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PAKEHA DISCOURSES OF MAORI/PAKEHA RELATIONS

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This thesis uses a discourse analytic approach to the language used by Pakeha in talk about Maori in Aotearoa/New Zealand. The research begins with an assay of a large body of public submissions and, using the finding of common themes and patterns of ideas, images and usages running through the data, proceeds to examine texts arising from other contexts in order to comment on the generality of the original results. It is suggested that the commonalities described amount to an ideological and linguistic resource base for the construction of a powerful "standard story" of Maori/Pakeha relations, which underpins and legitimates the oppressive status quo. Further extensions of the investigation examine changes in the discourse in the contemporary setting and pursue origins of the themes in historical texts arising from the period of contact between Maori and Pakeha prior to the colonisation of the country.
Preface

In one way the work which makes up this thesis amounts to a marker stone on a road that I have travelled for some years now, but there is an over-riding sense in which it is the road itself. The orientation and activities upon which the research and writing build are now an integral part of the way I think about and interpret my world, in my work, in my family life, my political activities, in the joys and perils of the daily round.

In many ways it has been a very easy road for me. Growing up in a family where language of all sorts was our first delight and plaything proved an excellent training for the later analysis of semantics, rhetoric and ideology which this work entails. Recapturing and developing that environment as my own children grow is like being part of an immersion course in continuing education.

In other ways the work has been extremely difficult and painful. For I have brought to the analysis of my own parent ideology and discourse all the fears that attend close and unflinching scrutiny of the self. The process of bringing to consciousness and critiquing the most basic of my culture's assumptions and commonsense is not comfortable to me. The business of working daylong, weeklong with overtly and covertly racist anti-Maori text has often left my head reeling as from a spell of working amid noxious chemicals. Particularly problematic is the realisation that despite (or perhaps because of) my liberal, woolly exterior, at many levels a lot of what I read is at best familiar and accessible to me; at worst it often seems part of my working cultural capital.
It has been a very human process, complex, untidy, split with cowardice, lapses, dead-ends, unrealised goals, but organic and overwhelmingly social. The best of it has been the free-flowing discussions and arguments with friends (and enemies), colleagues and critics. If I am due criticism for a lack of direction or insufficient focus in the execution of that process, then my only defence is to point to this as the milieu from which I work.

I take this opportunity therefore to recognise some of the many people who have travelled the road or part of it with me. Ray Nairn and I worked together on this project in its first stage and shaped the analysis and groundwork which are carried by the first two papers. Ray has been very supportive and constructive in his critiques of drafts of subsequent papers and I often feel that where I have written "I", I should really have been writing "we". My supervisors Fred Seymour and Fiona Cram especially have exercised the greatest patience and indulgence in allowing me to follow my heart into what must at times have looked grievously dubious enterprises. Many other colleagues, academics from other disciplines and journal editors have helped me enormously in refining publications into the final forms presented here.
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Introduction

In this country the issue of the relationship between Maori and Pakeha is preeminent at all levels. In the flash of five generations, Aotearoa has been transformed from an internationally recognised, sovereign Maori state to a vassal and satellite of metropolitan Europe and imperial America. In the process the culture, institutions, resources and zeitgeist of the indigenous people has been usurped, damaged and degraded. In terms of the Treaty of Waitangi, an exact reversal of the binding terms agreed to in 1840 have been enacted. Kawanatanga has been imposed over the guaranteed rangatiratanga of the tangata whenua; Pakeha sovereignty has dominated Maori sovereignty. In consequence, every area of our lives is infiltrated by the effects of the oppression and injustices that have been wrought. For Maori sovereignty and those who have sought to enact it this is an unmitigated disaster.

For Pakeha it is also a huge problem, not simply because of the material consequences that we also live with but as a result of the impact of participation in this process on our sense of identity. The execution of a programme of aggressive colonisation is dehumanising and debilitating as the traces of injustice and oppression are inscribed upon and embedded deep in our own cultural forms. For Pakeha concerned to try to effect change from this thoroughly unsatisfactory state of affairs, the examination of our culture and institutions is one of the first necessities. This is the challenge and starting point I set for myself in taking on the research reported here.

This presentation has taken some emergent theoretical and practical research developments from within social psychology and applied them in a post-positivist setting to the fallow field of race relations research. The topic is vast and overtly political. The methods are somewhat untested, but
growing steadily in stature. The theories upon which the research is based are complex, controversial and evolving.

The artificial barriers of compartmentalisation - a major artefact of the modernist project in relation to knowledge - between the sociological and the psychological disciplines the in study of language have much to answer for in the delay and difficulties in the development of discourse research. Psychology, in its desperation to gain and retain scientific status, has developed an obsessively individual-focused, reductionist approach to understanding people and their activities. As a result it has dealt with behaviour around language in terms of models which are rigid and essentialised in ways that do not reflect the complexity, the flexibility and the contradictions of the ways in which people actually use language. For its part sociology has a huge investment in the project of explaining the human condition without recourse to theories of the coherent, individual subject. However this position is similarly complicated in that it needs to be able to account for the collective representation which underpins so much of social behaviour. Emile Durkheim's charge upon psychology to accomplish this work seems to have been an early victim of the modernist forces referred to above.

Discourse theory is a move beyond this dichotomy in ways that acknowledge both the individual and the ideological dimensions of peoples actions in and interpretations of diverse situations. At the intersection of the social psychology and the sociology of language the tension between the individual and social dimensions of talk is partially resolved in a theoretical expectation that text will reproduce both the patterned and the particularised, from the context in which it arises. When coupled with a view that language is a material force in the world, especially the social world, the significance of this approach to the understanding of the social order becomes great. Further, overt links to theories of ideology and power offer the potential
to use the framework to critique established unjust social relations and to suggest ways of developing alternative ideological forms which can help to change the status quo.

I have sought support for these general canons in my chosen topic area searching firstly for pattern in a body of closely related but individually written texts, before looking increasingly for the particularised use of such resources in a number of other texts from a range of chronological and social contexts. My goals in this project have been to describe, and so expose to critique, Pakeha discourses of Maori/Pakeha relations in Aotearoa/New Zealand. It is my firm opinion that these are among the forces that are responsible for the historical and ongoing material, cultural and spiritual oppression of Maori in their native land. A further aim that runs on beyond the scope of this thesis is to use the understandings of the discourse and the development of methodologies to work for positive changes to Maori/Pakeha relations in all spheres.

In practice my research has come to focus on the forms, obvious and subtle, of anti-Maori discourse used by Pakeha. Some pro-Maori accounts appear in the earliest papers but in the process of research these were eclipsed by the need to study the clearly anti-Maori talk. This is not to say that examples of some of the former will not repay careful study as witnessed in the fifth paper, for as conditions change the softer line of resistance can prove more resilient, in appearing to make concessions and compromises but in the end ensuring the maintenance of Pakeha hegemony.

The content of the thesis consists of five published papers, plus another currently under review for publication and a concluding section. The first chapter attempts to lay a theoretical and methodological foundation upon which subsequent research can build. As such considerable space is devoted to exposing the way of working with text drawn from a substantial database so that other researchers and readers can examine and critique it.
In addition one of the patterns emerging from the data is described in some detail. Chapter two presents more of the patterns and offers the first attempts at using a knowledge of the patterns to analyse a text from a later period. Chapter three extends this process to look at the role of the patterns in the communication processes of newspaper stories. A substantial development here is the use of my own subjectivity in a reflexive process which matches the patterns deployed in a newspaper article with the resources I have to interpret them. This way of working is radically extended in chapter four, again using a single newspaper article, in the provision of multiple, subjectively generated, competing readings of a single item with a commentary which picks out the political implications of each version.

Chapter five takes its data from the political area, tracing the discursive work of a conservative politician as he juggles the competing demands of Pakeha self-interest with Maori claims for justice and redress. The reflexive element is more subdued but never-the-less remains a crucial part of the analysis. The sixth chapter takes up my growing interest in the origins and development of the Pakeha discourse by looking at a layer of texts from the first historical period of intensive interaction between Maori and Pakeha from about 1800 to 1840. In the concluding chapter I briefly examine broader implications, reactions and future directions of the research.

While the papers were written as a series, the fact that they were presented for publication in academic journals has meant that each is required to stand alone which leads inevitably to some repetition of content. Further the need to achieve closure on the thesis has meant that the vastness of the topic is only very lightly sprinkled with investigations. On the other hand the benefits of the discipline required to publish work at this level and the critical and constructive consequences of the subsequent exposure have made the process bracing to say the least.
Chapter One

Insensitivity and Hypersensitivity: An Imbalance in Pakeha Accounts of Racial Conflict in Aotearoa/New Zealand.¹

Abstract

In a plural society, the manner in which issues of race or ethnic relations are conceptualised is of considerable importance. So too are the processes by which such linguistic constructions are analysed. This article presents a detailed account of the analysis of one pattern observed in our analysis of submissions made to the Human Rights Commission (HRC) in 1979. The submission writers were explicitly asked to account for a physical confrontation between a group of Auckland University students performing a caricature of a Maori haka and a group of young Polynesians who objected to their performance. Sensitivity and related terms were used by 36 writers to accomplish various goals, particularly in attributing blame for the incident. The article describes the patterns of use and how they function for the writer.

Introduction

In this paper we² have two objectives: to discuss some particular research findings and to expose our way of working to scrutiny and criticism. We have been using discourse analysis to study a large body of material relating to race relations in Aotearoa (New Zealand). We have focused on writings of the dominant, Pakeha, New Zealanders (those of European descent) because of

¹ A version of this paper was published in the Journal of Language and Social Psychology, 9, 4, 293-308.
² This paper was co-authored with Ray Nairn of the Department of Psychiatry and Behavioural Science at the University of Auckland.
our interest in the role of discourse in the enactment of political domination. Our understanding of this relationship remains informal at this point but we consider the theoretical overview given by van Dijk (1988) which links discourse via complex interactions of cognitive and social processes to power to be a valuable beginning. Parker (1988) has also made a useful contribution in this direction.

In adopting and adapting discourse analysis for this project, we are aware of the major debate which has sprung up around theories of scientific knowledge (Barnes, 1974; Billig, 1987; Collins, 1983; Gilbert & Mulkay, 1984). We take it that many of the features attributed to the establishment and maintenance of scientific knowledge are present in other fields and therefore that many of the lessons from this forum are important background for the study of the sociology of race relations. We are also aware of the current tension between the methodological developments of various theoretical positions taken within this debate (Antaki, 1988; Knorr-Cettina, 1981, Fuhrman & Oehler, 1986; Potter, 1987; Woolgar, 1983). We believe that this provides an excellent context for criticism and present our way of working very fully to promote discussion.

Our interest in the strengths and weaknesses of technique is motivated by a concern with the understanding of discourse derived from it. Our approach includes both fine and coarse-grained evaluation of texts and provides an analysis of their linguistic and organisational features. In addition, because we have dealt with a relatively large sample of texts, we have observed general patterns emerging from diverse texts. For this paper, the focus is on one particular pattern of ten we have worked on. We describe it in some detail, look at its "reality" and functions, but we also want to ask more general questions about what it is and what value it might have. In this vein we were greatly interested by a concluding remark in Potter and Wetherell (1987) to the effect that the understanding of such patterns is vital
to understanding the construction and legitimation of racist explanations and further that through it we "can start to understand the techniques through which these explanations can be undermined and transformed" (p. 26).

Potter and Wetherell are suggesting that understanding the patterns in discourse may lead to an understanding of how they can be used as tools for change. This is precisely the kind of thing we are looking for in our rather practical orientation and in the context of the broader research project we are involved in; considerable energy is devoted to testing the practical implications of the research findings. Current interests include applications of our findings to contemporary discourse on race relations in Aotearoa (NZ) and attempts to monitor the effects of publicising details of patterns such as those referred to here on their subsequent deployment and function in the public domain.

Background

The historical relationship between Maori and Pakeha in Aotearoa has been dominated by the transition from indigenous sovereignty acknowledged by the British Crown, to British domination. This imposition was essentially completed in the fifty years between 1820 and 1870, although not without large scale Maori resistance. The process of colonisation started with the earliest European arrivals in Aotearoa, whalers, traders and missionaries. Haphazard contact from about 1800 saw the introduction of elements that radically altered Maori society. Agriculture, Christianity, foreign trade, weapons, especially firearms, and European diseases all made their mark.

struggles for political and economic control, led to the Constitution Act of 1852 that created "responsible" settler government from 1853. In the process, Maori were, despite the Treaty, vilified or ignored and the establishment of a settler parliament was swiftly followed by the removal of the remaining threat to substantive Pakeha sovereignty (Bellich, 1986). The Land Wars of 1860-1870 left Maori resources, human and material, exhausted, making effective resistance against this more insidious aggression of the racist bureaucracy and legal system almost impossible.

The impact of the colonial process on the Maori can be seen in the social statistics for 1979, the year of the Haka Party Incident. Maori life expectancy was lower, by about 10 years, than non-Maori (Men: Maori 60, non-Maori 69; Women: Maori 64, Non-Maori 75). Maori people, 12% of the population at most, constituted 45% of the male and 67% of the female prison population. The average income for a Maori worker was 78% of that of a non-Maori worker. While 67% of Maori pupils left school without any qualification, only 28.5% of non-Maori did the same. The Maori have been relegated to the status of an underclass in their own land. In spite of this oppression, a number of strong features of the Maori cultural, social economic and political organisation remain and currently form the basis of a resurgence of Maori widely dubbed "the Maori renaissance".

The Haka Party Incident

The Haka Party Incident was a title retrospectively applied to a confrontation between a group of Pakeha students from Auckland University, mainly from the School of Engineering, and a group of young Maori and other Polynesian people. The issue was the Engineering students' portrayal of a Maori haka—a ritual display of strength of defiance often used as a challenge in war or welcome—which the students had performed in various forms during
the University's graduation week for some twenty-five years. The event itself is subject to detailed examination by Hazelhurst (1988) and will not be further dealt with here.

The confrontation and its aftermath were widely reported in the New Zealand media both mainstream and fringe. This coverage was the primary source of information for most of the submissions that form the data base for this study.

The Research

The set of texts analysed in this study are from a large number of submissions made to the Human Rights Commission. In August 1979, three months after the incident and a matter of days after the conclusion of the resulting trial, the Human Rights Commission embarked on an extensive advertising campaign which sought answers to a number of questions on race relations. The following is the form in which the questions appeared in daily newspapers.

TO ALL NEW ZEALANDERS

What do you think caused the Auckland University Haka incident?
Do you think people's rights are being ignored or not?
Do you think cultural differences are being respected or not?
The HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION wants to hear from you as an individual or an organisation, if you are interested in questions such as:
What do you think causes intolerance between races?
Does racial intolerance affect you personally and, if so, in what ways?
Is lack of understanding of cultural differences sometimes seen as
illwill or hostility?

How can feelings of anger be redirected to increase understanding between people?

The Race Relations Office, a sub-section of the HRC, considered the resulting submissions and produced a publication, Racial Harmony in New Zealand (1980). This booklet presents excerpts from submissions that encapsulate alternative views on a variety of issues. The topics were identified by the editor who also provided a synopsis of both views of that topic. Released in 1980, the book became the focus for a further round of submissions. Members of the Race Relations Office (RRO) attended public hearings and received further written submissions up until late 1980. A total of 375 written submissions, running to well over 1,000 pages, were available for study. All these were photocopied, to protect the originals, and read through as the first stage of the project. The chosen aim was to explore the manner in which Pakeha writers of submissions constructed their analysis of race relations at that time. A second reading of all submissions sorted them into groups, first by date (1979 or 1980) and then by race of writer. The latter judgement was based primarily on the writer's self-identification. This was checked against distinguishably Maori names and specific, race-identifying content. By these means, and with adjustments on subsequent readings, submissions were divided into Maori and non-Maori categories.

Working with the non-Maori submissions, the overwhelming majority of which were from those of European descent, a further division was made on the basis of whether a submission was a group or individual effort. This was done because the group submissions typically presented a carefully thought out, highly organised application of the group's ideology to the question under discussion. Individual submissions seemed to be less polished than the group
efforts. It was decided to keep this categorisation throughout the analysis to see whether there were consistent differences in the nature of the representations provided. For the purpose of the study reported here the body of texts consisted of 221 submissions, a total of 604 pages, written by individual Pakeha in late 1979. The submissions vary from brief anonymous notes scrawled on scraps of paper to dissertations running to 20 or more typed pages. All submissions were given a reference number and each page was identified under that number.

From the readings of the texts undertaken in the familiarisation and sorting process, we were aware of a range of commonalities of ideas, language and images used by quite large numbers of writers to develop and support broader arguments. While we were impressed by the way in which some of these patterns interlocked and by the skill with which they were deployed in concert by writers to defend particular positions, as a first step we decided to study these patterns as discrete elements. We therefore chose to make detailed analyses of groups of submissions which used the common patterns. One such set of analyses is now presented.

Thirty-six submissions used notions of "sensitivity" in constructing their explanation of the Haka Party Incident and often in generalising this to race relations in the wider context. In all cases the ideas were used as part of longer tracts of discourse. We note that in gathering these texts from the main body of data we have cast our net very widely so that a range of usages such as sensitivity, insensitivity, hypersensitivity, "touchiness", lack of sense of humour are all included at this early stage.

To try to give an overview of the way in which the ideas of this pattern are used, we have taken out key words and phrases from every submission in the selection (see Table 1). We stress that this material is intended only as an indicator to provide background for the texts selected out for more detailed analysis below.
TABLE 1. USE OF SENSITIVITY AND RELATED NOTIONS IN
SUBMISSIONS TO HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION.

Submission number

7.3 justified frustration (M) cultural insensitivity (P)
10.0 mockery of culture (M) insensitivity (P)
27.0 intolerant too serious (M)
28.0/1 growing social/political awareness (M) racist NZ society (P)
36.0 feelings of frustration and helplessness (M) lack of sensitivity (P)
38.0 haka harmless, brainless (P)
42.0/1 lost sense of humour, sensitive (M)
49.0 thuggery (M) a certain insensitivity (P)
50.0 violently expressed paranoia (M) no intention to belittle (P)
55.0 unduly sensitive, "thin-skinned" (M) intended no offence (P)
56.1/2 frustrated (M) culturally insensitive (P)
58.0 losing their sense of humour (M)
71.0 lack tolerance to humour of others (M)
85.0 deeply offended (M) bad taste (P)
95.4 over sensitivity (M) insensitivity (P)
99.0 renewed awareness of cultural identity (M) completely
insensitive (P)
100.0 boorish, unnecessarily upset (M) boorish (P)
112.0 provocative, aggressive (M) non-belligerent, a fun thing (P)
114.0 oversensitive (M) harmless tradition (P)
116.0 such sensitivities have no place in our society (M) no racial
insult (P)
118.0 lost sense of humour, oversensitive (M)
121.0 pretence of affront (M) insensitive (P)
129.1 hurt and bitter (M) very insensitive (P)
136.0 arrogant opinionated twits (P)
165.0 immense pride (M) not sensitive enough (P)
166.0 lack sense of humour, oversensitive (M)
172.0 unwarranted sensitivity (M)
174.0 no insult in "haka fun" (P)
190.0 over-reacted (M) upsetting Maori feeling (P)
196.0 near-paranoia over rights (M) innocent, harmless actions (P)
201.0 justification undercut by resort to violence (M) oafish joke (P)
204.0 insulted, degraded (M) very insensitive, mocking (P)
207.0 overreaction to joke (M)
222.0 hypersensitivity (M) insensitivity (P)
224.0 devoid of all sensitivity (P)
225.0 disrespect of Maori sensitivities (P)

(P) - Applied to Engineering Students or Pakeha generally.
(M) - Applied to He Taua, or Maori generally.

We will begin with some short extracts which illustrate various uses of the pattern without much elaboration or explanation. This is the most common form in which the pattern appears in our data. All extracts are verbatim with omissions signified by dots (...).

Submission PI 55.0

In my opinion the engineers intended no offence and the Maori cultural group were unduly sensitive and "thin-skinned".
Here two predominant ideas in the pattern appear together. Firstly, the students "intended no offence"; they may have accidentally upset people through ignorance but cannot be accused of deliberate insensitivity. The second idea is that the Maori involved were unduly sensitive.

Submission PI 100.0
(1) I believe the Auckland University Haka Party Incident was caused by ignorance and boorishness on the part of both students and Maoris.
(2) Hakas and Maori dancing has been bastardised by both Maori and Pakeha for many years . . . (3) But basically I think the incident was outrageous and should never have happened. (4) Simply because "it wasn't a matter to be upset about".

In sentence one "boorishness" is used of both parties. Insensitivity is an aspect of boorishness. Blaming Maori and Pakeha equally for the abuse of the culture in sentence two strengthens the implicit acceptance of the engineers' performance provided in the last two sentences.

Submission PI 10.0
(1) Basically the incident was caused by the insensitivity, ignorance and "bloody-mindedness" on the part of the engineering students, who had been requested for many years to desist from this practice. (2) He Taua saw the haka as a mockery of their culture, and had done all they could (over the years) to explain their concern, but all such submissions had been ignored.

In this extract the idea of insensitivity is employed in an argument that seeks to justify the Maori position, their culture was subject to "mockery", they had
persisted with trying to get change by other channels for "years" but had been ignored. Their actions were neither unjustified nor precipitate.

These extracts provide a suitable introduction for examination of some longer more elaborate and varied texts.

Submission PI 42.0-1

(1) Have we lost our sense of humour in this country? (2) For centuries Variety Shows have used the customs and traits of different races, religions and cultures to entertain their patrons. (3) What was different about the students doing just that? (4) It has been done many times before—so why this sudden sensitivity?

This passage links a commonly used element, "loss of sense of humour", with sensitivity. The latter term is used in sentence four to describe the change indicated in the question of sentence one; we have become too sensitive. Sentences two and three support this conclusion. It is long established as acceptable that customs and traits are stock in trade for comedy and the students were simply following this tradition. This is suddenly no longer acceptable because we have lost our sense of humour and become inappropriately sensitive. The account depends for its success on the reader accepting the assertions of sentences two and three that the students performance was merely in accordance with comic tradition. He Taua are implicitly cast as unduly sensitive individuals who violated these social norms. This marginalises the group by doubly undermining their views.

Submission PI 95.4/5

(1) The Auckland University Haka Incident is an example of Pakeha insensitivity and inconsideration, combined with Maori over-sensitivity, aggravated by lack of educational ability to deal with this problem. (2) An
able, well-educated Maori group would have dealt with the problem by a court injunction against these students, with attendant publicity, rather than resorting to physical violence which has brought a backlash against them. (3) This is a perfect example of the lack of education producing lack of ability to deal wisely with community problems. (4) The Maori sensitivity is aggravated by a sense that Pakehas do not value their culture as they should, and that this undervaluation is incorporated in the stereotype. (5) If Maoris were happy with their position in New Zealand society, they would not be so sensitive about lampooning of their culture. (6) Many national groups in New Zealand (Scots, Irish, Jews in particular) accept such things with tolerance. (7) This is not to condone the bad taste of many such activities, but to point out that the remedy is in the principles I have set down. (8) Even deeply religious beliefs are commonly ridiculed without over-reaction. (9) At least one television comedian ridicules the Catholic Church, without fear of physical reprisal . . .

In this extract the Haka Party Incident is seen to arise from both Pakeha insensitivity and Maori hypersensitivity. The Pakeha contribution to the incident is presented very briefly and generally in sentence one; "... insensitivity and inconsideration", and this is amplified in sentence four; "... Pakehas do not value [Maori] culture as they should". The bracketing of insensitivity with being inconsiderate, moderates the already mild accusation. The effect of Pakeha neglect is to "aggravate" Maori sensitivity (sentence four); this characteristic or problem of Maori people is worsened but not initiated/caused by Pakeha activities.

The Pakeha contribution here is the sin of omission, of not valuing Maori culture as they should. Pakeha culpability is further reduced by the qualifying phrase "a sense that" in sentence four indicating that such devaluing might be a figment of Maori imagination, a feeling they have rather
than something that is certainly true. The total effect of this construction is to convict Pakeha of neglecting to do all that they might to live harmoniously with the Maori, mitigating the blame that would attach to the malign goals that would be implied by alternative constructions such as their devaluing or debasing the culture. In sentence five the Pakeha engineering students are said to have been "lampooning" Maori culture and, in the course of the argument, this is described as "bad taste" (sentence seven). These activities are not to be condoned. But the impact of this criticism of the students is undermined in sentence six where other national sub-groups are used as examples to Maori people of how such insensitive behaviour should be received.

The Maori contribution to the Haka Party Incident, in contrast, is described as "... over-sensitivity aggravated by lack of educational ability ..." (sentence one). This usage contrasts Maori hypersensitivity with Pakeha insensitivity but it modifies the former by having it "aggravated" by lack of educational ability. Pakeha insensitivity on the other hand, is moderated by the association with inconsiderateness, a lesser evil. Educational achievement is highly prized by Pakeha; to lack educational ability is to be of lesser worth and to be unreliable in judgement. The pattern, clearly in this example, facilitates the construction of victim blaming discourse.

The common understanding of the phrase "lack of educational ability" is "unintelligent" or "stupid" and this strongly affects the reading of the text. The apparently objective status of such labelling allows denigration of Maori without appearing to be racist and vindictive. This interpretation is supported by the alternative course of action laid out in sentence two. The Maori (who were involved in the Haka Party Incident) are deficient because they did not embark upon expensive, complex legal proceedings which provide no guarantee that the haka would be stopped. The construction contrasts the "physical violence" that is seen as counterproductive with an impersonal,
legal response. We are being presented with a picture of Maori people as less able, of thinking with their fists and of being too easily aroused.

Sentence five contrasts with the rest of the extract in that a social cause "position in society" is identified as a source of Maori difficulties. Otherwise the writer has spoken of personal causes: ability, over-sensitivity, inconsiderateness and so on. The inferred unhappiness of Maori people with their position in society is seen to account for some of their overreaction to the caricaturing of their culture. If they were happy they would not be so sensitive.

The points discussed here show clearly that the use of the sensitivity pattern does not entail an even-handed consideration of the position of the two groups. Rather we see that hypersensitivity on the part of the Maori is associated with characteristics such as intolerance, violence, unhappiness, overreaction and a deficient sense of humour (sentences six to nine). On the other hand, Pakeha insensitivity can be described in terms of inconsiderateness, bad tastes and lampooning, while some Pakeha provide examples of tolerance. The "balanced" blaming of both parties in sentence one, helps to distract attention from the essential asymmetry of the blaming revealed by the close analysis.

Submission PI 7.3
(1) The engineers' mistake alias the Haka Party Incident. (2) This was not an isolated explosion. (3) Rather it was the culmination of many years' frustration, the accumulation of many incidents of cultural insensitivity, the last straw. (4) Many young Polynesians have now reached the stage of awareness and bitterness to give each other the support they need to participate in a white man's country. (5) I am pleased. (6) I do not know who used violence first. (7) The press say it was He Taua, but the press belong to our new variety of MCP (middle class
The engineering students also belong. (9) He Taua say they were trying to talk, to ask them to stop, to explain why. (10) They say the engineers attacked first, maybe out of fear or anger. (11) I do not know who to believe. (12) But the engineers' act of thoughtlessness, of failing to recognise that different people respect different things, of denial that differences can also be right typifies the insensitivity, the restricted vision, the cultural blindness that most Pakeha share. (13) He Taua say they tried to talk, but met with mockery. (14) In these times when people will not hear, when arguments get swallowed up in endless subcommittees, when words fail only action remains. (15) They did try.

In sentence three Pakeha behaviour is summed up as "... many incidents of cultural insensitivity ..." This is greatly elaborated in sentence 12; the wealth of detail provided here encompasses many of the points raised in this area by the other submissions and can be regarded as a comprehensive list of the characteristics included in the "Pakeha insensitivity" part of the pattern.

The phrase "... many years of frustration ..." (sentence three) represents the Maori response to Pakeha insensitivity. The idea is developed in the first part of sentence four and in sentences 13 and 14. From this is built a subtle but powerful justification of He Taua's involvement in the Haka Party Incident. In sentences 6-11 the writer, having opened with intimations of impartiality - "I do not know who used violence first" - succeeds in sabotaging the interpretation placed on the Haka Party Incident by the conventional media (sentences seven and eight).

She then substitutes her own interpretation using a rare application of a human face to He Taua. In describing their frustration, their support for each other, and their attempts to negotiate with the students, her account contrasts sharply with media portrayal of the group as gang thugs. This move is complemented by suitable psychological justifications for the
engineers to explain why they may have initiated the violence. She ends most disarmingly, by returning to her initial stance of impartiality (sentence 11). After reiterating in amplified form the role of Pakeha insensitivity, the humanising of He Taua continues in sentence 13. If you attempt to communicate and are only mocked, you are justified in feeling frustrated. The full justification emerges in sentences 14 and 15 summarised in the slogan-like statement "... when words fail only action remains ..." In establishing that He Taua were justified in their actions, the usage is shifted from "violence" in sentence six to "action" in sentence 14, avoiding a possible conclusion to the effect that violence is justified.

Submission PI 116.0
(1) Hakas whether serious or mock have been part of the New Zealand way of life for as long as I can remember and no doubt well before that. (2) In my view hakas are no more a racial insult than the portrayal of the Frenchman wearing a beret and sporting a thin moustache, the Scotsman in his kilt with exaggerated accent, the Oriental as slit eyed, sing song and slyly servile or the German as humourless and regimented. (3) If some Maoris felt insulted then such sensitivities have no place in our society. (4) Respect and tolerance of cultural values cuts both ways. (5) I think the Maoris would do a lot more to help themselves if they identified themselves as New Zealanders, for better or worse for then we would all share some common bond.

This extract, like PI 7.3, only uses one part of the pattern directly. The core of the text is that Maori are hypersensitive and that such sensitivities are out of place. The impact of this marginalising is multiplied by the identification of only "some Maoris" (sentence three) who are unworthy of inclusion in New Zealand society. Those Maori who felt insulted by the engineers' performance
are defined to be a minority. The "If ... then ..." construction used here enables the writer to make the point without having to accept that Maori people were insulted by the performance further belittling the Maori case.

Sentence one builds up to the main argument by portraying all haka, including the engineers' performance, as being common property of all New Zealanders, a shared tradition. This serves a dual purpose, implying that it is acceptable to enact this tradition and defining those who object to particular performances as unacceptably sensitive.

Sentence two provides a set of relatively innocuous racial caricatures - although of increasing pungency with greater cultural distance from an English model - which are presented as equivalent to the engineers' performance. Again the device is to present others, mostly Pakeha, as models of tolerance who show He Taua's over-sensitivity in a critical light. The corollary is that the engineers are justified in performing while He Taua who cannot tolerate such minor slights are shown to be unacceptable.

Sentence four carries a statement which is effectively a threat. If you want us to respect your culture then you must respect ours. Specifically the sentence refers to the earlier hypersensitivity (sentence three) that is seen as unacceptable in the light of the notion that haka are common property of all New Zealanders and that racial caricatures of varying degrees of viciousness are part and parcel of the mainstream culture.

We want now to draw together the features of the pattern. Firstly, it appears in roughly one seventh of the submissions of our sample and so can be regarded as a widely and publicly understood part of Pakeha discourse on race relations. We note that speakers use this resource with considerable freedom, drawing upon larger or smaller chunks of it according to the needs of the conversation they are engaged in. The pattern has great flexibility being capable of being evoked by a single word but also offering the possibility of extended discussion and qualification. It consists of a pool of ideas and images
centring upon the opposed notions of "insensitivity" and "hypersensitivity". These two ideas may be portrayed using quite a range of alternative terms including synonyms such as "over-sensitive" and "lack of sensitivity", "boorish", colloquialisms like "bloody-minded", "thin-skinned" and other phrases such as "can't take a joke".

In addition, there is a corollary to the use of each of the two main ideas. For example PI 7.3 goes to some trouble to establish that He Taua were not hypersensitive or overreacting. They were frustrated by years of rebuff and provoked by the derision with which they were greeted by the engineers. They were thus justified in the actions they took. Similarly in PI 42.0/1 the students' performance is portrayed as fitting a tradition and therefore acceptable. We characterise these usages as "justified" and "acceptable".

It is of some interest to examine the key terms in a general way to provide a wider context for understanding their specific use in these texts. In spite of the frequent pairings in the usage of "hypersensitive" and "insensitive" there is an important asymmetry in their effect. The term "hypersensitive" carries a psychological load for which there is no parallel in "insensitivity". Insensitivity is represented as deriving from ignorance; as such it can be dispelled by information. It is to be regarded as transitory, incidental and non-deliberate. From a state of insensitivity an individual can act in ways similar or identical to those who are malevolent but is less culpable because a plea of ignorance can be made in mitigation. The use of the term often carries the implication that, if the insensitive actors had the necessary information, they would have acted differently.

In contrast, hypersensitivity is represented as deriving from emotional sources and is thus internally mediated. Such psychological phenomena are seen as part of the person's nature and are not easily accessible to adjustment. Hypersensitivity is thus regarded in the same way as aggression, introversion and other personal characteristics. Since
hypothesis is a problem of the individual it follows that responsibility both for the state and its consequences lie with the individual. Those who are affected by this characteristic are expected to change themselves, especially in the way they see slights and insults where it can be claimed that none are intended. The association of hypersensitivity with emotion and indeed with extremes of emotion, facilitates the marginalising of the actions and beliefs of people so labelled in ways which removes them from serious contention in social debate.

Given the usage of these two terms, the accusation of "insensitivity" generally carries a neutral or mildly negative loading, while "hypersensitivity" carries a loading that is negative to strongly negative. A similar asymmetry appears when looking at the outcomes identified above and labelled as "justified" and "acceptable". "Justified" actions can be seen as neutral or mildly positive while "acceptable" identifies an action as positive to strongly positive. The effects of these loadings are such that the deployment of apparently equivalent aspects of the pattern for Maori and Pakeha achieves quite different ends. An example of this is to be found in submission PI 94.4/5 where an apparently even-handed approach has the net effect of blaming Maori.

This kind of asymmetry is not wholly unfamiliar in recent literature on discourse analysis. Wetherell, Stiven and Potter (1987) found that in spite of a general endorsement of equality of opportunities for men and women in careers, in making sense of the existing patterns, subjects drew on asymmetric repertoires in justifying them for men and women. Mulkay, Potter and Yearley (1983) describe a similar asymmetry in scientists' application of "empiricist" and "contingent" repertoires in accounting for correct and incorrect belief.

We believe there are strong grounds for regarding all of the ideas as closely related and satisfactorily characterised under the term sensitivity. A
majority of submissions use key ideas concurrently to strengthen the defence of one party's behaviour and to attack the other. Where only one idea is explicitly used, the context often implies the complementary idea.

General Discussion

In this section we look at functions the pattern has served for our writers and then at the value of the concept of pattern as we have used it here.

Functionally the pattern appears to operate in at least two distinguishable though overlapping domains. In the first instance, as our analysis highlights, it at once delineates the bounds of discourse and directs such discourse toward particular conclusions and in this sense is akin to Billig et al's (1988) notion of "ideological dilemma". In a second area, the discourse functions in an intensely pragmatic way to give speakers both explanations and strategy for accounting for racial tension in New Zealand. There are several aspects to this function, the most apparent of which is that it allocates blame for racial tension primarily to the undue sensitivity of Maori people.

The appropriateness of this ascription is strongly contested by the work of Essed (1988). She notes other research that indicates that whites use a range of strategies to discuss or undermine black views and shows that blacks strive for alternative explanations of offensive or unusual white behaviour, only settling for an attribution of racism when these alternatives are eliminated. Corroboration of these findings comes from Louw-Potgieter (1989).

In marked contradiction of this work most of the writers in our sample label black reaction to offensive Pakeha behaviour as hypersensitivity, constructing an explanation of Maori behaviour that stigmatises the oppressed, presenting their testimony as inherently unreliable.
The allocation of blame for racial tension to Maori is underpinned by an explanation of how conflicts arise. In the case of the Haka Party Incident, He Taua is construed as over-sensitive, and are said to have overreacted. If this were not so the engineers would have performed undisturbed and the incident would not have occurred. This explanation relies for its power on a process of exclusion which is derived from the psychological loading carried by the term hypersensitive. Although the term insensitive is used of Pakeha in a number of submissions it does not perform an exclusion function because its loading is not strongly negative.

An inclusion process performs an opposite function in submissions which see Pakeha behaviour as acceptable. Examples are those which aim to establish that the engineers' behaviour, while in some sense exceptional, was nevertheless within the bounds of societal norms. We noted that very often the justification for the label of hypersensitivity as applied to Maori is couched in these terms.

A small number of writers use the pattern differently. This usage fits closely with Essed's work, arguing that Maori are justified in their interpretations of and reactions to offensive Pakeha behaviour and performs an inclusion function for Maori.

Another function of the pattern is to be found in its emphasis on the role of the individual. It is the individual, who is hypersensitive or insensitive and who must change in order that harmony prevail. This formulation diverts attention from the differences in Maori and Pakeha social systems and the power imbalance between them that makes major contributions to the states of Maori/Pakeha relations.

This process seems to parallel an aspect of the discourse on community discussed by Potter and Reicher (1987). In the aftermath of the "St Paul's riot", senior police officers construe problematic "community relations" as being partly a function of interpersonal processes, ignoring
structural and political influences on the event. They achieve this by including police in their discourse of "community", whereas residents of St Paul's explicitly cast the police as powerful outsiders. Thus priority is given to changes in police practice that are seen to foster and improve "community relations". As a result, the emphasis is on issues such as police "understanding" and their personal contact with the people of the area - in this sense their sensitivity - rather than the broader issues of power.

A final point to be made is that, especially in the case of those submissions which label Maori as hypersensitive and Pakeha as insensitive, there is a valuable impression of even-handedness conveyed. Blaming both sides, albeit one more severely than the other, appeals to readers' commonsense lore. "Takes two to quarrel" is a Pakeha truism underpinned by important societal institutions like the law. It does not matter that the unequal weighting of the ideas hypersensitivity and insensitivity prejudices the judgement. What is important is to keep the reader hooked into the discourse.

We feel this is a very important function of this and other patterns in Pakeha discourse on Maori/Pakeha relations. With this pattern we found it striking (and a factor in our choosing to present it before others we are working on) that the apparent balance of sensitivity/insensitivity is exactly the mechanism by which the reader's attention is held to a discourse which has the end effect of maintaining and normalising Pakeha hegemony. We prefer to take this view of such patterns rather than argue that they are a superficial gloss designed to make palatable an underlying racism. We suggest that patterns in this discourse are selected and tailored by speakers to meet the specific requirements of communicating successfully with a particular audience. A recent paper from Potter and Wetherell (1989), provides some corroboration for this interpretation. Their speakers frequently deploy apparently contradictory ideas without allowing their
discourse to be disrupted by doing so. Postulating an essential racism unrealistically simplifies the Pakeha contribution and makes problematic the explication of such variability.

Nine other patterns from our data seem to support this suggestion. One which we have called Good Maori/Bad Maori divides Maori according to whether or not they fit into Pakeha society. However, by avoiding identifying precisely which Maori are "good" and which are "bad" the pattern retains a flexibility which allows speakers to define the groups according to the needs of the situation. Maori can thus be portrayed as "good" in one part of the discourse and "bad" in another without the speaker being called to account. Other patterns such as those we call Rights and Privilege are separable and yet are frequently used as opposing versions of social reality in ways which protect speakers from accusations of racism. Rights are what Pakeha have; the same rights specifically allocated to Maori are termed privileges and deemed unjust. Parliamentary representation is a general right. Constitutional provision of Maori representation which gives them some measure of protection as a minority in a democratic system is seen as privilege.

Returning to the pattern discussed here, in general terms we see it as limiting what is easily communicated as an acceptable rendition of a particular social reality. Speakers who wish to contest that reality without drawing upon the established resources for doing so have a vast amount more conversational work to do and must take unparalleled risks in the process. Those who wish to argue against what Fish (1980) has termed "the standard story", the common version, using the available resource their efforts are heavily constrained by it. Thus speakers attempting to blame Pakeha for the current state of race relations using the sensitivity pattern (e.g. PI 7.3) do so with less force and clarity than those who blame Maori. In particular, because the issues of structural relations which might underlie the states of
sensitivity or hypersensitivity are not surfaced in the pattern, speakers wishing to draw attention to them cannot do so and remain within the accepted set of ideas which make up the pattern.

We have shown that our writers structure their discourse to explain, to allocate blame, to provide justifications, to present particular constructions of reality. In doing so, one of the resources at their disposal is the pattern centred on the idea of sensitivity. Such patterns have been characterised as "interpretative repertoires" by discourse analysts (Gilbert & Mulkay, 1984; Potter & Wetherell, 1987). Potter and Wetherell (1988) give a description of the repertoire as being made up of

a restricted range of terms used in specific stylistic grammatical fashion. Commonly these terms are derived from one or more key metaphors and the presence of a repertoire will often be signalled by certain tropes or figures. (p. 172)

We agree that the pattern we have described here is a pool of images and phrases which serve varying but related functions in constructing or explaining a social reality. Our reservations centre on the point that we are not really satisfied as to what repertoires are. Potter and Wetherell (1987) characterise them as "summary units" and "building blocks". We have some sympathy with such expressions, in the first case because we are aware of the way in which in our work, the patterns are collations of the discourse of many voices and in the second because in the extensions alluded to above we can describe the tactical and structural roles they play in actual discourse. There are, however, numerous difficulties with the idea. These range from issues of reification through to more practical problems such as the variations in which the building blocks are used, the variability of separate elements, the overlaps and complementarities and the difficulties of
distinguishing between "blocks" and the general matrix of language. We feel that our analysis shows the pattern as a core of ideas and images around which the stylistic and linguistic features are arranged. It is the core idea of sensitivity and its variations which channel the social constructions, facilitating some and obstructing others, including some and excluding others. Differing formulations of the core reset the boundaries and promote alternative constructions. In forthcoming papers, we shift from detailed analysis of the patterns from the 1979 data base to attempts to test the significance and durability of the patterns by using them as analytic tools in the deconstruction of more recent Pakeha discourse on Maori/Pakeha relations.
The reception of this paper was a considerable encouragement and far from being an end-point seemed to offer many possibilities for extending and widening of the investigation. The two questions that seemed most interesting were those of the significance of the patterning we were reporting and the applicability of the techniques we had tried to other data. These interests seemed to converge strongly in the idea of looking at text from other sources, to assess the extent to which they made use of these or other patterns.

On the question of significance, I was well aware that unlike the case of quantitative methodologies, there was no formula that could be applied or ratings that would confer an "objective measure". Rather, I had to rely on discursive means to establish the importance of the results of what had already been done. It seemed that other texts and their use or reliance on the patterns for developing arguments on the topic would act as some indication of their utility and power in the field.

This goal fitted easily with the methodological aspirations, where two developments of what had been done so far were required. This would be the first time that the patterns had become a guide or tool in analysis, and the prospect of working on a much smaller data base meant that a more deconstructive style of analysis than hitherto been used could be employed.

At this time, I was working with co-editors on an introductory book for Pakeha concerned with the issues arising from the revisionist views of the Treaty of Waitangi raised by Maori and some Pakeha academics. I had written a non-academic account (McCreanor, 1989) of the magazine article which became the data for the next academic paper and the challenge was to
underpin the lay-oriented analysis with a formal academic account. This project is the basis of Chapter Two of this thesis.
Chapter Two

Race Talk and Commonsense: Patterns in Pakeha discourse on Maori/Pakeha Relations in New Zealand.¹

Abstract

Discourse analysis of public submissions arising from an overt racial conflict in New Zealand in 1979 has yielded a number of patterns in the talk of Pakeha New Zealanders. An outline of two such patterns is presented and these are then drawn upon in the deconstruction of a piece of contemporary Pakeha discourse. This analysis is designed to shed some light on the significance of the patterns presented; their durability, their function, and their contribution to the apparent success of the sample discourse and their role in a broader Pakeha ideology of Maori/Pakeha relations in Aotearoa (New Zealand).

Introduction

Traditional social psychological research, true to its logical-positivist underpinnings, has aimed to describe and quantify social reality. It has sought fundamental and enduring truths about its field of study, encouraged in the endeavour by an image of science as the prescription for the unearthing of objective knowledge. Although this view has been under strong attack for more than 30 years since Karl Popper's (1959) assertions that all observation is theory-laden, social psychology has clung to the conventional philosophy of science. In the contemporary setting, with critiques of Kuhn

¹ A version of this paper was published in the Journal of Language and Social Psychology, 10, 4, 245-262. It was co-authored with Ray Nairn of the Department of Psychiatry and Behavioural Science at the University of Auckland.
(1970), Hesse (1974) and Feyerabend (1978) to hand and the flood-tide of poststructuralism (Gergen, 1990) all about us, it is vital that we attend to the implications of these developments for our research practice.

In calling into question the adequacy of the theoretical basis of science, the philosophers have stimulated sociological investigations of scientific practice (Mitroff, 1974) which have, amongst other things, demonstrated the subjectivity inherent in what scientists do. This substantial vindication of the theoreticians' claims amounts to a realisation that both scientist and non-scientist construct their realities on their interpretation of available data. Such parallels undercut the notion of a unique scientific method and the inescapable conclusion is that a multiplicity of methodologies are not only acceptable but called for in order to account for diverse and vital ways of understanding the world. A more recent sociological examination of a controversy in biochemistry (Gilbert & Mulkay, 1984) found that the scientists used conflicting discourses, only one of which was "scientific", to justify their work.

One of the few avenues within social psychological research that has offered at least the possibility of more flexible scientific practice is social representation theory (Farr & Moscovici, 1984). Moscovici (1984) arguing from a position congruent with that of the radical philosophy of science, begins with the idea that perception is mediated by representations which are overwhelmingly social.

Nobody's mind is free from the effects of prior conditioning which is imposed by his [sic] representations, language and culture ... We see only that which underlying conventions allow us to see, and we remain unaware of these conventions. (p8)
While accepting the possibility that a certain level of reflexive awareness of such constraints is possible, Moscovici urges that valuable insights can be gained from the intensive study of representations. The manoeuvre of placing representations in centre-stage has proved inspirational for scholars seeking to understand the ways in which people make sense of and interpret their social and physical worlds. Social representation theory now encompasses contributions in the fields of psychoanalysis (Moscovici, 1961), health (Herzlich, 1973), intergroup representations (Hewstone et al, 1982) and student protest (Di Giacomo, 1980) to name but a few.

This framework has not been without its problems. In spite of an awareness that language cannot be regarded as an unproblematic channel for the transmission of information (Moscovici, 1981), many using this framework have continued to behave as if it were. Potter and Litton (1985) have laid the blame for this situation with the vagueness of the definition of representation. Reviewing the effects of this on a number of studies, they recommend that the relationship between language, meaning and function be central to the study of representation. Their suggestion that social representations be reconceptualised as so-called "linguistic repertoires" amounts to a call to re-focus the field on discourse. Elsewhere, Potter and Wetherell (1987) suggest that discourse be regarded as a topic of study in its own right rather than a resource in the pursuit of more interesting problems. A number of what might be termed discourse analytic studies from both within and beyond social psychology are now available, advancing the theoretical and methodological scope of this approach (e.g. Billig et al, 1988; Essed, 1988; Gavey, 1989; Gilbert & Mulkay, 1984; Kress & Hodge, 1979; Parker, 1987; Potter & Reicher, 1984; Van Dijk, 1987; Wetherell, Stiven & Potter, 1984). A number of contributions to date deal with established problems in social psychology in innovative and refreshing ways (Goodwin, 1986; Reicher, 1986; Ullah, 1990) shedding light on the ways in which people
make sense of their worlds, without having to reify concepts such as trait, attitude or attribution.

We would locate our work in this developing tradition. For us, discourse includes all forms of communication; in practice, we are most interested in written and spoken forms and leave the non-verbal, the pictorial, the musical, the dramatic and so on to others. Basically, discourse is communication and as such it is inherently social, involving an interaction between two or more people.

The received meaning of any given communication is determined by the interaction between what is said or written and the listener/reader in a particular context. The need for communication to succeed is a powerful force in shaping its characteristics and its effectiveness depends on the appropriateness of the delivery for the particular audience. In general, communication will break down in various ways if a speaker's message does not match roughly with the interpretative resources of the audience. As a corollary, it is enormously hard psychological work for an audience to hear a version of an event or phenomenon that is too different from their own understanding of it. So we expect to find variation in the way speakers use the resources they have to meet the needs of different situations. The language, ideas and images which comprise a common ideology are a resource which used appropriately facilitates fluent communication. At the same time cultural/ideological boundaries constrain both speaker and listener in the production and interpretation of any communication.

The methods of traditional social psychology are inadequate for approaching written or spoken material from such a perspective. We have taken a discourse analytic approach (cf Gilbert & Mulkay, 1984; Potter & Wetherell, 1987) to an evaluation of submissions from Pakeha (European descent) New Zealanders to the Human Rights Commission (HRC) following the Haka Party Incident at Auckland University in 1979. Insights from this
work are used in a study of an "opinion" column written on the subject of local race relations by a prominent Pakeha businessman in 1988. The longitudinal comparison offers insights into the durability of a series of patterns drawn from the study of the 1979 data. These patterns, ten in all to date, are the subject of several other papers, some in progress, one (Nairn & McCleanor, 1990) in print. In this latter paper we examine in some detail a pattern which we call "sensitivity" which relies on the twin ideas that Pakeha are insensitive to the needs and aspirations of Maori and that Maori are hypersensitive about their culture and status. As a result of an unequal psychological load carried by the terms insensitive and hypersensitive, an apparently even-handed approach which seems to blame both parties, in practice allows Pakeha to level the balance of responsibility for our situation at Maori. Some of the other patterns as yet unpublished in our work include the idea that Maori are privileged rather than oppressed, that members of our society have a single national identity - New Zealander or "Kiwi" - which overrides any cultural affiliation, that where Pakeha offend Maori they do so out of ignorance rather than blameworthy intent, and a detailed view of Maori culture as non-viable in the modern context. Consideration of the function of such resources suggests that they operate at the level of a kind of Pakeha commonsense, similar perhaps to what Billig et al (1988) refer to as "lived ideology" and begins to address the issue of their role in a broader ideology of Maori/Pakeha relations in Aotearoa (New Zealand).

Background

The current ideological struggle between Maori and Pakeha arises from an aggressive colonisation by the British, actively opposed by the indigenous Maori of Aotearoa. In 1840, the British Crown signed the Treaty of Waitangi, guaranteeing Maori sovereignty, but armed conflict soon followed as the
colonisers sought to establish substantive sovereignty (Belich, 1986) over the country. A British Act of Parliament established "responsible" settler government without Maori representation in 1852. Despite the guarantees of the Treaty, colonial leaders worked to enhance British antipathy to any form of Maori autonomy. This led to the British invasion of Maori territory south of Auckland in 1863. Unable to inflict any decisive military defeat on the Maori resistance and despite some disastrous losses, the British effectively wore down Maori resources to the point where, for some twenty years, there was little organised Maori opposition. During this phase, we argue, the British attended to the consolidation and expansion of their gains and the active destruction of the Maori economic, social and cultural base. Since that time, Maori have struggled actively and collectively against the colonial state and latterly the pressures of international capital to avert being relegated to the status of second class citizens in their own land. Current social relations between Maori and Pakeha are reflected in a broad array of statistics which see Maori grossly over-represented in the casualty areas of society and markedly absent from indicators of mainstream success. This state of affairs has been part of the impetus powering the efforts of various Maori leaders pushing for recognition of a place for Maori, as Maori, in this country. Since the mid-1970s, such calls have been increasingly expressed in a strong resurgence of interest in and commitment to Maori cultural forms and a general increase in the assertiveness of Maori claims for self-determination under the Treaty. Such challenges have not passed unnoticed by the increasingly, potentially anyway, threatened Pakeha population. Although some minor concessions have been made, nothing of the scale that can begin to address the grievances of over an eighth of the population has been remotely approached. Monetarist experiments conducted on the national economy by the Labour government between 1984 and 1990 have impacted most severely on Maori communities (Kelsey, 1990) further damaging their
economic base and increasing their social disadvantage. The National
government (which replaced Labour in October 1990) was elected promising a
strict monetarism which could well exceed the ardour of its predecessor.

This account of Maori/Pakeha relations in Aotearoa, which we strongly
affirm, stands in sharp contrast to a more widely-held one. The standard
ideology says that Maori/Pakeha relations in New Zealand are the best in the
world, rooted as they are in the honourable adherence to the outcome of a fair
fight. Mutual respect for each other's strengths and tolerance of
idiosyncrasies has integrated the Maori people into a harmonious, egalitarian
relationship with the more recent arrivals; the whole working constructively
for the common good. Such a "story" explains Maori failure as due to their
inability to cope in the modern world due to inherent flaws in their character
or culture. Maori dissent is arguably cast as the work of a tiny minority of
congenital troublemakers who seek to arouse a wider Maori discontent to
further their own political ends. The materials which comprise the data for
this paper are examples of the linguistic resources that arise within and
sustain this ideological account.

The Haka Party Incident

In May 1979 there was a confrontation, now widely referred to as the Haka
Party Incident (Hazelhurst, 1988), between young Maori and Pacific Island
people and students from the Engineering School of the University of
Auckland. The event was heavily covered by the local media as an example
of the new Maori assertiveness and it generated a great deal of discussion and
soul-searching. Shortly after the trial and conviction of a number of the
Maori and Pacific Islanders involved, the Human Rights Commission
launched an investigation of the public sentiment concerning the Haka Party
Incident and race relations in general. In response to widely advertised
notices calling for public submissions, some 350 individuals and groups wrote to the Commission expressing their views; in 1985, we obtained permission to analyse this material for a research project.

As Pakeha New Zealanders, we were primarily interested in Pakeha discourse and our initial task was to sort the Pakeha submissions from the whole. To do this, we read each of the submissions, attending particularly to names, statements and other content that identified the writer's background. On this basis, we gathered a data base of 221 submissions written by individual Pakeha in mid-1979, amounting to some 600 pages in a variety of forms of presentation ranging from scrawled notes to typed dissertations of 20 or more pages. Using our understanding of what Potter and Wetherell (1987) label as discourse analysis, we began to work through the material again, looking for regularity and variation in the way in which the various arguments were made and supported. This manner of working is difficult to describe formally, involving as it does a blend of deliberately subjective and more detached reading. It also requires the analyst to move between micro features of a text - words, punctuation, pauses - and more global aspects such as images, colloquialisms and meaning. An analogy with the kind of active listening practised by skilled therapists is not inapt.

In this paper we introduce two patterns of language, ideas and images widely deployed by writers in our 1979 data base to construct and account for Maori/Pakeha relations. We then examine the relevance and importance of these patterns in the 1988 example of discourse in an attempt to account for its power and success as a communication. In an attempt to provide readers with a critical understanding of our process and in order thus to meet some of the requirements of reflexive practice (Ashmore, 1989; Mulkay, 1985; Potter, 1987), we present some sizeable tracts of text and the detail of our analyses of them.
We begin with a pattern that focuses on the Maori population, dividing it into "good" and "bad" sub-groups using a range of criteria. About one in ten of the writers in our sample have employed this pattern. In spite of this modest level of use, the pattern is of considerable importance and its impact is further enhanced by its deployment in association with the second pattern introduced below. Before attempting an overview of the constituents and functions of this pattern we present two extracts and our analyses of them.

Submission P.I. 62.1

(1) Many old Maori were fine, gentle and dignified people. (2) Most would never accept help unless something was exchanged too—a matter of principle ... (8) To my way of thinking, the Maori that works his land, or timber, or fishing is still a fine dignified citizen. (9) That applies to Pakehas too. (10) Everyone thrives on hard work, but I think that until this social security dole is stopped being handed out there will always be problems with their free time. (11) How can one have Pride and Dignity living on handouts? (12) We New Zealanders used to be so proud of our Maoris. (13) When asked overseas about the Race I used to present such admiration of them. (14) What a happy people they used to be before all this agitation. (15) And what a delightful sense of humour! (16) Now they are becoming unreasonable in their demands for money, for land—what did they give the previous owners of New Zealand, a karate chop!

In this submission the two poles are presented and used to sustain an argument that Maori people do not deserve any special consideration in our society. Good Maori are "fine, gentle and dignified" (sentence 1), principled (sentence 2) and an industrious landed gentry (sentence 8). They are historical figures - "many old Maori" (sentence 1) - whose virtues are still present in "the Maori who works his land, his timber, or fishing ... "
While such Maori must be few, as at least 95% of the land and nearly all the fisheries resources have been alienated to the settlers, they suffice to include some Maori among those who exemplify the Protestant work ethic (sentence 10). Sentence 10, with its contrast between worker and beneficiary, is the fulcrum of the argument and also begins to use the negative view of Maori. We are left in little doubt that it is Maori beneficiaries who have trouble with their free time and who lack pride and "dignity". Sentence 12 returns to the temporal split, setting Pakeha pride in "our Maoris" in the past. Sentence 14 draws on the stirrers pattern described below to explain a change in Maori behaviour. Due to "agitation" they are no longer "happy people" (sentence 14) with a "delightful sense of humour" (sentence 15) but are "unreasonable" and "demanding" (sentence 16). The final part of sentence 16 identifies the Maori as unjust and violent, discrediting their claims for control of resources. It is a reference to one of the widely-held arguments used to undermine Maori claims to this country that Maori are simply second in succession from putative original inhabitants, the Moriori, and are now being displaced in their turn by the Pakeha.

Submission P.I. 55.0-1

(1) My husband and I, both European, have taught many, many Maoris and loved them individually and collectively. (2) We have cleansed their wounds and hugged and kissed them when moved to show our affection. (3) Those country Maoris are lovely people! (4) But - our love for Maoris is lessened when we see and hear Maoris who behave like uncouth animals. (5) They are not only ignoring our culture - they are ignoring their own! (6) Where are the loveable, kindly Maoris who used to play tennis with us - and sing for pleasure?
This text dichotomises Maori into those who interact with Europeans on European terms and those who "ignore" Pakeha culture. Throughout the passage the former are presented in a passive role by the writer, being "taught", "loved", "cleansed", "hugged", "kissed", having no active roles except "playing tennis" with Europeans and "singing for pleasure". The other group, while dealt with briefly, are all action. They "behave like uncouth animals", they "ignore" their benefactors' culture and their own. More importantly, they undermine through their actions the writer's respect for Maori in general. In these two extracts the writers reproduce a catalogue of negative and positive characteristics by which they classify Maori.

In general, Maori who are seen to fit within the mainstream of society and to be contributing to its maintenance and advancement are presented as "good", while those who fail, resist or oppose in any way are seen as "bad". We recognise that these evaluations are not made explicitly but adopt them for the sake of brevity in future reference to the groupings used in Pakeha talk about Maori.

The general failure to identify clearly who is "good" or "bad" lends great flexibility to this pattern. Groups and individuals can be moved in and out of the categories as the communicative goals dictate. In particular this enables speakers to avoid the implication that many Maori are actually opposed to the Pakeha system. Further, the pattern places rigid limits on how the speaker can think about Maori. Because such categorisation does not apply to the population in general, very few would accept such either/or formulations in this context, it just serves to reinforce the separateness and alien status of Maori.

We identify the primary function of this pattern as dividing the Maori population. Identifying some as Good Maori legitimates the question - Why can't all Maori be like this? This formulation facilitates answers that blame Maori for their ascribed badness, absolving the Pakeha-dominated society
from any kind of blame. This "splitting" function also serves to pit Maori against Maori, a valuable way of relieving some of the pressure generated by Maori analyses of Pakeha history and practice (Awatere, 1984; Walker, 1987, 1989).

The second pattern we present is closely related to the first, overlapping to some extent with the Bad Maori category. In this instance, the focus is on those people seen as responsible for disturbing and agitating Maori people concerning their position in New Zealand society. The pattern of ideas built around this notion is employed by one in three of the writers in our data base. As before, we present an extract, our analysis and an overview.

Submission P.I. 58.0

[Q: What do you think caused the Auckland University Haka incident?]  
A: (1) The Maoris are losing their sense of humour. (2) We have had Haka parties at capping day celebrations for years and no-one has worried overmuch about it.

[Q: Do you think people's rights are being ignored or not?]  
A: (3) Yes I do, certain sections of our community expect too much and because of a small vocal group, are getting it.

[Q: Do you think cultural differences are being respected or not?]  
A: (4) Are we talking about the whole of NZ society or just the Maoris and Polynesians? (5) Everyone is falling over backwards to keep these groups happy but nothing is ever said about the Chinese, Dutch, Poles, etc. all of whom go to make up NZ.

[Q: What do you think causes intolerance between races?]  
A: (6) Outside interference mainly. (7) Most of all the Red intellectuals who constantly "stir". make mountains out of molehills and in general take offence when none is intended.

[Q: Does racial intolerance affect you personally and, if so, in what ways?]
A: (8) Yes it does. (9) My kids are now afraid to go to school for fear of incurring the wrath of some Maori child who then retaliates by calling in the "heavies" or should I say the budding thugs still at school. (10) (A child was stabbed at Papakura High School recently because she bumped into a Maori girl)!!!(11) I want freedom to love my neighbours as we used to without being accused of being a white pig.

[Q: Is lack of understanding of cultural differences sometimes seen as illwill or hostility?]

A: (12) I don't really think so. (13) Our young Maoris are being fed a diet of hate for anything white or in authority. (14) This is being excused as lack of understanding of their culture. (15) Rats! When I was a kid the Maoris we knew we loved and respected and they were only too eager to share with us. (16) They helped us to understand their ways and taught us respect for their customs.

[Q: How can feelings of anger be redirected to increase understanding between people?]

A: (17) Get rid of the stirrers and allow our wonderful Maoris to be themselves, dignified, courteous and with a great pride of race. (18) Not the dirty, degraded, dishonest, lazy dole bludgers that our stirrers are turning them into, because they think they are being "got at".

This submission is organised in answer to the questions posed by the Human Rights Commission following the Haka Party Incident (Nairn and McCreanor, 1990) and these have been interpolated, the brackets indicating they were not in the original. The pattern built around the notion of "agitation" appears explicitly in six of the seven answers: Sentences 17 and 18 summarise the main argument very clearly and are presented as the answer to the HRC question as to how better "understanding between people" can be achieved.
Sentence 17 is the core of the pattern; without agitation, here as is commonly the case, identified as the work of stirrers, the Maori people will return to their natural, dignified, courteous selves and race relations will return to the original harmonious state, alluded to in sentences 11, 15 and 16. The Pakeha contribution to race relations is construed as unproblematic since racial harmony can be restored by simply removing the "stirrers" and "allowing" the Maori to change in the prescribed manner. Since the word "stirrers" is frequently used in our data, we refer to this as the stirrers pattern.

Sentence 18 claims that Maori people are being debased and unequivocally blames stirrers for this change. The writer sees these agents as turning a "dignified, courteous" people with "great pride of race" into "dirty, degraded, dishonest, lazy dole bludgers". The accusation is made while simultaneously presenting a strongly negative image of Maori people as a whole. The last part of the sentence, which describes how stirrers work, uses the word "think" to indicate that the writer does not accept that Maori people are being "got at" and hence that Maori people are not justified in believing that they are oppressed. They are misled by the stirrers whose modus operandi is the spreading of such disinformation.

Other elements of the pattern are illustrated in earlier parts of the extract. Sentence 3 responds to the question on rights by claiming it is the rights of the majority that are under threat. A "small vocal group" are succeeding in getting "too much" for "certain sections of our community". Given the tone of sentence 4 it is clear that the privileged section is Maori and Polynesian. In sentence 5, the phrase "nothing is ever said" indicates the bias of the stirrers in that they do not do the same things for all the national groupings in society. Since "Everyone is falling over backwards to keep these (Maori and Polynesian) groups happy ..." there must be a considerable force operating. The threat to which all submit is the violence of Maori "heavies"
"Red intellectuals" have convinced these people that "molehills" are indeed "mountains" (7).

Sentences 6 and 7 identify further characteristics of stirrers. The word "interference" carries strong connotations of being unhelpful, unwelcome and unnecessary. Further, it implies that the situation on which these agents operate is satisfactory to the participants and that outside intervention is not warranted. Stirrers are cast as outsiders who do not have the knowledge or the intimate understanding required for constructive intervention. The final phrase of sentence 7 not only emphasises the inappropriateness of interference implicit in the previous sentence, but also describes an important aspect of how stirrers are said to operate. They over-emphasise the significance of certain events and take "offence where none is intended" to generate conflict where there should be harmony.

Sentences 8-11 encapsulate the perceived change created by the agitation and vividly portray the social forces that are being used to achieve these undesirable ends. There is a pervasive air of persecution for non-offences. In sentence 9 the "heavies" are unjustifiably aroused and the peace disturbed as the subsequent anecdote demonstrates.

In sentence 11 the writer complains that behaviour once regarded as neighbourly love now earns the epithet "white pig". Although there is no indication as to what the behaviour might be, the writer is claiming that stirrers have affected the neighbours to the extent that they now regard the behaviour as offensive. The idea is amplified in sentence 13 where stirrers are those who are indoctrinating Maori youth in racial hatred and contempt for authority.

This analysis shows the characteristics of the group commonly identified as stirrers. As before, the list is not exhaustive but intended to give a feel for the resources offered in the pattern. The key idea is that stirrers disturb an otherwise stable and harmonious situation. Race relations in this
country are seen to have been unproblematic until agitation began a decade or so ago and would return to that satisfactory state if agitation ceased.

Stirrers are identified as misinforming Maori people about their standing in contemporary society. This is seen to involve both telling Maori that they are oppressed and also encouraging undue sensitivity about the Maori cultural heritage. Against those who would criticise or expose their activities stirrers wield a potent weapon; they accuse such opponents of being racist.

Through this pattern, stirrers are portrayed as an extremist minority attempting to manipulate society for their own or political ends. They are seen as unreasonable, unjustified and typically as making trouble where none exists. It is frequently asserted that the stirrers are racist because their advocacy of the Maori cause. Groups of stirrers are widely held to be of left-wing origin and to be inspired, sometimes sustained by foreign agencies and the experiences of minorities abroad. Common among those who are identified as stirrers are Maori leaders and activists, Pakeha liberals, "do gooders", and the intelligentsia.

While various writers identify a diverse collection of agents as stirrers, the single largest group of submissions refer to stirrers and blame them for the perceived deterioration in race relations without any attempt to identify who they are. This allows a larger than life character to these troublemakers, a small group who manage to disrupt the ways of a whole country. Accusations that could not be substantiated for an identified individual or group can easily be sustained for these anonymous stirrers.

The most important work of this pattern is to marginalise stirrers and so declare their claims to be unworthy of consideration. By defining them as a minority that is extreme in its views and of questionable mental status, their actions and arguments can be dismissed from serious consideration in any reasonable discussion of social issues. In practice, the label itself carries sufficient of this load to achieve the desired end.
A second important function of the pattern is to allocate blame for the deteriorating state of race relations to stirrers. Such unequivocal blaming allows the writer to solve the problem presented by perceived worsening of relations without considering the possibility that many Maori are genuinely disadvantaged, ensuring that Pakeha social institutions and practices are not scrutinised.

Closely related to this is an effective discounting of problems in Maori/Pakeha relations. The contemporary unrest is portrayed as an unpleasant aberration in an otherwise harmonious history. The present malaise is superficial, too much is made of minor incidents, but the heart would beat as sound as ever, if the stirrers could be dissuaded from their destructive path.

Finally, the pattern presents a particular image of the Maori people. Given that the stirrers operate in a setting which is essentially harmonious, and that harmony would be restored if their activities were stopped, it follows that the ordinary Maori people are largely content with their lot. Maori people are represented as a passive, unperceptive group who are gullible enough to be used by the agitators for their own ends. In particular, young Maori are presented as puppets of these undesirables.

The patterns described above appear in discourse produced in 1979. One of our primary concerns with these findings is to test their relevance in the contemporary context. Are they specific to their time and of limited historical interest, or are they part of more flexible and long-lived patterns of language use? If the latter, can we identify variations in the way they are deployed and their functions in contemporary discourse. Approaching these questions we began, in 1988, to analyse public discourse on race relations; articles in newspapers and popular magazines, politicians' speeches, reports from institutions. In almost all such discourse we found that patterns similar to those identified in the 1979 submissions were widely employed.
In this section of the paper, we present an example of such discourse that, in our analysis, is substantially built upon versions of the two patterns described above. The article in question was written by a local business leader, Sir Robert Jones, for the "Opinion" section of the February 1988 edition of North and South magazine under the title Straight Talking About the Race Crisis. Limitations of space prevent consideration of the whole essay and we have restricted ourselves to the first 1,000 odd words which are reproduced, numbered by sentence, but otherwise unaltered (see appendix 2). Within the larger article, the role of this introductory section is to establish Jones' authority and to render ineffectual, alternative - and particularly pro-Maori - views of race relations in Aotearoa. Later sections of the piece elaborate and consolidate these manoeuvres before the author sets down his solution for how society should deal with the "crisis".

The article opens with the prediction that Waitangi Day, the anniversary of the signing of the Treaty of Waitangi by Maori and the British Crown in 1840 will be another "setback" for race relations. The phrase "fast fading harmonious race relations" sets the scene for the deployment of further aspects of the stirrers pattern. Although they are not named as "stirrers", Maori protesters (sentence 2) are portrayed very much in terms of the pattern we described above; aggressive, violent and out of control "screaming hatred". The "sycophantic fellow travellers", presumably non-Maori, contribute to the destruction of the harmony that used to exist.

The phrase "Maori malcontents" (sentence 4) presents the key idea that such agents disturb an otherwise harmonious situation; malcontents will make trouble in any situation.

(4) Because right now if I am any judge, most New Zealanders (and I include an enormous number of Maoris in that category) have had an absolute gutsful of the one-way racist shouting and insults from a bunch
of parasitical, snouts-deep-in-the-public-trough Maori malcontents, adept only at using the system, public money and the media to further their racist whining and abuse.

The use of the word "racist" to describe political actions that follow racial divisions is familiar from the 1979 data. Phrases such as "racist shouting and insults", "racist whining and abuse" reproduce the idea of the aggressiveness of stirrers portraying them as ruthlessly using all means at their disposal to further their own political programme. This opening section with its powerful negative images of militant Maori sets the frame for the subsequent dismissal of arguments said to be theirs. This major function of the pattern allows the writer to discredit any voice to which the pattern has been applied, without having to rebut or contest the substance of arguments. Much of the rest of the passage does just that.

Stirrers are depicted within a framework that emphasises their extreme position and their marginal status. Sentences 4 and 6 contrast them with the rest of society which is characterised as "middle New Zealand". Sentences 6, 8 and 10 declare the minority status of Maori and the small numbers involved in Maori activism. In sentence 4, the writer has already claimed "an enormous number of Maoris" for the general population whereas his Maori malcontents are "a bunch", a tiny group within a minority group. Here the writer benefits from the flexibility of the Good Maori/Bad Maori pattern to avoid the conclusion that Maori opposition is very strong.

Having dealt with the stirrers in this way the writer turns his attention toward the rest of the Maori population, drawing extensively on the Bad Maori part of the Good Maori/Bad Maori pattern. Sentences 13-17 describe Maori, by contrast with other groups, in terms of this Bad Maori pattern.
(13) And by and large every group with the exception of Maoris are making it. (14) They are employed, law abiding and in a general sense progressing; each generation doing better than their predecessors and each living fulfilling and happy lives. (15) With the tragic exception of Maoris. (16) Maoris dominate our crime statistics, dominate our prisons, dominate our unemployment sector, dominate our sickness statistics, dominate our welfare dependency categories. (17) Maoris it would seem are in big trouble.

Maori are not fitting into Pakeha society. Specific overlaps with the pattern as described above include unemployment and welfare dependency, criminality and imprisonment. The cited statistics are the logical corollaries and proof of the characteristics that comprise the pattern; violence, dishonesty, aggressiveness, lack of pride and dignity, degradation, poor hygiene and laziness.

Having established the two patterns, Jones now employs them to enhance the impact of subsequent discourse, which is built around an ongoing interplay between them. The next section of text is founded on two rhetorical questions which are posed in the terms of the Bad Maori pattern.

The mocking, bogus answer, is given as if from the pro-Maori or "stirrers" position. In this way, the writer both discredits the pro-Maori arguments by associating them with stirrers and establishes his own essentially unargued assertions in the vacuum so created. This process can be illuminated by a more detailed examination of selected passages.

(18) What sort of people abandon literally thousands of their children to live Calcutta-style in the streets, huddled together in shop doorways, living off scraps and charity?
In sentence 18, the image of Third World children "huddled together in shop doorways living off scraps and charity" is highly charged and can be expected to produce condemnation of those responsible. The accusation simultaneously identifies the latter as Maori and asks what sort of people they are. Links with the denial of alternative explanations (sentence 20) and the earlier demolition of stirrers who promote the discredited views, facilitate the answer - Bad Maori.

(19) What sort of people turn the other cheek when literally thousands of their young men form into gangs to rape and murder and pillage and generally declare war on society?

The same process operates in sentence 19. Here the central image is that crimes of Maori youth amount to declaration of war on society. The New Zealand situation is presented as equivalent to South Africa or Northern Ireland and as of much more concern than if the crimes were seen as unorganised, random events. This renders crime more fearsome, and framing the question in terms of the Bad Maori pattern, again discredits the alternative explanations while reinforcing the dread. The writer's bogus answers to his rhetorical questions feed off the strong negative images of Bad Maori and Stirrers already established to create a mocking incredulity that such proposals could even be entertained, opening the way for the writer to place his own ideas in subsequent sections. Further dismissal of pro-Maori arguments and strengthening of the writer's, again unargued, position is carried by sentences 20 and 21.

Moving between 1979 discourse and this example from 1988, we have demonstrated some durability in the patterns. Work in progress shows similar features for other patterns from 1979. This is not to say that the 1979 patterns are reproduced exactly in the 1988 example, rather that they
are recognisable in form and function. We suggest that the samples draw on a continuing, historical resource of Pakeha commonsense in the matter of Maori/Pakeha relations.

Paradoxically, the clarity of the patterns in the samples is a product of quite different historical contexts. For the 1979 writers the standard story was not in contention. The patterns thus reproduce a kind of dogma into which the tiny number of voices raising difficult alternatives have as yet made no inroads. In this context, the relative certainty of the standard Pakeha ideology demands and finds little of the rhetorical sophistication which has subsequently appeared. The 1988 discourse is set in a markedly changed context. By this stage, the Maori challenge to Pakeha hegemony is clear and is the source of alternatives to the standard story which are so diligently attacked in the 1988 text. Because it is under attack, the standard story is tightened and strengthened and the patterns again, although for different reasons, appear clear. Thus we feel that while the data support the theoretical predictions of variability, we are as well pointing to a constancy of a kind also recognised by other workers (Gilbert and Mulkay, 1984; Potter and Reicher, 1984; Potter and Wetherell, 1988).

Why should the patterns used in this way be so effective? In an earlier paper (Nairn and McCreanor, 1990), we sought to explain such power in terms of what Fish (1980) calls the standard story. This is very similar to the notion of commonsense used by Weedon (1987)

Commonsense consists of a number of social meanings and particular ways of understanding the world which guarantee them. These meanings which inevitably favour the interests of particular social groups become fixed and widely accepted as true ... Its power (that of commonsense) comes from its claim to be natural, obvious and therefore true. (p77)
Both commonsense and the standard story share features with Billig et al's (1988) notion of ideological dilemma. In this formulation, a dilemma is seen to exist as a set of conflicting alternatives within which a discourse can flow and be heard with relative ease, that is, be heard as "natural, obvious and therefore true". Further the patterns we have outlined are inherently dilemmatic. The Good Maori/Bad Maori pattern is most obviously so, the splitting supplying the essential flexibility upon which commonsense so strongly relies. The stirrers pattern is also a division into "us" - the reasonable, and "them" - the troublemakers.

For those wishing to move beyond the alternative provided in these patterns - for example to argue that "stirrers" are in fact thoroughly justified in calling for the redress of Maori grievances - the work required to produce successful communication is vastly increased and the enterprise prone to failure. In this sense an "ideological dilemma" has a strongly normative aspect, a feature shared with both commonsense and the standard story. Belsey (1980) puts it this way

To challenge familiar assumptions and familiar values in a discourse which, in order to be easily readable, is compelled to reproduce these assumptions and values, is an impossibility. New concepts, new theories, necessitate new, unfamiliar and initially difficult discourses. (p45)

This normative feature of such commonsense discourse goes some considerable distance in explaining the power of the 1988 item. Many of the dismissals of pro-Maori positions rely implicitly on commonsense notions. After the extended attack using the rhetorical questions in sentences 18 and 19, Jones concludes "It simply doesn't wash any more ..." (sentence 20). Elsewhere, the same effect is attained by the juxtaposition of his own views with the "racist whining and abuse" of the pro-Maori speakers. In other
examples taken from later in the article, Jones justifies his position as "obvious" and articulates commonsense views such as

[Maori are in prison] specifically for raping, murdering, assault, stealing and other criminal actions ...

If [Maori] are obese it is because they over-eat

[Maori dominate welfare dependency] for lack of will ...

In each of these instances the statements are implicitly coupled with a strong denial of alternative explanations.

We see Jones as an individual who has been thoroughly socialised into the standard Pakeha ideology of Maori/Pakeha relations and as a skilled artisan with its discursive forms. The ideology provides the elements that are deployed in ways familiar and palatable to his Pakeha audience, affirming and sustaining the ideology.

Ideology is not a concept that social psychology treats as being of central importance. While it is evoked in many studies and dealt with as part of the relevant context, few seem to draw upon it as an explanatory framework in the way in that sociologists do. There are some exceptions, Michael Billig being one social psychologist who has devoted considerable energy to the notion of ideology. His early work (Billig, 1978; 1985) is largely descriptive and in one of his latest works (Billig et al, 1988) systematic theorising begins to appear. The basic message is of a large overlap between ideology and thinking; thought is seen as more ideological and ideology more thoughtful than we might expect from reading about either in standard psychology and sociology.
Rather differently, Moscovici and Hewstone (1983) discuss many aspects of ideology within the rubric of social representation which they describe as "the raw material of commonsense ..." (p118), an enveloping social framework.

Every member of a group ... has the groups' representation pressed upon him or her. In this way representations infiltrate to the core of the individual's personality. They restrain one's attitudes and perceptions, and one's attractions or repulsions with regard to objects. (p118)

Except for the emphasis on psychological entities - personality, attitude and perception - this is congruent with sociologist Stuart Hall's (1985) description of ideology

Ideologies are the frameworks of thinking and calculation about the world - the "ideas" which people use to figure out how the social world works, what their place is in it and what they ought to do. (p99)

This points to a constructive relationship between psychology and sociology in which the former produces the detailed understanding of the mechanisms that the latter considers in a more global manner. There is considerable scope for a creative tension at the interface and we see our work as making a contribution to such an understanding. The particular discourses visited, the patterns we abstract from our analyses, and the ways in which they function are a working component of a Pakeha ideology of Maori/Pakeha relations.

Future papers will further explicate that ideology, drawing from the 1979 data base and other current materials, providing a context in which to extend the theoretical work so briefly signalled here.
I was now quite excited by both the responses to the academic articles, which had been published in consecutive issues of the *Journal of Language and Social Psychology*, and to the lay response to the general publication of the material in *Honouring the Treaty*. Together, these reactions felt like some sort of a breakthrough and although the range of data dealt with was small, the success of the "Race Talk" analysis had certainly expanded the investigation beyond its original premises. I was enthusiastic about spreading the range further and keen to locate what I was doing with respect to other local work. At the same time my theoretical reading was taking me in two other directions, namely the role of the media in the reproduction of discourse and ideology and the importance of the issues of reflexivity to the kind of analysis I was using.

I was at this time retained by the Race Relations Office to research and design an archive of all print media coverage of issues of Maori/Pakeha relations that arose in the course of 1990, the sesquicentennial year of the signing of the Treaty of Waitangi. This work prompted an additional interest in the media for me as I liaised with staff over the filing and retrieval system and with the various news monitoring organisations which were contracted to collect the stories.

Maori spokespeople in a range of quarters were quite clear that there would be numerous protests as the tangata whenua reflected on the tribulations of 150 years of dishonouring of the Treaty. When the first story of protest broke weeks before the assumed focus of most activism on the 6th of February, I quickly decided that it would be ideal as data for a short study. I worked on the critical reading style that had evolved in the assay of the Jones article but extended it again, admittedly in a rather tentative way, in the directions suggested by the reading I had done on reflexivity.
The analysis was presented to the Discourse Analysis Symposium at the annual conference of the New Zealand Psychological Society in Christchurch in August of that year, to strong responses - both affirming and critical - from the audience. I was particularly interested in the vehemence of an ex-journalist in defending the original media story as fair and unbiased coverage. Perhaps I was being bloody-minded but it seemed to me that I had hit a raw nerve, so I persisted with refining and had the paper accepted for Sites.
Chapter Three

Mimiwhangata: Media Reliance on Pakeha Commonsense in Interpretations of Maori Actions.¹

Abstract

This paper makes a discourse analytic appraisal of newspaper coverage of the events surrounding a Maori protest at Mimiwhangata Lodge, a Department of Conservation property in Tai Tokerau (Northland). The analysis is set in a brief commentary on the trends in recent attempts at evaluation of racism in the New Zealand media. From here it launches a reflexive style of analysis which draws upon the author's knowledge of regularities and patterns in Pakeha discourse of Maori /Pakeha relations and my own subjectivity. This work lays the foundation for a commentary on the role of the media and of audience ideologies in the reproduction of racism in Aotearoa.

Introduction

A number of local publications have recently dealt with the role of the media in constructing or otherwise determining aspects of social reality in this country (Bell, 1991; Hirsch & Spoonley, 1989; McGregor, 1991). Such work is congruent with major international studies including those of Gans (1978), Hartman and Husband, (1974) and van Dijk (1985) which share a basic constructionist view of the media. My own work, which is focused specifically on the language Pakeha people use to talk about Maori/Pakeha relations (McCreanor, 1989; Nairn & McCreanor, 1990, 1991), has recently been

¹ A version of this paper appeared in Sites, 26, 79-90.
redirected to look at the way in which such language works on and in the print media in Aotearoa. This shift arises partly from a discontent with some contributions to the Hirsch and Spoonley edition which for me fails to get down on the basic issue of how the media produces the biased effects that are so easily and frequently observed.

In brief this paper will suggest that a helpful and refreshing approach to the general issue of the role of the media (and other communication systems) in the establishment and maintenance of social and political forms is to be found in studies of discourse arising within social psychology and the focus that such work brings to the study of ideology. In this regard I was greatly interested in a recent article by Cochrane (1990), in which she notes

"a desperate need to examine in detail, in the New Zealand context, the factors which influence the reporting of Maori issues and the effects of such reporting on the public." (p25)

Cochane's paper focuses attention on a "multiplicity of factors" which affect the impact of media activities and produces some helpful quantitative data to the effect that negative aspects of the "Maori presence" (crime, illness, welfare dependence, etc) are over-represented, while other aspects of the topic (culture, housing, education, etc) are under-represented. However, elsewhere the work confounds a reductionist, quantitative methodology with a social constructionist theoretical position, so that although she includes theoretical statements such as

"the media draw upon the most broadly held common social values and assumptions ... [rather] ... than simply reflect and describe significant events." (p5)
"It would seem that the significance of an article ultimately comes down to the interpretation of the reader, who may adapt and translate it according to preconceived attitudes or ideas." (p19)

Cochrane is positioned by the theoretical underpinnings of content analysis, into a quantitative research frame. In practice she makes a series of analyses, particularly of newspaper headlines, which are then presented, in contradiction to her given theoretical stand, as if they were authoritative, objective interpretations. Re-analysis of one of her examples illustrates the problem of attempting to use such analyses to draw the kinds of conclusions she does about the media bias in the reporting of Maori issues.

As part of the examination of the proposition, "the media provide sensational and exaggerated headlines" (p13), Cochrane adopts a procedure by which a considerable sample of headlines relating to Maori issues, drawn from two daily papers, are rated "positive", "negative" or "neutral". This is illustrated with several examples of the evaluation process including the headline

"SHIRLEY PLAN MAY HALT COURT CASE" (p13)

This is rated "negative" with the given explanation that the word "Halt" "represents an obstacle". My reading of this interpretation is that it assumes the "court case" is a good thing so that the disruption is a bad thing. The headline refers to attempts by the then Minister of Fisheries Ken Shirley to solve aspects of the Muriwhenua claim to the Waitangi Tribunal, relating to Individually Transferable Quota of fish stocks. The Government sought to sell these ITQs on the open market and Muriwhenua had taken legal action
against it. Given this background (itself a reading) multiple interpretations of the headline are possible. For example if Muriwhenua are bringing a potentially damaging action against the Crown, then stopping the action can be seen as a positive thing by a reader supportive of the Government of the day. In another vein, a reader opposed to that Government might be even more adamantly opposed to making any concessions to Maori and therefore be pleased that their plans might be disrupted. A further interpretation might see the actions of the Minister as frustrating Maori ambitions in a way which heightens their sense of injustice and spurs them to a liberating uprising. It can also be noted that multiple interpretations which might concur with Cochrane's chosen evaluation, but for different reasons, can be accessed. For example the "Shirley Plan" might be considered an undesirable compromise with undeserving claimants; halting the case may be seen as a bad thing if the reader believes Maori would have lost it. A final point to note is that most of these positions are not unequivocal and contain their own contradictions. The reader who in my first instance for example wanted to save the Government the embarrassment of a court case may nevertheless see the politicians trapped against unsympathetic public opinion arising from perceptions of the special deal of the "Shirley Plan".

Background

The analyses of this headline are presented not as a critique of Cochrane per se (despite their relevance to the conclusions her study draws about media bias on the topic) but rather to introduce and illustrate the complexity, variability and contextuality (especially in relation to the readers contribution) of interpreting text. My claim is that the multiple interpretations are not merely an "interesting" intellectual exercise, but a strong reflection on the dependence of print media stories on the linguistic
resources its readership brings to any given item in achieving particular interpretations of events. This suggestion calls for some exposition of my theoretical, political and practical orientation.

The notion that there is "dependence" between media and audience for me derives from discourse theory and studies of ideology; the idea that the media might be "achieving" interpretative directions also assumes that political and ideological forces are at work. For a number of years now Ray Nairn and I have been working on the way in which a discourse of Maori/Pakeha relations is constituted and maintained to preserve the established social order. Some aspects of the Pakeha system such as the physical force of the police and the military and the effects of institutional racism, need little introduction. Less obvious perhaps is the contribution of ideology and in particular the role of language in the routine, hour-by-hour sustaining of the existing oppressive social relations between Maori and Pakeha. Yet as Wetherell and Potter (1992) point out such talk is demonstrably material in its effects; it is a crucial path by which Pakeha construct, interpret and so enact these social relations.

In practical terms the most powerful influences on what I do, have been the discourse analytic works of Potter and Wetherell (1987), Billig (1987), Billig et al (1988) and Reicher (eg, 1984). Developing ideas advanced within social psychology by Moscovici (1981) such work, rather than seeing language as an unproblematic resource in the study of more important "psychological" issues, treats it as a topic in its own right and seeks to study it as a potent force shaping and even determining our interpretation and understanding of our social and indeed our physical worlds.

In placing language in centre stage, discourse analysis has been able to investigate variation as well as regularity in peoples talk. One broad finding is that speakers tailor their delivery to the particular audience to hand, juggling the resources available to them on a subject in order to optimise their
chances of communicating successfully or persuasively. Another key idea is that various renditions of particular topics are more easily accepted and therefore more successfully communicated than others. Such material is the basis of commonsense or what Billig et al (1988) have called "lived ideology" - not the masterplan of the powerful elite, but the commonplaces by which large sectors of the population interpret and make sense of their daily experiences.

Discourse analytic theory (Potter & Wetherell, 1987) suggests that among the variables in context are included what have been termed the linguistic resources, which are conceived of as general patterns of ideas, images and language derived from a person's direct and indirect experiences. More recent work (Nairn & McCreanor, 1991; Wetherell & Potter, 1992) raises and elaborates the linkage between such resources and an overarching ideology. Following Billig et al (1988) such resources can be expected to embody inherently contradictory positions on any given issue, thus preserving to the reader the greatest possible flexibility, in the interpretation of diverse experiences.

It was against this kind of background that our first efforts in the field were set. We began work on the submissions written by Pakeha to the Human Rights Commission in 1979 following the Haka Party Incident at Auckland University. This confrontation between Maori and Pakeha youth received wide media coverage and public attention and the 220 contributions from individual Pakeha ran to some 600 pages. On this data-base we used and refined the craft-reading process outlined by Potter and Wetherell (1987) which entails examining texts in detail for the particularities as well as the commonalities and regularities with which language, ideas and images are used to argue various points in debating the significance of the Haka Party Incident or the state of Maori/Pakeha relations in general.
I want to introduce very brief sketches of some of the widely used patterns which we read from this project and then to examine the use of a few of these in relation to a newspaper article as an illustration of their variability or flexibility in use.

1. MAORI CULTURE. Maori culture is fundamentally inferior to the mainstream culture of the country. This view is commonly justified by comparing the material culture of European societies with that of pre-European Maori society. This comparison is then generalised to encompass other aspects of Maori culture such as language, religion, commerce, political organisation and so on, as "primitive", simple or "backward".

Thus Maori culture is of little value and cannot compete in the modern world. It is dependent upon Pakeha for support and survival. To prove the worth of their system, Maori are challenged to live without the advantages of Pakeha culture. They must give up their motorcars, television sets and refrigerators and return to "grass skirts and mud huts".

2. GOOD MAORI/BAD MAORI. Maori fall into two groups, those who fit into Pakeha society and those who do not. Good Maori are often historical figures, living in rural areas as quietly successful farmers or entrepreneurs. They are polite, dignified, passive and contribute unobtrusively to the welfare of their own and the broader society.

Bad Maori are a contemporary development, arising out of identification with Black militant organisations abroad and the work of local agitators. They are young, demanding and aggressive and disrupt the harmonious relations that otherwise pertain between Maori and Pakeha. Alternatively they are disproportionately represented in the casualty areas of society in health, education, welfare and poverty through their own shortcomings and as such are an unwelcome drain upon the taxpayer.
3. **MAORI VIOLENCE.** Violence is an essential part of the Maori character reflecting their recent emergence from the primitive savage state of their pre-European existence. Maori (men especially) seek and enjoy violence.

4. **MAORI INHERITANCE.** There are very few "real" Maori left. Most part-Maori are more something else. Many people who identify as Maori do so only in order to claim the unfair privileges which Maori enjoy.

5. **PRIVILEGE.** Maori have special privileges in our society. They have rights over and above those of the rest of the population. These include the Maori seats in parliament, the Maori Affairs Department, Maori housing loans, Maori sports teams, education allowances, fishing rights and other advantages. All of these are construed as unfair, racist and akin to apartheid.

6. **ONE PEOPLE.** We are all New Zealanders, Kiwis. Unless we move beyond racial difference and unite under our national identity, the tension will continue to undermine our country. Ideas of biculturalism and multiculturalism must be rejected except as a way of enriching the mainstream culture with a touch of the exotic.

7. **STIRRERS.** If only the (Maori) agitators would stop stirring up trouble where none actually exists, race relations in New Zealand would be the "best-in-the-world" once more. The activists are presented as malcontents who will never be happy unless they are making trouble. They operate by misleading segments of the Maori community into believing that they are unjustly treated by Pakeha. The activists are vocal, aggressive, separatist and racist; there is a considerable overlap between this groups and "bad Maori".

8. **RIGHTS.** Equal rights for all is a democratic cornerstone of our society. One person's rights end where the next person's begin. Privilege is anathema.

9. **SENSITIVITY.** Racial tension arises from the over-sensitivity of Maori to the importance of their culture and of their position in the mainstream. A common expression of this idea is that Maori have "lost their sense of
humour" in this regard and need to rethink their role in society as equal rather than privileged members.

10. IGNORANCE. Where Pakeha do offend Maori they do so out of ignorance rather than intent. This notion serves to excuse Pakeha transgressions and to shift the blame for such incidents to Maori who have failed educate Pakeha as to the niceties of the Maori way.

These scant outlines give little indication of the scope or function of the various patterns. Each can be deployed alone or in concert or contrast to other patterns. Each can be evoked by a few words and yet has plenty of room for qualification, explanation or justification. When the detail is filled in they are close to Moscovici's (1981) idea of social representation. Together they represent a considerable proportion of the linguistic resources available to those who wish to counter challenges from Maori or others, concerning the state of Maori/Pakeha relations. The list is by no means exhaustive and other patterns such as those relating to the Moriori and more recently the Treaty of Waitangi, are probably familiar to most.

These resources can be used to tell what Fish (1980) has referred to as a standard story, a common, sensible-to-most, account of, in this instance, Maori/Pakeha relations. These positive characteristics of such stories are highlighted in relief as it were, in the consideration of the hard psychological work required to either hear or speak alternative stories; and even when a speaker makes such an effort there is still a high risk that the message will not be accepted by the audience.

Analysis

To illustrate this way of working with media stories, I have chosen a single story drawn from an archive of all media publications on race relations,
collected by the Race Relations Office for the duration of 1990. The particular article is one from the entire coverage (some 70 items from news reports, editorials and letters to the editor) evoked by events at Mimiwhangata Lodge, north of Whangarei, in mid-January of that year. This item was published by the Evening Post of Wellington (see appendix 2) and I have chosen it because it is at once representative and idiosyncratic in relation to versions of the incident carried by other papers and illustrates the importance of some of the Pakeha linguistic resource patterns in the telling its story. I will not be trying to argue that these are the only elements at work; we will encounter others and different tricks of the wordsmith's trade. My reading is intended as a device to highlight aspects of the original text and the resources I draw upon in making my interpretation, rather than as an authoritative deconstruction. (I have numbered each sentence for ease of reference.)

1990 was the year of the sesquicentennial of the signing of the Treaty of Waitangi. Maori groups had promised that the celebrations would be the focus of major protests. The story broke on the 15th of January; was this the start of the big push? The headline sets up an immediate opposition between Maori and Pakeha.

(1) MAORI ACTIVISTS TAKE OVER LODGE

The term "Maori Activists" creates the expectation that the Maori involved will do something assertive and contentious. True to form the action is to "Take Over" with its implicit notions of use of physical assertion or even force, so my expectations are fulfilled and I can access a series of almost graphic images of demonstrations or protests complete with banners, staunch Maori people and grievance strong in the air. At the same time I have a catalogue of known "activists" that I can call up and associate with
this particular protest, beginning perhaps to imagine what they would do or say in this instance. The term "Maori activist" is a common variation on the "Stirrers" pattern referred to above and the kinds of material I have listed as flowing from the use of the term in the headline are common in talk centred on the pattern.

The word "Lodge" for me calls up a different set of associations and my first thought is of the recreational accommodation of some European aristocracy. The "Maori activists" are thus targeting a prestigious symbol from within my cultural realm. At this stage I do not know that the formal name of the building under protest is Mimiwhangata Lodge, and even when I do the double life of the headline does not diminish the initial impact because the actual name is also strongly evocative of prestige and privilege; wider still my reading indicates that Mimiwhangata Lodge is highly sought-after, quality, public rental accommodation operated by the Department of Conservation in a coastal park, and a name like Mimiwhangata Motel despite the appealing alliteration, somehow just lacks that elite edge.

The point that at this stage there is no indication as to what the protest is about reinforces a general expectation in the "Stirrers" pattern that even if there is no particularly pressing cause, Maori activists will make a fuss for political gain. Indeed there is a common view that most of the grievances are recent but popular innovations derived from a particular but erroneous reading of history.

Another point is that the headline is unattributed in terms of who is speaking and although it is almost certainly a sub-editor's gloss on the story, its anonymity has the interesting effect of making it appear as a simple statement of the facts of the matter. Not only is there no clearly interested party pushing a particular line, but the underpinning claim to objectivity and neutrality on the part of the media is widely known and as such plays an important role in the acceptance of the validity of the headline in ordinary
reading. The analysis to this point challenges those assumptions by demonstrating the different loadings carried by the words of the headline and by drawing attention to the issue of “voice” and the impact of the treatment of various speakers on the interpretation of the story.

The lead paragraph supports the general thrust of the interpretation so far providing various developments of the highly coded forms of the headline.

(2) Maori protesters have taken over a luxury lodge north of Whangarei, saying they will stay there until the Conservation Department agrees to return land to Ngati-wai people.

The Maori have become "protesters" which seems to be something of a softening compared to the tone established in the initial use of the word "activists"; protest is part of the legitimate rights of the people of democratic societies, whereas activism is somehow outside of the establishment, deliberately breaking rules to highlight issues, perhaps even akin to terrorism. Never-the-less "protesters" are a nuisance and the term is frequently used as part of the "Stirrers" pattern.

The target of the action has now become a "luxury" lodge confirming the opposition set up in the headline, but the conflict is now portrayed as being between the protesters and the Department of Conservation. The first intimation of the reason for the action is given and belongs firmly within my expectations of "Maori Activists"; intransigent until demands are met, grievances often focused on land. While direct quotation is not employed in this sentence, the use of the word "saying" indicates that the call to "return land" comes from the protest group and is their chosen wording. The issue of the nature of the groups’ demand is reiterated a number of times through-out the passage and evolves steadily in the process.
(3) Protest leader Howard Reti said today the group of seven young Ngati-wai planned to stay at the Mimiwhangata lodge indefinitely.

The name "Howard Reti" does not appear in my list of "Stirrers", so the "leader" is not one of the big names and his followers - "young", a "group" - do not quite fit with that image created in the headline, offering a partial explanation of the softening of the terminology in the lead paragraph. The phrase "the group of seven young Ngati-wai" helps nevertheless to create an image of unknown, unpredictable character for the protesters; this arises partly in the use of the tribal name which is unfamiliar and partly their anonymous uniformity. The Maori spokesperson is permitted to speak and what he says at least as reported indirectly, dovetails with the "Stirrers" pattern, with the expectations from the headline; open defiance of the laws of ownership. And the use of the word "indefinitely" underscores the tone; the protesters will not leave voluntarily unless their demands are met.

The next sentence begins to provide crucial elaboration of the situation.

(4) The group was frustrated at the time it took to win Maori land back from the Crown and wanted clear signs that the department was willing to discuss the return of the 3194 ha Mimiwhangata Coastal Park.

While this passage is unattributed, I read it as the journalistic overview of the situation. We do not know exactly what the protesters said but by focusing on the "time it took" to achieve action, attention is diverted from the fact that Maori land is rarely if ever returned by the Crown to its owners. At the same time, focusing on the emotions surrounding the delay constructs the protesters as impatient, possibly even impulsive; again these are hallmarks of the "Stirrers" pattern. Contextualising the protest as between Maori and
Crown, hints at undercurrents of contested sovereignty and highlights the seriousness of the issue. Detailing the precise area of the land under protest at once emphasises the seriousness of the claim and trivialises the frustration; it is a large area and any decision cannot be rushed just because people are upset.

Because this sentence is unattributed, I cannot be certain as to who is responsible for the variation of the protesters' requests, but the call for "clear signs" that authorities are "willing to discuss" represents a major change from the way in which I have read the Maori position so far. This shift is the first of several which, by means of an interplay between direct and indirect reportage, have the effect of obscuring the purpose of the protest to the extent of producing an overall impression that the people involved are self-contradictory and unsure of what they are actually doing.

Sentence 5 re-emphasises the opposition set at the start.

(5) The protest group took over the lodge during the weekend, arriving at the same time as a family that had booked the lodge for a long-planned holiday.

It is not stated that the "family" referred to is Pakeha, but my expectations that this is the case are enhanced on being told that their holiday is "long-planned" and "booked". Such characteristics are a strong part of my cultural base and I am immediately on defence when they are attacked or threatened. My sympathies are thus further recruited in support of the displaced family and against the Maori group. In addition here, the fact that this family has been physically displaced by the actions and presence of the protesters, along with the repetition of the phrase "took over", reinforces the initial impressions established at the beginning of the article. A further boost is taken from the injustice of imposing political posturing on the leisure time of others; the
phrase - “keep politics out of sport” - long applied to the issue of sporting contacts with South Africa, resonates here.

The next two sentences work together to produce a striking rhetorical effect.

(6) The Wilson family had been invited to stay on at the lodge with the group, and was offered the home of group members as alternative accommodation, Mr Reti said. (7) The family declined and returned to Auckland.

In the first, an apparent conflict arises between the gestures from Mr Reti and his role as an "activist". The offers of sharing the lodge or using group members accommodation don't fit with the stroppy, hard-nosed image of the group used at the outset. The next sentence quickly dispels the confusion by leaving the question hanging - “why did the family decline?” My cultural capital has no difficulty in providing scenarios of the unsuitability of the "activists" as fellow holiday-makers or of their tacky, sub-standard dwellings (complete with relatives?) as alternatives to the "luxury Lodge". In this manoeuvre the report at once gains an impression of even-handedness by juxtaposing the spokesperson's apparently reasonable statement with the unattributed rhetorical insertion in the neutral tone of the media, in a way which obscures or discredits the intent of the speaker. In this way the apparent contradiction between Mr Reti's stand and his role of "Maori Activist" is reduced and the flow of the story is maintained.

(8) Mr Reti said Ngati-wai people had been researching the land's history for a Waitangi Tribunal claim but the process was time-consuming and costly. (9) The land was precious to Ngati-wai he said.
Mr Reti speaks again, complaining that the process of taking a claim to the Waitangi Tribunal is "time consuming and costly". By now my sympathies are running firmly against him and my ready retort is that I should bloody well think any process that might result in the obtaining of more than 12,000 acres of paradise should be "time consuming and costly". The issue of claims and grievances and the existence of the separate court the Waitangi Tribunal to consider them also keys the privilege pattern. In an egalitarian and democratic society, the world of the level playing field, why is it that Maori have these special arrangements, funded with taxpayer's money, to look after their interests? This is an ongoing source of resentment and to have the spokesperson complain about the demands this system places on Maori rubs more salt in the wound.

And sentence 9, another of the short rhetorical devices like the one examined above, reinforces this line, with me fuming - "but if the land is so precious to you, you've got to expect to sweat for it...or are you another one of these Maoris trying to get something for nothing...?" My expectations about Maori and bad Maori in particular are easily accessed.

The first sentence of the next paragraph continues the process of clouding the Maori intent in the protest.

(10) The purpose of the protest was to draw attention to the issue. (11) Mr Reti said he hoped kaumatua would support the young people's stand.

We have shifted from a demand for the return of land, through to a call for discussion, finally to making the protest simply draw attention to the issue. The sentence 11 seems to put an end to any credibility Mr Reti might have had. After all even I have enough knowledge of Maori culture to know that proper Maori, good Maori don't even breathe without consulting their
kaumatua. This trouble-maker has not taken this basic step and has thus blown it in both Pakeha and Maori terms.

Discussion

The rest of the passage could be similarly dealt with but I do not have the space and the case can be argued on what we have. The remainder of the text is given over to a Department of Conservation spokesperson who effectively reinforces the established view of the inappropriateness of the Maori action and seeks its end, and further comments which discredit Mr Reti in relation to local kaumatua.

This news story is structured around an opposition between Maori and Pakeha which is to a large extent built around the two related patterns of "Stirrers" and "Good Maori/Bad Maori". The tension between the protesters and the Department of Conservation, Maori and the Crown, the protesters and the family, is illustrated in each instance by making use of the resources available from the two major patterns and others. The success of the story in reaching a mainstream Pakeha audience is dependant on its ability to resonate with what passes for commonsense in the issue at hand.

Three main points emerge from the analysis presented here. Firstly the reading given relies heavily on my knowledge of a commonsense of Maori/Pakeha relations and in particular on those resources which lend themselves to strongly negative constructions of Maori dissent from the status quo and protest on specific points of grievance. I feel that the strength of this claim can be illustrated in a brief consideration of the impact of alternative constructions of the event which could account for the "facts" and yet support a completely different interpretation of them. If for example we consider how the headline might have been written from other perspectives we might generate something like
HOLIDAY WRECKS PARK PROTEST

or more accessibly

LAND GRIEVANCE SPARKS PROTEST

With energy, commitment and understanding a reporter could easily develop this latter example into a coherent and readable account of the events at Mimiwhangata. The problem with all of these alternatives is that they would be unacceptable to the vast mass of the readership as a result of the pervasive ideology of Maori/Pakeha relations and thus politically and commercially threatening to the newspaper involved.

A second issue is the way in which the story evolves from the crisp, alarming images of the headline to a far more low key, puzzling event as the detail is added in. In part these changes can be tracked through the presentation of the aims of the protest, which as I have noted in the analysis, evolve steadily from apparently clearcut radical demands to an almost contradictory stance which seeks only to draw attention to the issue. One of the important achievements of this process is that despite drawing heavily on the words at least indirectly reported, of a Maori spokesperson, the item renders incomprehensible or at least inadequate, the Maori explanation of what was going on. The other part of this dynamic is that the media explanation of what is going on is steadily strengthened as the Maori version is obscured.

Thus the nett effect is to marginalise the protest as being improper according to various standards including Maori ones and Pakeha notions of "fair play". Whether they were raised by the spokesperson in this interview we may never know but questions of sovereignty, of justice and history can't
compete in such a setting and where they are spoken of by Mr Reti in other reports, they serve only to enhance the air of unreality.

Finally, I have no difficulty in agreeing with and extending Cochrane's proposition that headlines exaggerate events and think that I can go beyond the usual explanation - bad news is good news for the media - to suggest some of the reasons for this. While it is widely understood that much of the reading of newspapers rarely progresses beyond the headlines, the implication of this is that the media in their ideological role have therefore to a considerable extent to do their work within the space of a few words. That is they are often required to tell their story in the fleeting moment as the eye passes over the page amid other tasks and activities and must draw on the commonsense ideologies to do this or risk confusion or rejection. Beyond the issue of fundamental ambiguity, I would suggest that this is a factor in the richness which emerges from the analysis of headlines when deconstructed. Each word is like code for a raft of ideas, images and associations by which the interpretation is mediated and the combined effect of the elements builds an impression which can both compliment or stand instead of the story as a whole.

Conclusion

The sociologist Stuart Hall (1985) has posed the question as to how it is that ideology is reproduced in society without the direct intervention of the state. Speaking specifically of the media he notes

"...we cannot adequately explain the structured biases of the media in terms of their being instructed by the state what to print...how is it that such large numbers of journalists...tend to reproduce, again and again,
accounts constructed within fundamentally the same ideological categories." (p111)

On the basis of the work described here I suggest that a partial answer lies in the idea that media stories both construct and are constructed by those commonsense ideological patterns and associations shared by their audience. The patterns act as boundaries or fields within which the commonsense of a social group can flow with ease and beyond which a speaker's discourse can be expected to meet with hostility or incomprehension. It is the reliance of media accounts and other discourse on the kinds of pattern described here which ensures the reproduction of our social order without recourse to an ideological police force.
The next paper moves the issues of reflexivity first worked upon in Chapter Three into focus in order to foreground and investigate the role of the reader/listener in the interpretation of text. As before the source of data was a single newspaper item, chosen deliberately for its apparent rhetorical inaccessibility.

Although the work was grounded in an awareness of the patterns that resource the standard story of Maori/Pakeha relations, my subjectivity as reader was also a vital component of the analysis. Through this device the investigation tapped into two discourses aside from the standard version, again extending the scope of the techniques I was developing. The paper was entirely experimental, but was invited for inclusion in the Racism and Discrimination Symposium of the Fourth International Conference on Language and Social Psychology, at Santa Barbara in 1991. It was accepted by Symposium convenor, Professor Ruth Wodak of the Institut fur Sprachwissenschaft at the University of Vienna, and subsequently recommended by her to Folia Linguistica where it was published in 1994.
Chapter Four

Pakeha Ideology of Maori Performance: A Discourse Analytic Approach to the Construction of Educational Failure in Aotearoa/New Zealand.¹

Abstract

Findings from a discourse analytic appraisal of the linguistic resources of Pakeha (that is of European descent) New Zealanders are used along with the author's in-group knowledge of ideologies of Maori/Pakeha relations to deconstruct a media story about Maori educational performance. The process highlights not only the resources base for the maintenance of an ideology of oppression but brings the forward the challenge of subjectivity or reflexivity for workers in the field of discourse analysis.

Introduction

As a Pakeha New Zealander, I have been using a discourse analytic approach to investigate Pakeha forms in the language of Maori/Pakeha relations in Aotearoa/New Zealand. I view our society as a post-colonial structure imposed on the indigenous Maori culture, which leaves the Maori people a dispossessed and marginalised minority in their homeland. In self-defence, Maoridom is currently undergoing a strong resurgence and issuing powerful challenges to the hegemony and sovereignty of the Pakeha system. This paper draws on material arising from the ongoing ideological struggle between Maori and Pakeha.

¹ A version of this paper appeared in Folia Linguistica, 17, 3-4, 293-314.
Politics in Aotearoa/New Zealand

Our situation arises from an aggressive colonisation process embarked upon by the British about 150 years ago, which has been actively opposed by the indigenous Maori people from the outset. In 1840, after 30 years of sporadic activity by traders and missionaries, the British Crown entered into a formal contract, the Treaty of Waitangi (Adams, 1977), which guaranteed the Maori people their sovereignty in return for a limited right of governance aimed at maintaining order between British citizens and the indigenous Maori. Although a decade of relative calm followed, the desire of the colonisers to establish substantive sovereignty (Belich, 1986) soon led to armed conflict. In contravention of the Treaty, a British act of parliament established "responsible" settler government, without Maori representation, in 1852 (Orange, 1987). Colonial leaders worked to inflame Pakeha antipathy to any form of Maori autonomy and eventually invaded Maori territory south of Auckland in 1863. Although unable to inflict any decisive military defeat on the Maori resistance and despite some disastrous losses, the British army simply wore down Maori resources to the point where, for the next twenty years there was little organised opposition. During this phase the Pakeha attended to the consolidation and expansion of their gains and to the active destruction of the Maori economic, social and cultural base (Walker, 1987). Since that time Maori have struggled actively and collectively against the colonial state, and latterly against the pressures of international capitalism, to avert being relegated to the status of second-class citizens in their own land. Current social relations between Maori and Pakeha are reflected in a broad array of statistics which see Maori grossly over-represented in the casualty areas of society and markedly absent from indicators of mainstream success. This state of affairs has been part of the impetus behind the efforts of Maori leaders pushing for recognition of a place for Maori
sovereignty (Awatere, 1984) in our country. Since the mid-1970's such calls have been increasingly expressed in a strong resurgence of interest in and commitment to Maori cultural forms and a general increase in the assertiveness of claims for Maori self-determination under the Treaty of Waitangi. Such challenges have not passed unnoticed by the increasingly apprehensive Pakeha population and although some minor concessions have been made, nothing of the scale that can begin to address the grievances of the Maori population, has been even remotely approached. Monetarist experiments conducted on the national economy by the Labour government between 1984 and 1990 have impacted most severely on Maori communities (Kelsey, 1990), further damaging their economic base and increasing their social disadvantage. The National government which replaced Labour, is pursuing strict monetarism with even more ardour than it's predecessor.

This account of the situation, which I strongly endorse, contrasts sharply with the version widely held among Pakeha New Zealanders. The standard ideology says that Maori/Pakeha relations are the best in the world, rooted as they are in the honourable adherence to the outcome of a fair fight (the 1860 wars) which has seen the Maori succeeded in their dominance of the country, just as they displaced earlier indigenous inhabitants. The Treaty of Waitangi is seen as a document of historical interest only and is irrelevant to Maori/Pakeha relations in the modern context. Mutual respect for each others strengths and tolerance of idiosyncrasies has integrated the Maori people into a harmonious, egalitarian relationship with the more recent arrivals, the whole working constructively for the common good. This version explains Maori failure as due to their inability to cope in the modern world because of inherent flaws in their character or culture. Maori dissent is cast as the work of a minority of troublemakers who seek to arouse a wider Maori discontent to further their own political ends.
The rendition of the standard story of Maori/Pakeha relations I have given here is something of a caricature in the 1990s; few people would reproduce it in this form which probably dates to the late 1970s. However, rather than extinguishing the racist ideology entailed in this story, the Maori activism of the last fifteen years has served as an evolutionary pressure which has refined and drawn forth new levels of subtlety in the use of this resource, in ways similar to those observed in other contexts and given names such as "modern" or "symbolic" racism (van Dijk, 1984; McConahay & Hough, 1976). A prime example of this process can be given in relation to the Treaty of Waitangi, which in response to political pressure was included as a factor to be taken into account in a range of legislation introduced by the Labour government in the mid-1980's. However the wording of the laws was such that they gave recognition to the "spirit" (a term which Maori themselves had used in this regard) of the Treaty rather than the letter, which then opened up a Pakeha controlled and defined debate (ultimately in the Court of Appeal) as to just what the spirit of the Treaty of Waitangi might be.

Theoretical Background

My theoretical/political position begins as an attempt to understand the significance of the difference between these ideological formulations and their implications. Berger and Luckman (1971) and Gergen (1985) planted seed of the social construction of reality for me. Foucault (1981) points to the constitutive nature of language. Billig (1985) and Seidel (1985) have highlighted the critical role of language in the establishment and maintenance of power relations. Potter and Wetherell (1987), Gilbert and Mulkay (1984) and van Dijk (1988) have melded theory and practice into a workable, systematic approach to understanding ideology in discourse.
Seidel (1985) gives a brief outline of the significance of discourse to the social sciences.

...discourse of any kind ... is a site of struggle. It is a terrain, a dynamic, linguistic, and, above all semantic, space in which social meanings are produced or challenged. (p44)

Further she makes a clear link between discourse and ideology as the frontline force of social control. Her work (eg Seidel, 1988) has focused on social construction of race and gender and draws on text available in the public domain (eg political tracts, parliamentary records) which she uses in large juxtaposed sections which speak for themselves and for which structure and function are foregrounded by the comparison. Analysis turns on broad evaluations of textual expressions of various ideological positions which as she is at pains to point out, are necessarily viewed within a broader ideological structure or "positional politics".

van Dijk (1987a, 1987b, 1989) has developed an almost specialist interest in the role of the media in the reproduction and maintenance of racist practices in European societies. Noting the use of media reference in sourcing and justifying racist talk, van Dijk and his co-workers have studied many aspects of media coverage of racial issues. This work, which draws extensively on other major studies such as that of Gans (1978) and Hartman and Husband (1974), attends to fine detail such as "presentation" (frequency, size, position on page, headline, use of graphics, etc) and also considers the function and impact of "macrostructures" such as themes and topics, roles available and actually allocated to minority group members, and the contexts in which such stories and constructions are to be interpreted. van Dijk evaluates topics both quantitatively and qualitatively. Beyond a basic count of frequency, the interest in topic is refined from the approach taken in
studies such as Hartman and Husband (1974) which divide topics into
general classes. van Dijk looks at what he calls "propositional topics",
developments of the general ideas into expressions specific to the context and
purpose of use. A further focus is the durability of such expressions, the
extent to which they develop over time. He also notes the way in which the
themes build or generalise, eventually comprising a broadly available and
used ideological framework.

In an approach which builds from linguistics, Wodak (1989) analyses
text on four levels, lexical, semantic, syntactic and textual to assess the
meaning and effectiveness of a communication. This is done against a theory
of ideology derived from Manheim and Bourdieu which portrays the citizen as
enmeshed in an all-encompassing ideological structure, akin to what is
elsewhere termed culture, and within which, in spite of a range of alternative
versions, individual choice is foreclosed. Wodak's linguistic, multilevel
approach gives her work both a detailed and a broader contextual base from
which to address the questions of how discourse contributes to the
reproduction of ideology.

My growing interest in the role of ideology, it's constitution and
maintenance in the area of race relations, excited by contributions from Billig
et al (1988), van Dijk (1987c) and Ullah (1989), led me to the research on
which the current paper builds. van Dijk's (1987c) analysis draws attention
to the institutional forces - the mass media, symbolic elites (officials,
politicians, academics, etc) and education - as well as informal channels, such
as interpersonal communication, in the reproduction of racism. In this
country, as with minority/majority relations elsewhere, most of the knowledge
that Pakeha have of Maori is gained via indirect channels, of which the mass
media is one of the most important, especially with respect to the Maori
challenge. Some Pakeha have friendships, neighbourly relations, business or
sports contacts with Maori in which "politics" are, for a variety of reasons,
set aside, but the mass media still exert a powerful influence in the interpretation of even these interactions.

Subjectivity and Discourse

All of these influences have helped stimulate me to shift my attention to the role of the media. In the analyses that follow I use myself/selves to develop alternative readings of a single newspaper story which foreground both the structure of the story and kinds of resources available to me in making sense of the story. Rather than some cyclic return to a Wundtian introspectionism, I see this manoeuvre as an acceptance of the inescapable subjectivity of science. Instead of hiding this characteristic, in the manner of positivist empiricism and its successors, I seek to surface it and where possible to use it. In this venture support is drawn from Hollway's (1989) efforts at theorising subjectivity at once as a topic of study and as a methodological tool and Gavey's (1989, 1990) efforts in the same area. I am encouraged by voices from within social psychology which call for the adoption of new literary forms (Potter and Wetherell, 1987) and those who have begun to use them (Gergen, 1990). In the process I hope to meet some of the challenges of reflexivity raised by the sociology of scientific knowledge (Mulkay, 1985; Ashmore, 1989) and indeed by discourse analysis itself (Potter, 1987).

Consistent with a discourse analytic approach (Potter and Wetherell, 1987), I use a model in which text is taken as a topic of research in its own right rather than a handy resource in pursuit of theoretical constructs. I am also greatly interested in the role of the reader/listener in the construction of meaning and see interpretation as a complex interaction between text and reader/listener. The rhetorical structure of the text is one of the variables and the receiver brings at least two other kinds of input; an ideological or
commonsensical structure with which the new input is in various ways reconciled and a series of strategies for such alignment.

Elements in Pakeha Ideology

In earlier studies (Nairn and McCreanor, 1990; 1991) I begin to describe some of the resources which make up a Pakeha standard story of Maori/Pakeha relations in Aotearoa. This work took as its data base a collection of 220 public submissions written by Pakeha individuals to the Human Rights Commission in 1979, following what is now known as the Haka Party Incident (Hazelhurst, 1989) at the University of Auckland in May of that year. Very briefly this event involved a physical confrontation between a group of young Maori and Pacific Island people and a group of Pakeha engineering students because the latter were practising for the performance of an offensive and mocking form of a traditional Maori haka.2 The incident was widely and sensationally covered in the local media and became a focal point in a national debate about Maori/Pakeha relations.

My earlier research highlights a series of patterns which I present in a sketch outline here to give a feel for some of the resources used in the construction of the standard story. I emphasise that these are the barest outlines and note that several of the patterns form the basis for extended discussions in the papers referred to above.

1. Maori Inheritance: There are very few “real” Maori left. Most are part-Maori who are by definition, more something else.

2. Good Maori/Bad Maori: Maori fall into two groups, those who fit into society and those who don’t.


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2 Traditional Maori demonstration of welcome or defiance.
4. Stirrers: Our race relations would return to their former “best-in-the-world” status if only Maori agitators would stop fomenting trouble.

5. Sensitivity: Maori have become unduly sensitive about their culture and this has led to racial tension.


7. Privilege: Maori have special privileges which are unfair, racist and akin to apartheid.

8. Rights: Equal rights is a democratic corner-stone. Privilege is an anathema.

9. One People: We are all New Zealanders, Kiwis, and should all be treated the same.

These patterns in their flexible, extended form comprise a major part of the linguistic resources available to speakers wishing to deploy a version of the standard story of Maori/Pakeha relations. As well as carrying particular content, a feature is that they function in specific contexts, working in associations with each other and against various alternative interpretations. That is they are used strategically, in a co-ordinated manner to meet the needs of particular situations.

Pakeha Ideology of Maori Education

Among this rather focused group of ideas, a general pattern stands out as a catch-all for a range of common comments that writers make about Maori people and culture.

Maori Culture: Maori culture is fundamentally inferior to that of the Pakeha.
Elsewhere (McCreanor, 1989) I have characterised this pattern thus

Maori culture is inferior to that of the mainstream in this country... (it) cannot compete in the modern world and is dependent on the Pakeha culture for support and survival. (p117)

One aspect of this view is the idea that the only way forward for Maori wishing to escape their cultural shackles is to embrace education. In this section I use some direct quotes from my 1979 data base to illustrate various positions on the issue.

... increased emphasis on education...especially for Maoris, is the only way to break a vicious cycle of stereotyping in the New Zealand community. [PI 95.1]

This notion is very widely used among the submission writers and a very high proportion of them couple the assertion with the observation that Maori do not succeed at education. A small group of writers explain their observation in terms of the shortcomings of the education system and its failure to deliver an appropriate service to Maori.

... consider our schools ... children are channelled into a competitive pass/fail exam system. In [Maori] society the emphasis is on mutual help and group learning. [PI 7.1]

The system is unsuited to the needs and cultural imperatives of Maori and therefore is to blame for failing them. This view is contradicted by a much
more common assessment to the effect that Maori fail in the education system because they are Maori.

(Maori) didn't take to education they took to beer and bingo instead. They should be made to understand that they must make an effort if they want to share the good things from the white man's culture. [PI 57.0]

... for educational advance the home atmosphere is important. ie that books and educational success are encouraged. This has not been a feature of traditional Maori life. [PI 33.0]

The two extracts presented here represent different forms of the same proposition. PI 57.0 focuses on a lack of understanding on the part of Maori people, which at once explains their educational failure and their choice of aspects of "the white man's culture". PI 33.0 on the other hand emphasises the role of the cultural background in supporting educational effort, implying that Maori culture is deficient and blameworthy in this respect.

Together the conflicting views apparent in submission PI 7.1 versus submissions PI 33.0 and 57.0 seem very similar to what Billig et al (1988) refer to as the dilemmatic nature of commonsense. The point is that two apparently contradictory positions - in this instance person-blaming and system-blaming - can be used to account for the same phenomenon in a way which, because they operate under the umbrella assumption that education is progress, as it were, cover the field and in the process effectively block out alternative interpretations of the situation. In Wodak's (1989) formulation, ideological language is seen to

fix empty formulae, catchwords and stereotypes thereby excluding any kind of reflection. In the sub-conscious certain categories then become
established, often without the citizen even knowing what it is "really all about"... (p141)

Billig et al note that such pairs of ideas can, in spite of the contradictions be used in concert in ways which do not necessarily entail the embarrassment of the user. For example, while it is useful to be able to blame Maori children for their educational performance, it may equally be helpful to blame schools or teachers for not educating them properly, in order to criticise the inclusion of Maori in the curriculum. Conversely where Maori do succeed, it is important that credit accrue to the system for such results.

The Subject Reading/Reading the Subject

Potter and Edwards (1990) draw attention to a social psychology of factual discourse that bypasses the whole of attribution theory by questioning that approach on its assumptions about language, specifically in the central issue of distinguishing between fact and inference. Their proposal is that the distinction between fact and inference needs to be regarded as a matter of rhetorical construction in a given context. They claim

The distinction is an artefact of the methods of attribution research and that when we look at attribution in natural contexts it dissolves into a complex web of rhetoric. (p421)

I have deliberately chosen a newspaper article (see appendix 3) which is overwhelmingly "factual" in its content because of the challenge of dealing with such extreme cases. The multiple analyses which follow demonstrate the extent to which even such material is available for rhetorical work on the
part of the reader, to either undermine or strengthen the interpretation drawn from it. A further point is that in spite of my own perception of myself as strongly pro-Maori, I am perfectly capable of producing an apparently satisfying, self-contained version which is strongly contradictory of the views I believe to be my own. To an extent this is reflected in the relative eloquence and depth of the versions, but that is not to say that this is a mere academic exercise. To the contrary, I own, as a part of my cultural capital, all of these stories and make use of them or aspects of them in daily existence. It is true that I would rarely if ever make public use of the first of these which I judge to be "racist". However, as I have noted elsewhere (Nairn and McCreanor, 1991), it requires considerable awareness or psychological effort for me to hear or interpret stories of this kind in ways outside of the commonsense of my culture; it feels "unnatural" to do so and it is certainly orders of magnitude easier for me to hear or reproduce the standard version. In addition, when I am personally involved in strong inter-cultural conflict, the emergence of the standard interpretations of the situation, at least into my mind is practically unstoppable; the best I can manage is to prevent them spilling over into verbalisations.

I pick the morning paper on the morning of 10 May 1990. It has been a bad night with the children and I'm already late for work. By the time I've flashed over the front page of headlines about crime, economic depression and the rescue of someone's pet turtle from a public toilet, I'm really ready for the heavier stuff of page 3 of the local truth....

Timothy 1

Hmm yes that city council deserves everything it gets from the unions for its attempts to balance its books by sacking all its low-paid
workers....What's this, Fishermen Rescued After Dingy Capsize....bet they weren't wearing life-jackets....Maori Pupils Perform Poorly Says Report....well that's right, everyone knows that Maoris aren't keen on school....a third of them held back....and its official, a Stats Department report. Yeah and it sounds like they've been through the works and those kids are failing everywhere....except these language nests whatever they are, some kind of kindergarten I guess....its just baby-sitting anyway....another excuse for their mothers not to take proper responsibility for them....and to get the DPB\(^3\) from my tax money....yeah, we all know they leave school early with nothing to show for it....except this “taha Maori”\(^4\) that the ivory tower wankers at university and training college say is a vital part of their education and self-esteem....a load of crap, what they, what they need is a boot up the backside and forget about this Maori bullshit and get on with being Kiwis, hardworking and determined to pull this country back up to where it used to be, best in the world before stirrers started driving their racist wedges between the two races....we lived in harmony then....they just haven't got it into their heads that you have to work for what you get in this modern world. Well if they are going to these, what are they, these kohangas, at least it shows we can give them things which help them - so much for those screams about everything about the Pakeha way being wrong for Maoris. Mind you, you've got to watch out, it could go like Headstart in the States, millions of dollars down the drain for nothing, if you don't succeed in getting the parents in behind and make the kids do the homework....I mean, they have to provide them with a proper home, a family, the right atmosphere, not overcrowded with relatives and all-night parties and drugs and violence....yeah see, Goff is saying exactly that a bit further down....the

\(^3\) Domestic Purposes Benefit.
\(^4\) Maori culture.
situation's getting worse and worse in spite of all we've done for them. Hell, look at the time, now I'm really late, bloody Maoris ...

Timothy 2

Maori Pupils Perform Poorly Says Report....now there's a racist headline for you....no mention of the schools' performance, you know. But that's where the problem lies, with the school....its the school and the teachers who have the power and the resources....they're therefore in a position to do something about the problem. The sooner they make changes which accommodate the needs of Maori people, the sooner we will start to see improvements in the performance of Maori children....they'll get stuck in, stay at school, get the qualifications....get out there and make it in the world and we'll have another success story on our hands....like we have for the Chinese and the Indians and the Samoans. Education is the key to success and Maoris need it the same as everyone else, its just that they're not getting a fair go the way things are....see look at Kohanga reo, it's working out for them which just proves that its only a matter of tailoring the situation for them....And what's this Statistics Department report. Who wrote it? What questions did it ask?....I mean look at that first paragraph, "nearly one third of Maori boys", what about the girls?....left em out in case they raised the average eh?....and yet the headline says "Maori Pupils", so much for the "facts" .... these numbers....I see that "nearly one third" actually means thirty percent....just a wee slip but somehow a third sounds bigger than thirty percent. Then there's this bit saying the general school population pupils are held back at a rate of between 20 and 25 percent....so....the difference between the withholding rates for Maori and Tauiwi\(^5\) children is between 5 and 10%. So how come

\(^5\) Non-Maori people.
the headline doesn't say "Maori and Tauiwi Pupils". Just another one of those little slips eh? The media really has to take the blame for a lot of the ignorance and negative stereotypes about Maori....how can you expect them to catch up when they're being fed this sort of distortion every time they tune in?....and the racists out there will just love it.

A striking feature of these responses is that, different as they may be, they are both at various levels convinced of the value of education as the way forward for Maori people. In adopting fundamentally opposed rationales for this assumption, the positions are locked together in a self-sustaining system of argumentation. This structure is sufficiently dynamic and internally controversial to distract attention from explanations which lie outside its boundaries. By carrying the liberal, system-blaming version, in which I very easily position myself when confronted by the racist victim-blaming version, the dilemmatic shuts out alternative explanations and leaves me with a self-contained, rhetorically satisfying discourse which does not have irritating loose ends which stimulate me to worry off in search of alternatives. I am reminded of an idea from Lather (1991) about the need to move beyond the dead end of binary oppositions to seek the unheard, the backgrounded alternatives which may offer the chance to break the deadlock, to hear other voices.

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6 Although space prevents my developing these materials at this point, I note that several of the other statistics presented in the newspaper item can be similarly deconstructed to yield similar kinds of conclusions. For example the data on sixth form attendance in the latter part of the article are presented negatively, whereas they could be seen as cause for considerable celebration in that they show a much faster rate of growth than do the non-Maori figures.
Maori Pupils Perform Poorly Says Report. The headline immediately sets up both the context and the tone of the story; its role is to engage and hold the reader and at the same time to convey the essence of the story. Here the caption fits smoothly with the most widely accepted version of the standard story, that is that Maori fail at education. Although the statement of the headline relates to highly specific content, of its very nature it performs a simple generalisation, acting for the many who read no further, as a reinforcer of the standard version. The headline also works on at least two dimensions of contrast; between individual and system and between Maori and non-Maori. This is achieved by means of a foregrounding/backgrounding of particular elements. By focusing on the "performance" of Maori pupils, the question of the roles of the school, the teacher, the administrator and the educational philosophy are obscured; Maori children are positioned as having actively performed poorly, whereas the system is by default left as a passive (innocent?) bystander. The power of this positioning can be demonstrated by observing the impact on meaning of a simple rewriting of the headline in a way which can still account for the facts but relies on different resources to do so.

SCHOOLS PERFORM POORLY FOR MAORI PUPILS SAYS REPORT

Another similar effect is achieved by the focus on Maori pupils; in this sense the headline implies that non-Maori pupils are doing differently than Maori pupils. Whether or not this is the case (and on the basis of the above arguments the least that could be said is that the interpretation is open to debate) is not the point; the issue is the effect that the headline has upon the reader. For this analysis that effect is to again position
Maori as actively responsible for their own failure in contrast to non-Maori who are effectively absolved by their absence and thus implied to be doing well.

A further feature of the headline is the use of the tag "says report" to warrant the main claim. At least two aspects contribute; the format suggests that the main statement is a quote from the report or at least a strong implication from it. The other thing is that the word "report" keys into Pakeha expectations of objectively researched and considered analyses - in short, the truth. Another minor warrant is provided by the use of the NZPA label between the headline and the first paragraph; the story has been through the validation system of the media.

The first or lead paragraph carries a function nearly as vital as that of the headline. It's job is to support the head and to provide a version of the article which at once gives readers enough to go on if they read no further and draws them into reading the rest of the story. It is here that we get an impression of the magnitude of the problem, the first specific information to integrate with our expectations about Maori educational performance and precision about the authority of the data on which the article is based.

The necessary complexity and high information load of the lead helps to mask the first exaggeration of the headline pointed out in Timothy 2 above. In addition, because it does introduce some of the relevant data, it acts as a kind of transition between the drama of the headline and the actual numbers provided in the body of the story. The use of the word "nearly" is important in this respect and is the bridge between the "Maori Pupils" of the headline and the figures from the report (see Timothy 2).

The term "held back" is also loaded. Although it clearly implies that someone or something is responsible, this force is not identified. Expanded constructions might read "...held back by schools." or "...held back by lack of ability." This second expansion fits neatly with the standard story as
primed by the foregrounding in the headline and again serves to tie the headline into the story.

This kind of detailed analysis enhances the system blaming of Timothy 2 but does not usher in an alternative story. For me this is triggered in paragraph 3 where Te Kohanga Reo, a Maori pre-school system designed by Maori to advance the Maori language and culture, is referred to as the exception to poor Maori performance within the education system. However the claiming of these "Maori language nests" as part of that system, is a manoeuvre which deals with what is in my opinion a very difficult aspect of Maori educational performance for the standard story to cover. While it can be said that, in as much as it is an educational institution, Te Kohanga Reo is part of the education system, it is very different from the rest of that system. It is not funded from the budget of the Ministry of Education and it is not funded or otherwise supported by the government bureaucracies to anything like the extent that the education system is. The movement arose in the late 1970's as the response of large numbers of Maori people to the severe erosion of their language and culture by 150 years of colonisation. Using the Maori language resources of the kaumatua and kuia7 and the energy and commitment of the parents, it sought to re-establish a new generation of children with Maori as their first language. Centres were given a small annual grant from the Ministry of Maori Affairs. There was no money for the salaries of teachers or assistants. No premises or other major resources were provided. No advisory services or other personnel support was available. Centres ran on voluntary input in a wide range of facilities on a user pays basis. More importantly they ran according to the ways and needs of those involved; they were autonomous and imbued with an enormous radical potential (Walker,

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7 Male and female elders.
1991). And they were hugely successful and led to the establishment of kura kaupapa Maori and whare wananga\textsuperscript{8} run on the same lines.

So what? So firstly, these institutions are not to be regarded as part of the education system and therefore, contrary to my Timothy 1 and implicitly my Timothy 2, cannot in any way be seen as a success for it. The reason for their success is precisely that they are not part of the education system. Their autonomy and commitment to a Maori way of doing things seems like a seed, a beginning from which a full Maori autonomy, a sovereignty as guaranteed in the Treaty of Waitangi, might grow. Secondly this realisation calls into question the meaning of all of the facts produced in the report and the article derived from it. If the data for Te Kohanga Reo represent the performance of Maori children in an autonomous, Maori controlled educational institution, then data from the rest of the report are highlighted as Maori performance under one set of conditions only, that is in an alien education system. In this respect the data must be regarded as presenting a biased and inadequate picture of what is uncritically retailed as Maori educational performance.

Conclusion

Overall, the key point of this analysis is that the competing/complimentary aspects of the Pakeha ideology of Maori educational performance form a closed system of argumentation which effectively locks out a further competing alternative explanation. I believe that this alternative is not a Maori explanation although it clearly owes a debt to Maori energy and experience and may indeed overlap with Maori versions. My claim is that together the readings presented here constitute a discourse analytic version which draws its strength from its methodological commitment to attend to

\textsuperscript{8} Maori schools and universities.
the action orientation of language, to the detail, the nuances and flexibility of language, as it is deployed for its rhetorical ends. Inevitably my own personal positions are reflected in the various readings of the initial text. I would agree with a critic who said that I had privileged the third of these readings in a variety of ways which leave it ultimately the strongest and I make no apology for that. What I can say to such a challenge is that I have tried to surface my own positions, deconstruct my own interpretations in the process of laying them down and generally sought an openness which exposes what I have done in taking apart the newspaper item and the standard story.

Two theoretical implications are drawn from the work in this paper. Firstly analyses of this kind represent a severe challenge to the philosophical basis of social science inquiry in that questioning the notion of a stable consistent core of belief, an essential subject, undercuts the reductionist, individualist assumptions of the various disciplines. Closely related to this assertion is the point that the approach taken offers an entry into the realms of subjectivity and reflexivity which are at the forefront of the critical issues upon which the credibility of the discipline rests. As the theoretical and practical work in these areas continues to dissolve the "scientific" foundations of social science, the manner in which it approaches these concepts will to a major extent determine the role it plays in the development of our understanding of social life.

Coda

In a major commercial daily newspaper, the rhetorical goals referred to above are substantially to support the status quo which in this context and country are the continuation of Pakeha hegemony and power. In this instance we have seen the media contribution to the maintenance of a tiny but important
fragment of the standard ideology of Maori/Pakeha relations and the reliance of this process on that self-contained and circumscribed ideology.

But the political breadth and demographic depth of the Maori challenge in Aotearoa are such that unless Pakeha can move to adjust the psychologically dysfunctional aspects of our ideology, we risk political and material damage that will leave us unable to take up the partnership proffered in the Treaty of Waitangi. The radical potential of Maori to change this society in search what is theirs by right and by treaty presents a challenge to Pakeha to grow and extend our way of viewing our situation to the point where we can share in and contribute to this period of change.
The focus on reflexivity in Chapter Four was reassuring in the sense that it enabled me to move with some confidence into a rather more integrated approach to new texts that was at once reflexive and yet not so self-conscious that I could not stake a position and critique others from it. This self-assurance was based also on the steady positive feedback from both Maori and Pakeha over the handling of content.

Meanwhile the political system was changing again as the traditional right took the reigns of power from the new right which had dominated the scene since about 1987. The changes wrought by the 1984 Labour Government had trickled through in various forms, notably the changes to the Waitangi Tribunal’s realm of jurisdiction, to the ideological arena and the reconstituted right wing was left with some delicately poised issues, in the area of Tribunal recommendations. In this context a new twist to political discourse became apparent with the serious consideration of major claims such as Fisheries and Ngai Tahu. This seemed an ideal environment in which to pursue durability and evolution of ideological forms and a 1992 speech from the Minister of Justice provided a challenging and complex data set, with which to get to grips with the new Government line. I was supplied with a verbatim transcript of the speech by the Minister’s office and this offered me a first chance to work with actual speech rather than written text.

The paper was again presented in its early stages to the Discourse in Psychology Symposium at the Psychological Society Conference where feedback, including some from National Party sources, was invaluable. It was then worked up for publication in Sites (again, incidentally in the subsequent issue to the one which had carried the Mimiwhangata article) under the guest editorship of David Dowling of the Department of English at Massey University.
Chapter Five

Settling Grievances to Deny Sovereignty: Trade Goods for the Year 2000.¹

Abstract

This study builds on earlier analyses of the ideological resources which underlie the construction of anti-Maori positions in Aotearoa, to examine the effects of changing political circumstances upon the position and discourse of a senior government politician. One speech is subjected to a detailed analysis which tracks the manipulation and reworking of established patterns of ideas and language. These changes allow the speaker to reach a profoundly conservative audience on the issue of Maori/Pakeha relations in a way that they are likely to respond to in a positive vein, despite a deeply entrenched ideology of racial discrimination against Maori. The analysis also foregrounds the political quid pro quo, in which these transitions are offset against a promise of security and stability that will maintain Pakeha hegemony in the long term.

Introduction

Beginning in May 1992, the government announced a series of major initiatives which have fed substantial controversies in the field of Maori/Pakeha relations. The main focus has been on the Sealord deal in relation to the Maori fisheries claims, but other elements include the possibility of Landcorp and Department of Conservation property being used in settlements of Treaty claims, the announcement of mataitai reserves, the call for the lodgement of all claims to the Waitangi Tribunal by 1996, discussion of the future of Maori seats in parliament and a number of claim

¹ A version of this paper appeared in Sites, 27, 45-73.
settlements including the return of specific small parcels of land\(^2\) and the pardon of Mokomoko.\(^3\) These initiatives have occurred in the context of a widely held and deep-seated ideology that opposes what are seen as concessions to Maori, especially the return of resources in response to Maori claims. This ideology is justified on the basis that Maori should not be treated differently from other groups in society. In this arena, mainstream politicians walk a very fine line between conservative Pakeha appeals to national unity (and self-interest) and the Maori drive for justice and self-determination. Language clearly plays a key role in politics at this level and sites of transition such as that sketched here are particularly interesting points in the study of power and ideology.

A distinctive thread running through the discourse of the current administration, particularly as articulated by the Minister of Maori Affairs and the Minister of Justice, is the call for Pakeha to take the Maori resurgence seriously and begin to think about how to address the issues of justice that it highlights. This places the government in major conflict with a large portion of the electorate and so requires strategy and tactics to at least appear to balance the competing aspirations of Maori and Pakeha. In this paper my aim is to make a discourse-based commentary on aspects of the work embarked on by government in this sphere.

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\(^2\) These diverse claims and settlements arise from the historical injustices visited upon Maori by Pakeha in the process of British colonisation of this country. Readings are available from sources such as the Waitangi Tribunal, tribal histories and historical accounts and many of the issues receive extensive coverage in the media.

\(^3\) Mokomoko was wrongly hanged for his alleged role in the murder of Volkner a missionary accused of spying for the settler government during the land wars. His descendants had been seeking judicial recognition of his innocence for nearly 130 years.
Theoretical Background

My theoretical base and methodological orientation are in the forms of discourse analysis arising from within social psychology (Billig et al, 1988; Gavey, 1990; McCreanor 1993a; Parker, 1992; Potter & Wetherell, 1987; Wetherell & Potter, 1992) and the sociology of language (Fairclough, 1992). Both of these strands owe a debt to Foucault (1980) for highlighting the relationship between discourse and power. From this point of view, discourse analysis is an approach to the study of language as a potent force with profound material effects in the construction and negotiation of social reality (van Dijk, 1987). Language is the first line of defence and the cutting edge of change in the ideological fabric of societies.

A notion of ideology which differs from the perhaps classical renditions of Marx (1930) or Althusser (1975) is also crucial to this work. Rather than conceiving of ideology as the grand narrative, the blueprint for social order adopted by the ruling elite, I am more comfortable with a formulation that sees it as a much more tentative and negotiable phenomenon (Billig et al, 1988), a standard story (Fish, 1980), deeply cut into the daily interpretative and interactional features of ordinary lives (Antaki, 1987).

In peer groups, in the family, in the workplace, in our formal and informal institutions, through gossip, chat and banter, through lecture, political speech and media story, social reality is contested and affirmed, imposed and negotiated. These activities take place not within an open field, but bounded by conventions of knowledge, language, history and experience. This matrix, which itself changes over time, is normative in the sense that it proscribes and prescribes style and content of everyday communication. Successful (persuasive?) communication is most likely to occur if discourse is pitched within such an ideological framework. Here an apparently “psychological” dimension becomes important; to tell or hear an
interpretation of a social phenomenon that falls outside of the standard ideological account is much harder work and irrespective of the quality of such work, has the attendant risk of rejection simply on the grounds of unfamiliarity. Extending from Belsey (1980) discourse which falls beyond the bounds of commonsense is likely to be perceived as unnatural, problematic and unacceptable.

This linkage of the social and the psychological is made explicit by Wetherell and Potter (1992) in their discussion of discourse analysis.

Discourse analysis focuses above all on quintessentially psychological activities - activities of justification, rationalisation, categorisation, attribution, making sense, naming, blaming, and identifying. Discourse studies link those activities with collective forms of social action and thus have the potential to integrate psychological concerns with social analysis. (p2)

Having invested some energy in discourse analytic study and description of ideology in the field of Maori/Pakeha relations (McCreanor, 1993a, 1993b; Nairn & McCreanor, 1990, 1991) we have developed an understanding of the resources from which the arguments which support particular positions within the field can be constructed. Our earliest research drew upon discourses deployed in public submissions to the Human Rights Commission in 1979 following the Haka Party Incident at Auckland University (Hazelhurst, 1989). We found we could describe a series of common themes or patterns of ideas and language (Nairn & McCreanor, 1990. See p76.) akin to what Potter and Wetherell (1987) call linguistic repertoires. We believe these comprise a considerable proportion of the linguistic resources used in the construction of a standard story of Maori/Pakeha relations. The

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4 The standard story of Maori/Pakeha relations emphasises the benefits of Pakeha
resources seemed to be stable in the sense that although used and expressed in different ways by different writers, they were recognisable in form and content. We subsequently found variations of the patterns reproduced in more contemporary texts (McCreanor, 1993a, 1993b; Nairn & McCreanor, 1991), suggesting their durability and raising the question of their evolution.

The public presentation of government's line on Treaty issues is a likely source of information on the process of change in ideology and provides a context for the current study. Using discourse analytic methods my academic goal is to examine the discourse for evidence of change, particularly at the level of the linguistic resources and to attempt to provide some insight into the mechanisms of change. At a political level I aim to be able to show ways in which changes in the discourse are working to help the government manage the conflict between its position and that of the electorate of the issues and to be able to tease out some implications for Maori/Pakeha relations. The analyses I present are not intended as definitive interpretations but rather as my readings of text. I am reluctant to claim expertise above that of any other citizen in this process, but will own an intensity (some say an obsession) that most people cannot or will not invest in the examination of what are in the end, fleeting articulations of the ideology of the mainstream on the issue of Maori/Pakeha relations. The whole is intended to challenge, to stimulate discussion, to have us think about and

domination and marginalises expressions of concern at the impact that this has had on Maori and on society as a whole. The standard ideology says that Maori/Pakeha relations are the best in the world, rooted as they are in the honourable adherence to the outcome of a fair fight (the 1860 wars) which has seen the Maori succeeded in their dominance of the country, just as they displaced earlier indigenous inhabitants. The Treaty of Waitangi is a document of historical interest only and is irrelevant to Maori/Pakeha relations in the modern context (McCreanor, 1993a). Mutual respect for each others strengths and tolerance of idiosyncrasies has integrated the Maori people into a harmonious, egalitarian relationship with the more recent arrivals, the whole working constructively for the common good. This narrative explains Maori failure as due to their inability to cope in the modern world because of inherent flaws in their character or culture. Maori dissent is cast as the work of a minority of troublemakers who seek to arouse a wider Maori discontent to further their own political ends.
debate, throughout the commonplaces of our lives, the web of words which constructs our biculturalism.

The Analysis

The main subject of the analysis presented here is a speech by the Minister of Justice, delivered on 6.6.92. (see appendix 4) to the conference of the Wellington division of the National Party at Porirua. The Minister's office supplied me with a transcript of a recording of the address. The speech is one of a number of statements made by Mr Graham and his colleague Mr Kidd, the Minister of Maori Affairs, beginning in June 1992. The level of their collaboration on the issue is perhaps indicated in the point that as Graham notes in his opening remarks, he is in this instance deputising for Kidd at very short notice. Examination of speech notes from Kidd's office (eg., June, 1992), show exact overlaps with Graham's text and reports of his other speeches (eg., New Zealand Herald, 23.9.92; TVNZ, 5.2.93.) indicate direct repetitions of large sections of text. They were the team delegated to disseminate government policy in this area.

My analysis will follow Graham's rhetorical manoeuvres in their natural sequence; this is highly complex as he deploys his many skills to interweave disparate, apparently contradictory and often controversial strands of argumentation in a smooth and acceptable style. To facilitate the reader's assessment of my process, I begin with a gloss on the whole text which is intended as a preliminary guide to the way in which the analysis is structured.

Graham begins by working to displace the established ideology, producing a new account of Maori as honourable and justified in their claims against Pakeha, and of Pakeha as dishonourable and culpable for the position of Maori. As thesis (the standard story) and antithesis (Graham's version)
emerge and take substance in these two strands, the speaker begins to introduce his synthesis, the idea that justice requires the settlement of "grievances" - trading the unknown nature and cost of Maori claims for the stability of fixed and final compensation - in order that the old divisions can be healed and allow us to stand together as a nation united.

A crucial aspect of my analysis is to illustrate instances and directions in which current Government policy on the Treaty of Waitangi and bicultural issues challenges and displaces the common resources that have been widely used to interpret and deal with Maori challenges of all kinds. I develop a description of the ways in which this speech interacts with and changes the ideological context into which was delivered. Focusing especially on the opening passages where much of the rhetorical and psychological work is done, I deconstruct some of the linguistic and semantic features, describe the strategies that are involved in these moves, and reference them to a standard ideology of Maori/Pakeha relations. Much of the work goes into a systematic commentary on Mr Graham's speech, based in my subjective interpretation (cf. Hollway, 1987) on the basis that as a person immersed and versed in Pakeha culture, this parallel discourse can be engaged with, contested, affirmed by other Pakeha and so contribute to the ongoing debate over our position and identity in Aotearoa.

The Speech

The attack on established ideology of Maori/Pakeha relations begins immediately after an introductory pre-amble and is handled with finesse and circumspection, hallmarks of Graham's style.
I want however, to say how pleased I am to have this opportunity to discuss with you, somewhat briefly, matters which are dear to my heart and I suspect they are dear to all New Zealanders [10] although many may not realise it and it relates to the relationship that we have as a country between the Maori people and everybody else in the country...(L7-12)

Graham identifies as deeply concerned with the relationship between Maori and Pakeha. The significance of this self-positioning on the part of a senior Minister with the portfolio of justice is powerful; he is difficult to reject as a wild-eyed radical whose views can be discounted ad hominem.

The risk of rejection is further minimised by a delicate splitting operation. Prefacing this move with the phrase "I suspect" (L9) allows him to imply, while preserving interpretative flexibility for the audience, that some may not know their own minds; that they may be engaged in the issue without being aware of it. The split is between "all" who, like him, are vitally concerned and the "many" who are concerned but hadn't realised it.

The two final lines introduce an idea that stands outside the established ideology of race relations in this country in which minorities which happen to be racial relate to the mainstream, the norm, Pakeha. Talk of Maori and "everybody else in the country" is a departure from the standard story which at some level represents an acknowledgement of a bicultural basis for New Zealand society. As such it is a challenge to the "many".

The next passage (L21-24) is a rendition of the substantive base of the standard ideology of the way Maori people are. The speaker recites a catalogue of statistics which I can read as Maori failure in health, wealth, education and lawfulness. To distance himself from this version, which says that Maori fail because of weaknesses of character and culture, Graham
deploys a light irony, mimicking the phrasing of commonplace Pakeha answers to the question he poses.

Now if we say to ourselves why is this, why do we find that we have a very sizeable minority of our population in the lower socioeconomic group? I don't think its adequate to say - "oh well they have asked for it" - or - "they don't try." (L21-24)

The speaker now launches a different line - that Maori have "lost faith" - and this claim is privileged in that, unlike the unelaborated "replies" which he has just discredited, it is vested with an explanation.

[30] Why have they lost faith? One of the reasons I think is because for literally decades their cry for redress for matters that occurred many years ago has gone unheeded. (L30-32)

Rather than having failed on their own account, Maori people have given in to despair in the face of an unsympathetic opposing force which is indicated in the use of the word "unheeded". This entails a deletion that carries the idea that Pakeha have had a role in the tragedy of Maori experience. For the question is - "unheeded" by whom? And the answer is - by the Pakeha authorities and polity of the day; and for "literally decades".

The tentative nature of this exploratory allusion to Pakeha responsibility allows the speaker to exploit an ambiguity which protects his version from being seen too quickly as a major departure from the standard. In the absence of clear charges of Pakeha fault, speakers can easily access the familiar and comfortable idea that Maori are the source of their own hopelessness - the inferior pleading for help from the superior - rather than taking their destiny into their own hands. This interpretation is supported by
Graham's disempowering description of Maori resistance as a "cry" (L31) where thorough analysis shows a concerted and ongoing history of Maori challenges to implacable Pakeha injustice and domination, stretching over 150 years (cf. Belich, 1986; Ihimaera, 1993).

While my evaluation may seem to indicate that Graham is equivocating on the issue rather than developing a new line, I see this extract as one of a number of powerful examples of the kind of rhetorical feat necessary for the speaker to reach this, profoundly conservative audience. Being able to implicate both Pakeha and Maori in responsibility for the situation brings a balance which prevents listeners from simply switching off. Engaging the resources they already have for the interpretation of "Maori issues" and a cultural commonsense that says "it takes two to quarrel", keeps listeners involved and thus moving toward other resources, other interpretations. Overall the effect for me is an authoritative rendition of new ideas in a familiar context; Maori grievance and Pakeha injustice - seeds of a re-telling of our ideology - are evoked to explain Maori failure.

To strengthen and develop these tender shoots, the speaker produces a vulnerable version of the standard ideology which is easily attacked and disposed of, so making space for the new. Graham sets up the standard story as the province of the ignorant.

Now to many New Zealanders that's a nuisance. They don't know what the grievances are. They believe they all occurred in 1840 or thereabouts and therefore its far too long ago to worry about. (L32-35)

This move evokes the split established earlier (L9) which is marked by the use of the third person plural pronoun, making an outgroup - albeit temporary - of those who "don't know". Listeners are still free to choose a position - with
us (the enlightened) - from which to view the shortcomings of the standard story, without necessarily needing to own those difficulties. Graham's rendition of the standard story builds on two related ideas; that the problems occurred more than 150 years ago and that they are thus irrelevant to understanding or acting upon our current situation. Both points are weakly cast - a naive voice speaking with a simplistic logic - and for a speaker so versed in the detail of Maori claims and so critical of those who attempt to ignore the history of colonialism, are easily demolished.

A further point is the emphasis on the effect of Maori protest on the ignorant. At the outset, this is construed as a "nuisance" for them, a minor issue perhaps, but this facet evolves considerably as the ideas about Pakeha are developed. Thus in the next excerpt, it has become a source of discomfort and an ongoing annoyance.

[35] They feel uncomfortable that somebody should be saying - "why don't you fix this up?" - year after year and when we do fix it up, they come and say - "why don't you fix it up again?" So matters are relitigated and people get annoyed and I can understand that. (L35-38)

These constructions highlight emotional aspects of Maori/Pakeha relations which are ignored or denied in the standard story and support the hints of Pakeha culpability noted above. Mr Graham's expression of sympathy with such views serves the purpose of narrowing the gap earlier created between himself and the ignorant, helping to draw them back toward his position.

The idea that Maori will repeatedly seek compensation for claims is part of Graham's rationale for the goal of obtaining permanent solutions. As such this rendition of Maori accesses a Pakeha commonsense of Maori
protest which references to the "Stirrer" pattern⁵ - Maori will never be satisfied and will always try to get more than they are entitled to.

Having thus set up some of the tenets of the standard view the speaker is able to begin the work of undermining them and he starts by tackling head on the problem of the anti-historical approach.

But the sad fact is that a lot of these incidents in the grievance claims did [40] not happen in 1840 at all. Some happened in 1970 and those that did happen over 100 years ago are not something which were ignored for a century and then somebody dreamed them up a few years ago and they've been the subject matter of debates since they occurred and if we have turned our back on it time and time again it was because it was [45] uncomfortable. (L39-45)

At one level this is a straightforward rebuttal of the historical inaccuracies of the standard ideology but Graham's case is supplemented by the introduction of other aspects of the standard story which are then attacked in their turn. Maori concerns are not a thing of the distant past as it is widely held by Pakeha and many problems have never been forgotten by those affected. A new rendition of the nature of Maori claims is worked in contrast to the standard version put up earlier. They are not convenient inventions for extracting endless money from the Crown, but longstanding issues which have never been laid to rest by Maori. On the other hand they have been repeatedly denied by Pakeha who are thus to blame for the situation and their own discomfort.

⁵ This pattern loosely identifies Maori activists and other leaders as manipulators of Maori and mainstream public opinion who seek to mobilise such forces against the establishment for their own political purposes. Stirrers who can be identified by name but are more frequently anonymous, are blamed for raising Maori expectations to unreasonable levels and generally fomenting trouble between Maori and Pakeha.
However at another level this passage is not without its own rhetorical baggage. For example owning that some injustices occurred as recently as 1970, happily diverts attention from the impacts of the last 3 administrations on Maori people and society which uncomfortably rank with the worst in our history. The period since 1984 has entailed some of the most alarming economic and cultural disasters for Maori (Kelsey, 1990).

Further, the use of the term "grievance claims" reiterates its earlier introduction (L39) and begins to give some hint of the emergent emphasis taken from it. The common usage around Maori claims is "Treaty claims", which in my view correctly references them to the Treaty of Waitangi, the wide-ranging political agreement on which Pakeha immigration and involvement in Aotearoa are premised. Pinning Maori concerns to "grievance" limits the scope of what Pakeha will consider, undercutting both the notion of Treaty rights (which do not necessarily turn on grievance) and the concept of aboriginal rights which is increasingly recognised as natural law. This way of packaging the issues serves to mask the possibility that there might be other legitimate Maori aspirations concerning for example, culture or sovereignty.

In a final sketch, the speaker adds a parody of the standard view and those who bear it, which completes the justification for abandoning it.

[45] We preferred to think of our Maori people very warmly with great affection but in a rather patronising way that they played rugby very well and they were good fellows. But what's all this about their grievances and I want to talk to you about them for one or two moments now. (L45-49)

This rendition of the old story (complete with androcentric bias) drives home the notion of the inadequacy of this view by critiquing the caricature created
as "patronising", an activity readily understood by Pakeha as completely unacceptable\(^6\). Although Graham has here effectively disposed of the standard version, he simultaneously shifts from the distancing third person, to the personal plural pronoun, so including himself in the critique and in the process blurring the split between the ignorant and the enlightened. This final move seems to complete a carefully laid foundation in which the audience has been split, challenged, shifted and re-unified so that Graham can begin to flesh out the new ideas about Maori and Pakeha that he is floating.

Before he does this he invests considerable energy in a transitional section of the speech in which he lays down some key ideas that are essential to the solution he will propose to the problems of Maori/Pakeha relations. Principal among these is that for justice to be done, Pakeha must respond to the claims for redress for the wrongs that the Minister is acknowledging on the part of the Crown. Channelling the argument in this way directs attention towards the concrete, material claims - the bulk of those before the Waitangi Tribunal - and avoids consideration of a raft of Maori political, economic and cultural aspirations that may not be primarily defined in terms of "grievance". This implied distinction surfaces in the next section of the speech with a strong warning which divides Maori "grievances" into those which are "valid" and others which arise from some "misconception".

[50] Not all grievances are valid. Some grievances are based on a misconception of what happened in the past and when the evidence was researched properly it was found to be quite wrong. It didn't happen like that at all. (L50-53)

I read this at one level as a demonstration of the Minister's level-headedness - he is not one to be caught up in false claims - and is thus a very helpful

\(^6\) Particularly if it comes from the British or the Australians!
adjunct to his work, reinforcing his authority and so helping to convince the audience of the seriousness of the position overall. More importantly this statement, in establishing the notion of valid and invalid claims, retains for Pakeha the ultimate control of the political process, since inconvenient claims can by a range of criteria be ruled invalid⁷. Together these devices, while accepting Crown responsibility to an extent hitherto not acknowledged, act to marginalise the Maori sovereignty guaranteed by the Treaty of Waitangi from the debate about how to deal with the problems of Maori/Pakeha relations.

After explaining the mechanism - the Waitangi Tribunal - by which the validation of claims is now made, Mr Graham proceeds to offer a rationale for the Government's action on the issues.

Why are we bothering you might say. I'll tell you why we are bothering. We're bothering because we have to. We're bothering because if we do not [70] we have an aggrieved minority for another few decades and your children and mine and our grandchildren will have to face up to it sooner or later. (L68-72)

He gives a thoroughly pragmatic motive, well-pitched to the self-interest of Pakeha; we - spoken as government and society at large - cannot go on with the "aggrieved minority" in their current state. Aside from its implicit denial of tangata whenua status of Maori, this term carries with it expectations of the danger and unpredictability of the behaviour of such groups (particularly where the issues are longstanding grievances) drawn from the international setting. Eventually some generation - marked as Pakeha by the use of the

⁷ A recent example of this process, referred to by Graham in this speech is that of the land under claim by Te Roroa. In this instance the Minister and the government were highly critical of the Waitangi Tribunal's findings because it recommended the compulsory acquisition of "private" land. The findings have been sidelined and the claim is stalled.
pronoun "our" and portrayed as vulnerable in the representation as "children", "grandchildren" - has to tackle the issues and come up with solutions. We abdicate our responsibility to our own if we leave the next generation in a mess.

Switching tack slightly the Minister attacks an aspect of the standard view of the Treaty; that it is the source of tension between Maori and Pakeha.

And I don't believe that the Treaty, the Tribunal, the negotiations caused division in society. I think that's simply nonsense. What it does is bring [75] the two together. If we can resolve these matters and put them behind us and in my negotiations with Ngai Tahu they say to me clearly that they want to get out of grievance mode and into productive mode.
(L73-77)

The Treaty and the process of redress can unite the groups, provided that final (to "put them behind us") solutions can be wrought. This recourse to the One People pattern8 signals Graham's primary commitment to the status quo which is elaborated at the end of the speech.

Strengthening this rather abstract position is Graham's major departure from the standard rendition of Maori, by which Maori can be fitted smoothly into the One People scenario. Perhaps the most striking aspect - helpfully as if in their own words - is the Maori desire to shift from "grievance mode" to the new way; "productive mode". These positions exemplify the standard division of Maori by Pakeha in that "grievance mode" equates with

8 The "One People" pattern is a prescription for the way we should be in race relations which ends up condoning the status quo because the unity can only be in terms of the monocultural western model of in which "multiculturalism" is conceived of as ethnic flavouring added to an Anglo/European cultural recipe. We are encouraged to forget our differences call ourselves Kiwis and put the communal shoulder to the national wheel.
the Bad Maori and Stirrers patterns, while "productive mode" is comfortably familiar as part of the notion of Good Maori. What is easily read from the statement therefore is that these Maori wish to change from being bad to being good. This has always been possible in the terms of the patterns involved, which retain a highly desirable flexibility that facilitates moving Maori among categories in order to meet the rhetorical needs of specific situations. What Graham is doing here is utilising his rendition of Maori talk to re-orient the patterns to portray Maori as more positive than negative. These impressions are reinforced by other features such as drawing attention to the negotiated aspect of the interaction he reports and the clarity with which Maori are conveying their ideas. Beneath the surface, the implication that in various ways Pakeha are responsible for blocking the desired shift is also developing - if Maori want to make these changes, what is it that stops them?

9 In the Good Maori/Bad Maori pattern the Maori population falls into two groups - for convenience labelled good and bad - those who fit into the mainstream Pakeha culture and those who do not. Those who fit are basically indistinguishable from Pakeha, being either part of the honourable proletariat or minor capitalists and entrepreneurs. There seems to be little else to say about them but they are assumed to be healthy, educated, law abiding, successful and in general terms a majority of the Maori people. This group contrasts sharply with the mass of the Bad Maori sector. These people are those who are basically passively bad; they do not actively or deliberately resist the requirements of Pakeha society but are never-the-less to be found in the poor education and health statistics as the hapless victims of a superior culture with which they cannot compete or keep up. More worryingly, they appear disproportionately in the criminal statistics as both deperados stealing to keep their families and worse as violent and deliberately antisocial, elements expressing their frustration at their lot in these unacceptable ways. I note that this group has overlaps with the "Stirrers Pattern" in as much as this group have a political agenda of fomenting the discontented Maori elements of society into open and covert rebellion aimed at displacing the existing social order, often with the goal of the establishment of a sovereign Maori state.

The pattern is vague about the actual constitution of the groups, preserving the rhetorical advantages of being able to shift individuals and numbers in and out of the categories as arguments require. For example, in order to diminish the power of demographic arguments for social and political change, we Pakeha hold that most Maori are happy, easy-going and content with their lot. However when asked what Maori contribute or could contribute to society, we know that most are lazy, uneducated, on the dole or other benefits, unhealthy and criminal.
Finally before moving to support the new renditions of Maori, Pakeha and justice he has wrought with examples, Graham further strengthens his version of Maori/Pakeha relations by marginalising the Treaty of Waitangi.

[80] Can I tell you one or two grievances so that you have some idea for those of you who have not had time to look into them. Some of them haven't got much to do with the Treaty at all. (L80-82)

He could have chosen to be much more clearcut without misrepresenting the issues but instead hedges his position with the words "some" and "much". This stance is of interest in that the Treaty is a touchstone for Maori in their approach to Maori/Pakeha relations (Henare and Douglas, 1988) and the basis of many of the claims for recognition and redress particularly those directed through the Waitangi Tribunal. In general Pakeha interest in the Treaty is as a reaction to this use and as outlined in the sketch of the standard story is traditionally adversarial, claiming that the Treaty is irrelevant or at best problematic in the modern context. While this position has received some superficial modification in both institutional and individual discourse since the mid-1980’s, changes toward taking Maori claims to sovereignty seriously are not widely spread.

This point that the Treaty is a guarantee of Maori sovereignty, is a major difficulty for Graham in his efforts to persuade Pakeha to adopt his approach and he is obliged to find a way around it that can be seen as delivering something to both sides. Rather than deal with this interpretation - which would clearly involve major political concessions and settlements - Graham develops a path that sidelines it. Thus an alternative rendition of the issues is necessary and with singular consistency it is constructed in terms of what are referred to as problems, difficulties and most frequently "grievances".
The Minister now embarks on a case-book of claims which greatly supports the more psychological work that has gone into changing the ideological basis of the discussion of Maori/Pakeha relations borne by the introductory sections. The focus in this material is to support with historical evidence and institutional authority the reconstruction of Pakeha responsibility and Maori honour.

In the Ngai Tahu case

30,000 acres at Akaroa was sold but Ngai Tahu never got any money. The buyer got the land but the Maoris didn't get any money, a breach of contract. (L82-85)

Maori are the innocent victims of unscrupulous Pakeha. The illustration is concise yet detailed, and emphasised to drive home the speaker's dual point.

A number of instances of Crown dishonesty and racketeering in their historical dealings are given and used to flesh out the reconstruction of Pakeha culpability. Two examples suffice to illustrate this section.

Not only did

we short change them but we agreed to set aside 10% of the land for Ngai Tahu for their future development and we didn't do it. So having bought 35 million acres of land we should have set aside a very large number of reserves and we set aside 6000 acres and where we did it was normally vertical or swamp land. (L88-93)

Shifting to the contemporary context, Graham draws on his own direct experience to counterpoint dishonourable Pakeha behaviour with the conduct of Maori claimants.
They came to my office and sat in front of me and they said -
"Minister, this is the first time we've been to Wellington" - some of them -
"We're terribly embarrassed to take up your time. We've been writing to [110] the Crown for 30 years and we haven't even had a reply." So we are fixing that up. (L107-111)

Here the Maori concerned are working through the proper channels; they have written letters, come to the Minister's office, sat down with him. That this polite group are Good Maori, is highlighted in their putative opening statement; these are novices in the business of politicking. The speaker's aside "some of them" serves to leaven the image of inexperienced innocence with just enough realism to prevent the Minister's construction being seen as woolly, liberal, pro-Maori bias. The remaining statements further foreground the group's appreciation of etiquette, reasonableness and the point that they have, despite this, been wronged severely by the Crown. Further, that they have been attempting to use the proper channels of communication for so long demonstrates tenacity and patience.

Turning to the role of Pakeha, this is the second use of the term "fixing" in relation to Maori claims. In this instance "fixing" is vested with an air of successful permanence - you have a problem so you fix it. It is a positive and straightforward account that belies the enormous struggle that has bought the issue to this point, in effect diminishing and making light of the difficulties Pakeha society has imposed upon Maori. This is a central strand in Graham's vision of justice and it is developed and reinforced in subsequent use.

Some examples seem to look solely at Crown responsibility.
The Crown came along and said - "we would rather like to have that lake thank you very much" - and they said - "no." The Crown said - "but we want to turn it into a reserve so that people can come and have a picnic on the shore" - and the Maori people said - "but its our lake, its our heritage. There are burial grounds, all sorts of things, we don't want to sell." The Crown then went to the local body and arranged for the lake to be rated. No other lake in New Zealand is rated. The Maori people couldn't pay. The intention was that the Crown would buy it under a rating sale. Last week we agreed to pay the rates off and cancel it all. That wasn't 1840 that was in the 1960s. (L113-123)

These instances of Pakeha injustice toward Maori are difficult to contest as they are presented with considerable historical authority - dates and details - which help (through Pakeha respect for such narrative) to protect them from attacks on their veracity. Further they are replete with discursive forms which help to render them at once pungent but palatable for the audience. For example, the use of the term "the Crown" emphasises the extent of Pakeha responsibility without threatening the actual individuals who did the dirty work. The examples quoted are only part of a catalogue of cases that Graham cites to drive the point that the established conception of our role in relation to Maori needs to be re-examined. And the speaker now returns to this task.

Sometimes they have been resolved. Sometimes we thought they had been resolved like Bastion Point, but the law changed and enabled that to be relitigated and it was.

And it is frustrating for people who don't understand and many New
Zealanders don't understand and those who set out to try to understand generally never look back. In fact there is a risk that you become so embarrassed about it all that you go to the other extreme and lose your objectivity. (L136-143)

The first of these sentences gives a context to the more general comments on Pakeha, the heart of which are the focus on the anti-historical orientation adopted by Pakeha. Using the inclusive plural pronoun, the second sentence builds on the base established earlier around the reactions of the majority of Pakeha to Treaty claims, rehearsing the attendant emotion and confusion experienced in trying to come to grips with a new version of history. What is not said in this instance is that while Pakeha do have regard for "history", it is a very particular cultural form which is deeply inscribed with the ideological and epistemological traditions through which it was made and can only be coherently read in the light of these traditions. Pakeha focus on the present and the future and subjugate the past to this orientation. Thus history for us reinforces the contemporary ideologies and defends against the intrusion of alternatives into either the present or the past.

The dangers of attending to this revision of history are profound. Graham's portrayal of Pakeha has shifted from the initial point at which we were mildly irritated by the issues to this end where we are "so embarrassed" that we capitulate. The implication of the final sentence is that most seekers will simply be unable to handle the internal contradictions entailed in attempting to view Pakeha culture and history from another perspective and will conclude by abandoning "objectivity" in favour of the wholesale acceptance of an alternative Maori account. In describing the new position as "the other extreme" Graham is referring to a polarity which reflects the division he is working with, the conservative adherence to the standard
narrative and the guilty embracing of the alternative. What is needed is the helmsman who can steer the middle course.

Its not because you have suddenly become guilt ridden with what happened in the past in the sense of the grievances and [145] the wrong-doing and the land-taking. I don't feel any guilt about that. I feel guilty because we haven't fixed it up and we have got to fix it up if we want the Maori people to hold their head high. (L143-147)

Graham's path accepts guilt, not for the wrongs of the past, but for the inaction of the present. The distinction is between paralysis over the past and a commitment to future action. This is an interesting rhetorical move which allows listeners the possibility of taking responsibility without succumbing to the accusations of liberal guilt-tripping which are currently in wide circulation from right-wing sources. In adopting the inclusive pronouns "you" and "we", Graham tries to bring his audience with him into the acceptance of an alternative construction of the past which requires Pakeha moves to bring redress and justice. He encourages this acceptance further by owning it personally, modelling it - "I feel guilty ..." - for the audience before shifting back to the inclusive first person plural at the conclusion.

Despite these manoeuvrings toward an ideological change, this section is not without recourse to the standard view to keep it on an even keel. The focus on "wrong doing and land taking" is narrow, giving no indication of the historical involvement of the total machinery of the Crown in a process of wholesale and often deliberate acculturation of Maori which gives rise to the disastrous impact of Pakeha activity on the Maori nation as represented in the statistics presented by the speaker at the outset. A further point is the way in which such an analysis is deflected by the conclusion of this passage which, by giving as its rationale the goal of restoring Maori self-esteem,
actually reverts to a patronising, victim-blaming notion. This usefully contradicts Graham's earlier critique and defuses Pakeha responsibility; what "we" are doing is fixing up Maoridom, not changing ourselves in ways which help us meet our Treaty-based obligations. It is as if all the guilt-taking that has been so carefully wrought to this point is without impact on Pakeha. On my first reading of this passage I was really surprised that it did not say - "we have got to fix it up if we want to be able to hold our head high."

The return to "fix it" terminology helps in the casting of the difficulties as, if not trivial at least amenable to quick, final solutions. In terms of persuading the Pakeha audience, these are important attributes for Graham to be able to attach to his proposals.

The next section of the speech is given to acknowledging the complexity and difficulty of achieving solutions in the general area of Maori claims which serve reinforce the image of the Minister as level-headed but innovative. Graham then allows his new Pakeha to reach the lowest emotional ebb before moving toward his synthesis.

Now the thing to realise is this. If we can resolve these things it puts to rest that feeling of dismay, of hopelessness. (L182-183)

Although this statement is not unequivocally referenced to Pakeha, it seems to me to fit the continuum of Graham's portrayal of us and to be incongruent with his portrayal of Maori. Assuming he is talking about Pakeha, our evolution from detached and uninvolved in the position of Maori, as assumed in the standard ideology, has advanced considerably. Graham has steadily moved his portrayal of us from being mildly irritated and annoyed by Maori claims at the start of his speech, to being "frustrated", "so embarrassed", feeling "guilty" and loosing our "objectivity". The nadir is etched in these imprecations of despair; "dismay", "hopelessness". This process is a part of
the rites of passage which result in the speaker's goal of a kinder Pakeha New Zealand, able to consider some concessions and reparations to Maoridom.

I believe that New Zealanders are very fair-minded people. When I go and talk about Maori issues to people they say - "I never realised, I never knew what it was about, for God's sake fix it up." (201-203)

To balance this new Pakeha against the bleak historical reality, Graham deploys the Ignorance pattern - Pakeha would do right by Maori if only they were informed of what the issues were. We are "fair-minded", its just we didn't have the facts. The "fix it" mentality, always part of the pioneering tradition, is now generalised to the issue of Maori/Pakeha relations - the Minister has his mandate. Add to the potion the new Maori.

But we are also lucky because we have the Maori people amongst us and [205] they are very fine people. They are marvellous. (L204-205)

and you have the ingredients for that old formula.

So we have to bring the races together in New Zealand. (L209)

This point which appears sandwiched between a valedictory on the restorative powers of Maori culture and further talk of how important the issue is to the future of the country, is a return to the familiar nationalism of the One People pattern and signals the speaker's commitment to the

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10 The pattern labelled "Ignorance" is primarily a plea in mitigation which in the end shifts the blame for Pakeha offences against Maori culture back on to Maori. The claim is that we cannot know how to conduct ourselves in the Maori domain unless Maori will abandon their peculiar secrecy about their traditions and tell us what is important and distinctive about the culture.
accepted ideology which emerges more clearly near the conclusion of the speech a few lines later.

[235] I do not believe that we ought to separate policies for Maori over here and separate Maori access. I don't think we want to have separate Mana Enterprises. I think we ought to streamline government assistance to all New Zealanders and it will so happen that Maori people will get their share because they are at the bottom. Now Maori have an input about [240] how best they can be applied but I believe they should be mainstreamed. (L235-241)

These remarks are prefaced by the claim that aside from his government's just settlements of various claims, "a great deal of good things are happening in Maoridom". Graham goes on to state the orthodox creed; separate development is unacceptable either as policy or as applications of policy, accessing the closely related patterns of Privilege and Rights. Maori should not have privileged access to resources because this is an infringement of the democratic principle of equal treatment for all citizens. The position is restated in the affirmative in the theorising of resource or assistance benefit allocation to Maori on the laissez faire (if not racist), monocultural basis that has been established over the years of colonisation and greatly accelerated in the last decade of monetarist economics. This account contradicts Graham's earlier stance, adopting the ahistorical approach which fails to look at how it is that Maori just happen to be "at the bottom".

The final sentence - to my reading the end of the speech but for some platitudes and political slogans - removes any doubt of the speakers intent. This sentence takes the regular form of the disclaimer (Hewitt and Stokes, 1975) and uses that structure to emphasise the established power dynamic between Maori and Pakeha. Built around the central "but", it allows that
Maori can have "input" on the application of benefits (and other resources) while leaving no doubt that the Minister's view - that beneficiaries (Maori) should be "mainstreamed" - will prevail in the end. Power remains firmly in the hand of the monocultural society which has oppressed Maori for the past 150 years.

The Minister has invested an enormous energy in changing the established constructions of Maori, of Pakeha and of justice between us. This speech more than any of the many others that have carried the government's position on the issue of Maori/Pakeha relations, lays the foundation upon which a new rendition of our ideology is subsequently built. Graham, speaking undoubtedly with great personal sincerity, has pulled all the stops in a finely crafted piece of work which is well-balanced in its mix of pragmatism and psychological persuasion, and firmly grounded in a working knowledge of Pakeha ideology.

One of the inspirations for me in grappling with this piece has been the work on changes in anti-Semitic discourse in Germany since 1945, by the Israeli historian Frank Stern. Stern's (1989) language-based studies show that despite official and legal prohibition, and social opprobrium from some quarters, that anti-Semitic discourses are freely communicated among non-Jews and even between non-Jews and Jews in ways which are highly effective and offensive and yet sufficiently subtle as to be virtually undetectable except via sophisticated analytic processes. Graham's speech is an example of the ways in which speakers wishing to avoid the real challenge of Maori sovereignty can draw upon new levels of subtlety which have the advantage of dispelling anti-racist critiques currently in use.

Doug Graham's speech may be an early example of the sophistication signalled in Stern's work and is certainly a distinct evolution of the discourse of Maori/Pakeha relations in Aotearoa. For each of the major changes wrought a number of rhetorical devices have carried the manoeuvres. In
each area, the early work undermining the relevant aspects of the standard story and the attack on the traditional anti-historical approach Pakeha have taken to Maori claims, have been central. In the new account of Maori these combine with the highly personalised narratives of working with Maori and the fresh interpretations of Maori actions over their claims, to construct Maori as honourable and justified in their stance. The new Pakeha is built through the common work in concert with the highlighting of the Pakeha emotional and practical stake in our relationship with Maori, and the appeal to the "faireminded", "fix it" mentality. With the Minister's concept of justice in Maori/Pakeha relations, the work of marginalising the Treaty of Waitangi and making grievance the focal point have been crucial to the empowered rejection of any consideration of Maori sovereignty as expressed in the closing passages of the address. In my reading this is one of the key goals of this speech and of government policy in the area.

It is as though despite all the work that has been done here, in the end the Minister has come full circle to making some very limited concessions to Maori which will seem generous to Pakeha and increase our sense that Maori, who may well remain critical of the deals\(^\text{11}\), will never be satisfied. For even the much vaunted Sealord deal at 150 million dollars is a trinket compared with the value of the of the resource guaranteed to Maori in the Treaty and the form of the settlement as shares in a commercial venture leaves it distinctly insecure. Far from obtaining final and lasting solutions, the policy of the piecemeal buying off of specific claims - settling grievances - to me seems likely to exacerbate tensions as both Maori and Pakeha are frustrated in their respective aspirations to sovereignty and certainty.

However the lot of the politician is to walk such lines and the Minister has continued with a numerous statements which cover the same ground as

\(^{11}\) Matiu Rata (NZ Herald, 18.5.93.) says of Graham's final settlement proposals that "while Maori people might take what they are offered, they were unlikely to agree that it was full and final settlement."
the National Party Conference delivery, but with growing ease as the ideas sown there take root. The echoes of Graham's earlier speech in this excerpt from an interview with Lindsay Perigo on BBC World Service of 8.6.93 are clear and it seems to me that the delivery is now almost effortless compared to the speech analysed in this paper. Perigo has asked him to explain setting a deadline for lodgement of claims to the Waitangi Tribunal.

I think all New Zealand want to see these matters put behind us once and for all. I think New Zealanders are very fairminded, I think they realise that some of the events in the last century and even in the last 20 or 30 years showed a lack of good faith on the part of the government of the day to Maori and that something has to be done to resolve them but they don't want them to go on and on and on and be relived again time after time. So I think the thing to do is to look to a limitation period just the same as all other litigations.

The Minister has pressed ahead with his broader programme despite the controversy and discontent on both sides. The most recent move has been to float the notion of time and fiscal limits to the claims process. The Minister keeps his council on the latter but expresses a determination to attain the manifesto goal of the settlement of all claims by the year 2000.

Postscript

This year's election campaign has as usual avoided discussion of the political relationship between Maori and Pakeha. While there were some local discussions - as in Auckland Central between Prebble and Lee - neither the major political figures nor the media ran with the issues. The hung parliament/minority government scenario which remains at the time of
writing means that whichever party forms a government, progress on this and other pressing issues will be slowed. Assuming a minority National government, Mr Graham's programme will remain as the status quo in an enfeebled form.

Claims that the MMP reforms chosen in the election will improve the political representation of Maori need to be regarded with caution. It is further clear that the progress of "minority parties" under such systems elsewhere gives no cause for celebration. For any real change to occur, a major shift is required in the ideology of Pakeha with regard to Maori And Maori/Pakeha relations. Mr Graham's approach to the issues will not produce this and may in the medium term contribute to a further hardening of the Pakeha stance.
The process of extending the generality of the findings around commonalities in Pakeha discourse beyond the original data set to text arising after 1979, encouraged some further confidence. With the analysis of Doug Graham's speech I felt that I was getting pretty close to the leading edge of developments in the discourse (I was working on text that was only a few weeks old). This work bought home to me the layered and historical dimensions of our talk and re-emphasised the vast energy that goes into maintenance but especially into the reconstruction of elements of ideology.

Through my work on historical perspectives on Treaty issues in the context of anti-racism and pro-Treaty workshops and the reading of Anne Salmond's book Two Worlds, my interest was kindled in the role of discourse in the processes of European incursion into Aotearoa. I felt that Salmond's excellent social anthropological approach unearthed but did not examine a discursive dimension which at once led and underpinned the cultural clash that ensued. These ideas prompted an extensive scan of the earliest writings I could find on Maori and pushed me to move beyond first impressions of resonance between the historical and the contemporary record in terms of the linguistic resources they use, to a more focussed discourse analysis of some such materials.

I wanted to approach the issue of the transition from a point of little Pakeha power in the country to substantive control. As may be expected none of the first three major groups of Europeans to have contact with Maori, the explorers, the whalers and the missionaries, seemed to be interested in temporal power. However many of the traders of the first decades of the 19th century saw bounty in staying and made significant contributions to preparing the country for colonial enterprise. And it was the power brokers in
this latter context who really joined the battle for the discursive construction of the Maori, their land and their resources.

I chose therefore to work on the information and propaganda that was likely to be circulating among potential colonists in the few years before the signing of the Treaty in 1840 and the mass migration of Pakeha to the country which immediately followed it. In the process I realised of course that racist ideologies had histories preceding any European knowledge of Aotearoa and that these were a vital context to the ideas that were emergent in the early accounts I was working with, so that an examination of that context also became a part of the research.

This paper will shortly be submitted for publication within New Zealand.
Chapter Six

When Racism Stepped Ashore; Antecedents of Anti-Maori Discourse in Aotearoa

Abstract

Historical dimensions to discourse studies are seen as increasingly relevant to understandings of the ways in which power interacts with ideology and language to produce and maintain particular sets of socio-political conditions. Early studies in my research project use discourse analysis to examine ways in which Pakeha talk about Maori and Maori/Pakeha relations in the contemporary setting in Aotearoa/New Zealand. Various preceding papers describe a number of regularities and patterns in such talk and examine the ways in which these function to reinforce the status quo of Maori/Pakeha relations.

This paper is an assay of historical Pakeha writings from the early 1800s to 1840, the period immediately preceding British colonisation, and makes links between interpretative resources used in this period and those highlighted in my work on the contemporary setting. From such comparisons, questions about the development of Pakeha discourses on Maori and the implications of the durability of the patterning entailed are raised. In their turn, these considerations shed some light on the degree and form of social change in Maori/Pakeha relations over time.

1 Aotearoa is a Maori name for the country which appears to have arisen after European contact, but which is used in a political context to emphasise the indigenous status of the Maori people and language.
Introduction

This paper is a report on one aspect of a larger programme of study of ideological dimensions of Pakeha discourse on Maori/Pakeha relations in Aotearoa/New Zealand. This work has been undertaken against a theoretical expectation that ideology in its diverse forms of expression has material effects in the lives and practices of people and societies.

I am using the term ideology here in the sense articulated by Billig et al (1988) as the basic framework which people use to interpret their particular everyday experiences and relate them to the common knowledge of other members of their society. This interpretative framework both resources - through a pool of arguments, anecdotes, facts and other commonalities - and constrains - through the limited range of such resources - the interpretations that will be acceptable as "natural" or commonsensical in a giving setting. Ideology in this sense is profoundly normative and expressed through language, via a diverse array of formal and informal social institutions and interactions, it represents a potent force for the maintenance of the status quo.

Published papers to date draw data from talk and text generated by Pakeha people between 1979 and 1992. The research has involved the use of discourse analysis (Potter & Wetherell, 1987) in the reading and description of a series of relatively stable and widely used themes similar to those examined by Wetherell and Potter (1992). These amount to a resource base for the construction of a discourse which justifies and legitimates the domination of Maori by Pakeha, which in turn poses politically and theoretically interesting questions as to the function and development of such patterns.

Ballara (1986) suggests that even the earliest Pakeha immigrants arriving in this country in the mid-nineteenth century came with a "set of ideas formed in Britain or other parts of her colonial dominions" about "the
natives" - in this instance Maori - and the relationship between Maori and Pakeha. Can the origins of ideas, words, phrases, images which pervade our construction of Maori/Pakeha relations be traced in the context of the history of the beginnings of Pakeha colonisation of this country? And what would be the significance of such work to the ongoing tension in the interaction of the two groups in the contemporary context? In the theoretical realm, such research can make a valid contribution to the understanding of the ways in which discourse - and more broadly ideology - develops over time, challenging our knowledge of power relations and social change.

Discourse, Racism and Historical Text

Fairclough (1993) in discussing the merits of a "critical discourse analysis" spells out the importance of the historical dimension.

> Historical change ought, in my view, to be the primary focus and concern of critical discourse analysis if it is to be relevant to the great social issues of our day. (p137)

This suggestion does not offer much insight into resolving the serious difficulties of attempting to apply discourse analytic approaches to historical data. Seidel (1985) notes that discourse is a "semantic space in which social meanings are produced or challenged" (p 44), a key site for either the critique or legitimation of social practice. History itself is a strongly contested terrain, constructed in discourse and reciprocally interactive with contemporary ideologies. Potter (forthcoming) cites Hyden White and others on the role of subjectivity and ideology in historiography and concludes
Rather than there being neutral, historical facts which historians organise into narratives, here the picture is of documents that supposedly record historical facts being generated and selected precisely to sustain particular narratives. (p38)

If analogy with cultural context is appropriate (the past is another country?) then the many problems that attend intercultural research need to be considered. Wetherell and Potter (1992) suggest that one of the dimensions of satisfactory analysis of any text is insider knowledge of the culture and context in which the text arises and, optimally, a reflexively enhanced sense of what is entailed in cultural membership. For diverse reasons, these qualities are unavailable or at least attenuated for researchers wishing to examine historical data. My response to the allure and danger of historical texts is to stress the contingency of my readings, selections and analyses of the data. I try to counter-balance these idiosyncrasies by presenting relatively large tracts of historical material and contextualising these with larger excerpts in appendices. The reader can then better assess my construction and reconstruction of the historical material.

In regard to racism, Wetherell and Potter (1992) have developed a critique of the social psychological approach to “modern racism” (cf Gaertner & Dovidio, 1986; McConahay, 1986; Sears, 1988), which further encourages a historical perspective to the study of discourses of racism. They question the assumption of a disjuncture between the overt racism of the mid 20th century and the developments from the 1960s forward and replace the theoretical constructs of conflict between affect and cognition with a notion of the ideological efficacy of particular discursive forms. Within the limits of what is possible in the examination of historical data, this investigation takes the question of continuities in anti-Maori discourse as one of its key interests.
The analysis presented in this paper arises within a survey of published historical writings about Maori by Pakeha from the time of first contact in 1642 up to the beginning of organised colonisation in 1840. In this paper I focus on three texts from the period between 1800 and 1840, but the commentary locates these within a much broader literature which includes the theoretical and philosophical contexts from which they spring. I construe this as a study of a crucial aspect of my own culture and its role in the processes of colonisation and subjugation of the Maori world. To examine some of the limits to conceptualisation, some of the normative pressures at work in the historical production of dominance through discourse, from within the dominating culture is to be better able to understand the contemporary expressions of those power relations.

Theorising Discourse in Social Relations

The theorising and practices of social science discourse analysis as developed by a number of European researchers (eg., Billig et al, 1988; van Dijk, 1984; Parker, 1992; Potter & Wetherell, 1987; Wetherell & Potter, 1992; Wodak & Matoushek, 1993) have profoundly influenced my approach to the study of the ways in which discourse and ideology interact to reproduce the cultural and material manifestations of the status quo.

While these workers span a broad range of theoretical and methodological interests, in general terms they call for the suspension of the positivist assumption that language is a neutral medium for the transmission of information. Rather, language shapes and is shaped by the uses to which it is put so that the explication of the way talk or text functions to produce particular meanings is vital to the understanding of social relations at all levels from the interpersonal to the mass political.
Potter and Wetherell (1987) call for the investigation of discourse as a topic in its own right suggesting (Wetherell & Potter, 1992) that discourse entails "quintessentially psychological" activities - explanation, identification, justification, rationalisation, categorisation, blaming, attribution - by which individuals and groups make sense of their social world. To achieve this goal, discourse must be flexible and able to manage disparate and often contradictory observations and subject positions in ways that preserve a public (and private) sense of coherence.

The theorising highlights the role of power in discourse. Aside from the overt power entailed in the speech of members of various elite groups (van Dijk, 1993), speakers in ordinary situations who can position their arguments as "natural", "normal" or "commonsense" are far more likely to be heard & accepted (that is succeed in communicating) than those who are perceived as outside or marginal to the culture of the day. To this I would add a development of the notion of "exnomination" (Barthes, 1973), in which speakers produce a universalised authority in their speech by naming any competing discourse (eg feminist, anti-racist) while failing to similarly identify their own position. Perhaps one way of reducing this effect is to describe and explicate resources used in the construction of established ideology, to thus begin to "nominalise" the dominant discourses.

From this theoretical frame the analyst's attention is alerted to the forms and functions of language at all levels, from linguistic detail to the semantic and ideological - what Fairclough (1992) has called the intra- and intertextual dimensions of text - in an effort to account for the ways in which a text constructs and communicates particular meanings. Analysis takes the form of multiple detailed readings of texts to highlight the commonalities and the variation deployed in taking a position and to draw attention to the linguistic and rhetorical tactics by which it is achieved. It is a deconstructive approach which balances its inherent subjectivity with a need to produce
accounts of accounts which, while not authoritative ("objective"), nevertheless explicate their data in interesting and challenging ways. The reflexivity entailed in this process encourages analysts to acknowledge and work from their own subjectivities and to be as public as possible in their presentation (Ashmore, 1990).

This way of working supports the use of knowledge entailed in cultural membership referred to earlier. Deployed reflexively, such knowledge amounts to a "heightened ethnographic insight" which facilitates interrogation of the assumptions and practices upon which society is based (Wetherell & Potter, 1992).

Patterns in Pakeha Talk

The broad programme began with a discourse analytic survey of a large body of written submissions gathered by the Human Rights Commission of New Zealand (HRC), from the general public of in 1979, in response to a perceived crisis in Maori/Pakeha relations. An adaptation of discourse analytic methods drawn from Potter and Wetherell (1987) and Billig et al (1988) (see Nairn & McCreanor, 1990) was used to describe the patterns of ideas, images and language use available in the data. Subsequent papers set out to examine a range of contemporary texts on the topic in the light of the patterns from the 1979 data, and find that the former are strongly reproduced in various sources including newspaper reportage (McCreanor, 1993a; McCreanor, 1994), magazine opinion columns (Nairn & McCreanor, 1991), and politicians speeches (McCreanor, 1993b).

One of the key patterns appearing very widely in the HRC data base I have labelled "Good Maori/Bad Maori" (see Nairn & McCreanor, 1991, for a detailed description). In describing this pattern I present a collage of the ways in which writers divide Maori, often in the same section of text, into
groups constructed negatively and positively; Maori who fit smoothly into Pakeha society are good, while those who protest, agitate or fail in Pakeha society are bad. This sketch outline is based on the analysis of numerous verbatim extracts from submissions and as such goes beyond what can be read in any particular rendition. Awareness of the pattern now pervades and informs my reading of such-material in ways which are probably best illustrated by example. The following excerpt from the HRC database carries many of the common characteristics.

Get rid of the stirrers and allow our wonderful Maoris to be themselves, dignified, courteous and with a great pride of race. Not the dirty, degraded, dishonest, lazy, dole bludgers that our stirrers are turning them into because they think they are being “got at”. (PI 58)

Beyond the splitting of Maori as outlined above, this tract illustrates several important dimensions that operate in the use of the pattern. Agency in the process of the negative change in Maori belongs with “stirrers”, those Maori who agitate and foment tension among their people. This construction relies on an anti-historical image of the mass of Maori people as hapless or complacent parties to their own fate. It also builds an impression of gullibility reinforced by the notion that removing the troublemakers would alleviate the Maori condition.

Equally significant is the sense that racial problems are seen as present and future and implicitly compared to some ideal past. This stance evokes a “standard story” (Fish, 1980) which sees Maori/Pakeha relations as the world’s best model of race relations (see Nairn & McCreanor, 1991 for a detailed rendition of this account). The use of the term "allow" in the first sentence signals that nothing more than preventing agitation is required to foster the re-emergence of the preferred characteristics of Maori. The second
sentence emphasises the role of the militant in the transformation of Maori, reinforcing the contrast between then and now, between harmony and conflict, between good and bad.

Finally, despite the presentation of two constructions of Maori, there is a serious asymmetry in the semantic and political weight invested in these renditions. The positive terms are relatively minor virtues in the universe of high culture, either unfocused - "wonderful" - or somewhat overlapping and even ambiguous - "pride of race" is not necessarily a good thing. On the negative side industriousness and honesty are major canons of my culture which therefore is unswerving in its criticism of any form of social parasitism. Coupled with the accusation of dirtiness, general degradation and an implicit gullibility, the effect at the level of meaning is to contrast a past acceptability with a present repulsiveness.

Beyond the reading of this extract, another important aspect of the pattern is that the division of Maori into good and bad categories is rarely done in ways which tie identifiable people into one group or the other, thus protecting the discursive flexibility of the resource. Individuals or groups who at any point in time are seen as problematic can thus be moved between categories as required, avoiding the conclusion that large groups or significant individuals are on the one hand absolutely opposed to the status quo, or on the other are such inherently fine people that their contrary opinion should carry much weight. This point, along with the characteristic pitting of the Maori population against itself, makes the resource a very powerful device in exerting normative pressure on Maori and Pakeha who question Pakeha dominance. I hear myself (and others) pose a question of the general form "If these Maori can make it, what is wrong with the ones who don't?" The answers I build from the Good Maori/Bad Maori pattern tend to blame Maori in difficulty for their own plight and direct attention away from the role of
Pakeha individuals and institutions in enacting and maintaining the oppression of Maori.

Awareness of the Good Maori/Bad Maori theme has been central to my analyses of an opinion column in a local current affairs magazine written by a prominent local business figure (Nairn & McCreanor, 1991) and a speech by the current Minister of Justice of the New Zealand Government (McCreanor, 1993b). The pattern is also clearly identifiable in other texts I have worked on and forms a crucial part of the resource for constructing justifications and explanations of the status quo of Maori/Pakeha relations that I encounter in everyday settings such as in the local school management committee and in the university department where I work. Good Maori/Bad Maori as a resource has much of the dilemmatic quality described Nairn and McCreanor (1991) and by Billig et al (1988) as vital to the commonsense notions which mediate the maintenance of "lived ideologies" and the interpretation of everyday experience. It allows users to account for diverse and apparently contradictory situations and phenomena without having to draw upon competing ideologies or make major exceptions to the established forms. Identifying and describing this and other patterns seems to undercut the process of exomination referred to earlier. To the extent that the dominant ideology of Maori/Pakeha relations (perhaps so far most clearly illustrated in the contrast between received and revisionist histories of colonisation) remains nameless and thus normalised, examination of the resources which underpin it, helps to highlight it, make it stand out from its cultural matrix.

The Good Maori/Bad Maori pattern encompasses the ideas of several other patterns (eg Stirrers, Privilege, Maori Violence)\(^2\) seemingly acting as an

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2 *Stirrers.* Our race relations would return to their former "best-in-the-world" status if only Maori agitators would stop fomenting trouble. This category includes Maori activists, militants and politicians, minority and indigenous rights advocates in the international setting, the media, and anyone else who question Pakeha dominance. Such agents act upon the otherwise happy Maori majority to create unreasonable and dangerous expectations, which threaten the stability of the established social, economic and political order.
over-arching principle for organising the interpretation of interactions between Maori and Pakeha. For these reasons, along with the realisation that it would make this initial foray into the historical realm more manageable, I decided to focus on this pattern alone. Nevertheless in the course of the working with the large historical data base of this project, it has been clear to me that several of the other patterns also enjoy wide currency.

Historical Background

In the sense of the title of this paper I began thinking about the origins of Pakeha racism in Aotearoa. There are diverse perspectives in the construction of Pakeha accounts of the arrival of Pakeha on these shores and I am unable to encompass or critique them here. Instead I fall to privileging a sliver of that which underpins and supports the investigation I am working on. Against a field of imperial colonial expansion with strong differences of power and resources between the European and the Maori at an international level, I believe this move is justified but in the end it is just that, a ploy designed to justify the position I need. To attempt to present the arguments I am working with here against a fixed historical record - for example, that benevolent intervention by superior Pakeha culture was timely and crucial to save the savage Maori from misery and self-destruction - would be untenable. Having said this I suspect that the version I offer below would attract a

Privilege. Maori have special privileges which are unfair, racist and akin to apartheid. Maori representation in parliament, Maori education housing and welfare schemes, Maori resource controls (eg fishing rights), Maori sports teams etc are all cited as examples, ignoring the fact that most of these initiatives were only necessary to compensate the wholesale dispossession of Maori through the colonial process and that they were mostly only instigated in response to profound Maori hardship as it arose from colonisation. Maori Violence. Maori (men especially) seek and enjoy violence because they are so recently emerged from the savage state that this remains an essential part of their character.

Each of these patterns relates to the “bad” part of the pattern and in their full and diverse elaborations reinforce the already obvious negative bias in the apparently two-sided representation of Maori.
degree of consensus and that many Pakeha historians (Maori may well take a
totally different view) would have little difficulty with it.

European incursion into this country involved only small numbers of
gentle minimal investments before the signing of the Treaty of Waitangi
between Maori and the British Crown in 1840. Following the Treaty,
however, tens of thousands of British colonists migrated to the country in a
very short space of years. How was it that these people, without first-hand
experience of Maori, came to have such profoundly negative expectations and
opinions of Maori as evidenced in contemporaneous accounts (eg., Maning,
1863; Martin, 1884; Moser, 1863. See also Ballara, 1986) and the
subsequent history of aggression and oppression (Adams, 1977; Belich, 1986;

Knowing that many of those earliest arrivals had been brought here
under the auspices of the New Zealand Company, I examined the history of
the programme of commercial colonisation (Adams, 1977; Burns, 1986) by
which the speculation on Maori land was to be realised. In particular I
sought the kinds of information the Company might have circulated to
prospective settlers. Reading such material showed that much of the
Company’s advertising and propaganda was written second-hand from a
primary source; the records of Europeans who had actually spent time in the
country in the early decades of the 19th century. As a result I chose to work
with these different but related texts as the data in considering the issue of
the roots of racist discourse in Aotearoa.

In examining such materials, I am accessing a very large body of
material and it is beyond the scope of the present project to deal with it
adequately. While I have read far and wide within these sources, I have
focused my analysis on summary passages in which writers give an overview
drawn from and substantiated by the array of anecdotes, reports, experiences
and so on which make up the body of the work. I suggest that in terms of the
ways in which the texts reproduce and convey the resources of a developing ideology of Maori, such passages are likely to be highly effective; not only is the observer or commentator adopting a position of higher authority (warranted by the supportive detail) in these turns but the presentation of such glosses are, when well-pitched, clear and accessible.

A further point is that I have restricted my interest to text which discusses or describes Maori directly (as distinct from references to their culture, technology or economy, for example) and in particular those which make statements about the character of Maori as a group. This has meant that a vast quantity of peripheral references to Maori, which are deployed in ways which support the central themes, are set aside.

Thus it is from this restricted base of data that I seek traces, variations, precursors and antecedents of the Good Maori/Bad Maori pattern discussed above. Even with the focus described above, I cannot reproduce all and so turn to quoting extracts which exemplify the discursive work carried by the whole texts.

Cultural Foundations

Before I commence the discourse analytic appraisal, I want to relate the data to the historical, philosophical and intellectual traditions of the pre-colonial Europe, which are the cultural context in which the data were produced. I attempt an impressionistic sketch of some of the strands that contribute to the ideology of race and “other”, which are the cultural foundation upon which specific and particular accounts are built.

The immediate context was the contemporary British ideology of race (Belich, 1986; Bolt, 1971; Lorimer, 1978); humanity was ordered from most to least advanced by means of a number of primarily physical markers, especially skin colour and physiognomy. Also significant were a range of
cultural markers such as arts, industry, commerce and weaponry, as judged from a fundamentally ethnocentric and adversarial stance. The hierarchy so constructed located peoples on a scale, at the peak of which were the English above foreign European groups, followed by the barbaric and the primitive. Among the latter, the rankings continued as can be seen in texts reproduced below, with the Australian Aborigine often represented as the nadir and the Maori of New Zealand shown as "superior".

This ideology of race encompassed an evolutionary strand which allowed that less civilised peoples might progress toward the higher planes. The frequently aired claim that the Maori had uncommon potential to advance derived from this theoretical base. Linked to the notion that the advanced nations had a duty to civilise the benighted, the "potential" of the savage became one of the key political rationalisations for colonisation from metropolitan Europe.

The evolutionary theme also carried a Spencerian notion of the survival of the fittest race. This latter element was a precursor of what was later referred to Fatal Impact Theory (Adams, 1977; Belich, 1986), which enjoyed wide popularity among Pakeha in late nineteenth century New Zealand as an explanation for the decline of Maori. This held that Maori were unable to compete in the face of overwhelming Pakeha superiority and that their demise was thus natural (that is acceptable) and inevitable.

As will be evident below, I have placed some considerable emphasis on the importance of these notions of race, because they seem to foreshadow and provide the linguistic and semantic resources for a range of reactions to Maori and can satisfactorily be regarded as an ideology in the sense in which I use that term here. If indigenous peoples could be viewed by colonists as inherently inferior, they could be exploited, cheated, killed, raped, infected, plundered and dispossessed without scruple for profit or indeed "for their own good", as part of the forced march toward civilisation.
In its turn, the British ideology of race is rooted deep in the theological, philosophical and literary traditions of the West. A study by Sinclair (1977) examines the discourse of "the other" in its broadest perspective and is able to trace the ideology back toward its roots in myth. For example he recites the legend of Gilgamesh, the king of Mesapotamia whose epic is a tale of the struggle of civilisation to control the savage both within and beyond the city wall.

The infusing of the wild with powerful negative and positive attributes is refined in the writing of the Roman Tacitus, who, in his admiration for the tribal Huns, first articulated the ideal of the noble savage. The ability to defy the Roman legions' attempted crossings of the Rhine is lauded as the triumph of the simple virtues of the savage over the grasping decadence of the metropolis. The notion that "primitives" could be at once noble - brave, strong, unequivocal in defence of home and hearth - and savage - violent, destructive, uncivilised - is striking for its departure from the perhaps logical expectation that those who resist the empire could be unconditionally damned.

Traces of this kind of flexibility can be read in the writings of European philosophers of the 17th and 18th centuries. For example, Hume (1967) conceives of a state of nature in which people are tied into a relationship of reciprocal hostility, capable of commonwealth only through contracting their loyalty and obedience to the supreme and absolute authority of the "leviathan". Locke (1949) espoused the idea that the state of nature is socially mediated by a law of nature (namely "reason") by which the people consent to commonwealth as the way of assuring their own health and well-being. Despite the fundamental differences between their positions, both writers acknowledge an essential human tension in the social forces that produce the public and the private good, order and anarchy, peace and war, in short the noble and the savage.
A study by Saum (1965) indicates that such intellectual formulations were not the province of the philosophers alone. The ideology was evident in the writings of thoughtful Europeans who were in direct contact indigenous peoples in various settings. Sinclair (1977) quotes Henry Boller, a fur trader in the mid-seventeenth century, for his assessment of North American Indian life.

I could "paint" ... you two pictures: The one would represent the bright side of Indian life, with its feathers, lances, gaily dressed and mounted "banneries", fights, buffalo hunting etc. The other side the dark side showing the filth, vermin, poverty, nakedness, starvation, superstition, etc. Both would be equally true - neither exaggerated or distorted; both totally dissimilar. (p74)

Beyond the superficial observation that this text divides the other into the noble and the savage, I note some stylistic features of this passage that are shared with some of the texts examined as data below. First it takes a similar form in pointing out two separable but interwoven images - the light and the dark - of "Indians". Further, this is done actively and reflexively as a representation. This is a problem in a world of concrete truths and is contextualised by the counterintuitive claim that the divergent images are "equally true". Perhaps the apparent contradiction is acceptable in a general ideological context of "the other" where the ordinary expectations of the form of things are suspended in a general "strange but true" format. Here my point is simply that this form of exposition is current in this era and that its reappearance in the main data I draw upon is not unique.

In different ways these diverse elements traversed in this section seem to resonate with my descriptions of the resources for the categorisation of Maori presented above. Different work is being done according to the rigours
of context and the relationship between these examples and with my findings
is more impressionistic and perhaps developmental, than functional. The
presence of these forms in writings preceding my data means that they are
part of the intellectual context in which the data arose and therefore had
some bearing on the form it takes. In this sense, they contribute to a
resource base from which which early European arrivals in Aotearoa could
construct this new "other" - Maori.

Maori in European Racial Theory

Given the point that such ideology seems to be quite broadly available to at
least some sets of educated Europeans, it is not surprising to find these forces
also at work in the construction of accounts of Maori by early European
explorers of New Zealand. Salmond (1992), in examining the voyages of
Tasman, Cook, de Surville and du Fresne, highlights two main strands
contextualising interactions with Maori.

One was the image of the bestial savage, sometimes gigantic and
physically monstrous as well as brutally cruel, which derived from
mediaeval bestiaries and theories about demons. The other was the
"savage" as the innocent, happy child of nature, free of the corruptions
of "civilised" society, the Utopian inheritor of the biblical Garden of
Eden." (p95)

The case of Maori in Aotearoa/New Zealand represents a particularisation of
the generalised ideology of the "other" and the texts of the earliest European
explorers reproduce it freely. An excerpt from the journal of the illustrious
Joseph Banks the naturalist who represented the Royal Society on the
Endeavour during Cook's first voyage, demonstrates the form common in the

The dispositions of both sexes seem very mild, gentle, and very affectionate toward each other, but implacable toward enemies, whom having killed they eat, probably from a principle of revenge. I believe they never give quarter or take prisoners. They seem inured to war ... (Banks, 1962. p12)

Such apparently contradictory images of Maori were disseminated, often substantially embellished, in material written from explorers diaries (eg., Anon, 1771; Hawkesworth, 1774) very quickly after Cook's first voyage to New Zealand was completed. These texts contribute specific interpretative strategies to encompass Maori and combine with the outlines laid down at the philosophical and theoretical levels to provide the context within which another layer of observation and writing about Maori took place.

In the years following the visits by Cook and other European explorers, New Zealand saw a gradual increase in commercial shipping traffic. Slowly, beachheads of various kinds were established and by the early years of the nineteenth century, reports from missionaries, traders, gentleman adventurers and others who had actually spent time among Maori, began to filter back to England. This small number of early European firsthand accounts greatly influenced the New Zealand Company's own representations of the indigenous people of its chosen "colonisation field".

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3 I note profoundly "gendered" nature of these sources. Accounts from Pakeha women in this period are non-existent and none are included in Ward's book. My male readings of both contemporary and historical texts are also contributory in the sense that both are basically "gender neutral", an issue I plan to develop in collaboration with a woman colleague in the near future.
New Zealand Company Texts

Among a wealth of promotional material from the New Zealand Company, two books stand out. The first is *The British Colonisation of New Zealand* (Wakefield, 1837) written by E. G. Wakefield, prime mover in the New Zealand Company, in collaboration with John Ward, a school teacher and inspector of prisons, mainly to make the political case for the "systematic colonisation" of New Zealand by the British. The main arguments were that anarchic colonisation of New Zealand by Europeans was already under way and that the Maori were of such a superior order that

"future generations of Europeans and natives may intermarry and become one people" (p29)

This notion of the "superior native" is grounded in the racial theory outlined above. The subsequent arguments further extend established discursive practice by presenting two images of Maori. Thus on the one hand Wakefield is saying "The New Zealanders are a thoroughly savage people" (p28), who are warlike, thinly populated, exposed to famine and "barbarously inhuman" to women. They massacre, enslave and cannibalise. Meanwhile, on the other hand

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4 As outlined in Wakefield's (1967) *England and America* systematic colonisation turned upon the organised transplantation of stratified British society to new realms, allowing the entrepreneurial classes to find their potential using the land and resources of indigenous groups who would benefit by becoming a brown proletariat of skilled labour.

5 This is the first usage that I have seen of the phrase reportedly used by Lieutenant Governor William Hobson at the signing of the Treaty of Waitangi at Tai Tokerau in 1840 (Orange, 1989). The "One People" pattern (McCreanor, 1993a) has long been a rallying cry of nationalism but at the hand of Pakeha invariably reproduces the historical injustices between Maori and Pakeha by assuming an overwhelmingly Pakeha national culture and identity. It is in widespread use in the contemporary setting and was one of the most common features of the HRC database.
It is equally certain however that these poor savages have a remarkable capacity for being civilised - a peculiar aptitude for being improved by intercourse with civilisation. (p29)

In this construction Wakefield notes that Maori had become Christians, been softened by their exposure to missionaries, striven to attain European advantages, practised useful arts, worked readily as labourers. Further they were excellent sailors and whalers, gathered and grew commodities for export, built ships, saved capital, valued property, operated as traders and desired regular government.

The Colonists' Handbook

The second book, which amounts to a handbook for colonists, was written by Ward (1839), now the Company Secretary who, in spite of his intense engagement with the machinations of the Company, never came to New Zealand. As might be expected in a guide to potential investors and colonists, he outlined in glowing terms the landscape, the climate, the vegetation, birds and animals, stressing above all the potential of New Zealand for British colonisation. Clearly the disposition of Maori was of considerable importance and Ward devoted a whole chapter to the "native inhabitants".

Before I look at this text as data, I want to reflect briefly on the likely impact of such material. The majority of New Zealand Company immigrants were middle to lower middle-class British, frustrated entrepreneurs, literate, but not necessarily critically or widely read. In this context the New Zealand Company literature, compiled as it is from firsthand accounts by earlier European visitors to New Zealand, carried authority on the subject of Maori people. Readers would have ample time, either before or on their three month voyage to the new country to absorb and discuss Ward's account, which may
have helped to consolidate the ideas and explain their generalisation into the interpretative resources of those who had not read the material for themselves. As Ward noted with satisfaction in the preface to the second edition, the first run of 5000 copies had sold out after just 6 months, which seems to indicate that the book enjoyed a fair circulation to an appreciative audience.

My focus now shifts to a closer examination of excerpts of text from Ward’s chapter (see appendix 5). He opens with a commentary on the size of the Maori population and then offers a general introduction to the topic of Maori people.

Their colour varies from black to an olive tinge. They are both physically and intellectually superior to the New Hollanders; but although their capabilities of cultivation are great they are yet an essentially savage people. (p60)

These first few sentences build on and extend both the European theoretical frame outlined above and the flexible, two-edged discourse of the earlier book. Beginning with colour, the key racial marker of the day, Ward evokes the hierarchy of races. This is not done directly, but speaking of colour draws upon the then commonsense classification system in which white was the pinnacle, olive an intermediate state, with black the bottom. Maori range from black (the worst) to olive (marginally acceptable). The primary classification system of skin colour is then enhanced by reference to other markers of the racial hierarchy. The second sentence is organised in a rhetorical format (akin to the disclaimer, see Hewitt & Stokes, 1975), in which the initial mildly positive statement is undercut but a second strongly negative phrase. This move establishes Maori superiority over the archetypal primitive, the Australian Aborigine, allowing a positive
characteristic (skills in agricultural production) and then, after the pivotal "but", classifying Maori with the label "savage". The use of the word "yet" in the final sentence seems to have a dual function. It has the sense of "never-the-less" which locates Maori savagery as a current characteristic. It also has a future aspect in the possibility that Maori may evolve for the better, a useful idea for persuading the doubtful that the negative qualities of Maori need not be a final obstacle to colonisation.

It is not the case that Ward is unaware of the apparently contradictory nature of his positioning of Maori, for early on in the chapter he writes

We shall endeavour, briefly, in the first place, to describe some of his habits and character as a savage; and then to cite some facts which prove that his capacity, intelligence, and moral feelings are undoubtedly such, as afford the most promising hopes, both of his own civilisation, and of his future usefulness as a member of British Colonial Society.

(p61)

However this process of the active construction of Maori, juggling disparate elements, is not apparently seen as in any way problematic. Rather the discursive flexibility is exploited to the end of achieving the fairly difficult task of persuading people to pay for the chance to uproot themselves and cross the globe in search of a new life.

Lest there should be confusion arising from this two-sided presentation, Ward furnishes a brief summary to his introduction which reinforces the idea of the uncivilised nature of Maori.

... with the physical powers and passions of men, they have at present the intellect of children, and in moral principle are too often little above
the level of brute creation. Such are the unhappy circumstances of a thoroughly savage nation. (p62)

The use of the image of the child and of "brute creation" to convey the immature and undeveloped state of Maori simultaneously, signals the potential that may yet be coaxed from them. The implication is that under the guiding presence of English culture, the good characteristics will flower to lift the Maori to a higher plane. The use of the phrase "too often" hedges the conclusion that Maori are totally amoral and suggests that Maori do have some morality or perhaps that some Maori have developed this refinement. However despite these apparent concessions, Ward proceeds to elaborate the negative side of the Maori character, barraging the reader with an extraordinary welter of detail.

They are dirty in their persons and sometimes overrun with vermin. They have scarcely known the meaning of arts, trades, industry or coin; they have no roads, beyond footpaths from place to place. Their liberty depends upon the protection each individual can give himself ... there is no system of law or government ... Their most conspicuous passion is war, and they kill and sometimes eat their vanquished enemies, scalping and exhibiting their heads as trophies. ... [they] thief with little scruple. The licentiousness of the women is subjected to no restraint until after marriage. Polygamy prevails. (p62-63)

This section catalogues the woes that justify classing Maori as savage. As such it is well calculated to have Maori compare very unfavourably with the prevailing English view of their own superiority in so many of the areas mentioned.
That these introductory remarks should be cast in this way makes good sense if their role is to establish for the colonist not only a justification for taking over the new land from a people who neither use it as god intended, nor are fit subjects to that god. For if it is possible to advance a sense that the colonists are somehow answering a call to higher duty, in shouldering the white man's burden and working to bring humanity and civilisation to heathen savages, then the case is greatly strengthened. Having achieved these prerequisites, Ward moves to lighten the load by revisiting the other side of the dilemma; the positive aspects of Maori are used to enhance the overall attractiveness of the "colonisation field".

Their character according to Captain Cook is distinguished by modesty from the other inhabitants of the south seas. They are as ardent in friendship and love as they are cruel in jealousy and revenge. There is a natural politeness and grandeur in their deportment, a yearning after poetry, music and the fine arts, a wit and eloquence that remind us in reading all the accounts of them, and in conversing with those who have resided among them of the Greeks of Homer. Their language is rich and sonorous, abounding in metaphysical distinctions, and they uphold its purity most tenaciously ... They have an abundance of poetry of a lyrical kind, of which we have seen many specimens, in a metre which seems regulated by a regard for quantity as in Greek and Latin. They are passionately fond of music. ... They excel at carving ... They have given names to each [star], and divided them into constellations ... Baron Hugel, a distinguished botanist, who visited the island, affirms, as do the missionaries, that there is not, in the northern island at least, a single tree, vegetable, or even weed, a fish, or a bird for which the natives do not have a name; and those names are universally known. (p66-67)
The passage opens with a restatement of the superior standing of Maori in the racial hierarchy and then expands upon their nobility. The "thoroughly savage nation" of a few pages earlier is now accorded many characteristics which might be proudly claimed by any civilised society. The allusions to the classical civilisations help to construct Maori society as an antipodean variant on the theme complete with its own arts and sciences. The qualifying phrase "in the Northern Island at least" appears to echo a hierarchical subdivision of Maori, evident in the source texts discussed below in a way which is tidily congruent with the broader racial theory in which it is embedded.

Ward then moves beyond the assertion of the potential of Maori for civilisation to reconstruct Maori as "superior" savages; they have actually made significant steps of advancement already thanks to contact with Europeans.

They have exhibited a curiosity, ambition and powers of observation and imitation which render them admirable learners; they manifest, especially, discernment in their estimation of the value of things... They are well acquainted with the geography of their own country, and their curiosity to see distant lands is proved by the frequent instances in which natives have made voyages to England and elsewhere. The progress they make in learning to read their own language, together with the construction of their arms, and of their war mats, which are elegantly bordered, alone indicate a higher capacity for civilisation, than that of the helpless New Hollanders, or the generality of the islanders of the Pacific.

... nothing, it is said, meets with a more ready sale, at the missionaries stations, than a cargo of soap and English blacking. The natives enter largely into commercial transactions in the sale of flax, timber, potatoes,
and pork, with the ships which visit their coasts, and such is their credit, that some of them have been trusted with 1500 [pounds] worth of goods.

(p69-70)

This discourse provides the reader with resources to construct Maori in apparently conflicting but discursively useful ways. On one hand, Maori are located within a racial theory which values the European and discredits other races by degrees of difference from this standard. This ideology contributes to the fulsome justifications of colonialism of the day.

On the other hand, Maori are located in the racial hierarchy above other groups and so represented as good, in ways which emphasise their potential usefulness to Pakeha enterprise in Aotearoa. The focus on the good attributes enhances the contrast with the savage along a number of dimensions, such as honesty, cleanliness, morality, intelligence. In the context of colonising the country, this construction provides benchmarks which help to divide the Maori population between those who will fit in with Pakeha goals and standards and those who will not. In short Ward presents Maori as a clear example of the noble savage.

In practical terms these views amount to a series of justifications for choosing among Maori, rewarding those who co-operate and rejecting or punishing those do not. Such a resource is profoundly functional in a young colony where actual survival, particularly in the first decades after 1840 was heavily dependant on the nurturance and protection of Maori (Belich, 1986). If Maori were completely savage, there would be no way of making sense of, and so benefiting from such realities, without compromising the belief in the racial superiority of Pakeha. At the same time, the heart of the colonial enterprise is the capitalist exploitation of the new land, which rejects such tenderminded notions as the rights of indigenous people and must allow and
encourage its agents to remove all such obstacles from the path of the accumulation of profit and power.

The First-Hand Accounts

The number of published first-hand accounts available to the New Zealand Company as background to its own publications was small. While oral sources and various unpublished reports are also cited, these are beyond the scope of the present project. Aside from the logs and diaries of the European explorers, the first-hand accounts span a period of sporadic European contact with Maori from about 1800 to 1840. I have read as many as possible of Ward's references and present analyses of extracts of two of these.

I have chosen these two texts for different reasons. The book by John Savage (1807) is the earliest published account that I have found of direct experience with Maori since the reports of the European explorers. Savage, a surgeon stationed in Sydney who visited Tai Tokerau briefly en route for England in 1805, casts a very different eye upon the land and its people than do Cook and his cohort. Although far from expressing colonial aspirations, the tenor of his report stresses the bounty and desirable ambience of Aotearoa for Europeans, in decidedly romantic terms. The second book was written by Joel Polack and published in 1839, the same year as Ward's book. Polack spent about six years trading among the peoples of the Kaipara and Hokianga districts from the early 1830s and overtly expresses both his contempt for Maori and his desire for the land and colonisation. His accounts are long and full of detail and with his personal positions so firmly nailed to the masthead, comfortably accessible to read. I feel that together these authors offer some span over the decades in question and contrast a naive romanticism with an almost cynical self interest.
Savage had spent some time at the Sydney colony before his departure for England and in that time became familiar with a developing oral tradition about Aotearoa and its inhabitants. He records expectations that he bore before he met Maori.

In a country that has been described as being peopled by a race of cannibals, you are agreeably surprised by the appearance of the natives, who betray no symptom of savage ferocity ... (p14)

These first comments about Maori seem to presage an ongoing ambivalence; a reputation for "ferocity" is balanced against favourable first impressions. Thus civility demands that

When the ship is bought to anchor it would be unfriendly to prevent them coming aboard in moderate numbers; but it would always be prudent to be provided with firearms and other means of defence ... if appearances induced them to believe that there was a probability of their attempt [to take a ship] succeeding, it is scarcely to be expected that they would not make it. (p17)

Read as whole the passage builds rhetorically around the central "but", with the requirements of propriety undercut by the preparations of prudence. This seemingly superficial dilemma is directed by a deeper ambivalence toward Maori. In a particularly clear articulation of commonsense notions of the noble savage, the doctor is "agreeably surprised" by the appearance of Maori, but it is still "to be expected" that they will be treacherous. This introduction is followed by an summary which overtly places Maori in European racial theory.
The natives of New Zealand ... are of a very superior order, both in point of personal appearance and intellectual endowment.
The men are usually from five feet eight inches to six feet in height; well proportioned and exhibit evident marks of great strength.
The colour of the natives, taken as a mean, resembles that of the European gypsy; but there is a considerable difference in shades, varying between a dark chestnut and the light agreeable tinge of the English brunette.
Their countenances are in general open; and though you are not alarmed by any marks of savage ferocity, you clearly discover signs of undaunted courage and a resolution that is not easily shaken. (p25)

Savage speaks to a context which allows the ranking of Maori to be made without the usual overt comparisons with other uncivilised peoples. Maori are "other" and the first sentence reinforces their difference by naming them "natives". The distinction is strengthened by implicitly comparing characteristics attributed to Maori with some unspecified standard (presumably other "natives"), leaving British superiority uncontested and confirming the racial hierarchy. The third sentence takes up the signifier of skin colour in equating Maori with gypsies; by association this accesses the derogatory evaluation that this group would ordinarily attract. The use of the term "agreeable" juxtaposed with an English sub-type, serves as a understated reminder of the writer's personal bias.

The second and fourth sentences here reproduce in subtle form the fundamental ambiguity of Savage's view of Maori. He restates the formidable physical presence of Maori men, which linked with the comments on courage and resolution, tempers the suggestion that there are no outward signs of incipient brutality. Yet their underlying constitution predisposes
Maori to an uncomplicated assertiveness in the face of any perceived transgression.

A Trader's Story

Joel Polack wrote copiously from his personal experiences, producing both rollicking anecdotal narrative and generalised observations which are presented as the truth about Maori. Polack's account is on the surface at least, thoroughly self-contained and authoritative.

The New Zealanders when first discovered, were a ferocious and barbarous people, principally delighting in the practice of war ... (p4)

This representation of the essential nature of Maori, is familiarly supplemented by another side to their character.

Unlike the inhabitants of the various islands in the South Pacific Ocean, who are as indolent a race of beings as exist on the globe, the New Zealanders have ever been from necessity an industrious people, principally agriculturalists and fishermen. The nation consists of two aboriginal and distinct races ... The first may be known by a dark brown complexion, well-formed and prominent features, erect muscular proportions, and lank hair, with the boldness of gait of a warrior, wholly different from that of the second and inferior race, who have a complexion black-brown, hair inclining to wool like the Eastern African, stature short, and skin exceedingly soft. (p6)

Polack's analysis is built around a series of contrasts. Each split is Eurocentrically judgmental and entrenches a two part discourse of Maori;
warlike but industrious, barbarous but superior, and divisible into good and bad races as a nation. Considering the latter for example, the words used and their associations, elaborate the dichotomy between superior and inferior conveyed at the semantic level. Thus the “warriors” accrue positive terms such as “dark-brown”, “well-formed”, “prominent”, “erect”, “muscular”, while their inferiors are “different”, “black-brown”, “wool” haired (like sheep?), “short” and “soft”. The detail establishes and supports the overview; this hierarchy reflects the noble/savage ideology and is useful in justifying differential treatment of groups and individuals within Maoridom.

Conclusions

These firsthand accounts provide early articulations of an emergent ideology of Maori as a particularised example of ideology of the noble savage, so strongly reproduced in the New Zealand Company texts. Both Savage and Polack locate their observations of Maori within established English racial theory and achieve a two-edged presentation of Maori. They give the appearance, greatly enhanced in Ward (1839) of “seeing both sides”, while leaving no doubt as to the superiority of Europeans. Savage exhibits a prior knowledge of a European oral tradition which carries preformed ideas about Maori and Polack’s writing has a clear historical perspective, referencing and citing earlier accounts which he blends with his own experiences to enhance the authority of the images he presents.

Many of these features are repeated in other writings from this period which cover a range of institutional and personal perspectives including the churches (Nicholas, 1817; Yate, 1835), the military (Cruise, 1820; McCrae, 1924; Duperrey, 1824), a gentleman adventurer (Earle, 1832) and an academic (Craik, 1830). I have examined these diverse accounts of Maori and the general forms of these ideas from the philosophical and historical
writings of European tradition, both to help me understand how Ward came to the views he presented and to contextualise them in relation to a contemporary readership of immigrants to Aotearoa/New Zealand.

I note that Nicholson (1987) reports similar patterning in later representations of Maori in a study of the relationship between discourse and colonial policies around Maori health. Images of Maori including "the noble savage", "the ignoble savage" and "the romantic savage" have justified and supported different and often contradictory practices, sometimes concurrently. Nicholson builds his analysis on the work Bernard Smith who earlier related such ideological elements to the ways in which visual images of the Pacific and its people were recorded by early European visitors.

This study supports the theoretical expectation that patterns in Pakeha talk have a durability, that they have roots and that they change and develop over time as the needs of different historical contexts dictate. I suggest that the linguistic resource and practices represented by the Good Maori/Bad Maori pattern in the contemporary setting has arisen from earlier usages, which are most easily recognised in the historical commonsense notion of the noble savage. Clearly my assay has only examined this aspect of Pakeha construction of Maori at two disparate points in its development and in a limited array of applications but I suspect that findings of broader study and diverse settings will support the notion of continuous change around a stable core over considerable time frames.

The approach I have taken traces one marker within what I perceive as a slow but steady application of the ideology of the "other" to Maori in Aotearoa/New Zealand. This process assumes the tailoring of observation and experience according to the theoretical expectations, into a semantic and linguistic resource from which Pakeha could construct functional and discursively flexible accounts of Maori, which would in turn influence and be influenced by, their interactions with Maori. While the accounts of
encounters between Maori and Pakeha are shot through with confusions and contradictions in terms of the power dynamics that prevailed, there is a general sense in which the practices and ideologies of the Pakeha have gone hand in hand. In this model the point that the commonsense notions of race amount to an ideology of European superiority, determines that the fledgling power relations entailed in the early contact will be those of European domination and oppression and as such its arrival marks the point at which racism stepped ashore.

A Discussion

In this closing section I want to briefly touch some of the theoretical and practical implications arising from the paper. I am aware that there are numerous possibilities here (reflexivity not the least of them, cf note 4). I begin by revisiting the position of Wetherell and Potter (1992) with respect to "modern racism". This is well supported and I argue that on the basis of this study that the modern and historical expressions in relation to Maori are strikingly similar in both form and content, further emphasising the value of approaches which move beyond the traditional essentialisms of social psychology. We can account for the continuities and changes in discursive and ideological practice in terms of the evolution and flexibility of the discourse which is differentially expressed according to changes in the social climate, without theorising fixed attitudes.

There is a point which extends Wetherell and Potter's analysis to account for the dominance of particular forms in what might otherwise be taken for a "level playing field" of competing Pakeha ideological positions on Maori. In referring to these constructions of Maori, I have used the terms "two-edged" and "divergent" to try to capture the semantic basis upon which the images rest. On reflection this turn of language functions at different
levels to produce different effects. It is true that it preserves discursive flexibility in that speakers can make their constructions of Maori fit the requirements of communicating successfully with a particular audience. It is also true that being able to say - On the one hand ..."Good Maori"; on the other hand ..."Bad Maori" - facilitates the perception of a speaker as reasonable, balanced, "even-handed" and so trustworthy, believable, convincing. These two elements, which might reasonably be conceptualised as profoundly opposed, work together to produce an overall cohesion which can encompass the diverse experiences that Pakeha have of Maori. They seem to collude in a kind of self-contained system which can provide for most explanations and interpretations required by Pakeha in the process of colonising and dominating Maori.

Beyond this analysis however it is also true that there is a certain asymmetry to the usage, which ensures that in the end the speaker does not abdicate superiority; in short the savagery in "the other" will always outweigh the nobility, and so at a fundamental level this form helps support and perpetrate the extant evaluation of Maori and so the status quo of Maori/Pakeha relations. I note parallels with an earlier analysis (Nairn and McCreanor, 1991) in relation to discourses of sensitivity/insensitivity where in the field of Maori/Pakeha relations, Maori were characterised by Pakeha as sensitive or hypersensitive (with all the pathological undertones) in relation to their culture and its valuing. Pakeha were seen (by the same observers) as insensitive to Maori culture, but insensitivity was explained primarily as a function of ignorance and therefore a relatively easily solved issue. Again the apparent even-handedness is undercut by the judgmental loadings carried by the differential terms. This "unequal equality" of the asymmetrical pairing is

6 Interestingly many writers in the HRC database tried to make Maori culpable for what was on the surface a Pakeha fault, by implying that Maori have withheld or otherwise failed to inform Pakeha as to the crucial dimensions of their culture.
strongly at work in the use of the term "noble savage"; the mitigations of the first word will never outweigh the essentialism of the second.

However, at another level this vesting of differential persuasive power in different forms amounts to a kind of "psychologising" of discourse; speakers draw upon shared resources to facilitate communication and the commonalities have to be carried by the discourses available to individuals, in order for this process to work. To explain the impact of a particular text, I need to include an account of what the reader/listener brings to the interpretation. I see this as meaning that the resources are in some sense "in my head" at least as much as emanating through the social realm. This proposal builds on the idea taken from Billig et al (1988), to the effect that thought is heavily patterned and ideology strongly flexible. Clearly it is at odds with the anti-essentialism of some sociological and postmodern theorising, but I advance it as a way of accounting for both the coherence and durability of ideological traditions and the effortlessness with which they are reproduced by individuals and institutions.

These conclusions also have considerable practical educational significance for Pakeha New Zealanders attempting to deal with the consequences of colonisation. Having invested some considerable energy in working with such people (me!), I note the value of a Barthesian "nomination" of the racist ideology of Maori/Pakeha relations - and some of the resources from which it can be constructed - as a way of problematising and challenging its authority. I see this paper as extending the possibilities opened by the various discourse studies already available on the topic. These may seem trivial moves and yet they are vital if we as Pakeha are to change what often seem, from the whirlwind of life, natural and eternal verities which are never-the-less at the heart of our exploitation and oppression of Maori.
Chapter Seven

Concluding Comments

Given my publicly pro-Treaty analysis of Maori/Pakeha relations in Aotearoa, this thesis has been one of my responses to the question - "What useful contribution can a Pakeha social researcher make to redressing the injustices?" Both Maori and Pakeha have crucial contributions to make to this process and while the Maori interests and expertise may be clear, it is my firm belief that committed Pakeha have a unique role. As insiders to the oppressing culture we have access to knowledge, institutions, and experiences that Maori do not have and while there are many blockages, proscriptions and disincentives to using it, we retain the subversive possibility of carrying out an intercultural equivalent of Adrienne Rich's "disloyalty to the patriarchy".

At very least we have the responsibility to reflect Pakeha ways of seeing the world and our relationship with Maori into the public realm where it can be subjected to a debate entered by Maori and Pakeha without the distorting effects of hidden knowledge and agendas.

The papers of this thesis have been devoted to the examination of a range of discourse-based data in which Pakeha people describe and elaborate individual and especially broader cultural relationships between Maori and Pakeha in both talk and text. In the context of oppressive and exploitative political and social relations, this discourse serves important hegemonic functions in diverse fields of expression and communication by constructing, reflecting and reproducing the status quo. I have sought to expose, to name, to own and critique aspects of this discourse.

A key theoretical underpinning for me has been in the radical discontents over the political dominance of science in the production and legitimation of knowledge, arising with in the philosophy of science. When
applied to our intercultural field, I see this pattern as generalising freely to the dominance of Kawanatanga over Rangatiratanga.

Within the discipline of social psychology, my perception was that despite the venerable "crisis" of the late 1970s and early 1980s, which was in part a response to the relativist critique of science, little had changed and I became impatient with waiting for established social science to provide the means and directions for guiding social change. Thus, I became very open to calls for new approaches to social issues, especially those which commend a turn to language, such as those made by Michael Billig, Kenneth Gergen, Margaret Wetherell, Jonathan Potter and others. In moving to take up the challenges, I have tended to use the theorising of others and to concentrate on developing ways of dealing with textual data of various kinds, in order to tap the wealth of understanding - hitherto ignored by social psychology - that it carries.

The papers presented here, to an extent chart a journey (which is ongoing) through which I have learned about some of the possibilities and pitfalls, from the technical to the political, of one form of discourse analysis. They cover the initial phases of investigating the basis of the discourse of Maori/Pakeha relations, from the first efforts at evaluation and description through to the generalisation beyond the original data base to the deconstruction of texts from other sources and ultimately other eras. Looking over the corpus I find myself reluctant to attempt to draw threads into a finished fabric when the field is so vast and complex and my grasp upon it feels so tenuous. There are however some interesting loose ends which to me represent the potential for theoretical development and practical application of what has been begun here and I wish to turn the remainder of the work to unravelling these a little.

If it can be said that I have succeeded in conveying some useful impressions of the resources from which speakers can build arguments that,
in a variety of ways deny or undercut the sovereignty, rights and subjectivities of Maori and so contribute to their ongoing oppression and exploitation, then I count that as reflexively valuable to our attempts to bring justice and equity to our society. If people can see the basis upon which their constructions and interpretations of the issues are built, they are the better able to consider the implications and develop alternatives than if they are convinced that their view is natural, commonsensical or otherwise inaccessible to criticism. I see this work as helping Pakeha come to terms with Maori challenges and the renaissance of their culture and as complementing the revisionist histories of the country which have emerged in the last decade.

Although the work is focused exclusively on Pakeha discourse, it has been a surprise and delight to me that Maori academics other workers have made many positive and encouraging comments on its usefulness both in terms of methods and findings. From feedback on the practical work I have done with other Pakeha seeking change, and some responses from Pakeha academics, I am satisfied that these materials are among the useful tools that people can wield in the process.

A general observation of a different sort relates to my perception of the changes in Pakeha discourse that, in spite of the magnitude of movement over 150 years, are to me the more dramatic in the last 15. The theme of this year's New Zealand sociology conference was social futures and a strong vein running through this was that the notion of the "hybridisation" of discourses and ideologies as the old demarcations - for example between market and welfare ideologies, between feminist and patriarchal analyses - blur and fade, will be the key to understanding where we are headed. While such forces are undoubtedly at work in the relationship between Maori and Pakeha - there is after all a steadily emergent Maori middleclass - my feeling is that the cultural dimension remains unanalysed here. While the Pakeha discourse in
this area has undergone small shifts of emphasis from the complacent certainty of the early 1980s to the strident, discursive tour de force of Bob Jones and the eloquent reconstructions of Doug Graham, it also shows much of the instability that is a necessary precursor to major change. Yet although I see the situation balanced on the brink, my feeling is pessimistic; that the changes will be in the direction of full scale retrenchment into ideologies of Pakeha superiority and monoculturalism.

Beyond these general points in the theoretical realm, lies a far more controversial issue which begins to emerge toward the end of the cycle of papers. Of the various patterns in Pakeha talk that are discussed, I count two in particular as falling into a category which could be a basis for arguing a hierarchical relationship among the ideological resources I have been working with. Both the Good Maori/Bad Maori pattern and the One People pattern seem to overarch and contain a number of the others and also appear to generalise to constructions of the other in different contexts of marginalisation. I have worked on projects examining the social construction of homosexual people and of elderly people and reported the operation of parallel usages in these fields. Informally feminist colleagues have commented on similarities with the resources engaged in the discourses of the oppression of women.

In the One People and Good Maori/Bad Maori patterns there is something at work beyond the clear discursive and rhetorical efficacy of the ideas and the arguments which flourish from them. They are respectively fundamental expressions of inclusion and exclusion and of categorisation, by which the power and resources of society can be discursively apportioned. Without endorsing the psychological branches of a human sociobiology, the first foray into the roots of the GoodMaori/Bad Maori discourse illuminate the operation of ancient and highly adaptive forces seemingly useful for both individuals and broader social groups in making sense of and taking control of
their experience. I wonder if this and a small number of other patterns are not among a set of organising principals in a psychological survival kit which, refined and developed to meet the needs of each situation, has been passed from layer to layer of European - and in this specific instance Pakeha - culture, through myriad generations.

In using the term "organising principle" in this way I am highlighting a psychological dimension to discourse but I do so with a clear vision of the sociological forces with which this is inextricably tied. In attempting to grapple with the success of these argumentative forms, I am constantly aware of their dependence on the coercive power that underpins them. I am also signalling a role that the evoking of such patterns has in the marshalling of other elements and on the structure of an argument. The relationship with the rhetorical form of the GoodMaori/Bad Maori pattern and the disclaimer seems more than incidental. There is something inherently attractive/persuasive about both the apparent even-handedness and the ordering of the elements. The initial construction/acknowledgement of the disclaimed, facilitates its subsequent destruction. In a cultural context where strategy and tactics are acknowledged positive values that blend with a kind of modesty which entails the personal taking second place, this is far more successful than laying out your own claim first and adding the disclaimer, apparently as an afterthought. This approach helps to pre-empt the accusation that I have overlooked an alternative viewpoint, that I am wrong because I am one-eyed, or biased.

Small wonder then that anti-racism programmes in their various forms have little impact on behaviour; the ideas that sustain expressions of racial prejudice are inscribed very deeply in the rituals and expressions of our culture in all its manifestations from the most trivial to the sublime. Individuals resisting the daily flow of ideological reproduction have but a limited range of options and wherever they are not watching the current
continues to eddy and wear. When the energy, the life required for such a stand is gone, the stream flows over and on with only a ripple to show what has eroded away.

A second theoretical issue arises from the observation that much of the discourse of Pakeha people in this context can be accounted for in terms of the patterns described in the thesis. A strong implication from this idea is that Pakeha have a circumscribed array of resources to use in the interpretation of Maori/Pakeha interactions. While flexibility and a heterogeneity between competing ideological constructions may mitigate against this constriction, the more powerful forces are those of norming and conformity. It is in the relating of particular discourse to parent ideology in this way that the unique contribution of social psychological discourse analysis lies. In this sense this style of discourse study goes some distance toward resolving the tension between psychology and sociology over the theorising of individuality and identity. In the New Zealand context discourse may be a crucial factor in opposing the "atomisation" asserted in Miles Fairburn's accounts of the social history of colonial Pakeha society.

Reflections

In this concluding section of the thesis I look briefly at the development of my analytic process, the relationship with the efforts of other researchers and the potential for further research in the area.

Discourse analysis has been at different times in the course of this project, a security blanket, an inspiration and a millstone. My understanding of what is entailed has expanded and developed quite considerably through the process and I think that being able to say what it is, and thus to an extent what the significance of what I have done with it is, is of some importance. And I also see such definitional work as a site of ongoing (fruitful?) tension.
both among discourse researchers and between the former and those who apply more traditional positivist theoretical frames to fields of common interest.

Perhaps a starting point in talking about my style of analysis is to say that it is eclectic rather than schooled and leaning in the direction of semantic interpretation rather than linguistic explication. It is true that I have in places emphasised the contribution of linguistic structures and elements of text, but this is usually done only as a way of highlighting the functions of such phenomena in the communication of meaning. I have often felt this as a weakness, that if I took a firmly reductionist linguistic approach, every phoneme would be accounted for and meaning would lie "wriggling on a pin" of empirical certainty. I have frequently admired the work of Norman Fairclough in this vein; his almost magical demonstrations that semantics is no more or less than the sum of the semiotics of the speaker. And yet as I reflect and react to these achievements, I find that the grounds shift, the boundaries blur, the subjectivities collide and obscure, and meaning drifts and changes against the fluid and fractured backdrop of experience. In the end I have to work from that place and live with its inherent uncertainty.

I have used two forms of analysis to meet the different requirements of different stages of this project. These I have informally characterised to myself as "sharp" and "blunt", although in fact they are quite similar, overlapping in terms of the skills and processes involved. There is a difference in aim which calls for a different focus to the reading; the "blunt" form seeks to describe and characterise large bodies of data in terms of generalised patterns of ideas and language common to the pool. In this process I try to set aside the judgmental aspects of my own subjectivity in order to read without protest or argument the positions advanced in my data texts. I find this a taxing process and the readings are always nothing more or less than my own interpretations. But the collaging of numerous interpretations of
texts on the topic allows me to produce the general descriptions of the content and function of the resources to the topic.

The "sharp" variant of my process uses the general forms articulated in the first stage to deconstruct and explicate particular instances of text in terms of the ideological matrix in which it stands. It is an active process in which I often engage in open criticism of arguments and positions in the data, drawing heavily upon my own position and experience to foreground the commonalities and understandings shared by speaker and listener in the construction of the text. Here my aim is to be able to detail the extent to which a text relies on the knowledge and acceptance of both writer and reader of the orthodox form of the ideology of Maori/Pakeha relations.

When I started looking at the HRC data at the beginning of this project, the system of discourse analysis proposed by Jonathan Potter and Margaret Wetherell offered the promise of encompassing the quantity of data in a manageable way. In that setting my process was heavily descriptive and there was little room, beyond a detailed contextualising of the origins of the submissions, for much consideration of the reflexive dimensions of what I was doing. Despite my interest and awareness of the debates over relativism in the philosophy of science, I covertly saw myself as a reading machine, processing the data to provide as neutral as possible an account of what the writers were saying. To be fair on myself, I suppose it can be noted that the metaphor I chose - active listening - carries the seeds of a subsequently highlighted subjectivity, but the tension between the detached, dispassionate description and the partial, engaged, deconstruction of subsequent papers, remains undispersed. Despite all the caveats, I find that the brief sketches of the linguistic resources, produced from the collaging of verbatim extracts of data, around themes taken from repeated readings of the mass data, produces an extremely useful tool in the subsequent explication of particular examples of topic text.
But there is only so much that can be done with description and while I have never suggested that I have a complete coverage of the resources of anti-Maori discourse, reading Wendy Hollway on subjectivist science and Malcolm Ashmore especially on the sociology of scientific knowledge, laid down a challenge as to how a more reflexive social science might need to approach the topic. For in the shift to a post-positivist theory of knowledge there has been a change in the goals researchers can legitimately set themselves. If the aim is no longer to claim authority, facticity, for the interpretations we make of the accounts other people give of phenomena, then we are freed from the positivist forms of knowledge creation.

It is curious to me that the creativity, the inspirational subjectivity that has so long been the touchstone and cause for celebration in the arts is so difficult of birth, so harsh of rights of passage in social science. Those illogical flashes of brilliance that great thinkers have bequeathed us are regarded, if discussed at all, as aberrations, freaks and good fortune - "serendipity" as one behaviourist philosopher craftily puts it. This imbalance between art and science on this issue comes in the end from the relative power vested in these different spheres of activity; disciplinary power is greatest where most power is at stake.

So the move toward a reflexive approach in discourse is a double jeopardy in that the heresy of challenging the scientific method is the more delinquent if it happens within the temple walls, particularly in psychology where scientific status is guarded with a jealous paranoia. But the controversy of one era can, as the history of science demonstrates so eloquently, be the commonsense of the next and so it seems a gauntlet worth running. Moving as it does beyond the old dichotomies of generalisation and particularisation, of objectivity and subjectivity, between science and non-science, this way of working can produce socially relevant and accessible
analyses and critiques of the social order without the adoption of completely fictive forms.

The experimental use of this approach in chapters 3 and 4 especially allowed me to settle some personal ghosts so that in the final essays, I feel I am again writing as observer/participant and in a rather more balanced and uncomplicated way. The result is a style of discourse study which, while self-aware, resourced from my own subjectivity and acknowledging of its limitations, is never-the-less unapologetically partisan and political in its analysis of data and critique of mainstream ideology. These developments add to my collection of tools for interpreting discourse and I will continue to use them as the data and context suggest.

Latterly Teun van Dijk (1993) and Norman Fairclough (1993) among others, have moved to entrench discourse analysis (or in their construction "Critical Discourse Analysis" - CDA) in a more conventional positivist theoretical mould, respectively calling up foundations in cognitive psychology and linguistics as fundamentally necessary to maintaining the standards and credibility of research. In doing so they attempt to establish a moral and political superiority over other forms of discourse analysis and lay down methodological and theoretical prescriptions that would undoubtedly rule my contribution beyond the pale of science (good or otherwise). Yet despite the numerous protestations of political concern for the oppressed and commitment to social change, I remain sceptical as to whether their programmes are inherently more likely to result in the desired material effects than are those of my colleagues and I. In this sense it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that their call for standards and "unity" is in part at least an exercise in empowered gate keeping of a most ironical kind.

One of the major dangers in refusing to confront the intertwined issues of relativism and reflexivity is that CDA must paradoxically present itself as theoretically committed to the notion of social construction in any discourse,
but immune to the philosophical requirement of consistency that its standards must apply to its own products and discourses as well as those of its topics. In the positivist world of publication and grant funding these kinds of apparent contradiction are intolerable and CDA is left having to try to steal a piece of the mantle of science in order to proclaim its ability to discover truth and fact in the way people see their worlds. Naive perhaps but my feeling is that the field should remain open and unrestricted and that while standards are of the greatest importance that these should be debated and negotiated rather than imposed by the elite.

Reactions

Thinking about the strictures raised by the proponents of CDA has prompted me to a consideration of other ways in which I can assess the impact and significance of what I do. In this context I have sought reference to my research and findings in the publications of other Pakeha workers. While the references to my papers are sparse (perhaps inevitable in the New Zealand context, given the recent publication dates) there are two that I would like to comment upon.

The first is in a sociology of education thesis by Sue Abel (1992) that looks at constructions of Maori and issues of Maori/Pakeha relations in television coverage from a two week period in 1990. Within a theoretical investigation concerned with ideological and hegemonic functions of the news media, she has used the "One People" pattern as a framework for her description of what she calls television's "dominant discourse" of Maori/Pakeha relations. The dominant version is predictably, in a range of ways, privileged over various alternative accounts and so acts as the anchor to the coverage of particular issues, ensuring the expected reproduction of the dominant ideology at the expense of its competitors.
Abel also makes use of other themes including Good Maori/Bad Maori and Privilege, in the same way but to a lesser extent, and there are numerous cross-overs in both her theoretical model and her findings on the effects of ideological dominance in the media. An example of this latter overlap is in the common conclusion that when the media do seek Maori comment on issues it is often rendered incomprehensible or risible by the way in which it is presented.

The second paper, written by Larry Berg and Robin Kearns (1995, forthcoming), geographers concerned with the power of the naming of places, has used my accounts of established discourses of Maori/Pakeha relations to contextualise general theory of ideology and identity politics to Aotearoa. They have used my accounts of both dominant and alternative discourses to account for the construction of arguments opposing the changing of place names from Pakeha usages back to the original Maori names. Their analysis makes use of many of the patterns including "Stirrers", "Privilege", One People", "Maori Inheritance" and Maori Violence" to place elements of submissions to the Geographic Board, within an anti-Maori or racist discourse.

In the context of academic reactions to my research, there is a tension that I must acknowledge. Margaret Wetherell and Jonathan Potter, often the source of theoretical and methodological inspiration to my work, have in practice, made little use of my findings, despite the strong overlaps in topic and orientation with their own numerous studies in the area. To keep a balance here, it is equally true that while I have used their theoretical framework extensively in the development of my own style, I have made only sparing use of their findings in augmenting my analyses.

I have thought long as to why this should be the case and my best understanding is that despite the commonalities, there are still fundamental differences between their goals and mine in this work. Their main metaphor
for their later assays of Pakeha discourse has been "mapping". They devote some energy to developing the analogy between their discourse analyses of language and the charting of territory. Initially I assumed that my work would be, in terms of their analogy, high-resolution closeups of small sectors of the larger territory they were working through. On consideration, and particularly as the openly reflexive work of the middle papers developed, I have come to see what I do as standing in relation to their corpus as a travelogue stands in relation to a map. My analyses are more idiosyncratic, subjective and rooted in everyday experience and less closely integrated into the theoretical base. The accounts I have written relate to both map and territory but replicate neither. Like a travel writer, I talk about what happens in different parts of the territory, customs, usages, experiences, histories and how I react and relate to these. Like a travel book, this work may be more or less interesting and useful to others who visit the territory, but it can never be definitive and authoritative in the sense that the map is. While I am content with this image, I am also sensitive to the peril of being seen less as a Naipaul or a Chatwin than as some dreary, superficial camel train plodding through the pages of National Geographic.

I suspect that a major slice of the divergence arises from the point that mine is a hands-on, experiential approach that daily faces and deals with the diverse problems of the topic, including straight political work for change by Pakeha and ongoing consultations and daily contacts with a cross section of Maori people, politicians, neighbours, colleagues, activists.

I am not critical of the approach that Wetherell and Potter use. It has great strengths arising from its coherence with theorising and research in the global setting and benefits greatly from a little dispassionate distancing as well. I look forward to closer communication with these workers which I believe will greatly strengthen my contribution to pressure for social change.
Directions

From the outset a major goal of the research programme entailed in this thesis has been to develop applications which can help facilitate positive changes in social relations between Maori and Pakeha in Aotearoa. In this sense the studies gathered here have been a testing ground for one style of analysis with a particular kind of data. I see this as belonging within a stable of qualitatively oriented methodologies, by which social relations can be examined, critiqued against standards of justice and changed where they are found wanting. I envisage therefore that the major developments to flow from this work will take the form of action-oriented research projects with quite specific foci and incorporating a range of evaluation procedures which will ensure that both communities and funding agencies will achieve the various aims they have for the research.

So I am pleased to be able to report that the framework and findings have been the basis of a recent successful grant application to the Health Research Council of New Zealand. The proposal which was examined by local and international referees before acceptance, holds the promise of application of the techniques and analysis developed in this thesis and its various satellite projects, and by my colleagues in their research, to a more tightly defined topic area, namely the role of discourse and communication between doctor and patient in the ongoing crisis in Maori health.

This investigation is an initial survey of the resources that Maori clients and Pakeha general practitioners use when talking about Maori health. The project will be carried out by a bicultural team which will separate for data collection and analysis within their own cultural context before regrouping to make comparisons between their independent findings. Central goals are to examine the degree of overlap and difference between the culturally specific discourses and to develop strategies for resourcing the two
groups to improve the accessing and delivery of the necessary services required to materially change Maori health for the better in this country. The initial project is seen as a foundation upon which a range of other focused investigations can build, accounting for example for the roles of different health professionals and the contributions of different sectors of the Maori population.

Obviously the project is only in its earliest beginnings at this point but I take it that institutional support for its orientation and scope, is in some measure an affirmation of the development work entailed in this thesis. There will be plenty to learn along the way and that has been a crucial aspect of the thesis and the work that flows from it.
Straight Talking About the Race Crisis - Bob Jones

(1) Waitangi Days looms boringly, ominously and absolutely uncelebratoraly, and so too does yet another inevitable setback for fast fading harmonious race relations in this country. (2) Once again our news media will sensationalise the tiresome spectacle of Maori protesters and their sycophantic fellow travellers screaming hatred at "whitey". (3) And across the nation Whitey's alarmingly growing contempt for all things Maori will be intensified. (4) Because right now if I am any judge, most New Zealanders (and I include an enormous number of Maoris in that category) have had an absolute gutsful of the one-way racist shouting and insults from a bunch of parasitical, snouts-deep-in-the-public-trough Maori malcontents, adept only at using the system, public money and the media to further their racist whining and abuse. (5) Let me speak for middle New Zealand and report the message I receive every day, loud and clear in the workplace, socially and at play. (6) What is being widely spoken of in private and must surely erupt publicly if this obscenity is not nipped in the bud abruptly and soon, is that non-Maori New Zealand, which is nearly 90 per cent of our people, are just not going to take it any more. (7) The signs are portentous, not only with the hard-hat Archie Bunker brigade, but more telling in the bitterness now all too apparent among the trendy, urban liberals who a decade ago were prepared to buy any Maori message, no matter how preposterous, on demand. (8) When a radical or minority cause loses the support of that lot, then it has lost
everything and the end of the road is nigh. (9) We are a multi-racial nation.
(10) The vast majority are European. (11) The biggest minority are Maoris.
(12) Additionally there are large groups of Pacific Islanders, principally
Samoans, and smaller minorities of Chinese, Vietnamese and others. (13)
And by and large every group with the exception of Maoris are making it.
(14) They are employed, law abiding and in a general sense progressing;
each generation doing better than their predecessors and each living
fulfilling and happy lives. (15) With the tragic exception of Maoris. (16)
Maoris dominate our crime statistics, dominate our prisons, dominate our
unemployment sector, dominate our sickness statistics, dominate our
welfare dependency categories. (17) Maoris it would seem are in big trouble.
(18) What sort of people abandon literally thousands of their children to live
Calcutta-style in the streets, huddled together in shop doorways, living off
scraps and charity? (19) What sort of people turn the other cheek when
literally thousands of their young men form into gangs to rape and murder
and pillage and generally declare war on society? (20) The answer we are
told is a people who profess a unique only-to-them, special aroha; a
collective caring and love of the extended family. (21) It simply doesn’t
wash any more in the face of such compelling evidence to the contrary.
Maori Activists Take Over Lodge
By Sue Scott, Maori Affairs Reporter

Maori protestors have taken over a luxury lodge north of Whangarei, saying that they will stay there until the Conservation Department agrees to return land to the Ngati-wai people.

Protest leader Howard Reti said the group of seven young Ngati-wai planned to stay at Mimiwhangata Lodge indefinitely. The group was frustrated at the time it took to win land back from the Crown and wanted clear signs that the department was willing to discuss the return of the 3194 ha Mimiwhangata Coastal Park.

The protest group took over the lodge during the weekend, arriving at the same time as a family that had booked the lodge for a long-planned holiday.

The Wilson family had been invited to stay on at the lodge with the group, and was offered the homes of group members as alternative holiday accommodation, Mr Reti said.

The family declined and returned to Auckland.

Mr Reti said Ngati-wai had people had been researching the land’s history for a Waitangi Tribunal claim, but the process was costly and time consuming.

The land was precious to Ngati-wai, he said.

The purpose of the protest was to draw attention to the issue. Mr Reti said he hoped kaumatua would support the young people’s stand. ...
New Zealand Herald, 10.5.1990.

MAORI PUPILS PERFORM POORLY SAYS REPORT

NZPA Wellington

Nearly one third of Maori boys are held back at primary school, says a Statistics Department report about social trends in education.

The report shows Maori children performed poorly in nearly every aspect of the education system, except Te Kohanga Reo (Maori language nests).

Maori children did not stay at secondary school as long as non-Maori children and were more likely to leave without qualifications.

On the positive side, statistics show Maori attendance at pre-schools had almost doubled and in 1987, half of all Maori pre-schoolers attended Te Kohanga Reo.

The report said between 20 and 25 per cent of primary school children were not promoted from the junior classes each year.

Thirty percent of Maori boys missed promotion each year, which meant that by standard 1, only 70 percent of Maori boys were in the appropriate class for their age, compared with 79 percent of non-Maori girls.

Consequently, Maori students were more likely to have fewer years of high-school education before they reached age 15, than their non-Maori contemporaries.

"They are also more likely to reach 15 years of age before they have sat any formal examinations, leaving them ill-equipped to compete for work in a labour market which increasingly requires qualified recruits from the
education system, and where unskilled jobs were declining in number, "the report said.

The report showed the Maori retention rate at secondary school had improved since 1976, but still lagged behind the non-Maori rate. Twenty-eight percent of Maoris stayed to the sixth form in 1987 (compared with 63 percent of non-Maori) up from 18 percent in 1976 (62 per cent).

The Maori seventh form retention rate increased from 2 percent (18 percent for non-Maori) to 7 per cent (27 percent) over the same period.

The report also showed that Maori or Pacific Island children tended to have higher rates of enrolments in special schools.

Responding to the statistics, the Minister of Education, Mr Goff, said increased parental involvement and support was the key to Maori pupils’ success.

The other challenge was to improve the relevance to young Maoris of what was taught in schools. Mr Goff said the Government was also working on initiatives to promote changes in the junior secondary school curriculum to improve the achievement of Maori pupils.

It was also encouraging more Maori to train as teachers. He noted that the number of Maori trainees had more than doubled between 1982 and 1987.
Appendix 4

Transcript of a Speech given by Hon D.A.M. Graham, to the Wellington Division of the National Party, at Porirua, on Saturday, June 6.

[1] Madam Chair, ladies and gentlemen.
Thank you for the invitation to be with you. I have come somewhat unprepared because I'm a substitute for my colleague Doug Kidd. You will be able to tell the difference in physical appearance if nothing else.

[5] Doug Kidd's the gentleman who can [unclear] himself of his suit jacket merely by shrugging his shoulders. I have a somewhat more difficult time. I want however, to say how pleased I am to have this opportunity to discuss with you, somewhat briefly, matters which are dear to my heart and I suspect they are dear to all New Zealanders

[10] although many may not realise it and it relates to the relationship that we have as a country between the Maori people and everybody else in the country and what we are doing to resolve some of the problems that clearly exist.

If you look back over the last twenty or thirty years I think we would [15] have to be concerned at some of the statistics that have come through. There is no doubt at all that the Maori people have not been able to lift themselves up in educational standards the way we would prefer.

Our prisons are full of Maori people. There are 4100 people in our jails at the moment, some 22,000 are under some form of supervision by the [20] courts or probation and a very large percentage of those, far outweighing their percentage of the population, are Maori. Now if we say to ourselves why is this, why do we find that we have a very sizeable minority of our population in the lower socioeconomic group? I don't think its adequate to say - "oh well they have asked for it" - or - "they don't try."
I think we have to say why do people generally not succeed whoever they are and I think the answer to that is that sometimes they've lost faith in themselves and I think we all loose faith in ourselves from time to time and therefore if its your neighbour who looses faith then you feel obliged to do something about it and so should we. 

Why have they lost faith? One of the reasons I think is because for literally decades their cry for redress for matters that occurred many years ago has gone unheeded. Now to many New Zealanders that's a nuisance. They don't know what the grievances are. They believe they all occurred in 1840 or thereabouts and therefore its far too long ago to worry about. They feel uncomfortable that somebody should be saying - "why don't you fix this up?" - year after year and when we do fix it up, they come and say - "why don't you fix it up again?" So matters are relitigated and people get annoyed and I can understand that. But the sad fact is that a lot of these incidents in the grievance claims did not happen in 1840 at all. Some happened in 1970 and those that did happen over 100 years ago are not something which were ignored for a century and then somebody dreamed them up a few years ago and they've been the subject matter of debates since they occurred and if we have turned our back on it time and time again it was because it was uncomfortable. We preferred to think of our Maori people very warmly with great affection but in a rather patronising way that they played rugby very well and they were good fellows. But what's all this about their grievances and I want to talk to you about them for one or two moments now.

Not all grievances are valid. Some grievances are based on a misconception of what happened in the past and when the
evidence was researched properly it was found to be quite wrong. It didn't happen like that at all. Now up until the Tribunal started there was really no place for them to go. If they went to the Government, the [55] Government normally did nothing or if it ever did do anything it had a rather perfunctory look into the historical facts and then decided itself what it was going to do about it if anything. It tended to impose what it thought it would do.

When the Tribunal came along at long last there was somewhere for the [60] Maori take their grievances and have them aired. And the Tribunal researched the facts. Sometimes they spent years looking at what happened, studying the documents, all of which are still there or most of which are still there and then they came down with certain findings and they said well we've looked at it closely and this is what we think [65] happened. Sometimes they made recommendations and they said we think the Crown (because it is addressed to the Crown) might consider that this is the way to act from here on to try to resolve this matter.

Why are we bothering you might say. I'll tell you why we are bothering. We're bothering because we have to. We're bothering because if we do not [70] we have an aggrieved minority for another few decades and your children and mine and our grandchildren will have to face up to it sooner or later.

And I don't believe that the Treaty, the Tribunal, the negotiations caused division in society. I think that's simply nonsense. What it does is bring [75] the two together. If we can resolve these matters and put them behind us and in my negotiations with Ngai Tahu they say to me clearly that they want to get out of grievance mode and into productive mode. So its a matter of bringing people together and we must face up to it and Governments over the past decades have not done that very well.
[80] Can I tell you one or two grievances so that you have some idea for those of you who have not had time to look into them. Some of them haven't got much to do with the Treaty at all. In the Ngai Tahu case 30,000 acres at Akaroa was sold but Ngai Tahu never got any money. The buyer got the land but the Maoris didn't get any money, a breach of [85] contract. In Ngai Tahu's case millions of acres of land were bought by the Crown which was the only one who could buy it. They paid 7,800 pounds for millions of acres and today's analysis shows that a fair price at the time would have been 2.1 million pounds. We paid 7,800. Not only did we short change them but we agreed to set aside 10% of the land for Ngai [90] Tahu for their future development and we didn't do it. So having bought 35 million acres of land we should have set aside a very large number of reserves and we set aside 6000 acres and where we did it was normally vertical or swamp land.

Now funnily enough Ngai Tahu say, well we went into these deals in good [95] faith and we've come out the other end with not very much. As a result of that our people have been unable to develop and the Tribunal's findings were that they really had been disinherited and that common word now marginalised.

And what About Ngati Rangiateaorere in Rotorua. They have a mission [100] farm by the side of the lake. That farm is about 300 acres. They gave it to the church to build a church and a school. They built a church and a school. They burned down about 10 years later and the land's been vacant about 100 years, owned by the church. For 30 years the church has been trying to give it back. All that was required was a one line [105] amendment to a piece of legislation - never done. We're doing it now - the cost to the Crown, zero. The restoration to Ngati Rangiateaorere, fantastic. They came to my office and sat in front of me and they said - "Minister, this is the first time we've been to Wellington" - some of them -
"We're terribly embarrassed to take up your time. We've been writing to [110] the Crown for 30 years and we haven't even had a reply." So we are fixing that up.

Just over the hill is a lake, Rotokawau, as you turn right to go to Whakatane past the Rotorua airport - it belongs to them. The Crown came along and said - "we would rather like to have that lake thank you [115] very much" - and they said - "no." The Crown said - "but we want to turn it into a reserve so that people can come and have a picnic on the shore" - and the Maori people said - "but its our lake, its our heritage. There are burial grounds, all sorts of things, we don't want to sell." The Crown then went to the local body and arranged for the lake to be rated.

[120] No other lake in New Zealand is rated. The Maori people couldn't pay. The intention was that the Crown would buy it under a rating sale. Last week we agreed to pay the rates off and cancel it all. That wasn't 1840 that was in the 1960s.

There is some land in Kaikoura - its twelve miles wide, a beautiful valley [125] running down to the sea. The Crown went to buy it from Ngai Tahu. They said - "we don't want to sell." So the Crown took it for a road, twelve miles wide. In 1908 we passed the Public Works Act so that if the Crown wanted to take your land for roading it was surveyed off and you got compensation but the way it was worded meant that the Maori people [130] didn't get any compensation and that continued until 1974.

And if you drive from Auckland to Matamata down route 27 along long doglegs, along a long straight and then you suddenly turn right for 2 or 3 miles and then another long straight and they are going through the Maori blocks because they never paid for them. And so it goes on.

[135] Now these are grievances which have been around for a long time. Sometimes they have been resolved. Sometimes we thought they had
been resolved like Bastion Point, but the law changed and enabled that to be relitigated and it was.

And it is frustrating for people who don't understand and many New Zealanders don't understand and those who set out to try to understand generally never look back. In fact there is a risk that you become so embarrassed about it all that you go to the other extreme and lose your objectivity. It's not because you have suddenly become guilt ridden with what happened in the past in the sense of the grievances and the wrong-doing and the land-taking. I don't feel any guilt about that. I feel guilty because we haven't fixed it up and we have got to fix it up if we want the Maori people to hold their head high.

Now the Tribunal recently bought out a finding on Te Roroa which is up north and it caused a great deal of fuss. I have to say I think the recommendation there was unwise. It could have been worded in a much more placatory way. They could have said that the Crown talk to the farmers who find on their land that there is a wahi tapu or a sacred place to see if some satisfactory arrangement can be reached or something like that. Instead the Tribunal said we recommend that the Crown purchase this land whatever the cost. It did not say that the Crown must purchase the land but that is how it was taken by the farmers and perhaps understandably it caused a lot of upset.

Now it's important to realise, and I'll say it again, claims by Maori people are against the Crown. They seek redress from the Crown. Crown assets only are available, not private land. But private land is the subject matter of the claim. The Maori people say look I had those 100 acres over there which are presently being farmed by Fred Bloggs and I lost them, they were taken from me wrongly. That's the subject matter of the claim.

But they are not saying - "And I want that 100 acres back." Some of
them might like it back but they are not going to get it back and so we are going to change the law I think to make it quite clear that the recommendations cannot recommend the compulsory acquisition of private land.

Now they are difficult issues. They are very complex to resolve. You have no precedents to work from. Its no use looking up a casebook and saying that that's how we approached this one. Its difficult to get a consistency of approaching them and you have got different tribes looking at things in a different way. Tainui in the Waikato looks at it totally differently than Ngai Tahu in the South Island.

Tainui had 1.2 million acres of land confiscated after the Waikato wars. We returned about 400,000 acres of those not long after. We gave it to the wrong people but we returned it. That left 800,000 acres and Tainui simply say - "Whatever you've got left now, give it to us. We're not worried about all the other thousands of acres that have gone and been sold, but can't you do that?" I don't know whether we can but we are looking at it to see what it involves.

Now the thing to realise is this. If we can resolve these things it puts to rest that feeling of dismay, of hopelessness. It also means that applied properly, the Maori people will no longer be totally dependant in such large numbers on state dependency. So for those of you who have little sympathy for Maori claims and are more interested in the mercenary aspects of it, they may like to think lightly that there will be some tax relief in the long term from the benefits that can go back.

But it also does something else. It means that the Maori people can suddenly find their own soul again. We may find more and more of them going through the universities, and they are. I was at Turangawaewae the other day and they had a graduation ceremony. I
went down and watched O'Regan get his honorary doctorate at
Canterbury University. My daughter was being capped the same day
which was very fortuitous and the number of young Maori people
going across that stage and getting a Bachelor of Arts degree or whatever
it was, was very encouraging and each one of them acknowledged the
presence of Tipene O'Regan and the other Maori leaders that were there.
It was very symbolic and moving. Nobody took offence and I wanted to
say to you that I believe we are very lucky in New Zealand, very
lucky. I believe that New Zealanders are very fair-minded people. When I
go and talk about Maori issues to people they say - "I never realised, I
never knew what it was about, for God's sake fix it up."
But we are also lucky because we have the Maori people amongst us and
they are very fine people. They are marvellous. And for those of you
who have never been to a marae and you have never seen the orators
inaction I suggest you try. You will be made welcome and it is a fascinating
experience. It is greatly uplifting to your soul as well as everybody else's.
So we have to bring the races together in New Zealand. We can only do
that if we face up to some of the things that have gone wrong in the
past and we have to act decisively to fix them. It is taking an inordinate
amount of my time. We have negotiating sessions that last four or five
hours at a time, two or three time a month.
But I have never heard an outrageous claim. I have never heard anybody
suggest that what is given in redress is something which seems to
me stupid, foolish, if anything the other way. They are trying to say -
"Look lets see if we can't agree on this because that's the way to resolve
it." To acknowledge where we were wrong, where we weren't we don't, but
where we were we do, and then to try and resolve it in a satisfactory way.
I would like to see those matters put behind us. I think we all would
and it will require a lot of patience and tolerance from all New Zealanders
and you are the leaders in your communities and you can give it. We can either be in tolerant or we can be tolerant. We can either be impatient or we can be patient. We can either approach these problems which go to [225] the very heart of our society with some compassion, or we can forget about it and push it off on to the next generation and leave it for them to worry about. But one thing's for sure, if we do not face up to it they are not going to go away. Don't fool yourself.

There are a great deal of good things happening in Maoridom. A great [230] deal is being done to try and help the Maori people in the prisons to find their feet. There are all sorts of things, all sorts of programmes here, there and everywhere all over the country. Educational standards are being lifted. We've suddenly realised there are problems in health and glue ear and things like this and they are being remedied now.

[235] I do not believe that we ought to separate policies for Maori over here and separate Maori access. I don't think we want to have separate Mana Enterprises. I think we ought to streamline government assistance to all New Zealanders and it will so happen that Maori people will get their share because they are at the bottom. Now Maori have an input about [240] how best they can be applied but I believe they should be mainstreamed. I think we have spent too long paying money over here through Maori Affairs and it was lost and got nowhere.

But I do urge upon you to think carefully about resolving some of these matters which seem to be long ago. If we do, we have a chance of bringing [245] it together. I think we have that chance. I think we do have a lot of goodwill between the two now and long may it remain so.

When you listen to the rain on the roof and you know what is happening in our little country at the bottom of the South Pacific and you realise just how blessed we are and how often we seem to find it necessary to [250] criticise each other, try and knock over the ones that are doing
well, crush the life out of somebody who's fallen from grace perhaps of his own volition. Is it not time we started to have some compassion for each other and try to help and not be critical. Try to inspire instead of defeat. And try to lead instead of follow. Now that is what we have to [255] do. We have to do it as a party and we have to do it individually and if we do, this will continue to be the greatest country on earth.
Chapter Five; The Native Inhabitants.

Pages 60-70 from Information Relative to New Zealand.

The actual number of the natives in New Zealand is very small - quite insignificant indeed in proportion to the extent of the country they inhabit. We do not know the number accurately, but we believe the entire population of both islands does not, at the utmost, exceed 160,000. Mr Foster, who accompanied Captain Cook, estimated the population of the Northern Island at 100,000: and in a letter from the Rev. Wm. Williams, one of the missionaries of the Church Missionary Society, to the Secretary of that society dated 10th February, 1834, it is stated "I believe the population of this (the Northern) Island does not exceed 106,000, of which about 4000 are in connection with our station at Kaitaia to the northward, 6000 with the Wesleyan station at Hokianga and 12,000 with our four stations in the Bay of Islands. The number in the Thames is about 4800; while those in the Waikato, a district in the same parallel as the Thames, and on the Western coast, are about 18,000. Along the coast of the Bay of Plenty, and as far as Hicks Bay, are about 15,600. From Hicks Bay to Hawkes Bay, the number is about 27,000, concentrating in two principal places. There are now no other inhabitants in the Southern part of the Island, except in the neighbourhood of Entry Island, where the number is about 18,000".

Comparing this estimate with other statements particularly those of Mr Nicholas and Mr Polack, there is reason to think the opinion of the last-mentioned writer to be pretty correct, in supposing the population to be in the proportion of five persons to every three square miles, which, taking the extent, in round numbers at 95,000 square miles, gives 158,300 as the total number of native inhabitants of the New Zealand group.
"The New Zealander", says a recent writer, "possesses a character which, at no distant period, may become and example of the rapidity with which the barbarian may be wholly refined, when bought into contact with a nation which neither insults nor oppresses him, and which exhibits to him the influence of a benign religion, in connection with the force of practical knowledge". We shall endeavour, briefly, in the first place, to describe some of his habits and character as a savage; and then to cite some facts which prove that his capacity, intelligence, and moral feelings are undoubtedly such, as afford the most promising hopes, both of his own civilisation, and of his future usefulness as a member of British Colonial Society.

The New Zealanders seem to belong to the same race as the other islanders of the South Seas, and their language is radically similar to that of Otaheite and the Sandwich Group. Their colour varies from black to an olive tinge. They are both physically and intellectually superior to the New Hollanders; but although their capabilities of cultivation are great they are yet an essentially savage people. We will not attempt to disguise the black side of the picture. They are dirty in their persons and sometimes overrun with vermin. They have scarcely known the meaning of arts, trades, industry or coin; they have no roads, beyond footpaths from place to place. Their liberty depends upon the protection each individual can give himself; consequently although territory is divided among various independent tribes, there is no regular system of law, or government, in any. Their most conspicuous passion is war, and they kill and sometimes eat their vanquished enemies, scalping and exhibiting their heads as trophies. This latter practice may remind us that the head of Oliver Cromwell was exhibited for several years over the door of Westminster Hall, and that it is not a century since the heads of the rebel lords of 1745 were exposed to the public gaze on Temple Bar. But, we regret to add, infanticide is still not uncommon, particularly of female offspring. The spirit of revenge is implacable in their breasts; The law
of retaliation is their only rule for the reconcilement of differences, and their hatred of their enemies is deep and deadly. Many of them are covetous of accumulating property and thieve with little scruple. The licentiousness of the women is subjected to no restraint until after marriage. Polygamy prevails, and it is usual for the head wife to commit suicide after her husbands death. They have a propensity for ridicule and insult; and in short, with the physical powers and passions of men, they have at present the intellect of children, and in moral principle are too often little above the level of brute creation. Such are the unhappy circumstances of a thoroughly savage nation. Their religion is a confused pantheism, which has no moral influence. They entertain a superstitious dread of an "Atua" or supreme being and adore the sun, moon and stars with many minor divinities. It is curious that they regard the creation as the work of three principle deities operating together, and also hold that the first woman was made from the first man's rib, their term for bone being euee. They have an order of priests or tohungas, who are "keepers of the Gods" and act as physicians; in which respect their labours are light as diseases are stated to be almost unknown. When the body of a chief killed in battle is to be eaten, the priest gives the first command for roasting it, and when roasted eats the first few mouthfuls as the dues of the Gods. The priests also exercise very summary powers - one of them is represented as killing, with his own hands, a woman who went on board ship contrary to his orders and a man, on another occasion, for stealing potatoes.

Their physical appearance is for the most part very fine; Both men and women are very tall and well made, and some are very handsome, although their faces are disfigured by tattooing. The Children according to Mr Earle, are so fine and well made that each might serve as a model for an infant Hercules. The forms of the men are athletic, and those of the young women graceful, their limbs delicately rounded. The latter have expressive eyes, and a profusion of long silky hair, Mr Nicholas says describing a chieftain - "There
is an easy dignity in the manners of this man and I could not behold without admiration, the graceful elegance of his deportment, and the appropriate accordance of his action. Holding the pattoo-pattoo in his hand, he walked up and down along the margin of the river, with a firm manly step, arrayed in a plain mat, which being tied over his right shoulder descended with a kind of Roman negligence, down to his ankles; and to the mind of a classical beholder, might well represent a toga, while his towering stature and perfect symmetry, gave even more than Roman dignity to the illusion." In another place he says, "Duaterra's two sisters were the most remarkable among these, one of whom was distinguished for her uncommon beauty, and the other for the facetious vivacity of her manners. The former appeared about seventeen and would have been deemed, even in England, where there are many rivals for the palm of beauty, a candidate of the strongest pretensions. Her regular features, soft and prepossessing, displayed a delicacy, the effect of which was heightened by the mild lustre of her eye; and her cheek, lightly tinged with the roseate hue of health, needed not the extraneous embellishment of paint to which some of our finest belles are so fond of resorting. In her figure she was slender and graceful, while the artless simplicity of her manners gave additional interest to her charms.

Lieut. Breton says - "They are a fine race of people being well formed, athletic and active." He then gives extraordinary instances of their activity and strength, while employed as sailors on board English vessels. Mr Savage says - "The natives are of a very superior order, both in point of personal appearance and intellectual endowments. The men are usually from five feet eight inches to six feet in height; well proportioned and exhibit evident marks of great strength. The colour of the natives, taken as a mean, resembles that of the European gypsy; but there is a considerable difference in shades, varying between a dark chestnut and the light agreeable tinge of the English brunette."
Their food is simple, consisting chiefly of vegetables and fish; they have no flesh meat, or fermented liquors, till they became acquainted with British settlers; they naturally dislike intoxicating drinks and indeed drink very sparingly of any liquid. This simple diet, their freedom from labourious occupation, their constant habit of living in the open air, and the natural salubrity of their climate, keep their bodies in admirable health, as is proved by the rapidity with which they recover from severe and dangerous wounds. Their superstition is however fatal to the increase of their numbers; for example, no sick person is allowed to remain in their cabins. A patient seized with inflammation of the lungs, rheumatism, or any disease, is obliged to live in the open air, day and night, at all seasons; and the most tender females are delivered of their children out of doors. Many of them are no doubt killed by exposure in this manner to cold and rain. On being remonstrated with against thus exposing themselves to cold, they have made answer, "If Atua wished it so it must be; They could not strive with the great spirit." The practice of polygamy, and that of occasional suicide, by females under the influence of jealousy, have also tended to diminish their population.

Their dress consists of a great many different articles, made chiefly of the flax of the country, and suited to the different seasons of the year; the outer garment, which they use in cold wet weather, is very warm, and completely impervious to the rain.

When not at war, they are engaged in the cultivation of their vegetables, or in getting in the harvest, or in fishing, or in making distant excursions, or in social festivities and amusements with which the tribes frequently entertain each other. Many of them possess great humour and liveliness, and they converse in their animated manner for hours together. If a New Zealander is struck, even in jest, the blow must be returned. A curse is considered as an unpardonable injury and they often relieve themselves by suicide from a sense of disgrace. their affections are very strong. When they
meet after a long separation, they join their noses together (which is a usual mode of salutation) and will remain in that posture, sobbing and crying for half an hour; the same takes place as might be supposed, previous to a separation; the women cry and cut themselves with sharp shells, till the blood flows profusely. In their war dances, the sounds of scorn and hatred they utter, added to the ferocious expression of their countenances, and the violent motion of their frames, are calculated to inspire the highest degree of terror.

Their character according to Captain Cook is distinguished by modesty from the other inhabitants of the south seas. They are as ardent in friendship and love as they are cruel in jealousy and revenge.

There is a natural politeness and grandeur in their deportment, a yearning after poetry, music and the fine arts, a wit and eloquence that remind us in reading all the accounts of them, and in conversing with those who have resided among them of the Greeks of Homer. Their language is rich and sonorous, abounding in metaphysical distinctions, and they uphold its purity most tenaciously, although they had no knowledge of writing until the missionaries reduced their dialect to a grammatical form. It is radically the same with that of Tahiti and of the kindred nations. They have an abundance of poetry of a lyrical kind, of which we have seen many specimens, in a metre which seems regulated by a regard for quantity as in Greek and Latin. They are passionately fond of music. Mr Nicholas speaks of "a plaintive and melodious air which seemed not unlike our sacred music in its many turns, as it forcibly reminded me of the chanting in our cathedrals."

They excel at carving, of which their war canoes, carrying one hundred men are specimens. They display their natural talents also in their pursuit of astronomy. Mr Nicholas assures us also that, "they remain awake during the greater part of the night in the summer season, watching the motion of the heavens and making inquiries concerning the time when such and such a star
will appear. They have given names to each of them, and divided them into constellations and have likewise connected them with some curious traditions, which they hold in superstitious veneration. If the star they look for does not appear at the time it is expected to be seen, they become extremely solicitous about the cause of its absence and immediately relate the traditions which they have received from the priests concerning it."

Baron Hugel, a distinguished botanist, who visited the island, affirms, as do the missionaries, that there is not, in the northern island at least, a single tree, vegetable, or even weed, a fish, or a bird for which the natives do not have a name; and those names are universally known. Baron Hugel was at first incredulous about this; he thought that, with a ready wit they invented names; but on questioning other individuals in distant places he found them always to agree.

The most striking of their social institutions is that of chieftainship. Society is divided into three principal gradations: the Areekees, or chieftains; the Rangatiras, being the gentry of middleclass; and the Cookees or slaves. The Rangatiras are bound to the Areekees only in war; but the Cookees are held in complete slavery by the combination of the other two orders. Prisoners taken in war, if permitted to live, re reduced to the condition of slaves. The ransom of a slave is easily effected, but slavery is, notwithstanding, a source of grievous evils to the lower classes of natives, which the introduction of British laws appears to be the only effectual mode of suppressing. The upper classes, whilst they have a certain feeling of honour, often treat the their inferiors with great barbarity, against which at present there is no adequate control.

The habitations of the natives are in little villages, or groups of huts, scattered thinly along the coast and harbours; the mountains of the interior not being inhabited. The villages are sometimes on the top of a hill or promontory, and within a rude fortification called a pah. Wars are constantly
occurring between different tribes; and once begun they pass from one tribe to another, till the whole country is in an uproar. Feuds are prolonged by the custom of every chief exacting payment in kind for the relatives whom he may have lost in battle. There is however an officer bearing the venerable character of herald or peacemaker, whose medication is employed to bring about reconciliations.

The practice of taboo, though productive of some inconveniences, has been found of great use in dealing with the natives. It is a superstition by which people or things are invested with a scared character. The tabooed person is obliged to separate himself from the rest of the community; and the tabooed thing, whether it be a heap of provisions, a burial place, an article of domestic use, or a tract of land is invariably defended against even the touch of a New Zealander.

In considering the New Zealanders, as under the influence of a civilizing process, they will appear to susceptible and desirous of improvement to a remarkable degree. They have exhibited a curiosity, ambition and powers of observation and imitation which render them admirable learners; they manifest, especially, discernment in their estimation of the value of things. They know full well the difference between a mere trinket, and what is really useful. Although ignorant of the art of writing, they make a good facsimile of English penmanship. They are found of trying to speak English, and their desire of European clothes, and other comforts, is represented as very general. They are well acquainted with the geography of their own country, and their curiosity to see distant lands is proved by the frequent instances in which natives have made voyages to England and elsewhere. The progress they make in learning to read their own language, together with the construction of their arms, and of their war mats, which are elegantly bordered, alone indicate a higher capacity for civilisation, than that of the helpless New Hollanders, or the generality of the islanders of the Pacific.
With such a foundation to begin upon, it is not wonderful that the labours of the missionaries should have met with great success. The missionaries have in fact, accomplished a revolution in New Zealand, and have prepared the way for an enlightened colony, that would not only protect but co-operate with their labours. They have taught their Christian converts a knowledge of agriculture, and the mechanical arts, and have organised schools for both sexes, in which several thousands have been taught to read and have acquired the elements of European instruction. As a proof of the thinking powers of the natives, they have been known occasionally to dispute the missionaries interpretations of the Scriptures. Their eagerness indeed to be taught anything and everything is attested by every writer, and by all the voyagers who have held intercourse with them.

Dr Lang assures us that, "the best helmsman on board a vessel by which he once returned to England, was Toki, an New Zealander." "Nothing," says Dr Lang, "could divert his attention from the compass, or the sails, or the sea; And whenever I saw him at the helm, and especially in tempestuous weather at night, I could not help regarding it as a most interesting and most hopeful circumstance in the history of man, that a British vessel of four hundred tons, containing valuable cargo, and many souls of Europeans, should be steered across the boundless Pacific, in the midst of storm and darkness, by a poor New Zealander, whose fathers had, from time immemorial been eaters of men."

When among civilised people, either in England or in New South Wales, they have accommodated themselves with wonderful facility to the habits of civilised life, and have even excited surprise by the propriety and gentleness of their manners; nothing, it is said, meets with a more ready sale, at the missionaries stations, than a cargo of soap and English blacking. The natives enter largely into commercial transactions in the sale of flax, timber, potatoes, and pork, with the ships which visit their coasts, and such is their
credit, that some of them have been trusted with 1500 [pounds] worth of goods.
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