
Figure 1: Nga Tamatoa at Te Rapunga Marae, Waiomio, 1972.

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Abstract

This study discusses the origins, development and outcomes of the first wave of radical Maori activism between 1968 and 1978. It charts the events of the period and the body of politics, philosophies and strategies employed by Maori activists. It contends that the discipline of history as currently practised becomes problematic when it is applied to the study of non-western cultures, and that scholars undertaking research into Maori histories and communities need to develop a model or metaphor for writing history which is sympathetic to Maori epistemologies and priorities.

To this end the text focuses primarily on the words and actions of the activists themselves in order to better understand the way activists conceptualized their world. Activists’ ideas and politics should not just be studied in a ‘race relations model’, that is, in terms of their impact on society and the Pakeha public, and the reaction of the government. Taking activism out of the race relations model and examining it on its own terms throws the movement’s concerns, subtleties and contradictions into sharper relief and provides a deeper understanding of its significance.

The thesis is centrally concerned with how activists defined themselves, their actions and their politics, and will argue that Maori activism was implicated in the era’s emerging politics of identity. Maori activism was as much about reforming Maori and Pakeha attitudes towards Maori culture, society and identity as it was about policy and legislative reform. Furthermore, the thesis attempts to explain the influence on, and contribution to, the activist movement of three interrelated contexts: te Ao Maori, the Maori world, Aotearoa, national events, and te Ao Hurihuri, the international setting. It also pays special attention to the gender politics of the era.

The work is divided into four chapters. The first covers the Maori world and the ‘big three’ issues of Maori activism: the Treaty of Waitangi, land loss and cultural alienation. The second chapter discusses the national context and the ‘big three’ issues of national politics during the era: apartheid sport, the Vietnam War and class politics. The third chapter deals with the international framework and the influence of global trends on local events, while the fourth chapter details the emergence of the Black women’s movement.
Tohu Maumahara

He tohu aroha tenei mo Mihi Ora,
Moe mai kotiro, moe mai.

He tohu maumahara hoki mo papa Wiki Henare,
Haere, haere.
He Pepeha Mo Enei Ra

Tera te uira wahi rua, i runga o Poneke,
   I te whare miere,
   Whare pou i te ture,
   Pou Tinihanga.

Ehara ia nei he tohu no te mate?
Kia miere ko Ngati Maori, uri tangata
Whare wawahi i te wairua o Te Tiriti
Kawanata tapu i herea e nga matua,
Ki te remu o te kahu o Wikitoria.

I hua hoki ratou ka maringi mai,
   Ko te waiu, ko te miere reka,
I puakina e te pukapuka a te mihinare
   Waihoki te hua,
   Te takahi mana huti pouwhenua.

Topea ana e Heke te haki a te Kuini
Rukuhia ana e Kawiti te Atua-o-te-po.
   Maea ake, he toto te kai,
   Riro ana Nga Puhi ki nga niho o Tu.

Titiro whakarunga ki Orakau
   Ko Rewi Maniapoto,
   Ki te maunga houhunga ko Titokowaru,
   Ki a Te Whiti-o-Rongomai, Tohu-Kakahi,
   Taroi-o-te-riri,
   Kei Ngati Toa ko Te Rauparaha,
   Kei Tuhoe Potiki ko Te Kooti Arikirangi,
   Enei pokai tara, kahui toa,
   I wheke nei,
   Kia toi-te-kupu, toi-te-mana,
   Toi-te-whenua.

Na Rev. Maori Marsden *
Mihimihi

Ko Motatau ki runga, e tu kaha ana,
Tu tonu, tu tonu e!

Ko Taikirau ki raro, e rere mai ana,
Rere mai , rere mai e!

Ko Ngatokimatawhaurua te waka tupuna,
I hoia nei mai i Hawaiki nui, Hawaiki roa, Hawaiki Pamamao,
Hoia ra, hoia ra!

Ko Te Manu Koroki te whare tupuna, e manaaki ana,
Koroki nga manu i te ata, koroki nga manu i te po!

Ko Ngati Hine te hapu, Ngati Hine pukepuke rau,
He puke, he rangatira,

Ko Hine Amaru te tupuna,
He wahine whakaiti, humarie, hei ropiropi i tana uri.

Ko Nga Puhi Nui Tonu te Iwi, e wero atu nei,
Nga Puhi Kowhao rau, Nga Puhi taniwha rau!

Ko Kawiti te tangata, nona i tukua toha tohu rangatira
Ki te Tiriti o Waitangi,
Nona hoki I wero atu ki te Iwi Pakeha, me tona Iwi Maori,
Kia mau tonu ki te tikanga o tena Kawanata
I haina tatou ki reira, ki Waitangi,
Nona I whakaputa mai te ohaki ki ona uri whakatipu
‘Waiho kia kakati te namu i te wharangi o te pukapuka,
hei kona ka tahuri atu ai!’
Ko te whanau Henare, te whanau Kawiti, te whanau McDowell, 
Na ratou ka puta mai ko au, tena ratou, tena koutou, tena tatou katoa.

Ka tangi tonu te ngakau mo ratou kua wheturangitia. He tohu aroha tenei mo toku iramutu a Mihi Ora, i whanaumai, hinga atu i te tau rua mano ma rima. Aha koa te iti o te wa i noho ai koe I waenganui I a matou te whanau, ka nui to matou aroha mou, e kotiro, moy mai, moy mai. He tohu maumahara hoki mo toku koro a papa Wiki, raua ko nana Kura toku kuia, me nga kaumatua ki te taha o toku papa i koru e tutaki au a Keith raua ko Gwen, haere koutou, haere, ma te Ringa Atawhai e manaaki tatou i nga wa katoa. Nona i homai, tangohia hoki. Nona nga mea e kitea ana, nga mea e koru e kitea.

Ka huri. Ka huri ki te Ao Marama me nga kanohi ora, tena koutou, tena koutou, tena tatou katoa. Tuatahi, he koha tenei, he tohu o toku aroha, mo ratou nga kaiwhakahe, na ta ratou whawahai i tera atu wa, nga hua pai o tenei ao. Na ratou I whakatika ai te huarahi mo matou nga uri whakatipu. Tuatahi, hi mihi ki a ratou, ratou kua wehe atu, ratou e ora tona. Kia kore e wareware matou te koha kua kohatia e kotuou ki a tatou te Iwi Maori.

Tuarua, ki toku whanau, oku matua, toku tuahine a Te Rawhina, toku mahanga a Miriama, te potiki o te whanau a Rangimarie, na koutou i homai ki ahau te aroha ki te timata i tenei mahi, te kaha ki te whakaotinga hoki. Taku aroha.

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Te mihi whakamutunga ki toku hoa wahine a Ambika me te whanau Venkataiah, i homai ki ahau hei kai mo te tinana, te wairua, me te hinengaro hoki, hari om, hari om.
So many people have supported me in my effort to complete this thesis and they must be acknowledged. This thesis is dedicated to my beautiful niece who passed on in 2005, half way through the writing of this thesis, she was with us for such a short time, but will stay in our hearts forever. While not wanting to favour any one of my grandparents, this thesis is also dedicated to my koro Wiki Te Kiri Pukupuku Moeanu Henare, who in his own quiet way was a radical who resisted the privileges of the Maori ruling class, and was an activist in wanting a better life for his children and grand children. Moe mai korua, moe mai.

This thesis could not have been done without the support of my family. My three amazing sisters have supported me in every way imaginable, my mother has provided practical assistance (if I was a ‘cynical academic’ I would call her my ‘cultural advisor’), and always knows what to say, though usually at the last possible minute. Thanks to my father too, who is probably the reason I wrote this thesis. His war stories of ’81 and his sworn oath that ‘one day someone would write the history of the te reo Maori movement and recognize Hana Jackson.....’, obviously wore off. Thanks also to my partner Ambika and her whanau for physical, spiritual and mental sustenance. Hari om.

Also deserving a mention are my mentors and role models who have guided me over the years to where I stand today. Rawiri Taonui and Aroha Harris have inspired a generation of young scholars to follow the paths of history. Aroha’s decision to hire me in the early stages of research for her book Hikoi: Forty Years of Maori Protest encouraged me to look deeper into these histories, and she played a significant role in guiding me during the early stages of this thesis. Tena korua.
If all these people are the reason I started this thesis, then Deborah Montgomerie is the reason I finished it. I can say without out any doubt that I would not have completed this thesis without her intervention. Her advice, support, assistance, patience, wisdom, insightful feedback, and most importantly her passion for people and their lives, helped saved this project from spiralling out of control, and transformed ideas into words on pages. Tena koe te tuahine.

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Thanks to Paul Diamond for allowing us to access his amazing series of interviews with Nga Tamatoa. Thanks also to the staff at the National Archives in Auckland and Wellington, the National Library, and the Alexander Turnbull Library in Wellington for their time, patience and expertise.

I would like to pay tribute to Rev. Maori Marsden, whose powerful He Pepeha mo enei ra is a testimony to pan-tribal unity, mana Maori motuhake, and the ability of history to intervene in our lives: it seemed an appropriate introduction to this thesis and the take covered here. I remember being in awe of Uncle Maori as a child, and after studying his work as an adult nothing has changed.
Finally I would also like to pay tribute to my tupuna, Te Ruki Kawiti and his descendants, whose pepeha ‘Riria te riri, mahia te mahi’ provided the title for this thesis. Te Ruki ‘sponsored’ if you will the first Maori activist, Hone Heke, and held Pakeha to account for their failure to honour the guarantees of the treaty. One hundred and thirty years later, Walter Kawiti sponsored a new generation of activists, Nga Tamatoa, at Te Rapunga Marae, Waiomio on their way to Waitangi in 1971. This was more than an offer of accommodation, it was a public statement of support, and to this day Kawiti marae and Te Rapunga continue to open their doors to activists every year on Waitangi day. Their is absolutely no coincidence that Walter Kawiti’s actions mirrored those of his ancestors: this was whakapapa at work, history intervening in the events of the present. Walter Kawiti was fulfilling his duty as a kaitiaki of the treaty and his people, and in doing so fulfilled Te Ruki’s prophecy that one day the people of the North would rise up and take back their birth right. ‘Riria te riri, mahia te mahi’ as I read it, is a challenge that words are not enough, they must be followed up with action. This seems a good way to describe modern activism and its combination of articulate analysis and direct action. It also points to one of the great tests Maori activists and Maoridom in general faced during the period, implementing and putting into practice the reforms they had fought so hard to gain. Finally, it seems to embrace the sentiments of Paulo Freire, who proposed that a process of praxis, theory and action, was the only true means of overcoming oppression, a process adopted by Maori activists which is still relevant today. ‘Riria te riri, mahia te mahi’ is a reminder that we too as academics and students must practice what we preach, and translate our words and theory into action and outcomes for our respective communities. A kati ra, tena koutou, tena koutou, tena tatou katoa.

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Abbreviations

ACORD  Auckland Committee on Racism and Discrimination
ANZW  Archives New Zealand, Wellington.
AS  Auckland Star
ATL  Alexander Turnbull Library
BPP  Black Panther Party
CABTA  Citizen's All Black Tour Association
CARE  Citizens Association for Racial Equality
HART  Halt all Racist Tours
MOOHR  Maori Organisation on Human Rights
MWWL  Maori Women’s Welfare League
NA  Northern Advocate
NLW  National Library, Wellington.
NZ  New Zealand
NZH  New Zealand Herald
NZJH  New Zealand Journal of History
NZRFU  New Zealand Rugby Football Union
NZUSA  New Zealand University Students Association
OMCAG  Orakei Maori Committee Action Group
PPM  Polynesian Panther Movement
PIG  Police Investigation Group
SNCC  Student Non-violent Coordinating Committee
STANZ  Student Teachers Association of New Zealand
UN  United Nations
US  United States of America
Introduction
‘Tihei Mauriora!’
Defining Maori history and Maori activism

_Hana was the only person in our group, because she was tiny I guess, and the police and navy were more interested in stopping the bigger ones for whatever reason, but Hana got out and walked unimpeded across to the flag pole. And once she had got into the open they were reluctant because the media was there in such strong numbers, to actually go out and physically drag her off._

And I guess because she was so slim and was so tiny that may have acted to her advantage and helped protect her. And she then, called out, ‘Tihei mauriora!’_

Syd Jackson describing Nga Tamatoa’s inaugural protest at Waitangi in 1971.

With those prophet ic words, Hana Jackson and supporters breathed life into a movement which would attempt to turn the tide on 130 years of colonisation, land loss, cultural alienation and loss of mana at the very site where it had all begun: Waitangi. Activists like Jackson would have a momentous impact on the course of Aotearoa’s modern history and the fate of tangata whenua, forcing issues which had long been ignored by the government and Pakeha public onto the national agenda. In a surprisingly short amount of time, Maori activists won a number of key concessions, while in the mid- to long-term their efforts helped force important legislative and policy changes, bringing Aotearoa New Zealand, as Ranginui Walker described, ‘firmly into the post-colonial era’. Their influence however would be felt well beyond the corridors of power and the confines of government policy and legislation. In different ways Maori activists challenged Maori and Pakeha to revisit their histories, reconsider the old myths of ‘harmony’ and ‘one New Zealand’, and renegotiate their present-day relationships, reconfiguring Maori and Pakeha notions of themselves and each other, and permanently changing Aotearoa New Zealand’s’ culture and identity.

The inherent difficulty in discussing and defining these histories is that Maori activism was (and is) uniquely and quintessentially Maori. At the same time though, it was born of the politics of the 1960s and ‘70s and a rebellious youth culture which

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swept the western world. It was also inextricably tied to a burgeoning body of politics evolving in New Zealand around the contemporary issues of apartheid, the Vietnam War, class politics and second wave feminism. How do we reconcile these conflicting and contradictory contexts which mark Maori activism as both uniquely local and internationally influenced?

The whakatauki ‘Na wai i tara ai te wai?’ offers one way of conceptualising and explaining the emergence of Maori activism. Three inter-related contexts contributed to the emergence of Maori activism, the local context of te Ao Maori, the national context of Aotearoa, and the international context of te Ao Hurihuri. The three cannot, and should not, be discussed in isolation or independent of each other; they are inter-related and inform each other, and are best understood holistically as part of a wider whole. One way of imagining these three contexts is to see them like ripples in a pool; they are concentric circles, each moving outward from the centre. The circle at the centre represents te Ao Maori, as it was this context which had the strongest impact upon, and was most strongly impacted upon, by the emergence of Maori activism. The second circle represents Aotearoa whanui, the national context and its influence on te Ao Maori. The third circle represents te Ao Hurihuri, the modern world, and the global context within which these histories took place.

Internationally the 1960’s and ‘70s were decades of turmoil and change, as a multitude of groups struggled against the oppression of colonialism, imperialism, and racial, class and gender discrimination. Their struggles were like stones thrown into a pool, disturbing the peace of the post-war period, and while the impact was most often greatest at its epicentre, their actions were to have a ripple effect, spreading out across the globe, touching other countries and other movements. When these waves of activism struck the Pacific Maori, Pakeha and Pacific Island activists in turn threw their own stones into the pool of post-war New Zealand, breaking the surface and revealing the turmoil that lay below. Their efforts may not in turn have influenced global events as dramatically as the movements which had influenced them but they were to have a dramatic impact on New Zealand.

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3 This loosely translates as ‘Who has disturbed the waters?’
Imagining these three contexts as concentric circles enables us to emphasise their inter-relatedness, and helps us to explain how local experiences fit into global events. Most importantly, te Ao Maori remains central to understanding and explaining these histories. This process of reconceptualisation has been identified as essential by academic and former activist Linda Tuhiwai Smith, who has argued that decolonising indigenous histories requires us to centre ‘our concerns and world views and then coming to know and understand theory and research from our own perspectives and for our own purposes’.4

This model has been employed to structure this thesis. The argument presented engages not just with the way the history of 20th century Maori activism has been written, but more fundamentally with how history itself is written. Academics researching and writing about Maori need to develop methodologies and epistemologies more sympathetic to Maori culture, values and priorities. As a practical response to this, the following thesis will look to the words, actions and analyses of the historical actors themselves, the activists, their vision of the world, the way they defined their actions, and the body of political thought they developed, allowing the historical actors to speak for themselves. The current historiography focuses on the response of the government and Pakeha public to Maori activism and its subsequent impact on legislation and public policy, and provides a wealth of analysis and contextualisation to this end.5 There is a pressing need however for a detailed study of activism. Taking the politics and actions of activists seriously and treating the movement as important in its own right rather than simply for its outcomes and results allows more space to do as Smith urged and make Maori the centre of their own history. Such an approach paints a rich history of community revitalization, cultural renaissance, a finely articulated yet passionate body of political thought and philosophy, and a set of poignant lessons on the nature of colonisation, settler societies, western cultures and modern indigenous identities.


In revisiting and reconsidering these histories, we must also revisit the discipline from which they will be presented. To put it simply, history is not innocent. It is not the sum total of the events of the past, nor is it a constructed reading of those events from a particular position or perspective. History is a tool used by Western European cultures to organise, explain and render meaning from the past, it is no better and no worse than the systems devised by other cultures to imagine and describe the events of the past, and fits comfortably into the wider knowledge system of western society. History becomes problematic when it intersects with non-western cultures, and is employed as a supposedly or at least relatively ‘objective’ tool to observe and describe the histories of other cultures. History is rooted in western attitudes towards time, chronology, narrative, what constitutes evidence, causation, an obsession with ‘progress’ and the mythical search for objectivity which differ greatly from those of non-western cultures. By uncritically applying the norms and priorities of the discipline to the histories of non-western cultures we effectively marginalize and render invisible their own ways of organising and explaining the past. Arguably this is fine for colonial scholars, however it makes little sense for Maori scholars or non-Maori scholars sympathetic to the modern-day priorities of Maori culture and society. Many scholars undertake research on Maori communities as part of a wider movement to decolonise Maori culture and society, by uncovering the histories of marginalisation and oppression of Maori, identifying Maori efforts to reverse the effects of colonisation, and rediscovering bodies of learning and knowledge marginalised by the colonial process. However by approaching these histories uncritically, and applying historical methodology to Maori accounts of the past, we effectively colonise these histories, embodying the very process we are attempting to reverse. These problems can hardly be resolved in the scope of one thesis: yet it is important to attempt to rethink the past. Decolonisation is arguably best conceived of as a process rather than a goal, but in the process of thinking about the way history is written each of us contributes to the goal of liberating these histories, and in turn liberating ourselves from our own implication in the colonial process. As Paulo Freire has outlined: ‘Just as the oppressor, in order to oppress, needs a theory of oppressive action, so the oppressed in order to become free, also need a theory of action’. For

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Maori activists too, reconceptualizing the colonial past has been an important part of developing such a theory of action.

A number of scholars offer theoretical and practical examples of how best to achieve this, which will be explored briefly. Linda Smith has led the field in theorizing and critiquing the ways in which western scholars have represented Maori through the discipline of history, and urges Maori scholars to employ kaupapa Maori and decolonizing methodologies as a means of reclaiming their histories. She suggests we do this by centring our research within a Maori worldview, focussing on Maori epistemology, kaupapa, and language. Employing such an approach does not necessarily mean ‘a total rejection of all theory or research or Western knowledge’, but rather ‘it is about centring our concerns and worldviews and then coming to know and understand theory and research from our own perspectives and for our own purposes’. Further more, kaupapa Maori research, by definition, must be grounded in the needs of Maori communities, and must have transformative outcomes for communities if it is to be significant or useful.

Danny Keenan has argued that New Zealand history has tended to represent the Maori past through the frames of reference of race relations, culture contact and acculturation, subordinating Maori experiences and understandings of the past. Thus what Maori ‘sought to achieve, and achieved, within their kaupapa, was frequently diminished beneath any number of culture contact paradigms and broad historiographic frames of reference’, resulting in depictions of Maori which ‘always seemed to fall well short of how Maori people appeared to see themselves’. While Keenan’s comments are aimed at studies of tribal histories in the 19th century, they hold relevance for studies of pan-tribal histories in the 20th century.

Rawiri Taonui has wrestled with similar issues. Taonui asserts that Maori scholars need to ‘face and overcome the stigma of the assumption that the study of traditional knowledges is inferior’, and acknowledge that ‘Western and oral traditions are

7 Linda Tuhiwai Smith, *Decolonizing Methodologies*, p.39.
different, neither is superior to the other, each has strengths and weaknesses’. 9 Taonui argues the solution lies in finding a balance between emic (insider) and etic (outsider) skills, and that Maori scholars need to be grounded in matauranga and kaupapa Maori while also fostering the skills and spirit to embrace and employ new theories and methodologies.10

Manuka Henares’ comments on Maori history are also instructive and useful. Henare discusses the need for a new model of what he calls ‘Maori history’ which moves beyond the accepted paradigms of race relations and tribal histories as ways of explaining Maori experiences of the past. In stark contrast to those who question the relevance of Maori (as opposed to tribal) history, Henare argues for the validity of Maori history as a complement to tribal history.11 He defines Maori history ‘as a history of the people of that society or ethnic group called Maori of Aotearoa New Zealand’ which ‘involves an interpretation of both Pre-European and Post-European contact periods’.12 Unlike tribal histories, Maori history is ‘open to wider public scrutiny and interpretation’, and can be done by anyone, accepting that they have the mandate of the Maori institutions or communities relevant to their research.13 Henare admits that Maori history is ‘not yet fully developed or explained’, and that it is as yet unclear ‘if there are to be new or amended standards of scholarship ethics to be applied to Maori history by Maori historians’.14 Henare’s suggestions are particularly pertinent for Maori scholars wishing to engage with the history of the 20th century. The tribal history model may be an excellent vehicle for understanding the largely iwi-based world of 19th century New Zealand, but it is less suited to capturing the dynamics of mid- to late 20th century Maori life.

10 ibid., p.23.
13 ibid., p.25.
14 ibid., pp.24-25
Maori writers and writers of Maori histories most common means of dealing with these problems involves adopting metaphors to structure and inform their arguments, a strategy which bridges the gap between the often-employed open metaphors of oral cultures and the literal readings of western cultures. As the Samoan historian Damon Salesa has suggested in an essay examining the work of Judith Binney and the problems that arise from historicising Maori narratives of the past:

What is needed is not a manual or dictionary for the translation of Maori histories into English, which seems a dubious project, but perhaps something both more incisive and more challenging. It seems what might be most valuable is less a mechanism, but rather a poetics and an ethics.15

Writers of Maori histories have adopted numerous metaphors to structure and inform their arguments: Ranginui Walker adopted Rewi Maniapoto’s famous whakatauki to conceptualize Maori history as an ongoing struggle, Mason Durie employed a tidal metaphor to discuss the ebb and flow of Maori progress and endurance, while Bernadette Arapere structured her MA thesis around whakatauki of significance for her hapu, which ‘function as tenets for the chapter organisation and structure’.16 Hirini Kaa conceptualised whakapapa as a punga or anchor for his thesis, which provides ‘a foundation point from which all other information may evolve’.17 Some non-Maori writers of histories about Maori have also used poetic and metaphorical structures to underpin their work. David Young, for example, used the central metaphor of a river to connect his histories of Whanganui while Judith Binney’s placed song at the heart of her depiction of Te Kooti’s life.18

The metaphor which will be applied here is the metaphor of the marae, an obvious enough choice. Mere Whaanga has used her tribal marae as the central metaphor which structures and informs her tribal history of Ngai Tahu.19 Similarly Graham Smith has argued researchers can co-opt ‘the ‘marae’ format, that is the values, rules

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and practices embedded in the formal public forum of the traditional marae context’.\textsuperscript{20} In this way a thesis ‘becomes a ‘marae’ for the academic orator to put forward a ‘kauhau’ (address) and to lay out a kaupapa (a thesis)’.\textsuperscript{21}

The metaphor of history as marae on which different voices are heard and issues are debated is apt, however here it will be argued that the role of the academic should not be as the kai korero on the marae as Graham Smith seems to imply, but as the ringawera, the person or people who work behind the scenes, providing the space as a forum for the people, in this case the historical actors, to tell their histories and put forth their kaupapa. Historians play an organising role here, they do the background research, the leg work, they organise the hui along thematic lines, they transcribe interviews, follow up references and the like. They have an equal right to put forward their own opinions, but those of the historical actors are equally if not more important, and should not be overshadowed by the concerns and analyses of the historian.

This thesis attempts to appropriate this form where possible. Overwhelmingly the focus here is on the words and actions of the activists themselves. A more typical model of history supplements the historians’ analysis and reading of events with quotes, examples and evidence. Instead here the text is dominated by the words and actions of the activists, which are in turn supplemented by the comments and analysis of the historian. The intention is to allow the activists to speak, instead of speaking for them, to see their vision of the world rather than the priorities and concerns of the writer, to take activists seriously and view their words and actions as valid and important in their own right, rather than focusing on their impact on the government and the public. Historiography features on occasions but not at the expense of the contemporary sources. It is more important to study what the activists themselves have to say than it is to revisit what academics have argued. This thesis is not devoid of analysis or criticism, however it has attempted to stay relatively close to the analyses and critiques of the activists.

\textsuperscript{21} ibid., p.47.
Finally, while this thesis has attempted to gauge the impact of activism on the public, government policy and legislation, and national culture and identities this is not its main focus. More attention has been paid to the ways activists experienced these events. The two key texts on Maori activism, *Ka Whawhai Tonu Matou* by Ranginui Walker and *Hikoi* by Aroha Harris, deal sufficiently well with the impact of activism on wider society and the reactions of Pakeha, the government and the media. They both provide rich analyses of key events and the politics of activism. This thesis has avoided replicating this work. Instead it seeks to understand the way activists defined and experienced these histories, while filling in the gaps on the events as they took place and developed over the period. It is not presented as a final solution to the epistemological and methodological problems of writing Maori history, but as an attempt to engage with and bridge the impasse between Western histories and Maori accounts of the past, and an example which will hopefully inspire others to discover their own solutions.

Because the analyses of the activists feature so strongly in this thesis a word on sources is necessary. The words of the activists from the time, as contained in activists’ newsletters *Te Hokioi*, Maori Organisation on Human Rights (Here after cited as MOOHR) newsletters, the *Takaparawha Bulletin*, Matakite newsletters, and feminist magazine *Broadsheet*, press releases, pamphlets, posters, flyers, photographs and direct quotes from radio and print interviews have been accorded primacy. Later radio interviews, newspaper and magazine articles (utilizing both direct quotes and occasionally the perspectives of the journalists), published interviews and accounts by the activists and occasionally secondary texts by other historians have been used to supplement these sources.

There is an inherent conflict here between using contemporary sources which better represent the language and attitudes of the time, and the later sources, which better articulate activists’ perspectives and priorities in the present. Here kaupapa Maori and historical methodology conflict: kaupapa Maori demands prioritising the perspectives of activists in the present day, and their desired outcomes from research, while the discipline of academic history demands contextualising activism with its historical

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22 See Ranginui Walker, *Ka Whawhai Tonu Matou*, and Aroha Harris, *Hikoi*. 
context, and identifying change over time. The approach applied here attempts a compromise: following kaupapa Maori methodologies this research focuses primarily on the words, actions and analyses of the activists. In line with historical methodology, sources contemporary to the time have been favoured to show context and change over time, but these have been supplemented with more recent articles and interviews, which both fill in the gaps in understanding of the historical events, and allow an appreciation of the way activists have come to regard these histories ten, twenty, even thirty years later. Contextualisation and change over time are significant here: the politics of Maori activism changed drastically in the decade under scrutiny, and these changes highlight the dynamics at play within the movement. As will be seen, Maori activism was not a complete body of political thought and philosophy; it changed and developed significantly as events unfolded. Thus we need to pay careful attention to the nuances of activist politics; dealing with the period in generalities would obscure these significant developments.

Three particular sources of evidence deserve further mention. Firstly, newspaper and magazine articles on activism and protest events are by far the largest resource and the most commonly used by researchers as forms of evidence. The whole point of activism was to raise public attention, therefore media coverage was essential, it could make or break protest actions. What these forms of evidence do display well is the reactions of Pakeha, the government and conservative Maori leaders to the words and actions of activists, and they have been used most effectively by Ranginui Walker as a means of identifying and explaining the impact of Maori activism on wider society. However, while these sources tell us much about politicians and Pakeha attitudes towards Maori, they often tell us little about the activists themselves, their politics, the point of their actions, and details of events. Most Pakeha journalists lacked critical insights into Maori communities, and lacked the cultural skills to translate Maori politics to their readers. Therefore these sources have been largely avoided, partly because of their inherent bias and unreliability, and partly because a review of such sources has already been undertaken by Walker. Sadly, journalists still lack the ability to credibly cover Maori current affairs, while Pakeha researchers continue to rely on journalistic reports to probe the world of Maori politics, a dubious exercise at best.

suited to providing information about how journalists represented Maori politics than the politics of Maori themselves. Instead, articles and accounts written by the activists have been prioritised, as have interviews with activists.

Paul Diamond’s interviews undertaken for his award-winning series *Nga Tamatoa: The Maori Protest group Nga Tamatoa thirty years on*, produced for Radio New Zealand in 2001 have been particularly valuable. The interviews have painted in many of the finer details of the events of era, and provide critical insights into the internal dynamics of the movement, and the way activists have come to regard these histories themselves: as a result these interviews have been used extensively. While Diamond pursued his own line of questioning, his contributions were astute yet unobtrusive, allowing the activists to speak for themselves. Diamond, of Ngati Haua, Nga Puhi, and Te Rarawa whakapapa, is an exception to the norm of poor, exploitive journalism with regards to Maori affairs, and his work is conclusive proof of the need for more journalists with strong cultural skills and insights into Maoridom. The interviews also demonstrate that while the politics and perspectives of activists may have changed dramatically over 30 years, oral history, when done well, can be particularly useful, if context and change over time are taken into account.

A third source worth mentioning is the collection of interviews of Maori women from *Broadsheet*, which are peppered throughout the thesis and form the basis for the fourth chapter on the Black women’s movement. The chapter is perhaps over-reliant on this particular source, but what should be noted is that *Broadsheet*, the New Women’s Press and the Women’s Conferences of the period organised by Pakeha feminists provided a major forum for the Black women’s movement to develop and pursue its political goals. While Maori activists delivered stinging critiques of Pakeha feminists which at times amounted to little more than petty insults, feminists continued to provide a forum for Maori women to express their views. Therefore the sources here reflect the contribution of second wave feminists to the development of Maori activism and the Black women’s movement, a contribution which often goes unnoticed.

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Left-wing sources published by trade unions, communist, and socialist organisations need to be treated carefully. The early sources on Maori activism from 1968 to 1971 were often produced by or involved members of the political left. However, as will be argued in the second chapter this was not because class politics dominated Maori activism, nor does it indicate that Maori activism emerged from left wing or workers’ movements. More likely it indicates the efforts of the left to win over Maori activists as supporters, even before Maori activism cohered into a distinct movement.

As a final word on sources, Maori activism inspired a wealth of protest art in the form of posters, flyers, paintings, music, poetry, drama, sculpture and a plethora of other creative outlets. The art of activism is an important area of research: it has been touched on here but for the most part has been left to further research and other researchers to cover satisfactorily and do justice to this powerful outpouring of expression.

A brief word on language is in order. With regards to the use of te reo Maori within the text, little actually appears, reflecting the fact that few activists spoke Maori, and that the language was rarely used for other than ceremonial purposes in activist texts. What Maori does appear will not be translated, and a glossary is not provided, te reo Maori is an official language of Aotearoa New Zealand and anyone unfamiliar with the language and basic terms used should consult a Maori-English dictionary. Moreover, Maori language as expressed in this thesis has not been modified to conform to modern language conventions, the tohu toa used to indicate elongated vowels has not been used, nor have double vowels. Further, the idiosyncrasies of language use in the quotes have been retained: for example the word ‘Maoris’ will not be corrected, and a capital P will not be added to ‘pakeha’. These idiosyncrasies have been retained, not out of laziness, but to highlight the fact that at the time there was no standardised way of writing in te reo Maori, and while this presented some difficulties it also allowed speakers of the period to employ the language playfully and inventively. For instance, the name of activist organisation Te Roopu Ote Matakite would be spelt Te Roopu o te Matakite by today’s standards: retaining the words ‘o’ and ‘te’ as one word, ‘Ote’, preserves the creative, naturalised approach to te reo speakers employed at the time, which in this case mirrored the way the words were
spoken rather than their grammatical meaning. The mood of the era researched can be misrepresented through language standardisation. Further, standardising the text while retaining the original spelling in quotes would be undesirable.

For the same reasons the term [sic] to denote a spelling or grammatical mistake has rarely been employed in the text. In order to retain the spoken, oral delivery of the words transcripts of interviews have not been corrected to remove pauses, repetition or grammatical inconsistencies. Gendered language is outmoded today, but terms such as ‘mankind’, ‘spokesman’ and ‘the rights of all men’ have been retained without amendment: they speak for themselves as to the politics of the period and in their own small way contributed to the emergence of second wave feminism, the Black women’s movement and its critique of Maori men and other activists’ movements covered in the fourth chapter.

Several key terms should be defined here for clarity. The term Maori is used to denote the indigenous people of Aotearoa New Zealand and the indigenous language of said racial and ethnic group. Pakeha is used here to denote white New Zealanders of Western European origin, most commonly but not exclusively Britain. The term Tauiwi is utilized occasionally to designate non-Maori and non-western Europeans, in particular New Zealanders of Indian, Asian and Pacific Island descent. The people of the islands of the Pacific region, most commonly Samoa, Tonga, the Cook Islands, Niue, Tokelau and Fiji, and excluding Australians, Pakeha New Zealanders, New Zealand Maori and Australian Aborigines, have been referred to as Pacific Islanders, the most commonly used term in present times. The more exclusive term ‘Polynesian’ used at the time has been preserved in quotes without change however.

‘Activist’ and ‘activism’ have been used here in favour of the terms ‘protestor/protest’, ‘radical’, or ‘demonstrator/demonstration’. Using ‘protest/protestor’ would imply that activists were overly reactive and lacked initiative. Radical is useful in that it helps distinguish ‘radical’ activism from say ‘conservative’ activism, and is used occasionally in conjunction with the term ‘activists’. However the term’s implication of political extremism means it is not the most effective word to describe activists. Demonstrator and demonstration have occasionally been ascribed to activists on demonstrations, but the term does not encompass the wide body of tactics employed
by modern activists which expanded well beyond public demonstrations. ‘Activist’ and ‘activism’ were the terms employed most commonly by activists themselves and by academics, and the word’s pro-active, positive portrayal of modern activists and activism is appropriate.

The terms ‘radical activist’ and ‘activism’ are regularly contrasted with the terms ‘conservative leader/s’ and ‘conservative approach’. Here ‘conservative leader/s’ refers to the more conservative political and social organisations which emerged from Maori communities particularly from the 1950s onwards to address the needs of rural Maori communities and the rapidly expanding number of urban Maori. In particular the term refers to the Maori Women’s Welfare League, the New Zealand Maori Council, tribal committees, church organisations such as the Ratana movement, and the Maori members of parliament, who were most commonly members of the Ratana movement, tribal committees and the tribal elite. A ‘conservative approach’ refers to their methods of expressing dissent and campaigning for change, which were overwhelmingly non-confrontational, utilised official channels of communication with the government, most notably the Department of Maori Affairs, and relied on such strategies as petition writing, letter writing, passing remits, organising deputations and, very occasionally, staging peaceful protest rallies.

In turn ‘activist’ refers to the new generation of leaders, led predominantly (though not entirely) by young, urban born, university students who emerged in the late 1960s and early 1970s in the form of groups including Te Hokioi, MOOHR, Nga Tamatoa, Te Roopu Ote Matakite, the Orakei Maori Committee Action Group, the Black women's movement and various others. ‘Activism’ refers to their politics and strategies, which while they shared similarities with the methods and politics of conservatives were overwhelmingly more critical, called for structural change rather than reform of the government and society, were more confrontational in nature, and employed the direct action tactics of radical literature, pamphleting, protest marches, petitions, ‘sit ins’ and ‘teach ins’, and, on occasion, land occupations and violent confrontation with the police and armed forces.

Two other terms require clarification here: ‘Black women’s movement’ refers to the women’s rights movement developed by Maori women in the late 1970s, not their
African American counterparts, who preferred the terms ‘Black feminism’ and ‘womanist movement’. The name ‘Te Reo Maori’ in capitals, is short for the Wellington activist group Te Reo Maori Society, and should not be mistaken for the occipitalised ‘te reo Maori’, the Maori language.

This introduction will end with a brief overview of the period, so as to foreshadow the wider sweep of the events as they unfolded, and to explain periodization and thematic foci of the thesis.

A number of early protest actions led by conservative groups such as the Maori Women’s Welfare League (established in 1951), the New Zealand Maori Council (established in 1962), tribal leaders and tribal committees, set important precedents for the emergence of radical activism. In 1959 the ‘Bennett incident’, where a prominent Maori leader was refused service at the Papakura Hotel on the grounds of race, gave conservatives an opportunity to address and ameliorate the existence of unofficial colour bars in parts of New Zealand. In the same year the Citizens All Black Tour Association (CABTA) was formed to lead opposition to the 1960 All Black tour of South Africa. The organisation included members of the League, and tribal and conservative leaders, and was an early example of Maori supporting more modern forms of protest action, starting up a pressure group dedicated to a specific issue and organising petitions and public rallies. Conservative resistance to the Hunn Report of 1960, and the League’s opposition to the School Journal’s 1964 ‘Washday at the Pa’ photo essay were further examples of conservative-led protest from the era. The Maori Affairs Amendment Act of 1967, which allowed for the compulsory acquisition of ‘uneconomic shares’ in Maori land, popularly dubbed the ‘last land grab’, provoked widespread resistance from conservatives. The government decision to ignore their pleas was the veritable last straw: a younger generation of...

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educated, urban Maori took this as an indication that the conservative approach was no longer tenable, and that new tactics were needed to address Maori issues.

The initial response to the act was the launch of two radical newsletters, *Te Hokioi* and MOOHR. *Te Hokioi* was started in 1968 by Darryl J. Cunningham with the later support of Ngai Tahu leader Paranihi Alexander Rissetto and journalist Brian Bell. MOOHR was formed in 1968 by Tama Poata and Matenga Baker, and began publishing a newsletter in late 1970. Resistance to the 1970 All Black tour of South Africa and a Young Maori Leaders Conference organised by the Maori Council brought together a group of young urban Maori wanting to turn words into action. Following the conference, the group met in Swanson in west Auckland and agreed to form an activist organisation. The group initially took the name the Maori Youth Council, but this was seen as too tame. Their second choice, the Maori Liberation Front, received widespread condemnation and was quickly abandoned. The group finally settled on the name Nga Tamatoa, meaning ‘the young warriors’.

Thereafter Maori activism developed as a series of interrelated movements, at times (but not always) led by Nga Tamatoa, with significant overlaps in membership between groups and movements. Treaty activism was the first issue which emerged, as Nga Tamatoa and supporters began a tradition of protest at Waitangi on Waitangi day in 1971. In 1972 Nga Tamatoa organised a boycott of Waitangi commemorations and protested the government’s move to rename Waitangi Day ‘New Zealand Day’. Apart from protest at the Queen’s visit to Waitangi in 1974, Waitangi Day and Treaty based activism largely disappeared between 1972 and 1977. The issues were thrust back into public prominence in 1978 by Nga Tamatoa with a coalition of Maori land activist groups from Bastion Point, Raglan, Ngati Hine and Te Hapua, marking the second wave of Waitangi protests, and a symbolic reunion of land issues and treaty issues.

The Maori language movement evolved between 1970 and 1982. It was led by Nga Tamatoa and the Wellington-based Te Reo Maori Society formed at Victoria

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28 Maori language activism did not end in 1982; however this date marks the opening of the first kohanga reo. Thus the date allows us to distinguish between the first period of activism for the
University in 1970. Hana Jackson of Tamatoa organised a petition calling for the language to be taught in primary and secondary schools. The petition garnered a startling 44,000 signatures and was delivered to parliament on 14 September 1971. The day was designated as Maori Language Day and a coalition of groups including Maori and Pakeha activists and students calling themselves Te Huinga Rangatahi led by Nga Tamatoa member Rawiri Paratene joined forces to raise awareness of Maori language, eventually gathering enough support to extend Maori Language Day first to a week, then a month of activities. As a result of their efforts the government introduced te reo Maori as an optional subject in primary and secondary schools, and in 1974 established a one-year, ‘pressure cooker’ teacher training course for fluent speakers to meet the shortfall of Maori language teachers. From 1975 Te Reo Maori began campaigning for more substantial Maori programming on radio and television, and in 1977 delivered a petition calling for the formation of a Maori production unit to produce Maori content for radio and television. Their efforts, in conjunction with those of conservatives, saw the opening of the first bilingual school in Ruatoki in 1978 and the first of many kohanga reo in 1982.

In 1974 activists began targeting the justice system, calling for thorough systemic reform at all levels. Pauline Kingi and Patrick Te Hemara of Nga Tamatoa set up a legal aid scheme to provide advice and support to young Maori and Pacific Island offenders caught up in the court system; in less than a year it was adopted by the government as a duty solicitor and legal aid scheme.\(^{29}\) Also in 1974, Nga Tamatoa joined a coalition of Maori, Pakeha and Pacific Island activist groups called PIG patrol (standing for Police Investigation Group) to counter police brutality. A Police Task Force set up in June 1974 came in for particular scrutiny for unfairly targeting Maori and Pacific Islanders in the inner cities.\(^{30}\)

Maori resistance to South African apartheid and New Zealand’s involvement in apartheid sport spanned almost the entire 20\(^{th}\) century, and was another prominent issue addressed by activists and conservatives alike. Maori activists from Nga

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\(^{29}\) See Paul Diamond (producer), *Nga Tamatoa*.

Tamatoa and MOOHR, most notably Syd Jackson, Hana Jackson and Tama Poata, played prominent roles in establishing and supporting anti-apartheid groups CARE formed in 1964 and HART established in 1969, and the anti-apartheid movement became a breeding ground for Maori activism between 1968 and 1970. Maori activists went on to play leading roles in opposing the 1970 All Black Tour of South Africa and the 1981 Springbok tour of New Zealand.31

Historical land loss and recent land alienation via the ‘land land grab’ and other government acts provided the further impetus for the emergence of radical activism. In 1975, Nga Tamatoa sought to address the issue directly, and with northern kaumatua Whina Cooper as their leader, organised a series of public meetings which saw the formation of Te Roopu Ote Matakite, a pan-tribal organisation which dramatized land loss by leading the 1975 Maori Land March to parliament.32 While the organisation dissolved after the march as a result of infighting between conservatives and militants led by Nga Tamatoa members, the group’s efforts led to the ‘second phase’ of the land march, where tribal protest groups put the message of Maori land retention into practice. This saw protest led by Eva Rickard between 1974 and 1978 for the return of the Raglan Golf Course in Whaingaroa, the occupation of Bastion Point in Auckland between 1977-8 by protesters led by Joe Hawke and the Orakei Maori Committee Action Group and their forced eviction by armed forces.33

Similar activist groups were formed in Ngati Hine and Te Hapua to resist land alienation, but neither led to land occupations, and in 1978 a coalition of land protest groups from Bastion Point, Raglan, Ngati Hine and Te Hapua combined with Nga Tamatoa to reactivate Waitangi Day protests, symbolically linking land loss and treaty rights.

While gender politics had been a significant aspect of radical and conservative organisations from the 1950s and the formation of the League, a Maori women’s rights movement evolved between 1975 and 1977. The group, calling itself the Black women’s movement, emerged from the ranks of Nga Tamatoa, and eventually replaced Nga Tamatoa as the militant leadership of the second wave of Maori

activism. The Black women's movement delivered a sharp critique of Pakeha feminists, Maori society and male activists, and was involved in many of the more militant protests of the late ‘70s and early ‘80s.

This ‘second wave’ of Maori activism, referred to as such by activists and academics alike, evolved in the late 1970s and early 1980s as the groups of the early ‘70s, Nga Tamatoa, MOOHR, Te Reo Maori, and Matakite dissolved. It saw the proliferation of activists groups led by a new generation of young Maori, including Te Kawariki, the Waitangi Action Group, Black Women, He Taua, the Maori Peoples Liberation Movement of Aotearoa, Maranga Mai and the political party Mana Motuhake. The new wave of Maori activism between 1978 and 1986 bore witness to a dramatic rise in violent confrontation between activists and the police, leading to the ‘Haka party incident’ in 1979, the launch of Mana Motuhake and Maranga Mai in 1980, violence at the Investiture of Dame Whina Cooper at Waitangi and the Springbok tour, the equally explosive publication of *Maori Sovereignty* by *Broadsheet* in 1981, and increased violence at Waitangi up to 1986. This second wave of activism shared many of the same issues and concerns and involved many of the same members of the first wave; however it saw a distinct change in the nature of activism and the groups involved. This thesis has chosen to cover the first wave of Maori activism between 1968 and 1978, so as to address the origins and development of Maori activism during the early periods. Forays will be made into the events of 1978 onwards, however this thesis will not deal with the shift from the first wave to the second wave, the key events of the second wave, or the groups involved, which are deserving of a thesis in their own right.

The first chapter will begin with the local context of te Ao Maori and the ‘big three’ issues which dominated and defined the politics of Maori activism: te Tiriti, te whenua and te reo. The second chapter will spiral outwards, taking in the context of Aotearoa whanui, and the issues which dominated politics at a national level during the period, South African apartheid, the Vietnam War, and class politics. The third chapter will look to the wider global context of te Ao Hurihuri, the modern world, and

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the influence of global movements on local events. The fourth and final chapter will canvas the gender politics at play within the movement, and the emergence of the Black women’s movement. The chapter on gender politics does not fit comfortably within this structure, however these tensions will be retained as they mirror the tensions of the time and the counter-narrative offered by Maori women which undermined the grand narrative developed by a seemingly unified, self-confident movement ten years’ strong.

To finish, the conclusion of this thesis will tie together the various themes which arise from the issues and events of the period, and identify the patterns which emerged and came to typify Maori activism and the body of political thought and action it developed during the period. It will attempt to quantify what these histories meant to activists, the impact of Maori activism on society and government policy and legislation, the successes of the movement, and also the issues activists failed to address, which have been bequeathed to future generations to take up and resolve.
Chapter 1
‘The Kaupapa of our Tipuna’:
Te Ao Maori and the politics of Maori activism

The land is all but gone. The language is all but dead. The Gods have all but left us. The marae are all but empty. The tipuna have all but given up on us. All but. But not quite. Not yet.

Now, the wairua call. And throughout the land, Maori people are answering. Even against our will, our mauri takes us on, to touch the mauri ora of all other Maori, to take up the kaupapa of our tipuna.¹ Donna Awatere Huata, from Maori Sovereignty, 1984.

In this stirring battle cry from 1984, Donna Awatere Huata traversed time, space and imagination to transform Maori activists from representatives of a dying culture to heads of a new movement impelled by the very living spirit of their ancestors. Rather than depicting activists as drawing on the kaupapa of their tupuna, she presented the tupuna as calling on their descendants to take up their kaupapa.² Awatere Huata’s text is often seen as foundational – the battle plans for a full-fronted assault by Maori activists on racism in Pakeha society, the government, and activist circles. What is less often remembered is the extent to which Maori Sovereignty was grounded in an activist movement with already more than a decade of struggle behind it. Between 1968 and 1978, a burgeoning, multifaceted movement grew from the grievances and discontent which had festered in Maori communities for generations, as young disaffected Maori took up the kaupapa of their tupuna, the struggle of their day. Their actions would have a profound impact on the course of local history and Maori-Pakeha relations, effectively turning the tide on 130 years of colonisation, land loss, cultural alienation and loss of mana. Their influence was felt well beyond the corridors of power and the confines of government policy and legislation: activists challenged Maori and Pakeha alike to revisit their histories, to reconsider old myths, and to renegotiate their relationships in the present day, in turn reconfiguring Maori and Pakeha notions of themselves and each other, and permanently changing New Zealand’s culture, identity and New Zealander’s sense of self.

¹ Donna Awatere, Maori Sovereignty, p.59.
² With all due respect, the people of te Tairawhiti refer to their ancestors as tipuna, while the people of Taitokerau from whom I descend render the word tupuna.
In seeking to understand the Maori activist movement which emerged in the late ‘60s and early ‘70s, we are faced with a multitude of contributing and conflicting factors. The activism of this era cannot be encapsulated as a ‘sign of the times’; it cannot be explained away as a simple, local attempt to mimic overseas trends; nor can it be solely attributed to historical grievances and inherited protest tradition, as activists were heavily engaged by present-day issues and forms of protest. Maori activism was all these things and more, it was a mix of history and circumstance, change and continuity, tradition and innovation, local events and global trends. To understand these histories, we must understand and appreciate the influences of three contexts: Te Ao Maori, Aotearoa and Te Ao Hurihuri. Because the Maori world must remain central to explaining the events which unfolded this thesis begins with a chapter discussing Te Ao Maori as it informed and influenced the emergence of a new phase of Maori activism and the ‘big three’ issues which provided the impetus for activists and dominated their efforts during the period; te tiriti, te whenua and te reo.

The chapter begins with a discussion of the influence of ideas about the Treaty of Waitangi and Waitangi Day celebrations. Close attention will be paid to the way activist critiques of the Treaty and Waitangi celebrations developed over the years between 1968 and 1978 -- and the connections and distinctions between treaty issues and other issues -- which in turn show how important these were to the direction of the subsequent movement. A ‘broad brush’ approach to these histories, labelling them ‘treaty claims’ or ‘treaty grievances’ obscure their significance and clouds our understanding of the period. It will further be argued that the treaty was essential in elevating the status of Maori grievance above those of other interest groups, and that the return of land rights activists to Waitangi in 1978 and the reconnection between land rights and treaty rights was instrumental in addressing and resolving historical grievances.

Next we will cover the land rights movement which emerged during the same period, and which came to dominate and define the agenda of Maori activism in the 1970s. This section will cover the development of the movement from 1968 and the fall out from the Maori Affairs Amendment Act 1967, on to the Land March and the establishment of Te Roopu Ote Matakite, through to the test cases of the movement, Raglan and Bastion Point. The way activists conceptualised land and land loss during
this period was, however as important as specific protests. Maori critics of Pakeha society depicted Maori attitudes towards land as oppositional and irreconcilably different to that of Pakeha, pitting the Pakeha ‘quarter acre section’ off against the Maori ‘turangawaewae’. Their critiques forced New Zealanders to question some fundamental cultural attitudes, contributing to a redefinition of Maori and Pakeha cultures, national identity and race relations.

The third section covers the development of the te reo Maori movement between 1970 and 1978, and the efforts of activists to put Maori language on the national agenda and reverse the affects of a history of assimilation and cultural alienation born of urbanisation. This section features a more substantial events based account, due to the lack of detailed research on the topic, followed by a description of the way activists articulated and defined te reo Maori and language loss. This section shares similarities with the section on land, in that it will be argued that activists challenged Maori and Pakeha to revisit their histories and rethink old myths embedded in the national psyche, bolstering and revitalising Maori culture and language, critiquing Pakeha culture and identity, and contributing to redefining Maori and Pakeha culture and national identities, the repercussions of which we continue to experience today.

By undertaking this study of Te Ao Maori and the ‘big three’ issues which provided the impetus for activists and dominated their efforts during the period, we gain insights into the events and outcomes of these histories, the way activists defined and articulated these issues and how they developed and changed overtime, the outcomes and lessons of the moment and the impact it would have on society, Maori and Pakeha culture, national identity, and local history. Furthermore, understanding the context of te Ao Maori provides a standing point from which to regard the influence and significance of national and global trends and events. The lessons which emerge are powerful, poignant, painful and instructive.
Te Tiriti o Waitangi

It was a day of grievance, a day of grievance and a day of grief, and that was, and in a lot of ways we were just going up there to tangi over a tupapaku called the treaty, and then leave the tangi. And that’s pretty much the rationale for that action, and but you know in subsequent years – ah -- it wasn’t a tangi anymore it was ‘Hey this thing ain’t quite dead!’ [laughs].3

Taura Eruera describing the first protest at Waitangi, 2001

Decades after coordinating the first protest at Waitangi in 1971, even Taura Eruera of Nga Tamatoa seemed shocked and amused at the protests’ impact. With the dramatic and symbolic call ‘Tihei Maori ora!’ Hana Jackson and supporters brought to life a movement which would attempt to turn the tide on 130 years of colonisation, oppression and marginalization of tangata whenua at the very site where it had all begun: Waitangi. The same principle holds true here: any discussion of Maori activism must begin with the Treaty of Waitangi, as the symbolic starting point of Maori grievance from which other grievances branch out. This chapter begins then with a discussion of the emergence and development of treaty based politics by activists in the 1970s, tracing the origins and orientation of treaty protests from the efforts of conservative leaders and early protests groups in the late ‘60s, to Nga Tamatoa’s efforts to elevate the status of the treaty from 1971, through the years of the land rights movement and the ‘return to Waitangi’ by land rights activists in 1978.

For activists the treaty was essential to articulating Maori grievance in that its legal and symbolic status in turn elevated the status of Maori claims above those of other interest groups. In New Zealand land rights and treaty rights have often been regarded as synonymous,4 it will be argued here that the land rights movement of 1975-78 temporarily severed the link between land rights and treaty rights, and that the ‘return to Waitangi’ by land rights activists in 1978 was essential to addressing and resolving Maori grievances. To discern this a close examination of the ways in which treaty politics developed during the period is vital. By paying particular attention to both the

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3 Taura Eruera, in Paul Diamond (producer), Nga Tamatoa.
connections and distinctions between the treaty and other sites of Maori grievance like land and culture it is possible to see the disjunctions between these different themes, the details of which can be lost in a reductionist approach which depicts all Maori grievances as ‘treaty grievances’.

To give examples of this, treaty historians are not so crass as to depict these histories literally as ‘treaty histories’, not in published texts at least; the definition of activist histories as treaty histories lies within the broader narrative sweep writers employ to depict the events of the era. Ranginui Walker does not literally label these histories as ‘treaty histories’ but his constant referral back to the treaty throughout the text of *Ka Whawhai Tonu Matou* masks the fact that the treaty often was not a significant aspect of certain actions and movements. For instance his description of *Te Hokioi* as ‘publicising these issues and relating them to the Treaty of Waitangi’ is a highly selective reading, choosing to over-emphasise the importance of the treaty, which in reality featured rarely in *Te Hokioi*, appearing for the first time in a single sentence in issue three in relation to fishing rights. When describing the Maori land rights movement of 1975 to 78, Walker has argued that ‘These events tended to bemuse the general populace, which failed to connect them with the Treaty of Waitangi’. As we will see later, activists too failed to link the land movement with the treaty. The problem here is not Walkers research, but his incessant need to continuously refer back to the treaty as a point of reference for activism, something that the activists did at times, but not always. To put it simply, the treaty is not always speaking. Claudia Oranges two seminal texts on the Treaty of Waitangi achieve the same effect: they may not literally describe these histories as ‘treaty histories’ but by grouping these events into a larger narrative on the history of the treaty the practical effect is that all activists histories become part of this wider ‘treaty history’.

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7 See Claudia Orange, *The Treaty of Waitangi*, Wellington, 1987, and *The Illustrated History of the Treaty of Waitangi*, Wellington, 2004. Speaking from personal experience, the effect this has on students of New Zealand, Maori, and Treaty histories is to convince them that the treaty, land and culture were synonymous for activists. Thus the 1975 Land March is depicted as an important moment in ‘treaty history’, or Bastion Point will be described as a ‘treaty protest’.
While their efforts have largely been forgotten by historians, kaumatua and conservative leaders began using Waitangi celebrations as a platform for protest in the late 1960s, overwhelmingly as a response to the 1967 Maori Affairs Amendment Act. Ngati Hine kaumatua Walter Kawiti staged a lone boycott of Waitangi in 1968, warning other leaders that ‘no self respecting Maori would sit down with governmental leaders that would pass such laws’. Kawiti was quick to support the next generation of activists: he agreed to host Nga Tamatoa on their journey to Waitangi in 1971, providing Te Rapunga marae as accommodation and a forum for discussion, and was one of a handful of conservative leaders who spoke out publicly in support of the group. In 1968 the Waitangi Day Trust, whose members included Peta Awatere and Whina Cooper, organised an event at Carlaw Park in Auckland attended by as many as 20,000 people which included a re-enactment of the treaty signing. Donna Awatere Huata has described it as ‘the countries biggest treaty demonstration’ but it is unclear whether the event really was as radical as she describes. Claudia Orange had argued that the ‘latent political purpose’ of the event ‘went unrecognised’, with the press depicting it as merely a celebration. In a departure from the usual script of harmonious race relations which had come to dominate official Waitangi Day speeches, Brownie Puriri spoke out against the government at Waitangi in 1969, asking ‘Is there anything in the treaty today that I can celebrate with you? The answer is “very little”’. While their efforts were relatively conservative gestures of dissent, they are worth mentioning as a lead up to radical protest.

The activist newsletters Te Hokioi and MOOHR were first to publicise radical views on the treaty and yearly Waitangi celebrations. For these early radical groups the treaty was one issue amongst many. Te Hokioi made first mention of the treaty in its third issue of late 1968, describing it as ‘basic to the dignity of the Maori, guaranteeing the rights of our people to their land and their fishing grounds’ and reminding the government that, having been signed by the Queens representative, it

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9 Donna Awatere Huata, My Journey, New Zealand, 1996, p.32.
was as legally binding as any other statute and legislation. In its 4th issue following the Waitangi celebrations in 1969, *Te Hokioi* congratulated Kawiti, Puriri and Nga Puhi kaumatua for their acts of symbolic protest against the government at Waitangi. It described the celebrations as a farce, at which: ‘These speeches, like meringues full of hot air and signifying nothing, are made about our wonderful Maori people and the cultural aspects of the Treaty of Waitangi, carefully casting doubts on its validity as a legal document binding for all time.’ For *Te Hokioi*, the government were missing the point of Waitangi, thus a verbatim copy of the treaty and reproductions of its texts provided by Dr Keith Sinclair of the University of Auckland History Department appeared as a supplement to the fourth issue to clear up any misunderstandings. *Te Hokioi* argued that by focusing on the spirit of the treaty and the supposed positive aspects of its signing at the yearly celebrations, the government obscured the actual provisions of the treaty and its legal status. The article suggested understandings of the treaty needed to be shifted away from the official depiction of it as a symbol of harmonious race relations with little practical substance. In a later issue *Te Hokioi* defined its own efforts as embodying ‘Te whakakotahitanga i raro i te mana o te tiriti o waitangi’. Yet, while *Te Hokioi* discussed the treaty and Waitangi on occasion, land issues were its main focus.

In contrast radical newsletter MOOHR’s critique of the treaty and Waitangi was more substantial and better developed. MOOHR saw the treaty as charting a potential way forward for Maori- Pakeha relations. MOOHR’s constitution borrowed its style and substance from the treaty; it included a preamble and four clauses, featured quotes from and about the treaty and its journey from regal edict to rat-gnawed relic, and promised to ‘uphold the positive aspects of the Treaty of Waitangi and to ensure that these provisions are fully carried out’. In 1970, MOOHR urged the government to celebrate Waitangi as New Zealand’s national day and asked ‘How shall we observe the treaty?’ MOOHR envisioned the 6th of February as a ‘day of reckoning’:

We think that Waitangi day, as a national day and a nation-wide holiday at home, will regain its significance only if it is earnestly devoted by Maori and

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14 ibid., p.5, in Walker, *Te Hokioi Maori Iwi*.
15 ibid., pp.9-10, in Walker, *Te Hokioi Maori Iwi*.
17 ibid., pp.5-6, in Walker, *Te Hokioi Maori Iwi*. 
Pakeha to the study of our common problems in our common country.... So let’s get together on Waitangi day, Maori and Pakeha and all, to sort out our common problems and solve them, to learn from our past so that we can avoid past mistakes, correct injustices and shape ourselves a fairer future.\(^{18}\)

They levelled further criticisms at the government for its hypocrisy on the international stage: by ‘already celebrating Waitangi Day as New Zealand’s National Day overseas (but not at home) they are using it to get international MANA and sell “N.Z.’s model harmonious race relations” abroad, using glossy brochures to encourage tourists to come and see the Maori way of life, meet maidens in flax skirts by steaming pools’.\(^{19}\) Once again, activists identified the mismatch between the rosy picture painted overseas and local realities.

MOOHR stressed that reframing understandings of the treaty was ‘an urgent need, a race against time’, but, despite the ominous warnings, their vision was overwhelmingly upbeat.\(^{20}\) February 6\(^{th}\) was a chance to iron out the contradictions and inconsistencies between New Zealand’s international image and its local realities: an opportunity for New Zealanders of all races to ‘unite in the sprit of Waitangi’ and prove ‘official claims about model race relations can be achieved in reality’, ‘stamp out lies and deceit and one-sidedness’ and ‘uphold principles in practice’.\(^{21}\)

MOOHR’s warnings about a race relations ‘race against time’ were more prescient than their optimism about New Zealanders ability to unite around the treaty and Waitangi day. Nga Tamatoa, less positive in their attitudes toward the treaty, developed a set of ideas about Waitangi and treaty politics – and a set of protest tactics and media positions – which would come to overshadow those of their predecessors.

More than any other group before or since, Nga Tamatoa drew attention to the treaty and Waitangi Day celebrations.\(^{22}\) To this end their principle tactic was instigating a


\(^{19}\) ibid., p.3.

\(^{20}\) ibid., p.2.

\(^{21}\) ibid., p.2.

\(^{22}\) The origins and formation of Nga Tamatoa and other activist groups will be dealt with in a later section; here they will be discussed with regards to the treaty.
tradition of radical protests at Waitangi. While their efforts highlighted Maori grievances, their critique of the treaty was their own, and should not be used to stand in for Maori grievances of the time as it varied considerably from those of their predecessors and other activists. Ironically, their decision to launch radical protests at Waitangi on February 6th seems to have been influenced by events overseas: members discovered that every year on ‘New Zealand Day’ (as it was called by embassies and ex-patriots overseas) a propaganda film of Waitangi proceedings would be sent overseas to bolster the myth of harmonious race relations in New Zealand. Thus the aim of their first protest in 1971 was ‘to stop the celebration or at least to be disruptive enough to interrupt the film made of it each year and shown overseas to support the myth of cultural harmony’.23 This was a shrewd move, emphasising the group’s awareness of overseas tends and a desire to launch a movement that was international in scope and internationalist in perspective. The fact that 1971 was the United Nations Year to Combat Racial Discrimination and Racism was not lost on them either.24

Their initial critique of Waitangi was equally as shrewd, being as it was a potent mix of politics and theatrics. In the lead up to their first demonstration at Waitangi in 1971, Taura Eruera announced February 6th should be ‘declared a National day of Mourning and mourned accordingly’ and that rather than regarding Waitangi as a day of celebration, attendees should ‘treat the day as a tangi, complete with black garments, head wreaths and Karangas etc’.25 This poignant mixture of symbolism combined with direct action grabbed headlines, and neither Waitangi day nor New Zealand would ever be the same again.

More than any other group of the era, the treaty was central to the politics of Tamatoa. It was not one of many competing issues as it was for earlier groups; rather treaty activism was, alongside land and te reo Maori, one of the group’s three main concerns. In a 1971 article for instance, Nga Tamatoa listed observation of ‘both the spirit and the letter of the Treaty of Waitangi’ as one of its six objectives, while in

25 ibid., np.
1972 it listed ‘ratification of the spirit of the Treaty of Waitangi’ as one of its five aims, and threatened to disrupt annual proceedings until the treaty was ratified.26

In 1972 their emphasis shifted from mourning the treaty to calling on Maori to shun the celebrations. In a pamphlet titled Boycott Waitangi Day they urged:

The only way for us to state our disgust at this day of Government-sponsored hypocrisy is to stay away from Waitangi. The true significance of the non-application of the provisions of the Treaty of Waitangi will be brought home to the Pakeha Government if it is Pakeha alone who are there to celebrate.27

Tamatoa felt that a boycott would be a fitting statement about the extent to which Maori had failed to benefit from the treaty: ‘Only Pakehas have anything to celebrate as the result of the Treaty. So let them celebrate – alone!’ Maori should only celebrate February 6th when the ‘spirit of the treaty has been ratified’.28

Tamatoa’s treaty politics branched out from here to embrace other issues: they saw the treaty as the fountain of Maori rights; every Maori grievance was a treaty issue. An early pamphlet emphasized that the British rule of law, set up under the auspices of the treaty, had been a cloak for Maori land loss: ‘Since the signing of the Treaty millions of acres of Maori land have been confiscated and/or alienated by Pakeha legal trickery and theft by legislation’. This was proof that: ‘From 1840 when the treaty was signed, to the present day, it is self-evident that it has not been “honoured”.’29 Thus the fate of the treaty and Maori land were intertwined. A second press release from 1972 called on the government to honour the treaty by guaranteeing Maori rights, repealing the last land grab, increasing Maori representation in Parliament, instigating reforms in the education system to give Maori culture and language an ‘equal place in this society’, undertaking reform of the justice system, and protecting Maori fisheries amongst other demands.30 Here again the treaty becomes the foundation from which Maori grievances branch outward.

27 Nga Tamatoa, Boycott Waitangi Day Celebrations, 1972, Eph B Maori 1972, Ephemera Collection, Alexander Turnbull Library (here after cited as ATL), Wellington.
28 ibid.
29 Nga Tamatoa Tuatoru, Te Tahaetanga o nga tikanga o to tatou Iwi, 6 Feb 1973, Eph B Maori, Ephemera Collection, ATL, Wellington.
Boycott Waitangi! a 1972 pamphlet summed up treaty grievances unambiguously with the following bottom line:

Pakehas’ 64 Million acres
Maoris’ 3 Million acres 31

Land loss was the clearest example that the treaty had not been honoured and that Maori had little to celebrate. The panui called for reforms of Maori land ownership, the justice, education and health systems, protection of Maori fisheries, and the establishment of Maori radio and television to protect the language.

This was arguably a wise move: by articulating Maori grievances as related to and guaranteed by the treaty, Tamatoa lent their demands a legitimacy and status they otherwise may have lacked, calling on both the legal status of the treaty and its symbolic importance to New Zealanders. This differed from other movements considerably: unlike the feminist, Black civil rights and Black Power movements for instance they were not demanding equality; rather they were demanding special status as indigenous peoples, as enshrined in the treaty. Furthermore, they were not basing their demands on the grounds of liberal political thought, Christian morals, vague United Nations (here after cited as UN) charters, or basic human rights, as other interest groups had, but on a legal document written and signed by their forebears which guaranteed their rights. Although the treaty was not ratified, it lent a status to their efforts which other movements lacked. 32

Rather than increasing from 1972 onwards, emphasis on the treaty actually declined: token protests occurred in 1974 during the Queen’s visit to Waitangi, but with that exception from 1972 till 1978 protests at Waitangi largely disappeared. This was likely due to the fact that activists began diverting their attention to other pressing issues: in particular we see the emergence of the Maori land movement in 1975 and the mana wahine movement in 1977. Activists also put their time and effort into the establishment of kohanga reo and the teaching of te reo Maori in schools. It was not

32 Some Native Americans, and Native Canadians, too based their efforts on treaties signed by the United States and British governments, but because they had signed so many, a much greater demographic imbalance, lack of public awareness of the treaties, and because all had been broken, their emphasis on treaty rights were less effective than those of Maori on one single broken treaty encapsulating all tribes.
until 1978 that protest would return to Waitangi, led by a coalition of land rights activists from Bastion Point, Te Hapua, Ngati Hine and members of Nga Tamatoa. From 1978 to 1984 protest action at Waitangi escalated, as did tension between activists, the police and the government.

Between 1972 and 1978 Waitangi celebrations and treaty rights took a backseat to the Maori land movement. The distinction is an important one, as in hindsight land rights and treaty rights are often regarded as inseparable, and the land rights movement is portrayed as a part of treaty history or as ‘treaty claims’, when in reality the Maori land movement often failed to make the connection between land rights and treaty rights during these crucial years.

By way of illustration, the manifesto of activist organisation Matakite, which led land protests in the 1970s, pleaded for statutory reform, ‘in the name of social justice’, not the treaty, while the petition it delivered to parliament as the focal point of the 1975 Land March mentioned nowhere in its text the treaty or its significance in guaranteeing Maori land rights. Similarly, Eva Rickard focused on the legislation which denied her rights rather than the treaty that guaranteed them. Of all the protest actions of the 1970s, Bastion Point garnered the most attention, and yet rarely is the treaty ever evoked as the fountain of Ngati Whatua rights; Joe Hawke was more likely to mention Wounded Knee than Waitangi. The treaty appears in the Matakite newsletters for the first time in 1979, and appears only once in the Takaparawha newsletters at the very end of a submission to the government in 1977, almost as an after thought. Where it does appear, the treaty is often used to mark time, rather than as an important document and event in its own right.

Thus while earlier groups emphasised the connection between land rights and treaty rights, the Maori land movement largely ignored, or at the very least downplayed the
significance of the treaty during these years. The return to Waitangi between 1978 and 1984 ultimately led to the empowerment of the Waitangi Tribunal to finally address historical grievances, but this was not an easy, nor inevitable, conjunction. The history of 1970s treaty activism and the hiatus in Waitangi day protests raises several crucial points. First it highlights the significance of the treaty as the foundation of Maori rights both in the eyes of activists and the government, and the fact that activists chose to base their demands first and foremost on the rights guaranteed by the treaty. As argued previously, this elevated their demands beyond those of other interest groups, and took advantage of both the legal nature of the treaty, and its symbolic importance to national identity and a notion of a benign form of colonialism as a cornerstone of New Zealand society. Secondly, it demonstrates the need to attend to the connections and distinctions between the treaty issues and other issues, and the need to understand the way activist critiques of the treaty and Waitangi celebrations developed over the years: broad brush strokes obscure these significant shifts.

Te Whenua

In 1971 Dr Pat Hohepa defined Waitangi as ‘a portmanteau term to embrace a wide range of Maori grievances ranging all the way from impoverishment of the Maori language to erosion of tribal fishing rights’. If, however, we were to pick the one theme that dominated the efforts of activists and defined the era, it would have to be the struggle for Maori land. In the decade between 1968 and 1978 the Maori land rights movement emerged. While historical land loss was a significant factor in its rise, contemporary issues, in the form of legislation including the Maori Affairs Amendment Act of 1967, the Public Works Amendment Act 1962, the Ratings Act 1967 and the Town and Country Planning Act 1953 and in the form of tribal take concerning land and its associated resources, were the main impetus. Land rights had been one of the staple issues of early activist groups Te Hokioi, MOOHR and Nga Tamatoa between 1968 and 1975 but from 1975 it became the issue. The establishment of Te Roopu Ote Matakite, the Maori Land March in 1975, the Raglan Golf Course dispute in Whaingaroa between 1972 and 1978, and the occupation of Bastion Point from 1977 to ‘78 were major landmarks for the movement. In 1978 the

36 Alexander MacLeod, ‘Race Relations: Maoris voice their discontents’, NZ Listener (22 March 1971), ms- papers- 82–333 –07 /11, Press Clippings re Bastion point, F. Cook Papers, ATL.
land rights movement ‘returned’ to Waitangi, signalling the beginning of the new wave of Maori activism lead by the Waitangi Action Committee, Te Kawariki and the Black women’s movement in the late ‘70s and early ‘80s.

This chapter will deal with the first wave of the land rights movement between 1968 and ‘78, covering the development of the movement itself and the critique of land issues developed by activists during this period. The key thematic concerns that arise from this include the connections and distinctions between land rights and other Maori issues, Maori attitudes towards land and land loss during the period, the severing of links between land rights and treaty rights and the return to Waitangi in 1978, and the lessons of the land rights movement.

As noted above, the history of Maori land loss played an influential role as a foundation of Maori grievance, yet it was contemporary land loss and present day issues which arguably provided the momentum for the land rights movement. Despite being castigated for ‘living in the past’, activists did not have to look far to see land loss, it was a reality for Maori during the period. In their broadest sense the grievances originating in this period encapsulated two key concerns, the first being the impact of contemporary legislation on Maori land, and the second best termed ‘tribal take’, the land and associated resource issues of each hapu and iwi.

Legislation is a good place to start; in particular the Maori Affairs Amendment Act of 1967, popularly dubbed the ‘last land grab’, was cited by activists and academics alike as the veritable last straw which ultimately unleashed the floodgates of modern activism. To give just a few examples, the first issue of Te Hokioi employed humour and political farce ‘to illustrate in human terms the impact of the Maori Land-grab Legislation... on the youth of the Maori nation’. Just as the original Te Hokioi was born out of resistance to the ‘first land grab’, it was reborn ‘in 1968 during the second land grab’. The first MOOHR newsletter began with a tirade against the governments recent ‘violent seizure of Maori land’, arguing that ‘the infamous “Maori Affairs Amendment Bill” 1967’ sparked off Maori activism in the 1970s: ‘A previously recognizable cap-in-hand approach has turned to a demand for Maori

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37 Te Hokioi, 1, 1 (August 1968), pp.103, in Walker, Te Hokioi Maori Iwi.
38 Te Hokioi, 4, 1 (February/March 1969), p.8, in Walker, Te Hokioi Maori Iwi.
rights.’ Nga Tamatoa were equally motivated by the act, and voiced their concerns publicly at Waitangi in 1971 to the then Minister of Maori Affairs, Duncan MacIntyre, demanding its repeal. Donna Awatere Huata has recounted that it was John Rangihau, former senior Maori civil servant and Secretary of Maori Affairs, who originally suggested Nga Tamatoa organise the Land March ‘to highlight the continued taking of Maori land under the 1967 Maori Affairs Act’, and the need to repeal the act and others like it. Indeed the preamble to the Roopu Ote Matakite manifesto begins with the sentence ‘The 1967 Maori Affairs Amendment Act was branded as the ‘Last Land Grab’, and goes on to list a number of other statutes which continued to alienate Maori land. The act was a curse for Maori land owners, touching as it did almost every single individual with shares in Maori land, and yet in a sense it was also a perverse blessing. As the quotes above show, the act kick-started modern activism, and provided a rallying point, uniting Maori across tribal boundaries in their shared concern over land loss.

From the furore surrounding this issue it emerged that the 1967 act was but one of a phalanx of legislative measures operating to alienate Maori land. The main culprits included the Public Works Act, which had been used in Whaingaroa to confiscate the land on which the Raglan Golf Course was built, the Ratings Act 1967 which enabled local bodies to sell or lease land on which unpaid rates had accumulated, and the Town and Country Planning Act 1953 which was used by the Whangarei District Council to designate Maori land as public reserves, raising the ire of Matakite founders Witi McMath and Whina Cooper, amongst others.

Tribal take, that is the contemporary issues hapu and iwi faced in each district with regards to land and its associated resources, were the other main basis of the land rights movement. While Te Roopu Ote Matakite provided the ultimate forum for land grievances, these tribal take were the bread and butter of early radical groups Te Hokioi and MOOHR before the formation of Matakite. Land loss and tribal take were the main concerns of Te Hokioi: it drew attention to a myriad of tribal take including

41 Donna Awatere Huata in Paul Diamond (producer), Nga Tamatoa; Donna Awatere Huata, My Journey, p. 55.
42 Te Roopu ote Matakite, Manifesto preamble, p.1, in Walker, Land March.
the impact of the Bluff Aluminium smelter on local fisheries and the stripping of paua stocks in the Wairarapa.\textsuperscript{43} \textit{Te Hokioi} even went as far as printing lists of unclaimed monies held by the Department of Maori Affairs and advice on how to claim land and monies held by Maori trustees, stating bluntly: ‘STAKE YOUR CLAIM HORI’S, YOU HAVE NOTHING TO LOSE BUT YOUR LAND’.\textsuperscript{44} Similar stories poured from the pages of MOOHR’s newsletters, such as the exploitation of white silica sand deposits in Muriwhenua.\textsuperscript{45}

While these earlier groups helped to raise public attention and awareness of Maori land issues, Nga Tamatoa were instrumental in defining and guiding the movement in the lead up to the Land March. One of their earliest press releases demanded: ‘Give us either the land that you confiscated and stole, or give us compensation equivalent to today’s values.’\textsuperscript{46} At this early stage, land rights were seen as intimately linked with the treaty and issues of Maori language and culture. In the same press release they stated:

\begin{quote}
The Pakeha is now in possession of 66 million acres of land, leaving the Maori, or tangata whenua – people of the land – with a mere 4.7 million acres. These figures alone, without any other examples, show just how much the letter and the spirit of the Treaty of Waitangi, referred to as the foundation of New Zealand, has been observed or honoured.\textsuperscript{47}
\end{quote}

This argument appears again and again. Nga Tamatoa felt the figures spoke for themselves, and other activists echoed the sentiment. Here, land loss is definitive proof that the treaty had been honoured only in the breach. Little else needed to be said. Tamatoa also linked land rights with the loss of culture and language. In a leaflet entitled \textit{Te tahaetanga o nga tikanga o to tatou iwi} (an ironic play on the word tikanga itself linking the loss of rights to the loss of culture), Nga Tamatoa Tuarua argued that:

\begin{quote}
The initial taking of the land has removed the basis of our ‘Maoritanga’: the land is our ‘Maoritanga’; Maori people dispossessed of their land have no ‘money’, have no ‘incentive’ and to the present day must be dependent upon the ‘European capitalist economic system’.
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{44} \textit{Te Hokioi} Issue 5 pp.3-12, issue 6, p.7, in Walker \textit{Te Hokioi Maori Iwi}.
\textsuperscript{46} Nga Tamatoa Council, \textit{The Resurrection of Maori Identity}, p.2, in Walker, \textit{Nga Tamatoa}.
\textsuperscript{47} ibid., p.1.
As a result of losing our land in the past we are forced to move to crappy, deculturalised urban ghettoes.48

Thus Maori culture and language, Maoritanga, and Maori land are one and the same, and land loss and urbanisation have subsequently led to Maori becoming ‘deculturalised’. In an evocative poster from 1972 (see figure 2 above), Tamatoa argued:

A landless Maori is a lost Maori

A lost Maori is a lonely Maori

A lonely Maori becomes a ruthless Maori.49

The poster powerfully evokes two images, one of the warrior tradition, as encapsulated in the name Nga Tamatoa and their logo of a crouching toa, and that of the ‘ruthless’/‘lost’ Maori, the product of urbanisation and colonisation who has

48 Nga Tamatoa Tuarua, ‘Te tahaetanga o nga tikanga o to tatou iwi’, Eph B Maori, Ephemera Collection, ATL.
49 ‘A Landless Maori is a Lost Maori’, poster, Eph B Maori 14 November 1972, Ephemera Collection, ATL.
turned to gang life and anti-social behaviour. The poster then suggests two outcomes of land loss, either urbanisation and cultural alienation, or political awareness and militancy. Its power is that it suggests a blend of the two, reminiscent of Frantz Fanon’s lumpen proletariat, that ‘horde of rats’ made up of ‘the pimps, the hooligans, the unemployed and the petty criminals’, who, Fanon proposed were ‘one of the most spontaneous and the most radically revolutionary forces of a colonized people’.50

Up until 1975, land rights were one of a number of issues which concerned activists; after launching Waitangi protests in 1971, the Maori language petition and Maori language day in ‘72, the legal aid scheme and a police watchdog scheme entitled PIG Patrol in 1974, Nga Tamatoa came up with the idea of organising a march to parliament to protest land loss and the impacts of land legislation, and from this was born the Maori Land March, activist group Te Roopu Ote Matakite, and a Maori land rights movement which would come to define the period.

Formed in 1975, Te Roopu Ote Matakite became the focal point for Maori land grievances. The significance of the organisation was that it provided a forum for iwi to air their grievances, transforming a multitude of tribal take competing for public and government attention into a single, coherent, pan-tribal movement. The pan-tribal nature of the organisation made it a powerful vehicle for change, providing iwi with the numerical, moral, financial and spiritual support they needed to raise awareness of their grievances and demand redress. Matakite was also pivotal in providing a number of key groups with the inspiration and support they needed to take more direct forms of action, leading to the occupations of the Raglan Golf Course and Bastion Point.

The minutes of the inaugural Matakite conference demonstrate the significance and effectiveness of the organisation. In total 11 tribal take were presented at the meeting; alongside better known issues such as Tainui Awhiro’s struggle over the Raglan Golf course lead by Eva Rickard, and Ngai Tahu’s struggle for the return of their lands, lakes, foreshores and fisheries, a number of lesser known take were raised, such as the unauthorised taking of gravel from the Tongariro River by the Public Works Department presented by Rawiri Hepi, and the efforts of Kaimanawa iwi to prevent

50 ibid.; Frantz Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth: preface by Jean-Paul Sartre; Constance Farrington, trans., Harmondsworth, 1967, p.103.
the Kaimanawa plains from being designated a public reserve.\textsuperscript{51} Matakite did not just provide a forum to air tribal take, it also passed resolutions of support and plans of action to implement change, as well as providing iwi moral and financial support and the personnel to implement their plans. The highpoint of Matakite's efforts was the 1975 Land March, and while post-march bickering between rival factions of Matakite undermined the group and diluted its message, the march achieved a great deal.\textsuperscript{52} Part of the success was symbolic: to the government and the Pakeha public it was a powerful and poignant display of the strength of Maori grievance, and to Maori a demonstration of the strength and importance of pan-tribal coalitions. For Maori and non-Maori alike, the march has become a symbol of national identity and a quintessential image of Maori activism in the 1970s.\textsuperscript{53}

However the gains of Matakite and the march were more than just symbolic. Their efforts spawned a mountain of publicity; the media had a field day with the rag-tag band of organisers, marchers and their enigmatic, fiery leader Whina Cooper. As they journeyed down the North Island stopping off at marae on the way, the march provided a forum which allowed the marchers to raise awareness and consciousness of their efforts and allowed tangata whenua to share their tribal take and local issues with a sympathetic audience. The march was an exercise in consciousness raising and coalition building, and for a brief, shining moment, brought together rangatahi, pakeke and kaumatua, Maori, Pakeha and Tāuiwi, radicals and conservatives, and all the major tribal groupings of te ao Maori. The march was a lesson on the strength of pan-tribal and cross-cultural unity, and while the coalition was short lived its impacts certainly were not.

One of the march’s concrete achievements was the provision of much needed support to key local movements, readying them to take the next step. The two best examples

\textsuperscript{51} Te Roopu Ote Matakite, \textit{Minutes of Inaugural Conference, 16 November 1975}, in Walker, \textit{Land March}.

\textsuperscript{52} See Michael King, \textit{Whina}, Auckland, 1983, and Aroha Harris, \textit{Hikoi}, which sufficiently deal with the rifts that developed between the two factions of Matakite.

\textsuperscript{53} For example eulogies for Dame Whina Cooper referred to her as the ‘mother of the nation’, and reprinted images from the Hikoi at the time of her death. Most recently, an advertisement for Auckland University of Technology (AUT) features a collage of key leaders and events in New Zealand history, featuring stills and videos of, amongst others, Kate Sheppard, John Britton, Sir Edmond Hillary, and the 1975 Land March being lead by Whina Cooper over the Auckland Harbour Bridge. As the march appears on screen an over dubbed voice asks ‘You, and whose army?’: the ‘you’ refers to Dame Whina Cooper, the army seems to be Te Roopu Ote Matakite.
of this are Tainui Awhiro’s struggle over the Raglan Golf course in Whaingaroa and Ngati Whatua ki Tamaki’s struggle for the return of Bastion Point. Eva Rickard had been fighting for the return of the Raglan Golf course from the early ‘70s with little success; her involvement in Matakite and the Land March gave her a forum to air her tribes’ grievances, and provided her the contacts and support she needed to take direct action, ultimately leading to the return of the land. The same was true for Bastion Point; the Land March provided Joe Hawke and his supporters with the contacts, support and inspiration to take more direct forms of action. As the Orakei activists described it in 1978: ‘Following the historic Land March of 1975, the Bastion Point land occupation became a test case for Maori land grievances in all parts of New Zealand.’54 Joe Hawke identified the lessons of Bastion Point as the significance of direct action and unity:

In doing this we set a precedent for Maori land issues throughout Aotearoa. We showed that after trying all the official channels the redress of our grievances depends ultimately on the Maori people taking direct action and working to mobilise the widest possible support for their stand.55

Raglan and Bastion Point taught their own lessons, inspiring other iwi to ‘light their own fires’.56 Another take which received publicity and activist support was Ngati Hine’s efforts to prevent trustees signing a 75-year lease on 5504 hectares of tribally owned land near Kawakawa (see figures 3 & 4 below). Protest spokesman John Miller was clearly inspired by Bastion Point, pointing out that ‘The overwhelming public support for the struggle of the Ngati Whatua on Bastion Point illustrates what can be achieved by mass action on a united basis’.57 Bastion Point he stated in an interview ‘has become symbolic. It has raised the people’s awareness... but they haven’t really even heard the beginning of it. It’s only the tip of the Maori land issue iceberg.’58 Miller was right, for the handful of tribal take still prominent on the tip of the iceberg there were hundreds more below the surface, documented in local memory and in the historic record. Others which broke the surface and garnered attention included Saana Murray’s efforts to prevent the cross-leasing of tribal lands to the Crown for a timber-pulping project in Te Hapua, immortalized in the eloquent prose of her book The

54 Orakei Maori Committee Action Group (Here after referred to as OMCAG in footnotes) Takaparawha, Bulletin No 19, Auckland, 1978, p.3, in Ranginui Walker, Bastion Point.
57 Stop Grab! Maori Land, poster, Eph B Maori 1977 Bastion Point, Ephemera Collection, ATL.
Flight of the Kotuku. Another involved the Waahi Marae of Tainui protesting the social and environmental impact of the Huntly power station on the local community and environs. Locals composed a haka deriding the project, calling the plants chimney stacks ‘giant pakeha phalluses raping the land’. 59

If there was a negative side to the efforts of Matakiti, the Land March and the occupations and movements it inspired, it was that the land rights movement which developed in 1975 tended to sever the link between land rights and treaty rights. As argued in the previous section, in this period land rights groups rarely articulated their rights as being intimately linked to the treaty and the promises at Waitangi, though they might point to land loss as evidence of how little force the treaty had in practice. It is easy now with the wisdom of hindsight to see the significance of the treaty; after the establishment of the Tribunal in 1975 and the granting of retrospective jurisdiction in 1985 the twin issues of land rights and treaty rights would be reunited. Linking to the treaty was an effective strategy because it elevated Maori grievances above simple claims for equality on moral grounds or the broad outlines of

UN charters, playing on both the treaty’s symbolic place at the centre of the New Zealand myth of good race relations, and its status as a legal document. Arguably the activists came to realise this too. In 1978 activists ‘returned’ to Waitangi, lead by a coalition of land rights groups representing the take of Raglan, Bastion Point, Ngati Hine and Te Hapua amongst others. This signalled the new wave of Maori activism and activism surrounding Waitangi and the treaty in the late ‘70s and early ‘80s, fronted by the Waitangi Action Committee, Te Kawariki and the Black women’s movement and leading to the Treaty Amendment act of 1985. Arguably then, while the Land March was significant in that it raised awareness and consciousness of land issues and inspired unity, coalition building and direct action, the return to Waitangi in ‘78 and the reconnection of treaty rights and land rights led to the final solution to Maori land grievances, the empowerment of the Waitangi Tribunal in 1985 to investigate historical grievances.

Equally important to the actions and outcomes of the land rights movement was the way activists conceptualised land and land loss during the period. The most common and recurring image employed by activists involved defining and contrasting Maori and Pakeha attitudes to land as oppositional and irredeemably conflicting. Land rights were depicted by activists as a struggle between Maori spiritual attitudes towards land as ‘tangata whenua’ and Pakeha commercial attitudes towards land as ‘colonial settlers’, pitting ‘quarter acre sections’ against ‘turangawaewae’. Pakeha journalists and commentators often went along with these definitions, bemoaning Pakeha attitudes to land while admiring those of Maori.

While there are a multitude of examples of this image in the sources, three in particular succinctly sum up the associated ideas. The first comes from two interviews with Whina and Joe Cooper from 1975. In the first, the Pakeha journalist commented that ‘Land, or turangawaewae, means much more to the Maori than it does to the quarter acre dwelling European’, while Joe Cooper stated bluntly ‘We’re not used to this business of being stuck on quarter acre sections all our lives. We’re just not made

that way’.\textsuperscript{61} In the second, the writer similarly editorialised that ‘It is hard for the European mind, thinking as it does in terms of investment and profit, to grasp the full spiritual significance of the land to the Maori people’.\textsuperscript{62} Whina Cooper elaborated: ‘the land is the soul of the Maori. It is sacred – tapu and historical. Those bays where the canoes landed, those places where our ancestors are buried. The European would plough through them, even plant vegetables.’\textsuperscript{63}

These interviews show that while the land rights movement gave activists the opportunity to define their culture and explain it to Pakeha, it also prompted some Pakeha – represented in this case by journalists – to begin to define, question and understand their own culture and attitudes.

Te Roopu Ote Matakite provided one of the most eloquent and articulates definitions of Maori attitudes towards land, and employed this oppositional imagery. Their manifesto outlined the distinctions between Maori and Pakeha attitudes towards land:

Land is the very soul of a tribal people. It connects man with his ancestors in a great chain of being, back through the mists of time to creation itself through Papatuanuku the earth mother. Land for the Maori is his turangawaewae where he has dignity before all men. It is an act of cultural genocide for the Pakeha to use his political power to fashion laws that will eventually strip the Maori of his tribal estate.

Ever since the pakeha came to New Zealand, Pakeha and Maori concepts of land have been diametrically opposed. To the pakeha, land is a commodity to be bought and sold in the market place under individual ownership. To the Maori, land is a tribal communal estate passed down from the ancestors a trust for generations to come.\textsuperscript{64}

The Matakite pamphlet \textit{Maori Land: A question of culture} further developed this argument:

To the Pakeha, land has merely an economic value. It is worth so much an acre, and is farmed for profit. To the traditional Maori people though, land is more than that – it has a deep spiritual value. In the words of T.W. Ratana: ‘The Maori is like a potato, without the land he will not grow.’\textsuperscript{65}

\textsuperscript{61} Pauline Ray, ‘Somewhere to go back to...’, clipping from unidentified publication, p.62, ms-papers 4285 – 7, Hutchinson Papers, ATL.
\textsuperscript{62} Ray Watchman, ‘Whina Cooper – fight but not with arms’, \textit{Zealandia}, August 31 1975, np, ms-papers – 4285 – 2, Hutchinson papers, ATL.
\textsuperscript{63} ibid.
\textsuperscript{64} Te Roopu Ote Matakite, \textit{Manifesto preamble}, in Walker, \textit{Land March}.
\textsuperscript{65} Te Roopu Ote Matakite, \textit{Maori Land: A question of culture’}, 1975, in Walker, \textit{Land March}.
The Matakite Petition of support claimed that ‘Land means much more to the Maori people than it does to any other New Zealander. To them it has a deep spiritual value’, while a series of miscellaneous notes produced by the group contrasted Maori and Pakeha attitudes:

For the Maori land is impregnated with ancestral sentiment, historic association, as well as the sense of community ownership. It is regarded by the European as a source of economic wellbeing with a stress upon cultivation and production and an intense desire to posses idle Maori lands.66

A third example comes from an interview with Joe Hawke in 1977. In contrast to the stark opposition drawn between Maori and Pakeha attitudes in the earlier interviews, the interviewer here suggested that there was some common ground, stating ‘It would seem that land has two obvious feelings attached to it. Economic value and feeling for the land. Even the Pakeha has an attachment to his quarter acre section’, before asking Hawke to explain Maori attitudes to land.67 Hawke’s responded that:

Maori land use is peculiar because it’s opposite to present land use in the western world. A lot of people, Maori people, who have feeling for the land, when they stand on the land they feel mana coming through their body – especially in regard to ancestral land. The land where their forefathers lived, where their forefathers died. A term they use is that tupuna blood is spilled on this land. That’s what makes it tapu.... So land use to Maoris is quite a different thing to what it is for Europeans....

Economically, Maori land had no use in the historical sense – it was simply used for people. And this is what has been forgotten over the years. Now people use the land, not for the people but for other reasons. For monetary gain, social status – everything but for people.... So it’s totally a monetary gain concept. So Europeans find it very hard to understand why Maoris are very slow to do the same thing. They are slow because it’s against their whole lifestyle. Their lifestyle is set up in such a way that the whole end is for the peoples use. For whoever wants to use it – as long as it’s in the concept of a tribe or a particular people... people can use it....

This is the concept of land as far as the Tangata Whenua is concerned.68

Of all the examples, Hawke’s is the most explicit in both attempting to explain in concrete terms the link Maori have with land, and articulating why their values conflicted with those of Pakeha. One almost gets the feeling here that Hawke was explaining to himself and his people what the land meant in concrete terms, as much as he trying to explain it to the non-Maori journalist and his readers.

67 Spleen 8, June 1977, np, ms-papers- 2316 – 21, Hutchinson Papers, ATL.
68 ibid.
Taken together these three examples illustrate a tendency to romanticise Maori attitudes towards land and generalise individual and tribal experiences, while negatively simplifying and stereotyping Pakeha attitudes towards land as completely commercial and exploitive, devoid of any historical, emotional or spiritual attachment. The activists’ definitions aimed to explicate their own culture and identity, an important process for a movement interested in regaining not just land, but also culture, identity and mana as tangata whenua. Equally too, their definitions were about naming and defining the other, in this case Pakeha New Zealanders, and trying to understand and explain their culture, attitudes and actions. Their definitions of Pakeha were simplified and stereotyped, but it should be remembered that they were attempting to explain their culture to a Pakeha public largely ignorant of Maori cultural values and who often enough filled the void created by a lack of knowledge with racist stereotypes. Pakeha were ignorant of Maori culture and attitudes, but the opposite was not also always true, as Titewhai Harawira quipped in an interview: ‘I would make a better pakeha than you would a Maori. I learned all about Henry VIII and Captain Cook at school, but never about my ancestors. You have never had to learn my language and I have to see it blatantly bastardised today.’69 Moreover Pakeha, as members of the majority culture were often blind to the extent to which their own attitudes were culture based, seeing them as simply normal, practical and commonsensical. The land movement sparked debate about Maori and Pakeha attitudes towards land and contributed significantly to the redefinition of Maori and Pakeha identities and culture since the 1970s.

A second theme that arises from this material is that, like the treaty, land was connected to many other issues. Activists commonly defined land as ancestral land and as an ancestral right, as well as the birth right of future generations, connecting the rights and fates of past, present and future generations. As Nga Tamatoa expostulated: ‘For us land is a tribal estate, a trust vested in us during our lifetime, a privilege passed down from our ancestors to be safeguarded for generations to come.’70 The link between the land and the mana of the people was presented as

70 Nga Tamatoa, Whenua Aroha’, ms- papers – 4285 – 2, ATL.
inextricable: Matakite warned that without land Maori had ‘no mana and no stake in society’, while Titewhai Harawira commented just as bluntly that ‘As for the land, without land we are nothing. If you don’t have a Turangawaewae you are nobody.’

The links between the land, language and culture were also significant, as shown in previous quotes. In one of many examples, Joe Cooper warned that ‘They talk about the Maori language as part of our heritage... But we think if they want the language to survive and the people to survive, our land must survive also, as part of our heritage.’ Activists expressed holistic attitudes towards land and land loss; as tangata whenua, literally people of the land, for them land was inextricably linked to every other issue and aspect of their culture, with land loss came the loss of mana, language, culture, identity, everything of worth and meaning.

A third common theme that emerges from these materials is the historical and legal rhetoric with which activist Maori decried land loss during the period. To cite a few examples: the fight over land leases in Te Hapua was called a ‘Land grab in the far north’ by the government; Ngati Hine’s struggle another ‘land grab’, this time by commercial investors; Joe Hawke called Bastion Point a confiscation of Maori land, and Matakite classed land loss as cultural genocide and continuing confiscation. Maori then typified late twentieth century land loss as a confiscation of sorts, comparing it to the raupatu of the 1860s. At times this was appropriate, particularly as land was being taken by the government by way of compulsory purchase (though not as any form of punishment as is suggested by the term confiscation or raupatu), however often no form of confiscation was involved, such as in the case of Ngati Hine and Te Hapua where land was leased out without the iwi’s total agreement, but title to the land and accumulated rents remained with them. During this period Maori seemed to treat all land loss, rhetorically at least, as confiscation.

To sum this up, equally important to the actions and outcomes of the land rights movement was the way activists conceptualised Maori culture, attitudes to land and land loss. Their definitions suggested a stark contrast between Maori and Pakeha

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72 Pauline Ray, ‘Somewhere to go back to…’, p.62.
73 This is similar to the early 20th century, when confiscation and raupatu were terms used by Iwi to describe all forms of land loss to the Simms commission.
attitudes to land, romanticising the spiritual and ancestral attachment of Maori to their land as turangawaewae, while simplifying and stereotyping Pakeha connections to the quarter acre block as profit-based and devoid of emotional, historical or spiritual resonance. Land was inextricably linked to the fates of Maori culture, language, mana and identity, indeed everything of meaning and worth to Maori, while land loss was often labelled as ‘deculturisation’, confiscation and ‘land grabbing’, and modern land loss compared to the punitive government confiscations of the 1860s. While the contrast were over-drawn activist rhetorical strategies helped define Maori and Pakeha attitudes to land, contributing to the moulding and reshaping Maori and Pakeha identities in the late 20th century, a point which will be developed upon in the following section on Maori language and culture.

To conclude this section, in the decade between 1968 and 1978 a Maori land rights movement emerged, defining land as one of the key issues of the era and providing some of the most powerful and symbolic moments of modern New Zealand history, notably the 1975 Land March, the Raglan golf course dispute, and the occupation of Bastion Point. Land loss provided the impetus that kick-started modern activism in 1968, and land issues were a staple of the earlier efforts of activist groups Te Hokioi, MOOHR and Nga Tamatoa between 1968 and 1975. However it was the formation of Te Roopu Ote Matakite which brought land rights to the forefront of the movement, and public and government attention. Matakite and the Land March were to have a major impact on society and the course of activism, demonstrating the effectiveness of pan-tribal unity, and cross-cultural coalition building, and the effectiveness of direct action. In turn the organisation and the march captured the imagination of the public, embedding itself in the national psyche as a symbol of national identity, and lead to the direct action and confrontations at Raglan and Bastion Point. If there was a failing it was not the public squabbles over leadership by opposing factions of Matakite, it was the fact that the land rights movement had severed- temporarily at least - the link between land rights and treaty rights. In 1978, the land rights movement ‘returned to Waitangi’, leading to the second wave of Maori activism in the late 1970s and early ‘80s and the empowerment of the Waitangi tribunal in 1985 to address historical grievances. Equally important to the events, outcomes and lessons of the movement were the definitions it developed to conceptualise Maori attitudes towards land and land loss. These provided a means for Maori to explain
their culture and attitudes both to a largely ignorant Pakeha public, and to themselves, while also contributing to moulding and reshaping Maori and Pakeha culture, identity and race relations in the later decades of the 20th century.

**Te Reo Maori**

In an impassioned essay published during Maori language week in 1976, Hirini Melbourne described the te reo Maori movement as conveying two essential messages:

To the Pakeha it says we are sick of your mispronouncing our language. We hate your mono-cultural system. We want our rights to be ourselves and not to be changed and adapted to become brown-faced Pakeha. Pakeha, I want to educate you for a change.

To the Maori it is saying- speak Maori to your children so that your children can speak Maori to their children.  

In five short lines, Melbourne conveyed both the essential message of the movement and the passion and conviction at its heart; it revitalised Maori language and culture, challenged Pakeha culture and identity, and demanded change. Between 1970 and 1977 the te reo Maori movement emerged from the ranks of Maori youth, activists and students as the third piece in the puzzle of modern Maori activism. Like the other two, the te reo issue was as much about culture and identity as it was about rights and equality. Not only did Maori demand the equal status of Maori language and culture in the eyes of the government and the public, they also delivered a critique of Pakeha society and culture, challenging Maori and Pakeha to revisit their histories, to realize that the myths of racial harmony and one New Zealand were false and had failed to deliver Maori equal rights or equality in society, and thus proving that change was needed. The results of their efforts were both immediate and long term; not only did they achieve many of their goals in a surprisingly short period of time, they also succeeded in destabilising attitudes towards New Zealand’s history, national identity and race relations, in turn redefining both Maori and Pakeha culture and identities. This discussion of the te reo Maori movement will be split in two, the first section being an events-based narrative, filling in many of the gaps present in current accounts of these histories, while the second section deals with the key themes and

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arguments raised by activists, the way they came to define Maori and Pakeha culture and history, and the impact of their efforts.

It is necessary to preface this discussion of the te reo Maori movement with an account of the history and events surrounding the movement, due in part to the lack of detailed published sources on the subject, and to revise academic and popular accounts of these events, which have tended to obscure the actions and efforts of certain individuals and groups involved. To give examples of this, Walkers account consists of little more than a paragraph on the contribution of activists to the language movement in the early ‘70s, and mentions only Tamatoa, while conservative contributions take up six pages of detail. Aroha Harris’ account adds some much needed detail, at least mentioning the considerable role of Hana Jackson and Te Reo Maori Society. Michael King’s account is the shortest of the three, but at least mentions Te Reo Maori Society. The Te Reo Maori Claim published by the Waitangi Tribunal in 1986 is the worst example. Nowhere in the reports text does it mention the contribution of activists, instead it chose to focus on the testimonies of conservative leaders and Pakeha academics. At one stage it even pauses for a paragraph to contemplate the mana of Sir James Henare, his distinguished career and his impressive command of the English language. The main reason for this lack of detail on the contributions of activists can largely be put down to a lack of research; most accounts occur in general histories or popular histories and there has yet to be a book published solely on the subject. However, as with the tribunal report, part of the reason why activists have been marginalised in these accounts is because their efforts do not fit in with what would quite quickly become a conservative lead movement. Thus there is a need for more detail on these events, which have received far less attention than the treaty and land, and a need to highlight the significant contribution of activists in the earlier years of 1970 to ‘78.

Conservative groups had been campaigning for the introduction of te reo in schools since the 1950s, but by the late 1960s they had made little headway. Urbanisation and an unofficial policy of cultural assimilation had drastically reduced the numbers of

75 Ranginui Walker, Ka Whawhai Tonu Matou, Rev. Edn, pp. 210-11, 238-243.
76 Aroha Harris, Hikoi, pp.44-51.
fluent speakers of te reo. The generation that came of age in the 1960s were the first wave of urban-born Maori, and the first generation that had not learnt their own language from childhood. This played a significant role in influencing their efforts, as interviews with Nga Tamatoa members bear out. Linda Smith has argued that ‘our generation knew the price of not speaking Maori, that it was connected to your identity, to your history, you know that, to your spirit’, and that, ironically, ‘it took a group of people who didn’t speak Maori, to put Maori language onto a national agenda’.78 Donna Awatere Huata corroborated this, stating: ‘You have to lose something before you value it, and we were the first generation that really lost it all. It was the fact that Hana [Jackson] couldn’t speak the Maori language, her loss, the land loss that we all had, the cultural links that we were all by that stage loosing, we were so aware of what we’d lost, and in the losing of it was that rage that we didn’t wanna lose it.’79 Awatere Huata’s sense of rage was identified by Rawiri Paratene as an emotion which, though frustrating, fuelled their efforts:

you know our political activity came from that anger was that we were, we stood stronger in a Pakeha house than in a Maori house and that’s where our anger was, but it had to be like that in order for the consciousness to be raised to a point high enough for us to be for the ground to be fertile for things like kohangareo.80

Peter Rikys explained the link between urbanisation and language loss in simpler terms: ‘We were first wave urban Maori. We didn’t have a home marae just around the corner and the kaumatua and the opportunity to sit for hours listening to korero and attend hui and so on.’81

The te reo Maori movement emerged simultaneously in the two urban centres of Auckland and Wellington in 1970, and was the brainchild of activist groups Nga Tamatoa and the lesser know though no less significant Te Reo Maori Society. Hana Jackson was the leading light behind Nga Tamatoa’s role in the movement. Jackson has cited the influence of language advocates Turoa Royal and Dr Bruce Gregory in convincing her to act on the issue. Jackson attended the 1970 Young Maori Leaders Conference, which, under the main theme of urbanisation, had already organised a

78 Paul Diamond (producer), Nga Tamatoa.
79 ibid.
80 ibid.
81 ibid.
discussion of te reo Maori. Jackson put forward a remit that the language be taught in preschools and primary schools; the issue was debated, and four remits were passed, calling for te reo Maori to be offered at preschool, primary and secondary school levels, the establishment of a training course for Maori language teachers at Auckland’s university or teacher’s training college, and the addition of Maori to the subjects eligible for a Diploma in Teaching.

Remits were not enough though. Rangatahi who attended the conference felt direct action needed to be taken, and after a meeting in Swanson and a series of name changes, Nga Tamatoa was established. Jackson joined Tamatoa ‘specifically because they were sympathetic to the cause and I felt I needed to be part of a group’; the group launched a petition to campaign for the introduction of te reo in preschools and primary schools, and over the next two years Jackson toured the country visiting marae, organizations, schools, politicians, anyone sympathetic to her cause, rallying support and signatures. By late 1972 Jackson had gained some 44,000 signatures, and the petition was delivered to parliament by Jackson, kaumatua Te Uenuku Rene of Ngati Toa and Ngati Raukawa, and supporters in a solemn ceremony on the 14th of September.

The Te Reo Maori Society from Wellington played an equally important role. Members cite the influence of kaumatua Te Uenuku Rene, whose challenge to students of Maori language inspired them to set up the society in the Anthropology department of Victoria University in Wellington. In contrast to Tamatoa, Te Reo Maori focused primarily on learning and promoting Maori language and culture, by organising language classes, attending formal occasions such as hui and tangihanga to further their knowledge and skills, visiting schools and tertiary institutions, and creating resources for teaching and learning te reo. Te Reo Maori was a more conservative group oriented to the practicalities of learning and promoting te reo. Unlike Nga Tamatoa they opened their membership to non-Maori, and their vision was ‘to encourage the development of a uniquely New Zealand Society, a bi-lingual

84 Brown, Mana Wahine, p.52.
85 Te Reo Maori Society, Te Reo Maori Society, p.1, ms-papers- 93-180-08/2, ATL.
and bi-cultural society, which takes pride in its dual heritage Maori and Pakeha. As Hana Jackson would later comment: ‘Te reo Maori concentrated on the learning and maintenance of the reo, while our group, Nga Tamatoa, concentrated on political support and recognition by legislation.’ This was an optimistic view of the division of labour: national coordinator Rawiri Paratene has intimated that initially the longer established Te Reo Maori Society was unhappy at Nga Tamatoa’s plans for the petition and Maori language day, but eventually joined in support once momentum grew. There was tension behind the scenes; Te Reo Maori sources read as overly defensive at times, while Tamatoa sources show an occasional tendency to forget the input of other supporters.

The New Zealand Federation of Maori Students conference held earlier that year agreed to sponsor a Maori Language day, Te Ra o Te Reo Maori, to complement Jackson’s petition. A broad coalition of Maori students, youth and Pakeha supporters was formed including Nga Tamatoa, Te Reo Maori Society, Wellington Action, Maori Post Graduates, The New Zealand University Students Association (NZUSA), the Student Teachers Association of New Zealand (STANZ), CARE and HART. The group called themselves Te Huinga Rangatahi o Aotearoa and Rawiri Paratene of Nga Tamatoa Tuarua, then known as David Broughton, was elected the national coordinator. Maori Language Day was later extended to become Maori Language week, Te Wiki Nui o Te Reo Maori, and in 1975 the Land March was timed to coincide with the start of national Maori language week, symbolically tying together land loss and cultural alienation.

A multitude of activities were organised to celebrate Maori Language day and later week, which expanded and developed progressively. In 1972, activities focused primarily on gaining public and media attention, including articles and ‘a proverb a day’ in print media, a radio campaign encouraging listeners to ‘Learn a phrase a day’, interviews and publicity on television, the preparation of 5,000 posters and 40,000

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86 Te Reo Maori Society, *Te Reo Maori Society (historical overview)*, p2, ms- papers- 93-180-08/2 ATL.
88 Paul Diamond (producer), *Nga Tamatoa*.
89 See David Broughton, *Letter re National Maori Language Day Co-ordinating committee*, ms-papers 93-180-08/2, ATL.
90 Sources differ as to whether this occurred in 1973 or 1974.
leaflets (see figures 5 & 6 below), speakers at schools and tertiary institutes, displays in public places such as museums and libraries in the main centres, and the first of many Maori language seminars. By 1974, the emphasis was on activities rather than just advertising, and alongside the usual pamphleting and support drives for te reo Maori in primary schools, the Maori language week programme included an interdenominational service, guided tours of Orakei marae, arts and crafts, learning activities at the Auckland Museum and local schools, classes in basic Maori, school concerts, language sessions at Paremoremo prison, a lecture on waiata by Eruera and Amiria Sterling at Auckland University, a cultural performance at the YMCA, hangi, an open day at Mangere marae, and a Maori and Polynesian Speech Contest at Seddon High School.

Figure 5 & 6: The campaign to introduce the Maori language in mainstream Primary and Secondary schools necessitated Pakeha support: as a result the movement produced a large body of posters, flyers and pamphlets, which became a medium for political and artistic expression.

Their efforts reaped immediate awards: in 1974 the newly elected Labour government introduced the optional teaching of te reo Maori to primary and secondary schools, and a one year ‘pressure cooker’ course for fluent speakers was established on the

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92 *National Maori Language Week Programme, 1974*, Eph B Maori, 1974, Ephemera Collection, ATL.
advice of activists to meet the shortfall of Maori language teachers required to put the plan into action.

Despite their victories, activists were not complacent. In 1974 Nga Tamatoa and CARE prepared a response to the newly introduced scheme, criticising the selection process, the selection panel, the interview process, the application form and the courses designation as a small scale ‘pilot course’ rather than a permanent arrangement, typifying the Education Departments efforts as ‘abject tokenism’, ‘inadequate, pakeha-orientated, and obviously designed to fail’.\(^\text{93}\) Supporters continued their campaign too, using various public forums on Maori issues or issues of race to pass resolutions of support for the language and opposition to the government and Department of Education.

![Figure 7: In 1975 Te Reo Maori Society upped the ante, campaigning for Maori content on radio and television.](image)

Furthermore, in 1975 Te Reo Maori began campaigning for more substantial Maori programming on radio and television, moving away from the ‘phrase a day’ and

‘proverb a day’ approach (see figure 7 above). Their new approach included demands for a training course in pronunciation for presenters, the introduction of 5 minutes of Maori news each night before the news on TV One, and the establishment of a Maori language production unit to produce programmes in Maori. In 1977, the Te Reo Maori Society delivered a petition to Parliament, praying that the Government:

adopts a policy enabling the creation of a Maori Television Production Unit to facilitate and to ensure the production of programmes in the Maori Language and in the English language on or relating to various aspects of Maori culture, art and society so as to maintain and develop a balanced reflection of a New Zealand identity and culture.94

These programmes and changes activists agitated for were gradually adopted and commandeered by the Education department and conservatives. From 1978 onwards the movement was lead by more conservative elements of Maoridom, and the focus switched from activism and consciousness raising to implement the schemes, leading in turn to the opening of the first bilingual school in Ruatoki in 1978, the first of many kohangareo in 1982, the publishing of the Te Reo Maori report in 1986, the Maori Language Act in 1987, and the establishment of Te Taura Whiri i te Reo, the Maori Language Commission.

Activists played a significant role then in putting te reo Maori on the national agenda, and many of their goals were achieved in a surprisingly short amount of time. Their efforts however came at a price, as elders, conservatives and speakers of the language lambasted activists. Walking the walking was not a substitute for being unable to talk the talk. Nga Tamatoa members in particular, were accused of agitating for te reo when they themselves could not speak it. As Taura Eruera would later recall: ‘I guess the main thing they were dissatisfied about was the fact that in their eyes these Maori weren’t practicing what they were preaching, and the main thing these Maori weren’t practicing was te reo, and it didn’t cut any ice with them.’95 In Hana Jackson’s words: ‘It never occurred to me that it could be an issue with Maori, but to my surprise some Maori suggested I should go back to the marae, while others, like my mother, had been brainwashed into believing that the only way to get on was to speak English.’96 Linda Smith recalled that some of the strongest resistance came from native speakers, while Donna Awatere Huata has commented:

94 The Petition of Te Reo Maori Society of Wellington, 1977, ms-papers 93-180-08/2, ATL.
95 Paul Diamond (producer), Nga Tamatoa.
96 Brown, ed, Mana Wahine, p.52.
I think people have forgotten, the contempt with which we were held by most Maori, contempt and fear, and the fear was that...we’re the ones working with Pakeha and living with them who are actually going to have to put up with the backlash, and backlash there was, make no mistake about that, on the Maori language petition.\(^97\)

Not only were Nga Tamatoa members ostracised and branded radicals at the time, their efforts and those of their supporters have also been marginalised within official accounts and public memory. The *Te Reo Maori* report of 1986 fails to mention the efforts of activists at all, while their efforts seem to have been erased from public memory.\(^98\)

Several key themes do seem to emerge from the chorus of voices. At its most fundamental, the te reo Maori movement demanded the equal status of te reo Maori, as part of a wider push for the equal rights of Maori people. This in turn required New Zealanders to face up to their histories. Activists also had to sell the language; they did this with a mix of charm and force, on the one hand extolling the virtues and benefits of te reo Maori, while on the other hand offering a harsh critique of Pakeha society.

At a fundamental level, the te reo Maori movement demanded the equal status of Maori language and culture, as part of a wider push for the equal rights of Maori people in society. Part of this process required admitting that something was wrong in present day society, which in turn required people to revisit and question their histories; activists challenged Pakeha, the government, and notably their own people, to push beyond the rhetoric of harmonious race relations, to admit that the project of ‘one New Zealandness’ had failed, and to re-write and re-right past wrongs, starting with Maori language and culture. Thus we see the creation of post-colonial narratives, retelling New Zealand’s colonial past from a Maori perspective, as a means of explaining the process by which Maori lost equality and rights, challenging popular beliefs in racial equality and a history of harmonious race relations, identifying the negative results of colonisation, and thus showing why Maori rights needed to be restored. An excellent example of this appears in a Maori Language pamphlet

\(^{97}\) Paul Diamond (producer), *Nga Tamatoa*.

published by the Te Reo Maori Society in 1970, which powerfully recast New Zealand’s colonial history:

Since the middle of last century N.Z. educators have carried on a total war on the Maori language as part of the total war on Maori Identity. This has been a process of assimilation, euphemistically labelled ‘integration’, a process of murdering people by suppressing their culture, while robbing them of their land and wealth and reducing them to the semi-slavery of the unskilled labour pool, with the status of Honorary White Dropouts. If we take the more kindly view, that the suppression of Maori was not aimed to be cultural genocide but rather an aid to the ‘civilisation’ of the Maori people, we can only conclude that with 92.5% of the Maori labour force in 1966 (census figure) having no educational qualifications this approach has been catastrophic in its failure. This state of affairs calls for a complete change in education policy.99

This dense paragraph connected cultural assimilation, land loss, class exploitation, poor education and Pakeha paternalism into a web of grievances entrapping successive generations of Maori. ‘One New Zealandness’ and harmonious race relations is replaced here by a colonial process typified by division, exploitation and loss. The outputs cited here, lack of education and poor life prospects, were proof that whether the intention was cultural genocide or ‘civilisation’, the integration of Maori into Pakeha society was flawed and failed.

In another provocative pamphlet, Te Reo Maori used a hypothetical scenario to illustrate the plight of Maori, cutting through deeply embedded myths of racial harmony. The group challenged Pakeha to imagine what it would be like if present day New Zealand was colonised by Japan and Pakeha were outnumbered and forced to give up their language and culture to become Japanese. Readers were asked to imagine their children being beaten at school for speaking English, to imagine being called a dumb kiwi for having trouble with speaking Japanese, and to imagine consistently having their names mispronounced while being patronised as ‘our kiwis’.100 In bold capitals it asked: ‘Are you sure you would call that “unsurpassed harmonious race relations” and “complete equality under the law”?’.101 Rather than inscribing a Maori view of colonisation, the pamphlet challenged its readers to

100 Te Reo Maori (Maori Language Society), *Would it make any difference to you?*, pamphlet, Eph B Maori 1973, Ephemera Collection, ATL.
101 ibid.
imagine for themselves what colonisation had been like for Maori, disrupting popular attitudes towards New Zealand’s colonial past.

Other publications argued if Pakeha truly believed in racial equality they needed to put their money where their mouth was: ‘Study of the Maori language by Pakehas will help to convince Maoris that Pakehas mean what they say’. As Te Reo Maori argued ‘Racial equality in bi-racial N.Z. implies a bi-lingual and bi-cultural N.Z.’, therefore in the interest of racial equality and racial harmony all New Zealanders should learn Maori language and culture. Similarly Nga Tamatoa’s petition was offered to New Zealanders as ‘a positive effort to promote a more meaningful concept of integration’.

Activists had to sell Maori language and culture to Pakeha, the government and their own people. They did this with a mixture of charm and force, on the one hand extolling the virtues and benefits of te reo, while on the other hand articulating a harsh critique of Pakeha society, demonstrating why Pakeha needed to learn Maori language and culture for their own good.

The benefits of te reo Maori fell into two main categories, the benefits of learning Maori as a second language, and the benefits to New Zealand’s culture and identity. Akona Te Reo Maori: Why your child should learn Maori was one of the more substantial pamphlets used to promote te reo, and lists a number of benefits Maori and Pakeha children would gain from learning the language. For Maori children, it was expected that learning te reo would ‘promote a child’s self-respect and sense of identity’ giving them ‘the confidence to move out and meet other people on equal terms’. It would bridge gaps between elders and the younger generation, who ‘often speak different languages- literally’, and would enable ‘Young educated Maoris needed as agents of change’ to communicate with their communities. By learning te reo it was expected Maori students would be able to reach their full potential, giving them the confidence and skills to succeed in other areas of study, while also

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102 Akona Te Reo Maori: Why your child should learn Maori, Pamphlet, Eph B Maori ca 1973, Ephemera Collection, ATL.
103 Te Reo Maori (Maori Language Society), Maori Language.
104 Nga Tamatoa and C.A.R.E., Te Reo Maori, np.
105 Akona Te Reo Maori.
106 Ibid.
encouraging Maori parents to become more involved in their children’s schooling and the parent-teachers association. A lack of skills in te reo amongst teachers could also impact on Maori students: Whaimutu Dewes argued that mispronouncing a Maori child’s name would ‘degrade his culture in his own eyes’, and if the child reacted they would be ‘labelled a problem child’.107

For Pakeha children, the pamphlet argued that learning a second language helped students understand their own language and learn others, while learning a language actually spoken in New Zealand, unlike French, German or Japanese, was a further bonus. To bolster the language, and possibly to answer criticisms that Maori was not a language of commerce, a ‘bread and butter’ language, the pamphlet points out that te reo Maori ‘belongs to the Austronesian language family spoken by 150-200 million people in Polynesia, Melanesia, Indonesia, and Malaysia’ and that in the future the region would become more important to New Zealand ‘economically and politically’.108

A series of postcards produced to advertise the campaign for Maori in primary schools cited similar arguments, stating the language should be taught at primary level because ‘younger children acquire a language more readily than older children’ and because the ‘earlier the teaching of Maori begins the greater the growth of self-confidence and sense of identity in Maori children’.109 Non-Maori would also benefit from ‘the understanding by other children of the people whose land they share’.110

The other major argument that activists put forward to convince the public and government of the benefits of te reo was the positive impact it would have on creating a unique national culture at a time when national identity was in flux. Whaimutu Dewes expressed this point most succinctly, arguing that:

This country is having to cut ties with the mother land, and Europe is cutting its ties with us. The Pakeha are having to search for their own identity. They will soon be in the position Maori were; except that we have a distinctive

108 Akona Te Reo Maori.
109 Hana Jackson, Campaign for Maori in Primary Schools postcards, nd, Eph B Maori, 1970s, Ephemera Collection, ATL.
110 ibid.
culture which will last as it stresses conservation of natural resources and the quality of life rather than material gain.\textsuperscript{111}

As New Zealand’s past identity as Britain’s colonial daughter dissolved in the 1970s, activists joined the chorus of popular public opinion that New Zealand would have to look to itself and its Pacific neighbours in the post-European Economic Community world. Te Reo Maori Society contended ‘that New Zealand needs to be able to lay claim to something unique – which is our Maori heritage, the key to which is the Maori language’, and was ‘convinced of the role that Maori language has to play in determining a New Zealand identity’.\textsuperscript{112} Nga Tamatoa reminded the public that ‘New Zealand is a pacific nation’, and ‘Maori is the indigenous language of this country, and if we wish to build a “New Zealand Character” we need to recognise this fact and come to terms with it’.\textsuperscript{113} Because te reo Maori was the unique or ‘true’ language of New Zealand, activists argued that learning it would help Pakeha become ‘complete’ or ‘true’ New Zealanders. Thus activists sought to replace New Zealand’s past colonial identity with its modern reality as a Pacific nation of not only dual but multiple heritages.

This idea was developed further by activists; while they emphasised the positive aspects of Maoritanga many also delivered a sharp critique of Pakeha society and culture. Not only was the movement a means of bolstering Maori culture and identity, it was also for many a vote of no confidence in Pakeha culture. Their critiques share similarities with those described in the previous section on Maori land; an othering process arises here as Maori define and stereotype Pakeha as culturally barren and overly materialistic and capitalistic. In some cases the positive aspects of Maori culture are implied, while in others activists take this further developing a contrast between the two.

In critiquing the education system which had marginalized Maori culture and people, Nga Tamatoa argued that ‘The reality is the NZ education system is based on colonial, anglo-saxon, middle socio-economic values which actively discriminate

\textsuperscript{111} Whaimutu Dewes, in \textit{Te Ao Marama}, 1976, p.9.
\textsuperscript{113} Nga Tamatoa, ‘Te Wiki nui mo te reo Maori’, \textit{Craccum} Supplement, Auckland, 1975, p1, Eph C Maori, ca1975 [incorrect, actually 76], Ephemera Collection, ATL.
against Maoris’.  

Whaimutu Dewes put the same problems down to what he labelled ‘the indefatigable arrogance of European nations as illustrated on a world wide scale – White is right’. Sydney Melbourne labelled it a ‘monocultural system’, an ‘intrusion of colonisers’ and an attempt ‘made to assimliat [sic] everyone into the dominant culture’. Dave Ruru described New Zealand’s education system as ‘a monocultural system established and controlled by a white capitalist majority which does not meet the needs of New Zealand’s multicultural population’ and seemed ‘bent upon maintaining the status quo and ...the existence of a massive brown proletariat in New Zealand’. In this othering process Pakeha are re-imagined as coloniser, capitalist, and the dominant culture, while their culture is typified as monocultural, discriminatory, assimilationist, and maintaining the status quo, undermining the traditional markers of national identity ‘Kiwi’, ‘New Zealander’, ‘Harmonious race relations’ and ‘one people’.

Others took these ideas a step forward, contrasting the two cultures. In Whaimutu Dewes words, ‘we have a distinctive culture which will last as it stresses conservation of natural resources and the quality of life rather than material gain’: here Maori are typified as distinctive, or unique peoples who are interested in the conservation of the earth and the ‘quality of life’ of people, while Pakeha are simply materialistic. Hirini Melbourne warned Maori: ‘We must band together and revive our kinship and ethnic bonds to protect ourselves against the negative effects of western industry’ and becoming ‘physically isolated and individualised by western technology’, while suggesting that ‘Perhaps an increased understanding of the destructive results of western cultural and technological systems will encourage Pakeha to value our culture enough to pronounce Maori names and place names correctly’. Melbourne touched on the same sense of need to outlast some impending ‘destruction’ brought on by Pakeha technology, individualism and materialism. He compares this apocalyptic vision of Western culture to a Maori culture typified by kinship and ethnic bonds. Here the concept of whanau arises as typifying Maori culture and identity, in turn

114 ibid.
116 Sydney Melbourne, ‘Pakeha – I want to educate you for a change’.
118 Whaimutu Dewes, in Te Ao Marama, 1976, p.9.
119 Sydney Melbourne, ‘Pakeha – I want to educate you for a change’.
implying Pakeha are individualistic and lack strong kinship bonds. A third example from Te Reo Maori argued that ‘Few Pakehas can express themselves in times of deep emotion, such as funerals and weddings’, while ‘Most Maori-speaking people can.’

This is put down to the fact that ‘Maori culture contains many riches not found in European culture. Language is the key to the culture.’

The same pattern emerges as in the lands section: there Pakeha were typified by activists as having no emotional, spiritual or historical links with the land, for them it was a simple economic commodity, while in a similar vein here, Pakeha have no sense of kinship or ethnic bonds, are emotionally destitute, and care for little other than themselves and their own material welfare. In contrast, Maori care for the land, care for people’s welfare, retain strong kinship and ethnic bonds, and are in touch with their emotions. Again the image of the stereotyped Pakeha is compared to an overly romanticised view of Maori and is found wanting. Whether or not these stereotypes were strictly true or not, they served several purposes. Firstly they served to recast Maori culture and identity in a positive light, emphasising its benefits and virtues. This was important for a people whose culture had been marginalised as uncivilised and irrelevant in the modern world. If we read between the lines, we see the introduction of te reo Maori in schools was not just to provide self confidence, self respect and pride of identity for children alone, it was for the whole community, including activists. In turn activists both implied and directly declared a vote of no confidence in Pakeha society, which for all its rhetoric had ultimately failed to deliver equal rights and equal quality of life to the majority of Maori. This process of naming and othering was essential to convince Pakeha and Maori of the need to act. People believed the myths of harmony and equality, activists needed to convince the government and the public that the project of 'one New Zealandness' had failed, and that the words of activists were not just those of a radical, vocal minority who could therefore be ignored as ‘trouble makers’. This explains their need to revisit the past and recast Maori and Pakeha cultures and identities. This trend would re-emerge later in the scathing critiques of the Black women’s movement, discussed in detail in the forth chapter.

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120 Akona Te Reo Maori.
121 ibid.
Furthermore, their efforts seemed to work. While the movement achieved a number of its goals in introducing te reo to schools, it also succeeded in forcing many Pakeha, particularly liberals, to question their history and identity. Ironically many of the most insightful and damming criticisms of Pakeha culture and history and glowing tributes to Maoritanga came from Pakeha activists of the time. In response many Pakeha have since taken to adopting or at least tolerating facets of Maori culture and language, while others have risen to the challenge of activists in exploring and defining Pakeha culture and identity.

There were many lessons learnt from the te reo Maori movement. Conservative leaders had been campaigning for the introduction of Maori in schools since the ‘50s, yet it took just four years of direct action between 1970 and 74, as well as a sympathetic Labour government, to introduce some reforms. However many of the goals of the movement, such as the establishment of a Maori television service took another 30 years, and Maori desires for a bilingual, bicultural society have not and probably will not ever be achieved. It seems obvious that the efforts of activists fast tracked the reforms of the 1970s and ‘80s, and it could be argued that conservative control of the movement in the late ‘70s and early ‘80s detracted from its momentum. On the other hand, while activists fought for reforms, they were rarely involved in actually implementing them, and it was far easier to demand reforms than to actually put them into practice. The relationship between activists and conservatives was one of conflict, but it was also productive; the lesson may well be here that radical agitation and conservative negotiation and implementation must coexist for meaningful change to occur.

Conclusion

This chapter has attempted to discuss the place of te Ao Maori in the emergence and development of Maori activism in the decade between 1968 and ‘78, and the ‘big three’ issues which came to dominate the efforts of activists and define the era, te tiriti, te whenua and te reo Maori. What emerges is a vivid picture of passion and vitality which sprung forth from Maori communities during the period, taking in the actions and initiatives of activists and the thoughtful, poignant and often shrewd ways they sought to dramatise and resolve their grievances. Equally important was the rich body of thought, criticism and analysis which activists developed to define and articulate their experiences and vision of the world, and the profound impact their efforts would have on society, Maori and Pakeha cultures and race relations, national identity and sense of self, and modern New Zealand history.

Late twentieth century grievances were an important motor driving the movement. While historical grievances certainly played their part it was present-day issues which provided the spur for action. With the treaty it was the ‘New Zealand Day’ video shown overseas, with land it was the 1968 ‘land grab’ and recent seizures of Maori land, with te reo it was the language loss of young urban Maori that fuelled action, not the long term campaigns of elders and conservatives. The significance here is that the grievances activists held were not ‘all in the past’ or long forgotten events of the 19th century, they were fresh in the minds of Maori, and as was the case with Bastion Point and several other sites of protest, were ongoing.

A second theme that arises concerns the role of Nga Tamatoa. In each case here, early activist groups and, in some cases, conservative Maori leaders had campaigned for change; however in all three it was the intervention of Nga Tamatoa both in the public eye and behind the scenes, which finally put each of these issues on the national agenda. This was a testimony to the effectiveness of direct action, but it is also a testimony to the genius of Nga Tamatoa, which was their ability to take direct action, their shrewd eye for the dramatic which allowed them to gain government and public attention where others had failed, and their ability to multi-task and concentrate on several objectives at once. Nga Tamatoa do dominate the sources, and have dominated this chapter. More research is needed to uncover the work and
contributions of other groups, organisations and individuals; the section on Maori language and the Te Reo Maori Society is proof of this. However, part of the reason why Tamatoa do dominate the sources is that they were able to grab peoples attention where others could not, their uncompromising stance and politics prevented government officials from watering down their demands behind closed doors, and the fear they likely instilled in the government and public reeling from events overseas played right into the hands of conservative reformers: in short they succeeded where others had failed. Their role must be recognised, while in turn those of others must too.

This in turn proves the effectiveness of direct action and coalition building. Direct action at Waitangi was effective in garnering public attention, but declined due to a lack of popular support. The return to Waitangi with a broad coalition of activist groups covering the spectrum of leftist politics in the late ‘70s and early ‘80s lead to the empowerment of the tribunal to resolve Maori grievances. The establishment of Te Roopu Matakite and the Land March were both symbolic victories and concrete gains, leading in turn to even more direct action at Raglan, Bastion Point and later Waitangi. And their efforts worked: Raglan was returned, Bastion Point was returned, and the Tribunal would address the many take of other iwi that did not reach headlines but were no less important. The te reo movement achieved some of the most immediate and startling results, due to the direct action of activists, the depth of support for the movement, and a sympathetic government. Coalition building was also vital here, coalition building typified the politics of the ‘60s and ‘70s both here and around the globe, and many of the gains activists made can be put down to their ability to build effective coalitions bridging age, race, gender, tribal and political differences. Treaty activists had a slow start but eventually built a tidal wave of support spanning the spectrum of left wing politics in Aotearoa. The land rights movement achieved what many must have seen as the impossible, a coalition bringing together rangatahi and kaumatua, radicals and conservatives and bridging traditional tribal rivalries and animosities, which was essential in achieving the movements many victories. The language movement also developed a strong coalition of Maori and Pakeha students and activists, while gaining considerable sympathy from the public and the government for their cause. In the later years it also managed to bridge the gap between radicals and conservatives, showing the often conflicting and yet
complimentary and beneficial relationship that could develop when activists worked alongside their elders. As we will see in the next chapter, coalition building was a difficult and fraught process in which Maori activists walked a fine line between broad support and compromising their own priorities for the greater good, and while they encouraged support for their own objectives, they were often wary of having their politics subsumed or watered down by wider movements. If there were three lessons of the activist movement they were direct action, coalition building, and a shrewd eye for the dramatic, and activists were quick to learn and apply these lessons.

Maori activism however was about more than just rights and equality, it had as much to do with identity and culture. Activism provided a forum in which Maori expressed and defined their culture and identity, throwing off the negative associations which had come to typify Pakeha and Maori attitudes to Maori culture, language and life ways, while also offering a sharp critique of Pakeha culture which, despite the promises and rhetoric, had failed to deliver equal rights and status to Maori. An othering process occurred here, in which an often overly romanticised version of Maoritanga was contrasted with a stereotype of Pakeha as emotionless, materialistic, and lacking any emotional or spiritual bonds with the land, their kin or their people. This was a harsh lesson, and undeserved and openly racist at times, but it was a vital step in the process of decolonising and detoxifying New Zealand’s history, culture, society and identity. This was important for Maori in that it revitalised a culture and language which had been maligned and marginalised as uncivilised and irrelevant, however it was also important for Pakeha in that it forced them to revisit and rethink their own history, culture and identity, leading to an acceptance of things Maori amongst some, while encouraging others to seek out and define their Pakehatanga.

Finally, this chapter provides us a much needed standing point from which to regard the influence and impact of national and global trends on Maori, where Maori experience remains central to understanding and explaining these histories. As we will see, te Ao Maori informed the way Maori activists interacted with other organisations, movements and political issues locally and globally. On a national scale, activists had to ride the inevitable and unpredictable conflict which arose from coalition building, in which on the one hand Maori could gain much needed support, while on the other hand they risked having their own politics and priorities compromised and subsumed.
in the interest of the group. On a global scale we see that, despite the stereotypes of Maori activists as mimicking overseas trends, Maori politics remained unique to Maori and differed considerably from those of other movements, in turn showing that Maori attempts to copy overseas movements were superficial: they borrowed the methods and strategies of other movements, but retained their own priorities. Let us move on then by expanding this discussion outward.
Chapter Two
‘A world of shrinking proportions’:
South Africa, Vietnam, and Class Politics

In 1970, the debating team of the New Zealand Federation of Young Farmers Club wrote to then Minister of Works and Electricity Percy B. Allen, requesting information to support their moot point that ‘protest demonstrations are effective’. His response was enlightening: using Wellington as a case study, Allen provided notes and statistics showing that for the year ending May 1970, 25 protest demonstrations had occurred in the capital alone, ranging in number from eight to 1,000 participants. Roughly 3,000 people had been involved in total, and of those only three had been arrested for disorderly behaviour, a shockingly low arrest rate no one could be proud of. Of these demonstrations, 11 focused on the war in Vietnam, six opposed apartheid and sporting ties with South Africa, four related to labour disputes, two were concerned with ‘the cost of living’, and police brutality in Auckland, the monarchy, land disputes, the treatment of Jews in Russia, and “The Meaningless Nature of our Society” were each the theme of a single protest. The ranks of protestors were dominated by students, members of trade unions, the Progressive Youth Movement, anti-apartheid groups, and a smattering of socialists and communists. Allen concluded by noting that with the exception of trade unions ‘the bulk of protestors have been in the late teens and early twenties. No set pattern of occupations but many admit to being University “drop outs”’.¹ There was no mention of the outcome of the debate, but what this example does show is that this period of the late ‘60s and early ‘70s was a time of widespread protest and dissent on local and international issues. Not only do the statistics bear this out, but the fact that a conservative group like the Federation of Young Farmers Club saw fit to debate the issue shows the extent to which activists, largely Pakeha at this stage, had brought the politics of the ‘60s to New Zealand’s front door step. It took time, but by 1970 the ‘long sixties’ had reached the long white cloud.

This chapter will build on our understanding of te ao Maori outlined in the previous chapter, spiralling outwards to discuss the wider context in which Maori activism was placed, the national context of Aotearoa, and will consider the influence of national

¹Percy B. Allen, Protest demonstrations and parades, 1970, AAQB W4073 32/213, ANZW.
events and trends on the emergence of radical Maori activism. The difficulty of discussing these three contexts separately is that they are so inter-related; local issues were so often a spin on global trends. Te ao Maori cannot be removed from Aotearoa, nor can Aotearoa be removed from te ao. To deal with this a distinction will be made between issues New Zealanders were not directly involved in, but which informed or inspired their efforts, and those in which they were directly involved, and which assumed local dimensions. The issues which took on a local dimension, and crucially impacted upon Maori activism, include the anti-apartheid and anti-apartheid sport campaigns, opposition to the Vietnam War, class politics centred on trade unions and left-wing organisations, and second wave feminism.2

The conclusions which can be reached from each of these themes differ considerably: with anti-apartheid activism we need to ask why the role of Maori has been underestimated, with feminism we need to understand why women’s rights became such a significant issue, while for Vietnam and class politics we need to ask why they did not. Having said this, there are a number of over riding themes. The first of these is that while Maori activists encouraged coalition building, enjoyed a broad base of support for their own causes, and sympathised with the politics of other interest groups, they often rejected their overtures and concerns as ‘Pakeha issues’ or ‘outside the scope’ of their immediate objectives.3 A second theme that emerges is that activists created what could be described as new indigenous traditions, whereby Maori adapted new ideas and methodologies to create new traditions. Thirdly, Maori activists and the critiques and politics they developed were still taking shape and solidifying during the period of 1968-78, and as such can be better typified as a ‘rich human mess’ of ideas and methodologies than a coherent ideology.

The ‘60s were a time of turmoil and change. Protest and activism quite suddenly and dramatically became the norm, as ethnic groups fought for their rights and status within the new world order, and a generation of baby boomers began to challenge the conservatism of their parents and predecessors. This was the time of the counter culture, the cold war, second wave feminism, the African American civil rights movement and its offspring Black Power, not to mention Red and Brown Power, anti-

2 Second wave feminism will be dealt with in the forth chapter on the Black women’s movement.
3 Roberto Rabel, p.324.
Vietnam protests, the students rights movement, the Paris riots, anti-nuclear protest, anti-apartheid protest, Gay liberation, children’s rights, animal rights, even vegetable rights. Suddenly everyone had rights, and wanted everyone else to know about it. New Zealand was not immune to these global trends and by the late-’60s the waves of protest had begun to lap on the shores of the Pacific, though with a slight delay. The heyday of the Black civil rights, Black Power, Red Power and Brown Power movements was in the early to late ‘60s. The wave of ‘Brown Power’ and land rights activism lead by Maori and Pacific Islanders peaked in the early to late ‘70s. The feminist movements which emerged in Britain, Europe and the US in the 1960s were matched by local movements in the 1970s. New Zealand was not necessarily behind the times or backward, there was simply a slight delay as events echoed across the globe and resonated amongst local communities, in the same way that toll calls from overseas are accompanied by a short delay. On other issues New Zealand protests were contemporary, in particular opposition to the Vietnam War and South African Apartheid, and kept in step with overseas developments. Of these global issues, several were to assume significant and substantial local dimensions: anti-apartheid protest, anti-Vietnam protest, workers rights and feminism. These set the scene of protest and active dissent being played out across the world here in New Zealand, and provided impetus and inspiration for the emergence of Maori activism.

Anti-apartheid activism is a good place to start; for as long as the All Blacks have played the Springboks, New Zealanders have protested against sporting ties with South Africa, and anti-apartheid activism was an important breeding ground from which Maori radical activism would ultimately emerge. Maori opposition to sporting ties with South Africa can be divided into three periods.4 The first was the ‘No Maoris’ period from 1902 to 1948, during which the government and New Zealand Rugby Football Union (here after cited as NZRFU) accepted South Africa’s racial policy of excluding Maori players, and opposition was led predominantly by tribal elders and conservative Maori leaders. The second ‘No Maoris, no tour’ period between 1948 and 1965 saw increased opposition to the exclusion of Maori players by Maori and Pakeha, the emergence of the first anti-apartheid sport organisations and

4 Here Maori involvement in anti-apartheid sports campaigns has been divided into three periods: Trevor Richards divides New Zealand’s sporting relations with South Africa into six distinct periods, see Trevor Richards, Dancing on Our Bones, pp.3-4.
the first of many public rallies. The third, ‘No tours’ period from 1965 to 1984 saw a shift in focus from the exclusion of Maori players to the wider issue of condemning apartheid and sporting contacts with South Africa.

While the third period is of most significance to the emergence of radical Maori activism, it is important to note that during the first period, covering nearly 50 years from 1902 to 1948, the key issue at stake was the exclusion of Maori on the grounds of race and opposition was almost entirely led by Maori. In the second period, the 1949 All Black tour of South Africa and the exclusion of Maori players was the target of protests from Maori leaders with support from workers, unions, communists and high-profile spokesman General Kippenberger. In contrast the 1956 Springbok tour of New Zealand saw almost no opposition, with the Maori Women’s Welfare Leagues’ protests standing as a lone voice in the wilderness of public enthusiasm; New Zealanders were more concerned about exclusion of Maori from touring sides than they were about inviting apartheid-based teams. These earlier examples are important because they show that Maori had in fact been pushing the issues long before the emergence of CABTA, HART or CARE. Further, they provide us a point from which to plot the development of Maori analyses of these issues over the years.

Figure 8: CABTA saw conservative Maori leadership adopting modern strategies of protest which would come to typify Maori activism in the 1970s.
Anti-tour activism began in earnest in the lead up to the 1960 All Black tour of South Africa. Of particular significance was the establishment of CABTA, the first anti-apartheid sport organisation, whose creed ‘To Combat Racial Discrimination in the Selection of the 1960 Rugby Team to Tour South Africa, and to Demand the Abandonment of the Tour if Absolute Equality of Treatment Cannot be Assured’ spelt out in bold, if rather long winded capitals the organisations aims (see figure 8 above). A number of prominent Maori leaders played significant roles in the organisation; Joan Stone, a secretary for the MWWL was secretary of the organisations first branch in Wellington, while Colonel Peta Awarere was co-chairman of the Auckland branch. Important Maori spokespeople for the organisation included Awarere and Dr Maha Winiata, who addressed the organisation’s first public meetings and led protest marches in Auckland and Wellington. Supporters also included George Nepia and Lui Paewai of the famous 1924 “Invincibles” All Black side and half-backs M.N. Paewai and Vince Bevan, while civic leaders including Rev. Wiremu Panapa, Lady Miria Pomare, Mira Szazy (representing the MWWL), former commander of the 28th Maori Battalion Sir James Henare, and president of the Battalion Association George Harrison all added their names to CABTA's petition to the government.

Protestors articulated their grievances along two main themes: New Zealand’s ‘Harmonious race relations’ as exemplified by the Treaty of Waitangi and Governor Hobson’s exhortation ‘we are one people’, and Maori military service in World War II. CABTA's submission and petition to the government argued that: ‘It is true that race relations here are good but they could be better.... Were they as they should be, the action of the Rugby Union, in barring Maoris from selection, would be unthinkable.’ The submission further commented that New Zealanders ‘have always taken for granted that this policy could be summed up in the words, “We are one people”....There have been imperfections and failures, but the ideal is clear.... Now, when no pakeha parliamentarian has rebuked a sporting body which divides this “one

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5Citizens All Black Tour Association (Here after cited in footnotes as CABTA), ‘Public Protest Meeting’, poster, 1959, ABJZ 869 W4644/147 36/17/14, ANZW.
6Trevor Richards, Dancing on our bones, p.22, ‘Rugby Protest Tour March in City’, NZH, 09/05/1960, ms-papers-77-202 NZ Citizens All Black Tour Association, ATL.
7CABTA, ‘Public Protest Meeting’, poster, CABTA submission / petition to parliament, ms-papers-77-202, NZ Citizens All Black Tour Association, ATL.
8CABTA, CABTA submission / petition to parliament.
people” into two, we are not so sure.9 The submission implied that relations had not always been perfect, but overwhelmingly identified the NZRFU as undermining New Zealand’s reputation as a haven of racial harmony. Thus this issue was a means of employing New Zealand’s comparatively more lenient attitudes towards race as leverage, while using South African race relations to critique circumstances at home.

Anti-tour activism also provided Maori a means of introducing the treaty into public and political discussion without directly attacking Pakeha, by implying that racial equality was the norm, not the exception, and that not honouring it would effect New Zealand’s reputation overseas. In an address at the Wellington Town Hall Dr. Winiata focused on the treaty, arguing that:

The principle opened up by the rugby unions’ decision affected the very basis of New Zealand’s way of life. Waitangi was the cornerstone of the relationship between the two peoples: Governor Hobson and the Maori chiefs laid it down. “The treaty was of the same family of ideas as the charter of the United nations. Unity, equality and liberty were the keystones – and the rugby union decision cut across all three.”10 Winiata used the myths of racial harmony to question the actions of the NZRFU and subtly suggested New Zealand could do more to live up to these ideals.

Henare made similar public statements; ‘New Zealand’ the Northern Advocate reported him as saying, ‘has in the past championed the cause of racial tolerance and has actually made it work... Now comes a decision which must endanger the country’s proud reputation abroad’.11 In Henares view Maori ‘have never felt before that racial equality did not apply in New Zealand, but now it is possible some of them may wonder’.12 At a public rally in Auckland Colonel Awatere emphasised the importance of the martial myths of racial equality, stating that ‘In war we marched together on a matter of principle; today we march again- on a matter of principle’.13 He made similar observations at a rally in Wellington.

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9 ibid.
11 ‘Might (? Obscured)) Not Be Too Late To Redeem NZ’s Good Name – Henare’, Northern Advocate (hereafter cited as NA), 19/6/59, ms-papers- 77-202 NZ Citizens All Black Tour Association, ATL.
12 ibid.
13 ‘2000 in Rugby Protest Tour March in City’, NZH, 09/05/1960, ms-papers- 77-202 NZ Citizens All Black Tour Association.
The events and rhetoric surrounding opposition to the 1960 tour are significant for a number of reasons. As in the first and second period, they indicate that Maori played integral roles in organising and leading opposition to sporting ties with South Africa. At this stage Maori rights and race relations predominated over the issue of apartheid, and the founding myths of equality were used as powerful rhetorical devices to leverage support, critique local circumstances, and raise the issue of the treaty in the public mind. However, opposition to the exclusion of Maori players was still also based on the fact that the All Blacks were more likely to win with a racially inclusive team; beating the Springboks was ultimately more important than beating apartheid for the time being. Also significant is the way activists articulated the issues. While there were subtle suggestions that race relations might not have always been perfect, leading commentators reinforced the image of New Zealand as a haven of harmonious race relations as exemplified by the treaty and Hobson’s words ‘we are one people’, and used this powerful myth to challenge the NZRFU’s decisions to exclude Maori players on the basis of race. Awatere’s comments called on Maori service in World War II as leverage for Maori rights, the support of former commander James Henare and 28th Battalion Association President George Hamilton backed this up, and ex-All Blacks like Nepia needed no introduction to rugby aficionados. This made for a heady mixture of some of the foundations of national identity: rugby, war and harmonious race relations. These commentators then were shrewdly playing off two myths against the third, a cunning strategy considering rugby was the national religion and calling off the tour of South Africa was tantamount to heresy.

Opposition to the 1960 tour was significant in that although it was led predominantly by leaders embracing conservative attitudes to race relations, it saw the first instances of Maori establishing and supporting a modern activist organisation (as opposed to the more common formation of committees or councils), and employing the modern strategy of protest rallies which were to become so popular in the proceeding decades. James Henare echoed the sentiments of a future generation in identifying this as a momentous shift:

Traditionally, the Maori was loath to express his opinions before the world and he was reluctant to enter a controversy that must involve embarrassment to others…. This is exactly why I have now come forward with great
reluctance to express my views. I feel a deep and inescapable sense of responsibility and, therefore I cannot remain indifferent.\textsuperscript{14} The CABTA petition caught the same mood, stating prophetically ‘There is a fresh wind blowing around the world. It is blowing also across the maraes of Maoridom.’\textsuperscript{15} Ironically, the next generation of anti-apartheid activists would clash first with these same conservative leaders.

The 1965 Springbok tour of New Zealand was another anticlimax which like the 1956 tour was met with relatively mute resistance. Opinions were divided: while the New Zealand Maori Council welcomed the team, Maori MPs Matiu Rata and Eruera Tirikatene were vocal in opposition, and as the Springboks were welcomed onto Te Poho o Rawiri, Tirikatene's daughter Whetu Tirikatene and poet Hone Tuwhare spoke out against them at a public meeting in the Auckland Town Hall organised by CARE. Emphasis had shifted from the narrower issue of ‘no Maoris, no tour’ to the wider issue of opposition to apartheid. While the ‘no tour’ anti-apartheid period saw the emergence of activist organisations CARE in 1964 and HART in 1969, Trevor Richards founder of HART has suggested that the switch in emphasis by activists did not at first catch the publics imagination in the same way that the ‘no Maoris no tour’ arguments had.\textsuperscript{16}

This changed considerably in the lead up to New Zealand’s 1970 tour of South Africa. Once again, initial opposition was led by Maori, but they were soon joined by a chorus of Pakeha supporters lead by anti-apartheid organisations CARE and HART. Of particular relevance was the involvement of a number of young Maori activists for whom the campaign would be a watershed that quickly developed into radical Maori activism. Sid Jackson played a key role. As a graduate student in political studies, President of the Auckland University Maori Club and the New Zealand Federation of Maori students, a Maori All Black trialist, a player for Wellington and Bay of Plenty provincial teams, the son of former All Black Everard Jackson, and past nominee for ‘Maori Man of the Year’ he was well placed to lead opposition to sporting ties with

\textsuperscript{14} ‘Might (?) Not Be Too Late To Redeem NZ’s Good Name – Henare’, NA.
\textsuperscript{15} CABTA, \textit{CABTA submission / petition to parliament}.
\textsuperscript{16} Trevor Richards, \textit{Dancing on Our Bones}, p.31.
South Africa.\footnote{Syd Jackson, “I’m Against 1970 tour”, pamphlet, ms-copy-micro-0698-08, Pei Te Hurunui Jones, ms-group-0358, ATL, Trevor Richards, Dancing on Our Bones, p.36, David Ballantyne, ‘Young warriors are on the march’, AS, 17-10-1970, p.11, ms-papers- 82-333-07/11, Press clippings re Bastion Point, F. Cook Papers, ATL.} Jackson was one of the first to speak out, as president of the Federation of Maori Students he passed a resolution opposing the 1970 tour as a stand against apartheid, gaining national and international attention. He and a group of Maori students undertook a tour of East Coast marae to explain their cause to elders and to members of the Maori Council who had supported the tour and welcomed the Springboks on past occasions. Newspaper articles on the marae tour and a second tour in 1969 led by Hone Ngata indicate that their efforts were internationalist in scope, and focused on the wider issue of apartheid. Bernie Kernot summed up the sentiments of students, stating:

We live in a world of shrinking proportions and for that reason we are more conscious of the discrimination and injustices practiced in other countries. Our opposition to this tour is on moral grounds. We are conscious of oppression all over the world and we oppose it wherever it occurs.\footnote{Tony Reid, ‘Who Will Speak for the Maori? New Voices Challenge Traditional Thought’, in New Zealand Weekly News, (Monday June 2\textsuperscript{nd}, 1969), np, ABJZ869 W4644. /147- 36/17/14, ANZW.}

Selwyn Muru criticised the Maori Council openly, stating ‘[they] just don’t understand the shame the young people feel at their decision regarding the tour. They don’t seem to realise we stand to be judged internationally as the only coloured race which has condoned apartheid’.\footnote{ibid.} Sid Jackson echoed these sentiments:

Because of our education we can see issues more broadly and because we mix with coloured people from all parts of the world at university we feel a bond with them and see things through international eyes... we now feel the world is shrinking and that we have something deep in common with coloured peoples who live in other countries. And, secondly, because of our education we can think in European terms and see arguments from their perspective.\footnote{ibid.}

Jackson also worked with other anti-apartheid organisations in the lead up to the 1970 tour. In August he spoke at a public meeting organised by CARE in the Auckland Town Hall alongside Matiu Rata, launching CARE's national campaign. In a pamphlet entitled “I’m against 1970 tour” Sid Jackson spelt out his reasons for opposing the tour:

No Maori should go to South Africa, for how can we, when seeking equality, when wanting equality ourselves, go to a country which actively denies
another coloured people solely on the grounds of colour, the rights we either enjoy, want extended or are striving to achieve for ourselves.\textsuperscript{21}

Jackson further questioned the image of harmonious race relations on which his predecessors had based their arguments, stating: ‘The myth of Maori and Pakeha living side by side was true years ago when Maoris lived predominantly in the country. But urbanisation is showing the complete fallacy of this belief’.\textsuperscript{22}

Taken together, this range of quotes illustrates a distinct shift in the analyses and attitudes of Maori activists. While their predecessors had focused on Maori rights and race relations in New Zealand, this new generation saw things through international eyes. For them apartheid and oppression of coloured people around the globe was at stake, not just New Zealand’s reputation.

Jackson’s efforts caught the attention of young activists Matenga Baker and Tama Poata, founders of MOOHR. The two wrote and published a letter of admiration and solidarity to Jackson, stating their opposition to the tour in universalist, though gender blind, terms: ‘Operating on the basis that if one single man be in bondage, the world is in bondage, we stand firm, and in doing so, may we once more congratulate you for recognising your responsibilities without hesitation.’\textsuperscript{23}

Sid Jackson, Hana Jackson and Tama Poata were to become founding members of HART in 1969, with Poata providing the organisation with its name. A year later the three had joined with a number of other young students to form Nga Tamatoa.\textsuperscript{24} 1968 also saw the establishment of the newsletter \textit{Te Hokioi} in Wellington, which alongside MOOHR published the views of emerging young Maori radicals. The pages of both were filled with material opposing apartheid and sporting ties with South Africa.

These events marked the emergence of a burgeoning group of young, urban, university-educated Maori attuned to global issues of race relations and oppression, and at odds with the strictly local interests and conservative approach of rural elders and leaders. A number of young leaders including Sid Jackson, Tama Poata and Hana

\textsuperscript{21} Syd Jackson, \textit{“I’m Against 1970 tour”} pamphlet.
\textsuperscript{22} ibid.
\textsuperscript{23} MOOHR, \textit{Letter to Sid Jackson}, 20- 03-69, ms-copy-micro-0698-08, Pei Te Hurunui Jones, ms-group-0358, ATL.
\textsuperscript{24} Hana Jackson interview, in Donna Awatere, \textit{‘Wahine ma korerotia’}, \textit{Broadsheet}, 101, (July /August) Auckland, 1982, p.24.
Jackson came to public attention and gained their first taste of publicity and politics. For Hana Jackson the events of 1968 kick-started her own involvement in politics and activism. The media picked up on the trend, as newspaper articles and pamphlets from this period of 1968-9 feature the first instances of the terms ‘Maori radical’ and ‘Brown Power’. It is obvious then that anti-apartheid activism was a watershed for the emergence of Nga Tamatoa and radical activism in the 1970s. By 1970 when a Young Maori Leaders Conference was called by the New Zealand Maori Council at the University there was a sizable group of activist Maori primed by the anti-apartheid experience to move into organising on Maori issues.

By the mid-1970s the opinions of Maori activists had became even more clear cut and critical. A press release from the Te Matakite o Aotearoa policy-making conference of 1976 gives a good indication of activists’ opinion. While opposing apartheid and the proposed All Black and Maori tours of South Africa, Matakite also demanded the Governor General dissolve the present Muldoon Government for officially blessing the tour. Furthermore, it argued New Zealand’s affluence was ‘built upon the very same apartheid exploitation of the culture, lands and waters of the indigenous Maori people’ and that therefore the country should be classified as an apartheid country until the government introduced ‘a comprehensive policy of internal aid to redress the legal, cultural, social and material welfare of the Maori people’ and began ‘large scale reparations to the divested tribes’.

By 1981 this new militant wing would transform its attention from words to actions as Maori activists physically confronted both South African apartheid and Pakeha apathy towards New Zealand’s own history of racism and discrimination. Ripeka Evans summed the stance of Maori activists involved in the ‘81 tour up well in a 1982 Broadsheet interview:

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25 Paul Diamond has also mentioned that ‘The origins of Nga Tamatoa can be traced to the anti-All Black tour of South Africa campaign in 1968, but the group really began after the 1970 Young Maori Leaders Conference at Auckland University’, Paul Diamond (producer), Nga Tamatoa, Hana Jackson interview, ‘Wahine ma Korerotia’, p.24.

26 Tony Reid’s article ‘Who Will Speak for the Maori?’ is the first article to use the phrase ‘Maori radical’, while Sid Jackson’s “I’m Against 1970 tour” pamphlet is the first to mention the phrase ‘Brown Power’.

27 Te Matakite o Aotearoa, Opposition to Apartheid and to the All-Black and proposed Maori tour of S.Africa, press release, Aug / Sept 1976, ms-papers-2316-04, ATL.
the Springbok tour was a chance to get New Zealand whites to turn their eyes from overseas racism to take Maori. We realized that the whites who would care about our brothers and sisters in Azania [South Africa] would be the ones who would have the most potential to care about our struggles.\textsuperscript{28} Pakeha liberals were not to get a free ride though. She questioned the depth of their politics, asking:

\begin{quote}
You wonder how deeply they feel the oppression of the black of Azania. Still, the white New Zealander is the same stock as the white South African. They have lived with the hypocrisy about the injustices to us for so long they can’t see the contradictions… We knew it would be hard to open their eyes to our struggles and to their role as oppressor.\textsuperscript{29}
\end{quote}

The anti-apartheid sport movement was a breeding ground for Maori radicalism. Opposition to the 1960 tour saw the emergence of the first modern activist organisations created and led by Maori, and the first instances of Maori employing the modern protest technique of public rallies and protest marches to raise attention and support for their causes. Opposition to the 1970 tour was even more important, bringing together a number of key young Maori leaders and activists, and giving them their first taste of politics and publicity; ultimately contributing to the establishment of Nga Tamatoa in 1970.

These events also help us put the 1981 Springbok tour, an event which looms large in New Zealand’s history, into perspective. While they may not express these ideas publicly, privately Pakeha anti-apartheid activists often condemn Maori activists, in particular members of Nga Tamatoa and the Polynesian Panthers, for ‘hijacking’ the tour, pointing in particular to the over-emphasis of the contribution of Maori activists portrayed in the documentary \textit{Patu!} by Merata Mita, and the violent confrontation between Red squad and Patu squad at the top of Onslow Road, which diverted attention away from the key issue of apartheid and the efforts of what have often been classified as Pakeha anti-apartheid groups CARE and HART.\textsuperscript{30} A closer look at these events shows that Maori were always at the forefront of opposition to apartheid sport; up until the mid-1960s opposition was headed by Maori and focused predominantly on Maori rights, Maori helped found CARE and HART, and the militancy which appeared in 1981 can be dated back at least five years to 1976.

\textsuperscript{28}‘Rebecca Evans interview’, \textit{Broadsheet}, 103 (October 1982), Auckland, p.16.
\textsuperscript{29}ibid.
\textsuperscript{30}Merata Mita (Director / Producer), \textit{Patu!}, Awatea Films, Auckland, 1983.
A third point that can be made here is that Maori analysis developed significantly over the years. In 1960, Maori leaders employed the rhetoric of New Zealand’s reputation as a haven of harmonious race relations to oppose apartheid sport. By 1968 however young Maori activists had begun to question these myths and their attention was drawn towards apartheid and oppression around the world rather than just local concerns. By 1976, activist had developed a militant edge, arguing that not only should New Zealanders oppose apartheid overseas; they should also be eradicating it in New Zealand. In this case study we see the gradual development of attitudes and analysis which exemplified modern radical activism and differentiated it from the efforts of previous generations. Ironically though their critique turned full circle; in 1981 activists demanded Pakeha pay attention to local racism and discrimination in the same way that their predecessors had berated them in 1968 and 1969.

If Maori played a leading role in opposition to apartheid sport however, then the opposite is true of Maori involvement in anti-war protests. Rather than emphasising Maori involvement, we need to ask why so few Maori were involved. Certainly some Maori opposed New Zealand’s involvement in the war in Indo-China publicly and privately, but compared to involvement in opposition to sporting ties with South Africa their response was relatively mute. The New Zealanders serving in Vietnam were all volunteers and the lack of conscription of Maori males may have played a role, but this did not stop Pakeha resistance to New Zealand’s involvement in the War. Vietnam was a major issue in Pakeha politics. James Belich notes that of the 339 street demonstrations between 1967 and 1970, the majority focused on opposition to Vietnam, while the statistics cited at the beginning of this chapter show that Vietnam was the key cause of demonstrations in this crucial period of 1969 to 1970, the nursery years of radical Maori activism.31

Timing plays a role here, as the majority of anti-Vietnam protests occurred between 1965 and 72, while radical Maori activism started in 1968 and began in earnest in 1970. However, this does not fully explain Maori disinterest either, as conservative Maori were actively involved in anti-apartheid activism before and after the war in Vietnam. Maori military service was a ‘sacred cow’, but as we saw earlier so too were

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rugby and race relations, and that did not stop conservative leaders playing the three off against one another.\textsuperscript{32}

Arguably Maori opposition to the war could well have been provoked widespread militant dissent in New Zealand in a similar fashion to its role as a catalyst for Black Power militancy in the US in the 1960s. Maori were well aware of this, adopting some of their rhetoric and analysis of Vietnam from African Americans. In many ways Maori had as much reason as African Americans to oppose the war. While the number of Maori veterans is not clear, some contemporary commentators suggested that Maori commitments in Vietnam were nothing short of staggering. In 1968, the radical newspaper the \textit{Peoples' Voice} reported that ‘While the army refuses to release the figures, reliable sources indicate that over half V-Force and M-Force are composed of Maoris’.\textsuperscript{33} In 1969, \textit{Te Hokioi} similarly reported that:

- Of the New Zealand army it is estimated that over half is Maori
- Of the New Zealand forces in Vietnam it is estimated that about two-thirds are Maori.
- Of the New Zealand forces in Vietnam fighting in the battle zone it is estimated that about seven-eights are Maori.

(There can’t be many Maoris fighting a desk in base, eh?)\textsuperscript{34}

A recent estimate by Vietnam veteran and ex-platoon commander John Moller puts the number of Maori soldiers who served in Vietnam at 60%.\textsuperscript{35} A cursory glance at the honour role indicates that, going on names and place of burial, at least 6 of the 37 servicemen killed in Vietnam were Maori. A closer guess based on the place of burial would put that number around at least 15 out of 37; the real number is likely higher, at least over 50%.\textsuperscript{36} Figures do bear this out. Maori made up the majority of the total combat force in the armed forces. By the mid-1960s Maori had as much if not more reason to protest as African Americans: they were over represented in the army, in frontline troops and on casualty lists.

\textsuperscript{32} Orewa Ohia-Barrett used the phrase ‘sacred cows’ to describe such issues, Paul Diamond (producer), \textit{Nga Tamatoa}.
\textsuperscript{33} \textit{Peoples Voice: Articles on Maori Land grab reprint}, April 1968, Eph A Maori 1968, Ephemera Collection, ATL.
\textsuperscript{34} \textit{Te Hokioi}, 4, 1 (February/March 1969), in Walker, \textit{Te Hokioi Maori Iwi}.
\textsuperscript{35} ‘Agent Orange probe ‘insensitive’ say veterans’, \textit{NZH}, 16/12/05.
\textsuperscript{36} ‘Place of burial’ obviously does not indicate ethnicity, but guessing that soldiers buried in graveyards with Maori names in towns with unusually high Maori populations such as Wairoa or Gisborne is a fairly safe bet. \textit{Roll of Honour: New Zealand Personnel who gave their all in the Vietnam War}, accessed at \url{http://www.vietvet.org/nzlist3.htm}, Vietnam Veterans website, (23 October 2006).
Back on the home front their social situations were similar too, Maori could and did complain that the government denied them access to adequate employment, housing and education, and yet welcomed them to serve in Vietnam. We can not argue here that African Americans resisted more because their situation was worse; oppression is relative. For instance, segregation and Jim Crow laws were widespread throughout the American South and applied to all blacks, while apartheid sporting restrictions in New Zealand applied only to a handful of sporting figures, and yet this was enough to convince conservative Maori leaders to march down the main streets of New Zealand. In many ways Maori were in a similar situation to African Americans, Vietnam could have been as big an issue for Maori as it was for Black Power activists, and a breeding ground for radical dissent like apartheid sport. Closer to home, like apartheid sport, military service was an issue close to the hearts of Maori and Pakeha alike, alongside rugby and race relations. And yet Maori involvement in Vietnam protest was limited and muted at best. We have to wonder why? I will return to this question at the end, but it should not over shadow the fact that Maori activists did develop a critique of Vietnam which differed both from that of Pakeha activists and African Americans, which is well worth discussing.37

A preliminary point which needs to be made is that Vietnam was one of a number of high profile international issues which came to prominence in the 1960s and ‘70s. For Pakeha activists the top three were feminism, anti-apartheid activism and the anti-war movement, however for Maori the mantra was more typically apartheid, Vietnam and Black Power. These were the top three, and Maori activists added workers, women, Aboriginal Australians, Native Americans and even Irish according to their politics. What is interesting is that of the many issues which arose in the ‘60s and ‘70s, Vietnam was one of the least important for Maori in practical terms of involvement and support. It can be argued that Vietnam, both then and now, represented the politics of the era; it was symbolically if not substantially significant to activists, an

37 Much more research is needed on Maori involvement in Vietnam. Roberto Rabel's New Zealand and the Vietnam War is highly detailed and informative, but features little on Maori involvement. Maori make a brief appearance at page 300 of a 365 page book, their efforts are reduced to a paragraph, and this is preceded by a longer paragraph on Polynesian involvement, despite the minimal involvement of Pacific Island activists, the more substantial evidence of Maori involvement, and the possibility that the Polynesian ‘perspective’ may have been taken directly from or even written by Maori activists. What Rabel includes is highly informative, but much more is needed.
important ‘sign of the times’ even though it was not necessarily a pressing concern for Maori activists.

Maori activists developed a critique of the war which drew on but also differed from those of activists in New Zealand and overseas. Their critique can be grouped into three key themes: social inequality on the home front, indigenous solidarity and workers rights. To address this first theme, activists questioned the inequalities at play in society whereby Maori suffered limited access to employment, education and adequate housing, and yet were welcomed to join the army. The Peoples’ Voice was first to argue that Maori joined the army precisely because of these inequalities, while highlighting the irony that the army was the one place that offered them equality, stating ‘Unemployment, lack of job opportunities and shortage of housing drive many Maoris into the army... But all these inequalities open up one sphere where Maoris are permitted to be more than equal – the army!’

Te Hokioi argued similarly that:

Unemployment in New Zealand is causing disproportionate suffering by Maoris... If you stint on Maori education and training you:
Provide a pool of men with no work to do in their own country
So you use them to fight America’s monstrous war in Vietnam.

Figure 9: Art, politics and cultural identity combine in this poster designed by Eruera Nia from 1972.

38 Peoples Voice: Articles on Maori Land grab reprint.
Members of Nga Tamatoa Tuatoru also identified the link between inequalities in society and the opportunities opened up by active service:

You know what some of us think in Tamatoa, like the reason why so many of our people are in that army, Pakeha army, is that, for a starter, y’know, most of us are workers – and for many the Army provides some sort of adventure, the chance to go overseas or something, the chance to get training when you can’t get a job – and then (Laughter) there’s that long complicated process whereby the Pakeha think we’re good fighters, warriors y’know, “you can use em in the army”...

But if they had more jobs so they could do worthwhile human activity like building things... then we’d be getting somewhere. But they put us in the army and teach us to kill people.39

This critique had much in common with the arguments but forward by African Americans, and it is likely that Maori adapted this critique and rhetoric directly from Black Power activists. However, it should be noted that Maori were at the time experiencing a similar social climate with all the same contributing factors present, poor housing in slum areas, poor health, limited access to education and employment, the emergence of gangs, police brutality and racial discrimination. Their critique may then have been influenced by the rhetoric of Black Power activists, but at the same time it was warranted and legitimate. They also riffed on Mohammed Ali’s famous quote, claiming ‘No Vietnamese ever called me a HORI’ (see figure 10 below).40

Maori critiques varied from those of activists at home and overseas in their deployment of ideas of indigenous solidarity. They expressed a sense of shared experience and identity based on Maori and Vietnamese both being indigenous peoples rather than just ‘oppressed people’ or ‘people of colour’. The Peoples’ Voice drew parallels between Maori land loss and Vietnamese land loss as the result of colonial wars, pointing out the irony that Maori were being ‘encouraged to help foreign powers steal the land of the Viet Namese and “Malaysians”. Just as overseas troops were used to forcibly steal Maori land last century, so Maori troops are being used to steal the land of others to-day’.41 Further to this, Maori land was still being

40 Te Matakiti o Aotearoa, Maori Nationalism of the ’70s: A decade of Struggle Assertiveness and Right, poster, 1980, Eph D Maori C16226, Ephemera Collection, ATL.
41 Peoples Voice: Articles on Maori Land grab reprint.
stolen by ‘alien land-grabbers’ at home while Maori soldiers were busy fighting wars overseas.\footnote{ibid.}

Figure 10: The collage effect employed here mirrors the politics of Maori activists, who drew on a multitude of influences and took action on a similarly wide range of issues. In the lower centre of the poster to the right of the text, a protestor holds up a placard reading ‘No Vietnamese ever called me a Hori’.

\footnote{ibid.}
In a newsletter dedicated entirely to the issue of Vietnam, MOOHR made a similar point that ‘As the New Zealand land wars were fought against the Maoris, so too were the land wars in America against the Indians, in Australia against the Aboriginals and now still today against the peasants of Vietnam, of Indochina’. There were obvious flaws in their argument: land was not the only reason for the colonial wars mentioned, there were no Aboriginal land wars in the sense of the military campaigns undertaken in the United States and New Zealand in the 19th century, and not all Vietnamese were ‘peasants’. But where they may have lacked the finer details, MOOHR expressed solidarity and support on the grounds of shared indigenous heritage and similar experiences. Furthermore, MOOHR were dealing with one of the most problematic issues of the 1970s, trying to work out how various forms of oppression were interrelated. For MOOHR western imperialism and colonisation were the key factors, while for others it was class exploitation, patriarchy, or the white patriarchy.

Nga Tamatoa labelled Vietnam as ‘just another race war’, a ‘pakeha war, a pakeha race war’. They drew parallels with their own struggles for the political and cultural self determination promised in the treaty, and the rights of Vietnam to determine their own affairs without interference from foreign powers, stating: ‘we support the Vietnamese people because most of them just want their own nation. Like we’re the Maori here. What we want is a nation here in N.Z. where the Maori people can at least determine their own affairs, have their own government, their own culture and language’. Nga Tamatoa called on foreign powers ‘to get out and leave the Vietnamese to organise their own nation, work out their own solution, do their own thing.’ The more common argument put forward by critics of the war in Indochina in New Zealand and overseas was that the conflict was a civil war between North and South Vietnam, and thus foreign powers had no right to intervene. In contrast, Maori activists often framed the conflict as a colonial war between the indigenous Vietnamese and colonial western powers, and opposed it on these grounds. Maori activists were also far less critical of the United States; rather than focusing on American imperialism and its impact on groups like Native Americans and African

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43 MOOHR, ‘And the War goes on’: Newsletter on Vietnam, Wellington, 1971, np, in Ranginui Walker, MOOHR.  
44 MOOHR, ‘MOOHR interviews two members of Nga Tamatoa Tuatoru’, p.6.  
45 ibid., p.5.  
46 ibid.
Americans whom they often expressed an affinity with, activists more commonly represented American imperialism as part of the wider picture of western imperialism and colonisation. In doing this they ignored the recent shift in New Zealand’s alliances with Britain to its alliance with the US.

The third common theme was a critique of the war in Vietnam as a class conflict between Pakeha and American bosses and their victims, poor Maori and Vietnamese ‘peasants’. The *Peoples’ Voice*, predictably enough, characterised Maori involvement in Vietnam as a class conflict in which ‘unemployed Maoris’ were being forced to serve overseas by ‘pakeha bosses’ and ‘overseas pakeha bosses’, presumably Americans.\(^{47}\) Their headlines screamed ‘Only equality is to serve in army for alien land-grabbers’, and ‘Maori land stolen while fighting for overseas pakeha bosses’\(^{48}\).

The MOOHR constitution stated that the group aimed to ‘educate our Maori people and especially our younger generation on the nature of wars so that they will not be misled into fighting and killing young workers and peasants of the world, including Asia, Africa or Latin America, who are struggling to defend their human rights against overseas and internal exploiters.’\(^{49}\) Maori trade unionist J.R. Smith expressed solidarity with Vietnamese and others as ‘oppressed peoples’ and fellow workers rather than as indigenous people with similar colonial experiences, and saw trade unions as the best means of combating oppression:

> We have empathy with the oppressed peoples of the world be they American Negroes, African Negroes, Vietnamese, Aborigines or Irish. Through trade unions we have the opportunity to fight for and help these people, to meet them and learn at first hand the inhumanity of man to man.\(^{50}\)

Smith also agreed with *Te Hokioi*’s conspiracy theory, stating that ‘While big business, in the form of American land grabbers, are moving into New Zealand land speculations, and particularly Maori land... they are using Maori servicemen in Vietnam to continue their takeover of Vietnamese land... using worker against worker.’\(^{51}\)

\(^{47}\) *Peoples Voice: Articles on Maori Land grab reprint.*
\(^{48}\) ibid.
\(^{49}\) MOOHR, *MOOHR Constitution*, in Ranginui Walker, *MOOHR*.
\(^{51}\) ibid.
Here then the conflict is being characterised as ‘big business’ pitting ‘worker against worker’ to take over Maori and Vietnamese land. *Te Hokioi* also portrayed this as an issue of class and race, stating that Vietnam gave ‘the Maori soldier the chance to kill people of much his own colour, who are in much the same economic situation as himself (or worse)’.  

Their conspiracy also linked Maori service in Vietnam with government and foreign exploitation of Maori land.

Interestingly, one of the defining moments of Maori activism was very nearly commandeered by anti-Vietnam activists. In May of 1971 in the lead up to the large scale mobilisation (or ‘mobe’ as it was called) of July 12th, Tama Poata wrote to the New Zealand Anti-War Mobilisation Committee, suggesting they organise a nationwide march travelling from North Auckland to Bluff, staying at marae along the way, to raise awareness and support amongst workers and rural communities. Poata further suggested they organise rolling strikes as the march progressed, with workers striking in each area as the march arrived to ‘discuss appropriate action on Vietnam’. 

This idea eventually developed into the 1975 Maori Land March, the defining moment of radical activism in the 1970s. One can only imagine how history would have been written if Maori had chosen to march for Vietnam. Instead, the land march borrowed from anti-Vietnam protests, commandeering their slogan ‘Not one more soldier’, and changing it to ‘Not one more acre’ (See figure 11 below).

![Figure 11: The Maori land march of 1975 adapted the above slogan popularised by anti-Vietnam War protestors.](image)

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For Nga Tamatoa it was also an issue of race and class: Vietnam was a ‘pakeha race war’, however Maori served because it was one of few limited opportunities opened to them for training and employment, therefore making it a class issue.\textsuperscript{54} Furthermore, they pointed out the class differences between New Zealanders and the Vietnamese, stating: ‘We’re a pretty wealthy country, we got everything, and yet we send people over there to kill other people and burn their crops and their forests....’\textsuperscript{55}

Here then we see the development of a critique which both borrowed from and diverged from those of other interest groups locally and nationally. Like African Americans, Maori highlighted the inequalities they faced at home pitted against their over representation in Vietnam, and in common with left wing and trade unions around the world, Maori critiqued Vietnam as a class struggle, where poor Maori and Vietnamese ‘peasants’ were fighting one another in the class interests of Pakeha and American ‘bosses’. Where their critique differed was that Maori pledged solidarity with Vietnamese as indigenous people rather than just coloured or oppressed people, who shared similar experiences at the hands of their colonial oppressors. They further portrayed Vietnam as a colonial war, rather than just a class war, civil war, or ideological struggle between capitalism and communism, instead comparing Vietnam to the New Zealand Wars of the 19\textsuperscript{th} century. Their rhetoric was not particularly anti-American either, Maori portrayed US intervention in Vietnam as part of the wider story of Western imperialism. Their critiques differed significantly from those of Pakeha New Zealanders and foreign critics, many of who opposed Vietnam on the grounds that it was a civil war, that the west and America in particular should not be interfering, or as part of a pro-peace anti-war stance.

But while Maori developed a distinct critique of Vietnam, their support of the anti-war movement was limited. Maori activists spoke out publicly against the war, and published articles on the subject as early as 1968, however their official involvement in the movement was fairly limited. Nga Tamatoa officially took part in the mobilisation of the 30\textsuperscript{th} of April, however this was not surprising, considering the April ‘mobe’ was ‘the largest demonstration against war ever seen in New Zealand, as between 29,000 and 35,000 people took to the streets in largely peaceful and orderly

\textsuperscript{54} ‘MOOHR interviews two members of Nga Tamatoa Tuatoru’, p.6.
\textsuperscript{55} ibid.
protest’, marking ‘a high point of unity within the anti-war movement’. However, while members of Nga Tamatoa likely continued to support the anti-war movement and marched as individuals in demonstrations, particularly Tama Poata, they did not officially support the mobilisation of July 1972. Roberto Rabel puts this down to the fact that, following their support of the first mobilization in 1971 ‘the groups council had narrowly voted not to support the anti-war movement as a body, mainly because this was outside the scope of its immediate objects.’ Why did Nga Tamatoa make this decision? Vietnam was literally ‘outside’ New Zealand, and their focus was on the local situation rather than issues overseas, however, for all the reasons cited above, Vietnam was a Maori issue. It is likely that members felt that local issues in New Zealand were more pressing than those overseas; they reacted particularly negatively to anti-apartheid activists who fought oppression and racism in South Africa but ignored it in New Zealand. Hilda Halkyard made an off-hand statement in an interview in 1982 which, while not explaining this, gives us an insight into Maori thinking:

In 1973 this Maori guy McDonald, he was from Otara too, booked a time for Maori Language Day. He was talking when this white woman came up and said she had booked the mike to talk on a Vietnam appeal. He said Fuck off. We only get one week in a year. All the whites got uptight but he didn’t give in.

It could be argued from this then, that while Vietnam was still a significant issue for Maori, like apartheid it was seen as a ‘Pakeha issue’, and raised the ire of Maori activists who saw Pakeha fighting racism and oppression overseas while ignoring it at home. This helps explain why Nga Tamatoa did not lend their weight to further mobilizations, and is one of the over riding themes of Maori activism in the ‘60s, ‘70s and ‘80s. This stance contrasts to that seen in the previous chapter, where Maori encouraged and achieved a wide base of popular support for their own issues. While coalition-building was an integral part of modern activism it was also fraught with difficulties; minority interest groups had to enlist support without becoming marginalised within a wider movement. The power struggles that ensued were indicative of how delicate and difficult this process could be.

57 ibid., p.324.
58 Interview with Hilda Halkyard, in Donna Awatere, ‘Wahine ma korerotia’, p.29.
However, we still have yet to explain why Maori did not oppose Vietnam in any great number. There are likely a multitude of answers. Firstly, while Maori were over-represented in the army, they were not limited to being frontline troops and ‘cannon fodder’ in the same way that African Americans were. Paul Pononga was head of the army, and Maori were more likely to be appointed into positions of authority in the army than in other mainstream institutions. Maori were over-represented in casualty rates but with just 37 dead this was not as pressing an issue as the casualty rates African Americans suffered, which ran in the tens of thousands. As mentioned earlier, Maori did not face conscription, a significant intervening factor, but neither did Pakeha and that did not prevent them from opposing the war.\(^{59}\)

To answer the question fully we must look within the Maori world: iwi such as Te Arawa, Ngati Porou, Nga Puhi, Ngati Hau and Ngati Kahungungu had a history of allying themselves with the crown which went back over 100 years to the great kupapa leaders and their formidable forces of the 19\(^{th}\) century. Tradition was and is important to Maori, and Iwi continue to value and uphold these alliances even when their Pakeha ally has seemingly forgotten about them. We can also tie this into the ‘Warrior tradition’, which was partly a construct of Pakeha and missionary imagination, partly a result of the tribal and colonial wars of the 19\(^{th}\) century which over emphasised the martial dimensions of Maori society and culture, and partly a real, legitimate tradition. Whether true or constructed, the kupapa tradition and the warrior tradition both likely convinced Maori to support the war while simultaneously silencing dissent.\(^{60}\) We can even see this in the names of the activist groups: Nga Tamatoa (the young warriors), He Taua (a war party), and Nga Kuri a Tu (literally, the dogs of war), and their catch cry Ka whawhai tonu matou, ake!ake!ake! adopted from the great war general Rewi Maniapoto. While activists were not scared to challenge tradition, they were up against a powerful foundational myth of modern Maori identity. Some of them like Donna Awatere Huata inherit the tradition through whakapapa lines.

\(^{59}\) Comparisons between Maori and Chicano experiences in Vietnam are rich in similarities and parallels, however Maori were completely unaware of Chicano experience during the period. Thus while a comparative study would be interesting it would tell us little about the actual impact of Chicano experiences on Maori activism at the time.

\(^{60}\) A similar ‘machismo’ tradition amongst Chicano communities was integral in encouraging Mexican American support of Vietnam while minimizing dissent. See for example George Mariscal (ed), *Aztlan and Viet Nam: Chicano and Chicana Experiences of the War*, Los Angeles, 1999.
A scan of the literature on Maori war service in the 20th century by Maori authors indicates that, while Maori and Pakeha both emphasise the importance of war in defining national character, unlike Pakeha, Maori do not have a strong tradition of anti-war dissent. Maori authors almost never openly criticise Maori military service, unlike their Pakeha counterparts, to the point where even Army publications have criticised Maori for presenting overtly biased representations of Maori active service.61 Maori Veterans too almost never question their war service. In the entire The Battalion Remembers series not a single veteran questions their service, while in the documentary Maori Battalion: March to victory, battalion members encourage future generations to match their efforts, rather than emphasising the usual line that ‘they fought for the peace we now know’.62 Put together, all these influences, both real and constructed, likely acted together to limit Maori opposition to Vietnam.

Similarly, Maori relationships with unions and the left wing organisations lacked spark. While taking into account her rebirth as a neo-liberal, Donna Awatere Huata summed up the relationship between Maori activists and the political left best:

The Communist Party had been wooing Maori activists for years. On the face of it we were perfect for their purposes. We were working class, oppressed, we had a strong sense of community: we appeared to be their natural constituency.63

Appearances can be deceiving; on the outside this seemed the perfect marriage of interests, in reality, while Maori admitted to common interests they remained wary and aloof of the left, in spite of the advances of their enamoured suitor.

The class politics within Maori activism are hard to pinpoint, at least during the formative years of 1968-78. By the 1980s several activists including Donna Awatere Huata and Ripeka Evans had developed a strong understanding and critique of class politics. However, their analysis seems to have developed largely outside of the period covered here, and was shaped and influenced by events which occurred from 1978 on. It would seem that the heyday of serious interaction between Maori activists

63 Donna Awatere Huata, My Journey, p.61.
and left wing organisations took place roughly between 1977 and 1984, and the evidence suggests that Maori analysis of the class struggle developed during these years. Overall Maori attitudes to class are similar to their attitudes to Vietnam; rather than asking ‘why was it a big deal?’ we need to ask ‘why was it not?’

Figure 12: Left wing organisations anticipated the emergence of radical Maori activism, and were one of the first groups to offer support and solidarity to the movement in its infancy.

From the very first stirrings of Maori activism, trade unions and left wing groups were trying to win Maori over; indeed some of the sources are so early that it could be said that the left were trying to create Maori radicalism as much as support it. In 1968 the *Peoples’ Voice* released an eight page pamphlet targeted at Maori which reprinted a number of earlier articles from the previous year opposing the last land grab and the Vietnam War, and encouraging Maori to support unions.64 The pamphlet sympathised with Maori issues, and rationalised that ‘Race antagonism is a product of class society’, thus its aim was ‘to help build struggle against the common enemy of Maori and Pakeha working people’.65 The pamphlet included a photo of the newly founded MOOHR demonstrating outside the Conference on Peace, Power and Politics in Asia, along with a picture of happy Maori and Pakeha workers playing tug-o-war with the caption ‘Pulling together’ (see figure 12 above).66 The pamphlet was the first of many encouraging the emerging activist movement to support the class struggle; more over it was one of the first to engage with and publicise this burgeoning movement. In a way, the New Zealand Communist Party was anticipating and attempting to

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64 *Peoples Voice: Articles on Maori Land grab reprint.*
65 ibid., pp. 1, 4.
66 ibid., p.4.
encourage radical Maori activism before it had really gotten on its own feet; they were trying to create an ally as much as they were trying to enlist one. The pamphlet was before its time, and compared with other sources reads like it was written and published far later than 1968.

In the article ‘Who will speak for the Maori?’ Tom Potae, secretary for the Wellington Drivers Union, claimed ‘that so many Maoris are members (and some are officials) of trade unions that it is fair to regard the unions as a more powerful and representative Maori voice than the Maori council’ and were particularly suited to addressing what he called the ‘broader range of subjects which affect the urban Maori - unemployment, wages, the Vietnam War, and so on.’ 67 This was another of the earliest published sources on Maori activism from 1969, and was used by Potae to encourage Maori involvement in trade unions.

The finest example of this appeared in the first MOOHR Newsletter in December 1970. Under the title ‘A Maori Trade Unionist Speaks’, J.R. Smith wrote a manifesto for Maori involvement in class struggles. 68 Smith argued that unionism was attractive to Maori because it resembled ‘the thinking of the Maori as regards help for those less fortunate than oneself’, and because unions saw all ‘men’ as equals ‘regardless of skin pigmentation’. 69 Because of this he believed that unions would ‘become the kaumatua of the working class’ providing advice and support, and would logically replace the roles of marae and tribal committees as forums for Maori to voice their concerns. 70 Smith proposed that socialist principles were ‘the same principles by which my ancestors lived and thrived. Where everything is shared and my home is open to all who wish to take advantage of it. What I have my neighbour has; what I own he owns; and when I have problems we all have problems.’ 71 He also called on Maori solidarity with other oppressed peoples of the world, arguing that through unions ‘we have the opportunity to fight for and help these people’ and ‘actively ensure that the colour of ones skin is not a disadvantage’. 72 Smith was critical of the government, the Maori Affairs Department and the Maori Land Court, whom he believed ‘listen to

67 Tony Reid, ‘Who Will Speak for the Maori?’, p.5.
69 ibid., p.2.
70 ibid., p.3.
71 ibid.
72 ibid.
problems with both ears closed’ and criticised the Maori Council ‘who have grown so enamoured with the system that they no longer hear the people, but legislate to ensure that the system continues unhindered’. Smiths summarised that ‘The only true voice of the Maori, working class or otherwise, is the Federation of Labour.’ This was probably the most succinct example of reasons why Maori should support unions, and was written by a Maori trade unionist.

These three early sources are worth quoting at length because they exemplify the analysis of Maori left-wing activists from the period, indicating why Maori should and did support the left during the period. Moreover, they provide a contrast in both style and analysis to the arguments put forward by Maori activists. MOOHR’s response to this particular article was interesting. While offering support and solidarity to unions, MOOHR qualified these statements by calling for ‘More power to the Maori elbow and Maori values in the N.Z. trade union movement!’, and noted that despite the rhetoric ‘Trade unions up till now have not won equality of opportunity’ of oppressed and coloured peoples and ‘they have not kept foreign mercenary troops out of Vietnam... But the more active the efforts of the most oppressed workers and second-class citizens through the trade unions, the closer we are to winning equal human rights’. In the same newsletter, MOOHR went on to criticise the Labour Party for not including Maori Policy remits in its Policy manifesto. MOOHR then offered support and solidarity, but retained a critical distance, emphasising Maori rights were as significant as class rights. The MOOHR secretary Tama Poata was a union supporter, having been introduced to class politics in 1953 while working on the Roxburgh hydro project. However class politics did not eclipse the issues of racism, colonisation and assimilation for Poata or MOOHR. The only mention of class politics in the MOOHR constitution is a note on the need to educate the ‘younger generation on the nature of wars so that they will not be misled into fighting and killing young workers and peasants of the world’.

73 ibid.
74 ibid.
75 MOOHR, MOOHR Newsletter, December 1970, pp.3-4.
76 ibid., p.6.
78 MOOHR, MOOHR Constitution.
Similarly the first issue of *Te Hokioi* claimed that it was published ‘for the Rangatiras of the Maori along with their Maori and Progressive Pakeha Class brothers’, but despite the rhetoric focused primarily on the issues of land, resources, racism, the treaty and apartheid, not exploitation of workers.79

An interview with Nga Tamatoa Tuatoru published in an MOOHR Newsletter in 1971 contrasts significantly with the succinct, measured words of Maori trade unionists. In debating the creation of a separate Maori state, their discussion of socialist principles is as much about constructing an identity that is oppositional to Pakeha as it is about class. The interviewees questioned Pakeha attitudes to work and economics stating that while Pakeha farmers had to pay for labour: ‘In Maori society nobody asks for this. If they get money offered, they don’t take it – We won’t take your money, we’re going to give you a hand’. 80 They also questioned the individualistic consumerist ethic that had developed in Pakeha society, stating that amongst Maori:

> there’s no wastefulness, like in every Pakeha society every individual family has to have HIS thing, eh. Like every house has got a TV set even in Community areas – well, we could have just one TV set and everybody can go watch it – it’d be CHEAP. But no, Pakehas must have their own thing, they DON’T SHARE very much.81

They envisioned creating a democratic Maori government ‘that controls, like, all the economic things, and education and all that – based more on sharing, sharing equally of all economic resources.’ 82 This was contrasted with Pakeha society ‘where they have vast differentiation in wealth, where a few people have millions of dollars, and another level of society – in their class society – have only very little and no opportunity to progress beyond that.’ 83 The interviewees expressed that socialist ethics were attractive to Maori because as they put it:

> the whole way Maori society’s structured, it’s more conducive toward the community way of living, towards cooperation for common benefit ... some of the values that are fast being destroyed by the Pakeha ethic, the Pakeha values of the individualistic sort of thing. It hasn’t been lost by us young Maoris.84

Here we see a rough outline of their vision: it does include some basic socialist principles, but their commentary has more to do with differentiating Maori culture

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79 *Te Hokioi*, 1, p.1.
80 ‘MOOHR interviews two members of Nga Tamatoa Tuatoru’, p.4
81 ibid.
82 ibid., p.6.
83 ibid.
84 ibid.
from Pakeha culture than it does with establishing solidarity with the left, continuing an ‘othering’ process discussed in detail in the previous chapter. There was some sympathy for unions and left-wing organisations, but these Nga Tamatoa members were still highly critical of Pakeha. Their ideas contrast significantly with the earlier statements by Maori trade unionists.

The points that can be made here are simple but important; firstly by this stage these members of Nga Tamatoa at least, and arguably most Maori activists, had not yet developed a sophisticated understanding or critique of class politics. The point that can be made is not that they were misinformed, it is that this typified Maori activism: they often lacked the sophistication and depth of analysis of older, larger, better supported and better resourced, established Pakeha activist groups. Pakeha activists could call on resources built up over the years both locally and overseas, such as analysis of the situation in Vietnam, class politics in Western democracies, even anti-apartheid posters and catch-cries from organisations overseas. Maori borrowed from these resources, but they were also creating a movement and a body of political thought which was all their own, and shared with no one else in the world. Thus their critiques were often not as developed as those of other activists. We should not consider this phenomenon as overshadowing Maori activism however; this rich human mess of competing and sometimes conflicting ideas and ideologies were what made Maori activism unique. Furthermore, the successes of Maori activism lay not just in analysis but action. Their willingness to employ direct action had as much to do with their impact and successes as did the fact that they were educated and articulate.

A second point that can be made is that even in this early period activists retained a critical distance from the radical left. For them the chief issues were racism and colonialism, and they were not willing to give these issues up to Pakeha in the name of workers solidarity or any other slogan for that matter, regardless of how significant or convincing.

Links between Maori activists and the radical left began to increase in the latter half of the 1970s. As an example of this, Maori activist Ben Matthews began writing a column in the Socialist Action paper called ‘He Toka Tu Moana’, beginning in the
late 1970s. Matthews’ analysis focused as much on racism as it did on class politics; capitalism was part of the baggage Pakeha used to colonise Maori, it was part of a greater whole rather than vice versa.\(^85\)

![Ben Matthews](image)

Figure 13: Ben Matthew’s column in Socialist Action was tangible evidence of the growing connection between Maori activists and left wing groups in the late 1970s.

The 1977-8 occupation of Bastion Point was probably the high point of relations between Maori activists and the radical left, with groups including the Auckland Trades Council, the Socialist Unity Party, the Socialist Action League and the Communist Party all offering solidarity and support for the Orakei Maori Committee Action Group (hereafter cited as OMCAG). However Bastion Point was not articulated by the occupiers as a class struggle, and class politics were rarely expressed by protest leaders. There is one example of this in *Takaparawha Bulletin 14*, in which the OMCAG depicted their struggle as a boxing match, with ‘Tangata whenua’ on the one side fighting ‘the Government’, ‘the Crown’, ‘the Establishment’, and ‘the Capitalist system’.\(^86\) Even here though their point was more of a reference to the National Governments’ decision to partition the Orakei block for high price housing at the expense of Ngati Whatua, pitting the rich against the poor rather than class against class. The only other mention of class politics appears in *Takaparawha Bulletin 22*, with occupiers attacking the Government and medias’ use of cold war era red baiting tactics to divert attention away from the Governments use of force to evict protestors, to avoid the real issues at stake, and to marginalise support and empathy for them.\(^87\)

By the 1980s several key activists including Donna Awatere Huata and Ripeka Evans had developed a strong understanding, and an equally strong critique of the class

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\(^85\) Ben Matthews, ‘He Toka Tu Moana: N.Z.’s big lie’, *Socialist Action* (February 25 1977), ms-papers-2316-19, Hutchinson papers, ATL.  
politics outlined by Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels and practised in communist countries. However, their analysis seems to have been shaped by key events from 1978 onwards, including tours by several activists to communist countries Cuba, Russia and Albania beginning in 1978, the setting up of a Marxist study group for activists and students following their return, and the move by the Auckland Trades Council in 1981 to shut down a Polynesian Resource Centre in the Trade Union Centre, which angered and alienated Maori activists. Therefore it would be wise to argue that their analysis (the best example of which appears in Awatere Huata’s *Maori Sovereignty*), while influenced by previous events and likely responding to the overtures of left wing groups over the previous 15 years, was representative of events from 1978 onwards rather than the period in its entirety.

The analysis and ideas of activists published between 1968 and 1978 differ greatly both from those mentioned from the earlier period by left-wing groups and those of radicals in the early ‘80s. From what little they had to say with regards to class politics, it seems that, at least up until 1978, Maori did not harbour any strong misgivings about communism or socialism, or capitalism for that matter, but that more likely a lack of understanding of Marxism and class politics, coupled with an ambivalence towards Pakeha-led issues regardless of relevance, and a focus on racism and colonialism as the keys to understanding Maori experiences combined to turn Maori activists away from class struggles. Maori activists and left-wing groups continued to work together up to the present day, but by 1984 the window of opportunity for Maori to appropriate the workers struggle had closed.

Class politics are similar to the Vietnam issue then: workers’ rights were a Maori issue due to the over-representation of Maori in the working classes, and there was cooperation between the left and Maori. However Maori activists primarily focused on the issues of racism, colonisation and assimilation, and the politics of race, ethnicity and identity. Despite expressing sympathy for workers’ struggles, Maori activists were not willing to give these issues up to Pakeha in the name of workers’ solidarity or any other slogan for that matter, regardless of how attractive. For them all Pakeha were oppressors, worker and boss alike, and they were therefore unwilling

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to compromise their politics in the interests of class solidarity. These ideas had solidified by the 1980s, but can be seen in the ambivalence with which earlier commentators regarded the left.

Furthermore, the analyses Maori activists developed during this early period differed from those of left wing activists and those developed by Maori activists in the late ‘70s and ‘80s because they were far less sophisticated and developed. The point is not to put them down, but to point out that this typified Maori activism. Furthermore, their recourse to action was just as important as their analyses; for them action was as important as theory and words, and this was ultimately part of the reason why they had such an impact on society and were so successful in their efforts.

To summarise this chapter, anti-apartheid activism, opposition to the Vietnam war, and trade unionism and left-wing politics were all global issues which assumed local dimensions, and all three to a degree influenced and impacted upon the emergence and development of Maori activism, but they did so in differing ways. Apartheid and sporting ties with South Africa were a major concern to Maori of which they were involved from the outset. Anti-apartheid organisations CABTA, CARE and HART were all founded and supported by Maori, and were an important breeding ground from which Maori activism would eventually emerge. Furthermore, Maori developed a critique of apartheid from the early 20th century, which developed significantly over a period of nearly 80 years.

In comparison, Vietnam was not a major issue for Maori, and received little official support from Maori activists, in spite of major Maori commitments to Vietnam and the armed forces and similarities with African Americans for whom Vietnam was hugely significant in stimulating activism. Having said that, Maori developed a unique critique of the war in Vietnam which both borrowed from and differed from those of local and foreign commentators. In particular, Maori framed Vietnam as a colonial war, and offered solidarity to the Vietnamese as indigenous peoples, rather than just oppressed peoples or coloured peoples. Compared to the apartheid issue, Maori critiques of Vietnam were far less developed, and this had as much to do with the nature of Maori society and its attitudes to war and military service as it did to the nature of Maori activism.
Like Vietnam, and again unlike apartheid sport, class politics were not a major issue for Maori activists. Despite being over represented in the working class, and in spite of the overtures of unions and left wing organisations, Maori activists remained aloof from the left. This was arguably because they did not develop a sophisticated critique of class politics until the late 1970s, and because of a number of intervening factors which occurred at this time. Here then there were a number of similarities and differences between these three issues and the varying ways and degrees in which they acted upon and influenced Maori activism.

A number of themes arise from the rhetoric surrounding these issues. First, while Maori activists often borrowed their analyses, rhetoric and methods from Pakeha or other movements from overseas, they also developed their own unique movement, grounded in Maori culture and Maori priorities. In this way they were adapting and adopting outside influences to create new indigenous traditions, they were not just mimicking the words and actions of others.

A second theme is that their analysis and critiques were at times less developed and sophisticated than those of other activists groups. Maori critiques were often typified by what could be defined as a rich human mess of ideas and ideologies, due in part to the fact that they were developing their own movement, and could not rely on the combined resources or wisdom of others. This does not detract from their efforts; in fact it is what makes them unique. Moreover, their pro-active stance and willingness to employ direct action was what made their efforts so successful and influential; what they may have lacked in analyses they made up for with passion and action.

Thirdly we need to be careful in identifying when these critiques and analyses developed. Many of the critiques and positions of activists originated during the crucial period of 1977 to 1984; we can not then use analyses from this period to stand in for Maori activist critiques of the entire period. In other cases their critiques changed and developed over time, and we must be sensitive to these changes and the events which impact upon them, rather than creating a generality for the period of 1968 to 1984. As we will see in the fourth chapter also, 1977 was a major turning
point, leading into the ‘new wave’ of Maori activism in the 1980s and the emergence of the mana wahine movement.

A fourth theme that developed was that a number of issues which could and in some ways should perhaps have been more significant to Maori activists were not. In all four cases in this and the fourth chapter on the Black women’s movement, Maori activists rejected to a greater or lesser degree the efforts of other movements, despite showing some sympathy. They supported Black South Africans but attacked Pakeha for their hypocrisy in fighting racism overseas but not at home, they sympathised with both opposition to Vietnam and class politics, and yet in both cases remain relatively aloof from either, and as we will see, developed their own brand of women’s rights while rejecting and attacking Pakeha feminists. This was an important characteristic of Maori activism; their priorities were set on Maori issues, based on the politics of colonisation, race and a critique of Pakeha society, and the key issues of the treaty, land, language and culture, and later gender. While they were sympathetic to other issues, they often saw them as diversionary and outside their immediate objectives and no amount of reasoning or calls for solidarity would shift them from this position. Coalition building was the basis of modern activism, and Maori were obviously very conscious of this, picking their way delicately through the mine-field of radical politics, ever aware that a wrong step could leave Maori issues side-lined as they had been for a good hundred years.

To conclude, Maori activists were defined and shaped by national trends and events, while at the same time, they shaped and influenced the nation. They adopted and adapted the politics and rhetoric of other movements while adding their own distinct flair to proceedings, creating a body of political thought and action that was both uniquely Maori and internationalist in scope. Ultimately they were to have a huge impact on New Zealand society, culture and identity, bringing about concrete change for Maori people politically, economically, socially, culturally and spiritually. However, there were issues activists failed to engage with which could come back to haunt Maori society as it journeys into the 21st century, a possibility which will be explored in the conclusion to this thesis.
Chapter 3
‘This is definitely not Maori!’:
Maori activism and the global influence

I liked Donna when I met her years ago. She was in her Libya phase, all dull-brown army-coloured dungarees and eternal dark glasses. Donna shocked everyone then by taking up a public activist stance, echoing the American Black Panthers, who seemed both glamorous and sexily scary to bewildered white colonials.¹


Rosemary McLeod’s recollection of Donna Awatere Huata from the summer 2006 issue of Ngai Tahu’s Te Karaka draws on some popular stereotypes about Maori radicals. This chapter will engage with the prevalent image of Maori activists as ‘echoing’ or mimicking their more radical and militant overseas counterparts. The impact of international trends on local events needs to be explained but the notion of mimesis is not the best way to uncover Te Ao Hurihuri, our third context. While young radicals the world over were swapping tips and tricks as to the most effective means of challenging the status quo, their conservative adversaries were also trading strategies on the best means of containing activism and the rash of rebellion which arose in the ‘60s and ‘70s. One of the most effective means of achieving this was through accusations of mimesis: that activists were copying the actions of other groups for the sake of trends rather than legitimate grievance. This took on different dimensions in the various contexts and countries it was employed too numerous to include here. In New Zealand though, accusations of mimesis were made to achieve several goals. Most importantly, this strategy was employed by the media and conservatives to undermine the legitimate grievances of Maori as mere mimicry, thus letting New Zealanders ‘off the hook’ and avoiding confronting the very real issues of race, gender and class discrimination. For the media and journalists it was a complicated, dual process of simultaneously playing up and playing down the issues. Maori activists were labelled ‘Black Power’ and ‘Brown Power’ advocates and portrayed as such in photos via highly selective representation to heighten fear and hysteria that Maori may take up the militant stance of their African American counterparts. At the same time, the media focused on the empty clichés of radicalism, berets, afros and the like, refusing to take the politics of Maori activism seriously.

Rather than mimesis, it will be argued that a process of acculturation was taking place. Maori activists employed the tactics and methodologies of radical activism, and adopted some of the rhetoric, politics, and appearances of their overseas counterparts as a means of distinguishing themselves and their politics from those of previous generations. However in spite of the significant influence of overseas examples the issues Maori activists addressed and the body of political thought they developed remained distinctly Maori and shared more in common with conservative Maori politics. To put it simply, the methods changed, the message remained relatively the same.

There is little doubt that overseas examples had an impact locally; activists and academics alike agree on this point. Ranginui Walker has described the radical elements within Nga Tamatoa as having ‘modelled themselves on the Black Power leaders such as Rap Brown and Stokely Carmichael of the United States’ and drawing ‘adverse publicity with their rhetoric of Brown Power, Maori Liberation, separate government and even a separate foreign policy’.2 In a later interview, Walker described young activists and the mood of the era as follows:

It was quite an experience to see this range of people, people like John Ohia, and he would get up and talk to the conference and he’d talked about Maori liberation, Brown Power. I understood where he was coming from as far as the Brown Power was concerned because I’d been reading the Black literature coming out of America, Eldridge Cleaver’s Soul on Ice, the Black Muslims, Malcolm X, and so these urban Maori were also familiar with that and they were modelling themselves on those people. And in fact John Ohia had a huge afro haircut and dark glasses and he looked quite menacing.3

In his history of New Zealand Keith Sinclair described Maori activism as the emergence of a ‘Brown Power’ movement,4 while James Belich’s5 brief account of the movement presents Maori activists as being ‘influenced by international, and particularly American, developments in black activism’, while also sharing ‘characteristics in common with the other New Zealand activisms of the period’. Aroha Harris points to the influences of New Zealand’s involvement in the Vietnam War and opposition to apartheid sport, while adding that ‘some young Maori

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3 Paul Diamond (producer), Nga Tamatoa.
5 James Belich, Paradise Reforged, p.477.
developed a political affinity with the civil rights movement in the United States, including revolutionary liberation movements like the Black Panther Party’. 6 Claudia Orange lists ‘the post-war decolonisation of Africa, Asia and the Pacific, the growth of the Black Power movement in the United States and the activities of the United Nations and its agencies’ as well as the struggles and successes of Canadian and Native American ‘Indians’ as ‘sharpening Maori awareness of rights that might be conceded, and in demonstrating methods of protest that might strike at the weak points of the dominant culture’.7

The media and journalists equally contributed to this image. Tony Reid’s article ‘Who Will Speak for the Maori?’ from 1969 was first to employ the phrase ‘Maori radical’, even though the so-called radicals themselves were not yet using the term.8 David Ballantynes’ article ‘Young warriors are on the march’ was one of the earliest articles to publicise the efforts of the newly formed Nga Tamatoa, and described a faction of the group as favouring ‘separatism and self-determination along Black Power lines’.9 Photography was another medium used by journalists to portray Maori activists as taking on a Black Power image, a phenomenon discussed below.

The activists themselves were equally responsible for creating this image: Syd Jackson’s anti-apartheid pamphlet “I’m Against 1970 tour” from 1969 employed the phrase ‘Brown Power’ to describe Maori grievance.10 Taura Eruera described Nga Tamatoa in 1971 as ‘a black-power oriented action group’, and while the first interview of Nga Tamatoa Tuatoru did not use the actual term, the militant, separatist politics it outlined seemed to imply a Black / Brown Power stance to contemporaries.11

Decades later, activists still readily concede the point: Larry Parr described the radical members of Nga Tamatoa as ‘almost modelling themselves on the Black Panther

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6 Aroha Harris, Hikoi, p.15.
7 Claudia Orange, The Treaty of Waitangi, p. 244.
8 Tony Reid, ‘Who Will Speak for the Maori?’.
9 David Ballantyne, ‘Young warriors are on the march’, p.11.
10 Sid Jackson, “I’m Against 1970 tour” pamphlet.
movement and the American civil rights activists’. Peter Rikys recalled the influence of ‘the classic indigenous peoples writers of that era’ including Paulo Freire and Frantz Fanon, alongside the actions of ‘the Black Power movement and the Chicago seven and Angela Davis and all of that stuff’, and recalled the negative reaction Nga Tamatoa received for employing the ideas and language of Black Power advocates:

There was a reaction to the borrowed global dimensions and even occasionally the language of discourse which was borrowed from Black Power, Brown Power, you know we all read the Black writers so that was a part of our intellectual tradition but it was, in terms of very rigid tuturu Maori, the reaction was ‘None of that fits boy you know, hey boy, you got that all wrong you know!’.

Perhaps the best example of such negative reactions was delivered by Sir James Henare in 1971 in reaction to Nga Tamatoa’s inaugural protest at Waitangi, from which this chapter derives its title:

Whilst I appreciate the motives and the interest that these young people, including the Tamatoa group are taking on such matters as the Treaty of Waitangi, I think it is against Maori sentiment, Maori custom, and Maori tradition to use a day like this as a day of protest, this is definitely not Maori. If these young people are so keen about their Maoritanga and the Maori people, then this is the opposite to Maori sentiment and custom to make use of a day like this for protest. There are ordinary constitutional means of protesting, and to me Waitangi day is certainly not the day for protesting.

Maori activists were not the only ones accused of mimicking African Americans: Chicano (Mexican American) leaders lambasted radical groups such as the Brown Berets and Maya with the same criticisms, and Native American Red Power activists including the American Indian Movement (AIM) got more of the same. The following quote from conservative politician Henry Gonzalez could easily be mistaken as a quote from Maori conservatives:

We have those why cry ‘Brown Power’ only because they have heard ‘Black Power’ and we have those who yell ‘oink’ or ‘pig’ at police, only because they have heard others use the term. We have those who wear beards and berets, not because they attach any meaning to it, but because they have seen it done elsewhere.

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12 Paul Diamond (producer), Nga Tamatoa.
13 ibid.
14 ibid.
15 George Mariscal, ed., Aztlan and Viet Nam, p.194.
Mimesis did occur, but it was gangs, not activists who came closest to emulating the
‘look’ of Black Power. ‘Black Power’ and ‘Black Panther’ groups of a sort were
established in New Zealand around the same time as Nga Tamatoa and the Pacific
Island activist group the Polynesian Panthers. The Black Power gang, established in
Otahuhu in 1969, adopted the aesthetics, though none of the politics, of the Panthers,
with its black denim, leather jackets, dark glasses and raised fists. Black Power
outlasted many of its contemporaries, activist groups and gangs alike, and remains
today as one of the largest and longest established gangs in the country. Mangu Kaha
(meaning ‘Black Power’ in Maori), a South Auckland chapter with culturalists and
militant leanings, have been threatening to ‘go political’ since the early 1990s, and in
2005 made good on the promise by sponsoring the Maori Party and current MP for
Tamaki Makaurau, Pita Sharples, in the early stages of his election campaign.16 One
member of the Polynesian Panthers has intimated the group started life as the Black
Panthers Gang in Grey Lynn and Ponsonby in the early 1970s, while anecdotal
evidence suggests that in its early years the group often still had to prove they could
‘hold their own’ amongst other urban gangs in Otara and Ponsonby/Grey Lynn,
despite protests that they were an activist organisation.17

To contextualise these examples, Maori activists were part of an international youth
culture that spread across the western world in the ‘60s and ‘70s, which embraced the
ideologies of opposition to authority, discrimination and oppression, and expressed
these ideologies through music, art, literature, protest, speech, dress and self-
presentation. Maori were no different; they embraced these trends, rebelling against
society and their elders, and distinguishing themselves politically and aesthetically
from the drab realities of the inter-war generations. Undoubtedly Maori activism was
a Maori expression of the politics of the ‘60s and ‘70s, but we need to be careful here
not to mistake medium for message. Maori found new and effective ways of
expressing dissent and addressing grievance through direct action, and purposefully
cultivated a Black Power image at times as a way of co-opting the confrontational,
dangerous disposition the Panthers were notorious for. However the issues they raised
shared more commonalities with the politics of their elders than of overseas
movements. The treaty, land, te reo, opposition to apartheid and women’s rights were

17 Melani Anae, Lautofa Iuli and Leilani Burgoyne, Polynesian Panthers, p.49.
the mainstays of activist politics in the ‘70s and ‘80s, just as they had been in the ‘50s and ‘60s under the direction of conservative groups like the Maori Council, the MWWL, and the Ratana movement.

In attempting to delineate the impact of overseas trends on local events the superficial or stylistic similarities between movements are a good place to start, as a substantial reason for the criticism levelled at Maori that they were simply mimicking Black Power, Red power and Black feminist activists stemmed from their occasional adoption of the aesthetics of their American counterparts. To put it simply, Maori activists were at times prone to ‘radical chic’, styling their persons and at least some of their protests within a visual lexicon established in the US. A quick study of the photographic record is an effective and entertaining way of establishing this point.

![Figure 14: Working bees on rural marae were a way for activists to reconnect with the wellsprings of their culture and give back to their communities.](image)

The prototypical image of a brooding, defiant Nga Tamatoa sitting on the steps of Te Rapunga in 1972 is a good place to start (see figure 14 above). The figure in the centre sports the credible beginnings of an afro, while Tame Iti’s long bushy hair and head band place him somewhere between ‘easy rider’ and ‘nam vet’ - a vintage ‘60s look either way. The rest however sport standard, early 1970s toned-down hippy wear, what would today be labelled ‘bohemian’ or ‘op shop chic’: jeans, sandals, kaftans, head bands holding back ample amounts of hair and one beard for good measure.
A second image from 1972 of Tamatoa members camped out on the grounds of parliament captures the 'Black Power' aesthetic (see figure 15 above), four out of five men have afros and dark jackets, and, in the background, a Black Power sign featuring a raised fist is propped against Richard Seddon’s memorial. Only Tame Iti broke ranks, posing in this and other pictures in a swandri, worker’s boots, and a hat which defied description but hardly screamed ‘militant!’
activist gatherings lacked the sharp crisp lines the Panthers were famous for, whose presentation purposefully matched the military in tidiness and regularity.\(^{18}\)

Figure 17: Whaimutu Dewes and Minister of Education Phil Amos.

Although John Ohia (seen in figure 15 and 16) was remembered by contemporaries for his formidable ‘fro, there was one other activist who outshined all others: not only does Whaimutu Dewes deserve recognition for his contribution to the te reo Maori movement, he also tended to the biggest afro of any activist of the period, and did so in the dangerously windy city of Wellington (see figure 17 above). Planetary images best describe his efforts. In a photo from Maori language day 1973 in which he is shown greeting Phil Amos, the Minister of Education, Dewes looms large over Amos, like a huge black planet dwarfing its small white moon. In a second image of activists

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\(^{18}\) See the documentary *Black Panthers - Huey!* by French film maker Agnes Varda as the best example of this. Agnes Varda, *Black Panthers - Huey!*, 1968.
delivering the Maori language petition to Parliament from 1971 he shines out from the background like a great, black sun.

In a picture of a 1976 ‘sit-in’ celebrating the first anniversary of the land march (see figure 18 above), afros and beards are the order of the day. The activists are attired in a mix of gang vests, patches and swandris. The piece de resistance was Tama Poata’s black beret, albeit dressed down with a swandri, and dressed down with a stockman’s drizabone-style coat and a pram in an earlier photo from the actual march (see figure 19 above). Other photos from the land march before and after its arrival at parliament feature a similar mix of vests, denim jackets, afros, and perhaps most importantly Aotearoa’s only contribution to ‘radical chic’, the humble stitched taniko and plaited taniko headband, a Maori invention with parallels to the headbands worn by hippies and Native American activists (see figures 20 and 21 below).
Figure 20 & 21: Young marchers held back their hair with plated and stitched taniko headbands.
Radical fashion statements were not the movement’s only visual vocabulary. When the occasion warranted it movement leaders would dress conventionally. Photos of the delivery of the Maori language petition, for example, show fairly conservative clothing choices, as do images of Nga Tamatoa’s first Waitangi protest: attendees are dressed in formal black attire. For the first example they chose formal attire because the occasion was a powhiri rather than a demonstration and kaumatua were present, while on the second they dressed in black to highlight that Waitangi was a day of mourning, not celebration.

Bastion Point activists did not bother with image issues: photos from the occupation show a mixture of sportswear, jerseys, raincoats, swandris, woollen beanies and scarves, the everyday wear of Maori in the ‘70s adapted to the exposed and often harsh conditions of the Point. Indeed most protest lines featured more members of the general Maori public dressed in everyday clothes than afro-topped and sunglass-shaded activist.

Figure 22: Echoing the events at Parihaka a century earlier, War heroes, ex-All Blacks, kaumatua and young activists sing hymns on the steps of Te Arohanui Marae, as the police and army prepare to remove occupiers from Bastion Point.
The one local contribution to ‘radical chic’, and an important precedent for ‘native chic’, the taniko, did not catch on, and was abandoned for the time being. The greater influence of the Black Power urban style on the look of activists may have stemmed partly from an awareness of the kind of nostalgic essentialism often associated with indigenous costumes. Piupiu, poi and pounamu had after all been staples of the tourist and souvenir industry for decades. Taonga appear occasionally in the visual record but they were surprisingly rare until the mid 1980s: activists were as likely to be seen wearing a tie as a tiki. At least one activist has since commented that this was because at the time, being Maori simply was not something to be proud of.\(^1\) The woven kite, a modern essential for corporate Maori and liberal Pakeha alike, was something your aunty used to pick cockles with in the 1970s, not a fashion item. Native American activists made use of traditional costumes to good effect during the period, as seen most powerfully in photos of the occupation of Alcatraz in 1969-71, but there was a downside to this. The photos were good publicity, but probably also in some ways confirmed stereotypes of Native Americans as ‘Pocahontas’ and ‘Tonto’ figures rather

\(^1\) Syd Jackson, in Paul Diamond (producer), *Nga Tamatoa*. 
than modern people. Head feathers, the proverbial ‘tikitiki mo tou mahunga’ could potentially have bridged the two traditions, but alas this never eventuated.

By the mid-1990s Maori activists were making use of traditional costumes as part of the visual repertoire of the movement, though this had more to do with the revitalization of kapa haka than a desire for good publicity. Nonetheless the 2004 Seabed and Foreshore hikoi to parliament was headed by a huge taua of warriors in full dress with piupiu, ta moko and taiaha, and the arresting images were enough to convince international media to beam photos of the march around the world.

If anyone could be labelled as poster girl for ‘radical chic’, it was Donna Awatere Huata, whose black pant-suits, patent leather riding boots, leather jackets and dark glasses became a quintessential image of the era of ‘Maori militancy’, and explain the occasional accusations of mimicking overseas trends. Josie Keelan and Rebecca Evans at times loosely fell into the same category by association, but Awatere Huata was the instigator, and prime example. An explanation is best sourced from Awatere Huata herself:
We [herself and Josie Keelan] used to dress in all black in those days with dark glasses. I wore mine for medical reasons (after I went through the windscreen in my car accident my left pupil couldn’t adjust to light). But being of hedonistic stock my dark glasses had to be Christian Dior, and our jackets were hand-tailored leather jackets. We were in this respect very elegant revolutionaries. When we went to see the gangs they were all wearing black leather and dark glasses too: they looked just like us only with less expensive tailoring.20

Did activist Maori become ‘radical chic’ fashion victims more concerned with style than substance? Some did, at some times: afros, berets, black clothing and sunglasses did appear on protest lines, while hippy wear and headbands paid homage to the counter-culture and Native American aesthetics of the period. The ‘tailored revolutionary’ look adapted by Awatere Huata and cohorts during the late ‘70s and early ‘80s was the closest Maori came to copying the black clothes, dark shades and sharp lines of Black Power icons, replacing the Rayban Way-farers with Christian Dior in an expensive twist. Maori adopted the image of Black Power as a means of co-opting the confrontational, militant air cultivated by Black Power activists, and as the photos show, many achieved this goal.

More often though, activist garb was a mixture of biker wear and work wear, combining the black leather, studs, ripped denim, vests and patches of white biker gangs like the US Hell’s Angels with the clothes common to urban and rural labourers: swandris, rain coats and work boots. Remember too this was the ‘70s; American clothing was not as readily available as it would be in subsequent decades. The result could best be labelled ‘Bikey-Labourer chic’, and the combination was the obvious precedent for the more modern ‘westie/bogan’ look still sported and spotted in working-class neighbourhoods. Most commonly, protest lines saw everyday people wearing everyday clothes.

Furthermore, photographers played a role here in defining the image of Maori activism in the 1970s. Photography is no more objective and no less constructed than writing, and while these photos and the occasional afro or beret tell us something about the politics of the activists they also tell us something about the agenda of the people taking the photos. Photographers chose to shoot and publish pictures which

emphasised the ‘radical’ aspect of activism, to highlight that this was something new, edgy and dangerous. Photographers played on the publics fears that Maori activists would live up to the militant reputations of their US counterparts, while at the same time portraying them as ‘paint by numbers’ copy-cats without legitimate grievances. In some ways this undermined the efforts of activists, although the association with Black Power lent Maori activists a serious edge, which was precisely why they took up black clothes, shades and afros in the first place.

In total, ‘radical chic’ and the revolutionary aesthetic did appear from time to time in activist circles, photos do show the occasional iconic beret, afro or beard, and Awatere Huata’s ‘tailored revolutionary’ look all contributed to the attitude that Maori activists were mimicking their American counterparts. However, for the most activists were more interested in sounding and acting like revolutionaries than dressing like them, and developed neither a strong nor original dress sense during the period. Furthermore, while their aesthetics were decidedly new and radical, their political concerns shared more in common with those raised by conservatives over the previous two decades.

The music pouring in from the States, Britain and the Caribbean played a role, contributing to the mood of the times while influencing the burgeoning repertoire of protests songs and radical roots reggae which would emerge in the ‘70s and ‘80s. Tony Fala is currently putting the final touches on a PhD script on the influence of Bob Marley on Maori and Pacific Island communities which will offer valuable insights into this intersection of history and popular culture.21 To give a preliminary overview, American jazz, rock and R&B, with later arrivals soul, funk and even folk were important sites for expressions of rebellion, pride and solidarity and came to embody the times as the sound track to the protest era both at home and abroad. To name just a few, jazz artists like John Coltrane, Miles Davis and Thelonious Monk were as radical and articulate as their activist counterparts, providing a soundtrack to the undercurrent of militancy simmering in Black urban communities, though jazz did not seem to cross over in New Zealand to the extent it did in other European countries. Jimmy Hendrix and Carlos Santana added colour to the rebellious and

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typically white sounds of ‘60s rock. Sam Cooke was one of the first Black singers to warn that change was coming. Aretha Franklin demanded respect. James Brown urged people to ‘Say it Loud! I’m Black and I’m Proud’. Sly and the family Stone were sick of being called ‘niggers’, the Chi-Lites wanted more power to the people, Curtis Mayfield encouraged his people to move on up, Marvin Gaye asked what was going on and begged for mercy on the ecology, and every one could enjoy The Brotherhood of Man’s anthem to solidarity, ‘United We Stand’. By the blaxploitation era of the mid to late ‘70s ‘Black Power’ themed songs had, for the most part become a hollow pastiches of earlier examples, however some artists remained convincing and kept the tradition alive: Gil Scott-Heron, most famous for his 1974 satire ‘The Revolution Will Not Be Televised’, painted wide social portraits, and continued on into the 1980s, taking pot-shots at the Reagan administration. African American, Chicano and Maori activists alike have cited surprise at the unlikely relevance of white folk singer Bob Dylan while Cree singer Buffy Sainte-Marie also used the folk scene as a platform to spread the messages of Native American activists. UK Black groups including Black Slate, Black Uhuru, UB40 and LKJ kept the message alive in the later seventies and eighties as Jamaica turned to the dancehalls and digidub for revitalisation. Bob Marley, Peter Tosh and Burning Spear, amongst others from Jamaica, had a huge impact on local politics, music and youth culture within Maori and Pacific Island communities. Marley in particular touched a nerve in Maori and Pacific Island communities; his music was rich with stories of every day oppression and defiance, even his love songs were political.

This area is best left for more in-depth research, but one good example of the influence of overseas music on activists is the protest era anthem Nga iwi e.22 The songs lyrics effortlessly combined te reo and the politics of Pacific solidarity, mana wahine and direct action with African, Jamaican and African American rhythms, patterns of repetition and call and response vocals. The chord progression from A minor to G was an obvious nod to the simple two chord progressions of reggae, dub and ska from Jamaica, while the rhythm replaced the US guitar ‘chank’ and emphasis on the ‘one’ and the Jamaican ‘one drop’, ‘half-drop’, and ‘skank’ on the up beat with the ‘Maori strum’, ‘ringa-chink’ or ‘chinga-chink’ sound as it is known, a muted

Maori approximation of the ‘chank’ and ‘skank’ played on an acoustic guitar and emphasising the down beat in lieu of a drum beat.

The influence of American, British and Caribbean music on activism is difficult to quantify: the songs of the era were sung on ‘demos’, and can still be heard in Maori communities, on protest lines and on Iwi radio. Reggae in particular can be heard in the refrains of protest songs from the era, and lead to the emergence of politicised Maori and Pacific Island reggae groups in the ‘70s and ‘80s such as Chaos (later known as Dread, Beat and Blood), Herbs, I-Unity (later Unity Pacific), Aotearoa and the Twelve Tribes of Israel. The growth of the local reggae scene and the repertoire of socially conscious music these groups turned out are another good example of the acculturation process taking place here. Maori and Pacific Island youth took the medium, reggae in this case, but applied their own messages. Overseas music had an indirect influence too; it set the mood of the era and contributed to the atmosphere of rebellion, resistance and change amongst the youth of New Zealand and the world.

Activist literature is an obvious place to look for the influence of international trends on local events. Familiarity with the rhetoric, language and analyses of Black Power, Red Power, and Black Women’s groups, and empathy with other oppressed groups appear in the literature produced by activists during the period. Two quotes in particular exemplify Maori attitudes towards the experiences of other oppressed groups; the first, poorly phrased paragraph appeared in the sixth issue of *Te Hokioi*:

> While it is true that the Maori is the only non-European race in the world which has successfully co-existed with a European dominated culture, retaining to a large degree his land, language and legal equality, this has not been exclusively due to the high minded gentry that came to N.Z. in the early 18th century, having raped, murdered, pillaged and enslaved the Negroes, the American Indians and the Aborigines, who were unfortunate obstacles to the pursuit of freedom and prosperity.23

The second paragraph, written two years later by Taura Eruera of Nga Tamatoa and appearing in a MOOHR Newsletter, reads:

> We are always quick to assure ourselves that compared to U.S.A., South Africa and Australia for example, race relations in New Zealand are fine. As a comparative study this is true. But when we, as we all too often do, use this comparison as the basis for categorically stating that race relations in New

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Zealand are fine, we are kidding ourselves. Let’s face it! Sure. We haven’t had any race riots nor other occurrences of similar nature. But when a group of approximately 25 Maoris aged from 17 to 26 about, decide in all seriousness to form a black-power oriented action group or when numerous kaumatua (Maori elders) remain embittered over the non-ratification of the Treaty of Waitangi or when a dozen to fifteen young delegates can stand up at a conference advocating separation because integration is such a farce, nobody can convince me that race relations here are fine.  

These two quotes share striking similarities: both writers are clearly convinced that Maori has fared well compared to their counterparts in America, South Africa and Australia. In spite of their critique of New Zealand’s potted history of race relations activists conceded there were places in the world where indigenous people had fared better than others. They attempted to point out that this did not mean that nothing was wrong or that Maori had little to complain about. Mentioning these other groups was a way of showing global solidarity and affinity, and also a way of marking Maori politics as radical and potentially militant. The government and public knew what black South African resistance or African American militancy looked like, they did not however know that at least some Maori shared similar views. Drawing parallels with the experiences of these other groups achieved two things, firstly it linked Maori with their overseas counterparts as a way of explaining their own efforts in New Zealand, and secondly it served as a warning that if nothing was done, the militancy and violence which had emerged around the globe would eventually also emerge in New Zealand. This is the origins of the ‘civil war’ threat so often raised in times of conflict between Maori and Pakeha, and is used as the threatening alternative to reform in a multitude of activist texts, too many to list here.

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25 See David Slack, Civil War-- & Other Optimistic Predictions : Where is New Zealand Going?, Auckland, 2005, for a modern example and a summary of this trend, an example from the 1970s appears below.
Figure 27: In a sign of indigenous solidarity, Aboriginal activists joined the Maori land marchers in Wellington.

Two other oppressed groups were regularly evoked as sharing an affinity and similar struggles with Maori; Aboriginal Australians and Vietnamese, however Maori analyses rarely achieved much more than paying lip service to them. Vietnamese were portrayed as ‘peasants’, while Aborigines were only ever mentioned to demonstrate how racist white settler societies could be compared to Maori experiences in New Zealand, their experience being used more as a commentary about white Australians and New Zealand’s race relations than Aboriginals.

Maori activists often lumped together, generalised and stereotyped the experiences of other ethnic minorities around the world with little attention or even knowledge of historic details, while contrasting them with a more rosy picture of their own. The Matakite manifesto did this, saying: ‘The alternative is the creation of a landless brown proletariat with no dignity, no mana and no stake in society. Like the blacks in America, they will stand outside society and aggress against it’. An Nga Tamatoa pamphlet also drew an unflattering overseas comparison, this time to Native Americans: ‘The alternative is the creation of a landless brown proletariat with no

26 Matakite manifesto, in Walker, Land March.
dignity, no mana and no stake in society. Like the American Indian Maoris will be forced to stand outside society and fight against it.  

The two quotes, almost certainly both written by Nga Tamatoa members are nearly identical, and both use the better known experiences of African Americans and Native Americans as an explanation of their own experiences and as a threat of what may happen if their demands were not met. The interesting thing is that Native Americans and African Americans are treated as interchangeable here; their unique histories and experiences are erased as irrelevant. They are evoked by activists not as real peoples with diverse lived experiences but as mere symbols of oppression, resistance, modern radicalism and militancy, a sign of the times which explained their own movement and its goals.

Having said all this, despite the obvious influence of Black Power, Red Power and Black women’s groups and the symbolism associated with Australian Aboriginals and Vietnamese for Maori activists, they are rarely mentioned in the sources, and Maori rarely adopted their rhetoric and language. The language of the politics of colour employed by African Americans, Native Americans and Chicanos under the banners of Black Power, Red Power and Brown Power for instance did not catch on with Maori until the late ‘70s, and only then with the women. Up until 1977 the phrases ‘Black Power’ or ‘Brown Power’ were used to describe Maori activism only three or four times amongst literally hundreds, perhaps thousands of pamphlets, posters, interviews and articles. The terms ‘Maori’, ‘Pakeha’, occasionally ‘white’ or ‘European New Zealander’, and ‘Polynesian’, ‘Polynesian (including Maori)’ and ‘non-Maori Polynesian’ were favoured over terms of colour like white, black or brown. Instead the politics of the treaty, land and language took centre staged, while

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27 ‘Nga Tamatoa Pamphlets’, ms- papers-2316-24, V. Hutchinson Papers, ATL.
28 It could almost be argued that the opposite occurred: while African Americans transformed their self image from ‘Negro’ or ‘Nigger’ to ‘Black’, Maori activists transformed their own self image from ‘Brown’ to ‘Maori’, a process mentioned by at least two Maori activists. Hone Harawira has argued activists transformed from being ‘brown’ and ‘brownies’ to Maori and tangata whenua as distinct from other Pacific Islanders, see Melani Anae, Lautofa Iuli and Leilani Burgoyne, Polynesian Panthers, p88. In a radio interview from 1971 Taura Eruera described the impact of assimilation and urbanisation on himself as creating a ‘brown skin Pakeha as distinct from say an educated Maori’, see Paul Diamond (producer), Nga Tamatoa. Defining ones self by skin colour therefore indicated a loss of identity and culture for Maori activists.
the discourse of one New Zealandness, racial harmony and definitions of Maori and Pakeha cultures and identities dominated debates.

This changed in 1977, as the Black women’s movement adopted some of the rhetoric and politics of the Black feminist or ‘womanist’ movement developed by African American women in the 1970s and early ‘80s. The literature they produced from this later period is quite jarring, almost crass in its use of the terms ‘blacks’, ‘black women’ and ‘black men’ compared to the more familiar language used previously to denote race and ethnicity. The politics of Black women in New Zealand also mirrored those of their stateside counterparts more than any other Maori groups before or since, focusing for example on the need to include the politics of race alongside those of gender and class favoured by white feminists, the intersectionality between the feminist movement and the Black civil rights and Black Power movements which seemed to erase Black women, the sexism Black women suffered at the hands of Black men within the movement, and the racism they experienced at the hands of white feminists within their movement. Again here, Donna Awatere Huata and her cohorts came closest to adopting and at times imitating the rhetoric and politics of African American activists, however these trends were limited to a certain group during a certain period, and should not stand in for representations of all Maori activists from the period.

The stock phrases used in the states were rarely adopted by Maori. Catch cries like ‘Black Power’, ‘Black is beautiful’, ‘All power to the people’, ‘We shall overcome’, or ‘Solidarity forever’ rarely appear in the literature. The exception here were the anti-war protests, which makes sense considering Vietnam was an American war: as seen in the section on Vietnam several phrases were adapted from anti-war activists: ‘not one more soldier’ became ‘not one more acre’ and ‘no Vietcong ever called me a nigger’ became ‘no Vietcong ever called me a Hori’, though no one ever threatened to ‘bring the war back home’ as the Black Panther Party had.29 A variety of activists groups from New Zealand consciously adapted the Black Panther Party’s system of community development schemes, and yet rarely was the language of ‘self defence’, ‘survival programmes’, ‘survival pending revolution’ or ‘revolutionary inter-

29 Te Matakite o Aotearoa, Maori Nationalism of the 70s.
communalism’ ever used despite the obvious influence. Maori instead came up with their own catch cries in te reo and English, chief among them were Rewi Maniapoto’s challenge ‘Ka whawhai Tonu matou!ake!ake!ake!’ (see figure 28), from which Ranginui Walker took the title of his general history, and Nga Tamatoa’s own pepeha, ‘tama tu, tama ora, tama noho tama mate, tama toa!’ The land movement produced the English slogans ‘Not one more acre’ and ‘Bastion Point is Maori land’, and treaty activists favoured ‘The Treaty is a Fraud’ and ‘Boycott Waitangi’.

One way of demonstrating the extent to which Maori adopted the rhetoric and politics of Black Power activists is to look to the examples set by Polynesian activists in New Zealand. In 1971 a group of Polynesian youth, including a small number of Maori and non-Polynesians formed the Polynesian Panthers, a pan-Polynesian activist group modelled on their American counterparts the Black Panther Party (BPP). The group took the BPP logo as their own, their magazine was named the Panther Rapp, photos of the group featured afros, berets, black clothing and posters of Huey Newton and Angela Davis in the background (see figures 29 and 30 below), and their language not only mimicked but at times actually repeated verbatim the better known phrases and quotes of the BPP.30

30 See Melani Anae, Lautofa Iuli and Leilani Burgoyne, Polynesian Panthers.
Figure 29 & 30: Polynesian Panther Party members with posters of Huey Newton and Angela Davis in the background.

Their community programmes and activism mirrored the programmes outlined in *Seize the Time: The Story of the Black Panther Party and Huey P. Newton* by Bobby Seale (minus the guns), to a tee, right down to their efforts to install traffic lights at a pedestrian crossing on Auckland’s Franklin Road where children were being hit by cars. Instead of selling copies of Chairman Mao’s *Little Red Book* they sold copies of a legal aid booklet, produced in conjunction with a young Pakeha lawyer by the name of David Lange. Pointing out the parallels between the Polynesian Panthers and the Black Panthers is not intended to criticise or mock the efforts of Polynesian activists. The forms of community programmes they adopted were designed by people living in impoverished neighbourhoods for impoverished neighbourhoods, and addressed the problems common to all such neighbourhoods: bad housing, exploitive land lords and retailers, police violence, lack of access to education, health care or employment, high crime and an often poor sense of civic pride. The models established by the BPP influenced communities around the world and translated well to New Zealand, it therefore made sense that groups like the Polynesian Panthers employed these programmes. Maori were influenced by overseas precedents, but were not the only
ones, and were not as prone to direct adoption of the aesthetics, rhetoric or politics of Black Power activists, as this example shows.

Figure 31: *Seize the Time* by Bobby Seale had a huge impact on Maori, Pacific Island and Pakeha activists.

Figure 32: The Polynesian Panthers put community defence into practice by distributing legal aid booklets, produced in conjunction with a young Pakeha lawyer named David Lange.

The influence of the seminal Panther text *Seize the Time* raises another important point: the aesthetics, rhetoric and politics of overseas movements most often arrived in New Zealand via literature rather than the media; therefore radical literature played a major part in introducing these ideas to Maori activists and influencing their own politics and actions. In addition to *Seize the Time* by Bobby Seale, influential texts included *Black Power* by Stokely Carmichael and Charles Hamilton, Angela Davis’ *If
They Come in the Morning and Women, Race and Class, Eldridge Cleaver’s Soul on Ice, and the Autobiography of Malcolm X. Radical academic texts, in particular Pedagogy of the Oppressed by Paulo Freire, The Wretched of the Earth by Frantz Fanon, and later Das Capital by Karl Marx, were highly persuasive. Bury My Heart at Wounded Knee by Dee Brown informed activists of Native American experiences, and Notes From The Second Year was part of the impetus for second wave feminism.31

Activists attest to the impact of these texts on their own politics and actions. Through these books the politics of class, race, gender (and their intersections) came into sharper focus for Maori activists. A critique of integration and the desire to retain ethnic distinction and difference was drawn from the radicals reading, as was an understanding of racial discrimination and the way institutionalised racism persisted when overt racism disappeared. So too were ideas of ways in which change could be effected. In seeking to address these issues and campaign for change, activists of the ‘60s and ‘70s relied on direct action, mass popular support, utilizing the media to one’s advantage and coalition building between separate interest groups as a means of achieving change. Equally important were the articulate and hard-line ways in which activists conveyed their messages to the public. The Marxist term ‘praxis’ adapted by Paulo Freire, best describes the relationship between theory and action employed by activists around the world during the period, while Freire’s term ‘concientization’ describes well the way activists attempted to raise consciousness and awareness of their struggles. Maori activists applied these ideas and tactics to their own situation, historical experiences and to the contemporary issues facing their communities but this was not simply copy-cat politics. The politics developed by Maori activists contrasted and at times conflicted with those of their overseas counterparts, in turn showing up the unique characteristics of Maori activism.

If we had to identify the one feature which distinguished Maori radical politics from those of other groups it would probably be their focus on the significance of Maori culture, language, cultural revitalisation and indigenous identity. For instance, the BPP had a major influence on Maori activists, and yet their brand of politics which embraced cultural identity and revitalisation was thoroughly rejected in BPP texts as ‘cultural nationalism’, while negative Maori attitudes towards Pakeha and stereotypes of Pakeha culture contrasted to the anti-racism and solidarity of Panther politics. Similarly, the politics of culture, cultural revitalization and indigenous identity were rejected by Marxist writers including Freire, Fanon, and of course Marx himself, all of whom saw cultural and spiritual practices as masking oppression and protecting the true holders of power in societies, the state and capitalists. Marx’s critique of the role of the church within capitalist societies is well known, but Fanon and Freire’s critiques cut closer to home due to their familiarity with indigenous life in Algeria and Brazil respectively. Fanon argued that the oppressed turned to ‘tribal feuds’, ‘myth and magic’, tribal dances, possessions and exorcisms to hide from their true fear, which he identified as colonial oppression; that chiefs and witch doctors in rural areas were prohibitions and barriers which needed to ‘disappear’; and warned culturalists that ‘you will never make colonisation blush for shame by spreading out little-known cultural treasures under its eyes’.  

Maori activists were not prepared to relegate culture to window dressing. The Black women’s movement, while profoundly influenced by its American counterpart, developed a critique which went beyond ‘the “tripod” framework of racism, sexism and capitalism’ employed by African American feminists, which Awatere Huata viewed as ‘a fragmented approach to reality in which parts are seen as separate from the whole’. Instead she employed what she called a holistic approach, in which she asserted the significance of white racism over sexism and class politics, and the need for a body of political thought primarily grounded in Maori culture, language and customs. Finally, we have already seen that Maori evoked solidarity with class politics and workers on cultural rather than class grounds, while identifying with Vietnamese as fellow indigenous peoples, not just coloured or oppressed peoples or fellow ‘workers’. These examples show that while Maori were influenced by the

32 Frantz Fanon, *The Wretched of the Earth*, pp. 41-45, 179-80.
politics of overseas groups, the body of thought they developed focused largely on local concerns and experiences, and was unique in its emphasis on Maori culture and language, cultural revitalisation and indigenous identity.

So what impact did overseas precedents have on events as they played out locally? Activists and academics alike profess the influence of modern activism and radicalism and the particular significance of Black Power advocates, yet thus far little has been seen that could be attributed to them. There was the occasional beard, beret or afro, but Maori were more likely to be seen in swandries than dashikis. Activists deliberately appropriated the Black Power aesthetic, but photographers were equally important in representing this image. Modern music played its role, but so too did kapa haka. African Americans, Native Americans, Aboriginal Australians and Vietnamese were all evoked in solidarity as peoples who had endured similar struggles to those of Maori, yet Maori activist literature did little more than pay them lip service. On the same principle, activist literature from overseas provided the inspiration for local events, and yet rarely is the language or politics of these foreign examples adopted directly by Maori activists. The issues canvassed by Maori activists shared more in common with Maori conservatives than US radicals, and the body of politics Maori did develop differed considerably from that of some of their biggest influences. In undertaking this research I expected to find a large number of examples of the influence and appropriation of the aesthetics, rhetoric and politics of overseas movements, to the extent that I began my research by searching texts on American activism in the ‘60s and ‘70s to prepare myself for this fact. But it rarely eventuated. The Black women’s movement was the closest Maori ever came to mimicking African Americans, but this was limited to a very small group of people at a certain period of time, and should not be used to stand in for all Maori activists from the period as it sometimes is.

So how did overseas movements influence local activism? The answer lies not so much in the superficial appearances and rhetoric, nor in the deeper body of politics developed by other movements. Maori had their own unique culture, language, politics and concerns which contrasted and even conflicted with those of their counterparts. Ultimately what Maori activists borrowed from the wave of radical
activism sweeping the world were the tools and methods to have their own issues heard and dealt with here in Aotearoa.

To explain this we need to return once again to te Ao Maori. The establishment of activist groups Nga Tamatoa, Te Hokioi, MOOHR, Te Reo Maori Society and Te Roopu Ote Matakite was as much a reaction to the traditional conservative approach taken by rural and tribal elders and leaders as it was to the problems faced by Maori communities at the time. The inability of conservatives to resist the last land grab and other similar legislation enacted to alienate Maori land or remedy the effects of urbanisation and assimilation convinced activists that the conservative approach had stalled and that a new approach was needed. And what was this conservative approach? Larry Parr summed up the feelings of his contemporaries in saying ‘if you were conservative, you had a meeting at a marae and you talked about it, but you didn’t do anything about it because no, well, you know that’s, that’s how it is and that’s the rules of the bureaucracy and you accepted it’.34 The phrase ‘all hui and no doey’ was appropriate, and activists came up with a variety of labels. For Ripeka Evans ‘the favourite saying was Kia tau te Rangimarie. This kind of accommodationist attitude made my blood boil. Being quiet and polite has gotten us fuck all.’35 Dunn Mihaka labelled it ‘Reactionary conservatism’, the ‘traditional tyranny of kaumatuatanga’, and the tendency of Maori to ‘nod our heads in agreement and say, “Ae tautoko, ae tautoko, ae tautoko ae...” rather than rock the boat’.36 The conservative tactics of passing remits, signing petitions and making submissions to the government had lost their effectiveness, as Donna Awatere Huata argued ‘patience, petitions, seminars and Maori politeness and goodwill have done nothing to stem the destructive tide of cultural imperialism and the extinction of Maoritanga, the taking of land and the arrogance toward our language’.37 This approach had not ‘done nothing’, but it did have its limits. Successive generations of conservative leaders and groups had attempted to put Maori land, language, the treaty, women’s rights, housing issues, institutionalised racism and a multitude of other issues on public and government agendas, but by the late ‘60s and ‘70s activists believed the efforts of

34 Paul Diamond (producer), Nga Tamatoa.
35 ‘Rebecca Evans Interview’, p.13.
36 Dunn Mihaka, ‘“Ki Te Whei-Ao...Ki Te Ao Marama...”’, Wellington, 1989, pp. 28, 97, 84-5.
37 Donna Awatere, Maori Sovereignty, p.29.
conservatives had stalled in the face of urbanisation, assimilation and predatory land policies.

We should pause for a second to consider why activists viewed a conservative approach to voicing dissent as a ‘traditional’ response; was it traditional? Historically this is debatable; we see the emergence of a conservative approach to conflict resolution following the New Zealand Wars in the 1870s and 1880s, when rangatira and iwi swapped armed resistance for more peaceful means of voicing dissent through official channels, such as committees, petitions, submissions, letter writing campaigns, and deputations to parliament. Traditionally strategies such as symbolic gift giving and substantial trading relationships, hui and whaikorero, diplomacy, marriage alliances and war typified Maori means of voicing dissent and resolving conflicts, while in the 19th century they adopted new means of direct action, such as the establishment of the King movement in the 1850s, the invention of passive resistance by Te Whiti and Tohu at Parihaka in the 1880s, and the formation of two Maori parliaments in the 1870s. For some iwi, in particular Nga Puhi this new conservative approach had begun earlier than in other rohe, their years of armed conflicts with the Crown having largely ended by the mid 1840s. This conservative approach was not strictly ‘traditional’ then, but by the 1960s it had become entrenched within Maori society. It was all most activists had known within their own lifetimes; for them it was tradition.

The solution activists reached was as simple as it was effective: direct action. MOOHR spelt this out in its constitution: ‘For too long the Maori nation (in general) have shown subservience to the will of the master. This attitude is on the road toward its end and ultimately spells the death throws of the exploiter.’ 38And the reason why? ‘A previously recognizable cap-in-hand approach has turned to a demand for Maori rights.’ 39 For Syd Jackson, Nga Tamatoa’s pepeha summed up the basis of their approach:

the whakatauki which we took was an adaption of the whakatauki ‘mauri tu mauri ora, mauri noho mauri mate’, and we just changed it to ‘tama tu, tama ora, tama noho, tama mate’, and the, I suppose, the very free translation that we gave of that particularly when we spoke to other young people was if you

38 MOOHR, MOOHR constitution, p1.
don’t get off your asses and do something then you’re dead. And that reflected the philosophical position which we adopted at that time.\textsuperscript{40} The ‘new approach’ hinged on what is best described as praxis, which Freire described as ‘reflection and action upon the world in order to change it’.\textsuperscript{41} Modern activism as developed first in the United States and Britain in the ‘60s by the anti-war, feminist, Black, Red and Brown Power movements constituted a mix of radical theory on the need for social reform, the ability to articulate these ideas clearly and convincingly, the skills and vision to build coalitions with other radical interest groups in society across gender, race and class boundaries, and the conviction to transform these ideas into direct, attention-grabbing action. Direct action ranged from the most common tactics of ‘sit ins’, ‘teach ins’, protest rallies, marches and petitioning to, at times, occupations and physical confrontation with the army and police.

These were the tactics and methods Maori employed in their own struggle, which can be seen throughout this thesis. Treaty activists used protest rallies at Waitangi and an occupation of Parliament grounds. Land rights activists marched to parliament, taking their cues from Martin Luther King’s march on Washington in 1963 and the Trail of Broken Treaties organised by Native American Activists in 1972, while the occupations of Bastion Point and Raglan were inspired by the occupation of Alcatraz Island between 1969 and 1971 and Wounded Knee in 1973. Language activists combined radical literature, petitioning, and community activities to achieve their goals. Maori activists staged a multitude of public rallies and marches to protest the Vietnam War and worker’s rights, and resistance to South African apartheid lead to physical confrontation between Maori activists and the police.

Alongside these more high profile and dramatic forms of protest, low profile activist work behind the scenes, including community programmes and submissions to the government were equally as important. A number of local activist groups including Nga Tamatoa, the Polynesian Panthers, and Pakeha organisations CARE, HART, ACORD and the Ponsonby People’s Union established community development

\textsuperscript{40} Paul Diamond (producer), \textit{Nga Tamatoa}.
\textsuperscript{41} Paulo Freire, \textit{Pedagogy of the Oppressed}, p.28.
programmes, taking their cues from the community programmes outlined by the BBP in *Seize the Time* and their 10-point plan, often collaborating on different schemes.

Nga Tamatoa attempted to achieve their goal of reforming the justice system through community programmes similar to those advocated and developed by the BPP. Pauline Kingi and Patrick Te Hemara set up a legal aid scheme to provide advice and support to young Maori and Pacific Island offenders caught up in the court system; the scheme lasted for less than a year, as it was adopted by the government as a duty solicitor and legal aid scheme in 1974. Further to this, Nga Tamatoa was part of a coalition named PIG patrol, which patrolled the streets to combat police brutality and oppression of Maori and Pacific Island peoples. The patrol was strikingly similar to the Panthers self-defence programmes, minus the guns of course, but this was not a case of mimicking the Panthers; police brutality was a reality in New Zealand and a previously accepted part of urban life for Maori, Pacific Islanders and working-class Pakeha. The PIG patrols were a direct response to the creation of a Police Task Force set up in June 1974 to combat violent crime in Auckland. The Task Force’s job was to ‘clean up the streets’, but as activists would argue, this direction was ‘interpreted by the police as cleaning Maoris and other Polynesians off the streets and into the cells, innocent or not’ by picking on Maori and Polynesians and the inner city bars, bus

42 Paul Diamond (producer), *Nga Tamatoa*. 

Figure 33: Maori, Pakeha and Pacific Island activists combined to fight police brutality.
stops and taxi stands which they frequented.\textsuperscript{43} ACORD monitored the Auckland Magistrate’s Court for six weeks, and found that of the 403 arrests made over that period 80\% of all those arrested were Maori and Polynesian, an effective doubling of the regular officers’ Maori and Pacific Island arrest rates. Activists argued that the data demonstrated a clear bias on the part of the police: ‘It is inconceivable that this racial group has suddenly become much more prone to drunkenness, obscene language and offensive behaviour. The only conclusion to be drawn therefore is that the Task Force is to an ever-increasing extent selectively arresting Maoris and other Polynesians’.\textsuperscript{44} After following the task force, activists discovered the police were provoking young Maori and Pacific Islanders into arrests on trivial charges; one Pacific Island man was arrested for offensive language for saying his own name to police, ‘whakaofo’.\textsuperscript{45} Tensions flared again in 1976, when police shot dead 17-year-old Daniel Houpapa in Taumarunui, and several days later nearly killed prison escapee John Apolsio Smith in a violent raid on an Mt Wellington house. The Department of Justice drew complaints from Matakite and Nga Tamatoa for a department newsletter published in 1978 which depicted Maori Mongrel mob gang members as monkeys.\textsuperscript{46}

Nga Tamatoa also opened employment offices in Auckland and Wellington to provide jobs for new migrants and the unemployed, and at various times campaigned for housing reform and education reform in Maori communities.

While these community programmes shared striking similarities with those developed in the states, this was still not a clear case of mimicking the BPP. As mentioned earlier Maori suffered the same basic disadvantages as people in other impoverished neighbourhoods around the world. The programmes developed by Black Power activists were tested in similar conditions, and initially at least were effective, so they translated as well in the black ghettos of Oakland and barrios of Los Angeles as they did on Native American reservations, or in the state housing suburbs of Mangere and

\textsuperscript{43} Nga Tamatoa, the Polynesian Panthers, ACORD and CARE, \textit{Coalition formed against police racism}, paper, Auckland, Sept 1974, ms-papers - 95 -222- 1/06, Maori Struggles, D. Wickham papers, ATL.

\textsuperscript{44} ibid.

\textsuperscript{45} Melani Anae, Lautofa Iuli and Leilani Burgoyne, \textit{Polynesian Panthers}, p.87.

\textsuperscript{46} \textit{JD News: Newsletter of the Department of Justice}, No.44 ( 5 April 1978), ms-papers-99-278-31/08, Race issues in New Zealand, Trevor Richards Papers, ATL.
Otara in South Auckland and Porirua in Wellington. Further, while activists co-opted the term ‘pig’ from the BPP, their police watch group was a reaction to increased Police brutality at the hands of the newly formed task force.

Submission writing was another lower profile though no less effective form of activism employed by Maori. While delivering submissions to the government was a strategy more commonly employed by conservatives, the submissions written by modern activists were far more critical and uncompromising than those of their predecessors, and often demanded radical structural change rather than mild reform. Although activists did not always get what they wanted, their demands shifted the parameters of some key debates. Examples of this include Nga Tamatoa’s submissions on the Race Relations Bill, the Maori language, Legal Aid, Social Welfare and children’s homes, and a MOOHR submission to the educational development conference. The combination of radical submissions, community development programmes and direct protest action in many cases forced the government to react, and several of the schemes developed or advocated for by activists were quickly adopted by government agencies, while the combination of the Waitangi Tribunal, Maccess and Access schemes and Kokiri community development centres established by the newly elected Labour Government attempted to approximate the work of activists in the 1980s. Having said this, many of their demands, such as the establishment of Maori television and radio, would have to wait years, even decades to be introduced. Others, such as compulsory bilingualism in primary and secondary have still yet to be fully implemented, and Maori may never see the treaty and its guarantees of tino rangatiratanga implemented in government legislation. Furthermore, activists have uncovered new grounds for grievance, taking in cultural and intellectual property, genetic modification, the recent confiscation of the seabed and foreshore, ownership of taonga held in local and foreign museums and private collections, and most recently the right of Maori to fly the tino rangatiratanga flag from the Auckland Harbour bridge on Waitangi Day 2007. These issues will be dealt with in the conclusion to this thesis.

To return to the quote which began this chapter, were Maori activists ‘echoing’, or worse, ‘mimicking’ their contemporaries and counterparts overseas? Maori occasionally co-opted the dress and rhetoric of Black Power advocates. Their politics
followed the same basic outline of those of their contemporaries, but differed considerable on a number of crucial points. Their tactics and methods were clearly appropriated from overseas, particularly the community programmes, but this was because these types of campaigning for change were proven to work overseas, and often translated well in impoverished communities. What is strange here is that the activists themselves claim they were modelling themselves on Black Power leaders, yet we see little of this in the sources; these indicate Maori borrowed the tools and methods of modern activism but their politics and issues were largely their own.

What was likely occurring was a process of acculturation, whereby Maori activists co-opted the medium and the methods of overseas examples as part of a world wide trend of youthful rebellion against authority, discrimination and oppression. Adopting a radical or militant image helped young activists distinguish themselves from conservatives and earlier movements, while adding an air of confrontation and danger. But where the medium and methods changed, the messages stayed the same: the Treaty, land, language and culture, South African apartheid and women’s rights were the mainstays of Maori activism in the ‘70s, just as they had been for the Maori Council, the League and the Ratana movement in the ‘50s and ‘60s.

So why the disjunction here between the claims of activists, academics and journalists that they were highly influenced by overseas trends, and the arguments presented in this thesis? A possible explanation for this disjunction is that these influences do not or have not been translated to the sources used here. One might not see the resonance of Black Power in literature from the time, but perhaps attending a hui at the time may have told a different story; tone of voice, swagger, accent and delivery do not translate to paper the mood of the times particularly well, nor do interviews recorded 10, even 30 years later. A speech that reads as straightforward on a paper may well have come alive with the stirring tones of Dr Martin Luther King’s sermons, or Angela Davis’ fiery disposition. Another possibility is that, after criticism from Maori over early publicity labelling them a ‘Brown Power’ movement or Black Power militants, activists consciously removed such references from their rhetoric to avoid conflict. The over saturation of American art, politics and culture in modern New Zealand may also explain the findings reached here; perhaps the use of the term ‘black-power oriented action group’ to describe Maori activists in 1971 is the equivalent of
describing modern activists as ‘Al-Qaeda oriented terrorists’, and the subtlety is lost on modern readers and researchers saturated in Americana. More research may be what is needed here. What we can conclude is that it was the tactics and methods of modern activism which were to have the greatest impact on Maori, providing them the tools they needed to act on grievances which had for so long had been swept under the carpet or brushed aside. They achieved a number of key concessions in a relatively short time, while contributing to further reforms in the 1980s and a rethink of New Zealand culture, history, and national identity. Many of their goals however remain to be achieved by future generations, an issue which will be covered in the conclusion.
Chapter 4
Hine tu, hine ora:
Gender politics and the Black Women’s movement

In a 1973 editorial for Broadsheet, Pakeha feminist Hilary Haines turned her attention to Maori mythology and tradition, and was not impressed with what she saw. Having perused a copy of Berys Heuer's monograph on Maori women, Haines concluded that ‘pre-European Maori society was certainly sexist’. 1 After a cursory glance at Maori mythology and traditions, Haines deduced that: ‘The idea of male superiority and female inferiority are deeply embedded in Maori mythology’. The supposed ‘social norms’ of tapu, labour division, polygamy, female infanticide and abortion made it clear to her that ‘traditional Maori society oppressed women in that it denied them the right to participate in the more modern aspects of tribal life’ and that it was ‘up to women of all races to unite and fight for equality’. 2 Nearly a decade later in the same magazine, Donna Awatere Huata celebrated the victories of a Maori women’s movement which could not have been further from what Haines had envisioned:

We now have the strongest indigenous women’s movement in the world. Maori women have assumed the leadership role of Maoridom. While this has not been widely acknowledged within Maoridom as yet, it has gathered momentum nothing short of mass slaughter can stop. 3

Between 1970 and 1984 Maori women not only led Maori activism, they also led a movement within the movement, what was then labelled the Black women’s movement. In the short space of 10 years Maori women developed a potent brand of women’s rights blending their own traditions and experiences with the critiques of predominantly African American feminists. The movement was more than just a Maori approximation of contemporary feminist thought: labelling it ‘Maori feminism’ or the Maori ‘faction’ of second wave feminism misses the point. The Black women’s movement was grounded in the experiences and politics of being a Maori woman in

1 Hilary Haines, ‘Editorial; Maori Myths?’, Broadsheet, 12 (August 1973), Auckland, p.2.
Aotearoa New Zealand, and developed a body of political thought which was unique to the time, place and circumstances in which it developed.

The movement can be loosely grouped into two phases; the first phase occurred largely between 1970 and 1977, during which Maori women developed a unique analysis which critiqued Pakeha feminists and distinguished between Pakeha feminism and the rights of Maori women. The second phase from 1977 to 1984 saw the movement shift into high gear, with the establishment of a distinct Black women’s movement which was outspoken in its critique of both Pakeha and Maori society. These two periods are not distinct; there are significant overlaps. The key difference was the intensity of the movement after 1977. And intense it was. Maori women delivered a sharp critique of Pakeha society, Pakeha feminists, Maori society, and male activists, and transformed the remnants of Maori activism of the 1970s into a Maori women’s movement. Female leadership and the evolution of mana wahine are therefore fundamental to understanding the events of the 1970s.

Admittedly, this chapter does not fit comfortably within the scope of this thesis. After building up a body of politics and rhetoric defining a confident, unified movement ten years strong, the Black women’s movement comes as some sort of bad punch line, undermining and calling into question much of what has already been said. The events outlined here also sit on the periphery of the period, taking place largely between 1977 and 1985. It would have been easy then to discard the following chapter as outside the period and scope of this thesis. This chapter has been preserved however, for several good reasons. Most importantly, the tension between this chapter and preceding chapters mirrors the tension which built up amongst female activists and exploded in the late ‘70s and early ‘80s. This is precisely what happened historically: women were an integral part of Maori activism, but many were unhappy with their place within the movement, and after a decade of dedication to the issues of institutional racism, ethnicity and to a lesser degree class, they turned on their male counterparts, addressing gender discrimination inside and outside the movement. We need to retain these tensions; they should not be smoothed out to make for a cleaner, more predictable narrative.
Further to this, their struggles mirror the struggles of the wider movement. In the same way that Maori activists built up an ideology of modern political thought and action, only to have it undermined a decade down the track by women within the movement, so too had Pakeha New Zealanders built up a belief in ‘one New Zealandness’ and racial harmony, which Maori activists knew they would have to deconstruct and destabilise if change was to occur.

In turn this reminds us of the need to take a holistic approach to politics and activism in the present day, to move beyond sectarian causes and see the bigger picture of colonisation, imperialism, and oppression in all its forms. If modern day activists and political reformers fail to address the place of other, even more marginal interest groups within our communities, they too will turn on their counterparts and ask, ‘what about us?’ This will be discussed in more detail in the conclusion to this thesis. Finally, just as Maori and women are marginalised within society, they suffer the same oppression at the hands of history. Historians need to take the histories of Maori and women seriously. This does not mean we should all be writing gendered histories or Maori histories, what it means is that Maori and women must be included in every discourse on New Zealand’s history where they are present. They must be included in general histories, popular histories, cultural histories, social histories, political histories, colonial histories, every facet of the discipline; writing off Maori and women as ‘outside the scope’, ‘outside the period’, or ‘outside the area of interest’, mirrors, and is a contributing factor to the marginalisation of Maori, women, and indeed all oppressed groups within society.

Figure 34: Staunch, articulate Hawaiian women shared much in common with their Maori counterparts.
One of the distinguishing features of Maori activism, both locally and globally, was the prominence of female leadership within the movement. Few if any other activist movements in the world (with the obvious exception of first and second wave feminism and possibly the struggles of the Kanaka Maoli of Hawaii in the 20th century) can claim to have been led predominantly by women (see figure 34 above).

The treaty, Maori land issues and te reo Maori were the main focus of activism; women were the symbolic and substantive leaders of the campaigns about all three. Hana Jackson has been remembered for kick-starting radical protest at Waitangi, and was the driving force behind the campaign for te reo Maori in schools. Eva Rickard was the momentum behind the struggle for the return of the Raglan Golf course in Whaingaroa, in turn inspiring others to take direct action, while Dame Whina Cooper was the symbolic and substantive leader of the 1975 Land March and Te Roopu Ote Matakite. Donna Awatere Huata, Ripeka Evans, Hilda Halkyard, Titewhai Harawira and Hinewhare Harawira were involved from the early 1970s, and by the 1980s had become the public voices and faces of activism, while Linda Smith, Pauline Kingi, Orewa Ohia-Barrett, Darlene Henare, Mei Reedy, Darlene Virtue, Pauline Kingi, Moena Grace, Ngareta Dixon, Vini Raureti, Hinengaro Davis, Sharon Hawke, Josie Keelan and many others played equally important, though less high-profile roles.

Figure 35: Members of the Black women’s movement and supporters outside the Hamilton District Court fighting convictions arising from the 1981 Springbok tour.

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4 Haunani-Kay Trask, *From a Native Daughter: Colonialism and Sovereignty in Hawai‘i*, rev. edn, Manoa, 1999, p.94.
Why did women play such a prominent role in radical activism? Over the last 40 years debate has raged over the place of women and female leadership within Maori society, and the recent controversies over women’s speaking rights at public events and government-run powhiri show the issue is still not settled.\(^5\) While there are a range of positions on the issue, the general consensus amongst academics – Maori and Pakeha -- is that Maori society embodied a stronger balance between the roles of men and women than the records allow, but that this balance was disrupted by missionaries and settlers and the influence of Judaeo-Christian and Victorian-era attitudes towards women. Academics including Kuni Jenkins, Linda Smith, Ani Mikaere, Merimeri Penfold, Ngahuia Te Awekotuku, Donna Awatere Huata, Kathy Irwin, Cherryl Smith, Leonie Pihama, Aroha Mead, Api Mahuika, Rawiri Taonui, Ann Salmond, Joan Metge and Judith Binney have argued that Pakeha writers have played significant roles in marginalizing Maori women by misunderstanding and misinterpreting their place in myth, tradition and history. Kuni Jenkins provides a succinct summary:

> What the coloniser found was a land of noble savages narrating his/her stories of the wonder of women. Their myths and beliefs had to be reshaped and retold... in the retelling of our myths, by male informants to Pakeha male writers who lacked the understanding and significance of Maori cultural beliefs, Maori women find their mana wahine destroyed.\(^6\)

Ani Mikaere has argued that in particular Elsdon Best, Percy Smith and their informant H. Te Whatahoro were instrumental in rendering the female elements of myths, traditions and customs passive, subservient and negative. Thus Maori women were ‘redefined in terms of the idealised Christian model of women as passive agents of man’s will’, ‘stripped of their power and influence’ and ‘femasculated’.\(^7\) Mikaere also paints a vivid and convincing picture of the ways in which Maori women were marginalized within colonial society, as missionaries and settlers underestimated and purposefully subordinated the roles of women within the family, local communities and wider society. Mikaere argues that the application of English common law by secular authorities and Judea-Christian morals by secular and religious organisations effectively destroyed mana wahine in the 19\(^{th}\) and 20\(^{th}\) century,


\(^7\) ibid., pp. 78, 81.
trapping Maori women in the ‘contradictions of a colonised reality’. Furthermore, Maori men have been implicit in this process largely because it has been in their interest to attain status over Maori women in a society which has progressively undermined their own.

Other commentators have taken a different tack. Tribal patriarch Api Mahuika has ironically produced one of the strongest cases for mana wahine as tradition in his influential essay on Ngati Porou published in the 1970s, no doubt influenced by the politics of the time. Mahuika proves beyond a doubt, for Ngati Porou at least, that female mana and leadership was and still is an important aspect of the tribal landscape, concluding with the words of Arnold Reedy: ‘Remove our female genealogies and our genealogies will be made common’.

In contrast, others have been less forgiving; Ngahuia Te Awekotuku has been far more critical of traditional Maori society, though her position has softened considerably over the years. Te Awekotuku readily admits that colonisation and Christianisation both played their roles, but has also criticized Maori culture for being patriarchal and misogynistic, and has criticised Maori men for being implicit in this process.

To paint Maori women as passive within this process would be a mistake. From the late 19th through to the late 20th century we see the development of Maori women’s political activity leading up to the prominent roles played by women in activism. The first inkling of this appeared in the 1890s; Maori women were active participants in the Kotahitanga movement, campaigning for and winning the right to vote and stand for the Maori Parliament 22 years before their Pakeha counterparts were offered the same right. Maori women further lent their support to the Women’s Christian Temperance Union and the suffrage movement, while setting up their own Komiti Wahine to deal with the problems of land, health and education.

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10 See Ngahuia Te Awekotuku, Mana Wahine Maori: Selected Writings on Maori Women’s Art, Culture and Politics, Auckland, 1991.
11 Tania Rei, Maori Women and The Vote, Wellington, 1993, pp.17-25.
Elegant and enigmatic male leaders of the likes of Apirana Ngata, Peter Buck and Wiremu Ratana dominate the historical records of the early 20th century; however tribal matriarchs such as Te Puea Herangi of Tainui and Whina Cooper also feature, and were easily the equal of their male contemporaries. Tribal traditions often offer different insights into the inner workings of Maori communities and political activity of the period. For instance, while the history books recognize the contribution of male leaders like MP Tau Henare and Apirana Ngata to the building of Te Tii marae at Waitangi and the centennial celebrations held to commemorate the signing of the Declaration of Independence and the treaty, tribal histories remember the contribution of female community leaders like Mihiwira Tipene, whose mammoth efforts behind the scenes were remembered by the naming of a whare kai in her honour.

The formation of the Maori Women’s Welfare League in 1951 was another indication of increasing political involvement by Maori women. The League was established to give Maori women a voice in decision making, and to bring attention to the issues and hardships faced by Maori households and families. Because Tribal committees (established under the Maori Social and Economic Advancement Act 1945) were dominated by men, many of these issues were ignored, despite the fact that they were of immediate concern to the welfare and wellbeing of Maori families. The League therefore created an official arena for women to voice their concerns and take action. Further to this, because the League was the first national organization of its kind until the 1960s, it immediately became the leading voice expressing the concerns of Maoridom on a national level. Its annual conferences quickly became a platform for discussion of national issues affecting Maori, and remits from these discussions were forwarded to the Government to influence policy and legislation.

Ranginui Walkers’ description of the League as representing ‘conservative expressions of Maori Activism pursuing Maori rights within the frame work of the parliamentary system’ is apt. However the League also played a significant role in leading Maori protest and dissent up until the 1970s. They were vocal critics of South African apartheid from 1957 onwards, the ‘Bennet’ incident of 1959, the Hunn Report

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of 1960, the ‘last land grab’ of 1967, and initiated several of their own protests, including the removal from schools of the bulletin *Washday at the Pa* in 1964 for its controversial depiction of Maori families (see figure 36 below). The League were strong supporters of te reo Maori, and began campaigning for the introduction of the Maori language in primary schools in the 1950s, though their meek strategies of passing remits ultimately achieved little. While their members were openly critical of activists they also played a significant role as supporters of protest action, often repudiating the more brash actions of their unruly radical counterparts, as was the case with He Taua and the haka party incident in 1978. The League set a precedent for modern female leadership which activists would emulate, and proved a breeding ground for leaders like Whina Cooper and Mira Szazy, the matriarchs of Maori activism and mana wahine in the 1970s.

![Washday at the Pa](image)

Figure 36: The school journal *Washday at the Pa* was removed from schools and destroyed: remaining copies became collectors’ items.

Taking these differing perspectives into account, and allowing for tribal variation, academics do put forward a convincing case that Maori women played significant roles in traditional and modern times. Equally too the impact of colonisation and Christianisation cannot be ignored, nor can the implication of Maori men. While more research is needed, particularly in the area of oral traditions which Mahuika has shown to be a rich resource for clarification and evidence, arguably Maori women have always played significant roles within Maori society from traditional through to
modern times. These roles however have been progressively undermined by the imposition of Judaeo-Christian attitudes towards women introduced by missionaries and churches, and the imposition of colonisation and English common law, and Maori men and women have been implicated within this process. I would add a third agent here: War. From the early contact period right through to Vietnam, War seems endemic to Maori society, touching almost every generation up to the present. This has in turn emphasised the martial traditions within Maori society, while marginalising the peaceful arts. These can not and should not be typified or simplified as male and female, but the emphasis on martial traditions has at least exaggerated the importance of male leadership while marginalising the significant roles women played in peacemaking and diplomacy. The result is a society out of kilter with its own traditions, which in turn has marginalised the roles of women at the expense of all. Thus the female leadership we see emerging in the late 19th and early 20th century represent both change and continuity: They are a continuation of ongoing female leadership roles within Maori society, and they are a break from newer traditions that developed during the colonial period which denied the importance and significance of women.

While this academic commentary adds to our understanding of the debate and the historical context, the words of the activists themselves are of the utmost significance in explaining the emergence of female leadership within the activist movement of the 1970s, while also illuminating our understanding of the place of Maori women in society over a longer time period. Between 1970 and 1984 Maori women began forging a new identity for themselves, and while this had much to do with the gender politics of the time, it can also be viewed as a very traditional and uniquely Maori response to changing times. Within Maori society, decisions, actions, alliances, indeed any political act must be sanctioned not just by consensus but also by tradition; there must be precedence in whakapapa and oral traditions which explain and validate current circumstances. This held true for the Black women’s movement, and one striking feature of the movement was the construction of a whakapapa of mana wahine, highlighted again and again in the words of activists.

When asked in a 1973 interview how Maori women planned to tackle oppression in society Hana Jackson turned to historical precedents, citing the efforts and influence
of the MWWL formed in the 1950s to ‘try and help the needs of the people during that time’, and the efforts of Te Puea Herangi in building up Turangawaewae and the Kingitanga, whom Jackson called ‘another Maori woman liberationist’. In 1982 she cited the influence of her grandmother and the other women around her as a child who were staunch members of the Kotahitanga movement, while in a 1994 retrospective she paid tribute to the influences of Te Puea, Whina Cooper and Mira Szasy as well as aunties and kuia.

Ngahuia Te Awekotuku constructed a mana wahine whakapapa which reached back further in time. In a 1972 article she called on the spirit of the ‘illustrious female forbears’ of Te Arawa and Mataatua, Hinemoa and Wairaka. Six years later in an address to the Piha women’s convention, Te Awekotuku had developed this whakapapa even further, calling forth a pan-tribal genealogy which included Hine nui Te Po, Wairaka of Mataatua, Materoa of Ngati Porou and Rihi Puhiwahine of Waikato and Tuwharetoa, while challenging ‘the most rigidly misogynistic traditions’ of Te Arawa, Waikato and Tuhoe.

The whakapapa of mana wahine evolved during these early years. This whakapapa is commonly recited in the present by men and women alike, but in the 1970s it was a new construct, created to validate the actions of female activists in leading their people and challenging male dominance of leadership roles. This can be viewed as both a traditional response and a modern adaptation, it was traditional in that activists looked to whakapapa for precedents to legitimate female leadership, and yet it was a modern phenomenon equally influenced by the politics of the day, and was pan-tribal in nature and construction. Here again activists were developing new indigenous traditions, traditions which built on the past even as they broke with the past.

As mentioned earlier the Black Women’s movement can be roughly divided into two periods. While activists and academics alike cite the earlier influences of female

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17 Ngahuia Te Awekotuku, Mana Wahine Maori, p.45.
18 ibid.
19 See Ani Mikaere, The Balance Destroyed, Amy Brown, Mana Wahine, and Tama Te Kapua Poata, ‘Salute our Survival’ for contemporary examples of this.
leadership including Te Puea Herangi, Whina Cooper and the efforts of the MWWL, modern Maori feminism began in 1970 and at first comprised of just two advocates, cousins Donna Awatere Huata and Ngahuia Te Awekotuku. In Awatere Huata’s words, the women who joined feminist groups at that time:

were all Pakeha except one of my cousins Ngahuia Te Awekotuku, she and I were really the only two Maori from 1970 who were involved in the feminist movement and Ngahuia was more involved in the lesbian movement, I was more involved in the rape crisis, equal pay issues and child care issues.  

Te Awekotuku has alluded to the influence of the volume *Notes from the Second Year* on the sudden emergence of second wave feminism in 1971, stating:

never was a volume so cherished: articulating our grievances, exposing our pains, releasing us from our own doubt and self denial. Suddenly, we women realised, like the valiant Viet Cong, like the blacks, like the working class, we were an oppressed people, a voiceless, hushed, unseen majority – with the right to demand equality.

Te Awekotuku explains the book ‘did the rounds of radical households’ during the summer of 1971-2, and by March Women’s Liberation groups were meeting in Auckland, bringing in female activists from a number of other movements which were ‘politically involved but exploited women’.

At the time few others within the Maori activist movement had a well-developed sense of gender politics, and conflicts arose as Awatere Huata and Te Awekotuku struggled to convince these otherwise ‘politically involved’ activists that they were also ‘exploited women’. Hana Jackson recalled being introduced to women’s rights by Awatere Huata and Te Awekotuku, after they joined Nga Tamatoa. As she would later remember: ‘I’d thought only racial discrimination existed until I learned about sexual discrimination…. Sexism and racism seemed to go hand in hand.’ She also recalled a degree of tension. Speaking directly to Awatere Huata in 1982 she commented that ‘You kept trying to talk about sexism…. I thought, ‘what’s that got to do with us’ ….The hostility that you had towards me was because I let the men walk

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20 Paul Diamond (producer), *Nga Tamatoa*.
23 ibid.
all over me.' Jackson began addressing gender issues in 1975, when she wrote a paper on Maori women which she claimed Awatere Huata thought ‘was bloody pathetic’ even though the MWWL regarded it as so radical they wanted to sue her over it. In the same series of interviews Hilda Halkyard made a similar claim that Awatere Huata aggressively pursued a feminist agenda within Nga Tamatoa:

You didn’t help either, Donna. You were always pushing. I couldn’t even understand what you were on about, even the words, let alone the meaning. You used to attack. Whenever you were around I was on guard. Still am a bit... You were bloody terrible.

Te Awekotuku criticised Maori women activists in a 1973 interview:

too many women who are articulate and well educated hide behind the traditional shield of female muteness. In important tribal and political matters those few who do speak out too often are unprepared to encounter adequately the challenges and rebukes hurled at them by their male counterparts.

In an earlier 1971 article she argued that Maori activists needed to wake up to issues of gender, arguing that: ‘[what] the present upsurge of racial consciousness must result in, ultimately, is a purge of the white-male dominated power structure.’ If Maori gender roles limited Maori from participating the ‘purge’ would be undermined. Te Awekotuku was one of the first activists to identify the inherent contradictions Maori women faced:

We’re caught in the dilemma of trying to revive our traditional culture and yet as females we must question the patriarchal values of the culture. Unfortunately few Maori men are in sympathy with this situation and regard our resultant grievance as a diversion from the real issues such as Maori land rights, education, the judicial system, the white status quo.

While Awatere Huata and Te Awekotuku had developed a strong critique of gender issues, other women within the Maori activist movement had not, and although they agreed on the oppression of Maori, conflict arose as these two criticised other women for not addressing gender issues within the movement and Maori society.

A stronger critique of gender issues did eventually develop amongst female members of Maori activism in later years; however during the early period of 1970-1975 their critique focused predominantly on differentiating their central concerns from those of

26 ibid., p.25.
27 ibid., pp. 30-31.
29 Ngahuia Te Awekotuku, Mana Wahine Maori, p.47.
Pakeha feminism. Here their attitudes towards Pakeha feminists mirror Maori attitudes towards Pakeha anti-apartheid, anti-war and left wing activists: they may have sympathised with their politics at times, but their chief concern was in following up on Maori issues. While Te Awekotuku had her reservations about Maori radical politics, she was still predominantly concerned with issues of racism and ethnicity. In a 1973 interview she declared: ‘I see myself as a Maori first and my gender is largely irrelevant’. 31 Although she supported the principles of Pakeha feminism, for her the fight was for ‘the rights and self-determination of the Maori people and active participation of Maori women in this fight’. 32 She criticised the women’s movement for its lack of contact with ‘women who really need emancipation most of all’, namely Maori and working-class women. Nor could these groups be comfortably lumped together: between them she discerned tensions, with working-class Pakeha retaining a ‘superior racist attitude’. 33 Her comments on the manifesto of the Auckland Women’s Liberation Movement issued in 1971 are indicative. 34 While agreeing with the many of the principles of Pakeha feminism and the Women’s Liberation manifesto, she critiqued the manifesto as ‘directed at the pakeha’ and felt it should be amended ‘to appeal directly to and be fully appreciated by Maori / Polynesian women’. 35 In particular she disagreed with Pakeha feminist attitudes towards abortion and contraception.

Similarly Hana Jackson argued that while gender issues were important to Maori women, ‘[a]s Maoris we see most of our oppression as black and white. The oppression comes from white people.’ 36 When asked whether she felt more oppressed by Pakeha men or women she responded that ‘the whole of pakeha society’ was the problem. She also presented Maori activism as in danger of being overrun by the activities of Pakeha feminists. ‘Many Maori women’, she said, ‘resent the white women coming in and taking over something they have started. I really feel it’s an all

32 ibid.
33 ibid.
34 See Charlotte MacDonald, The Vote, the Pill and the Demon Drink: A History of Feminist Writing in New Zealand, 1869-1993, Wellington, 1993, pp.164-67 for a copy of the manifesto, Mac Donald is unclear as to the precise date the manifesto was published, as the Archival reference has it dated as ‘71?’.
36Sharon Alston, ‘talking to polynesian women part 1: Hana Jackson’, p.11.
white oppression’. \(^{37}\) In contrast to Te Awekotuku, Jackson argued that male chauvinism in Maori society was a relatively new phenomenon: ‘In the past history I know about women were always given a place in the community. The women called first on the marae. Only now, in some tribes, do the men do the formal welcome’ while in the present day the women in groups like Nga Tamatoa and the MWWL were leading their people and ‘doing all the work’. \(^{38}\)

Her attitudes towards the principles outlined in the Women’s Liberation manifesto were similar to Te Awekotuku’s; she supported them except on the issues of abortion and contraception. She labelled contraception as ‘a pakeha hang-up’, and contraception and ‘VD’ as ‘something Maori never had before the white man came’. \(^{39}\) Maori attitudes to abortion and contraception were a crucial point of difference within the feminist movement. Maori made fewer distinctions between children born out of wedlock and those born to married parents; families coped by supporting unmarried parents and adopting out children at birth if necessary. Jackson challenged the women’s movement to take on ‘a more Maori idea of extended family relationships’, and recommended they call on family members to care for children instead of establishing ‘child care centres’ which would likely become institutions dominated by male prerogatives. \(^{40}\) If Maori women were to work with Pakeha feminists, Jackson felt that Pakeha women needed to learn from their Maori counterparts: ‘they must be prepared to sit down, to keep their mouth shut, to learn and listen, and not to be the teacher. That’s the only way I can see Maori women and Women’s Liberation actually doing anything together.’ \(^{41}\)

Titewhai Harawira made similar claims in a 1975 interview, stressing that her brand of women’s rights was distinctly Maori, and that she did not ‘feel a part of all the “white women’s demands”’. \(^{42}\) In her estimation, ‘the white woman is more vicious in her organisations than the male club’ because white women ‘have been so repressed’. \(^{43}\) She conceded that Maori women had been repressed too, ‘but always

\(^{37}\) ibid., p.12.  
\(^{38}\) ibid.  
\(^{39}\) ibid.  
\(^{40}\) ibid.  
\(^{41}\) ibid.  
\(^{42}\) Jenny Phillips, ‘Behind the march: a foothold on life’.  
\(^{43}\) ibid.
with respect’, pointing out that on the marae visitors ‘are always welcomed by women’, that ‘all meeting houses have women’s names’, and are ‘regarded as the womb of a woman, where all progressive ideas come from’.44 As can be seen, there was much debate as to the nature of Maori society, as critics and apologists both argued over many of the same key points, in particular women’s roles on marae and attitudes towards contraception and abortion.

While supporting feminists’ causes and organisations Harawira refused to ‘support them if they don’t represent our point of view’.45 She gave the example of the first meeting of the Women’s Electoral Lobby which she typified as ‘so jacked up for the pakeha viewpoint it wasn’t funny’.46 Harawira agreed with Jackson and Te Awekotuku before her that abortion was a ‘White woman’s issue’ and ‘a load of rubbish as far as we are concerned’. ‘We have always, within our lifestyle, enough love to cope with that extra child, or grandchild, or guest’. The inclusiveness of Maori families was, she argued, a cornerstone of Maori resistance to colonialism: ‘if it were not for our large families the pakeha would have an even bigger hold on us’.47 Like Jackson and Te Awekotuku she believed Pakeha feminists needed to widen their vision to encapsulate struggles of class and race: ‘Neither women or Maoris should be fighting for anything that will perpetuate the present system. We should be fighting for real change.’ 48

During this early period between 1970 and 1975, the emphasis was on differentiating between the struggles of Maori activists and feminists, largely on the basis of racism, class, and, in particular, differing cultural attitudes towards family and children. While some Maori women sympathised with the principles of Pakeha feminists, most felt that their identity and oppression as Maori was more significant than their identity and oppression as women, either within Pakeha or Maori society. They argued that the women’s liberation movement was overwhelmingly middle class, out of touch with politics of class as well as race, and that feminists needed to widen their objectives if they wished to bring about meaningful change. Most significantly, they

44 ibid.
45 ibid.
46 ibid.
47 ibid.
48 ibid.
rejected Pakeha attitudes towards abortion and contraception which they typified as ‘Pakeha hang-ups’, favouring instead a Maori approach of whanau support and the whangai system of adopting out children. The place of women in traditional and modern Maori society were further bones of contention, in particular the roles of women on marae, and were tossed backwards and forwards in debate. Maori women distanced themselves from Pakeha feminists, and their politics embodied a mix of both Maori tradition and modern influences.

In 1975 these attitudes began to shift. While in the early period some women spoke out against their marginalised place within the Maori activist movement, discontent grew from 1975 onwards, leading to the second phase in 1977. The catalyst seems to have been the 1975 Land March. In commenting on female leadership of the march in 1975, Titewhai Harawira stated that women had been forced to lead the hikoi because: ‘The men have infiltrated so far into the pakeha system they are now neither use nor damn ornament.’ She criticised the conservatism of male leaders: ‘It is the Maori tradition that the men guide the women. That’s why we have no land today. They go and fight for the Maori Battalion, but when asked if they will fight for our land they say it will lower our dignity.’

In a later interview Harawira returned to the topic of the ongoing friction between women and men over the land march. Male leaders including the Labour MP for Northern Maori, Matiu Rata had attacked activists for organising the march, which he took to be a personal put down and a vote of no confidence in his efforts to introduce land reforms in parliament. Conservative male leaders from a number of tribes refused to support the march because it was being led by a woman, Whina Cooper. Nga Tamatoa, who organised and coordinated the march from its inception, originally approached male leaders to front the march, but all refused. Cooper was the only recognised leader who would accept the mantle of leadership. Harawira also recalled gendered conflicts within Nga Tamatoa, citing difficulties with the male members of the Wellington branch who refused to be ordered around by a woman. In Jackson’s recollection: ‘A lot of men said that no one would follow the land march because it

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49 ibid.
50 ibid.
51 Donna Awatere, ‘Wahine ma korerotia’, p.27.
52 ibid., p.27.
was led by a woman. Whina took a lot of flack from the men. The experiences of 1975 forced her and other activist Maori women to ‘to take a real look into the sexism issue’.

News articles published during the land march indicate that the marchers received little support until they reached Tamaki, as the male leaders of Taitokerau resisted the cause of the march, its female leadership, and its vote of no confidence in MP and Northern son, Matiu Rata (see figure 37 above). Ngati Wai rangatira Waipu Pita publicly refused to sign the Matakite petition, and poured scorn on Whina Cooper and the marchers for undermining the authority of Taitokerau kaumatua and daring to
speak on behalf of Ngati Wai.\textsuperscript{55} Nga Puhi elder Wiremu Peehikuru of Kaikohe made similarly scathing comments about Whina Cooper, claiming she had ‘gone over the heads of her elders’ and that Northern tribes had failed to support the march because “Ngapuhi has never been led by a female”.\textsuperscript{56} Some kaumatua did come out in support however: Ngararatunua elder Hoterene Cherrington was convinced the march was justified, and labelled criticism of Cooper as a case of jealousy that ‘A woman is doing what they who speak against her should have been doing for years past’.\textsuperscript{57}

It appears that the events of the land march in 1975 along with a general mood of discontent amongst female activists saw a shift in attitude, which would eventually transform into the second period of the Black women’s movement which began in earnest in 1977.

1977 was the next major turning point for Maori activism. This was the year that the Orakei Action Committee took the crucial step of occupying Bastion Point, raising the stakes for activists. As the previous chapter showed, 1977 was a high point of interaction with trade unions and left-wing organisations. The next seven years saw conflict and violence escalate and reach an all-time high, with the eviction of the Bastion Point occupiers in 1978, the He Taua incident in 1979, the Springbok tour in 1981, and increasing violence at Waitangi between 1981 and 1984. This was also a crucial time for Nga Tamatoa: in 1977 the tensions and contradictions within the movement reached boiling point, female activists lashed out at their male counterparts, and as Nga Tamatoa dissolved the Black women’s movement was formed.

Several members of Nga Tamatoa have commented on these developments, outlining the principal reasons for the breakdown in relations that occurred around this time. Chief among them were the criticisms levelled at male members of Nga Tamatoa for compromising their politics by taking white women as partners. Donna Awatere

\textsuperscript{55} ‘Waipu Pita: ‘Who dares sign for Ngatiwai?’’, \textit{NA} (September 18, 1975), ms – papers- 2316-14, V. Hutchinson papers, ATL.
\textsuperscript{56} ‘Nga Puhi scorn on woman as leader’, \textit{NA}, np, nd, na, ms – papers- 2316-14, V. Hutchinson papers, ATL.
\textsuperscript{57} ‘Jealousy motivates opponents of march, says Maori elder’, \textit{NA}, nd, ms – papers- 2316-14, V. Hutchinson papers, ATL.
Huata attacked the hypocrisy of members of Nga Tamatoa for taking a gung-ho revolutionary stance on Maori issues while taking white partners. In her words:

they’d die for the cause and this and that, but at the end of the day rejected Maori women as partners… the hypocrisy of on the one hand making these real macho stands on Maori issues, and then rejecting Maori women was something that we found difficult to live with.\(^{58}\)

Awatere Huata claimed that these actions not only compromised the men’s politics and disrespected Maori women but also their Pakeha partners. Rebecca Evans levelled similar accusations. The women of Nga Tamatoa, she felt, got fed up with empty rhetoric from men who professed to be ready to ‘“slit [their] throat/arm/etc for the revolution” and all the time they’re pumping their sperm into white women’.\(^{59}\) Pakeha women ‘were like ornaments at hui’, putting in little work or energy, just ‘looking adoringly at the men macho mouthing about the revolution’.\(^{60}\) Evans felt that Maori men rejected Maori women because they had been conditioned by society to believe that ‘white women are the prize and the Maori women are the booby prize’.\(^{61}\) Hilda Halkyard also commented on the sexual politics of the activist movement: ‘white women used to drool over’ Maori men, while Maori women activists would ‘give the men a hard time because of their sexism and their lack of commitment to the struggle’.\(^{62}\) Halkyard agreed that Maori men had been conditioned to see white women as attractive and as a means of demonstrating status: ‘the black men used to like being around white women... for white power and the white women thing. Even the ugliest white is Marilyn Monroe to some of our men. We used to say, Eh! Those white women are just drooling over ya balls.’\(^{63}\)

Taura Eruera was one of the men on the receiving end of this criticism. According to Eruera during the early years members of Nga Tamatoa shared common beliefs and aspirations, however after five years the focus changed from ‘just fighting injustice to perpetuating the race’.\(^{64}\) Eruera identified two factions in Tamatoa, one comprised of women who preferred that Maori choose Maori partners but accepted that sometimes

\(^{58}\) Paul Diamond (producer), \textit{Nga Tamatoa}.
\(^{59}\) ‘Rebecca Evans Interview’, p.13.
\(^{60}\) ibid.
\(^{61}\) ibid.
\(^{63}\)ibid. Awatere, Evans and Halkyard confronted white women directly at the Piha women’s conference in 1978, attacking white women for ‘fucking blacks’ under the patronising assumption that they could ‘fight racism by fucking the oppressed’ : ‘Rebecca Evans Interview’, p.14.
\(^{64}\)Paul Diamond (producer), \textit{Nga Tamatoa}. 
they might legitimately choose non-Maori partners, and a second, more militant faction ‘who disapproved of Maori men not being with Maori women, or Maori women not being with Maori men’. 65 Eruera had a Pakeha partner at the time. He remembered that ‘there was one year there where we got it in the neck from all over the place, we got it from Maori, and we got it from the gays, and we got it from the women, you know I mean, so I mean at one point there it was all wrong.’ 66 Eruera was not the only activist in this position either; by his estimation as many as one-third of Nga Tamatoa members had Pakeha partners. 67 Evans claimed the proportion was even higher; of 13 ‘male big shots’ in Tamatoa, ‘eleven had white wives or mates. One was celibate. Sid Jackson was the only one married to a Maori woman.’ 68

The other criticism that was levelled at the men of Tamatoa was that they took all the credit while women did all the work. Awatere Huata felt that in addition to dealing with the day-to-day realities of racism women like her also had to deal with Maori men’s tendency to take women for granted:

we were there to be in the kitchen, that we were there to do all the flyers, and do all the organising in the background but when it came to being up front only the men would be up there, and we’d have presidents and spokespeople who only showed up for the day really, when all the work from behind was being done by women. 69

As a result Awatere Huata increased her public opposition to ‘these attitudes, and to the way that people in the movement treated Maori women and Pakeha women’. 70 According to Evans by 1982 it seemed ‘like old news to say that in Nga Tamatoa the women did all the shit while the men did all the star turns’. 71 Women, she felt, were just there to ‘bolster up a man’s movement’, doing all the work while the men took the credit:

The women have the organisational skills, like how to get a hui together, get the money, the food, set the marae up, do the cooking, cleaning, organise the speakers, the timing. Get together the writings, typing, running pamphlets off, getting them out. The women did it all. 72

65 ibid.
66 ibid.
67 ibid.
68 ‘Rebecca Evans Interview’, p.13.
69 Paul Diamond (producer), Nga Tamatoa.
70 ibid.
71 ‘Rebecca Evans Interview’, p.13.
72 ibid., pp.12-3.
There was a positive side to all this activity by women. Women gained important skills and honed their networks. As Hana Jackson pointed out: ‘All throughout our men were pretty lax, and other than one or two men, the strength, the support and encouragement I received, all came from women’; for her ‘The women were more than the strength of Tamatoa, we were Tamatoa’.\(^{73}\) The women within the movement began meeting to discuss these issues. They were sick of being rejected for white women, and were sick of men taking credit for their efforts. Matters came to a head at a national Nga Tamatoa hui in Wellington (probably in 1977). There was a showdown between the men and women within the group. As Evans described it:

> the brothers were frothing, ready to get stuck into us. But we held our ground. Our kaupapa was right. As much as the men ranted and raved, the contradiction between their stated goals for the Maori people and their actual physical, emotional, psychological and sexual alliance with the white Nation become unavoidable for them.\(^{74}\)

All this led Maori women to conclude that Maori men had compromised themselves through their alliances with white men and women and white status, and that women needed to take over the reins of the activist movement. As Hana Jackson has pointed out: ‘Maori women have taken over leading our people, not from choice, but from need’.\(^{75}\) Evans argued that Maori men needed to face up to the contradictions ‘between their stated goals for the Maori people and their actual physical, emotional, psychological and sexual alliance with the White Nation’, and that ultimately Maori women had ‘to take the leadership of the Maori world because the men have been to close to the white world to give us the kind of leadership we need’.\(^{76}\) Awatere Huata and Evans argued that white colonial rule and white male domination were in part propped up by the relationship between Maori men and white women, and Maori men and white men.\(^{77}\) In Ngahuia Te Awekotuku’s analysis: ‘Male and male oriented leaders of the Maori movement are in no way getting to the flax roots of the conflict – the patriarchal, male directed, and manifest imposition of racism, sexism and classism’.\(^{78}\) Hawaiian activists, in the only other movement predominantly led by indigenous women, have made similar observations: activist and academic Haunana-Kay Trask explains the implication of Maori men in colonisation and Pakeha

\(^{73}\) Donna Awatere, ‘Wahine ma korerotia’, p.25.
\(^{74}\) ‘Rebecca Evans Interview’, p.13.
\(^{75}\) Brown, ed., *Mana Wahine*, p. 54.
\(^{76}\) ‘Rebecca Evans Interview’, p.13.
\(^{77}\) ibid., p.14.
\(^{78}\) Ngahuia Te Awekotuku, *Mana Wahine Maori*, p.61.
domination by arguing that ‘men are rewarded, including Native men, for collaboration. Women’s roles, if they are to be collaborators, is not to wield political power but to serve as an adjunct to men who do’.79 Trask argues this is why the Hawaiian movement was lead predominantly by women, and helps to illuminate the local situation. From their perspective then, Maori women argued that Maori men were too implicated within the structures of white power, domination and status to challenge it, and thus Maori women had to take the initiative and lead their people.

While their testimonies afford us valuable insights into the inner workings of Maori activism, accepting them at face value presents problems. Were the men in the movement so useless that they were ultimately expendable? If leadership was typically the domain of senior males within Maori society, why was it that during this period so few men – whether conservatives from outside the movement or radicals from within it -- provided the leadership their people needed? And were Maori women really marginalised within the movement? These harsh readings of Maori activism and their male counterparts were undoubtedly based in some truth, but they were also products of circumstances and need to be contextualised. Personal politics played a role here: Donna Awatere Huata has explained that personal circumstances came into play during the period, impacting on her politics in the late ‘70s and early ‘80s. She had court cases to deal with over trumped up charges related to her involvement in the 1981 Springbok tour, while at the same time she was dealing with painful injuries sustained from the tour. Her friends had left activism for jobs and families, while those who stayed on were condemned by the media, public and government, her father had died in prison for murdering her mothers lover, and she was working on far too many fronts: ‘psych services....health, language, justice, parenting’, in her own words she was ‘spread very thinly’.80 Awatere Huata's clarification of her own personal circumstances are not given as an excuse for her politics, but rather as an explanation for her rather uncompromising stance during the period. The politics of other women in the movement also seemed based, at least in part, on personal circumstances: Rebecca Evans recalled in an interview that many of the women had experienced being dumped for a white women, Hilda Halkyard recalled the anger she felt at being dumped at the age of 15 for a ‘blond-haired, blue-
eyed girl’, and anecdotal evidence suggests that Awatere Huata was dumped by her activist partner for a white woman.\textsuperscript{81} Part of their reaction was about personal experience, not just politics.

These events paralleled events overseas too: accusations that Black men were betraying Black women by sleeping with white women contributed to the demise of the Student Non-violent Coordinating Committee (SNCC) in the US. As seen in the previous chapter, the Black women’s movement in New Zealand borrowed some of its politics and rhetoric from African American activists in the states. The break down of the Black Power movement and the subsequent rise of the Black feminist or womanist movement overseas must then have a played a part in influencing events back home. To add to this, around the world women came to the fore in a number of radical movements because they had built up a skills base essential to organising and mobilising large scale protest action from work within families, communities, and community organisations such as churches and local women’s groups. Often they were invisible to the media which preferred to profile a Martin Luther King, Stokely Carmichael, or Sid Jackson, but they were there, and the fact that they came to the fore around the same time Maori women did in New Zealand was no coincidence.

Most importantly, what needs to be recognised is that Maori women were attempting to destabilise and detoxify the imbalanced power relations which had developed between Maori men and women. This was not the time for rational discussion; this approach had been tried and failed. We see parallels with Maori attitudes towards Pakeha here; Maori reactions to Pakeha and Maori women’s reactions to Maori men help to explain one another. As we saw in the first chapter, Maori activists developed a critique of Pakeha society which stereotyped and exaggerated Pakeha as materialistic and individualistic to a fault, while Maori were typified as spiritually aware and concerned for the people and the environment rather than just personal wealth and status. Their critiques were not balanced, objective, emotionless pleas to reason, they were highly emotive, highly personal, and were typified by anger and at times blatant racism and hatred. But this was precisely the point of their criticisms: they were enacted to correct an imbalance in Maori / Pakeha relations which said that

\textsuperscript{81} ‘Rebecca Evans Interview’, p.13, Donna Awatere, ‘Wahine ma korerotia’, p.29.
Maori were inferior, Pakeha were superior, and Maori needed to become Pakeha if they wished to survive in the modern world. This basic idea was ingrained in Maori and Pakeha, and had to be reversed as the starting point for meaningful change: New Zealanders had to recognize their actually was a problem and something needed to be done. The critiques Maori women levelled at their men share similarities. We should not explain them away as entirely ‘personal’ or ‘a result of circumstance’; they held some truth and weight. But they were also part of a process of returning balance to an unbalanced power relationship between Maori men and women. Many Maori had not recognized this contradiction, and the reactions of Maori women brought these issues to the forefront and forced Maori to address the sexism inherent in Maori society. A similar case can be made for their criticisms of Pakeha feminists: these were also likely the product of a balance of personal experience, circumstance, local and overseas trends, and could be vindictive and harsh at times, but they were also about renegotiating the unbalanced relationship between Maori women and Pakeha women, and holding Pakeha feminists to accountability for their implication in colonisation, a necessary first step in building a working relationship with Pakeha feminists.

Figure 38: A poster advertising the first Maori women’s hui in ‘post-pakeha herstory’.
Other events at the time compacted upon these issues, leading to the establishment of a Black women’s movement; the Young Maori Leaders Conference of 1977 was the first at which Maori women began seriously addressing the issues of gender discrimination within Maori society and within the activist movement. Mira Szazy addressed the conference with a controversial speech on the issue of female roles in Maori society. Against the wishes of the organiser, female activists in attendance formed a women’s only workshop group and passed three resolutions, arguing that women should have speaking rights on marae, and that a hui exclusively for Maori women should be organised. Subsequently the first Huihuinga Wahine Maori Anake ‘ever to be held in post-pakeha herstory’ was organised in Freeman’s bay (see figure 38 above). Around 20 to 30 Maori women attended the hui; Maori men and all Pakeha were banned.

Figure 39: A hand painted poster combines the icons of Maori and Pacific Island cultures and second wave feminism.

Ngahuia Te Awekotuku, *Mana Wahine Maori*, p.54.
In 1978, Evans, Awatere Huata and Te Awekotuku all attended the Piha Women’s Conference, presenting papers on the positions of Maori women and attacking Pakeha feminists, and in 1979 they confronted white racism again at the United Women’s Convention. Bastion Point and activities surrounding the overstayers issue also brought Maori women together and strengthened their position, as did the tour of Evans, Awatere Huata and Josie Keelan to communist countries in 1978. In 1980 the women’s movement ‘finally pulled it together’ and organised the first Black Women’s Forum (see figure 39 above). These forums are a wealth of politics and analysis, but fall outside the period and are too substantial to include here.

From these events a strong women’s movement emerged, and as Nga Tamatoa quietly disbanded, Awatere Huata, Evans and Halkyard began ‘a new Tamatoa’ which would become the Black women’s movement. As can be seen their critique developed considerably during these years, as their attention switched from focusing primarily on distinguishing their politics from those of Pakeha feminists and defending Maori culture, to openly critiquing Maori culture and society and male activists within the movement. Their critique borrowed from the discourse of African American feminists; in interviews from the era they used the terms ‘blacks’, ‘black men’ and ‘black women / womin’ to describe Maori men and women, organised ‘black women’s hui’, and described their movement as the ‘black women’s movement’ and ‘black feminism’, though they seemingly rejected the term ‘womanist’ coined by African American women to describe their movement. In terms of analysis, the Black women’s movement borrowed liberally from their Stateside counterparts. In particular they were influenced by the concept of intersectionality, that the rights of Black women were marginalised by Black men within the Black civil rights and Black Power movement, while also being marginalised by white women within the feminist movement. Thus Black women disappeared at the intersection of gender and race. Maori women also borrowed their critique that white feminists were irredeemably middle-class in outlook and aspirations, and that Black women needed to deal with the issues of gender, race, and class as a triumvirate of forces which acted together to create oppression within society. Maori women applied these basic

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83 ‘Rebecca Evans Interview’, p.15.
principles while adopting them to their own circumstances in New Zealand. In particular, they argued that while race, class and gender acted together to create oppression, white racism underlined all three. In particular, Awatere Huata argued that white racism underpinned the feminist movement, white liberalism and left wing and trade union organisations in New Zealand, and that therefore Maori would have to go it alone and seek Maori sovereignty and separatism rather than uniting with other activists groups to reform Pakeha society. While they borrowed the discourse and some of their analysis from overseas, as can be seen they mixed it with their own experiences and traditions, creating a movement that brought together traditional influences from within their culture and global examples and influences which informed their struggles.

Awatere Huata’s critique of Pakeha feminists in *Maori Sovereignty* was the most succinct analysis of the period, and gives a good idea of the positions of Maori female activists during the Black women’s movement of the late ‘70s and early ‘80s. Awatere Huata argued that in seeking an alliance with Maori women, Pakeha women were using them to ‘vent their anti-Maori xenophobia on Maori men’ whom they typified as ‘rapists’ and ‘gang members’ and ‘sought to set Maori women against Maori men’.85 Awatere Huata challenged Pakeha women to acknowledge their racism and role in colonisation stating that ‘the first loyalty of white women is always to the white culture and the white way’ and that as oppressors they were avoiding ‘confronting the role they play in oppressing others’.86 Within the women’s movement they marginalized Maori women by defining feminism and using ‘white power, status and privilege to ensure that their definition of “feminism” supersedes that of Maori women’.87 Issues of class were also raised. In Awatere Huata’s estimation: ‘The oppression of women does not exist in a vacuum: economic and racial privileges cannot be separated from sexual power.’88 She labelled white feminism as overwhelmingly individualistic, steeped in the politics of compromise, and the ‘province of the bourgeois and the petty bourgeois’ whose efforts reflected their ‘class and race privileges’.89 Awatere Huata believed Pakeha women focused too

86 ibid.
87 ibid.
88 ibid.
89 ibid., pp.43-5.
much on sexual oppression, and that what was required was a ‘political, economic, social and philosophical upheaval’ to eliminate ‘all forms of inequity based on race, sex and class’. Thus her analysis shared obvious similarities with those of Black feminists in the US, but was also likely based in her own experiences within the Pakeha feminist movement for over a decade.

Criticism of Pakeha feminists increased during this period. Evans and Atawater-Huata fired a broadside at Pakeha feminists at the 1978 Piha conference, making the point that the alliance between white men and women propped up white male domination and white colonial rule. As mentioned earlier they also criticized white women for thinking they could fight racism by sleeping with Maori men, arguing that ‘the oppression of our culture is more important than sex or romance’. Their papers provoked an immediate response. As Evans recalled: ‘While Donna was talking to the paper at the conference one white woman was yelling and crying at the top of her voice. “It’s not racism Donna, its sexism”. After the session the women were comforting her [the white woman] while she had hysterics.’ The conference demonstrated for Evans the individualistic attitudes of Pakeha feminists. She judged their attempts to break their individualist mindset down through group work and consensus decision-making ‘superficial attempts to overlook their conditioning’. Ngahuia Te Awekotuku also spoke at the 1978 Piha conference. While her paper focused primarily on Maori women and lesbian separatist politics, she too argued that white privilege ‘operates regardless of gender’ and that consequently all Pakeha were racist, including Pakeha women. At the 1979 United Women’s conference Evans spoke again on ‘the colonial oppression of Maori’, but was given little time or sympathy to argue her case by the organisers.

While her analysis was less developed than Atawater-Huata’s, Evans argued that Pakeha women were too focused on sexism, ignored their own racism, and avoided confronting class politics and capitalism because they were overwhelmingly and irredeemably middle class. Evans summarised her views: ‘white women are too

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90 ibid., p.44.
92 ibid.
93 ibid.
94 ibid., p.15.
soft…. I haven’t met one yet who wasn’t so steeped in racism and jellimeat brain luxury that she could see this country and its past from a Maori point of view.’95 By the 1980s Evans seemed to give up on working with Pakeha feminists, finding the constant need to educate and explain tedious and unproductive: ‘I’m actually sick of talking to whites. I don’t want to do that any more. My energies are directed to Maori women. Explain, explain, explain. And still white women get it wrong.’96 Sharon Hawke shared her exasperation. As she explained in 1982: ‘I’m wary of white women in [the] black struggle, I make it my job not to get too close to them. I respect the role that they play, but it’s up to them and their peer group to deal with their hassles.’97

The issues of racism, colonisation, class and white status which divided Pakeha and Maori feminists after 1977 -- and the inability of either to resolve these issues -- existed in the earlier 1970s. What changed was that the analyses of Maori activists had developed, solidified and hardened over time, and more female activists had become aware of them, and were better able and more willing to express them. Thus while their critique of Pakeha society and Pakeha feminists had not dramatically changed it had significantly increased in intensity and its constituency had significantly widened.

While much of the analysis developed by Maori women was overwhelmingly negative, confronting male activists in particular and Maori society in general with their sexism, and challenging Pakeha feminists for not owning up to their own racism and for failing to address class politics and capitalism, there was also a positive side. Their analysis was partly about challenging and changing the attitudes of Maori men and Pakeha women towards them, but it was also about changing their own attitudes towards themselves, and recognizing their worth, value and beauty as Maori women. Awatere Huata openly celebrated creating ‘the strongest indigenous women’s movement in the world’.98 Evans looked inwards, consciously or unconsciously echoing the international slogan that Black was beautiful:

In 1977 and 1978 it felt good to be a black woman and no one around me considered the white face the beauty. The black face and big thighs got to be

95 ibid., p.14.
96 ibid., p.16.
good. The black women’s version of beauty got accepted for itself and not for being close to white. We all know that now, but it had gotten really strong by 1977.99

There was some progress. Some activists, Pakeha and Maori, male and female, did seem to be listening. While Maori women delivered some of the harshest critiques of Pakeha feminists, critiques which at times were little better than petty insults, it was Pakeha feminists who provided Maori women many of the forums they needed to create their own movement. Broadsheet in particular published a range of interviews and articles about the Maori women’s movement, as well as the crucial text Maori Sovereignty. The New Women’s Press and the many public women’s forums such as the 1978 Piha Women’s Conference and the United Women’s Conference of 1979 provided similar support. Although many Pakeha found the conversation uncomfortable, they kept lines of communication and support open, and must be credited with making a significant contribution to the establishment of the Black women’s movement.

Figure 40: An account of the first Hui tane held at Te Tatai Hono Marae, Epsom in 1983.

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It seems that at least some Maori male activists were listening too. In 1982 Hilda Halkyard noted the establishment of two ‘anti-sexism Maori men’s groups’, Tama Tu and the Whakahou men’s group, which she claimed ‘have given me back my faith in our men’. An activist’s newsletter from the early 1980s featured contributions from Te Kawariki members Hone Harawira (Halkyard’s husband) and Mangu Awarau and informed readers that the first Hui Tane had been held at Te Tatai Hono Marae in Epsom on the 19 February 1983 (see figure 40 above). It was attended by ‘trade union officials, Kokiri workers, members of various political organisations, detached youth workers, teachers, work trusts, gay brothers/straight brothers, and workers’, and discussed issues including ‘te reo, Maori land take, Waitangi, Sexism, Worker education’ and the need to ‘build a movement that would cater to the needs of Maori men’.

By the late 1970s and early 1980s Maori women led the activist movement through what would be some of its most dramatic and violent moments. They provided the movement with its leadership, its organisation, its intellectual prowess and, when words turned to action, its muscle. While this ‘new wave’ of activism is outside the

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100ibid., p.31.
scope of this thesis, a brief look into this period is suggestive. Maori women led the treaty protests and hikoi to Waitangi, played important roles in Maranga mai and in the formation of Mana Motuhake and the Waitangi Action Committee. Women provided not only the brains but also the brawn: Maori women physically rebuked Pakeha engineers as members of He Taua, and led Patu squad in 1981. The famous photo of Whina Cooper, Eva Rickard and Titewhai Harawira at the 1984 Hikoi to Wellington (see figure 41 above), the photos of Donna Awatere Huata leading activists during the Springbok tour in *Batons and Barbed Wire* (see figure 42 below), and the footage of Rebecca Evans and Hilda Halkyard fighting with words and actions in the documentary *Patu!*, capture the mood of this era and the staunch, uncompromising women who would come to symbolise it. Awatere Huata’s ground-breaking *Maori Sovereignty* and the published works of Evans, Halkyard and Te Awekotuku quoted extensively in this chapter document the analyses that have come to typify the politics of this era.

To conclude, between 1970 and 1984 we see the development of a distinctly Maori women’s rights movement. Prior to 1977, Maori women focused their attention on differentiating their goals and politics from those of Pakeha feminists. However from 1975 onwards, partly as a result of the Land March which brought to the surface a
number of negative attitudes towards Maori women, they began to seriously critique Maori society. Their criticism of Pakeha feminists also intensified. Focussing on issues of race and class, they criticised Pakeha women for denying their involvement in colonisation, racism and white domination of Maori, while on the class front they mounted criticisms of Pakeha feminists as overwhelmingly middle class and individualistic, and for not confronting the inequalities inherent in a capitalist system. They criticised Maori men within the movement for rejecting Maori women by taking white partners, and for marginalizing women by taking credit for their hard work and effort. They criticised men inside and outside the movement for allying with white men and women and for trying to acquire the privileges of white status. The key issues here then of racism, colonisation, white power and status, and class did not differ greatly between the first and second periods. The change seems to have been in the way the critiques were expressed. The critiques and positions of Maori women developed, solidified and hardened over time, and more and more Maori women emerged as vocal exponents of this body of political thought.

A number of the themes of earlier chapters come into focus here. The late sixties and early seventies were clearly a transitional period in which Maori activists often focused on differentiating themselves and their politics from that of Pakeha. The emergence of new indigenous traditions which blended traditional and local experience with modern and global influences was a feature of the period. Once again we see here that while Maori activists often sympathised with the politics of other movements, in this case the feminist movement, they often rejected these movements as ‘Pakeha issues’ and outside their immediate objectives. Furthermore their politics developed significantly over the period, they were not a complete body of political thought and ideology but developed as activists matured, and were informed by local and global circumstances and experiences as they unfolded. The politics of the Black women’s movement were a critique of Pakeha and Maori society, but the women who espoused them were also engaged in acts of personal redefinition, affirming and revaluing themselves as Maori women. The evidence would suggest that at least some Pakeha women and Maori men were listening and taking on their criticisms, and their efforts have gone on to shape Maori and Pakeha identities.
To return to the question posed at the beginning of this chapter, why did Maori women play such a defining role in leading Maori activism during the 1970s and 1980s, when this was apparently such a rare occurrence in other circumstances? Their own words give us strong answers: the mana wahine whakapapa activists constructed was proof that Maori women had always been leaders in their communities. Women’s leadership was not a new thing, it was a continuation of mana wahine from times past to time present. Second, women were essential in this particular line of work; a number of activists complained that they were the key organisers, they organised the hui, hired the marae, printed the leaflets and so on. As a practical task activism requires the mobilisation of large amounts of resources, the organisation of large scale meetings, and the mobilization of large numbers of people, with a minimum of time and resources available. Maori women had the organisational skills to handle what were likely logistical nightmares; their work behind the scenes within the community meant they were well placed to organise activism. Thirdly and perhaps most significantly, Maori women had to lead their people; as they argued, Maori men had become implicated within the structures of white power and domination and were thus unable or unwilling to challenge the status quo and lead their people. Thus Maori women had to take leadership of their people in this time of need, in the same way that Wairaka, Hinemoa, Hineamaru and Te Puea Herangi had done before them.

While a conclusive and definite description of the role of women in traditional and modern Maori society and culture, and the apparent rise of female leadership in the 20th century can not be provided here, the arguments of these activists highlight an important aspect of modern Maori history which has had a major impact on our culture and society. Their analyses help explain at least the politics and events of the time, and help illuminate and explain the roles of Maori women over a much longer period of time, not to mention the efforts of other indigenous women and movements.
Conclusion

‘Ka Whawahai Tonu Matou’:
The ongoing struggle

My longing is for this country to return to Maori hands. For white occupation to end. This longing is my life. It’s safe, deep down inside of me. I’m not the only one. Every Maori has it, that taha Maori, the spirit of a people yearning to be free.’

Ripeka Evans, Broadsheet, 1982.

I will never never give up. When my Maori thunder begins to roll, everything else is nothing.’

Hilda Halkyard, Broadsheet, 1982.

Figure 43: Ordinary people doing extraordinary things, again: the 2004 Seabed and Foreshore Hikoi crossing the Auckland harbour bridge.

The late 1960s and ‘70s were not the first time Maori rose up in resistance to oppression and discrimination, nor was it the last. Though some of the issues changed and time marched on, the spirit of the era lingered just under the surface of Maori sentiment. Maori activism lived on well into the 1980s. It reignited at Waitangi for the sesquicentennial commemorations of the treaty in 1990, and again in 1995 at Pakaitore in Whanganui and in response to the ‘fiscal envelope’. The 2002 occupations of Ngawha in the north and Te Kuri a Paoa (Young Nick’s Head) on the

1 ‘Rebecca Evans interview’, p.17.
2 Donna Awatere, ‘Wahine Ma Korerotia’, p.31.
East Coast, the dramatic 2004 Hikoi to Parliament to protest the confiscation of the seabed and foreshore, and the rise of the Maori Party kept Maori activism at the forefront of the national political agenda. Before 2007 was more than a few weeks old Maori activist group Ata Tino Toa had launched a campaign to have the Tino Rangatiratanga flag flown from the Auckland Harbour Bridge on Waitangi Day. Maori activism was not restricted to the ‘60s and ‘70s, it was not just a ‘one off’, a ‘sign of the times’, a never-to-be-repeated ‘product of circumstances’; it reached back into cultural and political traditions as old, and older, than the British colonial presence in New Zealand, and forward into the national and international politics of the 21st century.

To sum up let us revisit the themes and outcomes which arise from this study and identify the patterns which came to typify Maori activism during the period. How does placing the words and actions of activist at the centre of their history add to our understanding of the movement? How do the insights gained from the re-conceptualisation of history as a marae help us assess the impact of the activists’ endeavours on society, government and themselves? What issues did they fail to address and what did they bequeath to their successors?

First of all let us return to the methodology employed, and the insights it offers into these histories. This thesis has attempted to appropriate the protocols and values of the marae as a means of re-imagining history and the role of the historian. Within this model, the historical actors play the leading roles as kai karanga, kai karakia, kai korero and kai waiata, calling forth, speaking to and singing into existence their vision of the world and their place in it. In contrast, the role of historian has been assigned to that of ringawera, the men and women behind the scene who facilitate the hui and provide the marae as a forum for debate and discussion. On the marae the position of the ringawera is just as important as any other role, a truism encapsulated in the whakatauki ‘ka tika kei mua, ka tika kei muri’: a hui is only as good as its workers. To embrace these values, the emphasis has primarily been placed on the words and actions of the activists themselves. With the sources, interviews, direct quotes and accounts written or spoken by the activists have been favoured over the accounts given by journalists and academics, and the commentary of politicians and Maori leaders. With regards to the role of historian within this model, criticism and analysis
do feature, however these remain for the most faithful to the vision of the activists, while avoiding the historians’ tendency to overshadow the subjects of their histories. The constant need to provide historical context and historiographic points of reference displayed by historians has been minimized, while the activists understanding of their own place in society and history has been maximised. The result it far from complete, nor is it an ideal answer to the perplexing question of how to write Maori histories. At best it represents one of many attempts to resolve these issues and hopefully will contribute to the ever growing body of kaupapa Maori scholarship.

In practical terms, a close-grained approach has been employed here which argues the need to take activists seriously and regard activism as important in its own right irrespective of impact or outcome. The rewards of this approach are that it provides a far greater understanding of the internal world of the movement, and the people and culture at its centre. To quantify the results of employing such an approach, let us review some of the key issues of the period and what they tell us about what these histories meant to Maori.

With the treaty, activists were concerned with revealing the very real and very painful memories Maori held of the treaty and the aftermath of its signing. Out of politeness to Pakeha, these sentiments had lain hidden within Maori communities and buried in whaikorero and waiata on Waitangi day, incomprehensible and unseen to their Pakeha treaty ‘partners’. Activists argued that Waitangi day and the treaty signings were not something to celebrate; the birth of ‘one people’ was the death of rangatiratanga and mana Maori motuhake. If Pakeha were searching for a foundation on which to build national identity and pride they would have to look elsewhere, Waitangi was not the place they would find it: ‘Only Pakehas have anything to celebrate as the result of the Treaty. So let them celebrate – alone!’ As Taura Eruera would later point out: ‘It was a day of grievance, a day of grievance and a day of grief, and that was, and in a lot of ways we were just going up there to tangi over a tupapaku called the treaty’. In this respect treaty activism could be likened to a hahunga, as activists exhumed the bones of the treaty for public mourning, and surprisingly found life still clung to them.

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3 Nga Tamatoa, Boycott Waitangi Day Celebrations.
4 Paul Diamond (producer), Nga Tamatoa.
Instead Waitangi would become the birthplace of a new, Maori movement for cultural pride and self determination.

With the land movement, activists expressed and celebrated their deep and ancient connection with the land. The relationship they invoked was that of a child to its mother: the land was not a commercial commodity; it was Papatuanuku, the earth mother, te ukaipo, the nurturing breast, ‘te wai u mo nga uri whakatipu’, the breast milk giving life to her descendants. Through the land movement Maori expressed and reaffirmed their connection to the land, while mocking the superficial, commercial attachment they felt typified Pakeha attitudes to land. As Joe Hawke described:

Maori land use is peculiar because it’s opposite to present land use in the western world. A lot of people, Maori people, who have feeling for the land, when they stand on the land they feel mana coming through their body – especially in regard to ancestral land.

Poet Hone Tuwhare explains best in poetry and metaphor what activists struggled to put into words:

We are stroking, caressing the spine
of the land.

We are massaging the ricked
back of the land.

With our sore but ever-loving feet.
Hell, she loves it!

Squirming, the land wriggles in delight.

We love her.

The language movement was equally an exploration and repudiation of Maoritanga, and a vote of no confidence in the project of assimilation. In the impassioned words of Hirini Melbourne:

To the Pakeha it says we are sick of your mispronouncing our language. We hate your mono-cultural system. We want our rights to be ourselves and not to

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5 Tihei Mauriora!!, Land March flyer, ms-papers-4285-01, ATL.
6 Spleen 8, June 1977, np.
7 ‘Hone Tuwhare’, excerpt from Spleen Number Two, ms-papers- 4285-01, ATL.
be changed and adapted to become brown-faced Pakeha. Pakeha, I want to
educate you for a change.

To the Maori it is saying—speak Maori to your children so that your children
can speak Maori to their children.\(^8\)

The Black women’s movement was an exploration of what it meant to be a Maori
woman, and the whakapapa of mana wahine which legitimated the positions of
modern activists. Being a Maori woman was something to be celebrated, as Ripeka
Evans expressed:

[I]t felt good to be a black woman and no one around me considered the white
face the beauty. The black face and big thighs got to be good. The black
women’s version of beauty got accepted for itself and not for being close to
white.\(^9\)

If Maori activism was a way of expressing a Maori world view, it also expressed a
Maori view of the world: South Africans were ‘our brothers and sisters in Azania’\(^10\),
Vietnamese were fellow indigenous people, and Vietnam was a ‘pakeha race war’.\(^11\)
Socialist principles and workers rights were not imported ideologies, but ‘the same
principles by which my ancestors lived and thrived.’\(^12\)

This approach also tells us something about te Ao Maori and our notions of Maori
society during the period. The standard line of ‘Te Ao Hau’, the modern world and
the realities of Maori urbanisation and cultural alienation holds true in some, but not
all cases. Some Maori did feel ‘alienated’, but this in turn forced many to return to
their roots. The period can be typified as seeing a decline in Maori language and
culture, but we can not forget that it also saw the beginning of the so called cultural
‘renaissance’. The assimilation policies of the ‘60s undoubtedly had an effect, but this
research would suggest that Maori culture must have been particularly resilient, as
activists did not have to look far to find and reconnect with the wellsprings of their
Maoritanga. The gradual trend away from unskilled labour towards education had
already begun here as well, and had a fairly immediate effect, as young educated
Maori quickly assumed leadership roles in society. The activist women force us to
question the gender politics at play in society as well. If Maori women were so

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8 Sydney Melbourne, ‘Pakeha – I want to educate you for a change’, p.11.
10 ‘Rebecca Evans interview’, p.16.
11 MOOHR interviews two members of Nga Tamatoa Tuatoru’, p.6.
12 ibid.
marginalised within society, why did they immediately assume key leadership roles within the movement? The example of the League demonstrates this was part of a longer trend of female political involvement and leadership, but we can still not answer for sure whether mana wahine was change or continuity. With regards to generational difference, the media stressed the disconnections between Maori youth and their elders; however kaumatua provided crucial support to activists: more likely there seems a divide between urban Maori and rural Maori, as Nga Tamatoa members cite that their own people were often their hardest critics. Understanding Maori activism gives us a clearer picture of what was going on in Maori society during the time, both conforming to and challenging the way the period has been portrayed.

To put this into perspective, a close-grained cultural approach to these histories reaps a rich body of insights into the ideologies and motivations of Maori activism, demonstrating that, from within the movement, activism embodied a powerful expression, reaffirmation and celebration of Maori culture, values and life ways, and what it meant to be Maori in the modern world. If taking a race relations approach to history which places Pakeha at the centre tell us more about Pakeha communities, then making Maori the centre of their own histories affords us valuable insights into Maori communities. Having said that, this thesis has not ignored the wider picture and the impact of Maori activism on government, society, Pakeha culture and identity. The approach employed here helps enlighten our understanding or race relations history too, by bolstering the position of te Ao Maori within historical narratives, while simultaneously looking to their position in New Zealand and the world. We could end here: defining what activism meant to Maori is an important project in its own right, and adds to our understanding of these histories. Such an approach has been employed in recent American texts. Several modern authors researching the Black, Red and Brown Power movements have turned away from the usual approach of quantifying the achievements of activists via their impact on society. Instead they have looked to the internal logic and meanings of these historical phenomenon, and the visions and aspirations of activist and what they wanted to achieve, rather than simply what they did achieve.13 Such an approach is valid and worthwhile, but has not

13 See for example William L. Van Deburg, New Day in Babylon: The Black Power Movement and American Culture, 1965 – 1975, Chicago, 1992, a revisionist text on the Black Power movement which shifts its emphasis away from the actual gains of the movement, instead choosing to define the culture,
been the sole focus of this project. Maori activism was a part of race relations history: activists sought to impact upon society and effect change, and consciously engaged with and sought to re-write Maori and Pakeha attitudes to race relations. Thus while focusing on what activism meant to Maori, we must also look to their impact and influence of society. To continue, let as look at some of the themes that arise from these histories, and what they tell us about Maori activism and its impact on society.

It is clear that much is to be gained from paying close attention to the fine details and nuances of Maori activism and the distinctions between issues. Maori activism was not a finite list of political philosophies and strategies; it did not spring fully formed from the minds of activists onto the front pages of the *Herald* and the *Dominion*. Rather it developed significantly through the period as events unfolded and activists gained in confidence and experience. There were also important differences of opinion between individuals and organisations. We can not and should not seek to establish a generality to describe activist politics, nor should we subscribe to any single view or reading as encapsulating or representing the politics of the era. For example, treaty politics did not dominate the period covered here; they largely disappeared between 1972 and 1977 and had to be revisited by the second wave of Maori activism starting in 1978. Land issues and treaty issues were disconnected, and had to be reconnected later in the period. With class politics, despite the early efforts of left-wing groups to recruit Maori, Maori activists did not seem to develop a strong understanding of class politics or strong links with the left until the late ‘70s. Similarly, gender politics were present from the very beginning, but only came to the fore of activist concerns from 1975 onwards. Furthermore, while activists were accused of mimicking overseas movements from as early as the late ‘60s, the strongest examples of mimesis actually occurred from 1977 onwards, when the Black women’s movement came closest to mimicking the dress, rhetoric and politics of African American feminists. The politics, rhetoric, and aesthetics of Maori activism evolved considerably during the period, as activists learnt from the events as they unfolded, taking on new ideas and strategies to aid them in their goals.

Methods changed. Activists drew on an evolving repertoire of strategies to achieve their goals: demonstrations, occupations, picket lines, pamphleting, conferencing and petitions were all employed at various times. The land movement developed from the radical literature and words of Te Hokioi and MOOHR to the creation of Matakite and the dramatic Maori land march. Raglan and Bastion Point put the lessons of the march into practice, leading to the second phase of the land movement. In turn these two movements inspired and informed other iwi: Ngati Hine and Te Hapua learnt the lessons of direct action, coalition building and raising media attention. Finally the four groups combined, returning to Waitangi in 1978 and reuniting land rights with treaty rights.

The language movement provides another example of the range of tactics and the evolving nature of activist politics. It began with Nga Tamatoa, Te Reo Maori and Hana Jackson’s petition. The delivery of the petition was used as a platform to launch Maori language day, and this later extended to a week and finally a month. The focus of Maori language week changed in the early years from raising awareness of the language to including in later years a plethora of different activities which allowed people to take part in the culture and demonstrated the benefits of the language. Furthermore, the movement progressively extended its activities and goals: it began pushing for Maori language in schools, and then moved on to campaigning for Maori language on television and radio. Part of the genius of Maori activists was their willingness to learn from their successes and their mistakes, and the ability to react and adapt their methods and strategies to suit changing circumstances.

While we should be wary of simplifying activist methods and strategies down to a finite list, three broad parameters of modern activism can be identified which typify their strategies and contributed to the successes of the era. Direct action was perhaps the single greatest tool employed by activists. It was effective because it dramatised Maori grievances in a way that the poignant pleas of conservatives could not. At its most effective it could force the governments’ hand, compelling it to react and react publicly. Direct action was a feature of every aspect of the movement. Treaty activists led protest rallies at Waitangi and a ‘sit-in’ at parliament. The land movement marched on parliament, occupied land and demonstrated at Waitangi. The language
movement delivered two petitions to government, and raised public awareness and enthusiasm through the activities surrounding Maori language week. Anti-war activists took part in large-scale demonstrations. Anti-apartheid activists organised public rallies, and violently confronted the police to push home their point. With regard to the justice system, activists went straight to the holding cells to aid offenders and patrolled the streets to stop police brutality. The Black women’s movement proved their validity by leading many of the protest events of the late ‘70s and ‘80s, and provided the movement with both its brains and its brawn. Direct action worked because instead of waiting for change to happen activists went out and made it happen. If government reacted positively activists celebrated a victory and moved onto the next goal, if it reacted negatively they entrenched their positions, regrouped, and deployed even more direct and forceful means of achieving their goals. Unlike the quiet negotiations behind closed doors which typified conservative strategies, direct action brought Maori issues out into the open, raising public awareness, consciousness and support far more effectively.

Direct action was linked to a second important tool of Maori activism: a flair for the dramatic was essential to the success of modern activism. The theatrics at the first Waitangi protests in 1971, where activists dressed up in black and wore wreaths to mourn the treaty grabbed the media’s attention. Matakite’s ‘Memorial of Rights’ could well have been just another petition rotting away in the archives: the dramatic march down the centre of the North Island, the symbolism attached to the pou whenua, the mystery surrounding the Memorial, and the charisma of Whina Cooper and her unruly band of supporters captured support and headlines. The confrontational rhetoric and aesthetics of the Black women’s movement forced the public to take notice. The images of violence and police brutality erupting on the streets of New Zealand as anti-apartheid activists peacefully confronted the governments pro-tour stance was the last nail in the coffin of New Zealand’s involvement in apartheid sport. Finally the sight of police and army personnel carting off occupiers from Bastion Point and Raglan Golf course were not scenes the government or the public ever wanted repeated. As mentioned earlier, media attention could make or break activism, therefore bold, dramatic gestures of protest were the order of the day and a sign of the times.
Legislative and policy changes were not the activists’ only goals. They were aware that public perception could be just as powerful as government policy, and thus heightening awareness and consciousness within Maori communities, activist networks and amongst the Pakeha public was an important aspect of their work. Bastion Point welcomed visitors daily onto the land, providing a forum for the activists and the public to interact and discuss the issues at hand. The marae visited by the Land March on their way to Wellington provided a forum for tangata whenua to share their take with manuhiri, while giving the marchers an opportunity to discuss the objectives of the march and rally support for their cause. Matakite played a similar role as a support network for iwi, and the language movement in particular pushed for Pakeha awareness and support of the language.

The fourth key feature of modern activism was coalition building. The ability to build coalitions across tribal, cultural and political boundaries was essential to the success of Maori activism: if the media could make or break activism, so too could the ability to raise and sustain support. Without the numbers to hand out flyers, put up posters, deliver leaflets, march in demonstrations, stand on picket lines, attend public meetings, raise funds, sign petitions or provide hospitality for guests, initiatives floundered. Maori activists learnt this lesson quickly: Nga Tamatoa failed to build a coalition of support around treaty protests in the early years. However their return to Waitangi in 1978 with a coalition of land activists rejuvenated treaty politics. The land movement built a stunning though short lived coalition of supporters under the auspices of Matakite, providing tribes the support they needed to act on their take. The language movement built a coalition of Maori and Pakeha students and activists who were essential to successfully orchestrating the multitude of events surrounding Maori language week, while support for the movements two petitions forced the government to finally take Maori demands seriously. Anti-war and anti-apartheid activists organised some of the most impressive feats of coalition building. Finally, a coalition of activist groups in the formation of PIG patrol provided a wider skills and support base to tackle the problem of police brutality.

Successful coalition building typified Maori activism, and indeed most forms of activism from the period. However, the process of building support networks was fraught with difficulties, and while Maori activists could gain much needed support
through coalitions with other groups, they also risked watering down their politics and marginalising their own objectives and priorities by supporting those of others. Thus while Maori activists encouraged support for their own causes, they were often wary of supporting other movements, in particular class politics, the anti-war movement and second wave feminism. Part of this also had to do with the politics of Maori activists: for them race, ethnicity, and the issues of racism, racial discrimination and institutional racism in New Zealand predominated over issues of class, gender, sexuality or events overseas, and nothing was going to move them from this position.

In summary, direct action, a flair for the dramatic, consciousness raising and coalition building came to typify the methods and strategies of Maori activism, and were instrumental to the achievements of the era.

Another important theme that emerged from this thesis relates to how we come to view and understand the relationship between the politics and concerns of the Maori world, the impact of national politics and events and the influence of overseas examples. First and foremost Maori activism was influenced by events specific to Maori communities, namely the ‘last land grab’, land alienation, tribal take, Maori attitudes to the treaty and Waitangi celebrations, and cultural alienation and language loss. To quantify the impact of national politics, anti-apartheid activism proved a breeding ground for Maori activism, and other issues contributed to the mood of rebellion and resistance of the period which undoubtedly rubbed off on Maori. Having said this though Maori remained relatively aloof from the politics and objectives of the anti-war movement and left wing groups. Second wave feminism had a major impact on Maori women; however Maori women largely rejected the overtures and politics of Pakeha feminists in favour of building their own movement, which blended Maori experiences with the philosophies and language of African American feminists.

Finally, international influences had a major impact on Maori activism: the issues and politics of Maori activism were unique to Maori and New Zealand, however overseas examples, in particular the Black civil rights and Black Power movements provided Maori activists with powerful examples of how to go about achieving their goals: the message was local, the methods were global. Thus Maori activism was a mix of internal, national and global influences, riding international trends while at the same time addressing long standing and contemporary grievances faced by Maori communities.
Equally important was the relationship that developed between radicals and conservative, which despite the conflicts was often mutually beneficial. Young radical activists took action because of what they saw as a lack of leadership and direction from conservatives. They resisted the ‘traditional approach’ of airing grievances through official channels, instead preferring dramatic and very public confrontation and direct action. As Sir James Henare commented, this definitely was not Maori; the strategies of modern activism were borrowed from national and international examples. Furthermore, rather than campaigning for reform, activists urged for a radical restructuring of government and society. But while their strategies and goals differed, the issues radicals sought to address shared more in common with those of their conservative predecessors: the treaty, land, language, apartheid sport, racial discrimination and women’s rights. Furthermore, while both groups stressed their differences they often came to complement one another’s actions. The Waitangi Tribunal and land reforms were the fruits of conservative labour, particularly Matiu Rata and the Ratana movement who had slowly and steadily campaigned for recognition of the treaty for over 50 years. Whether they liked it or not though, treaty protests, land protests and occupations, and the dramatic events of the land march, Bastion Point, and increasing violence at Waitangi added an urgency to the pleas of conservatives, convincing the government that the consequence of stalling would be violent dissent and civil unrest. The militant demands of activists actually played into the hands of conservatives, shifting the middle ground so that the once radical reforms suggested by conservatives suddenly seemed reasonable and acceptable in comparison.

The language movement provides another example of this: four years of direct action by activists succeeded where 20 years of conservative campaigns had failed. However, conservatives and traditional leaders came to play an essential role within the movement, implementing and putting into practice the schemes activists had fought for. The land movement also connected urban radicals with the take of rural tribes, and many had their first in-depth experiences of Maoritanga at Te Arohanui marae on Bastion Point and the various marae Matakite visited on the way to Wellington.
Despite constant attempts by the media to portray activists as out of sync with their elders, a number of kaumatua did support them. Several kuia became symbolic and substantive leaders of the land movement and tribal take. The issues at stake were very clear to Whina Cooper when she agreed to lead the land march. 94-year-old Herepo Rongo embodied the pain and the persistence of Tainui Awhiro in their struggle for the return of the Raglan Golf Course when she said: ‘Will I squat on the Aerodrome? Yes. Take my bed... I can’t understand the pakeha laws. I only know the truth’. Kuia and kaumatua stayed to the very last minute on Bastion Point, leaving just before the police began making arrests and dragging the occupiers off, pleading to their people to remain peaceful as they wiped away tears. Not all those arrested at Bastion Point were young; several wore service medals they had won in World War II as members of the 28th Maori Battalion. Walter Kawiti ‘sponsored’ Nga Tamatoa and publicly supported the groups stand, as did Henare Ngata, while Te Uenuku Rene was kaumatua for the Maori language movement in its early years. John Rangihau and Ngoingoi Pewhairangi both contributed to the efforts of Nga Tamatoa, and according to at least one activist, Rev. Maori Marsden allowed activists to hide from police at his estate in Te Kopuru just out of Dargeville, long enough for the police’s arrest warrants to run out. In total, despite the differences in style, tone and philosophy, the work of conservatives and radicals was often complementary, and in spite of media portrayals to the contrary activists often did have the support of elders and conservatives.

These activists were part of the rights movements of the ‘60s and ‘70s, and were influenced by proponents of women’s rights, Black civil rights, workers’ rights and the like. Maori activism was also deeply implicated in the identity politics of the era. One of the recurring themes of this thesis is the contribution activists made to redefining New Zealand history, race relations, Maori and Pakeha culture and identities, and New Zealander’s sense of self. You could not legislate against attitudes, and there was a vast difference between policy and public perception. Hirini Melbourne pointed out Maori wanted to educate Pakeha for a change: they also needed to re-educate themselves. The land, treaty and language movements forced Maori and Pakeha alike to revisit their histories, to recognize that the myths of

14 ‘Wounded Mother. Matakite poised for Raglan.’ City News, 23 (March 1976), np, ms-papers-2316-11, Hutchinson papers, ATL.
‘harmony’ and ‘One New Zealand’ held little substance when balanced against the weighty history of Maori oppression. The land, language and Black women’s movements, along with Maori critiques of class politics took this a step further, contrasting a romanticised, essentialised vision of Maori to a negatively portrayed stereotype of Pakeha. Activists set ‘turangawaewae’ against ‘the quarter acre’, ‘whanau’ and ‘aroha’ against ‘individualism’ and ‘materialism’, spiritual connection with land, people, history and tupuna against white ‘amnesia’ and secularism. At times their critiques amounted to little more than racist stereotyping, but what these critiques signified was an effort to detoxify the relationships that had developed in place of equality and acceptance, to remove the poison inherent in these relationships which said that, patronising epithets and myth making aside, Pakeha were superior to Maori, men were superior to women. Frantz Fanon spoke of a time when ‘in the period of decolonization, the colonised masses mock at these very values, insult them and vomit them up’ and inevitably this time did come. Donna Awatere Huata spelt it out loud and clear:

- White people are not superior
- British culture is not superior
- New Zealand is not British.
- This country belongs to the Maori.

Their efforts forced Pakeha to question and define Pakeha culture, and what it meant to be Pakeha, and to reassess Maori culture which for so long had been maligned as inferior or treated as a museum piece. The impact of their critiques is still felt today as New Zealanders continue to debate what New Zealand culture is and what it means to be a New Zealander.

The final point that will be made relates to the impact of Maori activism. This thesis has preferred to focus on the politics and actions of activists rather than their impact. Maori activism is important in its own right regardless of its outcomes, having said that though we should attempt to quantify the achievements of Maori activism, while identifying the issues activists failed to satisfactorily address or resolve, which remain

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15 Donna Awatere, *Maori Sovereignty*, pp.64-5
16 Fanon, p.34
17 Donna Awatere, *Maori Sovereignty*, p.32.
to be resolved by future generations. Maori activists won a number of key concessions in a surprisingly short amount of time, while having a long-term effect on policy, legislation, culture and national identity.

Treaty and land activism added urgency and legitimacy to the reforms advocated by conservative leaders like the Maori Council, the League, the Ratana movement and Maori members of Parliament. Their combined efforts led to the Waitangi Tribunal and the 1985 Amendment Act which empowered the Tribunal to begin settling historical grievances. This was certainly a success of the movement, providing iwi a legitimate avenue to resolve their grievances without having to go outside the law. However, in a way the Tribunal has taken the air out of the land movement. Without direct action like that seen at Bastion Point or Raglan, Maori claims appear far less urgent, and working behind closed doors and nailing out agreements between Crown officials and tribal authorities in private removes the consciousness raising that accompanied protest. Furthermore, the treaty has yet to be ‘honoured’ or enshrined in legislation, and it is doubtful whether the government policy of devolution will deliver any meaningful expression of tino rangatiratanga. Constitutional reform, the creation of a separate Maori parliament, and direct action may be required of future generations to resolve the ongoing concern of mana Maori motuhake.

The language movement achieved many of its goals at a startling rate, with the introduction of Maori in primary and secondary schools and the offering of a course to train teachers of the language occurring within four years, and the first kura kaupapa, whare wananga and kohanga reo being established in 1978, 1981 and 1982 respectively. Having said this, bilingual schools and units within mainstream schools still only provide access to the language to roughly 10% of Maori children: 90% remain in mainstream, where the Maori language and ‘taha Maori’ components are important but at the same time minimal, and marginalised to afternoon classes when children are less alert. Maori may be an official language but it is still not compulsorily taught in all schools beyond basic words, phrases and pronunciation. It would take the government a further 16 years to set up Te Mangai Paho, the Maori Broadcasting Funding Agency, four years on top of that to agree to the Aotearoa Television Network pilot series, and all up a total of 27 years before Aotearoa Television was finally launched, putting Te Reo Maori Societies’ calls for a Maori
production unit into practice. Iwi radio stations were more successful, and have benefited from the digital age and the ability to broadcast via the net. However, the stations are still under funded, struggle on shoestring budgets, and transmission signals are weak and often do not even extend to the edges of tribal boundaries. The numbers of language speakers are up, indicating the trend of language loss has reversed, but language advocates are still weary of celebrating, pointing out that while Maori is no longer a ‘dying’ language it still remains a largely ‘ceremonial’ rather than ‘living’ language. Courses and night classes to learn te reo are readily available at most polytechnics, universities and wananga, and are often free of charge, but their funding is provided at the whim of politicians, and the recent cutbacks on funding for Te Wananga o Aotearoa shows the courses are anything but certain. In total, much has been achieved, but much more needs to be done, and addressing issues via official channels, as demonstrated, is not always the best strategy.

Anti-apartheid activism contributed to the dismantling of apartheid in South Africa between 1990 and 1994. As Trevor Richards summarised, re-establishing international sporting contacts were one of eight reasons South Africans gave for voting for the abolition of apartheid. Reading between the lines, rugby was South Africa’s favourite sport; their favourite team to play was the All Blacks.\textsuperscript{18} Maori contributed to and celebrated this victory alongside Pakeha activists.

The Black women’s movement achieved some solid gains as well. Their efforts put Maori women's rights on the agenda within Maori and Pakeha society, and the issue continues to be debated in the media, on marae and within academic institutions. Many of the women involved have gone on to prominent positions in the government and civil service, such as Pauline Kingi who was appointed a regional director of Te Puni Kokiri, and Donna Awatere Huata who was elected to parliament, albeit as a member of right wing neo-liberals the Act Party. Others like Hilda Halkyard and Titewhai Harawira continue to lead activism, and are as sharp, critical, unforgiving and involved now as they were in the 1970s and ‘80s. Female leadership has continued to increase and strengthen in the intervening decades, and is now largely an accepted part of Maori society, particularly in the education sector. Having said this,

\textsuperscript{18} Trevor Richards, \textit{Dancing on Our Bones}, p.229.
Maori women still face some of the highest levels of violent abuse, abortions, smoking, lung cancer and suicide rates in New Zealand and OECD countries, while men continue to dominate tribal committees and tribal leadership. Mana wahine is still a force to be reckoned with, but women’s rights still need to be defended.

Three further sites of contention which emerged during the period remain to be addressed and resolved. Maori have yet to address the issues surrounding their place in the armed forces, and Maori troops continue to be sent overseas to fight unjust wars and prop up western imperialism while Maori continue to face basic inequalities at home. Maori war service is still too tapu to debate, and the Maori presence at ANZAC services and Maori televisions recent coverage of ANZAC day continues to confirm Maori allegiance to the national obsession with War and our pride in New Zealand troops killing men, women and children in foreign countries. While class politics were a factor in Maori activism, activists and Maori society in general have as yet failed to resolve the class inequalities inherent in New Zealand society from which Maori suffer the worst. The evolution of tribal capitalism, the establishment of the Wananga, Maori tertiary institutes, the continued existence of a tribal elite, and the growth of the Maori middleclass could offer solutions to these problems, but seem more likely to perpetuate current conditions by hiding them under a false cloak of Maoritanga and tino rangatiratanga. Despite the success stories Maori continue to suffer higher levels of poverty and unemployment and lower levels of income and home ownership than most other ethnic groups. Finally, while activists at times articulated the issue, Maori have yet to totally confront the past and present day implication of Christianity in colonisation and cultural alienation. The debate is not simply an argument of faith: moreover it is about recognizing the role Christian beliefs continue to play in marginalizing Maori culture, traditions and beliefs, and finding a means of synthesising the two without having to compromise tikanga and Atua Maori. These are not the only issues te Iwi Maori face as they enter the fourth century of contact with the outside world; as older grievances are resolved others grow in their place.

To end, Maori activism has had a vast impact on the course of modern New Zealand history and the fate of tangata whenua. While it was not the first and will not be the last time Maori rise up in resistance to oppression and discrimination, it succeeded where other movements had stalled, and combined with the support of tribes,
conservative leaders and everyday Maori, began the process of turning the tide on colonisation, land loss, cultural alienation and loss of mana, and the slow, painful process of reconciliation and redress. This story is far from over, as one chapter ends a new one begins, and Maori will continue on into this and following centuries, taking up the kaupapa of their tupuna, the struggle of their time.

As I write these final paragraphs, word has just come from the north: once again the tail of the fish threshes as the head lacks direction. Ngāti Kahurangi have just moved onto a 9.2 hectare block of land at Rangiputa they have been seeking the return of since 1997 and the publishing of the Waitangi Tribunal’s *Muriwhenua Report*. Runanga Chairwoman Professor Margaret Mutu, the tribe’s proud and outspoken leader, and the latest in a long line of tribal matriarchs, has called the move a repossession, not an occupation: the land was never sold, it does not need to be reclaimed or paid for. Their stand may well lead to nothing. It may be just another signpost on the road to redress or another footnote in the history of Maori land loss. Or it may be a gateway to new possibilities and new outcomes for Maori communities there and around the motu. If one thing is certain, it is that we have not heard the last of Maori activism or the spirit of pride and defiance that emerged from Maori communities in the ‘60s and ‘70s. For as long as Maori remain as a distinct ethnic and racial group they will continue to come together and stand up for their rights and their mana, until such time as their grievances are resolved: Haumi e, Hui e, Taiki e!

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