In this paper I discuss an issue mentioned in Kripke's discussion of Wittgenstein's views on rule-following - the issue of whether or not a Robinson Crusoe (raised by animals in isolation from his own kind) could be the private linguist of Wittgenstein's private language argument.1 The paper is divided into two parts each of which contains three sections. Part One is largely expository. After outlining the private language argument I suggest that the target of that argument is a Cartesian/Humean soul, rather than a Crusoe. An account of Kripke's interpretation of Wittgenstein reveals how he gives new life to the question of a Crusoe's status as the putative private linguist. In Part Two I suggest that Kripke's non-committal remarks about Robinson Crusoe are unsatisfactory. I attempt there to develop the Kripkean interpretation of Wittgenstein in a way which avoids some of the difficulties faced by Kripke's formulation and which brings Kripke's account nearer to a standard interpretation of Wittgenstein's view. In a Postscript I draw attention to the wider significance of this debate.

PART ONE

Section One - The Form of Wittgenstein's Argument

Although it lends itself to more than one interpretation, perhaps the best construal of the private language argument is the following: It is a necessary condition of something's
being a rule that there be a difference between on the one hand one's following the rule correctly, and on the other hand one's getting the right answer by chance rather than by following the rule, one's misapplying the rule and getting a wrong answer, one's getting the right answer by applying (or misapplying) some other rule, and so on. The intentions, convictions and feelings of the person attempting to follow the rule do not supply the requisite difference - a person intending to follow a rule, disposed to give a particular answer, convinced that the rule has been followed, and with the strongest intuition that the right answer has been produced, can be wrong. The standard of correctness against which attempts to follow a rule are tested for success must be independent of the intentions, dispositions, convictions and feelings of the person (supposedly) attempting to follow the rule correctly. Where no such independent checks are possible, no rule could be established. Since language is a rule-governed activity, it is possible to invent a language only where it is possible to establish linguistic rules. A putative private linguist could have no independent checks on its intentions, dispositions, convictions and feelings that its performance amounted to rule-following. So a private linguist could establish no linguistic rules and, hence, could not invent a private language exclusively for its own use.2

Note that, on this reading, the argument denies the existence of the relevant rules, rather than denying the possibility of the individual's accurately remembering a rule which has been established. The private linguist's difficulty does not consist in its being sure that it has remembered correctly the rule which previously it had set in place. The argument does not rest on any claim about the inherent unreliability of memory. Rather, the private linguist's difficulty is said to lie in its establishing a linguistic rule at the outset. The claim is that the private linguist cannot invent a language because it cannot establish a (linguistic) rule. A private language does not become impossible to use in practice because of the unreliability of memory; rather, it is logically impossible to set up such a language at the start.

Although I am not here concerned with issues of Wittgensteinian scholarship, several reasons for favouring this ontological account of the argument over a merely epistemological interpretation of it may be offered. First, Part One of Philosophical
Investigations seems constantly to take as its target the quasi-Cartesian/Humean view implicit in the passage from Augustine quoted in its first numbered section and, whilst the ontological reading of the argument is consistent with such an attack, it is not obvious how the epistemological reading could contribute to that critique. Secondly, the private language argument follows a major discussion of the nature of rules and of rule-following (_._1, _143-242) and it is natural to read the private language argument as a particular application of this more general and abstract discussion, the more so as the conclusion of the private language argument is anticipated explicitly in the earlier discussion (_._1, _202).

A further consideration is this: The private language argument clearly would fail in its aim had Wittgenstein been making an epistemological and not an ontological point. In arguing against the possibility of a private language Wittgenstein was trying to show that all languages are public, and public through and through. He was attacking the view of language implicit in the account of linguistic meaning offered in _._1, _1. In this Augustinian view, private languages are both possible and primary, and public languages are no more than 'second languages' into which the contents of private languages are translated (with only imperfect and incomplete preservation of meaning). Wittgenstein clearly aims to defend the ordinary, public language against this view by showing that it is the ordinary, public language which is the sole repository of linguistic meaning (not because the ordinary language is 'mixed', but because all meaning is public). Now, obviously Wittgenstein could not hope to be successful in this aim if his grounds for assigning public languages to the abyss could be applied with similar effect to public languages. Epistemological doubts can be raised as easily about a public language as about a private language. In speaking a public language the speaker must rely on memory, on the veracity of 'sense impressions', and so on. If epistemological worries give grounds for denying the possibility of a private language, equally they give grounds for denying the possibility of a public language. So, either Wittgenstein failed to see that his (allegedly) 'verificationist' argument was self-defeating in that it uses language to argue against the possibility of anything's being a language, or his argument is of an ontological rather than an epistemological variety. Some of the authors who have pointed to the
inadequacy of the epistemological interpretation of the private language argument have thought that they were attacking the interpretation which Wittgenstein intended his argument to be given. I support the alternative view.

Section Two - The Identity of the Private Linguist

Who, though, does Wittgenstein have in mind as the (putative) private linguist? Clearly he does not have in mind a person who is the last speaker of a language (as Truganini, the Tasmanian aborigine, may have been), nor the person who uses a code to express 'privately' thoughts which could be decoded without loss of sense into the ordinary, public language. These are cases of (or versions of) public languages which happen to have only one user (at the given time). These are not languages which defy translation and which therefore could not be understood by others (see _.1, _243). The fact that Defoe's Crusoe found himself separated from the community of English speakers (and from all humanity) did not make the language with which he spoke to himself a private language in Wittgenstein's sense.

But what of the case of Crusoe's Doppelgänger, Crusoe 2, who differs from Crusoe in having been raised from birth by animals? Would Crusoe 2 be a pseudo-linguist incapable of inventing and using a language according to Wittgenstein? Some of Wittgenstein's early commentators answered 'yes' to this question. Ayer took himself to be attacking Wittgenstein in arguing that Crusoe 2 could teach himself a language; Rhees took himself to be defending Wittgenstein in arguing that Crusoe 2 could not establish linguistic rules and, hence, could not invent a language. Obviously both Ayer and Rhees were agreed in thinking that the case of Crusoe 2 falls under the terms of Wittgenstein's argument. More recently a different view has prevailed. The proponents of this view apparently would accept that Crusoe 2 might invent a language, but they would deny that this counts against the private language argument, for they do not see Wittgenstein's argument as directed against any flesh-and-blood putative linguist such as Crusoe 2 is. In summary, the attitude to Ayer's and Rhees' views might be this: Ayer is wrong in thinking that Wittgenstein's argument relies on the fallibility of memory, and right in
thinking that the argument does not show that Crusoe 2 is incapable of inventing a language. Rhees is right in thinking that Wittgenstein's argument rests on denying that the putative private linguist could set up linguistic rules, and wrong in thinking that Crusoe 2 would be incapable of establishing the linguistic rules on which to base a language. Both Ayer and Rhees are wrong in thinking that what Crusoe 2 can or cannot do has any bearing on the soundness of Wittgenstein's argument, for his argument does not bear at all on such a case.

The suggestion that Crusoe 2 could invent a language might be developed along the following lines. Crusoe 2 lives in and interacts causally with a world which exists independently of his experience of it. This 'separation' between Crusoe 2's experience of the world and the way the world is allows for the possibility of things' being different from the way in which to Crusoe 2 they seem to be, and for the possibility of others' (or even Crusoe 2's) applying checks on his performance which are independent of Crusoe 2's intentions, dispositions, convictions and feelings of the time. Leaving aside epistemological worries (which are not at issue), Crusoe 2 may videotape himself, notate symbols and draw the objects he wishes them to signify, and so forth. Other people, if they were to be present (or Crusoe 2 himself) could check Crusoe 2's current performance against his past performance in a way which is independent of his current intentions, dispositions, convictions and feelings about the way in which his present performance measures up against the past. It is sufficient as a requirement of Crusoe 2's establishing a rule that the following counterfactual be true - if others were present (or if Crusoe 2 had access to an independent record) a check could be made of present against past performance, and so there could be standards of correctness for rule-following. Where the way that the world is and was is a matter of fact independent of Crusoe 2's immediate impressions of such matters, that counterfactual is true. Rhees goes too far in insisting that rules can be established only within the context of a social community. It is sufficient that interpersonal testing be possible in theory. And this does not require the presence of others, for Crusoe 2 might perform the independent checks for himself in a world (such as ours is) in which notes, signs, drawings, videotapes, photographs and the like have an existence and persistence which is
independent of his impression of such things. So Crusoe 2, despite his social isolation, does not fall foul of Wittgenstein's argument.7

But who, if not Crusoe 2, is the putative private linguist in Wittgenstein's argument? No flesh-and-blood person would qualify if Crusoe 2 does not. According to the commentators who pursue the above line, Wittgenstein saw the role of the putative private linguist as being filled by a Cartesian/Humean soul, rather than by a person.8 A Cartesian/Humean soul takes as certain, and as the basis of all knowledge, the individual's acquaintance with immediate experience. A being which supposed itself to be such a soul must infer (if it can) the existence of a stable, 'external' world and the existence of its own body. Since the knowledge which is supposed by the Cartesian/Humean soul to be beyond question is given in immediate experience, knowledge of the 'external' world must be derivative rather than foundational. For the Cartesian/Humean soul, any distinction between the way the world is and the way the world seems to be must be based ultimately on perceptual qualities (such as vivacity) given in immediate experience. For the Cartesian/Humean soul, the difference between 'present', 'remembered past' and 'imagined' experiences must be evident (if at all) also in terms of the qualities of immediate experience.

The Cartesian/Humean soul supposes that it can found its 'language' on the certainty of experience. It then goes on to use that language in inferring the existence of the 'external' world. But the validity of its inferences and the reliability of what seem to it to be regularities in its experiences cannot be subject to checks which are independent of the intentions, dispositions, convictions and feelings which it has. Rule-establishing/following depends upon the possibility of such checks. That is to say, rule-following presupposes the stability of an independent world. A being which does not accept this as foundational (and regards it as something to be inferred from the character of experience) could not allow for the possibility of the type of checks on which rule-establishing/following depends. Whereas, by contrast, Crusoe 2 takes the existence of a stable, 'external' world to be so certain as to provide a basis for testing the reliability of experience. The Cartesian/Humean soul might (perhaps) share Crusoe 2's belief in the existence of a stable, 'external' world, but differs
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crucially from Crusoe 2 in regarding the existence of such a world as something which could meaningfully be doubted.

Section Three - Crusoe Rides Again

Recently Kripke has characterised Wittgenstein's argument in a way which revives the controversy of the status of Crusoe 2 as a putative private linguist.9 Kripke's Wittgenstein concludes that only a member of a community can establish and follow a rule.10 As a corollary, Kripke's Wittgenstein accepts explicitly that Crusoe 2 could be thought by us to establish rules and to speak a language only if we take him into our community and apply to him our standards for rule-following.11 On this view, the argument in the previous section (according to which a solitary person's actions might be subject to independent checks) fails to establish that such a being escapes the private language argument. Kripke's Wittgenstein's claim is that none of the independent checks to which the behaviour of an isolated individual might be subject could uncover facts which would confirm the existence of rules and rule-following, because facts of that sort are generated only within the context of communal life. Whilst independent checks on the behaviour of an isolated individual are possible, it is not possible that such checks uncover facts of the sort which could show that such an isolated individual might establish and follow rules.

The argument by which Kripke's Wittgenstein attempts to establish the above conclusion is as follows: Whatever one's past practice, any continuation of that practice is consistent with one's having followed some rule throughout. That is, whatever one does, one's present practice might be brought under a rule in terms of which one's present practice is consistent and continuous with one's past practice. Now, if any continuation of one's past practice might be brought under a rule according to which the present practice is consistent and continuous with the past practice, then there can be no content to the claim that one is or has been following a rule unless one could specify in advance of a novel situation which rule was being followed and, hence, what would count as a correct and as an incorrect application of it. But, continues the argument, there is nothing about the intentions, dispositions, practices and feelings of the
individual which could settle in advance which rule he or she was following. If one had not added together numbers greater than 56, and if one were faced with the calculation '68 + 57 = ?', then there is nothing about one's beliefs or feelings (nor about one's past practice) to indicate whether or not the answer ought to be '125'. Whilst one's past performance is consistent with one's having followed a rule of addition signified by '+', equally one's past performance is consistent with one's having followed a rule of quaddition signified by '+', where quaddition is like addition except that, for numbers greater than 56, the answer always is '5'. Obviously the intention to use '+' to signify the function employed in the past fails to settle the issue (since it is the identity of that function which is in question). So, not even an omniscient god who is familiar both with one's past practice and with one's intentions, convictions, dispositions and feelings could know (on the basis of that familiarity) whether it is addition or quaddition that one has been doing, because there is no fact about such matters which would settle the question. There is nothing about one's intentions, convictions, dispositions and feelings such that a knowledge of them provides for a distinction between '125' as a correct answer in addition and as an incorrect answer in quaddition.

How do we avoid the paradoxical conclusion that rule-establishing/rule-following is impossible? The answer to the rule-sceptic's worries consists in locating the individual's practice within and against the wider context of a community practice. (The rule-sceptic fails to uncover the decisive fact because he or she looks in the wrong place in concentrating on the individual as if that individual lives in social isolation.) If in the novel situation the vast majority goes one way rather than another, then the agreement in the community practice establishes a standard against which the correctness of an individual's performance may be judged. So far as the community is concerned there is no 'right' answer - whatever it does and agrees to be right is right.12 That is to say, the community 'gets it right' only in the sense that it determines what is to count as being right. The community practice (i.e., the aggregation of the relevant actions and dispositions of its members) determines whether its members have been adding or quadding. What makes it addition rather than quaddition which we do is the community's members' practice of answering (or their disposition to answer) '125' when faced with '68 +
57 = ?'13  By contrast with the community, the actions of the individual member of the community can be judged for correctness or incorrectness against an independent standard. If the individual intended to use the function standardly signified by '+', firmly believed '5' to be the correct answer to '68 + 57 = ?', and so on, the individual would be wrong in answering '5' if the vast majority of the community's members would answer '125', given that there is no special story explaining why everyone might give the wrong answer at the same time.

But where does Kripke's 'community' solution to the apparent paradox of rule-scepticism leave Crusoe 2 who comprises a 'community of one'? Whenever Crusoe 2 faces a novel situation (as any situation might be) his decisions must be (unsuccessful) attempts at rule-determination, and not rule-applications. There can be no significant agreement between Crusoe 2's past and present practice in that any present practice is consistent under the terms of some rule with his past practice. That is to say, there is nothing revealed on the videotapes of Crusoe 2's past performance, nor in the most detailed and intimate diaries recording his mental life, which would establish that his past practice was one of addition rather than quaddition. It looks as if Crusoe 2's decisions must always be ones of pseudo-determination and never ones of rule-following. Unlike the member of a community, who can compare his or her answer to '68 + 57 = ?' with the answers which are given (or would be given) by other community members, Crusoe 2 can compare his present performance only with his past performance, but there is nothing about that (since he has never before met numbers greater than 56) to give substance to his conviction that his 'answer' is 'correct'. There is no evidence which could show that Crusoe 2 has been following any rule. Crusoe 2 could follow a rule, according to Kripke's Wittgenstein, only if there were a community which not only agreed in its past practice with his past practice, but was also inclined to continue the practice in a particular way rather than at random, thus establishing a standard for the novel case. That is, notwithstanding his causal interaction with an independently existing world, Crusoe 2 could follow a rule only where some community could set in its continuing practices a standard against which his continuing practice might (appropriately) be judged. But Crusoe 2 has been isolated since birth from his own kind; he is
not a member of any social community. So, apparently Kripke's Wittgenstein has a choice between saying either that Crusoe 2 cannot establish any rules and, hence, cannot speak a language, or that Crusoe 2 is a language-user because he can be seen counterfactually by members of a community as a member of their community and, thus, as subject to their standards of rule-following. Kripke's Wittgenstein acknowledges this choice in accepting the conditional that, if Crusoe 2 is seen by us as a language-user, he must also be seen as subject to our community's rules. But in a footnote he queries the acceptability of the consequent of this conditional, noting that observers might not have the 'right' to take Crusoe 2 into their community in this way.

PART TWO

A rough overview of the line I shall adopt is as follows. I wish both to accept that the private language argument does not count against Crusoe 2's inventing a language and that the 'community' solution provides the reply to rule-scepticism. So I shall argue against the prima facie incompatibility between these views. I do so first by trying to show in the next section that the choice faced by Kripke's Wittgenstein with respect to Crusoe 2 has the character of a dilemma neither horn of which could be accepted. It is not satisfactory, then, that Kripke closes the discussion of Crusoe 2's status as the putative private linguist at the point at which he does. In the subsequent section I propose a way in which a defender of the 'community' solution might dodge the dilemma and might accept that Crusoe 2 could establish and follow rules. Simply, I suggest that, despite his social isolation, Crusoe 2 has community membership such that he might establish and follow some rules, including linguistic rules. In a sixth section I point out that, were Kripke's Wittgenstein to adopt the proposed solution to the dilemma, he would remove an obvious discrepancy between his own and Wittgenstein's view.

Section Four - The Dilemma

The 'community' solution to the rule-sceptic's paradox apparently leaves Kripke's Wittgenstein with two options as regards Crusoe 2's speaking a language. But neither of these options proves to be viable.
The first option is to deny that Crusoe 2 could invent a language (on the grounds that he lacks membership in any social community). However, the adoption of this alternative is not satisfactory, for it can be argued that the 'community' solution fails to show how anyone could speak a language if it does not show (also) how Crusoe 2 could invent and speak a language. The point is that the rule-sceptic's worries apply with as much force to the one case as the other, so the 'community' solution, if it works, must work to defend both.

The 'community' solution supposes that we can identify the actions of different people (at different places and times) as tokens of the same action type; for example, as attempts to answer a particular mathematical problem such as '68 + 57 = ?'. It is only because my answer to '68 + 57 = ?' (here and now) is an answer to the same mathematical problem as was your answer to '68 + 57 = ?', (there and then) that the answers given by different people are appropriately grouped as a set. And it is only where there is a set of answers to be aggregated that there can be such a thing as a community practice. Now, the difficulty in showing that '+' signifies the same function for Crusoe 2 in '2 + 2 = 4' and in '68 + 57 = 125' is no different from the difficulty (if there is one) in showing that '68 + 57 = ?' for me now is the same mathematical problem as is '68 + 57 = ?' for anyone else now (or tomorrow). So, if the 'community' solution cannot successfully defend Crusoe 2's attempts at rule-establishing/rule-following from the sceptic's doubts, nor can it provide any significant analytical content to the notion of a community practice, and rule-scepticism is unvanquished. Clearly, then, the proponent of the 'community' solution to the (apparent) paradox generated by rule-scepticism cannot afford to favour the first alternative.

The second option open to the proponent of the 'community' solution proves to be equally unsatisfactory. The second option involves accepting that Crusoe 2 might invent and speak a language, which also entails accepting that Crusoe 2 has community membership. However, Crusoe 2's membership of a social community can only be accepted counterfactually since, by hypothesis, Crusoe 2 is not and never has been a member of a social community with his
own kind. But, if it is sufficient that community membership be imagined, then the restriction that rule-followers must have community membership is no restriction at all. To put the same point another way: whilst one can see how actual community membership could make a relevant difference, if a decision to grant Crusoe 2 honourary membership could turn Crusoe 2’s grunts into a language then it is hard to imagine what would not!

Section Five - The Dilemma Dodged

In this section I suggest a way in which a proponent of the 'community' solution might avoid the above dilemma. This is done by arguing that Crusoe 2 has community membership of a kind which makes possible (some) rule-establishing/rule-following. The claim is that Crusoe 2's community membership is a fact, and not something which must be imagined.

Rule-establishing/rule-following (I have accepted) presupposes a way of setting a standard for 'going on in the same way'. And, according to the proponent of the 'community' solution to the apparent paradox of rule-scepticism, this standard is set by the high agreement in judgments and responses (or in dispositions to them) which establishes a community practice. Although an appeal is made here to dispositions, it is important to note that the analysis does not rely on a crudely behaviouristic (and unsatisfactory) notion of dispositions as thoughtless urges with minimal cognitive content. The dispositions which generate the community practice are as much inclinations to agree in classifications and judgments as in behavioural responses. For example, the communal practice is not established merely by a common tendency to say '125' in answer to '68 + 57 = ?'; equally there must be a tendency to agree in the judgment that each '125' is an answer to the same mathematical problem. According to the 'community' solution, it is only where there is sufficient agreement in judgments and responses (or dispositions to them) that it is possible to see new cases as 'old' rather than as perplexingly novel. And it is only where cases are seen as 'old' that they are seen as requiring no more than the re-application of a technique which already has been mastered.
Now, agreement in judgments and responses (or in dispositions to them) may follow from a conscious and explicit decision reached by the members of a particular social group, or from training or habit within such a group. The standards of rules adopted in this way apply appropriately only to the actions of members of the social community or communities within which the rules apply. But, in other cases, there may be agreement in judgments and responses (or in dispositions to them) which seem to be independent of membership in social groups. Not all rules are socially relative; some rules seemingly apply to all people and their adoption seems to be appropriate to the way that the world is, rather than to social contingencies. That is, there seem to be tendencies common to all (mature) human beings to agree in classifying different situations as being of a single type and to agree in applying to those situations a single technique. Such agreement is a matter of co-incidence rather than of consensual commitment. But for all that, it is agreement of a type which establishes the standards of a community practice - standards for the human community rather than for any particular social community.

The term 'community' has more than one meaning. I consider here two of those meanings. We can talk of a community of plants (meaning a population which is no more than an aggregation of individuals of a natural kind, or of some non-natural type), and we can talk also of a social community (meaning a political grouping with laws and/or policies which are binding on all and which are not merely a sum of individuals' preferences and dispositions). Rule-following is an intentional activity (though this is not to say that rule-followers must always be able to formulate the rule that they are attempting to follow), so communities of plants do not follow rules whatever regularities there are in what they do. But the community (in the sense of population) of human beings might be a community whose members are rule-followers. That is, it may be appropriate to judge the individual's attempts to generate a regular pattern of behaviour against standards set by the similar attempts, judgments and dispositions of other members of the community of human beings, despite the possible social isolation of members of the community of human beings.
On this view, Crusoe 2 might establish and follow rules, despite his not being a member of any social community, in virtue of his membership (by birth and natural growth) in the community of mature human beings. It is the fact of human beings' sharing a predilection for certain judgments and responses which sets a standard for Crusoe 2's success or otherwise in inventing and following rules. (Obviously such a view supposes that it makes sense to talk of non-linguistic beliefs, judgments, desires and the like.) It is appropriate in such cases for us to judge Crusoe 2's actions against the standards of our society not because he is a member of our society, but because the standards of our society happen to be everyone's standards.

Of course, this is not to say that Crusoe 2 could invent all the types of rules which human beings who live within societies could invent. For example, he could not invent rules which govern relations between people within societies, such as the rules governing the institution of promising. Crusoe 2 could perhaps express determination to himself, saying 'I will' rather than 'I shall', but he could not promise to himself because he could not place himself under an obligation to himself where that obligation could be required of him against his will, where he could be released from the obligation independently of his deciding not to meet it, and so on. Promises cannot be revoked simply by the promisor's changing his or her mind, but Crusoe 2's firmest resolutions might so be revoked.

So, could Crusoe 2 invent and speak a language? Why not? Language does not rest on social interaction as does promising. Even if the primary function of language is to facilitate communication it does not follow that language is essentially social, because there is a point to an individual's communicating with himself or herself. (We might expect Crusoe 2's island to be dotted with calendars and reminders.) If the basic rules and principles on which communication depends rest on dispositions in responses and judgments common to the human species, then Crusoe 2 does have community membership of a kind which permits the possibility of his speaking a language. It would be appropriate to test whether or not Crusoe 2 has a language by seeing whether it is possible to translate his grunts and signs into English, to communicate with him in his own system of grunts and
signs, and so on. Children have the facility to learn any language as their first language; languages are inter-translatable with comparative ease and accuracy. Such facts support the view that basic linguistic principles are universal. There are patterns of thought in terms of which human beings tend to structure and articulate their experience of the world. In Wittgensteinian terms, the forms of life within which language plays a vital role include forms of life characteristic of human existence, whether or not that existence is conducted in a social/cultural context.

Consider again the case of the elementary rules of mathematics. Not every human being can add. Not every human being when adding gets always the same answer on different occasions, nor always the answer which others get. Further, some groups might answer 'many' whenever the sum of numbers exceeds ten, and other groups might accept as correct less accurate answers as numbers get higher. Nevertheless, such is the agreement in peoples' judgments that, rather than saying that people follow different rules, it is accepted that different peoples employ different formulations, or more or less sophisticated versions of a single rule of addition. (Equally, given that '5' refers unambiguously to the number between 4 and 6, it is clear that quaddition is a different rule from that of addition, and not a different formulation or version of the rule of addition.) Moreover, there is agreement also on the way in which failures in attempts at addition are to be explained. So, just as the universality of linguistic principles seems to allow for the possibility that Crusoe 2 might invent a language with which to communicate with himself, so too the universality of the rules of addition seem to allow for the possibility of Crusoe 2's inventing and using addition.

The claims made above about the agreement in judgments which are generative of universal laws of language and addition are descriptive. It must indeed be the case (if these claims are to be true) that there is a very high level of agreement about such things, or agreement about how to account for non-agreement about such things. But also there is a normative element in these claims. It is at least partly constitutive of what we mean by 'human being' that such a being will agree with us in just such judgments. This aspect of what we mean by 'human being' could be subject to review, but, if so,
this review would be forced upon us only under the strangest of circumstances and not without the rejection of much else which seems central to our notion of humanity. My argument does not rely for its plausibility on experimental evidence in holding that, whilst it would not be surprising if Crusoe 2 does not add (given that addition usually must be taught), it would be surprising to find a Crusoe 2 who turned out to quadd rather than to add. It would be inhuman (and not merely anti-social) to establish and follow rules of quaddition rather than some version of the rule of addition. If Crusoe 2 goes in for mathematics at all, it would be astonishing if he did not develop some version of the rule of addition, because Crusoe 2 obviously is a human being (and not a peculiar machine, nor an alien). And in the same way, it would be surprising rather than otherwise if Crusoe 2 did not establish some rules making possible his communicating with himself.

As I have already emphasised, the normative element in the above argument is only an element - legislatively to (mis-)define 'human being' as 'language-using animal' would be to dodge rather than to solve the issue of Crusoe 2's status as a putative linguist. But the presence of this normative element accounts for the a priori flavour of what looks as if it should be a claim requiring empirical testing; namely, the claim that there is universal agreement with respect to some rules, such as the rule of addition. Whatever social set-ups there are, quaddition does not look like a serious alternative to addition. The accessibility and recognisability of the mathematical systems of other cultures, rather than being treated as counting towards the view that some mathematical principles hold universally, is treated as presupposing that universality. Empirical matters, rather than being treated as accumulating confirmatory evidence making the claim about universality more plausible, are seen as co-inciding with that which is already established. Apparent counter-instances are treated as inviting special (but standardly special) explanations, rather than as pointing to the plausibility of alternative views. This does not indicate that empirical matters can be ignored, but it does explain the attitude which treats an empirical investigation of the phenomena as unnecessary.

Section Six - Kripke's Wittgenstein and Wittgenstein
KRIPKE, CRUSOE AND WITTGENSTEIN

In this section I suggest that, were he to argue as I have done above, Kripke's Wittgenstein would not only avoid the prongs of the dilemma, he would also bring his own views more closely into line with Wittgenstein's.

There is an apparently significant difference between the views of Wittgenstein and Kripke's Wittgenstein - they seem to be discussing different notions of privacy.21 Kripke's Wittgenstein's private linguist is solitary in not belonging to any community.22 Whereas Wittgenstein explicitly allowed that isolated, solitary human beings, such as Crusoe 2 is, might speak languages.23 As I have discussed above, Wittgenstein's putative private linguist is isolated in a way that no flesh-and-blood human being could be isolated. Hence, so long as Kripke's Wittgenstein describes the privacy of the putative private linguist as consisting solely in his or her social isolation throughout life, the target of his argument clearly differs from the target of Wittgenstein's.

But, if Kripke's Wittgenstein were to adopt the view for which I argued in the previous section, the difference between his and Wittgenstein's positions would be no more than apparent. Then, social isolation would not be equivalent to isolation from a community context. Despite his social isolation, Crusoe 2 is a member of the community of human beings, and that community membership is such as to allow the possibility of Crusoe 2's establishing and following some rules. No human being would be isolated in such a way as to be incapable of being a rule-follower. So, an advocate of the 'community' solution to rule-scepticism could accept that the target of the private language argument is a Cartesian/Humean soul rather than any flesh-and-blood person, since it is only the Cartesian/Humean soul which is entirely and always isolated from a community context. (Of course, the notion of a community of such souls is absurd, even where it is a non-social sense of 'community' which is being considered.)

POSTSCRIPT

Although I have confined my discussion to what may seem to be a rather trivial matter - the status of Crusoe 2 as a putative private linguist - this discussion does reflect upon a matter of much wider interest. It is this: There is a growing tradition of
interpreting Wittgenstein's later views as advocating a notion of the radical relativity of truth. Proponents of the 'community' solution who see themselves as putting Wittgenstein's view would also be inclined to see themselves as supporting such a reading. Kripke's Wittgenstein, having proposed the 'community' solution, moves immediately to abandon talk of the truth-conditions for asserting that someone is following a rule and to move instead to talking of the conditions for justifiably asserting that someone is following a rule. However, if the version of the 'community' solution which I have proposed is acceptable, it is by no means obvious that one is committed to replacing talk of truth-conditions with talk of conditions for justified assertability. The point is this: According to the 'community' solution, rules are relative to community practices. But if, for some rules, the relevant communities are so large as to include all human beings, then what is determined as right by the rule is determined as right for everyone. Whilst the truths which are generated by this fact are not independent of the experiences, judgments and responses of human beings (and so are not absolute), such truths are 'true for all (human beings)'. It is not implausible to suggest that the notion of objective truth just is the notion of truths which are inter-personal in being true for all. On this view, subjectivism and objectivism are the limiting cases of relativism, its extremes. Someone who rejected absolutism in favour of relativism would not thereby abandon the notion of objective truth. (And it would remain an open question whether a defender of such a notion of objective truth would be a realist or an anti-realist.)

There is little doubt, I think, that Wittgenstein wished to reject an absolutist notion of truth. It is likely, I think, that he supported some version of the 'community' solution to rule-scepticism. But it is not obvious that he wished to support a radically relativist view of truth. I have tried to show that there is one version of the 'community' solution which allows for an objectivist view. So, it need not follow from the fact, if it is one, that Wittgenstein favoured the 'community' solution that he did not hold also that there are non-tautological, objective truths.
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NOTES


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7. Oswald Hanfling turns this argument on its head in concluding that, because Wittgenstein's argument does not preclude the possibility of someone like Crusoe 2 from speaking a language, Wittgenstein was not arguing against the private linguist's giving meaning to private signs - see 'What Does the Private Language Argument Prove?', The Philosophical Quarterly, 34, 1984, 466-481.

8. Cook and Candlish are critical of the way in which Anscombe's translation into English is careless in implying more strongly than does the original German a commitment on Wittgenstein's part to the personhood of the putative private linguist.

9. Wishing to avoid the controversies and pitfalls of Wittgensteinian scholarship, Kripke presents a view (which is not necessarily his own) as inspired by Wittgenstein's discussion - op.cit., viii, ix, 5. I call the proponent of this view "Kripke's Wittgenstein".

10. See also Crispin Wright, Wittgenstein on the Foundation of Mathematics, Duckworth, London, 1980 (esp. 217 & 220) and
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13. Obviously this is too crude as it stands. Many stories could be told about exceptional circumstances; for example, drugs which affect mathematical ability might be in widespread use. Cases can be conceived in which it is accepted that everyone is inclined to give the wrong answer, or in which all answers actually given are wrong. What matters for such cases is that there is communal agreement about the fact of there being standard ways of going wrong, or standard conditions under which errors are made. That is, where it is denied that the communal practice determines the standard of correctness directly, there must be some other level of agreement which determines what is non-standard about the case.

14. In Scepticism, Rules and Language (Blackwell, Oxford, 1984), G.P. Baker & P.M.S. Hacker seem often to ignore the distinction between the ontological and the epistemological view. As I have stressed, the sceptic's point is not that we cannot be sure of knowing the decisive fact about which rule Crusoe 2 is following, but that there is no such fact of the matter. See Edward Craig, 'Review of Scepticism, Rules and Language', The Philosophical Quarterly, 35, 1985, 212-214 and Jane Heal, 'Review of Language, Sense and Nonsense and Scepticism, Rules and Language', Mind, 94, 1985, 307-310.


16. Ibid., fn.85.

17. The view that Kripke's Wittgenstein begs the argument by taking the notion of sameness of judgments to be unproblematic was first impressed upon me by Tim Dare. Versions of the argument
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20. There is a temptation to regard the determinants of such agreement to be exclusively biological, but other views are possible. Perhaps mathematical sets and functions have a natural occurrence - see Penelope Maddy, 'Perception and Mathematical Intuition', The Philosophical Review, 89, 1980, 163-196; 'Is the Importance of Identity Derivative?', Philosophical Studies, 35, 1979, 151-170; and 'Mathematical Epistemology: What is the Question?', The Monist, 67, 1984, 46-55 - in which case the agreement might be forced upon the individual from "outside", rather than "inside".


23. See Baker & Hacker, op.cit., 20 (fn.29) and 41.

24. Kripke, op.cit., 71-77.

25. I am happy to acknowledge the helpful comments of Tim Dare, Fred Kroon, Christine Swanton, Jan Crosthwaite and Denis Robinson in discussion of an earlier draft of this paper.