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SEAN STURM & STEPHEN TURNER

CARDINAL NEWMAN IN THE CRYSTAL PALACE:
THE IDEA OF THE UNIVERSITY TODAY

It will give birth to a living teaching, which in course of time will take the shape of a self-perpetuating tradition, or a genius loci, as it is sometimes called; which haunts the home where it has been born, and which imbues and forms, more or less, and one by one, every individual who is successively brought under its shadow.


Newman vs Muldoon in the university 2.0

In a Landfall article from 1971, ‘Cardinal Newman, Dr Leavis, and Mr Muldoon: The Idea of the University Today’, G.F. Waller, an expat University of Auckland, addresses the idea of the university suggested by then Minister of Education Robert Muldoon. For Waller, the Minister’s view that a university education should be ‘useful and practical’, responding closely ‘to the technological and economic needs of society’, reflects a ‘technico-Benthamite’ utilitarianism grounded in the principle that ‘civilisation depends upon science and applied science’ (p. 403). Waller contrasts such pragmatic Muldoonism with Cardinal Newman’s broader vision of a university education, whereby the university should teach ‘Universal knowledge’ that aims at ‘comprehensiveness and . . . integration’—though this laudable aim, he notes, is made difficult by the ‘diversity and largeness’, not to mention ‘specialization’, of today’s ‘multiversity’ (p. 399). Such knowledge, he concludes, isn’t merely ‘an acquirement’ but more akin to ‘philosophy’, in that it ‘open[s] up continually to . . . students the wider contexts of [their] subjects, within and outside the university’ (p. 400). In this way, ‘the university can be the source of ultimate values to which the student can commit [himself]’ (p. 401). To this vision, Waller adds an ‘active function’ for the university that he takes from F.R. Leavis (p. 401): that the university, to quote Leavis, should ‘apply itself to the problems of civilization (1943b, p. 30, citing Leavis, 1943a). For Waller, this means ‘establishing, articulating and acting upon the humane ends which the university and society at large should serve’: a civic function or will to community (p. 402). The job of this ‘critic and conscience of society’ (NZ Government, 2010, p. 320) is to ‘look Muldoon fearlessly in the eyes’ (p. 408).

Borrowing Newman’s terms, Waller sets this ‘liberal’ humanist idea of a university education against Muldoon’s ‘servile’ economic one (p. 400). But, for him, the product of such an education cannot be Newman’s ‘Gentleman’, a person of ‘ease, tolerance, patience, forbearance, consideration and respect’, which suggests to him an ‘effete dilettante’ (p. 401). We’d say that dilettantism does more good than harm, though the very idea of such a person makes most local critics defensive. In his epochal essay, ‘Fretful Sleepers’ (1952; 1974, pp. 24ff), Bill Pearson gives voice (not uncritically) to such criticism of the effete intellectual in accents of the pub-based masculinism that many intellectuals of his generation shared with Muldoon (see Horrocks, 2007). But the real political and popular objection to university ‘people’ is that the taxpayer has to support these un-Kiwi wastrels. However, we want to tackle not anti-intellectualism, that tame bugbear of university folk, but a more prodigious beast: the technocapitalist and transnational neoliberal university (the ‘University 2.0’) in which we find ourselves. Waller’s critique of Benthamism and his will to community do resonate for us as inhabitants of this university that seems wholly driven
by economics. In particular, talk of transparency, efficiency and productivity seem antithetical to ‘the humanities’, which have developed historically in opposition to ‘business’ interests: for Waller, ‘the realities of liberalism, philistinism and industrialism’ (p. 401). Today, the ‘humanities’ do seem under threat to anyone working in them, but we wouldn’t defend their existence on the humanist philosophical or moral grounds of Newman and Leavis. The university can no longer be defended, as Waller does, on the basis of a two-culture model, that is, on the separation of the ‘good’ humanist arts and the ‘bad’ technical sciences (see Snow, 1959). In fact, it is the mediated ‘humanity’ of our technologised lives that suggests other grounds of community: in the idle use of contemporary technology, both in- and outside the workplace, we find the idea of the university at its un-Kiwi, wastrel best.

What we mean by being idle or idling is a kind of work and thinking that goes beyond the preset terms of ‘work-programming and work-controlling apparatuses’, a phrase that we take from media theorist Vilém Flusser (2000, p. 25) and that includes any corporate apparatus, including the university. Here too we echo Waller: our university’s ‘responsibility’, he says, ‘is to recognise the need to face the revolutionary nature of our age, the rapid changes in technology, biological control and morality, and to develop in its students habits of mind and values to cope with those changes’ (p. 402). The remapping of our lives according to the possibilities enabled by new technologies must indeed be the object of our teaching and research in the university—but this remapping cannot exclude the university in which that teaching and research takes place. This university (2.0) enacts the design drive of neoliberal technocapitalism, which makes the world over in its own terms while seeming to give an account of it, and makes us academics, along with our students, part of its account (Flusser, 1999). Education is a commodity, as are we. The university is no haven from business—and no seat of critique or conscience.

Waller rejects modern media, for him the source of the ‘blunted emotional and moral responses’ of students (p. 405). We prefer to make the contemporary media—which have richly shaped the minds of our students—the very object of our study. And we draw on their knowledge to explore the contemporary world. This redefines English (our discipline), and History too, which for Waller are the keys to a liberal, humanist education (p. 407). If English doesn’t address digital literacy and History the history of technology, then neither can claim to speak authoritatively about humanity today. To do so would better embody a will to community than an old-fashioned humanist defence of the ‘arts’ or the ‘university’ in the spirit of Waller, which would serve only to shield a comfortably tenured class of intellectuals—and to show us to be blind to the changing university.

Our brief, then, is to consider the history of the idea of the university, the means by which the value of education can be assessed, and the design drive of neoliberal technocapitalism as enacted in the U 2.0. The ‘idea’ of the university today means recasting the obsolete humanities/science divide in the light of emerging knowledge-practices, in particular, the networks of distributed intelligence that constitute the new neural academy. It means speaking to the indoctrination of self-management that makes academics and students alike portfolio people for a global market or academic entrepreneurs. And it means attending to the associated ranking of performance via the peer-credentialising of networks in the terms of a rhetoric of ‘excellence’ that is a key aspect of academic econometrics.

We would argue that the utilitarian basis of the neoliberal university makes the humanities no different from sciences in the way that the value of education is measured. Nor do we think this is a bad thing. It is rather an opportunity to rethink the university as a technologised ‘community of interest’ (Baker, Chmura, & Chow, 2008). The word ‘community’, however, suggests that the function of the university must be something other, or more, than an account of its performance. For all the neoliberal talk of promoting global citizenship, partnerships and bright futures, the real ‘interest’ at stake in the discourse of accounting that dominates the university is the utilitarian mechanism of counting itself. What isn’t captured by this academic econometrics, and the managerial culture of its administration, is the simple idea that community is a non-countable good. (We’ll argue that community is about talking face-to-face, in the local Maori language, kōrero kanohi ki te kanohi.) A contemporary Muldoon might well ask that this good be counted like any other, but the real problem is posed by a technocapitalist machine, and no particular person. And you can’t look a machine in the eyes.

**From bricks-and-mortar to glass: The neural academy**

The U 2.0 machine didn’t come from nowhere—though it did seem to materialise out of thin air and threatens to vanish as quickly. It has a history. Transnationally speaking (which is not out of place, given that the idea of the university did come from elsewhere), if the U 1.0 is the old university of the guilds, which survives in the Oxbridge model, then the U 1.5 is the national university on von Humboldt’s model, the ‘university of culture’, in the spirit of which our local universities were instituted and which aims to create cultural capital for the nation. The U 2.0 is the
neoliberal university, the so-called ‘university of excellence’, which aims to produce intellectual capital for the global market in the form of world-excellent research (Readings, 1996, p. 11). This last is no longer the bricks-and-mortar edifice of old; it is glass and modular, transparent and transportable.

Figure 1. The University 2.0 (Gollings, 2009).

Needless to say, this new university has exploded the idea of the university as Ideal that evolved from Kant through the romanticism of Humboldt and Schiller and the neo-Hegelianism of Cardinal Newman to the modern humanities, based in a ‘supersensible substrate’ of Reason as ground, with the university as Mind made manifest ‘above ground’. With the ruin of Reason, the architecture of the university, its ‘sensible’ edifice and supersensible Idea, becomes see-through glass, technologically robust and transparent.\(^5\)

The Owen G Glenn Building of the Business School at the University of Auckland is our U 2.0.\(^6\) Its massive glass edifice bespeaks those mantras of managerial culture: transparency and business confidence; as Luciana Presas puts it, in transnational architecture, ‘the massive use of glass seeks to allude to the integrity and reliability of the company that inhabits the building’ (Presas, 2005, p. 26). When Barry Spicer, Dean of the Faculty of Business and Economics at the U of A (1996-2008), was interviewed in a NZ Herald article on the opening of the building, ‘The Building Means Business’ (2008), he wrote: ‘Now the school sees itself’. He might well have said, ‘Now the
University sees itself: the University is reflected and can—but may not—see itself in the Business School. For us, it’s a dark mirror. When we look at it, we’re reminded of Dostoyevsky’s description in ‘Baal’ (1997) of the colossus of the Crystal Palace, as he saw it on a visit to London in 1862, which foretells the totalising and posthistorical spirit of transnational capitalism:

You feel a terrible force that has united all these people here, who come from all over the world, into a single herd; you become aware of a gigantic idea; you feel that here something has already been achieved, that here there is victory and triumph. [...] It is all so solemn, triumphant, and proud that you begin to gasp for breath. You look at these hundreds of thousands, these millions of people humbly streaming here from all over the face of the earth—people who come with a single thought, peacefully, persistently, and silently crowding into this colossal palace—and you feel that here something final has been accomplished, accomplished and brought to an end. [...] You feel that it would require a great deal of eternal spiritual resistance and denial not to succumb, not to surrender to the impression, not to bow down to fact, and not to idolize Baal, that is, not to accept what exists as your ideal. [...] (p. 37)

Figure 2. Interior of the Crystal Palace, Sydenham, c. 1854.

Not Babel, a place of talk, but Baal, a place of power (Ba’al Hb ‘lord, master’).

To put it less apocalyptically, we’d say that the design-drive enacted in the Crystal Palace (a.k.a. the Great Exhibition of the Works of Industry of All Continents) exhibits par excellence what Harold Innis in Empire and Communications (2007) calls a ‘space bias’ (and in ‘A Plea for Time’ [1999] a ‘monopoly of space’): a bias toward the ‘less durable and light’ media, suited to ‘administration and trade’, toward ‘centralization’ and ‘government less hierarchical in character’ (p. 64). This sounds a lot like its avatar today, our technocapitalist Business School, which, as befits our national penchant for what we will call ‘fast following’, transplants neoliberal business practice: from the ‘centre’ of neoliberalism, whether we take that to be Chicago or Washington or, rather, their ideological eponyms (the School and the Consensus); and supposedly without prejudice, because neoliberalism ignores class (while exacerbating its inequalities) in favour of meritocracy. It exemplifies the new business culture of the U of A. The planning for a new Business School came out of an initial plan, ‘Agenda for Action’, drawn up by Spicer and John Hood (famously ousted by academics at Oxford University for his neoliberal reformism), that resulted in a proposal
for a public-private partnership, ‘Building a World-Class Business School’. The proposal came out of a change in the idea of the University to add a ‘third stream’ to the traditional streams of teaching and research, whereby universities [would] run more like businesses and in partnership with business to develop money-making spin-off companies, in order to create an ‘entrepreneurial ecosystem’ in the university (Barton). This is where we find ourselves in the U of A today.

But all is not lost. The U 2.0 is double-aspected: it’s a place of business but has, as it were, an invisible technological doppelganger, the network university or neural academy, of which academics and students inside and outside the university are ‘nodes’. Even in the U 2.0, most content is delivered by traditional means, by a straightforward download model from academic-node to student-node, even when newish technologies like learning management systems and online modules are used. Such a mode of delivery conforms, then, to the programming of the university: there are no ‘own programs’ here, to use Flusser’s term (2002, pp. 169-170). But some content circulates by less traditional means like web 2.0 technologies like Facebook pages and blogs that facilitate feedback, that is to say, an up-and-down exchange of ideas—or talk. This mode of ‘delivery’ tends to deform the programming of the university, to create new or ‘own programs’ that escape the calculable objectives and outcomes by which the neoliberal university accounts for its processes, foremost among which is to measure their economic return through academic econometrics. In the terms of such transparency measures, this new academic work looks like idle talk, time wasting; but these new academic places of work are our university.

The measure of our success: Academic econometrics

So, where Waller’s criticism of the university today is directed against the ‘technico-Benthamite’ drives behind the then Minister’s desire to make education useful, we believe the utilitarianism of Muldoon’s idea of the university extends beyond the arts-science divide to the very idea of education as ‘enlightenment’. While the foremost drive of education today is toward learning that can be applied (use-value), the deeper drive is to make learning a matter of its measure in economic terms (exchange-value), a matter of econometrics. This commoditisation of knowledge makes education a business and the business of the university, and makes learning calculable in business terms, according to the managerial rhetoric of transparency, efficiency, productivity, etc. (a.k.a. Total Quality Management, or TQM). The idea of the university isn’t, as Waller would have it, a problem of technology colonising the higher and broader mind of the humanist arts, it is a problem of subjecting all learning to a utilitarian for-profit count. And when the value of education to the wider community is counted in this way, ‘community’ becomes a for-profit collective. This utility calculus drives the U 2.0.

The end of the enlightened idea of the university opens out a hidden history of utilitarian education that embodies a set of practices of teaching- and learning-to-measure and measuring teaching and learning, including the ‘accountability’ that is the university’s prime concern today (Readings, 1996, p. 32). Accountability means the drive both to count all inputs, throughputs and outputs, and, as an aggregate of this counting, to be accountable for these. Since the end of the eighteenth century, according to Keith Hoskin’s genealogy of the knowledge economy of the modern university, education has been ever more subject to measure (econometrics). From then on, a new pedagogy of writing, examination and grading across all disciplines and expert/trainee relationships began to displace the older pedagogy of recitation and disputation within disciplines and master/apprentice relationships (Hoskin, 1993, p. 272). Examination—through lectures, seminars and labs (classes); essays, tests and exams (written assessment); experiment, critique and reporting (research)—was the key: through the practice of surveillance, judgement and calculability, from above and below, through teacher and learner alike, it created the calculable and calculating academic. Tracing the rise of examination through the French laboratory, the German seminar, the Scottish classroom and the Anglo-American sports field, Hoskin (1993) fleshes out the examinee in terms of Adam Smith’s impartial spectator, now ‘a self that is simultaneously spectator-examiner and agent-examinee’ (p. 292). Merging individual and social interest, this new academic subjectivity produced in the classroom suggests that an education may not just reflect social, economic and psychological realities, but also construct them. In this way, the new pedagogy created the disciplined academics and students we know today—self-actualising, failure-fearing, prize-seeking—and thus a post-scholastic, credentialising academic culture, in keeping with what Randall Collins (1979) once called our ‘credential society’. And, further, it produced new academic industries like pharmaceutics and, as in New Zealand’s case, bio- and agritechnology that link the new subjectivity of the calculating and calculable academic to technocapitalist productivity. It is the design drive of neoliberal technocapitalism in action.

Accountability, on this account, is delivered by the transparency of measurement. For us, it has two senses: firstly, counting, budgeting, statistics, and so on; secondly, being accountable, having to justify one’s self, actions or job.
The idea of the university today works to reduce the second sense to the first. The history lesson here, in short, is that teaching- and learning-to-measure produce writing-to-measure—and thereby reduce all education to measure: education becomes a process of continuous improvement by producing processes of its measure, or processes to measure improvement. ‘Excellence’, a.k.a. ‘international best practice’, is the measure. Even research isn’t immune: hence New Zealand’s PBRF (Performance-Based Review Fund) mechanism that frames and accounts for all aspects of academic work by analysing, reporting and ranking researchers and their research. PBRF extends and externalizes the micro-measuring—and thereby micro-managing—of academics and students at the university (TQM again), multiplying the disaffection and loss of confidence and trust that results from such microprogramming. The apparatus that has evolved to make the PBRF mechanism work is problematic on a cost-benefit analysis, and of little educational and dubious social benefit (though, as Grant Duncan [2009] has suggested, there isn’t really a viable alternative).

Academic econometrics does little else than effectively incorporate academics and students within a larger corporate structure that maps, more or less happily, onto other such corporate bodies nationally and transnationally. It exemplifies the preset programming or templating by which technocapitalism works: in the application of econometrics as standard practice and ‘international best practice’ in the university (a business model), we see the emergence of the template university, which creates, as a public (economic) good, the template student. The template student is merely the raw material—and funding unit—of the new university. This student isn’t any actual student from any actual place but an aggregate—an account or count—of the design objectives and outcomes of the course, which themselves align with those of the faculty and university, and the design drive of neoliberal technocapitalism as enacted in the U 2.0. The template student is the countable product of this university, and the new model citizen of the global commons being established by technocapitalism.

Fast following in the global market: Academic entrepreneurialism and provincialism

Likewise, the template university produced by the design drive of neoliberal technocapitalism makes The U of A no different from Melbourne or Minnesota in its transnational aspiration and the business model that follows from it (Waller too noted thirty years ago that ‘even our relatively small, financially struggling, administratively pragmatic, civic New Zealand universities reflect the diversity and sporadic integration of the North American “multiversity”’ [p. 399]). The template includes partnerships with industry, research-to-market transfer, inter-university research networks, tiered and flexible employment structures, and star-academic and logo-driven recruitment. This cluster of attributes doesn’t just require a new management apparatus, it makes academics and students alike their own managers: innovative, mobile resource units, academic entrepreneurs who can work anywhere, anytime, creating markets for themselves. The authors of a fine study of The University of British Columbia at Okanagan identify in the neoliberal university ‘normalis[ing] . . . logics of individualism and entrepreneurialism, equating individual freedom with self-interested choices, making individuals responsible for their own well-being’ (Whitely, Aguiar & Marten, 2008, p. 134, quoting Leitner, Sheppard, Sziarto & Maringanti, 2007, p. 2). While such operations are rationalised in terms of local and global betterment, success is measured—and it must be measureable—in terms of ‘numerical flexibility’, the ability of the university as a ‘flexible firm’ to adapt and succeed in a competitive marketplace (Harvey, 1989, p. 150, quoting Curson, 1986, cited in Whitely et al., 2008, p. 131). There follows the ubiquitous first-to-the-future rhetoric. That you will get left behind is the motivation. The contradiction is that, here, where strongly rooted Muldoonist pragmatism persists, the ‘New Zealand’s leading university’ might be more led than leading (University of Auckland, 2010). In an influential paper about how we should respond to climate change, David Skilling, CEO of the New Zealand Institute, makes a virtue of pragmatism and a contradiction of the rhetoric of entrepreneurialism: New Zealand, he argues, shouldn’t lead the world nor lag too far behind peer countries in cutting carbon emissions. Instead, ‘fast following’ assures us the most advantageous and profitable position (Skilling & Boven, 2007). Insofar as our universities have embraced this principle, they are hardly entrepreneurial or innovative.

The deeper contradiction lies in the idea of the template university and the rhetoric of excellence itself, which masks the machinic nature of neoliberal technocapitalism. The existence of the template for the neoliberal university ensures that the university reproduces an existing model, and needn’t itself create any other idea of a university. Once again, it is neither entrepreneurial nor innovative, for the very ‘idea’ of the university that governs its operations comes from elsewhere and is unfolded locally with near-Darwinian necessity. By a process of technologised natural selection, the design drive of neoliberal technocapitalism makes over any place and people in the terms of its own description: arriving first in the future isn’t just desirable, it’s inevitable. The contradiction
is all the more glaring in the smaller, more isolated, more exposed and more provincial setting of New Zealand. And the consequences for the local community are all the more harsh.

By fast following and reproducing an existing idea of the university from elsewhere, our university shows itself to be all-too-provincial. Such a diagnosis of provincial malaise in New Zealand isn’t new, witness Bill Pearson and Robert Chapman’s state-of-the-art-nation *Landfall* essays from the ‘fifties, ‘Fretful Sleepers’ (1952) and ‘Fiction and the Social Pattern’ (Chapman, 1953). Wystan Curnow, in his essay ‘High Culture in a Small Province’ (1973), roughly contemporary with Waller’s, prescribed the ‘psychic insulation’ (p. 155) of a high culture—‘a rarefied, cosmopolitan and globally-oriented return to aestheticism’, according to James Smithies (2008, p. 99)—to combat this malaise. Curnow wanted high culture to shield artists from our Muldoonist local culture; what we got in the university (and beyond) was high capitalism that realizes Muldoonism—and employs it in the service of masters elsewhere. We adopted a transnational cure by death.

This academic provincialism is exemplified by our fast-following idea of research excellence, which seems to be all about business confidence: ‘excellent’ equals ‘international best practice’ equals ‘attractive to transnational capital’. The world-excellent research of a local would-be academic entrepreneur may well improve his or her PBRF score and enrich the university, but it needn’t critically engage with local culture, which the academic only attends to in exogamous terms, established elsewhere in ‘excellent’ academic contexts and conversations. Real confidence, conversely, requires a trust that is irreducible to TQM. You cannot outsource governance, as managerial culture requires, and maintain the trust that defines human community. Nor can a ‘community’ be simply understood as a for-profit collective. Trust can only be secured through encounter and exchange, through talking face-to-face, *kōrero kanohi ki te kanohi*.

The ‘excellence’ of the neoliberal university, when locally embedded, suggests to us an inauthentic and panicked provincialism. How can we know we are ‘excellent’ if we don’t find examples of excellence elsewhere and then by following them produce work in their image? This is the design of the neoliberal university, which might as well be an alien spaceship, were it not the very basis on which our university is being redesigned. Yet we would probably give our fast-following, world-excellent university a B+, maybe A- (the A-/B+ mark is always so hard to decide on). Its second-best best practice isn’t actually entrepreneurial or innovative, let alone distinctive or local, but blandly corporatist and it might as well be anywhere. It may well be excellent according to the indices of excellence, but this just serves to illustrate the tautology of template thinking; it doesn’t mean it is vital or vibrant.

But provincialism needn’t always be a vice. A virtuous provincialism would offer a distinctive educational experience, one that takes up the local and makes over the transnational, including ideas from elsewhere like the U 2.0. It’s a mix of what we would call code-conformance and -deformance: conformance because we already have our own ideas and do our own thing here, for better or for worse; deformance because we can pick and choose from ideas from elsewhere—at will, this kind of wilful primitivism (‘the No. 8 wire mentality’) being a provincial virtue (after Eagleton, 1986, p. 16). Then we would be not fast-following, but fellow-travelling—because we take for granted that the network society of transnational technocapitalism isn’t going away, but don’t buy into the neoliberalism that drives it at present. Our version of virtuous provincialism also takes education seriously: it teaches the university. It makes the academy, and discipline, pedagogy, genre, style, subjectivity, etc. in the academy part of teaching. It does not mistakenly assume that students are blank slates, but takes them as they are—as always already part of communities of interest inside and outside the university. It aims to create creators of knowledge, rather than fillers-in of knowledge templates. Most importantly, it produces and promotes the community-building virtues: courage and trust, both of which virtues are implicit in the above manifesto. A will to (not-for-profit) community is the key, then, to virtuous provincialism, and can serve as a work-around, a modus operandi for productive dissent from the templates of neoliberalism. As Stephen Banks (2008) puts it, ‘To be open to dissent is to embody and enact trust and courage. One of the most powerful forces in almost all cultures is the norm of reciprocity: to show courage is to invite courage and trust in return’ (p. 229).

**The return of teaching: Just talking**

The loss of community is felt most gravely in the loss of the educational mission of the university. This is perhaps the most important point we take from Waller, because it defines education—teaching (and learning)—as more than just one of the many objectives and outcomes of the charter of the for-profit university. It is obvious to Waller in a way that isn’t obvious to academics today that teaching is central to the idea of the university. Teaching cultivates and communicates the humane values that are central to a vital and vibrant community. In his short article, Waller
manages to say nothing at all about the largely entrepreneurial business of producing essays and books for publication, giving papers at conferences, constructing research networks, getting patents and grants, and so on. It’s not that academics weren’t doing these things in 1971, but that the core value of the university lay elsewhere for him—in education. Fast-forward to the future and teaching has dropped some way, if not right down the list of an academic’s priorities. For the new academic entrepreneurs, a teaching excellence award might be valuable, but the greater incentive is to relieve themselves of teaching by getting grants for teaching buy-out. It’s hard to think of a more graphic illustration of the abrogation of the responsibility to educate—and the corrosion of the university community. World-excellent scholars actually widen the distance between themselves and their students by cultivating transnational research networks (Whiteley et al., 2008, p. 133). Their research community is located in the airport and hotel lounges and conference centres of international conferences. Community life back on campus becomes a matter of professionalisation and socialising in globally credentialising circuits. Students, in turn, internalise the entrepreneurialism of academics, and assume no more responsibility to the university community than the academics do.

We don’t find this a good account of our experience as teachers or of the experience of our students. The econometric template of the U 2.0 might be able to account for research productivity, but it can’t fully account for teaching and learning. With the commoditisation of knowledge, the idea of the university has been subsumed by its own practices of measuring the production of knowledge. We would rehabilitate Waller’s idea of the university and its civic function, its will to community, as against the global citizenship of the neoliberal university, with its flight from community. We would make teaching the all-important talk of the university and the classroom a vital and vibrant site of encounter and a model for the university community. Such talk today is scripted, power-pointed, transcribed and on-sold—hence we are obliged to convert teaching into PBRF-countable essays and books—but it is the encounter, not the script, that is key to real talk. To quote Leavis (1969): ‘a university education is more than a matter of being lectured at, taking notes, doing a canny reading course, having some exercises marked, and being examined’ (p. 67). Just talking might well be a problem for the university, but because we’re talking doesn’t mean we’re not working; it just means that we’re not working to the template. We’re idling.

Now, idling in university spaces informed by technocapitalist work programming is valuable because it is work that is creative and critical, rather than fast-following—and it is community-building. Mixing code-conformance and -deformance is the key to creativity and critical thinking, both processes that are apparently highly valued in the new university, and no less important to good teaching. Talk is about code-conformance and -deformance. In other words, talking through our ideas—articulating or working with others to articulate them, persuading others of them, weighing them against others—is their best test. Talking face-to-face, kōrero kanohi ki te kanohi, just talk, is enough. And the community built through just talking is a non-countable—but very real—good, though it escapes the utility calculus of the U 2.0. It follows that our idea of the university makes the classroom central to education, a classroom that works Socratically, in an encounter that is an open exchange, an open-ended and -eyed process of question and answer. Nor is the idea of the university itself exempt from this process. Indeed, we think the ‘university’ is constituted by this process, so that a ‘university’ can be said to operate wherever such talk takes place. Such a place of talk can promote an open exchange, a learning and a teaching excellence award might be valuable, but the greater incentive is to relieve themselves of teaching by getting grants for teaching buy-out. It’s hard to think of a more graphic illustration of the abrogation of the responsibility to educate—and the corrosion of the university community. World-excellent scholars actually widen the distance between themselves and their students by cultivating transnational research networks (Whiteley et al., 2008, p. 133). Their research community is located in the airport and hotel lounges and conference centres of international conferences. Community life back on campus becomes a matter of professionalisation and socialising in globally credentialising circuits. Students, in turn, internalise the entrepreneurialism of academics, and assume no more responsibility to the university community than the academics do.

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Now, idling in university spaces informed by technocapitalist work programming is valuable because it is work that is creative and critical, rather than fast-following—and it is community-building. Mixing code-conformance and -deformance is the key to creativity and critical thinking, both processes that are apparently highly valued in the new university, and no less important to good teaching. Talk is about code-conformance and -deformance. In other words, talking through our ideas—articulating or working with others to articulate them, persuading others of them, weighing them against others—is their best test. Talking face-to-face, kōrero kanohi ki te kanohi, just talk, is enough. And the community built through just talking is a non-countable—but very real—good, though it escapes the utility calculus of the U 2.0. It follows that our idea of the university makes the classroom central to education, a classroom that works Socratically, in an encounter that is an open exchange, an open-ended and -eyed process of question and answer. Nor is the idea of the university itself exempt from this process. Indeed, we think the ‘university’ is constituted by this process, so that a ‘university’ can be said to operate wherever such talk takes place. Such a place of talk can promote an open exchange of learning and about learning—for teachers and learners alike (or teacher-learners and learner-teachers, perhaps [see Hase & Kenyon, 2000]); it becomes, to recall Newman and Leavis, a true place of education, not only academic, but civic education. This is how we think the university ought to work and how we teach. We certainly feel responsible for giving an account of teaching, but this isn’t the same as counting teaching objectives and outcomes. Teaching cannot be end-stopped—preset and calculated—in this way. If the design-drive enacted in the neoliberal university is technocapitalist, it nonetheless unfolds, particularly in the classroom, in affective terms. This means that its outcomes, whatever its objectives, are neither calculable nor preset. And if technology mediates that design-drive, its remediation by academics and students can nevertheless serve to redesign—or redirect the design drive of—the neoliberal university.

1971 in New Zealand isn’t, after all, life on Mars. Waller’s concern for the mission of education makes his essay as relevant now as then. He is right to demand a return to teaching:

Alongside the liberal ideal in our universities has grown a tradition of vocational training, not just of technologists but, more importantly, of teachers. It would be abandoning the responsibility of which Leavis speaks unless we deliberately concentrate upon those too often responsible for reproducing in our country’s classrooms the half-hearted commitments and prejudices, alas, acquired in our universities. The universities must take very seriously the vocational demands
made upon it; our business is to train the teachers, the broadcasters, the journalists, who in turn will influence the community at large. (pp. 404-405)

If the talk of the classroom remains central to the university, then we must again start talking about teaching . . . in the hope, as Cardinal Newman would have it, that ‘[i]t will give birth to a living teaching, which in course of time will take the shape of a self-perpetuating tradition, or a genius loci’ that ‘haunts the home where it has been born, and . . . imbes . . . every individual . . . brought under its shadow’ (1996, p. 106). From that place and in that spirit, talk can turn to the idea of the university today.

NOTES

1 The first half of Newman’s The Idea of a University is a series of lectures, ‘University Teaching Considered in Nine Discourses’, delivered in Dublin in 1852, a year after the opening in London of the Great Exhibition, a.k.a. the ‘Crystal Palace’.

2 All references to Waller are cited in text.

3 In ‘A Short History of “the New Zealand Intellectual” ’ (2007), Roger Horrocks offers a short history of this anti-intellectualism, understood as a response to local conditions.

4 Note that we use the terms ‘academics’ and ‘students’ with reluctance: we prefer ‘teachers’ and ‘learners’, because we’re all academics, in the sense that we all contribute to the university community through teaching, learning and research, and we note that the role of teacher and learner often alternate and are shared in the face-to-face encounter of the classroom.

5 The term is Immanuel Kant’s from the Critique of Judgement (1987).


7 For the nodal self, see Flusser (1999, pp. 104-105).

8 In his emphasis on examination, Hoskin follows Michel Foucault (1975, pp. 184-192); for the ‘countable person’, see Miller and O’Leary (1994, pp. 98-113).

9 We thank our colleague David Stillaman for alerting us to Eagleton’s use of similar terms.

REFERENCES


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