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Dancing with the State:
Maori Creative Energy and Policies of Integration, 1945-1967

A thesis by Aroha Harris, in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in History, The University of Auckland, 2007.
Abstract

This thesis considers Maori-state relations in the post-war period up to 1967. It focuses on the complicated and congested nexus at which tribal committees, branches of the Maori Women’s Welfare League and the Welfare Division of the Department of Maori Affairs met and negotiated the particulars of the Maori-state relationship. Underpinning that relationship were the tensions inherent in the Maori world’s ongoing task of balancing the old and the new, the traditional and the modern, the rural and the urban during a time of unprecedented change. The thesis draws on a mix of oral histories and documentary sources, especially government archives, to examine the motivations of Maori and the department in their interactions. It presents the department’s broad integrationist philosophy and examines Maori peoples’ drives for both engaging with the state and undertaking a range of development projects that built on Maori tribal concepts to mark out Maori socio-cultural spaces in modern environments. Maori policy and legislation including the Maori Social and Economic Advancement Act 1945 and the Hunn Report of 1961, and the major demographic changes associated with urbanisation, presented enormous challenges for Maori. Implementation of the Hunn report in particular fractured tense but workable co-operation apparent in 1950s Maori-state relations. The thesis illustrates how Maori creatively negotiated those challenges and progressed their own projects undeterred by the onerous constraints of integration. It achieves that by restoring the Maori narrative and the Maori concepts at its base. It finds intelligent, critical, vibrant Maori leadership involved in highly nuanced and complex interactions with state.
He Whakamaharatanga

Dedicated to the memories of Nana and Aunty Lea: life-long friends and cousins, loved by their many, many mokopuna.
He Mihi

Ka tuku mihi ahau. Ka tuku mihi ahau ki a rau rangatira ma, ki a ratou, ki a koutou i hapaitia nei i tenei tuhinga whakapae. Ka mihi ahau ki nga taonga, araa, ki nga korero me nga whakaaro i whakataktorion nga kai-atawhai. Na a ratou rourou ka ora ai te kaupapa. Ka mihi ahau ki nga mahi me nga kupu tautoko o aku hoa me taku whanau. Na a ratou hiringa, ka puta nga wharangi e whai ake nei, aa, kua oti. No reira ka mihi atu ahau: mihi atu, mihi atu, mihi atu.

A project of this size is completed with heartfelt indebtedness of equal proportion to the many people who rallied around in support of the effort and who I now thank. I thank first of all the wonderful people who let me trawl through their life histories and capture them on tape: Nana and Aunty Lea, who have since passed on and whose korero taught me the difference between what I want to know, what I need to know and what is good to know; Letty Brown, with stories to tell that are lessons to us all and an acknowledged inspiration to myself and innumerable others; Tom Parore who, a long time ago as I transitioned from dole queue to public service, challenged me to finish my studies; Pio and Chrissie Jacobs, steady and supportive, I have had the pleasure of admiring them since I was a school girl; Manuka Henare who has a knack for making me think and who I knew would have a good story; Mum and Aunty Bubby, who honoured me by trusting me and whose korero, though collected separately, will always be connected by their deep friendship; and Taipari Munro and Cyril Chapman, two people who teach, two people who know dedication and have perspective. These people are stalwarts, thinkers, innovators, and challengers; leaders who gave generously. I am grateful they join this thesis as people who keep alive the daring and excitement of knowing and learning.

I not only thank Drs Deborah Montgomerie and Michael Belgrave, my supervisors, but I also warmly congratulate them. Deborah bore the brunt of my most stressful times, and they both provided intellectual mentoring and stimulation with great forbearance and fortitude. They also admirably represented New Zealand history in its engagements with Maori history throughout this thesis, drawing me out and encouraging my historical mulling process.
I have students, fellow-students and tutors to thank, who have endured competing against my thesis for attention. I especially acknowledge Melissa Williams and Tiopira McDowell ĭ simultaneously students, friends and whanaunga ĭ whose own academic endeavours have been a source of learning for me. Melissa has also been a quick and ready footnote soldier and main support during the crucial final days of thesis-writing.

I acknowledge the departmental support of all my colleagues at the University of Auckland history department, including the financial support initially provided by the department ľ Maori history fellowship. Over the years, a number of colleagues provided particular (and patient) intellectual and administrative support in relation to my thesis. In earlier days Professors Judith Binney and Keith Sorrenson were especially encouraging. Also from earlier days were Professors Raewyn Dalziel and Nicholas Tarling; more latterly, Professors Barry Reay and James Belich, and Associate Professor Malcolm Campbell; and practically every day, Barbara Batt.

I thank my kaupapa friends and colleagues from Te Pouhere Korero, Te Uira Associates and Huia Publishers, including: Danny Keenan who right at the beginning penned a proposed structure over morning tea; Bernadette Arapere who right at the end was ready with red pen poised for proof reading; and Robyn and Brian Bargh who patiently cheered from the wings with tempting offers of next projects.

My last words of thanks are for my friends and family: Mum and Dad; my sisters and all our iramutu, my mates, my whanau, my whanaunga. They are that wonderful mix of people who are there no matter the project; some tied in by the precepts of whanaungatanga, others by the whanaungatanga of shared personal and professional lives. They are the constant ones: my personal pastoral care providers; the ones from home who draw me home; and the ones to whom I am networked. I name none of them because the kind of love and support they give is the kind that also enjoys doses of ribbing, frowns, impertinent questions and pukana eyes ĭ none of which I am prepared to attract by accidentally omitting a name. I name none of them because they know who they are, and they know I know who they are.

So, to everyone here, thank you. Thank you. Kia ora rawa atu e.
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### Abbreviations

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<td>Appendices to the Journals of the House of Representatives</td>
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<td>ANZW</td>
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<td>ATL</td>
<td>Alexander Turnbull Library</td>
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<td>DMA</td>
<td>Department of Maori Affairs</td>
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<td>JPS</td>
<td>Journal of the Polynesian Society</td>
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<td>MOMA</td>
<td>Minister of Maori Affairs</td>
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<td>MWWL</td>
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WAHANGA TUATAHI

Learning to Balance on Three Legs:

Tradition, Modernity and Relations with the State

In 1945 the Maori Social and Economic Advancement Act set up a framework through which the Department of Maori Affairs could structure its relationship with Maori communities and provide policy-driven guidance in a period of great change. Central to the operation of that framework was the Welfare Division of the department. The team of Maori welfare officers who staffed the division worked in particular with the community-based leadership that expressed itself through newly formed units of social organisation, that is, branches of the Maori Women’s Welfare League and tribal committees. The ultimate goal was to instil, in Maori, confidence in the department’s policies of integration. It was an old approach made new: the idea that the leadership and energies of iwi Maori, appropriately organised and guided, could be influenced to support a government policy (equally as old) of “whitening” Maori. It is on this particular complex and congested nexus that this thesis rests: Maori relations with the state, or more accurately the Department of Maori Affairs, were intersected and underpinned by the state’s unrelenting pursuit of assimilation and its various mutant forms of integration, amalgamation, and even mainstreaming. Simultaneously, those relations were both tempered and challenged by the Maori world’s ongoing policy-defying act of balancing the old and the new, the traditional and the modern, the rural and the urban.

This chapter’s primary task is to set the historiographical context for the thesis. Key literature will be assessed, methodological issues discussed, and sources explained thus laying out the analytical framework for the thesis before proceeding to chapter two. Chapter two considers the motivations of Maori and the department in their interactions. It presents the department’s broad integrationist philosophy and examines Maori people’s drives for both engaging with the state and undertaking a range of development projects, drawing on Maori tribal concepts to mark out Maori socio-cultural spaces in modern environments. Chapter three begins the examination of structures designed in the post-war period to provide representative leadership for Maori and communication between Maori and the department, by focussing on the tribal committees and assessing the nature of their operation. Chapter four continues that discussion by introducing the committees’ sister organisation, the Maori Women’s Welfare League. Significant change of pace rather than policy per se is introduced in the discussion of the 1961 Hunn Report in chapter five. Considering the report
in some detail as well as arguments for and against it, chapter five suggests that Hunn’s desire for hastening integration constituted a major step back from the closer community relations in which the department had previously participated. Chapter six brings that suggestion to fruition by exploring particular elements of the implementation of the report. It notes the government’s newly developed preference for having Maori opinion registered through national organisations such as the New Zealand Maori Council, established in 1962. The chapter concludes with a comment on the ongoing creative energy of Maori, the same thing for which Hunn failed to account and on which Maori could rely to progress their own projects, undeterred by the onerous constraints of integration and continuing to balance the traditional and the modern.

The starting point for this thesis was a study of post-war Maori leadership, and the understanding that the dynamism and contestability of leadership prior to European contact, although placed under considerable stress by the process of colonisation, had persevered into the present as an important aspect of Maori society and social organisation. The idea was to study aspects of Maori leadership in the 1950s and 60s, and the ways in which it developed from its traditional criteria and fora to respond to the challenges of te ao hurihuri (the ever-changing world). That basic idea has maintained an influential hold on this thesis. Maori leaders, leadership and leadership processes are important throughout the whole of the thesis. However, the intersections with the state’s integration policies and Maori conceptualisations of their engagement with them have brought about a certain fluidity. This fluidity is unsuited to formulaic explanations of criteria and validating factors that defined Maori leadership or the development of a set menu of structures, processes and codes through which Maori leadership was expressed.

The existing literature on the subject of Maori leadership emphasises the achievements of individuals and organisations, and their relationships with those that supported and opposed them. Consequently, the available literature seems to be dominated by biographical studies and studies of Maori organisations or state-sponsored organisations in which Maori people were prominent. Biographical studies have been written about such Maori leaders as Sir Apirana Ngata¹ and Sir Peter Buck.² The recent volumes of The Dictionary of New Zealand Biography offer a remarkable set of twentieth-century Maori

biographies that include Maui Pomare, Tahupotiki Wiremu Ratana and James Carroll.³ Studies of organisations through which Maori leadership has expressed itself include Claudia Orange’s †An Exercise in Maori Autonomy: the rise and demise of the Maori War Effort Organization† and Graham Butterworth and Hepora Young’s Nga Take Maori, a history of the Department of Maori Affairs.⁴ More recently, Richard Hill has added his State Authority, Indigenous Autonomy to the mix.⁵ Some authors have considered Maori leadership in terms of its influence and activity within such contexts as Maori activism,⁶ urbanisation⁷ and specific government policies such as Maori land development.⁸ Others have studied Maori leaders whose achievements transcend the criteria usually assigned to traditional leadership. These include women,⁹ religious leaders,¹⁰ and those with charismatic and political appeal, regardless of the status into which they were born.¹¹ Community studies are popular in the discipline of anthropology. Works by Pat Hohepa¹², Hugh Kawharu¹³ and Joan Metge¹⁴, for example, discuss leadership in the context of the communities studied. Maharaia Winiata, on the other hand, uses the methodology of community studies to look specifically at the function of Maori leadership and the ways it changed over time.¹⁵

Typically this literature is framed by a discourse about the adjustments that colonised cultures make in order to adapt to changing and modern circumstances. Thus, in the modern world, Maori leadership has been viewed simultaneously as the protector of the cultural past, and pioneer of the modern future. This is the view proposed by Maori leaders and writers of earlier this century like Apirana Ngata and Te Rangihiroa Buck, as well as more recent

⁶ Walker, †The Genesis of Maori Activism†Journal of the Polynesian Society (JPS), 93, 3, 1984, pp.267-81.
¹⁰ J. M. Henderson, Ratana: the man, the church, the political movement, Wellington, 1972.
writer-leaders like Api Mahuika and Robert Mahuta.\textsuperscript{16} It points to the dominant theme underlying this study, that is, the creative tension between the so-called traditional and modern worlds of Maori culture. Manifested in this tension was a desire on the part of many modern Maori to remain traditionally Maori, and therefore tribal in outlook, while simultaneously participating fully in a modern Western society - socially, economically and politically. It has been a function of Maori leadership to navigate the stresses and changes of te ao hurihuri while endeavouring to maintain a comfortable balance between full participation in New Zealand society and preservation of cultural distinctiveness. It is this function that provides the wider context in which the research material presented in later chapters is analysed, agreeing with arguments that cultural change and cultural persistence co-existed.

The delicate and potentially culturally dangerous balancing act for which Maori became responsible was not peculiar to Aotearoa New Zealand; nor was the state\textsuperscript{\textasteriskcentered} development of policies to support it by pushing it towards modernisation. The \textquoteleft Native question\textquoteright has vexed governments from Aotearoa to Zambia, and the policies and indigenous responses to government attempts to answer that question have a familiar ring. Nicholas Peroff\textsuperscript{\textasteriskcentered} Menominee Drums examines the application of \textquoteleft termination\textquoteright policy to the Menominee people of Wisconsin. Introduced in 1954, termination sought to abolish Indian reservations and terminate any special rights that Indians were deemed to hold in consequence of their distinct legal identity. The prevailing goal, Peroff argues, was the same as it had been since early in the nineteenth century: assimilation.\textsuperscript{17} Meanwhile, James Ferguson, in \textit{Expectations of Modernity}, noted the role of government in attempting to control twentieth-century urbanisation in Zambia\textsuperscript{\textasteriskcentered} copperbelt.\textsuperscript{18} The Zambian government\textsuperscript{\textasteriskcentered} chosen strategy was to \textquoteleft establish \textquoteleft proper\textquoteright permanent settlements where \textquoteleft development\textquoteright could take place. It was driven to an extent by a fear that \textquoteleft breakdown\textquoteright and \textquoteleft detribalization\textquoteright would create a class of African urbanite \textquoteleft drifting\textquoteright aimlessly from town to town.

\textsuperscript{16}For example, Peter Buck, \textquoteleft Foreword\textquoteright and Ngata, \textquoteleft Tribal Organisation\textquoteright in Sutherland, \textit{Maori People}, pp. 1-17 and pp.155-181. Also: Api Mahuika, \textquoteleft Leadership: Inherited and Achieved\textquoteright in King, ed., \textit{Te Ao Hurihuri: The World Moves On}, rev. edn, New Zealand, 1977, pp.64-85; Robert Mahuta, \textquoteleft Maori Communities and Industrial Development\textquoteright in King, ed., \textit{Tihe Mauri Ora: Aspects of Maoritanga}, New Zealand, pp. 86-97.


\textsuperscript{18}James Ferguson, \textit{Expectations of Modernity: Myths and Meanings of Urban Life on the Zambian Copperbelt},
town, neither to workplace nor village — [and] evading traditional and modern forms of social control alike. However, it was also shaped by the view of copperbelt liberals that Africans could enter the modern world by relinquishing their traditions and mastering the settled urban life.

In the New Zealand situation the integration policies of the post-war period may also be viewed as a much older colonial instrument repackaged for modern consumption. The labels for this succession of policies infer not only the time to which they belong, but also the underlying thinking of governments and fellow citizens. Amalgamation was the favoured label for much of the nineteenth century. It is judiciously studied in Alan Ward’s *A Show of Justice*, a book which for a long time stood alone as a history that understood and analysed Maori-state engagement as a two sided struggle over the possibility of racial amalgamation through the policies of assimilation. Assimilation became the dominant label before 1900 and persisted well into the twentieth century. Ward notes that amalgamation was simultaneously ethnocentric and humanitarian, an attempt to protect Maori but under English law, which helps to explain some of its contradictions and complexities. He defines assimilation as a process of bringing Maori into the same political and judicial system as the settler population. Its major shortcoming was that while it sought unity it failed to deliver equality in the field for which Maori continued to press throughout the whole of the nineteenth century. Though there is a tendency in the literature to use amalgamation and assimilation interchangeably, Ward does make a distinction between the two. He proposes that as initially conceived amalgamation was not supposed to be the equivalent of unqualified assimilation. However, by the end of the nineteenth century official recognition of Maori leadership and institutions faded and amalgamation bore a much more coercive attitude, reflected in the rhetoric of the time which urged complete assimilation, including cultural assimilation, of Maori into settler society.

In more recent years other historians have joined Ward in highlighting the shifting currents of racial ideology as a theme in the history of Maori-state interaction. Some have entered the discussion via sites of resistance and debate, such as the battle-field or the court.

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19 Ibid., p.39.
20 Ibid., p.34.
22 Ibid., pp.308-312.
23 Ibid., p.viii.
room. Others jostle for elbow room in progressive national histories. James Belich has recently combed New Zealand histories and, building on his arguments in The New Zealand Wars, proposed an all-purpose theoretical toolset to aid understandings of Maori relations not just with the state but with Pakeha generally: racial lenses the pseudo-scientific ideas of race packed into the ideological luggage of New Zealand earliest Europeans red for the view of Maori as inherently warrior-like, grey for the so-called dying Maori and so forth. Of particular note in respect of this thesis is Belich’s white lens, that which viewed Maori as inherently salvageable, capable of learning and then living the white man’s way, of becoming brown-skinned Englishmen. It is the lens most donned by politicians and officials when designing policies of assimilation, responsible, for example, for transforming customary Maori land tenure from communal to individual in the nineteenth century.

In the twentieth century, even as assimilation made way for integration, the white lens continued to prevail. Many authors locate the changeover from assimilation to integration in the 1960s, coincidental with Jack Kent Hunn’s Report on Department of Maori Affairs. However, this thesis will show that the language of integration pre-dated the Hunn report. The key difference between assimilation and integration as Hunn proposed it was that integration allowed for the continuation of Maori cultural norms whereas assimilation did not, although Maori had difficulty seeing the distinction on the field. Maori had attempted to check assimilation throughout the early twentieth century. Competing against a view that assimilation was the best way for Maori to avoid extinction Ngata in particular urged that assimilation policies account for the Maori consciousness of their distinct and separate existence. Integration seemed to offer what Ngata had persistently held out for.

Interestingly, Hunn used the term mainstream, policy jargon usually associated with the

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26 For a fuller explanation see, for example, James Belich, Myth, Race and Identity in New Zealand in NZJH, 31. 1, Auckland, 1997, pp. 9-22, and Making Peoples, pp.19-22.
27 Sorrenson, Maori and Pakeha p.142.
28 J. K. Hunn, Report on Department of Maori Affairs with Statistical Supplement, Wellington, 1961, p.15. This report, hereafter referred to as Hunn Report, the footnotes is more fully examined in chapters five and six.
1970s and 80s and its *quid pro quo* biculturalism.\(^\text{30}\)

In a sense, any slippage in dating the policy changes is of minor consequence because assimilation by any other name is still assimilation. Nonetheless, such slippage is probably more likely to occur in respect of twentieth-century history for a fairly simple reason: compared to our historical knowledge of Maori in the nineteenth century, our knowledge of Maori in the twentieth century is incomplete. It is in fact scant in large parts, including the period studied here. Histories of the nineteenth century have fashioned some solid foundations for understanding assimilation, but there is plenty of room to learn more about its long-term influences. In effect, the history of Maori New Zealand consists of a long, much-reviewed and even litigated nineteenth century, and a much shorter, less-studied twentieth century. Consequently, Maori seem to recede into the shadows of the grand narratives for most of the twentieth century, making brief forays into the limelight on the backs of key individuals like Apirana Ngata, Tahupotiki Ratana, Te Puea Herangi and Whina Cooper or organisations like the Maori Women’s Welfare League, the New Zealand Maori Council and the 28\(^{\text{th}}\) (Maori) Battalion.

Furthermore, the Maori 1950s are almost absent from the historiography, including Belich’s major contribution to the twentieth-century narrative, *Paradise Reforged*.\(^\text{31}\) Overall, history tells us that an important piece of legislation passed in 1945, assimilation’s last stand heralding a new era in Maori Affairs aimed at undermining the few remnants of Maori autonomy.\(^\text{32}\) Often the establishment of the Maori Women’s Welfare League is touched on, but attention is quickly turned to Maori in the 1960s, who are usually discussed in terms of the burden of urbanisation, that omni-present and problematic phenomenon which has defined Maori experience ever since, or so it seems.\(^\text{33}\) Eliding the 50s has the effect of locating the 60s soon after 1945. So much more is known about the 60s than the 50s, like the Hunn report and its public debut of integration accessorised with the statistics of mass demographic change and social decline. Implementation of the Hunn report included the establishment of the New Zealand Maori Council and its legislative platform, the Maori Welfare Act 1962. The later 60s included official inquiries into Maori land administration, most notably the 1965 inquiry into Maori land legislation and the powers of the Maori Land

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\(^{30}\) Refer to chapters two and five.


Court which led directly to the ‘last land grab’ of the Maori Affairs Amendment Act of 1967. Though these events frequently feature in historical analyses, they are often viewed as introductions to the 1970s rather than extensions of the 1950s. They re-establish discord in Maori-Pakeha relations as a curtain-raiser to the re-appearance of Maori as a fully functioning ethnic collective in the 70s, wholly urbanised and unhappy with their urbanisation experiences but with a critical mass of educated rangatahi willing to take an aggressive stand on land and treaty rights. Arguably, even when some notable exceptions are accounted for, far more is known about Maori in the last thirty years of the twentieth century than in the first seventy.

In brief, the literature tells us that, for Maori, the net result of the post-war experience was an increasingly detribalised and bereft population, living at the margins and ghettoes of society, lacking in leadership and social control, emerging in the 70s as an angry under-class. This is demonstrably true, especially demographically, and the situation was far more complex than this picture usually depicts. A simple two-part approach can aid in understanding the added complexities. The first part requires a differentiation of the 50s and 60s and re-invigoration of the Maori 1950s in particular. This is one of the goals of this thesis. It reawakens the tribal committees and spotlights the depth of commitment of the league. In doing so it remembers a dynamic Maori-state relationship, replete with contradictions and conundrums, shades of grey and blurred boundaries, all the stuff of which human relations are made. It is worth noting that in this particular aspect, the light this thesis sheds on Maori has potential to contribute to an area it does not directly engage: a much broader reassessment of ‘New Zealand’ and post-war social policy currently underway. The second part of the approach requires what has already been suggested here, and understanding the state’s pursuit of assimilation, in whatever guise, as an immovable stake in the contested ground between Maori policy and Maori people. Here the already-mentioned notable exceptions to histories of the twentieth century come into play.

Ranginui Walker’s *Ka Whawhai Tonu Matou* is the stand-out Maori counter-

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narrative. The broader issues with which he grapples—race relations, state relationships with indigenous people, and indigenous autonomy—are often portrayed as common to colonised peoples around the globe, and New Zealand frequently features in comparative studies with the United States, Canada and Australia. One of the most recent examples is *The Politics of Indigeneity*, a study by Roger Maaka and Augie Fleras of the political autonomy of indigenous Canadians and New Zealanders, and state resistance to offering it constitutional support. Elsewhere, Fleras and Paul Spoonley have noted one of the primary ways in which indigenous people relate to society is through the mechanisms of state policy and administration. Told from the unescapable context of colonisation, *Ka Whawhai Tonu Matou* has rejoined contemporary Māori concerns with the shared historical struggles of Māori against the forces of colonisation. Like other authors Walker makes good use of the available statistics to illustrate demographic change, specifically the Māori population's dramatic transition from being predominantly rural to predominantly urban. He also acknowledges the existence of assimilationist policies beyond World War Two, but gives it most attention in relation to the Hunn Report. His coverage of the 1950s and 60s is relatively slight, despite having focussed on that period in earlier works. However he does continue the theme of tensions between tradition and modernity, and adds to it two developmental tasks picked up by Māori who made the city their home. The first was to adjust to the economic reality of the urban industrial complex. The second was to do more than just struggle with the tensions of assimilation but to actively avert it by relocating Māori culture to the city. The success of this second task rested with voluntary associations like Māori churches and church groups, culture, sport and family clubs, Māori committees, Māori wardens, the Māori Council and the Māori Women's Welfare League. A number of these

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39 Danny Keenan, *Predicting the Past: Some Directions in Recent Maori Historiography* in *Te Pouhere Korero*, 1, 1, 1999, p.29.


41 Walker, *Ka Whawhai*, pp.197-203.

occupy the pages of later chapters. According to Walker, at the heart of them, and numerous other Maori organisations, is group membership and common goals, built around Maori identity, values and culture.43

Graham Butterworth had an opportunity to shed historical light on the interconnections between assimilation and Maori-state relations when he wrote Maori Affairs, even if he was constrained by the fact the history was commissioned by the department it featured. Though he does address assimilation in the twentieth century, he too casts the Hunn report as its main carrier.44 Work by Claudia Orange and Ngatata Love offer some insights into the interconnections between the Maori penchant for Maori autonomy and the government’s offers of equality.45 Focussing mainly on the period of the first Labour Government, the picture Orange paints of the department is perhaps less rosy than Butterworth’s. In Orange’s view, the tribal committees lost their autonomy when they were absorbed into the department’s legislative framework in 1945, while the state lost an opportunity to uphold article two of the Treaty of Waitangi.46 So, historical understandings of the continuance of assimilation and its impact on Maori-state relations in the twentieth century have been, at best, patchy. Richard Hill stepped into the breach in 2004 with State Authority, Indigenous Autonomy. Not only is State Authority the first of what will soon become a two-volume effort, but Hill has opted for a hard approach. He effectively proclaimed assimilation as the single most persistent, forceful and politically influential factor to shape Maori policy. Furthermore, he stripped the state of any humanitarian qualities, despite appearances. Feigned humanitarianism was merely a strategy for keeping Maori in a holding pattern which allowed limited cultural and political autonomy until the ultimate goal of complete assimilation could be achieved.47 Additional complexities lay therein. The autonomy the Crown thought it gave Maori was in fact inherited. Its basis lay in a Maori past that pre-dated colonisation, so no matter how Maori engaged with policies of assimilation they would consistently approach from a different historical trajectory than the state.

Hill has captured the strategic dynamism in Maori interactions, although he risked being straight-jacketed by his hard line and the grounding of his views in the Treaty of

43 Walker, Ka Whawhai, pp. 198-9.
44 Butterworth, Maori Affairs, pp.80, 100-2.
46 Orange, Exercise in Maori Autonomy p.157.
47 Hill, State Authority, pp.11-30, 43-64.
Waitangi claims and settlement process. That his book originated from a research report commissioned in that process perhaps signals that the Waitangi Tribunal is now venturing out of the nineteenth century and further into the twentieth. Hill is arguably one of a number of historical scouts providing the tribunal with advanced, and usually unpublished, exploratory reports on the twentieth-century grievance landscape. So far, however, most of these reports have stopped short of the 1950s, with the exception of David Williams' Crown Policy Affecting Maori Knowledge Systems and Cultural Practices. Commissioned by the Waitangi Tribunal, Williams' report includes detailed coverage of the Hunn report, though the narrative space accorded the period 1945 to 1961 is brief. Hill's volume ends in 1950, although he foreshadows the first National Government's desire to hasten integration, a position from which it retreated somewhat when it recast the time as new phase in Maori development. This thesis has been completed before the publication of Hill's second volume, but the central arguments of the first can be expected to continue in his account of later twentieth century. Moreover, while this thesis keeps 50s and 60s renditions of assimilation, generally referred to as integration, in the analytical frame, it makes no attempt to write a Treaty of Waitangi report card for governments' policy-making successes and failures.

Fortunately for this thesis and perhaps for New Zealand history generally, New Zealand anthropology came of age during the period studied. In the process it produced a generous corpus of literature that allows further consideration of Maori social life at the time. The influence of theories of functionalism in much of the literature is clear, largely due to Ralph Piddington whose training in social anthropology began in the 1920s under Alfred Radcliffe-Brown at the University of Sydney, and later continued under the supervision of Bronislaw Malinowski at the London School of Economics. In 1950, Piddington was appointed the founding professor of social anthropology at the University of Auckland and launched an academic curriculum that included social and physical anthropology, linguistics, and pre-
Among the emerging scholars that he influenced were Joan Metge, Maharaia Winiata, Pat Hohepa and Hugh Kawharu. Piddington’s emphases on anthropological studies of contemporary society, field work using methods of participant observation, and analyses that considered social change help to explain the several community studies written in the 1950s and 60s. These include Winiata’s study of Maori leadership, and studies of Kotare, Waima, and Orakei by Metge, Hohepa and Kawharu respectively. The synchronic nature of such studies – a polite way perhaps of describing functionalism’s aversion to historical antecedence – will always present problems for the historian. However, there can also be advantages. The rich ethnographic descriptions available in these studies, because they are fixed in time and place, can be viewed as well-suited to historical methods. This is particularly so when the works are picked up by an historian some fifty years later, acting as a kind of unscientific but instructive test for historical findings.

As scholarly works, New Zealand’s anthropological studies of the 50s and 60s do have their own, powerful, historical antecedents well-documented in the works of Keith Sorrenson, Steven Webster, and Linda Smith. Each of these three authors approaches their work in markedly different ways and with markedly different intentions. However, their writings allow us to trace the intellectual lineages from the detailed body of observational work left by Captain James Cook and the several natural historians who voyaged with him to the Pacific in the eighteenth century; to the writings of numerous colonial collectors and ethnographical re-modellers of Maori words, deeds, people, and taonga katoa; and from the late nineteenth and through the twentieth century, the scientifically maturing quantity of anthropological studies institutionally supported, first outside and then inside universities. There is no intention to retrace those lineages in any detail here, but to turn to the additional and important, lateral connections that Smith and Sorrenson add by illustrating some of the inter-marriages between anthropology and Maori policy.

Those inter-marriages have recently been investigated by Melissa Williams. She found fraught, challenging, and yet enduring, three-way relationships between Maori, the

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53 Webster, Patrons of Maori Culture, pp.103-5, 124-7.
54 Winiata, Changing Role; Metge, New Maori Migration; Hohepa, Maori Community, and Kawharu, Orakei. (Although Kawharu’s Orakei was not published until 1975, the fieldwork for it was undertaken in 1964).
state and anthropology. One of the most complicated of those relationships is exemplified by the work of one man, Apirana Ngata: a Maori statesman who used anthropology to leverage the state's Maori land development policies for which he was ministerially responsible; no mean feat.\textsuperscript{57} However, drawing on Hirini Kaa's research, Williams found that for Ngata the \textit{use} of anthropology was a strategy\textsuperscript{58} With it Ngata could promise his government that his Maori land development schemes would result in cultural and economic assimilation, while at the same time stressing cultural continuity as indispensable to the process.\textsuperscript{59} It was a view he could arrive at because, according to Kaa, he understood culture not only from an \textit{anthropological perspective} but also within the framework of the \textit{concept of tikanga}.\textsuperscript{60} Despite his resignation from Cabinet in 1934, the model Ngata represented remained influential, and Williams found it in action in a particular Maori-state-anthropology triangle at Panguru, North Hokianga, in the 1950s. The Panguru community development project was initiated by officers of the Department of Maori Affairs, assimilation's foot-soldiers implementing the state's policy. The project was administered by a trained anthropologist employed by the department, John Booth, advocate of the community development ideals that insisted the essential elements of Maori culture be retained to ease Maoridom's journey to assimilated New Zealand. The third party to the project, the people and the land of Panguru, sought to apply the resources of the project, including Booth himself, to bolster their weathered but still apparent hapu autonomy by effecting economic development \textit{à la Panguru}. Despite the tensions, the relationship worked, for a while. When it floundered under arguments, essentially about land and money, two partners walked away and Panguru kept the house and children (though no alimony). Probably all three partners were somewhat battered and bruised, but none of them enough to compromise the fundamental goals with which they first entered the triangle.

Williams' work illustrates the unstable nature of the relationship between the state and anthropology, complicated by their various separate and combined intersections with Maori. Yet, anthropology remained an attractive partner throughout the post-war period. Its central interests converged around understandings of social and cultural change, often but not always portrayed lineally as a single (and mass) progression from a traditional to a modern world, from rural tribal homeland to sophisticated and civilized city. It also had a growing fund of

\begin{footnotes}
\item[57] Ibid., pp.1-5.
\item[58] Ibid., p.4.
\item[60] Kaa, \textit{Te Wiwi Natiō} p.111.
\end{footnotes}
investigations into the resulting tensions and potential pitfalls, no doubt an appealing dowry to a department charged with implementing assimilation and its successors. The department must have been equally as appealing to anthropology. The department’s need for strategies to steer Maori to assimilated New Zealand meant it could apply investigatory resources in the very field anthropology wanted to work. It also had opportunities for the application of anthropology to policy.

Two works, arguably products of the fragile Maori-state-anthropology bond, conveniently bookend the period studied here. They are Ivan Sutherland’s *The Maori People Today* published in 1940, and Eric Schwimmer’s *The Maori People in the Nineteen-Sixties*. Some attention will now be paid to them, though first the reasons for focussing on these two particular works during a period of relative plenty in terms of anthropological studies will be outlined. One of the main reasons is already given, and explains the detour to Panguru. Sutherland’s general survey and Schwimmer’s symposium both edited collections of contributed essays, are meetings of Maori, anthropology and Maori policy. It means that they speak directly to the kaupapa at hand, integration and, specifically, the perennial tensions between tradition and modernity which are at the core of this thesis and which, in my view, are ultimately worked out by Maori people themselves; anthropology and the state just get to help or hinder the process. Furthermore, the two books talk to each other across the very time in which this thesis is interested, re-emphasising both their intellectual lineages and their lateral connections. Each attempts to describe, explain and understand what happened to Maori in the colonial process, and to propose how best Maori development ought to or could proceed. As already mentioned, there are plenty of other works that could contribute to this assessment, particularly those already identified since this chapter began. They are not ignored here; they have informed the following discussion and will continue to be drawn upon in subsequent chapters.

In 1940 ethnologist Sutherland had established a well-known and respected interest in Maori affairs and would later become an official welfare advisor to the department.\(^{61}\) Contributors to his 1940 survey included ‘home-made’ anthropologists Ngata and Buck.\(^{62}\) They were joined by other academics, Ernest Beaglehole, Horace Belshaw, Roger Duff and Harold Miller, and two senior administrators Harold Turbott (public health), and Douglas

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Ball (education). The men were inter-connected colleagues and friends linked by variously shared professional, political and academic interests and activities. Their collaborative effort was fundamentally a critique of assimilation on a wide front. It provided a platform for comprehensive discussion and analysis of the tensions assimilation implied, and heralded the immeasurable changes that began before World War Two and continued after it on a much grander scale. An expectation that major change was upon the Maori raised some critical questions; these, for example, posed by Sutherland:

Is it possible to provide the Maori with the technical equipment of the pakeha [sic] so that his material well-being is in many ways provided for and economic self-support achieved while at the same time maintaining, as the Maoris most surely desire to do, the individuality of the race with a selected cultural background? Are the economic necessities and the spiritual needs of the Maori people incompatible and irreconcilable? Will the Maori yield in the economic struggle in order to survive culturally as a distinct people? Will he, as many seem to expect him to do, attempt all-round pakeha [sic] standards and so lose his racial identity?

The authors all recognised the stresses that Sutherland’s questions invoked, and drew on their particular fields to address them. Belshaw said that Maori people ought to aim for economic self-sufficiency whilst remaining versed in Maoritanga, the difficulty being to find an effective compromise between the imperatives of tradition and the imperatives of capitalism. There was no offer of a set formula for finding the best compromise, but Belshaw believed that community relations and traditions would have to weaken if Maori farmers were to fit into an individualist farm economy; the more successful Maori land development policies became the more likely community relations would change. By contrast, Buck hoped economic success and racial identity did not represent an either-or choice, that improved living standards would not demand the sacrifice of tribal loyalty. His hopes were buoyed by the fact that Maori people already allowed certain customs to change in order to fit the times. For example, marae had maintained their tribal individuality and modernised at the same time.

The linkages between Maori, state and anthropology continued in Schwimmer’s Nineteen-Sixties. Schwimmer’s initial academic training was in classics, though he later completed an MA and a PhD in social anthropology. Importantly, he edited Te Ao Hou

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63 Sutherland, ‘The Maori Situation’ in Sutherland, Maori People, p.425.
64 H. Belshaw, ‘Economic Circumstances’ in Sutherland, Maori People, p.194.
65 Ibid., pp.194-212.
66 Buck, ‘Foreword’ p.16.
magazine from 1954 to 1960. The magazine itself was published quarterly by the Department of Maori Affairs from 1952 to 1976. It accepted articles for publication in English and Maori and aimed to discuss ‘all questions of interest to the Maori.’ The first issue contains an article commemorating Buck’s ‘rich life.’ Buck had died in December 1951. Sutherland died a few months later in February 1952. Before then he had written an article especially for Te Ao Hou. Published posthumously in the first issue, it was titled ‘Progress in the North’ and was about Maori land development in Taitokerau.\(^\text{67}\) The linkages continued to cast themselves back and forth across time, from department to university and magazine to book.

Amongst the contributions to the Nineteen-Sixties was a previously unpublished address by Ernest Beaglehole, who had died in 1965. In the short paper, written in 1957, he expressed great impatience with the slow rate at which Maori were integrating.\(^\text{68}\) Other contributors included the 50s and 60s generation of established and emerging anthropologists, as well as other social scientists, for example, Piddington, Kawharu, James and Jane Ritchie, and Bruce Biggs. Schwimmer used his symposium to add to, interrogate and update the discourse begun in Sutherland’s general survey. Schwimmer engaged directly on the issue of leadership. The Maori People Today had treated Maori leadership as the focal point of Maori social organisation and the Maori value system, which Schwimmer ascribed to Ngata’s influence. Certainly Ngata supported the protection and nurturing of Maori leadership, both practically and philosophically, because it was pivotal to Maori acceptance of government policies. Schwimmer did not say that Ngata’s emphasis was misplaced, but he did deliberately de-emphasise leadership by shifting the focus to the more pressing issue of the late 60s, Maori-Pakeha relationships. Schwimmer argued that The Maori People Today viewed Maori-Pakeha interaction as negative, spoiling the ideal of natural and gradual Maori development, where Maori people remained semi-independent in rural strongholds guided by Maori leaders, and adapted to modern society at their own pace. The problem was that, in 1940, that ideal was on the verge of being spoiled anyway, by the increasing Maori population. Belshaw saw the demographic writing on the wall in 1940 when he urged the need for urbanisation and a varied pattern of employment, something that, by 1968 was universally recognised as essential.\(^\text{69}\)

The Nineteen-Sixties contained more academic, theoretical approaches to the central

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\(^\text{67}\) Te Ao Hou, Winter, 1952, pp.3-10.
\(^\text{69}\) Schwimmer, ‘The Aspirations of the Contemporary Maori’ in Schwimmer, Nineteen-Sixties, p.15.
problem than *Maori People*, and some offers to anthropologically and sociologically re-label the occurrences and processes described. In Schwimmer’s view a new theory on Maori social development with clear terminology expressing the end goal was needed to remove the ambiguity from the debate. He supported Piddington’s overdue revelation of the flaws integration caused by the confusion-inducing lack of clear definition in the term. Schwimmer then introduced a twin-set of end goals. He borrowed the first goal, ‘inclusion’ from American sociologist Talcott Parsons and immediately coupled it with ‘biculturalism’. Schwimmer’s theoretical model proposed that Maori people aimed to participate in the modern social, political and economic life of the country (inclusion), whilst at the same time maintaining certain Maori concepts and cultural norms, all of which are accepted by Pakeha (biculturalism). In New Zealand, inclusion would only work to the extent that Pakeha would accept Maori as Maori; hence the need for biculturalism in which Pakeha acceptance of Maori concepts would become less averse to those times that Maori reserved the right to be excluded. Inclusion that failed to allow for biculturalism was unacceptable to Maori and, if pursued to the extreme, inclusion ran the risk of in fact becoming assimilation. This, Schwimmer argued, had been the legacy of the first Labour government and its intensive pursuit of ‘including everybody through its policies of equality.’ Biculturalism was the magic stopper that would keep the racial tension genie in the bottle, but it too was problematic. Biculturalism required cultural effort from Pakeha’s acceptance of Maoritanga and it was probably unacceptable to many Pakeha without a guarantee that inclusion, for once and for all, would work. Thus, by 1968, in Schwimmer’s view, Maori-Pakeha relations had taken centre stage as social problem in most need of attention, nudging Maori leadership into the wings.

Piddington’s theoretical offering was ‘emergent development’ where new social institutions emerge within cultures undergoing changes that result from colonisation. A positive and spontaneous process that combines elements from both cultures, emergent development sought neither an outright return to the traditional Maori way, nor complete assimilation into Pakeha culture. Furthermore, Piddington argued, the two directions were not mutually exclusive. John Forster made a similar argument, beginning by explaining New Zealanders held two opposing views of Maori: the romantic Maori who emphasised ‘reconstruction of the past’ and who argued that Maori culture can contribute to the nation as

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70 Ibid., pp.15-16.
71 Ibid., pp.9-64.
a whole; and the modern Maori keen to engage in and benefit from the advantages of the modern world by, for example, committing to the forty-hours-a-week work ethic. For Pakeha observers, Maori culture must surely have been a handicap.74

Like Piddington, Forster did not see the tension as existing in choosing between being either a romantic Maori or a modern Maori, but in settling on one of countless variations that existed between and amongst these two polar opposites. However Forster’s argument was also set apart by the proposal that finding a comfortable space somewhere between being totally Maori and identifying completely with New Zealand European culture was a personal quest for identity which presented serious dilemmas for some.75 That quest and those dilemmas were fictionalised Arapera Blank. Poet and fiction-writer, one of her outlets for publication had been Te Ao Hou magazine.76 Her Nineteen-Sixties contribution, One Two Three Four Five is the story of a five-year-old boy’s first day at school, told in the first person. In the postscript he is older and educated, and Blank narrated a stream of consciousness in which he complains of having three (metaphorical) legs.77

The first leg was his Maori leg, rendered clumsy over time because his early education only let him keep the attractive part of it the part deemed Maori: action songs, haka [sic] and how to write in my own tongue His second leg was his Pakeha leg, which demanded strength, and said to get an education live in a house like the neighbour, and save for carpet and cups and venetian blinds and maybe a new car. His Pakeha leg told him there was no time for uneconomical, energy-consuming tangi and hui. His third leg was fashioned from looking at the other two and was very clumsy. It got him into trouble even with his family as he grappled with suggestions of being un-Maori, got chastised for missing an uncle’s tangi, and struggled with his family’s dislike of a Pakeha journalist, a representation of his own Pakeha education. His third leg was a nuisance and an oaf and nobody appreciated it because nobody wanted to see his Maori and Pakeha sides at the same time. In fact, he concluded, all three legs are a curse and he would not have to suffer from carting them around if only he had not turned five.78 It reads as an emotionally-charged story. Yet, those emotions seem to go unnoticed by Schwimmer as he wrote past them in pursuit of his theory. He described Blank’s essay as a clearly indicated condition of

73 Ibid., pp.260-4.
75 Ibid., p. 111.
76 For example, Arapera Blank, Yielding to the New in Te Ao Hou, 28, 1959, pp.8-10, and The Visitors Te Ao Hou, 38, 1962, pp.5-9. (The Visitors was published under the pseudonym Hineira).
77 Blank, One Two Three Four Five in Schwimmer, pp.85-96.
78 Ibid., p.94.
biculturnalism\[that is, \"the conscious confrontation and reconciliation of two conflicting value systems, both of which are accepted as valid\]

At that point, Blank\'\'s character had a choice to make, because biculturalism accepts the conflict of values it involves.79

The core arguments presented in the Nineteen-Sixties were interlaced with several ancillary pleadings. Forster, for instance, had a particularly ominous warning for government: expect social and economic disparities to arise between Maori and Pakeha; and watch for the intensification of race relations problems, particularly in Auckland where Maori would become most populous. These would be the results, Forster avowed, of sweeping Maori into the \"new world culture\". Social and economic conditions improved for everyone who entered into \"urban and industrial\" society. However, Forster argued, in no advanced country had those improvements been shared equally between demographic cohorts. In fact, in every such country, including New Zealand, the improvements in living standards promised by urbanisation increased disparities between the colonised and the colonising populations. It was a situation which did not bode well. Urbanisation also increased the occurrence of \"frequent intensive contact\" between Maori and Pakeha, who would now not only be culturally different, but socio-economically distinct as well.80

Certainly history has shown that the massive post-war changes that Forster detailed constituted one of the greatest challenges to Maori social organisation, aspirations, and values, and even warranted the government turning the attentions of policy to the cities. Fortunately he was ready with some advice for government: avoid the oft-repeated but most basic error of treating the Maori community as a single homogeneous unit. It was an inappropriate and inadequate view, Forster advised, that failed to understand the subtleties of Maori society. Governments had already erred by responding to certain Maori organisations as if they represented the Maori population as a whole. Forster\'\'s case in point was the withdrawal and destruction of the school bulletin Washday at the Pa in 1964 after the Maori Women\'\'s Welfare League\'\'s comprehensive criticism of it.81 Washday textually and photographically depicted a rural Maori family. Debate about it spilled into the public arena and lined up along the modern Maori-traditional Maori continuum, and not according to race or gender. In fact, it could be argued that the debate was wholly assimilated though the debaters were not. On one hand the book was regarded as a romantic, backward-looking and offensive eulogy to the unspoilt Maori living in their back-blocks pa; on the other it was

79 Schwimmer, \"Aspirations of the Contemporary Maori\" p.13.
81 Ibid., pp. 101-11.
innocent: the images beautiful, the text honest and unbiased. The family were happy and never intended to be portrayed as typical. The league drew fire during the debate and stood accused of over-reacting, being unrealistic and inconsistent, and failing to criticise tourism-driven images of cooking and washing in Rotorua hot-pools while preventing the enjoyment of Washday which at least depicted the truth.82

Forster’s chastisement of the government handling of Washday feeds into Schwimmer’s chapter on the same topic as this thesis. The Maori and the Government In it Schwimmer pointed to factionalism within the Maori community as one of the reasons it was difficult to find the Maori bearers of rightful authority who formed the Maori political system with whom the overall New Zealand political system could interact. It is a problem that continues to vex current-day governments as they seek to settle long-standing Treaty of Waitangi claims. Back in 1968, Schwimmer agreed the factions had legitimate local level or village leadership, but the further they got from the village, the more their influence waned. Other leadership strategies and processes were required to deal with Pakeha authority, and, according to Schwimmer, one stood out as well-established and effective: choosing a person with more than average understanding of the Pakeha world. More than likely such a person was a Maori with a good European education able to interpret Maori views to government authorities. His or her possession of the requisite qualifications, however, could not prevent instances of conflict with government arising. In times of conflict, such as taking land under the Public Works Act without consulting the Maori owners Schwimmer first noted the appropriate method for Maori to express their disconsolate grief in the form of a respectful approach to a Minister of the Crown. Furthermore, the Minister to be approached ought to be sympathetic to Maori welfare, to be, argued Schwimmer, a metaphoric father of the Maori people. Schwimmer also provided a response of last resort should Maori find themselves completely thwarted by Pakeha authority. It is a response equally as nineteenth-century as beseeching their metaphoric dad: withdrawal from the relationship. Withdrawal implied a metaphoric sulk, perhaps, coupled with estrangement from dad. It is worth noting here that Maori had applied the term withdrawal to themselves previously, although not in such a negative light. Maori regarded withdrawal as a more organic and positive process that allowed Maori to return to the tribe to culturally refresh, a point that will be picked up in

chapter five.

Schwimmer noted that government policy in 1968 was to rely on Òpopular Maori leadersÓ as intermediaries, whose authority derives not from the village but from the governmentÓs trust that the leaders will not Ôouch off a crisis in Maori public opinionÓ. It is an interesting scenario that Schwimmer painted, and one into which this history will journey. BeagleholeÔs postscript concluded the volume, but not only was Beaglehole three years deceased at time of publication he had first spoken the words of his postscript in the previous decade. So, in a kind of feedback loop, Beaglehole spoke into the (late) Nineteen-Sixties from 1957, arguing that the changes Maori had already faced were impossible to stop.

Change could be ÔdirectedÔ and Ôthe stresses attenuatedÔ but Ôfor their own sakesÔ Maori needed to change: change more, change faster and change radically. ÔNew horizonsÔ Beaglehole concluded, Ômean hope, enthusiasm, energy, challenge. Building on the past, even fixing the present, are only a confession of hopelessness and helplessness.Ô

Beaglehole could not have known his words would be recycled at the dawn of Nga Tamatoa who led an emerging generation of Maori activists. Wise to the disparities about which Forster warned, they were also armed with new interpretations of racism, which taught them that it not only prohibited their full inclusion in society, but also blocked the promised painkiller for the integration process: biculturalism. They were fed up with the hopelessness and helplessness of SchwimmerÔs prescribed respectful approach for engaging with the state. Instead, they would protest with hope, enthusiasm, energy and challenge and thus seek a fixing of the past in order to build Maori futures in the present. That, however, is another history, and possibly another future too.

Continuation of both public and historiographical debate around the issues of Maori cultural adjustment to modernity ought to be no surprise, particularly if HillÔs analysis in the second volume of State Authority continues the arguments made in the first. How debate about Maori leadership has developed can briefly be illustrated in particular works of two Maori academics already introduced, Mahuika and Walker. They not only continued the theme of balancing tradition and modernity, but took the discussion into the Maori world, and each of them wrote from a different part of that world: Mahuika from Ngati Porou; Walker from the ÔnationalÔ Maori world. KawharuÔ much earlier work had already been published, written from his Orakei doorstep while he watched ÔimmigrantÔ Maori settle in the surrounding city

and outnumber the tangata whenua in ever-increasing proportions, drawn by the desire to be Maori in a Pakeha world. It was a situation that presented a brand new challenge for Maori: working out the relationship between tangata whenua and a new kind of manuhiri, who were there to stay and not guests on a visit. Kawharu presented the challenge as problematic and complex, though not insurmountable, noting major overlaps and areas of interest within which tangata whenua and hon-tangata whenua could negotiate.85

In his 1977 essay, Leadership: Inherited and Achieved Mahuika critiqued the commonly-held view that emphasised leadership as the prerogative of males only, determined by primogeniture based on male issue. Focussing on his tribe, Ngati Porou, he found numerous exceptions to the popularly-held rule, all unwaveringly underpinned by the framework of relationships within and between kin-groups.86 Regardless of how leaders inherited or achieved their positions, they led the kin-group to which they belonged. Thus Mahuika reclaimed Ngata as a tribal leader. He argued that acquisition of te matauranga o te Pakeha was just an added accomplishment that all Ngati Porou children traditionally selected for leadership were required to master, for the express purpose of providing leadership in tribal relations with the modern world. It had had little if any effect on traditional expectations of tribal leaders. Mahuika argued this process continued into the post-war era, although it was challenged by urbanisation as the educated left their tribal homelands. However, in Mahuika’s view, regardless of what Ngati Porou leaders achieved in wider society, the traditional determinants of leadership remained relevant. They were still selected to address their kin-group situation; they simply had more demands placed upon them as modern ones were added to traditional ones.87

In 1984 Walker recognised a new group of leaders functioning in the post-war period, the educated elite founded by an earlier generation of Pakeha-educated Maori. Post-war, the educated elite expressed their leadership through national organisations like the league and the New Zealand Maori Council.88 It could be expected that Mahuika could simultaneously claim any Ngati Porou educated elite as tribal, assuming they met the appropriate criteria of their kin-group. Thus developments in thinking around the overlaps and dovetails of marking out Maoriness in a Pakeha world continued well beyond Schwimmer’s 1968 symposium, and continued to be driven by Maori having it both ways.

85 Kawharu, Urban Immigrants pp.174-186.
86 Mahuika, Leadership pp.64-85
87 Ibid.
88 Walker, Genesis of Maori Activism pp.274-5.
Modern leadership never replaced traditional leadership, and traditional leadership never went away. Indeed, in Mahuika’s argument, traditional leadership continued to lay claim to its modern graduates, even if they moved. The enduring power of tradition is a central theme in this thesis, with a recurring motif of Maori who could be simultaneously modern and traditional, urban and rural, and whose tasks of Maori community development did not necessarily succumb to the tensions.

The literature assessed thus far considers the debates that surround and intersect the narrative, the times and the analyses of this thesis. It is the literature that affects and interrogates the history written here. There is another body of work, though, that affects and interrogates the constitution of that history as it is written in the present, the literature that debates the nature of Maori history.

The Maori history debates comprise a maturing body of literature that considers the nature and form of Maori history, its tools, sources, and matauranga. One of the key precepts of Maori history, as Maori see it, is that history is ever-present. This idea is based on the facet of Maori knowledge that the way forward is best accessed via the past. Keenan’s exploration of the Maori intellectual landscape. From the vantage point of the tribe, and with an interest in revealing narratives about the past concealed from history, Keenan has proposed a range of Maori customary processes and frameworks through which tribes constructed their knowledge of the past. Of especial importance to what Keenan proposed is the persistence of whakapapa as the primary organising device of iwi and hapu history. Keenan illustrated that persistence on the Taranaki tribal landscape, and found it likely that Maori historians will increasingly turn to whakapapa to control and structure Maori history. Few Maori historians would take issue with Keenan’s contention, and none of those who share either Charles Royal’s position that there is no such thing as Maori history, only tribal history, or Joseph Pere’s that only those who whakapapa to an iwi ought to be considered to write that iwi’s history.


Keenan, Haere Whakamua, pp.x-xi.

Keenan, Ma Pango Ma Whero Ka Oti: Unities and Fragments in Maori History in Dalley and Labrum, Fragments, p.51.

Ibid., pp.44-51.

Te Ahukaramu Charles Royal, Te Haurapa: An Introduction to Researching Tribal Histories and Traditions, Wellington, 1992, p.9; and Joseph Pere, Hitori Maori in C. Davis and P. Lineham, eds, The Future of the
New Zealand's traditional historiography failed to see the importance of tipuna to Maori understandings of history. It is that situation which led Ōnon-Maori history writers ōto write ōo-called Maori history ōwhich fails in fact to give Maori people ōany mana or identity. In recent years, it seems that more and more Maori tribal historians have been drawn from their ōstorehouses of tribal mana ōto the whenua tautohetohe of Maori history. This is a good sign perhaps, an indication that numbers of Maori historians (tribal or not) are increasing. Also, as Bernadette Arapere points out by citing Ballara and Judith Binney, some Pakeha historians have learned to navigate that contested area by proceeding with caution. Learning to navigate contestability does not on its own remove it, but it can be useful. Binney, for example, acknowledges the role of history in relating the past in ways that are meaningful ōto Maori.

I understand Keenan’s arguments to mean that sometimes Maori are at work on historical projects that do not intersect with the mainstream historiography, in particular the shaping of a Maori historiography using Maori historical methodologies. However, he does not dismiss Maori historical projects that do intersect. These are the projects that occur on the whenua tautohetohe between Maori and New Zealand history. All of the Maori history projects, in my view, are contributions to a much broader goal currently understood as decolonization. However nuanced and fraught the Maori history debates, and whether they occur internally to Maori scholarship or externally between scholarships, Maori historians are engaged in a wider call from Maori to decolonize research methodologies, as espoused by Linda Smith. In effect, that is the activity that Pere, Royal, Keenan and numbers of other Maori historians have been engaged in, decolonizing the methodologies of history in particular. It is an activity concerned on one level with re-honing the Maori tools of historical enquiry, and on another with finding a historiographical location for its results.

Locating history is a concern of all historians, and in the case of Maori history it partly consists of escaping the past. That is, Maori historians are involved more and more in writing histories that help Maori escape the past into which they have found themselves written; the dominant historical discourse which tends to locate Maori history in the context

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94 Pere, ŌHitori Maori p.30.
97 Keenan, ŌPredicting the Past Ōpp.24-35.
98 Smith, Decolonizing Methodologies.
99 Other Maori historians include Monty Soutar and Te Maire Tau. See: Monty Soutar, ŌA Framework for Analysing Written Iwi Histories ŌHe Pukenga Korero, Koanga, 2, 1, 1996, pp.43-57; and Te Maire Tau, ŌMatauranga Maori as an Epistemology ŌTe Pouhere Korero Journal, 1, 1, 1999, pp.10-23.
of British colonialism and expansionism. There is a problem in that, if this past is inescapable, then attempts to escape it will likely be futile. This, perhaps, is the reason that so many Maori scholars have preferred to intellectually repatriate to their tribal homelands, to return to and reinvigorate the indigenous historical trajectory that pre-dates colonisation. Another way in which Maori scholars escape the past is by writing Maori history up from under the great weight of New Zealand historiography, such as Walker’s *Ka Whawhai Tonu Matou*. It is a huge task as New Zealand history has been written into New Zealand’s sense of itself. It is a task mostly undertaken on the contested ground, where Maori historians currently reject the role of historically accessorizing an unapologetic colonial narrative. Colliding with Western scholarship is therefore an occupational hazard. Maori tribal historians who write from a vantage point closer to the storehouses of tribal mana may not face that particular occupational hazard, but they have occupational hazards to face nonetheless. They also have an important role to play in writing Maori up from under, as Maori historians engaged in Western scholarship rely on their tribal historians to maintain tribal knowledge and share the tasks of re-honing the Maori tools of historical enquiry. It is the tribal historians who assist Maori historians to navigate the contested ground, and perhaps beyond. I believe the Maori historian who ranges to the limits of their tribal territory and beyond can still, therefore, remain tribally grounded.

To explain, and to extend the *whakapapa* theme so prevalent amongst Maori historians: as the author of this thesis, I am deeply embedded in my personal tribal *whakapapa*. It is my indigenous inescapable past, and it anchors me to the Hokianga, specifically the North Hokianga, Te Rarawa and Ngapuhi, and it gets more specific than that. The point, however, is that my anchor has a very long chain, and this thesis will find that much of the Hokianga, an ideological Hokianga perhaps, is found transplanted in Auckland. So the *whakapapa* presented here is more than the *whakapapa* of blood and bones, and extends to the *whakapapa* of experience. I am a descendant of the experience that is presented here in the urbanisation of my parents’ generation, and the home-based leadership of my grandparents. It needs to be clear that though the *whakapapa* of experience may be shared across tribal boundaries, it does not grant *whakapapa* admission to those other tribes. I would apply the same principle to other kinds of invented *whakapapa*, such as Reilly’s so-called *intellectual whakapapa*[^100]. Blood and bone is the baseline entry to *whakapapa*.

[^100]: Michael Reilly, *An Ambiguous Past: Representing Maori History* NZJH, 29, 2, 1995, p.39. Reilly’s recitation of his *intellectual whakapapa* as qualification for his work in Maori history has been described as *somewhat strange* by Kaa, and lacking in caution by Arapere. See Kaa, ʻ*Te Wiwi Nati*ʻ p.16; and Arapere,
Whakapapa of experience can only be overlaid onto tribal whakapapa if tribe permitting it is not whakapapa itself and never will be. It cannot replace whakapapa, it cannot even shift it, although I hope this thesis will show it can add texture and colour.

If history is the past constituted in the present, then this thesis is my past constituted in the present. With its movement in, out and around my tribal home I am compelled to ask if this is a past that invariably leads me home, if indeed, as Royal suggests, that even in writing Maori history am in fact writing tribal history My answer is in two parts: yes, and unsure. I answer yes because, as outlined above, I know I am from Te Rarawa and Ngapuhi, and even if I did not know that or any of its supporting evidence, it would still be the case. I answer yes because whakapapa is my entry point into the topic. It is who I am ancestrally that has called me to explore this particular aspect of my history. The unsure part of my answer is explained by the fact that this history leads me to West Auckland, and my West Auckland forbears occupy a certain socio-cultural space that is not tribal, or at least not consistently so. Yet those same forbears have kept my whakapapa alive in many and dynamic ways by drawing on the fundamental values and philosophies of the tribe that they packed with their material belongings when they shifted to Auckland. In Auckland, their extra-tribal socio-cultural space is shared with people from many other tribes. This thesis will show that ideologically Maori re-tribalise in the face of the profound changes of the post-war period as much as they are said to de-tribalise.

In laying out this whakapapa of experience, and allowing it to venture to Auckland, one challenge arises that this thesis has not met. I briefly acknowledge that challenge now, and consciously leave it in abeyance. It is the challenge laid down by Kawharu in 1968 regarding the relationships between Maori non-tangata whenua migrating to the cities and the tangata whenua of urban centres, introduced above. On the basis of anecdotal evidence, it is my view that those relationships have been and continue to be worked out. The development of those relationships has so far evaded historical enquiry, there being no thorough consideration of the problems of integration and leadership from the point of view of the tangata whenua of urban centres and their role as cultural hosts of urbanising Maori. Though this thesis notes the challenge, it has in no way set out to meet it. The thesis has tended to follow Maori people links between their rural homes and urban lives, links which leave an impression of skirting the tangata whenua of the city. In fact, that is a misleading view.

Tangata whenua around whom urban centres grew were acknowledged in specific parts of the

Maku Ano p.21.
research, particularly regarding the building of urban marae.\textsuperscript{102} Further, tensions did not occur simply between tangata whenua and non-tangata whenua. There were also tensions to address within the non-tangata whenua group as it worked out how to unite across tribal differences to become \textit{\textit{\textit{\textit{multi-tribal}}}}.\textsuperscript{103} It became apparent very early on that the problems presented were too big for this thesis and deserve their own detailed investigation, hence the decision to leave the matter in abeyance.

The challenge, as Kawharu expressed it, is one that can be laid before for all Maori historians who follow their hapu narratives into the city. If we continue the trend of re-centring our historical narratives around our tribal homes, we must be mindful that when those narratives extend into the city, there is another tribal narrative already there. It would be unfortunate if in keeping constant historical watch on tribal interpretations of life in the city, we obfuscate and risk un-remembering the narratives that would emerge if we inquired into Kawharu’s original wero. As Williams observed, the diversities of Maori experience in the twentieth century challenge writers of tribal histories to consider what tribal histories have the potential to become.\textsuperscript{104} Kaa thought similarly, and urged new approaches to historical enquiry into the Maori twentieth century. He noted the potential, for example, for oral histories to allow for a different type of interpretation and offered cultural analysis as a means for accessing the narrative and providing a more nuanced interpretation of the historical situation.\textsuperscript{105}

This part of the discussion may be underpinned by a term already introduced, te ao hurihuri, which is earlier translated as the ever-changing world and applied to the post-war period. That meaning may over-simplify matters, so some assistance is drawn from Manuka Henare’s use of te ao hurihuri as one of the powerful generative terms contained in his Korunga o Nga Tikanga or matrix of ethics. In Henare’s matrix te ao hurihuri becomes an ethic, the ethic of change and tradition. This ethic calls on another meaning for hurihuri: turning some thing over and over in one’s mind; pondering, reflecting, mulling.\textsuperscript{106} Applied to historical inquiry, it calls on the Maori historian to inquire thoroughly and thoughtfully. Though historical mulling may shift and change or mediate histories and their tools the ethic

\textsuperscript{101} Royal, \textit{Te Haurapa}, p.13.
\textsuperscript{102} For example, Letty Brown, interviewed by Aroha Harris, 25-27 May 1998. Letty raised the issue of relationships with tangata whenua in the planning and building of Hoani Waititi Marae in Glen Eden, Auckland.
\textsuperscript{103} Brown interview, Tape 2 Side B.
\textsuperscript{104} Williams, \textit{Panguru}, p.15.
\textsuperscript{105} Kaa, \textit{Te Wiwi Nati}, p.20.
\textsuperscript{106} Henare, \textit{Changing Images}, pp.87-9, and \textit{C19th Maori Society: From Tribes to Nation. To Cede or not to Cede that is the Question} unpublished lecture, University of Auckland, 24 July 2004.
also requires that change occur in relation to, and in fact be guided by, tradition. This returns to the suggestions of Williams and Kaa that the new historical approaches to the Maori twentieth century evolve from tribal history. That being the case, on the matter of urbanisation in particular, it may be the role of the hosts to provide the opening historical narratives.

The sources used and approaches to them perhaps reflect a practical application of Henare’s ethic of change and tradition. The sources used are mostly, not exclusively, the conventional sources of New Zealand history: official publications; government archives, particularly those of the Department of Maori Affairs; newspapers and magazines. Choosing the department’s Welfare Division as the nexus of Maori-state interaction in this thesis explains the emphasis on its files. The Maori Affairs series of archives have long dominated historical narratives about Maori, and continue to play a leading role in the construction of history in the process of investigating and eventually settling Treaty of Waitangi claims. One of the challenges of the research, therefore, was to attempt to counter-balance the dominance of the state’s record in constructing this history. A number of sources helped, in particular the oral history interviews, my approach to which is outlined below. I also had access to some of the minutes of the Mangamuka Maori Association (later Mangamuka Tribal Committee).

Though minute books are a conventional source in New Zealand history, my access to these minute books was facilitated by whakapa. Even then, access was not immediate; whakapapa gave eligibility, access had to be worked out and worked for on that basis. Access was granted by my Nana, Violet Otene Harris, and came very late in a long nana-mokopuna-researcher-researched dynamic that began in my childhood when I first asked for my nana’s assistance with a school project. I used modern versions of the customary sources that Keenan identifies as conveying Maori narratives of past events. For example, I have used one whakatauki and one waiata as explanatory devices, each composed in modern times, but grounded in tradition. I also read much poetry and fiction from the times, with a focus on Maori short fiction writers published through the main outlet of the times _Te Ao Hou_ magazine. I did not restrict myself to Maori writers, however. I read, for instance, Noel Hilliard’s _Maori Girl_, which offered some insights into the Pakeha conscience in race relations despite its unrepresentative depiction of the central character, Netta.107 Maori

short stories may not be the ‘ancient stories’ identified by Keenan, but they are nonetheless Maori stories.\textsuperscript{108} Furthermore, as Bill Pearson contends, they predominantly discuss one topic, ‘adaptation to the revolution in Maori society and outlook’ that resulted from post-war urbanisation and increasing contact with Pakeha.\textsuperscript{109}

The parameters I have set for this thesis are also largely conventional and Western. The thesis focuses on Te Taitokerau, a region which takes in Auckland and Northland, and within which the greatest proportion of Maori people in New Zealand live. It is also an area, alongside Te Tairawhiti, which in the 1960s the department identified as particularly prone to under-employment due to local industries being unable to keep apace of increasing local populations.\textsuperscript{110} The thesis is set in the timeframe 1945-1967, roughly. The end date 1967 is suggestive of the beginning of the modern Maori protest movement, whose history offers some useful parameters with which to end one phase of the Maori twentieth century and anticipate another.

The protest movement is not a direct part of this thesis, but histories of the movement have nonetheless informed it. In particular, this thesis understands the 1960s as the movement’s nursery.\textsuperscript{111} A transitional period in which integration policies tested existing Maori leadership and Maori-state relationships, it left old challenges and frustrations for a new generation to pick up. That new generation chose new ways to articulate Maori views and engage with the state, drawing on its own new experiences as Maori in the Pakeha world interpreted through modern Maori understandings. While 1967 is an acknowledged approximate end point, in fact I have used publication of the Hunn Report in 1961 and its aftermath as the historical cue to fade the thesis out.

The beginning point for the thesis is perhaps less amorphous than the end, being propped up by the end of war and also the 1945 act. Still, the point at which the thesis gains traction is more likely 1949 in the change over of government from Labour to National, and in particular an administrative relationship between the under-secretary and incoming Minister of Maori Affairs, Tipi Ropiha and Ernest Corbett respectively. Their leadership of the department continued to 1957, and is discussed in the next chapter. The chronological beginning and end of this thesis are not precisely fixed. They fade in and out, in a way that I compare with the interviews I conducted. This absence of definitive end points reflects

\textsuperscript{108} Keenan, ‘Ma Pango Ma Whero’ p.39.
\textsuperscript{109} Pearson, ‘Maori in Literature’ pp.245-7.
\textsuperscript{110} See, for example, ‘Relocation for under-employed Maori, Draft for MOMA’ 30 January 1961, AAMK 869/1101e, 36/20 pt 2, Archives New Zealand, Wellington, (ANZW).
\textsuperscript{111} There is some support for such a view from Donna Awatere who describes whanau as the training ground for
Graham Smith’s explanation that the thesis can be a ‘marae for the academic’ to lay out a kaupapa where leaving threads of an argument for others to pick up is appropriate.\footnote{Graham Smith, ‘The Development of Kaupapa Maori: Theory and Praxis’ PhD Thesis, University of Auckland, 1997, p.47.}

Clearly the periodization of this thesis required interview participants that lived through the time studied. However, I deliberately chose to interview two people who I knew had been involved in the 1975 Maori Land March to help me understand the changes towards the end of the 60s. I also interviewed two people who had not had a particular involvement in developments such as the league, tribal committees or urban marae. I approached three people for the opposite reason; they had had such involvements. The way I structured my choices about who I asked for an interview is reflected in the uneven use of them throughout the thesis. That unevenness is further contributed to by the uneven durations of the individual interviews. Almost all the recordings were at least two hours long. The two recordings that were longer were each recorded over two or three consecutive days rather than in one sitting. Different interviews are drawn on more heavily in particular parts than others, but I have made use of all the interviews, and there are recurring themes across them all as this thesis will show. I am connected closely by whakapapa to five of the people I interviewed, though not all through the same lines, and I am closer to two than the others. I share broader iwi connections with three interviewees, and even broader regional connections with two more. I have no whakapapa connection with one of them, Letty Brown, except, arguably, whakapapa of experience due to her role in the ‘Maori West Auckland’ in which I was raised.

My approach to the interviews was to try and ground them in the life histories of their contributors, partly achieved by interviewing them at the place of their choice which turned out to be either their work place or their home and by asking them all to begin with their childhoods and family upbringings before moving to the issues with which I was concerned. Though I planned to take a semi-structured approach to the interviews, with key topic areas arranged under the broad headings of leadership and organisation, the korero invariably circled around the catch-all broad heading ‘other’ under which I had included gathering places, family events and raising children. Even the topic of leadership circled back to the family, with the korero generally beginning with a quick list of so-called well-known leaders, but eventually resting with mentors within the kin-group parents, grandparents, aunties and uncles who influenced people’s life choices, and provided a template for family life. So the korero journeyed back and forth across time and place, from the families in which the

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contributors grew up to the families they had grown, along the way picking up some rich details about food, churches, children, dances, and life.

The interviews fade in and out similar to the timeframe for the thesis. The solid point in time at which each life history begins is time of birth. Yet birth invariably introduces people who pre-date it; parents, grandparents, tupuna. There is a fading quality about the end of the interviews also. In particular, the interviews with older contributors shift from what I wanted to know to what the contributor felt I ought to know. These oral endnotes were often couched as reflections on the whole of the interview, but also contain lessons from which the contributor could expect me, as the interviewer, to learn. Chrissie Jacobs' closing remark that 'perseverance...and learning to stop and listen...can take a person a long way is an example.' Similarly, Tom Parore counselled, 'You've got to have a purpose to things. The purpose might be simple...to advance your own whanau, that they all have some educational attainments, that they all learn more about their whakapapa and some of their history.' Nor are the interviews contained in the recording alone. They were preceded by the required rituals of encounter, the nature of them determined by my hosts, and often including the important questions about the current wellbeing of families. Once the recordings end, one of the most important parts of the interview process followed, the exchanges of acknowledgements usually accompanied by food and cups of tea. Often a signal for children and mokopuna to re-enter the room, the post-recording component of the interviews was a reminder of the way that my search for history interrupts continuous lives and also, as Kaa points out, the multiple demands for people's time.

The oral history exercise contained in the research was further nuanced by contributors' attitudes to oral history methods, including the consent forms and letters of introduction, and the ethical assurances they contain. This documentation is meticulously crafted in order to clear the hurdles of the University of Auckland Human Subjects Ethics Committee. One of my human subjects had no interest at all in my paper work, whether written in Maori or English. She happily signed the consent form, however, and as a back-up measure I made sure her daughter, who lived next door, was clear about the project and her mother's participation in it. In fact, family members of a number of other contributors chose to become involved in the preliminary matters that occurred prior to the start of the recordings. Another contributor was bemused by my questions that sought his express

113 Pio and Chrissie Jacobs, interviewed by Aroha Harris, 24 April 1998, Tape 2 Side A.
114 Tom Parore, interviewed by Aroha Harris, 6 July 1998, Tape 2 Side B.
permission to identify him in the thesis in relation to what he said, saying ‘well if you’ve got it on tape, I must have said it’ Others wanted the pre-recording process to consist of informal conversations about the research by phone or in person, after all, formal letters of introduction make little sense to people who are already connected. Only two wanted to talk about issues of depositing the recordings with an appropriate collection at the end of the project.

The passage of time between the interviews and the production of the thesis added another dimension. Two people have passed on since I interviewed them and their recordings have since developed a new significance. Wanting to maintain my ethical responsibilities, as the end of the thesis drew closer I checked in with a number of contributors to make doubly sure my use of their korero was still acceptable, with a focus on those who I considered had been most wary at the time the interview was conducted. The responses were all supportive, and one a nice surprise, that of the contributor who at the time of her interview had asked me to return to her when the thesis was complete to discuss destroying her recording. She was very clear she was only helping me with my research work, and I regarded her as the most wary of all the contributors. When I discussed her inclusion prior to completion of the thesis she asked tongue-in-cheek if I could use her middle name as a pseudonym. When I said I absolutely could, she smiled and said, ‘no, don’t do that, use my name’

Overall the participation and agreement of contributors was largely indifferent to the methods of oral history and its guidelines for ethical responsibility, no matter how rigorous. The reasons seem to return once more to the matter of whakapa. It is often who the researcher is that provides access to the korero of contributors, and as Arapere infers, the researcher does not stand alone but stands within his or her own whanau, who also influence access. Furthermore, as Kaa points out, the agreement and participation of contributors ultimately rests on their āroha and understanding and their ārūt in mē to treat their words with due respect and care. The underlying principle I applied to assist this process was to take my lead from the contributors, adhering to their methods and their guidelines.

There are clearly many tensions for the Maori historian conducting interviews with Maori to whom they are connected. Western scholarship questions subjectivity; Maori scholarship requires it. Maori Marsden has offered an access to reconciling subjectivity in Maori history. He embraces his approach as not only subjective but also passionate

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117 Arapere, Maku Ano, p.30.
118 Kaa, Te Wiwi Nati, p.18.
However, he also states that when viewing attitudes from within the culture the writer must unmask his or herself.\textsuperscript{119} I hope, therefore, that I am sufficiently unmasked for the reader to be able to read this history against my subjectivity (in Western scholarship) and whakapapa (in Maori scholarship). Such a reading in no way absolves the thesis from any inherent tensions, but does allow for clarity about them.

The tensions between and within scholarly practices continue to be played out in the conventions of the thesis itself. The practice of using surnames after a person is first introduced is a good example. It has long been an uncomfortable, un-cultural practice for me, but I have developed a compromise convention in this thesis. I identify Pakeha by surname, as I regard it as Pakeha practice. I refer to Maori academics and authors by surname, as it is a convention to which we have all subscribed. I also use surnames for Maori government officials and high-profile leaders, particularly those already in the history books. I could not and have not referred to the people who contributed interviews by surname, except in the footnotes. There are some inconsistencies. I struggled, for example, with Whina Cooper, who according to my own convention I ought to refer to by surname. However, calling Whina Cooper constitutes a major cultural hurdle for me. I share iwi connections with Whina and I am, as Monty Soutar states perceptively aware of the importance of iwi as part of the readership.\textsuperscript{120}

Regarding use of the Maori language, there are very few translations in either brackets or footnotes throughout the text. To me, this reflects the interviews, in which a lot of Maori was spoken, and never with translation or explanation. As a researcher, I was already sufficiently indulged by fluent speakers of te reo who spoke mostly in English, including at least four for whom te reo was their first language. A basic glossary of the Maori words and phrases used is provided at the end of the thesis. Following current orthographic convention, the words in the glossary have macrons. The words in the body of the text do not, mainly due to my lack of skill with them. Furthermore, I considered that readers who require the glossary would be most likely to require the macrons to assist with pronunciation.

I have deliberately preferred the term tribe over hapu and iwi, as it evades the sometimes straitjacketed use or misuse of hapu and iwi. I take on board, however, how distasteful the term is to many Maori people I know. I also acknowledge that their distaste has developed from the experience of having the word used to denigrate Maori, as the word

\textsuperscript{119} Maori Marsden, \textit{God, Man and Universe: A Maori View} in King, \textit{Te Ao Hurihuri}, p.143.
native once was. Even so, I have still preferred the word tribe, as it is my view that human beings the world over are essentially tribal, although often without that pre-requisite of kin-relationship implicit in Maori and other tribes. In my opinion, tribalism is a global phenomenon, one of the many factors that account not only for war, but also world cups and super-bowls, provincialism, and, indeed, debates in Maori history.

This thesis has had to work with two seemingly disparate yet clearly tightly inter-connected narratives; one embedded in one-size-fits-all Maori policy, the other in the ‘business of life’ and each with its problems. With their interest in the business of life the interviews, contain detailed analysis of local situations and on that basis could be considered micro-historical. Yet though the interview participants each had definable communities they could call home, they did not all come from the same home. In addition, their narratives had to share the pages of this thesis with the narratives of the state, usually more suited to the macro-history. Furthermore, the two narratives seem to screen each other out as well as intersect with each other, often in an unsynchronised way. The Maori business of daily life selects its interactions with the state, generally on the basis of local-level need, and furthermore is immune to the dictates of historical methods. On the other hand the state consistently interprets Maori as measures of success or failure against a blanket approach to the goals of integration. The narratives with which this thesis deals are the apparently inseparable yet clearly discordant narratives of people who arrived in the post-war era by way of separate historical trajectories. The tensions to be navigated were therefore convoluted and multi-layered, and further complicated by the engagements between Maori history and New Zealand history.

As discussed in the next chapter, the two narratives are conceived of in this thesis as ‘concurrent’. Within that concurrency, there is an explanation of ‘home’ as the place from which Maori thrust and parry with the state. Here the tensions between scholarships become particularly apparent again. On one hand, there is a question over the purpose of the explanation of home, and whether it is provided simply to satisfy New Zealand history; to once again explain Maori meaning across the divide, and to a scholarship that seems to struggle with it or use it as mere accessory. On the other hand, articulating home is a means

121 The business of life, Kaa asserts, is the only determinant of autonomy available to those who study their iwi in the twentieth century, as the nineteenth century armed conflict and legislative pillage of Maori land fades. Kaa, ‘Te Wiwi Nati’ p.112.
122 Deborah Montgomerie, ‘Beyond the Search for Good Imperialism: the Challenge of Comparative
of giving Maori voice a turn with the historical microphone, without reducing it to the role of back-up singer, and celebrating an aspect of Maori lives easily taken for granted; a pitfall of subjectivity. Reconciliation of these tensions continues to be played out and, as Keenan suggests, offers an opportunity for New Zealand history to assist: to allow itself to be tested and contested by the developing Maori historiography and ultimately influenced in the shaping of a new New Zealand historiography.

As history, this thesis is an exercise in remembering, and remembering from the vantage point of the present. It allows me to remember the past and her many characters and events in a way that best suits my particular present. In my present, I choose to remember my past in a way that honours the people who lived it and is honest about what it finds in a fundamental tenet in my understanding of whakapapa. This thesis is a pause on a particular generation and a place to reflect on their dreams and deeds, it is another manifestation of the fundamentality of whakapapa in Maori history. In that sense I hope I am doing what Smith says is vital for all indigenous peoples, that is, recovering Maori stories about the past and reconciling and reprioritizing what is important about the past with what is important about the present. I hope this thesis can be some small contribution to the Maori decolonization project. I hope it assists with writing Maori up from under. Its more modest immediate goal, however, is to represent a voice that is mostly unheard in New Zealand history, and to do that without forsaking the tools, Maori and Western, of the historians.

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123 Keenan, Predicting the Past, p.34.
124 Smith, Decolonizing Methodologies, p.39.
Uncoupling the Tight Embrace: Understanding the Dynamics of Maori-State Relationships in the Post-war Period

Official actions cannot be understood if reduced to policy statements. Nor can Maori actions be understood if reduced to sets of statistics aggregating behaviour. This chapter attempts an explanation of the motivations that underpinned the interactions between Maori and the Department of Maori Affairs, the two leading actors in the Maori-state relationship. It begins by laying out the department’s broad philosophy in order to present the ideologies underpinning its actions and continues with an organic examination of Maori people’s motivations for engaging with the state and undertaking a range of development projects. The discussion acknowledges and includes Maori who urbanised, but in no way is it a history of urbanisation. Rather, the Maori narrative of the post-war years, leads the discussion into urban areas and urban Maori developments. It is important to lay an analytical foundation for the operational aspects of the department’s policies discussed later in the thesis, but beside that it is also crucial to illustrate the concurrent histories that flow throughout this study. Department officials and Maori subjected to departmental policies engaged with each other from very different standpoints. There were fundamental differences in their understandings of the trajectories of Maori history and different histories of the state in relation to Maori. Each history provided its own commentary on key events in the Maori world and key developments in Maori-state relations, and paradoxically each commentary both stood alone and leant on the other. Each gave the other legitimacy, each parroted the other, and over time the rhetoric of each took root in the discourse of the other.

In brief: The department was driven by the political imperatives of the day and was responsible for implementing policies grounded in a long history of assimilationist policymaking applied in the new and challenging context of the post-war period. Yet these policies were to be implemented in Maori families and communities moved by the imperatives of the whanau, hapu and iwi. Maori were driven by the particular needs and experiences of their homes and communities, and their interpretations of the department’s proper functions flowed from the particularities of family and community circumstance. This chapter temporarily
removes Maori and the Department of Maori Affairs from the ongoing dance over policy implementation and reception. Separating the partners from their tight embrace allows better examination of the two parties to this intimate, complicated, sometimes confusing and often frustrating relationship, most notably the ideas at the heart of Maori motivations: home and family ā modern renderings of deeply tribal social units that had weathered the worst of colonisation.

A succinct example of the kinds of misinterpretations that could occur is evident in the way Karanga Harris engaged with the department over consolidation of his land interests in the North Hokianga. Karanga farmed a block of family land in Mangamuka, and held interests in other lands in neighbouring settlements. A series of arranged succession and amalgamated partition orders was invoked to redistribute the interests of the wider whanau, though not affecting the main block that Karanga farmed. It was an arrangement to which the whanau āunts, uncles and Karanga on behalf of his immediate family ā could easily agree as it merely aligned the titles to the way that individual families within the whanau actually resided on the land.¹ Yet, when the department urged Karanga to seek sole title to the family block he farmed, by receiving the interests of his sisters who had all moved away, Karanga firmly declined. As Violet, Karanga's widow, recounted, he said the land was from their mother and he wanted it to remain the same. He argued it was because everybody had gone that everyone ought to maintain their interests in it, and it was āmo nga mokopuna² He was happy to farm the land knowing he was but an equal shareholder, and repeatedly refused his sisters' attempts to transfer their interests to him. There was one exception. He succumbed to his older sister Rimu who arrived at his home with her son, explaining that the family had agreed Karanga should accept their interests. There was another layer of interconnection at play in the exchange that led to Karanga accepting his sister's shares. Rimu's husband, Timoti, was laterally connected by whakapapa and their family lived in a nearby settlement. Furthermore, Timoti had previously helped Karanga build his family home.³

The department's goals regarding issues of Maori land title and land development, including particular situations like Karanga, were to bring Maori land (usually viewed as ādle and people into full production inside New Zealand.

¹ Aroha Harris, ‘Maori Land Title Improvement since 1945: Communal Ownership and Economic Use’ NZJH, 31, 1, pp.134-5.
² Violet Otene Harris, interviewed by Aroha Harris, 2-3 July 1998, Tape 2 Side A.
³ V. O. Harris interview, Tape 2 Side A.
economic mainstream.\(^4\) Without explicitly rejecting the department’s approach, Karanga’s point of view was built on a different ethos: with the goal of maintaining the cultural integrity and intent of his family, he selectively participated in consolidation by applying whanau processes. The disjunction of the department and whanau narratives of Karanga’s situation is apparent in the paper and oral records. The department recorded that Karanga had trouble getting his sisters to transfer their interests; yet in the mid-1990s his widow still had at least one of the requisite forms that signed the interests of a younger sister over to Karanga and affirmed that Karanga had never wanted to disinherit any of his sisters.\(^5\) In a similar mismatch of perspectives, the department identified Karanga as a leading farmer in his community capable of encouraging others to participate in the land development schemes.\(^6\) Disappointed at the relatively low uptake of the schemes in Mangamuka, the department seemed unaware that though Karanga had clearly displayed his leadership qualities, in Mangamuka he was still a young man being groomed for leadership, by other men who were senior to him.\(^7\)

The goals of amalgamation, assimilation and integration successively framed the policies of New Zealand government toward Maori, which aimed to ‘whiten’ Maori, or in late-twentieth century terms, integrate them into New Zealand’s mainstream. Arguably it was Hunn who first attempted an official written expression of what the department meant by integration, and he took great care to relegate assimilation—which was by then regarded as unsavoury—to the dustbin of a less-enlightened past. According to Hunn, assimilation meant ‘to become absorbed, blended, amalgamated with complete loss of Maori culture.’ Integration, on the other hand, saw Maori and Pakeha elements combine in a natural process to form a single nation that allowed

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\(^4\) The details of the department’s programmes of Maori land title improvement and Maori land development are well-documented, and have recently drawn the attention of research completed for claims to the Waitangi Tribunal. Examples of relevant published and unpublished secondary sources include: Aroha Harris, *Maori Land Title Improvement*, pp.132-52; Kawharu, *Maori Land Tenure: Studies of a Changing Institute*, Oxford, 1977; and Loveridge, *Twentieth Century Maori Land Administration*.

\(^5\) V. O. Harris interview, Tape 2 Side A.


\(^7\) V. O. Harris interview, Tape 1 Side A.
Maori culture to remain distinct.\textsuperscript{8} Initially expressions of integration as a policy goal were fairly ad hoc, being discussed by departmental officers without the official guidance of formative policy documents. Nonetheless, a number of key memoranda and official publications clearly show integration had been pursued as a desirable political objective well before Hunn gave it his 1960s makeover.

In 1949, Tipi Ropiha – the Under-secretary of Maori Affairs – prepared a comprehensive memorandum for Ernest Corbett, the newly appointed Minister of Maori Affairs, to explain the work and organization of the department. It was an early and official exchange between two men who would dominate Maori policy for the whole of the first National Government’s tenure. Ropiha was of the Ngati Kahungunu and Rangitane iwi. His long public service career began in 1912. He joined the Department of Maori Affairs in 1947, having worked primarily as a surveyor in the intervening years. In 1948 he became the first Maori to head the department, a position he held until his retirement which he arranged to coincide with Corbett’s in 1957.\textsuperscript{9} Ropiha and his minister had farming, war service and Anglicanism in common. Their period of influence was marked by an emphasis on Maori land development and title reform, and the establishment of a new legislative foundation for a modern department. Indeed, the Maori Affairs Act 1953 remained the primary statute for the department and the Maori Land Court for forty years. Furthermore, Butterworth has credited Corbett and Ropiha with increasing spending on housing, land administration and land development and consistent success in garnering Cabinet support for better resourcing the department and progressing its legislative programme.\textsuperscript{10} Ropiha was hardworking and intelligent. He efficiently delivered on Corbett’s land development goals and indulged Corbett’s teetotalism by promoting community-led discussion on the alcohol question. He was also instrumental in a number of social and cultural endeavours such as the inauguration of the Maori Women’s Welfare League and Te Ao Hou magazine – the “marae” on paper.\textsuperscript{11}

When Ropiha explained the Welfare Division and its programme of welfare work to Corbett, he quoted the aim of the 1945 act – the social and economic

\textsuperscript{8} Hunn Report, p.15.
\textsuperscript{11} Te Ao Hou, 1, 1952, p.2.
advancement and the promotion and maintenance of the health and general well-being of the Maori community. Furthermore, Ropiha wrote, the act was designed to facilitate the full integration of the Maori race into the social and economic structure of the country. The organization of the department's welfare work with Maori welfare officers working alongside Maori communities and its emphasis on social education aimed to encourage a level of community control and direction on the essentials of good citizenship and civic responsibility. Amongst their many duties and responsibilities, tribal committees were required to balance the acceptance and maintenance of the full rights, privileges, and responsibilities of citizenship with the preservation and revival of Maori arts, crafts, language, genealogy, and history in order to perpetuate Maori culture.

To counter criticisms that he advocated assimilation, Corbett stated that in fact what he actually wanted was for Maori people to have the best of both worlds. His government, he argued, would work to provide Maori with access to the finest parts of Pakeha life, while at the same time teaching their children that they were still Maori members of a proud race with a great heritage. Similarly, the Prime Minister, Sidney Holland, told attendees at the inaugural conference of the Maori Women's Welfare League that league women would produce Maori children who would grow up as happy partners in a proud nation consisting of two peoples in one family. Maori and Pakeha would have shared interests and distinct lives, although always within the casing of a single national way of life.

This image of integration as the process by which sameness was created within an ongoing context of difference was enduring. When there was a change of government from National to Labour in 1957, the Secretary of Maori Affairs, Mortimer Sullivan, reiterated Ropiha's earlier words, agreeing that the full integration of Maori was a key goal. Sullivan's overall approach to explaining the department's work was more bureaucratic than Ropiha's but the overall vision of moving Maori from an historical position of cultural difference and outsiderhood to one of difference within a shared national ethos remained constant. Sullivan emphasised the mechanics and costs of conducting individual programmes under the

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12 Under-secretary (later Secretary) to Minister of Maori Affairs (MOMA), 14 December 1949, MA 1, W2459, 1/1/41 pt 1, ANZW.
13 Minutes of the Inaugural Conference of Maori Women's Welfare Leagues (MWWL), Wellington, 25-27 September 1951, MA 1, 36/26/18 pt 1, ANZW.
14 Prime Minister's address, Minutes of the Inaugural Conference of MWWL, Wellington, 25-27 September 1951, MA 1, 36/26/18 part 1, ANZW.
headings of land development, Maori housing, title improvement, Maori land claims, rehabilitation, and welfare (which included the sub-headings education, employment and delinquency). Still, Sullivan noted a number of modern-day challenges facing Maori including delinquency and heavy drinking which were symptoms of a deeper social disorder. He also indicated that integration had to account for Maori desires to retain Maori ways of doing and being. The department, he wrote, did not expect all community structures to be abandoned:

A large number of Maori people still find the old community structure intensely meaningful and beneficial and while working for those peopleâs individual material advancement, we must respond to their frequently expressed aspirations for a good and progressive community life with balanced material, social and cultural features.15

Even those who were cynical about the departmentâs work did not retreat from the basic premise that Maori policy ought to have at its core the goal of integration. For example, John Booth seemed concerned that many people wanted the departmentâs work kept as simple as possible, restricted to turning idle Maori land into productive farms, improving Maori standards of housing, freeing Maori land from the complications of multiple ownership and carrying out pretty vaguely beneficial works known as welfare.16 This view, with its emphasis on Maori land, could reasonably be distilled from Sullivanâs memorandum, which stated:

Pretty well all the activities of the Department are tied up in some way with the questions of land title. The whole operations of land development and housing are founded on title; title work is the main job of the Maori Land Court staff; Maori trust loans, leases and so forth all go to title and even Welfare has often some connection with the subject.17

Booth, a qualified anthropologist, was a research officer within the department. Engaged during the 1950s in a community development project in Panguru, North Hokianga, he also spent some time seconded to the Department of Justice where he worked on a survey of Maori offenders, and later contributed

15 Secretary to MOMA, 16 December 1957, AAMK 869/3a, 1/1 pt 1, ANZW.
16 John Booth, Community Development Work in Panguru, undated research paper, c. 1957, AAMK 869/3a, 1/1 pt 1, ANZW.
17 Secretary to MOMA, 16 December 1957, AAMK 869/3a, 1/1 pt 1, ANZW.
research to the Hunn inquiry. In Booth’s opinion, it was not possible to simplify the department’s work as much as some people wanted. The department was, after all, dealing with people, and not just any people, but Maori people who were different from all those ē who are pakehas. In his view, those who worked with Maori had to consider Maori desires and Maori well-being, and adopt, or at least understand Maori standards and values. It was important that the changes that policy sought imparted some positive satisfaction to Maori and were not detrimental to Maori beliefs and habits. He pointed out that the old way of life Maori policy sought to change was in fact one which made sense to Maori people and put forth an organic model of culture in which it was difficult to mix and match components. Booth counselled:

Maori culture, like any other, is a unit, a whole. Take away or change any part and the balance is upset, the whole culture is affected. That applies not only to the traditional form of culture but to all the variants of Maori culture that have been worked out since, that have become stabilized in any particular area and at any particular time, and that provide the environment in which we are working today.

There were some tensions between Booth and other departmental officers about how Maori policy ought to be implemented. The contradiction was epitomised by his work on a community development project that encouraged communal approaches to local enterprise and the preference for individualism evident in other departmental programmes like the land development schemes. Yet Booth did not waver from, and in fact endorsed, the department’s central objective, stating that any perceived contradiction was trivial compared with the overarching desire he shared with other officers to help the Maori people develop and achieve the utmost satisfaction from their own culture, at the same time working towards the end of harmoniously integrating that culture with that common to New Zealand as a whole.

In Booth’s view, the essence of democracy was the recognition of the right of minorities to retain and develop in freedom their own social systems and their

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18 The Panguru community development project is the subject of a recent thesis which examines the intersections between a Maori community, the department and the prevailing influences of anthropology at the time. See Williams, 1957, AAMK 869/3a, 1/1 pt 1, ANZW.
19 John Booth, Community Development Work in Panguru undated research paper, c. 1957, AAMK 869/3a, 1/1 pt 1, ANZW.
20 Ibid.
own cultural activities in accordance with their own wishes, only being restrained when their activities impinge harmfully on other groups.\footnote{Research officer to Secretary, 16 September 1955, MA 1 W2459, 19/1/290, ANZW.}

The language of integration permeated the department’s official papers, and gave the impression that the policies of integration could be implemented in specific and measurable ways. Yet that part of the integration equation that allowed for the persistence of Maori ways of doing and being was left largely undefined except for vague references to arts, crafts, language, history and culture. It is difficult to assess whether this vagueness resulted from accident or design, but it became a useful way of dealing with the logical inconsistencies in the philosophy that underlay integration policies. Also, as shall be shown, it is in that vagueness that Maori asserted the creative energies that enabled them to engage with integration from their own cultural basis. It is unsurprising, given the ambiguities in the underlying concept, and the failure to articulate how difference was to be fostered within the process of creating sameness, that department officials sometimes fended off criticisms that Maori policy was merely assimilation by another name.

Matters of Maori land development and Maori land title provided some clear examples of the systematic erasure of difference: the government could not tolerate Maori owning their land differently than other New Zealanders. In the post-war years, the government regarded it the duty of every good citizen to make full use of the soil, the foundation of prosperity.\footnote{\textit{New Zealand Parliamentary Debates}, (NZPD), 1950, 293, pp.4722-31, 4747-54.} However, Maori farming was impeded by the multiple ownership of Maori land which in turn obstructed the overall cultural adjustment of Maori people to the modern world and indulged their so-called sentimental attachments to the land. Throughout his ministry, Corbett responded by pressing ahead with a comprehensive programme of land title improvement in which the reduction of numbers of owners and individual titles for individual farmers was paramount. Conversion was the cornerstone of Corbett’s new title improvement framework introduced by the Maori Affairs Act 1953. The act set up a conversion fund which the Maori Trustee could then use to acquire uneconomic and other interests in Maori land. Uneconomic interests were those valued arbitrarily at less than £25. In an application of conversion known as ‘live-buying’ the Maori Trustee could also purchase interests above that value with the owner’s consent—a provision sometimes used by Maori to assist with housing or land development costs.
Conversion was applied compulsorily on succession, and the trustee could also apply it compulsorily in other circumstances with the support of a recommendation from the Maori Land Court. In particular instances, the impact of conversion was remarkable, reducing the number of owners in some lands by more than half. However it was also marked by absurdities such as the Maori Trustee becoming a major shareholder in some blocks of Maori land and the sole owner of others. The advantage of conversion was that the department enjoyed greater freedom in choosing farmers for the development schemes. From the department’s standpoint sole or controlled ownership of Maori land would encourage Maori farmers to maximise production on land they could call their own, without being fettered by obligations to whanau and tribe. However, Maori maintained a basic opposition to the department’s power to intervene in their proprietary rights. In some districts conversion came to be regarded as a kind of confiscation, a view which would gather momentum and feature amongst the catalysts for the initiation of a modern Maori protest movement in the late 1960s.23

The Hunn report was, in part at least, an attempt to clear up, once and for all, the intent of Maori policy. Hunn explained integration by classifying Maori into three groups: group A was comprised of assimilated Maori, a ‘completely detribalised minority’ retaining mere traces of Maoritanga; group B comprised the integrated majority of Maori comfortable in both Maori and Pakeha societies and able to participate in both; and group C, the unassimilated and unintegrated, ‘another minority complacently living a backward life in primitive conditions’. Hunn advocated that Maori policy should aim to eliminate the complacent and backward minority and raise it up to join the comfortable majority. This was an element of integration policy with which Richard Thompson took especial issue, arguing that ‘enforced integration was as much a violation of civil rights as enforced segregation’. Furthermore, ‘every Maori had a right to his [sic] distinctive social heritage’. The problem with Hunn’s approach, in Thompson’s view, was that despite the suggestion of cultural continuation, Hunn regarded Maori cultural difference as ‘endangering the race harmony of New Zealand’. The Maori who was not Europeanized was felt to be

23 For a thorough exposition on Maori land title improvement in the 1950s and 60s, and its links to Maori land development and policies of integration, see Harris, ‘Maori Land Title Improvement’ and ‘Maori Land Development Schemes, 1945-1974, with two Case Studies from the Hokianga’ MPhil Thesis, Massey University, 1996.
a serious problem. Hunn, however, argued that integration was a natural and inevitable process. All he proposed was that government could and should hasten its pace as a matter of policy. Assimilation, on the other hand, represented by the detribalised group A, was a matter of personal choice available to the successfully integrated who occupied group B. As this thesis will later show, it was arguably Hunn’s group C and its backward lifeways that gave group B the cultural wherewithal to maintain its Maoriness. Group A would also be likely to have recourse to Group C when seeking to re-connect to its Maoritanga. In many respects, Group C was one of few constants in a society undergoing phenomenal change.

Following the publication of Hunn’s report, integration consolidated its place in government policy. In 1962 Hunn and Booth explained: ‘Integration denotes a dynamic process by which Maori and Pakeha are drawn closer together, in the physical sense of the mingling of the two populations as well as in the mental and cultural senses, where differences are gradually diminishing’. In theory, Maori and Pakeha alike would change in the process of making a whole new culture by the combination and adaptation of two pre-existing cultures. As the 60s became the 70s, integration remained the cornerstone of government policy with an emphasis on equality under the law. A 1971 report on government activities for combating racism reiterated government’s policy as ‘the bringing together of different peoples with complete equality in the eyes of the law and with equality of opportunity in all fields of life, social, economic, political and cultural’. Integration also meant the government would recognise and encourage ‘the right of all peoples to maintain their own cultural and social heritage’.

One of the criticisms of integration was that it required Maori to conform to a Pakeha way of life. Hunn emphasised the naturalness of the process, saying that it was a matter of conforming not to a Pakeha way of life but adjusting to a modern one.

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25 Hunn Report, p.16.
26 J. M. Booth and J. K. Hunn, *Integration of Maori and Pakeha: No. 1 in Series of Special Studies*, Department of Maori Affairs, Wellington, 1962. This booklet and the series it inaugurated was intended to help New Zealanders to understand Maori problems and to appreciate better the role Maori played in society. (See Foreword by J. R. Hanan).
common to all developed societies. He specifically used Japan as an example to argue that it was not just a phenomenon of the western world.\textsuperscript{28} Officially, integration proposed ï as the quotations used here indicate ï that there would be some continuation of Maori culture. Indeed, the success or otherwise of integration relied somewhat on the maintenance of Maori culture and society. Yet the future of Maori culture and society, and the extent to which policy would support it was a poorly articulated, murky area. Some broad natural limits were imposed by an insistence that whatever the end result of integration, New Zealand could only ever comprise one people. Within that frame lay a set of unanswered questions about the nature and extent of the Maori world in modern, integrated form. Hunn\textsuperscript{28} view that integration was a natural process extended to the survival of Maori society ñ those elements worthiest of preservation would survive on their own merits. The 1945 Maori Social and Economic Advancement Act gave a nod of approval to Maori language, arts and crafts, and the institutions of the marae, although it did not specify if or how tribal committees would be supported to preserve and maintain those things. There was little if any discussion about who should determine the elements of Maori society that ought to survive, and how. Instead there was a substantial grey area, where the things that were important to Maori ñ and yet somehow difficult to explain across the cultural divide that separated Maori and Pakeha ñ competed against the forces of integration for a secure position in modern New Zealand. It was in this grey area of adjustment that Maori had to work out the creative tensions between tradition and modernity, policy and practice, theoretical Maori worlds and daily Maori lives.

A whakatauki coined by Sir James Henare illustrates what is meant here. In 1985, addressing a hui convened to discuss the future of the Taitokerau tribes, Henare said, Ï kore e taea te oranga mo te tangata ñ te aroha me te pipi anake. Ï It means Ïwe can no longer live on love and pipis alone.Ï\textsuperscript{29} It was an insightful call to action, referring to the need for innovation in a world of rapid change and increasing challenges. True to the tradition of whakatauki, it has a tribally specific origin and context and yet a broad ñ even universal ñ application. Being a modern composition, however, it also transcends tradition, successfully balancing the perennial tensions that occur between the traditional and modern worlds; a fundamental theme underpinning the current discussion and a fitting whakatauki on which to rest any

\textsuperscript{28} Hunn Report, p.16.
\textsuperscript{29} Department of Maori Affairs, \textit{He Whakatauki}, Whangarei, 1987, p.1.
study of Maori in the 1950s and 60s. An officer of the Maori Battalion and later a public servant, Henare was a leader whose contributions to Maori were acknowledged by Maori and Pakeha locally, regionally and nationally. He descended from the kahui ariki line of Ngati Hine of Ngapuhi. Henare’s words express a desire on the part of many modern Maori to remain traditionally Maori and therefore tribal in outlook, while simultaneously participating in a modern Western society socially, economically and politically.

Moreover, implicit in Henare’s words are ideas that encapsulate and mirror the creative energy that lay at the heart of the narrative presented in this thesis. By implication, Henare counselled in favour of providing something in addition to the love and pipi of old. Love and pipi (tradition) did not have to be abandoned, but the times demanded something beyond what tradition alone could provide. Henare did not attempt to prescribe that elusive and unspoken something the certain je ne sais quoi. Yet it is in that absence of definition that Maori people of the 1950s and 60s channelled their energies, using traditional imperatives to engage in modern ways with the forces of te ao huruhuri, especially that main vehicle for Maori policy, the Department of Maori Affairs, and its primary policy platform, integration.

Maori people engaged with the Maori Affairs and negotiated the on-the-ground realities of integration. Sometimes that engagement was aided by the coincidence of timing and circumstance, and sometimes it occurred purposefully in deliberate measures. Almost always, though, it occurred from inside a Maori world, increasingly under pressure to integrate or modernise but still connected enough to its past to know the ways in which it wanted to be influenced by tradition. Unsurprisingly, family was pivotal. Before continuing the discussion, it is important to pause and consider what is meant by family here. In brief, this thesis supports the view proposed by Hohepa almost 40 years ago that Maori lived in a relatively fluid unit that was something between the two-generation nuclear family and the whanau; Hohepa called it the ōwhaamere (a transliteration or coined word for family).
However, the point here is not to advance a term that satisfactorily defines the nature of Maori families, but to show them as something more than Mum, Dad and the kids living together under a single fixed roof.

Whaamere were close kin—the living descendants, spouses and tamariki atawhai of a couple, a matriarch or patriarch. Their respective households were interrelated not just biologically but also socially. In Hohepa’s study of Waima, whaamere members could enter each others’ homes without knocking and without hindrance, even if no one was home. Children could freely visit the homes of other whaamere members and join in as if they were in their own home, knowing they would be fed, accommodated and even disciplined if need be. Whaamere could also mobilise easily with or without notice to combine efforts in farming, gardening, hunting and fishing activities, or organise family milestones such as birthdays, weddings and tangihanga. Importantly, whaamere members could be relied upon during times of stress—a rebellious teenager, for example, could give his or her parents time out by staying temporarily with an aunt or uncle. Young people in search of paid employment could similarly commence their quest by lodging with a city-dwelling aunt, uncle or cousin.34

The oral evidence gathered for this thesis support Hohepa’s findings. The social interconnections between various whanau homes could transcend geographical distance. They could also be transplanted tram and taxi rides between city suburbs replacing the short walk or horse-ride between whaamere homes in rural communities. The fluidity of Maori families and their interconnecting households meant that though the nuclear family may have comprised the core of a home’s members, it was often supplemented with other whaamere members—cousins, siblings, parents—who stayed for a range of terms from a few nights to a number of years. Margaret Harris and her young family lived in the homes of a succession of relatives—her husband’s grandfather, her brother and his family, and her husband’s uncle—until finally settling into their own Maori Affairs home.35 Cyril Chapman lived for a year with an older sister near Wellsford so that he could complete his

34 Ibid., pp.84-100.
35 Margaret Harris, interviewed by Aroha Harris, 28 May 1998, Tape 1 Side A.
secondary education at Rodney College. A young Pio Jacobs, newly arrived in Auckland, lived for a time with his grandfather.

The centrality of the family and whanau to Maori communities, and therefore Maori relations with the state, is no surprise. The family was and is the primary unit of daily living, and generations of anthropologists have identified and examined it as a pivotal social unit in Maori society. The importance of the family seemed to reach a new height in the post-war period. The family was the template on which the great social upheavals of that era occurred. Even the rhetoric of good citizenship, which sat so furtively on the tips of most politicians’ tongues, was couched in terms of the family. The good citizen – male, female, Maori, Pakeha, short, tall – was a product of the good family, and it was the solemn duty of all families to be good families: to be well-behaved, law-abiding, healthy, educated, employed and economically independent. These are not particularly enlightening desires, surely they are fundamental to what most families want for themselves. However, for Maori citizens this kind of talk was code for integration, Maori citizenry could only occur in a mainstream (Pakeha) frame. Thus, good citizens owned their land individually and not communally as Maori did; and good citizens ensured all the land they did own was productive, and therefore contributing to and not burdening the national economy.

The family was virtually the raison d’être for the Maori Women’s Welfare League. In the lead-up to the league’s inaugural conference, Corbett stressed the importance of good citizenship at hui in Hiruharama where he opined:

... the root of good and evil starts in the home. If there are good homes and home surroundings then conditions are present for the up-bringing of good children who will develop into good citizens. Bad conditions will produce bad children and bad citizens. It is hoped to organise the whole [Whanganui] District under the Welfare League movement to effect the improvement in the home and home conditions, to care for the mothers and children, and to rear good and healthy children, who will be a credit to the race.

The league women had an important job ahead of them, and it was clear they were expected to promote the integration of Maori into the mainstream. Similarly, media coverage the night before the league’s inaugural conference stressed a general desire

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36 Cyril Chapman, interviewed by Aroha Harris, 4 July 1998, Tape 1 Side A.
37 Jacobs interview, Tape 1 Side A.
38 Notes for MOMA visit to Hiruharama, 26 May 1951, MA 1, 1/1/47 pt 2, ANZW.
to ensure all Maori families, guided by mothers educated for the home front, were well-balanced and healthy. Cabinet ministers, officers of the department, and even representatives of other women’s organisations all emphasized the league’s role in producing good Maori citizens. Apparently, the role of mothers and organisations like the league that were designed to support, advise and train mothers was even more loaded than that. According to the Auckland Star, Corbett’s Hiruharama speech had also called for patience and understanding between Maori and Pakeha—the two people together in one house. The league applied itself eagerly to all of its tasks, united on the purpose of serving both race and community.

No doubt families had enough responsibility already. In rural areas, family farms peaked during the 1950s, and at the same time faced the challenges of major tenurial reform instigated by the Maori Affairs Act 1953. Meanwhile those who moved to the cities were busy developing their new family homes, and adjusting to city life. Family members got each other work, attended the same church, and played in the same sports teams. Maori families organised themselves into family committees so that they could collectively deal with major family events like tangihanga, hura kohatu, marena and huritau. Some families, whether they realised it or not, participated in community development projects that either marked out new Maori socio-cultural spaces in Pakeha-dominated cityscapes or in rural areas competed against population loss and underemployment to maintain community cohesion and vitality. The specifics of Maori families gave rise to a countless number of possible outcomes and experiences for them, but the life histories gathered for this thesis inadvertently shared one major commonality: a perceptible awareness of a place they called ‘home’.

At the broadest level home might be described as the rural tribal communities from whence Maori who opted for city life originated. Notions of home came through very strongly, frequently unsolicited, in the interviews. Every informant had a concept of home as a rural Maori community that pivoted around a marae, including those who had lived at the same urban address for forty years or more, some of whom now have a mix of children and grandchildren living with them. In effect, these people had two homes: the one from which they originated, and the one they had

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40 MWWL submission in support of petition No. 21 (1960), MA 1, 36/26/11 pt 2, 8 November 1961, ANZW.
created in a distant but not entirely disconnected place. It could be argued that home was largely the nostalgic creation of a generation encouraged to relocate to the city. However, even the people who had lived most if not all of their lives at home, had an understanding of it and what it meant to those who had left it, as well as a sense of temporary stewardship over its permanence. Also, the notion of ‘home’ could equally apply to tangata whenua Maori communities around which cities grew ī Orakei in Auckland, for example, or Takapuwahia in Porirua.

Over the years, Maori terms used to describe home have included turangawaewae and kainga tuturu. They have related but distinct meanings. Literally ‘a standing place for the feet’ turangawaewae has also been used to describe the right to speak on or be represented at the marae and to participate in its decision-making processes. Kainga tuturu means proper or real home. In other words it is a reference to a person’s original, tribal home, as opposed to his or her urban home or residence. The kainga tuturu endures, no matter how many years a person might live away from it. Home is the term used throughout this work because everyone interviewed for the thesis used it. Moreover, they used it without being prompted and without explanation, as if they were in the company of someone who implicitly understood its meaning. No attempt is made to propose a set menu of what it is to be Maori, to be Ngapuhi, or Te Rarawa, or Ngati Porou. Though some patterns are apparent, much of the sense of belonging that emerges occurs in the emotional and ideological, and therefore eludes easy definition. Home could be geographically located: a hamlet on the shores of the Hokianga, a larger township on the East Coast, a remote settlement up a river or down a valley. But home was not necessarily constrained by its geography; it also held highly nuanced and important ideological blueprints that structured society and culture. The life history of Letty Brown provides a telling example. For her home was (and is) Te Araroa, at least geographically. Ideologically, home was the comfort and bosom of her whanau. While anchored at Te Araroa it linked, in Letty’s experience, to many other parts of Te Tairawhiti. The qualities of home are evident in memories of her school years, characterised by whanau support and participation, an emphasis on educational achievement, and the influence and role modelling of strong Ngati Porou women. The reach of her family was apparent even in her birth.

Letty was born Ereti Taitua Bristowe on 9 July 1938 at maternal grandmother’s home at Te Kaha, in the heart of Te Whanau-a-Apanui. Letty’s mother, Julia, stayed there for a few years while Letty’s father, Eru, of Te Aitanga-a-Mahaki, was away managing a farm in Whakatane. The family later returned home to Te Araroa. Letty first attended school at Tikitiki, staying there with an Aunty, Lena Goldsmith, because the family home at Te Araroa was too far from school. At the age of about seven she returned to Te Araroa to finish primary school. After two years at Gisborne Intermediate, during which time she stayed with a granduncle, Letty attended St Joseph’s Maori Girls’ College, largely at the behest of Aunty Lena, for three years. Letty’s final year of school was spent back at Te Araroa at Rerekohu Maori District High. Already this simple chronicle of Letty’s school years indicates that support for her education came from beyond the immediate family and moved her beyond the physical bounds of Te Araroa. Furthermore, Letty recalled that her education was important not only to her parents but to the whole community. The adult women who Letty knew as a child were strong Ngati Porou women and expected educational achievement from girls as well as the boys. Good teachers also played their part. One of the teachers at Rerekohu High organised weekly after-school study sessions, and the school attained its highest rate of School Certificate passes during the year Letty studied there. Letty grew up knowing she had to be educated and recalled feeling fortunate that good influences surrounded the young people of Te Araroa.42 The Hunn report’s assumptions that Maori communities and Maori people could be divided into the assimilated, the integrated and those who were neither assimilated nor integrated bears little relation to the complex family and cultural ideas underpinning Letty’s educational history.

Letty’s experience does not mean to say that all young Maori in the post-war period were similarly encouraged to pursue a modern education, although undoubtedly many were. The fundamental point, though, was that home communities offered guidance and support for getting on in the modern world. Margaret Harris’s experience, for example, contrasts with Letty’s in many respects but also illustrates this basic principle. Margaret grew up in the 1940s and 50s in Mitimiti, North Hokianga, a small, mostly Catholic Maori community isolated not only by distance

42 Brown interview, Tape 1 Side A.
and poor roads, but also by the absence of a comprehensive, accessible public infrastructure including schools and medical services.

Unlike Letty’s family, Margaret’s parents were divided over the value of educating girls. Margaret’s mother wanted her daughters to be educated; her father viewed female education as a waste because girls just grow up and get married and have babies. However, assisted by a scholarship, Margaret secured two years of high school education at St Joseph’s Maori Girls College, which she said most of the Catholics from home attended. In Margaret’s life history, the importance her family placed on Catholicism paralleled the influence placed on education in Letty’s narration of her life history. Although Margaret admits that at times her and her children’s church attendance lapsed, she persistently regarded the Catholic Church as an important part of her family life. Furthermore, the mix of Catholicism and familial relationships eased her transition to Auckland. Her first job was as a kitchen hand at Sacred Heart College in Glen Innes, where her older sister also worked, and where she was taken under the wing of Aunty Olive Rapira. Aunty Olive was a sort of a house mother to all the girls who worked at the college, Margaret remembered Aunty Olive always dressed nicely and that she encouraged the girls to keep themselves clean and tidy, enforced the domestic tikanga the girls would have grown up with (such as not combing their hair in the kitchen) and made sure everyone went to church on Sundays. For Margaret, Catholicism and church attendance were not just a demonstration of faith or doctrinal allegiance, but, as with many other Te Rarawa communities in the North Hokianga, it was also integral to her social and cultural world in the same way, that historically Anglicanism has been so integral to Ngati Porou in the Waiapu Valley. In the post-war period Maori churches reinvented themselves on modern Maori cityscapes. For North Hokianga Catholics in Auckland, their home away from home (or church away from church) is now Te Unga Waka in Epsom.

In offering these and other rudimentary guidelines for a good life, parents, grand-parents, aunts and uncles also provided a framework for social interaction. Whanau participation and support, and the guidance of elders, are echoed in Letty’s view of the security of home:

43 M. Harris interview, Tape 1 Side A.
44 Ibid., Tape 1 Side B.
45 Ibid., Tape 1 Sides A and B.
[I came from a] nice, secure kind of community where everybody helped each other, where my father would kill a beef or something like that and it would be shared to the whole community. Everybody shared, and that was the community. We stayed at each other's homes, and our parents never worried about us because they knew that we were at one of the relatives' homes. They had that nurturing for all the young people and children around. When we go to dances they'd all be there; all the elders will be there and they'd look after us at the dances. It didn't look so obvious, but when I think back that was the reason why they were there, they were just there to make sure we were all right and to protect us. And really they were the ones that organized all the dances, all the socials, everything for us.  

This kind of experience was reiterated by other interviewees. The idea that part of the point of gathering, hunting and fishing from the sea and the bush was distributing the catch among the wider whanau was discussed by Pio and Christina (Chrissie) Jacobs, both of whom are from Pawarenga (although they have lived in West Auckland for some forty or more years). Similarly, Caroline Reeves stressed her experience of being unquestionably and unconditionally 'whangai-ed' by her grandparents after her parents died when she was a young girl. Also, research participants recalled eating and sleeping over at different households within their home communities. Home was a safe place or, more accurately, a collection of safe places networked by blood relations among whom adults shared responsibilities for all children – theirs and others. 

Threaded through these understandings and experiences of home, was a kind of leadership that gave children social and cultural ground rules. Though most interviewees could name some of the key national and political leaders of the time such as Whina Cooper, Apirana Ngata, Tau Henare, and Paraire Paikea the leaders who they regarded as most influential in their lives were their elders and family heads. Sometimes those elders and family heads happened to be national leaders. Thus Letty remembered Apirana Ngata visiting her school and stressing the importance of education, alongside people like Tuini Ngawai who taught waiata-a-ringa and waiata. Caroline Reeves remembered Paraire Paikea visiting her family home as

46 Brown interview, Tape 1 Side A.
47 Jacobs interview, Tape 1 Side B.
48 Caroline Reeves, interviewed by Aroha Harris, 8 September 1998, Tape 1 Side A.
49 Brown interview, Tape 1 Side A.
both a whanaunga and a fellow adherent of the Ratana church. Other influential leaders were the local and familiar, like the father who wanted his daughters to be educated, the aunties at the dance who wanted all the young people to be nicely dressed, and the uncle who encouraged church attendance.

The strong Maori sense of community and belonging was spun from whakapapa, knitted together, kept alive and viable by the shared attitudes and values of the group. It is a defining quality of home, regularly spoken of in oral accounts, and in Letty’s experience difficult to leave. Despite her reluctance, her shift to Auckland in about 1957 was itself a testament to the achievements that the home she loved could produce: she went to Auckland because she had been accepted to train as a teacher.

Reluctantly, I must say reluctantly, I had to leave, because I didn’t really want to leave. I felt that I was really happy where I was in Te Araroa with all the whanau around and they had a little farewell party for me because I think they all knew that I didn’t want to leave. All my aunties decided to make it a big thing for me that night and then they push me on to the bus the next day and the did. They all had to help me get onto the bus, so I then made sure I came to Auckland. Looking back now, I think it was for a good reason because if I stayed there I probably wouldn’t have achieved as much as I did. But I really didn’t want to leave.

There is something familiar about Letty’s description of leaving Te Araroa. It is one of several aspects of home that seems to have been reflected in fiction by and about Maori at the time. It evokes, for example, the opening scene from Arapera Blank’s short story ‘Yielding to the New’ in which the central character, Marama, leaves home to pursue a university education. Her family farewells her, as she boards the service car crowded with exuberant youth on the way to the city. The departure is sad and Marama a little apprehensive, but that the wisdom of the move is understood is captured by her father’s words: ‘It is good that you go.’ Not surprisingly, the experience of leaving home for the bright lights of the big city took many forms. Some had the move imposed on them. Children shifted with parents and grandparents, as was the case with the family of Manuka Henare, three

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50 Reeves interview, Tape 1 Side B.
51 Brown interview, Tape 1 Side A.
generations of whom arrived in Auckland during the war.\textsuperscript{53} Others were sent as youths to live with relatives as way of addressing discipline problems. Although no such person was interviewed for this thesis, second-hand versions of their stories were apparent in the oral histories and anthropological studies of the time, the details of which will be briefly canvassed in the next chapter.

An assessment of the interviews shows that people’s awareness of home probably heightened after they left it, as it was brought into sharp relief by the glow of \textit{the golden city}.\textsuperscript{54} Reflecting on home from the distant city meant it could be both romanticized and vilified, usually in comparison to what was good or bad about city life. Home had the best kai and was a comfortable, relaxed place to be, where no one suffered the discomfort of having to explain themselves across the cultural divide. But the folks back home could also be unsophisticated and, to the chagrin of welfare officers, unenterprising. At home there was nothing for young people to do. In the city, there was plenty of paid work for everyone who wanted it and a dance with live music could be found practically every night of the week; but it also had its pitfalls.\textsuperscript{55} City living could result in the dreaded detribalisation for some, especially for young people who moved beyond the reach of the social sanctions of their elders.

Again, Maori fiction offers some useful depictions, such as in \textit{Country Girl} by Hirone Wikiriwhi, published in \textit{Te Ao Hou} in 1961. The story consists primarily of an exchange between the kaumatua Tom Hirai and his eighteen-year-old niece, Tirita, who had just had a child out of wedlock. Tom, counselled Tirita that in the city she must have an \textit{anchor} and chastised her for not joining with other Maori at church or at the \textit{Maori Club}. Their different views of home and city are juxtaposed. Tirita was \textit{hypnotised} by the city and unfavourably compared it to home with its \textit{dusty roads, pot-holed and unsealed, the shabby post office and store}… and the dullness of the days. Tom agreed that the city was the place for young people. Their demands could no longer be met by their marae, and the city offered access to the \textit{Golden Triangle} of marriage, employment and home. However, Tom also described all cities as \textit{cruel}, and emphasised the need for an anchor, in this instance the church, so that young Maori were not \textit{like seaweed drifting, floating aimlessly on the sea}.

\textsuperscript{53} Manuka Henare, interviewed by Aroha Harris, 12 May 1998, Tape 1 Side A.
\textsuperscript{54} \textit{The golden city} is an image from Hone Tuwhare, \textit{The Old Place} in Orbell, \textit{Contemporary Maori Writing}, p.51.
\textsuperscript{55} The frequency of dances and live music was mentioned as one of the main characteristics of the times in interviews with Caroline Reeves, Tom Parore, Margaret Harris and Letty Brown, for example.
Home is central to this story, a concept animating both characters’ assessment of their circumstances. Tirita wanted her uncle to name her daughter, who was to be collected by Tirita’s family to be cared for and raised at home. Even after twenty-five years of city living and a life of opulence and success, her uncle’s home was still represented in his wife and hot fried bread.

Unexamined in Wikiriwhi’s story is the city’s predilection for petty racism, which could also be very testing. Caroline Reeves recalled that she was terribly lonely when she lodged for a time in a nurses’ hostel. It was her first time with running water and she was not used to showering rather than bathing. Her early experience of Auckland was that there were a lot of Pakehas. At home only Pa [her grandfather] used to talk to Pakehas. They were teachers, shopkeepers, policemen. No doubt, they were also outnumbered by the local Maori among whom Caroline lived.

It is clear that home remained an important anchor for many Maori who urbanised, its values and practices permeating their daily lives and decisions. The impact of home on urban Maori life may be seen in the ubiquitous nature of whanaungatanga, or the adaptability and responsiveness of Hohepa’s whaamere. Escaping the kainga did not necessarily mean escape from the whanau, as Metge observed: the network of kinship is so strong and extends so far that when Maoris travel they nearly always find a kinsman from whom to seek interests and assistance. It is fairly easy to find evidence to support this view. Relatives eased the transition from school to work, country to city, Te Araroa to Auckland, Te Hauhanga to Whangarei. Relatives made big moves less lonely. They took new migrants to dances, helped them to find work, had them join the same rugby and netball teams, and carpooled for visits home. For example, Letty Brown was helped into her first job, as a toll operator for the New Zealand Post Office, by her Uncle Peta (Arapeta Awater), who was at the time the head of the Auckland region’s Welfare Division. She had another aunt living in Auckland whom she visited for meals and

56 Hirone Wikiriwhi, Country Girl in Orbell, Contemporary Maori Writing, pp.105-110; also in Te Ao Hou, 37, 1961, pp.13-16.
57 Reeves interview, Tape 1 Side A.
58 Metge, New Maori Migration, p. 211.
news of home. Caroline Reeves was assisted into her job by an aunt, and also enjoyed the support of family members when she caught tuberculosis.

Patterns of kin relationships also extended to non-kin situations. Once again, the story of Letty Brown is telling. As a mother and wife raising a family in West Auckland, she placed a high premium on the relationships that young people had with aunts and uncles, the kinds of relationships she had experienced growing up in Te Araroa. She ensured her own children who grew up away from the kin group typically found in tribal Maori communities were surrounded by extra-tribal aunts and uncles, the urbanising Maori with whom Letty chose to network. It was years, according to Letty, before her children realised that the numerous aunties and uncles they grew up with were not all, in fact, kin. What developed in the meantime was the language of family and whanau being applied to a non- or new family environment.

Sports teams, community centres, churches and workplaces also became sites for these new families. Margaret Harris socialised with other non-kin urban-dwelling Maori by joining sports teams. She variously played housewives’ netball, basketball, softball, badminton and tennis with all the Maori ladies around the neighbourhood. The women shared childcare responsibilities and transport to facilitate their participation. Tom Parore joined with his relatives to play cricket and rugby. Caroline Reeves practiced her Ratana faith in Auckland at a time when the church had no fixed location. Sometimes services were held at the Maori Community Centre, sometimes at a hired Masonic Hall. When she was at home Caroline said she went to church because it was compulsory. In Auckland however, when she was working and on her own, she found she wanted to go to church. Her distance from home invoked the example of her grandfather, a Ratana apotoro, and a sense that being Ratana was part of being herself. Thus, home had followed Caroline to town.

The linchpin of this process was the family, and its eventual outcome, whether people knew it at the time or not, was a distinct urban Maori collective. Many Maori who moved to the cities in the 1950s and 60s effectively participated in marking out Maori socio-cultural spaces within an urban landscape dominated by Pakeha. These

59 Brown interview, Tape 1 Side A.
60 Reeves interview, Tape 1 Side A.
61 Brown interview, Tape 1 Side B.
62 M. Harris interview, Tape 1 Side A.
63 Parore interview, 6 July 1998, Tape 1 Side A.
64 Reeves interview, Tape 1 Side A.
two components were tightly interconnected: the things Maori missed the most about home became the things they most wanted to provide for their children as they grew up. This is a pattern that was repeated in interviewees’ analyses of their moves. Family heads based the choices they made on what they perceived their respective families needed – whether those needs were spiritual, psychological, social, cultural or material – and their views of their families needs were often derivatives from home. One such example is evidenced in the Jacobs’ continuing practice of Hokianga-style Catholicism long after they relocated to Auckland.

From the late 1950s Pio and Chrissie Jacobs established their Auckland-based home and family in a way that kept them in tune with the rendition of Maori Catholicism that over generations had harmonised with the social and cultural tribal life of North Hokianga. It was Chrissie’s family who prompted her initial move to Auckland, sending her to complete her secondary school education at St Mary’s College, Ponsonby. Meanwhile, a young Pio alternated periods of schooling and paid employment in Auckland with military training and time at home to help out until he finally settled permanently in Auckland in the early 1950s. At the foundations of the family home that the newly married couple established in West Auckland was the value attached to maintaining existing connections for the benefit of their children and commitments to people from home and to fellow Maori-Catholics. What that meant in practice was that instead of attending the church near their home, the Jacobs preferred to either travel to the Catholic Centre in the city where they knew other Hokianga Catholics congregated or arrange family-oriented Maori services in their home. That was their strategy for ensuring their continued participation in miha Maori. After the Catholic Centre closed, Pio and Chrissie joined the Auckland Maori Catholic Society – the group that established Te Unga Waka Marae. Pio then became known amongst Hokianga Catholics living in West Auckland as someone who could be relied upon for a ride to church at Waka on Sundays. Later both he and Chrissie participated in a number of non-sectarian voluntary and social groups that based themselves at Te Unga Waka, including a branch of the Maori Women’s Welfare League.

For the Jacobs, and others like them, what began as a commitment to family evolved into wider roles within a particular section of the Maori community that was

65 Jacobs interview, Tape 1 Side A.
66 Ibid., Tape 1 Side B.
simultaneously laying down roots in the city, while retaining tribal life-ways. Yet such a deliberate approach to reconnecting on the cityscape did not preclude making all sorts of extra-tribal or extra-denominational connections. Indeed, as Pio pointed out, being at work from Monday to Friday and joining in at sports, church and a variety of functions around the city on the weekends meant he could make many friends from other tribes all the way down to Taranaki. These strangers with similarities became people with whom difference could be shared, and the groups that formed around the basic tenet of shared difference seemed to use the things they missed about home as a template for re-tribalising in the city. Maori from different parts of the country, while acknowledging their differences, shared similarities based on home. Those similarities were carried not only in the language or elusive definitions of Maoritanga, but also in the mundane: the taking off of shoes at the door, and the shared enjoyment of kaimoana and distinctly Maori foods. Maori looked the same as each other, and understood each other in ways that required no explanation.

In the cities, Maori also shared a level of uneasiness or self-doubt in the presence of Pakeha, and gathering together around food, sports, church or dances could restore i even if only temporarily i the comfort and familiarity of home. Maori kai was shared within family groups or in non-kin family groups, often after church on Sundays at places like the Maori Community Centre in Auckland. Margaret Harris, knew where to find kai like toheroa around Auckland but they werenâ€™t the same as getting them from home. A common strategy for getting food from home was to stock up at the end of visits, which required i yet again i support from home. In Margaretâ€™s case, visits home for holidays, tangihanga or weddings would often mean returning to Auckland with a stock of kumara and other vegetables, home-killed beef or pork, fish, mussels and toheroa depending on what was available at the time. Sometimes the food would be redistributed amongst family members in Auckland. Letty Brown who hungered for the kai we missed often visited an aunt in Grey Lynn on Sundays for a good boil up and news from home. So food i kai Maori specifically, or kai from home i had the power to do more than satiate an appetite. It was often accompanied by (Maori) social or intra-whanau exchanges.

67 Ibid., Tape 1 Side A.
68 M. Harris interview, Tape 1 Side B.
69 Brown interview, Tape 1 Side A.
Discerning some of the key components of home ākin, kai and karakia ā has been straightforward enough. More complicated, and perhaps more important, was the malleability of home and its ideological hold. Home not only tugged at the heart strings, but also seems to have pulled some of the modern extra-tribal community development strings ā a point that will be returned to near the end of this thesis. The important point for now is that to this mix will be added the social organisation and volunteerism provided by such state-sponsored organisations as the Maori Women’s Welfare League and the tribal committees. Maori policy in the 1950s and 60s, and the building of the league and the committees, was overlaid onto this richly textured world, a complex world of individual daily lives collectivising around shared aspirations for continuing the imperatives of the tribe, in the face of the goals of integration. This is the backdrop to the history that follows, which charts developments in Maori policy. It is a history that occurs in the gaps between policy and people, and the tensions between change and continuity. It is not, however, a history of urbanisation, even though discussion has now ventured into the topic. In fact, there is absolutely no suggestion a history of Maori urbanisation should be one of the outcomes of this thesis. The discussion has found its way onto an urban landscape, not because the history of Maori in the post-war period ought to proceed from that starting point, but because it followed Maori families and their narratives there. In effect, it has re-centred this history on concepts central to the Maori world. It would have been insufficient to merely accessorise New Zealand’s grand narrative with Maori stories on the topic. The more attractive challenge is to rethink the concepts that currently underpin New Zealand histories, and even if a concept like whanau is old and unoriginal it is probably one that has faded from the sight of New Zealand historians. Therefore, this part of the thesis is still essentially about home, but it includes urban environments because understandings of home were so often filtered through urbanisation experiences, and because home did not stop influencing people just because they had moved away from it. Yet home seemed to be threatened. Complete depopulation seemed imminent and home was often viewed as in a perpetual state of decline. However, population alone did not account for its viability. There always were and always have been people at home, however few, and all of them whanaunga.
Taking the Lead: Maori and ‘the Maori Affairs’

There is a tendency in New Zealand history to portray Maori leaders of the post-war period as the quiet before the storm of modern Maori activism: conservative, far too submissive in their relations with the state, and lacking in a central voice, particularly of the ilk of Apirana Ngata. Maori society is depicted as destabilized by post-war challenges, largely lacking in the formal, kin-based leadership of old, wired for dependence on the state and especially reliant on the main instrument of Maori policy, the Department of Maori Affairs.¹ There is a propensity to stereotype Maori who worked with the department as ‘collaborators’ enrolled by the department to promulgate its policies. Such a view may over-simplify matters. The pigeonholing may be partly explained by history’s reliance on the department’s files as the main source for understanding Maori-state relationships, and the disjuncture between Maori and departmental narratives. Furthermore, closer investigation reveals a relationship between Maori and the department that was far more dynamic and complex than categorising leaders as either collaborators or resisters allows. Rather than being unstable and lacking leadership, this chapter will show the Maori world of the 1950s and 60s in the process of social revolution, a veritable army of leaders at its helm available to influence the direction of change.

Therefore this chapter explores the experiences, deeds and dynamism of Maori communities and their leaders in the 1950s and 60s. It is framed by the tight interconnections between the department’s Welfare Division and Maori communities, and therefore has a focus on tribal committees. The committees’ sister organisation the Maori Women’s Welfare League will be discussed in the next chapter. Before proceeding, it ought to be acknowledged that tribal committees and branches of the league were by no means the only form of significant Maori social organisation in the post-war era. Churches and sports clubs were frequently mentioned throughout the interviews, for example. However the focus on the committees and league is necessary because of their close relationships with the department. Also, this chapter is less concerned with, although not ignorant of, the frame of urbanisation that usually dominates writings about Maori in this period. The chapter begins with the establishment of the tribal committees, including a brief consideration of their

¹ For example, see: Butterworth, Maori Affairs, pp.94-7; Schwimmer, Maori and the Government and Walker, Maori People Since 1950 pp.500-503.
transitioning from wartime to the post-war period. It then discusses some of the regular activities of the committees taking particular notice of the Maori courts before continuing to a broader discussion of the tensions apparent in the Maori-state relationship and some of the impacts of post-war change. The negotiated nature of Maori-state relationships is illustrated. Maori people's stories are told without consigning them to community or case studies. These stories are instead used as an important source of information on Maori-state relationships and attention is drawn to the considerable energy spent on building what were likely regarded as effective modern and durable institutions for facilitating the Maori-state relationship.

The network of tribal committees was established in 1942 to conduct the community-based work of the Maori War Effort Organisation. Initially intended to focus on a limited set of functions for a limited period of time, the organisation in fact remained until the end of war, at which time it was absorbed into a redesigned Department of Maori Affairs. During the war more than 300 committees were established in twenty-one zones covering the whole country. Clusters of committees combined within districts to form the forty-one tribal executives that co-ordinated their work. Initially concerned with recruitment, the committees' work expanded to focus on Maori man-powering, directing Maori men and women into wartime employment. Administratively the committees operated independently of the department. Their activities often led them into voluntary welfare work, particularly as they became acquainted with the social problems associated with increasing urbanisation, such as the poor living conditions of some young Maori women in particular.

Orange has described the wartime efforts of the committees as an 'exercise in autonomy' as Maori understood it 'under the promises of the Treaty of Waitangi'. The committees were organised on a tribal basis and operated according to Maori values and followed essentially Maori practices that recognised the indispensability of Maori leadership to their success. However, Orange argued, the exercise was short-lived. The apparent independence of the committees coupled with their venturing outside the strict boundaries of recruitment and man-powering added to already existing tensions with the department, particularly when the two agencies appeared to have competing authorities. When Maori, including the Labour government's Maori MPs, expressed a desire for the

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3 Ibid., pp.150-4.
organisation to continue into the post-war period as a Maori welfare agency, the Native Minister, Henry Mason resisted. Instead, building on his staff's existing ideas that the department’s work ought to expand into welfare, Mason counter-proposed an expansion of the department by introducing a team of welfare officers. Mason’s proposed expansion was made real by the passage of the Maori Social and Economic Advancement Act 1945. The act set up the Maori Social and Economic Welfare Organisation, later renamed the Welfare Division. Through it tribal committees and later the Maori Women’s Welfare League could participate in the Maori Affairs policy-making and service delivery machine.

The 1945 act then, according to Orange, offered a compromise position between the Maori and government points of view. It represented the department’s first official foray into welfare work, thus broadening the scope of its work into activities with which Maori were concerned. It also required the department to co-operate with Maori far more than previously. However, it also had the effect of shackling Maori communities to a department regarded as having a history of indifference towards Maori aspirations. Orange therefore portrays the act as signalling the demise of wartime Maori autonomy, largely because legislatively the committees were so entrenched in the department’s structure, had a very local-level focus, and lacked a national forum. Structurally it may be easy enough to detect this demise as the committees’ authority appeared to shift from the tribal community to the state. There were certainly many contradictions and difficulties within the act to be worked out, as detailed below. Overall, though, there is sufficient evidence to show not only the ongoing authority of Maori leaders within their communities but also a level of influence in their relations with the department. The new structure alone would not determine how the committees operated on the ground.

Outlets for Maori leadership, community effort and organisation were not dependent on the provision of state-sanctioned structures like the tribal committees. This was true during the war, and continued to be true after it. Some wartime examples may be found in Waima and Raukokore. Pat Hohepa’s description of the war effort at Waima was written retrospectively in 1964, and has a nostalgic feel about it. The groups Hohepa identifies, however, are not tribal committees, but the Waima Country Women’s Institute and a company of the Home-guard. The Waima tribal committee was separately identified as a post-war phenomenon charged with keeping order in the community and applying for

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4 Appendices to the Journals of the House of Representatives (AJHR), 1954, G-9, p.8.
5 Hohepa, A Maori Community, p.54.
government subsidies for various community projects. In the case of Raukokore, Amiria Stirling described the local war effort as being spearheaded by the ‘Young People’s Club’. The split into the tribal committee and the league occurred at a later date. This seems to be the pattern set at Mangamuka also, where wartime activities were organised through the Mangamuka Marae Association.

Furthermore, the activities of these organisations, even those that became tribal committees before war’s end, were not constrained by a war effort focus on recruitment and man-powering, and spilled over into community projects. Amiria Stirling, for instance, noted that alongside fundraising for the war effort and sending food and Christmas parcels, they were able on the East Coast to also fix up the maraes, and buy things for the schools. She related a story in which the women of Wairuru Marae made new mattresses and bed linen, and had the best-kept marae for miles. As Amiria pointed out, it wasn’t just the war effort, we did a lot of work in the district too.

In Mangamuka, wartime fundraising was also applied to the building of a new wharemoko, carved by the master carver Eramiha Te Kapua. Even when wartime tribal committees were established, they undertook work outside their role as the department understood it. For example, the Raukokore committee had each farmer in its area identify a cow as belonging to the marae as a strategy for ensuring a supply of meat for tangihanga and other hui.

Hohepa described the war years in Waima as a period of sustained excitement. The specific war activities he referred to include dances, picture shows, Maori concerts and the composition of waiata to farewell soldiers. Amiria too mentioned tournaments, sports days and bazaars amongst the activities undertaken to raise money for the boys. Fundraising activities also encouraged social interaction, as suggested by Amiria’s comment that when a particular marae had a function, others in the district would rally round in support. The social interaction aspect of wartime activity is further remembered in oral accounts. Rea Harris, for example, remembered basket socials at Mangamuka as an event that was about everybody getting together; lovely.

It is important to note that the combined energies of the various Maori community activities entered the post-war period alongside the committees

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6 Ibid., p.103-4.
7 V. O. Harris interview; and Mangamuka Marae Association, minute book, V O Harris private collection.
9 Wharemoko appears to be a colloquialism unique to Mangamuka, and is used to mean the wharenui with an emphasis on it being carved.
10 Salmond, Amiria, pp. 111-2.
11 Ibid., pp.109-111.
12 Martha Rea Harris, interviewed by Aroha Harris, 3 July 1998, Tape 1 Side B.
and could therefore counter-balance the perceived paring back of the committees’ authority. Further, Maori wartime efforts occurred not only on the home front but also on the battle front. Maori men in the Maori battalion practiced and developed their leadership skills, and applied them to Maori aspirations in the post-war period on their return home. Like the Maori War Effort Organisation, the Maori battalion was organised and led along tribal lines, appeals to tribal loyalty (and rivalry) playing their role in conscription. Winiata noted that tribalism as a basis for Maori organisation revealed the way in which modern Maori leadership has expressed itself in times of social crises.\(^\text{13}\)

This development of Maori leadership on two fronts, and the particular energy and buoyancy it took to the post-war environment, has led to observations like King’s that Maori consciousness and confidence grew as a result\(^\text{14}\). Yet much of the literature views the tribal committees as limited, if not failed, in the post-war period. Orange argued the 1945 act undermined the degree of autonomy the committees enjoyed during the war. The act formalized the relationship between the committees and the department, an agency the committees widely regarded with antipathy. Furthermore, the committees lacked a national outlet. They were positioned ambiguously either completely independent, nor wholly a part of government. They were also insufficiently resourced to successfully facilitate economic development, which enhanced their focus on political and social concerns.\(^\text{15}\) Butterworth agreed with Orange and wrote that ultimately the committees floundered and became disheartened.\(^\text{16}\) Lindsay Cox viewed the tribal committee system as a typically limited state-inspired movement, and inadequate as a vehicle for either asserting Mana Maori Motuhake or presenting a united Maori voice.\(^\text{17}\) Walker too regarded the requirement to co-operate with the state as a limiting factor.\(^\text{18}\)

The limitations identified by the literature are all structural in nature. It is important to articulate structural limitations. However, such critiques can be problematic in that it can appear that the actors within the structure concerned are passive, behaving in ways that the structure dictates as opposed to responding to, engaging with and influencing the structure. The structures referred to here contained people, groups of individual human beings. Therefore it is equally as important to consider the nature and effect of their participation. Mediating the difficulties of the Maori-state relationship in the post-war period was the

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\(^{13}\) Winiata, *Changing Role*, p.142.


\(^{15}\) Orange, *Exercise in Autonomy* p.163.

\(^{16}\) Butterworth, *Maori Affairs*, p.92.

leadership and energy of both the Maori battalion and the tribal committees. It may therefore be reasonable to expect Maori to work with the department in ways that promoted and privileged Maori aspirations. The departmental goal may have been to harness Maori wartime energy and apply it to post-war concerns, but that did not have to preclude Maori from applying that same energy to their own concerns.

Whatever their limitations, the committees enjoyed a relatively long history, spanning both the war and post-war years. They provided a site within which modern and traditional leadership could potentially coexist. They embraced both traditional and modern forms and formalities, and existed in both rural and urban locations. They were located in and representative of the community while at the same time inextricably entangled with the department. Whether these features had a positive or negative effect is a matter for debate, and each is worth exploring. This exploration requires some examination of where life happens, in the specifics. Therefore the deeds of the committees’ members become critical to returning the people’s stories to the historical narrative.

Initially, Mason left the provisions of the 1945 act largely untouched. However, when Peter Fraser took over the Maori Affairs portfolio in 1946 he made the Welfare Division one of the major innovations of his ministry. Fraser is known to have avoided committing his views to writing, but he had a particular view about the Welfare Division, and one about which he did write. He aimed to make the division as self-controlling and autonomous as possible, that is to the full limits of potential development always stipulating for efficiency. Fraser also said the division was not just a branch of the department, but an organisation that must be independent and self-reliant even going so far as to hold out the prospect of limited local government through it:

The Tribal Committees, the Tribal Executives and the Welfare Officers must think out proposals and plans for the advancement of the Maori people in all directions. They must feel that they are at full liberty to approach relevant Government Departments or their officers their representations will always receive their most understanding and favourable consideration possible the [Maori Social and Economic Welfare] Organisation should be looked upon by the Maori people as their Organisation which they control locally as a form of local expression, direction, and control, and even a measure of local government.

18 Walker, Nga Pepa a Ranginui, Auckland, 1996, pp.82-3.
19 Fraser to Cameron, 4 May 1948, MA1, 100/14/2, ANZW.
20 Ibid.
Orange regarded Fraser’s view as ambitious and unrealistic. Any expectations that the committees would be more or less autonomous were undermined by the 1945 legislation. Butterworth wrote that Fraser set high goals for the committees, goals that were unattainable without sufficient resources. However, Fraser’s view resonated throughout the department in a range of memoranda written by himself and his officials. Besides having these expectations of the committees, Fraser also had expectations of the resources available, writing that: “The resource of the Maori Department and all other Government Departments will be at the service of the local tribal committees, of the tribal executives, and of the welfare officers.”

In expressing his view, Fraser also boxed off the leadership structure with which he was prepared to work, and to which he was willing to apply government resources. Maori organisations outside this structure could affiliate or effectively be left out. It is important to note that Fraser included Maori women’s welfare committees as belonging to this structure. These committees would later combine and re-emerge as the Maori Women’s Welfare League discussed in the next chapter.

Practical implementation of the 1945 act would be confusing to say the least. On one hand the department said it wanted to steer Maori communities towards self-help, but on the other it relied on the committees to augment its own work. The line dividing committee initiatives in support of departmental policy and community initiative in, of and for itself, was blurred at best. Fraser earnestly believed that the Maori people would reap the benefits of a complete and fully functioning Welfare Division and tribal committee network, and took some steps from 1946 that would remain influential after National took office in 1949. One important step was his approach to staffing the division, which he regarded as the ‘operational arm’ that would ultimately implement the 1945 act. The first welfare officers appointed to the division were a mix of those who had established themselves as leaders through the wartime network of committees and the battalion. Rumatiki Wright, of Te Atihaunui-a-Paparangi and Rangitane amongst other iwi, is a good example. Her involvement with the Maori War Effort Organisation extended the already established local leadership roles she enjoyed in the Women’s Christian Temperance Union and the Raetihi Country Women’s Institute. In 1947 she was appointed welfare officer based at Hawera, and thereafter played an important role in encouraging to establishment of Maori women’s welfare committees. By the time the league was established in 1951 she had become the

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21 Ibid.
Senior Maori Lady Welfare Officer 23

A similar scene may be set for Rangiataahua (Rangi) Royal, of Ngati Raukawa and Ngati Tamatera. An excellent sportsman and formerly a land development supervisor for the Native Department, Royal commanded the Maori Battalion B Company for a time before returning to the department in 1944 in the position of chief welfare officer. 24 Royal’s appointment was upgraded in 1946 to controller of welfare, recognition of the expected increasing importance of the Welfare Division in departmental activities. Royal, alongside Wright, laid the organisational foundations that led to the establishment of the league. He seems in fact to have been influenced by a number of women around him at the time, including Wright and fellow welfare officer Miraka Petricevich (later Szazy). Women in Royal’s family may have had an influence also. Royal’s wife, Puhi, was a founding member of the league and was elected vice-President in 1955. Royal’s sister, Naki Swainson, was a member of the league’s inaugural executive and a cousin, Ruha Sage, became the league’s President in 1964.

An important point about Fraser’s approach to staffing the division is that it drew on the range of leadership expertise developed during wartime. Administration of the nationwide team of welfare officers that comprised the division was centralised at the department’s head office in Wellington under Royal. Whether Fraser knew it or not, his approach was one that allowed Maori aspirations to permeate the division’s operations, as much as those aspirations are said to be limited by the division’s source of authority, the 1945 act. It did not make the job easy, however, for either the committees or the welfare officers. Fraser was well aware that there was a tendency for the welfare officers to be treated as ancillary staff that could be deployed to work out problems in other divisions. Nor was he keen on the practice of district registrars (later district officers) taking primary responsibility for communications from tribal committees and executives. In Fraser’s view, this development was entirely opposed to his conception of how the division ought to operate and would slow up its development and effectiveness. Fraser reiterated the independence and self-reliance the division was meant to have, and warned that the apparent interference of the registrars would handicap all concerned and dishearten the Welfare Officers, the Tribal Executives, and Tribal Committees. 25 Arguably, the potential to be

25 Fraser to Cameron, 4 May 1948, MA1, 100/14/2, ANZW.
disheartened was maximised in 1949, when the newly-elected National government formally shifted administrative control of the welfare officers to the district officers, all of whom were Pakeha. It is possible to read Royal’s leadership as effectively sidelined from that point. However, he remained in the role of controller of welfare until he retired in 1956. Furthermore, he did not confine his leadership role to Wellington, and he is remembered as someone who worked well out in the community, encouraging debate and initiative on a range of health and welfare issues. Furthermore, the head office leadership included Ropiha, who as already discussed, worked well with Corbett.

Some continuation of Fraser’s approach may be detected after Corbett’s appointment to the Maori Affairs portfolio. Corbett reiterated the ‘certain measure’ of self-government that the committees practiced, and described their members as leaders following the Maori tradition. The practice of appointing former battalion men also continued. Both Awatere and Henare became welfare officers in the early 50s. With no previous background in Maori issues, Corbett was no doubt helped to his understandings of the division and the committees by Ropiha. Within the comprehensive description of the department’s work that he prepared for Corbett in 1949, Ropiha stressed the importance of the committees:

> The war revealed the value of the tribal organization in promoting among the Maori people a cause which fires their imagination and the spirit of tribal emulation. It was clear that the same type of organization would give life and inspiration to the cause of advancing the Maori race in social and economic affairs. The system of tribal executives and committees as was set up for the War Effort Organization was therefore adopted as the basis for the administrative organization under the Act.

Initially, the welfare officers’ work focussed on the tribal executives and committees, it being the duty of every officer to gain the confidence of the committees in his or her zone. The department saw this approach as providing the best avenue for promulgating its policy. It also viewed the tribal committees as fundamental to Maori communal organisation and treated them as a kind of basic building block for other sites for Maori leadership that followed in the wake of World War II. For example, branches of the league were intended to partner the committees and later, the New Zealand Maori Council became the umbrella under which the committees could formally gather at a national level. Corbett regarded the committees’ members as leaders following the Maori tradition, who could assist Maori to

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26 AJHR, 1953, G-9, p.2.
27 Ropiha to Corbett, 14 December 1949, MA 1 W2459, 1/1/41 pt 1, ANZW.
modernise.\textsuperscript{29}

As they had during the war, the committees worked at a very local level and continued to utilise local leadership and address local concerns. By 1950, 381 committees had been formed and 63 tribal executives chosen. Twenty-two zones based on tribal affiliation and population overlay this network of committees. The department employed 36 welfare officers throughout the country, 23 men and 13 women, and at least one male welfare officer operated in each zone.\textsuperscript{30} In theory at least, the committees were charged with a formidable set of tasks. The tribal committees and executives were the main avenue through which Maori welfare policy was implemented.\textsuperscript{31} As Ropiha explained to Corbett, the committees themselves, wholly voluntary organisations, were expected to:

conserve, improve, advance, and maintain [the Maori people's] physical, economic, industrial, educational, social, moral, and spiritual well-being; to assume and maintain self-dependence, thrift, pride of race, and such conduct as will be conducive to their general health and economic well-being; to accept and maintain the full rights, privileges, and responsibilities of citizenship; to apply and maintain the maximum possible efficiency and responsibility in their local self-government undertakings; and to preserve, revive, and maintain the teaching of Maori arts, crafts, language, genealogy, and history in order to perpetuate Maori culture.\textsuperscript{32}

The creative tension that resulted from the implication that Maori had to be both thoroughly modern and thoroughly cultural is apparent in this quotation. The committees were charged with producing responsible and fully participating citizens, and maintaining Maori cultural distinctiveness. Furthermore, while praising the success of the committees at a local level, Ropiha also indicated their important role in the modernisation of Maori people as a whole:

The work of the Welfare Organization must be measured by three standards – its effect on the individual Maori, on the Maori race as a whole, and on society in general. Assessed from the individual view-point its work already shows marked success. Its significance in the wider spheres is deeper and is only measurable by the extent of its influence for good on the character, living conditions, and social adjustment of a whole race of people.\textsuperscript{33}

There were clearly many tensions to be worked out. Corbett’s expectation was that

\textsuperscript{29} AJHR, 1953, G-9, p.2.
\textsuperscript{30} Ropiha to Corbett, 14 December 1949, MA1 W2459, 1/1/4 pt 1, ANZW.
\textsuperscript{31} Policy Paper, ‘Social Welfare Work’ c.1954, MA1 W2490, 36/1/1. ANZW.
\textsuperscript{32} Ropiha to Corbett, 14 December 1949, MA1 W2459, 1/1/4 pt 1, ANZW.
while the vestiges of the communal way of life would inevitably disappear, the committees would maintain Maori social organisation in a way that was geared to modern conditions. Corbett’s overall assessment was that the 1945 act could operate as a means of assisting Maori to take up a table position in society during a period of enormous change. The department would also have an important role to play which required it to maintain close links with Maori. After all, its main goal was to facilitate social change and the greater the need for the Department’s guidance.

Referred to in Maori idiom as the Maori Affairs, the department was the Maori world’s most important agent of the state, and its pervasiveness in Maori lives is difficult to untangle. Indeed, the department pervades personal recollections of people’s post-war experiences. When asked about the decision to opt for a Maori Affairs mortgage, one interviewee responded: It was a Maori, and everybody went to the Maori Affairs. It was just common knowledge. This apparent reach of the department into daily lives, coupled with continuing Maori cynicism and suspicion about the state, aids the view that the department was constrained in the benefits it could ever deliver to Maori. Certainly the department had a long history of being the government’s primary instrument of Maori policy. It was also a key distributor of resources to Maori communities, well-positioned to sow the seeds of dependency. Also, the department undoubtedly used organisations like the tribal committees to progress its own policy agenda. On that basis, views that the department was more of a hindrance than a help to Maori community development, and a suspect sponsor of bodies like the league and later the New Zealand Maori Council, are unsurprising. However, to treat such bodies as creatures of government set up for its own convenience, and their members as unsuspecting pawns may be misleading. Relying on the department for a full range of advice and services may not have been such a scornful act in the context of the 1950s and 60s.

Families during this period would have been plugged into the state with or without collaborative leadership. The state was such a big player: a lender of mortgages, the country’s biggest educator, the main provider of health and welfare services, a major builder of homes and a substantial employer. Close contact with families was a fundamental component of the department’s service delivery and policy development methods. Sub-offices were established in areas where close contact with people was deemed necessary.

33 Ibid.
34 AJHR, 1953, G-9, p.2.
Welfare officers visited individual families and could offer them departmental resources. The various divisions of the department assisted with accessing education grants, vocational training, land development, employment, rental accommodation, mortgages and relocation from rural to urban areas. Collaborative leadership ought to be no surprise; leaders that could organise, facilitate and mediate the overall relationship between Maori and the department especially may have been exactly what the times required. Through collaborative leadership Maori people could transform what was meant to be a dance to the state’s tune, with the state as the dominant partner, into a performance in which the ostensible leader was often the led.

As well as having the wide-ranging set of duties Ropiha described, the tribal executives and committees also had certain powers. They could make and administer public health by-laws. They could, for example, order owners of ‘dirty’ buildings to clean them. They had the power to protect tribal buildings and recreation grounds; they could license billiard rooms, shops and traders; and they could control traffic and meetings, activities that were fairly commonly undertaken by the committees. Penalties for any breaches of their by-laws were recoverable through the courts. Tribal and executive committees raised their own funds which, with the minister’s approval, could be subsidised at a rate of up to £1 for £1. The committees actively took advantage of the subsidy. They tended to spend these funds on marae improvements, water supplies, hygiene and sanitation, and education and sports facilities. Ropiha made a point of telling Corbett that at no time had religious projects been subsidised.

Corbett’s zeal for advocating temperance probably played a significant role in the department encouraging the committees to discuss the problems associated with alcohol, a topic on which Royal raised debate on marae throughout the country in the mid-50s. Tribal committees demonstrated their own eagerness to nominate Maori wardens for appointment by the Minister. These appointments were regarded as particularly responsible, and therefore the police were asked if the proposed wardens were fit to hold the position. Ropiha said the wardens’ job was to ‘keep the people out of trouble and to stamp out mischief before it becomes a crime’. In the four years following the passing of the 1945 act, 32 wardens were appointed. By the end of 1957, 376 Maori wardens had been gazetted.

The committees have attracted considerable criticism from Maori scholars. Cox

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36 M. Harris interview, Tape 1 Side A.
37 Report to MOMA on the Department of Maori Affairs (DMA), 16 December 1957, AAMK 869/3a, ANZW.
38 Ibid.
39 Jamison and Royal, Te Rangiataahua Kiniwe, 1896–1965
40 Ropiha to Corbett, 14 December 1949, MA1 W2459, 1/1/4 pt 1, ANZW.
pointed out that the committees potentially undermined traditional leadership because of the levelling effect of the voting system. Any adult Maori could stand for office and vote in a committee election. Rangatira could be out-pollled by people of lesser status, and Ī in urban situations especially Ī tangata whenua could be marginalised in their home areas. While these outcomes were theoretically possible, and were no doubt sometimes realized in practice, it may also be argued that community imperatives held some sway. People could use their votes to achieve the same result as if tradition were the norm. Most of the committees' members were local kaumatua. The election of female members was less common, an outcome which might be partially explained by the general acceptance that women participated in community affairs through their local branch of the league and the komiti wahine common to many marae. In some areas younger men were included and groomed for future leadership roles though sometimes at the risk of being embroiled in that perennial tension between electing ēalōleaders or younger, smarter newcomers. At Orakei, the Ngati Whatua stronghold in Auckland City, both the league and the tribal committee remained hapu oriented. The kaumatua on the committee were more concerned with the dominance of Maori Affairs officers than the unwanted influence of outside tribes. Generally then, the committees seem to have remained tribal in outlook and male- and elder-dominated.

Furthermore, tribal committees did not exist just because the state legislated them into being. State involvement was not a prerequisite for community organisation and cohesion. Shared goals and purposes are perhaps a more reliable driver for such developments. Mangamuka provides a useful illustration. Besides kinship, the Mangamuka people had farming in common and a desire to do what was mutually advantageous. During the war they rallied around the building of their new wharemoko, and later a visit by the Prime Minister, Peter Fraser, in 1946. For Mangamuka, and other communities like it, the practical implementation of the 1945 act, including setting up the committees, probably did little more than provide a legal structure for things that were already happening. The Mangamuka association, for example, operated from 1943 at least, the same year that building on the new wharemoko began. By May 1945, the association had 39 paid members, men and women, each paying an annual subscription of 5/-.

Members elected a council of eight to twelve members at annual general meetings. The association was mainly concerned with

41 Report to MOMA on the DMA, 16 December 1957, AAMK 869/3a, ANZW.
42 Cox, Kotahitanga, pp.104-5.
43 Kawharu, Orakei, p.70.
fundraising and mutual assistance for its members' farming and gardening endeavours. Fundraising not only produced income, but also provided opportunities for social interaction at dances and sports days. Throughout the 1940s the association lent money to members for farming and land development, and set up a taxi business and a small goods store at the marae. Members assisted each other in their gardens’ ploughing, fencing and planting. They also shared cartage costs when sending produce to the markets, for example. So, when the Mangamuka tribal committee was set up after the war, the people there were already accustomed to working co-operatively, electing committees, running meetings, keeping minutes, and fundraising.\(^{45}\)

The changeover from Mangamuka Maori Association to the Mangamuka tribal committee (later Mangamuka Maori committee) appears to have occurred in the early 1950s. It was more of a seamless transition than a dismantling of one organisation in favour of another. The operation of the Mangamuka committee comprised far more than a simple following of rules dispensed by the department, as committee members negotiated the process in a way that ensured aspects of the association continued. There was little differentiation between membership of the association and membership of the committee. Members continued to pay a subscription, at a rate of 2/6 each month. Even the minutes were recorded in the same minute book the association used. The committee continued many of the tasks of the association, adding the officially mandated tasks of appointing Maori wardens and dealing with problems of alcohol and delinquency. One of the features that changed, though, was the direct and formal participation of women, which declined after the association became a committee. Although a minority, women were included in the membership of the association and were elected to its council. In fact, it is at elections that the voice of women is most apparent in the minutes. The association actively encouraged its women to raise by organising dances and socials, buying and selling, and providing refreshments at sports days and race days. This seems to have been a role that the women had already accepted and developed. Apart from elections most of their contact with the association was in regard to fundraising.

By 1957 the Mangamuka committee looked much more like a product of the 1945 act than an organic community initiative. It had an all-male committee. Its focus had shifted to dealing with alcohol and petty crimes and misdemeanours. The one remnant from the

\(^{44}\) King, Whina, p.167; Winiata, Maori Leadership, pp.130-1; and Kawharu, Orakei, p.70.

\(^{45}\) Minute Book, Mangamuka Maori Association and Mangamuka Tribal Committee, V. O. Harris.
association was the imposition of a £1 ‘tax’ on committee members.\textsuperscript{46} Women still attended committee meetings but their fundraising work had shifted into the ambit of the Mangamuka Marae Women’s Committee. Mangamuka women also developed their involvements in local branches of the league and the Country Women’s Institute. In practice, it seems the distinctions between the various women’s groups were barely noticeable. Membership was virtually the same across all three organisations and activities like making jams and preserves, often for consumption at the marae, common to them all.\textsuperscript{47}

In some areas tribal committees had to be cajoled into existence, both during and after the war. When the committees failed to proliferate in Ngati Porou, local leadership was called upon to stimulate community interest in the committees, as in the case of Eruera Stirling who was asked to set up the Tihirau committee. Initially met with lack of interest, Stirling found people responded to his one-on-one approach and community fundraising efforts that were subsidised from the departmental purse. Stirling was also instrumental in a hui at Parihaka, to which he accompanied Awatere and two other departmental officers. There, in spite of a history of hostility towards government officials, the people set up not only a tribal committee, but also a branch of the league and an incorporation.\textsuperscript{48} This apparent breakdown of residual resistance and indifference, and acceptance of the department-driven network of committees ought not be misread. It has already been established that the absence of a tribal committee in a community was no measure of that community’s liveliness and organisation. Furthermore, the act of setting up committees did not mean the committees became obedient servants of the state. In practice, the committees worked out for themselves what activities they would undertake, responding largely to the concerns and circumstances of their respective communities and not just departmental policy. The committees operated at and impacted upon a very local level, one of the attributes that Orange counted against them because it failed to provide a national forum.\textsuperscript{49}

However, it was at the community level that people met together and with welfare officers, expressed their views and implemented their understandings of the 1945 act. Local experiences and local responses to local concerns gave rise to differences between the committees. Difference, according to Anne Salmond, is critical to Maori people’s

\textsuperscript{46} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{47} For example: M. R. Harris interview, Tape 1 Side A.
\textsuperscript{49} Orange, \textit{Exercise in Autonomy} p.163.
interactions with each other and fundamental to any notions of \( \text{Maoritanga} \)^{50} It is no surprise then that the committees operated at different pitches. Some were consistently active over time, whereas others operated intermittently, and others still were, in the main, defunct.\(^{51}\) Few, if any, fulfilled all of their supposed functions, and some fulfilled none, existing in the department\( \text{\^} \) records but not in fact. Some powers were never used, and others were used rarely. By 1958, only one of the 76 tribal executives had actually passed a public health by-law.\(^{52}\) In some places the committees were abandoned even before they began, more so in areas with small, scattered populations and where the community was transitory, as was often the case in saw-milling towns.\(^{53}\) Committees that were operational often kept to their administrative tasks of supporting applications for financial subsidies from the department, issuing liquor licenses and nominating wardens. More active committees also focussed on keeping their young people out of trouble, and maintaining their marae and other community facilities.\(^{54}\)

While the tribal committees thought and acted parochially, and while difference and local expression were critical to their functioning, they also had a lot in common both within and across districts. Recurring themes in representations to Corbett throughout the 1950s include outstanding grievances about land dating back to the nineteenth century, housing needs, and problems with land development and title reform.\(^{55}\) However, commonality co-existed with difference and local nuance, which is particularly illustrated by the committees\( \text{\^} \)tribal or Maori courts. The basic functioning of these courts was fairly straightforward. Tribal committees received complaints from within their communities, summoned the accused, heard cases, and dispensed punishment, often in the form of fines. While the process seems to have been uniform, the way the Maori court was used varied. The Newtoun committee which Walker studied preferred to hear cases that either the wardens or honorary welfare officers found too difficult to handle on their own.\(^{56}\) Sometimes the Huria tribal committee\( \text{\^} \) court was used by local police to discipline adolescents.\(^{57}\) The Mangamuka tribal committee,

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\(^{50}\) Salmond, *Amiria*, p.167.

\(^{51}\) Notes for the Hon. Minister\( \text{\^} \) visit to Hiruharama, 26 May 1951, MA 1, 1/1/47 pt 2, ANZW.

\(^{52}\) Report to MOMA on the DMA, 16 December 1957, AAMK 869/3a, ANZW.

\(^{53}\) AJHR, 1953, G-9, p.10.

\(^{54}\) Report to MOMA on the DMA, 16 December 1957, AAMK 869/3a, ANZW.

\(^{55}\) See, for example, notes of various representations and ministerial visits on MA 1, 1/1/47 pt 2, (Ministerial tours and interviews, 1948-1955), ANZW.

\(^{56}\) Walker, *Voluntary Association*, p.175. Newtoun is a pseudonym.

\(^{57}\) Winiata, *Changing Role*, p.131.
on the other hand, preferred using its own court to dealing with the police.58 However, minimizing contact with the police was probably more achievable in communities like Mangamuka, located some distance from the nearest town, compared to Huria located near Tauranga.

These variations between individual Maori courts were further reflected in the source of complaints. In Mangamuka, the complaints the tribal committee heard originated within the immediate community. The Newtown committee, on the other hand, besides receiving complaints from its wardens, also received complaints from schools, government departments and the Pakeha neighbours of alleged offenders. That non-Maori were able to make complaints against Maori within this system was a point of contention for some committees. According to its first secretary, one of the reasons the Te Atatu Maori committee set itself up in the first place was to oppose this practice. People from the Te Atatu area had appeared before the Maori court in nearby Henderson, many as the result of complaints made by Pakeha. A group of people from Te Atatu worked together to set up their own Maori committee so that they could extract their people from the situation.59

Given the departmental focus on problems associated with alcohol, cases involving drinking and juvenile delinquency frequently featured in the Maori courts. The Welfare Division described delinquency and alcohol abuse as being of ‘very serious proportions’ and ‘symptoms of a deeper social disorder’.60 In the 1950s and 60s, the department dedicated a section of its annual reports to commenting on ‘the liquor problem’. The situation was exacerbated by sly-grogging, including unrestricted after-hours trading in some communities. According to the department, the underlying reasons for excessive drinking amongst Maori were ‘poor housing and imperfect social adjustment’.61 It relied on tribal committees, Maori wardens and welfare officers to address the question of excessive drinking at the local level, especially at large hui. The committees could use the Maori court system to discipline offenders. Wardens could order drunk or disorderly Maori from hotels, and could warn publicans to stop serving the person concerned.62 They could also police activity on marae and in public places within the community. Delinquency amongst teenagers appears to have ranged from criminal activity to being a general, though not necessarily a criminal, nuisance.

58 V. O. Harris interview, Tape 1 Side B.
59 Brown interview, Tape 1 Side B.
60 Report to MOMA on the DMA, 16 December 1957, AAMK 869/3a, ANZW.
61 AJHR, 1953, G-9, p.11.
62 Ropiha to Corbett, 14 December 1949, MA1 Accn W2459, 1/1/4 pt 1, ANZW.
Welfare officers kept in touch with teachers of Maori children in an attempt to head off children who showed signs of becoming ‘troublesome.’ Welfare officers also encouraged communities to set up youth activities and clubs.63

Walker examined four cases brought before a Maori committee in an Auckland suburb in the 1960s. Three cases concerned drinking and delinquency. In the first case a woman was found guilty of harbouring escaped wards of the state and sentenced to twelve months ‘prohibition.’ In another case, four young boys who had chopped down several pine trees in a reserve had to help a team of wardens clear away the debris and, with their parents’ assistance, replant the area. Another case resulted in the defendant being fined $20 following complaints about late parties, abuse and obscenities heard from his home. The fourth case concerned a complaint of parental neglect. A working party organised through the committee helped the family clean up their home, and the committee secretary took over budgeting of the family’s finances to ensure the children, who had been seen searching rubbish bins for food, were properly fed.64

During the 1950s at least, the Mangamuka Maori committee seems to have heard no cases directly involving alcohol. Instead, it discussed periodically what it called ‘the alcohol question’ at its meetings. Its main concern was with controlling the consumption of alcohol at the marae. It designated an area outside the marae grounds behind the wharekai as a place where the ringawera could drink, and imposed a one-shilling toll to be paid every time liquor was taken into the area. Many of its court cases concerned the misbehaviour of teenage boys, damaging other people’s property or scaring girls by shooting off their guns, for example. Offences committed by adults included theft and assault. Typically offenders were fined a cash amount. For instance, the boys who ripped a blanket at the marae were fined £5, as was the man found guilty of hitting a female. The minute book indicates that compliance levels were high, and often the guilty party paid at least part of the fine immediately.65 However, according to the oral evidence, payment in kind was also common, giving a horse which could then be sold, for example.66

In Mangamuka, the most severe punishment was reserved for offences against the family like adultery and domestic violence. The written record is largely silent about these kinds of offences. The committees seem to have resisted recording such incidents in their

63 Report to MOMA on the DMA, the Maori Trustee, and the Maori Land Court, 16 December 1957, AAMK 869/3a, 1/1 pt 1, ANZW.
64 Walker, ‘Voluntary Association’ pp.175-8. The meaning of ‘prohibition’ is not clear in Walker’s essay.
65 Minute Book, Mangamuka Maori Association and Mangamuka Tribal Committee, V. O. Harris.
66 V. O. Harris interview, Tape 1 Side A.
minute books, but they are remembered in oral accounts. Violet Harris recalled committee members visiting perpetrators of domestic violence in their homes and checking on the wellbeing of the families concerned. Repeat offences attracted repeat visits. These cases were dealt with in a particular way, and by particular people. Violet’s oral account indicates that, although it was usually men from the tribal committee who dealt with offences against the family, whakapapa was their main qualifying factor. Thus, the committee member who dealt with one family may not have been the appropriate one to deal with another family down the road. Furthermore, these highly personal and sensitive situations were often handled outside the formalities of the committees, which probably explains their absence from the minutes. Oral histories also indicate that the most severe punishment ever dispensed was banishment from the community. Sometimes that banishment meant being sent to other family members resident elsewhere; sometimes it meant leaving without that kind of support.

Being sent away was also used as punishment for those found guilty of relatively minor misdemeanours. This was especially the case for younger community members, who would often be sent to an aunt or uncle resident outside the home community. Hohepa recorded a number of instances in the late 1950s where disputes within households resulted in offenders leaving home. This kind of supported removal from the community is perhaps reflective of a prevailing attitude that unless they were farming, there was nothing for these young people ‘back home’ and that was why they were getting into mischief. There is a sense that being sent to the city was viewed as a benefit to the young people concerned, also apparent in another reason young people were sent to live with relatives, education. So, when Pio Jacobs was sent to live with his grandfather in Auckland in the late 40s it was a treat rather than a punishment. He could stay on in Auckland so long as he was ‘good’ and went to school, but if he was ‘naughty’ he would be sent back to Pawarenga. It was quite a dilemma for the young Pio who liked Auckland but hated being the only brown face at his school, and began to spend his school days sitting on the swings in Victoria Park. Pio was sent home, but returned to Auckland again in the early 50s.

These whanau arrangements often occurred outside the formal structure of tribal committees and the courts, and many families instituted their own home-grown processes for disciplining and educating their young people, processes that appear to have been common and widely accepted. A story related by Taipari Munro illustrates such a process. He recalled his own youthful mistakes of doing ‘haututu things like truanting from school and

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67 Hohepa, *Maori Community*, pp.84-93.
petty theft. The inappropriate behaviour escalated until he was found out and his father intervened:

And of course the straw broke the proverbial camel’s back when some cousins and I had been missing from school for a couple of days during which time we went and robbed somebody’s motorbike, taken it up to Parahaki mountain and were driving it up and down the mountain and then when we finished we pushed it over the side of the cliff.

Early in the morning, my father comes in and says to me, ‘E ara, he manuhiri,’ and I thought the old people had come to town because when the old people come we have to get up. Got up to have a look and it was my cousin who had been with for the last two days, his father and two policemen. So we had to go and look for the bike up on Parahaki in the dark - just as well the moon was shining - and pull this poor bloody mangled thing up the hill and drag it all the way back to the police station with the policeman in front and our fathers behind.69

Although the police did get involved with this final escapade, it was Taipari’s father who took charge of dispensing the discipline. He offered his teenage son the choice of joining the army, going to borstal or finishing his schooling at Hato Petera College in Auckland. The errant son took what looked like the easy one - Hato Petera. This family approach to censuring seems obvious, as surely most families are concerned with the behaviour of their members. The examples given here reiterate the point that tribal committees were not a pre-requisite for expressing community leadership and initiative. Furthermore, Taipari’s experience occurred in the mid-60s, a time when the official view was that the authority of the elders was of little effect in modern times.70 It may be tempting to interpret such situations as examples of families and communities not caught in the net of tribal committees and somehow escaping the penetrating reach of Maori Affairs. However, that would be inaccurate in Taipari’s case. His father was a community leader himself, especially in respect of hapu lands, and therefore involved with the incumbent administrative bodies typically linked to the department through its land development programme and the Maori Land Court. It was difficult for Maori families in the 50s and 60s to live beyond the reach of Maori Affairs. Even resistance implies some kind of relationship, and where the committees had been completely abandoned the department reported that it implemented alternative measures to safeguard the welfare of all Maoris in such areas.71

68 Jacobs interview, Tape 1 Side A.
69 Taipari Munro, interviewed by Aroha Harris, 6 July 1998, Tape 1 Side B.
70 McEwen to Secretary for Justice, 26 April 1966, MA 1, 1/13/1 vol 1, ANZW.
71 AJHR, 1953, G-9, p.10.
To complete many of its tasks the department needed access to local information, for example, to prioritise the building of homes or identify students who might need financial assistance in order for their education to continue. Such an approach required an ongoing and accurate local knowledge which, under the 1945 act, was ideally supplied by welfare officers through their close working relationships with league or tribal committee members. This intricate web of relationships was seen in microcosm in West Auckland in the 1960s. Letty Brown was the Te Atatu Maori committee’s first secretary, and her oral account points to a strong overlap between the committee, the local branch of the league and the local kapa haka team, Manutaki. Setting up the committee instituted a partnership between it and the league, stamped out a socio-cultural territory for Maori in Te Atatu, and facilitated the department’s access to the community.72

Once more, it seems instructive to avoid the inclination to cast the department as dominant and the committees and leagues as therefore submissive. The picture that emerges is far more complex. Weaving the Welfare Division’s work together with that of the league and the committees set the scene for the channels between Maori and the Maori Affairs to allow two-way traffic, with each party running its own agenda and trying to influence and shape the other. Maori were well aware of the nature of the beast with which they were dealing. Letty Brown was clear that while she was involved with both the league and the committee, she spent a lot of her time doing the community based work of the division. In her words ‘work came from Maori Affairs and we did it’ Letty also refused to work for the department outside of Te Atatu, and expected and got the department’s support for her projects, like fundraising for the Hoani Waititi Marae.73

The intricacies of these relationships meant that the boundaries between department and community merged and blurred. Maori Affairs enlisted the support of key leaders as the main device for cultivating its community links, to progress its programmes and to model desired behaviour. Eruera Stirling’s role in establishing tribal committees amongst Ngati Porou has already been mentioned. In Taitokerau, at the request of the department’s district officer, James Henare encouraged various Maori groups to participate in the Maori land development schemes. With individual Maori playing such roles, it seems reasonable to find them espousing Maori policy. Addressing a hui at Oturu in 1950, the year before he took up a position as welfare officer himself, Henare said that Taitokerau Maori understood that the success or failure of the Welfare Division depended largely on the Maori people themselves,

72 Brown interview, Tape 1 Sides A and B, Tape 2 Side B.
a nice mirror of the official view that the 1945 act made Maori responsible for their own advancement.\textsuperscript{74} What looked on the surface like acceptance and collusion, however, could become a source of tension. The department typically patted itself on the back for doing such a splendid job of developing a nucleus of Maori leadership within the Welfare Division, as if such leadership did not exist previously. The department also claimed the leadership of its welfare officers helped to shape the future. Meanwhile, its relationship with Maori communities strained as members of the league and tribal committees sought acknowledgement for their very real contributions to Maori policy, including the production, prominence and competence of their leaders.

This merging and blurring of boundaries makes it difficult to assign simple labels of collaboration or resistance, conservatism or activism. In 1951, when the department sought to appoint new welfare officers in the Heretaunga region, a gathering of locals told Corbett that the welfare officer was unimportant: the tribal committees were the centre of the Welfare Division and did most of the work.\textsuperscript{75} By contrast, some of the northern tribes had already shown they were more inclined to participate with the department than reject it. At the Oturu hui Corbett said he had heard many reports of the excellent relations between the Taitokerau people and the department\textsuperscript{\textdegree} officers. Their relations were apparently so good that community spokespeople took the liberty to discuss the administration of the department and urged decentralisation in Taitokerau. They urged Corbett to split the northern office into two ī Auckland and Taitokerau, a change that was soon implemented.\textsuperscript{76} It could be tempting to portray the Taitokerau people in this example as collaborators, and the Heretaunga people as resisters. However such a portrayal would treat all concerned as two-dimensional. The Heretaunga people did resist the department, and also asserted themselves as integral to it. The Taitokerau people did collaborate with the department, and also told it what to do.

The negotiated nature of relationships between the department and the committees is further exemplified by early attempts in some districts to organise on a regional basis and to urge the establishment of a national body. Acting on their own volition, tribal executives in the Waiariki district combined for a regional conference in 1952. The conference agreed that it would be \textsuperscript{\textdegree} of real advantage\textsuperscript{\textdegree} to:

\begin{itemize}
\item have a Central Council representing the tribal executives in each district and also a
\end{itemize}

\textsuperscript{73} Ibid., Tape 2 Side B.
\textsuperscript{74} Notes of interview (at a gathering of Ngapuhi at Oturu), 3 June 1950, MA 1, 1/1/47 pt 2, ANZW.
\textsuperscript{75} Notes of representations made to MOMA at Kohupatiki, 13 April 1951, MA 1, 1/1/47 pt 2, ANZW.
\textsuperscript{76} Notes of interview (at a gathering of Ngapuhi at Oturu), 3 June 1950, MA 1, 1/1/47 pt 2, ANZW.
National Executive so that the Minister could have a responsible and representative body to refer to and confer with. The Maori people likewise would have a representative approach to the Department, the Minister or the Government on matters which merit their consideration.77

In 1953, administrative provision was made for tribal executives to form into district councils. However, the department took little interest in assisting the committees to form a national body, and the goal of a national council was not finally realised until 1962 as part of the implementation of the Hunn report. It is interesting to note that nonetheless the committees’ members seemed to be aiming for a structure outside of the department, yet at the same time saw the benefit of keeping the department’s confidence.

Some readings of the evidence suggest that in rural areas the committees were primarily a phenomenon of the late 1940s and 50s, their influence and drive in the tribal homelands then fading as they developed on the emerging Maori cityscape. This scenario seems likely given the change in designation from tribal committee to Maori committee under the Maori Welfare Act 1962, coupled with the major demographic shifts associated with urbanisation. The Mangamuka committee in North Hokianga, and the Newton and Te Atatu committees in Auckland fit this pattern convincingly. The Mangamuka committee flourished in the 1950s, and the other two were not established until after the passage of the 1962 Act. Yet, in 1953-55, Metge found a practically opposite situation: two tribal committees were functioning with some efficiency in Auckland, while in the rural committee of Kotare the tribal committee played a negligible role in community affairs.78 Kotare was neither too distant nor too dissimilar from Mangamuka, but uniformity and consistency were probably never key features of the committees; no two were alike it seems.

A policy shift resulting from publication of the Hunn report helps to explain an apparent growing disinclination on the department’s part to maintain its close links with the tribal committees. Though somewhat more difficult to detect in oral interviews, the shift is apparent in them. For example, asked if she remembered the last time the Mangamuka committee operated, Violet Harris paused, and then replied ‘well, they changed it to a Maori committee’ although she did later point out that the Mangamuka Maori committee was still in existence.79 Chapters five and six will pay close attention to the Hunn report and its implementation, with an emphasis on it as an explanation for change. A shift in departmental attitude had been signalled before Hunn, however, particularly after the retirement of Royal

77 Ropiha to Corbett, 12 December 1952, MA 1, 35/2 pt 1, ANZW.
78 Metge, *New Maori Migration*, pp.84-8, 215-20. Kotare is a pseudonym for Ahipara.
in 1956 and Corbett and Ropiha in 1957. For example, by 1958, the ‘functioning’ of the committees was reportedly not as good or as purposeful as was hoped. Yet, their ‘intimate knowledge of the circumstances of the people in their area’ continued to be of benefit to the department in its work. At the same time, the emphasis of welfare work gradually shifted away from community work to case work with individuals, arguably creating further distance between the division and the committees.

The tribal committees could perhaps argue similarly that the by the end of the 1950s the department had not worked out as well as they had planned, as shown by some of the discussion that occurred at a conference of Maori leaders in 1959. About two thirds of the conference participants were ‘young Maori leaders’ no older than 35 years and a very good cross-section of the best type of young Maori. Older conference participants included Ropiha, Henare (who had by then left the department) and Awatere. Amongst several specific complaints about land, housing and welfare, was a charge that some welfare officers tended to stifle local leadership. Meanwhile, in land development, insufficient skilful advice was available to ensure Maori farmers were supported into independence from the department, and training for responsibility was inadequate. The department acknowledged the criticisms levelled at it. It maintained the view, however, that overall the conference participants were aware that the department was above all the body from which the Maori people would get the greatest amount of help and advantage. Furthermore, the department indicated a willingness to continue to reciprocate in that relationship, noting that a lot could be gained if groups like those represented at the conference could have closer contact with the policy making levels of the Department.

The fluidity in the relationships between Maori and Maori Affairs allowed for all kinds of complexities and contradictions. Overall though, community based projects and community dynamism and organisation could continue in the face of apparently detrimental legislative and policy changes. In addition, it has been shown that servitude was not an unavoidable consequence of collaboration. Even the most co-operative relationships were tempered with resistance when required, and a level of suspicion towards Maori Affairs in particular consistently percolated under the surface. As Metge has illustrated, beneath the Kotare community’s amicable relations with departmental officers lurked a spectre of

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79 V. O. Harris interview, Tape 1 Side A.
80 Report to MOMA on the DMA, 16 December 1957, AAMK 869/3a, ANZW.
81 Ibid.
82 Report on the Maori Leaders Conference, 30 August – 4 September 1959, AAMK 869/19/1/562 pt 1, ANZW.
cynicism that never forgot the connection to government. Close study of the tribal committees has revealed an active, complicated Maori world rather than a complicit one. This is no new discovery. There is a long history of Maori working with, against and around the state, actively negotiating the Maori position in the relationship. Maori communities and the department engaged in multi-faceted, dynamic relationships. One party was driven by its own circumstances, needs and experiences and their incumbent interpretations and analyses; the other by political imperatives, government procedures and priorities and the associated policy-making machinery. Analyses that depict Maori Affairs as dominant and controlling, imposing itself on an unsuspecting population from above are sometimes too rigid, implying flat, static relationships. Thus the department’s influence in any circumstance can look like a natural check on the pursuit and achievement of Maori goals. Yet countering with an argument that acknowledges the active and willing participation of many Maori does not absolve the state from its responsibilities in the relationship. Nor does it mean that the views and desires of Maori and the department were perfectly matched. The strong-hand of the latter ought to be acknowledged—there was probably no escaping the Maori Affairs—but without relegating the influential hand of Maori communities and their leaders to the background.

This chapter has shown that sometimes Maori people worked with the department to the extent that they changed it and felt they exercised some kind of ownership over it. Sometimes they rejected and ignored it, as engagement with it was a choice and not a matter of fact. Accidentally or deliberately, the disparate agenda of the two parties converged at times, allowing community and department to serve each other quite nicely. Sometimes they grated on each other’s nerves. Maori could lobby for things to be done their way or opt out of the relationship, knowing full well that welfare officers were only as effective in their work as they were accepted by their community. Thus tribal committees, when and where they were active, sometimes acted in a way that created an illusion of a distant and indifferent state and a community in charge of its own affairs, and at other times eagerly accepted the gains to be had from inviting in a fattened and benevolent state. The complexities and intricacies that such relationships implied will continue to be discussed in the next chapter in relation to the Maori Women’s Welfare League.

83 Metge, *New Maori Migration*, p.89.
WAHANGA TUAWHA
Mana Wahine: the Dance of the Maori Women’s Welfare League

In September 1951 some 300 Maori women from throughout the country gathered in Wellington to attend the inaugural conference of the Maori Women’s Welfare League. The first such conference of Maori womanhood it was the pinnacle of many months of organising on the part of the women welfare officers, and many decades of Maori women’s participation in women’s voluntary organisations. A large part of the conference was devoted to considering the league’s draft constitution. The Prime Minister, Sydney Holland, and a host of Cabinet ministers and senior public servants addressed the women, rallying them to the central kaupapa of welfare and home. Whina Cooper, a prominent Te Rarawa leader from the Hokianga was appointed the league’s first president unopposed, and received a great ovation for her acceptance speech. The buoyant and congratulatory mood, and smooth running of the conference, belied the underlying complexities of relations between the women of the league and the officers of the department. Indeed, Whina and other league women are remembered for assaulting the ears of Government departments particularly about mortgages for Maori families.

Designed to work in close co-operation and harmony with the tribal committees, the league was also something of an agent of integration. Its goals required its members to partner the department in the integrationist dance (preferably without missteps), balancing good citizenship modelled on the best of Pakeha life with the most important elements of Maori culture. The league’s role put it in the position of negotiating its relationship with its main sponsor the department, and working out its role in the practicalities and particularities of departmental policy on the ground. This chapter begins with coverage of the league’s establishment, and continues with an account of some of its activities. These activities covered a wide spectrum including education, health, housing and justice. There is an immense amount of detail on each of these topics in both the department and the league.

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1 The First Conference of the MWWL by Rumatiki Wright, Senior Lady Welfare Officer, n.d. MA 1 W2490, 36/26 pt 1, ANZW.
3 Constitution of MWWL, as approved on 27 September 1951, MA 1, 36/26/18 pt 1, ANZW.
records. The chapter focuses on housing, an area in which the league was particularly active and vocal during its early years. The chapter concludes by considering the creative tensions that characterised the league, its work and its relationships, primarily with the department, during its first ten or so years.

The original design for a national Maori women’s organisation was first mooted by the Labour government’s Peter Fraser following the passage of the 1945 act. However, a sense of sisterhood and common purpose among Maori women clearly pre-dated Fraser’s proposal. There was a considerable history of Maori women’s organising. They had run their own organisations and also participated in a range of women’s groups dominated by Pakeha. Komiti Wahine ĭ tribally-based Maori women’s committees ĭ were an active part of Te Kotahitanga movement (or Maori Parliament) which flourished in the 1890s and early twentieth century. Maori women set up their own branches of the Women’s Christian Temperance Union and later, Maori branches of the Country Women’s Institute.\(^4\) Also, Maori representation at the triennial conferences of the Pan Pacific and South East Asia Women’s Association was integral to New Zealand’s participation in the organisation.\(^5\)

There were limits to this activity though. As controller of Maori welfare, Royal felt that the women who participated in these organisations were those who had regular contact with and who were comfortable with Pakeha life and society. Most Maori women were not members, and the reach of these organisations into Maori communities was restricted to the homes of its Maori members.\(^6\) A different view was held of the Women’s Health League, however, and to some extent the Health League seemed to transcend the limits of other women’s organisations by reaching a wider constituency. Established in 1936 under the tutelage of Nurse Ruby Cameron, the Women’s Health League had developed into a co-ordinated movement focussed on the health of mother and child, with particular prominence amongst Maori women in the Bay of Plenty, East Coast and Taupo districts. Fraser held a very high opinion of the kind of work the Health League undertook, and hoped that with the

\(^4\) Tania Rei, \textit{Maori Women and the Vote}, Wellington, 1993, pp.39-46.

\(^5\) See for example, correspondence and other documents on MA 1, 19/1/291, (Pan Pacific Women’s Conferences, 1936-68), ANZW. For a discussion of Maori women delegates at the 1934 conference specifically, see: F. Paisley, ‘Performing \textit{New Zealand} Maori and Pakeha Delegates at the Pan-Pacific Women’s Conference, Hawai\textit{i}, 1934’ \textit{NZJH}, 38, 1, 2004, pp.22-38.

\(^6\) Organisation of Maori Women’s Address of Rangi Royal to the inaugural conference of the MWWL, September 1951, MA 1, 36/26/18 pt 1, ANZW.
department's help a wholly Maori national organisation of women could be formalised.  

Several factors and people influenced the development of the league. The department's explanation began with the statutory recognition the 1945 act gave to 'self-help' process it used to solve 'Maori problems'. Because of the nature of tribal organisation and tradition the tribal committees quickly became almost the sole preserve of men, with no particular role for women to fill. The men, it seemed, gathered and deliberated on matters affecting the community but left undone those things which impinged upon family life and upon the home. These later things were the prerogative of the womenfolk. In the league's view, it was Royal acting on the instruction of Fraser, who took the initial steps towards establishing a national Maori women's organisation. Fully supportive, Royal fixed upon the notion that the home represented the foundation of welfare work, and that little progress could be made without the co-operation of women. Reflecting back on the history of the league, Mira Szazy, said Royal could see that the women were excluded: 'Nothing was being done with regard to one of the greatest needs of the Maori people - housing, and the conditions of the family, the women, and the children'. Szazy was a welfare officer at the time the league was constituted and was its President from 1973 to 1977.

The quotation used, like others of the time, shows a tendency among officials to see women (and children) as 'social problems'. This reflected the department's vision of itself as engaged in the task of remedying the problems of Maori society, or sometimes even the problem of Maori in society. Arguably everything the department did was a response to 'Maori problems'. If it was not problematising a race, it was probably racialising a problem. That the league was set up with the sponsorship of the department and worked profitably with it does not mean the league or its members shared the department's views or saw itself, its members or Maori people as problems. In fact, this chapter will eventually show the league was probably more likely to see government policy and officials as the problem.

After the war, Royal had the female welfare officers organise Maori women

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7 Fraser to Cameron, 4 May 1948, MA 1, 100/14/2, ANZW.
8 Assistant Secretary to Secretary, Public Service Commission, 17 August 1955, MA 1 W2490, 36/26 pt 1, ANZW.
9 'A Brief History of the League' in Te Ropu Wahine Maori Toko i te Ora newsletter, 1, 5, 1965, n.p., MA 1, 36/26/11 pt 2, ANZW.
into women’s welfare committees to work alongside the tribal committees. The welfare committees and their work overlapped and eventually merged with the Women’s Health League. The Health League soon came to be seen by the department as the primary organisation for Maori women, and it was hoped it would eventually develop at a national level supported by the department. Two years before the Maori Women’s Welfare League was formalised, Ropiha interwove the work of the Health League with that of the Welfare Division. He had no doubt that if wisely developed the Health League was destined to play a vital part in the lives of the Maori women and their families. He also described the Health League as the counterpart of tribal committees with the two bodies working in tandem.  

The idea of weaving the various strands of existing Maori women’s activity and networks into a cohesive whole seemed straightforward enough. Still, a number of difficulties had to be navigated in the establishment process. For example, the president of the Country Women’s Institute feared that Maori women would abandon the institute to join the league. By the middle of 1950, it seemed that was already happening, particularly in the Far North but also in parts of the Bay of Plenty and the East Coast. The greatest concern was for small Maori communities, such as those in the North Hokianga where eight of the eleven institutes were wholly Maori. The institute did not want to appear antagonistic towards the league indeed it was hoped the two organisations could work co-operatively. However, nor did the institute want to lose valued Maori members. Discussion with the then Minister of Maori Affairs, Ernest Corbett, resulted in an arrangement whereby no branches of the league would be set up in defined areas where the institute was already functioning. The objections raised by the institute were amicably resolved, but the promise of keeping the league out of certain areas was probably unnecessary. Branches of the league were established in areas where Maori membership of the institute was known, giving women an opportunity for dual membership rather than the quandary of belonging to

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11 Ropiha to Corbett, 14 December 1949, MA 1 W2459, 1/1/41 pt 1, ANZW.
12 Assistant Secretary to MOMA, 2 December 1959, MA 1 W2490, 36/24, ANZW.
13 Notes of County Women’s Institute Representation to MOMA, 31 August 1950, MA 1 W2490, 36/26 pt 1, ANZW.
one group or the other. In Mangamuka, for example, though the local branch of the league was set up following a visit from the female welfare officer, the difference between it and the Country Women’s Institute was barely discernable. Both organisations met at the marae, and contained virtually the same membership. Both organisations are remembered for ‘lots of sewing’ jams and preserves.\textsuperscript{14} Other branches similarly took on a dual identity, operating as both a branch of the league and a Catholic Women’s League, for example.\textsuperscript{15}

The objections raised by the Health League caused Corbett and officers of the department far greater consternation than those of the institute. First signs of a falling out between the Health Leagues and the department occurred in March 1950 following a proposal to formally constitute the Health League as a national organisation for Maori women. However, Nurse Cameron rejected a constitution the department proposed. She said the Registrar of Incorporated Societies had turned it down, and that she had been authorised to reject it at the Health League’s 1949 general conference. Royal refuted both of Cameron’s claims, arguing that the registrar had approved the constitution subject to one minor amendment, and that Cameron had been authorised to finalise the constitution, not ‘kill it’\textsuperscript{16} The rift continued. Cameron expressed her dissatisfaction with the control and interference the department was attempting to exert over the Health Leagues, complained that the proposed constitution was too strict, and pointed out that the Health Leagues worked because the existing constitution was kept simple.\textsuperscript{17} Eruera Tirikatene, MP for Southern Maori, felt that Maori women found the Health Leagues ‘too restrictive’ to meet their needs. Mira Szazy recalled that Cameron objected to the use of the word Maori in the proposed name of the new organisation.\textsuperscript{18} This view was supported by another (unnamed) source that noted Cameron’s opposition to the ‘introduction of ethnocentrism’ which led to a rift between Cameron and several leading Maori women. Maori women wanted not only a national organisation, but also an organisation controlled wholly by Maori women themselves.\textsuperscript{19}

Corbett did what he could to manage the rising tensions. He did not secure the

\textsuperscript{14} M. R. Harris interview, Tape 1 Side A; and V. O. Harris interview, Tape 1 Side B.
\textsuperscript{15} Jacobs interview, Tape 1 Side B.
\textsuperscript{16} ‘Organisation of Maori Women’ Address of Rangi Royal to the inaugural conference of the MWWL, September 1951, MA 1, 36/26/18 pt 1, ANZW.
\textsuperscript{17} Controller to all Welfare Officers, 19 June 1950, MA 1 W2490, 36/26 pt 1, ANZW.
\textsuperscript{18} Szazy interviewed by Else, ‘Recording the History of the League’ 1990, p.19.
\textsuperscript{19} Winiata, \textit{Changing Role}, 1967, p. 166.
support of Cameron and the Health Leagues, but arranged with Cameron that no
Maori Women’s Welfare Leagues would be established in an area covering Tongariro
to the Bay of Plenty, where the Health Leagues were most prolific.\textsuperscript{20} Unfortunately, this agreement did not prevent news of conflict and rivalry from spilling over into the media. One newspaper reported that the Health League had complained that the welfare officers were interfering with its work. It also claimed that although Cameron was willing to work with the Welfare Leagues she would not submit to the ‘control’ of the department.\textsuperscript{21} Corbett admitted there was some rivalry, mainly in the Arawa district, but in his opinion, all women’s organisations were working towards one goal, and there was nothing to prevent them working alongside the Welfare League.\textsuperscript{22} His comments were prescient. Numerous Maori women have remained loyal to the Health League, which has enjoyed a long history working in the area of Maori women’s and children’s health, although mostly confined to the Arawa territory. In 1976, membership mainly comprised nurses, dental nurses, teachers and other women working in education and health.\textsuperscript{23}

As the rift unfolded, the women welfare officers stayed focussed on the task of establishing branches. Rumatiki Wright, the senior lady welfare officer, was largely credited with the hard graft of establishing branches. Employing a method frequently used by departmental officers, she made a personal approach to renowned and influential Tainui leader Te Puea Herangi, who in turn stimulated interest in the league in the Waikato and Maniapoto districts.\textsuperscript{24} Te Puea then became something of a poster girl for the league as the attention of the press was drawn to the branch she established at Turangawaewae.\textsuperscript{25} Her support was further confirmed when she established the Te Puea Herangi Trophy to be awarded annually for ‘the best balance sheet and report’.\textsuperscript{26}

\textsuperscript{20} Acting Secretary to MOMA, 2 November 1960, MA 1 W2490, 36/24, ANZW.
\textsuperscript{21} Newspaper clipping dated 7 April 1951, at folio 44, (name of newspaper not provided), MA1 W2490, 36/26 pt 1, ANZW.
\textsuperscript{22} Notes of representation to Minister by Norman Perry, April 1951, MA 1 W2490, 36/26 pt 1, ANZW.
\textsuperscript{23} Extract, Rotorua District Community Officers Annual Report, period ended 31 December 1976, MA 1 W2490, 36/24 pt 3, ANZW.
\textsuperscript{24} Report of Assistant Controller’s Visit to Te Awamutu, 11 January 1957, MA 1 W2490 36/26 pt 2, ANZW.
\textsuperscript{25} Dominion, 24 September 1951, MA 1, 36/26/18 pt 1, ANZW.
\textsuperscript{26} Minutes of the Inaugural Conference of MWWL, 25-27 September 1951, and Minutes of the Dominion Executive Committee, 9 January 1952, MA 1, 36/26/18 pt 1, ANZW.
In 1950 there were 160 branches nationwide. Most of the branches operated under the proposed new constitution that Cameron had rejected, even though it was still essentially a draft. Some also formed district councils in anticipation that they would soon affiliate to the yet-to-be-established national body. Royal wrote to welfare officers in June, stating that it was clear the stand off with the Health League could not be resolved, and that the department’s plans ought to proceed. He instructed the officers to form district councils as well as branches, and asked that the branches provide urgent and immediate suggestions as to a name for the new organisation, preferably choosing from either the Maori Women’s Welfare League or the Maori Women’s Advancement League. The branches were also asked to suggest a motto, colours, a badge, a flag and an ode if it was considered necessary. Once these details were completed, Royal said a conference of delegates would be called for the election of a national council and executive. Meanwhile, Ropiha had advised Corbett that organised districts were requesting a general conference. He noted that Corbett was on tour and likely to have members of the Welfare League in his various audiences throughout the country. It seemed wise then that Corbett say something in regard to the Welfare League’s position in relation to the department’s Welfare Division, to give the women great heart in this very important phase of our activities.

The preparatory work paid off. When the league held its inaugural conference, 187 branches had been formed under 22 district councils. A further 30 branches were pending and there were 2,503 financial members. The main goals of the conference were fairly orthodox: to formalise the league’s constitution and to appoint a national executive council. Although she was absent from the conference due to illness, Te Puea was appointed patroness, and Whina Cooper president. Even before her election, Whina had made an impression as a high-profile participant. She was the first to respond to the welcome speeches, the first to answer the roll call and she questioned Rangi Royal about the constitution very early on in the proceedings.

The women worked for three solid days. They word-smithed, finalised and

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27 Secretary Maori Affairs to MOMA, 19 March 1954, MA 1 W2459, 1/1/41 pt 1; and also Under-secretary to MOMA, 31 March 1951, MA 1 W2490, 36/26 pt 1, ANZW.
28 Controller to all Welfare Officers, 19 June 1950, MA 1 W2490, 36/26 pt 1, ANZW.
29 Under-secretary to MOMA, 31 March 1951, MA 1 W2490, 36/26 pt 1, ANZW.
30 Secretary to MOMA, 19 March 1954, MA 1 W2459, 1/1/41 pt 1, ANZW.
31 Address of Mr T. T. Ropiha, Minutes of the Inaugural Conference of MWWL, 25-27 September 1951, MA 1, 36/26/18 pt 1, ANZW.
adopted a constitution of 64 clauses. They resolved to affiliate with the National Council of Women and the Pan Pacific and South East Asia Women’s Association, and appointed representatives to do so. It was the first instance of Maori women appointing their own representatives at a national level. Reports heard from each of the district councils attested to the versatility of the [conference] delegates. The 72 remits the women debated covered a wide range of topics in the areas of health, housing, education and justice. The remits reflected the diversity of the women themselves as well as the matters with which they were concerned. Time was taken to watch the Governor General, Lord Freyburg, open parliament. The Poneke Youth Club entertained at the po whakangahau with jubilant action songs, twirling pois and thunderous hakas. On the last day of the conference, Ropiha encouraged the women to go home fully charged with the responsibilities of the positions you hold in this very valuable organisation. Go home and stimulate the interest of those who are living in the isolated districts.\(^\text{32}\)

It must have been an exciting time. Rumatiki Wright, who chaired the conference, certainly seemed buoyed by the occasion. Her comments left an impression that the league was about to embark on a grand enterprise, leading the people through a time of enormous change. She described the women as animated by the desire to take action, not just talk and talk to no end. Maori women, she said, are on the march.

May they, like their menfolk of the famed Maori Battalion, march also, to honour and glory, on the humble homefront! May they build up Racial Prestige and respect, from the humble home to the pah marae, through the lanes and by-ways and great thoroughfares of our lovely land may their mission be blest and fruitful, not only for our brown New Zealanders but also for white as well. Then ōratou Tatou(we of one house) will indeed be a reality in this land of ours.\(^\text{33}\)

Wright’s we of one house was a telling interpretation of the league’s motto, Tatou Tatou, which she said was held aloft as the league’s torch of light.\(^\text{34}\) The term was translated in the constitution as Let us be United.\(^\text{35}\) The Dominion

\(^{32}\) Ibid.

\(^{33}\) The First Conference of MWWL by Rumatiki Wright, Senior Lady Welfare Officer, n.d. MA 1 W2490, 36/26 pt 1, ANZW.

\(^{34}\) Ibid.

\(^{35}\) Constitution of MWWL, as approved on 27 September 1951, MA 1, 36/26/18 pt 1, ANZW.
published the translation ‘We are one’36 A more recent translation is ‘we are all in this together’37 Each of these translations captures the central sentiment of unity and common endeavour. However, Wright’s version played up some of the political rhetoric of the day, particularly the idea promoted by the addresses of both Corbett and Holland that Maori and Pakeha were ‘two people in one house’ or ‘family’.

Though well on the path to unity, Maori and Pakeha were not yet one people, and the league women could play an important role in smoothing any difficulties between the races.38 That role was alluded to in the first of the fifteen aims articulated by the constitution: ‘to promote fellowship and understanding between Maori and European women’.39 It was an aim that linked with the department’s policy of ‘co-operation with the Pakeha’.40 The idea was not so much one of turning the league into a monitor of the country’s race relations, nor even into a national explainer of all things Maori. Rather, it was to ensure the broad aims of the league which were largely fashioned by the department anyway fitted with the philosophy of integration that underpinned the government’s Maori policies. While the league’s members were urged to be shining examples of good New Zealand citizenship – clean, healthy, sober, law-abiding, family-oriented and Christian – they were also counselled, like the tribal committees, to maintain the traditions of the Maori race, to ‘preserve, revive and maintain the teaching of Maori arts and crafts and to perpetuate the Maori culture’.41

The addresses to conference attendees emphasised the role of mothers in the home, and their ability to influence society generally from that position. Holland identified the home as ‘incalculable’ of a happy national life, and the mother as the bedrock of the home. Mothers, therefore, had a ‘profound influence in raising standards of living’ and in education, sanitation, help and responsibility. Similarly, Corbett credited the minds of mothers as the source of ‘all advances in community life. He said the mothers’ desire to protect and assist the people as a whole stemmed from their great love for and desire to protect their children. Other

36 ‘We are One Chosen As Maori Women’s Motto Dominion, 3 October 1951, MA 1, 36/26/18 pt 1, ANZW.
38 Minutes of the inaugural conference of MWWL, 25-27 September 1951, MA 1, 36/26/18 pt 1, ANZW. Also reported on in N.Z. Warned Against Development of Racial Antipathy, Auckland Star, 1 April 1952.
39 Constitution of MWWL, as approved on 27 September 1951, MA 1, 36/26/18 pt 1, ANZW.
40 Mary Seaton to Under-secretary, 1 December 1949 (notes on reverse), MA 1, 36/26/11 pt 1, ANZW.
41 Constitution of MWWL, as approved on 27 September 1951, MA 1, 36/26/18 pt 1, ANZW.
speeches added the importance of sobriety and Christian values in the home to this basic message. These general aims were summed up by Ropiha as the promotion of fellowship, understanding and wellbeing among the Maori people and between Maori and the rest of the community. A catch-all clause in the constitution called on the league to take an active interest in all matters pertaining to the health and general well being of women and children of the Maori Race. The constitution gave the league a central task some specificity. The aims of the league included discussion and instruction in the proper care and feeding of babies, the preparation of meals, the care and maintenance of the home, and in the benefits to be derived from fresh air and sunshine. Attractive home conditions were to be created by encouraging gardening, and young mothers were to be encouraged to learn knitting, dressmaking and needlework. The league women would also instruct them [young mothers] in the proper clothing of their children.

Part I of the league's constitution declared it non-sectarian and non-political. Being non-political meant that the league would refrain from influencing its members regarding any candidate for public office or any political or municipal party. The idea that the league ought to remain non-partisan reflected Royal's speech to conference attendees during which he urged the women to put aside the divisions of tribe, creed, and politics. It was an appeal that struck a chord with Wright, and was followed with a suggestion to unite in the fraternal spirit of the common Maoritanga of the people in their welfare efforts. Inter-tribal and other kinds of rivalry had their place, but: on the vital issues affecting the Race they had to be held in abeyance. The wisdom and strength needed, to deal with and remedy our peculiar problems, lay under the mantle of the Maoritanga of the people regardless of their tribe, creed or shade of politics. It was a view that has echoed down the decades. Even before the inaugural conference the Dominion identified the league as a non-sectarian, non-political and non-tribal movement. In 1960, the league's Secretary, Joan Stone, repeated the familiar refrain, describing the league as non Party, non Sectarian, non Tribal and non Racial. As recently as 1998, Letty Brown said the league was a

42 Under-secretary to Director-General of Health, 21 September 1951, MA 1, 36/26/18 pt 1, ANZW.
43 The First Conference of MWWL by Rumatiki Wright, Senior Lady Welfare Officer, n.d. MA 1 W2490, 36/26 pt 1, ANZW.
44 Dominion, 24 September 1951, MA 1, 36/26/18 pt 1, ANZW.
45 Dominion Secretary MWWL to Secretary MWWL Wanganui, 25 February 1960, MA 1, 36/26/10, ANZW.
non-political, non-this, non-that body. Widespread acceptance of the principle that differences be set aside for the good of the league’s work had little if any impact on branch autonomy. As Letty Brown recalled, the choices of individual branches are what shaped their work. For some branches the league was a means of encouraging social activities, or focussed on the home craft aspect of the work. Others, such as the Te Atatu branch, chose to focus on pre-school and primary school education for Maori children. The local attention to local concerns was further illustrated in the breadth of local or domestic matters raised at annual conferences. Individual branches sought national support for their particular communities in a range of projects from the establishment of school bus services to marae-building projects and representation on local hospital boards.

The newly adopted constitution, and the inaugural conference that surrounded it, set up the main planks of the league’s platform. It was in many respects a conservative constitution. It had been written by officers of the department, and aligned the league’s work with government views on family, motherhood and being Maori. Several of its aims and objectives were strikingly similar, almost word for word in some cases, to those of the Health League. But the conservatism of the league’s constitution did not accurately reflect either the league’s activities or its interests. Nor was the department’s influence an indication of ongoing harmony or even collaboration. The remits of the first conference show the league was a complex organisation which officials could always keep in line. There was, in fact, far more to the league than breastfeeding and flax weaving. In the years since that first conference, the league has taken both radical and conservative action, and challenged as well as collaborated with the Department of Maori Affairs.

The many remits debated at the inaugural conference covered a range of specific measures under the general headings of health, housing, education and alcohol. Two remits on the inclusion of Maori language, arts and literature in schools drew particular attention. The first advocated that the libraries of all schools (and not just Maori schools) attended by Maori children should include suitable books on Maori subjects. The league considered that Maori children who attended public schools were at a definite disadvantage because they lacked access to such material.

46 Brown interview, Tape 2 Side B.
47 Ibid., Tape 2 Side A.
48 See, for example: Remits, Dominion Conference Auckland, 1-3 April 1952, MA 1, 36/26/18 pt 1, ANZW.
and therefore tended to grow up in ignorance of their own people. The second remit made a case for the teaching of Maori in Maori schools and urged the Education Department to do whatever it could to address the difficulties caused by the lack of qualified teachers and reading materials. The women realised that it would be best for children to acquire a true knowledge of the Maori language by speaking it in the home. While it was clear to them that a full knowledge of English was essential in modern life they also felt that te reo had a place in schools. Even children who learned Maori in their homes tended to lose it because it was absent from the school curriculum. Jock McEwen responded to the matter of supplying Maori books on traditional history, arts, crafts, and language. McEwen was at the time an officer of the department, as well as secretary of the Maori Purposes Fund Board and assistant editor of the *Journal of the Polynesian Society*. He felt that Maori children did not read enough and that they should have books in their own homes. Unfortunately, according to McEwen, all worthwhile publications were out of print. He hoped the Maori Purposes Fund Board and the Polynesian Society would print more books, but the cost could be prohibitive. In the meantime, schools that had a fairly large attendance of Maori children had been sent a copy of Peter Buck’s *The Coming of the Maori.*

Showing its tenacity, the league did not let the matter rest there. Following the conference the two education remits were referred to the Minister of Education, and throughout the ensuing years remits on education were fine-tuned to recommend the incorporation of Maori arts and crafts into the training of teachers as well as Maori language as a compulsory subject. The various government officials who responded to the remits generally noted the provision of basic support for Maori language, arts and crafts in both schools and teachers’ training colleges. However it was impossible to endorse the suggestion that Maori language be made a compulsory subject, although those teacher trainees who participated in Maori clubs could be encouraged to study it. The league’s stance received something of a boost following the first meeting of the National Committee on Maori Education in 1955. The committee was established to bring Maori leaders together to discuss education at a

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49 Minutes of the Inaugural Conference of MWWL, 25-27 September 1951, MA 1, 36/26/18 pt 1, ANZW.
50 Minister of Education to Dominion Secretary, MWWL, 17 June 1952, MA 1 36/26/11 pt 1, ANZW; and MOMA to Secretary MWWL, 10 April 1959, MA 1 W2490, 36/26 pt 3, ANZW.
51 Minister of Education to Dominion Secretary, MWWL, 17 June 1952, MA 1 36/26/11 pt 1, ANZW.
national level. It passed a resolution that acknowledged that the teaching of Maori culture was necessary for the full development of the Maori. It supported the teaching of Maori language and recommended everything possible be done to implement it. Four years after that resolution passed, the matter was still one of the league’s primary concerns, but little had changed in schools. Walter Nash, the Minister of Maori Affairs from 1957 to 1960, said Maori culture was part of ordinary class-room teaching at isolated Maori schools, and that it was really the (mainstream) Education Board schools that needed the most assistance. He put at least some of the responsibility for addressing the issue back on the league saying that amongst its membership there were qualified women who could give effective help where required.

Batting remits back and forth with the government was only one way in which the league expended its energy. Over the years it made a major contribution to the survival of the weaving arts among Maori women by supporting weaving workshops, and during a time when few, if any, government resources were applied to the task. Since the league’s inception, the teaching and preservation of te reo me ona tikanga has rarely, if ever, been off the agenda of Maori development, and history has recorded it as is one of the areas in which the so-called conservatism of the league ultimately bowed to the radicalism of the Maori protest movement that flourished in the 1970s and 80s. The apparent politics of flax-weaving illustrates what distinguished the league’s social and political activities from that of Pakeha women, the importance of continuing the cultural distinctiveness of Maori. Though the league shared a focus on the home with Pakeha women’s organisations, its ideas about womanhood were always prefaced with ideas about Maorihood. Indeed, Whina’s speeches during her tour of branches in 1952 were described as making every individual more than ever conscious of his or her responsibility to family, community and race. The primacy of race in the league’s work is similarly identified as a feature of mid-twentieth-century African-American women’s organisations. Ethnic

52 Speech notes, MOMA, Maori Graduates Association, Rotorua, [embargoed to] 20 May 1967, MA 1, 1/1/64 pt 1, ANZW.
53 MOMA to Secretary MWWL, 10 April 1959, MA 1 W2490, 36/26 pt 3, ANZW.
54 For a fuller explanation see, for example, Walker, Ka Whawhai, pp.220-247; and Harris, Hikoi, pp.10-31, 44-51.
55 Comments of Meeting [sic] Addressed by Mrs Whina Cooper MA 1, 26/26/18 pt 2, c. September 1952, ANZW.
identity was a central component of Maori women’s politics not a substitute or barrier to the expression of the distinct politics of Maori womanhood.

In its formative years the league quickly established a presence throughout the country in both rural and urban situations. By the end of April 1954 there were at least 3,842 members in 303 branches under 64 district councils.57 Housing was probably the most consuming of the issues it tackled. The department’s housing programme included a mix of constructing and financing homes. It had been greatly expanded under Fraser, and reoriented towards urban centres whereas before the war it had been largely treated as ancillary to land development. The league was yet to be satisfied by any perceived improvements. The detailed lists of resolutions it sent to relevant ministers each year spurred the department to investigate in detail its performance in implementing housing policy. Nor was the league averse to undertaking hard work itself. Comprehensive housing remits seemed to critique every aspect of the department’s housing programme, from the design and planning of the houses on offer to the purchase of building supplies and the details of the mortgage repayments. The league wanted the department to step up the provision of rental and new housing to address the problem of overcrowding, and to provide homes for the elderly, invalids and widows. It urged the department to improve ablutions and water supplies at marae as well as in homes.58 It also put forward the view that houses ought to be built to suit families’ minimum accommodation requirements, rather than their financial positions. For instance, it was suggested that a family that needed a three-bedroom home but could only afford two bedrooms, ought to have a three-bedroom home built.59 The housing remits continued in this vein, and were often submitted more than ten at a time.

Government responses to the league’s housing remits tended to reiterate departmental policy and procedure in a rather bureaucratic manner. For example, on the matter of addressing overcrowding by stepping up the housing programme, Corbett said that the number of houses constructed was governed by the resources of competent Supervisory staff, labour and materials that are available. He explained that the department received a quota of completed houses to rent out. The quota was

57 Secretary to MOMA, 19 March 1954, MA 1 W2459, 1/1/41 pt 1, ANZW.
58 MOMA to Dominion President MWWL, 16 July 1952, MA 1, 30/1A pt 1, ANZW.
59 Dominion President MWWL to MOMA, 2 September 1952, MA 1, 30/1A pt 1, ANZW.
based on the proportion of registered "urgent" satisfactory Maori applications held in relation to European civilian applications. This approach ensured that Maori received equal treatment with that afforded Europeans. In the building of new houses, the department's policy was to prioritise the most deserving cases and arrange building on that basis. 

Explanations of policy such as this often left the league unsatisfied. In a lengthy letter responding to Corbett, Whina asked who determined whether a Maori application was either satisfactorily completed or urgent. She also inquired about the criteria for determining urgency. She cleverly suggested that the questions she raised could answer themselves if a committee that included league and tribal executive representatives was formed to set building priorities. While challenging Corbett, Whina also made sure to acknowledge that the league accepted much of what Corbett had to say and appreciated the difficulties of the housing position. In a nice re-packaging of the department's own rhetoric, she assured Corbett that the many queries she raised were not in any other spirit but that of the desire to help our Maori people and those charged with the duty of assisting them.

In the convoluted process of conferencing then submitting written remits which were further debated by letter, some specific challenges were placed before the league. Corbett, for example, intimated that there was an apparent lack of interest by people in the lower income groups in need of housing alleviation. He felt the league could assist by ensuring that those who were eligible lodged the appropriate applications. He also said that some Maori could afford to contract private builders to ease the demand for the builders the department employed; a mortgage from the department could still be made available. In later correspondence he stressed the importance of saving for a house, instead of putting all other things first like clothes and pleasure. Corbett's intimations were gentle hints compared to the more direct approach Ropiha took at the league's annual conference in 1952. Ropiha agreed with Corbett that those in most need of state rental housing simply did not apply; estimating that probably no more than a third of eligible Maori applicants in Auckland had applied. He put it to the women at the 1952 conference that perhaps they were prone to more talk than action and that they ought to be more specific when putting

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60 MOMA to Dominion President MWWL, 16 July 1952, MA 1, 30/1A pt 1, ANZW.
61 Dominion President MWWL to MOMA, 2 September 1952, MA 1, 30/1A pt 1, ANZW.
62 MOMA to Dominion President MWWL, 16 July 1952, MA 1, 30/1A pt 1, ANZW.
63 MOMA to Dominion President MWWL, 19 January 1953, MA 1, 30/1A pt 1, ANZW.
their arguments to the department. Ropiha’s words spurred the league’s Waitemata District Council to produce what was the centrepiece of the league’s many early projects – a detailed survey of Maori people’s housing needs in the Auckland area.

The survey covered a total population of 2445 men, women and children in 551 families including 32 Pacific Island families (167 people). The largest families surveyed had fourteen members, although the vast majority of families (about 90 per cent) had seven members or fewer. In the process, the league assisted in the completion and collection of 551 applications for state rental housing. A final report on the survey was completed within four months of the 1952 conference and sent to Corbett. It was a phenomenal effort, unequivocally supported by Whina. During her first year as president, Whina relocated from Panguru in the Hokianga to Grey Lynn, Auckland, a move which seems to have been linked to the priority given to the survey, and the league’s focus on housing and the needs of urban Maori. The fact that so many of the people in need of housing were from the Taitokerau iwi to which Whina affiliated may have also bolstered her support. Undertaken at great personal inconvenience, the survey required weeks of painstaking, hard work during which members of the league conducted a systematic house-to-house survey of Auckland City and outlying areas such as Pukekohe.

The survey meticulously recorded the iwi, number, ages, and relationships of the occupants of individual homes; their household income; the number of rooms they occupied; and the nature of their living conditions. The findings were startling. Amongst the worst cases were a family of nine living in a condemned property in Auckland’s inner-city suburb of Newton with seven children sleeping in one room; a husband, pregnant wife and young son who spent two-thirds of their weekly income of £12 on a single bedroom; a couple and their daughter who shared a room just big enough to hold a single bed into which water from the toilet seeped; a family of seven that ate, slept, washed and bathed in one cold, damp room with windows that did not open, and shared a toilet with ten others; another family of four adults and four children who slept in one room in a condemned house, one side of which the owner had already dismantled; and families that worked on market gardens and lived on the

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64 Report on Maori Housing Survey by the Waitemata District Council, MWWL, 10 August 1952, MA 1, 30/1A pt 1, ANZW.
65 Ibid.
properties in small huts unable to withstand wet weather. This dismal picture continued survey card after survey card.

The department was well aware of the kinds of problems the survey documented. Less wide-ranging investigations in 1934 and 1937 had noted the sub-standard living conditions of Maori resident in Auckland. By 1947 extensive over-crowding was a definite concern. In one example, six families comprising twelve adults and seven children shared four bedrooms and a kitchen. Although Auckland needed Maori labour, and Maori could find employment relatively easily, they had great difficulty securing accommodation. It appeared easiest for Maori to find a place to live in the inner city, though mainly in decadent areas in sub-standard premises and dwellings in a structural state of deterioration, also in vacant shops etc. By 1952 little had changed. Although the Maori population within Auckland was mobile, Maori continued to occupy a large number of condemned houses, and landlords charged exorbitant rents for accommodation that was squalid it was unfit for human habitation. Confessing themselves shocked by the findings, Huia Te Tai and Ruiha Bell, president and secretary respectively of the Waitemata District Council who signed off on the report on the survey said it painted a conservative picture because the research was constrained by the need to balance urgency with accuracy, and because housing conditions were ever changing.

The league hoped their research would lend some weight to the arguments expressed in the raft of housing remits they had submitted to government. In the short term they wanted more state rental houses to be set aside for Maori in the Auckland area, a move justified by the high proportion of needy cases that the survey revealed. In the long term, the women hoped the government would expand its housing programme by building more houses. Their research indicated that the majority of Maori in Auckland could afford to buy homes under the department’s scheme. They found further evidence the building programme needed to be expanded in the widespread complaint that people had paid mortgage instalments over a long period yet were still waiting to have their houses built.

In a covering letter sent with the survey results to Corbett, Whina carefully analysed the findings and expressed support for greater efforts to house Maori. She

66 Survey cards, June-August, 1952, MA 1, 30/1A pt 1, ANZW.
67 Chief Sanitary Inspector to Town Clerk, 31 October 1947, MA 1, 36/26/18 pt 2, ANZW.
68 Report on Maori Housing Survey by the Waitemata District Council, MWWL, 10 August 1952, MA 1, 30/1A pt 1, ANZW.
reiterated the view also shared by Te Tai and Bell that the project was motivated by a desire to improve Maori living conditions; ō do anything that would be the means of alleviating the distressful and totally inadequate housing accommodation of Maoris in Auckland. She indicated that the league had particular views on the issue but left the door open for the department to offer advice and guidance. She wrote:

[The] Dominion Executive appreciates that it sees the Maori housing problem in Auckland from substantially the League’s own viewpoint, but [it] appreciates also the matters of income, finance, land, labour and materials are governing factors, which as an organisation it cannot command. Therefore ē it is to you that we look for advice, direction and help on these highly technical matters.⁶⁹

Though existing histories credit the league’s survey with a stepping up of not only the department’s housing programme but also that of the State Advances Corporation, it was not a matter of simply sending the survey results, accompanied by a few sharp words from Whina, to the minister.⁷⁰ In fact, despite its robustness and potential as a planning tool, the survey did little to short-circuit the drawn-out process of composing, discussing and negotiating the remits submitted after each annual conference. Corbett and his department maintained the established strategy of replying to the league with exacting narrations of policy details. Corbett was careful in his correspondence to acknowledge the league’s contributions and the great deal of thought given to the representations it put forward. Yet, the main reason he supplied such thorough information was so the league could communicate the department’s policy to its members, not because he saw the policy as evolving in response to their input. Corbett wrote: ē hope the information supplied ē will help to render [the league’s] co-operation even more valuable by increasing [its] members understanding of the policy on which the Department is working and the difficulties it is endeavouring to surmount.⁷¹

Whina’s assurances that the league was merely doing its job of improving the welfare of Maori people by lobbying the department to expand its efforts pressed up against Corbett’s urging of the league to manage people’s expectations by ensuring they properly understood the policy. It was a significant but gentle tension, although

⁶⁹ Dominion President MWWL to MOMA, 27 August 1952, MA 1, 30/1A pt 1, ANZW.
⁷⁰ For example, King, Whina, p.177; and Walker, Ka Whawhai, p.203.
⁷¹ MOMA to Dominion President MWWL 19 January 1953, MA 1, 30/1A pt 1, ANZW.
dogged by a few terse moments in the wings. Corbett pressed the point that poor savings practices and a tendency to spend an undue proportion of income on entertainment or pleasure was part of the problem. He said the argument that it was impossible to save in these times was not sound and pointed to the incentives available through the department in the form of deposit accounts, standard plan services, general advisory and supervisory service, generous lending terms... construction at cost [and] a small administration charge. Corbett advised the league that all interested organizations presumably including the league, ought to encourage young men and women to save and think of the home he may want even though he may not want it for years hence. Whina, though, hinted that the primary object ought to be to get Maori into their own homes as quickly as possible. She argued from experience that Maori in their own homes were better at paying their mortgages than Maori who wished for their own homes were at saving for a deposit.72

A similar difference of opinion occurred on the subject of rental housing. The league expected the department to use the housing survey to make a case to designate a higher proportion of state rental houses for Maori. It was obvious to the league that some families were prevented from accessing the department’s home ownership facilities by their low incomes and limited employment prospects. In the league’s view, those families were definite candidates for state rental housing. If they could eventually purchase the accommodation they rented their housing situation would be nicely resolved.73 A year on from the survey, the league submitted a remit to Corbett proposing that the department institute its own rental housing scheme similar to that in operation by the State Advances Corporation. Corbett argued the remit had received full consideration. He conceded not all Maori could afford to own their own homes, and therefore had to consider rental housing. However, extensive provision for state rental housing already existed and parallel measures for Maori would be both unjustifiable and uneconomical (because they would draw on resources best applied to home ownership). In time-honoured fashion Corbett buttressed his argument by explaining the specifics of rental housing policy.74 The league persisted and at its 1953 conference not only retained the remit, but made it a policy of the league. Further, the league told Corbett more consideration was required, and on that

72 Dominion President MWWL to MOMA, 27 August 1952, MA 1, 30/1A pt 1, ANZW.
73 Ibid., and Report on Maori Housing Survey by the Waitemata District Council, MWWL, 10 August 1952, MA 1, 30/1A pt 1, ANZW.
74 MOMA to Dominion Vice President MWWL, October 1953, MA 1, 30/1A pt 1, ANZW.
basis introduced a further remit which asked the government to provide rental housing in rural areas for those who could not afford to purchase. Corbett made his desire to end the matter clear following the league's 1955 conference. It was plain to him that home ownership was the best solution to Maori housing problems and ruled out the possibility of establishing a rental scheme for a particular group of citizens. Maori who desired rental housing had to participate in the general rental housing scheme, and the league would best serve both the department and the people by assisting Maori to understand and make use of the available opportunities for home ownership. In addition, the league ought to encourage those who were eligible for state rental housing to apply.

It seemed that Corbett's details about the particulars of policy encouraged the league to further particularise its remits, which further protracted the debates. For example, the suggestion that the department establish building priority committees on which the league ought to be represented first proposed in 1952 was still being debated three years later. In fact, the department already had a priority committee in each of its districts. Each committee consisted of the district officer; the housing officer, the district building supervisor, the district welfare officer and the district field officer. At regular intervals, the housing officer supplied the welfare officer with a list of the cases in which building was ready to proceed. The welfare officer then consulted with the tribal executives who could recommend which cases ought to be prioritised. Although the tribal executives were not directly represented on the priority committee, Corbett told the league the tribal executive played a prominent part in determining the priority for construction. He also agreed to include tribal executive chairpersons on the committee, provided attendance was at the executive's expense, though his personal view was that the time, travelling and expense involved in relation to the benefit resulting would generally make the proposal impracticable.

The league dismissed Corbett's response as of no consequence because it said nothing about the league's representation. The department advised Corbett that his answer to the league was accurate and that changes to the existing arrangements were unnecessary. However, Corbett's tenacity equalled the league's. He recorded his

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75 Dominion Secretary MWWL to MOMA, 15 June 1954, MA 1, 30/1A pt 1, ANZW.
76 MOMA to Dominion Secretary MWWL, 7 October 1955, MA 1, 30/1A pt 2, ANZW.
77 MOMA to Vice President MWWL, 6 October 1953, MA1, 30/1A pt 1, ANZW.
78 Dominion Secretary MWWL to MOMA, 15 June 1954, MA1, 30/1A pt 1, ANZW.
eagerness to give the league’s proposal fuller consideration and district officers throughout the country were canvassed for their views.79

Most of the district officers agreed that no very useful purpose would be served by having the league represented on the committee, and that the contact welfare officers had with the league and tribal executives was sufficient to ensure the priority committees were kept informed of their views.80 However, there were some nuances in the district officers opinions. B. E. Souter, district officer for the Auckland district, noted that no difficulties would arise from including representation from the league (or tribal executive), and that it might even assist in giving these bodies a better insight into the workings of the Department. League representatives would, of course, have to pay their own expenses.81 In the Gisborne district, since 1949, it had been standard practice to invite members of the league and tribal executives to submit cases which they thought warranted special consideration to the priority committee. V. Holst, the district officer at Gisborne, suggested that if the league was told the practice was to be made established departmental procedure, its criticism would be satisfied.82 The assistant district officer at Rotorua had a different view again, and attempted to define a role for the league by reference to the 1945 act. In his view, the best way the league could help would be to advise the district welfare officer, ascertain the facts about the families concerned and help them to complete their housing applications. This kind of responsibility was what the 1945 act envisaged for Maori Local Government (which is how he described tribal committees and executives and branches of the league collectively). He continued with a less than subtle reminder that the league’s role was in and around erected homes already erected, rather than contributing to housing policy more generally:

Another way the Maori Local Government could favourably assist the Department is in the matter of educating some of the more backward families in the proper care and attention to the homes once they are erected. If the communal effort can be used to bring about a greater pride in home ownership, the creating of nice tidy outside surroundings and a realisation of the responsibilities involved in keeping up payments, much time of Civil Servants can be saved and this time saved can be devoted to other essential

79 Head Office to District Officers, 19 July 1954, MA1, 30/1A pt 1 ANZW.
80 For example, District Officer Wellington to Head Office, 28 July 1954; District Officer Wanganui, to Head Office, 30 July 1954; and District Officer Auckland to Secretary, 26 July 1954, MA1, 30/1A pt 1, ANZW.
81 District Officer Auckland to Secretary, 26 July 1954, MA1, 30/1A pt 1, ANZW.
82 District Officer Gisborne to Secretary, 27 July 1954, MA1, 30/1A pt 1, ANZW.
work in the programme of Maori Housing.\textsuperscript{83}

The league felt Corbett and his department presented some sound arguments, but maintained that its representation on priority committees would assist both the department and the people. In making its case, the league echoed the department’s own view, pointing out that it could help to prioritise needy cases using insights from their collective experience as homemakers and mothers. Furthermore, they argued there was a policy dimension to their role. If members of the league became more knowledgeable about housing policy and the workings of the department they could then facilitate co-operation with the department, and promote and interpret housing policy to the people.\textsuperscript{84} Eventually, Corbett met the league half way. League representation never became fixed policy, but Corbett said there would be no objection to a representative of the league attending committee meetings. He warned, though, that the priority committees ought to be safeguarded against becoming unwieldy and thus losing efficiency\textsuperscript{85} and reiterated that efficiency required close communication with the department’s welfare officers.

The debates outlined so far represent but a small proportion of the enormous workload the league shouldered in relation to the housing issue. Still the patterns of intricate and protracted interactions between the league and Corbett and the department seem consistent with the overall tone of the numerous files. Corbett was absolutely clear that promoting a spirit of individual home-ownership was fundamental to the government’s housing policy.\textsuperscript{86} The league was equally clear that the housing problem could not be met within the existing framework of government policy.\textsuperscript{87} The simple opposition between the two views belied the complex and contradictory negotiations that took place in the gulf between them. The league framed its demands aware of the limits of the department’s capacities. It wanted an effective working relationship with the department, and also wanted to challenge it. The department offered a Maori-only home ownership programme\textsuperscript{88} amongst numerous other services\textsuperscript{89} but refused to establish a parallel rental housing

\textsuperscript{83} Assistant District Officer Rotorua to Secretary, 5 August 1954, MA 1, 30/1A pt 1, ANZW.
\textsuperscript{84} Ministerial, extract from MWWL conference resolutions of 30 June 1955, MA 1, 30/1A, pt 2, ANZW.
\textsuperscript{85} MOMA to Dominion Secretary MWWL, 7 October 1955, MA 1, 30/1A pt 2, ANZW.
\textsuperscript{86} MOMA to Dominion Vice President MWWL, October 1953, MA 1, 30/1A pt 1, ANZW.
\textsuperscript{87} Report on Maori Housing Survey by the Waitemata District Council MWWL, 10 August 1952, MA 1, 30/1A pt 1, ANZW.
\textsuperscript{88} District Officer Rotorua to Secretary, 5 August 1954, MA 1, 30/1A pt 1, ANZW.
\textsuperscript{89} Assistant District Officer Rotorua to Secretary, 5 August 1954, MA 1, 30/1A pt 1, ANZW.
programme. The league was prepared to co-operate by offering suggestions of ways and means to overcome the [housing] problem. The department urged the league to stick to its taniko, or at least to the business of devoting care and attention to homes and families. The department was driven by an agenda that aimed to put Maori families in homes they owned individually (preferably in urban centres where employment was readily available). The league was driven by the stark realities of the sub-standard conditions it saw in Maori homes, and by a belief that home in its physical and symbolic manifestations was the key to Maori well-being.

The two organisations were really negotiating their roles and relationship. Added to the tension was the administrative relationship between the league and the Welfare Division. There was a shared goal that the league would eventually become administratively independent of the department, but when and how that would occur proved difficult to negotiate. Some branches expressed animosity towards particular welfare officers and Departmental interference. Others acknowledged accusations that the welfare officers used the league to do their work, but continued to regard them as key influences within communities. Ropiha said the department liberally supported the league by assuming the major responsibility for it. As early as 1953 he urged Whina to discuss the objective of complete autonomy at the next annual conference. Whina argued that it had been intended all along that the league be integral to the female welfare officers' work, ultimately to facilitate the department. Therefore attempts to sever the league from its relationship with the department had to be approached with care. While grateful for the department's assistance, Whina viewed it as an entitlement because the league's work was fundamental to all phases of Maori life.

The central negotiations over roles and relationship, often characterised by battles over the particulars and apparent inflexibility of policy, were infused with a significant set of less obvious elements, including the lurking spectre of racial discrimination. Racial discrimination, and its associate the racialisation of housing problems, were implicit in the exchanges between the department and the league.

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88 Ibid.
89 Writer unidentified, Christchurch, to Public Service Commission, 21 May 1955, MA 1 W2490, 36/26 pt 1, ANZW.
90 Brown interview, Tape 2 Side A.
91 Ropiha to Cooper, 8 June 1953, MA 1 W2490, 36/26 pt 1, ANZW.
92 Cooper to Ropiha, 3 August 1953, MA 1 W2490, 36/26 pt 1, ANZW.
already discussed. For example, when it conducted its 1952 housing survey, the league included families whose income was above the department’s maximum threshold for loan eligibility. The league’s rationale for doing so was that a high income did not overcome the racial discrimination that builders and landlords undoubtedly exercised against Maori people. It cited advertisements for ‘Europeans only’ commonly published in the press as evidence of its claim. The league found Pakeha landlords were reluctant to admit to having Maori tenants and concluded that the ‘generous rent’ collected was being protected by their evasions. Furthermore, rehousing tenants in over-priced accommodation did not seem a good solution; these landlords would in all likelihood ‘let to similar tenants’ Discriminatory practices in Pukekohe attracted specific attention. The poor housing conditions there were related to the employment of Maori on market gardens; the shacks Maori workers lived in were provided by their employers. The league was of the opinion that if alternative housing was available Maori gardeners would seek alternative employment. ‘Market garden housing’ was regarded as the cause of racial tensions at Pukekohe, once described as ‘New Zealand’s Little Rock’ due to its apparent support for racial segregation. A perception that working in a market garden equated to poor hygiene restricted Maori to the cheapest seats at the local cinema, and expressly prohibited them from the ‘dress circle’ Furthermore, Pakeha parents and teachers successfully lobbied to have a new Maori school opened, even though under existing policy Maori children ought to have attended the local Education Board school. The league said that whatever the reason for the separation, ‘Maoris see it as racial discrimination and Maori perceptions mattered. It did not want to ‘over- emphasise or dramatise the occurrence of racial discrimination, but ‘unfortunately, it must be recognised because it does exist’

While no one from the department, including Corbett, responded directly to the league’s assertions of racial discrimination and racial rack-renting at least one departmental official indicated a level of agreement by writing by noting in the margins of the survey report:

‘Their money is as good as yours.’ Actually it is better (or bigger, anyway).

95 Report on Maori Housing Survey by the Waitemata District Council MWWL, 10 August 1952, MA 1, 30/1A pt 1, ANZW.
What Pakeha would pay Ī or be asked to pay Ī the £5 paid by Wi Hemi?96

For Maori, the experiences and understandings of racial discrimination were part of a package of ideas about race including their perception of Pakeha attitudes about Maori, and Maori attitudes about Pakeha. Government officials had long held the view that Maori exhibited a preference for living ḍ in close proximity ṯ to each other, going so far as to gradually occupy whole ḍ apartment houses ṯ to the ṯ exclusion of Pakeha.97 The league inverted the situation. Its housing survey did not document a desire amongst Maori to live together, but a fear of having to live in an ḍ all-pakeha community ᵢ. For some families, tolerating sub-standard living conditions was preferable to the risk of being sent to live amongst Pakeha as a result of applying for state rental housing. A preference for being Maori together was enmeshed with an aversion to being a Maori minority and outsider in a Pakeha world. Comments from Maori about Pakeha slipped into the league ṫ correspondence and oral histories. So, for example, alongside an expressed dislike for being outnumbered by Pakeha, Maori who participated in the league ṫ housing survey gave a lack of ḍ Pakeha ᴋ now ᵬ ᶻ as a reason for putting off applying for a state home. Similarly, some ten years later in Te Atatu, Maori women said they did not attend the local play centre with their children because there were ḍ oo many Pakehas ᵬ They did not like the experience of being ᵬ surrounded ṯ by Pakeha.98 These kinds of comments came easily, yet often without explanation, probably due to a sense they were implicitly understood when expressed in Maori circles. Maori shared the same attitudes and etiquette around the most basic elements of social interaction like food, and meeting and greeting. They did not have to explain themselves to each other or feel uncomfortable about being ᵬ different ᵬ The league saw this situation not as something to be discouraged, but as reason for implementing the ᵬ special measures ᵬ for which it asked.99

Policy makers, however, were more inclined to problematise the Maori attitude and propose assimilation as the solution. Thus, the concept of pepper-potting introduced in the wake of the Hunn report (see chapter five) had been foreshadowed

96 Handwritten note, indecipherable initials, dated 26 September 1952, on Report on Maori Housing Survey by the Waitemata District Council MWWL, 10 August 1952, MA 1, 30/1A pt 1, ANZW. Wi Hemi was one of the tenants living in over-priced sub-standard conditions identified in the survey.
97 Chief Sanitary Inspector to Town Clerk, 31 October 1947, MA 1, 36/26/18 pt 2, ANZW.
98 Letty Brown, Tape 1 Side A.
99 Report on Maori Housing Survey by the Waitemata District Council, MWWL, 10 August 1952, MA 1, 30/1A pt 1, ANZW.
as early as 1947:

Maori families living in single units and interspersed with Europeans have a standard of living and hygiene equal to the latter, but where they are living in close proximity to one another or in congested conditions in apartment and rooming houses, the standard of living and hygiene is on a lower plane.\(^{100}\)

Overall, pepper-potting would not necessarily prevent Maori from seeking each other out to share their differences together, as chapter six will show.

Urban Maori housing received most attention, but similar issues were raised regarding rural housing. The league found that in the 1950s departmental practice tended to inhibit the building of new homes in rural Maori communities. In 1954, the league's Aupouri District Council complained that the department was refusing housing applications from people living in Te Hapua on account of the distance from Kaitaia, the nearest urban centre.\(^{101}\) The league identified a similar situation in Pipiriki in the Wanganui district in 1958. Although the department said it wanted to improve Maori people's housing conditions, it only wanted to provide mortgages to those who were able to meet the regular costs of home ownership through regular incomes, which were primarily available in urban centres and not isolated settlements like Te Hapua and Pipiriki. The league felt the department ought to assist in sectioning off Maori land for residential purposes, thus enabling the Maori race to retain its own Turangawaewae whenever that is possible without undue emphasis on the economic factor.\(^{101}\) It stressed that Te Hapua and Pipiriki were each ancestral homes to their residents. Te Hapua residents were well served by their local school at which their children reached a high standard of education and were further bound to Te Hapua by their recently completed Ratana church. Nash said he understood the reluctance of people to leave their ancestral dwelling-place and that he had seen for himself the need for better housing in Pipiriki. However, employment opportunities in rural Maori communities were severely limited, and any mortgagor had to be assured that any mortgagee would earn enough to service their loan, especially when public money was involved. Rural Maori could only expect a reasonable prospect of housing assistance if they could prove they were permanently able to meet the

\(^{100}\) Chief Sanitary Inspector to Town Clerk, 31 October 1947, MA 1, 36/26/18 pt 2, ANZW.
\(^{101}\) Dominion Secretary MWWL to MOMA, 15 June 1954, MA 1, 30/1A pt 1, ANZW.
likely mortgage costs.\textsuperscript{102}

These particular interactions show that, in the department’s interpretation, integration required the relocation of Maori from rural to urban areas, plus the prevention of Maori living together once relocated. Yet for Maori, the inverse was desirable. Many were reluctant to relocate from their tribal homelands, and those that did relocate were reluctant to live too distant from each other. The league viewed a desire to stay together, whether in a rural or urban context, as legitimate and wanted the government to address it, hence its suggestions for Maori housing. The department regarded the preference to be together as almost totally undesirable and repeatedly presented integration as the best way forward. One of the perceived problems was the illusion of separatism—the sworn enemy of integration created by the misunderstanding of some Maori aspirations. In reality, any resulting separatism was probably inadvertent. Recreating home on the unfamiliar urban landscape included recreating enclaves of predominantly Maori populations. Maori resisted living amongst Pakeha because they wanted to live amongst Maori, with the familiar, with those things from home that transferred easily to the city. They probably also preferred to avoid being on the receiving end of racial discrimination.

The focus on housing in this chapter has been used as a vehicle to progress the ideas introduced in chapter three about the complexity of relations between representative organisations such as the league and the department. Interactions between the league and the department are emblematic of the difficulties of negotiating a working relationship that could be effective and co-operative given the underlying differences in philosophy. The department’s stand allowed for persistence of Maori distinctiveness, but did not prioritise or materially support it. The league’s philosophy prioritised the perpetuation of distinct Maori values and Maori communities while allowing for integration, which set it apart from other women’s organisations by encompassing its focus on home and family within the broader goals of Maori autonomy. The department could not support any programme that looked like special treatment for Maori, while the league took the view that despite problems being shared by Maori and Pakeha, some applied much more to Maoris than Europeans. The kinds of situations that would anger the next generation, like discriminatory

\textsuperscript{102} MOMA to Dominion Secretary, 10 April 1959, MA 1 W2490, 36/26 pt 3, ANZW.
practices in the provision of accommodation, began to surface. In the meantime, the rising tensions between the department and Maori organisations would be further tested by the release of the Hunn report, discussed in the next chapter.
In 1961 the *Report on Department of Maori Affairs* was published, its bland title revealing nothing of the fame, or infamy, it would soon receive. Known as the Hunn report, after its author Jack Kent Hunn, it was to become the single most important mid-twentieth-century document on Maori relations with the New Zealand state. It provided a comprehensive and up-to-date exposition of the social and economic circumstances of the Maori people in relation to Maori policy. In doing so, it declared integration ‘the obvious trend and also the conventional expression of policy’. For the first time an official explanation of the meaning of integration as it related to Maori policy and the operation of the Department of Maori Affairs was put forward. On the surface, with its emphasis on integration, Hunn’s report might be regarded as a thorough re-statement of existing policy and not a significant departure from or development of it. Indeed, preceding chapters have shown how its main thrust – integration – had clearly underpinned Maori policy throughout the 1950s and before. However, the Hunn report advocated harder, faster integration, and heralded a new push for mainstreaming. If successfully pursued, integration would reduce the need for a government agency specifically designed for Maori needs. The Department of Maori Affairs could instead become a small co-ordinating agency with a watching brief over the other departments gradually taking over Maori Affairs’ existing functions.

Though the 1950s and 60s remain relatively under-researched in New Zealand history, mentioning the Hunn report is practically compulsory when the narrating history of the past 50 years. Yet, historical analyses are arguably narrow, and apart from some recent publications and unpublished research reports framed by the parameters of Waitangi Tribunal-driven history, few scholars have returned to the report and responses to it. The report remains well known, but under-read. It has become a cliché, a by-word for 1950s and 60s governmental short-sightedness without being properly contextualised. This chapter considers in some detail the finer

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1 Hunn Report.
points of the report, and support for and opposition against it. The report essentially advocated hastening the implementation of existing policy and in that advocacy lay many of the reasons for its later infamy. But, what has been seldom appreciated is that while an intensification of the pace and scope of integration might require the introduction of new approaches and procedures, it did not necessarily entail the formation of new policy per se. What was important about Hunn’s approach was the extent to which it constituted the Department of Maori Affairs taking a major step away from the Maori world. That step was associated with a growing impatience with Maori community approaches to policy implementation, and a new, inexperienced, and largely Pakeha team of administrators at the helm of Maori Affairs.

Hunn’s core goal was both optimistic and paradoxical. He hoped to completely integrate Maori into modern, urban New Zealand partly by accelerating integration at every opportunity, and partly by eradicating the elements of Maori tribal life deemed inconsistent with it even though. But, by definition and in contrast with assimilation, integration implied some continuation of Maori culture. Lauded in some quarters, denigrated in others, many of Hunn’s proposals were implemented throughout the 1960s. As will be shown in the next chapter, the net result for Maori was that the families and communities who had entered into relationships with Maori Affairs were left to work with departments that did not have the experience (nor sometimes the inclination) to work with Maori in the same way Maori Affairs had. In effect, mainstreaming institutionalised integration and made it compulsory, often marginalising the important creative energies that Maori contributed to the development and practical implementation of Maori policy, such as those exhibited by the Maori Women’s Welfare League and the tribal committees in earlier chapters.

The Hunn report had been initiated by Walter Nash, the Prime Minister and Minister of Maori Affairs in the Labour government, 1957-1960. It was usual practice in the 1950s to appoint a Public Service Commissioner as temporary head of any government department for which a review was required. It was in that capacity that Hunn was appointed Acting Secretary of Maori Affairs in January 1960, charged with providing Nash with an ‘accounting of Maori assets and making suggestions for how Maori assets might be used for the good of the Maori people as a whole’. Nash had been prompted to commission the review, according to Butterworth, as a result of a university study which had questioned the purpose of the department and its long-
term future. Nash’s main concern was with the fragmentation of Maori land titles, which was popularly viewed as the key factor impeding the economic use of Maori land. However, Hunn regarded Nash’s approach as limited by a disinclination to \textit{philosophise} about urban drift and the future of the Maori away from his natural habitat.\footnote{Butterworth, \textit{Maori Affairs}, p.100.} Of his own volition, Hunn expanded his brief by interpreting \textit{Maori assets} very broadly to include \textit{the human as well as material resources of the race} and decided the review required him to \textit{look at Maori affairs from every angle}.\footnote{Jack Kent Hunn, \textit{Not Only Affairs of State: an autobiography by Jack Kent Hunn}, Palmerston North, 1982, p.136.} Hunn had a distinguished public service career, including considerable prior experience with departmental and other public service reviews. He had little experience, however, working with Maori. His \textit{accounting} of Maori assets took some eight months to complete, and he relied on the co-operation of district officers throughout the country and drew on the services of eighteen researchers (including members from other departments) who were divided into nine working parties. He instructed the research teams to examine not just \textit{what} the department was doing for the Maori people, but also to determine \textit{the rate} or tempo at which it [was] being done in relation to the dynamic growth of the Maori population.\footnote{Hunn Report, p.13.} Nash’s focus on Maori land titles and farming was soon overshadowed by Hunn’s desire for an \textit{accurate measure} of whether the department was \textit{gaining or losing ground} in [its] work for the Maori people.\footnote{Acting Secretary, \textit{Survey of Maori Affairs Working Parties Brief}, 20 January 1960, AAMK 869/8a, ANZW.}

The resulting report analysed past and current trends, and assessed future needs, under the headings of: population, land settlement, land titles, housing, education, employment, health, legal differentiation and crime. It was supported by a detailed statistical supplement containing the research data compiled by the working parties, which pointed to some worrying social and economic disparities between Maori and Pakeha. Hunn commented briefly on the department’s general responsibilities, but deferred detailed discussion of administrative arrangements until the department’s future work programme had been determined.\footnote{Acting Secretary to District Officer, Whangarei, 22 January 1960, AAMK 869/8a, ANZW.} The report arrived at more than 80 \textit{conclusions} which Hunn presented as \textit{a basis for discussion}.\footnote{Acting Secretary to MOMA, 18 August 1960, AAMK 869/8a, ANZW.}
than ōfirm recommendationsō. Mostly, though, readers and commentators regarded ōHunnō conclusions as recommendations and core principles for progressing Maori policy.  

Central to Hunnō analysis were three trends for which he felt future policy should account: the ōexplosive growthō of the Maori population, a looming ōemployment problemō and the inevitability of urbanisation. Urbanisation, Hunn advised, should not be deplored, but rather ōwelcomed as the quickest and surest way of integrating the two species of New Zealandō. Rural Maori settlements could never accommodate the rapidly rising Maori population; that was clear. Relocating Maori to urban centres of employment offered a solution: sponges soaking up excess Maori labour and averting an unemployment crisis. Hunn advocated redoubling the departmentō activities in land development, housing and welfare, and placed particular emphasis on the intensification of housing and education services. Accelerating the departmentō work would ensure the tempo of policy kept in step with increases in the population while also equipping Maori to compete in the modern, urban labour market. Given the quickened pace, it was not unreasonable to expect that in another two generations Maori would be ōwell nigh fully integratedō. Moreover, if urbanisation was ōclosely watched and actively nurturedō it would be better positioned than ōrural segregation to prevent a ōcolourō problem from arisingō. Hunnō view was that ōpeople understand and appreciate one another better and mutually adjust themselves easier if living together as neighbours than if living apart in separate communitiesō. Integration, he advocated, could solve all manner of social ills.

Hunn and his teams of researchers used census figures and other government statistics to produce an authoritative snapshot of the Maori population. Further, shorthand references to the ōMaori situationō or ōMaori problemō had the arguably unintentional effect of problematising Maori, while at the same time presenting policymakers and government officials as the ōfixersō of Maori failure. The key demographic factors the report identified were: rapid increase in the number of Maori with a ōpreponderance of youthō, a concentration of Maori in the Auckland Province (72.5 percent) with very few (about four percent) living in the South and other islands; steady ōvacuationō of rural areas; and accelerating rates of urbanisation. There were

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9 Secretary to Secretary National Council of Churches, 18 July 1961, AAMK 869/8b, ANZW.
some problems with the demography, however. As Michael Belgrave and others explain, Hunn over-estimated population increases, and used a blood quantum of 50 percent to define Maori.\footnote{Belgrave et al., \textit{Crown Policy with Respect to Maori Land} pp.92-3.} Hunn reported that although Maori had recorded remarkable improvements in the twentieth century, their health status still lagged far behind that of Pakeha. Maori rates of infant mortality were more than twice those of Pakeha, and Maori life expectancy roughly ten years lower. Maori were significantly under-represented at university. They were disproportionately unemployed. When full employment was a central goal of economic policy, Maori unemployment was increasing while Pakeha unemployment decreased.\footnote{Hunn Report, p.28.} Maori dominated categories of employment like process work and labouring, but were barely noticeable amongst the ranks of professionals, technicians, managers, administrators, office workers and sales people. Though the percentage of Maori employed as farmers had decreased, workers in primary industry farmers, fishers, hunters and forestry workers still comprised more than a quarter of the Maori workforce. Amongst the most alarming statistical observations was the 'ordinately high incidence of law breaking by Maoris [sic]\footnote{Ibid., p.32.}

The rate of offending by Maori men was nearly three and a half times higher than the Pakeha rate, and had also risen by 50 percent between 1954 and 1958. Hunn noted that though Maori criminal activity was worst in Auckland, it could not be blamed on urbanisation alone. He offered other causative factors including: Maori 'unsecurity' in the modern urban world, poor housing, unemployment, living away from home or parents, 'bad company' and alcohol consumption. The Maori 'problem' as presented by the Hunn report, was multi-faceted, deeply rooted and in urgent need of the attention of policies that were equally as deeply rooted.

A large part of the report's attention was reserved for the discussion of housing and Maori land. Researchers revealed that an estimated 30 percent of Maori lived in 'grossly overcrowded conditions' mainly in the top half of the North Island, from the East Coast through the Bay of Plenty and Waikato and on to Taitokerau, including Auckland. Many of the houses were physically substandard. Less than half of Maori homes had hot water, and just half had any piped water. The Maori housing programme would have to be more than doubled if it was to keep abreast of the predicted increases in the Maori population, never mind remedy the existing shortfall
in standard housing. Difficulties regarding Maori land were well-known. Hunn calculated that over 500,000 acres of Maori land was ‘idle’ a problem that was exacerbated by its characteristic multiplicity of owners and fragmented titles. As with the housing programme, current farming efforts were inadequate. Hunn asserted that efforts in Maori farming and land title improvement would have to be doubled in order to ensure Maori land was farmed profitably and to prevent continuing deterioration of Maori land titles. He bravely came out in favour of incorporation to manage cumbersome Maori land titles.

The exhaustive list of conclusions included suggestions for a continuous Maori health campaign, pre-school facilities in Maori communities, targeted vocational guidance and apprenticeship training, the appointment of Maori counsellors, prison visitors, designated lawyers for Maori offenders, encouragement of community centres and youth clubs, a three-fold increase in funding for Maori housing over a six-year period, the provision of hostels and bachelor flats in the cities, a doubling of funding for land development, promotion of Maori education, and clarification of the roles of welfare officers. These practical proposals seemed palatable enough. However, Hunn’s take on integration – the cure-all, immutable centre of the whole of his report – would prove hard to swallow. Hunn tried to explain his philosophy of integration in inoffensive terms and set it apart from the less desirable policy outcomes of assimilation, symbiosis and segregation, but it was to become a bitter pill nonetheless.

In Hunn’s view, integration was an evolutionary process common to multi-ethnic societies all over the world; even assimilated societies had to pass through a phase of integration as a prerequisite of assimilation. It was quite possible, he wrote, that New Zealand could in the future emulate the British, for example, who had successfully assimilated the Celts, Britons, Hibernians, Danes, Anglo-Saxons [and] Normans into a single unified society. This was no minor matter. The full integration of Maori into the main stream of New Zealand life Hunn asserted, was becoming commonly recognised as the most important objective ahead of the country today. Within New Zealand, naturally occurring opportunities for integration were everywhere. Miscegenation was inexorably integrating, even assimilating Maori and Pakeha. Schools were the nursery of integration housing a strong force for it.

14 The 80 conclusions are summarized at the beginning of the Hunn Report, pp.5-12.
employment a means of ‘commingling the races in all ranks of society’ and the object of title reform to imitate European land titles. Furthermore, Hunn intended that integration apply not only to the social and cultural elements of Maori life but also to the administration of Maori affairs. He proposed closer formal liaison between the Department of Maori Affairs and the Departments of Education, Labour, Industries and Commerce, and Justice. He suggested that State Advances Corporation take over Maori Affairs mortgages, that the Ministry of Works take over part of the department’s building programme, and that welfare officers liaise with specialists from related departments like labour, housing and education.

The idea of integration was by no means new; one of the report’s critics proclaimed it a direct outcome of the policy stretching back to that decision made by Governor Gore-Brown, [sic] when he seized the land at Waitara (in 1860, and thus provoked the New Zealand wars). And while precedents for integration are easily traced back to the nineteenth century, Hunn brought a new fervour and twentieth-century nuances to its pursuit. Hunn not only advocated the maximising of opportunities to hasten integration but also the eradication of those elements of Maori life that were inconsistent with it. In education, he counted the historically significant Maori boarding schools like Te Aute College amongst those that continued to offer segregated education. He did not specifically advocate closure of those schools, but he did propose a more aggressive approach to the existing policy of mainstreaming Maori (formerly Native) schools into the public school system as a strategy for eliminating such segregation at the earliest inconvenience. In land administration Hunn hoped that urban Maori could give up the emotional attachments to minuscule interests in multiply-owned Maori land and instead come to consider their quarter-acre section in town as their modern turangawaewae. He made a case for purging the country’s statutes of legal differentiations between Maori and Pakeha, similar to cases made in the United States to justify termination policies and in Canada to axe the Department of Indian Affairs. Hunn went so far as to recommend the introduction of a blood quantum formula for determining who could count themselves as Maori. He said access to the privileges of special legislation ought to be made stricter and

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15 F. A. J. Caselberg to Hanan, 14 April 1961, AAMK 869/8b, ANZW.
16 For example, see: Peroff, Menominee Drums; Prucha, The Great Father, pp.1013-1086; and Dickason, Canada’s First Nations, pp.319-399.
more exclusive, and proposed the introduction of a universal "half-blood" formula to be followed by a raising of the threshold to "three-quarter-blood" before its final removal. Some moves toward integration were less brash, though just as concerted. Examples included the way Hunn measured the need for housing according to the number of Maori marriages, thus assuming that the Maori household would typically comprise a married couple with, or intending to have, children. He also judged Maori approaches to nominating farmers for land development schemes from an economic standpoint, implying a level of impatience with the perceived Maori preference for prioritising whakapapa over aptitude or experience as a qualifying factor. The push for eradicating difference was so strong that, even though the principle of maintaining the best of Maori culture was acknowledged, the Hunn report expressed indifference to the question of support for even the "chief relics of the Maori world — language, art, craft and the marae.

Hunn submitted his report to Nash in August 1960. He also sent it in confidence to district officers and judges of the Maori Land Court, and received a number of cautiously supportive responses. Judge Norman Smith congratulated Hunn on the sagacity of the report, and commented that a degree of flexibility ought to be applied to the implementation of its principles so that the "variety of circumstances which always arise in Maori matters could be handled with reasonableness and justice." Flexibility would also avert the usual "evil of recurring and early amendments" that hindered the interpretation and application of Maori statutes. Judge Ivor Pritchard was even more circumspect. He acknowledged Hunn’s recommendations deserved "careful consideration," but would go no further than to agree in principle with Hunn’s suggestion that the Maori Land Court be reviewed at intervals. By the end of September, Hunn had yet to receive a response from Nash, but remained confident and not too pessimistic that about the chances of making some headway.

Nash has been portrayed as failing to respond to Hunn’s report. Indeed, Hunn claimed that Nash gave the upcoming election as his reason for not having the time to study it. Certainly Nash made no formal comment on the report before National easily beat Labour at the polls in December. However, Nash must have read enough

17 Smith to Hunn, 31 August 1960, AAMK 869/8a, ANZW.
18 Pritchard to Hunn, 12 September 1960, AAMK 869/8a, ANZW.
19 Hunn, Affairs of State, p.139.
of the report to be able to regurgitate parts of it in October, during a debate on the Waitangi Day Bill. Nash borrowed Hunn’s observation that particular legislation gave ‘special privileges’ for the protection of Maori.20 Furthermore, Butterworth explained Nash’s apparent silence as an attempt to avoid the report becoming the subject of political attack during the election campaign.21 The cartoonist Gordon Minhinnick later depicted the Hunn report as having been deliberately buried by Labour, only to be discovered during National’s post-election ‘spring cleaning’.22

![Cartoon](image)

Above: Minhinnick’s ‘spring cleaning’ cartoon. A Mr Taylor from Treasury phoned the department on the day it appeared in the New Zealand Herald to congratulate Hunn on ‘achieving [the] eminence of furnishing subject matter for a Minhinnick cartoon’.23

Whatever the case, Hunn would not be deterred. He knew that if the department did not step up its activities ‘some pretty sizeable administrative problems would result.24 Furthermore, during the intervening months he had made the report ‘the subject of some administrative action’. Hunn was also keen to receive more feedback, and particularly felt that feedback from ‘responsible elements of the

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21 Butterworth, Maori Affairs, p.100.
22 New Zealand Herald, 18 January 1961, AAMK 869/8a, ANZW.
23 Note on file, New Zealand Herald, 18 January 1961, AAMK 869/8a, ANZW.
24 Hunn to A. E. Edwards, 28 September 1960, AAMK 869/8a, ANZW.
Maori people would assist in ensuring the best possible solutions were identified. The election returns had barely been counted when Hunn formally submitted his report for a second time, sending it this time to the newly appointed Minister of Maori Affairs, Ralph Hanan. Though a seasoned politician and Cabinet minister known for his humanity and ability, Hanan had no previous experience with Maori affairs. Indeed Hunn later claimed that with only slight exaggeration Hanan had joked that coming from Invercargill, he had never seen a Maori in his life. Hanan himself admitted that what he little he knew of Maori had come from a book he read as a youngster about the Maori Wars of the Nineteenth Century. Hanan has been remembered primarily for his role as Minister of Justice, but he was also an important Minister of Maori Affairs, holding the post until his death in 1970. The Hunn report was key to his handling of the portfolio.

Hunn told Hanan that the report would require not only the minister’s consideration, but perhaps, even the government’s. According to Hunn, Hanan totally agreed with the proposals laid out in the report and wanted it implemented quickly and safely. Hanan also wanted to release the report to the press. Hunn could see no reason against such a release, provided Hanan’s own introductory announcement left him detached enough not to be committed to the Report if it were strongly criticized. Hanan released the report in early 1961. It was a bold move, taken early in his ministry, but tempered by his heeding of Hunn’s advice. In his foreword, Hanan tactfully indicated broad, non-specific support for the report making the point that his brief time in office precluded him from detailing the government’s view of it. He highlighted the public’s need to know the facts of the Maori situation as the main reason for publishing the report, especially as its recommendations were of such far-reaching nature that they had a fundamental bearing on the well-being of the Maori people, the well-being of New Zealanders as a whole, and on race relations in New Zealand. Finally, Hanan held out hope that the report would meet with popular approval, particularly from Maori, who he promised to consult on major policy changes.

25 Hunn, Affairs of State, p.140.
26 Hanan, Speech at the Inaugural Meeting of the New Zealand Maori Council (NZMC), MA 1, 35/2/1 pt 1, ANZW. Though the book is not identified, it was presumably James Cowan, The New Zealand Wars: A History of the Maori Campaigns and the Pioneering Period, 2 vols, Wellington, 1922-3.
27 Hunn to Hanan, 12 December 1960, AAMK 869/8a, ANZW.
28 Hunn, notes of a session with MOMA, 10 January 1960, AAMK 869/8a, ANZW.
29 Hunn Report, p.3.
Despite the care taken in Hanan’s foreword, his words and actions in early 1961 indicated he tacitly approved of the central arguments of Hunn’s report, a point noted in early February by the Auckland Star.\(^3^0\) Also, Hanan’s Waitangi Oration delivered at the first official Waitangi Day commemoration further demonstrated his support. Without directly referring to Hunn, Hanan used his speech as a way of preparing the ground for upcoming debate about the report. He reiterated the perceived inevitability of Maori urbanisation and urged his audience to welcome, plan, and provide for a redistribution of Maori people in both the Maori interest and in the national interest. He summarised the disturbing signs and trends apparent in the disparities between Maori and Pakeha in health, housing, education, employment, crime and land development. The problems in these areas, Hanan implored, were urgent. If not checked, they could easily lead to a racial problem. They were the problems of all New Zealanders who all had to find and apply the remedies. The government was prepared to do its part: it would promote more education and vocational training for Maori, and take a more aggressive approach to Maori housing and land development. However, Maori and Pakeha would also have to play their part if the development of a divisive and unhealthy race consciousness was to be avoided. Hanan appealed particularly to Pakeha New Zealanders to give Maori a fair go and welcome Maori into their midst as they navigated the pitfalls of the city life to which they were compelled to adjust. He counselled, as Hunn had, integration but not assimilation:

We have a duty to see that there is a true merging of the two peoples, not a submerging of the minority people. This is an obligation to which, I affirm, we are committed by history and destiny. In a world torn by great differences between racial groups, New Zealand affords an example of the progressive blending of two races.\(^3^1\)

Perhaps to placate some Maori who had already spoken out against the report, Hanan closed his speech with an affirmation that he looked forward to consulting Maori leaders about the course and speed of the canoe on their great voyage into the future. He enthusiastically used the inaugural celebration of New Zealand’s National Day to dedicate Maori, Pakeha and the government to the clear objective of facilitating the

\(^3^0\) *Auckland Star*, 3 February 1961, AAMK869/8a, ANZW.
\(^3^1\) *Te Ao Hou*, 35, 1961, p.34.
advance of the Maori people as citizens of New Zealand so that two ways of life can become one\textsuperscript{32}.

The Government Printer produced 2,500 copies of the Hunn report, 1,000 of which were earmarked for distribution via the regular mailing list for parliamentary papers. The department bought 250 copies which it then sent as complimentary issues, on a selective basis, to those people and bodies who [could] advance worthwhile ideas and bring influence to bear in the solution of current problems\textsuperscript{33}. The remaining 1,250 copies were made available for purchase by the general public.

Requests for copies, often accompanied by words of congratulations, flooded in to the department from libraries, local authorities, government agencies, academics, church groups and a range of other individuals and organisations. The major newspapers including \textit{The New Zealand Herald, Auckland Star} and \textit{Evening Post}, and also \textit{Te Ao Hou} gave the report major coverage, dedicating sufficient space to summarise it in some detail. The \textit{New Zealand Herald} praised the report for grappling \textit{realistically} with complex Maori problems\textsuperscript{34} and suggested it might become \textit{the outline of a new Maori policy}\textsuperscript{34}.

The many who read and commented on the Hunn report in the months that followed found much to commend; after all, despite any shortcomings, it did promote the furtherance of Maori social and economic wellbeing. Nor could the apparently robust and \textit{impressive collection of facts and figures} that supported Hunn's core findings be easily refuted.\textsuperscript{35} But criticism was quick in coming too, especially regarding Hunn\textsuperscript{36}'s desire for a seemingly dogged pursuit of integration and urbanisation. Throughout 1961, debate about Hunn\textsuperscript{36} report permeated lengthy letters to Hunn and Hanan, newspaper editorials and articles, church newsletters, conference papers and speeches and variously expressed opposition, support, encouragement, criticism and concern. Extolled by some sources as bold, courageous and radical, the Hunn report was disparaged by others as objectionable and opportunistic. Others described it in more prosaic terms, saying it presented a reasonable analysis of the existing situation and deserved to be studied closer.\textsuperscript{36} The debate indicated a level of pre-existing

\textsuperscript{32} \textit{Te Ao Hou}, 35, 1961, pp.31, 34-35.
\textsuperscript{33} Assistant Secretary to MOMA, 6 February 1961, AAMK 869/8a, ANZW.
\textsuperscript{34} \textit{New Zealand Herald}, 17 January 1961, AAMK 869/8a, ANZW.
\textsuperscript{35} Metge to Hunn, 5 April 1961, AAMK 869/8b, ANZW.
\textsuperscript{36} See AAMK 869/8a and AAMK 869/8b, ANZW.
concern about the ‘Maori problem’ and an ongoing pre-occupation with the issue of racial differentiation.

Acceptance for the Hunn report’s general aims came relatively easy to a variety of Maori people. The report held out a broad promise of ōn fare and betterō backed by a range of specific proposals that appeared achievable. Even some of the reportōs detractors commended the components that aimed to progress Maori development. For example, Te Ouenuku Rene, a vocal critic who feared Hunnō proposals aimed to gradually obliterate Maori, conceded that reforms for the social and economic development of Maori ought to be welcomed.37 The Ratana Church youth clubs supported the Hunn report because its recommendations were ōframed for the betterment of Maori people.ō38 Newspapers headlined the fact that urban Maori leaders approved of the report. Pirimi Perarika Tahiwi, speaking as an elder of [the] Maori people in Wellington, congratulated Hunn on his ōmany innovations and proposalsōand agreed that ōNew Zealand would be richer for the blending of the best in the two cultures.ō39 Similarly, Whina Cooper ōhailedōthe report, and especially praised Hunnō proposals for education, while G. R. Harrison – former National Party candidate for the Northern Maori electorate – said it was the best such report to come from the government for decades.40

This broad endorsement of the report was augmented by specific endorsement of individual recommendations and conclusions. For instance, Hunnō proposal for the formation of a Maori Education Foundation found great favour. The foundation would consolidate the various existing educational grants for Maori under one administration. Hunn wished that the several Maori trust boards throughout the country ōwith their (short) histories of ōdisappointingōfinancial performance ōwould be encouraged to contribute half their income to the foundation.41 This approach would encourage Maori organisations to prioritise education and promote a shift from a tribal to a national focus on educating the ōelite of Maori scholarsōwho in turn would ōhave more influence than pakeha precept [sic] on the outlook of their peopleō

Hunn also suggested that half of unclaimed monies ōusually distributed for

37Te Ouenuku Rene to Hanan, 3 February 1961, AAMK 869/8a, ANZW.
38Wanganui Herald, 1 February 1961, AAMK 869/8a, ANZW.
40Auckland Star, 17 January 1961, p.3; and ōHunn Report Praised By Maoris in Cityō AAMK 869/8a, ANZW.
41There were ten Maori trust boards in 1960, variously established since the 1920s to administer compensation paid in the settlement of historical claims to land and related resources.
community purposes including education Í be paid into the foundation.\(^{42}\) Should the foundation be established, the government could contribute a £ for £ subsidy to the coffers.\(^{43}\) Support for the Maori Education Foundation came quickly. In May, after hearing Hunn talk on the topic, representatives from the Aotea District resolved to recommend that financial resources in their area be directed to the foundation.\(^{44}\) Others also supported the idea of the foundation specifically, as well as the principle of improving Maori educational achievement generally. Even critics of the report, like the Maori section of the National Council of Churches, liked the ôvaluableô suggestion that the foundation represented.\(^{45}\) Both Hanan and Hunn were enthusiastic. Hunn said the foundation would be as ôinspirationalô as it was ôutilitarianô and much to Nashô chagrin, Hanan delighted in introducing the Maori Education Foundation Bill to the house, proudly pointing out it was based on Hunnô recommendations.\(^{46}\) Other components of the Hunn report were similarly welcomed. Maori were encouraged by the backing Hunn gave to increased spending on both housing and land development, dominant facets of Maori policy. Spokespeople appreciated that the ôexed problemô of fragmented Maori landholdings î a ôbugbearô that had troubled Maori for ôoo longôi would be addressed.\(^{47}\) The secretary of the Te Arawa Maori Trust Board, Karauria (Claude) Anaru, took great interest in Hunnô suggestion that sole ownership of Maori land be pursued by creating a legally ôincorporated tribeô which could own and manage Maori land and other assets.\(^{48}\)

Alongside the apparent breadth of positive opinion on the Hunn report, there was also considerable criticism. This is not news though. The report is remembered because it became notorious, not because it found some support in some quarters. Even those who voiced congratulations and support also had their reservations. For example, anthropologist Joan Metge wrote that she was in ôfull agreementô with Hunnô main points, and congratulated him in particular for suggesting the Maori

\(^{42}\) Unclaimed monies were dividends owed to various shareholders of Maori land and held by the Maori Trustee because they were unclaimed (by owners for whom no contact details were known) or not distributed because the amounts were ôtoo trifling to bother aboutô


\(^{44}\) Wanganui Chronicle, 15 May 1961, AAMK 869/8b, ANZW.

\(^{45}\) Secretary National Council of Churches Maori Section to Hunn, 13 July 1961.


\(^{47}\) Secretary Aupouri Maori Trust Board to Hunn, 19 May 1961, AAMK 869/8b, ANZW; and ÔHunn Report is Praised By Maoris in Cityô AAMK 869/8a, ANZW.

\(^{48}\) ÔMaori Leaders Like Proposalsô AAMK 869/8a, ANZW. See Hunn Report, pp.52-63 for a discussion of Hunnô ôincorporated tribeô which he envisaged could include existing Maori incorporations and trust boards.
Education Foundation and the incorporation of tribes. Her own study of Maori living in Auckland had concluded that urbanisation was, indeed, inevitable and the best available means of avoiding the development of a rural Maori proletariat. She was concerned, though, that urbanisation required proper guidance and should not be allowed to occur in an uncontrolled manner which could lead to racial prejudice. She also recorded two minor reservations. Firstly, she warned that there may be dangers in using blood quantum as the basis for defining who is Maori, and suggested instead that it was preferable to simply accept as Maori those persons of Maori descent who feel strongly enough to identify themselves as Maori all the time. Secondly, Metge predicted that because turangawaewae was so hapu-specific a concept, it would be a long time before Maori could regard their city homes as a suitable substitute for it. Others who were mainly supportive of the report but cautiously so, had particular concern for the haste and compulsion with which Hunn wanted to pursue integration and urbanisation. Reverend Kingi Ihaka, of the Wellington-Lower Hutt Anglican Maori Pastorate, commended Hunn’s proposals for housing, land development and education, and even agreed with the inevitability of integration, but he drew the line at having it slammed down one’s throat and argued that it ought to take its course quietly. The argument against undue haste featured repeatedly. Reverend Canon H. Rangiu spoke out against accelerating integration, advocating that it should be a natural growth instead. Similarly, Father P. J. Cleary, Superior of the Catholic Maori Mission, stressed that he and other priests on behalf of Catholic Maori Missioners, were against a policy of hastening their integration and speeding their urbanisation.

What constituted reservations for some were the major criticisms of others. Andrew Sharp’s view that Hunn caused a lot of the debate because his language slid between assimilation and integration perhaps oversimplifies explanations for the debate. Uneasiness about urbanisation and integration were at the core of responses that slated Hunn. The paradox that integration implied some continuation of Maori culture, yet simultaneously urged driving down any expressions of difference was not

49 Metge to Hunn, 7 March 1961, AAMK 869/8a, ANZW.
50 Evening Post, 19 January 1961, AAMK 869/8a, ANZW.
51 Dominion, 30 January 1961, AAMK 869/8a, ANZW.
52 Cleary to Hunn, circa. October 1961, and Dominion, 4 May 1961, AAMK 869/8b, ANZW, (original emphasis).
lost on the report’s critics. Several critics were cynical about Hunn’s attempt to explain away assimilation and absorption while promoting integration. Rangihiwarika warned against the practical implications of integration, and the drive by the Western or pakeha society to absorb the Maori. In his view, integration could occur in its own time, but forcing it might encourage an unconscious barrier.54 Richard Thompson, then a senior lecturer in psychology at Canterbury University, was similarly opposed. He said that though integration was a more acceptable term, the policies Hunn actually suggested were more akin to assimilation.55 The National Council of Churches argued in the same vein that Hunn’s proposals would result in the complete loss of [Maori] identity and the Maori Synod of the Presbyterian Church interpreted the report as forcing the Maori race to eliminate itself and become Pakeha.56 Te Ouenuku Rene, a kaumatua of Ngati Toa and Ngati Raukawa, was particularly scathing. In a letter to Hanan he wrote:

In World War I and II both Maori and Pakeha fought side by side to defend their way of life - a democratic way of life. Is that way of life to be altered now by the Secretary of Maori Affairs? Is it to be adopted by a gradual series of laws obliterating the brown skin of the Maori completely because he is to be mass produced into a product named Progressive? ... Reforms for [Maori development] should not be used as a cloak to disguise the point of a dagger aimed at annihilating the spirit of a race.57

It was a complex argument. Metge saw capacity for Maori, even urban Maori, to remain Maori where others did not. She said integration meant eliminating enforced differences and safeguarding the rights of individuals to be different if they want to.58 John Caselberg, Burns Fellow in the University of Otago English Department, was far less confident that difference could be preserved under Hunn’s proposed regime. He noted that though Hunn’s definition of integration was one in which Maori culture could remain distinct, the goal of policy was actually to eliminate that group of Maori who would hold most strongly to Maori culture. Drawing from the writings of Claude Levi-Strauss, it seemed to Caselberg that diversity is the thing

54 Dominion, 30 January 1961, AAMK 869/8a, ANZW.
57 Rene to Hanan, 3 February 1961, AAMK 869/8a, ANZW.
58 Metge to Hunn, 7 March 1961, AAMK 869/8a, ANZW (original emphasis).
that integration threatened most — was the very thing that must be saved.

Furthermore, with its emphasis on pushing Maori towards the modern way of life, common to advanced people, the report subscribed to the notion that all people must belong to a mythical world civilization represented by urban living and characterised by the overworked importance of economic values. Those who would not urbanise or participate in the modern world would apparently be left to their own devices and risk, in Darwinian fashion, extinction. A number of commentators regarded economic development in rural areas as a better option than urbanisation. Yet it was one that Hunn had apparently not considered, and was arguably one that had no support within the Maori Affairs administration anyway. Priests representing Maori Catholic missioners, who were vehemently opposed to the report, and Whina Cooper and George Harrison who expressed some support, were amongst those who felt that some consideration ought to be given to initiatives for rural Maori development.

Some critiques of the report focussed on Hunn himself, though his performance in relation to the report and the subsequent announcement that he would take up the position of Secretary permanently were generally praised. The *Auckland Star* regarded Hunn’s appointment as not only a demonstration of Hanan’s approval of Hunn’s key arguments but also a recognition that Maori Affairs ought to be managed by someone of high calibre. The Maori Section of the National Council of Churches attributed a degree of naivety to Hunn and his ilk; few Pakeha, it said, had any realisation of the depth and warmth of the attachment of the Maori to his ancestral land. Hunn’s promotion of urbanisation as the best method of integration failed to account for the likelihood that for some generations to come urban Maori would be dominated in their whole spirit by rural Maori and held by family and tribal loyalties to the marae, where the inner spirit of the people is conserved and expressed. Nonetheless, the council regarded Hunn’s approach as a conscientious one, and expected he would become a trusted and wise leader in his task.

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59 F. A. J. Caselberg to Hanan, 14 April 1961, AAMK 869/8b, ANZW.
60 See, for example, Williams, *Panguru* pp.78–107, which argues that the Department resisted investing time and resources in any rural development outside the scope of existing Maori land development policy.
61 Cleary to Hunn, circa. October 1961, AAMK 869/8b, ANZW; *Hunn Report is Praised By Maoris in City* AAMK 869/8a, ANZW; and *Auckland Star*, 17 January 1961, p.3.
62 *Auckland Star*, 3 February 1961, AAMK 869/8a, ANZW.
63 Secretary National Council of Churches Maori Section to Hunn, 13 July 1961, AAMK 869/8b, ANZW.
claimed Hunn’s view was too limited to be representative. Father Durning of the Pakipaki Maori Mission said the report represented the department’s view alone. In some respects the report had to represent a Pakeha viewpoint, or at least be acceptable to Pakeha, whose support for the policies was important at the time. Furthermore, Hunn had based the report on official sources of information, making clear its bias towards the public administration of Maori affairs.

Elements of the debate were scored with the political rivalries between National and Labour Party supporters. When Steve (P. T.) Watene, chair of Labour’s Maori policy committee, attacked the Hunn report it was the Vice-President of the National Party (and former secretary to three Ministers of Maori Affairs), John Grace, who countered. Watene protested that the goal of Hunn’s proposals was to integrate Maori out of existence. Grace said Watene had twisted the matter to make a story fitting to the cause of the Labour Party. In Grace’s view the report had been about the betterment and not the elimination of Maori; it was really a matter of making [Maori] more proficient in the requirements of the general community. Party politics and their attendant motivations were also seen in newspaper editorials. An editorial in the New Zealand Herald acknowledged that none of the problems that Hunn identified were new, but former Labour Governments, precariously dependent on a Maori mandate and content to deal with Maori grievances through the expedient of the hand-out, consistently refused to face the fact. Moreover, the National government unfettered by political liaisons with Maori interests was better positioned to take a fresh and bold stand on reforming Maori policy. The Auckland Star took a similar tone and described the Hunn report as an implied criticism of the efforts made by previous Governments in the field of Maori welfare. The report contained more than a hint of fundamental change in Maori policy, and required a fundamental change of attitude on the part of Maori. It is difficult to lift these remarks out of the political rhetoric typical of party-political debates, but differences

64 Evening Post, 17 June 1961, AAMK 869/8b, ANZW.
65 The Hunn Report Criticized: Seen as Essentially a European document 19 September 1961, AAMK 869/8b, ANZW.
66 Dominion, 27 March 1961, AAMK 869/8a, ANZW.
67 Dominion, 28 March 1961, AAMK 869/8a, ANZW.
68 New Zealand Herald, 17 January 1961, AAMK 869/8a, ANZW.
69 Auckland Star, 3 February 1961, AAMK 869/8a, ANZW.
in the party approaches to Maori policy may be discerned. Labour had tended to prefer the vernacular of equality, to National’s more ready recourse to the language of paternalism. Labour’s equality, however, was expected to occur within the broader social and economic framework of New Zealand society which meant its policies easily leant themselves to the goals of integration. Indeed, Nash had regarded integration as central to addressing New Zealand’s race relations. He wrote that integration was not only the best path to follow but ultimately and inevitably the only path that will lead to the development of a happy, harmonious and progressive community.\footnote{70}

Neither Hanan nor Hunn were daunted by criticism of the report, no matter how vitriolic. Both men adopted the stand that the report had been overwhelmingly supported by Maori and Pakeha alike; negative reactions were merely differences of opinion and entirely expected given the several controversial points contained in the report.\footnote{71} Furthermore, some gratification could be taken from knowing that the report aroused so much interest in so many different quarters.\footnote{72} Even with the benefit of twenty years of hindsight, Hunn would later dismiss those who opposed integration as misconstruing its meaning and corral dissident opinions into academic circles from which vague criticism explained nothing.\footnote{73} Hunn remained resolute: Maori reaction was favourable and Maori leaders endorsed the findings and pledged their support of the recommendations.\footnote{74} He repeatedly deflected criticism by retreating to the position that none of his proposals were firm recommendations but rather they were offered as a basis for discussion.\footnote{75} Indeed, Hanan described the recommendations as ideas for discussion with Maori, and generously conceded that Maori may even be able to suggest something better. The rigorous discussion he implied would occur was a safeguard against the risk of unsound policies being pursued.\footnote{75} Clearly the report provided material for the many speaking engagements throughout 1961 that were part of both Hanan’s and Hunn’s.

\footnote{70} AJHR, 1958, G-9, pp.3-5.
\footnote{71} Hunn to Secretary National Council of Churches Maori Section, 18 July 1961, AAMK 869/8b, ANZW.
\footnote{72} Hanan to Cleary, 27 October 1961, AAMK 869/8b, ANZW.
\footnote{73} Hunn, Affairs of State, pp.141-2,144.
\footnote{74} See, for example: Hunn to Secretary National Council of Churches Maori Section, 18 July 1961, and Hunn to Cleary, 25 October 1961, AAMK 869/8b, ANZW.
\footnote{75} Hanan to Cleary, 27 October 1961, AAMK 869/8b, ANZW.
regular workload, and both men were keen to hear áhe reactions of responsible elements of the Maori peopleá76 But it seems no formal opportunities for Maori and government officials to discuss and debate the report occurred. Instead, Hunn and Hanan relied on the media, letters, and feedback received at various hui and public meetings as a basis for assessing the wide-ranging responses. Many years later, Hunn revealed that Hanan had in fact agreed wholesale with the report as early as mid-January 1961 and said it would become government policy án its entiretyá Furthermore, Hanan had allegedly offered Hunn a áfree hand to implementáthe report as an inducement to accept the appointment as Secretary of Maori Affairs.77 Hananá’s personal eagerness was patent in an address he gave at the inaugural meeting of the New Zealand Maori Council during which he claimed to have ádevouredáthe Hunn report. He ácould not stop reading it and could not get it published soon enoughá It was his áBibleá78

A less officious Hunn may be glimpsed in some of his correspondence with Metge. He told her privately that in fact he was áno great loveráof the word integration, and preferred instead to conceive of áliving togetherá He admitted to ávague uneasinessáabout the idea that Maori could be administratively defined by áquartiles of bloodá but he held á even twenty years later á to the view that intermarriage was á a powerful solventáwhich, over time, could reduce áhe original racial purityáto a ádaint traceá80 Hunn also retreated somewhat on the notion that turangawaewaeáí the bedrock of Maori tribal identity á could somehow submit to a modern western substitute; the quarter-acre section. He told Metge that he could áwell understand that the Maori would find it hard to claim turangawaewae at Te Hapua on the strength of his house at Panmureá In fact he had áno high hopesáthat his idea would be taken up. Rather, he had áthrownáthe thought out ámerely to offer a sensible (to the Pakeha) even if unacceptable (to the Maori) alternative to absentee turangawaewae which is rapidly suffocating Maori land with succession ordersá He preferred áhe idea of incorporating the tribes insteadá which would allow everyone to own the land without it becoming fragmented with every passing generation.81

76 Hunn to Secretary National Council of Churches Maori Section, 18 July 1961, AAMK 869/8b, ANZW.
77 Hunn, Affairs of State, p.141.
78 Hanan, Speech at the Inaugural Meeting of the NZMC, MA 1, 35/2/1 pt 1, ANZW.
79 Hunn to Metge, 10 March 1961, AAMK 869/8a, ANZW.
80 ibid., and Hunn, Affairs of State, p.147.
81 Hunn to Metge, 9 May 1961, AAMK 869/8b, ANZW.
Hunn's small concessions on these particular points were never made public, and over time he and Hanan stuck to a familiar set of responses to their critics. Both men stressed the inevitability of urbanisation and therefore integration, arguing that as a result Maori culture and society must change profoundly. So, for example, despite Hunn's apparent retraction (privately) on the matter, turangawaewae remained a formidable barrier to the progress of the Maori people and Maori attitudes towards it would have to modify if integration was to be fully achieved. Fragmentation exacerbated the problem; and though Hunn agreed land was the cornerstone of Maori culture fragmentation still obstructed its use for the benefit of the Maoris and the nation. To leave Maori in their economically stagnant rural hinterlands would prolong the segregation of Maori and Pakeha in separate communities. However, urbanisation would promote integration in a natural way. Appropriately guided by government policy it provided a means to secure the efficacious adjustment of Maori in the cities and thwart the development of an undesirable colour problem.

There is some benefit in pausing briefly here to consider the proposition of a colour problem in New Zealand. While not a central focus of the thesis, the spectre of racial discrimination is difficult to exorcise from either the documentary evidence or the life histories of interviewees. Furthermore, Hunn's treatment of the matter compared to its importance to Maori foreshadowed a growing distance between the views of those who made Maori policy and those to whom it applied. Hunn skirted around the issue, and ironically urged the complete elimination of any statutory distinctions between Maori and other New Zealander while accepting the persistence of social distinctions as a feature of human nature. He approved of the preventative role integration could play in Maori-Pakeha relations, but overall concluded that there was little evidence of racial discrimination in everyday life.

In fact, by 1960 persistent discrimination against Maori or the attitudes themselves were well-documented in both academic and public circles. Richard Thompson's study of newspapers published in 1949 and 1950 had found the New Zealand press guilty of perpetuating stereotypes that depicted Maori as lazy, likely to

82 Hunn, Affairs of State, p.145.
83 Ibid., p.143.
84 Hunn Report, p.78.
abuse social security benefits, content to live in dirty and over-crowded conditions, morally and socially irresponsible, and ignorant and superstitious. In 1959, when Dr Henry Bennett was refused service at the Papakura Hotel because he was Maori, the media and political investigations that followed uncovered a host of similar examples that banned Maori from certain barbers and bars, or restricted them to the cheapest seats in the cinema. Though the incident stirred up a public uneasiness about the reality of racial discrimination in New Zealand, it in fact had limited impact on the national myth of racial harmony. Mostly, public concern was for upholding the myth and avoiding comparisons with countries that had poor reputations like the United States of America and South Africa. The government response at the time was non-committal, and went no further than issuing statements from the Prime Minister and Attorney General pointing out that the law did not discriminate on the grounds of race, colour or creed. It ought to be noted, however, that nor did the law legislate against such discrimination occurring or impose penalties when it did. In the context of the Hunn report, the important point about the kind of petty racism exemplified by the Bennett incident is the way in which it was sidelined as an issue. Nor did New Zealanders take kindly to assessments such as David Ausubel that they pretended there was no racism, or his argument that stereotypes, even when innocent or ignorant, could have the same effect as a colour bar.

Instances of discrimination were treated as few and unfortunate, and also easily allayed if Maori themselves made the right efforts to master the various fields of pakeha [sic] endeavour. A cursory inquiry as a part of Hunn's investigations had in fact discovered a modest selection of cases of non-legal discrimination. Though the details were compiled from existing information without seeking the input of district offices, some recurring patterns were apparent. For example, some banks, hotels and retailers refused to employ eligible Maori applicants on the grounds of their race, particularly for positions that required direct interaction with customers. Such

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86 The Bennett incident and ensuing debate is discussed in Harre, A Case of Racial Discrimination pp.257-260. Additional newspaper coverage may be found in MA 1, 36/1/21 pt 2, ANZW.
88 [Author and Recipient(s) unclear], Non Legal Discrimination memorandum and schedule, 1 April 1960, MA 1, 36/1/21, pt 2, ANZW.
employment policies were often explained as strategies to pre-empt probable adverse reactions from Pakeha customers who would not want to be served by Maori. However, in some cases employment difficulties were due to Pakeha staff objecting to working alongside Maori. Objections against the prospect of Maori neighbours, whether as homeowners or as tenants in state houses were also common-place.

The official position in response to these revelations was that on the basis of ‘general observations’ there was no activity in New Zealand which amounted to ‘a colour bar’ with the exception of Pakeha parents who opposed social associations between Maori and Pakeha that might lead to inter-marriage (ironically, one of Hunn’s measures of successful integration). It was argued that prejudice did exist on its true sense of prejudgement against members of the Maori race but it was not insurmountable. Resistance to employing Maori in some sectors was gradually breaking down, and the provision of good housing for Maori would remedy one of the main causes of other discriminatory practices — poor personal hygiene — which was a social rather than a racial distinction. Furthermore, several complaints about the ‘irresponsible behaviour’ of Maori tenants seemed to justify objections to having Maori neighbours and criticisms that Maori-owned homes lowered the values of other properties in the area. The answers to the problems of race lay in integration as proposed by Hunn. Improvements in Maori education and greater emphasis on the department’s employment programmes were of particular importance in this regard: ‘By multiplying the points of contact we [the Department of Maori Affairs] increase racial interplay and thereby create a favourable climate in which healthy race relations must surely flourish.’ In addition, encouraging more positive Pakeha attitudes towards Maori would reduce the instances of race or group prejudices so that eventually such discrimination would become ‘so rare it would entice little or no comment.’

Maori opinion on petty racism was more forthright than the Hunn report, and came to the fore as an extension of protests against the exclusion of Maori players from the All Black team that toured South Africa in 1960. Maori and Pakeha clerics, academics, former All Blacks and others put their names to a ‘petition on race relations’ The petitioners argued that debate about the 1960 tour exposed a lack of understanding and political leadership in race relations. They harked back to the ‘absolute equality’ promised in the Treaty of Waitangi, and noted the frequent

89 Ibid.
unfavourable treatment of and prohibitions against Maori on the grounds of race. They sought some guiding principles to steer New Zealand’s race relationships and provide a mechanism for judging acts of racial discrimination. In expressing its support for the petition, the Maori Women’s Welfare League commented that for many Maori, including its own members, prejudice and discrimination were a matter of everyday experience so common as to cease to be a subject of surprise. In the league’s view, little would be gained from dwelling on the fact of discrimination but government effort ought to be directed towards positive measures to improve the situation. The league regarded race relations as unquestionably one of the dominant issues of the times. It argued that by providing the kind of leadership called for, the government would reflect New Zealand’s seriousness of purpose as a nation. It was clear to the league that humankind had to learn to live in harmony in a diminishing world and the time for government direction had come. Debate surrounding the 1960 All Black tour and, indeed, the publication of the Hunn report had stimulated a freer public discussion of race, which had been regarded as increasingly important in the public consciousness. There was a telling gulf, however, between the Maori and official views of the seriousness of racial discrimination, as illustrated by Hunn’s summation:

A few instances have been cited but they are isolated and extend over many years. They relate almost entirely to employment or accommodation and, even there, are quite noticeably on the wane. Such discrimination as may exist is obviously not racial but social and applies between different groups of society, whether Maori or European. Social distinctions, in all countries, will last as long as the human race; the faint traces of them in New Zealand are truly minimal and nothing to worry about.

Racial discrimination was not the only topic on which Maori voices apparently failed to register with officials during and following Hunn’s term as secretary of the Department of Maori Affairs. Amongst the many Maori criticisms of the Hunn report was an intimation that ignoring Maori opinion might become the final resort of an

90 Copy of Petition on Race Relations signed by Reverend W. N. Panapa, Bishop of Aotearoa, and sixteen others, c.1961, MA 1, 36/26/11 pt 2, ANZW.
91 It is interesting to note that when critiquing the league’s reaction to Washday at the Pa, David Walsh accused the league of having no previous record of speaking up about race, including the 1960 tour. See Walsh, Inter-ethnic Relations in New Zealand pp.340-1.
92 MWWL Submission in Support of Petition No. 21 (1960), 8 November 1961, MA 1, 36/26/11 pt 2, ANZW.
93 Hunn Report, p.78.
administration intent on hastening the pace of integration. However, the Reverend Rua Rakena argued, it was up to Maori themselves to set that pace, and one of the regulating mechanisms Maori would no doubt choose to exercise was the process of withdrawal\(^\text{94}\). Withdrawal was a term that the anthropologist Maharaia Winiata had coined in 1955 in discussions about the interactions between Maori and Pakeha. Winiata described the process commonly referred to as integration as one which contained a pattern of both intermingling between Maori and Pakeha in certain situations, and withdrawal into distinct cultural worlds in others.\(^\text{95}\) In the late 1960s, Erik Schwimmer used the label exclusion\(^\text{96}\) to describe what was essentially the same process. As discussed in chapter one, Schwimmer\(^\text{97}\) interpretation of withdrawal had a negative tone that suggested Maori withdrew when they could not get what they wanted from Pakeha authority. Maori saw withdrawal as the natural expression of the underlying, organic bonds of kinship and culture. Rakena reasoned that withdrawal would persist even on an unfamiliar urban landscape because Maori would seek one another out to give expression to their traditional and cultural inherencies as evidenced by plans for extra-tribal marae at Christchurch and Auckland.\(^\text{98}\) Leo Fowler held a similar view pointing out that every now and then Maori withdrew usually to the marae to refresh the springs of his Maoritanga\(^\text{99}\).

The strong pull of Maori culture and tradition was not restricted to those who left their tribal homelands for the city. The Te Aupouri Maori Trust Board considered the maintenance of tribal integrity of utmost importance. While the board strongly supported Maori education and Hunn\(^\text{100}\) proposals for a Maori Education Foundation, it opposed the suggestion that it should be impelled to spend more on education grants. It regarded expenditure on the upkeep and development of marae as a higher priority.

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96 Schwimmer, *Aspirations of the Contemporary Maori* pp.11-12.
99 *Te Ao Hou*, 32, 1960, p.49.
100 George Walker to J. K. Hunn, 19 May 1961, AAMK 869/8b, 1/1/42 pt 2, ANZW.
of a population of newly urbanised Maori. A decreasing rural population had to maintain whole marae complexes (which usually included churches, cemeteries and other community facilities) not just for their own use, but also for the use of those who lived in the cities and continued to call on the resources of the marae for family events such as birthdays, weddings, tangihanga and hura kohatu. This role of the hunga kainga as guardians of Maori tradition and source of Maori soul food both literal and figurative is borne out by the life histories of interviewees. For instance, Violet Harris recounted that she and her husband Karanga supplied their children with the important provisions of home (meat, vegetables, milk and cream) long after they had left and marked out their adult lives in the city.101 Similarly, Violet’s daughter-in-law noted that ‘home’ was a place to take the family for long weekends and holidays, funerals and birthdays, as well as a vital source of kaimoana.102 In specific cases, elements of the role of home would remain even after urban alternatives to hapu marae were established.

Withdrawal was usually attributed to an inherent Maori desire to be among their own people. Fowler said it was a matter of ‘instinct’ and there is an intrinsic element in explanations of the range of Maori preferences for separate Maori institutions such as Maori churches, marae in urban centres, and Maori sports teams, and a general preference for homes in close proximity to each other. However, Winiata also argued that in part withdrawal was encouraged by the administration of Maori policy. The use of specialist agencies such as the Department of Maori Affairs and the Maori Land Court gave a sense of critical mass to the Maori population and a degree of status in a society overwhelmingly European. Thus, Winiata continued, an illusion was created that Maori mattered in New Zealand society, their rights imagined and real were being preserved, and their culture would continue unthreatened.103 The case Winiata made fifty years ago is borne out by the historical evidence presented in earlier chapters which show the intricate nature of the relationships between Maori and the state. Yet it was that very bridge between the Maori and the public world that implementation of the Hunn report would dismantle.

101 V. O. Harris interview, Tape 3 Side B. See also, Mana, 69, 2006, pp.11-12.
102 M. Harris interview, Tape 1 Side B.
103 Listener, 25 March 1955, cited in Ballara, Proud to be White?, p.130.
No matter what historical post-mortem might now be performed on the extensive files that exist on the topic of the Hunn report, and regardless of whether the balance of public and political opinion tipped for or against it, that the central aims of the report would be made policy was a fact. Hanan and Hunn would see to it. Thus Hanan embarked on a legislative programme that would implement many of Hunn’s recommendations. It was also a programme that confirmed (rather than set) the scene for Maori policy for the coming years. By year’s end Hanan introduced bills to parliament that would establish the New Zealand Maori Council and the Maori Education Foundation. The relevant statutes were passed in 1962, as was the Maori Affairs Amendment Act 1962 which Hanan said addressed the problem of ‘legal distinctions which make for segregation’. Overall, in Hunn’s integrated world, social ills would be the lot of those Maori who failed to successfully urbanise. Urbanisation meant modernisation and rejection of tribal ways. If they so wished, modern Maori could accessorise their lives with Maori ceremony, and performing and material arts, but the preferred way forward was essentially assimilation, renamed integration – where Maori lived as nuclear families in individual homes that they bought with their wages, sent their law-abiding children to mainstream schools, had no need to be serviced by a specialist department, and left their land interests to the few relatives that could economically survive at ‘home’. What Hunn did not count on, however, was the tenacity and strength of the cultural pull of home, and the influence it would have on Maori people’s engagement with the processes of integration and urbanisation, a point that will be further developed in the next chapter.
Though the Hunn report did not please all of the people all of the time, enough of the people were sufficiently pleased with specific aspects of it that implementation could occur with limited and manageable opposition. This chapter considers particular elements of implementation and argues that in the process there was a significant shift away from the close relationship between Maori and the Department of Maori Affairs. The extent of this shift was such that by the mid-60s Maori opinion really only registered with government when channelled via national organisations such as the New Zealand Maori Council. Some attention is paid to implementation of the Hunn report in the areas of housing and education, with most focus on the New Zealand Maori Council to demonstrate the nature of the move away from the community consultation that characterised Maori Affairs since World War II. Despite the feeling that the department abandoned its people as a result of this restructured relationship, and marginalised Maori community endeavour, Maori continued with their own projects, such as urban marae and Maori play centres. The chapter concludes with a comment on that creative energy of Maori, the thing for which Hunn’s approach failed to account. Under-resourced and unsupported by the state, yet also unencumbered by the constraints of unimaginative integrationist policy, Maori innovation ensured the continuation of the old in new times.

The programme to give practical effect to integration as a matter of priority proceeded on numerous fronts simultaneously. Throughout the 1950s, the department seemed almost indivisible from the Maori world, but in the wake of the Hunn report it looked poised to abandon those who had come to rely on it. In the areas of education, housing and employment, existing policies were bolstered to advance mainstreaming, which would urge Maori to Ïturn to the ordinary agencies for their ordinary businessÓ. For example, the programme for mainstreaming Maori schools by transferring control of them to the Education Boards was sped up. Moves to mainstream Maori schools had been afoot since 1955. However, by 1961 only six out of more than 100 Maori schools had transferred to the boards. This low number of

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1 Hunn, Opening Speech to Inaugural Conference of NZMC, MA 1, 35/2 vol 2, ANZW.
transfers can be explained by the principle of not forcing the transition on the schools, and instead allowing it to occur on request or when the time was ‘opportune’.2

Following Hunn’s recommendations, a firm date was set: all Maori schools would be closed by the beginning of the 1969 school year. The rationale for fast-tracking what was effectively a policy of abolishing Maori schools, was that a combination of urbanisation and the consequent increase in the number of Maori primary school children in urban centres would lead to more children attending (mainstream) board schools, and fewer attending Maori schools. Also, Hanan posited that an improvement in the quality of Maori education would result. Still, the National Committee on Maori Education warned that a change in administration and in name did not absolve the boards from addressing Maori needs; most importantly the need to ensure Maori children learned ‘Maoritanga’.3 This was a view shared by many Maori, including the league and the council, each of which made specific proposals for the inclusion of Maori language, arts, history and culture in the school curriculum.4 Unfortunately it was also a view that struggled to find support. While the government agreed in principle that those who wanted to learn te reo Maori ought to, it remained largely indifferent to the application of resources to the task. The retention of te reo, which Hunn regarded as having a limited chance of success anyway, was a matter for the individual (and not the tribe or community) to resource.

Accelerated integration also impacted existing policies in employment and housing, several of which were interconnected. Assisting rural Maori to find employment and accommodation in urban areas had been part of the department’s work throughout the 1950s, partly under the general ambit of welfare work and partly by shifting the focus of its housing programme from rural to urban areas. In the 1960s, the Hunn report’s view of urbanisation ushered in a new approach: a formal relocation programme ‘somewhat akin to immigration policy’ that would ‘properly’ guide and control the diversion of Maori labour to areas where employment was available. Urbanisation had already begun but in a haphazard way; relocation would facilitate and regularize the process. More ‘careful planning’ would overcome difficulties that had already developed such as ‘broken family units, overcrowding

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3 *Te Ao Hou*, 62, 1968, pp.27, 43.
4 See, for example, Minutes of a meeting of the NZMC, 28 & 29 June 1962, MA 1, 35/2/1 pt 1, ANZW. Examples from the League are discussed in chapter four.
and unsatisfactory living conditions in urban areas, uncertainties about work, delinquency [and] poor race relations. Consequently, from about 1961, the relocation programme became highly bureaucratic. Its main function was to move specially selected single individuals and families from places of known unemployment to urban areas where work was available. Specifically, district offices at Whangarei, Gisborne and Rotorua would act as recruitment centres for the placement centres at offices in Auckland, Wellington, Dunedin and Christchurch. It is interesting to note that much of the language of the relocation programme was borrowed from Australia's post-war immigration programme, which stressed assimilation through employment and education. New Zealand officials took particular interest in Australia's good neighbour movement—an informal approach to encouraging the average citizen to welcome immigrants into the community that called on the practical support of churches and other voluntary organisations.5

Administrative oversight of the relocation programme fell to the Joint Committee on Maori Employment. The committee consisted of representatives of the Departments of Maori Affairs, Labour, Industries and Commerce, Education (Vocational Guidance) and Social Security. It provided advice and co-ordinated policy and procedure. The Department of Labour took main responsibility for locating vacancies, and Maori Affairs for accommodation and overall administration.6 Welfare officers became responsible for a complex scheme of identifying areas of under-employment, relocating under- and un-employed Maori people to the cities, and networking with them to find work, apprenticeships, accommodation, or schools. They also took up the role of easing the transition from a Maori rural to a Pakeha urban community by the use of encouragement and counselling which included developing worthwhile leisure time interests and helpful associations at the new location.7 The whole scheme was bound together by the red tape typical of the department's burgeoning bureaucracy. New instructions, forms and stationery recorded in duplicate and triplicate the personal details of suitable families and individuals, their financial circumstances and eventual placement. Individual actions

5 Notes on Agenda – Joint Committee on Maori Employment and attachments, 21 February 1961, MA 1, 17/1/1 pt 1, ANZW.
6 Interim Advice No. 252, 12 January 1961, MA 1, 17/1/1 pt 1, ANZW.
7 Comments on Balanced Development by Maori Affairs Department 21 June 1961, MA 1, 19/1/131, ANZW; and Interim Advice No. 252, 12 January 1961, MA 1, 17/1/1 pt 1, ANZW.
were itemised and the work overall quantified.\textsuperscript{8} The new regime simultaneously bureaucratised the work of the welfare officers and shifted their focus from cultivating the nexus between community and department to case work with individuals and families.

The relocation programme was not widely used compared to the thousands of Maori who urbanised. Most Maori who relocated did so under their own not the government’s impetus. Others selected specific components of the programme to access, such as opportunities for rental accommodation or employment. In the Taitokerau district, for most of 1961, nobody used the department’s relocation services. Some school leavers moved to other centres, but adults either did not make use of the programme or found work within the district. Yet, if the extent of dive-buying of individual shares of communally owned Maori land measured use of the programme a different story may be told. Live-buying manipulated existing provisions for conversion by allowing the Maori Trustee to purchase uneconomic interests from dive-Maori land owners (rather than waiting for compulsory conversion to occur on succession). The disposal of Maori land interests had a particular role to play as part of the relocation programme offering a kind of permanent severing of ties with the country and continuing Hunn’s push for urban Maori to modify their views of turangawaewae. Although Hunn had earlier attempted to back-pedal from his position regarding turangawaewae at least privately Hanan made the official view clear.\textsuperscript{9} He proposed that the pressure of hard facts would force a reconsideration (but not abolishment) of turangawaewae. In parliament, Hanan outlined the apparent evils of turangawaewae should it be carried to extremes:

Turangawaewae can prevent good land from being used or even looked after, and poorer land from being improved; it can cause Maori children to be brought up in areas where there is no employment for them or their parents; it can perpetuate inter-family and inter-tribal rivalries; and it can represent a formidable barrier to the advancement of the race. Perhaps it will sooner or later change its character, as other Maori customs have done, to fit in with the changing times.\textsuperscript{10}

\textsuperscript{8} Interim Advice No. 252, 12 January 1961, MA 1, 17/1/1 pt 1, ANZW. See also the details contained in AAMK 869/1101d and AAMK 869/1101e, ANZW.

\textsuperscript{9} As discussed in the previous chapter, Hunn drew back from his public position on turangawaewae in correspondence with Joan Metge. Hunn to Metge, 9 May 1961, AAMK 869/8b, ANZW.

\textsuperscript{10} Hanan to Darvill, 4 August 1961, AAMK 869/8b, ANZW.
Official advice identified the ‘suitable disposition of land interests’ as one of the conditions of participation in the re-location programme. Moving the surplus rural population from rural to urban areas was expected to ‘reinvigorate’ rural communities because competition for jobs in the country would decrease and some extension of land-holdings ought to occur. Those who feared that parting with their land interests might result in a loss of turangawaewae could be accommodated by being included as part-owners or trustees in their marae and urupa.\(^\text{11}\)

It is impossible to know precisely the extent to which Maori land changed hands as a direct result of accessing the department’s relocation services, partly because the statistics are so difficult to assemble from the official record and partly because the live-buying figures that were recorded were treated as part of the department’s ongoing title improvement work rather than relocation. Nonetheless, some broad observations may be made. In many instances, live-buying was used to purchase any interests ‘uneconomic or not. Used in connection with relocation, live-buying could help to finance the move from country to city and, at the same time, address the unrelenting problems of multiple-ownership and fragmentation of Maori land interests. Reprehensible to some, the method was used consciously by others, often to finance specific purchases such as new furniture. Compared to other districts, Taitokerau ‘despite its low level of participation in relocation ‘made especial use of the live-buying method.\(^\text{12}\) The use of live-buying can be partly explained by the Maori Trustee and departmental staff advocating its use. It also seems that, in Taitokerau at least, Maori selected the components of relocation with which they would engage. Live-buying offered financial relief to families faced with the costs of shifting, and it was useful to have help finding work and accommodation when needed, but there was some resentment about a policy which some people experienced as a forced eviction from their country homes, for example the Maori farmer from the Kaeo district who said that he was advised by a departmental officer to ‘move to town’ if he wanted to build a house, because his small farm was not productive enough to warrant the department financing him to build a house.\(^\text{13}\)

\(^\text{11}\) Interim Advice No. 252, 12 January 1961, MA 1, 17/1/1 pt 1, ANZW. Also discussed in Williams, ‘Knowledge Systems and Cultural Practices’ pp.83-4.
\(^\text{12}\) Harris, ‘Maori Land Title Improvement’ pp.143-5; and Williams, ‘Panguru’ pp.83-4.
\(^\text{13}\) Review of Northland Settlers, Kaeo, 24 June 1963, AAMK 869, W3074/1323a, 60/1/33/1 pt 1, ANZW.
Relocation was augmented by revamped housing policies. Hunn had recognised that a significant stock of homes would be required to house the increasing numbers of urban-dwelling Maori. In his report he pushed for a huge increase in government spending on Maori housing with a goal of more than tripling the number of houses built each year by 1966. Of particular importance in Hunn’s version of Maori housing policy was the ‘pepper-potting’ principle which aimed to disperse Maori homes among the homes of the general population. Pepper-potting not only located Maori families in predominantly Pakeha communities but could also prevent groups of related families from settling in the same neighbourhood. From the government point of view it was critical to the promotion of integration; in theory, settling Maori families amongst Pakeha neighbours would generate all-important social interaction between Maori and Pakeha. So convinced was Hunn of the merit of pepper-potting he urged that it be pursued even when rendered impractical by complications such as high cost and a shortage of available sections in particular localities. For example, in areas like Rotorua and Tauranga blocks of Maori land were subdivided into building sites, thus ‘consciously but regretfully’ allowing the possibility of all-Maori settlements. In those situations, Hunn urged that some sections be resold to Pakeha to achieve a mixed community.

Hunn claimed that in fact a large number of Maori favoured the pepper-potting principle. It was a claim borne out by Jane Ritchie’s 1961 study into Maori housing which found that the majority of a group of Maori living in the Wellington district preferred to live dispersed among Pakeha neighbours. Ritchie concluded that far from hankering after a closely-knit community life the city Maori she interviewed were eager for fuller experience of city life, for self-improvement, and increased knowledge of European life. She suggested that urban Maori communities would by attrition slowly disappear refuting any justification for the establishment of segregated or concentrated Maori communities in urban areas. Definite tensions existed between two competing views about the way housing policy could best channel Maori into city life: on one hand policies of integration necessitated pepper-potting, and on the other Maori community cohesion eased the stresses of adjusting to

14 Hunn Report, pp.40-43.
15 Ibid., p.41.
urban living. Neither pepper-potting nor integration would ever win the wholesale support of Maori. Even Ritchie’s study noted that those who preferred to live among other Maori emphasised that they could be ōnore relaxed with Maori, could speak their own language, and enjoy a ōmore friendly atmosphere. As one of Ritchie’s research participants put it: Even though the old Maori ways are going out we still have everything in common a presentiment of Margaret Harris’s much later reflection on the importance of having people with whom she could share her differences.

The reality of what Maori wanted for Maori housing was somewhat more complicated than a simple division of points of view, which also had to contend with officialdom. In some areas where Maori wanted and could afford to build homes on their own rural landholdings, their desires were stymied by the Town and Country Planning Act 1953. In June 1962 the Tairawhiti District Maori Council, for example, complained that ōunrealistic restrictions ōarose from the application of the act in its area and effectively prevented Maori from building on their own land. Hunn said some local authorities applied certain restrictions because they did not want ōpeople living in small holdings in the country ō The matter, however, was one that the fledging New Zealand Maori Council could address nationally and co-operatively, once district councils had completed their own investigations at a local level. Hunn went on to suggest that the department could take a ōmore liberal view ōin its handling of pepper-potting, and that exceptions to the policy ought to be allowed. He cited the ōattractive settlement ōof Bridge Pa ōpredominantly Maori and Mormon ō near Hastings as a positive example of ōMaori group-housing ō What Hunn told his Maori audience, however, was not entirely in step with what his own minister told parliament just five weeks later. Hanan outlined the government’s support of the pepper-potting policy, and used it to demonstrate opposition to anything that might be construed as segregation. He said the Department of Maori Affairs imposed ōno absolute ban ōagainst Maori who wished to build homes on their own rural land. However, the department did discourage such building because ōit was only common sense ōto build in areas where employment was available. Hanan reiterated that:

17 Walker, Ka Whawhai, p.198, contended that densities of Maori population above ten percent facilitated the formation of Maori urban institutions.
18 Jane Ritchie, Together or Apart ōp.198; M. Harris interview, Tape 1 Side B.
19 Minutes of a meeting of the NZMC, 28 & 29 June 1962, MA 1, 35/2/1 pt 1, ANZW.
The policy in cities was to build Maori houses among European houses. In the Government's view segregation of Maoris in urban areas should be discouraged. It might be said that certain Maori people, perhaps a little more backward than others, wanted to be together in one part of town, but the Department would agree only in exceptional circumstances. The general rule was that Maori houses in urban areas should be erected among non-Maori houses on the basis that there was no room for segregation in New Zealand.20

The implication that any activities out of step with integration were tantamount to segregation came to feature in some of the official rationales used to explain departmental policy, and supported the urgency applied to the task. Thus, activities that formerly kindled tribal organisation, such as the operation of the Maori courts described in chapter three, were allowed to gradually decline if it looked like they maintained a separation of Maori from Pakeha. In the cities especially, the department submitted to the views of Pakeha who abhorred anything that appeared separatist. Thus the courts became contrary to the policy of integration due to their separatist nature. In 1966, Jock McEwen, Secretary of Maori Affairs, noted:

> It is true that, in some of the communities where significant numbers of Maori people are to be found, the Maori Committees do have a restraining effect on behaviour at Maori gatherings and it is also true that Maori Wardens in many parts of New Zealand are performing a most useful function in controlling the behaviour in hotels. But generally speaking, present policy is to differentiate less and less between Maori and European so far as the law is concerned.21

Even the weaning of the Maori Women’s Welfare League from its fiscal and administrative relationship with the department coincided with the new urgency applied to promoting integration and rejecting separation. The department had financially and materially supported the league since its inception in 1952. For instance, the female welfare officers routinely liaised with branches in their areas and helped to set up and run the league’s conferences. The successive secretaries of the league had also been salaried officers of the department, and in addition the department funded the position of organiser.22 However, neither the league nor the department wanted to create a situation where the league became dependent on the state. The official view was that the league should aim for independence:

21 McEwen to Secretary of Justice, 26 April 1966, MA 1, 1/13/1 pt 1, ANZW.
22 Dominion Secretary MWWL to Controller Welfare Division, 23 April 1956, MA1 W2490, 36/26 pt 1, ANZW.
In principle, we have always felt that the greatest value would come from the Welfare League if it achieved full self-sufficiency and was not dependent in any way on Public Servants to do any of its work. The League also has felt this way and I think, has said in effect, that it wishes to run its own affairs and not have matters arranged or controlled by the Department.\textsuperscript{23}

While the league essentially agreed with this view, it continued to request the presence of the women welfare officers at its conference and the final push to have the league \textquoteleft stand on its own feet\textquoteright did not begin until 1959.\textsuperscript{24} The league\textquoteleft s independence was cited in \textit{Te Ao Hou} as one of the \textquoteleft thrilling events\textquoteright in Maori community life that year and was reportedly the \textquoteleft great topic of discussion\textquoteright at its annual conference.\textsuperscript{25} The proposal put to and accepted in principle by the league was that it would receive an annual grant of £2000 to cover the expenses. The amount would diminish as the league became more and more independent. Though the idea of independence had been thoroughly discussed at conferences and in correspondence, there was still some nervousness about finally breaking away from the department. The league appreciated the significant contributions of the welfare officers even though there had been some criticism of the welfare officers\textquoteleft involvement in districts; some officers were regarded as interfering while others were said to visit branches too infrequently.\textsuperscript{26} The league estimated that a bare minimum of £2550 per annum was required just to run the national office. The women quickly recognised the impact independence would have on the need to increase revenue, particularly by raising annual membership fees.\textsuperscript{27}

The league picked up its first £2000 annual grant in 1960, and understood that the amount would reduce every year thereafter by £500. However, it soon became clear that the league would be unable, financially, to withstand any reduction in the grant. Concerned about the effect of a change in government, the President of the league, Miria Logan, sought an assurance that ministerial support for the league would remain, with no premature or drastic cuts to the grant and the promise of

\textsuperscript{23} Assistant Secretary to Controller Maori Welfare and Dominion Secretary MWWL, 20 February 1957, MA 1, 36/26/11 pt 1, ANZW.
\textsuperscript{24} For example, Dominion Secretary MWWL to Secretary DMA, 24 March 1958, MA 1, 36/26/11 pt 1, ANZW.
\textsuperscript{25} \textit{Te Ao Hou}, 29, December 1959, pp.1, 59.
\textsuperscript{26} Notes of Welfare Officer regarding itinerary of Dominion President MWWL, Wanganui, 3 October 1957, MA1, 36/26/10, ANZW.
\textsuperscript{27} \textit{Te Ao Hou}, 29, December 1959, pp.59-60.
continued assistance from the female welfare officers. When Hanan took over the Maori Affairs portfolio his endorsement of the league – which he regarded as an initiative of the previous National government – was quickly forthcoming. He explained to the Prime Minister that it would be a matter of policy to encourage the league’s work. In particular, he pointed to the major role the league would play in the improvement of Maori health through its representation on the Board of Health, and its participation in health campaigns in selected areas. The league gave serious consideration to Maori social and economic advancement. Further, Hanan acknowledged the league for its good work and expressed his confidence that the league had even greater potential for the future. On the matter of the annual grant, Hanan agreed to pay the full amount of £2000 for the 1961-62 financial year but said the amount would be reduced in subsequent years. To aid the league’s planning processes Hanan capped the maximum reduction in any year at £500 and undertook to only calculate the reduction after the annual accounts had been considered.

On the surface it appears the principles of the Hunn report were easily achieved in this instance; the league would continue its important voluntary work, but in the spirit of self-reliance would gradually give up its financial dependence on the state. In fact, by 1965 the league’s annual grant was yet to be reduced by any amount, although inflation would have eroded it. It would have been difficult for either Hanan or Hunn to reject the league’s need for financial assistance. The league was regarded as having attained a status comparable to any European women’s organisation; it was accepted by and worked harmoniously with them. Moreover, it and the New Zealand Maori Council were touted as the only Maori organisations recognised by government. In some respects, the council had won the recognition of government even before it was formally established. It is an example of one Hunn’s proposals that gained widespread support, which may be explained by his clever lacing of the report with proposals for which endorsement from Maori already existed, perhaps as a deliberate strategy to foster support, or perhaps to re-introduce worthy proposals that

28 Summary of Points Raised for Discussion with Mr Sullivan [Secretary of Maori Affairs] and his Reply to them 18 September 1959, MA 1, 36/26/12 pt 1, ANZW.
29 Extract from the Minister’s Notes on Departmental Policy to the Prime Minister 2 May 1961, MA 1, 36/26 pt 3, ANZW.
30 MOMA to Assistant Secretary MWWL, 21 July 1961, MA 1, 36/26/12 pt 1, ANZW.
31 MWWL Newsletter, May 1965, MA 1, 36/26/11 pt 2, ANZW.
32 Ibid.
had previously floundered due to insufficient governmental support. The establishment of the New Zealand Maori Council (originally the Dominion Maori Council of Tribal Executives) to provide an overarching, wholly Maori structure for the existing system of tribal committees was one of the proposals that Hunn recycled.\(^{33}\)

Hunn knew the idea for such a council had been around for ten years or so and Maori enthusiasm for it had not waned. Hanan easily found merit in the idea and indicated his support for a Maori council in a general assurance that he would ōtake the Maori people into [his] confidence and discuss major changes in policy with themō. He underlined this support in his 1961 Waitangi Day speech, reiterating his desire to consult with Maori about significant policy changes.\(^{34}\) Then, at a hui at Mourea in March, he announced to great applause that the government had decided to introduce legislation to establish district councils and a national council. Hanan said he was already convinced that a dominion council would provide a number of advantages. Hanan said he wanted the council to ōprovide a unified voice for the Maori people on matters affecting the Maori raceō. He continued:

I have a hundred questions to ask the Maori people but who do I ask? Do I put an advertisement in the paper? Do I speak over the radio? Do I speak in the House of Representatives? Where can I get the answer? From the Maori people themselves. They are spread from one end of the country to the other. How do we get the answer? Such a Council would provide a two-way channel of communication between the Maori people as a whole and the Minister of Maori Affairs... And of course, it would activate and assist the District Councils and tribal committees and executives. It would make them worthwhile; it would make them tick; give them something to do; some objective.\(^{35}\)

In fact Hananōs sentiments replicated the pleas of tribal leaders such as Major Te Reiwhati Vercoe who had spearheaded an earlier Maori call for a national council. Vercoe was a member of the Te Arawa Maori Trust Board and a returned serviceman who had risen to prominence after the war. The Waiairiki district, to which he belonged, had held a conference of all its tribal executives in 1952 and discussed the proposition of forming a ōresponsible and representative bodyō that the government

\(^{33}\) Norman Perry to Hunn, 29 June 1961, MA 1, 35/2 pt 2, ANZW.

\(^{34}\) Te Ao Hou, 35, 1961, p.35.

\(^{35}\) Notes of a meeting of the Minister of Maori Affairs, the Hon. J.R. Hanan and party with the Maori people, held at Takinga meeting house, Mourea, Rotorua, on Wednesday, 15 March 1961, at 8.10 p.m., n.d.
could refer to and confer with. Support for the idea spread to other districts and gained momentum. In the Maori view, a national organisation would not only provide a vehicle for representation of Maori but also promote discussion and debate at a national level of such issues as Maori leadership and generating a renaissance in Maori welfare work. In Vercoe’s opinion, which he shared with Nash in December 1959, the spirit driving Maori leaders on the matter was a desire to contribute positively to the future welfare of Maori. Having a direct channel of communication with the minister that represented Maori in parliament would be an important part of that process. The arrangement, Vercoe argued, would also encourage independence amongst Maori organisations, expedite the work that the government did amongst Maori, and consolidate the experienced leadership that already existed in Maori communities.

For his part, Nash appreciated that there was a desire to find a way of expressing the views of the Maori other than on the marae and agreed with the principle of co-operating with the government. However, he had some reservations. He wanted the purpose of the proposed council to be clarified in further discussions, and was concerned about the possibility that such a council could undermine the authority of the sitting Maori MPs, who were elected for the express purpose of representing their constituents including organised groups of Maori such as tribal executives. Privately, it riled Nash that the tribal executives assumed a leading role in spontaneously resolving to form a national council. He preferred, as did some of the executives themselves, that the government both convene and sponsor any national conference or council.

Sullivan, who had succeeded Ropiha as Secretary of Maori Affairs in October 1957, held a view at odds with his minister’s. Sullivan said that, as a matter of principle, the department should refrain from promoting and facilitating national groups or conferences because any national Maori body would inevitably become a policy forming body, presenting its own views and recommendations to government. Sullivan was also pessimistic about the results any national council

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36 Ropiha to Corbett, 12 December 1952, MA 1, 35/2 pt 1, ANZW.
37 L. Rangi, Chairman Taniwharau Tribal Executive Committee, to Minister of Maori Affairs, 28 June 1958, MA 1, 35/2 pt 1, ANZW.
38 Deputation of Te Arawa Trust Board to Prime Minister, 9 December 1959, MA 1, 1/1/47 pt 3, ANZW.
39 Attachments to Secretary to MOMA, 16 February 1960, MA 1, 35/2 pt 1, ANZW.
40 Paper by Sullivan, 23 October 1959, MA 1, 35/2 pt 1, ANZW.
could produce, especially when measured against the time and talk and work involved. He was reluctant for departmental staff to become involved in liaising with or facilitating such a council or even attending its meetings. He felt that a national conference would achieve no more than what was already being achieved at district level. The department's preference to maintain a respectable and professional distance from the moves to establish the council ran contrary to the close working relationships between the Maori welfare officers and the tribal and executive committees.41 However, Sullivan's stance was in keeping with the notion of mainstreaming, and was later shared by Hunn who wrote that the less the department was involved 'officially' in setting up the Maori council, the better.42 Any attempt by Nash to establish the council was interrupted by the election, though Hunn said the matter had in fact been 'crowded out' of the 1960 legislation programme.43 Whatever the case, by 1961, Hanan was poised to enjoy the kudos of ushering through the legislation that would finally deliver the council. He 'positively relished' introducing the legislation to the house and had announced with pride that it was based on Hunn's recommendations. Though the media critiqued his enthusiasm as possibly a little premature it was clear that implementation of the Hunn report had a far more important long term goal: to speed integration.44

The Maori Welfare Act (the title of which was changed to the Maori Community Development Act in 1981) passed in December 1962. It re-arranged the tribal committees and tribal executives into a four-tiered system under which the committees remained more-or-less marae-based (with exceptions in the cities) and the executives represented geographically defined clusters of committees. District conferences of tribal executives had been provided for since 1953 but not councils as such. Under the 1962 act, four or more executives could form a district council, and the boundaries for district councils equated with the Maori Land Court districts, except for Auckland for which a separate council was established. Each district council nominated three of its members to the New Zealand Maori Council. The act also consolidated the existing legislation for Maori social and economic advancement. It honed the powers of Maori wardens, arming them with the authority to order

41 Secretary to MOMA, 4 June 1958, MA 1, 1/1/47 pt 3, ANZW.
42 Hunn to Norman Perry, 9 August 1961, MA 1, 35/2 pt 2, ANZW.
43 Hunn, notes of a session with the Minister of Maori Affairs, 10 January 1961, AAMK 869/8a, 1/1/42 pt 1, ANZW.
44 Southland Times, 10 July 1961, AAMK 869/8b, ANZW.
intoxicated Maori from bars and to retain car keys; and it reiterated the duties of Maori welfare officers.

Mostly, the establishment of the council was publicly portrayed as a major step forward in the pursuit of the goals of integration, and met with many congratulatory words. As a representative body interested in national affairs it would promote Maori participation in the national life of the country and, according to the Auckland Star, showed Maori wished to unite as one progressive race and speak with one voice. Thus Maori could continue to emerge from the narrow and restrictive bonds of tribal affiliation and regional interests which often tended to conflict. King Koroki was amongst those Maori leaders who commended the council, although his words of congratulations contained no concern for integration. Rather, he was buoyed by the fulfilment of a dream held by Maori of the past and of the present. Not all Maori leaders were so enthused, however. Tirikatene complained that the four Maori MPs were not invited to the council’s inaugural meeting, a discourteous act on Hanan’s part. As the person statutorily charged with calling the first meeting, Hunn took responsibility for the oversight. The matter was discussed and easily resolved when three of the four Maori MPs attended a later meeting, added their congratulations to those of others, and offered their full co-operation.

In many respects, though, the act did little that was new except to legislate in favour of a decade-old Maori initiative. (Some would say the initiative was older than that, dating back to the Maori councils of the 1900s which had been too short-lived to ever reach their full potential). However, the act also heralded more than just the establishment of the New Zealand Maori Council, especially when appraised in the context of the Hunn Report and the new drive for integration. In particular, Hunn expected Maori welfare work to increasingly address the problems of urbanisation. He wanted the priorities for welfare work to include assisting young Maori in adapting to the new culture and cultivating and developing an attitude of goodwill amongst Europeans. Though the Maori welfare officers played an important role in all aspects of Maori Affairs, in Hunn’s view the responsibility for housing, farming, education, employment and health rested with other units in the department and not the Welfare Division. He feared the effectiveness of welfare work

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45 Auckland Star, 7 March 1961, MA 1, 35/2 vol 1, ANZW.
46 Minutes of a meeting of the NZMC, 28 & 29 June 1962, MA 1, 35/2/1 pt 1, ANZW.
47 Hunn to Tirikatene, 20 July 1962, MA 1, 35/2 pt 2, ANZW.
48 Minutes of a meeting of the NZMC, 27 & 27 July 1962, MA 1, 35/2/1 pt 1, ANZW.
would suffer from being too diffuse. He wanted the job to be cut down to the bare essentials; he suggested a shift towards case work (rather than community work); and in keeping with the push for mainstreaming Maori policy proposed that the Maori welfare officers call more often on the expertise of professional social workers employed in other departments. The exhortatory work on the marae which Hunn grumbled was time-consuming, was an example of abstract welfare work that would be best left to Maori committees and branches of the league.49

On the surface, Hunn’s plan to streamline welfare work posed no threats, but the undercurrent of integration was stronger than initial appearances suggest. The 1962 act realised Hunn’s desire to wean the committees from their reliance on the local Maori welfare officer by removing all welfare officers from the committees’ memberships. The change was touted as a strategy for making the committees more independent, but it was coupled with other seemingly slight changes which suggest the integration agenda was foremost. For example, the committees were no longer tribal but Maori—a simple semantic shift that dispensed with the connotations of communalism and a time that had passed invoked by the word tribal and advanced a term more suited to the modern and mainstream organisation of New Zealand’s indigenous people. Furthermore, though appointment to the Maori council was derived from the flax roots (the Maori committees) authority was dispensed from the top down. Under the 1962 act the functions formerly conferred on the committees were instead given to the council. These functions were mostly the same as those assigned to the committees in 1945: to consider Maori social and economic advancement, to aid Maori economic and spiritual well being, to promote harmonious race relations, and to preserve and perpetuate Maori culture. Also, the 1962 rendition of these functions added a new responsibility in which the council would assist government departments to place Maori in industry, educate and train Maori, foster respect and prevent excessive drinking among Maori.50 Meanwhile, the committees which had previously operated fairly independently and conscious of local needs and aspirations (as established in chapter three) were relegated to carrying out the Maori council’s responsibilities in their discrete areas. The committees were to be

49 Hunn Report, pp.78-81.
50 Maori Welfare Act, 1962, section 18 (1) (d).
supervised by their district councils which in turn were subject to the control of the Maori council.

During its first year, the council drew criticism about its representivity. In parliament, Tirikatene claimed that the council was not representative of Maori opinion and ought to be directly elected by postal ballot. He even went so far as to suggest that the department had engineered council membership. Matakatea Rangiatea (Ralph) Love publicly supported Tirikatene's view. Love was a long-time Labour Party member and had formerly served as Tirikatene's private secretary. He was a noted leader in the Petone area and, despite becoming embroiled in the public spat that ensued, later spent three years in the 1960s in the employ of the department as a welfare officer. According to the Evening Post, Love described the council as a "complete jack up". He was quoted as claiming that one of the council members represented a defunct tribal committee, and lacked the support of the people in his area. Sir Turi (Alfred Thomas) Carroll "the chair of the council, farmer, local politician, and former National Party candidate for Eastern Maori" countered by accusing Love of being out of touch with Maoridom, saying otherwise he would have known that the council was a Maori initiative. Carroll stressed that the council was a welfare organisation, the democratically-elected top tier of the long-standing tribal committees, which strived to promote the interests of the Maori people. Love's extravagant and derogatory comments hurt and belittled Maori. Love replied that his criticism was only directed at the methods used to elect the council and not the council itself or its associated groups or any welfare organisation. In his view, the council's representivity was diluted by the extent of departmental involvement. Furthermore, he argued that even Sir Turi had to agree that the council was more than a Maori welfare organisation, and was in fact a "sounding board for Government legislation and Maori Affairs".

Neither Hunn nor Hanan commented publicly on the debate, which not only left an impression of division in Maoridom, but also the Northern Advocate argued that the otherwise flattering image Hanan enjoyed in his handling of the Maori Affairs portfolio. However Hanan and Hunn were not complacent. Love's contention

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53 Evening Post, 22 November 1962, MA 1, 35/2 vol 2, ANZW.
54 Ibid.
55 Ibid.
that a defunct tribal committee had representation on the council had apparently struck a chord. Behind the scenes Hunn investigated the election of South Island delegates where some administrative complications had arisen in relation to the Kaikoura Maori Committee. The Kaikoura committee represented ôonly a few familiesô and because of its isolation had enjoyed executive powers under the 1945 act. By the time the 1962 act passed, the committee had been in recess for a number of years, and was encouraged to become active again by J. E. Lewin, the district officer at the departmentôs Christchurch office. Lewin also tried to persuade the committee to relinquish its executive powers and join the Marlborough Maori Executive, but the committee refused. The situation meant that the Kaikoura committee would effectively have automatic representation on the district council and thus an increased chance of appointment to the ôDominion Councilô. It therefore became a point of contention amongst other South Island executives. Lewin was put in the position of having to explain the legal position of the Kaikoura committee at a meeting called to form the Te Waipounamu District Maori Council and nominate delegates to the national council. When a delegate from Kaikoura was nominated, two people at the meeting protested and a welfare officer stepped in to reiterate Lewinôs explanation. The protests were probably redundant, as the Kaikoura nominee received insufficient support to go forward as a member of the council. The nominee went on to complain that ôa Departmental officerô had ôinfluenced the election against himô. However, his perspective was jaundiced, in Lewinôs view, by ôhis disappointmentô. Hunn concluded that due process had been followed. The departmentôs officers had ôalone no more than fulfil their duty to assist by way of explanation and advice: that is the purpose for which they attend such meetingsô.

The broader debate about representivity can be partly explained by the political tensions between the National government and the Labour opposition: National had no Maori MPs. Conversely, Labour had held all four Maori seats without interruption since 1943. National had a major Maori policy programme to implement and administer, and the council could play a useful advisory role and provide Hanan with the ôpractical guidanceô he felt he needed as a Minister of Maori Affairs who was initially ôa stranger to the Maori peopleô. The public was

56 Lewin to Hunn, 22 November 1962, MA 1, 35/2, ANZW.
57 Hunn to Hanan, 3 December 1962, MA 1, 35/2, ANZW.
58 Hanan, Speech at the Inaugural Meeting of the NZMC, MA 1, 35/2/1 pt 1, ANZW.
frequently reminded that in implementing the Hunn report, and therefore establishing the council, National was merely doing what the previous Labour government had failed to do. The debate between Love and Carroll, however, hinted that the council might risk becoming Maori Affairs’ slave-child. Love asserted that Hanan had barricaded himself and would now be advised only from within this newly established inner circle which would lead to the Minister becoming more [not less] remote from Maori.

Even if political allegiances could be extracted from the debate, it is likely that aspects of it would have still concerned council members. Certainly council members could see that the cost of representing Maori in consultations with the state was a loss of contact with the very people for whom it was supposed to speak. While it was adamant, and could prove, its members were appointed by due process it did admit that it struggled to maintain relationships with its constituents. Hunn was less concerned. He wrote:

In the nature of things, it is hardly likely that 477 Tribal Committees will ever be consulted about any proposition (they certainly never have been in the past by the four Maori Members of Parliament); and, on any legislation, it will always be easy to discover opponents who do not go along with the views of their own national body.

Hunn stressed that government could only deal with the New Zealand Maori Council: that is what the Council was set up for. Walking the finest of lines, he said the council did not speak for the whole of Maoridom, but was a national body duly elected to speak for its particular group. Rangi Tutaki, one of the delegates for the Ikaroa District, expressed a much firmer position. At a meeting in July 1962 feeling pressed by Hunn to make important decisions quickly, particularly regarding government proposals for Maori land titles, Tutaki said that council members had a duty not only to give careful consideration to the matters now before them but to make decisions which they considered were in the best interest of the Maori communities they represented. The council should not be hurried but allowed to reflect, and perhaps Hunn could show some forbearance and understanding.

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59 *Northern Advocate*, 26 November 1962, MA 1, 35/2 pt 2, ANZW.
60 *Evening Post*, 22 November 1962, MA 1, 35/2 pt 2, ANZW.
61 Hunn to Hanan, 8 November 1962, MA 1, 35/1/2/1 pt 1, ANZW.
62 Minutes of a meeting of the NZMC, 26 & 27 July 1962, MA 1, 35/2/1 pt 1, ANZW.
agreed council members were accountable to their respective communities, but he also wanted it to face, not avoid, the important yet difficult decisions it had to make.\(^63\)

It would have been unrealistic to expect council members to operate without a perceptible awareness of those they represented. Council minutes show that while Maori policy and legislation dominated the agendas, ‘other business’ brought in from the districts also exercised members. For example: certain executives wanted Maori cemeteries set up in urban areas; the Waikato-Maniapoto District Council extended an invitation from King Koroki for the council to meet at Ngaruawahia; the Tokerau Council sought support for its opposition to the commercial harvesting of toheroa in Northland; and, regarding the labelling of Maori committees and executives, the Tairawhiti Council wanted to retain the term 'āriki. Also, the council was interested in the same topics that recurred at hui throughout the country: the Treaty of Waitangi and Waitangi Day celebrations (including the Declaration of Independence); education; Maori land development and Maori land tenure; ‘social progress’ of the Maori; and changes in the department.\(^64\)

Although the council claimed it had ‘fulfilled an important function’ representing its members and ‘opening the way for fuller consultation between the government and other authorities and the people’ it also publicly acknowledged that it had inadvertently distanced itself from ‘the people’:

‘...we seemed to have too much thrust upon us and not enough time to take matters on to our maraes to gather the opinions of the people as a whole. The urgency of several matters has meant that the Council has had to make decisions without reference even to District Councils. We prefer that all our Maori Associations right down to individual Maori Committees should be able to express their views on all matters coming before the Council so that our decision will truly reflect Maori opinion.\(^65\)

It was not only distance between the council and Maori communities that concerned council members, but distance between the council and the department’s officers. The council worried in particular that its ‘autonomous constitution’ might disturb the ‘close co-operation’ it was used to enjoying with the Welfare Division. John Booth, the associate secretary of the council, sought an assurance from Hunn

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63 Hunn to Hanan, 16 October 1962, MA 1, 35/2/1 pt 1, ANZW.
64 See the Council’s minutes on MA 1, 35/2/1, and its newsletters on MA 1 W2490, 35/2/4 pt 1, ANZW.
65 Report of the First New Zealand Maori Council n.d., MA 1 W2490, 35/2/4 pt 1, ANZW.
that working with the council and committees would remain one of the essential functions of the Welfare division. He contended that the official and the voluntary aspects of Maori welfare are necessarily inter-dependent and that this close contact must be maintained. Hunn replied that the council could expect the continued cooperation of the Maori welfare officers. He added the rider, however, that the relationship must necessarily change. The 1962 act excluded the welfare officers and other extraneous interests from membership of the committees, but it was a move that ought to be seen as a step away from paternalism. The committees had been active since 1945 and they now had the organisational framework to handle welfare work on their own. The Welfare Division could still provide assistance and advice but reiterating what he said in his report Hunn commented that the welfare officers ought to dedicate more time to case work and thus achieve deal progress in Maori welfare. The withdrawal of the Welfare Division from the community relationships it had established during the 1950s also reflected a reduction of resources applied to Maori Affairs. As a percentage of total government spending, the department's budget did steadily decrease throughout the 1960s, from one percent in 1958, to less than 0.5 percent ten years later. So, there was perhaps a question over whether or not the Welfare Division had the material support to continue its community approach to policy implementation anyway. Hunn appears to have made no particular comment on any budgetary constraints.

Overall, the future Maori-state relationship was expected to operate at a national level, to the detriment of local level relationships and community development. Indeed, Hunn told the council that Maoridom was obliged today to think nationally and not tribally. He explained:

Tribal loyalties are still strong and enduring may they always be so because identification with a place or a people is a source of strength but let those loyalties be a tributary to the main stream of national effort on behalf of the Maori people.

Though the establishment of the council meant a long-held Maori desire had borne fruit, it effectively shackled the councils and committees to the government.

66 Booth to Hunn, 26 October 1962, MA 1, 35/2 pt 2, ANZW.
67 Hunn to Booth, 20 November 1962, MA 1, 35/2 pt 2, ANZW.
68 Butterworth, Maori Affairs, p.129.
69 Hunn, Opening Speech at the Inaugural Meeting of the NZMC, MA 1, 35/2/1 pt 1, ANZW.
integration agenda, while at the same time withdrawing the preferred face of Maori Affairs (the welfare officers) from Maori communities.

During its formative years, the council’s work was primarily shaped by plans to implement the Hunn report. The council’s earliest meeting agendas included: proposed amendments to legislation governing adoptions and governing juries, the Maori Education Foundation, crime, education, relocation, Maori land titles and Maori farming and other issues all monotonously framed in terms of hastening integration. The Juries Amendment Bill fitted Hunn’s goal of removing legal differentiations between Maori and Pakeha. Under existing legal arrangements Maori and Pakeha juries were covered by different provisions which in theory meant that all-Maori juries could be convened in cases where the alleged crime was committed by a Maori against another Maori. Hanan and Hunn were keen to abolish this ‘privilege’ even though it was rarely used. It was an unwanted instance of separatism and the bill proposed to replace it by allowing Maori to serve on ordinary juries ‘as of equal right’70. Seemingly sensible, and eventually agreed to by the council, the bill was enacted in 1962. However, the legal arrangement it replaced was not so much based on privilege as it was on race. The provision for Maori juries was devised not only to allow Maori juries in Maori cases, but to prevent Maori from serving in cases concerning Pakeha.71

Council support for the Adoptions Amendment Bill was less easy to achieve. Customary Maori adoptions had continued largely untouched by the formalities of law until 1955 when the Adoption Act standardised all adoptions under a closed system administered by the Magistrate’s Court. One exception was granted to Maori; the Maori Land Court could authorise adoptions in which the child and at least one of the adopting parents were Maori. Unpopular with Maori, the Adoption Act was often ignored and many Maori continued to practice customary adoptions.72 The change proposed in 1962 sought to remove Maori adoptions from the Maori Land Court’s jurisdiction and deal with them all in the Magistrate’s Court. In Hunn’s opinion, the

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70 Minutes of a meeting of the NZMC, 26 and 27 July 1962, MA 1, 35/2/1 pt 1, ANZW.
1962 bill was another opportunity to step towards equality between the races. It was an approach that would lead to the end of Maori adoption practices, and another means of mainstreaming public services for Maori. The Maori MPs opposed the bill, and criticised the Magistrate’s Court for its tendency to refuse adoption applications from close relatives (such as aunties, uncles, and grandparents).

However, council minutes record a view that the change would provide the magistrates with an opportunity to appreciate the Maori point of view and way of life because men who have no association with the Maori people find new insights from their contacts. The council was divided on whether or not to support the bill. One member wanted to be sure that the process and the cost would remain the same. Specific submissions from Auckland recorded anxiety on the part of Maori mothers. Two district councils were definitely opposed to the bill (one unanimously); and two were divided. Others would support the bill provided adopting parents could request a report from the relevant Maori welfare officer. Despite resounding opposition in some districts, and an absence of clear agreement in others, the council agreed to support the bill and dissensions from just two members were recorded.

According to Hunn, the elements of Maori policy and legislation that found least favour with the council were those that pertained to Maori land, especially those going to rights of property. For example, in July 1962 the council rejected a succession of proposed legislative and policy changes aimed at stepping up efforts to arrest fragmentation and congestion of Maori land titles. These changes included a plan to compulsorily confer the status of European land on the land interests of any Maori whose shares did not amount to five acres. For Maori, the disadvantage of changing the legal status of Maori land to European is that it became easier to alienate from its Maori owners who lost the (few) protections that the Maori land title system offered. It was also a proposition that would potentially deprive many Maori of their turangawaewae, and was snubbed by the council, although one member suggested making it optional (for the Maori land owner) rather than mandatory. In a similar instance, council members also objected to a proposal to vest all Maori land interests

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73 Minutes of a meeting of the NZMC, 26 & 27 July 1962, MA 1, 35/2/1 pt 1, ANZW.
74 A. Mikaere, *Maori Women: Caught in the Contradictions of a Colonised Reality*.
76 Minutes of a meeting of the NZMC, 28 & 29 June 1962, MA 1, 35/2/1 pt 1, ANZW.
77 Minutes of a meeting of the NZMC, 26 & 27 July 1962, MA 1, 35/2/1 pt 1, ANZW.
worth less than £10 in the Maori Trustee on behalf of the Maori Education Foundation. The council was in no way opposed to the foundation, and in fact its minutes suggest wholehearted support, but its members were opposed to any measure that aimed to compulsorily relieve Maori of their land interests, uneconomic or not.  

Hunn noted the council’s disagreement, but also stated that any of the proposals could be reintroduced as part of the following year’s legislative programme. He was unhappy with the council’s aversion to supporting plans that, in his view, would boost existing methods for improving Maori land tenure. He had, for example, set his sights on using the Maori Education Foundation as a very convenient vehicle for title reformation. The idea was that the foundation could use its capital to purchase uneconomic interests from the Maori Trustee, and thus provide a suitable home for the trifling interests of no real value or use to the owners. He told Hanan that the idea would have to be adapted if the council would not change its mind. However it was clear to Hunn that the council looked upon such proposals as a policy of confiscation regardless of the value of the interests involved. His frustration with what he regarded as the council’s failure to deal assertively with Maori land tenure was clear. He told the council to take a responsible view of the state of Maori land titles because, unless an attempt was made to solve the title troubles, the only result could be further deterioration and chaos. Furthermore, he scolded:

If the department wanted to be calculating it would merely stand by, doing nothing, and the problem would, in due season, resolve itself because the system for the administration of Maori land would collapse at some time or other [the Council] would be obliged to face the situation squarely and try to find a solution. [The Council was] now in business as the national assembly of Maoridom to deliberate seriously on serious problems and not cast them aside.

Hunn’s view was that the more Maori land the Crown owned the more it could control land development without the need for consulting a host of owners at any stage. He thought conversion supplemented with live-buying was the best available option.

78 Ibid.
79 Hunn to Hanan, 16 October 1962, MA 1, 35/2/1 pt 1, ANZW.
80 Drift of Maori Farmers from Northland 28 June 1960, T W2591, 40/116/1 pt 3, ANZW.
In effect, Hunn’s proposals for reforming Maori land titles were eventually realised, although after he left the department. In a move that side-stepped the council and Maori cooperation generally, an independent report on Maori land titles was commissioned from former chief judge of the Maori Land Court, Ivor Pritchard, and Hone Waetford, a court interpreter. What became known as the Pritchard Waetford report was submitted in late 1965, and largely supported the basic policy emphasis on reorganising Maori land tenure so that it was less communal and more individualised. Despite unequivocal opposition from Maori, including vocal criticism from the council, the government acted on Pritchard and Waetford’s report by passing the Maori Affairs Amendment Act 1967. Though there were differences in detail between the report and the act, the basic principles were essentially the same. The act broadened both the department and the Maori Trustee’s ability to intervene in Maori land interests, and provided for the free-holding of Maori reserved and vested lands. It controversially increased the value of the already unpopular uneconomic shares from £25 to £50, the same level of increase the Hunn report had recommended. The rationale for the increase was that the increasing number of urban Maori would prefer to have the cash value of their interests. The act also provided that Maori land owned by four or fewer owners would have its status compulsorily changed to bring it under the title system for European land. 81

The act’s provisions had been foreshadowed by the similar proposals Hunn had first put to the council in 1962. Equally, the council’s objections at the time could have served as a forewarning of the resulting dissatisfaction amongst Maori. Maori soon dubbed the 1967 act the ‘last land grab’ and their widespread discontent about it became a major factor influencing the modern Maori protest movement that emerged by the end of the 1960s. Other factors no doubt contributed to the broadening and loudening of Maori discontent in the late 1960s. Maori critiques of the 1967 act were far more organised and widespread than they had been in relation to the Hunn report, this partly due to the availability of a formal submission process, but also due to the

81 The Pritchard Waetford Report, the subsequent 1967 act and Maori responses to them are thoroughly discussed in: I. H. Kawharu, Maori Land Tenure: Studies of a Changing Institution, Oxford, 1977, pp.250-293. Kawharu’s coverage includes appendices containing excerpts from the proceedings of a conference convened by the University of Auckland and New Zealand Maori Council to discuss the Pritchard Waetford report, a synopsis of the 1967 act, and part of the submission of the Tairawhiti District Maori Council together with various East Coast incorporations. The implications for the Department of Maori Affairs’ title improvement policies are discussed in Harris, Maori Land Title Improvement.
fact that even the Hunn report’s most vehement critics could find something in it that was useful and positive. The implications of the 1967 act were less mixed: it attacked a clearly defined Maori bottom line that Maori land should under no circumstances be dealt with compulsorily. Furthermore, in passing the act the government ignored the responsible and representative Maori opinion it claimed to have established in the council.

That the council’s early records contain noteworthy examples of it resisting specific measures the government wanted to introduce counters the reputation it earned over time for relative conservatism and acquiescence. Moreover, the government appeared willing to forgo not only council approval but also the support of Maori generally in order to achieve its aims. Establishing the council as an intermediary between Maori and the state was but one component of integration policy; hugely important but not always essential. The 1967 act proved the government could carry out its Hunn-esque agenda without Maoriī or even councilī support. Yet Maori too could progress their development goals largely outside the frame of Maori-state relations. Maori commentators had forewarned the government that such might be the case, arguing ī as outlined in the previous chapter ī that a distinct Maori cultural world would remain regardless of integration. The rest of this chapter considers the evidence of this continuing Maori world, returning to chapter two’s oral retellings of the integration experience, particularly as it occurred on urban landscapes, for example through the organisation of Maori churches, play centres and sports teams.

The continuing vitality of Maori communities, even when faced with major social and economic upheaval, ought to be unsurprising. Yet it continued to elicit much surprise, evidence of how deeply integrationist ideas had permeated into non-Maori ideas about the future of Maori communities and people. Maori had rarely if ever abandoned their desires for or interpretations of social and economic advancement. Even so-called collusion with the state through such intermediaries as the league and the council had never resulted in wholesale abandonment of Maori aspirations in favour of the government’s integration agenda. However, nor was Maori pursuit of their aspirations as exclusionist or contrary as often described. The negative descriptions of contemporary processes of withdrawal or exclusion (or separatism or segregation) are ill-fitting for the Maori development projects described in the oral accounts analysed for this thesis. Withdrawal and exclusion make a
Maori reaction to the modern Pakeha world the central problem by implying that a reluctance to integrate was the primary impetus for any Maori desire to get away from Pakeha. Analyses that frame Maori responses to urbanisation as resistance, or anti-assimilation, similarly risk assigning Pakeha (or colonisation processes) the starring role as protagonists. Such analyses are reasonable, and the evidence to support them ample and robust, but Pakeha were not always the reason for Maori activity. Urban marae and Maori churches were not necessarily used to resist or escape the Pakeha world. Often, all Maori were doing was continuing what they knew from their pre-city lives, returning to and recreating the familiar and the normal of the Maori tribal worlds they had physically left behind but to which they remained innately connected.

Moreover, this cultural continuity was not necessarily grounded in Hunn’s obvious and even hackneyed list of Maori cultural relics but in the customs, values and attitudes that Bruce Biggs identified in his critique of the Hunn report. Certainly, Maori communities and organisations regarded Maori language and arts as important components of Maori culture. They were worthy not only of optional preservation through the choices of individuals and families as proposed by Hunn, but also of structured support from both government agencies and Maori people as urged by the league. However, Maori approaches to engaging with the forces of modernisation were at least equally motivated by the esoteric and ideological cultural elements, such as the whanaungatanga and sense of belonging discussed in chapter two, or the aroha, obligations of kinship, and attitudes to land and family that Biggs identified. Thus, Maori in the cities at the time of Hunn were engaged in projects large and small, planned and accidental, which brought them together to share their differences.

The life history of Letty Brown, first introduced to this thesis in chapter two, amply illuminates the argument put here. No matter how alien Letty found city life when she first moved to Auckland, she was no youngster cast adrift in a foreign land. Rather, she lived deliberately, remaining firmly centred by and committed to the values of home. Once in Auckland she accepted the embrace of an inner-city Maori community, based around the Maori Community Centre. It was a community that, in Letty’s experience, was as equally secure as the home she had left behind at Te

82 For example, Walker, Ka Whawhai Tōnū Matou; Cox, Kotahitanga; and Belich, Paradise Reforged.
84 Ibid., p.362.
Araroa. One of the main reasons she liked the Maori Community Centre was because there were old people there too. It was like being back home, down the Coast. Even when the scene of her story shifted after marriage from Central Auckland to West Auckland, Letty continued to draw on the instructive and supportive foundation she found in the nucleus of kuia and kaumatua based at the community centre. Letty explained:

When I got married I never lost contact with all those people I met down at the Maori Centre. So they became real role models for us in the city. They had made it in the city and we were just getting into it. They had been here for years before we arrived so we sort of looked at how they handled the city life and we did the same. Then our kids got to know them – Aunty Miria [Amiria Stirling] and Aunty Sue Te Tai [and others].

Letty concluded this reflection with a comment that supports the notion of an essentially continuing Maori world: Even though we were surrounded by Pakeha, we were very much living in our own Maori world, and we never lost it. For Letty, this experiential Maori world was based initially on the Te Araroa-specific tribal imperatives packed into the cultural luggage she had carried from home to Auckland. It was also flexible enough to reshape itself in new environments and contribute to the fledgling extra-tribal and city-savvy expressions seeding themselves in Auckland at the time.

After she married Hone Paraone of Otitia, Ngati Hine, Letty moved away from central Auckland, and away from the Maori Community Centre geographically at least. In Te Atatu, where Letty and Hone raised their family of four girls and one boy, Letty turned her attention to a succession of community projects. She was involved in establishing the Te Atatu Branch of the Maori Women’s Welfare League. She was the first secretary of the Te Atatu Maori Committee, and was involved with the group of West Auckland Maori who, in the late 1960s, started the Manutaki culture group and began fundraising for the Hoani Waititi Marae. Letty’s involvements and achievements were acknowledged in 1968 when she was named Young Maori Woman of the Year, an award established by the Auckland industrialist Sir Jack Butland. The concern here, however, is not to list the

85 Brown interview, Tape1 Side A.
86 Ibid.

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achievements of one individual but rather, to consider the nature of them in relation to the business of daily lives and the policies of integration.

The various projects Letty joined may be collectively interpreted as attempts to mark out a Maori space within which she could raise a confident Maori family immersed in the cultural imperatives of her own tribal upbringing. The primacy of family as motivator and anchor quickly became apparent when Letty stepped into her first community leadership role. In 1961-2, Letty decided it was time to do something for her first two children, then aged about two and one:

Everybody used to take their kids up to [Te Atatu] play centre. I thought, I’m sure this would be a good thing for my kids, for them to get to know everybody in the community. So I used to take them and I was about the only Maori mother there.

Letty was certain there were more Maori mothers in her neighbourhood whose children might enjoy play centre, but in the meantime became resigned to the fact it was a Pakeha thing. Play centre [was] very much a community thing, but a community according to the Pakeha way of doing things, and it was very Pakeha.

Letty persevered with taking her girls to play centre, and sometimes was able to forget she and her children were surrounded by Pakeha. She regarded her involvement as an extension of her responsibilities as a mother and eventually decided to train as a play centre supervisor. While training she met other Maori mothers who had made the same vocational choice and struck up conversations with them about the apparent reluctance of Maori parents to utilise play centres. Letty resolved to act and, having identified the homes of Maori families in her neighbourhood, went door-knocking. She introduced herself as connected to the play centre and invited Maori mothers to attend with their children. The results were mixed. One by one Maori mothers and their children joined in at the Te Atatu play centre, but few maintained their attendance for long; a couple of weeks seemed long enough for most. As parents dropped out Letty went back out into the community and diplomatically inquired into why they had stopped attending. In Letty’s memory, most of the responses were about being shy or whakama. These references to the social discomfort of being an obvious cultural minority were occasionally expressed as

87 Ibid.
negative stereotypes of Pakeha, as women commented that there were too many Pakehas [sic] or that they can’t stand Pakehas.

For Letty, these comments were timely reminders of the alien Pakeha nature of play centre. However, with her supervisor’s certificate nearly complete, Letty also understood the benefits of social interaction for children through play and learning. Inadvertently going against the grain of integration policy, Letty called a meeting to ask Maori parents how they felt about establishing a Maori session at the play centre. Letty’s attitude towards calling the meeting was refreshingly spontaneous and innocent. She had not broached the idea with play centre staff and had no intention of being radical, provocative, or even political. In her words, all she was doing was ‘thinking about the kids and that they love to go up there and play in the hall, you know, and run around and [do] jigsaws and [read] books and everything. With the support of Maori parents, Letty asked the play centre staff and parents their opinions on introducing a session for Maori children. Unexpectedly, she could see her request shocked a number of parents and she found herself explaining: ‘Our [Maori] parents are very, very shy. They’ve all come up from the country, never mixed with Pakehas before, and all of a sudden I’m asking them to come into a Pakeha session with all Pakehas [sic], and they can’t [get comfortable].’

Letty recalls that it took about three meetings before the Maori session could go ahead. With her training and experience under her belt and with the support of Maori parents, she set up an organising committee. Again, she soon found herself in circumstances in Auckland that were ‘just like being back home’.

We ended up getting 35 kids per session with all the parents around, all wanting to fundraise, all wanting to participate. So we started fundraising. We started the first housie in the West at the school. We made money, started a little culture group, and we called our play centre Waipareira Play Centre.88

The funds raised were applied to the three Maori sessions that were held each week, the idea being that enough would be made to cover the costs of the children’s fees. That small act alone of generating a communal approach to paying fees normally paid by individual families was probably enough to differentiate the Maori parents and children from the Pakeha. However, though the goal was to create a culturally

88 Ibid.
comfortable space the supporters of the Waipareira play centre had no intention of attracting the negativity that soon came their way. A dirty letter from Wellington claimed the Maori sessions were an unwanted example of apartheid. It was a view apparently supported by education officials and local council members, while Letty and the others were shocked by it. Even the Maori Education Foundation, which had employed Lex Gray to promote the establishment of play centres in rural areas for Maori mothers, preferred that city-based Maori mothers mixed with Pakeha. Fortunately Letty had the support of her uncle Arapeta Awatere who was so proud of what his òramutu turanga whanau had done. There was some good press too. Harry Dansey, then a journalist with the Auckland Star, wrote a very favourable article about the Waipareira play centre. In the face of this mix of both positive and negative reactions, the strength of Te Atatu Maori community became obvious, spearheaded by the group of women that had coalesced through the play centre. The accusations of separatism did little to deter them. As well as a culture group, the women set up a Maori language and arts programme.

It is no surprise that Letty's next community development - helping to found the Te Atatu branch of the Maori Women's Welfare League - grew from the kernel that had been sown at the Waipareira play centre. What is surprising, perhaps, is that Letty's introduction to her new community and its projects was through her perceptions of the needs of her family, and that her involvement with the play centre pre-dated her involvement with the league. The task of setting up a branch of the league was eased somewhat by a sense of obligation to an aunt, Maraea Te Kawa, who was the president of one of the earliest branches, Arahina in central Auckland. Furthermore, the founding members of the Te Atatu branch of the league were practically the same women involved in the play centre. The league was another organisation through which the mums could structure their interactions and activities. It also pooled the skills of individual women into a collective.

Maori community development in Te Atatu seemed to gather its own momentum following the establishment of the branch, and Letty soon found herself appointed the first secretary of the newly formed Te Atatu Maori Committee. Around the same time, she became a part of discussions about setting up a West Auckland Maori culture group. In her view a culture group had the potential to attract different

90. Brown interview, Tape 1 Sides A and B.
people, perhaps those who were less-inclined to attend league or committee meetings. It would be another group through which the Maoriness of urban-dwelling Maori could be expressed. That group became the popular and renowned Manutaki, led by Peter Sharples. About the same time that Manutaki got under way, the topic of building a West Auckland marae came to the fore of community discussions. By then a steadfast, cohesive community of West Auckland Maori had developed and was meeting regularly and organising around shared commitments. Even so, thinking about building an extra-tribal marae in suburban Auckland at that time was something else altogether, no matter that a marae seemed the natural focal point to build as a permanent centre for the many Maori voluntary groups that had grown up in the area.

Conceptions of whanau also featured in the exchange of ideas about the marae. It was needed because it was becoming too difficult for the various Maori groups to meet — people’s homes seemed to be getting smaller as the numbers of people meeting grew. The ‘whanau’ was ready for a marae. Mavis Tuoro, teacher, social worker, and first president of the Waipareira branch of the league, said West Auckland needed a marae to help educate and motivate our people, a place we could bring manuhiri aboard and do things Maori. Further:

We were trying to create — a sense of family and a sense of belonging when people were no longer able to readily access their whanau ties in the areas they were originally from — We wanted to recreate whanau ties in the city. This is something the League and the Maori Committees were trying to do as well.

It was probably Maori West Auckland’s biggest project. By the end of 1967 a formal marae committee was busy fundraising, and the project marshalled the skills and resources of the ‘cream’ of Maori leadership. Fundraising and project development occupied the remainder of the 60s, all of the 70s and much of the 80s. The project peaked when Hoani Waititi Marae opened in April 1980, and marae-based initiatives have continued to proliferate, particularly around the Maori education centre established there.

91 Ibid., Tape 1 Side B.
92 Mavis Tuoro, ‘Evidence for Te Whanau o Waipareira Trust in Wai 414, a claim against the Community Funding Agency’ unpublished briefs of evidence, Te Whanau o Waipareira Trust, c.1994.
Hoani Waititi Marae and the many people involved with its establishment deserve to be written about in their own history. However, the marae enters this thesis as the apogee of all Letty’s community work, and a reminder of the longevity of the dedication to Maori community that built it. It is described as the prototype of the modern urban non-kin marae.\textsuperscript{94} It, and other marae like it, ought to be understood not just in the context of the time at which it became functional, but also in the context of the time that had gone before. Hoani Waititi Marae was both the end result of decades of community development, and the starting point of a whole new era for Maori West Auckland and urban-dwelling Maori elsewhere. It is unlikely that Letty could have predicted the eventual establishment of an urban marae when she first chose to address the issue of Maori attendance at Te Atatu play centre, but when viewed retrospectively, with an awareness of the energies and initiatives of the community it appears as a natural response to the circumstances in which Maori found themselves in the 1960s.

There are many other examples of the kind of community organising that occurred in Letty’s story. Most have already been suggested in chapter two, like the Jacobs family and their support for Te Unga Waka. In effect, after traversing the history of tribal committees, the league, and the Hunn report the thesis returns home or at least to the notion of it established in chapter two. The experiences of Letty Brown, Pio and Chrissie Jacobs, Margaret Harris, Caroline Reeves and countless other Maori can be shown as an anchor for the reality of Maori lives in the cities, combing in so many ways both new lives and their origins in the rural Maori world. Experiences like Letty’s explain both the weaknesses of Hunn’s approach, and the changeable nature of Maori critiques of the Hunn report. The Maori relationship with the state was difficult to define, complex and varied. The state had tremendous power, but could not do everything, and was indifferent to many things, such as Maori culture. It was in the state’s blind spots that Maori community leaders of the 60s could apply their efforts to what mattered to them. Going against the tide of integration, Maori people dug deep to produce urban marae, Maori churches, Maori sports teams and other Maori voluntary organisations. They drew on home and recreated home out of missing it, to set up new homes on unfamiliar landscapes. In doing so, they transplanted the

\textsuperscript{94} Walker, \textit{Maori People since 1950} pp.505-6.
familiar from their old homes. They did that work while the old debates about integration took new forms, reaching a new level of intensity and public scrutiny following the publication of the Hunn report. They did it at a time that Maori policy fractured the relationship between Maori leaders and the government. But policies of accelerated integration, weighted in favour of eradicating rather than nurturing difference, did little to deter the on-the-ground creative energies of Maori. Maori could take Hunn’s idea that integration was about Maori self-reliance and Maori finding their feet and interpret it to mean finding their Maori feet in a Maori conception of the modern world.\footnote{Hunn, Opening Speech to Inaugural Conference of NZMC, MA 1, 35/2 pt 2, ANZW.}
One of the tasks of history is as simple as it is powerful: to listen to the past. Having listened, attention can then be turned to the task of understanding, understanding not just what happened in the past but also what it means in the present. This particular history has listened to the narratives of the Maori 1950s and 60s and heard the distinct voices of Maori leadership, Maori womanhood, and Maori determination. Reflecting on these provided opportunities to consider and develop new understandings of the complexities of the Maori-state relationship, and the complexities of the Maori world and lives. There is a twin-set of conclusions to discuss here. The first part of the set relates primarily to how the professed ‘topic’ of the thesis has been periodised and conceptualised; the second part to the study’s philosophical, cultural and epistemological grounding as expressed by the notions of ‘home’ and ‘whakapapa of experience’.

Dealing with the first part of the twin-set first: the stories narrated here revise existing stereotypes about the nature and effectiveness of Maori leadership in the 1950s and 1960s. They also allow a reconsideration of the place of the Hunn report in derailing Maori-state relations in the post-war period. The 1950s are understudied in New Zealand history, and perhaps moreso in respect of Maori history. Appreciating the complexities of the Maori 50s has been key to demonstrating the importance of the period and what can be learned from studying it in depth. In the post-war period, the state continued its colonising project first begun in the nineteenth century. It refashioned assimilation as integration throughout the 1950s, and formally unveiled it as such in the 1961 Hunn report. Tracing the whakapapa of Maori urban experience and supposed integration back into the 1950s suggests that Maori relations with the state were simultaneously more conflicted, more subtle and more cooperative than has previously been acknowledged. The 1950s generation of Maori leaders finessed their relationship with the Department of Maori Affairs in ways that materially improved conditions for Maori people, and allowed Maori voices to be heard within the department by senior management and policy-makers.

Throughout the 50s Maori interactions with the state were largely facilitated through the home-grown and home-centred tribal committees and branches of the league. The league and the tribal committees engaged confidently and strategically with the Department of Maori
Affairs which, at the time, included significant Maori leaders at both senior official and community levels. Challenged by wide-ranging and onerous ‘official’ responsibilities the tribal committees played an important role in interpreting Maori policy in ways that best suited their local circumstances and community goals. The Maori Women’s Welfare League was effective partly because it consistently interpreted its aims in terms of the fundamental role of women in the lives of their children and families. By basing its assertions of Maori cultural distinctiveness and determination on womanly concerns for domesticity, the league impacted where it could on Maori education, housing, justice and the arts. The New Zealand Maori Council also engaged critically with the department and its policies. It too wanted the close co-operation with Maori communities to continue as a feature of Maori-state relations, and wanted to be representative of those many community voices. Ultimately, however, the council’s position was undercut by the implementation of the very report that established it. So Maori did not always get what they wanted, and though the gains achieved may seem small compared to the enormous energy expended, they could shape the implementation of what the state wanted. Examples include the league’s persistent engagement with the department over its housing policy, and its achievement of representation on housing priority committees. The Maori leadership that engaged with the state was vibrant and intelligent. It accepted major responsibility for navigating the stresses and changes of te ao hurihuri while endeavouring to maintain a comfortable balance between full and equal participation in New Zealand society and continuation of Maori cultural distinctiveness.

During the 50s, the state seemed unconcerned with those Maori who were not interested in integration, and posed no direct threat to the rural tribal homelands of the Maori world. However, the Hunn report attempted to make integration a minimum compulsory standard for Maori people to enter modern New Zealand society. Indeed, it emphasised eliminating the unintegrated Maori minority typical of rural Maori communities. Implementation of the Hunn report threatened the extent to which the home base of the Maori world could survive in the long-term by refusing to support its precepts as a matter of policy. But home had long been indifferent to policy when it suited, and continued indeed to shape and influence Maori lives. Maori proved they could achieve their development goals largely outside the frame of Maori-state relations. Maori commentators had forewarned the government that such might be the case, arguing that a distinct Maori world would remain regardless of integration. This continuity can be seen in the positive and meaningful projects that Maori parents instigated because they wanted their children to enjoy the advantages of tribal upbringings. It was the transplantation of the tribal
home into the modern urban environment that had Pio and Chrissie Jacobs join the efforts to establish Te Unga Waka and had Letty Brown set up a Maori session at the local play centre. To achieve their goals, community leaders like Letty worked with policies of integration and worked against them also.

Hunn laced his report with enough positive measures to garner Maori support, such as modern Maori institutions like the Maori Education Foundation and the Maori council. The establishment of the council offered some potential for Maori to continue their relationships with the state from the basis of their local autonomy. However, the state quickly treated the council not as an equal partner with whom it could negotiate but as a representative body to consult about what the state wanted. The council was then expected to convey the state’s desires to Maori and manage both Maori desires and Maori reactions downwards. Tolerance for Maori institutions and continuing Maori distinctiveness did have its limits. 1960s New Zealand was self-conscious about the appearance of its race relations and feared anything that might look like separation or segregation of Maori and Pakeha. That self-consciousness helps to explain Hunn’s emphasis on mainstreaming the administration of Maori Affairs and ridding the statutes of any legal differentiations between Maori and Pakeha. Moreover, though Hunn’s integration allowed for limited cultural continuity, it provided no mechanism to support it. These fiscal and attitudinal constraints were further complicated by racial discrimination, in the form of colour bars and stereotypes, which limited the extent to which Maori were accepted as integrated individuals in society. Again, Maori leadership neither ignored nor passively accepted the situation in which it found itself. Maori community projects continued, with or without state or public support. In some respects the state inadvertently assisted the process by gendering its approach to integration. It could allow Maori to direct domestic, cultural and feminine aspects of their modern lives, but where the economic, public and masculine aspects of modern life were concerned, government intervention became more concerted and rigid. Thus a Maori church in Epsom and a Maori play centre in Te Atatu could be tolerated because children belonged with their mothers and ought to be encouraged towards Christian living.

The state showed it could continue its Hunn-esque agenda without Maori support when it passed the 1967 Maori Affairs Amendment Act. Hunn, and his minister, Hanan, did not encourage the organic community relationships to which Maori had become accustomed. This side-lining of Maori opinion in the 1960s, and the fracturing of the close community relationships previously enjoyed, meant that the suspicion and wariness that percolated under the negotiated Maori-State relationships of the 1950s became more vocal and frustrated.
around the release of Hunn, and then more widespread and organised in the face of the last land grab. In the process, Maori demonstrated that though they were willing to actively engage in a tense but workable relationship with the state, there was a bottom line below which they would not venture. In the late 1960s that bottom line was represented by the 1967 act sanctioning of the state’s decision to deal with Maori land compulsorily, a decision taken despite unequivocal Maori opposition. Opposition to the 1967 act provided a modern catalyst for old grievances including concerns about land, te reo, and racism. In the wake of the act, and with no recourse to the negotiability of earlier Maori-state interactions, modern Maori protest would emerge and the community development projects of the 50s and 60s continue. But it was not just the act that redefined the new period. At the core of both the act and the Hunn report was an attack on home, the very basis from which Maori engaged with the state and sought to ameliorate their modern circumstances.

The second component of this twin-set of conclusions introduces the weight given not only to the oral history testimony but the ideas that underpin them, ideas that are as elusive as they are ordinary, ideas that the dismissively minded might regard as ‘obvious’. The use of oral history has provided important understandings of Maori-state relations unavailable in the reams of information preserved in government archives. The notions of home arose directly and uncompromisingly from the oral history, but could not be discerned in the department’s files. Furthermore, the contributors of the oral histories used were not randomly selected but were rather selected by whakapapa, the whakapapa of experience. It is an approach which makes the family, my family in particular, the centrifugal force in this history and brings into focus my distinctive subject position, and the consciousness of writing my history in my present. What has been narrated here is not simply a history of an impersonalised ‘other’ nor even the history of an amorphous, generic ‘us’. At the base of this history is my family history, the history of how I got to be here writing a history of how I got to be here. Subjectivity can be difficult to contend with in history writing. Answers to otherwise simple historical questions have been harder to articulate. It could have been easy to take for granted the obvious when writing from a world in which notions like ‘home’ are so normal and familiar they needed no explanation. It could have been easy to overlook the point that I was told some things not just because of what I asked, but also because of who I am. Yet, it has been the ‘obvious’ that assisted the history writing process. The notions of home and whakapapa of experience ā I in the double sense of ‘heir’ experience back then and my experience now ā I are central to how the oral and written sources are interwoven and also to
the way the demands of writing a history about ōhemō and me, then and now, have been negotiated.

Home was one of the few constants throughout this thesis, both for me as its author and for the narration of the history. The constancy of home, and its power to call on its people, no matter where their lives take them is expressed in this waiata. Composed by my nana, Violet Otene Harris, it counsels her mokopuna that wherever they are in the world, and whatever it is they are questing for, they will find it at home, at their turangawaewae, the place where the ancestors have left all treasured gifts, including knowledge and understanding:

Ka rapurapu kei hea ra me pehea ra e kitea ai nga taonga o oku tupuna e ka hoki nga mahara ki Hokianga whakapau karakia. Ka tangi mai te manu nei, e hoki ki to turangawaewae kei reira nga taonga tuku iho na nga tupuna e.¹

Like this waiata, home included highly nuanced and important ideological blueprints that structured society and culture, and was robust enough to transcend geographical boundaries, and shift between tradition and modernity. In its specificity, the waiata requires me to write this history from home. In its broader application, it is an acknowledgement that the guidelines for living as Maori in the modern world ought to be derived from home. This thesis has shown that these guidelines were included in the cultural luggage of the people who moved away from home. Much of the process of living away from home was about re-establishing the things from home that were most desired in the modern world. In the modern world, the particularities of specific homes merged and interacted with other homes. The ideas and activities that developed out of those interactions could have been regarded as evidence of the fragmentation and dilution of Maori lifeways and values. Instead, however, they have been woven together using the notion of whakapapa of experience to show the dynamic ways in which Maori engaged with the state from their home base, and faced the many challenges of urbanisation. To outsiders observing Maori living in 1950s West Auckland, Maori relationships to home may not look the same as they did in 1940s Hokianga.

¹ Original composition by Violet Otene Harris, 1979. The interpretation is based not only on the words, but on Violet’s explanation of how and why she composed it, V. O. Harris interview, Tape 4 Side A. The specific turangawaewae referred to is Hokianga whakapau karakia (Hokianga that exhausts prayers or incantations, a reference to a heated debate between the earliest Hokianga settlers who exhausted their repertoire of karakia in the process. See: Department of Maori Affairs, He Pepeha, he Whakatauki no Taitokerau, Whangarei, 1987, pp.24-5).
or Te Araroa, and certainly they would have changed markedly. Nonetheless, it is too simplistic to equate geographical distance and quarter-acre sections with a complete and irreversible severing of ties. Home not only reached its people in the city, but continued to call on them. In the Maori conception of home, its role expanded rather than diminished in the face of modernisation. To access understandings of the intricacies of the relationships between home and the city, tradition and modernity, and to show the variations in experiences as connected rather than disparate, this thesis has restored the Maori or home narrative and examined the state’s policies of integration from that position.

This thesis has emphasised Maori agency, achievement and determination. However care needs to be taken to ensure that it is not then erroneously used to somehow downplay the very serious social problems that arose out of Maori experiences of urbanisation. Similarly, the thesis makes no attempt to absolve the state from its responsibilities to Maori. It has simply been an exercise in rehabilitating the mid-twentieth-century generation of Maori leaders, to show them as precisely the kind of leaders that the times required. Being unable to cut assimilation out at its nineteenth century roots, they were unable to stop the push for integration, but they could subvert it. Furthermore, Maori never let go of the essentials of their tribal home, the very things the state regarded as threatening the success of integration because they continued cultural difference. Maori leaders of the 50s and 60s made important and difficult decisions during important and difficult times. The fact that they made those decisions and acted on them while engaged with a state intent on integration, and while undergoing a major social revolution, makes them all the more remarkable.

This view, this exercise in rehabilitation, was enabled by the approach employed to write this history. It required an integral acknowledgement that the 50s were not the 60s in another form, and that Maori lives were important and powerful even in their everyday expressions. This history has been careful to avoid pigeon holes that limit analyses of Maori actions to either resistance or collaboration, and thus risk glossing over the complexities of Maori engagement with the state. It took an approach that allowed the Maori voice to not only speak for itself, but also register in New Zealand history. Fundamentally, it re-centred Maori narratives on concepts central to the Maori world, and thereby remained anchored throughout by home and family, the one constant in the ever-changing world. In this way a philosophical reconciliation of the intellectual home-ground that is history, and the whakapapa of experience from which Maori descend, was given practical expression.
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GLOSSARY OF MĀORI WORDS AND PHRASES

ūpōtoro  minister in the Ratana faith, apostle (transliteration)
aroha  love, compassion, sorrow
haka  traditional Māori posture dance
harakeke  flax
hautūī  mischief, delinquent, tearaway
hunga kŪnga  home people
hura kōhatu  unveiling (generally of a memorial stone for deceased)
huritau  birthday
irūhutu  niece, nephew
iwi  tribe, nation, people
kŪui ariki  chiefly lines, aristocracy
kai  food, eat
kaimoana  seafood
kŪnga ū turu  original home
kapa haka  haka group, participate in haka
karakia  prayer
kaupapa  plan, policy, principle, proposal, project
kete  kit, basket
kāhanga reo  language nest, Māori pre-school
komiti wahine  women’s committee
kōero  talk, tell, say
manuhiri  visitor, guest
mūauranga  knowledge
marae  complex of whareniu, wharekai, wharepaku and grounds plus related facilities such as cemeteries, churches, and kāhanga reo. (Traditionally the courtyard in front of the whareniu).
mūena  marriage, wedding
miha Maori  Māori mass, Māori church service
mōngūmokopuna  for the grandchildren (and descendants thereafter)
mokopuna  grandchild, grandchildren
pōwhakangahau  evening of entertainment
poi  item for rhythmic accompaniment of waiata
pūkana - stare wildly, roll the eyes
rangatahi - youth
ringawera - worker, kitchen worker
tamariki atawhai - adopted children
tangata whenua - hosts, original people
tangiwhanga - wake, funeral
tūhiko - Māori decorative knotting art
taonga katoa - everything, all properties, all valued belongings
te reo - the (Māori) language
te reo me ōna tikanga - Māori language and its customs
Te Tairāwhiti - East Coast
Te Taitokerau - Northland	
tikanga - Māori values, custom
tūpuna - ancestor
tūrangawaewae - home ground, basis of iwi membership
wāhanga - chapter
waiata - song, sing
waiata-ūringa - action songs
wero - challenge
whaamere, whūhere - family (transliteration)
whakapapa - genealogy
whakatauki - proverb, saying
whūau - family, extended family
whanaunga - relative, cousin, kin, interrelated
whanaungatanga - relatedness, kinship
wharekai - dining room
wharemoko - carved wharenui (colloquial)
wharenui - meeting house
wharepaku - toilet, ablution block
whūiki - mats, matting, floor covering
whenua tautohetohe - contested ground