chinese community in China. Mr. Kim was angry with some ‘human treasures’ that did not qualify. He felt that there was nothing good for the ‘human treasures’, when their culture is swallowed up and their community disappears. He was also angry with the the Chinese government, which he thought manipulated people behind a curtain by offering financial incentives and honours. He noted:

> These obsequious fellows don’t know what they are doing. They are selling our ethnic culture in order to seek immediate gains. What an irresponsible act to our community. Since Korean swing\(^85\) has been registered as Chinese intangible cultural heritage in 2006, people from all walks of life are enthusiastic about making Korean Chinese culture Chinese. Whoever applies first becomes the possessor of the applied intangible culture. I know a woman who used to be a master of ceremonies at birthdays and wedding parties who has now become the Master of several intangible cultural heritages related to ceremonies. What’s more, she made her whole family into human treasures. Her deceased grandma, who was an illiterate farmer for her entire life, turned into the first generation Artisan of Korean wedding ceremony in a morning, with herself as the second generation, and her daughter, who could not even finish high school due to a nervous disposition, became the third generation Artisan.

At the other end of the spectrum, many people felt grateful for the Chinese government’s acknowledgement of Korean Chinese culture as Chinese. They felt it signified the Chinese government’s full acceptance of Korean Chinese as Chinese and a deep appreciation of the

\(^{85}\)그네뛰기
potential role of Korean Chinese, and thus considered it to be the best outcome for Korean Chinese. They responded that they felt even more grateful to the Chinese when they considered the rejection of Korean Chinese culture by South Koreans. Ms. LH Lee, a 39-year-old literary critic in Yanbian, felt Korean Chinese should appreciate the generosity of the Chinese and loyal to the Chinese government, which accepts Korean Chinese as members of the Chinese nation. Such sentiment once again demonstrates how South Koreans’ discrimination against Korean Chinese estranged them from their ethnic homeland. Ms. Lee responded:

Look at how we are treated in South Korea. We are discriminated against by our compatriots. The Chinese accepted us. If Chinese kicked us out, we would have nowhere to go. We owe Chinese so much. We should be thankful for the generous act of the Chinese government. If the Chinese want our culture then let them have it.

In contrast to the participants who were either outraged by or grateful for Korean Chinese culture being amalgamated to Chinese culture, ten participants, being neither grateful nor angry, accepted it as an inevitable process if Korean Chinese want to survive in China. They viewed the policy towards Korean Chinese as a carrot, designed to implant a sense of loyalty and responsibility as Chinese nationals among Korean Chinese by authorising full national membership; and the stick would follow if Korean Chinese did not obey the Chinese government. With such an understanding, they felt Korean Chinese have to cooperate with the Chinese government, or there will be a price to pay in the future. In addition, some of them felt it was not a big deal to list Korean Chinese culture in the category of Chinese culture because Korean Chinese people are Chinese and thus the culture of Korean Chinese is part of being Chinese. Mr. TU Kim, a 24-year-old student in Beijing, felt Korean Chinese are Chinese, both in name and reality, after living in China for more than 100 years. He commented, “I cannot see why some people have trouble in imputing Korean culture to Chinese culture if they claim they are Chinese. Everything we have is in fact Chinese.”

6.3.2 Concern of Conflicts between South Korea and China

The significant reason some participants had concerns about the Chinese government’s attempt to list Korean Chinese culture as Chinese culture is the possibility of conflict between Korea and China. They responded that conflict between their ethnic homeland and natal
homeland is the last thing they want to see. However, it seemed that disputes have already begun, triggered overall by the Chinese government’s registration of ‘Arirang’\(^{86}\) as a Chinese asset. Some participants were concerned that a dispute over culture might be just a start, and would lead to more conflicts, such as reigniting historical and territorial disputes. Fifteen participants responded that the worst scenario from their point of view would be an attempt by the Chinese government to list the history of the ancient Korean kingdoms in the category of Chinese history, because it might cause territorial disputes, as some ancient Korean kingdoms (e.g. Balhae\(^{87}\)) expanded their territory to Manchuria.

Understanding the cultural conflict as a matter related to national sovereignty, some participants felt the South Korean government should take the lead in registering ‘Arirang’ with UNESCO, given the probability that the Chinese government would not stop at domestic acknowledgement but would go as far as seeking international acknowledgement. This understanding came from their belief that ‘Arirang’ was a distinctly Korean symbol. Considering South Korea to be the suzerain state of Korean culture, these participants felt the South Korean government should pay more attention to the protection of Korean culture, including the culture of overseas Koreans. They felt the South Korean government’s adoption of multiculturalism was unwise, particularly considering China’s plan to make Korean Chinese culture a part of Chinese culture. In contrast to the expectation of these participants, the South Korean government did not make application to UNESCO until June 2012, whilst the Chinese government proposed joint-registration to South Korea in May 2012 and made it clear that China will apply individually if South Korea rejects its joint-registration proposal.\(^{88}\)

Many participants felt the possible disputes between China and Korea over culture, history, and territory can be seen as a historical product of two neighbouring countries. In contrast, some participants considered that the existence of Korean Chinese in China gives cause for Chinese to claim dominion over Korean culture and history. They responded that if there

\(^{86}\) ‘Arirang’ was selected as the 97th symbol of Korean culture by the South Korean government (Ministry of Culture, Sports and Tourism) in July 2006.

\(^{87}\) After the fall of the Goguryeo, the majority of Koreans moved south while the minority remained in the north and established Balhae. Balhae was assimilated into Manchuria over time (C.J. Lee 1986; Piao 1990).

\(^{88}\) The South Korean government succeeded in its application and registered ‘Arirang’ with UNESCO as a Korean asset in December 2012.
were no Korean Chinese in Chinese territory and if Korean Chinese did not share their culture with Koreans, the Chinese would not be able to incorporate Korean culture as theirs, and had less justification to claim the history of ancient Korean kingdoms as Chinese. Such a sense of guilt was complicated; it was caused by the awkward position of Korean Chinese between their ethnic homeland and natal homeland. However, a larger number of the participants emphasised the role of Korean Chinese that benefits both their ethnic and natal homelands. They considered Korean Chinese to be the key to resolving possible conflicts between China and two Koreas, with their bilingual and bicultural capital, and most importantly of all, their love for the three countries.

6.4 Identities of Korean Chinese Revealed from Multiple Factors

The identity constructions of Korean Chinese have been influenced by a range of factors that include different types of nationalism in respect of their natal and ethnic homelands. Chinese nationalism and Korean nationalism, which are routinely flagged in the daily life of Korean Chinese, ultimately play a central role. The sharply divided identities of Korean Chinese have been illustrated from participants’ wide-ranging responses to interview questions (e.g. how do you see South Korea’s adoption of multiculturalism). The differing practices of South Korea and China have further complicated the identities of Korean Chinese. A large number of participants felt that the recent policies of the two countries have confused Korean Chinese.

Mr. UQ Nam’s experience intimately reveals the complicated positions of Korean Chinese between the ‘undeserved’ inclusion policy of China and the ‘unexpected’ exclusion reality of South Korea. Mr. Nam, a leader of the Korean Chess Association in Yanbian, has devoted his whole life to maintaining traditional Korean chess. Mr. Nam has visited South Korea frequently to attend cultural exchange activities with the equivalent group in South Korea. He has several times organised games with players from South and North Korea and from other provinces of China. His efforts won official commendation from the Chinese government: Korean chess was approved as a Chinese intangible cultural heritage in 2008 and Mr. Nam became the third generation Artisan of Korean chess, with his late grandfather as the first generation Artisan and his late father as the second generation Artisan. He responded that he always felt grateful to the Chinese government for allowing his ethnic cultural activities, and that he felt thrilled when he heard Korean Chess was accepted as a Chinese intangible cultural heritage. “It was the full appreciation of the Chinese government of our ethnic
Mr. Nam commented. However, he recently started to have doubts, wondering if he had made an irrevocable mistake in relation to the Korean nation. Mr. Nam remarked:

I tried my best to maintain my hobby, but it has officially become Chinese culture now. I cannot help asking myself if I have sold Korean Chinese culture to the Chinese people. I am not sure what I did to my nation, and how our descendants will evaluate me.

6.4.1 Identities Revealed from Perceptions of the Position of Korean Chinese in China

An identity can be found in the embodied habits of social life that include habits of thinking and using language (Billig 1995). Twenty-two participants responded that the Chinese government always keeps a strict watch on Korean Chinese and takes Korean Chinese as seriously as it takes Tibetans, Uighurs and Mongolians. They emphasised that Korean Chinese are different from the three ethnic groups, who form the largest ethnic groups in China, whose regions include a remarkable amount of land mass (42% of the national territory), and who are often said to harbour intentions to bring about independence. They also emphasised that Korean Chinese cannot become a threat to the harmony of Chinese society, with a small population and small land and, most important of all, having never expressed dissatisfaction with the Chinese government nor desire for independence. Most participants did not make direct criticism of Korean Chinese expressing no dissatisfaction with the Chinese government. Mr. GH Jeon was the only person who used a ‘violent’ expression—a “lack of a rebellious mentality” —to describe the Korean Chinese for never

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89 This refers to the size of their autonomous regions. The size of the Tibetan Autonomous Region is 1,228,400km² (Government of Xizang Tibetan Autonomous Region 2008); the Uighur Autonomous Region is 1,660,000km² (Government of Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region 2012); and the Mongolian Autonomous Prefecture is 1,183,000km² (Government of Neimenggu Autonomous Region 2010).

90 The population of Korean Chinese is 8% of the population of the three groups. Tibetans reached 6,314,000 (Government of Xizang Tibetan Autonomous Region 2008); Uighurs reached 10,069,346 (Government of Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region 2012); Mongolians reached 5,981,840 (Government of Neimenggu Autonomous Region 2010); and Korean Chinese reached 1,830,929 (Yanbian State Government. 2012).

91 The size of the Yanbian Korean Autonomous Prefecture (42,700km²) is the 0.45% of the national territory. Unlike Tibetans, Mongolians and Uighurs who are concentrated in their Autonomous Prefecture regions, Korean Chinese are scattered in three provinces in Northeast China, with 42% (0.8 million) concentrated in Yanbian, which is located in the east of Jilin province (Yanbian State Government. 2012).
daring to challenge the Chinese government and knowing only how to blame the South Korean government, which they took for an easy mark. Mr. Jeon was a middle-aged businessman in Beijing. He compared the differences between Korean Chinese and the three giant ethnic groups with a sarcastic tone:

We don’t have a refugee government overseas like Tibetans in the Southeast. We don’t have a religion to unite us, but Uighurs in the Northwest do. We have never had armed clashes with the Chinese government to hold fast to our views, let alone a peaceful independence movement, but Uighurs have. We have a small population and land, but Mongolians in the North have a large population and a lot of land. Korean Chinese are a model ethnic group. We have never shown our dissatisfaction. Therefore, it is unfair to be treated in the same way as they are.

Some participants felt that the dual identities of Korean Chinese and the existence of ethnic homelands adjacent to the border made the Chinese government pay close attention to them. They felt that the Chinese government values internal solidarity and territorial integrity more than anything else, and that it enacted policies of engagement and conciliation towards Korean Chinese to strengthen control over them. Ms. MD Nam, a 36-year-old journalist, felt the practices of the Chinese government are intended to implant a strong Chinese mindset among Korean Chinese to avoid a possible split of territory. She commented:

From the perspective of the Chinese, we are still not politically stable and trustworthy, especially in situations related to South Korea and North Korea. The Chinese might worry about our unexpected behaviours when our ethnic homeland becomes united or more powerful or richer. China’s recent strengthening of control over us can be seen from such a context.

A minority of the participants revealed their anxiety about the future and security of Korean Chinese in Yanbian. They were concerned that the amalgamation of the three cities in Yanbian (Yanji, Longjing and Tumen) would cause the Yanbian Korean Chinese Autonomic Prefecture to have only a nominal existence, or worse, cause its disappearance. A few of them
even suspected that the Yanbian area could become a battlefield in the case of a war in the Korean peninsula; that the full facts of the damage of the North Korean nuclear tests to the Yanbian area were still not known; and that information about the possible volcanic eruption of Mount Changbai was withheld in order to avoid disturbances by people in the area.

6.4.2 Identities Revealed from Attitudes towards the Chinese and South Korean Policies

The identities of the participants were indicated from their attitudes towards China’s ambitious “Northeast Border History and Current State of Affairs Research Project” (hereafter Northeast Project). Z. Lee (2010) argues that China aims to build a Sino-centric nation, and the Northeast Project is intended to strengthen internal solidarity in the face of serious challenges caused by the border ethnic minority groups. Twenty participants felt that the Project aimed to prepare historical and geopolitical explanations for China to use in possible territorial disputes between China and Korea. A few of them regarded the Project as a trick to camouflage the Chinese government’s political intention to target a future united Korea. Such an understanding among participants came from the research outcome of the project, which redefines Goguryeo (37 B.C.-A.D. 668) as a local Chinese regime established by Chinese border ethnic minorities (Terms Dictionary 2005). Some of them felt that the purpose of the Chinese government’s such practice was to enable direct intervention in North Korea if the North Korean government collapsed, or to prevent the entire Korean peninsula falling into the hands of South Korea.

Regarding this particular issue of the history of Goguryeo, North Korea might be in a better position to protest than South Korea because the North Korean territory belonged to Goguryeo, which straddled the northern Korean peninsula and a section of Manchuria, and thus any possible border disputes are between China and North Korea. Nevertheless, no participants ever asked the North Korean government to protest to China because they felt the North Korean government would never challenge the Chinese government. Instead, they

92 This project is a national project, carried forward jointly by the Chinese Academy of Social Science and the three northeastern provinces. This project includes research on the Ancient Chinese border theory, research on the history of the ancient Korean kingdoms, research on the China-Korea relationship history, and research on the status change in the Korean peninsula and its subsequent influence on the stability of the northeast border (Terms Dictionary 2005).
asked South Korea to pay more attention to North Korea’s heavy reliance on China and China’s exclusive power to North Korea. Most participants tended to rely heavily on the South Korean government regarding the issues of the Korean peninsula, considering South Korea as the big brother who is principally responsible for the Korean nation. They saw the divided Koreas as one nation instead of as hostile countries technically at war, and such understandings indicated their ethnic consciousness, which longs for a unified Korean nation.

Mr. ZY Hong was one of the handful of participants who were concerned about China’s increasing influence resulting from North Korea’s reliance on China. At the core of such concern is China’s opening of North Korean ports (e.g. Rajin, which has been of geopolitical importance) to link its overland routes with North Korea to create economic zones. Mr. Hong was a retired engineer who worked as a security guard in Seoul. He felt that the South Korean government should help North Korean government because otherwise it would continue to sell its resources to China in order to maintain its regime.

An awkward position of Korean Chinese in China as an ethnic minority was indicated from participants’ restraining themselves from making criticisms of the Chinese government, despite their concerns over its negative influences on the two Koreas. Twenty-four participants were worried about China’s hindrance of Korean unification. Most of them appeared to wish to be more critical but held back due to fears of causing trouble. I assured them their identity would be kept strictly anonymous and thus they should be free to speak without fear of any repercussions. Unfortunately, my assurance did not help much. Participants felt that even if their individual identity was protected the Korean Chinese community in China would be harmed by their criticism of the Chinese government. However, they had confidence in me that I would not harm the interests of the Korean Chinese community, being Korean Chinese myself. It was not critical, but my writing this thesis in English and in New Zealand eased their concern, as they thought few people in China would read my thesis.

In contrast, many participants had different understandings concerning how much the Northeast Project can be seen as a threat to the two Koreas. They perceived the Project exactly as they were educated to do by the Chinese government: a non-political but academic activity aiming to solve the problems of underdevelopment of northeast China. They considered this project to give hope of development to be brought to the area where they live.
Such an expectation is not absurd. The Chinese government has been making concerted efforts to build highways and railroads to expand the region’s industrial capacity and economic performance since 2007 (Kim 2010). There is promise of the region’s transformation into a key industrial base. Some participants felt such development is a good opportunity for North Korea to stimulate its industry, considering the long land border between China and North Korea.

Regarding the economic development of northeast China, a minority of the participants had totally different attitudes from the participants who felt grateful to the Chinese government. They felt the area should have been developed earlier due to its rich natural resources, but remained untouched for so many years because of the wariness of the Chinese government concerning Korean Chinese. They argued that the recent development is caused by the Chinese government’s calculation that it is not safe to leave areas of ethnic minorities in too backward a state, particularly when they have a prosperous ethnic homeland that is accessible.

A large number of participants felt that China internally claims people in its territory as Chinese despite their non-Chinese heritage, and externally expands its influence over people with Chinese heritage. They felt the Chinese government has succeeded in achieving its political ideals, because it made the majority of its ethnic minority groups believe that they are well treated in China even when they are forced to assimilate into Chinese culture. Thirty-three participants pointed out that the South Korean government, on the other hand, is often criticised by people who it aims to help, because of its working style of leaving everything as a “take it or leave it” situation. They suggested that the South Korean government should copy the successful tactics of the Chinese government, which is practical, willing to negotiate, in order to find a way to construct a strong national identity and to reinforce the state’s capacity to govern in its transition from ethnic nationalism to multiculturalism. Ms. AU Lu, a 35-five-year old nurse in Seoul, felt that South Korea could kill two birds with one stone by following the example set by China: strengthen the Korean identity of migrants and increase their loyalty to South Korea, and embrace ethnic Koreans and enlarge South Korea’s national boundary. Ms. Lu commented:

If it were China experiencing transition from ethnic nationalism to multiculturalism, which seem to be in conflict with each other, China would find a style of multiculturalism that goes harmoniously with
nationalism. So far, China has made its ethnic groups part of the Chinese nation that is said to descend from one ancestor. It also has never stopped attracting and influencing overseas Chinese to expand its national boundary. There is no reason that South Koreans cannot do the same great job. Accepting multiculturalism is challenging for South Korea, a country with a long history of obsession with homogeneity. The South Korean government should be practical. Change the name multiculturalism if it causes too much public reluctance. What is most important is making the country strong.

Some participants suggest that their experience of maintaining Korean culture and a Korean identity despite generations of living in China could reassure South Koreans who worry that multiculturalism will cause them to lose their traditions and identity. Pointing out the small population of Korean Chinese and the assimilation policy of China towards ethnic minority groups, these participants believed that South Koreans, with their dominant status, would not lose their culture to migrants who are a minority. Their enthusiasm for contributing to their ethnic homeland is admirable. Nonetheless, closer attention must be paid to their multicultural experiences in China. It is true that with the advance of urbanisation in China huge numbers of people have migrated from villages to towns and from towns to cities. However, most of the ethnic minority population remain in their community, which overwhelmingly consists of themselves and Han Chinese and so is far from being multicultural in the sense of several cultures living together. As indicated by my participants, Korean Chinese could not have experiences of actively mingling with other ethnic groups in these circumstances. Few of the participants who claimed that China is a multicultural country have mingled with other ethnic groups, despite their high level of social communication in China. Thus, their understanding of other ethnic groups is superficial. No participants could give the names of even half of the 56 ethnic groups. Only one participant, Mr. TU Kim, was relatively well-informed about other ethnic groups, due to his school experience at the Ethnicity University in China, which advocates cultivating talented people from ethnic minorities. For the majority of the participants, their multicultural experience with different ethnic groups is actually a bi-cultural experience with Han Chinese.

6.4.3 Participants’ Self-Identification
Previously I discussed the identities of participants demonstrated by their responses to interview questions. When asked directly about their identities, their answers were often different from the identities revealed from their remarks to the interview questions. Some participants who showed resentment of the Chinese government’s listing Korean Chinese culture into the Chinese culture identified themselves as Chinese; some participants who showed interest in Korean unification and who desired a powerful Korean nation identified themselves as Chinese; and some participants who viewed South Koreans as selfish and cold identified themselves as Korean. The gap between their self-identification and the identities revealed from their remarks demonstrates the complicated situation of Korean Chinese. For instance, some participants who were asked why they identified themselves as Chinese despite showing Korean identity during the interviews answered that that was because they could never be regarded as Koreans by South Koreans even with South Korean citizenship.

The term ‘Chosŏnjok’ was frequently used when participants identified themselves. ‘Chosŏnjok’ is the Korean pronunciation of ‘Chaoxianzu’, the official Chinese term for people who are descendants of Koreans who migrated to Manchuria between the 1860s and the 1940s and became Chinese citizens with the establishment of the People’s Republic of China. Remarkably, participants used the term ‘Chosŏnjok’ differently: some used it to mean both Korean and Chinese; and some as neither Korean nor Chinese. For the six participants with South Korean citizenship, their ‘Chosŏnjok’ (and Chinese) identity was used as a defensive mechanism against many South Koreans’ refusal to accept naturalised Korean Chinese as South Koreans.

Some participants identified themselves as ‘Chosŏnjok’ simply to distinguish themselves from ‘others’. In China, they felt Korean Chinese were different from Han Chinese and from other ethnic minorities. In South Korea, they wanted to distinguish themselves from other migrant groups and co-ethnic groups. In other migrant countries, the opponents they bear in mind were Chinese migrants and other groups from the Korean diasporas. Such self-identification of participants indicates the significance of the interactions and continuing negotiations of boundaries between ethnic groups in the identity constructs of Korean Chinese, an argument suggested by Barth ([1969]1998). A few participants who obtained citizenship of the country they have migrated to identified themselves as ‘Chosŏnjok’, in the belief that this was the best term to describe their origin and characteristics. Clearly, they used the term ‘Chosŏnjok’ in a more symbolic way than others.
Despite the frequent use of the term ‘Chosŏnjok’ to describe their identity, most participants were aware of the negative nuance of the term in South Korea. The strengthening of the unique ‘Chosŏnjok’ identity among young generations, particularly people outside of their hometown, is especially noteworthy. This is significant in the consideration of the general understanding that younger generations in metropolitan areas show more assimilation to the mainstream culture than do older generations in rural Korean Chinese villages. The strong ‘Chosŏnjok’ identity of the young generation of Korean Chinese was visible from the comments they left on Korean Chinese websites. For instance, every August and September, hundreds of thousands of Korean Chinese left congratulatory messages online (e.g. Yanbian government website) to celebrate the anniversary of the Yanbian Korean Autonomous Prefecture, which was established on 3 September 1952. Most comments contain the meanings that Korean Chinese should unite, which is open to misinterpretation. This phenomenon indicated the significance of the media of social communication (e.g. Internet, TV and press) for Korean Chinese in solidifying feelings of allegiance and unity to their ethnic community, regardless of their current residence location. The role of the Internet is particularly important. This was because the Internet enables the interaction of people to transcend geographical boundaries. With an increase in the number of Internet users, cyber communities have been formed among Korean Chinese, and these cyber communities play a certain role in connecting Korean Chinese to their hometown. Moyiza.com, for instance, is run by Korean Chinese and has vast numbers of Korean Chinese visitors. As its name ‘Moyiza’ (a Korean word meaning ‘to get together’) indicates, this website facilitates the centripetal motion of Korean Chinese to their hometown in China.

Despite many participants’ reluctance to identify themselves as Koreans when facing negative experiences in South Korea, their Korean identity was indicated satisfactorily from their understandings of sharing a common ancestry with both South and North Koreans. None of the participants of this research felt himself/herself to be a descendant of the Yellow Emperor, the legendary genitor of the Chinese nation. Instead, they all felt they are

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93 It was Autonomous Region (自治区) in 1952, but was downgraded to Autonomous Prefecture (自治州) in 1955, with the inclusion of Dunhua, which has two percent of Korean Chinese.
descendants of Tangun, a legendary figure who came from heaven to create the Korean nation. As Smith (1986) suggests, national myths of origin are more invented narratives than they are real stories. However, the influence of the Tangun myth on Korean Chinese was significant, as seen from the primordial loyalty of many participants to the Korean nation. It acts like the cultural core of Korean Chinese. Additionally, belief in the arrival of Tangun at Mount Changbai in 2333 B.C. (Shin, Freda, and Yi 1999; Schmid 2002) made a few participants believe that the Chinese government might worry about possible territorial disputes over Mount Changbai and the surrounding area.

The three participants with South Korean citizenship identified themselves as South Koreans. Their ‘South Korean’ identity is surely at some level about their newly obtained South Korean citizenship. In many other cases, however, their identities are not based on their citizenship, for instance, six participants with South Korean citizenship identified themselves specifically as Chinese, and some participants identified themselves as South Koreans in spite of their Chinese citizenship. It is not as simple as it used to be when the Chinese identity of Korean Chinese was based on modernist ideas of nationality and ethnicity while their Korean identity was based on primordial ideas. With the increasing number of Korean Chinese with South Korean citizenship or citizenship of the countries they have migrated to, the issue of Korean Chinese identities has become more complex. It is hard to know whether participants’ identities are based on their citizenship (both previous and newly obtained), or on their ethnicity, or both or neither. The migrations of Korean Chinese beyond the borders of China have expanded their notions of citizenship so their sense of personal and national identity has become diversified and flexible. It seems that the changes in the identities of Korean Chinese in the two decades after the year 2000 are more complicated than those in the previous period from the 1860s to 2000.

**Conclusion**

This chapter discussed the influences of South Korea’s cultural exclusion of Korean Chinese in terms of their cultural consciousness and ethno-national identities, in the joint context of South Korean multiculturalism and Chinese engagement policy. The identities of Korean Chinese have been influenced in multiple ways by the contradicting ideologies of Korean and Chinese nationalism and multiculturalism, and the different practices of the two countries with regards to Korean Chinese. South Korea’s constant discrimination of Korean Chinese motivated Korean Chinese to turn against their ethnic homeland; whilst the Chinese
government’s cultural inclusion has caused confusion and concern among Korean Chinese. Multiple research angles demonstrated that a sense of a shared Korean ethnicity remains a major focus of identification for Korean Chinese, with apparent confusion caused by their awkward situation between the pulling and pushing forces of their ethnic homeland and natal homeland. This phenomenon demonstrates the importance of issues related to overseas Koreans for South Korea even after it has officially become a multicultural society.
CHAPTER 7: DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION OF RESEARCH FINDINGS AND SIGNIFICANCE

Introduction
This final chapter comprises two parts: a summary of major topics and empirical findings; and a brief discussion of the significance of the research. In this thesis on national membership and identity, I examine Korean Chinese perceptions of South Korea’s commitment to multiculturalism and the consequent social and ideological changes that they experienced. South Korea’s ethno-national concept of citizenship is analysed in this new multicultural context and I delineate the influence of these changing ideas of citizenship on migration and the ethno-national and cultural consciousness of Korean Chinese. First, I will revisit the major topic and findings of this thesis. Then the significance of this research is assessed in terms of its academic contribution, methodological advances, and social and political implications.

7.1 Determinants of the Responses of Participants towards South Korea’s Multiculturalism
This study is first devoted to the investigation of the attitudes and perceptions of Korean Chinese towards South Korea’s social transition (from a homogeneous society to a multicultural society) and its ideological transition (from ethnic nationalism to multiculturalism). Most participants’ commitment to ethnic nationalism determines their responses to South Korea’s shift to multiculturalism. In general, participants showed more unfavourable attitudes than favourable attitudes towards South Korea’s multicultural transition, with a substantial proportion of ambivalent attitudes. Regardless of the sharply divided responses, the majority of the participants recognised the significance of this transition in South Korea.

Unfavourable attitudes are caused by the participants’ beliefs in the homogeneity of the Korean nation and their commitment to ethnic nationalism. These participants understood multiculturalism as being in opposition to ethnic nationalism, and worried it might destroy ethnic nationalism and hinder Korean unification. Other perceived negative influences of multiculturalism included that it might cause social division and threaten social security and the domestic labour market. Not only the concept of multiculturalism, but also its practice in South Korea was seen as problematic.
In contrast, a minority of the participants perceived South Korea’s multiculturalism positively, in the belief that it would strengthen the national economy and social harmony. They understood that multiculturalism would fill the on-going labour shortage in South Korean society by bringing in a large population of cheap foreign labourers; and facilitate a harmonious society through reducing stereotypes against foreigners and encouraging locals to accept migrants. Multiculturalism was also regarded as a good opportunity to enrich Korean culture by encouraging South Koreans to accept the diverse cultures of migrants.

A considerable number of participants have ambivalent attitudes towards South Korea’s social transition. They were unsure about whether Korean Chinese have been included in South Korea’s multiculturalism policy; and whether they should be included. Being included or not is important to these participants, as they consider it signifies South Korea’s stance towards Korean Chinese, seeing them as foreigners and disregarding their shared descent with South Koreans, or seeing them as co-ethnics and emphasising their shared descent. The first source of confusion stemmed from participants’ perception of South Korea’s stance towards Korean Chinese as fluctuating with discriminatory policies, which put Korean Chinese awkwardly between foreigners and compatriots, without a clear definition of their position in this multicultural context. The second source of confusion stemmed from participants’ multiple identities and their understanding of multiculturalism as relevant for foreigners. Most participants with Chinese identity felt Korean Chinese should be included as beneficiaries of multiculturalism; whilst those with Korean identity felt Korean Chinese should not be included.

Demographic characteristics and socio-economic background influence participants’ attitudes towards multiculturalism. In general, participants who were younger, female, more educated and with higher socio-economic status have more favourable attitudes towards South Korean multiculturalism than did older, male, less educated participants with lower socio-economic status. The difference in attitudes between the old and young participants was mainly a result of their different identities: the older participants tended to have a stronger Korean identity and a stronger commitment to Korean nationalism than the young participants. Participants with more education were less likely to agree with giving or receiving preference for any reason, in comparison with those with less education. In contrast, the difference in attitudes between female and male participants was not great.
The difference in attitudes caused by employment conditions was noticeable. The difference was particularly significant for participants working in South Korea. Participants with non-professional jobs had low wages and suffered more discrimination, were more ready to resent South Korean government policies towards Korean Chinese, and to rate multiculturalism as a threat to Korean Chinese, in comparison with their counterparts who had well-paid professional jobs and benefitted from the privileged Overseas Koreans status. This finding goes against the findings of Esses et al. (2001) that lower social dominance orientation (of women) often resulted in their more favourable attitudes towards multiculturalism. This gap was the result of Korean Chinese migrants’ high anticipation that Korean Chinese would be given a warm reception, as befitted their co-ethnic status, in South Korea.

Participants’ responses also varied depending on their different experiences of upbringing and education in China, varying degrees of satisfaction with China’s policies towards ethnic minority groups, and different understandings of China’s multicultural status. In general, participants who were satisfied with China’s policy towards ethnic minority groups, and who regarded China as a multicultural society and considered the prosperity of China came from multiculturalism, were more likely to support South Korea’s multicultural transition than were others.

Migration experiences of participants have been highly influential on their attitudes towards South Korean multiculturalism. By migration experiences, participants of this research could be classified into people involved in transnational migration; people involved in ethnic return migration; people involved in domestic migration; and people remaining in their original place in China. A small number of participants who have migrated to western countries that promote multiculturalism were most likely to see the positive aspects of multiculturalism and thus accepted the changes in South Korean society with the least difficulty.

In contrast, participants in Yanbian felt the changes most negatively. They resented South Korea’s adoption/version of multiculturalism for harming the interests of Korean Chinese by reducing privileges for co-ethnics; and by increasing competition for Korean Chinese in the South Korean labour market through importing a large number of cheap labourers from Southeast Asian countries. Participants in non-Yanbian areas of Northeast China, on the other hand, did not show a clear regional characteristic. However, they at least did not regard
multiculturalism as reducing the migration opportunities of Korean Chinese nor as stealing
the attention of the South Korean government from Korean Chinese, as participants in
Yanbian did. This was a result of their generally better access to South Korea due to their
family ties with South Koreans.

Participants who had migrated to metropolitan cities in China were more likely to accept
South Korea’s multicultural transition than those in the three north-eastern provinces. This
was because they, being migrants themselves, understood the difficulties of migrants and the
need to help them. They felt South Korea’s change as less closely connected to them, due to
their having little intention to migrate to South Korea, as they considered they have better
chances to succeed in China, which they proudly felt is a country with world class economic
potential. Easier access to South Korea in comparison with participants in Yanbian also
allowed participants in metropolitan cities to have relaxed attitudes towards South Korea’s
multicultural shift. Their easier access to South Korea was not due to the regional
discrimination of the South Korean government, but due to their young age and high
educational level. Most participants in metropolitan cities settled down in those cities after
their graduation from universities, and participated in professional or white-collar jobs. Thus,
they could obtain the privileged F-4 visas without much difficulty. Most of them, however,
did not apply for the visa, feeling no need to do so. They had a better chance of obtaining H-2
visa, too, in comparison with many other participants in Yanbian, due to their young age and
the small number of Korean Chinese applicants in those regions.

Participants who were migrants in South Korea, feeling the changes in South Korean society
at first-hand, took the greatest interest in the changes and provided the most diverse opinions.
Citizenship was a significant factor influencing their perspectives. Participants with South
Korean citizenship felt that they become members of the Korean nation both in name and
reality, and have right to voice their opinion as citizens of the state. Their demand for the
abolition of multiculturalism is stronger than that of participants with Chinese citizenship.
They felt threatened by multiculturalism more than did their counterparts, perceiving that
multiculturalism harms the interest of underprivileged South Koreans, which apparently
include themselves. Most of these participants were born before 1 October 1949, and
obtained South Korean citizenship through the ‘citizenship reinstatement’ policy of South
Korea.
The visa types held by participants who were migrants in South Korea also highly influenced their responses towards South Korea’s social changes. This was because different visa types ascribed different legal status and rights to the holders, which often led to different migration experiences. For instance, the H-2 visa restricts its holders to finding jobs in non-professional sectors, which more easily leads to discrimination by locals. The tougher their life in South Korea was, the more readily participants resented multiculturalism, which, they believed, would steal the benefits that should be allocated to co-ethnic migrants. In contrast, participants with professional work visas were relatively satisfied with their life in South Korea, and had less complaint than their counterparts.

The most decisive factor in the participants’ responses were the different levels of their beliefs in ethnic nationalism and their commitment to maintain what they characterised as the homogeneity of the Korean nation. Participants with beliefs in ethnic homogeneity and ethnic nationalism considered multiculturalism to be a betrayal of the Korean nation, perceiving it to weaken Korean national identity, damage the alleged homogeneity of the Korean nation, and, in their own words, ‘kill the pure Korean nation’. In contrast, participants who regarded ethnic nationalism as discriminatory were more likely to accept multiculturalism, expecting it would bring a foreigner-friendly atmosphere and consequently reduce South Koreans’ discrimination against Korean Chinese. This implied that they identified themselves as foreigners to South Koreans. Most of these participants had Chinese identities, and focused on their ‘migrant’ identity in South Korea rather than ‘compatriot’ identity.

Lastly, different understandings of the term ‘multiculturalism’ also influenced participants’ responses towards South Korea’s adoption of multiculturalism. Perceiving multiculturalism as the opposite of ethnic nationalism led to the most unfriendly responses. In contrast, participants who perceived multiculturalism as cultural diversity or social integration were most convinced of the necessity of promoting multiculturalism. Meanwhile, participants who understood multiculturalism either as an immigration policy to fill the labour shortage or as welfare policy for migrants readily welcomed this change.

**7.2 South Korea’s Practice of Ethno-national Membership**

I studied South Korea’s practice of ethno-national membership and citizenship, particularly in the recent multicultural era. I found that multiculturalism has benefitted migrants and disrupted ethnicity-based nationhood to a certain degree, by granting citizenship to people
with non-Korean heritage. However, my findings based on the responses of the participants suggest that the ethnicity-based concept of membership still thrives in South Korea, despite the significant effort that the South Korean government has put into promoting multiculturalism. A contradiction to this ethnicity-based concept of nationhood was that it was not wide enough to easily embrace co-ethnics from poor countries.

7.2.1 Ethnicity-based Concept of National Definition in South Korea

The ethnicity-based concept of nationhood derived from South Koreans’ belief in the Korean nation being homogeneous and national identity being based on an intransigent compound of ethnicity (K. Kim 2006; Lim 2009). This concept of nationhood has been tightly connected to South Korean society, and has been influential in the fate of the nation during national crises. For instance, it has functioned as an effective instrument in bringing the nation together in the face of external threats. Even in the twenty-first century, such a concept of national membership thrives in South Korea. As Lim (2009) puts it, most South Koreans continue to believe that the Korean nation is homogeneous, and this belief in homogeneity often made South Koreans hostile towards minorities in its territory.

Demographic change in the last decade has heralded an enormous social change in South Korea, including a rapidly increased number of migrants and consequently an increased necessity to protect their rights. The majority of South Koreans’ attitudes towards migrants remained unchanged, and discrimination against migrants was pervasive in South Korean society, as illustrated by a large number of the participants of this study. In the face of the visible reluctance of many South Koreans to embrace minority groups, the South Korean government chose to adopt multiculturalism. Now that the wheels of change have been set in motion, multiculturalism has become an irresistible trend in South Korea. Major changes in policies soon followed, and ethnic nationalism has been challenged and the ethnicity-based concept of nationhood seems to have been undermined.

Nevertheless, the restriction in the boundary of the Korean nation was unchanged as was the ethnicity-based concept of nationhood, as was revealed from South Korea’s request of proof of the blood ties for the Korean diaspora to gain South Korean citizenship; the preferential treatment for overseas Koreans in terms of migration and settlement; and continuous rejection of naturalised citizens as fellow citizens and the hierarchical national order between Koreans by birth and Koreans by naturalisation. Blood ties are a fundamental condition for Koreans in
the diaspora to be recognised as overseas Koreans, and genealogical records or DNA test results are required to prove an applicant’s claim of Korean origin and national membership.

I also found from the cases of participants who were unskilled migrant workers that the ethnicity-based concept of citizenship in South Korea did not go far enough for South Koreans to willingly embrace non-professional Koreans from developing countries. The influence of the Chinese government should be considered when discussing South Korea’s different approaches to Korean Chinese and other co-ethnic groups. The Chinese government is against South Korea wielding a strong influence over Korean Chinese, not to mention South Korea’s granting South Korean citizenship to Korean Chinese. Opposition from China and the subsequent diplomatic pressure greatly influenced South Korea to adopt conservative principles in its treatment of Korean Chinese, that is, to see them as Chinese nationals. However, the South Korean government’s stance towards Korean Chinese was fundamentally decided by the ambiguous boundary among South Koreans between ethnicity and nationality.

7.2.2 Ambiguous Boundary between Ethnicity and Nationality
Many participants felt that the South Korean government has adopted inconsistent policies towards Korean Chinese, and perceived this phenomenon as being due to the fluctuating understandings of the South Korean government of Korean Chinese in terms of their being Korean or Chinese. They felt that the fluctuating understandings of the South Korean government led to double discrimination against Korean Chinese: Korean Chinese could not benefit from the multiculturalism policy as much as other migrant groups could; and Korean Chinese could not benefit from the Overseas Koreans Act as much as could other co-ethnic groups. I approached participants’ response of ‘fluctuating’ understandings of the South Korean government towards Korean Chinese from the point of view of the ambiguous boundary of South Koreans between ethnicity (minjok: Korean ethnic group) and nationality (kungmin: South Korean nationals). This ambiguity was prevalent in South Korea, as a result of the tradition of ethnic nationalism and the *jus sanguinis* principle of nationality.

The South Korean government acknowledges the shared ethnicity of Korean Chinese with South Koreans, but its fundamental principle towards Korean Chinese is that Korean Chinese are Chinese nationals. It has put Korean Chinese into the category of ‘co-ethnics’ in the annual report of the Korea Immigration Service since 1999, but began to grant the Overseas Koreans visas much later and only to a minority of Korean Chinese who met the strict
requirements. I argue that the South Korean government’s stance towards Korean Chinese is not as clear as it should be, and the ambiguity was indicated plainly from the inarticulate position of Korean Chinese in the South Korean multicultural context. South Korea’s multiculturalism policy does not officially exclude Korean Chinese, but neither does it specify that Korean Chinese are included. A quarter of the participants felt that Korean Chinese have been omitted from multiculturalism.

7.2.3 Discriminative and Hierarchical Nationhood

I found that hierarchical order exist in South Korean society between migrants (including co-ethnics), based on their country of origin, occupations and the capital they brought to South Korea. In general, professional and wealthy migrants from developed countries were positioned higher than non-professional and poor migrants from developing countries, and were granted preference in immigration and naturalisation. Many people felt that Korean Chinese were put low whilst ethnic Koreans from the West were positioned much higher than them and could claim almost the same benefits as South Koreans. In fact, even privileged ethnic Korean diaspora groups have difficulty in being accepted in South Korean society, as many previous studies have shown (JY Lee 2012), due to South Koreans’ discrimination against ‘others’. Selective or marginalisation policy in migration and naturalisation is not unique to South Korea. All countries are selective in who they accept as legal migrants with rights, regardless of having or having not a tradition of ethnic nationalism as South Koreans do. Thus it is not reasonable to attribute the whole motivation for South Korea’s discriminatory immigration policy to ethnic nationalism.

Hierarchical orders even existed within a migrant group. In the case of Korean Chinese in South Korea, the hierarchical orders were formed by the individual’s educational level and profession, which was closely linked to different visa types. Due to the strict eligibility criteria, only a limited number of Korean Chinese could get the privileged F-4 visas, the first-class ethnic citizenship; whilst most Korean Chinese had the less desirable H-2 visas. The hierarchy between participants with an F-4 visa and participants with an H-2 visa was considerable, because the first group could enjoy benefits almost as much as the co-ethnic groups from the West, whilst the latter group had an underprivileged status that was almost the same as that of migrant groups without Korean heritage. The two types of visa, which symbolise different status from the beginning, caused a further class differentiation among holders due to the restrictions on the economic activities of the holders. The internal gap was
widened, and the resentment of people positioned at the bottom of society was strong, as indicated from my research.

7.2.4 Multicultural Citizenship

Another important topic was the relationship between multiculturalism and citizenship. I found that the immigration path of obtaining citizenship and integrating into mainstream society was not followed by all migrants. Kymlicka (2002) and H. Kim (2012) argue that multiculturalism without offers of citizenship is functionless and causes further exclusion of migrants. The South Korean government offered citizenship to migrants, though hesitantly to a small number of people who meet strict requirements. Granting migrants South Korean citizenship has the potential to benefit migrants, but it also benefits South Koreans, because citizenship, as Gross (1999) argues, unites people of different backgrounds within a society, and so facilitates the building of a harmonious society. Scholars also argue that migrants want to gain citizenship in the host country, because citizenship is an ideal state that allies with freedom and a bundle of rights (Leary 2000) in the host society; a bond to link migrants to the host society with a strong identity as legal members of the state (Gross 1999); and an elite status and a democratising force (Heater 2004) that enables migrants to influence the host society and claim legal rights (Taylor et al. 1994).

In contrast, the majority of the participants in my research did not want South Korean citizenship, but preferred to keep Chinese citizenship. This was not because they wanted to avoid the responsibilities and burden of the extra belonging while only seeking the benefits. Many people wanted to keep Chinese citizenship, because they saw more opportunities in China in the future; some people wanted to keep Chinese citizenship, because their goal is to work in South Korea for a temporary period. The uncertainty of obtaining public recognition and of national inclusion in South Korea even after obtaining South Korean citizenship is one factor discouraging many people to obtain South Korean citizenship. Those participants with South Korean citizenship felt little change in the attitudes of South Koreans towards them after their naturalisation, and such experience made them perceive that South Korean citizenship made them South Korean citizens only in the eyes of the law but not in the eyes of the locals. This highlighted different dimensions of citizenship, and revealed that South Korean citizenship offered only the legal status of membership to the naturalised citizens, and it did not encompass social, emotional and identity aspects of membership. This also indicated that offers of citizenship can be a precondition to obtaining public recognition and
social inclusion, but does not guarantee those benefits. This finding agrees with the argument of H. Kim (2012) that different dimensions of citizenship are neither concurrent nor sequential in South Korea.

The reason naturalised South Korean citizens could not achieve national inclusion is the long-standing discriminatory nature of nationhood in South Korea. Nationalism often results in a narrow sense of community as it pushes for solidarity among the members of a given nation (Blackwell et al. 2003). The presence of outsiders often results in hostility in a society with a strong tradition of nationalism. The negative representation of migrants was pervasive in South Korea and it hinders the process of South Koreans accepting new citizens as members of the nation-state. Negative representation of migrants, which was surely part of the process of discrimination, derived from South Koreans’ prejudice against ‘others’, as revealed in this study. Prejudice refers to an unfavourable evaluation of people before becoming aware of the relevant facts (Dovidio and Gaertner 2010). South Koreans’ prejudice against Korean Chinese comes from various factors, which include Korean Chinese possessing Chinese nationality and the Sinicised culture. Even their Korean dialect and accent triggered discrimination, by revealing the speaker was Korean Chinese, about whom South Koreans already have prejudice. A large number of participants felt that even the title of Korean Chinese – ‘Chosŏnjok’ – has a negative nuance among South Koreans. They responded that it was a burden to live in South Korea as Korean Chinese, and thus they tried to hide their being Korean Chinese. The causes of prejudice and the urgent need to root out prejudice will be discussed in Section 7.4.

7.3 Ethno-national Consciousness of Korean Chinese

This research studied the identities of Korean Chinese in the South Korean multicultural context and also in the recent Chinese context where China lays claim to the traditional culture of Korean Chinese. Identities of Korean Chinese have been influenced by multiple factors that include their Korean ethnicity and Chinese nationality, as well as types of nationalism in their natal and ethnic homelands. My findings suggest that the identities of Korean Chinese, which have been complicated between the pulling and pushing forces of South Korea and China, became further diversified recently in the face of changes in the two countries, particularly in terms of their policies towards Korean Chinese. South Korea’s practice of nationhood has influenced the identities of Korean Chinese. Many participants
perceived that South Korea denies membership of Korean Chinese. Such perception, which in many cases is different from the goals of South Korean policies, discouraged Korean Chinese from feeling close to South Koreans.

7.3.1 Belief in Ethnic Nationalism and Principle of *jus sanguinis* of Korean Nationality

Most participants felt that ethnic homogeneity was crucial for the Korean nation, believing Korean nationality was exclusively based on Korean ethnicity. Their commitment to ethnic nationalism and the principle of *jus sanguinis* of Korean nationality was revealed from their objection to multiculturalism for its damage to ethnic nationalism; and rejection of the South Korean government’s granting citizenship to non-ethnic-Koreans. An understanding of ethnicity as non-changeableness was also detected. This understanding has a thread of connection with the argument of Muller (2008) that ethnicity remains the same. Many participants believed the ethnic characteristics they had were the same as the ethnic characteristics of other Korean groups. In the same vein, they saw both South and North Korea as their ancestral homeland, regardless of their ancestral origin. Undeniably, however, there were differences in the participants’ political preferences and emotional attachment to the two Koreas.

Ethnic nationalism often encompasses the ethnocentric supremacy of one group over others (Reagan 2005). I found that commitment to ethnic nationalism of Korean Chinese often resulted in their strong sense of a Korean supremacy over non-ethnic Korean migrants. A firm idea of possessing supremacy over non-ethnic-Korean migrants was predominant among participants who were migrants in South Korea. To put it delicately, this was more a mindset that Korean Chinese migrants should be a high priority of the South Korean government in helping migrants. I argue that the sense of Korean supremacy and a mindset of ‘co-ethnic first’ among Korean Chinese facilitated the formation of the hierarchical order in South Korean society, which Korean Chinese themselves also resented deeply when it failed to privilege them.

7.3.2 Different Understandings of ‘Nation’ in ‘Korean nation’ and ‘Chinese nation’

The terms ‘Korean nation’ and ‘Chinese nation’ were frequently mentioned, when they referred to themselves as members of either or both. Their understandings of ‘Korean nation’ and ‘Chinese nation’ are different from each other, and the differences are key to understanding their concerns or claims for membership of the two nations. In general,
primordial understanding applied to the concept ‘Korean nation’ and modernist understanding to the concept ‘Chinese nation’. Most participants tended to understand the Korean nation as a less calculating and more sentimental aspect of collective reality, whilst the Chinese nation as a more power-concentrating political organisation. They claimed membership of the Korean nation due to their Korean ethnicity, which they understood was inherited from their parents and would be inherited by their descendants. Meanwhile, they considered themselves to be members of the Chinese nation, due to their Chinese citizenship. Regardless of their Chinese identity, however, no participants felt themselves as a descendant of the Yellow Emperor. They made it clear that, although they were grateful that the Chinese government had embraced Korean Chinese as members of the Chinese nation, they could not agree to accept the Yellow Emperor as their ancestor. A belief in shared ancestry with Koreans on the Korean peninsula was decisive for Korean Chinese in regarding themselves as members of the Korean nation.

The desire of an overwhelming number of participants for Korean unification showed the understandings of Korean Chinese that Korean ethnicity held Koreans together, no matter where they are. Such understandings explained why their desire for Korean unification had no regard for the location of their ancestral origin or for their political inclination. Some participants expected to see a unification of Korean people in and outside of the Korean peninsula. Such an ideal of unification of the Korean people indicated a non-geopolitically bound concept of ethnic nationalism, which was raised by Smith (1994). A spiritual or an emotional dimension of national belonging was indicated, from the participants who expressed their desire to belong to a unified Korean nation, but admitted that they could not do much to achieve unification except to offer moral support nor would they move to the Korean peninsula to become citizens of a unified Korean state. This understanding of the Korean nation accords with the argument of Renan ([1882]1996) that a nation is a spiritual principle. In contrast, participants tended to approach their membership in the Chinese nation from realistic and political perspectives.

The understandings of Korean Chinese of the role of nation and nationalism – among many roles that include pursuing state power (Breuilly 1985), advancing national interests (Hastings 1997), and empowering national members (Greenfeld 1992) – focused on the requirement of nation and nationalism for an exclusive commitment by the members of a nation or the right of nation and nationalism to force its members to undergo sacrifice for the
sake of the nation. Many participants considered that the Korean nation and the Chinese nation could exist and prosper thanks to their member’s sacrifice for the nation, particularly in regard to facing internal and external threats. Such an understanding is in accordance with Greenfeld (1995), who argues that a nation exists as its members sacrifice their individual interests; and also accords with Renan ([1882] 1996), who argues that a nation is a culmination of a long history of past endeavours and sacrifice made by the national members, and that the sacrifice creates large-scale solidarity. However, participants’ claims of Korean Chinese sacrifice for the Korean nation could be double-edged due to the history of Korean Chinese participation in the Korean War (1950–1953) and their killing many South Koreans and being killed themselves too during the war. Many participants proudly mentioned the sacrifice that Korean Chinese made for the Korean nation through the anti-Japanese struggles in Manchuria. However, few of them mentioned the participation of Korean Chinese in the Korean War or regarded it as a ‘sacrifice’ that Korean Chinese made for the Korean nation. The ‘selective memories’ strategy or ‘politics of remembering’ is evident among the participants of this research, and in fact, in the popular history of Korean Chinese.

### 7.3.3 Multiple Identities and the Multiple Factors Influencing their Identities

The majority of the participants have fluctuating understandings of themselves, positioning themselves somewhere on a spectrum where on one end they see themselves as being Koreans and on the other end they see themselves as Chinese. Their multiple identities were highlighted from the frequent discordance between their self-identification and the identities revealed from their remarks to the interview questions. For instance, some participants who showed strong interest in Korean unification and desired a powerful Korean nation identified themselves as Chinese; and some participants who resented the ambition of the Chinese government to ‘swallow’ Korean culture identified themselves as Chinese. Such discordance should be dealt with particularly cautiously, as some discordance is caused consciously whilst other discordance is not. For example, some participants, who showed Korean identity during interviews, identified themselves as Chinese intentionally in order to express their resentment towards South Koreans who would never accept Korean Chinese as Koreans.

**‘Chosŏnjok’ Identity**

The term ‘Chosŏnjok’ was most frequently used when participants identified themselves. This is an unexpected finding, considering that many participants knew the term has a negative nuance in South Korea and answered they tried to hide their being Korean Chinese.
in South Korea. This term contains different meanings, and this was one reason it was preferred. When participants identified themselves as ‘Chosŏnjok’, they might mean both Korean and Chinese, or neither Korean nor Chinese, or a point on a scale with Korean identity and Chinese identity on either end. They felt this term helped to save them from explanation when even they themselves were not exactly sure of the subtle feelings they wanted to express. For the majority of the participants, ‘Chosŏnjok’ meant the descendants of ethnic Koreans who migrated to China and stayed in China as Chinese nationals following the establishment of the People’s Republic of China.

‘Chosŏnjok’ identity was used for many participants to distinguish them from ‘others’: from other ethnic groups in China; from other migrant groups and co-ethnic groups in South Korea; and from Chinese migrants and other Korean diasporas in the countries they migrated to. Some participants insisted on identifying themselves as Chosŏnjok after they had obtained South Korean citizenship, as a defensive mechanism against South Koreans’ unchanged rejection of naturalised citizens. A few participants who had migrated to western countries and had obtained citizenship of the countries identified themselves as ‘Chosŏnjok’ in the belief that this was the best term to describe their origin and characteristics. Clearly, they had different understandings of the term ‘Chosŏnjok’ than the most other participants, using it in a more symbolic way that was free of citizenship and residence location.

**Transnational Identity**

Although limited to a minority of the participants, an apparent transnational identity was indicated. This phenomenon was inseparable from the increasing transnational life patterns of Korean Chinese. A quarter of the Korean Chinese population has been involved in transnational migration since the 1990s, and this change brought a huge difference to the dual structure of the identities of Korean Chinese. Participants who were in western countries tended to lead a satisfying life in the host countries, having high education levels and satisfactory jobs. Most of them obtained either permanent residency or citizenship of the host country. Cano (2004) argues that transnational migrants can function on both sides of the border simultaneously through their family, remittances or political organisation. In the case of my participants, the functioning on both sides was not apparent, though they sent remittances to their family from time to time, or invited them to visit them.
In general, these participants were not bound by the territoriality of national borders, but were inclined to readjust their national identities in the host society. Their transnational identity tended to draw on their Korean ethno-national identity and Chinese national-political identity, but it also competed with these identities. Such a phenomenon was evident when they wanted permanent residency in the host countries. For instance, a participant (Ms. MM Hwang) in Australia has a strong Australian identity, which she had had even before obtaining Australian citizenship. She felt proud of becoming an Australian citizen, and identified herself as Australian with Korean Chinese heritage, in her own words, Korean Chinese Australian. This is in line with the argument of Yeoh et al. (2003) that transnational identities not only draw on the national identity of migrants but they also compete with national identity.

**Ambiguous Position of Korean Chinese between Two Koreas and China**

Participants’ deep concerns for potential conflict of interest between the two Koreas and China clearly indicated the awkward position, or ethno-national consciousness, of Korean Chinese. Most participants sought ethnic and cultural recognition in their ethnic homeland but adhered to the citizenship of their natal homeland. The competing forces of nationalism of South Korea and China caused the awkward position of Korean Chinese between their ethnic homeland and their natal homeland. With belief in ethnic nationalism, which defines the nation as being constructed by common descent and culture (Muller 2008), participants emphasised common roots with and emotional attachment to Koreans. Being influenced by Chinese nationalism, which has characteristics of civic nationalism, which defines the nation by common citizenship granted by the law of the soil, and provides political participation and legislative possibilities to minorities (Renan 1996; Nash 2001), participants felt they were Chinese citizens and owed allegiance to China. Chinese citizenship law and practice gives special rights to overseas Chinese. More and more, both South Korean and Chinese citizenship policies tend to incorporate the two different principles of the ‘blood’ and ‘soil’.

It seemed that so far the Chinese government is winning in gaining the hearts of Korean Chinese. The South Korean government has enforced policies that benefit Korean Chinese. However, these policies are not sufficient from the perspective of Korean Chinese, who resent the South Korean government’s initial exclusion of Korean Chinese from the Overseas Koreans Act in 1999, and its different policies towards Korean Chinese on the one hand and co-ethnic groups from West on the other. The belief that the South Korean government
discriminates against Korean Chinese readily sets Korean Chinese against South Korea. However, the emotional attachment that Korean Chinese have towards South Korea is complicated. Most participants had feelings of love and hatred, appreciation and resentment towards South Korea. Their immediate solidarity with the two Koreas in regard to issues like China’s amalgamating the ancient Korean regimes as a local Chinese regime indicated the ethno-national consciousness of Korean Chinese. After all, Korean Chinese have maintained what they treasure as Korean culture and identity despite generations of settlement in China.

The Chinese government, on the other hand, has granted Chinese citizenship to Korean Chinese, has embraced them as members of the Chinese nation, and has tried to implant Chinese identity in their minds. When Korean Chinese accepted the offer of citizenship from China, they implicitly accepted Chinese political identity and the associated cultural meanings of the mainstream Chinese. Of course, the identity development of Korean Chinese was much more complicated, and the acceptance of Chinese citizenship did not completely alter their identity, as seen from their maintenance of a strong Korean identity. The conscious attempts of the Chinese government to assimilate the distinctive Korean Chinese culture with the mainstream culture has facilitated the strengthening of Chinese identity in Korean Chinese. A widely consumed vernacular literature (Hastings 1997) is important for nation building in China, a country with many ethnic groups. The use of a common language has enabled Korean Chinese to communicate with other members of the Chinese nation. Linguistic and cultural ties, which Hroch (1996) postulates as being vital for nation building, were forged through time between Korean Chinese and other members of the Chinese nation; and a sense of belonging to the Chinese nation arose among Korean Chinese as time passed. In addition, the recollection of four generations’ shared history (e.g. participation in the Chinese civil war in the 1930s and 1940s) and a notion of social equality with other members of the Chinese nation are also crucial for the construction of the Chinese identity of Korean Chinese.

For most young participants, their Chinese identity came not merely from their Chinese citizenship but from many other factors. The efforts of the Chinese government have been successful, as seen from the participants’ considering China as their motherland and as the place where they could enjoy freedom and rights equal to those of any other Chinese citizens. Korean Chinese have seldom expressed dissatisfaction with the Chinese government nor a desire for independence, and are regarded as a model ethnic group (Lee 1999). In the case of
the Korean Chinese, the argument of Hutchinson and Smith (1996) that ethnic community and identity are often associated with political struggles, does not apply, at least on the surface.

**Influences of South Korea’s Multicultural Transition on Korean Chinese**

Even before the transition to multiculturalism, South Korea’s policy highly influenced Korean Chinese. Korean Chinese used to be known for their dual identity (Lee 1999; Ko 2003; Lee 2005; Song 2007; Kang 2008). However, their migration to South Korea complicated their previous dual identities (Lee 2005; Song 2007, 2009; Hong, Song, and Park 2013). Before their migration, Korean Chinese felt nostalgia towards South Korea, the prosperity of which was a source of their pride in Korean ethnicity. However, this nostalgia and pride soon dissipated upon their arrival in South Korea, where they received a frosty reception. As many participants put it, their ethnic homeland treated them as nothing but cheap foreign labourers from an inferior country, carrying out jobs shunned by locals. The negative experiences of Korean Chinese in South Korea made them reinforce their Chinese identity (Song 2007, 2009; Hong, Song, and Park 2013). Such a phenomenon is not unique to Korean Chinese, but is widespread in similar situations of ethnic return migration, for example Japanese Brazilians and Japanese Peruvians in Japan (Tsuda 2003, 2009).

In fieldwork for this study, carried out in 2010 and 2011, I found that many Korean Chinese perceived that they were treated as inferior to South Koreans and other co-ethnics from the West, and were put at the bottom of South Korean society, despite the introduction of many policies that were friendly to Korean Chinese. They also felt that the South Korean government denied the national membership of Korean Chinese. It should be noticed that the ‘national membership’ that these participants referred to was more an emotional inclusion than political or legal membership. This understanding of being shunned and discriminated against in South Korea discouraged their belief in ethnic nationalism and made them emotionally distant from South Koreans.

South Korea’s transition to multiculturalism had a remarkable influence on the identities of Korean Chinese. It brought a sharp division of opinions amongst Korean Chinese with different backgrounds in terms of understanding of their Korean ethnicity and their commitment to ethnic nationalism. The more the participants considered themselves to be Koreans, the more devastated they felt. Participants who had South Korean citizenship and
considered themselves as Korean nationals most resented South Korea’s multiculturalism. Moreover, South Korea’s granting of citizenship to non-ethnic Koreans, although confined to a limited number of people, challenged the commitment of Korean Chinese to ethnic nationalism, and made them feel their efforts to maintain homogeneity and Korean culture were futile. However, their Korean identity did not decrease, as seen from their unswervingly strong desire for a unified Korean nation and their concerns that their existence in China might be detrimental to the two Koreas. Their interest in South Korea did not decrease either, as seen from the increasing number of Korean Chinese in South Korea, even if their presence was just a result of their economic needs.

Flexible and Situational Concept of Citizenship
I found that Korean Chinese have flexible and situational understandings of citizenship, which was quite different from their relatively firm understanding of ethnicity and nationality. Such a gap was mostly from their understandings that ethnicity and nationality were transmitted by birth or through inheritance from their parents, whilst citizenship was achieved when they were accepted into a country’s political framework through legal processes. Flexible ideas of citizenship seemed to be responsive to situations. At one time participants focused on identity but at another time they focused on livelihood strategy or the world order. Young professional Korean Chinese in metropolitan cities tended to approach citizenship more flexibly than others, as illustrated by some participants, like Ms. YH Ho (a 30-year-old lawyer in Beijing) and Ms. JL Wang (a 35-year-old employee of a duty-free shop in New Zealand).

Ong (1998, 1999) suggests that flexible citizenship is arguably a form of citizenship primarily based on economic concerns rather than political rights, participation within the country in which the citizen resides, or an allegiance to the government of the country in which the citizen resides. The case of Korean Chinese who obtained South Korean citizenship was much more complicated. Economic concerns were undoubtedly the major contributing factor. This was clear, as many participants obtained or applied to obtain South Korean citizenship for the purpose of facilitating their family members’ migration and settlement in South Korea, or increasing their chances of success. Not many of them did so for the purpose of permanent residence in South Korea. Even members of the older generations, who showed a strong Korean identity, obtained South Korean citizenship in order to invite their immediate family members to South Korea, and wanted to go back to China after fulfilling their ‘mission’.
Nevertheless, such a phenomenon should not be interpreted as meaning that Korean Chinese wanted South Korean citizenship only for economic reasons.

In fact, a desire for political participation within the host country, which Ong (1998, 1999) argues was not the basis of flexible citizenship, was detected from the participants with South Korean citizenship. But more interesting than that was the interest of a large number of participants with Chinese citizenship in South Korean political reality. Such a phenomenon was particularly vivid among participants in Yanbian. They liked talking about South Korean politics, and had favourite political parties and politicians. Their different political opinions often led to argument, which they described as ‘armchair argument’. This expression was from their understanding that Korean Chinese, as Chinese nationals, did not have any rights in South Korean politics. The significant interest of Korean Chinese in South Korean politics was clearly illustrated by Mr. KX Kim, a 61-year-old professor in Yanbian, “When there is a national election in South Korea, we have our own ‘election’ in Yanbian for South Koreans. Political confrontation was everywhere. Of course, we know it is just talk. But people really enjoy it. It’s a bit like watching Olympic games.” In contrast to such enthusiasm for South Korean politics, Korean Chinese kept silence about Chinese politics.

The flexible understanding of citizenship was also indicated by the strong interest of many participants in gaining citizenship of western countries. Those participants who obtained citizenship of, or permanent residency in, these countries felt successful, and the participants whose children settled down in western countries felt superior to others whose children remained in Yanbian or in South Korea. Regardless of their desire for citizenship of wealthy western countries, participants showed a tendency to keep their Chinese citizenship. Participants who had obtained citizenship of a host country were reluctant to renounce their Chinese citizenship, and tried to keep their Chinese citizenship through various means, even though to do so was not legal. This desire to retain Chinese citizenship stemmed from the consideration that they might want to return to China in the future. In general, older participants considered returning to China for its cheap living costs and familiar living environment whilst young participants considered returning for greater opportunities of success in China. This is another good example to reflect the situational and strategic nature of citizenship of Korean Chinese.

7.4 Research Significance
7.4.1 Academic Contribution

Contribution to Studies of Multiculturalism

The implications of multiculturalism are striking in countries that have been traditionally defined as homogeneous. My research advances studies of multiculturalism in South Korea, allegedly one of the world’s most homogeneous nation-states, by revealing the internal complexities of South Korea’s accommodation of diversity. Contradiction between ethnic nationalism and multiculturalism was revealed. Paradoxically, the need for both ethnic nationalism and multiculturalism was also demonstrated. This was possible because Korean Chinese are influenced by both ethnic nationalism and multiculturalism in South Korea simultaneously. This research has revealed the lived realities of everyday life of some Korean Chinese struggling with the implications of this paradox. The perspectives of Korean Chinese are significant if we consider their distinct characteristics. In addition to numerical superiority as the largest co-ethnic and migrant group, Korean Chinese have the highest proficiency in Korean language and culture, and the most diverse relationship with South Koreans. The newly obtained South Korean citizenship of 8,556 Korean Chinese (Korea Immigration Service 2012) also added to the significance of the perspectives of Korean Chinese, as giving them every right to voice themselves as Korean nationals.

This research also adds new dimensions to the existing scholarship on South Korean multiculturalism, by revealing the complicated external constraints under which Korean Chinese discussed South Korea’s multiculturalism. As an ethnic minority in China, Korean Chinese had generations of encounters with other ethnic groups before they faced multiculturalism in South Korea. This ‘Chinese experience’ encouraged perspectives, which were different from those of others in South Korea. Many participants discussed South Korea’s multiculturalism in the context of China’s engagement policy towards Korean Chinese. The perspectives of Korean Chinese also reflected the policies of the South Korean government on co-ethnics from developing countries in general, and Korean Chinese in particular, in multicultural era.

Contribution to Studies of Ethnic Return Migration

This research supplements existing studies of ethnic return migration (Tsuda 2003, 2009; Song 2007, 2009), primarily through learning about the identities of Korean Chinese in the context of the transition of their ancestral homeland to multiculturalism and their perceptions of such changes; and, subordinately, through examining social issues and the living
conditions of Korean Chinese in South Korea. Knowledge about these topics is important because they show some leading contradictions in South Korean society and the Korean Chinese community, yet have received little attention in previous studies on migrants in South Korea (Kim et al. 2012). This research, by including those who have not been a main focus previously (e.g. the older retirees and the young professionals), better reflects the Korean Chinese community, and so creates a more complete picture of Korean Chinese ethnic return migration.

The differences in identities of Korean Chinese between the old and young generations accord with Hobsbawm (1990)’s concept of nation-building: that ethno–national identities change even in a short period of time. Diversity in region and social grouping in identities (Hobsbawm 1990) was also indicated. I found that national consciousness was created unequally amongst participants from different regions and backgrounds. In general, participants in Yanbian have stronger feelings of Korean ethnic solidarity than do those in metropolitan cities in China. Such a phenomenon confirms the argument of Berghe (1981) that the sense of ethnic solidarity is stronger in small and close communities than in large and dispersed communities. However, Berghe was talking about the development of primordial notions of ethnic groups before they develop into a modern nation. Further research is required to ascertain if Berghe’s insight applies to citizens of modern nations.

**Contribution to the Studies on Korean Chinese**

This research is an early attempt to study Korean Chinese in South Korea’s multicultural context. Multiculturalism has become a major issue in contemporary South Korean society, where the foreign population has increased to an unprecedented degree. Despite the increasing significance of South Korean multiculturalism for Korean Chinese migrants, few of the previous studies on Korean Chinese have specifically addressed South Korean multiculturalism. This study has explored the identities of Korean Chinese in the context of South Korean multiculturalism. It also puts Korean Chinese in the wider context of the competing notions of Korean nationalism and Chinese nationalism, which have influenced Korean Chinese internally and externally throughout history. The current situation of the Korean Chinese community in China was also reflected in this study. With the dramatic movement of Korean Chinese nationwide and globally, the former Korean Chinese communities are on the verge of collapse, but new communities have sprung up elsewhere.
The identities of Korean Chinese are the product of constant acknowledgments and self-acknowledgments through social processes of incorporation and exclusion of different ethnic groups. The resulting identity constructions of Korean Chinese indicated the interconnectedness of ethnic identities, as proposed by Barth ([1969]1998). Multiple identities of Korean Chinese were revealed from the divided responses of participants regarding South Korea’s adoption of multiculturalism. This change came as a challenge or even as a betrayal to those who maintain a strong Korean identity and commitment to ethnic nationalism, whereas it was seen as a welcome sign for those with Chinese identity, who expected it would engender better treatment of foreigners in South Korea. For those caught in the middle, South Korea’s adoption of multiculturalism was seen as a double-edged sword.

The multiple identities of Korean Chinese indicated both their primordial and modernist understandings of ethnicity and nationality. They saw the ethnic bond as a foundation of the Korean nation, but meanwhile, in the formation of the Chinese nation, they saw the clear role of the Chinese government’s efforts and authority in creating and maintaining a powerful and unified nation; and the significance of a shared national ideology and unified language. Many participants felt they were Koreans in primordialist terms and Chinese in modernist terms. However, the modernist term puts great importance on language. In this regard, those Korean Chinese, who have greater skill in Korean than in Chinese, would be considered Koreans. Moreover, in the case of participants with South Korean citizenship, it was not clear if their Korean identity was based on their Korean ethnicity or South Korean citizenship, or both. Therefore, the current situation is not as simple as the earlier cases.

This research also revealed the open and flexible mindsets of Korean Chinese towards migration. I found that a large number of participants had an open and flexible mind concerning migration, coming from their status as an ethnic minority in China; their understanding of their hometown as backward and lacking opportunity; their desire for maximising capital and upwardly mobile lifestyle; an attitude that they have nothing to lose; and a diaspora identity. Some participants felt that Korean Chinese own little in China and do not belong to mainstream society thus there would be no difference regardless of the country they go to. A few participants had a diaspora identity and responded in a quite literal way that they are like a rootless flower and migration was the fate of diaspora people.

**Contribution to the Studies of National Membership and Boundaries**
This study contributes to the scholarly discussions on national membership and boundaries, and deepens the understanding of Korean national identity, through exploring the practice of nationhood in South Korea. Reconsidering national membership and boundaries is important given that nationhood still survives today (Billig 1995), despite the argument that nationalism is losing its major force and nation-states are declining. The South Korean national boundaries used to be clear. They were underlined by ethnic nationalism that emphasised a shared identity amongst members of a nation. However, with the global spread of capitalism and transnationalism, South Korea has experienced a large influx of migrants, and the increasing ethnic diversity within its territory challenged the popular idea of the concept of national membership based on ethnicity. The increasing outflow of its nationals has also blurred the national boundary, which used to be identical to the boundaries of where Koreans lived (C. Lee 2012). South Korea’s adoption of multiculturalism also has challenged the ethnicity-based concept of nationhood, and raised the question of who comprises the Korean nation and who does not.

However, this does not mean a decline in nationalism in South Korea. In South Korea, nationalism remains strong, as can be seen from the ubiquitous symbols of nationalism. Though the claim that South Korea is homogeneous has been abandoned, the national membership of South Korea is still mostly based on ethnicity. Multiculturalism has broadened concepts of national membership but only to a minority who meet requirements. People who do not meet the requirements are excluded from being members of the nation, even if they are ethnic Koreans. Deciding who counts as Korean and who does not is a matter of defining national identity and deciding where the national boundary lies. This question is becoming increasingly difficult to answer. Considering the current circumstances in South Korea, studying South Korean national membership is timely and significant. Findings of this research could inform policy debates on ethno-national membership and boundaries.

In addition, this research shows a possibility of reverse understanding of the national formative process that commonalities among members facilitate the formation of a nation. K. Kim (2006) argues that Korean ethnicity is based on a shared belief in a common history, culture, and ancestry; and that these commonalities facilitated the formation of the Korean nation. My data showed that it was a much more intertwined than an either-or situation. Participants saw the Korean nation as culturally unified, and assumed they had more in common with other ethnic Koreans than they actually do. They also considered their
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communities in China homogeneous despite the differences between Korean Chinese in different regions. This finding agrees with the argument of Blackwell et al. (2003), who theorised that a nation/nationalism minimises differences between members of a nation and emphasises similarities shared by them.

7.4.2 Significance of the Combination of Methods

This research is based on an extensive period of data collection and multi-level interpretative analysis. Data collection lasted ten months, and was based on diverse sources including participant observation, in-depth interviews and focus group discussions. I interviewed 120 Korean Chinese from a wide range of backgrounds, interacted with a further number of Korean Chinese during my active participant observations and community involvements, and closely observed most of them. Substantial information was gathered through this process of corroborating information from different data sources. Thematic analysis and comparative analysis were used in multi-dimensional ways in order to ensure comprehensive findings.

The introduction of internet-based research (mostly email interviews) is another significant element of this research. By using email interviews and ethnographic methods I conducted a global study and this gave me some specific insights that I would not have been able to obtain if I confined my study geographically to South Korea and China. Email interviews, which can eliminate the need for synchronous interview time (Meho 2006), allowed me to contact 210 people and have exchanged up to 600 emails in a relatively short period. The responses I got were compact, logical, and reflectively dense, because email interviews allow participants enough time to respond (Meho 2006). Proceeding by email also gave me time to construct well-thought-out follow-up questions. I also found that email interviews were less intrusive than face-to-face interviews, as I could not give clues or hints to participants during interviews.

Inclusion of participants from diverse backgrounds, particularly those who were ignored before, made up a new aspect of this study. However, inclusion of a large number of young professional participants (mostly aged in their 20s and 30s) raised a minor concern that the high percentage of young participants might have reflected more favourable attitudes to multiculturalism than exist in the population at large. Consequently, a larger number of more representative samples will be required in later research. A further investigation regarding gender influences on the attitudes of Korean Chinese towards South Korean multiculturalism
is also required, considering that gender differences are rather inconsistent and insignificant in previous studies on attitudes towards multiculturalism (Van de Vijver et al. 2008).

7.4.3 Social Implications
This research is timely in the light of constant disputes on the influences of multiculturalism in South Korea. The complex situation of South Korea in accommodating diversities was revealed, with conflict between ethnic nationalism and multiculturalism as the most fundamental complication. Deep-rooted ethnic nationalism, one of South Korea’s unique socio-historical features, contradicts multiculturalism. No matter how much South Korea wants to accept multiculturalism, it cannot give up ethnic nationalism. This is because ethnic nationalism is often considered to be connected to the long-cherished wish for Korean unification. The task of Korean unification seemed to be overlooked because of the emphasis of the South Korean government on spreading multiculturalism, but it still remains as a major task confronting Koreans (Ministry of Unification 2012b, 2013a). Embracing millions of overseas Koreans is another reason that South Korea has to adhere to ethnic nationalism. Tension between ethnic nationalism and multiculturalism threatens the social congruence of the Korean nation. It creates further tensions that include strains between old and new members of society.

In spite of the concern of many participants over the challenges that South Korean society faces in accommodating multiculturalism, potential benefits have also been indicated (e.g. multiculturalism would help South Korea to achieve wealth, power and prosperity). Some participants hinted that multiculturalism and nationalism need not necessarily be paired as opposing ideas; and a smooth transition or co-existence of nationalism and multiculturalism was possible, by learning from China’s experience. Such opinion was based on their understanding of the term ‘multiculturalism’ as meaning cultural diversity and on a perception of China as being a multicultural country. Debate on the multicultural status of China was one distinctive mark of the discussions of Korean Chinese on South Korean multiculturalism. Many participants denied that China was a multicultural country due to its assimilation policy towards ethnic minorities. It seemed clear to them that multiple ethnicities did not equal multiple cultures.

Another social implication of this study is its revelation of the pervasive prejudice of South Koreans against migrants. A large number of participants answered that they have
experienced South Koreans’ prejudice against them. They suffered from two types of discrimination in South Korea: discrimination which was open, involving actions, and easily detectable; and discrimination which was hidden, subtle and hardly detectable. This situation of Korean Chinese showed the urgent need to root out prejudice against migrants in the public consciousness. However, ‘rooting out’ prejudice is rather complicated, and not just about simple changes in attitude. This is because prejudice is not merely attitudinal but often involves actions which are hidden and unconscious (Skutnabb-Kangas 2000). Hence, a deeper and more extended discussion of the causes of prejudice is required in future study.

The situation of Korean Chinese triggered the importance of giving prompt attention to linguicism in South Korea among many other types of prejudice (e.g. sexism, racism and classism). Phillipson (1992) observes that linguicism is an ideology and structure where language creates and maintains an unequal allocation of power and resources. As I mentioned earlier, the Korean Chinese accent is stigmatised in South Korea, and this has negative consequences for the settlement of Korean Chinese in South Korea. The importance of paying attention to linguicism is particularly evident in respect of the increasing number of children from multicultural families. For instance, the Korean accent of such children might be different from that of children from South Korean families and their Korean language proficiency might be low during their early school years due to their having a non-Korean parent, and this might have negative consequences in their school life.

### 7.4.4 Political Implications

**Implications for the Policies Based on Multiculturalism**

Many problems in the practice of multiculturalism in South Korea have been identified in this study, including an absence of a consistent definition of the term ‘multiculturalism’; the excessive speed at which multiculturalism was promoted; a deficiency of critical examination of the negative ramifications of multiculturalism; a blind confidence in multiculturalism as a master key to all social problems; negative representation of migrants and continuous discrimination against them; self-segregation of migrants; an exclusion of the voice of migrants and a failure to reflect the reality of migrants; reverse discrimination caused by unbalanced support between migrants and locals; an ignorance of the differences in needs of the migrants among and within groups; and mismatches between policies and practices.
It is suggested that South Koreans should give serious consideration to the negative effects of multiculturalism, fully study foreign examples to reduce unnecessary trial and error, not rush but be prudent and critical of accepting multiculturalism as a dominant discourse, and recognise differences in needs of migrants among the same nationality as much as the differences in needs of migrants among different nationalities. Most of all, some participants suggested a painstaking effort should be made to find a point of compromise between ethnic nationalism and multiculturalism, considering that ethnic nationalism is viewed as the opponent of multiculturalism by anti-multiculturalists.

**Implications for the South Korean Policies Related to Korean Chinese**

My study has the practical and political advantages of refining and reflecting on policies of the South Korean government on Korean Chinese. Because Korean Chinese are the largest co-ethnic group, the largest migrant group and the largest naturalised citizen group in South Korea, numerous South Korean policies are relevant to Korean Chinese, including overseas Koreans’ policy, migrant policy, multicultural policy and naturalisation policy. First of all, a vital need for protecting the interests of Korean Chinese who have obtained South Korean citizenship was underlined. Participants with South Korean citizenship felt that they were not accepted as South Koreans by the majority of South Koreans; and that South Koreans’ discrimination against them had not stopped and would not stop. Furthermore, they felt that the lack of appropriate government policy aimed at their needs positioned them awkwardly between locals and migrants, and positioned them in a ‘dead zone’ in terms of benefits.

An urgent need for the examination of co-ethnic relations in South Korean society, predominantly the relationship between Korean Chinese and South Koreans, has been highlighted. Reflection (or, at least consideration) of the perspectives of Korean Chinese is also suggested for South Korean policy-makers when establishing policies on Korean Chinese. Most Korean Chinese felt that the South Korean government should, at the least, not make Korean Chinese feel they are neither welcomed as co-ethnics nor treated as foreign migrants. Recognition of the different demands of Korean Chinese of different groups is also of importance. The sensitivity of the Korean Chinese position in relation to state relations between China and the two Koreas is shown in this research. This nuanced account may be helpful for South Korean policy makers in designing policies on Korean Chinese.
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Appendix 1:

Interview Guide and Record Form

Interviewee/ Code Date
Place Duration
Remarks

Section I: Personal Information

1. Gender:
2. Age group:
3. Ancestral Origin on the Korean Peninsula:
4. Place of Birth: ________________
5. Education: __________________
6. Occupation: ___________ ; Income: ___________ (e.g. high, average and low)

Section II: Migration

1. Year of First Migration: __________ ; Where: __________
2. Total Length of Migration: __________
3. Reasons of Migration
   a) What was the most important reason for your migration (e.g. domestic and transnational)?
   b) Why did you choose this country/city to migrate to?
   c) In the case of transnational migration, was it difficult to obtain a visa? How long did it take to obtain a visa? How much did it cost?
   d) In the case you migrated to South Korea, specify your initial entry purpose, visa type, and current visa type if there is change.
4. Settlement Experiences of Transnational Migrants
   a) How long have you been in the country you have migrated to?
   b) What lines of work have you been engaged in your life? Are there huge differences in your occupations before and after your migration?
   c) If you are not satisfied with your current job, what hinders you from getting a better job?
   d) What difficulties have you ever encountered in the host country as a migrant? Have
the difficulties been fixed?
e) Do you intend to change your citizenship? If yes, why?

5. Family, Social and Economic Network (To Explore Pattern of Interaction)
a) Where is your family? How often do you have contact with them? Do you feel you are close to your family?
b) Where is your main career or professional network?
c) Do you keep a business network (e.g. owning property or investments) back in your hometown or home country? Why?
d) Do you keep a regular commuting life between China and the host country? Why?

Section III: Understandings of South Korea’s Shift to Multiculturalism
1. How often do you see foreigners in South Korea? What is the first thing that occurred in your mind when you see foreigners?
2. How do you feel about the rapidly increasing foreign population in South Korea that stood at 2 million in 2010?
3. How do you feel about the international marriages in South Korea that accounted for 15% of the marriages in the country in 2010?
4. Do you welcome South Korea’s shift to a multicultural society? Why?
5. Why did the South Korean government adopt multiculturalism?
6. What is multiculturalism? How much do you know about the policies in South Korea based on multiculturalism?
7. Do you welcome that South Korea promotes multiculturalism? Why or why not?
8. Does multiculturalism act as an opportunity or a challenge to Korean Chinese in terms of their migration and settlement? How did it influence you?

Section IV: Understandings of South Korea’s Policy towards Korean Chinese
1. What policies has the South Korean government adopted towards Korean Chinese since the establishment of diplomatic relations between China and South Korea in 1992?
2. Has the South Korean government provided adequate support for Korean Chinese?
3. Have Korean Chinese been given preferential treatment in South Korea due to their Korean descent?
4. Should the South Korean government treat Korean Chinese better than other
migrant groups? Why and how?
5. In which category (between foreigner and Korean) has the South Korean government positioned Korean Chinese?
6. Have you experienced changes of the South Korean government’s policy regarding Korean Chinese after its promoting multiculturalism? If yes, how do you see the changes?
7. Are South Korean multiculturalism policies applicable to Korean Chinese? Have you benefitted from the policy?
8. Should South Korea’s multiculturalism policies include Korean Chinese in its beneficiary list? Why or why not?

Section V: Ethno-national Consciousness of Korean Chinese

1. Ethno-national Identities
   a) How do you identify yourself? Why?
   b) How much does Korean ethnicity mean to you?
   c) How much does Chinese nationality mean to you?
   d) When you say you are Korean, does it mean that you don’t feel you are Chinese at all? Vice versa.
   e) Are there times you feel you are more Korean than Chinese? Vice versa.
   f) What does the term ‘Chosŏnjok’ (Korean Chinese) mean to you? How do you feel about your being a Korean Chinese?
   g) How do South Koreans identify Korean Chinese? Are you satisfied with that identification?
   h) How do Chinese see Korean Chinese? Are you satisfied with that identification?
   i) Is being a co-ethnic a merit to live or work in South Korea? Do you feel comfortable telling South Koreans that you are Korean Chinese?
   j) How does South Korean multiculturalism influence Korean Chinese in terms of their identity?
   k) Do you think South Korea’s adoption of multiculturalism will weaken the Korean identity of Korean Chinese?
   l) Have you experienced identity changes after South Korea adopting multiculturalism?
   m) How has migration experience in South Korea affected your identity so far? How
has it changed your perception on China?

2. Sense of Belonging

a) In your everyday conversation, when you say ‘my country’, where are you referring to?
b) Where do you feel you belong to? China or Korea? Why?
c) How much do you consider South Korea to be your ethnic motherland?
d) Between ethnic homeland and natal homeland, which do you weigh more?
e) Between Han Chinese and South Koreans, to which group do you feel closer?

3. Understandings of the ‘Nation’

a) What does the term ‘Korean nation’ mean to you?
b) Do you feel homogeneity with Koreans from other areas (e.g. South Korea, North Korea, Japan, the United States and Commonwealth of Independent States)? To which of the above groups do you feel most closeness?
c) Do you consider Korean Chinese to be members of the Korean nation or of the Chinese nation? Both or neither?
d) If Korean Chinese belong to the Korean nation, do they belong to the Korean nation as much as the Koreans in the Korean peninsula?
e) If Korean Chinese belong to the Chinese nation, do they belong to the nation as much as Han Chinese?
f) South Koreans and North Koreans think their ancestor is Tangun whilst Chinese think their ancestor is the Yellow Emperor. Who do you consider as your ancestor?
g) When you meet North Koreans in South Korea, how do you feel? Do you feel they are the same ethnic people with Korean Chinese?
h) How do you feel about the division of Korea and the plight of North Koreans?
i) Is unification meaningful to you?
j) Do you oppose South Korean multiculturalism on the grounds it will hinder the unification of the Korean peninsula?
## Appendix 2:

### Summary Forms for Interviews

#### Summary Form for Individual Interviews

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of Interviewee:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Date and Venue of Interview:</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. Was the venue suitable? Does anything need to be changed for future interviews?
2. How easy was it to establish rapport? Were there problems and how can this be improved?
3. Did the interview schedule work well? Does it need to be altered or improved?
4. What were the main themes that arose in the interview? Did any issues arise which need to be added to the interview schedule for next time?
5. Is the interviewee willing to be contacted again?
6. Have I promised to send any further information or the final report to anyone?

#### Summary Form for Group Interviews

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of Group:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Date and Venue of Interview:</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. Draw a diagram of seating with participant name.
2. Was the venue suitable? Does anything need to be changed for future groups?
3. Did they work well as a group or were there any adverse group dynamics?
4. What can I learn from this for the next group?
5. Did the interview schedule work well? Does it need to be altered or improved?
6. What were the themes which arose during the focus group? Does anything need to be added to the interview schedule for the next focus group?
7. Are any of the participants willing to be contacted again?
8. Have I promised to send any further information or the final report to anyone?
Appendix 3: Participant Information Sheet

PARTICIPANT INFORMATION SHEET

Title: Korean Chinese Ethnic Return Migrants in Multicultural Korea: New Challenges and Responses

Researcher: Yihua Hong
Tel: 82(0)1035461277(Korea); 86(0)4332817667(China); Email: yihua725@yahoo.com

Dear participants,
I am a PhD student at the University of Auckland. I am working on a research entitled “Korean Chinese Ethnic Return Migrants in Multicultural Korea: New Challenges and Responses”. The aim of this research is to understand the multicultural realities of Korea and its influences on Korean Chinese, who are the largest co-ethnic and migrant group in South Korea, in terms of their migration, settlement and identity constructions. This research is being funded by the School of Asian Studies of the University of Auckland.

For this research, I am carrying out participant observation and in-depth interviews. I shall ask interviewees about: (1) their ancestral origins on the Korean peninsula, and socio-economic status and educational backgrounds in China; (2) their migration and settlement experiences in South Korea; (3) ways in which they perceive South Korea’s transition to multiculturalism and its policies related to multiculturalism; (4) ways in which they evaluate South Korea’s policy towards overseas Koreans and ethnic return migrants; and, (5) their understandings of homeland, ethnicity and nationality, especially in a changing South Korean environment.

I would like to interview you but you are under no obligation to be interviewed. Interviews would take one to four hours depending on your convenience and I may wish to interview you more than once if you are willing. You will be free to use both Korean and Chinese in the interviews. You do not have to answer questions if you so wish. I will take notes but it would only be done with your consent and you can withdraw information any time up until June 2011. With your consent I may wish to use a voice recorder. You may ask for the recorder to be turned off at any time. Interviews will be transcribed by me the researcher.

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In the write-up of the research results, your identities will be kept confidential and no identifying details will be used. You will have the opportunity to verify your interview transcript before publication, and you will also have access to a summary of the final research results. This feedback will be made available to you within 24 months of the interview. The results will appear in a PhD thesis and become available through the university library, as well as in published articles. Data collected will be kept in a locked cabinet at the University of Auckland for six years. Then it will be securely destroyed. No information you provide will be used for any other purpose or released to others without your written consent.

If you agree to be interviewed please let me know by filling in a Consent Form and sending it to me or e-mail me at yihua725@yahoo.com. Thank you for your time and help in making this study possible. If you have any queries or wish to know more please contact me, or my supervisors at ch.song@auckland.ac.nz or j.park@auckland.ac.nz. The Head of my department is Professor Paul Clark, and he can be contacted at School of Asian Studies, University of Auckland, Private Bag 92019, Auckland, New Zealand. You can also e-mail him at paul.clark@auckland.ac.nz.

For any queries regarding ethical concerns you may contact the Chair, The University of Auckland Human Participants Ethics Committee, The University of Auckland, Office of the Vice Chancellor, Private Bag 92019, Auckland 1142. Telephone +64(9)9233711.

APPROVED BY THE UNIVERSITY OF AUCKLAND HUMAN PARTICIPANTS ETHICS COMMITTEE ON 14 April 2010 FOR (3) YEARS, REFERENCE NUMBER 2010/058.
연구참여자를 위한 안내서

연구 제목: 단일민족주의에서 다문화주의로: 한국사회변화와 중국조선족이민자들의 경험과 대응

연구자: 홍예화
전화: 82(0)1035461277(한국); 86(0)4332817667; 이메일: yihua725@yahoo.com

저는 오클랜드대학박사생 홍예화입니다. “단일민족주의에서 다문화주의로: 한국사회변화와 중국조선족이민자들의 경험과 대응”이라는 박사논문을 준비하고 있습니다. 이 연구는 오클랜드대학동양학과의 후원을 받고 있습니다.

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연구에 참여하시는 경우 편의에 따라 이메일 yihua725@yahoo.com으로 문의하거나 01035461277(한국)으로 전화주시면 감사하겠습니다. 귀하의 소중한 시간과 협조에 감사 드립니다. 연구에 관해서 더많은 정보를 원하시면 오클랜드대학송주 교수님(ch.song@auburn.ac.nz) 혹은 폴 클락 교수님께 (paul.clark@auckland.ac.nz) 연락하시기 바랍니다.

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오클랜드대학 윤리위원회의 승인번호: 2010/058; 승인기간: 2010년 4월 14일~2013년 4월 13일
尊敬的先生/女士，
我是奥克兰大学的博士生。我正准备一篇题为“单一民族主义到多文化主义: 韩国社会的变化和中国朝鲜族回归移民者的新危机和对应”的博士论文。这项研究由奥克兰大学亚洲学专业支持并赞助。

韩国社会有着历史悠久的单一民族主义传统。但最近韩国社会迅速走向多文化社会。此变化引起了韩国社会各界巨大的反响。这项研究试图从海外韩人的角度，尤其是从中国朝鲜族回归移民者的角度，分析韩国社会走向多文化的现状，并考察此变化对朝鲜族的影响。目前韩国约有40多万朝鲜族移民者。他们在所有回归海外韩人中占压倒性的多数，并且与韩国社会的关系也最为密切。

我将在2010年7月到10月之间在中国和韩国以“现场参与”和“面谈”的方式进行研究。我真诚地邀请您接受我的面谈。面谈将围绕您的移民和定居经历，以及您对韩国社会变化的理解等主题进行。您所提供的材料将成为这项研究必不可少的重要部分。对于您提供的任何形式的帮助我表示忠心的感谢。

我恳请您接受我的面谈要求。面谈大概需要1到4小时，会在您感到舒适的时间和地点进行。您也可以不回答您感到不愉快或不想回答的问题。您也可以随时要求停止面谈。我将在您的允许下进行笔记和录音。录音的文字整理及英文翻译都将由我本人负责进行。所有的原始记录材料也由我来妥善保管。您可以在2011年6月之前要求退出这项研究，并不需要提供任何理由。我将按照您的意愿销毁您所提供的所有材料。

这项研究通过了奥克兰大学道德伦理委员会的严格审核。您提供的所有的材料和个人信息绝对不会被认出或泄露。我将用代号或匿名的方式确保您的私人信息得到彻底的保障。所有的材料会在奥克兰大学安全密的地方保存6年，之后销毁。您提供的材料将用于我的博士论文以及未来的学术研究。正式公布研究结果之前，您有机会订正有误的材料录取和分析。您可以在奥克兰大学图书馆网站阅读我的博士论文。您也可以要求我给您发论文概要。

如果您愿意参加面谈，请签字附带的同意书，扫描后发到 yihua725@yahoo.com。非常感谢您的时间。是您的鼎立合作令这项研究得以完成。如果您想了解更多信息，请联系宋沧洙教授 (ch.song@auckland.ac.nz) 或 Paul Clark 教授 (paul.clark@auckland.ac.nz)。

有关道德伦理的疑问请联系奥克兰大学道德伦理委员会主席(电话 6499233711)。

奥克兰大学道德伦理委员会审核编号:2010/058；许可期间: 2010年4月14日~2013年4月13日
Appendix 4: Consent Form

CONSENT FORM

Title: Korean Chinese Ethnic Return Migrants in Multicultural Korea: New Challenges and Responses
Researcher: Yihua Hong
Tel: 82(0)1035461277(Korea); 86(0)4332817667(China);
Email: yihua725@yahoo.com

I have been given and have understood an explanation of this research project. I have had an opportunity to ask questions and have them answered to my satisfaction. I understand that I may withdraw myself or any information traceable to me at any time up to June 2011 without giving a reason.

I understand that interviews would take about one to four hours depending on my convenience, and any information I provide will be kept confidential. I understand that interviews may be noted or recorded, and I have the right to ask for the recorder to be turned off at any time. I was told that I do not have to answer questions if I so wish. I also understand that data I provide will be used in a PhD thesis and subsequent publications. In the writing up of the research results, my identity will be kept confidential and any identifying details that may be revealed during the conversation will not be used.

I also understand that I will have the opportunity to see the transcript of my interview in electronic copy before publication, and that I will also be able to receive an electronic copy of the summary of the research findings. I understand that the data I provide will not be used for any other purpose or released to others without my written consent.

I agree to take part in this research. Yes / No
I agree to have my interview recorded. Yes / No
I would like to receive a copy of my interview transcript for verification. Yes / No
I would like a copy of a summary report in the end of the research. Yes / No
[If yes, please provide your email address here _________________________]

Signed:
Name of participant: ____________________________
(Please print clearly) 
Date:

APPROVED BY THE UNIVERSITY OF AUCKLAND HUMAN PARTICIPANTS ETHICS COMMITTEE
ON 14 April 2010 FOR (3) YEARS REFERENCE NUMBER 2010/058.
研究参加同意书

研究题目: 单民族主义的由来: 韩国社会变迁与中国朝鲜族人的经验与对策

研究者: 董雅华

我是经过研究者详细解释和充分理解后参与研究。我有权利在研究进行过程中自由退出，并且可以在2011年6月14日之前要求撤回我提供的资料。我也知道我的个人信息将会保密，只向研究者和指导教授透露。

研究内容会用于研究者的博士论文和以后的研究，只有在正式的研究结果发表前，我才会收到电子邮箱的记录，并有机会纠正任何错误。

我同意参与研究。

同意 / 不同意

同意发表研究结果前，我将收到电子邮箱的记录。

同意 / 不同意

研究者: 董雅华

日期:

奥克兰大学伦理委员会的批准编号: 2010/058; 批准日期: 2010年4月14日~2013年4月13日
Consent Form (Chinese)

参与研究同意书

题目：单一民族主义到多文化主义：韩国社会的变化和中国朝鲜族回归移民者的新危机和对应

研究者：洪艺花
电话：82(0)1035461277(韩国); 86(0)4332817667(中国); 电子邮件: yihua725@yahoo.com

有关这项研究，我已经被给予充分的解释并完全理解。我有过向研究者询问的机会，并且我的所有的问题均被予以回答。我了解，面谈大概需要 1 到 4 小时，会在我感到舒适的时间和地点进行。我有权不回答我感到不愉快或不想回答的问题，并且可以随时要求停止面谈。

我了解，只有经我的同意，研究者才能在面谈过程中进行笔记和录音。我有权随时要求研究者停止录音。研究者向我保证我的个人信息及我提供的所有的材料会保持机密。只有研究者和她的两位导师才可以接近我的原始资料。2011 年 6 月之前我可以随时要求退出这项研究或销毁我的材料。面谈材料会在奥克兰大学一处安全机密的地方保存 6 年，之后安全销毁，并且没有我的书面同意，有关我的任何材料都不会用于别的目的。

我明白，我所提供的材料可能用在研究者的博士论文及未来的学术研究。研究者正式发表研究结果之前，我将有机会订正有误的材料录取和分析。我可以在奥克兰大学图书馆网站阅读研究者的博士论文，并且可以获得一份电子形式的论文概要。

我同意参加这项研究。是/否
我同意研究者笔记或录音面谈内容。是/否
我希望研究者发表研究结果之前，我将有机会订正有误的材料录取和分析。是/否
我同意研究者把有关我的材料用于她未来的学术研究活动。是/否
我要求获得一份电子形式的论文概要。是/否
[如果您想获得论文概要，请留电子邮件地址：____________________________]

研究参与者 签名：

日期：

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