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Brave New Zealand:
The Construction of a New National Identity

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ABSTRACT

In 1999, Helen Clark’s New Zealand Labour Party came to power at the head of a coalition government. Central to the new government’s agenda was the strengthening of national identity. In the face of increasing globalisation and individualism, the Government saw national identity as something that should be both internally protected (as the guarantor of social cohesion) and externally projected (as a source of value in global markets). The two orientations were related in crucial ways, as New Zealand identity was increasingly narrated around the attitudes and behaviours - such as creativity, innovation and entrepreneurialism - deemed necessary for global economic competitiveness. Drawing on elements of both liberal and critical political theory, and paying particular attention to the discourses deployed by political actors, I describe and critically analyse Labour’s nation-building project, situating it within a broader project of economic transformation, which was itself a response to a reading of globalisation.

Through a detailed examination of the Government’s political practice in its main statements of intent and in three key policy areas – cultural, food production and immigration policy - between 1999 and 2007, I ask two questions. Firstly, what constraints were imposed on the assertion of a unique national identity by the Government’s simultaneous embrace of global economic liberalism? And, secondly, what have been the implications of this assertion for the rights and liberties of individuals and groups within and beyond the state?

Implicit in the nation-building project was an attempt to manage internal difference for the sake of “the nation”. Internal diversity could be accepted – even celebrated – in the Government’s project, but only insofar as it was willing and able to contribute to an officially sanctioned vision of a shared national purpose. On this corporate conception of the state, individuals were no longer seen as subjects related by the common recognition of rules of conduct, but as role-performers related in the pursuit of a putative common purpose. The emphasis placed on the trope of the nation asserted a commonality of vision and interests that elided questions of the distribution of costs and benefits, and that marginalised dissenting ideas and perspectives.
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Over the course of a project that runs for more than three years one incurs many debts.

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v
CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

Miranda:  O, Wonder!
How many goodly creatures are there here!
How beauteous mankind is! O brave new world
That has such people in’t
Prospero:  ‘Tis new to thee.¹

A Brief Introduction

In 1999, after nine years in opposition, the New Zealand Labour Party under leader Helen Clark was returned to power as the dominant partner in a coalition government. Central to the agenda of this fifth Labour Government² was the defence and the promotion of national identity. In this thesis, I describe and critically analyse this nation-building project, which can be seen as part of the Government’s broader programme of economic transformation fashioned in response to the increasing globalisation of economic and cultural activity. In the course of this analysis, I give an account of the policy implications of the nation-building project and I assess its implications for the rights and liberties of individuals and groups within and beyond New Zealand’s borders. The emphasis that any nation-building project necessarily places on the internal coherence and the external differentiation of the nation implies, I argue, corresponding elisions. Important moral questions of the status of groupings of identity and interest within the nation, and of obligations to those outside the nation may be obscured in asserting the pre-eminence of the national scale.

Against the view that globalisation is antithetical to state autonomy and national identities, the Labour-led Government asserted that a world without borders was in fact

² Throughout this thesis I use the label “fifth Labour Government” to refer to the Labour-led administrations in power since 1999 under the Prime Ministership of Helen Clark. While there is a certain awkwardness in using this label in a proportional representation electoral environment, in that it refers to more than one governing coalition, I continue to use it as a useful shorthand. It highlights the continuity that has been ensured by Labour’s dominant position within each of the coalition arrangements, and it throws attention on the ways in which the fifth Labour Government has engaged with the legacies of earlier Labour governments, especially the first (1935-49) and the fourth (1984-90).
‘made for a small, trading economy like New Zealand’s’, and set about positioning national specificity as a source of value in the global markets for goods, investment and talented people. But globalisation was constructed as threat as well as opportunity. Indeed, globalisation was often presented as a realm of hostile competition that demanded a co-ordinated national response. And, in the face of a global homogenisation of culture, it was argued that New Zealand would need to work harder than ever to define and assert its own unique identity. In addition to its economic and cultural functions, the Government’s emphasis on national identity was also expected to offer political benefit and to bolster the political legitimacy of the state. Labour’s insistence on the relevance of the nation translated into the construction of a shared national purpose underwritten by shared values and a shared vision. The Government justified its political agenda through an appeal to shared national benefit, arguing that its economic visions was about ‘reversing our fortunes as a nation’ and providing ‘security and opportunity for all New Zealanders’.

As a result of its economic, cultural and political drivers, the nation-building project had both an internal and an external orientation. A unique national identity was seen as something to be both internally protected and externally projected. Identity was simultaneously oriented towards a domestic audience constructed as a community united by a shared history and a shared vision for the future, and towards a global audience of consumers, investors and opinion leaders. It was simultaneously constructed as the locus of shared belonging and meaning at home and as a source of competitive advantage in the global economy. But while it faced in two directions at once, the nation-building project was of a piece. Essentially, it was the contention that the attitudes and behaviours necessary for global economic competitiveness were also the markers of an authentic New Zealand identity. The policies through which a strong, confident national identity was defended and promoted were presented as assertions of local specificity in the face of the homogenising force of globalisation. But if the practices of globalisation offered new opportunities for the foregrounding of national identity, then they also strongly structured the ways in which that identity could develop.

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The Government’s representations of globalisation, of the state and of the nation are best seen, I argue, not as descriptions of fact but as discursive constructions shaped by power and ideology. These discursive constructions carry with them political and moral implications. They serve to define policy problems in certain ways and, therefore, to legitimate and naturalise certain policy perspectives. They serve, moreover, to position, address and evaluate individuals and sub-state groups in specific ways. My analysis of the political and moral implications of the Government’s nation-building project is focussed by two questions. The first is chiefly empirical and asks to what extent the assertion of national specificity is possible given a simultaneous embrace of global economic liberalism. Through a detailed examination of political language and policy decisions within the Government's overall political project and within three key policy areas, this study analyses the ways in which global engagement both facilitates and constrains assertions of national identity. The second question is chiefly normative and asks whether the official emphasis on national identity is desirable. In this regard, the thesis asks what impact the Government's articulation of national identity and global engagement has had for the interests and identities of individuals and groups within the nation, and for the moral claims of those outside.

The title of this thesis – Brave New Zealand – suggests a link between the official attempt to construct a coherent and attractive image of the nation (the “Brand New Zealand” project) and the dystopian vision of *Brave New World*.\(^5\) In Huxley’s tale, the World State’s pursuit of prosperity and stability required that comfort and happiness be preferred to truth, beauty, danger and freedom, and that ideas about community and identity be re-defined towards that end. The fifth Labour Government, I argue, established economic growth and social stability as its key objectives, and has consistently evaluated the range of ideas, identities and perspectives within New Zealand society according to how well they contribute to those two objectives. Comfort, happiness, beauty, freedom, community and identity have all been defined in terms consistent with economic growth. As Neil Postman notes, Huxley’s concern was not that society would be controlled by the infliction of pain (as in Orwell’s *1984*) but by the infliction of pleasure and comfort.\(^6\) The Government’s nation-building project, I argue, has offered economic competitiveness and a strong, confident national identity as self-evident sources of pleasure, and as necessary

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protection against the dangers of a competitive global economy. The pursuit of pleasure and comfort, in turn, requires the marginalisation or the co-option of divergent identities and dissenting ideas about freedom, identity and community.

Situating the Thesis

This thesis gives an account of how the fifth Labour Government has sought to narrate a national identity consonant with its understanding of economic necessity. Such a study is valuable and timely for several reasons. Most obviously, it contributes to an understanding of recent political discourse and policy change in New Zealand. I argue that the fifth Labour Government has deployed a language of shared (national) benefits and of shared (national) values in order to naturalise its policy agenda and to bolster its political legitimacy. This process can be seen as a performance of power, even if (or especially if) it is successful in having its key ideas and proposals widely accepted as beneficial and as common-sense.\(^7\) I take it to be of fundamental importance that the exercise of political power is analysed and debated among the public that is affected by that exercise. In analysing the Government’s project, I highlight the groupings of interest and identity that have been influential in its development, as well as those that have been marginalised and excluded from it, or co-opted into it. The ways in which citizens and non-citizens are addressed and evaluated by the state, I argue, ought to be of interest and concern to all.

More broadly, this study also contributes to an understanding of the sorts of pressures that the contemporary global context places on the governments of nation-states, of the responses available to states, and of some of the likely impacts of those responses. The challenges that have faced the New Zealand state and the New Zealand economy since 1999 were far from anomalous in the global setting, and the New Zealand experience since then is instructive beyond its borders. In providing a detailed case study of the ways in which global economic liberalism simultaneously encourages and constrains the foregrounding of local specificity, this study contributes to the scholarly literature dealing with the relationship between globalisation, state autonomy and national identity.

This study is situated, then, within the various bodies of literature that deal with the relationship between globalisation, the state and the nation. The experience of New Zealand is situated, then, within the various bodies of literature that deal with the relationship between globalisation, the state and the nation. The experience of New Zealand with

Zealand since 1999 is understood in terms of the complex relationship between
globalisation and state autonomy, economic nationalism and national identity. This
study examines how national identity performs its historical function of cohesion and
legitimation under circumstances that challenge the nation from without (globalisation)
and within (individualism). It examines how the trope of the nation is used to ground
political obligation and authority in a 'post-traditional' world supposed to be increasingly
sceptical of authority. In doing so, as will be discussed below, it draws on a range of
theoretical and methodological tools including elements of liberal and critical political
theory, critical discourse analysis, and public policy literature dealing with the process of
problem definition.

Other analytical perspectives are, of necessity, set aside. This study is emphatically not,
for instance, an economic analysis of the Government’s project. Important as economic
analysis is, my intention is to highlight some of the theoretical and moral issues that
underpin such analysis, and that are sometimes obscured by it. This thesis is also not a
study in regulationist theories of the state, nor does it (or at least, not explicitly) explore
the question of the state’s relative autonomy. In this thesis I identify and acknowledge the
constraints within which the state operates, but assume that the state retains some degree
of agency. To deny that the state has any power is to elide questions of its responsibility.
While I analyse the ways in which state action is structured by a range of forces, my focus
is on the results of state action, in terms of policy outcomes and individual subjectivities.

8 A relationship discussed in, inter alia, David Held and Anthony McGrew (eds), The Global
Transformations Reader: An Introduction to the Globalization Debate. Cambridge, UK, Polity Press,
2000; Aihwa Ong, Neoliberalism as Exception: Mutations in Citizenship and Sovereignty. Durham,
Geo-Politics and Increased Autonomy?’, Review of International Political Economy, v.12, no.1,
9 See, inter alia, George Crane, ‘Economic Nationalism: Bringing the Nation Back In’, Millenium,
v.27, no.1, 1998, pp.55-75; Stephen Shulman, ‘Nationalist Sources of International Economic
Pickel’s edited volume Economic Nationalism in a Globalizing World. Ithaca, N.Y., Cornell University
10 See, inter alia, Stuart Hall, ‘The Question of Cultural Identity’, in Stuart Hall, David Held and
‘Country Before Money?’, and Ross Bond, David McCrone and Alice Brown, ‘National Identity and
Economic Development: Reiteration, Recapture, Reinterpretation and Repudiation’, Nations and
Nationalism, v.9, no.3, 2003, pp.371-391
11 Jürgen Habermas, ‘The European Nation-State: On the Past and Future of Sovereignty and
Citizenship’, in Jürgen Habermas, The Inclusion of the Other: Studies in Political Theory. 2nd ed.,
In a similar manner, I am not primarily seeking to extend theoretical understandings of citizenship, although my analysis reflects on the implications of globalisation and nation-building projects for the nature of citizenship.

The thesis, of course, also draws on and adds to the body of scholarly work addressing the state practice of nation-building in New Zealand, both historically and post-1999. Within the broad field of political studies, and with regard to the latter period, Jacqui True’s consideration of ‘the rebranding of national identity’ is particularly germane. Significant contributions have also been made by those working in the field of cultural studies (broadly defined), settler studies (especially Stephen Turner’s work on a New Zealand ‘political economy of identity’), sociology, history and post-structural geography. This study adds to this body of work by integrating three levels of analysis: a focus on the crucial role of discourse and language within the Government’s project; an analysis of the interaction between discursive contestation and policy decisions in three key policy areas, and an assessment of the implications of these changes (in both


17 I draw especially on the work of David Craig, including ‘Taranaki Gothic and the Political Economy of New Zealand Narrative and Sensibility’, *New Zealand Sociology*, v.20, no.2, 2005, pp.18-40


discourse and policy) for individuals and groups. The theoretical framework developed in Chapters 2 and 3 and the detailed analysis presented in Chapters 4 through 7 are designed to facilitate these research objectives.

**Thesis Outline**

In the following chapter (Chapter 2), I develop a framework for understanding the nation-building practices of contemporary states.\(^{20}\) I argue that a state’s power is dependant, at least in part, on its ability to control the terms of public and political debate. And I further argue that the fifth Labour Government’s project was predicated on specific discourses of globalisation and the nation. Labour’s representation of globalisation used a language of economic necessity that sought to justify its policy agenda and its rendering of national identity, and to remove its conception of political problems and solutions from the realm of political contestation. The Government's political project can be seen, in other words, as a hegemonic project: an attempt to present its definitions of political problems and solutions as common-sense and natural.\(^{21}\) The suggestion that ‘we must agree on our vision and our objectives and we must work together to achieve them’\(^{22}\) requires a specific conception of the state. Drawing on the liberal conservative thinker Michael Oakeshott, I argue that it requires that the members of the state be understood as united by their pursuit of some shared substantive purpose, rather than simply by their shared acknowledgment of common rules.\(^{23}\)

This movement was tendential rather than complete. The new ‘shared vision about what could be’\(^{24}\) was asserted in the context of an established acceptance of individual rights and freedoms. Indeed, it required the contribution of individual ambition and initiative, and it was offered as the best means to the end of individual security and substantive freedom. But to the extent that the members of a state are understood as united by their


\(^{24}\) Clark, ‘Prime Minister’s Statement [2001]’. 
shared pursuit of a common purpose, they come to be addressed and evaluated as role-performers related to that purpose. Such an address, I argue, has potentially damaging implications for those individuals and groups within society who hold divergent perspectives and ideals. It appears, for instance, to violate the fundamental liberal proscription against treating people as means rather than ends. So while the Government claimed to accept and value diversity within its articulation of national identity, the fundamental objective of economic competitiveness led it to evaluate diversity in the reductive terms of economic contribution. It’s pursuit of unity-in-diversity, in other words, privileged unity over diversity. I argue that the Government emphasised the rhetorical figure of the nation to assert a commonality of belonging and purpose that would obscure very real points of difference.\(^\text{25}\)

The central research questions of this thesis (of the possibility and the desirability of a nation-building project, given a simultaneous embrace of global economic engagement) demand a theoretical and methodological approach that acknowledges the fundamental importance of language and discourse within political life. Drawing on Antonio Gramsci’s theory of hegemony,\(^\text{26}\) Steven Lukes’ notion of three-dimensional power\(^\text{27}\) and Norman Fairclough’s elucidation of Critical Discourse Analysis,\(^\text{28}\) this thesis pays particular attention to the ways in which social issues and key political ideas are defined by various political actors. Language and discourse impact on people’s lives through the construction of a hegemonic common-sense that can serve to legitimate systems of domination and even to co-opt subjects into their own domination. But discourse creates not just subjectivities but practices as well. A given discourse will suggest certain definitions of policy problems and solutions as natural, and dominant ideas come to be embodied in institutions and policy settings.

This thesis draws on a range of theoretical approaches derived from both liberal and critical political theory, an eclecticism designed to generate as wide as possible a range of questions and perspectives. As they are used in this thesis, these different strands of political theory contain no serious incompatibilities. From liberal theory I mainly derive an account of the importance of individual autonomy, an account which is qualified but


\(^{26}\) Gramsci, *Selections from the Prison Notebooks*.

\(^{27}\) Lukes, *Power: A Radical View*.

\(^{28}\) Fairclough, *Critical Discourse Analysis*. 
not necessarily refuted by critical theory (which adds that individual autonomy is
threatened as much by economic relations of power as it is by state coercion and that even
an apparently autonomous decision may yet be the product of a form of mental
indoctrination\textsuperscript{29} or by some strands of communitarian or multicultural theory (which add
that individual autonomy may often be facilitated rather than threatened by an attention to
group identities and rights).\textsuperscript{30}

The political language and policy decisions of the fifth Labour Government, of course,
did not occur in a vacuum but in a specific place and time: New Zealand between 1999
and 2007. In Chapter 3 I relate how the specificities of the Government’s project can be
best understood in the light of how national identity, national interests, the role of the
state and the status of citizens have been understood by earlier New Zealand
governments. This historical narrative gives a context in which the moments of continuity
and innovation of post-1999 politics can be seen more clearly. Earlier Labour
governments, for instance, had narrated the nation around social democratic principles of
substantive equality for all or around forceful assertions of national independence. The
fifth Labour Government, while self-consciously invoking this heritage, based its national
vision on the individuating norms of the knowledge economy (such as innovation,
creativity and flexibility) and on the need for global connectedness.

The political practice of the fifth Labour Government was also shaped by its reading of
the opportunities and challenges presented by globalisation, and this thesis is situated in a
wider literature dealing with the relationship between globalisation, state sovereignty and
national identity. I have argued that the fifth Labour Government’s emphasis on national
identity in the pursuit of economic advantage and social cohesion was by no means
anomalous in the international context. But New Zealand faced the global from a unique
historical, cultural and geo-economic position. Due to its history, economic structure and
physical location, New Zealand has always had an identity constructed with one eye on
global markets, investors and migrants. And the state has historically been prominent
within New Zealand society. Due to its small size and its physical isolation from its major

\textsuperscript{29} In developing these arguments I draw on Gramsci, Lukes and Pierre Bourdieu (especially \textit{Language}
\textit{and Symbolic Power}. (John B. Thompson ed., Gino Raymond and Matthew Adamson trans.),

\textsuperscript{30} See, for example, Charles Taylor, ‘The Politics of Recognition’, in Amy Gutman (ed.),
\textit{Multiculturalism and the “Politics of Recognition”}. Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1992, pp.25-
73, esp. pp.51-61; Will Kymlicka, \textit{Multicultural Citizenship: a Liberal Theory of Minority Rights}.
markets, the case can also be more easily argued in New Zealand that something needs to be done in response to the challenges and opportunities of globalisation. Taken together, these factors suggest that those actors wishing to re-narrate national identity may be able to do so more quickly and more fully in New Zealand than elsewhere. As such, the political practices of nation-building and economic nationalism in contemporary New Zealand generate important insights for the study of similar practices in other countries.

Chapters 2 and 3 provide the theoretical and contextual foundation for a direct engagement with the nation-building project of the fifth Labour Government. This engagement begins in Chapter 4, in which I describe and critically discuss the nation-building project and a broader project of economic transformation. The priority placed on economic competitiveness has required that national identity be understood somewhat reductively, and valued chiefly for its capacity to contribute to desired economic outcomes. National identity can thus be seen as a source of value in the global economy and as the guarantor of the social cohesion necessary for the efficient operation of the domestic economy. My analysis of the fifth Labour Government’s overall project focuses on a series of texts in which that project was embodied. In fact, the project’s main elements were crystallised in a small number of core documents: 2002’s Growing an Innovative New Zealand, 2003’s Sustainable Development for New Zealand: Programme of Action and 2004’s Opportunity for all New Zealanders. Much of the interest in these documents - particularly in Growing an Innovative New Zealand - lies in the way that they adopt, adapt and qualify the arguments contained in a range of reports commissioned by the Government from outside consultants and advisory groups.

But while the main elements of the Government's project can be found in just a handful of documents, key ideas and passages were repeated - either verbatim or more loosely - in a wide variety of other places. Indeed, part of the force of the Government's message was derived from the sheer weight of texts in which it was repeated. Demonstrating a keen

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31 OPM, Growing an Innovative New Zealand.
34 Important here are the reports by LEK Consulting (New Zealand Talent Initiative: Strategies for Building a Talented Nation. Auckland, 2001), the Science and Innovation Advisory Council (An Innovation Framework for New Zealand. Wellington, 2001) and the output of the Growth and Innovation Advisory Board.
awareness that political success is increasingly dependant on the ability to control the terms of political debate,\textsuperscript{35} representatives of the fifth Labour Government stayed resolutely "on-message", and any number of press releases, interviews, policy statements and speeches in and outside of parliament could be substituted for parts of the core documents without damage to the essential message.

At the same time, key parts of the Government’s project remained deliberately un-codified. Concepts such as Brand New Zealand, New Zealand Inc. and the New Zealand way were not expounded so much in official documents as in a range of dispersed texts. The Brand New Zealand project - within which the Government undertook to work with the private sector to construct and promote a consistent, attractive and future-focussed image for the country - was referred to often in speeches, but it was run by a government agency (New Zealand Trade and Enterprise) in partnership with New Zealand businesses and codified mainly through a website, www.newzealandnewthinking.com. Ideas such as New Zealand Inc. and the New Zealand way, meanwhile, were not really things that could be articulated in an official statement. By their very nature, they were expected to emerge more or less organically - or, at least, to appear to have done so - in and from the attitudes and behaviours of New Zealand business and society, and in and from an atmosphere of national co-operation and a sense of national purpose and belonging.

Chapters 5 through 7 present an account of how the nation-building project interacted with discourse and policy in three key policy areas. These policy areas (arts and culture policy, aspects of food production policy, and immigration policy) have been selected for their ability to shed light on important aspects of the Government’s project. While other policy areas (most obviously education policy and welfare policy) would also have shed light on the interactions between globalisation, state autonomy and national identity, I considered that the three selected areas offered the greatest range of insights relative to my key research questions. They have also been selected on the basis of their differences from each other. Cultural policy deals with a sector as economically marginal as agricultural production is central, and immigration policy addresses issues of sovereignty and unity quite differently from either of the other two areas. These differences allow an examination of the different ways in which the Government’s agenda was accepted, negotiated and resisted.

An analysis of the three policy areas illustrates how an assertion of national specificity informed by global economic imperatives is constrained to adopt highly specific definitions of national identity, autonomy and unity. In each case I show how definitions of policy problems and solutions were shaped by this qualified emphasis on national interests and national identity. Each policy area serves as a case study of how specific conceptions of key political ideas are embedded in policy practice and how the promotion of a shared “national” purpose serves to marginalise divergent values and purposes. In each case I show how the Government's attempts to construct a substantive shared purpose served to co-opt individuals and groups as role-performers related to that purpose.

Cultural policy (Chapter 5) has been selected because it is a crucial site in which the Government has attempted to mediate its economic and nation-building goals. Cultural production, increasingly coupled with the output of the “creative industries”, has been celebrated both for its ability to develop a strong and unique national identity, and to communicate the nation’s special values to the world, creating thereby a significant competitive advantage in the global economy. Helen Clark signalled the importance her Government placed on cultural policy by taking on the position of Minister for Arts, Culture and Heritage. The creative industries were identified as one of three priority areas within the Government’s economic transformation agenda, and the arts and artists of New Zealand were celebrated as role-performers related to the shared national purpose. While the cultural sector was valourised as an enactment of national resistance to global homogenisation, economic imperatives and global forces continued to powerfully structure official understandings of the nature and function of art, culture and creativity. Ultimately, these same forces strongly influenced the form and content of cultural production and the status of cultural producers. Cultural policy is a site in which the nation-building project could be seen in a relatively pure form. Within the constraints imposed by economic forces, the sector’s economically marginal status afforded the state much greater scope to create nodes of partnerships, institutions and subjectivities consistent with its overall agenda.

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36 See Shulman, ‘Nationalist Sources of International Economic Integration’. 
Anything relating to food production policy (Chapter 6), by contrast, is strongly structured by the centrality of agriculture – and specifically trade in agriculture – to the New Zealand economy. Food policy has been selected because it demonstrates the malleability and the limits of the nation-building project. The points where agricultural policy intersects with policies for environmental sustainability and genetic modification technology illustrate in stark relief the ways in which the perceived economic imperative of trade liberalisation structures the specific definitions of national autonomy that can be accepted. An understanding of autonomy aligned with considerations of economic viability determines, in turn, which aspects of national identity can be foregrounded, and which must be marginalised. A consideration of food production policy shows more clearly than any other area the mechanisms by which the mythos of national identity is constrained and generated by the logos of national interests. The centrality of agricultural exports in New Zealand’s economy means that what I call the "state-at-war" narrative of globalisation is seen particularly strongly, as other countries are positioned as hostile competitors, and their policies, potentially, as acts of aggression. In positioning external forces as hostile competitors, this narrative structure also serves to marginalise dissenting perspectives within the state, subordinating questions of values and principle to questions of economic advantage and objective risk.

Immigration policy (Chapter 7) is the site in which the state is forced to be most explicit about who is welcomed and excluded, valued and denigrated within its national vision. In the competitive global economy, the attributes and capabilities of talented individuals are imagined as key national resources, while those who cannot contribute economically are seen as burdens on the nation. Immigration policy, therefore, is based on the nation’s need to “get its fair share” in the global race for talent. The focus on value-adding talent enacts a targeted and restrictive immigration regime that may be seen as morally progressive relative to earlier regimes where restrictions were based on ethnic and cultural criteria. Restricting the free movement of people based on a calculation of their ability to contribute to national economic goals, however, may still raise moral questions. The ethnic and cultural diversity that it generates, moreover, must be made compatible with a new understanding of national unity, based around the desirable traits of creativity, talent and innovation. At the same time, older popular ideas of what constitutes a New Zealander retain their emotional appeal, and immigration policy has remained constrained by the need to demonstrate that it is aware of popular concerns. In addition, an immigration policy aimed at attracting value-adding talent will address potential migrants
as rational individual actors, and it needs to address the tension inherent in simultaneously attempting to co-opt them into a shared national purpose.

In these three chapters I am interested in assessing how the Government’s construction of a “shared purpose” has informed policy, institutional and discursive change in each of the policy areas, while also accounting for how this shared purpose was resisted or transformed by the specific imperatives extant in each area. In each case I give an account of how political language and policy decisions enacted an official shared purpose and how they addressed the subjects of policy as role-performers related to that purpose. Associated with this is an investigation of the moral implications of imposing a unitary shared purpose onto the irreducible diversity of interests, identities and values contained within a society. Fundamentally, I am interested in the political practices – including, crucially, the practice of political language – that were deployed in order to construct a new societal common-sense able to naturalise and de-politicise specific understandings of freedom, choice, the public good, obligation, authority, the state and the citizen. In the Conclusion (Chapter 8) I reflect on how the theoretical framework of the thesis and the analysis of the Government's political project were able to address the question of whether an assertion of national specificity is possible given a simultaneous embrace of global economic liberalism, and the question of whether such an assertion is desirable, or whether it presents dangers for the interests and identities of individuals and groups both within and outside the nation.

**Concluding the Introduction**

Throughout this thesis I often refer to Labour’s nation-building efforts, and the wider political agenda within which these efforts were situated as “projects”, a label that connotes a high degree of intentionality and coherence. But it can plausibly be argued that the Government’s practice since 1999 is better described as fundamentally marked by pragmatism and flexibility. The two claims may not be entirely opposed: the Government may simply have been pursuing a project based on “pragmatic” results that would of necessity remain flexible in response to changing demands and circumstances. In setting out its agenda on taking office in 1999, the Government committed itself to ‘responsible, pragmatic change in the interests of the many’, a commitment that explicitly set itself against an ideologically-driven agenda: this was to be change for a nation ‘weary of
radical restructuring’. And yet the Government did articulate a relatively coherent change agenda in 1999 and thereafter, based on recurring themes. At its most basic, this agenda was based on obviating the worst excesses of a pure free-market. Setting out her agenda to the Labour Party Conference in 2000, Helen Clark stated that ‘[p]ure market forces … haven’t delivered the goods. The gaps just get bigger.’ An active role for government was re-asserted, in terms of ensuring that inequalities of outcome were managed, that equality of opportunity was provided and that cultural specificity was protected, and in terms of co-ordinating a strategic national response to economic globalisation.

Certainly, there were limits on the consistency and coherence of the project. Things could not really have been otherwise, given that the project arose as a contingent response to New Zealand’s need for global economic competitiveness and to the state’s need for the political legitimacy derived from a coherent polity, as well as from the personal commitments of key political figures. It arose, moreover, within a context of geo-economic insecurity, and within a proportional representation electoral environment that constrained Labour to work in consultation and partnership with a diverse range of other parties. I continue to use the descriptor “project” to refer to the nation-building and the economic transformation efforts of the fifth Labour Government, while acknowledging the flexibility and inconsistencies they often displayed.

Any nation-building project is not the invention of an identity *ex nihilo*, but a re-imagining in which some existing markers of identity are emphasised, while others are marginalised. My claim is not that the Government has got its ideas of national identity wrong, as though there was a correct definition of national identity that it somehow missed. I content myself with the more modest aim of identifying the potential markers of identity that have been embraced, marginalised and altered within its nation-building project. At a broader level, my intention is not to demonstrate that the Government's political project has been right or wrong (which would be to claim some privileged position from which to make such a judgment). Rather, I seek to identify the criteria which were offered as the basis on which the project could be judged right or wrong, and

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to show that they were neither natural nor neutral. In doing so, I problematise the
Government’s claims to be acting in the interests of, and in keeping with the values of all
New Zealanders.

An analysis of the political language and policy decisions of the fifth Labour Government
demonstrates that its nation-building project, despite having multiple motivations, was
strongly structured by a reading of economic imperatives. The sorts of national specificity
that could be asserted within cultural policy, food production policy and immigration
policy thus remained strongly structured by the Government’s reading of economic
necessity. Labour’s pragmatic positivism led it to portray globalisation as a realm of
hostile competition that required a co-ordinated national response. The logic of this
response does not necessarily lead to the brutal suppression of internal diversity and
difference, but it does lead to the evaluation individuals and sub-state groups according to
their willingness and ability to contribute to the economically-driven “shared” purpose.
Since 1999, artists, Maori and minority ethnic groups have been embraced and celebrated
within the Government’s assertions of national specificity, but only insofar as they are
willing and able to contribute to a national purpose defined in terms of global economic
competitiveness. The Government’s nation-building project, in other words, has managed
internal difference through processes of co-option rather than of suppression.

While the tendency to evaluate individuals and groups in the reductive terms of economic
contribution and to address them as role-performers related to this purpose stands in
tension with the Kantian imperative of treating people as ends rather than means, the
moral implications of the Government’s project are not uniformly negative. In contrast to
an earlier neo-liberal discourse, the Government’s project has at least developed a
political language able to recognise and deal with group identities and internal difference.
And its recognition of national identity and national interests has served to defuse other
variants of nationalism within the local political scene, notably a populist nationalism
(normally associated with the New Zealand First Party) built on an antagonism to cultural
difference. I conclude, however, that the emphasis placed on “national” interests and on
“national” identity has asserted a commonality of purpose that marginalises dissenting
ideas and perspectives, and that elides questions of the unequal distribution of the
project’s costs and benefits.
CHAPTER TWO: THEORY AND METHOD

... I believe a king
Should grasp misfortune with a steady hand;
The more unsure his state, more imminent
His fall from sovereignty, so much the more
Should he be resolute to stand upright.¹

The State, the *Societas* and the *Universitas*

This thesis explores a specific form of political action in New Zealand since 1999: the construction and the use of national identity by a series of Labour-led Governments. This field of enquiry implies a conception of the state as having some capacity for autonomous action. But the state should not be understood simply as an autonomous thing acting upon a separate (or separable) thing called the nation, or society. Rather, the state and the society it claims to represent are intersubjectively constituted, and cannot be properly understood without reference to each other. The state is constrained by forces it cannot entirely control, such as the various ideas, identities and interests that operate both within and beyond its borders. These factors contribute to a general milieu within which the state operates, and the state may plausibly be said to operate in the services of some of these ideas, identities and interests. I am interested, however, in the ways in which the state manages, mediates and acts on the circumstances in which it is located. As such, I am interested in the ways in which the state displays, or asserts, a degree of relative autonomy. At the least, it is assumed that particular states have the capacity to make choices about how to respond to a set of circumstances. Without this element of choice, there remains no element of responsibility,² and no possibility of critical assessment.

The state practice of nation-building, I will argue, offers the members of society an understanding of what it is that unites them. It includes the attempt to normalise and naturalise key social ideas, identities and interests and, simultaneously, the attempt to marginalise alternatives. Emerging from this practice are two important questions: one is the empirical question of the methods, the success and the material effects of these attempts, and the other is the moral question of the impact of these attempts on

individuals and groups within (and outside) the state. Nation-building projects can be seen as exercises of power, in which a powerful agent (in this case the state) attempts to get others (the members of society) to do things they otherwise would not do. Part of the force of a nation-building project, however, is its implicit argument that its proposed ideas, identities and interests emerge naturally from the members of the nation. The implicit argument of a nation-building project, therefore, is that it is not an exercise of power: it is not the attempt to get others to do what they otherwise wouldn’t, but a description of what these others naturally want.

But the attempt to inculcate specified ideas, identities and interests can be understood as a performance of power, if we accept, with Steven Lukes, that ‘A may exercise power over B by … influencing, shaping or determining his very wants.’ Indeed, even if the members of a nation appear to consensually accept the core tenets of a nation-building project, Lukes suggests that there is no compulsion to assume that such consensus is genuine. Rather, he leaves open the possibility that ‘power may be at work in such a way as to secure consent and thus prevent conflict from arising’. Such a conception of power is consistent with Gramsci’s notion of hegemony, and Bourdieu’s of habitus. My analysis is based on what I take to be an uncontroversial assumption: that the state’s construction of national interests and national identity does not fully represent the actual interests and identities of all New Zealanders. This assumption opens naturally into Lukes’ central question: ‘how do the powerful secure the compliance of those they dominate – and, more specifically, how do they secure their willing compliance?’ Lukes puts the question, perhaps, more provocatively than I would choose to in this study of contemporary New Zealand politics. But the shape of the question is right: how do

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4 Lukes, *Power*, p.27.
5 Lukes, *Power*, p.7. Lukes continues by asking, rhetorically, ‘is it not the supreme exercise of power to get another or others to have the desires you want them to have – that is, to secure their compliance by controlling their thoughts and desires?’
7 See Lukes, *Power*, p.140, where *habitus* is said to embody ‘dispositions which yield “practical sense” and organize actors visions of the world below the level of consciousness in a way that is resistant to articulation, critical reflection and conscious manipulation.’
8 Lukes, *Power*, p.140.
individuals and groups come to willingly meet the demands made of them by the Government’s economic and nation-building agenda?

The state is occasionally assumed to be admissible of straightforward reportative definition. The terms of such definitions typically emphasise the Westphalian coincidence of authority, territory and population, as when Habermas describes the state as a ‘power that possesses internal and external sovereignty over a defined area and over the totality of its members’. Definitions of this type, while not without some basis in observed reality, tend to express ideal-legal types at the expense of sensitivity to specific spatio-temporal contexts. It is worth recalling that the state in general is the product of history, and that specific states are products of specific histories. And, as Nietzsche famously said, ‘only that which has no history can be defined.’ It is primarily for this reason, as Chris Pierson notes, that Bob Jessop avoids offering a definition of the state until page 341 of his book State Theory and then only in well-qualified terms. Ideal-legal reportative definitions of the state tend to give a false impression of naturalness and timelessness, and they leave unanswered the question of how the individuals within society (or the society as a whole) come under the authority of the state. For, as R.B.J. Walker points out, treating state sovereignty ‘as a matter of definition and legal principle encourages a certain amnesia about its historical and culturally specific character.’

Instead of focusing on its legal status and its practical capacities, it is more useful to think of the state as a social actor that represents its function of social authority over a given territory and a given population as natural and consensual. Rather than speaking unproblematically of the state, it is more useful to speak, with Jessop, of ‘state effects’ and ‘state projects’, for the way in which those phrases foreground the idea of the state

13 Jessop, State Theory, pp.6-9.
as a contingent institutional fact. For the same reason, I find it helpful to think in terms of ‘sovereignty effects’ and ‘society effects’ rather than of sovereignty or society. Roxanne Doty uses the term ‘sovereignty effects’ to refer to the ‘relatively successful production’ of the ‘foundations presumed by conventional understandings of sovereignty.’ And Thomas Blom Hansen and Finn Stepputat describe sovereignty as both an ‘ontologically empty’ and a ‘performative’ category. Sovereignty, they argue, ‘needs to be performed and reiterated on a daily basis in order to be effective’. States, that is to say, are constantly and actively involved in asserting and naturalising their authority over place and people.

Sovereignty effects, moreover, become more visible and more overt when the foundations they seek to produce become more problematic. The contemporary trends of individualism (as an ideology and as reinforced by neoliberal policy reform in many countries) and globalisation tend, among other things, to problematise the ‘foundations presumed by conventional understandings of sovereignty.’ The global movement of goods, ideas, people and finance capital means that the salience of territory is, if not diminished, then at least reconfigured, and that the population of the state is less internally coherent or externally differentiated than ever before. Simultaneously, individualism challenges the state’s claim to represent the best interests of its society as a whole. Claims about globalisation's deleterious effects on state sovereignty are often contested, at least in the stark form in which they are presented here. Globalisation may plausibly be seen as presenting new opportunities for state autonomy, and a population may find considerable unity even among its increasing diversity and mobility. However,

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14 For this idea of ‘institutional’ (as opposed to ‘brute’) facts, see John R. Searle, The Construction of Social Reality. New York, Free Press, 1995, p. 2, where he writes that ‘[i]nstitutional facts are so called because they require human institutions for their existence. In order that this piece of paper be a five dollar bill, for example, there has to be the human institution of money. Brute facts require no human institution for their existence.’
20 Doty, ‘Sovereignty and the Nation’, p.123.
even if, as Aihwa Ong argues, the claim that globalisation threatens the ‘survival of the state … [has] been met by powerful counterarguments’ it remains true that ‘economic globalization – in the relentless pursuit of market freedom – has brought about important changes in the state of “stateness”.’\textsuperscript{23} I will return, in the following chapter, to the relationship between globalisation and state autonomy. In the current frame of ‘sovereignty effects’,\textsuperscript{24} however, we may say that the “taken-for-granted” perception of state sovereignty has been eroded by globalisation, and that states, in response, are increasingly active in re-asserting their authority and their capacity to exercise authority over their territory and their population.

The state practice of nation-building, then, is built around a re-assertion of a (suitably modified) coincidence of sovereignty, territory and population. While the population represented by a state becomes increasingly diverse and mobile, it may be held to be united nonetheless by a common identity defined by the attitudes and behaviours seen as necessary for national competitiveness in the global economy. Territory may be reinscribed: even as the state’s physical borders are dismantled in order to facilitate the easier movement of goods, money, ideas and (selected) people, ever greater emphasis may be placed on the ‘invisible, conceptual borders’ of identity and belonging,\textsuperscript{25} and efforts made to leverage the specificity of the state’s territory as a source of value in global markets.\textsuperscript{26} The state continues, moreover, to assert its sovereignty through the twin claims of authority and capacity.\textsuperscript{27} Its claim of authority is grounded in its claim to represent a people (most commonly to represent the nation\textsuperscript{28}) and in its claim of capacity

\textsuperscript{24} Doty, ‘Sovereignty and the Nation’, pp.123-4.
\textsuperscript{27} See Pierson, \textit{The Modern State}, p.38; and also P.T. Jackson, who notes that ‘capacity without authority is mere force, while authority without capacity is somewhat irrelevant’, but who also notes that this observation is complicated by the fact that ‘authority can often be used as a resource to enhance capacity’ (P.T. Jackson, ‘Whose Identity?: Rhetorical Commonplaces in “American” Wartime Foreign Policy’, in Kevin Dunn and Patricia Goff (eds), \textit{Identity and Global Politics: Empirical and Theoretical Elaborations}. New York, Palgrave Macmillan, 2004, p.172).
in a more pragmatic argument that it can best provide the leadership and co-ordination functions required by the competitive global economy. A state attempts to secure society’s consent to its nation-building project by encouraging a subjective sense of attachment to the national project and by stressing the trope of mutual advantage.

An official nation-building project can be read as an attempt to generate ‘state effects’ and ‘sovereignty effects’ under challenging circumstances. It involves, crucially, a ‘representative claim’, in which a national constituency can be seen as actively constituted by those making the claim. The trope of the nation is emphasised to assert the ongoing salience of the local political community. Within this process, however, “the nation” and “national identity” are carefully defined and presented, as ideas of a shared identity and of shared interests are constructed around certain goals, ideals and values. Often those goals, ideals and values are shaped by a reading of economic necessity, and the unifying rubric of the nation may be used in an attempt to mediate the individuating norms of economic liberalism and competition. The idea is that internal diversity, tensions and inequalities can be managed and legitimated through an appeal to shared goals and a shared identity. The practice of nation-building can be seen as part of a hegemonic project in which preferred definitions of problems, solutions and goals are presented as a shared, national common-sense.

Embedded in my object of analysis – the state practice of nation-building - is an ontological claim about the relationship between the state and the nation that amounts to a denial of the claim that the nation antedates and generates its own political manifestation in the state. The view of the nation that I am rejecting is associated with the primordialists, who see nations as organic, self-generating groups united by a shared sense of history, ancestry, territorial ownership, and by distinct culture and values. These pre-existing national groups are said to seek recognition and thus a political

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30 For a discussion of this sort of project in Australia, see Carol Johnson, Governing Change: from Keating to Howard. St. Lucia, University of Queensland Press, 2000, pp.30-32.
manifestation. They are said to generate their own states in order to give structural
eexpression to the common will of the people. Primordialists stress the centrality of the
ethnic core of the nation, or the ethnie, asserting that there is a real basis on which
contemporary nationalists can draw. Beneath contemporary rhetoric, power and practice,
these primordialists argue, there is a national “there” there, to paraphrase Gertrude
Stein.\(^{32}\)

Roughly opposed to the primordialists are the modernists, who argue that the idea of the
nation is the product of modern, objective forces. If there is a “there” there on this
account, it is one that has been invented for a purpose. On Benedict Anderson’s
influential account, nations are ‘imagined communities’, best understood as successors to
previous modes of social organisation: religious and dynastic hierarchies.\(^{33}\) In a similar
vein, Jurgen Habermas claims that the idea of the nation historically served to provide
states with the necessary sense of social cohesion and political legitimation.\(^{34}\) And Elie
Kedourie argues that nationalist politics are fundamentally concerned with the imposition
of social coherence and homogeneity.\(^{35}\) On this view, the state is fundamentally involved
in creating the nation. As Eugen Weber argues, ‘a lot of Frenchmen didn’t know they
belonged together until the long didactic campaigns of the later nineteenth century told
them they did.’\(^{36}\) Ernest Gellner takes this argument a step further, arguing that it is not
the case that nationalism imposes homogeneity, but ‘it is rather that a homogeneity
imposed by objective, inescapable imperatives eventually appears on the surface in the
form of nationalism.’\(^{37}\) On this view, the state, insofar as it creates the nation, only does
so in response to wider socio-economic forces.

While the idea of an eternally-existing ethnie is hard to sustain, the possibility certainly
remains open that political actors might work to reinforce an idea of an ethnie, by
emphasising a shared experience of the past, a shared set of values and practices, and a
shared vision for the future. This does not necessarily mean that the nation, being
imagined and ontologically subjective, is dangerous or wrong. While Tom Nairn calls

\(^{32}\) See Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of
\(^{33}\) Anderson, *Imagined Communities*.
\(^{34}\) Habermas, ‘The European Nation-State’, p.111.
nationalism the modern equivalent of neurosis in the individual, it also remains possible to see it as a useful source of personal identity and as providing the necessary structure for social co-operation and altruism. Having rejected the essentialism of the ethnie, it remains possible to embrace a form of existentialism, in which the intentional collective acceptance of national consciousness itself generates a range of beneficial effects: in short, national identity may be seen as one of Kurt Vonnegut’s foma: a ‘harmless untruth’ that makes one ‘brave and kind and healthy and happy.’

The contribution of the modernist view is to highlight the ways in which nationalism is not a description of fact but a political argument: a performance of power in which political actors (including the state and its representatives) seek to persuade the members of a society that they constitute a nation that is unified and that is (or should be) properly represented by its own state. Conceiving of the nation as a rhetorical device constructed by powerful actors in the pursuit of their particular interests demands that we pay careful and critical attention to those actors and their nationalist claims. This conception is in line with Stephanie Taylor's argument that the terms ‘nation’ and ‘national’ are best approached as discursive constructions. These constructions, she argues, are ideological, because they are implicated with power; because they are constitutive, because they legitimate or exclude, and because they set up subject positions which place the individuals who occupy them in certain relationships to each other and to resources.

The rhetorical force of invoking “the nation” or speaking of the “nation-state” is to suggest a degree of unity and, therefore, to obscure the fact of division and diversity within society. But the fundamental fact of states, according to liberal-conservative thinker Michael Oakeshott, is their irreducible diversity. Oakeshott is concerned not to debate the ontological priority of the state vis-à-vis the nation but to assert the priority of the individual over society, and to evaluate collectivities according to how well they respect the rights and the autonomous aspirations of individuals. States begin, he argues, as ‘mixed and miscellaneous collections of human beings precariously held together,

38 Cited in Anderson, Imagined Communities, p.5. Nationalism, Nairn expands, is the ‘equivalent of infantilism for societies’ and can be linked to ‘the dilemmas of helplessness thrust upon most of the world’.
disturbed by what they had swallowed and were unable to digest, and distracted by plausible or fanciful irredenta. As such, the character of a state can never be reduced to prescriptive definitions, and is best apprehended through metaphor. But not all metaphors are equally useful. Oakeshott flatly rejects the metaphor of ‘nation’, arguing that its organic and familial connotations posit an implausible degree of naturally occurring unity.

Oakeshott argues instead for the utility of the terms societas and universitas – terms derived from Roman law and normally given in English as partnership and corporation respectively – while stressing that they should be understood not as dogma, but as dispositions to push the potentialities of the state-form in one direction rather than another. The idea of state-as-societas is that of an association of individuals united by an acknowledgment of common rules of partnership; rules which are ‘indifferent to the pursuit or the achievement of any purpose.’ The idea of state-as-universitas, by contrast, is of persons associated in respect of some identified common purpose, in the pursuit of some acknowledged substantive end, or in the promotion of some specified enduring interest. A societas is an association of legal subjects; a universitas an association of role-performers related to a common purpose. A societas is a nomocracy, concerned with the production of laws; a universitas is a teleocracy, oriented towards the production of a specified outcome.

Although the societas and the universitas represent ‘two irreconcilable dispositions’, Oakeshott argues that they are not mutually exclusive. Indeed, he argues that any given state may be thought of as the ‘unresolved tension’ between them. While they are incompatible, and while neither can adequately explain the character of a particular state, they may achieve explanatory power ‘in the tensions of a partnership.’ This partnership – the societas cum universitate – imposes, according to Oakeshott, ‘a particular ambivalence upon all the institutions of a modern state and a specific ambiguity upon its

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43 Oakeshott, On Human Conduct, p.188. See also Isaiah Berlin, ‘Nationalism’, p.342.
45 Oakeshott, On Human Conduct, p.201.
46 Oakeshott, On Human Conduct, p.203.
47 Oakeshott, On Human Conduct, p.264.
48 Oakeshott, On Human Conduct, p.203.
49 Oakeshott, On Human Conduct, p.201.
This idea of the two dispositions coexisting uneasily is embedded in the historical emergence of Oakeshott’s rejected metaphor of the nation-state. If the state is more normally associated with the *societas*’ concern for laws, order and rights, its historical emergence also required, as Habermas argues, an ‘idea that was vivid and powerful enough to shape people’s convictions and appealed more strongly to their hearts and minds than the dry ideas of popular sovereignty and human rights.’ The idea of the nation, in this way, solved the nascent state’s problems of cohesion and legitimation, embedding new modes of political and economic organisation in a subjective idea of common purpose and belonging. So while Oakeshott finds the metaphor of the nation philosophically impoverished, it appears to retain, as Anderson notes, a very real political and rhetorical resonance.

Habermas’ argument as to the historical function of “the nation” is not merely of historical interest. As Roxanne Doty notes, the production of cohesion and legitimation are very much part of the modern purpose of “the nation”. Doty argues that sovereignty’s legitimacy is based on the state’s claim to represent ‘a political community with some sense of shared national identity’ and that, as a result, ‘[p]ractitioners of statecraft are ardent and continuously involved in the construction of the nation’. Doty’s argument here is closely aligned with Michael Saward’s discussion of ‘the representative claim’, in which he argues that representation should be understood ‘in terms of claims to be representative by a variety of political actors’ (emphasis in the original). Saward counterposes this view to Hanna Pitkin’s understanding of representation as ‘substantive acting for’. He objects that this view’s ‘resolute’ focus ‘on the representative’ tends to take the represented as ‘unproblematically given’ and he insists that attention should instead be placed on the ‘constitution of constituency’.

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52 Habermas, ‘The European Nation-State’, p.113.
53 Anderson identifies as a paradox “[t]he “political” power of nationalisms vs. their philosophical poverty and even incoherence.” (Anderson, *Imagined Communities*, p.5).
54 Doty. ‘Sovereignty and the Nation’, pp.122,123
A political claim to promote and strengthen an already existing national unity and identity can thus be viewed as the active construction of that unity and identity.\textsuperscript{58} It makes more sense, perhaps, to speak of verbs than of nouns: of an active attempt to \textit{unify} rather than of an extant \textit{unity}. The ‘inside/outside boundary’ of the state, as Doty argues, is neither simply territorial nor based upon political authority, but a ‘function of the state’s discursive authority’ which is defined as its ‘ability, in the face of ambiguity and uncertainty, to impose fixed and stable meanings about who belongs and who does not belong to the nation’.\textsuperscript{59} As Homi K. Bhabha notes, an investigation that focuses on the ‘performativity of language in the narratives of the nation’ directs us towards instances where ‘the image of cultural authority may be ambivalent because it is caught, uncertainly, in the act of “composing” its powerful image.’\textsuperscript{60} The state’s twin claims of authority and capacity both presuppose that there is an identifiable thing to represent.

The nation, with its connotations of a shared history, a shared culture and a shared destiny can be seen as a sympathetic ally of the state-as-\textit{universitas}. But a state might also be constructed on the model of the \textit{societas} without rejecting the language of nationhood.\textsuperscript{61} This approach is often called civic nationalism, where \textit{nationalism} connotes a sense of unity and belonging, and \textit{civic} asserts that this unity and belonging has emerged out of the common recognition of rules of belonging and conduct. It can be argued, however, that the recognition of common rules is insufficient to unite an individualistic, pluralistic and mobile society.\textsuperscript{62} It is unclear, for instance, why individuals would comply with rules that disadvantaged them at particular times, in the absence of a unity based on fellow feeling.
and a shared purpose. And if unity could be achieved through the recognition of common rules, it remains unclear why that unity would only apply within a single political society, rather than stretching across all states that shared similar rules. Just as Sheldon Wolin’s argument concerning the inadequacy of political society conceived of as a system of rules opens naturally into his discussion of ‘power and community’ (my emphasis), so nation-building projects that assert the centrality of common rules also tend to posit a common purpose and a shared sense of belonging.

Oakeshott, as a liberal, is uncomfortable with the universitas ‘corporate mode of association as a model for the state. The state-as-universitas, he complains, insists not just that its members metaphorically ‘speak the same language’ but that they ‘say the same thing’. Instead of the state existing to safeguard the liberties and facilitate the ambitions of its members, it claims agency for itself and status for its shared purpose. Even if this degree of state action were accepted (or welcomed) by individuals, it represents, for Oakeshott, a failure of individual nerve to assume the responsibilities of freedom. The rulers of the universitas, he worries, will become ‘lords’ who will ‘manage all those who live under them, and control their lives according to whichever policy they have chosen to adopt.’ The totalising rhetoric of a common purpose, he objects, fails to respect the irreducible diversity of free, autonomous individuals and addresses them instead as role-performers related to the common purpose. In these concerns he is in basic agreement with Stanley Benn and Richard Peters, who argue that when the function of the state is given primacy within society, then it must ‘guide and control all other associations to serve its own greater purpose.’ This view of the state, they observe, is ‘broadly the attitude of modern totalitarianism.’ Their fundamental concern is with the tendency of the universitas to annihilate individuality and diversity in its pursuit of a common

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63 For an argument for the implausibility of mutual advantage as a principle of justice, see Brian Barry, Justice as Impartiality. New York, Oxford University Press, 1995, pp.31-46. The point is put most clearly at p.33.
64 Wolin, Politics and Vision, pp.238-43.
66 Oakeshott, On Human Conduct, p.205.
purpose. The argument is that the universitas’ conception of its members as role-performers offends the Kantian imperative to treat people as ends in themselves, seeing them instead as means to its stipulated end.\textsuperscript{70}

But this liberal argument, and its implied claim that the neutral state of the societas would more effectively protect individual liberty and autonomy, is itself open to critique. The common rules of the societas, it can be argued, are themselves neither natural nor neutral, but reflective of the interests and values of powerful groupings of interest and identity within society. Indeed, the absence of a stipulated common purpose in the liberal conception can itself be seen as an articulation of a common purpose. And liberty within industrial societies may be, as Herbert Marcuse argues, a ‘powerful instrument of domination’\textsuperscript{71} as (in Barry Hindess’ gloss) ‘the “free” choices made by individual members of those societies serve to perpetuate a set of power relations that further the interests of those who dominate.’\textsuperscript{72} The individual freedom offered by the neutral liberal state can thus be criticised as simply the freedom to become unequal as a result of patterns of power. While liberals worry that focusing on the rights and agency of the collective threatens the freedoms of the individuals that comprise the collective, nation-builders might respond that it is only through the joint pursuit of a common objective that individual security and prosperity will be possible. While the liberal critique of the universitas implies that any sort of group personality and any sort of shared purpose is necessarily oppressive of individuality, it can also be argued that attending to a shared, collective purpose is a necessary means to the end of ensuring individual flourishing.\textsuperscript{73}

The relationship between contemporary nation-building projects and individualism is, in any case, far more ambivalent than is suggested by the liberal critique. In the case of New Zealand since 1999, the Government’s nation-building project has largely been articulated with the ideals of individual responsibility and reward and through the individuating norms of the knowledge economy. It promised to unleash rather than replace the private

\textsuperscript{71} Cited in Hindess, \textit{Discourses of Power}, p.87.
\textsuperscript{72} Hindess, \textit{Discourses of Power}, p.87.
sector, and it continued the already existing move from understanding welfare as state dependency, to understanding welfare as individual empowerment. It did not just offer a shared cultural purpose but also a shared economic purpose which, it was argued, would ensure security and opportunity for individuals. This sort of project might be seen as a form of the *universitas* that Oakeshott calls the

\[ \textit{civitas cupiditatis}: \text{a corporate productive enterprise, centred upon the exploitation of the material and human resources of an estate and managed by a government whose office it [is] to direct research, to suppress distracting engagements … to make instrumental rules for the conduct of the enterprise [and] to assign to each of its subjects his role in the undertaking}. \]

In analysing such a project, the more appropriate concern is not that difference and diversity is annihilated, but that difference and diversity comes to be evaluated according to its willingness and ability to contribute to the shared purpose. This sort of focus emphasises the importance of identifying how, and in whose interests, the officially-sanctioned shared purpose is constructed.

These concerns are echoed in the etymological twist that has seen the idea of the corporation acquire a new set of connotations salient to modern articulations of the state-as-*universitas*. While corporation, taken literally, carries personal, even organic connotations (think corporeal, or corpse, for instance) business and financial corporations are now widely seen in popular discourse as precisely *impersonal* entities. The term “corporate America”, for instance, would not normally be understood as referring to the American people united behind a common purpose, but to the practices of the business and financial corporations operating within the national economy, some of which practices might be taken as opposed to the interests of individuals and communities within the nation. While such corporations are, indeed, a number of persons united and able to act as a single legal person, their legal mandate to pursue profit for their

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77 The OED defines corporation as a ‘number of persons united, or regarded as united, in one body’. (This, and all other reference to the OED taken from OED online, retrieved from http://dictionary.oed.com.ezproxy.auckland.ac.nz/entrance.dtl.)
shareholders debar them from considering social or environmental considerations, where this would compromise profitability. The analogy of the business corporation broadens the critical focus on the state-as-universitas. Even if one does not share a liberal concern with the tendency of a shared purpose to marginalise individuality, it is still possible to critique the specific content of the shared purpose, and the extent to which it is able to marginalise alternative conceptions of the good. Where the shared purpose is articulated around economic imperatives, it can be seen to have moved from the realm of political debate into the putatively apolitical realm of competition and markets.78 And an emphasis on shared economic interests contains an implicit claim that internal diversity and difference is resolved, or dissolved, by these shared interests.79

The nation-building project of the fifth Labour Government, as we shall see, has been powerfully structured by economic considerations.80 In this project, national identity is seen, firstly, as a crucial source of the social cohesion and quiescence necessary to legitimize the new flexible regimes of accumulation associated with multinational capitalism. A strong sense of the nation as a unified ‘team of action’, 81 in other words, is expected to still concerns arising from inequalities within the nation. The new national identity, further, has been based around a set of attitudes and behaviours, such as flexibility, innovation and individual responsibility, that are also held to be necessary for national economic success. And a clearly articulated sense of national specificity, lastly, is held to be a potential source of national competitive advantage in global markets

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80 In the following two chapters I locate this project in an historical context that highlights how its vision of the nation drew on and was different from those held by earlier New Zealand governments and especially by earlier Labour governments.

81 Bertrand de Jouvenel, Sovereignty. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1957, pp.59-64. See also Andrew Sharp, Justice and the Maori: The Philosophy and Practice of Maori Claims in New Zealand since the 1970s. Auckland, Oxford University Press, 1997, p.298, where a ‘team of action’ is described as ‘an entity tolerably united in agreed purposes’.
supposedly ‘jaded by sameness’.\textsuperscript{82} This idea, that the assertion of national identity is unproblematically compatible with the pursuit of economic success in a competitive global economy, is predicated on a more fundamental assumption: that individual ambition, individual responsibility and individual reward are compatible with a sense of shared purpose, co-operation, obligation and altruism within society. But this assumption is vulnerable to critique from multiple directions.

From a leftist perspective, for instance, G.A. Cohen argues that the psychology required for market behaviour (the ‘self-interested motivation of market maximizers’\textsuperscript{83}) is inimical to the collective and altruistic mindset required by the state-as-\textit{universitas}. Along similar lines, Robert E. Lane argues that in a market society, ‘however much people sympathize with the unemployed, the handicapped, and even children, they will regard these non-productive others as externalities, for in the market they are undeserving’.\textsuperscript{84} In response, the architects of an economically driven nation building project might seek to remove the requirement of altruism by arguing that their project works to the mutual advantage of all members. This is true, to the extent that almost any shared purpose will deliver benefit to all, relative to an anarchical state of nature. But it is also true that some members might gain more by opting out of the demands of the \textit{universitas}. And in such cases, there is no reason to think that the self-interested subjects of mutual advantage will feel themselves bound by the unity of a putative shared purpose.\textsuperscript{85} Alongside the language of a mutually advantageous shared end, then, we might expect to find a language of shared values, in which the project is presented as deriving from a distinctive national culture and distinctive national values.

In a nation-building project structured by economic considerations, however, the precise national values, and the elements of national culture that can be deployed are tightly limited and carefully defined. Where such projects occur in broadly liberal states, moreover, the ideal of neutrality with regard to divergent conceptions of the good constrains the state’s capacity to promote an official “national” culture or shared

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\item \textsuperscript{82} This assumption underwrites much of the Labour Government’s national branding campaign. The quote is from Creative New Zealand (2002), \textit{Annual Report for Year Ending 2002}. Wellington, 2002, p.5.
\item \textsuperscript{84} Robert E. Lane, ‘Market Justice, Political Justice’, \textit{The American Political Science Review}, v.80, no.2., June 1986, p.397.
\item \textsuperscript{85} Barry, \textit{Justice as Impartiality}, p.33.
\end{itemize}
“national” goals. Communitarians such as Michael Sandel argue that the practices of the neutral state, (what he calls the ‘procedural republic’) tend to ‘undercut the kind of community on which [that republic] none the less depends.’\textsuperscript{86} The ‘forms of political life’ found in a welfare state that proclaims the primacy of individual rights, he argues, ‘have outrun the common purpose needed to sustain them’.\textsuperscript{87} While communitarians might be expected to support an official emphasis on the salience of the nation, they might also remain suspicious of a project whose economic agenda is based on attracting talented people, ideas and goods across the borders that communitarians remain anxious to control. Nation-building projects self-consciously attempt to construct and ground a sense of collective identity, of shared purpose and of the “common good”. But these attempts will struggle when the shared purpose is built around the individualizing norms of market behaviour and situated in a context of liberal neutrality. The market’s justice principle of earned desert\textsuperscript{88} and the ideal of state neutrality both tend to be corrosive of the fellow-feeling generated by a shared culture.

The tensions between the legitimation of mutual advantage and the legitimation of a subjective sense of belonging are mirrored in the theoretical distinction between collective and corporate group rights.\textsuperscript{89} On the ‘collective conception’, right-holding groups are defined by their shared interest in a particular good ‘rather than anything that distinguishes them as a group independently of that good.’\textsuperscript{90} The status or nature of the group is irrelevant on this conception, beyond its ability to aggregate the interests of individuals. It is impossible for a group to antedate or continue beyond the matter on which the interest is shared. Such a group is weak, however, in that it can have no hold over its members except for its capacity to best provide for their wants and needs. On the ‘corporate conception’, however, a group may claim rights on the basis of its status \textit{qua} group, rather than by virtue of the aggregated interests of its members. The moral

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88 Lane, ‘Market Justice, Political Justice’, pp.383-420 contraposes the market justice principle of earned desert to the ‘political’ justice principles of need and equality.


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standing entailed in right-holding is predicated upon agency rather than interest. The fifth Labour Government’s nation-building project has used a “not only but also” construction, arguing not only that it can best deliver the aggregated interests of its members, but also that the reality of the nation makes the irreducible diversity contained within the state a coherent entity able to formulate plans and pursue them.

It is insufficient to simply assume, as some liberals do, that the universitas’ attention to collective goals is necessarily opposed to individual liberty. Both the leftist and communitarian perspectives argue that such an attention is an important corrective to the vulnerabilities of individuals and sub-state groups within a free-market setting or within a neutral state context. But it is also insufficient to uncritically accept the claims of nation builders that their projects are mutually advantageous, or that they are consistent with a national culture. Any shared project distributes its costs and rewards unevenly, while drawing from the range of available values and identities in a highly selective manner. In specific settings, more precise questions must be asked of how a given construction of a shared purpose both facilitates and limits the free action of individuals and groups. An analysis of a nation-building project must attend to the precise ways in which it attempts to engage with the ‘unresolved tension’ between the societas and the universitas. It must attend to the precise ways in which the project holds in tension the mechanistic language of the state with the corporeal language of the nation; the primacy of law and individual rights with the assertion of a shared vision and purpose; the ideal of the neutral state with that of a perfectionist state; and the ideal of a nomocracy with that of a teleocracy.

While focusing on national interests and national identity may further the interests and identities of the members of a state, it is also true that an emphasis on the nation tends to reduce the moral status of individuals and groups within and outside the state to a calculation of the contribution they are willing and able to make to the shared purpose of the state-as-universitas. In a nation-building project structured by calculations of economic advantage, the unifying trope of "the nation" contains an implicit argument that putatively shared economic interests are able to resolve internal ‘difference, conflict and inequality.’ Difference in such a project may be not so much annihilated and rejected as

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91 See Jones, ‘Group Rights and Group Oppression’, p.363: ‘moral standing is a precondition of right-holding.’
92 Oakeshott, On Human Conduct, p.201.
93 Johnson, Governing Change, p.31.
managed through a process of incorporation into this “shared” purpose. An emphasis on
the nation may not necessarily threaten the rights of the individual. But it is not
necessarily the case, either, that simply asserting the salience and the unity of the nation
can dissolve its various internal lines of division and conflict. The claims of the
Government’s nation-building project are not descriptions of fact but performances of
power: attempts made by the state to control the terms of political debate, to naturalise
economic goals as primary, to present market-friendly attitudes and behaviours as
consistent with national values, and to secure consent to its preferred definitions of
problems and solutions.

The Nation as a State Personality

An assertion of the salience and unity of the nation can be seen as a rhetorical device by
which the state seeks to ground its vision of a shared purpose in a moral order presented
as the organically occurring common will. This is precisely the purpose of speaking of the
nation rather than the state. As Vincent Pecora wryly observes, ‘[f]ew have been willing
to die on a battlefield to extend the political life of a state bureaucracy’. 94 It is far easier,
politically speaking, to decry a dissenting individual or group as opposed to the values
and interests of the nation (or to praise them as promoting these values and interests) than
to criticise an individual or group for their opposition to the values and interests of the
state. The nation can be deployed as a state personality which attempts to underwrite a
juristic order of sovereignty with a moral order understood in terms of virtue and
loyalty. 95 The idea is of the nation as the personification of the state that both antedates
and generates the purpose that is to be pursued.

Crucially, however, the logic of state personality is the logic of political pluralism: if it is
possible, Runciman argues, ‘for the state to generate its own personality’, then it must
also be possible for ‘other groups [to] do likewise. And this means that moral order will
be opposed to juristic order, for the latter depends upon a categorical distinction between
the state and all other groups.’ 96 Herein lies a challenge for a nation-building project
which conceptualises the state as a universitas united in respect of a specified common
purpose. The state is led in such a project to assert its own personality as a focal point for
loyalty, and as the prerequisite for the agency and moral standing it requires to act in

95 Runciman, Pluralism, p.32.
96 Runciman, Pluralism, p.32.
pursuit of its objectives. But at the same time it also wants to marginalise other groups, for it ‘cannot accommodate other purposive associations whose purposes are eccentric or indifferent’ to its own.\textsuperscript{97}

The problem for the state is that sub-state groups clearly are able to generate loyalty-generating personalities of their own without state sanction. Even Hobbes, who viewed sub-state groups as problematic (‘like wormes in the entrayles of a naturall man’\textsuperscript{98}) and sought to disallow them wherever possible, accepted that associations of individuals within the state were able to generate their own personality. Indeed, the possession by sub-state groups of their own personality through the shared belief of their members is a crucial factor imposing on the state a need to generate one of its own. As Runciman notes, ‘if the state does not have such a personality, then its members may notice the lack. They may feel towards the associations in whose personalities they believe a loyalty which the state, unless possessed of its own personality, cannot match.’\textsuperscript{99} So while the logic of the \textit{universitas} is the logic of political pluralism, its political need is to manage and mediate internal difference so as to make it compatible with its own personality.

The construction of a personality for the state, effected through the language of the nation, is thus fundamentally about the political management of difference. In a nation-building project, each individual and sub-state group becomes a role-performer related to a common purpose. Like a secular Christ, the nation is used as a unifying rubric that breaks down dividing walls, uniting in its body formerly disparate parts. Divisions based on, \textit{inter alia}, ethnicity, gender and class are said to be dissolved by the over-riding salience of the nation. The irreducible diversity of individuals and sub-state groups can be accommodated within such a project, but only insofar as that diversity is willing and able to contribute to the common purpose, and to speak what David McCrone calls the ‘altruistic’ language of the national interest.\textsuperscript{100} (We should – as McCrone does - treat the word altruistic advisedly, given that, in the Labour Government’s usage at least, the

\textsuperscript{99} Runciman, \textit{Pluralism}, p.32.
national interest is not supposed to be opposed to, but compatible with, a regime of individual ambition that presupposes individual responsibility and reward).

The key statement of the fifth Labour Government’s economic agenda could even envisage an inclusive national identity not threatened but constituted by diversity.\(^\text{101}\) Here, following Doty, I take the Derridean notion of *examplarite* to be useful. Within even the most inclusive vision of the nation, Doty argues, there will always exist an element or elements that act as the ‘embodiment of exemplarity’.\(^\text{102}\) These elements can be thought of as ‘privileged discursive points … essential to the partial fixing of meanings and identities.’\(^\text{103}\) Even when a nation is officially understood as bicultural or multicultural, even when it is defined as tolerant, inclusive and diverse, it remains a rhetorical assertion of unity, such that internal difference can be organised according to a reading of national interests and objectives. This is what Stephen Turner calls the ‘inclusive exclusion’ of difference: difference is allowed, even celebrated, so long as that difference is oriented towards the shared purpose of the nation.\(^\text{104}\) Marginal groups within society are not necessarily ostracised: their difference may be managed instead by incorporating them within the nation, and relating them to an official shared purpose, on tightly controlled terms.\(^\text{105}\)

Thus, the fifth Labour Government could speak of leveraging the ‘unique contribution’ that Maori have to make to the Brand New Zealand project ‘for the benefit of all New Zealanders.’\(^\text{106}\) Artists, likewise, could be celebrated for the ‘pivotal role’ they play in ‘defining our point of difference and communicating our special values to the world … [offering us] a strong competitive advantage in a world jaded by sameness.\(^\text{107}\) The state-as-*universitas*, then, is fundamentally about the construction of a shared purpose, and the valuation of individuals and sub-state groups according to their willingness and ability to become role-performers related to that purpose. The language of national identity and national interests can be used to naturalise and de-politicise this practice, in which

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\(^{101}\) See OPM, *Growing an Innovative New Zealand*, p.5, where the Government articulates its vision of New Zealand as ‘a land where diversity is valued and reflected in our national identity’.

\(^{102}\) Doty, ‘Sovereignty and the Nation’, p.135.

\(^{103}\) Doty, ‘Sovereignty and the Nation’, p.127.

\(^{104}\) Turner, ‘A Political Economy of Identity’.

\(^{105}\) See Johnson, *Governing Change*, p.62.


difference is managed politically through practices of co-option rather than of ostracism. This is compatible, as we shall see, with a “Third Way” politics of inclusion; a politics, as Stuart Hall describes it ‘without adversaries’.\(^\text{108}\)

The ideal-type case of the state-as-\textit{universitas} is the state-at-war.\(^\text{109}\) During times of war, the state can call for an almost endless degree of loyalty and sacrifice in the name of a clearly-defined shared objective. It is during times of war that it becomes most acceptable to ask what citizens can do for their country, and to address citizens as role-performers. Giorgio Agamben makes a useful distinction between a ‘real’ state of exception and a ‘fictitious’ or ‘political’ state of exception,\(^\text{110}\) suggesting that states of emergency may sometimes be manufactured or exaggerated for political ends. From this perspective, it can be seen that the political language of contemporary nation-building projects often serves the purpose of putting the state on something approaching a war footing, through the production of a discourse in which national economies are engaged in a global war for resources, trade access and investment. Globalisation may be presented for this purpose as a competition between nation-states, and policy areas oriented towards success in a fiercely competitive global market. Co-operative domestic approaches may be urged in the pursuit of a national competitive advantage.\(^\text{111}\) The state–at-war (or nation-at-war) narrative structure is one of the main ways in which an economically-based “shared purpose” is naturalised and used to suppress alternative conceptions.

Insofar as it comes to be accepted as natural, however, a state-at-war narrative structure has the potential to structure how the rights of individuals and groups both within and outside the national space can be seen. The moral intuition that all human beings matter equally, and that their life chances should not be determined by arbitrary factors such as their place of birth or by partially-arbitrary factors such as their capacity for economic contribution is opposed by a nationalist discourse that reinforces the naturalness of national borders as moral boundaries. Such discourses make the value of those \textit{within} the nation conditional on their willingness and ability to contribute to the tightly defined national good, while at the same time denying, or attenuating, the moral claims of those...

\(^{109}\) Oakeshott, for instance, argues that the ‘purposeful disposition’ of a state conceived of as an ‘enterprise association’ makes it ‘inherently belligerent’ (Oakeshott, \textit{On Human Conduct}, p.273).
\(^{111}\) OPM, \textit{Growing an Innovative New Zealand}, p.25.
outside of the nation. Immigration, for instance, is typically restricted according to an applicant’s capacity to add value to the extant nation-state. From several perspectives, there is nothing wrong with this approach. Governments might be seen as primarily responsible to the people by whom they were elected, not to the wider human family. They are expected to attend first to the needs and interests of those they represent. The approach does assume, however, that we owe greater duties of obligation to some human beings than others, and that the criterion for this distinction is something as thoroughly arbitrary as the location of their birth (or in an immigration policy based on economic contribution, the arbitrary (though less thoroughly so) criterion of “talent”).\textsuperscript{112}

The \textit{Universitas}: Rights, Obligation and Authority

The corporate mode of governance of the state-as-\textit{universitas} requires that citizens come to see themselves as role performers related to the pursuit of a common purpose. But this idea is opposed to the liberal ideal of individual autonomy, and it raises questions about the basis of political obligation and authority. The question is of the right by which the state can request or require that its citizens adopt a specific set of attitudes, behaviours and objectives. The answer most commonly given to such questions is that of consent. On Jeremy Waldron’s account, liberalism’s commitment to ‘a conception of freedom and of respect for the capacity and agency’ of individuals generates a requirement that ‘all aspects of the social should either be made acceptable or be capable of being made acceptable to every last individual.’\textsuperscript{113} But the obdurate fact is that such consent is very rarely given to state sovereignty in a recognisable form such as a written or verbal contract. The alternative notion of “tacit consent”, if it is to carry any weight at all, must function as a mode of consent. It requires, in other words, a degree of intentionality generally absent in dealings between the citizen and the state.

While the notion of being obligated without choosing or even knowing it is a problematic one for liberal theorists, Margaret Gilbert defends an anti-voluntaristic notion of political

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\item[\textsuperscript{112}] The extent to which “talent” or other state measures of economic potential can be counted as matters of arbitrary chance or of personal choice will be discussed further in Chapter 7.
\item[\textsuperscript{113}] Jeremy Waldron, ‘Theoretical Foundations of Liberalism’, \textit{The Philosophical Quarterly}, v.37, no.147, April 1987, pp.127-50 at p.129. H.L.A. Hart, in ‘Are There Any Natural Rights?’, \textit{The Philosophical Review}, v.64, no.2, April 1955, pp.175-191 at p.183, states that by ‘promising to do or not do something it becomes morally legitimate for the person to whom the promise is given to determine how the promisor shall act.’
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obligation through her concepts of a ‘joint commitment’ and a ‘plural subject’.\footnote{114} According to Gilbert, our political obligation stems from nothing so grand as an original social contract, hypothetical or otherwise. Rather, it is affirmed every time we invoke “our” country, “our” constitution, or refer to our countrymen as “we” in our daily speech. There is a form of implied agreement – and thus a source of obligation – in this use of “we”, and Gilbert’s argument is that we enter into a ‘joint commitment’ through the simple act of intoning ‘our government.’ Her argument starts from people’s felt obligation and felt belonging and then defends these feelings as sensible and accurate. Our participation creates expectations on the part of others (our partners in the joint commitment) and over time, these others become entitled to have their expectations fulfilled.

As A. John Simmons points out however, and as Gilbert allows, it is hardly surprising that we speak of “us”, “our” and “we” in speaking of the nation. The naturalness of the national scale is inculcated in myriad quotidian ways: the national news, weather, flag, anthem, currency and so on.\footnote{115} It seems bizarre that we should be held to have obligated ourselves simply by internalising and perpetuating this, regardless of whether it is through conscious decision or habit. Simmons is surely correct to respond to Gilbert’s argument by claiming that she has failed to distinguish between felt and genuine obligation, between acts of acquiescence and obligation-generating acts, and between expectations and entitlements.\footnote{116} While Simmons’ argument is philosophically compelling, Gilbert’s retains a very real political application. As she notes, the ‘prevalence of the first person plural in the rhetoric of politicians’ suggests that her concepts of ‘plural subjects’ and ‘joint commitments’ are ‘well understood, at least at the pretheoretical level.’\footnote{117} Emphasising the salience of the nation in the context of a nation-state serves to naturalise thinking of one’s state, its institutions and peoples in terms of “we”, “us” and “ours”. And this naturalisation may serve to move citizens away from thinking critically about the basis of political obligations, and towards accepting them as natural and justified.

\footnote{115} This is a fundamental idea in Michael Billig, \textit{Banal Nationalism}. London, Sage, 1995.
\footnote{117} Gilbert, ‘Reconsidering the “Actual Contract” Theory’, p.253, in an echo of Anderson’s observation that nationalism retains a very real political power despite what might be seen as its philosophical weakness (Anderson, \textit{Imagined Communities}, p.5).
A similar point can be expressed in terms of the generation of political authority. Richard Friedman observes that the concept of authority ‘has been characteristically invoked in political philosophy to help define the nature of the cohesion or unity characteristic of human societies.’\(^{118}\) Common beliefs held on the ‘principle of authority’ are, according to Tocqueville, essential to the very existence of society,\(^{119}\) even though this principle of authority appears to run counter to the liberal insistence on individual autonomy and self-governance. Authority can generate this sort of cohesion and unity either through the ‘authoritative regulation of conduct’ or through the provision and acceptance of shared, authoritative beliefs: through its capacity to control what people do or what they think. Elites within society thus have a clear incentive to work towards having their preferred attitudes and behaviours accepted as ‘reflecting, embodying, or promoting’ the ‘shared beliefs’ of society.\(^{120}\) Controlling a population through coercion is both expensive and unstable. The generation of consent offers an attractive alternative.

It turns out to be very difficult to say anything about political obligation and authority that goes beyond Hanna Pitkin’s observation that ‘government and authority are concepts grammatically related to obligation and obedience’ and that a ‘legitimate government is one that you ought to obey and ought to consent to because *that is what the words mean*’\(^{121}\) (my emphasis). Pitkin, through a reading of Locke, derives an alternative to theories based on consent or joint commitment: that of ‘hypothetical consent’ by which a ‘legitimate government, ... one whose subjects are obligated to obey it, emerges as being one to which they ought to consent, quite apart from whether they have done so.’\(^{122}\) Pitkin accepts, of course, that such a conclusion ‘is likely to seem purely formal, and empty’; that it ‘will not satisfy someone genuinely puzzled about the justification of political obligation.’ But equally, this ‘quest for some “higher,” absolute, deductive justification is misguided.’ For insofar


\(^{119}\) Cited in Friedman, ‘On the Concept of Authority, p.123.

\(^{120}\) Friedman, ‘On the Concept of Authority, p.123.

\(^{121}\) Hanna Pitkin, ‘Obligation and Consent – II’, *The American Political Science Review*, v.60, no.1, March 1966, p.48. On the parallel answer to why promises oblige, Pitkin says ‘[b]eyond this one can only paraphrase Wittgenstein: there are a hundred reasons; there is no reason. There is no absolute, deductive answer ... beyond calling attention to the meaning of the words’ (Pitkin, ‘Obligation and Consent – II’, p.47).

as the grammatical point does not seem to still the question, does not get at what someone philosophically puzzled wants to ask, what is needed is not a better justification, but an account of why the philosopher is driven to ask the question [of why one is ever obligated to obey even legitimate authority] in the first place.\textsuperscript{123}

Pitkin argues that the question arises in an attempt to address the paradox that we are \textit{subject} to law, government and authority yet at the same time in \textit{judgment} on them. We are at once inferior and superior to them. The question is when obedience is demanded (or permissible) and when revolution is permissible (or demanded). And to this question there is no absolute answer: ‘if normally law and authority oblige and resistance requires justification ... then the crucial question seems to be: who is to say?’\textsuperscript{124} Or, if we press further, it seems that ‘[a]nyone can say, but not everyone who cares to say will judge correctly; he may be right or wrong. And who decides that?’\textsuperscript{125} ‘What is ultimately needed here’, Pitkin concludes, is not a better grasp of abstract principles, but ‘a better understanding of the role played in our language and our lives by assessments like “he was right,” “he made a bad decision,” “he betrayed the cause” and the like.’\textsuperscript{126} Demands for obligation, on a distinct though related view, might be justified on the grounds that they facilitate freedom, but even this formulation leaves very much open the question of how, and by whom, freedom is defined.

Pitkin leaves us in a position of radical indeterminacy: who, indeed, is to decide? The structure of her argument suggests a line of questioning that does not ask whether a specific policy initiative is \textit{good} policy, or even \textit{the right} policy, but by what criteria we deem such things good or bad, right or misguided. It suggests a critical analysis of the taken-for-granted common sense which political actors both assume and reinforce in their political practice. As well as examining how a corporate nation-building project addresses the individuals within society as a ‘plural subject’ bound by a joint commitment and united behind a ‘shared purpose’, it is also therefore necessary to analyse the ways in

\textsuperscript{123} Pitkin, ‘Obligation and Consent – II’, p.49.
\textsuperscript{125} Pitkin, ‘Obligation and Consent – II’, p.52.
\textsuperscript{126} Pitkin, ‘Obligation and Consent – II’, p.52.
which it seeks to present itself as “common sense” in order to obtain the active consent of those it co-opts. As Pitkin – and many others – have noted, questions of authority, legitimation, consent and obligation do not generally arise when all is well. The success of a nation-building project, therefore, is crucially dependant on its ability to control the terms of what it means for a policy initiative to work, or to be counted a good idea. It is dependant on its ability to define and naturalise ideas of what benefits are important, and how they should be distributed.

The normative force of such an ability is highlighted by Lukes, who regards the capacity to have one’s conception of desired outcomes accepted as natural as the ‘supreme exercise of power’. If, as Lukes assumes, a given prescription of desired outcomes works contrary to the real interests of others, then a serious question arises: ‘how do the powerful secure the [willing] compliance of those they dominate?’ In asking this question, Lukes is re-stating and developing what he takes to be Gramsci’s central question, of how ‘consent to capitalist exploitation’ comes to be secured under contemporary democratic conditions. Lukes goes on to describe the two broad answers that have been offered to Gramsci’s question. The first answer is that consent is secured through the psychological manufacture of subjectivities; the second that consent is secured on a more material basis, ‘through the co-ordination of the real … interests of dominant and subordinate groups.’ These two answers correlate to the two legitimations commonly offered by nation-building projects: that they are, firstly, consistent with and supportive of the broad contours of an already existing national character and, secondly, enabling of material benefit in challenging circumstances.

We saw earlier that, even if a focus on the collective good of the state-as-universitas is not necessarily oppressive to individuality, it remains plausible to hold that its totalising rhetoric retains the potential to marginalise internal lines of difference, such as those of class, gender or ethnicity. As such, it marginalises the dissenting claims of individuals and sub-state groups, and may plausibly be suspected of working counter to their interests. Under such circumstances, a question of political obligation arises, and we might ask why individuals and groups ought to conform to the demands and expectations

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127 Lukes, *Power*, p.27.
130 Lukes, *Power*, pp.7-9. Lukes associates the two arguments with Joseph Femia and Adam Przeworski respectively.
of the powerful. On Lukes’ account, even the apparent consent of the affected parties is not decisive, because a central feature of power is its capacity to influence, shape and determine the wants of others.\textsuperscript{131} As a result, it remains possible to give one’s consent to something contrary to one’s interests, and the question of obligation may remain unresolved. Accepting that power includes the discursive or definitional authority to have one’s reading of events widely accepted demands that close attention be paid to language. Language, that is to say, must not be seen as a mere descriptive tool. It is not incidental to relations of power but, rather, crucially implicated. An interest in the deeper question of how certain ends and criteria become naturalised and normalised necessitates a method that takes language and discourse seriously.

The nation, as produced by contemporary nation-building projects, is best understood as a myth, in the sense described by Roland Barthes.\textsuperscript{132} It is not a myth in the sense that it is false or fictitious, but by virtue of how it is used to naturalise and de-politicise specific constructions of policy problems and solutions, presenting them as common sense and in the common interest. Any construction of the nation serves to naturalise a specific view of the state and individuals, and a specific view of the relations of obligation and authority that arise between individuals, and between individuals and the state. The rubric of the nation serves to de-politicise the official construction of political problems and solutions, thus serving an anti-political function. It seeks to underpin the juristic order of the state with a subjective moral order, and to create a sense of co-operation and altruism within an economic order driven by competition and individualism. Drawing on a theory of speech acts that derives from both John Austin\textsuperscript{133} and Pierre Bourdieu,\textsuperscript{134} this thesis understands the Government’s nation-building project not as a description of established or intended facts but as a political argument: a performance of power in which the Government seeks to persuade the nation that its construction of political problems is plausible, and that its proposed solutions will indeed work towards the goals of national autonomy, unity and identity.

\textsuperscript{131} Lukes, \textit{Power}, p.7.
The state’s construction of a shared national purpose and its address of citizens as role-performers is generated by – and simultaneously constitutes – what Stuart Hall, following Gramsci, calls a ‘hegemonic project’: a discursive battle to define the ‘leading ideas which shape political consciousness and influence our political practice and allegiances – those of “freedom”, “choice”, “the people”, “the public good”, and what constitutes, and who can and cannot claim, [New Zealandness].’ The aim is not necessarily to prescribe exact answers but to set the ‘outer limit or horizon of thought in a society.’

A hegemony marked by “pragmatism” and empiricism, for instance, makes it difficult for appeals to values or overriding ideals to even be heard within the public sphere. Within such a hegemony, a national shared purpose may be presented as a necessary response to the challenges and opportunities of globalisation. But the nature of contemporary globalisation strongly structures the way in which the nation may be narrated, and it generates strong incentives to construct it around the attitudes and behaviours seen as necessary for global economic competitiveness. The power of financial and business interests, both within and outside the state, encourages governments to define ‘the public good’ in terms of net economic benefit; ‘freedom’ in terms of freedom from state interference; ‘choice’ in terms of the options available within a market system and ‘the people’ according to the criteria demanded by efficient market activity.

The question, ultimately, is one of power, and of the link between power and knowledge. Rather than appealing to a discourse of ultimate truth (philosophy) that could ‘establish the limits of power’s right’, it may be useful to follow Foucault in reordering that traditional question of political philosophy, asking instead: ‘What are the rules of right that power implements to produce discourses of truth?’ How, in other words, does power legitimate itself so as to have its definitions of problems and solutions accepted as reasonable and true? To repeat, this sort of question analyses not the content or the empirical results of a political project, but the rules and the ‘orders of discourse’ by which policies are judged appropriate, and results judged beneficial. When the powerful appeal to the liberal, deontological legitimation of consent, or to the empirical,

consequentialist legitimation of mutual advantage, Foucault’s approach insists that we look harder, asking instead how power has been able to generate spontaneous consent, and to define the terms in which mutual advantage can be calculated.

As liberating as Foucault’s rearticulation might seem, it is also deeply troubling: the oppressed, silenced, dominated and marginalised can no longer appeal, under his schema, to any notion of fairness or desert based on their rights, or on any objective idea of truth. They can no longer appeal to the ‘regulated and codified logic of right and sovereignty, [but must employ] the strategic and warlike logic of struggle.’ The social field comes to be understood as an endless play of language games, with no way of determining the relative validity or merit of any of the various positions taken. But it is dangerously limiting to abandon the notions of truth and rights and, with them, certain possibilities for normative judgment. In analysing power, we are interested in at least asking whether it has been exercised benevolently or harmfully. Power, as Foucault himself acknowledges, is productive as well as oppressive. The demarcations it establishes within society enable as well as constrain individual agency. The foundational creation story of western civilisation, after all, is fundamentally about the productive effects of the performances of power embedded in the practices of naming and separating. So while we should remain sensitive and sceptical about the impulse of power to construct a hegemonic common sense as a means of self-legitimation, we should also maintain that not every act of the powerful is harmful.

Norman Fairclough describes a discourse as a particular representation of the political world. Rather than simply reflecting a ‘social or political “reality”’, a discourse, as Frank Fischer explains, ‘actually constitutes much of the reality that has to be explained.’ Discourse, in other words, is an active process that is involved not just in the description but also, more actively, in the production of knowledge on a subject. But knowledge is not produced in limitless or arbitrary ways. The ‘discursive constitution of

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141 Foucault, *Society Must be Defended*, p.281.
society’, as Fischer glosses Fairclough’s argument, ‘does not stem from a free play of ideas in people’s heads’ but emerges, rather, ‘from practices that are rooted in and oriented to basic social structures and ideological practices’. The competition between divergent discourses to be accepted as plausible and compelling both reflects and constitutes relations of power within a society. As Fairclough notes, ‘[o]ne aspect of power is the capacity to impose and maintain a particular structuring of some domain’. A political discourse posits divisions on the world: a particular discourse of immigration, for instance, can divide immigrants into ‘human capital’ and ‘simple labour’ and a certain discourse of the nation can determine the boundaries of belonging, and the relative status of those who are included, and those who are not. Bourdieu describes such divisions as ‘symbolic violence’, although, as we have seen, the practice of division can be productive as well as repressive.

The nation, I have argued, is discursively constructed by a variety of actors for a variety of specific purposes. But the social-constructedness of the nation – what Searle might call its ontological subjectivity – does not stop it from being powerful and effective in people’s lives. The shared purpose and exemplary subject of the state-as-universitas have important effects in the lives of individuals, effects that may facilitate, hinder or fundamentally shape the pursuit of their conceptions of the good. The nation is, to again use Searle’s terminology, an ‘institutional fact’, a fact that exists only by virtue of a collective agreement that it does, but a fact nonetheless. As Frank Fischer argues, a focus on discourse does not commit one to ‘naively take the world to move just because of words.’ The specific ways in which categories such as the nation, national identity and national interests are constructed constitute orders of discourse that both facilitate and constrain action, making certain subjectivities, practices and ways of being more available, and appear more sensible than others. This is consistent with a Gramscian approach, which does not oppose language and materiality, as post-Marxism does, but sees them as intersubjectively constituted.

145 Fischer, Reframing Public Policy, p.76.
148 Fairclough, New Labour, p.4.
150 Fischer, Reframing Public Policy, p.viii.
Language and discourse are important to the extent that they impact on people’s lives by legitimating systems of domination and even co-opting subjects into their own domination through the construction of a hegemonic common sense. Discourse creates subjectivities, as subjects come to accept the way they are addressed or, in Althusserian terminology, interpellated, in the social sphere. If an individual’s identity is formed and confirmed within their matrix of social relations, then the construction in discourse of a widely-accepted understanding of the exemplary subject, and of a shared purpose to which subjects are related as role-performers has the potential to powerfully shape subjectivities. But, as Stuart Hall and his collaborators argue, ruling ideas are not just implicated in ‘mental subordination’ but are also embedded in more durable institutions and policy settings. As well as subjectivities then, discourse is able to shape practices, including policies, systems of accounting, institutional forms, and arrangements such as funding application forms, all of which serve to embed and further normalise the values and objectives that generate them.

The battle to define key political terms, then, is played out both in political and institutional practices but also, and fundamentally, in the practice of political language. The nature of a hegemonic project is to naturalise preferred definitions and conceptions of key political ideas, such that certain policy problems and solutions, and certain institutional arrangements are seen as legitimate, necessary or inevitable. In the process, other issues and problems are implicitly ruled out of political consideration. The importance of these processes of politicisation and de-politicisation makes the study of concrete policy areas a good starting point for a broader analysis of hegemony and power. As Carol Bacchi notes, ‘policy “problems” do not exist separate from their representations.’ As a result, she argues, ‘[r]epresentations of a problem must … be closely examined to see what assumptions underpin different representations, what effects follow from them, and how subjects are constituted within them.’ And as E.E. Schattschneider has argued, the ability to define alternatives can be seen as the ‘supreme

instrument of power. Lukes goes somewhat further, arguing that in fact the supreme instrument of power is the ability to have one’s preferences and interests accepted as natural, such that others are not even aware that alternatives have been defined, or that other readings were even possible.

The method of discourse analysis understands language and discourse as crucially implicated in patterns of power in modern societies. Following John Austen, this thesis understands language as a practice that does not just reflect but also influences the objective world. But it is also informed by Bourdieu’s ‘decisive critique’ of Austen and pays particular attention to the patterns of power within society that determine how certain speakers are able to speak with persuasion and authority and thus, to have their preferred definitions and divisions of the social world accepted as sensible and natural. It is an approach that is sensitive not just to the internal logic of speech acts, but also to the positions of power from which they emanate and the positions in which they are received – positions which fundamentally determine the illocutionary and perlocutionary force of the acts. In terms of method, I draw on the pattern of Critical Discourse Analysis explicated by Norman Fairclough which, as Fischer observes, synthesises several different approaches to discourse analysis and, importantly, articulates discursive practices with broader economic and ideological forces.

On Fairclough’s approach, Critical Discourse Analysis contains three stages: description, interpretation and explanation. The descriptive stage identifies the formal features of the text in question, whether that text be a policy document, a parliamentary speech or a radio interview. This stage draws attention to how words have been carefully defined and re-defined, and how syntax and grammar work to create meanings that are not stated explicitly. The interpretative stage gives an account of the interaction between the text and its producers, and between the text and its intended audience. It asks what work the text in question is expected to do or, in Austen’s terminology, what its illocutionary force

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158 See Lukes, Power, pp.6-7, 20 for his treatment of Scahttschneider.
159 Austen, How to Do Things With Words.
161 See Fairclough, Language and Power.
162 Fischer, Reframing Public Policy, p.74-76.
is. The explanatory stage gives an account of the durable social structures and wider forces that shape these interactions. This last process rests on a series of normative assumptions. For Fairclough, these derive from his socialist politics. In this thesis, they derive from the theoretical framework established above: a critique of the state-as-universitas based on its reductive address of individuality and diversity, and a critical concern with the capacity of the power of financial capital to dominate all other forms of power within society, including democratic power, while rendering its operation natural, apolitical and invisible. In the following examination of the Government’s overall political project and of three discrete policy areas I describe what has been said, interpret it in the light of the texts’ processes of production and reception, and seek to explain it with reference to the theoretical framework outlined above.

**Conclusion**

An emphasis on national identity posits the nation as externally differentiated and internally coherent. Emphasising the external differentiation of the nation elides questions of our moral responsibilities to those outside the nation. Emphasising the internal unity of the nation elides questions of the moral importance of groupings of identity and interest within the nation. Liberals such as Oakeshott prefer the model of the societas: the liberal ideal of individual liberty within a neutral state which contents itself with an arbitral function. But this liberal ideal can itself be critiqued and a focus on the “shared” purpose of a group, in turn, defended. A comprehensive analysis of a specific nation-building project cannot just protest the totalising rhetoric of the nation, but must demonstrate how the personality and the purposes that it constructs are in some way opposed to the best interests of its subjects. Nation-building governments defend their projects on the basis of shared advantage and popular consent. But it is necessary to also ask how the criteria for shared advantage come to be accepted as common-sense, how consent is manufactured within society, and whose interests these constructions serve.

This chapter began with an argument for thinking of state sovereignty in terms of the attempts by a social actor to present a relationship of authority between itself and a given population as natural and consensual. In practical terms, the successful production of ‘state effects’ or ‘sovereignty effects’ relies on several things – delivering desired ends (including defining what counts as a desired end), and engendering a sense of unity, so as to make issues of power, obligation and authority invisible. In this light, nation-building projects can be read as attempts to re-ground state authority. Invoking both material
interests (the economic benefit of a national branding and of new national attitudes and behaviours) and a collective sense of belonging (creating national subjectivities) nation-building projects are aimed at the production of “spontaneous” consent. They seek to naturalise the practice of thinking and acting in terms of “we”, “us” and “our” with regard to the nation. The nation here continues to perform its historical function of lending cohesion and legitimacy to the state. The myth of the nation is deployed, most fundamentally, to assert the continuing salience of the nation-state even as the state’s capacity for autonomous action is increasingly said to be constrained by global forces. It is also used to naturalise the inside/outside divide, asserting a commonality of interest and purpose (and thus to deny division and conflict) within the state, and attenuating the moral claims of those outside.

This thesis asks political theoretical questions of individual and group rights, power, obligation and authority, in order to investigate the dangers of the emphases and elisions of contemporary nation-building projects. But it is grounded in the real-world political practice of the fifth Labour Government in New Zealand between 1999 and 2007. In focusing on the practices of the political elites I may be ignoring Foucault’s injunction to ‘cut off the king’s head’, but I am doing so in a way that remains sensitive to the broader systems of power and control operating in society and the economy. The Government’s nation-building project has attempted to produce the taken-for-granted common sense of society within a context where other powerful actors – the business sector and the media, for example – also wield substantial discursive power. Given these constraints, this thesis examines how various actors including but not limited to the state are able to present their preferred interests and values as consistent with the general good, and it explores how the generation of authoritative beliefs is able to remove contestable issues from the realm of politics.

In the following chapter I situate my examination in the specific spatial setting of New Zealand, presenting a brief history of national identity and state involvement in New Zealand society. I also situate it in a precise temporal context: the current moment that can be variously described as late-multinational capitalism, globalisation and after-neoliberalism, terms that all express a sense of uncertainty and flux. I introduce and

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163 Habermas, ‘The European Nation-State’, p.113; Runciman, Pluralism, p.39
discuss therefore a variety of views on the status and salience of the nation-state in the contemporary era of globalisation. The specificities of New Zealand’s history, culture and geo-economic situation combine with the specificities of contemporary globalisation to produce a series of incentives for the New Zealand state to invest in a nation-building project, and to structure it around a reading of economic imperatives. These incentives are not unique to New Zealand but are, I argue, felt particularly keenly here, rendering New Zealand an interesting site in which to examine the contemporary relationship between nations, states and globalisation. Before turning, in the subsequent chapter, to a direct engagement with the Government’s agenda for change, I prefigure some of the main tensions that might be expected to arise in a political project that simultaneously embraces global economic engagement and the knowledge economy on the one hand, and the importance of a strong, confident cultural identity on the other.
CHAPTER THREE: SITUATING THE ANALYSIS

From the first place of liquid darkness, within the second place of air and light, I set down the following record with its mixture of fact and truths and memories of truths and its direction always towards the Third Place, where the starting point is myth.¹

Always to islanders danger
Is what comes over the sea;
Over the yellow sand and the clear
Shallows²

The State-Nation of New Zealand

Since 1999, New Zealand’s fifth Labour Government has placed considerable emphasis on the rhetorical figure of the nation. The Government announced its intention to defend and promote a strong, confident national identity from its first days in power, and has continued to present this goal as a central objective ever since.³ Indeed, the theme of national identity was named in 2006 as one of only three government priorities for the ‘decade until 2016’.⁴ Labour has understood its discursive emphasis on the nation as a response to both the economic and the cultural implications of globalisation. The nation-building project was not seen as opposed to the simultaneous goal of economic transformation. Rather, the two were seen as mutually dependant. Economic growth was seen as a necessary prerequisite for the preservation and development of national identity, while the ‘strengthening of national identity’ and the promotion of an attractive national image were seen as crucial components of sustainable economic growth.⁵ The political innovations witnessed since 1999 are best understood in the light of the history of state involvement in New Zealand’s economy, society and culture. In this section I present such a history, and argue that New Zealand’s unique experience of globalisation and

³ National identity was prominent in Labour’s initial parliamentary statement of intent (Helen Clark, ‘Speech from the Throne [1999]’, delivered by Sir Michael Hardie Boys, in NZPD, 21 December 1999), was one of the six key goals announced in the 2000 Budget (see New Zealand Treasury, ‘Budget 2000 Overview’, retrieved 13 August 2004 from http://www.treasury.govt.nz/budget2000/summary/overview/introduction.asp) and was named as one of the key three themes in the 2006 Budget (see Michael Cullen, in NZPD 18 May 2006).
national identity formation has rendered the country exemplary rather than anomalous in terms of the contemporary relationships between globalisation and nation-states. As such, the political practices of nation-building and economic nationalism in contemporary New Zealand generate important insights for the study of similar practices in other countries.

In the previous chapter we saw the different understandings of the nation held by primordialists and modernists. It is, I take it, difficult to be a primordialist when thinking about New Zealand.\textsuperscript{6} If there is a New Zealand nation, it is not one that emerged out of the mists of time seeking political expression in the form of its own state. It has, instead, a widely accepted date of origin: February 6, 1840.\textsuperscript{7} While this makes New Zealand a relatively old state in international terms, it also makes it a state with no national pre-history. Or, better put, it is one in which the reality of an indigenous long-history has been officially incorporated into a relatively short post-1840 national history.\textsuperscript{8} New Zealand, in fact, can be usefully thought of as a state-nation: a place in which the state assumed responsibility for building a viable nation. (Having argued for the utility of the locution “state-nation”, I do not now intend to use it often. I want to avoid any possible confusion with the German \textit{staatsnation} which, meaning the ‘active self-determining political nation’\textsuperscript{9} denotes something quite different). Rather, I use the term “state-nation” as an ontological claim about the New Zealand state. The commonly used term “nation-state” gives lexical priority to the nation, thus implying a previously existing national community that has gained political expression in the form of a state. In New Zealand, it is clear that this was not the case. Instead, the New Zealand state has historically been an active participant in the construction of the nation as a response to the country’s vulnerable position within the world economy.

\textsuperscript{6} In fact, I think it is difficult to maintain a pure primordialist account of any actually existing nation-state. In even the most ancient of nations, a sense of national unity can be seen as actively constructed, with national histories and traditions “invented” or at least carefully constructed for the purpose. (See, for a classic account, Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger (eds), \textit{The Invention of Tradition}. Canto ed., Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1992 and, of the Scottish case, David McCrone, Angela Morris and Richard Kiely, \textit{Scotland the Brand: the Making of Scottish Heritage}. Edinburgh, Polygon, 1999).

\textsuperscript{7} The country’s birth is sometimes, though less usually, dated to the gazetting of crown sovereignty. In any case, the central point – that the nation has an identifiable and relatively recent point of origin – holds true.

\textsuperscript{8} This formulation draws on Stephen Turner, ‘A New Old Country’, a chapter widely distributed in samizdat format in local academic circles.

Bruce Jesson describes New Zealand as a ‘state-created society’ in which ‘the state did not emerge from some already existing social order, some civil society, but instead created it.’\textsuperscript{10} The state in New Zealand, he argues, was responsible for creating the ‘social structure, as well as the economic infrastructure’ of the country, resulting in what he terms a ‘hollow society’\textsuperscript{11}. New Zealand’s institutions of civil society, rather than developing organically in response to felt needs, were either imported entire or instituted by the state. Brian Easton, developing Jesson’s argument, relates how local government, universities and unions, having been established and empowered by the state, were unable or unwilling to resist state antipathy in the 1980s.\textsuperscript{12} Gary Hawke argues that the ‘close-knit homogenous’ nature of this hollow society facilitated greater freedom for the state to ‘experiment with collective action’ and generated greater expectations that the state ‘act where it could be useful’.\textsuperscript{13} And French political scientist Andre Siegfried noted in 1904 the tendency of colonials within what he called New Zealand’s ‘simple’ society to appeal to the State (rather than to their own initiative or the help of the community) in the event of any difficulty.\textsuperscript{14}

The widespread acceptance of the ‘essential goodness of state action’\textsuperscript{15} was, according to Michael Bassett, predicated on pragmatism rather than principle. The state’s adherence to what he calls a ‘socialism without doctrines’ was based on a plausible assumption that collective action through the mechanisms of the state offered the best chance of defending New Zealand from its geo-economic vulnerabilities. Even Bassett, generally a trenchant critic of state over-involvement in the economy, allows that the results of the state’s activity in the early days of colonisation were ‘largely beneficial’, even when they moved beyond the provision of public goods into the provision of assistance to agriculture.\textsuperscript{16} In a small, distant and new society, Hawke argues, it was always likely that the state would be used whenever it was seen as ‘likely to be useful, irrespective of European ideas of

\textsuperscript{10} Bruce Jesson, \textit{Only Their Purpose is Mad}. Palmerston North, Dunmore Press, 1999, p.205.
\textsuperscript{11} Jesson, \textit{Only Their Purpose is Mad}, p.205.
\textsuperscript{15} Bassett, \textit{The State in New Zealand}, p.93.
\textsuperscript{16} Bassett, \textit{The State in New Zealand}, p.18.
propriety.' Usefully, Hawke notes that the state’s accepted responsibility for protecting its citizens against foreigners took on a distinct meaning in New Zealand. Rather than military security, the New Zealand state was most involved with ensuring economic security, through the use of government corporations or government patronage of local concerns to compete with overseas business interests in New Zealand.  

In its earliest days New Zealand was, as Donald Denoon notes, fully within the orbit of Great Britain, the dominant power in the world that was ‘made one during the nineteenth century.’ Denoon understands ‘New Zealand’s colonial development as a direct consequence of British migration, capital and market opportunities’, stating that without British markets, it is ‘difficult to see how New Zealanders could have escaped a mere subsistence.’ The structure of New Zealand’s economy meant that it integrated easily into a global trading system established by the major players overseas. In terms of understanding contemporary national responses to globalisation, it is important to note that New Zealand was founded and formed by the globalising British Empire and its circuits of trade, investment and migration. The country’s economic viability was predicated on its existence as the farm of the British Commonwealth. This status was facilitated by technology, and specifically by the advent of refrigerated shipping in the late 19th century, but also by a vision of New Zealand’s place in the world and its chances for security and prosperity. Indeed, New Zealand’s eventual turn to the wider world was not an entirely voluntary one, but shaped by the United Kingdom’s decision to join the European Economic Community. Later, in response to economic considerations, the country was presented as part of Asia, despite a lack of such self-identification on the part of New Zealanders.

20 Denoon, Settler Capitalism, p.55.
The settlement of New Zealand, according to Stephen Turner, relied on a ‘political economy of identity’ amenable to the “real” task of settlement: ensuring its viability through the attraction of more settlers and more investment. Constructions of the new nation, that is to say, worked to ensure the state’s viability by positing specific ideas of place and time. New Zealand was represented as a ‘better Britain’, in James Belich’s phrase, or a ‘Britain of the South’, in Geoff Park’s, rather than imagined on its own spatial terms. Representations of the new nation worked to assure the centres of international capital that New Zealand was a safe and familiar destination for investment and immigration. New Zealand’s economic reliance on global flows naturally found a cultural expression. Rather than seeking to forget or reject the “mother country”, early settlers, according to Bill Willmott, came to New Zealand with the goal of ‘reproducing British society in the antipodes’. Willmott claims that for ‘a long time … the dominant segments of Pakeha society in New Zealand considered themselves British and looked with disdain on anything “New Zealand” as inferior’ and found in maintaining their ‘identity with English culture’ a means by which to assert their status.

Stuart Greif concludes that ‘New Zealand was never designed to be a sovereign state… it was established as a colony in the truest sense of the word, a place where British excess population could go without losing their national identity.’ As late as 1974, following Britain’s economic turn towards Europe, National Prime Minister Robert Muldoon defied economic determinism by insisting that ‘[n]o European Economic Community and no British or New Zealand government will break the ties that bind us to the lands from which we came’. Historian James Belich describes Muldoon’s administration as the last attempt to preserve a system (of national security and prosperity underwritten by a

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28 Belich, Paradise Reforged, p.400.
privileged relationship with Britain) that was crumbling.\textsuperscript{29} Despite Muldoon’s attachment to Britain, his internationalism was constructed on a perception of New Zealand’s national interests. His policies, putting to one side the question of their coherence or their effectiveness, represented an attempt at economic nation-building.\textsuperscript{30}

This cultural affinity for the colonial centre can be partly explained by history.\textsuperscript{31} The New Zealand state achieved independence from Britain without any traumatic event capable of acting as a unifying national myth of origin. There was no war of liberation or secession capable of generating great heroes or mythologies.\textsuperscript{32} This of course, does not imply that the New Zealand nation-state came into being without violence and deceit, merely that the conflict that took place on New Zealand soil did not serve to separate the fledgling society from its imperial parent but, rather, to reinforce the mother-daughter bond and to create ambivalent lines of tension within the nation. Monuments can still be found commemorating the ‘brave men belonging to the Imperial and Colonial forces and the friendly Maoris who gave their lives’ (my emphasis) in the building of the new nation,\textsuperscript{33} presumably over and against unfriendly Maori. Instead of memorials commemorating heroes of national liberation, war memorials in New Zealand typically record the deaths of New Zealanders in wars fought overseas alongside British and allied troops. And Edmund Hillary’s conquest of Mount Everest in 1953, now accepted as an iconic national event, was described at the time by Acting Prime Minister Keith Holyoake as a ‘marvellous coronation present for the Queen’.\textsuperscript{34}

\textsuperscript{29} Belich, \textit{Paradise Reforged}, p.394.
\textsuperscript{30} Brian Easton, for example, accords Muldoon a chapter in his book \textit{The Nationbuilders}, concluding that Muldoon’s ambition to leave New Zealand as well off economically as when he took over was ‘not a dishonourable aim … merely an impossible one.’ (Brian Easton, \textit{The Nationbuilders}. Auckland, Auckland University Press, 2001, p.252).
\textsuperscript{31} Miles Fairburn argues that the timing of New Zealand’s founding left the country with insufficient time to develop a distinctive culture and left it thereby highly susceptible to external influences (among which he emphasises Australia and the United States as well as Britain). New Zealand’s point of exceptionalism, he concludes, may well be its anti-exceptionalism (Miles Fairburn, ‘Is there a Good Case for New Zealand Exceptionalism?’, in Tony Ballantyne and Brian Moloughney (eds), \textit{Disputed Histories: Imagining New Zealand’s Pasts}. Dunedin, Otago University Press, 2006, pp.143-168).
\textsuperscript{32} In a different setting, note Patricia Goff argument that Canada’s ‘nonrevolutionary past leaves few myths, heroes and symbols around which the Canadian people can rally.’ (Goff, ‘Invisible Borders: Economic Liberalization and National Identity’, \textit{International Studies Quarterly}, v.44, 2000, p.542).
\textsuperscript{33} This particular inscription is found on the side of a busy street near the middle of New Zealand’s largest city, Auckland.
\textsuperscript{34} Cited by Belich in \textit{Paradise Reforged}, p.392.
If the political economy of early New Zealand was shaped by, and generated a managed relationship between physical and imagined place, the same is true with regard to time and history. According to Stephen Turner, the ‘contradictory demands’ inherent in settling an already settled country – to simultaneously forget the old country … [and to] ignore people who already inhabit the new country’ – engender a difficulty with facing and addressing the past. National narratives in settler societies, in consequence, are strongly oriented towards the present and the future.\textsuperscript{35} Refusing to treat with the past does not, of course, diminish its influence. In a globalising world where it is increasingly accepted that ‘no country is an island’,\textsuperscript{36} it is also true, to adapt New Zealand author Janet Frame, that no country is an is-land.\textsuperscript{37} That is to say, a country’s present exists in relation to the events of the past (and the meanings attributed to those events) as well as to its vision of future goals and possibilities. Accepting Benedict Anderson’s observation that a national apprehension of time and space is developed through long, continuous narratives, Tony Bennett notes that ‘the construction of an “immemorial past” … is particularly evident in, \textit{and problematic for}, settler societies’\textsuperscript{38} (my emphasis). The precise temporal situating of the “birth” of settler nations means that questions about the constructed, interested nature of the nation become possible.\textsuperscript{39} In response, the ‘time of Aboriginality’ is “nationalised” as a way of ‘stretching a national past back beyond [settlers’] own too clearly identifiable … beginnings’.\textsuperscript{40}

The danger of this sort of articulation from the perspective of the descendants of the colonisers is that it confers a sense of ownership on the original inhabitants. In response to this problem, a discourse of equivalence and continuity is utilised, as when New Zealand’s national museum talks of ‘how the various cultures that have peopled New Zealand have developed, have interacted with one another and have been creating new

\textsuperscript{35} Turner, ‘Settlement as Forgetting’, p.21.  
\textsuperscript{36} The phrase ‘no country is an island’ was the title of a report by the think-tank The New Zealand Institute (\textit{No country is an Island: Moving the New Zealand Economy Forward by Taking it to the World}. Discussion Paper 2005/3, Auckland, 2005) but the general idea is embodied in the Government’s stated intention to improve New Zealand’s global connectedness.  
\textsuperscript{37} Frame, \textit{To the Is-land}.  
\textsuperscript{39} See Andrew Sharp, ‘The Treaty in the Real Life of the Constitution’, in Michael Belgrave, Merata Kawharu and David Williams (eds), \textit{Waitangi Revisited: Perspectives on the Treaty of Waitangi}. 2nd ed., Auckland, Oxford University Press, 2005, p.310, where Sharp presents (and subsequently qualifies) the view that when ‘acts of constitutional creation are identifiable, so are their authors, the authority they claimed to create them, and the intentions they had in constructing them.’  
\textsuperscript{40} Bennett, in Dibley, \textit{Museum, Native, Nation}, p.16.
and distinct cultures as well as a national identity.’ 41 This, and related statements such as ‘[f]or more than 1,000 years New Zealand has been settled by wave after wave of immigrants’, 42 while hard to fault historically, obscure questions of priority and primacy, presenting each migratory wave as equivalent. 43 The same discourse of equivalence is present in the recent claims to indigeneity made by prominent white New Zealanders including Labour minister Trevor Mallard. 44 Mallard’s claim was taken as a fact by a 2004 Ministry of Social Development document which stated that ‘the “indigenisation” of non-Maori New Zealanders requires new ways of thinking about the relationship between Maori as tangata whenua, and those who have subsequently made New Zealand home.’ 45

According to Stephen Turner, the political economy of identity present in the earliest constructions of New Zealand is also at work in contemporary New Zealand. He notes the presence of a ‘corporatised, media-driven and government-sponsored’ national identity, driven by the ‘idea that New Zealand is a business – a corporation’. This, he says, is a ‘politics of identity and belonging whose historical basis is fully and reductively economic’. 46 The contemporary commitment to developing a ‘consistent brand image of New Zealand across our industry sectors’ 47 towards the end of communicating the country’s ‘special values to the world’, offering it thereby a ‘strong competitive advantage in a world jaded by sameness’ 48 is thus in basic continuity with what have always been taken by the state to be the imperatives of New Zealand history. New Zealand nationalism is, on this view, inherently future oriented, and more concerned with

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44 In a speech to the Stout Research Centre for New Zealand Studies, Mallard stated that ‘Maori and Pakeha are both indigenous people to New Zealand now,’ and that ‘I regard myself as an indigenous New Zealander - I come from Wainuiomata’ (in Leah Haines, ‘We Are All Indigenous Now’, The Dominion Post, 29 July 2004, Edition 2, p.1. For a Maori response to Mallard’s claim and similar claims by other Pakeha, see Ani Mikaere, ‘Are We All New Zealanders Now? A Ma-ori Response to the Pakeha Quest for Indigeneity’, Red & Green, no.4, 2004, pp.33-45.
45 Ministry of Social Development (MSD), Opportunities for all New Zealanders. Wellington, Government Printer, 2004, p.48. Tangata whenua means, literally, ‘people of the land’, although it can also be given as ‘we who stand here’. The connotations of the words – in Maori, whenua means placenta as well as land – signify a deep and embodied relationship to the land.
46 Turner, ‘The Kiwi Nation’.
47 Helen Clark, ‘Prime Minister’s Statement [2002]’, in NZPD, 12 February 2002.
negotiating routes to future security and prosperity than with establishing its historical roots.\textsuperscript{49}

Within this contemporary project exist new and flexible ideas of place and time. Spatially, New Zealand is simultaneously re-situated within the “here” of its physical space, subtly modified for maximum appeal. Specifically, it is situated within the clean, green “100% Pure” wilderness spaces of Middle Earth and within pristine farmland, towards the end of promoting New Zealand as a tourism destination, a film production site and a producer of high quality agricultural produce.\textsuperscript{50} It is also located in the value-adding uniqueness of the South Pacific exotic, when the country is branded ‘as an innovative, vibrant and creative Pacific nation’\textsuperscript{51} and within a ‘broader East Asian regionalism.’\textsuperscript{52} This re-positioning since 1999 has built on earlier moves to re-define New Zealand as multi- rather than bi-cultural and on National Prime Minister Jim Bolger’s commitment in the mid-1990s (as Mark Laffey relates) to adding ‘an Asian strand to New Zealand identity’ that led him to argue that ‘New Zealand was never a European country situated in the South Pacific, though many thought of us like that.’\textsuperscript{53}

Occasionally since 1999, the physical space of New Zealand has been said to be irrelevant.\textsuperscript{54} A Government-commissioned report urged the Government to become ‘blind to national boundaries and [redefine] New Zealand as a global community of talented


\textsuperscript{51} CNZ, \textit{Annual Report for Year Ending 2002}, p.5.


\textsuperscript{53} Laffey, ‘Adding an Asian Strand’, p.239. See also ibid., p.235.

people” (my emphasis), and Helen Clark declared that a ‘world without borders [including, presumably New Zealand’s borders]’ is made for a trading economy like New Zealand’s. In consequence, New Zealand can be imagined as a space-less place, defined by networks of talent and knowledge, in keeping with the space-less technologies of the knowledge economy. Efforts have been made to re-define the New Zealand diaspora - long the subject of a sort of social and policy panic under the label of “the brain drain” – as a positive networking opportunity, and to co-opt ‘expatriate experts’ into the project of national economic development.

In terms of time and tradition, the language of New Zealand national identity has retained its relentless forward trajectory. In 2000, Clark stated baldly that a ‘vision for the future would not be created by looking backwards.’ The fifth Labour Government’s enthusiasm for the ‘race to the future’ of globalisation that ‘we New Zealanders have to be committed to winning’ is in keeping with an established narrative structure of progress and development: a structure that partially precludes a critical engagement with history. This future focus is augmented by a managed engagement with the past. New Zealand’s Maori heritage (its ‘long history’ in Turner’s terms) is presented as a useful point of difference. The Government claimed to be ‘working with Maori to find ways of leveraging [their unique contribution to a national brand] for the benefit of all New Zealanders.’ Similarly, specific aspects of New Zealand’s colonial, or ‘short’ history (for example the pioneering spirit and flexibility of the early British settlers) are

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58 Prince, *Catching the Knowledge Wave*, pp.165-177.
60 Clark, ‘Address to Labour Party Conference 2000’.
emphasised. But Turner’s point remains apposite: history is mediated, and difference managed for the sake of the present and future nation.

Peter van Ham has argued that the challenges and opportunities of economic globalisation constrain states to construct and advertise an appealing national image, resulting in what he calls the ‘rise of the Brand-State’. This is in keeping with Jacqui True’s assertion that globalisation does not simply obliterate national specificity in a tide of homogenisation, but actually affords states new opportunities to leverage national specificity as a source of value in the global economy. New Zealand’s small size and its distance from substantial markets generate particularly acute incentives towards the brand-state’s ‘politics of image and reputation’. A long-standing acceptance of the beneficial effects of state involvement in economic and social co-ordination, meanwhile, means that its contemporary efforts to construct and utilise an attractive national image have a strong historical basis. An official politics of image and reputation is currently embodied in the Government’s “Brand New Zealand” project, which is a deliberate effort to place an appealing and relevant image of New Zealand in the consciousness of global circuits of trade, investment, talent and ideas. In the words of Helen Clark ‘we have to get out and sell our goods and it is about brand, profile and image.’

The historical acceptance in New Zealand of the benefits of collective action, coupled with the country’s related ‘hollow society’ affords the state a high degree of agency in articulating a vision of national identity supportive of its economic agenda. Historical and material factors dictate that the New Zealand state is able to plausibly argue that there is no alternative but for all New Zealanders to pull together and work on the same team, towards a shared purpose. Globalisation is presented, for this purpose, as a realm of hostile competition, and New Zealand as a state-at-war: a team of action within a specifically defined milieu of existence. New Zealand can thus be seen as an exemplary case of Maria Gritsch’s argument that states ‘actively construct globalization … to

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63 In ‘The Kiwi Nation’.
acquire greater power over, and autonomy from, their economies and societies, respectively.  

In terms of recent history, the New Zealand state’s high degree of agency was reflected in the speed and rigour of the neoliberal reforms introduced from 1984 by the fourth Labour Government, and in the limited capacity of dissenting voices. In this instance, New Zealand society lacked the cultural critical mass necessary to resist change, or to tailor international ideas to local conditions.

Of course, a certain resistance to official constructions of identity may be generated by the rugged "man alone" national myth or by some variant of liberal individualism, as expressed by National MP Jonathon Coleman, who resisted what he described as Labour’s attempt to impose a national identity on New Zealanders from ‘the ninth floor of the Beehive’. New Zealanders, Coleman argued, ‘have always been strong and independent’ and would resist any governmental attempt to ‘tell them who they are or how they will behave.’ Coleman’s objection bears comparison to John Howard’s insistence, in Australia in 1995, that governments ought not to attempt to manipulate, or to ‘create a sense of crisis about identity. Constant debate about identity’, Howard argued, ‘implies that we don’t already have one or, worse, that it is somehow inadequate.’ But this argument was only taken so far in New Zealand, a decade later. In 2004, the then leader of the National Party Don Brash framed his liberal vision of a society marked by ‘the essential notion of one rule for all in a single nation state’, as an engagement with the issue of ‘nationhood’ and as an answer to the question of ‘what sort of nation … we want to build.’

Brash’s later self-proclaimed ‘fervent’ nationalism signalled a degree of discursive ascendancy for Labour. At the least, it confirmed that asserting one’s fervent individualism had become politically unpalatable. But Brash’s version of liberal nationalism also enjoyed some resonance. While he initially appeared unsure on exactly

70 Jonathon Coleman, in NZPD, 15 January 2006.
what the term meant,\(^\text{74}\) his emphasis on ‘mainstream New Zealanders’ was able to partially frame the debate around how national identity might be defined. National’s explicit claim during the 2005 election campaign that Labour had been ‘pandering to minority interests for too long\(^\text{75}\) and that only National was ‘addressing the issues of mainstream New Zealanders’\(^\text{76}\) forced Labour to join the debate on this term. But Helen Clark’s subsequent definition of a mainstream New Zealander: ‘any decent hard working, law abiding Kiwi’\(^\text{77}\) placed an emphasis on productive employment that played into Brash’s rhetorical emphasis on giving ‘hard-working Kiwis the chance to get ahead because of their own efforts’\(^\text{78}\) which was linked to a policy preference for tax-cuts. So while Labour’s emphasis on the nation constrained the political opposition to adopt the language of nationalism, Labour’s political pragmatism and its insistence on the primacy of economic competitiveness led them in turn to define the nation in terms of economic contribution.

One element of the state’s power in 1984 - the “winner take all” electoral system - has since been replaced by a proportional representation system, but New Zealand still has a unicameral legislature and the related potential for rapid and thorough change under the right conditions. The fifth Labour Government has operated under the limitations imposed by minority and coalition government and has been constrained therefore to pursue partnerships and consensus. But it had also learned important lessons from the experience of the fourth Labour Government, and its political language included consistent appeals to consent, partnership and mutual advantage. It took, as we shall see, great care to present its agenda as a ‘widely shared vision’\(^\text{79}\) and in keeping with national values and identity. The agency of the state and the limits of that agency can be seen in its capacity to function as the ‘sovereign definer’\(^\text{80}\) within society: its capacity to legitimate its change agenda as objectively beneficial, and to emphasise and marginalise various

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\(^{75}\) Brash, cited in Espiner, ‘Brash on Back Foot’.

\(^{76}\) Brash, cited in Espiner, ‘Brash on Back Foot’. This phrase was National’s election slogan, appearing on its television and many of its print advertisements.


\(^{78}\) Brash, in NZPD, 23 May 2006.

\(^{79}\) Clark, ‘Prime Minister’s Statement [2002]’.

possible markers of national identity in the search for a functional and appealing brand identity.

Founded and formed by an earlier period of globalisation, and developing, according to Miles Fairburn, into the ‘most globalised country in the world’, New Zealand is accustomed to presenting an attractive image of itself to circuits of first-world capital. New Zealand’s national identity, as Turner argues, has always had a functional, pragmatic aspect. It has always been, as True agrees, anchored ‘in a narrative of economic progress’.

The country’s contemporary engagement with globalisation should not be seen as a radical departure from some golden age of national independence, but in contrast to (and continuity with) an earlier managed global engagement mediated through a special economic relationship with Britain. The assumed challenges of the present phase of globalisation – to create value through knowledge and innovation, to attract the attention of global markets, investors and talented immigrants, and to preserve employment and a sense of social cohesion – are felt in particularly acute form in New Zealand, due to a combination of its size and remoteness from its major markets. At the same time, those who would construct and present a strategic articulation of national identity are faced with relatively few internal constraints. New Zealand’s historically formed orientation towards global economic and cultural flows and the hollowness of its society have rendered New Zealand and identity more malleable and fluid than other national identities which are held in place by longer historical development and by a greater degree of material self-reliance. As such, New Zealand is a compelling site in which to examine and analyse the sorts of state action made necessary and rendered possible by contemporary globalisation.

**Globalisation, State Sovereignty and National Identity**

The fifth Labour Government has operated in a context determined not just by the spatial factors of New Zealand’s size and location, but also by precise temporal factors. The period from 1999 has witnessed a continuation and even an embedding of the matrix of economic, technological, ideational and cultural processes commonly referred to as globalisation. The Government’s political practice – including its practice of political language – has been fashioned in response to a reading of the economic challenges and

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81 Miles Fairburn, ‘New Zealand Exceptionalism’, p.151.
82 Turner, The Kiwi Nation’.
83 True, ‘Country Before Money?’, p.204.
opportunities generated by this moment. But it has also been driven and constrained by some of the political concerns that attend it: specifically public concerns that globalisation has the potential to undermine the autonomy of nation-states and the specificity of national cultures and identities. So while Labour has understood engagement with globalisation as an imperative rather than an option (in Clark’s words, ‘[l]ove it or loathe it, globalisation is here to stay, and we have to succeed within that framework’\footnote{Helen Clark, ‘Prime Minister’s Statement [2001]’}) it has simultaneously rejected the claim that globalisation is antithetical to the autonomy or the unique identity of the nation-state. Rather, it has argued that globalisation is ‘made for’ a country like New Zealand,\footnote{MSD, \textit{Opportunities for all New Zealanders}, p.46-48.} and committed itself to defending and strengthening New Zealand identity within a globalising world.\footnote{Helen Clark, ‘Closing Address to the Knowledge Wave Conference [2001]’}

Theories that hold globalisation in opposition to nation-states are based on the premise that global flows of goods, people, investment and ideas, by definition, ignore the territorial borders and cohesive populations fundamental to state sovereignty. This ‘hyperglobaliser’ perspective\footnote{David Held and Anthony McGrew (eds), \textit{The Global Transformations Reader: An Introduction to the Globalization Debate}. Cambridge, UK, Polity Press, 2000, pp.3-5.} is descriptive rather than normative, being shared by those who find the demise of nation-state natural and desirable\footnote{See, for instance, Kenichi Ohmae in ibid., p.3 and Mike Moore in Jane Kelsey, \textit{Reclaiming the Future: New Zealand and the Global Economy}. Wellington, Bridget Williams Books, 1999, p.14.} as well as by those who find the prospect a dangerous apologia for powerful financial interests.\footnote{See Jane Kelsey’s overarching argument in \textit{Reclaiming the Future}, although Kelsey certainly holds the state to be complicit in the rise of globalisation.} As we have already seen, however, ‘claims that “the survival of the state” is threatened by globalization have been met by powerful counterarguments’.\footnote{Aihwa Ong, \textit{Neoliberalism as Exception: Mutations in Citizenship and Sovereignty}. Durham, Duke University Press, 2006, p.75.} The ‘sceptical’ thesis of globalisation holds that contemporary globalisation is neither truly global nor anything new in historical context.\footnote{Held and McGrew (eds), \textit{The Global Transformations Reader}, pp.6-7. An influential statement of this perspective in found in Paul Hirst and Grahame Thompson, \textit{Globalization in Question}. Malden, Mass., Polity Press, 1999.} It also understands the causal relationship between nation-states and globalisation differently, holding that states are not the ‘passive victims’ but the ‘active architects’ of globalisation.\footnote{Held and McGrew (eds), \textit{The Global Transformations Reader}, p.6.} Globalisation only exists, on this view, through the assent
and in the interests of states. It may simply represent a new means by which states pursue their ends of security and prosperity.

There are significant elements of truth in this sceptical response. Certainly states have been centrally involved in constructing the instruments of a global economic and (a still nascent) social order. At the same time, it can be argued that states are exercising agency in a structure determined by forces beyond their control. Anthony Giddens, in refuting Hirst and Thompson’s claim that the contemporary global economy is no more integrated than was the case in the late 19th century, draws attention to the fundamental importance of global financial markets.93 While it is true that states create and facilitate these markets, they in turn impose significant disciplines on state policies. Driven by a need to attract foreign investment, governments operate in the gaze of what Walter Wriston calls the ‘information standard’ which, he says, is far more draconian than the gold standard ever was.94 To Wriston, and to others such as Martin Wolf,95 this is good news. The panopticon of global financial markets creates disincentives to “bad” policies and institutions. But the need to remain credible to these markets and the broader competition for market access and human capital removes from states the autonomy to determine how policies may be judged “good” or “bad” within their own jurisdiction.

The more extreme claims – that globalisation represents the erosion of state sovereignty; or that it is the result of an exercise of that sovereignty – preclude a more nuanced discussion. The argument that states are globalisation’s ‘active architects’ asserts a degree of state autonomy at odds with the powerful financial interests operating in the global economy, while also overlooking the vast discrepancies of wealth and power between states. Meanwhile, the argument that capital mobility and the power of global financial markets result in a loss of sovereignty overlooks, as Louis W. Pauly points out, both ‘an extensive literature on the evolution of the legal concept of sovereignty and a generation of research on the political trade-offs entailed by international economic interdependence.’96 The material benefits of engagement with the global economy, then, make possible a greater range of policy options while simultaneously precluding policies

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96 Pauly, ‘Capital Mobility’, p.373.
deemed bad by the global ‘information standard’. Dani Rodrik, for example, argues\(^97\) that while global economic liberalism and state sovereignty may be compatible, the inevitable result is a constriction of the realm of domestic political activity: your economy will grow and your politics shrink under such circumstances, in Thomas Friedman’s terms.\(^98\) Even if sovereignty is defined as ‘policy autonomy’, meaningful sovereignty, as a New Zealand Treasury report argues, does not require limitless choices.\(^99\) Nations, it continues, ‘have always operated within the parameters of the options actually open to them and the pressures upon them.’ Globalisation, on this view, may alter the salient options and pressures, but its effect ‘on sovereignty is unclear.’\(^100\)

Even when states construct and endorse the legal and institutional structures and practices that enable globalisation, they cannot be taken as its sole architects. Globalisation is not simply a set of political and institutional innovations. It is, crucially, a product of wider technological, cultural and ideational change which may be shaped but cannot be controlled by states. For small states such as New Zealand, the limitations on state autonomy \textit{vis-à-vis} globalisation are particularly acute. New Zealand’s enthusiastic multilateralism and trade liberalisation mean that it can plausibly be counted one of globalisation’s active architects. Yet these political responses can be seen simply as strategic responses to circumstances over which it has almost no control. Labour’s embrace, after all, was framed by fatalism: ‘love it or loathe it, globalisation is here to stay’.\(^101\) This, of course, does not make New Zealand a passive victim (or, necessarily, a victim of any sort) of increasing global interconnectedness. It simply means that the agency that New Zealand can exercise operates within a structure it cannot substantially determine.

While the technological, demographic and economic changes associated with globalisation have an undeniable material reality, globalisation is also, and crucially, constituted in discourse. A politically resonant argument for global economic engagement relies on a discourse which can present globalisation as inevitable, as materially

\(^98\) Cited in Rodrik, ‘How Far Will Economic Integration Go?’ p.182.
\(^100\) Claridge and Box, \textit{Economic Integration}, p.4.
\(^101\) Clark, ‘Prime Minister’s Statement [2001]’.
beneficial, as culturally desirable or, preferably, as all three. Globalisation may be narrated, for instance, in terms of inevitability, velocity and hostile competition, terms consistent with a state-at-war narrative structure that justifies reactive state action. When Clark argues that there is a ‘race to the future going on, and we New Zealanders have to be committed to winning it’, the implication is both that the rules of the race are given and unchangeable, and that New Zealand is an enterprise association capable of common, purposive action. Globalisation, on this view, constitutes a state of exception, and addresses New Zealand as a state-at-war. Wendy Larner and William Walters, in their account of ‘globalization as governmentality’, take globalisation to be not just a descriptive but also a normative account: a meta-narrative that encourages ‘[b]oth people and places … to apply financial disciplines, demonstrate entrepreneurial capacities, and seek out new opportunities.’ In line with Ong’s understanding of ‘neoliberalism as exception’, global neoliberalism is represented as a set of circumstances in which there are no alternatives: it is a hostile world in which New Zealand has to ‘choose to compete’. It is a world in which political and moral questions may be more easily reduced to technical calculations of what is required to compete and succeed within a set of immutable circumstances.

Even if participation in globalisation can be defended as enhancing rather than undermining state sovereignty, then, the argument that global economic and cultural flows threaten the specificity of local cultural and identities may still carry political resonance. States, ideally, need to present global engagement as not merely acting in the national interest but also, crucially, as in keeping with a sense of national identity. In the absence of this assurance, globalisation may be widely seen as destructive of national specificity and the possibility of autonomous state action. Again, more extreme claims about the relationship between globalisation and local specificity may obscure more than they reveal. Writing in 1992, Stuart Hall noted Kevin Robbins’ observation that ‘alongside the tendency towards global homogenization, there is also a fascination with difference’ which suggests that globalisation, far from annihilating, will actually exploit

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102 Clark, ‘Prime Minister’s Statement [2001]’.
103 See my earlier discussion of the state-at-war narrative structure in Chapter 2.
105 Ong, Neoliberalism as Exception, esp. pp.1-27.
106 See LEK, New Zealand Talent Initiative, pp.28-59.
107 Claridge and Box, Economic Integration, pp.3-4.
local differentiation. Hall’s argument bears comparison with Jacqui True’s observation that states, as they ‘compete for global capital’, make ‘intense efforts … to play up the distinctiveness of local characteristics’. True’s argument is part of a body of work that has, in recent, years, challenged the established dichotomy between economic nationalism and economic liberalism. The practice of economic nationalism should be defined, according to this challenge, not by its adherence to a pre-determined set of non-liberal policies, but by its ‘nationalist content’.

In Stephen Shulman’s 2000 explication of this argument, he advises that ‘[i]nstead of identifying nationalists as those who support a particular foreign economic policy, scholars should independently define nationalists’. Nationalists are then defined as those who seek to ‘establish or promote the unity, identity and autonomy of a nation or potential nation’, and nations, in turn, as groups of people ‘who feel they form a distinct community bounded by shared culture, history, territory, ancestry, and destiny’. These definitions are problematic insofar as they tend to accept “the nation” as a label for an already united group. For unity is not a naturally occurring phenomenon, and a representation of the nation as coherent, homogenous and ancient can be thought of, in Stuart Hall’s terms, as a ‘discursive device which represents … difference as unity or identity.’ If these processes of construction and contestation are reified into a unified end product, they may overlook the ways in which self-proclaimed “nationalists” engage in the creation of definitions. Rather than simply assuming the nation to be a united entity, it makes more sense to add that political actors will propose readings of history and culture that generate a national history and culture, and attempt to build a national consensus around a sense of shared destiny.

112 Shulman, ‘Nationalist Sources’, p.368.
113 Shulman, ‘Nationalist Sources’, p.368.
This is the sort of approach that Jacqui True takes in applying the argument to the contemporary New Zealand context. Eric Helleiner says of True that she portrays economic nationalism ‘in more instrumentalist terms as a force that serves particular material interests’ and that she ‘suggests that economic nationalism is often used to benefit the material interests of specific private capitalist groups’.\footnote{Helleiner, ‘Conclusion’, p.228.} He describes her methodology as a ‘critical constructivism’ in which ‘dominant economic elites [are seen] as playing the central role in shaping national identities’ such that constructions of identities largely reflect and reify existing relations of power.\footnote{Helleiner, ‘Conclusion’, p.231.} Maya Eichler, writing in the same edited volume as True, defines economic nationalism as ‘the attempt by state and societal actors to link economic prescriptions to a particular understanding or “variant” of national identity in order to create greater legitimacy for their economic policies.’\footnote{Maya Eichler, ‘Explaining Postcommunist Transformations: Economic Nationalism in Ukraine and Russia’, in Helleiner and Pickel (eds), \textit{Economic Nationalism}, p.69.} A particular presentation of national identity can be seen as an exercise in what Lukes would call 3-D power, or as the attempted construction of hegemony around a prescribed course of action.

Given the emphasis in her chapter on the ways in which ‘nationalism and globalization may serve the very same material ends’,\footnote{True, ‘Country Before Money?’, p.219.} True tends to focus in her analysis on the instances in which New Zealand identity has been asserted by a variety of actors. Throughout this thesis I place greater emphasis on the potential assertions of identity that are marginalised or denigrated by the Government’s insistence on a highly specific articulation of national interests and national identity. I place greater emphasis, also, on the ways in which individuals and groups are addressed within this articulation, and analyse the moral implications of this address.

While it is true that the term economic nationalism is often used as a pejorative term, to simply denote policies of which economic liberals disapprove,\footnote{Helleiner, ‘Economic Nationalism’, pp.308-9; Pickel, ‘Explaining, and Explaining With, Economic Nationalism’, \textit{Nations and Nationalism}, v.9, no.1, 2003, pp.105-127 at pp.106-110; Goff, ‘Its Got to be Sheep’s Milk’, p.185.} if economic nationalism is redefined by its ‘nationalist content’ then the opposite also becomes true. On this reading, the term can also be deployed in a positive sense, as a justificatory rubric. Many
actors may wish to present themselves as economic nationalists, engaged in the promotion of what Shulman calls the ‘fundamental nationalist goals of autonomy, unity and identity’, 120 in order to ‘take advantage of the legitimating effects that the concept “nation” brings with it.’ 121 Even New Zealand’s neoliberal reforms in the mid 1980s, which included a vigorous programme of dismantling barriers to foreign trade and investment, were held not to illustrate the irrelevance of the nation, but to promote its interests more effectively. 122 Subsidies to specific sectors or groups were scrapped, so it was said, not to free individuals from coercive national claims but to further the national interest. The speech acts of economic nationalism should be approached not as statements of fact, or even of intention, but as political arguments designed to persuade or coerce and, thus, as performances of power. They aim, in conditions of contemporary globalisation, at the production of what Doty calls ‘sovereignty effects’, 123 as they foreground the ways in which national sovereignty may be augmented by global economic liberalism, while obscuring questions of the ways in which it may be curtailed.

Contemporary economic nationalism crucially involves the attempt to control political language. Political actors exercise power as they attempt to have their preferred discourses accepted. These discourses involve not just the organisation and presentation of knowledge and truth, but their active production. Put otherwise, they organise and present knowledge on a subject (in this case the nation, economic progress, resource distribution and political obligation) in a way that foregrounds certain aspects while marginalising others, thereby producing a specific construction of the topic. The purpose of analysis is not, therefore, to assess the truth or falsity of a set of speech acts, but to examine the ways in which their construction of problems and solutions is presented as reasonable, and the link between power and knowledge that enables a given actor to have their production of truth and knowledge accepted. Contemporary projects of economic nationalism are best analysed not by their success in delivering on the ‘nationalist goals of

120 Shulman, ‘Nationalist Sources’, p.368.
121 Eichler, ‘Explaining Postcommunist Transformations’, p.73.
The economic transformation project of the fifth Labour Government was consistently spoken of as a national project. In Shulman’s terms it can be counted as economic nationalism, as it deployed a range of policies – including global economic liberalism - in pursuit of the stated aims of national autonomy, unity and identity. But the project also involved the active production of highly specific meanings for each of those terms. As we have seen, this practice can be seen as one of contemporary myth-making, in the Barthesian sense that its aim was to naturalise and de-politicise chosen constructions of political problems, rendering them and their solutions as natural and common sense. Specifically, the Government’s project had to defend its strategy of global economic engagement against the charge that the trans-border flows of globalisation were, in important ways, antithetical to aspects of national autonomy, unity and identity.

In order to make global engagement appear consonant with national goals and national values, it is necessary to present the notions of national autonomy, unity and identity in specific ways. *Autonomy*, if taken literally as the capacity of an entity to give laws to itself and accept them from no other, would seem to be decreased by the ceding or delegating of significant law making powers to international bodies such as the United Nations (UN) and the World Trade Organisation (WTO). Because such a loss of national autonomy is politically unpalatable another conception is offered: autonomy as purposive capacity to act. This understanding holds that the material benefits of global engagement outweigh formal concerns over who is setting the rules of that engagement. The assertion of national interests and national economic competitiveness can be used to obscure the difficult question of how the nation-state’s capacity for autonomous action in various policy areas is compromised by global engagement.

National *identity* and *unity*, to the extent that they rely on internal similarity and external differentiation, are also challenged by the cross-border flows of globalisation. This tension is heightened by contemporary practice, in which the governments of developed states actively seek to attract value-adding ideas, technologies and people from abroad in their pursuit of national economic competitiveness. The inevitable result is that traditional

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\[footnote{Shulman, ‘Nationalist Sources’, p.368.}\]
bases of unity such as cultural or ethnic homogeneity (contingent and problematic as these bases are in the face of the diversity that constitutes any political society) are eroded. In this context, economic nationalism offers unity in two ways: by promising to share its benefits across the nation, disrespectful of internal dividing lines, and by providing new ‘privileged discursive points’ around which unity can coalesce.

Contemporary states, in sum, face two distinct incentives towards engaging in projects of nation-building. As van Ham, True and others have pointed out, the construction and deployment of a carefully crafted national image serves an increasingly important economic function as states compete for attention in global markets. At the same time, an emphasis on national identity serves an important social-political function. As Roxanne Doty notes, political legitimacy is reliant on the construction of an entity that may be represented. Nation-building is an insistence on the meaning and salience of the national scale over and against arguments for the primacy of the individual or the global scales. A nation-building project aims to enable the members of a state to feel connected in a national team of action, and united behind a national shared purpose. Its political function is to occlude the difficult questions of political obligation and authority; questions whose force might be heightened by perceptions that states’ ability to deliver security, prosperity and identity (the state’s side of an implicit social contract) are being challenged by global flows and the disciplines of global neoliberalism. Nation-building projects, in their social-political function, can be seen as states’ response to a crisis of sovereignty caused by simultaneous globalisation and individualism. They may provide, moreover, not just ongoing legitimacy for the institution of national governance, but electoral benefits for the party best able to articulate a compelling sense of national identity.

The economic and the social-political functions of nation-building projects, of course, overlap and interact in complex ways. The state’s political legitimacy is not simply based on its ability to construct a coherent entity to represent, but also on its capacity to deliver economic opportunity and security to that entity. Crucial here is the capacity to define opportunity and security, and to naturalise a given regime of distribution. A rhetorical

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insistence on the national scale of the economic benefits of global economic engagement serves to deflect questions of the unequal distribution of costs and benefits. For this reason, the fifth Labour Government has claimed its political project to be about ‘reversing our fortunes as a nation’ and ensuring ‘opportunity and security for all New Zealanders’¹²⁸ (my emphases). Economic success, it is argued, can be achieved by leveraging a sense of national specificity. But it is also facilitated by social stability and cohesion, whose presence both reduces the cost of domestic economic activity¹²⁹ and serves to attract investment and talent from overseas.

Besides the economic and the socio-political incentives to emphasise the salience of the nation, it is also possible that key political actors may feel a strong sense of personal commitment to the nation-building cause. The importance of individual political commitments is heightened in New Zealand, a country small enough that such things matter greatly. There is certainly no reason to assume that key individuals within the fifth Labour Government - and even the party as a whole - were anything but sincere and genuine about their desire for a strong and confident sense of national identity. The party’s key figures were, after all, a generation that cut their political teeth on issues – such as the Vietnam War, French nuclear testing in the Pacific, the 1981 Springbok tour and the anti-nuclear movement - where New Zealand independence and values played an important role. Individual motivations are, of course, notoriously difficult objects of analysis. And, even if the personal commitments of individuals were important in the Government’s nation-building project, they should not lead us to undervalue the strategic economic and political motivations that were also involved. There have been instances in policy and political language since 1999 in which, as we shall see, the language of national identity fell notably silent. These moments tell us much about the relative weights of the different impulses towards asserting national identity.

The Narrative Address of Nationalism¹³⁰

The economic nationalism of the fifth Labour Government proceeded by re-defining autonomy as national economic power, by stressing its widely shared benefits, and by

¹²⁸ Clark, ‘Prime Minister’s Statement [2001]’.
¹²⁹ See New Zealand Treasury, Towards Higher Living Standards for New Zealanders: Briefing to the Incoming Government [1999]. Wellington, 1999, p.41, where social cohesion is described as ‘valuable in its own rights’ but also as ‘part of the oil that facilitates the smooth functioning of relationships and transactions’.
providing a series of ‘privileged discursive points’ – talent, creativity, innovation – around which a new sense of national one-ness and same-ness could coalesce. These traits became markers of exemplarity, able to answer the question of how a government could emphasise national unity while simultaneously celebrating the diversity that immigration and innovation brings to the nation. They were also the traits deemed necessary for national economic viability in an age of multinational capitalism. The Government’s articulation of national identity presented economic necessity and national specificity as complementary rather than as opposed. It asserted the compatibility of Brand New Zealand’s emphasis on image and reputation with the nation’s connotations of belonging, co-operation and obligation. And it asserted the national scale of an economic success that was to be generated by smart, creative, talented individuals operating in an emergent “knowledge economy”. As we shall see, the traits of knowledge, talent and innovation within the individuating knowledge economy can be seen as problematic nodes around which to build a shared sense of unity.

The central point, again, is that the defence of national identity is not the defence of an extant reality but the active construction of something new. There is nothing neutral or natural about the nation built by an official nation-building project. The nation, as Homi K. Bhabha puts it, is narrated, and it is narrated in a ‘double-time’ in which the nation is simultaneously assumed and constituted. It is at once the justification for, and the product of discourses, policies and institutions; at once ancient and modern, solid and in flux. While any such project is compelled to pay attention to history, geography and culture, it is best understood in terms of how it marshals these resources for its present and future purposes. A nation building project is not the invention of a national identity ex nihilo, but a re-imagining in which some existing markers of identity are emphasised, while others are marginalised. This selective narration of the nation carries implications for diversity and difference within the political community. The assertion of a shared vision and purpose for the nation contains the tendency to value individuals and sub-state groups according to their willingness and ability to contribute to the common purpose.

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133 See, for an argument to this effect, Bond et al., ‘National Identity and Economic Development’.
A key statement of Labour’s economic agenda argued that in order to achieve ‘our economic and social goals’ we must ‘agree on our vision and our objectives and we must work together to achieve them’.

In keeping with Bhabha’s observation, a sense of national unity and of a widely shared national purpose is both the taken-for-granted assumption and the intended product of this and similar speech acts, the illocutionary force of which is to conflate the national government, the national people and national industry. The nation-building project was not just the defensive preservation of a unique cultural identity but also an active process by which a knowledge society was constructed in support of the desired knowledge economy. The attitudes and behaviours required for economic success were the same attitudes and behaviours said to be constitutive of a modern, realistic national identity.

Labour understood national identity both as a definable essence in need of defence against the spectre of global homogenisation, and as the malleable subject of state action. While identity, literally, denotes a stable essence enduring through time, the Government spoke of actively building, reinforcing and promoting national identity as easily as of defending it.

Indeed, the very notion of a nation-building “project” militates against the idea of identity as the condition of the nation remaining essentially the same through time, accepting instead that it may be constructed and shaped by deliberate action. Such projects are more easily aligned with identity understood as ‘formed and transformed continuously in relation to the ways we are represented or addressed in the cultural systems which surround us.’ But if this is the case, it is not just the government and “the people” who are able to influence and shape national identity, but also the global cultural and economic systems that represent and address national cultures and economies in instrumental and reductive terms.

134 OPM, Growing an Innovative New Zealand, p.6.
135 See Norman Fairclough, New Labour, New Language? New York, Routledge, 2000, p.29 for a discussion of how this strategic move was effected by Tony Blair and New Labour in the United Kingdom.
136 See, for example, Clark, ‘Closing Address to the Knowledge Wave Conference [2001]’, where a ‘strong sense of identity’ is taken as something to be built. See also MSD, Opportunities for all New Zealanders, pp.46-8 for ‘promoting’ and ‘defending’, and Helen Clark, ‘Prime Minister’s Statement [2007], in NZPD, 13 February 2007 for ‘reinforcing’ and ‘celebrating’.
Identity, then, is not necessarily a stable, enduring and natural characteristic of an entity but a category marked by fluidity, multiplicity, alterity and constructedness. It follows that specific constructions of national identity may be proposed by various actors as strategic devices or justificatory rubrics in support of their agendas. Identity can be seen as a functional, flexible and future-focussed political resource as well as an historically generated residue. In van Ham’s ‘postmodern politics of image and reputation’, and in True’s account of how nation-states ‘(re)invent … a sense of national identity in order to carve out a strategic niche and competitive advantage in the global economy’, identity is clearly understood as something that can and (for van Ham, at least) should be produced and used for strategic purposes. This prescription is in keeping with Zygmunt Bauman’s account of the ‘life politics’ most appropriate for individuals living in the uncertain conditions of “late” or multinational capitalism. Bauman argues that in conditions of increasing social and economic insecurity, individuals are best advised to stay clear of immersion in the form of commitments, loyalties and fixities, taking instead to living on the surface.

Bauman recommends, in other words, a life politics of surfing, as opposed to a life politics of swimming. He suggests that surfing is an appealing metaphor for being in such uncertain times, noting that when ‘surfing, one remains above the fluid substance. Contact with the substance is never more than skin deep, and any marks of wetness can be easily and quickly removed.’ All depth, he argues, ‘seems nowadays to be treacherous’ and while the surface does not offer the absence of danger, it at least offers the prospect of being able to move quickly. As Ralph Waldo Emerson noted, ‘in skating over thin ice, our safety is in our speed’. In a life politics of surfing, individuals attempt to avoid commitments and fixities as dangerously constraining, and adopt a light and flexible identity. At a societal level, the prevalence of a life-politics of surfing among individuals means that the analytical utility of the concept of “society” is diminishing, because society fundamentally relies on the ideas of obligation, mutuality and reciprocity eschewed by the surfing metaphor. The concept of society is being supplanted, Bauman

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140 True, ‘Country Before Money?”, p.204.
argues, by the idea of the network, the defining feature of which is the ease with which bonds can be put together, broken and re-arranged.\textsuperscript{144}

While the surfing metaphor is intended to describe an individual’s response to contemporary life, it is equally useful for understanding the responses of states to the uncertainties of contemporary globalisation. In the race to the future of globalisation, historical points of fixity such as national cultures and symbols, stable trading relationships and military alliances are re-evaluated or relinquished in the drive to stay afloat. Instead of immersing themselves in traditional national attitudes and behaviours, states may take to living on the surface, adopting the postmodern politics of image and reputation of the brand-state. In the global marketplace, it is supposed, the \textit{signifiers} of the national brand (New Zealand as clean and green, and now creative and innovative as well) are more important than their signifieds (modes of production and the state of the environment). Internal and external partnerships are no longer grounded in loyalty and tradition, but on a calculation of economic benefit. And national identity is re-imagined so as to be consistent with the attitudes and behaviours deemed necessary for global economic competitiveness.

Bauman argues that the ‘hub of postmodern life strategy is not identity building, but avoidance of fixation’ and that a ‘durable identity turns from an asset into a liability’.\textsuperscript{145} Explicitly critiquing these claims, Carol Johnson argues that while they ‘may have some relevance for issues of consumption and transitory personal style’, they ‘throw little light on the highly contested terrains of “mainstream”, “economic” and “national” identity, areas in which the battles are still very much about the fixation of identity in various forms.’\textsuperscript{146} Johnson’s critique gets at a tension at the heart of Labour’s nation-building project. National identity has been fashioned as a strategic response to external forces. Indeed, New Zealand, where national identity has historically been light, mobile, malleable and pragmatic can be seen as an historical exemplar of a national life-politics of surfing (Although, to repeat, identity cannot be invented \textit{ex nihilo} but must relate to widely held structures of feeling.)

\textsuperscript{145} Cited in Carol Johnson, \textit{Governing Change: from Keating to Howard}. St. Lucia, University of Queensland Press, 2000, p.59.
\textsuperscript{146} Johnson, \textit{Governing Change}, p.59.
But the national life-politics of surfing embodied in the externally-oriented national branding project is conterminous with attempts to strengthen internal bonds of social cohesion. And a liberal economic agenda based on the individuation of responsibility and reward is conterminous with a communitarian concern to co-opt citizens into the shared vision of the brand-state. In focusing on such terms as social cohesion, governments display a qualified acceptance of the communitarian Michael Sandel’s argument that rational, autonomous agents, relating to others on the basis of consent and mutual advantage, will not indefinitely bear what Rawls might call the ‘strains of commitment’\textsuperscript{147} of the modern welfare state\textsuperscript{148} or, in this instance, the requirement that individuals and groups conform to a coherent representation of the country. One of the major tasks for the Government’s new agenda was therefore the production of a unified community who would share a common interest in working towards a common goal. In its reliance on the legitimations of consent and mutual advantage, however, the Government’s ability to generate a popular sense of shared commitment must remain in question. The Government’s nation-building project constituted an attempt to effect the ‘partial fixing of meanings and identities,’\textsuperscript{149} but those meanings and identities were to be fixed to a national identity which was increasingly light, mobile and fluid: an identity designed to serve a material purpose as much as to offer psychological surety.

The way in which states understand national security is based on the way in which they understand the nature of prevailing threats.\textsuperscript{150} In the context of globalisation, threats can be framed in terms of economic competitiveness, which Mark Laffey calls the ‘new ground on which hopes and fears, opportunities and threats are being constructed’\textsuperscript{151} but also in terms of protecting cultural identity. Patricia Goff argues that governments, while willingly opening the ‘territorial borders of the state in order to reap the economic reward that accompanies participation in a global marketplace’ may also seek to fortify ‘the nation’ by ‘reinforcing the invisible or conceptual borders held in place by collective identity, and by the common understandings that underpin a distinctive political

\textsuperscript{149} Doty, ‘Sovereignty and the Nation’, p.127.
\textsuperscript{150} Patricia Goff, ‘It’s Got to Be Sheep’s Milk’, p.187.
\textsuperscript{151} Laffey, ‘Adding an Asian Strand’, p.236.
community’ (emphases in original). Sheldon Wolin, however, in arguing that a sense of community is a necessary grounding for power and authority, notes Coleridge’s distinction between ‘the imagination that merely joins and the imagination which truly fuses.’ This latter imagination would be better expressed by the metaphor of invisible sinews than by Goff’s invisible borders. The fifth Labour Government’s constant assertions of national identity and unity do attempt to give meaning to national borders, but they attempt more primarily to construct and naturalise the shared understandings and sense of belonging that would secure them in place.

The surface play of the brand-state and the social embedding of a nation-building project were two fundamental aspects of the fifth Labour Government’s political agenda. The project presented both a functional, malleable, light and externally oriented national identity informed by a politics of image and reputation, and an embedded, internally-oriented national identity aimed at the generation of loyalty, co-operation, obligation and altruism. It constructed national identity as both a marketing tool and as the cornerstone of social cohesion. The new national identity was the celebration of both individual ambition and a shared corporate vision. It celebrated both global economic competitiveness and an ethos of national co-operation. And while there are obvious differences between these pairs, part of the Government’s project was the argument that they were mutually reinforcing. The story of the fifth Labour Government’s nation-building project is in large part the story of how it sought to manage the tensions that arise between them. The Brand New Zealand project’s life-politics of surfing and the nation-building project’s life-politics of swimming were articulated together and offered as a coherent response to globalisation. The basic project was the construction of a new national identity tailored to the demands of global economic competitiveness but presented as a natural product of national history and culture. Taken together, the national branding project and the nation-building project constitute a moment of contemporary economic nationalism that offers important insights on the role of nations and states in an era of multinational capitalism.

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154 The term is Andrew Sharp’s.
Conclusion

The idea of the nation can be understood as a political myth, able to naturalise the salience and status of nation-states in a globalising world, to assert a tightly controlled unity within the nation, and to attenuate the moral claims of those outside the nation. A focus on a strong and confident national identity can be used to assert the legitimacy of the state, thus grounding the practices of authority and obligation and contributing to the successful production of ‘sovereignty effects’. It is also increasingly used as a marketing device: a collective action tool by which firms and products within the national economy can leverage value off an appealing and visible national brand. But this national brand cannot be created *ex nihilo*: it cannot be invented without reference to historical and cultural realities. Rather, national identities are imaginative constructions structured by dominant readings of economic necessity and by the socio-cultural demands of the domestic polity.

New Zealand’s small size, its distance from major markets, its specific colonial history, its hollow society and the historical centrality of the state generated an identity that was malleable, pragmatic, and oriented towards managing its economic vulnerabilities. These historical factors, coupled with contemporary geo-economic considerations, have rendered New Zealand an interesting site in which to examine a process which is increasingly widespread: the promotion of national specificity as a source of value in global markets and as a source of social cohesion in an age marked by both individualism and globalisation. The fifth Labour Government’s project of economic transformation coupled with nation-building has been situated in the context of increasing globalisation, such that its articulation of national identity has had to be consonant with the attitudes and behaviours deemed necessary for global economic competitiveness. While the Government has presented global economic engagement as a necessary means to the end of national autonomy, unity and identity, there are tensions inherent in this practice that require a very tight control over how key terms and categories are defined and understood. In the following chapter, I give an account of the main aspects of the Government’s change agenda, situating its focus on national identity within the broader project of sustainable economic growth through knowledge and innovation. The tensions and dynamics identified in that general discussion are explored in more detail in the three

subsequent chapters that deal with cultural policy, food production policy and immigration policy.
And that … is the secret of happiness and virtue – liking what you’ve got to do.¹

Come senators, congressmen
Please heed the call
Don't stand in the doorway
Don't block up the hall
For he that gets hurt
Will be he who has stalled
There's a battle outside
And it is ragin'.
It'll soon shake your windows
And rattle your walls
For the times they are a-changin'.²

Introduction: A New Political Project

The fifth Labour Government has constantly emphasised the importance of changing global circumstances, and has constantly insisted on the need for an appropriate national-level response. Changing circumstances, in which ‘the pace of change has never been faster’³ demanded a response: ‘[i]n an ever-changing world we cannot stand still and prosper.’⁴ Rather, ‘[w]e need to be innovative and adaptive to changing international demands.’⁵ Alongside its emphasis on national identity, then, the Government announced its ‘passion for economic transformation’ and argued that ‘economic and social advancement for New Zealand could not proceed satisfactorily without significant change.’⁶ The appropriate response, it was argued, would include an active leadership and co-ordination role for government, and Labour ‘signalled an end to hands-off economic management and foreshadowed the development of smart interventions to facilitate economic growth.’⁷ The response, more precisely, was fashioned around the promotion of a cluster of themes – innovation, creativity, ideas and talent – associated with a nascent

² Bob Dylan, *The times they are a-changin’*, 1963.
⁵ Clark, ‘Speech from the Throne [1999]’.
⁷ Clark, ‘Prime Minister’s Statement [2002]’, in NZPD, 12 February 2002.
national knowledge economy, in keeping with the belief that ‘innovative activity is becoming the key driver of growth’.  

While the theme of economic transformation was prominent and constant in the language of the fifth Labour Government, the overall project might be characterised as one of “economic transformation plus”. In its key ‘goals to guide public sector policy and performance’, the Government committed itself not just to the pursuit of an ‘inclusive, innovative economy for the benefit of all’, but also to the restoration of trust in government, the strengthening of national identity and the protection and enhancement of the environment. This broad range of objectives, crucially, was not held to be in tension with the goal of economic growth, but rather as compatible with it and, indeed, as dependent on it. ‘Economic and social development’, it was argued, ‘go hand in hand. A growing economy is the best guarantee of social security.’ In 2002, the Government promised to use the ‘fruits of economic growth … to underpin the development of our national identity, the preservation and enhancement of our natural and historic heritage, and social provision.’ These processes, it was argued, would be ‘mutually self-reinforcing as long as appropriate strategies are followed.’

The Government’s change agenda was predicated on the idea of ‘smart engagement’, with Clark declaring her Government ‘committed to being smart and active to get the best economic results for New Zealand.’ This smart engagement was narrated in the language of partnership. Simultaneously acknowledging that ‘all wisdom on economic policy does not rest with the government’ and that ‘simply relying upon market forces will not deliver [the necessary] changes’, the Government argued that ‘a new partnership

11 OPM, Growing an Innovative New Zealand, p.28.
12 Helen Clark, ‘Speech from the Throne [2002]’, delivered by Dame Silvia Cartwright, in NZPD, 27 August 2002.
14 Clark, ‘Prime Minister’s Statement [2001]’.
15 OPM, Growing an Innovative New Zealand, p.9.
needs to be built with business and local communities.\textsuperscript{16} The change agenda was thus described as a shared project that would bring together government, society and the economy. The Government argued that to ‘create the innovative New Zealand we need to achieve our economic and social goals … we must agree on our vision and our objectives and we must work together to achieve them’.\textsuperscript{17} Elsewhere, it was said that ‘[r]eversing our fortunes as a nation requires us to develop a shared vision about what could be, and the road map to get us there’.\textsuperscript{18} Despite this language of partnership, however, Clark insisted on a privileged role for government leadership, stating that the ‘nature of the change agenda will be driven by the values of those in the driver’s seat’,\textsuperscript{19} by which she meant her Government. This is in keeping with the model of the state-as-\textit{universitas}, in which individuals and sub-state groups are addressed as role-performers related to the pursuit of a common purpose defined by the lords of the \textit{universitas}.

The Government’s presented its agenda as a shared vision and, more precisely, as a shared \textit{national} vision, albeit a national vision fashioned in response to global forces acknowledged to be largely outside the nation’s control. Following the logic of the state-as-\textit{universitas}, internal difference was not to stand in the way of the assertion of a shared national purpose. ‘Divisions within the community’, Clark stated, whether ‘perceived or otherwise, must not be allowed to get in the way of the transformation of New Zealand, to a prosperous, confident 21st century nation.’\textsuperscript{20} The presentation of the official agenda as a genuinely national vision was made explicit when the Government spoke of reversing ‘our fortunes as a nation’ and of ‘getting the best … results for New Zealand’,\textsuperscript{21} but it was also implicit in the pervasive use of “we”, “us” and “our” throughout key speeches, press releases and policy documents. In the key statement of the Government’s agenda, the word “our” was used inclusively to invoke a national community, even when it applied more directly to certain sectors of the economy. In either case, the rhetorical force of, among other locutions, \textit{our} living standards, \textit{our} social and economic goals, \textit{our} national identity, \textit{our} overall productivity, \textit{our} access to skilled people and \textit{our} primary sectors was the same: to present the Government’s vision as a shared national vision. This

\textsuperscript{16} Clark, ‘Speech from the Throne [1999]’.
\textsuperscript{17} OPM, \textit{Growing an Innovative New Zealand}, p.6.
\textsuperscript{18} Clark, ‘Prime Minister’s Statement [2001]’.
\textsuperscript{20} Clark, ‘Speech from the Throne [2005], in NZPD, 8 November 2005.
\textsuperscript{21} Clark, ‘Prime Minister’s Statement [2001]’.
impulse, embedded in campaign slogans such as “Forward. Together” and “Sharing a Vision” was a central part of the fifth Labour Government’s move towards the universitas conception of the state. The construction of a shared purpose, as we have seen, claims to generate unity by relating citizens as role-performers to a widely-held shared purpose.

The Government’s project was situated within what I have earlier called its state at war narrative of globalisation. Labour’s commitment to allowing New Zealand to compete and succeed in the global economy rested on a conception of the global environment as a realm of cut-throat economic competition in which New Zealand was falling behind.22 In this anarchical global context, the nation was conceptualised as a haven of co-operation. ‘Improving our competitiveness internationally’, the Government stated, ‘will often require co-operative approaches at home.’23 The “shared” purpose of national economic growth constructed a sharp dichotomy between a hostile, anarchical outside and a unified and co-operative inside.24 This construction has the effect of marginalising the importance of internal dividing lines such as class, gender and race. The unifying rubric of the nation attempts to deflect attention away from inequalities in the distribution of rights, resources and recognition within New Zealand society. It also attempts to naturalise the goal of national progress as an unproblematic good, deflecting questions of the moral claims of those outside the nation.

In common with many other governments around the world, Labour in New Zealand pursued economic competitiveness for the nation – and, therefore, opportunity, security and freedom for individuals - through the promotion of a nascent knowledge economy around a few privileged discursive points: innovation, talent and creativity. A Government-commissioned report asserted that ‘[i]nnovation provides New Zealand with the best opportunity to lift our economic performance, enhance social well-being, and manage future uncertainty’25 and the Government agreed that the ‘transformation of the New Zealand economy will require the application of knowledge and innovation across

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24 On the active and problematic nature of attempts to establish ‘boundaries separating the inside from the outside’ see Roxanne L. Doty. ‘Sovereignty and the Nation: Constructing the Boundaries of National Identity’, in Cynthia Weber and Thomas Biersteker (eds), *State Sovereignty as Social Construct*. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1996, p.126, where she is referring to R.B.J. Walker,
the economy.' The creation of a ‘high skills, high employment, high value added economy’ in response to ‘changing international demands’, Labour argued, would not be achieved by ‘simply relying upon market forces’ but by a new partnership between government, business and local communities. The coupling of innovation and economic growth in the argument that ‘[i]nnovative activity is becoming the key driver of growth’ and in the challenge to ‘create wealth from ideas and knowledge’ dictated that only certain sorts of knowledge and innovation would be valued – those that could be commercialised.

Karl Polanyi has argued that a transformation in a society’s economic structure, if it is to be successful, must be accompanied by a transformation of society itself. And so the Government’s project of economic transformation was enacted not just at the institutional and policy level but, foundationally, on the attitudes and behaviours of individuals as well. It acknowledged, as did the Scottish Executive, the importance ‘not just of good legislation … but of attitudes and behaviours which promote economic growth’, and the necessity of fostering in individuals the traits – such as flexibility, confidence and a willingness to take risks - consonant with the goal of growth through innovation. It was argued that if the country was to excel and become a great place to live, then ‘our attitudes and behaviours must respect and reward ideas, knowledge, innovation and enterprise’. What was needed was not just a knowledge economy but a knowledge society. Without adopting its strident language, the Government accepted the Science and Innovation Advisory Council (SIAC)’s argument that it was ‘essential that all New Zealanders understand and accept the challenge of this innovation strategy’ (my emphasis).

So while the Government’s agenda was presented, within a narrative of partnership, as working with New Zealanders to provide opportunity and security, it can also be

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27 Clark, ‘Speech from the Throne [1999]’.
30 Clark, ‘Prime Minister’s Statement [2001]’.
understood as an attempt to act upon them as it addressed them as role-performers related to a shared national change agenda. Setting out its agenda in 1999, the Government promised to work ‘with all New Zealanders … to create a rich, vibrant, confident nation’ and to reach out to ‘local government, to business, to teachers, to scientists, sportspeople and artists’ and to ‘our many different peoples to join with it to make New Zealand a better place for all.’

And in 2007 it stated its intention ‘to work - as it has over the last six years - in partnership with people from across sectors and communities to advance New Zealand's interests.’ The Government’s agenda required the acquiescence and active participation of all of these partners. It addressed them in specific ways, celebrating certain traits such as individual responsibility, flexibility and commercialisable initiative, and it assumed that they would all be willing and able to contribute to the national good.

In keeping with Aihwa Ong’s application of the notion of governmentality, Labour’s political project employed optimising ‘technologies of subjectivity’ that attempted to ‘induce self-animation and self-government so that citizens [might] optimize choices, efficiency and competitiveness in turbulent market conditions.’

The Government’s project promised opportunity and benefit for all, but it also demanded the participation and contribution of all. This dual address can be seen in Labour’s stated commitment to ‘an inclusive agenda which enables all New Zealanders to be valued and encouraged to contribute to the richness and wellbeing of our nation’, its belief that ‘the talents of all must be deployed in the drive to transform our nation’, and its claim that ‘[u]nlocking the potential of all New Zealanders is an imperative, not an ideal, in a dynamic modern economy.’ And while the project was held to be consistent with New Zealand’s values and identity, it was also allowed that these things would need to be modified in the service of the national project. A Government-commissioned report acknowledged that while some existing ‘attitudes and behaviours are helpful in our quest for a more prosperous and inclusive economy … others are unhelpful.’ Values and

35 Clark, ‘Speech from the Throne [1999]’.
36 Clark, ‘Speech from the Throne [2005]’.
37 Aihwa Ong, Neoliberalism as Exception: Mutations in Citizenship and Sovereignty. Durham, Duke University Press, 2006, p.6 (but see also pp.13-14).
38 Clark, ‘Speech from the Throne [2005]’.
39 Clark, ‘Speech from the Throne [2002]’.
40 Clark, ‘Speech from the Throne [2005]’.
41 Clark, ‘Speech from the Throne [2005]’.
42 SIAC, An Innovation Framework, pp.49, 50. Further work on how national values might contribute to national economic value was carried out or commissioned by the government-appointed Growth and
identity, it was acknowledged, would need to be modified according to the demands of
the global economy. ‘No matter how much people value the “New Zealand way of life”,’
the Government warned, ‘capital and labour are mobile’.\textsuperscript{43} Government commissioned
reports noted that the required traits of entrepreneurship and risk-taking were not
naturally part of New Zealand culture,\textsuperscript{44} insisted that “[w]e must not let our past, however
glorious, get in the way of our future”,\textsuperscript{45} and urged that New Zealanders change their
attitudes towards success, towards ‘tall poppies’ and towards risk. The knowledge society
was clearly accepted as something that needed to be actively constructed in support of a
programme of economic transformation.

The Construction of a Shared Purpose

Labour’s change agenda drew substantially from the broad category of Third Way
politics. These politics, influentially expounded by Tony Blair’s New Labour in Britain
and by Bill Clinton’s Democrats in the United States, present themselves as a new
articulation of social democratic principles in a time of simultaneous globalisation and
individualism. Insofar as a definition of the modern Third Way is possible,\textsuperscript{46} it operates
by negation. In a series of oppositions set out by Martin Powell, the Third Way attacks
and deliberately eschews the ‘dogmatism’ of both the “old” left and the “new” right; it
claims that economies operate best not through ‘command and control’ or ‘free
competition’ modes but through ‘co-operation’ and ‘partnership’; and it rejects a class-
based analysis and the goal of equality on the one hand, and unquestioning faith in
unfettered markets, on the other. Both rights and responsibilities are stressed – not just the
‘partial’ emphases of the old left and the new right.\textsuperscript{47} The resultant promise of a
mediating Third Way is not offered as a compromise between the two positions, but as

\textsuperscript{43} OPM, Growing an Innovative New Zealand, p.12.
\textsuperscript{44} SIAC, An Innovation Framework, p.49.
\textsuperscript{46} For a manifesto of sorts, see Anthony Giddens, The Third Way: the Renewal of Social Democracy.
Cambridge, Polity Press, 1998. For further discussion, see also Anthony Giddens, The Third Way and its Critics.
\textsuperscript{47} Martin Powell (ed.), New Labour, New Welfare State? The ‘Third Way’ in British Social Policy.
the transcendence of the dichotomy they were presumed to present. The Third Way, writes Chris Pierson, lies ‘between but more importantly “beyond” two alternatives that were seen to have failed.’ It does not negotiate the tensions between them, but denies that tensions necessarily exist, in an approach that claims to combine ‘the ethics of community with the dynamics of a market economy’.

A common critique of the Third Way is that the whole project is ‘amorphous’ and ‘lacking in content’, and that its posited reconciliations (between economic growth and social cohesion, for example) are simply rhetorical performances that cannot be matched in reality. Criticism from the left commonly notes that the Third Way has formally dropped the ideal of equality of outcomes, preferring to stress equality of opportunity. As such, the “old left” insistence on structural inequalities is dropped, leading critics to portray the Third Way as neoliberalism with a human face. Simultaneously, Third Way thought loses liberalism’s insistence on the primacy of individual liberty. Ralf Dahrendorf notes the Third Way never talks of liberty, and carries a tendency to a sort of paternalistic authoritarianism. Third Way thought, in short, runs the danger of losing sight of the goals of both liberty and equality, and may be left clinging to a tenuous sense of fraternity. Its emphasis on “social cohesion” and the consequent refutation of social divisions based on class, gender and race leads Stuart Hall to conclude that the Third Way advocates a ‘politics without adversaries’.

There is, however, no one Third Way, but many variants that have emerged in a variety of settings. The danger of applying the label to the fifth Labour Government is that it tends to deflect attention from what was specific about this particular version, and its strengths

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49 The phrase is Martin Powell’s (*New Labour, New Welfare State?*, p.14), although Grant Duncan (in *Society and Politics*. Auckland, Pearson, 2004, p.214) notes that the same phrase was used by Social Development Minister Steve Maharey in an article in a 2002 *National Business Review* article.
and weaknesses as a local response to local circumstances.\textsuperscript{55} Generic accounts of Third Way politics, both descriptive and normative, carry a set of associations and critiques that may not necessarily be germane to contemporary New Zealand politics. Indeed, while Helen Clark described her Government as adopting a ‘third way approach in November 2000,\textsuperscript{56} by May of the following year Steve Maharey had dismissed the label as ‘imported’ and ‘imprecise’ and adopted ‘new social democracy’ as an alternative.\textsuperscript{57} But the Third Way label, loosely held, remains a useful analytical device for shedding light on the novelty of the Government’s project in relation to preceding modes of governance in New Zealand. And Hall’s observation that a politics of cohesion and inclusion marginalises internal difference lends support to a possible evaluation of the moral implications of the universitas’ construction of a shared purpose, and of citizens as role-performers united in a ‘team of action’.

It makes a good deal of sense in local historical perspective to think of the fifth Labour Government as a Third Way project. New Zealand political history since the 1970s provides relatively pure examples of the practice and the loss of legitimacy of First Way (the state regulation of the Keynesian mixed economy) and Second Way (liberal market monetarism) governance. The First Way, which can be read as a response to World War One and the Depression, was announced in New Zealand in 1936 by Walter Nash’s conviction that ‘economic forces … must be rationally controlled so far as is humanly possible’ towards the goal of ‘the provision of the highest possible standard of living consistent with a nation’s natural resources and its ability to utilise them efficiently’, and reached its high-water mark under the restrictive regulations and “Think Big” national infrastructure projects of the Muldoon years prior to 1984.\textsuperscript{58} This “Fortress New Zealand” approach, however, was predicated on a refusal to acknowledge New Zealand’s size and


\textsuperscript{57} Jane Kelsey, \textit{At the Crossroads: Three Essays}. Wellington, Bridget Williams Books, 2002, p.79.

\textsuperscript{58} Dalziel, ‘A Third Way for New Zealand’, p.86.
distance, which in reality could not sustain a self-sufficient national economy at any level beyond subsistence.  

The tensions of the First Way, brought to acuity by Muldoon’s policies, the oil shocks of the 1970s and the United Kingdom’s turn towards Europe, were resolved by the “blitzkrieg” neoliberal reforms of Rogernomics.  

In a remarkably short space of time, New Zealand was transformed from one of the most regulated to one of the most open economies in the world. The shared purpose assumed by pre-1984 economic nationalism and comprehensive welfarism gave way to the law-based order of the *societas*. Domestic and external deregulation was predicated on an economic rationalism that accepted the synergies of open competition and a global level playing field. Traces of the shared purpose of the *universitas* remained, and could be seen in the impulse to justify neoliberal reforms in the language of the national interest and even in an appeal to national pride on the basis that New Zealand was ‘leading the world’ through the speed and rigour of its reform process.  

The neoliberal reforms, however, were again based on a poor understanding of size and distance: they built an open economy, but no-one came, or even reciprocated. 

The neoliberal reforms were widely unpopular, in part because they were enacted very quickly with a resulting democratic deficit, and in part because they were seen as generating an increasing and unfair gap between wealthy and poor. These concerns were utilised by the incoming Government in 1999, when it described its agenda as change for a people ‘weary of radical restructuring’ and as ‘responsible, pragmatic change in the

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interests of the many’. This approach had been developed by Labour during their decade in opposition in the 1990s: in their 1993 manifesto, Labour described the idea of a strategic partnership between government and industry as the ‘new international orthodoxy’ and warned that such a partnership would ‘not be pursued under National’s hands off policies.’ In fact, National had also become increasingly aware of the need to articulate their economic agenda with a greater concern for the good of society. From the mid 1990s Prime Minister Jim Bolger had been increasingly interested in the notions of social capital and social cohesion. Bolger, Jenny Shipley and even Finance Minister Ruth Richardson spoke approvingly of coupling individual responsibility with an empowering and enabling government. This ‘rediscovery’ of society marked a partial return to the state-as-universitas, but National was unable or unwilling in 1999 to articulate its agenda around a sense of shared purpose as forcefully as Labour was.

New Zealand’s neoliberal reforms were unusual in that they were initiated by a Labour Government (although they were subsequently continued and extended by the right-leaning National Government). The incoming fifth Labour Government in 1999 explicitly defined itself against the unpopularity of the neoliberal reforms and, therefore, against the fourth Labour Government. ‘Pure market forces’, Clark declared, ‘haven’t delivered the goods. The gaps just get bigger.’ Elsewhere she charged that ‘radical economic change’ from 1984 ‘had not brought about recovery’. Labour’s emphasis from 1999 on national identity, consensus and partnership can thus be read as a claim to have returned to a politics of inclusion. The rhetorical insistence that its vision is in fact a widely shared national vision constitutes a claim to be properly representing the people, in an attempt to garner popular support. In fact, the trope of partnership can be seen as an attempt to resolve the legitimation crisis of the neoliberal reforms, in which democratic participation was seen to have been overtaken by ideology, technocrats and powerful interests. The fifth Labour Government operated in - and helped to constitute - a quite different political

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63 Clark, ‘Speech from the Throne [1999]’.
67 Clark, ‘Prime Minister’s Statement [2002]’.
and ideological milieu from that of the fourth Labour Government. The key Treasury reports of the mid-1980s (which were, in fact, quite substantial books) were the dogmatic statements suggested by their titles: *Economic Management* (1984) and *Government Management* (1987). Insofar as the documents of fifteen years later (1999's *Towards Higher Living Standards for all New Zealanders* and 2001's *Towards an Inclusive Economy*) were comparable, they were marked by a more inclusive focus, and by a pragmatic and incrementalist focus on a journey towards a desired goal rather than on an idealised destination.

But while Labour in 1999 defined itself in opposition to the neoliberal reforms, it had no intention of returning to the ‘very heavy [government] involvement in the economy’ that had preceded them. Neither approach, it argued, had ‘generated sustained high rates of growth.’ Its response drew on a “not only but also” approach typical of Third Way politics. The Government not only promised ‘a market led approach to economic development’ which aimed to ‘unleash the productive potential of the private sector not to replace it’ but also argued that ‘the government has an important leadership role in generating superior economic performance.’ In its reconciliation of economic and social goals (‘economic and social development go hand in hand’) the project was presented as the logical successor to the ‘comprehensive system of social security’ with which New Zealand ‘led the world’ 64 years ago. By referring back to this touchstone of Labour Party pride, the fifth Labour Government sought to distance itself from the neoliberalising fourth; while simultaneously reconfiguring its social goals to fit a ‘market led approach’. This updated approach to social security was evident in the subtitle of the Government’s publication *Pathways to Opportunity: From Social Welfare to Social Development*.  

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74 OPM, *Growing an Innovative New Zealand*, p.28.  
75 OPM, *Growing an Innovative New Zealand*, p.28.  
77 Office of the Minister of Social Services and Employment (OMSSE), *Pathways to Opportunity: Nga Whai Oranga: From Social Welfare to Social Development*. Wellington, Ministry of Social Development, 2001. This social development approach can be seen as a progression from the enabling
If the fifth Labour Government’s economic agenda claimed to negotiate a path between the approaches of the first and fourth Labour Governments, the same can be said of its nation-building agenda. Coming to power as the severity of the Great Depression eased, the first Labour Government (1935-49) sought to restore what historian James Belich calls the ‘populist contract’ of security and prosperity for all,\(^78\) promising to utilise the nation’s economic resources in such a way as to meet the social needs of the people.\(^79\) The universalist principles of its 1938 Social Security Act both assumed and enacted a national society seen as a system of shred co-operation. Its sense of national independence, however, did not ultimately question New Zealand’s close relationship with Britain. The fourth Labour Government (1984-90) drew on and developed the independent foreign policy of the short-lived third (1972-5) and the banning in 1985 of nuclear-powered or nuclear weapons-capable warship is still widely seen as an important assertion of national independence. But the economic reforms undertaken after 1984 were based on a rejection of shared social goals and values (beyond the expectation that an increased reliance on market forces would lead to an increase in overall productivity, the distribution of which was no longer taken as centrally important). National unity was increasingly based on the acceptance of shared laws and on the exemplarity of market freedom.

The fifth Labour government portrayed its overall project as a new articulation of economic nationalism; one not based on a pre-1984 “Fortress New Zealand” isolationism, but on smart and strategic engagement with the global economy, in pursuit of the nationalist goals of autonomy, identity and unity.\(^80\) As we have seen, such an articulation faces incentives to define the nation, nationalism, and nationalist goals in tightly circumscribed ways. In an updated take on the “there is no alternative” arguments popular in 1984, Labour’s post-1999 project was justified on the basis of economic necessity. Smart engagement, innovation, flexibility and investment in human capital were seen as the key components in facilitating individual and national prosperity in a competitive


\(^80\) See Chapter 3 for a discussion of this sort of understanding of economic nationalism.
global economy. But they were also grounded in an argument that such characteristics were constitutive of an authentic national identity. Labour argued that economic performance was improved in cohesive societies, and assumed that promising to work for the good of “all” New Zealanders and to protect national specificity against the forces of global homogeneity would prove politically popular. Agreeing with Australian Labor MP Mark Latham’s claim that the articulation of economic and social objectives makes for ‘good politics’, Labour MP Steve Maharey argued that the first party to effect this articulation ‘would be in power for a long time’ and, more interestingly, that it would ‘usher in a new political settlement that would last for decades.’

Rejecting the idea that globalisation was antithetical to the agency and relevance of nation-states, Clark argued that a ‘world without borders is made for a trading economy like New Zealand’s’. The benefits of globalisation, however, would not accrue to nation-states by themselves. Clark went on to say that ‘[w]e have to make globalisation work for us, not sulk and let it work against us.’ Elsewhere she claimed that her Government had been busy since 1999 ‘constructing the instruments and practices that will make globalisation work for New Zealand’. The Government’s agenda was based on the goal of tilting the playing field in New Zealand’s favour, by leading and co-ordinating a strategic national response. This response was based on a frank assessment of size and distance. In 2002’s *Growing an Innovative New Zealand*, this was represented graphically. Two maps were captioned ‘Draw two circles of radius 2200km. The one centered on Wellington captures 3.8m New Zealanders, the one centered on Helsinki captures 300m people from 39 countries.’ The Government’s response was that ‘New Zealand needs to aggressively find ways to overcome its geographic location and connect with global markets’. This new response embodied an acknowledgment, in David Craig’s words, that ‘distance does matter, and it’s us in the distance, not them.”

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81 Latham, ‘The Third Way’, p.25
82 Cited in Duncan, *Society and Politics*, p.214.
84 Clark, ‘Closing Address to Knowledge Wave Conference [2001]’.
87 David Craig, ‘Post-Fordism, Neo-Trekkaism’, in Michael Stevenson (ed.), *This is the Trekka*. Wellington, Creative New Zealand, 2003, p.59.
The Government’s articulation of a shared purpose can be read as a movement back towards the state-as-*universitas*. This shared purpose, however, was radically different from that associated with the “First Way”, which had been based on an assumption of a strong sense of social attachment. The Third Way’s “re-discovery” of society was made in the light of the neoliberal argument that society was wholly reducible to the individuals that made it up. The post-1999 project invoked the pre-1984 ideal of national economic development and rejected the post-1984 argument that such national-level progress would be the inevitable result of instituting a competitive free-market. But its resulting valourisation of society was ambivalent on the question of whether society was an intrinsic good-in-itself or an instrumental good that would facilitate the ambitions and interests of individuals. The shared purpose of the *universitas* had to co-exist with the *societas*’ emphasis on individual rights and liberties. The individual is ambiguously positioned within such politics, addressed simultaneously as a role performer related to a wider shared purpose and as human capital assuming individual responsibility and reward.

While the Government’s change agenda was presented as an explicit response to globalisation, and New Zealand’s unique geo-economic situation within global flows, it was also, implicitly, a response to individualism. When the Government spoke – as it often did - of “our” objectives, “our” interests or “our” fortunes as a nation, or of New Zealanders agreeing on their goals and working together to achieve them, it was seeking to naturalise the pursuit of shared collective goals, and it was seeking to broaden neoliberalism’s narrow focus on individual self-interest. The twin concepts of individual and collective goals were sometimes explicitly presented as complementary: the Government’s argument that ‘our individual success contributes to stronger families and communities’ and its vision of New Zealand as a nation ‘in which we work in harmony to achieve our separate and collective goals’\(^{88}\) can be seen as a local echo of Tony Blair’s presentation of ‘[s]elf interest and national interest together’.\(^{89}\)

This rhetoric of internal co-operation served to elide internal lines of division and competition. Most obviously, it served to marginalise a class-based discourse. Again, this


echoes Blair’s vision of people ‘freed from barriers of class, building a better future for themselves and the country’. Since all New Zealanders were now on the same team, the success of the wealthy and powerful could be applauded as “our” success. The implication is that the benefits of economic growth will accrue to the nation rather than to companies, bosses, and shareholders. But the desired economic transformation demands that businesses become more competitive, and the labour force more flexible. These demands stand as euphemisms for downward pressure on wages and job security, even as it is the knowledge and skills of workers that provide the crucial competitiveness. As opposed to a neoliberal discourse in which group difference is seen as irrelevant at best and dangerous at worst, Labour’s national vision was broader and more fluid. It was a vision able to manage difference for the sake of a larger purpose.

In consequence, sub-state groups, even groups that were previously marginalised within New Zealand society, came to be celebrated within this project, to the extent that they were willing and able to contribute towards it. Maori, for example, were celebrated as a unique point of difference. The Brand New Zealand project celebrated the capacity of “our” Maori influences to act as a unique selling point for the country. Creative New Zealand noted the ‘unique role’ that Maori arts played in the nation’s cultural identity. And Finance Minister described Maori as ‘the New Zealanders who, by definition, make us different from any other nation’ (my emphasis). Even if other countries were also clean, green, and even if they were also creative and innovative, New Zealand’s Maori culture could not be replicated. But Labour, while enthusiastic, understood the contribution of Maori in reductive terms. It recognised that ‘Maori have a unique contribution to make’ in the development and promotion of ‘a contemporary and future-focussed Brand New Zealand’ and promised to work ‘with Maori to find ways of leveraging this for the benefit of all New Zealanders’ (my emphasis). The logic of this statement clearly positioned the “difference” of Maori by its capacity to act as ‘difference for the nation’s sake’, thus positioning Maori as role-performers related to the shared

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93 Michael Cullen, ‘Budget Speech 2006’, in NZPD, 18 May 2006. The ambivalent address of Maori according to what they could do for the nation was expressed elsewhere in Cullen’s speech, where he held New Zealand’s national identity to be ‘comprised of many strands’ including ‘in some respects, the place of Māori in our nation’ (my emphasis).
Indeed, the Government’s celebration of Maori difference operated within tightly controlled parameters. In 2004, the Government responded to the claims to areas of the foreshore and seabed by certain Maori iwi by circumventing the legal process and placing the contested zones in the ‘public domain’, thus protecting them ‘for the common use and benefit of all New Zealanders’. Helen Clark pointedly refused to meet the leaders of the subsequent protest march, labelling them ‘haters and wreckers’. This description begs the obvious question of what, exactly, the march was seeking to wreck, with the most obvious answer being the Government’s corporate vision of a shared vision and a shared identity. Rather than coercively quelling protest, the Government sought to build public consent to its attempts to ‘fix meanings and identities’. The logic at work here was the same as that which brought artists in from the margins of society in order that they might play a role in ‘defining our point of difference and communicating our special values to the world … [offering us] a strong competitive advantage in a world jaded by sameness.’ Thus, while the Government officially envisaged a ‘land where diversity is valued and reflected in our national identity’, in practice the diversity that could be celebrated was carefully restricted to the diversity that would contribute to the appropriate image and identity. The logic at work here is what Stephen Turner labels the ‘inclusive exclusion of difference’, in which individuals and sub-state groups are understood as means to national ends.

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98 Doty, ‘Sovereignty and the Nation’, p.141.
100 OPM, *Growing an Innovative New Zealand*, p.6, and numerous Labour MPs in NZPD, 12 February 2002.
The specific challenge for the Government was to assert the primary importance of the nation as the locus of loyalty and belonging while simultaneously re-imagining that identity to make it compatible with the demands of global economic competitiveness. As we have seen, it was supposed that some elements of the existing national identity were untenable in an age of multinational capitalism. Attempts were made, however, to ground the attitudes and behaviours required by the economic transformation project in New Zealand culture and history. According to Creative New Zealand Chair Peter Biggs, ‘the vision of ourselves as a daring pioneering and creative country already exists among us. We need to celebrate and promote this reality’.\(^\text{102}\) New Zealand’s pioneering past was defined for the purpose as a history of flexibility, inventiveness and pragmatism, rather than as a history of conservatism and dour conformism. Indeed, the national identity asserted by the Government conforms with the argument of Ross Bond and his collaborators that national economic development projects narrate national identity through processes of ‘reiteration, recapture, reinterpretation and repudiation’.\(^\text{103}\) The multiple markers of national identity, in other words, are selectively edited, elided and emphasised according to a reading of economic necessity.

In official documents it was said to be “the nation” that would be the chief beneficiary of the pursuit of the Government’s “shared” purpose. The project, after all, was about ‘reversing our fortunes as a nation’.\(^\text{104}\) This implicit promise to share the material benefits of economic growth widely throughout the nation was made explicit when the Government stated that its vision saw New Zealanders “ensuring that a social dividend flows from economic success”\(^\text{105}\) and when it described its economic agenda acting in ‘the interests of the many’.\(^\text{106}\) At the same time, “the nation” was also imagined as means toward the end of this economic growth. The “Brand New Zealand” project was based on highlighting and advertising New Zealand’s unique value proposition to the world. And the Government’s support of, for instance, the “creative industries” was based on the argument that national cultural production offered national competitive advantage, due to

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\(^{104}\) Clark, ‘Prime Minister’s Statement [2001]’.


\(^{106}\) Clark, ‘Speech from the Throne [1999]’.  

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its ability to ‘leverage off New Zealand’s unique culture and capabilities, which international competitors can’t replicate’. This understanding of national culture as a potential route to future prosperity as well as the product of historical roots drew on the future-focused orientation of official national narratives in New Zealand. In the Government’s project, this orientation was aligned with the challenges of economic globalisation: the ‘race to the future … [that] we New Zealanders have to be committed to winning’.

The foregrounding of national identity and the construction of a national brand were presented as instances of local divergence standing against the homogenising force of globalisation. The assertion of national specificity remained, however, strongly structured by the global practices and processes it was responding to. National identity, in turn, came to be seen as instrumentally rather than intrinsically valuable. Certain markers of the national character – those seen as necessary for global economic competitiveness such as innovation, risk-taking and entrepreneurialism - were valourised as national traits, while other potential markers – egalitarianism, a pseudo-spiritual attachment to the land, or a propensity to ignore the outside world – were to be repudiated, or at least qualified and radically reinterpreted in the Government’s nation-building project.

**The Brand New Zealand Project**

The instrumental functionality of national identity was the starting point for the Brand New Zealand project, within which Labour sought to ‘rebrand New Zealand ‘as an upmarket, innovative, dynamic economy’ and committed itself to working with the private sector to develop a consistent and attractive ‘brand image of New Zealand’. The Government initiated the project under the auspices of New Zealand Trade and Enterprise (NZTE), who described it as establishing a clear point of difference for New Zealand in the minds of its potential trading partners and investors. The broad objective was to construct and communicate an image of New Zealand more closely aligned with the demands and values of the global knowledge economy, in which innovation, imagination

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109 Clark, ‘Prime Minister’s Statement [2001]’.
and ideas were said to be replacing labour and capital as the key factors of production.\textsuperscript{112} The Government complained that ‘[o]ffshore perceptions of New Zealand are outdated’, noting that while there was ‘some awareness internationally’ of the country’s “clean green image”, there was ‘too little awareness of New Zealand as an innovative country at the leading edge of knowledge’\textsuperscript{113} or as a ‘dynamic twenty-first century economy with sophisticated cities and a vibrant arts and cultural life.’\textsuperscript{114} This strategic use of national specificity and national identity can be seen as in historical continuity with earlier portrayals of New Zealand that had been based on integrating the country into the global trading system. National identity in New Zealand has been marked historically by malleability and functionality, characteristics that meant that identity could be deployed easily and readily in the service of a new political project.

The national branding project was an exercise in carefully controlled uniqueness. It was, as Jenny Lawn and Bronwyn Beatty observe, an exercise in ‘integrated branding’, in which the national brand should be ‘supported, reinforced and enriched by every act of communication between the country and the rest of the world’\textsuperscript{115} (italics in original). The goal, according to Clark, was a consistent image ‘across our industry sectors’.\textsuperscript{116} This drive for consistency is best embodied in the newzealandnewthinking.com website, established by NZTE as the homepage of the Brand New Zealand project. Within the site, government agencies and New Zealand companies are invited to register to access the “New Thinking Toolbox” which offers visual guidelines, presentation templates and content ideas, an image library, a quotes database and promotional material\textsuperscript{117} in order to help ‘[b]rand ambassadors tell the story of New Zealand.’\textsuperscript{118} The purpose of the project is to show ‘what makes our products, services and overall approach different … why

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item \textsuperscript{112} See Clark, ‘Implementing a Progressive Agenda after Fifteen Years of Neoliberalism: The New Zealand Experience’. Address to London School of Economics, 21 February 2002. Retrieved 20 November 2006 from http://www.lse.ac.uk/collections/LSEPublicLecturesAndEvents/events/2002/20020221t1512z001.htm for the need to align New Zealand’s image with ‘contemporary reality’ and OPM, Growing an Innovative New Zealand, p.14 for knowledge as a ‘key factor of production’.
\item \textsuperscript{113} OPM, Growing an Innovative New Zealand, p.48.
\item \textsuperscript{114} Clark, ‘Implementing a Progressive Agenda’.
\item \textsuperscript{116} Clark, ‘Prime Minister’s Statement [2002]’.
\item \textsuperscript{117} New Zealand Trade and Enterprise (NZTE), ‘About Brand New Zealand’. Retrieved 20 November 2006 from http://newzealandnewthinking.com/BrandNZ/about_brand_newzealand.aspx
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investors should consider New Zealand … [and] what makes New Zealand a good place to visit, buy from, or emigrate to.’¹¹⁹

These stated goals are explicitly about leveraging cultural specificity for economic advantage in the global economy. It is said that New Zealand New Thinking ‘defines our broader contribution to the world, unites us around a shared vision, celebrates our history, and defines our future success.’¹²⁰ This is a clear manifestation of the state-as-universitas, in which a shared purpose and vision is taken for granted, eliding the possibility of alternatives, or of asking questions as to exactly how the benefits of ‘our future success’ will be distributed. There is some unintended irony, then, when Pamela Ford describes the branding project as aiming to convey a ‘richer set of messages’,¹²¹ in that the point of the project is not to create a full and diverse set of messages, but to ensure that ‘all actions and messages are based on the value the company brings to its line of business’.¹²² The controlled uniqueness permitted by the Brand New Zealand project may be richer in terms of economic returns from global markets, but it comes at the cost of marginalising a genuinely rich diversity of ways of being and understanding New Zealand identity.

The branding project’s aim was not to obliterate, but to augment New Zealand’s existing image. “Clean and green” remained a valuable part of the country’s tourism and agricultural marketing strategies, but it could not adequately differentiate New Zealand, according to economist Ganesh Nana, ‘from our international competitors.’¹²³ New Zealand’s participation in the 2005 Aichi World Expo, for instance, was based on its capacity to promote ‘perceptions of New Zealand as a smart, innovative, high tech nation, as well as clean and green.’¹²⁴ The move to a “clean green plus” national brand emphasising the human capabilities embedded in terms such as ‘our innovation and new ideas, our creativity, and our Pacific and Maori influences’¹²⁵ engaged with Creenagh

¹¹⁹ NZTE, ‘About Brand New Zealand’.
¹²⁰ NZTE, ‘About Brand New Zealand’.
¹²¹ Pamela Ford, in Ryan, ‘New Zealand – New Thinking’, p. 12. The argument is echoed in NZTE’s claim that the ‘Brand New Zealand Programme has been developed to promote a richer understanding of New Zealand in the global marketplace’ in NZTE, ‘About Brand New Zealand’.
Lodge’s observation that ‘sophisticated markets increasingly want evidence that there is a mind behind the brand and its offer: a collective and conscious force which can be relied upon to keep the promise set out by the brand’. The move to “clean green plus” also had the force of eliding questions of whether the environmentally pure image was matched in reality: its implication was that clean and green was an accomplished fact that could be built upon.

Further, its privileging of human traits over the land served to ground national belonging in one’s capacity to contribute to present and future national purpose, rather than in one’s relation to the land. A brand based on creativity, innovation and talent diminishes the salience of one’s connection to New Zealand as a geographical place, replacing it with membership in New Zealand as a ‘global community of talented people’. It can be read as an attempt to provide a new focal point for unity: one which would be able to co-opt all New Zealanders into a national identity which naturalises the norms (individual responsibility, initiative, competitiveness) necessary for successful participation in the market, while reducing claims of belonging to a question of present and future contribution. Implicit in this move is an attenuation of the prior claims to belonging of Maori based on their connection with the land.

The New Zealand state’s branding project was part of a global trend in which nation-states embraced the marketing logic of branding. Commenting on the trend, Peter van Ham notes that in ‘today’s world of information overload, strong brands are important in attracting foreign direct investment, recruiting the best and the brightest, and wielding political influence.’ Hence, just as “[s]mart firms pour most of their money into improving their brands … [s]mart states are [also] building their brands around reputations and attitudes’. For van Ham, branding is a positive move: he argues that a state’s use of its ‘history, geography, and ethnic motifs to construct its own distinct image [constitutes] a benign campaign that lacks the deep-rooted and often antagonistic sense of national identity and uniqueness that can accompany nationalism.” This positive assessment of national branding rests on a sanguine view of economic globalisation. Just as

\[129\] van Ham, ‘The Rise of the Brand State, p.2. Lawn and Beatty note (‘Getting to Wellywood’, p.137) that this argument is problematised by the branding effort of nationalist terrorist groups.
globalisation works, according to its advocates, by rewarding “good” policies and institutions (and penalising “bad” ones\textsuperscript{130}), so it also works by rewarding a “good” national image and reputation (and penalising regressive elements of national identity). The construction of a national brand, however, may require an undesirable narrowing of how national identity can be understood.

Branding is an established corporate business practice: a form of advertising that attempts to create an emotional response in potential customers as much as it attempts to impart information about a product.\textsuperscript{131} Branding in the business world is evaluated according to its ability to maximise profits for a corporation and its shareholders. In this context, any moral, social or environmental concerns about the actual product are seen as irrelevant, except insofar as those genuine or asserted concerns confer market value.\textsuperscript{132} A political community, by contrast, is constrained by the requirement that it incorporate a range of functions, values and identities that are not reducible to the maximisation of profit. The corporate language of the Brand New Zealand project and the shared purpose that it serves address citizens as human resources: as role-performers related to the shared purpose. Within a national branding project, the emphasis is placed not on national identity’s internal orientation – its capacity to provide meaning and social cohesion – but on its external orientation – its ability to provoke positive emotional responses from prospective customers and investors.

In a Faircloughian act of commodification, the Brand New Zealand project constructs the nation as a unique value proposition, to be understood in commodified terms. The Government’s attempts to ‘leverage’ off high-profile cultural and sporting events (such as the Lord of the Rings film trilogy, the Americas Cup yachting regatta and the Rugby World Cup) were seen not as investments in culture or sport but as economic development opportunities pursued for the ‘benefit of our trade and tourism and the overall New Zealand brand.’\textsuperscript{133} The branding project privileges innovation, creativity and

\textsuperscript{130} See Martin Wolf, \textit{Why Globalisation Works}. New Haven, Yale University Press, 2004 for a defence of this position.
\textsuperscript{132} See Milton Friedman, cited in Joel Bakan, \textit{The Corporation: The Pathological Pursuit Of Profit And Power}. New York, Free Press, 2004, p.34, where any concerns except for profits are seen as ‘immoral’.
certain elements of internal difference, insofar as those things contribute to the specific goal of sustainable economic development through ‘developing great ideas’ and commercialising them.\textsuperscript{134} Since creativity, innovation and difference are understood as the necessary response to contemporary economic challenges, it follows that only those forms of creativity, innovation and difference that contribute to the goal of sustainable economic growth (only those ‘great ideas’ that can be profitably commercialised) will be valued. The danger is that this approach will limit those ideas, people and practices deemed valuable by government. In cultural policy, for instance, it might tend to proscribe dissenting or difficult art that foregrounds divisions within society. The fifth Labour Government has enacted the teleocracy of the \textit{universitas}, announcing its intention to provide ‘strong leadership’ and a ‘clear direction’.\textsuperscript{135} Its renewed attention on social cohesion and social values was at the same time a renewed willingness to act on society to construct an exemplary New Zealander marked by the traits demanded by the direction it had set.\textsuperscript{136}

The Brand New Zealand project is essentially the construction of a personality for the state, and is intimately connected with the central feature of a move towards the state-as-\textit{universitas}: the construction and naturalisation of a shared purpose. As such, it attempts to mediate between an externally oriented national image structured by frank economic considerations and an internally oriented national identity structured by a more complex mix of economic, cultural and political considerations. Its architects portray the Brand New Zealand project as simply communicating already existing points of national specificity to the world. But the project also acknowledges that global demands influence the sorts of messages that will add value to the national offering. In consequence, New Zealand’s identity is required to conform to the attitudes and behaviours necessary for competitiveness in the global knowledge economy. Significantly, the traits incorporated within Brand New Zealand’s ‘richer set of messages’\textsuperscript{137} such as creativity, innovation and

\textsuperscript{134} Clark, ‘Prime Minister’s Statement [2001]’.
\textsuperscript{135} Helen Clark ‘Prime Minister’s Statement [2002]’ and Labour MP Lianne Dalziel, in NZPD, 12 February 2002.
\textsuperscript{136} See, for a similar analysis in the Australian context, Johnson, \textit{Governing Change}, pp.24, 31.
knowledge are the same traits celebrated within the economic transformation project as necessary for economic growth and competitiveness.\textsuperscript{138}

Certainly the Brand New Zealand project incorporated objectives beyond the single-minded pursuit of national economic growth. It sought to leverage value from an existing clean green image, and from unique elements of New Zealand’s cultural identity. The central question – addressed below in chapter-length analyses of post-1999 cultural policy, food production policy and immigration policy – is of how economic considerations, global forces and alternative conceptions of national identity structure these assertions of national specificity. The question is of the extent to which the broader range of goals incorporated in the Government’s programme of “economic transformation plus” are seen as intrinsically worthwhile, and the extent to which they are held reductively as means to the end of economic advantage. This tension is implicit in the Government’s expectation that the country will ‘[d]erive considerable value from our natural advantages in terms of resources … human capital … and sense of community’.\textsuperscript{139}

The ‘postmodern politics’ of the brand-state suggests that national success under globalisation may require the privileging of projected signifiers (New Zealand as ‘a nation that gains strength from its foundation in the Treaty of Waitangi’, for instance\textsuperscript{140}) over a critical engagement with the material signifieds.

**The Political Project and the Pursuit of Hegemony**

The Government’s construction of a shared national purpose and its address of citizens as role-performers constitutes what Gramsci might call a ‘hegemonic project’: a discursive battle to define key political terms such as freedom, choice, the public good, and the limits and nature of the nation. As we have seen, the objective of a hegemonic project is to have its preferred definitions of these leading ideas - and thus its preferred constructions of policy problems and solutions - accepted as common-sense, legitimate and necessary. The capacity to influence the common-sense of society in this way has been theorised as an exercise of power; an exercise, as William Connolly argues, that raises moral questions of responsibility.\textsuperscript{141} Within a hegemonic shared purpose, difference

\textsuperscript{138} See especially OPM, *Growing an Innovative New Zealand*, p.14 (‘[i]nnovative activity is becoming the key driver of growth’ and ‘[k]nowledge has become a key factor of production) and p.56 (‘[c]reativity is at the heart of innovation’.)

\textsuperscript{139} OPM, *Growing an Innovative New Zealand*, p.12.

\textsuperscript{140} OPM, *Growing an Innovative New Zealand*, p.12.

and diversity can be accepted – even celebrated – but only insofar as they are able and willing to contribute to that shared purpose. This situation raises the question of whether the management of internal identities required by an official assertion of national identity is ethically desirable.

The Labour Government’s project offered a new understanding of freedom that defined itself in relation to the “negative freedom” of neoliberalism. Whereas the neoliberal turn had claimed to set individuals free from state regulation and interference, Labour has argued that this was a hollow freedom that had not set individuals free to define and pursue their life plans, and that it had served to generate and legitimate increasing inequality. A new conception of “positive freedom” that posited a connection ‘between economic security and the liberty of individual members of the population’,\(^\text{142}\) was implicit in the promise to ‘ensure opportunity and security for all New Zealanders’\(^\text{143}\) and in the requirement ‘that a social dividend [should flow] from economic success’.\(^\text{144}\) Labour’s emphasis on positive liberty should be seen as an argument rather than description of fact, however. The years since 1999 have not seen a return to a traditional social democratic critique of inequality that focus on structural factors. Rather, inequalities have been discursively linked with individual failure through a rhetorical insistence on the idea of “equality of opportunity”. In keeping with the prescriptions of Giddens, the fifth Labour Government rejected the “old left’s” emphasis on equality of outcome – what Giddens, using a term of Michael Walzer’s, denigrates as ‘egalitarianism at all costs’\(^\text{145}\) – and promised instead to deliver equality of opportunity.

Equality of opportunity has an intuitive rightness about it. It can be seen as a doctrine of freedom, in the sense that opportunity connotes the freedom to define and pursue one’s chosen ends, and in the sense that it offers freedom from the more oppressive demands of equality of welfare. The rejection of equality of outcome as a goal, it is argued, conforms to a widely held intuition that individuals should reap the rewards and bear the costs of their own decisions.\(^\text{146}\) From this starting point, it can be argued that the provision of

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\(^\text{143}\) Clark, ‘Prime Minister’s Statement [2001]’.

\(^\text{144}\) Clark, ‘Prime Minister’s Statement [2002]’.


equal basic rights and equal opportunities to succeed is all that is morally required of a society. The provision of equality of opportunity appears to satisfy what John Rawls takes to be another widely shared intuition: that one’s expectations in life ought not to be determined by the position – one’s class, gender, ethnicity and so on – into which one is born, since those positions are unchosen and therefore morally arbitrary.¹⁴⁷

If equality of opportunity can be provided then, so the argument goes, any resulting inequalities of outcome can be justified as matters of individual choice rather than decried as instances of social injustice. Such equality, it is often assumed, can be achieved through ensuring equal access to education and training. Indeed, the prominence of knowledge economy language can itself be seen as an argument for equality of opportunity. In the discourse of the knowledge economy, the new key factors of production – talent, knowledge and ideas – are taken to be inherent to the individual and not given by social position. So long as the state prepares its citizens to compete, by providing ‘globally competitive skills’¹⁴⁸ and ‘the right kinds of knowledge, skills and attitudes to succeed in a knowledge-based innovation-driven economy and society’¹⁴⁹ then opportunities for personal advancement and success might be seen as available to all and not pre-determined by the arbitrary fact of birth into a specific class, gender or ethnic position.

John Schaar argues, however, that while equality of opportunity presents itself as a ‘generous doctrine’, it merely offers the freedom to become unequal.¹⁵⁰ Under equality of opportunity, individuals may rise as far as their talents allow, but this, Schaar notes, offers little comfort to those with meagre talents, or talents not valued by the market.¹⁵¹ While the doctrine promises the equal opportunity for all to develop their capacities, freedom and choice are limited by the fact that each society values certain capacities more highly than others. As a result, only those ‘who are able and eager to do what society demands they do’ are able to ‘fulfil themselves and develop their abilities to the fullest’.¹⁵²

Equality of opportunity can thus lead to, and attempt to legitimate, massive inequalities of

¹⁴⁸ LEK, New Zealand Talent Initiative, p.6.
¹⁴⁹ SIAC, An Innovation Framework, p.9. See also OMSSE, Pathways to Opportunity, p.1 and MSD, Opportunities for all New Zealanders, p.3.
outcome, based ‘partly on natural inequalities and partly on the whims of consumers’. As such, it is a doctrine which serves to justify the talented – where “talent” is defined by market signals – rising to prominence and power, and gaining greater access to society’s resources. More seriously, it removes these results from the realm of political consideration. In Schaar’s terms, it ‘removes the question of how men should be treated from the realm of human responsibility and returns it to “nature.”’

The argument that access to appropriate education is sufficient to achieve equality of opportunity serves to marginalise established inequalities associated with socio-economic status. The salience of class is downplayed by equality of opportunity which, Schaar argues, ‘breaks up solidaristic opposition to existing conditions of inequality by holding out to the ablest and most ambitious members of the disadvantaged groups’ the prospect of individual success and advancement.’ Further, the posited centrality of the attributes and capabilities of individuals serves to elide questions of inequalities between groups. If one’s knowledge, ideas and talent are the key factors, then inequalities based on one’s group identification in terms of ethnicity, gender or sexuality can be presented as insignificant. Schaar concludes that equality of opportunity only holds if there is ‘prior acceptance of an already established social-moral order.’ The social and moral changes associated with globalisation and individualism, however, problematise the assumption that any such prior acceptance exists. In response, Labour explicitly presented its project as constitutive of a new and widely-held order, describing, for instance, its Growth and Innovation Framework as ‘document[ing] a broad consensus that has emerged over the last two years’, and arguing that its overall project represented a ‘widely shared vision for New Zealand.’ But, given the acceptance of globalisation as an immutable reality within which the country would need to succeed, the Government’s project could only provide equality of opportunity – and, therefore, a share in the public good - to those ‘able and eager’ to contribute to the shared purpose of sustainable economic growth through innovative activity.

158 Clark, ‘Prime Minister’s Statement [2002]’.
As we have seen, Labour presented a vision of “the people” and “the nation” characterised by the traits necessary for global economic competitiveness, but also by diversity, respect for Maori as tangata whenua and concern for the environment. It was a vision that conflated national identity and national interests, by re-narrating national identity in a way compatible with economic growth and by stressing the contribution of identity to economic outcomes. The valuation of individuals and groups according to their potential contribution to the national “shared” purpose was problematic enough. Just as problematic, however, was the fact that the attitudes and behaviours taken to be necessary for economic competitiveness were largely individualistic, and encouraged an expectation that everyone else should be able to succeed as well, whereas the construction of a national project implies the generation of altruism, which in turn relies on convincing citizens that their co-nationals are both similar to them and deserving.\(^{159}\) The challenge for the Government was to reconcile the knowledge economy’s individuation of responsibility and reward with a corporate vision and a sense of common purpose. The challenge was to encourage individuals to take individual responsibility seriously, but not so seriously that they would reject a sense of commitment to their fellow New Zealanders.

Rhetorically at least, Labour sought to attenuate the extreme individualisation of the knowledge economy with an emphasis on the unifying device of “the nation” which, it was supposed, connoted a sense of shared vision, communal responsibility and social cohesion. It was argued often that social and economic objectives were complementary,\(^{160}\) as the economic growth facilitated by talent and innovation underwrote ‘social well-being’.\(^{161}\) And ‘the important role of innovative and inclusive communities’\(^{162}\) was acknowledged in the argument that ‘well developed communities … are an essential part of, and precondition for, an effective economy.’\(^ {163}\) It was also argued that the ‘privileged discursive points’\(^ {164}\) of talent and innovation contributed to non-economic goals: talented people, it was said, were vital to the maintenance of a ‘vibrant New Zealand’.

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\(^{160}\) See Clark, ‘Prime Minister’s Statement [2006]’, in NZPD, 14 February 2006.


\(^{163}\) OPM, *Growing an Innovative New Zealand*, p.28. See also MSD, *Opportunities for all New Zealanders*, p.3.

\(^{164}\) Doty, ‘Sovereignty and the Nation’, p.127.
community.’\textsuperscript{165} Moreover, ‘talented individuals are meaningful contributors to the life of the nation’\textsuperscript{166} and those involved in economic transformation were advised that they must ‘must take into account the culture and values of our nation, and the need to bring people together’\textsuperscript{167} (emphases mine).

But the possible tension between a focus on community and the individuating tendencies of the knowledge economy was never directly addressed, except in the assumption that no tension existed. In a situation where talent and ‘[p]remium individuals are being targeted’\textsuperscript{168} in global markets, it was simply assumed that individuals would utilise their talent for the corporate good. The coupling of talent with the capacity to generate (economic) value lent itself to a conception of justice as earned desert, and to an individuation of responsibility and reward that militated against the creation of feelings of loyalty and altruism. Unequal rewards within the knowledge economy could be more easily justified as the appropriate result of the differential application of individual ambition and effort, provided only that equal access has been provided to the training and skills valued by the market. The assertion that the most relevant and important skills within the knowledge economy resided within individuals left the overall project with an ambivalence towards individual ambition, which was at once the driver of economic growth and innovation, and a hindrance to be jettisoned in the pursuit of collective ends.

While the Government’s project relied heavily on the language of the nation, it simultaneously served to challenge the nation-state’s traditional basis of belonging (the etymological link between birth (think nativity or nascence) and nation),\textsuperscript{169} positioning citizens as role-performers instead. Hannah Arendt’s 1967 coupling of the ‘decline of the nation-state and the end of the rights of man’\textsuperscript{170} sees rights as being accorded, in practice, not to humans \textit{qua} human being, but to humans \textit{qua} citizens of a nation-state. Leaving aside for now the moral desirability of this state of affairs, it is reasonable to wonder whether the rise of the brand-state threatens the link by which rights are guaranteed by

\begin{footnotes}
\item[165] LEK, \textit{New Zealand Talent Initiative}, p.3.
\item[167] SIAC, \textit{An Innovation Framework}, p.15.
\item[168] LEK, \textit{New Zealand Talent Initiative}, p.32.
\end{footnotes}
one’s belonging to a nation-state, and offers another, where one’s rights may come to be conditional on one’s alignment with the vision and purpose of the brand-state. In the United Kingdom, Tony Blair claimed that his Government marked the end of the “something-for-nothing” days. This is a claim for a new understanding of desert that is also relevant for post-1999 politics in New Zealand. Receiving “something-for-nothing” stands as a fair description of older understandings of citizenship. One gets something – rights, recognition, a claim of society’s shared resources – by virtue of nothing more than one’s birth or legitimate entry into the political community. On this new understanding, however, one’s claims are made conditional and contingent on one’s willingness to conform and contribute. To the extent that we are witnessing a partial move towards the state-as-universitas (or, in English, the state-as-corporation), the basis of belonging, perhaps, is coming to be increasingly determined by one’s capacity to contribute, rather than one’s birth-place. In this national corporation, the members of the state come to be addressed as human resources and PR ambassadors rather than as citizens.

The Government presented and imposed its preferred definitions of these leading political ideas, as all governments do, through a mixture of consent and coercion, with a strong preference for the generation of consent. Of course, coercion and consent are not so neatly separable, and hegemony can be seen as operating at the intersection of the two. Such coercive elements as can be found within Labour’s project - the changing terms of public recognition and support for Maori, artists and the unemployed, for instance - rely for their stability on the construction of popular consent. As we saw in Chapter 2, consent may be generated within a Gramscian framework through the psychological production of subjectivities or through the satisfaction of material interests. These dynamics correspond to two justifications that Labour has offered for its nation-building project: that it is in line with an already existing national identity, and that it provides for mutual advantage within the nation.

Labour attempted to generate the apparently spontaneous consent of cultural self-identification through a range of strategies. One might think of the establishment of the Tomb of the Unknown Warrior in 2004, the prominence given to the celebration of

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171 See Ong, *Neoliberalism as Exception*, pp.6, 12-18.
ANZAC Day as a quasi-religious national celebration and the pervasive use of terms of inclusion such as “we”, “us” and “our”. The Government has also, in its public speech acts, placed a great deal of emphasis on the international achievements of prominent New Zealanders, and encouraged its citizens to do the same. Within this focus on national achievement has been a broadening of the sorts of achievements that are seen as valuable. It has been important to celebrate not just national sportspeople, but also achievements in arts and culture, business and academic work. The aim in all cases is to broaden and thicken a popular sense of national pride, and to promote a sense of New Zealand as a country proudly holding its own on the international stage. In this endeavour, as will be seen in Chapter 5, cultural policy has gained a new salience as the site in which many of the new icons of national pride are produced.

But if Labour sought to generate consent through producing a psychological state of national self-identification, it also appealed to the apparently more pragmatic argument of mutual advantage. Its project was right, in other words, not just because everyone liked it, but because it was simply right, in that it was beneficial and necessary. Smart engagement, both domestically and internationally, was held to be the only credible response to the objective realities of a new global context. The Government was thus willing to engage with a variety of groups and sectors as means to its specified end; but the end itself remained beyond debate. This mode of anti-politics found support in a strong strand of pragmatic positivism within New Zealand history and culture, in which the content of a choice carries more weight than any metaphysical good attaching to the act of choosing. This argument was aligned with Labour’s state-at-war narrative of globalisation, in which the imperatives imposed on New Zealand by the global economy were held to create a state of exception that granted the state wider powers to do whatever was necessary in response. The Government’s political project relied, at a fundamental level, on its discursive authority to define the nature, purpose and limits of the nation, as well as key political terms such as freedom, choice and the public good. Its state-at-war narrative served to legitimate this internal struggle for discursive authority by linking it with the external struggle for economic viability (and thus national security).

173 See, for example, Clark, ‘Prime Minister’s Statement [2007]’.
In keeping with an understanding of ‘the medium of language as constituting the very meanings upon which ideas are constructed’, \(^{174}\) this study focuses not on the successes and failures of the Government’s agenda according to the terms set out by that agenda, but on the ‘rules that govern or make possible a policy decision’.\(^{175}\) Central to the political practice of the fifth Labour Government has been the attempt to naturalise and therefore to de-politicise its preferred understandings of policy problems and prescriptions. The pursuit of economic growth through innovation and the construction of a supportive national identity have been presented as common-sense: they are held to be both consistent with an existing set of national characteristics and, within the state of exception occasioned by global economic liberalism, empirically beneficial and necessary. The Government’s pragmatic positivism has marginalised appeals to alternative approaches, such as those that insist on the continued salience of class divisions, on the inherent value of dissensus and debate, on the inherent value of national and group cultures and identities, or on a moral (as opposed to functional) commitment to values such as the environment.

**Conclusion**

In the state-as-*universitas*, the shared purpose is constructed so as to meet a psychocultural need for identification and uniqueness, a political need for legitimacy and popularity and an economic need for image, reputation and visibility. Insofar as the individuating logics of mutual advantage and the knowledge economy cannot ground a shared purpose, the Government is led to invoke the political myth of the nation as a locus for authority, obligation and co-operation. Crucially, however, the content of national identity has to be re-defined so as to meet the economic objectives of the national brand. The branding project operates by the logic of the network, in which internal attachments and national identity are seen as functional and strategic and therefore as malleable and expendable. Structured by the logic of an advertising campaign, the branding project is reductive, as it assesses elements of national identity and image according to the value they would receive in global markets. Globalisation here offers opportunities for foregrounding elements of national specificity, but it also dictates which elements can be used.

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\(^{175}\) Fischer, *Reframing Public Policy*, p.41.
The expectation of the state-as-universitas that citizens ‘say the same thing’ and pull in the same direction are grounded in arguments that a sense of shared purpose genuinely exists, that the shared purpose will generate widely shared benefit, and that dire consequences would follow from a failure to participate in the shared purpose. The legitimation of necessity and the closely associated legitimation of mutual advantage both draw on the common sense tradition of pragmatic positivism in which public policy is judged right or wrong according to supposedly objective criteria. Part of the Government’s project has therefore been to naturalise the languages of economic growth, international competitiveness and individual responsibility as desirable and neutral goals, and to marginalise thereby alternative languages of internal egalitarianism and global justice.

Under the fifth Labour Government, the ends of public policy have been set by those in ‘the driver’s seat’ although great care was taken to present these ends as the consensual product of widespread consultation. To achieve the ends that had been determined, the Government called on the contribution of all New Zealanders in a language of partnership. But, there was a constant unresolved tension between the individual and the corporate, resolved only in language, in the call for all New Zealanders to ‘work in harmony to achieve our separate and collective goals’. Just as the Treaty partnership between the Crown and Maori was reduced to ‘working with Maori to find ways of leveraging [their unique contribution] for the benefit of all New Zealanders’ so the partnerships announced with other sectors may also be seen as functional alliances forged in the pursuit of a goal established by those in the driver’s seat. Individuals and sub-state groups were addressed as role-performers, and as means rather than ends.

The nation-building agenda of the state-as-universitas relies on its discursive authority to define key political terms and goals. As such, it will tend to be more interested in controlling the terms of public discourse than in strengthening a public sphere invested with the function of critique. Yet it may be, as Carol Pateman argues, that the notion of a public sphere in which public opinion serves to control and critique power is exactly what

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177 Clark, ‘Address to the Knowledge Wave Conference [2003]’.
is needed in order to provide a reasonable ground for political obligation. Without such a recovery, the re-discovery of society, community and the nation under Third Way governments, and the fifth Labour Government’s emphasis on shared visions and inclusive partnerships begin to look rather hollow; more like an exercise in public relations than an attempt to engage with a range of opinions and interests.

The following three chapters describe and analyse moments of continuity and change since 1999 in three separate policy areas: cultural policy, aspects of food policy and immigration policy respectively. In each case I am interested in assessing how the Government’s “shared” purpose has informed policy, institutional and discursive change in each of the policy areas, while also accounting for how this shared purpose was contested or transformed by the specific imperatives extant in each area. In each case I give an account of how policy decisions and the definition of policy problems were structured by the shared purpose (thereby enacting it) and how these decisions and definitions addressed the subjects of policy as role-performers related to that purpose. Associated with this is an investigation of the moral implications of imposing a unitary shared purpose onto the irreducible diversity of interests, identities and values contained within society. Fundamentally, I am interested in the political practices – including, crucially, the practice of political language – that were deployed in order to construct a new societal common-sense able to naturalise and de-politicise specific understandings of freedom, choice, the public good, obligation, authority, the state and the citizen.

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CHAPTER 5: CULTURAL POLICY

The clearest way to see through a culture is to attend to its tools for conversation.¹

In places where there is a Minister of Culture, it means there is no culture.²

Globalisation, National Identity and Cultural Policy

New Zealand’s fifth Labour Government has, since 1999, self-consciously sought to defend and promote a sense of national identity. It has done this both as a strategy of domestic political management and as part of a broader programme of economic transformation. The result has been the construction of a national identity built around the attitudes and behaviours deemed necessary for global economic competitiveness. The Government’s assertions of local specificity have been, consequently, powerfully structured by its understanding of the contemporary global economy, in ways that are seldom made explicit. Cultural policy has played a crucial and prominent role in the Government’s programme of nation-building and economic transformation. In a globalised world, Helen Clark argued, building a ‘strong sense of national identity is more important than ever.’³ At the same time, cultural production was articulated with the Government’s broader economic agenda. Creative New Zealand, the national arts finding agency, argued that ‘in an increasingly globalised world, New Zealand arts have the potential to build a strong, competitive edge’ for the nation by ‘defining our point of difference and communicating our unique values to the world’.⁴ The creative and cultural sectors were thus seen as an

integral part of the brand-state’s “postmodern” politics of image, reputation and visibility.\(^6\)

The Government’s key statement of its economic agenda identified the creative industries as a priority area, arguing that the sector was ‘able to leverage off New Zealand’s unique culture and capabilities, which international competitors can’t replicate’ and that they had the potential, therefore, ‘to generate wealth on a sustained basis’.\(^7\) On this understanding, New Zealand’s culture and its cultural production afforded the national economy with a non-replicable competitive advantage. In keeping with the wider branding project, a premium was placed on the differentiation provided by the ‘Pacific and Maori arts [which] play a unique role in New Zealand’s cultural identity’.\(^8\) This move marked a discursive broadening, as previously marginal portions of society – both Maori culture, and artists more generally – were incorporated into the mainstream of a national project. And yet it can also be seen as a discursive narrowing, as cultural production is positioned as a functional means to the shared ends posited by the state-as-*universitas*. Cultural and creative production have been celebrated by the fifth Labour Government, but they have been celebrated for their ability to contribute towards the officially shared vision of economic transformation and a strong sense of national identity.

Arguments since 1999 for the importance of cultural policy, then, have appealed to both the economic and the cultural benefits of art and culture. These multiple goals were expressed in Associate Minister Judith Tizard’s claim that arts and culture was ‘not just about our hearts and our souls, and … not just about national identity and personal identity’ but also ‘about jobs … [and] about how we describe ourselves and how we face the world in a globalising economy.’\(^9\) The Government sought to present these economic and cultural objectives not just as compatible but as mutually dependant. As Helen Clark stated, ‘[i]t is important that the fruits of economic growth are used to underpin the

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development of our national identity.'

It was expected, moreover, that support for New Zealand artists would define and advertise a national point of difference, providing the nation with a ‘strong competitive advantage in a world jaded by sameness’. And yet the Government’s economic and cultural objectives, while not necessarily mutually exclusive, were not automatically compatible either. The expectation that cultural production would project a unique identity to the world might be undermined by the demands and tastes of the global cultural economy. What is positioned as an assertion of national specificity may bear traces of Adornian pseudo-individualisation, in which an asserted difference has been constructed and deployed as a marketing strategy and, consequently, as a reinforcement of the dominant order.

This chapter examines the processes by which the Government has re-imagined and re-formulated arts and culture policy so as to make it amenable to the broader nation-building project. It explores the tensions generated by the expectation that cultural production would deliver both economic and cultural benefits. It asks, in other words, whether the assertion of a shared national divergence through cultural production is possible given the simultaneous embrace of global economic engagement and of the individuating discourse of the knowledge economy. Assuming that economic considerations structure and impose limits of some sort on the sort of local divergence that can be pursued, the chapter also asks whether the resulting construction of national specificity and a national shared purpose and a shared national identity is desirable. Cultural policy, in other words, is shaped by and helps to constitute a shared purpose and a shared personality for the state. This purpose and this personality are configured around certain ‘privileged discursive points’: innovation, creativity, talent and individual responsibility. The fifth Labour Government’s well publicised support for national arts and culture is structured by the expectation that its artists will embody these traits. It is led, therefore, to position them as role-performers related to the shared purpose of economic growth and the building of a national identity supportive of this transformation.

10 Helen Clark, ‘Speech from the Throne [2002]’, delivered by Dame Silvia Cartwright, in NZPD, 27 August 2002.
I have argued already that Labour’s political project since 1999 can be usefully analysed as an instance of economic nationalism, not in the sense that it has endorsed closed-border policies of protectionism and autarchy, but to the extent that it is oriented towards the pursuit of the nationalist goals of autonomy, identity and unity. I have argued, however, that these concepts are not eternal and natural, but constructed and contingent. The idea of national identity, for instance, must be seen as actively and deliberately constructed. Taken literally, the very term “national identity” is something of an oxymoron. The brute fact is that any nation is made up of many and diverse people, divided by a variety of differences. And yet identity is defined as the ‘quality or condition of being the same in substance, composition, nature, properties, or in particular qualities under consideration; absolute or essential sameness; oneness.’ The claim of national identity should be seen, then, as an argument that certain shared characteristics constitute a shared identity able to suppress internal lines of division. I have argued already that the rhetorical figure of “the nation” acts as a secular Christ, able to unify in its body a unity that abolishes dividing lines of antagonism such as race, class and gender. The ‘strong assertion of New Zealand identity’ enacted by Labour’s arts and culture policy since 1999 can be seen as an element in a broader Third Way ‘politics without adversaries’.

This argument for national identity constitutes what I earlier called a ‘hegemonic project’: a discursive battle to define the ‘leading ideas which shape political consciousness and influence our political practice and allegiances’. Cultural policy since 1999 has been promoted as a means of New Zealanders hearing their own stories, songs and voices, coming thereby to a better understanding of who they truly are. But

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14 The online version of the Oxford English Dictionary (OED) (http://dictionary.oed.com/) from which this definition was taken also offers Herbert Spencer’s observation that “[r]esemblance when it exists in the highest degree of all ... is often called identity.”
18 The official website of New Zealand on Air (the state’s funding agency to support local content on television and radio) was headed, circa mid-2007, by the slogan ‘New Zealand - our stories, our songs, our selves’. Retrieved 13 June 2007 from http://www.nzonair.govt.nz/. Variations on the same theme can be found through the official literature of the state-owned television network Television New Zealand (TVNZ).
the range of stories, songs and voices that can actually be heard is restricted by the requirement that cultural production generate economic benefit, that it contribute to the construction of a coherent and attractive national brand that can be offered to global markets and that it generate a strong sense of national unity and belonging. Certainly diversity is possible and can even be celebrated in this process. In 2004 CNZ Chair Peter Biggs described New Zealand art and artists as ‘distinctive, Pacific, vibrant and innovative’. But diversity has been carefully managed for branding and nation-building purposes. Biggs’ list of adjectives was closely aligned with the broad terms of the Government’s nation-building project, and was aimed towards ‘capturing the attention of the world’ and challenging us to see ourselves in the world anew’. If it is plausible that identity is ‘formed and transformed continuously in relation to the ways we are represented or addressed in the cultural systems which surround us’, then national identity might well be profoundly shaped by the values and demands of the global markets that represent and address New Zealand as an economic entity and that reduce culture and identity to a carefully branded image. The effects that globalisation might have on national cultural identities, however, are far from straightforward.

Global cultural and economic flows might, as Stuart Hall notes, have the effect of obliterating unique local identities under their sheer weight, or of strengthening these local identities through provoking a defensive reaction or through generating a new awareness of local specificity. The claim of anti-globalisation nationalists that globalisation is leading to a bland cultural homogenisation is certainly too quick. As Hall, Jacqui True and Bob Ashley have all pointed out, global markets offer new possibilities for leveraging national difference as a significant source of value. But there is more to this equation than states simply offering their unique wares and identities to a receptive global market. National specificity cannot diverge too sharply from dominant categories and expectations. There are strong pressures, in other words, towards a form of pseudo-individualisation, where national producers offer a (carefully

prepared) fresh and exotic twist on an established idea, and not something unintelligible or unattractive to international markets for cultural product. These pressures can be seen in the way that local cultural production is shaped for its presentation to global markets.

It is, in any case, natural to feel a little sceptical about an official project to build a sense of national identity through the arts. Asking rhetorically in 1981 whether his listeners could imagine Picasso speaking of ‘Mediterranean painting’, or Constable of ‘English painting’, New Zealand painter Toss Woollaston wondered whether the local obsession with ‘New Zealand painting’ was healthy, concluding that ‘if we [paint well] then unconsciously some New Zealand quality may be found to have crept in.’ Artistic and cultural practice, moreover, has historically included the ideal of critiquing, rather than celebrating social norms. National cultural production often acts as a highly critical observer of national cultural practice. As Salman Rushdie notes, the ‘nation requires anthems, flags’ while the ‘poet offers discord. Rags.’ Nation building projects, by their nature, require a positive account of the nation, whether this is narrated through myths of past struggle or triumph, or of bright futures. The nzedge.com website –independent from, but quite compatible with the Brand New Zealand project - seeks to ‘strengthen our identity and foster the global community of New Zealanders’ and invites visitors ‘on what we promise will be a radically optimistic journey’ (my emphasis). And yet the true artist, to Rushdie, cannot be made to notice and proclaim only good things of the nation. Rushdie’s warning that any project that ‘demands uplift, accentuates the positive, offers stirring moral instruction’ is the ‘murderer of thought’ can be placed in sceptical counterpoint to the triumphalist claims made by CNZ and the Government’s about the potential of cultural production.

Claims for an entirely unique and distinctive cultural identity, moreover, may not be realistic, given the historical influence of global economic and cultural flows. This argument is especially salient in New Zealand, where smallness, remoteness and

newness generated what Miles Fairburn describes as a unique national culture marked by
the very absence of a unique national culture.\textsuperscript{28} And, even if a truly unique national
culture were \textit{possible}, the ‘strong assertion of New Zealand identity as a unique and
creative nation’\textsuperscript{29} may not be \textit{desirable}. In a globalising and multicultural world,
government support for local culture may be presented as providing what Kymlicka
might call ‘external protections’\textsuperscript{30} against subjugation to ‘the cultural influences of
others’\textsuperscript{31}. But the incorporation of cultural production into a nation-building and national
branding project may also generate Kymlickian ‘internal restrictions’, through discourses
and policy practices that marginalise disruptive, dissenting and difficult art.

Any approach to cultural policy embodies an understanding of the function and value of
cultural production. The very fact of state intervention implies that there is something
about art and culture that makes it valuable to society; a value that may not be reducible
to its economic contribution. As an object of public policy, art and culture is most
usually thought about in terms of its status as a public good and in terms of the benefits,
or externalities, that it can make available to other sections of society and the economy.
In this frame, it is useful to think of cultural policy as a response to an instance of market
failure. Government intervention in the sector is predicated on an assumption that the
market does not adequately recognise the contribution that arts and culture makes to
overall public utility.\textsuperscript{32} A given approach to cultural policy, therefore, will embody not
just an understanding of cultural production, but also an understanding of the nature and
objectives of society and the public good. The approach of the fifth Labour Government
has been predicated on the expectation that cultural production can generate both
economic and cultural benefit. It has spoken little of the enlightenment function or the

\textsuperscript{28} Miles Fairburn, ‘Is there a Good Case for New Zealand Exceptionalism?’, in Tony Ballantyne and
Brian Moloughney (eds), \textit{Disputed Histories: Imagining New Zealand’s Pasts}. Dunedin, Otago
\textsuperscript{29} Clark, ‘Arts, Culture and Public Policy’.
\textsuperscript{30} I draw the distinction between ‘external protections’ and ‘internal restriction’ from the multicultural
theory of Will Kymlicka. See Kymlicka, \textit{Multicultural Citizenship: a Liberal Theory of Minority
Rights}. Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1995, p.35-44. The core of Kymlicka’s argument (at p.37) is that
‘liberals can and should endorse certain external protections, where they promote fairness between
groups, but should reject internal restrictions which limit the right of group members to question and
revise traditional authorities and practices.’
\textsuperscript{31} Clark, ‘Arts, Culture and Public Policy’.
\textsuperscript{32} For an introduction to some of the debates surrounding cultural policy see Arjo Klamer, ‘The Value
of Culture’, in Arjo Klamer (ed.) \textit{The Value of Culture: On the Relationship Between Economics and
the Arts}. Amsterdam, Amsterdam University Press, 1996, pp.31-43 and Ruth Towse’s response,
‘Market Value and Artists’ Earnings’, pp.96-107, in the same volume.
social critique function of art,\(^3^3\) preferring to emphasise the contribution it can make to an economic transformation based on ideas and innovation, an attractive national brand and a strong and unique sense of national specificity.

The ascendancy since the mid-1980s of economic rationalism within public policy led some arts advocates to emphasise the ‘level of the financial flows associated with artistic activities.’\(^3^4\) While this had the effect of keeping arguments for cultural policy audible within policy debates, such arguments, according to cultural policy analyst Christopher Madden, were ‘neither intellectually rigorous nor objectively compelling’ and, in the long run, the results were ‘to the detriment of the arts.’\(^3^5\) If nothing else, they reduced arts and culture to “just another” sector of the economy, and made arts funding vulnerable to the claims of other sectors to generate better returns on investment. Arguments for state support that assert the inherent social value of arts and culture, however, are easily positioned as elitist.\(^3^6\) State support for the arts is vulnerable to the charge that it imposes a paternalistic insistence that ‘culture-is-good-for-you-whether-you-want-to-know-it-or-not’ over the choices and freedoms of individuals.\(^3^7\)

In this context, arguments that cultural policy can deliver both an economic and a social cohesion dividend attempt to secure a political consensus around the desirability of state support for culture. Representing cultural policy as contributing to a broad range of goals (contributing to our ‘hearts and our souls’, ‘national identity and personal identity’ and ‘how we face the world in a globalising economy’;\(^3^8\) providing ‘rewarding employment, opportunities for creative entrepreneurs, and good economic returns’\(^3^9\) and conferring a ‘strong [national] competitive advantage in a world jaded by sameness’\(^4^0\)) was an explicit

\(^{33}\) These functions were not entirely absent. CNZ Chief Executive Elizabeth Kerr spoke in 2003 (CNZ, Annual Report for Year Ending 2003. Wellington, 2003, p.6) of the intrinsic value of artistic activity and, as we shall see, Helen Clark also noted art’s ‘time honoured function of serving as conscience and critic of society’ (Clark, ‘Arts, Culture and Public Policy’).


\(^{35}\) Madden, The ‘Economic’ Benefits of Art.


\(^{39}\) Clark, ‘Arts, Culture and Public Policy’.

\(^{40}\) CNZ, Annual Report [2002], p.6.
attempt to deflect criticism of state support of the arts, whether this criticism was based on a charge of elitism or on arguments from economic rationalism. There are, moreover, starker political considerations at work. Support for arts and culture is potentially a low-risk but richly-rewarding political strategy. As well as appealing to direct winners (artists who receive funding), cultural policy can argue that it protects and promotes a sense of national specificity and national pride in a globalising world, and that it constitutes a strategic national resource in the national economy’s global struggle, thus constructing a wider set of winners.

I have argued earlier that the Labour Government has sought to justify its nation-building project by claiming the spontaneous consent of its citizens to the project and by asserting its mutually advantageous consequences. Cultural policy was central to the Government’s use of “the nation” that sought to generate a sense of spontaneous consent to the vision and the demands of its shared purpose. The Government’s consistent celebration of the nation’s artists – ‘our energetic, intelligent, creative people’ – aimed to secure national pride in the country’s globally acknowledged cultural achievements and thus a degree of willed consent to the idea of New Zealand as united behind a shared purpose. Cultural policy since 1999 has also found value in the capacity of cultural production to contribute to a marketable and positive national brand and to economic competitiveness. But the global economic imperatives of the branding project make this a dangerously limited understanding of the function and value of art. It is an approach which is able to celebrate certain understandings of national identity, but which is led to denigrate and marginalise others.

The expected outcomes of state support for culture – social cohesion and economic dynamism – can be brought together within the frame of an expanded notion of national security. Patricia Goff has noted that ‘how we define security is largely contingent on the nature of prevailing threats’. Coupling cultural identity with an idea of national security, she writes that

France has no fear of American armies and welcomes American investors. Yet it recoils against the “Hollywoodization” of its film and television industries, the increasing use of anglicisms

41 Judith Tizard in NZPD, 24 May 2000
by native French speakers, and the effects of fast food on traditional culinary habits.\textsuperscript{43}

In previous chapters we have seen how economic viability has historically been understood as an important element of national security in New Zealand, and that such concerns are heightened in a contemporary globalisation-as-threat discourse. But, as Goff notes, cultural identity can also be seen as a form of national security, insofar as the threat of global cultural homogenisation to traditional cultural practices undermines ‘the survival of the nation as citizens have come to know it.’\textsuperscript{44} Drawing on this sort of argument, the fifth Labour Government saw investment in cultural production as necessary, in order to develop a secure national sense of “who we are” in a globalising world. This globalisation-as-cultural-threat discourse drew on a previously existing argument that, without a context of local cultural production, “[w]e will continue to be colonised in our own country, occupying a culturally third world status.”\textsuperscript{45}

The Government’s efforts to address these economic and cultural aspects of national security have afforded a new prominence to cultural policy, which has been brought in from the policy margins into the mainstream of government policy-making. This process has included a broadening of what can be counted as cultural production. Since 1999 a new language of “creative industries” has been ascendant and significantly displaced talk of arts and culture policy.\textsuperscript{46} The creative industries, identified within the Growth and Innovation Framework as one of three priority areas, offered a more catholic label able to admit activities as disparate as film-making, fashion design, popular music and even yacht-racing, and to speak of them seamlessly as creative projects that would ‘promote an image of New Zealand as technologically advanced, creative, and successful’.\textsuperscript{47} The force of the term was to effect the suturing of culture and creativity; identity and image;

\textsuperscript{43} Goff, ‘It’s Got to Be Sheep’s Milk’, p.187.
\textsuperscript{44} Goff, ‘It’s Got to Be Sheep’s Milk’, p.187. (There is, of course, no necessary reason why the ‘nation as citizens have come to know it’ ought to be accepted as inherently good).
\textsuperscript{45} New Zealand Film Commission (NZFC), \textit{Annual Report for Year Ending 1997}. Wellington, 1997, p.6
\textsuperscript{46} In 2000 Helen Clark explicitly stated her desire to see ‘arts and culture contribute to the building of strong creative industries’ (Clark, ‘Arts, Culture and Public Policy’). And CNZ Chair Peter Biggs opined that Clark ‘spoke eloquently about the role of the arts and creative industries in profiling New Zealand as a centre of creativity and innovation’ (CNZ, \textit{Annual Report for Year Ending 2003}, p.3).
\textsuperscript{47} Clark, ‘Prime Minister’s Statement [2002]’. See also Clark, ‘Arts, Culture and Public Policy’, where it is said that the ‘spectrum of the creative sector stretches all the way from the pure and high arts to more commercial applications in graphics, design, fashion, new technologies, the internet and new media.’
collective and individual goals. The creative industries were valued for the contribution they could make to ‘the emergence of a genuine imagination economy in New Zealand where the currency is in ideas’ and were situated in the wider discourse of the knowledge economy and its necessary corollary: the knowledge society.

As we have seen, the illocutionary force of knowledge economy language tends to support the individuation of responsibility and rewards in a way that makes it difficult to simultaneously argue for the relevance of communal responsibility, common interests and shared goals. So if cultural policy was expected to build the nation, it would have to do so in a way that incorporated an acceptance of individuation within its insistence on shared obligations and shared purposes. Creativity, ideas and knowledge were key signifiers in the knowledge economy discourse, but they were subordinated to the overriding imperative to ‘create wealth from ideas and knowledge’ and to commercialise more of the output of New Zealanders’ good ideas. This coupling dictated that only certain sorts of creativity, ideas and knowledge would be valued – those that could be commercialised. The notion of creativity as good for its own sake was subordinated to the ideal of creativity for the nation’s sake, which was understood in reductive economic terms. The ascendancy of the creative industries limited the role that cultural production might have in constituting or critiquing the practice of politics to its functional role of contributing to an officially defined shared purpose. Cultural policy, which had broadened to incorporate a range of creative activities, also underwent a discursive narrowing based on a reading of culture’s functional capacity to contribute to economic growth and a national brand. On this approach, according to sociologist David Craig, ‘artists like every other kind of producer [were] expected to line up behind a smart national venture, and project a cleverly branded image’.

In the following section, Labour’s political practice since 1999 in the field of cultural policy will be set in the historical context of a discussion of cultural policy in New Zealand since the 1960s. This survey will focus on major institutions and agencies,

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51 David Craig, ‘Post-Fordism, Neo-Trekkaism’, in Michael Stevenson (ed.), *This is the Trekka*. Wellington, Creative New Zealand, 2003, p.59.
drawing attention to the way that these institutions and the discourses that framed them embodied specific and evolving conceptions of the nature and function of cultural production, and related understandings of national identity and the national interest. This background will demonstrate the extent of political continuity and divergence since 1999 and draw attention to the way that changes in cultural policy express and constitute the Government’s broader project of economic transformation stabilised and facilitated by the production of a complementary national identity.

The History of Cultural Policy in New Zealand

A nation’s cultural production can tell us much about the nature and self-understandings of that nation. A survey of art and culture practice in New Zealand before the 1960s, for instance, might reflect the tensions inherent in settling an already settled country, the precarious status of the artistic sensibility in a small, distant, conservative society, an emergent sense of national pride and uniqueness among second and third generation settlers, or New Zealand’s position as a ‘small, distanced political and cultural economy in the semi-periphery of modern capitalism.’ The historical story told in this section is more restricted in scope, and related to the state’s activities in the cultural sector since 1963, the year that the Queen Elizabeth the Second Arts Council of New Zealand (hereafter, the Arts Council) was announced. This story records state attempts to provide coherent leadership in the sector, and can be contrasted to the *ad hoc* approach that held previously. As such, it records a history of evolving understanding of culture, society and the public good in New Zealand since the 1960s.

State cultural policy in New Zealand – including policy since 1999 – has had to respond to popular understandings of local culture, or to assumptions of the absence of local culture. This is a history that includes the first national heritage institutions in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, the exhibitions and cultural activities associated with the centenary of the Treaty of Waitangi and the Cultural and Literary funds established from the mid-1940s.

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56 See O’Halloran, *Towards a ‘Third Way’*, pp15-21 for a history of government action prior to 1963. This is a history that includes the first national heritage institutions in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, the exhibitions and cultural activities associated with the centenary of the Treaty of Waitangi and the Cultural and Literary funds established from the mid-1940s.
culture. This recurring theme of absence can be found in many histories of New Zealand cultural production, which often trace it to path dependencies established by size and distance. Fairburn, for example, locates New Zealand’s point of cultural exceptionalism in precisely this context as a national anti-exceptionalism experienced as a ‘pastiche’ of foreign cultures. Working against these understandings, state action in the cultural sector has, over time, evolved to promote local cultural production as autochthonous: as springing out of the unique soil and people of New Zealand and thus authentic and unique, while remaining globally relevant and of global standards.

The historical story set out in this section incorporates the evolution of the Arts Council, including its transformation in the 1990s into Creative New Zealand (CNZ). The story focuses on the understandings of art and the nation assumed and enacted by the Arts Council and by other key institutions and agencies, including the New Zealand Film Commission (NZFC) and the national museum, Te Papa. Each of these institutions offers a specific insight into the evolution of cultural policy and into the current Government’s articulation of national identity with cultural policy. The official literature of the Arts Council and CNZ presents the longest timeframe for analysis and the most explicit statement of evolving expectations for arts and culture. Te Papa, as a new national museum, was the idea vehicle for carrying an official, self-conscious narrative of national identity. It was, in Paul Williams’ phrase, the nation’s ‘identity complex’. Te Papa also illustrates the tensions between official and popular conceptions of national identity, and between cultural and economic imperatives. This latter tension is seen even more acutely in the practices of the NZFC, which is constrained to articulate its pursuit of national identity with the need to attract private – including foreign – investment and to engage global audiences.

The Arts Council was established in 1963 as ‘the nation’s commemoration’ of the Queen’s visit that year and the first reading of its founding legislation described the council as ‘a gift’ to her. The Council was given a “high culture” orientation, within which New Zealand arts and culture were seen - in parliament, at least - as the preserve of European New Zealanders developing the artistic traditions of Britain and Europe. In

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57 Fairburn, ‘New Zealand Exceptionalism’.  
60 Leon Gotz (Minister of Internal Affairs), NZPD, v.336, p.1262, 20 August 1963.
1993, the Arts Council noted that its 1963 incarnation was ‘seen as a way of fostering and reinforcing a European version of culture in a country which still tended to regard itself as a British colony’. 61 And yet a degree of nationalism attended the Arts Council’s birth. It was hailed as a sign that ‘our nation [had] reached a stage of adulthood’. 62 In parliament, both social and economic benefits were invoked. Art was valued for its ability to add to ‘the maturity and status of New Zealand’ as well as to the ‘country’s economic well-being’. 63 The weight of references, however, indicates that art was primarily seen as meeting the ‘needs of the human spirit’ and as helping to mould the ‘greatness of a nation’. 64 In practice, arts policy was viewed as a subsidy to an intrinsically worthy activity rather than as an investment aimed at generating an economic return.

On Michael Brown’s reading, this original “high arts” discourse was augmented from the late 1960s with a more overtly nationalist discourse that drew on metaphors of journey and growth. 65 In 1969 the Council argued that arts were a central component of the vital journey from country to nation, and in the nation’s ‘journey of exploration of identity’. 66 The parliamentary debates attending the Arts Council Act (1974) incorporated a greater ‘recognition that the arts are essential to the development of the people as a nation’ 67 (my emphasis) and the new Bill was said to be based on the belief that ‘[c]ultural activities play a vital role … in developing and defining our nationhood’. 68 Significantly, these debates simultaneously stressed the ‘multicultural structure of society in New Zealand’. 69 This acknowledgment of diversity, and the concomitant need to stress an essential national unity, had been notably absent from debates in the 1960s. By 1978 cultural diversity had come to be structurally acknowledged within the QEIIACNZ, with the establishment of the Council for Maori and South Pacific Arts (MASPAC). MASPAC was an acknowledgment that Maori and South Pacific art, if not preserved and

promoted in New Zealand, might not receive that support anywhere. No comparable bodies were established, for instance, for Dutch or Chinese art.

The decision to incorporate Maori and South Pacific art within the same institutional structure denied Maori any special constitutional status deriving from their indigeneity or from the Treaty of Waitangi. Maori were not tangata whenua but simply a ‘minority ethnic group’. New Zealand was not seen as bi-, but as multi-cultural. This situation was altered in 1986, when a separate body was established for Maori arts, to ‘reinforce the bicultural approach now developing within the Arts Council structure as a whole’. This incipient biculturalism achieved fuller expression in the early 1990s. Despite Labour MP Michael Cullen’s cautionary words in parliament about the spectre of ‘cultural apartheid’, the construction of the Arts Council as a bi-cultural organisation was never seriously in doubt. Public submissions to inform proposed changes to the Arts Council were restricted to addressing ‘whether they wish a bicultural partnership … to be achieved within one body, or whether it is preferable for Maori autonomy to be expressed through the creation of a separate Maori arts body.’ This greater institutional recognition of internal difference was contemporaneous with a more clearly articulated coupling of cultural policy and national identity. The arts were seen in 1994 as ‘integral to the development of a nation’s identity’ and as vital ‘to the way we demonstrate our uniqueness to ourselves and to people overseas.’ The incoming National Government of 1990 expressed this ideology of diversity-in-unity in its plea for ‘all the peoples of New Zealand … to draw on their rich and varied cultures and traditions’ in order to ‘advance the interests of our nation’.

The uneasy official construction of New Zealand as a bicultural nation in a multicultural society was most clearly expressed in the development of a new national museum: Te

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70 Highet argued (in NZPD, v.419, p.1800, 14 July 1978) that MASPAC acknowledged the importance of cultural activity to ‘any minority ethnic group, and that the establishment of MASPAC extended the QEIIACNZ’s previously existing mandate to ‘encourage, promote, and develop the practice and appreciation of the arts in New Zealand, including Maori and Pacific Island arts.’ (ibid, p.1801, emphasis mine).
73 Cullen is now the fifth Labour Government’s Minister of Finance.
78 Jim Bolger, ‘Speech from the Throne [1990]’, delivered by Dame Catherine Tizard, in NZPD, 29 November 1990.
Papa, which was initiated under a Labour Government in the mid-1980s and brought to completion under National from the early 1990s. National museums are, in general, ideal sites in which to examine politically dominant discourses of national identity. In a very public forum, national museums present a narrative in which elements of natural and cultural history are selected (or neglected), edited and placed in a certain order, in proximity to other elements. The end result will be very carefully constructed, and deliberately selected out of a range of possibilities to serve a precise political and ideological function. The purpose, the institutional forms, the physical building and the nomenclature – even the syntax – of the Te Papa project embodied a complex politics of how official biculturalism and *de facto* multiculturalism might be made compatible with the unifying vision of a new *national* museum.\(^79\)

The Te Papa concept was built on a ‘bicultural partnership between Maori and Pakeha’\(^80\) and the museum’s corporate principles stated baldly that ‘Te Papa is Bicultural’.\(^81\) The Te Papa Board heralded ‘the bicultural nature of the project’, promised an ‘impressive bicultural building’,\(^82\) and stated its intention ‘to establish the identity of the bicultural museum’\(^83\) and to ‘reflect the bicultural nature of New Zealand society.’\(^84\) Ben Dibley contends that official biculturalism was not a natural outgrowth of history but ‘the discursive reorganisation of the nation’s past so that the national past aligns with the political and cultural aspirations of the present “agenda”’.\(^85\) This official agenda can be read as a ‘Pakeha response to “the crisis of postcolonialism”’,\(^86\) which is a crisis of legitimation. Earlier narratives of settlement and belonging based on tropes of modernity and progress were incongruent with contemporary liberal conceptions of human dignity and human rights. The descendants of European settlers, according to Simon During, finding themselves ‘without strong ethical and ideological support’,\(^87\) saw biculturalism as a means whereby Pakeha presence in New Zealand could be re-legitimated through

\(^{79}\) According to National MP John Carter, the absence of any separating colon in the name Museum of New Zealand Te Papa Tongarewa was ‘necessary to recognise positively the bicultural nature of New Zealand.’ (John Carter, NZPD, 3 March 1992). This name was current when the Museum of New Zealand Bill returned to parliament in 1992.


\(^{82}\) Te Papa, *Te Papa Tongarewa Museum of New Zealand Press Kit*. 3 September 1992. (Note that the order of the names had been reversed, giving precedence to the Maori name).


the partnership of the Treaty of Waitangi. Biculturalism, then, can be read as a recognition of difference, but a recognition aimed at securing an ongoing basis for national unity. And Te Papa, the bicultural museum that is simultaneously “Our Place” can be read as a crucial institutional embodiment of this official project.

Te Papa’s pedagogical and performative roles of inculcating and embodying a preferred reading of national identity were structured by the economic constraints under which it operated. The museum’s funding arrangements required that it look to non–governmental sources – user charges, corporate sponsorship and retails proceeds – for approximately half of its financial needs. Te Papa’s educative and economic imperatives – its nation-building mandate and its position as a ‘competitive, commercially responsive customer focused organisation that occupies a leading role in the national and global recreation and leisure market place’ were, in theory, mutually reinforcing. Te Papa would be constrained to act as a democratic museum of the people by the disciplines of market signals. And Te Papa, in international comparison, succeeded admirably in terms of popularity and cost efficiency. At some point, however, a ‘commercially responsive customer focused organisation’ will be unable to achieve its stated goal of presenting research into ‘what New Zealanders consider contributes to their sense of national identity … and how these ideas contrast with the historical reality.’ In Te Papa’s case, one of the many resulting liminal points can be found in the development of the centrepiece of the bicultural museum: the Treaty of Waitangi exhibition.

The Treaty exhibition might be seen as the ideal site for the enactment of Te Papa’s bicultural agenda, but the museum’s audience research showed that it was likely to provoke a high degree of public antipathy. Here, the expectation that Te Papa be simultaneously authoritative and entertaining came into conflict. The museum’s educative role in which it might address misunderstandings and disturb comfortable assumptions could not coexist with the pursuit of a ‘seamless visitor experience’. Major changes were made to the proposed exhibition, as the museum’s board required that it present a vision of a ‘noble document that could unite people’, one that was ‘above day-to-day politics’. The aim was ‘not polemic, but discussion’ and the overarching need was

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to ‘de-politicise the whole thing’. In consequence, the focus moved from the Treaty itself, with its historical and political baggage of misunderstanding and division to ‘the forming of modern New Zealand’. The name of the final exhibition - Signs of the Nation / Nga Tohu Kotahitanga - no longer mentioned the Treaty at all and invoked national unity rather than irreducible diversity. The process is in line with Avril Bell’s argument that ‘the symbolic inclusion of Maori is essential to the Pakeha mythology surrounding … the “founding” of New Zealand as a nation’ and that the Treaty of Waitangi is used ‘to signify a relatively positive moment in the history of Maori-Pakeha relations.

The example of Te Papa’s Treaty exhibition illustrates well the tensions that can exist between official and popular understandings of national identity. At the same time, the requirement that Te Papa be commercially responsive illustrated the increasing dominance, since the late 1970s, of an economic discourse of cultural policy. Under straitened economic circumstances, these years witnessed the rise of an economic rationalism that disrupted the high arts and nationalist discourses. Art, understood only as a contributor to the ‘things of the spirit’ and to the ‘greatness of the nation’ could be too easily positioned as an unaffordable luxury. So, while art’s potential contribution to the ‘country’s economic well-being’ had long been acknowledged, economic arguments became increasingly common from the late 1970s, and the Arts Council’s 1980 Annual Report made its first, tentative mention of art’s ‘artistic, social and commercial potential’ (my emphasis). Arguments for the establishment of a new agency – the New Zealand Film Commission (hereafter, the Commission) – were made in this milieu and consequently emphasised both the cultural and the economic benefits of supporting the local film industry. Cinema was presented not just as ‘a cultural icon’ but also as carrying a strong commercial and industrial element, and the Commission was justified on the twin bases of both cultural nationalism and economic rationalism.

93 Paul Williams argues that ‘rather than being a forum for biculturalism, [Te Papa] is better seen as an ideologically rigid symbol of it’ (in Williams, ‘New Zealand’s Identity Complex’, p.12, italics in the original).
97 Highet in NZPD, 22 June 1978.
The Commission was designed to counter the ‘largely unrelieved diet of films from other cultures’\(^98\) that had ‘helped to breed a form of cultural colonisation – a passive cultural takeover of the mind and unconscious surrendering of independence’.\(^99\) In response, the Commission was charged with providing a means ‘whereby New Zealanders are helped through motion pictures to come to a better understanding of themselves, and a greater awareness of their role and responsibility as a populous and developing South Pacific nation.’\(^100\) Funding for films, however, was never imagined as a straight subsidy for an inherently worthy activity. Rather, it was to be a ‘businesslike investment’,\(^101\) with the Commission styled as a ‘business partner’.\(^102\) The Commission was always seen as a catalyst, facilitating the industry’s ability to ‘create employment opportunities’,\(^103\) to improve New Zealand’s balance of payments and to earn export dollars through overseas sales.\(^104\) In deference to the economic realities of feature film production, there was an increasing acceptance of the need for international finance and of the importance of international audiences. Accordingly, Section 18 of the New Zealand Film Commission Act (1978) that dealt with New Zealand content requirements was modified in 1985 to facilitate international co-production agreements.\(^105\)

Tensions between the cultural and the economic objectives of the Commission have commonly been denied.\(^106\) Minister for the Arts Alan Highet, on the Bill’s second reading, argued that the dichotomy between those who ‘regard films purely as an art form’ and those who stressed film’s economic potential was ‘more apparent than real’,\(^107\) and the Commission aimed ‘[t]o sustain and promote New Zealand Films as a cultural and economic resource’\(^108\) and to ‘support initiatives which …generate better returns on

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\(^{100}\) This passage appears in both Interim Film Commission (IFC), *Towards a New Zealand Motion Picture Industry*. Wellington, 1978, p.8 and NZFC, *Annual Report 1979*. Wellington, 1979, p.3. The same sentiments were repeated by Alan Highet, NZPD, v.420, p.3993, 28 September 1978.
\(^{103}\) Highet, NZPD, v.418, p.1208, 22 June 1978.
\(^{105}\) The amendment was enacted through the addition of Subs. 2 [A] of the New Zealand Film Commission Amendment Act 1985.
\(^{106}\) Although not always. See, for example, the Commission’s comment in 1985 that ‘that a film industry ‘involves an endless tug-of-war between finance, investment and economic returns on the one hand and art, culture and national identity on the other’ (NZFC, *Annual Report for Year Ending 1985*. Wellington, 1985, p.3).
investment – both cultural and financial.\textsuperscript{109} While cultural benefit was retained here as a goal, it was represented in economic terms: as a resource and a return on investment. But cultural and economic objectives are not automatically compatible. The film that best enables New Zealanders to ‘come to a better understanding of themselves’ is not necessarily the most popular film (although, of course, a certain number of people need to see a film before it can be of much social value). When tensions arise, they are likely to be resolved in favour of economic considerations. The Commission’s funding model under which it remained a business partner, a ‘catalyst and facilitator’ for private investment was hardly a strong position from which to demand a cultural dividend.

The realities of finite government money for the film industry and the very finite size of the New Zealand cinema-going market conspire to demand that New Zealand films be intelligible and appealing to an international audience. Amidst the economic rationalism and fiscal austerity of 1988, the Commission stated that it would focus on ‘realistic market prospects’ and especially international appeal in its selection process.\textsuperscript{110} It was quick to add that this focus ‘does not mean an abandonment of those elements which make New Zealand films distinctively New Zealand’, but acknowledged that ‘it does entail a greater level of market awareness.’\textsuperscript{111} In the same report, the Commission allowed that it could ‘afford to take fewer risks on particularly indigenous projects’ and that the trend towards international financing would reinforce this risk-aversion.\textsuperscript{112} The effect of the reliance on private investors generally, but on international finance and co-productions in particular is to marginalise those expressions of New Zealand identity that might be unattractive or inscrutable to overseas audiences. That is to say, the unique New Zealand culture that is to be nurtured and protected in a globalised world\textsuperscript{113} would have to be amenable to that globalised world. In practice, this dictated that the presented New Zealand culture come to resemble an exotic flavour of global culture as opposed to something truly different and distinct.

While the practice of the Commission moved inexorably towards partnering with international finance – both with private investors and through official co-productions - its language re-asserted the primacy of its cultural mandate. In a sense, this was a move

\textsuperscript{111} NZFC, \textit{Annual Report [1988]}.
\textsuperscript{112} NZFC, \textit{Annual Report [1988]}, pp.3,5.
of simple self-preservation. If the Commission could not defend its cultural raison d’etre, then film could be treated as just another industry within the economy. Thus, in 1997 the Commission warned that if more funding was not forthcoming, New Zealanders would ‘continue to be colonised in our own country, occupying a culturally third-world status.’\(^{114}\) In 1998 it aligned its goal of supporting ‘the creation of distinctively New Zealand images for New Zealand audiences and to present New Zealand to the world’ with the Government’s strategic objective of participating in ‘New Zealand’s economic, social and cultural development … particularly programmes which stimulate and affirm New Zealand’s evolving identity and cultural heritage.’\(^{115}\)

From the late 1970s, cultural policy in New Zealand has affirmed both the cultural and the economic benefits of arts and culture, while placing ever increasing emphasis on an economic rationalism that marginalised appeals to the intrinsic value, or the ‘magical uselessness’ of art. And yet, after 1984, cultural policy was never entirely subjected to neoliberal disciplines, and the political consensus that art was, by its nature, unsuited to the ravages of the market was never completely dismantled. Catherine Albiston goes so far as to say that arts policy represented an anomaly during the neo-liberal turn: outputs remained poorly specified, funding and delivery arrangements remained fragmented, and Maori arts funding was never mainstreamed. This anomaly reflected, according to Jennifer Lawn, the uneasy co-existence within the fourth Labour Government of cultural nationalists (led by David Lange who envisaged ‘the cultural sector as a complement to foreign policy’\(^{116}\)) and the economic rationalists. This uneasy co-existence was manifested in the changes made by the Lange Government to broadcasting policy. The 1989 Broadcasting Act replaced its 1976 predecessor’s focus on ‘programmes which inform, educate and entertain’ with the objective of ‘reflect[ing] and develop[ing] New Zealand identity and culture’.\(^{117}\) According to Avril Bell, however, this new focus was based on an erroneous conceptualisation of broadcasting as a ‘neutral system of representation’: it did not address, in other words, the question of what sort of broadcasting system would need to be enacted or protected in order to achieve the reflection and development of national identity.\(^{118}\)

\(^{117}\) Cited in Bell, ‘Mainstreaming the Margins’, p.108.  
\(^{118}\) Bell, ‘Mainstreaming the Margins’, pp.115-6.
The “high neoliberalism” of the National Governments after 1990 applied economic rationality more thoroughly. Funding was decreased for almost all institutions between 1990 and 2000, Television New Zealand was corporatised, and direct government funding to the Arts Council was systematically reduced from 1990, with the deficit being partially offset by an increased grant from the national lottery board. The logic of the market’s justice principle of earned desert119 positioned state funded writers and artists as non-productive and as “bludgers”. In 1994 the Arts Council was transformed into Creative New Zealand (CNZ), which introduced a greater degree of market responsiveness into its funding systems and articulated a more rigorous and transparent statement of outputs and objectives. This move towards accountability and openness was consistent with other reforms in the public sector. These reforms had included the privileging of generic management skills over sector-specific experience and expertise.120

Brian Easton, several years later, recorded the explosion of a row between CNZ and the writers’ community, commenting that ‘the rationalisation [of state funding] had involved concentration of power into the hands of some state-appointed generic managers, who seemed to know nothing about literature, but were earnestly imposing the commercialists’ model’.121 The National Government also failed to reserve the right to introduce local content quotas at the Uruguay Round of the GATS (General Agreement on Trade in Services) negotiations in the early 1990s, despite being fully aware that failing to do so would prevent any future New Zealand government from introducing such quotas.122 The desire to pursue a rigorous trade liberalisation stance thus created neo-liberal path dependencies that would make any later ‘establishment of a typical local content quota system … an infringement of New Zealand’s market access commitments under GATS article XVI’.123

121 Easton, The Commercialisation of New Zealand, p. 254
123 Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MFAT), cited in Aukett, p.688.
From the mid-1990s, National under Prime Ministers Jim Bolger and Jenny Shipley began to accept that the neoliberal reforms had created a politically damaging sense of social division and alienation and a sense of personal insecurity in the face of globalisation. A broad language of social cohesion and social capital generated discursive resources for those who saw in the arts and culture sector a vehicle for asserting the cohesion and legitimation of the nation. In Labour’s 1996 election manifesto, it offered the idea of ‘art for the Nation’124 and, in 1999 under the label “Uniquely New Zealand”, it stressed the importance of the creative industries, arts and culture to help the ‘expression of a strong sense of New Zealand identity as a dynamic and creative nation in the 21st century’.125 Labour’s agenda for arts and culture was framed by the challenges of globalisation and the concomitant need for ‘a strong sense of place and identity’.126 New Zealand, in fact, was coming late to this articulation of culture, creativity and nationality as a response to globalisation: Australia had become a “Creative Nation” in 1994 and the United Kingdom, famously, was already “Cool Britannia”. While successive governments had been constantly acting on the cultural sector since the 1960s, it had only intermittently been a high-profile political field. From 1999, it was to be placed prominently at the heart of government.

**Cultural Policy under the fifth Labour Government**

On taking office in 1999, Prime Minister Helen Clark installed herself as Minister of Arts, Culture and Heritage, in order ‘to indicate that the Government places a very high value on arts and culture’.127 Clark personalised this decision, describing herself as ‘one with a lifelong love of the arts who, by choice, has assumed the portfolio’.128 In 2000 the Government announced an $87 million “Cultural Recovery Package” based on a belief that ‘[o]ur arts, our culture and our heritage define and strengthen us as a country, as communities and as individuals’ and that the arts and culture sector ‘expresses our unique national identity.’129 From the very first statement of its agenda in office, the Government coupled its vision of a coherent and effective national brand with its support

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126 New Zealand Labour Party, *Key policies 1999*.
127 Clark, ‘Arts, Culture and Public Policy’. The portfolios taken on by New Zealand Prime Ministers often reveal something about their political priorities. Robert Muldoon was also Minister of Finance, and David Lange Minister of Foreign Affairs.
128 Clark, ‘Arts, Culture and Public Policy’.
for arts and culture. It promised to ‘strongly support our professional, performing artists … [in order to] expand job opportunities and wealth creation based on the arts as well as to promote New Zealand's identity.’\footnote{\textit{130}} As well as for their intrinsic benefits and their economic contribution, the arts were valued for their capacity to ‘help define New Zealand as a unique, dynamic and creative nation which stands tall in the world.’\footnote{\textit{131}}

Cultural policy was carefully articulated with the Government’s broader vision of ‘New Zealanders as innovators to the world, turning great ideas into great ventures’\footnote{\textit{132}} and of a ‘contemporary and future focussed Brand New Zealand’ that would ‘extend and complement’ the country’s clean, green image, position it ‘as a country where innovative, creative and technologically advanced ideas are pursued’ and project New Zealand as ‘a great place to invest in, live in, and visit.’\footnote{\textit{133}}

Cultural policy was seen as a vehicle which would showcase the creativity, innovation and talent of New Zealand’s people, thus augmenting the well-established “clean, green” trope. Cultural policy claimed to recognise that ‘a large part of the capacity of this country is our people – our energetic, intelligent, creative people.’\footnote{\textit{134}} This focus on developing and celebrating talented and creative individuals sat easily alongside Labour’s emphasis on talent as an increasingly important element of national economic success. Its assertion of a shared “national culture”, meanwhile, served to reinforce the natural-ness and popularity of the national scale and a national shared purpose. And in so doing it co-opted individuals into a “shared” purpose driven by a reading of economic imperatives. In keeping with innovations in other parts of the western world, cultural policy was brought in from the margins into the heart of public policy.\footnote{\textit{135}} Of most interest here is not the increased funding provided to the arts but the increased discursive prominence given to cultural policy.

\textsuperscript{130} Helen Clark, ‘Speech from the Throne [1999]’, delivered by Sir Michael Hardie Boys, in NZPD, 21 December 1999.
\textsuperscript{132} Clark, ‘Prime Minister’s Statement [2001]’.
\textsuperscript{134} Judith Tizard in NZPD, 24 May 2000, where she is speaking to the Government’s Cultural Recovery Package.
\textsuperscript{135} See, for example, Council of Europe, \textit{In From the Margins: A Contribution to the Debate on Culture and Development in Europe}. Strasbourg, Council of Europe Publishing, 1997, and the Scottish Executive’s declared intention to place arts at the ‘heart of government’ (Cultural Commission, \textit{Cultural Commission: Final Report}. Edinburgh, 2005, p.1). The ubiquity of the spatial metaphor of bringing cultural policy in from the margins was brought to my attention in a conversation with Michael Volkerling.
The arts were held to have both intrinsic and instrumental value. They were held to be inherently important and not reducible to financial calculation, when Helen Clark argued that ‘[a] nation can be rich in every material sense, but, if it fails to provide for and nurture creative expression, it is impoverished in immeasurable ways.’\textsuperscript{136} But they were also seen as containing instrumental value on several measures: employment, earnings and branding. Increasingly, the Government coupled arts and culture policy with a burgeoning new sector: the creative industries, which had been identified as one of three priority areas within the Government’s Growth and Innovation Framework. The Government’s explicit emphasis on cultural policy and the creative industries represented a return to the idea of picking winners which had been eschewed by neoliberalism’s assumption that markets rather than governments should make decisions on the allocation of resources. The rationale for targeting the creative industries was explained by Helen Clark, who argued that they ‘not only underpin the effective branding and marketing of all New Zealand goods and services but also can, through areas like design, have a major impact on industrial output’ and that they would ‘contribute to the vision of a globally oriented, innovative New Zealand economy.’\textsuperscript{137}

In parliament, the Government offered practical examples of the synergies that existed between the creative industries, economic growth and a new national brand, stating its intention to leverage off ‘both the release of The Lord of the Rings and the defence of the America’s Cup’ in its attempts to ‘rebrand New Zealand as an upmarket, innovative, dynamic economy.’ Those two events, it was said, helped to ‘promote an image of New Zealand as technologically advanced, creative, and successful’.\textsuperscript{138} What is occurring here is a form of discursive broadening, as two remarkably different projects (blockbuster film-making and international yacht-racing) could be talked about seamlessly as creative projects. At the same time, however, this statement contains a discursive narrowing, as creative and cultural activity is evaluated according to its ability to contribute towards a coherent and efficient national image. As Lawn and Beatty complain, the logic at work

\textsuperscript{136} Clark, ‘Major Investment’.
\textsuperscript{137} Clark, ‘Prime Minister’s Statement [2002]’.
\textsuperscript{138} Clark, ‘Prime Minister’s Statement [2002]’.
offers ‘a competitive business model … as the paradigm for other spheres of activity, both collective and individual’.  

Of course, economic imperatives are not said to replace social objectives. Rather, cultural production was seen as a crucial means of protecting and promoting a sense of cultural identity and social cohesion. The weight of references since 1999 in the literature of the Government and its cultural agencies, however, supports the claim that cultural policy has been seen primarily as a tool of a broader project of economic advantage, national branding, and the promotion of a national identity compatible with those goals. The incorporation of arts and culture into the creative industries incorporates art into the imperative of not just having good ideas but also ‘commercialising enough of the output’ and this represents a dangerously limited conception of the function and value of cultural production. The logic of this approach demands that artistic and cultural production be willing and able to contribute to the Government’s stated agenda. This logic threatens art’s ability to reflect the full diversity of New Zealand identity, and it threatens what Clark herself describes as art’s ‘time honoured function of serving as conscience and critic of society’, even though she insisted that ‘nations are the stronger for accepting and valuing that scrutiny’.  

Labour’s approach to arts and culture policy was compatible with the broad themes of its larger project. Cultural production, as the expression of a unique national culture, was seen as an appropriate response to the economic and cultural challenges of globalisation. Under conditions of globalisation, the Government argued, it was more important than ever that New Zealanders hear their own voices, stories and songs, as a means to an understanding of who they were. Without a ‘strong commitment to local content’, Clark argued, ‘we are subjected to the cultural influences of others without sufficient reinforcement from our own.’ Cultural policy was thus positioned as an assertion of local divergence in the face of the trends of global convergence. This assertion served both the cultural-political need to construct a coherent entity that could be represented, and the political-economic need for a politics of image, reputation and visibility. Cultural production, like the broader national branding project, contained both an internal and an

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140 Clark, ‘Prime Minister’s Statement [2001]’.  
141 Clark, ‘Arts, Culture and Public Policy’.  
142 Clark, ‘Arts, Culture and Public Policy’.
external orientation. It was about both ‘how we describe ourselves and how we face the world in a globalising economy.’

But while cultural policy sought to showcase national specificity, limits on the sort of specificity that could be asserted were imposed by economic imperatives and the need to engage with global audiences. Notably absent in the discourse of the fifth Labour Government was any discussion of how a strong assertion of national cultural identity could co-exist with a programme of continued global economic integration. Clark’s celebration of the Lord of the Rings films, for instance, did not address the foreign control of the capital and much of the talent involved. The Government’s attempts to get more of New Zealand “on air” through local content quotas negotiated with commercial radio broadcasters and through a Charter imposed on the national television channel were also compromises that accepted the continuation of a largely deregulated, ratings-driven broadcasting regime. And the new Cultural Diplomacy Programme (within the Ministry for Culture and Heritage) was established on frank economic development lines, stating that it would deploy ‘excellent’ and ‘distinctive’ cultural product that was able to project the ‘contemporary face of New Zealand - unique, creative, innovative, moving ahead’ in its strategic efforts to promote ‘New Zealand Inc interests’ in ‘key overseas regions or countries’. Cultural production was valued or constrained in each of these examples by the logic of the economic contexts and objectives within which they operate.

Understanding culture reductively as a productive sector within the economy was fundamental to the neoliberalism of the 1990s. Support for the arts since 1999 has retained the idea that it is a strategic investment rather than a subsidy, but it has become an investment expected to yield a broader range of dividends. When the Government stated in 1999 that its aim was to ‘expand job opportunities and wealth creation based on the arts as well as to promote New Zealand's identity’, the syntax both suggested and denied a possible tension between wealth creation and national identity. Subsequent policy has been based on the assumption that synergies exist between the two objectives: a unified and unique identity was held to offer a ‘strong, competitive edge’ for the

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145 Clark, ‘Speech from the Throne [1999]’.
nation” in the global economy, through the bolstering of “social capital” at home and the projection of a coherent “brand” overseas.

In both the cultural and economic sense, the goal for cultural policy has been to protect, produce and project a unique “point of difference”. Culturally, New Zealanders are expected to recognise themselves as unique and united through participating in national culture. This is the internal orientation of the nation-building project, an orientation concerned with national identity understood as a psychological need in the context of the insecurities generated by globalisation. This assertion of national specificity is an attempt to generate fellow-feeling, and related sentiments of obligation, co-operation and altruism. As David Miller observes, altruism depends in large part on understanding the potential recipient as somehow like ourselves. A political emphasis on national identity is thus a strategy aimed at helping to meet the ‘strains of commitment’ of the welfare state and of re-establishing the idea of New Zealand as a shared and fair system of social co-operation. This “re-discovery” of the social, or of community is a means of embedding the rational individuals of neo-liberal ideology into a stable social order. In Bauman’s terms, this is an emphasis on the continued salience of society, contra the looser and more functional bonds of the network. The life-politics of swimming expressed in a commitment to the nation may constrain rapid autonomous movement, but it also offers meaning and direction in an uncertain world.

Economically, however, the unique point of difference offered by cultural production is concerned with the projection of a carefully tailored national image to a discerning and critical global audience. This external orientation is concerned with national identity understood as competitive advantage. In line with this vision, CNZ embraced the need to ‘brand ourselves as an innovative, vibrant and creative Pacific nation’, and championed the arts’ contribution to ‘a brand for New Zealand as a great place to live and visit.’ According to CNZ, the nation’s arts and artists ‘play a pivotal role in

150 CNZ, Annual Report [2002], p.5.
defining our point of difference and communicating our special values to the world’,
and are ‘constantly profiling this country’s creativity to the world’. Artists are
subjected in this address to the same sort of logic that celebrated Maori for the ‘unique
contribution’ they could make to a ‘contemporary and future-focussed Brand New
Zealand’ and that promised to work with Maori to ‘find ways of leveraging this for the
benefit of all New Zealanders’.

Artists were positioned here as role-performers, valued for their capacity to contribute to
the shared purpose of the universitas. In the process they were subjected to an inclusive
exclusion of difference: they could be valued only insofar as they demonstrated a
willingness and ability to actually work towards the tightly defined shared purpose of
economic transformation and social cohesion. The incorporation of artists and Maori into
a putatively shared purpose is in line with Carol Johnson’s argument that ‘the
“mainstream” can be constituted just as much by a process of inclusion or assimilation as
exclusion’ and echoes what she describes as the Australian Labor Government’s
attempt to ‘incorporate marginalized identities into mainstream economic discourse.’
This process represents an attempt to dissolve internal difference through an appeal to
common economic interests. The function and value of artists was reduced to a
calculation of the economic value they could generate, albeit an economic value
understood within a broader set of parameters able to incorporate notions such as
domestic social cohesion.

In this logic we find, in Bauman’s terms, a national life-politics of surfing, where the
content of national identity is subject to a ‘postmodern politics of image and
reputation’. National identity is carefully tailored for external projection and becomes
more malleable. Within the ambit of cultural policy, however, there is an appeal not just
to common economic interests but also to the shared values of the national community:
this is the constant tension between the two orientations of the nation-building project.
Cultural policy embodies the tension – present throughout the Government’s project –

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152 CNZ, Annual Report [2002], p.5.
154 OPM, Growing an Innovative New Zealand, p.48.
155 Carol Johnson, Governing Change: from Keating to Howard. St. Lucia, University of Queensland
Press, 2000, p.57.
156 Johnson, Governing Change, p.62.
157 Johnson, Governing Change, p.73.
158 Bauman, Society Under Siege, p.152.
between national identity’s external orientation in which it is expected to generate mutual advantage, and its internal orientation in which it is expected to transcend mutual advantage in an assertion of unity and fellow-feeling. The generation of social cohesion through national identity is ‘very much about the fixation of identity in various forms’ even as the content of that identity becomes more subject to externally-driven considerations of strategic advantage.

The novelty attaching to cultural policy since 1999 was not just the posited total reconciliation of the cultural and economic benefits of art through the mediating mechanism of the nation but also the more precise statement of a shared national purpose that the value of cultural production can be related to. This must be understood as part of a hegemonic project that is part of a discursive battle to define the ‘leading ideas which shape political consciousness and influence our political practice and allegiances’ including the ideas of freedom, choice, the public good and the terms of national identity. Within cultural policy since 1999 have been embedded specific formulations of these leading ideas. Cultural policy has normalised understandings of “the public good” based on the desirability of a unified, cohesive national society and a globally connected national economy; of “choice” based on the range of choices available under broadcasting arrangements structured by commercial decisions, and of national identity consistent with the construction of a coherent and attractive national brand. Cultural policy since 1999 has constituted, naturalised and valourised a new form of exemplarity based on individuated talent and creativity flourishing under market disciplines. Culture, creativity, identity and branding were brought together in this project as a coherent response to both cultural and economic globalisation. Under these circumstances, local divergence is facilitated and constrained by the requirement that it be used as a source of advantage and the national point of difference must therefore remain keenly attuned to global preferences, norms and tastes. Local divergence, in other words, was reduced to what Adorno and Horkheimer might call a form of ‘pseudo-individualisation’, the fetishisation of petty difference.

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162 Held, *Introduction to Critical Theory*, p.91
Cultural policy was a crucial element of the Government’s attempts to ‘aggressively find ways to overcome [New Zealand’s] geographic location’. It enacted a more flexible spatial positioning of the nation, which was situated in the new, improved here of Peter Jackson’s Middle Earth, in which the “real” New Zealand had to be ‘nudged over ever so slightly’ to make room for a fantasy-land appealing to circuits of first world capital; in the value-adding exotic of the South Pacific and, crucially, in the space-less territory of the knowledge economy. The ideas and innovations produced by the creative industries met the Government’s demand that the country’s exports become ‘heavier in value and lighter in weight’. All of these positionings were directed towards the global centres of investment, audiences and tourists. The point, in David Craig’s terms, was to ‘transcend distance … on their terms, and not look stupid doing so.’ All of this was situated within the forward-facing trajectory of the race-to-the-future of globalisation and in the stipulation that ‘we move very fast to secure a stronger sense of who and what we are.’

Cultural policy since 1999 in New Zealand offers a good illustration of Patricia Goff’s argument that states, even as they are voluntarily dismantling their borders to global flows of goods, investment, ideas and talented people, simultaneously attempt to construct invisible, conceptual borders of belonging. While global flows of goods, service, ideas and people challenge or ignore the territorial borders and homogenous populations that had supported traditional understandings of state sovereignty, these new ideational borders argue for the continued relevance and autonomy of nations and states. In a globally interdependent world, the protection of a nation’s unique identity can even be seen as an aspect of national security: at stake is the very idea of New Zealand. But recent cultural policy in New Zealand also offers a compelling case study of the ways in which the construction of invisible, conceptual national borders is structured by the practices of globalisation. For these invisible borders of identity are not eternally existing

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163 OPM, Growing an Innovative New Zealand, p.15.
164 Peter Jackson, cited by Stephen Turner and Misha Kavka, ‘This is not New Zealand: An Exercise in the Political Economy of Identity’. Seminar Presentation, Departments of English and Film, Television and Media Studies, 10 June 2004, University of Auckland.
165 Turner and Kavka, ‘This is not New Zealand’.
167 OPM, Growing an Innovative New Zealand, p.32.
169 Clark, ‘Arts, Culture and Public Policy’.
170 Goff, ‘Invisible Borders p.533. cf. OPM, Growing an Innovative New Zealand, p.15, which states that ‘New Zealand needs to aggressively find ways to … connect with global markets – for goods and services, but also to access people, technology and ideas.’
or naturally occurring. Rather, border-making is a practice of statecraft, and every such act is a performance of power: an attempt to control the terms of political debate; to include and exclude; to endorse and denigrate. In the following section I identify the privileged discursive markers around which this national identity has been narrated, and evaluate their implications for artists, for cultural production and for society more broadly.

The Limits on Local Divergence

Post-1999 cultural policy has been a *prima facie* assertion of national specificity. Beyond the realm of political rhetoric, the period has witnessed many instances of institutional, policy and funding-level change directed towards the defence and promotion of national cultural production. In the field of popular music, the Government raised the spectre of compulsory content quotas to encourage commercial broadcasters towards a voluntarily agreed quota regime and, in 2000, it doubled New Zealand on Air (NZOA)’s local music budget to approximately $4 million annually, allowing it to fund the making as well as the marketing of local pop music. In March 2003 the Government imposed a charter on Television New Zealand (TVNZ), the state-owned broadcaster, that set out official quality and cultural goals, and that reflected the Government’s belief that the primary value of TVNZ lay in its ‘contribution to the social and cultural wealth of our nation.’

The Charter required, among other things, that TVNZ ‘provide shared experiences that contribute to a sense of citizenship and national identity’ while also catering for Maori and other minority perspectives. The Charter’s prime goal was, in TVNZ’s words, to ‘reflect New Zealand to New Zealanders’ and TVNZ subsequently positioned itself as the ‘home place for New Zealanders.’ Its business cards, circa 2005, carried the slogan ‘our nation. our voice.’

Various parts of the cultural sector were constituted as industries through the production of scoping reports and the establishment of taskforces and industry commissions. The Music Industry Commission, for instance, was established in 2000 with a mandate to develop the music industry through a range of co-operative partnerships between artists, the private sector and the state. At roughly the same time the large-budget Film Production Fund was established in order to facilitate more ambitious projects by

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171 Steve Maharey (Minister of Broadcasting) in NZPD, 27 February 2003.
experienced local film-makers. In 2001 the Pathways to Artistic and Cultural Employment (PACE) scheme was introduced as a collaboration between Creative New Zealand and Work and Income New Zealand in order to recognise and facilitate artistic activity as a viable career choice.\textsuperscript{174} The scheme was to provide funding for a year, during which times participants would undertake training programmes designed to develop business and marketing skills appropriate to state funding mechanisms.

All of these initiatives, however, were in various ways structured by (and thus both facilitated and constrained by) the ends prescribed by the state. Economic growth was held as the fundamental objective: the prize that would enable all other goals, and the Government’s interventions in the cultural sector were oriented towards or at least constrained by this fundamental objective. Consequently, TVNZ was required to discharge its Charter obligations in what remained a highly deregulated broadcasting environment. While the Government withdrew the requirement that the state broadcaster return a dividend, it was still expected to be commercially responsive, compromising the sorts of local divergence that could be screened (and the times at which it could be screened). These constraints were highlighted when TVNZ Chief Executive Rick Ellis attempted to argue that the Charter obligation to represent Maori perspectives was satisfied by commercially viable programmes with a minimal Maori component such as local soap opera \textit{Shortland Street} and – controversially – crime programme \textit{Police Ten-7}.

The sort of local popular music that could be funded by NZOA was structured by the policy decision to use commercial broadcasters as both the selection and delivery mechanism. In both cases, attempts to provide distinctively “New Zealand” content operated within the disciplines imposed by ratings and advertising revenues in a competitive marketplace. The funding made available and the mechanisms employed could never insulate cultural from financial concerns. Institutional arrangements favoured local product that was compatible with familiar – and thus probably foreign – formats and genres. Local divergence remained limited by global practices, such as the


large production and marketing budgets of foreign output, but also by the ways in which global practices are experienced as the tastes and preferences of local audiences. The rapid failure of the first model of 100% New Zealand music station Kiwi FM demonstrated that there was not an unlimited appetite by New Zealand audiences for New Zealand product.  

The tensions between the ideal of local divergence and the reality of economic constraints were particularly acute in the high-budget medium of feature film. Indeed, even as left-leaning a minister as Jim Anderton positioned subsidies to the industry as a ‘mechanism which inevitably limits growth’ and promoted a new approach that would ‘turn this cycle of dependency into sustainable, independent growth which will showcase New Zealand talent and creativity internationally, while growing new and existing businesses domestically.’ The 2003 report of the government-commissioned Screen Production Industry Taskforce acknowledged that the ‘retention of any national benefits for both partners’ through co-production arrangements was ‘complicated by the need to satisfy the cultural imperatives of two or more countries’. But it still celebrated such arrangements as a way of ‘meeting local content requirements and retaining nationality for tax and other purposes’ while augmenting ‘production funding with foreign money’ and identified co-productions as ‘a major growth area’. This is not a strong position from which to help New Zealanders towards a ‘better understanding of themselves, and a greater awareness of their role and responsibility as a populous and developing South Pacific nation’, or to resist the ‘cultural colonisation’ associated with the dominance of foreign cultural production. As Lawn and Beatty observe, intensive lobbying was eventually able to make a successful case for continued – even increased – financial assistance from the state. This assistance, however, in keeping with the historical approach of the Film Commission, was fashioned as a financial investment, not a cultural subsidy.

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176 Subsequently, the Government made radio frequencies available free-of-charge to Kiwi FM, which was run by a commercial operator, much to the anger of their competitors. (See New Zealand Musician, ‘Kiwi FM Ball Drops on Music Month Toes’, New Zealand Musician, v.12, no.9, 2006, pp.46-7).
177 Anderton was not a Labour Party MP but the leader of a coalition partner, the Progressives. He had been, as leader of the Alliance, Deputy Prime Minister between 1999 and 2002 and was at this time the Minister for Industry and Regional Development.
While international financing certainly compromises national cultural goals, there is no reason to assume that domestic investors would be any more inclined to be involved in a commercially risky film, or one that challenged the popular myths upon which the nation is constructed. The central tension might not be between local objectives and foreign finance, but between cultural goals and finance per se. Even local investors need to be aware of the tastes of foreign audiences and to ensure that our stories are intelligible “over there”. It is difficult to trace official policy through to finished cultural product, of course, in the presence of so many mediating levels: bureaucrats, selection and development boards, and artists. But it is worth drawing attention to the ways in which an organisation like the Film Commission, with its incentives to meet budgets, generate good news stories and articulate itself with the Government’s wider vision, is able to act on cultural production.

The Commission’s website, for instance, notes its close involvement with the script development of Christine Jeff’s *Rain*, rejecting a funding application at one stage because of perceived script problems that it felt might compromise the film’s chances of international critical success.\(^{182}\) The finished film was, of course, an international critical success. But the Commission’s influence over the creative development of local film’s gives it a large degree of control over which of our stories can eventually be told and heard, and the shape in which they can be told. In like manner, one of the early success-stories of the Film Production Fund – Niki Caro’s *Whale Rider* – achieved critical and commercial success both domestically and internationally, but it did so, arguably, by excising the elements of political and cultural protest contained in the novel on which it was based, thus embodying what Clair Murdoch calls the ‘recipe that has come to define our self-image: Maori-Pakeha biculturalism meets international-export-quality everything.’\(^{183}\) In the sphere of cultural production, the Government’s communitarian claim that strengthening national identity offers meaning and purpose to citizens is challenged by the simultaneous need to integrate New Zealand into global markets. New Zealand popular music is supported because it is held to ‘sing our songs’, even though the support is largely limited to those singers and songs likely to receive commercial radio airplay, a situation likely to lead, as Jody Berland argues, to local music in a format

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that conforms to global norms.\textsuperscript{184} Te Papa is expected to act as “Our Place” and tell our shared story while taking a ‘leadership role in locating museums in the recreation and leisure marketplace.’\textsuperscript{185} And New Zealand films need to tell our unique stories while engaging with the needs of international markets.

The extent to which New Zealand’s art and artists have been expected to “represent” a highly selective image of the country was illustrated by the political response to the selection of et al (et al is the official collective pseudonym for Auckland-based artist Merilyn Tweedie, who remains formally anonymous) as the New Zealand presence at the prestigious Venice Biennale in 2005. Et al’s selection was subjected to sustained and virulent criticism from the domestic media and opposition politicians. Rather than defending CNZ’s decision and the selected work, the Government opted to join the chorus of criticism, arguing that et al was not going to properly represent the country. Associate Minister for Arts, Culture and Heritage, Judith Tizard stated ‘without having seen the artist's work’ that she couldn’t see how it was ‘going to work well for New Zealand’\textsuperscript{186} and Clark complained that ‘yet again an artist has been selected who is unable to act in an ambassadorial role for New Zealand.’\textsuperscript{187} Even with the benefits of hindsight, National’s Arts and Culture spokesperson Chris Finlayson located the problem in et al’s lack of ‘the ability [and] the desire to converse with the rest of New Zealand about her work’\textsuperscript{188} a charge that needlessly narrows the way in which art and artists might be said to converse with the public.

In effect, et al was expected to perform the same representative function as New Zealand’s presence at the 2005 Aichi World Expo as discussed in chapter 4: to project an appropriate national image. Art is addressed, in other words, in the reductive terms of a corporate branding exercise. As Ian Wedde argued, however,

\begin{quote}
[b]eing "ambassadorial" and "representing" New Zealand might not involve talking nicely to the media or presenting a brand
\end{quote}

\begin{footnotes}
\item[185] Te Papa, \textit{Annual Report [1994]}, pp.6,22.
\end{footnotes}
such as "100% pure" …. "Representation" might consist more usefully and accurately of being, and of being seen to be, independent, uncompromising and principled.¹⁸⁹

Wedde’s complaint is not a plea for iconoclasm, or an argument that national cultural production has nothing to do with national identity. Rather, he articulates a potential role for art and artists in terms of representing tropes of identity that have been marginalised by the dominance of official discourse. New Zealanders’ self-identification is based, in part, on ideas of independence and principle, expressed most clearly in a continued pride in the anti-nuclear policy in place since the mid-1980s. Wedde is not rejecting all markers of New Zealand identity, but simply drawing attention to the way that some have been found more useful than others.

Tizard and Clark constructed the problem as one of too much global convergence: the installation might have made compelling sense in the context of contemporary international art discourse but, it was implied, it did not project a distinctive New Zealand image. From another perspective, the real problem was simply that et al presented the wrong sort of local divergence. Et al’s work was, by the reckoning of the international arts community, creative, innovative and globally relevant: all of the things required by the Government’s vision of a new national identity. The problem was that it was creative, innovative and relevant in ways incompatible with the marketing logic of the national branding project. Its dystopian vision in drab grey disrupted the official expectation that art and artists ‘line up behind a smart national venture, and project a cleverly branded image’¹⁹⁰ While not admitting that the public outcry had influenced its decision, CNZ did not support a New Zealand artistic presence at Venice in 2007, instead ‘supporting a delegation of visual arts professionals to attend three major art events [including the Venice Biennale] in Europe in June 2007’¹⁹¹ (my emphasis).

This narrow understanding of the function and value of art has implications for the sort of cultural production that can be officially celebrated. It also has implications for society more widely. Donald Horne argues that art is a ‘medium for social criticism and articulating cultural identity’ and a bulwark against ‘the monopolisation of the dominant

¹⁹⁰ Craig, ‘Post-Fordism, Neo-Trekkaism.’, p.59.
culture’. These functions, he argues, are ‘essential to maintaining a liberal democracy’.\textsuperscript{192} The Government aligned itself with these concerns when it acknowledged art’s ‘time honoured function of serving as society’s conscience and critic’.\textsuperscript{193} But it also celebrated the economic potential of the creative industries, and art’s contribution to social cohesion and social integration through its ability to create a ‘stronger sense of who and what we are.’\textsuperscript{194} It is difficult to argue that the Government has politicised cultural production in the sense of reducing it to ideological sloganeering, although it has shown a degree of willingness to couple cultural production with its goals of economic transformation and strengthening national identity. The greater danger is the possibility that the Government has \textit{de}-politicised art.

Victoria Lynn argues that the real political nature of art lies in its capacity to generate critical distance and to voice dissensus.\textsuperscript{195} It is these capacities which are threatened by the expectation that art and culture ‘play a pivotal role in defining our point of difference and communicating our special values to the world’\textsuperscript{196} and that they express a strong and clear sense of national unity. The local divergence promised by the promotion of local cultural production is constrained by positioning the cultural sector as an economic sector subject to the logic of the market, and by the expectation that it contribute to a coherent brand image supportive of the shared purpose posited by the Government. The paradox is that “genuine” local divergence, based on a presentation of the nation in its irreducible diversity, is undermined not by an acceptance of global convergence, but by the demand for a tightly defined and economically driven form of local divergence. In the joined-up-government approach, and in the strategy of integrated branding, art that could not or would not work towards these ends would not be valued.

In this ‘inclusive exclusion of difference’,\textsuperscript{197} the previously marginal social group of “artist” is incorporated into the mainstream of the Government’s political project. Lydia Wevers and Mark Williams argue that artists have been co-opted by the promise of

\textsuperscript{193} Clark, ‘Arts, Culture and Public Policy’.
\textsuperscript{194} Clark, ‘Arts, Culture and Public Policy’.
\textsuperscript{195} Victoria Lynn, ‘Turbulence’. Presentation to the Economies of Culture / Cultures of Economies symposium, Centre for Critical Inquiry, Auckland City Art Gallery, 10 November 2006.
\textsuperscript{196} CNZ, \textit{Annual Report for Year Ending 2001}, p.5.
greater recognition and financial support, and bemoan what they take to be a resulting bland consensus.\textsuperscript{198} In response, Tim Corballis finds this conclusion too quick.\textsuperscript{199} It is not so much that artists have forgotten about their dissident role, he argues, but rather that a new ideological common-sense has been formed which leaves artists with nothing to argue about. Corballis ties this to the global triumph of neo-liberal ideology, but more specifically to the Government’s capacity to re-define the terms of creativity. While the word connotes freedom, transformation and critical thinking, creativity has been reductively understood by the fifth Labour Government in terms consistent with their project of economic transformation. The Creative Nation of New Zealand is to be creative in ways that encourage the individuation of responsibility, ambition, the taking of risk and with global connectedness. Creativity has become a term able to mediate cultural and artistic activity on the one hand, and the demands of a competitive global knowledge economy on the other. In its ability to suture national culture and individual effort, creativity becomes a new ‘privileged discursive point’\textsuperscript{200} and the mark of the exemplary New Zealander. But it is a functional and tightly controlled form of creativity, able to marginalise the difference enacted by dissenting or disruptive modes of creativity.

Cultural producers are addressed and evaluated in the Government’s project as role-performers related to a putative shared purpose of economic growth and social cohesion. They are seen, in other words, as means to shared national ends. If we accept that identity is to some degree 'formed and transformed continuously in relation to the ways we are represented or addressed in the cultural systems which surround us'\textsuperscript{201} then this representation of artists as role-performers has important implications for their sense of self and sense of purpose. The new situation may be preferable to the ways in which artists had been addressed in previous articulations of national identity. A conservative and conformist vision of national identity tended to view artists as slightly weird misfits, while any variant of economic rationalism tended to view them as unproductive and, therefore, as undeserving. Within the national project of the fifth Labour Government, by contrast, artists can be celebrated and accepted into the mainstream of New Zealand society. The crucial qualification is that they can be celebrated only insofar as they are willing and able to contribute: to produce culture ‘for the nation’s sake’, as Stephen

\textsuperscript{199} Corballis, ‘Against Creativity’, pp.57-59.
\textsuperscript{200} Doty ‘Sovereignty and the Nation’, p.127.
\textsuperscript{201} Hall, ‘The Question of Cultural Identity’, p.277.
Turner might put it. Their identities are formed and transformed by the language of cultural policy, but also by the practices that discipline the life of an artist. Funding application forms offer incentives for artists to articulate their practice with official goals for culture. Institutions such as the artist dole, designed to help those working in the arts or creative industries ‘to move towards sustainable employment and self-sufficiency’ invite artists to conceptualise their art practice along business lines.

The emphasis since 1999 on the need to invest in, and act upon, the human capital of creative individuals is not new. The Arts Council’s argument in 1982 that ‘a nation’s wealth lies in the imagination of its people’ is not that far removed from Peter Biggs’ ‘creative society’ or ‘imagination economy’, or from the Government’s argument that competitive advantage lies not in goods but in ideas and innovation and, specifically, in ‘our energetic, intelligent, creative people’. It is nothing new, in other words, for artists to be addressed and evaluated as role-performers. What is new is the specific content of the role they are expected to perform and the nature of the shared purpose that they are related to. Their roles as artists are no longer self-defined, or open to the range of purposes traditionally attributed to artists within society. Rather, they are tightly co-opted into the shared purpose of the fifth Labour Government: economic transformation via the global knowledge economy, and the strengthening of a national identity compatible with this economic agenda.

The ideological force of Government action in the cultural sector has included the normalisation of the creative, individuated actor. It has contributed, therefore, to the construction of a knowledge society in which creative workers are exemplary knowledge workers, creating value through their imagination, ideas and creativity. In a context in which knowledge, rather than labour or capital, is said to be the key factor of production, creative industry workers are described in positive terms. The centrality of their ideas and creativity rhetorically frees them from class limitations and overrides the alienation of wage-labour. Self-employed artists are, according to Andrea Ellmeier, ‘described in heroic terms’, as ‘entrepreneurs of their own human capital’ rather than ‘job slaves’ or

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203 QEIIACNZ, Annual Report for Year Ending 1982, Wellington, 1982, p.3. This passage is attributed to Peter Brinson.
204 CNZ, Annual Report [2001], p.3.
205 Peter Biggs, ‘Islands of Imagination’.
‘day labourers’. The creative industries are incorporated into the discourse of the knowledge economy which uses supporting arguments from equality of opportunity to justify the talented – those who have talents that are recognised and valued by the market – rising to prominence and power, and gaining greater access to society’s resources. In its profound individuation, this equality of opportunity within the knowledge economy ‘breaks up solidaristic opposition to existing conditions of inequality by holding out to the ablest and most ambitious members of the disadvantaged groups’ the prospect of individual success and advancement. The clearest embodiment of this comes in the valourisation of individual success stories in the creative industries – film-maker Peter Jackson, musicians Nesian Mystik or fashion designer Karen Walker, for example. This is legitimation by anecdote, in which the success stories of the few – whether their success be due to genius, effort, luck, or all three – are presented as a model of what is achievable by all.

Ellmeier notes that new labour markets, based on the guiding principles of employability, entrepreneurship, adaptability and equality of opportunity, require ‘high motivation, low wages and variable working hours’. She asks whether the emergence of the ‘cultural entrepreneur’ in Europe represents ‘a (negative) vanguard of new labour relations’ that foreshadows a ‘rapid rise in “atypical”, precarious forms of employment’. The ideal of entrepreneurialism is seen here as an attack on labour as it gives rise to a situation in which all labour relations are organised by individual and variable contracts. While it may be argued that precarious employment relationships are not new, the knowledge economy generally, and the creative industries specifically, make a virtue of the casualisation of labour. The ideal of “flexibility” is coded positive in the Government’s economic transformation agenda, which states that “[w]e need to become a more innovative, more confident, more flexible economy which is able to compete successfully on the international scene”. But flexibility also connotes vulnerability and uncertainty. It is, according to Nancy Fraser, a process of ‘self-constitution’ marked by ‘fluidity, provisionality, and a temporal horizon of “no long

209 Ellmeier, ‘Cultural Entrepreneurialism’, pp.7-8. In this passage Ellmeier is referring specifically to the European Employment Strategy.
term.”

Marie-Luise Angerer’s list of the attributes of the ideal ‘new cultural worker’ (‘on average a 25-30 year old, multiskilled, flexible person, psychologically resilient, independent, single, unattached to a particular location, who jumps at whatever opportunity there is to be had’) describes, as Ellmeier notes, ‘everything that the new economy needs: young, unattached, creative people’ (my emphasis). But the precarious nature of new labour relations carries social impacts. It is difficult to see how these unattached, mobile actors will simultaneously act as the building blocks of cohesive communities, as required by the posited reconciliation of economic dynamism and social cohesion.

The fifth Labour Government has been remarkably successful in bringing cultural production and the creative industries into the mainstream of public policy from its previously marginal position. The opposition National Party had, by 2005, become committed to maintaining arts funding at ‘the present level’. In its 2005 manifesto, under the heading ‘Nurturing a Creative New Zealand’, National acknowledged the multiple functions of art and culture, describing them as ‘essential foundations for progressive and vibrant communities’ that provide ‘a link to our past, an insight into our present and inspiration for our future’. Moreover, besides their economic potential, ‘New Zealand’s arts and culture underpin our uniqueness, contributing to a sense of identity, belonging, and connection to these islands.’ Supporters of the arts may well feel relieved that continued support now seems secure regardless of electoral fluctuations. This newly formed consensus on arts and culture as a suitable object of public policy has come, however, at the price of positioning the cultural sector as willing and able to contribute to a hegemonic shared purpose of economic growth stabilised and facilitated by a strong sense of national identity and social cohesion. As Lawn and Beatty argue, the Government’s increased attention to arts and culture may have been a barbed gift, which

214 In this connection see Richard Sennett, The Corrosion of Character: the Personal Consequences of Work in the New Capitalism. New York, Norton, 1998, cited in Fraser, ‘From Discipline to Flexibilization?’, p.169, where Fraser notes Sennett’s description of ‘flexible men’ (and women) who change jobs, careers and locations ‘at the drop of a hat’, and ‘whose collegial relations and friendships are trimmed to fit the horizon of no long term’.
signalled its intention to submit the sector to the disciplines of its wider economic and political project.\textsuperscript{217}

This conclusion points again to the importance of discourse: the ability to normalise and naturalise the terms of debate. The analysis of cultural policy cannot be reduced to empirical calculation but must also take into account the capacity of various actors to define policy problems.\textsuperscript{218} The control of discourse offers a stable and enduring way of embedding certain policy approaches. Nick Perry’s description, in the context of New Zealand broadcasting policy of ‘what is variously either an endemic vulnerability to, or an enthusiasm for, the process of making, unmaking, and remaking the system’ is salient to the many changes in the structure of most of New Zealand’s major cultural institutions over the last twenty years. The advocate who wishes to embed a certain approach will do well to alter not just the specific institution but also the terms in which its function and value is understood. In the cultural policy of the fifth Labour Government, national identity has been consciously ‘aligned with contemporary reality.’\textsuperscript{219} In this process, the distinction between national image (structured by the demands of others) and national identity (structured by an internal demand for meaning and belonging) becomes blurred. Cultural production has been seen as a potential mediating device between the two demands. In cultural policy and in the new ideal of creativity we find embedded a statement of shared purpose, a statement of shared vision and, crucially, a statement of shared identity.

This is the construction of a new societal common sense, or the embedding of a previously existing common sense in a more stable manner: economic rationalism is stabilised by an assertion of national values and interests. What is presented as a national common sense, is however, only ever partial. Common sense is always fragmentary, contingent and contradictory. By deploying the field of arts, culture and creativity, an economic objective structured by the demands of global capital, markets and investment is presented as a national resistance to these forces. The national project of culture and


\textsuperscript{218} See my earlier discussion in Chapter 2 of the importance and the contested nature of problem definition.

creativity speaks at the level of myth, seeking to generate spontaneous consent by presenting its activities as natural, inevitable, necessary.

**Conclusion**

The New Public Managerialism of the 1980s and ‘90s introduced greater efficiency, transparency and accountability into the administration of cultural policy. These developments demanded the creation of more explicit criteria, standards and objectives against which funding applications may be measured, and placed greater power in the hands of those who formulate such measures. Funding agencies such as Creative New Zealand remain at “arms length” from direct political control. But an agency Chair or Chief Executive who hopes for continued or increased funding will take some care to articulate their goals and objectives with the broader goals and values of the current administration. In this way, cultural policy may be centralised and politicised by stealth, and this process justified by the arms-length structure. Such a process would have the positive effect of attenuating the power of arts and culture elitists, and of bringing cultural policy more tightly within the democratic ambit. Michael Volkerling argues, for instance, that the arm can sometimes be too long in arms length arrangements.\(^{220}\) But the case for centralisation and politicisation of arts and culture policy is not clear cut. At a minimum, the trend towards explicit criteria and strategic objectives imposes on government and its agencies a requirement to be honest and explicit about its objectives. And it imposes on the public a duty to critique how these categories are developed and put into practice.

In this context, it should be asked whether the requirement that art promote a sense of national unity proscribes expression that accentuates difference and division, and whether the requirement that it make a contribution to the economy rules out disruptive, “difficult” art. Most fundamentally, an engaged debate is needed on what, exactly, art is valued for in society. While art might sensibly be valued for its contribution to ‘social integration, social cohesion and engagement’, to ‘human capital investment spin-offs, including promotion of creative and lateral thinking’,\(^ {221}\) and to ‘cultural capital’, the aim of which is to ‘standardise interaction and reduce uncertainty by the formation of


\(^{221}\) Christopher Madden, “Economic” Benefits, p.18.
consistent expectations across a group’, those goals may place dangerous limitations on the scope for cultural production to serve as the conscience and critic of society. The political use of cultural policy by the fifth Labour Government – the production of an economic and a social dividend – may occlude what Lynn describes as the real political function of art: the articulation of dissensus. The increasing commercialisation of arts and culture policy discourse speaks to issues of what we value, what kinds of messages and mediums are available in the public sphere, and the formats in which we are able to talk to ourselves. If the mixing of culture with commercial imperative contributes to the commodification of culture, then current policy is vulnerable to Adorno’s criticism that it is funding a product that postulates false resolutions and reconciles individuals to their place in society.

State funding of the arts in New Zealand represents an acknowledgment that art is not entirely suited to the free market. It stands against the equation of art’s value with its price and symbolises the importance that New Zealand society places on art. Yet political rhetoric since 1999 dictates that cultural agencies pursue a narrow conceptualisation of art. From the raft of possible objectives for art, only the Third Way dream of an inclusive society and a dynamic economy remains. Far from being the bastion of the alarming and experimental, Creative New Zealand often seems to understand itself as the nations advertising and marketing department. This is, perhaps, unsurprising given that the agency’s chair from 1999-2006, Peter Biggs, doubled as the head of a major advertising agency. Asked whether he felt any tension between his two jobs, Biggs replied, somewhat alarmingly, ‘[w]ell, to me, it's all creativity, of some form or another’. One view of advertising in general is that it creates a sense of need and then offers a way of meeting that need: the consumption of a given product. This process sits easily with the current Government’s goal of economic development and the creation of a “Brand New Zealand”. It is a process rather harder to reconcile with any sensible view of artistic endeavour.

223 Lynn, ‘Turbulence’. See also Antoon van Den Braembussch, ‘The Value of Art’, in Klamer (ed.), The Value of Culture, pp.31–43 who describes (at p.31) art’s capacity to ‘represent ‘intractable problems of meaning’ without solving them as one of its important features.
224 Held, Introduction to Critical Theory, pp.100, 105.
The current Labour Government in New Zealand has explicitly coupled arts and culture policy with a nation building project. The strengthening of national identity carries an intuitive appeal for many. Further, the nation-building project of the current Government is presented in ways that make it difficult to dissent. It is presented as the defence of the local, the specific and the meaningful against the global, the generic and the commercialised. But it is a truism that every nation-building project is inspired by a vision, and the strength of this vision can tend to overwhelm and undervalue alternative visions and dissenting voices. As Fairclough notes, every political vision is also a political division – a way of dividing the world into categories of the visionary’s formulation.226

The fifth Labour Government, true to Third Way form, espouses a vision of New Zealand as an inclusive vision in which New Zealand is imagined as ‘a land where diversity is valued and reflected in our national identity’.227 But the expectation that all New Zealanders will contribute to a shared national purpose is the attempt to construct a new homogeneity based on the naturalisation of the demands of the free market, even as national identity is narrated in terms of openness, diversity and tolerance. The Derridean notion of exemplarity is useful here, in that it directs us to look within such a universalistic, inclusive discourse for the element that acts as the ‘embodiment of exemplarity’.228 Labour’s rhetoric seems, on the surface, to suggest that all New Zealanders are equally valued and welcomed into its inclusive and tolerant nation. But a critical analysis of the nation-building discourse reveals the embodiment of exemplarity to be a model citizen who is creative, talented, innovative, highly motivated, appropriately educated and outward and future-focussed. It is an individual conforming to the standard third-way injunction that citizens act as ‘entrepreneurs’ developing their ‘human capital’.

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227 OPM, Growing an Innovative New Zealand, p.5.
228 Doty ‘Sovereignty and the Nation’, p.135.
CHAPTER 6: FOOD POLICY

[N]ature in agricultural production cannot be reduced to an input; indeed it is the “factory” itself…. Agriculture, thus, kept the Copernican revolution of manufacturing at bay: the machine must continue to circulate around nature.¹

Globalisation, National Identity and Food Policy

Central to the political project of the fifth Labour Government was the pursuit of national economic viability within a globalising economy. It aimed to achieve this viability through what it termed a strategy of ‘smart engagement’ with the global economy – as opposed to earlier approaches, which were labelled ‘head in the sand’ and ‘open up and hope’.² Smart engagement included the strategic dismantling of national borders to global flows of goods, investment, technology, ideas and talented people. But the Government’s project also emphasised the continuing salience of national specificity and identity, both as a source of value in the global economy and as the guarantor of social cohesion at home. As I have argued earlier, this two-pronged strategy is in keeping with Patricia Goff’s assertion that some governments, even as they ‘willingly open the territorial borders of the state in order to reap the economic reward that accompanies participation in a global marketplace’, nevertheless ‘resist the concomitant cultural homogenization – the dilution of national identity – by simultaneously fortifying the nation’.³ State actions to reinforce the ‘invisible or conceptual’ borders held in place by cultural particularity⁴ constitute a Polanyian ‘secondary movement’ in response to ‘political demands for protection against the disruptive and polarizing effects of free markets on contemporary life.’⁵

As we have seen, cultural policy was accorded greater salience by the fifth Labour Government for its supposed capacity to reconcile the production of a national sense of self and belonging with global economic competitiveness. But cultural policy since 1999 has also demonstrated the tensions inherent in the simultaneous dismantling and construction of different kinds of national borders. Constructing New Zealand as engaged in a global realm of hostile economic competition affects the sorts of invisible, conceptual borders that can be erected. In consequence, the national identity posted by the fifth Labour Government has increasingly been based on the characteristics required by its economic agenda. The tensions between economic and cultural aspirations are heightened in the case of agricultural policy. Whereas the creative industries are new, disparate and relatively marginal in economic terms, New Zealand’s primary production sector has long been central to the country’s economy. The Government’s articulation of food production policy and national identity has been structured by this centrality (which generates an emphasis on production efficiency and trade liberalisation) and, increasingly, by a strategy of achieving economic growth through science and innovation and by an emphasis on transforming overseas perceptions of New Zealand. In basic continuity with preceding governments, the fifth Labour Government has understood New Zealand as a small, trade-dependant economy and kept the country ‘at the forefront of negotiations to break down barriers to trade’. The twin impulses to dismantle borders to global flows of agricultural goods and to leverage national specificity as a source of competitive advantage served to marginalise markers of national identity that could not contribute to those ends.

In this chapter I identify and analyse two specific tensions generated by the Government’s project. The economic imperatives of productivity and trade liberalisation, supported by a national identity said to be based on commercialisable innovation, flexibility and pragmatic positivism stand in tension, firstly, with other plausible markers of national identity, such as a deontological commitment to environmental preservation, or a hostile isolationism opposed to a perceived corporate takeover of global food chains. Embedded in arguments over policy prescriptions (with regard, for instance, to environmental sustainability or genetic modification) are more fundamental arguments over the nature of New Zealand identity: over whether it is based more centrally on principle and independence, or on pragmatism, innovation and global connectedness. Secondly, the

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ideals of efficiency and productivity are aligned with an emphasis on individual incentives and responsibility that stands in some tension with the very idea of national-scale goals such as sustainability. The Government’s conception of New Zealand as a universitas united by its pursuit of a common objective represents an attempt to reconcile individual and collective goals, but it struggles to engage with some of the tensions between them.

These contemporary political issues are situated within the broader “politics of food”. There is no way of overstating the importance of food. It is a necessity of life, a commodity, a sensual pleasure, a focal point of family and social life. It is the world’s biggest industry and its biggest export item. The production and trade of food is especially central to the New Zealand economy. But as well as being a staple of the global and the national economy, food is also a marker of culture, a component of collective identity and, in Arjun Appadurai’s phrase, a ‘highly condensed social fact’.7 Just as there are many ways to think about the importance and the meaning of food, there are many ways to think about the politics of food. If politics is an answer to questions of who gets what, when and how, and if food is a source of necessary nutrition, then the politics of food is reducible to the question of fair access to nutrition. But food’s centrality to national economies and to national identities means that the politics of food also incorporates nation-building projects that pursue national economic competitiveness in the global economy, and that assert national specificity as a response to global homogenisation. National specificity may be understood here both as the pursuit of ‘psychic’ as opposed to ‘material’ income8 (derived, say, when a national cuisine is protected at the cost of obtaining a lucrative trade deal) and as an economic strategy aimed at securing value through the foregrounding of place.

As networks of food production, distribution, regulation and consumption are increasingly globalised, food is ‘increasingly involved in controversies at a transnational level, in relation to issues of access, dominance, trade and control’.9 If nothing else, the

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8 The distinction between the two forms of income is made by Harry Johnson and is discussed by Stephen Shulman, in ‘Nationalist Sources of International Economic Integration’, International Studies Quarterly, v.44, 2000, pp. 365-390, at p.369.
globalisation of food has vastly increased ‘the number of diverse interests, relations and regulatory frameworks that are enrolled ... Hence the potential for interests to diverge and come into conflict also rises exponentially’. 10 This situation has serious implications. As Warren Belasco notes, ‘[m]any of the world’s wars may be viewed as a series of colossal food fights.’ There is reason then, to take very seriously ‘current trade battles over biotechnology [and] hormones’ 11 as well as, we might add, over traditional food products 12 and food-based exemptions in recent trade negotiations. Such debates pit the choices of local consumers against international trade laws, and the interests of various local producers against one another. Beneath these tensions lie the relations of power involved in the construction of consumer choices and international laws, and the question of whether the defence of local produce and producers should be seen as an assertion of cultural identity, or as an instance of old-fashioned protectionism.

National-level food policies in an era of globalisation are therefore key sites in which to examine (in Saskia Sassens’s terms) the dialectic between de-nationalisation and re-nationalisation 13 and (in Goff’s) the restoration of ‘meaning to national borders, not as barriers to entry, but as boundaries demarcating distinct political communities.’ 14 Richard Wilk describes the debate between those who believe that global agribusiness undermines national agricultural produce and practices and those who hold that globalisation actually creates and reinforces national specificity, while also noting that both sides share the assumption that ‘national, regional, or ethnic cultures are fundamentally different from mobile, market-based, mass-mediated global cultural forms, such that they represent different and basically antithetical processes’ 15 (my emphasis). It makes more sense to accept, with Robert Ashley and his collaborators, that the impact of globalisation on food culture ‘has been both to augment homogeneity and to increase diversity.’ 16 For while globalisation is often seen as an instance of commodity–fetishism in its ‘disregard for a

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commodity’s relations of production’, a more complex dynamic is at work, whereby these relations are sometimes obscured, but sometimes emphasised as a source of fascination and a guarantee of authenticity and the exotic. Both tendencies can be seen in the processes, discussed by Jacqui True, by which “New Zealand” kiwifruit grown overseas under licence to a New Zealand company (Zespri) are marketed as a New Zealand product, deriving value from notions of quality and sustainability associated with the “place” of New Zealand. In global food markets, nationality can be converted into a source of value if it can be associated with ideas of sustainable, high-quality and ethical production. As a result, states are faced with incentives to engage in a politics of image and reputation, such that national specificity can be invested with economic value.

Contemporary assertions of local, national and regional identity against the globalisation of food are seen clearly within the European Union. Opposition from some European countries – notably France - to genetically modified organisms (GMOs) and their enthusiasm for ‘protected geographical indications’ (PGIs) are understood by Patricia Goff and Chaia Heller as assertions of national identity. French resistance to the globalisation of agribusiness was predicated on the assumption that national, regional and local cultures are indeed antithetical to ‘mobile, market-based, mass-mediated global cultural forms’. In the GMO debate in France, the Peasants’ Confederation (CP) was successful in displacing a hegemonic discourse of scientific risk with their preferred discourse of traditional food production expertise. Drawing on these traditional and situated forms of knowledge, the neologism malbouffe was popularised by CP leader Jose Bove. This term is simply the opposite of la bouffe (good, authentic, cultured food), and was commonly given in English as bad food or junk food but, as Goff and Heller record, Bove himself saw wider connotations. For him, it indicted the “McDonaldisation” of food, where the same product tastes the same all around the world. It refers, Bove said, to ‘food from nowhere’ or, what is the same thing, food from everywhere.

17 Ashley et al., Food and Cultural Studies, p.102.
21 Wilk, ‘Food and Nationalism’, p.68.
22 Heller, ‘Risky Science and Savoir-faire’, p.86.
invokes the French concept of *terroir*: the idea that food is properly embedded in local culture. Support in France for PGIs and opposition to GMOs, asserted the primary importance of time and place: of specific traditions and temporal rhythms and of spatial location. Drawing on the French case, Goff argues that local food practices were understood as markers of culture, and were therefore protected, because cultural identity has come to be perceived as an element of national security.\(^\text{23}\)

This conclusion, sensible in the French case, cannot be easily applied to New Zealand, where food production, far from being threatened by ‘mobile, market-based, mass-mediated global cultural forms’, was generated by and continues to rely on these processes. The notion of *terroir*, meaningful in France, is problematic in New Zealand. Indeed, New Zealand’s agricultural productivity is based on a rupture of both produce and place, and produce and tradition. New Zealand’s food production culture is not built on the traditions and unique character of various specific sites, but on universal ideals of productivity, efficiency and flexibility. It is oriented towards future efficiencies rather than past traditions. There are, for instance, very few autochthonous New Zealand food products. The sheep that so famously outnumber humans in New Zealand are not indigenous but imported from Australia and Britain. The markets that would pay for New Zealand produce were similarly distant. It remains a point of pride that anything, seemingly, can be grown in New Zealand as efficiently as in its place of origin. New Zealand’s development as a settler capitalist economy shaped and was shaped by agricultural production. The very survival of this formation depended on flows from elsewhere of capital, investment, ideas, people, and animal species. The consequence of this history is that the New Zealand public and the New Zealand agricultural sector responds to globalisation with a specific set of dispositions and discourses.

The historical global orientation of New Zealand agriculture notwithstanding, a sense of place does command a role in the production and, especially, the marketing of New Zealand produce. The country’s geographical isolation, the thorn in the side of national economic planners, does confer clean, green connotations. In the GM debate in New Zealand, clean, green considerations – both as reality and as marketing strategy - were translated into *economic opportunity*, as well as *environmental* and *risk management* discourses, although these discourses, as we shall see, were not ultimately dominant.

Recently, attempts to foreground the unique characteristics of particular locations—notably specific valleys and riverside plains in wine production—have become more prominent. Such initiatives, whether they are driven by considerations of quality, profit, or both, are structured by future outcomes rather than past traditions. The general approach is exemplified by the Topoclimate project in Southland, in which scientific analysis of soil type and microclimate is mapped against a database of crops to suggest appropriate land uses and high value crops.\textsuperscript{24} New Zealand agriculture, like New Zealand identity, has a relentless future-oriented trajectory; it is directed not by history but by geo-economic imperatives.

Goff’s discussion of trade disputes between the European Union and the United States has the two sides as conceptualising the issue in mutually exclusive ways: European concerns for ‘food sovereignty’ and identity, and evolving notions of national security are set against the narrow American frame of ‘free trade versus protectionism’.\textsuperscript{25} In New Zealand, these easy distinctions are disrupted, and a complex dialectic emerges between identity and interests. Because of the tiny size of its domestic market and its concomitant dependence on exporting its agricultural produce, New Zealand, unlike the European Union, is unable to decouple economic sovereignty from food sovereignty. Since 1984, the ideal of trade liberalisation in agricultural products has commonly been linked with considerations of national economic security and an emergent national identity. Free trade in agricultural products is presented not just as an economic necessity, but also as consonant with such tropes of New Zealand identity as independence, efficiency, productivity, ingenuity and flexibility.

In global trade negotiations, New Zealand is firmly on the side of the liberalisers (the Cairns Group). In keeping with a state-at-war narrative structure of globalisation, it is predisposed to see proposals for trade restrictions as the hostile acts of competing states. The New Zealand state is wary of negative market measures (restrictions based on, for instance, specific processes or spatial designations). At the same time, it embraces local specificity as a positive market measure, and seeks to leverage the positive associations of the physical space of New Zealand as a market premium and market retention strategy.


\textsuperscript{25} Goff, ‘It’s Got to Be Sheep’s Milk’, p.189.
Fundamentally, trade liberalisation is understood as an economic necessity. The challenge for the state and the agricultural sector is to present necessity as virtue. It argues, therefore, for a national identity based on innovation, pragmatism and productivity derived from the pioneering past, and seeks to marginalise alternative constructions of identity that emphasise ethical, spiritual and environmental concerns. These concerns, as they relate to environmental sustainability and genetic modification may be accepted as important national values, but they must also remain subservient to the overarching national interest: to the need to create value through innovation, to create and commercialise good ideas, and to build a politics of image, reputation and visibility.

Saskia Sassen notes that the study of globalisation has often been confined to the international, the multinational and the transnational. This chapter follows Sassen and others in asserting that ‘to a large extent global processes materialize in national territories’. The processes and practices of globalisation, that is to say, find expression within discourse structures, institutions and policy programmes at the national level. Globalisation, Sassen argues, can be found in the development inside national states … of the mechanisms necessary to accommodate the rights of global capital in what are still national territories under the exclusive control of their states. Tensions at the international level, in other words – those between the advocates and institutions of free trade and environmentalism for example - are mirrored within nation states. In this chapter I examine how traces of globalisation are found in the food policies of New Zealand governments, and how the New Zealand state mobilises an idea of the nation as a strategic response to the challenges and opportunities of globalisation.

The fifth Labour Government’s specific understanding of national identity combined with New Zealand’s distinctive position in the global economy to structure the policies that were adopted in regards to food and agriculture. This chapter examines the Government’s response to two issues of particular contemporary salience: the pursuit of environmental sustainability in agricultural production and the introduction of genetically modified

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28 Sassen, ‘Embedding the Global in the National’, p.159.
29 Sassen, ‘Embedding the Global in the National’, p.159.
organisms. Food is selected here as an ideal site in which to examine the fifth Labour Government’s nation building project because food policy foregrounds the limitations and the flexibility of the project. The centrality of the New Zealand agri-food sector to the national economy, and the centrality of export earnings to the agri-food sector constrain the ability of the Government to re-imagine national identity with regard to the sector.

**Food Policy in New Zealand**

Since ancient times, rulers, leaders and, in time, the state, have taken responsibility for ensuring a secure and stable food supply, as well as, on occasion, sponsoring expeditions to find new foods and exercising price controls. More recently, states have been concerned to ensure favourable conditions for their food exporters in global markets. State responsibility for ensuring food security was strongly re-asserted after World War Two, when policies in western, developed economies—notably the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) in Europe—were based on ensuring a secure, affordable food-supply and on ensuring farm incomes. In practice, these policies often led to massive over-production, to unsustainable farming practices and to expensive systems of subsidy and support. These outcomes provide the backdrop for contemporary debates - and potentially explosive trade battles - over the conditions of market access, food safety regulation and global food inequality.

The centrality of agriculture to New Zealand’s economic performance, and the corresponding influence of well-organised interest groups (especially Federated Farmers) have determined that no government could afford to under-support agricultural production. At the same time, no government could afford to over-support the sector. Primary production was simply too large a part of a small national economy for large-scale subsidies to be sustainable. It was necessary that the sector be productive, efficient and globally competitive, especially after the United Kingdom, traditionally a guaranteed market for the country’s agricultural surplus, turned to Europe in the 1970s. Since the mid-1980s, free-market structures were applied to agricultural production in New Zealand to an extent exceptional by international standards. Indeed, New Zealand’s ‘radical programme of scrapping agricultural subsidies’ was said to have demonstrated ‘what was

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31 Sassen, ‘Embedding the Global in the National’, p.166.
possible’. 33 Significantly, the fourth Labour Government had more freedom to act on the sector than, say, the contemporary Conservative Government in Britain, which needed to appease its core rural constituency.

New Zealand’s radical reforms were based on the argument that the farming sector, by virtue of its age and size, had become an established interest group whose claims to special treatment must be rejected in the name of ‘the national interest’. 34 The farming sector was singled out for special attention in the early days of the neoliberal reforms. Land use issues were addressed in a separate sub-volume within Treasury’s 1984 statement of intent, with the general conclusion being that subsidies to primary producers were unwarranted because they presented a ‘major cost to the nation’. 35 As state support of the farming sector was drastically reduced, and as terms of trade fell sharply, farmers and rural communities bore a heavy financial and social cost. But it is also true that organised farmers groups were not united against the general nature of the reforms. Robert Bremer, for instance, notes that Federated Farmers’ 1984 statement Agriculture: the Anchor of the Economy ‘reads like an agenda for [the neoliberal reforms].’ 36

The application of a neoliberal approach was instrumental in achieving a massive intensification of agricultural production and led to impressive output gains. Between 1990 and 2003, ‘milksolids per hectare increased by 34 percent and lambing percentage from 100 to 118 percent.’ 37 But these productivity gains were achieved in large part through the intensive use of synthetic nitrogen fertilisers and the intensive use of fresh water for irrigation. 38 As a result, New Zealand came to fit even more closely Geoffrey Lawrence’s characterisation of Australia as a country ‘reliant upon a heavily-mechanized, chemically-dependant and energy-consuming agriculture whose development is geared to

the productivity-boosting technologies of transnational agribusiness’. The policy settings that delivered productivity and efficiency gains also implied a narrow discursive frame for policy-makers. This frame was well suited to ensuring capitalist accumulation, but less able to accommodate ‘what [were] construed to be “subjective” judgments about rural community life and the environment.’

In a report prepared in 2004 for the Parliamentary Commissioner for the Environment (PCE), Lindsay Saunders and Don Ross argued that the ascendancy in the 1980s of policy settings based on market signals maximised production efficiency at the loss of consumption efficiency. On this argument, distancing agricultural production from its environmental and social setting created a sector in which financial factors had become overwhelmingly dominant in farmers’ decision-making. In contrast to the neoliberal argument that laissez faire settings would contribute to the overall national interest, Saunders and Ross argued that they simply provided ‘significant support for private gains but at an increasing cost to the loss of public goods’, primarily environmental and social. They also held that free-market settings provided producers with incentives to ‘externalise costs, either spatially, or temporally’ in their efforts to remain profitable, while simultaneously weakening the relationships, and thus the accountability for effects, between producers and consumers. Against neoliberalism’s posited compatibility of individual competition and overall public utility, Saunders and Ross argued that the ‘collaboration and collective approaches’ required for meaningful sustainability remain ‘underdeveloped in market-based systems that have seen comparative advantages from individuality and the distancing of people’.

**Food Policy under the Fifth Labour Government**

The Third Way politics of the fifth Labour Government, with its discursive embrace of social cohesion and environmental sustainability, was at least able to comprehend a

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43 See, for example, the argument along these lines in New Zealand Treasury, *Government Management*. Wellington, Government Printer, 1987, p.4.
critique of this nature. But while it was able to recognise the shortcomings of a *laissez-faire* environment, the Government was of no mind to return to a heavily interventionist model. It accepted a need to maintain production efficiency and to advance trade liberalisation in agricultural products. In consequence, it sought to balance individual incentives and property rights with a consideration of the national good and with ‘the necessity of maintaining the social conditions … under which accumulation in general can occur.’

Labour, during its decade in opposition in the 1990s, was developing an approach to agricultural policy that it hoped would be able to reconcile the individual incentives of the neoliberal reforms with a better return for the nation. In 1993 it argued that the necessary partnership between government and industry would ‘not be pursued under National’s hands off policies’ and presaged a greater state involvement in developing the infrastructure and directing the ‘public good funding’ that would add value to the food and beverage sector.

The argument was that the increased productivity enabled by the neoliberal reforms had generated sub-optimal returns in social, environmental and national economic development terms. The realities of size and distance, it was held, required something more than just de-regulation. Against the neoliberal charge that monopoly Producer Marketing Boards (PMBs) meant ‘in practice the control of some producers by others’ at a cost to the nation, Labour argued that New Zealand producers were in a prisoner’s dilemma that could best be addressed through strategic and collective effort. In keeping with this, the fifth Labour Government passed enabling legislation to facilitate the creation of Fonterra – a massive co-operative company owned by 13,000 New Zealand supplier shareholders. More broadly, the Government disbanded the Producer Board Project team which, it said, had been initiated by National to ‘try to force deregulation.’ Instead, Labour declared itself convinced that there was still a place ‘for industry

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50 See True, ‘Country Before Money?’, p.212..
institutions, with the statutory powers to overcome the problem of free riding, to provide those services which can most effectively be provided collectively. The new arrangements, it said, would not be the old monopolies, but neither would they be marked by the ‘red-blooded de-regulation’ sought by the preceding National Government.

At a more basic level, the fifth Labour Government simply signalled its desire to act on the sector. It did this in its promise to add ‘stretch’ to the sector by adding value, and to focus on branding, environmental integrity, new product development, the skill base, market access, technology, offshore representation and distribution, and investment. This was an acknowledgment that optimal national performance, reliant on environmental sustainability and commercialisable innovation, would require smart engagement rather than a hands-off approach from government. In practice, Labour’s developing approach was structured by several factors. Its primary commitment to trade liberalisation constrained its ability, for instance, to argue for global environmental standards or to assume an independent posture on GMOs. And the country’s small domestic market meant that New Zealand producers had to operate in the context of standards, prices and consumer preferences largely determined overseas.

The nature of the Government’s action on the farm sector was also influenced by the terms of its stated national vision. A discursive emphasis on economic transformation through knowledge and innovation contained the suggestion that the primary production sector could be seen as something of a sunset industry. The project’s ambivalence towards the sector was confirmed when agriculture was pointedly not nominated as one of the three priority areas within the Government’s Growth and Innovation Framework (GIF). The three priority areas (creative industries, ICT and biotechnology) were selected, it was said, on three criteria: their ability to have ‘a material impact on growth rates’, to offer global competitive advantage, and to display ‘consistency with the vision … of a global innovative New Zealand economy and be consistent with the “New

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54 Sutton, ‘Speech to Manawatu-Rangitikei branch’.
Zealand brand”. Clearly, agriculture satisfies the first two requirements. It is one of only few areas that has developed a ‘degree of scale and specialisation […] which makes it] relevant on a global scale’. Presumably it was felt that the sector, taken as a whole, did not sit well with the new national brand based around creativity and innovation. Certainly, it is peculiarly unsuited to the injunction that ‘our exports need to reduce in weight and become heavier in value.’

The agricultural sector contested its omission from the GIF. In response, and in acknowledgment of the importance of agriculture to the New Zealand economy, the Government-appointed Growth and Innovation Advisory Board (GIAB) commissioned a report from the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry (MAF) addressing the importance of agriculture and its relationship with innovation. In its report, MAF deliberately articulated the sector with the discursive structure of the Government’s focus on growth through innovation, arguing that the ‘scale of agribusiness and forestry sectors provide much of the platform and the critical mass of competencies for New Zealand’s future economic growth, for the seeding and spinning off of new entrepreneurial ventures, and for the exploitation of new biotechnology opportunities. The report asserted the centrality of agriculture in any feasible economic strategy for the country and noted that even the perception of agriculture as a ‘declining, “old economy” sector … has detrimental effects on the sector because it makes it more difficult to encourage young and skilled people’ and to attract public R&D investment. Even more pointedly, it argued that such a perception had the potential to ‘lead to distortions in resource allocations between sectors as the tax streams from agribusiness and forestry are used to subsidise more “glamorous” sectors such as tourism, film making, information technology … and yacht racing.’

MAF’s explicit coupling of agriculture with the Government’s broader growth though

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58 OPM, Growing an Innovative New Zealand, p.51.
59 OPM, Growing an Innovative New Zealand, p.51.
60 OPM, Growing an Innovative New Zealand, p.32.
62 MAF, Land-based Primary Industries, p.4.
63 MAF, Land-based Primary Industries, p.4.
innovation project confirmed that the sector would be expected to prioritise adding value through creating innovative products, services and technologies.

The fifth Labour Government’s claimed commitment to environmental sustainability meant that it had to attend to the tension between economic and environmental objectives. This tension is analogous to the one between economic and cultural goals that emerges within cultural policy. In its agriculture policy, the Government again displayed a tendency to assume that no tension exists and warned against drawing ‘an artificial distinction between economic, social and environmental policy’. But some degree of tension certainly exists. Economic imperatives in food production are largely based on individual incentives and the profit motive, whereas environmental goals draw on shared values, social knowledge and a longer time-frame. The Government, perhaps, is susceptible to Norman Fairclough’s critique of Third Way politics: that its ‘not only but also’ articulations seek to ‘achieve rhetorically’ what cannot be achieved in reality. The Government’s root assumption, in arguing for the compatibility of individual and collective goals, is that rational individuals will commit themselves to the pursuit of the national interest. For this assumption to be valid, a degree of altruism is required, and altruism, as we shall see, is largely dependant on judgments made by the potential agent about the potential recipient(s) – in this case, other New Zealanders – of the altruistic act. In short, they must be seen both as deserving and, in crucial ways, similar to the agent.

The task of constructing New Zealand as a shared community of fate, such that all New Zealanders could generate valid moral claims on each other, was central to the construction of New Zealand as a universitas, a political society united by its pursuit of a common objective. Conceiving of the state, more specifically, as a civitas cupiditatis (a corporate productive enterprise) the fifth Labour Government presented its political agenda as a shared national vision able to ground obligation and co-operation. Emphasising the agricultural sector’s contribution to the nation served to legitimate

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64 See MAF, Land-based Primary Industries, especially at pp.4-6 and p.11, but the idea of innovation is pervasive throughout the report.
ongoing state support for the sector. This move sought to marginalise internal dissent (the ethical, spiritual and environmental concerns of Maori, religious groups and the Green movement) as the work of laudable but mis-guided idealists who were, implicitly, working contrary to the shared interests of New Zealanders. The universitas’ assertion of the national scale was simultaneously able to deflect questions of global justice, such as the global equity of food provision and global environmental impacts.

In order to make global engagement politically palatable or popular, it is commonly argued that such engagement contributes to the goals of national autonomy, unity and identity. But this argument requires that the notions of autonomy, unity and identity be presented in specific ways. Autonomy, if taken literally as the capacity of an entity to give laws to itself and accept them from no other, is decreased by the ceding or delegating of significant law making powers to international bodies such as the World Trade Organisation, and by the compromises embedded in international trade and food standard agreements. Food production policy is therefore a crucial site in which we can see how a government understands and pursues the idea of national autonomy. Agriculture’s vital contribution to the New Zealand economy requires compliance with global rules and standards: New Zealand cannot easily disregard standards, norms and rules established by the World Trade Organisation. This constraint on national agency is, literally, a decreased autonomy. In response, the state can declare itself to be actively involved in establishing the terms of trade liberalisation. But New Zealand remains bound by rules that it can attempt to influence but that it does not, in the last instance, control.

Any loss of national autonomy is politically unpalatable and, in response, another conception may be offered: autonomy as purposive capacity to act. On this view, the material benefits of global engagement facilitate the state’s ability to achieve desired ends such as improved security, opportunity and living standards for New Zealanders. These outcomes, in turn, are seen as outweighing formal concerns over who is setting the rules of that engagement. Even if global economic interdependence undercuts literal autonomy, in other words, it enhances a more substantive autonomy. An autonomy, it is argued, that cannot achieve desired ends is not an autonomy much worth having. This understanding of autonomy as the national production of intended effects, or as the nation’s ability to

69 Shulman, ‘Nationalist Sources’, p.368.
carry out its own will despite resistance, are in line with definitions of power offered by Bertrand Russell, Max Weber and C. Wright Mills.

The translation of autonomy as power places less emphasis on the idea of autonomy as the ability to create and follow one’s own laws. Defining things in this way, in other words, emphasises a national power to and obscures questions of power over: questions of who, or what, is influencing the state’s decisions and who is being affected by them. Defining autonomy as power serves to occlude questions of the ways in which the state’s agency is constrained on such matters as genetic modification technology and sustainability initiatives. The benefits of global engagement may well outweigh, but they do not remove the constraints imposed on a government to determine its own course in keeping with the wishes of the polity. The risk is that policy decisions based on the pursuit of autonomy-as-economic-power will restrict a government’s ability to address a broader range of political concerns.

In keeping with the shape of its broader project, the Government has sought to argue that its approach is not just economically beneficial but also in keeping with national identity. In this instance, the pursuit of trade liberalisation is said to be consistent with quintessentially “kiwi” characteristics of independence, efficiency, productivity, ingenuity and flexibility. Such claims are best seen as a series of communitarian arguments in which various actors (actors within, beyond and including the state) strive to construct the nation. Political actors ground their policy prescriptions in considerations of national identity by utilising some markers of identity, while ignoring others. In terms discussed by Ross Bond and his collaborators, this is a process in which markers of national identity are ‘reiterated, recaptured, reinterpreted and repudiated’ by the planners of economic development as they attempt to construct a supportive national identity.

The trait of independence, for instance, is recaptured and reinterpreted, such that it can be used to ground an argument for the removal of state subsidies and trade barriers: the independence of farmers from state control. This trait, clearly, has not been invented by the fifth Labour Government. It is a genuine point of collective self-identification for many New Zealanders, and for many New Zealand farmers in particular. But the specific

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content given to the trope of independence occludes others. The ideal of independence is emphatically not, for instance, the sort of antagonistic national independence associated with the anti-nuclear moment of the 1980s.

The remainder of this chapter considers how a politics of image and visibility has influenced the Government’s response to two contemporary issues in agricultural production: the imperative of environmental sustainability, and the advent of genetic modification technology. It demonstrates how New Zealand has sought to position itself within global circuits of trade, knowledge and investment, and how it has used image and identity in this project. While globalisation generates incentives for the foregrounding of national specificity under globalisation, it remains the case that the aspects that can be emphasised are powerfully constrained by the disciplines of global neoliberalism. But if economic considerations constrain how the Government might construct its shared purpose, the resulting vision will also be contested by other actors. The agricultural sector, due to their economic centrality and access to policy-makers, have been successful in re-negotiating the broad terms of the government’s agenda (in asserting the continued relevance of agricultural production) as well as specific proposals (especially around climate-change initiatives). Eventual discursive and policy constructions, structured as they are by multiple forces, continue to hold the capacity to marginalise eccentric perspectives, such as a competing articulation of national identity or an insistence on issues of global justice.

**Environmental Sustainability**

The deregulation that was so effective in raising productivity levels in New Zealand’s agri-food sector since the 1980s was poorly suited to the job of encouraging environmental sustainability. Deregulation placed responsibility for environmental and social outcomes with individual land-owners, while the simultaneous removal of agricultural subsidies presented farmers with strong incentives to increase their production efficiency.\(^72\) A 2004 report by the Parliamentary Commissioner for the Environment (PCE) entitled *Growing for Good: Intensive Farming, Sustainability and New Zealand’s Environment* demonstrated how the resulting intensification of agricultural production had generated negative environmental outcomes.\(^73\) In effect, free-
market policy settings had generated incentives for private landowners to impose negative externalities on surrounding environments and communities. The fifth Labour Government was committed, for a range of political, ideological and economic reasons, to a broader conception of efficiency in the sector: one that could incorporate a concern for environmental and social well-being, and for New Zealand’s international image and reputation. It asserted the salience of the national scale, such that the rights of individual landowners could be tempered by the claims of other New Zealanders, and even by future generations of New Zealanders.

The Government proclaimed itself committed to the goal of sustainable development and generally accepted the influential definition of the concept as ‘development which meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs.’ But sustainable development is a contested discursive structure, and a range of explicit and implicit constructions of sustainability were utilised by a variety of political actors within, beyond and including the state. The PCE observed that sustainable management of resources depends as much on the values and beliefs of individuals and communities, as it does on specialist knowledge.

It is necessary therefore to understand the ways in which economic, environmental and ethical discourses are able to shape the values and beliefs of individuals and communities. In contemporary New Zealand conceptions of sustainable development are formed in the context of a political consensus on the benefits of trade liberalisation, of a governmental focus on economic growth through innovation, of a resource management regime predicated on the rights of individual land-owners, and of cultural norms of independence, productivity and efficiency.

In keeping with its Third Way rhetoric of reconciliation, the Labour Government’s approach to sustainable development denied that economic and environmental goals were

Matthewman notes, the reforms ‘were not necessarily a Bad Thing for the environment. During the process of rationalisation some environmentally damaging subsidies were removed.’ (Steve Matthewman, Environmental Sustainability Initiatives in Aotearoa New Zealand. Local Partnerships and Governance Research Group Research Paper Number 5, University of Auckland, 2003, p.3, n.5.)


mutually exclusive. The Government’s key document on the topic (2003’s Sustainable Development for New Zealand: Programme of Action) asserted that the ‘sustainable development approach gives us a way of thinking about [a range of economic and social] issues and finding solutions that give us the best outcomes – not just for the life of our community but also for the environment and the economy.’\(^\text{76}\) Its key statement of its economic agenda argued that ‘using sustainable development as a filter for policy means that economic policy is not approached in isolation but as part of a bigger picture’\(^\text{77}\) and, more boldly, that economic considerations would not dominate: ‘the choice of economic policy instruments will be influenced by their interaction with social and environmental factors. Sustainability will be paramount’\(^\text{78}\) (my emphasis).

The closest the Government came to acknowledging a tension between environmental and economic goals was in its 2004 promise to decouple ‘economic growth from pressures on the environment’\(^\text{79}\) and its 2003 acknowledgment that ‘innovative thinking’ would be required to ensure that ‘economic growth yields positive outcomes in the other dimensions of sustainable development.’\(^\text{80}\) Implicit in these statements is an understanding of sustainability as a rational economic strategy concerned with optimising long-term output capabilities, rather than as the imposition of limits to growth. For the Government, it is poverty, rather than capitalist development, that lays the foundation for unsustainable practices.\(^\text{81}\) Saunders and Ross argue, however, that genuine sustainability was actually impossible in a laissez faire policy environment: ‘[s]ustainability needs collaboration and collective approaches – the total opposite of current institutional incentives’\(^\text{82}\) (my emphasis). But they also stressed that their recommendations, far from being anti-market, sought to utilise ‘the very markets that continue to drive food productivity gains’ in such a way as to also incent environmental innovation.\(^\text{83}\)

\(^{76}\) DPMC, Sustainable Development for New Zealand, p.8.
\(^{77}\) OPM, Growing an Innovative New Zealand, p.23.
\(^{78}\) OPM, Growing an Innovative New Zealand, p.12.
\(^{80}\) DPMC, Sustainable Development for New Zealand, p.10
\(^{81}\) See Steve Matthewman, ‘Environmental Sustainability Initiatives’, p.12 for a discussion of the two conceptions of environmental sustainability.
\(^{82}\) Saunders and Ross, The Food Production Revolution, p.8.
\(^{83}\) Saunders and Ross, The Food Production Revolution, p.78.
Growing for Good also coupled environmental with economic goals. New Zealanders, it said, were ‘highly dependent’ on their natural capital for sustaining the country’s wealth-generating capabilities. The marketisation of the environment through such terms as “natural capital” follows the same logic as economically-founded arguments for arts and culture funding. Such arguments appeared to be the only ones audible in political discourse, and came to be employed even by environmentalists. The then Green Party co-leader, the late Rod Donald stated in 2000 that the country’s ‘natural capital needs to be acknowledged, along with our human capital’ and that New Zealand must ‘treat our non-renewable resources - the air we breathe, the water we drink, and the soil that grows our food - as assets.’ As with similar arguments for arts funding however, describing the environment in market terms is a dangerous strategy. The notion of natural capital implicitly reduces nature to its exchange value in the market. While the locution allows the environment to be valued in the market, it denies any value for it that is not recognised by the market.

Such an approach is at odds with Karl Polanyi’s insistence that nature must not be reductively understood as a commodity, or as a mere factor of production. Polanyi argues that the economic function of land is ‘but one of [its] many vital functions’ stating that the land ‘invests man’s life with stability; it is the site of his habitation; it is a condition of his physical safety; it is the landscape and the seasons’ and adding that we ‘might as well imagine his being born without hands and feet as carrying on his life without land.’ For Polanyi, understanding the environment as a commodity, an asset, or as natural capital means that this range of meanings is diminished and devalued: ‘all that is solid melts into air’, as Marx and Engels might put it. Against this sort of critique we might say, following Jeremy Waldron, that thinking about anything in terms of its exchange value does not destroy but rather amplifies its meaning. Waldron notes, for instance, that he can pay for a coffee and pastry, and be aware of their exchange value, while also enjoying their intrinsic qualities of taste, nutrition and stimulation. Waldron’s assumption is that individual choices are rational and wise. An individual, understanding the multiple values

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84 PCE, Growing for Good, p.5.
85 Rod Donald, in NZPD, 9 February 2000.
(cultural, social, historical and emotional as well as financial) of her land, is expected to make a rational choice.

Questions remain, however, as to the relationship between rational individual choices and public utility. There is no reason why rational individual landowners should factor the preferences of nearby communities or future generations into their calculations. The 1991 Resource Management Act (RMA), one of the key pieces of legislation designed to mitigate unsustainable practices, replaced a ‘wise land-use’ paradigm with an approach based on effects and outcomes and holds that ‘responsibility for achieving sustainable land management rests with individual land owners and managers.’

The New Zealand model of sustainable development in agriculture, Richard Le Heron and Michael Roche argue, is predicated on an assumption of wise, informed individual decision-makers, whereas ‘sustainability initiatives are knowledge intensive’, and knowledge is social. Waldron’s argument, then, may not fully resolve the tension between economic and environmental goals. A Polanyian perspective alerts us to the question of whether initiatives for sustainability and a stated attention to the social value of land is aimed at the protection of society against the shortcomings of *laissez-faire* settings, or simply at securing a social consensus by appearing to respond to social concerns, thus stabilising nature’s place within a market economy. The discursive construction of sustainability adopted by the fifth Labour Government is an attempt to ease tensions arising from more-market agricultural policies, but it remains structured by the logics of efficient production and free trade in the agricultural sector.

While the fifth Labour Government was nominally committed to the ideal of sustainable development, its practice was constrained by its simultaneous commitment to trade liberalisation (especially in agricultural products) and to maintaining the productive efficiency and global competitiveness of the New Zealand agricultural sector. As such, it was averse to instituting domestic regulations or supporting global standards for sustainability. While *Growing for Good*, for instance, observed with obvious approval recent policy initiatives in the European Union aimed at promoting sustainability in

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90 Le Heron and Roche, ‘Sustainability and Institution Building’, p.372.
agriculture, both the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry (MAF) and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MFAT) reacted to the EU’s sustainability initiatives with considerable alarm, arguing that such measures could easily serve ‘protectionist ends’. From MFAT’s point of view, the European proposals seemed likely to justify ongoing financial assistance to New Zealand’s competitors, as well as to provide potential grounds for restricting New Zealand food products if they were deemed to be produced in a manner not sufficiently sustainable.

Successive New Zealand governments have agreed on the importance of global trade liberalisation to the country’s economy, and New Zealand was prominent in the Uruguay Round of WTO negotiations that brought agriculture within the ambit of global trade rules. Central to this round was the recognition of the view that ‘measures ostensibly adopted by national governments to protect the health of their consumers, animals and plants could become disguised barriers to trade as well as being discriminatory. The WTO itself says that it is

only competent to deal with trade. In other words, in environmental issues its only task is to study questions that arise when environmental policies have a significant impact on trade. The WTO is not an environmental agency. Its members do not want it to intervene in national or international environmental policies or to set environmental standards. Other agencies that specialize in environmental issues are better qualified to undertake those tasks.

On the surface, the WTO is simply arguing here for a sensible division of labour according to expertise. This reading, however, ignores the fundamental asymmetry that exists between the institutions, rules and norms of the WTO and those of multilateral

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91 See especially PCE, Growing for Good, p.61, where Agenda 2000, the latest European document to continue the trend away from the Common Agricultural Policy, is said to adopt ‘[e]nvironmentally sound production methods, high standards of animal welfare, and food safety and quality concerns’ as ‘leading priorities’.
92 MAF, Land-based Primary Industries, p.3.
environmental agreements (MEAs). As Robyn Eckersley argues, this power imbalance is seen in the contrast between the powerful sanctions and rapidly developing jurisprudence of the WTO and the more fragmented form of governance of international environmental law, which lacks the WTO’s ‘coherence, reach, financial backing and organizational structure’. Even though the founding documents of the WTO ‘acknowledged environmental concerns and the objective of sustainable development’, and even though the WTO established a Committee for Trade and Environment whose objective is the ‘positive interaction between trade liberalization and environmental protection’, the inherent tensions between these two objectives have never been transcended or resolved.

For a small, trade-dependant economy like New Zealand, the WTO’s language provides a strong incentive to play things safe. Thus New Zealand’s Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry (MAF) aligned itself with the WTO’s position, arguing that ‘WTO agricultural negotiations are not the place to address technical issues … such as standards’. These labels - technical issues and standards - are applied to a group of issues that include food security, the environment and rural development, serving to de-politicise them, and subsuming them under the pursuit of a free trade presented as ‘welfare enhancing and beneficial for all participants’. Overseas advocates of initiatives for sustainability in food production deploy the notion of the Multifunctional Character of Agriculture and Land (MFCAL), which argues that ‘agricultural systems … have always fulfilled more than just their primary aim of producing food, fibre and fuel’ and seeks to encompass ‘the entire range of environmental, economic and social functions associated with agriculture and related land-use.’ In global trade negotiations, this position is represented by the European dominated Friends of Multifunctionality. New Zealand is part of the opposed Cairns Group, which is committed to the liberalisation of agricultural trade and considers that the ‘concept [of multifunctionality] is artificial and designed merely to justify the continuation of high levels of support’. It holds that ‘while countries may have non-trade

97 On this point see also Duncan Brack and Kevin Gray, Multilateral Environmental Agreements and the WTO. London, The Royal Institute of International Affairs, 2003, especially pp.40,41.
98 MAF, Land-based Primary Industries, p.3.
99 MAF, Land-based Primary Industries, p.32.
concerns, these concerns, however legitimate they may be, must not take priority over the objective’ of trade liberalization reform.¹⁰¹

New Zealand’s national identity is routinely imagined to include a fundamental commitment to the environment. And it is certainly true that globalisation affords the country new opportunities to foreground and leverage this element, both in the marketing of its food and beverages and in its tourist promotions. But it is precisely a clean, green image, rather than a clean, green reality that is being presented. Claudia Bell notes that posters at a New Zealand airport describe sniffer dogs not as protecting our ‘clean green environment’ but our ‘clean, green image’.¹⁰² Priority is given here to protecting not the land but the brand. As the Government proclaimed its intention to leverage the difference of Maori for the good of the nation, it also positioned the natural environment as ‘[c]entral to New Zealand’s unique value in the world’.¹⁰³ It may well be that considerations of foreign perceptions and branding opportunities compel New Zealand to pay more attention to the reality of environmental degradation. The point is that the current discursive environment dictates that this attention will only be given if it is profitable, in the short or the long term. This economic reductionism amounts to doing “as much as necessary, as little as possible” – to the possible detriment of local communities and indigenous values.

The themes of global national interests, sustainability and national identity come together in the notion of “food miles” – simply the distance that an item of food travels prior to its consumption – which gained a good deal of local prominence in 2007. While the concept is certainly not new, it has become a highly salient issue in New Zealand recently due to specific and critical attention being paid to New Zealand agricultural products within the British and European marketplaces. Influential British journalist and author George Monbiot envisaged a future ‘where a majority of people will think it’s obscene to import apples from New Zealand when our own apples are rotting on the ground’,¹⁰⁴ British MP

¹⁰² Claudia Bell, ‘Sustaining the Clean, Green Myth’. Public lecture at the University of Auckland, 30 July 2002.
Stephen Byers singled out New Zealand kiwifruit in his case for an import tax based on food miles, and UK company Dairy Crest produced an advertisement which coupled its New Zealand competitor Anchor with an image of a ‘rusty-looking container ship sailing on a sludgy sea beneath grey skies’.  

This increased attention caused Helen Clark to note in 2007 that in ‘our high-value markets in Europe, we face increasing pressure on our trade and tourism from competitors who are all too ready to use [our remote location] against us’.  

The New Zealand agricultural sector – and by extension the wider economy and the state – are particularly sensitive to such pressure. The country’s physical location as the ‘most remote developed country in the world relative to international markets’ means that it is uniquely vulnerable to taxes or barriers based on distance. Even in the absence of formal trade barriers, consumer preferences against food from such a remote location remain a serious concern. So while Associate Minister of Agriculture Damien O’Connor dismissively rejected calls in parliament by the Green Party in 2005 to recognise the notion of food miles, the attention given to the concept in key overseas markets more recently has generated a fuller and more aggressive response. Since 2007, New Zealand producers, politicians, researchers and journalists have portrayed food miles as a ‘very simplistic concept’ that is ‘misleading as it does not consider total energy use, especially in the production of the product.’ The concept also does not take into account the way in which the food miles are travelled: sea-freight (the mode by which almost all of the country’s primary produce is exported) generates vastly less emissions than air-freight, for example. Politicians concluded that the concept was being used ‘by self interested

107 As are other specific sectors, notably the tourism industry and the exporting sector.
110 Damien O’Connor, in NZPD, 7 April 2005.
112 Saunders et al, Food Miles, p.vii.
113 Barnett, ‘Not Buying It’.
parties trying to justify protectionism in another guise’ rather than being motivated by ‘genuine environmental concerns’.\textsuperscript{114}

In its third term (since 2005) Labour has placed greater discursive emphasis on New Zealand’s environmental record. This was especially apparent in Clark’s 2007 Prime Minister’s Statement, in which she argued that New Zealand’s ‘quest for sustainability and carbon neutrality will define our nation’.\textsuperscript{115} The context for political action around sustainability had certainly changed between 1999 and 2007, but it is notable that the fifth Labour Government did not make its articulation of sustainability and national identity so forcefully during its first seven years in office. It had shown little enthusiasm, moreover, for strengthening the environmental regulatory framework, which is seen as exceptionally light in an international context.\textsuperscript{116} It would not be accurate, however, to claim that the Government had taken no action in terms of advancing environmental sustainability. It established the Sustainable Farming Fund to offer funding to small-scale projects that sought to ensure the social, economic, and environmental viability of rural communities.\textsuperscript{117} The Fund’s annual budget of around $10 million became part of the ‘core funding of Vote Agriculture and Forestry’ in 2005, offering it a degree of future certainty.\textsuperscript{118} And Crown Research Institutes (CRIs) were mandated to ‘enhance productivity in balance with environmental needs.’\textsuperscript{119} But efforts towards sustainability remained framed in the functional terms of ensuring the agricultural sector’s ‘sustainability and profitability.’\textsuperscript{120}

\textsuperscript{114} Cited in Phil Goff, ‘Food Miles Research’.
\textsuperscript{115} Clark, ‘Prime Minister’s Statement [2007]’. Political commentator Colin James noted that Clark had articulated national identity and a response to climate change in a range of contexts in late 2006, and predicted that this coupling would feature in her 2007 Prime Minister’s Statement. See Colin James, ‘A (maybe) sustainable idea for Waitangi week [James’s New Zealand Herald column for 6 February 2007]’. Retrieved 30 July 2007 from http://www.colinjames.co.nz/herald/Herald_2007/Herald_column_07Feb06.htm
\textsuperscript{116} This point was made by most of the experts assembled in a panel called ‘Northern Hemisphere Perspectives’ during at the “PCE20: Advancing Environmental Sustainability” forum. Sound recording of the panel retrieved 13 June 2007 http://www.radionz.co.nz/podcasts/advancingsustainability.rss
\textsuperscript{118} Sutton, ‘Sustainable Farming Fund’.
The depth of the Government’s commitment to promoting sustainability must remain in question, given the continuing absence of robust measures and methods of evaluation.\textsuperscript{121} This point, made in 2003 by Steve Matthewman, was repeated as late as 2007 by the PCE’s Senior Researcher Bruce Taylor and other speakers at a forum called “PCE20: Advancing Environmental Sustainability” that marked twenty years of the PCE.\textsuperscript{122} Challenged on this point, O’Connor conceded that the Government was not involved in calculating the cost of the negative environmental impacts of agriculture, before resorting to a mixture of economism and pure rhetoric: ‘I do know that this country and this economy depend upon the billions of dollars earned through sound, environmentally sustainable agricultural production in New Zealand.’\textsuperscript{123}

In keeping with Sassen’s argument that ‘to a large extent global processes materialize in national territories’,\textsuperscript{124} the asymmetries discussed above between global environmental agreements and global trade agreements are mirrored within the national space of New Zealand. The PCE’s advocacy of environmental sustainability, and the Government’s rhetorical commitment to the concept never fully engage with the reality that New Zealand is prominent among those fighting for environmental standards to be kept\textsuperscript{out of} trade agreements. The PCE is an office with no legislative power. As such, it cannot easily compete with the Government’s free-trade agenda and the weight of powerful ministries such as MAF and MFAT. Rather, it derives such influence as it has from the strength of its arguments, and its ability to strategically align its own recommendations with the general structure of the Government’s political project. To this end, it describes sustainable solutions, as ‘high value’, ‘knowledge intensive’ and ‘innovative’.\textsuperscript{125}

A policy environment in which decisions are made by individuals responding to market signals is an unpromising one for environmental sustainability, given the spatial and temporal dispersion of environmental degradation. Fundamentally, sustainability relies on a degree of altruism: the willingness to forego personal benefit for the good of another, or others. Public policy is, to a large extent, engaged with balancing individual rights and freedoms with a calculation of overall public utility – with legislating altruism, in a

\textsuperscript{121} Steve Matthewman, ‘Environmental Sustainability Initiatives’.
\textsuperscript{122} See especially ‘The State of the Environment’ panel, a sound recording of which retrieved 13 June 2007 from http://www.radionz.co.nz/podcasts/advancingsustainability.rss
\textsuperscript{123} O’Connor, in NZPD, 7 April 2005.
\textsuperscript{124} Sassen, ‘Embedding the Global in the National’, p.159.
\textsuperscript{125} PCE, Growing for Good, pp.28-29, although similar references can be found throughout the report.
The laws and institutions of public policy therefore, if they are to be popularly supported, must be consistent with a widespread sentiment of altruism. As David Miller demonstrates, key factors in determining the likelihood of altruism are judgments made about the beneficiary of the altruistic act. Specifically, the extent to which the beneficiary is seen to be similar to the prospective altruist, and the extent to which they are seen to be deserving rather than responsible for their fate seem to be important.

Sustainable development, to be an effective and compelling ideal, requires two things: the acceptance of a national ethical horizon such that imposing negative externalities on co-nationals becomes unacceptable, and the creation of an extended ethical time horizon, such that future generations can be included in this set of relevant persons. On Miller’s view, a large part of the justification for nations and nationalism is found precisely here – in the nation’s ability to generate feelings of loyalty, patriotism, and of belonging to a community of fate. His argument is that nations are ‘ethical communities’ whereby ‘I owe special obligations to fellow members of my nation which I do not owe to other human beings.’ The nation, moreover, is well suited to the task of constructing a shared community which can be imagined as continuing through time, creating the sort of elongated time frame required by the norm of sustainability.

For sustainability initiatives to gain traction in New Zealand, farmers must accept that the needs and wants of fellow New Zealanders (including future generations of New Zealanders) can be said to impose obligations on them, such that they may rightly be asked to forego a part of their potential profit. They must embrace what the Government describes as a ‘partnership approach’ based on ‘trust and understanding’, the purpose of which is to ‘combine efforts and resources towards common aims’. From this perspective, sustainability initiatives are based on unstable ground. Tan Copsey, in his

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126 See Miller, ‘Are They My Poor?’, pp.119-120, for a discussion of this point.
128 These two things are incorporated in Labour’s Sustainable Development Programme of Action, which names ‘significant impacts across the social, economic, environmental and cultural spheres’ and ‘inter-generational effects on wellbeing’ as important elements of sustainable development. (DPMC, Sustainable Development for New Zealand, p.12).
131 DPMC, Sustainable Development for New Zealand, p.11.
analysis of the development of climate change policy in New Zealand, notes that Federated Farmers have been ‘highly active in opposing government climate change policy’ due, he argues, to ‘the inclusion, within the Kyoto agreement, of a broad range of greenhouse gases, including those specifically associated with farming.’\textsuperscript{132} When the Government made a formal announcement on regulatory measures (a cap-and-trade scheme) to address climate change in September 2007, the farming sector was exempted from participation until 2013,\textsuperscript{133} even though it was the most significant sector in terms of emissions.

The erosion of the belief that all New Zealanders are inherently “like us”, moreover, was graphically demonstrated in the rural / urban split in the 2005 general election and in the heated farmer protests against Government proposals to guarantee public (read non-farmer) access across farmlands, leading to the unprecedented move of five Federated Farmers branches calling for the resignation of the Minister of Agriculture.\textsuperscript{134} Further, the underpinnings of altruism are challenged by the norms of the knowledge economy and the knowledge society, which hold individuals responsible for their own success and, therefore, for their own failure. Simply put, core tenets of the knowledge society – individual responsibility and rewards, the construction of New Zealand as a global community of talent rather than a geographical space, talent moving globally according to market forces and unconstrained by attachments of tradition and loyalty – are only partially consistent with the patterns of thought required for sustainable development.


\textsuperscript{134} See National MP David Carter, in NZPD, 8 March 2005.
In the lead-up to the 2002 general election, the Green Party stated that their post-election support for any government would be conditional on the continuation of a moratorium on the release of genetically engineered organisms beyond its scheduled finish in the November of 2003. This ultimatum was no small matter for the incumbent Labour Party: the left-leaning Greens appeared to be a natural ally, and it seemed that their support would be important in the proportional representation electoral system. Further, Labour might have been expected to be receptive to the Green’s stance, given that it continued to get political mileage out of both its independent stance on foreign policy and its association with the anti-nuclear legislation enacted in the mid 1980s by the previous Labour administration. However, Labour emphatically rejected the Greens’ bottom-line, insisting that the moratorium would be lifted on schedule. Pressed on this issue in an interview at the time, Helen Clark offered the following justification for Labour’s position:

As a party we have set out to get economic growth, to have our economy driven by science, skilled knowledgeable people, upmarket industries. Now if I’m to say to the New Zealand primary production sector, ‘excuse me, there may be advantages in gene technology, we don’t know, but you’ll never be able to use them. If there are advantages, your competitors will be able to, and they’ll go ahead, but you’ll never be able to because we’ve got the Greens who say we’ve got to have a moratorium.’ Do you want New Zealand to be taken seriously or become a backwater?

Clark’s statement set out the major factors that structured the Government’s policy on genetic engineering (GE): the country’s reliance on international competitiveness in, and market access for primary products, the Government’s strategy of achieving growth

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135 Although genetically modified (GM) and genetically modified organism (GMO) are the more common terms internationally, and even though the public debate in New Zealand coalesced around the Royal Commission on Genetic Modification, genetic engineering (GE) is truer to common usage in New Zealand. It is certainly used more commonly by opponents, perhaps because genetic engineering carries slightly more sinister overtones than modification (as per moral panics of governmental social engineering) and perhaps simply because GE-Free is a better sounding slogan than GM-Free.

through science and innovation, and its politics of image and reputation. The argument is that New Zealand’s national autonomy – understood as its ability to achieve desired ends – relied on national economic viability and that this, in turn, required that New Zealand be placed strategically within global flows of trade, investment, ideas and talented people. The specificity of this conception of autonomy can be seen by comparing it with an earlier enactment of national autonomy: the banning of nuclear-powered and nuclear weapons capable ships from New Zealand waters in 1985 by the fourth Labour Government.

In passing the anti-nuclear legislation - the high profile result of which was the banning of a United States warship from New Zealand waters – David Lange’s Government simultaneously drew on and enacted New Zealanders’ self-identification as principled underdogs unafraid to assume an independent stance. This stance was narrated in heroic terms. Deputy Prime Minister Geoffrey Palmer claimed that Labour’s anti-nuclear policy would ‘provide hope for the world’, adding that while New Zealand was a small country, it was still entitled to ‘make one small step for mankind.’ 137 On the face of it, the public debate over genetic modification in 2001 could have developed along similar lines. It developed, however, and was managed politically, in a very different way. Labour did not utilise the ethical, environmental and national independence discourses that had been so resonant fifteen years earlier. The negative connotations of these discourses – simple, backwards, parochial – were seen as the opposite of those characteristics – innovation, global connectedness, creativity – required by the fifth Labour Government’s economic agenda and its construction of a new New Zealand identity.

In 1985, the anti-nuclear policy was taken as incidental, or even as politically expedient, by the powerful neoliberal reform bloc within the Government. In either case, the legislation did not undermine their basic project. The situation in 2001 with genetic modification could not have been more different. Biotechnology had been identified as one of three priority areas in its programme of economic transformation, 138 and was seen as a key component in the construction of an economy built on commercialisable innovation. In 1985, security and trade considerations were effectively de-coupled. By 2001, trade had come to permeate all calculations of government. Given the

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137 In NZPD Volume 460, p.2906, 12 February 1985.
138 OPM, Growing an Innovative New Zealand, pp.49-54.
Government’s focus on trade liberalisation and market access, a ban on a contested category of goods was almost unimaginable. Reaching over the public debate were considerations not just of economic advantage but of ‘New Zealand’s international reputation and credibility’ as an innovative and knowledgeable member of the international community’ (my emphasis). A ban on the use and development of GE would, it was said, move New Zealand off the leading edge of the knowledge wave, drive its most creative and innovative scientists overseas, and present the country as backward and parochial to the rest of the world.

The GE debate in New Zealand thus took place in the context of significant constraints on government action. Given the political unpopularity of the idea that trade considerations limit New Zealand’s capacity for autonomous action, the Government had an incentive to argue that the anti-nuclear and the GE issues were of an entirely different type, scope and scale. Thus, in a television interview prior to the 2002 election, Helen Clark complained, ‘I can’t understand why anyone draws a parallel. Anti-nuclear was about saving the planet from catastrophe. GE is about what you eat. There can be no comparison [laughs].’

The national autonomy asserted by the anti-nuclear moment of the mid-1980s was an autonomy understood as the capacity of a nation to refuse the dictates of an external power. It was, in effect, a rejection of the international common-sense of nuclear deterrence and power blocs; an independent and oppositional autonomy that constituted a strong us contra them dichotomy.

The autonomy asserted by the Government’s stance on GE was an autonomy equated with the economic success that would facilitate the nation’s ability to achieve its desired ends. It was an autonomy based not on isolationism but on consciously placing New Zealand within international flows of technology, ideas, investment, talent, goods and services. Clark’s re-assertion in 2007 of environmentalist concerns as a defining part of New Zealand’s national identity explicitly invoked the nation-defining work performed by ‘our quest for a nuclear-free world … over the past 23 years’. But the Government's coupling of environmentalism with national identity was not based on isolationism. It can

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140 TVNZ, *One News Election Special*.
141 Clark, ‘Prime Minister’s Statement [2007]’.
be read, rather, as a rhetorical tool to keep New Zealand within global flows, in terms of, inter alia, agricultural exports and tourism.

The Government’s economic agenda and national branding project, which had an ambivalent relationship with the agricultural sector generally, enthusiastically embraced the nascent biotechnology sector. Given the Government’s desire for an economy focused on creating value through innovative goods and services that could overcome the organic barriers of time and space and that could present the country as ‘technologically advanced, creative, and successful’, a certain degree of support for GE was inevitable. Gene technology could be presented as pure knowledge – spaceless, weightless, transportable and valuable. It was uniquely suited – as the traditional farming sector was uniquely unsuited – to the injunction that the nation’s exports ‘reduce in weight and become heavier in value’. The Government noted that the 21st century had already been dubbed the biotechnology century, and saw innovation in biotechnology as offering significant global opportunities. Whereas food production had traditionally challenged the processes of industrialisation and capital accumulation by its organic nature, recent technological developments in the modification of seeds - ‘the “delivery system” of the new plant biotechnologies’ and the relatively new legal possibility of asserting intellectual property rights (IPRs) in genetic material had presented new opportunities for private profit-making. The creation of intellectual property rights in gene and seed technology was clearly a better fit with Government policy than the export of lamb carcasses and milk solids.

The public debate over genetic modification was mediated by the Government-appointed (but politically independent) Royal Commission on Genetic Modification (RCGM). The RCGM’s approach and eventual conclusions were signalled in its report’s opening sentences:

Genetic modification … holds exciting promise, not only for conquering diseases, eliminating pests and contributing to the

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142 Clark, ‘Prime Minister’s Statement [2002]’, in NZPD, 12 February 2002
143 OPM, Growing an Innovative New Zealand, p.32.
144 OPM, Growing an Innovative New Zealand, p.54, where it is citing the RCGM report.
145 Goodman et al., From Farming to Biotechnology, p.1.
146 Goodman et al, From Farming to Biotechnology, p.108.
knowledge economy, but for enhancing the international competitiveness of the primary industries so important to our country’s economic well-being.\textsuperscript{147}

Opponents of genetic modification were thus positioned as enemies of progress, knowledge and national development, and as the friends of disease and pests. Nonetheless, the RCGM had heard a great deal of public disquiet on a range of issues and devoted much time to a consideration of human and environmental health, the concentration of profits, national image, and cultural, ethical and spiritual values. In reconciling the benefits and the perceived downsides of GE, the RCGM’s core recommendations were that New Zealand should preserve opportunities and manage risks.\textsuperscript{148}

Advocates and opponents of GE tended to speak similar languages in the consultation process.\textsuperscript{149} Both argued that their preferred approach would generate economic advantage and reinforce a desirable national identity. In economic terms, advocates of GE technology argued that ‘New Zealand’s future can only be assured if it can develop new competitive products and services able to capture premium prices because of the nation’s ability to innovate’.\textsuperscript{150} They noted the ‘potential outcome of high-value, niche-market products and better positioning of New Zealand in the global economy’\textsuperscript{151} and argued that embracing GE technology would benefit New Zealand by creating jobs as part of the knowledge economy and by making New Zealand a more attractive target for international talent and investment. In sum, they argued that if New Zealand was to opt out of GE, it would be turning its back on everything that the Government’s economic

\textsuperscript{147} RCGM, Reports and Recommendations, p.2.
\textsuperscript{148} RCGM, Reports and Recommendations, p.2.
\textsuperscript{149} The RCGM Report was presented in four volumes: a main volume called Reports and Recommendations supported by three volumes of appendices describing the procedures for and the results of public consultation. The (roughly self-explanatory) titles of the appendices were Appendix I: Context and Process, Appendix II: Outcomes of Consultation: Submissions from Interested Persons and Appendix III: Outcomes of Consultation: Submissions from the Public. The “Interested Persons” (IPs) consulted with in Appendix II were 107 groups, many of whom were industry networks and associations, and almost 11,000 public submissions, most of which were from individuals, were summarised in Appendix III. The IPs were generally supportive of GE. The number “strongly for” (47\%) or “tends to be for” (12\%) almost doubled those “Strongly against” (19\%) or “Tends to be against” (11\%) (Appendix II, pp.26,27). By contrast, the number of public submissions “strongly against” (64.8\%) or “tends to be against” (27.3\%) overwhelmed those “Strongly for” (0.7\%) or “Tends to be for” (1.2\%) (Appendix III, p.40).
\textsuperscript{150} RCGM, Reports and Recommendations, p.78.
\textsuperscript{151} RCGM, Reports and Recommendations, p.78.
transformation agenda claimed to value. Along similar lines, opponents spoke of the financial value of New Zealand’s clean, green image, and of the potential of an emerging organic produce sector, arguing that the adoption of GE would negate the country’s ability to leverage value from these things.  

Weighing up these mutually exclusive positions, the RCGM report advocated ‘using genetic modification technology selectively, in a way that does not threaten New Zealand’s “clean, green” image.’ Again, it was the image (rather than the reality) of New Zealand as a clean, green country that was to be acknowledged and protected. Further, many dissenting voices spoke of the image-related problems that the release of GE technology would create for New Zealand’s tourism as well as food exports, and some argued explicitly that ‘pluralist’ or ‘mixed marketing’ strategies may not be credible. Yet the report’s recommendations overlooked these objections, tacitly asserting that using GE technology ‘selectively’ would not harm either food exports, or the wider clean green brand.

In terms of national identity, GE advocates argued that the adoption of the technology was consistent with the construction of a suitable national identity, and a way in which national characteristics such as flexibility, innovation and pragmatism could be made to work in a globalised world. They held that utilising GE would enhance ‘New Zealand’s international reputation and credibility as an innovative and knowledgeable member of the international community’. Such claims, while endorsed by the Government, implicitly required the suppression of other readings of national identity, such as those built on independence from foreign control or on a pseudo-spiritual attachment to the environment. Traces of the asymmetries identified in the preceding section between trade agreements and environmental preservation resurfaced in the GE debate. The global trade norm that any trade restrictions must be based on rigorous scientific assessment (rather than cultural or political considerations) is echoed in the RCGM’s explicit distinction between facts and values and its subsequent marginalisation of values. The privileging

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152 RCGM, Reports and Recommendations, pp.94-98.
153 RCGM, Reports and Recommendations, p.332.
154 See, especially RCGM, Reports and Recommendations, pp.94-98.
155 RCGM, Reports and Recommendations, pp.96-97.
156 RCGM, Reports and Recommendations, pp.332-333.
157 RCGM, Appendix II, p.170.
158 On this point see RCGM, Reports and Recommendations, p.24.
of facts over values made deontological or identity-based arguments subservient to the “facts” of objective risk and economic advantage. This approach dictated that a conclusion based on these facts would be adopted, and a supportive national identity constructed around it, rather than the other way round. This can be seen as the application of a neoliberal rationality of government, in which political and moral issues are recast as technical problems admissible of empirical calculation.\textsuperscript{159}

The adoption of GE was seen not just as a strategy for economic development but as a strategy for \textit{national} economic development. One submission argued that ‘[i]f \textit{New Zealand} can create ideas, which have intellectual property protection … then the potential revenues to \textit{New Zealand} of commercialising those ideas are often significant.’\textsuperscript{160} Another held that GE technology would benefit \textit{all New Zealanders} because of its positive impact on the national economy, and the resultant increase in our standard of living. Conversely, ‘if \textit{we} turned away from genetic modification \textit{our country} would lose ground to the developed nations of the world, and \textit{we would all} be subjected to a decline in \textit{our quality of life}’\textsuperscript{161} (my emphases throughout). Such arguments assumed that significant revenues would remain in New Zealand, even if the investment came from abroad. For this to be true, intellectual property rights (IPRs) would have to remain in local ownership, and the simple act of allowing GE technology into the country is necessary but not sufficient to generate this situation. Secondly, the assertion of national benefits posits a universal aspect that obscures questions of how these benefits would be distributed. While arguments for national benefit clearly presuppose the salience of national borders, they also acknowledge the importance of global flows. Labour’s qualified embrace of GE represented the pursuit of national autonomy by positioning the New Zealand agricultural sector within global flows of ideas, technology and capital. But for this coupling of national autonomy and economic dynamism to be plausible, it was necessary to overlook the ways in which New Zealand’s international obligations, and its vulnerable position within the global economy placed constraints on its capacity for autonomous decisions and action.

In this context, it is relevant that the lengthy discussion in the report’s appendices of the constraints imposed on New Zealand by its international obligations was almost entirely

\textsuperscript{159} Ong, \textit{Neoliberalism as Exception}, p.4.
\textsuperscript{160} David Parker, for A2 Corporation, quoted in RCGM, \textit{Reports and Recommendations}, p.94.
\textsuperscript{161} New Zealand Biotechnology Association, quoted in ibid., p.79.
absent from the main report. The RCGM was required by its enabling warrant to address the ‘international implications, in relation to both New Zealand’s binding international obligations and New Zealand’s foreign and trade policy, of any measures that New Zealand might take with regard to genetic modification’. In relation to this issue, the question of national sovereignty and autonomy emerged as the most important in submissions from ‘interested persons.’ Some submissions argued that any ‘international obligations that hindered or prevented the New Zealand government protecting the interests of its citizens had to be renegotiated or reassessed’ while others noted that non-compliance would carry heavy risks to New Zealand’s trade. The discussion of international obligations and sovereignty mainly centred on the obligations generated by New Zealand’s commitment to WTO rules. The RCGM offered the background that New Zealand was not a passive victim of these rules but one of their active architects, and noted the Government’s concern that ‘measures ostensibly adopted by national governments to protect the health of their consumers, animals and plants could become disguised barriers to trade.’

There was considerable disagreement within the submissions on the moral weight of New Zealand’s international trade obligations. Submissions from industry and other GE advocates generally stressed that ‘only scientific evidence’ would provide an acceptable basis for restricting trade. Submissions opposed to GE, on the other hand, took a broader view, arguing that the protection of the environment and public health also provided valid grounds. The “precautionary principle”, derived from the Rio Declaration was invoked, and some submissions noted that ‘regard to non-trade concerns, including … the need to protect the environment’ was enshrined in the WTO’s ‘Agreement on Agriculture’ that emerged out of the Uruguay Round. In the final analysis, the scope provided for by these statements and by the precautionary principle carried little weight in

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162 This discussion occurs in several places but see, for a good example, RCGM, Appendix II, pp.161-163.
163 RCGM, Appendix I, p.159.
164 RCGM, Appendix II, p.160.
165 RCGM, Appendix II, p.163.
166 RCGM, Appendix II, p.161.
167 RCGM, Appendix I, p.22.
168 RCGM, Appendix I, p.34.
169 RCGM, Appendix II, p.162.
170 RCGM, Reports and Recommendations, p.65.
the report. The risks of how a ban based on these principles might be perceived by New Zealand’s trade partners, or even how a pretended perception might be utilised were great, regardless of the scientific or moral virtues of the ban.

The stance of successive New Zealand governments on trade issues clearly structured the ways in which policies on GE could develop. The political consensus on the desirability of trade liberalisation held that New Zealand should be very careful about instituting trade restrictions not based on an irrefutable scientific risk. The view that it was in New Zealand’s interests to honour its WTO commitments took precedence in the report over the counter views that membership of the WTO did not and ought not to oblige New Zealand to ‘compromise or to accept processes or products that were contrary to the ethical, spiritual and cultural values of New Zealanders.’ In the RCGM’s final report, this hotly contested debate over the value, nature and implications of New Zealand’s international obligations was referred to only briefly. Specifically, the connection made by many submissions between New Zealand’s international obligations and an erosion of its sovereignty was not re-traced. The possibility of New Zealand re-assessing or re-negotiating its commitments was not raised. And the precautionary principle was not invoked during a discussion that understood New Zealand as powerless to resist the entry of GE into the country.

The dissenting voices in the appendices suggested that the inability to restrict trade on the basis of ethical or cultural considerations amounted to an erosion of national sovereignty. But supporters of GE also aligned their arguments with a version of sovereignty; one based on the positive freedoms that arise from economic progress, scientific freedom and global connectedness. Dissent over how sovereignty should be imagined echoes the divergence of views in the anti-nuclear debate in the mid-1980s, where sovereignty was said to either be exercised in the banning of nuclear ships, or guaranteed by the protection of powerful allies. What this suggests is that the language of sovereignty may be of limited utility in thinking about the GE issue. Politics, as Stanley Benn and Richard Peters point out, is ‘the interplay of pressures, rather than the assertion of sovereign will.’ The sovereign never has a free hand, and the image of a determinate sovereign ruling over all and restrained by none is seriously misleading. The state’s supreme power *de jure* is

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172 RCGM, Appendix II, p.163.
somewhat beside the point in the international context where state and non-state actors wield vast power *de facto*. Because it seems odd to speak of these agents and structures as exercising sovereignty over New Zealand, it might be better to revert to a plainer word: power, the ability to achieve one’s goals despite resistance.

The fifth Labour Government has continued to derive political mileage from its historical association with the anti-nuclear legislation, but its embrace of free trade and the knowledge economy has over-ridden its environmentalism in a number of actions in international fora. Citing three NGOs present at negotiations on the United Nations Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety, the Green Party accused the New Zealand representatives of ‘continuing to block consensus on key provisions’ regarding information and labelling requirements and of opposing a system of strict liability for the transnational movement of GM products. The Government attempted to evade these accusations, but some of its evasions were revealing. Environment Minister Marian Hobbs, for example, stated that New Zealand had ratified the Cartagena Protocol because doing so put us inside the tent, allowing us to influence the development of the rules - not to sign up to the rules, but to take part in the development of the rules - to protect our economic interests as an agricultural exporter. This means ensuring that rules do not become a barrier to trade.

This governmental action was little publicised in New Zealand. The same is true of New Zealand acting, in 2003, as a third party to a US suit to the WTO against the EU’s *de facto* moratorium on GMOs, an action decried by the Green Party as a ‘shameful case that is attempting to force the Europeans to accept GE organisms against their will’. One would search a long time to find a Government speech or press release that celebrates these actions, or that defends the charge that it supported changing the rules for “terminator technology” in modified seeds. The only response the Government could

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176 Fitzsimons, ‘Govt Dodges Questions’.
plausibly make was that its job is to safeguard and promote the country’s ‘economic interests as an agricultural exporter.’ Unlike the anti-nuclear policy, this is not iconic, nation-defining stuff. In terms of agricultural and trade policy, national identity is subservient to national interest. Indeed, the language of national identity falls silent at such moments, except insofar as an attractive identity needs to be projected to a global audience: ‘Do you want New Zealand to be taken seriously or become a backwater?’ in Helen Clark’s words. Counter-discourses of identity based on environmental, ethical or spiritual concerns are negated by an objectivist consequentialism held to be either value-free or in keeping with a flexible, creative, innovative national identity.

**Food Policy and (small) National Identity**

Political actors typically attempt to present their policy prescriptions as consonant with national values. But policy, as Cris Shore and Susan Wright argue, is a cultural agent capable not just of reflecting but of constructing national identity. This dual process is encapsulated in Homi Bhabha’s idea that political actors are engaged in ‘narrating the nation’ in a ‘double-time’ in which the nation is simultaneously assumed and constituted. Within this process, the nation’s people are, in Bhabha’s terms, both the historical ‘objects’ of a nationalist pedagogy and ‘the 'subjects' of a process of signification’. They are, in Roxanne Doty’s related terms, both the presumed, pre-given members of the political community and the effect of ‘a complex rhetorical strategy of social reference’. The nation is at once the justification for, and the product of policy; it is at once ancient and modern, solid and in flux. In such practices, one’s political opponents can be positioned as contrary to the tenets of the nation. They are, in a common local accusation, “anti-kiwi”. Opposing sides in debate over environmental sustainability and GE claim their positions to be consonant with New Zealand identity by appealing to

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179 TVNZ, *One News Election Special*
183 The example, par excellence of this point, is to be found in one of National’s pre-election billboards of 2005. Part of a red-and-blue billboard series, this one, under the question “Who owns the Beaches?” offered two answers: “Iwi”, on the red/labour side, “Kiwi” on the blue/National side. But the charge was commonly heard in 2005 – prominently in the debate over rights of public access to farmland. (Radio New Zealand, Morning Report, 14 June 2005).
specific elements of that identity and ignoring others. At the same time, their aim is to
enact and consolidate their preferred definitions of New Zealand identity.

In continuity with the history of settler capitalism in New Zealand, the fifth Labour
Government’s self-proclaimed ‘passion for economic transformation’\(^{184}\) carries with it a
passion for a transformation in national identity. Rather than simply communicating an
already existing national identity to the world, the Government’s nation-building project
has sought to construct a new national identity around the attitudes and behaviours
deemed necessary for economic competitiveness. New Zealanders, therefore, are
addressed as smart, innovative, confident and globally focussed. In this project, specific
policies narrate the nation in double time. The qualified acceptance of GE and the
definition of environmental sustainability according to criteria of trade norms and
economic viability both assume and constitute a certain vision of the nation – New
Zealand as pragmatic, efficient and productive.

The fifth Labour Government’s stance towards GE could – theoretically at least – have
developed along 1984 anti-nuclear lines. A firm stand against GE could have drawn on
the same elements of national identity: a pseudo-spiritual attachment to nature and the
land; a pride in clean, green produce, and an independent defiance of corporate control,
for instance. In time this stance, like the anti-nuclear policy, could have become part of
New Zealand’s international identity. Admittedly, such a course would necessarily have
omitted other elements of national identity: pride in agricultural innovation and a desire
for economic opportunities, for instance. But – and this is the point – these tropes were
effectively marginalised in 1985 and (to a much lesser degree) in the more recent
adoption of the Kyoto Protocol on climate change. The anti-nuclear policy was presented
as an instance of autonomous action and independence that enacted New Zealand’s ability
to opt out of global “sphere of influence” politics. Labour’s position on GE, however, was
explicitly defended as positioning New Zealand within international flows of talent, ideas
and capital. Its language on the issue drew on ‘deep time’ narratives of New Zealand’s
history of innovation and pragmatism in agricultural production; while also fulfilling a
‘constant renewal’ performative function\(^{185}\) as it emphasised those tropes and
marginalised alternatives such as independence and environmental ideals.

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\(^{184}\) OPM, *Growing an Innovative New Zealand*, p.5.

\(^{185}\) Bhabha, ‘DissemiNation’, p.297.
In keeping with those scholars who see the logics of globalisation and economic nationalism as mutually reinforcing, the fifth Labour Government in New Zealand has sought to construct and derive value from the specificity of New Zealand’s land and its people in its engagement with the global economy. Within this project, the Government’s articulation remains powerfully structured by global norms and forces. New Zealand’s reliance on agricultural production and on trade liberalisation constrains the state’s ability to enact some forms of legislation (such as a ban on GE products or sustainability regulation) even when that legislation would be popular and in keeping with powerful markers of New Zealand identity. A dominant discourse of globalisation, and a dominant articulation of identity based on the characteristics deemed necessary for economic competitiveness combine to privilege certain policy perspectives while marginalising others. These dominant discourses, which reflect the economic centrality of the agricultural sector, also have the potential to marginalise dissenting perspectives and identities as unrealistic and unhelpful.
CHAPTER SEVEN: IMMIGRATION POLICY

He aha o mea nui o te ao, maku a ki atu, he tangata, he tangata, he tangata.
(If you were to ask what is the most important thing in the world, I would say it is people, it is people, it is people.)

Globalisation, National Identity and Immigration Policy

In an era where the practices of globalisation are raising questions regarding the relevance and status of national borders, immigration policy is one area where states seek to re-assert such borders. In Saskia Sassen’s terms, while globalisation is often taken to imply a pervasive process of de-nationalisation, immigration policy is a site of the re-nationalisation of politics. The capacity to effectively control in-migration is a central component of state sovereignty. Material and ideational aspects of globalisation, however, challenge this capacity. Technological advances such as the increasing ease of global movement and communication combine with new patterns of global socio-economic inequality and international human rights norms to place considerable pressure on nation-states’ traditionally accepted right to control immigration. At the same time, developed states are actively seeking the talented human capital that can drive economic growth in a competitive global knowledge economy. This impulse, reflected in the belief that the ideas and knowledge embedded in individuals are replacing labour and capital as the key factors of national economic success is heightened by the pressures of aging

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1 This Maori proverb is commonly used in New Zealand and is often used by Government departments. (See, for one example among many, Ministry of Education, ‘Statement of Intent - 2006 to 2011’. Retrieved 12 March 2007 from http://www.minedu.govt.nz/index.cfm?layout=document&documentid=11148&data=I&goto=00-13
As Nesta Devine and Ruth Irwin note, the proverb can be interpreted in a neo-liberal frame to assert the primacy of the individual. They argue, however, that ‘the culture in which 'he tangata' has its place is a collective, not an individualistic one, and the [answer] is more accurately translated 'the people, the people, the people'. (Nesta Devine and Ruth Irwin. ‘Autonomy, Agency and Education: He tangata, he tangata, he tangata’, Educational Philosophy and Theory, vol.37, no.3, 2005, pp. 317–331 at p.317).
4 See Office of the Prime Minister (OPM), Growing an Innovative New Zealand. Wellington: Government Printer, 2002, p.14 for the idea of knowledge as a ‘key factor of production’ and LEK Consulting (LEK), New Zealand Talent Initiative: Strategies for Building a Talented Nation. Wellington, 2001, p.3 for the idea that talent was encapsulated in individuals. The idea, of course was hardly new. In 1989 J.L. Simon argued that ‘in a modern economy such as the US is today, where land
populations. As states position themselves to compete in the global economy, competition for value-adding talent, or human capital, becomes fierce. Conversely, unskilled immigrants who may not integrate into the economy, culture and society of the host country are understood as a potential burden. Thus, the global free-market can be characterised as a place where ‘goods, capital and ideas – but only selected people – move freely around the world’ (my emphasis).

Immigration policy, in both its positive and negative moments (its attempts to both attract desirable human capital and exclude those who pose risks of some sort) is a key element in contemporary programmes of economic nationalism. Immigration policy is situated within a broader “population strategy”, which also includes efforts to nurture talent within the existing population, and to leverage the skills and talents of nationals living abroad. And this population strategy is best understood as a response to a reading of globalisation. As we have seen in previous chapters, the fifth Labour Government describes globalisation as a ‘race to the future’ that New Zealand has to be ‘committed to winning’. Within the race to the future of globalisation lies a more specific race: the ‘global race for talent’ in which ‘we must win our share’. The dichotomy thus created – between the global economy as a realm of hostile competition and the nation as a safe haven of co-operation – contributes to what I have earlier termed a ‘state-at-war’ narrative structure, which naturalises and reinforces the shared purpose of the state-as-universitas.

Talent is understood in such projects as a strategic national resource, analogous to oil or water. Indeed, talent was held to be ‘key to New Zealand’s future because it is increasingly the fundamental platform for generating wealth for the nation.’ The related trait of innovation was said to be becoming ‘the key driver of growth, and knowledge a

...and other natural resources are relatively unimportant... The crucial capital nowadays is "human capital"... and migrants bring this human capital with them.’ (Cited in Wolfgang Kasper, Populate Or Languish? Rethinking New Zealand's Immigration Policy. Wellington, New Zealand Business Roundtable, 1990, p. 41).

9 LEK, New Zealand Talent Initiative, p.3.
‘key factor of production, rather than capital and labour.’ But if talent was seen as a crucial strategic resource, then it remained one with clear points of specificity. Talent, as a Government-commissioned report made clear, resides in individuals. The report concluded, therefore, that talent ‘cannot be owned’, where what it clearly meant is that talent cannot be owned by corporations, by governments or by nation-states. The key traits of talent – knowledge, ideas, imagination, innovation and creativity – are understood in this discourse as the property of individuals, and this understanding generates a significant tension for a population strategy that bases itself on nurturing, attracting and retaining talent in the pursuit of a collective end. The tension is between individuated rational self-interest and the shared purpose of the universitas. What Oakeshott calls the ‘unresolved tension’ between the societas and the universitas can be experienced at the individual level as a tension between the rational self-interest of the existing or prospective citizen and the mutual obligations of the role-performer.

The attraction of human capital in the pursuit of national economic objectives can be counted as an act of economic nationalism, if we accept the idea, discussed earlier, of economic nationalism as marked primarily by its pursuit of the goals of national autonomy, identity and unity. In our consideration of the fifth Labour Government’s approach to sustainability and genetic modification in agricultural production, we saw that national autonomy has been carefully defined as national power: the nation’s capacity to achieve its desired ends despite resistance. Significantly, autonomy also includes the notion of rational revisability: the idea that an autonomous agent is able to reflect on and alter their goals, values and behaviours. This raises the possibility that the claimed pursuit of national autonomy (if it is privileged over the protection of national identity and unity) may be held to legitimate efforts to re-define the terms of national identity and the bases of national unity.

Immigration policy is an ideal site in which to analyse this process. As Mark Laffey notes, ‘immigration policy reform is one of the sites at which state efforts to redefine the logic of identity/difference through which New Zealand has been constituted are taking place.’ The fifth Labour Government, in keeping with most western governments, has

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12 Mark Laffey, ‘Adding an Asian Strand: Neoliberalism and the Politics of Culture in New Zealand, 1984-97’, in Jutta Weldes, Mark Laffey, Hugh Gusterson and Raymond Duvall (eds), Cultures of
presented immigration policy or, more broadly, a population strategy, as fundamental to its economic objectives. But immigration is intimately and obviously connected to questions of national identity and unity. In a globalising world, it may no longer be tenable to consider national identity as marked by internal coherence and external differentiation. Liberal immigration policies may threaten the traditional bases of national unity in two distinct ways. Firstly, and most obviously, by creating a more diverse society that can no longer be unproblematically said to be united by cultural similarity and shared cultural memories. Instead, a new cultural similarity may be formed, based on the acceptance of the market valuation of human worth. But this construction of similarity may in turn serve to undermine a sense of national unity by emphasising the individuation of responsibility and reward over the pursuit of a shared purpose.

Sovereignty's legitimacy, however, is based on representing ‘a political community with some sense of shared national identity’. And, as Clifford Geertz argues, the peoples of states are animated not just by a practical demand for progress, but also by ‘a search for an identity, and a demand that that identity be publicly acknowledged as having import’. Given that the transnational flows of globalisation tend to undermine the relevance of physical, territorial borders, we might expect governments to respond with an increased focus on the construction of what Patricia Goff calls invisible, conceptual borders that seek to define and promote a unified political community at the nation-state level. As I have already argued, it is useful to supplement the metaphor of invisible, conceptual borders with that of invisible, conceptual sinews. Focussing on sinews places primary emphasis on the ‘cultural particularity … collective identity … [and] common understandings’ that Goff sees as holding the invisible borders in place, and allows us to more easily analyse these things as actively constructed to serve as the discursive markers around which a collective unity may coalesce. Doing so also foregrounds the fact that the

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invisible borders ‘held in place’ by invisible sinews may not map neatly onto the nation-state’s territorial borders. It focuses our enquiry, therefore, on the political practices that construct and assert national unity in a context where New Zealand is imagined not as a physical space but as a ‘global community of talented people’.18

Globalisation accords an increasing salience to states’ capacity to define an “inside” and an “outside” for the political community, an “us” and a “them”, a “self” and an “other”. Immigration control plays an obvious and important part in this process. It is one area where states are forced to be explicit about what qualities and characteristics of prospective citizens mark them for admission or rejection. As such, it is a site in which we can examine the state’s discursive authority: its ‘ability, in the face of ambiguity and uncertainty, to impose fixed and stable meanings about who belongs and who does not belong to the nation’.19 The challenge for governments is to reconcile the economic necessity of attracting talent with a re-articulated – yet still convincing – rendering of national identity, as well as with considerations of ethics and human rights. Immigration policy, then, is about more than just numbers and bureaucratic mechanisms: equally important are its subjective, emotive aspects. Given that the invisible sinews and borders of the state – ‘the articulation of who belongs and who does not – are not natural and pre-given but actively constructed’ and sites of contestation,20 the objective of this chapter is to identify and analyse how the state is able to use its discursive authority to reconcile an immigration policy driven by economic consideration with the socio-political demands of national unity.

Rather than focussing on the technical, economic and bureaucratic aspects of population policy, an examination of the discourses involved asks how the nation and immigration are represented. This is in line with Stephanie Taylor’s understanding of the terms ‘nation’ and ‘national’ as ‘discursive constructions’ that ‘are ideological, because they are implicated with power’. In their ideological function, they ‘legitimate or exclude’ and they establish ‘subject positions which place the individuals who occupy them in certain

relationships to each other and to resources. Immigration policy and understandings of national identity are intersubjectively constituted. Every approach to immigration policy, that is to say, both appeals to an assumed notion of national identity as a justification, while simultaneously generating and perpetuating an idea of that identity. In keeping with Cris Shore and Susan Wright’s conception of policy as a cultural agent capable not just of reflecting but of constructing national identity, and with Bhabha’s understanding of a national ‘double-time’, immigration policy appeals to a specific (yet taken-for-granted) reading of the nation (marked, perhaps, by cultural homogeneity, or by diversity and tolerance) as its justification, while simultaneously constituting a specific vision of the nation (as different policy settings generate specific demographics, and as different policy discourses celebrate and marginalise specific values). Representations of immigration – and of immigrants – must also resonate with popular categories of thought. This does not mean that immigration policy is inevitably constrained to conform to extant ideas of the nation but simply that innovations in immigration policy must articulate themselves with a compatible and compelling account of the basis of national unity.

The specific challenge for the fifth Labour Government, then, was to reconcile an immigration policy based on securing the highly mobile and highly sought-after talent required by its economic transformation agenda with a compelling vision of national unity and national identity. I argue that it has attempted to meet this challenge with two arguments. It has argued, firstly, that the benefits of liberal immigration policies would be shared widely within the nation. The attraction of talent was part of the economic transformation that would ‘reverse our fortune as a nation’ and deliver ‘security and prosperity for all New Zealanders.’ And it has argued, secondly, for a new national unity actively built around the traits valued by the economic transformation project and stated explicitly in immigration policy: talent, skills, knowledge, and value-adding potential. Hence, New Zealanders are urged to ‘change [their] attitudes towards success’, such that society comes to ‘respect and reward ideas, knowledge, innovation

24 Clark, ‘Prime Minister’s Statement [2001]’.
25 LEK, New Zealand Talent Initiative, p.5.
and enterprise’. The internal diversity created by liberal immigration policies can thus be said to constitute a new unity built around desirable and progressive characteristics.

This chapter places the fifth Labour Government’s practices of immigration policy and of immigration policy discourse in a context that is both diachronic and synchronic. Firstly, I give a brief historical account of immigration policy settings in New Zealand, commenting on the ways in which these evolving settings both reflected and generated understandings of national identity and unity. I draw attention to the broad consensus through time (both within New Zealand and internationally) on the primary importance of the “national interest” as a consideration for determining policy, and ask whether a distinctively “national” immigration policy is possible in an era of globalisation and, if it is, whether it would be ethically desirable. This historical account will provide a necessary background for a detailed account of the innovations of the fifth Labour Government since 1999. These innovations will also be situated in the context of the current spectrum of views existing within the New Zealand political scene, in order to show how Labour has negotiated its way within a broad spectrum of available discourses. Indeed, I argue that the immigration policies of the fifth Labour Government have not marked a decisive departure, despite much talk of the need to respond to a rapidly changing global context.

Accepting that there is at least a possible tension between the posited economic and social goals of immigration policy, I then discuss how the Government has sought to reconcile its vision of national unity with immigration policies that generate de facto diversity, that challenge the state’s redistributive capacity, and that rely on a discourse of individual responsibility and reward. I argue that the idea of “the nation” has been carefully constructed and used as a means for creating a new form of unity based on traits amenable to a project of economic growth, but that this definitional project has been only partly successful. Following the processes of critical discourse analysis, I not only describe what the Government has done and said, but also offer an interpretation and explanation, based on an analysis of the various material and ideational forces constraining their actions. Returning to the language of the state-as-universitas, I reiterate how the language and mechanisms of immigration policy reinforce the idea of globalisation as a realm of hostile competition, thus naturalising and de-politicising the

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shared purpose of the state, and the conception of citizens (and prospective citizens) as role-performers related to that purpose. I then ask whether it is plausible to argue that immigration policy, in line with the critique of the universitas, has served to marginalise diversity and difference, when the most obvious effect of recent policy has been to generate and celebrate diversity.

Immigration and Identity in New Zealand

As discussed more fully in Chapter 3, New Zealand had a profoundly ambivalent start in terms of forging an autonomous national identity. Bill Wilmott claims that for ‘a long time … the dominant segments of Pakeha society in New Zealand considered themselves British and looked with disdain on anything “New Zealand” as inferior’.27 This orientation towards Britain found expression in immigration policy settings. Although New Zealand never formally adopted an explicit “White New Zealand” policy, various exclusionary clauses, the use of ministerial discretion in application decisions and New Zealand’s low targets (in absolute terms) amounted to much the same thing in practice.28 Discussing post-war migration to New Zealand, Ongley and Pearson note that ‘[a]s well as the exclusion of Asian immigrants, a strong preference was maintained for British migrants over continental Europeans and for Northern or Western Europeans over Southern Europeans’.29 A summary of policy prepared by the Immigration Division in 1966 declared that policy was ‘dictated by the relative ease with which different groups of people can be assimilated’ and that ‘[t]he greater and more obvious the difference between the immigrant and the average New Zealander, the longer and more difficult the period of assimilation’.

Writing in the 1970s, Richard Northe and Bryan Lythe observed that the system of assisted migration privileged migrants from some countries, and even those of certain

races. Europeans from non-European countries, for instance, found it much easier to be accepted than their non-European fellow citizens. Indeed, a preference for ‘traditional source countries’ and the ‘potentially discriminatory ministerial discretion system’ were reaffirmed as late as 1974.\footnote{Ongley and Pearson, ‘Post-1945 International Migration’, p.774.} The vast majority of migration flows, even at their highest levels, might well have been seen as culturally neutral, given the high proportion of those flows coming from “Home”. National identity, from a British settler point of view, was unchanged – there was simply more of “us” out “here”. Pacific Islanders were a notable exception to the homogenous nature of immigration to New Zealand, although this can be seen as a simple expediency on the part of policymakers. Pacific Islanders filled a gap in the local labour force, and were unwanted again as soon as the gap closed.

Situated within the neoliberal reforms of the fourth Labour Government, the 1986 Immigration Review marked a significant departure in policy, both in terms of what immigrants were valued for, and where they might be expected to come from. Immigration Minister Kerry Burke stated in the review that ‘New Zealand is a country of immigration’, and that this fact has ‘moulded our national characteristics as a Pacific country and given our community richness and cultural diversity.’\footnote{Kerry Burke, \textit{Review of Immigration Policy, August 1986}. Wellington, Government Printer, 1986, p.9.} This can be seen as a straightforward case of historical revisionism, given that New Zealand’s immigration policies had little to do historically with its geographical location in the Pacific, and even less to do with its physical proximity to Asia. Policy had, rather, steadfastly valued homogeneity over diversity. The experience of Pacific Island labour in the 1970s attested to the fact that New Zealand was not a ‘Pacific country’ so much as a country able to utilise the resources of the Pacific. In terms of policy settings, the more liberal approach announced in the Review and enacted in the 1987 Act at a time of high unemployment marked a significant departure from earlier, \textit{ad hoc} approaches based on specific labour market needs.

But this movement was tendential rather than total. As Andrew Trlin relates, policy after 1986 remained linked to the country’s capacity to absorb new migrants, the labour market opportunities of New Zealanders, and a frequently-reviewed assessment of shortages in
specific occupations. The fourth Labour Government’s liberalisation of policy amounted to the removal of ‘the preference for traditional source countries and a family size guideline’, and the development of a Business Immigration Policy (BIP) that specifically sought out those who could contribute capital and skills of benefit to New Zealand. It was not, as Trlin notes, until the early 1990s under a National Government that immigration policy moved decisively from functioning as a tool of labour market policy to serving the wider goal of national economic growth and prosperity. Trlin also states that by this time Labour had also ‘signalled its intention to liberalise restrictions and increase immigration’, having realised that its policies were too cautious and were not delivering optimal results. Influential in the creation of this bi-partisan consensus on the economic benefits of increased immigration, particularly for highly skilled, entrepreneurial and wealthy migrants (and a bi-partisan consensus in the context of a “winner-take-all” electoral system) were the Business Roundtable funded report by Australian economist Wolfgang Kasper and the academic study by Jacque Poot and his collaborators.

The policy changes of the mid-1980s, however, were still radical in their own way. While they may be read as a pragmatic response to a set of structural issues – labour market shortages that could not be filled from traditional source countries and the need to engage with a broader range of trading partners – the 1986 Review did introduce a strikingly new language to immigration debates. It not only rejected national origin as a relevant factor, but went further and embraced immigration’s ability ‘to enrich the multicultural social fabric of New Zealand society’. This celebration of multicultural diversity,

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however, can still be understood in terms of what Carol Johnson calls a ‘crude economic 
reductionism’ in which increased immigration and increased diversity were seen as means to the end of economic competitiveness.\textsuperscript{40} This construction, significantly, allowed for the 
positioning of opponents of expansive immigration policies as xenophobic. It also 
flattened distinctions between immigrations. In declaring New Zealand a ‘country of 
immigration’,\textsuperscript{41} it allowed for no difference between tangata whenua and the first 
European settlers, or between these groups and more recent immigration cohorts, 
including short-term and business immigrants.

This evolution in political language and policy settings is a good illustration of the 
intersubjective constitution of national identity and public policy. In earlier stages of its 
history, encouraging diversity within New Zealand society would have been understood 
and portrayed as endangering rather than enhancing national identity. The “White New 
Zealand” mindset established a strong us \textit{contra} them dichotomy, representing outsiders 
as a dangerous and disruptive other. The representation of immigration in the 1986 
Review, then, was not simply a refinement of policy but, more fundamentally, a change in 
how New Zealand national identity was officially articulated. The liberalisation of policy, 
Ongley and Pearson argue, was ‘\textit{indicative of a new national identity}’ no longer 
predicated on the ‘cultural homogeneity’ of society\textsuperscript{42} (my emphasis). National identity 
was now to be based on the celebration of diversity and change. Instead of dangerous and 
disruptive, diversity and difference was now presented as constitutive of New Zealand 
identity.

The National Government from 1990 found no need, according to Kate McMillan, to 
include any ‘multiculturalism rhetoric’ in their support for more expansive immigration 
policy settings.\textsuperscript{43} McMillan concludes that the ‘economic rationalism of the National 
Government … led them to construe New Zealanders as without any genuine identity of 
their own, simply economic interests.’\textsuperscript{44} This construction was announced in the National 
Government’s statement of intent in 1990, in which they argued that New Zealanders

\begin{footnotesize}
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  \item \textsuperscript{40} Johnson argues that the Australian Labor Party under Paul Keating saw cultural production, the inclusion of Women and (Asian) multiculturalism as means to economic ends (Carol Johnson, \textit{Governing Change: Keating to Howard}. St. Lucia, University of Queensland Press, 2000, pp.31-32).
  \item \textsuperscript{41} Burke, \textit{Review of Immigration Policy}, p.9.
  \item \textsuperscript{42} Ongley and Pearson, ‘International Migration’, p. 788.
  \item \textsuperscript{44} McMillan, \textit{Citizenship Under Neo-liberalism}, p.177.
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were united not by a shared culture but by ‘their need for jobs’. In Carol Johnson’s terms, National replaced Labour’s inclusive discourse that had attempted to incorporate minorities into an overall economic agenda with an assimilationist discourse that did not mark difference, but sought to deny it. National’s approach was consistent with Kasper’s 1990 report for the Business Roundtable, which made no mention at all of national identity beyond the observation that immigration policy in New Zealand ‘has been highly selective and exclusivist and has ultimately contributed to an insular social atmosphere’. Kasper advocated migration from a more diverse set of countries of origin, but defended this not on the basis that New Zealand was inherently diverse and multicultural, but on the grounds that this would contribute to a wider pool of valuable practical knowledge. On this view, national identity was no longer predicated on cultural uniformity, but neither was it based on open-ness, diversity and tolerance, as on Labour’s conception. Rather, it was seen as an empty category, and one that could be rejected in favour of emphasising the identities and interests of individual citizens.

The policies of the National Government were distinguished by their ‘sharper, more determined attempt to secure human capital, investment funds and international linkages required for the nation’s economic growth strategy’. They thus initiated a move from ‘selective entry rules’, under which a government ‘selectively admits and does not actively promote the entrance of migrants’ to ‘promotional entry rules’, under which the government and its agents seek to actively attract desirable and valuable migrants, or human capital. Both of these features, as we shall see, have remained salient in the approach of the fifth Labour Government since 1999. Regardless of whether it was framed in the language of multiculturalism or of economic rationalism, the liberalisation of immigration policy and the subsequent increase in ethno-cultural diversity provoked a degree of public unease. As McMillan notes, the ‘unprecedented arrival of a comparatively large number of visibly ethnically and culturally differentiated migrants’, most of them from Asian countries, provoked fears that the ‘boundaries of the New Zealand community’ were being breached.

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45 Jim Bolger, ‘Speech from the Throne [1990]’, in NZPD, 29 November 1990.
46 Johnson, Governing Change, pp.56-57.
Another group within New Zealand society was also unsettled by changes in immigration flows, though on different grounds. Some Maori expressed concerns that high immigration flows from an increased range of source countries diminished the status of Maori as an equal partner with Pakeha, in line with their interpretation of the Treaty of Waitangi. Ranginui Walker, a prominent articulator of this view, charged that the Crown had made changes to policy in a unilateral fashion, without the due consultation with Maori provided for in the Treaty.\(^5^1\) Further, he argued, increased immigration levels would tend to diminish the prominence and status of Maori in New Zealand’s constitutional arrangements, endangering the vision of New Zealand as a bi-lateral partnership.\(^5^2\) Such concerns were expressed clearly, though unwittingly, in Wolfgang Kasper’s neoliberal assumption that ‘if immigration were from more diverse sources, Maori might no longer feel confronted by one dominant and fairly homogeneous block of population. They could instead live in a nation of many minorities, where the Maori minority fitted in much better as an equal social group.’\(^5^3\) Kasper went on to argue that any differences could be resolved in shared economic interests, stating that ‘Maori share an interest with all other New Zealanders in a growing and exciting economy.’\(^5^4\) This argument, echoing National’s roughly contemporary claim that New Zealanders were united not by culture but by their shared ‘need for jobs’ is in line with Carol Johnson’s argument that ‘conservative politicians do not necessarily seek to construct dichotomous opposites, but may seek to dissolve difference instead.’\(^5^5\)

Taken together these two sources of disquiet – the concerns that liberal immigration policies undermined, on the one hand, social cohesion and national identity and, on the other, the status and rights of Maori – produced a peculiar political moment, as a traditionally liberal concern for indigenous rights found itself in a tenuous alignment with

\(^{52}\) Walker asserts that although the primary rationale for the policies espoused since 1986 was economic, there was also an ‘underlying subsidiary agenda of countering the Maori claim to first-nation status as tangata whenua’ (ibid., p.286). For a critical discussion of Maori concerns, see Ip, ‘Chinese New Zealanders’, pp.193-194.
\(^{53}\) Kasper, *Populate or Languish*, p.49.
\(^{54}\) Kasper, *Populate or Languish*, pp.49-50.
a conservative or anti-liberal resistance to immigration. These twin concerns found themselves a provisional political vehicle in New Zealand First, founded in 1993 by the charismatic ex-National MP Winston Peters, himself of Maori descent.\(^5\) New Zealand First contested New Zealand’s first proportional representation election in 1996 on a ‘heavily nationalistic and anti-immigration’ platform in which, McMillan argues, ‘Asian immigration was implicitly if not explicitly singled out for criticism’.\(^6\) After this election, the party emerged as the kingmaker, having won 13.4 per cent of the vote, giving it seventeen seats in parliament, including all five Maori seats.\(^7\) New Zealand First’s attempted articulation of opposition to immigration with a support for Maori concerns was always a strained one, given its fundamental commitment to the principle of one standard of citizenship for all, a stance commonly understood as challenging any special legal status for Maori. By the 1999 election, all of the Maori seats had reverted to the Labour Party (their traditional home) even though, as late as 2002, New Zealand First MP Ron Mark was attempting to predicate an opposition to immigration on Maori concerns, sarcastically asking in a Maori-focussed magazine when China had become a ‘signatory to the Treaty [of Waitangi]’.\(^8\)

Governments of the day responded to these sources of unrest with a series of compromises, and immigration policy was amended in the mid-1990s, in deference to the view that ‘economic objectives could not be pursued indefinitely without due reference to the maintenance of social cohesion’.\(^9\) From 1995, immigration was officially required to attend to the maintenance of society’s ‘high level of social cohesion’,\(^1\) in keeping with Jim Bolger’s 1993 claim that his Government embraced both ‘economic growth and social cohesion’ as overriding goals.\(^2\) In consequence, an English language requirement

\(^{5}\) As Raymond Miller notes, New Zealand First was founded on a mix of Peters’ personal popularity and a ‘widespread public discontent in response to economic recession and policy reform’ which included, but was broader than, the liberalisation of immigration policy (Miller, ‘The New Zealand First Party’, in Raymond Miller (ed.), New Zealand Politics in Transition. Auckland, Oxford University Press, 1997, pp.165-176 at p.165. Miller discusses the party’s anti-immigration stance at pp.170-171.


\(^{2}\) Cited by Brian Easton, The Whimpering of the State: Policy After MMP. Auckland, Auckland University Press, 1999, p.101. Easton adds that it was ‘unclear what the latter concept [social cohesion] meant’, implying that the celebration of social cohesion was primarily a rhetorical ploy.
and a range of other “settlement factors” were given greater weight in the points system that determined an applicant’s chances of admission. For those with long memories, National’s introduction of a ‘language bond’ in 1995\(^63\) may have carried echoes of the ‘reading test’ introduced as a barrier to Chinese immigration after the British Secretary of State instructed colonies in 1897 that exclusions ‘must not be seen to be based on race and colour.’\(^64\) While National’s compromises didn’t fully address either of the two sources of protest, they served to take some of the heat out of political debates, such that New Zealand First’s presence in a National-led coalition Government after the 1996 election led to no major changes in policy.\(^65\)

During its decade in opposition (1990-99), the Labour Party was also developing an approach to immigration, and a political philosophy more generally, that could accommodate both economic dynamism and social cohesion. Addressing immigration policy in its 1993 election manifesto, Labour argued that ‘[t]he real competitive advantage for New Zealand lies in its people, not its raw materials. Immigration will become an important trigger for economic growth by adding to the skill base that helps create jobs.’\(^66\) This statement comes under the sub-heading ‘Immigration: Putting New Zealand’s Interests First’, in which the emphasis on the national interest is used to distance Labour from the laissez-faire, individualist approach of National, as well as constituting a direct claim that global engagement through immigration was compatible with national goals. Of course, as we have seen earlier, an appeal to the national interest was a common trope in the classic statements of neo-liberal reform in New Zealand. To emphasise its difference from National, Labour stressed the importance of New Zealand’s cultural identity, by promising to make ‘suitable information and programmes relating to New Zealand’s cultural identity and the importance of the Treaty of Waitangi’ available to migrants.\(^67\) In coupling immigration with the trope of “New Zealand’s people”, Labour attempted to reconcile a conception of migrants as rational, self-maximising agents with the collective idea of New Zealand as ‘team of action’, to use de Jouvenel’s phrase. Under Labour’s formulation, the idea of the national interest is able to incorporate both economic growth and cultural identity.

Labour’s approach to immigration policy since 1999 must be understood not just in its historical context, but also in relation to the spectrum of contemporary views within which it has been located. An awareness of this spectrum of views, each of which understands the relationship between national economic goals and the construction or protection of national unity in a specific way, enables us to see more clearly how the fifth Labour Government has attempted to reconcile a talent-based discourse of immigration with a vision of national unity. The brute fact of increased diversity generated by large scale migration stands in some degree of intuitive tension with the requirements of national unity. Different perspectives on immigration policy seek to manage that tension in different ways. In contemporary New Zealand, these perspectives include the communitarian, or ‘conservative nationalist’ view that national unity is an accomplished fact that must be protected, and the liberal or libertarian view that national unity can be achieved minimally through an insistence on common rules of conduct. The approach of the fifth Labour Government, I argue, represents a middle-way that mediates these divergent views, seeking to draw on the useful and popular aspects of both, while rejecting some of their extremes. Diversity and unity are brought together in this vision under the sign of a new set of “national” characteristics, and through arguments from mutual advantage and equality of opportunity. These bases of unity are, I argue, fundamentally unstable.

A communitarian-derived nationalism insists on the unity of the nation as a descriptive fact and a normative ideal. The nation is understood as ontologically prior to the individual, and the source of their identities, values, choices and purpose. This perspective is summarised in David Miller’s description of ‘conservative nationalism’, under which ‘it is essential to the stability of the state that [national] identities should be protected against subversion and transmitted to new generations of citizens.’ On this view, immigration policy should be ‘guided not by the supposed basic rights of individuals but by the need to preserve a common national identity.’ This position, most closely associated in New Zealand politics with New Zealand First and its leader Winston Peters, sees globalisation primarily as a threat, and invokes the ‘stark reality’ that there

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69 Miller, *On Nationality*, p.120.
are ‘only four million of us in a dangerous world of six billion’. In keeping with this, Peters promised during the course of the 2002 election campaign to ‘put a wall around this country to ensure that we do not have a flood of immigrants competing with us with respect to social services, education and health.’ New Zealand First equates globalisation with an erosion of national sovereignty, and demands a national resistance, calling to mind Tom Nairn’s claim that nationalism itself is ‘rooted in the dilemmas of helplessness thrust upon most of the world’.

Immigration, from Peters’ perspective, is dangerous both economically and socially. With regards to the economic impacts, immigrants are held to be putting pressure on our living standards, to be drawing on our welfare state entitlements without making any contribution, and to be demanding government assistance desperately needed by New Zealanders. These assertions are at odds with academic work asserting the generally salutary – if uneven - economic impacts of immigration, and are grounded instead in the “common sense” of ordinary New Zealanders, concerned when they see ‘the shape and form and very nature’ of their country ‘changing because of policies they have never voted for and never will vote for.’ This emphasis on the social impacts of ‘out of control immigration’ (its destructive effect on the ‘fabric of our society’) is even more prominent in the conservative nationalist discourse. Immigration, Peters claims, goes to the ‘heart of who we are as New Zealanders’, changes the ‘New Zealand we value’, diminishes the ‘value of our birthright’, and turns our country into a place that we don’t

71 Peters, on Television New Zealand (TVNZ), Holmes Election Special: Leaders’ Debate. Television broadcast, TV One, 15 July 2002
74 Petersburg, ‘New Zealand First – The Lightning Rod’.
75 Peters, ‘New Zealand First – The Lightning Rod’.
79 Peters, ‘Our Right to Speak Out’.
80 Peters, ‘New Zealand First – The Lightning Rod’.

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While New Zealand First posits a natural and eternal national unity, a liberal approach offers a unity based on the state-as-societas: a unity, in other words, based on the formal equality of citizens living under a shared set of laws. Economic liberals might, moreover, argue for less restrictive immigration policies on the basis of an economic benefit which would facilitate the security and opportunities of individuals. While liberals might be expected to deny the relevance of the national scale in favour of the rights and liberties of individuals, New Zealand’s National Party unapologetically focuses on the material interests of collectives: of New Zealand and New Zealanders. An outright denial of restrictions on the cross-border movement of people is left in New Zealand to the marginal Libertarian Party, who endorse a ‘completely open immigration policy subject only to a requirement that immigrants waive any claim to remaining elements of the
welfare state.”

National, by contrast, has demanded that policy settings embody ‘a more direct focus on economic benefit to New Zealand’ by restricting entry rights to those ‘who will benefit existing New Zealanders and enhance New Zealand society.’

National’s position demonstrates the potential that immigration has, as a policy field intimately tied to emotive notions of national sovereignty and identity, to generate contradictory discourses. Indeed, under the leadership of Don Brash, National’s rhetoric came to echo aspects of New Zealand First’s. Employing a contradictory amalgam of liberal and conservative arguments, Brash argued that New Zealand First’s stance on immigration ‘too often appeals to blind prejudice’, but also that ‘under current policies immigration has become a process which is threatening to change the very nature of our society’. Brash further stated that National wants ‘immigrants who want to become New Zealanders’ and that ‘[i]f immigrants don’t like the way we do things in New Zealand, then they chose the wrong country to migrate to.’ And he repeated and partly legitimated the sorts of felt resentments that Peters appeals to by describing them as underlying ‘the very real concern many people have about current immigration policy.’

Brash’s conception of national unity remains, however, distinct from Peters’. The argument of his 2004 speech ‘Nationhood’ was grounded in an appeal to ‘traditional kiwi values’ and to the ‘very essence of what it means to be a New Zealander.’ But his call for unity (‘one people … one country … one sovereign nation’) was based on ‘the essential notion of one rule for all’ (my emphasis). In this construction, the nation is understood primarily as the arrangement that best allows individuals to pursue their ambitions. National identity – if it exists at all – is the effect, rather than the cause, of living together under a shared system of rights and duties. In a television interview

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91 Brash, ‘A Responsible Middle Course’.
92 Brash, ‘A Responsible Middle Course’.
93 Brash, ‘A Responsible Middle Course’.
95 Brash, ‘Nationhood’.
following this speech, Brash could offer no answer when asked what he thought it meant to be a New Zealander. His discomfort was understandable - to deny the relevance of the nation is politically risky. But one is left with the impression that Brash views the nation as something closer to a fictitious – if useful - construction than to an organic and inevitable necessity.

While Brash explicitly positioned National as advocating a ‘responsible middle course’ between Labour’s ‘too lax’ approach and New Zealand First’s ‘blind prejudice’, Labour also sought to generate a discourse able to reconcile two disparate approaches: New Zealand First’s insistence on national cultural homogeneity and National’s on economic benefit. In its project of articulation, Labour’s mediating discourse stressed a national unity based on a shared history, culture and vision for the future, but also a shared national need to engage with the global marketplace. The nation was consequently imagined both as a unique and unified community and as a competitive economic entity. Immigration was promoted as contributing to both a cultural diversity and openness constitutive of national identity and to the asset base of the national economy. In its rejection of New Zealand First’s understanding of the nation as illogical and untenable, and its simultaneous recognition of the need for a pre-political source of national unity, Labour’s articulation presented itself as a happy compromise between the first two discourses.

Here, it is neither that the ethno-cultural diversity engendered by immigration threatens unity, nor that this diversity is unimportant. Rather, diversity is held to be actively constitutive of national identity. Within this compromise position, traces of the other two discourses can be found. It is allowed that increased diversity needs to be appropriately managed; even, on occasion, that it creates ‘challenges in terms of nation-building.’ Increasingly, as well, the diverse society created by immigration is required to conform not just to a common set of laws but to a minimal set of cultural norms. If immigrants are expected to contribute to the Government’s “shared purpose” for the country, then they need to contribute to the part of the purpose that emphasises social cohesion and national identity. But they are fundamentally addressed as means to the end of national economic

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98 Brash, ‘A Responsible Middle Course’.
viability and transformation. The fifth Labour Government has sought to articulate this economic felicity with a sense of national unity. Or, in other words, it has articulated an increased ethno-cultural diversity as a new form of unity based around new nodes of exemplarite. As such, talented immigrants become new New Zealanders.

Any mediating discourse, however, has considerable ideological work to do. National unity, in this discourse, is both intrinsically valuable and instrumental to other ends. Individuals – both new and old New Zealanders - are both patriotic national citizens and human capital. Further, they are both the citizens related by the nomocracy of the societas and role-performers related through the shared purpose of the universitas. What Oakeshott calls the ‘irreducible diversity’ of the state, even when it is accentuated by global migration, is supposed within this project to be united by this relation to a shared purpose. Immigration policy is an ideal site in which to examine the processes by which ideas of shared purposes and role performers are constructed. Prospective migrants are addressed precisely and explicitly as role-performers, and judged according to their likely ability to contribute to the shared purpose of economic transformation and social cohesion. So while liberal immigration settings generate a greater diversity of ethnicities and cultures within the state, they also enact and justify a new form of cultural homogeneity: one based around ideas of commercialisable talent and economic contribution. While this is a slightly different question to that of addressing citizens already within the state as role-performers, the understanding of immigrants within this project is instructive in terms of how it asserts unity through the construction and celebration of an exemplary citizen while simultaneously instituting an apparent diversity within the national population.

The nationalist claim that the nation is internally united as well as externally differentiated is reinforced by the language of borders, a language that is pervasive in immigration policy. The construction of the invisible sinews and borders of identity and belonging naturalises the moral distinction that immigration policies make between national citizens and “others”, and implicitly asserts the unity of those within those borders. The two aspects are related. A state-at-war narrative of global battles for talent and competitive advantage naturalises the idea of a shared purpose as an issue of national security. When, within this narrative frame, immigration policy explicitly addresses prospective migrants as role-performers, it establishes a discourse in which one’s willingness and ability to contribute to the shared purpose becomes naturalised as a
measure of value. A sense of unity is thereby constructed around the key nodes of
national competitiveness in the race to the future of globalisation: talent, innovation,
knowledge and flexibility. In the following section I identify exactly what was new about
the fifth Labour Government’s approach to immigration since 1999, before addressing the
ways in which immigration policy constructs national borders as moral boundaries, and
explaining how this understanding naturalises the idea of role performers related to a
shared purpose. I then argue that the ways in which prospective citizens are addressed and
evaluated has important implications for existing citizens.

Immigration Policy Since 1999

Since the mid-1980s, changes in immigration policy have reflected and constituted
changing understandings of the nation and how it is united. The fifth Labour
Government’s statements of immigration policy since 1999 should be understood in
relation to policy changes since 1986, and in relation to other powerful views present in
New Zealand politics. While policy settings and political language since 1999 displayed a
broad continuity with what had gone before, they also contained important moments of
novelty. These innovations are best expressed as new attempts to reconcile the economic
imperatives of attracting talented migrants in a context of fierce global competition with a
compelling rendering of national unity. Labour celebrated migration’s contribution both
to the pursuit of economic growth and global connectedness and to the creation of a
diverse, dynamic and multicultural society. At the same time it acknowledged that
work had to be done to ensure that the immigrants who will ‘pay for our pensions’ and
‘generate economic growth’ settled effectively into a cohesive New Zealand society.
Migrants, it was allowed, ‘present challenges for our country’s cultural identity and unity
that need to be carefully managed’ even though, somewhat paradoxically, it was also
held that immigration ‘plays an important role in building New Zealand society.’

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100 See, for example, Labour’s ‘Ethnic Affairs Policy 2002’ (retrieved 28 November 2006 from
bring the ‘ethnic and cultural diversity [that] enriches New Zealand society.’
101 Clark, speaking on TVNZ, Holmes Election Special.
102 MED et al., Population and Sustainable Development, p.7, for instance, notes that the increased
population generated by immigration carries ‘environmental and social costs’.
attracting the talent residing in, and owned by, individuals with an articulation of a shared national purpose capable of generating spontaneous obligation, co-operation and altruism.

The fifth Labour Government’s approach was clearly in the mode of promotional, rather than selective entry rules. Clark, in 2002, argued that ‘developing skills and talent for New Zealand … requires the Government … to keep adapting its immigration policies so that they assist, not hinder, New Zealand's search for specialist talent and skills’¹⁰⁵ (my emphasis). ‘We’ need to be, it was said, ‘at the top of our game to respond to international competition to attract skilled and talented people.’¹⁰⁶ The challenge for a government committed to ‘winning our share’ in the global race for talent,¹⁰⁷ and to increasing the nation’s global competitiveness through the attraction and retention of talented knowledge workers was to make these goals and the social changes they entail consonant with a compelling articulation of state sovereignty and of national identity and unity. In attempting to meet this challenge, the fifth Labour Government’s has used the rhetorical figure of the nation, and a specific vision of a shared purpose that it underwrites in a way that tends to marginalise dissenting perspectives. In analysing these political practices, I cast critical attention on the nature and content of this shared purpose, asking by whom and for whom it is constructed, and identifying how political actors deploy language in order to naturalise and de-politicise their agendas.

The Government’s approach to immigration was informed by a series of commissioned reports that addressed the issue of developing a skilled and talented population, and the role of immigration in achieving this goal. The key statement of the Government’s economic agenda, Growing an Innovative New Zealand, noted that ‘the SIAC [Science and Innovation Advisory Council] and BCG [Boston Consulting Group] reports and, particularly, the LEK [LEK Consulting] report all place emphasis on the need for New Zealand to perform more effectively in the global competition for talent.’¹⁰⁸ These reports developed an integrated population strategy that embraced not just immigration, but also training and equipping the existing population with ‘globally competitive skills’.¹⁰⁹

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¹⁰⁵ Helen Clark, ‘Prime Minister’s Statement [2002]’, in NZPD, 12 February 2002.
¹⁰⁶ Cunliffe in DOL, Immigration Act Review, ‘Foreword’.
¹⁰⁸ OPM, Growing an Innovative New Zealand, p.42.
¹⁰⁹ LEK, New Zealand Talent Initiative, p.6.
encouraging attitudinal change, and networking with talented kiwis abroad.\textsuperscript{110} This strategy was situated within a reading of the broader challenges of economic globalisation to New Zealand. The reports drew attention to the importance of factors as diverse as savings rates, foreign direct investment, marketing and lifestyle factors to immigration outcomes. Their considerations were set in an explicitly global context as they asked how New Zealand’s policies and outcomes compared to other countries’, and how New Zealand could better compete in a global competition for talent. These documents were focused on the goal of national economic transformation through the development of a national knowledge economy and a global search for talent.

The end point of this approach was a radical re-definition of what it was that constituted New Zealand. This re-definition was expressed most clearly by the LEK report, which urged the Government to ‘foster “free trade” in talent by becoming blind to national borders and redefining New Zealand as a global community of talented people’\textsuperscript{111} (my emphases). This prescription, however, did not go so far as to deny the relevance of social cohesion and national identity. The report argued that greater care should be applied to securing settlement outcomes that would allow talent to ‘assimilate into New Zealand society’\textsuperscript{112} such that their economic contribution could be maximised. Indeed, the traits seen as necessary for success in the economic war of globalisation were said to be the same as those necessary for strong communities, cohesive societies and a sense of national identity. Innovation was seen as vital for ‘maintaining a vibrant New Zealand community’,\textsuperscript{113} and talented people were celebrated as ‘meaningful contributors to the life of the nation’.\textsuperscript{114} And, as we have seen in previous chapters, New Zealanders were urged to change their attitudes towards success, to embrace risk and enterprise, and to embrace the challenge of the innovation strategy. Strategies for ‘building a talented nation’\textsuperscript{115} were presented as consonant with national identity, through the re-definition of national identity around the discursive points of talent, enterprise and individual ambition.

\textsuperscript{110} See especially LEK, \textit{New Zealand Talent Initiative}.
\textsuperscript{112} LEK, \textit{New Zealand Talent Initiative}, p.21.
\textsuperscript{113} LEK, \textit{New Zealand Talent Initiative}, p.3.
\textsuperscript{114} LEK, \textit{New Zealand Talent Initiative}, p.14.
\textsuperscript{115} This phrase is part of the subtitle of LEK, \textit{New Zealand Talent Initiative}.  

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The discursive approach and policy recommendations of these reports were given cautious approval by the Government. While *Growing an Innovative New Zealand* agreed on the central importance of knowledge, creativity, talent and global connectedness, it was far from explicit on how these things might be attracted to or retained in New Zealand. The Government endorsed the goals of economic transformation driven by highly educated and innovative people and of a diverse and tolerant population. But it remained sensitive to the political and cultural risks of championing an immigration policy based purely on the attraction of value-generating talent. Labour’s adoption of the language of knowledge, talent and global competitiveness represented an attempt, in the face of plummeting business confidence and organised opposition to some policy initiatives shortly after its 1999 election victory, to demonstrate its awareness of the interests and concerns of the business community. But the Government was constrained in translating its talent-based discursive framework into substantive policy change by the concerns of society more broadly over the implications of facilitating ‘free-trade’ in talent. As a result, Government statements and speeches were generally careful to insist that migrants contributed to the society and culture – as well as the economy – of the country. This mode of reconciliation was institutionalised in the Department of Labour’s mandate to provide ‘services to increase the capacity of New Zealand through immigration’, which aimed not just to build ‘skilled and inclusive communities’, but also to ensure ‘greater opportunities for all in New Zealand’ (my emphasis) and, significantly, to minimise the ‘adverse impacts of immigration’.

National’s tentative and poorly articulated move from the mid-1990s to reconcile the economic benefits of immigration with social cohesion was replaced from 1999 with a far more explicit language of reconciliation, effected through the mediating idea of the nation. Immigrants, with their attendant diversity of skills, backgrounds and perspectives were both human capital, who will ‘pay for our pensions’ and ‘generate economic growth’ as required by Labour Party policy, and also the agents of the ‘ethnic and

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116 OPM, *Growing an Innovative New Zealand*, p.42, where the Government records their support for the direction and ‘some of the specifics’ of the LEK report.


120 Clark, on TVNZ, *Holmes Election Special*. 

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cultural diversity [that] enriches New Zealand society.' Economic and social goals, it was argued, were both served by the objectives of the Investor Category: ‘to maximise and accelerate New Zealand’s capacity building, sustainable growth and innovation, global connectedness and thriving and inclusive communities’.

Growing an Innovative New Zealand imagined New Zealand as ‘a land where diversity is valued and reflected in our national identity’ and, perhaps anticipating election year rhetoric, Labour MP Mark Burton warned in early 2002 against those who would use ‘that very diversity … to promote prejudice, fear and intolerance.’ In terms of institutionalised objectives, certain elements of immigration policy, such as the family sponsored stream, were explicitly charged with the task of ‘nation-building’.

Specific changes since 1999, according to McMillan, retained 1987’s legislative framework and, broadly, 1991’s policy framework. But this should not be mistaken for a lack of action. McMillan notes that there was a return to the pre-1991 approach of micro-managing entry categories and criteria and Richard Bedford goes so far as to describe the five years from 1999 as a period of ‘revolution in migration policies, flows and outcomes’.

Steve Hoadley notes that institutional mechanisms had already been established which allowed for quick and unilateral changes to certain aspects of the regulations in response to a variety of economic, ideological, labour market or political needs. And, in the context of a renewed focus on ‘settlement outcomes’ rather than numerical targets, Immigration Minister Lianne Dalziel (1999-2004) oversaw ‘more than 33 changes in immigration policy, including four major reviews of the points selection system and the introduction of a much more targeted approach to meeting skills needs’.

These changes were consistent with Labour’s avowed intention to move away from the

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123 OPM, Growing an Innovative New Zealand, p.6.
125 NZIS, Operational Manual, Section 68-1.
The hands-off approach of the 1990s and to use ‘smart interventions’ in the pursuit of economic competitiveness. The points-based system for selecting immigrants was refined and periodically reviewed to ensure that successful applicants were able to generate direct benefit to New Zealand. Points were awarded for experience or qualifications in identified occupational areas of ‘absolute shortage’, or in identified ‘growth areas’, and for job offers outside of Auckland. And a greater degree of mechanisms were made available to officials to ensure that applicants coming under the ‘entrepreneur’ and ‘investor’ categories brought direct benefit to New Zealand through their businesses and investment capital. This fine-tuning of the regulations can be seen as a new attention to the importance of strategy in a fierce global competition for talent.

But these refinements could serve a number of purposes. A greater emphasis on settlement outcomes, including the controversial raising, in December 2003, of the English language requirement for applicants under the Skilled Migrant Category were justified as a move to ensure better and more productive settlement outcomes for immigrants. They could also be seen as a political response to what Don Brash called the ‘resentments and … fears that underlie the very real concern many people have about current immigration policy’, or what Winston Peters called the destructive effect of ‘out of control immigration’ on the ‘fabric of our society’. This requirement was perceived by some in the Asian community as a partial return to a White New Zealand mindset, and research conducted by the Asia New Zealand Foundation demonstrated a marked decline in Asian applications since the change was introduced. Indeed the Government has equivocated between asserting that national identity is constituted by the very diversity and openness generated by liberal immigration policies, and allowing that identity and unity are in fact threatened by this diversity. The Immigration Service’s overall objective for ‘residence’ immigration is ‘to contribute to economic growth …

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130 Clark, ‘Prime Minister’s Statement [2002]’.
131 NZIS, Operational Manual, Section 84-3.
132 NZIS, Operational Manual, Section 89-1.
133 NZIS, Operational Manual, Section 87-1.
134 NZIS, Operational Manual, Sections 49-1 and 55-1.
135 NZIS, Operational Manual, Section 86-1, SM5.10.
136 Brash, ‘A Responsible Middle Course’.
while maintaining a high level of social cohesion" and the Department of Labour was explicit about its efforts to ‘minimise the adverse effects of immigration’. Just as the economic centrality of agricultural production placed limits on the Government’s ability to reconfigure national identity in that policy area, so public and political disquiet has placed some limits on the Government’s attempts to construct a new sense of national unity in immigration policy.

The Government’s thinking on immigration policy was set out most clearly in the 2006 Immigration Act Review Discussion paper and the subsequent 2007 Immigration Bill, described as the most comprehensive back-to-basics exercise undertaken since 1980s. The review document (which presented itself as an exercise in public consultation but which was part of a larger programme of change, much of which was beyond the scope of discussion) argued again that New Zealand was ‘in a global race for talent and we must win our share’. Despite positioning itself in the field of promotional entry rules, the review paper was more notable for the changes it proposed in terms of New Zealand’s capacity to exclude or remove those whom it did not want. In language taken straight from a 1999 Home Office document in the United Kingdom, the review document advocated ‘fair, fast and firm’ procedures for dealing with unsuccessful asylum seekers, and argued for ‘streamlined review and appeal rights’, where streamlined is simply a euphemism for curtailed. While it spoke of the need to enhance New Zealand’s attractiveness to what it called ‘high-value low-risk customers’, the vast bulk of the paper dealt with procedures for dealing with those deemed of no use.

The 2006 review document and the 2007 Bill should be seen in the context of the contemporary public and political debate over the fate of the Algerian refugee Ahmed Zaoui. An elected member of the Algerian parliament until a military coup forced him to

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139 NZIS, Operational Manual, Section 10-1. See also MED et al., Population and Sustainable Development, p.7, where it is argued that an increased population – only realistically achievable through immigration – carries ‘environmental and social costs.’

140 DOL, Annual Report [2004], p.102. See also p.44 for a discussion of strengthened policing efforts.

141 DOL, Immigration Act Review.

142 Cunliffe, ‘Where From: Where to for Immigration’.


144 DOL, Immigration Act Review, p.5.


146 DOL, Immigration Act Review, p.2.
flee the country in 1993, Zaoui arrived in New Zealand as an asylum seeker in 2002. Immediately imprisoned, Zaoui was granted refugee status on appeal in 2003 but remained in prison nonetheless due to a security risk certificate issued by the Security Intelligence Service (SIS) which was based on undisclosed information. Zaoui was granted bail in December 2004 and in September 2007, more than five years after he arrived in the country, he was eventually declared to pose no risk to New Zealand. Political concerns, however, were not centered primarily around the possibility that Zaoui’s rights had been disregarded, but around the cost to the New Zealand taxpayer of his attempts to assert his status as a genuine refugee.\textsuperscript{147} New Zealand First went further and openly criticised the decision to free Zaoui, arguing that it would make New Zealand the ‘number one soft touch for illegal immigrants’.\textsuperscript{148} Throughout the process, Helen Clark and her Government had been highly critical of the initial decision to accord Zaoui refugee status\textsuperscript{149} and had sought to remove a consideration of Zaoui’s human rights from the terms of reference of the SIS Inspector-General’s review.\textsuperscript{150} Despite their record of success, Clark also laid the blame for the prolonged affair on what she called ‘the “fairly unusual group of lawyers” representing Zaoui, their media tactics, and their chosen course of “prolonged litigation”’.\textsuperscript{151} The way in which the SIS and the Government handled the case, then, stands as a challenge to the claim that New Zealand’s state identity is ‘intimately tied up with a principled commitment to the international rule of law’.\textsuperscript{152} Indeed, critics of the SIS held that its approach was based on

\textsuperscript{151} Campbell, ‘Zaoui of 1000 days?’.\textsuperscript{152} Jacqui True and Richard Devetak, \textit{Diplomatic Divergence in the Antipodes: Globalisation, Foreign Policy and State Identity in Australia and New Zealand’}, \textit{Australian Journal or Political Science}, v.41, no.2, June 2006, pp.241-256 at p.254. True and Devetak note the challenge of the Zaoui case to this claim at pp.250-1.
a subservience to foreign intelligence sources.\footnote{Gordon Campbell, ‘The Zaoui Case – Security, Paranoia and Immigration’, 18 July 2007. Retrieved 8 August 2007 from http://www.scoop.co.nz/stories/HL0707/S00232.htm} The proposals in the 2007 Immigration Bill, to ‘streamline’ appeal procedures for asylum seekers, to give immigration officials greater powers and to enshrine the use of undisclosed evidence can be seen therefore as attempts to avoid the political discomfort of a repeat of the Zaoui case.\footnote{Keith Locke (Green Party MP), ‘New Immigration Bill a Bureaucrat’s Paradise’. Press Release, 8 August 2007. Retrieved 8 August 2007 from http://www.greens.org.nz/searchdocs/PR11083.html} National MP Lockwood Smith, for instance, explicitly celebrated the enhanced status given to ‘classified evidence’, arguing that this change promised to save ‘New Zealand taxpayers the millions of dollars that Mr Zaoui has cost them.’\footnote{Smith, ‘New Immigration Laws’}. It is too early to say what the wider implications of the case will be. It remains possible that Zaoui’s eventual success will give greater credence to the argument of the Bill’s opponents (primarily the Green Party) that its restrictive measures would endanger the valid claims of future refugees. On the other hand, the widespread political support for such measures may yet make Zaoui’s success somewhat Pyrrhic in the longer-term context of refugee rights in New Zealand.

To a large extent, the rhetoric of competing aggressively in the global market for ‘premium individuals’\footnote{See LEK, \textit{New Zealand Talent Initiative}, p.32.} has not been matched by policies that could plausibly be expected to achieve this end. Policy remains oriented towards evaluating and admitting individual migrants, rather than proactively creating an environment that would be globally attractive. While the desired “talent” are imagined as ‘premium’ or ‘high-value’ individuals and thus as rational, self-interested agents, the incentives that might be expected to attract these rational agents, such as wage and tax levels, and globally competitive research environments have not been created. As such, New Zealand has continued to rely on its ability to provide an attractive lifestyle to prospective migrants.\footnote{See LEK, \textit{New Zealand Talent Initiative}, pp.4-5 for a discussion of this general point and pp.42-49, where the report advocates developing Auckland as New Zealand’s ‘global lifestyle city’.} But, the Florida thesis\footnote{Part of Richard Florida’s body of work on the link between creativity and economic development suggests that the migratory patterns of the desirable ‘creative class’ are based on the social and physical characteristics of places rather than simply by economic considerations. See Richard Florida, \textit{The Rise of the Creative Class: and how it’s Transforming Work, Leisure, Community and Everyday Life}. New York, Basic Books, 2002.} notwithstanding, it seems likely that lifestyle, unless backed up
by attractive career and earning opportunities, will be insufficient to attract the sorts of value-generating talent valourised by the Government’s policy discourse.\textsuperscript{159}

The discrepancy since 1999 between political language and concrete policy action can be explained in part by the Government’s increased reliance on focus groups and public opinion polls, and by its aversion to the sorts of political risks that can be generated by liberal immigration policies. Tax cuts, a measure that might have been taken to attract talent, and that would have been consistent with the logic of allowing highly sought after, highly valued, highly mobile talent to earn \textit{and keep} “what they’re worth” were eschewed partly for ideological reasons, but also for the sake of promoting national unity through the equality made possible by the redistributive systems of taxation and social welfare. The disjuncture between immigration rhetoric and the reality of immigration policy change thus marks a limit-point in the reconciliation of national unity and global economic engagement.

The language of immigration policy remains important however, even when it is has not been matched by substantive policy change. Within this language, and within the details of the points-system is embedded a conception of the ideal-type immigrant, variously described as a ‘premium individual’, valuable talent or human capital, and as a ‘high-value, low-risk customers’ which stands as an explicit statement of the exemplary New Zealander; an explicit statement of what sort of traits, talents and capacities are valued and desired. This statement is ethically interesting in its attempt to construct and naturalise a basis on which the government and people of New Zealand may exclude human beings from the national space. Importantly, it also carries ethical implications for existing citizens, insofar as it stipulates those things which mark someone as valuable to the nation. A statement of desirable characteristics quite explicitly addresses a prospective migrant as a role-performer related to a national shared purpose. But it has the secondary purpose of further naturalising this shared purpose, and the specific and exemplary nature of the national role-performer.

\textsuperscript{159} See Richard T. Harrison, Colin M Mason, Allan Findlay and Donald Houston, \textit{The Attraction and Retention of High Skilled Labour in Scotland: A Preliminary Analysis. Final Report for Scottish Enterprise}. The Centre for Entrepreneurship Research, University of Edinburgh School of Management and Economics and The Hunter Centre for Entrepreneurship, University of Strathclyde, 2004, for recent research (in the Scottish context) of the limitation on Florida’s emphasis on social-physical or ‘lifestyle’ factors as an important factor in attracting the new creative class.
In introducing the 2006 review, Minister of Immigration David Cunliffe expressed his confidence that, since the changes proposed were ‘in the national interest’, the ‘political football’ of immigration could be punctured.\textsuperscript{160} And indeed, the review was relatively well-received. Winston Peters, long a critic of what he sees as the loose and dangerous policies of both major parties, saw this review as ‘an important part of his party's confidence and supply agreement with the government.'\textsuperscript{161} And National, rather than explicitly attacking the review, merely described it as ‘fantastically underwhelming.’\textsuperscript{162} We can provisionally assume, therefore, that Labour’s approach is not anomalous within the New Zealand political scene. Most parties agree that immigration policy ought to be based on considerations of the national interest, somehow defined. I consider in the next section the constraints that global economic engagement places on a genuine pursuit of the “national interest” through immigration policy and, subsequently, the ethical implications of according this sort of primacy to the national interest.

**National Unity and National Interest**

Despite their divergent views on immigration and its relationship with national unity, almost all actors within the New Zealand political scene agree that immigration policy should be based on considerations of the national interest, somehow defined. Leaving aside for now these important differences of definition, this strong and shared emphasis on the rights of the nation carries important correlative elisions. Privileging the national interest marginalises a sense of moral responsibility to those outside, as well as divergent opinions and perspectives within the nation. The managed (or balanced) migration paradigm embraced by the governments of many Western states\textsuperscript{163} generally makes admission decisions according to the capacity of prospective immigrants to add to the global competitiveness of the national economy. Increasingly, this capacity is seen in terms of the skills and talents required by the global “knowledge economy”. By addressing and evaluating them as role-performers and as strategic national resources, the \textit{universitas}’ state-at-war narrative structure makes the rights of those outside the nation conditional on their ability to ‘connect and contribute’.\textsuperscript{164}

\textsuperscript{160} Gregory, ‘Government Acts’.
\textsuperscript{161} Gregory, ‘Government Acts’.
\textsuperscript{162} Gregory, ‘Government Acts’.
\textsuperscript{164} DOL, \textit{Immigration Act Review}, p.2.
The fact that governments are maintaining such an active role in determining criteria for admission militates against the arguments developed in the early 1990s by, among others, Yasemin Soysal and Rogers Brubaker, that states’ sovereign ability to control immigration would be progressively eroded by the growing acceptance of new global rights.\textsuperscript{165} It also shows that states have resisted Sassen’s more normative argument that the economic linkages and inequalities that form part of globalisation should constrain the capacity of states to maintain restrictive settings.\textsuperscript{166} The dominant “managed migration” paradigm is precisely about tailoring migration policy so as to serve a specific reading of the interests of the individual nation-state. It is selective because it is aimed at attracting (and retaining) those that can add value to the national economic space, while keeping out those who would represent a drain on national resources. Sassen cites Japan’s new immigration law of 1990 which ‘opened the country to several categories of highly specialized professionals with a Western background’ while making ‘illegal the entry of what it referred to as “simple labour”’, noting that the legislation established two separate discourses: necessary ‘human capital’ and undesirable ‘immigrants’.\textsuperscript{167}

The managed migration paradigm, reinforced by the border-language of immigration policy more generally, unashamedly (though usually implicitly) establishes a moral distinction between those inside and outside the nation state. The personal utility of potential immigrants or their inherent rights are not included in the calculation, but only their ability to add to the utility or the citizenship rights of existing citizens. Of course, once accepted, economic migrants are accorded a set of rights which in some cases amount to the rights of existing citizens. As Aihwa Ong suggests, in her helpful qualification to Giorgio Agamben’s theorisation of the ‘state of exception’, the state-at-war discourse of globalisation ‘can be deployed to include as well as to exclude.’\textsuperscript{168} The point here is that these rights are accorded only on the basis of their ability to add value to the already existing nation-state.

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\textsuperscript{167} Sassen. \textit{Globalization and its Discontents}. p.16.
\end{flushleft}
From several perspectives, there is nothing wrong with this approach. Governments, it might be argued, are primarily responsible to the people by whom they were elected, not to the wider human family. They are expected to attend first to the needs and interests of those they represent. This sort of argument, however, implicitly adopts Hanna Pitkin’s understanding of representation as ‘substantive acting for’\textsuperscript{169} which, as Michael Saward objects, is focussed ‘resolutely on the representative’ and takes the represented as ‘unproblematically given.’\textsuperscript{170} Saward’s focus on ‘the representative claim’, in which representation is understood ‘in terms of claims to be representative by a variety of political actors’\textsuperscript{171} (emphasis in the original) suggests that there is nothing necessarily pre-given about the national community and that attention should be placed on the ‘constitution of constituency.’\textsuperscript{172} It follows that there is nothing necessarily natural or neutral about the “national interests” that are ascribed to the community.

The idea, moreover, that we owe greater duties of obligation to some human beings than others, and that the criterion for this distinction is something as thoroughly arbitrary as the location of birth, militates against the liberal commonplace that all human beings matter equally, and that their life chances should be determined by life choices, rather than arbitrary factors. This critique is put most clearly by Joseph Carens, who calls ‘[c]itizenship in Western liberal democracies … the modern equivalent of feudal privilege’ and notes that, like ‘feudal birthright privilege, restrictive citizenship is hard to justify when one thinks about it closely’\textsuperscript{173} Carens is here extending the morally relevant set of persons from existing national citizens to include all human beings. The more specific idea embedded in the managed migration model - that the privilege of citizenship should be extended selectively, on the basis of one’s ability to contribute to a national

\textsuperscript{170} Saward, ‘The Representative Claim’, p.300.
\textsuperscript{171} Saward, ‘The Representative Claim’, p.298. Saward’s argument is in broad agreement with Roxanne Doty’s argument, discussed in Chapter 2, that a state’s legitimacy is based on its claim to represent ‘a political community with some sense of shared national identity’ and that, as a result, ‘[p]ractitioners of statecraft are ardently and continuously involved in the construction of the nation’ (Doty. ‘Sovereignty and the Nation’, pp.122,123).
\textsuperscript{172} Saward, ‘The Representative Claim’, p.299.
project of economic development - also appears to transgress the fundamental liberal proscription on treating people as means rather than ends.\textsuperscript{174}

Against these seemingly strong arguments from ethical universalism, some have sought to defend the practice of making moral distinctions on the basis of nationality. David Miller defines nations as ‘ethical communities’ whereby ‘I owe special obligations to fellow members of my nation which I do not owe to other human beings.’\textsuperscript{175} Miller acknowledges that this ethical particularism based on seemingly arbitrary, imagined ties may seem ‘rationally indefensible’ when set against the ‘powerful humanitarian sentiment … that every human being should matter equally to us’,\textsuperscript{176} but notes that ‘in our everyday life we decide what to do primarily by considering what our relationships to others, and our memberships of various groups, demand of us’.\textsuperscript{177} The relationships that arise within the nation may, in other words, be morally relevant. Miller also argues that his ethical particularism can be defended on pragmatic grounds. The demands of social justice require, he argues, a sense of fellow-feeling and shared destiny that is more likely to emerge in the national than the global setting.\textsuperscript{178} Acknowledging the relevance of specific relations may thus be the best way to get the ethical job done. Arguing in more explicitly communitarian mode, Michael Walzer defends restrictive immigration policies on the grounds that it is ‘moral to develop policies which preserve a particular way of life’.\textsuperscript{179} It is this sort of argument that grounds the claims of governments to the right to protect their nations against threats to their ‘cultural identity’.\textsuperscript{180}

But the nature of its nation-building project and the nature of its shared purpose has weakened the fifth Labour Government’s ability to employ these sorts of arguments. Its nation-building project, exemplified in its discourse of immigration, was built on the norms of the knowledge economy, on the primacy of talent, on knowledge as a key factor of production and on equality of opportunity (not outcome). As I have argued earlier,

\begin{itemize}
\item\textsuperscript{174} Kant's exhortation to treat humanity 'not as means only but as ends in themselves' is foundational to liberal theorists as diverse as John Rawls (the above paraphrase is given in Rawls, \textit{A Theory of Justice}. Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1972, p.179 and glossed at pp.179-183) and Robert Nozick (\textit{Anarchy, State, and Utopia}. New York, Basic Books, 1974, pp.30-31).
\item\textsuperscript{175} Miller, \textit{On Nationality}, p.49.
\item\textsuperscript{176} Miller, \textit{On Nationality}, p.49.
\item\textsuperscript{177} Miller, \textit{On Nationality}, p.51.
\item\textsuperscript{178} Miller, \textit{On Nationality}, pp.51, 52.
\item\textsuperscript{179} Cited in Myron Weiner, ‘Ethics, National Sovereignty and the Control of Immigration’, \textit{International Migration Review}, v.30, no.1, 1996, p.175.
\item\textsuperscript{180} Weiner, ‘Ethics, National Sovereignty and the Control of Immigration’, p.172.
\end{itemize}
each of these tropes carries an individuating aspect that militates against Miller’s idea of nations as ‘ethical communities’. Defending the boundaries of the nation in the name of ethical pragmatism may be untenable when the nation is only united by its shared adherence to these individuating norms and nodes. Further, Walzer’s argument that it is ethically permissible to preserve a distinct way of life may be incompatible with an immigration policy based on securing the nation’s fair share in the global race for talent. Talent is pursued not to preserve a particular national cultural form, but to allow the nation to compete in a global marketplace driven by global demand and global values.

While “talented” people are still addressed as means rather than as ends in themselves, the criterion of talent can facilitate a greater diversity of migrants, thus avoiding charges of xenophobia and ethnic exclusivism. And so it might still be argued that a talent-based immigration policy is ethically preferable to a nationality or race-based system. This, almost certainly, is true. It is difficult to establish a moral case for a return to a de facto White New Zealand policy. There are, however, limits to this argument. Most fundamentally, the fact that a policy is preferable to an alternative does not imply that it is morally optimal. And while one’s possession of value-generating talent might have more to do than one’s race does with one’s own efforts and abilities, the possession of talent is not equally available to all. Immigration policies based on the criteria of talent, or on the capacity of an applicant to ‘connect and contribute’ invoke the appealing norm of equal treatment which, as Carol Bacchi notes, ‘rests on an individualistic premise which grounds a gender-blind and race-blind approach to policy.”

But despite the implicit argument of the knowledge economy discourse that ideas, talent and knowledge, because they reside in individuals, are equally available to all, the sorts of talent required by the Government’s population strategy remain culturally specific to some degree. Policy settings and a policy discourse based on securing talented individuals should draw our attention to the link between power and knowledge, and to questions of how certain groups in society are able to define certain sorts of knowledge and talent as useful and meaningful. This dynamic is made most visible in the Government-commissioned LEK Report. Although the report claims to embrace an inclusive definition of talented individuals as ‘meaningful contributors to the life of the nation’ and

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acknowledges the critical role they will play in maintaining cultural institutions and a vibrant community,\textsuperscript{183} talent is identified in practice by a narrower set of criteria: knowledge workers, highly skilled workers and degree qualified people.\textsuperscript{184} The categories of ‘knowledge workers’ and ‘highly skilled workers’ are then subjected to further stipulative definition according to career-type.\textsuperscript{185}

Questions of whether managed migration’s meritocratic view of human worth is morally defensible are routinely elided in official documents, which present talent-based policies as a natural and normal part of political life. Again, an idea of the national interest is used to justify the extension of opportunity to some and not others. Policy is justified not on the basis of the equal inherent worth of humans, but on their potential benefit to New Zealand, and it thus remains susceptible to Carens’ charge that it represents nothing more than the protection of unearned privilege. Further, criteria for admission to citizenship are important because they represent an explicit statement of the traits and capacities valued and de-valued within society more broadly. The Government’s approach to in-migration serves to establish one’s economic contribution as an important measure of one’s value within society. A utilitarian account of immigration policy, nested within a talent-based population strategy, nested within a state-at-war narrative of globalisation serves to construct and naturalise the valuation of internal (as well as external) diversity according to its willingness and ability to contribute to the fight for global economic viability.

This line of critique, of course, is applicable not only to Labour but to all who advocate the basing of policy on considerations of the national interest. And Labour does seek to create a balance between economic interests and its commitments (and its reputation) as a good international citizen, which are expressed in its defence of an annual refugee quota and agreements with a range of Pacific Island states. But there is a tension between a practice that recognises the claims of refugees under international law and a practice of language that grounds these rights not in the circumstances of the individuals involved but in the benevolence of the nation-state. And, because it is situated in a broader discourse of

\textsuperscript{183} LEK \textit{New Zealand Talent Initiative}, p.3.
\textsuperscript{184} LEK \textit{New Zealand Talent Initiative}, p.14. This narrower understanding is also implied in the following: ‘some occupations have a greater prevalence of talented people contributing their ideas and innovation which leads to increased wealth. For example, knowledge workers … generate substantial economic value’ (ibid, p.3).
\textsuperscript{185} LEK \textit{New Zealand Talent Initiative}, p.14 at footnote 4.
‘high-value, low-risk customers’, the claims of refugees are further subordinated to the
claims of the state. Labour’s discourse of immigration, expressed most clearly in the 2007
Immigration Bill, clearly privileges national over individual security. The practice of
language is, of course, a flexible one. In certain contexts the Government is very eager to
advertise its humanitarian credentials. But tensions between national interests and the
interests of vulnerable non-status migrants will almost always be resolved in favour of
national interests.

Hannah Arendt observed that the experience of refugees after the Second World War
proved that universal human rights are so precarious as to be virtually useless. In practice,
she argued, rights are accorded through citizenship within a state, not by virtue of a
shared humanity. On this argument, rights only carry weight when there is a correlative
duty bearer both responsible and capable to deliver those rights. Giorgio Agamben, in his
sympathetic gloss of Arendt’s argument, notes that the rights of citizenship have
historically been based on the nation-state, and specifically on the basis of nativity (birth).
Active migration policies extend on this somewhat by offering citizenship rights
according to one’s willingness and ability to contribute to the nation-state. But they are
certainly not extended more widely on the basis only of a shared humanity. Rather, rights
are increasingly conditional on the tightly-defined criterion of “talent” which, as we have
seen, is an ethically questionable basis for limiting the life-chances of some (though not
all) human beings.

To use the language of the universitas, the immigration policy of the fifth Labour
Government has constructed and used an idea of a shared purpose for the state as a basis
for admitting or excluding human beings, understood as role-performers, from the rights
of citizenship. This shared purpose, as we have seen in other areas, is determined by a
reading of economic necessity, but narrated in the language of the nation, through such
concepts as national interests, national needs and national risks. While the language of the

186 DOL, Immigration Act Review, p.5.
187 For a discussion of how the Australian federal Government has asserted the same hierarchy of
securities, see Matt McDonald, ‘Constructing Insecurity: Australian Security Discourse and Policy
relevant chapter is called, tellingly, ‘The Decline of the Nation-State and the End of the Rights of
Man’. Cited in Giorgio Agamben, Means Without Ends: Notes on Politics. (Vincenzo Binetti and
189 Ong, Neoliberalism as Exception, p.5
nation is prominent here, the underlying logic of the project dictates a move away from
the nation-state (with its etymological connection, through terms such as nativity and
nascence, to one’s place of birth) to the state-as-corporation, where belonging is based on
one’s status as a role-performer.

This logic is explicitly applied to prospective citizens, as admission is based on one’s
alignment with the brand and the shared purpose rather than on one’s nationality or ethno-
cultural background. The question is whether addressing and evaluating prospective
immigrants in this way has implications for the evaluation of existing citizens.
Immigration policy is not necessarily the policy area in which to investigate this claim:
welfare policy more directly sets criteria for the distribution of resources, rights and
recognition. But the language of immigration policy does establish norms of exemplarite,
and it does naturalise the practice of linking citizenship rights and a new sense of national
unity with personal contribution. This hypothesis is consistent, I would argue, with the
broad direction of core welfare policy under the fifth Labour Government where, as
Louise Humpage, Susan St. John and Kate McMillan concur, there has been a significant
move towards making the social and citizenship rights of New Zealanders conditional and
contingent on their willingness and ability to contribute.190

The Fifth Labour Government and Modes of Unity
I have argued already that Labour’s political project since 1999 is best described as one of
economic nationalism, not in the sense that it has endorsed closed-border policies of
protectionism and autarchy, but to the extent that is oriented towards the pursuit of the
nationalist goals of autonomy, identity and unity.191 I have argued, however, that these
concepts are not eternal and natural, but contingent and actively constructed. The earlier
analyses of cultural policy and agricultural policy demonstrated how the tensions
generated by the simultaneous pursuit of economic and socio-cultural objectives structure
the definitions of national identity and national autonomy that can be promoted. Further,

190 See Louise Humpage, ‘An “Inclusive” Society: A “Leap Forward” for Maori in New Zealand?’,
http://www.nzherald.co.nz/topic/story.cfm?c_id=247&objectid=10444701&pnum=0, and Kate
Paper presented at the New Zealand Sociological Association of Aotearoa New Zealand Conference, 5-
7 December 2002, University of Canterbury, Christchurch. The idea also underlies Humpage’s
Marsden Fund-supported research project "Conditional and contingent? New Zealand Citizenship in
the Context of Neoliberalism".
191 See my discussion on this point in Chapter 3.
it demonstrated how the ideal of national autonomy, re-defined as national power, comes
to take precedence over that of national identity. The idea of autonomy includes that of
rational revisability, such that an autonomous entity is able to change its attitudes and
behaviours (and thus its identity) in light of changing circumstances. This idea is clearly
expressed in the 2006 Immigration Review discussion document, which argues that a
change in approach has been necessitated by ‘major changes in the international
environment and [in] New Zealand’s priorities.’ Political actors, then, will seek to
narrate the nation through processes of ‘reiteration, recapture, reinterpretation and
repudiation’ in order to make their proposed policies appear consistent with a sense of
national identity and unity.

Immigration policy, however, provides an instructive case-study of the limitations on
such a process. It is a policy area tightly tied to a national sense of self and belonging, and
a policy field made material in people: in the faces that appear on the country’s streets
and in its homes and workplaces. Whereas national unity – a national sense of one-ness –
is intuitively linked to ideas of internal similarity and external difference, liberal
immigration settings encourage the norms of internal diversity and external
connectedness. These settings are generated by an understanding of New Zealand as an
economic entity operating in a competitive global environment. If, as Stuart Hall asserts,
identity is formed and transformed continuously in relation to the ways we are
represented or addressed in the cultural systems that surround us then the practices
of global engagement might be expected to impact on New Zealand’s national identity.
The challenge for governments is to convincingly argue that national unity can be
protected, or even enhanced, by policies that increase ethno-cultural diversity in the name
of global competitiveness.

Takeshi Nakano argues that the unity demanded by economic nationalism can be
achieved by distributing the material rewards of global economic engagement widely

192 DOL, Immigration Act Review, Minister’s Foreword.
193 Ross Bond, David McCrone and Alice Brown, ‘National Identity and Economic Development:
Reiteration, Recapture, Reinterpretation and Repudiation’, Nations and Nationalism, v.9, no.3, pp. 371-
391.
194 Stuart Hall, ‘The Question of Cultural Identity’ in Stuart Hall, David Held and Anthony McGrew
within the nation, across internal borders of class, gender and ethnicity.\textsuperscript{195} As we have seen, this has been the implicit and explicit claim of economic nationalism in contemporary New Zealand. The goal of the project is to improve the living standards, security and opportunities of all New Zealanders. This is the mode of pragmatic positivism: liberal immigration policies simply “work” in objective and quantifiable terms. The fifth Labour Government’s statements about immigration policy have placed great emphasis on the net benefit that immigration brings to New Zealand. Immigrants, Helen Clark has argued, benefit us all: they are the ones who will ‘pay for our pensions’ and ‘drive economic growth’.\textsuperscript{196} The national economy, national resources and national interests are imagined as being held in common, such that aggregate national benefit can be presented as benefiting “all of us”, thereby contributing to national unity.

This mode of unity, however, is unstable because it co-exists with the need to attract the talent embedded in premium individuals, or in ‘high-value customers’. The way of attracting and retaining talent – supposed to be rationally self-interested – is to offer incentives in the form of high wages (over which the Government has limited control) and low taxes. The argument for lower taxes, based on allowing workers to keep what they earn through their own efforts is more normally associated with the National and ACT parties, but it is also logically follows from the LEK report’s argument that ‘[t]alented people are extremely valued and highly sought after – and the demand for their skills means that talented people are highly mobile.’\textsuperscript{197} The impulse to offer the incentive of lower taxes, however, would limit the Government’s ability to preserve unity through the wide re-distribution of material benefits. And, in practice, the Government has largely resisted calls to reduce tax rates, demonstrating the tension between the sort of unity offered by managing material inequalities through redistribution, and the sort of unity offered by its construction of the exemplary New Zealander marked by knowledge, independence and flexibility.

The mode of unity based on the promise of a widely shared beneficial outcome is also more fundamentally unstable. For the argument of mutual advantage is essentially a libertarian argument based on the aggregation of individual advantage, and it is one that

\textsuperscript{196} Clark, on TVNZ, Holmes Election Special.
\textsuperscript{197} LEK, New Zealand Talent Initiative, p.3.
invites questions of winners and losers. Unity, by contrast, connotes something deeper: the ‘condition of being one in mind, feeling, opinion, purpose, or action.’ Part of the answer to the question of how liberal policy settings and a more ethnically diverse society can be compatible with the nationalist pursuit of unity is that even this sort of unity can admit of considerable internal difference. When Shakespeare has Ulysses speak of ‘the unity and married calme of States’, for instance, the speech as a whole expounds the view, familiar from Plato, that this unity is only made possible by respecting existing hierarchies, or “degree”: ‘Take but degree away, untune that string / And, hark, what discord follows!’ Unity, then, may not be the condition of total homogeneity but the creation of a point of convergence that can explain and legitimate internal difference. But again, unity is not a naturally occurring phenomenon. It makes more sense to speak of verbs than nouns; to speak of active attempts to *unify* rather than of attempts to preserve an extant *unity*. The force of speaking of national identity and national unity is precisely to deny internal division, to legitimate social difference and to assert a shared purpose.

The second strategy, therefore, moves away from the language of mutual advantage and towards the Government’s preferred language of shared visions and objectives. In seeking to re-imagine national identity and unity along lines consistent with its economic transformation agenda, the Government created ‘privileged discursive points’ that it hoped will be able to provide a focal point for unity while also explaining and justifying inequalities within society. The economic transformation is enacted not just at the institutional and policy level but, foundationally, on the attitudes and behaviours of individuals as well. As has been discussed earlier, a Government-commissioned report in 2001 warned that if the country was to excel and become a great place to live, then ‘our attitudes and behaviours must respect and reward ideas, knowledge, innovation and enterprise’. This sort of cultural transformation is clearly an active process: a knowledge society has to be constructed in support of the desired knowledge economy. It is constructed, crucially, around norms which are then deemed to unite New Zealanders. But the ideal traits of the knowledge economy – imagination, ideas, talent etc, are profoundly individuating.

198 Definition and associated references from the online version of the *Oxford English Dictionary (OED)*. Retrieved from http://dictionary.oed.com/
199 OED. The quotation is from *Troilus and Cressida*, I, iii.
200 Doty ‘Sovereignty and the Nation’, p.127.
They are related to the trope of equality of opportunity which argues that, because the key factors of production – knowledge, ideas, imagination – are located now within individuals, they are available to all. The force of knowledge economy language, as I have argued earlier, is that knowledge, creativity and talent are equally available to all, dependant only on the provision of equal and appropriate education and training. The salience of class divisions and inequalities is held to be lessened in a context where knowledge – rather than capital or labour – is the key factor of production. Equality of opportunity here has a similar discursive force to unity. It is the argument that we are all in this together but, rather than expressing itself in the shared commitments of the welfare state, it is expressed as a formal equality before the laws of the market. But this mode of unity is also unstable. The individuating logic of the knowledge economy stands in tension with national unity. Indeed, as John Schaar notes, the rhetoric of equality of opportunity ‘breaks up solidaristic opposition to existing conditions of inequality by holding out to the ablest and most ambitious members of the disadvantaged groups’ the prospect of individual success and advancement.\textsuperscript{202}

The shared purpose of the universitas, enacted in a talent-based discourse of immigration, has two principal effects. It establishes moral borders that seek to justify evaluating those outside the state with respect to their capacity to benefit those inside. And it establishes norms of exemplarite that marginalise divergence of opinion within the state. Thus, while Labour celebrates the ‘unique contribution’ that Maori have to make to the Brand New Zealand project, they can ignore Maori disquiet over the effects for Maori of a liberal immigration policy. As we have seen, some Maori fear that liberal immigration policies threaten the primacy of bicultural difference with a surfeit of multicultural difference. Or, put otherwise, with a new homogeneity based on individual rights and economic contribution. This is the homogeneity described in 1990 by Wolfgang Kasper, in which ‘Maori share an interest with all other New Zealanders in a growing and exciting economy and they, too, lose when some of their young people migrate to Sydney or beyond.’\textsuperscript{203}

Labour’s discourse, which is based on an argument from national necessity, and which stresses individually-embedded talent and the benefits of cultural diversity, seeks to

\textsuperscript{203} Kasper, \textit{Populate or Languish?}, pp.49-50.
marginalise opposing political voices as xenophobic and as opposed to New Zealand’s real interests. So while Winston Peters accuses Labour and National of being ‘blind to what ordinary New Zealanders can see as plain as day’, the Government can calmly respond that Peters’ prescriptions would be economically disastrous for the nation and, further, contrary to a modern, enlightened national identity in which diversity is ‘valued and reflected’. Repeating this latter formulation, Labour MP Mark Burton also warned against the direction ‘where some would still to drive us, [where] that very diversity is used to promote prejudice, fear and intolerance.’ Ethnic minorities can be celebrated within Labour’s discourse, but they are evaluated primarily on their ability to contribute. While this is morally preferable to exclusionist or assimilationist discourses, it is still a reductive address in which fundamental importance is accorded not to individuals or cultures but to economic contribution. In a qualified rebuttal or New Zealand First’s construction of an “us” versus “them” dichotomy typical of populist nationalist movements, the fifth Labour Government imagines the other more flexibly. “They” are valued both for their ability to help “us” economically but also, to a degree, to define “us” as they enrich the country’s ‘social and cultural fabric’.

The Government’s twin goals of economic transformation and social cohesion have required new foundations for national unity. Rather than ethno-cultural homogeneity, unity is now said to be based on the attitudes and behaviours required by global economic competitiveness. The Government allowed that this cultural change would be a long-term process, and so it has proved. Political pressure and ideological preferences have led the fifth Labour Government to tread carefully in immigration policy, aware that popular understandings of the foundations of national unity will change only slowly. In contrast to its effusive rhetoric in relation to cultural production and the creative industries, and in contrast its more recent positive language around environmental sustainability and carbon

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204 Peters, ‘New Zealand First – The Lightning Rod’.
205 Labour’s vision of New Zealand as a ‘land where diversity is valued and reflected in our national identity’ is set out in OPM, Growing an Innovative New Zealand, p.6, and was repeated often in parliament in early 2002.
208 DOL, Immigration Act Review, p.25. It is possible to also see a multicultural society as a source of economic advantage. Mark Laffey relates how the link was made by Brian Mulroney in Canada and Paul Keating in Australia (‘Adding an Asian Strand’, p.243) and the practice is discussed critically by Carol Johnson (Governing Change, pp.31-2). Although this link has not been explicitly made by the fifth Labour Government, Wolfgang Kasper did so repeatedly in Populate or Languish?
neutrality, Labour has remained relatively muted on the topic of immigration. More recently, the Government explicitly referenced the economic costs of immigration, specifically its impacts on inflation. The Government’s decision to ‘lower its resident migrants target despite ongoing skill shortages in several industries’\(^{209}\) should be seen in the context of widespread concern over the rapid rise in house prices, an issue that the National Party had framed in the nationalistic terms of making it ‘harder for young Kiwis to buy their first home.’\(^{210}\)

Immigration is, as we have seen, an inherently contested and emotive policy area, and Labour has had to strike a fine balance between celebrating the economic contribution of migrants and acknowledging the concerns that sections of the public have about the cultural change that immigration brings. As a result, policy change has largely been effected through technical – and relatively de-politicised - changes to the NZIS Operational Manual, and pronouncements on immigration policy have largely been left to the responsible ministers. By contrast, Helen Clark has been prolific in her statements around culture and heritage (which is also her portfolio) but also on other potentially nation-defining issues such as foreign policy and, increasingly, climate change.

While Labour fully endorsed the proposition that immigration policy should contribute to a broader population strategy and thus to a national response to economic globalisation, policy action was constrained by a number of factors. Most broadly, the aggressive enactment of an agenda based on economic rationalism and the value of talented human capital was constrained by the demands of national unity. While unity is socially constructed, there are limits on how (and how quickly) it can be re-constructed by any given political actor or political project. Public disquiet regarding “Asian-isation” has remained a potential vote-winner for opposing parties, and Labour has re-introduced an ethnic dimension into its immigration policy through tougher language requirements and an increased focus on transferable skills and qualifications, which tend to privilege applicants from ‘comparable labour markets’, which are said to included some (Singapore and Malaysia, for instance) but by no means all Asian markets.\(^{211}\) Further, an aggressive

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global talent hunt would have required the provision of incentives to induce talent to come to New Zealand, and some of these incentives, such as reduced taxation levels, would have compromised the Government’s capacity to re-distribute its material benefits as widely as it deemed necessary to achieve unity.

Immigration policy and a corresponding construction of national identity and national unity must be negotiated in response to competing discourses and common sense present in the public sphere. We have seen that in contemporary New Zealand, these discourses include the ideas that national unity is based variously on the provision of mutual advantage, on the equal legal citizenship of the *nomocracy*, and on the subjective unity of an eternal nation. The fifth Labour Government’s immigration policy assumes and generates a discourse in which unity is based on *both* economic-rational and cultural-subjective considerations. Labour’s continued emphasis on the economic necessity of immigration\textsuperscript{212} contains an assumption that the increasing diversity generated by liberal immigration policies can be dissolved through shared economic interests.\textsuperscript{213} As immigration serves both economic and social objectives for Labour, it requires a composite argument for unity. In this discourse, unity is based, firstly, on an argument from mutual advantage and, secondly, on a more thorough-going argument based on constructing and offering new discursive nodes around which a new national unity can coalesce. That both of these arguments are problematic helps to explain a range of ambivalences that can be seen in the practice of policy settings.

\textsuperscript{212} For a recent example, see Cunliffe, ‘Immigration and Economic Transformation’.
\textsuperscript{213} See Johnson, *Governing Change*, p.73.
CHAPTER 8: CONCLUSION

A corporation is persons associated in respect of the pursuit of a common purpose, and it is specified, not in terms of its ‘constitution’, but by the particular purpose jointly pursued. Consequently, those who were disposed to think of a state in the terms of universitas had to assign to it a particular enterprise…. The manifestly miscellaneous composition and temporary character of states made this difficult; indeed, it imposed a visionary quality upon all such suggestions. But visions are related to circumstances and these, being the creatures of practical imagination, were related to current possibilities and ambitions.¹

New Zealand’s fifth Labour Government has, since 1999, self-consciously sought to defend and promote a sense of national identity, as a strategy of domestic political management and of economic transformation. The result has been the construction of a national identity and a national brand built around the traits, attitudes and behaviours deemed necessary for global economic competitiveness. In this thesis, which covers the period from 1999 to 2007, I have identified and analysed instances in which global forces and norms have structured the Government’s assertions of local divergence. I have done this through a critical analysis of the discourse and the policies of the Government’s nation-building project. I have argued that the Government’s insistence on a shared national purpose led them to marginalise dissenting perspectives as unhelpful. And I have given an account of the moral implications of valuing individuals and groups according to their willingness and ability to contribute to a shared “national” purpose.

The Government’s representations of globalisation, of the state and of the nation are best seen, I have argued, not as descriptions of fact but as discursive constructions shaped by power and ideology. These discursive constructions, of course, carry political and moral implications. They serve to define policy problems in certain ways, privileging some policy perspectives and marginalising others. They serve, moreover, to position, address and evaluate individuals and sub-state groups in specific ways. This study has analysed how the Government’s nation-building project has been made manifest both in policy settings and in political language. It has been focussed by two questions: a descriptive question concerning the nature of, and the limitations on, the local divergence that can be

asserted, given a simultaneous embrace of global engagement, and a more normative question concerning the ethical desirability of the nation-building project.

This study has contributed to an understanding of the sorts of pressures that the contemporary global context places on the governments of nation-states, of the responses available to states, and of some of the likely impacts of those responses. The pressures and challenges facing the New Zealand state and the New Zealand economy in 1999 were far from anomalous in the global setting, and the New Zealand experience since then is instructive beyond its borders. The leveraging of national identity as source of economic advantage has been widely practiced in the last decade or so, and this study adds to an understanding of the limitations on, and the implications of, this sort of political action. In providing a detailed case study of the ways in which global economic liberalism simultaneously encourages and constrains the foregrounding of local specificity, this study has contributed to the scholarly literature dealing with the relationship between globalisation, state autonomy and national identity. It has argued that, in a globalising world, official constructions of a national purpose and of national identity often remain strongly structured by global forces and that they often tend to evaluate individuals and groups according to the contribution they can make to the putatively shared national purpose.

In analysing the ways in which the fifth Labour Government deployed a language of shared (national) benefits and of shared (national) values in order to naturalise its policy agenda, I have highlighted the groupings of interest and identity that have been influential in defining the Government’s project, as well as those that have been marginalised and excluded from it, and co-opted into it. This study has engaged with these issues by integrating three levels of analysis: a focus on the crucial role of discourse and language within the Government’s project; an analysis of the interaction between discursive contestation and policy change in three key areas, and an assessment of the implications of these changes (in both discourse and policy) for individuals and groups. This study, which has situated the Government’s project in an historical perspective, and which has attended to a wide range of official texts and critical perspectives, represents a comprehensive scholarly engagement with an important and topical moment in New Zealand politics as well as a contribution to an understanding of global political change.
The theoretical and methodological framework that I developed in this study facilitated a critical engagement with the crucial questions of the *possibility* and the *desirability* of asserting a unique national identity in an age of globalisation. This framework emphasised that language and discourse are of crucial importance in contemporary politics because they shape the ways in which social phenomena can be understood and addressed. In this connection, I demonstrated how a discursive emphasis on the nation (through the repeated use of locutions such as national identity and the national interest) could serve to marginalise divergent identities, interests and perspectives within (and outside) the nation. A discursive emphasis on the nation, situated within a state-at-war narrative of globalisation that calls forth a co-ordinated national response, argues for a conception of society as united by its pursuit of a shared purpose. The fifth Labour Government’s construction of a shared national purpose and its correlative address of individuals and groups as role-performers led it, I have argued, to evaluate citizens according to their willingness and ability to contribute to that purpose.

The political practice of the fifth Labour Government did not exist in a vacuum. I situated my analysis in a spatial and temporal context by providing an account of how national identity, national interests, and the respective roles of the state and society have been understood historically in New Zealand, and by outlining how the contemporary practices of globalisation might be expected to influence domestic politics. Given this context, I argued that the fifth Labour Government came to power in 1999 with a specific set of discursive resources and facing a specific set of expectations. These resources and expectations both facilitated and constrained political action. The Government’s argument for a co-ordinated national response to globalisation in which national identity would afford economic, social and political benefit was strengthened, on the one hand, by a range of factors. These factors included the historical centrality of the New Zealand state within society and the economy, the real and perceived failings of the country’s neo-liberal reforms and the country’s unique and vulnerable geo-economic location. But another range of factors (a powerful sentiment of individualism, some of the norms of the global economy and a proportional representation electoral environment, for example) constrained the Government’s capacity to construct and implement a political project based on a shared national purpose and a unique national identity.

While Labour insisted that its twin goals of economic growth and social cohesion were mutually compatible (even mutually dependent) and while it argued that both goals were
served by the assertion of a unique and confident national identity, significant tensions were not addressed. While any nationally-scaled political vision might be expected to emphasise the internal coherence and external differentiation of the nation, the economic focus of the Government’s project led it to narrate the nation around themes of internal diversity and global connectedness. While all of these traits have some basis within New Zealand culture and history, it is a highly and obviously selective list that necessarily excluded other traits (conservatism, egalitarianism and isolationist independence, for example). The fifth Labour Government narrated its vision of national identity, moreover, around a set of traits deemed necessary for global economic competitiveness: traits such as innovation, flexibility and entrepreneurial activity. But these traits are based on an assumption of the individuation of responsibility and reward that undermines an important foundation of social cohesion. The narration of national identity in terms of economically desirable characteristics meant that identities and interests that diverged from the official shared purpose came to be seen as unhelpful at best, a policy problem at worst. While diversity was officially celebrated, internal difference could only be valued positively if it was the sort of difference that could offer the nation a competitive advantage in the global economy of signs and symbols.

Public policy is important because it affects human lives, and the three policy areas selected for analysis (cultural policy, food production policy and immigration policy) are inherently important because they affect the lives of individuals and groups, both directly and indirectly. These three policy areas also provided an opportunity to address the wider questions of the possibility and the desirability of the Government’s nation-building project. While the Government presented its economic agenda as one of smart engagement able to promote the ‘fundamental nationalist goals of autonomy, unity and identity’, my analysis of these policy areas illustrates how these three goals come to be defined in quite specific ways when they are pursued in a context of global economic liberalism. From an analysis of political language and policy decisions within discrete policy areas it is possible to derive some of the precise definitions offered for these key goals; definitions that reveal much about the limits on local divergence possible given a simultaneous embrace of global engagement. The three policy areas also offer insights into the moral implications of a project in which every member of society is called upon to contribute to a shared national project. Crucially, however, the three policy areas

selected are fundamentally different in terms of the problems they are trying to solve and in terms of their economic importance. Much can be learned from the ways in which the Government’s overall project is translated into practice in the three areas.

Cultural policy, increasingly articulated with the creative industries, was accorded great importance since 1999 within the Government’s nation-building agenda. It was presented as a key site in which identity could be simultaneously protected against the dangers of global homogenisation and projected as a source of value. Just as, within the Government’s agenda for economic transformation, Maori were celebrated for the ‘unique contribution’ they had to make in the development and promotion of a ‘contemporary and future-focused’ national brand for the ‘benefit of all New Zealanders’, so artists were celebrated for their ability to provide the nation with a ‘strong competitive advantage in a world jaded by sameness’.

But this construction of cultural production, in which it is valued for its ‘potential to build a strong, competitive edge’ for the nation by ‘defining our point of difference and communicating our unique values to the world’, represents an unduly narrow understanding of the function of art and culture within society. Evaluating cultural production according to its contribution to economic dynamism and social cohesion limits art’s function as the critic and conscience of society and undervalues the value of difficult or disruptive expressions of New Zealand culture. These limitations are augmented in contemporary New Zealand by finite financial resources, a highly commercial broadcasting environment and a keen awareness of the importance of foreign markets and investment. The tension between the economic and the social imperatives of cultural production dictates that the national specificity asserted by cultural production remained powerfully structured by the global forces that were said to necessitate public support for local culture.

Food production policy stands as an example of how economic considerations in the context of a competitive global economy structures the ways in which national autonomy and national identity could be constructed. New Zealand’s agricultural sector is as central as the cultural sector is marginal to the national economy, and agricultural policy is

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fundamentally driven by the pursuit of production efficiency and trade liberalisation. While arguments for policies to promote environmental sustainability (or arguments against the introduction of GE technology) could be framed in terms of a national identity marked by ethical and environmental principles, they met powerful counter-arguments also framed in terms of national identity. This latter conception of identity - marked by innovation, freedom (from undue state regulation) and global connectedness – was consistent with the Government’s agenda for economic transformation, and it implied at least a cautious embrace of GE. The economic centrality of the country’s primary production sector, coupled with an aversion to state regulation, also limited what the fifth Labour Government could easily do in terms of sustainability policies. The pursuit of collective goals, such as sustainability, was also made more difficult by the Government’s individualistic understanding of such traits as knowledge, innovation and creativity.

These discursive and policy responses were driven by the Government’s reading of global economic forces. Acting in continuity with earlier administrations, the fifth Labour Government defined national autonomy in terms of the economic success that would underpin national security. This emphasis on economic success generated both policy choices (a continuation of the official consensus on the desirability of trade liberalisation) and the construction of a national identity based on economically desirable traits. Given an understanding of trade liberalisation in agricultural products as beneficial and necessary, New Zealand governments cannot easily act against a contested category of food goods (such as GE food) or involve themselves too heavily in initiatives to promote sustainability in agricultural production. In the public debates over such issues since 1999, the language of national identity often fell silent, replaced by a more prosaic language of national interest. In order for the Government’s nation-building project to be compatible with global economic engagement, the national identity it embodies needed to be selectively edited, and alternative value sets (such as those held by Maori and some religious groups in the debate over GE) needed to be marginalised.

My analysis of immigration policy since 1999 focused on how the Government sought to construct and assert a sense of national unity, even as the traditional foundations of that unity (ethno-cultural similarity, for example) were being voluntarily eroded. Because policy settings based around the criteria of “talent” and economic potential tend to create a more diverse demographic, the Government was constrained to offer new nodes around which unity could coalesce. Its basic argument was that the traits demanded for success in
the global knowledge economy also constituted a sense of national specificity: they defined, that is to say, the new exemplary New Zealander. The Government’s limited ability to lure “talented” individuals with attractive incentives, coupled with some public resistance to rapid demographic change, ensured that policy practice since 1999 did not match the ambition of policy rhetoric.

The Government’s exemplary New Zealander, of course, is in no way a distinctively New Zealand figure but a commonly held ideal within the global knowledge economy. And the new discursive nodes of national unity, in their extreme individuation, offered an unstable foundation for an enduring national unity. The Government’s construction of a new national identity, in other words, is fundamentally marked not by its differentiation from global norms, but by its global relevance. Despite its limited application in terms of policy change, this new articulation of national exemplarity remains significant, insofar as the naturalisation of economic potential as the prime criteria for admission to citizenship marginalises alternative perspectives, especially those that would argue for the rights and status of those outside the nation.

In these policy areas, and in its broader political practice, the fifth Labour Government has understood internal diversity reductively, in terms of economic contribution. Official articulations of an inclusive national identity able to reflect and celebrate diversity may well represent an advance on conceptions of the nation in which diversity is either rejected or seen as an irrelevance. But the twin goals of economic dynamism and social cohesion have dictated that this inclusivity is actually used, to an extent, as a tool of exclusion, in which only those elements of difference able and willing to work towards a “shared” national purpose could be reflected and celebrated. Difference could be accepted so long as it contributed an element of uniqueness to the externally projected brand and so long as it didn’t undermine an internally protected cohesion. Class difference, for example, was denied. And the claims of Maori, of artists and of ethnic minorities could be heard and met when they conformed to the terms of exemplarite, but ignored or refused when they did not. The Government’s national vision presented itself as marked by exemplarite.

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diversity, inclusiveness and tolerance, but it simultaneously ushered in a new form of homogeneity structured by the norms of market behaviour.

Concluding Reflections

In the face of increasing globalisation and individualism, the Government saw national identity as something that should be both internally protected (as the guarantor of social cohesion) and externally projected (as a source of value in global markets). Embedded in the Government’s claim to be protecting a strong, confident national was the assumption that doing so would offer economic, political and cultural benefits, and that these benefits would be mutually reinforcing. Throughout this thesis I have argued that the way in which New Zealand identity has been constructed and deployed since 1999 was substantially structured by global economic considerations. Moreover, the construction of the nation as a ‘team of action’ united in their shared pursuit of this economically-defined common purpose positioned individuals and sub-state groups as role-performers related to that purpose.

In turn, these individuals and groups were addressed and evaluated according to their willingness and ability to contribute to the shared purpose. The Government’s nation-building project can be seen as a technique by which internal difference can be managed. Groupings of interest and identity can be accepted within this national vision, but only insofar as they are willing and able to contribute to it. But if the pragmatic positivism of Labour’s project understood internal diversity in the reductive terms of economic contribution, the implications of such an address remain ambivalent. From the point of view of Maori, or artists, or ethnic minorities, being celebrated within a political project is almost certainly preferable to being marginalised or ignored. Even a qualified acceptance of their interests and identities may strengthen their capacity to negotiate the terms of their recognition. And yet the over-riding logic of the Government’s conception of New Zealand as united in a shared corporate endeavour demands that dissenting perspectives be marginalised as unfeasible and unhelpful, and elides questions of the unequal distribution of the project’s costs and benefits.

In this study I have focussed on the logic of the Government’s conception and I have analysed how it has been translated into political language and policy decisions. Interesting work could proceed from this point and engage more directly with the ways in which individuals and groups (such as Maori, artists, the working class and ethnic
minorities) understand and respond to the ways in which they are positioned. Analyses of other policy areas and direct comparisons with other nation-state could also add much of interest. This study, however, has restricted itself to identifying and analysing the limitations on the sorts of national specificity that can be asserted under conditions of globalisation, and the ethical implications of addressing citizens as role-performers related to a national shared purpose. In achieving these aims, it stands as a comprehensive scholarly engagement with an important and topical moment in New Zealand politics as well as a contribution to an understanding of global political change.
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