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A Whakapapa of Whānau Ora

A new way of delivering social services in Aotearoa New Zealand?

Charlotte Ellen Moore

A thesis submitted in complete fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts, The University of Auckland, 2014.
Abstract

Whānau Ora is a new state-led, cross sectoral policy approach introduced in 2010. It places whānau outcomes at the very heart of social service delivery, and, in doing so represents a shift away from traditional approaches that delivered services to individuals. Furthermore, by focussing on collective outcomes, the approach is one that is intimately connected to Māori values and practices. This thesis traces the evolution of the Whānau Ora approach to social service delivery. In doing so, it explores the relationship between a philosophy of whānau ora, and the policy of Whānau Ora as it is enacted by various government institutions.

Drawing upon data collected from interviews with key informants, the thesis argues that Whānau Ora presents opportunities for a new way of thinking about social service provision but a number of barriers may limit the potential of this approach to achieve wellbeing for Māori. First there is a danger that Māori language and culture are simply co-opted by the state in ways that transform their original meaning, and that Whānau Ora may in fact serve as a vehicle to shift responsibility for core service provision from government to Māori. Second, the differential treatment of Māori service providers by funding bodies illustrates the way in which institutional racism continues to impact on Māori. Finally, Whānau Ora is vulnerable to a political environment in which discourses of Māori privilege can impact on the longevity of policies that are seen to target Māori. As such, Whānau Ora’s contribution to greater self-determination for Māori is limited. The thesis ends by identifying key constitutional and institutional changes that are more likely to provide an environment in which self-determination can be achieved.
Acknowledgements

Ko Tapuae o Uenuku te maunga
Ko Raukawakawa te moana
Ko Wairau te awa
Ko Kurahaupo te waka
Ko Rangitāne te iwi
Ko Ngāti Huataki te hapū
Ko Omaka te marae

This thesis is about whānau and whānau ora. My own whānau show me everyday what a strong, connected and loving whānau looks like, and what approaches such as Whānau Ora hope to see become a reality for all whānau. Special thanks to Andy for your constant support and for taking me for walks in an effort to keep me sane. E kore e ea i te kupu taku aroha mōu. To my parents, Colleen and Charlie, thank you for the wine, the food and the love – and the editing! I told you that policy analysis was interesting… To Frances, Justin, Sam, Andrea, Suzie and Chris and all assorted nieces and nephews, you are all awesome, and I am looking forward to seeing a bit more of you now that this thesis is done! To my Haigh whānau, thank you for your support, and words of encouragement.

Special thanks to Louise Humpage. You have been very patient with me! I needed the stick, and appreciated the carrots. Your supervision and hard work, especially in the last weeks, has really been important in helping me to see the wood as well as the trees. To Bruce Curtis, thank you for all the coffee and for being a cheerleader when I needed one! Thanks also to Tracey McIntosh, Margaret Mutu and Heather Cane for your guidance and suggestions at the beginning of this project. To all my colleagues in the Sociology Department, it has been a pleasure working with you all.

Finally, thank you to my interview participants. Your willingness to participate made this project possible and you were all incredibly generous with your time and your insights.
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Glossary of Māori words and terms

All words derived from the Māori language, with the exception of the names of people and places, are defined in English the first time they are used in each chapter. Thereafter refer to this glossary. Please note, for the sake of consistency, macrons are used for all relevant Māori words used in this thesis, even if not included in the original text. Definitions are sourced from Ryan (2008) and Williams (1971).

**Aotearoa**  
New Zealand; literally translates as long white cloud or long twilight

**ariki**  
god, noble, first born, paramount chief; aristocracy

**hapū**  
sub-tribe, clan; pregnancy

**He Korowai Oranga**  
Māori Health Strategy

**hīkoi**  
walk, march, step out; in modern usage it can be used to denote an action of protest

**hui**  
meeting, gathering, appointment

**Hui Taumata**  
1984 Māori Economic Development Summit Conference

**iwi**  
nation, tribal group, race, people; strength

**Ka awatea**  
*It is Dawn*, title of government document; literally, it dawns, it is light, daybreak.

**Kauhanganui**  
King’s council, Tainui main council and executive of the Kingitanga movement

**kaupapa**  
philosophy, theme, agenda, strategy

**Kaupapa Māori framework**  
Māori agendas and frameworks, Māori-centred research models

**kāwanatanga**  
government, governance; trusteeship;

**Kingitanga**  
The Māori King movement, an association of independent tribes under the Māori King; literally kingship

**koha**  
donation; gift; parting message; scar

**Kōhanga Reo**  
Māori language pre-school; literally language nest

**kōkiri(-tia)**  
vault, advance, develop, rise together
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Vocabulary</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kōkiri centres/units</td>
<td>community centres established as part of the Tū Tāngata programme implemented by the Department of Māori Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>kotahitanga</td>
<td>coalition, solidarity, unity through consensus; Māori parliament</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>kura kaupapa</td>
<td>Māori language school</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mana</td>
<td>integrity, authority, prestige, status, sovereignty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mana motuhake</td>
<td>autonomy, self-government, self-determination; name of a political party; proposed model of a parallel government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manatū Māori</td>
<td>Ministry of Māori Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mana whenua</td>
<td>defined in the New Zealand Public Health and Disability Bill 2000 as Māori people with customary authority over a particular area; trusteeship of an area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Māori</td>
<td>(n.) indigenous or descendent of indigenous New Zealander; (a.) normal, ordinary, natural</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>marae</td>
<td>meeting area of whanau, hapu and iwi; focal point of village and its buildings; courtyard in front of ancestral house</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pākehā</td>
<td>non-Māori, usually of European descent/Caucasian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pāremata Māori</td>
<td>Māori parliament</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>rangatira</td>
<td>chief, leader</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>rangatiratanga</td>
<td>sovereignty, chieftainship; kingdom; autonomy; weaving people together</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rātana</td>
<td>the religion and political movement established by the prophet Tahupotiki Wiremu Rātana in 1918; the pā (village) near Wanganui where the centre of the movement is based</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>rohe</td>
<td>district, territory, domain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>rūnanga</td>
<td>assembly, council; local form of tribal government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rūnanga Iwi Act</td>
<td>Iwi Authority Act</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>rūnanganui</td>
<td>large council; inter-tribal council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>tangata/tāngata (pl.)</td>
<td>person/people</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>tāngata whenua</td>
<td>people of the land; indigenous or local people</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>taonga</td>
<td>property; treasure; precious or treasured qualities/things</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phrase</td>
<td>Definition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>tapu</td>
<td>sacred; taboo, forbidden; under spiritual and cultural restriction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Te Puni Kōkiri</td>
<td>the Ministry of Māori Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>te reo</td>
<td>literally the voice or the language; Māori language</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Te Tira Ahu Iwi</td>
<td>the Iwi Transition Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>tikanga</td>
<td>principle; meaning; custom; rule; plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>tino rangatiratanga</td>
<td>absolute rule, absolute sovereignty; full chiefly authority;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>authority of self-determination; name of flag designed by Hiraina Marsden, Linda Munn and Jan Smith</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>tohunga</td>
<td>expert; specialist; priest; artist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tuku Rangatiratanga</td>
<td>devolution; title of a government policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>tupuna whakapapa</td>
<td>ancestor’s genealogy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tū Tāngata</td>
<td>‘People Stand Tall’, title of a government policy; self-reliance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>wairua Māori</td>
<td>Māori perspective, attitude; Māori spirit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>whakapapa</td>
<td>geneology; identity; descent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>whānau</td>
<td>extended family, genus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>whenua</td>
<td>ground; land; country; afterbirth and placenta</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Chapter One: Introduction

Introduction

In April 2010, the Minister for the Community and Voluntary Sector, Tariana Turia, announced the release of Whānau Ora: Report of the Taskforce on Whānau-Centred Initiatives, and with it, a significant new approach to social service delivery in Aotearoa New Zealand. Whānau Ora, as outlined in the Taskforce (2010) report, is a cross sectoral approach that places whānau outcomes at the very heart of social service delivery, and, in doing so represents a shift away from traditional approaches that delivered services to individuals. Furthermore, by focussing on collective outcomes, the approach is one that is intimately connected to Māori values and practices. As Turia (2010:np) stated in her comments at the release of the approach, the Taskforce challenged Government to:

...believe in transformation; to create a spirit of collaboration between funders, providers, practitioners and whānau. They ask us to invest in indigenous innovation; to enable a framework shaped by the unique values and beliefs of tangata whenua, to lead the notion in social change.

As well as wrapping integrated social services around whānau, the approach invites whānau to become active participants in the process through the formulation of whānau plans. These plans enable whānau to formulate their own vision of what whānau ora might look like for them, and what help they need from the social service sector to achieve this. Whānau Ora, therefore, can be considered as an approach that provides Māori solutions to Māori issues.

However, Whānau Ora has also proved controversial. As is evident in its title, the approach is explicitly designed around core Māori concepts and values, and is arguably intended to respond to the specific needs and preferences of the Māori community. Because of this, the approach is vulnerable to a political environment in which a discourse of Māori privilege is prominent. That Whānau Ora is so clearly a Māori approach presents a challenge for government. This was evident when Prime Minister John Key stated that Whānau Ora, although ostensibly an initiative aimed specifically at Māori, must cater to all New Zealanders by focussing on need not ethnicity (Espiner, 2010). Furthermore, like any government driven policy Whānau Ora is dependent on government funding; the extent to which Māori truly have control over policy and decision-making is thus likely to be limited. Therefore while some people may have expectations that Whānau Ora is about self-determination for Māori, there is a danger that Whānau Ora may in fact serve as a vehicle to shift responsibility for
core service provision from government to Māori, as part of a broader neoliberal agenda towards minimal government.

As a researcher with both Māori and Pākeha whakapapa, I have a particular interest in the way in which shifts in state policy reflect the evolving relationship between Māori and the Crown. These interests were shaped by my first-hand observations of the backlash against Māori that erupted over the 2004 Foreshore and Seabed Legislation and Don Brash’s infamous Orewa Speech (Brash, 2004). As someone who is not ‘visibly’ Māori in appearance, I was disconcerted by the way in which both acquaintances and strangers felt emboldened to express to me their unquestioning acceptance of the notion that Māori were privileged within our society. The fact these views were in such contrast to my own, based upon my formative experiences on marae, led me to seek ways whereby I could further my own understanding of the historical injustices experienced by Māori so that I could challenge some these views in a more articulate and reasoned way. This led to university studies in Māori studies and sociology.

Given the way in which government policy was so clearly impacted by the controversy surrounding Brash’s 2004 speech I believe that Whānau Ora is a fascinating topic of research, as it represents a significant shift towards approaches that explicitly acknowledge Māori language and cultural concepts within state policy. Furthermore, as a recent initiative, little has been written on this topic. However, while Whānau Ora may be ‘new’ in some respects, all policy is influenced by previous approaches, as well as the environment in which they are implemented within in the present. A significant portion of this thesis is thus devoted to understanding how the Whānau Ora approach has evolved, and how it reflects previous Māori Affairs policy. As such I have conceptualised this project as a genealogy or whakapapa of Whānau Ora. With this goal in mind, my research questions are outlined below.

**Research Questions**

Whānau Ora is relatively new policy approach and the way in which it is implemented is continuing to evolve. For example, changes to the funding structure and the winding down of the Regional Leadership panels were announced in July 2013, halfway through the timeline for this project. This has made it difficult to make any definitive statements about what the final shape of the Whānau Ora approach will look like. Furthermore, Whānau Ora can be
conceptualised in a number of ways (as discussed in Chapter Three), meaning there are a
broad array of (sometimes conflicting) understandings of what Whānau Ora is, how it should
be implemented and what it should achieve. Rather than attempting to promote an objective
and definitive analysis of what Whānau Ora is or does, this thesis attempts to understand
how it has evolved, and how the approach has been influenced by the broader political and
economic environment in which it has come into being.

With this in mind, this thesis seeks to explore the tensions inherent between the
philosophy of whānau ora as outlined in the Taskforce (2010) report, and the policy of
Whānau Ora as it is enacted by various government and non-government organisations.
More specifically it asks:

- How has the Whānau Ora approach to social service delivery evolved? (a whakapapa
  or genealogy of Whānau Ora);
- What (if any) tensions exist between the policy as outlined in the Taskforce (2010)
  report and its implementation thus far? And;
- To what extent is the Whānau Ora approach likely to contribute towards self-
determination for Māori?

**Methodology & Methods**

**Kaupapa Māori research vs Māori-centred research**

There are particular issues that need to be addressed when conducting research within a
‘Māori space’. Linda Smith (2012:1) argues that for indigenous peoples, “the term ‘research’
is inextricably linked to European imperialism and colonialism”. In particular, the position of
non-indigenous researchers is challenged on the basis that much of the research conducted
has perpetuated cultural-deficit theories whereby Māori are seen as the ‘problem’ and
solutions are accordingly located within the behaviour and choices of Māori individuals rather
than within wider society (Cram, 1997). In response, research methodologies underpinned
by kaupapa Māori values, have emerged within the wider project of Māori struggles for self-
research:

- Is related to being Māori;
• Is connected to Māori philosophy and principles;
• Takes for granted the validity and legitimacy of Māori, the importance of Māori language and culture, and;
• Is concerned with the struggle for autonomy over our own cultural wellbeing.

My whānau background bridges both the Pākeha and Māori worlds. My pepeha, included at the beginning of this thesis, illustrates my whakapapa links to Rangitāne o Wairau. However, I do not believe that simply being able to demonstrate my whakapapa is sufficient to claim that this thesis represents kaupapa Māori research. This project has been conducted primarily within the institution of the university, and I acknowledge that one of the primary purposes of this research is my own attainment of academic learning and recognisable qualification (a Master’s thesis). As Graham Smith (2013) notes, kaupapa Māori approaches must encompass more than simply observation of phenomena, they must engage in practical ways with Māori struggle for self-determination.

I argue it is more accurate to consider this research as being Māori-centred rather than kaupapa Māori. While recognising a diversity of Māori aspirations and agendas, this thesis adopts a critical lens that is directed primarily at the way in which the state continues to attempt to co-opt or absorb challenges to its overarching authority as sole sovereign power, while at the same time attempting to frame policy responses as enabling measures of self-determination for Māori. The analysis is centred on the drivers of state policy formation, rather than any specific aspect of Māori culture or any specific whānau, hapū or iwi group. It is interested in the relationship between Māori ideas and government policy. My hope is that this research can be considered being for Māori rather than being on Māori (Cram, 1997). By drawing further attention to the way in which the state deflects Māori aspirations for self-determination at the political level this may, in turn, enable approaches such as Whānau Ora to be developed and implemented to better meet the needs of Māori.

While no formal consultation process has been undertaken, advice has been sought and provided by a number of Māori academics at the university about the validity and appropriateness of this research project. These academics agreed to provide ongoing support and counsel to ensure that the research was culturally safe and to develop research which serves as a potential resource for the wider Māori community. Further feedback from the Māori academic community was received after I presented a paper outlining the
background to my thesis topic to the Te Whare Kura Symposium 2013, held at the University of Auckland.¹

Key Concepts

In the following section, I introduce a number of key concepts explored in this thesis. One of the difficulties is that particular terms and concepts are contested, and often used in a multitude of ways. The term ‘whānau ora’ is a prime example being used variously to describe a Māori concept, a health strategy outcome, and a whole of government policy approach. For the sake of clarity, when referring to the concept of whānau ora or the outcome goal of whānau ora as used in the Māori health strategy document He Korowai Oranga (Ministry of Health 2002), lower case will be used. When referring to the Whānau Ora approach to social service delivery launched in 2010, upper case will be used.

There are a number of terms that can be said to encompass Māori desire for autonomy, including sovereignty, self-determination, tino rangatiratanga and Mana Motuhake which are sometimes used interchangeably (although the appropriateness of these terms in particular contexts is also contested, for example see Barlow, 1991). Māori self-determination is often equated with aspirations for Māori sovereignty, which is problematic on several fronts. Durie (1998) argues that aspirations for sovereignty are likely to elicit a defensive response on the part of both the state, who maintain the British view that sovereignty is indivisible, as well as the non-Māori mainstream who are often enticed by the media to see Māori aspirations for measures of autonomy as a desire to secede from the state completely. Further, a number of indigenous scholars challenge the notion that sovereignty is an appropriate vehicle for achieving indigenous rights. Alfred (2009) argues that sovereignty is an ‘inappropriate concept’ in that it contradicts traditional indigenous values and processes, while at the same time co-opting indigenous peoples into the same structures which have been the source of their oppression. Likewise, Durie (1998:219) comments that “ironically, by encoding Māori aspirations in demands for sovereignty, Māori society itself could be undermined through the adoption of systems and processes which, though sanctioned in British law and custom, are the antithesis of Māori aspirations for fair society”.

¹ Te Whare Kura: Indigenous Knowledges, Peoples and Identities is a Thematic Research Initiative (TRI) hosted by the Faculty of Arts at The University of Auckland.
**Tino Rangatiratanga** is seen by many as a more fitting term to describe Māori aspirations for autonomy than the notion of sovereignty (Durie 1998). This term has gained increasing currency especially in recent decades, particularly since the creation of what has become commonly known as the tino rangatiratanga flag.² The flag has provided a visual symbol of Māori unity, (Hawksley & Howson 2011) although the extent to which Māori can be seen to constitute a nation is contested (for example see Hokowhitu, 2010) While the base term rangatira is often interpreted as meaning ‘chief’, Tuiono (cited in Hawksley & Howson 2011) points out that under a more literal understanding, the term rangatiratanga can be interpreted as being the act of weaving people together. Durie (1998:229) offers a more comprehensive framework for understanding tino rangatiratanga which includes four foundations: mana wairua (a spiritual dimension); mana whenua (iwi and hapū control over their own resources including land); mana ariki (the authority of Māori leaders) and mana tangata (Māori citizenship rights and right to live ‘as Māori’).

**Mana Motuhake** while also articulating Māori autonomy, can be differentiated from the notion of rangatiratanga through its emphasis on customary traditions of leadership and separation from the state (Durie 1998). Used as the motto for the Kingitanga movement, as well as the moniker for a political party, mana motuhake is seen as being more closely linked to notions of Māori self-government as opposed to self-determination. As Paora (cited in Hawksley & Howson 2011:254) comments, “mana motuhake… for me means an authority that derives from the land and is of the land, and tino rangatiratanga is what you do on the land or what you do within your society, within your people… mana is your authority, motu is the islands and hake is a form of digging up…”.

Another common translation of rangatiratanga is **self-determination**. Self-determination often serves as a default ‘catch-all’ phrase, which is useful when used to incorporate a broader struggle internationally by Indigenous peoples for recognition of rights. The best example of this is the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples which states in article three that “Indigenous peoples have the right to self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development” (United Nations 2008, 4).

For the purposes of this thesis, the terms ‘self-determination’, tino rangatiratanga, and mana motuhake will be used in various places, depending on the context of the discussion and, in particular, in response to the choice of language included in various policy documents. However, for the sake of simplicity, the term ‘self-determination’ will be used in

² The Tino Rangatiratanga flag was designed in 1989 by Hiraina Marsden, Jan Dobson and Linda Munn as part of a competition to find a Māori flag.
my own analysis to refer to Māori control over their own lands, people, culture and other issues affecting them.

**Institutional racism** is a recurring theme in this thesis. Given the highly contested nature of the term ‘racism’ and the way in which it can elicit strenuous objections from those individuals and organisations implicated, it is pertinent to define what is meant by the term. In particular, it is important to distinguish between individual racism and institutional racism, (also described as structural discrimination, see Human Rights Commission 2012). Whereas individual racism expresses bias at the level of interpersonal relationships, institutional racism is embedded within the very structures, norms and processes of organisations, and is largely unintentional (Fleras & Elliot, 2003). Sometimes, treating people the ‘same’ can have the effect of making invisible the way in which the values and preferences of the majority are privileged over those of other groups. As Fleras & Elliot (2003: 71) comment:

…it is not the intent or motive that counts, but rather the context and consequences. Policies, rules, priorities, and programs may not be inherently racist or deliberately discriminatory; that is, institutions do not go out of their way to exclude or deprive minorities. However, rules that are evenly applied (“we treat everyone the same around here”) may have a discriminatory effect in that they exclude certain groups while conferring advantage to others.

It is well established that the state’s attempts to assimilate Māori into legal, political and social structures that did not reflect Māori values and practices can be considered as a form of institutional racism, as discussed in Chapter Two of this thesis. However, I also argue that even where the state makes provisions to treat people ‘differently’, for example through contracting service delivery to Māori organisations, institutional racism can still be found in the differential treatment of Māori organisations by state agencies, as discussed in Chapter Four. Finally, the Human Rights Commission (2012:4) notes that structural discrimination can include:

support for measures that have a disproportionately negative effect on minority ethnic groups e.g. cutting funding to specific targeted programmes that are shown to improve outcomes for minority groups as an example of structural discrimination.

Under this understanding, it could also be argued that the underfunding of ethnically targeted initiatives such as Whānau Ora could also be seen as a form of institutional racism. These ideas are explored in Chapter Five.
Methods

This thesis adopts qualitative methods, which include policy analysis and semi-structured interviews with key informants, complemented by secondary sources.

Policy analysis

A detailed policy analysis was undertaken of major policy documents relating to Whānau Ora. The main policy document analysed was the Report of the Taskforce on Whānau-Centred Initiatives (2010). Further related documents including other reports, fact sheets, Briefings to incoming Ministers (BIMs), OIA releases, press releases and other related primary materials were gathered through an intensive web-based search. This included searches of government agency websites including Te Puni Kōkiri. Key word searches were also undertaken using search engines such as Google. Once the data was gathered it was analysed thematically. In particular I was interested in the use of key terms such as ‘partnership', self-determination’ and ‘tino rangatiratanga' within policy texts.

Key informant interviews

Once policy document data was gathered and analysed, a series of interviews with key informants were conducted between August and November 2013. One further interview was conducted via email, as the participant was overseas during the interview period. The interview participants were specifically selected on the basis of their professional expertise, and in order to gain a range of perspectives about the Whānau Ora approach. They were:

- Di Grennell, member of the Taskforce on Whānau-centred Initiatives and Director of Operations at Te Puni Kōkiri; and Herewini te Koha, Acting Chief Executive of Te Puni Kōkiri (the administering government agency for Whānau Ora);
- John Tamihere, Chief Executive of Te Whānau o Waipareira Trust (a Whānau Ora Provider);
- Lyvia Marsden, General Manager of Te Puna Hauora (a Whānau Ora provider)
- Simon Royal, Chief Executive of the National Hauora Coalition;
- Hone Harawira MP, leader of the Mana Party (and former member of the Māori Party);
- Dr Fiona Cram, Director of Katoa Ltd (involved in the Action Research component of Whānau Ora). This interview was conducted via email.
It is important to note that a number of people were invited to participate in this research project who, for a number of reasons including prior commitments and concerns over potential conflicts of interests, declined to be interviewed. In particular Tariana Turia, Minister for Whānau Ora and co-leader of the Māori Party, was not available for an interview. Turia’s perspectives on Whānau Ora have instead been gathered from a range of other publically available materials including press releases, policy documents and radio interviews.

Participants were provided with an information sheet when initially contacted about the research, and again before the interview was commenced. It was decided early in the project that interview participants would, with their permission, be named in the final thesis and associated research outputs, because, having been selected on the basis of their professional expertise and involvement in the Whānau Ora approach, it was difficult to guarantee their anonymity. Furthermore, it was possible that given their professional positions, their identities would have been discoverable to readers in some cases. All interview participants agreed to sign a form consenting for their interview data to be used and acknowledging that they would be named in the thesis.

Interviews were audio taped and then transcribed by myself. I completed some minor editing of transcripts, which involved removing fillers such as “um” and “ah” in order to ensure that comments were clear in meaning. Otherwise the quotes included in this thesis are verbatim. Once the transcripts had been thematically analysed, selected sections containing material that would potentially be quoted directly were returned to participants for final approval. Some further editing was completed as a result of participant feedback. Ethics approval for the research was granted by the University of Auckland Human Participation and Ethics Committee.

**Secondary Data Analysis**

Secondary sources, which include the work of prominent Māori academics, have provided insight into the historical relationships between Māori and the Crown, as well as critical understandings of theories relating to the formation of policy and Māori aspirations for self-determination. Together with the policy analysis and interview data this has enabled a triangulated approach (Denzin, 1970). There are a number of issues with regards to the validity of the research findings. First, given that participants were identified in this research, it is possible that they may not have been as open in expressing their views on Whānau Ora as they may have been if their identities remained anonymous. Furthermore, it is also
acknowledged that as key stakeholders, participants may have had vested interests in the success (or otherwise) of the Whānau Ora approach, which may in turn have influenced their comments. Notably, however, there was a strong coherence to the comments offered by participants and common themes emerged, suggesting that this was not the case.

Thesis Outline

This thesis consists of six chapters. Chapter One has explained the way in which, as a significant, ‘new’ approach to Māori policy, it is important to understand the context in which the Whānau Ora approach to social service delivery has emerged. This chapter has also introduced the thesis, by outlining my research questions, methodology and key concepts including ‘Whānau Ora’, ‘self-determination’ and ‘institutional racism’.

Chapter Two traces the way in which the relationship between the Crown and Māori has evolved in the years following the signing of Te Tiriti/The Treaty of Waitangi in 1840. Significant differences between the Māori and English language versions of Te Tiriti set the scene for differing expectations as to the nature of the relationship between Māori and the Crown and, subsequently, what Māori Affairs policy should achieve. On the one hand the Crown has consistently sought to maintain its sole sovereign power through the promotion of equal citizenship rights promised under Article Three of The Treaty. On the other hand, Māori have attempted to maintain their rights to self-determination, by drawing on rights based discourses stemming from Article Two. This chapter will explore the way in which Māori Affairs policy has shifted in line with the evolving political ideologies of the times. In particular, the chapter will seek to understand the ways in which the goals of Māori and the state diverge and intersect at particular points.

Chapter Three will pick up on these themes and examine in more detail some of the various policy developments that have contributed to the evolution of the Whānau Ora approach to social service delivery. Specifically, Chapter Three will define the concept of ‘whānau’ in more detail, and seek to understand the way in which an emphasis on whānau (and families) as a key site of intervention for social policy has emerged. The Whānau Ora approach introduced in 2010 is furthermore influenced by significant changes in the public sector, including a shift to neoliberal contractual models of social service provision. This in turn has created spaces for Māori providers to develop the capacity to provide services to their people that are underpinned by kaupapa Māori methods and values. Finally, this chapter will outline the Whānau Ora approach to social service delivery through a detailed
analysis of the Taskforce Report on Whānau-Centred Initiatives (The Taskforce, 2010). This highlights that there are multiple ways of conceptualising Whānau Ora, which in turn provides considerable scope as to how the approach might be understood and implemented. High levels of complexity inherent in the Whānau Ora approach as described by the Taskforce (2010) report, also increase the likelihood that the expectations of stakeholders including whānau, providers and the state may be divergent, just as they were in in previous iterations of Māori Affairs policies and programmes.

Chapter Four draws more heavily on interview data, supported by a range of policy documents and other relevant secondary material, to identify a number of tensions that exist between the aims of the Whānau Ora approach as articulated by the Taskforce (2010) report and the way in which the approach has thus been implemented. These tensions include the potential issues that arise when Māori concepts and models are co-opted into state-led policies and programmes, the difficulties in achieving cross-sectoral co-operation between agencies due to structural constraints, as well as the impacts of the broader economic climate. I will argue that, while ostensibly Whānau Ora seeks to focus on outcomes, which are driven by the needs and priorities of the whānau, funding and accountability structures result in a continuing default to measuring outputs. This means that state priorities are still paramount.

Chapter Five explores some of the ways in which the long term sustainability of Whānau Ora is challenged by the broader political climate in which they function. Māori engagement within the political sphere and the entrance of an independent Māori Party into Parliament has been a key driving force behind the establishment of Whānau Ora. However, approaches such as Whānau Ora are also challenged by an environment in which popular discourses of Māori privilege are prevalent. Looking back to Chapter Two, it is clear that the shifting political priorities of those in power have had significant impacts on the direction of Māori Affairs policy. Furthermore, there is a lack of agreement within Māoridom as to what the goals of Māori Affairs policy should be and the best methods of achieving them. Significantly, while the Taskforce (2010) claims that Whānau Ora is about self-determination for Māori, I argue that this goal is framed by the report as being about the economic independence of Māori from the state, rather than an articulation of Māori control over their own futures in partnership with the Crown. Furthermore, a focus on whānau ora may in fact contribute to an on going depoliticisation of Māori aspirations for self-determination.

Finally, Chapter Six draws together the many and complex threads of the Whānau Ora story by returning to the original research questions. It briefly summarises the major developments that have contributed to the evolution of the Whānau Ora approach and
outlines the key tensions that exist between the aims of Whānau Ora and the way in which it has been implemented thus far. Finally this chapter also considers what shifts within society are required to ensure that Māori Affairs policy meets the expectations of all stakeholders and ensure a meaningful relationship between Māori and the state can be achieved.
Chapter Two: Maintaining Tino Rangatiratanga Within a Colonial Context

Introduction

Since the signing of te Tiriti/the Treaty of Waitangi in 1840, the New Zealand Government has implemented a broad range of policy solutions in response to what has often been framed as the ‘problem’ of Māori. While these policy solutions have reflected the shifting ideologies of the governments in power, they have generally been underpinned by a view of Māori as being disadvantaged. Therefore, such policies have tended to focus on ways in which to mitigate the damaging effects of colonisation and, in the process, to ‘close the gaps’ with the non-Māori ‘mainstream’ population. As well as problematising Māori, this framing has resulted in state policy being seen as the ‘solution’ to perceived Māori failure (Harris, 2007).

This chapter will demonstrate the way in which the goals of Māori and the state are often divergent. Māori have consistently sought ways to maintain their rights to self determination, guaranteed under Article Two of Te Tiriti. On the other hand, the Crown has sought to establish and maintain sole sovereignty over a unified nation state through a focus upon Article Three’s emphasis on equal citizenship and policies that address ‘need’. Largely this goal has been pursued through strategies of assimilation, integration and, more recently, Māori development. Using these three broad strategies as a framework, this chapter will explore in more detail how these tensions between the goals of the state and the goals of Māori have influenced the direction of Māori Affairs policy.

In understanding the major developments in Māori Affairs policy we are able to see that the Whānau Ora approach to social service delivery has not emerged from a vacuum, but contains a number of principles which can be traced back to previous state-led attempts to manage the relationship between Māori and the state and to improve the social and economic wellbeing of Māori. These include: the incorporation of Māori cultural values in the development of state policy; a focus on whānau as a site for intervention; attempts to enable Māori self-determination through a partnership relationship with the state (through reference to the Treaty of Waitangi) and, finally, ‘by-Māori-for-Māori’ provision of social services. However, these principles have not been applied simultaneously or consistently in state policy, and many policy responses have proved to be vulnerable to shifts in the political
climate. This chapter will explore the way in which the Whānau Ora approach can be seen to reflect key developments with regards to state policy targeted towards Māori.

**Assimilation and resistance: 1835 - 1930**

The period following the signing of te Tiriti/the Treaty of Waitangi was one of rapid change for both Māori and settlers residing in the newly formed British colony. Crown policy with regards to Māori was largely characterised by attempts to assert Crown authority over the Māori population and assimilate Māori into a European system of laws and economic structures. For Māori, this period also saw a massive loss of land, and significant challenges to their language, social structures and cultural identity. However, far from being passive bystanders during this period, Māori actively engaged in a number of strategies aimed at protecting and promoting their interests.

**Setting the scene: He Whakaputanga and Te Tiriti o Waitangi/The Treaty of Waitangi**

Te Tiriti o Waitangi (the Treaty of Waitangi) was signed on February 6, 1840, enabling a formal relationship between the British Crown and Māori to be established. However, the political basis for Te Tiriti was laid years earlier with another document, He Whakaputanga (the Declaration of Independence) which was signed by rangatira (Māori chiefs) under the authority of the United Tribes of New Zealand in 1835. The Declaration stated that New Zealand was an independent state whose sovereignty rested with those chiefs who had formed a collective entity, Te Whakaminenga. Te Whakaminenga represented a departure from the typically tribal forms of governance structures favoured by Māori toward a confederated approach, signalling a desire by Māori to create a Māori-led independent nation state. Durie (1998:3) states that “Nu Tireni (as New Zealand was described in the Declaration) was to be a state where Māori values, practices and aspirations would determine future directions. Māori self determination was securely bound to collective Māori sovereignty”. However, Fleras and Spoonley (1999) argue that the Declaration served the interests of the British, who saw it as a vehicle for establishing an internationally recognisable polity on which they could confer the protection of the British Crown and, later, could negotiate with to enable a more permanent ceding of sovereignty.

While there were arguably a number of motivating factors which led both Māori and the British Crown to sign Te Tiriti in 1840, it is well established that significant differences in the
English and Māori language versions led to vastly different expectations from both parties as to the outcomes of such an agreement (Durie, 1998; Walker, 2004; Mutu, 2010). The English version contained three basic principles: the establishment of sovereignty on the part of the British Crown; recognition of Māori property rights and the conferral of British citizenship to all Crown subjects (Fleras & Spoonley, 1999). However, in the Māori version the notion of sovereignty in the English version was replaced with the term ‘Kawanatanga’ (government or governance). Mutu (2010) argues that kawanatanga was not a Māori term, or a concept most Māori would have been familiar with. She points out that there is little doubt that Māori did not understand this as ceding sovereignty, but rather that the Crown would have the right to govern the English settlers through the creation of laws – something that most Māori were concerned to see happen. It is especially significant that the Māori version also used the term tino rangatiratanga (paramount power and authority) when describing the rights that Māori would retain over their lands, fisheries and other taonga (treasures). Furthermore, as Durie (1998) notes, had Te Tiriti used the term ‘mana’ to translate the notion of sovereignty as it had been in the Māori version of the Declaration in 1835, it is more likely that Māori would have understood the intention of British Crown – and a lot less likely that any chiefs would have signed it. Instead, as translated, Te Tiriti implied that Māori would retain control over their own people and resources and would essentially enter into a partnership of equals with the Crown, whereby the Crown would govern the settlers, and Māori would largely continue on as before (Fleras & Spoonley 1999).

**Early Māori Affairs Policy**

As settlement accelerated post-1840, and on the basis that sovereignty had been ceded under the English version of the Treaty, the British Crown proceeded to establish the machinery of government in the new colony. The New Zealand Constitution Act was passed in 1852, and responsible government based on the Westminster model was operating by 1856. The need to develop a more formal relationship between Māori and the Crown in order to facilitate the purchase of Māori land, establish laws and manage disputes between Māori and settlers saw the beginnings of what would become a long lasting state bureaucracy dealing with Māori issues (Butterworth & Young, 1990).

As Butterworth and Young (1990:5) state, “[t]here have been, in fact, three Departments of Māori Affairs, each being very much a child of its time and falling out of favour when unable to adapt to changing conditions”. The first of these was the missionary influenced Protectorate Department, headed by George Clarke who was appointed as
‘Protector of Aborigines’. The role of the Department was two-fold; to advise the Governors on Māori policy and to act as mediators between Māori and Pākehā. Clarke advocated strongly for a system whereby British structures and legal principles were modified according to Māori values and Māori were directly involved in the justice process. However, Clarke’s stance was a far cry from the prevailing settler attitude which sought to establish British law for all as quickly as possible; a view shared by the incoming Governor George Grey. As Butterworth and Young (1990:24) comment: “[Grey] intended to supplant Māori tikanga with common law and force the pace of amalgamation. There was no suggestion of maintaining the tino rangatiratanga of the Māori chiefs”. As such, Governor Grey saw the Protectorate Department abolished in 1846.

However, while Grey clearly saw the Treaty of Waitangi as ceding full sovereignty to the British Crown, Hill (2004) argues that this sovereignty was nominal rather than substantive in the early years following the signing. Māori still outnumbered British settlers by a large margin and, as such, Māori continued to operate with a significant measure of autonomy. The need for a new government department to manage the relationship between Māori and the settlers was apparent by the 1860s, where tensions over land in Taranaki had reached crisis point, and some Māori iwi had formed their own challenge to British sovereignty by establishing the pan-tribal Kotahitanga (Unity) movement and crowning their own King. In response, the government established the Native Department, whose mandate included undermining independent Māori political aspirations. One of the ways in which the Native Department achieved this was by appearing to give some semblance of self determination back to Māori. For example, Crown authority was devolved to existing tribal committees or Rūnanga to deal with local issues. This was implemented by dividing the North Island (where most Māori resided) into 20 districts, headed by a Pākehā Civil Commissioner who would supervise Native Magistrates who in turn represented the district Rūnanga. These Magistrates were responsible for activities such as settling minor disputes and passing laws dealing with alcohol consumption and fencing of cultivations (O'Malley, 1998). Crucially, the Magistrates were also responsible for defining hapū or individual interests in land which, once confirmed by Crown grant, could then be alienated into Pākehā ownership (Butterworth, 1990). However, as Hill (2004) cautions, the district Rūnanga did not constitute true self determination for Māori, but were utilised by the Crown on the basis that they served to undermine the newly formed Kingitanga movement, which the Crown saw as a threat to its sovereignty. Once the Crown no longer saw officially sanctioned Rūnanga as useful to their own objectives, they were abandoned.
The most pressing concern for the settler government was the acquisition of land (Hill & O’Malley, 2000) and a significant barrier to this was the communal ownership and occupation of Māori land. The Native Land Act 1862 (which abolished the Crown right of pre-emption) and the Native Land Court proved to be devastatingly effective in relieving Māori of their land. As Walker (2004:135) argues, “the aim of the court as defined in the Act was to identify the owners of tribal land and transform communally owned land held under customary title into individual title cognisable in English law, so that Māori ownership would become ‘assimilated into British Law’”. Given that relationships to land form the very basis of Māori identity, the impact of alienation from their land was immense (Walker, 2004). Education was another arena in which the assimilation of Māori into Pākeha society was promoted. The 1867 Native Schools Act provided for the establishment of schools on Māori land; however a strong emphasis was placed on lessons being taught in English. In 1905 speaking Māori was prohibited within school precincts, and this was often policed through the use of corporal punishment. Inevitably this policy saw Māori children equating their own language and culture with negative outcomes, leading to a significant loss of fluency in Māori for entire generations. In 1900 90 percent of Māori children spoke Māori as their first language. This had dropped to 26 percent by 1960 (Walker, 2004).

After being disestablished for a second time in the 1880s, the Native Department was again re-established in 1906, thanks in large part to the efforts of Native Minister James Carroll (Ngāti Kahungunu) who was a key driving force in efforts to improve outcomes for Māori. Carroll favoured the leasing of Māori land rather than outright sale; unfortunately this attitude was not shared by the subsequent Native Minister, William Herries, who proceeded to remove many of the safeguards put in place by Carroll to prevent further alienation of Māori land. Over the period from 1913 to 1935, the Department effectively became a large scale land purchasing operation (Butterworth, 1990).
Kotahitanga: Alternative governance structures & pan-tribal identities

While the rapid pace of settlement put enormous pressure on Māori to adapt to and comply with the imposed structures of the colonial administration, Māori engaged in a number of strategies aimed at maintaining their authority, lands and ways of living. Although the social structures of whānau and hapū had been the most significant institutions with regards to the everyday organisation of Māori, in response to the challenges of colonisation, Māori began to see the benefits in organising collectively on a larger scale. Iwi groupings (which were comprised of a number of hapū) gained increasing prominence, as did pan-tribal or kotahitanga movements (Hill & O’Malley, 2000). While many of these can be seen to have been modelled on existing Pakeha institutions, Bargh (2010) argues that rather than being seen as evidence that Māori were acquiring measures of ‘civilisation’ by adopting such structures, Māori were engaging one strategy amongst many others to maintain and express their rangatiratanga.

One such pan-tribal movement was the Kingitanga movement which, after much discussion amongst Māori leaders, was established in the 1850s. Support for the movement was largely based in the central North Island amongst the various Waikato iwi, who at this stage still retained significant land holdings but were worried about the land loss occurring in other parts of the country (Hill & O’Malley, 2000). The first appointed Māori king was Tainui chief Potatau Te Wherowhero in 1858. His reign was short lived and, following his death in 1860, he was succeeded by his son Tawhiao, whose reign would last for the next 34 years. The Kingitanga movement established a constitution which encompassed the desire to hold onto land, prevent inter-iwi bloodshed and maintain Māori authority through Māori unity (Roa, 2010). While substantive unity at a national level was ultimately limited by traditional iwi rivalries and the support for the movement was very much centred around the Waikato region, many Māori sympathised with the goals of self-governance that they felt had been promised by te Tiriti (Hill & O’Malley, 2000).

However, the Crown viewed the Kingitanga movement as a direct challenge to the establishment of British sovereignty, and the settler government became increasingly frustrated at the way in which the movement blocked the sale of tracts of land. Tensions between the Kingitanga and the Crown eventually erupted in armed conflict when British soldiers invaded the Waikato in 1863. This conflict, which would become known as the ‘New Zealand Wars’, lasted until 1872 and resulted in the confiscation of over a million hectares of Māori land, not only from those iwi who were explicitly affiliated with the Kingitanga, but also other ‘rebel’ iwi. Even those iwi who had fought on the side of the British found their lands subject to confiscation (Hill & O’Malley, 2000).
Despite the significant losses suffered in the Waikato following the conflict, the Kingitanga movement under Tawhiao continued to work to progress Māori issues through various channels, including sending a delegation to directly petition Queen Victoria (although they were denied an audience), as well as making several submissions to the New Zealand Parliament. These included a proposal to establish a legislative council of chiefs, a move they felt was supported by section 71 of the 1852 Constitution Act. When this proposal was rejected by Prime Minister Ballance, Tawhiao moved to establish his own convention of chiefs, Te Kauhanganui, in 1891 (Cox, 1993). 1891 also saw a second Māori Parliament, unrelated to the Kingitanga, established by Northern iwi. This second parliament, known as Kotahitanga or the Paremata Māori (Māori Parliament) was established by ninety six chiefs who were frustrated at the continuing loss of land, as well as the continuing indifference shown by the Pakeha Parliament to such concerns (Cox, 1993). The Paremata Māori convened annually, adopted a Westminster based bi-cameral system and used the structures of hapū and iwi to establish district boundaries for the purposes of voting in representatives. While the movement has been described as one the most important examples of Māori unity up to that point (Hill & O'Malley, 2000), the Paremata Māori was ultimately undermined by the continued refusal of the New Zealand Parliament to recognise its legitimacy, and it was disbanded in 1902.

Ultimately, neither the Kingitanga movement nor the Kotahitanga movement proved successful in achieving the levels of Māori unity and autonomy that Māori desired. However, the increasing pressure by Māori for measures of self government did result in some concessions by the settler government. While the government could not abide any form of challenge to its authority at a national level, it was more willing to negotiate limited forms of regional self-government – especially if they served to undermine Māori aspirations at the national level (Hill, 2004).

In 1900, two Acts were passed; the Māori Lands Administration Act and the Māori Councils Act. The Māori Lands Administration Act was aimed at increasing the productivity of the small amount of land which remained in Māori ownership, and saw the establishment of Māori Land councils. However, these were abandoned by 1905, as they were seen as impeding the efforts of the settlers to obtain more land (Butterworth & Young, 1990). The Māori Councils Act gave Māori powers similar to those of local government, and once established the councils were tasked with looking after the health and welfare of Māori. They were particularly effective in the area of health; however, enthusiasm from Māori waned as it became increasingly apparent that the state had no intention of granting the councils any
meaningful power, and the councils came to be seen as agents of the state, rather than as examples of Māori autonomy in action (Hill, 2000).

Māori Political Participation

Another way in which Māori sought to protect and promote their own interests was by actively engaging in the political machinery of government. Under Article Three of the Treaty of Waitangi, Māori were conferred equal rights of citizenship to British subjects. However, Māori faced a number of barriers which prevented them from fully participating in the newly formed structures. Initially, Māori were largely excluded from the franchise due to the property qualifications placed on voting which required voters to hold individual land title (Sullivan, 2010). A number of factors combined to create the impetus for mechanisms to increase Māori representation, and in 1867 Parliament passed the Māori Constitution Act which introduced four Māori electorates. It was assumed at the time that these seats would be a temporary measure to enable Māori to have a voice in the interim while communal land title was converted to individual title. However, this process was a lot slower than anticipated, and the Māori seats have proved an enduring feature of New Zealand’s constitutional arrangements ever since (Sullivan, 2010).

Although the fact of establishing dedicated Māori seats in Parliament has often been cited as an example of New Zealand’s more enlightened attitude towards its indigenous peoples, the seats solved a number of political quandaries for the settler government. The seats were seen as a mechanism by which to maintain an electoral status quo between the North and South Islands (which had been under threat thanks to the Otago gold rush), appease Māori calls for representation in the wake of the land wars in the Waikato and Taranaki regions while also serving to further undermine alternate systems of pan-Māori political organisation. Despite the fact that the Māori population was at this time roughly equal to that of the settler population, there was no suggestion that Māori should be allocated an equal number of seats in Parliament, and instead they were allocated four seats out of a total of 76 (Sullivan, 2010). Furthermore, the Māori electorates were decided without consultation with Māori chiefs and without reference to traditional iwi boundaries, meaning that the electorates not only split some iwi but also likely contained feuding iwi within single electorates (Cox, 1993).

Early Māori representatives in Parliament included Hone Heke, a grand-nephew of the Ngapuhi chief of the same name who had cut down the British flagpole at Kororareka. The younger Heke represented the Northern Māori electorate and was also a member of the
Kotahitanga movement. While in Parliament he tabled The Native Rights Bill, which aimed to devolve authority over things Māori to the Māori Parliament, including the right to adjudicate over Māori land grievances. However, European Members of Parliament refused to even debate the Bill, walking out of the chamber and preventing a quorum being reached (Cox, 1993). This attitude is illustrative of the difficulties borne by Māori representatives who faced a number of challenges, including an often hostile Parliament in which they were treated with disdain if not outright racism. Another group of Māori representatives who would become well known was the Young Māori Party, originated from the Students Association of Te Aute College. The Young Māori Party represented a new generation of educated and professional Māori who saw the political process as a means of advancing programmes of social reform, albeit by utilising Pakeha structures and values. Members including Apirana Ngata (Ngāti Porou), Te Rangihiroa (Te Ati Awa) and Maui Pomare (Te Ati Awa) promoted an agenda that was underpinned by Christianity and encompassed issues such as temperance, sanitation and health, education and land rights (Cox, 1993). However, the Young Māori Party often struggled to gain the respect and mandate of their constituents, as tensions between traditional tribal leadership structures and what was viewed as a distinctly Pakeha institution emerged. As Cox (1993:93) comments, “while cognisant to act in matters distinctly political in the parliamentary arena, elected officials such as the Young Māori Party were not empowered, in Māori eyes, to act as spokesmen on Māori matters.”

While The Young Māori Party actively promoted political participation, not all of the members of the Young Māori Party became Members of Parliament and those that were did not all stand for the same political party (Smith, 2010). However, this would change when a new Māori political group, Nga Koata e Wha (the four quarters) emerged out of the religious Rātana movement, which would see all four of the Māori seats more firmly aligned with the Labour Party. The Rātana Movement, led by Tahupotiki Wiremu Rātana, was a faith based movement which leaned heavily on Old Testament explanations for Māori loss and suffering and compared the plight of Māori to that of the Israelites. The Rātana movement was significant for the way in which it de-emphasised traditional tribal hierarchies in favour of a pan-Māori identity which was distinctly working class (Hazelhurst, 1993). As well as seeking to unite Māori under the banner of Christianity, Rātana also drafted a petition seeking to establish te Tiriti/the Treaty of Waitangi in legislation, which was presented to Parliament in 1932 (Cox, 1993). Although ultimately this goal would not be achieved in Rātana’s lifetime, the movement’s focus became increasingly political, as Rātana sought to capture all of the four Māori seats, a feat finally achieved in 1943. As Cox (1993) argues, this move can be seen as a changing of the guard, whereby members of the Young Māori Party, who by this time had come to represent a more conservative and elite sector of Māori society, were

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replaced by those more representative of the poorer and displaced majority of Māori. Furthermore, the distinct class-based identity of the Rātana members lent itself to a political alliance with the Labour Party, which was established informally in 1931 when Labour Leader Harry Holland agreed not to contest the Māori seats in return for Rātana support in the House. This alliance was strengthened with the Labour victory in the 1935 general election under Michael Joseph Savage (Cox, 1993), and the fact that the Māori seats held the balance of power between 1946 and 1949 gave Māori a solid platform to promote Māori interests (Hazelhurst, 1993).

The early period of British settlement in Aotearoa New Zealand is characterised on the one hand by the attempts of the British Crown to establish sole sovereign power over Aotearoa New Zealand by attempting to assimilate Māori within British legal and social structures. In particular assimilation policies attempted to undermine the collective social structures of Māori which were seen as a barrier to the acquisition of Māori land for British settlement. On the other hand it is clear to see that Māori engaged in a number of different strategies in an attempt to assert and maintain their rights to self-determination. Māori affairs policies initiated by the state during this time have thus responded to these attempts by accommodating limited recognition of Māori authority. In contrast to policies of assimilation the Whānau Ora approach recognises and embraces the strengths of collective social structures such as whānau. While assimilation remained a priority for the New Zealand government at the turn of the century, the following decades would see a period of rapid social change for both Māori and Pakeha, leading to a shift in the direction of Māori Affairs policy.

Māori on the move: 1930 - 1970

In 1935 the Labour Government was elected. It owed a measure of its success to the support from the Rātana movement, which held a great deal of influence over the Māori parliamentary seats. The basis for its support of Labour was the promise that Māori would receive equal considerations in the creation of a new welfare state. However, although equal access to the welfare state had been a key goal of the Rātana movement, not all Māori were convinced of the benefits of such a scheme. Apirana Ngata was concerned that the provision of social security would result in Māori becoming less self-reliant, and disenfranchised from their traditional support structures of iwi, hapū and whānau (Cheyne et al. 2005).
The 1938 Social Welfare Act ensured Māori were given equal entitlements to the new benefit system in theory, but in practice this was often a different matter. As McClure (2004) argues, a loophole provided by section 72 (2) enabled discrimination by Social Security Department officers who used this loophole to pay disbursements to Māori at a consistently lower rate. Unequal benefit payments were a feature of the new welfare state until the Second World War, when Māori commitment to the national war effort made it difficult to justify denying Māori rights of equal citizenship. However, the resulting improvement in the socio-economic experiences of Māori led to increased levels of scrutiny over how benefit monies were spent, and a prevailing perception that Māori were feckless and lazy.

The outbreak of the Second World War saw significant societal change for both Māori and Pakeha. Māori were enthusiastic supporters of the war effort, seeing it as an opportunity to be regarded as full citizens within society (Stephens, 2011). As well as the Māori Battalion, whose exploits and conduct during the war created a lasting legacy, around 300 tribal committees were established as part of the Māori War Effort Organisation (MWEO). These committees took part in rallying support, fundraising, recruiting Māori into wartime employment and other community based work (Hill, 2009). The success of these organisations led to calls for the committee system to replace the official state agency for Māori and for Māori to have more control over their own affairs. The 1945 Māori Social and Economic Advancement Act (MSEA Act) was seen by the state as a compromise between allowing Māori to have the autonomy they sought and reverting back to the paternalistic systems in place prior to the war. As Hill (2009:13) comments, “government authorities had been frightened off by the very success of the Māori War Effort Organisation: its demonstration that Māori could run their affairs autonomously – a concept most Pakeha of the time found difficult to accept – and its fostering of kotahitanga or Māori unity”. The Act placed Māori committees under the auspices of the Department of Native Affairs, and continued its focus on the socio-economic improvement of Māori (Hill 2009).

By the mid-20th century the Māori population was increasing rapidly, doubling in the two decades following the end of World War II, and Māori were increasingly migrating into urban areas to take up the jobs generated by the post-war economic boom (Hill, 2009). This urban migration challenged the widely held belief that New Zealand was a shining example of perfect race relations – a view which had been easy to uphold when Māori and Pākeha lived separately (Hill, 2009). Another Māori-led organisation which emerged during this period was the Māori Women’s Welfare League. This grew out of nationwide Māori networks of Women’s Welfare Committees (WWCs) and the Māori Women’s Health League (WHL) and became increasingly influential in running the affairs of their people and initiating
flaxroots movements aimed at supporting the particular interests of whānau such as housing, education and health (Hill, 2009). The League would become one of the main driving forces behind the *Tu Tangata* initiatives discussed later in this chapter (Families Commission, 2013). However, Hill (2009) argues that the activities of the League did not challenge but in fact supported the assimilationist goals of the state, which included transitioning Māori into an urban life structured around Pakeha values.

**Integration and the Hunn Report**

By 1960, the Labour-led government was facing criticism over its failure to implement its own policies with regards to Māori. There was also public debate about the ‘social maladjustment’ of the increasing numbers of Māori migrating to the cities (Hill, 2009). In response to some of these criticisms, Prime Minister Walter Nash (who was also the Minister of Māori affairs) appointed Jack Kent Hunn to the role of Acting Secretary of Māori Affairs in January 1960, and tasked him with providing a review of the Department of Māori Affairs while at the same time undertaking a ‘stock take’ of the social and economic situation of Māori. The *Report on the Department of Māori Affairs* which became more commonly known as the ‘Hunn Report’, was completed in August 1960.

While Nash’s primary motivation in commissioning the report had been to tackle the issue of the increasing fragmentation of Māori land title which was seen as contributing to the decreasing economic viability of Māori land (Harris, 2007), Hunn saw the report as an opportunity to examine not only the economic resources of Māori but their social resources as well. The Hunn Report highlighted the fact that Māori were disproportionately disadvantaged in areas such as health, employment, education and housing. They had lower life expectancy than Pākeha and higher rates of infant mortality. They had higher levels of unemployment, and where they were employed it was more usually in less skilled categories such as process work and labouring (Harris, 2007). Analysis of issues and recommendations were included under the headings of population, land settlement, housing, education, employment, health, land titles, legal differentiation and crime. In total eighty-four recommendations were made under these headings, most of which were fairly uncontroversial. For example, suggestions included more kindergartens and play centres in Māori areas, a continuous health campaign targeted towards Māori, better legal representation for Māori offenders and an increase in funding for Māori housing (Hunn, 1960).
What was to prove controversial, however, was Hunn’s endorsement of a process of integration as the best means of achieving better outcomes for Māori. The report suggested that the best way forward for Māori was to become integrated with the Pākeha culture; that is “[t]o combine (not fuse) the Māori and Pākeha elements to form one nation wherein Māori culture remains distinct” (Hunn, 1960:15). However, it can be argued that many of the Hunn Report’s recommendations can be seen as an attempt to push Māori towards a way of life which was essentially indistinguishable from a Pākeha way of life, and in doing so the line between assimilation and integration becomes blurred. For example, recommendations to mainstream the relationship between Māori and Pākeha through the disestablishment of a specialist Department of Māori Affairs, as well as the removal of any reference to Māori within legal statute, were seen as indicative of the drive for Māori to simply be absorbed into the mainstream. Further recommendations included transferring the administration of Māori schools to the Board of Education, with the eventual goal being the phasing out of ‘segregated education’ (Harris, 2007).

Māori housing and land title was another area in which the distinction between integration and assimilation was blurred. Hunn believed that the relationship between Māori and the mainstream was best achieved by the dispersal of Māori amongst the wider population. Described as ‘pepper potting’, the policy aimed to avoid segregated Māori communities transplanted from the country into the cities, with the ultimate goal being one Māori family per street (Hill, 2009). Hunn’s vision was that urban Māori would eventually relinquish the ties that bound them to their land ‘back home’ and come to see home ownership in the cities as the new realisation of their turangawaewae (Harris, 2007). As Harris (2007:141) comments:

If they so wished, modern Māori could accessorise their lives with Māori ceremony, and performing and material arts, but the preferred way forward was essentially assimilation, renamed integration where Māori lived as nuclear families in individual homes that they bought with their wages, sent their law abiding children to mainstream schools, had no need to be serviced by a specialist department, and left their land interest to the few relatives, who could survive economically at ‘home’.

The report was initially shelved by Prime Minister Nash, who was wary of igniting controversy ahead of the general election which was held in November of that year. As Hill (2009:91) comments, “the major reason for non-release of the Hunn report in election year was to avoid publicly highlighting (in Pākeha eyes) ‘the Māori problem’ and (in Māori eyes) the government’s inability or unwillingness to seriously address indigenous marginalisation”. The report was instead released in January 1961, after the Labour Party lost the election to
National, by the incoming Minister of Māori Affairs J R Hanan, who recognised an opportunity for political points scoring in the report's implicit criticism of Labour initiated policies (Hill, 2009).

The Hunn report had a significant impact on Māori policy in a number of ways. As Harris (2007) argues, the report essentially had the effect of problematising Māori through a detailed accounting of their 'deficits' in comparison to the Pākeha population. This deficits based model has clear parallels to the Closing the Gaps approach discussed later in this chapter. The Hunn Report also firmly positioned the state as the 'fixer' of Māori issues. Whānau Ora, by taking a strengths based approach and seeking to involve Māori whānau in formulating their own paths to wellbeing, can be understood as a response against these types of state-led approaches.

**Māori Self-Determination and Development: 1970 - 2000**

The rapid urbanisation of the Māori population during the 1950s and 1960s, coupled with a significant economic downturn in the 1970s, set the scene for another period of social and political change in Aotearoa New Zealand. The emergence of a number of international social movements including the civil rights movement in the United States, contributed to a renaissance in Māori language and culture, as well as influencing calls from Māori for self-determination, and for the government to 'honour the Treaty'. While growing levels of Māori discontent and protest undoubtedly influenced the direction of Māori Affairs policy during this period, the introduction of neoliberal policies by the Fourth Labour Government in 1984 would have significant repercussions for the way in which the state engaged with Māori. Past attempts to assimilate or integrate Māori into the structures of the colonial state were abandoned in favour of a new model of ‘partnership’ between Māori and the government as well as a new emphasis on ‘Māori development’.

One of the most significant triggers for renewed Māori activism was the 1967 Māori Affairs Ammendment Act, which was recommended by the Hunn report. In particular, the Act doubled the value of Māori land which the government was able to forcefully acquire. Furthermore, the status of land that was owned by four or fewer Māori was to be changed to European land – which meant that it could be sold (Hill, 2009). Justified by the government on the grounds that the forced acquisition assisted those Māori migrating to the city by providing a form of relocation capital, the Act caused widespread anger amongst Māori who came to view it as another land grab by government. Hill (2009) argues that the Act served
as a turning point in the quest for Māori rangatiratanga as it served to unite Māori across all sectors of society, commenting that:

The struggle thus produced a basis for future cross-sector action within Māoridom to protect against social injustice and further the cause of autonomy in its many actual and potential manifestations.

This unification of Māori over the issue of land culminated in 1975 in what became known as the ‘Māori Land March’, which was led by founding president of the Māori Women’s Welfare League, Whina Cooper, who was by then in her 80s (Hill, 2009). Marching under the slogan of ‘not one more acre of Māori land’, the protest gathered huge publicity, while serving to connect the themes of landlessness with cultural loss in the minds of Māori (Hill, 2009). These events would serve to act as a forerunner to later protests including Māori occupations at Bastion point and at Raglan, and decades later, the Hīkoi sparked by the Foreshore and Seabed legislation.

At the same time as Māori protesters were beginning to unite over the issue of land, a new generation of Māori leaders were emerging who would play a significant role in Māori activism. This new cohort of activists included the likes of Ranginui Walker, Patu Hohepa, Robert Mahuta, Koro Dewes, Sydney Mead and leaders of radical protest groups such as Nga Tamatoa and Ahi Kaa including Syd and Hana Jackson and others (King, 2003). Unlike many of the key Māori leaders of previous generations, this new group of Māori activists were largely urban, tertiary educated and a great deal more strident in their criticisms of the perceived shortcomings of the state (King, 2003). Coordinated and sustained calls by Māori for self-determination and for the Crown to ‘honour the Treaty’ in turn influenced a shift in Māori policy direction. Tu Tangata (Standing Tall) were programmes initiated by the Department of Māori Affairs during the late 1970s and 1980s, which aimed to shift from a top down approach to one which encouraged engagement and participation from Māori communities by reflecting Māori principles of whānau and rangatiratanga (Patete, 2008). Driven largely by the influential Māori Women’s Welfare League, such programmes were seen by the National Government in power at the time as being a means of reducing Māori reliance on state welfare by encouraging a ‘self-help’ approach, while at the same time giving practical effect to the increasing pressure by Māori to have more control over their own affairs (Hill, 2009).

One of the major successes of Tu Tangata was the establishment of the Kōhanga Reo movement. Kōhanga reo (language nests) are total-immersion Māori language pre-schools, whose day to day operations are based on whānau principles. As Hill (2009:197) comments, “Kōhanga reo became the most successful – and representative – of all
programmes under the *Tu Tangata* umbrella, acquiring an international reputation for community based educational and cultural success*. By 1987, 500 Kōhanga Reo had been established (Hill, 2009). However, Patete (2008) argues that, while *Tu Tangata* had significant successes it also had fundamental problems, including being underfunded and largely ignoring the needs of urban Māori who had become a significant proportion of the Māori population. It was also made clear that any measure of Māori autonomy enabled by such programmes was at the pleasure of the Crown. Hill (2009:194) argues that, “any resources or powers conceded to Māori communities could be taken back if the actions of the recipients, in their capacity as people running institutions accountable to the Crown, displeased ministers or officials”. In spite of this, *Tu Tangata* did reflect a growing recognition of the importance of Māori cultural values in the formulation of solutions to Māori issues. It can also be seen as the forerunner to the policies of devolution which were to follow with the introduction into power of the new Labour Government. Both the incorporation of Māori cultural values in the formation of policy and the utilisation of ‘by Māori for Māori’ service provision would also become features of Whānau Ora.

**The establishment of the Treaty settlement process**

Another significant development in the latter half of the 20th century was the establishment of a framework to deal with Māori grievances against the Crown. Consistent calls on the part of Māori for the government to ‘honour the Treaty’, and to include Te Tiriti in government legislation, as well as a growing international movement focussed on civil rights, put increased pressure on the government to put in place structures which could deal with Māori grievances against the Crown. The 1975 Waitangi Tribunal Act did just that, through the establishment of a permanent commission of enquiry which was able to hear claims and make recommendations on alleged Crown Breaches of te Tiriti/the Treaty (Ruru, 2010). However, initially the jurisdiction of the tribunal was limited to hearing claims relating to breaches committed after 1975, which severely limited its ability to address the historical injustices which constituted the vast majority of Māori concerns. This limitation was resolved when the Labour Government passed legislation a decade later which allowed the Tribunal retrospective powers to investigate claims dating back to 1840.

The Waitangi Tribunal process has brought significant gains for some iwi and hapū, who have made claims not only regarding the loss of physical resources such as land and fisheries, but also over the loss of less tangible things such as language and culture. A number of pan-tribal claims have been presented, such as the Te Reo Māori claim which
contended that the government had failed in its duty to protect taonga (treasures) such as the Māori language. This resulted in Māori becoming an official language of New Zealand in 1987 and the establishment of the Māori Language Commission. The embedding of Treaty of Waitangi principles within legislation has also had significant impacts for Māori. For example, section 9 the State Owned Enterprises Act 1986 prohibited the Crown from acting in any way inconsistent with the principles of the Treaty (Hill 2009). The New Zealand Public Health and Disability Act 2000 took these principles a step further by explicitly stating that the government was responsible for Māori health outcomes, and as such was required to provide mechanisms for Māori participation and decision making within health structures. This Act is discussed in more detail in the following chapter.

However, while on the one hand the settlement process has seen significant economic benefits for some Māori, the settlement process is also open to critique on a number of fronts. As Ruru (2010) points out, even where claims are upheld by the Tribunal, its recommendations are not binding on the government, and the government ultimately decides on how much if any compensation for claims it is willing to make. Furthermore, National-led governments in particular have been keen to force the pace of settlements and place constraints on the total package of compensation in order to limit political backlash from their constituents. As well as setting an optimistic target of settling all outstanding Treaty claims by the year 2000 (Walker, 2004), National also sought to limit government spending on such claims by introducing what became known as the ‘fiscal envelope’. This was essentially a cap on what the government argued it could afford to set aside to deal with Treaty claims and was set at the tidy sum of $1 billion (Sullivan, 2006).

The settlement process also had the effect of creating significant debates centred around identity with regards to how resources were to be distributed. This was particularly evident in the case of the pan-tribal ‘Sealord Deal’ which saw the Crown purchase a 50% share of Sealord Products Ltd and allocate a further 20% of future quota under the quota management system (Hill, 2009). Significant litigation ensued over how this would be distributed amongst Māori, in particular were claims made by urban Māori institutions over who could be considered as ‘iwi’ for the purposes of allocation (Hill, 2009). In more recent years, the settlement process has become subject to increasing public scrutiny, both in terms of the amount of time it has taken to settle claims as well as the way in which Māori have engaged in claims seen as controversial (for example the recent National Freshwater and Geothermal Resources Claim) which has led some commentators to suggest that Māori are now embedded within a grievance industry (Poata-Smith, 2013). This has led to the
National Party including promises to introduce deadlines by which time all Treaty claims must be resolved.

While the increased focus on settling Treaty claims may have positive outcomes for Māori, there is a corresponding pressure on iwi to accept what is offered with little opportunity for fair negotiation processes. Promises by politicians to fast-track the settlement process also sends a clear signal on behalf of the Crown, that the Treaty of Waitangi is viewed as an historical artefact, and that once all such claims have been settled, the Crown will have fulfilled its duty to Māori and the relevance of the Treaty will be diminished. This does not speak to Māori expectations that te Tiriti/the Treaty forms the basis of an ongoing relationship between Māori and the Crown; a view encapsulated by the WAI 262 report, Ko Aotearoa Tenei:

> It is time to move forward. As a nation we should shift our view of the Treaty from that of a breached contract, which can be repaired in the moment, to that of an exchange of solemn promises made about our ongoing relationships. It is the process of historical settlements itself that allows us to shift our attention in this way from the past to the future (Waitangi Tribunal, 2011:247).

While the Treaty Settlement process has been significant with regards to acknowledging historical Māori grievance against the Crown, and providing limited forms of reparation to some iwi and hapū, it is the way in which te Tiriti/the Treaty influences the ongoing relationship between Māori and the Crown that will have the the most significant impact on policy in the future. As we have seen with the 1986 State Enterprises Act and the 2002 New Zealand Public Health and Disability Act, embedding the principles of the Treaty within legislation, although controversial, can emphasise the obligation that the state has to consider Māori needs, rights and aspirations as part of its decision making processes. Furthermore, placing te Tiriti/the Treaty at the centre of constitutional discussions may improve the longer term sustainability of Māori policy approaches such as Whānau Ora. This is discussed further in Chapters Five and Six.

The Shift towards Māori Development & Partnerships with the Crown

Following the General Election in 1984, the Fourth Labour Government embarked on a series of reforms which would see the state move away from the previous Keynesian model of a state managed economy towards a market-based approach to social service delivery (Humpage & Craig, 2008). These reforms were influenced by an international shift towards a neoliberal ideology, which was concerned with minimising state intervention while promoting the market as the key mechanism for the distribution of goods and services within society.
(Cheyne et al. 2005). In particular, neoliberalism encouraged competition between social service providers, as this was seen as a means of giving consumers choice. As Humpage and Craig (2008:45) comment, “the language of the market (choice, self-reliance, and devolution) appealed to a range of groups, not just free market economists, because it appeared to meet the calls by Māori, women and other identity groups for improved access, cultural appropriateness and control over the services they used”.

This new focus on neoliberal ideas by government subsequently saw a shift in Māori Affairs policy towards efforts to develop the economic potential of Māori through partnership relationships with the Crown. With this goal in mind, A Hui Taumata (Māori economic summit) was held in 1984. It concluded that previous policies of assimilation and integration had largely failed to lift Māori economic and social wellbeing and that Māori wanted greater involvement in meeting their own needs as being distinctly Māori (Sullivan, 2006). The Hui Taumata focused on positive Māori development, and a philosophy of ‘positive funding rather than negative spending’; the need for a solid economic base for Māori was seen as crucial in moving Māori away from dependency on state welfare (Durie, 1998). As Durie (1998:7) comments, “there was an expectation that Māori people could realise greater levels of economic self-sufficiency, improved social well-being and less dependency on the state if they took advantage of their own distinctive social institutions such as iwi and hapū and actively developed their own tribal resources”. The Hui Taumata coincided with a period of rapid economic and social change, and Māori desire for cultural recognition and self-determination seemed to fit well with the neoliberal policies favoured by the new government, who sought to de-centralise responsibility for service provision by pushing it out to communities. Mana Enterprises and MACCESS (Māori ACCESS) training programmes are examples of initiatives which arose out of the Hui Taumata (Durie, 1998).

Contributing to the view that Māori could achieve better outcomes by utilising the strengths of their own social institutions was a growing awareness that mainstream government institutions were mono-cultural, and did not adequately address Māori needs. These sentiments were echoed in the release of Pūao-te-ata-tū in 1988, which highlighted institutional racism in the way in which government departments and policies, especially those related to welfare, dealt with Māori. The report was commissioned in 1985 by the Minister of Social Welfare Ann Hercus, who sought to understand the best means of meeting the needs of Māori through policy and service delivery within the Department. Pūao-te-ata-tū was finally released in 1988 following an extensive process of consultation with both Māori and with public sector workers throughout the country (Human Rights Commission, 2012). The report found that institutional racism was not only present within the Department of
Social Welfare, but was an issue which was relevant to all government departments. It stated that “[n]ational structures are evolved which are rooted in the values, systems and viewpoints of one culture only. Participation by minorities is conditional on their subjugating their own values and systems to those of ‘the system’ of the power culture” (Ministerial Advisory Committee on a Māori Perspective for the Department of Social Welfare, 1986:19)

The report challenged government departments to incorporate the “values, cultures and beliefs of the Māori people in all policies developed for the future of New Zealand” (Ministerial Advisory Committee on a Māori Perspective for the Department of Social Welfare, 1986:9). Key recommendations were made around the recruitment and training of state sector staff to ensure greater understanding and awareness of Māori cultural issues and the need to be responsive to Māori sectors of the community. One of the more significant recommendations was that the Children and Young Persons Act 1974 be amended on the basis that it failed to take into account the importance of whānau, hapū and iwi relationships when decisions were made regarding the foster care of vulnerable Māori children. Maatua Whangai was a programme developed in response to this which sought to keep children within the wider whānau/hapū/iwi groups where possible, recognising the importance of whakapapa links in maintaining Māori identity (Durie, 1998). The programme was underpinned by a focus on the role of iwi which had also been a key feature of the Hui Taumata, and represented a strong move away from a pan-Māori approach to policy.

This renewed focus on the role of iwi was also reflected in the discussion document *Te Tirohanga Rangapu* (Partnership Perspectives) which was released by the Labour Government in 1988. The government’s objectives as outlined by the document were: to honour the principles of the Treaty of Waitangi; eliminate the educational, personal, socio-economic and cultural well-being gaps which existed between Māori and the general population; provide opportunities for economic development of Māori; deal with Treaty grievances; provide resources for the maintenance of Māori language and culture; promote decision making in the machinery of government including involving Māori in policy formation and service delivery and encourage Māori participation in the political process (Department of Māori Affairs, 1988). Through *Te Tirohanga Rangapu* the government not only signalled its desire to engage in a partnership relationship with Māori (a move which was also affirmed in the Report of the Royal Commission on Social Policy released at the same time) but also its commitment to restructuring the public service as part of its neoliberal agenda. This was to be achieved through a separation of the commercial, operational, policy and regulatory functions of government (Butterworth & Young, 1990). With this aim in mind, *Te Tirohanga Rangapu* proposed that the Department of Māori Affairs be abolished, with its operational programmes such as housing and Māori ACCESS being transferred to mainstream
departments and a new ministry being created which would develop and advise on policy in the Māori Affairs area. This in turn would enable a more direct relationship to be developed between iwi organisations and the government (Department of Māori Affairs, 1988). The document stated that the new structure would “give iwi organisations a strong and meaningful role in the machinery of government, both in the delivery of programmes and, through the Ministry, in their shaping and resourcing” (Department of Māori Affairs, 1998:11). This statement suggested that the government was willing to devolve some responsibility to iwi organisations.

As Butterworth and Young (1990) note, Māori were justifiably concerned about the destruction of the Department of Māori Affairs as mainstream departments were largely viewed as being unresponsive to the needs of Māori (a view affirmed in Puao-te-ata-tu). In response to these concerns, the government released a follow up policy statement *Te Urupae Rangapu* (Partnership Response), which reaffirmed the government’s objectives with regards to Māori and provided more detail as to how the government intended to implement its new programme of devolution. This included the formation of an Iwi Transition Agency, which would remain in place for five years. During this transition period, the operational functions of the department would be transferred to mainstream departments, a new Ministry of Māori Affairs would be established and iwi governance structures would be developed in order for iwi to deliver government funded programmes to their people. At the end of the five year transition period, the old Department of Māori Affairs would be disbanded (Patete, 2008).

*Te Urupae Rangapu* presented a strong vision whereby Māori would achieve self-determination (Patete, 2008). It stated that the Iwi Transition Agency would “ensure that Māori people achieve rangatiratanga in the sense of the agreed partnership guaranteed under te Tiriti/the Treaty of Waitangi – and that this partnership is achieved in practice, not just in words” (Department of Māori Affairs, 1998:23). The responsibility to create iwi governance structures was outlined in the Rūnanga Iwi Act. Passed in 1990, the Act acknowledged the central role of iwi, while presenting a framework for devolution in which legally incorporated Rūnanga became the administrative wings of tribes (Hill, 2009). On the one hand, as Sullivan (2006) argues, devolution required Māori iwi authorities and other organisations to create corporate governance structures before government awarded contracts for provision of services, which increased Māori capacity for self management. As a result of the government’s new philosophy of devolution, the number of Māori organisations keen to establish themselves as service providers for such initiatives increased rapidly (Poata-Smith, 2004). On the other hand, critics of the Act have claimed
that it set Māori up in a competitive struggle with each other for limited Crown resources, while at the same time prescribing how iwi were to operate.

However, the extent to which devolution truly offered autonomy for Māori has been widely debated. Martin (1991:268) distinguishes between the concepts of devolution and decentralisation, defining devolution as “the transfer of power, authority and responsibility from a national to a sub-national level; and decentralisation as the delegation of power and authority to lower levels, with ultimate responsibility remaining at the national level”. While Māori may have seen enhanced opportunities for developing “Māori solutions for Māori problems” (Bargh 2007:39) in the devolution programme initiated by the Labour government in the 1980s, what eventuated was in fact a decentralisation of service delivery rather than true devolution. Existing Māori structures and institutions were co-opted in similar ways to the tribal Rūnanga of the 19th century, serving to further the government’s neoliberal agenda by creating corporate models of management while at the same time allowing the state to minimise its own responsibility for positive outcomes for Māori. Ultimate power over funding and policy making remained firmly with the state. Urban Māori and pan-tribal organisations, such as Rātana, were also critical of the way in which the Act placed emphasis on iwi (Hill, 2009). However, despite the imperfect way in which devolution may have realised aspirations of true partnership between Māori and the Crown, it has had an ongoing influence on the direction of Māori policy making. In particular, there are strong parallels with Whānau Ora, evident in the neoliberal contractual relationships between the state and Māori service providers which have been facilitated through the separation of policy, funding and delivery mechanisms.

With the election of the National Party in 1990, Māori social policy direction shifted from devolution to what became known as mainstreaming. In its election campaign, National had played to a growing backlash against what was increasingly seen as a policy of separatism and a privileging of Māori partnerships with the Crown. Promoting a slogan of ‘one nation, one law’, the National Government sought to ensure that assistance to Māori was on the basis of need and not race (Hill, 2009). The policy document Ka Awatea, commissioned by the new Minister for Māori Affairs, Winston Peters, was focussed primarily on Māori needs, and held all government departments accountable for meeting these needs. Echoing the Hunn report, Ka Awatea claimed that a single Department of Māori Affairs which oversaw both policy advice and service delivery was neither sufficient nor efficient, and advocated a restructuring of the Department. This saw both the Iwi Transition agency and Manatu Māori replaced by the more compact Te Puni Kōkiri (Ministry of Māori Development), which oversaw policy development, and administered advice aimed at
promoting Māori development, and minimising the gaps between Māori and non-Māori, focusing particularly in the areas of education, health, training and economic resource management. As Hill (2009:248) comments, “each government department would deal with Māori just the same as if they were Pākeha”.

*Ka Awatea* also represented a significant retreat from the focus on partnerships with iwi, placing more emphasis on the responsibility of government to reduce the disparities between Māori and non-Māori in areas of health, education, training and resource development (Durie, 1998). The National Government repealed the Rūnanga Iwi Act, arguing that there were already mechanisms in place such as Māori Trust Boards which gave recognition to iwi (Durie, 1998). As imperfect as the Rūnanga Iwi Act had been in the eyes of many, its abolition was met with concern that with it went any notion of recognition of official partnership with the Crown (Hill, 2009). While mainstreaming shifted away from an outright focus on devolution, the contracting of service delivery to Māori organisations continued during this time (Sullivan, 2006).

By the late 1990s it had become evident that the neoliberal reforms implemented over the last decade and a half had a disproportionately negative effect on Māori, and that the gaps between Māori and non-Māori in areas such as health, educational outcomes and employment were significant. These disparities between Māori and non-Māori in regards to economic and social well-being were highlighted in a report published by Te Puni Kōkiri titled *Progress Towards Closing the Social and Economic Gaps Between Māori and Non-Māori* (1998). Drawing upon *Ka Awatea*, the report stated explicitly that responsibility for closing these gaps rested with the government. Although released under the National-led coalition, *Progress Towards Closing the Social and Economic Gaps Between Māori and Non-Māori* was picked up by the incoming Labour-led government to form the basis of its flagship social policy Closing the Gaps, launched in the 2000/2001 budget (Humpage, 2006).

The Labour-led coalition government was strongly influenced by the Third Way ideas of Britain’s New Labour, which attempted to find a middle way between the Keynesian model of a state managed economy and the market-led approaches which underpinned neoliberalism (Humpage & Craig, 2008). Third Way policies continued to emphasise paid work as the most effective form of welfare, but also focussed on issues of ‘social inclusion’ through a renewed focus on issues of inequality and disadvantage. As Humpage (2006:230) argues, Closing the Gaps “positioned Māori as the deviant excluded and non-Māori as the normalized included by pursuing the traditional goal of reducing Māori socio-economic disadvantage.” It did this in two ways: the first was by holding the government accountable for improving Māori outcomes by setting a series of benchmarks in areas such as health and
education against which progress could be effectively measured through annual updates. The second was a programme of capacity building, which saw funding given to Māori communities to assist them in implementing their own programmes. This included building provider capacity so that Māori organisations could bid for government contracts (Poata-Smith, 2013).

Humpage (2006) contends that Closing the Gaps was promoted to Māori through frequent reference to notions of partnership, self-determination and the Treaty of Waitangi as a strategy that would see enhanced measures of Māori autonomy. Labour had also recently facilitated the inclusion of reference to the principles of the Treaty into the 2000 New Zealand Public Health and Disability Act (NZPHDA), the first time such reference had been included in social policy (see Chapter Three). Māori, and the wider public, thus perceived the strategy to be one which recognised Māori rights as indigenous peoples (Humpage, 2006). However, Poata-Smith (2008:103) comments that:

While the rhetoric of Closing the Gaps is based on notions of empowerment and building the capacity of Māori communities, the emphasis on the rights of equal citizenship under the auspices of Article Three of the Treaty has effectively deflected the more politicised themes of tino rangatiratanga under Article Two.

I argue later in this thesis that similar observations can be made about the Whānau Ora approach. While the language may include references to self-determination, this is framed in terms of whānau self management, rather than being a statement of partnership at the political level. It is also interesting to note the way in which both Closing the Gaps and Whānau Ora included Pacific peoples as targeted communities alongside Māori. While the two communities may have comparable needs from a social policy perspective (see Poata-Smith, 2004), such a conflation serves to undermine specific Treaty based rights held by Māori (Humpage, 2006).

However, regardless of whether or not Closing the Gaps was fit for purpose in terms of realising tino rangatiratanga, the strategy proved to be shortlived. As Ringold (2005) points out, the Closing the Gaps policy was modified as early as 2001 in response to media reports that Māori were receiving special benefits not available to the rest of the population. Concern over overt targeting of Māori was influenced in part by the publication of an report on ‘Māori Socio-economic Disparity’ (Chapple, 2000). The Chapple report critiqued not only the notion of targeting policy towards reducing disparities between Māori and non-Māori but also claimed that the very basis for measuring Māori as a distinct ethnicity was flawed. Although the methodology which Chapple used to generate his conclusions was questioned by a number of authors (for example, see Alexander, 2001), the report fed into a growing sense
of unease about specific targeting of Māori in government policy. This led the Labour Government to downplay policies which could be seen to be based on ethnicity in favour of ‘social equity policies’ which focussed solely on needs (Sullivan, 2006). The initiative was thus repackaged as ‘Reducing Inequalities’, and was broadened in scope to include other ‘disadvantaged’ groups including the disabled (Ringold, 2005).

Another event during Labour’s second term which would have a significant impact on the direction of Māori Affairs policy was the controversy sparked over the 2004 Foreshore and Seabed Act. This legislation was introduced in order to quell fears raised by an appeal court ruling that Māori rights to parts of the foreshore and seabed had not necessarily been formally extinguished. Although the legislation saw Māori unify in protest the likes of which had not been seen since the Māori Land March of 1975, non-Māori were also whipped into further frenzy thanks to a divisive speech made by opposition leader Don Brash, which suggested that Māori were privileged on the basis of rights unavailable to other New Zealanders (Brash, 2004). The surge in popularity for the National party on the basis of so-called Māori privilege influenced Labour’s move away from policies that could be seen as favouring Māori. These events are discussed in more detail in Chapter Five.

As well as legislating to prevent Māori from testing their rights to the foreshore and seabed, Prime Minister Helen Clark responded to the controversy and Brash’s Orewa speech by creating a new ministerial portfolio on ‘Race Relations’, which was given to (Pākehā) MP Trevor Mallard in 2004 (Sullivan, 2006). Mallard’s first project in the newly created role was to undertake a review of all government policies and programmes to ensure that they targeted ‘need’ and not ‘race’ (Sullivan, 2006). The results of Mallard’s review of targeted government policies were released in 2005. As Humpage (2004) argues, although a number of programmes were renamed or altered to de-emphasise an ethnic focus, most programmes continued in some way.

In spite of the racially charged challenge by the National Party and its subsequent resurgence in the polls, Labour managed to win the 2005 General Election, albeit with a much reduced majority. However, the events of the previous few years meant that the Labour government remained wary of implementing policies which specifically targeted Māori. The major social policies introduced in Labour’s third term included ‘Working for Families’, an in-work tax credit for families with children where at least one parent is in paid employment, and the retirement scheme ‘KiwiSaver’. While both of these policies were widely viewed as being socially progressive, it is arguable that given Māori have much higher rates of unemployment than non-Māori, they are less likely than most to receive the
benefits from such schemes, which are only available to those in paid employment (Poata-Smith, 2013).

Another significant development during Labour’s third term was the emergence of a discourse of indigenous rights which had been evolving within the international forum of the United Nations for some decades. As part of a process of establishing international law which would recognise the rights of indigenous peoples worldwide, a working group was established to draft what would become the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP). A number of authors argue that international legislation such as UNDRIP offers a number of benefits to indigenous peoples. For example, O’Sullivan (2007) suggests that the declaration provides a crucial reference point against which state commitments to indigenous rights can be measured. He argues that “[j]t authoritatively challenges liberal assumptions that as long as individual indigenous people are given the same rights as non-indigenous individuals, then the state has met its moral obligations” (O’Sullivan, 2007: 110).

However, while UNDRIP was adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations in 2007, New Zealand, alongside Australia, the United States and Canada stood in opposition. Despite the fact that Māori had been actively involved in the working group drafting the legislation, the Labour Government argued that certain articles in the Declaration were incompatible with New Zealand’s constitutional and legal arrangements (Horomia, 2007). These contentious articles include article three, which upholds the rights of indigenous peoples to self determination. Again, the concern was raised that by signing the Declaration the government could be seen as conceding that Māori had rights not available to other citizens. As Labour Minister Parekura Horomia stated, “the government strongly supports the full and active engagement of indigenous peoples in democratic decision-making processes. But these articles imply different classes of citizenship, where indigenous peoples have veto rights not held by others” (Horomia, 2007: n.p).

The nine years that Labour held power offered mixed outcomes for Māori in terms of progressing moves towards self-determination. While on the one hand Labour were successful in seeing the first inclusion of Treaty principles in social policy (the NZPHDA), the backlash that Labour faced following the Foreshore and Seabed controversy saw it shift away from policies such as Closing the Gaps which could be seen to be targeted toward Māori. Furthermore, Labour alienated a large proportion of its Māori constiuency in the process. The Foreshore and Seabed legislation saw the departure from Labour of Māori MP Tariana Turia who subsequently returned to Parliament as the leader of a new political party called the Māori Party. The impact that the creation of the Māori Party and its relationship
with National following 2008 had on the evolution of Whānau Ora and on Māori policy more broadly is significant, and will be discussed in more detail in the following chapters.

Conclusion

This chapter has established that Māori Affairs policy has evolved over the years but the goals of the state and the goals of Māori have largely remained in tension. The state continues to seek ways to maintain its authority through a continuing focus on ‘needs’ rather than ‘rights’. While policy solutions have reflected the shifting ideologies of the governments in power, they have generally been underpinned by a view of Māori as being disadvantaged. Therefore, such policies have tended to focus on ways by which to mitigate the damaging effects of colonisation and in the process to ‘close the gaps’ with the non-Māori ‘mainstream’ population. As well as problematising Māori, this framing has resulted in state policy being seen as the solution to perceived Māori failure (Harris, 2007). On the other hand, Māori have demonstrated the fact that rights to self-determination continue to be a driving force for Māori engagement with the state. This chapter has also demonstrated that far from being ‘new’ in its approach to social service delivery, many of the principles of Whānau Ora can be found in previous initiatives. For example, the co-option of Māori concepts into policy, as well as a focus on the collective of whānau were seen in initiatives such as Tu Tangata. Furthermore, ‘by-Māori-for-Māori’ service delivery was a key feature of of the devolution approach introduced in the 1980s.

It is also evident when examining the evolution of state policy that, by and large, such policies have failed to meet the needs of Māori. As Durie (1998) argues, this has in large part been a result of a fragmented approach from government departments which attempt to force structures and ways of working onto Māori which do not match iwi policies and practices, and are at odds with a Māori world view – a view which does not recognise clear distinctions between the economic, the social and the cultural but instead favours a more holistic approach. This failure to take account of Māori values and cultural practices was formally identified in the report Puao-te-ata-tu as a form of institutional racism.

It is arguable that while Whānau Ora attempts to overcome some of these past failings, it is still vulnerable to the same shifts in the political climate which have seen policies such as Te Urupae Rangapu and Closing the Gaps fall by the wayside when new governments with competing ideologies have come to power or when the weight of public opinion has been such that policies have become politically unviable. Such tensions were evident when Prime Minister John Key stated that Whānau Ora, although ostensibly aimed
specifically at Māori, must cater to all New Zealanders as an initiative that responds to need not ethnicity (Espiner, 2010). Like previous policies, it is also constrained by the fact that funding is controlled by the state, and this results in accountabilities and structures which may require compromises on the part of Māori in order to be compliant. These issues are discussed further in the following chapters.
Chapter Three: The Evolution of the Whānau Ora Approach

Introduction

The previous chapter provided a broad historical background to this chapter’s analysis of the Whānau Ora approach. It found that, on the one hand, the state has sought to exert its position as sole sovereign power, at first through attempts to assimilate Māori into Pākeha society and structures of governance, and then later through more ‘enlightened’ policies of integration and then development. On the other hand, chapter two also established the fact that Māori have consistently sought to maintain their authority and rights to self-determination. These tensions are also apparent in recent policy, as the following three chapters highlight.

The first part of the chapter will explore in more detail three recent policy shifts and political developments that have contributed to the evolution of the Whānau Ora approach. The first is the adoption of whole of government approaches to social policy issues. This has occurred in conjunction with an increasing focus on families and children in policy initiatives, which was influenced by the Third Way ideas favoured by the Labour coalition government. The second key development is reforms in the health sector, which have seen a market-based model of healthcare provision established. In turn, these reforms created a space for Māori service providers to evolve. Finally, key political developments, including changes to New Zealand’s electoral system and the emergence of an independent Māori Party, created opportunities to advance Māori policy agendas and initiatives, including Whānau Ora.

The second part of this chapter provides a detailed analysis of the Taskforce Report on Whānau-Centred Initiatives (2010) and its recommendations for a whānau centred approach to social service delivery. This analysis highlights that there are multiple ways of conceptualising Whānau Ora, which in turn allows considerable scope as to how the approach might be understood and implemented, increasing the likelihood that, as demonstrated in previous iterations of Māori Affairs policies and programmes, the expectations of stakeholders including whānau, providers and the state may be divergent. While primarily focussing on the Taskforce (2010) report’s recommendations, this analysis will be supported by data collected from key informant interviews. Key tensions identified between the philosophy of Whānau Ora as outlined by the Taskforce report and the way in
which Whānau Ora has been implemented thus far will be explored further in Chapters Four and Five.

Definitions of whānau and whānau ora

In the context of this research, the term ‘whānau’ must be viewed critically as it is imbued with a multitude of meanings. In particular, it is important to note that ‘whānau’ should not be simply translated as ‘family’. The following descriptions of whānau are by no means exhaustive, and illustrate the difficulties in co-opting such a term into a policy setting.

Whānau is often described as constituting the most basic unit of Māori society, followed by the hapū (sub tribe) and the iwi (tribe). Metge (1990) claims that whānau are seen as the smallest social unit with a measure of self-determination, and that traditionally the interests of both the individual and the nuclear family were subsumed by those of the wider whānau group. Walker (2004) also describes whānau as the basic unit of Māori society, whose main purpose was the procreation and care of children. Traditionally, whānau were comprised of three or four generations, with male and female elders (kaumātua and kuia), their adult children, spouses and children forming households which sometimes numbered upwards of thirty members. The responsibility for raising children was usually shared between all adult members of the group with the grandparents often taking on a primary care giving role while the parents were engaged in other activities such as food gathering.

Metge (1995) identifies five contemporary usages of the term whānau, which she argues are continuous with pre-European Māori society. The first is the interpretation of whānau to mean a set of siblings born to the same parents. The second more common usage is that of all the living descendants of a recently named ancestor, traced through both male and female links. As Metge (1995) points out, this interpretation of whānau is solely based on descent, and includes all eligible members whether or not individuals interact with the whānau or are even aware of these links. The third usage, while also focussing on descent, takes into account active participation and self-identification by members of the group. Group members may therefore move in and out of active participation. The fourth usage is centred around the core of a descent group but also encompasses the spouses and children adopted from outside of the whānau. Finally, the fifth usage is applied to groups at a broader genealogical level of hapū or iwi; in some instances because they include the word whānau in their name (e.g. Te Whānau-a-Apanui) or because whānau is used in a
metaphorical sense when addressing groups to remind them of shared responsibilities and obligations.

This variation in the usage of the term whānau can be seen as constituting a spectrum, with whānau members organised strictly through lines of descent at one end, and whānau who share a common purpose but who may not be related through kinship ties at the other (Durie, 2001). In this later interpretation, often described as kaupapa whānau, members act towards one another as though they were whānau regardless of whether or not whakapapa relationships exist. Common examples of groups that function in this way are kōhanga reo (pre-school Māori language nests) and committees connected to urban marae. Durie (2001) points out that unlike whakapapa whānau, associations of this sort are more fluid, with individuals exiting groups when the relationship is no longer useful. Moeke-Pickering (1996) describes these sorts of arrangements as ‘whānau as a management framework’, cautioning that although there are positive aspects to this development, the original kinship element of whānau may become diminished as a result.

Whānau is also seen as a key site for the development of Māori identity, a place where the teaching of things Māori took place and an environment where particular responsibilities and obligations were maintained (Moeke-Pickering, 1996). Moeke-Pickering (1996:np) claims that “the formation of a secure whānau identity is likely to contribute to an overall stable Māori identity. Creating an environment where a sense of secure wellbeing among members of a whānau is nurtured leads to members constructing a whānau and Māori identity that is meaningful to them and their lives.” Taiapa (1994) also emphasises the fact that whānau are not exclusive groups and, given that whakapapa is traced through both the male and female lines, individuals may belong to and have corresponding obligations to a number of whānau.

It is also important to consider the ways in which whānau structures have changed over time. Walker (2004) points out that the mass urbanisation of Māori following the end of the Second World War changed the make-up of whānau, with the nuclear family replacing the extended family as the most common household unit. He argues that this is due to the fact that the nuclear family is more mobile, less tied to place and therefore more able to fit the demands of an increasingly industrialised society by being able to move in search of work. This led to a shift in the way in which notions of whānau are conceptualised, as the term whānau is now often used to describe nuclear family structures as well as more traditional extended family groups (Metge, 1995).

However, a number of authors argue that the interpretation of whānau as simply meaning family is problematic. Taiapa (1994) argues that using family as an interpretation of
whānau ignores the economic role that whānau plays in Māori society. Lawson-Te Aho (2010) further points out that the terms ‘whānau’ and ‘family’ are often used interchangeably in social policy documents and that this has the effect of reinforcing western cultural assumptions which are focussed on the nuclear family construction. She argues that this ignores the increasing diversity of family composition in New Zealand, and comments that “the use of whānau/family in social policy assumes that the terms can be used this way and that there are commonalities about these terms that justify their use without qualification or clarification of the differences” (Lawson-Te Aho, 2010:14). Confusion over the meaning of whānau is not helped by the fact that, as outlined above, Māori engage multiple interpretations of the word and often slide between these meanings with little explanation to ‘outsiders’ who may be less familiar with the term (Metge 1995).

Moeke-Pickering (1996) argues that, by the 1990s, increased separation and divorce rates amongst Māori coupled with sustained economic pressures and high dependence on state welfare benefits resulted in a significant proportion of Māori whānau headed by single parents. She comments that “this appears to be a dramatic shift from the traditional whānau arrangement and over a relatively short period of time.” (Moeke-Pickering, 1996:np). A sense that Māori identity is tied to traditional whānau, hapū and iwi structures has also diminished, with many Māori (especially those in urban areas) either being unable to connect themselves to iwi through whakapapa or choosing not to organise their lives around traditional tribal and cultural practices (Moeke-Pickering, 1996).

Given the diversity of formations and conceptions of the term ‘whānau’, the notion of ‘whānau ora’, or whānau wellbeing is difficult to pin down. ‘Ora’ is term that also holds many meanings for Māori, encompassing a sense of wellbeing that is both physical and spiritual (Metge, 1995). According to Walker (2006:30), “the concept of ora means a lot more than wellbeing because it is spiritual, emotional and profound”. Since the 1980s the term ‘ora’, however, has been connected with a number of health initiatives, often used in compounds such as hauora (spirit or breath of life), rapuora (seeking health) and tipuora (growing/developing health) (Durie, 1994). Likewise, the term ‘whānau ora’ connects the concepts of whānau with notions of holistic wellbeing. The way in which this idea has gained increasing currency within policy settings is described below.

**Increasing focus on whānau and families in social policy**

In spite of some of the challenges to Māori social structures described above, the emphasis on whānau as a key site of intervention in social policy recognises the fact that whānau
continues to be the key social institution for Māori (Lawson-Te Aho, 2010). As such, approaches such as Whānau Ora operate on the basis that interventions that enhance the wellbeing of the collective whānau are likely to contribute to individual outcomes and vice versa. By exploring the ways in which the concept of whānau has been included in social policy in particular, we can begin to understand how the philosophy of the Whānau Ora approach has evolved.

Placing whānau at the centre of social initiatives and social policy is not a new phenomenon. As discussed in Chapter Two, whānau-centred approaches can be traced back to programmes initiated by the Māori Women’s Welfare League in the 1950s, and the Tu Tangata programmes of the 1970s. However, the 1980s and 1990s saw an increased emphasis on the revival of iwi as a focus for Māori development, which was influenced by the Treaty settlement process as well as state policies of devolution. In more recent years, the emphasis has again shifted back towards building capacity at the whānau level. This shift was articulated at the second Hui Taumata held in 2005. Durie (2005:10) argues that, whereas the first Hui Taumata - and subsequent Decades of Māori Development - was focused on iwi development, the coming decades were likely to see a stronger focus on whānau:

...although Iwi development will likely continue as an important pathway for Māori advancement, it is also likely that there will be an increasing emphasis on building whānau. Expectations that Iwi gains might trickle down to whānau are probably unrealistic, given contemporary Māori affiliations and different priorities between small groups such as whānau and large groups such as iwi. Iwi may well contribute to whānau aspirations but for the most part the tools necessary for building Iwi capacities will not be the same tools required for developing whānau capacities, including the capacities for caring, for creating whānau wealth, for whānau planning, for the intergenerational transfer of knowledge and skills within whānau, and for the wise management of whānau estates.

This increased focus on whānau rather than iwi is also evident in the evolution of the term ‘whānau ora’, particularly within the health sector. The earliest use of ‘whānau ora’ in social policy was when it was included as an outcome goal in He Korowai Oranga, the Māori Health Strategy, which was launched in 2002 in response to the New Zealand Public Health and Disability Act 2000 (Chant, 2013). According to He Korowai Oranga, the overarching goal of the strategy was “whānau ora: Māori families supported to achieve their maximum health and wellbeing” (Ministry of Health, 2002:1). The strategy document went on to affirm the notion that whānau was the foundation of Māori society and that it played a central role in both the collective and individual wellbeing of Māori (Ministry of Health, 2002). Chant (2013) argues that policy documents produced within the health sector in the 1990s included reference to Māori aspirations for tino rangatiratanga. However, from the 2000s, this aspirational goal became reframed as ‘whānau ora’. She comments:
This was particularly evident in He Korowai Oranga 2002 where rangatiratanga was a key thread, and whānau ora the overall aim of the policy. This focus on whānau ora rather than rangatiratanga aligned with the political focus on community-led health developments, where Māori were seen as part of the health communities as envisaged under the New Zealand Health Strategy, (Minister of Health, 2000) and Primary Health Care Strategy (Ministry of Health, 2001), rather than autonomous from them (Chant, 2013:150-151).

An emphasis on whānau ora rather than tino rangatiratanga is also evident in the language of the Taskforce (2010) report, and in the way in which Whānau Ora has since become the default name of the strategy. Di Grennell, member of the Taskforce on Whānau-Centred Initiatives, and one of my key informant research participants, commented: “we were primarily the Taskforce on Whānau Centred Initiatives, not the Whānau Ora taskforce, but it’s interesting that the use of that term grew and built during the life of the taskforce consultation”.

More recently, the term ‘whānau ora’ has been incorporated into a number of state agency strategy documents. For example, Te Puni Kōkiri’s Statement of Intent 2010 – 2013 includes a four-part framework in which Whānau Ora is a cornerstone of its ‘Māori succeeding as Māori’ vision (Te Puni Kōkiri, 2009). The Families Commission (2010; 2011; 2013) has also issued a number of publications that incorporate the notion of whānau ora, including a Whānau Strategic Framework. The overarching goal of the strategy is “to support whānau to achieve a state of whānau ora or total wellbeing, utilising the mechanisms of advocacy, engagement, social policy and research (Families Commission, 2010:4). These publications also reflect an increased emphasis on the need for a strengths based approach to Māori policy rather than the focus on deficits that was evident in the Hunn Report and which formed the basis of previous approaches such as Closing the Gaps. As Humpage (2004) argues, a focus on disparities between Māori and non-Māori is problematic for a number of reasons; it has the effect of ignoring diversity amongst Māori, while at the same time resulting in Māori culture itself being seen as synonymous with poverty and disadvantage. Furthermore, it obscures Pākeha advantage resulting from structural factors including the long-term effects of colonisation and institutional discrimination. The move towards strengths based approaches, as articulated in Te Puni Kōkiri’s framework, in conjunction with the focus on whānau and families, underpin the Whānau Ora approach.

In summary, a focus on whānau in Māori Affairs policy is not new, however this focus has re-emerged in recent years and is now strongly connected to the outcome goal of ‘whānau ora’. Furthermore, a discourse of whānau ora has come to dominate policy documents over aspirations of tino rangatiratanga. I will argue in Chapter Five that this shift in language is significant, in that it indicates that Māori aspirations for self-determination are being depoliticised.
The Broader Policy Context: Whole of government approaches and a focus on Families and Children

An increasing focus on whānau ora in Māori initiatives over the last few decades is associated with a broader emphasis on families and children that has taken shape within the mainstream policy environment. This has occurred in conjunction with state attempts to introduce ‘whole of government’ approaches to complex social issues. Both of these developments have clear parallels with the Whānau Ora approach, and serve to locate Whānau Ora within the broader policy context.

It has become increasingly obvious to policy makers and politicians alike over recent decades that complex social issues, or ‘wicked problems’ (Rittel & Webber, 1973) as they are often described, require solutions that transcend the traditional boundaries between different areas of social service provision (Humpage, 2006). As such, the effort to foster collaboration and integration across government services as well as between government agencies and local government and community organisations has become a key feature of recent policy initiatives. The idea of whole of government approaches to policy issues is manifested particularly in the concept of partnerships in the social services, and the need to move beyond the contractual relationships that emphasise specifically purchased outputs to a focus on outcomes, which emphasise results (Cheyne et al., 2005).

Humpage (2006) suggests that whole of government approaches seem to make sense when attempting to address the multidimensional needs of indigenous peoples. This is due to the fact that integrated approaches appear to align well with indigenous values, which tend to view social, cultural, economic and political issues as being connected rather than separate. Furthermore, the emphasis on collaborative partnerships between government and communities can be seen to respond to Māori calls for a Treaty-based partnership with the Crown. However, Humpage (2006) argues that in practice, such approaches have failed to devolve actual power to Māori communities. These tensions in relation to Whānau Ora are discussed further in Chapter Five.

Attempts to apply whole of government approaches to social policy issues has also coincided with an increased focus on families and children that has emerged in policy debates in recent decades. This has been influenced by Third Way approaches, which are concerned with the way in which poor outcomes for children in areas such as health and education may impact upon their future ability to participate fully in society (Stephens, 2008). An increased focus on children was evident in the Labour-coalition Government’s 2002 Agenda for Children. The Agenda was driven by a number of concerns that reflect Third Way ideas. In particular was a view that children had rights as citizens as well as concern about
the number of children that were living in poverty, as this increased the likelihood that these children would suffer long-term adverse outcomes. The Agenda adopted a ‘whole child’ approach. This involved taking a holistic view of wellbeing and focussing on what was required for a child’s healthy development, rather than reacting to issues as they arose. It also involved a cross sectoral approach which involved multiple agencies (Ministry of Social Development, 2002).

Another example is the Strengthening Families initiative, which was piloted in the mid-1990s in Waitakere City and extended nationally in 1999. The initiative promotes a whole of government approach, which wraps services around families in a coordinated way. The Ministry of Social Development (2001:13) described the initiative as:

…a strategic initiative to deliver core services in the welfare, health and education sectors more effectively to that group of families experiencing the most serious disadvantage. Its central aim is to improve outcomes for children, and it is based on two assumptions: that families are important in shaping children’s outcomes, and that cross-sector co-ordination in service delivery is likely to achieve better outcomes than uncoordinated sector-specific approaches. Strengthening Families is a process or a way of working, not a programme or provider.

The initiative (which continues to be implemented around New Zealand) is targeted towards the most ‘at risk’ families and involves assigning a key contact to families who can assess the on-going requirements of the family and then coordinate appropriate services from a range of government agencies. While the initiative primarily involved the Departments of Social Welfare (now Ministry of Social Development), Health and Education, currently this has expanded to include:

- Accident Compensation Corporation
- Child Youth and Family
- Department of Corrections
- Department of Internal Affairs
- District Health Boards
- Housing New Zealand
- Inland Revenue
- Ministry of Justice
- New Zealand Police (Families Commission, 2013).

Strengthening Families has a number of clear parallels with the Whānau Ora approach. In particular, the deployment of a key contact, who is able to coordinate services for families, the whole of government approach and the focus on family outcomes are all characteristics which are fundamental to Whānau Ora. Although criticised as being a repackaging of Strengthening Families by opposition MPs (Reporting Services (HoR), 2010), Whānau Ora differs from this approach by involving service providers who operate within a kaupapa Māori.
framework. In doing so, Whānau Ora attempts to overcome some of the tensions that have traditionally existed between Māori communities and the institutions of the state.

Emergence of Māori Service Provision in Health

Another key to understanding the evolution of Whānau Ora is found in the transformation that occurred in New Zealand’s public sector in the 1980s and 1990s. In particular, a series of reforms in the health sector saw a shift from a state run bureaucracy to a system of devolved authorities (Boulton et al. 2004). This included the introduction of a contracting model of social service delivery, which in turn gave rise to a new approach to Māori health provision.

As discussed in the previous chapter, the 1980s saw a significant shift away from a Keynesian paradigm of state economic management and towards market focused policies grounded in neoliberal ideology, first by the fourth Labour government, and then by subsequent National-led governments. Concern over the rising costs of health care provision meant that the health sector, a cornerstone of the welfare state, was targeted for a new market based approach. In its post-election briefing papers for the incoming Labour Government in 1984, Treasury made a number of recommendations aimed at reducing state expenditure while increasing the efficiency and effectiveness of the health sector. These included the introduction of partial charges to some health services, the separation of funding and provision of services to encourage competition between providers, greater emphasis on community health care and greater targeting of services to those who were most in need (Treasury, 1984). What followed was a series of reforms beginning in the 1980s and culminating in the New Zealand Public Health and Disability Act 2000, which would see a significant transformation of the health sector (Boulton et al. 2013).

In 1993, radical reforms saw the splitting of the roles of purchaser and provider of health services. A four-tier structure was established, which included ministers, monitors and advisors, purchasers and providers. Government agencies including the Department of Health provided the monitoring and policy capacity, while four newly created Regional Health Authorities (RHAs) were responsible for establishing the health service needs of their populations and purchasing the relevant services required (Ashton, 1999). RHAs then negotiated a series of contracts with a range of public and private providers, including Crown Health Enterprises (CHEs) who ran public hospitals, General Practitioners, private hospitals and community-based organisations, who would deliver the services. These changes were
intended to transform the health sector into a series of quasi markets, with the expectation that CHEs would operate along commercial lines and generate profits (Ashton, 1999).

While the introduction of a market based approach to the health sector has seen a number of critiques and some of these reforms were short lived, (see Ashton, 1999), it has also arguably offered opportunities for Māori. In particular, the separation of the funding and provision aspects of health services in 1993 saw significant opportunities for Māori to become more directly involved in the delivery of services, as contracting has become a central aspect of the health system. By the mid-1990s it was increasingly evident that the mainstreaming approach favoured by government, which relied on mainstream agencies being responsive to the particular needs of their Māori clients, had failed to elicit more than token attempts at cultural awareness and poor Māori health outcomes persisted (Boulton et al. 2013). Building the capacity of Māori providers was one of the strategies employed by the government in its Closing the Gaps initiative discussed in Chapter Two. The development of Māori health providers who would bid for government contracts was framed by the state as an opportunity for Māori to develop an economic base through partnerships with government in the health and disability sector. Many Māori saw this as an opportunity for greater self-determination by allowing services to be delivered that were shaped by a philosophy of ‘by Māori for Māori’ (Chant, 2013). Kaupapa Māori services providing treatment based on tikanga Māori (Māori values and practices) and Māori models of holistic wellbeing began to emerge as a result (Boulton et al., 2013). According to Durie (2001, cited in Boulton et al., 2013:22-23), Kaupapa Māori health services are typically described as having some or all of the following characteristics:

- Management by Māori staff for the benefit of the Māori population, often referred to as ‘by Māori for Māori’;
- the incorporation of tikanga Māori (Māori values);
- the involvement of whānau, hapū and iwi in all aspects of the service, including treatment;
- the use of traditional Māori healing practices; and
- whakawhānaungatanga (connectedness between people, often based on genealogical connections).

Chant (2013) suggests that while mainstream health organisations were reluctant to adapt to the new model of health contracting introduced in the 1993 reforms, Māori saw the reforms as an opportunity to establish new provider organisations. Between 1993 and 1996, the number of Māori health organisations grew from approximately 25 to 185 (Chant, 2013), and currently, is somewhere in the region of 250-300 (Boulton et al., 2013).
However, while the health sector reforms of the 1990s implemented by National-led governments laid the grounds for the development of Māori health providers, further health reforms in 2001 under the Labour-led government also had a significant impact with regards to Māori participation within the health sector. The 2001 New Zealand Public Health and Disability Act was important for a number of reasons. For the first time in social policy legislation, reference to the Treaty of Waitangi was incorporated in such a way as to make provisions for Māori to participate in both the decision making process as well as the delivery of health services. This was achieved by mandating that Māori representation on the newly created District Health Boards (DHBs) had to be in proportion to their population in those areas, with a minimum of two members being Māori. In addition, the Act compelled DHBs to take responsibility for reducing disparities and improving Māori health outcomes (Boulton et al., 2004).

With these requirements in place, a separate Māori health strategy, *He Korowai Oranga* was launched by Associate Health Minister Tariana Turia in 2002; its overarching aim was ‘whānau ora’. Turia (2001, cited in Boulton et al., 2004:37) stated that:

... the whānau or extended family is the foundation of indigenous social, cultural and political organisation. It is the source of identity, security, support and strength. The strategy requires health workers to consider individual patients as part of a whānau and to take a multidisciplinary approach.

The strategy also acknowledged Māori desire for self-determination, stating that:

*He Korowai Oranga* seeks to support Māori-led initiatives to improve the health of whānau, hapū and iwi. The strategy recognises that the desire of Māori to have control over their future direction is a strong motivation for Māori to seek their own solutions and to manage their own services (Ministry of Health, 2002:1).

While whānau ora was the stated outcome goal of *He Korowai Oranga*, there were some limitations to the understanding and the reach of the strategy. As Boulton et al. (2004) argue, there was no operational definition of whānau ora provided in the document. This lack of definition was problematic, because while Māori may understand the philosophy of whānau ora, their understanding may not be shared by non-Māori or the health system more widely. It was also noted that many of the variables influencing Māori health outcomes lay outside of the health sector (such as housing, employment and education), and that simply focussing on health may be of limited value (Boulton et al., 2004). Given the consistency of the feedback from Māori that wellbeing needed to be treated in a holistic way, it appeared logical that the gains made by *He Korowai Oranga* be expanded beyond the health sector and into the social services more broadly. The establishment of the Māori Party and its subsequent relationship with the National-led government elected in 2008 would see this goal become a reality.
Political context

Although it is clear that the design of Whānau Ora has been shaped by broader developments within the public sector, it is also important to consider the impact that recent political developments have had on Whānau Ora becoming a policy priority in the first place. As we have seen from the previous chapter, implementing public policy that is seen to target Māori has proved controversial for governments. Therefore, given the political risks involved in implementing an approach such as Whānau Ora, which is so visibly focussed around Māori concepts and values, it is clear that the relationship between the Māori Party and National has played a significant role in seeing Whānau Ora become a reality.

As outlined in the previous chapter, Māori have been active participants within the New Zealand Parliament following the creation of the Māori seats in 1867. However, under the First Past the Post electoral system, the promotion of minority interests within Parliament faced significant barriers. The introduction of a Mixed Member Proportional (MMP) electoral system in 1996 (which followed a referendum in 1993) and the concurrent law change making the Māori seats proportional to the population enrolled on the Māori electoral roll saw increased opportunities for independent Māori political participation. It also meant that for the first time the votes of those Māori who chose to enrol in the Māori electorates were of equal weighting to those cast by voters on the general role (Sullivan, 2010). As Turia (2010a:65) notes, “by 1993, each Māori seat represented an average electoral population of 68,150. Each general electorate seat in 1993, on the other hand, represented an electoral population of 33,457”. The Māori electorates increased in number to five in 1996, six in 1999 and seven seats in 2002 where they have remained in subsequent elections.

A number of Māori political parties formed following the shift to MMP whose interests were focussed on the socio-economic advancement of Māori, including: Te Tawharu (1995), Mana Wahine Te Ira Tangata (1998), Mauri Pacific (1998), Piri Wiri Tua (1999), Nga Iwi Morehu (2002), Aroha Ngia Tatou (2002), The Derek Fox Party (2002) and the Hapū Party (2008) (K. Smith, 2010). While none of these parties were successful in reaching the 5% threshold required under MMP to enter parliament, the controversy surrounding the Foreshore and Seabed Act of 2004 provided a catalyst for Māori unity that would see the entrance of the first successful independent Māori Party into Parliament. The Māori Party was formed in 2004 when Labour MP Tariana Turia was faced with the choice of supporting the Foreshore and Seabed Bill through Parliament or resigning as a Minister (K. Smith, 2010). Choosing to resign from Parliament in May 2004, Turia successfully defended her Te Tai Hauaruru seat in the subsequent by-election and returned to Parliament as co-leader of a new political movement, dubbed the Māori Party. This saw a shift of Māori support away
from Labour, with four of the seven Māori seats won by the Māori Party in the 2005 election. While the repeal of the Foreshore and Seabed Act (2004) formed a significant part of the Māori Party’s political mandate, the party also campaigned for a number of other social and economic reforms. These included constitutional reforms entrenching both Te Tiriti and the Māori seats in legislation, education initiatives and a policy titled ‘Whānau First’, a forerunner to what would become the Whānau Ora approach to social service delivery. The Whānau First initiative identified whānau as a key site for transforming the social and economic conditions of Māori, stating that “whānau is an unheralded model for achieving economic security, creating social cohesion and stability and strengthening cultural identity” (Māori Party, 2004:21).

Following the 2008 election, the Māori Party entered into a Relationship and Confidence and Supply Agreement with the National Party, as part of a National-led government. The two co-leaders of the Māori Party were given Ministerial portfolios; Pita Sharples was appointed Minister of Māori Affairs, Associate Minister of Education and Associate Minister of Corrections, while the Tariana Turia was appointed Minister for the Community and Voluntary Sector, Associate Minister of Health and Associate Minister of Social Development and Employment. While both the National Party and the Māori Party disagreed over the future of the Māori seats (the National Party had included abolishing the seats as part of its election campaign), the agreement stated that the National Party would not seek to abolish the seats without the agreement of Māori while the Māori Party would not seek to entrench them.

As well as a commitment to a review of the Foreshore and Seabed legislation, the agreement also included acknowledgement of the Māori Party’s emerging policy priority of whānau ora, stating that: “The Māori Party seeks significant outcomes in whānau ora, through eliminating poverty, advocating for social justice, and advancing Māori social, cultural, economic and community development in the best interests of the nation” (National Party & Māori Party, 2008). The Māori Party Policy document (2008) further stated whānau ora as one of three key aspirations alongside a focus on Te Tiriti and the economy. Co-leader of the Māori Party Tariana Turia has played a pivotal role in seeing Whānau Ora become a reality. As discussed above, while with Labour she held the portfolio of Associate Minister of Health, and was instrumental in the development of He Korowai Oranga. In her new portfolio as Minister for the Community and Voluntary Sector, Turia was able to continue and expand the goals of whānau ora beyond the health sector to a whole of government approach. This focus on whānau ora as a key policy platform for the Māori Party
was further enabled by the formation of the Taskforce on Whānau-Centred Initiatives in 2009.

**Whānau Ora: A new way of delivering social services in New Zealand?**

The Taskforce on Whānau-Centred Initiatives (the Taskforce), convened in July 2009, aimed to develop a policy framework for a “new method of government interaction with Māori service providers to meet the social needs of Whānau” (Turia, 2009: np). The Taskforce comprised five members from a range of academic, policy and public sector backgrounds, and was chaired by prominent Māori academic, Sir Mason Durie. The other members were:

- Rob Cooper (Chief Executive of Ngāti Hine Health Trust);
- Di Grennell (Te Puni Kōkiri);
- Suzanne Snively (Partner at PriceWaterhouseCoopers); and
- Nancy Tuaine (Manager Whanganui River Māori Trust Board and a member of Whanganui DHB.).

According to Māori Party co-leader Tariana Turia, the main aim of the Taskforce was to construct an evidence-based framework that would lead to:

- Strengthened whānau capabilities;
- An integrated approach to whānau wellbeing;
- Collaborative relationships between state agencies in relation to whānau services;
- Relationships between government and community agencies that are broader than contractual;
- Improved cost-effectiveness and value for money.

Following consultation at hui around the country, the Taskforce on Whānau-Centred Initiatives Report (the Taskforce Report) was released in early 2010, which outlined a five-part framework consisting of a whānau aspirational aim, principles, whānau outcome goals, whānau centred services and a Whānau Ora Trust. The following model (figure 1) outlines the seven principles that underpin the Whānau Ora approach.
These principles are consistent with a number of the developments discussed earlier in this chapter. ‘Nga kaupapa tuku iho’ refers to the central importance of the beliefs, values and obligations that are passed from one generation to the next. The acknowledgement of such values reflects the increasing consideration given to Māori values and practices in the provision of services to Māori communities. ‘Coherent service delivery’ and ‘competent and innovative service provision’ speak to the way in which the public sector, through whole of government approaches, has attempted to move towards integrated methods of funding and delivery in order to reduce overlap and increase the effectiveness of service delivery. A focus on whānau outcomes and whānau opportunity can be seen to reflect Third way concerns with social inclusion as seen in the Strengthening Families Strategy. Effective resourcing is always a concern for community-based approaches (Grey & Sedgwick, 2013); these challenges in relation to Whānau Ora are discussed in following chapters.

According to The Taskforce (2010:13) report, the definition of whānau is taken to mean “a multi-generational collective made up of many households that are supported and strengthened by a wider network of relatives”. However, the Taskforce (2010) acknowledged that there was a wide range of meanings that individuals and organisations attributed to the term. On the one hand, some people primarily connected the concept of whānau ora to the
2002 Māori health strategy *He Korowai Oranga*. On the other hand, there was an acknowledgment that the use of the term had moved outside of the area of health and into other policy areas such as education, social development and justice. The Taskforce (2010) report concluded that Whānau Ora could be conceptualised in the following ways:

- A philosophy;
- As a model of practice for providers;
- As an outcome goal;
- A funding mechanism; and
- A foundation for future generations.

Each of these conceptions of Whānau ora are outlined in detail below.

**Whānau Ora as a Philosophy**

The Taskforce (2010:28-29) concluded that it was possible to identify six key characteristics when defining Whānau Ora. These were:

- Whānau Ora is about group wellbeing rather than individual wellbeing;
- Whānau Ora is about self-determination for Māori;
- Whānau Ora is concerned with on-going intergenerational transfers of values, knowledge, culture, technologies, lifestyles, wealth and assets;
- Māori cultural identity and the expression of Māori cultural values are of fundamental importance to Whānau Ora;
- Whānau Ora is concerned with the way in which whānau interact with the wider community; and
- Whānau Ora transcends sectors.

These characteristics reflect the broader trends occurring in both Māori and mainstream initiatives discussed earlier in this chapter. First, a focus on the collective unit of the whānau is clearly evident in earlier policy documents such as *He Korowai Oranga* as well as more generic approaches that provide ‘wrap-around’ services to whānau and families such as Strengthening Families. Likewise, the incorporation (or co-option; see Chapter Four) of Māori cultural values, along with the emphasis on cross-sectoral approaches, is not new. However, the Taskforce (2010:29) report appears to conflate self-determination with self-management, noting that “long term dependency on outside agencies is not consistent with Whānau Ora; instead the aim is to enable whānau to assume responsibility for their own
affairs”. This represents a somewhat narrow understanding of the notion of self-determination, focussing primarily on the economic independence of Māori from the state, rather than an articulation of Māori control over their own futures in partnership with the Crown. The emphasis on whānau assuming responsibility for their own affairs again illustrates the way in which neoliberal agendas to minimise the role of the state by placing responsibility for meeting welfare needs solely on families and whānau can be framed as being about choice and self-determination (Cheyne et al., 2005). The extent to which interview participants felt that self-determination is enabled by Whānau Ora is discussed in more detail in the following chapter.

Whānau Ora as a Model of Practice

The primary characteristic of Whānau Ora as a model of practice is its focus on the outcomes of whānau as opposed to the outcomes of individuals. This follows the notion that what impacts on the circumstances of individuals is likely to impact on the wider whānau and vice versa. According to the Taskforce (2010:7), the approach advocates whānau-centred services, which “focus on the whānau as a whole, build on whānau strengths and increase their capacity”. Central to implementing a more holistic approach to whānau wellbeing is the need for a cross-sectoral approach, as well as a shift from a focus on outputs (i.e. the delivery of services) to outcomes.

In practice this has seen Māori providers receive funding from a range of state agencies to deliver a range of services to whānau in conjunction with overarching whānau action plans, which outline the needs and aspirations of individual whānau. The Taskforce (2010) recognised that multiple levels and types of expertise were required to meet the complex needs of whānau, and it was unlikely that stand-alone providers would have the capacity to meet all of these needs. One of the report’s recommendations therefore was to connect providers together to provide integrated service delivery. By 2011, twenty five collectives comprising of 160 individual Whānau Ora providers had been selected by a Whānau Ora governance board, with a further eight provider collectives identified for further development (Te Puni Kōkiri, 2011). Up until December 2013, these Whānau Ora collectives were overseen by ten regional leadership groups. The establishment of Whānau Ora navigators, individuals from a lead provider who assist whānau to formulate a plan and help to broker the required services from the relevant provider and government agencies, complements the provider collective model (Te Puni Kōkiri 2011). These navigators are intended to reduce the ‘5 cars up the driveway’ phenomenon, a colloquial expression that has come to describe the reality that whānau are often dealing with multiple agencies:
I have heard it described as moving from “five cars up the driveway” to one car containing a navigator and four passengers. The shift in mind-set is a shift from multiple agencies working with individual family members often in isolation of each other, to instead a bold and innovative approach which places the aspirations of whānau at the centre of service planning and delivery. Everyone is facing the same direction; the focus firmly fixed on outcomes (Turia, 2011:12).

The Taskforce (2010) also recommended a shift to integrated contracting, whereby instead of providers having to bid separately for service delivery contracts from different funding bodies (e.g. District Health Boards, Ministry of Social Development etc.), contracts are combined into what have been called Integrated High Trust Contracts. Facilitated through the Ministry for Social Development, these contracts have been described as “combining complex multiple contracts into a single, simple contract that focuses on results for whānau and families, rather than outputs and ticked boxes” (Te Puni Kōkiri, 2011:17). However, interview data suggests that the process of creating systems of integrated contracts which cross over sectoral boundaries has been slow to realise in practice. This is discussed further in the following chapter.

Whānau Ora as an Outcome Goal

The Taskforce (2010) report noted that feedback from hui indicated that current outcome measures for Māori wellbeing were still focussed on negative statistics of individuals such as hospital admissions, rates of smoking, low educational achievement and rates of unemployment, rather than positive achievements. There was a strong desire that Whānau Ora take a strengths based approach, rather than continuing to follow a Māori deficit based model.

However, the report also acknowledged that shifting from previous approaches, which focused on outputs and individuals, to one that focused on the wellbeing of collectives presents a number of challenges, particularly in regards to the measurement of outcomes. First, it is difficult to measure the extent to which things such as values and culture are transmitted through generations. Second, whānau transformations are likely to happen over the long term rather than the short term, making it very difficult to attribute changes to a single policy intervention such as Whānau Ora (The Taskforce, 2010).

Finally, Whānau Ora attempts to create a system whereby whānau play an active role in determining what outcomes are important to them, what actions are required to enable them to reach their goals and deciding when they feel that whānau ora has been achieved. This means that individual providers need to be sensitive and accountable to the whānau
that they interact with. The 2011 Briefing to the Incoming Minister for Whānau Ora (Te Puni Kōkiri, 2011:3) notes that “whānau are also seeking support to build whānau capability from outside the range of activities that fit with the social sector and it will be important that the range of agencies involved to date is broadened”. This comment suggests that there may be gaps between what whānau are saying that they need from agencies to help them achieve a state of whānau ora, and what the agencies are able to deliver in terms of services. Furthermore there is likely to be a great deal of variation across different providers and different regions. This may present difficulties in comparing performance and outcomes across regions.

In order to overcome some of the challenges presented by a shift from measuring outputs to outcomes described above, a programme of Action Research was implemented alongside Whānau Ora. Cram (2011) argues that Action Research methodologies are particularly well suited to Māori environments due to the similarities between the values that underpin Action Research and those of kaupapa Māori approaches. Action Research involves embedding researchers within providers/provider collectives to assist them in formulating questions for reflection, which may then inform best practice with regards to implementing whānau centred services. However, Cram (2011:22) also comments that Action Research is constrained by the requirements for consistency and accountability across different provider collectives:

The freeing up of a provider-driven research and evaluation cycle by the implementation of Action Research is somewhat balanced by the Crown’s requirement that a common data set be collected across all providers/provider collectives. This enables the Crown to remain accountable for the funding going into both Whānau Ora and Action Research, while at the same time moving to more of a relationship context (rather than a contractual context) with Māori Iwi and Pacific providers of whānau-centred services.

Some of these constraints are discussed in the following chapter.

Whānau Ora as a Mechanism for Funding Providers

With regards to the proposed funding arrangements for Whānau Ora, providers who attended the consultation hui raised a number of issues, which were noted in the Taskforce (2010) report. They were generally in favour of simplified contracts as a means of reducing the compliance costs of the current system, and saw a shift to a single funding agency as potentially beneficial. However, there was some concern expressed that such a shift could lead to a drop in the overall funding levels as a result of all allocations coming from a single pot of money. It was also noted by providers that funding needed to sit as close to the level
of the community as possible where it could be more responsive to the priorities of whānau, rather than the priorities of government (The Taskforce, 2010).

One of the key recommendations made by the Taskforce was that an independent Trust be established, which would be accountable to a dedicated Whānau Ora Minister. Such an entity would “oversee whānau centred programmes and promote best outcomes for whānau across state, private, iwi and voluntary sectors” (The Taskforce, 2010:60). The Trust would work in conjunction with a series of Regional Panels, which would provide leadership and direction to providers and ensure that Whānau Ora responded to the local complexities and requirements of individual whānau within particular communities. According to the Taskforce (2010:61) report, the functions of the Trust would be to:

- Facilitate and implement Whānau Ora
- Invest in positive whānau development
- Oversee and manage the dedicated fund
- Oversee the regional panels
- Contract with providers for the delivery of whānau-centred services based on results-based outcomes
- In consultation with whānau and providers develop results-based indicators that reflect whānau satisfaction and provider engagement around services to support the achievement of desired outcomes
- Provide leadership and coordination across agencies that have responsibilities for whānau wellbeing
- Provide an independent review role to government on measures and indicators used for determining progress against outcomes
- Monitor providers according to outcomes agreed with whānau
- Monitor relevant whānau-level indicators, evaluation and research, innovation and models of whānau-centred practices
- Strengthen Whānau Ora networks at national levels and work collaboratively with other organisations who have similar goals
- Advocate for whānau at government, agency, iwi and community levels
- In association with other agencies, develop a clearinghouse for the dissemination of relevant research findings, innovations and models of whānau-centred practice
- Advise government on policies relevant to whānau wellbeing.

From this extensive list of functions, it is clear that the Taskforce (2010) proposed a number of shifts away from the four-part model of public sector management implemented as part of the 1993 reforms in the health sector. First, the functions of policy advice/monitoring and purchasing of services are combined into one organisation (the Trust). Second, while accountable to Parliament, this organisation sits outside of the state apparatus. Furthermore, although not explicitly articulated by the Taskforce (2010) report, sidebar quotes3 in this section of the report suggest that the intention of the Taskforce is that

3 Although not explicitly stated, the sidebar comments used throughout the Taskforce Report are assumed to be quotes from participants in the consultation Hui conducted by the Taskforce.
the Trust is predominantly Māori-led: “This fund must be governed and led by Māori” and “a commission or a trust - it’s got to look like us” (The Taskforce, 2010:59-60).

However, initially the recommendations of the Taskforce were only partially implemented by government; ten Regional Leadership panels were established, a Whānau Ora Governance Group was established to oversee implementation of the policy, with Te Puni Kōkiri responsible for administration. No Trust was established (Te Puni Kōkiri, 2011). In July 2013, over three years after the initial launch of Whānau Ora, it was announced that the Regional Leadership panels would be wound up, and the government would begin a process to establish three non-government organisations (NGOs) which would implement a commissioning model to contract for “whānau-centred initiatives through a range of entities” (Te Puni Kōkiri, 2013:np). The three NGOs would focus on building capability within whānau in the North Island, South Island and Pacific communities (Te Puni Kōkiri, 2013).

While the original governance structure recommended by the Taskforce Report had the potential to vest significant influence in a single Māori-led entity, the proposed NGO model more closely reflects the four-tier structure established by the Healthcare reforms of the 1990s. A clear separation of the functions of accountability (Minister for Whānau Ora), policy and monitoring (TPK), purchasing (NGOs) and provision of services (providers) is maintained. The responses of interview participants to these proposals are discussed in the following chapter.

Whānau Ora as a Foundation for Future Generations.

Finally, the Taskforce Report concluded that Whānau Ora could be conceptualised as a foundation for future generations. The report noted that Whānau Ora could provide a catalyst for Māori to reconnect with their wider whānau, so that the collective strengths of whānau groups could be better realised. In keeping with the goals of Third Way approaches, educational achievement for Māori children was also seen as being as a key area of concern. In particular, the report noted the importance of building positive relationships between whānau and educational institutions. The Taskforce (2010:36) noted that Whānau Ora was seen by some Māori as being “a catalyst for the development of better relationships between whānau and schools so that standards could be raised and young people could gain better prospects for employment and citizenship”. The Taskforce (2010) report recognises that Whānau Ora has the potential to create a sound future for coming generations both through the endeavours of whānau themselves and through the relationships they are able to construct with key societal institutions.
Conclusion

This chapter has explained how the Whānau Ora approach to social service delivery has evolved from key policy shifts in the last three decades. These shifts include the reforms of the health sector in the 1990s, which created the conditions for Māori providers to emerge, as well as broader shifts towards whole of government approaches. It is also evident that focussing on whānau as a site for policy intervention has been evolving for some time, both within Māori initiatives but also in mainstream programmes such as Strengthening Families. Furthermore, given the challenges in implementing policies that are seen to target Māori, the influence of an independent Māori Party within Parliament, and the particular efforts of co-leader Tariana Turia, have been a key driving force in the implementation of an approach which is so visibly Māori in its focus.

This chapter also outlined the Whānau Ora approach through a more detailed analysis of the key elements of the Taskforce (2010) report, which highlights that there are multiple ways of conceptualising Whānau Ora. Given the wide range of stakeholders involved in such an approach, which includes the state, funding agencies, Māori providers, and Māori communities, the complexity of Whānau Ora creates a space in which expectations of what Whānau Ora is and what it can deliver may vary significantly. It is also evident that there may be differences between the intention of the approach as it is outlined in the Taskforce Report, and the way in which it is implemented on the ground. Some of these tensions will be explored in the following two chapters, which examine the institutional and political constraints that shape how Whānau Ora is delivered.
Chapter Four: Institutional Realities

Introduction

This chapter argues that there is some alignment between how Māori and the state view of the aims of Whānau Ora but there are also tensions as to what Whānau Ora can (or should) deliver. As discussed in Chapter Three, the Taskforce (2010) conceived Whānau Ora as a philosophy, a model of practice, an outcome goal, a mechanism for funding providers and a foundation for future generations. Drawing predominantly upon data collected from interviews with key informants and supported by a range of policy documents and other relevant secondary material, this chapter will examine in more detail some of these differing conceptions of Whānau Ora and identify where potential tensions between the philosophy of Whānau Ora (as articulated by the Taskforce Report) and the implementation of the approach may exist. An analysis of the interview data identified a number of themes that will form the basis of this chapter. These include the incorporation of Māori models into policy settings, the institutional constraints and broader economic goals of government and the challenges in evaluating outcomes based approaches.

I argue that, while ostensibly Whānau Ora seeks to focus on outcomes, which are driven by the needs and priorities of the whānau, funding and accountability structures result in a continuing default to measuring outputs. This means that state priorities are still paramount. Systems of integrated contracts, which may have enabled providers to become more whānau-centred in their approach, are yet to be implemented across the board. Furthermore, a broader economic climate of fiscal conservatism and reduced spending in the public sector means that providers are under pressure to deliver more for less. The nature of contractual relationships between the state and Māori providers encourages competition for scarce resources and may lead to a focus on ‘provider ora’ rather than whānau ora.

The co-option of Māori concepts into public policy: Cultural responsiveness in action or colonisation by policy?

The Whānau Ora approach places whānau outcomes at its centre and, by focussing on collective outcomes, the approach is intimately connected with Māori values and practices. However, there are also potential issues that can arise when co-opting indigenous concepts and models into state driven policy approaches. One challenge to incorporating Māori
concepts and practices into policy or programmes is the way in which the intent or applications of those concepts can change. Smith (1991:10) argues that:

…by packaging and quantifying Māori cultural items within Pākeha definitions the control over what these items might mean shifts from Māori to Pākeha, and by redefining these cultural terms into self-contained components they become susceptible to market forces, in that their ‘value’ is more dependent upon economic considerations than cultural considerations.

This concern in relation to Whānau Ora is strongly expressed by Reid (Families Commission 2013: 112) in a Families Commission report called Whānau yesterday, today, tomorrow:

What worries me about Whānau Ora is all of it. Whānau ora is what we (Māori) have already been doing. Whānau ora is Kōhanga reo, whānau ora is Matua Whangai, whānau ora is Auahi Kore and now our problem is we have got hung up on the ‘policy’. We are waiting for the policy to come out. Waiting for someone to come around and tell us what it is. And that is ‘colonisation by policy’. And that is because the money is getting mixed up with the mana again.

These comments reflect the fact that, in terms of providing services to Māori that were ‘whānau-centred’, many Māori providers felt that they were already operating under these principles, and that Whānau Ora could be seen simply as a reiteration or formalisation of (an already established) kaupapa Māori values based practice (Ministry of Health, 2010). The difficulty then becomes apparent in how to distinguish between ‘whānau ora’ as a core principle underpinning the delivery of kaupapa Māori services and Whānau Ora which describes a discreet and finite series of contracts between the state and some selected providers. Interview participant Lyvia Marsden, General Manager of Māori provider Te Puna Hauora, argues that the risk is that Māori end up in a situation whereby Māori concepts are “absorbed back into the mainstream and we end up with a British version of what was a Māori model… That’s what we get. We get a British view of what we meant”. Similar concerns were articulated by participant Di Grennell, who was a member of the Taskforce:

Yes, yes, and also the tension that there always is around having aspirations for better recognition in public policy of iwi and Māori views and perspectives, but the counter challenge of what happens then when kupu Māori and Māori concepts and frameworks get appropriated into public policy settings and then perhaps become as some would term them, become bureaucratised or …appropriated and the challenges that that creates for public servants and people on the community side who have aspirations for the way in which they would like to see some of those things unfold.

Furthermore, the tension between creating an approach which enables Māori whānau to achieve holistic wellbeing on their own terms and the need for clear accountabilities, and measureable outcomes while delivering “improved cost-effectiveness and value for money” (The Taskforce 2010:6), creates a space where the original meaning of terms such as whānau ora can be lost.
The experiences of the Kōhanga Reo movement provide a good example of the issues that can arise when Māori models and concepts are embedded within public sector frameworks. Originally administered through the Department of Māori Affairs, responsibility for Kōhanga Reo was shifted to the Department of Education in 1990 as part of the government's move to 'mainstreaming'. This has seen Kōhanga Reo absorbed into the regulatory framework of Early Childhood Education (ECE), despite the fact that advocates for the movement claim that Kōhanga Reo is not simply about childhood education, but about the wider development of whānau, which includes te reo (language), culture and custom (Dodd, 2012). One of the significant barriers to the success of the movement has been the fact that the qualification created by Te Kōhanga Reo National Trust (TKRNT), Te Tohu Whakapakari, is not recognised by the National Teachers Council. This led to the generation of separate teacher-led/whānau-led categories within the ECE regulatory framework, which were then tied to differentiated levels of funding. As a result, teachers working within Kōhanga Reo are consistently paid at lower rates compared to teachers working within mainstream ECE organisations. Dodd (2012:99) states that:

The loss of key regulatory controls at a macro level and the non-recognition of the Kōhanga national qualification, Te Tohu Whakapakari, have been major barriers to the revitalisation of te reo me ōna tikanga in Kōhanga. The imposition of regulatory barriers upon Kōhanga has dominated day-today management and fettered the development of the vision that is so strongly held by Kōhanga. At a macro and international level, Kōhanga is recognised as an exemplar yet, domestically, it struggles to resist the spectre of being consumed by a sector stripped of diversity and reframed as ‘one size fits all’.

This application of ‘one size fits all’ regulations means that some common cultural practices, such having children share mattresses when sleeping, were at odds with ECE regulations which stipulated children must sleep in separate beds (Dodd, 2012). These concerns, coupled with a breakdown in the tripartite relationship between the TKRNT, Ministry of Education and Te Puni Kōkiri (established in response to the 2001 Gallen Report) resulted in a claim being made to the Waitangi Tribunal in 2011, which was heard under urgency. The Tribunal’s report, WAI 2336, was released in 2012. It found that the Kōhanga Reo Trust had suffered significant prejudice from the Crown due to the Crown:

- failing to provide a sound policy framework that addresses the Crown’s duty to actively protect te reo Māori in the early childhood education space through support for immersion services, particularly kōhanga reo to whom the Crown owes treaty obligations;
- failing to promote participation and targets for the numbers of children moving through early childhood education who can speak Māori with the competency necessary to enter the school system long enough to become bilingual and biliterate;
- omitting to develop, in partnership with the trust, appropriate quality measures for assessing and improving quality in kōhanga reo for transmission of te reo;
- imposing a funding regime that incentivises teacher-led ECE models and does not provide
equitable arrangements for kaiako holding the degree qualification designed for kōhanga reo;

- imposing a regulatory and licensing regime that does not adequately address the specific needs of the kōhanga reo movement and in part stifles their motivation and initiative; and
- failing to accurately measure the achievements of kōhanga reo at any time during the 30 years since the movement started (Waitangi Tribunal, 2012:334-5).

The experiences of the Kōhanga Reo movement provide an example of the way in which the values and practices that underpin Māori models can be undermined by their co-option into mainstream frameworks. Furthermore, it is also evident in the above findings of the Waitangi Tribunal that separate institutions can create spaces for Māori to engage in activities that reflect their own language and cultural practices yet Māori organisations are still impacted by institutional racism.

As discussed in previous chapters, devolution and reforms in the public health sector led to the emergence of Māori provider organisations, which have entered into contractual relationships with the Crown in order to deliver by-Māori-for-Māori social services. It is argued that Māori providers are better able to build trusting relationships with Māori clients because they are connected to the communities that they serve through the deployment of a predominantly Māori workforce, and the incorporation of kaupapa Māori values and principles into their practices (Ministry of Health, 2010). Therefore, the emergence of Māori providers can be seen to have a number of benefits for Māori in terms of overcoming institutional racism within mainstream government departments, exposed in reports such as Puao-te-ata-tu (Ministerial Advisory Committee on a Māori Perspective for the Department of Social Welfare, 1986).

However, it is also evident that despite the emergence of such organisations, the inequitable treatment of Māori providers by the state is a significant issue. For example, Māori providers receive a small proportion of the total available funding (Robson, 2007), and often work beyond the scope of their contracts in order to achieve outcomes for their clients (MKTA, 2010). In exploring the issue of institutional racism in the health sector, Came (2012) argues that mainstream providers and Māori providers are treated differently by funding bodies. Māori providers were not given opportunities to negotiate aspects of the contracts offered, the contracts were consistently for shorter periods of time, and Māori providers were audited much more frequently than their mainstream counterparts. Tamihere (2003:np), also expressed the way in which the devolution of service delivery to community agencies is flawed:

Contrary to popular belief on a dollar per unit social worker pricing model it is actually fiscally prudent and responsible to decentralise. As devolution and decentralisation occur however, what has happened in our experience is that discounting occurs. For example the Child, Youth
and Family Service will pay on average $90,000 per unit per full-time employee of the total agency on a mean average. To a provider agency in a Māori community you will be lucky to get $32,000 per unit full-time employee average. The Child Youth & Family Service will pay itself $110,000 per annum per bed night at its residential facilities. It will pay a community organisation from $15,000 - $20,000 per bed night per annum. Furthermore the model is flawed in so far as the funder of the service to the community is also in competition as a provider. The funder sets the budgets; the funder sets the standards and policies.

These comments reflect the way in which devolution and decentralisation, while appearing to offer choice to communities such as Māori, actually serve as a mechanism for cutting costs in the public sector, while at the same time the power over funding remains with government. These issues were also experienced by those interviewed. Institutional racism, articulated as differential treatment in funding and contractual arrangements, was seen as a significant barrier to the potential of Whānau Ora. Lyvia Marsden highlighted the increased scrutiny placed on Māori providers, commenting that:

Māori organisations are audited at about 3.5 times the rate that a mainstream equivalent would be. You can go on and it is damaging… And the more that you prove how good you are the harder they come down. If you are succeeding and you’ve come through with some brilliant stuff you’ve got to work even harder because you have become a threat to mainstream providers so there is another lot of oppression that comes down, still covertly but nonetheless as powerfully damaging. We spend more time defending our right to be here and surviving. We spend more time than mainstream organisations do I’m sure.

Hone Harawira, MP and leader of the Mana Party was also critical of the way in which Māori providers were offered shorter contracts and faced increased costs of compliance when compared to mainstream providers:

In terms of the level of scrutiny, a classic example is the levels of funding for say Salvation Army programmes. They will be funded for every three years and reviewed at three years with a right to roll over. John Tamihere’s programmes are funded for 6 to 12 months only and the compliance level is absolutely huge…. Whānau Ora is going to be exactly the same. So compliance just makes it so much more difficult for Māori programmes, Māori providers, Māori kaupapa, to get the go ahead.

John Tamihere, Chief Executive at Te Whānau o Waipareira Trust, argued that Māori providers were still struggling to be seen as legitimate, and that they were frequently under funded (if funded at all). He commented that:

The biggest barrier we’ve got is acknowledging that we have legitimacy as a solution maker in this space, Acknowledging that, well, “with respect we probably don’t need you and you and you”. The question is so why are you being funded and we’re not? So it all comes back to basic economic drivers all the time. That’s the discussion we have and that’s why there is huge tension. That’s why there is huge inspection on us because everyone wants us to fall over.

Whānau Ora is also shaped by the current economic climate of fiscal constraint, which means that providers are expected to deliver ‘more for less’. Poata-Smith (2013) argues that
the twin goals of returning to budget surplus while reducing levels of government debt has seen the current National-led government cut expenditure in the public sector, particularly in the area of welfare and social service provision. Key policy platforms of the National-led government since 2008 have included modifications to KiwiSaver, greater targeting for Working for Families and cuts to the student loan scheme as well as a broader restructure of the welfare system. Likewise, Whānau Ora is expected to lead to “improved cost effectiveness and value for money” (The Taskforce, 2010:6). As Herewini te Koha, Acting Chief Executive of Te Puni Kōkiri, observed:

We are in a public sector climate of more for less, same for less, less for less, you know. And in that environment you've got a whole lot of public sector leaders who are being tasked with big stretch targets and unambiguous result targets, and the temptation to put their hands more firmly around the levers that they control is high. So their ability to see or be open to something that is fundamentally out of the box, that's heading into a community space is going to be hard for some to process or get on board with… So we are working hard to have a louder voice I think because it's a big din out there, you'd think that sanity would prevail, and everyone would get a fair hearing, that the best initiatives would garner support but it's not quite like that at the moment.

These expectations in turn impact on the ability of Māori service providers to uphold the principles of Whānau Ora.

The bureaucratisation of Māori service provision: Whānau Ora or Provider Ora?

As well as the risk that Māori cultural concepts may be transformed through their incorporation into public policy settings, it is also arguable that Māori provider organisations themselves are influenced by the contractual relationships with the Crown in ways that potentially undermine Māori values and aspirations for autonomy. Commenting specifically on Whānau Ora, Linda Smith (2013:235) argues that,

providers are also shaped in ways which implicate them in the problem: they survive on contracts and have little infrastructure to re-imagine themselves. The key problem is embedded in the contracting paradigm, and the focus on short-term gains of individual clients rather than systemic change of the conditions that foster inequalities.

These comments also serve to reiterate the unequal relationships that exist between Māori and funding bodies (i.e. the state). As Grey and Sedgwick (2013:5) comment, “the mechanism of the contract has the uncanny capacity to generate fear, to focus minds on the survival of the fittest and to sideline public debate, forcing the attention of providers onto meeting the demands of funders.”
Given the challenges of operating in a competitive environment where the level of funding is limited and performance highly scrutinised, the viability of some Māori provider organisations may be uncertain. As Smith’s (2013) comments above suggest, this can lead providers to direct their focus to the short-term survival of their organisation rather than the medium to long-term outcomes of whānau. Some of those interviewed argued that, in their experience, ‘Whānau Ora’ had become a programme of ‘provider ora’. Interview participant, Simon Royal (Chief Executive of Te Puna Hauora), commented that:

Our argument always was that you should be using the non-government agencies to lead out this type of thinking because the rules and the entire weight of the public service would not allow this type of changes and innovations in thinking that was required to achieve success to achieve transformation. What you would get would be a programme called Whānau Ora, and in fact that’s what they did get. In our opinion, Whānau Ora became a programme of action and that programme of action was directed far more in our opinion towards provider ora, rather than Whānau Ora.

These sentiments were also echoed in comments made by Lyvia Marsden, who was concerned that providers were not placing the concerns of whānau at the centre of their practice. She observed that

You sit down around a table and you will never get alliancing, simply because everybody sitting at the table has got a different agenda. And that agenda does not include the families or the people we serve. It involves our organisations, and our survival and growth. You never hear families being mentioned at that table meeting. And dozens of those meetings take place in DHBs and PHOs, you sit at them. Not once will you hear about the families and about what is happening with the families on the ground.

The need to move beyond outputs to outcomes is clearly articulated by the Taskforce (2010). As well as identifying six outcome goals for whānau (discussed in the previous chapter), the report also identifies the need for a cross-sectoral approach in achieving these. The report states, “because it is concerned with socio-economic wellbeing, as well as cultural and environmental integrity, Whānau Ora cannot be fully addressed from the perspective of any single sector” (The Taskforce, 2010:30). However, interview data suggests that in practice the activities of Whānau Ora providers are still very much driven by outputs rather than outcomes. This means that rather than responding to the needs of individual whānau, provider activities are still defined according to the priorities of the state. As Lyvia Marsden stated:

Organisations have got to build the capacity according to what the whānau are requiring. Not from government that “you can have money for this contract” then you go out and fulfil that contract. For instance, at the moment we’ve got smokefree⁴. All the money is in smoking cessation. Politically it’s a big football at the moment and everybody is expected to change

⁴ Smokefree is a New Zealand public health campaign aimed at encouraging people to quit smoking.
what they do to fit into this latest top priority. Why? To make sure that the providers are able to
prove to the government that they are doing their job.

These comments illustrate that contractual relationships between providers and the state
continue to be based around outputs rather than outcomes, perpetuating ‘top down’ rather
than ‘bottom up’ relationships between the state, providers and whānau. Furthermore, the
broader economic environment of austerity and constraint means that the onus is on
providers to deliver more for less. One of the criticisms of contract-based models of social
service delivery is that there is a danger that the state gets credit for improved outcomes but
the providers get blamed for failures. As Grey and Sedgwick, (2013:6) comment, “the
survival of community and voluntary organisations is predicated on winning the contract
against competition and the corollary of this structure is that blame for failure will inevitably
fall on the provider”. Given that Māori providers are operating in environments where they
are in competition for limited contracts and resources, it is perhaps unsurprising that
priorities are based more around ‘provider ora’ rather than whānau ora.

Interview participants also questioned the extent to which Whānau Ora had been able
to overcome the issue of a silo mentality within state agencies. Dr Fiona Cram, Director of
Katoa Ltd, commented that while Māori providers may operate in a whānau-centred way,
there is little evidence that mainstream government agencies have shifted their own
practices and ways of interacting with Māori:

Māori providers have maintained that they provide whānau-centred services and in many ways
Whānau Ora was about service and capacity funding models (and government agencies)
catching up with the realities of the practice models of Māori providers. The criticism (e.g.,
many cars in a driveway) that Whānau Ora was supposed to be a response to was a criticism
of government agency service delivery. It is a shame that Whānau Ora has not pointed a
spotlight on the practices of these ‘mainstream’ agencies in an effort to make them more
accessible for Māori and for whānau.

The state sector has been slow to gain momentum around agency cooperation – although this
is not surprising as it is an on-going issue prior to Whānau Ora. What Whānau Ora has done is
give agencies the momentum to try and develop a common language around Māori service
provision to Māori. I have not seen much evidence that there is a comparable responsiveness
about mainstream agency responsiveness to Māori, even though mainstream agencies get the
majority of funding and should be held most accountable for Māori disparities.

As Cram’s comments above suggest, Whānau Ora attempts to address the failure of the
state to meet the needs of Māori yet it is unlikely to be effective if the broader public sector
does not also undergo significant changes in the way in which it operates. Furthermore,
given the low levels of overall funding allocated to the approach, there is some concern that
Whānau Ora may be being ‘funded to fail’. This is discussed further in the following chapter.
There was also seen to be a lack of progress in implementing mechanisms such as integrated contracts. One of the barriers to achieving whānau-centred outcomes identified by the Taskforce (2010) report is the fact that providers often hold multiple contracts with multiple agencies, which can lead to fragmented approaches to whānau interventions as well as high compliance costs for providers. A shift to integrated contracts was seen as key in overcoming such barriers; however, it was acknowledged by Di Grennell that this initiative had yet to be implemented across all providers:

There are some providers within collectives that have integrated contracts, but I think it would be fair to say that integrated contracting is part of a suite of approaches that government has sought to take over time to move towards more outcomes focussed ways of engaging.

At its best and well put together, integrated contracts might facilitate some more flexibility at the provider end but I think there is still quite a lot of work to be done around that whole outcomes and organising around the client groupings rather than around the service lines.

Another example of the way in which the implementation of the Whānau Ora approach differs from the framework outlined by the Taskforce (2010) report is the establishment of a non-government organisation (NGO) commissioning model. As mentioned in the previous chapter, it was announced in 2013 that the Regional Leadership Groups put in place to oversee the implementation of the approach would be wound up, and the government would begin a process to establish three NGOs. The three NGOs would focus on building capability within whānau in the North Island, South Island and Pacific communities. This model attempts to combine a commissioning structure with the need for regional variance and responsiveness to particular communities by having three separate organisations. However, the extent to which an NGO responsible for the entire North Island is likely to be able to respond to the diverse Māori communities within it is somewhat questionable. When asked about the potential impacts of the proposed NGO structure, John Tamihere, CEO of Te Whānau o Waipareira Trust commented:

It's a pathetic smokes and mirrors thing. So there is 30 million dollars that's been tagged to it. There are three NGOs to be set up to run it. One for Pacific Islanders, one for the South Island. Now 89% of Māori live in the North. So when they set up three different organisations to manage... three different cost structures to manage 100% of Māori but they're going to need two separate organisations. It's bullshit you know, iwi-ism gone stupid. So - and one for the Pacific Islanders – well the Pacific Islanders really should be exited to the Ministry of Pacific Island Affairs. They shouldn't be in this space. They should develop their own space, you know?

These comments also reflect the way in which policy approaches still fail to recognise the divergence between Māori and Pacific communities' needs and aspirations. By having a separate NGO for Pacific peoples, Whānau Ora is framed as an approach that responds to needs, rather than to Māori rights as indigenous peoples to have control over their own
affairs. This was also a feature of the Closing the Gaps initiative. The NGO structure proposed differs from the single dedicated trust that was a recommendation of the Taskforce Report in that rather than being independent, the NGOs will continue to be overseen by state agency Te Puni Kōkiri (TPK). As such, the new structure can be seen to reflect the neoliberal goals of separation of policy formation (TPK), funding (NGOs) and delivery (providers).

Others interviewed also had mixed views about the shift to an NGO model. Some expressed concern over whether NGOs would be resourced sufficiently, and whether the new structure would actually enable more input from whānau or would continue to be driven by state priorities. Hone Harawira was concerned that a lack of adequate resourcing coupled with high compliance costs would undermine the potential success of NGOs:

I'm not necessarily against the idea of NGOs taking on that kind of thing, but I am worried about the level of resources that are being made available to them… I know that back home we could do this stuff better, but the important part is given a similar level of resourcing. The expectation on Whānau Ora providers, the infrastructure, the whole philosophy is already nigh on impossible given how small the amount of money they have been given against the massive amount of money that is put into other things just in the social welfare sector and the huge cuts that have been made to beneficiaries. So nowhere near the same level of resourcing.

I guarantee you, the whole structure that's been talked about, the way Whānau Ora has been going along, like I say three years dragging on. It will be overloaded with compliance, with expectation and with contractual obligations, so by the time it even gets to an NGO they will be operating just like a government department at that level. And at that level, like you say a certain level of people will be helped, and the great unwashed will be ignored again. So can NGOs do it? I am absolutely convinced that they can, but the key thing is given a similar level of resourcing. And that will never happen. That will never happen. Government will point blank refuse to ever allow that to happen.

Lyvia Marsden was sceptical that shifting to NGOs was likely to result in priorities being driven by whānau:

I don't think that it will change at all very much because there are two different sets of people with a vested interest in this – and I mean that sincerely – you've got to look at whānau ora, which is about family wellness and capability and provider ora which is about capacity. They are two different beasts. And if you are going to take control away, these beasts are getting all of the money. Instead of all that bureaucracy we are being replaced by one beast. It is us organisations that are actually using the money that is supposed to be for whānau…

So if you ask about NGOs, my argument is that the role of NGOs is to provide the services that match what the whānau need on the ground. It hasn't been like that. Its been matching what the government thinks should be driven in here, what's a great problem to some parts of society – whoever yells the most – they will change things here to make that a priority. And get away from making sure that the kids are fed, that they are at school, you see what I mean? The drivers have to be changed.
However, perhaps the most interesting comments are those from Tariana Turia (2013), who in a recent radio interview expressed her own doubts as to whether NGOs would be an effective means of achieving the goal of devolving the control of funds from the state into Māori communities.

Because in parts of the world there [are] resources that go directly into families. We do it already a bit with ACC, and we do it in some ways in the disability sector. We try to get the money as close to the person who needs it. Now I don’t know whether I believe in all of these NGO service providers either at times you know? That worries me at times that we just shift from WINZ up the road into the NGO.

While Whānau Ora is a comparatively recent initiative which is yet to be fully implemented, (and clearly, the structure is still evolving), the interview data suggests that there are a number of institutional barriers to the approach realising its potential.

The Challenges of Evaluation

Evaluation forms an important component of any public policy initiative, as there need to be mechanisms in place that can provide evidence to the public that their tax is being spent appropriately. However, the process of how evaluation is applied in an indigenous context is contested. In particular, there are concerns about how the ownership and use of research and evaluation reflects the unequal power dynamics that exist between groups such as Māori and the state (Moewaka Barnes, 2013). As discussed in the previous chapter, the Taskforce (2010) report identified a number of challenges inherent in evaluating an approach such as Whānau Ora. One of these challenges is the difficulty in moving from traditional systems of evaluation, which measure outputs (i.e. how many services have been delivered), to measuring outcomes (what those services have achieved). This difficulty is compounded in approaches such as Whānau Ora, which is interested primarily in collective outcomes. Stephens (2011) argues that the social security system in New Zealand is premised on the notion of autonomous individuals. Therefore, state intervention in the form of service delivery is aimed at responding to individual issues such as a lack of employment. She comments that “the entire benefit structure, as it has been implemented and enacted since 1938, is simply an anathema to the Whānau Ora collective and tikanga Māori approach” (Stephens, 2011:33).

Fiona Cram who has been involved in establishing the Action Research component of Whānau Ora commented that the tension between outputs and outcomes continues to be a challenge in assessing Whānau Ora:
From the early days the Crown (in a big, stereotyped sense) wanted to measure widgets such as ‘number of truants back in school’ rather than understand and support Māori aspirations for Whānau Ora. Counting was never really going to get at the heart of Whānau Ora, but it was attractive as it potentially allowed for the same things to be counted across different provider/provider collective contexts.

If there had been interest in such things as whānau capability and capacity, whānau connectedness and links to support structures, and whānau access to services and programmes it would have been possible to collect meaningful and consistent data across provider/provider collectives. This would have required a change in focus from the Crown on the type of accountability data it wanted – shifting from widgets to in-depth signals of whānau transformation.

This suggests that in order to provide the data that is required to meet the threshold of accountability, officials and providers may end up perpetuating the deficits based view of Māori that has been a feature of past policies. Moewaka Barnes (2013:170) observes that “the issue of what constitutes evidence is complex: different groups and individuals operate within different world views and with differing values, needs and agendas all contributing to what constitutes evidence”. One of the challenges for evaluating approaches such as Whānau Ora that are underpinned by kaupapa Māori values, is that Māori approaches favour qualitative forms of evaluation, which express the richness and diversity of Māori experience over quantitative approaches, which are seen to have contributed to a deficits based view of Māori (Moewaka Barnes, 2013). Cram identified some significant tensions that exist between the role of the action researchers involved in Whānau Ora and the reporting requirements of Te Puni Kōkiri. While the Action research component of Whānau Ora was intended to provide a reflexive process of learning for providers and provider collectives to enable them to develop more effective whānau-centred services, Cram comments that these aims sat in tension with the accountability requirements of Te Puni Kōkiri in its role as administering department.

Te Puni Kōkiri developed the KPIs separately from the Action Research component. I suspect that this was a risk management strategy for Te Puni Kōkiri.

Demands were then placed on the provider/provider collectives and the action researchers to collect and report on this ‘core’ information. While Action Research was not intended to be the key data collection mechanism I feel Te Puni Kōkiri defaulted to be this. I would have preferred for the development and articulation of KPIs to fall primarily to the formative evaluation component that was also in the Whānau Ora budget (but, as far as I’m aware, never eventuated). In this scenario the knowledge and experience of the action researchers could have been an important supplement.

The difficulty was that the action researchers were embedded with the provider/provider collectives and there was reluctance on Te Puni Kōkiri’s part to over-burden provider/provider collectives with new people and data collective arms. Unfortunately Te Puni Kōkiri confused monitoring and evaluation and imposed upon the action researchers to collect monitoring data – in the guise of KPIs.
These comments reflect some of the difficulties that exist around how to implement approaches that challenge traditional frameworks of what is considered ‘orthodox public policy’.

Cram also commented on concerns that it was difficult to attribute positive whānau outcomes to Whānau Ora, although, she noted that what could be measured was the capacity of providers to deliver effective services which was useful:

Challenges with evaluation include the attribution of outcomes to Whānau Ora rather than to other funding streams that have resourced the programmes and services being delivered by provider/provider collectives. What should be able to be attributed to Whānau Ora with the most confidence is the capacity development of provider/provider collectives to deliver their services in a whānau-centred way, and the development of collectivity among provider collectives.

The evaluation component of Action Research has been about the assessment of provider/provider collectives’ delivery of services and programmes in a whānau-centred way. This provides some evidence for whether provider/provider collectives have changed their service delivery models in response to Whānau Ora capacity/business development funding.

Finally, one of the significant challenges of evaluating Whānau Ora is the fact that, as discussed in the previous chapter, there are many ways of understanding the approach. This complexity in turn allows considerable scope as to how the approach might be implemented. Di Grennell commented that:

I think also because Whānau Ora as it is lead from here is not a suite of services or a programme to be delivered, it’s actually a lot more difficult for people to come to terms with an approach than it is a programme suite….

It’s a way of working which by its nature you then want other parts of the public sector and service to pick up and adopt and adapt. One of the challenges of course is that people will pick it up and adapt it to work in their own way and in their own time so it’s one of those constant tensions where you seek to enrol people to something and then they start to describe it differently to the way that you do.

As well as the differing understandings that exist within the public sector described above, there are likely to be considerable differences in the way in which Whānau Ora is implemented within different communities. Given that one of the core goals of Whānau Ora has been to enable whānau themselves to define what whānau ora looks like for them, it is likely that Whānau Ora will continue to pose challenges for the public sector.
Conclusion

Whānau Ora undoubtedly has the potential to improve outcomes for Māori and, broadly speaking, all of those interviewed embraced the intention or philosophy behind it outlined in the Taskforce Report. However, this chapter has highlighted a number of tensions which exist between the philosophy of Whānau Ora and the way in which it has been implemented thus far.

On the one hand, Whānau Ora provides a framework for a values-based approach to social service delivery. It defines wellbeing using Māori language and cultural concepts and places an emphasis on the collective rather than the individual. However, there is a risk that Māori values and practices can become commodified in order to fit into mainstream policy and legislative frameworks or to meet the requirements of the market. Interview participants also felt that while considerable responsibility was placed upon Māori providers to implement whānau-centred approaches, there had been a lack of corresponding movement in the way in which mainstream agencies operated. Furthermore, interview data suggests that Māori providers are treated differentially by funding bodies, resulting in higher costs of compliance and shorter terms of contract. In sum, these issues can be understood as a form of institutional racism, as they constitute a significant barrier to positive outcomes for Māori.

Government agencies were still seen to operate in silos and, as a result, the contractual relationships with providers were still focussed on measuring outputs rather than outcomes. Like the decentralisation policies implemented by governments previously, this results in the state continuing to drive policy priorities, rather than giving substantial effect to the stated aim of involving whānau in decision making processes by asking them to set their own goals and determinants of wellbeing. Finally there are particular tensions between the need to balance the accountability requirements of the public sector with an approach that seeks to empower communities to formulate their own visions of wellbeing. Issues around accountability are particularly important given that the political environment is often hostile to approaches that are seen to target on the basis of ethnicity. The impact of the political environment on Whānau Ora is discussed in the following chapter.
Chapter Five: Opportunities and Constraints: The Impact of the Political Environment on Whānau Ora

Introduction

Chapter Two made clear that policy approaches implemented by the state have shifted in accordance with the prevailing political ideologies and priorities of the times. The political environment can thus be considered as one which offers both opportunities for, and constraints upon, the promotion of Māori interests. Māori engagement within the political sphere has provided space for Māori to have more direct involvement in the formation of policy. In particular the Māori Party was a key driving force behind the establishment of Whānau Ora. However, it is also evident that approaches such as Whānau Ora are vulnerable to persistent popular discourses of Māori privilege. Furthermore, there is a lack of consensus within Māoridom as to what the goals of Māori Affairs policy should be and what role the state should play in Māori lives. This in turn raises questions about how the current political environment may impact on the long term sustainability of an approach such as Whānau Ora, and, whether Whānau Ora is in fact the best vehicle for achieving Māori wellbeing.

The first part of this chapter will explore the ways in which the broader political environment has impacted upon the evolution and the scope of the Whānau Ora approach. The introduction of a new electoral voting system in New Zealand provided increased opportunities for Māori political participation and representation within Parliament. In turn, this contributed to the success of the Māori Party in being elected into Parliament and being placed in a position of considerable political power. However, I will argue that, like previous policy approaches, Whānau Ora is impacted by what Barber (2008) describes as a ‘politics of resentment’. In particular, the extent of funding for the approach was identified by some interview participants as evidence that Whānau Ora was being ‘funded to fail’. This raises doubt as to the extent to which Whānau Ora is fully supported by government. Furthermore, the scope of Whānau Ora as an ostensibly Māori approach to social service delivery has been limited by comments made by Prime Minister John Key that Whānau Ora is an approach which caters to ‘need’ rather than ‘race’. This is evident in the provision for a third non-government organisation (NGO) commissioning agency to provide for the Pacific community.
As well as the difficulties of promoting minority interests within Parliament, further challenges to the sustainability of Whānau Ora are found within the Māori community itself. On the one hand, the controversy surrounding the Foreshore and Seabed Act provided a rallying point for Māori from a diverse range of backgrounds to unite sufficiently to see an independent Māori political party enter into Parliament. On the other hand, that unity proved to be short lived. The second part of this chapter will explore these divergent Māori political interests, as exemplified by the split of the Māori Party and the emergence of the Mana Party. This in turn raises questions about whether Whānau Ora is the best vehicle for achieving self-determination.

The Political Environment: Opportunities and Constraints

Māori attitudes towards the New Zealand Parliament have, since its inception in 1854, been divergent. Parliament can be seen to represent the imposition of legal and social structures over top of those arrangements which existed in Māori society prior to 1840. At the same time Māori participation within the political machinery of New Zealand has provided significant opportunities to further Māori aspirations for measures of self-determination. For example, as discussed in Chapter Two, the close relationship between the Rātana movement and the Labour Party was instrumental in seeing Māori gain equal citizenship rights within the emerging welfare state. In recent years, the formation of the Māori Party and its inclusion within a National-led coalition government has significantly changed the political landscape, and enabled progress in some key policy areas for Māori. While Māori Members of Parliament (MPs) who belong to major parties are required to promote the broader policy priorities of their party (Sullivan & Hayward, 2010), the independent Māori Party has been able to negotiate key concessions such as the implementation of Whānau Ora, the government becoming signatory to the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP) and a review of New Zealand’s constitutional arrangements (Māori Party, 2011).

However, getting Māori initiatives off the ground continues to prove difficult in a Parliament where Māori constitute a minority. According to Barber (2008), a view of Māori as being ‘privileged’ has evolved in recent years due to a conflation within the public’s imagination of the Treaty settlement process, which seeks to address the failure on the part of the state to protect the rights of Māori as guaranteed by te Tiriti/the Treaty, with the use of ethnically targeted social spending, which is intended to address the increased social need of many Māori who continue to suffer the effects of colonisation and marginalisation. While
the issue of Treaty settlements is constitutional, targeted social spending is a matter of social welfare. Barber (2008:149) comments that:

…since some Māori have become the beneficiaries of Treaty of Waitangi Settlements, Māori as a whole have come to be perceived as a privileged group and, for most Pākeha, the idea that an already privileged group should be receiving further special assistance is anathema. As a result a high level of anti-Māori resentment has emerged.

Barber (2008) suggests that the framing of the relationship between Māori and non-Māori in New Zealand can be thought of in terms of race, ethnicity or indigeneity, and that each of these terms have markedly different political connotations. The notion of indigeneity has gained increasing favour from indigenous groups, including Māori, due to the way in which it affirms notions of collective rights and draws attention to the historical conditions of oppression and marginalisation suffered by such groups. Indigenous rights are also supported by international legislation such as UNDRIP. Framing discussions about the relationship between Māori and non-Māori as ‘race relations’, on the other hand, has the effect of shifting the focus from historical explanations for collective Māori disadvantage to the characteristics of individuals (i.e. ‘race’), which can then be addressed through minimal intervention policies such as those that outlaw discrimination on the basis of race (Barber, 2008).

A key example of the way in which a politics of resentment has emerged is the controversy sparked by the Court of Appeal’s judgement in the Ngāti Apa vs Attorney-General (2003) case, which upheld the jurisdiction of the Māori Land Court in deciding customary title of areas of the foreshore and seabed (McHugh, 2005). This decision signalled that, despite the earlier consensus that Māori rights to the foreshore and seabed were not recognised in statute and therefore did not exist, there had been no formal extinguishment of Māori customary title over the foreshore and seabed. McHugh (2005) argues that the issue at stake was one of jurisdiction not of ownership, but the ruling caused widespread alarm amongst the wider public who were led to believe that their ‘rights’ to access beaches was under threat from Māori ownership.

The National Party was quick to capitalise on the ruling, promoting a campaign claiming ‘Beaches for All’ (Gagne, 2008). However, it was a speech delivered by the new leader of the party, Don Brash that ignited the race debate in spectacular fashion. In 2004, the political consensus between parties over Māori receiving special consideration in policy was shattered when Don Brash’s speech to the Orewa Rotary Club ignited fierce public debate about whether social policies targeted towards Māori were in fact a form of racial discrimination, and whether there should be ‘one law for all’ (Brash, 2004). Although this line
of attack was hardly new, as evidenced in English’s (2002) earlier campaign on ‘One Standard of Citizenship for All’, the foreshore and seabed debate provided Brash with the platform he needed to finally gain traction with the public. Brash attacked New Zealand’s bicultural partnership with Māori, and played on the notion that Māori were receiving special privileges not available to non-Māori. Drawing heavily on the Chapple report (2000) which questioned the practice of targeting Māori in public policy, he claimed:

Much of the non-Māori tolerance for the Treaty settlement process – where people who weren’t around in the 19th century pay compensation to the part-descendants of those who were – is based on a perception of relative Māori poverty… Māori-ness explains very little about how well one does in life. Ethnicity does not determine one’s destiny (Brash, 2004:np).

This speech was a clear attempt to draw upon the undercurrent of racism that exists within some sectors of the wider population. It was a strategy that proved successful; following this speech, polls showed that approval for the National Party rose by 17% (Tunnah, 2004).

The surge in popularity for the National party on the basis of perceived Māori privilege influenced Labour’s move away from policies that could be seen as favouring Māori. As well as legislating to prevent Māori from testing their rights to the foreshore and seabed (through the Foreshore and Seabed Act 2004), Prime Minister Helen Clark responded to the controversy by creating a new ministerial portfolio on ‘Race Relations’, which was given to (Pākeha) MP Trevor Mallard in 2004. Mallard’s first project in the newly created role was to undertake a review of all government policies and programmes to ensure that they targeted ‘need’ and not ‘race’ (Sullivan, 2006). In a speech titled ‘We are all New Zealanders now’, Mallard (2004:np) claimed that “[S]ervices must be on the basis of need and not because of a sense of race-based entitlement. New Zealand also has to get its British imperial past behind it. Māori and Pākeha are both indigenous people to New Zealand now. I regard myself as an indigenous New Zealander - I come from Wainuiomata”. By positioning Pākeha as indigenous alongside Māori, the very basis by which Māori lay claim to difference and to particular rights was removed.

The resulting reluctance to target policies on the basis of ethnicity illustrates the fact that implementing Māori policy is politically contentious. It also illustrates the way in which overcoming institutional racism is a continuing challenge for Māori as efforts to establish services and programmes that reflect Māori values and practices are resisted by the public, and therefore also by the state, who are wary of alienating voters. My interview participant Di Grennell, member of the Whānau Ora Taskforce and Director of Operations at Te Puni Kōkiri, commented that this shift away from Māori initiatives in the period following the
Foreshore and Seabed Act was evident when the Taskforce was assessing existing programmes for Māori:

I have to say that one of the things that was quite interesting when as a taskforce we asked for the range of programmes and initiatives that were whānau focussed or Māori focused - that was in the period that followed that race based funding review - and there were a number of things had either disappeared from the screen, had been renamed, had been refocused and that was in response to that scrutiny. I think it would be very fair to say that if something happens in a Māori space it faces particular kinds of review and scrutiny. There are also some particular political arrangements that Whānau Ora sits in that probably open it up to other sorts of scrutiny from some opposition members.

Given the increased scrutiny of state-funded Māori initiatives identified by Grennell, it could therefore be argued that Whānau Ora represents a significant shift back towards recognition of indigenous Māori rights. While acknowledging the potential difficulties in co-opting Māori concepts into policy settings, as discussed in the previous chapter, the widespread use of te reo (Māori language) to name a significant cross-sectoral policy approach should not be underestimated. The visibility of Whānau Ora as a Māori approach is emphasised in its use of te reo in its title. The fact that ‘Whānau Ora’ is used by Māori and non-Māori alike to refer to the approach is significant. While the use of te reo in naming state policies and strategies is not new, for example He Korowai Oranga, Māori Health Strategy, such policies have tended to include an English language subtitle. Based upon my analysis of various references to the approach within the popular media, as well as various press releases from Ministers, there does not appear to have been any attempt to provide or promote an English language equivalent to ‘Whānau Ora’. Furthermore, apart from the portfolio of Māori Affairs, the establishment of a Ministerial portfolio for a specifically Māori initiative such as Whānau Ora, is unprecedented.

However, it is also evident that Whānau Ora remains vulnerable to persistent popular discourses of Māori privilege. Interview participant Simon Royal, Chief Executive of the National Hauora Coalition, argued that the very fact that Whānau Ora was so visibly Māori in its nomenclature was a barrier to its likelihood of success:

I think racism is a significant barrier as well. I think that the mere fact that Whānau Ora is Māori language is a fundamental barrier to Whānau Ora being successful. “Well that must be for Māoris”. What? We can’t have concepts that work for other people?

The Foreshore and Seabed Act also illustrates the way in which the interests of indigenous peoples such as Māori are particularly vulnerable to shifts in the political climate. Simon Royal commented on the fact that while the major political parties may need Māori parties as coalition partners, they still find it easy to sacrifice Māori interests in the pursuit of the ‘mainstream vote’:
Governments want to be re-elected, and they may or may not need Māori as a partner in that process. I think that altruistically there are many New Zealanders who see Māori as a partner in this country going forward, but in the realm of politics, the only thing that matters are the numbers, who gets elected, the votes that are swung your way. …Māori bashing has always been a pretty cheap way to acquire votes. Don Brash knew that, Winston Peters constantly knows it, it’s cheap and easy; it’s the simplest thing you can go for. It has a long-term detrimental impact on our society that is hugely damaging, but politicians are looking for short-term wins. Election cycles are three years long and if you are lucky you have got a government career that will last three terms. No one goes four terms. If you get three you are counted as lucky.

The reluctance to formulate policy on the basis of ethnicity or indigenous rights is also evident in the debate about who could or should access Whānau Ora services. Despite Whānau Ora being an approach designed explicitly around core Māori values (including confident participation in te ao Māori as one of the outcome goals), Prime Minister John Key was prompted by public pressure to confirm that all families would be able to access Whānau Ora services. Responding to earlier comments from Turia that the Taskforce Report contained “Māori solutions to Māori problems”, Key stated that “there is no preferential treatment in Whānau Ora. The National Party, for as long as I’ve been involved, has been a party that believes in policies based on need, not race. And that’s where we intend to end up” (both cited in Espiner 2010:np). This statement again illustrates the way in which the term ‘race’ is used to position policies such as Whānau Ora as being potentially problematic with regards to giving Māori unfair advantage. Simon Royal argues that Key’s comments are evidence of a lack of political leadership in framing the approach to the public. He commented that:

…to me it was astounding that he had to make any statement like that, and the smart thing to do was to not make any statement. Look, just keep reciting the mantra that we have got some challenges. “We want Māori to be fully integrated and participating in the economy and society in New Zealand so this offers us a way forward. There will be benefits for all New Zealanders that accrue as a result of this. Don’t you all want to benefit from the integration of health and social services, don’t you all want to benefit from the idea that your families are at the centre of everything?” …. Whānau Ora, and public policy more broadly is a leadership challenge. Really that is the fundamental thing. The biggest, greatest barrier is the lack of leadership. The single biggest opportunity is the creation of leadership. It’s that simple for me. The rest of it is detail.

It could be argued that this lack of leadership from the Prime Minister suggests a broader ambivalence on the part of the National Party to the aims of the Whānau Ora approach, and that the implementation of Whānau Ora in the first place owes more to the desire of the National Party to remain in government than to any real commitment to improving Māori outcomes. One of the most consistent themes emerging from the interview data collected was that the lack of funding was a significant barrier to Whānau Ora being successful. To put it bluntly, some participants felt that Whānau Ora was specifically ‘funded to fail’. Not only did
Whānau Ora receive a fraction of the funding initially sought by Tariana Turia to implement the approach, this was repurposed from existing budgets, rather than entailing any new allocation of funding (Hartevelt, 2010) Interview participant Hone Harawira, MP and Leader of the Mana Party, commented that when compared to the amount of funding given to other social services, Whānau Ora was clearly never intended to become a viable alternative to the mainstream approaches favoured by government:

National’s view was if we’ve got to spend a bit of money to keep these guys as a coalition partner how much are we going to have to spend. That’s all it was from National’s point of view. Whānau Ora was budgeted at a billion dollars a year. Tariana got $130 million. So what’s that, 13%. So basically that’s all it was. National was never going to fund it to be the success it was always intended to be, and I think that had they funded it strongly and positively it would have scared the shit out of a lot of other social services and social welfare departments and made them realise that either they come to terms with this model or else Whānau Ora was going to gobble them up. But National didn’t do it. They signed off on it and said we’re going to do it but only at $130 million.

The expectation on Whānau Ora providers, the infrastructure, the whole philosophy is already nigh on impossible given how small the amount of money they have been given against the massive amount of money that is put into other things just in the social welfare sector and the huge cuts that have been made to beneficiaries. So nowhere near the same level of resourcing.

In a recent radio interview given by Tariana Turia (2014), the Minister was also ambivalent about the extent to which Whānau Ora was supported by Government. She commented that:

There isn’t a great deal of resource going into Whānau Ora, I believe that if there was a commitment to Whānau Ora, and we saw those resources being used appropriately – and I use that word “used appropriately” – that we would see the change that we would want to see, not only for Māori, but for any New Zealanders who believe that their lives can be managed by themselves.

The fact that the Minister of Whānau Ora publically stated that Whānau Ora is insufficiently funded and that there is a lack of commitment to the approach (presumably on the part of government) suggests that there is significant doubt as to the long term sustainability of Whānau Ora.

As well as issues around funding, Whānau Ora has also faced considerable scrutiny from opposition politicians, which has largely been played out within the mainstream media. For example, the announcement of the shift of funding decisions to NGOs created considerable debate, with some media commentators suggesting that public accountability mechanisms - such as the Official Information Act (OIA) - would not be applicable to NGOs and that taxpayer funding was at risk of being misspent (for example see Stuff, 2013). This was despite the fact that a similar structure had been signalled in the Taskforce (2010) report and in the Relationship Confidence and Supply Agreement between the National
Party and the Māori Party in 2011 (National Party & Māori Party, 2011). The Whānau Integration, Investment and Engagement Fund (WIIE), which was earmarked for enabling whānau to develop whānau plans, had already been attacked by New Zealand First MP Winston Peters as wasting millions of taxpayer dollars on what he described as ‘family reunions’ (Trevett, 2012). Public concerns were further enhanced by revelations by Peters that a Dunedin gang had misappropriated $20,000 of money from the WIIE fund to buy drugs (Chapman, 2013). Other MPs, including Green Party co-leader Metiria Turei, accused the Māori Party of seeking to privatisé social service delivery by stealth, while creating an iwi elite which would act as gatekeepers for the programme. Left-wing political commentator Chris Trotter (2013:2) also attacked Whānau Ora as being “an extraordinarily brazen attempt to introduce the principles of neo-tribal capitalism to the intricate and largely voluntary world of Māori social service”. Such accusations were followed by further comment from Peters, who claimed to have found evidence that Te Puni Kōkiri had provided funding to the National Hauora Coalition to prepare its bid for NGO status and that the Iwi Leaders Forum were requesting similar assistance (New Zealand First Party, 2013).

While the implementation of Whānau Ora can be considered as marking a shift back towards recognising Māori practices and values within public policy, the examples above clearly highlight the ongoing scrutiny and controversy that surrounds initiatives that give particular consideration to Māori. The failure of the National-led government to define the scope of the approach and to fund Whānau Ora adequately demonstrates the lack of leadership necessary to move the country beyond a politics of resentment and towards a shared understanding of the goals of Māori self-determination.

The split Māori Vote: Shared goals and differing strategies for Māori self-determination.

The Māori Party’s move to form a relationship with the National Party, a party that has traditionally held little support amongst Māori voters, has provided both opportunities and meant significant compromises. The Māori Party has arguably had significant success in placing its policy priorities, including Whānau Ora, firmly onto the government’s agenda. However, it could be said that these concessions have come at the expense of more substantial moves towards self-determination for Māori. As a result, the Māori Party have faced a significant backlash from some sectors of its constituency over the way in which the Māori Party has been seen to support National Party policies which are arguably detrimental
to Māori communities. This has seen a split within the Māori Party and the formation of a new political party.

Many Māori were highly critical of the Māori Party’s willingness to support National Government policies, such as the increase in the rate of the Goods and Services Tax (GST) and the 90-day trial employment period, which would likely have significantly adverse impacts for Māori (Godfrey, 2012). The Marine and Coastal Area (Takutai Moana) Act 2011, a replacement for the Foreshore and Seabed Act which provided the impetus for the creation of the Māori Party, has also been criticised as little more than a symbolic gesture which did not significantly address Māori grievances or reinstate Māori rights over the Foreshore and Seabed (Jackson, 2010). Godfrey (2012) suggests that the Māori Party have come to represent the emergent Māori capitalist class, who have developed privileged relationships with successive governments and who have benefitted from the Treaty settlement process. He argues that “an examination of the Māori Party’s policy planks reveals a tension between the party’s desire to be a pan-Māori party and the reality that the party had come to represent Māori capitalism and iwi Māori” (Godfrey, 2012:275).

These tensions came to a head when Hone Harawira, a Māori activist and Māori Party MP, was ejected from the party in 2011 over his criticism that the Māori Party was shifting to the political right. Harawira in turn created the Mana Party, winning the subsequent by-election for the Tai Tokerau seat and returning to Parliament. The Mana Party, unlike the Māori Party, focuses explicitly on class identity rather than just ethnicity, and reflects a fragmentation of Māori politics by offering a staunchly left-wing alternative to the comparatively conservative Māori Party (Godfrey, 2012). Although the Mana Party is not fundamentally an explicitly Māori Party, evident in the party’s inclusion of prominent Pākehā activists such as John Minto and Sue Bradford, it effectively marries together aspirations of mana motuhake with workers’ rights, while claiming that it responds to the need for a “truly independent Māori voice in parliament” (Mana Party, 2013:np).

Hone Harawira’s departure from the Māori Party further underscores the fact that Māori are a diverse political constituency. While the goal of Māori self-determination may be shared, what becomes evident when assessing Māori Affairs policy is that what self-determination looks like and how it should be achieved is contested. As Kapua Smith (2010:208) points out:

while the notion of tino rangatiratanga can unite Māori voters and collectives, it can also act as a divider of people. There are a multitude of definitions of tino rangatiratanga, and a number of views on how best to achieve it and what it looks like. It is this very fine line between unity and division within which Māori political parties sit.
The extent to which Whānau Ora can be seen to enable self-determination for Māori is likewise contentious. That some Māori have expectations of Whānau Ora that may not be shared by the state is evident in the following observation by Simon Royal:

> The issue that government has and the issue for Māori communities, and this has been said by other people, is that Whānau Ora is code for tino rangatiratanga and self-determination. And at multiple levels, not just at a social level but also at a political level. And it’s the political level that I think creates the greatest problem for governments. “How can we move to a transformational programme of social and health action” suddenly gets translated [by Māori] as a statement of their own standing within the political dynamics of this country. Well it is; that’s the reality of it.

In my analysis of the language used in the Māori Party Policy documents between 2004 and 2011, it is evident that the Māori Party has shifted away from politicised calls for Māori self-determination and partnership with the Crown towards an emphasis on co-operation. The 2004 document made numerous references to concepts such as self-determination, tino rangatiratanga and kotahitanga, often in explicit reference to the Treaty based relationship between Māori and the Crown. This included the statement that:

> Constitutional change would focus on giving effect to Articles 1 and 2 of Te Tiriti/Treaty in a manner that reconciles Māori rights to exercise tino rangatiratanga with the need for kawanatanga. This would mean that the exercise of governance would be shared between the 2 Tiriti/Treaty partners, Tangata Whenua and the Crown (Māori Party 2004:1).

However, the use of language pertaining to measures of self-determination was considerably toned down in the subsequent policy documents released in 2008 and 2011. In 2011, reference to the Treaty was now much softer, centred around the need for “co-operation between iwi/hapū and the Crown” (Māori Party, 2011:n.p). This shift in language is also evident when analysing the Taskforce (2010) report on Whānau-Centred Initiatives. An analysis of the report reveals that although self-determination is listed as one of the key characteristics of a whānau ora philosophy, the term is used in a narrow and constrained way. The report states that:

> The Taskforce was frequently reminded at hui that Whānau Ora is about self-determination. While from time to time outside assistance is needed by many Whānau, a core feature of Whānau Ora is self-management and self-determination. Long term dependency on outside agencies is not consistent with Whānau Ora; instead the aim is to enable Whānau to assume responsibility for their own affairs (The Taskforce, 2010:29).

This statement can be clearly seen to conflate the notion of ‘self-determination’ with that of ‘self-management’; in fact, out of the seven references to the term ‘self-determination’ in the entire report, almost all of these references also contained the term ‘self-management’ as an adjunct. The term ‘rangatiratanga’ was not used at all. Such a conflation presents an understanding of self-determination which is about reducing long term dependency on the
state (i.e. welfare dependency), rather than a decision-making capability or meaningful partnership relationship between Māori and the state. It is also interesting to note that while the Taskforce (2010) report makes numerous references to a Treaty based relationship, reference to a Treaty based partnership is mentioned only once in the summary section of a discussion of case studies (The Taskforce, 2010:41). When compared to previous documents such as *Te Urupae Rangapu* with its commitment to “ensure that Māori people achieve rangatiratanga in the sense of the agreed partnership guaranteed under the Treaty of Waitangi” (Department of Māori Affairs, 1998:23), the emphasis on self-determination as it applies to Whānau becoming ‘self-managing’ is weak.

The way in which notions of self-determination are conflated with self-management speaks to the fact that the role of the state as provider of welfare for Māori is contested. This was further emphasised by the Minister for Whānau Ora, Tariana Turia (2014:np) in comments she made during a recent radio interview:

…I think that for too long, the left have decided that the state should provide, the state should do *for* the people. And what that has done is it’s created the situation that we see ourselves in today where the first thought of individuals is, do I go to WINZ or do I go to the food bank or do I go to here... Do they think to themselves I come from a hunter gatherer grower people. You know? Do they think, you know, I should be doing this for myself and my family? No, they think about where the resource is and it’s in the governments hands. So they turn firstly to the government to provide for them. That’s where the left has made their big mistake I can tell you.

Turia’s suggestion that the provision of state welfare results in welfare dependence for Māori is not new but is reminiscent of the debates that occurred during the establishment of the welfare state in the 1930s, discussed earlier in this thesis. Such arguments are also put forward by other indigenous leaders (Pearson, 2009; Tamihere; 2003). Pearson (2009:150) argues that:

…welfare is a method of governance. Welfare involves a superior power having all of the rights and all of the responsibilities to make decisions and take actions on behalf of relatively powerless people. People on the ground are seen as passive recipients, clients or customers. They are provided ‘services’, essentially on a plate, by far superior people (white and black) with greater expertise and knowledge.... As a method of governance, welfare is increasingly becoming a means of managing marginalised groups at minimal cost without even maintaining the fiction that a lasting solution to their problem is sought.

Echoing the concerns of Apirana Ngata, Tamihere (2003:2) argues that in positioning welfare as part of a contract between the state and its citizens, the ‘left’ ignores the way in which welfare dependency undermines social relationships based on self-esteem and mutual recognition. Under such critiques of the ‘left’, solutions such as Whānau Ora, which seeks to de-centralise responsibility out to communities, seem to fit well within neoliberal
approaches which are favoured by traditionally ‘right’ leaning governments such as National. As Simon Royal comments:

... of course under a National government they are quite happy to seek these kind of innovations as smaller government is the best idea, mobilise the private sector to help government achieve social objectives is very much part of the way in which National governments tend to want to operate. Which coincided with the desire by iwi and by many Māori to have localised control of our own destiny, just give us the resource. The issue that you have there is that governments don’t hand over taxpayer resources easily without some assurance that the benefit that will accrue the government and i.e. the taxpayer is well established.

However, these comments also highlight a fundamental tension that exists between the aspirations of Māori for self-determination and the goal of government to maintain control over policy programmes. There are clear parallels between Whānau Ora and the previous policies of devolution (or, more accurately de-centralisation) enacted in the 1980s. On the one hand, the government is pushing the delivery of social programmes out to the community sector under the auspices of providing space for Māori to design and implement programmes that reflect their practices and values. On the other hand, there is a danger that approaches such as Whānau Ora can, like devolution, appear to offer Māori measures of self-determination through the decentralisation of service delivery but this is not commensurate with an actual partnership relationship between Māori and the state. The fact that adequate resources are not provided for policy approaches such as Whānau Ora is evident in the first part of this chapter. Furthermore, as I have argued in the previous chapter, the separate provision of social services under philosophies of by-Māori-for-Māori can have unintended consequences, including differential and inequitable treatment of Māori providers.

Those interviewed had mixed views with regards to the extent to which Whānau Ora could offer measures of self-determination to Māori. Their comments further highlight some of the tensions identified above. For example, Fiona Cram, Director of Katoa Ltd, while dismissive of the idea that Whānau Ora offered real opportunity for Māori self-determination or was likely to transform whānau outcomes, also noted that Māori providers and Whānau were invested in the concept of Whānau Ora, commenting:

Rangatiratanga will only come about through constitutional change, not a small initiative that lays the responsibility for Whānau Ora at the feet of a few, reasonably poorly funded Māori services. Whānau Ora neither recognises nor seeks structural reform within mainstream services, so even its ability to facilitate whānau transformation is limited. Within this context I think we can be surprised that it’s taken such a firm hold and has lifted the spirits of Māori providers and whānau. Like many crown initiatives it gives a pittance and expects a palace in return. At least with this one we’re using Māori words and a Māori concept that will hopefully live on beyond the initiative itself – just like it existed prior to it.
Di Grennell felt that public policy as implemented by the state was not a vehicle for rangatiratanga or self-determination, but that public policy could bring about more productive and meaningful relationships between Māori and the Crown. When asked to what extent Whānau Ora might enable tino rangatiratanga for Māori, her response was:

Ah, I think before you answer that you have to come back to looking at what your definitions of rangatiratanga are. And I’m very cautious about any kind of articulation that any kind of uptake of a particular policy approach constitutes rangatiratanga. So in my personal view the uptake of something as a matter of public policy is not necessarily rangatiratanga. It fits for me more into a more appropriate responsiveness and improvement in relationship perhaps between Māori and the Crown.

Others were also sceptical of the ability of a policy approach such as Whānau Ora to achieve self-determination for Māori, given the broader structural challenges facing Māori and the lack of support on the part of government for devolving actual decision making power (and funding) to Māori communities. Hone Harawira was critical of the fact that there was still a lack of clarity in terms of what Whānau Ora was with regards to how it was structured, including the funding arrangements, which translated to a lack of understanding within the Māori community about how to access services:

I guarantee you this. That as we speak today it would be unlikely that any whānau that has had any assistance from Whānau Ora would be saying at the moment “this is my stepping stone to Rangatiratanga”. For the very simple reason that the levels of support will be hugely divergent at the moment, because of the lack of structure to the beast, three years on, and because the end goal is still unclear, and because the ability of the navigators to change a person’s condition is hugely limited…

So in terms of the continuum, you know, Puao-te-ata-tu and all the other programmes, even Winston’s Ka Awatea, they were all good ideas but they have all been treated by respective governments as a programme and not as genuine attempt to give Māori a sense that they can control their own lives.

The above statements signal that there are differing understandings and expectations between the wider Māori community (including Māori providers) who see Whānau Ora as offering real potential for self-determination at a political level, and the government’s official view that Whānau Ora will enable more responsive relationships between providers and Whānau and will enable Māori to become ‘self-managing’. Ultimately, as Fiona Cram comments:

Māori providers are used to changing their kaupapa, language and funding applications to adjust to the passing of slogans. They don’t stop doing their work just because the political context changes. The biggest challenge is the sustainability of Whānau Ora in the eyes and hearts of politicians, not Māori.
While such a comment raises questions about what role Māori who are also politicians might play in the sustainability of policy approaches, it is evident that an historical analysis of Māori struggle tells us that Māori efforts remain focussed on achieving self-determination. While there may be disagreement amongst Māori on the best strategies for achieving this, this goal remains a shared one.

Conclusion

One of the threads running through this thesis has been Māori efforts to enhance their levels of self-determination. Whānau Ora in turn has been described by some as being a significant step forward in Māori taking control over their own destinies. For instance, Stephens (2011:33) sees Whānau Ora as:

… another result of ongoing Māori efforts to effect real decision-making over social outcomes Māori as well as improving those social outcomes for Māori. Put another way, Whānau Ora seeks to achieve for Māori true tino rangatiratanga and the real benefits of equal citizenship within social policy areas.

However, it is also evident that the extent to which Whānau Ora is able to realise such aims is constrained by issues including a lack of real commitment on the part of government to devolve actual decision making power to Māori communities. In these respects, Whānau Ora has strong parallels to the programmes of devolution implemented in the 1980s. Furthermore the failure of government to provide adequate funding and to frame Whānau Ora to the public as an approach that was intended to recognise and uphold Māori values and aspirations suggests that government has yet to resolve issues of institutional racism in its decision making processes.

A further challenge to the sustainability of Whānau Ora is the instability of Māori internal politics. The departure of Māori Party MP, Hone Harawira, from the Māori Party to form the Mana Party is evidence of the fact that the Māori voting constituency is politically diverse, and that it is unlikely that a single party can represent the broad array of Māori political views. Support for Whānau Ora as the vehicle for achieving wellness and self-determination is therefore likely to be equally variable.
Chapter Six: Conclusion

Introduction

Whānau Ora represents a significant development with regards to Māori Affairs policy in Aotearoa New Zealand and, as such it was important to explore the potential this new development offers to Māori and the wider community. However, given that Whānau Ora was only launched in 2010, it is still premature to make any assertions about the extent to which the approach can be considered successful in any quantitative sense. Instead, this thesis has sought to trace the way in which the Whānau Ora approach has evolved, how it reflects and differs from previous policy and how it continues or overcomes tensions in the relationship between the state and Māori. From this analysis I have sought to identify key challenges that may inhibit Whānau Ora in achieving the objectives it was intended to fulfil. After summarising my main argument that Whānau Ora offers only limited potential for self-determination, this chapter concludes by considering other means by which this goal might be achieved.

Returning to my research questions

The aims of this research were threefold and each of these is explored below in detail, summarising the main arguments that have been presented across the preceding five chapters:

How has the Whānau Ora approach evolved?

This thesis sought to trace the way in which the Whānau Ora approach has evolved by looking at the way in which the shifting relationship between Māori and the state has been expressed through various policy initiatives. It has argued that Whānau Ora did not emerge from a vacuum, but represents the culmination of a long history of Māori Affairs policy in Aotearoa New Zealand. However, in saying that, it is clear that there are particular policies, reforms and events that have contributed to the policy genealogy of the Whānau Ora approach.
In the first instance, Whānau Ora clearly responds to some of the criticisms found in Puao-te-ata-tu, in that it attempts to place a Māori world view at the centre of policy for Māori. The incorporation of Māori concepts and language into policy approaches such as Whānau Ora also reflects the increasing commitment to biculturalism on the part of government that emerged in response to the period of political activism and social change in the 1960s and 1970s. There are also clear parallels with the programme of devolution initiated in the 1980s, in terms of the way in which a contractual relationship between Māori providers and the state has been established. Like devolution, Whānau Ora is more accurately described as a form of decentralisation, as the ‘buck still stops with the state’. Furthermore, lessons learned from the Rūnanga Iwi Act controversy saw no attempt to restrict Whānau Ora to iwi-based providers, and there are a number of urban Māori providers who are delivering Whānau Ora services.

Devolution also created space for Māori providers to establish themselves, first through the separation of funders and providers and more recently under the Primary Health Care Organisation structures. Furthermore, the role of Māori providers and Māori representation on District Health Boards was supported by the Māori Health strategy He Korowai Oranga. A further influence has been a broader shift in the mainstream policy priorities of government, which has seen an increased focus on families as a site of social policy intervention, as well as moves towards whole-of-government approaches. Finally, key political developments, including changes to New Zealand’s electoral system and the emergence of an independent Māori Party, have created particular opportunities to advance Māori policy agendas and initiatives, including Whānau Ora. It is in this unique environment that Whānau Ora came into being.

What (if any) tensions exist between the aims of Whānau Ora and its implementation thus far?

The thesis also attempted to identify what (if any) tensions exist between the aims of the Whānau Ora approach as expressed in the Taskforce (2010) report and the way in which it has been implemented thus far. More specifically, what are the barriers that stand in the way of Whānau Ora having a positive impact on the lives of Māori whānau? My key informant interview data, supported by my analysis of other key primary and secondary sources, suggests that there are indeed a number of tensions that exist between the aims of Whānau Ora as expressed in the Taskforce (2010) report, and the way in which it has been implemented at this point in time. One of the most significant issues was the way in which
institutional racism continues to limit Māori providers, and Māori more broadly. This is significant because initiatives such as Whānau Ora have evolved partly as a response to the institutional racism identified in Puao-te-ata-tu that resulted from mainstream government departments not having the capacity or cultural competency to deliver programmes that meet Māori needs. Building Māori capacity to deliver by-Māori-for-Māori social services and designing programmes that incorporate Māori values and practices are a key focus of approaches such as Whānau Ora. However, differential treatment by funding bodies has led to instances where Māori providers are funded at lower rates to deliver equivalent services, contract terms are shorter and involve higher costs of compliance, and Māori are often expected to work beyond the terms of contracts to meet the needs of their clients (Came, 2012). The potential for a two-tier system of social services, whereby Māori provided services become stigmatised, and are funded at a lower level certainly suggests that institutional racism continues.

At this stage it is unclear what impact devolving funding to three non-government organisations (NGOs) might have on improving this situation. However, given the issues identified around the lack of overall funding discussed below, it is unlikely that a shift to NGOs making funding decisions will have much impact. Furthermore, I question the extent to which these organisations can be responsive to the different needs of individual communities. In theory, one NGO will be tasked with overseeing all North Island providers (excluding those dealing specifically with Pacific Island communities), and, given that the majority of Māori reside in the North Island, this means that most Māori providers will be overseen by a single organisation. Even the Minister for Whānau Ora, who announced and championed the shift to an NGO structure, recently expressed her doubts over the potential effectiveness of the change.

There are also particular challenges that arise when co-opting Māori concepts and models into mainstream policy settings, as illustrated by the experiences of the Kōhanga Reo movement. The concept of ‘whānau ora’ could come to describe a set of prescribed social services delivered by Māori provider organisations, or as Graham Smith (2012) suggests, a programme of ‘brown welfare’, rather than a state of holistic wellbeing of whānau as defined by whānau. Furthermore, the contractual model of relationships between providers and the state in turn influences the way in which providers interact with the whānau that they work with. Although the Taskforce (2010) report emphasised the need to move beyond outputs to outcomes, this is difficult to implement in practice, and interview data suggests that outputs are continuing to drive Whānau Ora at this point in time. This
means that the extent to which whānau are likely to have meaningful input into the process is likely to be limited.

Another significant barrier to Whānau Ora’s success is the limited funding it received from government. The general consensus from those interviewed was that Whānau Ora is underfunded. Some key informants went as far as to suggest that this was a deliberate decision on the part of government, who were happy to see the initiative fail. Not only is Whānau Ora not adequately resourced, but it has been implemented by a government that has campaigned on the basis of its commitment to fiscal austerity and returning to a budget surplus. Cuts to other social programmes such as Working for Families, and KiwiSaver, increases in the Goods and Services Tax (GST), the restructuring of the welfare system and employment law which erodes workers rights are likely to impact particularly on Māori, and potentially serve to undermine gains made by Whānau Ora.

Furthermore, all key informants spoke about the way in which political and public scrutiny was a particular challenge in gaining support for Māori-led initiatives. Already there is a concern that the future of Whānau Ora may be in doubt, depending on which configuration of political parties form a coalition government in the 2014 election. Opposition parties such as New Zealand First are vowing to scrap Whānau Ora completely on the basis that it is a form of ‘apartheid’ (Television New Zealand, 2014), or to substantially alter it on the basis that it is “not just something we would limit to Māori” (Television New Zealand, 2014:np). This illustrates the way in which Māori initiatives continue to be used as a political football in the pursuit of the mainstream vote.

Finally, there are tensions between an emphasis on the demand for policy that is ‘evidence based’ by government and the shift to an outcomes focus for Whānau Ora. As stated in the Taskforce (2010) report, evaluation of the approach is likely to prove challenging for a number of reasons. First, reaching a state of whānau ora may be a long term undertaking, particularly for those whānau who face complex challenges and are at the more vulnerable end of the scale. Second, it will be difficult to confidently attribute outcomes to Whānau Ora. Changes in whānau circumstances may say more about changes in the personal circumstances of whānau members or within the broader economic environment than any particular interaction that they have had with Whānau Ora per se. The evaluation that has taken place thus far has consisted mainly of anecdotal evidence of whānau transformation, in the form of case studies and stories. While this may be an appropriate method of evaluation in a Māori context, it is risky given the political scrutiny the approach is placed under. As Stephens (2011) has highlighted, the social security system in New Zealand is premised upon the notion of individuals, not collectives. The danger is that in
To what extent does Whānau Ora enable measures of self-determination for Māori?

Finally, this thesis asked: to what extent might Whānau Ora enable measures of self-determination for Māori? Given the challenges outlined in the section above, I argue that the extent to which Whānau Ora in its current form can offer Māori opportunities for self-determination is limited. In distinguishing between the aims of positive Māori development and self-determination, Durie (1998:6) suggests that:

> While both are concerned with social, cultural, and economic development and Māori delivery systems, the aims of self-determination place more importance on Māori control over resources and independence from the state. The aims of positive Māori development, however, are not necessarily inconsistent with government policy and have not infrequently been initiated by government.

As an approach initiated by the state (albeit as part of a policy platform promoted by a Māori political party), Whānau Ora can be considered an example of positive Māori development rather than self-determination. While the approach certainly has the potential to improve the responsiveness of social service agencies to Māori Whānau and, in doing so, increase Māori capacity for self-management, Whānau Ora does not devolve control over resources to Māori. It continues to be a top down rather than bottom up approach, with decision-making and control over funding decisions still driven by state agency Te Puni Kōkiri. Furthermore, as comments from key informants suggest, the services delivered to whānau are still influenced more by the priorities of government, rather than the priorities of whānau.

It is also possible to argue that, in some respects, the very purpose of Whānau Ora is to depoliticise Māori Affairs policy. As noted by Durie (2005) and Chant (2013), Māori policy in recent years has shifted its emphasis from iwi development and the language of ‘partnership’ and tino-rangatiratanga to a focus on whānau. Whereas the Rūnanga Iwi Act sought to build a partnership relationship between the Crown and iwi (albeit one expressed through the somewhat narrow confines of contractual relationships), under Whānau Ora the primary relationship between Māori and the Crown is expressed as being between Māori service providers (who may or may not be based within iwi) and the Crown. This suggests that Whānau Ora, like previous Māori Affairs policy approaches, will continue to promote the
illusion of meaningful partnership between Māori and the Crown while obscuring the reality that the state maintains a firm grip on power.

**Looking to the future**

Although Whānau Ora may not itself serve as a vehicle for Māori self-determination in a political sense, I argue that there are still many aspects of the approach that may, in the long term, effect positive change for Māori and for the wider community. Effectively engaging in cross-sectoral approaches that wrap services around whānau, implementing an outcomes focus in social policy, and engaging with Māori in ways that reflect Māori values, practices and aspirations will undoubtedly improve the delivery of social services to the Māori community. However, given the way in which the sustainability of Māori Affairs policy is challenged by the shifting tides of the political environment, it is useful to consider what political and societal changes may be necessary to ensure that Whānau Ora and Māori Affairs policy more broadly can become less vulnerable to political points scoring and more sustainable in the long term.

**Entrenching the Māori seats**

The existence of the Māori electoral seats has had a significant impact on the political landscape in New Zealand. They have played a key role in progressing Māori interests and, under the Mixed Member Proportional (MMP) electoral system have been instrumental in seeing an independent Māori Party elected into Parliament. It is also evident, however, that the seats are controversial. Key arguments in favour of abolishing the seats include the idea that, since Māori have now achieved proportional representation thanks to the introduction of MMP, the seats represent a form of reverse discrimination which privileges the interests of Māori over other groups (for example, see Joseph, 2008).

However, as Sullivan (2010) contends, a focus on individual rights and treating everyone as equal under the law has not resulted in equal outcomes for Māori, who have faced particular barriers to achieving adequate representation with the legal and political structures of Aotearoa New Zealand society. The likelihood of Māori interests being paramount within electorates in which they form a significant minority is slim. For example, were it not for the existence of the Māori electorates, it is unlikely that the Māori Party would have been formed, given that its initial *raison d’être* was to repeal the Foreshore and Seabed
Act of 2004, which had considerable mainstream support. Furthermore, the existence of the Māori seats also ensures that major political parties must compete for the Māori vote, and therefore give consideration to the needs of Māori (Sullivan, 2010). This is evident in the considerable political presence at the annual celebrations at Waitangi and Rātana.

Several political parties, including National, have signalled that removing the Māori seats is on their agenda – although, in deference to its current relationship with the Māori Party, the National Party has (temporarily) deprioritised this goal. Depending on which parties form the next government, removing the Māori seats may not be difficult, given that legislation providing for separate seats is not entrenched and can therefore be repealed by a simple majority vote (Wilson, 2010). Entrenching the Māori seats would require cross party cooperation, as a majority of 75% of Parliament is required to agree to such a move (Wilson, 2010), and so, given the current political climate this is unlikely. However, giving more certainty to the future of Māori political presence within Parliament would have significant benefits with regards to promoting the rights of Māori as indigenous peoples of Aotearoa.

Embedding te Tiriti/the Treaty within the constitutional framework of Aotearoa New Zealand

Another concession made as part of the agreement between the Māori Party and the National Party in 2011 was a review of New Zealand’s constitutional arrangements. In August 2011, an independent panel consisting of 12 members, including a Māori co-chair was tasked by the government with instigating a ‘conversation’ with the general public about constitutional issues. These included views on whether New Zealand should have a written constitution, the role of te Tiriti/the Treaty in New Zealand’s constitutional arrangements, Māori representation, the Bill of Rights Act 1990, electoral matters including the size of parliament and the length of term and ‘other issues’, which included for example the status of local government (Constitutional Advisory Panel, 2013). In particular, the questions around the role of te Tiriti/the Treaty are significant for the on-going relationship between Māori and the Crown. As pointed out in the Constitutional Advisory Panel’s (2013) report, the Treaty (or reference to the ‘principles’ of the Treaty) has been incorporated into numerous pieces of legislation, but there is currently no requirement on the part of government to take the Treaty into account when making policy decisions. The report notes that:

In recent decades the Treaty has had a significant and increasing influence on New Zealand law. The Treaty may be taken into account in public decision-making, but is only required to be taken into account when referred to in legislation. The Treaty’s legal enforceability therefore
relies on Parliament, in which Māori are a minority, referring to the Treaty or the Treaty principles in legislation (Constitutional Advisory Panel, 2013:32).

This observation aptly captures the vulnerability of Māori as a minority peoples with regards to progressing Māori Affairs policy. During the period of consultation undertaken by the Constitutional Advisory Panel, there were also a number of parallel discussions occurring within the Māori community and other interested groups (for example see Mutu & Jackson, 2010) about what role te Tiriti/the Treaty might play in New Zealand’s constitutional arrangements. While not all Māori support entrenchment, constitutional reform which puts te Tiriti/the Treaty at the centre of the constitution as a foundational document – one option given by the report – may mean that the fortunes of Māori Affairs may be less prone to the vagaries of political ideology and opportunism.

**Treaty-based education**

Finally, it is important to remember that elected politicians do not seek to undermine Māori initiatives purely on the basis of their personal beliefs and values, but rather make decisions based on what they think their constituents will support at the ballot box. Therefore, the question that needs to be asked is: how can we overcome notions of Māori privilege within the broader population? In particular, how can our understanding of what citizenship means be expanded beyond the narrow confines of individual equality? Tawhai (2010:288) comments that “the notion of equal citizenship as it arises in New Zealand largely excludes the political attributes of indigeneity, and therefore requires political reconstruction if it is to serve as the basis of our constitutional future”. Tawhai (2010) points out that citizenship education has been identified as a priority by entities such as the Department of Internal Affairs, the Human Rights Commission and the Constitutional Arrangements Committee (2005), as well as being labelled as an area of ‘future focus’ by the Ministry of Education. However, she is critical of the fact that the curriculum of the Ministry of Education and the website of the Department of Internal Affairs have failed to address critical issues such as Māori representation or calls for tino rangatiratanga.

Given the apparent lack of engagement around issues of indigeneity and citizenship within the New Zealand education system and public sector more broadly, it is unsurprising that the Constitutional Advisory Panel’s report (2013) revealed a lack of enthusiasm amongst mainstream New Zealanders for building a constitutional framework that places Te Tiriti at its centre. I believe that building a better understanding amongst non-Māori about our shared history in Aotearoa New Zealand is crucial for moving beyond the politics of resentment that
currently shapes the state’s approach to Māori Affairs policy. The following comments from the Waitangi Tribunal’s report Ko Aotearoa Tēnei aptly describe the dilemma faced by society:

Unless it is accepted that New Zealand has two founding cultures, not one; unless Māori culture and identity are valued in everything government says and does; and unless they are welcomed into the very centre of the way we do things in this country, nothing will change. Māori will continue to be perceived, and know they are perceived, as an alien and resented minority, a problem to be managed with a seemingly endless stream of taxpayer-funding programmes, but never solved (Waitangi Tribunal, 2011: xviii).

Significant shifts thus need to happen not only at a political level, but also at a societal level if Māori aspirations for self-determination are to be realised.

**Concluding remarks**

It is significant that all of the interview participants involved in this research commented that they supported the kaupapa of Whānau Ora. I believe that this reflects a desire on the part of most Māori to see Whānau Ora succeed. Indeed, there are many positive aspects to Whānau Ora, including a shift to a whole of government approach, the recognition of Māori values and practices within policy and a focus on the collective outcomes of whānau, rather than the outputs delivered to individuals. However, I argue that significant barriers remain to achieving whānau ora. The extent to which the state is willing to support this goal with adequate funding and by relinquishing control to Māori communities continues to be limited. This indicates that institutional racism continues to be a problem that inhibits a meaningful partnership between Māori and the Crown. Furthermore the mainstream political environment is not conducive to supporting the aspirations of minorities such as Māori. Finally Māori are a diverse community. It is unlikely that a single approach such as Whānau Ora is likely to meet the needs of all Māori. Rather, it should be considered as one approach amongst many that contributes towards a state of whānau ora, not only for Māori but for all of society.

Although this thesis has highlighted a number of challenges to Whānau Ora, the approach represents a significant step forward when compared to previous state responses to Māori needs and aspirations. Māori also have significantly more influence over the policy-making process following changes within the electoral system and the greater levels of direct political participation that this has enabled. Furthermore, Whānau Ora may in turn contribute
to the development of future Māori-led approaches to improving the wellbeing of Māori in Aotearoa New Zealand.
Appendix 1

Letter of approval from

University of Auckland Ethics Committee
UNIVERSITY OF AUCKLAND HUMAN PARTICIPANTS ETHICS COMMITTEE

01-Jul-2013

MEMORANDUM TO:

Dr Louise Humpage
Sociology

Re: Application for Ethics Approval (Our Ref. 9567)

The Committee considered your application for ethics approval for your project entitled A whakapapa of Whanau Ora: A new way of delivering social services in New Zealand?.

Ethics approval was given for a period of three years.

The expiry date for this approval is 01-Jul-2016.

If the project changes significantly, you are required to submit a new application to UAHPEC for further consideration.

In order that an up-to-date record can be maintained, you are requested to notify UAHPEC once your project is completed.

The Chair and the members of UAHPEC would be happy to discuss general matters relating to ethics approvals if you wish to do so. Contact should be made through the UAHPEC Ethics Administrators at humanethics@auckland.ac.nz in the first instance.

All communication with the UAHPEC regarding this application should include this reference number: 9567.

(This is a computer generated letter. No signature required.)

UAHPEC Administrators
University of Auckland Human Participants Ethics Committee

c.c. Head of Department / School, Sociology
Ms Charlotte Moore

Additional information:
1. Do not forget to fill in the ‘approval wording’ on the Participant Information Sheets and Consent Forms, giving the dates of approval and the reference number, before you send them out to your participants.

2. Should you need to make any changes to the project, write to the UAHPEC Administrators by email (humanethics@auckland.ac.nz) giving full details of the proposed changes including revised documentation.

3. At the end of three years, or if the project is completed before the expiry, please advise UAHPEC of its completion.

4. Should you require an extension, write to UAHPEC by email before the expiry date, giving full details along with revised documentation. An extension can be granted for up to three years, after which a new application must be submitted.

5. If you have obtained funding other than from UniServices, send a copy of this approval letter to the Manager - Funding Processes, UoA Research Office. For UniServices contracts, send a copy of the approval letter to the Contract Manager, UniServices.

6. Please note that UAHPEC may from time to time conduct audits of approved projects to ensure that the research has been carried out according to the approval that was given.
References


fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Community Health, University of Auckland.


