Copyright Statement

The digital copy of this thesis is protected by the Copyright Act 1994 (New Zealand).

This thesis may be consulted by you, provided you comply with the provisions of the Act and the following conditions of use:

- Any use you make of these documents or images must be for research or private study purposes only, and you may not make them available to any other person.
- Authors control the copyright of their thesis. You will recognise the author's right to be identified as the author of this thesis, and due acknowledgement will be made to the author where appropriate.
- You will obtain the author's permission before publishing any material from their thesis.

General copyright and disclaimer

In addition to the above conditions, authors give their consent for the digital copy of their work to be used subject to the conditions specified on the Library Thesis Consent Form and Deposit Licence.
Where are the Men? Rethinking Gender, Sexual Violence and Security in Warfare

Baeda Jaralla Jaber

A thesis submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in Politics and International Relations, University of Auckland, 2015.
Abstract

As many as 50,000 women suffered sexual violence during the Bosnian war, 250,000 in the Rwandan genocide and 200,000 in Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) conflict zones since armed conflict began. Yet, the number of men targeted often remains unknown due to the little material on conflict-related sexual violence against men. However, recent limited reports show that sexual violence against men in conflict is a frequent occurrence; the case of Iraqi male prisoners in Abu Ghraib military detention, being one example. The over-simplistic gendered representation of women-as-victims and men-as-perpetrators present in debates on gender, violence and security, does not account for the thousands of men sexually abused during conflict or indeed the role of women in some of these attacks. Drawing largely on the work of International Relations poststructuralist feminist Laura Shepherd, this paper will explore how such gendered expectations are produced and reproduced across a variety of United Nations (UN) documents. Through a critical discourse analysis, with a specific focus on UN Security Council Resolutions 1325 (2000) and 2106 (2013), I argue that the UN’s policy response on the issue of conflict-related sexual violence is riddled with tensions and inconsistencies. The marginalisation of male victims in academic and policy discussions dangerously constructs a perpetrator class of all men and a victim class of all women.
Acknowledgements

Firstly, I would like to express my sincere gratitude to my supervisor Dr Tom Gregory for the continuous support of my Master’s research project. His guidance helped me in all stages of the research and writing of this thesis.

I would also like to express thanks to the academic and international community for their incredible work and continued commitment on the issue of sexual violence in conflict.

I would like to thank my friends, Maygen and Johan, for their time, encouragement and feedback on this research project. I am incredibly grateful.

Last but not the least; I would like to thank my mother for her love and support not just for this thesis but my life in general. Mum, thank you for always making me feel like I can conquer the world, even when at times all I want to do is give up. I love you.
# Table of Contents

Abstract .................................................................................................................. II
Acknowledgements ............................................................................................... III

## Chapter One: Introduction
Methodology ........................................................................................................... 3
Interviews .................................................................................................................. 5
Secondary Data ....................................................................................................... 6
What is Critical Discourse Analysis? ...................................................................... 7
Feminist Critical Discourse Analysis ..................................................................... 8

## Chapter Two: Theorizing Gender and Security
Poststructuralist Feminist Theory .......................................................................... 10
Gender and War ..................................................................................................... 12
Gender and Feminist Theory ................................................................................ 12
The Role of Women in War .................................................................................. 13
Protection of Women ............................................................................................ 14
Women as Aggressors ........................................................................................... 17
Men ......................................................................................................................... 19
Hegemonic Militarised Masculinity ....................................................................... 20
Soldiers and Masculinity ...................................................................................... 21
Are all Men Violent? ............................................................................................. 23

## Critical Security Studies
Securitization and the Copenhagen School ........................................................... 26
Emancipation .......................................................................................................... 28
Human Security ..................................................................................................... 29
Feminist Critical Security Studies ....................................................................... 30

## Chapter Three: Sexual Violence Literature Review
Defining Sexual Violence in Conflict .................................................................... 31
Explanations for Sexual Violence in Conflict ...................................................... 32
Weapon of War ..................................................................................................... 33
Biological/Heterosexual Urges ........................................................................... 38
Craziness of War ................................................................................................ 40

## Consequences
Neglect of Male Victims ..................................................................................... 42
Physical Violence against Men .......................................................................... 42
Sexual Violence against Men ............................................................................. 44
Female Perpetrators ............................................................................................ 47
International Response ....................................................................................... 48

## Conclusion

## Chapter Four: Emergence of Sexual Violence in Conflict
Introduction ........................................................................................................... 51
“Comfort Women” Before and During WWII .................................................... 53
Further Developments for Women’s Rights following WWII ......................... 59
The Former Yugoslavia ......................................................................................... 60
Further Developments on Conflict-Related Sexual Violence Post-Bosnian War .. 63
Chapter One: Introduction

There is no doubt that the issue of sexual violence in conflict has attracted significant increased attention by the international community in recent times. The UN Security Council has adopted six resolutions on women, peace and security since the passing of UN Security Council 1325 (2000), with four being on sexual violence in conflict. The UN ACTION (United Nations Action Against Sexual Violence in Conflict) was also launched. In 2012, the UN Secretary General appointed Zainab Bangura as the UN Special Representative on Sexual Violence in Conflict. The UK Global Summit to End Sexual Violence in Conflict is also a recent prominent feature; along with increased training, support services, workshops, research and reports on the issue from various international human rights organisations. Such developments mark a significant step forward in addressing the issue of sexual violence in conflict as a threat to international peace and security. Yet, male victims\(^1\) of conflict-related sexual violence remain marginalised, while women continue to be portrayed as the inevitable victims and inherently associated with children.\(^2\)

Through a Poststructuralist Feminist approach and a combined Critical Discourse Analysis and Critical Feminist Discourse Analysis methodology, this research project seeks to challenge the strict male-female binary we often see among war literature, international responses and the military institution itself. This research project aims to go beyond a mere textual analysis and deconstruction to argue that the issues dealt with have dire consequences for groups of women and men in specific situations. Its objective is to offer both theoretical substance and also real world repercussions, with a specific focus on UNSCR 1325 and UNSCR 2106. It seeks to do this by examining the following: How are women represented among discussions on gender, violence and security? How are men represented? How does the UN Security Council write about men and women on issues relating to gender, violence and security? What is missing? To what extent is the conceptualisation of gender, sexual violence and security framed as a women’s issue? To what extent is the male subject marginalised from such discussions? What theoretical and practical implications arise? For the purpose of this research project,\(^1\)

\(^1\) I acknowledge and respect the fact that some academics choose to use the term “survivor.” In this thesis, the term “victim” will be used as this is the predominant definition used in relevant international instruments.

\(^2\) It is important to clarify that this research project does not aim to take away attention or resources from women who are victims of sexual violence in conflict nor minimize their experiences. It also acknowledges the significant impact of sexual violence in conflict against children. I thank the academic and international communities for their incredible work and continued commitment on the issue of sexual violence in conflict. In this paper the focus of the issue of conflict-related sexual violence is on men who are also vulnerable to such attacks during conflict. The investigation of the various roles of men and women in warfare will include those that go against gender norms, particularly men-as-victims and women-as-perpetrators. This is necessary in order to challenge and deconstruct the perpetrator class of all men and the victim class of all women, we often find in war literature and policy documents on the issue. I am also aware that sexual violence occurs during conflict and post-conflict situations; however, for the purpose of this thesis, the focus is on conflict situations.
sexual violence in conflict, wartime sexual violence, conflict-related sexual violence and rape, will all be used interchangeably.

In the first section, I discuss the methodology of the research project and provide a justification on the combined methodology of Critical Discourse Analysis and Critical Feminist Discourse Analysis as the most feasible approach for undertaking this thesis.

In the second section, I discuss the various feminist theoretical conceptualisations on gender and warfare and the different Critical Security Studies approaches, and why a poststructuralist feminist approach is particularly helpful for this research project. This section examines the various roles of men and women in warfare, what is being left out of such discussions and the implications of doing so. It looks at what is meant by gender? Why is ‘gender’ a useful category of analysis in understanding the phenomenon of war and its causes and consequences? In what ways do the constructions of masculinity and femininity impact on the representation of men and women in times of conflict? Does gender matter in international relations? What does security mean? Who or what is the object of security?

The third section will provide an overview of the academic literature on sexual violence in conflict, drawing attention to the various competing explanations as to why it occurs and identifying the gaps in the literature, which this research project aims to contribute to. The focus of critical engagement will be on the feminist treatment of wartime sexual violence; in other words, how the existing feminist academic scholarship talks about sexual violence in conflict and the consequences of doing so. What is missing? To what extent is conflict-related sexual violence constructed as exclusively targeting women and girls? Could sexual violence during conflict also affect males as victims, not just as perpetrators? Where are the men?

The fourth section demonstrates how sexual violence in conflict became recognised as a significant problem that required the attention and response of the UN and the rest of the international community. It focuses on three case studies to illustrate this: the sexual slavery of “comfort women” by the Japanese before and during World War Two (1939-1945); the systematic mass rape and ethnic cleansing that occurred during conflicts in the former Yugoslavia in 1992 and Rwanda genocide in 1994.

The fifth section will critically examine the language of UN Security Council Resolution 1325 (2000) in its objectives and provide a feminist critique of the conceptualisation of gender, violence and security within the document. This will shed light on the tensions and inconsistencies present within the text that limit Resolution 1325’s understanding and response to gender violence and security, ultimately affecting its full and effective implementation. The analysis will pay particular attention on
how women are talked about in Resolution 1325, while also examining what is missing from the Security Council’s response on the impact of armed conflict on civilians, asking where are the men?

Following on from Resolution 1325, in the final section, I turn my analytical lens to the UN Security Council Resolution 2106 (2013) to critically examine the conceptualisation of gender, violence and security within the document. The purpose of this section is to examine if there have been developments within UN Security Council (UNSCR) 2106, regarding the Security Council’s response to the issue of wartime sexual violence in the preceding 13 years since Resolution 1325. This section will also look closely at how the Security Council writes about men and women in Resolution 2106.

I conclude by arguing that despite a concerted effort to address the issue of sexual violence in conflict, male victims continue to be largely neglected from discussions on the issue, with an over simplistic representation of women-as-victims and men-as-perpetrators present in much of the academic and UN documents examined. This has theoretical and practical consequences for both men and women.

Methodology
This project will combine both qualitative and quantitative forms of analysis of primary and secondary data in order critically analyse the conceptualisation of gender, sexual violence and security through two related analytical strategies: Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) and Feminist Critical Discourse Analysis (FCDA). Combining CDA and FCDA in my methodology will assist me in deconstructing the issues of gender, power and ideology which exist in our readings of significant policy documents and reports. These readings can at times be complex and subtle while discursively producing and perpetuating social assumptions and hegemonic power relations often taken for granted without a FCDA and/or CDA approach (Lazar 2005: 2). The primary data will largely consist of the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 (2000) and Resolution 2106 (2013) as vehicles of analysis to critically examine the concepts of gender, sexual violence and security.

The UN Security Council (UNSC) is the most powerful body within the United Nations (UN) and the most powerful international institution in the history of the nation-state system. Its primary responsibility is the maintenance of international peace and security. The UNSC membership includes the five most powerful and influential states in the world serving as permanent members: United States, United Kingdom, Russia, China and France. It also has legitimate authority to dispatch military operations; impose sanctions; mandate arms inspections; and implement a wide range of policies regarding peace and security (Cronin and Hurd 2008: 3) including resolutions on ‘women, peace and security.’ The UNSCR 1325 (2000) is a vehicles of analysis due to embodying discourses of gender, sexual violence and security within the document and often described as ground-breaking for being the first resolution to do so (Cohn 2004; Cohn, Kinsella and Gibbings 2004; Shepherd 2008). Resolution
1325 offers a platform for further analysis of UNSCR 2106 (2013). Resolution 2106 is also a vehicle of analysis due to being the most recent UN Security Council Resolution on conflict-related sexual violence relating to women, peace and security. The two UNSC resolutions will be used to critically examine the discourses of gender, violence and security present in the texts. In addition, it will pay close attention to how the Security Council writes about men and women in its resolutions and how this impacts on its response to the issue of sexual violence in conflict.

**Interviews**

I also conduct an interview with an official from Amnesty International, Todor Gardos, and use the data to supplement to the research project. The interview was approved by the Ethics Committee and conducted through Skype, hand written notes were taken and an informed consent form was signed by the interviewee. The interview consists of asking questions about the organisation’s research and campaign process and how AI recognises the male experience of conflict-related sexual violence. This interview introduces a ‘human touch’ to the research project and sheds light on how such influential organisations come up with campaigns and initiatives; the practice and methodology of their report and policy output. In other words, who becomes the target of the research and under what circumstances? Furthermore, how do they recognise the male experience of sexual and gender-based violence during conflict? How the representation of women-as-victims and men-as-perpetrators may be unconsciously present in their campaign and report practice? Most importantly, who, then, are they marginalizing in this way?

**Secondary Data**

The secondary data will be based on existing sources where I will draw upon secondary material including books and journal articles from several disciplines. This includes gender studies, feminist studies, sociology, political studies, legal, psychology and security studies, as well as, newspaper articles, documentaries, women’s rights activists and journalists. This allows me to conduct a wide range of quantitative and qualitative analysis that helps us to examine the ways gender, sexual violence and security are conceptualised in academic debates and the policy world.

---

3 Initially I was to conduct an interview with an official from each of the following organizations: UN, AI and Human Rights Watch (HRW). I tried for many months to secure an interview with each of the organizations through email and phone but it was very difficult to secure a person from the UN and HRW. They were resistant to agree to an interview and informed me that no one in their organization can assist me in discussing male victims of conflict-related sexual violence. HRW specifically said they do not deal with male victims at all and that their focus is solely on women and girls. Although I was unable to secure an interview, the fact that they did not want to be interviewed on the issue of male victims of conflict-related sexual violence, shows just how problematic the treatment of the issue among the international community actually is.

4 Although for one interview an Ethics approval is not required, initially the goal was to do three interviews which did require an Ethics approval first. However, due to the reasons noted above, my attempts at securing additional interviews proved unsuccessful.
What is Critical Discourse Analysis?

Before proceeding, it is important to understand what we mean by discourse where often it is defined as communication of thought whether verbal or written as a subject of analysis. A ‘text’ or ‘discourse’ could mean a television news item, a speech, a newspaper article or a journal article. A critical discourse analysis assists in bringing awareness to the significance; relevance and powerfulness of language. Most importantly, it highlights the critical role language plays in helping us make sense of the world. Furthermore, discourse analysis differs from other methods of analysis by expanding beyond a narrow investigation on modes of communication such as style of writing to include the broader values, norms, ideologies and other contextual factors embedded in a particular set of documents (Kaal Maks and Van Elfrinkhof 2014). The significance in CDA is that it treats language not only as a product of social interaction but also as a vital influence in reshaping social practices, in both positive and damaging ways. CDA puts an emphasis on power relations, context and ideology where the concept of domination is explored within the discourse.

Critical Discourse Analysis is most commonly associated with Norman Fairclough (1995; 1997; 2006), Ruth Wodak (1997), Teun A. van Dijk (1977; 1993; 1980; 1997) and Carmen Rosa Caldas-Coulthard and Malcolm Coulthard (1996). Fairclough, in particular, is influenced by Foucault especially in his use of the notions of ‘order of discourse’ and ‘discourse formation’. Wodak, however, approaches the analysis of language from various strands of sociolinguistics and ethnography. The work of van Dijk emerges from relatively formal text linguistics and largely concerned with mental schemas that represent the social and give rise to stereotypes which in turn gives rise to various ideologies. However, the aim of this section is not to provide competing debates on the methodology of CDA but rather an overview of the analytical strategies I choose to employ and the reasons behind it.

At the most global level, CDA increases awareness of the reciprocal influences of language and social structure. More specifically, it aims to describe the ways in which power and dominance are produced and reproduced in social practice through the discourse structures of everyday interactions (Lazar 2005). This research project goes beyond a mere textual analysis and deconstruction to argue that the issues dealt with have dire consequences for groups of women and men in specific situations. It not only offers theoretical substance but also real world repercussions, with a specific focus on UNSCR 1325 and UNSCR 2106. The methodological combination of CDA and FCDA enables us to investigate the conceptualisation of security and warfare with a gender perspective, along with the implications of doing so. This is because CDA is a type of discourse analytical research that primarily studies the way social power abuse, dominance, and inequality are enacted, reproduced, and resisted by text and talk in the social and political context (Van Dijik 1993; Wodak and Meyer 2001). While an FCDA approach primarily focuses on gender (Lazar 2005; 2007; Talbot 2010).
Louise Phillips (1998) illustrates through a Critical Discourse Analysis of repeated use of key words and formulaic phrases by politicians and mass media, how the discourse of Thatcherism was produced, reproduced and transformed across different texts. The discourse of Thatcherism consequently secured cultural change across British society. The important key words of ‘choice, community and enterprise’ and formulaic phrases of ‘value for money, enterprise culture, power to choose and consumer choice’ were picked up by people and reproduced through everyday ‘private’ language and formal ‘public’ language (Phillips 1998). In this sense, language is understood as a social practice and is an active agent in social, political and cultural change (Phillips 1998: 848; also see Zantop and Berman 2001; Frankenberger 2006).

This research project will show just how powerful CDA can be as an instrument of social justice. Language is everywhere we turn. We speak it, we write it, we communicate it, and we express it. Language is the most common and powerful tool to exert change, so if CDA is used to examine language discourse within texts then we are able to discover the tensions and disparities present among the documents which in turn allows us to find more effective solutions for their implementation. Language whether verbal, imagery or written, can make the readers feel and think a certain way. What if it is being used to provide a narrow understanding of the way in which the world works? How does it impact our understanding of what ‘gender’ means? What it means to be ‘feminine’ or ‘masculine’? Who is perceived to be the inevitable victim in sexual violence, particularly in armed conflict? What the referent object of security is or should be? What if language is to marginalise or exclude certain groups in society? CDA is a helpful tool to show how particular language users establish exclusionary attitudes and maybe practices by recurrently and selectively asserting certain attributes. This may include social roles, behavioural characteristics, physical appearance and the like, of social and ethnic groups (Schiffrin, Tannen and Hamilton 2001). For this reason, I argue that CDA and FCDA allow us to discover how the presentation and production of the gendered language used in the texts we read, watch or listen to largely impact on our understanding of the (re) conceptualisation of gender, sexual violence and security.

**Feminist Critical Discourse Analysis**

A CDA with a focus on gender automatically adopts a critical feminist approach of gender relations. Such an approach is concerned with deconstructing and understanding the complex workings of gender, power and ideology and how they intersect. It is also motivated by the need to change the existing conditions of these relations. Feminism and Critical Discourse Analysis when taken up together can create a rich and powerful political critique for action (Lazar 2005: 5).

Traditionally, Feminist Critical Discourse analysts are primarily concerned with critiquing discourses which sustain a patriarchal social order. This involves a critique of power relations where men are
privileged as a social group and women are disadvantaged, excluded and disempowered as a social group. This ideological structure of dividing men and women into two classes where the former is dominant and the latter is subordinate is a very common conception of gender. It is not only still evident in society but also among contemporary academic scholarship and significant documents produced by influential international organisations.

Michelle Lazar (2005) argues that an important goal for feminist CDA is to undertake contingent analyses of the oppression of women (2005: 9). However, not all feminists share in this view, with poststructuralist feminists particularly sceptical of the male-female binary. Yet, I choose a poststructuralist approach to argue that ‘men’ must also be taken seriously among discussions of conflict-related sexual violence. This requires an examination of how certain bodies are constituted in and through this violence. This is in line with post-modernist understandings of gender in which it is seen as a ‘performance’ (see Shepherd 2015; Butler 1990). The aim is to shed light on the frequently taken-for-granted gendered assumptions and hegemonic power relations which are discursively produced, sustained, negotiated and challenged in different contexts and communities (Lazar 2007: 142). These taken-for-granted power relations are much more complex and subtle and even at times not so subtle, thus requiring critical engagement.

I choose to employ both CDA and FCDA because CDA on its own tends to be one of those broadly progressive projects whose founders and dominant figures are all straight, white men (Cameron 1998: 969-970) who rarely give credit to feminists by citing their work (Wilkinson and Kitzinger 1995). Although recently there has been some acknowledgement of feminist work by some CDA scholars such as Lilie Chouliaraki and Norman Fairclough (1999), it is often minimised to a brief citation. There needs to be distinct feminist principles and insights within CDA which goes further in “theorizing and analysing the seemingly innocuous yet oppressive nature of gender as an omni-relevant category in many social practices” (Lazar 2007: 143). This is why using CDA and FCDA interchangeably would strengthen this research project. When applying these two related analytical strategies I am able to achieve two things. First, analyse the use of language in influencing social structure and show the ways in which power and ideologies are produced and reproduced in social practice. Second, draw attention to the gender inequalities and injustices. One of its strength is that FCDA is not undertaken by ‘straight, white men’ nor ‘straight, white women’ but rather a diversity of feminist people from various geographical locations, race, colour, social status and sexual orientation. The objective is to use FCDA alongside Critical Discourse Analysis to contribute to the prominent approach in the humanities and social sciences, not to replace it.

There are some limitations with employing FCDA due to the perceived notion of its ‘isolation of ‘gender’ as a variable or factor in investigating social phenomena’ (Wodak, cited in Harrington et al.
However, feminists would argue against this assertion, by maintaining that many social problems are inherently gendered. Therefore, when undertaking research through theory and methodology, ‘gender’ or ‘sex’ are not considered isolated variables but rather informative dimensions. Furthermore, combining FCDA and CDA as an interdisciplinary approach would ensure that none of the key concepts of power, dominance, ideology and gender are isolated or excluded. Rather all the key concepts are intertwined and considered when analysing the discourses of gender, sexual violence and international security.

When undertaking CDA/FCDA as a methodology we must be aware of the context of our texts and of the social problems we would like to tackle and also further reflect on how and in which ways gender comes into play when studying texts in contexts (Wodak 2008). The reason why these analytical strategies are so significant and powerful is because of the ‘critical’ aspect. When you are critically analysing discourse then you are not taking social phenomena and processes for granted. Instead, uncovering alternative options and de-mystifying power relations, latent beliefs and ideologies while de-constructing texts and discourses systemically (Wodak and Koller 2008; Lazar 2005). The reason I am using FCDA in relation with Poststructuralist Feminist theoretical framework is two-fold. It not only focuses on gender but with the modernised poststructuralist feminist movement I am able to challenge traditional assumptions of women-as-victims and men-as-perpetrators in any oppositional sense. Moreover, it does not even allow for an assumption that women as a category are necessarily powerless, disadvantaged or oppressed by ‘the other’ (Baxter, cited in Harrington et al 2008: 243).

Chapter Two: Theorizing Gender and Security

Poststructuralist Feminist Theory

This research project examines the role of males and females during conflict situations, particularly relating to sexual violence in conflict, through a poststructuralist feminist lens. Adopting a poststructuralist feminist approach in the study of warfare allows us to engage with the use of language in texts. Furthermore, Laura Shepherd (2008) argues that it allows us to question “the ways in which gender is made meaningful in social/political interactions and the practices – or performances – through which gender configures boundaries of subjectivity” (2008: 3). In international relations, poststructuralist feminism moves away from ‘state-centric’ approaches to security, and instead focuses on the individual as the referent object of security. Furthermore, it also draws attention to the gendered nature of the individual. It further challenges the traditional constructions of gender as ‘fixed’ and ‘inevitable.’ The poststructuralist approach enables the reader to think differently of gender, where there is no single universal category of ‘women’ or ‘man.’ Instead both ‘gender’ and ‘sex’ are a social
construction; fluid and constantly transforming depending on class, ethnicity, background, and the like (Butler 2004; Shepherd 2008; Peterson 2005). Unlike traditional feminist approaches, poststructuralist feminism draws attention to the marginalisation of all identities in international relations, thus providing a voice to all those who are silenced and excluded for not conforming to social norms of what it means to be ‘male’ or ‘female.’ In this way, the approach enables us to investigate the powerful role of language discourse in academic literature and international policy, in order to discover how certain groups are often marginalised. For example, academic and policy discussions on the protection and support services provided for victims of conflict-related sexual violence often marginalise the male subject.

Through a poststructuralist feminist lens, I examine how the concepts of gender, sexual violence and security are produced and reproduced in academic debates and the policy world. This will entail a critical investigation on how men and women are written about in academic literature and UN policy documents. As such, how are they represented and acted upon? Who does the international community and academic literature focus on in their discussions and responses to the issue of sexual violence in conflict? What is portrayed as the ‘referent object’ of security – ‘state’, ‘individual’ or ‘women’? What is missing? Who is being marginalised? What implications arise from such a conceptualisation of gender, sexual violence and security? I aim to contribute to both academic debates and the policy world by enabling a different way of thinking of gender, sexual violence and security. I do this by examining the relationship between language, subjectivity and power relations, among the body of related academic literature and empirical data of UN Security Council Resolution 1325 (2000) and UN Security Council Resolution 2106 (2013). Rather than accepting the way in which the world works as a ‘given,’ I apply a poststructuralist approach and use this platform as an opportunity to challenge, critique and analyse our understanding on gender, women and men. This theory section will focus on traditional feminist critiques of International Relations (IR) in relation to gender and war and Critical Security Studies (CSS). It concludes with why poststructuralist feminism is a particularly useful approach to the discipline.

**Gender and War**

The phenomenon of warfare within the IR discipline has traditionally tended to employ a ‘top-down’, macro-level, approach focusing on the concerns of power, statehood, and sovereignty (Waltz 1979; 2008; Baldwin 1993; Stolberg 2012; Mearsheimer 2001). However, IR feminists, most notably J. Ann Tickner (1987; 1992; 2001) and Cynthia Enloe (1993; 2000) adopt a micro-level, ‘bottom-up’ approach with a central focus on gender to examine the impact of war on the individual and groups. This raises a
few questions: what is meant by ‘gender’? Why is ‘gender’ a useful category of analysis in understanding the phenomenon of war and its causes and consequences? In what ways do the constructions of masculinity and femininity impact on the representation of men and women in times of war and conflict? Does gender matter in international relations?

Gender and Feminist Theory

Feminist theorists are credited in redefining the concept of ‘gender’ with no longer being restricted to biological inherent characteristics of males and females, but rather as a social construction (Tickner 1992; 2001; Thorburn 2000; Enloe 1993; 2000; Butler 1987; Peterson 2005). Simone de Beauvoir (1972) famously claimed that one is not born but rather becomes a woman and as such views the relations between men and women as more so influenced by the social construction of gender than biological sex differences. The social construction of gender means a female can only become a woman by ascribing to certain feminine traits and in doing so must learn and display ‘appropriate’ feminine behaviour. Feminine traits and behaviour are often associated with being weak, emotional, vulnerable, dependent, maternal, in need for protection, passive, and innocent (Chodorow 1994). In much the same way, a male can only become a man by ascribing to masculine traits and learning ‘appropriate’ masculine behaviour. Masculine traits and behaviour are often associated with strength, rationality, independence, aggression, autonomy, protector and stoicism (Connell 2005). Feminist theorists thus argue that men and women are not born ‘masculine’ or ‘feminine.’ Rather they rather must conform and sustain to certain social characteristics of ‘masculinity’ and ‘femininity’ in order to be socially accepted as a man or a woman. This conceptualisation of gender harbours the belief that masculinity and femininity can only be loosely defined and able to be continuously redefined and reproduced.

Feminists (Sjoberg 2013; 2014; Enloe 1983; 2000; 2007; Tickner 2011; 2014; Shepherd 2015; 2008) of war theory contend that gender is present through every aspect of war. The military and its gender order are an extension of the gender hierarchy present in mainstream society. The gender order in war is grounded on specific roles assigned to ‘masculine’ men and ‘feminine’ women. In this way, men fight wars in order to protect their nation and women succumb as innocent victims in need of protection, serving as the inspirations behind wars being fought. Feminists believe that wars’ association with masculinity creates a gendered institution. This requires a central gender analysis to uncover significant flaws of war theory and war system that reinforce gender subordination (Zalewski 2013; Enloe 1993; 2000). Thus, a feminist gendered analysis of war will provide a more in-depth understanding of its causes, systems and implications.

Traditional feminist theory is built on the belief that sex is biological, and gender is a social construction. Poststructuralist feminists, particularly Judith Butler (1990), V. Spike Peterson (2005) and
Laura Shepherd (2007; 2015) agree with traditional feminism that gender is a social construction. However, they are sceptical of the male-female binary, regarding it as representative of existing subordinate power relations in society. As such, poststructuralist feminists not only regard the concept of gender as a social construction but also the concept of sex. Judith Butler (1990) argues that the construction of ‘sex’ as a category is ultimately based on power relations that it cannot escape. As such, ‘sex’ is not ‘fixed’ to biological characteristics, as illustrated by the transsexual/intersex community, and is instead a social construction. Butler (1987) does not accept a steady and coherent gender identity, and coined the term ‘performative,’ to explain how ‘men’ and ‘women’ essentially ‘act out’ gender. This is due to the fluid and constantly changing nature of gender, which depends on an individual’s present situation rather than a biologically fixed or a collective ‘who you are’ entity.

Butler notes that while ‘traditional’ feminism rejects the notion of gender as being biologically inherent and criticises patriarchal structures viewing it as men’s oppression over women, it still manages to produce strict male-controlled cultures where ‘masculinity’ dominates ‘femininity’. In this sense, traditional feminism reinforces an outdated view of gender relations in which there are only two groups: ‘men’ and ‘women’, portraying a rigid universal image where each possess and sustain particular characteristics and interests. This in turn offers restrictions rather than possibilities for a person to explore their own identities and be able to develop as individuals.

Role of Women in War

Laura Sjoberg (2014) draws attention to the invisibility of women in war narratives despite women’s active participation throughout history as combatants in war. No feminist scholar explores the various roles of women among the international system and global political economy more than radical feminist pioneer, Cynthia Enloe, who famously asked ‘where are the women?’ (1990; 1993; 2000; 2004). Cynthia Enloe asserts that it was not so much the case that women were excluded from the core of international relations but rather their contributions were not publicly or formally recognised. In this way, Enloe urges IR feminists to not only search for women in high level positions of policymaking and leadership but also in their different roles as military wives, activists, soldiers or military prostitutes. This is because these roles of women during war were detrimental in the efficient operation of the international system but are far less explored. For example, while the men were expected to serve their country and leave home for tour of duty, the role of military wives was to stay home, take care of the household and raise the children. Most importantly, the wives acted as ‘motivators’ for the soldiers away at war, to fight courageously and win wars in order to return home safely to their wives and children (Sjoberg and Via 2010: 45).
Enloe has a particular interest in militarised prostitution, stating that more than one million women have worked as prostitutes for United States (US) military personnel since the Korean War (1993) and defines prostitution as “an integral part of a distinctive national security doctrine” (Enloe 2000: 53). Women who operate as prostitutes in warfare rarely do so voluntarily with many misled, kidnapped, sold or forced to due to economic hardships. Enloe is credited for putting the issue of militarised prostitution on the International Relations agenda and argues that a further understanding on this issue will enable a deeper insight into the military’s policies on issues of rape, marriage, pornography, morale, and homosexuality (2000: 51). However, Adam Jones (1998) criticises feminist theory in its limited understanding of IR, given that it largely focuses on the lived experiences of women at the expense of men. In this way, Jones argues that feminism wrongly equates ‘gender’ with ‘women’ since gender actually includes both the female and male subject. In later work, Jones (2000) specifically criticises Enloe’s lack of consideration of men and boys in her work as she rarely includes men in her gender analysis in their own right. This in turn provides a dangerous misrepresentation of our understanding on the conceptualisation of gender. If men are included in discussions at all, it is limited to the extent of how their behaviour impacts on women. Yet, feminists (Carver et al 1998) argue against Jones assertion of the shortcomings of feminism, noting that Jones chooses to ignore the vast feminist academic literature on the studies of men and masculinities. There is no doubt that there has been an increased commendable feminist literature on the study of men and masculinities. However, the literature on men and masculinities rarely extends to include men as victims, instead largely focusing on men’s role as aggressive ‘masculine’ subjects, thus leaving a significant gap in the scholarship.

Protection of Women

Women are often grouped with children in academic literature and policy documents relating to sexual violence, peace and security issues. This is so common that Cynthia Enloe (1990) coined the term ‘womenandchildren.’ Laura Shepherd (2008) argues that this association is inherently problematic as children are often seen as irrational, irresponsible and not yet fully-grown, primarily in need of protection. Jean Elshtain (1987) insinuates that the role of women in war is often portrayed as ‘beautiful souls’ - war victims - who are in need of protection by male ‘just warriors.’ This gendered narrative is prevalent in much of the historical and present literature on war.

Laura Sjoberg (in Evans et al 2014) provides a historical mythical example of this account with the Trojan War. The Trojan War was waged against the Trojans by the King of Sparta, Menelaus (the ‘just warrior) and his Achaeans army, after his wife Helen (‘beautiful soul’) was taken by Paris (‘the enemy’). The war lasted nine years and many lives were lost when the heroic ‘just warrior’ and his army of brave men embarked on a dangerous journey and risked their lives to rescue the ‘innocent and
‘helpless’ Helen. This was necessary in order to restore their honour and redress the insult. As such, women are often considered the symbolic and cultural bearers of the nation but also regarded as the ‘spoils of war.’ This is because their protection and honour is used to justify wars and encourage men to fight and die in them (Sjoberg 2010; Sjoberg and Peet 2011; Young 2003). This gendered narrative of brave men fighting wars to protect and rescue innocent woman is not restricted to the Trojan War, and can be found in much of the war literature. However it offers a narrow understanding of gender, in which alternative roles for men and women in war are not considered.

A contemporary example of the ‘beautiful soul’ narrative and protection of women is the abduction of the US female soldier, Jessica Lynch, who was captured by the Iraqi military forces during the 2003 US invasion of Iraq (Sjoberg 2014). Although Lynch was not the only US soldier held captive, her female status acquired considerable media attention. This resulted in a dangerous recovery mission implemented by the US Special Operations Forces. Regardless of Lynch’s status as a soldier, she was portrayed as a vulnerable and innocent feminine woman, in need of protection. Sjoberg (2007) argues that female soldiers in the US forces are viewed as “tough but not violent; brave but still in need of defence: adept, but still beautiful; a soldier, but still innocent” (2007: 98). Lynch was successfully rescued and unharmed, but the US soldiers who were also held in captivity, tortured and killed were merely a passing reference. The United States (US) and the world focused on the successful reassertion of power and masculinity of the US military by rescuing ‘their’ woman (not a soldier) – a symbolic and cultural bearer of the US nation. This representation of female soldiers in war further reinforces outdated stereotypes of male domination over subordinate females and removes women’s agency as active combatants in warfare.

Joshua Goldstein (2001) describes the ‘protection racket’ (see Peterson, in Vetterling Braggin et al 1977) as the motivation for men to go to war and risk their lives. It suggests that men do not necessarily wish to participate in war, but will readily do so for women, the innocent women who are presumably most affected by war. However, feminists like Laura Sjoberg (in Evans et al 2014) and Ann Tickner (2011) reject this gendered narrative of men as aggressive ‘just warriors’ and women as passive and vulnerable ‘beautiful souls’ in need of protection. Instead arguing that such narratives are more ‘symbolic than real’ (Sjoberg 2014: 536). Sjoberg claims that women’s active presence in war throughout history as nurses, soldiers and terrorists contradicts assumptions about ‘passive’ women in war. Laura Sjoberg provides a lengthy discussion on women’s various roles during armed conflict and challenges the ‘beautiful soul’ narrative by citing women acting as “instigators, violent participants, governors of fighting and makers of success or failure” (2015: 530). Yet, the historical and present role of women’s international movement and activism in issues relating to war, peace and security, is not included among discussions on the various roles of women in war. This is an important discussion to
include in the role of women during armed conflict, as it demonstrates women’s active role in security issues throughout history, including their resistance and support of warfare.

Ann Tickner (1992; 2001) challenges the ‘myth’ that wars are fought by men to protect civilians, particularly women and children. Tickner argues that this is not the case at all given the dramatic increase in the killing of civilians, especially women and children. The United Nations reported that the Syrian war alone has claimed approximately 220,000 civilian lives as of January 2015. The Syrian Observatory for Human Rights (SOHR) reported that 7,049 women were killed, while at the same time the number of children killed has increased from 500 in 2012 to 11,021 as of mid-April 2015 (UNICEF 2015). It is important to note that while data on approximate civilian causalities consisting of women and children is fairly accessible (on various conflicts); the same cannot be said on data available on the body count of civilian men.

It is evident that war and conflict produce far greater instability and vulnerability, than protection and stability, with millions of people forced to flee their homes. The UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR) estimates that as of the end of 2013 there were 51.2 million people forcefully displaced worldwide, 33.3 million internally displaced people worldwide and 16.7 million refugees worldwide (UNHCR 2015). These figures are steadily increasing due to conflicts mainly occurring in Sudan, Syrian Arabic Republic, eastern Democratic of Congo, Central African Republic (CAR), Palestine and Iraq. The UN Human Development Report 2014 notes that women and children account for 80 per cent of the world’s refugees and displaced persons (2014: 79).

Feminists also draw attention to the prevalent issue of sexual violence during conflict as evidence of further vulnerabilities women and girls face during conflict. For example, the 1992 former Yugoslavia conflict where approximately between 12,000 and 50,000 women suffered sexual violence, and the Rwandan genocide where between 100,000 and 500,000 women were estimated to have been raped in 1994 (Burnet 2012; Sharlach 2000; Niarchos 1995; Salzman 1998; Craven 1999; Buss et al 2014). The UN reports that over 200,000 women have experienced sexual violence in the DRC, since armed conflict began (UN 2015). The Euro-Mediterranean Human Rights Network (EMHRN) reports that that an estimated 6,000 women have been raped, since the Syrian civil war began in 2011 (EMHRN 2013). The figures, however, are believed to be much higher due to the underreporting of the crimes. Further issues arise with rape and sexual violence such as psychological effects and the spread of AIDS and HIV in places like Uganda, where there is an absence of health services and other sources of livelihood support. These are just a few issues that represent the lack of protection and stability women experience during conflict, challenging the ‘myth’ that wars are fought to protect women and children.

Wars are thought to be fought to create protection and stability for civilians, particularly women and children. Yet, in reality there is less protection and more violence targeted at civilians in times of
conflict. Such a grim reality of the effects of armed conflict, contradict the established association of war with protection and safety of civilians, particularly women and children. It challenges the justification and rationale behind the role of the ‘just warrior.’ It is also clear that the concept of ‘protection’ during warfare has been framed largely for women and children, largely disregarding other vulnerable groups that may be falling through the cracks, such as civilian men.

Women as Aggressors

The vast literature on war and security provides the impression that “men make war, women make peace” (Dilorio 1992: 51). Historically, women’s role in war centred around supporting male military personnel in traditional roles as wives, cooks, prostitutes, nurses and the like (Enloe 1983; 1992; Tickner 2001; 2014). Women are often excluded from fighting in wars (Horrigan 1992), as this would seemingly disrupt the strict gender dynamics of men as ‘just warriors’ and women as passive, ‘beautiful souls’ that the war system is built and dependent on. Further arguments against women in combat rest on the assumption that their presence causes feelings of confusion, jealousy and sexual tensions among male combatants. Therefore, the presence of women combatants presumably serves as a distraction for male soldiers, thus hindering their ‘true’ mission of protecting the nation during armed conflict. Additionally, there exists the belief that the presence of female soldiers in the military will make men less violent as women are generally associated with peace.

Scholar Stephan Maninger (in Evans et.al 2014: 555-556), believes women do not belong in combat due to their biological makeup. Due to women’s biological make up they are known for having less upper body strength than men, less endurance and further physical limitations due to menstruation and child-rearing. Maninger also affirms that in addition to physical strength, soldiers must exhibit personal traits of courage, discipline, and aggression which he believes can only be equated to male soldiers. However, Maninger contradicts himself when citing the killing of 12,000 German soldiers by approximately 1500 Soviet sniper women during the Second World War (2008: 17). Maninger admits that the women possessed a great deal of courage in combat and kill the enemy with no hesitations.

Jane Parpart and Kevin Partridge (in Evans et. al 2014) refute Maninger’s view that the military system is exclusively for male soldiers who exhibit hegemonic masculine traits. Parpart and Partridge argue that Maninger disregards other forms of complex masculinities and discounts the presence of active female combatants in the military, that “challenges the essentialized nature of a militarized body as male and masculine” (Parpart and Partridge 2014: 556). In short, not all ‘masculine’ men in war rejoice in violence, and not all soldiers in war are men; with many women serving as active combatants in war zones.
Some feminist scholars (Mackenzie 2009; 2012; Sjoberg 2010; Herbert 1994; Moser and Clark 2001; Cohen 2013; Baaz and Maria Stern 2013) have drawn attention to the role of women as active fighters during conflict. This is to broaden the framework beyond female victimisation. The active role of women in combat includes: traditional soldiers, guerrilla fighters, suicide bombers and terrorists. Sjoberg (2015) notes that women have acted as terrorists and suicide bombers in places like Chechnya, Sri Lanka, Palestine, Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan and Syria. They have participated as guerrilla fighters in the conflicts related to Sierra Leone, Colombia, Kashmir and Mexico (Sjoberg, cited in Evans et al 2014: 542). Evidence of women as active fighters in war challenges the stereotypical gendered role of women as passive, helpless victims. During the civil war in Sierra Leone, women made up about 30 per cent of soldiers (Mackenzie 2009), where an overwhelming 24 per cent were part of the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) (Cohen 2013). Yet, resistance remained in formally acknowledging them as ‘soldiers’ by Sierra Leone policy makers, thus diminishing women’s agency. Although female combatants were treated equally to their male counterparts during military training and were required to prove their physical and social masculinity (Cohen 2000), many are denied formal recognition as ‘soldiers.’

In countries like Nepal, Eritrea and Israel, women make up one-third of the military membership and during the US invasion of Iraq and Afghanistan, women represented 11 per cent of the US troops (Sjoberg 2014). Yet, female soldiers continue to be treated differently from their male counterparts. There are instances of women dressing up as men in order to fight in battle and some carrying suicide bombs disguised as babies to commit acts of terrorism as part of al-Qaeda (Sjoberg 2014). The role of women as combatants, who instigate violence and support war fighting not only questions the ‘beautiful soul’ narrative of women as helpless victims in need of protection, but also challenges the assumption that all women are peacekeepers and peace-builders.

The Gulf War (1991–1992) marked a significant change in two ways: first, military interventions were no longer based on traditional causes for political gain and power dominance. Instead military inventions shifted to military occupation on grounds relating to human rights issues and peacekeeping operations (Higate 2003). Second, women’s participation in the military expanded to different roles in the armed services such as soldiers, marines and air force personnel. Women were front and centre alongside their male comrades in the battle zones. Higate (2003) estimated that the US military force in Saudi Arabia consisted of approximately 40,000 female personnel. Yet, even when women are acknowledged as fighters, Sjoberg (2014) notes that their fighting is still distinguished from men’s fighting, where “men are soldiers, revolutionaries, and terrorists, women are women soldiers, women revolutionaries, and women terrorists” (Emphasis in original, 2014: 40).
In their interview with DRC armed forces female soldiers, Maria Eriksson Baaz and Maria Stern (2008) challenge the assumption that women do not belong in active combat as they are too weak and compassionate to kill in combat. Instead, these interviews reveal that the Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo (FARDC) female soldiers appear to be more brave and courageous than their male comrades, with much stronger desire to fight:

In order to be in the military you have to be strong [il faut ozala makasi]. You cannot be weak [okoki kozala faible te]. You have to be able to cope with all sorts of things and still be strong. You cannot be afraid. You have to have courage. Many of the men are afraid, more afraid than us women (Female major, cited in Baaz and Stern 2008: 68).

Dara Kay Cohen (2013) makes a related argument with female fighters during the civil war in Sierra Leone, revealing through interviews that they are not only more aggressive than their male counterparts but also had a reputation for encouraging extreme violence. For example, one ex-combatant states: “We would sometimes put women in front when we were attacking villages because they could be the fiercest fighters” (cited in Cohen 2013: 398). Cohen also concludes that the mere presence of female fighters, at least in Sierra Leone, produces more instances of rape not less. Thus, contradicting traditional perspectives of the correlation between an increase in women soldiers and decrease in sexual violence committed.

The war narratives we often see, hear or read are largely centred on men’s experiences in war, exclusively as soldiers/warriors displaying accepted masculinities. Sjoberg (2014), Tickner (2001; 2014) and Enloe, (2003) note that if women’s presence in war is recognised at all, it is largely restricted to their feminine roles as soldier’s wives, nurses, military prostitutes and caregivers. This consequently produces a narrow and essentialised gendered portrayal of women, because the narratives of war that often go untold are those that contradict gender expectations of men and women, such as the role women as violent combatants or men as civilian victims. This is because such narratives upset the strict binaries of masculinity and femininity that the war system is built upon.

Men

There is no doubt that men feature predominately in conflict situations in various ways including as soldiers, heroes, villains, political leaders, judges, and as implementers of related policies and resolutions. Debates surrounding justification for war often focus on women (Cockburn 2013), while men are largely ignored as there is a general assumption that men are, “aggressive, heroic warriors that want to fight and die for their nation and women” (Higate 2003: 3). The discussions on men in war are often limited to men as (or becoming) strong and masculine soldiers who must fight to protect their nation and women. Thus, war is inherently associated with masculinity.
Men, masculinities and war are undoubtedly linked; however, the concepts surrounding these discourses are much more complex. International Relations feminists, who study discourses of gender and war often ask: ‘where are the women?’ (Enloe 1990). This is an important question to ask as it enables critical engagement with the various roles attributed to women in war that extends beyond stereotypical traditional functions. It is also important to uncover the various roles that men play in war and ask the question ‘where are the men?’ (Sjoberg 2014).

The studies on the role of men in war very rarely expand past the narrow view of men as purely aggressive soldiers. These studies seldom include a critical analysis on the existing complex masculinities and expectations of men present in war. How are men represented in war? Do all men rejoice and participate in violence? Do all men choose to be combatants? How do civilian men experience war? What is missing from discussions on men and war? In order to understand and prevent the male domination over subordinate women in war, a feminist gender focus must include discussions on how both men and women are represented in war. This will assist in identifying any potential gaps in war literature and uncovering any inconsistencies which impact on our understanding on gender, sexual violence and security.

**Hegemonic Militarised Masculinity**

Feminist scholar, Raewyn Connell (1987; 1995; 2009), is credited with the conceptualisation of hegemonic masculinity. Hegemonic masculinity is understood as the structural and legitimised hierarchical gender relations between men and women, where men and masculinities exert dominance and power over subordinate women and femininities. This is in order to preserve political and social order (Messerschmidt 2012; Tickner 2001; Hearn 2004). While there is no denying that Connell’s conceptualisation of hegemonic masculinity has proved to be extremely significant in studying gender relations, some feminists like Mimi Schippers (2007) criticise this conceptualisation, arguing that Connell’s concept of hegemonic masculinity exclusively focuses on men’s ‘masculine’ dominance over ‘feminine’ women. This results in an assumption that such a relationship between men and women is not only natural but also unavoidable, thus reinforcing gender inequality and the continued victimisation of women.

Feminist scholars associate the concept of militarised masculinity in war to the hegemonic masculinity present in civilian societies (Connell 2005; Hinojosa 2010). Idealised militarised masculinities expected of soldiers are characterised by depictions of aggressiveness, bravery, courage, stoicism, phallocentricity, competitiveness, protection, precision and power over weak individuals (Hooper 2001). Men and boys must essentially learn to become masculine and violent through various methods of training, particularly a tough, challenging ‘rite of passage’ military training. The military training is a platform for men and boys to able to transform from civilians to good soldiers who are able to kill
and risk their lives for their nation (Higate 2003; Connell 1995; Miedzian 1992; Baaz and Stern 2009; Shepherd 2007; Whitworth 2004; Whitehead 1999). Those who fail in completing the strenuous military training are denied masculine status and instead become ‘feminized’ – viewed as cowardly, weak and womanly (Tickner 2001; 2014). The qualities of what makes a fitting soldier are reiterated in one of the interviews Baaz and Stern (2008) conducted with FARDC soldiers in the DRC armed forces:

When you enter the centre [for military training] you are civilian and now you must become, learn the tough [dur] spirit of a soldier. If you do not know that, some beat up [bimbo] is required. You have to be taught everything about soldiering, everything that you will encounter in war….Those who are not able to make it, we call them the inept, also sometimes women, the inept will run away….The centre is no place for compassion [mawa]. You can start maybe with 15,000 men; some will run away. They are not strong enough. Sometimes you will remain with 8,000. Those are the real/strong soldiers [soda ya makasi] (Male corporal, cited in Baaz and Stern 2008: 67).

In this way, one is not born masculine or a soldier, but rather must achieve this status by learning how to become masculine, such as ‘being tough,’ able to kill and endure beatings. Feminine qualities like ‘running away’ and ‘compassion’ are signs of weakness and associated with ‘inept/women’ (Baaz and Stern 2008; also see Elshtain 1987; Enloe 1990; Goldstein 2001). Such a mentality produces a highly masculine institution, where there is no room for women or weak individuals. According to feminist theory, masculinity is complex and societies largely favour and merit men and masculine characteristics over women and femininity, consequently causing male domination and female subordination (Tickner 2001; Connell 1987).

**Soldiers and Masculinity**

Baaz and Stern (2008) challenge stereotypical assumptions of African soldiers as radical barbaric warriors, who have an inherent desire to fight and kill, as often portrayed in Western media and academic scholarship. The appeal to join the army was not due to their desire or willingness to kill or prove their strength, but rather the desire to earn good money, to have nice things and to receive education and training. For these FARDC soldiers, their notion of masculinity and what makes a good soldier differs from traditional views. A good soldier does not necessarily have to be exhibit aggression, courage or a willingness to kill, rather discipline, dignity and respect in an individual is more favoured in forming a good soldier. The male soldiers in these interviews express their frustrations and disappointment in not receiving what they were promised: money, education and training. This highlights interesting inequalities between men and women present in the FARDC army forces where women are assigned ‘the most desirable positions’ (Baaz and Stern 2008: 71), i.e. administrative jobs and training. While men are put on the front to fight and risk their lives:
They give women all the good jobs. They are the ones who get training. They are the ones who get jobs as secretaries, who get to learn typing. If you look at the administrative jobs – it is only women! It is not fair. If they want equality, they should get equality. Then they should be at the front fighting like we do. But if you look there, there are almost no women. Very, very few (Male corporal, cited in Baaz and Stern 2008: 71-72).

Feminist research and the international community must refrain from portraying the military as an exclusively a masculine terrain, as this reinforces the misconception that the military is only a place for men and boys. Furthermore, it reproduces existing power inequalities between men and women within the military that causes frustrations, animosity and a divide between male and female soldiers, as illustrated above.

Masculinity associated with ‘favourable’ traits of strength, aggressiveness, independence and autonomy offers several contradictions. First, the fluid social construction of masculinity puts “a male in a constant state of anxiety and terror that what makes him a man can always be taken away” (Cornell 1998: 143). In this way, masculinity actually puts men and boys in a vulnerable position of losing their supposed privileged status in society if their behaviour is ever considered feminine or weak. Men essentially must not only achieve masculinity but continuously sustain it through successful ‘rite of passage’ military training, killing, committing acts of sexual violence, while at the same time providing protection and subordination of women. Second, the traits associated with masculinity – aggressiveness, stoicism, strength, and independence – offer contradictions in the military. Men often have to yield to peer pressure in order to prove their ‘manhood’ through violent acts, including ‘gang rape’ and torture. This portrays a weak and easily persuaded individual who is afraid to stand up to his peers, rather than exhibiting a strong and independent man. The third contradiction relates to the concept of ‘protection’ as soldiers are responsible for protecting their nation and ‘their’ women. This only offers a stereotypical view of women as men’s ‘property’ who are considered weak, vulnerable and in need of protection in warfare, but this ‘protection’ is also a double-edged sword. Male soldiers are often portrayed as the protectors of women (and children), however, they are also often depicted as the perpetrators of the violence committed against women. This is particularly the case with conflict-related sexual violence. How are male soldiers expected to protect and harm women at the same time?

Raewyn Connell (1992; 2005), and Michael Kimmel (2000) argue that war and the military system are the symbol of masculinity. They are depicted as exclusively a place for male comradeship and bonding, a place where boys are able to transform into men through ‘rite of passage’ military training. Men learn how to be aggressive, stoic, strong, and courageous and how to kill, only displaying masculine violent traits. Such a depiction of warfare and the military not only provides a narrow view of male soldiers as innately violent, aggressive but also leaves no room to consider women as soldiers or violent
perpetrators and men as potential victims in wartime. This is because such a representation of men and women would upset the male-female binary that war and military is structured on.

**Are all Men Violent?**

Paul Higate (2007) agrees that the military serves as the place where the most radical forms of violence are celebrated – rape, gang rape, other forms of sexual violence, torture, mass killings and the like. However, Higate argues against exclusive discussions on militarised masculinity as this produces limitations rather than explanations for predictable hegemonic masculine behaviour. There are limited discussions on men and masculinities in warfare and when they do surface, it is often restricted to militarised (hegemonic) masculinity. This leaves little room for consideration of other masculinities. Furthermore, militarised hegemonic masculinity reinforces stereotypical gendered assumption that not only are all men violent perpetrators but also that all men take pleasure in committing physical and sexual violence. Such an assumption discounts the male soldiers who are forced into military service, those who do not wish to commit any violence, those who exhibit other forms of masculinities and those who are victims of violence themselves. As Higate (2007) points out, not all military men who are ‘hypermasculine’ have been ‘involved in the exploitation of others’ (2007: 114). Higate (2007) cites the role of peacekeepers as an example of this. Another example is offered by Claire Duncanson (2013), who refers to some British soldiers in Iraq and Afghanistan that opted to treat civilians, both men and women, with mutual respect and dignity rather than violence.

The military system itself may be a violent institution; however, Napoleon Chagnon (1968; 1969), and Barbara Ehrenreich (1997) challenge contrary claims that all men and boys are inclined to fight wars. Instead the authors argue that men and boys are often forced to fight and risk their lives, coerced through humiliation, alcohol and drugs, and threats. Chagnon (1968; 1969) exposes the brutal forced recruitment of men and boys among the Yanomamo people in South America where he describes the experiences of young boys who attempted to flee during battle training, only to be brought back and forced to continue. Adult men are no exception in resisting fighting and often succumb to consuming mood-altering substances to assist them in engaging in combat. If they were to resist outright it would jeopardise their masculine status in the community. Ehrenreich (1997) affirms that men resisting combat is not restricted to a specific country or war as individual men have resisted fighting in combat throughout history through various means. This includes stimulating sickness, escaping, prison, self-mutilation and psychosis. The ethnic cleansing of former Yugoslavia is often portrayed as blood-thirsty men eagerly participating in the killing and raping of ‘the enemy.’ However, Franke Wilmer (2002) challenges such generalised assumptions by revealing that approximately 700,000 people fled to avoid conscription and over 9,000 charges of desertion were initiated in 1992 (2002: 92).
Moreover, Charli. L. Carpenter (2006) draws attention to the lack of protection available for men and boys who are forcibly recruited to fight in combat. Carpenter points to the visible gap in international law and international organisations like United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in addressing the violations of fundamental human rights against men and boys through forced recruitment, which results in their loss of freedom by the military. What these authors demonstrate is that not all men and boys are prone to violence and aggression. Many are forcibly transformed into soldiers who are ordered to commit violent acts to assert their masculinity. There is also a lack of commitment and accountability by the international community to protect these men and boys.

There is no doubt that the contribution of IR feminist theorists to the study of war has been fundamental with its central focus on gender, uncovering the various experiences of women in war. However, there still remains a significant gap in the literature regarding roles of men and women in war that go against gender norms, such as men who are resistant to violence and conflict, and women who support it. Also the impact of war on civilian men is even less explored. Megan Mackenzie (2012) is one of the few scholars who, through her study on female soldiers in Sierra Leone, draws attention to the role of women as active agents in combat zones. Mackenzie (2012) further argues that policies on peace-building and post-conflict reconstruction and DDR programmes will continue to be ineffective and remain deeply flawed, unless the experiences of female soldiers are considered. The experiences of female soldiers are important and must be taken into account in order to effectively implement policies relating to peace and security. However, it is simply not enough as other groups will continue to remain excluded. Policymakers must take into account the experiences of all soldiers and all civilians – men, women and children – in order to create effective armed conflict and post-conflict policies.

Jane Parpart and Kevin Partridge (in Evans et al 2014) argue the construction of militarised hegemonic masculinity as ‘a strongly hierarchical form of social performance’ (2014: 560), makes it impossible for men and indeed women to achieve. This causes a dysfunctional and destructive cycle of disappointment and aggression, as individuals feel they have failed as ‘men’ or ‘women’ in not being able to successfully sustain constructed ideals of who they should be and how they must act. Such a construction of gender in warfare has the following dire implications on the experiences of both women and men in conflict. First, the military and war is constructed as exclusively a hegemonic militarised masculine arena, which may result in women being discouraged to join armed forces or having their experiences minimised. Such a construction of the military and warfare views active female fighters in war as unnatural. Second, experiences of men in war that do not identify with militarised masculinity are ignored. This includes the psychological and emotional trauma from witnessing their comrades die in battle, having to kill others, being potential targets of violence themselves, including sexual violence and torture, or experiences of men who are in support of peace negotiations and reconstruction.
This section has provided various feminist critiques on the role of men and women in international relations which shows that the majority of the theoretical literature still manages to portray women as ‘feminine’ vulnerable victims in need of protection. Men are largely portrayed in their limited capacity as masculine soldiers who are perpetrators or protectors, precluding the possibility of alternative roles for them. The role of men and women in warfare is extensively studies and discussed among IR war literature. However, very few scholars go against gender norms of men and women, to examine the role of men as victims or the role of women as perpetrators or as active soldiers in warfare. This is a significant gap that requires increased critical engagement by IR feminist scholars. This is necessary in shedding outdated stereotypes that ultimately control the ‘appropriate’ behaviour of men and women that further victimises instead of empowers women and marginalises men. For the most part, the academic literature and international community neglect male victims of conflict-related sexual violence and obtain an incorrect concept of ‘gender’ as largely a synonym with ‘women.’ This hinders their ability to effectively respond to issue of conflict-related sexual violence as a threat to the maintenance of international peace and human security. In this way, they offer a narrow understanding of which groups are in need of assistance and protection during warfare and what issues are considered a threat to international peace and security.

Critical Security Studies

There have been ample competing discussions among academic scholarship on the definition of security and how we study it varying from traditional to critical approaches. Traditional Cold-War era realist-derived security is more simplistic in its approach. Realist-derived security sees the world as it is with no plans to change it. In other words, treating the prevailing social and power relationships and the institutions in which they are organised as the given frameworks for action. Security is ultimately by and for the state. There are different types of realism approaches to security ranging from “classical” and “neoclassical” to “structural” or “neorealist.” Yet, they all share in a common belief that the world order consists of self-interested states and their drive to survive and maximise power and security (Waltz 1979; Baldwin 1993; Stolberg 2012).

However, the post-Cold War era of Critical Security Studies (CSS) saw the broadening and deepening of the concept of security that goes beyond a traditional state-centric understanding of security to include more complex and different ways of thinking of security. Critical security studies theorists (notably Cox 1981) differentiate from traditional approaches with CSS falling under ‘critical theory’ which calls into question the prevailing social and power relationships and institutions. Whereas a traditional ‘realist’ security approach falls under ‘problem-solving theory’ which accepts the world it receives with no plans to change it but rather contributes to replicating what exists and making it work. A number of scholars (Booth 2005; Hentz and Boas 2003) renounce Cox’s view of traditional security...
studies as ‘problem-solving theory’ arguing that realism is actually part of the problem in world politics with its fixed categories and notions that do not work for its varied population. What does security mean? Who or what is the object of security? How can we achieve security? These questions have been at the centre of contending debates in CSS literature since its existence. Yet time and time again we come to the realisation that “there is no common understanding of what security is, how it can be conceptualised, and what its most relevant research questions are” (Haftendorn 1991: 15). Some theorists argue that the boundaries of CSS should be defined in broader and deeper terms (Krause and Williams 1997; Browning and McDonald 2011; Buzan and Hansen 2009). This would require including a range of approaches and analyses by drawing on elements of Marxism, Feminism, Critical Theory, Critical Constructivism and Post-Structuralism. We find that the answers to the questions above vary depending on which Critical Security Studies approach is applied. In its simplest form, security can be defined as the “absence of threats” (Booth 1991: 319), thus being “protected, free from danger, safety” (Der Derain 1995: 28).

Barry Buzan (1983) was among the first academics to expand the security agenda by encompassing five security ‘sectors:’ the military, political, economic, societal and ecological security sectors. Buzan acknowledged the threat of war to people but also considered other threats affecting people including famine, political oppression, poverty, global warming, pollution and the like. However, Buzan still maintained that the state was the ‘referent object’ of security concerns, as the state is the dominant actor in the international political system.

Securitization and the Copenhagen School

In later work, Barry Buzan, Ole Waever and Jaap de Wilde (1998) shifted from the state as the referent object of security studies to societal security based on identity. This led to a shift to encompass the idea of ‘securitization’ - the centre of analysis for the Copenhagen School. The Copenhagen School’s revision of critical security studies calls for the broadening of the concept of security and highlights the process of ‘securitization’ of political issues (Buzan et al 1998; Huysmans 1998; 2006). Securitization is seen as a speech act used to convince an intended audience that the state is under immediate security threat and thus required to use legitimate extraordinary measures that go beyond orthodox procedures. An example of ‘securitization’ can be found with the US and British invasion of Iraq in 2003. The Iraq war was strongly opposed around the world including by US-allies, yet the Bush administration justifying the war by stating that the coalition mission was to:

Disarm Iraq of weapons of mass destruction, to end Saddam Hussein's support for terrorism, and to free the Iraqi people…… The people of the United States and our friends and allies will not live at the mercy of an outlaw regime that threatens the peace with weapons of mass murder (President Bush 2003).
However, no weapons of mass destruction were found during the war in Iraq; instead the war resulted in the mass destruction of thousands of Iraqi civilians who were innocently killed during the invasion. Many civilians lost their lives, yet were of no threat to the people of America or their friends and allies. This illustrates how securitization can be used to further the interests of the state by appealing to the right audience, which can have dangerous and catastrophic consequences.

The concept of securitization has been applied to a diverse range of issues including: disease (Elbe 2003; 2006; Enemark 2009), the environment (Floyd 2010) and asylum/immigration issues (Buonfino 2004; Ceyhan and Tsoukala 2002; McMaster 2002). A good illustration of the negative and positive effects of securitization can be found in Stefan Elbe (2006)’s example of the securitization of HIV/AIDS epidemic. In some contexts, the HIV/AIDS epidemic produced problematic policies that treated those infected with the virus as potential threats to national security to be barred. However, in other ways it actually encouraged states to focus more resources in tackling the virus. This may not have been the case if HIV/AIDS was treated like just another public health issue.

The same argument could be used for sexual violence in conflict. For years this issue has been ignored by the international community and academic scholars, deeming it an inevitable component of war not worthy of further attention. However, due to the international outrage of the systemic mass rape of hundreds of thousands of women and girls during conflicts in the 1990s (i.e. Rwanda, former Yugoslavia and the DRC), the issue has attracted considerable attention in recent years. The issue of sexual violence in conflict is now considered a ‘weapon of war’ and a significant threat to international peace and security by the UN and the rest of the international community. The positive effect of the increased attention on the issue is the considerable resources, commitment and global attention now assigned to tackling the sexual violence epidemic in wartime. Conversely, the negative effect has been that sexual violence in conflict is often portrayed as exclusively a women’s issue, which further victimises women and removes their agency in political life. It also results in the neglect of male victims of conflict-related sexual violence, instead largely portraying men-as-perpetrators. This reproduces dangerous gendered norms of women as the weak, inevitable victims in need of protection during conflict and men as the violent and aggressive ‘other.’

These types of issues have highlighted the broadening of security to include non-traditional threats. Yet the Copenhagen School - securitization approach has attracted various criticisms within CSS field. Some CSS scholars argue this approach is still associated with the mechanisms of the state rather than freedom of individuals, thus mirroring the realist traditional approaches to security (Booth 2005; Wyn Jones 1999; McSweeney. 1999). Lene Hansen (2000) also criticises the securitization approach for its exclusion of gender-based security.
Ken Booth (2005), Richard Wyn Jones (1999) and Bill McSweeney (1999) criticise the Copenhagen School as being too state-centric in its approach. Instead they argue that the individual must be the focus of analysis of security studies, seeing as military, environmental, economic, societal and political threats ultimately affect people first and foremost (in Peoples and Vaughan-Williams 2010: 23). Booth (2005) further criticises other approaches to CCS such as postmodernism/post structuralism as being too characterised by relativism and forged radicalism; feminism as too broad and constructivism in falling short of providing a politically relevant ontology. Booth argues that such approaches fail in providing a persuasive theory of security. However, Booth’s argument is flawed as several of contributing authors to Booth’s work have relied on those exact approaches which he discards to make convincing arguments in their approaches to the field. Booth offers a contradiction because on the one hand he argues that critical security theory, unlike traditional approaches to security, is not bound by one unified scholarship; rather it includes a diverse body of scholarship. On the other hand, he encourages us to dismiss critical rival approaches as he did, instead of using them to develop political agendas.

**Emancipation**

Booth (1991; 2005) argues that human emancipation, which derives from the ‘Welsh School’ of CSS, is the ultimate goal of security. It is essentially the freeing of people from all forms of threats and constraints, including warfare, poverty and education, which stops them from doing what they want to do. Therefore, if we achieve emancipation then we ultimately achieve security (Bilgin 1999; Booth 2005; 2007; Jones 1999). In this sense, it is emancipation not power or order which produces true security, which is the security, protection and maintenance of the individual person not the state (Booth 2005; Fierke 2007; Baylis and Smith 2005).

However, some scholars have criticised the concept of emancipation within CSS for its universalism in assuming all people are the same in their desire of ‘freedom,’ whatever that may be (McDonald 2008). While others (Tarry 1999) argue that it does not provide a methodologically sound definition of security, by failing to provide a clear understanding of which cases are excluded and which are included as a security concern. Instead it provides a definition of emancipation that is far too ambiguous to be taken seriously as an approach in achieving security. Emancipation fails to recognise that security does different things at different times in different places (Browning and McDonald 2011; Ciuta 2009; Burke 2007). Furthermore, emancipation appears somewhat idealistic in its approach as the ‘ultimate’ goal of emancipation hardly appears achievable. Although the founding theorists of emancipation disregard the relationship between emancipation and gender, feminist scholars (Detraz 2012; Sjoberg 2011; Shepherd 2010; 2009) highlight how feminist interpretations of central issue and concepts within security studies intersect with the goals of emancipation. Emancipation locates
insecurity and security at an individual level, and insecurity can arise from various sources within society through an individual’s class, race or gender (Sjoberg 2011). The goal of emancipation as achieving security for all is ambiguous as it does not provide us with an understanding of what ‘security’ and ‘threats’ it is referring to. There are various forms of threats including wartime sexual violence that go beyond the idea of just being free and more about political security and personal safety.

**Human Security**

The emergence of ‘Human Security’ occurred at the end of the Cold War due to the devastating effects of war and conflict on civilian population. This included a large degree of civilian causalities and displacement, ethnic cleansing, genocide, and instances of mass rape and other forms sexual violence (MacFarlane and Khong 2006). For this reason human security focuses on the individual as the referent object of security in an attempt to draw attention to new threats that go beyond the state (Hampson 2001; Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy 2006; Newman 2010). This was due to failure of states in protecting the civilian population especially in times of conflict; with insecurity affecting individuals more so than states. The protection of civilians during armed conflict became one issue of human security agenda that includes disarmament, reconstruction and demobilisation efforts. The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) 1994 Human Development Report characterises human security as “a child who did not die, a disease that did not spread, a job that was not cut, an ethnic tension that did not explode in violence, a dissident who was not silenced” (1994: 22-23). In this way UNDP broadens and deepens the conceptualisation of security by moving away from a state-centric approach to a more individual focus found in seven key areas: economic security, food security, health security, environmental security, personal security, community security and political security (1994: 24-25). Such an expansion of human security led to the merging of security and development (Thomas 1987) as they work together to remove immediate security threats (conflict, war) and societal developmental threats (poverty, pollution, diseases). Two major components of the human security approach are freedom from fear and freedom from want. Freedom of fear is an attempt to narrow the focus of human security to protection of individuals from armed conflict, including related threats such as poverty and state insecurity (Mack 2004). Conversely, freedom from want seeks to broaden the concept to include hunger, disease and natural disasters; thus expanding beyond the threat of violence. Human Security is ultimately the protection and empowerment of civilian population from potential threats, including pollution, political violence, political oppression, life-threatening infectious diseases and famine.

The greatest degree of criticism is found in the concept of human security being too broad to define, as it appears to include everything that could be considered a threat to a human’s safety. This makes it meaningless to policymakers (Buzan 2004; MacFarlane and Fong Khong 2006; Alkine 2004; Paris
2001; Krause 2004). Some CSS scholars are resistant to include the human security approach within the discipline of CSS because its focus on the protection of the individual may be used by states to justify even more control over societies (Shani 2007; Newman 2010).

**Feminist Critical Security Studies**

Further criticism of the concept of human security is found among feminist IR scholars, who criticise its failure to take into account gender and gender-based inequalities, despite the basic source of insecurity - violence against bodies, such as wartime rape being thoroughly gendered. Feminists security scholars (Detraz 2012; Cohn 2013; Enloe 1989; Sjoberg 2013) argue that the ‘human’ in human security is thoroughly gendered because of their gendered identity that allows society to identify them as either ‘masculine’ (male) or ‘feminine’ (female), despite whether they identify themselves within these realms. Human security is essentially about the protection and empowerment of the individual from vulnerabilities deemed as potential threats. Such vulnerabilities depend on a person’s gendered identity and often the focus is on vulnerabilities experienced from being female such as conflict-related sexual violence. This has implications for the male subject, particularly as victims of wartime sexual violence because their ‘masculine’ identity does not allow them to be viewed as victims, so their gender identity becomes a source of insecurity (Detraz 2012). In this way, gendered identity is significant in examining and understanding the sources of the various vulnerabilities and insecurities we may face, which are often neglected by human security discourses. It is often neglected due to the treatment of ‘human’ in human security as a universal notion of people. Human security discourses treat people as all the same, disregarding that people experience security and insecurities in various forms depending on race, class, ethnicity, and the like (Kent 2006; Detraz 2012).

A report by the International Committee on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) outlines the human security framework of ‘Responsibility to Protect’ (R2P) (ICISS 2001). The R2P is used as a justification for military intervention by states who now have a responsibly to protect their civilian population and also civilians in other states. The US-led invasion of Afghanistan in 2001 is a common citation of the R2P framework in which US forces legitimised the invasion by appealing to the protection of Afghani women so as to gain sympathy and approval.

Feminist Critical Security Studies scholars criticise the R2P strategy as it reproduces essentialised gendered narratives of feminised women in need of protection by ‘masculine’ male-dominated multiple actors in the international community (Detraz 2012; Cockburn 2010; Tickner 2001; 2011; Shepherd 2009; 2012;2013). Human security asserts that the protection and empowerment of civilians, particularly women and children during armed conflict, is essential for the achievement of human security. Yet how are women meant to be empowered if they are continuously associated with children and portrayed as vulnerable victims in need of protection?
There are various feminist approaches to studying security studies such as the Liberal Feminists (Enloe 1989; 2000) who seek to make women more visible in the security sector but criticised for treating gender as ‘fixed’ rather than a fluid and changing social construction. Therefore, they are perceived to have failed in challenging the Realist frameworks of the state as the dominant and masculine actor of the realm of international security. The Standpoint Feminists (Tickner 1992) who regard gender as a social construction but through discussions on ‘gender differences’ still manage to treat it as ‘fixed’ due to the biological sex differences that inevitably separate men and women. Poststructuralist Feminists (Shepherd 2008; Peterson 1992; Butler 1990) view both gender and sex as social constructions in which there is no universal single category of ‘woman’ or ‘man.’ Instead they are gendered subjects which are able to produce and reproduce due their performative nature across time, space, race, culture and class. Poststructuralist feminism has been criticised for supposedly abandoning the female subject, but examining both male and female subjects within discourses of gender, (sexual) violence and security; actually empowers women by putting them on the same platform as men and rejecting strict male-female binaries. It provides a voice to those who are marginalised due to misconceptions on gender and power relations. This will also assist in addressing the issue of sexual violence in its entirety so that we are able to understand why it occurs, and assist policymakers in creating and implementing effective policies on sexual violence, peace and security. It can assist in discovering better preventive mechanisms and more successful peace-building and reconstruction efforts. All of which ultimately contribute to the maintenance of international peace and human security.

Chapter Three: Sexual Violence Literature Review

War is often characterised by extreme aggression and violence; in essence violence is the symbol of warfare. Nations engage in warfare and armed conflict to cause mass violence including an accumulation of killings, torture and sexual violence. Historically, research on violence during conflict, particularly sexual violence, was largely gender-blind, with even the experiences of women ignored altogether (Moser and Clark 2001: 3). Currently it appears to be gender-specific, with the focus largely on women as victims of wartime sexual violence and as peacekeepers; consequently ignoring the experiences of men, except as protectors or perpetrators (Moser and Clark 2001: 3).

The poststructuralist feminist theoretical approach is sceptical of the male-female binary, however, it also demonstrates how the current conceptualisation of ‘gender’ and human security essentially reproduces sexual violence against certain bodies (female) and marginalises others (male). This section will provide an overview of the academic literature on sexual violence in conflict, drawing attention to the various competing explanations as to why it occurs. The focus of critical engagement will be on the feminist treatment of wartime sexual violence; in other words, how the existing feminist academic
scholarship talks about sexual violence in conflict and the consequences of doing so. What is missing? To what extent is conflict-related sexual violence constructed as exclusively targeting women and girls? Could sexual violence during conflict also affect males as victims, not just as perpetrators?

Defining Sexual Violence in Conflict

Sexual violence during conflict is defined by the International Criminal Court as rape, sexual slavery, forced prostitution, forced pregnancy and forced sterilisation (ICC 2000) and also sexual mutilation and sexual torture (Wood 2009; also Wood 2015). For the purpose of this research project, sexual violence in conflict, wartime sexual violence, conflict-related sexual violence and rape, will all be used interchangeably.

Explanations for Sexual Violence in Conflict

Throughout history sexual violence in wartime was considered an inevitable by-product of war (Card 1996; Vikman 2005). This was linked to men’s need for sexual gratification to satisfy their biologically “natural” sex drive and hence victorious soldiers were rewarded with the fallen enemy’s women as “war booty” (Baaz and Stern 2009: 498). Claudia Card (1996) viewed rape in wartime as serving a triple purpose in that it represents the “spoils” of war and serves as a symbolic message of domination as an assertion of masculinity not only to women but also to those men who have been conquered. However, due to a strong feminist movement and feminist theorists in the 1990s, following the mass rape of hundreds of thousands of civilians during conflicts in Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia, there was increased attention on the issue by the international community. Sexual violence in conflict was no longer considered an inevitable by-product of warfare but instead reconceptualised as a ‘weapon of war’ and pushed into the public sphere by feminist scholars (Card 1996; Kirby 2012; Skjelsbaek 2001; Enloe 1996; Bourke 2014; Franco 2007; Harrington 2010; Tickner 1992; 2001). In this way, wartime sexual violence became politicised and viewed as a serious threat to the maintenance of peace and security by the international community, particularly the United Nations. While wartime sexual violence as a ‘weapon of war’ is the most common explanation, it is not the only explanation. As such this discussion will focus on explanations of ‘weapon of war’; biological/sexual urges and the ‘craziness of war’ in an attempt to understand why sexual violence in conflict occurs.

Weapon of War

Sexual violence in conflict as a ‘weapon of war’ differs from other types of sexual assaults because rather than being driven to rape by ‘biological’ sexual urges, army forces are urged to commit systematic mass rape in order to achieve political or military objectives (UN 2015; also see Pankhurst, in Shepherd 2015). Rape as a weapon or tactic of war is used to intimidate, humiliate, oppress and
displace specific group of people’s lives, families and communities (Alexander and Hawkesworth 2008; Kirby 2012; Skjelsbaek 2001; Enloe 1996; Harrington 2010; Branche and Virgili 2012). It is considered “as a particularly effective means to humiliate (feminise) enemy men by sullying “his” women/nation/homeland and proving him to be an inadequate protector” (Stern and Baaz 2009: 500; also Enloe 2000; Goldstein 2001; Stern and Nystrand 2006; Yuval-Davis 1997).

Indeed, the empirical data in historical conflicts of Rwanda and Bosnia and modern day conflicts in places like DRC, Sri Lanka, Liberia and Central African Republic, support the claim of wartime sexual violence as a weapon of war. For example, during the Rwandan genocide in 1994 up to half a million mainly Tutsi women were targeted and raped, sexually mutilated, killed by Hutu soldiers, as instructed by their Hutu leaders with the intent to destroy the Tutsi ethnic group (Mukamana and Brysiewkz 2008; Nowrojee 1996). The Bosnian war in 1992 resulted in between 12,000 and 50,000 majority Bosnian Muslim women and girls repeatedly raped and sexually abused (Wood 2013). The Bosnian Serbs set up “rape camps” where the women and girls were forcibly impregnated as part of an “ethnic cleansing” campaign to change the ethnic make-up of the next generation (Wood 2013; Crowe 2013; Cockburn 2004).

The systemic and extreme brutality of the sexual violence committed show that it is not due to ‘sexual urges’ but more so to humiliate the enemy. For example, during an interview with Stephanie Nolen in her 2005 article ‘Not Women Anymore…’ Dr Denis Mukwege, one of two doctors in the eastern Congo who performed reconstructive vaginal surgeries, highlighted the brutality surrounding the rapes many women endured:

They rape a woman, five or six of them at a time — but that is not enough. Then they shoot a gun into her vagina, says Dr. Mukwege. In all my years here, I never saw anything like it. … [T]o see so many raped, that shocks me, but what shocks me more is the way they are raped (Emphasis added, Nolen 2005).

Indeed it was not only women and girls that were targeted in such a way during conflict, with Sandesh Sivakumaran (2007) providing empirical evidence of brutal acts of sexual violence committed against male victims during conflicts in Sri Lanka. Sivakumaran (2007) details how male victims experienced “sticks pushed through the anus, usually with chillies rubbed on the stick first, also made to masturbate soldiers orally” (2007: 263). The male victims were also “forced with…friends to rape each other in front of soldiers for their ‘entertainment’ while others were themselves raped by soldiers” (2007: 264).

Cynthia Enloe (2000) identifies “systematic mass rape” as one of the three main types of military rape, along with “recreational rape” and “national security rape” (2000: 111-132). Donna Pankhurst (cited in Shepherd 2015: 163-167) also outlines rape as a weapon of war as one of five possible explanations of
sexual violence in warfare, in addition to sexual violence as a reward for troops; the result of a breakdown in social constraints; consequences of root cause frustration-aggression and male trauma. Feminists further argue that such acts of sexual violence during conflict are considered a ‘weapon of war’, due to their intention of terrorizing the population, breaking up families, and destroying communities and men’s pride in failing to protect “their women” or themselves (Pankhurst 2015; Card 1996; Enloe 2000; Tickner 1997). This portrayal of sexual violence as a ‘weapon of war’ precisely because it is used as a way to humiliate communities, families and men’s pride in failing to protect ‘their’ women is problematic. This is because it reproduces essentialist views of women as the inevitable victims in need of protection and as men’s property and cultural bearers of society. In this way, the rape of women is essentially the rape of the nation thus further victimizing women and neglecting male victims of wartime sexual violence.

In some instances, wartime sexual violence is used to deliberately infect victims with HIV/AIDS or render women from the targeted community incapable of bearing children. The infection of victims with HIV/AIDS in times of conflict has become such a prevailing issue. This is echoed during a BBC interview with one doctor in Congo in which he states of all the women he treated “between May and October 2003, 24 per cent were HIV positive” (Martens 2004). Furthermore, the UN Security Council 1325 provides a specific clause concerning the increased risk of HIV/AIDS infection among women and girls in areas of military conflict:

> The Secretary-General to provide to Member States training guidelines and materials on the protection, rights and the particular needs of women, as well as on the importance of involving women in all peacekeeping and peace-building measures, invites Member States to incorporate these elements as well as HIV/AIDS awareness training into their national training programmes for military and civilian police personnel in preparation for deployment and further requests the Secretary-General to ensure that civilian personnel of peacekeeping operations receive similar training (2000: Article 6).

Despite some feminist scholarship portraying the deliberate infection of victims with HIV/AIDS as something that happens to the female body, this is not the case as both female and male bodies are infected during armed conflict. For example, in Kosovo, in an interview with the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), one interviewee reported that “he saw two male detainees being raped by two policemen who declared that they had AIDS” (Sivakumaran 2007: 264). Yet, national training programmes, protection, international policies and health services appear only to meet the needs of women and girls, while male victims remain a marginal concern.

The most common form of sexual violence as a ‘weapon of war’ is the use of systematic mass rape. International human rights organisations such as Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch and
various UN agencies, as well as, journalists, document numerous campaigns on the issue of systematic mass rape during armed conflict. The UN agencies estimate during conflicts in Rwanda between 100,000 and 250,000 women were systematically raped during three months genocide in 1994, more than 60,000 during the civil war in Sierra Leone, more than 60,000 in the former Yugoslavia between 1991 and 2002 and at least 200,000 in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) conflict zones since 1998.

Cynthia Enloe (2000) refers to the conclusions of Doctors without Frontiers in her discussion of occurrences of mass rape during the Rwandan conflict, maintaining that “every adult woman and every adolescent girl spared a massacre by militias was then raped” (2000: 132). Similarly, in her discussion on rape as a weapon of ethnic cleansing, Enloe (2000) refers to the approximately 20,000 Bosnian Muslim women and girls raped by Bosnian Serb as reported by the European Union. She discusses how women have been raped in the presence of others as a means to terrorise populations and force civilians from their villages. Rape is used as a weapon of war here as a violent tactic to not only cause significant harm onto the victims, but to instil fear into communities (Enloe 2000: 140). Michele Lent Hirsch (2012) and David M. Crowe (2013) discuss the creation of “rape camps” during the Bosnian conflict, where Bosnian Muslim women and girls who were not killed were kept there and subjected to torture, rape and forceful impregnation. Similarly, Sara Lulo notes that reports of mass rape during current and recent conflict – including in the Democratic Republic of Congo, the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda – “underscore the widespread and insidious nature of conflict-related crimes against women and girls around the world” (cited in Grey and Shepherd 2012: 119). This presents a gendered understanding of sexual violence in conflict as a women’s issue; the female body is constituted in and through this violence. As such women and girls are portrayed as the inevitable victims, while men and boys are the perpetrators, which is a common representation found in wartime sexual violence literature.

Adam Jones (2001) criticises Enloe’s representation of the violence that occurred during the Rwandan and Bosnian conflicts. The criticism is due to Enloe’s analysis as exclusively one-sided, with no mention of the mass slaughter of men and boys in both conflicts. Jones also criticises Enloe’s failure in mentioning the mass killing of more than 7000 men and boys at Srebrenica in 1995, described as the worst mass slaughter in Europe since WWII. Jones argues that such a complete lack of interest in the male subject not only views women and girls as the inevitable victims and men as the perpetrators, but precludes the notion of female aggressors and male victims.

Male victims are not only targets of mass slaughter as a weapon of war during conflict, but also of sexual violence. The Journal of American Medical Association in 2010 revealed that 22 per cent of men from eastern part of the DRC experienced conflict-related sexual violence. Lara Stemple (2009)
also reported that 76 per cent of male political prisoners of war during the 1980s civil war in El Salvador and 80 per cent of concentration camp inmates in Sarajevo reported being sexually abused, humiliated and raped. The Refugee Law Project (2014) reported that between 1998 and 2008, sexual violence against men was reported in 25 countries affected by conflict. More accounts have since emerged in places like Libya, Central African Republic, Iraq, Iran and Syria. Other conflicts where sexual violence is used as a weapon of war against both men and women include Sudan, Uganda, Central African Republic and Liberia, and the act of ethnic cleansing and genocide to forcefully remove targeted population appear to be on the rise.

Despite this evidence, in 1994 the UN Security Council failed to recognise male victims and passed a resolution which “strongly condemns the abhorrent practice of rape and abuse of women and children in the areas of armed conflict in the former Yugoslavia, which constitutes a war crime” (UNSCR 77 1994). Furthermore, in 2008, the UN Security Council also passed Resolution 1820 recognizing the use of sexual violence as a systematic weapon of war:

Noting that civilians account for the vast majority of those adversely affected by armed conflict; that women and girls are particularly targeted by the use of sexual violence, including as a tactic of war to humiliate, dominate, instill fear in, disperse and/or forcibly relocate civilian members of a community or ethnic group (2008: Preamble).

Despite evidence of conflict-related sexual violence against men, the UN Security Council’s policy response to the systematic use of mass rape during conflict appears to be exclusively focused on women and children as victims. Where are the men?

While ‘weapon of war’ is the most common framework used to explain the occurrence of sexual violence during conflict, not all feminists agree with defining sexual violence in conflict solely as a weapon of war. Maria Eriksson Baaz and Maria Stern (2015) criticise the use of the phrase ‘weapon of war’ to explain away the occurrence of wartime rape. They argue that it fails to provide an adequate explanation as to how or why conflict-related sexual violence is considered ‘strategic’ and how it manages to “humiliate and demoralize individuals” (cited in Evans et al 2014: 592). Baaz and Stern further argue that such a simplistic generalisation reduces the understanding of sexual violence by assuming all conflicts are the same, thus concealing other varied and complex explanations. In other work, Baaz and Stern (2010), use the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) as a case study to argue that in many cases, the instances of rape and sexual violence during conflict are often a combination of features. This includes a dysfunctional military system which lacks loyalty and structure; a weak justice; a penal system with no accountability for perpetrators, and a mutual disrespect and distrust between army personnel and civilians. Focusing on ‘weapon of war’ as the only explanation of sexual violence in conflict offers a limited understanding of a much more complex issue, which shields
dysfunctional military institutions and systematic failures, instead of improving them in order to prevent the occurrence of conflict-related sexual violence.

Furthermore, Baaz and Stern (2010) assert that focusing solely on sexual violence dangerously results in inadequate attention and resources offered to other forms of violence. This includes torture, executions, arbitrary arrest, forced labour, lack of property rights and domestic abuse. When feminist scholars and international community discuss sexual violence in conflict as a ‘weapon of war,’ this often results in a neglect of male victims of sexual violence in their discussions. By not recognizing the rights and needs of male victims of sexual violence, the existing power inequalities between men and women are further reproduced. This is further harmful to women because phrases such as ‘shame’ ‘weak’ and victimisation are exclusively associated with women. The support and rehabilitation services available for male victims of wartime sexual violence are largely non-existent, resulting in a lack of physical and psychological support for these men and boys. This produces a cycle of violence where male victims ‘lash out’ by committing violent acts themselves as a way to cope.

One of the biggest flaws of the ‘weapon of war’ theory is that it assumes that sexual violence only occurs during times of conflict. The Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, William Hague, states at the *UK Global Summit to End Sexual Violence in Conflict* in June 2013 that “rape is used to tear apart lives and achieve military objectives…in just the same way that tanks and bullets are” (cited in Pablo K 2013). Many contributors to the debate on the Summit mirror this line of thinking, so much so, that the Rwandan representative came up with the simplest solution to end conflict-related sexual violence: end conflicts themselves since they appear to be the cause (UK Global Summit 2013). This representation of sexual violence is problematic for two reasons. First, it fails to consider the occurrence of sexual violence during post-conflict situations. Second, it does not bear in mind the concerning changing role of UN peacekeepers. Traditionally the role of UN peacekeepers is in supporting the maintenance of peace, security and protection of civilians during post-conflict reconstruction. However, recent reports shed light of a more sinister side, with some peacekeepers committing sexual violence against civilians.

There has been increased attention drawn on the issue of UN peacekeepers committing sexual violence against civilians. For example, during a UN peacekeeping mission in Haiti in 2011, a disturbing video surfaced of five Uruguayan peacekeepers raping a Haitian teenager. This is not an isolated occurrence, with the UN Secretary-General, Ban Ki-Moon, reporting 79 allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse by UN peacekeepers in 2014 (UN 2014). This issue has not escaped the attention of academic scholars such as Sandra Whitworth (2004); Paul Kirby (2011); and Dyan Mazurana et al. (2005), who have written about the linkage between UN peacekeeping and sexual violence. There is clear empirical evidence to suggest that warfare sexual violence can be explained as a ‘weapon of war,’ and as such a
threat to international peace and security. However, it cannot account for all instances of conflict-related sexual violence. While sexual violence in conflict is no longer considered a by-product of war and rightly so, some feminist scholars argue that in different contexts of war its occurrence can still be attributed to a male soldier’s ‘natural’ need for sexual gratification.

**Biological/Heterosexual Urges**

Cynthia Enloe identifies three types of military rape: ‘national security rape’ as a systematic use of humiliation to punish those that are viewed as a risk to national security (2000: 123); ‘systematic mass rape’ which is used to oppress specific groups (2000: 132), and ‘recreational rape’ which she associates with the lack of access to militarised prostitution offered to male soldiers (2000: 111).

Baaz and Stern (2009) study on the occurrences of sexual violence in DRC conflict zones appears to largely reflect Enloe’s ‘recreational rape.’ This is because it is linked to the belief in men’s heterosexual biological need for sexual gratification (Higate 2004; Witworth 2004; Seifert 1996). In this way, wartime sexual violence is a result of men’s biological heterosexual sexual needs (Paglia 1992; Thornhill and Palmer 2000; Palmer 1991), which in times of war are often fulfilled by taking a woman by force, due to absence of social constraints and lack of ‘normal’ access to women (Woods 2009; Baaz and Stern 2009; Enloe 2000).

Baaz and Stern (2009) provide significant insight into the mind-set of the DRC soldiers on the reasons why they rape, which challenges stereotypical notions of masculinity and what it means to be a ‘good soldier’. During an interview conducted by the authors, the soldiers explain their views on rape and the reasons why soldiers may commit such acts by differentiating between “lust rapes” and “evil rapes:”

There is the rape when a soldier is away, when he has not seen his women for a while and has needs and no money (lust/need rape). But there are also the bad rapes, as a result of the spirit of war […] to humiliate the dignity of people. This is an evil rape (Male Lt, cited in Baaz and Stern 2009: 495).

The majority of responses from the soldiers during the interview largely attest to the fact that the occurrence of rape and sexual violence in this context is largely seen as ‘lust rapes.’ This further stems from a frustrated sexual desire linked with poverty, a dysfunctional military institution, harsh living conditions and lack of punishment for perpetrators. Soldiers in the DRC are often denied sex, either due to the inability to pay for it or suffering rejection from their wives due to their failure in providing for their family and attaining the idealised militarised masculinity. This causes soldiers to take women by force in order to satisfy their heterosexual ‘natural’ needs, as the military institution barely pays wages to its soldiers, and rarely grants regular leave for them to be able to go home to their wives. This in turn causes a great deal of frustration, anger and disloyalty among the armed forces.
Stern and Baaz (2009; 2008) offer a significant piece of insight into the minds of soldiers who rape in the DRC and the reasons behind it that challenge the view of conflict-related sexual violence as exclusively a ‘weapon of war.’ In short, male soldiers have natural ‘heterosexual’ sexual urges and because they do not have regular access to women during warfare, they must resort to committing rape to achieve sexual gratification. This is a common explanation found among academic scholarship as to why sexual violence occurs during conflict. If this is the explanation to be used when attempting to understand the occurrence of conflict-related sexual violence, then the solution is simple. To prevent its occurrence, the soldiers must be paid better wages, permitted more leave so that they are able to return home to their wives and allow them increased access to militarised prostitution.

Yet, not all conflicts are the same with many soldiers who have ‘normal’ access to women such as prostitutes and those who are granted extended leave, still managing to commit rape and other sexual assaults. This explanation has significant flaws as it not only raises concerns in normalizing rape in times of war but just like ‘weapon of war’ theory, this too offers an overly simplistic understanding of the occurrence of sexual violence in conflict, with the belief that if soldiers had money and ‘regular’ access to women, they would not rape. The belief that wartime sexual violence is linked to men’s heterosexual biological sexual needs not only excuses men’s violent behaviour and depoliticises rape but also portrays men and women in essentialist and deterministic ways (Bourke 2014; Gottschall 2004; Connell 2009; 1995; 1987; Enloe 2000; Pankhurst 2015).

Men are portrayed as the inevitable violent perpetrators of wartime sexual violence, while women are recognised exclusively as victims or prostitutes, completely discounting female soldiers who actively partake in some of these sexual attacks and male-on-male rape. Further criticism of the ‘sexual urge’ theory is due to lack of empirical evidence to show that soldiers who have more access to women through leave approval or prostitution, are less likely to engage in sexual violence (Wood 2010; Morris 1996). Furthermore, the explanation of sexual violence in conflict as a result of men’s ‘natural’ biological sexual urges and their failure in maintaining impossible masculinities, still constructs wartime sexual violence as an inevitable by-product of war. It also often goes hand in hand with the fact that conflict brings chaos and turmoil which results in the breakdown of social constraints. In such circumstances the occurrence of sexual violence is not only more likely but unavoidable.

**Craziness of War**

The absence of social constraints and social order during warfare combined with men’s ‘natural’ and uncontrollable biological sexual urges, is another theory presented in explaining the occurrence of sexual violence in conflict (Pankurst, cited in Shepherd 2015; Baaz and Stern 2008; 2009; Goldstein 2001). Many soldiers suffer psychological trauma from the “craziness of war” (Baaz and Stern 2008: 78), and the lack of support, order and discipline present during conflict situations, causes many to
resort to consuming mood-altering substances like alcohol and drugs in order to cope. This consequently also results in soldiers lashing out against civilians by committing violent acts, including rape and sexual violence. Some scholars argue that this is due to the male’s ‘natural’ biological instincts to seek sexual gratification through acts of violence against women, particularly with the knowledge that they will escape punishment (Cowenburn 2005; Goldstein 2001).

However, Donna Pankhurst (2015) criticises such an explanation, as it mirrors Susan Brownmiller (1975) in her outdated feminist notion that “all men are potential rapists” (Pankhurst, cited in Shepherd 2015: 164). This explanation is flawed as it assumes that all men think and behave in the same manner, and all rejoice in their hatred and violence towards women. The ‘craziness of war’ theory is built on the fact that war itself is structured around violence, so more violent acts are expected and in some ways even encouraged rather than forbidden. This results in an inevitable continuation of a cycle of violence committed by soldiers. The soldiers become desensitised and removed from the violence they witness and actively engage in on a daily basis during conflict and as such begin to regard it as normal behaviour.

This theory is important in drawing attention to the impact of war on army forces including the psychological and emotional trauma, and in offering a possible explanation as to why violence against civilians may occur that is not necessarily within the paradigm of conflict. However, some scholars (Baaz and Stern 2015; Wood 2009; 2010) argue that the ‘craziness of war’ theory falls short in providing an understanding as to why sexual violence specifically occurs in warfare, rather than general violence. In addition, it does not provide solutions in ending such violence during conflict, instead enlist the belief that violence – in all its forms - is as an inevitable by-product of warfare.

Furthermore, some feminist scholars argue that sexual violence occurs during armed conflict due to the social construction of gender inequalities where men are able to maintain power and dominance over women (Stark 2011; Melander 2005; McLeod 2012; Caprioli 2000; Colombini 2002). This consequently results in sexual violence (Kimmel 2005; 2000; Hynes et al 2004). This is also considered a form of male comradeship, loyalty and bonding in which desirable masculine traits are achieved and demonstrated through acts of violence and aggression, particularly gang rape (Hudson et al 2009; Cohen 2013; Goldstein 2001; Card 1996). In interviews conducted by Dara Kay Cohen (2013) with ex-combatants from Sierra Leone, the idea that rape serves as a bonding purpose is supported in this context, with many fighters reporting a feeling of belonging. One male fighter stated when asked what group activities they did together: “The group rape of women….Afterward, we would feel good and talk about it a lot, discuss it among ourselves, and laugh about it” (Cohen 2013: 404-405). However, it is important to note that this is only specific to the Sierra Leone context, as not all conflicts support the idea of rape as bonding exercise. For example, the DRC soldiers interviewed by Baaz and Stern (2009)
strongly condemned rape viewing it as extremely immoral, stating that even when they must commit ‘lust’ or ‘evil’ rapes; they do not get enjoyment or feeling of belonging out of it.

Erik Melander (2005) further argues that if women are awarded more opportunities to participate in political life as active agents, this would lead to greater gender equality, higher social status and more economic independence. Melander acknowledges the fact that it may not prevent sexual violence in conflict altogether, but it would undoubtedly assist in more effective policies and systems in place and less instances of sexual violence in armed conflict and post-conflict situations. However, Elaine Zukerman and Marcia Greenberg (2005) point out that the increased participation of women in formal political processes does not necessarily equate to less instances of sexual violence as was the case of the election of Rwanda in 2003. Even though the women constituted 49 per cent of parliamentary seats, the statistics do not exhibit a decrease in the occurrence of sexual violence due to a lack of resources and strain between men and women (Shepherd 2008: 117).

There are various feminist explanations as to why sexual violence occurs in times of war and conflict, with each one encompassing both strengths and weaknesses. It is impossible to pinpoint one explanation in an attempt to understand the prevalence of sexual violence during conflict, simply because conflicts differ. The sexual violence during the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda are often described as a ‘weapon of war’ due to the prevalent systematic mass rape and ethnic cleansing of specific groups. Whereas sexual violence in DRC conflict zones are seemingly due to a combination of features. This includes: a dysfunctional military structure, poverty, male biological heterosexual urges, the ‘craziness of war,’ and the lack of social order and accountability for perpetrators. However, while there are various explanations for the occurrence of sexual violence during conflict, the commonality seems to be the tendency to view women and children as disproportionately affected by violence during warfare (Cockburn 2007; 2010; 2013; Giles and Hyndman 2004; Enloe 2000). Men are largely excluded.

**Consequences**

The construction of gender and explanations in understanding sexual violence in wartime often suggest that women (and children) are the victims, with men appearing as the perpetrators. The impact of the representation of women as the inevitable victims and the consequences of the wartime sexual violence they endure has been discussed not only in this research project, but also in existing related feminist literature. This includes the removal of women’s agency and the psychological, emotional, physical and economic trauma they suffer. Yet, the impact and consequences that such a limited construction of gender and wartime sexual violence may have on men, is much less explored.
Neglect of Male Victims

The construction of gender and explanations provided for understanding the occurrence of sexual violence during armed conflict largely focuses on women (and children) as victims that are in need of protection. This results in the marginalisation of male victims of conflict-related violence, particularly sexual violence.

Physical Violence against Men

The claim that women (and children) are disproportionately affected by and are most vulnerable to violence during warfare, therefore requiring ‘special protection,’ is a common belief often found in feminist war literature and related reports and policies implemented by international organisations, such as the UN and Amnesty International.

Rosemary Grey and Laura Shepherd (2012); Chris Dolan (2014); Sandesh Sivakumaran (2007; 2010); Dara Kay Cohen (2013); Adam Jones (2000; 2002) and Charli L. Carpenter (2006) all scrutinise the common phrase of women and girls being disproportionately and primarily affected by sexual violence during conflict. This is because when such a phrase is cited in academic literature or policy documents it is never supported with comparable data alongside male victims of sexual violence. Instead it is largely based on a “common sense” assumption. Furthermore, given that there is significant under-reporting by male victims of conflict-related sexual violence, along with lack documentation by international organisations like the UN or Amnesty International when cases are reported, how can we be sure that women and girls are disproportionately more affected by sexual violence in conflict situations?

Adam Jones (2000) criticises feminist studies on gender and war for largely neglecting the impact of war on civilian men and boys seeing as in times of war, “the most vulnerable and consistently targeted group, through time and around the world today, is non-combatant men of ‘battle age,’ roughly 15 to 55 years old” (2000: 185). Civilian men are more likely to be targets of genocidal slaughter as they are perceived to be the largest threat to the conquering force, whereas women are more likely to be sexually enslaved. Adam Jones (2008) cites testimonies of how men were targeted during the Bosnia-Herzegovina conflict:

Our men had to hide. My husband was with us, but hiding. I saw my uncle being beaten on July 25 when there was a kind of massacre. The Serbs were searching for arms. Three hundred men were killed that day…[..]….they were looking for men. We heard the sounds of the shooting. One man survived the executions. They killed his brother and father. Afterwards, the women buried the men (2008: 124-6).
Adam Jones (2015) also argues that feminist critique of gender and violence often portrays an oversimplistic gendered representation of women-as-victims and men-as-perpetrators, leaving little consideration to the thousands of male victims of violence during conflict or the role of women in some of these attacks. There is no doubt that Jones is one of the pioneers who shed light on the vulnerabilities of men (alongside women) to gender-based violence during conflict. However, he still manages to construct sexual violence as largely a women’s issue, by asserting that women are more vulnerable to being sexually enslaved and raped, while men are more vulnerable to being killed.

Human Rights Watch defines gender-based violence as “violence directed at an individual, male or female, based on his or her specific gender role in society” (cited in Carpenter 2006: 86). Yet we often find it is framed as exclusively violence against women in academic literature and human security sector. Carpenter (2006) and Jeanne Ward et al (2002) criticise humanitarian institutions such as the UN who make a commitment to promote ‘gender mainstreaming’, indicating a move away from ‘women’ toward ‘gender’, yet their policies and programmes do not reflect such a commitment. Carpenter (2006) identifies significant gaps in human security literature on the manifestation of gender-based violence in conflict zones. Carpenter recognises and condemns the various gender-based violence including sexual violence, forced recruitment and sex-selective massacre used against men and boys during conflict, who are deserving of protection in their own right.

Sexual Violence against Men

Sexual violence against women is a common feature of armed conflict that has been extensively discussed in academic feminist literature on war (see Brownmiller 1975; Chinkin 1994; Gardam and Jarvis 2001; Askin 1997). It is also a central focus of discussion among the international community, particularly the United Nations and its various entities when discussing issues relating to conflict, peace and security. This is evidenced by the various resolutions, policies, conferences, training programmes and support services, which is dedicated to combating this issue and assisting female victims of such atrocious acts.

All cases of sexual violence in conflict are greatly underreported; however, male victims of sexual violence in conflict remain largely ignored. The stories of male victims of sexual violence belong to the least told aspects of war, due to being one of the biggest taboos of warfare. In South Africa and Uganda, male rape is not even recognised as a crime defined only as ‘forced homosexuality’ (Al Jazeera 2011; Dyani 2008). Sexual violence against men during wartime occurs for similar reasons as female victims in that its intention is largely to humiliate, traumatisé, ‘feminise’ and silence the enemy. Enloe (2007) remarks that the purpose of feminising someone – man or woman – is to lower their status, by imposing feminine characteristics on them in order to demean them. This causes great anxiety among male victims who fear the demolishing of their 'masculinity'. There are various forms of
conflict-related sexual violence against men which include but are not limited to: oral and anal gang rape; forced nudity and masturbation, forced incest and rape of others, sexual mutilation, forced sterilisation, sexual torture and sexual slavery (Sivakumaran 2007; Stemple 2009; Wood 2009; Carpenter 2006).

Due to the under-recognition and under-reporting of the crime, the empirical data of male victims of wartime sexual violence is difficult to obtain. However, there are cases in Bosnia of fathers and sons forced to anally rape each other at gunpoint (Carpenter 2006: 95), while in the Balkans there is evidence of fathers forced to rape their daughters, sons forced to rape their mothers or brothers forced to rape their sisters (Carpenter 2006: 95). Enforced sterilisation of male victims took place during the conflict in the former Yugoslavia, with the UN Commission of Experts Report declaring that “castrations are performed through crude means such as, forcing one internee to bite off another’s testicles, and tying one end of a wire to the testicles and the other end to a motorcycle, then using the motorcycle to yank off the testicles” (1994: Paragraph 183).

Male victims of conflict-related sexual violence suffer psychological, physical and emotional trauma. This includes anxiety, fear, depression, low self-esteem, suicidal tendencies, substance abuse, post-traumatic stress disorder, sexual dysfunction, confusion over self-identity and fear of stigmatisation from family members and wider community (Solangon and Patel 2012; Sivakumaran 2007; 2010; Stemple 2009; 2011; Carpenter 2006). Male victims of conflict-related sexual violence can also experience the loss of reproductive capabilities much like women and girls. This is due to either the physical abuse suffered such as castration and genital mutilation or the psychological effects of the abuse (Sivakumaran 2010). Sarah Solangon and Preeti Patel (2012) shed light on the reasons male victims are forced to rape another family member or witness their rape, and argue it “is to rob him of his role as protector” (2012: 428). Often when women and girls are raped in conflict situations in front of their male relatives who are forced to witness, feminist literature tends to focus exclusively on the effects this has on the female victims. Yet interestingly, Carpenter (2006) draws attention to the psychological torture and impact this has on adult males who must watch helplessly while their loves ones are harmed by others, recognizing it as ‘secondary victimization’ (2006: 96). Carpenter (2006) further cites Anne Tierney Goldstein (1993) who writes:

[…..] To watch helplessly as someone you love is tortured may be as bad or worse than being tortured yourself, and international law should be able to reach and punish such harms (cited in Carpenter 2006: 97).

Unfortunately, international law and support programmes for victims of sexual violence in conflict rarely extend to meet the needs of male victims. Sandesh Sivakumaran (2005; 2007; 2010) provides possible clarifications as to why male victims are resistant to tell their stories and affirms that it is a
combination of shame, humiliation, guilt, confusion, fears and stigmatisation. Sivakumaran (2007) further argues that men who experience rape and other forms of sexual abuse are reluctant to speak of their victimisation as it would be inconsistent with their 'masculinity.' There is a gendered assumption that men’s identity is connected to power and control and dependent on their ability to protect themselves. Thus, failing to do so would result in no longer recognised as men, and instead as ‘women.’ As one commentator asks, “what greater humiliation can one man impose on another man or boy than to turn him into a de facto “female” through sexual cruelty?” (Sivakumaran 2007: 271). In a patriarchal society, which most societies are, there is no worse insult for a man than to be made to feel like a woman or be labelled as one. This is illustrated in the case of male victims of conflict-related sexual violence in Congo where they are often referred to as “bush wives” (Gettleman 2009; Solangon and Patel 2012).

The Gender Office of the Refugee Law Project, Salome Atim (2011), remarks how it is not uncommon for wives to leave their husbands once they discover they have been raped, detailing one male victim in East Africa who was raped twice causing his wife to leave with their child. Atim further remarks that the wives whose husbands have been victims of rape during conflict in places like Uganda and Congo would ask: “So now how am I going to live with him? As what? Is this still a husband? Is it a wife?...If he can be raped, who is protecting me?” (cited in Storr 2011).

Shame, humiliation and social stigma silences many male victims of sexual violence in conflict while also generating physical and emotional consequences, as one personal account in Will Storr (2011)’s ground-breaking article ‘The rape of men: the darkest secret of war’ illustrates:

Eleven rebels waited in queue and raped Jean Paul in turn…[...]…each male prisoner was raped 11 times that night and every night that followed….Today, despite his hospital treatment, Jean Paul still bleeds when he walks. Like many victims, the wounds are such that he’s supposed to restrict his diet to soft foods such as bananas, which are expensive, and Jean Paul can only afford maize and millet. His brother keeps asking what’s wrong with him. I don’t want to tell him, says Jean Paul. I fear he will say: Now, my brother is not a man (Male Congolese victim, cited in Storr 2011).

Male victims are also hesitant to speak of their experiences for fear of being stigmatised as homosexual, as homosexuality in some countries leads to severe penalties regardless of consent, particularly in the Middle East and Africa. There is an inability to distinguish same-sex consensual sex from rape, where often same-sex rape is associated with homosexuality bearing "disgust and hatred" (Scarce, cited in Gear 2007: 8). It is interesting to note that it is actually the perpetrator that maintains a heterosexual dominant masculinity despite committing the sexual act while their victims are the ones who become feminised. When sexual violence, primarily rape, is used against males its purpose is to
exclude them from the category of “men,” deeming them unworthy through sexual humiliation thus stripping the victim of his ‘masculinity’ (Whitehead 2005). These are some of the key factors affecting the perpetual under-recognition and under-reporting of this issue, as male victims of sexual violence suffer in silence and shame (Rumney and Morgan-Taylor 2004; Woodin 2002).

Chris Dolan (2014) further argues that gender assumptions of men and women largely contribute to the often hidden victimisation of men and boys. The notion that women are the property of men and often portrayed as weak, passive victims of sexual violence, while men are defined by their masculine status as strong, powerful and invincible, creates difficulties in attempting to comprehend men as victims and women as perpetrators. Due to the under-reporting by male victims and under-recognition by the international community on the issue of conflict-related sexual violence against men, it is very difficult to obtain data. Chris Dolan (2014) argues that the limited data on the occurrence of conflict-related sexual violence against men and boys should not be construed as lack of incidents, rather as a significant gap where more statistical evidence is required on the issue.

However, the Refugee Law Project (2014) reported that between 1998 and 2008, sexual violence against men was reported in 25 countries affected by conflict including Chile, Greece, El Salvador, Iran, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), the former Yugoslavia, Sri Lanka and Iraq, showing the widespread reach of the issue. The Refugee Law Project also did a further study with the Johns Hopkins School (2014) regarding male refugee survivors in western Uganda, indicating that more than one in three men have experienced sexual violence in their lifetime. In 2010, the Journal of the American Medical Association reported that in the eastern DRC, 22 per cent of men (compared to 30 per cent of women) have been victims of sexual violence in conflict. A study of the Bosnian conflict revealed that 80 per cent of the 6000 male concentration camp inmates in Sarajevo experienced sexual violence against them (Stemple 2009). While a non-governmental organisation in the Central African Republic called ‘L’Organization pour la Compassion et le Developpement des Familles en Detresse’ reported 140 cases of male rape and 800 cases of female rape (cited in Sivakumaran 2010: 263). Yet, numbers are always problematic, particularly due to the under-reporting and under-recognition of the crime. This reveals a significant and concerning gap in research, which must be addressed by the international community and researchers.

In 2004 and later in 2006, pictures emerged of US army personnel subjecting Iraqi male detainees inside Iraq’s infamous Abu Ghraib military detention centre to sexual and physical abuse, torture and humiliation. Shocking images of former female US Army Reserve soldier, Lynndie England, emerged. This included England posing alongside another soldier in front of a pyramid of naked men, another image of her pointing to a man forced to masturbate, and one of her standing with a dog leash strapped around a naked Iraqi male detainee. Lynndie England was one of three female soldiers featured in the
photographs which were the highlighted elements of the scandal (Caldwell 2012; McKelvey 2007). This is due to the fact that these were female soldiers victimizing male detainees, upsetting the gendered expectations of victim-perpetrator relationships. This was significant in drawing further attention on the plight of male victims during wartime, and the role of women as perpetrators in some of these attacks.

**Female Perpetrators**

Dara Kay Cohen (2013), Megan Mackenzie (2012), Caroline O.N. Moser and Fiona C. Clark (2001) and Laura Sjoberg (2015) examine the role of women as active soldiers and perpetrators of violence in wartime, contradicting the gendered assumption of the role of women as passive and peaceful victims. Through interviews conducted with Sierra Leone ex-combatants, Cohen (2013) reveals the willingness of both male and female combatants to engage in perpetrating sexual violence during conflict, particularly gang rape. Female combatants were involved in sexual violence by holding down the victims during the attacks and using objects (such as bottles and sticks) to rape women. This dispels three assumptions we often find in war literature: that women are peaceful and less prone to violence, that common women-as-victims paradigm and that there less instances of sexual violence when women are present in the military. Cohen (2013) argues that not only are female soldiers in Sierra Leone more aggressive than their male comrades, but also that more sexual violence is committed when women are present.

This phenomenon is not limited to Sierra Leone, with a 2010 population survey in the DRC which revealed that 41 per cent of female victims and 10 per cent of male victims experienced sexual violence by female perpetrators (Johnson et al 2010). Evidence of female fighters involved in physical and sexual violence against men and women are also found in Liberia (Specht 2006), Haiti (Faedi 2010), Rwandan genocide (Jones 2002; Wood 2009; Sjoberg 2015) and former Yugoslavia and Sudan (Sjoberg and Gentry 2007). This includes gang rape, rape with objects, torture, beatings, male genital mutilation, and encouraging and ordering rapes. The Rwandan Minister of Women and Family Affairs leader, Pauline Nyiramasuhuko, was the first woman to be convicted of genocide and incitement to rape by the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda. Nyiramasuhuko was sentenced to life imprisonment in 2011 (Sjoberg 2015; Sjoberg and Gentry 2007).

While Cohen (2013) acknowledges the recent research on female combatants as active fighters, she criticises the significant gap in the literature on women’s involvement in wartime sexual violence. Cohen argues that research surveys conducted on conflict-related sexual violence rarely attempts to question the sex of the attackers. Cohen’s work on women combatants is a significant contribution in challenging the assumption that women are innately peaceful victims. Yet the lack of discussion on
male victims still reinforces gendered assumptions of the role of male soldiers largely as perpetrators, leaving significant inconsistencies in the literature.

Lara Stemple (2011); Will Storr (2011) and Sarah Solangon & Preeti Patel (2012) argue that ignoring male victims of conflict-related sexual violence harms both men and women. It reinforces stereotypical views of ‘females’ inevitably being equated with ‘victim,’ removing their agency and hindering their ability to be viewed as strong and empowered. Neglecting male victims also reinforces unrealistic and unhealthy expectations for men and their presumed ‘masculinity,’ which may further encourage aggressive behaviour. The inherent association of ‘males’ as equated with ‘aggressors/perpetrators’ is problematic as it precludes the notion that they too may be victims of violence, which is clearly not a correct assertion. Such a neglect of male victims of conflict-related sexual violence also affects the response by the international community.

International Response
There is a gendered expectation that men cannot be victims. Lara Stemple (2009; 2011) and Eric Stener Carlson (1997) draw attention to the dire consequences of such a representation of men and women in warfare, with very few medical doctors, aid workers and counsellors trained to recognise signs of male rape and other forms of sexual assault. That not only meets the needs of male victims but also encourage them to speak about their experiences. The international humanitarian protection mechanisms, support services, guidelines, and training on gender-based violence prevention, largely neglect the experiences of men and boys as victims (Dolan 2014; Sivakumaran 2007; 2010; Carpenter 2006; Stemple 2009). Sivakumaran (2007) further notes that if sexual abuses against men and boys are recognised by legal frameworks or international organisations at all, it is often hidden under the umbrella of ‘torture’ or ‘mutilation.’ Thus, the sexual aspect of the abuse is ignored.

Dolan (2014) conducted a survey of penal codes in 189 countries combined with population statistics from the World Bank. The survey revealed a widespread neglect of protection and recognition of male victims of conflict-related sexual violence. It found that 90 per cent of men in conflict-affected countries are not protected by law should they become victims of sexual violence; 62 countries only acknowledge female victims of rape; 67 states criminalise men who report abuse and in 28 countries only males are recognised as perpetrators of sexual violence, while females are excluded.

Furthermore, the UN has over a hundred uses of the term ‘violence against women’ including sexual violence, through its international languages within various UN policies, resolutions, and agreed documents, but the majority exclude men (Stemple, 2009; 2011). The United Nations Security Council
Resolution (UNSCR) 1325 (2000) and subsequent resolutions (1820; 1888; 1889; 1960; 2122, and 2175) focus on violence against women and girls/children, including conflict-related sexual violence, and simply ignore men. Resolution 2106 (2013) is the only resolution on WPS that mentions men and boys as victims of conflict-related sexual violence and even then only as a passing reference. This gives the presumption that sexual violence against men in conflict does not occur nor is it a threat to them. Furthermore, the innovative scenario-based training programme for UN peacekeepers uses context-setting video clips, photos and other audio-visual tools, and hypothetical scenarios based on real-life cases. This objective of the training is to deepen the understanding of sexual violence in conflict and improve the response by UN peacekeepers when addressing such situations. However, the videos used to teach the peacekeepers only feature stories by female victims, excluding the possibility that civilian men and boys could also be subjected to sexual violence during conflict. This offers a narrow understanding of conflict-related sexual violence and a limited response in recognizing and assisting male victims on the ground.

Adam Jones and Augusta del Zotto (2002) in their research on the international response by Non-Governmental Organisations (NGO) indicate that they too are failing male victims of sexual violence. Of the 4,076 NGOs reviewed only 3 per cent actually address the experiences of men in their literature of wartime sexual violence and even then only as a passing reference. The UNHCR and NGOs support and rehabilitation programmes only appear equipped in meeting the needs of female victims of conflict-related sexual violence (Storr 2011; Stemple 2009). Grey and Shepherd (2012) also argue that the international policy world continues to marginalise male victims of sexual violence, which impacts on the lack of facilities that exist to support male victims during and after conflict situations. Indeed, during my interview with Amnesty International Campaigner, Todor Gardos5, he notes that ‘as far as [he] knows there has not been any research that specifically focuses on male victims of war crimes of sexual violence.’ Gardos further asserts that this is largely due to the lack of access to male victims as it is a ‘very closed and secretive issue so male victims of sexual violence are very reluctant to come forward as victims of this crime.’ Gardos also associates the neglect of male victims of conflict-related sexual violence to how society understands sexual or gender-based violence, as a:

Form of rights violation [sexual/gender-based violence] is understood by the broader society as being perpetrated against women….the broader society [he] means those main sources of influence for how the international rights framework is developed as well. When it concerns men it is more seen as a form of torture so when men are exposed to sexual violence and rape this is seen as a form of breaking dissent or as a form of torture not as a form of sexual violence

5 I conducted an interview via Skype with Amnesty International Campaigner, Todor Gardos, on 8th November 2014.
If influential organisations like Amnesty International or the UN do not recognise male victims of conflict-related sexual violence, then who is meeting their needs? How are male victims meant to be encouraged to report their cases when such organisations barely acknowledge their experiences? Who is supporting and protecting them alongside women and children?

**Conclusion**

There is no doubt that the reconceptualising of sexual violence in conflict as a threat to international peace and security is a historical and significant step in preventing its occurrence. However, the international community’s continued neglect of male victims of conflict-related sexual violence and its outdated understanding of ‘gender’ as a synonym with ‘women,’ its ability to effectively address the issue in its entirety. This contributes significantly to its failure in creating and effectively implementing policies on matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security. The international community, such as the UN, present a narrow view of which groups are in need of assistance and protection and what is considered a threat to international peace and security.

There has been ample exceptional work done on the issue of wartime sexual violence by feminist scholars including providing various explanations to help readers understand why sexual violence in conflict occurs. However, the marginalisation of male victims and neglect of female aggressors remains a significant gap in the literature. In order to understand why sexual violence in conflict occurs and find effective preventive mechanisms we must address the issue in its entirety by including male victims and female aggressors and not just as a passing reference. As Rosemary Grey and Laura Shepherd (2012) point out, it is the responsibility of feminist researchers to explore the silences, gaps and erasures of power, even if it causes the feminist researcher to be uncomfortable. This is the objective of this research project. It aims to contribute to the existing feminist literature on male victims of sexual violence in conflict, which remains marginal within broader discussions on the issue by academics and policy makers.

**Chapter Four: Emergence of Sexual Violence in Conflict on the International Community Agenda**

**Introduction**

Discussions on war and conflict within the International Relations discipline and among the international community have largely focused on state actors, their desire for absolute power and their
military capacities to protect national security and maintain state sovereignty. This also includes
discussions on nuclear weapons, arms trade and military spending (Waltz 1979; 1995; Walt 1987;
1996). In 2014 alone, the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) reported that the
global military expenditure was $1776 billion. Such a focus on state actors derives from a realist
approach, in which there is a shared common belief. The shared belief is that the world order consists
of self-interested states and their drive to survive and maximise power and security (Waltz 1988;
Baldwin 1993; Stolberg 2012). This view of security as ultimately by and for the state offers a narrow
one-dimensional conceptualisation of security that ignores the ‘human’ aspect.

However, the post-Cold War saw the broadening and deepening of the concept of security that goes
beyond a traditional state-centric understanding of security. Instead the concept of security focuses on
the impact of war and conflict on individuals rather than states. Some scholars argue that the individual
must be the focus of analysis of security. This is because the military, environmental, economic,
societal and political threats ultimately affect people first and foremost (Peoples and Vaughan-Williams
2010: 23; also see Booth 2005; Wyn Jones 1999; McSweeney 1999).

Such an expansion of security issues includes environmental issues (climate change, pollution), life-
threatening diseases (HIV/AIDS), immigration issues (asylum seekers, refugees) and human security
(state insecurity, famine, poverty). The security studies shift of focus from a state-centric approach to
the individual did not initially include the issue of conflict-related sexual violence, as a potential
security threat. Sexual violence in conflict was traditionally considered an inevitable by-product of war,
because a gendered perspective was not incorporated into the critical study of security. However,
feminist scholars entered the realm of international relations discipline to ask where the women are, to
examine the role of women in warfare and the impact of war on women (Enloe 1990; Tickner 1992;
Sjoberg 2014).

During the 1990s, there was particularly increased feminist academic literature on the role of women in
warfare and the impact of war on women, along with a strong global women’s activist movement. This
led to the revelation of hundreds of thousands of women and girls systematically raped, sexually
enslaved, and sexually tortured across numerous conflicts. This included conflicts before and during
WWII and then later during in the former Yugoslavia in 1992 and the Rwandan genocide in 1994.

Feminists argued that the massive scale and the nature of the sexual violence carried out, demonstrated
that this was not just an inevitable by-product of war – a few random attacks by individual male
soldiers in need of sexual gratification to satisfy their biologically ‘natural’ sex drive (Baaz and Stern
2009; Kirby 2012; Skjelsbaek 2001). Instead it revealed a disturbingly calculated and systematically
deployed sexual attack against specific ethnic groups in order to achieve military and political
objectives. This included but not limited to: gang rape, sexual slavery, public rape, mutilation,
genocide, forced incest, sexual slavery, sexual torture, rape with objects and forced impregnation (Wood 2009; Brown 2011). Thus, sexual violence in conflict was reconceptualised as a ‘weapon of war’ by feminist scholars (Card 1996; Kirby 2012; Skjelsbaek 2001). Rape as a weapon or tactic of war is used to intimidate, humiliate, oppress and displace specific group of people’s lives, families and communities (Alexander and Hawkesworth 2008; Kirby 2012; Skjelsbaek 2001; Enloe 1996; Harrington 2010; Branche and Virgili 2012). It is considered “as a particularly effective means to humiliate (feminize) enemy men by sullying “his” women/nation/homeland, and proving him to be an inadequate protector” (Stern and Baaz 2009: 500; also see Enloe 2000; Goldstein 2001; Stern and Nystrand 2006; Yuval-Davis 1997). The international community, particularly the United Nations (UN) was no longer able to turn a blind eye to the widespread atrocious acts committed. It recognised that the occurrence of sexual violence is a substantial problem in warfare, deeming it a ‘weapon of war’ and a threat to international peace and security.

Sexual violence in conflict has been occurring since the beginning of warfare, so how did ‘gender’ and ‘sexual violence in conflict’ finally become mainstream security issues? How did the issue get onto the United Nations international security agenda? The purpose of this section is to show how sexual violence in wartime became recognised as a significant problem that required the attention and response of the UN and the rest of the international community. There have been a number of historical conflicts that involved systematic wartime rape and other forms of sexual violence, such as the Cold War and the breakdown of Soviet Union. However, it is not possible to include them all in this section due to limited space.

That being the case, the focus will be on three case studies in order to make visible the issue of conflict-related sexual violence as a significant threat to international peace and security, requiring the attention of the UN and the rest of the international community. The three case-studies are: the sexual slavery of “comfort women” by the Japanese before and during World War Two (WWII) (1939-1945); the systematic mass rape and ethnic cleansing that occurred during conflicts in the former Yugoslavia in 1992 and Rwanda genocide in 1994.

The case of “comfort women” is an important example to include because of the concerted, systematic nature of the sexual abuse suffered; it was a policy by the Japanese government and army, not just a by-product of an unruly army. It highlighted the extreme forms of coercion and oppression imposed on the hundreds of thousands of women and girls before and during WWII that violated a host of human rights and international law principles. This includes: human trafficking, forced labour, sexual slavery, forced prostitution and systematic sexual violence. Yet it remains as one of the most unrecognised injustices of the Second World War. The conflicts in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda served as a watershed.
for bringing the issue of conflict-related sexual violence to the forefront of international security concerns.

This section should ignite curiosity in the reader to question the role of women in warfare and if there is a problem with the way women are represented? What are we missing from discussions on gender, (sexual) violence and security? Who is being marginalised? Where are the men? Does the gendered language discourse we see among academic and policy documents affect our perspective and understanding on issues relating to gender, (sexual) violence and security?

“Comfort Women” before and during WWII

There has been ample discussion on the systematic mass rape during The Cold War (1947-1991). However, the hundreds of thousands of so-called “comfort women” sexually enslaved, raped, beaten, tortured and starved by the Japanese Army before and during WWII (1939-1945), rarely features in Western feminist war literature. Their experiences are also often excluded from Japanese history textbooks. Yet the treatment of these so-called “comfort women” was rigorous and systematic in nature and reinforces the fact that sexual violence and forced prostitution during conflict is not simply a by-product of war but rather a tactic or weapon strategically used by a disorderly Japanese army.

Background

During the Asian Pacific War, the Japanese military established “comfort stations” before and during World War. These stations held approximately between 70,000 to 200,000 women (Yoshimi 1995: 79), who were either deceived under false pretences of better jobs or forcibly abducted and turned into sexual slaves, branded so-called “comfort women.” These women were subjected to brutal rape, torture, sexual and physical abuse, as well as, humiliation at the hands of Japanese soldiers. The majority of the violated women were from colonial Korea, particularly young lower class females but also consisted of other occupied territories, including Thailand, Burma, Taiwan, Indonesia, the Netherlands and the Philippines. The use of the term “comfort women” ‘transcended the realm of “militarized prostitution” into that of “sexual slavery” based on gender, class, ethnicity and the state’ (Soh 1996: 1226). Feminist scholars (Soh 1996; Yamashita 2011; Argibay 2003) argue that the Japanese government used the term “comfort women” in order to deceivably portray them as ‘voluntary prostitutes.’ This is to deny responsibility and conceal the fact that these women were actually sexual slaves, imprisoned against their will, with no payment or consent for their sexual services.

---

6 The term “comfort women” was used by the Japanese military as a euphemism for women as ‘military sexual slaves’ to minimize the severity of violations perpetrated against the victims.
There were three main reasons for the forceful abduction and sexual slavery of the so-called “comfort women.” First, the establishment of “comfort women” was to ensure that the Japanese soldiers did not damage the integrity of the Imperial Japanese Army by raping civilians. Second, it was also to ensure the protection of the soldiers from contracting sexual diseases if they were to seek sexual gratification in brothels (Yamashita, cited in Fujimura-Fanselow 2011: 214). Third, to provide sexual pleasure to the Japanese soldiers who were often unable to take recreational leave from the army (Yoshimi 1992).

The case of “comfort women” is significant in any discussions on conflict-related sexual violence as it encompasses a host of human rights violations, including sexual slavery, forced prostitution, human trafficking across borders and systematic mass rape. All of which are now considered threats to national and international security. The Japanese government and military attempted to diminish their responsibly in the forced abduction and sexual slavery of these “comfort women” by claiming they were voluntarily prostitutes used purely for recreational purposes. Yet, later evidence revealed their heavy involvement in the formation and continuation of the system and in enlisting and trafficking women across international borders (Tanaka 2008: 180-181).

The Experiences of the “Comfort Women” and International Response

Further evidence reveals rape of “comfort women” extended beyond purely recreational purposes. It was a systematic tool of war to ensure national security by humiliating the enemy into oppression, and can be found in personal testimonies of the survivors provided in later years. Kim Yong-Sil recounts both the physical and cultural abuse she suffered at the hands of the Japanese military where she was raped and stripped of her Korean identity and native tongue:

We hesitated to wear a strange dress and were disrobed by force. With just a word I was named Eiko, a Japanese name, and the soldier stuck a tag bearing the name of Eiko on my breast, which I wore from that day. The man who was the first to enter my room was the one who had lured me there. Unlike before, when he was wearing a suit, he was now wearing a middle-ranking officer’s uniform. He raped me by force and was followed by seven other officers (1993: 57).

This is but one testimony among thousands of women forcibly abducted, sexually enslaved, beaten, tortured and raped. These women were carefully selected from poor backgrounds and not of Japanese ethnicity, but rather the ethnicity of their enemies. Women were sex providers in the Japanese military and whether it was voluntary or not was of minimal concern to both the Japanese government and the military. Cynthia Enloe (2004) argues that “in our society there is a widespread belief that soldier’s sexuality is determined by uncontrollable drives” (2004: 119). However, the rape and sexual violence against the “comfort women” extended beyond the soldier’s seemingly ‘uncontrollable drives.’ The Japanese army used the rape of enemy women as a tactic to destroy the fabric of society, as women are often symbolically portrayed as the bearers of national identity. Forced prostitution and mass
systematic rape humiliated the enemy, oppressed their ethnicity and ensured Japan’s ethnicity was protected. This counteracts the simplistic explanation of men in wartime purely needing a sexual release to carry out their duties.

The experiences of these women went untold for forty-five years after the war ended and the “comfort stations” ceased to exist. This was largely due to the lack of documentary evidence, with the Japanese government making sure to destroy any relevant evidence regarding the so-called “comfort women.” However, some feminists argue that this was also a result of the Korean hegemonic patriarchy society, in which the men were allowed sexual freedom and even encouraged to partake in extra-marital affairs. While the women’s sexuality was strictly controlled in order to maintain their virginity and honour (Chow 1943; Kingston 2012; Hicks 1994). The strict control of a women’s virginity is not only to maintain her honour but also the family honour and ultimately the nation’s honour. The concept of honour is founded on the notion that a person’s honour depends on the behaviour of others that behaviour and thus, must be protected and controlled (Baker et al. 1999; Gill 2009). This control and protection of women is assumed to be carried out by their male counterparts. Be it in the community as part of the patriarchal societal structure where men are the head or during warfare by ‘masculine’ male soldiers.

Hegemonic patriarchy is universal, not merely restricted to Korean societies. It is the man’s duty to protect and oppress “his” women from sexual misconduct, which would otherwise threaten the nation’s security. This is due to the belief that women are the “symbolic bearers of ethno/national identity through their roles as biological, cultural and social reproducers of the community” (Baaz and Stern 2009: 500).

In an effort to improve the treatment and protection of war victims Post-WWII, the International Committee of the Red Cross launched the four Geneva Conventions in 1949, collectively setting the standard for humanitarian law in times of war. The Convention expressly addressed rape, enforced prostitution and other forms of sexual violence in its provisions and Additional Protocols (1977). However, sexual violence was depicted as a violation against women’s “honour” and personal dignity rather than their breach of rights. Even though protection against sexual violence is a universal right, it is largely considered a women’s right but it is not a right unique to women.

This ‘honour’ and personal dignity is not an individual component belonging to a woman, but rather a socially constructed entity provided to women under the protection and control of dominant male masculinities (Gardam 1997). This concept of honour dates back to colonial expansion when colonial

---

7 According to historian Yoshiaki Yoshimi, the majority of the “comfort women” were of Korean ethnicity, comprising approximately 51.8 percent of the total comfort women population.
domination threatened the “rape” of motherland by a penetrating foreign force, which then threatened men’s honour and were called upon to protect it (Gerami, cited in Kimmel et al 2005: 449-450). Following this, women became the ultimate symbol of men’s honour as they constituted the national, political and personal symbol of honour. In this way “no longer was women’s honour particular to a clan, a tribe, or a man; it became symbolic of the national honour” (Gerami, cited in Kimmel et al 2005: 450). In its effort to improve women’s rights and provide women with protection against violent crimes, particularly sexual violence, the Geneva Convention still manages to portray sexual violence as a violation of men’s ‘property rights.’ It does this through its focus on female ‘honour,’ rather than a violation against the female victim in their own right (Brownmiller 1975; Evans et al 2014). In short, women in the Geneva Convention and Additional Protocols are represented as vulnerable victims in need of protection and as men’s property rather than as women in their own accord.

The concept of ‘honour’ has caused these “comfort women” to feel great shame and become fearful of losing their virginity, even through rape. Hence, they were discouraged from speaking out about their experiences as sexual slaves in the Japanese military for fear of social stigma and being ostracised from their family and community. It can be argued that a similar situation is currently occurring regarding male victims of conflict-related sexual violence in the 21st century. Male victims of conflict-related sexual violence are resistant in speaking out about their experiences in much the same way that women were in the 20th century, due to feelings of shame, humiliation and fear of stigmatisation by the community.

Despite the Geneva Conventions recognizing the plight of women during WWII, the international community remained silent. Inspired by the strong feminist political activism of Korean women to bring this issue to the public sphere, Kim Hak-Sun provided the first ever public testimony of her experiences as a so-called “comfort woman”:

A commissioned officer took me to the next room which was partitioned off by a cloth. Even though I did not want to go he dragged me into the room. I resisted but he tore off all of my clothes and in the end he took my virginity. That night, the officer raped me twice (Yoshimi 2000: 141).

This inspired more women to come forward with their own stories, including Dutch woman, Jan Ruff O’Herne, in 1992. O’Herne recounted her harrowing ordeal to the Tokyo Tribunal 2000 of being forcibly abducted, enslaved, beaten, tortured and raped alongside other young Dutch women. O’Herne further testified in 2007 to a U.S. House of Representatives committee:

Many stories have been told about the horrors, brutalities, suffering and starvation of Dutch women in Japanese prison camps. But one story was never told, the most shameful story of the
worst human rights abuse committed by the Japanese during World War II: The story of the “Comfort Women”, the jugun ianfu, and how these women were forcibly seized against their will, to provide sexual services for the Japanese Imperial Army. In the “comfort station” I was systematically beaten and raped day and night. Even the Japanese doctor raped me each time he visited the brothel to examine us for venereal disease (O’Herne 2007).

Feminist activists, international human rights organisations and women’s organisations, including the Korean Council and Amnesty International, demanded an official apology from the Japanese government and compensation on behalf of the survivors. However, the Japanese government initially refused to take any responsibility until mid-1992, where after damaging documents were revealed by historian Yoshiaki Yoshimi, they had no choice but to admit and somewhat apologise for their involvement (Yoshimi 2000: 35). In the same year, the Japanese government established the Asian Women’s Fund (AWF) to provide additional compensation to former “comfort women” survivors. However, by 2007 the AWF was disbanded due to the majority of the women rejecting the compensation offered, arguing it allowed the Japanese government to avoid its responsibilities. It is clear that these “comfort women” were not only used as ‘sexual objects’ to satisfy the desires of Japanese soldiers, but were also part of a fundamental structure of violence that included systematic rape (Yamashita, cited in Fujimura-Fanselow 2011: 215).

During the 1980s and 1990s, strong lobbying efforts by feminist and humanitarian activists continued to raise public awareness on the plight of “comfort women.” This included demonstration marches, drafted letters, a lawsuit against the Japanese government and further public testimonies by former “comfort women.” In 1992 the issue of the “comfort women” finally became an international human rights issue rather than merely a bilateral compensation dispute. This is because Lee Hyo-Chae, the co-chair of the Korean Council for the Women Drafted for the Military Sexual Slavery by Japan (KCWS), submitted a petition to the United Nations Human Rights Commission (UNHRC) on 4 March 1992.

The Commission was asked to investigate the brutalities committed against the Korean “comfort women’ by the Japanese military during the Asian Pacific War and to put pressure on the Japanese government to award compensation to the victims. The sexual violence and sexual slavery committed against the “comfort women” of WWII was finally declared by UNHRC’s Submission for the Prevention of Discrimination and the Protection of Minorities to be “a crime against humanity that violated the human rights of Asian women and the international agreement prohibiting forced labor that Japan signed in 1932” (Chai 1993: 67-91).

Radhika Coomaraswamy, the UN’s then Special Rapporteur on violence against women, upon investigation reported that these women and girls endured:
…multiple rapes on an everyday basis in the ‘military comfort houses’…Allegedly, soldiers were encouraged by their commanding officers to use the “comfort women” facilities rather than civilian brothels for the purpose of stabilizing soldiers’ psychology, encouraging their spirit and protecting them from venereal infections (U.N 1994: Para. 288).

In 1996, the UN published a report in which it referred to the “comfort women” as ‘military sex slaves’ and recommended that the Japanese government issue a formal apology and provide compensation to the “comfort women” survivors. The term ‘military sex slaves’ is preferred over ‘forced prostitution,’ largely due to protests by the “comfort women” survivors against using the term ‘prostitution.’ This is due to the negative and discriminatory connotations of the term ‘prostitution’ that often results in the stigmatisation of women. Furthermore, Carmen M. Argibay (2003) argues that the use of the term ‘forced prostitution’ does not convey the severity of the abuses suffered by the victims, as it tends to reflect the male view – the organisers of the system. Whereas the term ‘sexual slaves’ reflects the perspective of the victims and the large scale and severity of sexual abuses suffered by the women (Argibay 2003: 387). Is there an issue with inherently associating women with terms like ‘prostitution’ and ‘victim’?

Despite a brief apology by Japanese Prime Minister to the plight of “comfort women” in 1992, it was quickly retracted by the government. In June 2014, a report was issued by a Japanese government-appointed study team stating there is no conclusive evidence to show that the “comfort women” were forcefully sexually enslaved, they were voluntary wartime prostitutes. The Japanese government has received considerable pressure over the years from UN and its various entities to address this issue. The UN Human Rights Committee has recently called on Japan to take:

Immediate and effective legislative and administrative measures to ensure that all allegations of sexual slavery are investigated and perpetrators prosecuted. It also called for access to justice and reparations for victims and their families, the disclosure of all evidence available, and education in the country surrounding the issue (OHCR 2014).

There is no doubt that the case-study of “comfort women” demonstrates that rape and sexual violence is a significant problem in warfare. It also sheds light on other human rights violations and human security threats, including trafficking and sexual slavery, which require the increased attention and resources by the international community. We now know about the plight of these “comfort women” who suffered against sexual slavery and sexual violence before and during WWII, but where are the men?

Further Developments for Women’s Rights following WWII
The Commission on the Status of Women (CSW), a division within the United Nations, also began a strong movement between 1947 and 1962 to raise further global awareness of women’s issues by creating international conventions to change discriminatory legislation. In agreement with this consideration, the Economic and Social Council (ESOSOC) suggested to the General Assembly to enlist a declaration on this issue. In response, the General Assembly adopted the Declaration on the Protection of Women and Children in Emergency and Armed Conflict in 1974. The Declaration mirrored the Geneva Conventions in its portrayal of women’s role, “in society, in the family and particularly in the upbringing of children,” (1974: Para. 8), thus according them special protection as mothers and caregivers in armed conflict rather than as women. This pattern of grouping women and children together and categorising them as ‘vulnerable groups,’ demonstrates the persistent fixation with women as mothers and caregivers, who are weak and in need of ‘special protection,’ presumably by men. This association is so common that Cynthia Enloe coined the term ‘womenandchildren’ (1990) and it is extremely problematic “given that children are not fully mature, are depicted as not fully capable of rational thought and are also seen to be in need of care and protection” (Shepherd 2008: 41).

In 1985, at the UN’s Third World Conference on Women in Nairobi, the Forward-looking Strategies for the Advancement of Women was adopted. The aim was to provide a plan to improve women’s advancement to the Year 2000. The conference focused on sexual violence against women and ways to strengthen the role of women in Peace and Development plans. Although the threat of sexual abuse and rape was acknowledged in the Forward-looking Strategies, it was only in relation to everyday life, rather than sexual violence in armed conflict. The UN continued to take into account the impact of armed conflict. However, it was not until the prevalent mass rape against thousands of women during the conflict in the former Yugoslavia in 1992, that the UN began to explicitly link sexual violence with armed conflict.

The Former Yugoslavia

During the former Yugoslavia conflict in 1992, between 12,000 and 50,000 mostly Bosnian Muslim women were symmetrically raped by mainly Serb forces (Wood 2013; Crowe 2013; European Community 1993; Drakuli 1993). The systematic and strategic “ethnic cleansing” of Muslim women in Bosnia by Serbian forces, led to recognition of rape as a tool of war rather than random sexual assaults by individual soldiers.

Slavenka Drakuli (1992) further asserts that:

The rapes in Bosnia are not only a standard tactic of war, they are an organised and systematic attempt to cleanse (to move, resettle, exile) the Muslim population from certain territories Serbs want to conquer in order to establish a Greater Serbia…..They are also deliberately impregnated
in great numbers ... held captive and released only after abortion becomes impossible. This is so they will "give birth to little Chetniks," the women are told (1992: 271).

Similarly, Cynthia Enloe (2000) remarks that:

Rape has been used as one method to terrorize civilian populations in villages and forcing ethnic groups to leave... Several women would be raped in the presence of others so that word would spread throughout the village and a climate of fear was created (2000: 140).

While Cynthia Cockburn (2004) notes on how the Bosnian Muslim women who were not killed were sent to “rape camps” (2004: 237-238), subjected to repeated rape with the intention of “plant[ing] the seed of Serbs in Bosnia” and forced to complete full term of pregnancy and give birth to “little Chetniks babies” (Weitsman 2008: 561-578). The effects of forced impregnation is three-fold as the presence of the child born serves as a permanent reminder of the humiliation and derogation suffered, while the stigmatisation and isolation of the mothers and children further disrupts the organisation of the community (Salzman 1998; Mullins 2009). Lastly, given that in most societies ancestry membership is only guaranteed through the bloodline of the father, the change in the ethnic makeup of a community effectively works in eliminating the population (Mullins 2009; Card 1996).

The nature of rape and sexual violence as a campaign of ethnic cleansing during the Bosnian war flooded international media stories with headlines reporting ‘Serbian rape camps: Evil Upon Evil’ and ‘Serbs rape on highest order.’ Such media stories provided an insight into the systematic use of rape against women in detention camps, causing worldwide outrage and a demand for action. This was also due to the tireless work and advocacy of non-governmental organisations\textsuperscript{8} and women’s groups and activists, to bring attention and justice to victims of sexual violence in the conflict of former Yugoslavia.

Women are portrayed as disproportionately affected by violence during Bosnian conflict, particularly sexual violence; however, we cannot forget male victims. Lara Stemple (2009) has reported that 80 per cent of male concentration camp inmates in Sarajevo suffered rape and other forms of sexual violence during the conflict (2009: 605).

Dubravka Zarkov (in Moser and Clark 2001) notes how the international media marginalised the male victims of conflict-related sexual violence in the former Yugoslavia:

The international media, so fervent in reporting rapes of women, shied away from the topic of sexually assaulted men. Pictures of the starved bodies of Muslim men from the camps bun by Bosnian Serb forces were on the front pages of international magazines, as were photos of tearful,

\textsuperscript{8}This included: Centre for Women War Victims, Humanitarian Law fund, Karetta, and Tresnjevka
raped women. But nobody published a photo of a raped man. The national press within former Yugoslavia offered a similar picture. Rapes of women were newsworthy; rapes of men were not (2001: 72).

Zarkov’s statement largely reflects the mentality of both the international media and the international community like the UN, on the erasure of male victims when reporting on sexual violence in conflict. However, one may argue that it is not the case of which rape is more newsworthy – male or female – but rather which are more accessible, to be able to gain information, evidence, photographs and data to report on and process. Male victims of conflict-related sexual violence are particularly difficult to process. This is because many are resistant to come forward and tell their stories due to a combination of shame, humiliation, guilt, confusion, fear and stigmatisation (Sivakumaran 2007). To be associated with victimisation is inconsistent with the militarised masculinity instilled upon men in warfare, where they are depicted as strong, aggressive, brave, courageous, powerful and able to protect themselves and others (Sjoberg and Via; Connell 2005; Grey and Shepherd 2012; Sivakumaran 2010). Men who have experienced sexual violence during warfare become fearful of losing their masculine status, instead becoming feminised – viewed as cowardly, weak and womanly (Tickner 2001; 2014).

Nevertheless, the international outrage on the systematically mass rape used against women in conflict of former Yugoslavia led to the UN establishing a Commission of Experts. The Commission of Experts collected over 1,100 reports of sexual violence committed during the conflict in the former Yugoslavia that violated international humanitarian law (Sharratt and Kaschak 2013: 9). Following this, the UN Security Council (UNSC) declared the "massive, organised and systematic detention and rape of women, in particular Muslim women, in Bosnia and Herzegovina an international crime that must be addressed” (UNSC 1992). The UN’s focus appeared to be solely on women and children, as reflected in the gendered language used in UN General Assembly Resolution 50/192 where it “strongly condemns the abhorrent practice of rape and abuse of women and children in the areas of armed conflict in the former Yugoslavia, which constitutes a war crime” (General Assembly 1996: Article 1). The UN’s exclusion of men as victims alongside women and children during the former Yugoslavia conflict is concerning given that there is clear evidence that they too have suffered physical and sexual abuse. J. Ann. Tickner (1992) is credited for asking the important question of ‘where are the women?’ in global politics. However, we must also ask ‘where are the men?’ as civilian men are also vulnerable to physical and sexual violence during armed conflict.

In response to conflict-related sexual violence in former Yugoslavia conflict, the UN Security Council also established an international ad hoc tribunal known as International Criminal Tribunal of the former Yugoslav (ICTY) in 1993. The ICTY was created with the purpose to prosecute any persons suspected of breaching the Geneva Conventions and violating international humanitarian law during
conflict, including sexual violence. The first ever person to be indicted for war crimes in the former Yugoslavia was the Bosnian-Serb concentration camp commander, Dragan Nikolić, in his direct involvement in the murder, rape and torture against non-Serb detainees. Following the trial, on 18 December 2003 he was sentenced to 20 years imprisonment for ‘universally condemned offences’ (ICTY 2003). The former female Serb President, Bijana Plavsic, was also indicted in 2001 by the ICTY for war crimes, including crimes against humanity and genocide. Plavsic is credited with being the mastermind behind the forced impregnation of Bosnian Muslim women as tool of “ethnic cleansing”. However, after serving only two-thirds of her sentence was released in 2009 after a plea deal with ICTY (Sjoberg, cited in Evans et al 2014: 573). Seeing as both leaders were charged with war crimes, it appears that Plavsic’s significantly reduced sentence is related to her female status. This suggests that in some circumstances, the international criminal courts and international law tribunals treat offenders accused of war crimes in a gender-specific manner, with leniency offered to a certain sex or gender (female). This is extremely concerning as the punishment should be based on the severity of the crime committed, not whether the perpetrator was male or female.

Further Developments on Conflict-Related Sexual Violence Post-Bosnian War

Following the international outrage and feminist movement regarding the widespread and systematic sexual violence during the former Yugoslavia conflict in 1992, the UN World Conference on Human Rights was held in Vienna the subsequent year. The UN Conference proved to be a turning point for women’s human rights as it was the first time violence against women, including sexual violence in conflict, was recognised as a human rights issue. This was reflected in the adoption of the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action where Article 38 states:

> Violations of the human rights of women in situations of armed conflict are violations of the fundamental principles of international human rights and humanitarian law. All violations of this kind, including in particular murder, systematic rape, sexual slavery, and forced pregnancy, require a particularly effective response (UN Vienna Declaration 1993: Article 38).

These developments which highlighted the issue of violence against women at the Vienna Conference in 1993, were largely due to a number of NGO’s working together under the agency of the Centre for Women’s Global Leadership, including: WiLDAF (Women in Law and Development in Africa); the Asian Women’s Human Rights Council and Latin America Committee for Women’s Rights (Bunch and Reilly 1994: 4-6). The International Women’s Rights Action Watch and the International League for Human Rights were particularly involved in the inclusion of violence against women as a provision within conventions and treaties and the recognition of violence against women as a human rights issue.
This was also echoed in the adoption of the Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against Women in 1993 by the UN General Assembly. The Declaration acknowledged physical, sexual and physical violence against women in private and public, particularly in conflict situations. We know that these significant developments ensued largely due to an international outcry following the systemic mass rape and sexual violence against thousands of women during the conflict in former Yugoslavia, but where are the men?

There is no denying that these developments were significant in recognizing the severity of sexual violence in warfare. Yet, the systematic mass rape and sexual violence against civilians in conflicts continued to increase and the prioritisation of sexual violence against women and girls carried over to the 1994 Rwandan genocide.

**Rwanda**

International organisations like Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International and UN agencies estimate that in April 1994 during the Rwandan genocide between 100,000 and 500,000 Rwandan women were subjected to brutal acts of sexual violence, during the three months of warfare. Although both Hutu and Tutsi women suffered sexual attacks, the majority of the sexual violence was specifically targeted against Tutsi women in a brutal and systematic manner as part of a campaign to oppress and cleanse the Tutsi ethnic group (Buss et al. 2014; Turshen et al 2001).

Women were subjected to various forms of sexual violence including individual and gang rape, rape with weapons, sexual slavery and sexual mutilation (Human Rights Watch 1996). While the majority of the rape followed with sexual mutilation or outright killing, some Tutsi women were instead deliberately infected with life-threatening viruses of HIV/AIDS. This is to inflict symbolic and psychological violence, and also to ensure a prolonged painful death. One source has reported that 70 per cent of those raped during the Rwandan genocide have contracted the HIV virus (Russell-Brown 2003: 354). The public rape and forced rape by male relatives was also common in order to humiliate, terrorise and oppress the enemy. For example, a 12 year old boy was forced to rape his mother, while his five younger siblings were made to hold her legs open and the father was forced to helplessly stand and witness the attack (Russell-Brown 2003: 352). The female victim of the rape is often discussed among feminist literature and policy documents and rightly so. Yet, very rarely is the detrimental emotional and mental impact on the son who was forced to rape his own mother or the father who was unable to protect his wife or children, ever considered or examined.

Nevertheless, rape and sexual violence was used as a tool during the Rwanda conflict to destroy the Tutsi women’s capabilities of bearing children for their own community. This is either physically through mutilation of reproductive organs or culturally and symbolically as they are often shunned.
from their community for being ‘tainted,’ no longer considered ‘pure.’ In Rwandan culture and indeed in the majority of African cultures, women and girls who are unmarried are expected to preserve their honour and the family’s honour by remaining virgins until marriage (Burnet 2012; Buss 2014).

The International Criminal Tribunal in Rwanda (ICTR) was established by the UN in 1994. During the trial of Alfred Musema, former Director of the tea factory in Gisovu, a witness recounts Musema’s selection of a heavily pregnant 25 year old Tutsi woman:

Telling his troops that he would give them an example as to what to do with the women … the young men should take the Tutsi women and see how they are made, he raped the woman, then stabbed her in the throat. After their leader was finished, the militia men fell upon the rest of the women, rap[ing] them and after raping them, they stuck some pointed sticks into their private parts … those who did not die were finished off either with clubs or with machetes (Witness, cited in Mullins 2009: 728).

The nature of the rape and sexual mutilation demonstrates that its occurrence is not due to male’s ‘biological urges’ but rather a tactic of war used to intimidate, humiliate, oppress and displace the Tutsi ethnic group. The ICTR trial of Jean-Paul Akayesu was monumental as it was the world’s first ever genocide conviction, which included using rape as genocide (Volkmann-Benkert 2009). Akayesu was held for violating Article 2 (b) of the Genocide Convention: ‘cause serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group’ with the requisite specific ‘intent to destroy, in whole or in part’ the ethnically defined group ‘as such’ (Jones, cited in Evans et al 2014: 573). Akayesu was sentenced to life imprisonment for genocide and crimes against humanity, including rape (Eltringham 2004).

The ICTR was also monumental in convicting the first ever woman, Pauline Nyiramasuhuko, former Rwandan Minister of Women and Family Affairs, of genocide and incitement to rape. Nyiramasuhuko was sentenced to life imprisonment in 2011 (Sjoberg 2015; Sjoberg and Gentry 2007). The case of Pauline Nyiramasuhuko contradicts the concept of ‘genocidal rape’ often described as a specific ‘gender’ attack against women by male soldiers, as it sheds light on the role of female perpetrators in some of these attacks (Russell-Brown 2003). Furthermore, women as active agents of the slaughter and sexual violence during conflict, challenge traditional notions of women as helpless, peaceful victims of war. Males and females are able to be perpetrators of physical and sexual violence during conflict and they can both be potential victims of that violence.

To supplement the International Criminal Tribunals in former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, the Rome Statue established the Intentional Criminal Court (ICC) in 1998 which came into force in 2002. The ICC objective is to prosecute persons for the “most serious crimes of concern to the international community as a whole,” namely genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and aggression (Rome
Statue: Article 5), when the state with jurisdiction is unwilling or unable to try the case (Rome Statue: Article 17). The ICC is remarkable in its use of gender-neutral terms to define sex crimes, so as to include both female and male experiences of rape and sexual violence in the ICC framework (Grey and Shepherd 2012: 127).

The framing of the Rwandan genocide largely depicts women and girls as principal victims of slaughter and rape, while excluding men and boys. The UN Human’s Rights Commissioner’s Special Rapporteur for Rwanda, Mr. Rene Degni-Segu, responded to the prevalent sexual violence during the Rwandan genocide in a report stating that:

Rape was systematic and was used as a ‘weapon’ by the perpetrators of the massacres… and that according to consistent and reliable testimony, a great many women were raped; rape was the rule and its absence was the exception (UN 1996: Para. 16)…. It was the first time that mass systematic rape was described as an act of ‘genocide’ and therefore, considered a crime against humanity (UN 1996: Para. 136-137).

During the same year as the Rwandan genocide, the Fourth World Conference took place in Beijing. Sexual violence against women during conflict and gender mainstreaming were key topics highlighted in the adoption of the *Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action*. One of the twelve critical areas of concern to be addressed by the Member States and international community was women and armed conflict where the Platform for Action declares:

While entire communities suffer the consequences of armed conflict and terrorism, women and girls are particularly affected because of their status in society and their sex. Parties to the conflict often rape women with impunity sometimes using systematic rape as a tactic of war and terrorism (Beijing Platform Critical Area E: Para. 135).

This reinforces the perception of women and girls as victims as a result of their sex, the fact that they are born “female” consequently puts them at a disadvantage in society as they are perceived as the lesser sex. This in turn implies men and boys, the ‘male’ sex, as the strong and advantaged sex. The representation of women as the inevitable victims in warfare significantly hinders their ability to actively participate in post-conflict situations, such as formal peace negotiations and reconstruction plans.

**Conclusion**

This section of the research project has demonstrated through three case-studies: “comfort women,” former Yugoslavia and Rwandan genocide; how sexual violence in wartime became increasingly recognised as a significant problem. This has caused the UN Security Council (UNSC) and the rest of
the international community to acknowledge the changing nature of warfare, in which civilians are increasingly targeted, and the significant threat of systematic mass rape and sexual violence during conflict to international peace and human security. However, it also sheds light on the early framing of conflict-related sexual violence as largely a women’s issue and their inherent association with children. This leaves a significant gap to question where the men are.

The UNSC has attempted in various ways to address the issue of sexual violence and the protection of women and children during conflict situations; however, partial measures over a period of time was not enough to address the critical issue of women and armed conflict. Therefore, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1325 (UNSCR 1325) on women, peace and security on 31 October 2000. The UNSCR 1325 is the first ever resolution to consider gender dynamics in relation to conflict, peace and security, including gender-based violence. Resolution 1325 is also the most prominent UNSC resolution to address this issue.

Chapter Five: UN Security Council Resolution 1325

Introduction

On 31 October 2000, the UN Security Council unanimously adopted UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1325 on Women, Peace and Security (WPS) to address the impact of armed conflict on women and girls. This includes the protection of women and girls against conflict-related sexual violence and a call for women’s full and equal participation in all levels of decision-making and peace process. The purpose of this section is to critically examine the language of UNSCR 1325 in its objectives and provide a feminist critique of the conceptualisation of gender, violence and security within the document. This will shed light on the tensions and inconsistencies present within the text that limit the Resolution’s understanding and response to gender violence and security, ultimately affecting its full and effective implementation. The analysis will pay particular attention on how women are talked about in Resolution 1325, while also examining what is missing from the Security Council’s response on the impact of armed conflict on civilians.

Path to UN Security Council Resolution 1325

In June 2000, at the twenty-third special session of the General Assembly on ‘Women 2000: gender equality, development and peace for the twenty-first century’ (Beijing +5), a review of the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action was held. The review found that the critical area of concern, ‘Women and Armed Conflict,’ was not adequately addressed or implemented. Following the review, the NGO Working Group (NGOWG) on Women and Armed Conflict was created. The NGOWG was
created to lobby the UN Security Council in including a resolution that sufficiently addresses the issue of ‘women, peace and security.’

In response to the lobbying by the NGOWG, Namibia, which took up presidency of the United Nations Security Council in October 2000, sponsored a session on women, peace and security. Previously in June 2000, Namibia had passed the ‘Windhoek Declaration’ and the ‘Namibia Plan of Action on Mainstreaming a Gender Perspective in Multidimensional Peace Operations.’ Both were critical in the push for full participation of women in peacekeeping and peace-building plans. On 23 October 2000, an Arria Formula meeting was held to create an arena for civil society organisations and Security Council members to engage on the topic of ‘Women and Armed Conflict.’ The UNSCR 1325 was adopted shortly afterwards on 31 October 2000.

**What is UNSCR 1325?**

The UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1325 is a legally binding document on women, peace and security adopted on 31 October 2000. Resolutions generally consist of:

- Two clearly defined sections: a preamble and an operative part. The preamble generally presents the considerations on the basis of which action is taken, an opinion expressed or a directive given.
- The operative part states the opinion of the organ or the action to be taken (UN 2015: Resolutions).

Resolution 1325 is built upon and a response to the strong international women’s movement to bring the issue of women’s rights to the forefront of UN Security Council’s concerns, particularly in relation to armed conflict. This is evident throughout the document in its recognition of various international conventions and declarations. This includes “the commitments of the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action”… “Charter of the United Nations” and “the Windhoek Declaration and the Namibia Plan of Action” (2000: Preamble). The Resolution also references previous resolutions on protection of civilians during armed conflict, particularly women and children (2000: Preamble). It also notes the Geneva Conventions (1949) and Additional Protocols (1977); Refugee Convention (1951) and CEADAW (1979) along with relevant provisions of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (2000: Article 9). The inclusion of these resolutions, treaties, conventions and declarations within Resolution 1325 provides an insight into its foundation. These documents were detrimental in acknowledging the significant role of women in formal political life and the need for protection of civilians, particularly women and children, during armed conflict.

Feminist scholars describe Resolution 1325 as ‘ground-breaking’ (Cohn, Kinsella and Gibbings 2010; Cohn 2008; Charles-worth 2008; Otto 2006; 2007) and ‘unique’ (Cohn 2004). This is due to the
resolution being the first ever to consider gender dynamics in relation to discourses of war and conflict, including gender violence and inequality. The Resolution is also considered historical in recognizing women’s active role in their own protection and their participation in conflict resolutions, as opposed to purely vulnerable victims in conflict situations (Otto 2004; Shepherd 2008). The scope is extensive including a call for equal and full participation of women in peacekeeping operations, resolution initiatives and decision-making process. Furthermore, it requests for special measures to be taken in protecting women and girls from gender-based violence, particularly sexual violence during armed conflict. The Resolution also calls for the Secretary-General, Security Council and member states to ‘mainstream gender’ into policies relating to peace and security.

Resolution 1325 and its Successes

While this section focuses on various feminist critiques of Resolution 1325, there is no denying that UNSCR 1325 has also achieved some advancement on the issue of women, peace and security. This includes: an increase in women’s active participation in peacekeeping operations and reconstruction, introduction of the ‘code of conduct’ for peacekeeping forces, and increased reporting on abuses against women during conflict situations (Tryggestad 2009). Further progression also includes the allocation of gender advisors to counsel UN peacekeeping operations and development of the National Action Plans by some developed countries for achieving the goals of UNSCR 1325 (Willet 2010: 142). Torrun L. Tryggestad (2009) and Laura Shepherd (2008) argue the Resolution has especially made a difference in putting women’s issues on the UN security agenda. Its leading attribute is the recognition of women as active political agents on matters relating to peace and security, rather than purely as victims in need of protection. Yet despite some positive developments, Resolution 1325 has still attracted a degree of criticism from some feminist scholars.

Critique of Resolution 1325

Gender

The UNSCR 1325 was adopted in an attempt to address and improve the impact of armed conflict on women and girls, by calling for increased representation of women at all decision-making levels; equal and full participation of women as informal organisers and the protection of women and girls during armed conflict.

In addressing the issue of the impact of armed conflict on women, the UNSCR 1325, ‘Urges Member States to ensure increased representation of women at all decision-making levels in national, regional and international institutions…’ (Emphasis in original, 2000: Article 1). It also ‘Urges the Secretary-
General to appoint more women as special representatives and envoys…’ (Emphasis in original, 2000: Article 3).

In this way, the UN Security Council harbours the belief that appointing more women as formal political actors would equate to better policymaking and less violence occurring, particularly conflict-related sexual violence. This is due to the essentialist view of women as ‘nurturing’ and more ‘peaceful.’ However, Elaine Zuckerman and Marcia Greenberg (2005), point out in their study on the Rwandan election in 2003 that even though women constituted 49 per cent of parliamentary seats, the figures on sexual violence in Rwanda show that its occurrence is far from decreasing. This shows that an increase in representation of women in formal political processes does not necessarily equate to less instances of sexual violence. Sarah Childs and Mona Lena Krook (2006) also assert that a greater representation of women in formal political processes does not necessarily equate to better lives for women as a whole. This is because not all women are the same and cannot be represented as such.

Similarly, Shepherd (2008) argues that UNSCR 1325 offers a simplistic notion of representation in which a group of females would somehow be able to represent all women. In this way, the Resolution treats gender as ‘fixed’ and ‘inevitable’ where the representation of women is based solely on their biological inherent characteristics as ‘female’ (see Enloe 2000), rather than as a social construct. A social construction of ‘gender’ indicates that not all females or all males are the same; instead they differ according to ethnicity, race, class and other social circumstances (Stean 2009; Shepherd 2008; Peterson 1992). Moreover, Shepherd (2008), Tryggestad (2009) and Sharon Gibbings (2011) criticise the Resolution’s complete disregard of the possible limitations hindering some women’s agency. This results in UNSCR 1325 speaking for all women, regardless of their backgrounds and hardships. For example, a woman undertaking long hours of heavy duty fieldwork will be severely limited in her capacity to engage in formal or informal political processes (UNDP, cited in Shepherd 2011: 511). Laura Shepherd (2011) argues that despite the UN Security Council recognizing the role of women as formal political actors, this does not necessarily translate into those same women having the capacity and resources to actively participate.

The UNSCR 1325 is considered a landmark document as it is the first formal and legal document to acknowledge and support women’s role as active formal agents in political life:

Reaffirming the important role of women in the prevention and resolution of conflicts and in peace-building, and stressing the importance of their equal participation and full involvement in all efforts for the maintenance and promotion of peace and security and the need to increase their role in decision-making with regard to conflict prevention and resolution (Emphasis in original, 2000: Preamble but also see Articles 1-4).
However, a closer inspection reveals that UNSCR 1325 only acknowledges the ‘important’ role of women in their capacity as peacekeepers or as peace negotiators in the prevention of conflict. Such a representation associates women with being peaceful, which implies that all women are inherently peaceful and in opposition to war and conflict. This is problematic as it disregards women’s role as active combatants during armed conflict and women’s agency in the military, justice and security sector. Feminist scholars further criticise the Resolution’s construction of women as inherently ‘peaceful’ arguing it reproduces essentialist views of women as ‘nurturing’ based on their roles as mothers and caregivers (Shepherd 2008; Sjoberg 2014). By applying an ‘add women and stir’ approach (Steans 2009), the Security Council treats ‘women’ and ‘gender’ as a given, neglecting the complex fluid social construction of gender. Gender as a social construction does not treat all women as ‘feminine’ or ‘promoters of peace’ or ‘nurturing’ or all men as ‘masculine’ or ‘blood-thirsty’ or ‘aggressive.’ Women can also be in favour of war and conflict as evidenced by the presence of female soldiers in active combat in places like Chechnya, Sri Lanka, Palestine, Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, United States and Syria. Women are also active participants in guerrilla fighting forces in conflicts related to Sierra Leone, Colombia, Kashmir and Mexico (Sjoberg, cited in Evans et al 2014: 542).

Nonetheless, Tryggested (2009) applauds UNSCR 1325 for implementing an increase in representation of women at all levels of decision-making, particularly crediting the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO). Yet if we look at the current representation of women as of January 2014 within DPKO, out of sixteen peacekeeping operations, only five are led by women as Special Representatives of the Secretary-General (SRSG) (UN DPKO 2015). As of September 2013, women only make up 3 per cent of military personnel, 29 per cent of international civilian personnel and ten per cent of police personnel in UN Peacekeeping missions (UN DPKO 2015). The UNSCR 1325 was adopted almost 15 years ago and yet the figures above have remained unchanged since 2009, except for women in leadership positions increasing from one to five. If the UN Security Council and various UN entities recognise the important role of women as formal political agents and support a commitment to increase women’s representation in post-conflict situations, why has this not translated into tangible results? The UN and Security Council appear to be unwilling to assign more women to decision-making levels of conflict and reconstruction.

Feminists argue that the biggest obstacle to implementing Resolution 1325 is ironically the highly bureaucratic, complex, male-dominated and traditional UN hierarchy itself. This is related to the UN’s lack of political will, accountability and commitment in following through with the recommendations they set out in the Resolution (Willet 2010; Puechguibal 2010; Tryggestad 2009). This includes their unwillingness to assign more women to decision-making levels of conflict and reconstruction.
operations. This is because instead of viewing women as formal political actors capable of high-level decision making, women are viewed as ‘peaceful’ in their capacity as mothers and caregivers in society (Cohn et al 2010).

The Security Council uses rather weak language terms such as ‘encourage,’ ‘urge’, ‘emphasise,’ ‘expresses its willingness’, ‘calls upon,’ and ‘request’ (UNSCR 1325 2000: Articles 1-9), in its objective to influence member states in fully implementing Resolution 1325 (Tryggestad 2009). The Security Council’s reluctance to move away from a hierarchal male-dominated organisational structure further reinforces the perception that UNSCR 1325 is more rhetorical than tangible, in responding to the issue of armed conflict and women. This is even more apparent in its failure to address its policymaking processes “where it takes a very long time to achieve anything” (G-77 UN diplomat, cited in Tryggestad 2009: 549). Despite the Security Council’s resistance in moving away from the ‘traditional,’ the UNSCR 1325 is still considered revolutionary for being the first ever resolution to recognise the significance of gender mainstreaming.

The UNSCR 1325 is hailed for being the first ever UNSC resolution in ‘Recognizing the urgent need to mainstream a gender perspective into peacekeeping operations’ (Emphasis in original, 2000: Preamble). Gender mainstreaming is defined by the Economic and Social Council as:

…the process of assessing the implications for women and men of any planned action, including legislation, policies or programmes, in any area and at all levels. It is a strategy for making the concerns and experiences of women as well as men an integral part of the design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of policies and programs in all political, economic and societal spheres, so that women and men benefit equally, and inequality is not perpetuated.

The ultimate goal of mainstreaming is to achieve gender equality (ECOSOC Agreed Conclusions 1997: 2).

While the ECOSOC definition of ‘gender mainstreaming’ is quite clear, Carol Cohn, Helen Kinsella and Sharon Gibbings (2004) criticise the Resolution’s ambiguity around what ‘a gender perspective’ actually means. Laura Shepherd (2008) notes that despite the Resolution asserting the need for ‘mainstreaming a gender perspective,’ it neglects to mention ‘men’ in the entirety of the Resolution, while women and girls appear throughout the document. Therefore, Resolution 1325 associates ‘gender’ with ‘women’ through the clear absence of men. This is problematic as gender is not a synonym for women, yet we “slip from gender to women and women to gender but have yet to slip from gender to men” (Cohn et al. 2004: 136). Resolution 1325 and the wider UNSC framework on WPS largely exclude ‘men’ from discussions on gender, instead using ‘gender’ interchangeably with ‘women.’ In this way, the Security Council provides a narrow view of gender, in which ‘gender’ is portrayed as a ‘women’s issue’ (Grey and Shepherd 2012). The Resolution also conceptualises gender
mainstreaming and equality as the empowerment of women, disregarding how in some situations men are disadvantaged. It further discounts the active role of women in the subjugation against other women. Laura Shepherd (2008) argues that Resolution 1325 treats ‘gender’ as a variable instead of as a power relation or a performative discourse. It implies that ‘gender’ can be used as an analytical tool and as such can be influenced or controlled depending on the value of attributes. For example, the use of ‘gender’ as an analytical tool in the study of the impact of armed conflict requires the data to be filtered by ‘gender identity.’ This enables the Security Council to provide statements like “women….account for the vast majority of those adversely affected by armed conflict” (2000: Preamble). Shepherd (2008) concludes that treating ‘gender’ as a variable not only limits our understanding of gender, violence and security but also provides a dangerous misconception that ‘suffering’ can somehow be measured by a comparable study of ‘men’ and ‘women’. The needs and protection of ‘men’ or ‘women’ or ‘children’ should not be based on who suffers more during armed conflict, but rather provided to all identities that may be vulnerable during warfare, regardless of the scale of suffering.

The UN Security Council Resolution 1325 addresses the issue of the impact of armed conflict on women and girls by positioning women as empowered active actors, through their participation and representation in political life. Yet the Resolution also constructs women as in need of protection, with UNSCR 1325 calling for the “protection, rights and the particular needs of women” (2000: Article 6). The Resolution also continuously groups women with children, “civilians, particularly women and children, account for the vast majority of those adversely affected by armed conflict” [and] “specialized training for all peacekeeping personnel on the protection, special needs and human rights of women and children in conflict situations” (2000: Preamble).

The inherent association of women with children throughout Resolution 1325 produces a construction of women based on their sex and biological abilities to bear children. Such an association defines women as mothers, caregivers and cultural bearers of society, rather than on their gendered social construction as women in their own right (Shepherd 2008; Carpenter 2006; Rich 1986; Puechguirbal 2004). The Security Council’s tendency to associate women frequently with children is not restricted to Resolution 1325. Charli Carpenter (2006) conducted a gender analysis on the use of terms of ‘women,’ ‘men,’ and ‘children’ in UN Security Council documents from 1993 to 2003. The study reveals women are mostly associated with children (163 times), and rarely as combatants (six times) and mention of men as vulnerable only once. This sheds a concerning light on just how ingrained this trend of ‘womenandchildren’ is within the overall Security Council framework. Carpenter’s findings indicate that women, not men, through their association with children are perceived to be peaceful, innocent and vulnerable. Shepherd (2008) criticises this association of women with children deeming it inherently problematic as children are often seen as irrational, irresponsible and not yet fully grown, hence in need
of protection. Once more, the Security Council offers an essentialist construction of ‘women’ that relies on their biological capabilities rather than as ‘women’ in their own accord. Moreover, by positioning ‘women and children’ as the inevitable group in need of protection, the absent ‘other’ – ‘men’ – consequently become responsible for protecting ‘their’ women and children and nation as a whole (Shepherd 2008: 119). The Resolution also positions women and girls as having “special needs” and require “protection” (2000: Preamble) especially “from gender-based violence, particularly rape and other forms of sexual abuse” (2000: Article 10). This is problematic as it constructs women alongside girls as first and foremost vulnerable and in need of protection. It also shifts the focus to ‘women and girls’ as soon as gender-based violence, particularly sexual violence is mentioned, so not only men but even boys are excluded from discussions on sexual violence.

Shepherd (2008) notes that because the Resolution positions women and children as “targeted by combatants” (2000: Preamble), this excludes them from being combatants and as such women’s role in Resolution 1325 is exclusively as civilians. Moreover, if ‘women and children’ are exclusively civilians, then the ‘combatants’ targeting them must then be men. What about the vulnerable experiences of civilian men and boys during armed conflict?

Nadine Puechguirbal (2010) and Laura Shepherd (2008) assert that the language of Resolution 1325 largely portrays women as especially vulnerable and in need of protection. This in turn constructs women as the inevitable victims of violence during armed conflict, particularly sexual violence, rather than as empowered, formal political actors. Through an exercise with women who have experienced violence, Liz Kelly, Sheila Burton and Linda Regan (1996), reveal the negative connotations associated with the word ‘victim.’ This includes: “helpless,” “weak”, “vulnerable,” “shame,” “small,” “hurt,” “powerless,” “passive,” “controlled” and “guilty” (1996: 91). Thus, the continued portrayal of women as ‘victims’ in need of protection further harms women’s agency, rather than empowers them.

The Resolution and the wider UN agenda on the protection of civilians are profoundly gendered, particularly on the issue of wartime sexual violence, with an exclusive focus on women and girls. In this way, Resolution 1325 removes women’s agency and marginalises other vulnerable groups during armed conflict, particularly civilian men and boys.

**Violence**

Laura Shepherd (2008) argues that the conceptualisation of violence in UNSCR 1325 is as “armed conflict” and the perpetrators of that violence are “combatants and armed elements” (2000: 1325). The targets of the violence are largely “civilians, particularly women and children, [who] account for the vast majority of those adversely affected by armed conflict” (UNSCR 1325 2000: Preamble). The use of such gendered language implicitly precludes the notion that civilians may also be perpetrators of violence and portrays violence, much like ‘gender,’ as largely a women’s issue. Both ‘gender’ and
violence are something that happens to women. Moreover, the claim that ‘women and children’ are the ‘vast majority of those adversely affected by armed conflict’ is problematic given that the Security Council fails to provide comparable empirical data of civilian men in order to assert such a statement. This is further concerning due to Adam Jones (2000) empirical research on the impact of armed conflict on civilians in which he concludes that “the most vulnerable and consistently targeted group, through time and around the world today, is non-combatant men of battle age, roughly 15 to 55 years old” (2000: 185).

Nevertheless, the UNSCR 1325 frames the general impact of armed conflict as largely affecting ‘women and children.’ However, as soon as the discussion shifts to gender-based or sexual violence in conflict, the language of the Resolution adjusts to “women and girls:"

*Calls* on all parties to armed conflict to take special measures to protect women and girls from gender-based violence, particularly rape and other forms of sexual abuse…in situations of armed conflict (Emphasis in original, 2000: Article 10) [and] war crimes including those relating to sexual and other violence against women and girls (2000: Article 11).

Such a shift in focus is significant as it precludes the possibility that men and boys could also be victims of gender-based and sexual violence during armed conflict. According to Human Rights Watch, ‘gender-based violence’ is defined as “violence directed at an individual, male or female, based on his or her specific gender role in society” (cited in Carpenter 2006: 86). Yet in UNSCR 1325 ‘gender-based violence’ is framed as exclusively violence against women and girls. Thus ‘gender’ reproduces violence against certain bodies - the female body - while the victimisation of civilian men and boys essentially falls through the cracks. By excluding male victims of sexual violence in conflict, the UN Security Council constructs an outdated assumption that rape and other forms of sexual abuse only happen to women and girls by male perpetrators. This reproduces the assumption that women are men’s property. Women are raped either to satisfy male soldiers natural sexual urges during warfare or as an effective weapon of war to humiliate and feminise the enemy by dishonouring ‘his’ women. Both explanations portray women as men’s property and as symbolic cultural bearers of the nation, which ‘he’ has failed to protect (Stern and Baaz 2009; Goldstein 2001; Enloe 2000). Such a construction of gender-based and sexual violence reinforces the notion that women and girls are the inevitable vulnerable victims, while men and boys are the ‘masculine’ other – perpetrators but also responsible for their protection and security.

**Security**

Despite not explicitly referencing ‘men’ in the document, which is a surprise in itself considering the Resolution’s goal for ‘gender mainstreaming’, UNSCR 1325 manages to conceptualise security as
provided by the Secretary-General and member states. This is through a construction of a masculine narrative in which ‘he’ – ‘man’ is the protector (Shepherd 2008: 128):

Within Resolution 1325, it is then ‘he’ who is ‘urge[d]…encourage[d]…invite[d]…request[d]’ (2000: Articles 2-6, 16, 17) to ‘protect women and girls’ (2000: Article 10). It is also ‘he’ who ‘express[es] concern…..reaffirm[s]….emphasiz[es]…..recogniz[es]…calls on…measures…invites’ (2000: Preamble and Articles 8, 11, 16) to ensure women are given equal opportunities to engage in formal processes relating to peace and security. It is ‘he’ who is urged to ‘appoint more women’ with assistance from member states in providing candidates on ‘his behalf’ (2000: Article 3). In this way, security is expressed as protection of civilians, particularly women and children, which is the responsibility of the Secretary-General and member states. The Secretary-General and member states are gendered throughout the Resolution and portrayed as the ‘masculine’ role of the protector (Shepherd 2008). Yet again, women are portrayed as the vulnerable victims in need of protection while the male subject (‘security’) is responsible for women’s (‘peacemakers’) protection but also seemingly ensuring and encouraging women’s full and equal engagement. Due to the Resolution’s construction of ‘gender’ as women’s vulnerability to violence, women as such are fixed as vulnerable and in need of protection. This removes women’s agency in being able to actively participate in their own protection and security.

Conclusion

This section has provided various critiques by feminist scholars of the conceptualisation of gender, violence and security within UN Security Council Resolution 1325, which in turn produces tensions and inconsistencies throughout the document. The UNSCR 1325 was created with the intention of responding to the significant issue of armed conflict on women and girls, including sexual violence in conflict and women’s formal participation in political life. On the surface of Resolution 1325, women are constructed as formal political actors in the context of participation and representation in political life. However, through a closer inspection we discover that the dominating narrative within Resolution 1325 is “women essentially victims, peace-builders and peace-makers” (Cohn, Kinsella and Gibbings 2010: 136). In this way, women are portrayed as especially vulnerable, inherently associated with children and in need of protection, particularly against wartime sexual violence. While the Resolution’s complete absence of men essentially positions them as protectors or perpetrators. The Resolution fails to address the issue of the impact of armed conflict on civilians in its entirety, due to the marginalisation of male victims of conflict-related sexual violence. It completely disregards the vulnerabilities civilian men face during armed conflict, alongside women and children. Feminists argue that the gendered language used in UNSCR 1325 where women are represented as mothers, victims, vulnerable groups and often grouped with children, undermines the UN Security Council’s purpose to
fully engage women as active decision-makers in conflict resolutions. This consequently makes Resolution 1325 an obstacle rather than a tool to gender equality (Puechguirbal 2010; Shepherd 2008; Pratt and Richter-Devroe 2011; Cohn, Kinsella and Gibbings 2010).

Since the adoption of UNSCR 1325 in 2000, there have been six subsequent-resolutions on issues relating to WPS: (2008); 1888 (2009); 1889 (2009); 1960 (2010); 2106 (2013) and 2122 (2013). The UN Security Council 2106 adopted on 24 June 2013 is the most recent pronouncement to focus on conflict-related sexual violence, and therefore the focus of critical analysis in the following section. The various feminist critiques of Resolution 1325 (2000) offer a platform for further critical analysis on UNSCR 2106 (2013). This platform is used to examine if there have been developments regarding the Security Council’s response to the issue of wartime sexual violence in the preceding 13 years since Resolution 1325. The subsequent section will also look closely at how the Security Council writes about men and women in Resolution 2106.

Chapter Six: UN Security Council Resolution 2106

Introduction
Laura Shepherd (2008) argues that there has been a positive shift in the Security Council’s language with regard to Women, Peace and Security (WPS) framework. In Resolution 1325 women were largely portrayed as victims, where in later resolutions they are represented as active agents. The purpose of this section is to examine if indeed there have been developments within UN Security Council (UNSCR) 2106, regarding the Security Council’s response to the issue of wartime sexual violence in the preceding 13 years since Resolution 1325. This section will also look closely at how the Security Council writes about men and women in Resolution 2106. It will follow a similar structure to the previous chapter on UNSCR 1325 in providing a brief overview of the resolution, followed by a critique of the conceptualisation of gender, violence and security within Resolution 2106. It should be noted that there is limited academic engagement on Resolution 2106 due to being so recent; therefore, a feminist critique will consist of a combination of academic contributions on other related resolutions and my own critical discourse analysis.

Path to UN Security Council Resolution 2106
On 21 June 2013, the UN Security Council (UNSC) held an open debate centred around the adoption of a new UNSC Resolution on the prevention of conflict-related sexual violence within the WPS agenda. The open debate highlighted the difficult negotiations leading up to the adoption of Resolution 2106. This was due to national and regional interests creating tensions among some members of the Security
Council, particularly on agreed upon language to be used. However, shortly following the open debate, the UNSC adopted UNSCR 2106 at the Security Council’s 6984th meeting on 24 June 2013. During its adoption, the Secretary General affirmed that Resolution 2106 “sends yet another strong signal to perpetrators that their acts will no longer be tolerated. They will be held accountable” (UNSC 2013).

The adoption of UNSCR 2106 was largely due to strong lobbying efforts by civil society organisations, particularly Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF). The Security Council was urged to not only address but also take tangible steps to tackle the root causes of conflict-related sexual violence, while placing equal emphasis on women’s empowerment.

**What is UNSCR 2106?**

Resolution 2106 adopted 24 June 2013 is the sixth resolution on WPS and the fourth and most recent pronouncement to focus on conflict-related sexual violence. The Resolution’s key areas include: justice and security reform; women’s empowerment; arms; women’s human rights and civil society engagement. It also features further emphasis on impunity, prevention, accountability and punishment for perpetrators of conflict-related sexual violence (Miller et al 2014; UNSC Report 2014).

The UNSCR 2106 commences with a page and half of Preamble in which it notes the slow implementation of UNSCR 1960 (2010) in prevention of conflict-related sexual violence. The Resolution also acknowledges the significance of the full implementation of Resolution 1325, cites the G8 declaration on sexual violence in conflict and the new Arms Trade Treaty which includes revolutionary language on the issue at hand. Despite being the sixth resolution in relation to WPS framework and fourth on conflict-related sexual violence, some academics note that Resolution 2106 has not brought any new commitments, structures or initiatives in response to the issue of wartime sexual violence (Shepherd 2014; Taylor 2013). Instead the Resolution focuses on reaffirming existing operationalizing obligations (Shepherd 2014; Taylor 2013). In this case, why is yet another UN Security Council Resolution on WPS and conflict-related sexual violence required?

**Critique of Resolution 2106**

*Gender*

The UNSCR 1325 and subsequent resolutions have no doubt significantly contributed to the increased attention on the issue of sexual violence in conflict as a threat to international peace and security. This resulted in greater resources, training and funding on the issue at hand; however, the Security Council has failed to respond to the issue it its entirety (Dolan 2014). This is due to two reasons: first, the Security Council’s continued resistance in acknowledging men and boys as victims of wartime sexual
violence, alongside women and girls. Second, the overemphasis on the ‘protection’ of women and girls, which further victimises women and removes their agency as formal political agents.

The UNSCR 2106 marks the first time ever a UN Security Council Resolution within the WPS framework acknowledges men and boys in the discussion on sexual violence: “Noting with concern that sexual violence in armed conflict and post-conflict situations….affect[s] men and boys” (Emphasis in original 2013: Preamble).

Although it is the only mention of men and boys as victims of conflict-related sexual violence in the entire Resolution, it is still a significant step forward in the prevention of sexual violence in conflict, given the complete negligence on the issue for the preceding 13 years (Dolan 2014; Kirby 2015). Furthermore, Chris Dolan (2014) argues that such an acknowledgment of men and boys signals “an important paradigm shift in terms of how the international community does ‘gender’” (2014: 8). This means that previously the international community, particularly the UN, always associated ‘gender’ exclusively with women and girls, resulting in a portrayal of ‘gender’ as a ‘women’s issue.’ However, the move toward the inclusion of men and boys signifies a (re)conceptualisation of gender as both male and female subjects.

Indeed, not only does UNSCR 2106 acknowledge men and boys as victims of conflict-related sexual violence itself but also recognises those who are “secondarily traumatized as forced witnesses of sexual violence against family members” (2013: Preamble). It is often adult males who are forced to watch helplessly while their loved ones are harmed by opposition forces, particularly rape and other forms of sexual violence. This not only inflicts psychological torture on the male adults but also serves to humiliate and emasculate them in failing to protect their family (Carpenter 2006). Often ‘secondary traumatization/victimization’ during conflict situations is ignored by the international community and international law. Therefore, this is a significant breakthrough in recognizing the various ways that gender-based violence is perpetrated against civilians during warfare, thus assisting in the prevention and accountability for such crimes. However, in the extensive six page UNSCR 2106, men and boys only feature twice. The Resolution’s first mention of men and boys is in their enlistment and effort to “combat all forms of violence against women” (2013: Preamble). The second mention of men and boys is as potential victims of conflict-related sexual violence (2013: Preamble). Thus the recognition of men and boys in UNSCR 2106 is more so a ‘passing reference,’ instead of a discussion requiring further engagement on its own accord.

The UNSCR 2106 encourages “women’s political, social and economic empowerment, gender equality… [treating them as ]… central to long-term efforts to prevent sexual violence in armed conflict and post-conflict situations” (2013: Preamble). The Resolution also mirrors preceding resolutions, including UNSCR 1325; it “stresses women’s participation as essential to any prevention
and protection response…. [and to]….ensure women’s participation in all aspects of mediation, post-conflict recovery and peace building” (Emphasis in original 2013: Article 1; 5). Yet, it also expands the role of women beyond post-conflict reconstruction and peace building to include an increase in women’s representation at professional levels in justice and security sectors. The Resolution does contain some language on women’s participation and equality in political life. However, Sarah Taylor (2013) notes that this is largely limited to the prevention of sexual violence in conflict and argues that women’s role as formal political actors in all levels of decision-making is not merited to them:

Because of their subjugation to sexual violence but rather because women have the right to fully participate in decision-making regarding the future of their communities and to have barriers to that decision-making that are based on gender discrimination fully dismantled (2013: IPI).

The Resolution’s focus on the prevention of sexual violence in conflict more so than women’s political participation is even more evident with the absence of two historic documents: the Beijing Platform for Action (1998) and the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW). These documents were instrumental to the creation of the WPS agenda at the UNSC and in creating a significant link between women’s participation and global change for greater gender equality (Taylor 2013). Resolution 2106 and preceding resolutions have continued emphasis and encouragement on increased participation and representation of women in political life. However, this has not translated into tangible results, with the representation of women in high-level political positions and in peacekeeping missions remaining alarmingly low.

Furthermore, alongside the UNSCR 2106’s affirmation of women’s empowerment it also calls for the “enlistment of men and boys in the effort to combat all forms of violence against women” (2013: Preamble). This is somewhat contradicting as it implies that not only do women need protection by their male counterparts but also that men and boys are vital to women’s empowerment. How can women be empowered and achieve gender equality alongside men when they are continuously being portrayed as the weaker, more vulnerable sex in need of protection? Women are portrayed as needing protection against violence by not only men but also boys who in essence are children themselves but are represented as being stronger than women.

Moreover, the inherent association of women and children or women and girls is present through all the preceding resolutions on WPS. Resolution 2106 proves no exception with the “disarmament, demobilization and reintegration processes, including, inter alia, by establishing protection mechanisms for women and children” [and ’] “fight against impunity for the most serious crimes of international concern committed against women and girls” (2013: Article 16a; 3). The UN Security Council continued tendency to group women with children is further victimizing and harming women’s agency by “infantilizing” women (Sivakumaran 2010). Women are grouped with children as vulnerable and in
need of protection, rather than in their own right as strong and empowered subjects. Furthermore, the inherent association of women with children reproduces the limited construction of women as mothers, caregivers and cultural bearers of society rather than as women in their accord (Shepherd 2008; Carpenter 2006).

The UNSCR 2106 uses strong language in calling for “further deployment of Women Protection Advisors (WPA),” (2013: Article 7) and their adequate training before deployment in order to curb sexual violence in conflict situations. The Resolution also:

\[\text{Recognizes the distinct role of Gender Advisors in ensuring gender perspectives are mainstreamed in policies, planning and implementation…[and]}\ldots\text{calls upon the Secretary-General to continue to deploy Gender Advisors to the relevant United Nations peacekeeping missions (Emphasis in original, 2013: 8).}\]

The further deployment of WPAs in peacekeeping and political missions is no doubt a significant step in the prevention of conflict-relegated sexual violence. However, the deployment of ‘gender advisors’ and their role in ensuring a ‘gender perspective’ is somewhat problematic. ‘Gender’ is a social construction that includes both male and female subjects (Goldstein 2001; Jones 2002; Shepherd 2011). Yet if we look on the UN Peacekeeping website to see what the work of a ‘Gender Advisor’ actually entails, we discover that yet again ‘gender’ is used as a synonym for ‘women and girls’:

\[\text{[Gender Advisory teams] work includes supporting local women to participate in peace processes; protecting women and girls from sexual violence, advocating and promoting the inclusion of women in electoral systems; providing support for DDR programs and engaging women’s voices in legal and juridical procedures (UN Peacekeeping 2015).}\]

This is problematic as the UN offers an incorrect construction of ‘gender,’ in which it ignores the concerns and experiences of men and boys and further reinforces the victimisation women and girls. The exclusion of the male subject makes it impossible to successfully mainstream a gender perspective.

The UNSCR 2106 features men and boys only as a ‘passing reference,’ while in contrast ‘women’ are featured extensively throughout the resolution. As a result, despite 13 years since the introduction of UNSCR 1325, the UN Security Council’s conceptualisation of gender continues to marginalise the male subject and associate gender with women. Thus, the Security Council largely portrays ‘gender’ as a women’s issue. Conversely, men and boys are portrayed as strong and masculine, beings that are pivotal for the empowerment of women and women’s protection against all forms of violence, particularly conflict-related sexual violence.
Violence
The conceptualisation of violence in UNSCR 2106 is as “sexual violence” that occurs during both “armed conflict and post-conflict situations” generally against “civilians” yet “disproportionally affects women and girls….but also affecting men and boys” (2013: Preamble). While as previously stated the mention of ‘men and boys’ is a ground-breaking moment, the reference of men and boys only appears after Resolution 2106 states “that sexual violence in armed conflict and post-conflict situations disproportionately affects women and girls” (Emphasis added, 2013: Preamble). The use of the word ‘disproportionally’ is a double-edged sword. It automatically implies that women and girls are and always will be the main victims of conflict-related violence. It also suggests that although sexual violence in conflict also affects men and boys, they appear to be so few in numbers in proportion to that of women and girls that it is not even worth a further discussion or focus. Furthermore, if women and girls are the majority of the victims as stated in the text, then that would mean that the “perpetrators must logically be all male” (2014: 81). Such a representation of women as “disproportionately affected by sexual violence” during warfare is a common gendered narrative we often find in war literature. As the role of women is often portrayed as the ‘beautiful soul,’ who is especially vulnerable and in need of protection by a masculine ‘just warrior’ – be it a male soldier or the masculine Security Council (Sjoberg 2015; Young 2003; Elshtain 1987). This not only precludes the role of female perpetrators in some of these attacks but also provides a narrow view of gender in Resolution 2106 in which alternative roles for men and women in war are not considered.

The claim that ‘women and girls are disproportionally affected by sexual violence’ is a common phrase often cited in both academic war literature and the policy world, particularly within the UN Security Council framework. Yet, it rarely attracts critical engagement. This is not to discount the experiences of women and girls during warfare; but rather to draw attention to the reality of warfare in causing drastic upheaval and instability. This not only causes some governments to restrict access to external research staff but there is also a general under-reporting of wartime sexual violence crimes. Therefore, how can we be sure that women and girls/children are the most affected by conflict-related sexual violence? Furthermore, if the victimisation of men and boys against conflict-related sexual violence is mentioned at all, it is only as a passing reference rather than concrete comparable data, which makes it very difficult to verify the claim of women and girls as ‘disproportionally affected’ (Carpenter 2006; Sivakumaran 2007; Stemple 2009; Dolan 2011).

In the same preamble, even though both women and men (and girls and boys) are recognised as potential victims of conflict-related sexual violence, the Resolution only mentions “the acts of sexual violence in such situations….severely impede the critical contributions of women to society” (UNSCR 2106 2013: Preamble). What about men’s capacity to contribute meaningfully to society being
undermined by acts of sexual violence? It appears that despite UNSCR 2106 being the first ever resolution on WPS to acknowledge men and boys as victims of conflict-related sexual violence, it still largely treats the issue as something that happens to women by men.

The UNSCR 2106 does at times address the issue of conflict-related sexual violence at a general level when it:

- Affirms that sexual violence, when used or commissioned as a method or tactic of war or as a part of a widespread or systematic attack against civilian populations (Emphasis added, 2013: Article 1)

- Reiterates its demand for the complete cessation with immediate effect by all parties to armed conflict of all acts of sexual violence and its call for these parties to make and implement specific time-bound commitments to combat sexual violence (Emphasis in original, 2013: Article 10).

However, in other parts of Resolution 2106 the emphasis is on conflict-related sexual violence specifically against women and children in:

- Noting the provision in the Arms Trade Treaty that exporting States Parties shall take into account the risk of covered conventional arms or items being used to commit or facilitate serious acts of gender-based violence or serious acts of violence against women and children (Emphasis added, 2013: Preamble).

This mirrors Sandesh Sivakumaran (2010) critical analysis on UNSC Resolution 1820 (2008) which reveals that when Resolution 1820 attempts to purely describe the issue of conflict-related sexual violence or to adopt general action, its language is inclusive rather than gender-specific. However the language becomes more exclusive to ‘women and children/girls’ once it shifts to specific and detailed measures of employment or enforcement. Although this pattern is not as extensive as in UNSCR 1820, it can still be found in UNSCR 2106. When Resolution 2106 seeks to increase awareness and responsiveness, the language is inclusive of all civilians as it:

- Affirms that sexual violence, when used or commissioned as a method or tactic of war or as a part of a widespread or systematic attack against civilian populations, can significantly exacerbate and prolong situations of armed conflict and may impede the restoration of international peace and security (Emphasis added, 2013: Article 1).

On the other hand, when Resolution 2106 moves to more detailed and concrete prevention of sexual violence, the focus of protection then become exclusively women and children as it:
Recognizes that women who have been forcefully abducted into armed groups and armed forces, as well as children, are especially vulnerable to sexual violence in armed conflict and post-conflict situations and as such demands that parties to armed conflict immediately identify and release such persons from their ranks (Emphasis added, 2013: Article 17).

This passage not only groups women and children together but also explicitly states that they are the most vulnerable when it comes to sexual violence in conflict situations. This requires the insistence of parties to armed conflict to instantly release all women and children from their ranks. This is troubling as not only once again Resolution 2106 deems women as the inevitable victims in need of protection but also raises concerns about the absence of male adults. What happens to the fate of the male adults who are forcefully abducted into armed groups and forces? Who will protect and release them? Especially given that adult men who are held captive or in detention during armed conflict are at their most vulnerable to sexual violence and torture (Carpenter 2006; Sivakumaran 2007; Jones 2002; Stemple 2009). Furthermore, why must women always be depicted as especially vulnerable and inherently associated with children?

Men and boys can be victims of sexual violence in conflict in much the same way as women and girls. Although all cases of sexual violence in conflict are greatly underreported; it is male victims in particularly who remain largely ignored. Their stories belong to the least told aspects of war. The sexual violence against men in wartime are recognised to include: both oral and anal rape; sterilization; castration; genital violence, forced incest; forced masturbation; forced nudity; sexual slavery (Vojdik 2014: 929).

It is a taboo that few men have the courage to report, precisely because such acts are meant to induce unspeakable shame, humiliation and fear of being shunned by the community within the victim. Due to the underreporting of the crime by the male victims themselves and notable international bodies like the UN accused of largely overlooking it, it is extremely difficult to obtain data on the issue. However, the few studies that have been done, hint at a much larger problem. For example, the Journal of American Medical Association in 2010 revealed that 22 percent of men from eastern part of the DRC experienced conflict-related sexual violence. Lara Stemple (2009) also reported that 76 per cent of male political prisoners of war during the 1980s civil war in El Salvador and 80 per cent of concentration camp inmates in Sarajevo reported being sexually abused, humiliated and raped. The Refugee Law Project (2014) reported that between 1998 and 2008, sexual violence against men was reported in 25 countries affected by conflict. More accounts have since emerged in places like Libya, Central African Republic, Iraq, Iran, Sudan, Kenya, Zimbabwe, and Syria. These figures are only the tip of the iceberg as thousands of cases go unreported, due to male victims feeling of shame, confusion, guilt and fear of stigmatisation. This flows from fear of being branded homosexual or feminized as a woman, as there is
a perceived notion that victimisation is incompatible with men’s masculinity (Grey and Shepherd 2012).

There are also thousands of cases which go untreated due to shortcomings in the programmatic response to male victims of conflict-related sexual violence, in ensuring they have access to medical and psychological services and their needs are taking into account. In 2012, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) issued guidelines on how staff and aid workers can identify male victims, facilitate reporting, and provide protection and resources in conflict and internal displacement situations (UNHCR 2012). Also, shortly after the adoption of UNSCR 2106, the UN held a two day workshop to highlight the plight of male victims of conflict-related sexual violence. The event included participants from various UN agencies, civil society organisations, legal experts, researchers, victims and medical practitioners. The objective of the workshop was to address several issues which required immediate attention including the lack of legal frameworks available for male victims of conflict-related sexual violence. Also the significant gap in research on the issue of and the lack of programme support services offered to male victims of wartime sexual violence (UN 2013).

Although this is ground-breaking in increasing global awareness and sensitivity on the issue of male victims of conflict-related sexual violence, it has still not produced practical outcomes. The penal codes in many countries still contain gender-exclusive rape laws, which not only fail in protecting men who experience sexual violence but also prevent them from speaking out. This is especially true in places like Uganda where male rape is often associated with homosexuality which is condemned and criminalised, regardless of its circumstances (Dolan 2014). The Refugee Law Project (RLP) is one of the very few organisations that offer support services to male victims of conflict-related sexual violence and have done so in places like Congo, Rwanda, Uganda, Burundi, Somalia, Ethiopia and Eritrea (Natabaalo 2013). Chris Dolan (2014) emphasises the need for gender-training and screening tools to assist in seeking out signs and symptoms in male victims that may not necessarily be outright evident. For example, the particular manner in which male victims walk or whether they experience difficulties in sitting for a long period. There is still a significant gap in programmes and research targeted at male victims of conflict-related violence, highlighting the considerable cultural problem of the way ‘gender’ is understood within the UN and general NGO community.

There is not only evidence of male victims of conflict-related sexual violence but also female perpetrators of physical and sexual violence in conflict. For example, the infamous Abu Ghraib military detention centre scandal of female US army soldiers photographed sexually abusing and humiliating male Iraqi detainees (Bourke 2007). There is also the Rwandan Minister of Women and Family Affairs leader, Pauline Nyiramasuhuko, who was the first woman to be convicted of genocide and incitement to rape by the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda. Nyiramasuhuko was sentenced to life
imprisonment in 2011 (Sjoberg 2015; Sjoberg and Gentry 2007). These are not isolated cases, with further evidence of female perpetrators found in conflict related to Liberia (Specht 2006), Haiti (Faedi 2010), the Rwandan genocide (Jones 2002; Wood 2009; Sjoberg 2015) and former Yugoslavia and Sudan (Sjoberg and Gentry 2007).

The UN Security Council can no longer turn a blind eye to the issue of male victims and female perpetrators of conflict-related sexual violence, nor reduce them to a ‘passing reference.’ Instead, the UNSC must translate such an acknowledgment to a more detailed consideration of the issue and more tangible preventative mechanisms and support services. Protection and security should not be based on who suffers disproportionately – men or women, girls or boys – it should be awarded to all those who may be vulnerable to violence, particularly sexual violence during warfare. The object of security should be the ‘individual’ regardless of their gender, race, ethnicity, class and the like.

**Security**

The conceptualisation of security within UNSCR 2106 is that it is provided by the Secretary-General, member states, and civil society. Collectively, they must protect civilians, particularly women and children, against conflict-related sexual violence.

Resolution 2106 sends a strong message to the perpetrators of such crimes that they will be held accountable as it:

*Calls upon Member States to comply with their relevant obligations to continue to fight impunity by investigating and prosecuting those subject to their jurisdiction who are responsible for such crimes; encourages Member States to include the full range of crimes of sexual violence in national penal legislation to enable prosecutions of such acts; recognizes that effective investigation and documentation of sexual violence in armed conflict is instrumental both in bringing perpetrators to justice and ensuring access to justice for survivors (Emphasis in original, 2013: Article 2).*

This is based on the deterrence logic: “potential aggressors are less likely to commit atrocities where there are clear and effective mechanisms for the investigation and punishment of crimes” (Kirby 2015: 464). Paul Kirby (2015) rejects the deterrence logic as a seemingly effective tool in decreasing the occurrence of sexual violence in conflict. Instead Kirby (2015) argues that during warfare the immediate military concerns would outweigh a possible distant punishment for any potential perpetrators. Furthermore, the Resolution also does not take into account the expensive legal costs of deterrence, with ICTR totalling about $39 million per conviction and ICTY $35 million. There is also the knowledge that tribunal trials are extremely lengthy and often take many years to conclude due to the complexity of the cases (Kirby 2015: 466).
There has been a development, however, with the language used regarding exclusion of amnesty provisions of such crimes. While UNSCR 1325 used more timid language, “where feasible” (2000: Article 11), Resolution 2106 is more assertive and “stresses the need for exclusion of sexual violence crimes from amnesty provisions in conflict processes” (Emphasis in original, 2013: Article 12).

The role of United Nations peacekeeping is especially significant in the prevention of conflict-related sexual violence and in the protection and security of civilians. Therefore, the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) is essential for the maintenance of international peace and security. This is reiterated in Resolution 2106 as it “calls for all predeployment and in-mission training of troop- and police-contributing country contingents to include training on sexual and gender-based violence” (Emphasis in original, 2013: Article 14). The Security Council Report (2013) also stated that in “the United Nations Action support the roll-out of scenario-based training for peacekeepers to improve their operational readiness to recognize and react swiftly to sexual violence, and piloted new early-warning indicators to enhance prevention” (UNSC 2013: 2).

This scenario-based training was piloted by UN Women and DPKO on behalf of UN Action Against Sexual Violence in Conflict. Retired Major General, Patrick Cammaert, who has previously served as a Military Advisor to the UN Secretary-General leads these training exercises and stated that:

> Gender issues should be taken into account in everything the UN does to prepare for tactical operations or field deployments, ranging from patrol composition, to information and intelligence-gathering to special measures in the construction of camps to accommodate women’s needs (UN Women 2015).

The training programme uses context-setting video clips, photos and other audio-visual tools to set the scenes for troops and officers and provoke the discussion on sexual violence in armed conflict. However, a closer analysis on the tools used to train peacekeepers raises concerns about the type of ‘scenes’ they are setting for their troops and officers. For example, a teaching video includes stories of victims of sexual violence in conflict in the DRC:

> There were six soldiers; they came into my house, recalls one Congolese woman, her gaze fixed and sad. Immediately they pointed their guns at me, says another survivor, holding her infant son in her arms (UN Women 2015).

It is clear that the victims in this video who are recounting their stories are women, the use of ‘her’ precludes the notion that the victim may be male – a man or a boy. They use phrases like ‘gaze’ ‘fixed’ and sad’ and ‘holding her infant in her arms’ in order to further victimise the women and associate their role as mothers and caregivers. This also portrays the women as weak and vulnerable. The language is
used to ignite empathy, pity and also outrage from the audience (i.e. UN peacekeepers). In this way, the victims of conflict-related sexual violence are women.

A third woman also features in the teaching video and recounts her experience: “They asked me ‘do you want to live or die?’” “Then he began to rape me.” While in the above passages, it is clear who the victims are, in this story it is also clear who the perpetrator of the sexual violence is - ‘he’ becomes gendered – a man or a boy. ‘He’ cannot be a woman or a girl. In this way, the perpetrators of conflict-related sexual violence are either men or boys.

The scenario-led approach aims to “provide current and prospective peacekeeping unit commanders with an understanding of sexual violence in conflict as well as the dilemmas military and civilian decision-makers face in the field” (UN Women 2015). If current and prospective peacekeepers watch ‘teaching’ videos of solely women recounting their experiences of wartime sexual violence by male soldiers, they will continue to have a shallow black and white thinking of women as the inevitable victims and men as the perpetrators. Furthermore, they will fail to recognise the thousands of men and boys sexually abused during conflict or indeed the role of women in some of these attacks. The UN peacekeepers and military personnel have an extremely limited understanding of sexual violence in conflict ‘on the ground,’ which has an impact on who they protect and who consequently falls through the cracks.

**Conclusion**

Resolution 2016 is ground-breaking for its recognition of men and boys as potential victims of sexual violence in conflict. This is a significant step forward in tackling the issue of conflict-related sexual violence in conflict. However, the greater part of UNSCR 2106 still manages to construct an over-simplistic gendered representation of women-as-victims and men-as-perpetrators. This further perpetuates harmful stereotypes that diminish women’s agency and further marginalise male victims of conflict-related sexual violence. This makes it very difficult for the Security Council to effectively implement Resolution 2106, due to the inconsistencies and gaps present within the document, ultimately failing in addressing the issue of sexual violence in conflict in its entirety. Thus, Resolution 2106 is treated as more so ‘rhetorical’ than ‘tangible’ in its efforts, in much the same way as previous Security Council resolutions on women, peace and security.
There is no doubt that feminist IR scholars, women’s activists and influential international organisations like the UN, and Amnesty International, have done a great deal of commendable work to address the issue of sexual violence in conflict. The intention of this research project is not to minimise their efforts, but rather contribute to it which I hope to have done.

This research project has critically examined discourses on gender, sexual violence and security among war literature and UN related policy responses, with a specific focus on UN Security Council Resolution 1325 and UN Security Council Resolution 2106. The analysis has revealed the largely oversimplistic gendered representation of women-as-victims and men-as-perpetrators, present in much of the documents. Such a representation has dire consequences for groups of men and women in specific situations. It diminishes women’s agency as formal political actors and as such, largely excludes them from formal peace negotiations and reconstruction plans. Furthermore, it precludes the notion of male victims of conflict-related sexual violence who often do not know where to turn as there is a lack of support services and rehabilitation centres that exist to meet their distinct needs. Additionally, this will further hinder male victims from coming forward with their experiences due to feelings of shame, humiliation, fear and a perceived loss of an already fragile masculinity, in presumably failing to protect themselves.

It is commendable that Security Council Resolutions 1325 and 2106; subsequent-resolutions and wider UN instruments have acknowledged the issue of sexual violence against men. However, a standard sentence in their policy framework and reports is simply not enough. This needs to translate into an effective response to the issue through practical steps in providing treatment of care for male victims of conflict-related sexual violence. Further critical engagement from academics and the international community on the issue of male victims of conflict-related sexual violence is greatly required. International and domestic legal frameworks must recognise and provide protection for male victims, especially given that many countries penal codes do not even recognise ‘male rape’ as a crime. The international language used in UN agreed upon instruments, NGO reports and international and domestic legal frameworks must stop neglecting male victims of sexual violence in warfare. This is a necessary step in addressing the issue of conflict-related sexual violence in its entirety and implementing effective policies and preventative mechanisms. The UN Security Council must lead by example and uphold its commitment to maintaining international peace and human security. This is possible by recognizing, protecting and supporting men, alongside women and children from wartime sexual violence.

This research project has demonstrated that discourses of gender, sexual violence and human security are still largely portrayed as women’s issues. This is an incorrect and narrow conceptualisation, which marginalises the male subject; further victimises women and ignores the role of female aggressors in
Protection and security should not be based on who may be disproportionately affected during conflict, as suffering cannot be measured. Instead, it should be provided to all vulnerable groups during armed conflict and post-conflict situations. Through a poststructuralist feminist approach, this research project has gone beyond a mere textual analysis and deconstruction of key concepts of gender, sexual violence and security. It has also argued that the issues dealt with in this research project have dire consequences for groups of women and men in specific situations. This thesis has not only provided theoretical substance but also real world repercussions, through a specific focus on UN Security Council Resolution 1325 and UN Security Council Resolution 2106. As a feminist scholar, it is my responsibility to explore the silences, gaps and erasures of power relations; no matter how unconventional they may be. I have done this through a critical examination on the role of men and women in warfare including those that go against gendered norms, such as men-as-victims and women-as-aggressors. Thus, this thesis has challenged the strict male-female binary we often see in war literature, international responses and the military institution itself.

**Bibliography**


94


95


Kaal, B., Maks, I. and Elfrinkhof, A. (n.d.). *From text to political positions*.


Sjoberg, L. (n.d.). *Gender, war, and conflict*. 104


