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The Evolution of the Japanese Strategic Imagination and Generation Change: A Generationally-Focused Analysis of Public and Elite Attitudes towards War and Peace in Japan

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A thesis submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Politics and International Relations,
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Abstract

A significant post-Cold War development in Japan’s politics has been the rise of a group of hawkish security elites with substantial political and institutional influence. A common scholarly and popular narrative that has accompanied this development is that the younger generation in Japan is more open to the pursuit of security on the basis of realpolitik attitudes in particular, and that this will lead to the Japanese government abandoning its postwar antimilitarist security orientation. By systematically examining these claims, this study evaluates whether generational change will become a salient factor that will challenge Japan’s traditional antimilitarism and drive radical change in Japan’s security policy orientation.

Members of the Heisei social generation, born between 1965 and 1989, are the core focus of this study. Members of this Heisei cohort witnessed significant change in Japan’s foreign and domestic policy environments during their formative years when political socialisation is likely to have the greatest impact upon attitude formation. Using the concept of militant internationalism as an analytical framework, this study evaluates quantitative data on public attitudes and primary interview data to identify any notable overlap in attitudes towards national security between the Heisei cohort and Japan’s hawkish security elites. This study rejects the militant internationalist characterisation by showing that the Heisei public cohort continues to support military restraints on Japan’s security policy and military posture.

The analysis of attitudes does reveal, nevertheless, that antimilitarism is no longer an appropriate descriptive label to apply to the contemporary security identity embraced by the Heisei cohort. The assumption of Japanese having an instinctive aversion to the use of military tools for maintaining Japan’s security no longer holds, particularly in relation to the Heisei elite cohort. In deepening the analysis, this study does show, however, that a distinctive but evolved anti-war peace nation identity is still salient among both the Heisei public and elite cohorts. Such an identity will continue to play a notable role in restraining Japan’s evolution as a military actor in regional and global affairs, particularly in regards to Japan being able to use force inside the territory of other nations.
Acknowledgements

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On a personal level, I have to thank all of the PhD students in the department for their companionship over the years. The diversity of our department is a great strength and I thoroughly enjoyed meeting you all. I would like to thank Nick, Ziv, and Lyndon for taking me away from my work for a game of squash or some beers at OGH (usually the latter). My thanks also to Lina for being a fantastic office mate– I usually like working alone, but in this case it was great to have someone around!

But most important, I must acknowledge my family. For their patience – I took much longer than I promised. For keeping me sane and motivated to finish – there was no chance of backing out once it was started! For assistance – Kaori was amazing help during the research planning and implementing stage. And most of all, for their love and support, without which I would not have been able to achieve as much as I have over the last four to five years. I hope I can repay all of this in the years to come now that I am finally finished!
Table of Contents

Abstract ........................................................................................................................................ 1

Acknowledgements ..................................................................................................................... 2

List of Figures ............................................................................................................................. 7

List of Tables ............................................................................................................................... 10

Notes on Transliteration and Translation ............................................................................. 11

CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION ...................................................................................... 12

1.1: Conceptualising Generational Variability ........................................................................ 14
   Categorizing Social Generations in Japan ............................................................................ 16

1.2: Theoretical Foundations of the Study ............................................................................. 20
   Security Identity ................................................................................................................... 25

1.3: Militant Internationalism .................................................................................................. 29
   1.4 Thesis Outline ................................................................................................................ 34

CHAPTER TWO: METHODOLOGY ................................................................................... 36

2.1: Qualitative Methodology ................................................................................................. 36
   Ethics Approval Process ........................................................................................................ 38
   Recruitment Methods .......................................................................................................... 40
   Age, Gender, Occupational Experience ............................................................................ 41
   Interviews as a Tool for Collecting Data ............................................................................ 43
   Construction of Questions ................................................................................................... 44
   Semi-structured and Semi-active Interviewing .................................................................. 45
   Positionality .......................................................................................................................... 47
   Method for Analysing the Qualitative Data ........................................................................ 48

2.2: Quantitative Methodology ............................................................................................... 50
   Survey Selection ................................................................................................................... 51
   Statistical and Substantive Significance ............................................................................. 54
   Major Surveys Used ............................................................................................................. 57

Summary ...................................................................................................................................... 62

CHAPTER THREE: JAPAN’S TRADITIONAL ANTIMILITARISM ........................................ 63

3.1: From Militarism to Pacifism ............................................................................................. 63
   The Security Treaty between the United States and Japan ................................................ 66
   The Construction of a ‘Peace Nation’ .................................................................................. 67
   Aspirations of a Peace Nation .............................................................................................. 70
3.2: The First Wave of Antimilitarist Strengthening (1952-1960) ............................................... 73
Component One: No ‘War Potential’ ............................................................................................... 75
Component Two: No Capacity to Exercise the Right to Collective Self-Defence ....................... 76
Component Three: No Dispatch of the SDF Overseas ................................................................. 77
Component Four: Containment of Military Political Influence .................................................... 77
3.3: Antimilitarism and the Yoshida Doctrine ............................................................................... 80
3.4: The Second Wave of Antimilitarist Strengthening (1967-1969) ............................................ 86
The Strengthening Firewall: Non-constitutional Components of Japan’s Traditional Antimilitarism .......................................................................................................................... 88
Component Five: The Three Non-nuclear Principles .................................................................... 90
Component Six: Arms Export Restrictions .................................................................................. 92
Component Seven: The Peaceful Use of Outer Space ................................................................. 93
Component Eight: One Percent of GDP Limit on Defence Expenditure ........................................ 95
3.5: The Third Wave of Antimilitarist Strengthening (1975-1978) ............................................... 96
Summary ....................................................................................................................................... 101
CHAPTER FOUR: CHALLENGES TO JAPAN’S TRADITIONAL ANTIMILITARISM ................................................................. 103
4.1: Changes to Constitution-derived Components of Traditional Antimilitarism ....................... 103
No SDF Dispatch Overseas ........................................................................................................... 104
No Collective Self-Defence .......................................................................................................... 106
No War Potential ......................................................................................................................... 109
Containment of Institutional Military Influence ........................................................................ 110
4.2: Non-Constitutional Components of Japan’s Traditional Antimilitarism ............................... 113
Nuclear Weapons ........................................................................................................................ 113
The One Percent of GDP Cap .................................................................................................... 114
Arms Exports Restrictions .......................................................................................................... 115
The Peaceful Use of Space .......................................................................................................... 117
4.3: Japan’s Rightward Shift .......................................................................................................... 118
Rising Nationalism in Japan ....................................................................................................... 119
Generational-focused Japanese Nationalism .............................................................................. 121
Realism in Japan ........................................................................................................................ 123
Realism and Generational Change ............................................................................................ 124
CHAPTER FIVE: JAPANESE PUBLIC OPINION AND MILITANT INTERNATIONALISM

5.1 Attitudes towards Power Projection Overseas
Constitutional Change and Article 9
Preferred Overseas Roles for the SDF
The Use of Force Overseas and Combat
Pre-emption and Overseas Military Intervention

5.2: The Global Alliance
The War on Terror and US Intervention in the Middle East
Attitudes towards Strengthening the Alliance
Collective Self-Defence

5.3: Managing Japan’s Security Environment and the Rise of China
General Attitudes towards Defence Strengthening
Attitudes towards Managing the Rise of the People’s Republic of China

5.4: Japan as a Peace Nation
Conclusion

CHAPTER SIX: POWER PROJECTION

6.1: Hesitancy about a Military Identity
A Military Identity for Japan?
Rejection of a Military Identity for Japan

6.2: Preference for SDF Maintaining a Non-Combat Identity Overseas
A Non-combat Overseas Identity for the SDF

6.3: Prioritisation of Non-military International Contributions to Peace and Security
Japan’s International Contribution

6.4: The End of One-Country Pacifism
Conclusion

CHAPTER SEVEN: THE GLOBAL ALLIANCE CONCEPT

7.1: The United States, the United Nations, and the Use of Force

7.2: US-Japan Alliance as the Singular Core of Japan’s Security Policy?
Burden Sharing and Collective Self-Defence
Contributions to US Overseas Military Activities .......................................................... 239
7.3: Japan’s Preferred International Foreign Policy Orientation ..................................... 241
Japan as a Great Power or a Middle Power? ................................................................. 242
Support for East Asian Regionalism ............................................................................ 244
Japan’s Dual Identity ..................................................................................................... 246
Conclusion ..................................................................................................................... 249

CHAPTER EIGHT: STRATEGIC ANTIPATHY TOWARDS CHINA ............... 251
8.1: Strategic Distrust ..................................................................................................... 251
Is China-sceptical Nationalism a Hawkish Phenomenon? ........................................ 257
8.2: Mutual Interests within Strategic Distrust ............................................................. 259
Encirclement of China .................................................................................................. 262
8.3: China in Japan’s Foreign Policy ............................................................................. 263
Engagement and Competition through Regional Frameworks, Not Estrangement .... 265
Conclusion ..................................................................................................................... 267

CHAPTER NINE: JAPAN’S EVOLVED PEACE NATION IDENTITY .......... 269
9.1: Limitations of the Study ........................................................................................ 269
9.2: Japan’s Evolved Peace Nation Identity ................................................................. 271
Evolved Elements of Japan’s Peace Nation Identity ..................................................... 271
Continued Rejection of Great Military Power Identity ............................................. 273
Japan’s International Contribution in a New Era ......................................................... 276
The SDF and Overseas Territorial Combat Aversion ................................................... 279
9.3: Japan’s Exercise of Collective Self-Defence and Normative Restraints ............... 281
Conclusion ..................................................................................................................... 286

References .................................................................................................................... 291

Appendix One: Confidence Intervals and Statistical Significance ......................... 346
Appendix Two: Patriotism, Nationalism and Authoritarianism in Japan ................ 351
Appendix Three: 2012 COJ SDF Survey Figure ......................................................... 355
Appendix Four: Commonly Used Acronyms ............................................................... 356
List of Figures

Figure 1.1: Wittkopf’s Four Foreign Policy Clusters ...................................................... 22
Figure 5.1: Percentage of Respondents in Favour of Constitutional Revision .......... 134
Figure 5.2: Support for Article 9 Revision ................................................................. 136
Figure 5.3: Opposition to Revision of Article 9 by Generational Cohort ..................... 137
Figure 5.4: Support for Revision of Article 9 by Generational Cohort ....................... 137
Figure 5.5: Attitudes towards Individual Article 9 Paragraphs .................................. 138
Figure 5.6: Percentage Support for Revising Article 9 to Specify the SDF as a “National Defence/Military Force”? ................................................................. 140
Figure 5.7: Japanese Support for Acquiring an Independent Nuclear Capability ....... 141
Figure 5.8: Percentage Support for the Maintenance of the 3NNP ............................... 141
Figure 5.9: How Should Japan Approach UNPKOs in the Future? ......................... 144
Figure 5.10: Purpose for Existence of the SDF ......................................................... 145
Figure 5.11: HADR Role as Purpose for Existence of the SDF ................................. 146
Figure 5.12: Support for SDF Dispatch on UNPKOs ................................................. 146
Figure 5.13: Support for Japan making a Contribution to UNPKOs and “International Peace Activities”? ................................................................. 147
Figure 5.14: What Should the SDF be doing Overseas? ........................................... 148
Figure 5.15: What roles is it acceptable for the SDF to engage in overseas? ............. 149
Figure 5.16: If the SDF participates in overseas activities, what sorts of activities do you think they should perform? ......................................................... 149
Figure 5.17: Which of the following best fits with what your view on the appropriate roles for the SDF to perform? The SDF should: ................................................. 150
Figure 5.18: Affirmative Support for Japan Holding Pre-emptive Capabilities ......... 153
Figure 5.19: If an Attack was Imminent from another Country, then Japan should not Hesitate to Conduct a Pre-emptive Strike ......................................................... 153
Figure 5.20: Approval or Disapproval for the Attack on Iraq .................................. 159
Figure 5.21: Do you Favour the US-led Global War on Terror? .............................. 160
Figure 5.22: Security Concern Regarding International Terrorism ......................... 161
Figure 5.23: Global War on Terror Support .............................................................. 162
Figure 5.24: Will the US Fail in Stabilising Iraq? ..................................................... 162
Figure 5.25: Confidence in President Bush to “Do the Right Thing” in World Affairs .................................................................................................................. 163
Figure 5.26: Confidence in Candidate Obama to “Do the Right Thing” in World Affairs .................................................................................................................. 164
Figure 5.27: Do you Support the International Policies of President Obama? .......... 164
Figure 5.28: Do you Support President Obama’s Policy of Closing the Guantanamo Bay Prison? ................................................................. 165
Figure 5.29: Approval or Disapproval for Drone Strikes ......................................... 165
Figure 5.30: Percentage of respondents believing it is “never justified” for the “the military to target and kill civilians ................................................................. 166
Figure 5.31: Should the US military Presence be ...................................................... 168
Figure 5.32: Should Japan Strengthen the Alliance with the United States? .......... 169
Figure 5.33: From now on, what should be done about the US-Japan alliance? It should be: ................................................................. 169
Figure 5.34: What Kind of Country should Japan Aim to become in Order to Protect its Security from now on? ................................................................. 170
Figure 5.35: From now on, should Japan place more emphasis on relations with other nations in Asia or on the US-Japan alliance? ................................................................. 171
Figure 5.36: What do you think is the best way to guarantee Japan’s security of these options? ................................................................................ 171
Figure 5.37: Support for Japan being able to Exercise its Right to Collective Self-Defence ................................................................. 173
Figure 5.38: Support for Japan being able to Exercise its Right to Collective Self-Defence through either Reinterpretation or Constitutional Revision ................................................................................ 173
Figure 5.39: Should Japan Allow itself to Exercise its Right to Collective Self-Defence? ................................................................................ 174
Figure 5.40: Should the SDF respond to any sudden attack on the US vessel when operating together? ................................................................................ 176
Figure 5.41: Should the SDF use weapons if UNPKO units from other countries come under attack? ................................................................................ 176
Figure 5.42: Should Japan be able to shoot down a missile heading for the United States? ................................................................................ 177
Figure 5.43: Can't Say Either Way Regarding the Exercise of the Right to Collective Self-Defence ................................................................................ 178
Figure 5.44: Agree that Japan Should be Able to Exercise the Right to Collective Self-Defence ................................................................................ 178
Figure 5.45: Japan should allow itself to utilise its right of collective self-defence for the purposes of fighting with allied nations who have been attacked ................................................................................ 179
Figure 5.46: The current situation of not allowing the use of the right of collective self-defence for the purposes of fighting with allied nations who have been attacked should be maintained ................................................................................ 179
Figure 5.47: Will Abe’s collective self-defence plans to strengthen the US-Japan alliance and military cooperation lead to more negative or more positive impacts on peace and stability in East Asia? ................................................................................ 182
Figure 5.48: Do you perceive a possibility of Japan being caught up in a war in the near future? ................................................................................ 186
Figure 5.49: Percentage concerned about Japan being caught up in war ................................................................................ 186
Figure 5.50: Support for strengthening or maintaining the SDF’s power and fear of entrapment in conflict or invasion from other nations ................................................................................ 187
Figure 5.51: The SDF’s Defence Strength should be ................................................................................ 188
Figure 5.52: Agree that the SDF’s defence capabilities should be strengthened ................................................................................ 188
Figure 5.53: Agree that Japan should strengthen its defence capability ................................................................................ 189
Figure 5.54: Agree that insufficient defence is a reason for Japan being potentially caught up in a war ................................................................................ 191
Figure 5.55: Concern regarding China’s military ................................................................................ 192

8
Figure 5.56: Japanese perception of affinity for China and perception of good diplomatic relations............................................................................................................................ 193
Figure 5.57: Percentage of respondents believing China’s growing military strength is bad for Japan............................................................................................................................. 193
Figure 5.58: Respondents feeling a sense of affinity for China........................................ 194
Figure 5.59: In an Asia-Pacific where China is increasing its power and influence, do you think the United States should increase its military power in the region, maintain it, or reduce it?.......................................................................................................................... 196
Figure 5.60: Which is more important: The US or Chinese political relationship/The US or Chinese Economic Relationship? .................................................................................................................... 200
Figure 5.61: Do you see China as an enemy or an adversary, or as a partner to Japan? . 201
Figure 5.62: Attitudes towards relaxation of Japan’s arms restrictions.......................... 204
List of Tables

Table 5.1: Why do you think it is necessary to change the constitution? ......................... 135
Table 5.2: Why do you think it would be a good idea to change Article 9? ....................... 139
Table 5.3: Should the 3NNP be maintained? .................................................................... 142
Table 5.4: What should be done with the 3NNP? ............................................................ 143
Table 5.5: Should the SDF participate in UN-authorised “collective security” operations that include the use of force? ........................................................................ 150
Table 5.6: Why do you feel it is justified for countries to equip themselves with conventional arms? ........................................................................................................ 154
Table 5.7: War justified if: ............................................................................................... 154
Table 5.8: War is justified if another country is suspected of harbouring terrorists ....... 155
Table 5.9: War is justified if you are threatened by another country .............................. 155
Table 5.10: Will the US succeed in stabilizing Iraq? ....................................................... 160
Table 5.11: Should the US and/or NATO: ................................................................. 160
Table 5.12: Do you believe that Japan should give priority in its diplomacy to the United States, or Asia? ......................................................................................... 170
Table 5.13: Do you believe that Japan should give priority in its diplomacy to the United States, or Asia? ......................................................................................... 170
Table 5.14: If Japan Recognises its Ability to Exercise its Right to Collective Self-Defence: .................................................. 182
Table 5.15: Should the government spend more money on defence? ............................ 190
Table 5.16: Is spending on national security too much, too little, or just right? .......... 190
Table 5.17: Do you feel a sense of military threat from China? ..................................... 194
Table 5.18: China is proceeding with strengthening its military and engaging in increased maritime activities in waters around Japan. What kind of posture should Japan take towards such movements by China? .................................................. 196
Table 5.19: What kind of country should Japan aim to become in order to protect its security from now on? ................................................................. 197
Table 5.20: Japanese attitudes towards the relationship with China ............................ 197
Table 5.21: Should Japan take a hard-line stance with China and South Korea (on diplomatic disputes) or should it show some flexibility? ........................................ 197
Table 5.22: The Value of Article 9 .................................................................................. 203
Table 5.23: What is the more important dimension of Japan’s national security, military dimensions or economic/diplomatic non-military security dimensions? ............ 204
Table 5.24: Is the peace constitution a reason to be proud of Japan? .............................. 205
Notes on Transliteration and Translation

Japanese names are rendered in the traditional order, with family name first and personal names second, except when referring to works published in English by Japanese authors. In this case, names are rendered in accordance with the order indicated in the citation. The revised Hepburn system has been used for the transliteration of Japanese words.

Translations are my own, unless otherwise stated. This is particularly important in regards to the reproduction of elements of interview transcripts. All interviews were conducted in Japanese, and all translations, as well as mistakes, are my own. I also translated the survey questions from Japanese newspapers, Cabinet Office of Japan surveys, the Japan Social Survey, NHK surveys, and the ATPS and NHK surveys. In surveys such as the Pew GAP and ISSP, the provided English language translations were used for the questions.
CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

Japan’s immediate post-World War II military posture and security policy were both heavily restrained by pacifist or antimilitarist norms. This self-maintained restraint was considered by many international relations scholars to be an abnormal departure from the expected security behaviour of a stable, technologically-advanced, and economically-developed nation-state (Cooney 2007: 23; Singh 2002; Hagström 2014). Japan was seen to be “reluctant” to “become a military power commensurate to its economic capacity” (Takao 2011: 3), and instead attempted to conduct a foreign policy that pursued national interests through economic and diplomatic engagement rather than militarily coercive means.

Recent academic attention has, however, focused on whether in the post-Cold War era Japan will transition away from this antimilitarist or pacifist orientation towards a more hawkish security policy orientation.1

A hawkish security orientation embraces the tenets and assumptions of realpolitik, where the international environment is seen to be one which is “comprised of states pursuing self-help strategies and constrained by few regulatory institutions,” and where “accommodative strategies are not expected to produce altruistic motives in others” (Herrmann and Keller 2004: 561-562). States which are dominated by elites and leaders with a hawkish security orientation will tend to pursue assertive foreign and security policy strategies that prioritise military-focused foreign policy approaches over cooperative approaches to achieving security. Such states will be willing to use force if required, and strategically balance against identified threats to national interests. Post-Cold War hawkishness in Japan’s security policy has been connected to perceived increases in the salience of such realpolitik-orientated assumptions in Japan’s wider security discourse (Middlebrook 2008; Calder 2006: 129-130; Cooney 2007: 50), as well as increasingly aggressive nationalism becoming more acceptable among the Japanese population and Japanese elites (Nakano 1998; Miller 2005; Fukuyama 2007; Moon and Li 2010: 339). Alongside structural changes in the post-Cold War international system (Waltz 1993: 54-55; Layne 1993: 39-41), these two trends are seen to have eroded antimilitarism,2 and likely presage Japan’s security policy being “drawn in radical new directions” (Hughes 2013: 131).


These two trends are also seen to increasingly characterize the worldviews of the younger generation in Japan. The ascendance onto the political stage of a more hawkish generation steeped in the logic of state-focused realpolitik and nationalism is expected to result in Japan making a clean break from its pacifist past (Robinson 1994: 33; Chang 2009: 812-813). A number of prominent security scholars argue that this break will inevitably rationalize and ‘normalize’ Japan’s security policy as Japan acquires its own independent military capabilities and commits more fully to the United States-Japan alliance.

Others scholars argue that heightened nationalism will fill the national identity void previously occupied by pacifism (Tanter 2005; McCormack 2008). This in turn is expected to lead to the resurgence of Japanese aspirations to become a great military power and may result in the public embracing a modern version of militarism (Harrison 2011: 183-197; Yi 2012; Etzioni 2014; Tamamoto 2006). This nationalist resurgence will potentially have destabilizing consequences for East Asian regional geopolitics (Sutter 2002; Chanlett-Avery and Nitkin 2009: 7). These analyses all make the assumption that changes in public and elite discourse on security policy will inevitably result in Japan throwing off any remaining military restraints, and in turn the Japanese government will embrace an assertive military-orientated approach to securing its safety and national interests. Such an assertive Japan would focus on the acquisition of full-spectrum expeditionary and offensive military capabilities that would allow it to project coercive military power into the territory of other nations.

There are, however, no intensive studies that systematically focus on whether attitudes among the younger segment of the Japanese public and elites have moved strongly away from antimilitarism and are being influenced by new hawkish discourses. This is clearly a gap that requires filling in the scholarship on Japan’s security policy change. This is also an important topic in terms of the implications for the security policies of nations in East Asia carefully watching Japan’s security policy evolution, such as the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and the Republic of Korea (ROK). If Japanese public and youth opinion is likely to be the driving force of a more aggressive Japanese security policy, this will justify

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4 For examples of such predictions, see also Smith (2014), Hua and Guo (2006), and Chiba (2007).
concerns expressed by the PRC and ROK regarding Japan’s loosening of its antimilitarist restrictions. If this is not the case, this would suggest that Japan’s security policy is likely to remain restrained in terms of military power projection into the immediate future, and changes in Japan’s security policy are unlikely to result in Japan asserting itself as a great military power on the regional and global stage.

This study provides a systematic treatment of the issue of generational change by answering the question: In what ways will generational change challenge Japan’s traditional antimilitarist security identity and influence Japan’s security policy evolution? The core argument of this study is that generational change will not be a driving force behind radical change in Japan’s security policy and it will ultimately consolidate the incremental but still highly restrained security policy changes currently being undertaken in Japan. The rest of this chapter outlines the important concepts used in this study that support this conclusion. It shows how generational variability was conceptualised and identifies the theoretical foundations of the study, and then articulates the concept of militant internationalism that is used to evaluate the research data collected.

1.1: Conceptualising Generational Variability

A systematic study of generational change and its impact upon security worldviews requires an analytical rationale for dividing a population or sample into discrete categories. A number of studies show that societal developments, socialisation processes, and events that take place during young adulthood can in certain circumstances greatly influence the development of political attitudes that persist well into late adulthood.6 These studies have one common element, which is that they use a “Mannheimian” definition of the demographic concept of “social generation” (Pilcher 1994: 487-491). Social generations conceptualised within a Mannheimian framework are not explicitly defined in terms of apolitical structural demographic trends (such as ‘baby boomers’ or ‘Generation X’), but are formed when an age cohort “during its formative years, collectively pass through events and experiences that destabilize prevailing social and cultural norms” (Rigger 2006: 11; see also Mannheim 1952: 186-187). Essentially, a social generation is defined more by major events of sociological importance and its socio-psychological qualities during a time of

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increased impressionability, rather than by notable structural demographic features. Protest movements, wars and major security events, changes in governmental regime, and rapid changes in social norms within a given society are expected to have a salient, although not necessarily homogeneous, impact upon the way a particularly social generation understands the political and social world around it.

The period between 18 and 25 years of age is generally held to be the period when individuals within a cohort are most likely to be acutely influenced by or sensitised to “destabilizing” social and political change (Kent Jennings 2002; Marwell, Aiken, and Demerath 1987). Persons coming of age during these ‘formative years’ will have their views “decisively coloured by their collective historical experience,” thus leading them to become distinct from other generational cohorts in that society in terms of the issues that concern them and the way they conceptualise their political universe (Rigger 2006: 14). These critical experiences will have long term consequences as political opinions and orientations appear to stabilize the deeper individuals advance into adulthood (Rigger 2006: 14; Sears and Funk 1999).

Mannheim’s concept has been quantitatively tested by researchers who have found it to be statistically robust (Kent Jennings 2002; Plutzer and Berkman 2005; Schuman and Scott 2005), and that “attitudes gained during the formative years are in fact very persistent” beyond the formative years (Rigger 2006: 14; see also Alwin and Krosnick 1991; Sears and Valentino 1997). From the specific point of view of the study of attitudes towards foreign policy and security, salient security events, rapid changes in the international system, and the rise of new threats that occur during a given cohort’s formative years may therefore influence the frame of references they use to interpret subsequent events and evaluate security risk as they become older. It is therefore likely that generationally-distinct security worldviews will eventually affect policymaking and important foreign policy choices when a specific generational cohort starts to dominate political and policymaking institutions, or when a particular social generation starts to make up a substantial proportion of the voting adult population.

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7 See Pop-Eleches and Tucker (2014), Down and Wilson (2013), and Dinas (2013) for recent discussions about how major societal events and developments impact upon attitude formation during young adulthood and lead to the rise of distinct generational cohorts.
Categorizing Social Generations in Japan

The Mannheimian approach to generational categorization can suitably be applied to the case of Japan. In particular, the sociological changes experienced by Japan from the 1980s onwards, and the economic changes from the 1990s onwards, have been sufficiently destabilizing that a different “structural reality” faced those Japanese coming of age in the late 1980s and beyond (Brinton 2011: 11). The transition from adolescence into adulthood for many members of what Brinton calls the “lost generation” was fundamentally different from that of their parent’s social generation and would have caused significant anxiety among this cohort as socioeconomic norms and expectations rapidly changed (11). Boyd and Samuels (2008: 27-28) noted that concern over the continued feasibility of Japan’s postwar economic and redistributive policies in the context of socioeconomic change also overlapped with rapid changes in the international system with the fall of communism in Eastern Europe, and then in the Soviet Union itself. Boyd and Samuels then used the Mannheimian model to analyse generational variation in a smaller-scale study of Japanese members of parliament prior to the 2005 House of Representatives election. Boyd and Samuels found that while there were some indications that the youngest cohort of parliamentarians elected in the 2005 election was more hawkish on some security issues, they also noted that these results frequently did not reach a level of statistical significance (46-47).

This study largely follows Boyd and Samuels in terms of breaking down the sample into three generational cohorts (2008: 25-27). This study is, however, looking at public opinion as well as elite opinion. As post-Cold War socioeconomic and domestic factors are seen to be an important element driving popular nationalism in contrast with the antimilitarism of the Cold War era, this study takes a slightly different approach to conceptualising the generational cohorts in order to capture this distinction. The first social generation or cohort comprises those individuals who were born before 1942 and entered their formative years during World War II or in the immediate postwar period. This cohort’s critical period of political socialization would have taken place either during the wartime period itself, or more likely, during the United States (US) Occupation period and/or the immediate post-Occupation period. This group’s formative experiences would have preceded the rise of popular antimilitarism symbolized by the 1960 protests over the US-Japan Mutual Security

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8 For a small selection of such assertions, see Harrison (2011: 195-200), Tabuchi (2014), MacKinnon (2010), and Sung Suh (2005).
Treaty (discussed in Chapter Three). This group was also politically socialized during the less economically prosperous periods of wartime and Occupation Japan, and would have only caught the tail end of the benefits of Ikeda Hayato’s successful 1960 income doubling plan. This cohort is labelled the ‘postwar’ cohort throughout this thesis. The postwar segment as of 2013 represented about 18 percent of the general population, and approximately 23 percent of the adult population (Statistics Japan 2014a).

Members of the second cohort, the ‘antimilitarist peak’ cohort, were born between 1942 and 1965. They would have had almost no memories of wartime Japan and little, if any, of the subsequent Occupation period. Individuals in this cohort came of age during the period in postwar history when Japan was increasing in political and economic prowess on the world stage. They would have also enjoyed improving living conditions as Japan rebuilt its economy and society after WWII and attained high levels of development (Sakurai 2004: 20-24). Members of this cohort would also have been influenced by the rise of antimilitarist politics during the traditional antimilitarist peak described in Chapter Three, with the 1960 protest against the US-Japan Mutual Security Treaty and anti-Vietnam protests being critical events. This group’s experience of Japan’s foreign and security policy during its formative years was one strongly rooted in a controversial Cold War dependence on the US-Japan alliance and economic relations with the West to the exclusion of the rest of Asia. Many members of this cohort are argued to have taken on the progressive and antimilitarist attitudes embraced by social democrats, socialists and communists during their youth, attitudes that defined social and political movements of the 1960s onwards in Japan (Sasada 2006: 117; Osamu 1989: 282; Robinson 1994: 33). They are considered to be “idealists” in comparison with younger Japanese (Kliman 2006: 49, 153). In 2013, the antimilitarist peak segment represents 33 percent of the general population, and close to 40 percent of the adult population (Statistics Japan 2014a).

The third and final cohort, the main focus of this study, is a cohort whose members were born between 1965 and 1989. They are labelled the ‘Heisei’ cohort as the last members of this group were born when the wartime Showa Emperor died in early 1989 and was succeeded by his son, Akihito, the Heisei Emperor. More importantly, during this cohort’s formative years the Cold War started to wind down with the diminishing of the Soviet threat after Gorbachev’s rise to power in 1985 and the eventual collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. This cohort would have had relatively little direct experience during their formative years of the most intense period of global superpower competition between the USSR and
US that resided somewhat in the late 1980s due to Gorbachev’s “New Thinking” on foreign policy towards the West (Holloway 1998). They would, however, have experienced threats more specifically directed towards Japan from the DPRK’s ballistic missile and nuclear programs, and from China’s military modernisation in the 1990s.

This momentous change in international relations and regional geopolitics also coincided with the deterioration of Japan’s domestic economic and social situation. Japan started to experience rapid and destabilizing socioeconomic change from the mid-1980s. Such changes were brought on by deepening urbanization, the forces of globalisation, the development of the mass consumer market, increasing regional integration, changes to Japan’s political and economic institutions, and technological and communications innovation (Sakurai 2004: 22-23; Vogel 2006: 22-50; Pempel 1997: 349-358). The eventual explosion of the Japanese economic bubble and the end of the postwar economic miracle ushered in the so-called ‘lost decades.’ Most members of this Heisei cohort are also members of the Japanese ‘lost generation’ (ushinawareta sedai) who struggle to secure stable employment in their adult lives or enjoy the benefits of the postwar Japanese welfare state (Hirayama and Ronald 2008: 341; Genda 2003; Shirahase 2010: 39). This lost generation phenomenon correlates with not only broader social and political changes in Japan, but also rapid sociological changes in individual patterns of marriage, fertility, home ownership, living situations and social relationships. The Heisei generational segment as of 2013 already represents about 31 percent of the Japanese population, and 37.5 percent of the adult population. By 2030 this segment should peak in influence and will represent about 40 percent of the adult population (Statistics Japan 2014a).

It is often taken for granted in the Japanese politics literature that members of this generational cohort are no longer steeped in the historical and ideological controversies of the immediate postwar and Cold War period, and are also less interested in Japan’s former antimilitarist identity and in reflecting upon Japan’s wartime conduct (Cooney 2007: 51-52; Kaufman 2008; Matthews 2003). Due to their social experience, this cohort is seen to be generally more pessimistic, and potentially resentful, about both Japan’s domestic and foreign policy environments (Yang and Lim, 2009; Takahara, 2006). There is an

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9 For examples of each of these developments, see Zielenziger (2006: 337-340), Ronald and Hirayama (2009), Bell and Blanchflower (2010: 22-23), Rawley and Hall (2007).

10 This has been a prominent meme in the North American media in particular (Mackinnon 2010; Fackler 2010; Tabuchi 2009).
expectation that this cohort has a less internationalist outlook, and will therefore embrace the nationalistic and more aggressive security policies advocated by politically influential older conservatives, such as former Prime Minister Koizumi Junichirō, and Japan’s current prime minister, Abe Shinzō (Harrison 2011: 197-199; Tanimichi 2005; Kazi 2010: 446). Understanding this cohort’s views will be important as members of the Heisei cohort make up a significant voting bloc in Japan, and the elite segment of this cohort are currently starting to come into positions of influence. Within the next ten to fifteen years this elite segment will likely make up the dominant social generation inhabiting Japan’s political and policymaking institutions as the final members of the antimilitarist peak cohort start to retire.

There is convincing evidence, however, that the vanguard of the Heisei cohort was still strongly antimilitarist in their outlook at around the time they entered their formative years in the mid-1980s, particularly in comparison with their US counterparts. In a survey conducted by Cogan, Torney-Purta, and Anderson in 1983, approximately half of the US university undergraduate students answered that “under some conditions war is necessary to maintain justice.” Only 7 percent of Japanese freshman and seniors agreed with this sentiment (1988: 293-294). More than 80 percent of Japanese undergraduates agreed that there was no “conceivable justification for war,” in comparison with only a little over 40 percent of American students believing in such sentiment. Japanese students appeared to reject the connection between patriotism and going to war, with around 78 percent agreeing that “people should refuse to engage in any war, no matter how serious the consequences to their country may be” (Cogan, Torney-Purta, and Anderson 1988: 293-294). Only around 13 percent of American students agreed with this sentiment. The authors of this survey argue that the findings indicated that “the Japanese do not see war as an appropriate instrument of foreign policy and do not believe that individuals should participate, even to defend their country” (294). Japanese students were positive towards human rights protections both domestically and abroad, thus reflecting “the strength of democratic institutions in Japan” (296). Given this initial pro-democratic and pacifist orientation, one of the key questions that this thesis will therefore need to address is whether the destabilizing events and experiences of the late-1980s, 1990s and 2000s have drawn the members of this cohort away from their initial antimilitarist disposition towards a more hawkish conception of Japanese security identity.
1.2: Theoretical Foundations of the Study

This study is a problem-driven social inquiry that tackles a substantive issue that has practical implications for how social and political actors make sense of Japan’s security environment and its government’s policy responses to security issues (Sil and Katzenstein 2010: 418; Checkel 1998: 325-326). It generates knowledge about the phenomena of social generations and how generationally-specific changes in a national security identity will impact upon discourse and outcomes related to security policymaking. This study utilises the “theoretical vocabulary” of constructivism by using the concept of security identity to analyse generational change and to evaluate in what ways it might impact upon Japan’s security policymaking (Sil and Katzenstein 2010: 418). It is important to note, however, that there has been considerable debate in international relations theoretical literature over influences on Japan’s security policy.11 These theoretical debates raise important issues that require discussion about whether generational differences in relation to ideas on security are likely to have a substantive impact upon security policymaking in the first place.

Japan’s behaviour in international politics has often been difficult to explain by reference to traditional international relations theories. The rationalist theories that dominated scholarly Cold War analyses of international relations in particular (Wohlforth 1994; Lebow 1994) found it hard to explain Japan’s behaviour despite Japan labouring under the “same structural and material constraints as other states” (Hagström 2014: 6-7). For example, the postwar Japanese government appeared to reject the neorealist tenet of “self-help” (Lebow 1994: 250) by refusing to build up its independent military power, even after it became economically prosperous and technologically sophisticated (Miyashita 2008: 24). This continued reluctance violated fundamental neorealist logic where “great powers inevitably seek to develop military capabilities commensurate with their economic strength and overall political status in the international community” (Berger 1998: 1-2; Miyashita 2008: 21). Japan was therefore often treated as a deviant case with an abnormal security policy based on idealistic pacifism that was happy to passively rely on US protection (Miyashita 2008: 91-93; Cooney 2002: 23-56; Cooney 2007: 23-37).

With the winding down of the Cold War from the 1980s, there were further attempts to explain Japan’s international behaviour and the evolution of its security policy by reference

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to rationalist theories. Rosecrance (1986) argued in the mid-1980s that trading and economic concerns would play an increasingly important role in the foreign policy of many nations, with enhancing economic output and institutional efficiency being the key factor motivating nation-state behaviour. This argument appeared to be strengthened by the accelerated globalisation of the post-Cold War era where economic cooperation and multilateralism became increasingly common (Rosecrance 1996: 46). Japan and Germany, as trading states or “civilian” powers, were seen to be at the vanguard of this liberal orientation to shaping international order (Maul 1990; Rosecrance 1996: 46).

From the neoliberal view, Japan’s restrained postwar orientation should not have been a surprise as Japan’s reliance on access to foreign markets and on transnational production networks for economic prosperity will favour the pursuit of security and foreign policies that favour non-military solutions to problems and avoid the use of potentially economically disruptive force (Berger 1998: 4).

Foreign and economic policy adjustments in Japan and changes in the international system from the late-1980s suggested that realist theories of great power behaviour would become more applicable to Japan, despite the failure of similar predictions in the past (see Kahn 1973). Paul Kennedy (1987) for example predicted that, in the context of rise of tensions in the US-Japan relationship from the late-1980s, Japan would not only become an independent military power but would become a regional hegemon that would seek to displace American influence. Neorealist scholars later looked at post-Cold War changes in East Asia and in Japan and initially predicted that Japan would throw off its reticence about great power military competition (Layne 1993; Waltz 1993). Based on Japan’s economic and technological prowess, Layne and Waltz argued that Japan would challenge US unipolar hegemony by building up its military power on the basis of its economic and technological capabilities, and would eventually acquire nuclear weapons (Layne 1993: 37; Waltz 1993: 64-69).

There are, however, problems with neoliberal and neorealist accounts of Japan’s security policy behaviour. Katzenstein (1996a: 17) notes that neorealism frames social and political actors as deploying culture and norms only “strategically” in order to achieve aims determined by the rational pursuit of national interests vis-à-vis other actors in the

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12 For more recent discussions of this idea, consult Berger, Mochizuki, and Tsuchiyama (2007), and Fukushima, Rosecrance, and Tsuyama (2012).
international system. In Japan’s case, this ignores the history of successful public resistance to elite proposals to enhance Japan’s military power in the postwar era. As noted by Checkel (1998: 328), neoliberal theories of international relations also only superficially recognise the importance of norms. Neoliberal accounts of Japan’s behaviour, for example, present the Japanese government’s adherence to antimilitarist norms and military restraint as being motivated more by concern for economic efficiency and rational profit maximisation than any deep socio-cultural preference for military restraint or the norms of cooperation (Katzenstein 1996a: 17).

These materialist theories also failed to adequately predict Japan’s postwar foreign policy behaviour. For example, Rublee notes that Japan continues to reject the acquisition of nuclear weapons despite expectations in the post-Cold War era that it would increasingly consider this option (2009: 94-100). Furthermore, Japanese elites also failed to take the opportunity to project military power on the basis of Japan’s national interests and make military contributions to the UN-sanctioned Gulf War. This was despite the situation being ripe for Japan to play a much larger military role and significant encouragement from other nations, including the United States (Berger 1998: 3). Moving to neoliberalism, Berger notes that as an export-dependent trading state with energy resource vulnerabilities, and Japan’s high degree of dependence on oil from the Gulf region in particular, meant that the government had significant material incentives to participate in the Gulf War (Berger 1998: 3). Japan, however, failed to send even a token military contribution that would have helped “preserve the [cheap] free-ride” on US military power that had previously used to explain Japan’s reluctance to take on a more forceful military role within the international security order (Berger 1998: 3).

Rather than sending forces to the Persian Gulf, Japan made a massive financial contribution of US$13 billion which required the Japanese government to impose a tax on the general public and only sent a minesweeping contingent to the area well after hostilities had ceased. These acts were significantly more expensive financially than if the Japanese government had sent forces “at least on a level comparable to the contingents sent by Italy, Holland, or Belgium” (Berger 1998: 3). In Berger’s view, these nations were similarly dependent on “outside sources of raw materials and equally orientated toward international trade,” and were not hampered in deploying military forces in situations similar to the Gulf War in the way Japan was (4-5). Given the failure of neorealism and neoliberalism to adequately explain Japan’s post-Cold War security policy behaviour on their own, Katzenstein and
Berger argue that greater attention to discursive politics and cultural factors relating to norms around the use of force and violence in Japan was essential for understanding Japanese behaviour from a theoretical point of view (Katzenstein and Okawara 2008: 120-128; Berger 1998: 3-5; Katzenstein 1996a: 17; Katzenstein 1996b: 1). Green (2003), Kliman (2006), Middlebrook (2008) and Hughes (2009a) later challenged early constructivist accounts like those of Katzenstein and Berger that placed an emphasis on the normative antimilitarist elements of Japan’s security policy in the post-Cold War era. Referencing the policies of the Koizumi administration, these scholars have argued that Japan’s strategic culture is making greater use of the assumptions and vocabulary of realism (Green 2003; Kliman 2006), and is thus becoming more ‘normal’ (Hughes 2009a: 96; Middlebrook 2008). Kliman argues that in the post-9/11 era in particular Japan is actually in a transitional phase where its strategic culture is moving from a norms-based to interests-based culture (2006: 2, 155-161). Similarly, Szechenyi argues that Japanese government elites and the public now appears to be losing its strict antimilitarist “allergy” to the use of military force, and the dispatch of troops overseas in particular (2009: 149-150). As evidence of this, constitutional revision is seen to no longer be the “third rail of Japanese politics” (Kliman 2006: 23-26), and the Japanese government has started to acquire military hardware and capabilities that represent a challenge to Japan’s postwar military posture based on “defensive-orientated defence” (senshu bōei). By analysing Japanese parliamentary discourse, Amy Catalinac also argues that a “role identity [that] prescribes realpolitik behaviour for Japan” is starting to form (Catalinac 2007: 91). This transition is not yet complete, but Kliman coins the term “transitional realism” to explain the supposed normalisation of Japan’s security policy and strategic culture (2006: 146-162).

The concept of Japanese “normalisation” refers to the idea that Japan’s security policy is in the process of becoming more rational in terms of paying greater attention to structural and material factors in the international system that it seemed to have avoided addressing during the Cold War era (Hagström 2014: 7-10). In particular, Katzenstein and Okawara note that the normalisation thesis considers the “institutional legacy of Hiroshima and defeat in World War II” to have prevented Japan from pursuing a “normal” security unencumbered by antimilitarist restrictions and dependence on the US for protection (2008: 98). There are problems, however, with the normalisation thesis’ basic assumptions about change. First, like many neoliberal explanations, these realism-orientated explanations for policy change have had to “smuggle” sociological and cultural variables into their analyses. 23
in order to give them explanatory power (Checkel 1998: 329). Explaining the normalisation of Japan’s security policy by reference to changes in strategic culture and domestic politics rather than international conditions indicates that Japan’s policymakers and Japan’s international behaviour is not simply determined by the structural balance of power in the international system.

Second, any concept of ‘normality’ is inherently a social construction defined in part by domestic contestation and in part by reference to the expected behaviour identified by other powerful actors in the international system, in this case, the United States (Hagström 2014: 12; Howe 2010: 1314). Structural and material factors in the international system, perceptions of threat, and the conceivability of conflict, do not have “extra-discursive meaning” and ultimately only gain meaning through ideational and socio-political processes and contestation (Hagström 2014: 11). Tamamoto and Howe both note that the rational choice approaches of the American political science tradition, where the normalisation thesis is derived from, ignore their own culturally-specific foundation by taking a homogenizing view of what different cultures consider to be rational behaviour and attitudes towards the use of force (Tamamoto 2003: 192; Howe 2010: 1316).

A third problem is that assumptions about the normalisation of Japan’s security policy evolution are not only deterministic in terms of emphasising the material causes of state-behaviour, but teleological in that there is a presumption of a natural tendency towards certain final outcome operating as an end in itself in the process of policy evolution. It is not clear why “normalisation” should be the expected natural end point for Japan’s security policy evolution (Katzenstein and Okawara 2008: 101), nor why a concern for normalisation in itself is a salient factor for Japanese elites. Political actors pursue many varying interests and simultaneously possess a multiplicity of motivations for driving and contesting policy change. Perceiving ‘normalisation’ to be the ultimate end in itself ignores such complexity.

The normalisation assumption has also been questioned in terms of adequately accounting for actual Japanese security policy outcomes. Oros (2008) and Takao (2008) have asserted that, while there have been changes in Japan’s security policy since 9/11, the antimilitarist identity has continued to assert significant influence over policymaking and security policy outcomes. Oros notes Japan continued to commit to arms export restrictions that are much stricter than the international standards despite having one of the world’s most advanced
manufacturing bases (2008: 2). Japan also sends only small numbers of SDF members on overseas UN missions, and even then only for non-combat missions. The Japanese government still refrains from acquiring most offensive weapons, including the most provocative ones, such as aircraft carriers, long-range strategic bombers, and ballistic and cruise missile capabilities (including nuclear capabilities) (see also Miyashita 2008: 22). Japan’s overall military posture is still far from resembling a military great power and does not pose a threat on its own to other nations in the region (Howe 2010: 1317-1318). Given the recognised but contested influence of ideational and cultural variables described above on Japan’s security policymaking, it stands to reason that generationally differentiated conceptions of security and identity, if apparent, will also play an influential role on security policymaking. The constructivist concept of security identity is used in this thesis as a way of conceptualising how generational change might come to impact upon Japan’s security policy evolution.

**Security Identity**

According to Wendt, “a fundamental principle of constructivist social theory is that people act towards objects, including other actors, on the basis of the meaning that the objects have for them” (1992: 397). In essence, social identities play an important role in ascribing meanings to objects and actors in the security environment of a nation. An understanding of identity as a security policy-influencing variable can therefore provide insights into how meaning is ascribed in policy debates to national power, military capabilities and the use of force, international structure, international community, role expectations, and the actions of prominent actors in a given nation’s foreign policy environment (Hopf 1998: 175-176; Jepperson, Wendt, and Katzenstein 1996: 33-75). Understanding the impact of identity over such understandings is therefore a valuable way of understanding the restraints and drivers of decision making pertaining to security issues in a democracy such as Japan.

In this thesis, a nation’s security identity is understood to be connected to overall national identity (Oros 2008: 42), and overlaps strongly with the foreign policy and international identity of a given state (Singh 2013: 41). Security and foreign policy identities, and the domestic foreign and security policy debates that they are expressed within, are not simply ideational distortions of “system-driven behaviour” that prevent “optimal” balancing policies from being adopted (Yoo 2012: 319). They are instead an inherently important part of understanding how nation-states understand their interests and the legitimacy and utility
of the methods by which they wish to pursue those interests. The connection between
identity and foreign policy decisions is ultimately “tightly linked” because “it is always
necessary for policy makers to be able to present a convincing narrative of how the present
trends and a nation’s foreign policy orientation point towards a future which is hospitable
to an attractive vision of the self” (Waever 2002: 26), while defining “standards of
appropriate behaviour for in-group actors vis-à-vis an out-group” (Son 2014: 97).

A security identity is not synonymous with a nation’s security strategy or with security
policy itself. Oros notes that understanding a security identity is, nevertheless, critical to
understanding the strategies and policies pursued by nation-states. In particular, a security
identity structures political discourse over security policies, and ultimately policymaking
itself, in four ways. First, it provides a unifying vocabulary to enable political cooperation
around specific policies among a wide range of political and policymaking elites (2008:
33). This enables elites with differing motivations and interests to work together to achieve
common policy objectives, and also allows elites and the public to negotiate policy
outcomes and policy expectations by reference to a shared articulation of a stable identity
(32). Second, it provides a focal point for public opinion. The public can often be resistant
to change and prefers policy continuity over time (33), and also requires a non-technocratic
basis for reference to understand security policy and national strategy. A security identity
thus structures the discursive environment that political actors must ‘speak’ into when they
attempt to assert in public debate their security and foreign policy visions and influence the
trajectory of security policy outcomes (11). Third, security identities become
institutionalized into the policy-making process and exact political and social costs for
violators of the security identity (33). This is particularly the case if bureaucratic norms
related to the behaviour of the military have been explicitly articulated (32). The influence
and institutionalisation of such norms deters policy, behaviour and discourse that
challenges widely-held security identities, again promoting policy continuity over time.

A fourth way that identity structures policy debates relates to how security risk and threat
is identified and politically calibrated in societal discourses about salient security Others
and the type of danger that risks and threats present to the national Self (Hopf 1998: 187-
188). Identified high-risk entities become the referent objects upon which security policy
choices are justified (Mason 2012: 2-3). Risk ascription and recalibration is a complex
socio-political process where state, market and societal actors identify, contest and
collectively mediate the appropriate reaction to be taken towards perceived threats (4).
Agents of change with institutional and political power may try to impose their own perception of risk on a discourse, but this conception of risk is contested and mediated by the political process and through the pre-existing security identity before gaining legitimacy and becoming shared among a wide segment of the public and elite (Mason 2012: 19; Mason 2014: 14; Oros 2014: 229). In the case of Japan, its postwar security identity was one that was defined by a strict antimilitarism and all four of the above noted effects can be seen in the debate over the evolution of Japan’s postwar security policy discussed in Chapter Three.

In this study, the concept of security identity is not assumed to be a logically consistent, all-encompassing ideology that neatly structures beliefs. Rather, it approximates what is called a ‘schema’ or worldview. A security identity is a schema that, like ideological belief systems, simplifies experience, and includes a “rich web of associations” (Larson 1994: 20) that allow the interpretation of social phenomena. Schemas enable people to use pre-existing knowledge, concepts, analogies and experiences to organize complex stimuli so that they can better comprehend new and novel information (Larson 1994: 22). Schemas thus allow people to “go beyond the information given,” and make decisions or comprehend a situation when data is incomplete, ambiguous or a situation is still evolving (Larson 1994: 22). They do this by essentially forcing logical links between sequences of events and outcomes based on a pre-existing worldview (Taleb 2007: 43).

A security identity, once it becomes dominant, acts much the same way. It will often take on a life of its own, resulting in a “narrative fallacy” (Mason 2014: 20). In such a case, social and political actors embodying the dominant identity will defend and reassert the identity by attempting to “theorize and make connections between events, regardless of their empirical similarity or the statistical likelihood of similar future events” (Mason 2014: 20). While identities are frequently challenged and contested (Abdelal et al., 2006: 700), once a particular identity becomes accepted as a broad consensus in society it will become hegemonic by defining the identities of salient security Others and by privileging certain conceptions of the way a state should engage with the world system and conduct its affairs in international politics (Oros 2008: 9-11).

In the case of Japan, a postwar peace nation identity “set boundaries for appropriate action in the foreign policy arena” that restrained the range of options policymakers could pursue, although like a schema it did “not rise to the level of a uniformly causal or principled belief”
(Oros 2008: 11; see also Takekawa 2007: 78). As such, a critical point to note is that Japan’s post-war security identity was not an ideologically pacifist belief system. Pacifism in its purest and absolute form is an ideal predicated on an assumption that complete disarmament by a nation will not invite aggression and will therefore enable a country to avoid war (Yamamoto 2004: 8-11). Yamamoto argues that few Japanese ultimately thought the principle of total disarmament was a serious possibility in the context of early Cold War tensions in East Asia, despite the salience of a peace nation ideal (10). Furthermore, the Japanese government did not, and arguably never intended to (Almog 2014), pursue a purely principled and ideological pacifist security policy.

In the postwar period, the tensions between the overall peace nation identity, the ideologies and interests of determined conservative and progressive political actors, and the exigencies of Japan’s security environment were only settled in favour of a defensive-orientated defence (senshu bōei) policy under the Yoshida Doctrine (Samuels 2007a: 29, 65) animated by antimilitarist restrictions. Senshu bōei was more hawkish than what the strongest advocates of Japan’s peace-nation identity vouched for, but less hawkish than what many security and military elites wished to pursue (Samuels 2007a: 65). As such, Japan’s security policy itself was the outcome of a negotiated but politically contested policymaking process, of which collectively held antimilitarist preferences were an important, but not necessarily determinative, influence. There were struggles within the broader set of influential elites in Japan, and there was struggle between elites and the general public, and neither the public nor the narrow group of security policymaking elites were necessarily fully satisfied with the outcome (Samuels 2007a: 34-36). A key point to note, therefore, in terms of the value of using identity for explanatory relevance is that while identity considerations may not determine foreign or security policies of a nation, they will influence security policy in a way that leads to different outcomes from those predicted by realist traditions which place emphasis on states as unitary actors with homogeneous material interests and homogeneous understandings of global power (Wendt 1992: 393-395; Hopf 1998: 175-176; Singh 2013: 305). A critical element of this study is to ascertain whether the overall security identity embraced by the Heisei social generation deviates greatly from Japan’s traditional antimilitarist security identity.
1.3: Militant Internationalism

An alternative to antimilitarism is therefore required as a basis for comparison to evaluate whether residual antimilitarist attitudes still structure the security identity of the Heisei segment of the public and Heisei elites. The polar opposite of “antimilitarism” is, of course, militarism. Militarism, as a historical phenomenon, is understood to not simply be where a nation has a large, strong, or sophisticated military for national defence (Vagts 1981: 13-17). Rather, militarism is a specific ideology that glorifies the central role of the military in dictating the strength and prestige of a nation, and where the influence of military institutions and martial values pervades society and government in a way that privileges the interests of the military (13). This makes the use of military instruments to acquire security or pursue national interests an attractive option, and usually results in an expansionistic foreign policy agenda (Okabe 1974: 1; Hane and Perez 2012: 258-259). Pre-war Japan itself is often held up as an example of a militaristic nation; not only was there strong military control over government decision making, but there was specific educational indoctrination based on martial and nationalistic values spread among the population (Smethurst 1974: xvi, 164; Hane and Perez 2012: 260-262). There was also severe repression of anti-war dissent (Hane and Perez 2012: 257-258; Samuels 2007a: 26; Allen 1987: 554).

Using militarism as a concept to measure Japanese security identity and attitudes to war and peace would do little to illuminate the gap between Japan’s traditional antimilitarism and its modern security identity. Although many wartime ultranationalists “weathered the Occupation storm” by avoiding punishment (Samuels 2007a: 30), by the 1960s they were virtually absent from mainstream debate and had little political influence (35). Even critics of the influence of nationalist Japanese politicians supporting a stronger Japanese military admit that it is unlikely that Japan will revert “to the old stereotype of Japan as addicted to militarism” (Tanter 2005: 175; see also Samuels 2007a: 77). Using militarism as a framework to evaluate attitudes to security policy change in Japan may result in a straw person fallacy. A more useful and moderate concept that could be used to measure whether Japan’s security policy will become increasingly hawkish is militant internationalism.
The US public, and in particular US elites and opinion leaders, have since the end of World War II been strongly in favour of the US government taking an active part in world affairs. According to public opinion polls, many Americans are, however, “selective internationalists” in that their support for internationalism and the nature of this involvement in foreign affairs can be broken down by reference to whether they prefer a foreign policy approach based upon cooperative internationalism or upon militant internationalism (Wittkopf 1986: 427-428; Wittkopf 1990: 26). Cooperative internationalists, for example, place emphasis on non-military approaches to maintaining peace and stability. These approaches include supporting improvements in the standard of living, combatting world hunger, strengthening the United Nations, emphasising cooperative diplomatic ties with other nations to solve collective problems, de-emphasising realpolitik language, and promoting human rights in other countries (Wittkopf 1986: 438; Wittkopf and Maggiotto 1983: 308). Cooperative internationalists are generally associated with ‘liberal’ approaches to IR focusing on economic aid, economic integration and multilateral action through international organisations such as the United Nations (Wittkopf 1986: 427; Chanley 1999: 25-26).

Militant internationalists, on the other hand, assert the need to use hard power in a successful foreign policy strategy. There are three specific policy components to the militant internationalist worldview which overlap with many neorealist and offensive realist policy prescriptions in particular (Bjereld and Ekengren 1999: 505). The first component relates to support for the projection of military power and force beyond a country’s immediate security environment on to the global stage. The use of force overseas is seen by those with a militant internationalist orientation as a valid policy instrument and essential to guarantee a nation’s security and national interests in an inherently conflict-orientated world (Dolan 2008: 545). There is therefore consistent support for relatively high levels of defence spending to maintain military superiority and the balance of power (Reifler, Scotto and Clark 2011: 249; Hurwitz, Peffley, and Seligson 1993: 267; Kam and Kinder 2007: 324), to maintain the ability to engage in combat operations far from the homeland to remove nascent security threats (Wittkopf and Maggiotto 1983: 308), and to deter military actions by rivals through punishment or retaliation rather than simply through denial (Dolan 2008: 546; Reifler, Scotto and Clarke 2011: 247; Wittkopf 1986: 440). In

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13 Not once since 1942, after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour, has US support for taking an active part fallen below a majority and more typically hovers around the 60 to 70 percent range (Holsti 2009: 44).
addition to the explicit use of force for intervening in international affairs, the use of special and secret forces to conduct more specific military or political interventions in overseas nations is seen as legitimate (Holsti 2011: 130-132).

A second important component of militant internationalism is the full embrace of military alliances and defence commitments to other nations (Chanley 1999; Guth 2013: 247), having forward deployed forces, and the willingness to engage in the cooperative use of force regionally and globally with those partners (Holsti 2009: 136). The underlying purpose of this component is to protect the collected national interests of the allies and balance against or contain potential peer competitors that are the focus of mutual strategic antipathy (Wittkopf, 1986:439). There is an expectation that a significant degree of military aid, including arms sales, is given to weaker allies (Wittkopf and Maggiotto 1983: 311; Chanley 1999: 31). An important, related dimension is that greater priority is given to bilateral alliances than multilateral organisations for managing foreign policy and diplomacy (Reifler, Scotto and Clarke 2011: 251), which are generally seen to be ineffective or even irrelevant to the competition for power in international relations (Drezner 2008: 56; World Public Opinion.org 2006).

A third component is strategic antipathy towards a peer competitor and the foreign policy prioritisation of an uncompromising strategic containment strategy for competing with the identified competitor (Murray and Cowden, 1999: 455-456; Kam and Kinder, 2007: 333-335; Wittkopf and Maggiotto 1983: 306). The perception of another nation as an enemy harbouring aggressive intentions, as an ideological competitor, or as a security threat, has been linked to the use of force and/or the preference for containment rather than engagement in international relations (Hermann and Keller 2004: 561-577; Barker, Hurwitz and Nelson 2008: 308; Bacevich and Prodomou 2004: 51). Strategic containment in this case is understood to involve two elements. The first is the presence of hard military ‘internal’ balancing against a perceived threat to security through the enhancement of a country’s own power projection capabilities, including the ability to deter through punishment rather than simply through denial. A focus is placed upon power maximisation and maintaining military superiority over other potential powers, or at least military equality (Drezner 2008: 62-63; Page and Bouton 2008: 141-142; Chicago Council on Global Affairs 2010: 3). The leveraging of military alliances to externally balance against a perceived threat is also a part of this strategy (Holtsi 2009: 130-136).
The second element is the wide-ranging pursuit of a zero-sum relationship where a country attempts to distance itself from the country that is the focus of containment as well as balance against it militarily. In particular, the containing country seeks to undermine the target country’s economic, diplomatic and security wellbeing in international politics through the zero-sum pursuit of relative gains rather than absolute gains (Guth 2013: 232; see also Holtsi 2009: 130-132; Drezner 2008: 56). Policy cooperation and coordination in order to achieve shared benefits requires that states “adjust their behaviour to others’ preferences” and for expectations of appropriate behaviour to converge before absolute gains can be realised (Simon 1995: 7). In the pursuit of relative gains, a state would forego an absolute gain in its own economic, diplomatic and security welfare if the gain was acquired through cooperation and mutually shared to an equal or greater value with the state that is the focus of containment. In the most extreme version, the pursuit of relative gains refers to the idea that “one actor’s gain is another’s loss,” and diplomatic or military conflict is seen as an opportunity to reduce the rewards that a competing country can derive from a given policy approach (Simon 1995: 6).

Wittkopf found that support for one militant internationalist item usually correlated well with support for other militant internationalist items in US opinion surveys; the same trend was also found for cooperative internationalist items (1986: 427-440). By analysing the data in greater depth using the concepts of militant and cooperative internationalism, Wittkopf also found that most respondents could be clustered again into one of four separate ideological groups (see Figure 1.1 on the page over). One group is called “isolationists,” and members of this group reject all international engagement other than the most basic needed for the functioning of international commerce, and thus are hostile to both militant and cooperative internationalism. A second group is called “hardliners,” and members of this group reject cooperative internationalism, or at least do not believe in investing US resources in non-military security tools such as international diplomacy, disarmament regimes, and the promotion of trade, anti-poverty programs or aid. Rather than a venue for cooperation, hardliners in the US see international relations as resembling the “state of nature” described by Thomas Hobbes (Brewer et al., 2004: 105; see also Brewer, Aday, and Gross 2005; Brewer 2004). Hardliners therefore embrace militant internationalism and see the use of force overseas as having utility and often being essential for the maintenance of security and international order.
A third group takes the exact opposite orientation to hardliners. “Accommodationists” reject militant internationalism, but support cooperative internationalism. They are therefore optimistic about the power of diplomacy to solve security problems. Finally, “internationalists” embrace both militant and cooperative internationalism and favour a strong diplomatic engagement in international political and economic institutions, as well as the maintenance of a robust global military footprint for US foreign policy. Internationalists have been the consensus makers in US foreign policy debates over the last thirty years. This means that there are periods where one form of internationalism can become dominant over another in US foreign policy, but rarely does one form dominate to the exclusion of the other (Wittkopf 1990: 9-10, 52-106; Holsti 2009: 51-52, 118-121).14 In this sense, it may not always be hardliners or conservatives who embrace militant internationalist attitudes, as the embrace of cooperative internationalism does not exclude the embrace of militant internationalism (Herrmann, Tetlock and Visser 1999: 56).15 This study will be focused in the first instance on detecting whether the hardliners and internationalists who reflect militant internationalist attitudes are also prominent among the Japanese population and a wider group of Japanese Heisei cohort foreign policy elites.

14 The most recent attempt to map out these attitudes can be found in Busby and Monten (2012) for 2004 where they found 38 percent of the public were hardliners, 44 percent were internationalists, 9 percent of the public were isolationists, and 11 percent were accommodationists.

15 Wittkopf also found in analysis of elite attitudes the same breakdown in foreign policy attitudes was detectable (1990: 107-133), and did not radically differ from the general public’s orientation (134-165). Subsequent research has continued to find strong support in the United States for both cooperative and militant internationalism, with militant internationalism in particular having played a significant role in structuring the outlook of US security policymaking and military elites (Holsti 2009: 44-121; Holsti 2011; Wittkopf 1994; Chanley 1999: 31; Murray and Cowden 1999; Page and Bouton 2008: 141-142; Drezner 2008: 62-63; Brewer et al., 2004: 105; Brewer, Aday, and Gross 2005; Brewer 2004).
1.4 Thesis Outline

Chapter Two outlines the methodological approach to studying the core research question of this thesis. This study is based on a mixed methods approach that analyses quantitative survey data as well as data collected in interviews from the framework of militant internationalism. Chapter Three outlines the process of contestation that eventually resulted in the traditional antimilitarist consensus over Japan’s postwar security and foreign policy approach that peaked in salience in the mid- to late-1970s. Japan’s peace nation identity replaced the prior militant-nationalist identity that played a role in enabling Japan to invade and dominate countries in East Asia from 1931 onwards in particular. As discussed in more depth in Chapter Three, during a three decade period stretching from the 1950s until the late 1970s, four constitutionally-inspired antimilitarist norms and four non-constitutional norms were institutionally enshrined and came to represent the practical expression of Japan’s commitment to the peace nation ideal as it applied to Japan’s postwar security policy. Analysis of the antimilitarist security identity and how it came to be embraced is essential as it serves as basis for comparison in trying to evaluate the significance of policy change in Japan and whether the Heisei social cohort has departed from this antimilitarist security orientation.

Chapter Four outlines Japan’s apparent movement away from its traditional antimilitarism and the initial changes in security policy that this movement allowed. It then discusses in more detail popular and academic arguments that a more hawkish security orientation is
dominating thinking among both the Heisei Japanese public and Japanese elites. This chapter also notes that the overall security worldview contained within the militant internationalist orientation comfortably overlaps with the views expressed by a group of influential and hawkish Japanese political elites. Chapter Four therefore provides contextualisation of militant internationalism for the Japanese case by reference to the attitudes towards security policy of an influence group of Japanese hawkish elites called normal nationalists (Samuels 2007a: 122-127). The concept of militant internationalism is used as a framework for evaluating the degree to which both the Heisei Japanese public and elites have moved away from traditional antimilitarism towards a more hawkish conception of security identity.

Chapters Five through Eight are the empirical chapters of this study. Chapter Five analyses opinion survey data by reference to the militant internationalist framework to ascertain how far both the public segment of the Heisei cohort have moved away from Japan’s traditional antimilitarist identity, and how it differs from the postwar and antimilitarist peak cohorts. Chapters Six, Seven, and Eight provide analysis of this study’s primary research data collected in interviews with Heisei cohort elites. The aforementioned three individual components of militant internationalism are addressed in these chapters. As this study finds that a militant internationalist orientation to security will not be a driving force behind radical change in Japan’s security policy, these chapters provide discussion of additional themes that arose from the content analysis of the interviews. These themes will be of critical importance in the concluding chapter. This chapter articulates a new conception of the peace nation identity for contemporary Japan that can help analysts of Japan’s security policy evolution understand why certain issues relating to Japan’s military activities overseas remain controversial. This chapter also demonstrates how agents of change in Japan’s security policymaking process still have to recognise the concept of Japan being a peace nation remains salient among the public and the wider group of elites in Japan, even while they attempt to adjust Japan’s military posture and security policy. This suggests normative restraints on the SDF will remain in place in Japan for some time into the future, and generational change will not necessarily be a development that will challenge the durability of these restraints.
CHAPTER TWO: METHODOLOGY

This chapter identifies the main methodological approaches used to collect and analyse the quantitative and qualitative data collected and analysed in this mixed methods study. The study uses statistical methods for analysing public opinion data in Chapter Five, and an active content analysis in Chapters Six, Seven, and Eight. The initial focus for conducting this analysis is to deductively test the validity of using the concept of ‘militant internationalism’ as a descriptor of the security policy orientation of Heisei cohort public and elites. Deductive research starts with theories or analytical insights acquired from “common sense, from observation, or from the literature,” derives hypotheses from them, and tests the suitability of a model for generating explanations and predictions regarding the phenomenon that is the key focus of the research agenda (Bernard and Ryan 2010: 265). In this case, the initial hypothesis that is explicitly tested is whether the Heisei cohort is slowly embracing a militant internationalist identity on the back of the influence of aggressive nationalist or realist thinking about Japan’s international relations. The militant internationalist security orientation that is used for the initial hypothesis testing is discussed in more depth in Chapter Four in terms of how it might apply to the Japan case. This initial focus is then followed up by further analysis of the interview data using the content analysis approach to ascertain original and deeper insights about how a generationally distinct view on security might impact upon security policymaking.

2.1: Qualitative Methodology

The major original data collection component of this study comes from semi-structured interviews conducted with foreign policy-relevant elites from the Heisei cohort. Members of this sample included current Japanese MPs, political party administrators, policy officials, members of the media, think tank members, members of key commerce and union groups and organizations, scholars and members of important cultural organizations and NPO/NGOs. The idea of an ‘elite’ is defined in a somewhat broad way in this study, reflecting changes in Japan regarding the impact of non-governmental influences on policy development. While some treatments of Japanese foreign policy-making see it as the exclusive prerogative of Japanese government elites (executive, bureaucratic and legislative) and the US Departments of State and Defence (for example, Singh 2008; Pyle 2009), other influences have come to have a greater impact upon policy making in Japan over time. This is in part due to the effect of the 1993 electoral system reforms (Rosenbluth, Saito and Yamada 2011) which has required Japanese politicians to articulate positions on
foreign policy that include national security rather than focus exclusively on local issues or “pork-barrel” politics (Catalinac 2013). The presence of wider foreign policy consultation and discussion among elites in Japan’s media (itself becoming more diversified with different mediums for engagement), as well as wariness of social protest facilitated by improving civil society organization in Japan, has also lead to foreign policy being determined less by high-level policy elite prerogatives than before in Japan (for example, see Hattori 2007; Adachi 2005).

This concept of a wider elite cohort also includes opinion influencers. Opinion influencers or ‘opinion leaders’ are an intermediary group between the public and high-level policymaking elites that can become important actors in foreign policy-making. Opinion leaders have been identified as critical players in both the US foreign policy-making process (Holsti 2009: 99; Drezner 2008: 63), as well as in the Japanese foreign policy process (for example, Bungei Shunjū 1990: 99; George 1993: 565; Brown 1991; Maswood 1992). The concept of opinion leader is actually quite salient in the Japanese case and the term is often used as a short-hand for those non-government actors who engage in policy discourse and debate in the media, including university academics, religious leaders, think-tank analysts, public intellectuals, business elites, NGO commentators, and media elites themselves (Shinoda 2007: 174). Sometimes legislative and bureaucratic elites are included in the opinion leader group (Brown 1993: 545). While not all opinion leaders may be involved in the explicit making of foreign and security policy, they play an important role in shaping political discourse and contestation, as they assist in the framing of issues, and draw ethical and normative lines in the discourse that can make certain foreign policy actions more or less controversial. It thus makes sense to consider for interview participation a wider group of participants beyond just current parliamentary and bureaucratic elites.

As there is no research specifically focused on interviewing and interrogating the views of large numbers of Heisei generation opinion leaders, there is a gap to be filled in the literature on opinion leaders in the Japanese case. The focus on conducting interviews with members of Japan’s Heisei foreign policy elite and opinion leaders is also partially practical. While a full survey of public opinion, or “maximum variation sampling” (Draucker et al., 2007: 1137), would have been ideal as a complement to surveying opinion leaders, a randomly selected but representative cross-section of the public would have been impossible given the pre-existing funding and time restraints of this research. An elite
sample was seen as the more valuable research addition, as a wide range of data on public attitudes was already available and analysis of Heisei cohort elite attitudes was clearly missing from the literature.

The issue of identifying foreign policy-relevant elites and potential opinion leaders was a somewhat more difficult issue. Holsti notes that one approach has been to identify “key roles and then surveying a sample of the persons filling them,” in other words, to “sample” those who inhabit professions believed to be influential (2009:100). Holsti notes that another approach has been to target specific individuals who are believed to be influential in some way or form (100). This research relies mostly on the former approach, although Heisei cohort MPs who sat on important foreign policy-related committees were sought out as authoritative sources of elite opinion on security issues. Given that not all future Heisei cohort elites will already be leaders in their field, it was decided that it would be inappropriate to only interview those opinion leaders who were directly influential now, ignoring the cohort of people who may be making their entrance on to the political and policy stage over the next ten to fifteen years. The main criteria for inclusion within this elite sample was that each potential participant was part of the Heisei social generational cohort, and was involved in an occupational or voluntary field that related to Japan’s foreign policy, rather than simply the somewhat narrow security field. The expectation was that they were strongly invested and interested in Japan’s future approach to regional and international relations and had a high level of responsibility relative to their age. Not all of those interviewed will turn out to be opinion leaders who are politically active, or become influential policy elites, as they get older. Nevertheless, a sample of opinions from this broader elite group will be valuable as changes in Japan’s security and foreign policy trajectory are likely to impact upon their contemporary interests.

**Ethics Approval Process**

Ethical issues related to this project were somewhat minimal. The University of Auckland Human Participants Ethics Committee (UAHPEC) requires researchers to gain ethics clearance for research that involves human participants. The researcher is required to demonstrate that participants will be able to give informed consent to participate in the study without coercion, and that the participants will be provided with a safe environment in which to be interviewed. Participants were provided with sufficient information regarding the research project through a participant information sheet that detailed the
researcher’s intentions in gathering interview research data. As a post-industrial, more developed country very familiar with academic research and scientific concepts and practice, there was little concern that Japanese participants would not be able to give informed consent in terms of understanding the consequences of participating in the interviews.

All interviewees were over twenty years of age, which in Japan is the age at which people are culturally and legally considered to be adults. The main ethical issues of this research in terms of the vulnerability of participants related to the need to consider confidentiality. As some of the participants were in high-level and potentially sensitive positions, such as members of parliament, government officials, or in media organizations, keeping their identities confidential in the text was considered to be essential. As it was, the researcher did not wish to give any one view more attention because of that person’s recognisability within the sample, so not being able to specify the names of participants or the exact organisation they worked for was not a barrier to research. An outline of both the Japanese and English language participant information sheets and consent forms were provided to the UAHPEC along with a description of the project and a discussion of the required ethical issues relating to cultural sensitivity, recruitment methods, anonymity and confidentiality, and informed consent.

Research conducted overseas, particularly interviews, can also raise significant ethical issues relating to socioeconomic, cultural, linguistic, philosophical, and moral differences (see McDonald 2000 for a detailed discussion of these issues). UAHPEC required that the researcher be able to “demonstrate that they have considered the safety of the researchers and participants and taken into account ethical conditions appropriate to the area in which the research will take place” (University of Auckland 2013: 15). The UAHPEC also requires that the researcher is familiar with the local law and customs, particularly regarding the protection of privacy and informed consent. The researcher/interviewer was well positioned to address what the UAHPEC (15) labelled the “contextual issues” related to cross-cultural research. The researcher speaks Japanese to a high level that would enable smooth communication, they had lived in Japan for a number of years working in a Japanese work environment, and they possessed a high level of cultural awareness and sensitivity. This would enable the researcher to be sensitive and culturally appropriate in conducting the research. Participants were also made aware of the funding sources that supported this research. In addition to basic funding from a University of Auckland
Doctoral Scholarship, the researcher received additional research funding from the University of Auckland Doctoral Fund ($6000), the University of Auckland Department of Political Studies ($1000), and also received $4000 from the Asia: New Zealand Foundation. This funding was used to support travel to Japan and also within Japan in the interests of diversifying locations where interviews were conducted. Approval was acquired from UAHPEC prior to the researcher going to Japan (Reference 2011/008).

Recruitment Methods

The researcher already had extensive contacts in Japan before starting the research and these diverse networks were utilized to identify potential participants. Assistance was provided by these contacts as well as other organizations. For example, the New Zealand Embassy in Tokyo helped establish suitable contacts, as did Waseda University where the researcher had the privilege of spending three months as an exchange researcher in the Graduate School of Asia-Pacific Studies. The researcher also spent one month working voluntarily as a political secretary in the Japanese parliament for a Japanese House of Councillors representative. Between existing and new contacts with individuals and the aforementioned organizations, the researcher gained credibility which was converted into access to higher-level interview subjects such as MPs and ministry officials. While a small degree of ‘cold-calling’ to specific people and organisations was utilized to diversify the interview sample, for the most part participants were identified through contacts or recommendations as this is both the most effective and most appropriate way to approach people in Japan.

The initial interview participants sometimes volunteered to pass on the details about the research project to people who they thought would be interested in participating in the project. Around one-third of participants were identified in this manner, although in these cases the researcher was careful to wait for contact to come from the prospective participant rather than following up with them directly. This would avoid the explicit use of the “snowballing” technique (Kelley et al., 2003: 264), where the interviewer explicitly prompts the interviewee to identify other potential participants and follows up on those leads. The use of this technique can be appropriate in some situations, but in general the use of such a technique raises issues of coerciveness and whether participation is truly voluntary (Brace-Govan 2004: 58). As fifty-six participants were identified and
interviewed without much difficulty, more aggressive approaches to recruitment were not required.

Every effort was made to ensure that viewpoints were acquired from elites with different political orientations. While the researcher relied on pre-existing contacts, it is important to note that these contacts tended to not be affiliated with any political organization or for that matter, political ideology. The exception of course was the 14 MPs interviewed, although even in this context ideology did not always align with party affiliation. In fact, many Japanese, including elites, tend to not be strongly affiliated with one particular political party or ideology. In the Japanese political system, swing voters are a very decisive influence in terms of elections and public opinion, and political ideological coherency is low. For example, opinion polls in 2012 indicated that self-identified unaffiliated voters made up to 70 percent of the electorate (Jiji Press 2012). The last four House of Representative elections have produced wildly varying results, suggesting that unaffiliated voters are also “swing” voters. Even within the major governing party, the LDP (Delamoutte 2012: 49; Rosenbluth, Saito and Yamada 2011), and major opposition parties (Scheiner 2006: 214), ideological coherence is low. Discussions with the respondents both prior and subsequent to interviews confirmed that most participants were not strongly committed to one political ideology or party affiliation, at least as conceptualised along the left-right axis that is often the case in Cold War descriptions of Japanese politics (Wakefield 2011: 68-70). Ultimately, the sample appeared to represent a mix of ideas on both domestic and foreign policy issues, and the researcher is confident that the sample is not biased towards one particular partisan or ideological point of view. If anything, the sample may be biased towards the centre section of the political spectrum rather than the extremes of Japanese political discourse. In formal terms, this is a research limitation, although, as noted above, if the unaffiliated public or opinion leaders are the decisive political influences in Japanese society going forward due to a continuing lack of strong party affiliations and ideological coherence, then the salience of this limitation is somewhat mitigated.

**Age, Gender, Occupational Experience**

The age breakdown was 23 percent for those born after 1981 (13), 54 percent for those born after 1971 but before 1981 (30), and 23 percent (13) for those born after 1965 but before 1971. This was a satisfactory outcome as those in the mid-to-late 30s will soon become more prominent in Japanese society in terms of participation in the policymaking process.
and/or the wider public debate on security policy change. In terms of the gender breakdown, approximately two-thirds of participants were male (38) and one-third (18) were female, making it a strongly male-dominated sample. Important to note, however, is the current situation in Japan regarding women in positions of authority and influence. Japan has one of the lowest rates of female labour force participation in the OECD (Süssmuth-Dyckerhoff, Wang, and Chen 2012), and only 25 percent of private company workers are women (Zahidi and Ibarra 2010). Only 10.6 percent of all managers and officials are women, and in companies with over 30 workers the figure for “section chief” (buchō) positions is only 5 percent (Gender Equality Bureau 2011). Only 10 percent of MPs in the House of Representatives and 18 percent in the House of Councillors are women (The Guardian 2012). The gender breakdown of the sample acquired in this study could, perhaps perversely, be argued to be a sample that over-represents women. In any respect, given that the researcher was initially concerned about an acquiring an even more gender-skewed sample, this result is not altogether an unfavourable outcome.

The sample was impressively diverse in terms of occupational experience. In terms of public sector experience, 23 percent (13) of participants were either government officials working in central government organizations or had worked as a high level official prior to their current occupation. Around 27 percent (15) of participants were current local or national politicians. The 14 national MPs interviewed were on various committees, but all were on at least one foreign policy related committee. These committees were: the Special Committee on Anti-Piracy Measures, Prevention of International Terrorism, and Japan's Cooperation and Support; the Special Committee on Okinawa and Northern Problems; the Special Committee on North Korean Abductions and Other Issues; the Overseas Development and Assistance Committee; the Foreign Affairs, Defence and Security committees; and the Constitution Committee. 18 percent (10) of interviewees had also had significant experience working in semi- or non-governmental organizations working closely with the Japanese government. At least 12.5 percent (7) were or had been involved in media organizations, and 27 percent (15) were experienced in either IR-related academic or policy research at the Masters level or above. In total, 12.5 percent (7) of participants had experience working in defence-related fields, and precisely one-third of participants were either working or had spent significant amount of time in private sector or involved in international trade and business.
Interviews as a Tool for Collecting Data

Interviews are useful tools for collecting qualitative data because they allow the researcher to acquire an understanding of the assumptions made, or the values utilized, by interviewees in making sense of a complex international environment. This is because the additional time offered to interviewees and the ability to ask follow up questions allow the generation of more specific information. The interviewer can prompt the interviewee to explain why they think a certain way about an issue in addition to recording the interviewee’s opinion towards a given issue. Interviews can also be helpful in deepening the analysis of foreign policy dispositions beyond a superficial understanding of only a few pre-selected answers to narrowly posed survey questions. As an example of this dynamic, the interviews helped the researcher probe thoughts on the controversial issue of collective self-defence. The quantitative data based on responses to questions on collective self-defence showed variation that was initially hard to explain, and depended on the way the question was framed. As the discussion in Chapter Seven will show, while interview participants were lukewarm in their support for the idea in theory, many of the interview participants worried about the various security policy implications of Japan allowing itself to utilize this right in the context of Japan’s relations with the United States given the recent wars in the Middle East. There were also significant differences between those who understood the right as a generalised obligation that Japan had to the international community in general, and those who understood the right as a way to enhance the US-Japan relationship, with the latter being a less convincing rationale. In both of these cases, the overall attitude is the same (support for the legitimate exercise of the right to collective self-defence), but the method of rationalization and motivation for embracing collective self-defence is different. Understanding this difference is important to understanding its potential impact upon Japan’s foreign and security policy evolution from now on, and shows the value of interviews in drawing out the deeper context behind general attitudes. This shows the value of mixed methods research, where initial “data set observations” underpin and inform the qualitative research approach, which in turn allows “causal-process observations” to be more effectively and precisely derived from the collection and analysis of qualitative data (Brady and Collier 2010: 298).

On a few occasions the researcher did have to adjust slightly the content of the questions as well as the order of the questions, and indeed which questions were asked, often due to time constraints or because the central issues were covered in prior answers to a particular
question. In terms of timing, most interviews averaged around thirty to forty minutes. A few interviews lasted around twenty minutes for the respondent’s convenience, and a few also approached the one hour mark, although in the latter case this was due to the respondents’ own desire to answer questions in-depth. Most interviews were conducted in a quiet office environment, although a few were also conducted in public places such as a cafe, bar or restaurant. This did not seem to have a detectable impact upon the respondent’s attitude to the interviews as privacy was generally afforded. Transcription was successful even though some of these environments were noisy.

**Construction of Questions**

The questions were constructed to be somewhat challenging to answer so as to avoid a large number of simple yes or no answers. As noted by Bernard and Ryan, “Terse questions tend to produce terse answers” (2010: 32). While not every question was a long one, sets of questions were prefaced with a ‘frame’ or background context which served partially to challenge respondents to engage with difficult issues, but also to stimulate longer, more meaningful answers and narratives. The questions asked were also somewhat open ended, and pointed towards difficult security issues and debates that Japan will need to address in the next twenty years. In particular they were framed in a way where the respondents would likely need to consult their values in order to make judgements about how to answer the question due to the future-orientated nature of the questions. While some respondents had very clear views on the questions, others were conflicted, although not necessarily confused. Respondents were informed that if they were unable to give a definitive answer to the questions then their general perspective on the question, or even their ‘feelings’ or ‘intuition’ about the question would be sufficient.

One of the first questions asked of the interviewees, for example, was whether they felt that it was important for Japan to be respected internationally in the future as a country with military power. This question was framed in the context of Chinese maritime interventions around the disputed Senkaku Islands. In a situation such as the one identified above, this would usually result in the interviewees starting off answering the question by articulating their assumptions about the international environment, China, and Japan’s own security challenges, before deciding on a more specific answer. This was incredibly valuable. Even when the questions did refer to specific issues that may be only familiar to those immersed
in the security policy literature, the background context provided and the questions themselves were carefully constructed to explain what was meant by specific concepts. For example, with the question on collective self-defence, the researcher was careful to outline what this concept exactly was before introducing the term itself. It was also put into the context of what the embrace of this norm might actually mean to Japanese security policy, namely that if the United States ally was attacked, Japan might be expected to respond to this attack in kind.

**Semi-structured and Semi-active Interviewing**

The use of semi-structured interviews was considered to be critical for the success of this research as probing deeper into the rationalizations behind some of the attitudes expressed was identified as an important goal of the interviews. While structured interviews ask identical questions in an identical order (Bernard and Ryan 2010: 29), semi-structured interviews allow for similar questions to be used, but also for the interviewer to make interventions that allows further discussion on certain key or interesting insights. Semi-structured interviews are, however, supposed to be structured in a way that ensures a basic degree of consistency, which in turn allows comparisons to be made across the data during the analysis stage (Bernard and Ryan 2010: 29). This is particularly important as the researcher was ultimately inquiring into the degree that Heisei elite attitudes conformed to a militant internationalist worldview, and without some core questions consistently being asked, and a consistent focus on themes across the interviews, it would have been very difficult to analyse and code the responses later in the project.

In addition to the structure of interviews, Holstein and Gubrium argue that there is a need for the interviewer to identify in advance an overall approach to the interview scenario (1997: 120-124). They advocate an “active” approach to interviewing in contrast with the “minimalist” tradition of interviewing, whereby the interviewer is simply engaged in the process of “perceiving, storing and reporting experience” (120). Holstein and Gubrium argue that an interview should take advantage of the opportunity to “incite the production of meanings that address issues relating to particular research concerns” (120). This can be done by various types of probing, and engaging in discussion about socially relevant issues that sit alongside the key issues and themes being discussed in the interview. They argue that “active interviewing” can be a valid and valuable tool for exploring deeper issues that may pertain to key research insights that would otherwise not be explored (124).
Various probing techniques were used during the interviews to incite narrative production (Bernard and Ryan 2010: 31). The use of “phased assertions” or “baiting” was occasionally used, especially later on in the data collection process. This allowed for indirect interaction between the ideas offered by different respondents. After the interviewee had offered their own point of view on a particular issue, the researcher very occasionally suggested alternative opinions (expressed as such and not as criticism deriving from the researcher), prior historical occurrences and political controversies over a policy that may complicate a preferred policy outcome. This was done in order to get a particular interviewee’s viewpoint on these particular issues, especially if those answers had been expressed by other interviewees in the past. Such an approach was useful, as by asking the respondent to respond to “orientations to, and linkages between, diverse aspects of respondents’ experience (Holstein and Gubrium 1997: 123), deeper insights into important questions were generated. This ‘phased assertion’ approach was used sparingly, however, limited to at most twice an interview to ensure an atmosphere of implicit criticism did not arise.

The researcher made use of a number of more simple probes as well. One such probe was the “silent probe,” which is waiting for respondent to continue without “alienating them” through a long period of silence. Even though the conversations were recorded, the researcher took written notes. In addition to creating an air of engagement and interest in the answers offered, this introduced an element of natural silent probing as respondents tended to wait for the writing to finish if they had nothing else to say, but did not seem to hesitate to continue if they did have more to say. On occasion the “echo probe” was used. The echo probe involves the reconfirmation of what was said in order to advance and prompt the respondent to discuss further a certain aspect (Holstein and Gubrium 1997: 120-121). It indicates an interest in a particular point and “shows that you understand what’s been said so far and encourages the informant (sic) to continue with the narrative” (Bernard and Ryan 2010: 31). In this particular case, the occasional use of the echo probe was important to give the participant confidence that the researcher understood the conversation (conducted in Japanese) at the level of detail engaged in by the respondents, and that the interviewee could continue to engage in sophisticated reasoning, and ultimately that they were not wasting their time discussing these issues with someone who may be out of their depth. Finally, a “long-question probe” was a particularly useful probe in these interviews, as discussed above (Bernard and Ryan 2010: 32).
The interviews also turned out to be ‘semi-active’ in so far that the researcher was for the most part attentive to the participants comments and conformed to the so-called “don’t interrupt-this-turn rule” (Bernard and Ryan 2010: 248). There is also the issue of their being a fine line between “making meaning” with interviewees and biasing the interview towards one’s own (conscious or subconscious) view of the world as an agent with his/her own political, and for that matter, academic, worldview. There was awareness of the need to avoid coercion, coaxing, or putting words into the respondents’ mouths, or dictating interpretation (Bernard and Ryan 2010: 31). While there is no guaranteed way of avoiding such bias, awareness of these possibilities is an important consideration for implementing interviews where the interviewer plays a large role. The researcher was gratified to find that significant amounts of probing and other types of interventions were ultimately not required as most respondents were quite forthcoming in their answers, covered significant conceptual territory, and were generally very engaged in the interviews.

**Positionality**

As discussed above, the interviewer influences the direction of the interview in a number of ways, and the socially-constructed ‘positionality’ of the interviewer is important to note. As the “social milieu” in which communication takes place during interviews “modifies not only what a person dares to say but even what he thinks he chooses to say,” researchers cannot assume that they will be able to collect data in a “neutral non-social, uninfluenced situation” (Ithiel de Sola Pool quoted in Holstein and Gubrium 2010: 119). In particular, the researcher’s identity cannot ultimately be separated from the answers they ultimately receive. In this case, however, the positionality of the researcher, as a New Zealander who was nevertheless supported by both a foreign and Japanese university, was likely a significant factor in the success of the interviews in soliciting wide-ranging and in-depth responses from participants.

In short, the respondents appeared to offer candid answers to the questions posed. The researcher had sufficient credibility and pre-existing connections to Japan to not be considered a complete outsider. This may have mitigated some doubts about the treatment of information. Nor was the researcher an insider, which could raise worries regarding judgment by peers or carry risks regarding the sharing of delicate information. The researcher was able to speak Japanese to a level sufficiently high enough to conduct the
interviews without assistance, and was aware of Japanese cultural norms. Both of these factors enabled the interviews to go smoothly and without discernible discomfort. New Zealand is increasingly familiar to, and arguably positively viewed by many Japanese, but is at the same time not one of Japan’s important security policy ‘Others.’ This likely worked in favour of the soliciting of candid views. In other words, the interviewees were likely not tempted to moderate the tone or their opinions for fear of offending the interviewer or of being judged in response to specific and sensitive questions regarding China, or Japan’s alliance with the US. In such cases there is always the risk of the “deference effect,” which is people telling you what they think you want to hear, something which the positionality of the researcher might affect (Bernard and Ryan 2010: 267). In the context of the conduct of Japanese social interactions this is a particularly important consideration as many (but certainly not all) Japanese are intuitively sensitive to the social dimensions of the proffering of personal opinions. While the researcher cannot claim to have accessed the ‘true’ opinions of the respondents due to the socially generated nature of all interviews, there was a general sense that the opinions of respondents had been ‘activated’ in deep, meaningful and informative ways and positionality may have played an important role in this outcome.

**Method for Analysing the Qualitative Data**

A modified and directed content analysis will be undertaken in Chapters Six, Seven, and Eight. This is to draw out from the interview texts key ideas and attitudes towards Japan’s future security policy evolution. A “directed content analysis” was conducted to do this. Put simply, “the goal of a directed approach to content analysis is to validate or extend conceptually a theoretical framework or theory” (Hsieh and Shannon 2005: 1281). Specifically, with a directed approach, analysis starts with an existing theory, salient concepts, relevant research findings, or a predictive model derived from the existing literature, which in turn provides guidance for the initial coding approach and construction of an analytical framework to interrogate the data (1281). Directed content analysis is also an appropriate method to analyse the type of semi-structured, semi-active interview process undertaken in this study (1279). As the interviews were not completely open-ended, and participants’ attention was focused on certain topics before letting them give their answer, the directed approach is ultimately the most appropriate approach for the kind of deductive qualitative analysis being undertaken in this study. While the data is not amenable to using statistical tests of difference in the same way as the quantitative data is, codes, themes and narratives can be grouped in terms of whether they are more or less common (1282).
Themes relevant to the discussion of a majority or strong plurality of interviewees will in particular focused on in the qualitative analysis chapters. Furthermore, as one of the major objectives of the qualitative analysis is to identify the presence of militant internationalist assumptions in thinking about Japanese security, the absence of certain assumptions or narratives will be particularly noteworthy and of explanatory significance.

Through the appropriate use of coding techniques, the goal of this directed content analysis is to ascertain whether there is any supporting evidence for Heisei cohort Japanese elites thinking more in terms of a militant internationalist worldview. The previous chapter noted that the militant internationalist worldview or security identity is based on a set of attitudes which supports the projection of force overseas to shape the security environment and protect national interests, supports strong emphasis being placed on military alliances, and exhibits strong strategic antipathy towards a likely peer competitor that must be strategically contained through direct military competition and the diplomatic and economic isolation of the competitor. These related elements served as the framework for structuring the initial coding process. Coding was undertaken through the use of the Nvivo software for organising and classifying qualitative and non-numerical data. This allowed the researcher to arrange the information on the basis of the elements of militant internationalism examined in more depth in Chapter Four, and later allowed for the author to examine relationships in the data between different attitudinal dispositions. The researcher started coding the data according to very general dispositions towards the questions. For example, on the questions relating to the use of arms in humanitarian interventions by the Self-Defence Forces, the answers would first be arranged according to whether the interviewee was critical of the possible use of weapons, was supportive, or was hesitant. Once these broader categories were identified, deeper coding of the data was undertaken in order to ascertain whether there were any consistent narratives shared among the respondents as to why the interviewee was disposed towards the question the way they were. This involved multiple examinations of the transcripts and the coding, recoding, and recombination of themes to not only uncover major salient narratives indicated by the literature on Japanese security policy and attitudes, but also to uncover unique, original narratives otherwise not anticipated.
2.2: Quantitative Methodology

This study also uses public opinion survey data to evaluate both the Heisei cohort and general Japanese public’s overall attitudinal disposition towards security policy issues. Public opinion is considered by some scholars to not be worthy of study in terms of understanding foreign policy outcomes (Midford 2011: 3). There is evidence, however, that public opinion and broader beliefs are influential in that they will restrain or drive foreign policy decisions in certain ways, even if they do not always directly determine these decisions. In his monograph, *Rethinking Japanese Public Opinion*, Midford shows that Japanese public opinion in particular matters in terms of influencing security and foreign policy outcomes. By using case studies from Japan, Midford argues that while public opinion can be influenced through elite framing (Midford 2011: 3, 18-19), it is not infinitely malleable, even by politically influential and highly motivated elites with a specific policy agenda (10-11, 18-26). In his process tracing studies on Japanese attitudes towards the “war on terrorism” and the Iraq invasion after 9/11, Midford finds that robust public attitudes played an important role in thwarting the Koizumi administration’s desire for Japan to make even more expansive security commitments in support of the United States’ interventions in the Middle East (8-11).

Midford argues that “stable opinion majorities” in particular played a significant role in restraining Japanese elites on high salience issues of great interest to the public, such as the foreign dispatch of troops (2011: 11-13). Stable opinion majorities are those that are well over 50 percent in favour or in opposition to a policy, persist over time, and are not greatly affected by survey question wording (10-13). Midford’s research ultimately provides support for Barker, Hurwitz and Nelson’s assertion that “understanding the sources of militaristic beliefs among mass publics is important because democratic leaders cannot sustain aggressive military engagements without the support of the polity” (2008: 307). In line with these insights, this study will provide analysis of the topline results of public opinion surveys under the assumption that stable public opinion in a parliamentary democracy is an important independent variable, which in turn will allow inferences to be made regarding this study’s central hypothesis. Before discussing the data sources used in this study, it is important to discuss two critical issues surrounding data selection and

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16 For examples of this discussion of the role of public opinion in the US context, see Hildebrandt et al., (2013); Klarevas (2002); Barker, Hurwitz, and Nelson (2008); Murray, Cowden, and Russett (1999); Guth et al., (2006).
analysis of public survey information. These issues are survey selection, and the interpretation of the statistical and substantive significance of data.

Survey Selection

There are a number of issues that need to be considered when evaluating the use of surveys as tools for making inferences about a broader population. The biggest issue in survey selection relates to whether a sample is sufficiently representative of the broader population to allow for initial inferences to be made on the basis of that data. The method of actually making contact with a population to acquire a sample is also an important factor in this regard. In general, there are three main ways that surveyors will make contact with potential survey participants in public opinion research. All three methods feature in this study – self-administered mail surveys, face-to-face surveys, and telephone surveys. A review of the literature on public opinion research reveals that all three types have their advantages and limitations and one type cannot be privileged over another. Random digit dialling (RDD) surveys, for example, have the advantage of being cost-effective, thereby allowing a large sample to be collected in a short period of time. They also allow for greater standardization through supervision of surveyors, and give a degree of social distance between the surveyor and respondent (Holbrook, Green and Krosnick 2003: 80; Keeter et al., 2006: 760-761). On the other hand, respondents may not exert much effort in thinking about their answers to questions. Furthermore, RDD approaches have suffered from plummeting response rates, apparently due to new monitoring technology and a general backlash against unsolicited calls (Keeter et al., 2006: 760-761; Ellis and Krosnick 1999).

Face-to-face interviews, on the other hand, result in greater “cognitive effort” being exerted in response to questions in comparison with RDD surveys, and are generally considered to achieve higher representation as people from marginalized groups are more likely to respond to face-to-face interviews (Holbrook, Green and Krosnick 2003: 82). In general they have higher response rates. There are concerns, however, that the interviewer in face-to-face surveys can in certain circumstances influence the choices that are made by the respondent as a mediator. The most discussed of these influences is the “social desirability bias,” where a respondent, in order to avoid what they perceive to be social disapproval, may give an answer that presents a more positive image of themselves or what they think

the interviewer wants to hear (Holbrook, Green and Krosnick 2003: 86-87). Face-to-face surveys are also considerably more expensive and do not allow a large sample to be collected without significant resources invested.

The third method, self-administered mail surveys, avoid many of the issues of the two approaches used above, by allowing greater time and consideration to be given in response to questions while also allowing social distance to be maintained. By providing privacy, anonymity, the ability to cross-reference answers and to take time in coming to conclusions, mail surveys may allow superior representation of the actual opinions of respondents on certain issues (Visser et al., 1996: 212-213). This approach has, however, fallen out of favour as mail surveys tend to elicit the lowest response rates, and because of the time taken to collect a large sample (216).

Due to the prevailing assumption in social science research that response rate is a direct indicator of quality of the survey, there may be a temptation to only rely on surveys that have high-response rates, such as face-to-face interviews (Visser et al., 1996: 216). The logic behind this assumption is that a large number of non-responses will lead to a non-response bias. Non-response bias occurs when a survey’s results would have appreciably differed if the attitudes of non-respondents were included in the sample. This is based on the belief that non-respondents are in some way different from responders and are more heterogeneous than the responding sample (Groves and Peytcheva 2008: 175). Research over the last twenty years has, however, problematized the assumption that surveys with low response rates necessarily contain large nonresponse bias. Visser et al., for example, used election outcomes to evaluate the value of mail surveys and found they predicted election outcomes with remarkable accuracy despite their disadvantages (1996: 216). Subsequent studies have found that surveys with a low-response rate do not necessarily betray a higher nonresponse bias in comparison with so-called ‘rigorous’ surveys, which use multiple and intensive methods, such as incentives and persistent follow up, to acquire a higher response rate (Pew Research Centre 2012; see also Keeter et al., 2006; Groves 2006; Blom 2013). This has led to doubts over whether the non-responding population is actually all that different from the responding population in terms of their views and social characteristics, and when there is nonresponse bias, the impact has been found to be not significant in terms of the degree to which results are skewed (Groves and Peytcheva 2008: 184; Pew Research Centre 2012; Keeter et al., 2006). The implication is that even if surveys with low response rates included the opinion of non-responding sections of the population
in the final results, it is not clear that this would yield different results (AAPOR 2014; Visser et al., 1996: 212-213; Keeter et al., 2002, 2006). In essence, while a high response rate is preferable, it is not an automatic signifier of survey quality.

In trying to gauge the reliability of one survey versus another, a more critical factor may be the initial research design. The most important factor and cause of bias, including non-response bias, in survey design comes from the method of identifying a population sample rather than necessarily the method of acquiring the sample. A “bad sample” leading to substantial skewing of results is one where a sample is taken simply for convenience and often relies on self-selection (AAPOR 2004). Such surveys are not “probabilistic” samples, where a member of a given population has an equal chance of being selected. Non-probabilistic sampling also does not allow for margins of error or confidence intervals to be worked out, thereby undermining the ability to evaluate statistical significance (AAPOR 2004). Internet polls in particular usually produce bad samples and should be disregarded. This does not always happen, however. For example, one study (Kazi 2010: 438) quoted a 2003 website poll from “vote.co.jp” which presented the question: “Would it be right for Japan to possess nuclear weapons?” This poll resulted in 53 percent of respondents in support of the proposition that it was acceptable for Japan to have nuclear weapons. Despite the number of respondents (8,000) being very high, the fact that this was a self-selected internet sample does not allow for the ultimate conclusion that there was an “incipient change” in attitudes towards nuclear weapons in Japan (438).

The decisive factor for selecting surveys used in this study, therefore, is whether probability sampling was used to acquire a sufficiently robust number of respondents. Probability sampling uses random selection, which means that all potential population cases have an equal chance of being included in the final sample frame (Thompson 2012: 11). As an example of the difference this makes, in comparison with the poll cited above, all stratified random probability surveys analysed during this study found no more than one-fifth of the Japanese population interested in Japan acquiring nuclear weapons, and in most cases this figure hovered around ten percent (see Section 5.1 in Chapter Five). This example demonstrates why this study will only use surveys acquired through probability sampling with representative sample sizes (at least 500, generally 1000 or more).

Simple random probabilistic sampling is an efficient way of identifying a sample, but it can underrepresent smaller sub-population groups whose opinion may otherwise be valuable
and lead to a more diverse response. Stratification of a sample is one way survey organisations have attempted to address this issue in order to gain more statistically representative and diverse samples. Stratified random sampling refers to the process of partitioning a sample population on the basis of at least one demographic variable in order to ensure sufficient representation of a particular subgroup. A stratified sample will contain a predetermined number from each stratum in the population, and will in general tend to be more “representative” of the population as a whole than a sample that is not stratified (Thompson 2012: 141). In the first stage of stratification a population is usually separated into discrete geographic units from which a predetermined number of cases are acquired (141), and all of the major surveys used in this study were stratified geographically at some point. Stratification at subsequent stages may be based on further geographic differentiation, or other variables such as age, gender, ethnicity, income or educational levels. The most robust surveys use multi-stage stratified random sampling and analytical priority is given to surveys that use some form of multi-stage stratified random sampling.

**Statistical and Substantive Significance**

Another issue requiring discussion relates to interpretation of the results themselves in terms of statistical and/or substantive significance. It is necessary in reporting on public opinion data to give some quantitative indication of the statistical likelihood of a given sample being an extreme outlier. This is a concern because such extreme samples are likely to result in outcomes that are highly unrepresentative of the population that is the target of a survey. In general there are two ways that researchers can provide indications of the statistical significance of their results and accuracy of the outcome from a given survey. Researchers often provide a ‘confidence interval’ to indicate the reliability of results. A confidence interval is a value range at a given level of probability, called a “confidence level,” within which an analyst or researcher can be confident that the true population value lies (Thompson 2012: 39). If a sample of a population revealed that fifty percent of respondents within that sample agreed with a given proposition, then knowing that the confidence interval was two percent for that sample would allow the analyst to say the population result for the same proposition will in 95 out of 100 identical studies (if using a 95 percent confidence level as most studies do) be within two percentage points either side of the result derived from the acquired sample. Many prominent scientific journals recommend the use of confidence intervals when reporting results (du Prel et al., 2009: 335).
The second approach to assessing the statistical significance of results is through the reporting of the ‘p-value.’ This used to be a popular method for reporting on statistical significance of results, particularly in the traditional science fields as well as quantitative social science fields. The p-value provides different, although not wholly unrelated, information from confidence intervals. A result from a sample is generally considered to be ‘significant’ in quantitative research if the p-value is less than 0.05; that is, there is a less than five percent chance of a given result being due to rare and extreme cases impacting upon the overall outcome (du Prel et al., 2009: 335). In cases when the p-value is lower than the predefined statistical significance level, researchers can reject the null hypothesis that there is no relationship between the variables used. The p-value gives researchers greater confidence that a result is significant below a certain predefined confidence level (again, 95 percent) and is therefore not likely to have been acquired by chance. P-values essentially allow the “hypothesis of equality” to be rejected, which is the possibility that results can be purely assigned to chance rather than indicative of an actual effect or dynamic (du Prel et al., 2009: 335). While a p-value is usually set at the 0.05 level, it is not unusual for “weak” significance of 0.10 to be used in some social science research (Kam and Kinder 2010: 313). A result is conversely considered ‘statistically highly significant’ when the p-value is greater than 0.001, that is, there is less than a one in a thousand chance of a result being generated by chance (Margetts et al., 2011: 336).

This study provides both pieces of information when possible. From the point of view of practicalities relating to this study, the confidence interval is useful because knowledge of the sample size and response rate for any survey is sufficient to work out a confidence interval. Not all of the surveys used made case-level data available which would have allowed the calculation of statistical significance based on the p-value approach. In any respect, p-values on their own are insufficient as they cannot tell the researcher or analyst the range within which a result is likely to be located (unlike confidence intervals), only whether it is likely that the null hypothesis can be rejected (Gardner and Altman 1986: 746). Using confidence intervals also allows some initial observations about substantive significance to be made, as the “effect strength” of the sample can be deduced from confidence intervals, while p-values do not provide this information (du Prel et al., 2009: 335). While p-values will be provided when possible, ultimately confidence intervals provide sufficient insights into the statistical reliability of results, meaning that p-values need not be provided in all cases (Feinstein 1998: p.355). A confidence interval approach
for reporting on statistical significance is, in any respect, becoming increasingly more common in some science fields and social science (du Prel et al., 2009: 335; Gardner and Altman 1986: 746). The process of acquiring confidence intervals is relatively simple. There are a number of calculators available, and with the population size, sample size and desired confidence level, a precise confidence interval can be given. This study uses the calculator recommended by US Department of Health and Human Services for calculating confidence intervals.\(^{18}\) When case-level data is available, quantitative data will be analysed using the SPSS statistical analysis software by performing ANOVA tests for interval scale data, and chi-square tests for nominal scale data to ascertain the p-values of data where access to individual cases is possible.

Even if a result is statistically significant, it is not necessarily the case that a result is ‘substantively significant,’ or in colloquial terms, important or meaningful. Even if a result is unlikely to be generated by rare events or cases, the magnitude of the result could still raise doubts about its relevance. Evaluating substantive significance is a more difficult question and can be a somewhat more arbitrary and subjective distinction than that of statistical significance, depending on the specific research field, project and objectives (Feinstein 1998: 355). Identifying substantial significance has been a consistent problem for quantitative public opinion research and is often left unaddressed by many researchers who provide indicators of statistical significance, but leave it up to the readers to decide whether statistical significance is also substantial significance (Burstein 2003: 33). Certainly, if there was a difference of less than five percentage points between groups, in this case, generational cohorts, then such differences may be considered “substantively small” (Berinsky 2007: 982). Differences larger than five percentage points, and particularly beyond ten percentage points, however, may indicate some kind of substantive significance in terms of probable impact upon politics and policy (Luedtke 2005: 99; Gabel 1998). As one of the key questions animating this research is whether public opinion is a possible driver or enabler of a more hawkish security policy in Japan, one way of reflecting upon this issue is to consider whether a politician would adjust an electoral strategy in response to changes in public opinion.

\(^{18}\) The US Department of Health and Human Services undertakes a large number of high quality household surveys in the US and is a well-respected provider of social science survey data. The calculator can be found at [http://www.macorr.com/sample-size-calculator.htm](http://www.macorr.com/sample-size-calculator.htm).
Page and Shapiro provide the most useful insights into this question. They found that differences and changes in public opinion under six percentage points generally led to “incongruence” between policy outcomes and public opinion at levels not much more than would be expected by chance (1983: 180). As changes in attitudes increased to six percentage points and above, they found that congruence between public opinion and policy initiatives measured over the course of one year increased beyond the level of chance, meaning that politicians and policymakers were arguably reacting to public opinion (180). Page and Shapiro’s work suggest that ten percent is not only considered a significant and notable difference in public opinion, but estimate that it would lead to significant congruence between public opinion and policy outcomes (180). These insights would seem to suggest that a difference of six to ten percentage points would be a good although imprecise benchmark to evaluate whether generational differences are likely to be substantively meaningful and incentivise different behaviour as the Heisei generational cohort becomes a larger percentage of the voting public and is therefore able to shift public opinion. Nevertheless, to rule out the impact of a single poll with an unknown sampling bias giving an unrepresentative image of attitudes, it will be expected that any statistically significant result will be consistently expressed throughout various polls, both over time, and between different types of surveys. This practice of using multiple data points is particularly important as it allows the “triangulation” of empirical data sources. If different survey sources acquired through different methods, and often using different question wording, align, this allows the analyst to have greater confidence in the inferences derived from the core data (Midford, 2011: 28; King, Keohane, and Verba 2010: 192).

Major Surveys Used

A number of different data points and surveys will be used where possible to confirm the results of any given survey. The confidence intervals for tables and figures covering generational differences in Chapter Five are contained in Appendix One for consultation. Six major surveys deserve special mention. These surveys were conducted in a way that met the above described standards, and also provided data over multiple time points. These surveys make up the backbone of the quantitative data utilised in this study.

Asahi Shimbun-University of Tokyo Joint Public Survey

19 Differences of 9 percent registered a level of 64 percent congruence, 15 percent registered a 69 percent level of congruence, and differences of 20 to 22 percent registered 86 percent congruence.
Since 2003, the Asahi Shimbun, one of Japan’s top two daily newspapers (the other is the Yomiuri Shimbun), and the University of Tokyo, Japan’s highest ranked university, have jointly undertaken surveys in Japan that touch upon a range of public political attitudes. This thesis utilizes the three most recent iterations of this project, the 2007, 2009-2010, and 2012-2013 surveys. All three surveys were conducted through postal mail using a random stratified two-stage sampling method which initially selected 3000 potential participants from the Japanese electoral roll. The latest survey was conducted just prior to the December 2012 House of Representatives election, and achieved a robust 63.3 percent response rate, with 1900 eligible voters responding to the survey. This would yield a 1.4 percent confidence interval at a 95 percent confidence level, and a 1.8 percent confidence interval at a 99 percent confidence level. Valuably, case-level data is available from this survey, allowing for finer analysis and the calculation of p-values when required. This particular data set was probably the most robust used in this research as it not only contained both a significant sample size and response rate, but utilized a two-stage stratified sampling method based on a random selection of eligible voters. Most impressively, despite all three surveys being self-administered mail surveys, the surveys still achieved high response rates.

**Cabinet Office of Japan Surveys**

Two regular surveys from the Cabinet Office of Japan (COJ), or naikaku-fu, are used in this study. The Cabinet Office conducts an annual survey that tracks attitudes towards various diplomatic partners and critical foreign policy issues for the purpose of grasping citizen awareness regarding diplomacy so that it can used a reference for foreign policy making in the future (Cabinet Office of Japan 2013). Such issues regularly include Japan’s relations with other countries, Japan’s role and responsibilities towards the United Nations, external economic relations, attitudes towards cultural relations and exchange, and Japan’s desired international role. Every three years the Cabinet Office also conducts a survey on attitudes towards security and defence issues, including attitudes towards the SDF itself. Topics regularly include public interest in the SDF and defence issues, impressions of the SDF, the way the public thinks about the defence arrangements and approaches, awareness of the SDF’s activities and roles, and security and threat awareness.

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20 Data and survey overview is available in Japanese from [http://www.masaki.u-tokyo.ac.jp/ats/atpsdata.html](http://www.masaki.u-tokyo.ac.jp/ats/atpsdata.html).

All surveys were conducted using a random two-stage stratified sampling method of eligible voters (20 years of age or older in the Japanese case). The diplomacy survey generally yields between 1800-2200 respondents out of an initial 3000 person sample, for response rates of between 60 percent and 75 percent, and confidence intervals varying between 1.2 percent and 1.4 percent for a 95 confidence level, and a 1.6 and 1.9 percent confidence interval for a 99 percent confidence level. The SDF survey yielded similar response rates and confidence intervals based on the same initial population sample. The strength of these surveys is that the use of a two-stage stratified sampling method is employed, the sample size is large, and the surveys yield excellent response rates.22 The one drawback of using this survey was that case-level data was not publicly available, meaning that p-values or correlational coefficients were not able to be produced. This was only a minor problem as the results were broken down into age-based increments.

**NHK Surveys**

*Nippon Hōsō Kyōkai* (NHK), or the Japanese Broadcasting Corporation, is Japan’s government-owned public broadcasting organisation. It also conducts a large number of surveys to gauge public awareness on various issues. NHK also provides survey services to the International Social Survey Programme, and is one of the major survey organisations along with Chuō Chōsa-sha (Central Research Services) in Japan. The NHK conducts RDD surveys targeting people aged 18 years or older. It manages to acquire a reasonably high response rate of between 55 to 65 percent in its surveys. Most importantly, it utilizes a two-stage stratified random probability sampling approach, and all surveys have a high number of respondents of 1500 or more. This means that the surveys yield a confidence interval of less than 2 percent at the 95 percent confidence level, and a confidence interval of less than 2.5 percent at the 99 percent confidence level. This study in particular makes use of surveys conducted on citizen awareness of the constitution, the US-Japan security treaty, awareness of peace in Japan, and nuclear weapons.23 NHK surveys do not provide access to case-level data, but again age-based incremental breakdowns are frequently available.

**Asahi Shimbun Surveys**

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22 All surveys, along with descriptions of the data collection methods, can be accessed at http://survey.gov-online.go.jp/index.html.
23 These surveys and information can be found in Japanese at: http://www.nhk.or.jp/bunken/yoron/social/index.html.
All of the five highest selling Japanese newspapers, the Asahi Shimbun, the Yomiuri Shimbun, the Mainichi Shimbun, the Sankei Shimbun, and Nihon Keizai Shimbun (or the Nikkei) (Takekawa 2007: 63), conduct regular polls and surveys in Japan. The Asahi Shimbun is the most consistent and thorough in making its results available for public analysis and conducts a variety of surveys in different ways. It conducts surveys both through the RDD method, the face-to-face interview method, and through mail surveys, allowing some degree of cross-comparison. Critically, whatever survey it conducts, the Asahi Shimbun surveys are meticulous in that they use a two-stage stratified random probability sampling technique, and in many cases the organization uses a three-stage stratified approach. The Asahi Shimbun also conducts annual, large-sample postal or face-to-face surveys which touch upon key constitutional questions and attitudes towards defence and security issues in Japan, as well as supplements the insights from these surveys with regular monthly RDD polls focused on security issues as they arise in public consciousness. The Asahi surveys do not provide case-level data, but do provide age-based incremental breakdowns in their Journalism *gekkan-shi* (monthly journal).

**Pew Global Attitudes Project Surveys**

The Pew Global Attitudes Project (Pew GAP) was established in 2001 by the Pew Research Centre, around the time of the 9/11 terrorism incident.24 With former Secretary of State Madeline Albright as its original (and still current) chair, the stated overarching objective of the Global Attitudes Project is to determine “common points of view on issues and life’s circumstances across continents and cultures” (Pew Research Centre 2001). The survey itself is based on both telephone and face-to-face interviews under the direction of Princeton Survey Research Associates International. It attempts to survey nationally representative samples when possible. The Pew GAP’s data is useful not only for differentiating generational attitudes, but also allows contextualization of results through cross-national comparison. It provides case-level data, which allows finer and correlational analysis when necessary. Japan was surveyed 9 times between 2001 and 2013, with a probability sample method being employed. A RDD probability sample has been used since 2010, which increased the margin of error due to houses with no phone not being included, although the most recent surveys now include mobile phones to increase the participation of younger people without oversampling or weighting the final results (Pew Research

24 All Pew datasets are available for download from: [http://www.pewglobal.org/category/datasets/](http://www.pewglobal.org/category/datasets/).
Centre 2014). The sample sizes for Japan range between 700 and 762, except for 2006 when only 500 Japanese citizens (18 years and above) were sampled. The self-reported margin of error at the 95 percent confidence level has varied between 3.7 percent and 4.1 percent for Pew surveys, except for 2006 when the margin of error was estimated to be 5.0 percent, and 2011, when the 5.4 percent of the population judged to be living in areas affected by the earthquake and nuclear power station incident were excluded. While the response rates are not routinely reported for Pew surveys, the Pew organisation pays a large amount of attention to acquiring a national representative sample from the broader population even as it struggles with declining response rates (for a discussion of these issues see Pew Research Centre 2012).

**Study of Attitudes and Global Engagement (SAGE)**

The Study of Attitudes and Global Engagement (hereafter SAGE) was conducted by postal survey in late 2004 and early 2005, and acquired responses from American and Japanese citizens. According to the authors of the study, Andrew Appleton and Wilhelm Vosse, “the overall purpose of the survey was to better understand how citizens in both the United States and Japan think about their countries’ roles in the world and how they think about global issues.”²⁵ The benefit of this particular survey will not only be comparison within generations, but also between Japanese and the United States during a time when the two countries’ conservative governments were working closely together on the war on terror, with Japan providing rear area and reconstruction support subsequent to the US’ Iraq and Afghanistan wars. This survey allows case level analysis and the research was conducted through a two-stage stratified random probability sampling approach. The Social and Economic Sciences Research Centre (SESRC) at Washington State University in Pullman oversaw the collection of the U.S. data. Chuō Chōsa-sha conducted the Japanese component of the survey. In line with many mail surveys, only a twenty-nine percent response rate was achieved for the Japanese sample, with only 581 Japanese out of 2000 mailed requests agreeing to participate. This nevertheless still results in a 3.4 percent confidence interval at 95 percent confidence level, and 4.5 percent at a 99 percent confidence level, roughly similar to the surveys conducted by professional polling organizations, such as Pew Research. Other polls using a two-stage stratified random

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²⁵ This dataset and accompanying information can be downloaded at [http://thedata.harvard.edu/dvn/dv/wsu/faces/study/StudyPage.xhtml?globalId=hdl:1902.1/10757.](http://thedata.harvard.edu/dvn/dv/wsu/faces/study/StudyPage.xhtml?globalId=hdl:1902.1/10757.)
probability sampling approach, such as from other Japanese daily newspapers or television stations, will also be utilised as triangulation data points to confirm the general trends derived from the main data sources (see Chapter Five for a description of these results, and Appendix One for information on statistical significance).

**Summary**

Taken together, the quantitative chapter (Five) and qualitative chapters (Six, Seven, and Eight) will enable the author to fulfil the goal of answering the question whether there is anything unique about the Heisei generational cohort’s foreign and security policy worldview, and whether this is likely to push Japan towards a dramatically changed Japanese security policy in the future. The concluding chapter will discuss the implications of the findings from the four empirical chapters in terms of what they suggest about the security identity of the Heisei cohort. Before the empirical chapters, however, Chapter Three provides a discussion of Japan’s traditional antimilitarist security identity, which will be used as a necessary baseline for tracking the evolution of Japan’s security identity. Chapter Four identifies the security policy changes that strongly suggest that Japanese elites and the public are moving away from this traditional antimilitarist security identity, and also details arguments that Japan is instead moving towards embracing a more aggressive militant internationalist security orientation.
CHAPTER THREE: JAPAN’S TRADITIONAL ANTIMILITARISM

It is essential to describe the nature of the security identity that became salient in Japan after the militarist World War II period to establish a baseline for comparison before discussing whether generational change is likely to impact upon Japan’s security policy approach. This chapter outlines Japan’s ‘traditional antimilitarist’ security identity, and places it in the socioeconomic, diplomatic and political context that supported its implementation after World War II. Consideration of both Japan’s international environment and domestic politics and discourse provides necessary background for understanding the implementation of eight normative components that comprise Japan’s ‘traditional antimilitarism.’ These normative components were institutionalised in three waves, and antimilitarist sentiment continued to strengthen up until the end of Japan’s ‘antimilitarist peak’ in the late-1970s.

The first wave of antimilitarist strengthening took place immediately following Japan’s independence between 1952 and 1960. Four normative military restraints were derived from the spirit of Article 9 and became important political principles in their own right during this first wave, despite attempts by both internal and external elite actors to overturn or weaken the salience of Article 9-inspired antimilitarism in Japan. The second wave of antimilitarist strengthening took place between 1967 and 1969 when the government committed to four further non-constitutional norms that would serve as internal and external reassurance during a period of controversy over the role of the US-Japan alliance in the Vietnam War. These four components were later consolidated during the third wave of antimilitarist strengthening between 1975 and 1978 as the Japanese government started to pursue a more independent foreign policy in East Asia while also paying increased attention to national security issues raised by Soviet military movements in the Far East.

3.1: From Militarism to Pacifism

Even before Japan was defeated in World War II, the US government had come to the simple conclusion that there was a need “to follow a constructive policy to rebuild Japan into a peace-loving country that would not pose a threat in the future” (Hanneman 2001: 85). Demilitarization and democratization were thus the original goals of the Occupation, and the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (hereafter SCAP) induced the Japanese parliament to conduct a number of political reforms during the early occupation period (Hanneman 2001: 85). The prominent of these reforms included the elimination of militarist
agitators from public life and the promulgation of a new “pacifist” constitution grounded in the ideals of the United Nations established in the aftermath of World War II (Peters 2010: 88-91). SCAP, at the time staffed by idealistic “New Dealers” (Cohen and Passin 1987: 35), also focused on important progressive social reforms (Peters 2010: 79-80). Such reforms included the emancipation of women, land reforms, labour reform and the promotion of labour unions, changes to the civil code, and reform of the infamous zaibatsu, “huge financial combines whose grip on the economy and links with government were believed to have fuelled Japanese military aggression” (Hanneman 2001: 92-94). Such liberalization was backed up by educational reform which de-emphasised conservative ethics and the glorification of war and imperial loyalty in favour of teachings emphasising democratic values, human rights, and citizen (rather than imperial ‘subject’) consciousness (92-93). These reforms were for the most part popular with many elites who were Japan’s initial intellectual leaders in the immediate aftermath of World War II (Hanneman 2007: 480-494), and were embraced by the Japanese public as a whole (Dower 2000: 30, 83-84).

Heightening Cold War tensions and superpower competition would, however, intervene to complicate progress on implementing the progressive, anti-war, international community-orientated ideals of the United Nations upon which the Constitution of Japan was built (Dore 1997: 30-34, 52-55). A change in US policy towards Japan in October 1948, known as the “reverse course,” stunted the growth of the new progressive Japanese nation-state. SCAP provided tacit support for conservative politicians and repressed progressive and liberal political actors that they had previously tolerated (Togo 2010: 47-48). The US Occupation authorities also committed to fully rebuilding Japan into an “economic powerhouse that would serve as a bulwark against communism in East Asia,” rather than the “peaceful, relatively weak” agrarian nation that was the original intention of SCAP (Hanneman 2001: 86, 95). Occupation policy inside Japan became “highly partisan” and anti-progressive, particularly after the outbreak of war on the Korean Peninsula (Wakefield 2011: 117-118). Changes in Occupation policy included the repression of organized strikes, the purging of progressive union leaders, journalists and critics of US policy, and the surveillance and repression of the Japanese Communist Party (JCP) which had links to the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) (Dower 1988: 205-206; Fauconnier 2013: 238, 244; Price 1989: 106-108). This suggested that the “United States no longer cared as much about democratizing Japan as about anti-Communism” (Samuels 2001).
SCAP and the US government also softened some of the “demilitarizing” reforms, such as the complete deconstruction of the *zaibatsu* (Hanneman 2001: 94). SCAP and the US government then decided to decisively throw their support behind conservative and nationalistic political elites in Japanese society, including former high-ranking wartime elites, to combat the rise of socialism in Japan (Takekawa 2007: 59; Dower 1987). The US “de-purged” thousands of wartime conservatives, leading to many wartime officials returning to government roles (Reed 1988: 326) or to the parliament on the back of still existing political and patronage networks (316). Conservative wartime parliamentarians in Japan’s postwar House of Representatives jumped from 10.1 percent in 1949 to 28.9 percent by 1952 (Fukui 1970: 218). Depurgees, many of whom were bureaucrats in the wartime government, made up 30 percent of the Diet after the 1952 election (Reed 1988: 327).

One of the most controversial Occupation moves was MacArthur’s authorization in 1950 of the “formation of a 75,000 member self-defence force to compensate for American forces that left Japan for Korea” (Hanneman 2001: 95). The formation of the National Police Reserve (NPR) was resisted by many groups throughout the political spectrum in Japan. With wartime elites coming back into the political system and reintroducing “prewar issues and cleavages into the system” (Reed 1988: 326), the prospect of remilitarisation raised the spectre of domestic repression. Progressives in particular saw the new NPR as being a possible instrument of domestic ideological repression rather than being for national self-defence (Welfield 1988: 73-77; Kersten 2006: 306). The result of these various reverse course moves was the intensification of the “internal Cold War” through conservative-progressive polarisation, and increasing social and political unrest (French 2014: 25-28, 34).

Supporters of Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru, Japan’s conservative prime minister between 1946 and 1954 for all but 17 months, did have mixed feelings about the establishment of the NPR as a new armed Japanese organisation. While Yoshida and his supporters were increasingly concerned about social order and the threat of a communist insurgency in Japan (French 2014: 25-28, 34), they also perceived US plans for new Japanese armed forces as a potential economic drain, and as a potential source of future recruits for any US war on the Asian mainland. The US government would soon pressure Yoshida to further enhance Japan’s armed forces, which resulted in the NPR being converted into the National Safety Force (NSF) in 1952. This new organisation represented
a more traditional standing military with heavy arms under an embryonic ministry of
defence (Welfield 1988: 78-79). The US would soon push to increase the NSF’s numbers
to over 300,000 troops, a number for which there was little security justification unless
there were unstated plans for a sizeable proportion of them to be deployed overseas (Chai
1997: 397). Even before the end of the Occupation, Yoshida became determined to “check”
the development of the NPR, and then the NSF, into a full-scale military (Welfield 1988:
72). Yoshida was particularly adamant that such armed organisations would not be
integrated into the United States military presence in East Asia as had been advocated by

The Security Treaty between the United States and Japan
The original 1952 US-Japan Security Treaty was negotiated during the Occupation and
“enforced” upon Japan as a necessary concession for receiving back its sovereignty
(Hanneman 2001: 96). Hara notes that when Japan regained its formal independence in
1952 it was widely felt that Japan was coerced into agreeing to a problematic security treaty
and, without a genuine choice being given, Japan had been “locked into the US side of the
Cold War structure” as a “subordinate partner to the USA” (Hara 2003: 39; see also Togo
2010: 49-50). Ominously, the treaty also compelled Japan to remilitarize while under US
protection. Soon after independence, the US would also encourage the recreation of a
military-industrial complex in Japan (Samuels 1996: 130-161; Oros 2008: 94-102). During
this early period, even ostensibly pro-Western conservative political figures such as Prime
Minister Yoshida perceived the United States to be simultaneously “Japan’s most
dangerous enemy and most desirable ally” (Samuels 2007a: 32).

This concern was due in part to concerns about militarisation being an economic burden on
Japan or leading to entrapment of Japan or its new Self-Defence Forces in war either at
home or overseas (Izumikawa 2010). Particularly controversial was the treaty provision
that the US military presence would be necessary “to contribute to the maintenance of
international peace and security in the Far East and to the security of Japan against armed
attack from without,” suggesting that the US would be using military bases in Japan for
purposes other than the protection of Japan (Togo 2010: 51, 54). The unequal treaty with
the US, the continued presence of US military bases in Japan, and the continuation of US
administration of Okinawa as essentially a massive Cold War US military base, would
consolidate both public and elite fears about entrapment in US military policy in East Asia
in Japan (Togo 2010: 52-53; Samuels 2007a: 14-33; Peters 2010: 72, 91-98). The US also thwarted Japanese attempts to independently reengage with various countries in Asia economically or diplomatically due to the US’ own Cold War strategy (Takamine 2012: 26-28; Drifte 2012: 14, 20), including even other US allies (Sahashi 2012: 215).

Progressive forces were also troubled by the provision in the treaty that, at the request of the (conservative) Japanese government, the US military could intervene in Japan to “put down large-scale internal riots and disturbances in Japan” if instigated by “outside powers” (Togo 2010: 54). The treaty would also not permit Japan to implement similar security relationships with other nations. This was a problem because many moderate and progressive elites advocated for Japan to take a neutral stance in the Cold War (Bukh 2009: 35) by forging a “comprehensive peace” with all prominent geopolitical actors in the region, rather than a “partial peace” with the US alone (Peters 2010: 125, 129). The ratification of the treaty stimulated opposition from civil society groups, including unions, the student movement, newly emerging women’s rights organizations (148), and explicitly peace-focused organizations. The anti-treaty socialist parties championed this cause and opposed the treaty in parliament (130) and would go on to make major gains in the October 1952 election immediately following the end of the Occupation. Yoshida and his cabinet thus sought to temper US expectations regarding remilitarization both before and after independence (Togo 2010: 53). They used the war-renouncing Article 9, public sentiment, and loud progressive opposition as a “weapon” against US expectations of Japanese remilitarisation and full Japanese cooperation in Cold War military strategy (Boyd and Samuels 2005: 25-26).

**The Construction of a 'Peace Nation’**

It is important to note that the consolidation of Japan’s postwar antimilitarism was not simply an idealistic, “war-induced” (Kunihiro 1997: 37) pacifist social experiment deriving from a reactive, fear-based response to the horrors of war (Cai 2008: 197; see also Almog 2014). It was by no means inevitable that Japan was going to embrace antimilitarist norms in the postwar period, and there was ample opportunity for Japan’s leaders to change the constitution after independence, especially given US government support for this action. At various points during the US Occupation, a plurality of the Japanese population actually supported constitutional change and a degree of independent rearmament (Miyashita 2008: 30-31; Chai 1997: 397; Bukh 2007: 9). Some members of the Japanese conservative elite
with links to the wartime government, called revisionist conservatives, were also initially eager to embrace the reconstruction of an independent Japanese military, especially in the context of the Cold War and the potential for ‘hot’ wars in East Asia to draw Japan into a conflict (Chai 1997: 398; Oros 2008: 60; Boyd and Samuels 2005: 25-26). At around the time of the start of the Korean War, a discernible project of renewing Japan’s national identity under a newly independent, democratic regime arose to contest such a development (Miyashita 2008: 30-31).

The construction and promotion of the “peace nation” ideal (heiwa kokka kensetsu) would play a critical role in influencing the direction of Japan’s postwar security policy. Through appeals to the war-renouncing Article 9 of the Constitution of Japan, progressive intellectuals in the heiwa mondai danwa-kai (Peace Issues Discussion Group) had success in promoting opposition to rearmament in the early 1950s (Samuels 2007a: 30-31; Peters 2010: 128; Scheiner 2006: 46). The prevailing sentiment in regards to the history of the Pacific War gradually came to be that the Japanese wartime military’s political independence (Kowner 2007: 39-41, 51; Gow 2004: 4, 11; Maxon 1973), and the Imperial Japanese Army’s intervention in politics in particular (Nakamura and Tobe 1988: 512), were significant factors that led to domestic repression at home during the 1930s. The military’s role in driving the policy process from the 1930s would also lead to Japanese entrapment in costly wars, and the sacrifice of Japanese citizens on the Asian continent (not to mention atrocities committed against many Chinese) (Orr 2001: 66; Conroy 1970: 61-64). The military was seen to have ‘victimised’ the Japanese population (Orr 2001: 3, 66; Midford 2002: 37; Wirth 2009: 476; Kersten 1995: 3), and was ultimately responsible for bringing war and devastation back to Japan during World War II and forcing the population to endure significant postwar deprivities. This led to a condition called kyodatsu afflicting the Japanese population, which Dower describes as a state of exhaustion and despair that led to “psychic collapse” among the Japanese populace after the end of the war (Dower 2010: 88-89). This was fertile ground for a new national identity based on the concept of a

26 As noted by Yamamoto (2004:10), the Japanese term for peace nation (heiwa kokka) is not in its usage in Japan’s debate equivalent to “pacifist nation,” nor should heiwa-shugi (lit. peace-ism) be translated as pacifism as is common in English descriptions of Japan. Identifying Japan’s orientation towards international security and national identity as pacifist would be problematic as pacifism is a discrete and specific set of attitudes and principles that morally reject coercive violence in all of its forms, in many cases, even for self-defence (see Almog 2014). Yamamoto suggests that the national ideal encapsulated in the idea of heiwa-shugi is more akin to the concept of “pacifism,” which expresses a general tendency to choose peaceful solutions over violent ones, but is less morally absolute in terms of ruling out the use of force (2004:10).
peace nation to be asserted, and grassroots anti-base, anti-alliance, and antinuclear movements of the 1950s through to the early 1970s seized upon the opportunity to promote this ideal (Orr 2001; Izumikawa 2010: 125-130; Takekawa 2007: 59-60).

Japan’s media also played an important role in nurturing this identity. For example, the Asahi Shimbun attempted to enhance Japanese public’s sense of pride by “transforming their experiences in war, including Hiroshima and Nagasaki, into their moral authority to lead in the development of world peace” (Takekawa 2007: 66; see also Orr 2001). This new peace nationalism was essentially an attempt to develop a positive sense of national self and “a new sense of national purpose” that would differentiate Japan from not only its own wartime militarism, but also from the United States and the USSR who were in military competition with each other during the Cold War (Hagström 2014: 8; see also Orr 2001: 65). The general public continued to support conservative rule due to their promise of economic development, but, as described below, more hawkish conservatives were not able to realise their agenda to thoroughly rebuild Japan into an independent military power. In fact, paying respect to this peace nation ideal became unavoidable and politicians had to be careful to frame policy in this context to avoid being associated with militarism and wartime politics (Takekawa 2007: 66).

Even former suspected war criminals ultimately came to understand the importance of this identity. For example, in explaining to a puzzled American government why the Japanese government had taken on an antimilitarist and an anti-nuclear weapons stance on the global stage subsequent to its accession to the UN, wartime elite and Foreign Minister Fujiyama Aiichirō once offered: “The psychological situation in Japan compels the Government to stand for disarmament, the abolition of war, and the establishment of peace, and against the manufacture and use of all nuclear weapons” (Dower 2014). During the 1950s and 1960s even the conservative Yomiuri Shimbun emphasised individualism and democracy, and was sceptical of changing the constitution as advocated by the “old” revisionist conservatives (Takekawa 2007: 68). In this sense, the Yomiuri Shimbun expressed a view on postwar rebuilding that was closer to the views of the so-called mainstream conservatives in Japan, such as Prime Minister Yoshida, who were in no rush to build up an independent Japanese military.

Politicians such as Yoshida who wanted to resist US government and revisionist conservative pressures to remilitarize, would therefore appeal to this public discourse in
parliamentary proceedings to justify their preferences for a low-profile diplomacy not overly entangled in US foreign policy in East Asia (Rublee 2009: 55; Pyle 1996: 22). This would also have the additional benefit of neutralizing the growing political challenge of left-wing parties during the 1950s, which had been successfully championing support for a security approach that was completely opposed to rearmament and entanglement in the US-Japan alliance (Schneier 2006: 46; Welfield 1988: 81). Many top US officials would eventually come to see the original insertion of Article 9 into the constitution as a “mistake” as Japanese elites used Article 9 to push back against United States demands for military rearmament in aid of US foreign policy objectives (Chai 1997: 397; see also Pyle 1996: 22-24; Samuels 2007a: 30, 39).

**Aspirations of a Peace Nation**

Three interrelated major aspirations and commitments are critical to understanding the immediate post-independence articulation of a peace nation identity based on Article 9. The first important commitment relates to Japan’s positioning within the international system. Contrary to aspirations developed during the post-Meiji Restoration era, there was support for the idea that Japan should not seek to become a great military power (*gunji kokka*), and it would reject war as an instrument for pursuing national interest and security. A great power in material terms has a significant population, and because of this it is economically large. Based on its economic size, it has developed a significant military industrial base and therefore has significant independent military capabilities (Buzan 2004: 59-60). In addition to projecting its military capabilities beyond its borders regionally or globally, great powers demand respect and must think about themselves as great powers (Dore 1997: 98); that is, their own leaders and population must “assert the right, and are accorded the right, to play a part in determining issues that affect the peace and security of the international system as a whole” (Buzan 2004: 60-61). In this sense, governments and elites must be intently focused on the ability to project power in order to defend national interests while playing a role in preserving the international system and balance of power that accords them great power status (Rozman 1999: 384).

Due to the conventional military and nuclear destruction of WWII, Japan’s non-revisionist elites keenly understood the costs to political and economic wellbeing of great power military competition and oversensitivity to regional security dilemmas that had driven Japan’s expansion during World War II (Iokibe 2013: 3-9). There was a “profound popular
scepticism about the legitimacy and effectiveness of military power” (Kaimiya 2002: 66) in postwar Japan, and the Japanese public in particular were “socialised” to the “costs of harbouring (or appearing to harbour) aggressive intentions” that would come with embracing a great military power identity in international relations (Midford 2002: 19). The constitution and its war-renouncing Article 9 would therefore become a symbolic reminder of the lessons of war time destruction (Ogawa 2011: 374; Orr 2001: 66), as well as a legal restraint on the temptation for the state to use its powers against both Japanese and other nations’ citizens. This adherence to Article 9 would also constitute a rejection of the Western “just war” tradition and allow Japan to play a role as a “conscientious objector” in the global military politics (Ogawa 2011: 383). After the war, Japan would reject its former identity as a continental power (tairiku kokka) that was dominant on the Asian mainland, in favour of a maritime “small Japan” identity (Iokibe 2013: 8-9). Popular and elite support developed for the idea that Japan should aspire to become a passive but affluent trading state that focused on developing its economic, social, industrial and technological potential by embracing norms of liberty and peaceful democracy (Samuels 2007a: 36).

A second aspiration of the peace nation identity was that Japan’s primary international contribution would be to avoid causing disturbances in the international system or appearing to be a threat to other countries in East Asia in particular. Japan’s wartime behaviour overseas in East Asia would work against the Japanese government playing a proactive foreign policy role in the region and in the international system (Orr 2001: 66; Midford 2002). Japan could only appear threatening to other nations if it immediately embraced an activist foreign policy after independence, and it was best to pursue international engagement in a low profile and cooperative way through the UN. In the security realm, Japan would deliberately limit its ability to project military power abroad, either independently or through a strong alliance with the US centred on the cooperative use of force on the East Asian mainland. Japan would therefore avoid full identification as a US ally in the context of US interventionism in the Cold War in Asia, which pitted the US against the USSR and the PRC, so as to avoid being seen as an expansionist or imperial power (Inoguchi 1991: 265). Japanese industrial and economic power would not be diverted to exacerbate the tensions in regional and international society by supporting aggressive rearmament at home or contribute to security instability abroad through military exports. Through this approach based on respect for Article 9, Japan could gradually win
back the trust of the region, and eventually free itself from the burdens of its “debt of history” (264).

The third peace nation aspiration was a commitment to strict antimilitarism, which was built upon the maintenance of distrust towards military institutions and scepticism of realpolitik-orientated approaches to national security. Antimilitarist distrust (Midford 2011: 49-54) affected perceptions of the SDF and its forerunners, of pro-military revisionist elites with connections to the wartime military government, and also affected perceptions of United States Forces Japan (USFJ). In fact, one of the primary motivations for post-war Prime Minister Shidehara suggesting Article 9 in the first place was to ensure that military elites would be “deprived of any instrument through which they could someday seize power” (MacArthur 1965). The strength of this antimilitarist sentiment was also built on a sense of “dual victimisation” (Berger 1998: 7). The Japanese public essentially perceived that both the “blind ambition of Japan’s wartime military leadership” and the US’ “ruthless campaign of conquest to strengthen their own power” were responsible for bringing destruction to Japan (Ogawa 2011: 393-394; see also Orr 2001: 65-66; Kamiya 2002: 66). They were therefore highly sensitive to the possibility that pro-military Japanese elites and the US elites would come together again to undermine Japanese economic and social wellbeing, this time in tandem.

It is important to note that the Japanese public and elites during this period were not necessarily anti-American in terms of harbouring antipathy against American cultural values and Americans themselves. Rather, they were sceptical of the US military asserting itself as a destabilizing actor in the policymaking process and privileging its own view of international security and its priorities over what many Japanese elites and the Japanese public identified as being in its own interests. In particular, there was significant sensitivity to the possibility of entrapment in conventional or possibly nuclear conflict, as well as to making Japan morally “complicit in war” (Kelman 2001: 129). Given these dangers, the priority for ‘peace nation’ Japan in the post-War era was to avoid becoming a nation that can go to war overseas and that is constantly making preparations to employ violent force at both home and abroad. Rebuilding Japanese society and the economy was identified as a clear priority over independent rearmament, which should be kept to a bare minimum, and should be defensively orientated. Post-war Article 9-inspired “peace nationalism” (McVeigh 2003: 207-210; Penney and Wakefield 2008: 538) would ensure that any available resources that Japan had at the end of the war should go to rebuilding the nation
and bolstering the economy, and communicating to the rest of the world that Japan never intended to wage war again, as the original creators of Article 9 intended (MacArthur 1965: 346-347).

3.2: The First Wave of Antimilitarist Strengthening (1952-1960)

The above aspirations provided ample public support post-independence to conservative elites like Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru to implement institutional constraints that would weaken revisionist conservatives’ demands for immediate rearmament, as well as insulate Japanese governments from requests for full support of US regional and global wars. Building on Article 9, Yoshida successfully institutionalised four antimilitarist normative components that would underpin Japan’s security identity as described below. Article 9 simply compels Japan to renounce war as the prerogative of the state, and specifically states that Japan will not use “the threat or use of force as a means of settling international disputes.” It also critically states that “land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained” (Kantei 2014a). Much less has been written about the preamble which frames the constitution, but it also resolves that “never again shall we [the Japanese people] be visited with the horrors of war through the action of government.” These aspirations survived challenges in the 1950s and remain constitutionally intact some 68 years later.

One of the first issues that Japanese politicians felt needed to be resolved after Japan received back its independence in 1952 related to whether Japan had the right to militarily defend itself. There was much debate about whether Japan constitutionally possessed the right to individual self-defence in the 1950s (Wohlstetter 1972: 172-174; McNelly 2000; Boyd and Samuels 2005: viii-ix). While Occupation-era tendencies were to interpret Article 9 as precluding this possibility (Samuels 2004: 5), idealism regarding the United Nations collective security system, and whether it would or could protect Japan, dissolved rapidly as the Cold War heated up. Very few politicians by the late 1940s seriously believed that the UN would come to Japan’s defence given that the veto-wielding permanent members of the United Nations Security Council became divided about how to manage international affairs (Peters 2010: 92-93; Dufourmount 2013: 105). Even one of the purported originators of Article 9, Prime Minister Shidehara Kijūrō, believed that Japan’s disarmament should only take place in the context of global disarmament that the original aspirations of the UN implied, and should not simply be a unilateral commitment (McNelly 2000: 107).
Minister Yoshida Shigeru in 1946 also expressed his belief that Japan would not need to remilitarise as it would be protected by the UN in the context of the new collective security system that was envisaged after WWII (Kantei 2014d: 4-5). In any respect, on regaining its independence Japan had already set up the NSF, an organisation that strongly resembled a military with increasingly heavy armaments. Soon after independence, the Cabinet Legislative Bureau (CLB), which took on responsibility for interpreting the Japanese constitution in the post-independence period, ruled that the NSF was not unconstitutional as Japan did indeed possess the right to self-defence.27

This interpretation hinged on the exact meaning in international law of ‘war,’ ‘war potential’ and ‘the use of force.’ On the basis of international treaties and supporting documents, the Japanese government identified that the proscribed potential to wage war and use force as a means of “settling international disputes” refers to the potential to engage in war to invade other countries, and not homeland defence (Kantei 2014d: 12; Samuels 2004: 5). Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter essentially bans the use of force “against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state,” but does not interfere with the customary rights of states to engage in individual and collective self-defence (United Nations 2014). The supporting documents to the Kellogg-Briand Pact (The Avalon Project 2008), which was a legal precedent for the UN Charter’s prohibition on the use of force, show that the signatories to the treaty understood that genuine self-defence would not be included within the definition of ‘war.’ The CLB would therefore reaffirm post-independence that Japan did indeed have the right to self-defence (Samuels 2004: 5), and the Japanese Supreme Court itself in the 1959 Sunagawa ruling would eventually recognize that the constitution did not explicitly renounce the Japanese state’s ability to exercise the right of self-defence (Haley 2005: 24). In exercising its quasi-constitutional prerogative under Yoshida Shigeru’s supervision, the CLB did, however, place limits on how the Japanese state was able to utilize the self-defence military potential it is constitutionally allowed to possess (Samuels 2007a: 52). These limits evolved into four discrete components of Japan’s antimilitarist security identity during the first wave of antimilitarist strengthening.

27 See Samuels (2004) for a discussion of how the CLB effectively came to exercise the right to interpret the constitution.
Component One: No ‘War Potential’

In a November 25, 1952 statement, the CLB promulgated the defining interpretation of constitutionally-prohibited senryoku or ‘war potential’ identified in Article 9 (Samuels 2007a: p.46). According to this interpretation, war potential:

refers to [the maintenance of] a force with the equipment and organization capable of conducting modern warfare . . . . Determining what constitutes war potential requires a concrete judgment taking into account the temporal and spatial environment of the country in question. . . . It is neither unconstitutional to maintain capabilities that fall short of war potential nor to utilize these capabilities to defend the nation from direct invasion (Samuels 2007: 46).

After the establishment in 1954 of the Self Defence Force, the prevailing interpretation has been that the allowable military hardware that Japan can possess is “limited to the minimum necessary for self-defence,” and that war potential is “any military capability in excess of the “minimum necessary level” (Samuels 2007a: 46-47). This interpretation was ultimately accepted and consolidated in policy in May 1957 when the National Defence Council adopted the Basic Policy for National Defence (Kase 2004: 140). This policy committed Japan to a long-term process of “building a modest defence capability under the Constitution for exclusively defence-oriented purposes [senshu bōei] without becoming a military power that could threaten other countries” (MOD 2012: 111). The Japanese government would for many years severely limit the range of equipment it could acquire out of sensitivity to some of the potential offensive applications of certain weapons systems.

In the early 1950s, the Japanese government considered even fighter aircraft to be prohibited ‘war potential’ (Cooney 2007: 34). This designation of fighter aircraft as inherently being war potential eventually changed, but the Japanese government remained cautious when purchasing modern fighter jets. For example, in the 1970s Japan’s F-4EJ fighter was delivered without the air-refuelling probe or receptacle that would allow in-air refuelling, or the AN/AJB-7 bombing computer system (Baugher 2014; Japan Times 2000). The government also avoided acquiring any vessels that had the appearance of an aircraft carrier (Koda 2011: 39-41, 46), strategic bombers, vessels that had amphibious capabilities such as the ability to land troops or tanks on the shores of other nations, platforms with significant strategic lift, platforms with air-to-ground guided missile capabilities, in-air
refuelling capabilities, ballistic missiles, and land attack and anti-ship “Tomahawk” cruise missiles (Samuels 2007a: 172-173).

**Component Two: No Capacity to Exercise the Right to Collective Self-Defence**

Collective self-defence (shūdan-teki jieiken) is defined in international law as the right of a nation to use force in aid of another nation subject to an unprovoked attack, “until the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to maintain international peace and security” (United Nations 2014). Nations may regard an attack on a nation “with which it is intimately friendly as an attack on itself and [thus are allowed] to act jointly to counter that attack” without waiting for United Nations Security Council authorization (Sato 1996: 96). The Japanese government, however, essentially rejected the idea that it can consider an attack on other nations in the international community as synonymous with its own individual defence, and legally treated the idea of individual and collective self-defence as distinct and separate concepts (Wakefield 2014: 2-3). This was an interpretation that circumscribed the range of security-related actions that the Japanese military can constitutionally take irrespective of international law and the rights afforded to Japan by the international community as a nation-state.

The SDF’s establishment in 1954 was a critical moment for Japan’s antimilitarist security orientation and for consideration of whether Japan could exercise its right to collective self-defence. Despite it being clearly prohibited from maintaining the ability to independently wage war overseas, the SDF was much more than a police force in the sense that it had heavy armaments and would be tasked with defending the country from attack by other nations. Its establishment therefore raised the possibility of a postwar Japanese military coordinating with the US military just after the US had finished fighting a war on the Korean Peninsula (Sato 1996: 94). Under Yoshida’s watch, the CLB issued an interpretation in 1954 that was highly suggestive that the exercise of the right to collective self-defence would be considered unconstitutional. This was because the CLB’s interpretation of Article 9 only allowed the SDF to respond in the name of self-defence to eliminate an illegitimate act of aggression directly against Japan (Boyd and Samuels 2005: 23; Hughes 2006: 728). This ruling was clearly directed at resisting the US pressure that had been applied to Prime Minister Yoshida by the United States to make Japan a part of an Asia-Pacific collective security order (Welfield 1988: 78). This prohibition was more explicitly reaffirmed in 1960 when controversy over the Mutual Security Treaty forced
Prime Minister Kishi Nobusuke to state that the Japanese government was not able to exercise the right to collective self-defence (House of Councillors Budgetary Committee 1960), particularly if such exercise would infringe on the territory of other nations.

**Component Three: No Dispatch of the SDF Overseas**

The SDF Law that accompanied the establishment of the SDF in 1954 was very specific in identifying the SDF’s main task as consisting of protecting Japan “from direct and indirect aggression,” and a non-binding House of Councillors resolution passed the same year also forthrightly declared that the SDF should not be sent abroad (Tatsumi 2008: 132). This made it very clear that not only did Japan not have the right to exercise collective self-defence, but that there was no intention to dispatch the SDF overseas in any independent capacity or to support US military activities. The Cabinet Legislative Bureau seemingly reaffirmed the restrictions on the overseas dispatch of the SDF overseas in 1954 when it ruled that the newly formed Self-Defence Force was not constitutionally permitted to be deployed overseas for the purposes of using force (*kaigai hahei*) (Keddell 1993: 177-178).

This component was so faithfully observed that it was not until the 1990s that the SDF was dispatched overseas for even ‘peaceful’ purposes (*kaigai haken*), such as disaster relief, post-conflict minesweeping, UNPKOs, or humanitarian relief. This is despite such operations being constitutionally permitted, at least in respect of how the use of force in an international conflict is understood in international law (Martin 2009). Such operations would not have necessarily involved the use of force against another international state-actor, or have technically involved Japan providing military assistance in the context of an armed conflict (Ishizuka 2006: 5). It is therefore important to note that the traditional antimilitarist norm concerning SDF overseas dispatch was politically applied in a wider fashion than the explicit CLB-authored constitutional prohibition on the use of force overseas.

**Component Four: Containment of Military Political Influence**

In the aforementioned November 25, 1952 interpretation of Article 9 by the CLB, it was also stated that ‘organisational war potential’ would be prohibited. Organisational war potential was defined as the organisational infrastructure of a conventional military that could wage war (Boyd and Samuels 2005: 7). The Japanese and American authors of the constitution were seemingly aware that Article 9 may subsequently be interpreted as allowing the establishment of an organized armed force for the explicit and sole purpose of
self-defence to be set up by the Japanese state. As evidence of this, Article 66 was inserted into the constitution as hedge against the military coming to dominate political life in Japan like it did in interwar years (Chai 1997: 397). This article stipulates very simply that the Prime Minister of Japan and all ministers of state must be civilians. Such a provision would have, however, been redundant if Japan was prohibited from maintaining an armed force of any kind in line with strictly pacifist arguments regarding constitutional interpretation (Haley 2010: 23). Contrary to the post-Meiji Period practice of having military officers in the cabinet, this proscription was intended to ensure strict civilian control over even the limited amount of military power that may be necessary for self-defence, and thus serve as an obstacle to captured political and institutional interests utilizing military potential and government budgets in aid of self-serving and belligerent goals both at home and abroad.

The interpretation of the constitution in this case justified the Japanese government strictly circumscribing the types of activities the SDF could undertake when it was established in 1954 (Samuels 2007a: 54-55). The combination of Article 66’s explicit concern for civilian control over the military, and the prohibition of the maintenance of organizational war potential, led to civil-military relations in Japan being characterised by what one trio of scholars has labelled “an excessive concern among its people about ensuring protection from its own military, and inattention to the protection provided by the military” (Feaver, Hikotani and Narine 2005: 244). Such “excessive concern” included the Japan Defence Agency (JDA) being initially designated an agency (chō) within the prime minister’s office (Oros 2008: 61), rather than a full ministry (shō). Denying the JDA full ministerial status meant that the JDA and the SDF could not directly participate in budget negotiations, or even make budget requests (Samuels 2007b: 87). The CLB, in overseeing the drafting of the law, also recommended that the JDA and SDF be supervised within the JDA by an “Internal Bureau,” which would in turn be staffed by elite civil servants seconded from other government agencies (Tatsumi 2008: 34). This led to the practice of officials from other major ministries being seconded to the highest positions within the JDA “to ensure they were supervised by officials without military experience” (Samuels 2007b: 87; see also Katzenstein 1996: 106). The JDA’s Internal Bureau Councillors (sanjikan) were always civilian bureaucrats and they, along with the administrative vice-minister, handled communications between politicians and the JDA General-Director in particular, and between civilians and uniformed officers in the JDA and the SDF in general (Feaver, Hikotani and Narine 2005: 246). Uniformed officers were deliberately kept “at arm’s length”
from the policy-making process (Samuels 2007b: 87), and the uniformed institutions, such as the JDA and the SDF, were to be no more than passive executioners of policy determined solely by civilian leaders (Oros 2008: 19; Tatsumi 2008: 34, 49).

Not only were the connections between Japan’s political and military elites highly regulated, but organisational behaviours engaged in by conventional military forces were restrained for a long period of time. This was to avoid the impression of the SDF preparing to employ violent force. Such regulated behaviours included tactical planning, operational simulations, and certain types of homeland defence training.28 There was also very little inter- and intra-service integration. When the SDF was set up in 1954, the Ground Self-Defence Forces (GSDF), essentially the new Japanese army, came in for special attention. The pre-war Imperial Army had a particularly dubious legacy as an organisation that had spurned civilian and democratic control at both home and abroad, and committed a number of atrocities on the Asian mainland. On its creation, former Interior Ministry officials in the new National Police Agency worried that a unified GSDF might “reproduce the power of the Imperial Army” (Samuels 2013: 99-100). Using a “divide and conquer” strategy (100), only the GSDF was not permitted to have a strong Joint Staff Office with a singular, unifying chief of staff (rikujō sōtai shireikan).

Integration within the SDF’s different services and integration and joint training with the US was also decisively constrained (Samuels 2007a: 77, 94; Katzenstein 1996: 81; Sebata 2007: 157). Pyle argues that this was to erect a firewall within the alliance where, “by Japanese choice,” there would be “no joint command of U.S. and Japanese forces as existed in other U.S. alliances, no integration of forces, no interoperability, and limited consultation” (Pyle 2012: 2). In fact, it was considered politically inappropriate to even describe the US-Japan security relationship as being an “alliance” (dōmei) until the 1980s (Miyaoka 2011: 241-242; Feldman 1998: 50). With these collected regulations, and the explicit avoidance of a military-technology driven reindustrialisation strategy by the Japanese government (discussed later in this chapter), Japan essentially rejected “the rise of the sort of military-industrial complex developed in the United States in the early years of the Cold War” by isolating military and defence interests from the policymaking, budgeting and planning process as much as possible (Oros 2008: 45). These prohibitions served as a form of internal regulatory controls to ensure that the military and defence institutions could not influence the political process.

28 For examples of how the SDF was restrained from conducting these activities, see Oros (2008: 82), Samuels (2007a: 53-54), Koda (2011: 52), Kaida (2005: 5), Tatsumi (2008: 25, 131); Pyle (2011: 395).
containment to ensure that neither the newly established SDF nor US Forces Japan (USFJ) would wield significant influence over Japanese security policymaking during a sensitive period of nation building and reconstruction in the postwar era (Hikotani 2009: 22-26).

3.3: Antimilitarism and the Yoshida Doctrine

Japan’s antimilitarist norms, derived by reference to its peace nation identity, would play an important role in the antimilitarist security identity that would underpin the “Yoshida Doctrine” (Samuels 2007a: 36). The Yoshida Doctrine was a political consensus and foreign policy grand strategy forged throughout Japan’s antimilitarist peak period (29, 35-37), and approximated Yoshida Shigeru’s thinking about the best way for Japan to manage international politics while rebuilding itself in the postwar era (1952-1978). As conceptualised by this doctrine, by relying on the United States for its most basic security needs, Japan could take a low-profile approach to international security issues and focus almost exclusively on efforts to reconstruct its economy and society through a strategy of mercantilism. There were concerns, however, that the rise of pro-military revisionists inside Japan and the alliance with the US could undermine this strategy by pushing Japan to take on a bolder military role in the early Cold War period and by diverting valuable resources needed for recovery and postwar nation building. Japan’s institutionalised antimilitarist commitments would, therefore, perform an important role in the success of the Yoshida Doctrine, for three critically interrelated reasons.

First, these commitments would function as a form of reassurance for the Japanese public as they effectively resulted in internal containment of still highly distrusted military institutions and authoritarian political elites with wartime links (Togo 2010: 34). This was required because these actors advocated for a revived Japanese military with the right to project power overseas, and may have been willing to use these instruments of violence against the public to repress dissent (Midford 2011: 14). The new military and pro-military elites were thus seen as potential threats to Japan’s still nascent democracy and recovering economy. As noted by Samuels, in postwar Japan “the balance of public opinion” valued protection from, rather than overprotection by, their military (2007a: 49). Compared to the risk of internal repression that Japan had already experienced during the war (Tipton 1990: 3; Allen 1987: 553-554, 560; Oros 2002: 7), “attack by hostile powers was the last thing on the public’s mind, and Japanese politicians had to be sensitive to public demands for guarantees” that military prerogatives would not be prioritised over public wellbeing and
freedom (Samuels 2007a: 49). Many Japanese were in fact more worried about the dangers connected to hosting military institutions and bases inside Japan. Starting with the Uchinada protests of 1953, a vigorous anti-base movement grew in response to this concern (Kersten 2006: 312-317).

Second, the peace nation identity and antimilitarist commitments were essential to operationalize Japan’s postwar foreign policy in East Asia. Yoshida Shigeru asserted that “large-scale rearmament in the 1950s was impossible because we needed to remember that many of the countries with which we had been at war still held Japan in distrust, a distrust which could easily be fanned into active hatred” (quoted in Midford 2002: 28). Japan’s antimilitarist orientation performed a critical role as reassurance for many countries in Asia and allowed Japan to build the necessary relations to support its maritime “trading state” and mercantilist focus in the immediate postwar era (Maull 1990: 96; Midford 2002: 41; Iokibe: 7-9). Third, these components would allow Japan to insulate itself from the worst excesses of US military policy in East Asia. Full entanglement with United States military policy in the Far East could result in Japanese armed forces being involved in another disastrous war in East Asia, or entrap the Japanese archipelago itself in another catastrophic, and potentially nuclear, war at home. Article 9 and popular Japanese antimilitarism essentially served as a valuable “pretext…to limit Washington’s ability to control and manage their foreign policy” (Pyle 2012: 2), allowing for Japan to maintain a modicum of an independent foreign policy and to reject requests for overseas dispatches of troops or for fuller alliance integration.

The Yoshida Doctrine after Yoshida

After Yoshida Shigeru’s tenure as prime minister ended in 1954, revisionist conservative elites gained in political influence. Many of these elites had links to the pre-war regime and were in favour of constitutional revision and the reinvigoration of a Japanese military. The US government supported these elites and the CIA in particular played a critical role in the setting up and resourcing of the Liberal Democratic Party in 1955, which would rule for 38 years continuously (Samuels 2007a: 216; Peters 2010: 143-145). The LDP was constructed through the merger of two conservative parties, formerly antagonistic towards each other, in order to thwart the reconstituted and reunified Japan Socialist Party (JSP) in 1955. The JSP was gaining political strength post-independence through its promotion of a pacifist
and anti-conservative vision for postwar democracy, and threatened to make further gains in the next election (Masumi 1988: 286; Samuels 2001).

Contrary to American expectations and overt and covert support, the Japanese government in the 1950s would only implement a very limited rearmament. Support for rearmament declined rapidly in Japan during the 1950s subsequent to the security treaty with the US and Japan starting to rebuild a military organisation with heavy arms. Between 1951 and 1953, favourability for some degree of rearmament fell rapidly from 80 percent to just below 50 percent (Miyashita 2008: 30-31). Support fell again as the SDF was set up in 1954 and revisionist conservatives came to power in 1955. Support had fallen to 35 percent by 1956 after the formation of the LDP, and was under 30 percent in 1957 (Miyashita 2008: 30-31) when Japan’s defensive senshu bōei military posture was made official. Given the limited form of rearmament that had already been undertaken in Japan was extremely controversial, there was little possibility of a constitutional revision that would allow Japan to more thoroughly rearm as an independent military power. The possibility of revision to allow for more freedom of action for the SDF to work with the United States was also unlikely. This lack of support for constitutional revision (Fukui 1970: 214) was despite revision of Article 9 being a core founding principle of the LDP in 1955 and embraced by at least two post-Yoshida prime ministers (215), Hatoyama Ichirō and Kishi Nobusuke. The Japanese electorate, progressives and mainstream conservative elites fought back against plans to remilitarize Japan and make Japan a military pillar of the US Cold War strategy in Asia.

The most prominent postwar revisionist, Kishi Nobusuke, had been identified as early as the late-1940s as a key political player in Japan amenable to US Cold War foreign policy interests (Schaller 1995; Samuels 2001). Prime Minister Kishi was known as “Shōwa no yōkai” (the ghost of the Showa era) due to his prominent role in Japan’s wartime cabinet as one of Tōjō Hideki’s most loyal deputies (Fukai 2001: 167). He was a fervent anti-communist traditionalist who openly favoured constitutional revision and Japanese rearmament. He took over the prime minister’s role in early 1957, and after re-election in 1958 increased the number of SDF uniformed soldiers by 10,000 men. On top of this, Kishi introduced a new police law (Law concerning Execution of Duties of Police Officials) which gave the police significant powers of surveillance (Samuels 2001). This brought up the image of the pre-war police state, and was an ominous sign that pro-revisionist conservatives such as Kishi were preparing to use instruments of violence and repression.
should they need to ahead of the upcoming battle over renewing the US-Japan Security Treaty (Boyd and Samuels 2005: 24-25; Samuels 2001).

The renewal of the US-Japan Security Treaty itself was controversial, and raised the possibility that Japan would be expected to play a military role in East Asia alongside the United States (Matray 2001: 50). The period leading up to the ratification of the treaty in 1960 “saw the largest mass protests in Japan’s postwar history” organized by the National Congress for Opposition to the Security Treaty, which drew together a coalition of leftist political parties, labour unions, student organizations, and civic action groups (Boyd and Samuels 2005: 25). The protests had an impact upon the general public who became sympathetic to the movement’s concerns. The movement was helped by the fear that Kishi and other revisionist elites would make it easier for Japan to be disastrously entrapped in overseas wars, especially as tensions between China and the US, and the US and the USSR, were high in the period between 1958 and 1960 (Izumikawa 2010: 134-136).

The Mutual Security Treaty (MST) eventually signed by Kishi in the US in January 1960 seemed to confirm the worst fears of many progressives in particular. The new treaty was more ‘equitable’ in terms of removing the right for the US military to intervene domestically in Japan, and it provided an explicit and positive assurance of US protection. Controversially, however, the treaty also provided for the two nations to “meet the common danger” in case of armed attack on either parties inside territories under Japanese jurisdiction” (Article V), and also included “a pledge for mutual consultations in the event the peace and security of East Asia were threatened” (Article IV). Article VI was particularly troubling as it identified the use of Japanese bases and territory for the “maintenance of international peace and security in the Far East” (Matray 2001: 50). These treaty articles when taken together were highly suggestive of the US wanting to increase interoperability between US military and the growing Japanese SDF for the purposes of maintaining the security of East Asia. This perception heightened concerns of entrapment in US military adventures overseas.

The public appeared to concur with this assessment of the danger of entrapment. One poll taken during discussions over the renewal of the MST in 1959 showed that the public was highly sceptical of the claim that the MST would guarantee Japan’s security (Peters 2010: 147), with twice as many (44 percent) saying they felt it endangered Japan than those who thought it made Japan safer (21 percent). Other polls showed that the public was less than
convincing about the wisdom of siding with the United States in the Cold War (Peters 2010: 147). Despite this, on May 19, 1960, Kishi forced the ratification of the revised treaty in the Diet. In doing so, he ordered the police to block opposition party members who were trying to prolong the Diet deliberations in the hope of preventing ratification (Izumikawa 2010: 136-137). By this act, Kishi essentially confirmed his reputation in the eyes of the public of being an arrogant, autocratic elitist, and media condemnation of Kishi’s action soon followed, along with an unprecedented number of mass demonstrations and strikes (Izumikawa 2010: 136-137). These were held in opposition to the treaty, and arguably in opposition to Kishi himself, in what would become known as the Ampo Tōsō. Kishi had unwisely raised the stakes surrounding the treaty from being about foreign policy and security to being about the defence of Japan’s fledgling but “maturing democracy” (Izumikawa 2010: 136-137; Kersten 2009: 233). From here it became straightforward for Japanese on the left in particular to point out the various dangerous connections between the imperious and anti-democratic attitude of Kishi and his allies, their revisionist domestic agenda, their rearmament and constitutional revision agenda, and the seemingly positive disposition of this group towards the alliance with the increasingly militarily interventionist US.

Kishi would soon resign in July of 1960, and with his fall revisionist conservatives within the LDP were forced into the background of Japanese politics for more than two decades (Samuels 2007a: 55). Mainstream conservatives, many of whom were Yoshida acolytes and favoured a low-profile mercantilist foreign policy for Japan, would reassert themselves in the LDP and come to dominate Japan’s ruling party. In order to ensure the long-term political viability of the LDP, these mainstream conservatives quickly moved to adopt a “low posture” on security affairs, and downplayed “ideological and military agendas” in favour of an almost sole focus on economic issues and development (Boyd and Samuels 2005: 41). Kishi’s successor, Ikeda Hayato, promulgated the ambitious “income doubling plan” (Johnson 1982: 231). Ikeda promised to double real national income within a decade while reducing income equality at the same time, which would require the difficult task of keeping inflation and unemployment levels low. Ikeda also assured the public of his commitment to Article 9 and Japan’s antimilitarist stance when he stated that the

29 When revisionist conservatives were ascendant in Japan in the mid-1950s, the number of wartime parliamentarians in conservative parties in Japan’s House of Representatives stood at 28.4 percent. By 1965, this number was only 12.9 percent (Fukui, 1970, p.218).
government would “not push the [sic] constitutional revision, even if we can obtain the two-thirds majority in both Houses” (Peters 2010: 150; Samuels 2007a: 34).

Article 9, and the related components of antimilitarism, appeared to be safe and the worst excesses and arrogance of Japan’s traditional elite had been tamed by public protest (Izumikawa 2010: 134-137; Peters 2010: 151-152). For many modernist and liberal thinkers, while the protest against ratification of the treaty had failed in practical terms (although it did end Kishi’s tenure as prime minister), in symbolic terms, by “engaging in protest, the people of Japan had indigenised democracy through their enactment of shutaisei [autonomy]” (Kersten 2009: 232-233). By embracing “people power” the Japanese public had stood up to authority in a way that had not happened during wartime Japan (Ogawa 2011: 377) and, by asserting their antimilitarist and pro-democratic preferences, had strongly asserted their own vision of the national self against Japan’s traditional elite who were in charge of the state apparatus (Kersten 2004: 502).

Japan’s economic growth and social prosperity in the 1960s seemed to confirm the wisdom of the Yoshida Doctrine’s focus on the economy and its related antimilitarist commitments. Through maritime trade, Japan had made “the world its market, not its battlefield” (Samuels 2007a: 32). The Japanese “economic miracle,” built on the back of a civilian rather than military industrial focus, was becoming increasingly obvious by the early 1960s. Ikeda’s income doubling plan turned out to be far too conservative (Katz 1998: 122), and Japan, on the back of a high-technology export-orientated strategy, regained its squandered national wealth of the pre-war era and more. While it took until 1954 for Japan to recover to pre-war peaks in national income (Maddison 2013: 46), growth subsequent to this was “spectacular” and was “without parallel in the previous history of any country” (50).

Importantly, this economic growth led to less income inequality and the general population, broadly speaking, was able to share in this increased prosperity (Minami 2008: 8-12). This was in direct contrast to the situation in Japan in the lead up to World War II where income inequality rose sharply in line with Japan’s first attempt at industrialisation and technological modernisation (Moriguchi and Saez 2008: 716-718; Minami 2008: 8-12). Pre-war Gini coefficients rose as high as 0.57 in the 1930s, while in the 1960s it dropped close to 0.3, and remained at that level throughout the 1970s (Minami 2008: 8). This “growth with equity” led to standards of living rising across the population (Kabashima and MacDougall 1999: 275), including for blue-collar workers, who were able to enjoy the
modern conveniences of consumer culture (Cole 1971: 4-5). The mass media often referred to the “100 million person middle class mainstream” (ichiokunin sōchūryū), which was positively contrasted with the “phrase that was the national self-characterization just after World War II: ichiokunin sōkyodatsu,” or “100 million people in a state of trauma” (Kelly 2002: 235). Growing public antimilitarist sentiment, the consolidation of a trading-orientated peace nation identity inside Japan, and the success of the Yoshida Doctrine as a general foreign policy approach, meant that both the revisionists at home and abroad (US foreign policy and military elites) had to settle for a less ambitious alliance relationship and a severely constrained approach to rebuilding Japan’s military power.


With the peace constitution and the general foreign strategy encapsulated in the Yoshida Doctrine now seemingly accepted by elites throughout the ideological spectrum and by the Japanese public (Takekawa 2007: 69), the focus of the second wave of antimilitarist strengthening was almost solely concentrated on the United States’ foreign policy strategy in East Asia and issues connected to US military bases in Japan and Okinawa. From whichever angle it was viewed in Japan, American interventionism in East Asia in the 1960s was problematic. It thwarted Japanese national interests, including the signing of peace treaties and pursuit of economic relations with the communist nations in close proximity to Japan (Drifte 2012: 14, 20; Takamine 2012: 26-28), and there was a significant possibility of Japan itself being drawn into a war with the PRC and the USSR at certain points during the 1960s due to US foreign policy (Izumikawa 2010: 135-136, 140). It also stimulated Japan’s postwar “anti-expansionist” and “anti-colonial” sentiments (Inoguchi 1991: 265).

The Japanese public was particularly shocked by the sudden escalation of the conflict in Vietnam in early 1965, and “No major paper approved of the bombing strategy” (Havens 1987: 50). An early August 1965 Asahi Shimbun survey found that 75 percent of Japanese disapproved of the bombings in the north of Vietnam, and 57 percent believed that the bombing could cause a “World War” within 12 months by possibly drawing the PRC into the war (Kelman 2001: 127). When asked who was at fault for the worsening of relations in Indochina, 33 percent blamed the US, while only 8 percent blamed the Viet Cong who were the target of American antipathy (Havens 1987: 50). The Japanese media covered the war in great detail and “images of death and destruction from the B-52s flying over the
North [of Vietnam] were a ready reminder of the air raids over Japanese cities 20 years before” (Kelman 2001: 127-128). While Japan did not commit its own troops to the war due to the antimilitarist restraints articulated above, there was significant media scrutiny of the fact that the US was using Japanese bases on the mainland and in Okinawa to bomb Indochina without prior consultation (Kelman 2001: 130). There was considerable outrage in Japan over this fact, and doubts about the wisdom of the alliance with the US rose anew (Havens 1987: 84). This intensified the resentment at an example of militarism and colonialism closer to home in the form of the US’ military’s large presence in Japan and continued occupation and administration of Okinawa (Sarantakes 1994: 39-48; Havens 1987: 193-199).

There was much to lose for Japan through entrapment in US foreign policy and military strategy in East Asia. Democracy looked like it was being consolidated in Japan in the postwar era, in contrast to Japan’s first attempt to democratise during the Taisho era, when the nation’s political institutions degenerated into a militaristic police state (Togo 2010: 34). Japan was now enjoying economic, cultural and social rejuvenation and change, and many remained suspicious that the state would again lead the people into a disastrous war through the abrogation of democratic ideals, such as had been the case during World War II (Kersten 2006: 304; Kelman 2001: 123-124). The protests against the war in Vietnam, therefore, rivalled those against the Mutual Security Treaty in their importance for the development of the antimilitarist security identity and exposed “the centrality of protest, activism and democratic renewal to conceptions of Japan’s postwar national identity” (Kelman 2001: 123). New citizen awareness and social movements led to Japanese of many ideological persuasions openly questioning the morality of US foreign policy and the American understanding of the implications of the communist threat in East Asia (Havens 1987: 32-41, 76; Kelman 2001: 129-130). The Japanese government’s own lack of ethical conviction in giving moral support to US for the war in Vietnam was also questioned. The Japanese public were by no means passive onlookers on the war in Vietnam, and were sensitive to “the ways in which they might be implicated in the US aggression” due to the continuation of the alliance relationship (Kelman 2001: 125).

It was also not difficult for Japanese of varying political persuasions to draw an “analogy between Japan’s war in China in the 1930s and early 1940s and the US war in Vietnam in the 1960s” (Young 1988: 674) in terms of the strategic futility and moral legitimacy of fighting wars on the Asian mainland. Progressives, including many participating in the
beheiren (Vietnam peace) movement, arguably could be said to be “protesting two wars – one that Japanese had not protested at the time but should have [the war in China from 1937], and another, currently being fought, that recalled the earlier war” (Young 1988: 674; see also Tanaka 2007). Continued ‘colonisation’ of Okinawa, and US intervention in what many Japanese saw to be anti-colonial rather than communist movements in Southeast Asia, also irked many Japanese across the political spectrum due to its hegemonic appearance. Hara sums up the sentiment in Japan at the time as such:

“Japanese diplomacy then began to seek higher international status, and was attracted by the independence movements in Asia. In other words, while US protection facilitated Japan regaining of its national strength, it also engendered a sense that Japan’s subordination was incongruent with a period when decolonization, a phenomenon of immense historical significance, was under way in Asia and Africa.” (Hara 2003: 39)

Japan’s conservative ruling elites therefore had to tread a fine line between public sentiment and support for the US alliance. Many of these elites also continued to see US attempts at containing communism working directly against Japanese desires to pursue economic and diplomatic reconciliation on the East Asian mainland (Takamine 2012: 26-28; Drifte 2012: 14-20), which generated antipathy within some sections of the ruling LDP (Kelman 2001: 125-126). A significant number of influential LDP conservatives expressed public and private concern regarding the US’ strategy in Vietnam (Havens 1987: 111), and Kelman notes that even ostensibly pro-US Prime Minister Satō Eisaku was personally uncomfortable with the war. His support for the US position was mainly due to an opportunistic desire to achieve his two foreign policy goals of heading off impending US trade restrictions and getting back Okinawa for Japan (Kelman 2001: 130).

**The Strengthening Firewall: Non-constitutional Components of Japan’s Traditional Antimilitarism**

In the second half of the 1960s after the US escalated the war in Vietnam, and Japan signed a peace treaty with South Korea (and not North Korea), public concern over the Vietnam War and the possibility of a second Korean War raised the possibility that the SDF might be deployed overseas (Hosoya 2014c: 3). These concerns complicated security policy making, a situation not helped by the controversy over the revelations of the 1963 “Three Arrows Study.” It was revealed in 1965 that secret emergency consultations between a
limited clique in the SDF and the US military had taken place during this study (Izumikawa 2010: 137-138; Samuels 2007a: 53-54). The 1963 study outlined potential SDF military assistance if another Korean War broke out on the Korean Peninsula, and became the focus of intense proceedings in the Diet in 1965. Its revelation heightened Japanese concerns about possible ethical and strategic entrapment in overseas US wars. It also dovetailed with concerns over whether sufficient civilian control was being exerted over the military (Olsen, 1985:89), or whether democratic principles were being respected by Japanese and US military elites (Izumikawa 2010: 138-140, 156; Samuels 2007a: 53-54). Confidential consultations between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Cabinet Legislative Bureau about whether it was constitutionally possible that Japan could dispatch the SDF on UNPKO missions were then revealed in 1966, which lead to opposition parties attacking the government (Hosoya 2014c: 3). Concerns about entrapment in wars in East Asia made even the dispatch of non-combat troops or civilians to UNPKOs politically untenable at this point in time, and the Japanese government abandoned proposals to allow the SDF to be deployed overseas for UNPKO missions (Hosoya 2014c: 3).

In the late 1960s there were still worrying signs for the LDP, however. The proportion of Japanese rejecting any party affiliation jumped from 19.8 percent in late 1964 to 32.5 percent only two years later (Havens 1987: 111). This led to some experimentation with new liberal, progressive, but not necessarily Marxism-orientated opposition parties in the 1967 election (the Democratic Socialist Party and the Buddhist Komei Party, or Kōmeitō). In this election, the LDP also lost ground and slipped below fifty percent support from the electorate for the first time, despite Japan’s rapid economic growth under their watch (Statistics Japan 2014b). With the LDP’s political dominance weakening in the second half of the 1960s, the LDP had to continue to tread carefully in regards to security politics in particular. The Japanese government attempted to reassure the public and increasingly powerful progressive politicians that the constitutionally-derived norms discussed above would remain in place. Prime Minister Sato apologised to the nation for the lapse in civilian control that the Three Arrows Study represented, and promised that the government would strengthen the SDF’s education in democratic principles (Samuels 2007a: 53-54). After abandoning the idea of the SDF being dispatched overseas for UNPKO missions, the government then reassured opposition parties that the dispatch of the SDF overseas for the use of force would remain proscribed (Hosoya 2014a). In 1968, the government would reiterate that the SDF could only be deployed “when there is a sudden unprovoked attack...
on Japan and there are no other means to protect the lives and safety of the people” (Samuels 2004: 6), essentially further narrowing down the possibility of the government exercising its right to collective self-defence.

Such reassurances were still not sufficient. It was in the context of concern over a growing gulf between state and society over security issues that we see the explicit promulgation of restrictions on arms exports, the military use of space, defence spending, and Japan’s strongest reaffirmation of its anti-nuclear stance. These non-constitutional antimilitarist components functioned as a way for the Japanese government to assuage public concerns, to strengthen the alliance firewall, and to insulate itself as much as possible from any blowback from regional US military strategy. These non-constitutional components came to be embraced in the period between 1967 and 1969, and again between 1975 and 1978 during the third wave of antimilitarist strengthening. These four components do not directly derive from the constitution itself, although may allude to its spirit and have thus been considered by some to be “semi-constitutional rules” (Chai 1997: 401).

Component Five: The Three Non-nuclear Principles

Perhaps the most well-known of the ‘semi-constitutional’ antimilitarist components is Japan’s three non-nuclear principles (3NNP). The background for the promulgation of the 3NNP is Japan’s experience as the only country to have been attacked by nuclear weapons. Japan’s antinuclear sentiment, however, actually did not arise immediately after the bombings, but intensified over time. It was only in the 1950s after Occupation censorship was lifted, and the horrors of Hiroshima and Nagasaki could be revisited in full detail, that a forthright and explicitly anti-nuclear weapons political movement intensified in Japan (Rublee 2009: 55; Oros 2008: 60). With the USSR’s testing of an atomic bomb in 1949, the possibility that Japan could be involved in a nuclear exchange was felt keenly, especially because nuclear weapons were being maintained on Okinawan soil. Okinawa was considered to be the “keystone” of the Pacific for the US military presence (Havens 1987: 88), and conventional military bases on the Japanese mainland would also likely be neutralized during such an exchange (Ito 2003: 21; Rublee 2009: 64-65). The possibility of a nuclear exchange in the mid- to-late 1950s with the USSR was a genuine source of fear for the Japanese public (Izumikawa 2010: 132-142).

Beyond considerations of security, debate over nuclear weapons would play an important role in the articulation of Japan’s national identity as a peace nation, and in solidifying
general antipathy in Japan toward great military power competition in the Cold War, where ‘nuclearization’ of a nation’s military posture was symbolic of great power status (Sodei 2006: xv; Rublee 2009: 55, 64). The antinuclear movement became particularly prominent subsequent to the 1954 ‘Lucky Dragon 5’ (daigo ōkuryū maru) incident, where a Japanese boat was exposed to and contaminated by the US’ Castle Bravo thermonuclear test on Bikini Atoll (Ogawa 2011: 376-377; Rublee 2009: 56). Rublee notes that within one month of the sick crew returning to Japan, both houses of the Japanese Diet had passed resolutions calling for “the prohibition of nuclear weapons and international control of nuclear energy” (2009: 56). The antinuclear norm only grew stronger over time and even revisionist conservatives accepted the need to be wary of the strength of public sentiment on this particular issue (Dower 2014). In 1957, therefore, the National Defence Council adopted the Basic Policy for National Defence and identified the precursor to the 3NNP as one of the “basics” that would inform its defence posture going forward (Kase 2004: 140). There were also frequent reminders of the problematic connection between nuclear weapons and the US alliance. In 1958 there was the discovery of a “United States marine barge filled with atomic bombs” (Havens 1987: 149-150), and it was later revealed that between 1955 and 1958 the United States had, without prior consultation, introduced nuclear weapons into Japanese territory (199-200).

In the late-1960s explicit non-nuclear principles were further enshrined as a crucial feature of Japan’s antimilitarist security policy. This move came in the context of negotiations over Japan joining the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) and over the return of Okinawa to Japan, (Izumikawa 2010: 141-142). When Prime Minister Satō Eisaku pledged to the Japanese Diet in December 1967 that Japan would not allow the manufacture or possession of nuclear weapons by the Japanese state, or would even allow nuclear weapons to be introduced to Japanese sovereign territory by other nations, the antinuclear component of traditional Japanese antimilitarism was officially entrenched (Rublee 2009: 57-58). Satō followed through in negotiations over Okinawa’s return in 1969, and managed to convince the US, officially at least, to commit to the principle of hondo nami, or “the same as the mainland,” in terms of whether Okinawa would continue to house nuclear weapons in US bases after reversion back to Japanese sovereign territory (Havens 1987: 174). This was a risky move that may have derailed negotiations over Okinawa as the US military wished the 3NNP only to be applied to the Japanese mainland (Havens 1987: 174; Welfield 1988: 247). Public opinion, however, was very much against any reversion deal if it included
provisions to allow the US to maintain nuclear weapons in Okinawa (Welfield 1988: 241). These principles were reconfirmed subsequent to Japan signing the 1968 Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1970, and in 1971 the Diet passed a resolution affirming the 3NNP, applied the principles to Okinawa ahead of the 1972 reversion (Takao 2011: 9), and designated them to be *kokuze*, or a broad national commitment (Solingen 2009: 69).

**Component Six: Arms Export Restrictions**

In exactly the same year the 3NNP were affirmed by Prime Minister Satō in the Diet (1967), the Three Principles of Arms Exports was also promulgated by his government. Like nuclear weapons issues, the issue of restricting arms exports first arose during the first wave of antimilitarist strengthening when it looked like revisionists were going to engineer a vast remilitarization of Japan’s security policy and use military sales to reinvigorate Japan’s industrial and technological economic base. In order to assert their vision of Japan’s national recovery without Japan becoming a military power (Oros 2008: 95-101; Samuels 1996: 133-152), mainstream conservatives battled against revisionist conservatives and pressure from Cold War US elites who had visions of Japan becoming the “Far Eastern arsenal of the Free World” (Samuels 1996: 130). Through decisive influence in shaping Japan’s industrial policy, government regulations, and budget commitments, mainstream conservatives and their supporters in the business world and the bureaucracy were able to direct Japan’s postwar recovery towards civilian orientated industries. Even when the Japanese government received military technologies from the United States through the military sales program based on the 1954 Mutual Defence Assistance Agreement, the government and business world would use US military technology to catalyse its own civilian-focused industrial development rather than use the technology to support rearmament (Samuels 1996: 147-152). The Japanese government used legislation and regulations originally implemented by the United States itself during the Occupation period (to prevent Japan trading sensitive exports to communist countries) to restrict most arms sales overseas (Takamine 2012: 26-30).

In the second half of the 1960s, there was also increasing concern about Japan’s own indirect contributions to war in Indochina, in addition to the concerns about moral complicity in the Vietnam War due to the Japanese government’s stance of support for the

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30 A particularly notable example of US military assistance playing a role in catalysing the Japanese automobile industry.
There was particular concern over Japanese companies supplying military materiel to the United States and allied militaries (Havens 1987: 92-94; Takahashi 2008: 103). Perhaps the most infamous incident reflecting this concern took place during the Vietnam War. The US had used Sony video cameras to locate bombing targets, which on its discovery in 1967 remarkably led to Sony’s Morita Akio to apologise to the nation (Oros 2008: 104). Many larger Japanese companies became wary of being labelled as “merchants of death” (shi no shōnin). They therefore tried to avoid direct entanglements in terms of provisioning goods to overseas militaries due to a fear of a consumer backlash (Oros 2008: 93, 100; Havens 1987: 99).

These sensitivities were also felt by the Japanese government, and by 1967 further reassurance appeared to be required, especially as revisionists and defence industry advocates were once again making a case for a significant military build-up now that Japan’s economy was growing rapidly (Samuels 1996: 168-170). While the Japanese government had had the institutional capability to regulate arms exports since 1949, the symbolic codification of an explicitly antimilitarist approach to arms exportation came on April 21, 1967, during a House of Representatives Accounting Committee meeting. Prime Minister Satō Eisaku, referencing the relevant legislation and cabinet ordinance of 1949, in a parliamentary statement declared that Japan should not export weapons and military materiel to countries that were communist, under a UN arms embargo, or currently in the middle of a conflict or appear to be heading towards conflict (Tomita 2011: 2). The last of these principles was noteworthy from a comparative international point of view as being particularly restrictive (Samuels 1996: 168-170).

Component Seven: The Peaceful Use of Outer Space

The Japanese government became interested in the development of space soon after the end of World War II, and Japan’s first formal budget allocation for space development was in 1955 (Oros 2008: 127). The Soviet Union’s Sputnik launch in 1957, and the establishment of NASA by the US in 1958, alerted the Japanese government to the fact it was lagging behind internationally in terms of the potentially important area of space technology. In 1958, the Japanese government approved a budget allocation for research into rocketry for the first time (Oros 2008: 127), and during the 1960s, various space-related activities were undertaken by Japanese government and industry (Samuels 1996: 78). There are, however, a number of areas where the use of space is essential for military applications; most notably
in the areas of ballistic missile technology, surveillance and intelligence, and of course, space weapons. Military interests in Japan were certainly aware of this potential, and in 1968 the Japanese Ordnance Association declared that “it is necessary to promote scientific utilization of space in order to modernize our national defence” (Samuels 1996: 78). If there was any thought that Japan would use space for military purposes, this was however soon snuffed out as Japan further strengthened its antimilitarist firewall near the end of the 1960s.

Japan’s official space policy quickly shifted to it being one focused on a ‘peaceful uses’ doctrine. This doctrine was one where military funding would not contribute to the development of Japan’s space capabilities, where space technologies with military applications would not be transferred overseas, and where explicit militarization of space would not be pursued as part of an overall space policy. From the 1960s onwards, Japan pursued a civilian-focused space policy that was quite different from the space programs of the US, the USSR, and other major military powers, where military applications were key factors driving the development of both military and commercial/civilian space technology (Pekkanen and Umezu-Kallender 2010: 32). The possibility that Japan would cooperate with the US, who from the late 1950s was aggressively pursuing a “space race” with the Soviet Union, sufficiently worried Japanese politicians that they committed to an explicit non-military stance regarding the use of space (Oros 2008: 125-127). In this particular case, Japan’s concern with the impact of militarization of international relations pushed it take a proactive stance towards the creation of international institutions to regulate the militarization of space.

In the 1960s, Japan, alongside many other nations, “took their concerns to the United Nations to deliberate on possible restrictions of the use of outer space to peaceful purposes” (Oros 2008: 127). The Japanese government therefore played an active role in promoting the 1967 UN Outer Space Treaty, and then committed itself to the principles of that treaty by promulgating in 1969 a Diet resolution which declared that Japan would only use space for peaceful purposes (125-127). This resolution passed the same year as Japan’s space program was comprehensively institutionalized through the establishment of the National Space Development Agency (NASDA), Japan’s equivalent to NASA, thus giving it an explicit civilian character (Pekkanen and Umezu-Kallender 2010: 24). What was distinct about Japan’s space policy at the time was its interpretation of the ‘peaceful uses’ doctrine institutionalized in the 1967 UN treaty. While Japan and other countries managed to convince the US and USSR to sign the treaty and thus symbolically limit themselves to the
peaceful use of outer space, the US and Soviet Union interpreted the meaning of ‘peaceful’ in a different way from Japan. The major difference is that both the Americans and the Soviets argued that the ‘peaceful use’ of space did not preclude ‘military use’ as such, but that only the aggressive military use of space was prohibited. For example, orbital weapons and other space weapons that could be used against space assets such as satellites would not be deployed. Japanese politicians, however, responding to the prevailing antimilitarist sentiment of the time, instead interpreted the peaceful uses doctrine as explicitly meaning non-military uses of space for Japan (Pekkanen and Umezu-Kallender 2010: 32-33). While Japan wanted to develop space technology – and wanted to collaborate with the US and gain access to certain profitable space technologies – it was wary of being seen to support a militarization and weaponization of space in the international context of the time, a concern similar to that which underpinned the restrictions on arms exports (Oros 2008: 128).

Component Eight: One Percent of GDP Limit on Defence Expenditure

The eighth and final institutional component of Japan’s traditional antimilitarist security policy is a one percent of GDP limit on defence expenditure. Japan’s spending on defence-related activities reached a healthy 2.8 percent of national GNP when the SDF was set up in 1954 (Takao 2008: 40-41). While by 1956 it had dropped to a still not insignificant 1.7 percent, the Japanese defence budget naturally fell below the one percent mark in 1967 (Bobrow and Hill 1991: 4). In 1967, the one percent maximum was frozen in place by cabinet order (Samuels 2007b: 87), and was accepted within the JDA as an acceptable target (Takao 2011: 8). The cap was exceeded only once, in the late 1980s, and even then only by a mere 0.013 percent of GDP (New York Times 1987; Chai 1997: 389-390).

The logic behind promulgating a limit pegged to Japan’s GDP was to win support for an incremental approach to Japan’s post-independence defence build-up, while assuring the public that defence spending would be subjugated to concerns relating to economic growth and social security (Takao 2011: 7-8). Essentially, if the Japanese economy did not grow, and if policymakers and policy did not dedicate their energy to ensuring Japan’s economy would grow, then defence spending could not be increased. This would ensure that Japan’s government budget could not be hijacked by militarists such as happened during the lead up to World War II where the proportion of defence spending to national income exceeded 17 percent (O’Neil 2003), and deficit spending was introduced just to cover these military
outlays (Samuels 2007a: 33). The one percent limit was notable because it was considerably less than the US’ NATO partners in the 1970s, where the overall average was 4.4 percent of GDP (NATO 2014). The cap effectively prevented Japan’s newly recovered wealth from being diverted to a significant defence build-up that could subsidise military adventurism in collaboration with Japan’s alliance partner.

3.5: The Third Wave of Antimilitarist Strengthening (1975-1978)

Traditional antimilitarist concerns unsurprisingly remained powerful in Japan well into the 1970s. Public sentiment continued to thwart attempts to nurture the Japanese defence industry and promote remilitarization. Nakasone Yasuhiro, a well-known revisionist, was appointed director-general of the Defence Agency in January 1970. Nakasone was already outspoken on defence issues, and his appointment was controversial. Just two months after the 1969 Guam Doctrine pointed to the US drawing down its military commitment to the “Far East” and required allies to shoulder a greater burden of their own defence (Soeya 1998), Nakasone insisted on a new U.S.-Japan relationship based on the principle of “autonomous defence in the front and the alliance in the rear” (Samuels 1996: 172-173). He also proposed significant increases in defence industry support, particularly for defence R&D. Nakasone was however still “too far ahead of public opinion” (175). Concerns were also expressed by Asian neighbours, and eventually Nakasone was forced to step down due to the controversy generated at home and abroad (Keddell 1993: 95; Havens 1987: 92). He would be replaced by Sakata Michita who was less ambitious regarding the build-up of Japan’s defence capabilities, and defence production and budgets declined after Nakasone’s departure (Samuels 1996: 175).

By the middle of the 1970s, however, the international environment around Japan had changed which led to a rethinking of Japan’s security approach, even if the antimilitarist security identity remained strong. The US started to adapt its own foreign policy strategy towards Asia. It became less interventionist and less bellicose, engaged in a slow withdrawal from the war in Vietnam, and drew down military forces from the region. Critically, the US normalized relations with China, which opened the way for Japan to reengage politically and economically with the PRC, as well as with an eventually reunified Vietnam, as had been sought after by conservatives, progressives and the public alike since independence (Welfield, 1988: 322; Sahashi 2012: 215). Prime Minister Tanaka Kakuei during his tenure committed Japan to “peacetime defence capabilities” in diplomatic
interactions with China, and achieved “Chinese tacit acceptance of the One Percent ceiling on defence expenditures” in return for Chinese recognition of the legitimacy of the SDF and the role of the US-Japan treaty for Japan’s defence (Keddell 1993: 95; see also Hook 1988: 386). To this end, in a 1972 House of Councillors session, the Cabinet Legislative Bureau reaffirmed in the strongest terms to date that the exercise of collective self-defence was unconstitutional (Committee on Audit of the House of Councillors 1972). These movements helped ease concerns at home as a ‘comprehensive peace’ was now appearing to develop. The alliance with the US, now less likely to lead to Japanese entrapment in wars very much against Japan’s national interests, was seen in less negative terms and support for the alliance from the mid-1970s onwards increased (Welfield 1988: 162-163, 197-198, 323; Linley 2011). In fact, the USSR now appeared to be becoming the more hegemonic and military aggressive actor in the wider region with naval modernisation progressing quickly from the mid-1960s, and a build-up of military hardware taking place in the Far East precisely as the United States appeared to be drawing down its influence (Nishihara 1983: 182).

Against this background, discussion of the US-Japan alliance, and Japan’s own defence strategy within it, was no longer considered to be quite the “taboo” it was before (Samuels 2007a: 53-54; Mochizuki 1983: 156-157). In August 1975, for example, “Japan and the United States agreed to set up a consultative mechanism for the “operational coordination” of American forces and the Self-Defence Forces” (Havens 1987: 242), arguably allowing Japan to live up to the expectations for coordination articulated in the 1952 and 1960 security treaties. In October 1976, Japan’s first official postwar military doctrine was promulgated. The Standard Defence Force Concept (kibanteki bōeiryoku kōsō), identified in Japan’s first National Defence Program Outline (NDPO) (Mochizuki 1983: 155), specified that Japan would engage in a slow build-up of its capabilities for the purpose of deploying an even amount of defensive power around the country. This would be to ensure that a strategic vacuum did not create a situation where a hostile power could launch a “limited and small-scale aggression” and create a fait accompli (155-156). Japan should therefore have sufficient defensive power that would enable it to repel such an attack, or hold out for long-enough to allow time for the US to intervene in the case of a larger conflict (Cronin and Green 1994: 44-45). It therefore explicitly affirmed the US-Japan alliance as the basis for Japan’s security (Cronin and Green 1994: 15), although it also noted that a significant build-up was not required as the threat of a major conflict breaking out was
relatively low as seen in 1976 (Nishihara 1983: 180-181; Welfield 1988: 325-329). The NDPO also allowed Japan to strengthen its maritime security in order to deal with “indirect aggression” that may lead to the undermining of Japan’s Sea Lines of Communication (SLOCs) (Nishihara 1983: 183, 185; Patalano 2014: 44-45; Katahara 1991: 12).

Despite being Japan’s first official postwar long-term military planning document, and one that envisaged a limited degree of coordination with the United States, the NDPO was presented as a dovish plan that would consolidate “present force levels,” rather than justifying “a significant military build-up” (Mochizuki 1983: 156-157. The NDPO was also presented in terms that did not raise the possibility that Japan would become entrapped in wars abroad, in addition to it not identifying a specific overseas threat (Nishihara 1983: 180-181; Hara 2003: 39). Importantly, soon after the NDPO was promulgated, Prime Minister Fukuda Takeo declared the ‘Fukuda Doctrine’ while on an ASEAN tour in August 1977, which dedicated Japan to help assist the Southeast Asia region’s development now that the Vietnam War was over, and importantly came with the reassurance that Japan would not seek to become a military power that would dominate the region (Midford 2002: 30; Havens 1987: 247-248). This was followed the next year by the finalisation of the Treaty of Peace and Friendship between Japan and the People's Republic of China (MOFA 2014a), which supported mutual non-aggression and the denial of any state in the region to pursue regional hegemony. Japan would, from that point, come to strongly engage China and would provide considerable amounts of development assistance, business capital and technological assistance as the PRC adopted a more market-focused and open economic policy in the post-Mao era (see Jerdén and Hagström 2012; Takamine 2012). These new diplomatic developments helped offset any concerns about Japan once again becoming a dominant great military power in the region as it moved to rebuild its defence capability and strengthen the alliance.

The Japanese government, however, found it prudent at this time to further strengthen the non-constitutional antimilitarist components of the second wave of antimilitarist strengthening as a form of both domestic and international assurance. The Miki Takeo government, for example, ratified the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1976, which was a clinching sign that Japan had indeed indefinitely committed itself to the peaceful use of atomic energy and the Three Non-nuclear Principles, given that opting out of the NPT to build nuclear weapons would incur significant international reputational costs for Japan (Izumikawa 2010: 147-148; Rublee 2009: 66-68). While it had gradually come
to be accepted by a wide variety of elites, including defence policymakers from the late 1960s (Takao 2011: 8), the one percent of GNP defence spending limit was to be more prominently and publicly embraced by Miki in the Japanese Diet in 1976 (Samuels 2007b: 87). Promulgated alongside the NDPO, the reassertion of this limit was a way for the government to win public support for a more strategic and planned approach towards the use of defence outlays (Takao 2011: 8).

The strengthening of the arms export restrictions, also in 1976, was similarly important. The original “three principles” were officially strengthened on the February 27, 1976 when the Miki Cabinet’s “Collective View of the Government on the Export of Arms” was articulated at the Lower House Budgetary Committee (MOFA 2014b). Under the original restrictions promulgated in 1967, there had been some lapses which meant that Japanese exports and technologies had indirectly supported the US war effort in Indochina (Oros 2008: 98-107; Havens 1987: 99-100). Generally speaking, the collective view was seen to be equivalent to a comprehensive ban on the export of arms to any overseas nations – one that would not allow Japan to even export weapons to its American alliance partner and security guarantor. This effective blanket ban would even apply to ‘dual-use’ technologies, capital equipment used for the making of arms, technologies for weapon-making processes, and also included anything that could be reconfigured for military purposes without too much difficulty (Samuels 1996: 177; Abrams 1981).

Prime Minister Miki’s decision was all the more remarkable as there was a broad “assault” on the export ban in early 1976. Proponents of increased arms exports invoked the French model that sought to barter arms for oil and argued “that Arab states and Iran needed to recycle their petrodollars and were seeking alternative sources of military equipment” (Samuels 1996: 175-177). Miki, however, would not only deny requests for relaxation of the 1967 restrictions, but instead strengthened them as described above, despite arguments that Japan could acquire both access to valuable energy resources and sell its advanced technologies (Samuels 1996: 378 Samuels 2007a: 105-107; Oros 2008: 93). Miki was wary of the upcoming elections in 1976, and defence and corruption scandals and Japan’s first official embrace of a somewhat autonomous defence doctrine were playing an important role in domestic political discourse. Miki judged that rejecting the new proposals for flexibility on arms exports, and extending restrictions to an effective ban, was a more politically profitable course of action (Tago and Schneider 2012: 421; Samuels 1996: 176-177).
In 1978, Japan also strengthened its insistence that space technology development be used for civilian purposes and technologies with the new “Fundamental Policy of Space Development.” Oros argues that the 1978 policy was an important development because “it codified the 1969 Diet resolution on the peaceful use of space – which did not have the force of law – into a government-promulgated, cabinet-adopted policy which all government bodies that engage in space activities were required to follow” (2008: 132-133). This policy reaffirmed the spirit of the arms export ‘ban’ of 1976 in that if any space technologies developed by Japan they had potential military applications, they would not be exported, even to the US. This new policy was initiated in the same year that the first defence cooperation guidelines between Japan and the US were declared, suggesting that concerns regarding Japan being seen to be too closely tied in with the US military-industrial complex still existed. Ultimately, until the end of the 20th century Japan’s space program stuck closely to the exploration, commercial, civilian, and “international cooperation” justifications for Japan’s space program and government investment (Pekkanen and Umezu-Kallender 2010: 33-34). Japan did not even launch a surveillance satellite until the post-Cold War era, despite this generally being a relatively routine and uncontroversial action for a nation with the capability to do so.

Taken together, the government’s strengthening of the non-constitutional antimilitarist components provided a degree of assurance that Japan’s new military doctrine, the embrace of long-term planning for defence spending, and cooperation with the United States as symbolized by the 1978 US-Japan Defence Guidelines, would not lead to Japan becoming entrapped in a regional or global arms race or security dilemma. This strengthening also ensured that Japan would not commit to developing a full military-industrial complex in tandem with the US now that there were greater possibilities for the two countries to work together as allies. Also important to the Japanese public was the reaction of other nations in East Asia, particularly China. While in the 1960s and early 1970s the Chinese government insisted that Japan “abandon its subservience to American imperialism” (Welfield 1988: 290), the PRC’s reaction to the (first ever) Guidelines for Japan-US Defence Cooperation in 1978 was unremarkable, and in fact China would encourage a limited build-up of the SDF in the early 1980s due to the perceived mutual threat of the USSR (Keddell 1993: 95-98).

The new defence approach was also framed in terms of previous defence build-up plans having been kept modest and that the government and the military had not exceeded its
multi-year plans despite external and internal pressures (Samuels 1996: 178-179). This was essentially an argument for recognizing that the Japanese government had indeed been able to constrain the influence of the military in line with concepts of civilian control and democratic oversight over the previous twenty-five years, and that the new approach would also conform to such standards. As evidence of the government having alleviated to some degree the fear that the public still retained of it losing control of the military and military spending if a more proactive security policy was discussed, the 1976 NDPO was reasonably well received with 60 to 70 percent of the public supporting the government’s general approach on defence policy (Mochizuki 1983: 156-157). The government would, however, still tread slowly for the first decade after the NDPO by undershooting its production and acquisition targets to avoid controversy (Samuels 1996: 179).

**Summary**

This chapter discussed eight normative components of Japan’s traditional antimilitarist security identity by reference to the social and political context within which they were institutionalised. Japan’s traditional antimilitarism was strengthened during three waves from the post-independence period up until the late-1970s, which, as the next chapter discusses, turned out to be the ‘antimilitarist peak.’ These components resulted in the SDF and pro-military revisionist elites essentially being contained and isolated from playing a significant role in Japan’s security policymaking. They also resulted in a firewall being erected between the US and Japanese military establishments that would limit the influence of the US government on Japan’s own foreign policymaking and mitigate the possibilities for Japanese entrapment in US military interventionism in East Asia. Adherence to the antimilitarist norms described in this chapter, and a strictly defensive rebuilding of Japan’s armed forces, provided the public assurance that military interests would not pervert national revival by contributing to political, social, economic instability and deprivation domestically. It also provided assurance for international actors in Asia that helped operationalize a more independent foreign policy from the 1970s onwards and enabled Japan to reengage with many countries that suffered under its militarism during WWII. As the next chapter will show, however, changed international conditions and domestic attitudes in Japan from this point onwards led to greater emphasis being placed on deterrence as part of Japan’s security policy. The next chapter covers the changes in Japan’s security policy, and explanations for change. This will be critical as such changes
accelerated as the vanguard of the Heisei generational cohort was coming into its formative years from the mid-1980s.
CHAPTER FOUR: CHALLENGES TO JAPAN’S TRADITIONAL ANTIMILITARISM

The previous chapter described Japan’s postwar antimilitarist security identity and the associated normative components that came out of post-independence debates on security policy in Japan. Far from simply being an idealistic assertion of national identity, Japan’s traditional antimilitarism was also underpinned by a pragmatic security logic connected to the defence of Japan’s postwar democracy, societal rebuilding, economic development, and the avoidance of war and militarism. By the 1970s Japan had acquired the necessary economic and political resources to become a great military power, and was certainly already a great economic power. Debate started to form around what kind of power Japan should become in international society and what international responsibilities it should take on globally and regionally as its economic growth continued and its global influence increased (Takekawa 2007: 69-70). The first half of this chapter notes that Japan’s traditional antimilitarism appeared to ‘peak’ in the late-1970s, as many of the antimilitarist components discussed in the previous chapter have subsequently weakened in various ways. This suggests that there has been a change in Japan’s security identity since the end of the antimilitarist peak, raising the possibility that the Heisei cohort in particular may have been influenced by a different type of security discourse during their formative years. The second half of this chapter looks at arguments that the Heisei cohort in particular has become more hawkish in the post-Cold War era. This is followed by a discussion of the militant internationalist worldview, and its applicability to Japan’s security discourse, in setting out the analytical framework that will be used to examine this thesis’ quantitative and qualitative research data.

4.1: Changes to Constitution-derived Components of Traditional Antimilitarism

While the Japanese constitution has remained unchanged since 1947, discussion about whether to revise Article 9 in particular has become notable in the post-Cold War era. For the first time since the 1950s, Japanese politicians in the 1990s started pushing for revisions to the constitution without necessarily being electorally penalized by the public as they might have been during the traditional antimilitarist period (Boyd and Samuels 2005: 1-2). Both the Liberal Democratic Party and the Democratic Party of Japan – the two main mainstream centre-right and centre-left parties respectively – are in favour of revising the constitution, including Article 9 (Boyd and Samuels 2005: 1-2), and cross-party
parliamentary committees have been set up to discuss these issues. Critically, in 2007 Japan passed a law setting out the legal procedures for initiating the public referendum that must be held before changes to the constitution can be accepted, raising some concern both inside and outside Japan that the peace constitution and Article 9’s days were numbered (People’s Daily 2007). Barriers to constitutional change remain high, however, due to Article 96 of the constitution. Article 96 stipulates two-thirds of both legislative houses must pass an amendment, and in turn this amendment must receive majority support in a public referendum to be ratified. While any future change to the constitution and Article 9 will likely be a slow process requiring significant consensus, revealing evidence of changing attitudes towards security and the constitution can be detected in how the four constitutional antimilitarist components derived from Article 9 have evolved within Japan’s security policy framework since the antimilitarist peak.

**No SDF Dispatch Overseas**

The most thoroughly altered component of Japan’s traditional antimilitarism relates to the restrictions on the dispatch of the SDF outside of Japan’s sovereign territory. Changes to the practical implementation of the ‘no overseas SDF dispatch’ norm first started to take place in the early 1980s. In 1980, the Japanese government made a critically symbolic move by sending a small MSDF contingent overseas to participate in that year’s RIMPAC exercises alongside the United States (Graham 2005: 134). Also in 1980, Suzuki Zenkō became the first Japanese postwar prime minister to assert the constitutionality of the SDF protecting Japan’s sea lanes beyond its own territory (135). In 1981 the Suzuki cabinet decided that Japan’s interpretation of its ‘defence perimeter’ would be extended out to 1000 nautical miles from the island of Honshu in order to defend the Sea Lines of Communication (SLOCs) critical to Japan’s economic and military security (Graham 2005: 142; Buszynski 2009: 79). The 1000 nautical miles limitation was symbolic as it cut off the SDF’s theoretical sphere of action just north of the Philippines and West of Guam (Rapp 2004: 92). Prime Minister Nakasone in 1983 then announced that it would “be within the limits of Japan’s own self-defence to repel attacks made outside Japan’s territorial waters on US naval vessels that are operating to defend Japan” (Sato 1996: 99), further expanding the range of extra-territorial operational activities the SDF could undertake in aid of national security (Graham 2005: 142).
The dispatch of the SDF overseas for peacekeeping, disaster and humanitarian relief purposes also started to be discussed in the 1980s (Oshiba 1999: 8; Hynek 2012: 63; Ishizuka 2006: 5). The Japanese government sought to take advantage of the political distinction that the CLB had previously made between unconstitutional overseas dispatches for the explicit use of armed force (kaigai hahë) versus constitutionally acceptable dispatches for non-combat purposes (kaigai haken) (Haley 2005: 30). In 1988, Prime Minister Noburu Takeshita proposed greater Japanese contributions to the resolution of overseas conflicts, and in the same year Japan made its first dispatch of civilian personnel to UNPKOs (Ishizuka 2006: 5). In 1992, Japan passed a law that would allow SDF participation in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations (UNPKOs). While the Japanese had already dispatched the MSDF to conduct a minesweeping mission in the Persian Gulf in 1991 after Gulf War-related conflict had ended (Graham 2005: 148), it was Japan’s participation in a UNPKO in Cambodia in 1992 on the basis of the PKO Law that represented Japan’s first official post-independence participation in an exercise where Japanese troops would be authorized to conduct operations of any kind within another nation’s territory (Samuels 2007a: 66). In 1992, the SDF was also authorised to join Japan Disaster Relief (JDR) teams dispatched overseas for disaster relief following 1987 legislation that initially established this unit (Tatsumi 2008: 132; Samuels 2013: 72). The SDF has gone on to conduct major disaster relief operations alongside the US, Australian and Indian militaries in response to the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami (Sahashi 2012: 231; Samuels 2013: 70), and with the United States in response to the 2013 Haiyan Typhoon that hit the Philippines.

Following these developments and the end of the Cold War the SDF’s role in national, regional and global security was officially reconceptualised in the 1995 National Defence Program Outline, the first successor to the 1976 NDPO. This led to the 1997 revision of the 1978 Guidelines for Japan-US Defence Cooperation (Hughes 2012: 26), and SDF involvement in the resolution of contingencies in “areas surrounding Japan” (shūhen jitai) was subsequently legalised. While a full commitment of the SDF to combat operations during these contingencies was rejected, it was agreed that Japan could provide non-combat “rear area support” (kōhō chiiki shien) for “U.S. forces in the event of a regional emergency involving Japan’s security” (Boyd and Samuels 2005: 32-33). In August, 1999, after two years of vigorous debate in the Diet, the Law Ensuring Peace and Security in Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan was passed (Arase 2007: 568; Hughes 2012: 26). In addition to
representing a symbolic shift of the SDF’s military focus from one solely of homeland security to regional security, this would mean that Japan could in theory dispatch the SDF outside of Japan, outside of the mandate of the UN, and outside of operations related to the *explicit* defence of Japan (Arase 2007: 568).

The government led by Koizumi Junichirō then proceeded to use the 1999 Law Ensuring Peace and Security in Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan to provide naval rear area support for anti-terror activities in the Indian Ocean and support for reconstruction activities in Iraq (Arase 2007: 571). The Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law allowed the dispatch of MSDF vessels to the Indian Ocean for various refuelling and water provision purposes and the Iraq Reconstruction Law allowed the dispatch of Japanese troops to Iraqi territory during US occupation.  

While not explicitly in support of US combat operations, the dispatch of troops to Samawah in Southern Iraq was the first time since World War II that Japanese ground forces were dispatched to a country where on-going combat was taking place (Mochizuki 2004: 108). During the Koizumi and subsequent administrations, the MSDF, working together with the Japan Coast Guard, has also committed resources to anti-piracy activities overseas, including up to the Gulf of Aden (Baruah 2009). Many of these overseas dispatches were controversial at the time of their occurrence and led to considerable debate inside of Japan (Zisk 2001: 39; Lee and Park 2009; Sekiguchi 2007). Ultimately, with these overseas dispatches and changes to the SDF’s mandate, the traditional antimilitarist avoidance of any Japan military overseas has ceased to exist, and the SDF is regularly sent overseas by the Japanese government for various humanitarian and non-combat purposes.

**No Collective Self-Defence**

Since the antimilitarist peak, the government has openly considered allowing the SDF to engage in various military activities in collaboration with other nations’ militaries that were previously avoided due to their potential to overlap with collective self-defence activities. For example, prior to the 1980s, the Japanese government’s stance had been that the “SDF would not have been allowed to assist a U.S. warship that came under attack while defending Japan” (Boyd and Samuels 2005: 9). In 1983, however, Prime Minister Nakasone Yasuhiro narrowed the scope of what could be considered the exercise of the right to collective self-defence when he announced that the SDF could help US ships repel

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31 For a discussion of these special measure laws, see Tatsumi (2008: 133-139).
attacks on US ships outside of Japanese waters if US ships were “operating to defend Japan” (Sato 1996: 99; Graham 2005: 142). The government also announced a constitutional interpretation that the Self-Defence Forces could be dispatched to protect a foreign-flagged ship in Japan’s sea lanes in the event of a contingency if the goods carried on the ship “are considered to be goods absolutely essential for ensuring the survival of the people” (Yomiuri Shimbun 2014c).

The aforementioned special measures laws passed by the Koizumi government that allowed the SDF to engage in rear area support roles were also controversial from the point of view of collective self-defence. While the SDF was ultimately limited to the provision of water, food, and fuel, the transport of material (with the exception of weapons and ammunition), and medical support,” they arguably constituted a form of “de facto” collective self-defence (Boyd and Samuels 2005: 33, 46). Combat activities were still arguably on-going in both Afghanistan and Iraq at the time of SDF dispatch, thus raising numerous possibilities that members of the SDF would either be caught up in situations where the use of arms to defend themselves would be necessary. Critically, the SDF assisted other nations’ militaries and essentially become “integrated” with the use of force (buryoku kōshi to no ittai-ka), thus potentially making the SDF a belligerent party to an international conflict (Tanter 2005; Samuels 2007a: 180; Heinrich, Shibata and Soeya 1999: 51-52). Japan’s indirect support of UN, US and NATO activities in Afghanistan, and the Air Self-Defence Force’s (ASDF) activities in Iraq, involved the provision of logistics, refuelling and intelligence support, which are arguably “crucial element[s] of war fighting” (Martin 2007). Certainly, during the antimilitarist peak such activities would have been decisively ruled out, and the Nagoya High Court in 2008 agreed when they ruled ASDF activities in Iraq as unconstitutional (Japan Times 2008).

The Ground Self-Defence Forces (GSDF) mission to Iraq was also controversial. The Iraq Reconstruction Law only permitted the dispatch of armed GSDF troops to Iraq if the troops would not have to use force to accomplish their mission and the area of operations did not constitute a “combat zone” (sentō chiiki) (Boyd and Samuels 2005: 46). The CLB argued that carrying and using weapons within a non-combat zone within a UN-authorised mission did not constitute the “use of force” (buryoku kōshi), but rather, if used in a minimal way to defend their own persons, would only constitute a defensive “use of arms” (buki shiyō). Even after the cessation of state-to-state conflict, the insecurity and on-going combat activities that characterised US interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq raised doubts,
however, about whether a clear distinction between humanitarian and war-fighting assistance can be meaningfully upheld in such situations. This distinction became more dubious as Iraq turned into a quagmire subsequent to the passing of the Iraq Reconstruction Law (Sebata 2007: 148; Tamamoto 2004). Even the minister responsible for defence at the time of the Iraq dispatch admitted that the SDF would be going to areas where security was “poor” (Mochizuki 2004: 108).

While Koizumi tried ultimately to work around the ban on collective self-defence in dispatching the SDF overseas (Boyd and Samuels 2005: 46), this has not been the case for another notable Japanese leader, Abe Shinzō, who has challenged the ban head-on. Abe has attempted to explicitly legalise the exercise of the right to collective self-defence through a cabinet declaration, with the CLB’s imprimatur, that would ‘reinterpret’ the constitution to explicitly allow the exercise of the collective self-defence right. During his first administration (2006-2007), Abe pursued reinterpretation of Article 9 to allow Japan to engage in activities formerly considered to fall within the realms of collective self-defence. Such activities included Japan using its Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) system to shoot down a missile heading towards the United States, particularly Guam or Hawaii, and allowing a MSDF ship to defend other nation’s ships if it came under attack while it was working with the MSDF in an overseas operation not explicitly related to Japan’s defence (Boyd and Samuels 2005: 59; Slavin and Sumida 2011). During his second administration (2012- ), Abe revived his pursuit of constitutional reinterpretation, citing the rapid deterioration in Japan’s security environment since his first administration (Asahi Shimbun 2014a).

Abe’s moves have raised concerns inside Japan because full legalisation of the exercise of collective self-defence could in theory allow the Japanese government to dispatch the SDF to participate in direct combat operations overseas given that US allies legally justified intervention in Afghanistan on the basis of collective self-defence (Quigley 2003: 542). The SDF already regularly conducts joint military exercises simulating combat with the US military inside Japan, and increasingly abroad, and has also started combat-orientated military drills with India and Australia. Japanese officers have also been involved in multinational combined task forces for overseas training exercises, and there are plans for a joint training facility to be established at a base on Tinian Island in the Northern Mariana Islands (Spitzer 2012). In July of 2014, the Abe Cabinet promulgated a declaration that reinterpreted Article 9 to allow Japan to assist other nations under attack if the attack would
also threaten Japan’s territorial security (Mie 2014a). The aforementioned developments have gradually undermined the institutional legal basis for the original ban on collective self-defence (Samuels 2007a: 89). They also represent a departure from the almost faithful avoidance of entanglements with other nations’ militaries outlined in Chapter Three that motivated the original ban, and suggest that attitudes towards defence cooperation and integration have evolved since the antimilitarist peak period.

**No War Potential**

As noted in the previous chapter, during the antimilitarist peak, the Japanese government strictly operationalized the prohibition on war potential by avoiding acquiring weapons systems with significant potential offensive applications. While there are still limits on the types of military platforms the government allows itself to acquire, it is clear that the Japanese government is no longer as sensitive to the offensive potential of hardware acquisitions as it was during the antimilitarist peak period. Revisiting the example of the F-4EJ fighter, its lack of an air-refuelling probe and targeting system would constrain the SDF’s ability to fly long-distances and conduct air-to-surface strike operations as well as provide anti-air cover for the protection of sea lanes in Japan’s far maritime periphery (Midford 2002: 11). Subsequent fighter aircraft, however, have both capabilities (Hook 1988: 386). The Japanese government has since also purchased a small number of KC-767 refuelling tankers which, alongside guided missile systems and Joint Direct Attack Munitions, would in theory allow the aforementioned strike operations to take place (Ishizu 2008: 74; Hughes 2009a: 91; Benedict 2012). Japan has also purchased the F-35A, which has sophisticated weapons capabilities as well as low-observability (‘stealth’), which could also in theory give Japan a limited ability to conduct offensive operations against other countries by penetrating their air defence systems, even if the Japanese government has emphasised their defensive value in arguing for their acquisition (Jiji Press 2011).

Japan has also increased its strategic lift and transportation capability, allowing it to move its armed forces from Japan to areas beyond its immediate security environment. In the 1990s, the Japanese government commissioned three Ōsumi-class transport ships, which at the time were four times larger than any ship the MSDF had deployed up until that point (DuPont 2004: 30; Erickson and Wilson 2006: 25). These vessels had flat decks for the landing of transport helicopters (Medeiros et al., 2008: 53), and an integral rear dock for the operation of Landing Craft Air Cushions for landing tanks and transporting ordnance.
ashore (Hughes 2009a: 93). Japan’s government is also in the process of acquiring 40 Kawasaki C-2 transport planes which will allow Japan even greater ability to transport numbers of troops, ordnance and materiel (Hughes 2009a: 93). Japan has also recently committed to setting up a military unit modelled on the US marines for offshore island defence (MOD 2013a), and also recently announced plans to introduce Assault Amphibious Vehicles (AAV7s), improving Japan’s amphibious capabilities (Nikkei Shimbun 2012). The MSDF’s Hyūga-class or Izumo-class helicopter carriers, both having flat decks, have also attracted attention due to the assertion that they could be converted into traditional aircraft carriers (Hughes 2009a: 93; Koda 2011: 32; Haizhou and Chunyan 2011; Li 2011). Acquired for the specific purpose of conducting Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW), and humanitarian and disaster relief uses (Oros and Tatsumi 2010: 57), the carriers are not able to operate any fixed-wing aircraft currently in production, but the MSDF could potentially operate a small number of short take-off vertical landing (STOVL) F-35Bs should they be purchased in the future.

It is clear that Japan has evolved away from the initial antimilitarist sensitivity that had restrained the acquisition of hardware platforms in the first thirty-five years after regaining independence. The Ministry of Defence of Japan (2014) states clearly, however, that “it is unconstitutional to possess what is referred to as offensive weapons that, from their performance, are to be used exclusively for total destruction of other countries [emphasis added], since it immediately exceeds the minimum level necessary for self-defence. For instance, the SDF is not allowed to possess ICBMs, long-range strategic bombers or offensive aircraft carriers” (MOD 2014). Essentially, if a weapons system has a convincing defensive application that is applicable to Japan’s situation and immediate security needs, then the acquisition of the concerned hardware should not be ruled out simply because it also has offensive applications. While the legal existence of the prohibition on war potential has not changed since the formation of the SDF in 1954, the method of its operationalization has clearly changed given the decreased sensitivity to potential offensive applications of defence hardware.

**Containment of Institutional Military Influence**

As described in the previous chapter, during the three waves of antimilitarist strengthening the Japanese government essentially focused on preventing Japan’s own military and USFJ becoming prominent and powerful political organizations in postwar Japan that could exert
influence over policymakers. By the 1980s, however, containment of these organisations as a form of assurance appeared to no longer be seen as a priority. At the interpersonal level, for example, the practice of preventing career JDA officials from taking over the top JDA roles was relaxed in 1988 (Samuels 2007a: 53). In 1997, Prime Minister Hashimoto Ryūtarō revoked the original directive that required a civilian JDA officer to be in the room when a member of the SDF General Staff was meeting with a politician, and Hashimoto himself regularly met with the chairman of the Joint Staff Council without supervision (Samuels 2007a: 101). Under the Koizumi administration, the non-JDA councillors (sanjikan) had their numbers reduced, which allowed members of both the JDA and SDF to take on more prominent roles in top-level policymaking (76, 101). Prime Minister Kan Naoto’s 2010 appointment for the first time of a Prime Minister’s secretary (hishokan) from the Ministry of Defence (MOD) also demonstrated the increasing stature and influence of defence officials in Japan’s security policymaking. This appointment put the MOD alongside the other major agencies, namely the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI), the Ministry of Finance (MOF), and the National Police Agency (NPA) in terms of esteem in being represented in the Prime Minister’s inner circle of secretaries (Asahi Shimbun 2010a).

The centralization of security policy planning within the executive government has also advanced. Since the Nakasone administration, the Cabinet Secretariat (naikaku-kanbō) has undergone three major security-related reorganisations, each one giving defence officials greater input into policymaking and moving them closer to civilian leaders (Tatsumi 2008: 52-56; Shinoda 2005: 807, 816). In probably the most symbolically important move, the JDA was upgraded in 2007 in status to a full state ministry. In terms of practical policy implications, the JDA (now the MOD) would no longer be a subordinate organization fighting for influence within the Cabinet Office and would have input into Cabinet-level policymaking and budget negotiations (Takahashi 2007: 235; Pettibon 2011: 39; Tatsumi 2008: 125-131). There has also been increased integration between the three different SDF services (Ota 2000: 60; Ishizu 2008: 76; Kaida 2005: 5). The passing of legislation to set up the National Security Council in 2013, modelled on the US National Security Council (NSC) (Berkshire Miller 2014; Takahashi 2013), will likely greatly increase the interpersonal and policymaking interaction between different parts of the civilian and military bureaucracy. The establishment of the NSC will also consolidate the centralisation of post-Cold War evolution of Japan’s security intelligence gathering capabilities (Tatsumi
This is notable because intelligence and surveillance capabilities were purposefully kept modest and diffuse during the antimilitarist peak due to sensitivity about intelligence gathering organisations and centralised covert police organisations. This is because during World War II a police state apparatus was built-up and had detrimental effects on Japanese society and Japan’s vulnerable democratic development, as exemplified by the legendary brutality and repressiveness of the Tokkō and Kempeitai (Tipton 1990: 12).

Recent changes also suggest that the SDF is no longer conceived of as a back-up for the “real” military of the US as it effectively was during the traditional antimilitarist period (Samuels, 2007a: 44). The SDF has become a partner organisation to the USFJ, and regularly engages in military exercises and joint training (Ota 2000: 60; Ishizu 2008: 76; Kaida 2005: 5). In 1978, the Air Self Defence Force (ASDF) had its first exercises with the US, and the Ground Self Defence Force (GSDF) also had similar exercises in 1981. Perhaps most symbolically, in 1980 the Maritime Self Defence Force (MSDF) participated in the multinational RIMPAC naval exercises for the first time (Soeya 1998). By 1986 it was deemed politically acceptable for USFJ and the SDF to implement biennial exercises, known as “Keen Sword,” to improve interoperability between the various military services of the two countries (US Pacific Fleet 2010). Subsequent to the 1995 NDPO, the first ever Acquisitions and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA) between the two nations was signed in 1996. This which would allow the provision and exchange between the two militaries of food, water, fuel, and defence equipment (Tatsumi 2008: 135; Akaha 1998: 465). Japan and the US then agreed to revise the 1978 US-Japan Defense Guidelines (the Revised Guidelines) in 1997 (Cronin 1996: 2-3), and Japan then passed the Law Ensuring Peace and Security in Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan on the basis of the Revised Guidelines. After 9/11, the breadth of US-Japan military cooperation was further increased beyond Japan’s immediate regional security environment with the Defence Policy Review Initiative (DPRI) (Tatsumi 2008: 177; Takahashi 2007: 240; Chanlett-Avery and Konishi 2009: 4). The final reports from the DPRI outlined expectations that Japan would make security contributions on a global level to activities such as counterterrorism, reconstruction assistance, and counter-proliferation operations, in addition to the PKO and humanitarian roles it had already committed itself to by reference to its UN responsibilities (Takahashi 2007: 241).
Subsequent to the DPRI, additional moves were made to further increase interoperability between US and Japanese forces, such as the establishment of the Bilateral Joint Operation Coordination Center (BJOCC) at Yokota Air base, the relocation of the mobile and elite GSDF Central Readiness Force to Camp Zama (near Tokyo) to establish a forward operational headquarters, and base sharing overseas such as in Guam (Takahashi 2007: 232, 242; Chanlett-Avery and Konishi 2009: 6). There has also been increased US-Japan alliance interoperability at the level of hardware and technical components, particularly in the naval sphere. Examples include the operation of the P-3 platform from the late 1970s (Imaki 2012: 8), the operation of the Aegis Combat System and its Ballistic Missile Defence component on naval destroyers for anti-air operations from the 1990s (Koda 2011: 46, 59), and Japan’s purchase of the F-35A (Laird and Timperlake 2012: 86). Japan has also initiated ministerial-level and subministerial-level ‘two plus two’ dialogues (which involve the ministers/ministries of foreign policy and defence on both sides) with Australia, India, Vietnam, France, the UK, Indonesia, and Russia, in addition to the Japan-US Security Consultative Committee that has been the focus of the US-Japan alliance.

4.2: Non-Constitutional Components of Japan’s Traditional Antimilitarism

Nuclear Weapons

The one component of antimilitarism that has not been loosened at all since the end of the antimilitarist peak, and may have undergone strengthening, is Japan’s commitment to not acquiring nuclear weapons and to the 3NNP. There have been arguments that Japan is increasingly likely to acquire a nuclear deterrent capability, with some analysts pointing to the fact that the nuclear weapons issue is no longer the third rail of Japanese politics as evidence of this possibility (Lim 2002). Over the last two decades there have been an increasing number of public statements by Japanese politicians that suggest Japan should at least debate the value of nuclear weapons for Japanese national security (Waltz 1993: 69; Rublee 2009: 74-76). Mochizuki identifies research showing that the Japanese public is indeed increasingly in favour of having a debate on nuclear weapons (Mochizuki 2007a: 318). This willingness to accept debate on the proposition, however, does not automatically equate to Japanese wanting to attain nuclear weapons. As will be noted in the next chapter, if anything, negative sentiment regarding the acquisition of nuclear weapons and the 3NNP has only increased in the post-Cold War era, despite the DPRK nuclear weapons program and China’s nuclear modernisation program.
The technical steps the Japanese government would have to go through before it can deploy anything more credible than a rudimentary nuclear device are also not inconsequential (Schoff 2009: 44-49; also see Thompson and Self 2003). Japan appears to hold a recessed nuclear weapons capability, thereby qualifying Japan as a virtual or threshold nuclear state (Rublee 2010: 61; Ichimasa 2012). The Japanese government’s continued reluctance to take the final steps towards acquiring an actual nuclear weapons capability suggests that Japan is respecting the boundary between its civilian nuclear program and a credible and immediately useable nuclear deterrent, however. The political steps may be even more insurmountable. As Rublee argues, there have been four occasions since 1964 when the Japanese government has discreetly investigated the possibility of acquiring nuclear weapons, only to ultimately conclude that it was either strategically or politically unrealistic for Japan to formally commit to a nuclear weapons-focused deterrence posture (2009: 62). Japan continues to reject the nuclear option or even the less dramatic option of allowing the US to transit nuclear weapons through Japanese territory. This would suggest that the opposition to Japan acquiring nuclear weapons is a sustainable and distinct norm of its own, given the weakening of other elements of Japan’s traditional antimilitarism described in this chapter.

The One Percent of GDP Cap

Keddell notes that at the time of the 1973-1974 oil crisis, defence spending as a proportion of GDP in Japan dropped to as low as 0.83 percent (1993: 80-81). This was contrary to US expectations in the 1970s for allies to take a greater responsibility for their own security by spending at least 3 percent of GNP per year on defence (after inflation adjustment). Defence spending also decreased as a percentage of the national budget from 20.76 percent in 1952 to 5.13 percent in 1981, leading to great American displeasure. The Suzuki administration appeared to react to this displeasure by raising overall defence expenditures from approximately 0.90 percent of GNP to close to the one percent limit in line with US requests from the early 1980s (Keddell 1993: 88-90). For the first time since 1967, the one percent cap came under siege during the pro-American administration of Nakasone Yasuhiro (inaugurated in 1982) (Chai 1997: 401-402). While these plans led to significant public outcry, and even to some within Nakasone’s own LDP threatening abstention in a no-confidence motion against him, Nakasone eventually succeeded in breaching the limit in 1987 by 0.013 percent through a budgetary sleight of hand (New York Times 1987). This sleight of hand would be to leave the initial budget allocation procured through parliament
at under one percent, but have spending automatically exceed the one percent limit when public service salaries in general were automatically raised later in the year. Subsequent to Nakasone’s gambit, in 1988 the US Congress demanded that “Japan raise its defence spending to at least 3 percent of GDP” (Chai 1997: 390).

This did not happen, however, and Japan’s defence spending remained under one percent from that time onwards, far lower than most NATO allies that Japan was compared to. While from 1982 the defence share of the budget started to increase – being 5.2 percent in 1982, increasing to 6.5 percent in 1989 (Keddell 1993: 80-81), from the long-term view this appears only as a mere adjustment rather than a change in priorities. At its high-water mark relative to national income, Defence spending remained 6th in terms of the priorities of the Japanese budget by the end of the 1980s, well behind social security, public works, education, financial grants, and national debt servicing (91-92). As of the mid-1990s, Japan was as low as 138 out of 166 countries for defence expenditure relative to national income (Menon 1997: 30). From 2001 to 2011, the Japanese defence budget actually decreased in both nominal and real terms eleven times consecutively, despite the rapid military build-up and defence spending increases of Japan’s neighbours (Klingner 2013a). Currently, Japan’s spending as a percentage of GDP sits at approximately 0.98 percent (MOD 2013b: 42).

It is possible that Japan’s post-Cold War budgetary problems have played a significant role in the cap not being breached, however, rather than any commitment to antimilitarist sentiment. Addressing this concern, Takao finds that, unlike other nations such as the US or the UK, the Japanese public is particularly sensitive to increases in defence spending as a percentage of GDP, rather than overall defence spending, the perception of outside threat, or the presence of on-going global conflict (Takao 2011: 13-15). As Takao notes, the ratio of social spending to GDP continues to increase with no sign of a downturn, while that of defence spending is kept under the restraint of a spending ceiling (Takao 2011: 5). If fiscal responsibility was the major concern of the electorate, then Japan’s continuous deficits, enormous spending on public works, and burgeoning social security spending would be expected to be restrained in similar ways to defence spending (Midford 2002: 8), which makes up a much lower amount of Japan’s overall budget in relative terms.

**Arms Exports Restrictions**

While the 3NNP and defence spending non-constitutional components of traditional Japanese antimilitarism appear to remain intact, the arms export effective ban and non-
military use of space components have radically changed since the late 1970s. The effective arms export ban of 1976 lasted little more than seven years before slowly being loosened. In 1983, Prime Minister Nakasone, trying to balance US pressure for increased defence spending with public sentiment, promulgated an exception to the 1976 effective ban. This allowed the transfer of defence technology exports jointly developed to the US, although weapons themselves were not to be exported (Tago and Schneider 2012: 421-422; Samuels 2004: 4). This would allow Japanese defence companies to partner with the US and it would encourage two-way transfer of technology as well as increase interoperability in essential military technologies (Tago and Schneider 2012: 421-422). For example, in 1989 the two sides came to an agreement on joint development and mutual technology transfer of a fighter jet based on the U.S. F-16 (Imaki 2012: 4-5), with the result being the Mitsubishi F-2.

Over time, more exceptions were promulgated. These included exceptions allowing the SDF to take equipment out of the country on UNPKO missions and other humanitarian missions after new legislation in the late 1980s and early 1990s permitted SDF participation in these kinds of missions. The 1993 Government Collective View on the Export of General Dual Purpose Equipment (hanyō-hin no yushutsu ni kansuru seifu tōitsu kenkai) was particularly important. Promulgated by the Chief Cabinet Secretary Kōno Yōhei at the Upper House Budgetary Committee on behalf of the Miyazawa Cabinet (House of Councillors Budgetary Committee 1993), this was essentially a declaration that dual use technologies and equipment with significant commercial and civilian applications would not be subjected to restrictions if the product was exported in exactly the same condition as it would be used within a civilian context (Tomita 2011: 3-4). The specific example of the time was the Boeing 767 civilian aircraft (Tago and Schneider 2012: 422). Exceptions related to the Acquisition and Cross-servicing Agreement (ACSA) agreement between Japan and the US in 1996, and revisions in 1998 and 2004 were promulgated, as were exceptions for the SDF’s participation in rear area activities in support of US and NATO operations in Afghanistan and Iraq.

Another noteworthy change was allowing BMD technology and other non-BMD equipment produced through co-development and co-production between Japan and the US to be exported to the US (Imaki 2012: 17; Samuels 2007a: 106-107). The government also announced exceptions that would allow it to make contributions to the security of regional nations with limited state capacity to deal with maritime and other internal security threats.
The Japanese government also made exemptions and reconfigured its foreign aid packages to include certain types of equipment as “security assistance” for dealing with non-traditional security concerns (Samuels 2007b: 103).

After more than fifty years of trying, and Japan’s defence industry being reduced to nothing more than a “boutique defence industry” with “often staggeringly high unit costs of production for weapons” (Tago and Schneider 2012: 421), in the late 2000s the Keidanren eventually managed to convince the Japanese government of the need for a more flexible overall approach to arms exports (Keidanren 2004). In 2011, a wholesale change was eventually made to the arms export restrictions after many years of discussions. This change permitted increased flexibility for the export of some types of equipment that had previously been restricted and effectively rolled back the 1976 ‘blanket ban’ to the original three principles of 1967 (Tago and Schneider 2012: 423). In the case of international joint development and manufacturing consortia, the changes allowed Japan’s partners to export the co-manufactured/developed equipment, should it be deemed to be in the interests of both Japan’s security and international peace and security (Kantei 2011). Then in 2014, the Abe government proposed a complete overhaul of the original 1967 principles, which have been renamed the “Three Principles on Defence Equipment Transfers” (Shiraishi 2014). While Japan would still avoid exporting defence equipment to countries in the middle of a military conflict or countries subject to a UN arms embargo, and would avoid the export of technology and arms controlled by international agreements (Konno 2014), the loosening of restrictions look set to allow the limited export of high-technology and maritime-focused military equipment (Shukla 2014), as well as to allow Japanese companies to more effectively work with overseas companies in the co-development of new technology (Grevatt 2012; Nicholson 2013). Japan is now considering technology transfers to non-US strategic partners, such as submarine technology to Australia, or non-combat planes to India (Yomiuri Shimbun 2014b; Kallender-Umezu 2014a).

**The Peaceful Use of Space**

Japan has also drastically changed its space policy over the last two decades. In reaction to the North Korean ballistic missile threat symbolized by the 1998 North Korean Taepodong test, Japan made the decision to deploy its first surveillance or ‘spy’ satellite in the early 2000s. The Japanese government has also come to see investment in the military use of space as a force multiplier and one area where it must not fall behind technologically. This
is due to increasing concern about China’s military use of space, particularly for C4ISR purposes (Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance). There is also awareness that Japan cannot compete in terms of a quantitative arms build-up given its self-imposed security policy restrictions, fiscal troubles, and decreasing military spending relative to China (Pekkanen and Umezu-Kallender 2010: 253).

The Cabinet Office’s Council for Science and Technology Policy (CSTP) has been at the forefront of implementing this strategy. In September 2001, the CSTP released a science promotion strategy for Japan which contained within it the “first official and visible statement to acknowledge the role of space in Japan’s national security” (Pekkanen and Kallender-Umezu 2010: 35). Then in 2004, the CSTP released the “definitive version” of a detailed space plan that “stressed the importance of autonomy and independence” of Japan space policy, and consequently “left little doubt about the importance of space for national security or public safety in Japan” (38). Later, the 2008 Basic Space Law essentially represented the “normalisation” of Japan’s space policy as it legally redefined the peaceful purposes resolution for Japan’s space activities (226).

This new law would legally legitimate Japan’s new “dual use” space policy, and both national security and military applications would be considered to be crucial parts of Japan’s overall space program (Pekkanen and Kallender-Umezu 2010: 40). Japan is now “in line with international interpretations of ‘peaceful uses’ as being nonaggressive rather than non-military” (245). There was little public outrage with the passing of this law, despite the key players in the space industry “having suffered threats of condemnation in earlier times” (246). Subsequently, in March 2013, the U.S.-Japan Situational Space Awareness Sharing Agreement was signed, the first Japan-U.S. Comprehensive Dialogue on Space took place, and the Security Consultative Committee announced that Japan and the US would increase cooperation on space to enhance the security of both nations (Security Consultative Committee 2013). It would appear that traditional antimilitarist sentiment no longer guarantees the subordination of national security prerogatives to civilian prerogatives in this critical industrial area.

4.3: Japan’s Rightward Shift

The above discussion of the components of Japan’s traditional antimilitarist security policy has shown that many restrictions on the range of activities that the SDF can engage in both
at home and abroad, the types of hardware it can maintain, as well as restrictions on arms exports and the use of space have been relaxed. This would suggest that Japan no longer adheres to the traditional antimilitarism that was a feature of the period between the late Occupation period and the late 1970s. Looking at reasons for change, and whether the next generation will reflect these changes in their security policy outlook, appears therefore to be a valid topic for investigation. Indeed, discussion about a rightward shift in Japanese societal values and political discourse has become a staple of both academic and media commentary on Japan since the 1980s (Komiya 1980; Nakano 1998; McCormack 2000; Matthews 2003), although examples of this discourse can be found dating back to the 1960s and 1970s (Totten 1963; Dixon 1972; Shaw 1975). Correlated with a perceived decrease in the salience of Japan’s postwar constitutional “pacifism” (Royer 1993: 749), many scholars and commentators tend to see, either positively or negatively, the inevitable evolution of Japan’s security policy towards a more aggressive military posture. Two narratives dominate analysis and scholarship regarding Japan’s security policy evolution, both suggesting that it is only a matter of time before Japan becomes a conventional great military power. These two explanations are the rise of nationalism in Japan, and a transition from idealism to realism.

**Rising Nationalism in Japan**

In the foreign policy literature on Japan, rising nationalism in the post-Cold War era among the Japanese population has frequently been connected to the security policy changes outlined above. Calder (2006: 129), for example, emphasises the “resurgence” of hawkish nationalism in Japan as a cause of changing attitudes towards Japan’s post-Cold War security policy. Concrete evidence for this resurgence of hawkish neo-nationalism in Japan (Smith 2006; McNeill 2010) include legislation in 1999 that identified the *hinomaru* (Japanese national flag) and *kimigayo* (Japanese national anthem) as the legal national symbols of the Japanese nation (Rose 2000: 171-173; Amemiya 1999). Disputes over textbook content and awareness of WWII in education (Vollmer 2006), disputes over the meaning and symbolism of the visits by ‘neo-nationalist’ Japanese prime ministers to the Yasukuni Shrine,32 and attempts to paint a positive picture of the Emperor’s centrality to

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the Japanese national life, have all been raised as evidence of a neo-nationalist resurgence in Japan.\(^{33}\)

The main concern in these analyses is that, due to some form of historical amnesia relating to World War II, such developments portend the possible reinvigoration of authoritarian and militaristic values with antecedents in pre-war Japan (Chang 2008: 801; He and Yu 2002; Fukurai and Alston 1992: 211). Japan is argued to have insufficiently taken note of the lessons relating to the dangers of nationalism,\(^{34}\) and the inherently militaristic nature of Japanese culture itself is often offered for explanatory relevance.\(^{35}\) Japan’s past adherence to antimilitarist norms is seen to only be superficial cover for what has long been an inherently nationalistic Japanese society.\(^{36}\) Worries about the political influence of neo-nationalists revolve around a perception that these elites are “whitewashing facts” and “distorting history,” which in turn allows them to manipulate public sentiment in order to reconfigure Japan as “a normal country that can bring on war” (Yi 2012: 110). This narrative often implies a need for the “cork in the bottle” of irresponsible and excessive Japanese nationalism and militarism to be firmly put back into place. This would be achieved by Japan remaining militarily weak (Yi 2012; Matthews 2003: 75, 88-90; Zhou 2005),\(^{37}\) and by the US continuing to “dominate” Japan through its alliance relationship (Robinson 2010: 316; Kaufman 2008: 267; Matthews 2003: 90).

Concern about Japanese conservative and militaristic nationalism in Japan reached a crescendo during the end of the Koizumi administration and during both Abe administrations. Both politicians are generally regarded to be archetypical pro-US neo-nationalist conservatives who share political heritage deriving from postwar revisionist elites.\(^{38}\) Debate on the merits of changing the peace constitution raised by these politicians

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\(^{35}\) Such militarism is usually based on a perceived combination of xenophobia and martial cultures in Japan’s past (Etzioni 2014; Ryu 2007:714; Pence 2006: 336; Kaufman 2008: 266; Xie 2004; Zhao 2003; Guttentag and Sturman 2013; Choe 2006).


in Japan is often reflexively associated with this apparent neo-nationalism becoming “one of the major driving forces behind Japan’s foreign and domestic policy” (Moon and Li 2010: 339) that will lead to Japan “shedding the pacifist plumes it acquired after World War II” (Etzioni 2014).39 Utilizing realpolitik vocabulary and drumming up fears around international terrorism, or the military activities of the DPRK and “historical rival” China (Calder 2006: 129), neo-nationalist elites have supposedly cynically shifted Japanese security policy towards one which will allow them to pursue their objective of resurrecting Japan’s great power status in global affairs.40

**Generational-focused Japanese Nationalism**

The development of nationalism in place of pacifism is also noted as having a bottom-up dimension connected to the educational reforms and right-wing and hard-line foreign policy agenda undertaken by nationalist elites (Chang 2008: 791; McCormack 1998: 17; Cao and Wang 2006: 40-45).41 Lamenting the decreased concern with inculcating anti-war sentiment in Japanese students by teachers, Yuan Cai argues forcefully that “Generational change is perhaps the greatest enemy of pacifism in Japan” (2008: 197). Instead, having dominated the “minds” of the younger generation in Japan “for close to two decades now” (Chiba 2007: 52; see also Rose 2000: 175), neo-conservative elites are said to have “whitewashed” history through textbook revisions, which in turn has led to a lack of historical awareness and appreciation of the follies of war and nationalism among the younger population in Japan.42 Such reforms are seen as likely to have stirred up “blind” patriotic sentiment through the promotion of the singing of the Japanese national anthem in front of the Japanese flag in schools, and by making revisions to the Fundamental Law on Education “to inculcate a more nationalistic spirit” and “an attitude of loving one’s nation and homeland” in school curricula (Ryu 2007: 715; Chiba 2007: 53).43 Ultimately,

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40 Competition with a rising China is often given as the motivating factor for Japan attempting to become a great military power (Saft and Ohara 2006: 82; Matthews 2003: 80-81; Tsai 2007; Bix 2013; Lai 2011: 115; Kotler, Sugawara, and Yamada 2007: 93; Qiao 2006; Suh 2005, 2010; Qi 2005; Takahashi 2010; Zhang 2006; Feng 2001).
41 See also He and Yu (2002) and Amemiya (1999) for concerns about the influence of patriotic education in Japan.
43 Ryu (2007) provides a discussion of how these reforms have been discussed in Japan; there are also a number of non-Japanese accounts that also express concern about these reforms (Wu 2005: 122, Sasada 2006: 118-120; Kristof 1998; Fukurai and Alston 1992: 211; Yi 2012: 109; Smith 2006; Yang and Lim 2009: 78)
by symbolising the apparent end to the Japan’s postwar inculcation of peaceful “democratic education” (Chiba 2007: 76; Hua and Guo 2006; Cai 2008: 197), these developments can be seen as creating a favourable social context for neo-nationalism reclaiming its prime ideological role in Japanese society (Wu and Zhang 2004) label these developments a “spiritual tunnel”.

These changes to Japanese education and historical awareness in turn provide an explanation for a less accommodating Japanese foreign and security policy (Ienaga 1993: 124-133; Yang 2002).

The rise in expression of nationalist sentiment among the younger generation, particularly online (Maslow 2011: 307-310), is seen to have dovetailed with socioeconomic conditions experienced by younger Japanese (Kotler, Sugawara, and Yamada 2007: 93; Kitada 2005; Takahara 2006). Some commentators argue that this is making younger Japanese more open to right-wing, xenophobic nationalism (Yang and Lim 2009: 78; Tanimichi 2005; Yang and Fu 2011). As formerly “fringe” views such as historical revisionism are now supposedly making their way “into the mainstream” (McNeill 2010), these younger portions of the general public, often seen to be envious and resentful of China and Korea’s recent successes and increasing international power, have become supportive of an uncompromising stance towards China and Korea in regional diplomacy (Yang and Lim 2009: 81; Chang 2008: 812-813; Tamamoto 2006: 55-57). They are arguably all too “happy to be led in a more nationalistic direction” (Teslik 2007) by Japan’s neo-nationalist leaders (Chang, 2008: 795), a direction that will include “calls for revitalized Japanese militarization” (Kaufman 2008: 272; Restall 2005: 10; MacKinnon 2010), and the expansion of Japan’s influence at the expense of relations with regional nations (Chang, 2008: 791, 795). There are therefore worries that a new generation of nationalist leaders will be unlikely to support or may even be actively hostile to the idea of accommodation with a rising China in regional politics (Kazi 2010: 446; Matthews 2003: 74-90) as well as on critical historical issues. Strengthening nationalism among the younger generation could also lead to conflict in the US-Japan alliance as younger Japanese want Japan to acquire greater independent military capabilities in which to not only defend itself (Chanlett-Avery

44 For prominent popular media accounts of such developments, see Tabuchi (2009) and MacKinnon (2010).
45 For further examples, see Kristof (1998), Matthews (2003: 76), and Sasada 2006 (112).
46 For two early American accounts of this development, see Matthews (2003: 81) and Sutter (2002: 370).
and Nikitin 2009: 7), but also to pursue a more “assertive” security policy that may go beyond the boundaries acceptable to even the US (Kazi 2010: 446; Chang 2008: 812-813).

Realism in Japan

Another group of analysts and scholars see Japan to be increasingly embracing a ‘normal nation’ identity by throwing off the restraints of pacifism and antimilitarism (Mathur 2007; Fackler 2013; Rosenbluth, Saito, and Zinn 2007: 585). Japan’s constitutional restrictions on the use of force are seen as barriers to normality by scholars and analysts influenced by American-style normative realism (Arbaugh 2011: 148; Layne 1993: 38-39; Waltz 1979: 54-55; Middlebrook 2008: xiii). Because of the influence of Article 9, the seeming lack of a Japanese “rational national security decision making process” (Auslin 2012) has “left the Japanese intellectually, doctrinally, organizationally, and even psychologically ill-equipped to deal with threats, both potential and real, that now confront them” (Middlebrook 2008: 17). In particular, a “normal” Japan is one that inherently understands that its security interests are tied directly to it supporting its alliance with the US and imitating the US in terms of military doctrine and capability acquisition (Hughes 2013: 368-369; Green 2002: 11; Auslin 2012; Hagström 2014: 12).

Some scholars, particularly those closely associated with Washington DC security policy community, have pointed to developments in Japan that signify a welcome realism becoming dominant among the Japanese political elite at the very least (Kliman 2006; Green 2002: 10-11; Rosato and Schuessler 2011: 803-804). The political influence of politicians like Koizumi Junichirō and Abe Shinzō suggest to these analysts that even if the public remains predisposed to antimilitarism, public opinion or “domestic factors” will no longer be more than “secondary factors” in dictating Japanese foreign and security policy, and at best will only delay Japan from its transition to realism (Green 2002: 11). Arguing that “for six decades the Japanese have laboured under the mistaken belief that they had found a more civilized way to interact globally,” Middlebrook asserts that under the influence of politicians such as Koizumi, the Japanese are now in the process of forging a “more rational future” based on an increased strategic sensitivity to traditional power politics rather than naïve pacifism (2008: 37).

The Iraq War in particular was a major watershed for Japanese security policy for these analysts, especially as Koizumi acted in line with the expectations of realists by being attentive to alliance politics and dismissive of public opinion or public preferences to avoid
any cooperation with the US military overseas outside of the UN (Shinoda 2006: 73-74; Kliman 2006: 23-26, 146; Middlebrook 2008: 38). Koizumi’s embrace of the alliance can therefore be seen as evidence that Japan will increasingly attempt to increase its national power by leveraging its alliance with the US and its strong economic, industrial and technological base into independent military power, thereby allowing it to assert itself in East Asia and globally alongside the United States (Samuels 2007a: 32). Miyagi notes that Japanese conservative politicians saw the Iraq War as an opportunity to displace traditional antimilitarist norms with a new norm of commitment to the US alliance (2009: 360). On the basis of these developments, Szechenyi argues that Japanese security policy has reached a turning point and the country is now losing its “allergy” to the use of force and the dispatch of combat troops overseas (2006: 149-150).

**Realism and Generational Change**

Kliman also argues that the younger generation of Japanese are in particular more “pragmatic” than the older generation in terms of their views of security issues (Kliman 2006: 44). For example, younger Japanese elites are more likely to use terms like “national interest” that were explicitly avoided by the older generation in Japan who grew up during the seeming more idealistic and pacifist postwar period (44). The foreign policy shocks of the 1990s, combined with a “lack of sense of historical shame,” have led to younger Japanese looking at security policy from an “increasingly realist perspective” (49, 153). A 2002 report by the Washington DC think-tank CSIS argues that the younger generation’s nationalism, while not necessarily belligerent, “generally takes the form of asserting Japanese identity and calling for a greater international role,” and overall suggests that the younger generation of elites are likely to take on a more assertive role in regional and global politics as they come into power (CSIS 2002: 4). Funabashi Yōichi, former lead editor of the Asahi Shimbun, and one of Japan’s leading foreign policy commentators, also concurs with this assessment, noting that the younger generation believes “that because there is danger and instability in the world, for the sake of maintaining peace and stability it is necessary to maintain deterrent power, and therefore military power is essential” (2014: 15). Menon points to an increasing Japanese tendency to discuss the possibility of embracing pre-emptive strikes and the acquisition of nuclear weapons in Japan. He partially attributes this shift to generational change and the fact that “Japanese have undoubtedly become more comfortable with and receptive to discussions that invoke the national interest and advocate the need for stronger military forces” (Menon 2003: 13).
Michael Green also asserts that generational change has been a factor in Japan moving towards a more “realist” perspective and the increase in taking up of additional roles within the US-Japan alliance subsequent to the 1997 Japan-US Revised Defence Guidelines (Green 2003: 272; Green 2002: 10-11). Similarly, Rapp (2004) argues that the willingness to discuss Japan’s national interests is associated with an increasing awareness of importance of the alliance with the US. Rapp notes that “[t]he younger and more realist of politicians, academics, and the public want to prevent abandonment by the US, especially with respect to North Korea, if they are seen as not supportive enough of the US” (2004: 106). Middlebrook (2008: 63) points to generational change among elites and within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan in particular, and argues that this has led to a more realistic approach to engaging China over the last decade. Samuels and Boyd found in a narrower study on parliamentary elites “that the youngest generation appears more hawkish on security issues than the older generations,” and “that support in the youngest cohort for increasing Japan’s defence capabilities is stronger than in the midcareer generation—a statistically significant result” (2008: 47).


In terms of measuring Japanese attitudes in a systematic way, a key question is whether the militant internationalist orientation described in the introductory chapter is becoming stronger and whether the Japanese public or elites are likely to draw closer to the US in terms of the balance between militant and cooperative internationalism in overall security worldview. It so happens that the dimensions of militant internationalism overlap with the discourse of a powerful group of hawkish pro-US conservative elites in Japan with close ties to hawkish elites in the US security community (Wakefield 2011: 152-153; Pyle 2012: 3). This allows for some organic and intellectual continuity to be drawn between the most influential group of ‘hawks’ in the Japanese context, their American counterparts, and their shared security policy worldview.

This group of political actors’ motivating desire is for Japan to become a “normal nation” and live up to an imagined great power destiny in terms of its security institutions and international behaviour, with the United States being seeing as a model security actor (Samuels 2007a: 112, 124-125, 177). Samuels labels members of this group “normal nation-alists,” as they also tend to hold views critics regard to be the essence of postwar Japanese neo-nationalism (122-127). The intellectual heritage of these so-called normal
nationalists derives from those who formed the revisionist conservative element in the LDP up until the 1980s. Early revisionists, such as Hatoyama Ichirō and Kishi Nobusuke, had various levels of connections to the wartime government that fought the United States. Many of these revisionists eventually settled on a pro-American orientation in seeking to reinvigorate Japanese power in the postwar period (177). While this group was forced to take a back seat in Japanese politics after the Mutual Security Treaty debacle of 1960, from the Prime Ministership of Nakasone Yasuhiro in the 1980s the amount of influence this group has on Japanese politics and policy is increasing. Six out of the last eleven prime ministers since the late 1990s have been normal nationalists (Hashimoto Ryūtarō, Mori Yoshirō, Koizumi Junichirō, Abe Shinzō (twice) and Asō Tarō), for example. The three major components of militant internationalism pertinent to the United States also fit the security views of the normal nationalist group, and will be used to measure whether the public and the wider elite are predisposed to militant internationalist thinking in Chapters Five, Six, Seven, and Eight.

**Overseas Power Projection**

Since the 1980s, normal nationalists have come together to revitalize and strengthen Japan’s own “Gaullist” tradition, which places significant emphasis on national military autonomy in security policy. This group insists that Japan should become a great power that enjoys *grandeur* and prestige in the world of foreign relations (Envall 2008), and that military power accords international respect necessary for diplomatic strength as well as provides security (Samuels 2007a: 122-127). In accordance with the Gaullist outlook, an economically powerful nation like Japan should build a military commensurate with its economic strength (Samuels 2007a: 32; Menon 1997: 29). Furthermore, a “normal” security policy is not simply the defence of territorial integrity and homeland safety (Middlebrook 2008: 35). Samuels (2007a: 80) notes that a critical normal nationalist assumption is that the difference between “a great power and a small power is the willingness [and capability] to use force,” and ultimately a “normal nation” is one that “can go to war.” Japan would therefore “join the other great powers in a permanent struggle to maximize national strength and influence, and it would not be averse to revising the status quo in the process” (Samuels 2007a: 192-193; see also Middlebrook 2008: 34).

Normal nationalists, therefore, strongly support Japanese making changes to its constitution and Article 9 to allow, if necessary, the use of force in international relations to preserve
global and regional order as well as to protect Japan and its overseas interests (Samuels 2007a: 126-127). Normal nationalists believe that Japan should not be restrained in its use of military tools any more than other countries are in international relations (Mochizuki 1983: 174; Miller et al., 2002). The reconceptualization of the Self-Defence Force as a standard military is a related policy aspiration for normal nationalists (Samuels 2007a: 125-126), as represented most recently by Prime Minister Abe’s promotion of the concept of a National Defence Force ( kokubō-gun). These normal nationalists also support the “sharpened sword” (Samuels 2007a: 193) of a larger military and the acquisition of offensively-orientated hardware for power projection and overseas intervention. Japan would, in neorealist vocabulary, have the ability to conduct “offensive operations,” which are actions in which a state uses force to project military power into the heart of another nation’s territory, compel compliance with policy demands, and/or impose its will on the other state (Adams 2003: 53). Such capabilities would facilitate the government to strategically exploit “opportunities to expand Japan’s power” (Samuels 2007a: 192-193) and would include the development of expeditionary capabilities that would allow the SDF to engage in combat overseas.

Offensive-orientated military capabilities would also support Japan embracing an explicit deterrence by punishment policy. The dissuasive effect of this kind of deterrence derives from being able to inflict an unacceptable level of punishment on an adversary considering engaging in an attack or challenging the core national interests of another nation-state (Bowen 2004: 58). This approach traditionally relies on attacking civilian targets or critical economic or military infrastructure of another state, thereby suggesting the need for missile or aerial strike capabilities in order to credibly deter potentially aggressive states (Rumsfield 2002: 28-29). This is in contrast with deterrence focused on ‘denial,’ where the aim is to “sow the seed of doubt in an opponent’s mind by undermining confidence in his capability to achieve the desired outcome” in the event of an attack (Bowen 2004: 58). For this ‘defensive’ deterrence mechanism to work, a state must credibly demonstrate preparedness for an attack and an ability to repel and limit damage from another state’s attack, and thereby retain control of territory and resist coercion (Adams 2003: 53). Given the increasing military spending of China (Liff and Erickson 2013), the acquisition of military capabilities for the purposes of deterrence by punishment and retaliation, if not for power projection in competition with other great powers, is expected in the long-term to be
rationally irresistible for Japan’s security policymaking elites (Waltz 1993: 54-55; Layne 1993: 9).

In measuring the militant internationalist orientation based on the overseas power projection element, support for changing Article 9, legally recasting Japan as a traditional military force with belligerent rights, and support for overseas combat interventions would be the bare minimum expectations. There would also need to be evidence of support for Japan going beyond its current deterrence by denial focus encapsulated in Japan’s senshu bōei military posture. Such evidence would include support for a significant military build-up and the acquisition of capabilities that would allow deterrence by punishment or the ability to conduct offensive operations overseas more broadly (Kliman 2006: 23-26). The latter would involve the acquisition of the ability to conduct (pre-emptive or otherwise) missile or aerial strikes against North Korea or other nations planning to use or using ballistic missiles against Japan. This possibility has already been on more than one occasion raised during the administrations of normal nationalist leaders (Sieg 2013; Takahashi 2006a; Pinkston and Sakurai 2006; Kubo 2014). Increased consideration of the acquisition of nuclear weapons, or at the very least increased support for US extended deterrence through relaxing the 3NNP, has also been suggested by normal nationalists (Takahashi 2010: 37-38), and would also constitute evidence of militant internationalism.

**Global Alliance**

An additional element of a Japan-specific militant internationalism relates to the strengthening of the US-Japan alliance for the purposes of the alliance playing a more global role. An often ventured model for this new type of alliance is the “special relationship” that the US shares with Britain based on strategic convergence (Midford 2011:1, 194; Hughes 2007: 332-334).47 This would include both the Japanese and US governments coming to see Japan as an important node in a global alliance alongside US allies such as the UK, France, and Australia. This is because these countries appear to share significant assumptions in common with the US regarding the validity and desirability of using military tools in international relations to shape their security environment (Tanter, 2005: 176), and Japan would play a contributing role in supporting the effectiveness and operations of such a global alliance. Throwing off the last remnants of the US-Japan

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47 These concept of a special relationship is discussed by both critics and supporters of the alliance alike (Takahashi 2005; Armitage and Nye 2000, 2007, 2012; Cossa and Glosserman 2005)
alliance firewall built during the implementation of the Yoshida Doctrine (Samuels 2007a: 177, 190-191; Hughes 2009a: 115), Japan would transform into “a real American ally” where Japan would provide “combat troops and helicopter gunships” to future US operations, and Japanese soldiers would fight “alongside American GIs in far off lands” as “America’s Gurkhas” (Tamamoto 2004: 10; see also Asher, 2001: 114-115). Prominent normal nationalist politicians such as Abe believe, ultimately, that Japan needs to have the “courage” to participate in the use of force alongside of the US, and must be willing to spill blood in combat like the UK did with the US in Afghanistan and Iraq (Asahi Shimbun 2014b; Midford 2011: xiii). Such willingness would represent the realisation of a normal or a mature relationship based on genuine reciprocity between the two traditional allies, rather than the current incarnation focused on Japan’s defence and regional security (Preble 2006; Cooney 2007: 3).

An alignment of supporters of the global alliance concept was particularly prominent during the 2000s with Koizumi Junichirō in power in Japan, and George W. Bush in the US (Takahashi 2010; Wakefield 2011: 2-3, 152-154; Tatsumi 2008: 177). On the floor of the Diet in 2005, Prime Minister Koizumi invoked the once taboo term for “alliance” and proclaimed that it was already global (sekai no naka no nichibei dōmei) (Samuels 2007a: 193). One of the most prominent normal nationalists, Asō Tarō, noted in his first policy speech after becoming foreign minister in 2005 that the “United States should come first, Asia second” (Lai 2006: 266; Samuels 2007a: 126-127), meaning that Japan would prioritise the relationship with the United States even to the detriment of Japan’s own national interests and relations with other important countries in Asia (Sneider 2013).

Consultations that took place during the Koizumi and George W. Bush administrations attempted to move the alliance from being a means of defending the territory of areas surrounding Japan to one that took a “global perspective that views the security of Japan and the region as linked with international stability” (Chanlett-Avery and Konishi 2009: 4). This implied increased expectations that the Japanese would make security contributions on a global level to US military activities (Takahashi 2007: 241; Ozaki 2007: 6). These consultations also legitimized what was perhaps one of the most controversial aspects of the alliance during the traditional antimilitarist period when it explicitly “opened the way for the US to utilize its bases in Japan for projecting power globally” (Hughes 2009a: 84; see also Takahashi 2007: 232, 242; Chanlett-Avery and Konishi 2009: 6).
Evidence of a more militant internationalist orientation in terms of the military alliance component would therefore be seen in support for Japan for strengthening the US-Japan alliance not only for Japan’s defence and regional stability, but for the purpose of sharing the “task of guaranteeing international security” with the US and other US allies (Cooney 2007: 48; see also Asher 2001: 114-115; Marthur 2007: 517). This would be symbolized by Japanese public support for US wars in the Middle East, for Japanese contributions to these wars, and by general support for the US global war on terror. There would also be support for the embrace of the full exercise of the right to collective self-defence for the specific purpose of the US and Japan working together to maintain international security through the cooperative use of force overseas (Japan Times 2004). This would include the two countries being able to work together in engaging in combat and using lethal military force against and inside other nations’ territories.

**Strategic Antipathy towards China**

The US-Japan global alliance would also explicitly function to contain and hard balance China and its North Korean “ally” (Takahashi 2010: 34, 38; Yeo 2011: 116; Tsai 2007; Asher 2001: 116). Normal nationalists see the most pressing short- to medium-term security priority for Japan to be the need for Japan to take a strong diplomatic, and if necessary, military stance against the DPRK, and increasingly China, by increasing Japan’s autonomous power projection capabilities and leveraging the global alliance (Takahashi 2010: 34, 38; Menon 1997: 29; Lai 2011: 116). Many normal nationalists also harbour strong anti-Chinese biases, reject Chinese (and Korean) demands for further apologies for the war, and chafe at being lectured by CCP-led China on issues such as the Yasukuni Shrine, Japan’s wartime record, and history awareness issues (Samuels 2007a: 125-127). The strongest of these normal nationalists see China not only as a potential threat in conventional realist terms focused on China’s military build-up, but also “leaven the argument with a dash of disdain” and chauvinism (126). They see Chinese intentions in the most cynical of ways and see very little value in embracing China as a security or foreign policy partner in regional or global affairs. The “pro-China faction” in the ruling LDP is no longer as strong and influential as it used to be, and instead the LDP has come to be increasingly associated with a more ideologically consistent anti-Chinese and pro-US line in Japanese security policy discourse (126).
Indicators allowing the evaluation of strategic antipathy towards China would include general support for autonomous defence strengthening and deterrence alongside a perception of military threat from China. While defence strengthening could also be considered in the context of militant internationalist support for overseas power projection capabilities, it will be evaluated in this study in the context of the rise of concern regarding China’s military threat. This is because attitudes towards Japan’s own military posture are usefully considered in the context of what kind of security policy is preferred by the Japanese public and elites to deal with China’s rise given its increasing military spending (Liff and Erickson 2013). If there is significant support for independent military strengthening by Japan alongside a rise in military threat perception regarding China, then this would be indicative of militant internationalist strategic antipathy developing.

Other indicators of strategic antipathy would include: a desire for Japan to embrace the alliance with the US specifically to counter China; a perception of China as solely as a threat rather than potential partner; a belief that the best approach to China is to alienate/contain it rather than engage with it; and a lack of support for strengthening regional cooperation with China. In addition to evidence of significant anti-Chinese sentiment, we would also expect to see emphasis on so-called “values dissimilarity” (Eicher, Pratto and Wilhem 2013: 130). This will be particularly important to explore in more depth during the interview dimension of the research project as such values can be hard to discern through the analysis of survey data. In a Japan-specific militant internationalist orientation, there is an expectation that Chinese behaviour will be seen as prone to unprovoked aggression and erratic behaviour, and the attribution of inherently malevolent motivations to Chinese strategic intentions. Most critically, the peer competitor dimension of militant internationalism would result in zero-sum combative approaches to foreign policy taking precedence over the development of constructive approaches towards regional and international cooperation.

**Summary**

The first half of this chapter showed that changes to Japan’s security policy since the 1980s challenge many of the norms of Japan’s traditional antimilitarist approach described in Chapter Three. This raises the possibility that the Heisei cohort may have been influenced by a different type of security discourse during their formative years. In terms of explanations for change, the second half of the chapter detailed arguments made in the
scholarly literature and in popular commentary that a resurgence of nationalism and/or a
transition to a more realist view of international relations from antimilitaristic idealism
accounts for these changes and will likely result in a much more aggressive or militarily
proactive Japanese security policy in the future. This chapter then made a connection
between militant internationalism and a group of influential politicians in Japan, called
normal nationalists, in terms of the overlap of their views on Japan’s security policy with
militant internationalist attitudes. This connection justifies looking at generation-specific
views on security policy from a militant internationalist point of view in order to evaluate
the claims of academics and analysts who have asserted that the rise of nationalism and a
realist-orientated view of international politics is leading to an increasingly hawkish
security policy. Analysis using a militant internationalist framework will allow greater
understanding of whether generational change in public and elite opinion is a factor that
will drive an increasingly military-orientated Japanese security policy in the future. This
analysis will be undertaken in Chapters Five, Six, Seven, and Eight, which make up the
empirical sections of this thesis.
CHAPTER FIVE: JAPANESE PUBLIC OPINION AND MILITANT INTERNATIONALISM

This chapter provides analysis of indicators that allow an initial assessment of whether the Japanese public in general has shifted, or is shifting, from an antimilitarist-orientated security identity towards a militant internationalist-orientated security identity. These indicators are further analysed to ascertain whether there are any differences between the three generational cohorts outlined in Chapter One. Analysis of attitudinal dispositions are a first step in evaluating the likelihood that more aggressive and hawkish public opinion will be a driver of Japan’s security policy evolution over the next ten to fifteen years. This chapter is structured in terms of the three critical components of the militant internationalist security orientation discussed in Chapter Four. These elements, contextualised for the Japan case, are: attitudes towards overseas power projection of military capabilities; attitudes towards the US-Japan alliance, particularly towards the concept of a ‘global alliance’; and views on Japan’s own defence strengthening and its connection to strategic antipathy towards Japan’s most likely long-term security threat, the People’s Republic of China. This chapter demonstrates that not only does the younger Heisei generational cohort not differ greatly from the older generations in terms of attitudes towards security issues, but that the Heisei cohort does not appear to embrace a militant internationalist orientated security outlook. The number of respondents in the sample, the confidence interval, and if available, the p-value for the surveys that touch upon generational differences are outlined in Appendix One.

5.1 Attitudes towards Power Projection Overseas

Constitutional Change and Article 9

As outlined in Chapter Four, the central component of a militant internationalist security orientation is the perceived need to project military power overseas in order to manage security challenges and protect national interests. As a resource-poor island nation that imports significant quantities of its food and energy from other countries by sea (USEIA 2013; MAFF 2013), is thoroughly integrated into international production networks, and is located in a volatile geopolitical region, Japan would appear to have many incentives to project military power overseas in order to protect its national interests and manage its security environment. Changes to Article 9 of the constitution to loosen the restrictions on Japan’s military and security posture in particular would enable Japan to more proactively
project this power as well as more fully commit to a global alliance with the US. The co-occurrence of dynamics such as a significantly increased perception of insecurity (NHK 2013a; see also Vosse 2006, 2014: 16-17), openness to constitutional change among all generational cohorts (Figure 5.1), and the increasing influence of nationalist politicians on policy and politics, is highly suggestive of the possibility that constitutional change may not only take place, but that it will be focused on changing Article 9. This aligns with the logic asserted by various analysts discussed in Chapter Four who emphasised the increasing salience of rising nationalism and/or transitional realism in Japan.

**Figure 5.1: Percentage of Respondents in Favour of Constitutional Revision**

A closer look at these statistics, however, reveals that for the Japanese public the main motivations for changing the constitution appear to not be related to security at all. Only between 12 percent and 14 percent of the Japanese public appears to perceive Article 9 to be a significant motivating factor for changing the Constitution of Japan (Table 5.1). Instead, domestic issues such as the reform of the unstable political system that leads to a rapid turnover in political leadership, and the introduction of new rights and guarantees for citizens, appear to be of greater concern. Importantly, the Heisei cohort is slightly less likely to see a problem with Article 9, and appears to be more interested in changing the constitution for the purpose of establishing new rights compared to the two older generations.
Table 5.1: Why do you think it is necessary to change the constitution? (Asahi Shimbun 2011, 2012)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Heisei</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>77.5</td>
<td>76.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Antimilitarist Peak</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>10.5</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>66.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Postwar</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>13.5</td>
<td>16.5</td>
<td>20.5</td>
<td>65.5</td>
<td>62.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>7.5</strong></td>
<td><strong>6</strong></td>
<td><strong>14</strong></td>
<td><strong>12</strong></td>
<td><strong>74</strong></td>
<td><strong>76.5</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Multiple surveys conducted by differing surveying organisations also show that a majority of Japanese citizens favour keeping Article 9 intact. Support for revision of Article 9 has never gone above 43 percent of respondents to any poll (Midford 2011: 158), and support appears to have stabilized in the 30 percent range since 2006 (see Figure 5.2). A 2012 NHK survey showed support as low as 25 percent for revising Article 9 (NHK 2012: 7). Even in 2013, when Japan was in the middle of disputes over the East China Sea and the Senkaku Islands with China (Envall and Fujiwara 2012: 70-71), and with the DPRK over nuclear and missile testing, no significant jump in support for revising Article 9 was apparent. This was despite conservative politicians, and Prime Minister Abe himself, putting revision on the political agenda (Japan Times 2012; Kantei 2014b). Even among those who support revising Article 9, a majority of respondents identify the need to establish clearly the constitutional legitimacy of the SDF as it currently is, rather than to allow Japan the legal right to use force overseas, to use force to support allies, or to participate in UN collective security actions (Asahi Shimbun 2013b; NHK 2013b).
The analysis of age-differentiated data suggests that the Heisei cohort’s attitudes do not deviate greatly from the public opinion baseline towards supporting Article 9 revision. In fact, the 2004, 2005, 2011, 2013, 2014 Asahi Constitution Day Surveys, and the 2006 Japan General Social Survey (Figure 5.3 below), show that the Heisei cohort may be slightly more opposed to changing Article 9 than other generational groups beyond the confidence interval for these particular surveys (Asahi Shimbun 2004, 2005; Journalism 2011a: 131, 2013a: 125, 2014: 164). While asking a slightly different question, NHK found similar differences beyond the confidence interval in surveys conducted in 2007 and in 2013 between the cohorts (NHK, 2007a: 76, 2014a: 36). The only surveys to show any favourability among the Heisei cohort relative to the other two cohorts towards revising Article 9 were the 2006 and 2013 Pew GAP surveys, although the differences were well within the margin of error for these surveys (see Figure 5.4). In any respect, all surveys still show that a substantial majority of all three cohorts are opposed to revising Article 9 (see Figures 5.3 and 5.4).
According to the Yomiuri Shimbun Constitution Day surveys from 2007-2014, the Japanese public appears to be overwhelmingly against any revision to the first paragraph of Article 9 in particular (see Figure 5.5). Paragraph one proscribes Japan from using the threat of or the use of force to settle international disputes. The Japanese public, however, does appear to be more open to changing the second paragraph of Article 9. The wording of the second paragraph has been a subject of debate in Japan due to the issue of whether
the ‘war potential’ (*senryoku*) proscribed in this paragraph also means that Japan cannot have a self-defence military force. Although support for changing the second paragraph does not reach a majority, resistance to changing the second paragraph is nowhere near as strong as it is with the first paragraph.

**Figure 5.5: Attitudes towards Individual Article 9 Paragraphs (Yomiuri Shimbun 2007-2014)**

Recognition of this fact has led to pro-revision Japanese politicians proposing specific second paragraph-related amendments to Article 9. One of the most common of these second paragraph-amendment proposals relates to the perceived need to clearly state that Japan can actually have a ‘self-defence force’ in the first place. In 2006 and 2007, the Asahi Shimbun asked this question and found solid majorities of around 62 and 56 percent respectively favouring changes to Article 9 if it was limited to the addition of a clause to establish explicitly the constitutionality of the SDF (Asahi Shimbun 2006a, 2007a).

Another, more controversial proposed amendment relates to the SDF being stipulated as a ‘national defence force’ (*kokubō-gun*), which would be a conventional military along the lines of the German Bundeswehr, which is technically also restricted to national defence. Through Federal Constitutional Court-directed changes to the interpretation of Germany’s Basic Law in 1994 and 2008, and the promulgation of the 2005 Parliamentary Participation Act, the Bundeswehr is now, however, allowed to operate in collective security operations outside of NATO (An 2009a: 72; Brose 2013: 7). In Japan’s case, constitutionally changing the SDF to a national defence force would not only be a rhetorical change, but it would also likely come along with the recognition of the right of belligerency of the state. The recognition of this right would have the implication of providing immunity from
prosecution under Japanese domestic law to Japan’s soldiers for the use of lethal force and other violent actions taken during combat in Japan and overseas, as long as the actions did not contravene the laws of international armed conflict as defined in the Hague Treaties and the Geneva Conventions (Martin 2008: 311-313). Such a change would clarify the legal status of the SDF as a “military” in both domestic and international law (Martin 2012: 52), and would expand the situations where a Japanese military force could engage in combat overseas, making the SDF more similar to the Bundeswehr (Noetzel and Schreer 2008: 214).

A range of surveys have, however, found consistent opposition to renaming and changing the identity of the SDF during the two Abe Shinzō administrations when the issue was raised and debated. This opposition is similar for the three cohorts analysed. Table 5.2 shows that even among respondents open to changing Article 9, less than one-fifth of the members of all three cohorts identified making the SDF into a “national defence force” as a particular priority when they were asked why they favoured revision, with the Heisei and antimilitarist peak cohorts feeling slightly more strongly that it was necessary to clarify the existence of the SDF. Figure 5.6 shows significant opposition to the idea of a national defence force when the question was posed to those who both favoured and opposed changing Article 9. There was no significant variation between the generational cohorts in response to the survey questions in this case. Ultimately it would appear that the only short-to medium-term possibility of the public supporting a change to Article 9 is to clarify the constitutionality of the SDF based on the defensive-orientated security policy that Japan has pursued since the 1950s, and not to establish a more normal or conventional military orientated identity for its SDF.

Table 5.2: Why do you think it would be a good idea to change Article 9? (Asahi Shimbun 2013, 2014)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cohort/Year</th>
<th>2013</th>
<th>2014</th>
<th>2013</th>
<th>2014</th>
<th>2013</th>
<th>2014</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Heisei</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>46.5</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Antimilitarist</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>41.5</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>40.5</td>
<td>44.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peak</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Postwar</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Nuclear Weapons and the 3NNP

Japanese attitudes towards the maintenance of nuclear weapons are also an important consideration for evaluating militant internationalist attitudes. The maintenance of nuclear weapons is, in traditional realpolitik thinking, one of the ultimate power projection capabilities a nation can maintain. Indeed, Japanese acquisition of an independent nuclear capability was assumed to be inevitable in the post-Cold War by realist scholars such as Waltz (1993: 66) and Layne (1993: 37). There are certainly some voices in Japan’s domestic discourse, such as former Tokyo Governor Ishihara Shintarō, academic and television personality Nishibe Susumu, and aide to Prime Minister Abe, Nakanishi Terumasa, who advocate the need for Japan to acquire nuclear weapons for self-preservation, to be respected internationally, and to protect Japan from aggressive neighbours (Samuels 2007c: 138-141; Rublee 2009: 64, 75, 88). Furthermore, there is also support for Japan at least having a debate on the issue of nuclear weapons, thus suggesting the “taboo” on discussing nuclear weapons no longer exists (Mochizuki 2007a: 304). Figure 5.7 shows, however, a profoundly strong antipathy towards the idea that Japan should possess its own nuclear weapons. This sentiment does not seem to have moved at all since the late 1950s and 1960s when concerns about entrapment in nuclear war due to the Cold War and the alliance with the US were at their height in Japan (Miyashita 2008: 32; Izumikawa 2010). Furthermore, the Japanese public does not appear willing to compromise
Japan’s nuclear principles by allowing the US to station nuclear missiles inside Japanese territory, or even allow the transit of such weapons through Japan as indicated by the continuing strong support for the 3NNP (Figure 5.8). This lack of support is despite an increase in the fear of a nuclear war in Japan in 1994 due to increased nuclear and missile tests by the PRC and the DPRK (Kristensen 1999: 24-26). These tests have led to a lack of Japanese confidence in diplomatic solutions to the problem of the nuclearisation of the Korean Peninsula (Mochizuki 2007a: 307), creating, in theory, the right conditions for Japan to consider acquiring nuclear weapons for itself.

**Figure 5.7: Japanese Support for Acquiring an Independent Nuclear Capability**

![Japanese Support for Acquiring an Independent Nuclear Capability](image)

**Figure 5.8: Percentage Support for the Maintenance of the 3NNP**

![Percentage Support for the Maintenance of the 3NNP](image)
In terms of generational breakdown, the two youngest cohorts remain trenchantly anti-nuclear. In the 2005 NHK survey on nuclear awareness (NHK 2005), 81 percent of the Heisei generation was against the use and maintenance of nuclear weapons, while the oldest cohort registered 75 percent support. In the 2010 survey on nuclear awareness (NHK 2010), the Heisei generation was again slightly more against the use or acquisition of nuclear weapons at 84 percent, compared to the oldest generation at 78 percent. This survey also showed that the Heisei cohort is no less enthusiastic in wanting the reduction or elimination of nuclear weapons. Furthermore, support for the 3NNP remains strong among the Heisei generational cohort, and in fact this cohort appears to be more supportive of the 3NNP than the oldest postwar cohort (Table 5.3 and Table 5.4).\textsuperscript{48} None of the surveys available provide any evidence of the Japanese public wanting to go as far as acquiring nuclear weapons, or better integrating into the US nuclear security umbrella by loosening the restrictions imposed by the 3NNP. This is despite results showing a lack of confidence amongst the Japanese population regarding the protection provided by the US nuclear umbrella (NHK 2010: 73). Ultimately, anti-nuclear sentiment appears to be as strong as it was during the antimilitarist peak,\textsuperscript{49} and generational transition is unlikely to change this.

Table 5.3: Should the 3NNP be maintained? (ATPS 2007, 2009)

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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Heisei</td>
<td>73.4</td>
<td>19.7</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>75.7</td>
<td>18.7</td>
<td>5.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Antimilitarist Peak</td>
<td>75.8</td>
<td>17.5</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>69.5</td>
<td>21.8</td>
<td>8.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Postwar</td>
<td>65.4</td>
<td>26.0</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>63.6</td>
<td>26.8</td>
<td>8.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>71.4</td>
<td>21.2</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>68.7</td>
<td>23.0</td>
<td>8.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textsuperscript{48} The full question for Table 5.4 was: Japan has the “Three Non-nuclear principles” which forbids Japan to make, possess and allow others to bring nuclear weapons on to Japanese territory. What should be done with these principles?

\textsuperscript{49} Welfield provides a summary of the relevant surveys taken between 1966 and 1977 (1988: 264-266).
Preferred Overseas Roles for the SDF

In addition to attitudes toward Article 9 and nuclear weapons, another way to analyse Japanese public attitudes towards military power projection internationally is to look at the roles the public identifies as suitable for the SDF to undertake overseas. Strong support for overseas roles would be suggestive of an abrogation of Japan’s antimilitarist ‘no SDF overseas’ component norm discussed in Chapter Three. Furthermore, support for overseas activities that involve the possibility of engaging in combat, or supporting the exercise of the use of force against other nations through collective security and/or collective self-defence actions, would be suggestive of the presence of militant internationalist attitudes towards security policy.

The results below show that, in the post-Cold War era, SDF participation in humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR) overseas and UNPKOs in particular has become an acceptable norm for the Japanese public. Right up until the passing of the 1992 UNPKO bill and the legalisation of SDF participation in disaster relief overseas, strong majorities of 60 percent or more of the Japanese public opposed the dispatch of the SDF overseas (Hatakeyama 2005: 6-9). Some fifteen years later, however, when Japanese respondents to the 2006 COJ SDF Survey were asked about support for the SDF in humanitarian and disaster relief missions overseas specifically, around 90 percent of respondents saw this as an acceptable role for the SDF. A 2007 Yomiuri Shimbun survey showed that 82 percent of respondents were in favour of SDF embracing overseas operational roles such as UNPKO participation and disaster relief within Japan and overseas (Yomiuri Shimbun 2007). The 2007 NHK Constitution Survey also showed that a strong majority of
respondents (65.5 percent) felt that, in addition to self-defence, the SDF should participate in UNPKOs and international humanitarian assistance operations (NHK 2007b). In the 2012 SDF Survey, the Cabinet Office of Japan (2012) found significant levels of support (87 percent) for the more generic “overseas peace cooperation activities.” Combined support for either the current level of engagement in UNPKOs, or a more proactive level of engagement, sits at around the 80 percent level (Figure 5.9). As Figure 5.10 below indicates, over time the public awareness of the SDF’s “purpose for existence” (sonzai suru mokuteki) has also consolidated around HADR roles, which have been a prominent post-Cold War activity for the SDF both at home and abroad. Interestingly, this role is even more widely recognised than “defending the nation from invasion” (Cabinet Office of Japan 2012a). UNPKOs are also increasingly seen as not only an acceptable role for the SDF but a fundamental part of the SDF’s mandate.

**Figure 5.9: How Should Japan Approach UNPKOs in the Future? (COJ Diplomacy Survey 1994-2012)**
There are some slight generational differences regarding the preferred overseas roles for the SDF. Since 2003, there has been slightly more recognition by the Heisei and antimilitarist peak cohorts of the SDF as a humanitarian and disaster relief organization in general than for the postwar cohort (see Figure 5.11). In terms of support for sending the SDF overseas, the 2003-2012 Cabinet Office SDF Surveys show about a ten percentage point gap between the Heisei and the postwar generation for support for HADR activities. When asked about dispatching the SDF overseas for UNPKO roles specifically (Figure 5.12), and “international peace activities” more generally (Figure 5.13), the youngest two cohorts are more positive than the oldest generation. This suggests that the two younger cohorts are slightly less restrained by concerns about Japan’s SDF conducting activities overseas than the oldest generation, although this gradual weakening of concern applies to all three cohorts.
Figure 5.11: HADR Role as Purpose for Existence of the SDF (COJ SDF Survey 2003-2012)

Figure 5.12: Support for SDF Dispatch on UNPKOs (COJ Diplomacy Survey 2003-2012)
The Use of Force Overseas and Combat

This lack of concern does not, however, apply to the idea of the SDF undertaking combat roles overseas. Acceptance of the SDF engaging in the use of force or combat overseas remains very low in Japan despite relaxation of traditional antimilitarist reservations about the overseas dispatch of the SDF. For example, Asahi Constitution Day results from 2003-2009 show an aversion to the use of force if the SDF goes overseas (Figure 5.14). An Asahi Shimbun survey conducted in December 2010 also touched upon this issue with a slightly different question, and found only 15 percent thought the option of accepting “UN activities and non-UN activities such as activities required by the US,” which implied a combat commitment, was desirable. On the other hand, 21 percent chose the option “except for disaster relief, there is nothing the SDF should be doing overseas,” while 59 percent said the SDF should be limited to UN-related activities (Journalism 2011b). The 2014 NHK Sense of Peace Survey reflects a similar attitude, with 21 percent of respondents saying the SDF should devote its entire attention to defending Japan, and a further 59 percent
indicating that the SDF should make contributions to UNPKO activities that do not constitute the use of force. Only 10 percent of respondents indicated that using force overseas, even in collaboration with the US military or other military partners, was an acceptable role for the SDF (NHK 2014a).

**Figure 5.14: What Should the SDF be doing Overseas? (Asahi Shimbun 2003-2009)**

The 2013 and 2014 Asahi Constitution Day surveys provide a more specific breakdown of the relative balance between Japanese support for SDF engaging in non-combat humanitarian missions and missions potentially involving combat and the use of force. This survey offered respondents the opportunity to indicate their acceptance of five different hypothetical overseas SDF missions (Asahi Shimbun 2013b; Journalism 2014). As can be seen in Figure 5.15 below, the three humanitarian orientated overseas roles registered very high levels of acceptance (UNPKO participation, disaster response, and citizen transportation). The two roles related to combat or the use of force (fighting on the frontline with the United States and provisioning weapons to the United States military), however, registered very low levels of acceptance (Asahi Shimbun 2014c). Notably, the same survey found that only 34 percent of Japanese respondents would be supportive of the SDF being able to participate in UN-sanctioned “collective security” missions where SDF troops may have to use force in order to accomplish mission objectives (58 percent were opposed). Only 23 percent favoured supporting the US-Japan alliance through the use of force if necessary (66 percent were opposed). A June 2014 Asahi Shimbun survey found only 20
percent of respondents in support of Japan engaging in the use of force under a UN collective security mandate, while 65 percent were opposed (Asahi Shimbun 2014d). These results do not differ greatly from results detailed by Midford (2011: 40) nine years earlier in a 2004 Yomiuri Shimbun survey (Figure 5.16), or the 2007 NHK Constitution Survey (2007b), except that there is increased support for UNPKOs and similar types of post-conflict military activities (Figure 5.17).

**Figure 5.15: What roles is it acceptable for the SDF to engage in overseas? (Asahi Shimbun 2013, 2014)**

![Bar chart for roles acceptable for the SDF to engage in overseas]

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**Figure 5.16: If the SDF participates in overseas activities, what sorts of activities do you think they should perform? (Yomiuri Shimbun Survey 2004)**

![Bar chart for sorts of activities the SDF should perform]

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149
The Heisei generational cohort appears to hold similar attitudes to the rest of the population when it comes to activities explicitly related to the use of force, despite being more positive towards dispatching the SDF for non-combat humanitarian purposes. The 2013 and 2014 Asahi Constitution Day Survey revealed identical results for all three cohorts in terms of support for the SDF being involved in disaster relief roles, citizen transportation roles, and UNPKO roles (Journalism 2013a, 2014). For the two options indicating the use of force either directly or indirectly, all three cohorts were also similarly strongly opposed. All generational cohorts remain quite reluctant to accept the need for the SDF to engage in combat overseas even with United Nations support, with the Heisei cohort being slightly more reluctant by 6 to 7.5 percentage points compared to the other two older cohorts in relation to this question in 2013 (Table 5.5).

Table 5.5: Should the SDF participate in UN-authorised “collective security” operations that include the use of force? (Asahi Shimbun 2013)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>It is acceptable for the SDF to participate</th>
<th>The SDF should not participate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Heisei</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Antimilitarist Peak</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>55.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Postwar</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>34</strong></td>
<td><strong>58</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Pre-emption and Overseas Military Intervention

The option of acquiring ballistic and cruise missile capabilities for the purposes of conducting strikes on potential aggressors has increasingly been debated in Japan since the 1990s by analysts and politicians in the context of the DPRK’s missile and nuclear weapons programs. While not operationalized during the antimilitarist peak due to antimilitarist sentiment, such an option would technically be constitutional if its use was limited to situations where there was an impending attack on Japan (Takahashi 2006a; Pinkston and Sakurai 2006). Under international law, pre-emption is technically not considered to be an aggressive and illegal use of force if it is undertaken at a time when an attack is imminent, when it is necessary to respond to allow the timely exercise of the right to self-defence, and if the principle of proportionality is observed (Schachter 1984: 1635). Interestingly, under a long-standing interpretation of the Japanese constitution, the Japanese government has since 1956 also argued that it retains the legal right to develop a limited pre-emptive capability that could be used to attack enemy bases if, for example, a missile attack was imminent and there were no other ways to deter the attack (Takahashi 2006a: 81).

This option is no longer off the table of public discourse. A majority of the public appears to be open to the need to debate acquisition of this capability (Jiji Press 2006). Most recently, in the debate leading up to the release of a new NDPG in late 2013, the second Abe administration publicly proposed consideration of this option (Sieg 2013). Despite DPRK missile tests and nuclear weapons testing, and a strong concern among both elites and the public regarding the possibility of a missile strike on Japan from the DPRK (Kantei 2013a: 3; NTV 2006; Cabinet Office of Japan 2014a; FNN 2013a), the Japanese public are still not convinced about the desirability of giving the SDF a pre-emptive capability with no more than 40 percent at any point being in favour of a strike capability (Figure 5.18).

All four ATPS surveys show that the pre-emptive strike option is least popular among the Heisei cohort. The oldest generation was more likely to agree with Japan not hesitating to use its right to pre-emptive force by approximately 10 points more than the Heisei generation in all surveys (see Figure 5.19). Given these results, it will not be easy for the Japanese government to actually go forward with this proposal, not only due to residual antimilitarist sentiment regarding this option noted in Figure 5.18 and 5.19, but because of the likely regional repercussions. The public, unlike the government, is also quite sceptical.
of the constitutionality of Japan maintaining a limited pre-emptive strike capability (FNN 2013a).

As of writing, it appears that the Japanese government had given up on pushing forward on pre-emption, and in the 2013 NDPG there was little more than an oblique reference to the need to “study a potential form of response capability” relating to DPRK missile launches in the context of the US-Japan alliance (Kantei 2013a: 20). Given the above scepticism of overseas combat and pre-emption in the narrowest, traditional sense, the data unsurprisingly shows that the Japanese public is decisively against widening the concept of pre-emption to include “preventive warfare,” where an attack is not imminent, as encapsulated in the Bush Doctrine and the war on terror (Kegley Jr., and Raymond 2003: 391; Ikenberry 2002: 53) that was ostensibly supported by Koizumi and other normal nationalists (Hughes 2007: 326). Compared to its US respondents, the 2005 NHK Atomic Bomb Awareness Survey (Table 5.6) and the 2005 SAGE study (Table 5.7) both suggest that, even in the abstract, the Japanese public generally sees overseas military combat as not being justified. Only in a scenario where Japan was directly attacked did Japanese decisively think having conventional arms or going to war was justified.

In terms of generational variations, the oldest postwar cohort is actually somewhat more supportive than the two younger cohorts of going to war against countries that have not directly started an attack on Japan but are either harbouring terrorists or making hostile threats (see Tables 5.8 and 5.9). The generational cohort differences from these two preventive warfare items were highly statistically significant. Taking together attitudes towards changing Article 9, attitudes towards making the SDF into a conventional military, support for certain SDF roles overseas, support for nuclear weapons and the 3NNP, and attitudes towards pre-emption and overseas military intervention in general, this section of the chapter does not provide any evidence that the Heisei cohort holds attitudes that would suggest sympathy for the overseas power projection component of militant internationalism. They appear to hold in common with the two older generational cohorts a residual scepticism of the overseas use of force, and in some cases the results show that the Heisei cohort is actually slightly more sceptical of military power projection overseas outside survey confidence intervals. The next section reveals similar results in regards to the global alliance component of a Japanese militant internationalism.
Figure 5.18: Affirmative Support for Japan Holding Pre-emptive Capabilities

Figure 5.19: If an Attack was Imminent from another Country, then Japan should not Hesitate to Conduct a Pre-emptive Strike (ATPS 2007-2013)
Table 5.6: Why do you feel it is justified for countries to equip themselves with conventional arms? (NHK 2005)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Related to deterring attacks on country</th>
<th>Necessary for repelling attacks by other countries or terrorists</th>
<th>Necessary to punish attacks by other countries or terrorists</th>
<th>Allows pre-emption of attacks by other countries or terrorists</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>39.4</td>
<td>82.9</td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>12.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>58.0</td>
<td>87.9</td>
<td>62.9</td>
<td>47.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5.7: War justified if: (SAGE 2005)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Somewhat Justified/Justified</th>
<th>Not Justified/Not Very justified</th>
<th>Net “Justified”</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>To acquire scarce resources</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>-78.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>-55.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Another country is harbouring terrorists</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>-22.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>+36.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Threatened by a hostile power</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>+5.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>+75.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attacked</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>+64.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>+97.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 5.8: War is justified if another country is suspected of harbouring terrorists (SAGE 2005)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Not Justified/Not Very Justified</th>
<th>Justified/Somewhat Justified</th>
<th>Net justified</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Heisei</td>
<td>76.4</td>
<td>23.6</td>
<td>-52.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Antimilitarist Peak</td>
<td>68.2</td>
<td>31.9</td>
<td>-36.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Postwar</td>
<td>43.5</td>
<td>56.5</td>
<td>+13.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>61.0</td>
<td>39.0</td>
<td>-22.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5.9: War is justified if you are threatened by another country (SAGE 2005)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Not Justified/Not Very Justified</th>
<th>Justified/Somewhat Justified</th>
<th>Net Justified</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Heisei</td>
<td>59.8</td>
<td>40.1</td>
<td>-19.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Antimilitarist Peak</td>
<td>54.7</td>
<td>45.3</td>
<td>-9.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Postwar</td>
<td>30.4</td>
<td>69.6</td>
<td>+39.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>47.1</td>
<td>52.9</td>
<td>+5.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5.2: The Global Alliance

While attitudes in support of avoiding overseas combat of any kind remain strong in Japan, thereby suggesting some degree of residual antimilitarism, there is now widespread support for the continuation of the security relationship between Japan and the United States, unlike during certain periods during the antimilitarist period discussed in Chapter Three. For example, the 2008 and 2009 Pew GAP Surveys found that 65 percent of Japanese respondents regarded the US to be a “partner nation.” A December 2010 Asahi Shimbun survey found that 70 percent of the population felt that the US-Japan alliance was operating for the purpose of defending Japan, as opposed to supporting US regional and global objectives (Journalism 2011b). The 2013 Asahi Shimbun Constitutional Day survey found that 81 percent of Japanese wanted to continue the alliance (Asahi Shimbun 2013b).
results discussed below, however, suggest that many Japanese do not support the relationship with the United States in an uncritical way. This section shows that the Japanese public are likely to be sceptical of proposals to make the US-Japan alliance into a “global alliance” centred on the cooperative use of military force overseas (Arase 2007: 581-582), and were particularly sceptical of the US war on terror.

The War on Terror and US Intervention in the Middle East

Section 5.1 noted antipathy among the Japanese public regarding abstract overseas military activities focused on the use of force or combat. Analysis of actual cases of overseas combat activities by other nations, such as the invasion of Iraq and on-going combat in Afghanistan undertaken by Japan’s sole alliance partner, show similar reservations regarding both the utility and legitimacy of engaging in combat overseas. For example, just one month after 9/11, a near majority of Japanese felt that the US military attack on Afghanistan would not be effective in preventing future terrorist attacks, with only 36 percent believing the attack would achieve this goal (Midford, 2011:35). In a November 2001 survey, only 30.6 percent of Japanese felt that military force in general would be effective in routing out terrorism, in contrast to 87.6 percent of Americans who believed likewise in the same survey (Midford 2011: 35). Only 23 percent of Japanese in August 2002 thought positively of America’s post-9/11 policies, compared to the 50 percent who believed that these policies had had a negative impact on their perception of the United States (Midford 2011: 44). In 2003, a majority (57.8 percent) thought the impact of the US invasion of Iraq on WMD proliferation threat would be negligible, or would worsen the threat (15.4 percent), with only 16.5 percent believing it would decrease the threat (Midford 2011: 37). 70 percent of respondents to a March 2007 Asahi Shimbun survey felt that the 2007 military surge would not have an impact on the stability of public safety (Asahi Shimbun 2007b).

The public were also decisively against the Iraq War itself due to perception of illegitimacy (Figure 5.20; see also Karasutani 2005: 65-66; Midford 2011: 37). The Japanese public appeared to perceive the attack as a cynical use of the pre-emption doctrine and military force for other purposes (NHK 2004; Midford, 2011: 45-48), with 70 percent in one Asahi Shimbun poll viewing the Bush administration’s policy as “either arrogant or destabilizing” (Mochizuki 2004: 113). Only 29 percent of the public believed the initial justification of removing WMDs was legitimate in first place (Asahi Shimbun 2007c), and majorities disagreed with Koizumi’s decision to lend even moral support to Japan’s sole alliance
partner (Asahi Shimbun 2003, 2004). When in 2007 Minister of Defence Kyūma Fumio controversially admitted that he had at the time of the Iraq war felt that it was a mistake, 57 percent of respondents to one Asahi Shimbun survey said they could sympathise with his statement (Asahi Shimbun 2007d); 75 percent of respondents to another Asahi Shimbun survey in the same year indicated that they also thought the initial decision to go to war in Iraq was the incorrect one (Asahi Shimbun 2007b). This objection against the use of force against other nations appears to have not deteriorated since the end of the Bush administration. The September 2013 FNN survey showed 71 percent of respondents were against any US decision to use military force against the Syrian Assad regime, and 66.3 percent were against the Japanese government declaring its support for any strike against Assad over the issue of the use of chemical weapons (FNN 2013b).

As discussed in Chapter Four, the Japanese government did eventually make a contribution to the reconstruction of Iraq through the dispatch of SDF troops to non-combat zones for humanitarian and reconstruction purposes. It is important to note, however, that even this mission was scaled back from a plan whereby the US Department of Defence and some high level Japanese politicians initially considered having the SDF “occupy” a whole region of Iraq (Samuels 2007a: 99). Even in its scaled back form (Miyagi 2009: 358-362), the SDF dispatch to Iraq divided Japanese public opinion (BBC 2004). It remained divided even once the SDF had been dispatched (NHK 2004). By the end of 2004, support for the mission had wilted, with 63 percent opposing any extension to the mission (Asahi Shimbun 2004). A December 2005 Nikkei Shimbun survey showed that only 11 percent of respondents felt that Japan should stay in Iraq alongside the United States until the US withdraws (Nikkei 2005). After the SDF had come back from its initial non-combat deployment, 69 percent of Japanese respondents to one Asahi Shimbun survey said that the Japanese government should not extend the Iraq Special Measures Law, and 69 percent also said that Japan should no longer cooperate with the Bush administration on any aspect relating to the war in Iraq (Asahi Shimbun 2007b). The ASDF continued a minor role working with the US after this, but 55 percent of Japanese respondents were against this continued role (Asahi Shimbun 2006). When given the option of choosing “the SDF should respond to requests for assistance from the United States” in addition to humanitarian and UN activities in a December 2010 Asahi Shimbun Survey, only 15 percent of respondents selected this as an option (Journalism 2011b). None of these surveys in this section on
attitudes towards the Iraq War or SDF Iraq mission indicate any discernible generational differences.

Japan’s most direct cooperation with the US in the war on terror can be seen in the dispatch of MSDF vessels to the Indian Ocean, ostensibly to provision NATO vessels conducting operations in Afghanistan. This was done on the basis of the 2001 Anti-Terrorism Special Measures (ATSM) Law. Public attitudes, while appreciating the job the SDF itself did (Cabinet Office of Japan 2009), were somewhat more sceptical of the overall policy, and many Japanese wanted to see Japan’s SDF role to be as limited as possible. An October 2007 Asahi Shimbun survey noted that the Japanese government had claimed that SDF operations in the Indian Ocean constituted “one step in preventing terror,” had the “universal support of the international community,” and had been “highly praised by the United Nations” (Asahi Shimbun 2007e). When subsequently asked whether they were convinced by the above mentioned government stance, a plurality of 48 percent of respondents to the survey said that they were not convinced, with only 34 percent saying they accepted the government’s explanation (Asahi Shimbun 2007e). It was around this time, after the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) took control of the House of Councillors, that there was a political showdown between the government and opposition parties about whether to extend the ATSM Law, with public opinion appearing to be on the side of the DPJ who wanted to end the SDF mission (Asahi Shimbun 2007f; see also Nikkei 2007). According to a 2007 NHK poll, support for renewing the mission was as low as 24 percent (NHK 2007c). Only a temporary extension was able to be negotiated, and the mission was not renewed when the DPJ also took over the House of Representatives in 2009.

Despite Japan having been an alliance partner of the United States for over 60 years, and despite the COJ SDF Survey showing since 2003 that significant and consistent amounts of Japanese have expressed concern with terrorist activity, the Japanese public appear sceptical of the overall war on terror. A plurality of Japanese respondents to the Pew GAP Survey has consistently been against even the more general proposition of the global war on terror, with the exception of the year immediately after 9/11 (Figure 5.21). On more specific questions relating to US military activities in the Middle East, the Japanese public also appear unconvinced. The 2006 Pew GAP Survey showed that only 25.8 percent of respondents saw Iraq as being safer after the US invasion, with 60.8 percent saying Iraq had become a more dangerous place. When asked whether the US military occupation would eventually succeed, Japanese were extremely doubtful, as demonstrated in Table
5.10 below. Not only did the Japanese public not believe that US military intervention and occupation would succeed, but they increasingly saw little merit at all in the US remaining in Iraq and Afghanistan (Table 5.11). Midford (2011: 45-48) notes a number of polls in the years after 9/11 that show a connection between the war on terror and the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq, and increasing negative views of the US in Japan (see also Linley 2011). According to one October 2004 Asahi survey, 74 percent of Japanese said their view of America had worsened over “the past three years” (Midford 2011:45). Midford also notes a GMI poll from October 2004 that showed 71.1 percent of Japanese respondents viewing the US more negatively directly due to the war on terror and the war in Iraq, with only 6.8 percent viewing the US more positively (2011: 46-48). When asked about the guiding motivations for US foreign policy, 62 percent noted self-interest and empire building, while confusion and lack of understanding of other cultures was noted by another 18.2 percent. According to Yomiuri Shimbun surveys conducted between 2001 and 2008, trust of the United States as a nation radically deteriorated, with those distrusting the US rising from 35 percent to approximately 60 percent during this time period (Midford 2011: 45).

Figure 5.20: Approval or Disapproval for the Attack on Iraq
Figure 5.21: Do you Favour the US-led Global War on Terror? (Pew GAP Survey 2002-2012)

![Chart showing the percentage of people favouring the US-led Global War on Terror from 2002 to 2012. The chart shows a general decrease in support over time, with a slight increase in recent years.]

Table 5.10: Will the US succeed in stabilizing Iraq? (Pew GAP Survey 2006-2010)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Definitely/Probably Succeed</th>
<th>Definitely/Probably Fail</th>
<th>Net Succeed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>38.1</td>
<td>54.5</td>
<td>-16.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>24.8</td>
<td>67.1</td>
<td>-42.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>24.8</td>
<td>60.2</td>
<td>-35.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5.11: Should the US and/or NATO: (Pew GAP Survey 2007-2009)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Keep Troops in Afghanistan/Iraq</th>
<th>Remove Troops from Afghanistan/Iraq</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2007 (Iraq)</td>
<td>26.4</td>
<td>60.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007 (Af)</td>
<td>29.3</td>
<td>46.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008 (Af)</td>
<td>32.2</td>
<td>59.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009 (Af)</td>
<td>36.0</td>
<td>50.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Due to the Aum Shinrikyo sarin gas attack (1995) and 9/11 taking place during the Heisei cohort’s formative years, the cohort is perhaps slightly more concerned about the threat of
terrorism than other cohorts (Figure 5.22). Despite this additional concern, the Heisei generational cohort was very similar to the majority of the Japanese population in terms of its willingness to support Japan’s sole ally in its conduct of the war on terror (Figure 5.23) between 2002 and 2012. All Japanese generational cohorts doubted the utility of US military activities in Iraq and Afghanistan. Less than 30 percent of all three cohorts thought that Iraq was safer after the US invasion in the 2006 Pew GAP Survey. According to the 2007 to 2009 Pew GAP Surveys, all three generational cohorts appeared to support the US and its allies removing troops as soon as possible from Iraq, and opposed keeping them in the respective country until the respective situations had stabilized. When tracked over the years 2006-2012, the three cohorts did not deviate from each other regarding whether they thought the US military occupation would succeed in implementing a stable/democratic government in Iraq, although the Heisei cohort was more decisively sure that the US would fail in Iraq (see Figure 5.24). All three cohorts also overwhelmingly and positively evaluated Obama’s pledge to withdraw combat troops from Iraq by 2011 in the 2009 Pew GAP Survey (80 percent in favour for the three cohorts). Taken together, these results suggest that the Heisei generation and the Japanese public in general do not see military-induced nation building and long-term occupation/combat in foreign countries to be a particularly effective or legitimate approach to national security.

Figure 5.22: Security Concern Regarding International Terrorism (COJ SDF Survey 2006-2012)
Particularly notable was the considerable lack of confidence in George W. Bush’s foreign policy in Japan (Figure 5.25), and confidence in what were perceived to be the initially more conciliatory policies of Barack Obama (Figure 5.26). In the 2009 Pew GAP Survey, the Heisei cohort was the most positive towards Obama’s election, with 82.5 percent agreeing that Obama’s election had positively influenced their appraisal of the United
States, while 76.5 and 70.2 percent of the antimilitarist peak and postwar cohorts respectively agreed with the proposition. This favourability appeared to relate to Obama’s foreign policy as evidenced by the strong support for Obama’s international policies (Figure 5.27), including closing Guantanamo Bay (Figure 5.28), and Obama’s pledge to withdraw combat troops from Iraq by 2011 (80 percent support among all three cohorts).

This support for Obama’s policies was not an uncritical support, however. All three cohorts in the 2009 Pew GAP Survey expressed concern at Obama committing to the “Afghanistan Surge” by sending additional troops, with 28 percent of all respondents surveyed approving, while 62 percent disapproved. All three cohorts also strongly condemned US policy of “conducting missile strikes from pilotless aircraft called drones to target extremists in countries such as Pakistan, Yemen and Somalia” (Figure 5.29) in the 2012 Pew GAP survey.\textsuperscript{50} This echoes a Gallup International finding in 2009 where 87 percent of Japanese respondents said it was “never justified” for “the military to target and kill civilians.” Japan was one of the top five countries in the world for saying killing civilians was never justified for military objectives. This contrasts with the US and other US allies or US strategic military partners as seen in Figure 5.30. Ultimately, all three cohorts are sceptical of both US methods and justifications for its war on terror and intervention in the Middle East, with the Heisei cohort being slightly more sceptical on many of these indicators.

\textbf{Figure 5.25: Confidence in President Bush to “Do the Right Thing” in World Affairs (2006 Pew GAP Survey)}

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=0.5\textwidth]{figure5_25.png}
\caption{Confidence in President Bush to “Do the Right Thing” in World Affairs (2006 Pew GAP Survey)}
\end{figure}

\textsuperscript{50} The full question was: Do you approve or disapprove of the United States conducting missile strikes from pilotless aircraft called drones to target extremists in countries such as Pakistan, Yemen, and Somalia?
Figure 5.26: Confidence in Candidate Obama to “Do the Right Thing” in World Affairs (2008 Pew GAP Survey)

Figure 5.27: Do you Support the International Policies of President Obama? (2009 Pew GAP Survey)
Figure 5.28: Do you Support President Obama’s Policy of Closing the Guantanamo Bay Prison? (2009 Pew GAP Survey)

Figure 5.29: Approval or Disapproval for Drone Strikes (2012 Pew GAP Survey)
Figure 5.30: Percentage of respondents believing it is “never justified” for the “the military to target and kill civilians (2009-2012 Gallup International Tracking Polls)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Singapore</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>87</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Attitudes towards Strengthening the Alliance

A number of different survey sources provide insights into attitudes towards the US-Japan alliance and attitudes towards further strengthening the alliance. While Figures 5.31, 5.32, and 5.33 suggest that there is support for the status quo of the alliance, other polls suggest an increase in US forces in Japan is not necessary seen as enhancing Japan’s security. For example, during the period of greater coordination between the US and Japan in the reconstruction of Iraq around 2004, only a mere 7 percent of respondents to one Asahi Shimbun survey agreed with the idea of strengthening the US-Japan alliance as a way to guarantee Japan’s peace and security (Asahi Shimbun 2004). A 2006 MOFA survey asked what respondents felt about the US-Japan alliance, and only 10 percent said that the alliance should be strengthened on the basis of an enhanced US-Japan Mutual Security Treaty, while 42 percent were in favour of it continuing along the current line, and 24 percent in favour of reducing cooperation (MOFA 2006a). A NHK 2012 survey showed that only 18 percent of respondents were willing to say that the alliance was “very useful” for Japan’s security, with the large majority (57 percent) of respondents believing that the alliance was merely “somewhat useful.”51 This result is similar to a December 2010 Asahi Shimbun Survey which found only 15 percent of respondents indicating the alliance was very useful for Japan and Asia’s peace and security, with 65 percent recognising it to be useful to a

51 This is a small improvement (overall 75 percent) from the 1991 low of 62 percent believing the alliance to be useful (Miyashita 2008: 33).
degree (Journalism 2011b). In a separate question to the 2012 NHK survey, only 17 percent were willing to decisively say that US bases in Japan were “necessary,” with 58 percent committing to the more ambiguous “unavoidable,” which implies that the decision to host bases was not made willingly or autonomously. A strong majority of respondents to this survey also wanted to see less US bases in Okinawa (61 percent), while 48 percent wanted to see a reduction in bases throughout the whole country. This exceeded the 44 percent who wanted to see the current level of bases maintained. Only 2 percent of respondents wanted more US bases (NHK 2012).

Indeed, in terms of Japan’s overall security and foreign policy identity, the Japanese public also appears reluctant to strongly associate itself with the United States in military terms. The 2011 Pew GAP Survey found that only 11 percent of respondents answering that the Japanese government “does not cooperate enough” with the United States government in general, with considerably more answering (32 percent) that they thought the two governments did too much together, and the remainder saying the two countries were working together to the right degree. NHK surveys undertaken around the time of the 2010, 2012, and 2013 elections offered respondents a simple, straight choice between whether Japan should prioritise its diplomatic relations with the US or with Asia. While this shows a strong surge in 2012 in support for prioritising relations with the United States, in 2010 and 2013 there was more qualified support for prioritising the US over Asia (Table 5.12). The 2012 ATPS also found only a plurality were decisively in favour of emphasising the US-Japan alliance over diplomacy in Asia (Table 5.13), although in this case the Heisei cohort were in favour of a more balanced approach than the two older generational cohorts.

When questions are framed differently and with additional options provided as possible answers, this US-orientation looks even more qualified. A 2011 NHK survey on the US-Japan relationship found that in terms of Japan’s overall security identity, only 19 percent wanted to identify Japan as a nation that is a strong US ally over the identity of Japan supporting a regional security framework alongside other nations in Asia and other options (see Figure 5.34). The 2013 and 2014 NHK Sense of Peace Surveys inquired into whether from now on Japan should emphasise the US-Japan alliance or Asia more in its diplomacy in relative terms. Support for increasingly emphasising the US-Japan alliance is much less than support for emphasising Asia, or maintaining the current balance between the US and Asia in Japan’s diplomacy (Figure 5.35). Figure 5.36 shows that while support for promoting the US-Japan alliance as the main focus for guaranteeing Japan’s security has
increased since the end of the Cold War, it still sits in a relative balance with support for focusing on building a wider UN-focused security order. On the other hand, support for abolishing the alliance and the SDF, or unarmed neutrality, sits under ten percent where it has been almost consistently since 1975, and much further down from its postwar high of over 40 percent in 1966 (Miyashita 2008: 36). In terms of generational differences, no distinct generational trend is apparent in any of the surveys relating to the degree of focus on the US-Japan alliance in Japan’s foreign policy, except for those detailed in Table 5.13 above. Overall, concern regarding Chinese naval activities in waters close to Japan has not led to a strong desire to strengthen and further militarize the US-Japan alliance, especially in terms of increasing the US military presence in Japan itself.

Figure 5.31: Should the US military Presence be: (Yomiuri US-Japan Relationship Joint Survey 2007-2013)
Figure 5.32: Should Japan Strengthen the Alliance with the United States? (ATPS 2007, 2010)

Figure 5.33: From now on, what should be done about the US-Japan alliance? (NHK 2007-2014) It should be:
Table 5.12: Do you believe that Japan should give priority in its diplomacy to the United States, or Asia? (NHK 2010-2013)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>United States</th>
<th>Asia</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NHK 2010</td>
<td>51.6</td>
<td>44.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NHK 2012</td>
<td>61.9</td>
<td>34.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NHK 2013</td>
<td>55.7</td>
<td>40.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5.13: Do you believe that Japan should give priority in its diplomacy to the United States, or Asia? (ATPS 2012)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>United States</th>
<th>Can’t say either way</th>
<th>Asia</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Heisei</td>
<td>33.8</td>
<td>32.5</td>
<td>33.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Antimilitarist Peak</td>
<td>38.9</td>
<td>34.5</td>
<td>26.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Postwar</td>
<td>50.3</td>
<td>26.3</td>
<td>23.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>42.5</td>
<td>30.6</td>
<td>26.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 5.34: What Kind of Country should Japan Aim to become in Order to Protect its Security from now on? (2011 NHK US-Japan Security Relations Survey 2011)

- Hold no military capabilities at all: 12
- Deal with foreign invasions and threats through own military capabilities: 7
- Try to build an international security framework with various countries in Asia: 55
- Protect Japan's security on the basis of the US-Japan Alliance: 19
Figure 5.35: From now on, should Japan place more emphasis on relations with other nations in Asia or on the US-Japan alliance? (NHK 2013, 2014)

![Graph showing the percentage of responses for each option between 2013 and 2014.]

Figure 5.36: What do you think is the best way to guarantee Japan’s security of these options? (NHK 2012, 2013)

![Graph showing the percentage of responses for each security option from NHK 1992 to NHK 2013.]

Collective Self-Defence

Japanese attitudes towards the exercise of the right to collective self-defence are also potential indicators of support for a global alliance with the United States. The full embrace
of the right to collective self-defence would mean that Japan could become involved in the use of force of overseas in aid of protecting the interests and security of alliance and other military partners. The analysis so far suggests that the Japanese public has little interest in explicitly aligning with the United States in the use of force overseas. The surveys discussed below, however, do indicate the possibility that the Japanese public may accept revision or reinterpretation of the constitution to allow for collective self-defence in certain circumstances. Given that the second Abe administration declared the need to ‘reinterpret’ the constitution to allow for the exercise of collective self-defence, this is an issue worthy of greater attention (Smith 2014a).

The wording of the questions and the answer options seem to make a significant difference in this particular case, leading to mixed results. For example, the questions used in Asahi Shimbun and Mainichi Shimbun surveys are straightforward in that they simply ask whether Japan should allow itself to utilise the right to collective self-defence and thus, in theory, be able to engage in the use of force. The results in this case show a strong majority in opposition to embracing the right to collective self-defence (Figure 5.37). On the other hand, the Yomiuri approach since 2011 brings in issues about the appropriate process that would allow Japan to embrace collective self-defence (constitutional revision or constitutional reinterpretation) and positions collective self-defence explicitly in the context of the international norm on collective self-defence which allows an attack on an ally to be seen as a grave security threat to the nation itself. When asked in this way, a majority or near-majority appears to accept the need for Japan to exercise collective self-defence in 2012 and 2013 through either constitutional revision or reinterpretation (Figure 5.38). When a distinct undecided option is included as a response, such as in the 2007-2013 ATPS surveys, the results change again. This time a plurality forms around the “undecided” option (see Figure 5.39) in three out of four ATPS surveys.

The first surveys conducted immediately after Prime Minister Abe’s decision to reinterpret the constitution on July 1, 2014, show a Japanese public that is even more sceptical than prior to reinterpretation. The first NHK Sense of Peace Survey conducted after the decision showed only 9.2 percent of respondents appraised the decision highly, with an additional 28.4 percent evaluating it positively to a certain degree (NHK 2014a). In total, 54 percent did not evaluate the decision positively. In the same survey, respondents were asked whether they felt there was some danger of Japan being caught up in a war or conflict, or being invaded by another nation. While over 70 percent indicated that they were worried
to some degree about these possibilities, only 11 percent of respondents thought that Japan embracing collective self-defence would decrease this likelihood. Instead, 37 percent indicated that there would be no change, and 44 percent indicated that the danger had increased because of Abe’s July 1 cabinet declaration.

**Figure 5.37: Support for Japan being able to Exercise its Right to Collective Self-Defence**

![Graph showing support for Japan being able to exercise its right to collective self-defence.](image)

**Figure 5.38: Support for Japan being able to Exercise its Right to Collective Self-Defence through either Reinterpretation or Constitutional Revision (Yomiuri 2002-2014)**

![Graph showing support for Japan being able to exercise its right to collective self-defence through reinterpretation or constitutional revision.](image)
Figure 5.39: Should Japan Allow itself to Exercise its Right to Collective Self-Defence? (ATPS 2007-2013)

![Graph showing public opinion on collective self-defence](image)

It would appear that the Japanese public is, at best, undecided on exercising the collective self-defence right. It may well be that the public is supportive in some contexts, while sceptical in others, particularly those contexts that would allow the Japanese government to proactively use force within the territory of another country in the name of collective self-defence. When asked about specific activities and situations that are not explicitly labelled collective self-defence situations, Japanese respondents appear to be more permissive if there is no proactive use of force by the SDF or there is no prospect of a long-term engagement in hostilities. The 2009, 2013 and 2014 versions of the Yomiuri Constitution Survey touched upon one of these situations by asking respondents whether they supported the MSDF using force in a situation involving Japanese and US military ships working together and were subjected to an unprovoked attack. Figure 5.40 shows some support for allowing the limited use of force in this situation,\(^{52}\) while a May 2014 FNN survey shows the public also strongly in favour (73.1 percent) of the SDF protecting US warships that were rescuing Japanese citizens and other countries’ citizens from a danger zone overseas. This May 2014 FNN survey also showed that 78.3 percent of respondents were in favour of the SDF cooperating with other nations’ militaries to protect

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\(^{52}\) The full question was: If Japanese and US vessels are conducting operations together in waters around Japan, should the government recognise Japan’s ability to respond to any sudden attack on the US vessel?
important energy sea lanes through minesweeping and other activities on the high seas (FNN 2014).

While SDF UNPKO participation is limited to the provisioning of medical care and delivery of goods to non-combat areas, and participation “in noncombat (post-conflict) roles, such as constructing roads, and helping run refugee camps and hospitals” (Umeda 2006: 20), debate has arisen in regards to the degree that the SDF can use weapons if there is an unprovoked attack on non-Japanese civilians or military unit members associated with a UNPKO. Currently the SDF can only protect its own members and civilians directly under its supervision if they come under attack. If a separate unit from another country is attacked, or civilians not being directly supervised by the SDF are attacked, the SDF is legally obligated to not intervene irrespective of the consequences. Figure 5.41 below shows, however, that a majority of Japanese appear to be comfortable with the SDF using weapons to protect or come to the aid of other units and civilians performing non-combat and post-conflict roles alongside the SDF.53 These Yomiuri results are reaffirmed by the results from a May 2014 Nikkei Survey (Nikkei 2014) where 47 percent were in favour of SDF using arms to help other units and civilians being attacked by non-state actors (34 percent were opposed), and a May 2014 FNN survey, where 50 percent of respondents were in favour (37 percent were opposed) of Japan using arms in this specific situation (FNN 2014).

53 The full question was: Do you believe the government should recognise the SDF’s capability to use weapons if UNPKO units from other countries come under attack, and the SDF is able to help them by using weapons?
Another policy option that would technically constitute the exercise of collective self-defence relates to Japan’s Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) system. As Japan’s BMD system has become increasingly sophisticated it has raised the possibility that Japan could intercept a missile launched from somewhere in East Asia flying towards the United States. The traditional interpretation was, however, that such an act would constitute the exercise of collective self-defence (Martin 2012: 54-59), even if Japan did not launch a counter-
strike against the protagonist. Figure 5.42 suggests that public opinion seems to however support the exercise of collective self-defence in this particular situation.

**Figure 5.42: Should Japan be able to shoot down a missile heading for the United States?**

![Graph showing public opinion on Japan's right to collective self-defence.](image)

In terms of generational breakdown, where data was available, the Heisei generation actually appears to be a little more indecisive than the other two generational cohorts on the issue of collective self-defence. For example, three out of the four ATPS surveys undertaken between 2007 and 2013 show a plurality of Heisei respondents were unable to say either way about Japan exercising its right to collective self-defence (Figure 5.43). Across all four ATPS surveys, the Heisei cohort was slightly less enthusiastic about Japan being able to exercise this right than the antimilitarist peak (4.6 percent difference on average) and postwar (8.2 percent difference on average) cohorts (Figure 5.44). Similarly, three surveys undertaken between April 2013 and May 2014 by the Asahi Shimbun found that, when forced to choose, robust majorities of all three respondent cohorts were in favour of the current proscription on Japan being able to utilise its right to collective self-defence (Figures 5.45 and 5.46), with the Heisei cohort being the most cautious in all three surveys. Ultimately, there is no evidence that the Heisei generation is more eager to embrace collective self-defence than the two older cohorts.
Figure 5.43: Can't Say Either Way Regarding the Exercise of the Right to Collective Self-Defence (ATPS 2007-2013)

![Graph showingcant say either way regarding the exercise of the right to collective self-defence from 2007 to 2013, with data points for each year and period.]

Figure 5.44: Agree that Japan Should be Able to Exercise the Right to Collective Self-Defence (ATPS 2007-2013)

![Graph showing combined agree regarding the exercise of the right to collective self-defence from 2007 to 2013, with data points for each year and period.]

178
Figure 5.45: Japan should allow itself to utilise its right of collective self-defence for the purposes of fighting with allied nations who have been attacked (Asahi Shimbun 2013, 2014)

Figure 5.46: The current situation of not allowing the use of the right of collective self-defence for the purposes of fighting with allied nations who have been attacked should be maintained (Asahi Shimbun 2013, 2014)
Interestingly, invoking the need to strengthen the US-Japan alliance as a form of deterrence against regional threats does not appear to increase support for collective self-defence. The results below suggest that invoking the goal of strengthening of the alliance may actually reduce support for the exercise of this right in some cases among the public. For example, the 2013 and 2014 Asahi Shimbun Constitution Day Surveys found that, in addition to majorities of respondents being opposed to allowing the exercise of collective self-defence for Japan, a majority of respondents also felt that the Abe government embracing this right for the specific purpose of strengthening the US alliance and cooperation on military matters would be a negative from the point of view of peace and stability in East Asia (Figure 5.47).\textsuperscript{54}

Other surveys emphasise this caution. An October 2013 ANN survey shows only 39 percent of respondents thought the Japanese government recognising Japan’s UN Charter-enshrined ability to exercise the right to collective self-defence would be a good idea if it was to lead to regularised overseas military collaboration between the SDF and United States forces, with 42 percent against it for this specific reason (ANN 2013). A June 2014 NTV Survey also shows similar sentiment, with 22 percent seeing Japan embracing collective self-defence as a positive for Japan’s overall security, 24 percent seeing it as a negative, and 43.5 percent not convinced it would make a difference either way (NTV 2014a). The 2014 NHK Constitution Awareness Survey indicated that even among respondents who favoured Japan legalising collective self-defence rights, only 17 percent indicated that their favourability related to the maintenance of alliances (NHK 2014b). A plurality of favourable respondents (38 percent) indicated Japan participating in international security cooperation activities not necessarily related to the US-Japan alliance were a more important consideration (NHK 2014b). A May 2014 Asahi Shimbun survey question inquired into the Abe administration’s logic for legalising the exercise of collective self-defence, which is that collective self-defence will strengthen the alliance, increase deterrence in the region, and make it less likely that there will be a conflict. Only 23 percent of respondents agreed with this logic, while 50 percent indicated that Japan being able to exercise collective self-defence would make it more likely that conflict would

\textsuperscript{54} The full question was: Will Abe’s plans to allow collective self-defence to strengthen the US-Japan alliance and military cooperation between lead to more negative or more positive impacts on peace and stability in East Asia? There were no statistically significant differences between the generational cohorts in response to this question or the questions regarding collective self-defence conducted by the Asahi Shimbun in 2013 and 2014.
break out (Asahi Shimbun 2014e). Likewise, a May 2014 ANN survey showed that only 27 percent of respondents felt that embracing collective self-defence would make Japan safer, with 49 percent explicitly disagreeing with the proposition (ANN 2014). The 2014 NHK Sense of Peace Survey taken after the July 1 cabinet declaration showed that only 43 percent of respondents were convinced by Prime Minister Abe’s assertion that an increasingly dangerous regional environment made embracing collective self-defence essential. On the other hand, 50.4 percent were not convinced by Abe’s logic (NHK 2014a).

The 2014 Asahi Shimbun Constitution Day Survey went into more detail and asked respondents three additional questions regarding collective self-defence. Table 5.14 shows that most respondents to the survey felt that there would be a greater tension in East Asia and there was a greater risk of Japan becoming entrapped in a war. Furthermore, it showed a strong reluctance to fight alongside the US at the frontlines of any conflict even if the Japanese government legalised the exercise of the right to collective self-defence. There were some minor generational differences, with again the Heisei cohort being slightly more opposed than the postwar cohort to fighting alongside the US (Journalism 2014). The Heisei cohort was also more wary than both older cohorts of military tensions increasing in East Asia. A follow up survey in May 2014 by the Asahi Shimbun (2014e) confirmed these reservations regarding collective self-defence, with 73 percent of respondents agreeing with the proposition that if Japan was able to exercise its right to collective self-defence then the possibility that it would become entrapped in America and other allies’ wars would heighten.
Figure 5.47: Will Abe’s collective self-defence plans to strengthen the US-Japan alliance and military cooperation lead to more negative or more positive impacts on peace and stability in East Asia? (Asahi Shimbun 2013-2014)

Table 5.14: (Asahi Shimbun 2014): If Japan Recognises its Ability to Exercise its Right to Collective Self-Defence:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question</th>
<th>Should Japan join the US in fighting a war if requested?</th>
<th>Do you feel Japan will be entrapped in a war?</th>
<th>To what degree will military tensions increase in East Asia?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Answer/Cohort</td>
<td>Fighting together is acceptable</td>
<td>Feel (Feel Strongly)</td>
<td>Don’t Feel (Don’t Feel at all)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heisei</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>89 (57)</td>
<td>9 (2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Antimilitarist Peak</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>87 (50.5)</td>
<td>9 (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Postwar</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>88 (47)</td>
<td>8 (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>16</strong></td>
<td><strong>88 (52)</strong></td>
<td><strong>9 (1)</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The above results do not provide a conclusive picture regarding attitudes towards collective self-defence in Japan. While it appears that Japanese are wary of exercising this right in general, with the Heisei generation being mildly more sceptical than other two cohorts, this
is not the case in all situations and according to the full range of surveys available. This particular issue appears to be one where question wording makes a significant difference to respondents’ answers, as does the specific activities alluded to in the question regarding the activities the SDF might undertake in the name of collective self-defence. This is likely because there is recognition in Japan that the exercise of the right to collective self-defence could be utilised to justify intervention in a wide range of different military situations, from intercepting a ballistic missile heading towards another country, to attacks on foreign states and actors. In Japan, opponents of changes to Japan’s current stance often make reference to the use of collective self-defence to justify the USSR’s interventions in Hungary and Czechoslovakia, US intervention in the Vietnam War, and United Kingdom and other US allies’ attack on the Taleban in Afghanistan, (House of Councillors Constitution Investigative Panel 2014; Fukushima 2014).

On the other hand, there are some surveys which have found that the Japanese public appears to accept SDF engagement in some military activities which could approximate the exercise of collective self-defence (as demonstrated in Figures 5.40 to 5.42 above). Additionally, in early 2014 some surveys started showing public acceptance of the limited or partial embrace of collective self-defence, suggesting support for changes proposed by the Japanese government that stop short of allowing Japan to engage in combat within another countries’ territory may be forthcoming (Mainichi Shimbun 2014a; NTV 2014b; FNN 2014). Indeed, in a May 2014 FNN survey, which showed majority support for a number of the specific scenarios identified by the Abe administration in May 2014 as requiring legalisation, one question decisively showed where the respondents drew the line regarding military activities overseas. An overwhelming 79.6 percent of respondents agreed with Prime Minister’s Abe’s assurance that “the SDF will not participate in combat involving the proactive use of force by other countries,” and that even if there was a United Nations Security Council resolution, Japan would not join a multinational coalition for this purpose (FNN 2014).

The Japanese public appears to remain sceptical about strengthening the alliance for the purpose of building a truly reciprocal relationship where Japan would be obligated to defend the United States and its global interests. Ultimately, a more global approach to managing the alliance through the cooperative use of force far from Japan’s immediate security environment remains controversial for the Japanese public and arguably became more controversial, not less so, due to the US interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq and
pressure applied to Japan to provide military assistance. This section has also demonstrated that the Heisei cohort does not appear to deviate greatly from the baseline public opinion regarding the ‘global alliance’ concept based on the available evidence. Where there are differences, the Heisei cohort appears to be more against ‘widening’ the alliance to become a global one than the older two cohorts, and it cannot be automatically assumed that the Heisei cohort will embrace an unequivocal pro-alliance orientation in the future irrespective of US foreign policy behaviour.

5.3: Managing Japan’s Security Environment and the Rise of China

This final section looks at attitudes regarding whether Japan should become a stronger military power, with a view to using this military power against the most likely peer competitor in the form of the People’s Republic of China. An important question to answer is whether concerns about China are particularly salient among the younger generation due to the purported rise of nationalism and the decrease of pacifism in Japan over the last twenty years. If there is evidence of a desire among the Japanese public, and the Heisei cohort in particular, to strengthen its military and engage in a containment strategy that seeks to distance Japan from China while embracing zero-sum strategic competition, then this would be one indicator that Japan is embracing a more militant internationalist identity disposition. While the first two components of militant internationalism presented above do not appear to be present among the general public or the Heisei cohort, it is possible that strategic antipathy towards China will build over time and strategic antipathy towards the People’s Republic of China may become a pathway to an increasingly aggressive military posture.

**General Attitudes towards Defence Strengthening**

Before discussing attitudes towards strategic competition with China, there is a need to identify the Japanese public’s attitudes towards independent defence strengthening in the context of perceptions of its regional security environment. This will provide initial clues as to whether a specifically militarised response to China’s rise is supported by the public and Heisei cohort in particular. In terms of the perception of the regional security environment, what is particularly notable is the increase in generalized threat perception over time in Japan. Figure 5.48 shows concerns have increased over time regarding the possibility that Japan might be caught up in war. A 2012 NHK survey indicates similar sentiment where 80 percent of respondents considered the possibility of an external
invasion, with 17 percent thinking there was a high chance (NHK 2012). The 2013 and 2014 NHK Sense of Peace Surveys found that 68.8 percent and 72.9 percent of respondents respectively thought there was a danger of Japan being either caught up in a war or conflict, or being invaded by another country (NHK 2013a, 2014b). Figure 5.49 suggests that there are minor generational differences in the perception of fear of being caught up in war, with the two younger generations being slightly more worried.

Despite the gradual decrease of the US military presence in Japan since the end of the Cold War (Kane 2004), these concerns about Japan’s security have not spurred the Japanese government into a significant defence build-up or led to strong calls from the public for such a build-up. Nor has the extra sensitivity to regional instability led the Heisei cohort to be at the vanguard of support for defence strengthening. The Japanese government in the 2000s actually reduced its defence budget in both real and nominal terms in 11 consecutive years (Klingner 2013b). Three NHK surveys conducted between 2012 and 2014 show that there is no popular desire to see the SDF significantly strengthened despite approximately 70 percent or more of respondents indicating a fear of Japan being entrapped in conflict or invaded by a foreign nation (see Figure 5.50). Almost identically, the most recent 2012 SDF Cabinet Survey found 60 percent of respondents saying the current level of defence strength was appropriate, despite 72 percent of Japanese respondents indicating that they feared Japan being caught up in a war. Vosse’s case-level analysis of the SAGE survey data finds that perception of insecurity related to the state or global issues has no notable correlation with “militarist” attitudes conceptualised by reference to support for defence strengthening or justifications for going to war (2014: 24-25). Vosse found in the Japanese case that “antimilitarists” and “militarists” alike shared similarly high-levels of threat perception. Vosse (2014: 21, 25) notes that while threat perception towards state-level and global issues is considerably higher in Japan than in the US, support for militarist attitudes is considerably lower in Japan (8.4 percent of respondents) than in the US (50 percent of respondents).
Figure 5.48: Do you perceive a possibility of Japan being caught up in a war in the near future? (Source: COJ SDF Survey 1969-2012)

Figure 5.49: Percentage concerned about Japan being caught up in war (COJ SDF Survey 2003-2012)
Figure 5.50: Support for strengthening or maintaining the SDF’s power and fear of entrapment in conflict or invasion from other nations (NHK 2012-2014)

Notably in the most recent 2012 COJ survey, only 24.8 percent of respondents felt that the SDF should be strengthened (Figure 5.51 tracks this sentiment over time) despite the security situation in Japan worsening since 2009.55 This was despite a very suggestive graph accompanying this question indicating that Japan had much less quantitative military power than other major nations in the region (see Appendix Three). As indicated by Figure 5.52, there is little noteworthy or consistent generational variation in terms of support for strengthening of Japan’s defence posture.

The ATPS surveys undertaken between 2007 and 2013 suggest more support for defence strengthening, however (Figure 5.53). In fact, simple majorities of respondents were in support of strengthening defence capabilities in response to the most recent 2012 and 2013 surveys. These diverging results may be accounted for by looking at the answer options made available. The NHK and COJ surveys both include an explicit option for maintaining the status quo of Japan’s defence capabilities, while the ATPS survey does not offer an option for maintaining the status quo, only agree, disagree, or undecided. In any respect, the three sources cited here do suggest that if there is any support for defence strengthening, it is relatively weak.

55 Miyashita (2008: 33) provides historical data from NHK that shows that while there was a spike in support for strengthening in 2012, this was no higher than support for increasing the strength of the SDF in 1969 of around 25 percent. Those in favour of keeping the SDF at its current level never reached the current level of 60 percent until 1988, while those in favour of reducing the power of the SDF has consistently been between 8 and 20 percent since 1969.
Figure 5.51: The SDF’s Defence Strength should be: (Source: COJ SDF Survey 1991-2012)

![Graph showing the SDF's Defence Strength from 1991 to 2012]

Figure 5.52: Agree that the SDF’s defence capabilities should be strengthened (COJ SDF Survey 2003-2012)

![Graph showing the percentage of agreement from 2003 to 2012]
Figure 5.53: Agree that Japan should strengthen its defence capability (ATPS 2007-2013)

Furthermore, even if there is slight support for defence strengthening, it is not seen as sufficiently important to justify large amounts of government spending and attention. A majority of respondents to various surveys indicate that the current relatively low levels of defence spending to be appropriate. A question on defence spending in the 2005 SAGE Survey asked respondents to identify their position on a seven point scale ranging from decreasing spending to increasing spending. An ANOVA of the responses from all three cohorts revealed an average of 3.43, almost precisely in the middle with no significant generational differences. According to the 2006 ISSP Role of Government Survey, 80 percent of both antimilitarist peak and Heisei cohorts wanted to spend the same as now or much less on defence, with the postwar generation being 7 percentage points more in favour of spending more (Table 5.15). Table 5.16 shows very similar results were detected by the 2010 Japan Social Survey.

Defence is also seen as a much lower priority for government spending compared to other issues. Strong majorities of all cohorts in the 2006 ISSP Role of Government Survey were in favour of more spending on environment and health measures, suggesting that an anti-government spending sentiment was not the cause of weak support for defence spending. In the most recent World Values Survey (2010), when asked about the “aims of the country,” having “strong defence forces” was ranked fourth out of four choices on 6.8 percent, behind
“trying to make our cities more beautiful” (11.4 percent). When asked to rank the order of importance of issues for the Japanese government, in the 2009 ATPS only 5.3 percent of respondents put diplomacy and security policy as the number one choice (making it only the sixth most popular choice), with 5.0 percent and 7.2 percent of respondents putting it as their second and third choices respectively.

Table 5.15: Should the government spend more money on defence? (2006 ISSP Role of Government Survey)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cohort</th>
<th>Spend more (Much more)</th>
<th>Spend the same as now</th>
<th>Spend less (Much less)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Heisei</td>
<td>18.8 (7.4)</td>
<td>43.4</td>
<td>37.7 (19.1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Antimilitarist Peak</td>
<td>18.6 (7.5)</td>
<td>40.6</td>
<td>40.8 (17.7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Postwar</td>
<td>26.0 (11.8)</td>
<td>43.1</td>
<td>30.9 (14.2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>20.8 (8.7)</td>
<td>42.3</td>
<td>37.0 (17.2)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5.16: Is spending on national security too much, too little, or just right? (2010 Japan General Social Survey)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cohort</th>
<th>Too Much</th>
<th>Just Right</th>
<th>Too Little</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Heisei</td>
<td>17.0</td>
<td>56.7</td>
<td>26.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Antimilitarist Peak</td>
<td>16.6</td>
<td>51.2</td>
<td>32.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Postwar</td>
<td>11.7</td>
<td>55.2</td>
<td>33.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>15.6</td>
<td>54.0</td>
<td>30.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The support for status quo defence strengthening and spending options, despite increasingly high levels of subjective threat perception, suggests that the Japanese public ultimately remains sceptical about the utility of the defence strengthening being an effective deterrent.

56 The most important aim of the country identified by Japanese respondents was to maintain a high level of economic growth (56.2 percent). The data can be analysed online at this web address: http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/WVSOnline.jsp.
57 Asahi Shimbun surveys regularly show similar results in terms of the relative priorities the Japanese public identifies for its leaders (see Journalism 2013b, 2013c).
COJ SDF Surveys provide evidence for this assertion by showing that only a minority of the respondents who are concerned that Japan might get caught up in war thought that the reason for Japan being insecure is due to insufficient defence strength (Figure 5.54). This result held for each generational cohort to the same degree. A 2006 MOFA survey also found a similar outcome when asking a question directed at respondents who did not feel that Japan’s security was adequately safeguarded. When asked what should be done to enhance Japan’s security (multiple answers possible), only 25 percent indicated the need to increase Japan’s defence strength, and only 21 percent indicated strengthening the US-Japan alliance would enhance Japan’s security. Majorities pointed to improving friendly relations with other Asian countries (55 percent) and supporting the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and other WMDs (52 percent) as priorities (MOFA 2006a). This overall support for the status quo position is particularly notable given the increasing concern about China and its military modernisation detailed in the next section.

Figure 5.54: Agree that insufficient defence is a reason for Japan being potentially caught up in a war (COJ SDF Survey 2003-2012)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Heisei</th>
<th>Antimilitarist Peak</th>
<th>Post-War</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Attitudes towards Managing the Rise of the People's Republic of China

Growing concern over Chinese military modernization specifically has been a notable feature of Japanese attitudes towards China since the beginning of China’s military modernisation in the late 1980s. Figure 5.55 shows that by 2006 significant concern about China’s military development was detectable among the Japanese public. The 2012 COJ SDF survey also found that concern about China’s growing military capabilities had
increased from 30.4 percent to 46.0 percent between 2009 and 2012. It was now only second to the situation on the Korean Peninsula in terms as a defence issue of concern (64.9 percent) (Cabinet Office of Japan 2014a). The 2012 Genron-NPO survey also found a majority of Japanese now feel a military threat from China (58.7 percent), only second to that of North Korea (72.8 percent) (Genron 2012). Given this perception of military threat, it is no surprise that Figure 5.56 shows the Japanese perception of the health of the Sino-Japanese relationship, and Japanese affinity for China, trending downwards over time. In terms of generational attitudes towards China, Figure 5.57 suggests that concerns about China’s military are shared across all three generational cohorts. Table 5.17 shows that the oldest generational cohort may fear China’s military rise slightly more intensely than the Heisei generation, although a majority of all cohorts are concerned. Interestingly, the oldest cohort’s affinity for China in particular appears to have deteriorated the most rapidly over the last five years, dropping from 41 percent in 2009, to 13 percent in 2012 (Figure 5.58).

**Figure 5.55: Concern regarding China’s military**
Figure 5.56: Japanese perception of affinity for China and perception of good diplomatic relations (COJ Diplomacy Survey 1987-2013)

Figure 5.57: Percentage of respondents believing China’s growing military strength is bad for Japan (Pew GAP Survey 2006-2011)
Table 5.17: Do you feel a sense of military threat from China? (Asahi Shimbun 2012)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Feel military threat</th>
<th>Do not feel threat</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Heisei</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Antimilitarist Peak</td>
<td>74.5</td>
<td>21.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Postwar</td>
<td>77.5</td>
<td>17.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>74</strong></td>
<td><strong>22</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 5.58: Respondents feeling a sense of affinity for China (COJ Diplomacy Survey 2008-2012)

It is important to note, however, that there is little public support in Japan for the government to pursue a strategic containment policy towards the PRC. Japanese citizens appear not to see the solution to military tensions between the two countries to be either the building up of a significant independent defence capability (addressed above), and/or pursuing a strategic containment policy in partnership with the US, similar to US policy towards the USSR during the Cold War.\(^{58}\) For example, two Yomiuri surveys in 2013 showed little desire for Japanese respondents to see an increased US military presence in East Asia specifically to combat China (Figure 5.59), while four NHK surveys taken between November 2010 (immediately subsequent to the first diplomatic dispute between

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\(^{58}\) For such assertions, see Onishi and French (2005), Hughes (2009b: 838, 848, 856), Key-young and Mason (2013).
Japan and China over the Senkaku Islands) and August 2013, suggest little desire for Japan to embrace military options over diplomatic options for managing tensions with China (Tables 5.18 and 5.19). In terms of generational differences, the NHK surveys show very little variation, although Table 5.19 shows some variation in the 2011 NHK survey where the Heisei generation was slightly more supportive of managing Japan’s security on the basis of cooperation (61 percent) with various countries in Asia than the postwar cohort (47 percent).

Ultimately, most Japanese appear to believe that the long-term management of a constructive relationship with China is still a priority for regional stability and economic prosperity. In a question in a 2006 MOFA survey on how to deal with a rising China, there was support for “emphasize the interests of international and regional society more than Sino-Japanese interests” (19.9 percent), and “emphasise friendly Sino-Japanese relations from a big picture perspective” (47.7 percent). The answers “emphasise Japan’s sovereign rights” and “emphasise Japan’s economic interests,” on the other hand, garnered 9.9 percent and 5.8 percent of respondent support respectively (MOFA 2006b). Interestingly, in a November 2009 Yomiuri survey, 60 percent of Japanese respondents identified China as a country that should shoulder a role as Asia’s leader in the future, which was not all that far behind the rating Japanese respondents gave to Japan (76 percent) (Yomiuri Shimbun 2009a). A December 2010 Asahi Shimbun survey (Journalism, 2011b) found that 64 percent of respondents preferred that Japan, along with the United States and China, try to develop a “mutually economic beneficial relationship” between the three countries, rather than Japan emphasise the strength of the US-Japan alliance toward China (31 percent).

Even during periods where military tensions have been high, such as after the Senkaku Islands disputes in September 2010 and August 2012, surveys have shown that more Japanese prefer to focus on deepening the Sino-Japanese relationship than have Japan distance itself from China (Tables 5.20 and 5.21).

In terms of generational views, there is a little variation in the Asahi Shimbun surveys cited above. The Heisei cohort was somewhat more positive towards deepening its relations with China than the antimilitarist peak cohort (Table 5.20). This was also the case in two of the surveys in comparison with the postwar cohort. The Heisei cohort’s result over these three surveys was remarkably consistent, with approximately a small majority favouring deepening in each survey, and the gap between those desiring deepening and those desiring distancing being between 15 to 17 percentage points. This consistency was despite the two
latter surveys being conducted almost immediately after diplomatic disputes with the PRC over the Senkaku Islands in September 2010 and August 2012. Additionally, Table 5.21 actually shows a majority of the Heisei cohort want the government to show some flexibility on disputes with China and Korea, while a plurality of the other two cohorts favour a hard-line stance on diplomatic issues.

**Figure 5.59:** In an Asia-Pacific where China is increasing its power and influence, do you think the United States should increase its military power in the region, maintain it, or reduce it? (Yomiuri US-Japan Joint Survey 2013)

![Figure 5.59](image)

**Table 5.18:** China is proceeding with strengthening its military and engaging in increased maritime activities in waters around Japan. What kind of posture should Japan take towards such movements by China? (NHK 2010-2014)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Deal with China on the basis of deterrence provided by the US-Japan alliance</th>
<th>Deepen the bilateral relationship with China</th>
<th>Strengthen relations with other countries in East Asia</th>
<th>Deal with China through Japan’s own independent defence capabilities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>12.4</td>
<td>23.2</td>
<td>57.3</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>23.3</td>
<td>33.3</td>
<td>25.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>21.3</td>
<td>47.2</td>
<td>13.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>23.1</td>
<td>50.0</td>
<td>9.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 5.19: What kind of country should Japan aim to become in order to protect its security from now on? (2011 NHK US-Japan Security Relations Survey)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Protect Japan’s Security on the Basis of the US-Japan Alliance</th>
<th>On the basis of cooperation with various countries in Asia, try to build an international security framework</th>
<th>Deal with foreign invasions/threats through own military capabilities</th>
<th>Hold no military capabilities at all</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Heisei</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Antimilitarist Peak</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>58.5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Postwar</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>19</strong></td>
<td><strong>55</strong></td>
<td><strong>7</strong></td>
<td><strong>12</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5.20: Japanese attitudes towards the relationship with China (Asahi Shimbun 2010-2012)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Should Japan:</th>
<th>Deepen the relationship with China</th>
<th>Distance itself from China</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Heisei</td>
<td>52.5</td>
<td>53.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Antimilitarist Peak</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Postwar</td>
<td>47.5</td>
<td>53.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>48</strong></td>
<td><strong>51</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5.21: Should Japan take a hard-line stance with China and South Korea (on diplomatic disputes) or should it show some flexibility? (Asahi Shimbun 2012)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Should take a hard-line stance</th>
<th>Should show flexibility</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Heisei</td>
<td>43.5</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Antimilitarist Peak</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Postwar</td>
<td>43.5</td>
<td>39.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>45</strong></td>
<td><strong>45</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Even in the sensitive military and security fields, the Japanese public appears to not have ruled out a closer relationship with China, and see no need to adopt an inherently adversarial orientation towards the PRC. When asked in the 2012 Genron-NPO survey what countries should be included in any regional security framework alongside Japan, 87.9 percent of Japanese respondents said China, and 87.5 percent said South Korea. Only 57.8 percent of respondents to the survey chose the United States, which registers just ahead of ASEAN at 54.7 percent, India at 51.8 percent, and Russia at 51.4 percent (Genron 2012). The favourable sentiment towards including China in a regional security framework is affirmed by the 2012 COJ SDF Survey, which asked respondents who they felt was the most desirable country for increased defence relations outside of the United States. Japanese respondents identified China as the top country (61.7 percent), followed by US ally South Korea at 61.5 percent. This came ahead of Southeast Asia at 45.9 percent, and regional US strategic partners or allies like India or Australia, at 19.2 percent and 17.2 percent respectively (Cabinet Office of Japan 2012a). In the 2013 Yomiuri Shimbun Joint Japan-Korea Survey, not long after it was revealed that a Chinese warship had “painted” a Japanese warship with a fire-control radar, and less than six months after the 2012 Senkaku Islands dispute, 55 percent of Japanese identified China as a country Japan needed to work closer to guarantee its own security (Yomiuri Shimbun 2013). These findings suggest that the Japanese public at least are not likely to embrace any kind of Pacific NATO military alliance centred on the United States where China is excluded, and effectively ‘contained.’

The Japanese public also appears to support incorporating China into the broader regional framework. The Yomiuri Shimbun in 2009 asked respondents whether they positively evaluated Prime Minister Hatoyama Yukio’s East Asia Community proposal which would strengthen cooperation in policy fields in Asia on the basis of leadership shared between China, Japan and Korea. The reaction was positive with 76 percent evaluating the proposal highly, including 30 percent who evaluated it very highly (Yomiuri Shimbun 2009b). An Asahi Shimbun survey found 58 percent of respondents supported Japan developing an “East Asian Community” framework based on financial, economic and diplomatic cooperation with China, South Korea, and other countries in East Asia (Asahi Shimbun 2010b). An Asahi Shimbun survey in January 2012 found that a majority of Japanese (52 percent) agreed with Japan joining the China-Korea-Japan three-way free trade agreement, with 36 percent against (Asahi Shimbun 2012a). There was no generational variation detectable in these surveys.
China’s importance to Japan beyond being a security concern can be seen in how Japanese appear to conceptualize the relationship of Japan to its supposed “historical rival” (Hoshino and Satoh 2012) relative to Japan’s relationship with its sole alliance partner and security guarantor, the United States. Until 2004, when the COJ Diplomacy Survey stopped asking the specific version of the question, most Japanese identified China and Korea as Japan’s main economic priority, rather than North America or Europe, with South and Southeast Asia second. Japanese respondents affirmatively answered that as a “member of Asia,” Japan should prioritize relations with the region, even while continuing relations with other nations globally (Cabinet Office of Japan 2004). Within East Asia, China was constantly identified as the main country for Japan to engage with economically in these surveys. More recently, in an April 2010 Yomiuri survey (Yomiuri Shimbun 2010), out of a choice of 7 countries or regions, 50 percent of Japanese chose China as the most important for the future for Japan, with the next most important being the United States at 22 percent.

The biennial Yomiuri US-Japan Relationship survey echoes these findings. While Japanese saw the US quite decisively as the most important country for its political relationship, China was almost equally decisively identified as the most important country for Japan’s economic relationship (Yomiuri Shimbun 2009b, 2011, 2013). Even after the September 2010 and August 2012 Senkaku Island incidents that soured relations, and specifically raised concerns about China using its economic leverage over Japan through punitive economic measures (Envall and Fujiwara 2012: 70-71), the identification of China as a more important economic partner than the US continued, despite some post-2010 negative movement (see Figure 5.60 below). The 2013 Yomiuri US-Japan Relationship survey found that despite a strong perception of bad relations, 72 percent of Japanese respondents still identified China as an important country for Japan economically (Yomiuri Shimbun 2013). Ultimately, the Japanese public appears to be unable or unwilling to decisively choose between its two very important economic and politico-security partners. In the 2012 Genron-NPO survey, 60 percent of respondents accorded the same level of importance to the Sino-Japanese relationship as they did to the US-Japan relationship. Only 27 percent said they thought the US-Japan relationship was distinctly more important than the Sino-Japanese relationship. This was despite, according to the survey, 52 percent of Japanese respondents feeling a particular affinity for the United States, and only 6.5 percent feeling affinity for China (Genron 2012).
While there are clearly competitive elements at work in Japan’s regional diplomacy (Terada 2010: 72, 80), and significant distrust of Chinese military modernisation and strategic intentions in Japan, it is not the case that there is support for a hard balancing and relative-gains focused strategic containment policy towards China among the general public. The concept of a strategic partnership and cooperation in building an Asian regional community is not beyond possibility should diplomatic relations improve at some point in the future. If, however, improvements in the relationship are not seen in the short-term it is also possible that the Japanese public’s antipathy towards China will harden in the long-term. A Pew GAP question asked over the course of many years shows that while a near majority of Japanese still see China as neither a partner nor an enemy, over time this sentiment is indeed hardening. In the latest iteration of the survey, 40 percent of respondents went as far as identifying China as an enemy (Figure 5.61). These sentiments were generally shared evenly throughout the three generational cohorts. China is gradually being perceived as a more inherently antagonistic foreign policy actor that is a strategic peer competitor and perhaps even an existential threat to Japanese security. It is unclear how long the Japanese public will favour a more moderate strategic approach to the PRC if relations do not improve soon.

Figure 5.60: Which is more important: The US or Chinese political relationship/The US or Chinese Economic Relationship? (Yomiuri Shimbun US-Japan Relationship Survey 2007-2013)
5.4: Japan as a Peace Nation

Based on the above analysis, there are some indications that Japan’s traditional antimilitarism detailed in Chapter Three is not as salient as it used to be among the Japanese public. There is solid support for maintaining the US alliance in its current form, there is strong support for the SDF to go overseas on non-combat humanitarian missions, and there is support for SDF activities that were avoided in the past due to the possibility for overlapping with collective self-defence. Japan has a robust even if defensive-orientated military which the public supports at the current level of strength and does not desire to see it weakened. The Japanese public also has an increasingly favourable view of the SDF and currently sees it as one of the most trusted societal institutions (Mochizuki 2004: 110; Vosse 2014: 14; Samuels 2013: 92-93). Almost two-thirds (64.4 percent) of the public supported the establishment of Japan’s National Security Council in 2013 to coordinate the response of Japan’s civilian and uniformed security institutions to contingencies, with only 10.6 percent opposed (Jiji Press 2013).

The above analysis does show that certain military restraints remain nevertheless important for the general Japanese public, including for the Heisei cohort. In terms of identifying with these military restraints, surveys coveted in this study show that Japanese overwhelmingly value Article 9 as something that has kept Japan safe and peaceful, and such sentiment has not decreased over the last decade and a half since normal nationalists gained influence in Japanese politics (Table 5.22). Overall it appears that the Japanese still sceptical about
taking a proactive military-orientated approach to managing Japan’s security environment. For example, a December 2010 Asahi Survey taken subsequent to the first Senkaku Islands dispute between Japan and the PRC revealed that, despite the tensions, only 22 percent of respondents thought that military dimensions of Japan’s national security policy were more important than non-military dimensions, while 64 percent said that diplomatic and economic non-military dimensions were more important (Journalism 2011b). The 2014 NHK Sense of Peace Survey also asked respondents what they thought the best method for guaranteeing Japan’s peace was more broadly. Only 9 percent of respondents identified deterrence based on force, while 53 percent of respondents identified diplomacy not reliant on force as the best method. A further 26 percent indicated that non-government economic and cultural exchanges were the best method for securing peace (NHK 2014a). In a similar fashion, the Japanese public still seems to reject the expansion of the export of Japanese made arms either as an economic opportunity or as a conscious part of Japan’s security policy by assisting other nations to build up their military strength (Figure 5.62).

There was very little detectable generational change in response to these questions. The question on the importance of military versus non-military dimensions did reveal that the Heisei cohort thought that non-military dimensions were more important by 9 and 14 percentage points respectively compared to the antimilitarist peak and postwar cohorts (Table 5.23). Table 5.24 also shows that the Heisei cohort appears to be more proud of Japan due to Article 9 as a whole by 7 percentage and 11 percentage points respectively when compared to the antimilitarist peak and postwar cohorts. All generational cohorts of the Japanese public are ultimately attached to Article 9 as an important element of Japan’s identity. Furthermore, they do not see it or other restrictions on Japan’s security policy as burdens but as valuable and practical contributors to keeping Japan safe in the tense geopolitical region it inhabits, alongside a modest but defensive deterrence orientated military posture and alliance relationship.
### Table 5.22: The Value of Article 9

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Survey</th>
<th>Option</th>
<th>Result (%)</th>
<th>Option</th>
<th>Result (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NHK (2002)</td>
<td>Article 9 is valuable for Japan’s peace and security</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>Not so valuable</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOFA (2002)</td>
<td>Article 9 is a reason for Japan enjoying peace and security</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>The US-Japan alliance is a reason for Japan enjoying peace and security</td>
<td>51(^\text{59})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asahi (2004)</td>
<td>Article 9 has been valuable for Japan enjoying peace and prosperity</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>Not so valuable</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asahi (2007)</td>
<td>Article 9 has been valuable for Japan enjoying peace without war over the last 60 years</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>Has not been valuable</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asahi (2007)</td>
<td>Article 9 has contributed to the peace and stability of East Asia</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>Has not contributed</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NHK (2007)</td>
<td>Positively evaluate Article 9</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>Don’t evaluate it positively</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NHK (2007)</td>
<td>Article 9 is essential for creating world peace or is a brake on the use of force overseas and rapid increases in defence spending</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>Article 9 is a barrier to effective diplomacy or is out of touch with reality</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asahi (2010)</td>
<td>Article 9 will continue to be valuable in the future for keeping peace in Japan and stability in Asia</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>Will not be so valuable</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asahi (2010)</td>
<td>The peace constitution a reason to be proud of Japan</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>Not a reason to be proud</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asahi (2012)</td>
<td>Article 9 will continue to be valuable in the future for keeping peace in Japan and stability in Asia</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>Will not be so valuable</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NHK (2013)</td>
<td>Positively evaluate Article 9</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>Don’t evaluate it positively</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

[Continued on the next page]

\(^{59}\) Five other options were given as options for why Japan has been able to enjoy peace and security, but all rated under fifty percent. These included: the three non-nuclear principles (46 percent), cooperation with the United Nations (20 percent), economic cooperation (18 percent), diplomatic exchange with other nations (16 percent), and the existence of the SDF (12 percent).
Figure 5.62: Attitudes towards relaxation of Japan’s arms restrictions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Pro</th>
<th>Against</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Asahi (2013)</td>
<td>The current constitution is responsible for the Japanese people believing the collective illusion that absolute peace is possible</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>67</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asahi (2014)</td>
<td>Because Japan has Article 9, the 3NNP and restrictions on arms exports, this has prevented military aspects becoming too strong in Japan.</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>25</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NHK (2014)</td>
<td>Positively evaluate the post-war role of Article 9’s resolution to renounce war and Japan holding war potential</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>16</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5.23: What is the more important dimension of Japan’s national security, military dimensions or economic/diplomatic non-military security dimensions? (Asahi Shimbun 2010)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Military Dimensions</th>
<th>Non-Military Dimensions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Heisei</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Antimilitarist Peak</td>
<td>23.5</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Postwar</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 5.24: Is the peace constitution a reason to be proud of Japan? (Asahi Shimbun 2010)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Proud</th>
<th>Not particularly proud</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Heisei</td>
<td>73.5</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Antimilitarist Peak</td>
<td>66.5</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Postwar</td>
<td>62.5</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>67</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Conclusion**

There are two conclusions that can be drawn from the analysis conducted in this chapter. First, as a whole, the Japanese public does not appear to have embraced a militant internationalist security identity. While there may be increased comfort with the US-Japan alliance status quo and there is support for the SDF performing certain humanitarian roles abroad and defence roles at home, traditional antimilitarism has not necessarily been replaced by an aggressive militant internationalist outlook on security and foreign policy issues. The attitudes towards security of the broader Japanese public do not appear to be driving security policy ‘normalisation’ and rapid remilitarisation in Japan, as alluded to by some commentators (discussed in Chapter Four). Rather, if public opinion is an indication, residual elements of the antimilitarist security identity will continue to act as constraints on the implementation of more militarily proactive security policy.

Second, the indicators analysed above show little notable generational variation. It was difficult to find any indicators that suggested that the youngest cohort was significantly more open to militant internationalist outlook on security issues, even in a narrow statistical sense. This is irrespective of whether focus is placed on attitudes towards power projection, towards the alliance with the United States, or attitudes relating to defence and strategic posturing towards China. Where there were differences, the Heisei cohort was actually slightly less supportive of embracing military security tools to solve pressing security problems in comparison with either the antimilitarist peak cohort or the postwar cohort, or in comparison with both. Contrary to the expectations of some observers and commentators identified in Chapter Four, a residual antimilitarist sentiment among the younger generation is still apparent and may work against a more militant internationalist security identity among the public being embraced in the short- to medium-term.
As noted in Chapter Two, however, establishing the orientation of public opinion to security issues is only the first half of answering the question regarding the impact of generational change in Japan, albeit a very important part. Elite opinions, attitudes, and identities, also play a significant role in framing security policy choices and narratives, as well as influencing the security policy debate through their own power and influence. The next three chapters reflect upon the findings from interviews undertaken in Japan with current and potential future Japanese elite opinion leaders. These interviews will provide insights into attitudes towards security policy and whether there is support for a more aggressive security policy and the presence of a more militant internationalist security identity among the future Japanese elite. Where elite and public opinion are in accordance with each other, such analysis will also allow for the deeper understanding of some of the quantitative public opinion baseline data identified in this chapter.
CHAPTER SIX: POWER PROJECTION

Chapter Six articulates the distinctive themes and narratives arising from the analysis of interviews that relate specifically to the activities of the SDF overseas and the projection of military power beyond Japan’s immediate defensive perimeter. The overseas power projection component of militant internationalism is probably the central component and the most direct indicator of the likelihood that militant internationalist attitudes are being embraced. The previous chapter demonstrated that the general Japanese public, including the Heisei generational cohort, was still very sceptical about overseas power projection activities focused on combat and coercive territorial intervention. As this chapter shows, there is notable overlap between public attitudes and the attitudes of the Heisei elite sample interviewed as part of this study. The chapter is structured around three main themes that arose from the directed content analysis described in Chapter One. These themes are: hesitancy about embracing a proactive military identity for Japan; a strong desire for the SDF organisation to maintain an identity that does not engage in combat overseas; and a tendency to emphasise non-military contributions to international peace and stability as a priority when talking about Japan’s responsibilities to upholding regional and global security. Each theme is discussed in greater depth and whether it aligns with evidence and arguments present in the research literature on Japanese foreign policy. Such contextualisation of the findings will provide valuable insights that will be used in the concluding chapter to discuss the content of an evolved peace nation identity in Japan.

6.1: Hesitancy about a Military Identity

While many interview questions touched upon the broader theme of Japanese military strength, one question focused directly on attitudes toward the idea that maintaining military power should be an important part of Japan’s security identity and the way it presents itself to the outside world. The question was contextualised by reference to Sino-Japanese security tensions, which arose suddenly after a diplomatic dispute in September 2010 when the Japanese government arrested a Chinese fishing boat captain who struck a Japan Coast Guard vessel around the Senkaku Islands. This context was given to prompt interviewees to think about the situation where Japan is most likely to use force against another state. The researcher then posed the question: Is it necessary for Japan to be recognised and respected internationally as a country with significant military power? This question would elicit responses which would bring out the preferred type of military capabilities that Japan should possess, if any, and how they should be leveraged against
other countries. If a desire for a greater power projection-orientated identity, justified on
the basis of a realpolitik-orientated worldview, was present, then this would be evidence of
an elite shift in Japan’s traditional defensive-orientated security identity and a potential sign
of a militant internationalist orientation becoming a factor in the thinking of the Heisei elite
cohort.

A Military Identity for Japan?

In response to this question, thirty-two interviewees, about three-fifths of the sample, made
direct references to the importance of Japan emphasising that it had military potential. Out
of these responses, two main narratives can be discerned. By far the strongest narrative that
came through in the analysis of these thirty-two respondents’ transcripts was the
identification of the need for Japan to hold military capability as a form of defensive
deterrence to make it difficult for other nations to challenge Japanese territorial integrity.
Twenty-one respondents out of this group of thirty-two asserted that Japan needed to be
respected for having sufficient military power for defensive deterrence first and foremost.
Many interviewees saw the need for a fixed level of defensive capability to protect its
sovereign territory, but otherwise did not feel Japan needed to project significant amounts
of power overseas in order to compete militarily with surrounding states. One prominent
security analyst at a Japanese think tank summed up the sentiments of this group succinctly:

I think it is important [to be respected as a military power]. That is to say, it is not
the issue of Japan becoming a great military power, or competing with China to
gain parity, but to hold sufficient military power to ensure territorial integrity
(Interview with author, Tokyo, October 2011).

A Japanese member of parliament likewise agreed with the above sentiment:

[Yes, but,]…it depends on the meaning of “be respected as” – there is no need for
us to appear as if we are expanding outwards. Such a thing would inevitably be
painful to Japan. It is important to think about this kind of thing. Honestly, if you
look within current Japan, and the Japanese mentality, there is no sense of
expansionism. […]We really do have a ’self-defence force’ (Interview with author,
Tokyo, December 2011).

One of the more hawkish members of parliament interviewed also added a provision:
Ah, it is very difficult for me to say which is more important [to be seen as militarily strong versus not] – they are both very important for Japan. It is very important for other countries to not see Japan as a threat through its military capabilities, however (Interview with author, Tokyo, December 2011).

A freelance defence journalist identified the issue of trying to walk a fine line between defensive and offensive capabilities in strengthening Japan’s military power:

I think we should increase our defence, but there is some limit. I don’t think we have enough money to have a navy like the US or British Royal Navy which are both independently powerful. [...] we shouldn’t be a copy of China with its emphasis on aircraft carriers, and we don’t want to just be a small version of America’s navy…I don’t think it is appropriate for us to have an aircraft carrier, for example (Interview with author, Tokyo, December 2011).

Eleven respondents, on the other hand, suggested that Japan might need military capabilities exceeding simple self-defence to either be respected internationally or to engage in regional balance of power competition. Seven of these respondents directly alluded to the need for Japan to play a larger role in the maintenance of regional or global balance in addition to the emphasis on defensive deterrence. A US-educated author and former journalist, for example, argued that:

To some degree it is important to be recognised as a country that has military power. To be sure, I don’t think we should have power to the point of having nuclear weapons. Rather, due to China’s military expansion the military balance of power is being undermined in the region. Japan cannot rely on just the United States to assure military balance. That is not to say that Japan should go out of its way to make China an enemy, rather it should strengthen itself as a way of hedging against risk (Interview with author, Tokyo, October 2011).

An academic with close ties to the self-defence forces noted Japan’s balance of power responsibility:

For the purposes of deterring China’s illegal naval activities, it is important for us to have the awareness of the need for holding military potential. If not, then deterrence will wilt…it is Japan’s responsibility to balance against China given the
worries of the US and other countries in the Asian region about China (Interview with author, Tokyo, December 2011).

A former US think tank fellow also argued in response to the question that Japan should be wary of the regional balance of power:

Yes…but the current system with the US is the ideal way of matching China. As US commitment may reduce over time, we should be ready to take up any slack should this situation occur (Interview with author, Tokyo, September 2011).

In terms of traditional international relations theory, these respondents’ attitudes could be categorised as approximating the neo-realist tradition with its focus on power projection capabilities to check and balance against other international great powers (Waltz 1979: 118-121; Taliaferro 2001: 129, 135). This requires a consistent sensitivity to the military capabilities and activities of other nations, and also a willingness to engage in military balancing in conditions of international anarchy (see Kirshner (2012: 60-61) and Taliaferro (2001) for in-depth discussion of the tenets of types of realism and expected state behaviour). This is an influential school of thought within both American academic institutions and US policymaking circles (Le 2004: 73-80). Only two interviewees, however, directly specified the need for Japan to have offensive military potential. This suggests that there is only very weak support for the more offensive power projection dimensions that characterise militant internationalism, and sensitivity to Waltzian balance of power considerations over and above territorial defence do not appear to be dominant in terms of thinking about Japan’s military identity (Waltz 1979: 118-121).

Such insights ultimately confirm the assertions made by Midford (2011: 2, 19-20) and Cha (2003: 5-6) that offensive realist attitudes based on significant power projection are not an important part of the Japanese security discourse, and Japan’s security orientation more closely approximates defensive realism. Defensive realist attitudes allow states to pursue moderate defence and military strategies “that communicate restraint” (Taliaferro 2001: 129), which in turn should help mitigate the influence of classical security dilemmas in structuring the foreign and security policy discourse. Ultimately, with no more than one-fifth of interviewees expressing support for more aggressive security policies, the above findings suggest that the Heisei elite cohort holds attitudes about broader military power projection that overlaps strongly with the hesitant attitudes of the general public towards the overseas projection of military power described in Chapter Five.
Rejection of a Military Identity for Japan

Just over two-fifths (25%) of interviewees, however, rejected the idea that military power should be explicitly emphasised as a part of Japan’s foreign policy and international identity, even if they recognised that a basic level of military preparedness was necessary. Of this group, sixteen spontaneously asserted an alternative non-military identity for Japan. These respondents affirmed a view that Japan was a peaceful nation that was economically or technologically influential and that Japan’s non-military strengths should be emphasised in international diplomacy. Such an identity was not only raised in response to this question, but in response to many other questions as detailed in sections 6.2 and 6.3 below. One worker at an overseas NGO in a developing nation was unwilling to buy into the idea that Japan’s immediate security concerns required a more robust military build-up:

Personally, I think how it is now is just fine. Yes, the DPRK and the Taepodong is a worry…but I don’t necessary think that we should greatly increase our defence strength. Japan lost in the war and embraced pacifism, become economically strong, and we gained international respect because of this. Even from developing nations. We don’t invade other nations like the United States does (Interview with author, Osaka, December 2011).

A Japanese foreign policy researcher similarly argued:

I think Japan has been respected internationally for its peace constitution. More than trying to become a normal nation with a normal military, I think it is important for Japan to emphasise the message globally that it will not go to war. This is more aspirational and effective for peace – Japan being abnormal, so to speak, is a good thing (Interview with author, Tokyo, September 2011).

One leading member of an organisation for young, aspiring politicians argued that elements of pacifism were still deeply engrained in Japanese culture:

Even more than foreigners think we do, Japanese actually do conceive of our identity as a peace nation. We don’t like the idea of taking up arms for war and going to other countries and thinking we are strong...we actually don’t think it is attractive and we don’t feel we need that kind of respect…there is more resistance in Japan to using weapons than most [foreign] people think (Interview with author, Tokyo, November 2011).
Other respondents emphasised the importance of the status quo, where Japan would hold some degree of defensive military power, collaborate with the United States, and forge constructive relations with other nations in the area. One influential security analyst in Japan noted:

> For Japan, I don’t think it is important to put military power at the front of its diplomacy and security…I don’t think that is possible. Of course to a minimal level it is important to have a military, but based on the alliance with the US, and cooperation with other nations such as India, Korea, Australia and ASEAN nations, then if we cooperate then we do not need to become a military power (Interview with author, Tokyo, October 2011).

Important to note, however, is that no interviewees explicitly rejected the idea that Japan should have military power and no more than three interviewees argued that Japan should spend less on defence. Almost all interviewees appeared comfortable with current levels of defence spending and strength and indicated an understanding of the need to adapt Japan’s security policy given maritime insecurity around Japan. Negative attitudes towards the SDF as an organisation were non-existent. This suggests that the Heisei elite cohort has indeed moved beyond the traditional antimilitarist outlook described in Chapter Three, where Japan essentially ‘contained’ and circumscribed the roles and the activities of the SDF very narrowly, even for national defence. This is in line with Hikotani’s argument that there has been a transition from the strong ‘antimilitarist’ attitudes of the past based on “restrictive control” to attitudes based on a sense of “positive control” (Hikotani 2005: 6). Restrictive control is characterised by the widespread desire for Japanese society to be “protected from” rather than “protected by” the SDF, and a reluctance to make the SDF a central part of its security strategy. Hikotani argues that contemporary attitudes towards the SDF are more in line with the concept of “positive control,” where civilian elites are confident in their ability to use the SDF for defending the nation, and the public does not fear losing control over the military (2005: 6). In other words, the loosening of some of the traditional “brakes” on the SDF (detailed more fully in Chapter Three) is a function of greater trust in the SDF by the Japanese public as well as within the political elite class. There is greater comfort and even a general expectation for the SDF to play an important role in defensive deterrence and defending the nation (Hikotani 2009: 22-26).
While there is greater acceptance of the SDF and its deterrence by denial role, there was very little detectable support, however, for imbuing the SDF with an identity as a ‘normal’ military that can go to war overseas. The Heisei elite cohort appears to accept that the SDF has to play an active defensive deterrence role, and, in a worst case contingency, may have to engage in combat within its defensive perimeter. As the next section shows, there is also a strong hesitancy towards the use of force and combat beyond Japan’s defensive perimeter even when the government does send the SDF overseas.

6.2: Preference for SDF Maintaining a Non-Combat Identity Overseas

A further set of questions focused on hypothetical situations that might involve the SDF using weapons or engaging in overseas combat. A set of three consecutive questions was designed to give interviewees the opportunity to articulate their ideas about the desirability of the SDF engaging in humanitarian missions overseas, and the degree to which they were comfortable with the SDF using force in aid of humanitarian goals. A strong indication of support for using force in aid of humanitarian goals would be an interesting insight as the SDF engaging in combat operations of any kind could potentially function as a bridge to a more militant internationalist security identity in the future by desensitising the Japanese public towards international combat activities. The first question on humanitarian intervention asked interviewees how they felt about the SDF using military force in order to protect other countries’ citizens under the banner of the United Nations. If required, the researcher would then ask what the interviewees felt about humanitarian activities that would potentially include the SDF engaging in combat in response to a United Nations Security Council collective security resolution to prevent or stop a conflict that was harming citizens of other countries. An immediate and closely related follow up question inquired into interviewees’ thoughts regarding whether Japan should risk the lives of SDF members and project Japanese military power overseas to safeguard human rights.

When the response to these questions are analysed together, fifteen interviewees indicated that the SDF could play some kind of role in situations going beyond the more passive post-conflict UNPKO role. One analyst from a Japanese think tank was, however, the only interviewee to unequivocally argue that Japan had a clear international obligation to prevent genocide or protect human rights, even if it meant proactively using force:

Absolutely, yes. […] in situations where there is no government security apparatus and strong peoples or tribes are massacring weak ones, we should be able to stop
this. For example, with Rwanda you had genocide between the Hutu and Tutsi tribes. […] Obviously when intervening in such situations a reasonable amount of military power is required, and if necessary such military power may have to be used to kill people in order to restrain the genocide. In regards to the SDF, I think it is a perfectly natural activity for it to be able to use coercive force to protect the peace. It is a problem of principles. If Japan says that we alone cannot intervene [while others countries are] because we are a “peace loving” country, I don’t think this is anything other than hypocrisy (Interview with author, Tokyo, December 2011).

A government official reflected the opinion that Japan could not morally ignore the plight of other people overseas:

Yes, while it is the SDF, and therefore dedicated to Japan’s defence only, I don’t think [in modern times] we can take the attitude that we are only going to defend Japanese people (Interview with author, Tokyo, October 2011).

A well-known university lecturer on international relations echoed three other respondents in saying:

In general, I think it is obvious that we should protect human rights. However, […] we cannot bear the responsibility of every country’s issues, so we have to use national interest as a guide. In this sense we are not different from any other country (Interview with author, Tokyo, September 2011).

Others were not against the idea in principle, even if not enthusiastic. A senior manager at a large energy utility in Japan noted for example:

There are issues about spilling blood in war which makes this difficult….if it is part of a multinational military force, and if the understanding of the Japanese people is acquired and that they understand that the SDF will be acting in accordance with international rules, I think that perhaps we should be able to use force in this situation (Interview with author, Osaka, November 2011).

A significant majority (two-thirds) were sceptical, however, of going beyond the current situation in terms of Japan’s contribution to UNPKO and post-conflict peacebuilding activities, even if there was some support for relaxing the restrictions on the SDF’s use of weapons. Seventeen interviewees were quite specific in identifying and rejecting the
possibility of the SDF proactively engaging in combat overseas, while affirming the need for the SDF to use weapons within UNPKOs in some cases. One MP noted for example:

[…] well it depends on what you mean by the use of military force….if a SDF member is on a PKO mission and is in a potentially dangerous place where there might be terrorists, and if they can only use a pistol after they have already been attacked, well you cannot properly carry out your duties. […] That said, in regards to other uses of military power, such as proactively sending [the SDF] to crush other governments and other militaries, I don’t think the SDF should participate in this kind of activity. I think we should just use weapons to the minimum degree we need to complete our UNPKO missions (Interview with author, Tokyo, December 2011).

A senior journalist at one of Japan’s major newspapers argued:

Well, on a case by case basis, perhaps it is acceptable. However, if one were to say that we should go to Afghanistan and engage in combat with Taliban, I disagree with this. It isn’t good to engage in full combat under the banner of “protecting” others; although basic policing and security activities are acceptable. Intervening in another country already in full-scale conflict is not a good thing, however (Interview with author, Tokyo, November 2011).

Approximately half of the interviewees, without being prompted, also expressed explicit doubts in response to this question as to the goals and intentions related to human-rights based interventions in particular. This was particularly true if combat, rather than post-conflict management, was involved. One mid-level supervisor at a semi-government agency noted:

This is a difficult question…we were taught at school that the SDF was just something that protects our own country. It wasn’t a military. So protecting other people from the point of view of Japan’s own morals is hard to think about. […] I am not against it…but we need to be concerned and cautious about the way the SDF interacts with other countries, and even then using military power should be a last resort (Interview with author, Tokyo, October 2011).

One Japanese diplomat, precisely reflecting the hesitation of a number of interviewees, argued:
I think it is important in PKO operations to be able to properly guarantee the lives and security of residents. But human rights are thought about in different ways in different countries, so we need to be cautious when trying to change the situation relating to values. […] I am not sure therefore if trying to impose European conceptions of human rights is without problems. I think the SDF should not be involved in missions specifically for the purpose of upholding human rights (Interview with author, Tokyo, October 2011).

A government MP with significant diplomatic experience contested the idea of human rights-based justification in noting:

There are various cases where the protection of human rights is an excuse for protecting something else. Depending on the case, protecting human rights can be about defending somebody’s specific interests. I am sure you know about Japan’s history, […] we used various justifications. It is not necessarily the case that developing nations will be thankful for developed nations coming in on the basis of human rights justifications. Of course I understand the feeling of wanting to protect people’s human rights, but given world history, I think there is a need to be careful about justifications based on ‘beautiful words’ (Interview with author, Tokyo, December 2011).

Additionally, fifteen respondents were simply unmoved by human rights-related rationales that would involve the SDF projecting power, risking their lives, and potentially using weapons overseas. A sceptical Japanese NGO worker (sarcastically) expressed the feelings of a number of these respondents regarding the difference between US and Japanese approaches to the management of international relations, humanitarian intervention, and the use of force:

Isn’t it better for the US to do this? I don’t think Japan should intervene in ways like this (Interview with author, Osaka, November 2011).

Overall, there was some indication of lukewarm support for increased flexibility to use weapons within UNPKOs, although this was not always decisive with many respondents saying their support would be on a case by case basis. The possibility of the SDF proactively engaging in direct combat in an already unfolding conflict situation was, however, soundly rejected. There was a much stronger acceptance for the SDF to be
involved in post-conflict scenarios rather than in combat scenarios in order to protect overseas citizens, prevent genocide, and defend human rights.

When it came to the promotion and protection of democracy through military force, the result was considerably more decisive. The Heisei elite interviewed for this study resoundingly rejected any justification for connecting the use of force overseas to the protection, preservation, or promotion of democracy or any other ideological agenda as an important foreign policy value. Only seven respondents were even moderately open to the SDF being used in missions with goals and justifications based on defence (or promotion) of democracy. A former journalist and manager in a multinational corporation came closest to connecting security and democracy overseas by saying:

> We have entrusted ourselves [Japan] in a democratic world, and because of this we trade, and communicate with people, and exchange information, and we should have a stronger recognition [of this interconnectedness]. […] we should be very clear that the essential base of modern Japan is that it is a democratic and liberal one. To some degree there is a necessity to fight to protect the kind of world we live in (Interview with author, Tokyo, September 2011).

Out of the fifty-one respondents who were asked this question on democracy, forty-four indicated strong reservations or even outright hostility towards the idea that democracy was a relevant consideration for intervening in other countries’ affairs. A member of the SDF itself noted:

> I do not think it is acceptable. As a reason, compared to severe human rights dangers, the concept of assisting democracy [through the use of force] is more difficult to comprehend. It is difficult to evaluate the reasoning [for intervention] (Interview with author, Tokyo, October 2011).

Along with others, a free-lance defence journalist noted that far from enhancing Japan’s standing in the world, careless engagement in humanitarian endeavours would hurt Japan’s international reputation:

> Right now the SDF does not have the military potential to be involved in the Middle East or the Gulf and I don’t think it should be. That will ruin Japan’s soft power. […] We could gain the ability if we needed to, but I don’t think that is such a good idea (Interview with author, Tokyo, December 2011).
A political lobbyist and former government official likewise noted this inconsistency in the specific context of the Iraq War and Middle East interventions, which was spontaneously raised by other respondents as the most problematic expression of the use of force overseas:

In regards to democracy, when the US attacked Iraq, they said it was about democracy. [...] There are various countries facing difficulties in this sense...so why bring democracy to the Middle East and Iraq but not to Africa? Protecting democracy was all rhetoric...depending on for whose purposes, and for each person, the definition of democracy is vague (Interview with author, Tokyo, October 2011).

The scholar and think tank professional quoted above who enthusiastically supported intervening in situations relating to genocide had a very different attitude to the idea of supporting democracy through force:

If we are talking about killing for democracy, well the Japanese people and I are generally not committed to this. [...] for myself, and for many Japanese, compared to the US, if we were asked which is preferable, democracy or stability, then I think we would go for stability first. If we place importance on democracy but it all falls to pieces, well, what is the point? (Interview with author, Tokyo, December 2011)

Analysing the discussions about humanitarian intervention and collective self-defence (discussed in Chapter Seven) together, the sample overall seemed unconvinced about the need for the SDF to engage in outright combat, whether for national security reasons or for humanitarian-based reasons. A broader analysis of all responses to all questions did, however, reveal that forty-six interviewees clearly identified Japan having some kind of international responsibility to dispatch the SDF for either the purposes of UNPKOs specifically, or for peace cooperation activities and humanitarian relief in general. This suggests a clear preference to avoid combat and instead focus on pre- and post-conflict scenarios as has been the case with Japan’s UNPKO participation up until now. There appears to be a narrative which strongly delineates between the SDF taking on a role in protecting others in situations where there is not a strong expectation of armed conflict and battle in the first place, and the idea that an international humanitarian mandate is an acceptable basis for Japan engaging in a wider range of violent military activities. One MP succinctly alluded to this difference:
To the degree that there is not an on-going conflict, Japan should proactively assist nations and regions that are in trouble. I think it is important for us to work up a sweat in order to help other nations. Japan needs to avoid being self-absorbed and support international peacekeeping operations. We can therefore become a peace-creating nation (Interview with author, Tokyo, December 2011).

One political analyst working in a foreign embassy of a European country in Tokyo also explicitly delineated a line between different types of UN activities:

In regards to the dispatch [of engineers] to South Sudan, it is necessary for Japan to properly protect its own people if necessary [with weapons]. In terms of general principles, and going to other countries to use weapons to protect their security, or proactively engaging in PKO activities which directly involve combat activities, as a personal opinion, I don’t think Japan should do this kind of thing (Interview with author, Tokyo, November 2011).

A mid-level supervisor at an agency involved in Japan’s development work emphasised the importance of a HADR role for the SDF and connected it to ‘defence’ in non-traditional terms:

Well military power and self-defence power for me are different. I don’t think of the SDF as a military. At the time of the latest earthquake, the SDF were able to show one kind of power by quickly responding and gathering in Iwate and Fukushima [to help people in trouble]. After the earthquake, everyone felt that the SDF was here to defend Japan and well felt a desire to support them. I felt that, because of this, maybe we should be showing the world Japan’s SDF…but in a way that is a bit different from a “military” [guntai] (Interview with author, Tokyo, October 2011).

**A Non-combat Overseas Identity for the SDF**

While the sample appeared overwhelmingly supportive of the continuation of SDF contributions to UNPKOs in post-conflict situations, interviewees raised a number of questions about forceful military interventions. Similar to the public cohort analysed in Chapter Five, most respondents indicated that they had a strong preference for Japan and its SDF in particular to make international contributions to stability and peace through less violent means. Such opinions are consistent with a subset of the literature on Japan’s
security policy evolution which has emphasised the creation of new norms regarding Japan’s international contribution since the SDF’s first overseas missions in the 1990s. The insights also suggest that worries about Japan embracing the SDF as a normal military through the acceptance of overseas combat (Zisk 2001: 23), and the “crumbling away of pacifism” (Hagström and Williamson 2009: 244) due to SDF overseas dispatch, were not well founded.

For example, Yeo points to the fact that Japan’s UNPKO contribution since the SDF’s first dispatch to Cambodia in 1992 has maintained a focus on a strictly circumscribed range of ‘humanitarian’ activities, such as engineering, construction, and medical activities, rather than more forceful and coercive activities (Yeo 2013: 74; see also Itoh 1995: 286). Such missions over time became sufficiently popular that “non-combatant foreign dispatch,” which includes UNPKOs, disaster relief, and other peacebuilding activities, was upgraded to a “primary duty” (honrai ninmu) of the SDF alongside territorial defence at about the time the Japan Defence Agency was upgraded to the Ministry of Defence (Yeo 2013: 74; Williams 2006: 404). Wary of public sentiment, political and policymaking elites have increasingly connected these non-combat military missions to Japan’s international responsibilities in an age of globalisation and the rise of non-traditional security issues (Singh and Shetler-Jones 2011) while being cautious about widening the range of activities the SDF can participate in (Midford 2011: 33). Hook and Son note that ultimately “Japan’s routine choice of non-combat troops on international humanitarian missions clearly demonstrates the normative preference in dispatching the SDF, despite US pressure on Japan as an ally to dispatch combat soldiers” (2013: 39). Japan’s participation in UNPKOs, peacebuilding activities, and humanitarian disaster relief overseas has therefore created a new identity for the SDF that does not conceptualise it as a ‘normal’ military force (Hook and Son 2013: 47; Yeo 2013: 72).

The non-fighting nature of the SDF was also asserted by a majority of interviewees who felt that the SDF is not psychologically geared to engaging in combat overseas like other ‘normal’ militaries. This insight is supported by a survey undertaken by Hikotani Takako (2006) with 900 SDF officers themselves. Hikotani found that SDF officers had a much lower tolerance for the idea of deaths suffered during regional contingencies close to Japan when compared to similar surveys undertaken with United States officers. For example, 50 percent of SDF officers responded that “less than 100 deaths are acceptable” in a contingency taking place around Japan, which arguably could impact upon homeland
security, while 83 percent of US officers responded that 500 or more deaths were acceptable in the specific case of defending South Korea, and 52 percent cited the same figure for defending Taiwan. This was despite both South Korea and Taiwan both being geographically much further away from the US compared to Japan and not directly connected to US homeland security (Hikotani 2009: 26). This conforms to the traditionally risk-adverse nature of the SDF itself where military elites have often been more cautious than even civilian elites in terms of the dispatch of the SDF overseas and the dangers they may face. For example, the GSDF opposed government plans to deploy to Afghanistan in 2001 due to concerns about the danger presented (Miyagi 2009: 356), and in 2006 the Japan Defence Agency requested the immediate withdrawal of the SDF from Iraq for the same reason, only to be overruled by the Koizumi government who had prioritised relations with the US (Ishizuka 2006: 18).

Nevertheless, the above attitudes conform to Richard Samuels’ most recent argument that the SDF is no longer seen as a threatening institution in Japanese society and thus no longer a focus of negative antimilitarist sentiment (Samuels 2013: 81-84). In fact, it is now expected to contribute to Japan’s national defence as well as make humanitarian contributions overseas as well as at home. The SDF’s identity has remained, however, circumscribed in terms of the expected activities it should engage in overseas. The analysis undertaken by Yeo of MOD and SDF public relations materials shows that, rather than emphasising homeland defence and other possible missions, a majority of this material “depicts non-combatant and strictly defensive activities that are humanitarian/aid, and UNPKO or “world peace” orientated” (Yeo 2013: 77). Zisk argues that the SDF is increasingly being seen as a “safe” career and that the defence ministry's success in promoting this identity has meant relatively “few in Japan associate military duty with danger,” and that if the SDF did suffer casualties on a UN mission or were forced to use weapons on another country’s citizens, then this would “certainly threaten JDA’s recruitment and publicity efforts” (2001: 32). Samuels notes that there was also a strong narrative arising from the wake of 3.11 where the SDF’s non-combat and humanitarian responsibilities were emphasised as its true value to the nation (2013: 86). There still seems to be some distance between the SDF’s currently conceptualised identity in Japan and that of it being a normal military.
6.3: Prioritisation of Non-military International Contributions to Peace and Security

While the SDF may now be widely recognised as an important part of Japan’s international contribution, contrary to attitudes during the antimilitarist peak period, it is also important to note that Japan’s international contribution to security and stability is imagined in a far broader manner than simply being a SDF-orientated one. This section deepens this insight and looks at how the SDF is seen as only one tool among many for Japan to achieve its strategic security goals as well as fulfil its international responsibilities. Specifically, it analyses whether interviewees conceptualised Japan’s contribution towards international society in military-orientated terms rather than the “civilian” orientated terms it had up until the end of the Cold War (George 1993: 575).

Japan’s International Contribution

The interviewees were initially asked how they would feel if they heard the phrase, “Japan needs to make a greater international contribution.” This question was followed, if necessary, by the researcher urging the interviewees to consider what kind of international contribution Japan should make to international security, peace, and stability. The reason for asking this question can be understood by reference to the much debated concept of ‘international contribution’ (kokusai kōken) in Japan. Originally conceptualised in explicitly non-military terms as a way that Japan could contribute to international stability, a number of politicians and policymakers in Japan from the 1990s associated the concept of kokusai kōken with more military- and security-orientated international contributions, such as the need to dispatch the SDF on UN missions (Satake 2011: 102; George 1993: 564, 568; Singh 2011: 430-431; Yasui 2010: 131). In the 2000s, pro-US politicians, like former Prime Minister Koizumi Junichirō and current Prime Minister Abe Shinzō (Okuda 2009; Sugawa 2000), attempted to transform the concept by associating Japan’s international contribution with the need for Japan to support the US-supported global security order and regional alliance system (Satake 2011: 108; Hughes 2004: 368-369; Singh and Shetler-Jones 2011). US policymakers and analysts from time to time have also articulated the need for Japan to make a more significant international contribution in a military sense (Asher 2011: 112-115; Armitage and Nye 2000; Pyle 2012), particularly after the Gulf War in 1990/1991 (Miyaoka 2011: 245).
This question, therefore, effectively functioned as a test to see how successful conservative political forces have been in shifting the consciousness of younger Japanese regarding international contributions from a non-military to a military orientation. This question was asked closer to the end of the interview, and despite prior questions focusing on SDF activities, thereby potentially priming the respondents to see Japan’s overseas contribution in military terms, half of the interviewees straightforwardly ignored the military dimension and went straight into discussing the non-military dimension of Japan’s international contribution. Most of these respondents identified the need for Japan to continue its current economic, technological and diplomatic cooperation with various countries. For example, an overseas salesperson for one of Japan’s largest infrastructure firms noted:

I think this is correct [that Japan should make a greater international contribution]. In the economic and business fields we should be doing as much as possible. I think in terms of technological cooperation, for example between Japan and China, this could be a very good thing and help with the integration of regional business networks (Interview with author, Osaka, November 2011).

An administrator working with a supplier of military equipment to the SDF noted:

I think we should put in some more effort. For example, we have so many NGOs, but different from other countries’ NGOs. These are NGOs where you do not get paid and they are therefore real volunteer organisations. […] I think the government should change this by spending some money on raising human resources that are able to make a contribution to international society (Interview with author, Yokohama, November 2011).

Half of the interviewees did, as expected, pick up on the nuance of international contribution referring to military activities. A majority of these respondents, however, addressed this association by rejecting the idea that the military dimension of Japan’s international contribution was particularly defining. One MP presciently identified the tension regarding the conceptualisation of Japan’s international contribution that motivated the researcher to ask the question:

In the general sense, I agree that we should put a lot of effort into international contribution. However, how much money we should give out, or military units should be deployed, that should be discussed in each case. It is not the case though
that we are not making a contribution, however […] Japanese do not know this, they think we are not doing much….there are however, of course, the peace-building efforts after wars, ODA, cultural contributions, etc. But when people speak of kokusai kōken, most of them are referring to military aspects, and they are trying to imply that we are not doing much, I feel (Interview with author, Tokyo, December 2011).

Another MP similarly noted:

In terms of civilian contributions, I feel Japan is making an appropriate amount. If we include the ODA budget and the development of infrastructure for developing nations, medical assistance, and human resource cultivation, then we are doing quite a bit. If by contribution you meant American and NATO type of military activities, well yes, this is sometimes requested of Japan. Under the current rules we can only provide civilian assistance or rear area logistical support. If we don’t change the constitution, then we cannot make more than such a contribution. This is the answer we should give to this question (Interview with author, Tokyo, December 2011).

An official working for an organisation inside the wider UN umbrella organisation noted:

In terms of international cooperation, it shouldn’t just be about military power, but also in developing countries there is a need for business development, technology development, and there are various things we can do. We need to go beyond just doing things for our own country, or else we will become a sort of Galapagos (Interview with author, Yokohama, October 2011).

A top international negotiator for the Japanese government noted:

Well perhaps we do have to fill some gaps, but we need to be able to draw a clear line between what we can and cannot do. It’s the same as the UNPKO discussion before….we can’t go into combat but we can build bridges, build wells, build hospitals, and treat patients. But we don’t kill people. Even if the US says “show your flag,” I think it is quite fine to not send the military and fight together in combat. We should be content with Japan’s own particular way of making contributions (Interview with author, Tokyo, October 2011).
A leader of a group for young, aspiring politicians and policymakers identified the question’s deeper significance and offered their insight into the matter:

Average Japanese don’t conceptualise international contribution in terms of military. […] I am personally against the idea that Japan should imitate the US and the UK in terms of their conceptions of international contribution. It would be bad if we just followed along with this. We have sort of left diplomacy up to the United States since WWII and didn't really think about these things and we probably won’t until we get away from the US a little bit (Interview with author, Tokyo, October 2011).

A Japanese diplomat noted that Japan could even make a distinctive non-military contribution within the context of the dispatch of its SDF overseas:

Well there are various types of international contribution, and it is often said that “Japan should sweat a bit more, and not just contribute money, and actually should put people out [into the world].” But it isn’t just about the SDF, but also various types of experts, such as doctors and so forth. These people are included within our PKO units, so if someone said that we need to do more of this then I don’t think it would be so bad. If someone said for us to go beyond the PKO principles, I would feel differently. A general contribution is fine I feel (Interview with author, Tokyo, October 2011).

In total, around four-fifths of interviewees to this question directly identified Japan’s international contribution to be decisively non-military in nature, even if they accepted some limited need to dispatch the SDF for UNPKOs, disaster relief and other humanitarian purposes. Ultimately these narratives suggest that the Japanese public and elites continue to be reluctant to emphasise military power as an approach to making an international contribution. The interviewees, however, were not isolationist and were very supportive of Japan making increased contributions to regional and global stability and security.

6.4: The End of One-Country Pacifism

The above discussion suggests that military contributions are expected to be highly circumscribed and ultimately subordinated to non-military contributions to regional and global wellbeing in Japan’s foreign and security policies. Such insights strongly align with a common argument that Japan’s foreign policy since the 1970s has started to move on
from what was labelled by various Japanese elites as “one-country pacifism” (*ikkoku heiwa-shugi*) (Soeya 2005: 104-105; Takekawa 2007: 72; Akimoto 2012a: 8). One-country pacifism is a term that was often used to disparage the Japanese government’s postwar focus on Japan’s narrow economic interests while enjoying the international stability and open markets that other countries were upholding (Takekawa 2007: 70-71; Jameson 1998: 65-67; Miyaoka 2011: 249; Suzuki 1985). Since the late 1970s, however, a more consciously “proactive pacifism” began to form, with its focus on *mostly* non-military contributions, and it now shapes the Japanese government’s overall foreign and security policy approach (Soeya 2005: 104-105; Akimoto 2012b: 122-130).

The 1977 Fukuda Doctrine, for example, was one of Japan’s first proactive and independent postwar foreign policy initiatives (Yeo 2006: 260). The Japanese government and Prime Minister Fukuda Takeo explicitly committed to upholding peace in Southeast Asia, to strengthen the solidarity of the ASEAN organisation, and support the rebuilding of Indochina after the Vietnam War, all the while promising not to become a “military power” in terms of its influence in the region (Yano 1978: 60; Haddad 1980: 10). The regional acceptance of the Fukuda Doctrine, and “Japan's generally successful postwar security experience” through the Yoshida Doctrine (Akaha 1991: 325; Akaha 1995: 61), was followed by an attempt at forging an explicit Japanese strategy for proactive diplomatic engagement outside of the US-Japan alliance after the relative isolation of the antimilitarist peak period (Sato 2000: 14-15). To this end, a study group appointed by Prime Minister Ōhira Masayoshi in 1979 articulated the concept of “comprehensive security.” This concept refers to an understanding of security for the nation where military aspects of achieving national security are kept to a minimum (but not ignored as was arguably the case during the antimilitarist peak), while maximum use is made of non-military measures. Such an approach envisioned Japan making increased contributions to assist and stabilise surrounding countries whose own insecurity might impact upon Japan, under the assumption that “Japan's national security pursuits must not threaten the security of its neighbours” (Akaha 1991: 339).

In concrete terms, the new desire for proactive diplomatic engagement overseas led to the Japanese government extending more diverse forms of ODA overseas other than economic assistance for building industrial infrastructure. Such contributions included humanitarian aid to refugees and poverty assistance to areas identified as “those areas which are important to the maintenance of world peace and stability”; by 1989 Japan had become the
world’s largest ODA donor (Akaha 1991: 329-333; Akaha 1995: 64-65). In 1987, Japan also passed a bill that allowed the dispatch of disaster relief teams overseas (Sato 2000:14-15), and this organisation’s first mission came in 1990 in response to the Manjil-Rudbar earthquake that claimed forty thousand lives (Samuels 2013: 72). Japan also took on a significant diplomatic role in trying to solve the Cambodia issue which was a barrier to greater Mekong cooperation (Akimoto 2012b: 122-123).

Japan’s new strategy did, however, have some military content, thus beginning the challenge to Japan’s traditional antimilitarism. While Japan’s SDF contributions to UNPKO have generally been associated with the post-Cold War process of military ‘normalisation,’ discussion on the legitimacy of non-combat participation was actually raised on multiple occasions before the end of the Cold War, starting with then UN Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjold’s 1961 request for Japan’s participation in peace support operations. Against the background of Japan’s newly promulgated comprehensive security approach, discussions on SDF participation in UNPKOs were restarted in 1980 (Hynek 2012: 63), and again in 1988 (Takekawa 2007: 72-73). For the first time, Japan dispatched civilian personnel to a UNPKO (Ishizuka 2006: 5) in 1988, and in 1989 Japan became the third largest contributor to the UNPKO peacekeeping budget behind the US and the USSR (Akaha 1991: 328-329). Certainly the criticisms that Japan faced after the Gulf War regarding its conspicuous absence from the UN mission were the catalyst for Japanese politicians actually passing a PKO Law that authorised SDF dispatch overseas (Ishizuka 2006: 5-6; Zisk 2001: 26; Clausen 2013). The eventual dispatch of the SDF to Cambodia, with its focus on reconstruction rather than peace or truce enforcement, can nevertheless be seen as a logical evolution of Japan’s initial interest in the resolution of the Cambodia issue based on the commitments of the Fukuda Doctrine, and interest in peacekeeping based on its comprehensive security approach.

The debate regarding the need for “proactive pacifism” accelerated in the post-Cold War era, which led to the crystallization of the human security doctrine. This concept would be institutionalised by Japanese intellectuals and the Japanese government from the mid-1990s (Soeya 2005: 108-114). Building on the comprehensive security agenda, which “made economic insecurity and non-traditional security concerns important issues in their own right,” Japanese officials would also play a role in consolidating human security as an
important influence in Japan’s foreign policy (Edström 2011: 9-19, 39-40). The specific Japanese government understanding of the human security concept is predicated upon the idea that “under the impacts of globalisation, military and material capabilities do not necessarily enhance the security of states” (Kim 2010: 88). Japan was one of the pioneers of the concept at the international diplomatic level, strongly advocating for the “freedom from want” approach to understanding human security, which emphasised non-military assistance to societies and “the right of people to live in freedom and dignity, free from poverty and despair” (Tarnogórski 2013: 2; see also Edström 2011: 10). This is in contrast with the “freedom from fear” concept of human security initially advocated by Canada and Norway in the late-1990s, which focused on aspects of protection against violations of human rights and genocide. Many non-Western countries saw this approach as potentially justifying developed nation interventions in weaker countries by reference to humanitarian needs (Osei-Hwedie 2011: 100).

This concern about using human security as a justification for intervention was apparently seen sceptically by the Japanese government as well, which was particularly wary of the concerns of its Southeast Asian partners regarding the principle and the possibility for Western and/or Japanese intervention in their affairs, militarily or otherwise (Kim 2010: 91-92; Kurusu and Kersten 2011: 115-124). Japanese scepticism about these motivations also spilled over into the debate about the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) concept (Honna 2012: 96-97).

In addition to institutionalising the human security idea within Japan’s ODA provision (Kurusu and Kersten 2011: 117-120), the Japanese government has also made concrete steps in promoting peacebuilding initiatives in Aceh, Sri Lanka (Lam 2009a: 5, 105-108), East Timor (Kikkawa 2007), and Mindanao (Ferrer 2007), and an embryonic interest in assisting the Myanmar Government’s reconciliation with militias in minority areas (Nippon.com 2014). Peacebuilding refers to post-conflict activities that assist in creating a secure environment, and promote economic and social wellbeing with a long-term view to put in place sustainable democratic systems (Ishizuka 2006: 10-14). Applying the “freedom from want” human security framework to peacebuilding has allowed Japan to put “boots on the ground.” Instead of armed troops these will, however, be “engineers, doctors,

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60 For examples of the importance of the human security concept to high level Japanese officials, see Ogata and Sen (2003), Tarnogórski (2013), Soeya (2005: 108-110) and Adachi (2005).
agronomists, teachers and other experts in capacity building” (Honna 2012: 109), thereby allowing Japan to establish a diplomatic niche in “non-combat-related peacebuilding” (Lam 2009a: 4). The Japanese government has also confidently taken a leading role in UN Peacebuilding Commission (PBC), and has endorsed “integrated peacebuilding strategies (IPBS)” that merge SDF activities with non-military assistance by allowing the SDF to play a role in coordination with the non-military community “empowerment” agenda (Honna 2012: 105-106). This in turn has allowed the SDF, under the mantle of proactive pacifism, to win a “reputation as being a humanitarian assistance force, such as transportation and engineer units” (Ishizuka 2006: 17).

Hynek (2012: 66-67) notes that even within the peacebuilding framework, the participation of the SDF has gradually been marginalised by other ministries since the Koizumi’s administration’s original eagerness for the SDF to play a greater role in framing Japan’s international contribution. MOFA and the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) have essentially taken over the peacebuilding portfolio from the MOD and the SDF, and have asserted their own non-military vision of peacebuilding based on the human security norms that they have promoted through the United Nations. While Japan’s one-country pacifism has gradually weakened, it has not been replaced by a strong military-focused approach to making international contributions or stabilising Japan’s wider security environment. Rather, it has been replaced by a strategy which highly circumscribes the SDF’s activities and even then embeds these activities within a broader non-military, humanitarian orientated ‘peacebuilding’ approach.

**Conclusion**

The analysis of interviews in this chapter show that the SDF is seen as an important military organisation for national defence, and is expected to play a role in facilitating Japan’s international contribution. There is, however, little support among the Heisei elite sampled in this research for greater power projection capabilities, for a significant military build-up that would include the acquisition of offensive capabilities, or for the SDF to become a ‘normal’ military that has the ability to engage in combat overseas, whether combat be for national security or humanitarian reasons. Given a degree of convergence with public opinion, this suggests that there will be more continuity rather than change in Japan’s security policy when the Heisei elites come into positions of power. The Heisei elite cohort maintains a deliberately circumscribed understanding and scepticism regarding the
purposes towards which Japanese military power can be put to in global society. The
Japanese government is therefore likely to continue to be cautious about overseas SDF
activities other than in pre- and post-conflict situations or in disaster relief or other similar
type of humanitarian emergency (Kurusu and Kersten 2011: 116, 124-130; Honna 2012:
96-98, 103). The next chapter builds upon these insights by looking at the attitudes towards
Japan’s alliance partner, the United States, and Japan’s preferred relationship with the East
Asia region and international society.
CHAPTER SEVEN: THE GLOBAL ALLIANCE CONCEPT

This chapter looks at the commitment of the Heisei cohort to a global alliance with the United States centred on the cooperative use of force overseas. This chapter identifies three overall themes that stood out in the analysis of transcripts by reference to the concept of a global alliance. These are: the presence of a strong scepticism of US global foreign policy and military interventionism; reluctance to prioritise the US-Japan alliance as the singular core of Japan’s security policy, with a preference for the US-Japan alliance to sit alongside an ‘open’ approach to East Asia regionalism and multilateralism; and support for reciprocal defence relations with the US and various countries to the point of accepting some elements of collective self-defence. Among the sample there was more support for deepening the US alliance on the basis of its current focus on regional stability and defensive deterrence-orientated posture rather than widening it into a global alliance based on the cooperative use of force and shared combat overseas.

7.1: The United States, the United Nations, and the Use of Force

A number of interview questions touched upon issues relating to the US-Japan alliance and the appropriate degree of Japanese commitment to the alliance. One set of questions was framed within the context of Japan’s SDF gradually becoming increasingly integrated with United States Forces Japan. Interviewees were told that this would likely lead to US requests for military assistance overseas. One question asked interviewees whether they felt that Japan’s alliance partner, the United States, absolutely needed to gain United Nations Security Council (UNSC) approval before engaging in the use of force overseas. This question was followed up by another question asking respondents whether they felt Japan should cooperate with the US if it did not have UN approval. Only three interviewees hinted that it might be possible for Japan to cooperate with the US if it did not gain UN approval, although these answers were not decisive. On the other hand, forty-two respondents out of forty-five asked this question felt that it was important that the United States gain UNSC authorization for the use of force, with most of those respondents feeling that Japan should not cooperate with the United States in cases where it did not receive support. A worker at a semi-government organisation was most poignant when, in response to the question, only uttered with puzzled incredulity:

…hissu? […]absolutely essential?] (Interview with author, Tokyo, October 2011)

A Japanese university lecturer on international relations elaborated:
The UN is very important. In modern international society, legitimacy is very important in order to use military power and engage in military actions. If there are no legitimate reasons then it is not an action that the international society can accept (Interview with author, Tokyo, September 2011).

This question raised various issues and concerns among the respondents regarding US unilateralism and overall global policy. In terms of articulating their reservations, interviewees cited principles of legal legitimacy, the possibility of the breakdown of the international order, and the need to ensure proper ‘buy-in’ for post-conflict rebuilding. A majority of the interviewees were very critical, even angry, about the US interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq. In terms of legitimacy concerns, a journalist working for an upmarket Japanese current affairs magazine noted:

I think they must get permission… The US shouldn’t just work for its own national interest. As for Iraq, I thought there was no reason for us to go there…there was not anything that could be done (Interview with author, Tokyo, September 2011).

An official in a semi-governmental organisation who had worked on trade relations with North America noted:

Surely it is very important?...well up until now there hasn’t been anything good about the wars that the United States has fought…so I think it is essential to deliberate more thoroughly through the United Nations (Interview with author, Tokyo, October 2011).

An MP also noted that it was very important for the US to gain international acceptance. When asked about how they felt about the US’ approach to the UN in the case of Iraq specifically, they replied tautly:

It was ugly [literally: “not beautiful”] (Interview with author, Tokyo, October 2011)

In addition to legitimacy, others mentioned the importance of international ‘buy-in’ if the United States wanted to succeed in any overseas interventions. A leader of a Japanese religious organisation, who had been educated overseas, noted:

In the Iraq War and so forth, to the degree that the US didn’t get permission, it became the United States’ problem. It will get all of the criticism [when things go
wrong]. There is a need to work for international harmony…not just for one country’s interests (Interview with author, Kyoto, November 2011).

An academic with close ties to the SDF similarly noted:

Whether you have UN permission or not will matter a lot in terms of the burden you will have to bear. I think this is something that the US learned in regards to Iraq. It was easy to start the war, but in the end the ultimate cost became extremely large. I think this is really important. For Japan, getting permission is important. It all depends on this (Interview with author, Tokyo, December 2011).

In terms of ensuring proper buy-in, a member of a Japanese think-tank noted:

This is very important. Combat periods are getting shorter. But the rehabilitation afterwards [after combat] is five to ten years. Look at Iraq and Afghanistan. It is not good if just one country is involved in this process. You know, what will happen if the US pulls out of Afghanistan and Iraq? So there needs to be shared responsibility. If you don’t have international support then ultimately the war itself will not go well (Interview with author, Tokyo, December 2011).

There was a strong sense that while the United States was an ally of Japan, Japan should distance itself from the US in the case of unilateral uses of force. In fact, the responses suggested widespread distrust of the United States global policy was a major factor in Japanese thinking about security issues, similar to concern about US regional policy and military interventionism in East Asia up until the mid-1970s. A communications adviser at an asset management firm noted that UN approval:

[…] is essential. There should be UN consensus. We shouldn’t participate in anything if there is no UN permission. I think Japan should go along with the UN. That is, the US-Japan treaty consensus should not be more important than the UN consensus. Japan should be a bit more independent I feel. It is not clear to what extent the US will come to help Japan anyway [if we only concentrate on the alliance] (Interview with author, Tokyo, October 2011).

An official in an organisation affiliated to the United Nations noted that Japan should be wary of cooperating with the US if it goes around the United Nations:
[...] in terms of debating whether some country, the US or otherwise, should invade another country, it is weird if Japan attaches itself closely to a country that does not defend the general principles of international society at a time when the mood of international society is that gaining recognition [for the use of force] is important (Interview with author, Yokohama, October 2011).

A Japanese diplomat also noted:

For me personally, Iraq was completely mistaken. It seemed to me that as they were already in Afghanistan, they wanted in some way to use their military capabilities, so they decided that, while they were at it [they would attack Iraq]...and there were no weapons of mass destruction. I think it represented American high-handedness...they should support the UN framework (Interview with author, Tokyo, December 2011).

Overall, the response to this question was decisive in showing that the norm of UN-centred diplomacy (Yasui 2010: 16) is still alive and well both within the Japanese elite, even if political administrations in Japan vary in terms of how much emphasis they place on the United Nations versus commitments towards the US-Japan alliance. Despite the predictions of scholars such as Kliman (2006: 30-31), who argued that Japanese would prioritise the US alliance over international UN norms and become the “Britain of the East,” Heisei elites appear to enthusiastically support Japan continuing to bind itself to the restrictions of the United Nations security system and international law when it came to discussions of the use of force overseas, irrespective of the position the United States takes on any one given issue. The prospect that the next generation of elites will favour acting unilaterally or in collaboration with military security partners in projecting military power overseas against the wishes of the international community is not borne out by the quantitative and qualitative evidence collected in this study. The United Nations will continue to play an important role in Japan’s broader diplomacy, and Japan may act independently from the United States in this forum and in others on global issues as it has done so on many occasions since Japan’s UN entry in 1956 (Pan 2005: 2, 15-24, 41-52).

7.2: US-Japan Alliance as the Singular Core of Japan’s Security Policy?

It is also valuable to note in this context that around two-thirds of respondents, including many who had indicated in their interviews strong support for the US-Japan alliance, also
expressed a preference that Japan should try to forge a more independent line in its foreign policy even while maintaining the alliance. The two main justifications for this view were due to the perception that United States dominance would gradually weaken and the future balance of power would change, and due to a preference for Japan to resist American pressure to take certain foreign and security policy actions if such resistance is in the national interests of Japan. A ruling party MP, who was one of the strongest supporters of the alliance in the interview sample, noted explicitly the evolution of multipolarity as a future dynamic:

If I say a more personal opinion, Japan, up until now we have relied significant on the United States, and only forged a military alliance with the US…we have come to rely on it exclusively, but from now on the world will not be focused exclusively on the US, and East Asia will grow; and we should extend such collaboration to other nations and reduce overreliance, including to ROK and China, but also Australia, NZ, ASEAN nations. This is to create multifaceted and multipolar relations. It is important to recognize and adapt to the fact that the US will no longer be calling the tunes and there will be increasing multipolarization (Interview with author, Tokyo, December 2011).

An MP from a conservative party, and also one of the strongest supporters of the US-Japan alliance, noted similarly:

Until now, if I had to say, we are clinging a little to the Western approach and Japan playing a role in the West is stronger and more prominent. However, […] our presence within the Asia region needs to be heightened […] It is inconceivable that the US will all of a sudden say goodbye, and we will continue to remain dependent on East Asia as well, so we need to have good balance, and increase the strength of our relations with both, especially as Asia’s power rises (Interview with author, Tokyo, December 2011).

A US-educated author and journalist also in favour of enhancing US-Japan relations expressed a desire for the US to drop its attitude of being the superior in the relationship and suggested it listen to Japan more:

The US is a very attractive nation in some ways to Japanese and I personally think we should continue to cooperate with the US, but we need to get to the point where
we can say things to the US. [...] To be able to tell them what we are doing and have done, and for them not to be so self-important; to be able to discuss things with them on an equivalent level. We don’t even have to go to the degree of the US and UK relationship…just a more trusting relationship where we can say what we need to say. In particular, my generation wants a US-Japan relationship like this. Not with the US as boss, and Japan the subordinate, but a more mutual relationship. So in situations like Afghanistan and Iraq, which were truly dangerous wars, we should not just go just because the US said so. Should Japan say no to some kind of Afghanistan war? Yes, it should say no (Interview with author, Tokyo, September 2011).

This last comment can be connected to the strong concerns about Japan’s foreign policy independence that were raised in the context of Koizumi’s cooperation during the Bush presidency (Inoguchi and Bacon 2006: 10; Yoshimatsu 2012a: 113). Furthermore, a member of the executive of a prominent energy infrastructure company echoed nine other respondents who spontaneously used the phrase “yes man” in the context of Japan’s relations with the US:

If we were economically more powerful than the US then I would say we could say no….however, Japanese current conditions are bad, the economy is weak, we can’t really say so….that is there is a big chance we will become a US ‘yes man.’ We need to strengthen ourselves economically so to avoid becoming a yes man…..We can then start thinking about a stronger security policy a bit more too (Interview with author, Osaka, November 2011).

The above concerns regarding placing too much emphasis on the US-Japan alliance conforms to arguments that Japan is likely to increasingly pursue its independent national interests, even while it deepens the alliance (Inoguchi and Bacon 2006:18). Japan’s occasional tendency to assert independent interests that may clash with the US has also been well noted (Sunohara 2010: 41-43), particularly when dealing with issues in Asia (Pempel 2011: 266; Mochizuki 2004: 117; Sudo 2009: 139). While no interviewees mentioned the possibility of the US abandoning Japan, or vice-versa, there was a general consensus regarding the relative US decline that echoes a narrative that has slowly grown in prominence subsequent to the global financial crisis that began in 2008 about a decline in relative US importance regionally and globally (Seki 2012: 26-29; Tanaka and Liff 2011:236).
2009:7). Critical to note is that a majority of those interviewees who were worried about dependence on the United States did not want to see the alliance weakened or “downgraded,” contrary to concerns raised by the DPJ Hatoyama administration’s attempts to increase Japan’s diplomatic freedom of action relating to the East Asia region (Smith, 2014b: 5). There is instead a desire for Japan to become more independent even while it cooperates with the US and promotes increased integration between the SDF and USFJ.

**Burden Sharing and Collective Self-Defence**

Interviewees were also directly asked about how they felt about increased integration between the US and Japan defence forces for the management of regional security and territorial defence of Japan. Despite the considerable antipathy towards US wars in the Middle East, around four-fifths of respondents were generally comfortable with some kind of increased collaboration between Japan and the US, or burden sharing, for national defence and regional stability. A critical question, however, is whether burden sharing extends to global security. If there was support for the exercise of the right to collective self-defence (CSD) in aid of American objectives overseas or to protect Japan’s allies, then this would be indicative of not only greater support for defensive deterrence, but also for the cooperative use of force overseas that would characterise a global alliance. The most liberal interpretation of CSD, for example, would allow Japan to proactively engage in combat against threats to the United States and other allies by fighting “shoulder-to-shoulder” with coalition forces in overseas missions that “are not directly tied to the defence of Japan or mandated by a UN Security Council Resolution” (Mochizuki 2004: 111).

After the question on US cooperation with the United Nations Security Council, interviewees were asked whether it was acceptable for the SDF to put themselves in danger inside other countries for the purposes of helping people from allied/partner nations who have been attacked. This was subsequently explained as being an important element of the exercise of the right to collective self-defence. A majority of respondents were open to the possibility that Japan may need to exercise some elements of the right to collective self-defence in the future, even if they disagreed widely to the extent. The overall tone of the responses suggested that, because Japan had international responsibilities, both to international stability, the United Nations, and to the US and other countries in its region, a blanket ruling out of Japan providing some kind of military support to countries under attack was somewhat irresponsible. The elite sample, overall, was more comfortable with
the general idea of Japan exercising its right to collective self-defence than was the public Heisei cohort as discussed in Chapter Five.

In terms of the explanations given by interviewees, approximately two-thirds of interviewees (35) identified ‘defence reciprocity’ and international obligations as the major reason for Japan coming to the aid of nations that have been attacked. An executive at a multinational corporation most straightforwardly noted:

I think it is acceptable. If countries that we have military relations with…for example with US and ROK in the case of a war breaking out with North Korea…well what would be the point of having military relations with such countries if we simply do nothing when they are attacked? Even if the SDF or Japanese become victims, we need to put in place a framework for helping our allies (Interview with author, Tokyo, September 2011).

An official at a foreign embassy in Tokyo that was otherwise sceptical about using force overseas argued that:

To the degree that we can, we should. We can’t pretend that we are not aware of what is happening. Even if we are not on the front line, we could provide fuel etc…in terms of committing troops to the front line for combat at direct risk, well there are various complications regarding that…ultimately it would be case by case. If it is absolutely necessary and greatly related to Japan’s security, well maybe we can’t help but go (Interview with author, Tokyo, October 2011).

Others noted a ‘common sense’ or ‘human responsibility’ dimension to supporting allies who had been attacked, which contradicted any notion of one-country pacifism discussed in the previous chapter. An entrepreneur conducting business overseas noted:

This is a human on human conversation…I don’t think that if your friend is attacked that you can turn away as if you don’t know…we should go and help them properly (Interview with author, Tokyo, October 2011).

One government MP suggested that:

[…] coming to the aid of our friends - well this is a natural and normal feeling, like treasuring our family (Interview with author, Tokyo, December 2011).
While another MP said:

> Well it is hard to say definitively, but I agree with the general direction [of utilising the right of CSD]. […] If we are going to accept a restriction on this right in the future, and then there is an emergency in a neighbouring country, or an allied nation, we need to be prepared and willing to abandon [these countries’ people]. Such situations cannot be ignored in humanitarian terms. Trust with our allies will become an issue, thus we should investigate, and eventually recognize our own right to embrace it (Interview with author, Tokyo, December 2011).

What was interesting about the abstract discussion of whether Japan should embrace collective self-defence was that surprisingly few made a connection to the US-Japan alliance despite the question being framed within the context of tightening US-Japan relations. No more than three respondents directly identified the primary motivation for Japan embracing CSD being due to a desire to enhance the US-Japan relationship, which has been a theme emphasised by the second Abe administration and other supporters of the alliance for pursuing a policy that allows the exercise of collective self-defence (Sakoda 2013; Sieg 2014). Indeed, when the issue of US cooperation overseas was introduced into the context, attitudes often changed very quickly as discussed above in regard to interviewee references to US wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. This suggests that the interviewees in this sample were not overly concerned with debate over the principle of whether Japan should be able to exercise the right to collective self-defence, but were wary of the context in which such a principle might be invoked and the types of activities that might Japan might be compelled to participate in. Wariness about US making unreasonable or controversial requests in the future, such as they perceived came during the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq (and in the past, Vietnam), was mentioned by half of the interviewees.

**Contributions to US Overseas Military Activities**

The above discussion suggests that scholars emphasising the normalisation of Japan’s security policy through the embracement of a global alliance, where Japan and the US interests align and are increasingly congruent (Kliman 2006: 77, 131, 139), have exaggerated the degree of change in national security attitudes. Instead, it provides support for the continual salience of arguments of Inoguchi and Bacon (2006: 10), Miller (2005: 84), and Hagström and Williamson (2009: 243), that the Japanese elite as a whole are unlikely to embrace the idea of Japan becoming the “Great Britain of the Far East” (Hughes
2007). Japan is not likely to provide full support for the cooperative use of force overseas (Mochizuki 2004: 105), either for the purposes of further pursuing the war on terror, or for other types of military interventions. Indeed, as Yeo (2013: 74) notes, there has been support for some degree of “retrenchment” of Japan’s support for US operations beyond Japan’s immediate security environment during the 2000s. The war on terror showed the wariness of the Japanese public towards US global policy, unilateralism, and requests for support from Japan (Hook and Son 2013: 44), and this resulted in the SDF coming home from Iraq relatively early and the early cessation of the SDF mission in the Indian Ocean. This overall wariness also appears to be the case with the new generation of elites, many of whom were influenced by 9/11, and the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq during their formative years.

It is telling that, in justifying the SDF’s contribution to even the non-combat missions to the Indian Ocean and Iraq, the Japanese government had to avoid mentioning the “US ally identity to justify the deployment of the JSDF in the Indian Ocean and Iraq in the global war on terror” (Miyaoka 2011: 241). Instead, the government placed the emphasis on Japan’s responsibility to the international community when it realised that obligations to support the US-Japan alliance globally were less convincing (Honna 2012: 97). The analysis of transcripts also suggests that Miyaoka was correct to observe that while many Japanese “recognize the importance of the alliance with the US, some feel that Japan has gone too far in following the US to think about its own national interests and strategy, which has led to the loss of sovereignty” (2011: 250). Analysis of the responses to this question show that Japanese Heisei elites are strongly supportive of deepening the alliance for Japan’s defence and regional security, but are somewhat more sceptical of the ‘widening’ of the alliance in terms of a ‘global alliance’ based on the cooperative use of force overseas (also see Miyaoka 2011: 244). As was the case for Japanese elites during the Cold War, Heisei elites appear to worry about the US “relying overly much on its military prowess to shape its foreign policies in the region,” which could have negative consequences for Japan and/or global security (Pempel 2011: 259). Further evidence of wariness about a single-minded devotion to a global alliance can be seen in questions on Japan’s preferred international position and identity as an international relations actor.
7.3: Japan’s Preferred International Foreign Policy Orientation

One question inquired into interviewees’ preferred overall strategic orientation for Japan into the future. This question situated debates over Japan’s security identity in the context of greater tensions in international relations due to the rise of China, and was analysed to ascertain insights about preferences related to the idea of a global alliance. Interviewees were simply asked “given potential tensions between US and China in international relations, what kind of international actor should Japan strive to be in the future?” If required, respondents were given examples of possibilities that they could use for reference or to choose between. These examples included Japan becoming: a major military power; a regional power that played a proactive role in supporting East Asia regionalism, similar to Germany and France in the EU (Berger 2010: 575); a passive, economically-focused power; a country that bases its diplomacy on the United Nations; a middle power which seeks to mediate between great power competition such as between the US and China; or a middle power that supports a US-centred security order. Most respondents used these suggestions as references and, usually through a process of trial and elimination where they thought out loud about the options, decided on one or two that they felt fit best with their own thoughts and preferences.

Only four participants thought it desirable to fully commit to a UN-centred security policy, despite almost all interviewees admitting that working through the UN was important for acquiring international legitimacy for the use of force, as outlined in the previous section. No interviewees indicated a preference for a unilateral approach to managing Japan’s security through the build-up of independent military power. At the other extreme, no respondents thought that Japan should be a passive, economically-focused agent in international relations as it was during the antimilitarist peak period. The three main options selected were the East Asian regionalism option, and the two middle power options. While almost all respondents recognized the importance of the US-Japan alliance in their responses to other questions, only twelve respondents chose the option of Japan being a nation that supported a US-centred security order. An MP, who was a strong supporter of the centrality of the US-Japan alliance, noted for example:

First, we should aim to be a nation that through foreign policy attempts to keep the balance of power in the region through various types of policies. After that is the maritime dimension. I think that it is necessary to secure the sea lanes through the
East China Sea, the South China Sea at the same time in order to uphold our national interests. […] If I think 50 years into the future, as a peer with China, the balance of power in East Asia should be a focus of our foreign and security policy as particularly important (Interview with author, Tokyo, December 2011).

Ultimately, however, two-thirds of interviewees identified Japan’s preferred security identity role being either as a middle power that mediated between major powers in the international system and/or as a regional power supporting East Asia regionalism, with half of all interviewees identifying with both conceptions. Much like during the antimilitarist peak, it would appear that there is still a desire to differentiate Japan from the United States in global politics, even though there is strong support for Japan remaining committed to an alliance partnership with the United States for the purposes of regional stability.

**Japan as a Great Power or a Middle Power?**

Debate over Japan’s self-conception as a great or middle power has been a constant source of discussion in the Japanese foreign policy literature. A middle power is essentially a relatively wealthy country that is highly influential in its own geopolitical region, has a modicum of military power, but “lacks the military and diplomatic clout to be a true global power” (Zisk 2001: 22). A middle power is generally focused on maintaining its place in the international system, rather than desiring to increase its strength with a view towards becoming an influential great power. Middle powers tend to prefer making contributions to international security through involvement in multilateral and UN activities rather than projection of force in a conventional manner. They also prefer to pursue national interests by “fostering reciprocated goodwill from the international community” rather than engaging in confrontational power politics (Zisk 2001: 22). Through a degree of foreign policy activism, they often attempt to carve out a leadership niche for themselves in international and regional organisations to differentiate themselves from great powers (Son 2014: 96).

In addition to having significant military potential, great powers will on the other hand often be sceptical, if not hostile, to multilateral binding. They will be reluctant to yield to outside pressure and criticism, and may in certain circumstances act unilaterally or bilaterally only with close alliance partners in international politics (Smith 2009: 246; 61 For example, see Rozman (2003), Zisk (2001), Soeya (2005a, 2005b), Samuels (2006, 2007c), Hughes (2009b), and Son (2014).
Rozman 1999: 384). There was no such sentiment present in this interview sample, however. Twenty-nine respondents noted that Japan should play a role as a middle power mediating between major powers. A diplomat noted that Japan could not aspire to being an international great power:

I think we should be a middle power trying to mediate between super powers. Japan is shrinking….there are no energy resources. But we have technology still so we should have some confidence. It is not desirable to become a military power…at the very least we should develop enough to allow the citizens to live in a safe country while being firm in our diplomacy (Interview with author, Tokyo, November 2011).

An economics lecturer at a private Japanese university thought such a role was beneficial for Japan:

I think China becoming a large country is a good thing for Japan, economically. China and the US, both being superpowers is quite a benefit for Japan. […] Like in the distant past, we share a trading nation destiny similar to countries like Holland, Venice, or Portugal. Such countries were small and had no resources. But through ocean trade, they were able to grow. There is no other option for Japan other than to become friends with everyone. Like a superpower, Japan is unable to “stick to principle” in international relations. If Japan tried to be like this, we would be bulldozed (Interview with author, Kyoto, November 2011).

A manager at a multinational corporation made the point that Japan needed to not be overly focused on US-China competition:

Well, a middle power but not just between the US and China, but US, China, EU/Europe etc.[…] Given China’s relative size, I don’t think we can perform a role like Germany. When China becomes a big power, Asia will possibly become China-focused…so it would be impossible for it to become centred on Japan [like the EU is centred on Germany]. But we can come to understand the logic of China, the US, Europe and perform a role in skilfully integrating the relations between them (Interview with author, Tokyo, September 2011).
Support for East Asian Regionalism

This middle-power orientation seemed to be tightly aligned to thoughts about East Asian regionalism in the interviews, with a strong majority (60 percent) of interviewees choosing both the East Asian regionalism identity and one of the middle power identities. Regionalism has been described by Okawara and Katzenstein as geographic manifestations of “political, military, economic or social processes at the international level” (2001: 166). Critically, such processes cross borders and create socioeconomic interdependencies and linkages that are largely independent of control by an individual nation-state. Nevertheless, regional institution-making processes pursued by governments can consolidate these socioeconomic dynamics while also having the benefit of establishing regional norms for behaviour which function as a form of reassurance that underpins the various types of governmental and non-governmental cooperation. Twenty-five interviewees identified with Japan playing a constructive role in constructing an East Asia regional order. An advisor at a semi-governmental economic organisation noted:

If I have to say, I would say realistically a country that supports East Asia regionalism. China will probably become a great economic power much like the US…it’ll be difficult to match China in that context…..so as a supporting country if we economically assert ourselves then that would be fine (Interview with author, Tokyo, October 2011).

A member of the executive of one of Japan’s biggest telecommunications companies argued that becoming a military power was not a preference:

I want us to become a country that supports Asian regionalism….I don’t want us to be a small passive country, but I don’t want us to be a country that relies on military power either (Interview with author, Osaka, November 2011).

An employee at a company specialising in East Asian business links wondered aloud about the essential problem posed by the question:

This is Japan’s big problem that it is currently facing - where should Japan go in this context [of changes in the international system]? […] For me, if I say ideally, I would like to say a country that relies on UN-centred diplomacy. But the UN is not fair, so I think we would want to become a country that supports East Asia integration as such (Interview with author, Tokyo, October 2011).
A Japanese diplomat was clear about where Japan’s economic destiny was:

Asia will be the most important economic region from now on. Japan’s population will decrease from now on, but in terms of economy, and technology and perhaps even pop culture, we have various things that are attractive to Asia and while emphasising these features of our society, we should try to cooperate in developing the Asia region (Interview with author, Tokyo, December 2011).

Interviewees were particularly enthusiastic about Japanese enmeshment in Southeast Asia, where Japan’s “de facto middle power diplomacy” had been traditionally successful and where engagement has intensified since the mid-1990s (Singh 2010: 397-399; Sudo 2009: 141-151; Sohn 2010: 499). Soeya notes that Japan shares much in common with nations in Southeast Asia in that they are all concerned with the evolving regional power balance between the US and China and wish to maintain as much autonomy and avoid overdependence on the great powers as possible (Soeya 2009: 292-293). This has led to the development of preferences for Japan and other many other nations in the region to bind themselves as well as other great powers to multilateral regional structures (Berger 2010: 576).

Overall, these insights correlate with the quantitative data analysed in Chapter Five which showed that most respondents to surveys were comfortable with the alliance with the US, supported its continuance, but were unwilling to identify it as sufficient to guarantee Japan’s security and prosperity on its own (see Tables 5.18 and 5.19, and Figures 5.34-5.36). Economic and diplomatic outreach to the East Asia region, including to Japan’s supposed strategic competitor in the form of China, still appears to be a major preference for Japan’s Heisei elite, as it is for the Japanese public (see Tables 5.20 and 5.21, and Figure 5.60). Mochizuki notes that a similar orientation is true of policymakers in Japan who since the end of the World War II, “have always understood that while the U.S. alliance is essential to Japan’s security, it was by no means sufficient for making their nation more secure and prosperous” (Mochizuki 2004: 104). The support for an East Asia-focused future foreign policy orientation reveals a ‘dual identity’ or desire for Japan’s foreign policy to avoid positioning itself solely as a supporter of the United States and the West’s foreign and security policy interests.
Japan's Dual Identity

The analysis of transcripts revealed a complex imagination of the geographic location of Japan’s cultural heritage and socio-economic destiny. Heisei elites in this sample saw Japan, on the one hand, to be a country that was aligned with the West in terms of political values, economic development, and strategic goals connected to the US-Japan alliance. On the other hand, there was a strong awareness of the need to continue Japan’s socio-economic integration into the East Asia region. This suggests the process of regionalisation that has accelerated from the mid-1970s has greatly influenced the Heisei cohort’s thinking about Japan’s foreign policy orientation.

Hitoshi Tanaka and Adam Liff (2009: 1) identify 1976 specifically as a “watershed” year for Japan in its relations with Asia as its last wartime reparation cheque was signed and Japan became part of the G7 as the only Asian representative. Japan then in 1977 declared the Fukuda Doctrine, which was a positive affirmation of Japan's non-military commitment to the Southeast Asia region, and committed to supporting China’s opening up from 1978 when the Treaty of Peace and Friendship between Japan and the People's Republic of China was signed. From the 1980s, both culturally and economically, Japanese society “increasingly turned its attention to East Asia” (Mochizuki 2004: 117; Rozman 2008: 216-217), and economic interdependence accelerated as Japan reduced its reliance on Western markets (Pempel 2011: 263). This regionalism further accelerated in the post-Cold War era when an “incipient multilateralism” started to develop (Okawara and Katzenstein 2001: 176-178).

The Japanese government in particular was a proactive promoter of various types of regional institutional initiatives, from economic to security to environmental initiatives.62 APEC and the ASEAN Regional Forum are two examples of institutional cooperation that were pushed forward by the Japanese government in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Japan took on an even larger role in the region after the 1997 financial crisis, with the most notable Japanese contribution being the Miyazawa plan of 1998, which committed $30 billion to help Asian countries hit by the regional economic crisis (Japan Times 1999). While the US and Europe essentially abandoned East Asian nations in trouble, Japan and China both took the opportunity to achieve the long-held shared goal of limiting the economic power of US

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and Europe over the region (Bowles 2002: 249-250). Such moves towards greater economic integration also correlated with a broader desire in Japan and the wider region for a “new type of regional interaction which was based ‘neither on Chinese or Soviet communism nor on U.S. laissez faire market stratagems’” (Pempel 2011: 262-263). Japan has since remained at the forefront of a number of regional processes and dialogues despite occasional opposition from the US (Tanaka and Liff 2009: 4; Pempel 2011: 265). As examples of Japanese leadership, the Chiang Mai currency swap initiative (started in 2000) now has a $240 billion pool, and the Comprehensive Economic Partnership for East Asia (proposed by Japan in 2006) has evolved to become the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) (Yoshimatsu 2012b: 370; Tanaka and Liff 2009: 3; Sohn 2010: 518). Japan’s human security and peacebuilding focus in its foreign policy described in the previous chapter can also be understood within the context of a Japanese desire to take the lead in region-building by asserting its own forms of niche expertise (Soeya 105: 112-113; Ashizawa 2008: 586; Ishizuka 2005: 79).

While the interviewees expressed strong support for East Asia regionalism, they were sceptical, however, of any approach that would completely exclude the United States and Western nations. This issue had become a topic of discussion in Japan at the time of the interviews because the centre-left DPJ stormed into power in 2009 on a platform that would increase Japanese independence from the alliance (Sneider 2011: 106-110; Yoshimatsu 2012a: 113-116; Shiraishi 2010). While not necessarily popular, the first DPJ Prime Minister Hatoyama Yukio vouched for the building of an Asia community which placed China and Japan at the core, and possibly excluded the United States (Envall and Fujiwara 2012: 63-64; Japan Times 2010). Hatoyama was criticized by LDP’s normal nationalists in particular for mismanaging and weakening the US-Japan alliance with its focus on an exclusive East Asia regional bloc (Hosoya 2012). The DPJ’s policy brought up concerns about Japan being integrated into a region dominated by Chinese hegemony, especially subsequent to the 2010 and 2012 incidents that led to the Senkaku Islands becoming a serious diplomatic issue.

In this study, the elite sample seemed to be located between the DPJ’s “Asianists” and the LDP’s normal nationalists. The interviewees rejected Hatoyama’s purported desire to downgrade the foreign policy importance of the US-Japan alliance (Smith 2014b: 5), but they also rejected the normal nationalist preference for a global alliance. They did, however, enthusiastically embrace the idea that Japan had an important independent role to play in
integrating into East Asia socio-economically, and that Japan’s future prosperity was heavily dependent on relations with the East Asia region. Around fourth-fifths of interviewees felt that Japan had been playing an important diplomatic and economic role in East Asia and desired to continue this policy. There was strong support for a rules-based regional order to be built that would bind not only China and Japan, but a wide variety of other powerful nations, including Western nations and India. It is notable in this context that the Japanese concept of *takakuteki*, often translated as multilateralism, has a slightly different meaning in the context of East Asian regionalism for Japan. Katzenstein and Okawara (2008: 102) argue that *takakuteki* conveys a sense that Japan is attempting to embed its bilateral security ties with the United States in a broader, multifaceted web of relations that cannot be understood simply by reference to preferences for bilateralism or multilateralism. This support for multi-tiered foreign policy rather than multilateral or bilateral foreign policy approaches goes to “the core of Japan’s security policy as it complements its vitally important ties with the United States with an Asia of increasing economic and political relevance, and relates the military security concerns of the United States to a more comprehensive Japanese conception of the same term” (Katzenstein and Okawara 2008: 102).

Critical to note, however, is that this support for multi-tiered approaches to regionalism is not simply derivative of strategic concerns but is underpinned by Japan’s historically conflicted identity as a nation with an ‘Asian’ cultural heritage. Japan’s geographic isolation from the mainland, while still being subject to the cultural and economic influences of China and Korea in particular, has underpinned an awareness of Japan being ‘in’ Asia but not necessarily ‘of’ Asia, therefore creating a conflicted sense of belonging among Japan’s elite.63 Hatch (2010: 378) therefore argues that one of the reasons Japan has embraced this wider view of regional institutions in the post-Cold War era is “precisely because it could not stand to choose between its Asian identity and its Western identity” (see also Ooba 2004). Ashizawa (2008: 595) also argues that among foreign policy officials specifically there is a “level of discomfort with the exclusive Asian-only grouping in which China has become increasingly prominent.”

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Around three-quarters of interviewees in this sample mentioned that Japan had its cultural origins in East Asia, but that ‘Western’ values or affinity for Western nations had taken on a significant degree of importance in Japan, at least in comparison with other East Asian nations. Japan’s successful adaptation to democracy postwar, its developed economy, and the embrace of modern technology that Japan still excels at producing, also underpinned the idea of Japan being a socio-economic as well as ideational hub for integrating East and West that around three-fifths of interviewees thought Japan should continue to aspire to. The interviewees were, therefore, unsurprisingly strongly supportive of the Japanese government’s policy of embracing a wider concept of “East Asian” regionalism in the post-Cold War era, which includes the US, Australia, India, and New Zealand (Ashizawa 2008: 595; Yu Jose 2012: 115-116; Yoshimatsu 2012b: 370). Sohn (2010: 498) argues that ultimately the Japanese government’s fundamental policy towards the region has been one of supporting “open regionalism,” which seeks to maintain “friendly relations with extra-regional partners based on the principles of openness, flexibility, transparency, and inclusiveness.”

**Conclusion**

The insights of this chapter, when considered alongside public sentiment analysed in Chapter Five, indicate that an instinctively anti-alliance and antimilitarist security identity orientation has reduced in intensity in Japan to the point of allowing greater integration between Japan’s SDF and the US and other militaries. Support for the US-Japan alliance is at its highest postwar level among the public (Samuels 2013: 92-93), and this is reflected in the orientation of this elite sample where there is some support for enhancing the alliance’s deterrence and regional security functions. Transforming the alliance into a global alliance based on the cooperative use of force would, however, go against the preferences of general Japanese public and those of the wider Heisei elite interviewed as part of this study. The cohort expressed comfort with Japan continuing to be a strong supporter of adherence to international norms on the global scale, as represented by the United Nations and other multilateral forums such as the G20 (Dobson 2010: 34-40), and to avoid an association with unilateral uses of force by great powers. Too much pressure by the US government on Japan to take up greater global military roles may also stimulate the underlying independent streak among the Heisei elites that came through in the interviews. In fact, in late 2014, strong concerns precisely over US expectations for “global” military support rose anew during the negotiations over the Revised US-Japan Defence
Guidelines. This led to US and Japanese officials being at “loggerheads” over the vision statement that would guide the revision of the guidelines, due to the perception of Japanese officials that Japan was taking on significant security risk with little reward in terms of US security assurances, and wariness of public sentiment regarding Japan being involved in combat far from home (Kallender-Umezu 2014b).

Interviewees also expressed continued support for Japan playing an important role in the US-Japan alliance at the regional security level while the government pursued an increasingly vigorous role in pushing forward on East Asia regional integration. While these roles are not necessarily mutually exclusive, they can often be in “complex tension” with each other (Pempel 2011: 256-258). This complex tension is likely to persist indefinitely, however, as a strong duality that privileges neither its Western nor its Asian identity or foreign policy commitments characterises Japan’s cultural identity disposition. This dual identity underpins the Japanese government’s ‘open’ approach to regional and multilateral binding based on policies of institutional cooperation and the purposeful deepening of economic interdependence.
CHAPTER EIGHT: STRATEGIC ANTIPATHY TOWARDS CHINA

This chapter examines how the Heisei cohort conceptualises Japan’s relations with the People’s Republic of China, the major perceived threat to Japan’s national security and most likely regional strategic peer competitor. The main focus of this chapter is considering whether strategic antipathy towards the rise of China characterises the worldview of Heisei elites. Such antipathy is likely to lead to Japan embracing an explicit policy of strategic containment made up of hard military balancing and zero-sum diplomatic and economic competition, as described in Chapter Four. This chapter identifies two overall themes that stood out in the analysis of transcripts that centred on attitudes towards the strategic antipathy component of militant internationalism. The first theme is that there is indeed significant strategic distrust of China’s motives among the Heisei cohort. The second theme of this chapter is that there remains strong awareness of Japan and China ultimately sharing many mutual interests, despite current tensions. This chapter concludes by arguing in the third section that alongside maintaining the US-Japan alliance, interviewees indicated a preference for dealing with China’s rise by emphasising the co-binding and enmeshment of both Japan and China into a wider regional and global order, rather than taking on an inherently combative and direct containment approach.

8.1: Strategic Distrust

A number of minority narratives that arose in the analysis, when collected together, suggest that a strong majority of the Heisei elite are very concerned about China’s rise and see significant differences between Japan and China’s approaches to foreign policy. No more than four respondents out of fifty-six indicated that there was no particular need for vigilance regarding China’s military build-up, the recent territorial disputes that China has been having with multiple neighbours including Japan, or China’s current combative diplomatic orientation towards Japan. Overall, forty-three respondents out of fifty-six interviewees expressed concern that differences in national interests, differences between Japan and China’s approach to international relations, and differences in values and political systems between the two countries, would present problems for the development of the Sino-Japanese relationship going forward. This was particularly notable when interviewees were asked a question on what they perceived were the differences between Japanese and Chinese diplomacy and the aims of the two nations in international politics. Furthermore, almost two-thirds of interviewees (39) noted that China, through its building up of military power, was seeking to attain a higher international status through its
diplomacy. Many articulated a belief that China desires to compete with the United States to become a ‘superpower’ or ‘number one’ in terms of power and influence in international relations, and that such a goal animates China’s foreign and security policy. A SDF Member suggested this in comparison with Japan’s aspirations:

China wants to become an increasingly larger power and to gain influence. It wants to become a superpower…Japan on the other hand desires to become a middle power through diplomacy, as this is suitable for it (Interview with author, Tokyo, October 2011).

A US-educated author and journalist made a direct connection between the US and Chinese aspirations for international relations:

China sees itself as a central country globally, and thinks other countries should conform to it. In that sense, it is actually quite similar to the US (Interview with author, Tokyo, September 2011).

An MP went further and detailed the genesis of China’s aspirations for becoming a great power by citing China’s post-1985 change in military doctrine:

China’s increasing naval expansion and activity has been particularly noticeable – it would seem that for China there is a long-term strategy to project power into the East China and South China Seas, rather than a tactical or short-term strategy. In concrete terms, in 1985 a Chinese Admiral called Liu Huaqing established a long-term strategy and envisioned it would take 60 years for China to expand its naval power. […] China’s long-term strategy will naturally conflict with our territorial interests. How to resolve this problem is an important dilemma that Japan is currently facing and will continue to face in the future (Interview with author, Tokyo, December 2011).

Concern was also expressed by interviewees that the two countries may have vastly different visions of what future regional order will look like, with the most sceptical viewing a Chinese attempt to impose a hierarchical Sino-centric understanding of regional order. Modern Sino-centrism is a form of Chinese ‘exceptionalism’ or nationalism that asserts that China has a historical destiny to become one of the world’s great powers. In this view, China is an inherently harmonious and peaceful actor in international politics that is in the process of ‘national rejuvenation’ in order to assume its historical destiny or
right to become one of the great global powers, and the central power in East Asia. The discursive construction of this harmonious orientation towards other nations is, however, seen to be based on an assumption of submission to and acceptance of China’s central role in the region by smaller regional nations (Black and Hwang 2012: 437). The most nationalistic expressions of Sino-centrism are argued to be based on a paternalistic sense of cultural superiority which harks back to pre-modern history where China hierarchically structured regional relations around itself (Buzan 2010: 32; Ng-Quinn 1983; Wang 1996; Rozman 2011). Many Western as well as Japanese analysts have made reference to the fact that this kind of Sino-centric nationalism may well be increasingly driving China’s foreign and security policy (Furuta 2003: 70; Kitaoka 2011: 6-9; Drifte 2012: 82; Rozman 2011). Eighteen respondents specifically noted that the possibility of Chinese hegemony and the (re)rise of Sino-centrism in the future posed a particular problem for Japan and other countries around it. For example, a former US think tank analyst admitted that Sino-centrism was a worry for many Japanese:

China, in the distant past, had a very Sino-centric approach to the Asia region…for Japan, if it is the case [that such attitudes are present], it is not a good thing and Japanese will reject Sino-centrism. We should look on to the region together and develop a regional order where China is not self-centred but is able to give due consideration to ROK and Japan (Interview with author, Tokyo, October 2011).

A government MP was more decisive in noting this desire for submission:

The Chinese appear to not only have some expansionist aspect and want to project their power into East Asia, but also want to have people act in line with their intentions. When they go right, they want other nations to also follow them – they want more nations to be like this (Interview with author, Tokyo, December 2011).

Sixteen respondents throughout the interviews also explicitly placed emphasis on the cultural differences and values between China and Japan, and thought this to be important to the conduct of international relations and the countries respective (perceived) behaviours. A businessman who had recently lived in Taipei argued:

Well the fundamental personalities of Chinese and Japanese, in politics and in business, are different. Japanese tend towards harmonious relations...if I was to deprecate ourselves, we are people who will try and get on with everyone and tell them what they want to hear...Chinese on the other hand are not like that. Chinese have had to live through fighting around many dynasties, and through their own power assert their own rights and interests strongly. In that sense they are a little different from Japanese (Interview with author, Tokyo, December 2011).

A member of a group for aspiring politicians made a similar point referencing Western views of Chinese and Japanese:

From the Western point of view, the problem is that they think we are similar to Chinese in some ways. But, actually we are much more different from each other than even Europeans and Americans are from each other. Sometimes it is quite confusing just how different Japanese and Chinese can be from each other (Interview with author, Tokyo, October 2011).

An MP from a conservative party also noted:

It is no longer in style, but perhaps there is something to Huntington’s clash of civilizations idea. Japan has different values, independence, and an independent worldview [from China]. In addition to having a firm grasp on this for ourselves, there is a need to form a position on how to grasp our relationship with the world on this basis (Interview with author, Tokyo, December 2011).

A senior consultant for one of the world’s biggest information media companies also asserted a strong difference between China and Japan and associated Japan with what they thought to be Western values:

On the basis of democracy, human rights, rule of law, we have this kind of world vision that is not shared by China. If I was to say, Japan is closer to the West in terms of vision and values....that is perhaps the big difference (Interview with author, Tokyo, December 2011).

A Japanese diplomat also referenced these values:
Well within the [then ruling party] DPJ there is this thought that we should get closer to Asia, but with China our values are too different. After all, China’s system is a dictatorial type (Interview with author, Tokyo, September 2011).

Overlapping with this sense of Chinese exceptionalism is the perception that China, as a great power, does not feel that it needs to follow all international rules. This is arguably similar to discourses of “American exceptionalism” which allow for the US to break international rules while demanding others respect them (Holsti 2011: 382-385). Thirty-one respondents expressed a sceptical attitude towards China being a cooperative international player committed to international stability and following international rules. A government MP argued, for example:

In regards to Japan’s intentions, we do not necessarily want nations to have to listen to us as if we are some kind of hegemon they need to be afraid of [like China] (Interview with author, Tokyo, December 2011).

A security analyst at an American think tank also noted:

In Japan’s case, Japan’s national interests are directly connected to the international order and international society and the need to protect the interests of various countries. In China’s case, there are aspects of the current international order that do not suit them and thus it seems as if they are trying to change the international order (Interview with author, Tokyo, November 2011).

An American-educated author and journalist made a similar allusion to China not being a country that will work with others:

Japan, well it doesn’t really have a culture of making rules and imposing them; it doesn’t really have the will. It is more concerned with how it fits into the world…how it can avoid upsetting the people of the world…in this sense the way of approaching these issues are completely different between China and Japan (Interview with author, Tokyo, December 2011).

An MP from the ruling party was also very direct in their criticism:

Currently, China is not and will not play by the rules. I really feel they are pushing the bounds of acceptability (Interview with author, Tokyo, December 2011).
Almost all of these respondents directly contrasted this apparent lack of commitment to the international system and diplomatic engagement with Japan’s own more rules-based and cooperative approach to foreign policy. An analyst at an asset management firm noted for example:

I don’t think that China sees itself as just one country in international society. Japan sees itself as part of international society and more often thinks about other nations (Interview with author, Tokyo, October 2011).

A political analyst at a foreign embassy reflected similar sentiments:

Japan on the other hand is having its economic power reduced, and can no longer think in terms of only it “winning”….and thus is dedicated to a more cooperative approach to various countries (Interview with author, Tokyo, October 2011).

The sentiment of interviewees in response to questions on the differences between Japan and China does echo some of the literature on differences in strategic culture between China and Japan. Paul Smith, for example, notes that “Chinese leaders appear to be more consistently persuaded by realist notions of international politics, whereas Japanese leaders tend to favour liberal-institutionalist values” (Smith, 2009: 230, 247-249; see also Pempel 2011: 256; Zisk 2001: 22). Wang (2000: 487) likewise argues that “China’s experience in the 20th century – from two World Wars to the cold war – only confirmed the central tenet of realism in the minds of most Chinese: ‘The strong do what they have the power to do and the weak accept what they have to accept.’” Johnston (1998: 259-260) argues that modern strategic culture in China actually has much in common with Western concepts of realpolitik thought and practice. Among others (Fukushima 1999; Okawara and Katzenstein 2001; Gilson 2004), Ashizawa argues on the other hand that Japan’s stated preference is for a rules-based multilateralism with multiple actors that “presumes cooperation, or coordinating activity, among actors on the basis of certain principles of conduct” (2003: 365). The responses of interviewees appears to confirm that there is at least a perception of a problematic gap between the thinking of Chinese and Japanese foreign policy elites in regards to international cooperation, regional order and the pursuit of national security.
Is China-sceptical Nationalism a Hawkish Phenomenon?

In Chapter Four it was noted that there is a common belief in both scholarly and popular literature that the rise of conservative neo-nationalism was a major factor driving antipathy towards China in Japan. One unexpected finding from this study was that the most dovish respondents were often the most critical of and least sympathetic to China, its international behaviour, its military build-up, and the perceived unwillingness of China to work cooperatively within international institutions and to respect international rules. Dovish respondents were considered to be those interviewees who were against a large Japanese military build-up, acquiring significant power projection capabilities, and sceptical of collective self-defence and greater US-Japan alliance collaboration even for regional security. Being sceptical of enhancing Japan’s military posture and critical of some elements of the alliance with the US did not necessarily result in interviewees being more tolerant of perceived provocative and coercive Chinese behaviour. For example, in terms of the perception of China wanting to become hegemonic and impose its own vision of regional order on others, one dovish interviewee noted:

As for what China is pursuing, its image of itself is not as a modern nation. More, it is aiming for the kind of powerful China that existed before modernisation in Asia (Interview with author, Tokyo, September 2011).

Another interviewee who was also completely against Japan’s SDF going overseas:

I think China is pursuing a diplomacy based on wanting to become a power and regional hegemon. It seems to them to be some kind of historical inevitability (Interview with author, Tokyo, November 2011).

An interviewee, who argued that Japan’s SDF should remain a disaster relief organisation rather than become a conventional military, contrasted Japan’s behaviour with that of China:

I feel Japan has an internationally cooperative personality. In regards to China, more than good relationships, China wants to demonstrate its international presence, I feel (Interview with author, Tokyo, October 2011).

While another interviewee who had been very critical of US foreign policy also argued:
I think the Chinese government doesn’t have a cooperative instinct like Japan. It isn’t a responsible nation…while it will become a great economic power, I think there is something lacking (Interview with author, Osaka, November 2011).

Sentiments that China wished to become a great military power were particularly pervasive among the more dovish interviewees. An academic with strong scepticism of the US military presence in Japan argued:

The Chinese government is more self-centred, committed to defending its privileges, and wishes to become a world power and compete with America in this way (Interview with author, Tokyo, September 2011).

Another interviewee who had been critical of US overseas foreign policy endeavours also noted China’s desire to compete with the US internationally:

I have the sense that China, now having passed Japan in terms of GDP, wants to match the United States in the long-term, and has the conceit of wanting to be number one. Thus it is becoming stronger and more coercive in its diplomacy. It does not tend towards negotiation or compromise, and is working to have the world revolve around it (Interview with author, Osaka, November 2011).

While a journalist who noted and supported Japanese reluctance to acquire offensive weapons contrasted this dynamic with China’s new carrier program:

There is a strong sense in Japan that the PRC wants to become a great naval power and assert itself militarily into the Pacific Ocean through its construction of aircraft carriers and its submarine build-up. There is some fear of the Chinese naval build-up, especially given the issues over the Senkakus and Chinese nationalism (Interview with author, Tokyo, December 2011).

The only MP interviewed that consistently expressed scepticism of any Japanese military build-up was also not optimistic about Chinese strategic intentions:

If I look at the current situation, China looks like it wants to divide the Pacific Ocean into half with the US (Interview with author, Tokyo, December 2011).

This suggests that the trend first noted by Green and Self in 1996 regarding the worsening of perceptions of China on the Japanese Left has been consolidated among the Heisei cohort
(Green and Self 1996: 46). Such concern throughout the full political spectrum is in line with concerns articulated in recent defence white papers under both the centre-left DPJ and centre-right LDP, where the MOD has started to describe China as a “potential” threat due to concerns about civilian control and wanting to project naval power into the waters surrounding Japan and beyond (Smith 2009: 241; Roy 2004: 90; Hayashi 2013; Yoshimatsu 2012a: 118-119). This would suggest that wariness about China is not necessarily an outgrowth of a desire for greater military power projection that is associated with a normal nationalist disposition. This insight suggests a need to be careful in interpreting distrust or concern with China as equivalent to support for an aggressive form of nationalism in Japan.

8.2: Mutual Interests within Strategic Distrust

Despite the strong concern expressed by the above respondents regarding China’s foreign and security policy behaviour, over four-fifths of interview participants (41 out of 50 interviewees) indicated that Japan would ultimately have to find a way to coexist with a stronger China and remain committed to bilateral and multilateral engagement. This suggests a complex and uneasy view sits at the heart of the Heisei generation’s vision of the best approach to take towards security, diplomatic and economic relations with China. It was clear during the interviews that there was a strong affirmation of there being the potential for a mutually constituted relationship with mutual interests, especially if the political environment inside of China changes and anti-Japanese sentiments decrease. A professor of international relations supportive of the US-Japan alliance noted for example:

> Japan and China’s relationship is a long one, and there are some very good things to this. However, in regards to the PRC in the modern era, and the very difficult historical relationship that we currently have, this is a very frustrating issue for us. There needs to be a political rather than simple legal resolution to various issues. Clearly deepening the relationship with China within East Asia should take place. However there is a massive duty to make the other country’s citizens understand the historical perspective of the other (Interview with author, Tokyo, September 2011).

A prominent security analyst with an American think thank argued:
Japan should pursue diplomacy with China based on a “win-win” relationship. There needs to be a future looking approach to relationships throughout Asia (Interview with author, Tokyo, December 2011).

An MP similarly noted:

Of course, Japan’s should use its capacity to help China economically develop within the context of international rules. The mutual reciprocal relationship based on mutual interests, and a partnership on the basis of mutual growth, and so forth, should be emphasised. […] We must pursue our relationship and diplomatic relations/negotiations and deepen correspondence with China in regards to that direction. […] For countries close to us like China and Korea, while we have various history issues, and are struggling together, we should reflect upon how to build a strong and friendly relationship, I believe (Interview with author, Tokyo, December 2011).

Many interviewees emphasised the economic relationship between the two countries and the potentially significant benefits of interdependence. A defence analyst noted, for example:

With China there is an economically interdependent relationship. Already it is Japan’s biggest trading partner so we cannot just cut off the relationship. There needs to be mutual recognition of this relationship (Interview with author, Tokyo, December 2011).

A government MP that had expressed hawkish views on building up Japan’s military also emphasised the need for coexistence:

In terms of the Japan-China relationship, as one of being neighbours, well we can’t change that. We can’t ignore the economic dimension in particular even if we want to ignore each other politically. We ultimately have to find some way to deepen our economic development and move forward together. We have the Senkaku Islands territorial issue, and that is really difficult. But it is undeniable that they are a country next to us, and even if your neighbour is a trouble maker you have to find some way of getting on by (Interview with author, Tokyo, December 2011).

An organiser of a political society for young elites in Japan was similarly emphatic:
[While there are many problems with the Sino-Japanese relationship] we have to find a way to fit China in the international order. Japan should take the initiative and use soft power, hard power, economy, culture…everything, Japan needs to use networks and build international societal trust to achieve results (Interview with author, Tokyo, October 2011).

These attitudes are of significance in terms of possibilities for a degree of political reconciliation between the two countries if current diplomatic tensions are managed. After all, as Jerdén and Hagström argue (2012:218), the pervasive popular and scholarly narrative of Sino-Japanese rivalry “underestimates Japan’s own role in facilitating the rise of China” well into the 21st century. Jerdén and Hagström show that, since 1978, Japan has done much to accommodate China’s rise by facilitating “the successful implementation of China’s grand strategy,” and by respecting “China’s core interests and acting accordingly” (2012: 218). In other words, Japan has not gone out of its way to undermine China’s post-1978 rise, and, if accommodation is defined as helping a nation become more successful, prosperous or even powerful, then Japan has gone beyond engagement and has actually been accommodating China’s rise. In the 1980s, Japan even supported CCP political elites in China in their quest to consolidate political legitimacy (2012: 218-222).65 Jerdén and Hagström ultimately find that “Contrary to most of the literature in the field, we conclude that Japan has not been pursuing a policy of balancing or containment vis-a-vis China” (2012: 240).

Jerdén and Hagström’s argument is supported by Paul Smith (2009: 233) and Mike Mochizuki (2007b: 751) who both note that between 1972 and 1995 engagement was the most appropriate label to give to Japan’s China policy. Japan set about enhancing commercial relations with China, was sympathetic towards China’s grievances regarding Japan’s past aggression against China, and went out of the way to avoid security competition with China. Even after 1995 when Japan moved to “external balancing” by recommitting to the US-Japan alliance that had been adrift after the Cold War (Mochizuki,

65 Other accommodative foreign policy actions towards China include not undermining China’s perceived territorial integrity by supporting Taiwan’s status in the international community; not raising issues of national sovereignty around Tibet and Xinjiang; not making human rights a major concern of its foreign policy towards China despite the concerns of the Japanese public; actively pursuing trade with China; encouraging foreign direct investment in China; providing China with significant amounts of foreign aid; and embracing China as a partner in trying to build regionalism and cooperation on non-traditional security (Jerdén and Hagström 2012: 218-222).
Japan continued in implementing policies designed to engage and support China’s economic and social development.

Chapter Five showed that a majority of the public still preferred engagement to distancing Japan from China, despite the two countries going through their most difficult diplomatic period since the 1970s. At the time of the interviews, affinity for China had, however, dropped to its lowest post-1978 level (Cabinet Office of Japan 2014b). Despite this, only seven interviewees emphasised the need for Japan to take an inherently combative approach to China that would involve diplomatic containment and/or referenced some kind of policy approach that would alienate Japan from having wide-ranging interactions with China. A political lobbyist for a multinational corporation was the most pessimistic regarding the possibility of a cooperative Sino-Japanese relationship:

If Japan accepts and accommodates China on the Senkakus then it actually will encourage China to expand more. They will go beyond the Taiwan-Okinawa line. They are already investigating the area around Okinawa. […] With countries, like in the animal world, there is no sense of just getting on together well…it’s all about military power and money. Unfortunately we have around us Russia and China, who are powerful, and they are smart. In order to resist them, we can’t just rely on money and intelligence, but some military potential is essential. China is using lots of money on its military and strengthening, so Japan needs to somewhat balance this. […] Aside from China, then we should be willing to side with any countries in the broader region…..we should tell everyone that it is better to be with us because China is just so big and will be a threat (Interview with author, Tokyo, November 2011).

Encirclement of China

Answers to one question relating to whether Japan should build security and military relations with countries in South and Southeast Asia to meet security challenges show, however, that this is not the dominant view. A majority of interviewees asked this question (26 out of 49), while supportive of working on security issues with nations in South and Southeast Asia, spontaneously cautioned against turning such strengthened relations into some kind of specifically anti-Chinese policy. They were also generally cautious about an excessively military-orientated focus of connecting with countries to the south of Northeast
Asia. An official from a semi-government agency focused on economic diplomacy argued, for example:

I have some concerns about Japan and the strengthening of military in the region….it might cause alarm with China…I don’t think it will be a plus for Japan to strengthen itself militarily at this point (Interview with author, Tokyo, October 2011).

A senior manager at a large international company was similarly sceptical:

Wouldn’t China just feel encircled [if military relations were formed with other countries in East Asia]? Already there is military tension between China…I don’t feel such a policy is particularly sensible. No need to cause unnecessary tension (Interview with author, Tokyo, September 2011).

An MP suggested strengthened relations were fine, but was wary of an emphasis on Japan showing off its power projection capabilities:

First, the focus should be on the economy. In the military field, we can cooperate on intelligence. Joint exercises and humanitarian exercises are fine, but not explicitly militarily exercises. We are using the military, but not for military purposes (Interview with author, Tokyo, December 2011).

A political consultant with a multinational corporation was very specific:

I think it is good for us to send the MSDF to collaborate with the major nations in the area on various issues. However, the issue is that we must communicate to China that this is not a containment policy (Interview with author, Tokyo, October 2011).

8.3: China in Japan's Foreign Policy

Decisively positive formulations of China’s relationship to Japan started to fall away in the 1990s (Rozman 2001: 101-103), during the interviewees’ formative years period. Debate about China in public, policy and academic discourse became particularly fierce as Japan neared the end of the millennium (Rozman 2001: 106). The former “taboo” against considering China to be a threat has also fallen away (Rozman 2001: 107; Smith, 2009: 241). This suggests that, along with doubts about US global foreign policy, Heisei elites have been strongly influenced by discourses on China that portray a more “angst”-ridden
and pessimistic bilateral relationship (Smith 2001: 232). This is in comparison with the postwar sympathy for China (Johnson 1986: 406-409; Oguma 2007: 212), and the “naive romanticism” about China of the 1980s regarding the potential for the PRC to liberalise economically and politically with Japan’s help (Rozman 2001: 100-104; see also Green and Self 1996: 39-40). While there is still strong recognition of mutual interests between China and Japan that the two sides could focus on, there was little confidence that “the rise of China would enhance, not challenge, Japan’s regional and global status” (Rozman 2001: 101).

The awareness of mutual interests against the background of diplomatic distrust shows that the preferred strategy among Heisei elites for dealing with China’s rise and potential regional geopolitical challenges do not necessarily align with a type of rivalry based on strategic antipathy. It is far too early to describe Japan’s strategy towards China as containment, as argued by Hughes (2009b: 838-840) and others (Yeo 2006: 259; Rozman 2008: 223-224; Yang 2007: 266-268). Such a containment policy relates to Japan’s perceived effort to become a “normal nation” (Yeo 2006: 266), where it will increasingly relax the restrictions on the use of force for the purposes of centring the US-Japan alliance in Japan’s foreign policy (Hook and Son 2013:45) and keeping “China down” (Yeo 2006: 270-271; Ross and Zhu 2003; Odgaard 2008: 193-194). There is little indication that there is any desire for the kind of policy some officials in the Bush and Koizumi/Abe administrations have promoted, namely, the “forging a kind of NATO of the East with Japan the first ally of the US, politically, militarily, and ideologically in promoting universal values” (Rozman 2008: 227). Among the Heisei elite support for a “mutually reassuring strategic partnership based on common strategic interests” focused on absolute and shared gains for both Japan and China (Smith 2009: 231; Yoshimatsu 2012a: 111) has not been replaced by a type of strategic antipathy where Japan will only accept relative gains in its favour vis-a-vis China in zero-sum economic and diplomatic competition.

In any respect, the “eroding foundations of Japan’s national power” (Fouse 2013: 69-70) in terms of economic global influence are recognised by Japanese officials and the elites interviewed here as requiring an economic and socio-cultural embrace of China and the rest of Asia in order to maintain the levels of societal and economic wellbeing that Japan currently enjoys. This has resulted in the abandoning of the “pretension” of wanting to become a great power and increased awareness of the need to concentrate resources on “multilateral diplomatic efforts that will give the country its most effective means for
promoting national welfare and maintain foreign policy autonomy from great powers” (Fouse 2013: 70). Thus, while top-level political relations may be “cold” between the PRC and Japan, the working level relationship between Japan and China’s diplomats and business leaders “have developed relatively effective ways to deal with bilateral disputes and frictions in a constructive manner, as well as to deal with common challenges in the region” (Mochizuki 2004: 122). Mochizuki’s insight that the Sino-Japanese relationship is comprised of a “mix of “cooperation and coexistence” on the one hand, and “competition and friction” on the other, still seems appropriate (Mochizuki 2004: 121).

**Engagement and Competition through Regional Frameworks, Not Estrangement**

As argued by Soeya (2013) and Sohn (2010), Japan’s foreign policy will ultimately continue to be based on an acceptance of China’s rise, and rather than containment, Japan’s strategy will be to enmesh China in a cooperative regional order and liberal international order. Competition with China will take place more through battles over ‘regional vision’ within the context of multilateral forums in East Asia than through the competitive build-up of military capabilities. Only through showing leadership in region building, and having its preferences supported by other regional players, will the Japanese government be able to shape China’s rise in its favour (Sohn 2010: 500). Japan’s regional initiatives, in addition to serving Japan’s own mercantilist interests, are a form of “soft power strategy to counter China in the regional leadership stakes” that allow Japan to cooperate with nations with similar diplomatic preferences regarding the management of China’s rise (Yu Jose 2012: 118; see also Yoshimatsu 2012: 364, 368-369; Tanaka and Liff 2009: 3).

Even relatively hawkish Japanese analysts emphasise the need for Japan to become a “rule-promoting power” focused on multilateral binding, and emphasise the need for China and Japan both to adhere to a consistent set of rules in order to avoid conflict. For example, Mori Satoru, Sahashi Ryo, Itō Shōichi, Kotani Tetsuo, and Yoshihito Yasaki (all five prominent scholars were born between 1969 and 1978 and thus firmly part of the Heisei cohort) note that strategies to deal with China must focus on “building or stabilizing a rules-based order” as a complement to traditional deterrence-focused approaches (Mori et al., 2011: 5). They argue that balance of power approaches to “counter power with power,” while necessary, are ultimately limited “in terms of improving the equality of security as tension will rise limitlessly during power shifts,” and do not offer a way to build “strategic trust” and construct a “legitimate order…agreed upon by rising and leading nations” alike.
(Mori et al., 2011: 5). For these scholars “Japan should play a leading role in implementing the rule-promotion strategy, and rule promotion should be its defining identity in the age of power shifts, globalization, and resource constraints. Japan must convince other status quo powers to adopt similar approaches and thereby avoid severe strategic confrontation between rising and leading powers” (Mori et al., 2011:5).

Similar sentiments are expressed in a 2014 report titled, “Quiet Deterrence: Building Japan’s New National Security Strategy.” This report was co-authored by a group of influential Heisei cohort experts on security and diplomacy who wanted to provide a more nuanced alternative to the Japanese government’s first ever official National Security Strategy document, adopted in 2013.66 This report emphasised the need to deepen trust in Sino-Japanese diplomatic relations, to build and develop a cooperative relationship with China on such matters as energy and non-traditional areas of security, and to ensure appropriate bilateral risk and crisis management institutions are put in place to manage potential security contingencies between the two nations. The key strategic insight and goal articulated in this report is that while deterrence through the US-Japan alliance is required, Japan must also endeavour to support the development of regional conditions where China can pursue its interests through the maintenance of an amicable relationship with Japan, rather than a hostile one (RJIF 2014: 69-70). In particular, the report notes that “The reality of deep economic interdependence between Japan and China is often overshadowed by nationalistic sentiments over political disputes,” and a pressing task for both countries is to overcome this “strategic mismatch” (70). It is in this context of this moderate understanding of the security dilemma by some of Japan’s most prominent Heisei cohort security analysts that we can understand the continued emphasis on engagement and Japanese support for strengthening the deterrence mechanisms of the SDF and US-Japan alliance by focusing on deterrence by denial rather than by punishment.

Indeed, while it is true that the Heisei elite cohort appears to have some misgivings about the actual effectiveness of the “commercial liberal” assumption that increasing complex interdependence will enable the two countries to automatically reduce their tensions (Green and Self 1996: 50), it is not necessarily the case that they believe military instruments will prove to be any more effective in managing China’s rise. A large majority of interviewees

66 Heisei cohort authors of this report included Jimbō Ken, Akiyama Nobumasa, Nakayama Toshihiro, Aizawa Nobuhiro, Kotani Tetsuo, Shiozaki Akihisa, and Matsuda Yasuhiro.
indicated that a combative and aggressive approach to China is neither desirable nor possible given the pre-existing embedded relations between the two countries. The Heisei elites interviewed appear to accept the need for not only enmeshing Japan and China in an East Asian regional structure, but also Australia, India, New Zealand and even the United States and Russia, as is already being pursued by the Japanese government (Rozman 2010: 223).

The cultivation of increased multipolarity in Asia may be one of the only realistic strategies that will give Japan “confidence that China will not gain a dominant position” over it in the future which would allow it to economically, diplomatically and militarily coerce Japan to act against its will (Sohn 2010: 518; see also Fouse 2013: 70). Strengthening relations with countries that Japan has affinity for will play a role in ensuring no particular nation becomes dominant in an “Expanded East Asia” (kakudai higashi ajia) region in the future (Terada 2010). To the degree that the Japanese government is attempting to balance or constrain China, it is within the context of the concept of an integrated rules-based expanded East Asian community and a multipolar regional network (Fouse 2013: 70), rather than through a confrontational hard military balancing strategy which would include the full-scale development of offensive and retaliatory military deterrence capabilities. The strategic consensus that has formed in Japan could be characterised as “middle power realism” in which socio-economic integration is promoted and pursued within Asia on the one hand, while Japan hedges against Chinese military coerciveness in a low-profile and circumspect way through the US-Japan alliance on the other (Fouse 2013:70).

**Conclusion**

There is great concern among Heisei elites about China’s military build-up, scepticism of China’s future strategic intentions, and a strong sense that China and Japan have fundamentally different geopolitical aspirations for the East Asia region. Interviewees noted strong distrust of China’s strategic intentions, and placed an emphasis on different political values and attitudes towards international society between Japan and China. There is a strong perception that China desires to become a ‘normal’ great military power that, like the US, takes the attitude that it is not always beholden to international rules and norms. Similarly, there are expectations that China would engage in strategic competition with other great military powers in various parts of the globe, as well as try to assert hegemony over its own region in the form of a Sino-centric “Monroe Doctrine” (Mearsheimer 2010:
Interestingly, China-scepticism is not solely the domain of hawkish or conservative respondents, but also dovish interviewees were equally sceptical about China’s strategic intentions and foreign policy behaviour. This suggests that concerns about China are now shared throughout the political spectrum in Japan, even if there are differences over how to deal with the threat of China’s military strengthening. Tension between the two countries, whether motivated strategically by material interests, or by antagonism focused on national identity and nationalism, appears to be accepted by interviewees to be a long-term feature of the rise of China.

Interviewees, nevertheless, overwhelmingly indicated an awareness that Japan and China share mutual interests and destinies, and that Japan would ultimately have to find a way to live with a rising China. Preferences articulated by the elites were for promoting the co-binding of Japan and China into regional and global multilateral orders, as well as for encouraging as many other nations as possible to take a strong interest in supporting and participating in regional integration in East Asia and networks throughout the Asia-Pacific. Based on the interview responses, it appears that there is reduced confidence in commercial liberal assumptions and full political and economic engagement with China, as Japan pursued at least arguably up until the mid-2000s. This reduction in confidence, however, does not appear to have automatically equalled realpolitik-influenced security narratives becoming the dominant framework in Japan for articulating Japan’s response to the rise of China. Both economic engagement with China and the wider region, and a basic level of defensive deterrence and military cooperation with other nations, are seen to be necessary, but there is little optimism that either one will resolve the security dilemma Japan faces with China. While strategic antipathy towards China was the most well-developed of the three elements of militant internationalism that could herald a much more aggressive Japanese security policy posture in the future, even in this case the Heisei cohort wishes to see reactions to China’s rise stay within a range of responses which will allow Japan to continue to claim a distinctive peace nation identity for itself going forward, as detailed in the next chapter.
CHAPTER NINE: JAPAN’S EVOLVED PEACE NATION IDENTITY

The previous four empirical chapters provided analysis of quantitative and qualitative data gathered as part of this research project to explore the salience of militant internationalist attitudes in the security identity embraced by the Heisei generational cohort. These chapters did not find evidence of strong support for militant internationalist attitudes among the general public, including the Heisei segment, nor among the sample of Heisei elites interviewed as part of this study’s field work. While the traditional antipathy towards Japan’s own military, the SDF, and the alliance with the United States has decreased, as has Japanese sympathy and support for China’s rise in international relations, there is little evidence that generational change will be a driving force of an aggressive military approach to Japanese security policy. This concluding chapter takes these insights and articulates a new understanding of Japan’s peace nation identity that better aligns with the preferences expressed in the survey data and in the interviews, as well as with the concerns expressed in Japan’s domestic political contestation over security policy changes. An understanding of this contemporary identity brings clarity to the foreign and security policy choices made by Japan’s government and points to the normative restrictions under which the Japanese government continues to make security policy. After noting three limitations of this study, this chapter argues that, while antimilitarism may no longer be the most appropriate descriptive label to apply to Japan’s security identity, the broader national identity of Japan distinctively being a peace nation is still influential and shapes the way military threat and action are framed in security discourses among the public and the wider Japanese elite.

9.1: Limitations of the Study

One major limitation of this study is that it does not discuss the evolution of conservative or authoritarian nationalism and the potential for it to be a bridging factor for a more militant internationalist understanding of its security identity in the future. US research shows, for example, that those sections of the public most strongly in favour of projecting power overseas tend to score higher in terms of patriotic sentiment (Hurwitz, Peffley, and Seligson 1993: 247), “national chauvinism” as measured in terms of the belief in the superiority of one’s nation and its culture (Herrmann, Isernia, and Segatti 2009: 741-742), right-wing authoritarianism (Torabian and Abalakina 2012: 466-468), ethnocentrism (Kam and Kinder 2007: 328), nationalist exceptionalism forged upon messianic and religious evangelism (Guth 2006, 2012; Glazier 2012; Baumgartner, Francia, and Morris 2008: 171-179; Johns and Davies 2012: 1039), and strong conservative moral and social values (Baker,
Hurwitz, and Nelson 2008: 320-321; Johns and Davies 2012:1047). Vosse similarly found that in the Japan case there are correlations between a set of militarist attitudes and nationalism using the 2005 SAGE survey (2014: 26). This connection suggests that there is in fact a socio-cultural basis to militant internationalism formed around a specific type of conservative and authoritarian nationalist identity conception. This discussion and analysis was part of the original ambit for this study, however space limitations and the added complexity of discussing and connecting different types of socio-cultural attitudes with attitudes towards the use of force internationally is more appropriately covered in a separate study building upon this study’s initial findings.

Nevertheless, initial analyses conducted within this study suggested that the Japanese public are not particularly more nationalistic than the global average measured in terms of authoritarianism and attitudes towards loyalty to the state, and that this dynamic does not appear to be on a consistently upward trajectory. More importantly, members of the Heisei generational cohort are, contrary to predictions, less nationalistic than the antimilitarist peak cohort, and are considerably less authoritarian and conservative than the older generations. It is as yet unclear that an increase in threat perception and nationalist sentiment in Japan will necessarily lead to increased support for hawkish security policy. Appendix Two details a small set of these indicators.

A second limitation was the lack of availability of panel data, which in this case would be data on attitudes towards the same questions obtained over multiple time periods for the same individuals. This precluded life-cycle analysis. It may be possible, for example, that the antimilitarist peak cohort was considerably more antimilitarist in orientation during their youth, but became less so as they entered their fifties and sixties. It may also be possible, although not necessarily determined, that the Heisei cohort will become more hawkish as they get older, and will end up, on average, being more hawkish than either of the other two cohorts when measured at the same life stage. Nevertheless, as the attitudes during formative years are seen to have a significant impact on the persistence of political values into adulthood, even if “a capacity for life-long political learning exists” that can lead to changes (Markus 1979: 338; see also Delli Carpini 1988: 18-20), there is a high likelihood that the Heisei cohort will not deviate greatly from their current disposition, notwithstanding a global or society-altering security event taking place.
A final potential limitation relates to the need for caution in applying the findings to understanding the outcomes of security debates in Japan. This study was situated within the constructivist tradition, where domestic contestation over national identity frames shared understandings of risk, threat and security, and plays an influential, but not a determinative role in shaping a given nation’s policy choices and international behaviour. Sudden changes in international politics and major security events, alongside domestic factors such as political contestation and changes in the institutional influence of certain elite groups, also play an important role in shaping countries foreign and security policies. This thesis’ main goal was to explore the idea of whether a more hawkish or aggressive security identity among the Heisei generation in particular was driving Japanese security policy change. As discussed in more depth below, the research analysis showed that the peace nation identity is still prominent in an evolved form among the Heisei cohort, and generational change on its own will not be a factor that will enable the pursuit of a more hawkish Japanese security policy.

9.2: Japan’s Evolved Peace Nation Identity

The breakdown of traditional antimilitarism has led to arguments that Japan can no longer be regarded as a “nation dedicated to peace,” and that it has lost a sense of a distinctive national identity (George Mulgan 2009: 101). Both the quantitative and qualitative evidence analysed during this thesis indicate, however, attachment to Article 9 and an aversion to the use of force overseas is still a significant factor in the security policy worldview of all segments of the Japanese public and younger Japanese elites. There is still a sense that Japan has a special and distinctive approach to international relations as a country that has inherited a constitution based on the aspirational principles of the United Nations and a desire for peace as expressed in Article 9. Alexander Bukh has asserted that the discursive concept of Japan being a “peaceful nation” has been a postwar constant in Japan, but what “peaceful nation” means overtime has evolved in response to contestation in Japan’s political discourse (Bukh 2009: 10; see also Ogawa 2011: 375). Based on the evidence collected through this thesis, the outline of an evolved concept of the peace nation ideal that underpins Japan’s security identity can indeed be discerned.

Evolved Elements of Japan’s Peace Nation Identity

While Japan’s original peace nation identity contrasted Japan’s peaceful postwar democratic and economic growth with that of its own pre-war militarism and that of US
postwar militarism in East Asia, the focus of concern in this identity contrast has evolved since the 1970s. While the peace nation identity still encapsulates qualities that mark Japan as different from modern Western states, in particular the US, from the 1970s general opinion towards the US has overall improved (Linley 2011). Since the mid-to-late 1970s, the “Othering” of threats to Japan’s physical security in its political discourse has instead focused on the rise of aggressive, undemocratic, nationalistic and military-focused states in North East Asia (Bukh 2009: 11; Suzuki 2007: 29-31; Wirth 2009: 473-474; Hagström 2014). There has therefore been a recalibration of risk associated with certain security policy actors and institutions in Japan (Mason 2014: 17-20), such as the SDF, pro-military conservative elites, China, the United States, USSR/Russia, and the DPRK. The change in the way both internal and external security actors have been identified as high-risk entities of concern for Japan’s security policy has evolved over time and has led to a subtle reconceptualization of Japan’s peace nation identity. This in turn has affected norms surrounding Japanese security policy and the expression of Japanese security identity in security discourses.

In concrete terms, the Soviet Union’s activities and military build-up in Northeast Asia in particular from the 1970s until the mid-1980s was seen as particularly aggressive. (Bukh 2009: 26-39; Ferguson 2007: 55; Kimura 2000: 120, 199-301). This perception played a role in Japan reconceptualising its relationship with the United States in particular, which was no longer seen as pursuing as problematic a foreign policy in the post-Vietnam War era. The Soviet Union’s role in reinforcing the alliance as valuable for Japan’s security rather than a potential threat to Japan’s security was then taken over almost seamlessly by the People’s Republic of China and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea from the early-to-mid 1990s. The PRC in particular was perceived to have taken advantage of the post-Cold War US and Russian military drawdown from the region to build up and modernize its military, and push it maritime claims.⁶⁷ Due to the increased sense of risk and threat, the Japanese government made policy adjustments that challenged Japan’s traditional antimilitarism. Instead of discarding the still salient peace nation identity and engaging in a rapid military build-up similar to the USSR and the USA during the 1980s, and similar to the PRC after the end of the Cold War, a slow reconfiguration of Japan’s

⁶⁷ In this sense, the PRC’s emphasis on increase naval power projection capabilities has been particularly notable (Drifte 2012: 25-82; Takamine 2012: 62-64; Wirth 2009: 486; Kitaoka 2011: 5-8; Ishida 2008: 50-51; NIDS 2011: 9-14; Asahi Globe 2014; Yoshihara and Holmes 2005: 682-687; Rozman 2001: 113-114).
security institutions as well as Japan’s peace nation identity has taken place side-by-side in an incremental way that has allowed Japanese citizens to retain a plausible attachment to the positive sense of self that had come from identification with a distinctive peace nation identity.

**Continued Rejection of Great Military Power Identity**

While there was obvious pride in Japan’s various postwar political, economic and technological achievements, the contemporary security identity imbibed by the Heisei cohort in particular is not that of a great military power in waiting (cf. Layne 1993: 38-39; Rozman 2003). There were no indications in the sample of aspirations for Japan to become a great power, despite Japan having the economic and technological capability to do so (Oros 2014: 229). 68 This is critical because true great powers need to think about themselves as great powers that not only play an active role in international politics, but have special rights to “play a part in determining issues that affect the peace and security of the international system as a whole” (Buzan 2004: 60-61). The key difference from the traditional antimilitarist period, however, is that the dominant identity in terms of Japan’s international positioning is not that of Japan being a “small,” reclusive and passive power (Iokibe 2013: 9), but of Japan being a positively engaged, regionally influential middle power in favour of binding itself closer to multi-tiered diplomatic and socioeconomic frameworks of the Indo-Pacific (Ashizawa 2003: 374; Ashizawa 2008: 592; Sahashi 2012: 224).

There are three major tiers in this multi-tiered vision of regional networks. First tier mechanisms include traditional bilateral and dyadic security cooperation frameworks such as military alliances and strategic partnerships. Second tier frameworks are “needs-based” (Sahashi 2012: 230) or “ad hoc arrangements” (Ashizawa 2003: 364) among a larger group of specific states. They are designed to address specific security issues such as disaster relief response, piracy and terrorism, and peacebuilding support, or intended to address and negotiate over issues such as the DPRK nuclear weapons program, climate change and transnational pollution, and transnational resource management. The third tier in this vision refers to regularized multilateral forums such as the ARF, the East Asia Summit, ASEAN, ASEAN plus Three, or APEC (Sahashi 2012: 217-218), as well as forums for the

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68 While there are no recent polls on this question, a Yomiuri poll taken on May 23, 1995, showed that 74 percent of respondents did not expect that Japan would ever again become a great military power, with only 18 percent even contemplating the possibility (Ikenberry and Mastanduno 2003: 11-12).
negotiation of region-wide trade agreements such as the TPP or RCEP. Rather than throwing around its military weight, a preferred leadership role for Japan is through it trying to thread together the different multi-tiered frameworks and thus “advance original ‘made-in-Japan’ perspectives in a visible manner” (Ashizawa 2003: 376). Ashizawa argues that taking an active role in promoting multi-tiered frameworks in the region “offers Japanese foreign policy-makers more space to manoeuvre in their foreign and security policy-making toward the United States as well as other countries in Asia, including China and South Korea (2003: 377).”

By design, therefore, Japan’s trade and investment links with the expanded East Asia region has rapidly increased over the last 15 years, and Japan has extended more ODA to Southeast Asia than to any other region (Lam 2009b: 121-122). Japan has also contributed to peacekeeping and peacebuilding activities in the region, and has provided considerable humanitarian relief after natural disasters (Sudo 2009: 146-149). Because of sensitivities regarding the past and Japan’s own preferences, the Japanese government is still careful to not project the appearance of it being a military hegemon in its approach to regional countries, in contrast to events of the World War II period (Yu Jose 2012: 124; Inoguchi 2011: 234; Christoffersen 2009: 110-111). An example of this can be seen in the area of maritime security. Peng Er Lam (2009b: 116) argues that “Rather than naval brute force, Japan has adopted a multilateral approach with littoral states in East Asia to create cooperative norms to support a maritime regime of global public good,” rather than attempting to become the primary provider of maritime security as a great power might. The Japanese government’s dispatch of Japan Coast Guard rather than the SDF for capacity building, joint training, and regional security cooperation, has been a particularly notable element of this policy (Manicom 2010: 33-36; Black 2012: 276). This overall policy approach appears to have worked as there are very high levels of affinity for Japan among the citizenry in Southeast Asian nations in particular, and there is little fear of a resurgent Japanese militarism (MOFA 2014c).

This cooperative middle power or regional power aspect of Japan’s peace nation identity provides a positive identity contrast with a perceived domineering and increasingly military-oriented Chinese security policy as China rises to become a significant player in regional and international relations. This is because China’s rise is viewed as being supervised by an opaque, undemocratic and anti-Japanese Chinese Communist Party that is pursuing full-scale remilitarisation for the explicit purposes of becoming a great military
There is also a general perception that China does not assign “high priority to Asian-based regional institutionalism” even as a means to solve its own economic and security problems (Sahashi 2012: 228; Hosoya 2011: 16-20), and is determined to assert itself as Asia’s sole great power. Scepticism of great power motivations is also apparent when considering the United States. It appeared that many in the interview sample had been affected by the US wars in the Middle East, often offering them as negative examples without prompting from the researcher. An identity as supporter of the US-Japan alliance was strong among the Heisei elite cohort, and over the last two decades pro-alliance sentiment has strengthened among the public to the point where the Japan Socialist Party, an explicitly anti-alliance political party, is no longer a major player in Japanese politics (Hatakeyama 2005: 15; Oshiba 1999: 16). Nevertheless, there are some continuities in that interventionist US policies are still seen with scepticism and represent the undesirable behaviour of a great military power, in contrast to Japan’s (apparent) peaceful democratic disposition.

In this sense, Soeya argues that Japan shares with countries in Southeast Asia an appreciation for the importance of “middle power cooperation” against the backdrop of the competitive USA-China relationship (Soeya 2009: 293; Singh 2010: 395-396). The pursuit of regional enmeshment, or “multicephalism,” meaning “many headedness” (Berger 2010), “provides a strategic opportunity for the countries breathing between the USA and China, including Japan, to coordinate policies and create solid infrastructure of an East Asian security order in the coming years” (Soeya 2009: 294). Rather than competing with China as a great military power, geopolitical competition is likely to take place through “conceptual competition” over visions for an East Asian order (Soeya 2009: 301-302; Sohn 2010: 518). In this conceptual competition, Japan is more likely to place emphasis on trade cooperation, development and environmental aid, human security and shared values as drivers of regional integration while advocating for US, India, Australia and New Zealand to also make contributions as part of an ‘expanded’ East Asia region (Sohn 2010: 498). Japan will thus position itself as a nation that rejects regional hegemony and a hierarchical concept of regional stability based on Sino-centric conceptions of regional order (Soeya 2005a: 112-114; Soeya 2009: 301). On the other hand, the Japanese public and the wider group of elites will not support a *Pax Americana* in the way that Japanese normal nationalists have started to assert from the 1980s (Takekawa 2007: 71).
Japan's International Contribution in a New Era

The conceptualisation of Japan’s international contribution is also a component of Japan’s peace nation identity that has evolved over time. During the antimilitarist peak, the Japanese government was cautious in taking on leadership roles, regionally or globally, because of residual concern about Japan’s wartime behaviour. This is in addition to the suspicion of engagement in early Cold War ideological and great power military competition that both Japanese elites and the public wished to avoid. Japan’s most important contribution to international peace and stability would be best achieved by retaining a detached, low-profile pacifist approach to diplomacy and regional and global security through the embrace of “one-country pacifism” (Miyagi 2009: 350). From the 1970s, however, a higher profile regional and international policy was put into place by the Japanese government.

On the back of its economic comeback, increased confidence, and foreign policy independence (Ito 2003: 21, 54-58; Takamine 2012: 42-44; Havens 1987: 224), Japan was well placed to react to changes in regional geopolitics and expectations for a constructive Japanese role in the aftermath of the Vietnam War (Haddad 1980: 11-13; Yano 1978: 61-62). It promulgated the Fukuda Doctrine in 1977, before moving on to assist China economically after its opening up in 1978. On the basis of its comprehensive security concept, the government engaged in diplomatic outreach in terms of ODA to the wider region and beyond during the 1980s, and played a high-profile role in the Cambodian peace process. In the post-Cold War era, Japan also dispatched the SDF on UNPKO and disaster relief operations, promoted regional cooperation and multilateral binding through institution building, and played a leading role in formulating human security-orientated peacebuilding approaches to reducing instability in its region and beyond. Through these activities, Japan has sought to internationalize its peace nation identity by embracing basic “system-level norms,” such as providing ODA to less affluent nations and contributions to UNPKOs and disaster relief operations, in order to be “accepted as a legitimate world player” (Miyagi 2009: 350). Japan would attempt to refashion its regional and international identity in a way that promoted the idea that it was a cooperative player that would make an international contribution (kokusai kōken) and would not export insecurity or make others feel insecure.
The dispatch of the SDF overseas for UN missions did, however, create tensions in Japan’s domestic debate due to the centrality of the war renouncing Article 9 and the Peace Constitution to Japan’s peace nation identity. Japanese politicians and elites of various ideological backgrounds, while all having different underlying reasons for doing so, have therefore started to invoke the preamble of the constitution in justifying Japan making a greater international contribution through SDF dispatch (Takekawa 2007: 73; Ishizuka 2005: 68-69; Singh 2011: 442-444; Akimoto 2012a). This has been achieved by pointing to the principles enshrined in the preamble which include a “desire to occupy an honoured place in an international society striving for the preservation of peace, and the banishment of tyranny and slavery, oppression and intolerance for all time from the earth,” the belief “that no nation is responsible to itself alone,” and the pledge “to accomplish these high ideals and purposes with all our resources.” In essence, the argument is increasingly being made that Article 9 cannot be understood without reference to its obligations to the international community or without Japan making a contribution to international security and stability that would allow it to enjoy the fruits of Article 9 (Kantei 2014d: 12; Gibbs 2010: 141).

Japan’s new peace nation concept demands that Japan not passively benefit from international order and stability that underpins its prosperity as it arguably did during the early Cold War (Suzuki 1985: 47). In August 2010, a civilian and private Prime Minister’s panel, (The Council on Security and Defense Capabilities in the New Era 2010), tried to balance Japan’s security needs, its international obligations, and its peace nation identity through reconceptualising Japan as a “peace creating nation” (heiwa sōzō kokka) that would more proactively dispatch the SDF overseas. More recently, in the first ever Japanese National Security Strategy, it was identified up front that Japan should strive to make a “proactive contribution to peace based on the principle of international cooperation” (kokusai kyōchō-shugi ni motozoku ‘sekkyoku-teki heiwa-shugi’) (Kantei 2013b). It is important to note, however, that public and regional acceptance of these new concepts has only been possible precisely because the SDF has engaged in post-conflict non-combat and non-coercive UNPKO roles (such as infrastructure building) and disaster relief, and stopped short of taking on a conventional combat role outside of Japan’s borders in support of US overseas interventions (Midford 2002: 41).

Miyaoka (2011) argues that this new non-combat (but not antimilitarist) security identity has been largely accepted because it accords slightly better with the reality of Japanese
government policies than the previous strict traditional antimilitarist identity. This is because it has “relieved” the Japanese public and government officials of the “cognitive dissonance” between Japan being an alliance partner of the US with its own robust armed forces on the one hand, while somehow still being committed to a ‘pacifist’ or strictly antimilitarist security identity on the other (2011: 240, 251). Japan can now cooperate with its main alliance partner and other nations’ militaries, and can make contributions to regional and international security while cooperating with the United Nations, as long as cooperation with these international actors remains non-combat in orientation and is in line with international rules and norms. Critical to the domestic acceptance of non-combat military contribution, however, is that Japan’s overall international contribution must remain non-military in overall orientation and that military solutions must not displace non-military solutions to conflict as discussed in section 6.3 of Chapter Six.

In fact, when the Koizumi administration emphasised military contributions to the UN and the US-Japan alliance as a critical component of Japan’s international contribution, this did not go uncontested. By capitalising on public support and preferences for UN-focused non-combat, humanitarian-orientated contributions overseas, JICA and MOFA have in the post-Koizumi era managed to successfully marginalise the SDF and the MOD within Japan’s bureaucratic apparatus in favour of their own non-military visions of human security contributions through ODA and personnel assistance in post-conflict spaces (Hynek 2012: 66-67). The international leadership role played by Japan in the human security and peacebuilding space connected to the pursuit of Millennium Development Goals, and the international acceptance of this role, has also been a point of prestige for the Japanese government which has further consolidated and legitimated the approach (Hynek 2012: 67-70, 74). SDF activities have therefore been pursued in the context of wider non-military government contributions to international and regional security, which is further strengthened by the large number of private Japanese NGOs that work with the Japanese government and international and regional organisations to implement this agenda (Yeo 2013: 74; Hughes 2007: 333-334). As such, the Japanese government and other Japanese non-government organisations have played roles as mediators in internal conflict cessation negotiations, and have promoted human security orientated approaches through the provision of ODA, such as the development of local governance, human resources, infrastructure and capacity building. They have also emphasised poverty reduction for

This orientation to peacebuilding allows Japan to forge economic and political relations with countries around Japan in a way that is distinct from the United States (Osei-Hwedie 2011: 91). This is because the US has been criticised for being overly focused on military-orientated contributions to international security and is too focused on state security rather than local capacity building to prevent conflict recurrence when involved in peacebuilding initiatives (Osei-Hwedie 2011: 92-97; Kikkawa 2007: 248-251). The Japanese government and Japanese civil society organisations have in their cooperation positioned Japan’s international contribution as that of a “humanitarian power” (Hook and Son 2013: 46-47), or a “humanitarian relief power” (Williams 2006: 400-402), or, as the Japanese government itself has identified (Kantei 2010), a “peace-creating nation” (Miyaoka 2011: 240). Despite discussion of military normalisation, Japanese public opinion and government policy demonstrates the continuing power of norms and socio-cultural preferences “to inform state identities rooted on a non-violent contribution to international peace and security” in the case of Japan (Hook and Son 2013: 47).

The SDF and Overseas Territorial Combat Aversion

While Japan’s original postwar peace nation identity was built on a wide-ranging antimilitarism that strictly limited the policymaking influence and the activities of the SDF internally, while erecting a firewall between the SDF and USFJ, such strict antimilitarist sentiment no longer seems to be a dominant feature of modern Japanese political debate. Japanese have become more comfortable with the SDF over time (Samuels, 2013:80), and perceive that it has a valuable role in collaboration with USFJ in defending the nation. There is also comfort with dispatching the SDF overseas for a limited number of humanitarian purposes. The threat to Japanese democracy and to foreign nations through the loss of civilian control is also no longer feared (Samuels 2013: 91, 107-108). As a salient expression of this development, the Japanese Emperor felt comfortable enough to make mention of the SDF for the first time ever publicly after the March 11, 2011 Tohoku earthquake and tsunami (Samuels 2013: 85), and followed this up with a first ever visit to an SDF base (Kitano 2014). Applications to the SDF, the MOD, and the National Defence Academy have increased in quantity and quality, and members of the SDF itself also no
longer feel compelled to change into mufti when outside of bases to avoid public scrutiny or criticism, as was the case until recently (Samuels 2013: 93).

Subsequent surveys revealed that 95 percent of the public supported the SDF’s Tohoku operations, 88 percent agreed it was appropriate for the SDF to have worked with the US military to provide relief, 91.7 percent supported the SDF in general, and 75 percent indicated that the SDF is the institution they most trust (Samuels 2013: 92). This represents a significant turnaround from thirty years prior when in 1984 only 36 percent of the Japanese public had a positive perception of the SDF (Mochizuki 2004: 110). There appears to no longer be a “military allergy” (Samuels 2013: 92) in terms of general public attitudes towards the SDF in Japan, with strong consistent majorities seeing the SDF favourably since the 1990s and peaking after the Tohoku disaster (Vosse 2014: 14). The analysis of attitudes of the Heisei elite cohort in this research similarly revealed only two interviewees out of fifty-six being concerned about the current roles of the SDF.

Scepticism nevertheless remains about widening the roles of the SDF or the US-Japan alliance to include combat roles (Samuels 2013: 81-84). In fact, after the Tohoku disaster, an influential narrative was one that rejected the idea of Japan being a “strong nation with a strong military” (fukoku kyōhei), and emphasised that Japan should become senshin saigai kyōkoku, or “a strong country with advanced disaster response capabilities,” in order to make an appropriate contribution to international wellbeing (Samuels 2013: 86-87). While this narrative was not influential enough to lead to majority support to ‘disarm’ the SDF, it seems to have discursively undermined conservative political actors in Japan who wanted to use the disaster, and the increased popularity of the SDF and the US-Japan alliance, to justify the need for Japan to play a greater military role in global affairs. Instead of a “major Tohoku dividend – either for war-fighting capacity of the Japanese troops or for the U.S.-Japan alliance” (Samuels 2013: 109), the response to the disaster provided a “proof of concept” for the current SDF as well as the current alliance relationship (Samuels 2013: 90) by effectively demonstrating that, in collaboration with USFJ, the SDF could be quickly and effectively mobilised at a time of national emergency to ‘protect’ the Japanese homeland (Samuels 2013:98).

One of the reasons for this lack of enthusiasm for expanded SDF roles is because a fundamentally important peace nation norm still underpins Japan’s claim to having a distinctive commitment to being a peace nation in comparison with various other nations.
This norm is the restriction on the operational and legal ability of the SDF to conduct overseas combat, particularly within the territory of another nation. In essence, Japan should avoid becoming a nation “that can go to war” (sensō ga dekiru kuni). War in this sense refers to “offensive operations” (Adams 2003: 53), which could be conducted for the coercive purpose or territorial conquest or occupation, or for deterrence purposes through retaliation against an aggressive nation-state. In this sense, the core principles that underpinned Japan’s military restraint since the 1950s still stand, even if the wider antimilitarist restrictions have been relaxed due to decreasing concerns about the US-Japan alliance and the behaviour of Japan’s pro-military elites.

For example, Japan retains constitutional, legal, and normative proscriptions on waging “aggressive war” inside or against the territory of other nations, even as it has moved towards allowing the SDF to operate overseas in a wider variety of situations (Oros 2014: 238). The destruction of the civilian and economic infrastructure of another nation by a Japanese military, as characterised Japanese military adventurism on the East Asian mainland during World War II, are still seen as the ultimate taboo in Japan alongside the possession of nuclear weapons (Ogawa 2011: 387-388). Related to this, the SDF domestically still does not legally possesses belligerent rights, which based on international law, allows during wartime the “killing, maiming, and destruction of the military forces of another country” in an international conflict, and the coercive occupation of territory against the will of another nation (Samuels 2004: 9). Japan also continues to avoid the possession of “war potential” in terms of having a defence force that possesses the hardware necessary for aggressive warfare, and the SDF on the whole is still not capable of posing a realistic threat to Japan’s neighbours (Samuels 2004: 5). Support for maintaining these normative restrictions came through strongly in the surveys analysed in Chapter Five, and in the analysis of interview transcripts in Chapter Six. The evidence clearly showed a continued, almost instinctive opposition to the SDF engaging in combat overseas and inside other nations that many other developed nations’ militaries accept as a sometimes necessary reason for existence.

9.3: Japan’s Exercise of Collective Self-Defence and Normative Restraints

Critically, this anti-war norm has been playing an influential role in restraining the second Abe administration’s attempts in 2014 to engineer change in the current interpretation of Article 9 to allow Japan to exercise its right to collective self-defence. Many of the specific
contingencies that are up for debate in the context of this new understanding of Japan’s
defence mobilisation are limited to non-combat activities, such as minesweeping, logistics
and provisioning, protecting ships providing humanitarian relief and conducting
evacuations, and ballistic missile defence. This highly conservative approach is due to the
concern that has been expressed about whether the ability to exercise the right to collective
self-defence would allow Japan to go as far as travel to another country to engage in combat
within their territory (Kazama 2014; Asahi Shimbun 2014f), or proactively engage in
hostilities on the high seas (Kyodo 2014). Prime Minister Abe and the LDP ruling party in
the lead up to the decision on reinterpreting the constitution have therefore had to clearly
assert that Japan would not be using force within the territory of other nations (Asahi
Shimbun 2014g). Even in providing non-combat support to military operations justified by
reference to collective self-defence or authorised by the UN, the SDF would not be allowed
to engage in combat (sentō kōi), to directly support military activities in combat zones, or
dispatch the SDF overseas for the explicit purpose of using force (kaigai hahei) (Mainichi
Shimbun 2014b; Mie 2014a; 47 News 2014). Ultimately, in declaring his support for
adjusting the current interpretation of Article 9 at a May 15, 2014 press conference, Prime
Minister Abe asserted that that it was a mistake to characterise his policy as one that would
allow Japan to become a “nation that can go to war” (nihon ga futatabi sensō wo suru kuni
ni naru to itta gokai ga arimasu). Abe forthrightly declared that “The Self-Defence Forces
would never join armed conflicts such as the Gulf War and the Iraq War with the intent of
using force” (Abe 2014). Abe later clarified in a June 9, 2014 House of Councillors
committee meeting that the SDF would not engage in “acts like launching air strikes,
shelling and forcibly entering the enemy’s territory” (Yomiuri Shimbun 2014a).

Despite his position of political strength at the time and his personal determination, Abe
was unable to push through a reinterpretation that would allow Japan to completely
embrace collective self-defence. Abe and his advisors were restrained by an alignment of
bureaucratic forces such as the Cabinet Legislative Bureau and the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, pro-Article 9 political forces, and public concern (Aoyama 2014), and were only
able to reinterpret Article 9 to include a “limited” form of collective self-defence (Kuramae
2014). The exercise of this limited right is conditional on any overseas attack on another
nation posing an existential threat to the Japanese nation (Kantei 2014c). In this new
formula, collective self-defence “would be exercised within the spectrum of the individual
right of self-defense” (Togo 2014), an outcome which brings into question whether the new
understanding can even be considered “real” collective self-defence (Hosoya 2014a; Aoyama 2014).

Subsequent to the July 1 cabinet declaration that promulgated a reinterpretation of Article 9, the Abe government’s support fell rapidly, resulting in the enabling legislation being delayed considerably (Davis 2014). In follow up debate in the Japanese parliament, Abe was forced again to clearly indicate that Japan would not be able to participate in prior US wars such as the Gulf War or the war in Iraq on the basis of this new ruling, and even in cases where the SDF was providing support overseas, if combat broke out in the area of operations then Japan’s forces would have to withdraw (Aoyama 2014). Abe had to constantly reject assertions that Japan would become a country that would go to war, would become entrapped in war, or would have to introduce conscription to fill the SDF ranks because of the reinterpretation (Moritaka 2014).

Furthermore, when faced with the question of whether Japan supported US air strikes in Iraq and Syria during August and September of 2014, Abe and Minister of Foreign Affairs Kishida Fumio repeatedly avoided saying that Japan “supported” (shiji suru) the airstrikes. They referred only to supporting the broader war on terror while making it clear that they merely “understand” (rikai suru) why the US is conducting air strikes (Sankei News 2014a, 2014b; Jiji Press 2014). Given the slightly differing linguistic nuances between these two concepts compared to English, and Japanese political practice, such distinctions are significant concessions to public sensitivities about Japanese participation in overseas wars and elite concerns about the domestic and international legal basis of the Obama administration’s interventions in the Middle East (Kobayashi 2014). Instead of supporting the airstrikes militarily, Abe noted that Japan would enhance SDF participation in (post-conflict) peacekeeping operations. Just prior to making a speech to United Nations General Assembly (UNGA), Abe told Japanese reporters that Japan’s specific contribution to the problem of ISIL would not be a military contribution but humanitarian contributions to countries in the area and to refugees through cooperation with international organisations (Sankei News 2014c). In his eventual speech to the UNGA at around the time of the start of the air strikes, Abe emphasised that Japan has made a “pledge never to wage war,” and that “Japan is a nation that has worked to eliminate a ‘war culture’ and will spare no efforts to continue doing so” (Kobayashi 2014). It is clear that in the aftermath of his controversial decision to reinterpret Article 9, Abe understood the need to assure the public by paying
respect to this still strong anti-war and anti-combat norm, and its influence over Japanese political discourse.

Proponents and supporters of a more active international military role for Japan also noted the resilience of Japan’s peace nation identity as demonstrated by the controversy over Abe’s moves on collective self-defence. Hosoya Yuichi, who was part of a committee that gave advice to Prime Minister Abe on engineering the reinterpretation of Article 9, admitted that the reaction to the cabinet declaration was stronger than expected and that Japanese clearly “hate” the possibility of “Japan being involved in foreign wars” (Hosoya 2014b). Tatsumi (2014) also notes that despite Abe’s rhetoric about Japan making a greater contribution to international security partially through the collective self-defence reinterpretation by engaging in chikyuugi-fukan-gaiko (diplomacy taking a panoramic view of the world map), he was unable to bring the public along in terms of expanding Japan’s international security footprint. Tatsumi notes that it was clear the Japanese government was avoiding getting politically and militarily involved in geopolitical issues related to the Middle East or the Ukraine and had “fallen back on its usual approach of providing financial aid for humanitarian assistance.” Mochizuki (2014), while admitting that he would like to see Japan participate in UN collective security missions, saw the negative reaction to even the limited exercise of collective self-defence as pointing to the continuation of the peace nation identity. Mochizuki argues that a critical reason for this is because of the “rich tradition of postwar peace and conflict studies in Japan that takes a sceptical view of the utility of military force in addressing international conflicts. Indeed one does not have to be a hard-core pacifist to recognize how the use of force in a number of cases exacerbated security problems rather than solved them.”

Concerns about broader US global foreign policy and combat-orientated military interventionism in particular played an important role in the 2014 collective self-defence debate, despite many Japanese being comfortable with the US-Japan alliance’s role in East Asia in a way that they were not during the antimilitarist peak. Recent US wars offered up two types of negative examples that the Japanese media noted could pose troubles to Japan if it embraces collective self-defence. First, there is the traditional concern that Japan may become entrapped in wars overseas with imperial dimensions, which will harm its diplomatic image (47 News 2014; Japan Federation of Bar Associations 2014; Asahi Shimbun 2014f, 2014h; Hokkaido Shimbun 2014; Kyoto Shimbun 2014). Second, these wars point to the types of military quagmires and morally dubious situations Japan might
get involved in if it allows itself to be involved in combat overseas based on the pretext of collective self-defence (Nishi-Nippon Shimbun 2014; Koichi Shimbun 2014; Asahi Shimbun 2014i; Mainichi Shimbun 2014c). Certainly among the public, the wars in the Middle East have contributed to the revival of activities of anti-war grassroots organisations and NGOs, such as the Article 9 Association (Ogawa 2011: 388-391). Ogawa goes so far as to argue that the thousands of new Article 9 Associations around the country are responsible for a turnaround in public sentiment favourable towards revising the constitution and Article 9 since the mid-2000s (393). The data from the public opinion polls and the interviews indicated that antipathy towards the Iraq and Afghanistan wars have helped to keep alive in the Heisei generation the view that overseas military adventurism is not only immoral but an ineffective method of addressing security problems.

These developments suggest that the broader societal commitment to the peace nation identity and anti-war sentiment is genuinely felt and is a restraint on Japan’s normal nationalists, and not simply a “temporary veil covering Japan’s full scale militarisation” (Hook and Son 2013: 51). The contested nature of changes to Japan’s security policy can be seen in the above examples. Hawkish elites cannot dictate policy changes and face significant public and institutional resistance to change that impact upon policymaking outcomes (Miyagi 2009: 351; Oros 2014: 235-245). While there has been much concern expressed about some of Japan’s recent military acquisitions, Japan ultimately remains unable to conduct sustained offensive operations in any meaningful way far beyond its surrounding waters. A careful analysis of the tactical and operational uses of platforms such as the SDF’s helicopter carriers, fighter jets, Aegis-equipped destroyers, in-air refuelling tankers, and submarines, show that they all have convincing defensive roles while allowing only minimal ability to project power into another nation’s territory (Wallace 2013: 487-488). Many of Japan’s controversial military platforms, such as the various transport aircraft and maritime vessels able to move large numbers of troops and materiel, have also played essential roles in humanitarian rather than combat activities both at home and overseas, thereby justifying their value (Yoshihara and Holmes 2006: 38; Takahashi 2006b: 237; Goldman 2013: 130). Even the recent improvement in Japan’s amphibious capabilities, which for most countries are a breakout offensive/combat expeditionary capability, are kept modest in terms of troop numbers, and are justified by reference to defence of Japan’s 6,800 offshore islands from on-going Chinese maritime incursions. The lessons learned from the 2011 earthquake and tsunami, where the ability to access remote areas from the sea would
have saved lives, has also been used as justification (Samuels 2013: 101-102; Goldman 2013: 130).

Even though in theory some of Japan’s more recent hardware acquisitions could be used for limited offensive purposes, this manner of justifying Japan’s acquisitions is in itself notable. In order to push forward on their agenda, politically powerful elites in favour of a stronger military still need to frame their vision for Japan’s security evolution in terms of its application to self-defence at home and humanitarian contributions abroad. They also need to provide reassurance that Japan will not be involved in aggressive war overseas, including alongside the United States. This has the effect of reinforcing rather than challenging the overall norm, even while incremental policy changes are made. Japan’s overall military posture and planning is therefore still largely focused around *senshu bōei*, or defensive-orientated defence, as support for military restraint remains in place and identification with the aspirations contained within the concept of Japan being a peace nation remain salient.

**Conclusion**

This has been the first systematic and in-depth study of how generational change will impact upon security policymaking. Chapter Three outlined Japan’s traditional antimilitarist security identity, which served as a basis for comparison with contemporary conceptions of Japan’s security identity. Chapter Four outlined the institutional and policy challenges to Japan’s traditional antimilitarism that started in the 1980s, as well as detailed explanations for change focused on the rise of nationalism and increased salience of *realspolitik* discourse that is purported to have influenced younger Japanese citizens and elites in particular. The four subsequent empirical chapters tested these assertions by analysing attitudes among the Heisei public segment and a sample of Heisei elites towards security issues. This was done by reference to the concept of militant internationalism which is an orientation to international security politics that overlaps neatly with the views of a group of influential Japanese security policy hawks called normal nationalists.

By analysing a wide range of quantitative poll data, Chapter Five showed that militant internationalist ways of thinking about international security was rejected by all three generational cohorts. All cohorts were resistant to the idea of projecting military power overseas, particularly offensive and combat-orientated military power projection. The Japanese public and the Heisei cohort were happy with the US-Japan alliance maintaining
its current regional and territorial security focus, and did not wish to see the alliance widened in a way that would see Japan committed to a global alliance predicated on the cooperative use of force overseas alongside the US and other allies. Chapter Five identified significant concern among all generational cohorts in regard to China’s military rise, and high levels of threat perception. It did indicate, however, that there was no desire among the Heisei cohort for Japan to pursue a military build-up, contain China militarily, or for Japan to distance itself from China diplomatically. Generational differences among the three generational cohorts were in most cases small and not statistically significant. Where there were substantive differences, it was usually the oldest postwar cohort that was the most hawkish, with the two younger generational cohorts being more similar in terms of their responses to the various poll questions analysed.

Chapters Six, Seven, and Eight focused on interviews with an elite sample of the Heisei generational cohort collected during this study’s field research. These chapters analysed the interviews by reference to the three individual components of a militant internationalist security orientation to evaluate whether a new Japanese security identity might become more salient as this cohort becomes more politically influential. Chapter Six showed that Heisei elites appear to remain hesitant about Japan embracing a great military power identity, and prefer that its military remain focused on non-combat activities if it is deployed overseas. In terms of attitudes towards power projection, there was robust support for defensive deterrence and incremental strengthening of Japan’s senshu bōei military posture, but not for projecting coercive military power into the territory of other nations. Chapter Seven indicated that while there was strong support for maintaining the US-Japan alliance among the Heisei elite cohort, and some openness to accepting elements of collective self-defence, there was still strong scepticism of US global foreign policy and military interventionism. This suggests there is more support for deepening the US-Japan alliance on the basis of its current orientation rather than widening it into a global alliance that allows the cooperative use of force and shared combat. There was also a preference for the US-Japan alliance to sit alongside a multi-tiered and non-exclusive ‘open’ approach to East Asia regionalism and multilateralism, rather than the alliance to occupy the singular core of Japan’s security orientation in international affairs. Chapter Eight indicated that strategic distrust had become a major factor in influencing the Heisei cohort’s thinking about the rise of China and its implications for Japan. This distrust applied to even dovish interviewees, thereby suggesting that China-sceptic sentiment was not the domain of
hawkish or conservative interviewees. There was nevertheless strong awareness of Japan and China having mutual interests in common, and strategic distrust has not yet developed into support for a strategic containment policy based on hard military balancing and zero-sum competition with the PRC.

At the same time, these empirical chapters indicated that the conception of the Heisei cohort’s security identity no longer aligns with Japan’s traditional antimilitarism. This is particularly true for the elite cohort sampled in this study. There appears to be acceptance of the need for Japan to have a robust military that can defend itself and not simply rely on the US military, there is acceptance of a non-interventionist US-Japan alliance as a force for regional stability, there is increased support for interoperability and cooperation with the militaries of other nations, and there is support for Japan to make non-combat military contributions to international peace. Defensive deterrence appears to be accepted as a necessary component of national security strategy. The SDF is no longer the focus of negative antimilitarist sentiment, and the alliance is seen in a more positive light. It is therefore difficult to reconcile these attitudes, as well as the actual evolution of Japan’s security policy and military posture over the last twenty years, with Japan’s strict traditional antimilitarism outlined in Chapter Three.

This concluding chapter attempted to reconcile the findings and analysis of the empirical chapters in terms of the implications for conceptualising the evolution of Japan’s security identity, and how this might have influenced the Heisei social generation. In short, the peace nation concept remains salient in contemporary Japan, but it is one that has evolved compared to the antimilitarist peak period discussed in Chapter Three. The differences relate to how Japan’s international status, its international role, and attitudes towards military power are conceptualised. Rather than a passive, economically-focused country engaging in nation-(re)building, there is greater identification with the concept of Japan being an influential middle or regional power that has an important stabilising international and regional role to play by making a distinctive, largely non-military orientated international contribution. Critically, the normal nationalist vision for Japan becoming a ‘normal’ great military power is still not a salient or popular identity conception in contemporary Japan. The ultimate taboo of Japan not becoming a country that can go to war inside the territory of another nation still appears to be firmly in place and looks likely to persist for some time. The influence of the concept of Japan being a unique peace nation
rather than a great military power remains an important component of identity in Japan that should be taken account of when trying to project Japan’s future security policy evolution.

The findings do raise the question of why this identity has remained resilient over such a long period of time despite quite significant changes in international politics over the last sixty years since the identity started to gain salience. Three particular explanations can be identified from the results of this study. First, robust domestic contestation and affirmation of the peace nation identity over time has been just as much a characteristic of Japanese security politics as has been challenges coming from elites wanting to see a stronger Japanese military role in international politics. In fact, these elites since the 1980s have had to use the language of the peace nation narrative in public discourse, and have had to articulate even the limited and incremental military reforms they have pursued by reference to how they enhance Japan’s ‘peaceful’ international contribution and do not undermine Japan’s peace nation identity. Japan’s civil society, media, and economic stakeholders have all played their own role in framing and contesting Japan’s national identity, perceptions of risk, and the range of appropriate government reactions to those risks, and do not passively accept the framing of security issues articulated by political leaders and government officials.

Second, the events of 9/11, and the US’ related involvement in disastrous wars in the Middle East, also appear to have also strengthened this identity just at a time when many scholars were arguing military normalisation was imminent (Green 2003; Kliman 2006). These wars served as a precautionary warning about the perils of fighting inside other nations that Japan itself had experienced in World War II (Ogawa 2011). A third explanation that came through strongly in the interviews is that there is awareness of the difficulties that Japan could face in attempting to become a more strident military actor in regional and international politics. Japan’s own domestic economic, political, and demographic issues make a focus on regional integration and cooperation based on an evolved conception of the peace nation identity a more attractive and lower risk strategy than Japan attempting to aggressively assert itself in international security politics (Fouse 2013: 69-70).

A fourth explanation not explicitly investigated in this thesis can be located in the continued prevalence of peace education in Japanese schools (Kodama 2010). The emphasis on conceptions of positive peace introduced during the 1980s may well still be playing an
important role in keeping the peace nation identity salient in Japan through the emphasis on the horrors of war (Murakami 1992: 43-53), even if there has also been an increased emphasis on patriotism in schools since the mid-1990s. Despite the concerns identified in Chapter Four about a state-focused nationalism and patriotism playing a more prominent role in Japanese schools, other studies have analysed influences on younger Japanese from more nuanced perspectives and found that there are diverse messages relating to war and peace impacting upon young Japanese both inside the classroom and out (Watts and Feldman 2001:653; Condry 2007; Penney and Wakefield 2008; Penney 2007, 2008; Bukh 2007, 2012). There is also the possibility that patriotism in modern Japan is based not on the glorification of military strength, but on a conscious embrace of the peace nation concept itself.

This research also raises similar questions about whether aggressive nationalism has had a significant impact on the mainstream consciousness of Japanese society (see also Boyd 2012), and on younger Japanese in particular. While the discussion of the evidence indicates that Japan’s traditional antimilitarist security identity is no longer salient, the evidence also shows that it has not been superseded by a hawkish or militant internationalist security identity among the broader public or among the Heisei generational cohort. This study finds that a peace nation identity still operates and plays a substantive and influential role in Japan’s foreign and security policy debate, and this identity, comfortably embraced by the Heisei cohort, is likely to complicate the full ‘normalisation’ of Japan’s security policy. Ultimately, generational change on its own will not be a factor that will drive a more aggressive security policy in Japan and is more likely to lead to continuity rather than radical change. Significant restraints stricter than international norms relating to the use of force will continue to be imposed on the freedom of action for Japan’s security hawks and on the Japanese Self-Defence Forces.
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312


334


Appendix One: Confidence Intervals and Statistical Significance

N= Number of Responses
RR= Response Rate (%)
CI= Confidence interval for survey at 95% confidence level
N/A= not available
N/S= p-value not statistically significant (p-value > 0.10)

Ref: Figure 5.1, Table 5.19

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<td>&lt;0.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>681</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>&lt;0.001</td>
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</tbody>
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Ref: Figures 5.25-5.29

<table>
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<td>3.7</td>
<td>&lt;0.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>&lt;0.001</td>
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Ref: Figures 5.43, 5.44

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<td>1430</td>
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<td>2009</td>
<td>1883</td>
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<tr>
<td>2012</td>
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<td>62</td>
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<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>1547</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>1.1</td>
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Ref: Figure 5.53

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<tbody>
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<td>1449</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>N/S</td>
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<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>1883</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>N/S</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>1850</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>N/S</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>1549</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>1.1</td>
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Ref: Figure 5.57

<table>
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<th>P-value</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>2006</td>
<td>501</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>N/S</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>762</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>N/S</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>700</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>N/S</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>681</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>N/S</td>
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### Ref: Figure 5.58

<table>
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<th>COJ Diplomacy Survey Year</th>
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<th>P-value</th>
</tr>
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<td>2008</td>
<td>1826</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>1.4</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>1850</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>1953</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>1912</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>1838</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>1848</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>1.4</td>
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</table>

### Ref: Table 5.20

<table>
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<th>N</th>
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<th>CI</th>
<th>P-value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<tr>
<td>April 2010</td>
<td>2347</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>N/A</td>
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<tr>
<td>December 2010</td>
<td>1995</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 2012</td>
<td>1006</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>N/A</td>
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</table>
Appendix Two: Patriotism, Nationalism and Authoritarianism in Japan

**ISSP 2003:** How proud are you of your nation’s armed forces? (Minimum sample size: 816)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Proud (Very Proud)</th>
<th>Not Proud (Not Proud at all)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>44.4 (10.0)</td>
<td>55.6 (14.9)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>87.4 (42.1)</td>
<td>12.6 (3.0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>35.8 (4.6)</td>
<td>64.2 (19.4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Great Britain</td>
<td>90.7 (53.1)</td>
<td>9.3 (2.6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>93.9 (75.8)</td>
<td>6.1 (1.6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>68.7 (28.7)</td>
<td>31.3 (9.1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Zealand</td>
<td>73.9 (31.4)</td>
<td>26.1 (7.9)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**ISSP 2003:** Your nation should follow its own interests, even if this leads to conflict with other nations (Minimum sample size: 833)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Agree (Strongly)</th>
<th>Neither agree or Disagree</th>
<th>Disagree (Strongly)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>23.9 (10.1)</td>
<td>30.2</td>
<td>45.9 (27.5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>45.6 (12.2)</td>
<td>24.3</td>
<td>29.7 (3.7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>44.2 (10.5)</td>
<td>21.9</td>
<td>33.9 (8.9)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Great Britain</td>
<td>50.1 (14.9)</td>
<td>20.9</td>
<td>29.1 (3.4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>47.0 (75.8)</td>
<td>24.7</td>
<td>28.3 (3.4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>53.4 (14.1)</td>
<td>22.4</td>
<td>24.2 (2.6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Zealand</td>
<td>55.7 (17.9)</td>
<td>23.0</td>
<td>21.3 (2.2)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**ISSP 2003:** Do you think the world would be a better place if other countries were more like our country? (Sample Size: 1001; p<0.001)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Generational Cohort</th>
<th>Agree (Strongly)</th>
<th>Neither agree or Disagree</th>
<th>Disagree (Strongly)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Heisei</td>
<td>17.6 (5.2)</td>
<td>40.3</td>
<td>42.0 (27.2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Generational Cohort</td>
<td>Agree (Strongly)</td>
<td>Neither agree or Disagree</td>
<td>Disagree (Strongly)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------</td>
<td>------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heisei</td>
<td>11.9 (2.0)</td>
<td>28.9</td>
<td>59.2 (37.4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Antimilitarist Peak</td>
<td>20.6 (7.1)</td>
<td>23.8</td>
<td>55.6 (36.0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post-War</td>
<td>39.1 (22.0)</td>
<td>20.9</td>
<td>40.1 (28.2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>24.7 (11.0)</td>
<td>24.2</td>
<td>51.1 (33.6)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**ISSP 2003**: Your Country should follow its own interests, even if this leads to conflicts with other nations? (Sample size: 989; p<0.001)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Generational Cohort</th>
<th>Agree (Strongly)</th>
<th>Neither agree or Disagree</th>
<th>Disagree (Strongly)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Heisei</td>
<td>17.6 (6.0)</td>
<td>34.2</td>
<td>48.2 (27.8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Antimilitarist Peak</td>
<td>20.6 (6.4)</td>
<td>31.1</td>
<td>48.4 (30.6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post-War</td>
<td>32.5 (17.4)</td>
<td>26.1</td>
<td>41.5 (24.1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>23.9 (10.1)</td>
<td>30.2</td>
<td>45.9 (27.5)</td>
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</table>
**ISSP 2003:** How proud are you of your nation’s armed forces? (Sample size: 832; p<0.001)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Generational Cohort</th>
<th>Proud (Very Proud)</th>
<th>Not Proud (Not Proud at all)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Heisei</td>
<td>34.8 (6.5)</td>
<td>65.2 (23.5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Antimilitarist Peak</td>
<td>41.4 (7.1)</td>
<td>58.6 (11.8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post-War</td>
<td>54.4 (15.4)</td>
<td>45.6 (11.5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>44.4 (10.0)</strong></td>
<td><strong>55.6 (14.9)</strong></td>
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</table>

**Asian Barometer 2007:** Statement A - Sample size: 946 (p<0.001); Statement B – Sample Size: 1067 (p<0.001).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statement</th>
<th>The relationship between the government and the people should be like that between parents and children</th>
<th>A citizen should always remain loyal only to their own country, no matter how imperfect</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Generational Cohort/Response</td>
<td>Agree (Strongly)</td>
<td>Disagree (Strongly)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heisei</td>
<td>33.1 (2.4)</td>
<td>67.0 (14.2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Antimilitarist Peak</td>
<td>38.9 (5.4)</td>
<td>61.0 (20.7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post-War</td>
<td>43.5 (8.2)</td>
<td>56.5 (11.8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>39.0 (5.6)</strong></td>
<td><strong>61.0 (15.8)</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Asian Barometer 2007:** Statement A - Sample size: 993 (p<0.001); Statement B – Sample Size: 964 (p<0.001).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statement</th>
<th>People should always support the decisions of their government even if they disagree with them</th>
<th>For the sake of the national community, society, the individual should be prepared to sacrifice</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Generational Cohort</td>
<td>Agree (Strongly)</td>
<td>Disagree (Strongly)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heisei</td>
<td>18.3 (2.3)</td>
<td>81.8 (31.6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Antimilitarist Peak</td>
<td>18.8 (1.6)</td>
<td>81.1 (30.3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post-War</td>
<td>30.4 (2.7)</td>
<td>69.5 (19.8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>22.9 (2.2)</strong></td>
<td><strong>77.1 (26.8)</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Asian Barometer 2007: Sample size: 1046 (p<0.001).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Generational Cohort/Response</th>
<th>Citizens should obey laws without exception</th>
<th>Protests should be allowed</th>
<th>Revolutionaries allowed to hold public meetings</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>Follow conscience on occasions</td>
<td>Allowed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>17.8</td>
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<td>92.0</td>
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<tr>
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<td>78.2</td>
<td>90.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post-War</td>
<td>36.3</td>
<td>63.7</td>
<td>80.4</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>24.7</td>
<td>75.3</td>
<td>88.0</td>
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Appendix Three: 2012 COJ SDF Survey Figure

防衛体制についての考え方

（調査員注：【資料１】を提示して、調査対象者によく読んでもらってから質問する。）

【資料１】アジア太平洋地域における各国及び地域の陸上、海上、航空兵力概数

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>国と地域</th>
<th>陸上兵力 （人数）</th>
<th>海上兵力 （噸数）</th>
<th>航空兵力 （作戦機数）</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>日 本</td>
<td>14万人</td>
<td>44.8万t</td>
<td>430機</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>韓 国</td>
<td>52万人 (海) 2.7万人</td>
<td>18.1万t</td>
<td>570機</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>北朝鮮</td>
<td>100万人</td>
<td>10.7万t</td>
<td>620機</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>中 国</td>
<td>160万人 (海) 1万人</td>
<td>134.1万t</td>
<td>2,040機</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>台 湾</td>
<td>20万人 (海) 1.5万人</td>
<td>20.8万t</td>
<td>530機</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>植東ロシア</td>
<td></td>
<td>55万t</td>
<td>400機</td>
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<tr>
<td>米国</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>在日米軍</td>
<td>1.9万人</td>
<td></td>
<td>140機</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>第7艦隊</td>
<td></td>
<td>33.6万t</td>
<td>60機</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>在韓米軍</td>
<td>1.7万人</td>
<td></td>
<td>60機</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. 資料は、米国防務公報資料、ミリタリーバランス（2011）などによる。
2. (海) は海兵隊を示す。
3. 在日・在韓米軍の陸上兵力は、陸軍および海兵隊の総数を示す。
4. 作戦機については、海軍及び海兵隊機を含む。
5. 第7艦隊とは、日本を主要拠点とする米海軍の艦隊である。
## Appendix Four: Commonly Used Acronyms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3NNP</td>
<td>Three Non-Nuclear Principles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AAPOR</td>
<td>American Association of Public Opinion Research</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANN</td>
<td>Asahi News Network</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANOVA</td>
<td>Analysis of Variance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APEC</td>
<td>Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASDF</td>
<td>Air Self-Defense Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASEAN</td>
<td>Association of Southeast Asian Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ATPS</td>
<td>Asahi-Todai Public Survey</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BMD</td>
<td>Ballistic Missile Defence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCP</td>
<td>Chinese Communist Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CLB</td>
<td>Cabinet Legislative Bureau</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COJ</td>
<td>Cabinet Office of Japan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSTP</td>
<td>Council for Science and Technology Policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DPJ</td>
<td>Democratic Party of Japan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DPRK</td>
<td>Democratic People’s Republic of Korea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FNN</td>
<td>Fuji News Network</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GAP</td>
<td>Global Attitudes Project</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GSDF</td>
<td>Ground Self-Defense Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HADR</td>
<td>Humanitarian and Disaster Relief</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISSP</td>
<td>International Social Survey Program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JCP</td>
<td>Japan Communist Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JDA</td>
<td>Japan Defense Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LDP</td>
<td>Liberal Democratic Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOD</td>
<td>Ministry of Defense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOFA</td>
<td>Ministry of Foreign Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MP</td>
<td>Member of Parliament</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MSDF</td>
<td>Maritime Self-Defense Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MST</td>
<td>Mutual Security Treaty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NDPG</td>
<td>National Defense Program Guidelines</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NDPO</td>
<td>National Defense Program Outline</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-Government Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NHK</td>
<td>Nippon Hōsō Kyōkai (Japan Broadcasting Corporation)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NPR</td>
<td>National Police Reserves</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NPT</td>
<td>Non-Proliferation Treaty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSF</td>
<td>National Safety Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>NSS</td>
<td>National Security Strategy</td>
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