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‘Tolerance, freedom, justice and peace’?:

Britain, Australia and anti-Muslim racism since 11th September 2001

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Abstract:

Since 11 September 2001, Muslim minorities have experienced intensive ‘othering’ in ‘Western’ countries, above all in those US-led anglophone nations which invaded Afghanistan and Iraq to prosecute their ‘war on terror’. This paper examines the cases of Britain and Australia, where whole communities of Muslims have been criminalised as ‘evil’ and a ‘fifth column’ enemy within by media, politicians, the security services and the criminal justice system. Although constituted by disparate ethnic groups, the targeted communities in each of these nations have experienced similar treatment in the State’s anti-terrorist measures, as well as ideological responses and everyday racism, making comparable the two cases.

Keywords:

Muslims, Islamophobia, Australia, United Kingdom, 9/11, racism

Introduction

Since 11 September 2001, ethnic minorities associated with Islam have experienced increased negative attention from the police and security forces in countries allied with the United States¹. In the United Kingdom and Australia, this has been particularly so, and these are the two cases considered in this paper. We argue that the ethnic targeting, and indeed racial profiling, involved in this process invokes an 'othering' of the communities concerned and a racialisation of security threats. This is akin to the previously existing racialising of crime and of asylum-seekers in both nation states. Thus September 11 marks a drastic upsurge, but not the beginning, of this process. Certainly, the increased attention from police and security agencies to the racially targeted groups since 9/11 has not, on accounts from the ethnic and religious communities concerned, involved a positive increase of paying attention to their reports and experiences of racial hatred, abuse and victimisation, nor of acting on these in a non-discriminatory way. These processes have only intensified, moreover, following events which have occurred since 9/11: the October 2002 Bali bombings, the July 2005 London bombings and the October 2005 bombings in Bali.

In the case of both nation states considered here, the minority 'other' underwent a transition in representation and also in identity over the foregoing decade or so before 9/11. Thus in the UK there was a shift from mainly 'Pakistani' or 'Asian' identification, to identification in terms of religion: from Asian Other to Muslim Other. This transformation took place both in racialising labels and in the construction of identity (Modood 'Difference': 154-172; Modood *Multicultural Politics*: 4, 122,

155-161; Poynting et al *Bin Laden in the Suburbs*). In Australia, the transition was from ‘Lebanese’ or ‘Arab Other’ to Muslim Other. Thus the racialised minorities concerned were increasingly represented (and identified) in these terms, from the Salman Rushdie affair of 1989 and the Gulf War of 1991 against Iraq, to the communal disturbances in Bradford, Burnley and Oldham in northern England in early 2001, to the moral panics over supposed ‘ethnic gang rape’ in Sydney in 2001-2 (Anti-Discrimination Board of New South Wales; Poynting et al *Bin Laden in the Suburbs*; Gleeson; Warner) and over so-called ‘boat people’ seeking asylum in Australia, culminating in the Tampa Crisis in August 2001 (Poynting “Bin Laden in the Suburbs”: Attacks on Arab and Muslim Australians before and after 11 September 2002”; Deen; Lygo; Poynting et al *Bin Laden in the Suburbs*; Poynting and Mason).

As Pnina Werbner (1997) points out, the conflicts inherent in racialised labelling lead, through ongoing moral panics, to shifts in, and limits to, identification and belonging: “The pathological ambivalences of racism or xenophobia are the very motor that drives polarising processes forward through a series of agonistic moral panics, towards violent exclusions, assimilations and denials” (Werbner 19). Part of this polarization and moral panic has been the increasing currency of ideas of Arab and Muslim populations comprising a possible ‘fifth column’ threat within both the UK and Australia. The idea of the ‘fifth column’ – of the ‘enemy within’ who cast up new questions about citizenship, identity, and loyalty during times when their country of residence is seen to be in conflict with their country of origin – is not new: the term was first coined during the Spanish Civil War. Fears that clandestine groups would attempt to subvert the nation from within resulted in both Britain and Australia

¹ The authors would like to thank Dr Mike Sutton and the Centre for Study and Reduction of Hate Crime at Nottingham Trent University for their hospitality to Scott Poynting there as a Visiting

interning individuals of ‘questionable loyalty’ during WWI and WWII. The extension of the idea of the ‘fifth column’ specifically to Arab and Muslim populations in these countries started to gain momentum in the wake of the Salman Rushdie incident and the 1990-1991 Gulf War, where race and religious relations and issues of who constituted a ‘loyal’ citizen were brought to the surface and polarised (Abbas 13-14; Kepell 38-143).

As Ghassan Hage notes, questioning the loyalty of particular individuals within the nation demonstrates the “incompatibility between the state’s formal acceptance of new citizens and the dominant community’s everyday acceptance of such people” (*White Nation* 50). Zlatko Skrbis defines this as there being various ‘gradations’ of acceptance and belonging within the formal citizenship discourse, and the tension between what he calls the ‘formal’ and ‘social’ status of citizenship:

Formal citizenship is static, whereas its social status is charged with normative and ever-changing notions of what constitutes the acceptable attributes of citizenship and belonging. It is in the domain of social citizenship where the notions of ‘appropriate’ and ‘inappropriate’, ‘right’ and ‘wrong’ ... play a defining role (182).

Two caveats must be made before proceeding. Firstly, since this article is primarily about the empirical manifestations of the assembling of this ‘Muslim Other’ in Britain and Australia, there is not space here for a nuanced concrete examination of the moral panics in which this folk devil has been constructed. Such an examination can be found in Alexander (*The Asian Gang*; “(Dis)Entangling the ‘Asian Gang’:

Ethnicity, Identity, Masculinity”) in the case of the UK, in Poynting et al (*Bin Laden in the Suburbs*) which refers to the post 9/11 ‘Arab Other’ in the case of Australia, and Collins et al in the case of ‘ethnic gangs’ in Australia. Secondly, this is not the place for a theoretical study of how a religious ‘other’ can be racialised. Others have undertaken that task, including Miles (133, 138-9, 143-8), Miles and Brown (30-32) and Kushner, the obvious case being that of the racialisation of Jews. Brah has also addressed the question, and Hage (“White Self-Racialization as Identity Fetishism”) has conducted an exemplary analysis of how Lebanese Maronites racialise Muslims as Arab and Other in racialising themselves as White and European.

Within this framework, the contemporary racialisation of Muslims, we contend, offers ideological justification – what Barbara Perry (179-223) calls “permission to hate” – to both everyday and egregious acts of racial hatred against these ethnic and religious communities. This increases virulently in incidence after 9/11, and then the bombings in Bali in 2002 and 2005 (Poynting and Noble) and London in 2005. Furthermore, we argue that the highly publicised and politically manipulated State raids on ‘terror suspects’ and crackdowns on communities linked with them, and their ensuing discriminatory treatment in the criminal justice system (and its ‘anti-terror’ analogues), from incarceration and interrogation without charge under anti-terror provisions and laws, to indefinite confinement, to condoning maltreatment of the detained at home and collaborating in their torture abroad, lends ideological and moral licence to racist anti-Muslim hate crime. Indeed, they can be seen as a form of State hate crime in themselves (Poynting “Hate Crimes of the State?”).

In the post 9/11 climate, some would argue that increased measures to protect the nation are necessary. And indeed the police must police – and will do so in any functional State. Yet police and security forces should not abuse, harass, intimidate, bash, or falsely arrest or prosecute. Such unlawful actions by definition erode the rule of law, and in practice undermine people's confidence in the State and its criminal justice and enforcement systems. To the extent that the police, courts, military, security services and other repressive apparatuses of the State resort to such measures on a racially, ethnically or religiously discriminatory basis, the State itself – its functionaries, its institutions and above all its processes – are implicated in racialisation. This is of vital significance in understanding, in more radical analyses, how the State operates in the concrete conjunctures where such patterns are observable – we outline some in this paper – but it also has important consequences for the perceived legitimacy of the state among the sectors of the population so targeted (Dreher). Of course the police must focus their attention on suspect individuals or cohorts, perhaps even justifiably using ideal-typical suspect 'profiles', but this is certainly not the same as deeming whole populations, whole communities, to be suspect by virtue of a racialised profile. Nor are victims less worthy of police assistance, protection, investigation and other duties, by virtue of being 'othered' into categories ideologically associated more with suspects than with victims.

The construction of the Muslim Other as the pre-eminent folk devil in both the UK and Australia, took place against the backdrop of concerted and corrosive right-wing ideological attacks on multiculturalism over a decade or more since the 1990s, as the 'political correctness' of elites out of touch with the concerns of ordinary (read

white, Anglo) people. Thus, it is useful to preface our account with a brief comparison of multiculturalism in the two countries.

Multiculturalisms

In Australia, multiculturalism had been more entrenched, since it had formed government policy with bipartisan support from the major parties since the early 1970s, when the policy was borrowed and adapted from Canada (Cope and Kalantzis 326-7; Lopez 164-5) to address the manifest failures and unsustainability of the earlier assimilation approach to ethnic affairs instituted after the abandonment of the White Australia policy in the 1960s. By 1981, as a result of the postwar labour immigration program, 20.7% of Australia's population was born overseas, and almost 20% who were born in Australia had at least one parent born overseas (Collins 32). The immigrant population was very diverse, with around 100 ethnic groups and 80 immigrant languages. In 1981, only 37% of the foreign-born population came from Britain and Ireland (Castles, Kalantzis, Cope and Morrissey 25). Under these circumstances, Immigration Minister Snedden's vision in 1969 had been sheer fantasy:

We have a single culture. If migration implies multicultural activities within Australian society, then it was not the type Australia wanted. I am quite determined we should have a monoculture with everyone living in the same way, understanding each other and sharing the same aspirations. We do not want pluralism (cited in Hartley and McDonald 11).

By the 1970s, it was apparent that persistent social inequalities faced by immigrants of non-English-speaking background (such as in education, the labour

market, and political and cultural representation) were being reproduced. People who had moved half a world away and sacrificed enormously to make a better life for their children, found that those of this generation also were being systematically disadvantaged. The larger and earlier (and therefore more settled) immigrant communities, notably Italians and Greeks, had begun to organise politically and culturally, and to exercise a 'migrant vote' as well as a political voice. Australian multiculturalism was not a mere well-meaning plan of social engineers, it was won by struggle and achieved in compromised settlement.

Australian multiculturalism always had two main thrusts. One was in the direction of equity and social justice, towards eradicating the existing inequalities which operated along ethnic lines (which very often were also, or were complicated by, class lines). The second was the equal right to practise and maintain different cultures, with equal respect and value being accorded these, and well as some state resourcing of their maintenance (such as of languages) for example. The "carefully defined limits" which accompanied the right to "cultural identity", however, always included a commitment to Australia's "democratic institutions" and the "rule of law".

Conservative governments in Australia have tended towards the second moment of multiculturalism, and eclipsed the first, such that the objective of 'social justice' had actually disappeared from the 1999 version of the National Agenda on Multiculturalism (produced by the National Multicultural Advisory Council appointed in 1997 by the new Howard government). There has been, in the name of multiculturalism, under governments of both ilks, some trivialising of culture which reduced it to the superficial spectacle of celebrating exotic food and folkloric dance

(cf. Werbner “The translocation of culture” 2005: 760): an approach which left multiculturalism prey to lambasting by cultural conservatives. There has also become instituted (through both main political parties) a multicultural politics of ‘ethnic leader’ patronage and the conditional delivery of sorely needed community resources in return for political quiescence or blocs of votes (Tabar, Noble and Poynting): again an easy target of right-wing anti-multiculturalist attacks.

In Britain, multiculturalism came later, was more contested (from both the right and the left), and appears to be ‘colour coded’ in a manner shared by the United States. Official statistics in Britain today categorise the population as White, Black, Asian and ‘Other’, in a way which ‘whitens’, say, Arabs, Afghans, Iranians and Turks. In Britain in the 1970s, as in Australia, ‘Multiculturalism emerged as a result of the realization, originally in the USA, and then in Britain, that the melting pot doesn't melt, and that ethnic and racial divisions get reproduced from generation to generation’ (Anthias and Yuval-Davis 158). Multiculturalism has never been entrenched in government policy in Britain, however, to the extent which it has in Australia. British multiculturalism has been a philosophy, a cultural politics, but not a defining set of national principles.

The demographics are different, and they are accounted for differently. In Britain, ‘ethnic minorities’ comprise 7.9% of the population, according to the National Statistics: 4% Asian or Asian British, 2% Black or Black British (about half from the Caribbean and half from Africa), 0.4% Chinese, 0.4% ‘Other ethnic groups’ and 1.2% ‘Mixed’. These are officially equated with ‘Non-White’; if you are ‘White’ you are not counted as an ‘ethnic minority’.

Nick Pearce, Director of the Institute for Public Policy Research, sums up the principles of British multiculturalism as:

a description of practices which are common to many progressive democracies: race equality strategies, public recognition of cultural diversity, and sensitivity, within the framework of public law, to religious beliefs.

This embraces the two moments we identified in Australian multiculturalism, but the first one, that of equality, has in Britain been couched largely in terms of racial equality and race relations. As Tariq Modood (eg *Multicultural Politics*) has consistently pointed out, such parameters cannot adequately grasp inequalities that discriminate against, or systematically ‘other’, cultures or religions rather than ‘race’. Anthias and Yuval-Davis (158) describe what we might call transatlantic multiculturalism as follows:

Multi-culturalism constructs society as composed of a hegemonic homogeneous majority, and small unmeltable minorities with their own essentially different communities and cultures which have to be understood, accepted and basically left alone ... in order for the society to have harmonious relations.

They point to this form of multiculturalism being congenial to ‘the first generation of “Race Relations Experts”’ (Anthias and Yuval-Davis 158). Elements of this form of multiculturalism which were to be found in Australia in the measures introduced after the Galbally report in 1978, were strongly criticised as exacerbating and solidifying inequalities along ethnic lines (Jakubowicz, Morrissey and Palser). The second of the two moments, that of cultural sensitivity and belonging, is succinctly stated by Bhiku

Parekh, one of the foremost proponents of British multiculturalism, and Chair of the Commission on the Future of Multi-Ethnic Britain, set up in 1998 by the Runnymede Trust:

...since citizens have differing needs, equal treatment requires full account to be taken of their differences. ... Equality must be defined in a culturally sensitive way and applied in a discriminating but not discriminatory manner. ... Every society needs to be cohesive as well as respectful of diversity, and must find ways of nurturing diversity while fostering a common sense of belonging and a shared identity among its constituent members (Runnymede Trust)

Note that the mention of cohesiveness and shared identity is made in the context of multiculturalism being under attack for divisiveness and erosion of national identity – in Britain as in Australia. Note, also, that the principle of differential provision to meet differing needs equitably, has always been under attack in Australia as well, and that the respect for cultural diversity there enshrined in policy has often featured more in rhetoric than in practice.

Demographic background

Australia's 2001 census recorded 281,578 Muslims: around 1.5% of the population. They live predominantly in capital cities, especially Australia's two largest and most ethnically diverse cities, Sydney and Melbourne, with 48% and 31% of Australian Muslims respectively. Of the 102,566 Australian-born Muslims, about 30% recorded Lebanese ancestry and about 18% Turkish ancestry (HREOC). Large-scale immigration from these backgrounds began in the 1970s, when Australia's

postwar immigration program needed sources beyond Europe. Some 36% of Australian Muslims were born in Australia; 28% in the Middle East or North Africa, 16% in Asia, 9% in Europe, 4% in Africa (excluding North Africa) and 3% in Oceania (excluding Australia). Their language backgrounds include, in addition to English: Arabic, Turkish, Persian (Farsi), Bosnian, Indonesian, Bengali, Malay, Dari, Albanian, Hindi, Kurdish, and Pashto (HREOC).

The 2001 census enumerated 1,558,890 Muslims living in Great Britain, or 2.8% of the population (bearing in mind that 7.8% did not state a religion or 'no religion'). Largely deriving from postwar labour immigration from former colonies, the vast majority of the Muslims within Britain are of South Asian, East African and Middle Eastern origin (Khan 38; Lewis 13-16). Some two thirds originate from Pakistan, Bangladesh and India (Peach 20). Approximately half of these Muslims have been born in the United Kingdom (Smyth). Muslim communities have historically been located in the so-called 'urban heartland' of Britain in areas such as the London and the cities and big towns of the Midlands and the north of England (Peach 28; Khan 38).

The British Backlash after 9/11

With Osama bin Laden's al Qaeda network rapidly blamed and soon claiming responsibility for the airliner attacks in the USA on 11 September 2001, 'Islamophobia'² and racist violence against Muslims across Europe increased substantially. Britain was no exception. While continental Europe saw a marked and

² The term was "... coined in the late 1980s, its first known use in print being in February 1991, in a periodical in the United States. The word is not ideal, but is recognisably similar to 'xenophobia' and 'Europhobia', and is a useful shorthand way of referring to dread or hatred of Islam – and, therefore, to fear or dislike of all or most Muslims" (Runnymede Trust 1).

widespread resurgence of far-right and anti-immigrant political groups, Britain also experienced virulent campaigns and local election victories by the right-wing, racist British National Party (BNP) (Kundnani).

Of the European nations, the United Kingdom responded the most extremely to the events of 9/11 in terms of legislation – invoking a State of Emergency in order to pass the controversial *Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act* two months after 9/11. When declaring the ‘state of emergency’, Home Secretary David Blunkett admitted that he invoked this measure as a technical means to derogate from the European Human Rights Convention (Young). This draconian response may in part have been a reaction to Britain being labelled as a so-called ‘haven’ for ‘terrorists’, as a result of media coverage given to radical Islamic leaders and organisations in Britain who publicly expressed sympathy for al Qaeda and who have been accused of recruiting for its network (Dhondy; Moussa; Burke “Terror video used to lure UK Muslims”, “AK-47 training held at London mosque”; Wazir “Essex boys sign up for ‘holy war’”). These figures included Omar Bakri Muhammad and Abu Hamza from London mosques, and the *Al-Muhajiroun* organisation (Wazir “The Talibanising of Britain proceeds”, “Essex boys sign up for ‘holy war’”; Harris, Wazir and Burke; Burke “Terror video used to lure UK Muslims”, “AK-47 training held at London mosque”).

The notion that a threat was posed to Britain by groups supporting al Qaeda stemmed from the belief that September 11 constituted an attack on the ideals of the ‘West’ as a whole, rather than a single attack on the US specifically. Prime Minister Tony Blair pronounced in a joint press conference with US president, George W. Bush:

There may be some who think that Britain would gain from standing back from this struggle, even some who believe that we, and the United States, and our allies have somehow brought this upon ourselves. Let us be very clear. America did not attack al-Qaida on September 11, al-Qaida attacked America, and in doing so attacked not just America, but the way of life of all people who believe in tolerance, and freedom, justice and peace (“Transcript: the Bush-Blair press conference”).

Though recognising the enmities attracted by the alliance which saw Britain participate in the 1991 Gulf War and the blockade of Iraq, the popular ideology surrounding this notion also draws on the controversial ‘clash of civilisations’ paradigm from which Blair attempted to distance his government. Not all political leaders and public opinion-makers have been so careful. While maintaining that Islam was not the enemy, Opposition Leader Iain Duncan Smith told the Conservative Party conference in October 2001, “When civilisation is attacked, civilised nations must spring to each other's defence” (Smith). He asserted:

The terrorists who attacked America also have us in their sights. Not because of what we in Britain have done but because of what we and America stand for. Britain and the United States have become the enemy because we are beacons of democracy and champions of freedom.

Even a cursory assessment of the Arab and Islamic populations within Britain shows that individuals such as radical cleric Abu Hamza represent a very small minority within the British Islamic communities. Indeed the majority of Muslim spokespeople in Britain were very vocal in denouncing the 9/11 attacks, and made it

clear that pro-al Qaeda views and actions were not representative of British Muslims. Yousef Bhailok, spokesperson for the Muslim Council of Britain, said: “[the people supporting 9/11] are not rational people ... their extreme views are certainly not the views of the Muslim community or indeed any part of our civilised society” (cited in “UK to monitor Islamic group”.)

Of the 17 people found guilty in the UK since 9/11 of terrorist acts (as at June 2005), however, only four of the twelve whose ethnic backgrounds are known are Muslim, according to Massoud Shadjareh, chair of the Islamic Human Rights Commission (Dodd and Travis). Shadjareh commented:

The war on terror has had a devastating effect [on British Muslims]. ... We have become targets of the security apparatus and are seen as an enemy within unjustifiably. This has resulted in a backlash against the Muslim community. We have become the hidden victims. People are having to live, being terrorised, in the name of the war on terror (in Campbell, Norton-Taylor and Dodd 12).

The pre-existing notion of these communities as constituting a ‘fifth column’ prior to 9/11, coupled with media coverage of individuals such as Abu Hamza (Cook), resulted in an amplification in Britain demonising Muslims as the dangerous Other. The immediate consequence of this was a range of attacks against Arab and Islamic people and communities within Britain (Jones “Muslims targets in terror backlash”; “Scottish Muslims describe fears”; “Muslim community targets racial tension”; “Extra police to protect Muslims”; “Muslim leaders debate race hate”; Hill; Ferguson). In the two years to July 2003, there were 674 reported incidents of anti-Muslim attacks, with many more (and probably most) going unreported. Some 51% of

reported cases were serious and violent crimes, and 28% were verbal and written abuse, according to the Islamist *Khilafah Magazine* (“Islamophobia – The product of a Clash of Civilisations”).

In the immediate aftermath of 9/11, for example, graffiti scrawled on a mosque in north-east England read “Avenge USA – Kill a Muslim now”. Mosques received threats, vandalism, desecration with pigs’ heads and actual bomb attacks; many more mosques did not report attacks, fearing retribution. Schools and pre-schools were attacked, including an arson attempt in Surrey while children and teachers were inside. Businesses and private homes of Muslims were subjected to vandalism; Muslim graves were desecrated. A large number of beatings of Muslims occurred. Many Muslim women wearing the *hijab* were vilified and physically harassed. Representing just a few examples, a teenage girl of South-Asian descent was attacked with a baseball bat by two youths and a young Muslim woman was bashed with a hammer on the head and body by a white man on a crowded tram in Manchester. In one particularly vicious attack, an Afghani taxi driver was attacked by three passengers in West London, leaving him a quadriplegic (Jones “Muslims targets in terror backlash”; Human Rights Watch “United Kingdom: Human Rights Developments”).

While Kenan Malik argues that the evidence from such statistics and accounts “does not amount to a climate of Islamophobia”, Hage (*Against Paranoid Nationalism* 247) points out, “Violent racists are always a tiny minority. However, their breathing space is determined by the degree of ordinary ‘non-violent’ racism a government and culture will allow”. Despite official British government rhetoric condemning such

attacks, the actions undertaken by the British government served to reinforce the idea of Muslims as a ‘fifth column’ to be feared.

Since 9/11, Muslims in Britain face disproportionate police ‘stop and search’ measures and targeting. From 2002 to 2003, the stop-and-search of Asian people (a category which also includes Hindus and Sikhs and other non-Muslims, who together comprise 45.3% of the Asian or British Asian population who stated a religion) in the UK increased by 285% (calculated from Peach 22; Hayes). From 2002-3 to 2003-4, counter-terrorism stop and searches increased by about 40%, to almost 30,000.

Other steps taken by the government included the blanket banning of sixteen Islamic organisations and the rushing through parliament in December 2001 of the controversial ‘Anti-Terrorism’ legislation. Over 500 Muslims have been arrested in the UK under the prior Terrorism Act 2000, yet only two of these were convicted by January 2004 (Islamic Human Rights Commission “Briefing: Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001”). The Anti-Terrorism Crime and Security Act 2001 (ATCSA) contained sweeping measures that were criticised by civil libertarians as draconian and as undermining basic democratic rights³ (Horsley; Hyland; Young; Human Rights Watch “Commentary on the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Bill 2001”, “UK Anti-Terrorism Bill Undermines Fundamental Human Rights Protections”, “UK: New Anti-Terror Law Rolls Back Rights”; Sampson; Dyer “Top judge’s human rights

³ The central measures of the Act include: the power to intern indefinitely any non-citizen suspected of involvement in terrorist activities (and deny those interned the right of appeal to a normal court of law); restricting the right to seek asylum; granting police enormous powers to access people’s personal information (including tax returns) and broadening the ability of government agencies to exchange information about individuals, greatly curtailing internet privacy, for example. The original passing of the Act itself was conducted in a manner that allowed it to be renewed without the full assessment of the British Parliament (Young; Hyland).

warning”; Morris “Are civil liberties at risk?”; Bright; McDonald; Kamal, Barnett and Bright).

Under the 2001 Anti-Terrorism law, which has been called Britain’s ‘Guantanamo Bay law’ (“Ancient Liberties”) sixteen men, all Muslims, were arrested and imprisoned without charge or trial in Belmarsh high security prison. Upon detention, they were denied access to lawyers or family. Amnesty International reported that the detainees were locked in for 23 hours a day and were not allowed daylight. They were denied prayer facilities, and subjected to humiliating body searches by women (Islamic Human Rights Commission “Briefing: Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001”). Detainees spent over three years in Belmarsh, until the government was obliged to release them into home imprisonment in early 2005. This was as a result of a decision by the Special Immigration and Appeals Commission (SIAC), later upheld by the full bench of the nine law lords, that the detention of the men was unlawful and breached the European Human Rights Convention. Under pressure of a March 2005 deadline imposed by the law lords’ decision, the Government proposed new legislation involving confinement and deprivation of liberties which stopped short of incarceration. With the opposition under pressure of the forthcoming election and unwilling to be cast as soft on terrorism, the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005 was passed.⁴

⁴ The Act provides for home detention with curbs on visits and meeting people, electronic tagging, curfews, regular reports to police stations, and police or security searches at any time, to enable the Home Secretary to restrict individuals’ movement and communications (no mobile phones or internet), on suspicion of their involvement in terrorism-related activities, with little (and no independent) judicial review and minimal parliamentary review of the legislation. This can be without sufficient evidence to charge the suspected individuals with any breach of the law, and without their knowing what information is being acted upon.

Islamophobia increased following the 7 July 2005 terror attacks on the London underground which killed fifty two people and injured approximately seven hundred. The discovery that the perpetrators of the attacks were all British-born and raised began a spate of worrying about ‘home-grown’ terrorists and the propensity for second-generation (mainly young, male immigrants) of Muslim background to be radicalised and recruited by terror networks.

According to the UK Monitoring Group (which publishes accounts of racist incidents), attacks on Muslims in Britain started immediately after the terrorist attacks. Within the first day of the bombings, a schoolboy in Devon was assaulted and told it was retribution for the bombings; there were attempted arson attacks on houses of families of South-Asian descent in Middlesex and West London; racist graffiti defaced a mosque and Pakistan community centre in Edinburgh and even a Sikh temple in Kent was – presumably mistakenly – attacked (Monitoring Group).

Within three weeks of the bombings, hate crimes, particularly against Muslims, had increased six-fold (“Hate crimes soar after bombings”). In their report on the impact of the terrorist attacks, the European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia (EMCRX) noted that rates of ‘hate crime’ in London had increased by five percent and over 200 calls had been made to the Merseyside Racial Monitoring Unit helpline in the first six weeks after the London attacks. Days after the attacks the British National Party started a leaflet campaign that showed a photograph of the bombed bus with the slogan “maybe it’s time to start listening to the BNP” (EMCRX 15-19).

Whilst the EMCRX praised efforts by the government and police to prevent reprisals against the general Muslim community, in early August 2005 the government decided that further anti-terrorism measures were needed. The Terrorism Bill of October 2005 was described by Amnesty International as containing “further sweeping and vague provisions that undermine the rights to freedom of expression and association, the right to liberty, the prohibition of arbitrary detention, the rights to the presumption of innocence and fair trial”. One proposal was to introduce as a crime the vague notion of “glorification of terrorism”. This lack of legal clarity, remarked Amnesty, could arbitrarily restrict human rights such as freedom of expression.

Reservations about the new security measures were underlined by the execution-style killing, shortly after the bombings, of Jean Charles de Menezes, an innocent 27-year-old Brazilian electrician was on his way to work on a London Tube train. He was mistaken for a terrorist by special police, and, under ‘shoot to kill’ orders, shot dead with seven bullets to the head. Tariq Ali (64) surmises that “a premeditated execution was ordered’. He asks rhetorically whether such ‘taking out’ is employed ‘[a]s a deterrent in a country where capital punishment is forbidden”. He reasons that such ‘public execution’ cannot possibly deter suicide bombers, it can only put off dark-skinned people from taking the Tube. The Brazilian, it had been reported, had South Asian appearance.

British involvement in torture and killing of Muslims abroad

There is also now mounting evidence that the British military in Iraq has been involved in widespread abuse of civilians, apparently (at best tacitly) sanctioned by the chain of command, and in several cases causing death (Carrell “Four soldiers face

charges”). An Iraqi hotel attendant, Baha Moussa, died on 14 September 2003 after allegedly being badly beaten in British military cells. While four soldiers faced charges over this, none faced charges over the torture and assault of the eight civilians arrested along with Mr Moussa (Carrell “Four soldiers face charges”; Shiner). Four other soldiers were charged with having abused and handcuffed a 17-year-old Iraqi youth, and thrown him into a river, where he drowned (Dodd “Soldiers arrested after Iraqi beaten and drowned”; Carrell “Four soldiers face charges”; Shiner). A 53-year-old Iraqi schoolteacher also died after a vicious beating allegedly at the hand of British troops. Some ten cases of torture are pending hearing (Shiner). British soldiers court-martialled for binding, beating and tormenting civilian captives at ‘Camp Breadbasket’ in Iraq claimed that they were acting under orders.

Britain acted somewhat more expeditiously and effectively than Australia, however, to secure the release of its nationals from Guantanamo Bay, where US military torture is now well documented (Carrell “US guards at Guantanamo tortured me” 1, 4; Shiner). Nevertheless, three British citizens who were interned there have claimed that “they were repeatedly punched, kicked, slapped, forcibly injected with drugs, deprived of sleep, hooded, photographed naked and subjected to body cavity searches and religious humiliations”. They report that “there was never any suggestion on the part of British interrogators that this treatment was wrong” (“Hate crimes soar after bombings”). Australian Guantanamo detainee, David Hicks, who has made corroborated claims to have been ‘rendered’ and tortured under US military custody (“The Case of David Hicks”), was also interrogated at Guantanamo by MI5, according to documents the British intelligence agency themselves produced in the British High Court (Crabb).

The Anti-Muslim reaction in Australia

As in Britain and as also had occurred during the 1991 Gulf War, Australia also experienced an upsurge of racially based attacks on Muslims and those of 'Middle Eastern appearance' after 9/11. Numerous Muslim women wearing their *hijab*, or traditional headscarf, in public places, were assaulted, abused and had strangers of both genders trying to rip their veil away. There was an outbreak of incidents of people in Muslim dress or of 'Middle Eastern appearance' being spat upon or more violently assaulted in streets, shops and on public transport, of incidents of arson, vandalism, threats, harassment and other racist attacks directed by 'white-thinking' people against these newly discovered enemies within. It was as if, as Ghassan Hage ("Anthrax-politics") has put it, there were now manifold 'borders' internal to the nation rather than around its edges to be patrolled against the non-Christian, non-western, 'third-world looking' (Hage *White Nation*) outsiders who might endanger the Australian good life from within the nation.⁵

By the end of September 2001, a bilingual (English and Arabic) Anti-Racism Hotline in New South Wales had logged well over 300 calls (Brown 2); by the time it finished operation on 9 November, there were about 400 responses recorded. It needs to be recognised that the number of incidents actually tallied in this way is a measure only of the 'tip of the iceberg': those with knowledge of the Hotline and with the most motivation and means to complain. This is borne out by a survey of 186 Arab and Muslim Australians in Sydney and Melbourne conducted in 2003 for the Human Rights and Equal Opportunities Commission (Poynting and Noble) in which 87% of

the Muslim respondents said they had experienced racism, abuse or racist violence since 9/11, with three-quarters saying they had experienced more such racism since that date: 39% saying “a bit more” since September 11 and 37% saying “a lot more”. Yet of those surveyed, only 6.5% had reported incidents of racism, abuse or violence to the police, and even less to other instrumentalities or community organisations. The most common reason offered (by 33% of respondents) was that they did not think anything useful would come of it. They had good reason to think so: of those who did complain, 70% were dissatisfied or very dissatisfied with the outcome. The State thus not only arguably induces hate crime by modelling it, as we argue below, but also generally neglects or declines to bring the perpetrators to justice when hate crime is committed by individuals.

Other official bodies, such as (federally) the Human Rights and Equal Opportunities Commission (HREOC) and (statewide) the New South Wales Anti-Discrimination Board (ADB), and the Victorian Multicultural Commission (VMC), as well as religious and ethnic community organisations, also received and recorded a plethora of such complaints. The evidence bespeaks an existing base level of incidence of such attacks and an underlying tendency waiting for an immediate cause to realise it. The range of types of racist attack, moreover, remains continuous: only the intensity surges. This upsurge was widely reported in the media (Jopson; Brown; “Australia's Islamic Community Victims of Racial Tension”; Burke and AAP). There was an intensification of existing, ongoing and everyday forms and patterns of racism (Poynting and Noble).

⁵ In the hierarchy of otherness set up in compounding these categories, we might compare the exclusion of Hage’s ‘third-world looking’ other with what Sivanandan (“Poverty is the new Black”) has

In one instance, a middle-aged housewife and her daughter were attacked by “a group of Australians” in a Sydney supermarket. Their veils were snatched from their heads and they were beaten, with the daughter suffering a broken arm (Australian Arabic Council). A 17-year-old school student of second-generation Lebanese background was verbally abused and had her veil was ripped off on a tram in Melbourne; she was later cut with a knife at a tram stop, threatened by a group with baseball bats, had a brick through her window and a fire set in her front yard (Poynting and Noble). Places of worship, schools, workplaces, shops and streets were all sites of racist attack (HREOC). There was vilification and menace by internet, radio, telephone and mail. A busload of Muslim schoolchildren was set upon with stones and bottles in Brisbane.

The spate of anti-Muslim racist attacks continued long after September 2001, and resurged following the October 2002 Bali bombings where eighty eight Australians were killed and many more seriously injured. With the bombings, carried out by the Indonesian Islamic militant group *Jemaah Islamiyah*, Australia found itself directly touched by Islamist terrorism for the first time. This precipitated another cycle of anti-Arab and Muslim violence including the firebombing in Melbourne of the Umma Islamic Center, and the vandalising in Sydney of the Rooty Hill Mosque, an Islamic school, and the home of a Muslim cleric. (“Firebugs threaten mosque attacks”; “Mosque attacks leave Muslims fearing backlash”).

As recently as May 2005, a school bus belonging to an Islamic College in Perth was completely destroyed in an arson attack (AAP “Perth Islamic school bus set

ablaze”; “School bus gutted by fire”). It bears repeating that such outbreaks of racial hatred and vilification have been an upsurge, albeit a dramatic one, against a background of anti-Arab and anti-Muslim racist attacks that existed in Australia well before 11 September. As Ghassan Hage (“Postscript: Arab-Australian belonging after ‘September 11’” 241-2) puts it, with the recent racism directed at Middle Eastern ‘boat people’ and so-called ‘Lebanese rapist gangs’, “‘September 11’ happened right after ‘June, July and August 11, 12 and 13’”.

Security raids

In late September 2001, the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO), accompanied by the Australian Federal Police (AFP) and New South Wales police with 'intimate local knowledge', raided 30-odd suburban households and workplaces in Sydney. They brought the media with them and publicised the raids (Trad; Kidman 4-5). All those raided were Muslims, and the Australian tabloid media provided justification, as well as publicity:

The perpetrators of the September 11 attacks were young Middle-Eastern Muslim men. Bin Laden's followers are young Middle-Eastern Muslim men. So it is young men of Middle-Eastern Muslim background who will be targeted in Sydney, many of them Australian citizens, who were born here (Devine 28).

Whatever other purposes were intended, the raids were clearly meant to be a public gesture. They were also plainly designed to intimidate. In one case, a mother of two young children, complained (as did others raided) that a gun was put to her head and she was made to lie on the floor. She said “police turned the residence ‘upside down’ and interrogated her in front of her family”. The raids were “backed by armed teams

of the State Protection Group” and there were dozens such raids around the country (Watson 15).

After the Bali bombings in October 2002, ASIO and AFP operatives again mounted raids on suburban homes of Muslim citizens – this time mainly Australians of Indonesian origin in Sydney, Perth and Melbourne (Poynting et al *Bin Laden in the Suburbs*). *AM* (“More ASIO raids expected”) reported that “a key to the raids” was that men in the families targeted had attended lectures of visiting religious leader Abu Bakar Bashir, suspected of being the spiritual leader of *Jemaah Islamiah*. As with the 2001 raids, there have been (at June 2005) no charges laid and no arrests made on terrorism-related matters – though there was an arrest over a visa infringement.

Once more, the ethnic profiling brought terror to the communities being targeted. Muslim leaders said the raids had 'caused hysteria and fear that anyone in the community could be targeted'. Sheik Fehmi Naji, Imam of the Preston mosque in Melbourne, said that many Muslims were upset about the blaming of their community for the Bali bombing (“Muslims Condemn ‘Heavy-Handed’ Tactics”).

Such swoops serve an important function in the maintenance of the prevailing hegemony: the coercion behind the consent, in Gramsci’s famous formulation. The effect goes well beyond those raided. The raids were clearly intended to send an intimidatory message to whole communities to which those raided belong. For that very reason, the media were taken in tow in both the 2001 and 2002 raids. On several occasions the media identified the families concerned, and they were consequently subjected to vigilante style harassment. As the raids were inefficient and probably counter-productive for intelligence-gathering purposes, and no-one raided was

charged for terrorist offences; this can hardly have been their underlying purpose unless they were extremely bungled. They did function to reassure the white, Christian ‘mainstream’ that something was being done about these terrorists or terrorist sympathisers in our midst, and to frighten the targeted communities into keeping a low profile. The mainstream media literally went along with this. This, too, is a form of terror, as is the gentler form of persuasion in the shape of fear of the ubiquitous enemy.

One everyday effect of what could be seen as hate crime at the level of the State (Poynting “Hate Crimes of the State?”) is that it seems to license the more recognisable forms of hate crime perpetrated by individuals and groups of individuals. If the State is assaulting, harassing and vilifying Muslims as the enemy in the war on terror, and thus terrorising whole communities, then perhaps white-thinking citizens feel justified in personally attacking this enemy wherever they might encounter them. One victim of a veil-tearing assault and verbal abuse, an Australian-born, Lebanese-background medical professional in her mid-twenties, told researchers for HREOC of her attackers: ‘They obviously felt powerful or something, “cause they felt that they could speak like that to us, and do all that, and no one would do anything to them”’ (Poynting and Noble). From the reports of two hundred-odd other respondents, they would probably have been right that no-one would do anything to them. That is to say, in the rare cases where victims report racist hate crimes to State authorities, their perception is that no action was taken. The State thus not only arguably induces hate crime by modelling it, but also generally neglects or declines to bring the perpetrators to justice when hate crime is committed by individuals.

Anti-Terror Laws

Though the raids detailed above were plausibly claimed by Minister Downer to be within existing law, federal and state governments saw the need for further legislation effecting anti-terrorist measures. The Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Legislation Amendment (Terrorism) Bill 2002 provided for the capacity hitherto unknown under Australian Commonwealth law to arrest a person on suspicion, merely for interrogation. According to Justice John Dowd, a judge in the Supreme Court of NSW, people could be held for up to seven days under the proposed legislation, and when released, “can be detained on a new warrant ... in the lobby of the building as they leave” (“Dowd and Brandis on anti-terror legislation”). The whole family of a “person who may have information that may assist in preventing terrorist attacks or in prosecuting those who have committed a terrorist offence” could be detained in this manner (“Other threats to freedom” 12; “Dowd and Brandis on anti-terror legislation”). “People of interest” may be so held for a week under the legislation, without charge, without legal representation, without appearing in court, and without the right of silence (“Backlash building over security laws” 9; “Proposal to boost ASIO powers has judges worried”). The “safeguards” regarding the issue of warrants were virtually valueless, in Dowd's experience, since warrants are almost always issued when security or police services make a case for them. Justice Dowd argued that in “an atmosphere of hysteria”, “Muslims stood to become the first victims of the new laws” (“Backlash building over security laws” 9).

The Islamic Human Rights Commission (2002) saw this law as modelled on the UK anti-terror laws. As in the British case, there were some very token concessions made to civil liberties objections, but with the opposition cowed, the ASIO

Legislation Amendment (Terrorism) Act was passed in 2003. Certainly, in addition to the above provisions, the new raft of legislation proscribed membership of 17 “terrorist organisations”. As in the British case, every one was a Muslim organisation. Draconian though these laws were, they were further strengthened and supplemented by new laws after the July 2005 London bombings, including reintroduction of laws against sedition, a crime which had not been prosecuted in Australia since the Cold war and the Vietnam War.

Australian complicity in torture

Australian citizen, Mamdouh Habib, who was finally released from Guantanamo Bay without charge at the end of January 2005 after more than three years in detention, was kidnapped unlawfully in Pakistan and handed over to US forces. They ‘rendered’ him to Egypt to be interrogated under torture (Wilkinson, “ASIO fed information to my torturers” 9) and from there he was taken to the US base in Guantanamo, where he was subjected to further torture (McLean). Pakistani president Pervez Musharraf has said that the Australian government must have known of his country’s handing Habib over to US forces, since this notification was always Pakistan’s practice in such cases (AAP “Govt knew Habib to be handed over”) The Australian government denied any knowledge about Habib’s transfer to Egypt, but has conceded that ASIO and AFP officers were in Pakistan to see Habib. The commissioner of the AFP told an Australian Senate hearing that US officials advised the AFP in Islamabad that Habib was detained in Pakistan. Habib claims (with a witness) to have been interrogated by US officials in Pakistan in the presence of an Australian official; the government does not deny this. Habib says the Australian officer was also at the airport when he was bound and gagged and taken by plane to

Egypt. A former CIA lawyer believes it likely that the Agency would have informed Australia of this transfer (“The Extraordinary Rendition of Mamdouh Habib”). Habib also claims that information from materials taken from his home by ASIO was passed on to those who interrogated him under torture of “unspeakable brutality” in Egypt (Wilkinson “ASIO fed information to my torturers”, “Australian official saw torture”).

Habib claimed to have been in Pakistan looking for a suitable Muslim school for his several children. He was there legally. As someone who had called attention to himself in the Sydney Muslim community, for example by wearing t-shirts showing support for Osama bin Laden, and was wont to public arguments and known to be a disturbed personality, he is an unlikely operative of an organised terror machine. When public knowledge emerged of his detainment in Guantanamo (along with that of fellow Australian David Hicks, alleged to have been captured fighting in Afghanistan alongside the Taliban), the Australian government claimed that they could not ask for their repatriation to Australia, since there was no evidence of their having broken any laws, and they would have to be released. Habib indeed eventually was released after his return to Australia in 2005, though under heavy security surveillance and subjected to mysterious house break-ins and an unsolved stabbing under the noses of ASIO (Nicholson; AAP “Habib stabbed near his home”). For several years the Australian government merely accepted the assurances of American officials that Habib and Hicks were in good health and being treated well in Guantanamo, despite the obviousness of what was happening there. Visiting Australian officials turned a blind eye to their condition and treatment.

David Hicks, is a working-class white Anglo Australian who converted to Islam. He was certainly maltreated in Afghanistan and Guantanamo, and claims to have been tortured (*Four Corners*). He is, however, still imprisoned at Guantanamo, awaiting trial by a military tribunal subject to a series of legal appeals, so we have yet not heard much of his own account of his treatment. The Australian government still appears to be doing little to seek his repatriation, despite the illegality of his detention. Habib himself was only returned to Australia when the US found inconvenient the emergence in court documents, and thus in the media, of horrifying details of his torture in both Egypt and Guantanamo.

Beyond complicity with Guantanamo abuse, Australian military and security services personnel were (at best) complicit with the keeping of 'ghost detainees' at Abu Ghraib and with interrogations at Camp Cropper, near Baghdad airport, where torture and killings are also known to have occurred (Wilkinson "Military Lawyers a law unto themselves"; Fisk). Major George O'Kane brushed aside the Red Cross report about torture at Abu Ghraib (Wilkinson "Military Lawyers a law unto themselves"). Another Australian military officer seconded to the US military became aware of 'ghost detainees' at the prison, in contravention of international law, and allegedly only reported the matter after the Abu Ghraib outrage became public knowledge (Wilkinson "Military Lawyers a law unto themselves"). One Australian intelligence officer, Rod Barton, interrogated Iraqi scientists at Camp Cropper, where he witnessed facial bruising of two prisoners and became aware of the mysterious death of another (Wilkinson "Military Lawyers a law unto themselves"). The Australian government attempted to cover up both O'Kane's and Barton's

involvement, and then prevaricated, saying, for instance, that the “interviews” were not “interrogation” (Manne).

Dissent

The anti-Muslim racism demonstrated in the wake of 9/11 in both the UK and Australia did not go entirely unchallenged. In the UK hundreds of thousands of people took to the streets to demonstrate against the planned military action against Iraq, and opposition to jingoistic Islamophobia in the ‘War on terror’ was part of their protest. Conservative police estimates placed the numbers marching on one day alone in London – 16 February 2003 – at 750,000 people (“‘Million’ march against Iraq war”). As discussed earlier, dissent also came from unlikely sources such as the House of Lords, with the Law Lords forcing the hand of the government in regards to unlawful detention under the 2001 anti-terrorism legislation.

In Australia, small opposition parties such as the Greens and the Democrats (these now being practically defunct following the 2004 federal elections) were very vocal in condemning the government’s unlawful and inhumane treatment of refugees and opposing Australia’s involvement in the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. Public opposition to government policies, particularly in relation to refugees, was reflected in the ‘protest’ votes received by the Greens during the 2001 election, where their vote doubled to nearly five percent (Dellit). Whilst such dissenting voters were still in the minority, this was a significant indicator of opposition to the stance of the government.

Strong opposition to government policies in relation to refugees, the ‘war on terror’ and human rights in Australia were also expressed by human rights and refugee advocate groups such as ‘A Just Australia’ and the ‘Justice Project’ with members of the latter including former Prime Minister Malcolm Fraser. Many in the legal profession in Australia also spoke up against the injustices they saw, such as high profile QC Julian Burnside.

Public protest in response to the Australia’s participation in the ‘war on terror’ matched levels not seen since the nuclear disarmament marches of the 1980s, or the protests against the Vietnam War of the 60s and 70s. Hundreds of thousands of Australians marched against Australia’s involvement in the US-led military incursions into Afghanistan and Iraq. There was also questioning of, and opposition to, the dominant discourse following 11 September to the Bali bombings and great division over how to view and react to the Bali bombings (Fickling “Australians fear Bush link backlash”; Mason). This was demonstrated particularly when members of the government insinuated a linkage between the Bali bombings and Australia’s involvement in the then-proposed war against Iraq (Fickling “Australians fear Bush link backlash”).

Andrew MacIntyre notes that many Australians refused to support a war in Iraq as a knee-jerk reaction to the Bali bombings and protested what they saw as the political exploitation of the tragedy:

My guess would have been that the dominant effect [of the Bali bombings] would have been, if not a rallying around the flag, then at least a coming together, but I’m not sure that’s what we’re seeing ... People understand that

Saddam Hussein is a bad guy who could do some terrible things, but they are wary of going into a discretionary war (cited in Fickling “Australians fear Bush link backlash”).

How these dissenters were encoded by the respective governments, however, speaks volumes. In Australia, those who marched and protested against the war in Iraq were accused by Prime Minister Howard of giving ‘encouragement to the leadership in Iraq’ (Jones “PM accuses anti-war protesters of siding with Saddam”). This questioning of the ‘loyalty’ of such Australians was firmly framed within George Bush’s paradigm of being either ‘with us’ or ‘against us’ in the war between ‘good and evil.’ Similarly, in a speech at the United Nations’ 60th-anniversary summit in New York, Tony Blair expressed unity with President Bush, saying, “Terrorism won’t be defeated until our determination is as complete as theirs, our defence of freedom as absolute as their fanaticism, our passion for democracy as great as their passion for tyranny” (Gawenda).

Conclusion

We have seen how, both in Britain and Australia, the Muslim immigrants and their families who had been subjected to racism over several generations, experienced an exacerbation of such othering, and indeed, criminalisation after 11 September 2001. They had experienced a similar heightening of racism a decade earlier during the Gulf War against Iraq: the racism, be it individual, institutional, or indeed State racism, was not new (nor, of course, unique to these groups), but underwent a marked upswing with these critical events of 11 September and the Bali and London bombings. Nevertheless, the form of racism in these (and many other ‘western’)

countries had been undergoing a transition, since about the time of the Iranian revolution in 1979, but certainly since the *Satanic Verses* controversy. Contemporaneously with the rise of the 'New Racism' (Barker), we have seen a transformation of such a demonised 'other' in Britain from being othered as 'coloured' (phenotype) or Asian (a continent of origin, mainly imagined as the Indian subcontinent, involving orientalised others) to their othering as Muslims (Peach 18). At about this time, the term Islamophobia was coined in the US, and was imported to Britain in the early 1990s. Similarly and contemporaneously in Australia, where the majority of Muslims are of Arab – and most of these of Lebanese – background, there has been an analogous shift from racial to cultural othering, and a move from Arab or Lebanese, or more generally 'Middle Eastern', as racialised other, to 'Muslim' as the diabolised figure of danger and threat.

In response to 9/11, Bali and London, both Britain and Australia passed draconian new legislation designated as 'anti-terrorism' measures which was condemned by civil libertarians and senior members of the judiciary as a dangerous erosion of legal rights. The Australian laws were said to be modelled on the British ones, and both sets bore a more than passing resemblance to the US 'PATRIOT' Act. The new laws explicitly targeted membership or aid to (respectively sixteen and seventeen) specific organisations labelled as 'terrorist': all were Muslim. Both countries participated in the US-led coalitions which attacked, occupied, and ultimately set up puppet governments in Afghanistan and then in Iraq, arguably making real the threat of terrorist attack, particularly given the London bombers apparently committed the atrocious acts in response to UK involvement in Iraq (Sivanandan "Race, terror and civil society" 4-5).

Both countries have conducted, since 9/11, high profile security and police raids on mosques and private homes of Muslims, which have functioned to construct a manifest and imminent dangerousness among the communities concerned. In both Britain and Australia, Muslim communities have subsequently, with the aid of the media, been diabolised in cycles of moral panic. These cycles have corresponded with spates of vilification and violent racist attacks on members of the communities concerned, who understandably believe that their labelling and targeting by the media and politicians is a cause of the attacks. In neither nation has such crime been adequately monitored or dealt with by the criminal justice system, in the experience of the communities victimised. Finally, both States have been involved or complicit in what could arguably be characterised as Islamophobic hate crime abroad, such as unlawful deprivation of liberty, mistreatment, and even torture and killing. The state terror of the raids on Muslim others at home, and the latter hate crimes abroad, arguably lend a sort of moral licence and impetus to Islamophobic hate crime attacks within each nation.

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