"Is Music a Language of the Emotions?"

In discussing musical works and their appreciation we accept they may be understood (and misunderstood) and that a person who understands a work can be asked to justify her understanding. The nature of aesthetic discussions and disagreements about music indicates that we accept that music is the bearer of meaning or sense and that it is this meaning or sense the listener comprehends when she is said to understand a musical work. Nevertheless, neither what it is that music means nor the way music bears its meaning is readily apparent. It is these subjects I consider below.

What is the meaning of a piece of music? It is whatever it is that we understand when we (can be said by others to) understand a musical work aesthetically; it is what interests us and what we value in musical works. On the phenomenological level, a typical understanding response to music is the experience of hearing the way one series of notes gives rise to another. It is to recognize that a musical continuation makes 'sense' (or does not make 'sense') as a consequence of what preceded it, even where the continuation might not have been predicted on hearing the antecedent passage. We experience music not merely as a succession of notes and chords but as developing, recasting, and otherwise exploring its materials in a connected way. Our attempt to understand music is premised on the belief that we can attempt reasonably to justify and not merely explain the course of the music.

If music never referred us beyond itself, so that all that was involved in understanding music was an appreciation of its structure, its texture, the thematic relationships, and so on, then the nature of musical understanding (and, thus, of musical 'meaning') would raise few philosophical difficulties. But music does refer beyond itself, in that it is expressive of emotions, and there are considerable philosophical difficulties faced in attempting to account for this. Since it is arguable that the listener usually reveals her understanding of the music through her appreciation of, and response to, what is expressed in music (in those cases where the music is expressive), such difficulties cannot be dismissed in discussing the nature of musical meaning. I do not wish to claim that all music is expressive of emotions. But the importance attached to the appreciation of such expressiveness, where it occurs, as indicating that the listener understands the music, clearly suggests that the conceptually interesting difficulties in describing music as expressive of emotion are of central importance in a consideration of the philosophically interesting cases of musical meaning.
We would not say of a person that he understood a musical work if he was unaware, for example, that its themes were related, that some sections were texturally and harmonically denser than others, that some sections were relatively more tense than others, and so on. We would expect him to be able to give some account of such matters, though not necessarily in technical terms. But, if the music were expressive of some emotion, we would be dubious of the claim that the person understood the piece, even if he could provide a description of his experience of the relatedness of its themes, etc., if he failed to notice the expressiveness of the music. A musician with a complete grasp of the music's technical features may not be able to play it convincingly until told to play it as if in 'cheerful resignation' rather than 'tense foreboding'. Though not all music is expressive of emotion, our present notions of musical understanding and musical meaning would be quite other than they are if music were never experienced, and responded to, as expressive of emotion.

We sometimes say 'This music is expressive' without feeling that we can adequately answer the question 'What, then, does it express?'. A person may feel that he cannot convey in words what is expressed in a musical work when he is describing it to another who is not familiar with the piece, but if he says that the work is sad he has conveyed something about it, although he may not have captured the quality of the sadness that he finds so interesting (Wollheim 1980: 110-14; Scruton 1974: 78-83). Now, of course, to understand a musical work is not simply to be able to name the emotional states expressed in it. To justify an understanding of some particular work it must be described in such a way as to reveal it as the sole source of our experience of the emotion expressed in it. In describing the emotions expressed in music one is led to describe the course of the music and the experience of its connectedness.

So far, I have suggested both that to understand the meaning of a musical work expressive of emotion will involve appreciating the emotions expressed in it and that we are not precluded from identifying and describing these emotions. I have also suggested that there are few philosophically interesting difficulties in accounting for the 'sense' or 'meaning' of music in which emotions are not expressed. In discussing musical meaning I will be considering the philosophically interesting case, that of how expressive music gets its meaning. The question is: How is musical reference to the expressed 'content' secured? In what follows it will be argued that music is understood neither as a (natural) language, nor as a nonlinguistic symbol system, before it is suggested that music is 'naturally' meaningful (in the Gricean sense) of emotions. I will be attacking the view that our present notions of musical understanding and musical meaning are best elucidated by showing that these notions are strictly analogous to the notions of linguistic meaning or of meaning determined by the conventions of a symbol system.

Several writers (see Meyer 1956, Cooke 1959) have argued that in understanding a musical work we appreciate it as having a propositional function. According to this theory, music has assertoric meaning in the way that declarative sentences have assertoric meaning; musical compositions are a means for the communication of information in the way that assertoric sentences of natural languages are. Music differs from natural
languages only in that its field of reference is restricted to the world of emotions. Music, in this theory, is a semantic system with a vocabulary and a syntax.

One objection to this view is the following: To say that music is understood as having an assertoric function is to claim that music refers to emotions and goes on to describe the emotions to which it refers. In developing a parallel between music and language it is not sufficient to show that music may refer us to emotional states, it is also necessary to show how emotions are described in music. Though there may be a point to developing a description of the emotion expressed in a musical work in terms of the musical features through which the emotion is presented, it is not clear that music provides for the completion of one's thoughts about the expressed emotion in the way the predicate of an assertoric sentence provides for the completion of one's thoughts about the subject of that sentence. The emotion is announced through the music rather than described by the music.

The theory under consideration might attempt to meet this objection by claiming that musical 'sentences' are of the type called by Strawson (1964: 202-17) 'feature-placing sentences'. That is, it might be claimed that musical sentences perform the same function as a subclass of the class of assertions found in natural languages. The assertions in this subclass introduce neither particulars nor sortal universals (such as, fall of snow); they introduce 'feature universals' or 'feature concepts' as does, for example, the sentence 'It is snowing'. According to this view, 'The music is sad' can be analyzed as asserting: 'There is sound and sadness here'. Feature-placing sentences are not subject-predicate sentences; they introduce a universal, or 'stuff', and place it in space and time. It might be said that in feature-placing sentences the assertion is effected through the location of the subject.

This answer to the objection fails on two counts. First, it might be suspected it is 'particular-placing' rather than 'feature-placing' that is required. By feature-placing the subject is transformed into a universal (or, sometimes, a 'stuff'), so that 'Sadness is here' is not equivalent to 'The (bit of) sadness in which you are interested is here'. The counter to the objection loses the fact that our interest in the expressiveness heard in music is an interest in the particular expressiveness of a particular piece of music. Second, the possibility of feature-placing sentences within a language presupposes the possibility within the language of assertions introducing particulars and sortal universals (Strawson 1964: 214-15). That is, there could be no language, as the counter to the objection claims, in which all assertions were of the feature-placing type. The attempt to analyze 'The music is sad' as 'There is sound and sadness here' will fail. We will be forced to conclude that what is involved in musical reference is not feature-placing but, rather, something like brute 'naming'. And, as Rhees (1959-60) has argued, that is an idle, senseless game except within the context of a fuller language in which it is possible for people to tell each other things.

The second objection to the theory that music is understood aesthetically as a language like any other argues that musical meaning is unlike linguistic meaning in that whereas the latter depends on the possibility of truthful assertion, the notion of truth plays no part in the determination of the former. Two (contrasting) accounts of linguistic
meaning (of an assertion) for natural languages are given in the contemporary literature. The first defines the meaning of an assertion in terms of the assertion's truth-conditions; the second defines the meaning of an assertion in terms of the assertion's verifiability-conditions or justified assertability. Fortunately it is not necessary that we adjudicate between these accounts before we are able to argue that music does not constitute a language of the emotions such as could answer to either of these views. Both definitions of linguistic meaning entail that language is essentially a semantic system, and it can be argued that music is not understood as such. Both accounts of linguistic meaning entail that the meaningfulness of linguistic utterances rests in all their uses on the possibility of truthful assertion. The non-assertoric uses of language depend on and follow from the possibility that those same words can have a use in the making of truthful assertions. Within the context of a semantic system by which communication can be effected, reference and meaning entail the possibility of truthful assertion. As Rhees (1959-60) has argued, there can be no language that admits of the possibility of non-assertoric uses of sentences that does not also admit of the possibility of an assertoric use of sentences.

To understand a musical utterance is not to know whether that utterance is true or false. We do not regard musical utterances as subject to truth-conditions or as meeting standards of assertive correctness or incorrectness of use. In respect of its meaning, music cannot usefully be compared to a language.

It might be argued that the above conclusion was reached too hastily. For, though music obviously is not a natural language, the appreciation of musical meaning and the appreciation of the meaning of a declarative sentence may be, in important respects, analogous. It might be argued, for example, that musical reference is like reference in the sentences of a natural language to the extent that both types of reference are secured by the conventions of a symbol system. The conventions, by means of which the symbols are systematized, serve to make manifest the symbolizer's intentions, and thus his meaning, to his audience. According to this view, music is understood as a nonlinguistic symbol system.

An account of meaning applicable both to linguistic and nonlinguistic symbol systems is offered by Grice (1957). He analyses utterer's occasion meaning—"The utterer meant by uttering x (an instance or token of an utterance type, such as a word, sentence, gesture, name, or whatever) that x'—as follows: For some audience, A, U uttered x intending (a) A to produce a particular response, r; (b) A to think (recognize) that U intends (a); and (c) A to fulfill (a) on the basis of his fulfillment of (b). This definition is inadequate as it stands to cope with some of the less usual instances of utterer's occasion meaning, but it is adequate for our purposes.

Now, if the utterance is a work of art and if the audience's interest in the work of art is an aesthetic one, then the third condition, (c), is not necessarily met. An aesthetic interest in the work of art concerns itself with the best (most aesthetically rewarding)
reading of the work of art, without treating the work of art merely as a vehicle for the communication of the artist's thoughts. An aesthetic interest is an interest in what the artist has 'to say', but an interest in what the artist has 'to say' need not necessarily be an interest in the artist's intentions (made manifest in the work of art or by their avowal) that the work of art be read and understood in one way rather than another. The audience may respond, say, to a poem as it was intended to respond, and it may also recognize that the poet intended it to respond this way, but the response, if aesthetic, is not determined by the recognition of the artist's intention. That is, the acceptance of the first condition, (a), does not rest on the recognition that the second condition, (b), is fulfilled. This is a general point about the way aesthetic interest differs from an interest in utterer's occasion meaning and about the way the aim of aesthetic understanding differs from the aim of understanding an utterance spoken on a particular occasion as communicating a meaning intended by the utterer. This point holds true of art (such as literature and representational paintings) that could be understood nonaesthetically according to Grice's model, because it constitutes or falls within symbol systems. The same argument shows that music is not understood as a nonlinguistic symbol system, but leaves open the question of whether music could be so understood.

In the same paper Grice distinguishes cases of 'naturally' determined meaning from 'non-naturally' determined meaning. Non-natural meaning (meaning\textsubscript{NN}) is secured by the conventions of a symbol system that serve within the system to make understandable the meaning that the utterer intended to convey. Non-natural meaning may be either linguistic or nonlinguistic. Grice uses 'Those three rings on the bell (of the bus) mean that "the bus is full"' as his example of non-natural meaning. Natural meaning (meaning\textsubscript{N}) is not determined by the conventions of a symbol system. Grice uses 'Those spots mean measles' as his example of natural meaning. Five points of difference between these two kinds of meaning are noted:

1. 'X means that p' with meaning\textsubscript{N} entails p (the person must have measles); but with meaning\textsubscript{NN} p is not entailed (the bus-conductor can be mistaken). (2) With meaning\textsubscript{N} we cannot argue from 'x means that p' to 'by those spots it is meant that he has measles'; but with meaning\textsubscript{NN} we can argue from the sentence to what is meant by it. (3) With meaning\textsubscript{N} we cannot argue from the sentence to the conclusion that someone meant by the spots so-and-so; but with meaning\textsubscript{NN} we can argue to the conclusion that someone meant that the bus was full. (4) With meaning\textsubscript{N} the sentence cannot be restated in such a way that 'mean' is followed by a sentence or phrase in reported speech (we cannot say 'Those spots mean "he has measles"'); but with meaning\textsubscript{NN} we can do this. (5) With meaning\textsubscript{N} the sentence can be restated beginning with 'the fact that' (as in 'The fact that he has those spots means that he has measles') without changing its meaning; but with meaning\textsubscript{NN} a restatement of the sentence in this form does not preserve the meaning of the original version, although both statements may be true.

Representational paintings and the statements found in literature are clearly understood as non-naturally meaningful. 'This picture of Wellington means that "Wellington looked [or '. . . ought to have looked . . .', or '. . . might have looked . . .', etc.] like this"' is substitutable for 'Those three rings on the bell mean that "the bus is full"'.

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This is not to say, though, that an aesthetic interest in a portrait of Wellington is an interest in the Wellingtonlikeness of the painting, nor that an aesthetic interest in the statements found in literary works is concerned with their truth. The appreciation of what a painting represents or what is stated in a literary work rests on recognition of the conventions of their respective symbol systems. However, 'This music means sadness' would seem more readily substituted for 'Those spots mean measles' than for 'Those three rings on the bell mean that "the bus is full"', at least in (1), (4), and (5).

Grice's second and third criteria leave vague the way we should treat cases where something that is naturally meaningful is given an intentional use; for example, where a person frowns intentionally. As Grice points out, our recognition that the frown was intentional would normally require understanding it as non-naturally meaningful to the extent that one's concern is with what the frown is intended to convey rather than with the significance merely of the person's appearance. Since, usually, music presents in sound the appearance of the emotion that it was intended by the composer to present, it would seem that musical expressiveness should be analyzed as non-naturally meaningful after all. But the case of musical expressiveness differs importantly from that in which a person frowns intentionally. It is because one's interest in facial expressions normally follows from a concern with their indicating how the person feels that an intentional frown becomes non-naturally meaningful, whereas an unintended frown is naturally meaningful. By contrast, the expressiveness of music does not interest us as indicating how any person feels; our concern is with the appearance of emotion rather than with a particular feeling as indicated in such an appearance.

Grice's second and third criteria do not suggest that all intentional 'utterances' must be understood as non-naturally meaningful. Where the meaningfulness of the utterance depends on an appreciation of the intention, as is the case with onomatopoeic words or where intentional frowns interest us as signifying a person's feelings, non-natural meaning is involved. But where the intention may be disregarded without this thereby altering the potential meaning of the 'utterance', the meaning of the utterance is natural rather than non-natural. In the case of musical expressiveness, the composer's intentions are essentially irrelevant. Though it may be the case that most music that is expressive presents the appearance of emotions that the composer intended it to present, the absence of such an intention does not affect the expressiveness heard in a musical work. Either the music presents the appearance of some emotion or it does not, independently of its being intended or not to present the appearance of this emotion. Once more there is an obvious contrast with representational painting. A painting of a man may resemble Wellington whether or not it was intended to do so. But representation (as opposed to mere resemblance) crucially involves intention. However much a painting may resemble Wellington, it does not represent him unless it was intended to represent him. The appreciation of representation involves the recognition of intention in a way that the appreciation of musical expressiveness (as the presentation of appearances of emotions) does not.

With the above argument in mind, it appears that music is naturally, rather than non-naturally, meaningful of emotions. Thus, music is not even like a language to the
extent that musical reference to emotions is secured by the conventions of a nonlinguistic symbol system. Musical reference to emotions is natural rather than conventional. Music does not constitute a symbol system; the means by which music is expressive are importantly unique to each piece. There are conventions in music, but they are formal and stylistic rather than semantic; that is, they do not serve to reveal the composer's intention in order that we may appreciate what is expressed in the music. If composers have regularly expressed sadness by similar musical means, this is because those means are naturally expressive of sadness rather than because audiences have associated those means with intentions to express particular emotional states. Of course, recognizing what is expressed in a musical work may require some familiarity with the stylistic conventions (and so it may be difficult to appreciate the expressiveness of non-Western music, for example), but not because the conventions make the expressiveness understandable as the expressiveness the music was intended to convey.

With words and representational pictures we can ignore what was meant or what was represented and consider the meanings that may be put upon the words or what the picture is experienced as resembling. It is because we can distinguish between what is meant and what is 'said' that an aesthetic interest in literature and representational pictures may ignore the artist's intentions as determining the meaning of his creation. Symbol systems that primarily serve the end of communication provide for the possibility of an interest in the meanings of 'utterances' that does not concern itself with intended meanings. But we cannot make a similar distinction between what a musical work expresses and what it is intended to express (except by means of independently conveyed information about the composer's intentions). Music does not lend itself to the Gricean analysis of utterer's occasion meaning in respect of its expressiveness. There is no way of recognizing the composer's intention to express some emotion within the context of the music except by taking what is actually expressed as realizing the composer's intention. Because it does not constitute a symbol system, the audience cannot fulfill (b) (recognizing that the composer intends a given response), the second part of Grice's analysis of utterer's occasion meaning, when appreciating the expressiveness of a musical work. The composer's intentions as regards the expressiveness of his work drop out at the second level of Grice's account of utterer's occasion meaning, and thus music could not be understood nonaesthetically as conveying such a meaning. In contrast, in the case of literature and representational painting, the second level in Grice's analysis becomes irrelevant only where an aesthetic interest leads the reader/audience to ignore the third level of intention (to produce the response intended by the artist as a result of recognizing that this was intended).

Having claimed that music is naturally meaningful of the emotions expressed in it, it remains to demonstrate an appropriate connection between the music and the emotional states to which it refers us. Obviously the connection is not a causal one, as is often the case with meanings (where, for example, smoke means fire, or where a groan wrung from a person means that he feels sad). I have already suggested that music expresses emotions by presenting or exemplifying the appearances of emotions. How could a connection be established between appearances of emotion and the human world
in which emotions are felt? That is, how can music refer to emotions by exemplifying their appearances?

The fact that a musical work exemplified some property, for example harmoniousness, would not normally lead us to say that it thereby refers to harmoniousness. Music presents many properties without thereby referring beyond itself. Why, where the features presented are expressive, are we inclined to understand the music as referring to the world in which emotions are felt? Normally we are interested in appearances of emotion as indicating how the 'owner' of the appearance feels; our interest in the appearances of emotions is parasitic on a more fundamental concern with the feelings indicated in such appearances. Even where we interest ourselves in the appearances of emotions for themselves, a reference to the world of feelings remains implicit. We may divorce our interest in the particular appearance of some emotion, sadness, say, from a concern with the particular sadness felt by the 'owner' of this appearance, but the appearance alone could sustain such an interest only where it was taken as referring to sadness in general. So it is, I think, that the emotions expressed in music refer generally to emotions although they are not taken as signifying any particular person's feeling of an emotion, and so it is that we regard musical expressiveness as worthy of interest.

It remains to show how appearances of emotions may be presented in the sounds constituting a musical work. Before sketching my own answer to this difficulty I consider briefly the theory proposed by Susanne Langer. Although I wish to reject Langer's theory, it is of the type required by the preceding argument; that is, she argues that music is naturally meaningful of emotions and that it refers to them by means of presenting their 'appearances' or forms.

In the writings of Susanne Langer (especially 1942) we find an attempt to analyze music as naturally meaningful (in her terms, as a 'presentational' symbol). She specifically rejects the view that music is non-naturally meaningful (a 'discursive' or 'propositional' symbol). According to Langer, a presentational symbol brings to mind a conception of the subject symbolized. The appropriate response to a presentational symbol is a thought; not a thought about the subject referred to, but, rather, an idea or conception of the nature of that subject. One thing, $S$, can be a presentational symbol of another thing, $O$, by virtue of the fact that the form of $S$ is 'iconic with' the form of $O$. No feature of a thing can be dismissed a priori as irrelevant to its form. The form of an object can be abstracted from it in thought (it can be known) but not in practice (it cannot be described, except via ostension). Where two forms are iconic, the essential relation between the elements of the two objects are identical, even though the 'materials' of which the elements are comprised may be unlike. Thus the relation between the aural elements of a musical work can be the same as the relation between the thoughts and sensations that constitute a feeling. When a composer symbolizes some feeling in her music, she 'transforms' the relation between the elements of that feeling to a relation between auditory elements by applying the appropriate 'laws of projection'. She could not state these laws; they are applied unconsciously and intuitively. And when her audience appreciates her music as a presentational symbol of that feeling, their recognition of the
iconicity between the form of the feeling and the form of the music is unconscious and intuitive. Where one form is recognized as a transformation of another with which it is iconic, the audience becomes aware of the first form-bearer as a presentational symbol of the second form-bearer.

Langer's theory is founded on a questionable characterization of the nature of emotions and it might be attacked on this and many other grounds. However, in the following discussion it is the notion of a presentational mode of symbolism that is confronted. The central concepts of Langer's theory—indescribable forms, indemonstrable iconicity, and unstatable laws of projection—are unintelligible. If 'unintelligible' means here 'cannot be explained in language', Langer would agree. But, we might continue, the problem her theory 'answers' is such that it demands an explanation that can be given in language and, therefore, the unintelligibility of her theory is a crucial weakness. It is not nonsensical to ask how art can be a natural bearer of emotions in the way it is nonsensical to ask how (genuine) groaning can be expressive of, say, sadness. Because it is not obvious how (non-sentient) works of art can be bearers of (disembodied) emotions, the first question requires an answer where the second does not. By denying the possibility of an answer to the first question, Langer deprives her theory of significant content. Rather than solving the problem, as it purports to do, Langer's theory restates the apparent fact to which the nature of aesthetic discourse testifies—that we hear emotions in music, that music is naturally meaningful of emotions—in new and misleading terms.

Langer would claim, I presume, that the ultimate and only real test of her theory is that once we have understood what presentational symbols are like, we recognize that we appreciate works of art as presentational symbols conveying conceptions of emotions when we appreciate those works as expressive. When her claims are tested against our experience of the expressiveness of the music they prove false, however. The expressiveness of music sometimes seems to demand an emotional response from the listener. Whereas it is obvious that the presentation of an emotion in a musical work might sometimes compel an emotional response from the listener, it is not at all obvious that the presentation of the conception of an emotion would ever compel an emotional response. Langer's theory demotes emotion from art, replacing it with conceptions of emotions. In so doing, her theory removes the basis for emotional responses to musical works and makes mysterious the power of music to evoke emotional responses. That is to say, her theory severs the connection between emotions in music and emotions in life on which an acceptable characterization of the nature of aesthetic responses and interest depend. In responding emotionally to musical works as we do, we are not responding to them as natural signs conveying conceptions of emotions.

Rather than arguing (as Langer did) that it is the forms of music and emotions that resemble each other, one might argue that music is naturally expressive because the dynamic character of music is experienced as significantly similar to human behavior expressive of emotions. Movement is heard in music. The relative highness and lowness of notes provides a dimension in aural space within which music moves through time. Thus, if the characteristic behavioral expression of an emotion, X, has the dynamic form
Y, and if a musical work is heard as having the same dynamic form, then X is heard in the music.

Such a theory faces a major objection. However close may be the analogy between one's experience of musical movement and the dynamics of human behavior, it could never be the case that musical movement expresses emotions such as those expressed by human behavior, since there is no felt emotion that finds expression in music. Because music is non-sentient, musical movement could not be heard as expressive just as human behavior may be seen as expressive, since, in the paradigmatic cases, our recognition of the expressiveness of human behavior is founded on our understanding of that behavior as the expression of something that is felt. The objection rightly points out that emotion words do not retain their primary use (that of denoting the experience of an occurrent emotion) when used in describing musical expressiveness. The primary use of emotion words cannot be learned solely from musical examples; also, key distinctions, such as that between pretended and genuine expressive behavior, do not arise in the musical case. Furthermore, it will not be possible to meet the objection by arguing that emotion words are given a special, secondary use applicable only to musical expressiveness. Unless the sadness heard in music can be connected somehow to the sadness people feel and express, our interest in the expressiveness of music will be inexplicable. If it is only by chance that emotion words are given this special, aesthetic use, there is no reason why we should not be uninterested in musical expressiveness.

The objection can be met if we can show there is a secondary use of emotion words that applies to people and that this same use applies also to musical expressiveness. Though admitting that the use of emotion words in connection with music is secondary, it will be possible to demonstrate that this use preserves the meanings that the words have in their primary use by explaining how the same secondary use in connection with sentient beings is parasitic on the primary use. Now, there is a secondary use of emotion words that does not involve (even implicit) reference to felt emotions. In this use we talk of the expressive character of an appearance; usually a person's or animal's appearance. Thus, one might say that a Saint Bernard is a sad-looking dog without meaning that Saint Bernards feel sad any more often than other breeds of dog. So, it might be possible to argue that music is naturally meaningful of the emotions expressed in it by showing that musical 'reference' to emotions is secured by virtue of the fact that musical movement mirrors the bearing, carriage, or gait of people, in that both music and people are experienced as wearing appearances that present emotion characteristics. That is, one might argue that the recognition in music of emotional expressiveness depends on an analogy between the experience of hearing expressiveness in music and seeing bearings, carriages, and gaits as presenting appearances of expressiveness (that pay no regard to what is felt).²

² Goodman (1968) analyzes expressiveness in art as involving reference through metaphorical exemplification. Though my own view retains the key notions of reference and exemplification, I have rejected in the above the claim that the predication of emotion words to works of art is metaphorical. It is an extremely narrow view of meaning that concludes that all non-primary uses of words are
Of course, the view advocated above must be argued in detail. In particular it will be crucial to explain how it is that music can be experienced as presenting the appearance of emotions; that is, how the dynamic character of music is appreciated as analogous to actions rather than to mere movements. In Davies 1980 I have tried to demonstrate that such explanations are possible. Here the concern has been to indicate that a consideration of the nature of musical meaning leads toward a theory of the kind proposed above.