The difficulty in claiming that emotions may be expressed in music consists in this: In the non-musical paradigmatic cases something that is sad feels sad. Since no one who says that a particular musical work is sad believes (or knowingly imagines) that the music feels sad, how is it possible to claim that music is sad and, at the same time, maintain that the word 'sad' retains here a use that preserves its meaning? Clearly we cannot say, as in the views that purely musical emotions are expressed in music or that disembodied mental states are expressed in music, that in their application to musical works emotion words have a uniquely aesthetic secondary use. For then we would be unable to explain why it is that, say, musical sadness interests and moves us as it does. What is interesting about 'sadness' that is divorced from and in no way reflects on the world of felt emotions? Why does musical expressiveness compel from us emotional responses if that expressiveness is not related to the expression of human emotions? If the expression of emotion in music is seen as one of music's most important features, then it can be only because we recognize a connection between the emotions expressed in music and in life, because musical expressiveness reflects and reflects on the world of emotions. These considerations demand that, in their application to music, emotion words retain the meaning that they have in their primary use. One way this could be demonstrated is by showing that (a) there is a secondary use of emotion words in the description of human behavior and that (b) the use of emotion words in descriptions of music is significantly analogous to their use in (a). Thus it could be shown that although the use of emotion terms in describing music is secondary, it is a use that also finds application in the description of human behavior, and, via the parasitic connection between (a) and the primary use of emotion terms, a connection could be established between the emotions
expressed in music and the emotions felt by sentient beings. This, then, is the route by which I hope to analyze the nature of musical expressiveness.

I

The emotions expressed in music differ from the emotions felt by people in that they are unfelt, necessarily publicly displayed, and lack emotional objects. Do emotion terms have a secondary use in descriptions of human behavior in which they refer to 'emotions' that are similarly unfelt, necessarily publicly displayed, and lacking in emotional objects? As the following case indicates, the answer is 'yes'. People frequently describe the character of a person's appearance or bearing by the use of emotion terms. They say 'He is a sad-looking person' or 'He cuts a sad figure'. In such cases they do not mean that he now feels sad or even that he often feels sad; they are referring not to any emotion, in fact, but to the look of him, to what I will call 'emotion characteristics in appearances'. Because this use of emotion terms involves reference to appearances and not to feelings, the sadness of a person's look cannot not be displayed, nor does it take an emotional object as his feeling of sadness does normally. Although we may sometimes be justified in overruling first-person reports of felt emotions, we are obliged to take such reports seriously and, in some cases, as definitive. We are under no such obligation when a person reports on the emotion characteristic worn by his appearance. He is as liable as anyone else to be mistaken about that. The emotion characteristics in a person's appearance are given solely in his behavior, bearing, facial expression, and so forth. And, since a person's felt emotion need not be expressed, it can be privately experienced in a way the emotion characteristics in appearances can never be. A person who changes or suppresses the behavior that made him a sad-looking figure ceases to be sad-looking. Emotion characteristics in appearances do not take objects in the way that felt emotions do; to say that someone cuts a sad figure is not to say that he has something to be sad about or about which he feels sad. The emotion characteristics in a person's appearance may be socially appropriate or inappropriate to a context, but they are not appropriate or inappropriate to an object.

Of course it will sometimes be the case that a sad-looking person looks sad because he feels sad or because he is a person who is prone to feel sad. The point that I wish to make here is that there is a legitimate and common use of the word 'sad' in such sentences as 'He is a sad-looking person' that does not imply that the person feels sad or is prone to feel sad and, therefore, that does not refer to the person's felt sadness or proneness to feel sad. This no-reference-to-feeling use refers solely to the person's look. That is, emotion words can be used, are regularly used, and can be understood by others as being used without even implicit reference to the occurrence of feelings. Despite the fact that such sentences as 'He is a sad-looking person' may also be used implicitly to refer to the person's feelings, I wish to distinguish the no-reference-to-feeling use as a distinct use. In this latter use emotion words refer solely to what I have called emotion characteristics in appearances. The distinction invoked does not depend on a difference between verbal forms; for example, between 'He looks sad' and 'He is a sad-looking person'. The distinction drawn points to a difference in use, and the same verbal form may lend itself to both the uses I wish to distinguish. Where 'He is a sad-looking person'
involves implicit reference to that person's feelings it does not point to an emotion characteristic in his appearance as I restrict that term's use.

The distinction made above and consequent restrictions on the use of the term 'emotion characteristics in appearances' are not arbitrarily imposed. This distinction is apparent in and gains its force from the ways expressions of emotions and emotion characteristics are discussed in everyday language. If when a person looks sad he feels sad, then his look expresses or betrays his felt emotion. By contrast, an emotion characteristic in appearance is 'worn' by, say, a face; it is not expressed by the face, nor does it express a feeling. When we use emotion words in describing people it is normally clear from the context, whatever verbal forms we employ, whether we are referring to their feelings or merely to the look of them. If this is not clear we can sensibly ask for clarification. The need for this distinction is obvious. A person need not look the way he feels and, therefore, an interest in the way he feels need not be an interest in the way he looks. The criteria for sad-lookingness are given solely in appearances; it makes no difference whether the appearance is consciously adopted or worn naturally. A person who consciously adopts a sad look may attempt to deceive us into believing he feels sad (or into thinking he is a naturally sad-looking person) and, as a result, we may make false predictions about his future behavior (or future deportment). By this ruse he may mislead us about his feelings, but he could not deceive us about the emotion characteristic worn by his appearance. We may be mistaken in thinking, for example, that a person is sad-looking, but we are never mistaken about this as a result of that person's deception. A person who 'pretends' to be sad-looking cuts as sad a figure as someone who is naturally sad-looking. Strictly speaking, a person cannot pretend to be sad-looking or be sincere in being sad-looking except in respect of what he actually feels. Many of the notions—sincerity, pretence, the non-expression of felt emotions—on which our ordinary discussions of emotions center rely on the distinction formalized above in the definition of an emotion characteristic in appearance.

The use of emotion words in attributing emotion characteristics to appearances is secondary to and parasitic on the use of such terms in referring to felt emotions. It is not difficult to see how the meaning of emotion words has been extended to this secondary use. The behavior that gives a person's appearance its emotion characteristic is the same as the behavior that gives 'natural' expression to the corresponding felt emotion. To be a sad-looking person is to look as if one is feeling sad. Thus it is the behavior that characteristically and naturally expresses a felt emotion that, in other contexts, gives rise to the corresponding emotion characteristic in an appearance. This is why emotion words retain the same meaning, although they have a non-primary use, in referring to the emotion characteristics in appearances.

Three points emerge from the relationship between the behavior giving rise to emotion characteristics in appearances and the behavior that betrays or expresses the corresponding felt emotions. These points are:

(1) Some behavior that could give expression to a felt emotion could not also give rise to the corresponding emotion characteristic. Much behavior is seen as expressive
because it serves to identify the emotional object of a person's emotion or the desires he entertains toward that object. In other contexts this same behavior would not be seen as expressive of any emotion. Only what I have called naturally expressive behavior—that is, behavior that can be seen as expressive without further knowledge of emotional objects or without evincing emotion-appropriate desires—can give rise to emotion characteristics in appearances. This is important because many emotional states lack characteristic modes of behavioral expression. It might be possible to distinguish between emotions 'proper' (sadness, joy, etc.) and what are generally called feelings (embarrassment, hope, acceptance, despair, puzzlement, annoyance, amusement, nervousness, etc.) by the fact that some of the behavioral expressions of the former can be seen usually as expressive of emotion although we lack a knowledge of the emotion's emotional object, cause, and context, whereas the behavioral expressions of the latter are not self-evidently expressive to those who lack such knowledge. The range of possible emotion characteristics in appearances corresponds with only one class of possible emotional states. There are no emotion characteristics in appearances corresponding to felt hope, felt despair, felt acceptance, and so on. To say that a person is hopeful-looking is to indicate either that we believe that he feels hopeful, or that we believe that he is a person who tends to feel hopeful, or that we are entertaining without belief the thought that he feels hopeful. To say that a person is hopeful-looking is not to attribute to his appearance an emotion characteristic as something that pays no regard to how he feels, for the hopefulness is apparent in his look only when we believe he feels or is inclined to feel hope or where we entertain without belief the thought that he feels hope.

(2) Not all the behavior that might naturally express a felt emotion is equally likely to occur in the corresponding emotion characteristic in appearance. A person who continually weeps (without cause and without feeling sad) is sad-looking but, usually, sad-looking people continually frown, say, rather than continually weep. Among the behaviors that are naturally expressive of felt emotions, those most likely to occur in giving rise to the appearance of the corresponding emotion characteristic are ones a face, gait, or deportment might fall into without intentional pretence or genuine feeling. Though a person may consciously attempt to adopt an appearance displaying a particular emotion characteristic, by no means all such appearances are consciously adopted.

(3) It need not be necessary that we are able to identify a felt emotion uniquely on the basis of the behavior that naturally expresses that emotion, if that behavior, in other contexts, is to give rise to an emotion characteristic in an appearance. If several felt emotions have the same or similar natural behavioral expressions then in other contexts those behaviors may give rise to the appearance of one or more of the corresponding emotion characteristics. But of course this is not to say that just any naturally expressive behavior can give rise to just any emotion characteristic in appearance. We justify our perception of the emotion characteristic in an appearance by arguing that the behavior giving rise to it would, in appropriate contexts, naturally express the corresponding felt emotion. Where the naturally expressive behavior could be expressive equally of more than one felt emotion, we could justify equally seeing that behavior as giving rise to the different corresponding emotion characteristics in an appearance, but not to just any emotion characteristic. If the natural behavioral expressions of felt happiness and felt joy
are similar then we may be able justifiably to support the claim that someone's appearance is both joyous-looking and happy-looking, but, given that the natural behavioral expression of felt sadness differs from that of felt joy and felt happiness, we could not justify the claim that the appearance was sad-looking.

The perception of an emotion characteristic involves the recognition of an aspect of the appearance that bears the emotion characteristic. As with other instances of aspect perception, it is sometimes possible to see an appearance as presenting first one emotion characteristic and then another. Because of the possibility that the same material object of perception may be seen under more than one aspect, aspect perception differs from 'ordinary' seeing despite remaining a perceptually based experience. To say that someone is hopeful-looking where one believes that he feels hopeful or is prone to feel hopeful is to report an 'ordinary' perceptual experience. To say that a person is 'hopeful-looking' where one entertains without belief the thought that the person feels hopeful or is prone to feel hopeful is to report an experience of aspect perception. But this case involves what might be called 'seeing as if', whereas the perception of an emotion characteristic in an appearance involves what might be called 'seeing as'. Among the differences between these modes of 'seeing' is the fact that 'seeing as' does not involve the (willing) suspension of belief whereas 'seeing as if' does. When we see a person's appearance as wearing an emotion characteristic, our beliefs about his feelings are irrelevant.

It follows from the fact that the perception of the emotion characteristic in an appearance involves aspect perception that the emotion characteristic is like (without being) a simple property of the appearance in that there are no specifiable rules for its occurrence. There are no generalizable rules of the type: 'Whenever the ends of the mouth droop the person is sad-looking'. Though the behavior that gives rise to an emotion characteristic in an appearance is necessarily similar to the behavior that naturally expresses the corresponding felt emotion, and though we might draw attention to analogies between the two in aiding another to perceive the emotion characteristic worn by the appearance, the perception of the emotion characteristic does not depend on the noticing of analogies. No amount of analogical evidence will entail that another who accepts the 'evidence' will perceive the appearance as wearing the emotion characteristic.

II

I consider now whether there are any important respects in which music is like human behavior. My concern is not to show that music may imitate or represent human behavior but, rather, to demonstrate that music is experienced as having features displayed in human behavior, especially the features of behavior giving rise to the emotion characteristics in appearances.

Music, like behavior, is dynamic. It is a straightforward fact about hearing that two notes an octave apart are heard as 'the same' and that notes are heard as relatively high or low. The relative highness and lowness of notes provides a dimension in aural 'space' within which music may move through time; that is, we hear movement between notes. Furthermore, like the behavior giving rise to emotion characteristics in
appearances, musical movement is non-teleological. (Though notes may move, say, toward a tonic, the notion of a 'tonic' must be defined in terms of the course of musical movement.) In this respect both are unlike the behavior that expresses a felt emotion, which is frequently teleological because most such emotions take emotional objects.

The similarity noted above between musical movement and the behavior that gives rise to emotion characteristics in appearances is hardly striking enough to establish my case, though. Much more important is the need to show that music displays the kind of intentionality on which the expressiveness of human action depends. As the product of human actions, music does display intentionality, but this does not yet substantiate the sort of claim I wish to make, for the movements of a machine exhibit intentionality in this sense without being regarded as like human behavior in such a way as to be intrinsically expressive. The important difference between the movements of the machine and human behavior consists in this: To explain the movements of the machine we refer to its creator's intentions and to causal mechanisms. To describe the causal mechanisms is to show how the machine's movements are determined and, therefore, to explain fully those movements. This is all the explanation consists of; nothing else is needed. But this is not the case when we explain why a person behaves as he does; here a further dimension is apparently required. By referring to a person's motives, desires, feelings, and intentions we can give the causes of his behavior, but, at the same time, we recognize that these causes do not determine his behavior in the way that causal mechanisms determine the machine's movements. His behavior could have been other than it was and, what is more, it could have been other than it was and yet still be explained by the same motives, feelings, etc. Human behavior goes beyond the reasons explaining it in a way that mere movement does not (which is not to say that explanations of human behavior are in some sense incomplete). Explanations of human behavior do not stop short at the specification of causal mechanisms and entertained intentions. The difference between human behavior and mere movement is reflected in the terms used to discuss them. A machine may move jerkily, quickly and so forth, but it cannot move with hesitation, vivacity, abandonment; it cannot hurry. 'Hesitation' connotes behavior and not mere movement.

Returning to the case of music, it is possible to argue that music displays the type of intentionality characteristic of human behavior. Unlike an explanation of the movements of a machine, an explanation of the movement of music is incomplete if it refers merely to causal mechanisms and the composer's intentions. Much more to the

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1 My use of the term 'intentionality' is unusual. I do not mean 'intension', as in the directedness of mental attitudes with propositional content toward objects, events, or states of affairs, and I do not mean 'intentionality', as in the goals, purposes, or designs of an agent. As I intend the term and go on to explain, it refers to an appearance of rationality and coherence that is internal to the order and shape of the music. It arises in part from the fact that music making is a social practice governed by rules and conventions. The music's intentionality is apparent in the organization of its materials—as a function of the music's structure, tonality, syntax, and so on—whether that organization is engineered deliberately or not by the work's composer. The composer may harness the music's intentionality, but does not create it.
point in such an explanation is an account of the reasons why the musical movement takes the course it does. We say, for example: 'This section develops the preceding motive and foreshadows the melody that follows'. The reasons for the musical movement are to be sought in the music itself; if the music makes 'sense' then its sense is given in the course of the music and an appreciation of the composer's intentions is not yet an appreciation of the musical sense. We recognize that the course of the music could have been other than it is; the possibility of alternative courses comes with the notes themselves. No causal mechanism determines the outcome. As in explanations of human behavior, we recognize that the reasons we give in explaining why the music takes the course it does could count equally well in explaining other courses the music might have taken. The movement of music is not governed by natural laws. At any moment a musical work could pursue a number of different courses each of which would be consistent with and explained by the music preceding that moment. Like the intentionality of human behavior and unlike the intentionality displayed by the movements of a machine, the intentionality of musical movement does not derive directly from the fact that the music is the product of its creator's intentions. The analogy between musical movement and human behavior goes much deeper than the analogy between human behavior and the movements of a machine. It is noteworthy that the adjectives listed above as connoting behavior rather than mere movement find ready application to music.

My claim is that, because musical movement can be heard as making sense and because that sense is not determined solely by the composer's intentions, musical movement is sufficiently like the human behavior that gives rise to emotion characteristics in appearances that musical movement may give rise to emotion characteristics in sound. Of course, musical movement can only be like human behavior that is indifferent to sentience in the way the human behavior that gives rise to emotion characteristics in appearances is indifferent to sentience. 'That is a sad-looking face', where it involves no implicit reference to feelings, is not reducible to a statement about the way any particular person will look if he is sad-feeling and shows it, nor does it contain an implicit reference to an intention to wear any particular facial expression even where the expression was consciously adopted. The point is this: Anything that can wear an expression or have a gait, carriage, or bearing in the way a person's behavior may exhibit these things can present the aspect of an emotion characteristic in its appearance. Few non-sentient things will be able to meet these requirements, but among these few music will find a place.

Now, let us look more closely at the 'mechanics' of the process by which music comes to wear emotion characteristics. As I have already indicated, our appreciation of music's dynamic nature is essential to our appreciation of the analogy between our experiences of music and human behavior. This is apparent when we consider how we would attempt to get another to experience the sadness, say, that we hear in a musical work. At first we might describe the music as dragging and forlorn. If she could not hear the music in this way we would describe the dynamic character of the music in a fashion that would encourage her to hear the musical movement as dragging and forlorn. For example, we would draw her attention to the slow tempo, the faltering and hesitant rhythms, the irregular accents on unexpected discords, the modulations to 'distant' keys,
the dense texture, and so forth. That is, we would encourage her to experience the musical movement as analogous to (which is not to say imitative of) movements that, as part of a person's behavior, would lead us to describe that behavior as dragging and forlorn. Having led her to experience the music in this way, we would expect her to hear the sadness in the music, just as a person, seeing the appearance of human behavior as dragging and forlorn, would see that behavior as wearing the sadness-characteristic in its appearance. Of course, no amount of such evidence entails that the person we are trying to convince will be able to hear the music as dragging and forlorn, or to hear the sadness in the music. She may be able to hear all the musical features to which we draw her attention without being able to hear the sadness in the music. To that extent the analogy between human behavior and musical movement is irreducible. But to acknowledge this irreducibility is not to accept that it is impossible to help another to experience the sadness in the music by pointing musical features out to her. To say that the only evidence available cannot entail that the other hears the sadness when she accepts the evidence is not to say that we have no evidence at all and that argument and discussion are therefore irrelevant. The relevance, if not the conclusiveness, of the evidence is apparent from the following example. Would it be possible to argue that the brisk tempo, driving rhythm, open texture, bright scoring, etc. in the overture to Mozart's The Marriage of Figaro provide evidence that the overture is expressive of sadness? Would this not be like claiming that behavior properly described as vivacious and energetic could betray felt sadness? Even if our hearing of the musical features of slowness, etc. in a musical work does not entail that we will also hear sadness in that work, these features may be relevant to our experience of the music's sadness. They could not be used to support the mistaken claim that the music expresses happiness in the way they may be used to support the claim that the music expresses sadness. The ultimate irreducibility of the analogy between musical movement and human behavior does not preclude the possibility of drawing out the analogy in an instructive way and thereby helping others to experience expressiveness of which they were previously unaware in music. When there is disagreement about the expressiveness of a musical work, the debate centers on the applicability of the descriptions offered of the musical movement, not on the appropriateness of describing musical movement in terms more relevant to the description of human behavior than to the description of mere mechanical movement.

If the theory—that in hearing the emotions expressed in music we are hearing emotion characteristics in sounds in much the way that we see emotion characteristics in appearances—is correct, one might expect that the limited range of emotion characteristics that can be worn by appearances corresponds with the limited range of emotions that may be expressed in music (by contrast with the wider range of emotions that can be expressed through music). Indeed, I do wish to make this claim, but, because this correspondence is indemonstrable, the claim will remain a controversial one. Not all the emotions music may be said 'to express' (that can be expressed through music) can also be said 'to be' in music (can be expressed in music). Music can be said to express (someone's) sadness and can also be said to 'be sad'; sadness may be expressed both through and in music. But whereas music can be said to express hope it cannot be said to 'be hopeful'; hope can be expressed through but not in music. To say that hope is
expressed in music is to refer implicitly to someone's felt hope expressed through the music.

In some musical works, if not in many, we may reasonably wish to say that hope is expressed in rather than through the music. I have suggested that only a limited range of emotions may be expressed in music—namely, one corresponding to the restricted number of emotion characteristics that can be worn by appearances—and that hope is excluded from this range. How can these claims be qualified to accommodate exceptional cases?

It is arguable that, as feelings, emotions have natural progressions; for example, from slightly hysterical gaiety to fearful apprehension, to shock, to horror, to gathering resolution, to confrontation with sorrow, to acceptance, to resignation, to serenity. Such progressions might be used by the composer to articulate in his music emotions other than those that can be worn by appearances without regard to feelings. Thus, by judiciously ordering the emotion characteristics presented in an extended musical work, the composer can express in his music those emotional states that are not susceptible to presentation in mere appearances. These emotional states belong naturally within the progression of emotions whose characteristic appearances are given in the music. In this way hope, for example, may be expressed in music, although hope cannot be presented as the emotion characteristic in an appearance. Thus, the range of emotions that can be expressed in music, that music can be said 'to be', goes beyond the range of emotion characteristics that can be worn by appearances. Nevertheless, the expression of such emotional states as hope in a musical work depends directly on and is controlled by the emotion characteristics in sound presented in the musical work. Before hope can be expressed in a musical work, that work must have sufficient length and expressive complexity to permit the emotions presented in its 'appearance' to form a progression in which hope occurs naturally. The close relationship between the emotion characteristics that can be worn by appearances and the emotions that music can be said 'to be' remains essentially unbroken by the exception considered here. We would allow, I think, that saying a musical work 'is hopeful', or 'is accepting', or 'is full of longing', etc. is unusual in a way that saying a musical work 'is sad' is not.

III

What evidence is there to support the theory that the emotions heard in music are presented to the listener as emotion characteristics in the 'appearance' or sound of the music? The most striking confirmation is provided by a consideration of the listener's emotional response to the expressiveness she hears in a musical work. Not only is there a close parallel between that response, where it is an aesthetic one, and a person's emotional response to the emotion characteristic that she perceives in another's appearance, but also the nature of the listener's response as an aesthetic response can be accounted for only as a response to an emotion characteristic she hears presented in the music. The listener's emotional response can be understood as an aesthetic response, as a response to the musical work that may be justified by reference to features of the music,
only when it is regarded as a response to an emotion characteristic presented in the sound of the music.

How do we respond to the emotion characteristics displayed in human appearances? Note that, in so far as an emotion characteristic observed by B in the appearance of A may be believed (or knowingly imagined) by B to instantiate the formal object—to borrow Anthony Kenny's term—of some emotion, then it will be possible for B to respond to the emotion characteristic seen in A's appearance by feeling the appropriate emotion. Thus, for example, B may be annoyed by happy-looking A because B does not think that anyone should be happy-looking, whether he feels it or not, at a funeral. Such emotional responses, in which the emotion characteristic in appearance supplies the emotional object of the emotion felt, are unproblematic and philosophically uninteresting. However, other emotional responses to the emotion characteristics in appearances are possible. That is, surprisingly, when we have covered all the emotional responses for which the emotion characteristic in an appearance supplies the emotional objects of the emotions felt, we have not yet exhausted all the emotional responses that can be made appropriately to the emotion characteristic in an appearance. There are several points to make about these other responses, which take the emotion characteristic in the appearance as their perceptual object but not as their emotional object. They are typical of the responses to emotion characteristics in appearances. They are typical in the sense that emotional responses of this form are characteristic of responses to emotion characteristics in appearances where they are not characteristic of responses to the felt emotions of others. Thus it might be an identifying feature of emotion characteristics in appearances that they invite emotional responses of this form.

The form of these 'typical' emotional responses to emotion characteristics in appearances is as follows: Provided there are no intervening factors, when one has an emotional response to an emotion characteristic in an appearance one will tend to respond by feeling the emotion that is worn by the appearance. The 'intervening factors' are just those things that, if believed or knowingly imagined, would make the emotion characteristic in an appearance the emotional object of one's emotional response. If one responds to an emotion characteristic in an appearance without taking that appearance (or any other thing) as the emotional object of one's response, then the felt emotion with which one responds will mirror the emotion characteristic displayed in the appearance. In support of this claim we can mention that if one wished to feel happy one might attempt successfully to do so by surrounding oneself with happy-looking people. The facts that one need not believe that the happy-looking people feel happy before their appearance can have a cheering affect on one and that no belief that they felt happy would have this affect on one if they never showed their happiness indicate that emotional responses of this kind are made to emotion characteristics in appearances rather than to felt emotions per se. The mood of a look is often contagious. Quite simply, happy-lookingness is extremely evocative of happy-feelingness.

Obviously the typical emotional response to an emotion characteristic in an appearance takes the appearance as its perceptual object but not as its emotional object. The emotion characteristic is not the emotional object of the typical response and nor is
anything else. It follows, therefore, that we cannot justify the typical response to an emotion characteristic in an appearance; or, at least, not in the way that we would justify a response that has an emotional object. To say that one believes that the object toward which one's felt sadness is directed instantiates the formal object of sadness is to say that one has reasons for responding as one does, that one sees the object as possessing sadness-relevant features. But when one responds 'reflexively' to another's happy look by feeling happy there are no similar reasons that justify one's feeling happy. One might argue that the other has a happy look and not a sad look, but one has no reasons of the kind that justify an emotional-object-directed response. 'Why does the happiness of his appearance make you feel happy?' is often an odd question because the response is so natural. By contrast, it should always be possible to supply an answer to 'Why, when you do not believe that he feels happy, are you annoyed by his happy look?'

That emotion characteristics in appearances do not supply emotional objects for the typical emotional responses that they evoke does not mean, however, that just any response to an emotion characteristic will be appropriate. Already I have suggested that the only appropriate response here is the emotion that mirrors the emotion characteristic displayed in the appearance. One argues for the appropriateness of the response of felt sadness to something that is sad-looking by arguing that that thing is sad-looking. To show that an appearance wears the emotion characteristic that is mirrored in one's emotional response is to demonstrate the appropriateness of that response. The appropriateness of the mirroring emotional response to the emotion characteristic worn by an appearance consists in the fact that no other, non-mirroring, emotional objectless response would be accepted in the same unquestioning manner as equally fitting. Because the same appearance may be seen as wearing more than one emotion characteristic, different emotional responses to the same appearance could be equally appropriate because more than one mirroring emotional response is possible. But an emotional response that does not mirror an emotion characteristic that can be seen in the appearance (and that does not take an emotional object) would be rejected as an inappropriate response.

IV

Is there a parallel between the listener's emotional response to the expressiveness heard in a musical work and an emotional response to an emotion characteristic in an appearance, to support the claim that music wears its expressiveness just as a person's appearance may wear an emotion characteristic? Apparently there is. The typical emotional response to the emotion heard in a musical work is the feeling of the emotion heard presented in the music. It is strange that this is rarely remarked on, for, in this respect, responses to music differ markedly from responses to others' felt emotions or to the represented content of a painting, where the emotional response rarely mirrors the emotion being expressed or represented. The question 'I know the music is sad, but why does it make you feel sad?' is strange in the way that 'Why does the happiness of his appearance make you feel happy?' is. The arguments employed in justifying the aptness of a mirroring emotional response to a musical work take the form of showing that the music presents the emotion that our response mirrors and not some other emotion. And, lastly, although
we cannot justify our response by showing that the music's expressiveness instantiates the formal object of our feeling, it is not the case that any other equally objectless, non-mirroring response would 'do' as well.

An aesthetic response can be taken as an index of the responder's understanding of the work of art to which he is responding; an aesthetic response can be justified by reference to features of the work of art qua work of art. From this it appears, paradoxically, as if an emotional response to a musical work could never be an aesthetic response, for such responses obviously do not take the musical work as their emotional object. The listener does not believe that the musical expressiveness instantiates the form object of the emotion that he feels. Nor, since music is nonrepresentational (see Scruton 1976) and does not therefore provide any represented putative emotional objects for the listener's responding emotion, could the listener entertain without belief thoughts about a musical work that could, at the same time, make the work the emotional object of his response and aim at understanding the musical work. If emotional responses to musical expressiveness are non-emotional-object-directed then how could they be subject to justification and therefore be aesthetic?

The theory proposed here solves this apparent paradox. Although non-emotional-object-directed responses are not subject to justification as are emotional-object-directed response, some such responses, namely the typical response to an emotion characteristic in an appearance (and to musical expressiveness), are subject to criteria of appropriateness. This has been established above. So, the theory explains how an emotional response to a musical work can be both aesthetic and non-emotional-object-directed. That the theory deals with this counter-intuitive paradox counts very strongly in favor of it. Furthermore, the dissolution of the paradox cannot be robbed of its significance by the claim that emotional responses to the expressiveness heard in musical works are unique and strange in being both non-emotional-object-directed and subject to justification. By arguing that emotional responses to musical works are like emotional responses to the emotion characteristics displayed in human appearances, the required connection between aesthetic responses to works of art and responses to 'human' situations has been preserved.

I have been guilty so far of implying that emotional responses to musical works are much simpler than they are in fact. The appropriateness of the typical, mirroring response to the expressiveness of a musical work can often be questioned, but this does not undermine the points made above. Consider the following example: In a musical work a prolonged sad section follows a brief, frenzied, gay section. It might be rightly felt that a person who responded to this work by feeling happy and then sad displayed a lack of sensitivity and missed the significance of the first section, the function of which was to heighten the poignancy of the second section. Here, the appropriate response to the first section need not be a feeling of gayness (nor need it be of sadness). That is, the mirroring response may not, in the full context of the work, be appropriate, because the work may provide reasons for overruling the mirroring response. Similarly, if a section can be heard as presenting the aspects of several different emotion characteristics, the subsequent course of the music may provide reasons why we should hear the section as presenting
one rather than the other emotion characteristic and, therefore, why one of the possible mirroring emotional responses is inappropriate. In the unusual case where an emotional state such as hope is expressed in the music as a part of the natural progression of a sequence of emotions most of which are presented in the 'appearance' of the music, some thought may be required to appreciate that hope is being expressed in the music. If it is impossible to understand the music without recognizing that hope is expressed in it and if, as one would expect, this recognition depends on reflection and consideration, then the mirroring response is unlikely to be an understanding one. The more sensitive, sophisticated response may, in the kinds of cases just described, overrule a mirroring response that fails to take account of the full context provided by the complete musical work. The crucial point though is this: However sophisticated an aesthetic response to the expressiveness of a musical work may be, the mirroring response is ontologically prior to the more sensitive and sophisticated response and to be disregarded it must be overruled. And, sometimes at least, the typical, 'reflexive' response will be an understanding response. By contrast, an aesthetic response to a representational painting is necessarily sophisticated in that it must be thought-founded. There can be no ontologically prior 'reflexive' response that must be overruled to a representational painting; or, rather, the response to a representational painting as if it were non-representational would itself be a sophistication on the ontologically prior response to it as representational.

Further confirmation of the view defended here is afforded by a consideration of the way the listener's emotional response to a musical work is identified (by others) as an instance of, say, sadness. Another's emotions are often revealed to us by his behavior; his behavior may identify the emotional object of his emotion, or it may indicate the desires that he holds toward the emotional object, or it may betray or express the nature of his emotion. Now, if a listener to a musical work is delighted and intrigued by the ingenuity of the work's construction, then his response takes the musical work as its emotional object and may be identified in the usual way. But how, except by appeal to his reports, can others identify his emotional response to the work's expressiveness as one of sadness, say? Music is non-representational; it represents no subject that could be the emotional object of his emotional response and about which he could entertain the appropriate desires. Because his response has no emotional object nor any entertained emotion-appropriate desires, the listener's response can be identified by others only via the behavior that is naturally expressive of the emotion that he feels. Sometimes, at least, he looks and acts as if he feels, say, sad, and from this behavior we can identify the emotion that he feels. This is all very well in the case of sadness, which has a characteristic mode of behavioral expression, but what of emotional states lacking such distinctive natural expressions in behavior? How would one recognize that another's response to a musical work was a feeling of hope in the music? The answer is, I think, that one cannot and that, therefore, such emotional states are not felt as aesthetic responses to musical works. If a person avows he feels hope when listening to the music, he must be able to supply an emotional object for his feeling and, since no candidate for this object is given in the music, in doing so he makes obvious that his response is not an aesthetic one. He can make his response identifiable as one of hope only by indicating how the response is not a response to anything heard in the music. Again, there is an obvious contrast with responses to representational paintings. The subjects represented in paintings may be
taken by the observer as emotional objects for his response. He may knowingly entertain desires about them. The emotions he feels or entertains may be identified by others via their emotional objects and his entertained desires, while remaining obviously aesthetic responses. Thus, a wider range of aesthetic emotional responses is available to the observer of a representational painting than is available to the listener to a musical work.

The range of aesthetic emotional responses that may be made to musical works corresponds to the range of emotions that may be mirrored by emotion characteristics in appearances. Only those emotions that may be naturally expressed in behavior can be mirrored by emotion characteristics in appearances, and only these same emotions can be aesthetic emotional responses to the emotions expressed in music. This was predicted by the theory presented, and its independent confirmation through a consideration of how emotional responses to the emotions expressed in music are identified therefore supports that theory. I noted previously that the typical response to an emotion characteristic in an appearance is a mirroring response and that the ontologically prior response to the expressiveness heard in music takes this mirroring form. That no equally non-emotion-object-directed response to an emotion characteristic in an appearance would be accepted as an appropriate response suggests that the available range of non-emotion-object-directed emotional responses to emotion characteristics in appearances is restricted to what I called the typical, mirroring response. The fact that the range of aesthetic emotional responses to the emotions expressed in music is similarly restricted supports strongly the claim that the emotions expressed in music are best analyzed as emotion characteristics presented in sound.

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Finally, I consider whether the theory is able to account for the importance and value we attach to the expressiveness heard in music. On my account music conveys to us what an emotion characteristic 'sounds' like. To say merely that music may enrich our experience, understanding, and appreciation of the emotion characteristics in (human) appearances is to make a claim that is perhaps too feeble to justify the importance we attach to the expressiveness of music. The claim can be strengthened, however, in the following way: The emotions heard in music are powerfully evocative of emotional responses in the listener. The listener who feels a response mirroring the emotion characteristic presented in the music experiences an emotion uncluttered by the motives, desires, and the need to act on his feeling that accompany the more usual occurrences of that emotion. He can reflect on his feeling of, say, sadness in a way he could not do normally. Because his emotion is divorced from the sort of contexts in which it usually occurs, he may come to a new understanding of it. The power of music lies in the way it works on our feelings rather than in the way it works on our thoughts. The view defended here quite rightly locates the value and importance music has for us in what it makes us feel.