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Gender Quotas, Reserved Seats and Women’s Representation in Politics: A Comparative Study of Pakistan and Bangladesh

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A thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Politics and International Relations

The University of Auckland

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Abstract

This thesis examines the history and impact of reserved seats on women’s descriptive and substantive representation in the national parliaments of Pakistan and Bangladesh. I employ a comparative-institutionalist approach, drawing on historical institutionalism, and argue that the conception – and later adoption, implementation and reinstitution – of reserved seats for women, from the colonial to the contemporary period, was shaped by the traditional and culturally-specific patriarchal ideas associated with male dominance and female subservience. The mobilization of the women’s movement around the representation of women in politics was supported, primarily out of self-interest, by male political elites.

However, the findings support the view that in the gendered socio-cultural and institutional context, the reserved seats provision was necessary to and effective in increasing the number of women in the parliaments. Further, I argue that qualified women from diverse backgrounds and professions were elected to the reserved seats in both parliaments. Importantly the thesis affirms that most reserved seats women provided a more effective voice for women than did those members in general seats. Not only did they substantively represent women in parliament but also at party and constituency levels. Nonetheless, comparison between cases shows differences in the degree of substantive representation and reveals that women’s presence in parliament, regardless of numbers, is mediated by factors at both institutional and individual levels.

I demonstrate that masculinist norms in political institutions, the process of indirect election and the quota label, party discipline and affiliation, lack of institutional supports, and social gender norms all pose challenges to substantive representation of women in
both countries. However, at the individual level, I argue that increased numbers and
diversity among women, women’s parliamentary caucus, critical actors, feminist
attitudes, and links with women’s and civil society organizations, improve women’s
substantive representation even in constrained contexts. These enabling factors though are
not present uniformly across the legislative space and ultimately account for the
differences in substantive representation. Finally the thesis argues that the reserved seats
provision has created a political space for women but a precise understanding of how
women use their political presence requires a critical analysis of the context and space
within which substantive representation occurs.
Dedication

Dedicated to my mother, the late Nurun Nahar Chowdhury, she dreamed of me doing a PhD and my father Azizur Rahman Chowdhury who let me live that dream.

Also to Manha and Ayaan, my biggest source of enjoyment, laughter and love in difficult times.
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During my work in Pakistan’s National Assembly, I received immense support from the Chief Librarian Hajj Hattar, Tahir Hanif, Wasim Kazmi and others to access the National Assembly Debates and women parliamentarians. I am indebted to them. I am grateful to those women parliamentarians who gave me interviews and enlightened me about Pakistani society. In Bangladesh, Mrs. Sabera Murshed, Director, and other staff members of the Parliament library supported me all through my work. Most importantly women parliamentarians put their trust in me and granted me time for interviews. I am
grateful to them. In addition to formal institutions, I also enjoyed many hours of stimulating and nerve racking formal and informal discussions with different individuals and friends. I am indebted to each one of them. Finally, I wish to thank my father and younger brother for their support and encouragement to continue the work during difficult moments.
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List of Common Abbreviations

AL- Awami League

ANP- Awami National Party

BBS- Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics

BDMP- Member of Bangladesh Parliament

BMP- Bangladesh Mohila Parishad

BNP- Bangladesh Nationalist Party

CAN- Calling Attention Notice

CEDAW- Convention of the Elimination of the Discrimination against Women

ECP- Election Commission of Pakistan

EU- European Union

FAFEN- Free and Fair Election Network

GS- General Seat

INC- Indian National Congress

IPU- Inter Parliamentary Union
IDEA- Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance

JI- Jamat-e- Islami

JP- Jatiya Party

JP-(M) - Jatiya Party –Manju

JSD- Jatiya Samajtantrik Dal

LFO- Legal Framework Order

ML- Muslim League

MMA- Muttihida Majlis-e- Amal

MQM- Muttihida Qaumi Movement

NDI- National Democratic Institute

PCHR- Parliamentarians Commission for Human Rights

PKMNA- Member of Pakistan National Assembly

PILDAT- Pakistan Institute of Legislative Development and Transparency

PML-N- Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz

PMB- Private Member’s Bill

PML-Q- Pakistan Muslim League- Quaid

PPPPP- Peoples’ Party Parliamentarians of Pakistan

PTI- Pakistan Tehriki Insaf

RS- Reserved Seat
SAARC- South Asian Association for Regional Co-operation

TIB- Transparency International Bangladesh

UN- United Nations

UNDP- United Nations Development Programme

UP-Union Parishad

WAF- Women’s Action Forum

WB- World Bank

WPC- Women’s Parliamentary Caucus
## Glossary

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Urdu</th>
<th>English</th>
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<tr>
<td>Khairati</td>
<td>Alms</td>
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<tr>
<td>Madrasha</td>
<td>An institution for study of Islamic theology and religious law</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ulema</td>
<td>Muslim scholars trained in Islamic law</td>
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<td>Ummah</td>
<td>The followers of Prophet Muhammad</td>
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<td>Vani</td>
<td>Child marriage</td>
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<td>Zaminder</td>
<td>Feudal Lord</td>
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<td>Zina</td>
<td>Adultery</td>
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<th>Bangla</th>
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<tr>
<td>Fatwa</td>
<td>Religious edict</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mohila/Nari</td>
<td>Women</td>
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<td>Shalish</td>
<td>Village arbitration</td>
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<td>Shongshad</td>
<td>Parliament</td>
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<td>Shongrokkhito</td>
<td>Reserved</td>
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<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------</td>
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<tr>
<td>Upa-Zilla Parishad</td>
<td>Sub–District Council, the second tier of rural local government</td>
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<tr>
<td>Union Parishad</td>
<td>Union Council, the lowest tier of rural local government</td>
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Introduction

In June 2014, the female population of the world was a little over three and a half billion. This constituted almost half of the world’s population (49.6 percent) but at the same time the percentage of women parliamentarians in the world (in both houses) was 21.9 percent only and in the single or lower houses it was only 22.3 percent (IPU 2014). In absolute numbers only 9,761 women represented almost three and half billion of women whereas 34,803 men represented the male half of the world’s population. These figures show the sharp disparity in women’s representation in positions of power and decision-making (Krook 2009; Dahlerup 2009a). Such under-representation of women not only questions the legitimacy of democratic institutions (Phillips 1991), but also does injustice to women where the decisions are made for women without women’s views and opinions (Paxton and Hughes 2007). To present women’s perspective, women’s equal representation in political decision making is both necessary and just (Dahlerup 2008; 2006a; Lovenduski 1997; Phillips 1995).

In this state of gender disparity in formal political decision making institutions, gender quotas are increasingly being advocated by women’s activists, politicians and scholars as an effective strategy to ensure gender balance in legislatives bodies (Dahlerup 2005; 2006a; Mansbridge 2005). Over the last two decades since the topic of gender quotas (re)surfaced during a discussion on women’s political representation at the fourth world conference on women held in Beijing in 1995, research on gender quotas has exploded and continues to grow. This increased interest and the resulting research stems in part from the adoption of gender quotas and increasing number of women in policy making bodies both across, and within regions (Paxton, Kunovich and Hughes 2007). However, in this recent surge of political science research on gender quotas, it is surprising that
quota scholarship is unevenly distributed geographically and is predominantly Western (Devlin and Elgie 2000).

Researchers know a great deal about gender quotas such as legislative and voluntary party quotas in Western industrialized countries. Much less is known about gender quotas in developing countries which often take the form of reserved seats, the oldest form of gender quota in South Asia. This region, with its patriarchal social structure, implemented reserved seats for women back in 1935, a first in the history of women’s political representation and a development which has produced a high number of women leaders (Samarasinghe 2000; Afzal 1999; Jahan 1987). At present four out of eight countries in South Asia have adopted and implemented gender quotas and the reserved seats type of quota is predominant in this region (www.quotaproject.com). Yet, the long history and experience of reserved seats in the South Asian region has not received its fair share of attention and interest by international political science or gender quota researchers. Very few, if any, detailed and long-term studies on how gender quotas in the form of reserved seats impact on women’s political representation in South Asia are available.

I intend to begin to fill this void in existing gender quota scholarship and to contribute to the development of new knowledge from the history and experience of reserved seats in the South Asia region. My initial interest and enquiry about reserved seats in South Asia revealed that three countries - Afghanistan, Pakistan and Bangladesh - have adopted and implemented the reserved seats form of gender quota (www.quotaproject.com). However, the reserved seats provision in Pakistan and Bangladesh is most similar in terms of origin, history, implementation design and time frame. At the same time I found that there were differences in regard to reserved seats women legislators’ performance and success in the legislative process. This prompted me to undertake a comparative study to understand and
gain insights into how reserved seats work - for good or for worse - in patriarchal contexts. The similarities in the reserved seats provision and differences in outcomes made Pakistan and Bangladesh interesting and suitable for this type of comparative study.

**Situating the Thesis**

Several points need to be made to introduce the research. This thesis studies the reserved seats type of gender quota and its effect on women’s political representation in two South Asian countries, Pakistan and Bangladesh. I examine whether the existing knowledge of gender quotas generated from the findings of different empirical studies in a Western developed and more egalitarian context are appropriate to apply to the study of the historical and contemporary experiences of reserved seats in Pakistan and Bangladesh. I formulate several hypotheses from these reviews of the existing literature and test them in the selected cases. In this research ‘gender quota’ is used to indicate the reserved seats system where certain seats are added to the existing general seats and are reserved for women in parliament through a constitutional provision; and where women are elected indirectly by the respective parties after a general election (Norris 2004).

The research focuses on three broad questions. First, I want to know why and how the countries adopted the reserved seats type of gender quota for women’s representation in law making institutions despite the ingrained masculinist norms and practices of the socio-cultural and political structures. Second and related to the first question is to understand the effect of reserved seats on women’s descriptive and substantive political representation. Using the elements taken from the existing quota literature and representation, I investigate whether the reserved seats system has improved the descriptive presence of women in the law-making bodies in both countries and the extent
to which women acted for women in the different sites of representation. And lastly, I am interested in understanding whether the reserved seats provision has produced similar or different outcomes across the cases and what explains these similarities and differences in outcomes. In general my aim is to look for a broad pattern in reserved seats and women’s representation and to provide a clear account of individual and institutional-contextual factors that influence the political presence of women and their substantive acts in the patriarchal institutions. Therefore the research is timely and significant in many aspects.

First, the research traces the history and development of reserved seats in the selected cases that provide the opportunity of practical application of historical institutionalism (HI) and to gauge the role of different actors, interests and ideas in gender positive changes in political institutions (Waylen 2009). The practice and example of employing an HI perspective to analyse the development of reserved seats is rare in gender quota scholarship. By reconstructing the roles played by different actors at different phases of the adoption and implementation of reserved seats, this research will deepen our understanding about how entrenched political elites are influenced by self-interest and how their decisions can affect the goals of gender equality. The historical interpretation of the reserved seats contributes to a better understanding of the impact of the gendered nature of reserved seat women's representation in politics.

Second, this comparative study is conducted with a focus on both general and reserved seat women parliamentarians in two South Asian countries. A comparative analysis of reserved seats both across countries but also between reserved and general seat women is unusual. This work thus does three things. First, it introduces the elite’s perception of politics in patriarchal context by bringing in the views and ideas of women legislators
about the political institutions. Second it helps to fill the vacuum in comparative research on gender quotas and especially on reserved seats, and finally it explores the quality and attributes of women elected to general seats and their substantive representation of women.

Third, the research applies Western-based concepts and theories about gender quotas to non-western contexts to see if the existing scholarship is useful in capturing the complete picture of reserved seats in developing and patriarchal contexts. This helps to distinguish between the features that are common to other quota experiences and those that are unique to these particular cases only. The insights gained from this empirical research will inform and improve the theorizing of quota policy and provide practical lessons. As such, the research seeks to link micro level findings to macro level gender quota theories and concepts.

Fourth, in this research I expand the concept of descriptive and substantive representation to comprehend the effect of reserved seats on women’s descriptive and substantive representation. I go beyond numbers and consider the kind of women elected to reserved seats. I examined not only the number of women in parliament; but also the attributes of women elected to reserved seats and general seats in all the parliaments in Pakistan and Bangladesh from 1972 to 2008. In this regard, I conducted a longitudinal study of the attributes of women legislators to provide a better understanding of women’s descriptive representation. I also make a comparative assessment of the elected women’s backgrounds thereby contributing to the debate on quota women and their credentials. The database developed for the research comprises of demographic and bibliographic information of almost 450 women legislators and is a rich source of information which
could support future research on women parliamentarians in Pakistan and Bangladesh. It may encourage the development of a more comprehensive and complete global data base of quota women legislators and allow us to understand how gender quotas impact on the background and election of women parliamentarians.

I also expand the concept of substantive representation to capture the acts of women within and outside the legislative environment. This research brings to light some less explored and undervalued acts of reserved seat women’s representatives. The study also avoids the tendency to devote too much attention to the legislative arena and therefore reduces the risk of losing sight of important acts of women in other sites of representation. Thus the study contributes to the growing tradition to judge the impact of gender quotas on women’s presence in parliament and on the lives of women. Such an approach to study substantive representation is rare in the existing quota scholarship in the South Asian context.

Lastly, the research integrates a form of feminist institutionalist theory with which is interested in theorising how gender underpins institutional norms and how policy inertia/change might be underscored by feminist activism or the lack thereof (Krook and Mackay 2011; Waylen 2007). Alongside, it explores the interconnection and influence of formal and informal institutions of society and politics on women’s representation. From the myriad propositions and constructions of women’s political representation, I identify several factors to explain the challenges and opportunities of women’s representation in

1 Most of the literature on gender quota and reserved seat in South Asia, which I reviewed for the purpose of this research, indicates that there exists an understanding to consider women’s legislative participation and representation as the only standard way of measuring the substantive representation of women. Very few work focus on the acts women perform for women in other area such as, party and constituency which includes Firoj 2003a, 2003b.
the patriarchal legislative space. This research thus brings new insights from empirical work and throws light on those views and perspectives which have long remained latent in the discussion on reserved seats and women’s political representation in South Asia. Thus this research is important for expanding knowledge and understanding of how women’s descriptive presence can be improved and advanced, offering women’s movement and women legislators’ new strategies and insights to make a difference in politics.

**Organization of the Thesis**

The thesis is divided into ten chapters and is organized as follows. Below I provide a brief presentation of each chapter to introduce the reader to the ideas and arguments behind the chapters and how they connect to the central questions under study.

**Chapter One: Why and When Gender Quota Matters?**

In the first chapter of the thesis, I present the literature review to understand the link between gender quota and women’s political representation. It develops the operational terms of descriptive and substantive representation to be used in this thesis.

Investigation into the quota mobilization and adoption process provides a way forward to understand the different motivations and coalitions between actors in the adoption process. A focus on the outcomes of quotas in term of improving the descriptive and substantive representation of women allows the researcher to capture the different constructions of descriptive and substantive representation. Again it supports an understanding that different institutional and individual-level factors are in play in the
process of substantive representation thus helping to construct the aiding and hindering contexts when women act for women.

However from the review of the literature, it is evident that most of the knowledge is generated from the experiences of legislated and party quotas in a Western context and very few emerged from the experience of gender quotas in non-western contexts. While it is important to understand these different frames of quota process and outcomes, I argue that the existing literature may not be adequate to explain how the reserved seats form of gender quotas work in developing and patriarchal contexts.

The reserved seats type of quota adopted in developing contexts offers a different framework for an analysis of the gender quota process and its outcomes. I put forward a number of hypotheses about the effects of reserved seats on women’s descriptive and substantive representation and from these various constructions I draw out several critical elements to explore in the thesis. The contrasting views and findings on reserved seats pave the way to test the hypotheses in selected cases to develop new knowledge or to defy or contest the existing literature.

To provide the rationale and scope of this research, I extensively review the literature on reserved seats and its effect on women’s representation in the parliaments of Pakistan and Bangladesh. I find that in terms of indirect election to reserved seats the countries share a similar history and design of implementation. Yet the initial review shows that there are differences in substantive outcomes that constitute the core idea of the comparative study. From the overall review of gender quota and reserved seats literature in general, and Pakistan and Bangladesh in particular four key questions emerge from the attempt to develop a framework for analysing first, the role and interest of different actors in the
adoption and implementation of reserved seats with indirect election and second, the impact of reserved seats on women’s descriptive and substantive representation.

In order to answer the research questions, I develop and present the two-step conceptual framework of the research in the second part of the chapter. First, to trace the development of reserved seats and explain the adoption of reserved seats for women, that is, how the gender positive changes in institutions happened, I employ a historical institutionalism (HI) approach. In the process of explanation, I explore the interaction between the formal and informal institutions as well as the interest of elites in adopting, continuing and reintroducing reserved seats in different contexts and times. In the next step the insight gained from the historical analysis is integrated to analyse the effect of reserved seats on women’s representation. Here, I consider the existing knowledge developed in the field of gender quotas and include those in the framework. I integrate a feminist institutionalist analysis to examine the impact of present institutional design and context of reserved seats on women’s representation and delineate the influence of different individual and institutional variables on women’s substantive representation. Exploring the problems of the meaning of women’s issues, women’s concerns and women’s interests and the differentiation between them, I use the term ‘women’s issues’. Women’s issues indicate those ‘issues of concern to women’ as identified by women legislators of the selected cases. Such a construction of women’s issues thus remains a priori undefined and context related and reduces the possibility of bias in the research.

Chapter Two: Mapping the Research

To translate the conceptual framework of the research into reality, I turn to different research paradigms to develop a method of inquiry that adequately maps the development
of reserved seats and its effect on complex issue of women’s representation in politics. Understanding the combination of history and its present effect on reserved seats, I employ the comparative-interpretive approach that allows me to be involved in in-depth historical analysis of the institutional context of reserved seats and understand its impact on women’s representation by interacting with the women’s representatives in their natural settings. The selection of cases was influenced by the convenience of area studies and most similar systems (MSS) design (Przeworski and Teune 1970). The similarities in the history, adoption, and implementation of reserved seat provisions for women but differences in substantive outcomes of women elected to reserved seats made Pakistan and Bangladesh ideal for MSS design (Lijphart 1975). Next from the analysis of the concepts of descriptive and substantive representation I operationalize the terms to be used in this research to examine the effect of reserved seats on women’s representation. I explain the rationale for the use of interviews and content analysis for the collection and analysis of data from the primary sources.

The cross-national component of the analysis draws on secondary literature on the social and political histories of British India, Pakistan and Bangladesh with a focus on women’s political representation, as well as on primary sources where these are required to address the research questions. To analyse the descriptive representation, I depend on parliamentary and bibliographic data of women parliamentarians. To measure the substantive representation I used two indicators: speeches and acts of women legislators within and outside the parliament. I selected two different techniques of data collection: content analysis of the parliamentary debates to locate the speeches of women; and in person interviews with women legislators to reveal their experiences and acts for women.
Chapter Three: Tracing the History of Reserved Seats in Pakistan and Bangladesh

In chapter three I investigate how the idea of applying the reserved seat system to women as a group in need of representation was initially developed and institutionalized in the political institutions of British India. I also explore the role and interests of different actors in the decision to adopt and implement reserved seats for women. My historical institutional analysis traces the origin of reserved seats back to the nineteenth century and provides an account of the reserved seats system - its origin, intent and its present state - revealing that the reserved seats provision was first adopted for the Māori population in New Zealand and for women in British India (Fleras 1985, Cousins 1941). After briefly describing the history and state of reserved seats as a power sharing mechanism in different countries, I conclude that the mechanism of reserved seats provision has both positive and negative implications for representation and representatives. Further, to gauge the development of the reserved seats provision and its institutionalization in the selected cases, I traced the initiative across three different time periods with different socio-political contexts. I also analyse the debates and discourses on women’s political representation and gender quotas in both national and global contexts during these time periods.

The second section of this chapter presents an analysis of the development and present nature of reserved seats in Pakistan and Bangladesh. I employ and unite two important elements of HI, critical juncture and path dependency, to explain the introduction of women’s reserved seats during the British regime and the reproduction of this institutional arrangement in combination with feminist and rational analysis. I highlight the specific features of the socio-cultural and political contexts that were crucial to
adoption and implementation of reserved seats for women for the first time, but subsumed under more ambiguous explanations like political will (Krook 2013). I also explore the politics behind the continuation and reintroduction of reserved seats in later phases. Based on this analysis I argue that the reserved seat system was reproduced as an institutional legacy that harmonized with the existing formal and informal institutions of the patriarchal society and provided different benefits to the elites at the cost of women’s agency to act independently. Finally, I reinforce the argument that the idea of the self-interest of entrenched male political elites within the political institutional arena has to be at the centre of an HI analysis to understand the adoption and incremental changes in reserved seats provision (Waylen 2011). The exploration of the politics behind the adoption and implementation of reserved seats formed the basis of the analysis of the effects of reserved seats on women’s representations addressed in the subsequent chapters.

Chapter Four: Do Reserved Seats Matter for Women’s Descriptive Presence in the Parliaments of Pakistan and Bangladesh?

In this chapter I present the empirical data and analyse the impact of reserved seats on women’s numeric representation in the parliaments of Pakistan and Bangladesh in chapter four. Quantitative data on women’s political participation is complemented with qualitative interviews of women legislators to examine the context and effect of reserved seats on women’s representation. A more nuanced understanding of the effect of reserved seats on women’s numeric representation necessitates an explanation of the low level of women’s political participation and representation in the law making bodies of both countries. The research identified three broad categories of factors – economic, socio-cultural and institutional - that affect women’s political participation. A low level of
economic development coupled with deeply embedded patriarchal culture and Islamic religious norms discriminates against women and limits their access to the resources - education, employment and financial - that are required to enter into political life (Haq and Azad 2013; Mumtaz 2005). Moreover, the dynastic nature and male domination in political parties and electoral system acts against women aspirants and candidates in the electoral process and their entry to parliaments (Islam 2014; Shaheed 2002). Thus the political explanation of women’s under representation in the law-making bodies is related to the analysis of the economic development, socio-cultural structure and party and electoral institutions of the countries. Specifically, the socio-cultural context in Pakistan and Bangladesh is patriarchal in form, understood here as where there is male domination and control over the lives, choices and opportunities of women, facilitated by Islamic religious doctrine. I examine how these have impacted on women’s political participation, through an exploration of institutionalized masculinist norms, the informalization of candidate selection processes, the First-Past-The-Post (FPTP) type of election system and the institutionalized norm of the ‘political man’ at the societal level in both cases affect women’s electoral participation. Drawing on the reality of women’s political participation both from the theory and personal experiences and perceptions of women legislators, I argue that such gendered socio-economic and institutional contexts necessitates the implementation of reserved seats to ensure women’s representation in law-making bodies.

Bringing together the quantitative data on women’s representation in the different parliaments with and without reserved seats with the views of women legislators on the reserved seats provisions, I examine by using selected cases the effect of reserved seats on women’s numeric representation in the parliaments. Based on the analysis, I find that
Chapter Five: Reserved Seats and Women’s Identity: Between Myth and Reality

In the fifth chapter of the thesis, I ascertain whether indirectly elected reserved seats women are elite, loyal, token or unqualified as some of the existing studies suggest. I approach this issue from two angles, pursuing both a cross-national and longitudinal dimension. I analyse the bibliographic information of reserved seats women elected to all of the parliaments from 1972 to 2008. I also look into the family and political background of women legislators to explore their social and political backgrounds. I also analyse the profiles of general seat women and make a relative comparison with reserved seat women to test the validity of the assumptions about the quality of reserved seats women. Further, I make a comparative assessment of Pakistani and Bangladeshi women legislators to understand the influence of different social structures on women legislators’ quality and credibility. Based on the analysis, I claim that reserved seats women are in no means inferior to directly elected women and that existing views about reserved seats women are assumptions rather than fact.

Chapter Six: Reserved Seats Women Legislators: The ‘Voice’ of Women in the Parliament

In chapter six, I seek to understand the link between descriptive and substantive representation and make inquiry at two levels to learn whether reserved seats women act for women. The first level is the parliamentary arena with its articulation of women’s concerns in the debates; and second, the acts women legislators claimed they performed
for women at the constituency and party level. In chapter six I examine in detail the differences in women’s commitment to placing women’s issues in the parliamentary debate. I present the empirical findings from the content analysis of the parliamentary debates and examine the number of times reserved seats and general seats women initiated debates on women’s issues and spoke for women. The presentation of the data according to these issue areas provides the scope to trace the overall changes in number of times women’s issues were presented and the relative importance of the issues in each parliament. Doing so supports my argument about reserved seats and general seat women’s substantive representation of women.

Throughout this process of investigation I registered the instances of women’s pro-activeness, activeness, over activeness, inactiveness and reactiveness on women’s issues and sought to understand the reasons for the diversity of representation. Accordingly, both acts and non-acts constitute substantive representation and these acts are crucial to an understanding of the space and agency of women’s substantive representation (Franceschet and Piscopo 2008).

Chapter Seven: Reserved Seats Women Acting to Change the Lives of Women

Based on the interviews and secondary sources, I explore in chapter seven the acts reserved seats women performed at the constituency and party level for women. I register the works women claimed to act for women at the constituency and party level though these self-proclaimed acts do not permit careful examination of the actual veracity of

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2 I examined women’s substantive representation in the committee function. However the quantitative and qualitative data are not enough to make an assessment of substantive representation of women. Therefore I summarized the findings and present them in Appendix 3. No further references will be made on women’s substantive representation in regard to committee work in the text.
these claims (Lovenduski and Norris 2003). However based on the acts performed by the women legislators, I argue that these acts can have two dimensional impacts on women’s lives which include socio-economic empowerment of women, and the engendering of politics (Dahlerup 1988). I also explore the constraints reserved seats women face at the constituency level given the patriarchal context of these societies. Finally, exploring and analysing the parliamentary and non-parliamentary acts of women in both cases, I draw a comparative picture of the findings to ascertain the extent of substantive representation by Pakistani and Bangladeshi women legislators. I explain the similarities and differences in substantive outcomes using qualitative indicators but quantitative data generated from the content analysis of the debates is also used. However, I refrain from attempting any quantitative value laden evaluation of substantive representation of women as the research is not designed to measure substantive representation in absolute numbers. The overall findings confirm the third hypothesis that directly elected general seats women act for women more than indirectly elected reserved seats women to be false. It also confirms the fourth hypothesis that indirectly elected reserved seats women do substantively act for women as true.

Chapter Eight: Women in Institutional Sites of Representation

The tentative findings and insights from women’s substantive representation from the previous chapters are brought together in chapters eight and nine of this thesis. The major idea of the chapters is to test the hypotheses formulated in chapter two to identify the hindering and enabling contexts of women’s substantive representation. I formulate the hypotheses that women’s substantive representation will be hindered when the following factors are present: masculinist norms in political institutions, indirect election and the quota label, party discipline and affiliation, lack of institutional support systems and
social gender norms. On the other hand, I argue that following factors are positively related to women’s improved substantive representation: increased number of and diversity among women, a women’s parliamentary caucus, critical actors, women with feminist attitudes and links with women’s organizations and civil society organizations. However for convenience, I grouped these factors into institutional and individual and present the analysis accordingly in two consecutive chapters. In chapter 8, I test the influence of different institutional factors on women’s substantive representation including: increased number of and diversity among women; presence of women’s parliamentary caucus; masculinist norms and practices of the institutions; indirect election and reserved seat label; party discipline, affiliation and party’s position; and lack of institutional support systems are analysed from the insights gained from feminist institutionalist scholarship and the experiences of women legislators. This is important in terms of revealing the degree of influence of the factors that enable or hinder women’s agency to act for women within the political institutional environment.

Chapter Nine: When are Women Able to Act for Women?

In chapter nine, I focus on the individual-level variables in each case to ascertain whether the presence of women with feminist attitudes, the presence of critical actors; women’s membership and link to women’s organizations and civil society groups enable women to act more substantively for women as quota scholarship suggests. At the same time I explore the effect of the social gender norms of a carer role and domestic responsibility on women’s ability and time to act for women. Untangling the influence of these factors on women’s substantive representation allows us to consider the importance and implications of certain individual-level variables that are effective in minimizing the
influence of gender bias in institutional environments and in bending existing institutional norms and practices so as to foster women’s agenda.

While there are always problems in comparing case studies from a qualitative perspective, the other aim of chapter nine is to isolate the influence of different factors on women’s substantive representation and to account for the differences in outcomes. The findings from chapters eight and nine are combined at the end of this chapter to argue that women face similar kinds of constraints across contexts. Institutional and individual-level factors, such as, the masculinist formal and informal norms and practices of political institutions; the indirect election and reserved seat label; party discipline, affiliations and positions; lack of institutional support systems and social gender norms impose limitations on women’s substantive representation. At the same time, the presence of an increased number and diversity among women; a women’s parliamentary caucus; the presence of women with credible profiles and positions; feminist attitudes and links with women’s organizations and civil society groups at multiple levels amplify women’s substantive representation of women. These aiding factors enable women to develop new formal and informal norms, create a space to promote women’s concern and to a considerable extent weaken the influence of the masculinist norms of the political institutions. In this chapter I reinforce the idea that the presence of institutional and individual-level factors in different degrees result in differences in substantive outcomes between these two countries.
Chapter Ten: Linking the Reality and Experiences of Reserved Seats to Gender Quota Theory

Chapter 10 completes the circle of the thesis by returning to the literature that exists on gender quota and reserved seats. The aim is to establish whether the existing Western scholarship on gender quota theory can be used to explain the experiences of reserved seats in Pakistan and Bangladesh. I present the overall findings of the research and its contribution to the broader gender quota literature. I revisit whether the reserved seats provision enables women to be present in greater numbers in the parliaments and to act for women in different sites of representation.

In the process of making this investigation on reserved seats, I identify that the entrenched elite’s support during all periods was pivotal for the provision of reserved seats for women and that women’s movements alone were not enough to make the changes to the political institutions or to the institutionalized masculinist rules and practices. However, the support of the elite was influenced by the idea of self-interest rather than gender equality. The formal and informal institutions of the society, politics and state necessitated the implementation of reserved seats but maintained the status quo of male domination within the political institution through the process of indirect election. The findings assert that reserved seats despite maintaining the elite’s interests and image have significantly increased the number of women in parliaments of each country. The findings from both cases contest the idea that reserved seats women are elite or unqualified and that the different mode of election impacts on the background of women elected to the parliaments. Rather male dominated undemocratic and dynastic party structure produce legislators of similar kinds in general and reserved seats. It also reveals that women’s substantive representation occurs in various forms at different sites of
representation and confirms the links between descriptive and substantive representation. I also claim that this link is not absolute or guaranteed and is contingent upon an array of institutional and individual factors.

The thesis also makes explicit that there are differences in substantive outcomes between cases and this is due to the different degree of presence of institutional and individual level variables in each case. Ultimately, this thesis draws attention to the fact that the challenges and opportunities of quota women legislators are similar across time, space and quota regime but their degree of influence on women’s substantive representation may vary with time and context.

Finally, I raise a range of critical issues which surfaced during the process of the investigation and that run counter to the existing knowledge on reserved seats such as, the representativeness of elite women; the label effect of quotas; the two-fold responsibility of quota women; and the direct election to reserved seats as possible points for future discussion and research. If my findings and explanations of critical issues are effective, they will encourage quota scholars to think critically about the challenges and opportunities of reserved seats women in strong patriarchal contexts and their contribution to desirable outcomes for women. It will also stimulate reflection on the role women’s organizations, civil society organizations, political parties, and most importantly on the role women legislators can play to ensure effective outcomes for women in the parliaments. Thus I add new insights to the reserved seats literature and claim to make a contribution to the development of gender quota scholarship.
Chapter 1: Why and When Gender Quotas Matter?

The debate and discussion on women’s under representation in political decision making institutions and the need of affirmative action such as gender quota surfaced at the Beijing Platform for Action in the fourth World Conference on Women in 1995. Since that time gender quotas have become internationalized and institutionalized both as a strategy and a solution to women’s under-representation in legislative and policy making bodies. Quotas in electoral politics involve setting up a percentage or number of women representatives, a minimum percentage might for instance be 20, 30 or 40 percent of women in the legislative bodies. It requires the nominating bodies, in most political systems, the political parties, to recruit, nominate, or select more women for political positions (Dahlerup 2006a; 2005). As a kind of affirmative action, quotas have been adopted in more than 120 countries in different regions to increase the presence of women in legislative institutions (Clayton 2014; Tripp 2013). Therefore, an in-depth understanding of gender quotas and their impact on women’s political representation in a global context is fundamental to the study and exploration of reserved seats in the national contexts of the selected countries.

This chapter has two central purposes: first, I explain the link between gender quota and women’s political representation to understand what a gender quota is expected to do (i.e. change the political representation of women). Related to this is an explanation for the mobilization and adoption of gender quotas in different contexts and the outcomes in terms of women’s representation in legislative institutions. I progress by focussing on the literature on reserved seats to identify the salient aspects which are not common to other quotas. From this review I locate the key variables, here numbers and kinds of women
and their substantive acts, and from these I formulate several hypotheses. I also construct the research questions germane to understanding the nature and the outcomes of reserved seats in Pakistan and Bangladesh.

Second, I present a framework for the research. To understand why the countries have adopted the reserved seats type of quota and to understand the present context of reserved seats, I employ historical institutionalism (HI) approach. In chapter four, I explain the role of different actors and trajectories that led to the adoption of reserved seats for women. Next, I examine the effect of reserved seats on women’s descriptive and substantive representation. For this I propose Phillips work that suggests a link between descriptive and substantive representation of women and examine whether gender quotas combine these representational idea and, if they do, to which extent. I examine the influence of different factors on women’s descriptive and substantive representation and provide an account of the outcomes of reserved seats. At the end I present a brief summary of the chapter that outlines the issues and concepts to be addressed in the research.

**Linking Gender Quotas and Women’s Political Representation**

Most of the quota theorists invoke Pitkin’s concepts of representation to build their argument for the adoption and implementation of gender quotas. Pitkin (1967) identifies four types of representation but contends that three of these - formalistic, descriptive, and symbolic—are limited. In her view, substantive representation, what she often refers to as ‘acting for’, is the one true type of representation (cited in Celis et al., 2008, p.100). Formal representation focuses on the rules and procedures regulating the selection and removal of representatives. The second, descriptive representation - representativeness is used to indicate that a person shares some of the characteristics of a group of persons.
Third, substantive representation refers to the congruence between a representative’s action and the interest of the represented where legislators take policy actions that serve the population subgroups he/she represents. And fourth, symbolic representation refers to the represented’s feelings of being fairly and effectively represented (Schwindt-Bayer and Mishler 2005, p.407). However, Pitkin cautions that it should not matter what kind of persons speak for a given constituency as long as they do so effectively (the politics of idea) and thus rejects the link between characteristics and actions (Held 1997, pp.530-532).

Phillips (1995), contrary to Pitkin’s view, asserts that the ‘politics of ideas’ has given way to a ‘politics of presence’. Phillips stresses that social representation is not meant to replace the representation of ideas and argues that women have interests, experiences, values, and expertise that are different from those of men (Phillips 1995, p.25). To present these different experiences in policy contexts women must be represented in formal politics (politics of presence). Thus she proposes a link between descriptive and substantive representation where women legislators are seen to be not only “standing as” women but also “acting for” women on the basis of gender experience and consciousness (Celis and Childs 2008, p.419; Lovenduski and Norris 2003). The underlying assumption is that female legislators represent women by not merely standing and speaking, but by doing (Piscopo 2006, p.4). However, Phillips does not provide an explicit formula on how to connect these two representational perspectives in real life (Dahlerup 2007, p.74). Gender quotas in party based political systems provide the opportunity to link the social representation of women and representation of their ideas (Socialist International Women 1996 cited in Dahlerup 2007, p.75)
Quota proponent Dahlerup argues that quotas shift the classic liberal notion of “equality of opportunity” to one of “equality of result” which is based on the argument that if barriers exist, compensatory measures must be introduced as a means to reach equality of result (2005, p.144). Moghadam is more optimistic in asserting that gender quotas ensure the recognition, representation of women and redistribution of power and resources at once (2009, p.26). Others argue that through the redistribution of power, quotas will eventually change the masculine norms of politics (Baldez 2006; Heath, Schwindt-Bayer and Taylor-Robinson 2005).

These observations illustrate that the gender quota is imbued with two sets of gendered expectations: distribution of power and resources and an alteration to the masculine nature of political institutions. So, from these perspectives, it can be argued that gender quotas are intend to produce two outcomes: first, the immediate effect of increasing the number of women in the parliaments concerned; and second, to bring changes to these masculinist political institutions through the institutionalization of women’s presence and through the representation of women’s perspectives in the political institutions.

Based on this link between descriptive and substantive representation, it is to be expected that gender quotas should increase the descriptive representativeness of women by enabling them to represent their shared experiences with female citizens. The presence of more women means a higher chance of representing issues important to women as women place greater values on women’s issues (Celis 2009; Beckwith and Meyers 2007; Schwindt-Bayer 2006). Women as representative, Mansbridge (1999) believes, would open lines of communication with their constituents and improve the substantive representation of women. It is argued that an increased proportion of women elected in legislatures beyond a certain threshold would feminize and transform the practice of
politics through a change in both the quality and content of politics (Lovenduski and Norris 2003). The presence of women in sufficient number and their inclusion in political elites through use of gender quotas can bring about a new set of political priorities and change the institutions they enter (Heath, Schwindt-Bayer and Taylor–Robinson 2005; Skjeie 1991). This expectation led women to mobilize and link with the international and national level state and civil society actors to address and adopt gender quotas in political institutions. Women’s increased mobilization and the diffusion of international gender quota norms influenced the adoption of quotas in a large number of countries though the motivations of the state actors may vary across space and time.

**Actors and Motivations in the Gender Quota Process**

The increased mobilization for quotas by domestic and international actors in the post Beijing Platform for Action period and the adoption of quotas by an increasing number of countries led to the emergence of a new wave of women in politics literature. This wave of research focused on the global and regional diffusion of quotas and the role and motivation of different actors and institutions in the quota adoption process. Different empirical studies confirm that three different groups of actors are involved in the quota process: state actors, societal actors (i.e., domestic women’s movement; political parties; and civil society groups) and international actors (i.e., the transnational and international organizations and the international women’s movement). The scholarship from different countries shows that alliances among actors are formed and maintained at different stages of the mobilization process for quotas and for different reasons (Tadros 2010; Krook 2008; Pires 2002). Krook identifies four explanatory factors behind the adoption of gender quotas: women's mobilization, the strategic incentives of political elites, consistency with existing political norms, and international norms and transnational
sharing (Krook 2009). In different contexts any one or combinations of these factors can facilitate the process of quota adoption (Darhour and Dahlerup 2013). However, each of these explanations requires study of both the structural barriers and opportunities as well the intent of the key actors in the quota adoption process.

Empirical studies suggest that in most cases the adoption of gender quotas is facilitated by the strength and cohesion of national women’s movement with the support of international organizations in the post Beijing phases (Bush 2011; Krook and True 2010). The wealth of research on this aspect indicates that cross party women’s coalitions, women’s mobilization and links with women policy agencies, transnational sharing and links with international institutions like the UN facilitated the adoption of quotas in countries like Rwanda, Eritrea, Jordan, Turkey, Mexico, Morocco, Brazil, Bolivia, and Costa Rica. Waylen (2008) argues that the success of women’s organizations is largely dependent on how a movement interacts with other political actors and women policy agencies during a transitional period. Further the quota experience of different countries indicates that alliances and support for quotas are facilitated in the context of countries undergoing difficult transitions. One of these is transition from authoritarian rule to democracy (for example Bolivia, Peru, Costa Rica, Brazil, and Pakistan). Another is during the formulation of new constitutions and design of electoral systems and governing institutions after internal conflicts or civil war (in the cases of Rwanda, Uganda, Tanzania, Sudan, Afghanistan, Iraq, and Nepal) (Bauer and Britton 2006; Ballington and Dahlerup 2006; Ghimire 2006). A third is in response to a commitment to international gender equality and quota norms and pressures after the Beijing Platform for Action (for example Jordan, Morocco, and Eritrea). In some cases, international military
invasion facilitated the efforts of women’s groups to achieve quotas such as in Afghanistan and Iraq (Krook, O’Brien and Swip 2010).

In the process of deciding upon quotas the most important factor was the motivations and interest of the state actors to support or oppose them. The state actors’ support for quotas was mostly based on their political calculation and idea of self-interest (Murray, Krook and Opello 2012). Across Latin America, the adoption of quotas by male-dominated legislatures is explained in part by the desire of political leaders to present their countries as modern and to accrue the benefits of the system (Dahlerup and Freidenvall 2005). As in Peru, the leaders approved gender quotas without any prior pressure from women’s organizations to create a political market of women supporters and voters (Towns 2004 cited in Paxton, Hughes and Green 2006, p.901; Araujo and Garcia 2006).

In Arab regions where political norms contradict public participation of women, state actors adopted quotas as a response to international pressure for women’s political representation and to the renewed social pressure of national women’s movement after the ‘Arab Spring’ (Darhour and Dahlerup 2013; Abou-Zeid 2006). In some Asian countries flow of external funds along with commitment made to international norms of gender equality also facilitated the decision to implement quotas (UNDP 2000; Khan 2007). In other cases elites adopted quotas to appeal to female voters or to compete with rival parties such as, in Mexico, Brazil and Bolivia (Baldez 2004a; Caul and Binghamton 2001). In the case of France and United Kingdom, gender quotas were consistent with the countries’ social and political norms of gender equality but different terms such as, parity or equality guarantees were used instead of gender quota (Krook 2013; Squires 2005). In more gendered and authoritarian contexts, political elites supported quotas to consolidate regime interests or to secure the support of women legislators (Tripp 2005; Meena 2004).
In combination these empirical studies suggest that the political elite’s support for gender quota does not always stem from the idea of main-streaming women or their interests in politics but rather to consolidate party and regime interests.

Yet the choice of quota type and design of implementation has been shaped either in accordance with socio-cultural norms or by the nature of the political regime. Amongst the three basic types of quota - party quota, legislative quota and reserved seats - most countries have adopted party and legislated quotas (53 and 54 respectively). Relatively few countries have adopted reserved seats (23) (www.quotaproject.org). The profiles of the countries and choice of quota reveals a pattern. Less democratic, patriarchal and authoritarian states mostly with an Islamic heritage and hierarchical culture adopted reserved seats, while democratic and welfare states with egalitarian cultures opted for legislated and party quotas (Costa 2010; Matland 2006; Tripp 2005). The reviews indicate that quotas are expected to make gender positive changes in political institutions but several factors are important for their adoption: strength and mobilization of women’s organization or movement; institutionalized norms about women’s political representation; international pressure; and the support of state actors. Finally, choices of quotas and implementation design are shaped by the actor’s socio-political context and priorities that in reality impact to different degrees and levels on the outcomes of quotas (Davidson-Schmich 2006).

Gender Quota and Descriptive Increases of Women

After quotas became prevalent and institutionalized, research was undertaken to examine the effect of quotas on women’s descriptive representation. The main interest in the literature has been whether quotas contribute to an increase in the number of women in
parliament. Research has focused on the changes in the number of women resulting from the adoption of quota from those of previous parliaments. The empirical findings suggest that quotas have produced transformative results and have significantly contributed to improve the presence of women in legislative institutions (Clayton 2014).

Prior to the adoption of quotas, the average representation of women in 1995 in national parliaments of the world was only 10.5 percent. The percentage increased to 15.5 percent in 2005 and 21.9 percent in 2014 (IPU 2014). Women’s average representation was doubled within the 20 years of quota adoption. Many argue that this drastic increase in women’s representation in legislatures is the outcome of gender quotas (Tripp and Kang 2008; Tinker 2004). Though there is some debate over the effectiveness of particular types of quotas, findings show that all three types of quotas have in practice produced similar results in terms of increasing women’s numerical representation. The reserved seats type of gender quota increases the proportion of number of women representatives from between 6.4 and 48.8 percent, party quotas between 4.1 and 47.3 percent and legislative quotas between 9 and 40 percent (IPU 2008 cited in Krook 2009, p.39). Nonetheless the influence of other factors on women’s increased representation such as democratization, modernization, globalization and increased economic development should not be ignored (Freidenvall, Dahlerup and Skjeie 2006).

In some cases quotas have been found to produce stagnation and a decrease in the number of women representatives (Krook 2013). Yet it cannot be overlooked that most of the countries in the top 50 spots on the Inter-Parliamentary Union’s (IPU) list of women in national parliaments have some kind of gender quota (McCann 2013). Quotas have improved women’s representation in highly gendered and patriarchal countries in Arab, Asia and Africa. However due to differences in gender quota type, implementation design
and socio-political context, women’s representation does not increase uniformly within and across the regions. Nonetheless, scholars agree that gender quotas are an effective means to increases the number of women in parliament in a short time (Bauer 2008; Jones 2006). The major focus of the research on gender quota however did not remain static over the years. Along with the increases in the number of women, research starts to focus on the extent to which this increase presence of women can effectively pursue substantive changes in the gendered political institutions.

With the increase in the number of women in parliaments, the practical application and interactions of descriptive and substantive representation have come under close feminist scrutiny (Childs and Lovenduski 2013). Though quota proponents expect that diverse kind of women will be elected, some research has found that quotas lead to the election of elite women who serve as proxies or tokens of their families and are related to powerful men in political parties (Sater 2007; Abou-Zeid 2006). Evidence also suggests that women who win office via quotas tend to have less political experience and ambitions when compared with non-quota women (Davidson-Schmich 2008; Murray 2008; Schwartz 2004). It is argued that there is lack of diversity among quota women, and election of women with such backgrounds as described above would not be able challenge the status quo of male dominated institutions. However, few studies (Allen, Cutts and Campbell 2014; Josefsson 2014; Franceschet and Piscopo 2012; O’Brien 2012) inquire into the issue using within case comparison that is between quota and non–quota legislators to test the assumption that whether only elite or inferior women are elected through a quota provision. The emerging insights suggest extending the concept of descriptive representation by going ‘beyond numbers’ and including the quality and capacity of women elected through quotas (Murray 2010; Piscopo 2006). Thus it is
agreed that not only numbers, but the characteristics - competence and quality- of women are intimately linked with the substantive representation of women (Weeks and Baldez 2014).

**Gender Quota and Substantive Representation**

Researchers have also begun to take an interest in regard to understanding the outcome of quotas in terms of producing gender positive changes in both policy and political institutions. Gender quotas are typically assumed to provide women’s substantive representation (attention to women’s interests in debate and in legislation) through descriptive representation (the presence of women). The main thrust of the research on gender quota is to understand whether the numbers in fact translate into power to implement a feminist agenda (Tinker 2004). Tremblay (2007, p.283) asserts that “a woman MP must speak and act in favour of the expectations, needs and interests of women.” Lovenduski (1997, p.710) discerns two approaches to the definition: representation of women’s issues (that affect women either for biological or social reason) and representation of women’s perspectives (women’s perspective on all political concerns).

Others find that substantive representation takes place in different forms and spaces other than legislatures. At this point, concepts like critical acts (Dahlerup 1988) and critical actors (Celis and Childs 2008; Childs and Krook 2008) are highlighted. Critical acts refer to any initiatives inside and outside the legislative boundaries that intend to change the position of the minority and lead to further changes (Dahlerup 2006b). Thus a critical act itself is a kind of substantive representation. Critical actors are those who initiate any critical act for women or embolden others to act for women (Celis and Childs 2008). Thus
substantive representation through critical acts can occur in difference spaces in different moment. The definitions and views illustrate that substantive representation is comprised of both voicing and acting in favour of women’s interests, needs and expectations in any spaces.

Related to women’s substantive representation is an understanding of what constitutes women’s interests and of the issues that need to be represented. The notion of women’s interests remains controversial and has been criticised for having connotations of elitism and essentialism (Wängnerud 2009; Zetterberg 2009; 2008). Feminist political scientists have defined ‘women’s interests’ in three main ways, often using this concept interchangeably with terms like ‘women’s issues,’ ‘women’s needs,’ and ‘women’s concerns’ to explain women’s substantive representation (Dahlerup 2009b). The notion of women’s issues also remains controversial (Celis 2006). Feminist scholars have identified and operationalized women’s issues in a number of different ways. Lovenduski defines women’s issues as those “that mainly affect women, either for biological reasons (such as breast cancer screening or reproductive rights) or for social reasons (sex equality or child care policy)” (1997, p.710). Carroll (1992) defines women’s issues as those that “disproportionately become the responsibility of women as a result of the sexual division of labour” (cited in Beckwith and Cowell-Meyers 2007, p.555). Mackay views any issue relating to the broader society as women’s issues (2001). In the empirical research two main approaches are found in the study of women’s substantive representation. Some define women’s interest based on the demands of the contemporary women’s movement (Celis 2004). In others, women’s interests are subjectively defined by the researcher as either those traditionally associated with women or those with a feminist accentuation (Celis 2009). In both cases, researchers risk losing sight of context-specific women’s
issues which cannot be defined in line with either feminist or traditional interests of women.

Despite these conflicting perspectives on women’s issues, empirical studies have been conducted in Western democracies including the United Kingdom, the Nordic countries and in Latin America to examine whether substantive representation of women has improved or not with the presence of more women. This research suggests that with the increasing presence of women in legislatures, women’s issues are raised more frequently in them through questions, discussions and bills (Murray 2011; Schwindt- Bayer 2006; Celis 2004; Norris and Lovenduski 2003; Swers 2002). Wängnerud’s work on the Swedish Riksdag has also found that female politicians do contribute to strengthening women’s issues in important decision making bodies (2009; 2000). The work of Bauer and Britton (2006), Bauer (2012; 2008), Bauer and Burnet (2013) on Africa also reveals that working together across religious, ethnic, and class divisions, helps women to formulate legislation and foster democracies more inclusive of women's interests.

Childs’s (2004) work on the British parliament demonstrates that women worked for women in constituencies, committees and parties as well as in the parliamentary chambers. Their participation opened lines of communication between constituents and representatives in a way not prevalent earlier. Franceschet and Piscopo’s work (2008) on Argentina’s chambers find that women made unique and distinctive contributions to debates, bringing viewpoints and arguments to the table that might otherwise have been absent. Celis (2009; 2004) work on the Belgian Lower House reveals that women irrespective of their different ideological orientation ensure the representation of women’s interests in legislative debates. It also broadens the idea about what constitutes women’s interest by bringing different ideological views of women’s needs and interests. Kittilson
(2008) also confirms that women influence the inclusion of carer perspectives in the public policy process. Xydias’s (2007) work on the German Bundestag confirms that women legislators speak in reference to both feminist and traditional issues of women and the presence of gender quotas enhances attention to these issues.

Research also finds that women legislators put forward explicitly gendered ideas and issues to frame and reframe the debate with the intent to gender or regendered the discourse in favour of women’s interests (Childs and Lovenduski 2013). Further, it is revealed that although women parliamentarians do vote according to party lines and weigh their party affiliation more, they raise more women’s issues than men (Thomas 1994). Women, as scholars argue, act for women on the basis of gender consciousness. Further it is argued that the mandate effect of quotas places a responsibility on quota women to act for women (Franceschet and Piscopo 2008).

However, there is little evidence to demonstrate that women have been able to change pervasively masculine cultures and norms of politics (Baldez 2006; Kittilson 2005). Despite the increase in the number of women, the timing, rules and norms of political institutions, working environment and arrangements, allocation and membership of important parliamentary committees and other important positions remain male dominated (Dalton 2008; Ross 2002). Masculine behaviour continues to shape parliamentary process and debating styles (Grey 2002). In historically male dominated institutions like the parliament, women are considered as ‘space invaders’ and are subject to marginalization (Puwar 2004 cited in Dalton 2008, p.4). Moreover, some women have tried to fit with the dominant male style and environment and in that process they have intentionally distanced themselves from representing or supporting women’s issues (Franceschet and Piscopo 2008; Khan 2004; Childs 2002). In some instances women have
refrained from taking action against bills that disproportionately and negatively affect women. Instead they have voted along party lines for bills that affect women’s rights and interest and have rejected any mandate to act for women (Tripp 2004).

The quest to understand why and when women succeed or fail to act for women reveals that the institutional context in which acts of substantive representation occur is crucial. Grey (2006, p.498) warns that only focusing on the numerical strength of women ignores the complexity of power relations in politics and how this affects the ability of female politicians to act as and for women. Beyond the numbers of women, a myriad of institutional and individual-level factors impact on women and their ability to act for women. The feminist analysis of institutions further explains that the formal and informal institutions of society and politics in which women are present and operate have a gendered structure (Krook and Mackay 2011). These institutions originate and operate on the basis of males’ perspective about life, work and politics and largely undermine the presence of women or the integration of women’s views (Acker 1990). The gendered nature of institutional spaces like parliaments, political parties and constituencies affects women’s substantive representation in varying degrees and manners (Kenny 2013; Krook and Mackay 2011; Franceschet 2010). From these various propositions, several critical elements are identified that impact positively or negatively on women’s substantive representation such as: the masculine nature of political institutions; the quota label of women; party discipline and affiliation; experience and newness of women; women’s social gender norms; feminist attitudes; the increased number and diversity of women; the presence of a women’s parliamentary or party caucus; links with women’s organizations, civil society groups and women’s policy agency. Based on these propositions, these
institutional and individual-level factors can be grouped under two categories: facilitating and hindering factors of women’s substantive representation.

The Enabling Context of Substantive Representation

Feminist researchers agree that institutions created by men in response to the interest of elites often function to constrain the behaviour of women. Prevailing rules, norms and patterns of behaviour in the institutions provide either opportunities or obstacles to the promotion of women’s issues (Franceschet 2011; 2010). However, several factors are found to be positively related to enhanced representation of women’s issues. Among these factors, foremost in importance is the presence of more women in parliament. Empirical research draws on the concept of ‘critical mass’ to argue for women’s increased presence in the parliament as a means to change institutional practices and policy agendas (Grey 2002). Scholars argue that once woman’s descriptive representation reaches a particular threshold- critical mass (usually 30 percent) - women would then be more likely to have an impact on parliamentary politics (Dahlerup 1988; 2006b). Beneath the idea of critical mass of women is the expectation that with increased numbers, diverse kinds of women will be elected to parliament (Childs and Krook 2009). There will be diversity among women in terms of experience, professional education and backgrounds which will ensure the representation of the diverse issues of women of different groups and classes. Thus increases in number of women (due to the shared gender experience) open the possibility for the increased representation of women’s issues and facilitate the process of substantive representation. However, the presence of critical mass of women needs to be supported by additional enabling factors or resources as I highlight in the ensuing paragraphs.
Further research confirms that even without a critical mass, women parliamentarians can gain legislative success in favour of women (Yoon and Banwaree 2008; Ayata and Tütüncü 2008). Findings assert that critical actors are a more decisive factor in achieving substantive success through critical acts in favour of women (Nzomo n.d.; Childs and Krook 2009; Chenay 2003; Dahlerup 1988). Critical actors put in motion individual and collective campaigns for women-friendly policy change. They initiate policy proposals on their own, and embolden others to take steps to promote policies for women (Celis and Childs 2008; Childs and Krook 2008). The presence of critical actors can enhance substantive representation or bring about substantive changes in political institutions.

Other researchers contend that feminist attitudes and self-identification as feminist are more important for substantive representation to occur (Studlar and McAllister 2002; Tremblay and Pelletier 2000). The presence of not just any women but the presence of ‘women-identified-women’ or ‘preferable descriptive representatives’ is advocated for women’s substantive representation. It implies that such representatives experience a sense of belonging to, and have strong mutual relationships with women (Dovi 2002, pp. 729-736). This kind of women representatives share aims with women and would want to see improved socio-economic and political status of. Such women representatives are also able to recognize the differences between women (Dovi 2002).

Other empirical studies have found that woman’s cross party caucuses are highly effective at enabling women’s substantive representation in parliaments (Yoon 2011; Sater 2007; Thomas 1991). Childs (2004; 2001) suggests that female MPs have to have a ‘safe space’ or an environment in which feminist ideas can be freely expressed. Different case studies confirm that a women’s caucus create a space for women to discuss and
minimize differences and promote issues of concern to women. Caucus members put together omnibus legislative packages on women’s health, gender equality in education and economic equity (Swers 2002, p.31). It provides training to new women legislators, formulates women related bills, establishes strategic links with other actors in the society and provides regular updates. These activities of caucus have facilitated the substantive representation of women in male dominated institutions in Uganda, Rwanda, Tanzania, and Morocco (Wang 2013; Bauer 2012, Yoon 2011; Goetz 2002).

Further it is asserted that a link with organized and active feminist movements and civil society is important for substantive representation. These organizations train and encourage women legislators and supplement their effort with information and other resources (Htun, Lacalle and Micozzi 2011; Curtin 2008; Beckwith and Cowell-Meyers 2007; Karam and Lovenduski 2005; Childs 2004). Many women develop leadership skills through their participation in women's organizations which support the representation of critical bills related to women (Yoon 2004).

The Hindering Context of Substantive Representation

Enquiry into when and what obstructs women to act for women affirms that the formal and informal rules of political institutions and contextual factors intervene in the process of the representation of women. The rules and practices of the parliamentary system present strong obstacles to women’s substantive representation (Trimble 2006). The historically male dominated parliamentary practices and norms inhibit women legislators’ capacity to accomplish policy goals where women experience marginalization, invisibilisation and tokenism (Zetterberg 2009). In masculine institutional structures and practices, women are conferred to less prestigious positions without any opportunity to
manoeuvre political power and are ignored or neglected. The limited positional power of women inside legislatures is often owing to a lack of seniority or lack of legislative experience (Fuente and Verge 2013; Beckwith 2007; Swers 2002).

Quota women in such contexts face an additional but different set of challenges due to their mode of election or selection. In many cases demeaning status and labels are used to stigmatize, marginalize and de-legitimize women elected through quota (Franceschet and Piscopo 2008; Bilal 2006). The ‘quota label’ in some cases may influence women to disavow their association with what are considered to be a ‘narrow’ set of female concerns (Childs 2004) or vote against legislation that would promote women’s rights (Tripp 2004) or to be less willing allies to their female-friendly colleagues (Schwindt-Bayer 2006). In other cases, quota women’s agency to act for women is further decreased by indirect election and absence of constituency (Tinker 2004). Moreover, women remaining feminine or female-focused in the male dominated institutions lose status required to legislate successfully and are side-lined or marginalized (Franceschet and Piscopo 2008; Bochel and Briggs 2000). Dahlerup’s work on Norwegian women politicians found that women politicians are met with negative reactions or even sanctions if they are ‘too’ feminist (Dahlerup 1988, p.294).

Women legislators are also constrained by party discipline, party affiliation and party’s position in the parliament. In authoritarian or un-democratic party structures, cross-party alliances of female MPs are considered inappropriate and women are expected to remain within the boundaries set by the party (Bari 2010). Studies found that women vote according to party line and are driven by the party ideology and the party’s position in parliament (Childs 2006; 2004; Childs and Withy 2004; Lovenduski and Norris 2003).
However, elected male and female legislators also have to confront the same limitations; their representative acts too are shaped and dictated by party affiliation and politics (Darhour and Dahlerup 2013). Party allegiance, however, puts additional pressure on quota women and their desire to push for women friendly changes as their election and position is largely dependent on the decision of the party.

Again, the ability of female legislators to initiate women related activities are also shaped by human, technical and financial resources. Where women have resources to hire highly skilled assistants, they can initiate acts for women. Lack of support systems within the institutions such as necessary staff, space, information, and funding affect women’s ability to undertake women related research and activities (Franceschet 2011).

In addition, the timing of parliaments and working hours conflict with women’s carer role. Political time is complex (Childs and Lovenduski 2013; Fuente and Verge 2013).³ Time is a resource for elected parliamentarians and women have less time since they have to divide their time between politics and domestic responsibilities (Shvedova 2005). Politics is a full time job and its norms contradict with the social gender norms of women. This ultimately impacts on women’s ability and desire to act for women (Fuente and Verge 2013; Paxton and Hughes 2007).

What has surfaced from the explanation of hindering and facilitating contexts of women’s substantive representation is that different factors are in play and they exist both at institutional and individual-levels. The factors like the masculinist nature of political

³ Political time is generally understood as the time politicians need to spend performing their party and legislative responsibilities, cultivating their constituency, establishing and maintaining links with different individuals and groups and extending the network of support and patronage required for a credible political career (Childs and Lovenduski 2013; Fuente and Verge 2013).
institutions, party discipline and affiliation, indirect election and quota label, presence of increased number and diversity among women in parliament, presence of women parliamentary caucus and lack of institutional support systems prevail at institutional spaces like parliament, party and constituency. On the other hand, critical actors, women with feminist attitudes, links with women’s organizations and civil society groups, and social gender norms are particularly related to the attributes and choices of individual women legislators and certainly contribute to improve the representation of women.

However, the existing set of quota knowledge as reviewed and presented is mostly produced from the experiences of legislated and party quotas adopted in developed, democratic and egalitarian contexts. There is a lack of attention to the impact of different institutional and social contexts on women’s agency to act for women in the gender quota scholarship. Although reserved seats are the oldest type of quota very little research has concentrated on reserved seats and their impact on women’s representation. One possible explanation for this is that scholars “go where the action is” (Basu 2005, p.3). The lack of popularity of reserved seats among scholars signals that there are insights yet to be explored and argued.

**Where, When and Why are Reserved seats Adopted?**

Among the three types of gender quotas, the reserved seats provision is the only kind of quota where a fixed number of seats for women in elected positions are allocated prior to elections. This mandates a minimum number of female legislators, usually between 10 percent and 30 percent of all elected representatives. In some cases, reserved seats apply to single-member districts in which only women may run for election. In others, they are allocated in multi-member districts to the designated number of women that win the most
votes (Norris 2004). In yet others, women are selected to these seats by the respective parties or elected by members of the national parliament or appointed by Monarch, Prime Minister or President.

The review of the profiles of the countries exhibits some similarities in terms of socio-cultural, economic and political structure. Most of the countries that have adopted reserved seats are underdeveloped and predominantly Muslim. Here a strong fusion of state and religion is observed in the regimes of authoritarian, semi-authoritarian, defective democracies or monarchies. These factors are related to women’s low socio-economic status; the presence of dominant patriarchal norms; a strict segregation of private and public domains; lack of social and political space for equality and diversity and low representation of women in policy making bodies. Reserved seats provision adopted in such social-cultural and political contexts differ significantly from the legislated and party quota contexts where the purpose is to increase the number of women in parliament.

Some of countries adopt reserved seats during the formulation of a new constitution in post transition periods due to the effective mobilization of women. Some adopted reserved seats due to international pressure and the mobilization of women leaders and activists to include women in political institutions in the post-Beijing phase and some adopted them to meet the targets of regional institutions such as the Southern African Development Community’s target of 30 percent women in national legislatures by 2005 (Yoon 2011; Bauer 2008). Nevertheless, a few countries such as Pakistan, Bangladesh, Egypt and Uganda had reserved seats for women even before the internationalization of gender quotas post 1995. Critics, however, assert that many of these countries respond positively to international norms of gender quotas in order to win women’s vote and to gain the support of female legislators for regime consolidation and to maintain the
patriarchal status quo (Tripp and Kang 2008; Ballington 2004; Meena 2004). The country’s choice for reserved seats is intractably linked with the socio political context and interests of the elites. However, factors like best fit with electoral system of FPTP and level of democracy were found to be at play in all of these cases (Matland 2006).

Despite the strategic motives of adoption, the findings of the IPU and International IDEA quota project (http://www.quotaproject.org) show that reserved seats contribute to increasing the number of women within a short time and thus impacts positively on the descriptive presence of women in these countries. The number of women in parliament globally has increased over time and now ranges from 10 to 63 percent. Rwanda, Tanzania and Uganda in East Africa, all have national legislatures with women’s membership ranging from 25 to nearly 50 percent (Bauer 2008; Powley 2005; Tripp 2004; Yoon 2004). In South Asia, the adoption of gender quotas in countries like Nepal, Afghanistan, Pakistan and Bangladesh has improved the representation of women compared to India and Sri-Lanka (Attanayake 2008; Mumtaz 2005; Kishwar 1996).

In terms of increasing the number of women members, some researchers have found that the reserved seats form of gender quota is the most effective since it directly indicates the outcome of seats rather than percentages of women candidates and is more reliable in regard to achieving a gender balanced parliament compare to other quotas systems (Ertan 2011; Tripp and Kang 2008). Some assert further that the reserved seats provision is a ‘best fit’ for a FPTP electoral system. The system helps women to overcome the constraints imposed by low economic status, deeply embedded patriarchal and religious norms and practices and masculinist structures. Meier (2009) asserts that reserved seats are actually the only form of guaranteed representation that exempts women from
electoral thresholds. Critics however argue that reserved seats are a safe way of involving women without transforming the masculinist culture of politics or pattern of women’s subordinate representation (Rai 1999). It erodes the competitive power of women and impacts on the exercise of ‘gender power’ in political institutions (Meena 2004). The reserved seats type of quota they argue is implanted to appease, and ultimately side-line women (Norris 2006).

An important dimension of this review is to understand whether in such patriarchal institutional contexts, reserved seats women have been able to use the legislative space to promote issues of concern to women. There are, however, two different and conflicting perspectives on substantive representation in the literature on reserved seats. According to some, reserved seats improve women’s status and position in society and create a space to promote women’s concerns (Wang 2013; Burnett 2011; Devlin and Elgie 2008). While the other perspective holds that reserved seats are just a tool to consolidate the interests of patriarchal and authoritarian regimes (Tripp 2005; Tahri 2004).

There is evidence that women voiced women’s concerns and acted for women in legislative debates, pushed for women friendly acts and achieved success in some cases. Moroccan women, for example, were successful in reforming the ‘Moudawana Act’ and Moroccan Nationality Law so as to serve the interests of women (Sater 2007). In

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4Women’s rights were limited by the Moroccan family code, the Moudawana, which restricted women’s participation in public life through the principle of guardianship. Women needed the approval of their legal guardians, usually their husbands or fathers, before they could legally work, travel, or go to university. Moreover, the Moudawana, in conformity with Sharia Law enshrined the principle of polygamy in Moroccan legislation. This grants Muslim men the right to marry up to four wives. The reformed Moudawana abolished the necessity for women to have their guardian’s signature in order to obtain a passport. Also Moroccan Nationality Law no longer restricts Moroccan nationality to children whose father is not Moroccan-born (Sater 2007).
Rwanda women legislators revoked a law that prohibited women from inheriting land, and passed the ‘Law on the Prevention, Protection and Punishment of Any Gender-Based Violence (Burnet 2011; Devlin and Elgie 2008; Powley 2005). Women MPs also mobilized and influenced parties to adopt voluntary party quotas (Bauer and Burnet 2013). In Tanzania, women MPs raised different women’s issues in debates, tabled a bill that concerned maternity leave for both married and unmarried mothers and in collaboration with women’s non-governmental organizations, pressed for gender budgeting (Yoon 2011). Ugandan female MPs made a significant gain through the passage of a Domestic Violence Bill in 2010 (Wang 2013). Women made key policy and legislative changes in favour of women in Kenya. These include the passage of the Sexual Offences Bill into the Children’s Act of 2002 (Nzomo n.d.).

In other cases quota women were not able to act for women. In Tunisia and Sudan, reserved seats women legislators’ prioritized their party affiliations in the overall parliamentary activities and tended to avoid confrontation with parties and legislatures on issues important to women (Liddell 2009; Goulding 2009; Kuku 2009). In Uganda women were used to vote for anti-democratic legislation and against legislation that would promote women’s rights (Bauer 2008; Tripp 2004). In these countries reserved seats women acted as regime-consolidating tools to reinforce patriarchal structures and to increase the voice of the ruling party in multi-party systems (Moghadam 2009; Sabbagh 2007; Meena 2004).

The mixed results of women in reserved seats to make substantive changes have brought the implementation and design of reserved seats and women elected to these seats under close scrutiny of researchers. Many argue that reserved seats and an indirect election
system impact negatively on women’s capacity to act for women. It is assumed that that a reserved seats type of quota in a FPTP system might lead to tokenism (Tripp 2006 cited in Bauer 2012, p. 375). Reserved seats women unlike other quotas can be identified from the outset and due to quota label may have an inferior status (Matland 2006). Goetz (2003) claims that reserved seats for women negatively impacts on the legitimacy and political effectiveness of women and ultimately may diminish their legislative accomplishments. The reserved seats provision undermines the incumbency and autonomy of female representatives to change the masculine culture and norms of political man (Tahri 2004; Tamale 2004).

Further, where a quota design enables women to be indirectly selected without constituencies, they are unable to fulfil their traditional role as geographically-based representatives (Darhour and Dahlerup 2013; Dahlerup 2005, p.149). Dahlerup contends that quota rules where seats are ‘added’ (as in case of reserved seats) women politicians are more likely to produce ‘token’ MPs (Dahlerup 2006a, p.14, also cited in Liddell 2009, p.84). Goetz (2003) is more straightforward and terms this kind of quota as an ‘add-on mechanism’ which is only created to extend the line of patronage to a new group of women. Since the party elites select these women and their future career is dependent on the party, these women remain pliable and toe party positions (Browne 2014; Tripp 2013; Yoon 2011). Reserved seats women thus lack the power base to initiate changes in the system or act independently of the parties (Meena 2004).

Further, indirect elections provide party leaders with the opportunity to ensure the election of loyal and elite women (Tripp and Kang 2008). Leaders lean to women who are token representatives without any power-base and are least likely to upset the political
applecart (Hassim 2006 cited in Bauer 2008, p.359). In order to control the political agenda political leaders also select powerless and inexperienced women (Dahlerup and Freidenvall 2005). It is argued that women elected through indirect election are mainly elite with less experience and knowledge about constituency needs (Domingo et. al 2012; Schwartz 2004, p.40). They are not sufficiently qualified and competent to voice their constituent’s needs or act to advance gender equality (Meena 2004; Tripp 2004). They are said to lack social and political capital, and lack the gender consciousness necessary to represent the concerns of women. Therefore it is argued that reserved seat women’s attributes are intimately related to their ability or inability to represent women and to make changes to the masculinist nature of political institutions.

These arguments however also hold that women who are directly elected in general seats are more experienced and qualified compared to indirectly elected women in reserved seats. They also have more autonomy to act independently of the party or the leaders due to constituency backing. However, I find that this issue is widely supported but little examined. There is little evidence or within case comparative research to affirm that general seats women act more for women than those in reserved seats. However, there is some evidence to indicate that this is not always the case. Qualified women from diverse backgrounds have been elected to reserved seats. There appears to be little statistical difference in terms of education and profession between quota and non-quota women (Josefsson 2014; O’Brien 2012). Moreover, research confirms that directly elected women are more elite than reserved seats women (Josefsson 2014). Therefore it is argued that reserved seats are not only a device of elite politics but they also paved the path for different groups of women with diverse professional, political and social background to enter the parliament (Bauer 2012; Dahlerup and Freidenvall 2010).
The general scholarship suggests that reserved seats are adopted to maintain the patriarchal structure and women are included in the institutions as a site of accommodation without any agency to promote women’s perspectives and concerns. I argue that existing knowledge does not capture the entire picture of reserved seats and that there are other nuanced issues yet to be explored from other regions. I endeavour to further explore and explain the effectiveness and impact of reserved seats on women’s representation. I am interested in investigating how the institutional design and context of reserved seats impacts on women legislators and their acts of substantive representation. What differences can we expect to see between general and reserved seats women and what accounts for the differences in substantive representation of women across different contexts. Consideration of these broad aims reveals that several questions need to be addressed. The questions are: why do patriarchal societies prefer to adopt reserved seats type of quota? What motivates the leader to adopt reserved seats for women? Does a reserved seats provision harmonize with the countries informal and formal institutions? Does the reserved seats provision increase the number of women as quota activists suggest? Is a particular type of women elected to reserved seats? Are these reserved seats women able to make changes in the legislative process and outcomes in patriarchal institutional contexts? Do directly elected women act more for women compare to those in reserved seats? Do reserved seats produce similar results in all cases? Are there any differences in outcomes? What accounts for the similarities and differences? I consolidate these questions in the form of several hypotheses to test across the selected cases.

The first set of hypothesis is based on research on the link between reserved seats and women’s descriptive representation.
H1: (a) The reserved seats system improves the descriptive representation of women in national legislatures.
   
   (b) Reserved seats women elected by party elites are from an elite background, inexperienced, and unqualified compared to directly elected women.

To explore the extent to which general seats women represent women in the legislative process and to prove or disprove the relationship between descriptive and substantive representation of reserved seats women, I formulated a second set of hypotheses.

H2: (a) Directly elected general seats women act for women in the legislatures more than indirectly elected reserved seats women.
   
   (b) Indirectly elected reserved seats women do substantively act for women at different sites of representation.

Finally to understand when and why substantive representation of women improved, I formulate different hypotheses under two categories – enabling and hindering factors of substantive representation. I argue that women’s substantive representation will differ based on the degree of presence or absence of the factors stated below. This set of hypotheses is constructed from the insights of feminist scholarships on women, gender and politics already presented and integrated in the discussion on gender quotas and reserved seats. Therefore, the following are hypothesized as factors positively related to women’s improved substantive representation:

H3: (a) The increased presence of and diversity in female representatives
   
   (b) The presence of a women’s parliamentary caucus
   
   (c) The presence of critical actors
   
   (d) The presence of women with a feminist attitude, and
(e) Link between women legislators and women’s organizations and civil society groups

The following are hypothesized as factors negatively related to women’s substantive representation.

H4:  
(a) The masculine nature of political institutions
(b) The indirect election and reserved seats label
(c) Party discipline, party affiliation and position of the party
(d) Lack of institutional support systems, and
(e) Social gender norms and care perspectives

These two sets of factors are not exclusive to each other or prevalent in any particular context or quota type. Rather they can and do co-exist at different degrees across legislative spaces, time and quota regimes. The hindering factors as listed are intricately interrelated and entrenched in the institutions. Different patterns of masculine power and authority are embedded within the design of the social and political institutions and reinforced by informal norms and practices over time (Mackay 2001). This embeddedness means that institutions are sticky or resistant to change (Piscopo 2006). The entrenched masculine norms of power and the status quo in political institutions constrain women’s political presence to act for women. These factors also resist the integration of women’s perspective into the legislative and policy process. Again the masculine construction of politics as a full time job overburdens women with the dual responsibility of performing domestic and legislative activities. Thus these factors work together in ways that are mutually reinforcing. However the presence of any or all of the aiding factors can support women at different level to minimize the constraints imposed by the hindering factors but cannot completely outweigh them. An increased number of women also increase the possibility of diversity among women with different level of gender consciousness and
commitment to the cause of women. Individual attributes, like a high level of gender consciousness or a feminist attitude, allied with positional power and supportive women’s organizations and civil society groups can enable women to emerge as critical actors and to carve a critical space to promote women’s concerns. Therefore it can be expected that the presence of the aiding factors in greater numbers and degrees can offset the influence of masculinist norms and practices to the extent that improves the substantive representation of women.

These hypotheses build on the knowledge generated primarily from empirical research conducted in the Western and African institutional contexts which I want to test in the socio-cultural and institutional contexts of Pakistan and Bangladesh. I argue that the extent of women’s substantive representation will differ based on the degree of effective presence of these institutional and individual-level factors. I expect to provide new evidence from the case studies and develop some new insights about reserved seats. Next, I present the review of the reserved seats in the selected cases to situate the context, scope and rationale for the study.

**Setting the Context and Scope of the Study**

Quota scholarship is unevenly distributed in terms of geographical region. Most of the research on gender quotas is Western based though recently some has emerged on Africa. Thus there remains a vacuum in understanding how gender quotas in the form of reserved seats work and what can be expected of reserved seats women in the regions that differ significantly from Western contexts in terms of economics, culture and politics. This vacuum formed the basis of my interest in undertaking the research in Pakistan and Bangladesh. The historical, socio-economic and political similarity of the countries as
well as the similarity in the origin, time period and implementation design of reserved seats provision make Pakistan and Bangladesh suitable for this comparative study.

Pakistan and Bangladesh have both adopted and implemented reserved seats for women. The countries’ history of reserved seats dates back to 1935 when they were part of British India (which is now three sovereign states: India, Pakistan and Bangladesh). The system still exists in both Pakistan and Bangladesh. Under the existing constitutional arrangements, reserved seats are distributed among parties according to the proportion of seats they hold in parliament, meaning the party that wins the highest number of seats in parliament gets most of the reserved seats (Bari 2010; Mohsin 2010). In both cases, women are elected to these seats by the respective parties after the general election: in Pakistan the party select the women for each province from a closed list of women candidates; and in Bangladesh the parties invite application from interested women aspirants and after interviewing the applicants, the parties select the women for the reserved seats. Each political party has instituted its own internal mechanisms for electing or nominating female representatives for reserved seats and these mechanisms are so opaque they prevent further investigation into the process of selection. The majority of women, and indeed the rest of the population, have little say as to who enters parliament through the reserved seats arrangement.

5Based on the 'Mountbatten Plan', East Bengal was given to the dominion of Pakistan in 1947 and became a province of Pakistan under the name East Pakistan. After the war of independence in 1971, East Pakistan was officially disestablished and became the independent state of Bangladesh (Begum 2000; Chowdhury 1994).
The system of reserved seats has gone through three challenging and similar phases to reach its present state. The reserved seats provision, first adopted and implemented during the British regime (1935-1947), was the outcome of the women's movement which centred on the issues of women’s development, and women’s enfranchisement and representation (Forbes 2008; 2002; Begum 2000; Everett 1979). The second phase of the reserved seats provision (1947-1988), started after Pakistan was born in 1947 with two regions: West and East Pakistan (now Bangladesh). The first constitution of Pakistan passed in 1956 had a provision of 10 reserved seats for women (3 percent) in the National Assembly for a period of 10 years and women were to be elected directly by women voters but after the military coup in 1958, changes were made in the number of reserved seats and in the election process (Begum 2000; Afzal 1999). After the independence of Bangladesh in 1971, Pakistan continued the system and reserved 10 seats for women in its 1973 constitution for 15 years. Later, the military government of Zia-ul- Haq increased the number to 20 in 1984 (Shaheed, Zia and Warraich 2009; Mumtaz 2005). In Bangladesh, the provision of 15 reserved seats for women was adopted for 15 years in the 1972 constitution (Kabir 2004). The number of seats was then doubled during the military regime of Zia-ur-Rahman, but in neither of these countries was the system of indirect election to reserved seats altered (Kabir 2004).

The last phase began after the time bound reserved seats provision for women lapsed and was then reintroduced in these countries. In Pakistan, the reserved seats lapsed in 1988 but the government did not reinsert the provision until 2002. The number of reserved seats for women was reinstated and increased from 20 to 60 (out of 342) along with an increase in the total number of seats in National Assembly under the Legal Framework Order 2002 (Jabin and Jadon 2009; Mumtaz 2005). In Bangladesh when the same 15 year sunset
clause caused the lapse of the reserved seats in 1987, they were not reintroduced until 1991, and then only for another 10 years. The provision again lapsed in 2001 and reintroduction occurred in 2004 and the number of seats increased to 45 and finally to 50 in 2011 through a constitutional amendment (Daily Janokhontho 9 March 2004, p.1; Prothom Alo 25 July 2011, p.16; Mohsin 2010). In these countries, reserved seats were reintroduced in increased numbers after gender quota norms became a part of the policy scripts of international institutions during the post Beijing period and received increased support from international and domestic women’s movement (Krook and True 2010; Khattak 2010; Shaheed 2010).

In the absence of any informal targets or recommendation (soft mechanism) to increase women’s representation, reserved seats have become the most important means to ensure women’s representation in parliament in these two countries. After the reserved seats provision lapsed in these countries the proportion of women in parliament dropped below 2 percent in Pakistan (Mumtaz 2005; Reyes 2002) and in Bangladesh, it dropped to 1.3 percent (Chowdhury 2002). Understanding the socio-economic and political constraints of women’s political and electoral participation, civil society organizations and women’s organizations mobilized to reintroduce reserved seats in these countries. Yet, according to critics, the system had failed to make any substantive impact on women’s representation and the problem lay in the indirect system of election of women to reserved seats.

In both cases, reserved seats women legislators do not have a geographical constituency to represent. Predominantly male political actors play the decisive role in the election of women to reserved seats (Bari 2010; Choudhury 2010). In Pakistan it is alleged that relatives or close associates of male leaders are elected to reserved seats though this trend is also apparent in the case of male and female general seats parliamentarians. Critics
label reserved seats women legislators as loyal, unqualified and elite; sometime as dangerous and wasteful tokens and question their ability to represent women (Bauer 2012; Bilal 2006; Salahuddin 2002). Moreover, research in Pakistan and Bangladesh has found that although educationally qualified women are elected to reserved seats they failed to make their presence meaningful (Pervez 2000; Afzal 1999; Mumtaz 1998).

These arguments, however, do not constitute the end of the debate on reserved seats as these contradict some recent findings which assert that Pakistani women legislators do represent the interests of women (Hassan 2012; Bari 2010; Ebrahim 2009). The number of times gender issues were raised in the National Assembly of 2002 by women was unprecedented in the parliamentary history of Pakistan (Bari 2009). In Pakistan a cross-party caucus of women parliamentarians was formed under the guidance of the female Speaker in the thirteenth National Assembly with the support of UNDP. Women legislators from five mainstream political parties worked together to advocate for gender-sensitive legislation and to amend discriminatory laws and practices. This way they significantly contributed to the rights and development of women (Aqueel 2010; Bari 2010; Saeed 2010). This contradicts with the findings that elite and token women are less concerned or unrepresentative of women in general (Bilal 2006). Thus a gap exists in the literature about the class of representatives and their acts of representation.

The findings in regard to Bangladeshi women legislators by contrast indicate that women representatives failed to make significant advances in regard to the representation of women’s issues. Despite a rise in the number of reserved seats, qualitative changes in the representation of women did not occur (Halder 2004). Women legislators were not visible in representing women’s issues or women related bills in parliament (TIB 2009a; Firoj
Compared to Pakistani female legislators, Bangladeshi women’s substantive representation seems to have been less in parliament although both operated in almost similar institutional contexts. However, the findings on women’s legislative participation in both countries suggests that overall participation of reserved seats women was higher than directly elected women but does not explain why this has happened nor reveal the extent of substantive representation of women by general and reserved seats women (FAFEN 2010; 2012; Afroz and Mahmud 2010; Mirza and Wagha 2009).

However, most of the research focuses on the acts of women in terms of representation of women’s issues and women related bills in parliamentary arena. This indicates that reserved seats women’s acts in other sites of representation such as party and constituency remain less explored in gender quota, women and politics research in Pakistan and Bangladesh. Also the challenges the women encountered within the legislative environment or outside parliament are under-evaluated. Thus the review signals the need to examine the quota regime (type of quota adopted within a specific electoral system) and the effect of this regime on women’s representation from a comparative perspective.

What became evident from the review is that, in each phase of reserved seats (re)creations, starting from its initial adoption in 1935 to its continuation and reintroduction, different actors were involved at each stage, and pursued this form of gender quota for different reasons. This is perhaps unsurprising given the adoption of gender quotas does not always stem from principle concern to empower women in politics nor does it take the concept of equality as a starting point (Tripp 2013). Rather, most quota policies are the outcome of bargaining and mediation between different
stakeholders with different political interests (Tadros 2010; Krook 2009). I am interested in testing whether the reintroduction of the reserved seats in both cases was the outcome of a bargaining process between different actors (domestic and international), and shaped by past legacies and the recent diffusion of international gender quota norms.

I am also interested to find whether entrenched elites in political institutions used reserved seats as mechanisms to consolidate their political and strategic interests. I examine whether indirect election to reserved seats was designed in harmonious sequence with the existing formal and informal institutions of society and politics that are based on the idea of patriarchy. In patriarchal social structures men control women’s production, reproduction and sexuality (Ray, n.d.). As Moghadam states “patriarchal control over women is exercised through the institutionalisation of restrictive codes of behaviour, rigid gender separation, family and kinship patterns, and a strong ideology that links family honour to female virtue” (Moghadam 1992, p.37). As such, patriarchal societies such as Pakistan and Bangladesh are characterized by male control of economic resources, male domination of political processes and a predominance of men in positions of authority (Paxton and Hughes 2007).

Informal institutions include unwritten rules, norms, and discourses about gender and equality which impact on women’s political and electoral participation (Kang 2013). In the patriarchal context, the informal norm of gender subjugation is also institutionalized in formal institutions like the legislature, the parties and elections. In terms of number and influence, women are nowhere near equal to men in the power structures, such as the Parliament, the cabinet and political parties. Their access to politics and in social decision making is phrased in terms of dominant male values, norms and practices where men
dominate oppress and exploit women (Walby 1990), discriminate against women and their election to parliament. I seek to reveal if indirect election was necessary to maintain the interests of male political leaders or to exempt women from the electoral threshold and ensure women a safe passage to parliament or for both reasons. Moreover, I also seek evidence to establish whether the reserved seats provision was effective in increasing the presence of women in the parliaments and whether it opened entry to only elite or diverse group of women to parliament. At the same time I want to explore where and how reserved seats women acted for women and the extent to which general seat women represented women and why women elected to reserved seats may act differently compared to general seat women. I also seek to unravel the extent to which institutional or individual variables impact on women’s substantive representation. Thus the review signal the necessity of a dynamic and comparative approach to examine the effect of reserved seats on women’s representation rooted in the historical legacies of existing institutional contexts. Therefore, I formulate the following exploratory questions to be addressed in the thesis. The questions are:

1) What actors and factors can explain the historical and contemporary cases of the adoption and implementation of reserved seats for women in Pakistan and Bangladesh?

2) Was the reserved seats provision necessary to and effective in increasing the number of women in the parliaments? Was there diversity among the reserved seats women legislators? Were there differences between general and reserved seats women legislator’s backgrounds?

3) Did the reserved seat women act to promote women’s issues in different sites of representation? To what extent did general seat women act for women?
4) Were there similarities and differences between cases in terms of women’s substantive representation? If so what factors explain the similarities and differences and how do these factors impact on women’s substantive representation?

The first question addresses the history, adoption, and reinstitution of reserved seats form of gender quota with the provision of indirect election. Thus it focuses on exploring the interests of different actors, the internal history and socio-political characteristics of the countries, and external context in relation to the adoption and implementation of the reserved seats. The explanation derived from asking this question is integrated to examine and analyse the effects of the present institutional design and context of reserved seats on women’s representation as addressed in the next three questions.

The second question asks whether reserved seats increased the number of women in the parliaments and about the quality of women elected to reserved seats. Here one must consider not only the reserved seats women but also general seat women to ascertain the impact of reserved seats and different mode of election on women representatives’ quality and background. It also related to first set of hypotheses. The third question which examines the substantive representation, considers the interaction between women’s presence in the parliaments and the substantive acts of women. This question relates with the second set of hypotheses. To analyse the substantive acts, therefore, it is important to begin by determining what is meant by women’s issues and substantive representation and what indicators need to be used to see whether women acted on those issues or not at the different sites of representation. Next, the substantive representation of general seat women is also examined to understand the fate of ‘women’s issues’ which it has been assumed are raised and represented more by directly elected women legislators.
The fourth question shifts the focus to explain the similarities and differences in outcomes of women’s substantive representation between the cases. It examines why and how women legislators appear to play a more visible and active role in certain contexts and sites of substantive representation but not in others? This question relates to the set hypotheses built on the knowledge of the enabling and hindering contexts of women’s substantive representation and draws attention to the important factors that may not be obvious in a single case. This can only be achieved by doing a comparative analysis.

These questions are answered by examining the reserved seats provision in the context of Pakistan and Bangladesh but they have implications for the broader gender quota literature. It relates to the testing of the hypotheses developed from the review of gender quotas and reserved seat literature and to confirm or refute the validity of the existing knowledge. Thus I propose to link the micro level experiences of reserved seats to the macro level gender quota scholarship.

**The Framework of the Research**

The research examines the impact of reserved seats on women’s descriptive and substantive representation in Pakistan and Bangladesh. Prior to that another issue is addressed, why the countries adopted reserved seats with indirect election. Based on these broader objectives, a two-step interrelated framework is proposed. I set forth the framework with the relevant concepts that I use to conduct the study.
Explaining the Development of Reserved Seats: History, Actors and Motivations

To explain how the idea of reserved seats arose in the countries’ domestic debate and how it entered into the political institutions and why the actors supported reserved seats with indirect election, I employ the new institutionalism approach with a particular focus on historical institutionalism. Institutions possess an explanatory power to account for differential socio-political outcomes in different contexts and institutional theory seeks to trace the emergence of distinctive forms, processes, strategies, outlooks, and competences which emerge from patterns of organizational interaction and adaptation (Sangmpam 2007; Selznick 1996). The prevailing motto ‘institutions matter’ has led to ‘new institutionalism’ (Sangmpam 2007, p.201). New institutionalism, unlike previous institutional theory, is concerned with both formal and informal institutions but still reinforces the dictum that institutions ‘matter’ (March and Olsen 1984, p.747) and govern actors’ decisions by establishing norms and rewarding certain behaviours (Mackay, Kenny, and Chappell 2010; Hall and Taylor 1996). The proponents of neo-institutionalism (NI) argue the approach opens up avenues to incorporate not just the formal features of a political system, but also informal practices, conventions and norms in the analysis of change in institutions (March and Olsen 1984). As political institutions constitute the primary elements in the political analysis of institutional changes, the theory is thus relevant to this study with its focus on the interaction of actors, institutions and discourses in the process of the adoption and implementation of reserved seats (Finer 1975 cited in Uhr 1995, p. 213). What is important to understand that institutional arrangements both prescribe and proscribe, and can speed up and delay change. Therefore a clarification of the role of institutions is valuable to an analysis of how
Among the different approaches of ‘new institutionalism’, historical institutionalism (HI) is more open to the inclusion of gender in its framework than other forms of institutionalism (Waylen 2007). Further HI helps to identify the causal mechanisms that lie behind particular empirical processes and defines human motivation in terms of goals and collective action (Sanders 2008). It facilitates better understanding of why and how gender positive changes occur in institutions in certain context and not in others Waylen (2009, p.246).

Although HI is interested in the construction, maintenance, and adaptation of institutions (Sanders 2008) and is better at explaining continuity than change (Schmidt 2010), two elements of historical institutionalism (HI) -critical juncture and path dependency - are especially important in explaining the different trajectories and forces that led to gender positive changes in institutions. Critical junctures are defined as the moments when substantial institutional change takes place and produces distinct legacies, a 'branching point' from which historical development moves onto a new path (Collier and Collier 1991, p.29). In the phase of critical juncture, a particular institutional arrangement is chosen from two or more alternatives. These are critical because once a particular option is selected it becomes progressively more difficult to return to the initial point or change the course of action (Mahoney 2000). The concept of critical juncture is useful in explaining the context for when and why the reserved seats system for women was

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6 There is a significant body of work that has built on March and Olsen 1984. However in this thesis I am most interested in explaining the utility of feminist Historical Institutionalism as it has been used by Waylen 2007, 2008, 2009; and Mackay 2011, Mackay, Kenny and Chappell 2011.
adopted for the first time. Capoccia and Kelemen (2007) argue that critical junctures constitute the starting point for many of the path dependent processes and lasting legacies of institutions. However, among the four (utilitarian, functional, power, and legitimation) explanations of the path dependency nature of institutions or institutional ‘stickiness’, I employ the ‘power’ explanation to provide an account for translating the reserved seats provision into lasting legacies over time. Power explanations of self-reinforcing processes assume that actors make decisions by weighing costs and benefits (Mahoney 2000, p.521). According to the power-centered approach, institutions can persist despite demand for change provided that the elites who benefit from the existing arrangements have sufficient strength to promote their reproduction (Mahoney 2000). In this view individuals are conceived of as both rule followers and strategic self –interest person (Steinmo 2008).

The political opportunity concept is used to explain how the idea and political discourse on women’s reserved seats enters into the institutional agenda and how changes were made in the formal institutional rules and design during critical junctures. Political opportunities are comprised of specific configurations of resources, institutional arrangements and historical precedents for social mobilization (Waylen 2008). It can obstruct or facilitate the success of mobilization and thus informs about women’s movements’ interactions with state and other institutional actors and the resources used at different phases of mobilization for reserved seats for women (Kitschelt 1986).

After I demonstrate that HI helps account for gender positive changes in political institutions, I adopt a two-dimensional approach to explore the roles and interests of different actors and their choice of reserved seats. Feminist analysis is helpful in explaining the role of women’s movement in instigating the idea of reserved seats in the
first place, their persuasive discourse and strategies in promoting support for reserved seats in different phases (Waylen 2011; 2007). Rational analysis also allows us to explore the interest of political leaders to explain their support of reserved seats for women. It focuses on rational actors who pursue their preferences following a logic of calculation within political institution defined as structure of incentives (Schmidt 2010, p.2). With the emergence of an international discourse on gender quotas, it is also necessary to examine the influence which international organizations and gender equality norms had on the domestic debate on reserved seats. This can facilitate better understanding and identification of key actors, ideas, interests and institutions to explore the politics behind the adoption of reserved seats. This also addresses whether reserved seats fit with the formal and informal institutions of the society since institutions provide the context within which representation of women takes place. Once, I identify the key actors and their interests in adopting and reintroducing reserved seats with indirect election, I address the impact of the present institutional design and context of reserved seats on the important dimensions of women’s representation that will be emphasised in this thesis.

To understand the interconnections of formal and informal institutions and their role in women’s descriptive and substantive representation in political institutions, I integrate this feminist institutionalism scholarship with the quota literature. Feminist institutionalism explains how gender underpins institutional norms and how policy inertia or change might be underscored by feminist activism or the lack thereof (Krook and Mackay 2011; Mackay, Kenny and Chappell 2010). The insights gained from the quota literature and feminist historical institutionalism analysis form the basis for an understanding of the gendered nature of institutions and are used as a tool kit to examine
the outcomes of reserved seats in the institutional context of the countries. Exploring the ways in which the formal and informal institutions structure, operate and reinforce gendered relations, I not only concentrate on the number and presence of women and their acts but also on a range of institutional and individual-level factors to explain the causal mechanisms that contribute to distinct differences and similarities in outcomes of the reserved seats in two different contexts.

**Linking Descriptive and Substantive Representation**

The idea of a link between descriptive and substantive representation of women as conceived by Phillips provides the basis of the framework for this study. Quota activists, based on this link, argue that in real life gender quotas combine these two representational perspectives and so they support to increase the descriptive presence of women that in turn improves substantive representation. Descriptive representation indicates that the representatives resemble their constituents through passively sharing phenotypes or ascribed similarity based on class, gender, ethnicity and religion (Mansbridge 1999). In the empirical studies on gender, quota and politics, there have been two different perspectives that have dominated the study of the descriptive representation of women.

The first focuses on the economical, socio-cultural and institutional factors that influence the descriptive presence of women in parliament (Stockemer and Byrne 2011; Paxton, Hughes and Painter 2010; Iversen and Rosenbluth 2008; Paxton and Hughes 2007; Kunovich and Paxton 2005; Yoon 2004; Paxton and Kunovich 2003; Kenworthy and Malami 1999; Matland 1998; Paxton 1997). This line of inquiry identifies different determinants of women’s political participation such as level of economic development, state of democracy, education, labour force participation, and most importantly the social
gender norms. Some of this research concentrates on institutions of the society and on the politics that reflect and reinforce unequal gender power relations through the institutionalization of masculinist norms and practices. Research in this field indicates that formal and informal rules, norms and values of the society, political parties and electoral system design may disproportionately affect women and constrain and their access to law making bodies (Dahlerup and Leyanaar 2013a; Paxton and Kunovich 2003; Karam 1999; Reynolds 1999).

The second conceptualization of descriptive representation pays attention to the effects of quota on the presence of women in the national parliaments (presence of elected women in numerical terms) measured in terms of differences in number of women elected before and after the implementation of gender quotas (Wängnerud 2009; Bauer 2008; Tripp 2004; Yoon 2001). Schwindt-Bayer and Mishler (2005) conceptualise descriptive representation as the ‘compositional similarity’ of the legislature compared with the constituent population, and operationalize descriptive representation as the percent of women in the legislature.

However with the increased level of debate regarding the kind of women elected through quotas and their quality and credibility to make substantive changes, descriptive representation now includes both the number and kind of women. It is argued that attributes of women and kinds of women elected in terms of education, occupation, legislative and political experience are important in regard to making a substantive impact (Krook 2013; Franceschet, Krook and Piscopo 2009). Quota women’s qualifications are thus intimately connected to the prospects of women’s substantive representation (Josefsson 2014).
Further, it is claimed that the type of quota and election system influences the kind of women being selected to these seats. It is assumed that different types of election and electorate may lead to the election of different kinds of women which in turn produce differences in substantive outcomes (Krook 2013). To test such predictions, scholars suggest comparing the profiles of quota and non-quota women parliamentarians. Such a comparison can test whether quotas are effective in promoting a diverse array of women parliamentarians or whether they served to ensure only the entry of elite, less experienced and unqualified women (Dahlerup and Freidenvall 2010). Therefore, it is necessary to integrate all these insights, notably focusing on the gender relations inscribed in social and political institutions, to understand and examine the descriptive representation of women in parliament. I plan to review the context of women’s political representation in each case and examine the parliamentary data to compare the representation of women with and without reserved seats. Further, I examine the bibliographic and demographic data of reserved seats women legislators elected to all the parliaments until 2008. At the same time, I also review the biographies of directly elected women to ascertain if different modes of election impact on the background of women legislators.

Linked with descriptive representation is an understanding of women’s substantive representation. Feminist scholars argue that substantive representation takes place in different fora and spaces and by critical actors who could be male or female (Celis 2009; Childs and Krook 2009). However, remembering the locus of the enquiry, only women legislators’ acts are considered here as substantive representation. To measure substantive representation of women, Franceschet and Piscopo (2008) ‘disaggregate’ substantive representation into the process related activities where female legislators act to represent women’s interest and then into outcome-related factors concerning the success or failure of female legislators in the presentation and passage of women’s related policies.
Women’s process-related substantive acts include, voting for feminist legislations and bills, asking questions, speaking and introducing women’s issues, participating in floor debates, questioning committee witnesses, and holding press conferences (Franceschet and Piscopo 2008). The outcome perspective of substantive representation focuses only on the number and nature of women’s related bills submitted by women legislators and their successful passage through parliament. Yet some scholars criticise this approach on the grounds that priorities do not always translate into policy initiatives on behalf of women as a group. Usefulness of voting as a measure of women’s substantive representation is also less valued as party memberships’ and discipline are crucial factors in the voting decisions of legislators (Celis 2008; Wängnerud 2000).

Scholars instead argue that articulating and voicing women’s concerns in the legislative process, the feminization of the political agenda, is more important and entails a far greater commitment to the cause of women (Tamerius 1995 cited in Celis et al. 2008, p.107; Franceschet and Krook 2008, Childs 2006, pp.7-9). Thus, speaking for women, making claims about group members’ needs, circumstances and values is considered as representation in itself (Piscopo 2011; Walsh 2002 cited in Celis 2009, p.97). Catalano (2009) asserts that making women’s voices heard in parliamentary debates is perhaps one of the best ways of acting for women. This aspect of representation is a valuable representation of women’s concerns and this is what I am interested in using in this thesis as an indicator to examine women’s substantive representation. However, it is difficult to measure a complex concept like substantive representation with single indictors (Franceschet and Piscopo 2008, p.400).
Quota scholars believe that measuring substantive representation focusing only on the legislative arena or using only one indicator does not reveal much about the critical acts of women representatives (Mackay 2008). It loses sight of important acts by women legislators in other sites, or behind the scenes (Childs and Lovenduski 2013; Celis 2009; 2008). Acts such as constituency cultivation, links with women’s and civil society groups to promote women’s rights, mainstreaming women in politics, participating in women related meetings and conferences and acting to support and improve the lives of women constitute the critical act(s), which is one kind of substantive representation but one that may often remain hidden from view (Schwindt-Bayer 2010; Celis and Childs 2008).

I argue that along with articulation of women’s concerns and perspectives, these acts of women are equally important and these two aspects of women’s substantive representation do occur in separate spaces but in parallel. Thus women’s substantive representation is conceived as a multifaceted and dynamic process that includes both process related acts and critical acts performed in different sites of representation (Franceschet 2011). A feasible approach is, therefore, to investigate formal political institutions as well as the other sites of women’s substantive representation and to analyse the acts and non-acts of women parliamentarians (Curtin 2008; Mackay 2008). Employing two indicators to measure women’s substantive representation has several advantages too. First, I can avoid the misconception of a linear relationship between the presence of women and substantive outcomes (Franceschet 2011). Second, it allows a more context specific analysis of women’s role in promoting women’s concerns in the gendered institutions in which they act. It permits a better understanding of those institutional dynamics of legislatures, political parties and constituencies that either facilitate or obstruct favourable outcomes.
I gain insights into the substantive representation of women legislators from content analysis of those parliamentary debates and interviews, which provide an intensive focus in this thesis. However, equally important is to inquire into what issues women legislators have represented or acted on that are of concern to women. This requires the framing of the women’s issues that are to be addressed in the study.

**Determining what has been represented**

One of the important empirical focuses of the study is to determine the issues that women have represented and acted upon at different sites of representation. Representation of these issues constitutes the substantive aspect of representation. Determining what has been represented by women first requires a clear conception of what we understand by ‘women’s issues or women’s interests’. As mentioned earlier the idea of women’s interests is still contested and debated among feminist scholars and there are both feminine and feminist perspectives. Moreover women have issues that vary over time and context. What constitutes women’s issues for the North does not necessarily represent the locus of women’s issues in the South. While women from the South argue that women's major priorities were both local and material, women from the North typically focus on women's broad transnational identities, individualism and interest (Basu 2000).

Scholars have defined women’s interests in a host of ways. Reingold and Swers (2011) argue that women’s interests are endogenously constructed while Smooth (2011) reminds us that women are not a homogenous group with a uniform set of interests, instead women are a diverse set of individuals motivated by a wide range of intersecting identities. Mackay (2008; 2001) states that political concerns are gendered but not
unified, and women’s interests and opinions are likely to be inconsistent, conflicting and varied.

Beckwith (2011) distinguishes between interests, issues and preferences. According to her, interests are fundamental to women’s life chances and their options for action; issues are more specific, immediate, and present limited strategic choices derived from interests while preferences position actors to select among discrete and limited alternatives in relation to specific issues. I find it problematic to address them separately as they are intricately intertwined with each other. Most of the research avoids making such fine distinctions and has used issues, interests or concerns to mean almost the same thing. Therefore the term ‘women’s issue’ is used as a reference to measure the substantive representation of women in this thesis.

Traditional research examines the substantive representation of women in relation to a pre-defined set of ‘women’s interests’ which, according to Celis (2008), fails to capture the contextually constructed interests of women and their representation. Celis argues that it limits the acts and actors the research can register and entails bias in the research design (2009, p.103). To overcome such limitations, it is important that research must ask women to define what they think is important to them (Wängnerud 2009). Women’s issues identified and prioritized by women themselves are labelled “subjectively defined interests” (Celis 2006 cited in Wängnerud 2009, p.53). This is an important departure from existing practices and allows the researcher to locate ‘women’s issues’ within a specific context. This is an effective means to measure substantive representation and can include both feminist and feminine issues. As women’s issues are connected to the societal structure and anchored in time and space, this approach can help to identify women’s issues in relation to the context and time periods that are to be examined (Celis
2009; 2008). Moreover, to gain in-depth understanding of these context specific women’s issues, I also review the international and regional women related policy scripts such as: CEDAW, Beijing Platform for Action and South Asian Association of Regional Cooperation (SAARC)\(^7\) (Women’s Aid International 2011; UN Women 2010).

In this research, I am interested in exploring what issues have been represented by Pakistani and Bangladeshi women legislators in parliament and at the constituency and party level to advance women’s interests. Individual women legislators’ perception of ‘women’s issues’ in each case is addressed to measure the substantive representation. The other important dimension of examining substantive representation of women is to explore the factors that impact on women’s ability and agency to act for women. As seen in the literature reviewed here empirical researchers on gender quotas have identified different enabling and hindering contexts on substantive representation. I integrate these insights with feminist institutionalism notably by examining the relationship between these different factors and substantive representation of women to test the hypotheses. In this way I trace in the chapter that follows the institutional and individual-level factors and their degree of presence in each case to explain the similarities and differences in substantive outcomes in Pakistan and Bangladesh.

\(^{7}\)Article VI of the SAARC Social Charter deals with the Promotion of the Status of Women and lay out the goals and strategies to be followed by the member countries to support the empowerment of women. Retrieved from [http://www.wikigender.org/index.php?title=SAARC_Social_Charter_and_Womenon][20 June 2013].
Summarizing the Insights and Plan of the Research

This chapter brings together the experiences and knowledge of gender quota from global and national contexts to ascertain the link between gender quota and women’s representation. The review is important for two reasons: first to develop an in-depth understanding of the actors and motivations in the gender quota process and second, to identify the extent to which gender quotas are effective in improving women’s representation, both descriptive and substantive. It also forms the basis to argue that among the three types of quotas, the reserved seats form of quota has received less attention and remains relatively unexplored. I take this lacuna as a starting point to undertake the research on reserved seats for women in the parliaments of Pakistan and Bangladesh. Several hypotheses are formulated from the review to test the applicability of Western gender quota theories in a non-western context.

To develop an analytical framework, four questions germane to the history and effect of reserved seats on women’s representation in Pakistan and Bangladesh are framed. The new-institutionalism theory has been integrated with the gender quota literature to examine the historical and institutional context of reserved seats and their impact on women’s representation in the parliaments. The concepts of descriptive and substantive representation have been expanded to throw light on the attributes of quota women and their acts at different sites of representation other than the legislative arena. A pre-selection of women’s issues for measuring substantive representation has been avoided in order to maintain the integrity of the research. Thus the framework developed for this study is appropriate to study the phenomenon of reserved seats in their natural contexts to confirm or contest the existing theories of gender quota and reserved seats and to add new insights to the existing scholarship.
Chapter 2: Mapping the Research

As mentioned the study has two broad objectives. The first is to understand the actors and motivation for the adoption of reserved seats in the selected cases. The second is to explore the effect of reserved seats on women’s descriptive and substantive representation in each country. Four empirical questions were derived from the review of the literature where I found that the issue of reserved seats is an entity of complex linkages of critical moments, actors, interests, institutions, number, kinds and concerns. In order to unfold this complex web of relations, it is necessary to gain an insight of the reserved seats both from historical and contemporary perspectives. Such a view underpins the study reported in this thesis. To conduct the research with the above objectives in mind, I present in this chapter the methodology and the rationale for selecting the method adopted. In this chapter, I first establish my theoretical position and then present the rationale for the selection of the comparative interpretative research approach and the cases, Pakistan and Bangladesh, and go on to delineate the operationalized concepts used and data collection strategy applied. Later, I present the experience of the field visits and address the data collection and data analysis techniques used in this research.

Positioning the Researcher and Research Method Selection

When conducting any research, the foremost duty of researcher is to position her/himself within a research paradigm. Without nominating a paradigm as the first step there is no basis for subsequent choices regarding methodology, methods, literature or research design (Mackenzie and Knipe 2006). Accordingly, different research paradigms such as
positivism, post-positivism, critical theory, transformative, pragmatic and constructivism/interpretivism provide different perspectives and choices regarding ontology, epistemology and methodology. A paradigm enables one to position oneself as a researcher and to perceive realities from different philosophical perspectives in specific ways (Walsham 2006; Guba and Lincoln 1994). It is the choice of paradigm that sets down the intent, motivation and expectations for the research (Mackenzie and Knipe 2006).

Among these research paradigms, this study was conceptualized within the interpretive paradigm. Interpretivism starts from the position that our knowledge of reality including the domain of human action is a social construction by human actors and to be able to find the meaning of the actions they must be interpreted within context (Walsham 2006; Creswell 2003). Thus the interpretivist approach to understanding reality is oriented towards an intersubjective understanding of human experience, which is both time and context bound (McNiff and Whitehead 2001, p. 162). With the intention of understanding the adoption and outcomes of reserved seats in a patriarchal context, I therefore have to rely upon the ‘participant’s views of the issue being studied’ in order to understand their motives, meanings, and other subjective experiences in regard to reserved seats (Creswell 2003, p.8).

Moreover, the interpretive approach is closely related with the qualitative method of research (Punch 2005). Importantly the method permits a researcher to be highly involved in the actual experiences of the participants and allows the meanings behind the actions of the people under study to be revealed (Creswell 2003, p.181). In seeking to understand the context of reserved seats system and its effect on women I interact directly with the participants in their own settings. Only qualitative research enables me to do that. Most
importantly the newness of the research in terms of a sample group comprised of reserved and general seats women parliamentarians in two different countries merits a qualitative approach (Morse 1991 cited Creswell 2003, p.20-22). The open–ended and exploratory questions formulated for the research also merit qualitative inquiry as there is little known about reserved seats in South Asian region (Barker et al. 2002 cited in Elliot and Timulak 2005, p.149).

And lastly, qualitative research uses a variety of types of data and multiple methods of data collection that are interactive and humanistic. The use of multiple methods for data collection or triangulation secure an in-depth understanding of the research issues (Flick 2002, p.226). Validity is the strength of qualitative research. It is used to determine whether the findings are accurate from the standpoint of the researcher, participants and readers. The credibility of this research is ensured through the process of triangulation of data sources during the process of data analysis and as Yin (1994) argues this makes the conclusion much more convincing. However, conceptualizing the research from an interpretivist position, I agree that the interpretations of reality in this research are subjective and may contain socio-historical biases.

Therefore, a comparative-interpretive method of investigation was selected for the study since this approach would provide greater opportunity to understand the phenomenon in all its complexities. The comparative method is regarded as a method of discovering empirical relationships among variables, and it values interpretation and context (Ragin 1987; Lijphart 1971, p.683). Importantly, the method is best suited for this research because it tests empirical hypotheses either to corroborate or falsify them (Meckstroth cited in Lijphart 1975, p.159).
More specifically the research followed the method of structured focused comparison (George and Bennett 2005; George 1979). The structured element of the method involves creating a set of structured questions which are developed to ensure the acquisition of comparable data. This reflects Yin’s case study protocol which recommends a list of questions and identification of possible sources of evidence for answers be included (1994, p.70). It is focused because the research seeks to understand the development and effects of reserved seats provision on women’s representation in two different cases. The theoretical focus of the research draws on the arguments and concepts utilised in literatures on gender quotas and women’s descriptive and substantive representation.

The structured questions were essential to accumulate same set of data to identify the similarities as well as differences between the cases. It facilitates the comparison and identification of the variables responsible for the similarities and differences between cases. Thus the method supported the orderly and cumulative development of knowledge and theory about reserved seats (George 1979). Moreover, the focused comparison helped in dealing with the too many variables problems of small-N cases (Lijphart 1971). In addition the method was convenient as an individual researcher was responsible for the overall planning and conduct of the research (George and Bennett 2005, p.71).

In this thesis I examined two countries, Pakistan and Bangladesh, located in South Asia and similar in terms of several variables relating to the origin, process and design of implementation of reserved seats. The intellectual and theoretical justification for area studies was their inherently similar history, religion, political system, and socio-economic structure that enabled the isolation and analysis of the influence of other variables that might account for the differences I wish to explain (Landman 2003; Smelser 1967 cited in Lijphart 1975, p.164). Besides, as Schmitter (1995) says, ‘analyses undertaken in
countries within a region are more valuable and avoid conceptual stretching’ (cited in Waylen 2007, p.48). In order to successfully accomplish the research goal, I selected cases that are geographically similar. Moreover, lack of research on gender quotas in the South Asian region and my own background and understanding of the patriarchal context provided me the impetus to undertake the research.

I seek to understand the applicability of the Western and context specific scholarly literature to a developing and patriarchal region like South Asia. Three countries in South Asia have reserved seats for women in parliament: Afghanistan, Pakistan and Bangladesh. The reserved seats system in Afghanistan is comparatively new and it is too early to examine the impact of the reserved seats. In this research I used three different languages, Urdu (Pakistan), Bangla (Bangladesh) and English, for data collection, analysis and presentation. It would have been more difficult to deal with another country and language. The tactical choice was limited to two countries given the limitations of money, time and access (Przeworski and Teune 1970).

The study constituted a binary comparison of Pakistan and Bangladesh. The study employed the logic of most similar systems (MSS) design which seeks to compare cases that share numerous similarities and yet differ in other respects. Pakistan and Bangladesh are similar in terms of history, religion, political culture and institutional arrangements of reserved seats for women. The countries, however, differ in the socio-cultural dimension. Pakistan is an Islamic state indicating a strong fusion of state and religion. Pakistan was created on the basis of religious identity and Islam was at the centre of a male-dominated nationalist construction. It was not possible to separate religion from politics and for any regime to work outside the Islamic cultural framework (Zia 2013). The women’s reserved seats were adopted and implanted within this Islamic cultural framework.
created with religion as its raison-d'être, and Islam and Muslim-ness have been important social categories (Shaheed 2010). The feudal and tribal dimensions of Pakistani society are also different from Bangladesh. Though Bangladesh is a predominantly Muslim country, the influence of religion is less in the governance of state and societal institutions.⁹ What would arguably account for the absence of Islamic influence in Bangladesh is that Islam is not the raison d’être of the state as in the case of Pakistan (Mishra 2012). This implies that there are differences in the contexts of women’s political representation. Again the countries reserved seat provision for women is similar in terms of origin, history, implementation design, time frame, and election of women to reserved seats. However, there are differences in the substantive outcomes of women elected to reserved seats. The MSS design used in this thesis allows these differences in the socio-cultural context and in the substantive outcomes to be highlighted. These similarities and differences between Pakistan and Bangladesh thus made them suitable for a MSS research design and overcome the limitations of many variables and N small cases (Lijphart 1975). Besides, MSS is well suited for area studies due to the countries’ inherent similarities in terms of history, political culture and institutional legacy (Przeworski and Teune 1970).

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⁹ Bangladesh emerged as a sovereign, independent entity in defiance of a national identity defined by Islam. What makes Bangladesh distinct is its local syncretistic cultural practices, as reflected in Bengali folk culture, literature, music and festivals. Bangladeshi nationalism was primarily rooted in the unique combination of land and language. The culture and traditions are a blend of Hindu values and customs of majority of the converts to Islam and Islamic religious inscription (Mishra 2012; Kabeer 1991). While there is growing trend of Islamisation and religious extremism globally and in Pakistan, the religious political parties in Bangladesh have taken a back seat in last few years (Riaz 2003). In spite of the conventional belief that the rise of Islamic political forces in Bangladesh is the reassertion of the dormant Muslim identity, in practice this has been refuted by the defeat of Islamic fundamentalist parties in Bangladesh at recent elections. This is despite the majority of voters being Muslim (The Researchers 2009, p.44).
However, I must mention that the sample size in the present study is too small to make substantive generalizable claims and it suffers from what Lijphart dubbed ‘vulnerable to the too many variables, too few countries dilemma’ (1975; 1971). Yet, I argue that intensive examination, lower level of abstraction and inclusion of historical and cultural factors, restricting the analysis to the key variables and omitting those of only marginal importance and most of all the focused comparison serve reserved seats and quota scholarship well and can contribute to the creation of new knowledge (Lim 2006; Lijphart 1975).

History Sets the Path for Future

The research not only examines the role and motivation of the actors within the present institutional design and context of reserved seats but also seeks to examine the outcome of reserved seats on women’s descriptive and substantive representation and explores the factors accounting for the similarities or differences. Comparative analysis often deals with a case as a whole – meaning that a full range of factors are considered at once within particular contexts. It allows the researcher to control, discover and understand empirical relationships between independent and dependent variables (Lijphart 1971). In order to explore the issue of reserved seats, I argue that the reserved seats system is both a dependent and independent variable. To be adopted and implemented as a policy for women’s representation the reserved seats provision depends on the actors and their motivations. Whereas, in the process of representation, reserved seats provision is an independent variable that impacts on women’s descriptive and substantive representation in the political institutions. In the former case, the reserved seat provision is a dependent variable whereas in the latter it is an independent variable. Thus the reserved seats form of gender quota and its different aspects must be carefully studied to unfold how the system fits with socio-political institutional structure and practices and with the interests
of different groups of actors in regard to reserved seats over different periods of time. Therefore, the phenomenon of reserved seats is analysed from both historical and contemporary perspectives. To understand why the countries adopted, implemented and reintroduced reserved seats with indirect election, an in-depth historical analysis of the development of reserved seats is necessary.

It is evident that historical analysis occupies an important position in this research to establish the link between past and present and to provide insight into interpreting specific experiences and trajectories in both countries. Only by doing a comparative analysis, was I able to explain how internal and external actors and forces interacted within the domestic environment at different time periods to produce the specific results in each case. Lim states that:

The comparativists begin with the assumption that “history matters”. It shows exactly how historical processes and practices, as well as long established institutional arrangements, impact and shape the contemporary environment in which decisions are made, events unfold and struggles for power occur. It means demonstrating a meaningful continuity between the past and the present (2006, p.20).

Through this research I seek to understand why and how the idea of women’s representation in British India gained momentum. I ask why the political actors supported the demand and what strategies were adopted by the women’s movement? I am also interested in the question of why the system of reserved seats continued after the independence of Pakistan and Bangladesh. What factors motivated the political actors to continue the system? How did international and domestic forces and relationships
influence the reintroduction of reserved seats in these countries? What were the trade-offs? Using the HI approach, the answers are analysed and constructed through careful analysis of the historical development of reserved seats. The HI perspective requires a careful analysis not only of the ideas that drive change but also of the larger social, economic and political context in which these ideas are situated (Peter, Pierre and King 2005, p. 1297).

The analysis was not only relevant to understanding how institutions shape and impact on the behaviour and actions of the actors but how in different transition and critical moments, actors can also change institutional design, rules, norms and practices. Thus historical analysis explores the formal as well as the informal rules that structure individual preferences and behaviour within institutions (Thelen and Steinmo 1992). This knowledge is the key to understanding, explaining and interpreting diverse historical outcomes and processes and also the significance of the current institutional arrangements of reserved seats and their impact on women’s representation in the parliaments of Pakistan and Bangladesh.

Reserved Seats and Women’s Representation: Measuring the Effect

The literature review indicated that to examine the effect of reserved seats in the process of women’s descriptive and substantive political representation, an array of factors ranging from the socio-cultural, political, institutional and individual must be considered. This means the cases should be studied as a whole in their natural settings and interrelated through a complex web of factors. I examine the relationship between independent (reserved seats) and dependent variables (descriptive and substantive representation) and delineate the influence of the different intervening variables as outlined in the previous chapter on women’s representations. However, it must be noted that the relative influence
of these factors may be different in each case but the degree of influence of each factor is not measured in specific terms as the comparative method is not a method of measurement (Lijphart 1971). Qualitative judgements only can be invoked to explain the influence of the intervening variables on the outcomes. However, prior to examining the relationships between the variables, operationalization of the concepts is important.

Operationalization of the Concepts

In comparative research, conceptualization and measurement require a system-specific approach. This means that instead of searching for a single ‘best’ meaning, researchers need to operationalize the concept based on what they seek to do with it (Przeworski and Teune 1970). In other words, the goals of the research should shape the application of concepts. This offers the researchers some flexibility in conferring meanings to concepts, but at the same time it establishes boundaries on what they can plausibly claim. According to Sartori (1970), to be able to measure a given political phenomenon, it is necessary to establish what it is. Accordingly how concepts are defined affects the causal relations that are to be explored and as well as the cases (Goetz and Mazur 2008 cited in Krook 2013, p.10). Celis confirms that a basic prerequisite lies in concept operationalization that allows them to be applied in different time periods, countries and sites (2009, p.96). Thus stable concepts and shared understandings are central to any research (Collier and Mahon 1993). I revisited and modified the background and systemized concepts of descriptive and substantive representation to ensure that operationalized concepts fit the cases well without any conceptual stretching (Sartori 1970 cited in Collier and Mahon 1993, p.845). It was important to avoid the meaningless togetherness of the concepts and to establish the parameters of investigation such as,
identification of the participants and framing of questionnaires (Adcock and Collier 2001).

Descriptive representation was operationalized as ‘the number of women elected in the national parliaments (with and without reserved seats) expressed in terms of percentage of the total members of parliament and their attributes (education, profession, experience and political connection and ambition)’. To examine the effect of reserved seats on the descriptive representation of women, I gathered two sets of data: the parliamentary data and bibliographic information of women legislators. The former was examined through a comparison between the numbers of women in parliaments without and with reserved seats from 1972 till 2008, and the relative percentage of women in the parliaments of each case. The latter aspect was examined through an analysis of bibliographic data of women legislators. A data base of almost 450 reserved seats and general seat women parliamentarians in Pakistan and Bangladesh was developed for this purpose. Thus the study empirically examine whether reserved seats and indirect election impact on the number and background of women legislators thus enabling an evaluation of the assumptions about reserved seats women.

Linked with the descriptive representation was the exploration of women’s substantive representation. How best to measure substantive representation has been the focus of much debate in the literature. Wängnerud observes that ‘the research on substantive representation is a less mature field compared to descriptive representation’ (2009, p.55). Considering and accepting the complexity of defining substantive representation, I operationalized it as ‘voicing and acting for women within and outside the legislative boundary whenever and wherever the opportunities to promote women’s issues arise’.
As a matter of interest, substantively representing requires determining first the interests of women that need to be represented and second asks whether women parliamentarians seek and are able to represent women’s issues/interests (Schwindt-Bayer and Taylor-Robinson 2011; Celis et al., 2008). This addresses another concern, what should be termed as women’s issues. ‘Subjectively defined interest’ was used to define women’s issues in order to examine substantive representation. I consider women’s issues’ as those perceived and expressed by individual women legislators as important issues of concern to women during interviews. Later I searched whether they had represented or acted on those issues or not. To examine substantive representation, I depended on different sources and techniques of data collection. Content analysis and interviews were used to collect data from relevant primary sources such as parliamentary bulletins and debates and women legislators.

**Field work: Challenges to Access Restricted State Institutions and the Elites**

I carefully examined available knowledge and theory, carried out a thorough literature search that included up to date information and realized that the issue of reserved seats for women is a relatively less explored and under-researched area in the quota literature. The scant attention of the feminist scholarships on reserved seats women and their substantive acts in other sites of representation motivated me to explore new dimensions and knowledge about this phenomenon. However, to retain the integrity of the phenomena and the research, I conducted the field work in Pakistan and Bangladesh and interviewed women legislators elected in general and reserved seats. Data collection of such nature allowed revealing the meanings behind the actions of the people (Elliot and Timulak 2005).
The field work in Pakistan and Bangladesh was conducted in two stages. First, from June – October, 2012. During this period I mainly conducted my field work in Pakistan. In the second period I conducted field work in Bangladesh from December 2012- February 2013 (details are in Appendix 1). I collected a wide range of material related to each of the cases before, during and after the field work. This material included archive data, newspaper articles and reports, media releases, the reports of different government and non-government organizations, personal web pages, academic articles and other materials that provided information on relevant issues. The research hinges on parliamentary data, bibliographic profiles, content analysis and interviews of the women. The following chapters contain copious references to these analyses and interviews demonstrating the importance of the information as a source of producing new knowledge.

I used a purposive selection method to select the participants from both cases. I interviewed 35 women legislators from general and reserved seats; former and currently elected women; and women of different parties (for details see table 2.1). I aimed to sample broadly enough and to interview deeply enough, so that all the important aspects of reserved seats and women’s representation were captured in the sample. From the reviews, three sets of questionnaires were developed to interview three groups of women legislators: general seat, reserved seats and former reserved seats. The questionnaires were used as interview guides.

Content analysis of the parliamentary daily bulletins was conducted to search, identify and record the information about the representation of women’s issues by women legislators. Content analysis provides us with the knowledge about the phenomenon of representation of women’s issues (Downe –Wamboldt 1992, p.314). It is a flexible method for analysing large amount of text data (Cavanagh 1997). This approach is

Interviews: Reaching the Elites

The interview is one of the main data collection tools in qualitative research. It is a useful way of accessing people’s perceptions, meanings, and definitions of situations and construction of reality (Punch 2005). It is also a tool of great flexibility, which can be adopted to suit a wide variety of research situations. Among different types of interviews, I conducted the interviews with an open ended questionnaire; the reason was to allow the participants to express their in-depth feelings and views in detail. The response of the women legislators was also helpful in getting an idea about their orientation to feminist issues as well. Childs (2004) finds that interviews provide rich qualitative data revealing whether women are attitudinally feminist and acted for women in feminist ways. Only an unstructured interview can do this.

Interview data was mostly used to get insights into important issues regarding women and politics, in this case acts performed inside and outside parliament, their views on indirect election and numbers and the challenges they encountered. Thus each interview was unique and women legislators offered valuable insight into their experiences as women and reserved seat women in parliament, their attitudes towards women’s issues, and the extent of substantive representation as a process. The interviews were an important source of information, to ascertain what factors might influence women’s agency to act for women and how women view what can be gained from the reserved seats experiences. They also provided information about the acts the women performed at different sites of representation. It supports better understanding of why certain women do not pursue
women’s issues in the parliamentary and non–parliamentary arena. This information is not available in any other sources and is undervalued in the feminist research on reserved seats women. Had I only focused on the content analysis of parliamentary documents and secondary sources without conducting the interviews I would have not been able to reveal the personal experiences, contributions, frustration, challenges, and limitations of the women legislators.

Content Analysis: Searching for Women’s Voice

Content analyses of parliamentary bulletins were undertaken to identify and analyse if women initiated and spoke in reference to women’s issues during parliamentary debates. According to Grey (2002), parliamentary debates are the public face of the culture of parliament and can readily be examined. These parliamentary proceedings are rich and authentic sources to explore the substantive acts of women parliamentarians in the legislative arena. It is suggested that women legislators’ speeches in the parliamentary debates are as important as any of their acts (Childs and Krook 2006). Speeches matter, as important moments of women’s representation occur when female legislators describe female constituents’ needs, experiences, and circumstances and invoke their shared gender experiences (Piscopo 2011). They indicate a female legislator’s intent and ability to articulate women’s issues in parliament from her particular perspective and experience (Catalano 2009).

I conducted content analysis of parliamentary proceedings of three different parliaments in each case. I employed a summative approach to identify and quantify the appearance of certain words or content in the text with the purpose of understanding the contextual use of the words or content by the women legislators (Hsieh and Shannon 2005, p.1283). It is
an unobtrusive and non-reactive way to study the articulation of women’s issues by women legislators (Babbie 1992). It can provide basic insights into how words are actually used. Along with the words, the source or speaker was also identified.

The parliamentary archive data were collected to examine the intervention made on behalf of women by women legislators, and both general seat and reserved seats women were included in order to examine the variations in representation caused by mode of election and number of women. This quantitative part of this research could only be done by conducting the content analysis as I collected a large amount of text data, but I also faced time and access limits. By examining a wide range of legislative interventions, I was able to collect the reserved seat and general seat based disaggregated data and the numbers and issues represented in each of the three parliaments of the countries involved. Later relevant speeches were searched, collected, copied and sometimes noted, and then translated. This was of particular importance to reveal legislative speech behaviour such as: nature and quality of intervention; the rule used; the length of the speeches; time devoted; the arguments made and the information and data invoked in the speeches. The details of the parliaments and participants are noted in the following table.

Table 2.1: Data collection

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strategies of data collection</th>
<th>Pakistan</th>
<th>Bangladesh</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Interview                    | Total MNAs-17  
Former reserved seats -2  
General seats -3  
Reserved seats -12         | Total MPs-18  
Former reserved seats -3  
General seats -3  
Reserved seats -12         |
| Content analysis of the daily bulletins of Parliament | 10th (1993-1996)= 230 days  
12th (2002-2008)= 382 days  
8th (2001-2006)= 373 days  
9th (2008-2012)=310 days |
Data Analysis

This thesis employed thematic analysis of the interviews to identify key themes. I manually analysed the interview data following an analytical coding process\(^{10}\). The aim of the analysis was to produce a detailed and systematic recording of the themes and issues addressed in the interviews and to link the themes and issues together into a reasonably exhaustive category system (Burnard 1996). The data analysis was done in different stages. All the interviews were transcribed and then translated into English. Transcripts were read through and notes were made, throughout the reading, on general themes within the transcripts. Doing so supported getting a whole picture of the studied phenomena. The first relevancies started to unfold during this pre-analysis stage and influenced the later steps of the data analysis (Elliot and Timulak 2005). I reviewed the transcripts, divided each of them into analytical segments and coded them with different category names to describe the relevant aspects of the content. Each transcript was worked through with the list of categories and coded. After finishing coding, I organized the data to make it thematically consistent with the questions for analysis. From these themes, I identified and selected illustrative passages and quotations to include in the thesis wherever appropriate.

I then reviewed the core content of the issues collected through content analysis and categorized them under several themes, such as: violence against women, women and legal system; women’s rights, women and children; the material interests of women; and women and society, and made note of the numbers of total issues voiced in each thematic

\[^{10}\] I agree with Walsham that a researcher’s best tool for analysis is his or her own mind supplemented by the minds of others when work and ideas are exposed to them (2006, p.325). Individuals are biased by their own background, knowledge and prejudices and they interpret reality in the ways they see or understand it.
area. Through the close analysis of the contents and debates, I established the numbers of women and their silence or opposition to women’s issues; the issues emphasized or seldom raised and debated, and the differences between the initiation and promotion of women’s issues by reserved and general seat women in each case. Later I triangulated this information with the interview data to ascertain links between women’s legislators’ perception of women’s issues, the claims they made during interviews and the representations of the issues in the debates. Thus I was able to test the validity and authenticity of this material. Data from the content analysis and the interviews were widely applied in the remaining chapters of the thesis.

Summary

This chapter outlines and justifies the epistemological position of the research and the approach followed to conduct the study. The interpretive-comparative approach employed was appropriate to answer the research questions that have both historical and contemporary dimensions. I explained my choices of cases, theories and data collection strategies and their appropriateness for answering the research questions. I conducted content analysis of the parliamentary debates and semi-structured interviews with women parliamentarians. In the interpretive data analysis tradition, I thematically coded all interview transcripts and key texts, categorized the content of the speeches and then analysed them to reveal how reserved seats work in these patriarchal contexts. It allows me to understand the dominant norms and practices of the gendered political institutions and how this institutional gender discrimination impacted on the presence and acts of women legislators. It was of particular importance to frame the critical explanation of the findings and their articulation from a feminist institutionalist perspective. Finally the interpretivist position and focus on the historical and the institutional contexts of reserved
seats enabled me to link the micro level findings of reserved seats with macro-level gender quota discourse and debates and to claim the intellectual virtue of the new knowledge about reserved seats generated from this thesis.
Chapter 3: Tracing the History of Reserved Seats in Pakistan and Bangladesh

This chapter analyses the historical and contemporary cases of the reserved seats form of gender quota in Pakistan and Bangladesh. It explores the factors that influenced the decision to proceed with reserved seats and thus answers the first research question. I provide an account of how the idea of reserved seats arose in the first place and how it became institutionalized over time. Insights from HI are included here to explore the enduring legacies of institutional reproduction and their stubborn nature even in the face of change. Building on the insights offered by HI and existing quota scholarship, I argue that the present reserved seats arrangement with indirect election in Pakistan and Bangladesh was shaped by the institutional legacies and the elites’ self-interest in maintaining the status quo.

Two important elements of HI, critical juncture and path dependency, are used to explain the different phases of the reserved seats, from conception, adoption and implementation for the first time in British India, and later their continuation and reinstitution in Pakistan and Bangladesh. This however does not provide a full account for the choice of reserved seats type of gender quota with indirect election. A more in-depth appraisal of institutional changes is necessary to expose the reasons behind the entrenched institutional actors’ support for the adoption and implementation of reserved seats. This appraisal involves consideration of both the larger social, economic and political context, and of the actors and ideas responsible for change (Peter, Piers and King 2005, p.1297).
Identification of critical juncture reveals the influences of socio-political changes on political institutions and their responses to such changes in the external environment. It helps to explain the mobilization of women’s movement for women’s political rights and representation, how the women’s movement interacts with their context during transition, and the nature of responses of different group of actors towards the demands of women’s movement. It also places an emphasis on individual women activists and their strategies and tactics, the alliances they made as well as their ability to support, defend and promote women’s political rights during the critical moments of institutional change (Waylen 2007, p.56). Thus critical juncture analysis considers both actors and institutions in this study. However, the concept of political opportunity structure more appropriately explains how the complex interaction of all these actors and factors during the transition period led to the adoption of the reserved seats provision for women in British India. It also includes the state institutions and socio-political cultures that provided both opportunities and constraints for women’s movement. Feminists engaged with new-institutionalist approaches find that discourses, resources, strategies and tactics used by women’s movements during opportunity structure are important determinants for the success of the claims made on behalf of women (Dahlerup 2013a, 2013b; Waylen 2007).

Path dependency, however, explains the institutional stickiness, the institutional reproduction of reserved seat system for women, over time. It more specifically explores the reasons for the continuation of indirect election and how the opportunities for change are constrained by prior choices. In particular, I explain that different trajectories offer an explanation for gender positive changes in the institutions.

Before taking up a substantive review of the history, process and the outcome of reserved seats, it needs first to be mentioned that prior to its adoption as a form of gender quota,
the provision of reserved seats had been adopted in a number of British colonies and other
countries to ensure representation of different (often ethnic or religious) groups. To
explain why societies adopt and implement reserved seats for different groups and women
in political institutions requires a close look at the particular configuration of social,
cultural and political forces in different context, and an understanding of how, from a
historical perspective, these configurations emerged and developed. The chapter thus has
two central purposes: the first is to review the role of reserved seats as power sharing
mechanisms and of the institutionalization of reserved seats as gender quotas; and second
to understand the context and interest of different actors in the adoption and
implementation of reserved seats for women in British India and then in Pakistan and
Bangladesh.

**Reserved Seats as a Power Sharing Mechanism**

It is widely agreed democracy is inherently difficult in divided societies and majoritarian
democracy contains special problems for ethnically-divided societies (Lijphart 2004; Sisk
2002). Some argue that successful establishment of democratic government in divided
societies requires mechanisms of power sharing to ensure the participation of
representatives of all significant communal groups in political decision making (Sisk
2002; Papagianni 2007). Power sharing defined as practices and institutions that result in
broad–based governing coalition generally inclusive of all ethnic major in society, can
reconcile principles of self–determination and democracy in multi ethnic states (Sisk
2002, p.vii). It is also agreed that electoral reform can play a powerful role in promoting
both democracy and successful conflict management (Reilly 2002). Reserved seats as a
power sharing mechanism and as a kind of electoral reform were designed to ensure the
election and representation of minority groups’ representatives, irrespective of electoral
outcome (Miere 2009; Lijphart 2004; Biber 1995). It is an odd element in electoral systems since they preclude the result by establishing how many seats a specific group will get prior to an election (Htun 2004). In a system with reserved seats a determinable criterion such as religion, ethnicity, language or gender may be a requirement for nomination or election.

Reserved seats as a mechanism of representation were first adopted for indigenous groups in British-administered New Zealand. The reserved seats for Māori was established by the Māori Representation Act of 1867, passed by the British Parliament in 1852 as a part the New Zealand Constitution Act (NZCA). The Act of 1852 provided all Māori adult males with the right to vote upon fulfilment of a nominal property requirement. The Act divided New Zealand into four electoral districts and entitled Māori males to elect one representative from each constituency to parliament (Fleras 1985). The Act provided only four seats to 50,000 Māori, and 72 seats to 250,000 Europeans. Based on population Maoris were entitled to have 14-15 seats (Sorrenson 1986, pp.20-21). Critics argue that the creation of the Māori seats was a result of the Europeans’ desire to pacify and assimilate Māori (Sorenson 1986) and to accelerate the Europeanization of Māori through involvement in political affairs and European law (Fleras 1985). Others view the Māori seats as having involved no high intentions or moral principles; they were simply a useful way of rewarding Māori loyalists and placating Māori rebels (New Zealand Parliament 2009). It was a transitional mechanism to keep the indigenous group away from power (Reynolds 2005, p. 306; 2006).

Later a similar legislative system for minorities was introduced in British administered India in 1892 (now three independent states: India, Pakistan and Bangladesh). First
Muslims (in 1909) and then Christians and Sikhs (in 1919) were granted separate electorates. Later seats were granted to "untouchables' or dalits to offset the inequities of the caste system (Forbes 2008; Krook 2007; Htun 2004). This reserved seats system as critics argue was mainly devised to divide the population according to ethnicity and religion so as to destroy the spirit of united movement and rule the country with the support of favoured groups (Sharma 2003). Reserved seats for women were first implemented in 1935 in British India only after women were granted limited franchise and representational right.

After WW II, a number of other countries adopted reserved seats and it became an integral part of power sharing policies to end internal conflict without seriously destabilizing the unity of the regions or country (Reynolds 2005). Others adopted reserved seats to ensure the collective representational rights of democracy in a plural society. In "consociation" or "consensus" polities of democracy, each group is guaranteed a share of power to preclude secession and civil war (Htun 2004, p.440). The most common criteria to ensure the representational rights of groups are race /ethnicity, language/nation, religion and island/geography. At present 32 (including Tibet and Palestine) countries have reserved seats in parliament and one-third of these reserved seats are on the basis of ‘race’ or ethnicity. Some countries have reserved seats both on the basis of race, ethnicity and geography (Table 3.1). In a few other cases, reserved seats are the result of peace deals to end civil wars such as the Dayton agreement in Bosnia and the Taif Accord in Lebanon. In other cases the need for reserved seats was driven by the location of
The experience of reserved seats in different countries provides the different contexts and causes of reserved seats.

A number of liberal, conservative and critical thinkers argue that quotas such as reserved seats undermine democratic values. Liberals argue that granting rights to minority groups reduces candidates and voters to a particular group instead of recognizing the differences within groups, similarities across groups or the possible belongingness to several social groups (Rosenblum 2006). It is also suspected that the collective rights of social groups could be used to benefit the privileged, and could increase group inequality and aggravate social division in quota or reserved seat systems (Htun 2004, pp.440-441).

Reynolds (2005) further adds that some forms of reserved seats instead of ensuring minority rights only lead to further institutionalization of ethnic differences. The fixed number of communal seats in Fiji may not bear relation to the proportions of indigenous and Indian Fijians as migration and birth rates change the balance over time for example. The Christian-Muslim ratio in Lebanon after the Taif Accords has been controversial and has failed to bring peace to the society. The system of reserved seats in Bosnia, rather than offering collective rights to minority groups actually secures power for local majority groups. In the present system of reserved seats, there is no central power to unify the groups while each group protects its own interests. Moreover other smaller groups like Roma, the Jewish peoples and those with mixed heritage have no real access to

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11The institutional separation of the ethnic groups or the system of reserved seats came in to effect under the Dayton Agreement (1995) that brought an end to conflict in the region. In Lebanon the system of reservation was introduced in 1943 (Taif Accord); in Cyprus in 1960 and in Zimbabwe in 1980 to end internal conflicts (Reynolds 2005).
political power (http://www.ohr.int/dpa). Biber (1995, p.92) finds that reserved seats as a power sharing mechanism, is a blunt tool with considerable disadvantages. He argues that as a positive discrimination mechanism, it attracts the resentment of the majority and thus does not promote cooperation or participation. In cases where reserved seats failed to establish peace through power sharing and compartmentalization, it bears the mark of institutional failure and may encourage disintegration or balkanization of the society (Reynolds 2006).

Table 3.1: Reserved seats as power sharing mechanism

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Race/ethnicity</th>
<th>Language /nation</th>
<th>Religion</th>
<th>Island/geography</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td></td>
<td>Bhutan</td>
<td>Denmark</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fiji</td>
<td></td>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>Fiji</td>
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<td>New Zealand</td>
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<td>Jordan</td>
<td>Finland</td>
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<td>India</td>
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<td>Lebanon</td>
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<td>Taiwan</td>
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<td>Sri Lanka</td>
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(Adopted and developed from the work of Krook and O’Brien 2010; Reynolds 2005)

Papagianni (2007) however, argues that in the short to medium term, the drawbacks of reserved seats may be outweighed by their potential benefits. Bose (2005) asserts that the institutions of reserved seats can contribute significantly to the country’s transition from war to non-violent politics. By bringing all parties to a grand coalition and a common political process, power-sharing institution like reserved seats create possibilities for relationship-building among former adversaries (Rothchild 2001 cited in Papagianni...
Since this research focuses on gender quotas and reserved seats, I will not go into further detail about this aspect of reserved seats although the existing literature suggests that reserved seats in political institutions have both positive and negative implications for both representation and representatives.

Reserved seats as a Gender Quota

Women’s equal political rights are set out in different United Nations instruments, notably Article 25 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights of 1954; and Article 7 of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) adopted in 1979 (Women’s Aid International 2011). Yet women’s under-representation in political institutions which was only 10.5 percent in 1995 failed to draw enough attention from the state and international actors (IPU 2011). It was not until the Beijing Platform for Action that was adopted at the Fourth World Conference on Women in 1995 where the discriminatory attitudes and practices against women were addressed. The platform demanded a minimum level of representation with new discourses of equal representation and suggested affirmative action was a possible means of attaining the goal of women’s equal representation (Dahlerup 2006a; Sawer 2000). In the process of institutionalization of gender equality norms CEDAW and the Beijing conference have been the major influences. Krook and True (2010) argue that two norms of the UN- gender-balanced decision-making and gender mainstreaming-became the partner strategies of the Beijing Platform for Action and influenced the adoption of quotas in member countries. The target to have women in 30 percent of decision making positions was endorsed by the UN Economic and Social Council in 1990 and was later reaffirmed in the Beijing Platform for Action in 1995 further strengthened the demand for gender quotas in politics (UNDP 2014b;2000).
Immediately before and after the Beijing conference, numerous international and regional organizations issued similar recommendations embracing affirmative action and quotas for women. These included the Inter-Parliamentary Union, the Socialist International, the Council of Europe, the European Union, the Commonwealth, the African Union, the Southern African Development Community, and the Organization of American States (Krook 2006; Tripp 2004). The diffusion of gender equality and gender quota norms at the global and regional level opened the window of opportunity for domestic women’s movement to organize and mobilize for electoral gender quotas to remedy women’s under representation at the national level (Dahlerup 2006a).

The commitment to the Beijing Platform for Action and the UN policy instruments increased interaction between international and national women’s movements. This transnational sharing of gender equality norm and gender quota and international pressure led many countries to adopt some form of quota for women. Most of the countries adopted party and legislated quotas. To ensure representation of women as a group, some countries in Arab, Africa and Asia adopted reserved seats, the oldest mechanism of group representation. Thus the reserved seats came to be accepted as a form of gender quota. It should be mentioned that even before the beginning of the international discourse on gender quotas, countries like Pakistan, Bangladesh, Egypt and Uganda had reserved seats for women in the 1970s and 1980s in their parliaments. Nonetheless, the increased mobilization in support of gender quotas and women’s representation during the post-Beijing period led Pakistan and Bangladesh to reinstate the lapsed British institutional legacy of reserved seats for women and with an increase in the number of representatives.
Exploring the Politics: Adoption, Continuation and Reintroduction of Reserved seats in Pakistan and Bangladesh

The phenomenon of reserved seats in Pakistan and Bangladesh can be grouped into three different phases: the adoption of reserved seats during the time of British India, the continuation of reserved seats in Pakistan and Bangladesh; and last, the reintroduction of the system. The timing, national and international context; and the dominant discourses help to explain what factors influenced the state and societal actors and how internal and external forces and relationships interacted with domestic factors to adopt and reinstate women’s reserved seats. I approach this issue from two angles, pursuing both the cross-national and longitudinal dimension of the reserved seats provision.

Phase 1: Adoption and implementation of reserved seats for women in British India (1927-1947)

The adoption of reserved seats in the Indian subcontinent, from the embryonic idea of women’s representation in politics to become a part of the constitutional framework requires an analysis of the historical, social and political context. Three different movements started over a short time span or in parallel: social reform, women’s and national movements; and the response of the state towards these movements. These constitute an important part of understanding the formation of a discourse on reserved seats and its adoption in British India.

In pre and post-colonial India, women were legally denied the same rights as men in matters of inheritance, property ownership and the guardianship of children. They were also the victims of harmful customs such as polygamy, child marriage, purdah, devadasi
and satee\textsuperscript{12}. According to James Mill (1826) among ruled people, women were generally degraded; among civilized people they were exalted (cited in Shukla 2012, p.2). To change the condition of women, a few male reformers like, Raja Rammohan Roy, Ishwar Chandra Vidyasagar, Kandukuri Virasalingam Pantulun, and Justice Mahadev Govind Ranade campaigned effectively for women’s education and widow marriage and the removal of social practices like, satee and child marriage in the second decade of nineteenth century (Happtodd 2013; Begum 2002; Visram 1992).

Critics however argue that reformists stressed women’s education and social reform just to preserve, protect and strengthen the inner domain of Indian culture without tempering the male status-quo\textsuperscript{13}. The goals of education for women were limited and cautious. It was considered adequate for girls to receive basic educational skills and training that would make them better wives and mothers (Happtodd 2013; Kasturi and Majumdar 1994). Males were only ready to endorse education not equality (Happtodd 2013). Women’s role was only widened to serve the family and community without any attempt to tamper with patriarchal values. The 'modernists' or the 'revivalists' were not really concerned with gender equality, women's own desires or their perspectives on dignity and justice (Kasturi and Majumdar 1994, p.9). As Forbes notes, ‘social reform was often tentative, facile, or nugatory’ and was built within patriarchal norms to ‘reconcile the desire for tradition with the demand for modernity’ (2008, pp.27-28). Social reformers

\textsuperscript{12}Satee or Suttee which literally means ‘virtuous woman’ was an ancient Hindu custom practiced among some Hindu communities where a widow was burnt alive in the funeral pyre along with her deceased husband. It was believed that women, who were virtuous and pure, would not feel the pain and would go straight to heaven (Begum 2002; Visram 1992).

\textsuperscript{13}The reformists recognized that to avoid British criticism, Indian culture had to be rendered more consistent with western ideas of liberalism and humanitarianism. These Western values were part of the ‘material’ (public) domain. Opposed to this domain was spiritual (inner) domain and women were supposed to be the guardian of this domain (Chatterjee 1988 cited in Thapar 1993, p.82).
thus emphasised on the views and needs of men rather than liberating women from servitude and exploitation.

Along with men, a few eminent women such as Swarnakumari Devi, Pandita Ramabai Sarawasti, Sarala Devi Choudarani, Begum Rokeya emerged in the social reform movement by the end of nineteenth century and started to set up local women’s associations to bring women together on the basis of their common interest in their moral and material progress (Forbes 2008; Begum 2000; Everett 1979). Swarnakumari Devi founded a Ladies Theosophical Society in 1882 and four years later the Sakhi Samiti. Pandita Ramabai Saraswati formed the Arya Mahila Somaj in Poona, and in 1889 she started a home-cum-school for widows in Bombay named Sharda Sudan (Basu 1995, p.94). These local women’s associations for the first time provided women the opportunity to interact and raise women’s issues in an organizational platform and to participate in public life and define key issues affecting them.

As women’s experiences grew, second generation educated middle class women formed women’s organizations to fight their cause and articulate new priorities. Several organizations were formed between 1910 and 1920 and the number of women's organizations grew rapidly. Significant among these were, Women’s India Association (WIA) in 1917, National Council of Women in India (NCWI) in 1925, and All India Women’s Conference (AIWC) in 1927 (Forbes 2008; Everett 1979). Women’s organizations were primarily concerned with ensuring social and economic rights of women and for the removal of all forms of discriminatory practices against women (Haptodd 2013; Basu 1995, p.55).
However, from the platform of these organizations women articulated and mobilized for women’s political rights of citizenship and representation. They used different organizational and discursive strategies and played a critical role to affect the power structure (Forbes 1982). Thus the growth and discourse of the women’s movement that emerged with the formation of women’s organizations over a period of 50 years from 1880-1930 had a significant impact on women’s acquisition of political power in British India (Forbes 2008; 2005; Cousins 1941).

Also, the formation of the Indian National Congress in 1885 paved the path of a national movement in India. Basu (1995, p.95) argues that the process of nation building and the creation of a national identity was paralleled, in fact, preceded by the growth of social reform movements focusing on women's issues. Many members of women’s organizations became actively involved with the national movement due to their relations with male nationalist leaders (Jahan 1987). Women’s participation in nationalist activities started with the Swadeshi movement in Bengal (1905-1908). However, the involvement of large numbers of women in the nationalist movement began with the Khilafat and non-cooperation movement of the 1920s (Mhatre 2009; Forbes 2005; Visram 1992)\(^\text{14}\). Women took part in the non-cooperation movement, Salt Satyagraha\(^\text{15}\), non-violence and Quit

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\(^\text{14}\)The Khilafat Movement was organized in 1920 to protest the treatment of Muslims generally and the Punjab tragedies commonly known as the Jallianwala Bagh massacre or the Amritsar massacre. On 13 April 1919 a large group of Punjabis protesting against British rule gathered in the Jallianwala Bagh in Amritsar. They were incensed at the arrest of two of their leaders, and for 24 hours the city had been consumed by riots. That evening, General Reginald Dyer marched into Jallianwala Bagh with 140 soldiers, blocked the exits, fired into the peaceful, unresisting crowds. Official estimates indicate 379 were killed and 1,200 injured. Others estimates put the casualty rate as 10 times higher (Dalrymple 2013). The non–cooperation movement was designed to get the government’s attention through a nationwide “boycott of titles and honours, elections and legislatures, schools and colleges, courts and tribunals” (Kaur 1968 cited in Broome 2012, p.4).

\(^\text{15}\)Also known as the Dandi March began in 1930 as a part of the non-violence movement that aimed to end the British monopoly on salt, decrease the dependence on foreign cloths, increase unity between
India movement against the British. The nationalist symbols and representations of ‘new women’ created by the nationalist leaders facilitated women’s involvement in the movement (Björkert 1997, p.493).

Some scholars assert that involvement with the national movement made Indian women politically conscious of their political rights, spurred their feminism and to some extent enhanced their confidence in demanding those rights (Basu 1995; Everett 1979). Björkert (1997) argues that the national movement served as a vehicle to encourage women to enter in public sphere and to adopt a new role model. It altered women’s role from a passive to a more active one (Sudarshan and Bisht 2010).

Yet Samarasinghe (2000) argues that Indian women participated in the movements as dictated by male leaders. The ideological framework within which nationalism resolved the women's question was constructed not on the idea of equality but rather on the reinstatement of the norm of male domination in a modern way. Kasturi and Majumdar (1994) argue that the nationalists constructed the idea of ‘new women’ to subjugate the acts, behaviours and freedom of women and bound women to a new yet entirely legitimate subordination. They needed this new breed of women to make sacrifices and endure sufferings for the cause of the national movements (Forbes 2002). The ‘new

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16Over 80,000 persons were arrested during the Salt Satyagraha, more than 17000 of whom were women (Basu 1995; Visram 1992). In 1930-1931, for every six persons who courted arrest, one was a woman (Kaur 1968 cited in Broome 2012, p.33).
patriarchy of nationalism’ replaced the old patriarchy through the construction of the idea of ‘new women’17.

Nonetheless, women organized within the constraints of an oppressive and patriarchal society and to some extent acted independently of the influence of nationalist leaders on the issue of the franchise and reserved seats for women. Indian women’s movement activism in regard to politics fell into two distinct phases. The first phase of the movement on enfranchisement and eligibility for legislature covered the period from 1917-1928. It coincided with the demands of the first wave of the international women’s movement (Paxton, Hughes and Green 2006). The second phase of the women’s movement started from 1928 and focused on liberalization of the terms of enfranchisement with reserved seats for women in legislatures (Forbes 2008; Everett 1979).

Women’s activism for political rights started with the visit of the Montague Committee in India in 1917 to devise a framework for representative government through the inclusion of Indians in the government. A delegation of women called on the Committee and demanded franchise rights on the same terms as men18. Women’s demand for franchise right was to some extent influenced by the women’s suffrage movement in

17The ‘new woman’ was supposed to be inculcated with virtues of cleanliness, companionship, discipline and self-control. These were added to her traditional role in the family without changing the basic social relationship characterized by male dominance (Kasturi and Majumdar 1994; Thapar 1993). Further, for the strategic development of the movements, the construct of new women incorporated other qualities like strength of will, steadfastness of purpose and fortitude in the face of adversity (Björkert 1997).

18The absence of women in the political process led Margaret Cousins, an activist and suffragist from Ireland, to initiate and form a fourteen member delegation of women to present women’s view on the issue before the committee (Cousins 1941, p. 29). However, according to Everett the number of women was eighteen - fourteen Indian and four European (Everett 1979, p.103).
England (Cousins 1941). Despite opposition from the conservative factions and political leaders like Gandhi, women continued their campaign for suffrage. During this phase women used both essentialist and rights discourse but in different places. Within India women used essentialist discourses to convince and gain the support of prominent political leaders and parties. In Britain, the women’s delegation used the rights discourse and on advice of the British suffragists made petitions to British authorities. They argued that women could play a special and unique role in politics and could bring new perspective in regard to social policy (Forbes 2005; 2002; Everett 1979).

The demand for women’s suffrage was unacceptable to the Montague-Chelmsford Committee since conservative opposition to women suffrage was akin to a religious belief (Forbes 2008). The Southborough Committee which toured the country to collect evidence also rejected the demand for women’s suffrage on the ground of women’s adverse social condition. However, understanding the sensitivity and complexity of the issue, it was left to the provincial legislature as a ‘domestic subject’ in the Government of India Act (Kishwar 1996; Cousins 1941). It was an opportune time for the women’s movement to mobilize their resources and make connections for the suffrage cause. They took advantage of this new opportunity to make their claim for political rights and

19 In 1918, only women over thirty in Britain were enfranchised as against men who could vote at twenty one. It was only in 1928 that women in Britain could vote on the same terms as men (Mhatre 2009, p.19).

20 Prominent political leaders like Mohammad Ali Jinnah, Vithalbai Patel, U.P. Madava Rao, Bal Ghandakar Tilak and Anne Besant supported women’ demand and gave evidence before the committee. Ghandi, on the other hand, did not support “vote for women campaign”. Instead he advised women to support and assist their men in the struggle for freedom (Forbes 2008, p.101; Everett 1979; Cousins 1941).

21 The demand for franchise was quite preposterous to British government because women in most western countries at that time were not given the right to vote despite a protracted struggle (Mhatre 2009; Everett 1979).
presence. Women used personal and organizational connections to lobby members of the provincial and legislative councils to support their claim. Most of the women during the first wave of the women’s movement were elite in nature. They were urban upper class English speaking women; and had personal and organizational connections (due to the party membership of many women in Muslim League and Indian National Congress) with many members of the legislative councils.

Due to the successful mobilization of women’s movement, Indian provincial legislatures removed the ban on women’s enfranchisement and representation despite the absence of a mass-based women’s suffrage movement (Forbes 2008; Everett 1979; Shahnawaz 1971). Between the Madras Legislative Council in 1921 and the Bihar Council in 1929 all the legislative areas of India conferred the instrument of equal citizenship on women who possessed the necessary requirements such as, a certain level of literacy, sufficient property, age, payment of taxes, and length of residence (Cousins 1941, p.32). About a million women gained the right to vote for the first time in India under this act (Mhatre 2009, p.20). Thus the elite nature of women’s mobilization and their strategy of petition politics eliminated the boundaries between public and private worlds of Indian women.

During the second phase of the women’s movement, two contesting discourses for increasing women’s representation in the legislature evolved amongst women. A faction of the women’s movement wanted to ensure women’s representation in legislative bodies through the provision of reserved seats as implemented for other different groups in India. They argued that reserved seats were necessary to encourage women to take part in political affairs and to better represent women’s material interests in education and social welfare. This faction of women believed that there was a definite women’s
point of view on social issue that needed to be tapped into by extending the women’s vote and women representatives (Forbes 2005; Everett 1979; Shahnawaz 1971). Based on the nature of their discourse, I term this faction of women as ‘progressive and practical’.

Another group of women was against any kind of reservation and, in line with the Indian National Congress, demanded universal adult franchise based on equality (Forbes 2002; Visram 1992; Everett 1979). These women considered reserved seats as a retrograde step for women and believed women would have no difficulty in getting elected. They wanted to ensure that capable women served as representatives rather than individuals selected only because of sex (Forbes 2005; Everett 1979; Shahnawaz 1971). I term this faction of women ‘progressive and radical’. The group was criticised for being too westernized and extremist (Everett 1979). The discourse of the former was constructed out of the realization of structural inequality in Indian society and the needs for women’s emancipation. The activists’ idea of women’s political rights and representation was influenced and shaped by the gender norms of traditional social institutions. The latter discourse arose out of the interaction between INC and women’s movement with a focus on equality. The group overlooked the varied nature of women’s constraints within the complex system of inherent structural inequalities based on caste, community and class in India (Kasturi and Majumdar 1994). However, both factions challenged the existing institutional norms and practices regarding women’s civil and political rights and acted to infuse new and positive gender norms and rules in the social and political institutions of India.

During this ongoing activism of the women’s movement and of the intensified national freedom movement, the Simon Commission was appointed in 1927 to devise a more
representative system of government for India. This phase of transition and the appointment of the Commission was the second political opportunity structure for women to pursue their demand for representation. Major political parties, the INC and the ML boycotted the Commission but in a display of considerable autonomy, the ‘progressive and practical’ section of the women appeared before the Commission. They argued for an extension of female suffrage on a wifehood basis and to reserve four seats for women in the legislatures.

In the process of devising a representational framework for India, several conferences were held between British administrators and different political parties and communal groups. At the first Round Table Conference in 1930, Begum Jahanara Shahnawaz and Mrs. Radhabai Subbarayan of the women’s organizations recommended reserving seats for women in the legislatures. In the second Round Table conference, only Mrs. Subbarayan suggested that five percent of the seats in the first three legislatures should be reserved for women (Everett 1979, p.121). She argued that women’s presence in the legislature would lead the society to accept women as politicians and legislators (Everett 1979).

22The British Government appointed the Simon Commission for recommending the time to establish responsible government in India and the Commission came to India in 1928 to discuss the issue of the franchise and political representation. Protesting the fact that the Simon Commission was composed entirely of British members, the Indian National Congress and the Muslim League boycotted it (Everett 1979; Shahnawaz 1971).

23Sarojini Naidu, Begum Jahanara Shahnawaz and Mrs. Radhabai Subbarayan participated in the second Round Table Conference in 1931. Miss Naidu and Shahnawaz presented the demand for adult suffrage; however, on the insistence of Muslim league, Begum Shahnawaz forcefully presented the demand for separate electorates for Muslim women’s seats during the joint select committee meetings (Shahnawaz 1971; Cousins 1941).
During the ongoing debate on women’s enfranchisement and reserved seats, the British government appointed the expert Indian Franchise Committee (Lothian Committee) in 1931 which toured the country to gather evidence on the adult franchise and on the reservation of seats for women. The Committee proposed that at least one-fifth of the voters should be women (Forbes 2005; 1982; Everett 1979). The recommendation failed to meet the aspirations of the Indian women’s movement and they sent three representatives to England to plead their case before Joint Select Committee.24 Based on the testimony of political leaders and women’s activists, the Committee finally recommended the provision of reserved seats for women in legislative bodies and to confer franchise rights to women on more flexible terms in regard to property and educational requirement. The proposal of the Joint Select Committee was accepted and incorporated in the 1935 Government of India Act.

The 1935 Act provided for the formal induction of women into the political process through a broadened franchise and contested elections for both reserved and general seats. The Act was extended to allow more than 6 million women and 29 million men (a ratio of 1:5) to vote and seats were allocated for them in the Council of State, the Central Legislative Assembly and Provincial Assemblies (Mhatre 2009). It was the first attempt to include women in elected assemblies. Six seats were reserved for women in the 156 seats of the Council of State and the male and female members of the provincial assemblies were to constitute the Electoral College. These six seats were allocated to the

24Begum Jahanara Shahnawaz and Miss Mary Pickford MP were the only female members of the Indian and British delegation to the Joint select committee and they fought to ensure the representation of women in the legislative councils and for enfranchisement of women in liberal terms (Shahnawaz 1971, p.150).
provinces of Madras, Bengal, Bombay, Uttar Pradesh, Punjab and Bihar. Nine seats out of 250 were reserved for women in the Central Legislative Assembly and women were elected by the women members of the provincial legislatures. These nine seats were distributed among seven provinces and four provinces went unrepresented. Seats were also reserved for women in the provincial legislatures. The number of these reserved seats though was small, representing less than 4 percent of the total and also excluded some provinces (Afzal 1999; Everett 1979). The elections held in terms of the Act brought 41 women in reserved seats, 10 on general seats and five through nominations (56 out of 1500 seats) in various provincial legislatures. Additionally 30 women were elected to the Central Assembly and India was third in the world in terms of women’s representation after the USSR and the USA (Shahnawaz 1971, p.152).

It became apparent that women’s participation in politics and their activism in regard to the franchise and representation had to a considerable extent changed the role and perception about women in Indian society. In addition, the intensified national movement had seriously disturbed the equilibrium of the society and state institutions. Orren and Skowronek state that:

One important source of change comes from the interactions of different institutional orders within a society, as change along one time line affects order along the others as interactions and encounters among processes in different

25 In the Council of State, women from five provinces-Sindh, North Western Frontier Province, Orissa, Assam and Central Province were not given reserved seats for representation (Afzal 1999, p.9). No explanation has been provided for why women from these provinces were not included.

26 The four provinces were Sindh, North Western Frontier Province, Orissa, and Assam (Afzal 1999, p.9).
in institutional realms open up possibilities for political change

The interaction of social, cultural and political factors led to a process and period of
fundamental changes in political institutions - the critical juncture - which offered
opportunity structures to women to advance their claims for citizenship and
representation (Capoccia and Kelemen 2007).

The formulation process of the Acts impacted on women’s tactics, demand and structure
for representation. During this temporary political opportunity phase, the women’s
movement had successfully used their resources; organizational, discursive and personal,
to mobilize the elite’s support for the demand of women’s political rights and presence.
In the first phase, women were united and used both external and internal resources;
interacted with different political and social actors; and used the tactics of petition
politics and elite mobilization. They used the discourses of ‘rights’ and ‘essentialism and
interest’ to influence the domestic and British political elites and suffragists (Forbes
2002). As Meyer (2004) contends, advancing any particular claims depends on
exogenous factors, such as, cultivating some alliances, employing particular political
strategies and tactics, affecting mainstream institutional politics and policy and even
personal affiliation.

In the process of transition and the formulation of the Government of India Act 1935, the
demands of the ‘progressive and practical’ faction of the women’s movement won the
elites support for women’s representation over the demand for equality of ‘progressive
and radical’ faction. A number of factors accounted for the success of the ‘progressive
and practical’ group. This group mobilized its resources effectively. The group interacted
with other influential actors and organizations and were flexible in their demands. This group did not align itself with any political parties and acted independently when making the claim for reserved seats for women. However, advancing any particular claim, mobilizing supporters and affecting the influence are context-dependent (Meyer 2004, p.126). The time period, access to the decision making process, personal connections with political elites and context all worked favourably for them to exert the most influence on the actors and policy process. The transformation of political institutions during critical moments provides women’s movements with unique opportunities to demand women’s political rights and presence in political institutions (Bauer and Burnet 2013).

An important political opportunity that also contributed in the interactions and negotiations process of ‘progressive and practical’ faction of women’s organization was the support of the general Indian women and British women leaders and activists (Everett 1977, pp. 67 & 129; Shahnawaz 1971, p.150). The British women’s delegation to India, women leaders and members of parliament mostly supported the views of the ‘progressive and practical’ group. Thus I argue that the ‘progressive and practical’ group’s successful interaction with different social and political actors during the critical juncture period resulted in securing the support of entrenched institutional elites for their claim.

27Mrs. Subbarayan was a member of the Lothian committee and was in support of reserved seats for women. Eleanor Rathbone, a member of the House of Commons and member of the British women’s delegation was a close friend of Mrs. Subbarayan. Their personal relation also influenced the decision of the committee and of the women’s delegation to support the position of Mrs. Subbarayan (Forbes 2008; 2005; Everett 1979).
This way, female agency and activism during the critical juncture period resulted in the guaranteed representation of women in the legislature for the first time in the history of women’s political representation. In the absence of a dominant discourse on gender equality and women’s representation in parliament at the international level, a faction of the Indian women’s movement had been successful in ensuring the presence of women in the policy process. The favourable political opportunity structure and strategic organising by women was crucial for the success of women’s mobilization for reserved seats (Waylen 2008).

According to Meyer and Minkoff (2004), the most important factor during women’s successful mobilization for reserved seats was the elite’s openness to the movement’s claims. British authorities were particularly open to the claim of the ‘progressive and practical’ group but found the demand for universal adult franchise of ‘progressive and radical’ group unpalatable. The proposal of a wifehood qualification and reservation was consistent with the goals of representation of moderate opinion and fit into the strategy of representation of British policy makers (Everett 1979). The British government at that time was not ready to accept an adult franchise based on equality and wanted to avoid any expensive and complex device. Also the conservative British section, Indian government officials and conservative forces were against the demand for an adult franchise (Cousins 1941).

The nationalist leaders did not overtly oppose or restrict the idea of reserved seats for women although the liberal perspective of Indian nationalist elite was not broad enough to include women’s political rights (Thakkar 2002). The starting point of nationalist leaders’ support for reserved seats was partly motivated by culturally and politically
constructed ideas of women’s emancipation and women’s presence to assist in the formulation of social and family laws (Everett 1979). National political leaders also did not want to let go of the opportunity to demonstrate their progressiveness and modernity to the British who had enfranchised women after a 50 year suffrage campaign (Everett 1979). Yet, I argue that the design of reserved seats was the most important reason behind the support of the elites. The number of reserved seats was too few to become a concern to male interests and their domination in politics and in assemblies (in central legislature 3.4 percent and not more than 4 percent in provincial legislatures). It rescued the leaders from nominating women in the general seats during election and thus the general seat remained the preserve of males (Forbes 2008). The system did not in any way offend the interests of nationalist male leaders to maintain their status quo. Above all by extending covert support for reserved seats, Indian political elites were able to secure the support of women for their broader nationalist agenda and activities.

Thus, I contend that the reserved seats for women served the interest of the British government and the nationalist leaders and to some extent of women. Women were ensured a passage to parliament using a mechanism that did not challenge ideological culture that upholds male supremacy and authority, the root cause of structural inequalities in society (Samarasinghe 2000; Forbes 2005). On the other hand, to entrenched institutional elites it was a rational and self-interested decision that benefited all the groups with strategic and electoral incentives. It also made the point that women’s mobilization and elite's support were crucial for the successful adoption of reserved seats in any context and time.
**Phase 2: The continuation of reserved seats for women in Pakistan and Bangladesh (1947-2001)**

The second phase of reserved seats started after the independence of Pakistan (West and East wing) and India from the British in 1947. India, after independence from the British formulated a new Constitution with the provision of equality for men and women. It maintained the provision of reserved seats for scheduled castes but refrained from continuing the provision of women’s reserved seats. In Pakistan during the process of making a new constitution, two women legislators demanded 10 percent seats for women in both central and provincial legislatures for two elections (Shahnawaz 1971, p.248). Using their experience of politics, women legislators argued and asserted that until conservative Muslim society was ready to accept women as politician and legislators, reserved seats were needed to ensure the presence of women and of women’s perspective in the policy process. The first Constitution of Pakistan which was adopted in 1956 made a provision to reserve 3 percent seats for women (for 10 years) with the system of direct election based on the principle of female suffrage. Women’s reserved seats were created in addition to the existing seats. In the lower house, 14 additional seats were reserved for women with the existing 300; and in the upper house two additional seats were reserved for woman with the existing 50 (Begum 2002; Afzal 1999).

Later, the military government of General Ayub abolished the constitution and replaced it with a new constitution in 1962. The new constitution reduced the number of reserved seats for women to six and replaced the system of direct election with indirect election.

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28 Begum Jahan Ara Shahnawaz and Begum Shaista Ikramullah were the only women in the first Legislative Assembly of Pakistan in 1953. Women were granted a duel voting right, one for general seats and the other for the reserved seats for women (Shahnawaz 1971).
However, in 1967, the number of reserved seats was increased to eight with an increase in the number of general seats (Begum 2000; Afzal 1999). Later in 1970, General Yahiya Khan declared the Legal Framework Order which reserved 13 seats for women in 313 seats of the National Assembly. The reserved seats were distributed among the provinces according to the proportion of the population of the provinces.

In post-independence Pakistan, the role of individual women activists was crucial to the adoption and implementation of reserved seats. The demand for women’s reserved seats was put forward primarily by individual women activists turned legislators. They lobbied against entrenched male political leaders and fought against fundamentalist forces to insert the system of reserved seats in the constitution. They pushed for women’s rights via informal social networks and connected with women outside parliament to create pressure for women’s seats (Shahnawaz 1971). Their strategies, tactics and alliances inside and outside the parliament played an important role but were separate from the broader women’s movement during this period.

In the years of United Pakistan, there was barely any activism or any effective women’s organizations to struggle for women’s political rights or reserved seats (Awan 2012). During the process of the 1955 constitution making only the All Pakistan Women’s Association (APWA) demanded 10 percent reserved seats for women in the national and provincial assemblies for 10 years (Shaheed, Zia and Warraich 2009; Afzal 1999).

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29 The distribution of seats was as follows: East Pakistan: 162 general and 7 reserved seats for women and West Pakistan: 144 and 6 reserved seats for women. The 1970 general elections were the first one in united Pakistan’s history held on the basis of an adult franchise and with the participation of the two major parties of West and East Pakistan (Begum 2000; Afzal 1999).

30 It was formed in 1949 by the then Prime Minister’s wife. Wives of the government officials tended to head the local chapters of APWA. The United Front for Women Rights (UFWR) established in 1955 but became inactive during the regimes of Ayub (Awan 2012).
The vibrant activism for women’s rights in the pre-independence period became almost invisible in independent Pakistan. Two factors I argue explain the apparent inactivity of the women’s movement during this period. First, women’s organizations and leaders focused their attention more on pressing social issues and challenges such as, refugees, rehabilitation and rebuilding of social harmony which had arisen from the partition of India and Pakistan (Ikramullah 2000; Shahnawaz 1971). Second, Pakistan’s creation was tied, in some way, to religious identity, and Islam was at the centre of the male-dominated nationalist construction. At this time it was not possible to separate religion from politics and for any regime to work outside an Islamic cultural framework that constrained women’s public participation (Haq 1996).

Also, during the military regime of Ayub, there was no women’s movement activism on issue of women’s political representation. Shaheed observes that in the decade from 1957-1968 the struggle for women’s political rights ceased to be visible as a movement and gender inequality dropped off the socio political radar screen (2010, p.96). It was only in 1970 when Mahila Parishad (Women’s Organization) was formed in East Pakistan demand was made for direct election for the reserved seats for women in Pakistan (Choudhury 2010).

After the independence of Bangladesh in 1971, Zulfiquar Ali Bhutto and his Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) formed a government in Pakistan (in 1972) and formulated a new Constitution. The 1973 Constitution reserved 10 seats (5% of the seats) for women in the National Assembly for a specified period of 10 years or two general elections but retained system of indirect elections. The 10 reserved seats for women were added to existing 200 seats (Jabeen and Jadon 2010; Bari 2009; Afzal 1999; Mumtaz 1998).
The changes in the political situation and the imposition of Martial Law by General Mohammad Zia-ul-Haq in July 1977 meant that politics in Pakistan was complex and fraught with tension (Basu 2005; UNDP 2005). Zia banned all political parties and suspended the Constitution. He created an alliance with the fundamentalist religious group Jamat-e-Islami (JI) and started the process of Islamization of Pakistan (Basu 2005; UNDP 2005). Ironically perhaps, in the political arena, he inducted 20 women in the Majlis-e-Shoora (nominated federal assembly that replace elected assembly) and despite the recommendations of Ansari Commission to limit women’s participation, he doubled the number of women’s reserved seats in the National Assembly in 1984.31 Thus indirect election to reserved seats continued and 20 women were indirectly elected to the 1985 and 1988 parliaments (Bari 2009; Bilal 2006).

After the death of Zia, a national election was held in 1988 with the same provision of reserved seats. The PPP came into power with a bare majority under the premier of Benazir Bhutto. The time-bound provision of the reserved seats also lapsed in 1988 and there was no reserved seats provision for women in the subsequent parliaments.

However, in the years from 1973-1977 several women’s organizations namely Aurat, Shirkat Gah, and Women’s Fronts were established in Pakistan (Shaheed, Zia and Warraich 2009, p.16). These organizations were involved with awareness raising and conducting research on women’s development. Women’s political representation or

31During his regime, Ansari Commission was appointed to present an Islamic political framework. The Commission attempted to limit the participation of women and recommended the following: separate electorates for men and women; that the office of the Head of the State exclude women and non-Muslims; and that women candidates to the assembly should be over 50 years of age (Shaheed, Zia and Warraich 2009; UNDP 1995).
reserved seats were not on the list of their organizational goals (Awan 2012). Yet the formation of these organizations marked the beginning of a vibrant women’s movement which grew up against the Islamization process orchestrated by the Zia regime. The Women’s Action Forum (WAF), the main political lobby for Pakistani women was formed with like-minded organizations to lobby on behalf of women and their rights (Shaheed and Mumtaz 1990). It demanded increased seats for women (20 percent) with a double vote for women and campaigned for addressing women’s concerns in political parties’ manifestos (Shaheed, Zia and Warraich 2009).

Unlike Pakistan, Bangladesh adopted nationalism, socialism, democracy and secularism as state principle in the first constitution of 1972 (Mohsin 2010; Kabeer 1991). However, Choudhury (2010, p.210) states that the secularism adopted following the liberation of Bangladesh was more an act of defiance against the Pakistani rulers than a philosophy. Both secularism and liberal democracy provided the basis for constitutional guarantee of political and gender equality for men and women. Article 65(3) of the constitution reserved 5 percent of seats for women for 10 years. Following a military coup in 1975, the constitution and parliament were both suspended and General Zia-ur-Rahman grasped state power. In 1978 through a presidential proclamation, he increased the proportion of women’s reserved seats in parliament from 15 to 30 and extended the period of reservation to 15 years from the date of promulgation of the constitution of the Republic in December 1972 (Mohsin 2010; Begum 2000). General Ershad assumed state

32 Zia amended the constitution in 1977 and replaced ‘socialism’ and ‘secularism’ with ‘social justice’ and ‘the absolute faith in God Almighty’, and inserted Quaranic verses in the Preamble of the constitution in the late 70s through the 5th Amendment in the constitution. General Ershad through the 8th amendment of the constitution proclaimed Islam as the state religion in 1988. Finally, through the 15th amendment of the constitution in 2011, AL replaced absolute faith and trust upon Almighty Allah with secularism but maintained Islam as the state religion (Datta 2005).
power in 1982 and promulgated a special ordinance in 1986 which changed the election process of women to reserved seats. The previous provision of election by secret ballots in parliament was replaced by a system where women candidates nominated and seconded by 151 MPs were considered elected (Halder 2004). He dissolved the parliament in 1987 and the constitutional provision of reserved seats for 15 years also lapsed in 1987. No initiative was recorded for reinstating the amendment in the constitution or extending the time or number of reserved seats in parliament. Due to the absence of the reserved seats provision, there were no reserved seats for women in the fourth parliament of 1988 (Chowdhury 2002; Begum 2000). During the period of 1988-1990, women’s representation in parliament dropped to 1.3 percent from the previous 10.6 percent. This parliament suffered from legitimacy crisis since none of the political parties took part in the election and it lasted for only two years. The military government of General Ershad was ousted by a mass movement in 1990 and parliamentary democracy was re-established.

The 10th constitutional amendment of 1990 substituted clause (3) to Article 65, and provided 30 reserved seats for women for a further period of 10 years from the first sitting of the 5th parliament. In the subsequent sixth and seventh parliament there were 30 reserved seats for women (Begum 2000; Chowdhury 1994). However, this time the bound provision of reserved seats lapsed for the second time in April 2001. With the opposition engaged in a lengthy boycott of parliament, no serious attempt was taken by the ruling government of the seventh parliament to reinstate the system (Begum 2000).

During this phase, activism by women’s organizations in regard to reserved seats was almost absent. The women’s movement in Bangladesh developed during the 1970s due
to the extent of violence against women in the independence war in 1971 (Ahmed and Begum 1997). The issue of women’s representation or reserved seats did not gain importance on the agenda of the women’s organizations at that time due to the presence of more pressing issues such as the treatment and support for war victims and their families.33 Women’s organizations directed their attention and activities towards the rehabilitation of raped, imprisoned and impregnated women and war babies. During the formulation of the constitution, only Bangladesh Mahila Parishad (BMP) demanded for 30 reserved seats for women with the provision of direct election (Begum 2000). Other than the BMP, most of the women’s organizations remained silent on the issue of women’s political representation. It was not until 1988, when the reserved seats provision lapsed and that woman’s organizations like Women for Women (WFW), and the United Women’s Front started to mobilize and publicize the issue. They demanded reintroduction of reserved seats provision with an increased number of 33 percent and direct election (Begum 2002). Thus a strong women’s movement on the issue of women’s political representation was absent until 1995. During this period women’s movement activism on reserved seats was confined within women’s organizations without any initiatives taken to make it a broad based issue for civil society and political parties.

33During the war of independence, women were abducted, imprisoned and impregnated by the Pakistani army to create a new breed of pure Muslim West Pakistani (Saikia 2011; Roy 2010). Almost 0.45 million women were raped by the Pakistani military and their supporters. There were 170,000 cases of abortions of pregnancies caused by the rapes, and 30,000 war babies being born (D’Costa 2010; Hassan 2002).
Exploring elite’s interest and reality of women’s reserved seats

The analysis reveals that the reserved seats system was adopted as an institutional legacy in Pakistan and later in Pakistan and Bangladesh without any prior pressure from the domestic women’s movement and in absence of a gender quota discourse at the international level. Later incremental changes were made to the system during different regimes but these changes did not alter the very basic arrangements for women’s representation in the legislative bodies.

In Pakistan and Bangladesh, the leaders of the ruling parties were influenced by left wing values and ensured equality for men and women in their new respective constitutions. They adopted the reserved seats provision for women in the parliament for a specific period with reserved seats created in addition to the general seats. Pakistan created 10 additional seats for women with the existing 200 general seats and Bangladesh created 15 additional reserved seats to the existing 300 general seats (Mohsin 2010; Mumtaz 1998).

Leaders of both countries considered the system as an appropriate political device for guaranteeing women’s protected representation in the legislature without undermining male interests (Chowdhury 2002). Behind their equality championship, they accrued different advantages from the design. First, male politicians supported reserved seats since it did not threaten their own constituency seats. Second, the nomination for candidates for the reserved seats was an internal party process and dominated by male political leaders. As such it provided male elites with a mechanism for tactical manoeuvres and nepotism (Khanam 2005). Some argue that through indirect election only elite, unqualified, and loyal women were selected for reserved seats to maintain the
control of the political agenda (NCSW 2011; Mohsin 2010). Thirdly, the system accentuated women’s dependence on male political actors and reinforces their marginality. Tinker (2004) argues that indirect election to reserved seats reinforces a continuous dependence of women on quota provisions. And lastly, the rules of distribution of seats enabled the winning party to capture all the reserved seats and maintain its domination and control in the legislative process (Halder 2004; Kabir 2004).

Similarities were also prevalent in the changes made during the military regimes in Pakistan and Bangladesh. Both authoritarian leaders doubled the number of reserved seats in the parliaments but retained indirect election. The reserved seats provision for women was a political calculation of military and authoritarian leaders to win women's votes and support for the transition to democracy. Krook points out that:

> For non-democratic regimes reserved seats provided a convenient and easy solution for demonstrating their will to include many different groups, thus in their eyes legitimizing their rule (2009, p.106).

Through reserved seats the military leaders were able to create a market of female supporters. They used reserved seats and the reserved seats female parliamentarians as another patronage group to legitimize and consolidate the regime’s interest (Halder 2004). However, the inclusion of reserved seats in the constitution without any activism of women’s movement during 1970s was a state driven decision which had only symbolic value. It did not alter the pattern of recruitment and representation of women or their dependence on male political actors (Rai 1999). The state elites only reproduced the institutional legacy that preserves and protects the status quo at the cost of women’s autonomy and agency to act independently. The historical analysis of the reserved seats
in Pakistan and Bangladesh thus supports the assertion that political elites pursue quotas to increase regimes power in the absence of any mobilization or discourse on gender quota or representation (Paxton, Hughes and Green 2006).

**Phase 3: Reintroduction of the reserved seats provision in Pakistan and Bangladesh (2002 and 2004)**

In Pakistan due to the absence of reserved seats the number of women parliamentarians dropped to less than 1 percent in 1990. Three governments were formed under PPP and PML- N between the periods from 1990 to 1997 but none could complete their five years terms or reinstate the reserved seats system\(^3\). The parliaments were dismissed by the President and later the military took over the state power. The issue of women’s reserved seats thus remained unsolved due to the short tenure of the elected governments, lack of interest and consensus among the parties on the issues of women’s reserved seats (Kazi 2011; UNDP 2005; Zia and Bari 1999). Therefore, the years from 1990-1999 were termed as “barren” from the point of view of women’s representation in the assemblies (Mumtaz 2005, p.15).

Musharraf after his assumption of state power in 1999 reinstated the reserved seats for women through the Legal Framework Order (LFO) of 2002. The number of seats was

\(^3\) During her tenures Benazir Bhutto attempted twice to bring an amendment in the constitution to reininsert the provision of reserved seats in the parliament. During her first term (1988-1990) as prime minister, a bill on women’s reserved seats was moved to the upper house but before it could be acted upon her government was dismissed by the President. In her second term (1993-1996) an amendment bill was introduced in 1993 that sought to restore 25 seats for women in NA and 5% in provincial assemblies but it did not prescribe any time frame for the reservation. Due to the opposition of PML (N) to the mode of induction of women in reserved seats, the bill was defeated (Shaheed Zia and Warraich 2009).
raised to 60 (17.5 percent) in an enhanced 342-member National Assembly (Bilal 2006; Reyes 2002). Based on proportional representation, seats were distributed among the parties and women were elected to these reserved seats in the national parliament from a closed list of candidates put forward by their respective parties.

Women’s movement in Pakistan assumed the role of pressure groups in the reintroduction process of reserved seats. The issue of reserved seats took the central focus of the women’s movement after women’s representation dropped to less than 1 percent in the National Assembly due to the lapse of reserved seats provision in 1988. Influenced by the Beijing conference in 1995, Pakistan’s ratification of CEDAW in 1996 and increased networking with international women’s organization, the domestic women’s movement started lobbying, advocating and mobilizing public support to ensure women’s representation in decision making bodies (NCSW 2011; Khattak 2010; Gulrez and Warraich 2009). Consequently the Aurat Foundation (AF) launched a specific campaign from 1995 to mobilise its networks for advocacy on the issue. Several women’s rights organizations organised a round table discussion in July 1995 with representatives from the three major political parties of the country on the issue of women’s reserved seats. The discussion resulted in the signing of a joint declaration by the party representatives to restore women’s reserved seats and extend the provision to the Senate. In 1998, a country wide signature campaign was undertaken by organizations to secure support for the principles of reservation and 33 percent representation. The increased activism of women’s organizations on the issue of women’s reserved seat during the decade of 1990s, failed to make any impact on political parties or on their decision to reinstate the reserved seats provision. The feudal and patriarchal nature of the parties and their prejudices against women’s political participation were the major reason for the
unsuccessful initiatives for reinsertion of the reserved seats provision (Aurat Foundation 2012; Kazi 2011; Gulrez and Warraich 2009) 35.

General Musharraf’s assumption of political power in 1999 and the ban on political activities provided the women’s movement the opportunity to structure, to strengthen and to intensify their lobbying and advocacy work on reserved seats as a non-political and social issue (Shaheed 2010). 36 Also the Commission of Inquiry for Women in 1998 and Ministry of Women’s Development in 2001 endorsed the principles of reservation and recommended 33 percent reservation of women seats in all the elective bodies, and also a system of direct, constituency based elections by a joint electorate of women and men (Aurat Foundation 2012; Shaheed 2010). The women’s movement interacted with both the civil society actors and policy agencies during the period of democratic transition in Pakistan and pressured the regime to reinstate the reserved seats provision with an increased number and direct election in the national and provincial legislatures in Pakistan (Shaheed, Zia and Warraich 2009; Gulrez and Warraich 2009). However, the reintroduction of reserved sets did not reflect the demands of the women’s movements and reserved seats were again reinstated with indirect election.

35 The Islami Jaamhori Ittehad (IJI) is a conglomerate of nine mainly rightist parties under the Prime Ministership of Nawaz Sharif and came to power in 1990 with ‘Islamic approaches to women’. The government amended the constitution but discounted women’s rights issues in the amendment. During his second term as Prime Minister in (1997-1999) with two thirds majority, Nawaz did not initiate the amendment to restore women’s reserved seats in parliament as per the election manifesto (UNDP 2005, Shaheed, Zia and Warraich 2009). The government defeated a private member’s bill for the restoration of the lapsed parliamentary seats for women in May 1997 (Khattak 2010). Again in January 1999, the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) introduced a bill in the Senate, proposing 9 reserved seats for women in the Senate, 40 in the National Assembly (double the previous number) and 20 percent in the provisional assembly but there was no positive outcome (Ghimire 2006).

36 WAF continued to be the main vehicle for articulating a collective demand, but the ground work and organizing was carried out by specific women’s groups, such as Shirkat Gah (Women’s Resource Centre) and the Aurat Foundation (Shaheed, Zia and Warraich 2009).
In Bangladesh, the issue of women’s reserved seats remained on the political agenda of the government after the reserved seat provision lapsed in 2001. The coalition government of Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) and Jamat-e-Islami proposed constitutional amendments to increase the number of reserved seats from 30 to 45 through the system of indirect election in early 2004. The seats were to be distributed among political parties on the basis of their respective strengths in parliament. The 14th amendment was passed in the eighth parliament on 16 May 2004 (Mohsin 2010). Through this amendment the reserved seats provision was reinserted in the constitution and 45 women were elected to reserved seats. The 15th amendment made to the constitution in the ninth parliament of 2008 increased the number of reserved seats from 45 to 50 (Prothom Alo 25 July 2011, p.12). Unlike the period of 1987 when reserved seats lapsed for the first time, women’s movement played a significant role in the reintroduction of reserved seats for the second time in 2004.

By the time of the reintroduction, the women’s movement in Bangladesh had established a discourse on reserved seats and reached a consensus on the number and mode of election. The Beijing Platform for Action Conference preparation committee of 220 organizations demanded direct election to reserved seats. Women lobbied and networked with representative of different political parties and civil society organizations on the issue of reserved seats and direct election (Khanam 2005; Begum 2000). There was also strong public support for direct election and the reintroduction of reserved seats (Democracy Watch 2003). Bangladesh Mohila Parishad (BMP) even submitted a draft bill to reinstate the reserved seats to the government prior to the lapse of reserved seats for second time (Daily Ittefaq, 19 July 1999, p.8). The groups referred to international frameworks such as the Beijing Platform for Action and CEDAW as the basis of their
demand for direct election and 33 percent seats for women. After the BNP government adopted the 14th constitutional amendment with the provision of indirect election in 2004, women’s organizations undertook street demonstration and protested against the amendment (Prothom Alo, 24 March 2004, p.17). They termed the amendment as ‘undemocratic’ and a ‘bill of betrayal’ (Daily Ittefaq 18 March 2004, p.10).

In both countries, women’s movements exerted pressure on the government to reintroduce the reserved seat system but were not the decisive actors. Unlike earlier phases, domestic women’s organizations in the post 1995 period used international and regional platforms and framework such as CEDAW and Beijing Platform for Action as a reference to lobby different actors and organizations regarding the reserved seats (Begum 2000). Factors such as the spread of an international discourse on gender quotas, improved links with international institutions, networks with international women’s movement’s and transnational experience sharing contributed to the movement’s activism for quota seats. These international conferences and frameworks acted as a catalysts and an inspiration to domestic campaigns for gender quotas while international organizations provided the legitimacy of the quota claims of the national women’s movements.

International institutions have come to play a major role in the institutionalization and internationalization of gender quota norms within member countries. Pakistan and Bangladesh are party to the UN conventions on Political Rights of Women, CEDAW and the 1995 Platform for Action in Beijing (Jabeen and Jadoon 2009; Chowdhury 1994). The commitments to international conventions act as a framework of standards to
promote women’s representation through affirmative action such as gender quota/reserved seats.

Numerous other international and regional donor organizations including the United Nations, the EU, The Commonwealth, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund as well as bilateral donors such as Canada, Denmark, Norway, Sweden, USA, UK and the Netherlands, provided funds to these countries to promote gender equality (Khattak 2010). It is alleged that the $4 million project entitled ‘Strengthening Parliamentary Democracy’ of UNDP influenced Bangladesh government to initiate the process to reinstitute and increase the number of reserved seats system for women (Paxton, Hughes and Green 2006, p.901; UNDP 2000, p.97). Similarly, funding from the US in Pakistan influenced Musharraf to fund women’s organizations as a support base to counter fundamentalist aggression and reintroduced reserved seats for women (Khan 2007).

Thus international organizations supported the reintroduction of reserved seats in two different ways: first, through the diffusion of gender equality and gender quota norms, and second through the endowment of resources. It is apparent that international funds had a considerable impact on the decision to reintroduce the reserved seats for women in each case (Towns 2012; Bush 2011). Basically the low economic position and dependency on external resources compelled Pakistan and Bangladesh to comply with the international norms of gender quota despite their ingrained socio-cultural and political antipathy to gender equality.

The reintroduction of reserved seats in Pakistan and Bangladesh took place at a similar time but in the context of a different political regime. The actors in both countries followed the same institutional design for women’s representation. In Pakistan, the
transition from military rule to democracy opened the door for women’s entrance into politics. Through the reserved seats provision for women, Musharraf gained national and international legitimacy of the democratization process. Women’s inclusion in the decision making bodies is considered as a sign of democracy and modernity (Dahlerup and Freidenvall 2010). It must be mentioned that through the LFO 2002 presidential powers was increased tremendously along with increased number of reserved seats for women, Ulema and technocrats in national and provincial legislatures. In addition this military leader used reserved seats as a tool to drive a rift between his military backed government and his political opponents, especially in the context of a growing threat from Taliban movement and to have women’s support for the military backed political party (Khan 2007).

By contrast the restoration of reserved seats in Bangladesh took place during the democratic regime period. The BNP government brought the amendment to reinstate the provision in the constitution in 2004 ignoring the demand of the opposition Awami League (AL) for direct election. Later the AL led 14 parties Grand Alliance formed the government in 2009 and increased the number of reserved seats from 45 to 50 but did not alter male dominated recruitment pattern or women’s subordinate status in the legislative body.

37 LFO proposed fundamental changes in the constitution of 1973. Twenty nine (29) articles of the constitution were amended. LFO validated the presidential referendum, wherein General Musharraf became the President for next five years, as well as the local bodies were given constitutional cover (Khan 2013, p.95).

38 Musharraf’s military government was secured and legitimized by US support following September 9, 2001, given to General Musharraf in return for his willingness to join hands with the US in its War Against Terror by hunting down Al-Qaeda operatives hiding in Pakistan. Also to counter the Islamic extremism, Musharraf created support base among women – the worst victims of Islamization (Khan 2007; Zaidi 2005).

39 AL supported the demand of women’s organizations and proposed direct election to reserved seats in the parliament. After the passage of 14th (constitution amendment) Bill, AL refrained from electing women to nine reserved seats in eighth parliament (Mohsin 2010).
institutions. In both cases the decision to reinstate the reserved seats was influenced by a set of factors, such as: the mobilization of women’s movement, the country’s weakness in complying with international norms, and the strategic incentive of elites (Krook 2009). It reasserts that women’s mobilization and support of the elites at the institutional sites are crucial in quota process. At the same time it evinces that women’s movement alone are not enough to make changes in the institutions and political elites pursue quotas to fulfil their own political and financial interests (Murray, Krook and Opello 2012; Tripp 2004).

Path Dependence of Reserved Seats: Explaining the Reproduction of an Institutional Legacy in Pakistan and Bangladesh

According to the historical analysis of reserved seats in Pakistan and Bangladesh, the reserved seats arrangement has benefited both the military and democratic political elites by allowing them to gain legitimacy, build coalitions or strengthen the ruling party’s base in parliament. The reintroduction, however, did not entirely reflect the countries’ socialization to international gender equality norms or of the commitments made at the Beijing conference. The elite’s interest to protect their power and domination suppressed demands for direct election to reserved seats and an increase in the number of the seats. Further the lack of cohesion and grass-roots strength of the women’s movement (Shaheed, Zia and Warraich 2009; Jahan 2004), and the absence of any sanctions in international policy scripts for non-compliance enabled key political actors to implement the reserved seats system in its former design of indirect election (Mahoney and Thelen 2001).
The power and advantages political elites accrued from the implementation of reserved seats with indirect election was sustained by a dominant coalition of political actors - party leaders, women and male politicians - and made it extremely difficult to abolish or embark any other alternative paths (Peters, Pierre and King 2005). The elites during the changes in institutions used their resources –political and ideological- to reinforce and entrench their ‘power position’ partly because they were used to such power (Steinmo 2008; Kenny 2007). Changing the system of election or other form of gender quota such as party or legislated quota would threaten male domination over constituency seats and would have negative effect on the electoral configuration of the political parties. To ensure the domination of the ruling parties in the parliament and preserve the males’ share of constituency seats, the elite’ preferred to continue the reserved seats system with indirect election.

The entrenched ‘interest for power’ of the political elites became the self-reinforcing mechanism of institutional reproduction and path dependency of reserved seats (Mahoney 2000). The reserved seats provision with indirect election was reinstated as a process of ‘institutional layering’ in which only number of reserved seats were partially renegotiated while leaving the male status quo and women’s subordinate pattern of representation intact (Thelen 2004). Through the reintroduction of reserved seats elites reproduced a system that was most advantageous for them to reinforce power disparities and masculinist norms in political institutions (Knight 1992 cited in Thelen 1999, p.385).

**Learning the Lesson of the Past**

This chapter presented an over view of historical developments and the current context of reserved seats in both Pakistan and Bangladesh. This was done in order to provide the necessary context and understanding of the role and interest of the actors in adopting
reserved seats with an indirect election system. The analyses of the movements reveal that a patriarchal culture of male domination that prevailed at the family and societal level also influenced the discourse and strategies women's movement and national movement and became embedded in political institutions like political parties and legislatures. Women were included in the political institutions through changes to institutional rules rather than changes in the institutionalized masculinist norms and values. Bound up in this discussion has been the question of understanding how institutional changes happen in different contexts and the extent to which actors and their choices shape the institutions or the other way around. Important is the understanding of the role of elites who pursued reserved seats for strategic incentives, and mobilization of women’s movement in each context. The historical analysis of the reserved seats system gives rise to the insight that women’s inclusion in the political system through the reserved seats was mainly state driven and was not intended to alter the male dominated recruitment pattern or women’s dependency on men (Chowdhury 2002; Afzal 1999). Later positive gender changes were made to the number of women elected only to an extent that did not threaten male domination in the party and parliament. The institutional design of inclusion was rationalized on the ground of structural inequality of women in electoral politics but the motive was to keep women within the parameters of patriarchy. Thus indirect election to reserved seats was incorporated in a harmonizing sequence with the existing formal and informal institutions of society and politics that underpins male supremacy over female instead of gender equality (Krook 2009).

It is asserted that low numbers of reserved seats only weaken the pro-women impact where the initiatives of few women to act for women are restricted by the dominant group of men (Nanavidekar 2006; Tripp 2005). Male leaders and legislators try to
prevent the indirectly elected women from exercising political power by putting them in less prestigious positions and by neglecting their proposals (Dahlerup and Freidenvall 2005). Some suspect that only elite, politically inexperienced, un-ambitious and loyal women are elected by the elites to maintain control of the political agenda and thus there might be lack of diversity among women.

But beyond these assertions, evidence presented here shows that that in specific gendered socio-cultural and political contexts, reserved seats system have been supported by women’s groups, political parties and civil society organizations. Understanding the gendered and dynastic nature of the political parties and institutions, women’s groups adopted reserved seats as a strategy to redress the gender imbalance in politics. Therefore, it is important to enquire whether the reserved seats form of gender quota was just a tool of male dominated political institutions to maintaining the status quo or whether it also contributed to improving the presence women in parliament, and what kinds of women were elected. Along with this it is necessary to examine the extent to which women were able to use this limited political space created by males to advance their concerns and what challenges women faced to act for women in the patriarchal institutional context. I organise the remaining parts of the thesis to address these important issues of women’s representation keeping in mind the entrenched norms of ‘patriarch and power’ in political institutions as the history of reserved seats reveals.
Chapter 4: Do Reserved Seats Matter for Women’s Descriptive Presence in the Parliaments of Pakistan and Bangladesh?

Do reserved seats improve the representation of women in Pakistan and Bangladesh? And what are the outcomes of reserved seats in terms of improving women’s descriptive representation in these two countries? To test the impact of reserved seats on descriptive representation of women, I connected two parallel perspectives of descriptive representation - the number of women in the national parliaments; and the quality of the women elected to reserved seats. In this chapter I examine the effect of reserved seats on women’s numeric presence in the parliament through a comparison between numbers (percentage) of women without and with reserved seats in parliaments.

However, the investigation about the effect of reserved seats on women’s representation in the national parliaments of Pakistan and Bangladesh has generated a need to answer a priori question. What factors influence the descriptive presence of women in parliament and provide the context and rationale for implementation of reserved seats? The answer is essential to set the scene to provide a more precise and nuanced understanding of the impact of reserved seats on women’s numeric presence in parliament.

Women’s political participation and representation in decision making bodies has been the subject of much and diverse research in political science. To explain women’s representation in formal political institutions, researchers have made an explicit connection between women’s representation and factors such as: level of economic development, level of democracy, women’s labour force participation, socio-cultural norms and religion, percentage of women college graduates, electoral system and
political party structure and ideology (Stockmer and Byrne 2011; Paxton, Hughes and Painter 2010; Iversen and Rosenbluth 2008; Yoon, 2004; Kenworthy and Malami 1999; Reynolds 1999; Paxton 1997; Rule 1987). Feminist political scientists argue that the formal institutional rules and structures as well as the informal norms and practices of society and the state are gendered and affect women’s access to political offices (Faunte and Verge 2013; Krook and Mackay 2011; Lovenduski 2005; Acker 1990). As rules and practices corresponding to male dominance become entrenched in the institutions, women’s exclusion from such institutions evolves into discrimination. Piscopo (2006, p.8) used the term ‘institutional stickiness of gender discrimination’ to describe the absence of women from power positions in parties and parliament.

It is agreed that no single explanation accounts for the low level representation of women; rather a complex interaction between a wide range of factors impacts on women’s electoral participation. The political explanation of women’s low representation is intertwined with an explanation of the economic, socio-cultural and institutional context of the countries. From this array of factors, I argue that women’s political representation in the case study countries is contingent upon level of economic development, socio-cultural norms and institutional factors and use the existing scholarships to analyse the influence of these forces on women’s political representation.

In doing so, I integrate the experiences and views of women legislators with the theoretical explanations of women’s political representation. This also enables me to portray the complete picture that necessitates the implementation of reserved seats in selected cases. Next, I examine and explain the effect of reserved seats on women numeric representation in the parliaments of the selected cases. Therefore, this chapter
draws on both interviews and quantitative data on women’s political representation. Interviews are used to complement the quantitative data. For convenience, I use PKMNA to indicate a member of the National Assembly of Pakistan and BDMP, to indicate a member of the Bangladesh parliament. Drawing on this data, I test the first hypothesis that a reserved seats provision improves the descriptive number of women in the parliament.

Contextual Analysis of Women’s Political Representation in Pakistan and Bangladesh

Economic Context of Women’s Political Representation

Some researchers have argued that the level of economic development is a significant determinant of women’s representation in legislatures (Tripp and Kang 2008; Matland 1998). According to Matland (1998, p.114), development leads to the weakening of traditional values, decreased fertility rates, increased urbanization, and greater educational and labour force participation for women, and attitudinal changes in perceptions of the appropriate roles for women. On the contrary, in less developed contexts women are deprived of education, employment and lack the time to become involved in political activities due to domestic responsibilities. Thus, low level of economic development as, Nzomo (1993) states, decreases women's interest in running for elective offices (cited in Yoon 2004, p.449) and thus can limit the number of interested women candidates.

Pakistan and Bangladesh are categorized as under-developed or developing country according to global economic development indicators. According to the World Bank, 60.19 percent of the population falls below the poverty line in Pakistan and 26 percent
live below the national poverty line of US $2 per day in Bangladesh (Ali 2014; World Bank 2013). The low level of economic development has influenced the state investments on health, education, employment and training. It is believed that people with limited core capabilities such as in education and health are less able to live easily and their choices are restricted and held back by social barriers and other exclusionary practices (UNDP 2014a). It affects both men and women and their participation in social and political activities.

In addition to suffering from the same deprivation as men, women face the additional suffering of unequal opportunities to education, health and other services due to existing gender norms and cultural restrictions on mobility. Thus poverty in Pakistan and Bangladesh has a ‘female’s face’ (Khan 2009). Due to low level of income, families are less interested in investing in girls or in their education and health and instead find it more beneficial to invest in sons. Girls are married off early. In Bangladesh one-third of women are married between the ages of 15-19 (UNFPA 2012). Women in developing countries are solely responsible for household maintenance and family care such as child care, food preparation, subsistence farming and livestock management as well as the collection of water and fuel wood (Huq and Azad 2013; Gaus-Pasha, Hafiz and Nasar 1999). In sum, poor women play both productive and reproductive roles that decrease their time and interest to participate in politics (Shvedova 2005). It is agreed that middle-class women find it easier to participate in the upper echelons of conventional politics than poorer women because of economic resources and employment, levels of education and confidence (Waylen 1996).
In addition, the lack of access to financial services, to land, to information and technology exacerbate the unequal treatment of women. Women are also discriminated against in terms of wage and work in the labour market. Women engaged in the informal sector receive lower wages than men for an equal amount of work. Thus a country’s level of development imposes limitations on the time and resources of a large number of women and limits their ability to become political activists.

**Socio-Cultural Context of Women’s Political Representation**

Other strands of research confirm that patriarchal culture furthers women’s subordinate status (Studlar and McAllister 2002). The formal and informal gender related norms and practices, and some of which are obvious and open, others that are deeply embedded and invisible, negatively affect the perception towards women’s political activism and leadership role (Paxton and Kunovich 2003; Norris and Inglehart 2001).

Religion is another aspect of culture which is differently conservative or patriarchal in their views about the place of women in society. Generally conservative religious ideology promotes a less public role for women. Research by Paxton (1997), Norris and Inglehart (2001), Gihan (2004), Tripp and Kang (2008), Kenworthy and Malami (1999) found that women’s access to political decision making bodies are lowest in countries that are guided by Islamic ideology and these countries are often ranked at the bottom of the list in terms of the number of women in parliament. Basu finds that ‘Muslim women are often considered as the victim of the Islamic faith and of the misogyny of men of their community (2000, p.82), while Shirin Ebadi a Noble Laureate says that, “many people use Islam to justify the unequal position of women. They are wrong” (cited in Kunovich and Paxton 2005, p.520). Few scholars, however, argue that political Islam is responsible for the low status of women in Muslim countries where patriarchal mind-set interpreted
Islamic injunctions to affect women in a parochial manner weighing heavily in favour of male (Karam 1999; Sharabi 1988 cited in Cheref n.d., p.8).

According to Denoeux (2002, P.61), Political Islam is “a form of instrumentalisation of Islam by individuals, groups and organizations that pursue political objectives. It provides political responses to today's societal challenges by imagining a future, the foundations for which rest on reappropriated, reinvented concepts borrowed from the Islamic tradition”. It provides Islamists with a powerful ideological tool that they can use to "purge" Muslim societies of the "impurities" and "accretions" that are the inevitable accompaniments of the historical process and a reason for Muslim decline (Ayoob 2004, p.1). Shaheed (2005, p.8) states that the major strategy of the politico religious group is to monopolize the religious discourse and impose it as only legitimate framework for all discourses that affects women most.

In regard to socio cultural aspects, masculinist norms and practices are dominant and ingrained in the South Asian social structure (Samarasinghe 2000). Women’s historical subjugation and denial of human rights predates British colonial era. Women were educated and brought to the public arena by males only to protect the inner domain of Indian culture to counter western invasion (Thapar 1993). Women’s emancipation was designed without tempering the dominant patriarchal norms of society. Even after decades, the institutionalized norms of gender subjugation are active and dominate women both in the private and public domain. Though both countries granted equality to women in the constitution, the effect of past and present discrimination prevents laws ensuring equal opportunity from being translated into equal outcomes for women (Paxton and Hughes 1997). The hierarchical and unequal power relations between men and women imposes masculinity and femininity character stereotypes which only then
strengthen the iniquitous power relations between men and women (Ray, n.d., p.1). The informal constraints that include ingrained norms of gender subjugation are embodied in the customs and codes of conduct and are considerably impervious to gender equality changes (North 1990 cited in Krook and Mackay 2011, p.11).

In patriarchal states like Pakistan, the ruler, state, or ruling party plays the role of the patriarch and uses legislation to limit women’s autonomy and to control women outside the private domain (Moghadam 1992). Moreover, the state is governed by Islamic law which indicates the significant role of Islam in the state and social affairs. Religious values are used by those in power to preserve patriarchal dominance (Botman 1999 cited in Kunovich and Paxton 2005, p.520). Mumtaz (1991) argues that the declaration of Pakistan as an Islamic state prescribed an inferior status for women in society and a limited role in public life. The masculinist informal norms and practices have also been institutionalized in the legal system in the name of Islam and Sharia to control the life and sexuality of women (Shaheed 2005; Mumtaz and Shaheed 1987). Islamization of the legal system through the promulgation of Hudood ordinances during the regime of Zia further worsened the status of women in Pakistan. Zia’s search for a basis of legitimacy implanted a religiously based code unparalleled in the modern history of Islam in South Asia. For the first time, the resultant laws regarded men and women as having different

40 Among the 44 Muslim countries classified according to constitutional provision of religion, 22 countries declared Islam as the state religion and 10 among them distinguish themselves as Islamic states (Stahnake and Blitt 2005 cited Ertan 2011, p.9).

41 The Islamization project in Pakistan and the subsequent growth of Islamic fundamentalist movements in the region was enabled by the funneling of $3.5 billion to $10 billion in arms and aid from the United States and Saudi Arabia to the military regime of Zia-ul- Haq (from 1977 to 1988) for the mujahedeen or ‘holy warriors’, who were committed to establishing an Islamic state in Afghanistan and Pakistan (Mishra 2012; Critelli 2010).
legal rights and those for women compromised their rights (Weiss 1990). Some explanation of the Hudood ordinances is required to realize the extent of legal discrimination against Pakistani women. The Hudood laws, promulgated in 1979 and enforced in 1980, are a collection of five criminal laws, collectively known as the Hudood Ordinances.

The Hudood Ordinances were promulgated to bring the criminal justice system of Pakistan in conformity with the injunctions of Islam. Hence, the forms of punishment recognized by Muslim jurists are introduced in the Ordinances. Two levels of punishment and, correspondingly, two separate sets of rules of evidence are prescribed. The first level or category is the one called the Hadd which literally means the “limit’ and the other Tazir, which means “to punish”. Hadd punishments are definitely fixed, leaving no room for the judge to take account of mitigating or extenuating circumstances of the crime (Mirza 2011; Imran 2005). Among these laws, Zina Ordinance, is of particular importance to women’s rights and lives in Pakistan.

The Offence of the Zina Ordinance relates to the crime of rape, abduction, adultery and fornication. The following is a description of the Zina Hudood Ordinance as contained in the Hudood Ordinance of 1979 under the Sharia laws of Pakistan.

1) The Hudood Ordinance criminalizes Zina, which is defined as extra-marital sex, including adultery and fornication. 2) It also criminalizes Zina-bil-jabr, which is defined as rape outside of a valid marriage. 3) The Hudood Ordinance further defines Zina and Zina-bil-jabr on the basis of the assigned criminal punishment. 4) Hence there is Zina and Zina-bil-jabr liable to Hadd (punishment ordained (supposedly) by the Holy Quran or Sunnah and, 5) there is Zina and Zina-bil-jabr liable to tazir, that is, any punishment other than Hadd. The Hadd punishment for Zina and Zina-bil-jabr is stoning to death for married Muslim and 100 lashes for non-Muslim or single Muslim, and the tazir punishment for Zina is
up to ten years of imprisonment and whipping - up to thirty lashes and/or a fine. The tazir punishment for Zina-bil-jabr is up to twenty-five years of imprisonment and whipping (cited in Imran 2005, pp.85-89).

The Offence of Qazf Ordinance relates to a false accusation of Zina (adultery or zina–bil-jabr) (Imran 2005, p.85). Under the Hudood law it was required from the complainant of zina and zina–bil-jabr to come in the Session Court with the four pious Muslim witnesses as evidences. One who would not be able to bring proves would be punishable under the Qazf. The punishment of fornication was imprisonment for a term which may extend to five years and same punishments were for false accusation of fornication (Mirza 2011; Imran 2005).

The Zina ordinance coupled with the Islamic Law of Evidence introduced into the Pakistani legal system in 1984 made women liable for harsher punishment than men for offences relating to rape, adultery and extra-marital sex. The Law of Evidence was a highly discriminatory ‘Islamic’ penal code which states that a woman who has been raped can be guilty of fornication or adultery and be imprisoned or subjected to corporal punishment under the Zina Hudood Ordinance if unable to provide an adequate number of witnesses to the incident. The law requires that an equivalent of four Muslim male witnesses of good character verify a woman’s claim to sexual penetration and consequent rape. The Law of Evidence reduced the value of women and women’s testimony to half that of a man.

In 1997, Nawaz Sharif’s government of PML-N formally enacted the Qisas or Qasas and Diyat Ordinances, which instituted Sharia-based changes in Pakistan's criminal law. Following the introduction of the Qisas and Diyat laws crimes affecting the human body
were no longer considered offences against the society or state, but were now considered offences against an individual (Shah 2013). The law Qisas was used to victimize women, because under this law, if a person kills somebody, the family of the victim can compromise with the killer in return of an agreed amount of money, land and a female member of the killer’s family. However, if a woman is killed, the family of a murdered woman was paid half the amount of blood money paid in case of a male victim. The laws stipulated in black and white that the life of women was worth half that of a Muslim man (Shaheed and Mumtaz 1990). These laws were mostly used and abused by families, society and the state to deny women’s rights to life and justice (Imran 2005; Mumtaz and Shaheed 1987). Backed by the state these laws encouraged men to intensify their control over women’s lives (Shaheed and Mumtaz 1990, p.14). Critics argue that religion has been used, manipulated and imposed in a selective and narrowly defined manner by political actors to gain leverage in internal power struggles (Critelli 2010; Shaheed 2005). Political Islam and the strong fusion of state and religion worsened the social, economic, and political rights of women in Pakistan (Ertan 2008; Shaheed 2005).

Feudalism and tribalism are other aspects of Pakistani society that have negative impact on women. Feudalism is a strong part of the Pakistani political system. The major

42 The legal heirs of a deceased have the right to make a compromise with the offender under section 309 and 310. In the first provision, legal heirs can forgive the murderer in the name of God without getting any monetary compensation in the form of Diyat, while under section 310 the legal heirs can compromise after receiving their respective shares of Diyat (Shah 2013).

43 Under the Zina ordinance, over 1500 women were in prison all over Pakistan in 1988 as opposed to only 70 for various crimes in 1977 (Mumtaz 1991) and 52 percent of women prisoners in Pakistan jails were convicted in these cases (Zahra 2005).

44 Feudalism is a strong part of the political system, so both the government and feudal dictatorships are inter-related. This is why it has become so difficult to isolate these systems. The landlord, by virtue of his ownership and control of such vast amounts of land exercises considerable influence over people, the police, and the judicial system and administration of the area (Anwar 2013).
political parties in Pakistan are headed and controlled by feudal lords and they dominate the government, the military, the bureaucracy and business (Khan 2004). In the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) women are subject to different kinds of discriminatory tribal laws and customs such as Karo-Kari and Swarni as imposed by Jirga. Many of the tribal norms and practices deny women their fundamental human rights and are responsible for expressions of violence against women (see Appendix 2).

Bangladesh, like Pakistan is also a patriarchal society. The indigenous culture and tradition of the land is blended with Islamic religious proscriptions to control the lives and mobility of women. However, the influence of Islamic injunctions is comparatively less in Bangladesh when compared to Pakistan despite Islam being the state religion. Islam has assumed pre-eminence in the Bangladeshi polity only after the introduction of a new national ideology by Zia-ur-Rahman which transformed Bangladesh into a quasi-Islamic state in the late 70s. The Islamisation process started by Zia in some respects grew even stronger under General Ershad (1982–1990). The induction of rightist political groups into the government during the restoration of parliamentary democracy in 1990s and the

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45 FATA is given a so-called special status in the constitution of Pakistan and the federal and provincial laws are not extended to these Tribal Areas. In the absence of statutory laws, Frontier Crimes Regulation (FCR) 1901 is used to maintain law and order in FATA (Afridi 2007).

46 Jirga is an assembly of male tribal elders; an informal body for resolving disputes, and decides civil and criminal cases according to customary laws and self-proclaimed interpretations of Islamic Sharia. They are dominated by influential members of the community who are usually conservative and patriarchal (Aurat Foundation 2011).

47 Countries declared as Islamic states are governed by Islamic Law, while countries that declare Islam as the state religion recognize religion not as supreme force in the country but under the administration of the state (Walseth and Fasting 2003 cited in Ertan 2011, p.9). This partially explains the low support in Bangladesh for fundamentalist state policy towards women that thwarted any systematic attempts to curtail women's rights in the name of religion (Kabeer 1991).
expansion of fundamentalism however, introduced another form of oppression and violence against women meted out through Salish \(^{48}\) and fatwa in rural areas (Mishra 2012; Datta 2005; Riaz 2005).

Although Pakistan and Bangladesh are different in some aspects such as, feudal structure of society, tribal tradition, and extent of Islamization, women face almost similar patterns of discrimination. The patriarchal and religious values and norms ingrained in the societal and legal systems affect the social status of women and their access to resources. In such societies, I argue that discrimination against women stems mainly from three sources. First, the legal restrictions and inequalities interpreted from the religious scripts and guidelines. These include inequality in inheritance, marriage, divorce, child’s custody and the ability to serve as a legal witness which are mainly derived from the imposition of Sharia Law which reinforce the gendered power relation of society (Shaheed 2002, p.11).\(^{49}\) Accordingly, 70 percent women in Bangladesh have no property and 24 percent of earning women have no control over their own income (Prothom Alo 23 January 2014, p.1; 14 July 2014, p.5). However, such data is unavailable for Pakistan.

\(^{48}\) Fatwa is a sanction or a kind of ruling according to Islam, decided by muftis, Imams or other Islamic scholars. Mullahs and influential section of the rural power structure through a traditional social institution called salish sanction fatwa- stoning of women or lashes for the “crime” for committing offences against the ‘moral code of conduct’, or Sharia, such as having been raped or having sex outside marriage or in an illicit relationship (Riaz 2005). From January to June 2012, nineteen women were subject to fatwa and five later committed suicides (Prothom Alo 2 July 2012 p.7).

\(^{49}\) Sharia is the Arabic word for the Islamic religious code. The Quran forms the basis of Sharia and personal or family law in most of the Muslim world. The edicts in the Quran most relevant to the treatment of women deal primarily with four major areas: marriage and related topics, divorce, inheritance and the ownership of property, and veiling and seclusion (Smith 1987, pp.236-37 cited in UNHCR 1993).
The second category of restrictions is associated with the enforcement of purdah (veil) or seclusion of women\(^50\). Women are restricted to the inside space of the home and secluded from the outside world through the institution of purdah. This restricts women’s mobility as well as their access to education, employment, training opportunities, inheritance and social services. Further, existing social norms encourage less investment in the education or health of daughters than in sons. Of the 60 percent illiterate population, more than 60 percent are women and of those without basic educational opportunities in Pakistan, about 70 percent are girls\(^51\). Moreover, while the number of illiterates has doubled in Pakistan since 1951 it has tripled in the case of women (Jabeen and Jadoon 2009). In Bangladesh, women of all ages are behind men in literacy. It has been found that over 80 percent of girls were enrolled in the formal schooling system but almost 40 percent of them dropped out and only 20 percent of those enrolled in grade six were able to complete grade ten and finish school. Only 26 percent of females received higher education compare to 74 percent of males (BBS 2011). In accordance with the practice of purdah (veil), girls are often taken out of school when they reach puberty to limit their contact with males (Hakim and Aziz 1998; UNHCR 1993). Female access to higher education is restricted and denied in the name of religion and tradition.

\(^{50}\) Both Hindu and Muslim religions mandated that women be modest and under the guardianship of men, and women of both religions observed purdah. Yet modernist Hindus and Muslims denied that rigid purdah derived from their respective religions. Hindus spoke of the ‘Golden Age’ when women moved freely and Muslims argued that during Muhammad’s time women were not veiled or restricted in their movements. The abuses of the system were regarded as the result of ‘custom’, further explained by some as imitation of Muslim court customs, as imitation of Hindu customs, or as necessary to protect women during the Muslim invasions (Forbes 1982, p.531). Anis Mirza (1984) in his careful analysis argues that the present custom of Purdha has its roots in the confluence of two cultures, Hinduism and Islam. The system was first grown within the ruling classes of Huns and Rajputs. Later when the Mughul and Arabs came to the scene they introduced the system among the upper classes and with time it became a middle class symbol in cities (cited in Pal 1990, p.451).

Third is the extent of violence against women committed in the name of religion and tradition. In patriarchal societies violence against women is validated as an acceptable attribute of masculinity (Shaheed 2005; Yoon 2001). Patriarchal society uses the mechanism of violence to suppress women which dis-empowers women, destroys their self-confidence and self-worth and thus diminishes their ability to resist and live to their full potential by achieving parity with men in personal and public life (Weldon 2003).

The extent of patriarchalism can be better understood from the number of violence committed against women. The incidents of violence against women in Pakistan increased from 7,571 in 2008 to 8,539 in 2011 (Shirkat Gah 2012). According to a strategy paper, domestic violence took place in almost 80 percent of households and one in every three women experienced some form of violence such as rape, honour killing, immolation, acid attacks and verbal or psychological abuse (The Express Tribune, 2 March 2011). In Bangladesh, the number of extreme of violent act committed against women was 4777 in 2013, and the Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics (BBS) reports that 87.7 percent of women are subject to domestic violence and 16.2 percent experience violence at the work place (Prothom Alo, 24 January 2014, p.1). Women across different ages, classes, groups, professions and religions are subject to domestic violence and harassment at the workplace. Even female MPs had experienced such violence.

My husband beats me. I can’t say it to anyone or leave him. People will think of me as ‘weak’ and will question my ability to serve and protect them. (BDMP-16)

My male colleagues harassed me and used to send slang text messages. I protested this and there was some tussle and fusel. Later they filed a case against me and I became the perpetrator! (BDMP-12)
The institutionalized masculinist norms and practices, the exclusion of women from the public sphere, and violence committed against women has led to a low level of investment of resources in women by the family and the state (Critelli 2010; Hakim and Aziz 1998; Moghadam 1992). Socio-cultural norms, social and legal institutions, and traditions do not serve women equally and create structural barriers for women to exercise their rights and choices (UNDP 2014b). Socio-cultural practices, based on a strong patriarchal ideology curtail women's mobility and prevent them from utilizing opportunities to enhance their capabilities. Human Development Reports on South Asia (2003) argue that the embedded system of male domination results in “discrimination against women in South Asia [that] is far worse than in most other developing countries” (cited in Mumtaz 2005, p.6). Thus patriarchy and Islamic religious tradition together created a “culture against women’ where women are socialized to sacrifice their chances of life option” (Sen and Sengupta 1983 cited in Moghadam 1992, p.36). Pakistan’s and Bangladesh’s rank in the Gender Inequality Index (127 and 115) and the Gender Development Index (145 and 107) are indicative of women’s subordinate status in society (UNDP 2014a).

In such contexts, women are discriminated against by having less access to higher education, healthcare, property, mobility, legal protection and time. They lack information, broad based networks and the social skills required to enter into politics (Tremblay 2007; Kenworthy and Malami 1999; Paxton 1997). Women also internalize many of these gender biases due to the traditional gender socialization, and hesitate to participate, exercise leadership or compete in elections (UNDP 2007; Ballington and Matland 2004). Women legislators of both countries provide important insights into the reality of women’s political participation:
Women are financially dependent on their family and men; husbands are hardly willing to spend money or step out of the election competition for their wives unless they are compelled to do that. (PKMNA-10)

In our feudal system, men like to suppress women and are reluctant to let women come forward. Lack of awareness among men is the biggest problem. (PKMNA- 3 GS)

My husband asked me to choose either him or contesting the election. I choose to contest. The day I won the election, he left me. (BDMP-2)

The views expressed by the women legislators confirm that the most intractable obstacle to women’s political participation is the deeply embedded patriarchal culture (Omvedt 2005). Women’s electoral participation is constrained due to the patriarchal and feudal structure of social and political institutions where males dominate women and their choices and opportunities. The limited capabilities, restricted mobility and lack of choices make women subject to structural vulnerabilities and prevent women from entering into the political realm.

Institutional Context of Women’s Political Representation

Experts note that the structural elements of each country’s political system and environment exert a strong influence on women’s effective participation in policy-making (DAW 2005). Piscopo (2006) argues that gendered formal and informal rules and practices of party and electoral institution affect women’s electoral participation and election to parliament. Scholars find that party acts as the gate keeper and the formal and informal rules and practices of the political parties largely determine the access of women
to political office (Krook 2007; Paxton, Kunovich and Hughes 2007; Paxton and Kunovich 2003). The ideology of the parties influences the access and participation of women too. Rule (1987) theorizes that women are less likely to be nominated by rightist parties because they hold a more traditional view of women's roles. However, feminists suggest that in a gendered political party structure, women in powerful positions can exert influence to ensure the repeal of discriminatory practices against women and can advocate for a greater number of women candidates (Kittilson 2005; Kunovich and Paxton 2005). The presence of more women in party’s powerful positions also indicates the supply of qualified women for elective offices (Sanbonmatsu 2003).

In the arena of political recruitment, the demand-supply model of Norris and Lovenduski is considered a useful framework to study the candidate selection process. The model highlights that the number of women elected to political office ultimately depends on both the supply of prospective female candidates willing to stand for office and the demands of party ‘gatekeepers’ who select the candidates (Kenny 2013). But, according to feminist scholars, this model fails to comprehend the complex interactions and influence of different formal and informal institutions such as masculinist party rules, values, and practices at different levels of the selection process. Critics argue that the model does not go into the detail to explain how the dominant criteria of demand discourage women and limit the supply of women candidates who find themselves unable to meet the criteria of a candidate (Kenny 2013; Krook 2010). Further, I suggest that the model has been developed in the context of egalitarian and democratically institutionalized party structures that emphasise the merit of candidates and may not be adequate to explain the recruitment process in weakly institutionalized party structures in under-developed and patriarchal contexts.
In chapter three, I argued that the way women are included in political institutions does little to change masculinist norms and values of the institutions. Women’s inclusion in the political institutions of the South Asian region has been dependent on the strategic choices made by the male political actors. Women were allowed to take part in different movements during critical and transition periods but have been pushed back to the home as soon as the struggle is over (Mumtaz and Shaheed 1987). Even women’s assumption of leadership positions and power are mediated by a male relative and usually in the absence of male progeny (Jahan 1987, p.850). Women are allowed to enter the political realm but are not drawn into the core of power politics and are included in a way that does not impinge on the patriarchal nature of the parties (Kazi 2011; Samarasinghe 2000). The norms and practices of patriarchal culture were extended to political arena, institutionalised and exercised in a such a manner that even women party leaders adhere to, and are affiliated with the prevailing norms of political man and appear unable to transform existing deep rooted political cultures (Mahtab 2014).

The ideological orientation of the major parties in Pakistan and Bangladesh are of either centre right, centrist or rightist, and only a few are centre left. This implies that the norms of gender equality in most of the party structures and practices are likely to be absent. These parties have won a meaningful share of parliamentary seats over the years but none underpin gender equality in practice. Moreover, the majority of parties are dynastic in nature and lack democratic ideals and practices. In such parties, internal procedures are poorly defined with rules mostly ignored, and the parties remain male-dominated in terms number, positions and presence (DAW 2005). These established parties are unwilling to go against the status quo or to take risks with women or adopt equality policies. None of the parties has adopted any proactive mechanisms (motivation, training, and financing of
women candidates), or provided soft quotas (party quotas) to ensure and encourage women’s participation in elections (Mahtab 2014; Majumdar 2012).

Although women have been participating in the formal channel of politics as voters, as party workers, and as candidates, women seldom find themselves a place on the decision-making committees of political parties (Thakkar 2002). The dominant patriarchal culture is also prevalent in the politics and parties remain male-dominated with respect to number, position in the party hierarchy, and presence (Sobhan 1994). Women’s representation in the parties’ decision making bodies and in central committees remains low and ranges between 5 to 13 percent in both cases as Table 4.1 shows (see over).

Table 4.1: Women in the decision making bodies of major political parties in Pakistan and Bangladesh

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pakistan</th>
<th>Percent of women</th>
<th>Bangladesh</th>
<th>Percent of women</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan People’s Party (PPP)</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>Awami League (AL)</td>
<td>12.59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan Muslim League (PML-N)</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP)</td>
<td>6.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan Tehriki Insaf (PTI)</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>Jatiya Party (JP)</td>
<td>3.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Awami National Party (ANP)</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>Jamat- e-Islami (JI)</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muttihida Qaumi Movement (MQM)</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>Jatiya Samajtantrik Dal (JSD)</td>
<td>3.57</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Developed from the work of Ali 2014; Mohsin 2010; Shaheed, Zia and Warraich 2009; UNDP 2005).

One Pakistani female MNA and social activist regarding the party’s position on this issue mentioned that,
Our parties are not yet giving us that place and presence, and not mainstreaming us into all their committees and standing committees and main bodies. We are, in some parties, a total fickly. (PKMNA-11)

Despite having female leaders in major parties, women’s representation in party policy making positions remain low in Bangladesh. Though the Bangladesh Election Commission made it compulsory to ensure the representation of 33 percent of women in the executive and central committees of the parties’ by 2020, but progress has been slow (Majumdar 2012). Female MPs in Bangladesh expressed their frustrations and realizations:

Women are not given any posts in the central committees. Women are made only members and general secretaries of women’s wing. This is not justice. (BDMP-12)

Mostly local male political activists and groups act against women of their own party. (BDMP-13 GS)

I contested in general seat but failed due to party politics and non-cooperation of some male members of my own party who worked against me. Men feel threatened by women contestants and think that they are losing the constituency for ever to the women. (BDMP-3)

The low number of women in policy making bodies implies that there is less influence by women in the party decision making, and less opportunity for women to be nominated as males dominate the selection of process (Kazi 2011; Shaheed 2002). In such contexts,

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52 This word was used by the participant herself. For a more detailed meaning visit https://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/fickly.
female leaders are unable to promote the interests of women in facing other pressing issues set forth by male counterparts (Islam 2014).

Political parties have women’s wings and recruit women activists through the women’s wings. But the participation of women party activists is limited to voting, providing help in organizing processions and doing voluntary and ancillary work during political and election campaigns (Ahmed 2008; Thakkar 2002). Party leaders want women to work for narrower party aims (Dahlerup and Leyenaar 2013b). In general women’s wings have no role in the decisions of the parties or the selection of women candidates except the women’s wing of JI in Pakistan.53 Female legislators in Pakistan and Bangladesh confirmed this:

The importance of women enhanced during elections. We work for the male candidates, mobilize women voters and go from door to door to seek vote. (BDMP-9)

Female political workers work for the male candidates during election as polling agents and door to door campaigners. (PKMNA-13)

Political parties are reluctant to field these women activists as candidates and the gradual induction of women into party politics has not translated into their being considered for party tickets (Mumtaz1998). The feminist antipathy to political parties in developing

53 It was mentioned by a woman MNA during the Roundtable Conference on ‘Positioning of Women’s Agenda in the Policy making of Political Parties’ at hotel Serrena Islamabad on 17 October 2012, that the women’s wing of Jamaat-i-Islami (JI) independently selects female candidates for reserved seats; the male leadership cannot nominate female members of parliament. Also see Junaidi 2012.
countries has thus become pronounced by relegation of female politicians to a feminised and marginalised 'women's wing' of parties (cited in Goetz 2002, p.551-552).

Most importantly the candidate selection processes that Gallagher and Marsh (1988) termed as ‘the secret garden of politics’ influences the prospects of women’s electoral participation. Bjarnegård and Zetterberg (2011) argue that both the psychological and procedural aspects of the candidate selection process affect women disproportionately. The psychological aspect or informal norms of the candidate selection process is inherently connected to the broader societal cultural and dominant ideology of women’s role in society and politics (Piscopo 2006). The dominant norm about ‘women as politician’ at the societal and state level shapes the decision of political leaders in the selection process. Informal patriarchal norms and values leads to negative discrimination against women where party gate keepers perceive women to be less electable than men, and male candidates are considered as stronger, more competent and fit the common picture of a politician (Bjarnegård and Zetterberg 2011; Shaheed 2002). Thus women are demotivated from entering politics by the pre-existing social and party norms that associate leadership with men. This ‘ingrained ethos of masculinity’ in political parties obstructs women in electoral politics (Fox and Lawless 2010 cited in Sandstorm and Wängnerud 2013, p.3).

In Pakistan and Bangladesh, the majority of the policy making positions in the parties are occupied exclusively by males. They dominate the candidate selection process. Bangladeshi female MPs shared their views on ‘male’s attitude’ toward female aspirants and candidates.
The party is not confident about women. Some despite having qualification did not get the nomination. Within the party, there is a tendency to dominate women. (BDMP-2)

The attitude towards women is not favourable. If a man even fails three or four times, he will be given nomination but if a woman fails just once, she will never be considered for nomination. (BDMP-3)

Still the party cannot take female candidates in confidence. In our country a woman’s desire and hard works are not enough to get the tickets for general seats. (BDMP-18)

They (male) don’t take it easily if women are given nomination for general seats. Women face resistance and competition within the party. (BDMP-7)

These opinions of female politicians describe the extent of male domination in the selection process and their attitudes towards women candidates. It only reflects the sexiest nature of the political parties. It also confirms that the party system is clearly a reflection of the society from which it has come; in it the politicians reproduce the styles and conduct of society (Benavides 2003, p.108). In politics, men set the norms and women are expected to live up to them. These norms are framed as standards of competence and women are evaluated against such standards which skews the selection process in favour of men (Fuente and Verge 2013).

The process gets more complex due to the informal selection process and weakly institutionalized party structures. Candidate selection and recruitment to parliament in both cases is shaped by the deeply entrenched patterns of clientelism through raising the
value of elected positions that receive and distribute moneys, contracts, aids and favours (Franceschet and Piscopo 2012). Women who are considered as the fairer sex are generally thought to be immune to corrupt practices and this negatively discriminates against the selection of women candidates (Dollar, Fisman and Gatti 1999).

In Pakistan, the major parties have a feudal background and are based on extended networks of families, classes and clans which play a major role in the perpetuation of dynastic politics. In many cases members of the same clan are distributed among different political parties and organs of the state to protect family interests (Hussain 2012; Bari 2010)\textsuperscript{54}. The ‘power network’ is maintained within family and clan and close loyalties reap benefits in terms of nepotism, favouritism, corruption and gaining control of state patronage. The extent of corruption of the top leaders of the major leading parties indicates that corruption is pervasive at the top of the party and potentially influences the selection process.\textsuperscript{55} Moreover, tribal priorities in the nomination process discourage the parties from nominating women candidates in tribally dominated provinces in Pakistan. None of the parties nominate women in these regions and until now only one woman contested election from FATA in 2013 as an independent candidate (NDI 2013; Wasim 2013).

\textsuperscript{54}The Bhutto family of PPP is one of the richest families in the subcontinent. The Pakistan Muslim League is almost wholly dominated by feudal lords such as the Zamindars, Jagirdars, and Nawabs. Pakistan’s major political parties are feudally-oriented, and more than two-thirds of the National Assembly is composed of this class (Anwar 2013).

\textsuperscript{55} During the regime of Asif Ali Zardari, Pakistan lost a huge amount more than Rs. 8.5 trillion ($94 billion) in corruption, tax evasion and bad governance. Nawaz Sharif took billions of rupees in loans from National and commercials banks in Pakistan and never repaid the loans. Pervez Musharrat’s government was involved in the privatization of Pakistan’s Steel Mill Corporation, from which he extorted money (Top five corrupt politicians of Pakistan access from http://top5ives.blogspot.co.nz on 18 October 2012).
In reviewing the profiles of women nominated and elected, it becomes apparent that two groups of women are most often considered for nominations by the parties. First, the high profile politically active women who are related to powerful and important political leaders and families with constituency backing. The second group of women are related to powerful male political and feudal leaders but not involved in politics. These women were mainly nominated to the safe seats of male members who had contested particular family constituencies for many years but had failed to continue to do so due to death, education restrictions or criminal charges. In rare cases, parties nominate women workers with a strong background in political or social activism.

In Bangladesh, dynastic political parties adopted authoritarian models and operated on the basis of the personal decisions of the leaders (Ahmed 2008; Monir et al. 2008). Political elites are institutionalized sites of patriarchal power in politics and loyalty to a political mentor is of paramount importance for securing nomination (Shaheed 2002). This position was also echoed by a male political leader, “anyone can gain nomination for election by feeding the top leaders” (Prothom Alo 8 January 2012, p.2). Such internal practices indicate that patron-client relationships based on informal networks of exchange were at play where top leaders of major parties are involved.\textsuperscript{56}

It became more obvious during election time when political parties raise and spend huge amounts of money without any audited accounts. It is alleged that political parties sell nominations to financially affluent persons with no political background (Jahan 2014). It

\textsuperscript{56}Bangladesh faced unprecedented and boundless corruption during the rule of the democratically elected female prime ministers. Sheikh Hasina was accused of accepting illegal money for a total amount of US$ 435,000 from a private electricity company and Begum Khaleda Zia faced criminal charges over tax evasion allegations (Monir et.al 2008).
was reported that prior to the eighth and ninth parliamentary elections, AL and BNP sold nominations for seats for a minimum of Tk. 50 million to a maximum Tk. 200 million (Majumdar 2008; Karim 2005). Many corrupt businessmen and criminals became members of parliament through this nomination process (Majumdar 2008). It was reported that 43 percent of the MPs of the Grand Alliance (alliance of AL and 14 other left leaning parties), and 72 percent MPs of the Four party alliance (BNP and other rightist groups) in the ninth parliament had criminal cases against them. Overall, out of 293 MPs, 139 (46 percent) MPs had past criminal records and 92 (31 percent) were engaged in criminal activities. Moreover several of these MPs were loan defaulters (Majumdar 2009). Women politicians also voiced their frustration over the corrupt practices in politics:

Now-a-days the politics is corrupt and criminals are now nominated, elected and highlighted in politic. (BDMP-14)

To buy nomination you have to spend 10 million Taka.

(BDMP-17)

In such a context, then, without financial resources and networks, women are highly disadvantaged and are unlikely to gain nomination through exchange. However, examining the background of women candidates in different elections, it becomes evident that parties in Bangladesh tend to nominate two types of women. First, the female party chiefs who have close blood or marriage ties with the party leaders and a few women with credible political career are nominated because of their constituency backing. And second, women related to powerful political leaders and male members of political

57Taka (Tk.) is the currency of Bangladesh. 1 US$ is equivalent to 77 Tk. This amount is equivalent to US$ 0.65 to 2.6 million. However, the amount may vary based on the conversion rate.
parties. These women are usually nominated when male member failed to contest due to death or criminal charges (The Researchers 2009). The analysis shows that the nomination of women is not only determined by the contribution to the party but also the family one belongs to and/or whose protégé one is (Jahan 1987). However parties sporadically nominate women political worker in non-winnable seats such as in those constituencies known as strongholds of the opposition party or where the party used to be weak (Ryan, Haslam and Kulich 2010; Murray 2004). One Bangladeshi female MP complained that:

The tendency of the party is that if a man fails it’s nothing but if a woman fails it’s everything. The attitude is that women fail because of their sex identity. Sometimes women are nominated in such seats which are really difficult to win (areas know as AL or BNP forts). (BDMP-16)

The masculinization and informalization of the candidate selection process become embedded in party policies and make it difficult to assess the influence of informal gendered norms on the selection of women candidates. The process becomes even more complex in the absence of formal candidate selection criteria. Yet, the percentage of women nominated as candidates by parties provides scope to understand the extent of gender bias in parties (Baldez 2004a).

Table 4.2 shows the number of women contestants in different elections in Pakistan from 1971 to 2008. In the 1970 election, parties did not nominate any women but nine

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58 East Pakistan declared independence from West Pakistan in March 1971 and the war of independence started on 25 March 1971. East Pakistan which is now Bangladesh became independent on 16 December 1971. West Pakistan officially became Pakistan at this time.
independent women contested the election. In 1977, only one woman was nominated and
won a seat. In the 1985 non-partisan election, 15 women participated independently.

Table 4.2: Number of women contestants in different elections in Pakistan

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<tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>15**</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>31***</td>
<td>58****</td>
<td>64*****</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent</td>
<td>9 (6+3)*</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>27</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party tickets</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. of women elected</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Nine women contested the 1970 elections as independent candidates. Six were from West Pakistan and three were from East Pakistan (Zia and Bari 1999, p.37). ** The 1985 election was held on non-partisan basis. *** Actual number of candidate was 34, three women contested on two seats. **** Two women contested in two seats and the number of seats women contested was 60. ***** Actual number of seats contested by women was 71; three independent women contested in two seats each, three women contested in two seats as independent and in party tickets and one woman contested in two seats with party tickets. I counted three women in the party ticket category instead of independent which brings the number of party ticket holder 37 and independent 27. (Developed from NDI 2013; The Researchers 2008; UNDP 2005; Zia and Bari 1999; Institute of Human Rights and Democracy 1998).

In the subsequent elections of 1988, 1990, 1993, parties nominated only seven, four, and eight women respectively. The number of women who contested in the 1997 election increased to 22. In the election of 2002, 12 contesting parties nominated 38 women after certain changes were incorporated in the electoral laws under the LFO 2002. The number slightly decreased in the 2008 election with the nomination of only 37 women by the

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59 During the nonpartisan election in 1985 candidates were allowed to run under their own names. They were not nominated by any political party.

60 The election of 1970 was held in United Pakistan but it is included in the table 4.2 since the candidates who were elected from West Pakistan in this election later became the members of the fifth National Assembly of Pakistan in 1972.

61 In the 1977 election, a woman, Begum Naseem Wali Khan, was directly elected for the first time for a general seat. But she never took oath as a Member because of the opposition’s boycott (WPC 2010).
contesting seven parties and women constituted only 2.9 percent of the total candidates. The right wing and fundamentalist parties, like Jamat Ulema-I-Islam-Fazal (JUI-F) and Jamat-e-Islami (JI) refrained from nominating any women in the elections (Wasim 2013; EU 2008, p.47).

Table 4.3: Number of women contestants in different elections in Bangladesh

<table>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party tickets</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. of women elected</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>20</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
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</table>


It has been observed that newly formed parties with more middle class background and outlook offer more space for women in electoral politics than long established feudal parties (UNDP 2005).

As Table 4.3 indicates, the number of women candidates remained low in different parliamentary in Bangladesh. In the first election of 1973, only two women were nominated by the leftist parties among the fourteen parties. In the 1979 election, 13 women were nominated by the parties. During the period of the authoritarian regime, two elections were held in 1986 and in 1988. In these elections 15 and six women were nominated by the parties. However, major parties like AL and BNP did not participate in the 1988 election. After the restoration of democracy in the 1990s, 40 women were nominated by parties to contest the elections of 1991. In the subsequent 1996 elections, 32 women were nominated by the major parties. In the eighth parliamentary election of 2001, 54 parties contested but nominated only 30 women candidates. However, the highest numbers of women, 51 were nominated in the 2008 election which was held after
the two years of civil-military rule. The rightist party Jamat-e-Islami like the Pakistani rightist parties has never nominated any women for general seats. However, some small and new parties (like Jatiya Party (M), Bikolpodhara, and Gonoforum) have been more liberal in regard to nominating women candidates (Bangladesh Election Commission Report 2008). The percentage of women candidates on party tickets continued to increase incrementally rising to 3.6 percent in 2008 from 0.18 percent in 1973.

The analysis of data shows that women have constituted a small number of candidates when compared to men and the nomination of women candidates tend to increase during periods of transition or when changes were made to electoral rules. In the 2002 and 2008 elections in Pakistan, parties nominated a significant number of women after many male incumbents failed to qualify for selection. However, one can argue that the availability of reserved seats from the outset might have taken the pressure off parties to nominate women in directly elected seats (Matland 2006). However, this does not explain the low number of women candidates and representatives when the reserved seats system lapsed in these countries.

In such gendered informal and formal institutional contexts, the FPTP system of election multiplied the challenges for women aspirants and candidates. Researchers argue that the FPTP election system enhances the degree of discrimination against women in the candidate selection process and negatively affects the representation of women in political bodies (Tremblay 2007; Paxton, Hughes and Green 2006). Matland argues that,

Because of the zero sum nature of nominating decisions in single-member districts, female candidates must compete against existing interests within the party that are represented by men (1998, p.112).
In this system a single member with the highest vote in a single constituency is elected (Dahlerup 2006a) and the party with the highest number of seats forms the government. This bars parties from following gender equality policies in the candidate selection process as women in most cases do not possess the required qualities or resources to win election in either Pakistan or Bangladesh. Parties therefore tend to avoid the risk of losing any seat by not nominating women candidates. The threat of losing seats acts as a strong deterrent to the nomination of women in this system. Female legislators reminded that:

We need to remember that parties need seats to form government; they don’t need to favour women. (BDMP - 16)

Party has to look for itself, only nominating women does not benefit the party. (BDMP-11 GS)

These views of women parliamentarians are based on the fact that the number of businessmen winning nomination and contesting the election is on the rise in Bangladesh. As a result, businessmen become the dominant occupational group in all post-1991 parliaments in Bangladesh. Accordingly 59.4 percent members of the fifth, 47.8 percent of the seventh, 52.1 percent of the eighth were businessmen (Firoj 2013, p.87). In the ninth parliament of 2008, 59 percent of the members were businessmen (Majumdar 2009). Bangladeshi MPs confirmed that:

Parties are now nominating businessmen and depriving women and dedicated political workers. (BDMP-12)

Earlier people with knowledge of laws were elected to parliament, now it’s the businessmen. (BDMP-13 GS)
These days’ businessmen are increasing in number in parliament. (BDMP-9)

Election campaigning is a relevant factor to examine when considering the likelihood of women’s selection as candidates in the FPTP institutional context. Both male and female candidates need a certain amount of funding to build a name and recognition, to travel and attend party meetings, to organize a campaign team and cultivate a constituency (UNDP 2007). However, women compared to men are more constrained by campaign costs in developing and patriarchal countries like Pakistan and Bangladesh. The problems become more acute in the absence of financial support from the parties and the flow of ‘black money’ in the election process (Jahan 2014)\(^6\).

In Pakistan the minimum cost for contesting an election is 10–20 million rupees, whereas according to the electoral rules candidates are only allowed to spend 1.5 million rupees\(^6\). Such high election and campaign costs bar women without powerful family backing and financing to stand for a general seat. In this connection, a former MNA Shahnaz Wazir Ali mentioned that:

>A woman is constrained if she does not have her own strong financial base. You need a large establishment,

\(^6\)In Bangladesh, ‘black money’ refers to funds generated by evading income and other taxes. According to a study, ‘black money’ accounted for 40-80 percent of Bangladesh’s economy. During the election “black money” is used to buy votes and bribe electoral officials, government functionaries and police officers (bdnews24.com 8 April 2014).

\(^6\)Rupee (Rs) is the currency of Pakistan. 1 USS is equivalent to 100 Rs. The cost of election is roughly around USS 1 million to 2 million (subject to the changes in the conversion rate). PKMNA -12 mentioned the amount during interview.
funds, and a big family to gather resources and provide manpower (cited in Ghosh 2013).

Other female legislators shared this view of Wazir Ali and mentioned that:

Election process in Pakistan is very expensive and unless husbands allow and provide funds it is difficult to contest for general seat. (PKMNA-7)

The amount of money required to contest election is huge and it is not possible for many women to manage that amount of money. (BDMP-15)

For women to be elected in general seats, two factors are important: party tickets and financial support. (PKMNA-10)

In Bangladesh the legal limit for election expenses is Tk.1.5 million but candidates on average spent a little more than Tk.4.4 million in the ninth parliamentary election of 2008 (Democracy Watch 2009, p. 19; TIB 2009b). Bangladeshi women MPs stated that:

Party also nominates those who have money. I want to contest in general seat but it requires huge money which I don’t have. (BDMP-10)

Women have to face so many hurdles to get nomination and to contest election. I sold my land in a very lucrative area to contest the election and also spent all my income in politics. (BDMP-13 GS)

For winning election one needs money and to some extent muscle power. (BDMP-11 GS)
Moreover, in most contexts, men have different sources, connections and networks which women mostly lack (Ballington and Matland 2004). Women’s link with powerful and influential males is viewed in a negative way. Bangladeshi female MPs touched on the issue and stated that,

Males can spend money which they earn through legal and illegal way. Also they receive donation from different sources. For women it is bit difficult to receive donation from any person. It is viewed in a different way and people try to malign the character of women. (BDMP-15)

At the electoral level, the patriarchal tool of violence is used as an instrument to dissuade women from participating in election for political office (UNDP 2011). The incidence of slander, misbehaviour, personal attack and physical abuse are common against female voters and candidates (Asif 2008). In Pakistan women receive death threats, are fired from their job and attacked for participating in elections (NDI 2013; Waring 2010).

In Bangladesh three out of six female candidates in the 2008 elections faced coercion and threats from competing male candidates and male party members; and psychological violence at the family level (Democracy Watch 2009). Some explained their ordeal as such:

Men vying for nomination create problems for women. They spend money and spread disgracing rumours about the women aspirants. (BDMP-13 GS)

If women are selected, male party members spread rumours about their character and corruption. They publish degrading news about those women. Only the women who
are involved in politics know how low a man can stoop?
(BDMP-8)

In addition, lack of enforcement of electoral rules and regulations by Bangladesh’s Election Commission and party antipathy to reform and to enforce new rules and norms in regard to candidate selection constrains women’s participation in the electoral process, as does the way political parties sanction illegal practices. In such contexts, independent women candidates are more vulnerable. According to a former Bangladeshi MP (10), ‘besides money, muscle power is another problem for candidates especially for independent candidates’. Independent women candidates not only lack political support and sufficient volunteers, financial resources and full-fledged campaign strategy but also have to contend with muscle power and fear of sexual harassment (Chowdhury 2011, p.4; Shaheed 2002)64. In response, women legislators from both countries recommended that:

Political parties and Election Commission need to work on women. (PKMNA-15)

Parties should nominate more women to general seats and provide support for election campaign. (PKMNA-1)

I think more and more women should be encouraged to take part in general election, and political parties can play a better role there. (PKMNA-6)

64The use of ‘musclemen’ is a serious threat to the integrity of the election process in Bangladesh. Mainly the hooligans and anti-social activists are hired by the political parties as well as candidates during elections to carry out political violence and to intimidate voters, supporters of political opponents, election workers and domestic election monitors (NDI 2001).
They (parties) should financially support and control the muscle power. Then it would be easy for women to join politics. (BDMP-18)

Election Commission should make it mandatory to nominate women at least in 30 percent seats, than gradually to 50 percent. (BDMP-16)

In the process of moving from being a candidate to becoming legislators, women must be elected by the electorate in order to achieve political office (Paxton and Kunovich 2003). At the electorate level, public support is the most important factor (Piscopo 2006; Sanbotsumu 2003). The traditional societal gender norms and the dominant discourses on women as politician frame women’s agency in politics impact on the voting decisions of the people and as well the election of women candidates (Dahlerup and Leyenaar 2013a; Paxton 1997). The patriarchal belief system fosters stereotypes about politics being a ‘man’s game’ and thereby negate the idea of women as politicians (Piscopo 2006).

The mind-set of the Pakistani people is such that many voters do not cast votes for women (cited in EU 2008, p.44). Women candidates in Pakistan tend to have less support among the general Pakistani people. Many communities in Pakistan also consider a woman to be of bad character and lose respect for her if she participates in politics and runs for election (EU 2008). The sexism by voters at the final stage serves as a brick wall for women seeking to enter parliament (Ballington and Matland 2004).

A Pakistani legislator mentioned that:

There are many voters who don’t cast vote for women. We need to change the mind-set of people. (PKMNA-15)
Contrary to Pakistan, the slow but steady increase of women elected to the Bangladesh parliament indicates an acceptance of women candidates for higher level political leadership (Aminuzzaman 2010). Such acceptance of women as candidates, I argue is due to the partisan nature of politics where voters cast their ballot for the party rather than individual candidate or the sex of candidate (Matland and Tezcu’r 2011). A Bangladeshi MP also confirmed this assertion,

There are certain areas where no matter who the candidate is, it’s easy to win. In our country people still vote for the party, not for the candidates. (BDMP-18)

The analysis of the economic, socio–cultural and intuitional context of Pakistan and Bangladesh reveals that a country’s low level of economic development affects the political participation of both men and women. But it disproportionately impacts on women due to the gendered dimensions associated with development, economic growth and social and cultural norms (UNDP 2014b; Waylen 1996). A country’s socio-economic structure affects women’s access to time, education and resources as well the development of the civil skills and informal networks required to enter to politics. Moreover, the patriarchal social structure further restricts women’ access to education, employment and the inheritance of property. In such contexts, gender power relations and gender structures are reinforced through the mechanism of purdah, religious Sharia laws and gendered violence. These factors also have an impact on the development of women’s civil society participation and the formal networks required for entering politics in Pakistan and Bangladesh. Though women are granted equal rights in terms of men, rights do not remedy the substantial social and economic inequalities women experienced in such patriarchal societies (Paxton and Hughes 1997).
The analysis of the institutional context shows that political parties are male dominated and women’s inclusion in politics is used strategically to mobilize public support and voters. In such institutions women are under-represented in low number in decision making bodies with little room to influence the candidate selection process. Due to the existing masculinist norms practiced by parties, women aspirants are subject to negative discrimination which is exacerbated by informal selection processes and power networks. In the existing undemocratic party structure, women political workers are discriminated against male and female candidates who have links with male leaders or influential families. In some cases, parties nominate female workers but often in unwinnable constituencies. Thus the demand and supply model of Norris and Lovenduski falls short of explaining the complex recruitment process in developing countries with weak institutionalized and dynastic party structures (Bjarnegård 2013).

At the electoral level, the FPTP election system, the high level of election expenses, violence and gendered norms are also at play and women’s participation in elections is sometimes viewed as ‘unexpected’ especially in tribal dominated regions in Pakistan. Women are constrained by the dominant masculinist norms and practices of the political parties and the gender ideology of societies (Kunovich and Paxton 2005; Paxton and Kunovich 2003). Discrimination against women in society, party organization and electoral rules results in low number of women in legislative institutions. This way gender discrimination is linked across the institutions (Burns 2005 cited in Piscopo 2006, p.9).

In such contexts, to increase the number of women and ensure gender balance in parliament some kind of affirmative action like reserved seats is necessary and just. The extent to which reserved seats have improved women’s representation in the national
parliaments of Pakistan and Bangladesh is more precisely revealed from the parliamentary data and is discussed next. To examine the effect of gender quota’s on women’s descriptive representation, researchers have traditionally compared the number of women elected to parliament before and after the adoption of gender quota policies. This is problematic to apply to the selected as reserved seats provision has been in effect from the election of the first parliament of the countries. Therefore, a feasible approach is to provide a comparison between the number of women in parliament with and without reserved seats.

**Effect of Reserved seats on Women’s Representation in the Parliaments of Pakistan and Bangladesh**

The following table provides information on women’s representation in different national assemblies in Pakistan. It contains data on the number and percentage of women elected to the general seats, and reserved seats, and the overall percentage of women in the eight national assemblies of Pakistan.

Table 4.4: Number of women legislators in the National Assembly of Pakistan (1972-2008)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time period</th>
<th>Assembly</th>
<th>Women elected to general seats</th>
<th>Women elected to reserved seats</th>
<th>Total no of women</th>
<th>Percent of women’s representation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1972-1977</td>
<td>5th</td>
<td>-/144</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6/144</td>
<td>4/150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988-1990</td>
<td>8th</td>
<td>4/217</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>20/237</td>
<td>24/237</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>9th</td>
<td>2/217</td>
<td>.92</td>
<td>2/217</td>
<td>2/217</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year Range</td>
<td>Assembly</td>
<td>Seats (General)</td>
<td>Seats (Women)</td>
<td>Representation (%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------</td>
<td>----------</td>
<td>----------------</td>
<td>---------------</td>
<td>--------------------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993-1996</td>
<td>10th</td>
<td>4/217</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>-5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997-1999</td>
<td>11th</td>
<td>7/217</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>-5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002-2007</td>
<td>12th</td>
<td>13/282*</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>17.5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008-2013</td>
<td>13th</td>
<td>18/272*</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>17.5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


* Two women were elected in general seats and another one Lilawanti elected to reserved seats for minority. ** Initially 13 women were elected to general seats and later one of them resigned. However, another woman was elected to reserved seats for minority. *** 16 women were elected and later Khadija Amir Yar Malik and Natasha Doulatana were elected in by-elections.

A close look at Table 4.4 and the data according to election year and National Assembly indicates that women’s representation in the National Assembly of Pakistan through general seats remained low in almost all of the parliaments except for those of 2002 and 2008. In the first assembly, no women were elected to the general seats and women’s representation in general seat was absent. Women’s representation only increased to 4 percent after the election of six reserved seats women.

However, the representation of women increased after the 1985 election. In this election three women were elected to general seats in the 217 member assembly and women’s representation increased to 1.4 percent. Added to the 20 reserved seats for women, women’s over-all representation increased to 10 percent. In the next assembly of 1988 women’s representation increased slightly. In this assembly four women (1.8 percent) were elected to general seats and women’s representation and with 20 reserved seats the percentage of women increased to 11 percent. Thus it is clear that without the provision of reserved seats women’s representation was below 2 percent in the assemblies.
The provision of reserved seats lapsed in 1989 and from the period 1990 to 1999, three elections were held with no provision of reserved seats for women in the ninth, tenth and eleventh national assemblies. Women’s representation dropped to less than 1 percent (0.9) with only two women elected to general seats in the ninth assembly of 1990. In the next two elections of 1993 and 1997 four and seven women respectively were elected to general seats of the tenth and eleventh assemblies. Overall women’s representation dropped below 2 percent in the 1990s primarily due to the absence of the reserved seats provision.

Interestingly, with the reinstating of the reserved seat system in 2002 which increased the number of reserved seats for women to 60, the twelfth National Assembly witnessed a significant increase in women’s representation in both the general seat and reserved seats. Thirteen women were directly elected among 282 members and the percentage of women increased to 4.6 percent. Moreover, with the increased number of 60 reserved seats, women’s representation reached 21.3 percent. In the 2008 election, 16 women were initially elected in general seats and later two more women were elected in by -elections.

Table 4.5: Number of women legislators in the Parliaments of Bangladesh (1973-2008)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time period</th>
<th>Parliament</th>
<th>Women elected to general seats</th>
<th>Women elected to reserved seats</th>
<th>Total no of women</th>
<th>Percent of women’s representation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1973-1975</td>
<td>1st</td>
<td>0/300</td>
<td>15/315</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979-1982</td>
<td>2nd</td>
<td>2/300</td>
<td>30/330</td>
<td>9.01</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988-1990</td>
<td>4th</td>
<td>4/300</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991 -</td>
<td>5th</td>
<td>5/300</td>
<td>30/330</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>10.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
(Developed from Firoj 2003a; Bangladesh Election Commission, accessed from the website ecs.gov.bd).

As a consequence women’s representation reached at 23 percent with 18 women elected in general seats and 60 in reserved seats. This was the, the highest in the South Asian region and in the history of Pakistan National Assembly. Analysis of the parliamentary data shows that, the reserved seats provision has significantly contributed to an increase the numbers of women in each National Assembly of Pakistan.

To help understand the effect of reserved seats on women’s numeric presence in Bangladesh Table 4.5 provides details of women’s representation in general seats and reserved seats in the parliaments from 1973-2008. The data presented above indicates that in the first parliament, no woman was elected to a general seat and women’s representation was only 4.8 percent due to the presence of 15 reserved seats for women. In the second parliament of 1979, only two women were elected and women’s representation in the general seats was less than 1 percent (0.7), but the election of the 30 reserved seats women pushed the percentage up to 9.7 percent. In the third parliament five women were elected to general seats and with the 30 reserved seats, women’s representation reached at 10.6 percent. The rate of women’s representation increased in the second and third parliaments only after the number of reserved seats increased from 15 to 30 in 1979. After the provision of reserved seats lapsed in 1988, women’s representation dropped to 1.3 percent with the presence of only four women elected to
general seats. After the reinstitution of reserved seats in 1991, women’s representation increased to 10.6 percent in the fifth parliament with the presence of five directly elected and 30 reserved seats women. In the seventh parliament of 1996, women’s representation increased to 11.5 percent. However, during the first four years of the eighth parliament of 2001, the number of women remained low at 2.3 percent due to the lapse of the reserved seats provision and presence of only seven general seats women. After the reserved seats provision was reinserted in the constitution for the second time in 2004, women’s representation increased from 2.4 percent to 15 percent at the end of the eighth parliament. In the ninth parliament with the presence of 20 general seats and 50 reserved seats women, women’s representation increased to 20 percent, the highest ever in the history of the Bangladesh parliament.

The data from the different parliaments exhibit a positive relation between reserved seats and number of women in both countries. Without the reserved seats provision, women’s representation remained on average around 2.4 in Pakistan and 2 percent in Bangladesh and with reserved seats it averaged around 9.7 and 11 percent respectively. This indicates the positive effect of reserved seats on women’s numeric presence. The women parliamentarians interviewed who had been elected to both general and reserved seats supported the adoption of reserved seats and reconfirmed its effectiveness in increasing the presence of women in parliament.

Reserved seats provision has been very effective. Without reserved seats provision, so many women wouldn’t make it to the national and provincial assembly. Reserved seats system has played a pivotal role to make the society aware and accept the presence of women. (PKMNA-7)
Reserved seats provision is an effective device to increase women’s representation since women are not that much aware, politically mature and experienced about electoral politics. (PKMNA- 13)

Reserved seats provision is necessary to bring equality among men and women and to minimize the discrimination towards women. It built female political resources and prepared women for contesting general seat. (PKMNA-1)

In Bangladesh, women parliamentarians not only view reserved seats as effective mechanisms to increase the number of women but also as a mechanism to gain political experience for future elections.

Reserved seats are effective and women can gain political credibility and make a position in politics through this system. (BDMP-2)

Reserved seats provision has created a space for women in parliament and politics. (BDMP-11)

Usually there is a tendency to isolate women and we need to mainstream women into the politics. Reserved seats provision is very effective to bring women in the parliament. (BDMP-13 GS)

It is an effective device to ensure the representation of half of the population (women) and only six percent of us (general seats) are not adequate. It also encourages and motivates women. (BDMP- 5 GS)

The presence of reserved seats also appears to have encouraged women to stand for election, especially middle class and upper middle class women without the political
linkages and resources to compete for political offices. One former woman MNA asserted that:

If we want middle class, upper middle class women to come to the parliament than we need some form of quota. (PKMNA-4)

However, the extent to which the presence of reserved seat provision encouraged women to participate in the electoral politics can be understood from the following Table 4.6. In Pakistan the number of women candidates for reserved seats has increased over the years. Table 4.6 shows that only 60 women registered their interest for 20 reserved seats in the 1985 elections. In 2002, the number rose to 280 and in 2008, it was 169. Some political parties did not participate in the 2008 elections and thereby reduced the number of women contestants for the reserved seats.

Table 4.6: Number of women contestants for reserved seats in Pakistan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year of election</th>
<th>No. of reserved seats</th>
<th>No. of candidates</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>280</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>169</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Developed from EU 2008, p.31; Zia and Bari 1999; Institute for Human Rights and Democracy 1998)

Although the total number of women candidates for reserved seats is not available for Bangladesh, it is reported that 179 women purchased nomination forms for five reserved seats in 2011 and in 2009 186 forms were sold in the first day of selling nomination forms
for 35 reserved seats (Prothom Alo, 15 February 2009, p.20; 27 November 2011, p.2)\textsuperscript{65}. This provides an idea about the increasing interest among women in accessing political office through reserved seats. However, the indirect election to reserved seats that exempted women from the electoral threshold and ensured a safe passage to parliament was also found to have negative implications for women. During the interviews, women legislators explained that party leaders selected women based on their relationship status rather than on their quality or contribution to the party:

Party leadership give the reserved seats whoever they want, it is a ‘gift’. (PKMNA-17)

The process of selection of women to reserved or general seats is not good. It depends on the discretion of one man, head or the president of the party. They can bring anyone they want. (PKMNA-4)

The system of selection of reserved seats women needs to be refined. Here selection is based on relationships. (PKMNA-8)

In the present system of election, party select from the priority list but sometime financially solvent and family members get the priority, not the workers. Your efforts and contribution to party are not considered. (PKMNA-12)

\textsuperscript{65} The parties sell the nomination forms for reserved seats candidates. Interested candidates have to buy and submit the duly filled up forms. Afterwards women candidates are interviewed and selected by the respective parties. Election Commission after performing necessary formalities declared these women as elected to reserved seats.
In Bangladesh, woman expressed their disappointment about the method of selecting women and complained that sometimes unqualified women were elected to reserved seats due to their connection with party leaders:

The selection of reserved seats depends on the party head but can’t claim that it is entirely based on qualification only. (BDMP-8)

Political parties are manipulating the reserved seats system in the name of women’s empowerment. The selection of women to reserved seats is done on the basis of relation with the party high ups. (BDMP-12)

If someone can please the party high ups s/he will be elected. There is no practice of democracy. (BDMP-10)

In this system qualification is the biggest disqualification. (BDMP-2)

The informal candidate selection process was also at play in the selection of reserved seats. In this case elite women or relatives of male leaders without any experience of political activism are preferred instead of women political activists. Despite the weakness in the election system, women parliamentarians agreed that reserved seats have been an effective device to increase the number of women in parliament. They viewed reserved seat provision is necessary to ensure the entry of women to political office and to gain political experience and maturity. Yet they considered the system as a temporary device to bring women into parliament who are vulnerable and denied due positions in society and in the parties. They claimed that reserved seats are a mechanism to make society aware of the importance of women’s presence and to create an attitude of acceptability of
women’s space among people, party and parliament (PKMNA-7, 11 and 14). For that to happen, they stressed the need to change the mind-set of male dominated society and the political parties as well as strengthening the role of political parties and the election commission in main streaming and supporting women in the election and the candidate selection processes.

Harmonizing Reserved Seats with Existing Social and Political Institutions

The analysis of the economic, socio-cultural and institutional contexts in Pakistan and Bangladesh reveals that a range of factors account for women’s low level of political and electoral participation in both countries. Women are constrained by a lack of resources and time, complex and corrupt processes of party nomination, male domination, violence and high costs. In the formal and informal institutional context of male domination, women experienced discrimination and disparity in terms of nomination and election both at party and electorate level. Women continue to constitute a very low percentage of total candidates (only 3-4 percent) which has resulted in a low number of women in parliament. On average, women’s representation remained around 2 percent.

It is apparent that without any affirmative action strategies by the parties or legislatures, women’s representation in general seats is unlikely to increase and lead to a closure of the gender gap. The small number of women nominated and elected to general seats when compared to men shows how essential it is to have affirmative action measures in place, such as reserved seats. Given the extent and embeddedness of patriarchal norms, legislated or party quotas have not been implemented arguably because that would threaten male’s domination over constituency seats. Therefore, the reserved seats system is currently the only realistic option to bring women into parliament. This is the reason male politicians support the creation of additional reserved seats for women. It best suits
countries with FPTP election system and the parties’ institutionalized informal candidate selection processes that favour men. It also provides an avenue for politically active women who cannot afford high nomination and election costs and lack strong feudal and family support to enter parliament.

Reserved seats to some extent minimize the constraints on women’s access to political office because of the barriers posed by lower socio economic status, cultural prejudices and electoral systems, but it surely does not remove all of the hurdles in politics. It is evident from the parliamentary data and the women’s views that reserved seats were effective in increasing the number of women in the parliaments of Pakistan and Bangladesh. This form of gender quota has improved women’s numeric presence and thus appears to have positive outcomes. However, undemocratic party structures, patriarchal, feudal and tribal aspects of the informal selection process and indirect election raise questions about the quality of reserved seats women and their ability to represent women both in theory and reality. Therefore, this aspect of female representatives is highlighted and analysed in the chapters that follow.
Chapter 5: Reserved seats and Women’s Identity: Between Myth and Reality

The increased attention given to gender quotas over recent decades has spurred debate about the quality and ability of quota women to act for women. While quota proponents argue that quotas lead to the election of a diversity of women (Dahlerup and Freidenvall 2010; Krook 2013), critics argue that quota women may be less qualified, less ambitious and less knowledgeable about constituency needs and too loyal and elitist compared to non–quota women (Davidson-Schmich 2008; Murray 2008; Cowley and Childs 2003). Therefore they are assumed to be unable to challenge the status quo or patriarchal agenda of the political elites. To evaluate such predictions, Dahlerup and Freidenvall (2010) suggest undertaking systematic study comparing the profiles of quota and non-quota women parliamentarians.

Further, it is claimed that the type of quota and electoral system influences the kind of women being selected to these seats. In case of reserved seats provision, critics and activists argue that indirect election to reserved seats by small groups of elites primarily leads to the selection of elite, inexperienced and loyal women (Mohsin 2010; Bilal 2004; Tripp 2004). It implies that there may be an important connection between modes of election and the profiles of quota women (Krook 2013).

It is agreed that education, professional and organizational experiences provide women with knowledge, skill and networks (Ballington and Matland 2004). In the complex and masculinist legislative institutional environment, women’s educational and professional
background and political status determine the extent of their invisibilisation in the legislative process (Zetterberg 2008; Beckwith 2007). These factors are closely linked with women’s willingness and ability to initiate changes in political institutions and law. Thus kinds of women elected in terms of education, occupation, legislative and political experience are important in terms of making a substantive impact (Dahlerup and Freidenvall 2010; Franceschet and Krook 2008; Weeks and Baldez 2014). It is against this backdrop that this research intends to explore the election of women to reserved seats to understand whether quota leads to the election of unqualified and elite women and whether there are difference between quota women and non–quota women.

For this purpose the concept of descriptive representation has been extended to include potentially relevant attributes of quota women beyond mere numbers. I asked if reserved seats women are politically qualified, inexperienced, the tokens of their families, elites and less ambitious as critics argue. In this way, I suggest there exists diversity among reserved seats women representatives in terms of education, profession, class, experience and political ambition.

Diversity means understanding that each individual is unique, and recognizing our individual differences. These can be along the dimensions of race, ethnicity, gender, sexual orientation, socio-economic status, age, physical abilities, religious beliefs, political beliefs, or other ideologies. However, in this thesis the term ‘diversity’ is used to indicate the difference among the reserved seats women legislators in terms of education, profession, background and class and ambitions It does not include religious and cultural diversity since both Bangladesh and Pakistan are predominantly Muslim (95-98% Muslim in Pakistan and Hindu 2% and Christian 1.59% and in Bangladesh 90.4% Muslim and 8.2% Hindu). Also the seats are distributed across the provinces and districts which ensures the presence of women from different provinces and regional cultures. At present the 60 reserved seats for women in Pakistan are divided across four provinces (Punjab – 35, Sindh-14, North-West Frontier-8, and Balochistan-3) and 10 seats are also reserved for minority groups where women from these minority groups may also be elected (The Researchers 2008; Firoj 2003a).
In order to reveal this phenomenon I collected bibliographic information (academic qualifications, professional political experience) about women elected to reserved and general seats in the parliaments of Pakistan and Bangladesh from 1972 to 2008. The data spanning a long period of time also has the advantage of assessing a link between increased number and diversity among women legislators. Using this data I test the hypothesis that reserved seats women elected by party elites are more elitist, inexperienced and unqualified compared to general seats women. The data were collected from the Parliament Library, Election Commission, non-government organizations, journals, and different websites. Due to poor institutional knowledge management and record keeping, the biographies of some Pakistani MNAs and Bangladeshi MPs could not be obtained.

Educational background is an indicator of a legislator’s ability to govern or legislate. It indicates the level of understanding of issues and representing them. Moreover, through educational attainment it is to some extent possible to assess the background and status of the women involved. Educational qualifications are categorised according to the different levels of education and degree common in these countries (Josefsson 2014; Franceschet and Piscopo 2012).

Occupational background is indicative of one’s merit, experience and elitism (Josefsson 2014). Legislators’ occupations are categorised according to listed careers of their countries. Working in the bureaucracy, private organizations, international and national organizations and involvement in business, social and political activities can be interpreted as a sign of awareness and the ability of women to overcome societal barriers. The professional and educational background to some extent was also supportive in making an assessment of class.
Experience is defined here as previous membership of national or provincial parliaments and local councils. It indicates women’s expertise in legislative work and representative acts as well as an understanding of how male dominated institutions work. It also indicates that women have social connections and have learned the skills of negotiation.

I collected information about the family backgrounds of reserved seats women and tested the assumption that they are elites and proxies. The professional and educational background to some extent was also supportive in making an assessment of women’s class position. The political ambition of reserved seats women was also assessed. This information like political linkages was not explicit in the parliamentary documents or biographies. I reviewed the biographies of general seat women legislators and finally made a comparative assessment to understand whether reserved seats women are more elite, and loyal, or less ambitious or less qualified than directly elected women. Information was then categorised according to education, profession, experience and political linkages and is presented in the tables’ below.

**Reserved Seats Women in the National Assembly of Pakistan (1972-2008)**

From 1972 to 2008, Pakistan had nine national assemblies but reserved seats provision for women was effective in only five of these. The second legislative assembly lasted only three months and was not included in the research data analysis. The educational background of the reserved seats women elected to national assemblies is presented in Table 5.1.

In the fifth National Assembly of 1972, among the six reserved seats women two had post graduate and graduate degrees while another two had completed college education. One
of them had a medical degree and another had completed her school education. In the seventh National Assembly of 1985, 20 women were elected to reserved seats. Among them three had post graduate degrees, six had graduate degrees, and one had a medical degree. Only two completed school and four received Fazil degree, the religious stream of education.

Table 5.1: Educational background of Pakistani reserved seats MNAs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PhD /MPhil</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MA/ MBA/MSC</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MBBS/ LLB/ LLM</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BA/BSC/BCOM</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>College education</td>
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<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Higher School Certificate Examination)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>School Education</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(School certificate examination)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary School/Madrasah</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-education</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Another four women were self-educated\(^{67}\). In the eighth National Assembly of 1988, there were also 20 reserved seats for women and information was obtained for 15 members. Of the 15 members, four had post graduate degrees (MA/PhD) and another four

\(^{67}\) The term is used to indicate a person who received education at home instead of any educational institution.
had graduate degrees. Four members had obtained professional degrees and only one completed school. The remaining two members received primary and religious education.

After the reintroduction of reserved seats for women in twelfth National Assembly of 2002, the number of reserved seats women rose to 60. The LFO 2002 required graduation as the minimum qualification for candidature in the National Assembly, which raised the overall educational qualification of the Pakistani MNAs. As shown in the table, of the total 60 women, 29 women had post graduate degrees from home and abroad and 20 women had a graduate degree. The remainder 11 women had professional degrees in law or medical. In the thirteenth National Assembly, of the total of 60 women, 20 had post graduate degrees and 28 had a graduate degree. The remaining 12 women had professional degrees either in law, medicine and business.

The educational data of Pakistani reserved seats women MNAs shows that educationally qualified women were elected to reserved seats. Among the total of 161 women, only 10 women had no institutional degree or had low level of education. These women were elected to the National Assembly during the authoritarian regimes and at that time only 0.8 percent of the women had received a university education (Mumtaz and Shaheed 1987, p.28). This group of women cannot however be termed as unqualified in terms of representing women. Rather I argue that they were the mirror representatives of most Pakistani women. However with the increase in the number of reserved seats, more women with a higher level of education entered the twelfth and thirteenth national assemblies. More than 50 percent of the women in the twelfth and thirteenth national assemblies had educational qualifications higher than what was required by law. There was an increase in the number of women with professional degrees along with degrees in general subjects. This shows that most of the reserved seats women in all the parliaments
were educated and the changes in the electoral law impacted on the educational background of elected women.

The professional backgrounds of the reserved seats women are summarized in Table 5.2.
In the fifth National Assembly of 1972, two of the women legislators were a researcher and a doctor while the remainder were involved in social work. In the seventh National Assembly of 1985, 11 women were involved in social work and politics, and four were professionals.

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<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Politics and social work</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Doctors/agriculturist/lawyer/journalist/environmentalist</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Researcher/educationist/consultant/teacher/</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business/entrepreneur</td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Homemaker</td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(The numbers shown in the bracket in the top row are the number of women whose information was not available)

Only three were home-makers and two were owner of business firm. In the eighth National Assembly of 1988, information of 17 women was obtained and among them seven was involved in social work and in politics and another seven women were professionals like researcher, consultant, and educationist and three were home-maker.
In the twelfth National Assembly, of the total of 60 women, information about 55 women was obtained. Among them, 30 women were political and social workers and 22 had designated professions like doctor, teacher, farmer, journalist, environmentalist and lawyer. Only three were business women. In the thirteenth National Assembly of 2008, among the 60 reserved seats women 29 were involved in politics and social work, and another 24 were professionals and seven women were involved in business.

The data about the professional background of reserved seats women legislators in Pakistan indicates that women from diverse professional backgrounds were elected to reserved seats in all of the national assemblies. Among the 157 women only six women legislators were home-maker. However, in all these assemblies the majority of women were social and political activists. The professional diversity among women legislators was most evident in the twelfth and thirteenth National Assembly when the number of reserved seats was increased from 20 to 60. It also suggests that some reserved seats women were politically experienced and aware about issues regarding women in different sectors.

Table 5.3 presents the data on women elected with previous political experience. In the fifth National Assembly of 1972, among the six women only one had previous provincial legislative experience. In the seventh National Assembly, none had previous legislative experience and in eighth National Assembly, only four had previous legislative experience.
Table 5.3: Previous experience of Pakistani reserved seats MNAs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Parliamentary/ Provincial</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>25</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In the twelfth National Assembly of 2002, eight women had previous experience in legislative and local councils. In the thirteenth National Assembly of 2008, 25 experienced women entered the National Assembly and among them 22 had legislative experience and of these three had local council experience. In the twelfth assembly the number of experienced women increased slightly. However, with the continuation of the reserved seats provision, some women of twelfth National Assembly were re-elected in the thirteenth National Assembly. It indicates that more women legislators in the thirteenth National Assembly were experienced in legislative work and had developed political and negotiation skills.

Table 5.4: Political and Feudal linkages of Pakistani reserved seats MNAs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Political link</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 5.4 presents the political and feudal linkages of reserved seat women from 1985 onwards. However in the seventh National Assembly of 1985, according to the available information two women members had feudal and political family backgrounds and there was only one woman with political link in the eighth National Assembly of 1988. In the assembly of 2002, of the total of 60 women 17 had links with political leaders. In 2008, of the total of 60 women, 25 women were found to be related to influential male political leaders and MNAs or were from feudal families with a long tradition in politics. Although it is not possible to ascertain the political and feudal linkages of all the reserved seats women, the data available shows that the number of women with such linkages increased in the twelfth and thirteenth national assembly when compared to previous assemblies. This suggests that feudal structure continue to influence party selection process.

To explore the degree of the political ambition of reserved seats women, I relied primarily on interviews and election reports to examine whether past and present reserved seats women had contested previous elections but were unsuccessful. During the interviews, I found that, 12 out of 14 reserved seats women were interested in competing in general election but confided their inability to bear the high election cost. Pakistani MNAs said that,

The cost of election is so high, 10-20 million rupees and women are not financially well off to have that amount of money. (PKMNA-12)

68 Data on the political linkages of the women elected to the assembly in 1972 and 1985 was not discoverable.
I am not filthy rich or Zaminder (landlord) and I don’t have enough money to contest election unless party supports me. (PKMNA-5)

Frankly speaking it’s only the money. Other than that nothing stops me. The kind of work I do in my constituency and the passion for work I have, I don’t see anything stopping me from contesting in general election. (PKMNA-6)

Some however, confided their unwillingness to contest election or pursue political careers in the future. They had not been politically active prior to their election to reserved seats and had been (re)elected due to their relation with male political leader. They noted that their future in electoral politics entirely depended on the decision of male family members. A few women mentioned that their participation in future elections depended entirely on their husband’s and family’s decision (PKMNA-2 and 7). Some said it was a party decision. This group of women is labelled as less politically ambitious but represents a very low percentage of reserved seats women.

To reveal the political ambition of reserved seats women, I traced the past election records and found that some reserved seats women contested for general seats both after and before their selection to reserved seats. Some were successful and few were elected to reserved seats after they lost the election (as Table 5.5 shows). The data reveals that reserved seats women are not necessarily lacking in political ambition. Rather their ambitions were constrained by the reality of gender norms governing party politics and election costs.
Table 5.5: Electoral experience of Pakistani reserved seats MNAs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Elected to RS</th>
<th>Participated in election</th>
<th>Result</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nusrat Bhutto</td>
<td>6th</td>
<td>9th, 10th, and 11th</td>
<td>Won</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dr. Ashraf Khatun Abbasi</td>
<td>5th</td>
<td>8th</td>
<td>Won</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tehmina Daultana</td>
<td>12th</td>
<td>10th, 11th and 13th</td>
<td>Won</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>12th</td>
<td>Failed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dr. Ferdous Ashique Awan</td>
<td>12th</td>
<td>13th</td>
<td>Won</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>12th</td>
<td>Failed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mervi Memon</td>
<td>12th</td>
<td>14th</td>
<td>Failed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fauzia Wahab</td>
<td>12th and 13th</td>
<td>11th</td>
<td>Failed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jubaida Jalal</td>
<td>13th</td>
<td>12th</td>
<td>Won</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>13th</td>
<td>Failed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Majida Wayne</td>
<td>14th</td>
<td>11th</td>
<td>Won</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shazia Mari</td>
<td>13th</td>
<td>14th</td>
<td>Won</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


What is evident from the analysis of reserved seats women legislators’ profiles that most reserved seats women were educated, professionals and urban based. The analysis also confirms that women of diverse class and professions were elected to reserved seats. Yet, feudal influence on the election process of reserved seats women was evident in the election and re-election of reserved seats women in the twelfth and thirteenth National Assembly. Women legislators who were elected on the basis of their relation with political leaders and lacked experience of political activism were less willing or confident to build a political career for themselves. By contrast women legislators active in local level politics were more willing and confident to contest election but constrained by election cost. Based on these findings I agree with Bauer (2012) that the reserved seats provision played a critical role in diversifying and broadening access to elected office away from those of feudal and political families in Pakistan.
Table 5.6: Profiles and family background of general seats women legislators in Pakistan

National Assembly

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Education and profession</th>
<th>Family background</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Benazir Bhutto (4)</td>
<td>Oxford Graduate</td>
<td>Daughter of former Prime Minister and PPP leader Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nusrat Bhutto (2)</td>
<td>Senior Cambridge</td>
<td>Wife of PPP leader Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fehmida Mirza (3)</td>
<td>MBBS, Politics</td>
<td>Belonged to the Qazi family of Sindh and her father and brother were MNAs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Henna Rabbani Khar (2)</td>
<td>MA, Business</td>
<td>From the influential feudal lord of Punjab. Father was a politician and uncle was</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Punjab's Chief Minister.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tehmina Doultana (3)</td>
<td>MA, Politics and</td>
<td>Father was a former MNA and uncle was former Chief Minister of Punjab.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Educationist</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Azra Fazal Pechecho (2)</td>
<td>MBBS, Doctor</td>
<td>Sister of Asif Ali Zardari, former President of Pakistan and leader of PPP.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sumaira Malik (2)</td>
<td>BA, Politics and</td>
<td>Daughter of Malik Allah Yar Khan -the Nawab of Kala Bagh. Her uncle, Farooq Leghari</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>agriculturist</td>
<td>was the President of Pakistan.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gulam Bibi Bharwana (2)</td>
<td>LLB, Politics</td>
<td>Grand Daughter of famous politician of Jhang, Ghulam Haider Bharwana.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abida Hossian (3)</td>
<td>BA</td>
<td>Wife of the former Speaker of the National Assembly.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saira Afzal Tarar (1)</td>
<td>MA, Politics and</td>
<td>Daughter-in-law of former Pakistani President Raviq Tarar.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Teaching</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Samina Khalid Ghurki (2)</td>
<td>BA, Politics</td>
<td>Husband Khalid Ghurki was an ex-MP and has been the leading figure in the PPPPP.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Majida Wayne (1)</td>
<td>FA, Home maker</td>
<td>Wife of Gulam Haider Wayne, Punjab’s provincial Chief Minister.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Education/Profession</td>
<td>Details of Election</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Begum Kulsom Mehmood (1)</td>
<td>Early education</td>
<td>Elected after her husband MNA Mehmood Akbar Khan was assassinated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saima Akhter Bharwana (2)</td>
<td>BA, Politics</td>
<td>Hailed from the powerful landlord and political family of Bharwana.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Natasha Doultana (1)</td>
<td>MA, Home maker</td>
<td>Elected after her brother who was a sitting MNA died</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rahela Baloch (1)</td>
<td>BA</td>
<td>Elected from her father’s seat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Faryal Talpur (1)</td>
<td>MA, politics</td>
<td>Sister of Asif Ali Zardari and a powerful leader of PPPP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khadija Malik (1)</td>
<td>BA, Homemaker</td>
<td>Elected in her husband’s seats who lost his membership due to false education certificate.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dr. Ferdous Ashiq Awan (1)</td>
<td>MBBS, Doctor</td>
<td>Wife of Mir Malik Amjad Awan who belongs to a famous political family of Golra.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shamsad Sattar Bacchani (2)</td>
<td>MA, Social work</td>
<td>Elected in her husband, a PPP leader Abdul Sattar Bacchani’s seat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khalida Mohsin Qureshi (1)</td>
<td>BA Home maker and</td>
<td>Elected after her husband Mohsin Qureshi a PPP leader failed to contest election.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>social work</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farkanda Amzad Warriach (1)</td>
<td>BA Home maker</td>
<td>Elected after her husband Amjad Ali Warriach a PPP leader disqualified to contest election.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sumaira Rasheed (1)</td>
<td>BA, Diploma in homeopathic and acupuncture</td>
<td>Elected after her husband was disqualified to contest election.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rubina Shaheen Watto (1)</td>
<td>BA, Home maker and politics</td>
<td>Father Mian Manzoor Ahmad Wattoo was the Speaker of Punjab Assembly and was a Chief Minister of Punjab; brother was a MNA.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mrs. Kushbaqt Sujat (1)</td>
<td>BA, Politics</td>
<td>Husband was former caretaker Minister of Sindh.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It is worth noting that the feudal structure of Pakistani society and parties influences the selection and election of elite and feudal members irrespective of sex. The history of Pakistan indicates that from 1970 to 2008, almost 44 percent of the seats in the National
Assembly, Provincial Assembly and Senate were occupied by the members of 597 families from Punjab, Sindh and other regions. In 1993, 50 percent of the seats were occupied by political families, and 355 political families dominated the National and Provincial Assembly seats in 2008 (Prothom Alo 23 May 2011, p.9).

To reconfirm my argument, I present in Table 5.6 above the profiles of the directly elected women to the National Assembly in Pakistan from 1972-2008. In eight national assemblies, 29 women were elected 49 times to general seats and the profiles of 27 women were reviewed. Among the directly elected women, three were elected to reserved seats before their election to general seats and some were elected more than once which I indicate in brackets. Of these women, 25 women were related to influential male leaders and MNAs and most of them were from feudal and influential families with a long tradition in politics. Most of them contested the seats of their male family members and had no prior record of political or social activism. Many of these directly elected women did not continue their political career afterwards. It reveals that women without any political background and lack of experience were mostly the elected stand-ins for the male relatives (Nanavidekar 2006). It also proves that in Pakistani feudal context, for women without wealth or connections, a political career remains largely out of reach (Ghosh 2013). So far only one woman (Jubaida Jalal) with a strong track record of political and social activism but without any feudal or dynastic political family background has been elected to the National Assembly. Moreover the data shows that the majority of general seat women were drawn from the elite and feudal class and benefited from nepotism and dynastic politics. However, critics remain silent in regard to the election of male and female to directly elected seats based on their family linkage and
only reserve seats women are considered as surrogate or proxy and have their right of representation questioned.

Again in terms of education and profession, there is no significant difference between reserved seats and general seat women. On the contrary, I find that reserved seats women were slightly more educated than general seat women and differ considerably in the types of degrees they hold. Reserved seats women were more likely to have professional degrees than general seat women and women from diverse professional background and feminized field of activism were represented through reserved seats in the national assemblies. In addition, reserved seats women had more experience of local political activism than general seat women (Devlin and Elgie 2008).

Based on the findings I argue that there is diversity among reserved seats women in terms of class, education, profession and political experience. This implies that reserved seats have not been only a device to bring elite or unqualified women to parliament, rather they have opened a window of opportunity for women from different backgrounds - middle and upper middle class and the less highly educated to enter the parliament and gain legislative experience (Bari 2010; Mumtaz 1998). A significant number of women elected to reserved seats were party activists and had a strong track record in politics and social activism. The reserved seats provision has also accommodated politically ambitious women who were elected to or contested general seats before and after their election to reserved seats. Thus we can conclude that reserved seats women cannot be termed as inferior to general seat women.

Bangladesh has had nine parliaments since its independence on 16 December 1971\(^{69}\). In the fourth parliament of 1988 there were no reserved seats for women and the sixth parliament only had 12 working days. Therefore these parliaments were not included in the analysis. The table 5.7 contains the educational background of women elected to reserved seats over the years in Bangladesh parliaments. Information of some women could not be found and the number is shown in brackets.

Table 5.7: Educational background of Bangladeshi reserved seats MPs

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<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PhD/ MPhil</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MA/MBA/MSC</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>14</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MBBS/ LLB/LLM</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BA/BSC/Diploma</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>College Education</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Higher School Certificate Examination)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>School Education</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(School certificate examination)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary/self-education</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^{69}\)Unfortunately information about the women of the third parliament could not be found anywhere despite repeated efforts.
Of the total 15 women legislators in the first parliament of 1973, eight had post graduate and five had graduate degree. Of the rest, one had completed higher school secondary certificate examination and another one had completed school certificate examination. In the second parliament of 1979, there were 30 women members, 13 of whom had post graduate degree (MA/PhD). Of the remaining, six had graduate degrees, six had completed college education, and four had completed school. Only one had received a primary education.

After the restoration of parliamentary democracy and the reintroduction of reserved seats in the fifth parliament in 1991, 30 women were elected. In this parliament, nine had postgraduate degrees and 10 women were graduates. Of the remaining 11 women, seven had completed college and three completed their high school education. One did not complete her schooling. In the seventh parliament of 1996, there were also 30 reserved seats for women and information was obtained for 29 of these women. Among them, 10 had post graduate degrees and 13 were graduates. One had professional degree in law. Among the rest, two had completed college and another two had completed a high school education. In the eighth parliament, information was available for 43 of the 45 women. Of these, nine women had post graduate degrees and nineteen had graduate degrees. Seven women had medical and legal degrees. Among the remaining eight, three had completed a college education and five had completed high school education. The ninth parliament elected in 2008 had 50 reserved seats for women. In terms of education, 23 out of 50 women had post graduate and professional degrees and 13 had graduate degrees. Of the remaining 14 women, two had completed a college education, four had completed a school certificate examination, six had received only a school education and two were self-educated.
The data shows that in all the parliaments the women elected were educationally qualified. Only a few had received only a school and college education. Among the 197 reserved seats women elected over time, 28 women had received only school education, with 18 completing school certificate examination. In all of the parliaments more than 50 percent of the women had either a graduate or post graduate degree. This trend remained almost unchanged but an increase in the number of women with only school or college education increased slightly in the ninth parliament with the increase of the number of reserved seats. Considering the low rate of female higher education in Bangladesh, most of the reserved seats women were educationally qualified.

Table 5.8: Professional background of Bangladeshi reserved seats MPs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Politics and social work</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lawyer/journalist/doctor/teacher</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>17</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government/non-government service</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>15</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Homemaker</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The professional background of the reserved seats women is presented in Table 5.8. In terms of profession, in the 1973 parliament, seven women were involved in social and political activities and five women were involved in teaching, and the remaining two were involved in business and agriculture. However, information about one woman MP
could not be found. In the second parliament of 1979, among the 30 members, 13 had political and social work backgrounds and 10 were involved in teaching. Among these 10 women, four were also involved in social work and politics along with the teaching profession. Of the total women, seven were homemakers.

In the fifth parliament, most of the women, 18 were involved in politics and social work, five were involved in business, four were teachers and one was a retired public officer. Only one woman was homemaker. In the seventh parliament, among the 30 women 13 were political/social workers and 12 women were teachers or lawyers. Only three of the women were involved in business, and two were former public and private office holders. In the eighth parliament, according to the information of 43 women, 23 had political and social work backgrounds. Nine women were involved in the legal, medical and teaching professions and eight were business women. The remaining three women were homemakers. In the ninth parliament, of the total of 50 women, 15 were involved in business and 11 were involved in political and social work. Of the remainder, 17 women were lawyers, teachers, journalists and artist. Also three women who served in private and public offices were elected along with another four homemakers.

The data on the professional background of the reserved seats female member’s shows that in all the parliaments, the highest number of women with a background in politics and social work were elected to reserved seats. There were also women professionals like teachers, journalists and lawyers. However, over the years business women were elected to parliament and the number increased in the ninth parliament. Among the total 195 reserved seats women elected over the year’s only 15 women had no professional background. Thus it proves that reserved seats women had knowledge of politics and awareness about different issues effecting society.
Table 5.9: Previous experience of Bangladeshi reserved seats MPs

<table>
<thead>
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<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Parliament</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local Council</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5.9 presents an overview of the number of experienced women who were elected to reserved seats. In terms of experience, in the first parliament of 1973 only two women had legislative experience. In the second, three women had prior legislative experience. In the fifth parliament, of the 30 women, six women had previous legislative experience. Only three women with previous legislative experience were elected in the seventh parliament of 1996. In the eighth parliament of 2001, 10 women had previous legislative experience and 35 were newcomers. In the ninth parliament of 2008, only nine women with previous legislative experience were elected and one of them had urban local council experience.

The analysis of the data shows that in all the parliaments a few women with previous legislative experience were elected to reserved seats. However the number increased in eighth parliament. The data also demonstrates that most of the reserved seats women lack legislative and local council experience important to make an impact on the representation of women.
Table 5.10: Political and family link of Bangladeshi reserved seats MPs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Link to a political leader or family</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5.10 presents the political link of reserved seat women. In the first parliament of 1973, one woman was linked to a famous political leader of East Bengal. The table shows that three women of the second parliament of 1979 were directly related to male political leaders. In the fifth parliament of 1991, only three women were found to be linked to male political leaders and influential families but they too were involved in politics in their personal capacity. Only two women were linked to political leaders in the seventh parliament of 1996. In the eighth parliament of 2001 only three and in the ninth parliament of 2008 four women were related to political leaders of the ruling coalition parties. In terms of class, most of these women were from middle class and upper middle class backgrounds and a very few were from the upper and elite class.

The data reveals that in Bangladesh parliaments very few women related to male leaders of the parties were elected. These women were elected to reserved seats after the death of their husbands. But the number of such women remained almost static in all the parliaments. This suggests that reserved seats women were mostly elected due to their involvement and contributions to the parties rather than their relationship to political leaders.
In terms of political ambition, a few women indicated their unwillingness to contest in general seats or to continue their political career in future (BDMP-1, 6 and 10). Reviewing the electoral record, I found that some of the reserved seats women contested in previous elections. Few were elected while some lost the election (Table 5.11). There were few women who failed to get nomination. Some had to withdraw their nomination for alliance parties’ candidates or for the senior member of their own party. Bangladeshi female MPs mentioned their personal experiences.

I was involved with politics since my student life. I sought nomination for general seats in 1996 but did not get it. (BDMP-12)

In 2001 election I had to withdraw my nomination for a senior member of my party. (BDMP-15)

I have been involved in politics since my student life. I started area based politics and sought nomination for general seat three times. But I never got it. (BDMP-16)

I got the nomination in 2008 but I had to surrender my nomination for a candidate of an alliance party. (BDMP-2)

I wanted nomination in 2001 but my party did not give me the ticket. (BDMP-18)

Many reserved seats women expressed their desire to contest election but informed me that they faced the obstacles of the high costs of nomination and election, male domination in the nomination process, and the threat of physical and psychological violence. Some confided their inability to maintain networks and collect donations from different sources as did men due to prevailing social gender norms and expectations. Only
three of the 14 women were not confident enough to contest election or pursue political career in future. It reveals that most reserved seats women are politically ambitious and have strong backgrounds in political activism. Few of the reserved seats women were able to make credible political careers in politics.

Table 5.11: Electoral backgrounds of Bangladeshi reserved seats women MPs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of the candidate</th>
<th>Elected to RS</th>
<th>Contested for GS</th>
<th>Results</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Begum Sajeda Chowdhury</td>
<td>1st and 7th</td>
<td>5th and 9th, 2nd, 3rd, 7th and 8th</td>
<td>Won</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kurshid Jahan Haque</td>
<td>5th</td>
<td>6th and 8th</td>
<td>Won</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kamrunnahar Jafar</td>
<td>2nd and 3rd</td>
<td>4th</td>
<td>Won</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navila Chowdhury</td>
<td>8th</td>
<td>6th</td>
<td>Failed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rabeya Bhuiyan</td>
<td>3rd and 7th</td>
<td>7th</td>
<td>Failed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Munnujan Sufiyan</td>
<td>7th</td>
<td>3rd and 4th, 9th</td>
<td>Failed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shagufta Yeasmin</td>
<td>7th</td>
<td>8th, 9th</td>
<td>Won</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mamaching</td>
<td>5th</td>
<td>8th</td>
<td>Failed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meher Afroze Chumki</td>
<td>7th</td>
<td>9th</td>
<td>Won</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Selima Rahman</td>
<td>5th and 8th</td>
<td>8th</td>
<td>Failed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hamida Bano Shova</td>
<td>9th</td>
<td>8th, 5th</td>
<td>Won</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syeda Razia Faiz</td>
<td>8th</td>
<td>2nd, 7th and 8th</td>
<td>Won</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kamrun Nahar potul</td>
<td>7th</td>
<td>8th</td>
<td>Failed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professor Jahanara Begum</td>
<td>5th</td>
<td>6th, 7th</td>
<td>Won</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saleha Musharraf Begum</td>
<td>9th</td>
<td>7th</td>
<td>Won</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Analysing the overall information of reserved seat women, it is evident that most of the reserved seats women in Bangladesh parliaments were well educated (Pervez 2000; Chowdhury and Hasanuzzaman 1993). Nevertheless, it cannot be overlooked that some women were comparatively less qualified than others. The women without formal education cannot be termed as unqualified considering the educational status of women in
Bangladesh. They represented the general women in Bangladesh who experienced inequality in terms of education and early marriage. Many of these women were involved in political and social activities. Also professional women like lawyer and teachers were also elected. Interestingly, in the last two parliaments, there was an increase in the number of business women in the reserved seats. This trend is also visible among the elected male members of the parliament (Jahan and Amundsen 2012). However, election of experienced women to reserved seats remained low.

Yet it cannot be denied that a few of the women were elected as tokens for their husbands but this is also evident in the case of some general seats women MPs. In the Bangladesh parliament many of the male and female MPs were related or the members of extended families of the head or leaders of the parties (Sk. Fazlul Karim Selim, Cousins and Fazle Noor Taposh nephew of AL leader Sk. Hasina, Syeed Iskandar brother of BNP leader Khaleda Zia). Some were elected to the seats of their fathers (for example (Zahid Ahsan in his father former MP Ahsanullah Master’s seat, Andaleeve Rahman is the son of Naziur Rahaman-a former Minister and founder chairman of Bangladesh Jatiya Party (BJP), and Tanjim Ahmed Sohel son of Bangladesh’s first Prime Minister Tajuddin Ahmed).

70 Only 1.3 million of the population receives a higher education in Bangladesh and the rate for female graduates and post graduates is only 0.92 percent and 0.45 percent (BBS 2011; Create 2007).
Table 5.12: Profile and family background of general seats women in Bangladesh parliament

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Education and Profession</th>
<th>Connection with political leaders</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Monsura Mohiuddin (2)</td>
<td>BA, Home maker</td>
<td>Sister-in-law of former President and the founder and leader of Jatiya Party Hossain Md. Ershad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hasna Moudud (2)</td>
<td>MA, Academician</td>
<td>Wife of Jatiya Party leader and former minister</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roushan Ershad (3)</td>
<td>BA, Business</td>
<td>Wife of former president and founder of Jatiya Party Hossain Md. Ershad.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sk. Hasina (5)</td>
<td>BA, Politics</td>
<td>Daughter of the deceased leader of AL and President Sk. Mujibur Rahman</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khaleda Zia (4)</td>
<td>Self-educated, Politics</td>
<td>Wife of assassinated president and founder of BNP, Zia-ur-Rahman</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kurshid J Haque (1)</td>
<td>BA, Politics</td>
<td>Sister of BNP leader and prime minister Khaleda Zia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dr. Dipu Moni (1)</td>
<td>MBBS, Politics</td>
<td>Daughter of MA Wadud one of the founding member of AL and a former MP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kabori Sarwar (1)</td>
<td>Class-VIII, Actress</td>
<td>Daughter-in-law of a renowned political figure and founder of AL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meher A Chumki (1)</td>
<td>MA, Social worker</td>
<td>Daughter of AL MP Moijuddin and contested in his seat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khadija Ameen (1)</td>
<td>BA, Home maker</td>
<td>Elected in by election after the death of her husband</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israt Ellin Bhutto (1)</td>
<td>BA, Home maker</td>
<td>Husband was a former MP and she contested in his seats after his death</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mumtaz Begum (1)</td>
<td>HSC, Home maker</td>
<td>Elected after her husband’s surrendered one of two constituencies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Simin Hossian (1)</td>
<td>HSC, Business</td>
<td>Contested in her brother’s seat and father was a famous politician</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saleha Musharaff (1)</td>
<td>Class-VIII, Home-maker</td>
<td>Elected from her husband’s constituency after his death.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roushan Ara (1)</td>
<td>Home maker</td>
<td>Elected after the death of her husband who was a MP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rumana Mahmud (1)</td>
<td>BSc, Business</td>
<td>Elected from her husband former MP Iqbal Hasan Mahmud’s constituency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hasina Ahmed (1)</td>
<td>LLM, Business</td>
<td>Wife of former Minister Salauddin Ahmed and contested in his seat.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nilufar Zafarullah (1)</td>
<td>BSc, Home maker</td>
<td>Contested in her husband Kazi Zafrullah’s seat.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rebeka Momin (1)</td>
<td>MA, Home maker</td>
<td>Wife of late AL leader and contested in his constituency</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Most of the general seats women MPs also exhibited the same trends as men. From 1972-2008, 37 women were elected 43 times in general seats and the profiles of 33 were reviewed. A few of these women returned to parliament more than once (as shown in brackets in Table 5.12). Among the 33 directly elected women, 22 were related to male political leaders. According to the available information, only five women who assumed the party leadership due to their relationship with male party leaders managed to get elected more than once. The remainder 17 women were elected from their male family member’s seat and they did not continue their political career. Ironically they were never subject of criticism, only when a female is elected to reserved seats due to a family linkage people become cynical. The remaining 11 women were elected due to their background of strong political activism, and nine of them were elected to reserved seats first. Also it is evident that general and reserved seats women exhibit almost similar backgrounds in terms of education. Yet, more women from diverse professional backgrounds were elected to reserved seats compare to general seat women who were mostly either home maker or businesswomen.

Another important aspect of criticism against reserved seats women is their lack of involvement with women’s movement or display consciousness about women’s issues. Nonetheless, I found very few women were involved in NGOs and women’s organizations besides their parties. There are two different reasons behind this non-involvement. Firstly, political parties consider the contribution of the candidates to the
parties, and not their involvement in women’s organizations. And their identity as party worker weighs more than their identity as women activists. Besides, the absence of a linkage between women’s organizations and political parties naturally limits the entry of any women activists into parliament through party nomination. However, there is no restriction on party workers from being involved with women’s movement in their personal capacity which some women do. And secondly, the women activist themselves also stay away from involvement with political parties and in electoral politics. Some claim that there are many women organizers who are eligible for contesting elections (only if direct election to reserved seats is introduced) but until now no or a very few woman activists and leaders have contested for general seats. They know the reality of electoral politics which operates in a different way than women’s organizations do. The track record of independent candidates is not encouraging at all. Until now not a single independent female candidate has been able to win election in Bangladesh.

Reserved Seats Women: More Accused than Valued

From the analysis of the data in Pakistan and Bangladesh, I find that in terms of educational qualifications quota women were not unqualified. Moreover, quality is an abstract term which is difficult to analyse or define. It is a context and time specific value laden concept. The quality of women in terms of education should be measured against the overall educational state of female which is low compare to that of men. Since there is no educational bar to contesting election, many females and males without any university qualification had been elected to general seats in Pakistan and Bangladesh. This indicates that educational qualification is not an important criterion for being elected as an MP.

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71 During a press conference of Social Protest Committee, women leaders challenged the statement of the Law Minster and claimed that there were at least 500 women leaders and organizers who are qualified and willing to contest election (Daily Janokkhontho 10 March, 2004, p.7).
From this perspective, reserved seats women without any institutional degrees should not be termed as ‘unqualified’. However compared to Bangladesh, more educated and highly educated women entered in the post 2002 Pakistan National Assemblies. Some of these women received their education at world renowned universities abroad.

In terms of profession, most of the reserved seats women were involved in political and social activities. Some held important position in party decision making bodies and some were leaders of the women’s wings of the party. Again women from diverse professions like medicine, law, research, teaching, journalism and business entered in parliament. Pakistani women had more diversity in professional background compare to those in Bangladesh. In Bangladesh’s parliament teachers and lawyers and business women were most visible.

In terms of class, most of the reserved seat women in Pakistan National Assembly were either from the elite, feudal or urban based upper classes and few women were from upper middle class or middle class backgrounds. In Bangladesh, most of the women were from middle class and upper middle class backgrounds and very few were from the upper strata or elite class. However, which women will be indirectly elected to reserved seats also depends on the class composition or background of the political parties (as most of the political parties in Pakistan are dominated by feudal lords), as it is the political parties that undertake the selection process. The findings indicate that in Pakistan, more women were elected to reserved seats based on their elite status and connection with male political leaders compared to Bangladesh. Also experienced women entered in the twelfth National Assembly and in the thirteenth National Assembly the number of women with previous experience increased significantly but such a result is absent in Bangladesh. This
implies that the Pakistan National Assembly had more women with experience and skills in legislative dealings compare to that in Bangladesh.

From this analysis it can be argued that Pakistani women legislators were qualitatively stronger than those of Bangladesh. In terms of political ambition, most of the reserved seats women were politically ambitious and were interested in competing for general seats and some of whom did. Many failed to get nomination due to the masculinist norms of the parties. Also the findings reveal that reserved seats women had national and local level political experiences. However, from the overall analysis of the data, it appears that over the years different kinds of women were elected to reserved seats in Pakistan and Bangladesh. Based on the available information, I categorize the reserved seats women elected to reserved seats into four types and describe them in Table 5.13.

Table 5.13: Classification of women elected to reserved seats in Pakistan and Bangladesh

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Types of women</th>
<th>Education and experience</th>
<th>Social status and backgrounds</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Women political workers and leaders at the district/national levels</td>
<td>Educated/well-educated, experienced in local politics and newcomer in parliament</td>
<td>Mostly belongs to the middle class and upper middle class and no relation to party leaders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Women associated with political leaders</td>
<td>Well/less/no education; mostly newcomer in parliament and politics.</td>
<td>Mostly belongs to the upper class and feudal families.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Women associated with human right activism/ women activists</td>
<td>Highly educated/ professionals; electoral and legislative experiences/newcomer</td>
<td>Some belongs to middle /upper /feudal class ; and some related to male political leaders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Women in important positions in the party policy making bodies</td>
<td>Educated and experienced in electoral politics</td>
<td>Have feudal or political/ middle class background, related to politically influential families and leaders.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Reserved Seats Women Parliamentarians: Challenging the Myth

Considering the overall electoral reality of Pakistan and Bangladesh, and reviewing the attributes of women legislators, it can be argued that reserved seats women closely resemble to directly elect female members of parliaments. This proves that direct and indirect elections produce almost similar kind of women legislators. Indirect election did not have any impact on the background of reserved seats women. However, women elected through direct elections were found to be more elite and beneficiaries of nepotism and privilege in Pakistan and Bangladesh. They also had less experience of local politics. In weakly institutionalized party structures and informal nomination systems, small groups of party elites are involved in the selection process of candidates in general seats and elite women from families with considerable political and economic clout were preferred due to their ability to finance the huge election costs and gain constituency backing. Thus my research supports Josefsson’s (2014) and Weeks and Baldez (2014) findings that directly elected women are more likely to be from the elite and have less local experience than indirectly elected reserved seats women. Therefore, that reserved seats open the gate for only elite women to enter the legislatures is found to be a myth in these cases.

The data implies that both general and reserved seats women do not necessarily resemble their constituents. The educational, professional and political data confirm that women legislators were more educated and had more professional and political opportunities than do general women in society. Beyond their sex, they appeared unrepresentative of women in the population. Some of the women legislators were more elite than others. Yet generally elected women are less likely to subject to charges, as in the case of reserved seats women, of being unrepresentative of women (Franceschet and Piscopo 2012). Also
the data shows that in undemocratic party structures most of the members are chosen for their political and family connection and loyalty to party but only reserved seats women are labelled negatively as being too loyal or surrogate representatives (Xydias 2007; Bilal 2004). The findings also reveal that most of the reserved seats women are politically and socially active individuals with political ambitions. There is diversity among women in terms of class and professions. Thus evidence negates the continued characterization of reserved seats women as elite, unqualified, politically un-ambitious or mere tokens of their families.

Finally the data confirms that reserved seats women legislators did not exactly mirror the female constituents and were comparatively elite. Yet it is expected that based on gender identity, professional and political background and experiences of gender discrimination in patriarchal societies, women legislators, if not all, would be more inclined to act for women. Therefore, the next chapters examine the representation of women’s issues by reserved seats women in different sites of representation with the intention being to approve or disprove the link between the descriptive presence of women and the substantive representation of women.
Chapter 6: Reserved Seats Women Legislators: The ‘Voice’ of Women in the Parliament

This chapter asks two important questions: do reserved seat women act for women? And to what extent do general seat women act for women? In the previous chapters I argued that the reserved seats provision has contributed significantly to increasing the number of women in parliament and reserved seats women are not only elite or unqualified as the exiting knowledge holds. The question is whether reserved seats women substantively represent women – have they spoken for women in the parliamentary debates and performed critical acts for women in their constituency and party (Murray 2008; Dahlerup 2006b; Mansbridge 2005). Some researchers have contended that due to the ‘added’ nature of reserved seats and in the absence of a constituency, reserved seat women are more likely to become ‘tokens’.

Further it is assumed that the legislative autonomy of reserved seats women is likely to be circumscribed due to their selection by party elites instead of by a constituency or women’s organizations (Krook 2013; Zetterberg 2009; Tinker 2004). Many argue that reserved seats women are not directly elected and have no constituency. They are neither accountable nor responsible to women constituents rather their loyalty lies with the party and party leadership (Bari 2010; Bilal 2006; Tripp 2004). Moreover, it is noted that the quota label diminishes the power of women legislators to manoeuvre (Franceschet and Piscopo 2008; Frankl 2004). Such assumptions are explicitly and implicitly related to the indirectly elected reserved seats women’s ability to represent credibly women’s issues. On the contrary, it is assumed that directly elected women with constituency backing
have more leverage and autonomy to act independently of party pressure (Zetterberg 2008). However, the extent to which general seat women represent women compared to those in reserved seat has yet to be analysed. I want to fill this void in the literature and explore the substantive representation of general and reserved seats women in the legislative debates.

Thus I test whether reserved seats women legislators can substantively represent women or not. Moreover, I inquire whether indirect or direct election impacts on the substantive representation of women. For this purpose, I empirically examine the variations in the representation of women’s issues in the legislative debates caused by mode of election (women elected on reserved seats through indirect election and general seats through direct election); and context (women legislators in two different countries) to provide empirical evidence of women’s substantive representation. I also explore the acts reserved seats women performed for women in different sites of representation such as constituency, and party level. The overall findings and analysis are divided into two chapters. In this chapter, I provide evidence of the articulation of women’s issues by reserved seat and general seat women in the legislative debates in different parliaments in Pakistan and Bangladesh. The following chapter focuses in detail on the acts reserved seats women performed outside the legislative arena.

**Exploring Women’s Substantive Representation in the Legislative Debates**

In this research, I construct women’s issues as those identified by women legislators as issues of concern to women. Though their statements did not guarantee the representation of the issues in legislative fora they did indicate women’s empathy and awareness of women’s issues (Josefsson 2014). By asking questions like what you think constitute
women’s issues? And whether you acted on these issues and how? I obtained different responses that contained a wide variety of views and perspectives on what constitutes women’s issues in Pakistan and Bangladesh (Celis 2009). It was also a way to distinguished feminist and other issues.

Pakistani female MNAs mentioned several issues which they deemed of importance to act upon. Women legislators identified violence against women, patriarchalism, feudalism and religious mind-set, legal discrimination against women, women’s rights, financial independence, political awareness, internally displaced people (IDP), and health and education as the most important issues to focus in the context of Pakistan. A female legislator opined that ‘I don’t think we can say distinctly these are women’s issues and these are not. I think every parliamentarian would try to reflect the issues that are of concern in that particular context’ (PKMNA-14). Yet, I list these issues because most of the women identified them as women’s issues.

In Bangladesh, women legislators identified poverty, employment, health, education, violence against women, women and children, and RELIGIOUS fundamentalism as the most important issues of women in the present context. One female legislator (BDMP-2) mentioned that ‘every aspect of society, from education to employment to health is women’s issue’. However, Bangladeshi women did not mention the issue of discriminatory laws as identified by Pakistani women. The existence of tribal customary practices and discriminatory laws like the Hudood Ordinance, Karo-Kari in the Pakistani context may have provided Pakistani women legislators with the impetus to concentrate on this issue. The issues identified by women legislators also comprised the core aspect of different international and regional policy scripts on women such as, CEDAW, the Beijing Platform for Action and the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation
Thus women’s issues in Pakistan and Bangladesh to a great extent reflect many of the broader and core issues of women around the globe. Here I have grouped the issues into several thematic areas such as: violence against women, women and children, women and legal system, material interests of women, women’s rights issues, women and politics, and women and society.

To examine whether women spoke on those issues they termed as ‘women’s issues’ during the legislative debates, a content analysis of the daily bulletins of three parliaments in Pakistan and Bangladesh was conducted. I wanted to explore whether the system of election impacted on women’s acts of substantive representation and for that I investigated the substantive representation of directly elected general seat women legislators. The focus of this examination was on the representation of different issues of women by general and reserved seats women rather than the actual number of general seat and reserved seat women elected in those legislatures. Legislators made interventions through resolutions, Calling Attention Notices (CAN), point of order, privilege motion, and adjournment motion and through participation in the motion and debates on bills. During these interventions any speeches of women legislators that referred to women’s experiences, identities, policy issues and opinions were counted as representing women. I examined both the nature and number of such intervention (rules used, issue covered and the number of representations) and the category of women-reserved seats (RS) and general seat (GS). To do that, the number of times general and reserved seats women initiated debates in reference to any of the women’s issues and the number of times they spoke for women during those debates was recorded separately and then combined and

72Although violence against women does not appear in the formal articles of the CEDAW Convention, the CEDAW Committee has, since 1992, considered the eradication of violence against women to be central to the elimination of discrimination (Baldez 2011).
compared. The quantitative data generated from the content analysis of the parliamentary debates is complemented with the qualitative information from interviews and secondary sources.

I undertook content analysis of the daily bulletins of the tenth, twelfth and thirteenth national assemblies of Pakistan. However, each parliament had a different number of sessions and working days. The tenth National Assembly lasted for only three years and content analysis of 230 working days was conducted. However, this assembly had no reserved seats for women and only four women were directly elected in this parliament. The twelfth National Assembly of 2002 had 73 women, 13 in general seats and 60 in reserved seats. It conducted its business over 385 days during 44 sessions and content analysis was conducted of 41 session and 382 days (daily journal of three sessions was confidential and unavailable). The thirteenth National Assembly had 63 sessions and conducted its business over 456 days. There were 77 women, 17 in general seats and 60 in reserved seats. The data however, was collected from 44 sessions and 351 days. The number of debates initiated on each issue and the speeches given by women legislators during these debates in each parliament is presented in the tables below.

Table 6.1: Pakistani general and reserved seat women MNAs representation of violence against women issue

<table>
<thead>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number of time debate initiated</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Categories of women</td>
<td>GS</td>
<td>RS</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. of debates initiated by</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>-</td>
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<tr>
<td>No. of times women spoke</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>1</td>
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</table>

Table 6.1 presents the issues represented in the national assemblies of Pakistan in regard to violence against women. In the tenth National Assembly no interventions were made
by general seat women on this issue. In the twelfth National Assembly, debate was initiated 14 times by reserved seat women legislators on this issue and they spoke 26 times during these debates. A general seat woman spoke once on this issue. Women legislators criticised the legal system for failing to ensure justice for rape victims condemned an attack on women during a marathon race and the murder of women on the pretext of Karo-Kari or Honour killing. Women legislators demanded justice for Mukhtaran Mai, a victim of gang rape and criticised the release of the accused rapist. They were critical of ‘Honour killing’ and legal and social discrimination against women. During these speeches women made specific reference to the laws that justified the Karo-Kari in the name of Islam and Honour. During the debates ruling party reserved seat MNAs said that:

The killing in the name of Karo-Kari and honour is on the increase. Since the Pakistan has been created, 56 years have passed and in these years, human civilizations have evolved in 21st century while it is seemed that Pakistan society is still in the 17th and 18th century. This is an issue of seven and half crore women. (Mehnaz Rafi, Extracted and translated from The National Assembly of Pakistan Debates, 30 March 2004, p.2414).

I would like to ask what these people are doing and it is imperative for us to legislate about this matter particularly about the sections 338, 302, 308, 311, 306, 307, 309. The dignity of women is being trampled in our society.

73Mukhtaran Mai was brutally gang-raped on the orders of her village council, because of an offence her 12-year-old brother was alleged to have committed. She started her legal battle against the powerful clans for justice and became a national and international symbol of oppression and courage (The Express Tribune 22 April 2011).
Reserved seat MNA Fauzia Wahab criticised the extremist group’s ideology and their attack on women during the marathon in Gujranwala and said:

Due to these people our religion has adopted an image of a regressive religion. They are afraid of women. Due to these very people women like Madam Curie, Florence Nightingale or Mother Teresa does not appear on the horizon of the Muslim Ummah (Extracted and translated The National Assembly of Pakistan Debates, 11 April 2005, pp.122-125).74

During the debate in the 24th session of the twelfth National Assembly, reserved seat MNA Samia Raheel Qazi (MMA) strongly condemned police violence on girl student during a demonstration and staged a walk out in protest (The National Assembly of Pakistan Debates, 12 April 2005, pp.141-144).

In the thirteenth National Assembly, reserved seats women MNAs initiated debate on violence against women nine times and general seat women did so three times. Reserved seats women spoke 16 times and general seat women spoke five times during these debates. Issue like forced religious conversion of minority girls, kidnapping and gang rape of minor girls, increased incidence of kidnapping and acid violence on women and burying of five women alive in the name of tribal honour were discussed. Reserved seat MNA Ishrat Ashraf raised the issue of government’s failure to arrest the criminals who

74 My thanks go to Muhammad Wahiduzzaman, senior translator National Assembly of Pakistan who assisted me in translating the speeches of women legislators from Urdu to English.
buried five women alive in Baluchistan and staged a walk out in protest\textsuperscript{75}. Thus both general and reserved seats women acted to focus parliament’s attention on the extent and nature of violence committed against women in the name of custom, religion and honour. However, reserved seats women made a greater contribution on this issue.

Table 6.2: Pakistani general and reserved seat women MNAs representation of women and legal system

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<tr>
<td>Total no of debate initiated</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Categories of women</td>
<td>GS</td>
<td>RS</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>No of debate initiated by</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No of times women spoke</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6.2 presents the representation by women legislators in debates in regard to women related bills. In the tenth National Assembly, no debate was initiated on women-related bills by any general seat women legislator. In twelfth National Assembly, debate on this issue was initiated 11 times by reserved seats women only. Reserved seats women spoke 25 times for the reform of the legal system to repeal discriminatory laws and practice against women and ensure justice for women but two reserved seat women of the MMA raised concern against Criminal Law Amendment Bill 2006 that aimed to repeal discriminatory laws and practices against women twice\textsuperscript{76}. They argued that the Hudood law was enacted in conformity with Quran and Hadiath and the Constitution of Pakistan.

\textsuperscript{75}The provincial government tried to cover up the incident and manipulated the local administration and the law enforcement agencies because of the alleged involvement of influential tribal and political families. As a result no FIR was registered (Bari and Bari 2008).

\textsuperscript{76} The two main religious parties of the alliance of Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal (MMA) are the Jamaat-e-Islami (JI) and the Jamiate-Ulema-e-Islam (Fazlur Rehman Group). During the passage of the bill the MMA voted against the bill (Mirza 2011).
They declared that the bill is un-Islamic and would not offer protection to women. Further they opined that the bill would increase vulgarity and westernize the country (The National Assembly of Pakistan Debates, 8 June 2004, pp.822-839). General seats women spoke only three times on this issue during these debates.

Opposition reserved seat legislator Sherry Rehman moved two private member’s bills: ‘The Criminal Law (Amendment) Bill, 2004’ and ‘The Protection and Empowerment of Women Bill 2004’. During the motion for Introduction of the (Criminal Law Amendment) Bill 2004, Sherry Rehman said:

A number of innocent men and women are killed in the name of honour killing. We have given minimum amendments on Pakistan Penal code and Criminal Procedure code. We pray that Honour killing and Karo- Kari killing may be declared murder case. And murders may not be reconciled (Extracted and translated from The National Assembly of Pakistan Debates, 6 April 2004, pp.3155-3158).

The bill dealt with the elimination of ‘honour’ killings in Pakistan and had provisions to end waiver and exemption of Qisas and compromises in crimes committed in the name of ‘honour’ (as discussed in chapter four and also see Appendix-2). The motion on Sherry Rehman’s bill was delayed and deferred many times and finally rejected. However, the eventual government bill on ending honour crime which was passed by the National Assembly did not have both the provisions on Qisas and compensation (Mirza 2011; Mirza and Wagha 2009).
As mentioned earlier, the Qisas and Diyat provisions have provided a statutory right to the heirs of the deceased to pardon the killer/s, and to ask for compensation or demand retribution77. These provisions are used in cases of ‘honour’ killings as the majority of such murders of women in Pakistan are committed by family members who either benefit from these provisions or are ‘forgiven’ by the heirs of the deceased. Without amending or revoking the provision of Qisas and Diyat, murderers of women cannot be punished (Shirkat Gah 2012). Reserved seats women legislators of both the ruling and opposition parties played a critical role in the formulation and passage of the bill that became the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act (Honour Killing) 2004. The Act only declared honour killing as ‘cold- blooded’ murder (WPC 2010).

Another important government bill which became the Protection of Women (Criminal Laws Amendment) Act 2006 amended two ordinances of the Hudood Law: Zina and Qazf78. The Women Protection Act 2006 moved all the provisions of Zina Ordinance back to the Pakistan Penal Code including rape and gang rape. The Act also made a clear distinction between Tazir and Hadd in the Zina Ordinance.

77 These provisions exempted some relations from any mandatory imprisonment sentences. A parent can kill a child or a grandchild and the only sentence under the law is blood money, though the Court has the discretion to sentence the accused to imprisonment for twenty five years depending upon the facts and circumstances of the case. There is no minimum sentence mentioned in the law. There is a similar provision for a spouse killing the other spouse provided there is a living child at the time of the killing (Shirkat Gah 2012; Mirza 2011).

78 On 15 November 2006, the National Assembly passed the official bill ‘The Protection of Women (Criminal Laws Amendment) Bill, 2006, moved by the government on 21 August 2006. The bill carried 29 amendments in two of the Hudood Ordinances (the Offences of Zina and Qazf Ordinances). Some of its salient features were: it separated the Hadd and Tazir offences/punishments in the above two ordinances; rape (zina-bil-jabr) was also separated from fornication/adultery and shifted to the PPC from the Zina Ordinance with punishment of death or imprisonment not less than twenty five years. In the case of gang rape each will face same punishments; however, the offence of fornication (all sex outside marriage) was inserted in the PPC as separate sections (496B & 496C) with imprisonment up to five years and fine up to ten thousands rupees (Mirza and Wagha 2009, p. 57)
The Act also brought changes to the reporting procedure of Zina. After the enactment of the Act, the victim of rape no more bound to produce four male pious eye witness Muslims to present evidence. The person who complaints or comes with the charge of rape does not have to face the charges of Zina and the circumstantial evidences are required to investigate the case. This Act protects women as women can no longer be arrested and imprisoned on just the mere accusation of Zina (Mehdi 2010). It blocked the path of false FIRs in the cases of Zina because after the enactment of new law it becomes difficult for the people to wrongly implicate the people on the charges of adultery or Zina.

Reserved seats women Sherry Rahman, Kashmala Tariq, Mehnaz Rafi and other women from both the ruling and opposition parties spoke in support of the bill to repeal these discriminatory law and practices against women. However, evidence indicates that during the debates on this bill only two reserved seat women legislators of the right wing parties (MMA) spoke against the bill and oppose the passage of the bill.

The Domestic Violence Bill moved by Ms. Sherry Rehman also provoked a long and heated debate in parliament. During the debate a few male members opposed the bill and justified the beating of wife according to Sharia law. Reserved seat MNA Samia Raheel Qazi of MMA protested and urged the male members not to interpret the Quran wrongly. She said:

79Previously arrest warrants were sanctioned on the basis of a complaint of Zina. After the enactment of the law, any complaint regarding Zina or Qazf must to go to the District or Session judge along with the statement of four witnesses. If the judge finds that the complaint is genuine, only then the application is accepted, and a warrant can be issued for arrest (Mehdi 2010).
Any person, husband or father has no right to adopt threatening attitude. We also oppose the wrong explanation of Qur’anic verses that man has right to beat their wives and women (Extracted and translated from The National Assembly of Pakistan Debates, 8 August 2006, pp.344-346)

In the thirteenth National Assembly, reserved seats women initiated 16 debates on women-related bills and voiced their concerns and views in support of the bills 58 times. General seat women did not initiate any debate on these issues but during the debates they spoke six times. Women legislators during this term submitted and spoke for the passage of women-related bills that exemplify female parliamentarians’ active role in bringing up new ideas on women’s rights and legal issues. Some of these bills were: The Prevention of Anti-women Practices (Criminal Law Amendment) Bill 2008, National Women Commission Bill 2008, The Criminal Law (Amendment) Bill 2009 (on sexual harassment), The Prevention of Harassment at Work Place Bill 2008, The Reproductive Health Care Right Bill 2009, and The Acid Crime and Prevention Bill 2010. During the motion on The Criminal Law (Amendment) Bill 2009 (on sexual harassment) reserved seat MNA advocate Anusha Rahman Khan said:

All NGOs and parliamentarians are involved in this bill and the women who are working in public sector, private sector, fields and brick field. This will empower women; they can take action and register the complaint in police against the violation. (Extracted and translated from The National Assembly of Pakistan Debates, 4 November 2009, pp.256-258)
The Prevention of Anti-women Practices (Criminal Law Amendment) Bill 2008 which later became an Act in 2011 dealt with issues such as depriving women of their inheritance and forcing them into marriage to settle disputes (Yasin 2011).

The Prevention of Harassment at Work Place, Bill 2008 which later became The Protection against Harassment of Women at the Workplace Act 2010 provided for protection against sexual harassment of women at the workplace and a safe working environment for females (WPC 2011b). It aimed to legitimise and strengthen women’s presence in the public arena. The Acid Control and Acid Crime Prevention Bill 2009 proposed the rehabilitation of acid burn victims, and urged the government to set up a separate institution for this purpose. Advocate Anusha Rehman recommended follow-up legislation by the provinces to make the law more effective. Female MNAs from all political parties called for an effective implementation mechanism to ensure enhanced punishments for those responsible for acid crimes against women (Khan 2011).

Pakistani women MNAs also actively spoke in support of Reproductive Health Care Rights Bill 2009 that provided comprehensive reproductive healthcare services particularly to women in remote areas and marginalized groups. Dr. Attiya Enayetullah while presenting the bill described the urgency of such acts in the context of Pakistan by providing relevant data and urged parliament to ensure the reproductive rights of women especially rural and poor women. Other important bills supported by women legislators and which became Acts were: National Commission on the Status of Women Bill 2012
and Women in Distress and Detention Fund (Amendment) Bill 2010. The National Commission on the Status of Women Act 2012 established the Commission as a permanent body with the task of ensuring the implementation of women protection legislation and the prevention of abuses against women. The Women in Distress and Detention Fund Act 2011 provided legal and financial assistance to women in distress condition and women languishing in jail (Mirza 2011).

Women legislators during the debates expressed their frustration and disappointment on the delay of the presentation of reports on women related bills and on reservations to the Domestic Violence Bill. Through the submission of many women-related bills and speaking for their passage women legislators advocated women’s inheritance, legal and reproductive rights. They also spoke for the passage of bills that explicitly recognized acid violence and forced marriage to so-called ‘honour killings' as criminal acts and bills that afforded protection, support and legal action for victims (UN Women 2012). The passage of the Domestic Violence Bill submitted and supported by women from all the parties brought domestic violence within the purview of the state which had previously considered the matter as a domestic issue and therefore excluded from state jurisdiction. The number of times women legislators, especially reserved seat women, spoke for these bills indicate that Pakistani women made an impact in relation to feminist legislation and acted to ensure the protection of women’s human, social and legal rights.

80The National Commission on the Status of Women Act has afforded the Commission new financial and administrative autonomy, and therefore better scope to investigate women’s rights violations (Jamal 2012).
In Table 6.3, the debates initiated on the issue of women and politics in the three national assemblies is presented. No women MNA initiated any debate or spoke on this issue in the tenth National Assembly. In the twelfth National Assembly, only reserved seats women initiated debate on this issue eight times and during these debates spoke 17 times. They spoke about the apparent discrimination against reserved seats and opposition MNAs in terms of allocation of time during the debates and in regard to development funds, the nomination of more women in general seats and the lack of support systems and development funds and non-coverage of the discussion of women’s issues in the assembly by Pakistan Television (PTV). They raised concerns about the arrest and detention of a directly elected opposition female MNA without an arrest warrant. One opposition general seat woman once spoke about her arrest and detention for two days without any arrest warrant, an event which was indicative of the challenges women politicians face in the political culture of anonymity and vengeance.

During the debate reserved seats women parliamentarians made formal complaints to the Speaker for discrimination against reserved seats women MNAs. Ms Zeb Gohar Ayub, on a point of order, protested that women elected to ‘reserved seats’ were being completely ignored during assembly proceedings. She requested the Speaker to devise a mechanism for creating special opportunities, for example ‘Zero Hours’ for women parliamentarians.
to be able to participate effectively in the assembly proceedings (The National Assembly of Pakistan Debates, 27 October 2003, p.606).

Dr. Rozina Tufail, on a point of order, urged parliament to change the law to make it mandatory for political parties to allocate a certain percentage of general seats for women so that they could come to the House as elected members, and male parliamentarians would not have any grudge about female members or the allocated development funds (The National Assembly of Pakistan Debates, 7 February 2006, p.1770).

In the thirteenth National Assembly a reserved seat woman MNA brought a resolution and spoke about the need to establish a Women’s Parliamentary Caucus. Another general seat woman spoke once about the issue of the non-availability of female doctors and nurses in the parliamentary lodge the lack of which posed problem for females who were religious and reluctant to interact with male. However, the number of debates on these issues was higher in the twelfth National Assembly when mostly reserved seats women invoked their experiences of discriminations to make their argument for a political environment of equality and respect. Complaints about discrimination against reserved seats women and their participation in the legislative process were however absent in the thirteenth National Assembly.

Table 6.4: Pakistani general and reserved seat women MNAs representation of women’s material interests

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total no of debates initiated</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Categories of women</td>
<td>RS</td>
<td>GS</td>
<td>RS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No of debate initiated</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No of times women spoke</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>6</td>
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</table>
The data on women’s material interests presented during the assembly proceedings by women MNAs is presented in Table 6.4. It shows that in the tenth National Assembly, no debate was initiated on this issue and no woman MNA spoke about women’s material needs. In the twelfth National Assembly, only reserved seats women intervened on issues regarding women’s material needs. Reserved seats women MNAs initiated five debates and expressed the different concerns of women six times. Issues such as, conditions for working women, problems of women commuters, the photographs of women in National Identification Card (NIC), and provision of father’s name in the NIC were brought to the attention of the House. The representations of general seats women was absent on these issues. In the thirteenth National Assembly reserved seats women initiated three debates on women’s practical needs and on five occasions raised issues like emission of radiation waves from mobile towers resulting in health hazards like abnormal births and fatal illness, non-release of funds for a women’s university, and the construction of hostels for working women. As with previous assemblies, general seat women did not speak on these issues at all. The low number of debates on this group of issues indicates that reserved seats women placed less emphasis on the material needs of women when compared with other issues, but they were still active than their general seat counterparts.

Table 6.5: Pakistani general and reserved seat women MNAs representation of women and children issue

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total no of debates</td>
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<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Categories of women</td>
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<td>GS RS</td>
<td>GS RS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No of debates initiated by</td>
<td>1 - 9</td>
<td>- 21 3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No of times women spoke</td>
<td>1 -</td>
<td>21 3</td>
<td></td>
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81 It refers to women’s practical issues of gaining access to education, employment, accommodation, training, health supports, transportation, financial and other support systems that are relevant for women’s socio-economic well-being empowerment.
Intervention on the topic of women and children and their representation in the selected assemblies are recorded in Table 6.5. In the tenth National Assembly debates, the issues remained unrepresented. In twelfth National Assembly, a reserved seats woman raised and spoke about this issue once. In the thirteenth National Assembly, reserved seats women MNAs initiated debates on children related issues and bills nine times and they expressed concerns about the state of children’s rights 21 times. Issues such as the increase in the number of incidents of child abuse, acts or practices that hindered girls’ education and increased child labour were highlighted in the House. General seat women spoke three times during these debates. Some of the significant bills related to children submitted and discussed by women were: The Criminal Law Amendment Bill 2012 (rape and unnatural offences with minors), Compulsory Education for Children Bill 2008 (to ensure free and compulsory education for all children aged between five and sixteen), The Child Marriage Restraint (A) Bill 2009, and The Charter of Childs Rights Bill 2009. It is evident that women legislators were not confined to representing of women’s issues but also increasingly focused on children’s status and rights. Thus they brought more of a carer’s perspective to the legislative debates of the thirteenth National Assembly.

Table 6.6: Pakistani general and reserved seat women MNAs representation of women and society issue

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total no of debate initiated</td>
<td>1</td>
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<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Categories of women</td>
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<td>RS</td>
<td>GS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No of debate initiated by</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No of times women spoke</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>3</td>
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Table 6.6 presents the number of debate initiated on women and society issue in the selected three national assemblies. In the tenth National Assembly, one general seat
woman initiated a debate and spoke on this issue. In the twelfth National Assembly, reserved seats women initiated 14 debates during the five years term and spoke 52 times on different issues in society that concern women. Compared to reserved seats women, general seat women initiated debates once and spoke three times. Issues such as, law and order, increases in the prices of daily commodities and the plight of flood affected people were among the issues discussed by women.

In the thirteenth National Assembly reserved seats women initiated debate 17 times and expressed their concerns and experiences 34 times. General seats women initiated debate once and only spoke three times. Women during these debates raised issues that affect women disproportionately, such as the rapid increase of HIV and Aids, human trafficking, increasing use of narcotics by youth, increases in the ratio of poverty, law and order in Swat- a district in Kyber Pakhtunkhwa province and provisions for disabled persons.

Table 6.7: Pakistani general and reserved seat women MNAs representation of women’s rights issue

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<tbody>
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<td>Total no debates initiated</td>
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<td>10</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Categories of women</td>
<td>RS</td>
<td>GS</td>
<td>RS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No of debate initiated by</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No of times women voiced women’s issues</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>1</td>
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In Table 6.7 includes women’s rights issues as represented by women legislators in the selected national assemblies. In the tenth National Assembly, no representations on these issues were recorded. In the twelfth National Assembly, only reserved seats women initiated five debates on women’s rights issues and expressed their concerns 11 times. One general seat woman spoke on these issues just once. In the thirteenth National Assembly reserved seats women initiated nine debates out of 10 holds on women’s rights
issues. They voiced women’s rights issues 18 times and drew the attention of the House to issues such as preventing women from casting the vote and the violation of women’s rights in the Swat valley by the Taliban. They were critical of Dr. Afia Siddique’s arrest, her handover to US authority and imprisonment\textsuperscript{82}. One general seats woman initiated a debate and spoke on these issues just once. The representation of these issues indicated that women were critical of government’s failure and unwillingness to protect women’s political and civic rights. However, women’s rights issues were also addressed in bills like the Pakistan Citizenship (Amendment) Bill which intended to remove gender inequality by granting citizenship to the foreign husbands of Pakistani women on the same terms as granted to foreign wives of Pakistani men.

The data shows that during the three years tenure of the tenth National Assembly, no elected women raised any issues specific to women’s practical or strategic needs or submitted or supported any women related bills. During that period many women languished in jail under Zina ordinance, were killed in the name of honour and women’s representation dropped to around 1 percent due to the lapse of women’s reserved seats provision. General seat women did not raise these issues in the parliament and representation was limited to only one female MNA.

In the twelfth National Assembly, women parliamentarians raised women’s issues 60 times during the 44 sessions of the assembly. A total 35 reserved seats women initiated debate 58 times out of a total of 60 interventions and general seats women initiated two.

\textsuperscript{82}Dr. Afia Siddique is a Pakistani born neuroscientist who was convicted of terrorist activism and attempted murder of US military official. She was arrested in Pakistan and handed over to US. The court sentenced her to 86 years imprisonment in a Texas penitentiary (The Independent 27 September 2014. Accessed from: http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia).
During these 60 debates, both general and reserved seats women spoke together on six issues. During the 58 interventions reserved seats women spoke 140 times on issues that directly or indirectly affected women and general seat women spoke only nine times. The overall contribution made by general seats women was 6 against 94 percent contribution by reserved seats women. Out of 13 general seat women, only four (30 percent) of the women spoke about women’s issues compare to 35 (58 percent) reserved seats women.

In the thirteenth National Assembly, women legislators initiated debate on women’s issues 70 times in the legislative process, general seats women only 7 times and reserved seats women 63 times. Reserved seats women during the total of 63 debates spoke 153 times on women’s issues and general seat women spoke 19 times. Of the total number of times women spoke for women in the debates, general seat women’s contribution was 11 percent against the 89 percent of reserved seats women. However, the number of general seats women who voiced women’s issues increased from four to eight in this assembly. Yet, compared to 39 (65 percent) of reserved seats women, only eight (47 percent) general seats women out of 17 spoke on women’s issues. However, the overall number of speeches shows that representation of women’s issues increased in the thirteenth National Assembly from the previous twelfth assembly.

From the overall analysis of women’s representation in different national assembly, the following table is developed with a comparative view of the representation of women’s issues by general and reserved seat women along with their number in each National Assembly.
Table 6.8: A comparative view of numbers of Pakistani general and reserved seats women MNAs and their representation of women’s issues

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>National Assembly</th>
<th>General seats women</th>
<th>Representation of general seat women</th>
<th>Reserved seats women</th>
<th>Representation of reserved seats women</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Actual no.</td>
<td>% of total women</td>
<td>No. of times women spoke</td>
<td>% of total contribution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10th (1993-1996)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12th (2002-2007)</td>
<td>13</td>
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<td>6</td>
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<tr>
<td>13th (2008-2012)</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>11</td>
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Table 6.8 shows that the representation of women’s issues by the general seat remained low in each National Assembly. This is not surprising as general seat women’s lower contribution to overall representation of women’s issues corresponded to their low number of presence. However, what needs to be considered here is that the focus of this research was not on the number of general or reserved seats women as such. Rather it was grounded in the idea that general seats women due to their direct election and constituency support have more autonomy and independence. Therefore it was expected that general seats women are more capable and can represent critical issues of women more than indirectly elected reserved seats women. However, the findings indicate that directly elected general seat women in spite of constituency support and autonomy spoke less for women and on critical issues.
In contrast the data reveal that the number of reserved seats women and their representation of women’s issue were higher than those of general seats women in the twelfth and thirteenth national assemblies. Reserved seats women rather than bringing the material interests of women to the floor, focused more on violence against women and amendment of customary laws and practices which were used against women to suppress and deny their rights. They worked to repeal the Hudood ordinance that had been in force for more than a decade and none of the previously democratically elected governments initiated any amendment to the laws.

My analysis clearly shows that reserved seats women MNAs brought those issues that were responsible for the subordinate status of women in Pakistan to the floor. Women legislators used all the available parliamentary rules of procedures and mechanisms to represent women’s needs and perspectives. They introduced and spoke on women’s issues through calling attention notices (CAN), points of order, private members bill and resolutions, adjournment motions, and even staged walkouts. They also introduced and spoke on issues relating to women and society under rules 87 and 259 (matter of sufficient public interest and urgent matter of public interest and short discussion). Reserved seats women presented their views and perspectives on different issues regarding women with arguments, experience and relevant data. Women legislators devoted their time and efforts to present the situation and needs of general Pakistani women.

Accordingly reserved seats women surpassed general seats women legislators in terms of legislative performance on women’s issues. This finding is not unusual and consistent with the earlier findings of civil society organizations like PILDAT, FAFEN and Aurat Foundation that amongst the most active 25 female parliamentarians in the twelfth
National Assembly, only two were general seats women (Mirza and Wagha 2009). It was observed that more bills were placed by reserved seats women and general seats women’s contribution was merely 8 percent of all the interventions made by female parliamentarians in thirteenth National Assembly (PILDAT 2013; FAFEN 2011). Reserved seat women legislators despite their limited political and parliamentary experience drew greater attention to women’s issues in parliament (Bari 2010).

Several factors, I argue explain the increase in the representation of women’s issues in the thirteenth National Assembly compare to the twelfth National Assembly. Such factors included the appointment of a female Speaker, the formation of a women’s caucus, the presence of more experienced women compare to the twelfth National Assembly and the entry of highly educated professional women with a background in social activism. It was found that in the twelfth National Assembly reserved seats women were discriminated against and ignored but in the thirteenth National Assembly women were given more opportunity to intervene and voice women’s concerns and views. Accordingly women’s voices got stronger with the presence of a woman Speaker (Ebrahim 2009). Pakistani woman MNAs recognized the initiatives and efforts of the Speaker to form the caucus and to promote women’s concerns. They mentioned:

We are very grateful to our Speaker Fehmida Mirza. She has filled the gap and has brought us all together under the platform called Women's Parliamentary Caucus. (PKMNA-11)

Women from and across the party met the Speaker, who is the custodian of the house. She boosts and appreciates the confidence of every woman in the assembly. (PKMNA-7)
Women’s Parliamentarian Caucus (WPC) was instrumental in the formulation and passage of different women related bills in the thirteenth National Assembly. During an interview, a woman PK MNA (16) mentioned that though there was diversity of thoughts women discussed different issues across party lines and tried to work on the differences in the WPC. It provided a uniformity of thought. Another PK MNA (12) disclosed that women members of the WPC informally agreed to support any bill submitted by woman MNAs. It is evident that the WPC provided women parliamentarians space and motivation to act for women. It also worked as a training ground for newcomers where they learned about legislative procedures from the experienced MNAs. It facilitated women’s substantive representation in the thirteenth National Assembly and increased commitment to support bills that benefited women. It also confirms that women do introduce and support women related bills more when there is an increased numbers of women or when there is a women’s parliamentary caucus (Thomas 1991).

Also the bibliographic analysis of women legislators in chapter five revealed that more experienced women entered in the thirteenth National Assembly due to the re-election of several women legislators of the twelfth National Assembly. They were experienced in the legislative procedures and the law making process. This group of women were more active in representing women’s issues when compared to other reserved seat and general seats women (FAFEN 2012). It provided women legislators the opportunity to continue their work on women related bills some of which they had initiated in the twelfth National Assembly. In addition to the political workers, several women and social rights activists were elected to reserved seats and this provided an opportunity to raise more women related critical issues.
Analysis of the data indicates that representation of women’s issues increased in the National Assembly of Pakistan over time and with the presence of an increased number of women. However, it also indicates that reserved seats women legislators made the highest contribution in drawing the attention of the House to the critical right issues and needs of general Pakistani women. Reserved seat women legislators in both assemblies spoke more on violence against women, the enactment and amendment of laws regarding women, and women and society issues. However, women represented women and children related issues more in the thirteenth National Assembly. Issues like women and politics and women’s material interests were comparatively less focused on by women legislators. The representation of general seats women on issues like women’s material interest, women and children, women’s rights, and politics were low or absent in these assemblies. General seats women voiced women’s issues like women and society, violence against women and women and legal system but in much lower numbers. The findings confirm that reserved seats women spoke for women in the debates and thus feminized the political agenda and policy process.

In Bangladesh I undertook content analysis across three different parliaments, the fifth, the eighth and ninth. These parliaments had different compositions and working days. The fifth parliament elected in 1991 had 400 working days in 22 sessions; the eighth parliament of 2001 sat for 373 days in 23 sessions and the ninth parliament of 2008 sat for 315 days in 13 sessions. In these parliaments the number of women also varied. In the fifth parliament there was 35 women, five in general seats and 30 in reserved seats. In the eighth parliament of 2001, initially there were seven women in general seats and 30 in reserved seats. In the eighth parliament of 2001, initially there were seven women in general seats and there were no reserved seats for women until the eighteenth session of 2005. Later with the
reinstitution of the reserved seats provision, 45 reserved seats women were elected in 2005 and number of women rose to 52.

In the ninth parliament there were initially 65 women legislators, 20 in general seats and 45 in reserved seats. Later through a constitutional amendment the number of reserved seats was increased to 50 and another five reserved seats women were elected. The total number of women increased to 70. These differences need to be considered while judging the substantive representation of women. Based on the content analysis, data are presented in the following tables according issue.

Table 6.9: Bangladeshi general and reserved seat women MPs representation on violence against women

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<tr>
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<td>9</td>
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<td>Categories of women</td>
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<tr>
<td>No of time debate initiated by</td>
<td>6</td>
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<tr>
<td>No of times women spoke</td>
<td>6</td>
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In table 6.9 the interventions on issue of violence against women in all the three parliaments is presented. In the fifth parliament, only reserved seats women initiated and spoke six times on violence against women. Women drew the attention of the legislature to the violence committed against women under the pretext of fatwa and dowry. General seats women did not initiate or speak on this critical issue. Reserved seat woman Begum Farida Rahman spoke about the fatwa culture and said:

The 14 years old teenage Hajera was lashed 100 times in the name of fatwa because she failed to produce any witness of her rape. Can there be any witness of rape? There can be no. Two months have passed since the incident happened. Do the perpetrators get arrested?
In the eighth parliament, there were no interventions on this issue. However in the ninth parliament reserved seats women initiated debate and spoke about this issue nine times. They expressed the need to establish speedy tribunals and crisis centres for women victims, to raise social awareness against eve-teasing, to declare fatwa unlawful and to formulate new laws to prevent the practice and spread of fatwa and eve teasing. During her speech, reserved seats MP Tarana Halim said that domestic violence had become a critical issue all over the world. Different countries had established crisis centres for the victims of domestic violence. The crisis centres provides different services such as rehabilitation, training, treatment, legal support and counselling to women victims at one place. She urged the government to establish crisis centres for women in every division and districts (The Parliament of Bangladesh Debates, 2 April 2009, p.130). No general seat women voiced concerns about violence against women in the ninth parliament.

The data indicates that women legislators represented issues about violence in parliament but the number of representations did not reflect the extent of violence committed against women in Bangladesh and its impact on the lives of women. According to the data, from February 2009 to February 2011, 1018 women were raped, 701 were victims of dowry related violence and 174 were the victims of acid violence (Odhikar 2011). Ain–O-Shalish Kendro (ASK), a non-government organization, reports that from January to June 2012, ten females committed suicide after being sexually harassed and violated. At the same time, 31 women were victims of acid violence, 457 females were raped out of

83 Eve teasing commonly refers to verbal and physical harassment and abuse of young and adolescent girls by males. Sometimes it reached to such an extent which compelled girls to commit suicide to avoid harassment and social stigma.
which 59 were murdered after rape and 300 became victims of dowry related violence (Prothom Alo, 2 July 2012, p.7). Violence against women continue to rise and in such a context, the low number of representations on violence against women and only by reserved seats legislators is surprising given the significance of the issue to many Bangladeshi women.

Table 6.10: Bangladeshi general and reserved seat women MPs representation of women and legal system

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<td>5</td>
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<tr>
<td>Categories of women</td>
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<tr>
<td>No of time debate initiated by</td>
<td>4 1</td>
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<tr>
<td>No of times women spoke</td>
<td>9 2</td>
<td>- -</td>
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Table 6.10 exhibits the representation of issue in regards to women and legal system in the selected parliaments. In the fifth parliament, women legislators initiated debate on women related bills five times. Among these interventions, reserved seats women initiated debates four times and spoke on the bills nine times. They participated in the discussion on ‘Muslim Family Law (Amendment) Bill, 1991’, and The Prevention of Violence against Women and Children Bill, 1995. General seat women initiated the debate once and spoke about The Muslim Family Law (Amendment) Bill, 1991 and The National Women’s Organization Bill. Most of the reserved seats women did not speak and only two women voiced their support for ‘The Muslim Family Law Amendment Bill 1993’. An opposition general seat woman spoke in support of the Bill. Reserved seat MP Begum Farida Rahman stated during the debates on this bill that the amendment to the Muslim Family Law 1961 was proposed to stop the practice of polygamy and to ensure the payment of denmohar (bridal money) to wives (The Parliament of Bangladesh Debates 23 June 1994, p.41). Reserved seats MP Begum Lutfuneesa protested those male
members who expressed that the amendment is against the ‘Sharia law’. She instead questioned if the present amendment was against Sharia Law then how was it that the Muslim Family Law was enacted for the first time back in 1961 in Islamic Republic of Pakistan84? She also described the injustice that happens to the first wife when a man takes a second wife (The Parliament of Bangladesh Debates 1 September 1994, pp.59-60).

In the eighth parliament, no intervention was made on women related bills by general or reserved seats women. Prior to the election of 45 reserved seats women, several women and child related bills were introduced and discussed such as, The Child and Maternal Health Institute Bill, The Acid Crime Prevention Bill, The Acid Control Bill, The Prevention of Violence against Women and Children(Amendment) Bill, and importantly The Election of Reserved Seats Women Bill, 2004. None of the general seat women participated in debates on these bills. In the ninth parliament, no interventions were made in this issue area either by general or reserved seats women. Women did not speak on important women related bills such as The Citizenship Amendment Bill and The Prevention of Domestic Violence Bill, 2010. Overall the number of representations indicates that Bangladeshi women legislators lacked the will or the opportunity to act on women related bills. The factors that likely to explain the absence of women’s voice in this issue were: first, most of the general seat women lack legislative experience or

84 The first and major progressive legislation on women in Pakistan was the promulgation of Muslim Family Law Ordinance (MFLO) in 1961. The MFLO was based on the recommendations of the Rashid Commission on Marriage and Family Laws, set up in 1955. The recommendation was accepted in a diluted form. The primary aim MFLO was to discourage polygamy and regulate divorce. It also provided for procedures and much needed documentation of marriages and divorce (Mirza 2011). Scholars in the 1960s and 1970s, pointed to the possibility of disagreement among APWA members, but suggested that it was primarily APWA's lobbying that led to an official enquiry (the Rashid Commission on Marriage and Family Laws), its 1956 report and later the passing of the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance (MFLO) in 1961 (cited in Ansari 2009, p.1424)
background of political activism or women’s movement. Most of these women as I mentioned in the chapter five were elected to their husband’s seats or due to their relation with the leader while directly elected female leaders of the party lacked the desire and commitment to promote women’s issues. Secondly, reserved seats women were mostly elected for the first time and they lacked experience, information and support systems to be involved in the complex process of law making process.

Table 6.11: Bangladeshi general and reserved seat women MPs representation of women and politics

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<td>Total no of debates initiated</td>
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<td>2</td>
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<tr>
<td>Categories of women</td>
<td>RS</td>
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<tr>
<td>No of time debate initiated by</td>
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<tr>
<td>No of times women spoke</td>
<td>-</td>
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<td>1</td>
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In the table 6.11, I present the interventions made by women legislators on women and politics issues in the debates of the three parliaments. No interventions were recorded in the fifth parliament on women and politics issue. In the eighth parliament a reserved seats woman raised an issue about defamatory news about reserved seats women MPs in a newspaper. In the ninth parliament reserved seats women only initiated debates twice and spoke about the clarification of the reserved seats women’s constituency and women’s participation in politics. During the speech MP Advocate Salma Islam raised the issue of lack of specific geographical constituencies for reserved seats women MPs and urged the government to designate specific constituencies so that reserved seats women could contribute to the development of the country (The Parliament of Bangladesh Debates 9 June 2009, p.9). Women legislators made a very few interventions on this issue even though political empowerment is intricately related to the socio-economic empowerment
of women. When they did speak women invoked their personal experiences of being a reserved seat MP and highlighted the problems they had to face in the constituencies.

Table 6.12: Bangladeshi general and reserved seat women MPs representation of women’s material interests.

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<tr>
<td>Total no of debates initiated</td>
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<td>12</td>
<td>18</td>
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<td>GS</td>
<td>RS</td>
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<tr>
<td>No of time debate initiated by</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No of times women spoke</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>11</td>
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Table 6.12 exhibits the total interventions made on the issue of women’s material interest.

In the fifth parliament, only reserved seats women initiated and voiced material interest of women eight times. Among the issues, accommodation, transport, and establishing colleges and universities for women were highlighted. During this period general seat women did not make a single intervention on women’s material needs. In eighth parliament, reserved seats women initiated debate and spoke 11 times on this issue. They mostly focused on issues such as accommodation and transport facilities for girls and working women, the appointment of female doctors in gynaecology departments, and training for garments workers. In this parliament, only once did general seat women speak about this issue.

In the ninth parliament, reserved seats women made 17 interventions on issues like women’s employment, accommodation, transport and training centres for women. They also brought some new issues and values related to women to the floor which are seldom discussed or raised. Most notable were the security and safety of women working in foreign countries, old age homes for elderly women, rehabilitation of thousands of women engaged in risky works at Sunderbhan (the biggest mangrove forest in the world), support for Bag bidhoba (widows of those killed by the tigers in Sunderbhan) and for
widows in Dhaka. Women legislators emphasized on improving the living standard of female tea and garment workers, providing facilities for caesarean operations at each Upa-Zilla (sub-district) health centre and punishment for syndicates involved in unnecessary caesarean operations. Begum Tahura Ali during her speech described the condition of women labourers especially in the Gulf countries of the Middle East, and about their oppression. She urged enhancing the support and the monitoring system of the embassies on this issue (The Parliament of Bangladesh Debates 7 June 2010, p.231). Only one intervention was made by a general seat woman.

The data reveals that Bangladeshi women legislators made the highest number of interventions on the issues that relate to low level of economic development and drew the attention of parliament to the needs and problems of different groups of women. They acted to ensure more government investment to improve the education, transport, training and accommodation facilities for girls and women of different classes.

Table 6.13: Bangladeshi general and reserved seat women MPs representation on women and children related issue

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<tr>
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<td>17</td>
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<tr>
<td>Categories of women</td>
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<tr>
<td>No of time debate initiated by</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4</td>
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<tr>
<td>No of times women spoke</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4</td>
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Representation on issues relating to women and children is presented in Table 6.13. According to the data, four interventions were made on women and children related issues by reserved seats women in the fifth parliament and they spoke about child trafficking, support for children’s homes and a stipend for secondary school students. In the eighth parliament only reserved seats women made four interventions and spoke on
issues like reproductive education at school, and women and child trafficking. In the ninth parliament only reserved seats women intervened 17 times and spoke on child labour, safe home for underprivileged girls and projects for the children of prisoners and prostitute women, child marriage, maternal mortality and child health, and unsafe motherhood and death during childbirth, and amendment to the child marriage acts. During the debates, reserved seats women MPs Apu Ukil and Faridunahar Laily made specific reference to the reports of UNICEF and the Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics regarding the number and condition of child labourers and the alarming the rate of child marriage. Women recommended amendment to the Child Marriage Act, 1929 and The Child Labour Act, 2001 and urged the effective implementation of the Acts (The Parliament of Bangladesh Debates 6 June 2010, p.67; 1 February 2012, p.97). General seat women’s representation on this issue was absent in all the parliaments. The representation of women and children related issues as the data shows increased from previous parliaments and confirms that women do draw attention to children and family issues. The increase in the number of representations suggests that women and children related issues had become significant issues for reserved seats women.

Table 6.14: Bangladeshi general and reserved seat women MPs representation on women and society issues

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<td>Total no of debates initiated</td>
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<td>13</td>
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<tr>
<td>Categories of women</td>
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<tr>
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<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No of times women spoke</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
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The data on representation of women and society issue in all the parliaments is presented in Table 6.14. The issues that affected both women and society were raised six times in the fifth parliament. Reserved seats women initiated the debate three times and spoke six
times on issues like famine, and the spread of drug use. General seat women raised the issue three times and spoke four times on issues such as poverty and famine. In the eighth parliament reserved seats women intervened and spoke five times on issues like control of drugs, ramps for disabled persons, health services and the use of arsenic contaminated water. A general seat woman MP intervened once and spoke twice on this issue. In the ninth parliament only reserved seats women initiated the debate 13 times and spoke 16 times on issues like homes and hospitals for the elderly, the effect of drugs, cyber-crime, and law and order situation of the country. They raised and spoke for the rights of neutral genders, institutes for intellectually disabled persons and about raising social awareness of autism. General seat women did not make any intervention. The data shows that representation in this issue area increased from the past and mostly brought to the floor by reserved seats women who pressed issues that disproportionately affect women.

Table 6.15: Bangladeshi general and reserved seat women MPs representation on women’s rights issue

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<tr>
<td>Total no of debates initiated</td>
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<tr>
<td>No of times women spoke</td>
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Women’s representation of women’s rights issues is presented in the Table 6.15. In the fifth parliament a reserved seat woman MP spoke once about Hindu women’s rights of inheritance. In the eighth parliament, reserved seats women twice raised the issue of the
payment of ‘denmohar’\textsuperscript{85} (bridal money) and fair wages for women labourer. General seat women remained silent on these issues in the fifth and eighth parliaments. In the ninth parliament reserved seats women initiated the debates and spoke 14 times on women’s rights issues and general seat women initiated and spoke about women’s rights twice. Reserved seats women spoke about issues like wage discrimination, recognition of ‘Birongona’ (rape victims of the war of independence) as freedom fighters, women’s inheritance rights and laws, female feticides, the National Women Development Policy, 2011 and its implementation, and recognition of women’s contribution to development. General seat woman spoke about the implementation of the ‘National Women Policy 1997’ and the discrimination against reserved seats women members of local government councils in terms of allocation of funds and responsibilities.

The data indicates that representation of women’s rights issues increased from the past parliaments and reserved seat women legislators represented this issue more to ensure women’s equality and autonomy in the socio-economic and legal arena. From the above analysis of women’s substantive representation in Bangladeshi parliament, The following table is developed that provides an overview of the number and representation of general and reserved seats women legislators in each parliament.

\textsuperscript{85}In Islam, a mahr (in Bangla known as ‘denmohar’) is a mandatory payment, in the form of money or possessions paid by the groom, or by groom's father, to the bride at the time of marriage that legally becomes her property (retrieved from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mahr).
The table 6.16 reveals differences in the number of interventions made on women’s issues by general and reserved seat women. It shows that the representation of women’s issues by the general seat women remained low in each parliament compared to reserved seats women. This is unsurprising given the fact that the number of general seat women was less compared to the reserved seats women. It was also evident in Pakistan but the findings in Bangladesh indicate that even after an increase in the number, directly elected general seat women’s representation of women’s issues did not increase and instead decreases. It shows that the direct election and autonomy of women legislators do not always guarantee increased representation of women’s issues.

A fine grained analysis of the fifth parliament shows that of the total 31 debates on women’s issues, reserved seats women initiated 27 debates and general seat women initiated four debates. In this parliament 12 reserved seats (40%) women voiced women’s issues 34 times and three general seat women (60%) voiced women’s issues six times.
Both general and reserved seats women collectively voiced women’s issues during three interventions. General seats women represented 15 percent of women’s issues compared to reserved seats women who contributed 85 percent representation of women’s issues. In the eighth parliament, of the total 26 interventions on women related issues, 16 reserved seats women (36%) spoke for women 23 times (during the last one year of the parliament) and only two general seat women (29%) voiced women’s issues three times during the five years of the parliament. The contribution of general seats women was only 11.5 percent compared to the 88.5 percent contribution of reserved seats women.

In the ninth parliament, of the total 75 debates on women related issues, reserved seat women initiated debate 72 times and voiced women’s issues 75 times while general seat women initiated and spoke for women only three times. In the ninth parliament 28 reserved seats women (56%) participated in debates on women’s issues against three general seat women (15%). The contribution of general seats women was only 4 percent compare to the 96 percent by reserved seats women. Though a female reserved seat MP was appointed as the Speaker she failed to have any impact on promoting women’s issues. Her lack of legislative and political experience and commitment to women’s issues explained the lack of initiative to promote important concerns of women at the parliamentary arena. The findings from all the parliaments indicate that reserved seats women represented women’s interest more than general seat women and this finding is consistent with previous finding that reserved seat MP’s are the main participants in the legislative business and the wider participation of general seat women is lacking in the legislative process (TIB 2009a).

86 Dr. Sheerin Sharrmin Chowdhury was elected to reserved seat for the first time in the ninth parliament due to her support and loyalty to AL leader Sk. Hasina (Khan 2013).
In terms of using different parliamentary rules to introduce and voice women’s issues, women legislators relied specifically on rule the 71, and calling attention notice to matters of public interest to speak for women. In rare instances, women in the fifth parliament participated in resolutions, short discussion on matters of public importance under rule 68, and participated in discussions on women related bills (see also Hussain and Hasanuzzaman 2002). In the eighth and ninth parliaments most of the interventions on women’s issues were made under rule 71a and a few under 71b. According to rule 71a of the rules of procedure, members whose notices are not considered for discussion in the parliament are entitled to speak for two minutes on his/her notice. This rule restricts other members to intervene or to speak on the issue. The admissible notices are placed under rule 71b and are discussed in the parliament. Women’s representations on women related bills in terms of submission, selection, recommendation or amendment were few and bills regarding women’s rights or interests were not addressed in the eighth or ninth parliaments by women. Women legislators did not use point of order rules nor did they bring any adjournment or privilege motions on women’s issues. Only in rare instances did women intervene through calling attention notices or tabled resolutions on women. Further the analysis of the data reveals that in Bangladesh parliaments most of the interventions on women’s issues were made by woman MPs individually. There were very few interventions where women collectively voiced their concerns and it was only evident in fifth parliament. Due to the rivalry of the parties and party discipline, cross-party initiatives on women’s issues were absent in eighth and ninth parliaments.

Though an increase in the representation of women’s issue was visible qualitative changes in the articulation and representation of women’s issue was absent in Bangladeshi parliaments. This finding is also consistent with TIB which observed that
women legislators’ role in terms of women related bills was minimal and women primarily used rule 71 to address women’s interests (Afroz and Mahmud 2010; TIB 2009a). In a review of the speeches, I find that women made very general statements about the issues in most cases which lacked strong argument, relevant data, in depth analysis or claim making effort.

The analysis of the data of three parliaments in Bangladesh demonstrates that representation of women’s issues in the parliamentary debate increased over time with the increased number of women. The segregated data on reserved and general seat women shows that reserved seats women represented women in all the parliaments and they did so more often than general seats women. Issue based analysis of representation shows that reserved seats women represented the material interests of women, and women’s societal issues most in all the parliaments and these increased over time. Representation of women and children and women’s rights issues increased significantly in the ninth parliament compared to previous parliaments. Violence against women was represented but compared to the extent of violence committed against Bangladeshi women, can be viewed as inadequate. General seat women’s representation on violence against women and women in politics and women and children was absent in all the parliaments, and representation of material interests of women, women and society, women’s rights issues were of least importance. Importantly, neither reserved seat nor general seat women represented women related bills in the eighth and ninth parliaments. There was a lack of consensus and cooperation among women legislators on support for the passage of women related bills (TIB 2009a; Firoj 2003b).
Women in Parliament: The Moment of Silence and Frictions

It is agreed that women differ in social and political background, values, life experience, role perception on public representation, and political and party loyalty (Fleschenberg 2007; Lawless 2004). In some cases, women can actively act to promote women’s concerns and in other cases women may disavow distinct feminine or feminist concerns to avoid being labelled as women’s MP or feminists (Swers 2002). It is likely that some women are less effective and willing than others to act for women. Sometimes women’s agency to act for women is circumscribed like any other legislators by institutional rules and norms. This may also influence reserved seats female legislators to respond to quota mandate in different ways (Childs and Krook 2012). To explore the influence of institutional-level factors and the individual attributes that impact on the process of women’s substantive act, I examine when and why women parliamentarians in Pakistan and Bangladesh refrained from representing critical women’s issues in the parliaments.

From the content analysis and review of the speeches of the National Assembly debates in Pakistan, I found that almost 42 percent in the twelfth and 35 percent reserved seats women MNA in the thirteenth National Assembly did not voice concerns for women. When asked, about her contribution, a reserved seats woman PKMNA (2) mentioned the biases towards senior members in the legislative business and absence of a support system for newly elected legislators. Another PKMNA (5) said that a few women remained silent due to lack of confidence to articulate and speak in the parliament. Again in the legislative debates on issues critical to women, I found that a few reserved seats women acted against women’s interest or remained silent. Some of these instances are mentioned below:
The ruling party’s (PML-Q) female legislators in twelfth National Assembly opposed opposition member Sherry Rahman’s motion on ‘The Introduction of a Bill to Provide for Elimination of Gender Discrimination’. The bill proposed that one-third of women must be recruited in the Federal Public Service Commission and that equal pay be paid for equal work for women in line with the International Labour Organization’s Convention No. 100. The content of the bill, which also sought universal education for women and free primary education to every child, was non-controversial (Bari 2010). Also ruling party female legislators did not support Sherry Rahman’s ‘The Criminal Law Amendment Bill, 2004’ which included important positive amendments on honour crime. Instead ruling party women legislator supported the passage of the government bill that was limited to declaring honour killing as a crime and did not address the issues of compromises made in the form of Vanni or Diyat to protect the criminals or murderers (Mirza and Wagha 2009). Again during the debate on the report of the Protection of Women (Criminal Laws Amendment) Bill 2006, reserved seats women MNA, Farida Ahmed and Samia Raheel Qazi of MMA, (MNA is an alliance of six religious or right wing parties) argued against the passage of the bill due to their orientation to rightist ideology and their religious values which also emphasizes traditional and limited roles for women in society and politics (Mirza and Wagha 2009).

The thirteenth National Assembly of Pakistan passed a resolution on 13 April 2009, approving the Nizam-e-Adl Regulation, the aim of which was to impose Sharia laws in the Swat Valley in the North West Frontier Province of Pakistan. Sharia courts would interpret civil rights according to Islamic strictures which would render women invisible and enable unprecedented violence to be inflicted on them (True et al. 2013). However, female lawmakers were silent on raising the implication of Sharia law on the lives of
women (Zubeida 2009). Women parliamentarians also did not protest against the induction of Israullah Zahri in the cabinet, a senator who defended and supported honour killing as a Baloch tradition (Bari and Bari 2008). Women legislators played by the rules and refused to rebel in order to defend women’s interest due to the coalition nature of the government and in some cases due to party discipline (Mackay 2001).

In Bangladesh, though data supports the contention that women’s representation increased with the presence of reserved seats women in the Bangladeshi parliament, it also indicates that not all women voiced women’s issues in the legislative debates. In these parliaments, 60 percent, 62 percent and 44 percent of women respectively did not voice any women’s issues. When asked about their silence women’s issues, reserved seats women mentioned the undemocratic practices of the parliament and discrimination against the opposition members (BDMP- 2, 12, and 17). Two female reserved seat women (BDMP 1 and 2) confided that due to tragic incidences in their family and the lack of initiative and interest are the main reasons for their non-articulation of women’s issues. Another one (BDMP-16) said that she found it difficult to find a balance between her domestic routine and the odd timing and process of submitting notices for discussion in parliament. One of the female MP’s (BDMP-6) lacked the knowledge and confidence to articulate and present women’s issues. A former reserved seat woman (BDMP-4) however mentioned that the time required learning the rules of legislative procedures and the short period of the eighth parliament resulted in the loss of women’s voices in the legislative debates. Also I found evidence that women went silent on women’s issues or did not raise the critical issues of women due to the coalition nature of the government and partly due to party affiliation and position. Instances of women’s non-activity on some important women’s issues are mentioned below:
In the fifth parliament, ruling party women MPs went silent on ‘Muslim Family Amendment Bill 1993’ which required changes in Sharia laws and conflicted with the ideology of the fundamentalist party in the coalition government. The bill was formulated to control the practice of polygamy among Muslim men and to ensure the rights of married women on ‘denmohar’. The bill was placed twice with two different amendments in the Muslim Family Law, 1961 but failed to gain passage due to the lack of support from the ruling party members. Also the rape and murder of Yasmin, a teenaged girl by police raised havoc in the country during the tenure of the fifth parliament but none of the women raised this issue. The women members of ruling party in the ninth parliament did not speak on issues like, equal inheritance rights for women in ‘Women’s Development Policy’ and changes in the Sharia law; withdrawn of reservation from Article 2 AND 16C(a) of CEDAW; and for direct election to reserved seats. It should be mentioned that the ruling AL in its election manifesto undertook to introduce direct election to reserved seats and to increase the number to 100. I found evidence that a few

87 Yasmin Akhter’s case represents one of the most shameful moments in Bangladesh’s history. Three policemen gang raped and then strangled Yasmin Akhter, a 14 old girl while she was returning home from Dhaka on August 23, 1995. The next day her body was found by the roadside. Yasmin’s murder led to widespread protests in Rangpur – one police station was besieged by a crowd for two days. In the ensuing riot, officers fired on the protesters. Six people were killed and there were calls for the government to stand down. Following a judicial inquiry and police investigations, the three officers were finally arrested in 1997. Two out of three policemen convicted in Yasmin rape and murder case were hanged nine years later on September 1, 2004 (accessed from http://businessnews24bd.com).

88 Since the 1990s the government of Bangladesh has informed the CEDAW committees about the process of withdrawing the reservation from the article 2 and 16 C(a) but until now no concrete initiative has be taken to do so. The AL government formulated ‘Women Policy’ in 1997 with the provision for equal rights of women in inheritance and property but the BNP led government in 2004 curtail the word “inheritance” and “property” from the policy. Later during the period of caretaker government in 2008, the policy again included the provisions of women’s equal right on movable and immovable properties and enactment of laws resulted. Also in the 2008 election manifesto, AL promised to restore the original 1997 women policy but in the face of opposition and threats from fundamentalist force, the women’s policy was adopted without altering the pattern of inequality in inheritance and property. Instead of including equality of men and women on inheritance and property, the policy mentions women’s equal rights and control over acquired and inherited property (Prothom Alo 10 March, and 4 September 2011, pp.1, 16 and 23).
women legislators expressed their support for direct election in different fora but never raised this issue in the parliament.\footnote{During the meeting on ‘Political Empowerment of Women and the Role of Women MPs’ organized by Bangladesh Mahila Parishad on 4\textsuperscript{th} February 2012 reserved seats women demanded that the government should bring a bill to provide for direct elections to 100 reserved seats (New Age 5 February 2012).}

Women MPs of the ninth Bangladesh parliament were also silent on critical issues of women such as, the increasing rate of violence against women, the problems of gender disparity and lack of justice in the lives of rural women, and serious gender gaps at the top tier of administration. Nor did they seek to remove wage discrimination in the informal sectors where 60 percent of women are engaged in labour (Khan 2013). General seat women legislators with constituency backing and autonomy also remained silent on these issues.

The findings from the content analysis in Pakistan and Bangladesh indicate that reserved seats women cannot or do not always act for women. Their willingness and ability to act are circumscribed by personal and political considerations. What these analyses demonstrate is that women parliamentarians, feminist or not, are individual politicians with their own minds (Bochel and Briggs 2000; Phillips 1998). They can either chose to rebel, speak against the party and face disciplinary action or like any politician can seek a credible political career and make compromises when it comes to representing critical women’s issues. A reserved seat woman legislator (BDMP-9) from Bangladesh admitted that, “we speak to please our leaders so that we can be elected again”\footnote{In Bangladesh reserved seats women spent significant amount of time to praise their leaders and criticise the opposition leaders and sometime use unparliamentarily language (TIB 2009a).}. It was observed...
in Bangladeshi parliament that legislators spend significant amount of time praising the leaders and their policies to remain in the good book of the leaders.

Direct or indirect election and constituency or no constituency hardly matters in these cases. These non-acts of women legislators as mentioned are important indicators to examine the complex process of substantive representation but not enough to doubt the relationship between descriptive and substantive representation at this point. As the link between descriptive and substantive representation is complicated, these non-acts of the reserved seat women legislators offer valuable insights to analyse the space and agency of women’s substantive representation (Franceschet and Piscopo 2008).

The overall analysis of the representation of women’s issues in the Pakistan and Bangladeshi legislative arena indicates both positive and mixed outcomes. However, several observations are mentioned here to understand the substantive representation of women in the parliamentary arena. In terms of raising and voicing women’s concern in the legislative debates, the number of interventions confirms that women’s representation has increased from the previous parliament in each case.

I found evidence that women spoke and acted on all the issues they identified as ‘women’s issues’ during the interviews but there were differences in terms of the emphasis placed on the issues and in regard to representation. In Pakistan women focused more on the formulation and amendment of new acts in the interest of women and children compared to those in Bangladesh. The extent of violence, oppression and legal discrimination committed against women in the name of traditions, honour and religion in Pakistani society motivated Pakistani women legislators to act and establish cross partisan networks on legal reforms to protect and preserve the rights of women.
In contrast to Pakistani women, Bangladeshi women focused more on the practical needs of women and societal issues that arose from the low level of economic development and social gendered norms that disproportionately affect women’s access to gender responsive services. Another reason may be that laws similar to the bills submitted and supported by Pakistani women to enact new and amend existing laws had already been enacted and implemented in Bangladesh such as, The Prevention of Oppression Against Women and Children Act 2000, Acid Crime and Prevention Act 2002, Acid Control Act 2002 and Domestic Violence Act 2010.

However a significant number of women in both cases remained silent on women’s issues during legislative debates, some acted against women’s interest and mostly refrained from voicing critical issues relating to women if they went against the party. This was due to differences in the perception of representativeness, lack of awareness and ability to articulate and represent women’s issues, domestic responsibility, and the formal and informal norms and practices of the parties and legislative institutions.

**Who Speaks for Women and Why?**

It becomes clear that with the presence of reserved seat women in the parliaments of Pakistan and Bangladesh, more women’s issues were raised in legislative debates. The analyses of the parliamentary data further indicate that the number of times women’s issues were raised in the debates increased from the previous parliaments with the presence of increased numbers of women. This confirms a relationship between female representatives and representation of women (Celis 2009; 2008). The data demonstrates that reserved seats women made the highest contribution to the representation of women
and the presence of reserved seats provision independently enhanced attention to women’s issues (Xydias 2007).

From the data of the parliamentary debates an increase in the number of women and representation of women’s issues is observed in the thirteenth National Assembly of Pakistan and the ninth parliament of Bangladesh compared to the previous parliaments. Reserved seats women despite their newness, and experience of discrimination from male dominated parliamentary practices raised important women’s issues. The representation of issues in the legislative debates also shows that women represented the issues they identified as important for women during the interviews. The findings from each parliament confirm that reserved seats women represented women’s issues in the legislative debates more than did general seats women. The general seats women in each case spoke little for women despite having autonomy and resources at their disposal. On an average, in Pakistan, a reserved seat MNA spoke for women 4 times and a general seat MNA 2.3 time in the twelfth National Assembly. In the thirteenth National Assembly it was 4 and 2.4. In Bangladesh on an average a reserved seat woman spoke 2.8 times on women’s issues and a general seat woman spoke for women 2 times in the fifth parliament. In the eighth parliament it was 1.4 (based on the representation of women’s issues in the last one year) and 1.5, and in the ninth parliament it was 2.7 and 1 time. In both countries, the average contribution of reserved seats women was higher than the general seats in terms of representation of women’s issues in this parliament.

The findings suggest that indirectly elected reserved seats women represented women’s issues more than directly elected women. Most reserved seat women, if not all, assumed active, proactive and overactive role in promoting women’s rights issues in the parliamentary debates. It contests the assumption that indirect election impacted on
reserved seats women’s credibility to represent women. Although reserved seats women did not actually mirror the vast female constituents of Pakistan and Bangladesh in terms of social characteristics, they spoke for women more than general seats female legislators.

The factors that are likely to explain the low level of inclination of general seat women to speak for women are the differences in role perception, lack of personal experiences and of the gendered ideas and norms of legislative institutions. A general seat woman MNA mentioned that:

As a woman MNA in general seats you are more in touch with the constituency issues. You are more sensitive to those issues though general issues are also there. You have to go back to that electorate for next election. (PKMNA-16 GS)

Female MPs in Bangladesh stated that:

General seat MPs have constituency. They have responsibilities and passion to work for the people since they want to be re-elected. (BDMP-5 GS)

As MPs, we are responsible for legislative activities and at the same time for development activities of our constituencies as a part of tradition, election promises and public demand. (BDMP-13 GS)

The views expressed by general seats women imply that directly elected women considered themselves as people’s representatives, primarily accountable and responsible for a specific geographical constituency (and not for women only) which is different from those elected on women-specific quotas (Thomas and Welch 2001, p.167 cited in Fleschenberg 2007, p.18). Directly elected women weigh the prospects of re-election and
therefore concentrate more on constituency development issues rather than women specific issues. It is important remember that in the existing socio economic context in Pakistan and Bangladesh, women have not yet emerged as an equal force to men at the electorate level. In Pakistan women only made up 39 percent of registered voters on the draft electoral roll of the Election Commission’s registration process in 2006-7 and there were more than six million fewer women than men registered as voters, or a difference of about 11 percent (EU 2008, p.44). In Bangladesh, women constituted 50 percent (during the 2008 election the actual percentage of women voter was 50.87) of the total voters (Bangladesh Election Commission Report 2008).

Nevertheless, the long period of franchise right of women and the higher numbers of female voters had no or little impact on the election of more women. Several forces work in this process. First, political awareness among women is low due to lack of mobility and education. Women have less chance to receive information about the elections. Second, women are restricted from being registered as voters and to vote. In some cases women are forced to cast votes according to the dictates of the male members of the families and leaders of the community and parties.91 In such an electoral context, where males dominate in terms of voter numbers and in the voting decision of females, general seats women may find it beneficial and practical to invest more of their political time and effort on attending constituents’ claims than speaking for women.

Again feminist scholars recognize that women have diverse experiences mediated through differences in class, race, ethnicity, sexual orientation and age as well as through gender

91 The disfranchisement rate in Pakistan increased to 44.6% during 1997 and 46.14 % in 2002 (NCSW 2011; EU 2008).
(Mackay 2001). In the previous chapter I argued that general seats women in Pakistan and Bangladesh are more elite and most of the Pakistani women were from feudal backgrounds and elected in the male member’s constituency. Also Bangladeshi general seat women except for a few were elected on the basis of their link to political leaders. They did not face the complex process of a formalized nomination process nor had experience of discrimination in political parties. In addition, most of the general seats women had no previous experience of social and women rights activism; and most importantly they lacked experience of politics or knowledge of women’s issues. One Bangladeshi reserved seat woman legislator (BDMP-16) mentioned that general seat women legislators had less experience. Also a Pakistani reserved seat female legislator (PKMNA-13) mentioned that there are some general seat women who don’t do anything. The most effective starting point for knowledge is one’s own experiences, and the lack of personal and political experiences of general seat women I argue may impact on their feelings, willingness and effectiveness to speak for women (Jones 1993 cited in Reingold 2000, p.34).

Moreover, in the institutional and political contexts of Pakistan and Bangladesh, women elected to general seats find it difficult to be publicly identified with women's issues because it might be detrimental to their future political career. A Bangladeshi female legislator (BDMP-12) mentioned that ‘it is not safe to talk anything without party’s approval’. Even directly elected women MPs of the ruling party do not talk about women’. Feminist institutionalist argue that women seeking to be both accepted and effective in politics encounter assimilative pressures to conform to the established male behavioural norm in the gendered cultures of the institutions (Puwar 2004, p.77 cited in Franceschet 2011, p.65). Women in such masculinist institutions deny their gender
identity and try to fit in with the dominant male styles. Some women under the pretext of being national leaders ignored women’s issues. Some argue they are like the biological females who act as a social man (Sorenson 1984 cited in Acker 1990, p.139). The female leader of a leading party in Bangladesh once posed the question “as a leader why should I think about women only apart from men?” (Chowdhury n.d., p.7). Such a tendency by female leaders to deny their gender identity and consciousness is dubbed ‘The Margaret Thatcher syndrome’ (Rahman 2004; Shaheed 2002).

Contrary to this perception of general seat women, reserved seats women during interviews confirmed that they considered themselves as the representatives of women and were responsible for voicing women’s concern in the political process. Their responsibility was not confined within a specific geographical constituency like those women in general seats. This difference in role perception and responsibility arises from their election to reserved seats that confer a special mandate to improve the representation of women as a group (Franceschet and Piscopo 2008; Schwartz 2004). Mandates emerge over the quota campaign as a result of arguments that female representatives are needed in order to present perspectives of women which are different from those of men (Childs and Krook 2012). Such expectation translated into an informal norm and impacts on reserved seats women’s representation of women. Moreover, reserved seat women are constantly reminded of their responsibility to women constituents, to use their political time and presence to pursue important issues of women (Bari 2010; Dahlerup 2009b). Thus reserved seats women’s perception of being a representative and their representative acts shape the prospects for the substantive representation of women. Reserved seat legislators in both Pakistan and Bangladesh claimed that reserved seat women do better work than many directly elected female legislators. Some mentioned:
Reserved seats women are doing good work. They are educated and present their view in well-articulated manner. (BDMP-18)

Once women got that political space through the constitution, women have done exceptionally well by using the political space productively. (PKMNA-11)

I have seen a sense of pride in women who are on quotas. Some of the best legislation has come from women. (PKMNA-14)

Reserved seat women are working positively for the cause of women and in general for the cause of people. (PKMNA-16 GS)

The reserved seats women legislators brought women’s perspectives to the male dominated legislative and policy process. They articulated the situation and needs of different dispossessed group of women and acted on the mandate of ‘difference’ which comes with the argument for the adoption of gender quotas and the inclusion of women in political elites (Dovi 2002; Skjeie 1991). Reserved seats women legislators used their recreated political space to promote women’s issues in Pakistan and Bangladesh.

Reserved Seats Women in Parliament: Fulfilling the Mandate of Difference

Women’s representation in the parliamentary arena shows that with the presence of more women, representation of women’s issues increased and therefore confirms the relationship between female representatives and representation of women. Data also
reveals that reserved seats women in both cases represented women more than those elected in general seats and made major contributions on women’s issues. Thus it refutes the assumption that directly elected women act more for women. The increased representation of reserved seats women I argue occurred mainly due to the differences in the role perception that arose from the mandated effect of quotas. Women also acted on the mandate of difference and brought different perspectives of different groups of women to the parliamentary debates. In both cases, the number of issues represented increased from the previous parliament but a qualitative shift in the representation of issues in regard to critical women’s bills in the Pakistan National Assembly is observed. I found that several factors, female Speakers, a women’s caucus, an increased number of experienced women and the presence of women who were feminist activists all caused this shift in representation. In Bangladesh an increase in representation of issues in regard to women’s material interests, children and society is observed. Contrary to Pakistan, representation on women related bills decreased from the past parliaments in Bangladesh. In both countries women increasingly represented their carer perspective in the debates and spoke for children’s rights and violence committed against women and children. However women could not always represent women’s issue due to party discipline and positions, lack of interest and ability, complex legislative procedures and domestic responsibilities. These findings indicate that the relationship between descriptive and substantive is not deterministic but complicated (Childs 2006). The instances of non-responsiveness of reserved seat women parliamentarians indicate a disjuncture between expectation of quota activists and reality.

In the ensuing chapter, I offer a more complete discussion on women’s substantive representation by presenting the acts reserved seats women performed for women at the
constituency and party level. I explore these acts and examine the extent to which reserved seats women act to promote women’s issues further to confirm the relation between descriptive and substantive representation.
Chapter 7: Reserved Seats Women Acting to Change the Lives of Women

This chapter has two objectives, first to explore the acts reserved seats women legislators performed for women in non–parliamentary areas such as in their electorate or division and party. And second to provide an account of the similarities and differences in substantive outcomes between Pakistan and Bangladesh. In accordance with the existing definitions of substantive representation I argue that the acts of women at any level and fora that are intended to change and improve the lives of women also constitute substantive acts.

In this chapter I follow the advice of Reingold (1992) and simply ask the women to explore whether they believe they acted for women in their electorate or division and party. Therefore this chapter draws on the interviews with reserved seats women legislators and secondary source materials. Then I present a comparative perspective of Pakistani and Bangladeshi women’s substantive acts at different sites of representation to examine the similarities and difference between cases and from that identify the factors that influenced the process of women’s substantive representation.

Reserved seats Women’s Substantive Acts for Women at their Constituency and Party level

The strategies and locations that women use to maximize their effectiveness include when they act for women at the constituency level or organize within women's sections in parties to promote women’s concerns which are important to translate their descriptive presence into substantive outcomes (Waylen 2007, p.8). It is agreed that women legislators are open and maintain communication links with their constituents
(Mansbridge 2005; 1999). Their work in the constituency, such as building representative-constituent relationships, maintaining communication, taking care of the demands and needs of different groups and nurturing the constituency is what Schwindt-Bayer (2010) terms ‘home style’ and counts as an act of substantive representation. Few of the Pakistani women MNAs claimed that they had been working in a specific constituency and acted to support women. They used their financial allocation to support the socio-economic development of women and children. Women MNA’s acts are represented in following statements.

In my constituency there are 70 villages, I provided Sui gas, build one degree college, two girl’s high schools, set up a health unit for women. (PKMNA-4)

I up graded the girl’s college and started post-graduation, so girls can continue higher studies. In my constituency I worked with women and tried to help them to market their handicrafts with the support of Commerce Ministry. (PKMNA-5)

I have built the maternity complex in national hospital in Multan, to provide health support to women. (PKMNA-8)

I visit my constituency twice a week and remain there from morning to noon. People and especially women come to me with their problems and I try to solve them on the spot with the support of other branches of the government. (PKMNA-15)

I have constructed and upgraded schools and even donated my land for the construction of schools for girls in my district. (PKMNA-13)
Moreover, Pakistan women MNAs used the platform of the Women’s Parliamentary Caucus (WPC) to act for women in different fora and worked with national and provincial governments to set up organizations for women victims of violence and acid attacks. WPC members visited police stations and recommended improving the working conditions of women police stations in regards to their salary and transportation. The WPC also recommended the establishment of gender sensitive training programmes for police and gender crime centres (WPC 2010). Also members of the caucus made a monthly donation of 5,000 rupees to the relief fund for Internally Displaced People (IDPs) camps which house about 69,000 pregnant women. The members committed to bear the overall expenses of ten mothers and their babies in the camp (Raza 2009). WPC worked with provincial governments to direct development funds to build burn units in at least three districts of Punjab with similar plans for Sindh to support female victims of arson and acid attacks (WPC 2011b). One Pakistani reserved seat woman legislator expressed that:

We have women parliamentarians who are leading the fight against polio. The agenda of Millennium Development Goals (MDG), polio eradication, health and education are the issues we can proudly say we have led from the front. We also focus on violence against women, issue of SWAT displacement and IDP and peace. (PKMNA-14)

These acts indicate that women legislators supported the social empowerment of women by investing in the construction of schools, colleges and hospitals for women. They acted collectively to develop and provide organizational support systems for women victims of violence and for women in distressed condition.
In Bangladesh, women legislators spent their allocations to provide micro credits to poor and destitute women and arranged training for women for income generating activities. Some used their allocation for the renovation of schools and colleges. Women legislators supported the local council’s reserved seats women members who are ignored in the distribution of work and authority. Accordingly Bangladeshi female reserved seats MPs performed the following acts:

I work in my constituencies and try to provide educational facilities. I advise to provide training and micro credit to women. I spend voluntary allocation to support women. (BDMP-8)

I formed 10 women’s organization to support women in income generating activities. I used my allocation and also arranged to allocation from the destitute women’s fund of the Prime minister. (BDMP-10)

I always try to allocate more work to female UP (Union Council) members. (BDMP-7)

I found that Bangladeshi women legislators specifically worked to stop child marriages which are common place in Bangladesh. Female MPs worked to raise awareness about the rise of fundamentalism, and worked against the practice of dowry which is the key reason for increasing violence committed against women. They encouraged and motivated local council’s women members to pursue a career in national politics. Women MPs took up those issues that are responsible for the lower status of women and the expression of violence against women in society:
I encourage women in general to protest and raise their voices for violence against women and other discriminations. (BDMP-3)

I try to make women aware about the rise of fundamentalist forces and educate them on how to work and resist such forces. I worked to make women conscious about the importance of education and health. (BDMP-15)

I work to stop child marriage in my area, support the raped victims and provide counselling to them. Try to raise awareness about the dowry. (BDMP-1)

I helped the aboriginal women in my area who are mostly deprived and face different set of problems. (BDMP-8)

I supported women to get legal aid, advised women members of Union and Up-Zilla Parishad92 and try to inspire motivate and guide them to continue their political careers. (BDMP-2)

Women legislators individually supported girls and women victims of violence as well.

I supported a rape victim of a minority group to lodge cases against the criminals and publish the news in the newspapers. Also arranged the legal and counselling support for her as there was an attempt to silent and cover the incidents. (BDMP-12)

92 Union Parishad (Union Council) and Upa-Zilla Parishad (Sub -district Council) are the part of local government system and 33 percent seats are reserved for women in these councils. Union Parishad women members are directly elected by the people and Upa-Zilla Parishad women members are elected by elected women members of the union and ward councils.
I supported the family of a rape and murder victim to get legal and financial aid. I communicated with different organizations to provide financial and psychological supports for the girls whose mother was killed for protesting the eve teasing in my constituency. (BDMP-4)

When I was a MP in 1996, a girl was raped by a member of defence force. The girl was kept in safe custody in a jail. After learning about it, I went to the jail and took the media with me to meet the girl. The elected male MP advised me not to get involved with the case, however due to media coverage the rapist was brought to justice. (BDMP -18)

What is evident is that the absence of a formal and specific geographical constituency for reserved seats women had different implications for constituency acts which vary across women’s political backgrounds. First, in Pakistan and Bangladesh, influential political families dominate the national politics and specific geographical area or constituency. Some women were elected to reserved seats from these families or constituencies after their male members failed to contest or win election or died. Again some were elected to reserved seats from the area where they had been politically active for a long time. This group of reserved seat women were generally entrusted with the responsibility of that particular constituency. One reserved seat woman legislator of Pakistan explained:

My husband always contested from Lahore. So that became automatically my constituency but it is not formally mine. People there expect me to address and take up their issues. (PKMNA-7)

Second, some women were selected without any background in political activism or constituency connection and later delegated responsibility for a specific constituency.
These two different kinds of constituency connection and responsibility provided both opportunities and constraints on developing representative-constituents’ relations and acts. Reserved seats women legislators who were selected from a particular constituency had more opportunity to act since they were aware of the local issues and had already developed and nurtured relations with women constituents. Women legislators delegated the responsibility for an unknown constituency faced different challenges to developing and maintaining representative-constituent relations. This group of women lacked the social and political capital necessary to act at the constituency level. A female legislator stated that:

There are some who are not actively involved with party or party works. They have no constituency and they cannot use the funds. For reserved seats, having a political background is important. (PKMNA -17)

In the quota literature some scholars argue that lack of strong power base in a constituency curtails the power of women legislators to represent women (Dahlerup 20005, p.149; Goetz 2003). However Childs (2004) suggests that even without a geographical constituency women legislator can act as surrogate representatives for women. Having no specific geographical constituency provides women with more leverage to spend their funds anywhere they want and speak on any issues of women from any corner of the country. Nevertheless, the experiences of some reserved seats women revealed the challenges surrogate representatives’ face in the representation of women. Female legislators expressed the difficulties they faced in following manner.

I worked in my constituency, but the sitting MNA ...did not like it. The candidate of my party also felt threatened too. They thought I am doing all these to contest in the next election. (PKMNA-4)
I don’t get any support from the elected male MP in my constituency. Instead he slanders me. (BDMP-2)

Reserved seat women’s involvement and work in male members’ constituencies is considered as an invasion and as a threat to the latter’s re-election. It is further revealed that women legislators without any political background or constituency had to surrender their funds which were spent in male member’s constituencies. A woman MNA mentioned that:

Due to having my grandfather and father’s constituency, I was lucky to do development work in my area. Some women didn’t have any constituency, and they had to give up their development fund to the party president and he spent it wherever he wants. (PKMNA-5)

In Bangladesh, some of the reserved seats women of the ruling party in ninth parliament were delegated the responsibilities of some constituencies where there were already directly elected male MPs from the opposition and alliance parties. These constituencies were completely new to reserved seats women legislators and they had no public relation there. According to constitution and tradition, directly elected MPs are the formal representatives of their constituencies and are responsible for constituency development work. Reserved seat women legislators delegated the responsibility in these constituencies were viewed as outsiders and faced difficulty in working without being accepted by the local people. Moreover, they had less information and knowledge about the constituents’ needs and had to rely on the support of local political leaders. This discouraged them from building any representative-constituent relation with women. A reserved seat woman legislator (BDMP-17) confided that she had never visited her constituency in the last three years. Others shared similar kinds of problems:
I am entrusted the responsibility of a constituency where I have never gone before and not known to the people at all. (BDMP-14)

I have no scope to work in my constituency. There is an elected MP there. I gave all my allocations to a committee which look after the matters. (BDMP-17)

At present I am responsible for such an area which was never known to me. I have little connection with people and women. I have to work very carefully and depend on local party leaders. (BDMP-18)

Reserved seats women are given responsibilities of some constituencies which they are not familiar with. We can do 70 percent less work due to unfamiliarity with the area. (BDMP-1)

However, reserved seats women MPs entrusted with responsibility for their local constituency were able to do more work for women due to their knowledge of the constituency and of women’s needs. A female MP (2) exclaimed “I am lucky to get the responsibility of my own constituency”.

The experiences of women legislators from Pakistan and Bangladesh reveals that reserved seats women have two fold responsibilities without proper status and authority. They were expected to represent and act for women as mandated by gender quota scholars, and to represent and act for a constituency as assigned by the party. Doing the former, women were labelled as feminist or pro-women and their MP-constituents relation especially with women at the constituency level often offended male leaders’ interests. Male political
leaders’ misconstrued their constituency work as ‘constituency invasion’ and a threat to future election. Doing the latter, they were criticised by women’s organizations for ignoring critical women’s issues (Dahlerup 2009b; Salahuddin 2002). Thus women legislators are derided by male and written off by women’s organizations (Mackay 2001, p.1-2). One reserved seat woman remarked that:

We work hard and people can come to us especially women which are not the case for general seat male MPs. A kind of jealousy works here. The elected MPs of our designated constituency feel threatened of reserved seat women. (BDMP-15)

Bangladeshi reserved seats women legislator felt that the decision to designate responsibility of opposition party’s MPs’ constituency to reserved seats women was a mechanism to prevent women from cultivating a constituency for future election.

Reserved seats women are made responsible for some constituencies where there are already opposition MPs. As a result these women have to work in difficulties where they have no public relation or bonding with the local party politics. They are sometime victims of vengeance of local and opposition male political leaders. It was bad decision for democracy. (BDMP-16)

Making reserved seats women responsible for constituencies where there are already elected MPs was a strategy to prevent them from seeking nomination for future election. (BDMP-12)

Another aspect of women’s constituency work relates to raising social awareness of the necessity of improving the socio-economic and political status of women. Reserved seats
women attended different conferences, seminars and the discussions of local and national level women’s organizations and civil society organizations to share their views and initiatives in improving the lives of women. In this way they worked to raise gender awareness and sensitize the community on the situation and needs of women. According to PKMNA Asia Nasir, legislation alone did not offer a solution to women’s issues, so parliamentarians have been trying to create awareness among the people. Another PKMNA (8) stressed the necessity of informing and educating women about legislation on the protection and empowerment of women and their rights, and to ensure the effective implementation of these acts. Women MNAs in Pakistan mentioned that they participated in different workshops, meetings, seminars and round table discussions and exchanged ideas, information and views. Their participation helped to draw society, media and the government’s attention to women’s issues.

Whenever there is any issue related to women, we participate with other NGOs in protest and demonstration activities. (PKMNA-12)

Whenever there is any conference or workshop of women’s organizations, I participate and encourage them to go to the grassroots people. (PKMNA-10)

I participated in the some seminars and activities of Aurat, US Aid and educational institutions. We exchange ideas and discuss the important issues, and the media coverage of the issues helped to gain attention of people and government. (PKMNA-5)

In addition women legislators from the platform of the WPC, highlighted issues critical to women and girls through the media and arranged discussions with different government policy agencies, civil society and women’s organizations in order to create a heightened awareness about fundamentalism and terrorism: violence against women and education of girl Childs (WPC 2012).

Bangladeshi women legislators also indicated their participation in processes to raise awareness and consensus on important women’s issues.

I participated in the seminar of Mahila Parishad, Working women’s organizations, UN women, Pradip and explain the issues of women from my point of view and exchange our ideas. (BDMP-1)

I have link with some specific women’s organizations and I participate in their seminars, meetings etc. (BDMP-2)

Apart from supporting women’s material well-being in a designated constituency, several women were also involved with NGOs or established NGOs to support women and girls. Female legislators of Pakistan and Bangladesh mentioned the following about their work.

I am involved with an NGO. We established a school, computer training centre; skill learning and health centre and manage a hostel for working women that provide accommodation and food in affordable rate to working girls and women. (PKMAN-8)

I have two NGOs that are working to promote rural women and special education for the disabled. (PKMNA-10)

I have established a women’s organization- Jinnat welfare society- to support women. (PKMNA-12)
In Bangladesh, women legislators established different organizations and acted to support the social, economic and political empowerment of women.

I have established a university where the semester fee of the female students is half of the male student and it is free for the poor female student. I always try to appoint more women staff if they are qualified. (BDMP-2)

I have my own NGO through which I support women. I am presently the executive member of WISE which provides training and employment to women. (BDMP-15)

I have my own NGO and through that I try to make women financially independent. (BDMP-7)

I have established an organization named Bangladesh Alliance for Women Leadership. The purpose is to provide leadership training to women political workers. (BDMP-10)

These activities indicate that women were concerned about the empowerment of women in society. Women legislators’ provided women and children with education and health facilities in designated constituencies. They extended legal and financial support to women and girls. Some supported destitute and poor women in income generating activities through their own NGOs. One woman legislator (PKMNA -5) commented that, ‘only women can give some direction to women.’ In this way, their acts sought to change the lives and status of women in society.

The findings reveal that reserved seats women legislators were conscious about women’s needs and situation in society and acted to promote their interests at different levels.
Women used their political capital and position to support women and girls. Some women legislators in their individual capacity supported and established organizations to provide accommodation, employment, education and training to women for their economic wellbeing. Due to the presence of the Women Parliamentary Caucus Pakistani women were able to collectively support women including IDP and Acid attack victims. These women linked with a range of stakeholders such as women’s organizations, civil society organizations, and government agencies to promote critical women’s issues and educate women about their rights and entitlements. Such acts led to a political transformation in MP and constituents relationships and could be considered as critical act (Celis and Childs 2008; Dahlerup 2006b). However, sometimes the initiative, ability and willingness of the reserved seats women to act for women were constrained by the lack of a constituency, party rules and the opposition of male leaders. Reserved seats women had to perform two fold responsibilities: representing the constituency as designated by the party and representing women’s issues as mandated by the quota rule. Thus reserved seats women in both countries faced the dilemma of being a people’s representatives versus women’s representatives.

Reserved seats Women Promote Women in Politics

Feminist scholars argue that gender bias in the personnel and in the policy and culture of party institutions plays a key role in the production and reproduction of unequal gender relations (Piscopo 2006; Lovenduski 2005). The different patterns of masculine power and authority are embedded in the design of political institutions and are reinforced by the informal power and networks of males (Mackay 2008). These informal norms and practices make the parties gendered in nature (Lovenduski 2011; Kittilson 2005). It is thought that the presence of women in political parties could stimulate changing attitudes
within the gendered institutions and thus initiate the process of regendering political institutions (Mackay 2008; Krook 2008; Kittilson 2005). Women legislators can act to feminize political structures, norms and practices and ‘normalize’ the presence of women politicians in the policy and political process (Mackay 2008).

I endeavour to explore the acts women legislators performed at the party level to promote and enhance women’s political participation and representation. Women legislators of Pakistan and Bangladesh discussed their efforts to bring changes in party and electoral politics. Pakistani women MNAs said that:

Political parties should amend and change the system of nomination. They should give 10 percent of tickets to women for general seats. I have raised the issue many times in the party forum. (PKMNA -7)

I encourage women to be involved in the politics and brought women to the party. (PKMNA-10)

I am promoting women and encouraging them to come out from their home and join politics. (PKMNA-13)

Pakistani women MNAs collectively acted from the platform of the WPC to strengthen women’s representation in political parties and legislative assemblies. The WPC organized several meetings and conferences with the representative of major parties and recommended to nominate more women in general seats during election.  

Women parliamentarians and women party leaders across political parties tried to build consensus on the need for increasing women’s representation.  

94 I was present at the conference on the “Positioning of Women’s Agenda in the Policy making of Political Parties,” organised by Women’s Parliamentary Caucus. Also see http://dawn.com/2012/10/18.
to provide a minimum of a 10 percent quota for women in winnable general seats and to increase women’s representation at all levels of decision making in political forums.

Bangladeshi women MPs acted to raise awareness about gender inequality in order to subvert the power and practices of males. Some of the women worked to reduce gender imbalances at the party and committee level and tried to sensitize the others on gender issues and gender budgeting. They worked to promote gender equality in the political institutions.

I try to promote and mentor women to reach in a position within the party. I have framed the constitution for BNP women wing where I have incorporated the concept of gender. I am working to develop a charter of recommendations that includes the nomination of women, electoral campaign and women in leadership position of the party. (BDMP-16)

Another group of women MP’s focused on increasing the number of women in political parties and thus worked to recruit women for the party. Women mentioned the acts they performed at party level to increase the representation of women in politics:

Women should be given 10 percent nomination and I always speak about this in the party forum. In my constituency, I have ensured 10 percent women in the local committees of the party. (BDMP-12)

At the national level, I am working to encourage, aware and inspire young women to join in politics. I am working to locate the women from all over the country who were once involved in politics and trying to involve them with politics again. (BDMP-15)
These acts reveal that reserved seat women were conscious about their role and acted in different capacities that regendered the political parties and ensure women’s due representation in important decision making positions. The strategies employed by women representatives to increase the number of women in political parties are important acts of substantive representation (Waylen 2007).

The overall findings reveal that reserved seats women legislators in Pakistan and Bangladesh acted on those issues which they viewed to be the cause of structural inequalities and of the subordinate status of women in society and politics. Reserved seats women legislators focused on enabling women to cope with structural vulnerabilities and to improve their position within family, society and state. Thus I conclude that reserved seats women’s acts at the constituency and party level can be best described under two categories.

The first revolves around the empowerment of women. Women legislators acted to provide education and health support to women and children, financial support and credit for income generation, legal and institutional support for women victims, raising awareness about social issues like violence, child marriage, dowry and fundamentalism. The women legislators interviewed maintained that these acts at the constituency and party level would eventually empower women both economically and socially.

Second, they focused on regendering society and politics. Women legislators claimed that they acted to raise awareness about gender disparities within the parties, encouraged and recruited women to political parties, trained women political activists and ensured the inclusion of women in local committees, and provided recommendations and formulated guidelines with a gender perspective for the parties. Moreover, women through their
participation in seminars, discussions and meetings of women’s organizations and civil society organizations acted to promote gender consciousness within society and to create awareness and consensus on women’s political representation.

It is hoped that these acts in the long run will change the makeup of society and politics with more women being empowered, involved in politics and pursuing political careers in a social context of increased gender awareness (Dahlerup 1988). Women legislators focused on those issues which required attention to bring changes to the lives of women in patriarchal societies. Reserved seats women mobilized financial, political and social resources to improve the situation of women in society in general.

A Comparative View of Women’s Substantive Representation in Pakistan and Bangladesh

In this section I provide a comparative assessment of the substantive representation of Pakistani and Bangladeshi female legislators in the parliamentary and non-parliamentary arena as discussed in the previous and this chapter. This is necessary for two reasons: first to identify the similarities and differences between cases in order to understand the extent of quantitative and qualitative increases in substantive representation and second from these similarities and differences, to explore institutional and individual-level factors that influence the process of women’s substantive representation in political institutions. Connected with the exploration of factors is the interest of male leaders in maintaining ‘power and patriarchy’ in political institutions through the mechanism of reserved seats and indirect election. The explanation also highlights the factors that facilitate the creation of a critical space for women and enable women to contest the institutional rules and the underlying patriarchal values and norms.
As it is difficult to measure and compare a complex and multifaceted concept like substantive representation in absolute quantitative terms, I combine quantitative data generated from the content analysis with the qualitative indicators to compare the cases as appropriate. Though the composition, working days and number of women in each parliament varies and makes comparison difficult a general quantitative assessment is done that includes number of women both general and reserved seats and number of times women legislators voiced women’s issues in parliamentary debates. To identify whether there is any difference in the numbers of representation of women’s issues in the parliamentary debate between the countries, I combine all the interventions made by women legislators on women’s issues in each parliament and the number of women who spoke for women. Through comparing the data from content analysis of the debates I provide evidence of a bigger increase in the substantive representation of women in the parliament of Pakistan. Table 7.1 provides a comprehensive picture of representation of women’s issues in the parliaments of Pakistan and Bangladesh.

It is evident that in the tenth, twelfth and thirteenth National Assembly one, 39 and 47 Pakistani women voiced women’s issues one, 149 and 172 times. In Bangladesh 15, 18 and 31 women legislators voiced women’s issues 40, 26 and 78 times in the fifth, eighth and ninth parliament. The overall number of representation shows that except in the tenth National Assembly, a higher number of Pakistani women legislators represented women and voiced more women’s issues compared to their counterpart in Bangladesh. The differences between the representation of women’s issues in Pakistan and Bangladesh widened in post 2000 parliaments and it is more evident in the thirteenth National Assembly. What is evident from the analysis is that the presence of critical actors, a critical space like the WPC and a higher number of qualitatively strong and experienced
women provided more opportunity to women legislators to speak for women in the
parliamentary debates in the thirteenth National Assembly compared to the twelfth
National Assembly and to Bangladeshi Parliaments as well. Nonetheless, the number of
women and interventions made by women increased from the previous parliaments in
both countries with an increase in the number of women.

Table 7.1: A comprehensive picture of Pakistani and Bangladeshi general and reserved
seats women legislators representation of women’s issues

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Pakistan</th>
<th>Bangladesh</th>
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<tr>
<td>Parliaments</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>No. of total women</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>73 (13+60)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(GS+RS)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>No of women who spoke</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>39 (4+35)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(GS+RS)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No of times women who</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>149 (9+140)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>voiced women’s issues</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(GS+RS)</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Rules used</td>
<td>Motion under 241</td>
<td>Point of order, CAN, resolutions, PBM,</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Adjournment Motion</td>
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|
To understand the qualitative increase in substantive representation I use three criteria: diversity and support for the issues represented; rules, strategies and fora of representation; and constraints on women’s voice. In doing so close analyses of the debates and secondary sources are used.

Diversity and the support for the issues represented: The aspect of diversity in issue representation indicates whether women legislators brought new ideas and advocated different interests-representation of the needs of different groups and classes of women – on the legislative floor. Also included are representations of different ideological perspectives on issues regarding women (Celis 2009).

From this perspective, in the Pakistan National Assembly women brought a range of different issues and bills relating to minority women, women’s status in tribal regions, legal and reproductive rights of poor and rural women, a charter of child rights, and child abuse. There was representation of different ideological perspectives on ‘The Protection and Empowerment of Women’ Bill, ‘Reproductive Health Care Rights’ (Amendments) Bill’, the dress code for air hostesses, the veils of women in photographs, and discrimination and police brutality against student of religious educational institutions.

Apart from supporting amendments to existing laws, Pakistani women legislators also brought and supported the passage of new laws on acid attack crimes, reproductive health, child rights, compulsory education of children, and harassment at the work place. They convinced party leaders and members and secured support across party and gender lines to promote and secure women’s and child’s rights and entitlements (Mirza 2011). Pakistani women used their political capital and presence, positions and their professional and activism experiences to propose and support the passage of feminist bills.
There was broad base support for those women’s issues represented in the Pakistan National Assembly. Pakistani women MNAs irrespective of their partisan identity supported most women’s issues. They did not involve themselves in divisive politics around gender related issues. There are many instances where women members across and within parties presented a united voice about women’s issues and supported women related bills. Thus they acted for women despite the possible threat to their political careers.

In Bangladesh women also represented the needs of different women focusing on Hindu women’s marriage registration, indigenous women workers in tea gardens, garments workers, women labourers, female workers in foreign countries, elderly women, children of prostitutes and prisoners, child labour and those of neutral gender. Bangladeshi women legislators however did not submit any women related bill or initiate the amendments on existing laws on women’s inheritance rights, equal wages for female labour or direct election and an increase in the number of reserved seats. By contrast to Pakistani women, the substantive acts of Bangladeshi women legislators also lacked a support base to promote women’s concerns. Only in one or two cases did women MPs collectively protest against violence on women. The cross partisan initiative to support women’s issues was rare.

Rules, strategies and fora of representation: This aspect of the qualitative assessment of women’s representation involves focusing on the nature of representation including the time devoted, rules and arguments used to voice women’s issues, and fora, link and networks used for representation. The content analysis of the debates reveals that Pakistani women legislators used almost all the parliamentary rules of procedures to introduce and voice women’s issues. Women legislators during the debates raised
women’s issues through calling attention notices and points of order. They initiated and participated in the debates on women related government and private member’s bills. They took part in the discussion under rule 87 on matters of sufficient public interest, and brought and spoke on the resolution and adjournment motions on women’s issues. Women legislators individually and collectively voiced their concerns on the deferment, rejection and passage of important women related bills. They presented their opinions with data and arguments. Their involvement in the long and complicated law making process and speeches reveals that women devoted time and effort to making claims on behalf of women.

Bangladeshi women legislators mostly relied on a specific parliamentary rule, 71a (3) which only allowed for two minutes to speak on issues not accepted for discussion in parliament. Other than this, women legislators on rare occasions used mechanisms like calling attention notices or presented resolutions on women’s issues. Their intervention in the debates on women related bills was only visible in the fifth parliament. Women legislators devoted less time and effort to promoting women’s concerns in parliament.

Both Pakistani and Bangladesh legislators claimed to act to promote women’s socio-economic and political issue on the legislative floor, constituency and party level. Women legislators claimed that they acted on the needs and requests of women constituents in their areas and supported women more than men. This confirms that female legislators are more attentive to female constituent claims and requests than men do (Thomas 1991) and this is due to their feelings of common gender identity and experience of gender subjugation. However, Pakistani women’s acts of substantive representation occurred at two levels: individually and from the platform of caucus that impacted more on the representation of women’s issues in the social, legal and political arenas. In Bangladesh,
women legislators individually represented women’s issues and a collective effort was absent due to divisive nature of politics.

Again Pakistani women legislators used networks of information and knowledge by linking with different organizations and individuals that includes provincial governments, women’s organization, media, political workers and leaders, woman’s rights activists and experts, and civil society organizations and to promote women’s issues at parliamentary, party and constituency levels. Bangladeshi women legislators did not establish or use network of information and knowledge like Pakistani women to promote women’s issues in the political process. The overall analysis indicates that Pakistani women legislators, more so than their Bangladeshi counterparts, introduced more bills that advanced women’s interests, brought gender perspective to bear on legislative debates and networked with women both inside and outside parliament. This indicates that Pakistani women legislators were effective representatives of women (Goetz and Hassim 2003).

Constraints on women’s voice: As noted, both Pakistani and Bangladeshi reserved seats women legislators did not always voice their concerns on some issues critical to women. Some remained silent and some opposed initiatives to amend legal discrimination against women. Again the data on legislative debates shows that a significant number of women in both cases did not initiate any debate nor spoke for women. Formal and informal institutional norms and support systems are viewed as the primary explanations for women’s inactiveness and reactiveness on women’s issues. Further, reserved seats women legislators faced the burden of representing both constituency and women. In some cases, reserved seats women legislators could not develop and nurture representative-constituent relations due to lack of authority and acceptance by the constituents and resistance from male leaders. The power of institutionalized masculinity
worked against the reserved seats women’s ability to act on their quota mandate. However, I develop the following table based on the findings from the fine grained comparison of Pakistani and Bangladeshi women’s substantive acts in different sites of representation.

Table 7.2: A comparative assessment of Pakistani and Bangladeshi reserved seats women’s substantive representation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nature and extent of women’s substantive representation</th>
<th>Pakistan</th>
<th>Bangladesh</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Representation of women’s issues in debate</td>
<td>√+</td>
<td>√</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Both Pakistani and Bangladeshi reserved seat women represented women’s issues in the debates. Pakistani women on an average represented more women's issues, used diverse mechanisms, and devoted more time to the representation of issues compared to Bangladeshi women.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inactive</td>
<td>√</td>
<td>√</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Both Pakistani and Bangladeshi women remained silent on important issues or acted against women’s issues.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constituency Act</td>
<td>√+</td>
<td>√</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistani and Bangladeshi women acted individually for women’s socio-economic and political empowerment but Pakistani women MNAs also acted collectively from the platform of caucus.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party</td>
<td>√+</td>
<td>√</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistani and Bangladeshi women individually acted to promote gender consciousness and reduce gender disparity at the party level but Pakistani women collectively acted from the platform of caucus and reached out to political parties and civil society groups to build consensus on women’s political representation.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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(Key: in this table the tick indicates that substantive representation of women occurred at different sites, and the + sign indicates more and improved substantive representation)

Understanding the Space of Representation

The chapter reveals that most reserved seats women acted in all the sites of representation- parliament, constituency and party to promote equality, rights and the autonomy of women. Reserved seats women legislators acted on those issues in the constituency and party that are responsible for the subordinate status of women. They sought to empower women and engender the political process. Thus the link between
women’s presence and substantive representation of women is confirmed. However, women faced several challenges at the constituency level when acting for women. Resistance from male leaders, absence of a geographical constituency and most importantly the double burden of representation pose significant obstacles to women’s substantive acts. The experiences of women legislators however reveal two different implications of reserved seats on maintaining the constituent-representative relation.

The chapter also brings the Pakistani and Bangladeshi reserved seats women’s substantive acts in the parliament and constituency and party level together, makes quantitative and qualitative assessments and finally makes a comparison. Doing so reveals both similarities and differences in substantive representation and finds that Pakistani women’s substantive representation increased more than Bangladeshi women in quantitative and qualitative aspects. The constraints on women’s substantive representation in both countries make it explicit that women’s substantive representation was mediated by different institutional and individual-level factors in both countries. Therefore, in the ensuing chapters, I examine the influences of these factors on women’s substantive representation in each case and provide an account for the differences in substantive representation between cases.
Chapter 8: Women in Institutional Sites of Representation

This chapter has one broad objective. To identify the different factors that were responsible for the similarities and differences in substantive outcomes between Pakistan and Bangladesh as explored in the previous chapter. I identified a bigger increase in substantive representation by Pakistani women compared to Bangladeshi women. I also exposed several instances where women acted against women or just remained silent. Several factors surfaced in the process of investigation of women’s substantive representation which were associated with these acts and non-acts of the women parliamentarians. To this end I seek to explain why and when improved substantive representation of women occurs.

Institutional Challenges and Opportunities for Substantive Representation

Trying to understand the complex process of women’s substantive representation, research confirms that the capacity and inclination of female representatives to ‘represent’ and ‘act for’ women are constrained by numerous personal, institutional and party political factors (Mackay 2008). Such findings imply that women’s substantive representation does not take place in isolation from the surrounding context and it should not be measured only in terms of women’s ability to represent. Existing scholarship on gender quotas and feminist institutionalism reveals several factors that constitute hindering or aiding factors of women’s substantive representation. These factors were set forth and formulated as hypotheses in chapter two. I test these hypotheses with available
data and provide empirical evidence of the important factors to women’s substantive representation in each case. I group these factors into two broad categories. First, institutional and contextual variables, such as masculine norms and practices of the political institutions, indirect election and the label effect of reserved seats, party discipline, affiliation and positions, institutional support systems, increase in numbers and diversity among women, and the presence of a women’s caucus. Second, individual level variables such as critical actors, links with women’s organizations and civil society groups, feminist attitudes and social gender norms of domestic responsibility (Franceschet and Krook 2012; Dahlerup 2009b, 2006b; Grey 2006; Karam and Lovenduski 2005). I present the analysis of the influence of these factors on women’s substantive representation in two separate chapters. This chapter explores and explains the institutional factors that aided (or hindered) the substantive representation of women while the following examines the individual level factors that impact on women’s capacity to act for women.

**Formal and Informal Norms of Political Institutions**

Feminist political scientists argue that the formal and informal norms and practices of political institutions are constructed from a male perspective and reflect a bias toward men’s experiences and authority (Kathleen 1995 cited in Childs and Krook, 2005 p.525; Acker 1992). In these institutional environments women are not accepted in equal terms with men. Lovenduski (2005) argues that masculine legislative norms and practices and the patriarchal structures of political parties undermine the integration of women’s perspectives into the legislative process. In such environments women also experience “invisibilisation” meaning their presence is ignored in the legislative process (Zetterberg 2008, p.444). The process of invisibilisation and marginalization multiplies due to the
limited positional power of women inside legislatures, and lack of seniority or party position that arises out of gender discrimination in the party institutions (Beckwith 2007; Piscopo 2006). Thus male-dominated legislatures and sexism among male legislators make it difficult for women legislators to press for women's issues (McGregor 2000 cited in Yoon 2001, p.183). Therefore the hypothesis is:

\[ H1: \text{Institutionalized masculinity in the parliamentary space and political parties obstructs women's substantive representation} \]

Women parliamentarians in developing and patriarchal contexts have to operate in a difficult political and societal environment with a very limited space of agency (Fleschenberg 2007). The Pakistan legislature is infused with patriarchal, feudal and tribal norms and women legislators complained of not being taken seriously, not only by male colleagues but by the Speaker of the National Assembly who ignored the notices of women and allocated less time for them to speak (PILDAT 2006). In the twelfth National Assembly, women’s opportunity to participate in the legislative process was curtailed and not a single woman member was put on the list of the Panel of Chairmen (Wasim and Wagh 2009). In this way experiences of marginalization and invisibility in the masculinized space like legislative institutions constrained and sometimes discouraged women from speaking for women (Dalton 2008). Women legislators mentioned that male members were not supportive of reserved seats and were suspicious about the formation of the Women’s Parliamentary Caucus. Further woman legislators had to face the wrath of party members for praising any positive effort of opposition woman legislators.\textsuperscript{95}

Women experienced lack of support from their own party members and MNAs on women’s issues. Male members also barred women from taking the chair in committees. Women legislators informed that:

When WPC was formed many men though not openly but resented it. They were jealous and felt that women are bypassing the party. Whenever women get together, it becomes an issue for the parties but they also do whenever required. (PKMNA-1)

The president of my party was bit conservative and was not happy about giving so many seats to women. (PKMNA-4)

They (male) oppose the appointment of women as Minister or chair person in the committees. (PKMNA-5)

In Pakistan, sometimes women legislators’ were either expelled from the party or criticised for promoting women’s concerns and initiating cross partisan networking. Kashmala Tariq, a reserved seat legislator and a woman activist was expelled from the party (PML-Q) due to her outspoken nature and the anti-woman mind-set of the party (Sahi 2008). Dr. Fehmida Mirza, Speaker of the thirteenth National Assembly and three times directly elected MNA, was criticised for being ‘women’s Speaker only’ for her support to women legislators in promoting women’s issues and for her part in the formation of the caucus (PILDAT 2013). A female legislator remarked:

I don’t feel there is any difference between reserved seat and general seat. The social and political contexts are same for general and reserved seats women. (PKMNA-1)

Feminist scholars argue that institutions created by men in response to the interests of elites often function to constrain the behaviour of women (Browne 2014; Franceschet
In the legislative process, parliamentary leaders decide who is to speak and what not to say. The gendered processes of the legislative and political party institution silence women by pressurizing them to conform to the positions taken by their male colleagues or blocking avenues usually available to articulate their own views independently (Hawkesworth 2003). One Pakistani female legislator disclosed her ordeals as below:

I gave a resolution ... and it was accepted by the Speaker. That time many MNAs from my and other party..., they requested me to withdraw the resolution even my party leader but I refused. That day the session was adjourned to kill my resolution. After that, not a single one of my resolutions or bill was allowed to be tabled or incorporated in the agenda. (PKMNA-4)

It was observed that in Pakistan, whenever women wanted to raise issues of mutual concern, parties or party leaders were always there to impose their own political priorities which usually conflicted with the larger agenda of gender equality (cited in Saeed 2010). Moreover, according to informal conventions, senior members and leaders of the parties and parliaments are given priority in the conduct of business and appointment to important positions of the parliament. Most of the senior members are obviously male. Women’s junior status limited women’s access to formal position of institutional power and sometimes constraints women from taking initiative to participate in debates (Swers 2002). One Pakistani legislator mentioned:

Being a junior member our notices are sometime ignored or we have to wait long hours for our turns. The experienced and seniors are given preferences. This discourages us to give notices. (PKMNA-2)
Women legislators faced resistance from males during the passage of women related bills. Women members of the ruling party failed to incorporate two positive amendments in the Criminal Law Amendment Act 2004 (on honour crimes) due to strong resistance from some quarters in the government and party (Mirza 2011). The Domestic Violence Bill was passed in the thirteenth National Assembly in 2009 but it lapsed in the Senate due to the opposition of the rightist JUI –F party that termed the bill a ‘western agenda’ (Lari 2012). The Prevention of Anti Women Practices Bill 2011 and its standing committee had faced significant resistance to pass the bill (Khan 2011). The main opposition women face was from male members of own or opposition parties who ignore them in the legislative process or block any legislation to ensure women’s access to gender rights, good and services (Imtiaz 2011).

Bangladeshi women MPs stressed on the attitude of males as the most challenging factor for women. Women MPs experienced non-cooperation and resistance from males in constituency work. Women legislators complained that male MPs’ attitudes towards women were not favourable for work in the legislative arena. Women legislators are not treated as equally or respected by men. Female MPs of Bangladesh said that:

In the parliamentary committees men are cooperative until they are in a position of doing favour to women. The moment they (men) feel ‘women are becoming equal’ the tendency to cooperate unconsciously vaporised. Their (men) attitude is that, we are receiving facilities only for being women. (BDMP-1)

One of the problems for women is the attitude of the male political leaders and activists who try to stop women in any way they can from elevating to a higher position. (BDMP-13 GS)
Zetterberg (2008) argues women legislators whether directly or indirectly elected can end up being seen as token representatives when nominated or appointed by the party leadership. It becomes more acute when these women had no other party assignments and lacked leadership experience of other organization(s). In Pakistan and Bangladesh, it was revealed that several women legislators prior to their election were never involved in politics or assumed any leadership role or had experience of women’s movement. Some were local and national level political party activists and most of the women were elected for the first time. Those women legislators who lacked political, legislative and leadership experiences were more likely to be treated as tokens and made to feel invisible in legislative process.

In some cases, men slandered or threatened women who raised critical issues that are seen as affecting the interests of male leaders. In Bangladesh general and reserved seats women MPs of the ninth parliament were physically and verbally abused as they were thought to be working against the interests of the former or incumbent male leaders of that constituency. Reserved seats MPs Chemo Ara and Fazitulennesa Bappi became the victims of degrading comments and physical and verbal assault committed by male MPs and their supporters (Prothom Alo 29 November 2011, pp.41-42; Prothom Alo 20 December 2012, p.2). General seat MP Kabori Sarwar was verbally abused and threatened by her own party male leader during a formal meeting (Prothom Alo 19 November 2011, p.1). In Pakistan Senator Yasmeen Shah was threatened by another Senator Israullah Zahri for raising the issue of burying five women alive in the name of Karo-Kari in parliament. Most alarmingly, women were sexually harassed and felt pressured to give sexual favour to leaders in powerful positions in the parties and legislatures (Bari 2010, p.380). These examples indicate that male political leaders and
legislative members are not enlightened and are impolite and often aggressive towards female members (Heath, Schwindt-Bayer and Taylor-Robinson 2005; Hawkesworth 2003).

In addition, constitutional provisions bind women to support acts that might have disproportionate effects on women across parties. They constrain women from taking an independent stance on women’s issues irrespective of the party’s position and ideology. One MNA expressed her frustration:

The 19th amendment has curtailed the freedom of MNAs. They can’t vote against the party. Our freedom has been compromised. (PKMNA-2)

Like Pakistan, the constitutional provision (70)\textsuperscript{96} in Bangladesh bars MPs from voting against the party and if they do, they lost membership of parliament. This seriously limits the freedom of the MPs.

Both Pakistani and Bangladeshi political parties resist the integration of women’s perspectives into institutional rules and norms. Women legislators and women’s organizations have mobilized for allocation of 10% of general seat tickets to women candidates but this was not accepted by the political parties in Pakistan. In Bangladesh, political parties expressed very little commitment to implementing the Election Commission’s regulation to implement the 33 percent representation of women in the decision making bodies of the parties (Majumdar 2012). Also the request by women

\textsuperscript{96} Article 70 of the Bangladesh constitution stipulates that: (1) A person elected as a member of Parliament at an election at which he was nominated as a candidate by a political party shall vacate his seat if he resigns from that party or votes in Parliament against the party. Accessed from: http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/research/bangladesh-constitution [25 September 2014].
legislators to increase the number of reserved seats was turned down by the Speaker on the ground of lack of seating space for additional number of women members (BDMP-16).

The findings indicate that women legislators in both countries were ignored, marginalized and victimized in political institutions. Their efforts to act for women were further limited by constitutional rules to control the freedom of legislators. Thus the masculinist formal and informal norms and practice constraint women legislators to voice women’s concerns and affects their ability to act for women.

Reserved Seats and the Quota Label

In the quota scholarship, it is argued that the structure of electoral system exerts an influence on women’s substantive representation (Ballington and Matland 2004; Schwindt Bayer-Mishler 2005). The design of the quota regulation in combination with electoral system can have an impact on the psychology and status of women politicians (Krook 2013; Matland 2006; Yoon and Banwaree 2006). It is argued that the quota label, indirect election and the lack of a constituency is likely to diminish reserved seats women’s capacity to represent claims (Frankl 2004; Reyes 2002). Research also indicates that women elected to reserved seats are in a less favorable situation when males try to prevent reserved seats women from exercising political power or to act independently (Zetterberg 2009; Liddell 2009). Drawing from this scholarship, I formulate the following hypothesis:

\( H2: \text{Indirect election to reserved seats and quota label affect women's ability to work for women.} \)
To understand whether the reserved seats label affects women’s ability to act for women, I asked women legislators about their experiences in parliament and in constituencies. Their experiences and perception about their mandate and the label effect of reserved seats are presented in chapter six and seven. It is evident that reserved seats women in these masculinist political institutions experienced marginalization more than general seat women. The discrimination faced by women legislators as a result of gendered norms and institutional culture were multiplied by indirect election and reserved seat label. In Pakistan’s National Assembly, a few male members’ remarked that reserved seat women had been brought to the assemblies as a ‘sweet dish’ of democracy and termed the reserved seats women as political show girls. They viewed the restoration of reserved seats as Musharraf’s gifts to the West and advised women legislators to prove their worth instead of sensationalizing the Assembly (Bilal 2004).

The indirect election and reserved seats status was used by male leaders and parliament members’ to make women legislators’ invisible in the legislative process. In the twelfth National Assembly of Pakistan, female reserved seats legislators were ignored during debates on important national issues and were not even provided with the minutes of the meetings despite repeated requests. Reserved seats women MNAs were only allowed to speak for two to three minutes with repeated interruptions to wind up (Mirza and Wagha 2009).

Reserved seats women MNAs confided that they were often taunted by their male colleagues. They were often reminded of their election and positions. Male members regarded them as ‘not real politicians’ since they had no constituency and their election was dependent on the favour of the party leadership (Bari 2010). Reserved women MNAs
were less respected and valued in parliament compared to general seat legislators.

Reserved seats MNAs remarked that:

There is a difference between reserved seats and general seats. General seat women are more respectable than us. The attitude of party leader is that they have given us the seats for the betterment of women, so we should oblige them. They can use us the way they want. (PKMNA-8)

There are differences between reserved seat and general seat. Previously reserved seat MNAs did not have any funds now we are getting funds too. Some people view reserved seats as ‘khairati seat’. (PKMNA-12)

Directly elected are given priority for foreign tours and training. (PKMNA-15)

If you compare reserved seats with general seats, there is only one difference- when the slots for cabinet are considered they prefer those women who are elected in open or general seat. There is no hard and fast rule, general seats women are preferred for the positions. (PKMNA-7)

Also due to reserved seats status, women were more vulnerable to party pressure and disciplinary actions. A reserved seat MNA described:

I was discriminated against just because I’m a woman who has been elected on reserved seats. The party leadership believes that all MNAs elected on reserved seats for women and minorities should play as puppets in their hands (cited in Sahi 2008).
Like Pakistani women MNAs, Bangladeshi women MPs had a similar feeling of being less respected and valued in the legislative arena. The reserved seats women were targets of defamatory comments. Male members called the reserved seats women as ‘rented MP’ or ‘MP of five thousand Takas’ or ‘Queer MP’ (Firoj 2003a, pp.161). Women legislators stressed the informal institutions and norms regarding the status and position of reserved seats women in parliament. Though there are apparently no difference in terms of salary and other allowances, reserved seats women were discriminated against in terms of allocation of development funds and other opportunities. Reserved seats women often were used to fulfil the quorum in the parliament (Daily Samakal 19 July 2009, p. 14). They complained about some discrimination between reserved seats and general seats. The separate seating arrangement for reserved seats women on the back benches indicates the institutional discrimination against the reserved seats women. Women MPs explained that:

There was some discrimination. The directly elected MPs had power and could fulfil their promises but we could not. (BDMP-3)

The general seat MPs are given the preferences for attending foreign tours and delegation. In this way, in terms of learning the legislative rules and procedures, we (reserved seats MPs) lag behind the general seats legislators. (BDMP-4)

The time allocates to reserved seats women during legislative business is less than the general seat. We don’t get equal respect or privilege. (BDMP-16)
Thus reserved seats women and their indirect election were used to control and dominate women and their acts within and outside the legislative arena. The size of the constituencies allocated to reserved seats women in Bangladesh were six time larger than those of the general seats but these women received almost half of the allocation of general seats MPs. They had no administrative authority for development activities or freedom to spend their fund and it was the elected male members of the constituencies who dictated the distribution of the funds of reserved seats women legislators. For example:

Everything in reserved seats is also ‘reserved’. There is less respect, allocation and facilities for reserved seats. There is less scope to work in reserved seats and less administrative importance of the position. Allocation for reserved seats is half of general seat. Reserved seat MP has no specific areas or public relation. (BDMP-2)

We could not use our allocation according to our wish which was only 30 percent of general seats MPs. The elected MPs dictated the distribution of the allocation in our constituencies. (BDMP-3)

Moreover, in the absence of direct constituency Pakistani women parliamentarians across parties had to surrender their development grants to male party members. In Bangladesh, the ruling party in the ninth parliament tended to designate responsibilities for some constituencies (mostly of opposition members) to the reserved seat women of their own party). The ability of these women to act for women at the constituency level was also obstructed by male leaders who considered them as ‘constituency invaders’. Female legislators mentioned that they had to work with difficulty and experienced non-cooperation from male MPs. Reserved seats legislators mentioned that:
I am not sure what reserved seats women MNAs are supposed to do? If they want to contribute to the parliament and committees they have to tow their party line and if they work in constituency, they are considered as threat. In fact this became the biggest hurdle for me to get in to the parliament in the next tenure. (PKMNA-4)

In my designated area, I have to work in difficulties with the opposition MP. (BDMP-8)

The elected MP of my constituency behaved inappropriately with me. Now I don’t go there anymore. (BDMP-9)

What is evident is that the reserved seats label reduces women’s ability to act for women and build solidarity with constituents (Franceschet and Piscopo 2008). However in the existing system of constituency representation, women legislators did not recommend a change to the system of indirect election to one of direct election for reserved seats. Although the change would enable women to have a specific geographical constituency, it would have some negative implications for women’s electoral participation and representation and risk the whole system of reserved seats.

The change in the election system can’t be done so soon. It can have a retrospective outcome. The party can turn against the whole system of reserved seats. We need to work slowly to bring change. (PKMNA-5)

97 She believes that in feudal and patriarchal societies like Pakistan, it was as a result of the generosity of men that the reintroduction of reserved seats for women was not opposed and an increased number result. However, since reserved seats provision was only reintroduced in 2002, the demand to change the indirect election system may agitate some male leaders and they may then turn against the system of reserved seats for women and its continuation.
I don’t suggest any change in the exiting election system to reserved seats. (PKMNA-13)

No changes in the present system. On the contrary more women should be inducted through constituency seat. (PKMNA-11)

Bangladeshi women also supported the present system of indirect election and argued against the demand for direct election on the following grounds:

I directly reject the idea of direct election to reserved seats. The existing system is perfect where the party gives nomination for reserved seats. I was a directly elected councillor in the reserved seats and I have experience of discrimination between male and female councillor. (BDMP-14)

In my district there are five MPs. So if women are to be elected in 64 seats from 64 districts, a woman will have constituency five times bigger than the general seats MP. Is it feasible? (BDMP-5 GS)

Direct election to reserved seats is also problematic. In that case a reserved seat woman candidate will have six time bigger constituency than a general seat candidate. Even if she contests, the ruling MPs will demand money and other things to allow her to do electoral campaign in their constituency. (BDMP-16)

Thus I conclude that that women legislators’ opposition to direct election resulted from their selection in the existing system of election. At present a reserved seats woman’s constituency is comprised of 6-7 general constituencies and direct election would only
enhance women’s problems of electoral participation because they would need to campaign across bigger constituencies than a general seat MP. Unless supported by the parties, the additional election costs would only discourage non-elite women from contesting election and have a reverse effect on women’s political participation. In addition women would be still known as reserved seats or quota women and their status would not change.

On a more positive note, few Pakistani reserved seats women MNAs confirmed that reserved seats status and lack of constituency had little or no effect on their representation of women. They argued that reserved seats women were responsible for representing the women of Pakistan and the directly elected members are responsible for representing the restricted interests of a specific constituency.

I don’t believe in constituency politics. The difference between reserved seat and general seat is a completely fallacious mind set. I disagree with any such difference and to me (reserved seat) is more important. (PKMNA-11)

I never experienced any discrimination in the parliament. It depends on one’s own attitude and how seriously one works. (PKMNA-7)

Bangladeshi legislators expressed the same views regarding their reserved status and its influence on their ability to work for women:

There is basically no difference between reserved seat and general seat to those who know how to work. Reserved seat women MPs participate more than male or elected female MPs. (BDMP-9)
I wanted to express my views and there is no difference between general seat and reserved seats to speak in the legislative activities. (BDMP-10)

They argued that reserved seats women had greater freedom to spend their budget as they were not responsible for any specific geographical constituency and they represented larger numbers of women when the size of their constituency was taken into account. Further they felt that the acts of a representative depended on the individual capability of a legislator. Whether they are reserved or general seat should not matter when it came to voicing women’s concerns.

Reserve or general, it is just the ability to perform, just a way for coming to the parliament. ... I believe it is one’s own ability to perform and raising the voice for people in whatever way you can. (PKMNA-6)

If you have the confidence and spirit, there is no difference between reserved seats and general seats. (PKMNA-13)

However, the analysis of the bibliographic information (of those MNA and MPs interviewed) reveals that the women who assumed important position in the cabinet or in their parties, have strong political or feudal family backgrounds and had experiences as activists and so had more power to manoeuvre, and were less conscious about indirect election or reserved seats labels. Those women though elected as a result of their ties to male political leaders, were able to resist being labelled as token and worked for women. By contrast this analysis reveals that women who were low-level political party workers without any leadership or organizational experience and lacked strong feudal or political family connections were most often affected by the reserved seats label. This kind of women legislator experienced triple jeopardy due to gender, their reserved seats status,
and lack of leadership support or connections. This conclusion confirms that although women need no special ability or qualification they do need some resources to act as substantive representatives of women (Piscopo 2006). Therefore, the findings reveal that indirect election and the reserved seats label will not affect all women in a similar way. It varies between individual women and does not preclude women from acting for women. The findings also appear not to support Childs and Krook’s (2012, p.101) view that the stigma connected to a quota may erode and the power of labels appears to diminish over time given the fact that these two countries have had reserved seats in place for a considerable of time. Instead I find that self-confidence (acquired from educational and professional achievement), experience, and strong political and family background all support reserved seat women to overcome the stigma of quota labels in a patriarchal context.

**Party Discipline, Party Affiliation and Party’s Position**

Research confirms that the substantive representation of women is also influenced by the extent of party discipline. Political parties and party discipline undoubtedly impact upon the substantive representation of women, both its content and the representatives involved (Celis 2008b; McGregor 2000 cited in Yoon 2001, p.183) and can limit individual legislator's interest in representing women's issues (Bari 2010; Liddell 2009; Ayata and Tütüncü 2008; Childs and Withy 2004). Party discipline is the rule whereby the members of a political party take a common public stand on a given issue (Tremblay 2003, p.230) and has a tendency to prevent women working across parties (Mackay 2001).

However, in the context of a weakly institutionalized authoritarian party structure, what influences the capability of women to speak for women is party affiliation. Swers (2002)
argues that women legislators too are influenced by and act on the basis of their party affiliation and vote along party lines. As women are both individuals and politicians with their own political beliefs and views they are also like male party candidates, who represent that party’s policies and programmes (Bochel and Briggs 2000; Phillips 1995). Women legislators need to protect their political capital and reputation and to do that they must balance their own policy preference and that of the party (Swers 2002; Mackay 2001). Therefore the hypothesis is:

H3: Party discipline, party affiliation and a party’s position reduce the opportunity of women legislators to act on women’s issues.

Pakistani and Bangladeshi political parties are weak and dynastic in nature but disciplined in practice. In Pakistan the parties enforce strict discipline due to a culture of floor-crossing and the corruption of MNAs known as ‘horse trading’ and ‘lotacracy’ (Mumtaz 1998, p.322). The cross-party networking among women MNAs in such an environment is viewed with a lot of suspicion and parties discourage their MNAs from working closely with MNAs of other political parties (Bari 2010). Women legislators who disregard party rules are subject to disciplinary action and reserved seats women are more vulnerable to party discipline in Pakistan. Female reserved seat legislators who have tried to act independently or disregard party directives lost their chances for re-election. Female legislators mentioned that:

Party does not always allow saying or doing things. They need to consider the prospects of future election. (PKMNA-8)
Party never stops me from doing anything. There are some issues which I wanted to do in my constituency but party try to oblige everyone and need to look at the bigger picture. (PKMNA-3 GS)

In the parliament in your personal capacity you can contribute a lot but the thing is whether your party is inclined to support you or not. You can convince them to some extent still they have their own policy and lines. (PKMNA-4)

It is not safe to talk about anything without the decision of the party. (BDMP-12)

In Bangladesh, party discipline restricts women from making contact with opposition members. Women from both parties confirmed that they seldom interact with opposition members on women’s issues in the parliament due to party rules.

We female MPs organized and protest on women, children and disable issues. We do personally interact with opposition MPs but due to party politics it was some time difficult. (BDMP-15)

I do discuss women’s issues with other MPs in general seats and reserved seats of the alliance parties but not with the opposition party. (BDMP-13 GS)

However, apart from adhering to party rules, female legislators’ affiliation with the party ideology in some cases also influenced women to act against women’s interest or to remain inactive. In other words, women’s political presence may trump the ideology and position of the party (Kittilson 2008). For example, women parliamentarians, Dr. Farida Ahmed and Ms. Samia Raheel Qazi, of MMA strongly condemned and rejected the
Protection of Women (Criminal Laws Amendment) Bill 2006, due to their party affiliation.

Sometimes, female legislators weigh the party’s position and their own future career prospects as a parliamentarian. In the twelfth National Assembly in Pakistan the ruling party’s (PML-Q) women parliamentarians were unwilling to let the opposition party (PPPP) to get the credit for securing women’s rights and so opposed Sherry Rehman’s bill on ‘The Introduction of a Bill to Provide for Elimination of Gender Discrimination’. In the thirteenth National Assembly of Pakistan, pro-women legislators like Nafisa Shah, Bushra Gohar, and Shazia Mari remained silent on Nizam-e-Adl Regulation (Zubeida 2009). Women’s willingness and ability to act for women is circumscribed by their party’s position in parliament. According to a female legislator,

I have been elected in general seat twice. First time I was in opposition and this time in treasury bench. As an opposition MNA I had pointed agitation but in treasury bench I have to sway my opinion. (PKMNA-16)

In Bangladesh, women legislators also acted on the basis of their party affiliation on several occasions. During the fifth parliament when a BNP-JI alliance formed the government, women MPs did not speak on the Muslim Family Amendment Bill 1993. In the eighth parliament of 2001 women refrained from raising the issue of direct election even though women’s organizations mobilized a protest movement against indirect election. The women members of the ruling party in the ninth parliament neither initiate debate on equal inheritance right for women nor for changes in the Sharia law. Bangladeshi female MPs remarked that:
There are some women who used to speak about women’s empowerment and women’s rights in the seminars and meetings; it brought them to lime light and helped them to get nominated and elected. Now they don’t talk about women anymore. (BDMP-12)

We cannot speak against the party. Even when the opposition raise the issue of violence against women, the ruling party’s women MPs and Ministers are silent. We need to understand that not all issues are political or party matter. (BDMP-3)

This confirms that pure feminist politicians which feminist movement desire are rare (Dahlerup and Freidenvall 2010, p.419). Woman’s willingness and ability to act for women is often circumscribed by their party’s position in parliament since women are expected to work as loyal party representative (Dahlerup 2006b). In addition, the nature of coalition government constrained women to raise women’s issues. In Pakistan women often felt compelled to resist taking a stance on some women’s issues. Women parliamentarians often faced the dilemma of having to follow their party’s directive, which may not correspond with their intent to articulate demands for women and gender equality. It is harder for women politicians to pursue a feminist agenda (Dahlerup 2006b, p.519). Some MNAs explained the reality in the following manner:

Party never stops me from raising any issue but due to the coalition government, sometime party asked us not to discuss some issues. The coalition partners have their own priorities and agenda. (PKMNA-17)

Sometime we have to give up some issues due to party pressure. Considering the coalition nature of the
government, I was asked to drop some important issues in the parliament. (PKMNA-7)

On gender issues we have to consider the coalition partners and sort out the issues. That takes pre-eminence over gender issues. (PKMNA-16 GS)

The party’s strength and position in parliament also impacted on women’s substantive representation. Parliamentary parties with few seats are given less opportunity to speak in the House. This in turn constrains women from speaking for women. One female MP in Bangladesh remarked,

I gave questions and notices under 71 many times, but my question or notice was never accepted. I was not given the opportunity to speak. I am the only member of my party, without majority in parliament it is not possible to work. (BDMP-17)

Again in weak democratic systems, opposition party as well the opposition women members are discriminated against and opposition party’s most of the notices are not accepted for discussion. In the first sessions of the ninth parliament, opposition female MPs gave eight notices and none of these notices were accepted and the Speaker was criticised for his biasness in managing the legislative business (TIB 2011; TIB 2009a). Female MPs of the opposition party confirmed the undemocratic practices opposition members of parliament faced.

In 2001, I was cornered by the ruling party for being an opposition member. (BDMP-2)

I gave notices so many times but they were not accepted in the agenda. Also due to the less participation of opposition
Thus female legislator’s opportunity to speak for women was limited considerably by their party’s position and strength in the parliament. It is evident that women legislators like their male counterparts have to act within parameters set by the party leaders and rules. Party ideology, position and rules not only determine which representative and representative acts are involved but also the content of the representation (Celis 2009). However, in a weakly institutionalized party context, the compromises made to get elected to parliament limit women’s agency to speak for women. Party affiliation remains important in the light of its role in providing access to political patronage (Franceschet, Krook and Piscopo 2012; Goetz and Hassim 2003). Such attitudes and practices of the parties also limit the effectiveness of the presence of women to work for women and determine whether substantive representation can take place.

**Institutional Support Systems**

Political institutions can facilitate or hinder the substantive representation of women by providing different levels of resources to initiate women related activities or research (Franceschet 2011). They can also support women, especially new comers, to adapt to the legislative environment and learn the rules and procedures. However, considering the environment and support system of legislative institutions in a developing country context, I hypothesized that:

\[ H4: \text{Lack of institutional support system hinders women’s ability to act for women} \]

As legislative business is a complex process, it takes time to learn the rules and apply them. The inexperience of new women legislators in participating in the legislative
business is multiplied by the absence of institutional support systems for women. This is characteristic of underdeveloped institutional contexts. In Pakistan and Bangladesh, most of the women MPs were new comers as indicated in chapter five. Many of these women were political party workers and professionals but they lacked knowledge about the complex process of legislative business. There was no system of training in place for these women, nor mentors for newcomers to learn the legislative rules and procedures. In such institutional environments new women legislators became invisible in the legislative process almost immediately. According to Pakistani women MNAs:

First time was always difficult. I learnt through the passage of time. (PKMNA-4)

Most of the women though not confident in the early years of the resumption of seats, they started learning and participating in development programmes within two and half years. (PKMNA-5)

This is my first time in National Assembly. There are so many things to learn. Legislative business is a vast subject to comprehend. (PKMNA-3 GS)

In Bangladesh most of the women were elected for the first time and they found it difficult to learn and use the different legislative procedures in the absence of any training or guidance. Many times the Speaker had to direct the newly elected women legislators on how to speak during the debates in the parliament. Thus it is argued that it is important that parliament secretaries arrange necessary training on legislative procedures for newly elected legislators (Afroz and Mahmud 2010).
The performance of women parliamentarians in both countries suffered due to the lack of support systems such as office space, funding or support staff for legislative work. In particular, the lack of gender expertise in research staff and gender disaggregated data posed difficulties for women to raise gender-related issues in parliament. In Pakistan elected representatives continued to work without office space and assistance. Committees, which are considered the work horses of Parliaments, work without committee room suites. Only committee chairs are provided with office space which is not part of Parliamentary estate (PILDAT 2013). Women MNAs in the twelfth National Assembly reported that they did not receive any technical support or advice from parliamentary staff in drafting their bills. Nor was there assistance from within political parties to help parliamentarians to draft their bills. Only women legislators of the MMA were provided with a secretariat and the services of a professional lawyer in addition to the advice of senior party members in the drafting of bills (Bari 2010).

In Bangladesh, there are no support systems for reserved seats women parliament. The reserved seats women had no office space and were not provided with any support staff or additional funds to initiate women related projects or research. Again support and training for new comers was inadequate and women lacked the guidance of mentors and experienced MPs in the preparation and submission of notices and bills in parliament. One MP mentioned that:

There is no office for the reserved seats women legislators in the parliament. We requested for the office; even asked only one office for all the reserved seats women but we did not get any office. (BDMP-16)
As such the lack of institutional support systems limited the effectiveness and willingness of women to act for women in the legislative process or to initiate women related activities.

**Presence of More and Diversity among Women Legislators**

In the gender and politics literature, it is argued that the presence of women, in legislative institutions is required to enhance attention to women’s issues and to ensure that gender salient issues are not ignored (Dahlerup 2006b; Lawless 2004). It is believed that gender differences narrow as the legislature becomes more gender balanced (Bratton 2005). The presence of more women in traditional male institutions like legislature makes men aware of the needs and situation of women (Karam and Lovenduski 2005). Reingold (2000) finds that the increased presence of women leads men to show more interest in women’s issues. Thus in politics the short term agenda of increasing women’s presence leads to a longer term agenda of political transformation (Mackay 2001).

Some scholars argue that the infusion of women’s interests’ and perspectives becomes possible once women constitute a critical mass in legislatures, generally regarded as a 30% threshold (Grey 2006; 2002; Thomas 1994). Dahlerup (1988) finds that a critical mass (which originally was developed from Kantar’s 1977 work) can enable women to act as and for women98. It is also argued that when women exceed a proportion of about 30 percent a qualitative shift may result with a more gendered political discourse, political culture and policy process (Dahlerup 2006b; Grey 2002). It has the potential to start a

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98 Although Drude Dahlerup supported Kanter’s idea of critical mass to bring changes in the masculine organizations, she never claimed that critical mass is the only way to address the problem of gendered organizations. She equally stresses on the diversity among women, presence of critical actors, the institutional environment and the critical acts within and outside the legislative institutions to bring changes in the design and process of institutions.
chain reaction and will be a departure point for a new process of change. Thus numbers begin the process of regendering politics (Dahlerup 1988, pp. 275–76).

Others argue that a set proportion of female representatives proves to be neither a necessary nor sufficient condition for women’s substantive representation (Reingold and Swers 2011; Yoon 2011; Xydias 2007; Childs 2006). Childs and Krook find that ‘critical mass’ makes two problematic first-order assumptions: first, that (all) female representatives want to act for women, and second, that the percentage of women present is the key determinant of women’s legislative behaviour (2006, p.22). Thus the concept of critical mass when used out of context ignores the differences among women in terms of their gender consciousness. Trimble (2006) argues that critical mass decontextualizes the relationship between numbers of women and the impact they make and it places undue responsibility on women legislators. Grey (2006) however, argues that a certain number or percentage of women is required to begin debates on hard issues and to bring changes in the policy environment.

The idea of ‘critical mass’ also suggests that an increase in numbers will lead to the entry of an increasingly diverse group of women into political decision making bodies some of whom would be committed to women’s causes (Krook and Childs 2009; 2008). Quota scholars also contend that an increase in the number of women through quotas would lead to diversity among women who might differently qualified in terms of class, education profession and experience (Dahlerup and Freidenvall 2010). Bratton (2005) holds that, increasing diversity within a legislature is also accompanied by a greater focus on women’s issues and may indeed bring about changes in representation of women’s issues. The presence and effect of critical mass combined with diversity among women could thus potentially increase the substantive representation of women.
However, the concept of critical mass was developed and mostly contested primarily in egalitarian institutional contexts. While the presence of a critical mass of women may not be a precondition to gain substantive success in the legislative arena, it is a powerful argument to increase women’s representation in the parliament especially in patriarchal and undemocratic contexts (Childs and Krook 2008). It is argued that, with few women in politics, it is women who have to change. With many women in politics, politics changes (Marx, Borner and Caminotti 2007 cited in Franceschet and Piscopo 2008, p.407). The traditional male dominated political institutions are good at protecting their cultures and procedures (Lovenduski 2005) and therefore a certain percentage of women and diversity among women are necessary to bring changes to institutional norms and practices. Based on this existing scholarship it is hypothesized that,

*H5: Presence of 20 percent or more than 20 percent women and diversity among women enables women to act for women.*

The data from the parliamentary debates of in the parliaments of Pakistan and Bangladesh shows that in each parliament with the presence of more women, the representation of women’s issues in the debates increased from that of past parliaments. Table 8.1 presents a comparative view of women’s representation of women’s issues in all the three national assemblies of Pakistan.
Table 8.1: PKMNAs representation of women’s issues in the 10th, 12th and 13th National Assemblies of Pakistan

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number and Percentage of women</td>
<td>4 (1.8%)</td>
<td>73 (21%)</td>
<td>77 (23%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total no. of times debate initiated</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total no of time women spoke</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>149</td>
<td>172</td>
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</tbody>
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Accordingly, women’s representation of women issue was least in the tenth National Assembly. With presence of only four women, only one issue was raised in the debates during the three years of its tenure. In the twelfth National Assembly, with the presence of 73 women (21 percent), women legislators initiated debate on women’s issues 60 times and during these debates women voiced women’s issues 149 times. In the thirteenth National Assembly, there were 77 women (23 percent) and during the first four years, women imitated debates on women’s issues 70 times and voiced women’s issues 172 times.

A Pakistani woman MNA (16) opined that though women only constituted 23 percent in the Pakistan National Assembly it was a significant increase from previous assemblies. Due to the increase in the number of women, attention to women’s issues also increased. Female MNAs explained,

Whenever there is an opportunity women are trying to grab it. They raise the issues relating to women and children. The presence of 76 women is sufficient to raise issues. If one cannot, then another one will raise the pressing issues
for women. This way attention is drawn to women’s issues. The presence is important. (PKMNA-7)

Women tend to focus, go into more details into right issues in social sector, and on issue of peace which we have taken up. So there is clear focus on some aspects and there is also love for details. I have seen women parliamentarian go into much more detail and even in the caucus we sit and look into the laws for like days and days. We sit and look into the commas and full stops. (PKMNA-14)

In Bangladesh the representation of women’s issues also increased in the parliaments with the presence of an increased number of women. Table 8.2 presents a comparative view of women’s representation of women’s issues in all the three parliaments of Bangladesh.

Table 8.2: BDMPs representation of women’s issues in the 5th, 8th and 9th Parliament of Bangladesh

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<tr>
<td>Number and Percentage of women</td>
<td>35 (10.6%)</td>
<td>52 (15%)</td>
<td>70 (20%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. of times debate initiated</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total no of time women spoke</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The table shows that in the fifth parliament, there were 35 women (10.6 percent) and women initiated debate on women’s issues 31 times and during these debates they spoke on women’s issues 40 times. In the eighth parliament, only seven (2.3 percent) women were present in parliament during the first four years. Women’s representation increased to 52 (15.1 percent) at end of the fourth year after the election of 45 women to reserved seats. In the last 12 months of the parliament women initiated debate and voiced
women’s issues 26 times. During the first three years of the ninth parliament with the presence of 70 (20 percent) women, debates on women’s issues were initiated 75 times and women voiced their concern about women’s issues 78 times. This shows that representation of women’s issues more than doubled with the presence of 20 percent women in the fifth parliament of Bangladesh.

Half of the Bangladeshi and Pakistani women legislators interviewed claimed that women act on the basis of gender consciousness. They added that women listened and worked for women more than did male MP’s. They suggested women are in a position to recognize the nature of women’s subordination and the uniqueness that emerges from that subordination (Schwindt- Bayer 2010). They expressed that women constituents felt more comfortable to come and talk to them. It provided them (women parliamentarians) the opportunity to learn more about women’s issues and speak for women in parliament. This confirms that due to the political presence of women and shared gender experiences more women could access and raise women’s concerns with women MPs (Childs 2004).

A woman MP on this issue remarked that:

> Women are more sympathetic to women and can easily interact with women. (BDMP -18)

Other female legislators also confirmed that:

> Women think about everything and everyone including children while men are confined within their own interest and power politics. Their psyche is different. Women could play much more positive role and contribute to the country. (PKMNA-3 GS)
You have access and are invited to their home which is an added advantage that male MNAs don’t have.

(PKMNA-16 GS)

Though women's levels of gender consciousness vary according to socio-demographics, political ideology, and other variables Lawless (2004) argues that gender consciousness acts to unite women based on their identification with women's place in society and the issues that merits inclusion in the public agenda. A former female legislator mentioned that:

During my term, we modified several provisions of Hudood Ordinances but not all of them and about honour killing. It was intra-party as well as inter-party initiative. Women from all the parties stand on the issues and we worked on it. Men wouldn’t have done that. (PKMNA-5)

Women members based on their own experiences of gender discrimination in male dominated societies like Pakistan and Bangladesh focus on discriminatory laws, unequal rights, violence and lack of education, health and security that particularly affect women. Women in their individual capacity and collectively raised important women’s issues on the legislative floor and thus increased the representation of women. Therefore, I claim that the significant increase in the number of women in parliament from previous parliaments increased the opportunities for women to promote women’s issues in Pakistan and Bangladesh (Dahlerup and Freidenvall 2005).

Besides the number, the presence of women from different backgrounds and professions in the legislatures contributed to an increased diversity amongst women legislators and in the representation of issues. There was diversity in terms of class, education, profession
and experience and political background among the Pakistani women MNAs in the twelfth and thirteenth national assemblies. Connecting the bibliographic information with the content analysis and interviews, I find that the representation of women’s issues varies across individual women. Based on the link between their personal attributes and acts of representation I group these women into three categories.

The first group of MNAs were educated and were political or party workers. They were mostly elected to reserved seats. They voiced women’s issues less in the debates but they were more aware about the grass root level issues of women and acted to support women at the constituency level. This proves that reserved seats women have more experience of local politics and issues (Weeks and Baldez 2014). The second group of women were urban based, highly educated, professionals and women activists. Few of them had international exposure due to their educational and professional backgrounds. A significant number of these women had strong political and feudal backgrounds and memberships in national and international organizations. Some had previous legislative and local council experience. They contributed the most in the parliamentary debates and represented and secured support for the passage of women related bills. Most were elected to reserved seats with very few in general seats. Women MNA’s professional backgrounds in community development and the public and private sectors provide them with unique insights into how legislation affects women (Ross 2002). It was revealed that experienced women, women with professional achievements, activists and those with links to other organizations were more able to voice critical women’s issues in the debates. Thus this indicates that leadership positions and experience can prepare women for legislative success (Beckwith 2007).
The third group of Pakistani women legislators were not involved in politics or any organizations before their election to parliament. They were new, related to political leaders or feudal families and were educated. They represented women least in the debates. Most of them were elected to general seats. Thus it is confirmed that the personal attributes of Pakistani women legislators are important determinant of their ability to transform their presence into power.

In fact there was a well-balanced mix of new and experienced women MNAs in the thirteenth National Assembly which supported the representation of women’s issues. From the data presented in chapter five, it was reported that in twelfth National Assembly there were only nine (eight reserved seat and one general seat) women with previous experience of legislative and local councils, while 35 experienced women (25 reserved seat and 10 general seat) entered in thirteenth National Assembly. The commitment of new female MNAs together with guidance from experienced MNAs brought changes in the quantitative and qualitative representation of women’s issues in parliamentary debates and committees (Karam and Lovenduski 2005).

In Bangladesh, most of the women were active political party workers and leaders of the local women’s wing. They had knowledge about local women’s issues. These women brought to the floor the problems of local women and children which constituted a significant percentage of women’s substantive representation. According to a woman MP of the ninth parliament,

This time some very capable and different kinds of women are elected to reserved seats. They are no longer ornaments. (BDMP-16)
As with the Pakistan case, three categories of women MPs are identified in the Bangladeshi parliament. The first category of women had legislative experience. Some women were well educated but they represented women few times. The second category of women was new and was mainly made up of political activists. Some women were leaders of the national and local women’s wings of the party. Most women were educated and a very few were highly educated. Yet few represented women in parliament. The last category of women was also new but lacked political or social activism experience. They tended to be related to male leaders and they were the silent spectators in the house but supported women constituents.

However, it is evident that Bangladeshi parliamentarians lacked the diversity of those in Pakistan. Few women had previous legislative experience and even fewer had successful educational or professional achievement or national and international exposure. Most of the members had no link with other organizations besides their party and NGOs. In terms of experience, there were eight experienced women (six reserved seats and two general seats) in the fifth parliament, 12 experienced women (10 reserved seats and two general seats) in the eighth parliament and 14 experienced women (seven reserved seats) in the ninth parliament. However, the presence of experienced women did not translate into any effective outcomes in terms of the promotion of women’s issues. Most of these women lacked influential family background and strong political connections which influenced their position in the party and parliament. In patriarchal institutional environments where kinship and links with the male leadership are important to manoeuvre to power, most of the Bangladeshi reserved seats women lacked such connection (Samarasinghe 2000). This implies that Bangladeshi women had less influence within the parliament and lacked diversity in terms of experience, activism, education and profession. This
impacted on the representation of women’s issues (Hussain and Hasanuzzaman 2002). The presence of more and diverse kinds of women made a difference to the parliamentary representation of women but the lack of diversity among Bangladeshi parliamentarians may in part explain the lesser representation of important women’s issues in the debates compare to those in Pakistan.

Effective Women’s Parliamentary Caucus

Scholars found that the presence of a women’s parliamentary caucus is important to enhance the women’s political effectiveness and their ability to voice issues important to women (Thomas 1991). “A caucus is formal or informal in nature, with official membership and regular meetings of parliamentarians who share common interests and come together in attempting to influence the agenda” (McLean and McAllister 2003, pp.67-68 cited in Fleschenberg 2007, p.8). Such a caucus can exert pressure on female members of other parties, emboldening them to take similar positions on women's issues (Tremblay 1998, p.446). It is argued that women’s own institution building such as a women’s party or parliamentary caucus within powerful institutions is necessary to maintain a feminist identity and perspective (Sawer 2006). It provides women with the opportunity to develop legislation, exchange information and cooperate across party lines (Swers 2002). Therefore it is hypothesized that:

**H6: The presence of an effective women’s parliamentary caucus facilitates the representation of women’s issues in different venues.**

In Pakistan, a Women Parliamentary Caucus (WPC) was established in 2008. The main objectives of the caucus was to enhance the role of women parliamentarians in proposing gender sensitive legislation, reviewing and amending discriminatory laws and policies, and to ensure effective parliamentary oversight of implementation of international and regional commitments (WPC 2011a; Harron 2010). The formation of WPC is a historic
step by women parliamentarians who have collectively sought to rise above party lines and work together on policy issues for women (Ebrahim 2009).

Over time the Women’s Parliamentary Caucus in Pakistan emerged as the most effective strategy to push a women’s agenda and to protect women’s interests in the parliament process (Harron 2010). As caucus members were also present in the standing committees, they worked to mainstream gender in legislation and ensure that the needs of women were addressed in policies across the board (Saeed 2010; WPC 2011b; 2010). Moreover, the WPC had a positive impact in giving confidence to work across party lines and addressed gender related issues within the parties (Harron 2010). It united women legislators and constructed an informal norm to support any bills submitted by women without indulging in divisive politics. Apart from raising women’s issues in legislative debates, women MNAs from the platform of Caucus (WPC) acted on other issues such as, women and IDP, and violence against women. During the interviews, some members of the caucus commented that:

We are very fortunate and recommend other countries to follow an instrument like WPC. We have been able to use the piece of paper that gave us the 60 seats into a productive ends. It made us to work beyond partisan politics and to look at all women’s issues. We worked to ensure justice for women. (PKMNA-11)

Many bills that had been hanging for many years were passed with the support of the WPC. (PKMAN-15)

Issues such as, vani or child marriage, domestic violence, health, reproductive health, and acid violence are among the discussion of WPC. We have move bills in the parliament. In the caucus everybody has different mind-set
and diversity is also there. But it also provided a uniformity of thought. Taking the point of commonality as issue we work and raise awareness about that. (PKMNA-16 GS)

Women are leading the parliamentary business. The exemplary model is the WPC, women have proved that they can and do work beyond party lines on certain conditions. (PKMNA-14)

The caucus was also active in shaping civil society and public opinion towards women’s leadership. Since its formation, the WPC has organized several meetings, conferences and seminars with women’s organizations, women’s activists, academicians, civil society organizations and political parties to mainstream women in politics (WPC 2011b, 2012; Saeed 2010). The caucus has been an effective platform to build consensus and to form strategic coalitions among provincial and national level women MNAs, political activists, academicians, and women’s and civil society organizations to build consensus to nominate a minimum of 10 percent of women in winnable general seats in the elections and fulfilling the 10 percent quota in the bureaucracy. It helped women to expand their influence beyond their small numbers (Swers 2002, p.31). These women acted to enhance and strengthen women’s representation in legislatures and at all levels of decision making in the political forums. The presence of the Women’s Parliamentary Caucus initiated a process that shaped the political discourse and policies on women in Pakistan (Grey 2006).

In Bangladesh, a caucus of women parliamentarians was formed in the ninth parliament and three of the Bangladeshi women MPs informed me that the constitution of the caucus had only been submitted to the Speaker and it had not been provided with office or staff in order to function. Rest of the women legislators were not informed about the caucus.
Women legislators also expressed their doubt about the effectiveness of the caucus. One of the women mentioned that,

We can’t rise above partisan politics and hardly interact with opposition MPs. We have a caucus but it is not effective. The chairperson of the caucus does not have the credibility. That’s why we are not interested in it. (BDMP-9)

In the absence of an effective women parliamentary caucus, cross party mobilization and collective efforts to promote and work on women’s issues was absent in the Bangladeshi parliament. It is evident then that the presence of a parliamentary caucus enabled Pakistani legislators to diffuse their priorities throughout the legislative process, represent women’s issues at different fora and form alliances with other organizations outside parliament to mainstream women in politics. Bangladeshi women legislators, however, could not transform their number into an effective force to promote women’s concerns.

**Explaining the Presence and Absence of Substantive Representation**

In this chapter, I discussed the different institutional factors that facilitate or obstruct women’s substantive representation of women. According to the analysis presented above, women’s presence in parliament was constrained and controlled by masculinist practices and norms. Moreover, the reserved seats label and indirect election were used to treat women as tokens, and to marginalize and stigmatise them. Despite these constraints, some women resisted the negative labelling effect of quotas. However, women legislators were limited by party discipline and sometimes their party affiliation overrode their gender identity. Women legislators usually played by the rules and did not rebel against party’s decisions. In addition the party’s strength and position negatively affected women’s opportunity to act for women; when parties were in opposition or limited in
size, women found it difficult to speak out in parliament. Also I exposed the relevance of the lack of institutional support in both countries to women’s willingness and ability to act for women.

However I find that despite the presence of the hindering factors, an increased number of women in parliament and diversity among women in terms of class, education, profession and social background enabled women to represent more women’s issues from different backgrounds and groups. The process of representing women was facilitated by the presence of a Women’s Parliamentary Caucus in Pakistan’s National Assembly. However, in Bangladesh the extent of diversity among women members was less and the absence of an effective Women’s Parliamentary Caucus impacted on women’s substantive acts.

In conclusion, it is apparent that different institutional factors hindered women from acting for women while factors like the increased number and diversity among women and the presence of a cross partisan women’s parliamentarian caucus aided women’s capacity to represent women. Because of small-n of this study it is not possible to measure the influence of each institutional factors but it is evident that these factors are intricately interconnected and operate in a complex and sometime compounding way to determine when substantive representation might occur. Nevertheless, individual-level factors may be able to minimize the extent of the negative influence of the institutional factors and can enhance the substantive representation of women. I examine the impact of individual-level variables on women’s substantive representation in the ensuing chapter to ascertain whether these factors in reality support women in the complex process of representation.
Chapter 9: When are Women able to Act for Women?

This chapter has two purposes: first, to analyses the influence of individual-level factors on women’s substantive representation and second to explain the cause of improved substantive representation of Pakistani women legislators compared to those of Bangladesh as I argued in chapter seven. To what extent are women able to act for women? Feminist scholars argue that political institutions are structured according to male norms and values and even male lifestyles (Shvedova 2005; Acker 1990). In such an environment certain individual level attributes and resources may be important to enable women to carve out a space to promote a women’s agenda. In the previous chapter, I argued that different institutional factors hindered and aided women’s substantive acts. In this chapter I examine whether the presence of female critical actors, women with feminist attitudes, and individual women legislator’s link with women’s organizations and civil society organizations enables women to act for women. Also I test the extent to which social gender norms impact on individual women and their acts of substantive representation. Finally, the findings of these two chapters are brought together to draw a comparative view of the degree to which institutional and individual-level factors in each country explain cross-national differences in substantive representation.

Individual-level Factors of Women’s Substantive Representation

Presence of Critical Actors or Women’s Champions

In the literature on women and politics, it is argued that women in powerful positions can exert influence to ensure the repeal of discriminatory practices against women and effect feminised change (Kunovich and Paxton 2005; Caul 1999). They argue that attention
should be paid to those individual or critical actors who act in association with actors in other arenas in various kinds of ‘strategic alliances’, and seek policies that are ideologically congruent with those of the governing party to promote women’s concerns (Beckwith and Cowell-Meyers 2007; Childs and Krook 2009). The presence of such critical actors in greater numbers implies that there will be more substantive representation of women’s issues. Based on this knowledge I formulate the following hypothesis:

\[ H7: \text{The presence of critical actor or women’s champions in greater numbers can foster women’s substantive representation within and outside parliament.} \]

I argued in the previous chapter that increased in the number of women also resulted in an increased diversity among women legislators. It was further argued that reserved seats women acted on the basis of their gender identity producing a mandate effect. Some of these women appeared as critical actors to promote women’s concerns at different sites in Pakistan in particular.

In the parliamentary arena, Pakistani women legislators were marginalized by the male dominated legislature and their opportunity to represent women in the twelfth parliament was curtailed (Mirza and Wagha 2009). In many instances women were disallowed from making an intervention by the Speaker. Their questions, resolutions and calling attention notices were often ignored without any reason or explanation (Mirza and Wagha 2009). One of the MNA’s exclaimed her position in a male dominated legislature in the following manner:

Yes, we admit that we are children of a lesser god. But once we are there we should be given a chance and not ignored only
Yasmeen Rehman, a reserved seat MNA to explain the situation of women in parliament remarked that, “you had to have a very thick skin to be vocal in parliament” (cited in Ebrahim 2009). In such a constraining environment, several female legislators emerged as critical actors and acted for women. These women used their experience, power, positions and social capital to support and promote women’s concerns. Social capital is an important resource to solve common problems. Fukuyama considers social capital to be “an informal norm that promotes cooperation between two or more individuals” (2001, p.7; 2000, p.3) And according to Bourdieu (1981) it is “the totality of actual or potential resources related to the possession of a lasting network of more or less institutionalized direct or indirect social relations” (cited in Schuurman 2003, p. 994). As such, it is networks, norms, and trust that facilitate action and co-operation for mutual benefit (Putnam 1993). Women legislators received and relied on different kinds of support due to their personal and professional relations and membership in different networks and groups which in turn facilitated their ability to act for women.

Dr. Fehmida Mirza, who was directly elected to general seat three times and held an important position in the party, provided more opportunities to women members to voice women’s issues in the parliamentary debates after her election as the Speaker in the thirteenth National Assembly of Pakistan. She initiated the formation of the Women Parliamentary Caucus (WPC) and constituted an inquiry committee in the National Assembly Secretariat under the Protection against Harassment of Women at the Workplace Act, 2010. One female legislator mentioned that:
The Speaker is the chairperson of the caucus and she also holds an important position in the party. She is pro-women and suggests that there should be increase in the presence of women. (PKMNA-7)

Dr. Attiya Enayetullah, another experienced legislator acted to increase the number of reserved seats for women in the parliament. She brought the Women’s Reproductive Rights Bill which became later the Reproductive Healthcare and Rights Act 2013. She said:

As a minister during Zia-ul-Haque regime I worked to change the constitution to increase the number of reserved seats from 11 to 20 and during Musharaff’s regime from 20 to 60. (PKMNA-11)

Reserved seat MNA Bushra Gohar as the chair of the Standing Committee on Women’s Development constituted a sub-committee with Dr Attiya Enayetullah to facilitate the process of consultation between women’s organizations and women’s policy agencies to formulate a more comprehensive Domestic Violence Bill (Mirza 2011). Reserved seat MNA Sherry Rehman during her period as Information Minister, made special efforts to hold two broad based consultative meeting between various stakeholders to provide input and feedback on ‘The Protection against Harassment of Women at the Work Place Bill 2010 which later Protection against Harassment of Women at the Workplace Act, 2010. This Act is the main and comprehensive law that proposes the establishment of an inquiry committee in each organization within the 30 day period of the enforcement of this Act to enquire into complaints (Mirza 2011).

Dr. Nafisa Shah, secretary of the WPC and an experienced grass-roots level politician, facilitated the cross partisan networking of women parliamentarians to ensure that women
did not indulge in divisive politics in gender related issues. Ishrat Ashraf, an experienced reserved seat legislator trained the newly elected female parliamentarians to become effective representatives.

Some reserved seats women were appointed as the chairperson of different parliamentary committees such as, the Information and Broadcasting Committee, the Social Welfare and Special Education Committee, the Revenue and Planning and Development Committee, and the Women Development Committee. Also reserved seats women were appointed as the chairperson of the National Commission for Human Rights and Benazir Income Support Programme for Women. These positions of power provided them an opportunity to act for women. They were able to influence the decisions and activities of these committees and organizations in favour of women (NCSA 2011; WPC 2010). Also the appointment of Begum Shahnaz Wazir Ali as adviser to the Prime Minister contributed to the success of women friendly and gender sensitive legislation.

Along with these women, other women legislators individually and collectively acted to submit and passage important women related bills. Dr. Doniya Aziz played a critical role in the submission and passage of the Prevention of Anti-Women Practices Bill 2008. This law made three offences unlawful against women: (1) to deprive a woman of her rightful inheritance by using illegal and deceitful means (2) to give the girls in badl-e-sulha or in exchange to settle the disputes which are civil or criminal (3) force the women to marriage with Quran according to the traditional values. People committing these acts are subject to hefty fines or up to 10 years in prison (Yasin 2011). Reserved seat MNA Yeasmeen Rehman submitted the Domestic Violence Bill 2008 which was passed by the Senate on February 2012 (Lari 2012; Mirza 2011).
Marvi Memon, Begum Shahana Sheikh and Advocate Anusha Rahman played critical role in the submission and passage of Acid Control and Acid Crime Prevention Act 2011. Under this Act, persons committing such a crime will be subject to 14 years to lifetime imprisonment and a fine of Rs.1 million (Khan 2011). Reserved seats MNAs Sherry Rehman and Farahnaz Ispahani pushed for laws against the sexual harassment of women and the persecution of minorities (Imtiaz 2011). These women emerged as critical actors who individually and sometimes collectively took the initiative to promote critical women and children related issues, initiated cross partisan networking and encouraged others to act for women. This group of women mostly elected to reserved seats, involved in counter arguments and in long and complicated processes of law making; and acted in different capacity at different fora to ensure the rights of women.

However, bibliographic and other sources confirm that most of these women were highly educated and professionals; some were related to male political leaders and belonged to elite and urban based educated families. Elites have more social, political and financial resources than others to invest in their efforts. Women from powerful political families and feudal backgrounds had connections and networked within and across parties which enabled them to secure support for women’s issues in the legislative process. Besides, successful professional achievement gave women the confidence and skill to pursue and negotiate for a cause (Ballington and Matland 2004). It reinforces the point that women legislators must have both presence and agency to make an impact on the masculine nature of politics (Walsh 2008 cited in Piscopo 2011, p.25).

In Bangladesh, since 1991, all the parliaments have had both female a prime minister and a female opposition leader; and the ninth also had a female deputy leader and Speaker. At the end of the ninth parliament a reserved seats woman was appointed as Speaker but she
lacked grass-root level political knowledge and parliamentary experience. The Speaker was elected to reserved seat only due to her loyalty to the party leader (Khan 2013). Her non-involvement with women’s movement and may be lack of experiences helps to explain her lack of initiative to support women to act for women. Among the women members only Tarana Halim emerged as a critical actor and actively worked for the establishment of a women’s crisis centre and formulation of the Domestic Violence Bill, 2010. She was also a member of the National Women’s Development Committee and used this work to inform her proposal to establish schools for the children of prostitute women near the brothels. She also sought a budget allocation for the third sex. She raised the issues of registration of Hindu Marriage and the provision of lunches at schools\(^99\). These proposals were later translated into action by the government (The Daily Star 8 March 2010, p.9; Prothom Alo 9 June 2013, p.23).

These findings indicate that in the Pakistani legislature, a good number of women legislators were able to emerge as critical actors to promote women and women’s issues in the policy process. They convinced party leaders and members of the parliament of the merit of their proposals; they secured support across party and gender on women’s issues. Pakistani women legislators involved in the long and complex law making process, and connected with other actors in civil society to act for women. In the Bangladeshi context, the presence of such numbers and the same quality of critical actors were rare.

**Feminist Attitudes among Women Legislators**

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\(^{99}\) There was no legal provision to register the Hindu marriages like the Christian and Muslim marriages. This practice of Hindu marriage affected women in that they had difficulties seeking any legal support or to demand financial support when they were abandoned by their husbands because they had no proof of marriage.
Some have argued that an increase in feminist attitudes and self-identification as a feminist are more important than simply a greater numbers of women in the legislature to substantively represent women (Murray 2009; Beckwith 2002; Studlar and McAllister 2002; Tremblay and Pelletier 2000). Childs (2001) found that two thirds of Labour women MPs in Britain in 1997 were feminist and they supported the values of women’s autonomy and equality. Based on this I hypothesize that:

**H8: The more female legislators there are with a feminist attitude the more women’s issues will be represented.**

In the Pakistani National Assembly a significant number of young, highly educated and professional women were elected to the reserved seats. In the twelfth National Assembly there were 37 and in thirteenth National assembly 26 women aged between 25-45 years entered parliament. Almost fifty percent of these were highly educated and professional women. Some were also actively involved with human and women’s rights activism. In Pakistan five out of 17 women interviewed were involved with women’s movement and consider themselves feminist. Many of them were activists and were involved with women’s rights organizations. This particular group of women along with several other women were active in bringing women’s rights issues during debates. They were instrumental in sponsoring women related bills and resolutions. Pakistani legislator Kashmala Tariq argues that only women can solve women’s problems and that the responsibility of women’s representatives is to highlight women’s issues and to make women more aware of their rights (Bilal 2004). Women MNA’s also expressed their desire to work for the equal rights of women. Some of them explained that,

To me women’s right is human right. I joined the party 10 years back to protect the interest of women. Both feminist
and I came to the assembly and fight against extremist and MMA government. (PKMNA-1)

I am a people activist who acts to promote the rights of poor women and children. I firmly believe that it is essential to give women political space in South Asia. Ever since I joined politics my effort was to ensure the growth and strengthening women’s space in politics. (PKMNA-11)

I have been involved in women’s movement. There are a good number of women -a critical mass- of women who have been involved in women’s movement and know the gender theory. There are some like us who knows gender politics. That’s why the caucus has moved forward; at least we know our politics. (PKMNA-14)

Dr. Nafisa Shah was a woman’s right activists and has written extensively on women’s rights issues. She has spoken on issues such as mainstreaming women in politics, ensuring the education of girl children and on the prevalence of violence against women. Sherry Rahman was a strong advocate of women and minority rights. She submitted critical bills relating to the Hudood Ordinance and domestic violence to parliament. She was also the architect of the Act on Sexual Harassment passed by the thirteenth National Assembly. Kashmala Tariq submitted and supported the passage of important bills in regard to women. These acts were indicative of their commitment, ability and maturity to act for women and connected to their feminist attitudes. These feminist women legislators were able to emerge as critical actors along with other female legislators to promote women’s issues.

In the Bangladeshi parliament, the presence of women legislators with a feminist attitude was rare. Several identified themselves as feminist but they did not expose this identity in
parliament. Some women expressed their willingness to work for women’s empowerment but a gap exists between their words and their work in the legislature. Only three out of 18 women interviewed were involved with women’s movement but the visibility of their work on women’s issues was not significant. I found that due to their party’s position in parliament and lack of support from party members, feminist women had to compromise their stance on women’s issues. A female legislator remarked that:

I have always spoken about women’s rights. Due to my present position in the parliament I cannot raise many issues. There are problems when you are in the treasury bench. (BDMP-11 GS)

Another woman legislator mentioned that:

As a woman, I always wanted to promote women. I have always been involved with women’s movement. I could not do much in the parliament since I am the only member from my party. I don’t have that strength. Though there are other leftist groups but they have compromised. (BDMP-17)

The presence of only a few women legislators with feminist attitudes is likely to partly to explain the lower level of representation of critical women’s rights issues in the legislative process in Bangladesh.

Link with Women’s Organizations and Civil Society Groups

A range of research on what facilitates successful substantive representation confirms the importance of strong and vibrant women’s movement in civil society context (Weldon 2002; Baldez 2004b), and the extent to which the women legislators develop coalitions
with these organizations (Curtin 2008; Beckwith and Cowell-Meyers 2007). It is found that network and communication skills can support women legislators to perform their role as representatives more effectively (Bochel and Bochel 2008). Accordingly, women’s substantive representation may depend upon their links to civil society, in particular women's movement and their constituencies through effective networking across party lines and with society at large (Karam and Lovenduski 2005). Feminist movements and women’s organizations are posited to have two impacts that activate the process of women’s substantive representation. First, they advocate for women by supporting and publicizing key issues and second, a feminist movement can provide support to women in elected office who are seeking to represent those issues (Beckwith and Cowell-Meyers 2007; Meyer 2003). Meyer (2003) asserts that women members of parliament supported by other groups can greatly influence the legislative process and outcomes. So grounded on this literature I hypothesize that:

**H9:** Membership of and links with women’s organizations and civil society groups facilitates the capacity of women legislators to act for women.

In Pakistan, women MNAs established and maintained links with women’s organizations and civil society groups at two levels: first, from the platform of the WPC as mentioned earlier and second, at personal level. Women legislators network with many national and international organizations on women’s issues through membership and participation in different programmes.

For example, Sherry Rahman was the Chair of the Lady Dufferin Foundation Trust that works for the provision of better access to health and education for women and children of the lower-income group. She is also the founding member of Pakistan Human Rights
Commission. Mehnaz Rafi was chairman of Women’s Rights Commission, and member of the Parliamentarians Commission on Human Rights (PCHR) and the Women Action Forum (WAF). Dr. Attiya Enayetullah is Convener of the Pakistan Parliamentary Group on Population, Reproductive Health and Development. Dr. Doniya Aziz is a member of the Parliamentarians Network for Conflict Prevention, and of the Working Group on Women, Peace and Security. Ms. Kashmala Tariq is the executive director of the Parliamentarian’s Commission on Human Rights in Pakistan (PCHR). Ms. Gul-e-Farkanda is a member of Amnesty International, the Aurat Foundation and the Parliamentarians Commission on Human Rights (PCHR). Dr. Noor Jehan Panezai and Ms. Fauzia Wahab were members of PCHR (Bilal 2006; 2004; PILDAT 2009). Thus the available information on women parliamentarians in Pakistan indicates that many were members of different local, national and international organizations that provided them with necessary information, social connections, finance and knowledge on issues important for women (Mansbridge 2005).

There are several women’s organizations in Pakistan such as Shirkat Gah, Aurat, Patan, AASHA, and WAF that work for women’s rights. Some civil society organizations such as PILDAT, FAFEN specifically focus on the work of women parliamentarians and assisting them. These organizations provide training to women MNAs on equality and gender budgeting, effective committee membership, conflict management and negotiation styles. These organizations have also arranged conferences and discussions forums from to aware and sensitize women MNA’s about critical issues of Pakistani women. Women MNAs mentioned that:

I participate in the conferences and seminars of different organizations like PILDAT, FAFEN. (PKMNA-9)
I was never involved with women’s movement before I became an MNA. I was doing business and not concerned about women’s issues. Now I am networking and working with women’s organizations like Aurat, Ayesha, and PLAN. (PKMNA-7)

In addition several women politicians remained active in the advocacy and lobbying network of the Aurat Foundation, and benefited from the input and public lobbying for their own legislative work (UNDP 2005). Such links with other civil society organizations outside the parliament provide women MNAs with the impetus and encouragement to raise critical women’s issues and bills to reform discriminatory laws. Pakistani women MNAs lobbied in partnership with civil society groups for the passage of The Criminal Law Amendment Bill 2004 to end waiver/exemption of Qisas and compromises in crimes committed in the name of ‘honour’ and The Protection against Harassment of Women at Work Place Act, 2010 (WPC 2011a; Saeed 2010). Sherry Rahman and AASHA, a civil society coalition, were credited with the drafting of a comprehensive Harassment at the Workplace Bill (Mirza 2011).

This shows that women legislators in Pakistan actively and effectively promoted women’s issues with the support of other organizations. Their link with women’s organizations and civil society groups had two different implications for women’s representation. First, the links supported women legislators in the complex process of formulating important women related bills and second, they provided training and information to women legislator’s so that they became effective and knowledgeable on women’s issues. The analysis of representation of women’s issues and critical actors
earlier reveals that qualitative improvement in substantive representation was realized by those MNAs who were linked to such knowledge and information networks.

In Bangladesh, women legislators did not maintain strong links with women’s organization or civil society group that dealt with women’s issues. It was not possible to ascertain their membership of international or national organizations, however, among the total of 18 respondents, only three confirmed their membership of women’s organization but they confided that they never networked with any organizations to promote women’s issues in parliament. Some women legislator expressed their disappointment over agenda of women’s organizations and blamed them as being too partisan in nature. One woman MP complained that:

The women’s organizations are silent about the repression of women workers of Jamat-e-Islam (JI) by the police during the present AL government. They should raise their voice against such brutality on women, it should not matter to which party these women political activist belongs to. All women should be treated as women. (BDMP-12)

Another former MP resented that:

Women’s organizations are now silent on women’s issues which are not addressed in the Women’s Development Policy of the present government. The women’s organizations support a specific party and are political, that’s why they are silent on the implementation of CEDAW. (BDMP- 3)

The partisan nature of women’s organizations and their silence on violence committed against the women political activists of opposition parties and the groups’ lack of
activism around the issue of direct election discouraged few women legislators from linking with these organizations. For others, the relationship with women’s organizations was limited to participating in roundtables discussions, seminars and conferences. No effective policy network was developed between the women legislators and women’s organizations and civil society groups as in the case of Pakistan. One female Bangladeshi legislator however expressed that it was not necessary to be involved with any organization to raise their voice for women.

You can speak about women’s issues from any platform and you don’t need an organization for that. (BDMP-18)

Unlike Pakistan there are few civil society groups in Bangladesh that work with women legislators’ to promote women’s issues or train women parliamentarians to be effective representatives. These findings suggest that women legislators in Bangladesh did not maintain or nurture any relations with women’s organizations or civil society organizations. This implies that Bangladeshi women were less likely to acquire information, knowledge and broad based network on issues critical to women and this appears to have negatively affected their substantive representation of women (Hussain and Hasanuzzaman 2002).

Social Gender Norms and Care Perspective

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100 This view was that of the women legislators. Women’s organizations undertook a series of protest activities for direct election to reserved seats during the BNP regime in 2004 and AL supported their demand and refrained from electing any women to the reserved seats in 2005. AL, which formed the government in 2009, increased the number of reserved seats to 50 in 2011 but retained the indirect election to reserved seats through the 15th Constitutional amendment and also did not ensure equal rights of women on property in Women’s Development Policy due to the opposition of fundamentalist forces. Yet protest activities of women’s organizations’ on these issues were not as visible as in 2005, and were limited to press conferences and round table discussions.
Gender politics scholars have focused extensively on the social gender norms of ‘care’ and its impact on women’s political participation (Paxton, Kunovich and Hughes 2007; Paxton 1997). The emphasis on care giving has had an impact on the social, economic and political patterns of women’s lives (Swers 2002, p.4). The dominant gender ideology on the roles and expectations of women often conflicts with women legislators’ pursuit of public office. Women politicians face this double bind across time and context. The issue of balancing gender social norms and political norm is a complex one. Women legislators confront the double bind of violating the primary responsibility of care for legislative and constituency work; if they do not keep pace with the parliamentary work, they violate legislative norms. The full-time dedication norms of parties and legislative institutions leads to women’s frustration and ‘feeling of guilt’ for not giving enough time to their carer role and doing political work at the expenses of family time (Childs and Lovenduski 2013; Fuente and Verge 2013). Thus political times is a critical resource that remains scarce for women but not for men as the political institutions and social norms are structured according to male views about life and politics and also to male lifestyles (Shvedova 2005). This issue becomes more acute in under-developed contexts where women have to perform household work manually\(^{101}\). Therefore, I formulate that:

\[ H_{10}: \text{Traditional social gender roles impose limitations on women’s will and ability to act for women.} \]

\(^{101}\) Although women may have full time or part-time household help they still have to manage the household activities, cook, and take care of the children and the elderly. As a part of their socialization process women also internalize the social gender norms and try to fulfill their duties. During my interviews with Bangladeshi women legislators at their residences I witnessed some of them managing household chores despite having household help.
In the existing economic and social reality of Pakistan and Bangladesh, household responsibility bears directly on women across class and status. The expectations of social gender norms and of the legislative role are a constant pressure on women legislators to manage their political time. Many women find that the parliamentary work schedule is difficult to balance with the demands of family life and careers, often referred to as the double or triple burden (Ballington and Matland 2004). The requirement for women to perform wide range of social, familial, professional and political responsibilities impedes their efforts to act for women. Sometime, it discourages women from becoming effectively involved or networking with women and civil society organizations on women’s issues. Two young married women legislators in Pakistan expressed their inability to work more for women in parliament and other arena due to their family obligations. One female Pakistani woman legislator mentioned that:

At the moment I am not involved with any women’s organizations. I am already overburdened with my family and legislative duties. I don’t want to expand it any more. (PKMNA-3 GS)

Also lack of support from the family restricted women’s willingness to act for women. Another legislator explained that:

My husband did not want me to come to the parliament today as I was in an official tour for few days. Instead, he wants me to stay in home and look after the children. I realize that we should have given more but we could not. May be those who have previous experience and are single can contribute more. (PKMNA-2)

In Bangladesh, women complained that the working hours of the parliament seriously conflicted with their carer role and imposed more challenges for professional women.
One woman legislator (BDMP-9) mentioned that the time and procedure to submit notices required standing in a queue for hours in the early morning. However, it is difficult for women to be present in the early hours since most have domestic chores to manage at this time. This discouraged her from submitting any notices on women’s issues. Presently most parliamentary programmes and sitting hours are not adjusted to take into account the dual burden of women (Shvedova 2005). The submission of questions and means by which some are chosen to appear on the Orders of the Day is a very complicated. According to the rules of Pakistan National Assembly, notices should be submitted 15 days in advance to the Secretary. In both countries questions and notices are submitted manually in the Notice Office and are placed in the House on a first come first serve basis (PILDAT 2013; Firoj 2003a). In such a working environment women have to struggle to balance family life and legislative responsibility of representation. One MNA explained that:

> Women have different roles to play as wife and mother. For men it is different, they are the head of the family and work outside. They earn money but not necessarily spend time with children or family. (PKMNA-3 GS)

The dilemma of balancing legislative and personal lives sometimes compels women to give up their desire to act for women.

The different factors that I put forth appear to significantly impact on women and their substantive work. However, the presence or absence of these attributes and capacities varies among women and the outcome also depends on the individual decisions of woman. The educated, elites and experienced women legislators could initiate more often for women because of their social and political status. Yet not all educated or elite
women shared the same level of gender consciousness necessary to emerge as critical actors. While feminist attitudes foster the representation of women issues they also depend on the personal interpretations of what women’s issues or rights. Even feminist legislators may not that they have the liberty to act in feminist ways in masculinist formal and informal political institutions. Their choices sometimes are limited by their party and their desire for a long-term political career. The link with civil society organizations and women’s organizations provides a platform for women to act on women’s issues but the formation and continuation of such links also depends on the decision of individual woman. The burden of domestic and legislative responsibility sometimes discourages women from linking with organizations on women’s issues. Most of all, the domestic responsibility of women may vary across married, unmarried and elderly married women. Unmarried and women with grown up children had comparatively less responsibility compared to women with young children and were therefore able to devote more time to political work.

Obviously not all women share the same views about women’s issues or act on the basis of gender consciousness, but the presence of more women with feminist attitudes, confidence and commitment can encourage and provide more opportunities for women to promote women’s concerns. Their presence is important to lessen the influence of masculinist institutional formal and informal norms on women’s representation. It is difficult to measure individually which factors impacts most on women’s substantive representation but the degree of presence of these factors appears to influence the substantive representation of women in both Pakistan and Bangladesh and might explain differences in substantive outcomes between countries.
A Comparative View of the Factors and their Degree of Presence and Effectiveness in Pakistan and Bangladesh

Analysis of the data reveals that a set of factors ranging from the individual to institutional and contextual influenced the substantive representation of women in Pakistan and Bangladesh. In both cases women faced similar challenges in their efforts to promote women’s issues. The biggest challenge was the masculine norms embedded in the political and legislative arena. These norms posed constraints on women’s substantive work in the parliament, parties and even in constituencies. In some cases the reserved seats status of women was used as a device to control and suppress women legislators’ initiatives. However, women did not always work on a consensual basis to promote women’s issues as expected, they were like any legislators sometimes leaning more towards the party rather than acting on important women’s issues. In some cases they were restrained by party discipline and nature of coalition government.

In addition party affiliation and their positions in parliament influenced the decisions of individual women. Even feminists were sometimes unable to raise their voice against their party’s decisions and positions. The situation was more discouraging for women parliamentarians of small and opposition parties. Their notices were ignored or neglected in a hostile legislative environment. The non-acts and silence of women legislators on women’s issues therefore should not be attributed to the reserved seats status or the quality of the female representative. Rather such constraints are common across time and country where legislators, men or women, general or quota face the dilemma of a duality of representation. They are required to choose between the party interests and the interest of the constituency. They are constrained in their ability to act or say things independently of their party’s direction (Darhour and Dahlerup 2013). In addition, social
gender roles and a lack of institutional support systems impeded the efforts and the will of women to act for women.

I found that all these factors were present in the selected cases to a great extent and, as quota scholarship suggests, hindered women’s substantive acts. Women legislators of both countries confirmed the challenges they faced at different sites of representation. However, the findings and analysis affirmed that these sets of factors are common across time and space and quota and reserved seats women legislators face similar challenges across different quota regimes. Women legislators cannot avoid these situations but must face these challenges in all the political and legislative environments with commitment, confidence and maturity. The following Table 9.1 provides a comprehensive picture of these factors and the degree of presence in Pakistan and Bangladesh.

Table 9.1: A comparative assessment of the presence of hindering factors in Pakistan and Bangladesh

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Constraints on women’s substantive representation</th>
<th>Pakistan</th>
<th>Bangladesh</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Masculinist nature of the political institutions</td>
<td>√</td>
<td>√</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Indirect election and label effect of reserved seats</td>
<td>√</td>
<td>√</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Party discipline, party affiliation and party’s position</td>
<td>√</td>
<td>√</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>Lack of institutional support systems</td>
<td>√</td>
<td>√</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>Social gender norms and care perspective</td>
<td>√</td>
<td>√</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It is also confirmed that several factors such as the increased number and diversity among women, presence of women’s parliamentary caucus, critical actors, and feminist women and links with women and civil society organizations facilitated the process of women’s substantive representation. These set of factors aided women in countering the influence of the formal and informal norms of patriarchal institutions. The presence of more women
and diversity among women ensures the representation of women of different classes and
groups in the legislative debates. It also brought women of diverse backgrounds and
professions to the parliaments which broadened perspectives about women’s issues and
needs. In this way women added new ideas and values to the policy process.

The other important factor was the presence of the Women’s Parliamentary Caucus
(WPC) that created a space for women and aided the diverse kind of women to priorities
and voice women’s issues at different sites of representation (Thomas 1991). Also the
presence of female critical actors, women in important position of institutional power and
women with feminist attitudes made an impact with regard to the support and passage of
legislation targeting the rights and substantive needs of women and children.

The links and networks with women’s organizations and civil society organizations
complemented women’s efforts to promote new and critical issues within parliament. The
involvement of women legislators with local and national level organizations sensitized
them to women’s concerns and needs. The key findings show that the presence of women
with a certain level of education, exposure and experience in politics combined with a
range of enabling factors impact on the quality and quantity of substantive representation
of women in Pakistan. This supports the view that women politicians can act as and for
women when they have a team (of sufficient size), whose members have feminist
leanings, and when they act in a favourable civil society context (Grey 2006).

Nevertheless, the in-depth analysis of the factors confirms that these aiding factors were
present in both cases but in different degrees. In Bangladesh, the representation of
women’s issues in debates increased over time and women did act for women at the
constituency and party level. However, due to the absence of the facilitating factors noted
above (in particular a WPC), the substantive representation of women was qualitatively less than in Pakistan. Based on the above analysis, Table 9.2 is developed that presents a comparative view of these facilitating factors and the degree of presence in Pakistan and Bangladesh.

Table 9.2: A comparative assessment of the presence of enabling factors in Pakistan and Bangladesh

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Supportive factors to voice women’s issues</th>
<th>Pakistan</th>
<th>Bangladesh</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Presence of increased number and diversity among women</td>
<td>√ +</td>
<td>√ -</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Effective Women’s Parliamentary Caucus</td>
<td>√+</td>
<td>√ -</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Presence of more critical actors</td>
<td>√+</td>
<td>√ -</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>Presence of more women with feminist attitude</td>
<td>√+</td>
<td>√ -</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>Link and membership in women’s organizations and civil society groups</td>
<td>√+</td>
<td>√ -</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Key: in this table the tick indicates that the factors are present, and the + sign indicates the factors are effective and utilized but – sign indicates the factors are less effective and not utilized)

Explaining the Reality of Women’s Substantive Representation

It is evident that women’s substantive representation does not depend solely on the number of women elected but on the presence and complex interactions of institutional and individual-level factors. These factors intervene in the process of substantive representation of reserved seats women. The factors that hindered women’s substantive acts were present in both cases to a great extent. It confirms that women face similar challenges across time and contexts. However, the aiding factors that enabled women to promote women’s concerns were present to a higher degree in Pakistan when compared to Bangladesh. The difference in the relative strength of the facilitating factors ultimately accounts for the differences in the substantive outcomes between Pakistan and Bangladesh.)
Bangladesh. It reveals that the findings of existing quota scholarship developed from the experiences of party or legislated quotas in the western developed context also apply in the case of developing country contexts. Nonetheless in patriarchal and undemocratic systems, several factors had a more profound impact on women’s substantive representation compared to others and I raise these issues in the postscript to the thesis.
Chapter 10: Linking the Reality and Experiences of Reserved Seats with Gender Quota Theory

This chapter circles back to theory and provides a postscript to the thesis which has sought to develop our understanding of the links between the reserved seats form of gender quota and women’s representation. More specifically the study explored whether the reserved seats provision was effective in improving women’s descriptive and substantive representation in the context of Pakistan and Bangladesh. It was a valid query and was investigated within the broader framework of the gender quota and neo-institutionalism theory. This was not an examination of the reserved seats form of gender quota only on its own; rather it was an endeavour to understand the context specific socio-political and institutional realities of women’s representation in patriarchal societies. Therefore I focused both on the implementation and design of reserved seats and the space where women could represent women. The research asked three key questions: what actors and factors influenced the adoption and implementation of reserved seats with indirect election? To what extent does the reserved seats system improve women’s descriptive and substantive representation? Finally, what factors explain the differences and similarities between the countries?

Why did Pakistan and Bangladesh adopt and implement reserved seats for women with the provision of indirect election? My analysis of the history of the British administered Indian sub-continent traced the influence of three different movements on the conception of the idea of reserved seats for women and its adoption for the first time in the Indian subcontinent. I contend that the idea and discourse of reserved seats for women was constructed within the framework of patriarchy. Further the resources, strategies and
tactics used by a faction of women’s movement during the transition period facilitated what was considered to be a positive change - the adoption of reserved seats for women. Yet male actors in the institutional sites and their self-interest were also pivotal in the adoption. In addition, the reserved seats provision via indirect election was reproduced in Pakistan and Bangladesh as an institutional legacy to provide different strategic, financial and political benefits to entrenched elites rather than conforming to the norms of gender equality and altering the pattern of women’s representation. Reserved seats were designed and reinstated in a harmonizing sequence with the formal and informal institutions of society and politics. The analysis made it explicit that although the women’s movement was the instigator of the idea of reserved seats for women and mobilized for its adoption, the interest and support of the entrenched institutional elite was pivotal to the adoption of reserved seats. Here I agree with Waylen (2011) that the women’s movement on its own was not enough to achieve positive gender outcomes. Understanding that the male leaders had an interest in maintaining ‘power and patriarchy’ in political institutions was important since it had both positive and negative implications for reserved seats women and their representation.

To understand the outcomes of reserved seats on women’s descriptive presence and substantive representation in such patriarchal contexts, the concepts of descriptive and substantive representation were expanded. Descriptive representation of women was examined both in terms of number and attributes of women elected. The qualitative information received from interviews complemented the quantitative data on women’s representation in parliaments over time and proved a positive relation between reserved seats and women’s numeric presence. The analyses of the economic, socio-cultural and institutional contexts of the countries showed that the institutionalization of masculinist
values and norms, and discrimination against women in social and political institutions resulted in a low number of women in law making bodies and thus necessitated the implementation of the reserved seats provision. In the highly gendered social and political context, reserved seats significantly contributed to improvements in women’s numeric presence in the parliaments of both countries although indirect election to reserved seats was found to be more beneficial to women with links to political leaders and feudal families. Thus the thesis confirmed the claim that reserved seat provision is an effective device to increase the number of women in legislative bodies.

Further, it was revealed that reserved seats women were not unqualified or elite as often presumed. Moreover, this study reinforces the idea that reserved seats ensure the entry of women from diverse backgrounds, classes and professions in the parliaments. It was also demonstrated that directly elected general seat women were more elite and more likely to be tokens of male leaders than reserved seats women. Reserved seats women were more similar to directly elected women in terms of education but proved to have more diversity in terms of profession and their experience of activism. It indicated that politically ambitious women were often elected to reserved seats, not only in general seats. The findings led me to argue that institutionalized masculinist norms and practices and undemocratic party structures produce parliamentarians of almost similar background in patriarchal contexts. Thus my research refutes the idea that reserved seats women were inferior to directly elected general seats women. However, this research made it explicit that due to the feudal nature of Pakistan, more elite, politically well-connected and qualitatively strong women were elected to reserved seats than in Bangladesh. Yet the overall analysis found that reserved seats and general seats women did not exactly mirror the general women constituents in terms of education, profession or political
opportunities and linkages in both countries and from this perspective they were ‘elite’ in nature and some were more elite than others.

Women’s substantive representation in the parliamentary arena was examined by undertaking content analyses of the parliamentary debates. Three important observations were made in this regard. First, reserved seats women represented women more often than general seats women in all the parliaments and were more likely to voice important women’s issues. General seats women represented women in lower number in all the parliaments. These findings run contrary to the assumption that directly elected women with constituency backing and autonomy are more likely to act for women compared to reserved seats women. Second, in both countries the representation of women’s issues increased with the presence of an increased number of women. This confirmed the quantitative relationship between the number of women and the representation of women’s issues. And lastly, not all women legislators voiced women’s concerns. Sometimes women legislators including feminists did not act for women or some acted against women at different points in time. It was thus found that the relationship between descriptive presence and substantive representation is not straight forward but a rather complicated connection. It revealed a range of factors for women’s lack of activity on, and reaction to women’s issues.

Inquiry into women’s substantive representation outside the legislative arena showed that women acted for women at the constituency and party level. Women legislators acted to support women’s material interests and to raise gender awareness in society. At the party level women legislators acted to promote and mainstream women in politics. The thesis revealed that reserved seats status or lack of constituency did not always preclude reserved seats women from acting for women in the community and thus contested the
view that reserved seats women are just ‘tokens’ in the absence of any constituency or power base.

However, qualitative and quantitative comparative assessment of Pakistani and Bangladeshi women’s substantive representation within and outside legislative arenas revealed both similarities and differences. The thesis found that the number of representations of women’s issues in debates increased in both cases over time. However, the quantitative assessment of women’s substantive acts in the parliamentary debates revealed that the number of women legislators and the number of times women voiced women’s issues was consistently higher in Pakistan. Also there were differences in terms of representation of women’s issues. Pakistani women initiated more debates on critical women related bills, women and children, and social issues. Bangladeshi women tended to stress the material interests of women, women and children and social issues.

From the qualitative perspective these acts revealed that Pakistani women used all of the rules of procedure of the legislative business to initiate debates on women’s issues, devoted time and effort, and used organizational, positional, social and political capital to act for women. They acted both in an individual capacity and collectively from the platform of the Women Parliamentary Caucus. In contrast Bangladeshi women relied on fewer specific rules of procedure to initiate debates on women’s issues and lacked organizational, positional, social and political capital. The time and effort devoted to voicing women’s issues was also less in Bangladesh compared to Pakistan. Moreover, Bangladeshi women legislators tended to act for women only in their individual capacities in parliament, and the party and constituency level. A collective initiative or effort by women legislators to promote women’s concerns was largely absent.
This thesis also indicates that around 40 percent of reserved seats women in both countries did not voice their concerns on important issues that affect women in the parliamentary debates. Sometimes women also felt constrained about acting for women at the constituency level. This indicated that the link between descriptive and substantive representation is not guaranteed and is mediated by different institutional and individual factors.

Grounded this research in the experiences of women legislators as well as feminist-informed institutionalist theories it was affirmed that several institutional factors imposed constraints on women to act for women. First, women experienced marginalization and invisibility because of the masculinist formal and informal norms of the institutions. Women were ignored and their notices were overruled or excluded from the legislative process. Pro-women women legislators were criticised and male political actors resisted the appointment of women as chairpersons of parliamentary committees. However in non-democratic, patriarchal and feudal contexts women faced more resistance when compared to egalitarian cultures. Their efforts to develop a relationship with constituents or to integrate women’s needs and views in the institutional rules were resisted by their respective parties. Women legislators often experienced sexual harassment and were verbally and physically assaulted by the male leaders of the opposition and of their own parties.

Second, due to their indirect election and the reserved seats label women were often controlled and dominated at the parliament and constituency level and were made to feel invisible in the legislative environment. Reserved seats women faced intimidation and humiliation within the political institutions. Moreover, in the context of the undemocratic party structures, reserved seats women were vulnerable to disciplinary sanctions and
stigmatization. It also became evident that the quota stigma or reserved seat label effect varied between individual women. It impacted most on those women who were just political party workers without connections. These women faced a triple jeopardy due to sex, reserved seats status and lack of leadership positions or credible personal or family background. By contrast self-confident women with credible political, social, professional and family backgrounds were less susceptible to such labelling affects.

Third, party discipline, positions and ideology put limitation around women legislators like any other legislators, preventing them from acting independently of the party to promote women’s concerns or to protect their interests. Women legislators are accountable to their parties first and to women in their constituencies only after they have fulfilled their party’s expectations. Like their male colleagues and general seats women, reserved seats women legislators also had to weigh their future electoral prospects. This posed a double jeopardy for reserved seats women due to their election by their parties’ instead of voters and often they choose to toe the party line. Besides, the coalition nature of the various governments and the strength of their own party’s position in parliament impacted on their ability to initiate debate on women’s issues in parliamentary arena. Alongside this, party discipline and decisions affected women’s cross partisan networking and the cultivating of a constituency for future election.

Fourth, a lack of institutional support in terms of office, logistics, staff, funding and training in the under developed context multiplied the discrimination against women and many times discouraged women from acting for women. Thus the thesis contends that informal and informal norms and the rules of the political and legislative institutions impacted on women’s agency to act for women in the formal institutional site of representation. These factors are all interrelated as they are rooted in the deeply
embedded norms of gender subjugation. Masculinist norms and perspectives are prevalent in the structure, rules and functions of the legislative and party institutions and discriminate against women. Although the reserved seat provision created a political space for women the integration of women’s views in male dominated institutions was resisted in both Pakistan and Bangladesh. Moreover, male leaders used the reserved seat provision as a device to control women and their independence in order to maintain the status quo.

However, it was confirmed that within these institutional sites, the presence of an increased number and diversity among women legislators increased the representation of women’s issues. This was mainly due to a common gender identity and experience of discrimination that provided women legislators more access to and information about women constituents and their needs. Thus it presented the opportunity to represent more issues regarding women and of dispossessed subgroups of women in the debates. Moreover, the presence of an effective Women’s Parliamentary Caucus provided Pakistani women with the space within the male dominated parliament to act for women. It was an effective means to strategically link women legislators with women’s organizations and civil society groups to promote issues important to women mostly in forms of bills.

The analysis of the presence and impact of individual level variables on women’s substantive representation revealed differences between cases. In Pakistan women of the urban elite and feudal class with remarkable educational and professional achievements were often elected. Some of these women due to their social, political and organizational positions were able to emerge as critical actors and assumed important positions of institutional power. They embolden others to act for women. They provided opportunities
for women and carved a space for other women to work act for women. Thus Pakistani women legislators achieved institutional power individually and as a group which facilitated the promotion of women’s issues (Swers 2002). Such opportunities were absent in the Bangladeshi case.

Hitherto, contrary to the assumption that elite women are unable to act for lower class women, the study finds that the social and political capital and financial capacities of elite women were especially relevant for producing an enabling environment to advance gender equality goals. Their social positions and family and political backgrounds made them less susceptible to male domination. In addition women legislators’ previous background as activists supported the representation of critical women related bills and debates in parliament. This activist experiences made women legislators skilled in negotiating and pursuing women related agendas. Their efforts were complemented by links and networks with women’s organizations and civil society groups on two levels: through the platform of the women’s caucus and through individual membership. Thus the combined election of diverse kinds of women, the presence of a women’s parliamentary caucus, the appointment women legislators to important parliamentary positions and a favourable relationship with civil society groups, supported Pakistani women’s ability to substantively represent women.

By contrast though educated and professional women entered Bangladesh parliament, they were less diverse in profile when compared to Pakistani women. Bangladeshi women legislators lack a strong social and political base and the power to negotiate their positions and rights as representatives. Very few women had experience as women’s activists and few had any links with or membership in national and international
organizations. This indicated that Bangladeshi women, unlike those in Pakistan, tended to lack information, resources and networks to support and promote women’s concerns.

In both countries the social gender norms of care givers and domestic responsibility constrained women legislators’ political time and will to act for women. Women legislators were overworked with domestic, legislative, party, constituency and professional responsibilities. Moreover, the sitting time of the parliaments and the accelerated pace of parliamentary work contradicted with women’s domestic role. Thus the lack of social or institutional support systems for women in underdeveloped contexts impact on women legislators will or ability to act for women especially women with young children.

The comparative assessments of representation, experiences and initiatives of women legislators in both countries revealed the importance of the presence of facilitating factors: critical actors, more diversity among women legislators in terms of credible track record and background, an effective women’s parliamentary caucus, the presence of women with feminist attitudes, and links with women’s organizations and civil society groups. Finally the research found that due to the greater presence of the enabling factors in Pakistan, women were able to act more for women despite the presence of hindering factors.

The overall findings suggest that reserved seats adopted to provide strategic incentives to elites eventually were transformed into an effective mechanism to improve women presence both in terms of numbers and quality in parliament and created a political space for women in masculinist political institutions to advance their needs and interests. Reserved seats women after their election have used the space to promote women’s
concerns more that the male leaders expected or anticipated (Dahlerup 2008 p. 325). It however also reveals that the link between descriptive and substantive representation is not guaranteed or absolute. Descriptive representation - number and presence of women - is not entirely sufficient for substantive representation to occur. Rather, substantive representation is contingent upon an array of institutional and individual factors as explored in this thesis. Finally the thesis confirmed that quota women legislators and their agency to act for women in different quota regimes faced similar sets of challenges but the degree of influence varied across quota type, implementation design and culture. However, presence of a greater number and diversity among women, the presence of critical actors, the presence of women with feminist attitudes, presence of the women’s cross partisan parliamentary caucus and links with women’s organizations and civil society groups can facilitate the substantive representation of women in any institutional structure and cultural context. Thus the research confirms much of what has been learnt from the western scholarship on legislated and party quotas with some caveats, most obviously that not all reserved seats women act as tokens.

**Discussion Points for Future Research**

Although the research focused on two South Asian countries, it has broader implications. The tenor of my argument was influenced by my own background and experience of working in a predominantly gendered and under-developed institutional context, yet I believe my findings have generated a number of possible avenues for future research and a wider academic agenda for women, quota and politics.
Reserved seats and the Election of Elite Women

While elite women are the subject of negative stereotypes, I argue, especially in Pakistani feudal and patriarchal contexts, that elite and politically well-connected women offer more resources to act for women than non-elite women. In a patriarchal institutional context kinship ties are important to manipulate institutional and political power and the presence of women with such ties and a high level of gender consciousness proved to be effective agents of change. They can emerge as critical actors and act for women. It implies that empathy with women’s issues and a high level of gender consciousness can override class consciousness. Therefore, more research is required to understand whether class or political connections should be linked with discussions on representatives and representative acts.

Label Effect of Reserved Seats

Previous research on gender quotas and women’s political representation has tended to endorse the negative label effect of quota and its impact on women’s substantive acts. The research in the gendered context of Pakistan and Bangladesh however revealed that the label effect did not impact on all women equally. I found that women were able to resist and overcome the stigmatization and negative labelling. This was especially the case amongst women who built name recognition and competence in their professions, were confident, and developed the networks and skills to negotiate in the political arena (Ballington and Matland 2004). These women were least affected by their quota label or reserved seats status. Thus I contest the idea that the stigma of the label effect will erode only with time. Rather I argue that in short term it will take women with confidence and a credible background to overcome the stigma in masculinist political institutions. As such
further research is required to make substantially generalizable claims about this new insight into the relative success of quota women and their practices.

Reserved seats Women’s Two-fold Responsibility

Another issue resulting from this research is the two-fold responsibility of reserved seats women. Reserved seats women are responsible for representing women as mandated by gender quota and they are responsible for constituency as mandated by the party. Women representing women’s issues are termed as pro-women and feminist and may lose their credibility as politicians and their constituency work or links with voters are considered to be form of constituency invasion by the male leaders. These women are also criticised for ignoring women’s issues. This dilemma of being a representative and doing representation appear less prevalent in research on legislative or party quotas. Therefore, further investigation could be undertaken to explore how reserved seat women and their presence can best be utilized to promote women’s concerns.

Reserved seats and Direct Election

Contrary to the demands of women’s movement both directly and indirectly elected women legislators supported the system of indirect election in reserved seats. The complexity that surrounds direct election to reserved seats in the present constitutional arrangement of both countries discourages reserved seats women legislators from supporting direct election. Accordingly a change to direct election to reserved seats in the present institutional arrangement would have three implications for women’s representation. First, direct election would require women to campaign across bigger constituencies and eventually increase election costs preventing non-elite women from standing for election. Second, the existing group of party elites will continue nominate the candidates for reserved seats, and elite women are more likely to be selected due to their
better financial situation. Third, women candidates would also need the support of the incumbents of the general constituencies and the costs of their support might be different in nature. In the existing political culture, independent women candidates will be least expected to win in the absence of party support, fully-developed campaign strategies and resources. This is an issue that constitutes an important discussion point for researchers, political parties and most of all women political activists. More research is required in order to identify and devise an appropriate mode of election to reserved seats and how to offset the costs of a shift to direct election.

Finally, I conclude that women activists and quota researchers’ expectations that the presence of more women or direct election to reserved seats will change the entire social fabric of patriarchal and feudal context are too ambitious. Such expectations overburden women legislators. The global data on women’s representation shows that even in egalitarian and developed cultures where women enjoy greater equality with men only a few countries have achieved gender equality in parliament. Strong autonomous women’s movement or high level of socio-economic development is effective in altering the broader practical and normative institutions of the society and politics. Within parliament women are yet to change the masculine nature of politics in most countries. We need to remember that social attitudes towards women and women’s own self-perception are deeply rooted in the psyche and social structure. Traditional political institutions are underpinned by embedded patriarchal practices and often insulated from changes in the external environment as feminist political scientists suggest. Changing deeply rooted social attitudes or masculinist, partisan and hierarchical institutions is not an easy task. It will take time, and continuous and collective effort to construct new values and ideas that
underpins gender equality in society as well as in institutions. The reserved seats provision is just one among other mechanisms to make that happen.
Appendix 1: Experience of field work in Pakistan and Bangladesh

I elaborate below about my experiences of data collection in highly restricted state institutions like parliament, the experience of interviewing the elites and the challenges it poses for researchers, especially those in under-developed contexts. I found that many of the tools and techniques of research were not effective in a developing country context and researchers must develop and use different strategies to cope with the challenges of data collection.

The time lapse between applying for a Pakistani visa and being granted one, requesting and being permitted access to the parliament library together with political unrest and violence left me only with six months of field work in Pakistan and Bangladesh. I emailed the Pakistan embassy in NZ and phoned them regarding the visa requirements for research purposes. I did not get a reply. Then after going back to Bangladesh I contacted with the Pakistan embassy in Dhaka and they refused to grant the visa. Later with the intervention of Bangladesh High Commissioner in Pakistan, I was granted a visa for only one and half months. I came back, applied a second time for the visa and was granted a one month visa. My scholarship’s terms and conditions also imposed barriers to my fieldwork as I had to return to NZ within six months.

Practical constraints of accessibility, availability of the required documents and the interests of the legislators shaped the choice of sampling and data collection. The absence of a Hansard index in both parliaments challenged my original formulation of a research strategy and time allocation. I reformulated my strategy and instead of the Hansard index, I decided to undertake content analysis of the daily parliamentary bulletins which was
much more time consuming. Even after receiving permission to use the parliamentary library and documents, access to some documents was unavailable and classified. However it provided me with insight into the highly sensitive state institutions and the environment in which women act. Most challenging was the access to the female parliamentarians and undertaking interviews. Initial contact was difficult and they were often very busy. I experienced several disappointments in regard to the MP leaving in the middle of the interview or unable to provide the interview after having giving assent. I however, managed to interview 35 women legislators from both countries and collected sufficient information and materials to describe and analyse the issues in detail.

Realizing that I would not get the second chance to interview the participants, all interviews in this study were semi-structured and conducted with open-ended questions. This also means that the inquiry was flexible and carefully adapted to the individual legislators’ particular experiences and abilities to communicate those experiences. A participant information sheet, the questions and a consent form was provided to each participant before the interview. I reassured the participants at the start of the interviews about the purpose and confidentiality of the research. Signed consent forms were sought and secured. To protect the participants’ identity, individuals are not named except for those who gave permission to use their name in the thesis. In most cases, I interviewed each participant for 20 minutes to an hour in the caucus office, in their residence or in a hotel lobby. Interviews were conducted in Urdu and Bangla and later translated and transcribed into English. Hand written notes were taken during the interviews whenever possible. All interviews except two were recorded and those that were recorded were undertaken with the permission of the participants. The structured elements of the questions ensured that participants answer several key questions. Such as what do you think are issues important for women in your country? Do you think reserved seats are
effective or do you support indirect election? A few questions were included to gain
insight into their experiences and political ambitions. This created some consistency and
facilitated comparative analysis. I strayed from the guide whenever it was felt appropriate
to follow the tropical trajectories in the conversation and to maintain a balance between
passivity and over direction. I interacted with the participants in order to understand the
meaning of context specific terms and words used during interviews.
Appendix 2: Tribal Traditions that Discriminate Against Women

The tribal traditions and practices that deny the fundamental and human rights of Pakistani women and which are instrumental for the committing of violence against women (VAW) are mentioned below for the convenience of readers.

Karo-Kari or Kala-Kali: Literally meaning a disreputable man or women (who has brought disgrace to the family or clan), a ‘crime’ that allows culturally condoned killing of a man or woman charged with an illicit relationship in the name of honour. Honour killings are known by different names in Pakistan depending on the region. In Sindh province they are called Karo-Kari, in Punjab province, Kala-Kali; in Balochistan, Siyah Kari and in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Tor -Tora. Honour killings are included in the wider term "honour crimes" which includes, among others, assault, acid throwing, confinement, imprisonment, interference with the choice of a marriage partner, burning, and nose-cutting. According to the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan (HRCP), 70 percent of the victims of honour killings are women, while 30 percent are men.

Vanni or Qasas: A custom and tradition of child marriage practised in tribal areas and in Punjab. This custom is tied to blood feuds among the different tribes and clans where young girls are forcibly married to members of opposing clans in order to resolve feuds or compensate for a crime. Vanni can be avoided if the girl’s clan agrees to pay blood money, called Diyat. Otherwise the young bride may be forced to spend her life paying for a crime committed by her male relatives.

Marriage to the Quran: Marriage to the Holy Quran (the holy book of Islam) is also common in Sindh. Under this law a woman has to live without a husband throughout her
life. But this law is only applied among the landlord class. They use this only to keep the land of their sisters and daughters.

Appendix 3: Reserved seats Women in Parliamentary Committees

Another aspect of women’s substantive representation in parliamentary arena I examined is the representation of women in parliamentary committees, however there was insufficient material collected on this topic to include in the body of the thesis. Nevertheless parliamentary committees are important instruments in the legislative arena and are involved in both policy making and oversight functions (Yamamoto 2006). Research conducted in the Canadian and Australian parliaments reveals that committees present strategic opportunities for substantive representation by facilitating collective deliberations and inviting different interest groups to offer their views. Also cross party cooperation of women is possible that can facilitate the process of substantive representation (Tremblay 2003; Trimble 2006).

In Pakistan there were 54 standing committees and seven of them in the thirteenth National Assembly were headed by women. Among these seven women, four were elected to reserved seats. Several reserved seats women were also member of these committees (NCSW 2011). Pakistani women MNAs interviewed claimed that they acted to promote women’s interest during the committee functions. Women legislators mentioned that they ensured there was gender dimension in the policy implementation process during their memberships in the ‘Women and Development’ and ‘Public Accounts’ committees. They endorsed that committee work provided opportunities to link with women’s organizations on different women’s issues and to act for women since bureaucrats were accountable to these committees.
The investigation on Pakistani women’s substantive acts in parliamentary committees revealed three insights. First, reserved seats women’s memberships of caucus made them aware of important gender issues relating to public policy (WPC 2011b). Second, women legislators received training on committee proceedings (PILDAT 2006). And last, the appointment of some reserved seat women as chairperson in the parliamentary committees provided the opportunity to act for women (WPC 2011b; Bari2010).

In Bangladesh, there were 48 standing committees and in the ninth parliament there were female members in 43 committees (TIB 2009b). The standing committee on the Ministry of Primary and Mass Education had a female chairperson who was elected to reserved seat. Women members interviewed said that they acted in the committees but only one MP mentioned her contribution to promoting women’s concerns during the meetings. The lack of experience and training on parliamentary committee work and awareness of the gender dimensions of the public policy process are likely explanations for the lower degree of representation of women by Bangladeshi female legislators when compared to their Pakistani counterparts.
Appendix 4: The data base of Women Parliamentarians

In this research I examined the bibliographic and demographic profiles of women parliamentarians elected to reserved seats and general seats in the parliaments of Pakistan and Bangladesh. For this purpose I developed a database of women parliamentarian’s that included information about their political affiliation, age, marital status, education, profession, and previous experiences. However, the parliament of 1977 of Pakistan and parliaments of 1986 and 1996 of Bangladesh are not included in the data base. Also for the purpose of exploring the link between women legislators and male political leaders, I used some secondary sources that included personal websites and articles in newspapers.

For the convenience of the reader I provide a list of the sources below. No further reference to the data base is made in the bibliography. For more information please contact the author.

List of reference used for the data base:


National Assembly of Pakistan 1972, Who’s who in the National Assembly of Pakistan, Pakistan Press Islamabad.

Pakistan National Assembly 2008, Bio-data of the members of Pakistan National Assembly, Islamabad.

_________ 1988, Bio-data of the members of Pakistan National Assembly, Islamabad.

________ 1985, Bio-data of the members of Pakistan National Assembly, Islamabad.

PILDAT 2003, Directory of the Members of the 12th National Assembly of Pakistan, PILDAT, Islamabad.


USAID 2009, Member Directory 9th Parliament of Bangladesh, Dhaka.

Websites:

www.pakistanileaders.online.com

www.dawn.com
Appendix 5: The University of Auckland Human Participants Ethics Committee

Office of the Vice-Chancellor
Research Integrity Unit

The University of Auckland
Private Bag 92019
Auckland, New Zealand
Level 10, 49 Symonds Street
Telephone: 64 9 373 7599
Extension: 87830 / 83761
Facsimile: 64 9 373 7432

UNIVERSITY OF AUCKLAND HUMAN PARTICIPANTS ETHICS COMMITTEE
05-Apr-2012
MEMORANDUM TO:
Dr Jennifer Curtin
Political Studies

Re: Application for Ethics Approval (Our Ref. 7922)

The Committee considered your application for ethics approval for your project titled Gender quotas, reserved seats and women's representation in politics: A comparative study of Pakistan and Bangladesh on 05-Apr-2012.

Ethics approval was given for a period of three years.

The expiry date for this approval is 05-Apr-2015.

If the project changes significantly you are required to resubmit a new application to the Committee for further consideration.

In order that an up-to-date record can be maintained, you are requested to notify the Committee once your project is completed.
The Chair and the members of the Committee would be happy to discuss general matters relating to ethics approvals if you wish to do so. Contact should be made through the UAHPEC secretary at humanethics@auckland.ac.nz in the first instance.

All communication with the UAHPEC regarding this application should include this reference number: 7922.

(This is a computer generated letter. No signature required.)

Secretary
University of Auckland Human Participants Ethics Committee
c.c. Head of Department / School, Political Studies
Nusrat Chowdhury
Dr Gerald Chan
Appendix 4

Additional information:
1. Should you need to make any changes to the project, write to the Committee giving full details including revised documentation.
2. Should you require an extension, write to the Committee before the expiry date giving full details along with revised documentation. An extension can be granted for up to three years, after which time you must make a new application.
3. At the end of three years, or if the project is completed before the expiry, you are requested to advise the Committee of its completion.
4. Do not forget to fill in the 'approval wording' on the Participant Information Sheets and Consent Forms, giving the dates of approval and the reference number, before you send them out to your participants.
5. Send a copy of this approval letter to the Manager - Funding Processes, Research Office if you have obtained funding other than from UniServices. For UniServices contract, send a copy of the approval letter to: Contract Manager, UniServices.
6. Please note that the Committee may from time to time conduct audits of approved projects to ensure that the research has been carried out according to the approval that was given.
Appendix 6: Interview Questions

General seats legislator

1. Can you tell me something about yourself?
2. Could you describe your experience in the parliament as a general seat MP?
3. To what extent do you think reserved seats are an effective device to increase the number of women? Did you stand in a reserved seat prior to moving to a general seat?
4. What sorts of changes could be made to the existing system of reserved seats?
5. What else can be done to increase the number of women in parliament in general seats?
6. As a MP what have you done to increase the number of women in election and parliament?
7. What do you think are the important issues for women?
8. How have you sought to address these issues in parliament?
9. To what extent do you communicate with other women MPs within and across party regarding any issues of women?
10. Do you ever give up any initiative to speak up on women’s issue due to the contradiction with party’s ideology and pressure? Can you give any examples?
11. What activities do you perform to serve your constituents? Can you give examples?
12. Have you ever been involved with women’s movement? If so, in what capacity?
13. Do you network with any women’s organizations regarding the women’s issues that need to be addressed? Which organizations and on what issues?
14. How do you think you will utilize your experience as an MP in future?
Appendix 7: Interview Questions

Reserved seats legislator (current)

1. Can you tell me something about yourself?
2. Could you describe your experience in the parliament as a reserved seat MP?
3. To what extent do you think reserved seats are an effective device to increase the number of women?
4. What sorts of changes could be made to the existing system of reserved seats?
5. What else can be done to increase the number of women in parliament?
6. As an MP what have you done to increase the number of women in election and parliament?
7. What do you think are the important issues for women?
8. How have you sought to address these issues in parliament?
9. To what extent do you communicate with other women MPs within and across party regarding any issues of women?
10. Do you ever give up any initiative to speak up on women’s issue due to the contradiction with party’s ideology and pressure? Can you give any examples?
11. What activities do you perform to serve your constituents? Can you give examples?
12. Have you ever been involved with women’s movement? If so, in what capacity?
13. Do you network with any women’s organizations regarding the women’s issues that need to be addressed? Which organizations and on what issues?
14. Have you ever contested in general seats in elections before elected to reserved seats or do you intend to do in future? Why is this?
15. How do you think you will utilize your experience as an MP in future?
Appendix 8: Interview Questions

Former reserved seats legislator

1. Can you tell me something about yourself?
2. Could you describe your experience in the parliament as a reserved seat MP?
3. To what extent do you think reserved seats are an effective device to increase the number of women?
4. Do you suggest any changes in the existing system of reserved seats?
5. What else can be done to increase the number of women in parliament?
6. Did you take any initiatives to increase the number of women in election and parliament?
7. What do you think are the important issues for women?
8. How did you work to address these issues in parliament while you were an MP?
9. To what extent did you communicate with other women MPs within and across party regarding any issues of women?
10. Did you ever give up any initiative to speak up on women’s issue due to the contradiction with party’s ideology and pressure inside the parliament? Can you give examples?
11. What activities did you perform to serve your constituents when you were a MP? Can you give examples?
12. Were you involved with women’s movement during your term as a MP? If so, in what capacity?
13. Did you network with women’s organizations regarding the women’s issues that need to be addressed? Which organizations and on what issues?
14. Have you ever contested in general seats in elections before or after being an MP in reserved seats?

15. How have you utilized your experience as an MP to promote women’s issues and concerns in politics?
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